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RECUEILS
de la
SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL MILITAIRE
ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE
IV
QUATRIEME;CONGRES INTERNATIONAL
MADRID
9-1 2 MAI 1 967
Volume 2
L'EXTRADITION
POUR
DELITS MILITAIRES
STRASBOURG
1969
M. , -
*^
I
1!
L'EXTRADITION POUR DEUTS MILITAIRES
i
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PREFACE
par
John GILISSEN
President de la Societe internationale de
droit penal militaire et de droit de la guerre
Auditeur gener al pres la Cour militaire
Professeur a l'Universite de Bruxelles
,■»»
I
Le quatrieme Congres international, organise ä Madrid par la « Societe
internationale de Droit penal militaire et de Droit de la guerre » du 9 au
12 mai 1967, a ete consacre en ordre principal ä Vetude des delits militaires,
et ce sous le double aspect des incriminations et de Vextradition. Les
travaux consacres ä ces deux themes sont publies dans le quatrieme tome
des « Recueils de la Societe » ; ce tome est compose de deux volumes, le
Premier etant reserve ä Vetude des incriminations en matiere d'injractions
militaires, le second aux etudes relatives ä Vextradition pour injractions mi-
litaires.
D'autres problemes en rapport avec les buts de la Societe internationale
ont ete etudies ä Madrid au sein de trois commissions specialisees : ils
concernent la criminologie militaire, la protection de la vie humaine dans
la guerre moderne, Vhistoire du droit penal et disciplinaire militaires. Les
travaux de ces commissions sont brievement analyses ä la fin de la pre-
sente preface.
Uetude des delits militaires sHmposait comme theme d'un des congres
organise par une Societe scientifique internationale creee pour promouvoir
« Vetude du droit penal militaire et du droit de la guerre ». Apres^ avoir
consacre ses precedents congres successivement aux rapports entre Vaction
penale et Vaction disciplinaire (Bruxelles, 1959), ä la Subordination dans
le cadre de la collaboration militaire internationale, au Statut de Vaeronef
militaire dans le droit des gens (Florence, 1961), aux garanties des droits
individuels dans la repression disciplinaire et penale militaire (Strasbourg,
1964), il a semble au Comite de direction de la Societe qu'il etait opportun
d'aborder Vexamen de la criminalite specifiquement militaire, pour en
definir le domaine, en rechercher les causes et en anahjser ccrtaines inci-
dences internationales.
Trois voies s'ouvraient ä la recherche dans ce domaine :
— d'une parU Vanalyse des droits nationaux : eile a Hi abordee som
forme d'une etude de droit covipare, consistant ä examiner comment
John GILISSEN
PREFACE
chaciiic pays incrimlnv Ics diverses formes de la deUnquance militaire,
Ce fut Vobjet du Premier theme du Congres de Madrid, intitule
« Les delits militaires » (1) ;
d'autre pari, les incidences internationales de la deUnquance militaire :
parmi les divers prohlemes qui auraient pu etre etudies, on a retenu
celui de l'extradition pour delits militaires, deuxieme theme du
Congres de Madrid ;
cnfin, une etude des causes de la deUnquance militaire, c'est-ä-dire
une etude de criminologie militaire. En raison de Vinsuffisance des
travaux preparatoires dans ce domaine tres neuf dans la plupart des
pays, il a ete finalement decide d'en confier Vetude ä une commission
de specialistes qui pourrait jeter les hases de cette brauche nouvelle
en faisant Vinventaire des resultats acquis et en recherchant les me-
thodes pour la jaire progresser.
Methode de travail
Pour les deux themes principaux, il a ete procede de la maniere deve-
nue classique pour les etudes comparatives : etablir un questionnaire, de-
mandcr ä des specialistes des differents pays participant aux activites
de la Societe d'y repondre, confier ä un rapporteur general pour chaque
theme, le soin d'elaborer la synthese generale qui se degage des rapports
particuliers, enfin soumettre les conclusions des rapporteurs generaux a
une discuss'ion generale ä Voccasion du congres.
Cette methode de travail suppose evidemment la collaboration active
d'un grand nombre de membres de la Societe longtemps avant Vepoque
du congres. II m'est un agreable devoir de remercier tous ceux qui ont
accepte de rediger des « rapports nationaux » dans les delais fixes par le
Comite de direction.
Lors d'un precedent congres — celui de Strasbourg en 1964 — les rap-
ports nationaux avaient ete publies un certain temps avant la date du con-
gres gräce ä la collaboration de la Revue de droit penal militaire et de droit
de la guerre. Cette fois-ci, il n'a pas ete possible de reussir ce que notre
secretaire general, le professeur Leaute, avait appele un « tour de force ».
Cest pourquoi les rapports nationaux sont publies dans le present
Recueil en meme temps que les rapports generaux. Cette methode, certes
moins propice ä susciter des discussions fructueuses au cours du congres,
puisque les participants n'ont pas re(^u d'avance la documentation relative
aux differents systemes juridiques, presente cependant un avantage qui
ne peut etre sous-estime : celui de reunir en un seul volume Vensemble
des travaux — analyse et synthese — sur les themes etudies.
(1) Travaux nublies dans U^ volume 1 du tome IV des Rocueils de la Society inter-
nationale de droit p6nal militaire et de droit de la guerre. Strasbourg.
1969.
**
Dans la methode de travail adoptee, un element essentiel de reussite
reside dans la qualite des rapporteurs generaux. Sous cet angle, nous avons
ete particidierement privilegies. En confiant ä M. Paucot, Avocat
general ä la Cour de Cassation franqaise, le rapport de synthese concer-
nant les incriminations, nous avons beneficie de la collaboration d'un haut
magistrat, juriste eminent alliant une connaissance approfondie du droit
penal militaire ä une longue experience tant militaire que judiciaire. La
synthese du Probleme concernant Vextradition pour infractions militaires
a ete faite par M. le Directeur Paul-Günter Potz, fonctionnaire au Minis-
tere federal allemand de la Justice qui, tant par ses hautes fonctions que
par ses travaux personnels, etait tout specialement qualifie.
Vun et Vautre ont su degager, de la masse des donnees fournies par
les rapports nationaux, les tendances essentielles des systemes juridiques
actuels.
A M. Jose Maria Rodriguez Devesa, professeur de droit cri-
minel ä Vuniversite de Madrid et magistrat militaire espagnol, revenait
"^ un perilleux honneur : celui de prononcer le discours de clöture
du congres, en faisant la synthese des syntheses. II a su, avec son habilete
coutumiere, mettre en evidence les elements fondamentaux des questions
etudiees en les situant dans le cadre des grands problemes penaux actuels.
La Societe internationale exprime sa re connaissance envers MM.
Paucot, Pötz et Devesa pour leur apport substantiel ä une etude
scientifique du droit penal militaire.
Notre reconnaissance va aussi ä nos collegues espagnols qui se sont
devoues pour Vorganisation du Congres. Nous voulons tout specialement
remercier M. Eduardo de No Louis, Auditeur General, actuellement Ma-
gistrado del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, qui a ete la cheville ouvriere de
cette Organisation parfaitement reussie.
Au cours du Congres les participants eurent Voccasion de manifester
leur vive Sympathie ä leur collegue espagnol au moment oü un haut ma-
gistrat bresilien lui remit publiquement la Medaille de haute distinction
de Vordre du Merite Juridique militaire du Tribunal Supremo Militär
duBresil.
Domaine et Classification des infractions militaires
La notion d'infraction militaire (2) est — il faut bien le reconnaitre
apres Vexamen des travaux du congres — une notion complexe, voire une
notion confuse. Les criteres adoptes pour classer teile ou teile infraction
parmi les infractions militaires varient d'un pays ä Vautre. SM existe des
(2)
Le questionnaire porte le titre : « Les delits militaires ». Mais il est pr6cis6 k
la question A. 1. a. que le terme « dölit » est pris au sens large. c'est-ä-dire
dans le sens d'infraction, et non dans le sens 6troit de ce terme dans la Clas-
sification traditionnelle frangaise et beige des infractions en trois cat^gories :
crimes, delits et contraventions.
ö John GILISSEN
criteres swiples, par exemple le fait que Vinfraction est commise par un milx-
taire et punie par une loi ou un code dit müitaire, Vanalyse des infractions
prevues dans d'autres textes legislatijs montre que la limite entre les
infractions militaires et les infractions de droit commun, surtout dans le
domaine de la protection des valeurs militaires ou des biens de Varmee,
varie d'un pays ä Vautre. A cet egard, la conclusion de M. VAvocat general
Paucot doit etre mise cn evidence : « Uinfraction militaire tend de plus
en plus ä se concevoir d'une maniere limitee, comme celle sauvegardant
le maintien des valeurs indispensables aux fonctlons d'une armee » (3).
Dans le questionnaire auquel les rapporteurs nationaux etaient invites
ä repondre (4), il etait tont d'abord demande « quel est le critere juridique
determinant les delits militaires par rapport aux delits de droit commun ».
Sans ecarter a priori le critere tire de la competence des juridictions mili-
taires, il etait cependant precise qu'on n'etudierait pas d'une maniere
systematique les problemes de competence, ceux-ci pouvant entrainer
le rapporteur dans de longs exposes techniques sans rapport direct aVec
Vobjet de la recherche.
Mais d'autres questions furent posees qui devaient permeitre de cerner
le ou les criteres. Tout d'abord, le Probleme des personnes soumises aux
lois penales militaires: sont-ce les militaires seuls ou aussi les civils ou
certains civils (qucstion A, I, b) ?
Ensuite, le Probleme des peines : peines encourues pour les delits mi-
litaires (question A, I, g), Peines de droit commun ou peines propres au
droit penal militaire (question A, l,h).
Enfin, la localisation des incriminations militaires dans Varsenal U-
gislatif : les infractions militaires sont-elles exclusivement contenues dans
les Codes militaires ou autres lois viilitaires, ou sont-elles incluses dans les
Codes penaux generaux, ou encore dispersees dans des lois diverses (ques-
tion A, 2) ? Ainsi etait souleve le prohleme des rapports entre les codes mili-
taires et les autres codes, c'est-ä-dire Vopposition entre un Systeme de
Codes militaires complementaires et un Systeme de codes militaires inte-
graux. Le President de la Societe, M. Ciardi, avait dans une note adressee
ä un Conseil de direction auquel il n'avait pu assister, mis Vaccent sur
Vimportance de ce Probleme et montre Vinteret du Systeme des codes in-
tegraux (5).
A cette question des rapports entre les codes penaux militaires et les
autres codes penaux, se rattache un Probleme capital : celui de Vapplica-
tion, totale ou partielle, du droit penal general de droit commun aux in-
fractions militaires (question A, 1, c).
A cöte de ces trois questions d'ordre general tendant ä rechercher les
criteres determinant le domaine des infractions militaires, il avait par u.
opportun de demander aux rapporteurs de repondre de maniere breve ä
(3) Recueils de la Soci^t^ internationale de droit p^nal militaire et de droit de
la guerre, tome IV, volume 1, Rapport *;'Jneral de R. PAUCOT, p. 71.
(4) Ibid., le questionnaire est reproduit en frangais p. 143 ; en anglais p. 145 ;
en espagnol p. 147.
(5) Ibid., p. 37.
PREFACE •
quaire questions concernant des cas particuliers en rapport direct avec
la recherche du domaine specifique des infractions militaires:
— l'ivresse a-t-elle des consequences penales differentes seien qu'elle est
en rapport avec des infractions militaires ou des infractions de droit
commun (question A, 1, d) ?
— le Systeme penal propre aux mineurs delinquants s'applique-t-il aux
infractions militaires (question A, 1, e) ?
— les delits commis en execution d'un ordre donne peuvent-ils etre
justifies ou excuses legalement (question A, 1, f) ?
— quelle est Vincidence des Conventions internationales .sur le droit penal
militaire (question A, 3) ?
Une seconde serie de questions concerne la division ou Classification
des infractions militaires en grandes categories (question B, 1 et 2). Outre
une question relative ä Vopportunite de modifier la Classification existante
(question B, 5), il etait demande si les infractions militaires sont definies
d'une maniere plus precise ou plus souple que les infractions de droit
commun (question B, 3), et si les faits non incrimines par les lois penales
militaires peuvent etre punis disciplinairement (question B, 4). Cette der-
niere question reprenait un des elements du theme etudie au cours du Pre-
mier congres de la Societe, ä savoir les rapports entre Vaction penale et Vac-
tion disciplinaire (6).
Ainsi, dans le cadre de la recherche d'un concept, il a ete possible
— et necessaire — d'aborder des aspects tres divers du droit penal militaire
et plus specialement des connexions entre ce droit et le droit penal general.
Les auteurs des rapports nationaux et surtout le rapporteur general, ont
ete amenes ä depasser largement les aspects particuliers du droit penal
militaire, augmentant d'autant Vinteret de leurs travaux pour les crimi-
nalistes non specialises dans le domaine militaire.
Extradition pour delits militaires
Passant du plan de la comparaison des droits nationaux au plan du
droit international le Congres de Madrid a etudie plus specialement le
Probleme de Vextradition pour delits militaires.
Le lien entre les deux themes est evident. Car, si dans la plupart des
Etats Vextradition pour delits militaires est interdite — sous reserve de
certaines exceptions — encore faut-il savoir ä quelles infractions cette in-
terdiction est applicable.
II peut paraitre assez surprenant que, pour le rapporteur general du
second theme comme pour la plupart des rapporteurs nationaux, ce pro-
(6) Action penale et action disciplinaire, Recueils de la Soci^^ internationale de
droit p^nal militaire et de droit de la guerre, Tome I, Strasbourg, 1960.
10
Jühn GILISSEN
Herne de la dejinition des infractions militaires ne semhle pa^^ presenter
de reelles dijficultes. Constatani qu'il existe deux categories d'injractions
militaires les injractions purement miUaires et les iniractions viilitaires
mixtes ou complexes, M. Pötz precise que « Zu der Frage, was darunter
zu verstehen ist, gibt es keine wesentlichen Meinungsverschiedenheiten »
(Sur la question de savoir ce qu'il faut entendre par iyifraction purevienl
militaire et infraction mixte ou complexe, il n'existe pas de reelles diver-
gences d*opinion) (7).
Pour les infractions purement militaires, ä savoir «Celles qui compor-
tent des elements constitutifs particuUers qui sont etrangers au droit penal
commun et qui relevent de la Situation militaire particulierey>, limpos-
sibüüe d'extrader nee vers les annees 1830 est erigee en principe general.
Si quelques exceptions remontent encore ä Vepoque ou par des accords
hilateraux deux pays convenaient de se livrer mutuellement leurs deser-
teurs (ex Espagne et Portugal 1884), d'autres apparaissent dans des ac^
cords multilateraux conclus recemment entre pays amis (Pays nordiques
de VEurope, 1961 ; Benelux, 1962).
Uautre part, par suite de la presence de troupes d'un paus sur le
territoire d'un autre pays, de plus en plus frequente par suite du develop-
pement des alllances militaires et de la Cooperation müitaire internationale
effectivement organisee des le temps de paix, la pratique de la remise
de militaires par VEtat de sejour ä VEtat d'origine, en dehors de la proce-
dure de Vextradition, a connu un certain developpement. Ventraide poli-
ciere et judiciaire, prevue par certains traites d'alliance militaire, nest
cependant pas organisee ni appliquee d'une maniere uniforme, car, comme
le souligne M. Pötz, « la question de la remise de militaires deserteurs
par une voie autre que Vextradition constitue egalement un prohleme
politiquey^ (8). Dans le present Recueil, des precisions sont donnees dans
les rapports nationaux sur Vetat actuel de la pratique dans ce domaine.
En conclusion, on peut constater une evolution generale tendant ä
permettre Vextradition ou la remise de müüaires ayant commis une in^
jraction müitaire entre Etats lies entre eux par des alliances militaires
et/ou politiques. Mais, en raison meme de la nature des infractions mili^
taires, cette tendance se heurte ä de nombreux obstacles, tantot jundiques,
tantöt surtout politiques.
Criminologie militaire
Uetude de la criminologie militaire est encore peu developpee. Uob-
jection principale ä laquelle se heurtent les travaux en cette matiere, est
le caractere plus ou moins secret, explique par des motifs de securite, des
(7) Injra, p. 60; resume irangais, p. 73; resume anglais, p. 81. resum6 espagnol.
p. 89.
(8) Injra, p. 79.
PREFACE
11
donnees statistiques relatives ä la criininalite militaire. 11 a cependant
ete constate que certains pays publient d'une maniere officielle les sta-
tistiques des activites et decisions des juridictions militaires; dans les
autrcs pays, Vopposition ä la publication de ces donnees semble pouvoir
etre levee apres un certain delai.
La Commission de criminologie inilitaire, creee au sein de la Societe
internationale de droit penal militaire et de droit de la guerre, s'est reunie
pour la Premiere fois ä Voccasion du Congres de Madrid. J'eus personnel-
lement Vhonneur d'y presenter un rapport sur « Les Premiers resultats
d'une enquete internationale sur la criminologie militaire ».
Des reponses ä un questionnaire sur la matiere avaient ete obtenues
pour sept pays : Republique Federale d'Allemagne, Belgique, Canada, Es-
pagne, Etats-Unis, France et Norvege. Les statistiques disponibles .^^ont
d/importance et de valeur tres inegales; aussi le souhait fut-il exprime
d'essayer d'obtenir une plus grande uniformite dans Velaboration des .sta-
tistiques annuelles, en s'inspirant des conclusions des travaux sur la Clas-
sification des infractions militaires, qui avaient ete etudiees dans la cadre
d'un des themes du Congres de Madrid.
D'autre part, les viethodes de travail dans Vetude de la criminologie
militaire revelent egalement une grande diversite de tendances. II fut
cependant possible de presenter quelques reflexions sur des resultats ac-
quis par quelques recherches basees sur une analyse approfondie de
la personnalite des delinquants militaires plus specialement en Belgique,
aux Etats-Unis et en France.
Les rapports nationaux requs, ainsi que Vebauche d'une premiere
Synthese, seront publies dans la Revue de droit penal militaire et de droit
de la guerre, probablement en 1969.
Au cours de la reunion de la Commission ä Madrid, le Doctenr
Moutin, medecin-capitaine ä VHöpital militaire d'instruction de Val-de
Gräce ä Paris, presenta en outre un rapport sur Vanalyse clinique et
sociale de nombreux cas individuels de delinquants militaires frangais:
il y ajouta des considerations tres judicieuses sur la prevention et le trai-
tement de la delinquance en milieu militaire.
II est ä esperer que ces Premiers travaux en susciteront d'autres, dans
d'autres pays, afin de developper un aspect des etudes criminologiques
trop lojigtemps neglige.
Protection de la vie humaine dans la guerre moderne
La « Commission pour la protection de la vie humaine dans la guerre
moderne yy existe dejä, au sein de la Societe internationale, depuis plu-
sieurs annees. Elle s'est reunie ä nouveau ä Voccasion du Congres de Madrid
pour etudier plus specialement le Probleme de l'aeronef militaire en mis-
sion sanitaire. Le Probleme pose etait essentiellement celui de Vhelicop-
12
John GILISSEN
tere sanitaire ; mais on avait uülise ä dessein un terme plus general pour
reserver les techniques futures.
Dans son rapport general le GeneraUMajor medecin Evrard (Beh
gique) donna un apevQu des travaux de la Commission medico-juridique
de Monaco qui a elabore un projet de texte destine ä modijier les Conven-
tions de Geneve. Parmi les lacunes ä combler, il signala surtout la neces-
site de donner une deiinition des appareils proteges, d'instltuer des moyens
modernes radio-electriques pour identifier les appareils portant les sxgnes
conventionnels, de supprimer Vobligation d\in plan de vol prealable et de
determiner la protection des aeronefs sanitaires evoluant au-dessus des
zones d'operation, surtout celles «d'extreme-avant » oü devrait pouvoir
agir Vhelicoptere sanitaire.
Le conipte rendu des discussions au sein de cette commission a ete
publie dans la Revue de droit p^nal militaire, n° VW, 1967, p. 198-199.
Uinteret des travaux de la Commission de la protection de la vie
humaine n'echappera ä personne ; reunissant autour d'une mime table des
juristes et des oüiciers, eile permet de conjronter les aspects techniques
et juridiques du Probleme avec les realites de la guerre inoderne.
Histoire du droit peiial et disciplinaire militaires
La commission creee pour favoriser Vetude historique du droit penal
et disciplinaire militaires, sest reunie eile aussi pour la premiere fois ä
Voccasion du Congres de Madrid. Sous la presidence de M. le Professeur
de Graajj (Pays-Bas), eile put jeter les bases de son activite future
gräce ä la collaboration promise par une soixantaine de specialistes.
Trois exposes jurent presentes ä Madrid, ä savoir :
— Quelques problemes de droit militaire resultant de Vemploi d'armees
de composition internationale au service de la Republique des Pro-
vinces-Unies (M. H.H.A. de Graaff, Pays-Bas) ;
— Uevolution de la procedure militaire allemande au cours du XIX'
siede (Dr O. Ehrl, Rep. Fed. d'Allemagne) ;
— Le droit concernant le rachat d'un captif pendant la guerre de Cent
ans (Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, Grande-Bretagne).
Ces trois etudes ont ete publiees dans la Revue de droit penal mili-
taire, vol. VII'2, 1968.
La commission envisage d'etudier ä Vavenir Vaspect historique des
problemes qui feront Vobjet des themes reienus pour les congres interna-
tionaux de la Societe.
PREFACE
13
Prix de la Societe et de la Revue de droit penal militaire et de droit
de la guerre
••;»•
Au cours du Congres de Madrid, a ete decerne pour la deuxieme fois
le Prix cree par la Societe internationale et subsidie par la Revue de
droit penal militaire et de droit de la guerre pour recompenser une etude
substantielle et originale traitant du droit penal militaire, du droit disci-
plinaire militaire ou du droit de la guerre.
Le Jury, compose de juristes appartenant ä cinq pays difjerents, s*est
trouve devant la tacke dijficile de departager 17 concurrcnts. Le nombre
de travaux soumis ä son appreciation est une preuve de la vitalite de la
Societe et de Vinteret des milieux scientijiques. Parmi les ouvrages qui
ont retenu tout specialement Vattention du jury et qui par leur valeur et
leur originalite auraient merite d'etre couronnes, citons ceux de :
— M. Fernando De Lasala Samper (Espagne) sur La proteccion a los he-
ridos, enfermos y naufragos de las fuerzas armadas en campana,
analyse fouillee des positioiis de la doctrine ä cet egard depuis le 16e
siede, et surtout de Vorigine et de Vapplicabilite des dispositions des
Conventions de Geneve ;
— du Dr Walter Meier (Suisse) sur Die Bestimmungen über das Kriegs-
verbrechens- und Besetzungsstrafrecht in den Genfer Abkommen zum
Schutze der Kriegsopfer von 1949, excellent travail sur certaines di.s-
positions des Conventions de Geneve, notamment les articles 49 et
suivants, base sur une documcntation tres etendue, plus specialement
les decisions judiciaires rendues dans dijferents pays apres la 2e guerre
mondiale :
— du Medecin Capitaine Pierre Moutin (France) sur Une etude de
criminologie differentielle en milieu militaire, daborce au depart de
Vetude dinique et sociale d'un grand nombre de militaires, les uns
ayant, les autrvs nayant pas d'antecedents judiciaires, apport impor-
tant ä une branche peu developpee de la criminologie ;
— M. F.A. Small (Nouvelle Zdande) sur The Extradition of Military
deserters at international law, etude historique et surtout de droit
compare d'une question qui a fait Vobjet d'un des themes du Congres
de Madrid ;
— du Colonel Dennis A. York (Etats-Unis), sur Military due process :
sous ce titre Vauteur examine la procedure administrative du renvoi
de Varmee, en la comparant ä la procedure penale militaire aux Etats-
Unis ; il montre comment, gräce ä la jurisprudence de la Military
Court of Appeals des U.S.A., les droits subjectifs des prevenus ont
ete de mieux en mieux garantis, surtout dans le domaine du droit
de la defense devant les juridictions militaires et du droit de faire
entendre des temoins ; ces garanties n'existent pas dans la procedure
administrative aboutissant au renvoi de Varmee, alors que cette me-
sure peut avoir des consequences particulierement graves pour Vavenir
du militaire renvoye dans la vie civile ; Vauteur fait des propositions
de reformes de lege ferenda, qui paraissent tres opportunes.
14
John GILISSEN
Malgre les qualites indeniahles de ces travaux, le jury a ete mianime
pour attribuer le Prix ä M. Armin Steinkamm (Republique Federale
d'Allcmagne), qui avait presente une tres importante etude sur Streit-
kräfte im Kriegsvölkerrecht (Le Statut des forces armees en droit interna-
tional de la Querre),
Cette etude avait ete presentee recemment comme these ä la jaculte
de droit de Vuniversite de Würzburg. Elle concerne un Probleme fundamen-
tal du droit international de la guerre, qui est en meme tevips un probleme
tres actuel, puisqu'il concerne les limites et les possibilites aciuelles des
regles du droit de la guerre dans le monde moderne. Le livre de M.
Steinkamm est base sur une documentation tres etendue, non seulement
allemande, mais pratiquement de tous les pays du monde, y compris les
pays de VEst,
Ueffort fait pour definir les notions de « comhattant » et « non combat-
tant » est des plus meritoire. Le probleme des « Partisans », des « resistants »,
des « groupes subversifs », a retenu tout specialement Vattention de Vau-
teur, qui a etudie ce probleme aussi dans les ecrits des pays de VEst;
il a ainsi mis en evidence Vevolutlon des idees des Sovietiques au sujet
de la notion juridique de guerre.
Le jury a egalement apprecie Vefiort de M. Steinkamm pour ela-
borer des propositions de lege ferenda au sujet de la notion de combattant
Thenies du Congres de 1970
Des ä present la Societe internationale de Droit penal militalre et de
droit de la guerre se preoccupe des themes qui feront Vobjet de son prochain
congres, qui sera organise ä Dublin en mai 1970. Comme precedemment,
deux themes ont ete retenus ; dune part, le probleme de Vobeissance
militaire au regard des droits penaux internes et du droit de la guerre ;
d'autre part, la notion de « guerre » et de « combattant » dans les coyijlits mo-
dernes Si le Premier theme interesse surtout les penalistes, le second con-
tribue au developpement scientijique du droit de la guerre en essayant de
circonscrire certaines notions jondamentales.
Le congres de Madrid a donne, une nouvelle jois, la preuve de la vi-
talite de notre Societe internationale. Tant par les travaux sur les themes
principaux que par Vactivite des commissions specialisees et par l interet
suscite par le Prix triennal, la Societe a montre que les domaines auxquels
eile s' Interesse, peuvent faire Vobjet de recherches scientifiques d une va-
leur et d'une importance egale ä celles des autres branches du droit.
15
-*«
PRE F ACE
by
John GILISSEN
Cbairman of the International Society of
Military Penal Law and Law of War
Auditeur general pres la Cour militaire
Professeur at the University of Brüssels
The fourth international Congress, organised in Madrid by the « In-
ternational Society jor Military Penal Law and War Law » from 9th to
12th May 1967, concerned itselj mainly with the study of military offences
from a double point of view : on the one hand the charge and on the other
hand extradition. The papers concerning these two subjects are published
in the fourth tome of the « Proceedings of the Society » ; this work is compo-
sed of two volumes : the first concerns the study of military offences, the
second the study of extradition for military offences.
Other Problems related to the objects of the International Society were
studied in Madrid within three specialized committees : military crimino-
logy, the protection of human life in modern war, the history of penal
law and military discipline. The proceedings of these committees are brief-
ly analysed at the end of this preface.
The study of military offences ivas a suitable subject for a Congress
organised by an international scientific Society created to promote « t/ic
study of military penal law and war law ». After having dealt successively
at its previous congresses with the relationship between the penal action
and the disciplinary action (Brüssels, 1959), Subordination within the frame-
work of international military Cooperation, the Status of military aircraft
under the law of peoples (Florence, 1961), the guarantee of individual
rights within the frameiüork of disciplinary and penal military repression
(Strasbourg, 1964), the steering committee of the Society considered that
it would be useful to undertake a study of purely military criminality to
define its scope, to try and find its causes and to analyse certain interna-
tional implications.
There were three possible ways of dealing with this subject :
— on the one hand an analysis of national laws : this was done in the
shape of a study of cnmparative law, and within this framework, the
16
«
if
John GILISSEN
way in which each country considers the various jorms of military
delinquency was studied. This was the first theme oj the Madrid Con-
gress, covered by the title « Military Offences» (1) ;
on the other hand, a f^tudy of the international implications of military
delinquency ; amongst the various problems which could have been
studied it loas decided to consider solely the problem of extradition
for military offences; this was the second theme of the Madrid Con-
gress ;
finally, a study of the causes of military delinquency; that is to say a
study dealing loith military criminology. As insufficient preliminary
work had been done in this very neiu field in most countries it was fi-
nally decided to refer this study to a committee of specialists which
could define the scope of this new field by listing the existing results
and by considering methods lohich might stimulate prcgress.
PREFACE
17
Method of work
For the two main subjeets the usual procedure in the field of compara-
tive studies ivas followed : first of all a questionnaire loas prepared and the
specialists in the various countries were invited to send in answers ; for
each theme a rapporteur loas requested to prepare a general summary re-
port, based on all individual reports and to submit conelusions ; the conclu-
sions of the rapporteurs were then referred to the Congress for general
discussion.
This method of work presupposes of course that a great number of
memhers of the Society are willing to eooperate aeüvelij ahead of the Con-
gress. I am extremely glad to be able to thank all those who accepted to
prepare « national reports » within the time limits agreed to by the stee-
ring committee.
At a previous Congress — the Strasbourg Congress in 1964 — the na-
tional reports teere published sometime before the Congress thanks to the
help given by the Revue de droit penal militaire et de droit de la guerre.
It was not possible this time to succeed in repeating what our Secretary
General, Professor Leaute, had previously called a « tour de force ».
This is lohy the national reports are published in the present -Volume
of the Proceedings, at the same time as the general reports. This method,
which of course does not to the same extent encourage fruitful discussions
at the Congress, as the participants have not received in advance the
documents on the various legal Systems, however, has an advantage which
should not to be underrated ; in this way all the papers on the subjeets for
study — the analysis and the summaries — appear in a single volume.
To obtain satisfactory results with the method of work which was adop-
ted, it is esseniial inter alia that the summary reports should be excellent.
In this respect we have been extremely fortunate. By asking M..
Rene Paucot, Avocat general to the French Cour de Cassation, to prepare
the summary report on incriminations, tue have been able to benefit from
the Cooperation of an eminent magistrate and an eminent Jurist who in
addition to a thorough knowledge of military penal law has considerable
military and legal experience. The summary on the problem of extradi-
tion for military offences was prepared by Director Paul-Günter Pötz, of
the German Federal Ministry of Justice, who by reason of the post which
he holds and of his personal achievements was particularly qualified to car-
ry out this work.
Both the rapporteurs were able to extract from the mass of data provi-
ded in the national reports the general trends of present legal Systems.
M. Jose Maria Rodriguez Devesa, professor of criminal law at the Uni-
versity of Madrid and a Spanish military magistrate, had a difficult task :
he was to make the closing speech at the Congress and to summarise the
summary reports. With his usual skill he was able to highlight the funda-
mental aspects of the problems studied and to integrate them within the
frameiüork of the main penal problems of the present day.
The International Society would like to thank MM. Paucot, Pötz and
Devesa for their important contribution to the scientific study of military
penal law.
We are also grateful to our Spanish colleagues who have so ably orga-
7iised the Congress. We would like to thank in particular M. Eduardo de
No Louis, Auditor General, at present Magistrado del Tribunal Supremo
de Justicia, who was mainly responsible for the very successful Organisa-
tion of the Congress.
During the Congress the participarits had the opportunity of showing
their sympathy to their Spanish colleague when a Brazilian magistrate de-
corated him before the Congress of the Order of Military Legal Merit of
the Superior Tribunal Militär of Brazil.
Scope of Classification of military offences
The concept of military offence (2) is — this is apparent after studying
results of the Congress —a complex or even a confused concept. The crite-
ria adopted to classify a given offence within military offences vary from
(1) studies published in the Proceedings of the International Society for Military
Penal Law and War Law, lome IV, volume 1, Strasbourg, 1969.
(2) The questionnaire bears the title «Les d^lits militaires » (Military offences).
But it is stated in question A, 1, a, that the term « d^lit » is taken in a general
sense, i.e. in the sense of offence, and not in the limited sence it has in the tra-
ditional Belgian and French Classification of offences in three categories :
« crimes, d^lits et contraventions ».
iö
John GILISSEN
^
country to country. There are simple criteria, for example the fact that the
ojfence was committrd by müitary personnel and is punished by a law or
a Code which is called military, but an analysis of ofjences covered by other
laios shows that the distinction between military ojfences and common
law ofjences, particularly with regard to the protection of military property
or army property varies from one country to another. In this respect the
conclusions of Monsieur VAvocat general Paucot should be stressed ; « the
military ojfence tends increasingly to be considered in a limited sense as
something safeguarding the inaintenance oj esscntial values to the Opera-
tion oj an army » (3).
The questionnaire which the national rapporteurs had been invited
to answer (4), started by asking «what werc the legal criteria dejining
military ojjences as opposed to common law ojjences». Without neglec-
ting a priori the criteria drawn jrom the comyetence oj military tribunals,
it was yievcrthelcss stated that the problems oj competence would not
be studied systcmatically as these might lead the rapporteur to present
long technical Statements which were not directly related to the object
oj the study,
But other questions were raised which were designed to make it possi-
ble to dejined the criteria. First oj all the problem oj the persons subject to
military penal law ; military personnel only, civilians, or certain civilians
only (question A, 1, b) ?
Then the problem oj sentences : sentences jor military ojjences (ques-
tion A, i, gj, common law sentences or sentences specijic to military pe-
nal law (question A, I, h).
Finally, the place oj military ojjences within the legal arsenal ; are mi-
litary ojjences exclusively contained in military codes or other military
laws, or are they included in general penal codes, or even throughout va-
rious laws (question A, 2) ? This raised the problem oj the relationship be-
tween military codes and other codes, that is to say the dijjerences between
a System oj complcnientary military codes and a System oj integral military
codes. The Chairman oj the Society, M. Ciardi, in a note sent to the steering
commiltee, whose meeting he could not attend, had stressed the importance
oj this Problem and showed the advantages oj a System oj integral codes
(5).
To this question oj the relationship between military penal codes and
other penal codes is related a very important problem ; that oj the total or
partial application oj general penal law to military ojjences (question
A, 1, c).
In addition to these three questions oj a general nature, the object oj
xühich lüas to dctermine the criteria dejining the jield oj military ojjences,
it appeared usejul to ask the rapporteurs to ansxver briejly jour questions
(3)
(4)
(5)
Recueils de la Societe internationale de droit penal militaire et de droit de
la guerre, tome IV. volume 1, Rapport genöral de R. PAUCOT, p. 71.
ibid., the questionnaire is published :n Frencn p. 143; in English p. 145 and in
Spanish p. 147.
Ibid., p. 37.
.. .-^ ,
PREFACE
19
conccrning specijic cases directly related to the dejinition oj the specific
jield oj military ojjences :
— drunkeness : does drunkeness have dijjerent penal consequences when
it is related to military ojjences or common law ojjences (question
A, 1, d) ?
— is the penal System applicable to delinquent minors applicable to mi-
litary ojjences (question A, 1, e) ?
— can ojjences committed when carrying out an order be justijied or ex-
cused jrom a legal point oj view (question A, 1, j) ?
— what is the injluence oj international Conventions on national militai'y
penal law (question A, 3) ?
A sccond series of questions concerned the division or classijication of
rnilitary ojjences into main categories (question ß, 1 and. 2). In addition to
a question concerning the necessity oj vtodijying the existing classijication
(question ß, 5), rapporteurs werc asked whether military ojjences were
dejined with more precision or with more jlexibility than common law
ojjences (question B, 3), and whether the jacts which are not covered by
viilitary penal law can be punished disciplinarily (question B, 4). This last
question rejerred to one oj the aspects oj the subject studied at the jirst
Congress oj the Society, the relationship between the penal action and the
disciplinary action (6).
Whilst searching jor a concept, it was possible — and necessary — to
deal with very dijjerent aspects of military penal law and to consider more
specijically the relationship between this law and general penal law. The
authors oj the national reports and the rapporteur general in particular
had to go beyond the specijic aspects oj military penal law ; this has made
OUT work all the more interesting jor penalists who are not specialized in
the military jield.
Extradition for military offences
Ajter comparing national laws the Madrid Congress studied interna-
tional law aspects and in particular considered the problem oj extradition
jor military ojjences.
The link between the two subjects is olvious. For ij in most oj the Sta-
tes extradition jor military ojjences is prohihited — subject to certain eX'
ceptions — one must nevertheless know to what ojjences this prohibition
applies.
It may appear suprising that the rapporteur general jor the second
theme and most oj the national rapporteurs did not consider that the pro-
(6) Action penale et acHon dii^ciplinaire, Recueils de la Sociöt^ internationale de
droit penal miütaire et de droit de la guerre, Tome I, Strasbourg, 1960.
20
John GILISSEN
hlem 0} the defimüoji of vüUtarij offences presented any real difficulty,
Noting that there exist iwo categories of military ojjences, the purely mi-
litary ofjences and the complex or dual military ojjences, M. Potz States
that « Zu der Frage, was darunter zu verstehen ist, gibt es keine wesent-
lichen Meinungsverschiedenheiten)) (On the question oj knowing what
should be understood by purely military ofjence and complex or dual of-
fence there are no real dijjerences oj opinion) (7).
For purely military ojjences that is to say «the offences which in-
clude specific constructive eleinents which are foreign to common penal
law and which concern a specific military Situation » the impossibility of
granting extradition which was established around 1830 has become a ge-
neral principle. Although a few cxceptions date back to a period where
bilateral agreements made it possible for two countries to exchange their
deserters (for instance Spain and Portugal, 1884), other exceptions appear
in multilateral agreements recently signed between friendly countries^
(European Nordic Countries, 1961 ; Benelux, 1962).
On the other hand due to the presence of troops of one country on the
territory of another country which is becoming more and more frequent
as a result of the development of military alliances and of international
military Cooperation in peace time, the handing over of military personnel
by the host nation to the nation of origin ivithout following an extradition
procedura has become more frequent. The legal and police Cooperation
provided for by certain military treaties of alliance is not however organi-
sed or applied in a uniform manner for as M. Pötz poiyits out « the problem
of the transfer of military deserters without extradition is also a political
Problem)) (8). In these proceedings national reports give införmation on
the present practices in this field.
In conclusion one can note a general trend towards the authorisation
of transfers of military personnel having committed military offences, be-
tween States linked by military alliances or political alliances. But due
to the nature of military offences themselves this trend raises many Pro-
blems both legal and mainly political.
PREFACE
21
The military criminology Committee set up within the International
Society of Military Penal Law and of War Law rnet for the first time du-
ring the Madrid Congress. Personally I had the honour to submit a report on
« The first results of an international survey of military criminology ». Re-
plies to a questionnaire on this suhject had been sent in by seven countries :
Belgium, Canada, The Federal Republic of Germany. France, Norway,
Spain and the United States. The available statistics are important but of
diffcring value ; it was therefore recommended that a greater standardisa-
tion ofthe annual statistics should be sought ; these statistics should be ba-
sed on the conclusions of the study on the Classification of military offences
which was considered within the frav^ework of one of the themes of the
Madrid Congress.
On the other hand the methods used for studying military criminology
reveal differing trends. It was, however, possible to submit certain consi-
derations on the results achieved in certain studies, oased on a detailed ana-
lysis of the Personality of military off enders, more specifically in Belgium,
France and the United States.
The national reports which loere received and the draft of a first sum-
mary report lüill be published in the Military Law and Law of War Review
prohably in 1969.
During the meeting of the Committee in Madrid Doctor Moutin, mede-
cin-capitaine at the Hopital miUtaire d'instruction of the Val-de-Gräce in
Paris, also submitted a report on a clinical and social analysis of many in-
dividual French military off enders ; he made some very judicious remarks
on the prevention and treatment of delinquency in a military environment
It is to be hoped that these first studies will give birth to others in
other countries and will make it possible to develop the study of one aspect
of criminology which has been neglected for too long.
Protection of human life in modern war
<
Military criminology
The study oi military criminology is not yet highly developped. The
main difficulty in this field is the more or less secret nature, for reasons
of security, of Statistical data concerning military criminilogy. However,
it has been noted that certain countries officially publish statistics on the
activities and decisions of military jurisdictions ; in other countries it seems
that the prohibition of publication of this data may be lifted in time.
(7) Infra p. 55, French summary p. 73 ; English summary p. 81 ; Spanish summary
p. 85.
(8) Infra, p. 87.
The « Committee for protection of human life in modern war » has been
in existence within the International Society for several years. It met once
again during the Madrid Congress to study more specifically the problem
of military aircraft on medical duties. The problem raised was essentially
that of the medical helicopter ; but a more general term was used purpo-
sely to take into account any future technical devclopments.
In his general report General-Major medecin Evrard (Belgium) sixm-
marised the ivork of the Monaco medical and legal Committee which pre-
pared a draft modification of the Geneva Conventions. He pointed out that
among the deficiencies which should be remedied was the necessity of gi-
ving a definition of the aircraft protected, the setting up of modern com-
22
John GILISSEN
viunicatlons to identihj alrcraft ivearlng tlic conventional syinhols, the sup-
pression of the preliminanj flight plan and the protection oj medical air-
craft ahove the Operations zone and rnainly ahove the forwards areas where
the medical helicopter should he free to operate.
The report of the discussions within this Comvüttce was pubUshed in
the Military Law and Law of War Review, volume VM, 1967, pages 198-199.
The importance of the work of the Committee on the protection of hu-
man Ufe is apparent to cvcryone ; in this Committee laimjers and officers
Sit around the same table and it is vossihle to compare the technical and
legal aspects of the problev^s with the realities of modern warfare.
History of Pciial Law and Military Discipline
The Committee set up to encourage the historical study of penal law
and military discipline, also met for the first time dxiring the Madrid Con-
gress. Under the chairmanship of Professor de Graaff (Netherlands) it was
able to define the lasis of its future activitics with the help and the Coope-
ration of sixty specialists.
Three Communications loere made in Madrid :
— Certain Problems of military law resulting from the use of internatio-
nal armics at the Service of the Rcpublic of the United Provinces
(M. H.H.A. de Graaff, Netherlands) ;
— The evohition of German military procedure during the XIXthe Centu-
ry (Dr. O. Ehrl, Federal Republic of Germany) ;
— The laio concerning ransoms of captivcs during the Hundrcd Year
War (CoJoncl G.IA.D. Draper, United Kingdom).
These three studies werc published in the Military Law and Law of
War Review, volume VII-2, 1968.
In the future the Com.mittee intends to study the historical aspects of
Problems related to the themes chosen for the international Congresses of
the Society.
Prize of the Society and of the Military Law and Law of War Review
At the Madrid Congress the prize set up by the international Society
and suhsidized by the Military Law and Law of War Review was
granted for the second time to honour a suhstantial and original study dea-
ling with Military penal law and military disciplinary law or war law.
V'
PREFACE
23
The Jury composed of jurists from five different countries was faced
with a difficult task as thcy had to chose amongst seventeen competitors.
The number of studies subviitted is proof of the vitality of the Society and
of the interest of the scientific bodies. Amongst the studies which were
more particularly commended by the jury and which by their originality
and importance could have received a prize are the following :
— M. Fernando De Lasala Samper (Spain) on La proteccion a los heridos,
enfermos y naufragos de las fuerzas armadas en campäna, which is a
detailed analysis of doctrine in this respect since the 16th Century with
particular cmphasis on the origin and applicability of the Gencva Con-
ventions ;
— Dr. Walter Meier (Switzerland) on Die Bestimmuii£?en über das Kriegs-
verbrechens- und Besetzungsstrafrecht in den Genfer Abkommen zum
Schutze der Kriegsopfer von 1949 which is an excellent study on cer-
tain clauses of the Geneva Conventions, in particular articles 49 and
following based on a very extensive documentation and more particu-
larly on the legal d.ecisions taken in various countries after the Second
World War ;
— Medecin Capitaine Pierre Moutin (France) on Une etude de crimino-
logie differentielle en milieu militaire based on a cliniral and social
study of a great number of military personnel with or without known
legal antecedents which is an important contribution on a little studied
branch of criminology ;
— M. F.A. Small (New Zealand) on The Extradition of Military deserters
at international law, which is a historical study and mainly a compara-
tive law study oj a question which was one of the themes of the Madrid
Congress ;
— Colonel Dennis A. York (United States), on Military due process ; under
this title the author has examined the administrative procedure for
dismissal from the Service. By comparing it with the military penal
procedure in the United States, he shows how the jurisprudence of the
United States military Court of Appeals has incrcasingly guaranteed
the sabjective rights of the persons charged mainly in the field of de-
fence before the military Jurisdiction and of the right to call witnesses ;
these guarantees do not exist in the administrative procedure which
leads to a dismissal from the Service although this measure may have
particularly serious consequences on the future of the soldier sent back
to civilian Ufe. The author makes certain proposals for reform de lege
ferenda, which appear to he very useful.
But notwith Standing the great merits of these studies the jury unani-
mously agrced to give the prize to M. Armin Steinkamm (German Federal
Republic) who had presented a very important study on Streitkräfte im
Kriegsvülkerrecht (The Status of the armed forces in international war
law).
24
John GILISSEN
TMs Study had recenthj heen presented as a thesis hefore the Faculty
of Law of the University of Würzburg. It concerns a fundamental prohlem
of international war law which is at the same time a very actual prohlem
as it concerns the limits and present possihilities of the rules of war law in
the modern world. The book of M. Steinkamm is based on very extensive
documentation not only from German sources but also from practically all
countries of the world, including the Eastern countries.
His attempt to define the concepts of « combatant » and « non-comba-
tant » is meritorious. The prohlem of partisans, of resistance and of subver-
sive groups, has been particulary studied by the author who has also exa-
mined what has been said on this suhject in the Eastern countries ; he has in
this way shown the evolution of the Soviet interpretation of the legal con-
cept of war.
The Jury has also appreciated the effort made hy M. Steinkamm to
draft proposals de lege ferenda concerning the concept of combatant.
Themes for the 1970 Congress
The Interyiational Society for Military Penal Law and War Law is al-
ready considering the themes which will he discussed at its next Congress
which will take place in Dublin in May 1970. As in the past, two themes
have been chosen ; on the onc hand the prohlem of military ohedience in
international penal Jaws and in law of war : on the other hand an attempt
to find a definition for the concept of « War » and « Combattant » in modern
conflict. The first theme is mainly of interest to penalists hut the second
contrihutes to the scientific development of war law hy trying to define
certain fundamental concepts.
0
The Madrid Congress has proved once again the vitality of our Interna-
tional Society. By its study of the main theme, by the activity of the spe-
cialised Committees and by the interest shown in the triennal Prize the
Society has proved that the field with which it is concerned can he the suh-
ject of valid scientific research which is as important as that carried out
in other fields of law.
25
PREFACIO
por
John GILISSEN
Presidente de la Sociedad Internacional de
Derecho penal militar y Derecho de la guerra
Auditor General en la Corte Militär
Profcsor de la Universidad de Brusetas
El IV Congreso internacional, organizado en Madrid por la « Sociedad
internacional de Derecho penal militar y Derecho de la guerra », del 9 al 12
de mayo de 1967, ha estado consagrado, principalmente, al estudio de los
delitos militares, hajo el dohle aspecto de las incriminaciones y de la extra-
dicion. Los trabajos consagrados a estos dos temas son publicados en el
cuarto tomo de los « Recueils » de la Sociedad ; esto tomo es compuesto por
dos Volumen, primero reservada al estudio de los incriminaciones en materia
de los delitos militares, segundo al estudios relativa a la extradicion por
infracciones militares.
Otros prohlemas en relacion con los fines de la Sociedad internacional
han sido estudiados en Madrid en el seno de tres comisiones especializadas :
coricernientes a la criminologia militar, la protecciön de la vida humana
en la guerra moderna, y la historia del Derecho penal y disciplinario militar.
Los trabajos de estas comisiones son brevemente analizados al final del
presente prefacio.
El estudio de los delitos militares se imponia como tema de uno de los
Congresos, organizado por una sociedad cientifica internacional, creada pa-
ra promover « el estudio del Derecho penal militar y del Derecho de la guer-
ra ». Despues de haher dedicado sus precedentes Congresos sucesivamente
a las relaciones entre la Acciön penal y la Acciön disciplinaria (Bruselas,
1959), a la suhordinacion en el cuadro en el cuadro de la colaboraciön mili-
tar internacional, al cstatuto de la aeronave militar cn el Derecho de gentes
(Florencia, 1961), a las garantias de los derechos individuales en la repre-
sion disciplinaria y penal militar (Estrashurgo, 1964), ha parecido oportuno
al Comite de Dirccciön de la Sociedad, ahordar el examen de la criminali-
dad especificamente militar, para definir su dmbito, investigar sus cau-
sas, y analizar ciertas incidencias internacionales.
Tres cajyünos se abrian a la investigacion en este terreno :
John GILISSEN
voruna parte elamlisis de los derechos nacionales : ha sido realizada
hajo el aspccto de un cstudio de derecho comparado. consistente en
examnmr como cada pais incrimina las diferentes formas de la delin-
Madrid, denommado « Los delitos militares » (1) ;
porotm parte las incidencias internacionales de la delincuencia mili.
hnZT'r, , TT P^«f'^^"'«« <l^^ ^^"brian podido ser estudiados, se
haescogido el de la extradiciön por delitos militares, segtmdo tema
del Congreso de Madrid ;
finalmcnte un estudio de las causas de la delincuencia militar, es decir
unestudw de cnminologia militar. Por razön de la insuficiencia de los
trahajos preporatorios en esta materia, viuy nueva en la mayor parte
de los pmses, se decidiö finalmente confiar su estudio a uruteornisiön
de especmhstas que podria fijar las bases de esta rama nueva, haciendo
tnventario de los resuUados logrados y buscando metodos para hacerla
progresar. ^ 'mteriu .
Metodo de tiabajo
;.. ^'Z ' Prmcipales, se ha procedido de manera cläsica en
losestudwscomparativos: estahlecer un cuestionario ; solicitar aes^ecZ
hstas de diferentes paises, colahoradores en las actividades de la Sociedad
el cuidado de elaborar la sintesis general que se deduce de las comunicacio-
nes particularcs : nnalmente, someter las conclusiones de los ponen^esgene-
rah's a una discusion general con ocasion del Congreso.
Este metodo de trahajo supone, evidentemente, la colahoracion activa
a la fecha del Congreso. Es para vii un grata deber, el agradecer a todos los
Z: el'coZTd'lT''''-' ''' ^'^""""''^^ '^«^'""'^'^-^ - ^- PlazosZdos
poi et Lomite de direccion.
Con ocasion de un Congreso anterior ~ el de Estrasburao en 1964 - la<:
La celebracion del Congreso, gracias u la colaboraciön de la Revista de De-
recho pönal militar y Derecho de la guerra. Esta vez, no ha . do posibl lo-
z\LTdeZ:::. "^'^"^-^'^ ^^'^^™'' ^^ ^^«^^- ^-"*^'' '-^^« "«-^o
Por ello, las comunicaciones nacionales se publican, en el presente Re-
cueil. al mismo tiempo que las comunicaciones generales. Este Ltodocier.
tamente menos propicio a suscitar discusiones fructiferas en el desarrollo
(1)
uenaf mim ^^^'"''^f ^\ ^"'""^^' ^" ^^ Sociedad International de Derecho
penal müitar y Derecho de la guerra. tomo IV. volumen 1. Estraburgo
PREFACIO
27
del Congreso, puesto cjue los partic'ipantes no han conocido anteriormente
la docunientaciön relativa a los diferentes sistemas juridicos, presenta, sin
cmhargo, una 2:entaja que no paede dcspreclarse : Ja de reitnir, en un solo
volumen. el conjunto de los trabajos — anälis'is y sintesis — de los temas
estudiados.
En el metodo de trahajo adoptado, un elemento de exiio reside en
la calidad de los Ponentes generales. En este sentido, hemos sido ex-
traordinarianiente Privileg lad os. Conjiando a M. Rene Paucot, Ahogado ge-
neral en la Corte de Casaciön francesa, la Ponencia de sintesis relativa a
las incriminaciones, nos henios bencjiciado con la colahoracion de un alto
MagistradOy jurista eminente^ que une al conociniiento profunda del Dere-
cho penal militar, una larga experiencia, tanto militar como judicial. La
sintesis del prohlema relativo a la extradiciön por infracciones militares,
ha sido realizada por M. Paul-Günter Pötz, funcionario directivo en el Mi-
nisterio de Justicia de Aleniania Federal que, tanto por sus altas funciones
como por sus trabajos personales, era un especialista muy cualificado.
Uno V otro han sahido deducir del conjunto de los materiales proporcio-
nados por las coviunicaciones nacionales, las tendencias esenciales de los
sistemas juridicos actuales.
AI catcdrätico de Derecho penal en la Universidad de Madrid y Magis-
trado militar espanol, Jose Maria Rodriguez Devesa, se le reservaha un pe-
ligroso honor : el de pronuncmr el discurso de clausura del Congreso, ha-
ciendo la sintesis de la sintesis, Supo, con su hahilidad acostumhrada, poner
de relieve los elementos fundamentales de los prohlemas estudiados, situdn-
dolo en el cuadro de los prohlemas penales de actualidad.
La Sociedad Internacional expresa su reconocimiento a los senores
Paucot, Pötz y Rodriguez Devesa, por su aportacion sustancial para un estu-
dio cientifico del Derecho penal militar.
Nuestro agradecimiento es tamhien para nuestros colegas espanoles
que se han prcocupado por la organizaciön del Congreso. Qucremos, muy
especialmente, agradecer al Auditor General don Eduardo de No Louis, ac-
tualmente Magistrado del Tribunal Suprevio de Justicia, que fue la piedra
maestra de esta organizaciön perfectamente lograda.
Durantp cl desarrollo del Congreso, los participantes tuvieron la oca-
sion de exteriorizar su viva simpatia a su colega espanol, en el momento en
el cual un alto Magistrado brasileno le hizo entrega, püblicamente, de la
Medalla de Alta Distincion de la Orden del Merito Juridico-militar del Tri-
bunal Supremo Militar del Brasil.
28
John GILISSEN
Ambito y clasificacion de las infracciones militares
I
La nocinn de infraccwn 7nilitar (2) es — preciso es reconocerlo despues
dcl examen de los trabajos del Congreso — una nociön compleja, incluso
una nociön confusa. Los criterios adoptados para clasificar determinada in-
fraccion entre las infracciones militares, varian de un paisa otro. Si hien
es cierto que existcn criterios sencillos. por ejemplo, el hecho de que la in-
fraccion sea cometida por un militar y castigada por una ley o un Codigo
vülitar, el andlisis de las infracciones previstas en otros textos legislativos
demuestra que el limite entre las infracciones militares y las infracciones de
derecho coviün, sohre todo en el terreno de la proteccion de los valores mi-
litarr^ 0 de los hicnes del ejercito, varia en los diferentes paises. A este res-
pecto, la conclusiön del Ahogado general Paucot dehe ponerse de relieve :
<( La infraccion viilitar tiende, cada vez mds, a concecebirse de una muncra
limitada, coino la salvaguardia y mantenimiento de los valores indispensa-
bles a las misiones de un ejercito » (3).
En el cuestioyiario enviado a los ponentcs nacionales (4), era, en primer
lugar, interesado « cudl es el criterio juridico determinante de los delitos
viilitares en relaciön con los delitos de derecho coniün». Sin descartar a
priori el criterio obtenido de la compctencia de las jurisdicciones militares,
se especificaha que no se estudiaria de una manera sistemdtica los proble-
mas de competencia, los que podrian conducir al Ponente a largas exposi-
ciones tecnicas, sin relaciön directa con el objeto de la invcstigaciön.
Pero, otras cuestiones fueron expuestas, que permitian discernir el cri-
terio. En primer lugar, el prohlema de las personas sometidas a las ley es
penales militares : l Lo estdn solamente los militares, o tambien los civiles,
o ciertos civiles ? (cuestiön A, l,h),
Seguidamente, el problema de las penas : penas senaladas para los de-
litos militares (cuestiön A, 1, g), penas de derecho comün o penas propias
del Derecho penal militar (cuestiön A, 1, h).
Por fin, la localizaciön de las incriminaciones militares en el arsenal
Icgislativo : l Las infracciones militares, estdn exclusivamente comprendi-
das en los Cödigos militares u otras leyes militares, o estdn incluidas en los
Cödigos penales generales, o incluso dispersas en diferente leyes ? (cuestiön
A, 2). Asi estaha planteado el problema de las relaciones entre los Cödigos
militares y los otros Cödigos, es decir, la oposiciön entre un sistema de Cö-
digos militares integrales. El presidente de la Sociedad, M. Ciardi, habia
(2)
(3)
(4)
El cuestionario lleva el titulo : «Los delitos militares». Pero se precisa en la
prcßunta A, 1, a, que cl t^rmino « dclito » se toma en scntido amplio, es decir
en el sentido de infraccion. y no en el sentido estricto de este törmino en la
clasificacion tradicional francesa y belga de las infracciones en tres categorias :
crimenes, delitos y contravenciones.
Recuoils de la Soci^t^ internationale de droit p^nal militaire et de droit de
la guerre, tomc IV voIume 1, Rapport general de R. PAUCOT, p. 71.
Ibid., el cuestionario es reproducido, en francös p. 143 ; ingl^s p. 145 ;
y espanol p. 147. ^
PREFACIO
29
puesto el acento sobre la importancia de este problema y senalado el inte-
res del sistema de los Cödigos integrales en una nota dirigida a un Consejo
de Direcciön al cual no pudo asistir (5).
A esta cuestiön de las relaciones entre los Cödigos penales militares y
los otros Cödigos penales, se liga un problema capital : el de la aplicaciön,
total 0 parciah del Derecho penal general de derecho coniün a las infrac-
ciones militares (cuestiön A, 1, c).
AI lado de esas tres cue^stiones de ordcn general, tendentes a encontrar
los criterios detcrminantes del ambito de las infracciones militares, habia
parecido oportuno preguntar a los Ponentes para que respondiesen breve-
mente a cuatro cuestiones concernientes a casos particalares en relaciön
directa con la investigaciön del ambito e^^pecijico de las infracciones mili-
tares :
— La embriaguez, ^', tiene consecuencias penales diferentes segün este en
relaciön con infracciones militares o infracciones de Derecho comün?
(cuestiön A, 1, d).
— El sistema penal para los menorcs delincuentes, l se apUca a las infrac-
ciones militares ? (cuestiön A, 1, e).
— Los delitos cometidos en la ejecuciön de una orden, /. puedes estar jus-
tificados o excusados legahnente ? (cuestiön A, I, f).
— i Cudl es la incidencia de los Convenios internacionales sobre el Dere-
cho penal militar naciopal ? (cuestiön A, 3).
Una segunda serie de problemas conciernen a la divisiön o clasifica-
cion de las infracciones militares en grandes categorias (cuestiön B, 1 y 2).
Ademds de una cuestiön relativa a la procedencia de modificar la clasifi-
cacion existente (cuestiön B, 5), se preguntaba si las infracciones militares
estdn definidas de una manera mds precisa o mds flexible que las infrac-
ciones de Derecho comün (cuestiöri B, 3), y si los hechos no incriminados
por las leyes penales militares pueden ser sancionados disciplinariamente
(cuestiön B, 4). Este ultimo problema volvia a considerar uno de los ele-
mentos del tema estudiado con ocasiön del I Congreso de la Sociedad, es
decir las relaciones entre la acciön penal y la acciön disciplinaria (6),
Asi, en el cuadro de la investigaciön de un concepto, ha sido posible,
y necesario, abordar aspector muy diversos del Derecho penal militar y
mds especialmente las conexiones entre este Derecho y el Derecho penal
comün. Los autores de las Comunicaciones nacionales y preferentemente
el Ponente general, tuvieron que sobrepasar ampliamente los aspectos par-
ticulares del Derecho penal militar, aumentando, por tanto, en la misma
medida el interes de sus trabajos para los criviinalistas no especializados
en la esfera militar.
(5) Ibid., p. 37.
(6) Action penale et action dl^ciplinaire, Recueils de la Soci^t^ internationale de
droit p^nal militaire et de droit de la guerre, Tonne I, Strasbourg, 1960.
1
3ü
John GILISSEN
PREFACIO
31
Extiadiciön por delitos militares
tares, esta tendencia tropieza con numerosos ohstdculoSy unas veces juridi-
cos y otras, principalmente, politicos.
«
1
Pasando del piano de la comparaciön de los derechos nacionalcs al pia-
no del derecho intcrnacionaL el Congreso de Madrid ha estudiado, mäs es-
pecijicainente, el probleina de la cxtradicion por las infracclones viilitares,
La relacion entre los dos temas es evidente. Porque, si en la mayor
parte de los Estados cstä prohibida la extradiciön por delitos militares, con
reserva de algunas excepciones, es preciso saber a que infracciones es apli-
cahle esta prohilncion.
Puede parecer sorprendente que, para el Ponenie General del segunda
tenia, conio para la viaijor parte de los Pom^ntes nacionales, el prohlema
de la definiciön de las infracciones viiliiares no parece que les presente
grandes dificultadcs. Constatando qne existcn dos categorias de infraccio-
nes militares, las infracciones puramente nnUtares y las infracciones mili-
tares mixtas o coniplejas, M. Potz precisa que (nsobre la cuestion de saber
lo que CS preciso entender por infracciön puramente viilitar e infraccion
mixta o compleja, no existen realmente divergencia de opiniones (7).
Para Jas infracciones puramente militares, es decir «aquellas que con-
tienen elementos constitutivos particulares que son extranos al Derecho
penal comün y que nacen de la situacion militar particular », la imposibi-
lidad de extradiciön nacida hacia los aiios 1830, continüa erigida como prin-
cipio general. Si bien algunas excepciones se remontan a la epoca en la
que, por acueruos bilaterales, dos paises acordaian entregarse mütuamente
sus desertores (Espana y Portugal, 1884), otras aparccen en el seno de acu-
erdos multilaterales celebrados recientemente cjitrc paises amigos (paises
nordicos de Europa, 1961 ; Benelux, 1962).
Por otra parte, como consecuencia de la presencia de tropas de un
pais sobre el territorio de otro, hecho cada vez mds frecuente debido a las
alianzas militares y a la cooperaciön militar internacional efectivamente
organizada en tiempo de paz, la prätica de la entrega de militares por el
Estado sobre el que encuentran al Estado de origen, fuera ael procedimien-
to de extradiciön, ha conocido un gran desarrollo. La mutua ayuda policial
y judicial, prevista por algunos tratados de alianza militar, no esta, sin
embargo, organizada ni aplicada de una manera uniforiiie, porque, como
sefiala M. Pötz, « el problema de la entrega de militares desertores por via
distinta de la extradiciön constituye igualmente un problema politico)) (8).
En el presente Recucil, se contienen precisiones aportadas por las comuni-
caciones nacionales sobre el estado actual de la practica en este terreno,
En conclusiön, se puede constatar una evoluciön general tendente a
permitir la extradiciön o la entrega de militares que han cometido una in-
facciön militar entre Estados ligados entre si por alianzas militares o po-
liticas. Pero, por la propia razön de la naturaleza de las infracciones mili-
Criminologin militar
(7) Infra p. 55, trances p. 73 ; ingles p. 81 ; espanol p. 89.
(8) Injra p. 95.
El estudio de la criminologia militar esta todavia poco desarrollado.
La Principal dificultad con que tropiezan los trabajos en esta materia, es
el caräcter mds o menos secreto, explicable por motivos de seguridad de
las bases estadisticas relacionadas con la criminalidad militar. Se ha com-
probado, sin embargo, que ciertos paises publican, de forma oficial las es-
tadisticas de las actividades y decisiones de las juridicciones militares;
en los demds paises, la oposiciön a la publicidad de estos datos parece que
podrd ser levantada despues de un cierto lapso.
La Comisiön de Criminologia jnilitar, creada en el seno de la Sociedad
internacional de Derecho penal militar y Derecho de la guerra, se reuniö,
por ves primera, con ocasiön del Congreso de Madrid. Tuve personalmente
el honor de presentar una ponencia sobre aPrimeros resultados de una en-
cuesta internacional sobre criminologia militar ».
Se habian obtenido respuestas en relacion a un cuestionario sobre esta
materia procedentes de siete paises: Republica Federal Almana, Belgica,
Canadd, Espana, Estados ünidos, Francia y Noruega. Las estadisticas de
que se pudo disponer eran de una importancia y de un valor muy diferente
y por ello se expresö el deseo de intentar obtener una mayor uniformidad
en la elaboraciön de las estadisticas anuales inspirdndose en las conclusio-
nes de los trabajos hechos sobre la clasificaciön de las infracciones milita-
res que habian sido estudiadas en el cuadro de uno de los temas del Con-
greso de Madrid.
Por otra parte, los metodos de trabajo en el estudio de la criminologia
militar ponian de manifiesto, igualmente, una gran diversidad de tenden-
cias. Resultö, sin embargo, posible presentar algunas reflexiones sobre re-
sultados obtenidos por investigaciones basadas sobre un andlisis cuidadoso
de la personalidas de los delincuentes militares, especialmente en Belgica,
Estados Unidos y Francia.
Las comunicaciones nacionales recibidas, asi como el esbozo de una
primera sintesis, serdn publicadas en la « Revue de droit penal militaire
et de droit de la guerre », probablemente en el cur so del ano 1969.
Durante la reunion de la Comisiön en Madrid, el Dr. Moutin, capitdn
medico del Hospital militar de Instrucciön de Val-de-Gräce, en Paris, presen-
tö, ademds, una comunicaciön sobre el andlisis clinico y social de numerosos
casos individuales de delincuentes militares franceses, anadiendo muy
ponderadas reflexiones sobre la prevenciön y el tratamiento de la delincuen-
cia en el medio militar.
II John GILISSEN
Es de esperar que estos primeros trabajos suscitarän otros, en otros pai-
ses, que pinnitan el desarrollo de estudios crivünolögicos en un campo ex-
cesivamente olvidado.
Proteccion de la vida humana en la gueira moderna
La {{Comision para In proteccion de la vida humana en la guerra mo-
derna » cuenta, dentro de la Sociedad Internacional, varios anos de existen-
cia. Celehrö una nucva reumön con ocasion del Congreso de Madrid, para
estudiar mäs especialmente el problema de la aeronave militar en misiön
sanitaria. El problema planteado era, principalmente, el del helicoptero sa-
nitario, pero deliberadamente sa habia utilizado una denominaciön mäs am-
plia para poder abarcar tecnicas juturas.
En SU Ponencla generale el General Mayor Medico Evrard (Belgica)
presento un resunien de los trabajos de la Comision Medico-Juridica de
Monaco, que ha elaborado un proyecto de texto destinado a modijicar los
Convenios de Ginebra. Entre las lagunas que es preciso cubrir, destacö la
necesidad de dar una dejiniciön de los aparatos protegidos, de instituir se-
nalizaciones por niedios modernos radioelectricos, para identificar los apara-
tos marcados con los signos convencionales, de suprimir la obligaciön de
un previo plan de vuelo, y de determinar la proteccion de las aeronaves
sanitarias cuando evolucionan sobre zonas de cperaciones, sobre todo las
de «extrema vanguardia», en las que debiera perinitirse actuar al helicop-
tero sanitario.
El sumario de las discusiones de esta Comision ha sido publicado en
la « Revue de droit penal militaire » n" VI-1, 1967, pdg. 198-199.
El interes de estos trabajos de la Comision para la proteccion de la vida
humana, no puede escapar a nadie, pues reunicndo alrededor de la misma
mesa juristas y militares, permite conjrontar los aspectos tecnicos y juridi-
cos del problema con las realidades de la guerra moderna.
Historia del Dereeho penal y disciplinario militar
La Comision constituida para promover el estudio histörico del Dere-
eho penal y disciplinario militar, se reuniö tambien por primera vez con
ocasion del Congreso de Madrid. Bajo la presidencia del Projesor de Graafj
(Holanda), pudo fijar las bases de sus juturas actividades, gracias a la cola-
boraciön prometida por unos sesenta especialistas,
Tres co7nunicaciones fueron presentadas en Madrid :
*•
PREFACIO
33
— Algunos problemas de Dereeho militar con ocasion del empleo de ejir-
citos de composiciöji intcrnacional al servicio de la Repüblica de las
Provincias Unidas. (M. H.H.A. de Graajj, Holanda) ;
— Evoluciön del procedimiento militar alemän durante el siglo XIX (Dr,
O. Ehrl, Repüblica Federal Alemana) ;
— Dereeho relativo al rescate de un cautivo durante la Guerra de los den
Anos (Coronel G.LA.D. Draper, Inglaterra).
Estos tres estudios han sido publicados en la « Revista de dereeho penal
militar », volumen Vll-2, 1968.
La Comision se propone estudiar en el futuro el aspecto histörico de
los problemas que serdn objeto de consideracion en los Congresos interna-
cionales de la Sociedad.
Premio de la Sociedad y de la Revista de dereeho penal militar y de
dereeho de la guerra
Durante el Congreso de Madrid, ha sido otorgado. por segunda vez, el
Premio instituido por la Sociedad Intcrnacional y subsidiado por la Revista
de dereeho penal militar y dereeho de la guerra, para premiar un estudio
sustancial y original relativo al Dereeho penal militar, al Dereeho discipli-
nario juilitar o al Dereeho de la guerra.
El Jurado, compuesto por juristas pertenecientes a cinco paises distin-
tos, se encontro con la dijicil tarea de seleccionar entre diecisiete concur-
rentes. El nümero de trabajos sometidos a su apreciaciön es una prueba de
la vitalidad de la Sociedad y del interes de los medios cientificos. Entre los
trabajos que han oeupado, muy especialmente, la atenciön del Jurado y
que por su valor y originalidad habrian merecido ser galardonados, debe-
mos citar los de :
— Don Fernando De Lasala Samper (Espana), sobre «La proteccion a los
heridos, enfermos y näufragos de la fuerzas armadas en campana»,
anälisis projundo de las posturas de la doctrina, a este respecto, desde
el siglo XVI, y principalmente del origen y aplicaciön de las disposicio-
nes de los Convenios de Ginebra ;
— Dr. Walter Meier (Suiza), sobre «Die Bestimmungen über das Kriegs-
verbrechens- und Besetzungsstrafrecht in den Genfer Abkommen zum
Schutze der Kriegsopfer von 1949 », excelente trabajo sobre ciertas dis-
posiciones de los Convenios de Ginebra, principalmente los articulos
49 y siguientes, elaborado sobre la base de una amplia documentacion,
especialmente las decisiones judiciales adoptadas en diferentes paises,
finalizada la segunda Guerra Mundial ;
34 John GILISSEN
— Capitdn Medico Pierre Moutin (Francia), sohre « Une etude de crimi-
nologie differentielle en milieu militaire », elaborado partiendo de un
anälisis clinico y social realizado sohre gran nürnero de rnilitares, con
y sin antecedentes penales, aportacion iinportayite a una rama poco de-
sarrollada de la criminologia ;
— M. F.A. Small (Nueva Zelanda), sohre «The Extradition of Military
deserters at international law », estudio histörico y sohre todo de dere-
che coniparado, sohre un prohlema que ha sido ohjeto de uno de los
temas del Congreso de Madrid ;
— Coronel Dennis A. York (Estados ünidos), sohre « Military due pro-
cess » ; bajo este titulo, el autor examina el procedimiento administra-
tivo para la ha ja en el ej er cito, comparundola con el procedimiento pe-
nal militar enlos Estados Unidos, poniendo de manifiesto cömo gracias a
la jurisprudencia de la Military Court of Appeals de los Estados Unidos,
los derechos suhjetivos de los encartados han tenido inds garantias,
principalviente en el terreno del derecho de defensa ante la jurisdic-
cion militar y del derecho a poder presentar testigos ; estas garantias
no existen en el procediiniento administrativo para la haja en el ejer-
cito, cuando esta medida puede tener graves consecuencias para el por-
venir del militar vuelto a la vida civil ; el autor propone reformas de
« lege ferenda », qup parecen muy acertadas.
A pesar de las calidades excepcionales de estos trahajos, el premio ha
sido concedido a M. Armin Steinkamm (Alemania Federal), que hahia pre-
sentado un importantisimo estudio sohre « Streitkräfte im Kriegsvölker-
recht » (El Estatuto de las fuerzas armadas en el derecho internacional de
guerra).
Este estudio hahia sido recientemente presentado como tesis en la Fa-
cultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Würzhurg. Trata de un prohlema
fundamental del Derecho internacional de guerra, que es al propio tiempo
un prohlema muy actual, puesto que se refiere a los liinites y a las posihi-
lidades actuales de las reglas del Derecho de la guerra en la guerra moder-
na. El lihro de Steinkamm estä hasado en una documentaciön muy extensa,
no solamente alemana sino präcticainente de todos los paises del inundo,
incluidos los paises del Este.
El esfuerzo hecho para definir las nocioncs de <( comhatiente y> y «no
comhatiente » es, realmente, meritorio. El prohlema de los « partisanos »,
{{resistentes» y {( grupos suhversivos )), retiene muy especialmente la aten-
cion del autor, que lo estudia tamhien utilizando textos de los paises del
Este, poniendo en evidencia la evoluciön de las ideas sovieticas respecto a
la nocion juridica de la guerra.
El Jurado aprecio igualmentr el esfuerzo de M. Steinkamm para ela-
horar proposiciones de lege ferenda sohre la nocion de comhatiente.
tf
PREFACIO
35
Tema del Congreso de 1970
Ya, desde ahora, la « Societe internationale de droit penal militaire et
de droit de la guerre » se ocupa de los temas que serän ohjeto de su pröximo
Congreso, que proyecta organizar en Dublin, en mayo de 1970.
Como en ocasiones anteriores, dos temas han sido escogidos : por una
parte, el prohlema de la obediencia militar en relaciön con los Derechos
penales internos y con el Derecho de la guerra ; de otra parte, la busqueda
de una definiciön de las nociones de « guerra » y de « comhatiente ». Si el
Printer tema interesa especialmente a los penalistas, el segundo trata de
contrihuir al desarrollo cientifico del derecho de la guerra, intentando con-
cretar algunas nociones fundamentales.
«
El Congreso de Madrid ha sido una vez mds prueha evidente de la vi-
talidad de nuestra Sociedad Internacional, tanto por los trahajos sohre los
temas principales, como por la actividad de las Comisiones especializadas
y el interes suscitado por el premio trianual, la Sociedad ha demostrado
que las materias en las que se halla interesada, pueden constituir el ohjeto
de investigaciones cientificas de un valor y de una importancia igual a las
que pueden desarrollarse en las deinds ranias del Derecho.
I»f
37
COMITE DU CONGRES
Le Congres de Madrid a 6te organise par la Soci^te internationale
de droit penal militaire et de droit de la guerre avec la collaboration
de la Section Espagnole de la Societe et sous le haut oatronage de :
S.E. D. Agustin NUNOZ GRANDES
Vicepresidente del Gobierno
D. Antonio Maria de ORIOL y URQUIJO
Ministro de Justicia
D. Camilo MENENDEZ TOLOSA
Ministro del Ejercito
D. Pedro NIETO ANTUNEZ
Ministro de Marina
D. Jose I ACALLE LARRAGA
Ministro del Aire
et d*un Comite d'honneur compose de :
Excmo. Sr. D. Cesar MANTILLA LAUTREC
Teniente General, Jefe del Estado Mayor Central del Ejercito
Excmo. Sr. D.Ramon CARMONA y PEREZ de VERA
Teniente General, Presidente del Consejo Supremo de Justicia
Militär
Excmo. Sr. D. Carmelo MEDRANO EZQUERRA
General de Division, Suhsecretario del Ministerio del Ejercito
Excmo. Sr. D. Acisclo FERNANDEZ CARRIEDO
Director General de Justicia del Ministerio de Justicia
\
38
COMITE DU CONGRES
Excmo. Sr. D. Benito PICO MARTINEZ
Fiscal Togado del Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militär
Excmo. Sr. D. Jose ABTA ZURITA
Ministro Togado, Asesor General del Ministerio de Marina
Excmo. Sr. D. Pedro VILLACAnAS GONZALEZ
Consejero Togado, Asesor Juridico del Ministerio del Aire
Excmo. Sr. D. Juan AGUIRRE CARDENAS
Auditor General, Asesor Juridico del Ministerio del Ejercito
Le Comite organisateur etait compose comme suit
COMITE DU CONGRES
Sr. D. Martin BRAVO NAVARRO
Capitan Auditor del Aire
Sr. D. Carlos GIRGADO DOGE
Capitan Auditor del Ejercito
Sr. D. Emilio DE MIGUEL ZAMORA
Capitan Auditor del Ejercito
Sr. D. Matias HERNANDEZ GARCIA
Capitan de Ü.M.
39
Pr&ident :
Excmo. Sr. D. Eduardo de NO LOUIS
Auditor General del Ejercito
Vice-President :
Excmo. Sr. D. Antonio LOPEZ BLANCO
General Auditor de la Armada
Secretaire general
Ilmo. Sr. D. Julio SAINZ BROGERAS
Coronel Auditor del Ejercito
Membres :
Sr. D. Carlos GOMEZ JARA
Teniente Coronel Auditor del Aire
Sr. D. Jesus GARCES LOPEZ
Teniente Coronel Auditor de la Armada
Sr. D. David ADAN HERRERO
Comandante Auditor del Ejercito
Sr. D. Joaquin ROMERO SIMON
Capitan de Cahalleria, Diplomado de E.M.
f
* I
41
SEANCE INAUGURALE
Une seance solennelle s'est deroulee le 9 mai au siege central du
Conseil superieur des Recherches Scientifiques en presence des represen-
tants du Gouvernement, des autorites locales et de nombreuses hautes
personnalites judiciaires et militaires.
Le President de la Societe, M. le Professeur Giuseppe Ciardi,
Teniente Generale Capo della Giustizia Militare, a, le premier, pris la pa-
role en ces termes :
Excelencias, Sefioras v Senores,
Tengo el alto honor de pronunciar, como presidente de la Sociedad
Internacional de Derecho penal militar y de Derecho de guerra, el discurso
inaugural de este cuarto Congreso Internacional, que empieza bajo los
auspicios y con el alto patronato de los ministros del Ejercito, del Aire,
^de la Marina y del Ministro de la Justicia de Espana, en presencia de tan-
tas altas autoridades espanolas y extranjeras, de juristas ilustres, legisla-
dores, hombres de ciencia, de toga y de armas, aqui congregados proce-
dentes de todas las partes del mundo.
Sobre todo lo hago con profundo afecto hacia esta tierra predilecta e
insigne ; llena de glorias y de historia, en este esplendido Madrid, bien
digno de alzar hoy la antorcha que ilumina nuestro Camino en el que noso-
tros nos proponemos continuar, despues de once aiios de intensa activldad
y tres precedentes congresos, nuestros trabajos y nuestros estudios para
conseguir los altos fines que nos proponemos.
A todas las ilustres personalidades y a las delegaciones de los diversos
paises, presento, en nombre de la Sociedad Internacional de derecho penal
militar y de derecho de guerra, nuestro saludo al Senor Camilo Menendez
Tolosa, que nos ha dado la bienvenida, agradeciendoselo mucho. — En
nombre de todos dirijo nuestro saludo respetuoso y vibrante al Jefe del
Estado que representa y rige la suerte de Espana.
1 I
11
ll
jl
42
SEANCE INAUGURALE
La Sociedad Internacional de derecho penal militar y de derecho de
guerra no se propone intentos puramente cientificos, sinö tambi^n socia-
les y morales, porquc tiende, a traves de su actividad y sus estudios, a Uevar
el derecho penal militar y el derecho de guerra hacia esquemas con funda-
mento comun de civilizaciön, de humanidad y de progreso y que, posible-
mente, sean inspirados en los mismos principios y la misma terminologia
juridica.
Una legislacion penal militar y de guerra, fundadas, en diverses
paises, sobre los mismos principios, contribuirän indudablemente, a la
aproximaciön de los pueblos, a reunir los supremos ideales, consolidar en
ol reciproco respeto, las fuerzas armadas de los diferentes Estados y
rendirlas solidarias para la defenza del progreso y de la paz duradera.
Es anhelo de toda la humanidad, de todas las naciones y todas las
razas, cualquiera sea su religiön, su fe, su ideologia, que las guerras sean
por siempre rechazadas ; pero, aün siendo posible que a traves de la aflic-
cion pasada y presente de nuestra humanidad se pueda llegar a una era
mejor de fraternidad, es preciso que fuerzas militares de cada Estado
existan para tutelar y mantener la disciplina nacional ; como es tambien
necesario que fuerzas militares internacionales puedam siempre intervenir
donde se enciendan focos de insurreccion o, peor aün, luchas cruentas
entre pueblos diversos. — Hoy dia ya existen, en manera limitada, estas
fuerzas internacionales que operan bajo la dependencia de la Organiza-
ciön de las Naciones Unidas.
Por lo tanto un derecho penal militar no podrä jamas ser cancelado
de las ensenanzas juridicas ; un derecho penal militar mas moderno y
adecuado a la humana naturaleza y a las contingentes necesidades de se-
guridad, tendrä que existir siempre.
El progreso se impone tambien en este ramo particularisimo de la
ciencia penal, que no puede ser estatico, sinö dinamico, un progreso que
nos conduzca a esquemas unitarios que se inspiren en las mismas finali-
dades eticas y en misma terminologia.
No olvidemos que la ley penal militar es una ley de valor y de honor.
En ella deben creer todos aquellos que anhelan el respeto de la soberania
de los Estados y la paz del mundo, porque esa ley senala la medida de la
rigida disciplina y del sacrificio que, en todo caso, constituyen la sal-
vaguarda y la defensa de todos valores humanos y sociales.
Como los creyentes de una misma religiön y de una misma f^ se cöno-
cen entre ellos por su credo, asi mismo todas las fuerzas militares de los
diferentes paises, educadas y sostenidas por el credo de los mismos prin-
cipios, orientarän su costumbre y sus almas hacia un sistema de normas
que concretan el comun fundamento y la razon por la cual fueron creadas.
Y, si el nombre de nuestra Sociedad reevöca el derecho de guerra, y
si tenemos que creer tambien que no sea una utopia evitar los conflictos
belicos, dejarlos a parte para siempre, es necesario que, en la espera de
un mundo mejor y de un divino aire que de vida, al fin, a una era duradera
SEANCE INAUGURALE
43
de paz, sean establecidos principios fuertes, claros, precisos para que no
resulten aberrantes los conflictos, si surgieran.
Es tambien necesario regularizar el derecho de gentes para que, en
la deprecada hipotesis, la humanidad se salve y pueda reenprender su fati-
goso Camino sin ser arrollada por una apocalisis que haga nuestra tierra
un mundo sin vida y que destruya la obra sublime de la creaciön.
No debemos olvidar que la guerra determina el trastorno de las nor-
mas en todos los sectores juridicos no solo en el campo penal sinö tambien
en lo civil, comercial y administrativo. — Cuando se habla de derecho
de la guerra no se refiere solo al derecho penal militar, sinö tambien a
cada ramo del saber juridico, como ademäs claramente trasparenta de
las varias legislaciones dictadas por los diferentes Estados beligerantes en
tiempo de guerra.
Ahora, fijar normas de caracter estatutario, de las que puedan tomar
inspiraciön y origen las diversas legislaciones de guerra y los tratados y
convenciones internacionales, quiere dicir proteger, por lo menos en parte,
el porvenir y la vida misma de los pueblos.
Nuestros estudios y nuestras metas no estan, pues, dominados por un
ideal belico que ponga bases espirituales de guerras futuras, sinö por un
anhelo profundo, por una esperanza de paz universal, que podrä ser sola-
mente actuada en la plena seguridad del orden interno e internacional
que de tranquilidad y certeza de vida a todos los pueblos de la tierra.
La etica de la naciones se desarroUa grado a grado y demasiados lutos
y sangre se ha derramado para que, al fin, los pueblos y los gobiernos res-
ponsables no comprendan que yä es hora de emprender otras vias supe-
rando los obstaculos, en el respeto absolute del derecho de gentes.
El primer tema desarrollado en nuestro primer congreso interna-
pional en Bruselas, ha sido precisamente el relativo a los « problemas plan-
teados por la colaboraciön militar internacional ».
Ya en el pasado, fueron actuadas tentativas para fijar la unidad del
derecho marciäl entre Estados aliados : tipicos, en este caso, son los estu-
dios realizados al tiempo de la organizaciön militar de la C.E.D. y de los
que forma parte el protocolo relativo al derecho penal militar, firmado en
Paris el 27 marzo 1952.
En nuestros tres precedentes congresos hemos tratado otros proble-
mas fundamentales que se refieren a el aeromovil militar, al derecho de
gentes, a la subordinaciön militar t n el piano de una cooperaciön internacio-
nal, a la garantia de los derechos individuales en la represiön penal y disci-
plinaria, a las relaciones entre la acciön penal militar y la disciplinaria, a
la defensa del inculpado.
En este cuarto congreso serän tratados los siguientes temas : « la in-
criminacion ambilo de la infarciön militar » y « la extradiciön y sus
posibilidades de evoluciön». Ademäs grupos especializados profundizarän
M
44
SEANCE INAUGURALE
dichos temas y se ocuparän, tambien, de la historia del derecho penal
militar. — Opino seria, indudablemente, muy importante y actuäl, so-
meter a la publica opiniön y a las autoridades cualificadas de cada Estado,
aquellos principios basicos, que puedan servir de guia al desarroUo de
los institutos y de las legislaciones militares nacionales a internacionales.
— A proposito, recuerdo que la revista internacional de derecho penal
militar y de derecho de la guerra, publicada por nuestra Sociedad y re-
dactada en seis idiömas, trata, con profundidad de investigaciön y con
inteligencia, los principales problemas que pertenecen a nuestro sector.
Se publica en Bruselas y colaböran competentes escritores de cada naciön.
— Dicha revista constituze, verdaderamente, una magnifica palestra de
estudios y un elemento de profundizacion y de divulgaciön de la ciencia del
derecho penal militar.
A este proposito siento el deber de recordar, en este congreso de Madrid,
que aqui se publica una revista de derecho penal militar que tiene carac-
ter internacional, porque recoje escritos de personalidades competentes
de cada rais. Es un modelo por la amplitud y la importancia de los temas
tratados y por el sistema actuado en su redacciön.
Pero la actividad cientifica y de colaboracion entre los diversos Paises,
se desarrolla tambien a traves de los grupos nacionales de la Sociedad
que funcionan como centros de estudios y de consults.
La lenta formacion de un derecho penal militar comparado, que se
funde sobre los mismos principios, haria posible la evoluciön de una con-
ciencia unitaria internacional, de una comprensiön entre los pueblos civi-
lizados de la tierra amantes de la paz de la libertad, y, con el tiempo,
haria posible tambien la organizacion de una legislaciön militar nacional
o internacional o supranacional, fundada sobre los mismos esquemas parä
que sea salvaguardada la dignidad humana y, al mismo tiempo, sean
satisfechas las exigencias supremas de las fuerzas armadas.
Nosotros creemos on este porvenir y deseamos que todas las sociedades
nacionales, aün mantenendo viva la antorcha del amor de patria, puedan
sentirse tambien, con nueva y mas alta conciencia juridica y social, hijos
de una mas grande patria, en la obediencia de leyes civiles y militares ana-
logas y comunes, idoneas para consolidar la uniön de los pueblos.
Desde Europa yä algunos principios pasan a las naciones de otros con-
tinentes y ya fundaciones de vn tan gran edificio se recononcen en
la O.N.U. ^
En la atormentada historia de estos Ultimos decenios hemos visto res-
petadas las convenciones que rechazaban la guerra realizada con los gases
y la guerra bacteriologica, y hoy yä esperamos en gestiones pendientes
parä evitar la guerra atomica y los desastres consecuentes a toda la hu-
manidad.
Cada Estado y todas las fuerzas de cada Pais tienen que contribuir
a la formacion de un movimiento unico dirigido a este f in.
SEANCE INAUGURALE
43
La ley penal militar, como han dicho ilustres juristas y legisladores, es
una ley politica por su altisimo fin, porque supone el mantenimiento de
la disciplina de las fuerzas armadas, que constituyen la suprema tudela de
la soberania del Estado, de la defensa, de la integridad y de la unidad de
la patria, contra las agresiones externas. — Este caracter de la ley penal
militar no comporta lentitüd procesal o cmtiguos procedimientos, sinö que
debe, por la reintegracion del orden juridico turbado y por el modelo de
sus juicios, adecuarse y descubrir el metodo de una justicia rapida, perö
segura, que concrete su juicio en la mas intransigente objetividad
y equidad y, al mismo tiempo, reintegre oportunamente dicho orden, cuando
Viva y presente estä todavia la alarma por la infraciön cometida.
— Por lo tanto nuestra Sociadad ponc, en consecuencia, el fin y el
empeiio que se relacione con tal ley, en los limites de sus estudios y de
sus iniciativas. Asi que, sün siendo una Sociedad libre, de derecho, se reve-
la como una institucion digna de ser considerada por el conjunto de su
actividad internacional, notable por direciones y metas, en el interes de
todas las naciones civilizadas.
No solamente los Paises pertenecientes han aumentado de numero
en estos once anos de vida (de cinco a trenta ocho), sinö que las mismas
delegaciones y representaciones que llegan ahora, yä desde todos los conti-
nentes estän, en general, formadas de personalidades militares y de ju-
ristas congregados yä en varios congresos, con el consentimiento y la auto-
rizaciön de sus gobiernos.
Esperamos que esta nuestra institucion, encuentre en el orden inter-
nacional, un mas adecuado y juridico reconocimiento, parä poder mejor
realizar las tareas que en su estatuto se prefi^uran, en el interes de todas
las iucrzas armadas y de cada Pais en ellas representado, para contribuir
asi a la realizaciön del fin supremo de la paz y al progreso de la civiliza-
ciön.
* Auguramos que, en una era no muy lejana, la tierra, el mar y
el cielo puedan ser recorridos por todos los hombres libremente en la salva-
guarda de las leyes internacionales.
Yä en nuestra Europa se entreven los primeros resultados, por lo cual
se estä realizando el pensamiento profetico de Montesquieu : «L'Europe
n'est qu'une nation composee de plusieurs », pensamiento que mas clara-
mente ha sido expresado por el espanol Jose Ortega y Gasset con la cono-
cida fräse : « La unidad de Europa no es una f antasia, sinö que es la reali-
dad misma, y la f antasia es precisamente la otra, la creencia de que Francia,
Alemania, Italia o Espaiia son realidades substantivas e independientes ».
— En el surco de estas premisas, formülo el voto que las jovenes gene-
raciones de hoy puedan recoger el fruto de nuestras esperanzas, de nuestros
deseos y de nuestros sacrificios, y con este auspicio declaro abierto en
Madrid el cuarto congreso de la Sociedad Internacional de derecho penal
militar y de derecho de guerra.
SEANCE INAUGURALE
4 t)
RESUME
Le President du Congrds, aprds avoir rendu hommage k rEspagne, « terre privi-
16gi<§e et insigne, dont "'histoire ost chargee de gloire » vi k toutes Ics hautes auto-
rit6s präsentes, a rappelt que la Society internationale de droit p^nal militaire et
de droit de la gueire nc sc propose pas des buts exciusivement scientiliques, nnais
pareillement des lins hautement socia'cs et morales, parce qu'elle entend, ä travers
ses propres activit^s et sos etudcs. acheminer le droit p^nal militaire et le droit
de la guerre vers dos conceptions fond^es sur une vision commune de la civilisation,
de l'numanite et du progr^s et qui, dans la mesure du possible, s'expriment partoüt
par les memes principcs juridiques et une terminologie identique.
C'est l'aspiration de toute l'humanit^ et de toutes ]es races, par-dolä leurs
diversit^s religieuses et ideologiques, que les guerics soient bannies ä jamais. II
tombe ccpcndant sous le sens que des forces armees doivent encore subsister k
l'int^rieur de chaque Etat i^our proteger la discipline nationale, de meme que des
forces armees internationales doivent par ailleurs toujours pouvoir intervenir lä oü
s'allument des foyers de troub.es et des insunections ou, plus malheureusement
encore, des lüttes cruelles entre divers peuples. Le droit penal militaire ne pourra
donc jamais ctre raye du nombrc des disciplines juridiques : la söcurite generale
exige un droit penal militaire plus moderne et davantage adapt^ ä la nature humai-
ne et aux contingences.
La d^nomination de notre soci^tö se refdre d'autre part au droit de la guerre
parce que, dans l'attente de tcmps meilleurs, il reste n^cessaire que des rdgles claires
et pr^cises soient stabiles pour rendre les conflits moins monstrueux et moins cruels,
s'il en surgit encore.
Apr^s avoir 4voque ces premisses fondamontales, le President a rappelö quels
6taient les th^mos qui devaient etre developpös au 4e Congr^s international de
Madrid, principalcment ceux de l'incrimination et du domaine des infractions
militaires et de l'extradition. II a en outre Signale l'existence de la Revue interna-
tionale de droit penal militaire et de droit de la guerre qui est publice k Bruxelles
sous l'egide de la Societe et qui, redigee en 6 langues. est vraiment un modele du
genre par Tamplcur et l'importance des sujets traites. II a d'autre part mentionnö
a Revue de droit militaire qui est edit^e k Madrid, sous l'egide de la magistraturc
militaire espagnole, et oü paiaissent des etudes de a plume d'emineiitcs person-
nalit^s de tous les pays.
Enfin, il a rappele l'activit^ scientifique et la collaboration qui, dans le do-
maine du droit penal militaire et du droit de la guerre, est aussi deployöe au sein
des 27 groupes nationaux de la Society qui fonctionnent comme centres d'etudes,
de consultation et d'impulsion, et qui, en ex^cution des directives du Conseil de
direction, sont animes par le secretariat general de la Societe, lequel a son si^ge
k Strasbourg.
Apräs s'etrc pench^ un instant sur le caractäre politique de la loi pönale mili-
taire, edict^e pour le maintien de la discipline des forces armees qui constituent la
sauvcgardc supreme de la souverainet^ de l'Etat, de la defense, de l'int^gritd et
de l'unit^ de la Patrie, l'orateur a soulignö que cette loi ne peut comporter des
procedures lentcs et surannees. Pour restituer l'ordre juridique militaire troubl6
par le d^Iit et pour assurer l'exemplarit^ de ses sentences, cette loi doit au con-
traire s'adapter et decouvrir les normes d'une justice rapide, mais süre, qui concr6-
tise ses jugements dans l'objectivite la plus iiitransigeante et l'equit^, tout en
sachant restaurer ä temps l'ordre trouble, c'est-ä-dire lorsque le souvenir du d61it
est encore vivant et present aux esprits.
En conclusion, l'orateur a formule l'espoir que, dans une ^re pas trop ^loign^e
de nous, la terre, ^a mer et le ciel puissent etre parcourus librement par tous les
hommes, sous la protection des lois internationales, et a rappelt que d^jä, dans
SEANCE INAUGURALE
47
notre Europe, se pergoivent les Premiers indices qui v^rifieront la pens^e proph^-
tique de Montesquieu : « TEurope n'est qu'une nation compos^e de plusieurs ».
Plus explicitement le grand ecrivain espagnol Jos^ Ortega y Gasset a affirm^ que
« l'unit^ de l'Europe n'est pas une iantaisie, mais une realite ; la fantaisie est pr6-
cis^ment de s'imaginer e contraire, en pensant que la France, TAllemagne, l'Ital'p
et TEspagne sont des realiles substantivcment independantes ».
SUMMARY :
The Chairman. after paying tribute to Spain, a « privileged land laden with
glory » and to all the eminent authorities present, recalled that the International
Society for Miütary Law and the Law of Wi^r has not set itself purely scientific
ends, but equally strives to achieve lofty social and ethical purposes, because its
intent, by means of its activitics and studics, is to lead criminal law and the law
of war along the read that abuts on to a common vision of civilisation. humanity
and piogress and which also strives to unify principles of law and terminology.
All the races that make up mankind aspire to the permanent outlawing of
war. beyond ideologica! and religious diversity ; it Stands to reason, however, that
armcd forces must go on exisling within each state to saleguard internal Order,
just as international armcd forces m.ust be in a position to intcrvene wherever
trouble and insunections break out or, what is cven more unfortunate, cruel con-
flicts between the various peoples of Ihe world. Military law still therefore always
have to be rcckoned with : general security requires a more up to date System,
more in consonance with human nature and unlorseeable circumstances.
Our Society is also concerned with the law of war, because, while hoping for
better times, it is necessary that clear and precise rules should be drawn up to
rendei- future conflicts that may break out less monstruous and relentless.
After recalling these fundamental premises, the chairman recalled the themes
to be examined at the Madrid International Congress. chiefly that of « indictment
and the field of military offences » and « extradition ». Furthermore, he mentioned
tlje fact of the existence of the Military Law and Law of War Review published
in Brüssels under the acgis of the Society and which, drafted in six languages,
constitutes a model of its kind, by reason of the scope and the weight of the topics
it deals with. The Chairman also referred to the Review of Military Law published
in Madrid iinder the auspices of Spanish Judges : eminent Personalities from
many countries contribute.
Finally, reference was made to the scientific activities and Cooperation in the
fields of military law and the law of war going on within the 27 national groups of
the Society, run as study, consultation and initiating centres and which, by virtue
of the Instructions of the managing board, are coordinated by the Society's general
secretariat in Strasbourg,
After dwelling briefly on the political character of military law, a System
intcnded to maintain discipline in the armed forces, which constitute the supreme
safeguard of state sovereignty and the integrity and unity of the country, the
Speaker emphasised that this System must shed its slow and obsolet procedures.
If it is to uphold the military legal order when breaches occur and see to it that
exemplary sentences are passed, military law must adapt itself and determine the
norms of a swift but reliable System to make concrete its judgments, that must be
based on absolute objectivity and equity, while sanctioning breaches in time, i.e.,
when the oftence is still clearly present in the minds of those concerned.
48
SEANCE INAUGURALE
In conclusion, the Speaker expressed the hopc that, in a not too far distant
future, all men may Ireely and without hindrance use land, sea and air means of
communication. under the saieguard of international law, and recalled that, even
now, the lirst indications were perceptible that would bear out Montesquieu's
prohetic aphorism : « Europe is a Single nation made up of several ». More
oxplicitly, the renovvned Spanish writer Jose Ortega y Gasset has asserted that
« the unity of Europe is not a fantasy but a reality ; the fantasy lies precisely in
Ihinking that France, Germany. Italy and Spain are independant reaiities ».
DISCURSO DEL EXCELENTISIMO SENOR MINISTRO DEL EJERCITO
Camilo MENENDEZ TOLOSA
Sefioras, sefiores :
Por delegaciön del Vicepresidente del Gobierno y Capitän General
Jefe del Alto Estado Mayor, y como Ministro del Ejercito y en nombre de
mis companeros de Marina y Aire, me complazco en dar la bienvenida a
Espana a la brillante representaciön e ilustres componentes de los dife-
rentes paises de Europa y America que nos honran con su presencia en
el «IV Congreso Internacional de Derecho Penal Militär y Derecho de
la Guerra », y desearles una agradable y feliz estancia, con el mayor exito
en las conclusiones que puedan conducir al estudio de los delitos milita-
res, y la extradiciön por delitos militares, que constituyen el temario de
este Congreso.
No dudo que estas conclusiones serän despues recogidas en vuestra
importante publicaciön « Revue de Droit penal militaire et de Droit de
la guerre», y lo que es mäs importante, en los sistemas penal y judicial
militares y aün en el nonal comün de los distintos paises como en ante-
riores ocasiones se hizo y con vista siempre a la unificaciön o aproxima-
ciön en la zona de las grandes alianzas internacionales, en las que inevita-
blemente se plantean a los ejercitos aliados problemas nuevos no solo en
el orden penal sino tambien en el derecho de la guerra.
Estais en Espaüa, pais de larga tradiciön juridico-militar, ya que la
instituciön del Auditor Juridico Militär es casi coetänea con el nacimiento
de los ejercitos permanentes. En nuestra historia juridico-militar, cono
sabeis, figuran figuras mundialmente conocidas en el campo del Derecho
de la Guerra. Asi, Baltasar de Ayala, Auditor de Alejandro Farnesio,
en Flandes ; el italiano Pierino Belli, Auditor del Duque de Alba ;
el Doctor Morcate, Auditor de Don Juan de Austria en la Armada de
Lepanto, y desde 1587 se contiene una regulaciön del oficio de Auditor
en las « Ordenanzas » de Felipe IL
SEANCE INAUGURALE
49
Antes de terminar, quiero agradecer la presencia de la representa-
ciön del Ministro de Justicia, cuyo titular no puede asistir por ineludibles
obligaciones de su cargo. Y de manera especial la del Presidente de la
« Sociedad Internacional de Derecho Penal Militär y Derecho de la Guer-
ra », Teniente General Giuseppe Ciardi, quien a pesar de ver difi-
cultados sus movimienLos por una fractura de femur, no ha vacilado en
venir a Madrid para presidir este IV Congreso y presentar despues, preci-
samente en tierra espafiola, su dimisiön por incapacidad fisica.
Nuestro mäs grato recuerdo para fallecido Sr. Gomes Carneiro,
Ministro que fue del Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militär del Brasil y
que, juntamente con el Teniente General Ciardi fueron, en 1959. los
mäs decididos patrocinadores del ingreso en esta Sociedad de los miem-
bros espaiioles.
AI hacer sinceros votos por la prosperidad de vuestros paises y po-
nerme a vuestra disposiciön para cuanto pueda redundar en el mayor
exito y brillantez del Congreso, podeis estar seguros de que encontrareis
aqui las mäximas facilidades para lograr vuestro objetivo primordial :
la mayor armonia de los derechos nacionales con los convenios interna-
cionales en materia de Derecho Penal Militär, y la promociön de un de-
recho establecido en el respeto de los derechos del hombre.
Nada mäs, sefiores.
PALABRAS DEL DIRECTOR GENERAL DE JUSTICIA
Aciscio FERNANDEZ CARRIEDO
Excelentisirno sefior Ministro del Ejercito ;
Excelentisinws e Ilustrisimos sefiores ;
Sefior as y sefiores :
Me cabe el alto honor, en representaciön del sefior Ministro de Justi-
cia, a quien ocupaciones ineludibles de ultima hora le han impedido asistir
personalmente a este acto, de dirigir unas palabras de saludo a los presti-
giosos miembros de la « Sociedad internacional de Derecho Penal militar
y de Derecho de la Guerra», que congrega cerca de un miliar de miem-
bros pertenecientes a 32 paises de la Europa Occidental, America, pröximo
Oriente, Asia y Oceania que, desde 1955, se ocupan afanosamente en la
armonizaciön de los derechos nacionales con los convenios internacionales
en la materia, y en promover un derecho de la guerra establecido en el
respeto de los derechos del hombre.
La finalidad que perseguis no es extrafia a la cultura de nuestra Patria,
en la que la concepciön « ius naturalista » de la guerra tiene su mäs clara
manifestacion al seüalar los representantes de la Escuela espafiola del
Derecho de Gentes el significado de la guerra justa como la condena al
50
SEANCE INAUGURALE
delincuente por el principe ofendido constituido en tribunal. En efecto,
la concepciön escolastica de la guerra justa puede condensarse en las si-
guientes palabras : El principe o el pueblo que declara la guerra, actüa
como un magistrado, bajo cuya jurisdicciön cae una Naciön extranjera
como consecuencia de una falta muy grave, de un crimen que ha come-
tido y que no ha querido reparar, y «minister Dei » debe castigar en los
casos en que el mismo Dios hubiera castigado ; « vindes in ira» no debe
castigar mäs que si aquel a quien condena ha realizado una accion capaz
de provocar la cölera, es decir, la voluntad de castigar de Dios. Solo se
podrä usar del poder para herir o coaccionar al que haya obrado mal, y
esta concepciön que se basa en la existencia del derecho natural, recobro
todo SU alcance dentro de un derecho internacional püblico de cierta per-
fecciön de normas y de organismos, como pone de relieve el articulo 16
del Pacto de la Sociedad de Naciones.
Aün en la concepciön positivista de la guerra, que ve esta como un
medio para resolver un conflicto ideolögico o de intereses, no deja de atis-
barse la necesidad de un stntido espiritualista, si nos atenemos a las pala-
bras de Schiller segün el cual la Hisloria Universal es el tribunal del mundo.
Para un Dirictor General de Justicia, el Derecho de la Guerra, en
general, y el Derecho Penal Militär, en particular, son temas del mäximo
interes. Si despues del celebre discurso de nuestro inmortal Cervantes,
sobre la relaciön de las armas y las letras, no puede omitirse, en la inter-
venciön de cualquier humanista, la refercncia a aquel tema, despues de
los trabajos de Goldschmidt y de Carreras, el primero con su estudio « Guer-
ra, duelo y proceso » y el segundo con su lecciön « Prcceso, guerra y juego »,
nadie, relacionado con la justicia, puede omitir el parangön entre el pro-
ceso, instrumento para la soluciön justa de los conflictos inter subjetivos,
y la guerra como medio de resolver los conflictos internacionales. La guer-
ra, los juegos de caräcter agonistico y el proceso, estän sometidos a nor-
mas generales pensadas para todas las hipötesis, que ticnden a disciplinar la
conducta de los contendientes con caräcter imperative, sin dejar al arbitrio
de los destinatarios su cumplimiento o violaciön ; y si bien las normas
o leyes de guerra no regulan el derecho positivo de la utilizaciön de la
oportunidad para alcanzar la victoria, que constituye el caräcter militar,
si tienen de comün el aspecto negative por el cual se prohiben activida-
des aisladas o se proscriben determinados medlos de lucha. Pero, aün con
la diferencia de medios, pregunto : i Cuänto no hay de afin entre el arte
de litigar y el arte de la guerra ? Si nos referimos, ya en concreto, al dere-
cho penal militar, vuelvo a preguntar : i Cuantos tcmas no nos son co-
munes ? La limitaciön entre la Jurisdicciön ordinaria y la militar, con
los problemas que plantea en esta sociedad dinämica el estacionamiento
de ejercitos de otras Naciones, la existencia de ejercitos de composicion
internacional, etc., son todas cuestiones que nos obligan a prestar la
mäxima atenciön a vuestras deliberaciones que, estoy seguro, han de
estar a la altura de los anteriores Congresos, en los que se abordaron ex-
tremes tan relevantes como « La accion penal y Accion disciplinaria »,
en el de Bruselas ; « La aeronave militar y el derecho de gentes », que tu-
vo SU sede en Florencia ; o en el mäs cercano de Estrasburgo, sobre « Las
garantias de los derechos individuales en la represiön penal y disciplina-
SEANCE INAUGURALE
51
ria militar ». No, no ceden en interes los dos temas de este IV Congreso,
sobre «Los delitos militares» y (uLa extradicion por delitos militaresi».
Y voy a terminar, para no cansar vuestra atenciön.
Que vuestra capacidad y noble intenciön encuentren, en el marco de
este Madrid primaveral, el ambiente propicio para que brote con la lo-
zania de lo justo una aportaciön sobre tan importantes materias.
Chapitre I
RAPPORT GENERAL
55
Rapport gcncral
DIE AUSLIEFERUNG WEGEN
MILITAERISCHER STRAFTATEN
von
Poul-Günter PöTZ
Regierungsdirck tor
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
I. Einleitung
Für mich ist es eine besondere Ehre, vor Ihnen sprechen zu
dürfen Die Internationale Gesellschaft für Wehrstrafrecht und Kriegs-
recht ist mir seit vielen Jahren ein Begriff ; ich verfolge ihre Arbeiten
auf den vielfältigsten Gebieten mit regem Interesse und bm immer wie-
der erfreut zu sehen, dass sie mit Tatkraft und einem sicheren Gespür
für die modernen Gegebenheiten die aktuellen Probleme des Wehrstraf-
rechts und des Kriegsrechts aufgreift auf ihren Kongressen behandelt
und auf diese Weise wesentlich zu ihrer Lösung beiträgt.
Für Sie dagegen bin ich fin Unbekannter. Erlauben Sie mir daher
ein Wort zu meiner Person : 'ch wai früher Richter für Strafsachen.
Seit 7 Jahren bin ich im Bunaesministenum der Justiz der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland mit Fragen des ausländischen und des internationalen Straf-
rechts befasst. Insbesondere beschäftige ich mich mit dem Recht der
Auslieferung und der internationalen Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen^ Das
ist ein Gebiet, das lange Zeit vielen Juristen - wenn sie sich überhaupt
jemals mit ihm befasst hatten - unbekannt war und in dem sich aucft
heute nur verhältnismässig wenige Spezialisten auskennen. Ich glaube
aber, dieses Rechtsgebiet ist es wert, dass sich weitere Kreise mit ihm
beschäftigen, seine vielfältigen Probleme kennenlernen, die gerade in
unserer Zeit zunehmende Bedeutung gewinnen, und sich mit ihnen aus-
einandersetzen. Aus diesem Grund wird sich die Internationale Gesell-
schaft für Strafrecht auf ihrem nächsten Kongreß im Jahre 1969 in
Italien mit dem Thema « Moderne Aspekte der Auslieferung » befassen.
Und ich bin sicher, das man von den Erörterungen auf dem jetzigen
Kongrei5 mit grossem Interesse Kenntnis nehmen wird.
Die Gesellschaft ist daher zu beglückwünschen, dass sie die Frage
der Auslieferung wegen militärischer Straftaten zum Gegenstand ihrer
Beratungen auf ihrem gegenwarti.gen Kongrel^ gemaclit hat. Ich schätze
mich glücklich, zu diesem Thema den Generalbericht erstatten zu dürfen,
und danke Ihnen sehr für die Übertragung dieser Aufgabe.
56
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
II. Vorbemerkungen
Bevor ich mich der Prüfung der Einzelfragen zuwende, darf ich zu-
nächst einige Vorbemerkungen allgemeiner Art machen, die dem besseren
Verständnis dienen sollen, die aber auch erforderlich erscheinen, um
Ihnen die Gesamtproblematik aufzuzeigen.
Auslieferung ist nach herrschender Meinung die amtliche Überstel-
lung einer Person aus der unringeschninkten Straf gewalt eines Staates,
der diese in vollem Umfang aufzugeben bereit ist, in die Strafgewalt eines
anderen Staates zum Zwecke der Strafverfolgung oder der Strafvoll-
streckung. Sie ist die wichtigste Massnahme der zwischenstaatlichen
Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen. Ihre praktische Bedeutung wird erkennbar,
wenn man überlegt, dass die Justizhoheit eines jeden Staates an seinen
Grenzen endet und er ohne die Hilfe anderer Staaten ausserstande wäre,
seinen Strafanspruch oder seinen Anspruch auf Vollstreckung einer Strafe
gegenüber einem im Ausland befindlichen Beschuldigten oder Verur-
teilten zu verwirklichen.
Heute ist das Auslieferungsrecht Bestandteil der meisten Rechts-
ordnungen der Welt. Das war nicht immer so. Die Geschichte des Aus-
lieferungsrechts als Rechtsinstitut ist nämlich noch verhältnismässig
jung. Zwar gab es schon in vorchristlicher Zeit berühmte Auslieferungs-
fälle und -vertrage. Auch wurden, vor allem im 12. Jahrhundert, zwischen
den norditalienischen Fürstentümern Auslieferungsverträge abgeschlossen.
Im wesentlichen aber wurde die Auslieferung als ein politischer Hoheitsakt
angesehen, der weitgehend von der Willkür des Staatsoberhaupts oder
den politischen Machtverhältnissen abhängig war. Erst die Aufklärung
Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts und die durch sie bewirkte politische Umwäl-
zung ließen die Entwicklung des Rechts der Auslieferung zu. Das Ver-
dienst, das erste Auslieferungsgesetz der Welt geschaffen zu haben, kann
Belgien für sich in Anspruch nehmen. Dieses am 1. Oktober 1833 erlassene
Gesetz war das Vorbild für viele Auslieferungsgesetze und hat bis in die
Gegenwart starken Einfluss auf die Gesetzgebung anderer Länder aus-
geübt. Belgien darf daher als Vorkämpfer des Auslieferungsrechts be-
zeichnet werden. Der von Belgien mit Frankreich im Jahre 1834 abge-
schlossene Auslieferungsvertrag ist als der Urtyp der modernen Auslie-
ferungsverträge anzusehen.
In vielen Staaten der Welt ist das Auslieferungsrecht durch ein Aus-
lieferungsgesetz, durch Vorschriften in der Verfassung, dem Strafge-
setzbuch oder der Strafprozessordnung gesetzlich geregelt. Von den euro-
päischen Staaten kennen u.a. Dänemark und Portugal keine gesetzlichen
Bestimmungen über die Auslieferung. Island, Liechtenstein und Österreich
haben in ihren Strafgesetzen nur einige auslieferungsrechtliche Fragen
geregelt.
Noch im 19. Jahrhundert, insbesondere aber im Laufe der letzten
50 Jahre, wurden zahlreiche zweiseitige Auslieferungsverträge geschlos-
i
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RAPPORT GENERAL
57
sen. Unabhängig hiervon hat es viele Bemühungen gegeben, das Aus-
lieferungsrecht einheitlich zu regeln. Insbesondere die Vereinigten Staaten
von Amerika und die süd-amerikanischen Staaten hatten hieran grossen *
Anteil. Eine panamerikanische Konferenz nahm im Jahre 1928 nach
umfangreichen Vorarbeiten in Havanna den « Codigo Bustamente » an.
Dieser enthält eine fast vollständige Regelung der Auslieferung, wurde
am 26. Dezember 1933 in Montevideo unterzeichnet und einige Jahre spä-
ter von 11 Staaten Zentral- und Südamerikas ratifiziert. Andere Versuche
sind an den unterschiedlichen Auffassungen von der Auslieferung als
politischem Machtmittel oder als reiner Rechtshilfehandlung gescheitert.
Trotz dieses Vorbildes kam es erst im Jahre 1957 zu einem weiteren mul- ^:> ' .
tilateralen Übereinkommen. Als Frucht der europäischen Integrations- '^^'^ [ M^So
Politik unterzeichneten am 13. Dezember 1957 11 Mitgliedstaaten des
Europarats, nämlich Belgien, Dänemark, die Bundesrepublik Deutsch- / ^
land, Frankreich, Griechenland. Italien, Luxemburg, Norwegen, Österreich ' ^^ *^
Schweden und die Türkei das Europäische Auslieferungsübereinkommen. ^ '
Später sind ihm noch die Niederlande, Irland und die Schweiz beigetreten.
Wenn dieses Übereinkommen auch nicht alle Fragen abschließend löst
und den Vertragsstaaten noch weitgehende Möglichkeiten zur eigenstaat-
lichen Handhabung ihres Auslieferungsverkehrs läßt, so kann es doch als
ein großer Fortschritt auf dem Weg zu einer Vereinheitlichung des in-
ternationalen Strafrechts angesehen werden.
Von besonderer Bedeutung sind in diesem Zusammenhang zwei wei-
tere multilaterale Übereinkommen, nämlich die Verträge über die Aus-
lieferung und die Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen zwischen Dänemark, Finn-
land, Island, Norwegen und Schweden vom 3. März 1961 sowie zwi-
schen Belgien, Luxemburg und den Niederlanden vom 27. Juni 1962. Beide
Übereinkommen, auf die später noch einzugehen ist, beruhen auf den
besonders nahen Beziehungen der Vertragspartner und sind in ihrer
Ausgestaltung vorbildlich.
Das Auslieferungsrecht wird in vielen Staaten vom Grundsatz der
Gegenseitigkeit beherrscht, d.h. daß der Staat, der eine Auslieferung
verlangt, auch seinerseits in einem vergleichbaren Fall dem anderen
Staat die Auslieferung bewilligt. Dieses Prinzip ist z.B. in der Schweiz
und in der Bundesrcpubhk Deutschland besonders ausgeprägt. Frankreich
dagegen hat in seinem Auslieferungsgesetz von 1927 davon abgesehen,
den Grundsatz der Gegenseitigkeit als Rechtsprinzip ?inzuführen. Andere
Staaten,wie z.B. Finland und Norwegen, haben in ihren Auslieferungsge-
setzen die Gegenseitigkeit ausdrücklich nur für bestimmte EinzelmaI5nah-
men vorgesehen. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die gegenwärtig mit
der Reform des Deutschen Auslieferungsgesetzes befallt ist, wird vor-
aussichtlich auf den Grundsatz der Gegenseitigkeit verzichten.
Als wichtigstes Element des Prinzips der Gegenseitigkeit wird das
Prinzip der beiderseitigen Strafbarkeit bezeichnet. Hiernach ist eine
Auslieferung nur zulässig, w^enn die im ersuchenden Staat verfolgte Tat
auch nach dem Recht des ersuchten Staates strafbar ist.
58
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
RAPPORT GENERAL
59
■ «
It-
Schließlich muß noch das Prinzip der Spezialität genannt werden.
Hiernach darf eine Person in dem ersuchenden Staat nur wegen solcher
vor ihrer Auslieferung begangener strafbarer Handlungen verfolgt wer-
den wegen derer die Auslieferung von dem ersuchten Staat bewilligt
worden ist. Es beruht auf der Überlesung, daß kein Staat einen Verfolg-
ten auf Gnade und Ungnade ausliefert. Dieses Prinzip kann als ein Grund-
satz des Völkerrechts bezeichnet werden.
Damit darf ich den kurzen Überblick über die Entwicklung und
fundamentalen Regeln des Auslieferungsrechts beschließen.
Die Auslieferung wegen militärischer Straftaten, insbesondere wegen
Fahnenflucht, ist im Laufe der Jahrhunderte oft eigene Wege gegangen.
^nSTliat es ffri 17. und 18. sowie im ersten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts zahl-
reiche zwei-und mehrseitige Übereinkommen gegeben, die ausschließhch
die Auslieferung Fahnenflüchtiger betrafen. Zu dieser Zeit war die Fah-
nenflucht ein außerordentlich häufiges Delikt. Das ist nicht weiter ver-
wunderlich, wenn man an die unmenschlichen Bedingungen der Rekru-
tierung sowie an die Disziplinlosigkeit denkt, die charakteristisch für
die überwiegend aus Ausländern bestehenden kleinen Armeen der damals
zahlreichen europäischen Staaten waren. Es handelte sich häufig um
Soldaten, die durch Zwang oder List zum Kriegsdienst gezwungen wurden
und deren Sold lächerlich gering war. Die Auslieferung diente aus-
schließlich politischen Zwecken. Sie war für viele Fürsten vor allem ein
Mittel sich durch Auslieferung ihrer Feinde gegenseitig einen Dienst
zu erweisen. Das 19. Jahrhundert jedoch brachte einen Wechsel in der
Zusammensetzung der Armeen, die zu nationalen Truppen wurden,
ausgerüstet mit neuen Waffen und perfektionierten Taktiken. Abetwa
XTgio^erfolgte eine radikale Wendung. Es setzte sich mehr und mehr der
GT^ndsatz durch, daß eine Auslieferung nur noch wegen Verbrechen und
Vergehen gegen das gemeine RecfiT^tattfinden sollte. Der Grund hierfür
war Innerster Linie die ErTi:^gung, daß kein Staat dazu beitragen wollte,
die militärische Macht eines anderen Staates zu stützen, der möglicher-
weise bald schon sein Feind sein konnte. Das führte dazu, daß m zu-
nehmendem Maße verbündete Staaten Abkommen über die gegensei-
tige Auslieferung fahnenflüchtiger Soldaten schlössen. Als Beispiel seien
die Verträge zwischen Brasilien und Ecuador aus dem Jahre 185J und
zwischen Griechenland und der Türkei aus dem Jahre 1855 erwähnt.
Diese Entwicklung fand ihren Höhepunkt in zahlreichen Vertragen über
die Auslieferung von Fahnenflüchtigen und Wehrdienstverweigerern im
Zusammenhang mit dem Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (z.B. ^f^f^f %f^^^^^^
Vertrag von 1914: deutsch-türkischer Vertrag von 1917). Über den ge-
genwärtigen Stand wird später zu berichten sein.
Wenn ich mich nunmehr der Erörterung der Einzelfragen zu un-
serem Thema «Auslieferung wegen militärischer Straftaten» zuwende,
darf ich zunächst darauf hinweisen, daß der von der Gesellschaft heraus-
gegebene Fragebogen sich als ein sehr nützliches Hilfsmittel erwiesen
hat weil die wesentlichen Probleme in ihm angesprochen worden sind
und auf diese Weise eine Konzentration bei der Bearbeitung der Fülle des
Materials erreicht wurde. Es sind von 16 Ländern Berichte erstattet wor-
den, nämlich von Argentinien, Brasilien, Belgien, der Bundesrepublik .
Deutschland, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Israel, Italien, Kanada, Lux-
emburg, den Niederlanden, Norwegen, Österreich, der Schweiz, Spanien
und den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika. Diese Berichte sind in
ihrem Umfang zum Teil sehr unterschiedlich. Daraus kann aber kein
Schluß auf die Qualität gezogen werden. Wenn ich gleichwohl zwei Lan-
desberichte besonders hervorhebe, dann glaube ich, das deshalb tun zu
können, weil derjenige, den ich selbst erstattet habe, nicht dabei ist : die
Herren Raemaekers, Belgien, und Kalshoven, Niederlande, haben sich
mit besonderer Sorgfalt und einem erheblichen Arbeitsaufwand unserem
Thema gewidmet und aus der Sicht ihrer Länder umfassende Berichte
gefertigt. Ihnen und allen anderen Berichterstattern gilt mein herzlicher
Dank für ihre ausgezeichneten Arbeiten.
Das mir zur Verfügung gestellte Material war sehr umfangreich.
Es liegt in der Natur der Sache, daß im Rahmen dieses Generalberichts
nicht jede Überlegung und nicht jeder Gesichtspunkt gewürdigt werden
können. Ich werde aber versuchen, Ihnen einen möglichst umfassenden
Überblick über die Rechtslage in den einzelnen Staaten und die nationa-
len Auffassungen zu geben.
III. Die Auslieferung wegen militärischer Straftaten
Die Auslieferung wegen militärischer Straftaten ist, wie ich bereits
sagte, seit Jahrhunderten Gegenstand der internationalen Erörterung.
In unserer Zeit hat sie eine besondere Bedeutung gewonnen. Insbeson-
dere nach dem letzten großen Krieg ist es zu umfassenden Militär-
;. bündnissen gekommen, die manche Probleme aufgeworfen haben. Sie
wissen, daß in zahlreichen Staaten der Erde, insbesondere in Europa,
nationale Streitkräfte im Hoheitsgebiet anderer Staaten stationiert wor-
den sind. Dies war eine Folge gemeinsamer Verteidigungsinteressen.
Die Stationierung von Streitkräften verbündeter Staaten auf dem eigenen
Hoheitsgebiet dient der Verstärkung der eigenen und der gemeinsamen
Verteidigungsmöglichkeiten. Sie bringt zwangsläufig eine Erhöhung
der Zahl militärischer strafbarer Handlungen mit sich und stellt diese
Staaten vor das Problem, wie sie sich gegenüber Ansprüchen befreunde-
ter Nationen verhalten sollen, deren Soldaten wegen militärischer Straf-
taten auszuliefern, damit sie im Heimatstaat verfolgt und verurteilt
werden können. Das Problem hat aber auch einen allgemeinen Aspekt :
die heutigen Verkehrsmittel und der erleichterte Grenzübertritt geben
auch den Personen, die sich militärischer Straftaten schuldig gemacht
haben, weitaus größere Möglichkeiten als früher, ins Ausland zu fliehen
in der Hoffnung, dort nicht verfolgt zu werden. Wie sollen sich die Zu-
fluchtstaaten nun gegenüber Ersuchen der Heimatstaaten verhalten,
ihnen die Täter wieder zuzuführen ? Hierfür gibt es zwei Möglichkeiten :
(
»
\
T
V
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
die förmliche Auslieferung und die Überstellung von Soldaten auf einem
anderen Weg.
A. Auylieierung wegen militärischen Straftaten im eigentlichen Sinn.
1. Zunächst ist festzustellen, daß es zwei" Arten von militärischen
strafbaren Handlungen gibt : die rein militärischen und die gemischt
militärischen oder komplexen Straftaten. Zu der Frage, was darunter zu
verstehen ist, gibt es keine wesentlichen Meinungsverschiedenheiten.
Als Ergebnis' der gestrigen Diskussion kann festgestellt werden: rein
militärische Straftaten sind solche strafbaren Handlungen, die einen
speziellen Tatbestand enthalten, der dem allgemeinen Strafrecht fremd
ist und der auf dem besonderen Militärdienstverhaltnis beruht. Hiervon
sind die gemischt milit irischen oder komplexen Straftaten zu unterschei-
den. Hierunter sind solche Handlungen zu verstehen, die sich auch im
allgemeinen Strafrecht finden und dort bereits unter Strafe gestellt
sind, die aber mit Rücksicht auf besondere militärische Verhaltnisse
ihv'ch das Militärrecht zu einem be*>onderen Tatbestand umgestaltet
worden sind. Derartige komplexe Straftaten sind häufig — aber nicht
notwendig — in Militärstrafgesetzbüchern geregelt und mit einer regel-
mäßig höheren Strafe bedroht.
Die vielfach vertretene Meinung, eine Auslieferung wegen rein
militärischer Straftaten werde generell nicht bewilligt, ist nur bedingt
richtig Die meisten Staaten kennen allerdings keine Auslieferung wegen
solcher Handlungen. Häufig ist sie in nationalen Auslieferungsgesetzen
ausdrücklich verboten (Frankreich, Norwegen, Schweiz, Spanien, Bundes-
republik Deutschland). In vielen, vor allem älteren, Auslieferungsgesetzen
sind die auslieferungsfähigen strafbaren Handlungen einzeln aufgeführt
(Enumerationsprinzip). Rein militärische Straftaten sind dort nicht er-
wähnt (Belgien, Großbritannien, Israel, Kanada, Luxemburg, Nieder-
lande). Italien hat keine spezielle gesetzliche Regelung, ebenso wie Os-
terreich, nach dessen Auffassung die Nichtauslieferung wegen rem mili-
tärischer Straftaten aber eine allgemein anerkannte Regel des Volker-
rechts und daher Bestandteil des österreichischen Bundesrechts ist. Diese
Ansicht erscheint indessen bedenklich. Denn die Vereinigten Staaten.
von Amerika und Argentinien kennen z.B. kein gesetzliches Verbot der
Auslieferung wegen derartiger Straftaten und sind deshalb m der Lage,
in Verträgen anderes zu vereinbaren. Gleiches gilt für einige sudanrien-
kanische Staaten. Der brasilianische Landesbericht beantwortet diese
Frage zwar positiv. Dem Auslieferungsgesetz von Brasilien vom 28.4. 19 Jö
(Art. 2 Nr. VII a) ist aber zu entnehmen, daß auch dort die Auslieferung
wegen rein militärischer Straftaten nicht bewilligt wird.
Zusammenfassend ist festzustellen : das Verbot der Auslieferung
wegen rein militärischer Straftaten ist in den meisten Staaten Gesetz.
Wegen der angeführten Ausnahmen wird es aber nicht als eine allgemeine
Regel des Völkerrechts angesehen werden können.
i'
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2. Ein wesentlich anderes Bild ergibt sich in der Frage der Aus-
lieferung wegen gemischtmilitärischer oder komplexer Straftaten. Hier
sind folgende Fallgruppen zu unterscheiden :
a) Ein Auslieferungsersuchen hat eine gemischtmilitärische Straftat
der oben beschriebenen Art zum Gegenstand (z.B. Kameradendieb-
stahl; Nötigung eines Vorgesetzten; tätlicher Angriff auf einen
Vorgesetzten ; Mißhandlung Untergebener).
b) Einem Auslieferungsersuchen liegen eine rein militärische Tat und
eine gemischtmilitärische oder eine ausschließhch nach allgememem
Strafrecht zu beurteilende strafbare Handlung zugrunde, die kei-
nerlei Verbindung zueinander haben (z.B. Fahnenflucht und Unter-
schlagung ; Befehlsverweigerung und Tötung eines Vorgesetzten).
c) Ein und dieselbe Handlung verletzt zugleich ein rein militärisches
Strafgesetz und einen gemischtmilitarischen oder einen allgemeinen
Straftatbestand.
Die letztere Fallgruppe wird hier außer Betracht bleiben können,
da sie der Regelung der rein militärischen Delikte unterfällt.
Die meisten Staaten sehen in ihren Gesetzen die Möglichkeit vor,
wegen gemischtmilitärischer Straftaten die Auslieferung zu bewilligen.
Das gilt auch, wenn eine solche und eine rein militärische Straftat im
Verhältnis der Tatmehrheit zueinander stehen. In diesen Fällen wird
lediglich die Auslieferung wegen der rein militärischen Tat verweigert,
die sich ja von der gemischtmilitarischen trennen läßt (Belgien, Frank-
reich, Israel, Italien, Kanada, Luxemburg, Niederlande, Österreich,
Schweiz, Spanien, Bundesrepublik Deutschland). Für die USA und Argen-
tinien ist diese Frage kein Problem, weil dort ja unter den genannten
Voraussetzungen sogar wegen rein militärischer Taten ausgeliefert
.werden kann. Nach norwegischem Recht ist Bedingung für eine Auslie-
' ferung, daß für die gemischtmilitärische strafbare Handlung keine höhere
Strafe zu erwarten ist als für ein vergleichbares Delikt des gemeinen
Rechts.
In diesem Zusammenhang muß darauf hingewiesen werden, daß in
allen diesen Fällen durchweg die Auslieferung nur dann bewilligt wird,
wenn der ersuchende Staat die Gewähr dafür bietet, daß der Völkerrecht-
liehe Grundsatz der Spezialität beachtet wird. Es muß also zugesichert
werden, daß der Ausgelieferte in dem Staat, an den er ausgeliefert werden
soll, ohne Zustimmung des ersuchten Staates weder wegen einer vor der
Auslieferung begangenen Tat, für welche die Auslieferung nicht bewil-
ligt worden ist, zur Untersuchung gezogen, bestraft oder an einen dritten
Staat weitergeliefert noch aus einem anderen, vor der Auslieferung ein-
getretenen Rechtsgrund in seiner persönlichen Freiheit beschränkt wird,
es sei denn, dass er das Gebiet des ersuchenden Staates innerhalb einer
bestimmten Frist nach dem Tage seiner Freilassung nicht verlässt oder
dorthin zurückkehrt oder von einer dritten Regierung von neuem ausge-
. f
(
62
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
liefert wird. Liegen diese letzteren Voraussetzungen vor, kann ein Be-
schuldigter also auch wegen eines rein militärischen Deliktes verfolgt
werden. Diese Auswirkungen des Grundsatzes der Spezialität, auf die
in den Landesberichten von Großbritannien, Israel, Österreich, der Schweiz,
Spanien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ausdrücklich hingewiesen
worden ist, haben für die rein militärischen Straftaten eine erhebliche
Bedeutung.' Denn auch für derartige Handlungen dürfte die Erfahrungstat-
sache gelten, dass die meisten Täler irgendwann einmal in ihr Heimat-
land zurückkehren.
3. Die bisherige Erörterung hat ergeben, dass das Verbot der
Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten weit verbreitet ist.
Wenden wir uns deshalb nunmehr der Frage zu, ob und in welchem Um-
fang zweiseitige oder mehrseitige Verträge bestehen, die Ausnahmen
von diesem Verbot enthalten.
Bei der Prüfung dieser Frage lasse ich die Verträge ausser Betracht,
die sich auf die Auslieferung von Seeleuten, auch soweit sie Seestreit-
kräften angehören, beziehen. Hier handelt es sich um ein spezielles Pro-
blem, das nicht unmittelbar zu un.serem Thema gehört. Das ergibt sich
schon daraus, dass die Auslieferung von Seeleuten durchweg in Konsu-
larabkommen oder in Handels- und Schiffahrtsverträgen geregelt ist.
Was die Auslieferung im allgemeinen betrifft, so besteht ein welt-
weites Netz von zweiseitigen Verträgen. Dieser Umstand rechtfertigt
die Feststellung, daß die wirksame Bekämpfung der internationalen
Kriminalität ein Anliegen aller Staaten der Welt ist. Um noch bestehende
Lücken zu schließen, ist es insbesondere erforderlich, mit solchen Staaten
Auslieferungsverträge zu schließen, die nach ihrem innerstaatlichen
Recht nur auf Grund eines völkerrechtlichen Vertrages Auslieferungen
bewilligen dürfen.
Eine Analyse der Landesberichte zeigt, daß nur wenige Staaten
die Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten vertraglich geregelt
haben. In keinem der von Italien, Österreich, der Schweiz und der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland abgeschlossenen Auslieferungsverträge ist eine
entsprechende Bestimmung enthalten, so daß man sagen kann, daß
diese Staaten in keinem Fall eine Auslieferung wegen rein miUtäri-
scher strafbarer Handlungen bewilligen können. Ähnlich ist die Rechts-
lage in Großbritannien und Kanada. Hier gibt es zwar Sonderregelungen
für die Truppen der Länder, die zum Commonwealth gehören. Indessen
handelt es sich hierbei nicht um Auslieferungen im eigentlichen Sinn,
obwohl die vertragliche Regelung dieser Institution angepaßt ist. Soweit
ich feststellen konnte, gibt es nur noch einen heute gültigen zweiseitigen
Auslieferungsvertrag, nämlich den zwischen Portugal und Spanien aus
dem Jahre 1884, nach dem sich diese Länder gegenseitig die Fahnenflüch-
tigen der Land- und Seestreitkräfte ausliefern. Dies gilt allerdings nur
für die Staatsangehörigen des ersuchenden Staates.
Dagegen gibt es eine größere Zahl mehrseitiger Abkommen, die das
Problem mehr oder weniger positiv regeln. Die erste Lösung dieser Art
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es
finden wir in dem Übereinkommen über die auslieferung von Montevideo
vom 26. 12. 1933. Dort ist zwar keine völkerrechtliche Verpflicmung^zur
Auslieferung -wegen rein militärischer Straftaten statuiert worden. In Ar-
tikel 3 dieses Übereinkommens ist vielmehr bestimmt, dass der ersuchte
Staat in Fällen dieser Art nicht zur Auslieferung verpflichtet ist. Das be-
deutet aber, dass er die Auslieferung auch wegen einer rein militärischen
Tat bewilligen kanft. Es liegt also im freien Ermessen eines jeden Staates,
wie er sich einem solchen Auslieferungsersuchen gegenüber verhalten
will. Wenn dieses Übereinkommen auch nur in einigen süd und mittel-
amerikanischen Staaten — z.B. Argentinien, Chile, Kolumbien —
und in den USA in Kraft ist, so hat es doch eine erhebliche Bedeutung
weil es — ebenso wie der Codigo Bustamente — für die Staaten, die
es nicht ratifiziert haben, als Quelle V'>lkerrechtlicher Grundsätze über
die Auslieferimg dient. Eine ähnliche Regelung findet sich auch in
Auslieferungsverträgen, die Argentinien mit mehreren Staaten abge-
schlossen hat.
Einen entscheidenden Schritt auf dem Weg zu einer umfassenden
Lösung des Problems haben die nordischen Staaten und die Benelux-
Staaten gemacht. Dänemark, Finnland, Island, Norwegen und Schweden
haben am 3.3.1961 ein Übereinkommen geschlossen, in dem sich diese Län-
der verpflichtet haben, sich gegenseitig auch solche Verbrecher auszulie-
fern, die rein militärische Straftaten begangen haben. Voraussetzung ist
lediglich, dass die Straftat, wegen derer die Auslieferung begehrt wird,
im ersuchenden Staat mit Gefängnis bedroht ist. Am weitesten geht
der am 27.6.1962 zwischen Belgien, Luxemburg und den Niederlanden
geschlossene Vertrag über die Auslieferung und die Rechtshilfe in Straf-
sachen. Er bestimmt, dass diese Länder sich verpflichten, wegen rein
militärischer Straftaten gegenseitig auszuliefern. Einzige Voraussetzung
ist lediglich, dass die dem Auslieferungsersuchen zugrunde liegende Tat
nach dem Recht beider Staaten strafbar ist. Darüber hinaus ist ausdrück-
lich festgelegt worden, daß die Fahnenflucht nicht als politische Straftat
anzusehen ist. Grundlage für diese Lösung war die Erwägung, dass die
enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen diesen Staaten auch auf den militärischen
Sektor ausgedehnt werden muß, zumal sie sich hinsichtlich ihrer natio-
nalen Verteidigung in einer Lage befinden, die eine unbedingte Solida-
rität erfordert.
In diesem Zusammenhang muß auch das von den meisten Staaten ^
des Europarats unterzeichnete Europäische Auslieferungsübereinkommen X^ \^ v'\J
vom 13.12.1957 erwähnt werden. Zwar findet dieses Übereinkommen Q^^
auf rein militärische Delikte keine Anwendung. Es schließt aber nicht
aus, daß wegen dieser Frage zwischen den Vertragsparteien Sonder-
abkommen abgeschlossen werden.
Diese Ausführungen zeigen : die Tendenz geht dahin, die Ausliefe-
rung wegen rein militärischer Delikte nicht in einem allgemeinen Aus-
lieferungsvertrag, sondern nur im Zusammenhang mit einem militäri-
schen Bündnisvertrag zu regeln. Die Verträge zwischen den nordischen
Staaten und den Benelux-Staaten sind daher besonders bemerkenswert,
9
■ •
64
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
weil sie ein hervorragendes Beispiel dafür sind, auf welche Weise unser
Problem einer Lösung zugeführt werden kann.
4. Ich wende mich nunmehr der interessanten Frage zu, welche
nationalen Behörden über ein aus einem anderen Staat eingehendes Aus-
lieferungsersuchen zu entscheiden haben.
In ihrem Fra,L,^ebogen hatte die Gesellschaft diese Frage so formu-
liert : « Welche Behörde ist zuständig um festzustellen, ob ein Ausliefe-
rungsersuchcn wegen einer gewöhnlichen Straftat in Wirklichkeit nicht
eine verkappte Methode ist, um das Auslieferungsverbot bei einer militäri-
schen Straftat zu umgehen ? Ist es dieselbe Behörde, die auch die Entschei-
dung trifft, das Ersuchen des betreffenden Staates abzulehnen oder ihm
stattzugeben?» Dieser Fragestellung liegt offenbar die Annahme zu-
grunde, die Entscheidung werde möglicherweise nur von einer Be-
hörde getroffen, die nicht alle Umstände übersehe. Das scheint indessen
durchweg nicht der Fall zu sein.
Das Verfahren, das aufgrund eines Auslieferungsersuchens durch-
geführt wird, ist in den meisten Ländern gesetzlich geregelt. Zwar ist
es für den Ablauf dieses Verfahrens ohne Bedeutung, ob das Ersuchen
auf einem Auslieferungsvertrag beruht oder ob zwischen den beteilig-
ten Staaten kein solcher Vertrag besteht. Gleichwohl ist davon auszuge-
hen, dai^ ein Staat einen anderen Staat, mit dem er einen Auslieferungs-
vertrag hat, nur dann um Auslieferung ersuchen wird, wenn dieses Ersu-
chen auch Aussicht auf Erfolg hat. Sonst läuft er Gefahr, daß der andere
Staat das Ersuchen als einen unfreundlichen Akt ansieht. Im vertraghchen
Auslieferungsverkehr dürfte deshalb die Gefahr, daß verkappte Auslie-
ferungsersuchen gestellt werden, schon aus diesem Grunde kaum bestehen.
Besteht kein Auslieferungsvertrag, ist es für den ersuchenden Staat oft
schwierig festzustellen, ob der ersuchte Staat einem Auslieferungsersuchen
wiegen bestimmter Straftaten stattgeben kann. In keinem Landesbericht
ist übrigens ein Fall mitgeteilt worden, in dem um Auslieferung eines
Beschuldigten wegen einer gemeinen Straftat ersucht worden ist, während
er in Wahrheit ausschließlich oder in erster Linie wegen einer militärischen
Straftat verfolgt werden sollte. Das würde auch dem früher erörterten
Grundsatz der Spezialität widersprechen.
Die innerstaatliche Regelung des Auslieferungsverfahrens ist unter-
schiedhch. In einigen Ländern, so in Brasilien, Großbritannien und Öster-
reich, sind für die Prüfung der Zulässigkeit und für die Bewilligung
der Auslieferung ausschließlich die Gerichte zuständig. In Argentinien
Belgien, Frankreich, Israel, Italien, Kanada, Norwegen und der Bundes-
republik Deutschland wird die Zulässigkeit der Auslieferung in einem
förmlichen Verfahren von Gerichten geprüft. Über die Bewilligung ent-
scheiden dagegen die Regierungen. Hat ein Gericht eine Auslieferung
für unzulässig erklärt, ist die Regierung an diese Entscheidung gebunden.
Sie darf dann die Auslieferung nicht bewilligen. Ein ähnliches Verfahren
wird in Luxemburg und in den Niederlanden praktiziert. Dort entschei-
den die Gerichte allerdings nicht über die Zulässigkeit der Auslieferung.
RAPPORT GENERAL
65
Sie erstatten ihren Regierungen vielmehr ein unabhängiges Gutachten.
In allen diesen Fällen können die Regierungen ein Auslieferungsersuchen
aber auch von vornherein ablehnen, wenn es offensichtlich eine nicht-
auslieferungsfähige rein militärische Straftat zum Gegenstand hat. Die
schweizerische und die spanische Regierung entscheiden vorab über die
Annahme oder Ablehnung eines Auslieferungsersuchens. Wird es ange-
nommen, entscheiden die Gerichte nach einem förmlichen Verfahren
abschließend über das Ersuchen, ohne daß es nochmals der Regierung
vorgelegt wird. In den Vereinigten Staaten erstreckt sich die gerichtliche
Prüfung auf die Frage, ob das von dem ersuchenden Staat vorgelegte
Beweismaterial ausreichend ist. Je nach dem Votum des Gerichts entschei-
det der Außenminister, wobei dieser allerdings in seiner Entscheidung
frei ist.
Die meisten kontinentalen Rechte kennen die sogenannte vereinfachte
Auslieferung. Das bedeutet daß es in der Regel keiner gerichtlichen
Entscheidung bedarf, wenn sich ein Verfolgter mit seiner Auslieferung
einverstanden erklärt. In diesen Fällen prüfen die Regierungen ledig-
lich, ob die Voraussetzungen eines etwa bestehenden Auslieferungsver-
trages oder des innerstaatlichen Rechts gegeben sind. Liegen diese Voraus-
setzungen nicht vor, dann darf die Auslieferung auch dann nicht bewilligt
werden, wenn der Verfolgte sich mit ihr einverstanden erklärt hat.
In allen genannten Staaten haben die Verfolgten weitestgehende
Möglichkeiten, Einwendungen gegen die Auslieferung geltend zu machen.
Insbesondere haben sie Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör. Auf diese Weise
und im Hinblick auf das Prinzip der Spezialität dürfte es praktisch
ausgeschlossen sein, daß ein Beschuldigter wegen einer rein militäri-
schen Straftat ausgeliefert oder daß er im ersuchenden Staat wegen emer
solchen Tat verfolgt wird, wenn der ersuchte Staat hiermit nicht em-
verstanden oder wenn die Schutzfrist noch nicht abgelaufen ist.
5. Nur in einem der Landesberichte sind Angaben über die Zahl
der Auslieferungsersuchen gemacht worden, die in den letzten 10 Jahren
wegen militärischer Straftaten gestellt worden sind. Österreich hat die
Frage verneint. Argentinien hat mitgeteilt, daß in den letzten 2 Jahren
keine derartigen Ersuchen eingegangen sind. Frankreich hat alle da-
hingehenden Ersuchen, deren Zahl nicht bekannt ist, abgelehnt. In der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland sind, soweit festgestellt werden konnte, m
den letzten 10 Jahren keine Ersuchen um Auslieferung wegen rem mi-
litärischer Straftaten gestellt worden. Zuverlässige Angaben über Aus-
lieferungsersuchen wegen gemischtmilitärischer strafbarer Handlungen
liegen auch dort nicht vor. Ihre Zahl ist auf höchstens 50 geschätzt worden.
Selbst wenn es Statistiken auf diesem Gebiet gäbe, würden sie jeden-
falls in den Staaten, die keine Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer
Straftaten kennen, nur geringe Bedeutung haben. Denn da der Rechts^
zustand in diesen Staaten weithin bekannt ist, wird durchweg davon
abgesehen in diesen Fällen um Auslieferung zu ersuchen. Es wäre jeden-
^v ~
g. Paul-Günler PÖTZ
falls erwünscht, wenn zukünftig die Ersuchen um Auslieferung wegen
militärischer Straftaten jeder Art statistisch erfaßt wurden.
6 Am Ende dieser Überlegungen drängt sich die Frage auf, ob die
Staaten die wegen militärischer Straftaten nicht oder nur in beschrank-
tem Umfana ausliefern können, durch Abkommen oder durch gesetzgebe-
rische Mai^nahmen eine Änderung herbeiführen sollten. Es liegt auf der
Hand, daß diese Frage nicht einfach mit ja oder nein beantwortet werden
kann.
Zu Beginn meiner Ausführungen habe ich bereits einige Gründe
angeführt die dem weitverbreiteten Verbot der Auslieferung wegen
rein militärischer Straftaten zugrunde liegen. Ich darf diese noc'h durch
weitere Argumente ergänzen, die insbesondere in dem franzosi.schen und
dem deutschen Landesbericht enthalten sind.
Der Ausschluß der Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten
beruht wohl in erster Linie auf der Erwägung, daß die Streitkräfte emes
ander.» Staates schon im Frieden eine potentielle Gefahr für den eigenen
Staat darstellen können. Oft haben Staaten auch in Fricdenszeiten kein
Interesse an der Erhallung und Stärkung der Streitkräfte andeier Staaten.
Auch wird der Gedanke eine Rolle spielen, daß man z.B. von Deserteuren,
die vor einer Auslieferung geschützt sind, wichtige Mitteilungen erv^ar-
ten kann und daß die Unmöglichkeit, ausgeliefert zu werden manchen
Soldaten überhaupt erst zu einer militärischen Straftat mit anschließender
Flucht verleitet, überdies ist der kriminelle Charakter militärischer
Straftaten häufig weniger ausgeprägt als bei Zuwiderhandlungen gegen
das gemeine Recht. Auch werden militärische strafbare Handlungen
oft von Militärgerichten abgeurteilt, denen weite Kreise nut einem
gewissen MiBIFäuen 'gegenüberstehen, weil sie Sondergerichte sind. Und
Ichließlich wird die Ahndung derartiger Taten vielfach auch heute noch
als ein nationales Problem angesehen.
Alle diese Gründe zeigen die Schwierigkeiten auf, die einer generellen
Aufgabe des Verbots der Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten
entgegenstehen. Sie sind aber nicht unüberwindlicli ; insbesondere stellt
das Völkerrecht keine Schranke dar.
Für die Staaten, die dieses Verbot nicht kennen, wie z.B. die Vereinig-
ten Staaten, stellt sich das Problem nicht. Auch Brasilien tritt für eine
Abschaffung des Verbots ein.
Die Schweiz ist der Auffassung, die Frage werde für sie erst aktuell,
wenn sie den Vereinten Nationen beitreten oder sich einem Militärbündnis
anschließen würde. Auch Österreich, das - als einziges Land - das
Verbot der Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten als eine
allgemeine Regel des Völkerrechts ansieht, hat sich einer Stellungnahme
enthalten.
Großbritannien und Kanada halten die Vorschriften, die sich auf
die Truppen des Commonwealth beziehen, und das NATO-Truppen-
statut auf das noch einzugehen sein wird, für ausreichend. Nach dem
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67
kanadischen Gesetz über die in Kanada anwesenden Truppen hat der
Gouverneur en Conseil das Recht, jedes Land als assoziierten Staat zu
bestimmen.
Gegen eine generelle Aufgabe des Verbots der Auslieferung wegen
rein militärischer Straftaten hat sich Argentinien mit der Begründung
ausgesprochen, die Tendenz des amerikanischen internationalen Rechts
gehe dahin, derartige Handlungen in den Katalog nicht ausliefe-
rungsfähiger Straftaten einzubeziehen Alle anderen Staaten nehmen in
dieser Frage eine flexiblere Haltung ein. Nach belgischer Auffassung
sollten grundsätzHch auch solche rein militärischen Straftaten auslie-
ferungsfähig sein, die von einer gewissen strafrechtlichen Bedeutung
smd. Der Landesbericht führt aus, das allgemeine Interesse an der Be-
kämpfung der Kriminalität müsse auf die Dauer zu einer weitreichen-
deren Anwendung des Auslieferungsrechts führen. Besondere Bedeutung
habe das Problem im Verhältnis zwischen Staaten, die durch gemeinsame
Verteidigungsinteressen verbunden seien. In diesen Fällen bedeute
die Nichtausiieferung wegen Fahnenflucht z.B. eine Schwächung
der gemeinsamen Verteidigungskraft. Da gegenwärtig keine Aussicht
bestehe, einen weltweiten Vertrag zu schließen, der alle Staaten zur
Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer strafbarer Handlungen verpflichte,
müsse die Lösung in zwei — or^er mehrseitigen Verträgen zwischen ver-
bündeten Staaten gesucht werden. Hierbei könne der Vertrag zwischen
den Benelux-Staaten vom 27. Juni 1962 als Vorbild dienen.
Frankreich, Israel, Italien, Luxemburg, die Niederlande, Spanien
und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vertreten im Ergebnis die gleiche
Auffassung.
Der luxemburgische Landesbericht hebt hervor, daß das Maß gegen-
seitiger Unterstützung davon abhänge, wie eng die Allianz mit befreunde-
ten Nationen sei. Im Falle integrierter Streitkräfte müsse sie umfassend
sein Nach niederländischer Auffas.-ung ist zu beachten, daß z.B. eme Fah-
nenflucht auf poUtischen Gründen beruhen, eher auch aus ganz anderen
nämlich kriminellen, Motiven begangen worden sein kann. Besonders
problematisch sei die Auslieferung eines Mannes, der aus Gewissens-
gründen den Wehrdienst verweigert. Ebenso zweifelhaft sei es, ob dem
Auslieferungsersuchen eines Staates stattgegeben werden könne, der bei
der Anwerbung eines Soldaten die Menschenwürde verletzt habe.
Norwegen verweist auf das bereits vorher erwähnte Auslieferungs-
übereinkommen der nordischen Staaten vom 3. März 1961.
Der spanische Landesbericht geht von der Erwägung aus, daß rein
militärische Straftaten Angriffe auf Rechtsgüter darstellen, die auch
in der internationalen Rechtsordnung schutzwürdig sind. Nach spanischer
Auffassung sollten aber vor einer supranationalen Lösung der Auslie-
ferungsfrage zunächst die nationalen militärstrafgesetzbücher verem-
heitlicht und danach auf internationaler Ebene Versuche unternommen
werden, die auslieferungsfähigen und nichtauslieferungsfähigen militäri-
schen Straftaten zu bestimmen.
. i
^. —
68
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
RAPPORT GENERAL
69
/
\h
Der deutsche Landesbericht macht den Vorschlag, in den nationalen
Auslieferungsgesetzen die Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straf-
taten nicht schlechthin auszuschliel^-en. Die Staaten wären dann zwar nicht
verpflichtet, aber durch das innerstaatliche Recht auch nicht gehindert,
die Auslieferung wegen einer solchen Handlung zu bewilligen. Wie Frank-
reich ist auch die Bundesrepublik Deutschland der Meinung, das Problem
nicht im Rahmen allgemeiner Auslieferungsverträge, sondern im Zu-
sammenhang mit militärischen Bündnisverträgen zu losen. Diese Auf-
fassung liegt auch dem Europäischen Auslieferungsübereinkommen vom
13. Dezember 1957 zugrunde.
Fassen wir als Ergebnis zusammen :
a) Die Frage der Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten
ist in erster Linie eine politische Frage. Im Vordergrund aller ^
Überlegungen steht der Vertrauensgrundsatz. Zwischen vielen
Staaten der Welt bestehen unterschiedliche politische, soziologische
und rechtliche Auffassungen. Sie machen es — jedenfalls gegen-
wärtig — unmöglich, die Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer
strafbarer Handlungen generell zuzulassen.
b) Die nationalen Gesetze sollten die Auslieferung wegen rein mili-
tärischer Straftaten nicht allgemein verbieten, um allen Staaten
die Möglichkeit zu geben, auch diese Frage in Verträgen zu regeln.
c) Es sollte versucht werden, die nationalen Vorschriften über militä-
rische Straftaten zu vereinheitlichen.
d) Sind zwei oder mehrere Staaten durch gemeinsame Verteidigungs-
interessen verbunden, dann haben sie die politische Entscheidung
getroffen, für ein gemeinsames Ziel zusammenzuarbeiten und sich
gegenseitig^ zu unterstützen. Dazu gehört, daß sie einander die Sol-
daten ausliefern, die militärische Delikte begangen haben. Diese
gegenseitige Unterstützung muß in Fällen integrierter Streitkräfte
umfassend und vorbehaltlos sein.
e) Das Problem der Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Taten
sollte nicht in allgemeinen Auslieferungsverträgen gelöst werden.
Dort werden in erster Linie die Fragen behandelt, die für eine
wirksame Bekämpfung der allgemeinen Kriminalität über die
Grenzen hinweg erforderlich sind. Die Einbeziehung spezieller
Straftaten wie der rein militärischen Delikte würde diesen Rahmen
sprengen und passen nicht recht in die beabsichtigte Zeilsetzung.
Das Problem sollte vielmehr im Zusammenhang mit militärischen
Bündnisverträgen — zwei-oder mehrseitigen — gelöst werden,
deren Grundlagen eni;e Partnerschaft und unbedingtes Vertrauen
sind. Beispielhaft sind hier die Verträge zwischen Dänemark,
Finnland, Island, Norwegen und Schweden vom 3. März 1961 sowie
zwischen Belgien, Luxemburg und den Niederlanden vom 27 Juni
1962.
B. ÜhersteUung von Soldaten auf einem anderen Weg als dem der Aus-
lieferung.
Diese Frage wird überall da aktuell, wo Staaten Teile ihrer Streit-
kräfte auf dem Hoheitsgebiet anderer Staaten stationiert bzw. wo Staaten
ihre Zustimmung zur Stationierung ausländischer Streitkräfte auf ihrem
Hoheitsgebiet gegeben haben. In allen diesen Fällen handelt es sich um
Staaten, die eine enge politische Beziehung zueinander haben und die durch
gemeinsame Verteidigungsinteressen verbunden sind. Häufig sind die
nationalen Streitkräfte im Rahmen von Militärbündnissen in übernatio-
nalen Streitkräften integriert.
Wenn es sich hierbei auch um ein Problem von erheblicher Bedeutung
handelt, so darf doch nicht übersehen werden, daß mehrere Staaten, die
Landesberichte erstattet haben, hierzu keinen Beitrag liefern konnten,
da sie weder eigene Streitkräfte im Ausland stationiert haben, noch
fremden Truppen auf ihrem eigenen Hoheitsgebiet beherbergen. Das gilt
für Argentinien, Brasilien, Israel, Österreich und die Schweiz.
Erfahrungen, die auf diesem Gebiet gesammelt worden sind, haben nur
die Länder mitgeteilt, die Mitglieder der Nordatlantischen Verteidigungsge-
meinschaft sind. Zwisclien diesen Staaten bestehen eine Reihe von Verträ-
gen, die alle den Zweck haben, gemeinsame politische Ziele zu verfolgen
und die Verteidigungsmöglichkeiten der einzelnen Staaten mit mehr Nutzen
für diese Ziele einzusetzen. Von diesen Verträgen sind in erster Linie das
«Abkommen zwischen den Parteien des Nordatlantikvertrages über die
Rechtsstellung ihrer Truppen » vom 19. Juni 1951 — das sog. NATO-Trup-
penstatut — und das sog. Zusatzabkommen vom 3. August 1959 von Bedeu-
tung. Im Rahmen dieser Erörterungen ist es nicht möglich, aber auch
nicht erforderlich, auf Einzelheiten dieser Abkommen einzugehen. Es ge-
'nügt hier festzustellen, daß sie u.a. die gegenseitige Unterstützungspflicht
sowie die Kompetenzkonflikte regeln, die sich zwischen den Mitglied-
staaten und vor allem zwischen dem Aufnahmestaat und dem Entsende-
staat ergeben. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist in diesem Zusammenhang
Artikel VII Absatz 5 des NATO-Truppenstatus, der im Auszug folgen-
den Wortlaut hat :
«Die Behörden des Aufnahme- und des Entsendestaates unterstützen
sich gegenseitig bei der Festnahme von Mitgliedern einer Truppe
oder eines zivilen Gefolges oder von deren Angehörigen im Hoheits-
gebiet des Aufnähmest aates und bei der Übergabe dieser Personen
an die Behörde, die die Gerichtsbarkeit auszuüben hat.
Die Behörden der Aufnahmestaates sind verpflichtet, die Behörden
des Entsendestaates unverzüglich von der Festnahme einer Person zu
unterrichten, die zu den in seinem Gebiet stationierten ausländischen
Truppen gehört ».
70
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
RAPPORT GENERAL
71
,1 '
Prüfen wir nun anhand der Landesberichte die praktischen Aus-
wirkungen derartiger Regelungen.
1 Wir wenden uns zunächst der Üherstellung ausländischer Soldaten
die auf dem Gebiet eines anderen Staates stationiert sind, an die Behör-
den des Entsendestaates zu.
Nach dem in Großbritannien geltenden «Visiting Forces Act 1952»,
der auf alle Commonwealth-Staaten und auf eine Reihe anderer
Staaten Anwendung findet, kann jeder Fahnenflüchtige wie ein eigener
Deserteur festgenommen und den zuständigen Behörden des Heimat-
staates übergeben werden. Nach der Übergabe kann der Heimatstaat alle
von dem Deserteur begangenen militärischen Straftaten aburteilen. Ahn-
lich ist die Rechtslage in Kanada.
Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika halten sich im Rahmen des _^
NATO-Truppenstatus für verpflichtet, Deserteure an ihre Heimatstaaten
zu übergeben.
Nach dem Landesbericht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland besteht auch
dort die Auffassung. daR im Zusammenhang mit Bündnisverträgen die
Möghchkeit der Überstellung von Deserteuren an befreundete Nationen
bestehen muß Eine bestimmte Praxis hat sich noch nicht herausgebildet,
weil sich verfassungsrechtliche Schwierigkeiten ergeben haben, deren bal-
dige Lösung ancestrebt wird.
Der belgische Landesbericht geht davon aus, daß grundsätzlich die
Möglichkeit besteht, im Zusammenhang mit dem NATO-Truppenstatut
Deserteure von in Belgien stationierten ausländischen Streitkräften an die
Behörden des Heimatstaates zu übergeben. Im Verhältnis zu Großbritan-
nien besteht bereits eine derartige Praxis. Im übrigen ist die Frage noch
nicht aktuell geworden.
Die gleichen Erwägungen liegen dem niederländischen Landesbe-
richt zugrunde. Von Bedeutung ist ferner, daß niederländische Behörden
Angehörige der belgischen Marine, die sich zu Übungen in den Nieder-
landen aufhalten und strafbare Handlungen begangen haben, an belgische
Behörden übergeben können. Ähnliches gilt für fahnenflüchtige amerika-
nische Soldaten, die zwar nicht zu den dort stationierten Streitkräften ge-
hören, aber dorthin geflohen sind. Auch Luxemburg hält sich für ver-
pflichtet, Bündnispartnern Deserteure zu übergeben, ohne daß die bei ^iner
Auslieferung üblichen Formalitäten eingehalten werden müssen. Das ist
mehrfach im Verhältnis zu den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika gesche-
hen.
Zwischen Spanien und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika besteht
ein im Jahre 1963 geschlossenes Abkommen über gegenseitige Vertei-
digung und Wirtschaftshilfe, aufgrund dessen amerikanische Streitkräfte
auf spanischem Hoheitsgebiet stationiert sind. Begeht ein amerikanischer
Soldat dort eine rein militärische Straftat und hält er sich danach in
Spanien verborgen, wird er von den spanischen an die amerikanischen
Behörden übergeben.
In Norwegen i.st bisher kein Fall der Übergabe von Soldaten an aus-
ländische Behörden praktisch geworden. Der norwegische Landesbericht
erwähnt aber den interessanten Fall, daß ein bei einer Truppe der Ver-
einten Nationen dienender norwegischer Soldat nach Gaza desertiert
war. Die dortigen Behörden haben ihn festgenommen und den Streitkräf-
ten der Vereinten Nationen übergeben.
Frankreich hat mit mehreren Staaten, z.B. den Republiken Kongo, Ni-
ger, Madagaskar und Senegal, Verteidigungsverträge oder Verträge über
technische Militärhilfe abgeschlossen. In Anhängen zu diesen Verträgen
findet sich eine Bestimmung, die in den meisten Fällen etwa folgendes
besagt : die Behörden dieser Staaten können ein Mitglied der dort
stationierten französischen Truppen nur festnehmen, wenn es auf frischer
Tat betroffen wird. Sie unterrichten unverzüglich die französischen Mili-
tärbehörden darüber und übergeben den Verhafteten innerhalb der für
die Übergabe festgesetzten kiirzestmöglichen Frist diesen Behörden.
2. Zum Schluß bleibt die Frage zu prüfen, ob ausländische Solda-
ten, die im eigenen Land oder in einem dritten Staat eine Straftat begangen
haben und deshalb desertiert sind, von dem Aufenthaltsstaat über die Gren-
ze an den Heimatstaat abgeschoben oder ausgeimesen werden können
In diesem Zusammenhang kommen nur die Fälle in Betracht, in denen
keine sonstige Möglichkeit besteht, den Soldaten — etwa aufgrund eines
Auslieferungsvertrags, eines Bündnisvertrags oder anderer Vereinba-
rungen — an den Heimatstaat auszuliefern oder auf anderem Weg zu
übergeben.
Hierbei handelt es sich um die Frage der Konkurrenz zwischen dem
Recht der Auslieferung und dem Recht der Ausweisung. Zum Unterschied
von der Auslieferung"lvird eine Ausweisung von" d'em Aufenthaltsstaat
> nämlich ausschließlich im eigenen Interesse angeordnet, z.B. aus sicher-
heitspolizeilichen Gründen. Die Auslieferung dagegen ist eine Maßnahme
zu Gunsten des ausländischen Staates.
In den Fällen, in denen weder eine Auslieferung noch eine Übergabe
des Soldaten an den Heimatstaat in Betracht kommt, ist die Praxis der ein-
zelnen Staaten unterschiedlich. Der argentinische, der deutsche, der
französische und der norwegische Landesbericht verneinen entschieden
die Möglichkeit einer Ausweisung oder Abschiebung in derartigen Fällen
Auch nach österreichischem Recht ist die Ausweisung eines Soldaten
nicht möglich, wenn wegen der von ihm begangenen Straftat eine Aus
lieferung an sich unzulässig wäre oder ein Auslieferungsersuchen bereits
abgelehnt worden ist. Ähnlich ist die Praxis in Spanien. Hier gilt aller-
dings die Regel, daß ein fahnenflüchtiger Soldat, dessen Ausweisung von
spanischen Behörden verfügt worden ist, selber das Land wählen kann,
in das er ausreisen will. Nach schweizerischem Recht ist dagegen die Aus-
weisung eines solchen Soldaten aus fremdenpolizeilichen Gründen an den
Heimatstaat auch dann zulässig, wenn eine Auslieferung an sich unzulässig
Jj
72
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
wäre Das gilt vor allem im Verhältnis zu Staaten, mit denen Abkom-
men über die gegenseitige Übergabe an der Grenze bestehen. Auch das
niederländische Recht verbietet in derartigen Fällen nicht grundsatz-
lich die Ausweisung eines Soldaten an den Heimatstaat. Allerdmgs
sieht das in Vorbereitung befindliche neue niederländische Atisliefe-
nmgsgesetz vor, daß eine an sich unzulässige AusUeferung nicht durch eine
Ausweisung ersetzt werden darf, so daß sich die jetzige niederländische
Praxis möglicherweise ändern wird. Fälle der besprochenen Art sind
bisher in Gror^britannien tind Kanada noch nicht praktisch geworden. Bei-
de Länder haben aufgrund ihrer Bestimmungen über die Einreise m ihr
Hoheitsgebiet aber die Möc^lichkeit, z.B. Soldaten auszuweisen und m
ihr Heimatland zurückzuschicken, wenn sie die Voraussetzungen für
einen Aufenthalt in einem dieser Staaten nicht erfüllen.
3. Über die Zahl der Soldaten, die rein militärische Straftaten be-
gangen haben und deshalb auf andere Weise als durch Auslieferung an
ihre Heimatstaaten übergeben worden sind, liegt kein Material vor, das
Aufschluß geben könnte. Ledif^lich Frankreich hat eine. Statistik übersandt
aus der sich ergibt, daß in den Jahren 1956 bis 1966 insgesamt 187 franzö-
siche Soldaten an Frankreich übergeben worden sind.
Fassen wir als Ergebnis dieser Ausführungen zusammen :
a) Auch die Frage der Überstellung fahnenflüchtiger Soldat(^n auf
einem anderen Weg als dem der Auslieferung ist eine politische
Frage. Bei ihr spielen aber auch rechtliche Erwägungen eine we-
sentliche Rolle, die durch die innerstaatliche Gesetzgebung auf dem
Gebiet des Verfassungsgerechts und des Rechts der öffentlichen
Ordnung bedingt sind.
b) Die formlose Überstellung fahnenflüchtiger Soldaten an ihren Hei-
matstaat sollte grundsätzlich nur erfolgen, wenn hierdurch nicht
das im Einzelfall bestehende Verbot der Auslieferung wegen mili-
tärischer Straftaten umgangen wird. Das muß jedenfalls dann gel-
ten, wenn der Aufenthaltstaat ein Auslieferungsersuchen des Hei-
matstaates bereits abgelohnt hat. Eine Ausweisung darf eine an
sich unzulässige Auslieferung nicht ersetzen.
c) Die Frage hat eine besondere Bedeutung im Verhältnis zwischen
verbündeten Staaten. Diese Staaten sollten fahnenflüchtige Sol-
daten einander auch dann übergeben, wenn sie nicht auf dem Ho-
heitsgebiet des anderen Staates stationiert sind und von bestehen-
den Verträgen über gegenseitige Hilfeleistung im Zusammenhang
mit Stationierungsstreitkräften nicht erfaßt werden.
Damit darf ich meinen Bericht abschließen. Die Fülle des Mate-
rials und die vielschichtige Problematik haben es mir unmöglich ge-
macht auf alle in den Landesberichten angesprochenen Gesichtspunkte
und Überlegungen einzugehen. Hierfür bitte die Herren Landesbe-
richterstatter um Nachsicht. Ich hoffe aber, alle wesentlichen Fragen be-
handelt und Ihnen damit eine ausreichende Grundlage für die Diskus-
sion gegeben zu haben.
73
Rapport general
(Exfraifs)
L'EXTRADITION POUR DELITS MILITAIRES
par
Paul-Günter PöTZ
Regierungsdirektor
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
I. Remarques preliminaires
De noinhreux documents ont ete mis ä ma disposition pour etablir le
rapport general. Seize pays ont foiirni des rapports, ä savoir VArgentiney
le BresU, la Belgique, Ja Repuhliquc federale d'AUemagne, la France, la
Grandc-Brctagne, Israel, VItalie, le Canada, le Luxemhourg, les Pays-Bas,
la Norvege, VAutriche, la Suisse, VEspagne et les Etats-Unis d'Amerique.
Avant d'exanüner las questions en particulier, je nie permets de faire
quelques remarques preliminaires d'ordre general destinees ä jaciliter la
comprehension du rapport et necessaires pour exposer Vcnsemhle des
prohlemes.
Uextradition est, selon Vopinion generale, Vacte ofjiciel par lequel un
Etat transfere une personne de son pouvoir repressij ahsolu, qu'il est pret
ä ahandonner entieremcnt, au pouvoir reprcsslf d'un autre Etat cn vue
'de la poursuite ou de Vexecuiion de la peine. Elle est la mesure la plus
irvportante de Vassistance judiciaire entre Etats en mutiere penale. Son
importance pratique apparait lorsque Von considere que le droit de tout
Etat de^rendre la justice s'arrete ä ses frontieres et que, sans Vassis-
tance d'autres Etats, il serait dans Vimpossihilite d'exercer son droit
de prononccr une peine ou d'executer celle-ci ä Vencontre d'un inculpe ou
d'un co7idavine sc trouvant ä Vetranger.
Le droit regissant Vextradition fait aujourd'hui partie integrante de
la legislation de la plupart des pays du monde. Cela n'a pas toujours ete
ainsi. Cest ä la Belgique que revient le merite d'avoir cree la premiere
loi sur Vextradition. Cette loi promulguee le 1er octohre 1833 a servi de
modele pour nombre d'autres lois en la matiere tout en exerqant jusquä
nos jours une grande influence sur la legislation d'autres pays.
Dans de nombreux Etats, le droit extraditionnel est regi soit par une
loi sur Vextradition, soit par des dispositions de la Constitution, du codc
penal ou du code de procedure criminelle. Parmi les Etats d'Europe, le
74
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
■ '*
I
\h
Danemark et le Portuqal entre autres, ignorent les dispositions legales
concernant Vextraditlon. Ulslande, la Principaute de Liechtenstein et
l'Autriche nont regle dans leurs codes penaux que quelques questions
relatives au droit extraditionnel
De nombreux traites d'extradition hilateraux ont encore ete coyiclus^ au
XIXeme siede, mais plus particulier erneut au cours des 50 dermeres
annees. Independamment de ces traites beaucoap d'ejforts ont ete deploijes
2n vue d\niformiser le droit extraditionnel
Les trois Conventions multilaterales qui revetent, ä ce sujet, une
importance particulierc sont la Convention d'extradition europeenne, jrmt
de la politique d' Integration europeenne, signee le 12 decemhre 1957 par
13 paus les Traites sur Vextradition et Ventraide judiciaire en mattere
venale passes le 3 mars 1961 entre le Danemark, la Finlande, Vislande, la
Norvegc et la Suede et ceux conclus le 27 juin 1962 entre la Belgique, le
Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas.
Le droit extraditionnel s'inspire, dans heaucoup d'Etats, du principe de
la reciprocite, cest-ä-dire que VEtat qui demande Vextradition accorde, a
son tour, Vextradition ä Vautre Etat dans un cas semblable.
Le principe de la double iyicrimination est qualijie d'element principal
du principe de la reciprocite. Cela implique que Vextradition n'est accor-
dee que si Vinfraction commise dans VEtat requerant est egalement pu-
nissaüle suivant le droit de VEtat requis. II reste ä noter le principe de la
specialite Selon ce principe, une personne ne pourra etre pou>suivie dans
VEtat requerant que pour des injractions anterieures ä son extradition.
Ce principe, qui se fonde sur la consideration qu'aucun Etat ne livre un pre-
venu ä la discretion dun autre Etat, peut etre qualifie de droit internatio-
nal public.
Uextradition pour delits viilitaires, notamment pour desertion, a connu
une evolution particulierc ä travers les siecles. Cest ainsi quaux XVIIeme
et XVIUeme siecles et dans le premier tiers du XIXeme siede, il existait
de nonibreuses Conventions bilaterales et multilaterales qui concernaient
exdusivement Vextradition de deserteurs. Cest vers 1830 que s'est impose
de plus cn plus le principe de ne proceder ä une extradition que pour des
crimes et delits de droit commun. La raison en residait principalement dans
le fait quaucun Etat ne voulait contribuer ä soutenir la puissance militaire-
aun autre Etat qui, eventuelle nie nt, pouvait bientöt etre son ennemi. Ceci
a amene des Etats allies ä condure de plus en plus des Conventions d'extra-
dition reciproque de soldats deserteurs. Cette evolution a atteint son point
culminant dans la condusion de nombreux traites en mutiere d'extradition
de deserteurs et d'objecteurs de conscience passes au cours ae la guerre
mondiale 1914-1918.
II. L'extradition pour delits militaires
Uextradition pour delits militaires fait depuis des siecles Vohjet de
discussions internationales. Cest surtout apres la Seconde Guerre mondiale
EXTRAITS DU RAPPORT GENERAL
75
que d'importantes alJiances militaires ont ete contractees. Les interets com-
muns de defense ont eu pour consequence que dans de nombreux Etats,
notannnent en Europe, des forces armees nationales ont ete stationnees
sur le territoire d'autres Etats. Or le stationnement de forces armees alliees
sur le propre territoire entraine forcement Vaugmentation du nombre des
infractions militaires. Ce probleme a aussi un aspect plus g euer al : les
moyens de communication actuels et la facilite du passage des frontieres
offrent aux auteurs de delits militaires des possibilites beaacoup plus gran-
des que par le passe de se refugier ä Vetranger dans Vespoir de ne pas y etre
poursuivis. Or, quelle sera la Position ä prendre par le pays de refuge
ä Vegard de la demayide de livrer les auteurs d'infractions afin de les pour-
suivre et de les condamner dans VEtat d'origine ? II y a deux possililites :
soit Vextradition proprement dite, soit la remise du militaire par une autre
voie.
Extradition proprement dite pour delits militaires.
2. 71 existe deux categories d'infractions militaires : les infractions pu-
revient militaires et les infractions militaires mixtes ou complexes. Les
infractions purement militaires sont Celles qui comportent des Clements
constitutifs particuliers qui sont etrangers au droit penal commun et qui
relevent de la Situation militaire particuliere. Par infractions militaires
mixtes ou complexes il faut entendre des actes dejä prevus et incrimines
par le droit penal comniuii, mais qui, compte tenu des circonstances mili-
taires particulieres, ont ete transformes par le droit militaire en elements
conUitutifs speciaux de Vinfraction.
Dans la plupart des Etats la loi interdit Vextradition pour infractions
purement militaires. Mais etant donne un certain nombre d'exceptions,
cette interdictwn ne pcut etre considerec comme une regle generale du
droit international public.
2. En ce qui concerne Vextradition pour infractions militaires mixtes
*ou complexes, il faut distinguer principalement les cas suivants :
a) Une demande d'extradition a pour objet une infraction militaire
mixte du type defini plus haut.
b) Uextradition est demandee soit pour une infraction purement
militaire et une infraction militaire mixte, soit pour une infraction
justiciable du droit penal commun, les deux categories d'infractions
n'ayant aucun rapport entre dies.
La plmmrt des Etats prevoient dans leur legislation la possibilite d'ac-
corder Vextradition pour infractions militaires mixtes. Ceci est egalement
applicable lorsqu'il y a concours d'infractions entre une teile infraction et
un delit purement militaire. Dans ces cas, on refuse seulement Vextradi-
tion pour Vacte purement militaire, celui-ci pouvant etre dissocie de Vin-
fraction militaire lyiixte. Pour les U.SA, et VArgentine ce probleme ne se
pose pas, puisque ces pays, dans les conditions indiquees, peuvent cxtrader
meme pour des jaits purement militaires. Dans le droit norvegien Vextradi-
76
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
tioii est suhordonnee ä la condition que la peine prevue pour Vinfraction
militaire mixte ne soit pas superieure ä celle prevue pour une iiifractioa
comparable du droit covnnun. Dans tous ces cas, Vextradition n'est accordee
que si VEtat requer ant garantit Vapplication du principe de la specialite
prevu par le droit international. Les incidences de ce principe sont d'une
grande importance pour les infractions purement militaires, car pour les
actes de cc genre Vexperience nous apprend que la plupart des interesses
rejoigneyit un jour leur paijs natal.
3. Quant ä la question de savoir si, et dans quelle inesure, il existe des
traites bilateraux ou multilateraux, admettant des exceptions ä Vin-
terdiction d'extrader pour des infractions purement militaires, il resulte
dhine analyse des rapports nationaux que peu d'Etats ont regle par une
Convention Vextradition pour delits purement militaires. Autant que
yaie pu le constater, il n'est plus qu'un seul traite bilateral actuellement
en vigueur, celui passe entre le Portugal et VEspagne en 1884, d'apres
lequel ces pays s'extradent mutuellement les deserteurs des jorces ter-
restres et navales. Par contre, il existe un novihre plus important
d'accords multilateraux reglant ce Probleme d'une jaqon plus ou moins
positive. Le premier accord de ce genre se trouve dans la Convention
d'extradition de Montevideo du 26 decembre 1933. Uarticle 3 de cette
Convention permet en pareil cas ä VEtat requis d'accorder aussi Vextra-
dition pour un fait purement militaire. Chaque Etat est donc lihre de
determiner Vattitude qu'il prendra ä Vegard d'une teile demande d'extradi-
tion. Si cette Convention nest en vigueur que dans quelques Etats de
VAmerique du Sud et de VAmerique Centrale et aux Etats-Unis d^Amerique,
eile iien reste pas moins tres importayite parce qu'elle sert — au meme
titre que le Codigo Bustamente — aux Etats qui ne Vont pas ratifiee de
source de principes internationaux concernant Vextradition.
Mais ce sont les Etats nordiques et ceux du Benelux qui ont contri-
bue ä faire avancer d'un pas decisif la Solution du prohleme. En effet,
le Danemark, la Finlande, Vislande, la Norvege et la Suede ont conclu
le 3 mars 1961 une Convention par laquelle ces pays s'engagent mutuel-
lement ä livrer aussi les criminels qui ont commis des infractions pure-
ment militaires. Une Solution semhlable se trouve dans le Traite d'extra-
dition et d'entraide judiciaire en matiere penale passe le 27 juin 1962
entre la Belgique, le Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas qui stipule expres-
sement que la desertion ne doit pas etre consideree comme une infrac-
tion d'ordre politique. Cette Solution a ete prise cojnpte tenu du fait
que la collaboration etroite entre ces Etats doit aussi s'etendre au
domaine militaire. d'autant plus qu'ils se trouvent, ä Vegard de leur
defense nationale, dans une Situation qui exige une solidarite absolue.
La Convention d'extradition europeenne passee le 13 decembre 1957
ne s'applique certes pas aux infractions purement militaires. Elle permet
toutefois aux parties contractantes de conclure, ä ce propos, des Conventions
speciales.
II existe une tejidance ä regier Vextradition pour infractions purement
militaires non pas dans une Convention d'extradition generale, mais
EXTRAITS DU RAPPORT GENERAL
TT
dans le cadre d'un traite d'alliance militaire.
4. Les lois de la majorite des pays regissent la procedure applicable
ä Vexamen d'une demande d'cxtradition, inais la reglementation inte-
rieure relative ä une procedure d'extradition varie d^un pays ä Vautre.
Ainsi, dans certains pays, seuls les tribunaux sont competents pour exa-
miner la recevabiUte et pour acrorder Vextradition. Dans d'autres pays,
ce sont les tribunaux qui examinent la recevabiUte par la voie d*une
procedure judiciaire fortnelle, et il incovibe au gouvernement d'y donner
son approbation. Lorsqu'un tribunal a declare irrecevable une extradition,
le gouvernement est tenu de respecter cette decision et il ne peut accorder
Vextradition. Dans tous ces cas, les goui'ernements peuvent aussi rejeter
immediatement la requete d'cxtradition s'il apparalt clairement que celle-ci
a pour objet une infraction purement viilitaire ne pouvant donner Heu
ä extradition.
La plupart des droits continentau,x connaissent Vextradition dite
simplifiee. Cela signifie, en regle generale, qu'il n'y a pas Heu de recourir
ä une decision judiciaire si le poursuivi consent ä etre extrade.
Dans la presque-totalite des Etats, les poursuivis beneficient des
plus larges possibilites pour soulever des objections contre Vextradition.
Ils ont notamment le droit de demander ä etre entendu par un tribunal.
5. Les rapports nationaux ne donnent pas d'indications precises sur le
nombre de requetes d'cxtradition presentees pour infractions purement
militaires ou infractions militaires niixtes.
6. II est impossible de repondre par oui ou non ä la question de
savoir si les Etats qui ne peuvent pas accorder Vextradition, ou seulement
Vaccorder dans une mesure limitee, devraient inodifier la Situation juri-
dique en concluant des Conventions ou en prenant des mesures legislatives.
L'exclusion de Vextradition pour infractions purement militaires s'ex-
plique en premier Heu par la consideration que les forces armees d'un autre
Etat peuvent, des le temps de paix, constituer un danger potentiel pour
le propre Etat. Meme en temps de paix les Etats n'ont souvent aucun
interet ä maintenir et ä renforcer les forces armees d'autres Etats. Une
autre idee qui est au^si d'importance ä ce sujet c'est que par exemple
les deserteurs, qui sont ä Vabri de Vextradition, sont supposes fournir des
renseignements importants et que cest precisement Vimpossibilite d'etre
extrade qui incite en definitive maint militaire ä commettre une infraction
militaire et ä se refugier ensuite. Par ailleurs, le caractere criminel des
delits militaires est souvent rrioins prononce que celui des delits de droit
commun. D' autre part, les infractions militaires sont frequemment jugees
par des tribunaux militaires ä Vegard desquels divers milieux eprouvent
une certaine mefiance, ces tribunaux etant des juridictioyis speciales.
Enfin, la repression de tels faits est encore consideree actuellement comme
un Probleme national.
78
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
Tous ces motifs inontrent les difficultes qui s'opposent ä ahroger pure-
ment et siinplement la prohibition de Vextradition pour infractions pure-
ment militaires. Ces difficultes ne sont pas insurmoiitahles ; en parti-
culier le droit international public n'y faxt aucun obstacle,
Les considerations einisf s dans les differents rapports nationaux per-
mettent d^etablir les theses suivantes :
a) La question de Vextradition pour infractions purevient rnilitaires est
avant tout un Probleme politiquc. Le principe qui se situe au premier
plan de toutes les considerations est cclui de la confiance. Entre de
nonibreux Etats il existe des opinions divergentes dans les domaines
politique, sociologique et juridique. Ces opinions ne permettent pas
— au moins actuellement — d^accorder d'une faqon generale Vextradi-
tion pour infractions purevient militaires.
b) Les lois nationales ne devraient pas interdire, en gener al, Vextradition
pour infractions purcment Vfiilitaires, afin de permettre ä tous les Etats
de regier egalement ce probleme dans le cadre de traites.
c) On devrait essayer d'uniformiser les dispositions nationales relatives
aux iniractions inilitaires.
d) Quand deux ou plusieurs Etats se lient en vue d'interets communs de
defense, ils prenneiit aussi la decision politique de collaborer ä un but
commun et de se preter mutuellemcnt assistance. Cela implique qu'ih
extradent les militaires qui ont commis des delits militaires. Dans le
cas des Forces armees integrees cette assistance reciproque doli etre
totale et sans reserve.
o) Le Probleme de Vextradition pour des faits purement militaires ne
devrait pas etre regle dans des Conventions generales d'extradition, car
celleS'Ci traitent en premier Heu des questlons indispensables ä la lutte,
au'delä des frontieres, contre la criminalite generale. Le fait d'ij incor-
porer des infractions speciales telles que les delits militaires ferait ecla-
ter ce cadre sans pour autant sadapter convenablemcnt aux Imts que
Von se propose d'atteindre. Le probleme devrait, tout au contraire, etre
regle dans le cadre de traites d'alliances militaires — bilateraux ou
multilateraux — qui sont bases sur une association etroite et une con-
fiance absolue. Les traites qui peuvent servir d^excmple ä ce sujet sont
ceux passes le 3 mars 1961 entre le Dänemark, la Finlande, Vislande, la
Norvege et la Suede et ceux conclus le 27 juin 1962 entre la Belgique,
le Luxembourg et les Pays-Bas.
B. Remise des militaires par d'autres voies que l'extradition.
Ce Probleme se pose toutes les fois que des Etats stationnent des ele-
ments de leurs forces sur le territoire d^autres Etats ou donn?nt leur accord
au stationnement de forces etrangeres sur leur propre territoire. Dans
toiis ces cas, il s'agit d'Etats qui entretiennent d'etroites relations poli-
tiques et q^ii sont lies par des interets communs de defense. Souvent, les
EXTRAITS DU RAPPORT GENERAL
70
Forces nationales sont integrees ä des Forces supra-nationales dans le
cadre d'alliances militaires.
II existe entre ces Etats un certain nombre de traites qui visent tous
ä poursuivre des buts politiques communs et ä mettre en ceuvre avec plus
de Profit les moyens de defense des differents Etats afin d'atteindre les
buts fixes. Parmi ces traites citons principalement la « Convention entre
les Etats Parties au Traite de V Atiantique Nord sur le Statut de leurs for-
ces)) du 19 juin 1951, dite Convention OTAN sur le Statut des Forces,
et Vaecord conipletant cette Convention du 3 aoiit 1959, dit Accord comple-
vientaire.
1. Remise de militaires etrangers stationnes .skt le territoire d'un autre
Etat aux autorites de VEtat d'origine.
La legislation et la pratique varient d*un Etat ä Vautre. En vertu de
traites d'aUiance, quelques Etats se voient obliqes de remettre les de-
serteurs aux Etats d'origine. D'autres estiment qu'il faut prevoir dans le
cadre de traites d^alliance la possibilite de remettre les deserteurs ä des
nations amies.
2. Les rapports nationaux ont encore examine la question de savoir si
des militaires etrangers qui ont deserte pour avoir commis ^tne injraction
dans leur propre pays ou dans un Etat tiers, peuvent etre refoides ou cxpul-
ses par VEtat de sejour en les remettant ä la frontiere meme ä VEtat
d'origine. Les seuls cas ä considerer dans cet ordre d'id-ee soni ceux ou il
il']! a pas d'autre moyen de livrer le militaire — eventueUement en vertu
jVnn traite d'extradition, d'un traite dalliance ou d' une autre Convention —
ou de le remettre par une autre voie.
II s'agit ici du concours existant entre le droit d'extradition et le droit
d'expulsion. En effet, ä la difference de Vextradition, Vexpulsion n'est
ordonnee par VEtat de sejour que dans son propre interet, par exemple
vour des raisons concernant la police de sürete. Par contre Vextradition
est une mesure prisc en faveur d'un Etat etranger.
3. // n'existe pas de documentation susceptible de preciser le nombre
de militaires qui ont commis des infractions purement militaires et qui,
de ce fait, ont ete reinis ä leurs Etats d'origine par d'autres moyens que
Vextradition.
Les considerations emises dans les differents rapports nationaux per-
mettent de resumer le probleme comme suit :
a) La question de la remise de militaires deserteurs par une voie
autre que celle de Vextradition constitue egalement un probleme
politique. Mais ce qui importe ä ce propos, ce sont les considerations
juridiques enoncees dans la legislation nationale en matiere cons-
titutionnelle et en matiere d'ordre public.
80 Paul-Günter PÖTZ
b) La remise pure et simple de müitaires deserteurs ä leur pays d'ori-
gine ne devrait intervenir en principe que si eile ne tourne pas,
par lä rueme, la prohibition de Vexiradition pour infractions mili'
taires prevue dans des cas particuliers. Ceci doit en tout cas etre va-
Jable lorsquc VEtat de sejour a dejä rejuse une demande d'extra-
dition presentee par VEtat d'origine. Une expulsion ne pourra rem-
placcr une extradition non autorisee.
c) Le problen.c est particulierement important en ce qui concernc
les rapports entre Etats allies. Ces Etats devraient se livrer mutael-
lement les militaires deserteurs, meine si ces derniers ne sont pas
stationnes sur le territoire de Vautre Etat et s'ils ne fönt pas Vobjet
d'accords d'assistance recxprcque concernant les jcrces de station-
nement.
81
General reporr
(Extracts)
EXTRADITION FOR OFFENSES UNDER
MILITARY LAW
by
Paul-Günter PöTZ
Regier ungsd'irek tor
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
I. Preliminary remarks
The material supplied for the General Report was very extensive. Re-
ports have heen submitted by 16 countries, viz., the Argentinc, Austria, Bel-
gium, Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Israel, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlayids, Norway, Spain, and the United
States of America.
Before turning to specific questions, allow me to make a few prelimi-
nary remarks of a general nature which may help to understand the report,
biit which also appear necessary to delincate the problem as a whole.
Extradition has been defined as the formal surrender of a person from
the unrestricted penal Jurisdiction of one state prepared to relinquish
such Jurisdiction into the penal Jurisdiction of another state for the purpose
of prosecution or punishment. Extradition is the most important measure
in the field of interstate legal assistance in criminal matters. Its practical
ifiiportance becomes evident if one considers the fact that the Jurisdiction
of any and every state terminates at its houndaries, and that the state in
question would be incapable of realizing its claim to Jurisdiction or of en-
forcing a penalty against a prosecuted or condemned person residing
abroad without the help of other states.
Nowadays, most codes of law throughout the world include extradi-
tion law. This was not always the case. Belgium can claim to have drawn
up the first extradition law in the world. That law, passed on 1 October
1833, served as a pattern for many extradition laws, and exerts a consi-
derable influence on the legislation of other countries even now.
In many countries, extradition law is laid down in the form of an ex-
tradition act, of regulations in the Constitution, the penal code, or a code
of criminal procedure. Two of the European states without legal provisions
on extradition are Denmark and Portugal. In the criminal codes of Iceland,
Liechtenstein, and Austria, only a few matters pertaining to extradition
are dealt with.
82
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
During the 19th Century, and especially during the past fifty years, nu-
merous bilateral extradition treaties were concluded. Independently of the-
se, frequeiit efforts have beert made to arrive at a Standard form of extra-
dition law.
In this context, three multilateral agreements are of particular signifi-
cance. They are a European Extradition Agreement of 13 December 1967,
signed by 13 countries and one of the fruits of European integration policy,
and the agreements on extradition and legal assistance in criminal matters
signed by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, on 3 March
1961 and by Belgiuni, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, on 27 June 1962.
In many countries, extradition law is governed by tlie principle of
reciprocity, which vieans that the country demanding extradition grants
the State from which extradition is sought the same privilege in a compa-
rable case.
The most important facet of the principle of reciprocity is the principle
of mutual Uability to punishment. This means that extradition is permis-
sible only if the offense prosecuted in the State requesting it is also punisha-
ble under the law of the State to which the request is addressed. In conclu-
sion, I must mention the principle of specificity. This means that no per-
son can be proceeded against in the country requesting extradition for any
offense comDiitted prior to his surrender other than that for which extra-
dition is granted by the country receiving the request. This is based on the
consideration that no country extradites a prosecuted person unconditional-
ly. It is a principle which may be termed a fundamental of international
law.
Extradition for offenses under military law, in particular desertion,
has often gone its own way in the course of the centuries. In the 17 th and
18th Centuries and in the first part of the 19th Century, for instance, there
were numerous bi- and multilateral agreements dealin j exclusively with
the extradition of deserters. From about 1830 onwards, the principle that
extradition should be graiited only for crimes and offenses against common
law gained more and more ground. The main reason lay in the considera-
tion that no country was desirous of contributing to the military power
of another country which might very soon be a Potential enemy. This led in
ever increasing measure to the signing of agreements by allied states on
the reciprocal extradition of military deserters. It was a development-
which culminated in numerous agreements on the extradition of deserters
and conscientious objectors in connection with the Great War (1914-1918).
IL Extradition for offenses under military law
Extradition for offenses under military law have been a subject of
international discussion for centuries. Especially since the last World War,
extensive alliances have come into being. As a consequence of common
defense interests, the national forces of one country have been stationed
EXTRACTS FROM THE GENERAL REPORT
83
in the sovereign territory of other countries in many places in the world,
especially in Europe. Having the forces of one's allies stationed in one's
own territory is bound to entail an increase in the number of offenses un-
der niilitary Law. However, the problem has a general aspect as well :
modern means of transportation and the ease with which frontiers can be
crossed give people who have committed military offenses a far better
opportunity than was 07ice the case of escaping to another country in the
liope of evading prosecution. What, then, is to be the attitude of the coun-
tries in which refuge is sought towards applications by the authorities of
the countries fled to extradite the refugees so as to enable them to be pro-
secuted and punished in their native country ? There are two possibilities :
formal extradition and handing over military personnel by sonie other
means.
A. Extradition for offenses under military law in the actual sense of
the Word.
1. There are tivo kinds of military offenses : the purely military offense
and the mixed, or complex offense. Purely military offenses are offen-
ses involving specific constituent elements alien to general criminal law
and founded on the specific Service relationship of the man concerned.
By niixed military, or complcr, offenses, we mean acts couched in general
peyial law and punishable under such law, although given special substance
by niilitary law in view of the military circumstances prevailing.
In most countries, extradition for purely military offenses is prohi-
lited by laiv. On account of various exceptions, however, such prohibition
will not be ablc to be regarded as a general rule of international law.
2. In the event of extradition on the grounds of mixed military or
complex offenses, the distinction belween the foUowing main groups of
cdses should be made :
a) Extradition is sought on the grounds of a mixed military offense
of the type referred to above.
b) Extradition is sought for a purely military act and a mixed mili-
tary offence or an offense punishable exclusively under general
law without any connection existing between the two.
Most countries provide in their legislation for extradition on the
grounds of mixed military offenses. This also applies in the event of com-
pou7id punishment being awardable for two separate offenses, one of which
is punishable only under military law, the other constituting a mixed
military offense. In such cases, extradition is refused merely in respect of
the purely military offence, which, after all, can be separated from the
mixed military offense. This is a question which presents no problem to
the United States and the Argentine, since their legislation permits
extradition under the conditions referred to even on the grounds of purely
EXTRACTS FROM THE GENERAL REPORT
85
84
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
'■i!
inilitarji offenses. In Noricegian law. the prerequisite to cxtradition is
that the purüshvicni to he antic'ipated for a inixed mUitanj offense be no
severer than jor a comparahle ojjense under ordinary criviinal law. In all
these cases, extradition is granted only if the requesting State gives a
quarantee that the principle of specijicity in international law will he ob-
served. The repercussions of this principle of specificity are very significant
so far as purely viüitary offenses are concerned, since, ei'en in cases of
this kind, what experience has taught us holds good : sooner or later,
most people return to their native country.
3. An analjisis of the national reports to ascertain whether and in loliat
vieasnre mutual or multilateral agreements admitting cxceptions to the
Prohibition on extradition on the grounds of purely military offenses
exist shows that very few countries have settled the question of extradition
on the grounds of purely müitary offenses contractually. So far as I
have been able to asa^rtain, only one valid bilateral extradition agreement-
still exists, viz. the 1884 agreement between Portugal and Spain under
which these two countries undertake to extradite each other's deserting sol-
diers aiid sailors. On the other handy there are quite a large number of muU
tilateral agreements settling the problem more or less positively. The first
Solution of this kind is to he found in the agreement on extradition cori-
cluded at Montevideo on 26 Decemher 1933. Under Articlc 3 of that Agree-
ment, the State receiving an application for extradition can grant it in
case of this kind even on the grounds of a purely military offense. So it is
left to the discretion of each country to decide what to do upon receiving a
request for extradition. Although this agreement is in force only in a
few South and Central American states and in the United States of
America, it possesses considerable importance since, as in the case of the
Codigo Bustamente, it serves those states which have not ratified it as
a source of principles in international law governing extradition.
A decisive stcp on the way to finding a comprehe7isive Solution to the
Problem has been taken by the Scandinavian and Benclux countries. On
3 March 1961, Denmark, F Inland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, con-
cluded an agreement binding them reciprocally to extradite the persons
guilty of purely military offenses. A similar settlement is laid down in the
agreement concluded by Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands, on
27 June 1962 on extradition and legal assistance in legal rnatters in which
it is expressely laid down that desertion is not a political offense. The
lasis for this settlement was the consideration that the general dose
Cooperation among.st these countries should be extended to the military
sector, especially since, in respective national defense, they find them-
selves in a Situation calling for unconditional solidarity.
Although the European Conveiition on Extradition of 13 Decemher
1957 does not apply to purely military offenses, it does not preclude the
parties to it jrom entering into .special agreements for the purpose.
The tendency is to lay down rules governing extradition on the grounds
of purely military offenses not in a gerieral extradition agreement, but
in connection with a military alliance agreement.
4. Most countries have special legal provisions governing the pro-
cedures to be applied in dealing with a request for extradition. Domestic
rulings on extradition vary. In a few countries, the responsability for
determining lohether extradition is admissihle and for granting it rests
exclusively with the court. In other countries, the admissihility of
extradition is e.xamined in formal proceedings before courts of law.
The decision to grant or refuse rests with the governments. If a court
decides that extradition is inadmissible, the government is bound by
such decision. In sucJi case, it cannot grant an application for extradition.
In all thes?- cases, however, the government cari refuse an application
for extradition from the very first if it is founded on a purely military of-
fense not giving grounds for extradition.
The law in most continental countries admits what may he called
simplified extradition procedure. This merely means that a court decision
is normally not required if the person claimed signifies his agreement to
being extradited.
In nearly cvery country, persons claimed have very comprehensive
opportunities of raising objections against their extradition. In particu-
lar, they have a right to a legal hearing.
5. No reliahlc data on the number of applications for extradition on
the grounds of pure or mixed military offenses are available.
6. The question of lohether states in ivhich extradition for military
offenses is either prohibited or admitted in limited measure should try
to changc this Situation by treaties or legislatory action cannot be ans-
wered by a simple « yes » or « no ».
The ban on extradition for purely military offenses is probahly foun-
ded mainly on the consideration that the armed forces of a foreign country
can be a Potential threat to one's own country even in time of peace.
Even in peacetime, many countries have no interest in supporting or
strengthening the forces of other countries. Then again, the idea that
offenders, for instance deserters, who are protected against extradition
may prove to be sources of intelligence, and that, in the case of many
.soldiers, it is only the knowledge that they cannot be extradited that
leads them to commit an offense under military law and subsequently to
desert, also plays a pnrt. Furthermore, the criminal character of military
offenses is in many cases less pronounced than that of offenses under ordi-
nary criminal law. Offenses under military law are frequently tried by mili-
tary courts, which, on account of their character as special courts, are
regarded hy many people with a certain measure of distrust. And, finally,
the prosecution of such offenses is widely regarded, even nowadays, as a
national problejn.
All these reasons point to the ohstacles in the way of a general ahro-
gation of the prohibition on e.xtradition for purely military offenses.
However, they are not insurmountable ; in particular, no harrier is offered
hy international law.
Paul-Güater PÖTZ
EXTRACTS FROM THE GENERAL REPORT
87
As a result of the suhjccts hroached in the national reports, the jol-
lowing Dieses can be laid down :
a) Extradition on the grounds of purely miliiary offenses is jirst and
foremost a political matter.
The guiding principle of any and every consideration is that of viutual
trust. Many of the couniries in this world have different political,
sociologicaU and legal views. These differences make it impossihle, at
least for the present, to admit extradition on the grounds of purely
military offenses.
b) National legislation should refrain from placing a general veto on
extradition on the grounds of purely military offenses, so as to give
every country an opportunity to settle this question contractually.
c) An attempt should be made to staridardize national provisions on
offenses under military law.
d) // two or iJiore states have drawn together in the interest of cominon
defense, they have taken the political decision to cooperate with a view
to achieving a common aim and to rendering each other mutual assis-
tancc, This includes the extradition of military personnel who have
committed offenses under military law. Such mutual support must be
both unconditional and comprehensive where the forces have been
integrated.
e) The problem of extradition for purely military offenses should not be
solved by general extradition treaties. Such treaties are designed first
and foreraost to deal with the measures required for effectively dealing
with general criminality extending beyond the countries boundaries.
To inchide offenses of u specific character, such as purely military
offenses, wouJd mean going beyond their scope : such inclusion
would not fit into the primary objective of such treaties. Rather should
the Problem be solved i7i association with military alliance treaties
- bi - or multilateral -, which are founded on dose partnership and
unconditional trust. The treaties signed by Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sioeden, on 3 March 1961, and by Belgium, Luxemburg,
and the Netherlands, on 27 June 1962 are exemplary examples.
B. Handing over military personnel by means other than extradition.
This is a matter of practical importance wherever a country has part
of its armed forces stationed in foreign territory or has given its approval
to foreign armed forces being stationed in its national territory. In all such
cases, the countries involved are countries which maintain dose politicals
relations and are linked by common defense interests. Frequently, the
national forces are integrated in supranational forces within military
alliaiices.
These countries are party to a number of agreements, all moulded in
the pursuit of common political objectives and in the exploitation of
the defensive possibilities of the individual countries in the interests of
such objectives. The most important of these agreements are the « Agree-
ments between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Sta-
tus of Iheir forces » of 19 June 1951 — what is called the Nato Status
of Forces Agreement — and the Supplementary Agreement of 2 August
1959.
1. Handing over of foreign military personnel stationed in the ter-
ritory of another country to the authorities of the sending state.
Legislation and practice differ in the various countries. A few coun-
tries con.sider themselves under Obligation, on the grounds of alliance
treaties, to extraditc deserters to their native countries. Others maintain
the view that, in connection with alliance treaties, there should be a pos-
sibility of handing over deserters to friendly countries.
2. The national reports furthermore broach the question of whether
foreign military per:;onnel who have committed a punishable offense
either in their native country or in a third country, and have conse-
quently deserted can be sent back across the border to their native country
or otherwise expelled. This problem concerns only those cases in which
there are no other ways and means of extraditing or surrendering the
Person concerned to his native country — for instaiice, on the basis of an
extradition treaty, a military alliance, or other pertinent agreements.
The question at issue here is that of concurring Jurisdiction in the
fields of expulsion and extradition. Expulsion differs from extroMi^n..
insofar as an expulsion or der is issueA by a country oj resiZence in its
"own rx'clusive' interests — forlnstance: for reasons of security. Extra-
dition is graiited in the interests of a foreign country.
* 3. There are no relevant statistics available on the number of military
person7iel who have committed purely military offenses and have there-
fore been handed over to their native countries by some means other
than extradition.
Deliberations in the national reports make it possible to state the fol-
lowing :
a) The question of handing over deserters by some means other than
extradition is partially a political matter. Notwithstanding this,
it is also a matter largely inflaenced by legal considerations dic-
tated by domestic legislation pertaining to constitutional law and
by the law of public order.
b) Deserters shoidd never be handed over to their native countries
under informal procedures if such a course of action is conducive
to circuinventing a veto on extradition for military offenses which
I,
&R
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
89
c)
mighi apply to the individual case. This must at any rate apply
ii the country of residence has already rejected a request jor
extradition suhmitted by the deserter's iiative country. Expulsion
miLSt not he alloived to replace extradition when extradition is
actually inadmissible.
Particular importance attaches to this question where relations
between allied countries are involved. Such countries should
hand over each other's deserters even ij they are not stationed in
each other's territory and are not dealt with under existing agree-
vienta on mutual assistance in connection with stationed jorces.
Poncncia general
(Extrocl-os)
LA EXTRADICION POR
DELITOS MILITARES
por
Paul-Günter PöTZ
Regierungsdirektor
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
1 1
I. Observaciones preliminares
El material entregado para la ponencia general era muy amplio. Pre-
sentaron informes los dieciseis paises siguientes : Argentina, el Brasil,
Belgica, la Repüblica Federal de Aleniania, Francia, Gran Bretana, Israel,
Italia, el Canadä, Luxemburgo, los Paises Bajos, Noruega, Austria, Suiza,
Espana y los Estados Unidos de Norteamerica.
Antes de examinar cuestiones particulares, quisiera hacer algunas ob-
servaciones generales destinadas a aclarar ciertos puntos y necesarias para
exponer el conjunto de problemas.
La extradiciön, segün opinion general, es el traslado oficial de una
persona de la jurisdiccion ilimitada de un Estado dispuesto a renunciarla
por completo, a la jurisdiccion de otro Estado con el fin de la persecuciön
judicial y aplicacion de la pena. Constituye la viedida mäs importante de
la asistencia juridica interestatal en causas penales. Su importancia prac-
tica se reconoce si se considera que la jurisdiccion de todo Estado termina
cfi sus ironteras y que sin la asistencia de otros Estados seria incapaz de
hacer valer su derecho a condenar, o aplicar penas, a personas iiiculpadas
o condenadas que estän en el extranjero.
Hey en dia, el derecho de extradicion es parte integrante de la mayoria
de los sistevias juridicos del mundo. No siernpre fue asi. A Belgica le cor-
responde el merito de Jiaber creado la primera ley de extradicion del mundo.
Esta ley, promulgada el 1 de Octubre de 1.833, fue modelo para niuchos
leyes de extradicion, ejerciendo una gran influencia hasta nuestros dias
en la legislacion de otros paises.
En viuchos Estados del mundo, el derecho de extradicion esta regulado
por una ley de extradicion, o por disposiciones en la constituciön, en el c6-
digo penal o en el cödigo de procedimiento criminal. Entre los Estados eu-
ropeos, Dinamarca y Portugal figuran entre los que no tienen disposiciones
legales relativas a la extradicion, mientras que Islandia, Lichtenstein y
Austria han reglameritado en sus leyes penales tan solo algunos aspectos de
la extradicion.
V'
90
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
EXTRACTOS DEL RAPPORT GENERAL
91
/.
U I
< <
En el s\qlo XIX y sohrc todo en el transurso de Jos Ultimos cincuenta
anos s? celebraron numerosos tratados de extradiciön bilaterales. Aparte
de ellos se realizaron miichos esfuerzos con el fin de reglementar unifor-
memente el derecho de extradiciön.
Son especialmente importantes en este conjunto tres convenios multi-
laterales, CS decir el convenio curopeo de extradiciön que, como resultado
de la poUtica europea de integraciön, fue firmado el 13 de Diciembre de
1.957 por trece Estados : el tratado de extradiciön y asistencia juridica en
materias penales celebrado entre Dinamarca, Finlandia, Islandia, Norucga
y Suecia el 3 de Marzo dv 1.961, y el celebrado entre Belgica, Luxemburgo
y los Paises Bajos el 27 de Junio de 1.962.
En muchos Estados, el derecho de extradiciön es dominado por el prin-
cipio de reciprocidad, que significa que el Estado que exige la extradiciön
concede tambien por su parte la extradiciön al otro Estado en casos seme-
jantes.
Como elemento vids importante del principio de reciprocidad se califica
el principio de penalidad reciproca segün el cual se admite la extradiciön tan
solo en los casos en que el delito punible en el Estado solicitante lo es tam-
bien segün el derecho del Estado del que se solicita la extradiciön. Ray que
mencionar por fin el principio de especialidad, segün el cual una persona
en el Estado solicitante puede ser perseguida unicamente por aquellos deli-
tos cometidos antes de su extradiciön. Este principio se basa en la considera-
ciön de que ningün Estado entregarä incondicionalmente a una persona pe-
reguida. Puede calificarse este principio como axioma del derecho interna-
cional.
La extradiciön por delitos militares, en particular por deserciön, toma-
ba con frecuencia caminos propios en el transcurso de los siglos.
En los siglos XVII y XVIII y en el primer tercio del siglo XIX, por
ejemplo, hubo numerosos convenws bilaterales y midtilaterales que trata-
ban exclusivamente de la extradiciön de desertores. A partir de 1.830 apro-
ximadamente fue prevaleciendo cada vez mas el principio de que la extra-
diciön ya no debia practicarse sino en casos de crimenes y contravenciones
contra el derecho comün. La razön era en primer lugar la consideraciön de
que ningün Estado queria contribuir a apoyar el poder militar de otro
Estado que acaso no tardara en convertirse en enemigo smjo. Esto tuvo por
resultado que un nümero creciente de Estados aliados celebrö convenios
sobre la extradiciön mutua de desertores. Este desarrollo culminö en nume-
rosos tratados sobre la extradiciön de desertores y personas que rechazaron
prestar el servicio militar, celebrados en relaciön con la Guerra Mundial
de 1.914 a 1.918.
IL La extradiciön por delitos militares
Desde hace siglos la extradiciön por infracciones militares ha sido
objeto de discusiones internacionales. Fue en particular despues de la Se-
gunda Guerra Mundial que se celebraron extensas alianzas militares. Como
consecuencia de interese comunes de la defensa se han estacionado tropas
nacicnales en los territorios de gran nümero de otros Estados del mundo,
especialmente en Europa. El estacionamiento de tropas de Estados aliados
en el proprio territorio trae forzosamente consigo un aumento del nümero
de infracciones militares. Pero el problema tiene tambien un aspecto gene-
ral : Los viodernos medios de transporte y el paso mas facil de la frontera
ofrecen, tambien a personas que han cometido infracciones rnilitares, muchas
mas posibilidades para huir al extranjero con la esperanza de que alli no
seran perseguidas. i Cömo deben proceder, pues, los Estados en que se hayan
refugiado esas personas freute a la exigencia de los Estados de origen de
entregarles los inculpados a fin de perseguirlos judicialmente y condenar-
los ? Hay en este caso dos posibilidades : la extradiciön formal y la entrega
de soldados por otro Camino.
A. La extradiciön por infracciones militares en el sentido propio de la
palabra.
1. Existen dos tipos de infracciones militares : las infracciones pura-
viente militares y las infracciones mixtas militares o complejas. Las infrac-
ciones puramente militares son aquellas que se refieren a circunstancias
espcciales ajenas al derecho penal general y relacionadas con las condicio-
nes especiales del servicio militar. Se distinguen de ellas las infracciones
mixtas rnilitares o complejas, en que son actos punibles tambien segün el
derecho penal general, pero considerados por el derecho militar como espe-
ciales a causa de las caracteristicas militares es^peciales.
En la mayoria de los Estados se ha sancionado la prohibiciön de la
extradiciön por infracciones puramente militares. No puede considerarse,
sin embargo, como regia general del derecho internacional a causa de que
existen varias excepciones a esta prohibiciön.
2. En lo que concierne la extradiciön por infracciones mixtas militares
0 complejas se pueden distinguir esencialmente los grupos de casos si-
gUientes :
a) La extradiciön se solicita por una infracciön mixta militar del tipo
arriba mencionado,
b) La solicitud de extradiciön se basa en una infracciön puramente
militar y una infracciön mixta militar o una infracciön a juzgar
exclusivamente por el derecho penal general, entre las cuales no
hay ninguna relaciön.
La mayoria de los Estados preve en sus leyes la posibilidad de conceder
la extradiciön por infracciones mixtas militares aun cuando a estas se anade
cumulativamente otra purainente militar. En estos casos se deniega solo la
extradiciön por la infracciön puramente militar. Para los Estados Unidos
y Argentina esta cuestiön no es problema, ya que sus leyes admiteii, bajo
las condiciones mericionadas, la extradiciön aun por infracciones puramente
militares. Segün el derecho noruego, es condiciön para la extradiciön que
la pena correspondiente a una infracciön mixta militar no sea mayor de la
92
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
corrcspondicnte a una infraccion segün las normas juridicas generale^.
En todos estos casos se concede la extradicion tan solo si el Estado solid-
tante da Ja garantia de que se espetarä el principio de especiaUdad del de-
recho internacional Los efectos del principio de especiaUdad son muy im-
portantes para infracciones puraviente rnilitares, ya que es cosa probada
por la experiencia que tambien en el caso de tales infracciones la viayoria
de las pcrsonas (ine las cometen regresan algün dia a su patria.
3. AI analizar los injormes de los paises respecto a la cuestiön de si,
y en que escala, existen tratados bilaterales o multilaterales que contienen
excepciones de la prohibiciön de extradicion por infracciones puramente
militares se ve que solo un nümero reducido de Estados ha reglamentado en
un traiado la extradicion por infracciones puramente militares. Por lo que
acabo de averiguar. ya no existe mds que un tratado bilateral de extra-
dicion todavia en vigor, es decir, el entre Portugal y Espana del ano 1.884,
segün el cual estos paises se entregan mutuainente los desertores de las
fuerzas terrestres y navales. Existe, por otra parte, un nümero importante
de convenios bilaterales en que la cuestiön estä reglamentada de forma
mds o menos positiva. La primera soluciön de este tipo se halla en el conve-
nio sobre la extradicion celebrado en Montevideo el 26 de diciembre de
1.933, estipulando el articulo 3 de este convenio que en casos de este tipo
el Estado a que se dirige la solicitud puede aprobar la extradicion tambien
por una infraccion puramente militar. La forma de proceder en el caso de
tal solicitud de extradicion queda, pues, a su arbitrio. Este convenio, aunque
estä en vigor solo en algunos Estados suramericanos y centroamericanos
y en los Estados Unidos, es no obstante muy importante, ya que sirve, lo
mismo que el Codigo Bustamente. de fuente de principios de extradicion
del derecho internacional a los Estados que no lo han ratificado.
Un paso decisivo en el Camino nacia una soluciön completa del proble-
ma fue dabo por los Estados nördicos y los de Benelux. El 3 de marzo de
1.961 Dinamarca. Finlandia, Islandia, Noruega y Suecia celebraron un con-
venio por el que estos paises se comprometieron a entregarse mutuamente
incluso aquellos reos que hayan cometido infracciones puramente militares.
Una reglamentaciön semejante se encuentra en el tratado de extradicion y
asistencia juridica en materias penales celebrado el 27 de Junio de 1.962
entre Belgica, Luxemburgo y los Paises Bajos, en el cual se estableciö
explicitamente que la deserciön no debe considerarse como infraccion poli-
tica. Esta soluciön se basa en la consideraciön de que la estrecha colabo-
raciön entre estos Estados debe extenderse tambien al sector militar, ya
que estos Estados se encuentran, respecto a su defensa nacionaL en una
situaciÖ7i que exige una solidaridad absoluta.
El convenio de extradicion europeo del 13 de diciembre de 1.957, aun-
que no es aplicable a infracciones puramente militares, no excluye que se
celebren entre las partes contratantes convenios especiales respecto a esta
cuestiön.
Hay, en generaU una tendencia a reglamentar la extradicion por infrac-
ciones puramente juilitares solo en el marco de un tratado de alianza mili-
tar y no en un tratado de extradicion general
EXTRACTOS DEL RAPPORT GENERAL
93
4. En la viayoria de los paises se ha reglamentado la tramitaciön que
se realiza con motivo de una solicitud de extradicion. La reglamentaciön
respectiva varia en los distintos paises. En algunos, el examen de la admisi-
hilidad y la concesiön de la extradicion incumben ünicamente a los tribu-
nales. En otros, la admisihilidad de la extradicion es examinada por los tri-
bunales en un procediniiento formal, mientras que los gobiernos son los que
deciden sobre su concesiön. Si una extradicion ha sido declarada como inad-
misible por un tribunal, el gohierno esta sujeto a esta decisiön y no debe
conceder la extradicion en este caso. Pero en todos estos supuestos los go-
bieryios pueden tambien negar desde un principio una solicitud de extra-
dicion si esta se refiere a una infraccion de naturaleza puramente militar
que no da lugar a la extradicion.
La mayoria de los derechos continentales conocen la extradicion sim-
plificada, que significa que normalmenie no es necesaria una decisiön
judicial si la persona persegiiida estä de acuerdo con la extradicion.
En casi todos los Estados las personas perseguidas tienen amplias posi-
bilidades para poner reparos a la extradicion. Tienen en particular derecho
a ser oidas por las autoridades judiciales.
5. No existen informaciones fidedignas sobre el nümero de solicitudes
de extradicion por infracciones puramente militares o complejas.
6. La pregunta de si los Estados que no conceden la extradicion por
infracciones militares o la conceden solo en grado limitado deberian cam-
hiar este estado de cosas por medio de acuerdos o medidas legislativas, no
puede ser contestada con un sijnple si o no.
La exclusiön de la extradicion por infracciones de naturaleza pitramen-
te militar se basa probablemente en primer lugar en la consideraciön de que
las fuerzas armadas de un Estado pueden representar ya en la paz un peli-
gfo potencial para el otro Estado. Muchos Estados no tienen, aün en tiempos
de paz, interes en conservar y consolidar las fuerzas de otros Estados.
Interviene probablemente tambien la idea de que se puede esperar por
ejemplo que desertores protegidos contra la extradicion hagan importantes
comunicaciones y que la imposibilidad de la extradicion es precisamente
la razön que induce muchos soldados a cometer una infraccion militar y a
huir despues. Ademäs, el caräcter criminal de las infracciones militares es
con frecuencia menos pronunciado que el de las infracciones contra el
derecho comün. A juds de esto, son a menudo los tribunales militares los
que juzgan las infracciones militares, estos tribunales son considerados con
cierta desconfianzia por muchas personas por ser tribunales especiales. Yor
fin, el castigo de semejantes infracciones se considera en inuchos casos,
tambien hoy en dia, como problema nacional.
Todas estas razones seiialan las dificultades ciue se oponen a una renun-
cia a la prohibiciön de la extradicion por infracciones de naturaleza pura-
mente militar. Pero no son insuperables. En particular, el derecho inter-
nacional no representa ningün obstdculo.
tl *,
94
Paul-Günter PöTZ
ii
Resumiendo las consideraciones eocpucstas en los informes de los dife-
rentes paises, podevios decir lo siguicnte :
a) El prohlema de la extradiciön por infracclones de naturaleza pura-
mente militar tiene acusadamente un caräcter politico. En todas las
consideraciones respectivas figiira el principio de confianza. Los con-
ceptos poliücos, sociologicos y juridicos varian entre muchos paises
del mundo. Impiden, por lo menos actualmente, adviiür generalmente
la extradiciön por infracciones de naturaleza puramente militar.
b) Las lexjes nacionales no deherian prohibir en general la extradiciön
por ijifracciones de naturaleza puramente militar, para poner a todos
los Estados en condiciones de poder reglamentar tambien este prohlc-
ma por medio de tratados.
c) Se deheria tratar de unificar las disposiciones nacionales relativas a
infracciones militares.
d) Si dos 0 vids Estados se han aliado en razon a intereses comunes res-
pecio a su defensa, esto significa que han tomado las decisiones politi-
cas con el fin de colaborar para un objetivo comün y apoyarse mutua-
mente. Esto incluye la extradiciön viutua de soldados que hayan come-
tido delitos militares. El apoyo mutuo en casos de fuerzas intcgradas
debe ser extenso e incondicional.
e) El problema de extradiciön por infracciones de caräcter puramente
militar no deberia solucionarse por medio de tratados de extradiciön
generales. En estos se trata especialmente de las cuestiones relacionadas
a la lucha eficaz contra la criminalidad general a traves de las fronteras.
La inclusiön de infracciones especiales, como por ejemplo los delitos
de naturaleza puramente militar. excederia de este marco y no estaria
completamente de acuerdo con la finalidad que se quiere lograr. El
problema deberia mäs bien solucionarse en el conjunto de los tratados
de alianzas militares bilaterales o multilaterales que se basan en estre-
cha colaboracion y confianza absoluta. Pueden servlr de inodelo los
tratados entre Dinamarca, Finlandia, Islandia, Noruega y Suecia del
3 de marzo de 1.961 y entre Belgica, Luxemburgo y los Paises Bajos
del 27 de Junio de 1.962.
B. La devolucion de militares por procedimiento distinto a la extradiciön.
Esta cuestiön cobra actualidad en todos casos en que los Estados
tienen estacionadas parte de sus fuerzas armadas en territorio de otros
Estados o en los que los Estados han consentido en el estacionamiento de
fuerzas armadas extranjeras en su territorio. En todos estos casos se trata
de Estados con estrechas relaciones politicas o unidos por intereses de de-
fensa comunes. En muchos casos las fuerzas armadas nacionales se hallan
integradas en fuerzas supranacionales en el marco de alianzas militares.
Existe entre estos Estados un numero de tratados cuyo objeto es el de
perseguir fines politicos y aprovechar mejor el potencial defensivo de los
EXTRACTOS DEL RAPPORT GENERAL
95
varios Estados en pro de estos fines. De estos tratados revisten especial
importancia el « Convenio OTAN de las Fuerzas » y el acuerdo comple-
tando este convenio, llamado «Acuerdo Complementario », del 3 de Agosto
de 1.959.
1. La entrega de militares extranjeros estacionados en el territorio de
otro Estado a las autoridades del Estado de origen.
La legislaciön y la practica respectii^as varian en los varios Estados.
Algunos se consideraji obligados en virtud de tratados de alianza a entregar
desertores a sus Estados de origen. Otros son de la opiniön de que debe
haber, en conjunto con los tratados de alianza, la posibilidad de devolver
desertores a naciones amigas.
2. En los informes de los paises se ha examinado tambien el problema
de si los militares extranjeros que hayan cometido una infracciön en su
propio pais o en un tercer Estado y hayan desertado por esta razön pueden
ser conducidos a traves de la frontera o expidsados al pais de origen por
el Estado de refugio. Cabe considerar en este conjunto solo los casos en que
no hay otra posibilidad de devolver el rnilitar, sea en virtud de un convenio
de extradiciöji. un tratado de alianza u otros acuerdos, a su pais de origen
o de entregarle por otro conducto.
Se trata aqui de la cuestiöri de concurrencia entre el derecho de extra-
diciön y el derecho de expulsiön. Es que la expulsiön, a diferencia de la
extradiciön, es ordenada por el Estado de refugio en su propio interes, como
por ejemplo por razones de seguridad del Estado. La extradiciön, por el
contrario, es una medida a favor del otro Estado.
3. No disponemos de material con datos relativos al numero de mili-
tares que hayan cometido delitos puramente militares y que hayan sido
entrcgados a sus paises de origen por procedimiento distinto a la extra-
diciön.
Resumiendo las consideraciones expuestas en los informes de los dife-
rcntes paises, obtenemos los resultados siguientes :
a) La cuestiön de la entrega de desertores por procedimiento distinto
a la extradiciön es tambien una cuestiön politica. Pero intervienen
tambien mucho consideraciones juridicas condicionadas a la legis-
laciön interna en el campo del derecho constitucional y del derecho
del Orden püblico.
b) La devolucion sin formalidad de desertores a su pais de origen
deberia en principio practicarse solo si no se elude con ella la pro-
hibiciön de la extradiciön por delitos militares que exista en el caso
individual. Este principio es especialmente valido en casos en que
i'
90
c)
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
el Estado de refugio haya denegado ya una solicitud de extradiciön
jormidada por el pais de origen. Una expulsion no dehe sustituir
una extradiciön que de por si seria inadmisible.
Esta cuestiön reviste especial iraportancia en las relaciones de Es-
tados aliados. Estos Estados deheridn entregarse reciprocamente
desertores aün cuando no estuvieren estacionados en territorio del
otro Estado y no fuere apUcable a ellos lo dispuesto en convenios
existentes sobre el mutuo auxilio en relacion con las Juerzas esta-
cionadas en el otro pais.
t
Chapitre II
QUESTIONNAIRE
ET
RAPPORTS NATIONAUX
I !
X
I I
90
QuesHonnaire
QUESTIONNAIRE
sur le theme :
L'EXTRADITION POUR DELITS MILITAIRES
A. L'extradition proprement dite
1. Le refus de Textradition pour delits militaires est-il consacre per un
texte de loi ? Lequel ?
2. Votre pays a-t-il conclu des Conventions derogeant ä cette Prohibi-
tion ? En cas de reponse positive, priere de preciser ces Conventions
et les parties contractantes.
3. Quelle position est prise en cas de delits complexes, dans lesquels
des infractions de droit commun sont indivisiblement liees ä des in-
fractions militaires ?
4. Quelle est l'autorite competente pour determiner si une demande d'ex-
tradition pour delit de droit commun n'est pas en realite une maniere
deguisee de tourner la prohibition de l'extradition pour delits mili-
taires ? Est-ce la meme autorite (judiciaire, par exemple) qui prend
aussi la decision de refuser la demande de l'Etat requerant ou de la
satisfaire ?
5. Quelle a ete, en fait, le nombre d'extraditions requises par un Etat
;. etranger au cours des dix dernieres annees ; le nombre des requetes
satisfaites ? Pour quelles infractions militaires ?
6. Estimez:-vous qu'une derogation conventionelle (ou legislative)
devrait etre apportee ä la prohibition generale de Textradition pour
delits militaires ? Pour quels delits, sous quelle forme ? Le probleme
se presente-t-il de maniere plus pressante pour le cas de forces in-
tegr^es ?
B, La remise de militaire par d*autres moyens que Textradition
1. Y-a-t-il une pratique de remise de militaires etrangers stationnes sur
votre territoire lorsque leur caserne est situee sur ce meme territoire
qui est le votre ?
2. Y-a-t-il une pratique similaire pour les militaires de votre pays sta-
tionnes ä l'etranger ?
100 QUESTIONNAIRE
3. Y-a-t-il une pratique de remise a la frontiere pour les militaires etran-
gers qui ont commis leur delit dans leur pays et qui se sont enfuis
pour chercher refuge dans votre pays ou qui transitent dans le votre
pour chercher refuge dans un troisieme pays ?
4. Statistiques comparees sur ces trois points, s'il est possible.
101
Qucstionary
QUESTIONARY
on the topic :
EXTRADITION FOR MILITARY OFFENSES
A. The properly so-called Extradition
1. Is the refusal of extradition for military offenses sanctioned by law ?
By which one ?
2. Has your country concluded Conventions which are affecting this Pro-
hibition ? If the answer is in the affirmative, please state these Con-
ventions and the contracting parties.
3. Which Position has been taken in case of complex offenses where the
infractions of the common law are indivisibly connected with mili-
tary infractions ?
4. Which is the competent authority to determine whether a request
for extradition for an offense under the general law is not, in reality,
a veiled manner to evade the prohibition of the extradition for mi-
litary offenses ? Is this the same authority (legal, for instance) who
also makes the decisions as to whether the request of a State be denied
or granted ?
5., Which, in fact, was the number of extraditions repuested by a foreign
State within the last ten years? The number of requests complied
with ? For which military offenses ?
6. Do you believe that a conventional (or legislative) derogation should
be brought to the general prohibition of the extradition for military
offenses? For which offenses and under which form? Is the Pro-
blem more urgent in the case of integrated forces ?
B. Delivery of military individuals by other nieans than Extradition
1. Is there a practice to deliver foreign military individuals who are
stationed on your territory if their barracks are located on the same
territory as yours ?
2. Is there a similar practice which applies to military individuals of
your country who are stationed in a foreign country?
II
■l
102
QUESTIONARY
8. Does the practice exist to deliver foreign military individuals at the
border who have committed their offense in their own country, and
who escaped, in order to seek refuge in your country, or who transit
to your country, in order to seek refuge in a third country ?
4. If possiblc, give comparing statistics concerning these three points.
, I
ii I
CUESTIONARIO
sobre el tema :
103
Cucstionario
LA EXTRADICION POR DELITOS MILITARES
A. La extradiciön propiamente dicha
1. La negativa a la extradiciön por delitos militares 6 estä consagrada
por un texte legal ? 6 Cuäl ?
2. l Ha concertado vuestro pais Convenios que derogan esta prohibiciön ?
3. i Cuäl es la toma de posiciön en caso de delitos complejos en los que
las mfracciones de Derecho comün se encuentren indivisiblemente li-
gadas a infracciones militares ?
4. 6 Cuäl es la autoridad competente para determinar si una peticion de
extradiciön por delito de Derecho comün no es, en realidad, una for-
ma disfrazada de burlar la prohibiciön de la extradiciön por delitos
militares ? 6 Es la misma autoridad (judicial, por ejemplo) la que toma
tambien la decisiön de denegar o satisfacer la peticion del Estado re-
quirente ?
5. i Cuäl ha sido, de hecho, el nümero de extradiciones requeridas por un
> Estado extranjero durante los dos Ultimos anos ? i Que nümero de re-
querimientos han sido satisfechos ? i Por que infracciones militares ?
6. c Estima usted que una derogaciön convencional (o legislativa) ^delria
introducirse en cuanto a la prohibiciön general de extradiciön por
delitos militares ? i Para que delitos y en que forma ? i Se presenta el
problema de manera mäs urgente para el caso de fuerzas integradas ?
k\
1.
B. La entrega de militares por otros medios que la extradiciön
6 Existe una practica de entegra de militares extranjeros estacionados
en vuestro territorio, cuando su acuartelamiento estä situado sobre
vuestro territorio ?
2. i Existe una practica similar para los militares de vuestro pais esta-
cionados en el extranjero ?
II
VJf
Vit
M
104 CUESTIONARIO
3. i Existe una prätica de entrega en la frontera para los militares ex-
tranjeros que han cometido el delito en su pais y que han huido para
buscar refugio en vuestro pais, o se encuentran en el en trämite para
buscar refugio en un tercer pais ?
4. Estadisticas comparadas soore estos tres puntos, si ello es posible.
105
Rapport allcmand
DIE AUSLIEFERUNG WEGEN
MILITAERISCHER STRAFTATEN
von
Paul-Günfcr PöTZ
Regierungsdirektor
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland)
A. Die Auslieferung im eigentlichen Sinne
1. Ist die Ablehnung der Auslieferung wegen militärischer Straftaten
in einem Gesetzestext vorgesehen ? In welchem ?
In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist das Recht der Auslieferung
im Deutschen Auslieferungsgesetz — DAG — vom 23. Dezember 1929
(Reichsgesetzbl. 1929 I S. 239 ; 1930 I S. 28) in der Fassung der Gesetzes vom
12. September 1933 (Reichsgesetzbl. 1933 I S. 618) geregelt. In § 2 Abs.
2 dieses Gesetzes ist bestimmt :
«Die Auslieferung ist nicht zulässig, wenn die Tat nach deutschem
Recht nur nach den Militärstrafgesetzen strafbar ist... ».
In der Begründung, mit der der Gesetzentwurf dem damaligen
Deutschen Reichstag vorgelegt worden ist, heisst es u.a. :
«Mit den Interessen der Strafrechtspflege ist es vereinbar, von der
Auslieferung bei solchen Straftaten abzusehen, die einen dem all-
gemeinen Strafrecht unbekannten, lediglich den besonderen mili-
tärischen Verhältnissen entnommenen Tatbestand enthalten. Es
wird daher die Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten,
wie Wachvergehen, Feigheit, Ungehorsam, Fahnenflucht usw., un-
tersagt. Dagegen ist die Auslieferung wegen der Straftaten des
allgemeinen Strafrechts, die aus militärischen Gründen umgestal-
tet und in das Militärstrafrecht übernommen sind, wie z.B. Miß-
handlung Untergebener, Diebstahl oder Unterschlagung zum Nach-
teil von Kameraden, zulässig. Es erschien auch nicht empfehlens-
wert, für die Ahndung der gemischtmilitärischen Straftaten an dem
Ausgelieferten die ausschliessliche Anwendung des allgemeinen
Strafrechts vorzuschreiben, da diese Beschränkung, namentlich bei
schon erfolgter Verurteilung, zu grossen Schwierigkeiten führen
kann ».
iil
H
106
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
RAPPORT ALLEM AND
lü7
(i
Nach § 3 Abs. 2 eines im Bundesministerium der Justiz erstellten
Referentenentwurfs zur Reform des Deutschen Auslieferungsgesetzes, der
gegenwärtig von einer Sachverständigenkommission beraten wird, ist, in
sachlicher Übereinstimmung mit § 2 Abs. 2 DAG, jede nicht rein' militä-
rische strafbare Handlung auslieferungsfähig.
Unter rein militärischen Straftaten sind solche Taten zu verstehen,
die einen dem allgemeinen Strafrecht fremden Tatbestand enthalten, der
auf dem besonderen Militärdienstverhältnis beruht. Ob dieser Straftatbe-
stand in einem besonderen Militärstrafgesetzbuch enthalten oder Bestand-
teil des allgemeinen Strafgesetzbuchs ist, ist ohne Bedeutung.
2. Hat Ihr Land Konventionen geschlossen, die von diesem Verbot
Ahioeichendes enthalten'' Bejahendenfalls wird um nähere Anga-
ben über diese Konventionen sowie über die Vertragsparteien ge-
beten.
Im deutschen Auslieferungsrecht hat das Verbot der Auslieferung
wegen rein militärischer strafbarer Handlungen nicht immer bestanden.
Vielmehr wurde früher die Auslieferung für zweckmässig angesehen, so-
weit es sich um Fahnenflucht handelte. So bestanden Verträge über die
Auslieferung Fahnenflüchtiger mit Dänemark (vom 25. Dezember 1820)
und mit Österreich (vom 10. Februar 1831). Noch am 11. Januar 1917 schloss
Deutschland mit der Türkei einen Vertrag ab, wonach die Wehr- und
Fahnenflüchtigen gegenseitig auszuliefern waren. Diese Verträge sind
aber nicht mehr in Kraft.
#
Gegenwärtig hat die Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit 15 Staaten Aus-
lieferungsverträge und mit Dänemark eine vorläufige Vereinbarung über
die Regelung des Rechtshilfeverkehrs in Strafsachen. Hinzu kommen Ge-
genseitigkeitsvereinbarungen in Einzelfällen der Auslieferung mit zahl-
reichen Staaten.
Vorläufige Regelungen des Rechtshilfeverkehrs in Strafsachen und
Gegenseitigkeitsvereinbarungen im Einzelfall unterfallen der unter 1) be-
sprochenen Vorschrift des § 2 Abs. 2 DAG. Eine Auslieferung wegen rein
militärischer strafbarer Handlungen ist daher unzulässig.
In keinem der gegenwärtig in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Kraft
befindlichen 15 Auslieferungsverträge ist eine Auslieferung wegen rein
militärischer Straftaten vorgesehen
In den Verträgen mit Belgien (vom 17. Januar 1958), Großbritannien
(vom 14. Mai 1872/ 23. Februar 1960), Griechenland (vom 12. März/ 27.
Februar 1907), Luxemburg (vom 9. März 1876/ 6. Mai 1912), den Nieder-
landen (vom 31. Dezember 1896/ 1. Dezember 1956), Norwegen (vom 19.
Januar 1878/ 7. März 1907), der Schweiz (vom 24. Januar 1874), Spanien
(vom 2. Mai 1878) und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika (vom 12.
Juli 1930) sind die auslieferungsfähigen strafbaren Handlungen noch
einzeln aufgeführt (Enumerationsmethode). Rein militärische strafbare
Handlungen sind in den Katalogen nicht enthalten.
In den übrigen Verträgen, in denen die auslieferungsfahigen Straf-
tatbestände allgemein umschrieben sind (Eliminationsmethode), sind die
militärischen Straftaten mit unterschiedlichen Formulierungen von der
Auslieferung ausgeschlossen worden. So heisst es in den Verträgen mit
Finnland (vom 14. Mai 1937) und — im wesentlichen übereinstimmend
— mit der Türkei (vom 3. September 1930) :
«Die Verpflichtung zur Auslieferung besteht nicht, wenn die Tat
eine Wehrpflichtverletzung darstellt oder nur nach den Militärstraf-
gesetzen strafbar ist » ;
— mit Frankreich (vom 29. November 1951) und — im wesentlichen
übereinstimmend — mit Monaco (vom 21. Mai 1962) :
« Die Auslieferung wird nicht bewilligt, wenn die strafbare Handlung,
wegen deren sie beantragt ist, ausschliesslich in der Verletzung mili-
tärischer Pflichten besteht » ;
— mit Italien (vom 12. Juni 1942) :
«Die Auslieferung wird ferner nicht gewährt, wenn die Tat aus-
schliesslich eine Wehrdienstentziehung darstellt oder ausschliesslich
nach den Wehrstrafgesetzen strafbar ist » ;
— und mit Österreich (vom 22. September 1958) :
«Die Auslieferung wird nicht bewilligt, wenn die dem Ausliefe-
rungsersuchen zugrunde liegende strafbare Handlung vom ersuch-
ten Staat als eine rein militärische angesehen wird».
Artikel 4 des Europäischen Auslieferungsübereinkommens vom 13.
Dezember 1957, das von der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ratifiziert wor-
den, aber im Verhältnis zu ihr noch nicht in Kraft getreten ist, lautet :
' « Auf die Auslieferung wegen militärischer strafbarer Handlungen, die
keine nach gemeinem Recht strafbaren Handlungen darstellen, ist
dieses Übereinkommen nicht anwendbar ».
Diese Bestimmung besagt nur, dass ein Auslieferungsersuchen wegen
einer rein militärischen strafbaren Handlung nicht auf das Europäische
Auslieferungsübereinkommen gestützt werden kann. Sie schliesst dagegen
Sonderabkommen zwischen den Vertragsparteien wegen dieser Frage nicht
aus. Diese Regelung beruht auf der Erwägung, dass eine Auslieferung we-
gen rein militärischer Delikte nur im Zusammenhang mit einem miHtä-
rischen Bündnisvertrag und nicht in einem allgemeinen Auslieferungsver-
trag vereinbart werden sollte.
3. Wie verhält man sich im Falle von komplexen Straftaten, bei denen
allgemeine Straftaten untrennbar mit militärischen Straftaten ver-
bunden sind ?
»
108
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
I I
Das in § 2 Abs. 2 DAG und in den Auslieferungsverträgen enthaltene
Verbot der Auslieferung wegen militärischer Straftaten bezieht sich nur
auf die rein militärischen Straftaten. Es umfasst dagegen nicht die kom-
plexen oder gemischtmilitürischen Straftaten. Hierunter sind solche Hand-
lungen zu verstehen, die sich auch im allgemeinen Strafrecht finden und
dort bereits unter Strafe gestellt sind, die aber mit Rücksicht auf beson-
dere militärische Verhältnisse durch das Militärrecht zu einem besonderen
Tatbestand umgestaltet und -- möglicherweise, aber nicht notwendig —
in einem Militärstrafgesetzbuch mit einer — regelmässig höheren -— Strafe
bedroht sind. Wegen derartiger Handlungen darf grundsätzlich ausgelie-
fert werden.
V
')''
Es sind folgende Fallgruppen zu unterscheiden :
a) Handelt es sich bei der einem Auslieferungsersuchen zugrunde lie-
genden strafbaren Handlung um eine gemischtmilitärische Straftat
der vorher beschriebenen Art (z.B. Kameradendiebstahl, Nötigung ei-
nes Vorgesetzten, tätlicher Angriff gegen einen Vorgesetzten, Miß-
handlung Untergebener), so ist die Auslieferung ohne Einschränkung
zulässig, falls die übrigen Voraussetzungen nach dem Vertrag oder
dem Deutschen Auslieferungsgesetz vorliegen. Im Falle einer Verur-
teilung nach erfolgter Auslieferung kann die Strafe dem Militärstraf-
gesetzbuch entnommen werden. Bei der Strafzumessung kann der mi-
litärische Charakter der Straftat berücksichtigt werden.
b) Bilden eine rein militärische Tat und eine gemischtmilitärische oder
eine ausschliesslich nach allgemeinem Strafrecht zu beurteilende straf-
bare Handlung, die keinerlei Verbindung zueinander haben, den Ge-
genstand eines Auslieferungsersuchens (z.B. Fahnenflucht und Un-
terschlagung), so ist wegen der ersten Tat die Auslieferung unzulässig ;
wegen der zweiten kann sie bewilligt werden (Tatmehrheit).
Verletzt ein und dieselbe Handlung zugleich ein rein militärisches
Strafgesetz und einen gemischtmilitärischen oder einen allgemeinen Straf-
tatbestand (Tateinheit), gilt das gleiche. Die rein militärische Straftat
ist von der Auslieferung auszuschliessen.
Tn allen diesen Fällen wird die Auslieferung u.a. nur dann bewilligt,
wenn der ersuchende Staat Gewähr für die Beachtung des völkerrechtli-
chen Grundsatzes der Spezialität bietet. Es muss also sichergestellt sein,
dass der Ausgelieferte in dem Staat, an den er ausgeliefert werden soll,
ohne deutsche Zustimmung weder wegen einer vor der Auslieferung be-
gangenen Tat, für welche die Auslieferung nicht bewilligt worden ist, zur
Untersuchung gezogen, bestraft oder an einen dritten Staat weitergelie-
fert noch aus einem anderen, vor der Auslieferung eingetretenen Rechts-
grund in seiner persönlichen Freiheit beschränkt wird, es sei denn, dass
er das Gebiet der ausländischen Regierung innerhalb einer bestimmten
Frist nach dem Tage seiner Freilassung nicht verlässt oder dorthin zurück-
kehrt oder von einer dritten Regierung von neuem ausgeliefert wird. Ist
diese sogenannte Spezialitätsbindung weggefallen, kann ein Beschuldigter
also auch wegen eines rein militärischen Delikts verfolgt werden.
\ V.
V
RAPPORT ALLEMAND
109
4. Welche Behörde ist zuständig, uvi festzustellen, oh ein Ausliefe-
rungsersuchen wegen einer gewöhnlichen Straftat in Wirklichkeit
nicht eine verkappte Methode ist, um das Auslieferungsverhot hei
einer inilitärischen Straftat zu umgehen? Ist es dieselbe (z.B. Ju-
stiz) Behörde, die auch die Entscheidung trifft, das Ersucheri des
betreffenden Staates abzulehiien oder ihm stattzugehen?
In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gibt es keine Behörde, deren spe-
zielle Aufgabe es wäre, Feststellungen der in der vorstehenden Frage
bezeichneten Art zu treffen.
Satz 1 der Frage 4) enthält eine diskriminierende Unterstellung, die
besser vermieden werden sollte, zumal fingierte Auslieferungsersuchen —
wenn überhaupt — äusserst selten vorkommen dürften. Dieser Frageteil
sollte besser lauten :
« Welche Behörde ist für die Prüfung zuständig, ob ein Auslieferungs-
ersuchen zulässig ist ? »
Das Verfahren, das in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland aufgrund ei-
nes aus dem Ausland eingehenden Auslieferungsersuchens — gleich wel-
cher Art — durchgeführt wird, ist im Deutschen Auslieferungsgesetz ge-
regelt (§§ 24 ff). Nach dem Eingang des Ersuchens um Auslieferung
beantragt der Staatsanwalt die Vernehmung des Verfolgten durch den
Richter. Bei der Vernehmung ist dem Verfolgten Gelegenheit zu geben,
sich zu dem Ersuchen zu äussern. Er ist auch zu befragen, ob er sich mit
der Auslieferung einverstanden erklärt. Erklärt er sich nicht einverstan-
den, dann entscheidet das zuständige Oberlandesgericht darüber, ob die
Auslieferung zulässig ist. Erklärt der Verfolgte sich mit seiner Auslie-
ferung einverstanden, bedarf es einer gerichtlichen Entscheidung über die
Zulässigkeit der Auslieferung nicht. Der Staatsanwalt kann sie aber auch
in diesem Fall beantragen. Das Oberlandesgericht kann vor der Entschei-
dung den Verfolgten vernehmen und Beweise über die Zulässigkeit der
Auslieferung erheben. Es kann auch eine mündliche Verhandlung anord-
nen. Die gerichtliche Prüfung des Ersuchens erstreckt sich auf alle in
einem etwaigen Vertrag und gegebenenfalls im Deutschen Auslieferungs-
gesetz enthaltenen rechtlichen und tatsächlichen Voraussetzungen.
Zur Entscheidung über Auslieferungsersuchen der ausländischen Re-
gierungen ist grundsätzlich die Bundesregierung zuständig (§ 44 Abs. 1
DAG). Sie hat jedoch ihre Befugnisse zur Entscheidung über aus Däne-
mark,Österreich und der Schweiz eingehende Auslieferungsersuchen bis
auf einige Ausnahmen den Regierungen der deutschen Bundesländer über-
tragen. Die Bundesregierung und die Landesregierungen sind an die Be-
schlüsse der Oberlandesgerichte gebunden, sofern diese die Auslieferung
eines Verfolgten für unzulässig erklären. In diesen Fällen darf die Auslie-
ferung nicht bewilligt werden (§ 7 DAG). Hat das Oberlandesgericht
die Auslieferung dagegen für zulässig erklärt, können die Bundesregierung
bzw. die Landesregierungen die Auslieferung bewilligen oder ablehnen.
Gleiches gilt für den Fall, dass eine gerichtliche Entscheidung nicht ergan-
'^ I
l* >
110
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
RAPPORT ALLEMAND
111
gen ist, weil der Verfolgte sich mit der Auslieferung einverstanden erklärt
hat.
Im Hinblick auf die ursprüngliche Fragestellung ist hier besonders da-
rauf hinzuweisen, dass jede aufgrund des Deutschen Auslieferungsgesetzes
oder eines Auslieferungsvertrages ergangene Auslieferungsbewilligung
zur Voraussetzung hat, dass der oben erörterte Grundsatz der Spezialität
von dem ersuchenden Staat beachtet wird.
5. Wie gross war de jacto die Zahl der von einem ausländischen Staat
in den letzten 10 Jahren verlangten AusUejerungen und wie vielen
Ersuchen wurde stattgegeben ? Bei welchen militärischen Strafta-
ten ?
Die Fragestellung ist nicht eindeutig. Vermutlich wird Auskunft dar-
über erbeten, wie viele Ersuchen um Auslieferung wegen militärischer
Straftaten in den letzten 10 Jahren von ausländischen Staaten gestellt wor-
den sind. Die so verstandene Frage kan für die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land nicht zuverlässig beantwortet werden, weil hierfür statistische Anga-
ben nicht vorliegen. Soweit feststellbar, sind in den letzten 10 Jahren Ersu-
chen um Auslieferung wiegen rein militärischer Straftaten von ausländi-
schen Regierungen nicht gestellt w^orden. Dies dürfte auf den weithin be-
kannten Rechtszustand in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Aus-
schluss der Auslieferung wiegen rein militärischer Straftaten in den Auslie-
ferungsverträgen zurückzuführen sein. Die Zahl der Auslieferungsersuchen
wegen gemischtmilitärischer strafbarer Handlungen war, gemessen an der
Zahl der in den Jahren 1954 bis 1964 bei deutschen Behörden eingegange-
nen Auslieferungsersuchen — insgesamt 2358 — , sehr gering. Es werden, ge-
schätzt, höchstens 50 derartige Ersuchen gewesen sein.
6. Sind Sie der Auffassung, dass durch Abkommen (oder durch ge-
setzgeberische Massnahmen) von dem allgemeinen Verbot der Aus-
lieferung hei militärischen Straftaten abgewichen werden muss ?
Bei welchen Straftaten und in welcher Form ? Hai die Frage etncn
höheren Dringlichkeitsgrad in Fällen eines integrierten Rahmens?
Aus der bisherigen Erörterung folgt, dass sich die vorstehende Frage
für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland nur auf eine Aufhebung oder Locke-
rung des Verbots der Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten
beziehen kann, da die gemischtmilitärischen strafbaren Handlungen aus-
lieferungsfähig sind.
Zunächst ist festzustellen, dass es sich bei dem weitverbreiteten Ver-
bot der Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten nicht um eine
allgemein anerkannte Regel des Völkerrechts handelt, die nach deutschem
Verfassungsrecht den Rang eines innerstaatlichen Gesetzes beanspruchen
könnte. Dagegen spricht, dass Deutschland, wie bereits ausgeführt, noch im
Jahre 1917 mit der Türkei einen Vertrag über die Auslieferung von Wehr-
und Fahnenflüchtigen abgeschlossen hat und dass derartige Verträge
heute noch zwischen anderen Staaten bestehen.
Der Ausschluss der Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten
beruht wohl in erster Linie auf der Erwägung, dass die Streitkräfte eines
anderen Staates schon im Frieden eine potentielle Gefahr für den eigenen
Staat darstellen. Oft haben Staaten auch in Friedenszeiten kein Interesse
an der Erhaltung und Stärkung der Streitkräfte anderer Staaten. Auch
wird der Gedanke eine Rolle spielen, dass man z.B. von Deserteuren, die
vor einer Auslieferung geschützt sind, wichtige Mitteilungen erwarten
kann und dass das Verbot der Auslieferung manchen Soldaten überhaupt
erst zu einer militärischen Straftat mit anschliessender Flucht bringt.
Diese und weitere Gründe stehen einer generellen Aufgabe des Verbots
der Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten entgegen.
Andererseits ist nicht zu verkennen, dass derartige Überlegungen im
Verhältnis zwischen befreundeten oder verbündeten Staaten nur geringe
oder gar keine Bedeutung haben. In diesen Fällen kann sich die in ei-
nem innerstaatlichen Gesetz enthaltene Regelung, dass die Auslieferung
wegen rein militärischer Straftaten unzulässig ist, störend auswirken. Es
könnte deshalb daran gedacht werden, derartige starre gesetzliche Rege-
lungen aufzuheben. Für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland würde eine Auf-
hebung des anfangs angeführten § 2 Abs. 2 DAG bedeuten, dass sie im
Einzelfall nicht verpflichtet, aber doch in der Lage wäre, auf ein ausländi-
sches Ersuchen die Auslieferung wegen einer rein militärischen Straftat zu
bewilligen. Dies würde zwar zu einer flexibleren Handhabung einschlä-
giger Ersuchen beitragen. Eine solche Regelung hätte aber auch Nachteile.
So könnte z.B. die verschiedenartige Behandlung gleichartiger Ersuchen
zweier ausländischer Staaten unerwünschte politische Auswirkungen nach
sich ziehen.
Gegen eine Lösung dieses Problems im Rahmen allgemeiner Auslie-
ferungsverträge spricht, dass dort in erster Linie die Fragen geregelt wer-
den sollen, die zu einer wirksamen Bekämpfung der allgemeinen Krimi-
nalität über die Grenzen hinweg, die ein gemeinsames Anliegen aller Staa-
ten ist, erforderlich sind. Die Einbeziehung spezieller Straftaten wie der
rein militärischen Delikte würde diesen Rahmen ausweiten und nicht recht
in die beabsichtigte Zielsetzung passen.
Diese Überlegungen führen zu dem Vorschlag, die Frage, ob und in
welchem Umfang die Auslieferung wegen rein militärischer Straftaten er-
möglicht werden soll, im Zusammenhang mit militärischen Bündnisverträ-
gen — zw^ei-oder mehrseitigen — zu regeln. Hier ist der Platz für eine Ver-
einbarung, deren Grundlagen u.a. enge Partnerschaft und unbedingtes
Vertrauen sind. Dies war auch die Auffassung des Europäischen Ausschus-
ses für Strafrechtsprobleme beim Europarat, der das oben erwähnte Euro-
päische Auslieferungsübereinkommen vom 13. Dezember 1957 ausgear-
beitet hat. Dabei wird keine allgemeine Empfehlung erteilt werden kön-
nen, welche rein militärischen Straftaten von dem Verbot der Auslieferung
auszunehmen sind. Hier kommt es auf die jeweiligen Besonderheiten an.
Aus dem Gesagten ergibt sich, dass die erörterte Frage in Fällen
eines integrierten Rahmens einen höheren Dringlichkeitsgrad hat.
Fl .
112
Paul-Günter PÖTZ
113
•0
B. Die Ueberstelliing von Soldaten auf einem anderen Weg als dem
der Auslieferung
1. Gibt CS eine Praxis der Überstellung ausländischer Soldaten, die auf
Ihrem Hoheitsgebiet stationiert sind, wenn ihre Kaserne auf diesem
seihen Hoheitsgebiet liegt ?
Auf dem Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland sind bekanntlich
Streitkräfte verscliiedencr befreundeter Nationen stationiert. Das ge-
meinsame Verteidigungsinteresse erfordert die Abwehr schädlicher Ein-
flüsse. Hierzu zählt die Behandlung von Deserteuren aus Truppentei-
len, die in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland stationiert sind. Die Mög-
lichkeit ihrer Überstellung an die Truppen der Heimalstaaten würde
den gemeinsamen Zielen dienen.
Eine Praxis der Überstellung ausländischer Soldaten in Fällen der
vorgenannten Art hat sich in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bisher
nicht herausgebildet. Ihr standen rechtliche, insbesondere verfassungs-
rechtliche, Schwierigkeiten entgegen. Es sind verschiedene Lösungs-
möglichkeiten erw^ogen worden, um diese Schwierigkeiten zu beseiti-
gen. Dies kann entweder durch innerstaatliche gesetzliche Maßnahmen
oder durch zweiseitige Verträge geschehen. Möglicherweise wird der
ersteren Lösung der Vorzug gegeben werden.
Gegenwärtig muß also die eingangs gestellte Frage verneint werden
2. Gibt es eine ähnliche Praxis bei den Soldaten Ihres Landes, die im,
Ausland stationiert sind ?
Bisher ist kein Fall bekannt geworden, in dem ein im Ausland statio-
nierter Soldat der Bundeswehr von seiner Truppe desertiert und dieser-
halb die Unterstützung durch die Behörden des Aufenthalsstaates erforder-
lich gewesen wäre.
Die Frage ist daher zu verneinen.
3. Gibt es eine Praxis der Üherstellung an der Grenze bei ausländischen
Soldaten, die ihre Straftaten im eigenen Land begangen haben und
die geflohen sind, um in Ihrem Land Zuflucht zu suchen, oder die
durch Ihr Land reisen, um in einem dritten Land Zuflucht zu suchen ?
In Fällen der vorgenannten Art gibt es in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland keine Praxis. Die Frage ist daher zu verneinen.
4. Wenn möglich, vergleichende Statistiken zu diesen drei Punkten.
Aus den Antworten auf die Fragen zu L bis 3. ergibt sich, daß
sich hinsichtlich der darin genannten Fälle in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland eine bestimmte Praxis bisher nicht entwickelt hat. Es
ist daher nicht möglich, vergleichende Statistiken aufzustellen.
Rapport argenfin
LA EXTRADICION POR
DELITOS MILITARES
por
Colonel Carlos J. COLOMBO
(Argentina)
A. La extradiciön propiamente dicha
1. La negativa a la extradiciön por delitos militares, i esta consagrada por
un texto legal ? <i Cual ?
La negativa a la extradiciön por delitos militares estä contemplada
en la Convenciön de Montevideo sobre Extradiciön de diciembre de 1933,
signada por las Repüblicas americanas, con excepciön de Brasil, Paraguay,
Peru y Uruguay ; y ratificada por nuestro pais por la Ley N" 14.467.
Cabe seiialar, empero, que tal exclusiön de los delitos militares, no es
un principio uniforme en el plexo de convenios internacionales que la
Argentina ha suscripto sobre la materia con distintos paises, sino que por
el contrario este principio se incorpora recien a partir de la citada Conven-
ciön de 1933, figurando tambien en el Tratado de Derecho Penal Interna-
cional suscripto en Montevideo en 1940, aün no ratificado por nuestro
pais»' como asi tambien en los proyectos de acuerdo sobre extradiciön, en
trämite, con otros Estados.
Consecuentemente, la negativa de extradiciön por delitos militares no
figura en los convenios celebrados con Espaiia, Italia, Belgica, Gran Breta-
na, Holanda, E.E.U.U., Suiza, Noruega, anteriores a la Convenciön de
Montevideo de 1933.
2. l. Ha concertado vuestro pais Convenios que derogan esta prohibiciön ?
Queda contestada esta pregunta con lo expresado al responder la
primera.
3. l Cuäl es la toma de posicion en caso de delitos complejos en los que
las infracciones de Derecho commün se encuentren indivisiblemente
ligadas a infracciones militares ?
114
Carlos J. COLOMBO
RAPPORT ARGENTIN
115
)\
Dependerä del convenio que deba aplicarse en cada caso en particular.
En efecto si en la situaciön planteada debe aplicarse la Convenciön de
Montevideo de 1933, que niega la extradiciön por delitos militares, la toma
de posiciön serä entonces negar la extradiciön por cuanto este delito priva-
ria sobre los delitos comunes por aplicaciön de los mismos principios que
rigen la exciusiön de los delitos comunes conexos con delitos politicos, en
el examen de un supuesto de este tipo.
En el caso en que hubiera de aplicarse convenios que no excluyan la
extradiciön por delitos militares, no habria menester toma de posiciön
alguna ya que el caso se reduciria a la aplicaciön estricta del tratado que
correspondiera.
Por ultimo, en el supuesto en que no hubiere tratado vigente, se apli-
carian en el particular los principios de reciprocidad, de acuerdo con lo
dispuesto en la Ley N" 1.612 y articulos 646 a 674 del Cödigo de Procedi-
mientos en lo Criminal de la Capital Federal. En este supuesto el juicio
sobre la aceptaciön de la reciprocidad y por ende la toma de posiciön es
un juicio netamente politico, reservado al Poder Ejecutivo Nacional y
sustraido a la resoluciön del Poder Judicial.
dibles (conforme Tratado de Montevideo sobre Extradiciön de 1933, Tratado
de Derecho Penal Internacional de Montevideo de 1940).
B. La entrega de militares por otros medios que la extradiciön
1. 6 Existe una practica de entrega de militare extranjeros estacionados en
vuestro territorio, cuando su acuertelamiento esta situado sohre vuestro
territorio ?
Si, en los casos de infracciones vinculadas con el servicio militar que
prestan los causantes.
En los supuestos de infracciones comunes sin conexiön con la activi-
dad militar de sus autores, priva la jurisdicciön argentina.
2. i Existe U7ia practica siniüar para los militares de vuestro pais esta-
cionados en el extranjero ?
Si.
4. 6 Cuäl es la autoridad covipetente para determinar si una peticiön de
extradiciön por delito de Derecho comün no es, en realidad, una forma
disjrazada de buiiar la prohibiciön de la extradiciön por delitos mili-
tares ? l Es la misma autoridad (judicial, por ejemplo) la que toma
tambien la decisiön de denegar o satisjacer la peticiön del Estado
requirente ?
Compete a los Jueces Federales el examen tecnico juridico sobre los
pedidos de extradiciön formulados al Gobierno Argentino.
En cambio, es privative del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional la decisiön
sobre la aceptaciön o rechazo del pedido de extradiciön.
3. i Existe una practica de entrega en la frontera para los militares extran-
jeros que hau cometido el delito en su pais y que han huido para
buscar refugio en vuestro pais, o se encuentran en el en tramite para
buscar rejugio en un tercer pais ?
No. En este supuesto debe aplicarse los principios del sistema de la
extradiciön.
5. c Cuäl ha sido, de hecho, el nümero de extradiciones requeridas por un
Estado extranjero durante los dos Ultimos anos ?
No ha habido durante los dos Ultimos aüos pedido de extradiciön por
delitos militares.
6. 6 Estima usted que una derogaciön convencional (o legislativa) deberia
introducirse en cuanto a la prohibiciön general de extradiciön por
delitos militares ?
No, en razön de que la tendencia en el Derecho Internacional America-
no es de incluir a los delitos militares en la nömina de los delitos no extra-
li/'
I
.1
117
Rapporf autrichicn
DIE AUSLIEFERUNG WEGEN
MILITAERISCHER STRAFTATEN
von
Oskar ZLAMALA
Ministerialrat
Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung
(Osterreich)
A. Die Auslieferung im eigentlichen Sinne
1. Ist die Ablehnung der Auslieferung ivegen militärischer Straf-
taten in einem Gesetzetext vorgesehen? In welchem?
Die Verweigerung der Auslieferung bei militärischen Delikten ist
nicht durch Gesetz geregelt, doch handelt es sich hierbei um eine allgemein
anerkannte Regel des Völkerrechtes, die auf Grund der Bestimmungen des
Art. 9 des Bundesverfassungsgesetzes als Bestandteil des Bundesrechtes
anzusehen ist. Dieser Grundsatz kommt in allen zwischen der Republik
Österreich und anderen Staaten abgeschlossenen Auslieferungsverträgen
zum Ausdruck, insbesondere aber auch im Artikel 4 des Europäischen
Au^lieferungsübereinkommens vom 13. Dezember 1957, welches allerdings
für Österreich noch nicht in Kraft getreten ist. Dieser Regel entsprechende
Bestimmungen finden sich auch im Staatsvertrag vom 10. März 1896
zwischen Österreich und der Schweiz, im Vertrag mit der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland vom 22. September 1958, BGBL Nr.194/1960, sowie u.a. auch im
Auslieferungsvertrag mit Italien vom 6. April 1922, BGBL Nr. 278/1934 IL
Festzustellen ist, daß bei Kameradschaftsdiebstahl nach Auskunft des
Bundesministeriums für Justiz wohl eine Auslieferung vorgesehen ist, weil
es sich nach da. Ansicht nicht um ein rein militärisches Delikt handelt.
2. Hat Ihr Land Konventionen geschlossen, die von diesem Verbot
Abweichendes enthalten?
Es konnte nicht festgestellt werden, daß Vereinbarungen bestehen, die
den Grundsatz der Nichtauslieferung bei rein militärischen Delikten
einschränken.
118
Oskar ZLAMALA
RAPPORT AUTRICHIEN
119
H
):
,1
3. Wie verhält man sich iin Falle von komplexen Straftaten, bei
denen allgemeine Straftaten untrennbar mit militärischen Straf-
taten verblinden sind?
Wird der Auszuliefernde nicht nur wegen einer kriminellen strafbaren
Handlung, sondern auch wegen eines militärischen Deliktes verfolgt, kann
die Auslieferung nur wegen der kriminellen strafbaren Handlung bewil-
ligt werden. Nach dem völkerrechtlichen Grundsatz der Spezialität der
Auslieferung, ist die Verfolgung des Ausgelieferten wegen militärischen
Deliktes ausgeschlossen.
4. Welche Behörde ist zuständig, um festzustellen, ob ein Ausliefe-
rungsersuchcn ivegen einer gewöhnlichen Straftat in Wirklichkeit
nicht eine verkappte Methode ist, um das Auslieferungsverbot bei
einer militärischen Straftat zu umgeheji ? Ist es dieselbe (z.B.
Justiz-) Behörde ?
Gemäß § 59 StPO ist zur Beurteilung der Auslieferung der Gerichts-
hof erster Instanz zuständig, indessen Bereich der Auszuliefernde seinen
Wohnsitz oder Aufenthalsort hat. In Ermangelung eines solchen derjenige,
in dessen Bezirk er betreten wird. Über Antrag der Ratskammer kann
auch der Gerichtshof zweiter Instanz eingeschaltet werden.
Die Prüfung eines ausländischen Rechtshilfeersuchens in der Richt-
ung, ob gegen die Gewährung der Rechtshilfe nicht etwa Bedenken vor-
liegen (z.B. bei Vorliegen eines rein militärischen Deliktes) obliegt dem
Präsidium des Gerichtshofes erster Instanz (Z 35 Abs. 2 des Rechtshilfeer-
lasses für Strafsachen, Erlaß des Bundesministeriums für Justiz vom 13.
Juli 1959, JABI. Nr 16/1959).
die allgemein anerkannte Regel des Völkerrechtes eine sehr einschnei-
dende Maßnahme, die jedenfalls gründlich geprüft werden müßte.
Es ist weiters unzulässig, den Auszuliefernden unter Druck zu setzen,
sich dem ausländischen Gericht zu stellen.
Sofern jedoch die Außerlandschaffung eines Ausländers unbedingt
erforderlich und in einen dritten Staat nicht möglich ist, kann die Ab-
schiebung in den Staat des Tatortes erfolgen. Wurde jedoch von diesem
Staat die Auslieferung begehrt und von den österreichischen Justizbe-
hörden abgelehnt, ist eine derartige Abschiebung in diesen Staat unzu-
lässig.
B. Die üeberstellimg von Soldaten auf einem anderen Weg
als dem der Auslieferung (1)
Gibt es eine Praxis der Überstellung an der Grenze bei auslän-
dischen Soldaten, die ihre Straftaten im eigenen Land begangen
haben und die geflohen sind, wn in Ihrem Land Zuflucht zu
suchen, oder die durch Ihr Land reisen, um in einem dritten Land
Zuflucht zu suchen?
Maßnahmen, die zur Außerlandschaffung eines Ausländers, dessen
Auslieferung an einen fremden Staat in Betracht kommt, führen oder
führen können, sind als Umgehung der Bestimmungen des § 39 StG. und
des § 59 StPO unzulässig (Z 55 Abs. 4 des obzit. Rechtshilfeerlasses).
I I
5. Wie groß war de facto die Zahl der von einem ausländischen
Staat in den letzten 10 Jahren verlangten Auslieferungen und
wie vielen Ersuchen wurde stattgegeben? Bei welchen militä-
rischen Straftaten?
Nach Auskunft des Bundesministeriums für Justiz wurden in den
letzten 10 Jahren durch fremde Staaten keine Auslieferungsbegehren
wegen militärischer Delikte gestellt. Im übrigen wäre dies völkerrechtlich
auch nicht möglich.
6. Sind sie der Auffassung, daß durch Abkommen (oder durch ge-
setzgeberische Maßnahmen) von dem algemei^ien Verbot der
Auslieferung bei militärischeji Straftaten abgewichen werden
muß?
Eine Änderung des allgemeinen Verbotes der Auslieferung bei mi-
litärischen Delikten durch Konvention oder Gesetz wäre im Hinblick auf
(1) Da die Fragen Bl, 2 und 4 nicht aktuell sind, ist eine Beantwortung nicht
möglich.
121
Rapport beige
L'EXTRADITION ET LA REMISE DE MILITAIRES
PAR D'AUTRES MOYENS QUE L'EXTRADITION
par
Jean RAEMAEKERS
Premier Substitut de l'Auditeur militaire
(Belgique)
CHAPITRE I
Introduction
r y
En fonction du theme du 4eme Congres international de Madrid
(mai 1967), le Seminaire beige de Droit penal militaire a etudie durant
sa Session 1965-66 les aspects principaux des delits militaires.
Le plan propose pour les travaux du Seminaire a egalement prevu
Tetude des problemes que pose l'extradition. Aussi un groupe de travail
(1) fut cree en marge du Seminaire, avec mission d'analyser les problemes
propres a l'extradition et ä la remise de militaires par d'autres moycns
que Textradition. Le present rapport est d'ailleurs le resultat des travaux
des membres respectifs de ce groupe de travail.
Ce rapport etant celui de la delegation beige, nous exposerons avant
tout'le Probleme tel qu'il se pose en droit positif beige, pour examiner
ensuite l'extradition et la remise dans les Statuts internationaux. En outre,
Taccent principal sera mis sur le cote pratique et concret des problemes
et de leurs solutions. La problematique speciale de l'extradition des cri-
minels de guerre, des prisonniers de guerre et des coUaborateurs de Ten-
nemi ne sera cependant pas abordee.
Le droit extraditionnel a, en outre, connu une profonde evolution
lorsque la pratique de remise s'est substituee, dans beaucoup de cas, a cellc
d'extradition par suite du Statut penal de forces armees en sejour sur le
territoire d'un Etat allie autre que celui d'origine. Nous songeons ici ä la
collaboration policiere au sein de l'OTAN concernant l'arrestation de mili-
taires delinquants et leur remise aux autorites competentes.
(1) Le groupe de travail ^tait compose de Messieurs le Substitut de l'Auditeur
general P. Cassiors. President, le Premier Substitut de l'Auditeur militaire
J. Raemaekers, rapporteur, le Major B.E.M. P. FoUet, le Capitaine d'Aviation
J. Boddart ; le Lieutenant de Vaisseau J. Vindevogel et le Lieutenant de Get
darmerie Y. Dewallef.
t
122
Jean RAb:MAEKERS
RAPPORT BELGE
123
w
i.
Dans la deuxieme partie de notre rapport, nous examinerons d'ailleurs
longuement la remise de militaires beiges et etrangers par d'autres moyens
que l'extradition.
II est indeniable que, durant le 20e siecle, la criminalite s'est fortement
internationalisee. Le mode de vie actuel, le passage aise des frontieres et
surtout le developpement verligineux des moyens de locomotion n'y sont
pas etrangers. A une epoque oü les avions a reaction fönt que les distan-
ces n'existent pratiquement plus et qu'un delinquant peut atteindre en
quelques heures n'importe quel point du globe, il est plutot genant de rap-
peler que la legislation beige en matiere d'extradition date du 19e siecle.
Mais il est evident que les memes facteurs ont rendu plus complexes les
problemes de Textradition dans tous les pays.
Le Marche Commun et d'autres organismes s'efforcent ä supprimer
les barrieres qui entravent encore les echanges commerciaux. Le fait que
de nombreux Etats se sont groupes dans un meme organisme de defense,
ayant un caractere institutionnel comme l'OTAN, exige de leur part la con-
fiance et l'assistance mutuelle de sorte que la mefiance reciproque est de-
placee. Or, l'etude de la legislation et de la procedure concernant l'extra-
dition demontre que trop de traites en matiere d'extradition comportent
encore bien des complications et que la maxime « do ut des » semble y
demeurer de rigueur.
Plusieurs Conventions recentes ont cependant cree de nouveaux ho-
rizons dans la voie de la simplification de l'extradition et, parmi elles, le
Traite Benelux a ete le plus progressiste. En outre ce traite a prevu Tex-
tradition pour les delits militaires, ce qui correspond au voeu emis par
notre groupe de travail.
Puissent les discussions de Madrid apporter des Solutions positives
afin de contribuer ä rendre l'extradition un instrument simple et efficace
au Service d'une justice equitable et expeditive.
CHAPITRE II
La legislation beige en matiere d'extradition.
I. Generalites
L'histoire de l'extradition remonte assez haut dans le passe, mais les
lois qui la gouvernent sont dans la plupart des pays de date recente. II
nous est evidemment agreable de souligner le fait que la Belgique a ^te
le Premier pays a connaitre une loi en matiere d'extradition. Aussi, est-ce
ä juste titre que la Belgique est citee comme pays classique et d*avant-gar-
de du droit extraditionnel, gräce ä sa celebre loi du 1 octobre 1833.
Apres la Belgique (1833) suivent les Etats-Unis (1848), TEmpire Bri-
tannique (1870), les Pays-Bas (1875), l'Argentine (1885), le Japon (1887),
la Suisse (1892), le Perou (1906), la Norvege (1907), le Bresil (1911), la
Suede (1913), la Finlande (1922), la France (1927) et l'Allemagne (1929).
II sied cependant de remarquer que la legislation beige de 1833 n'au-
torisait l'extradition que pour sept categories de faits ; il s'agissait de cri-
mes graves.
IL La loi beige siir Fextradition du 15 mars 1874
Cette loi est generalement consideree comme constituant pour la Bel-
gique le droit commun de Textradition. En fait, pour etre complet, il faut
stipuler que si la matiere d'extradition est reglee par la loi du 15 mars
1874, eile a ete modifiee et completee par les lois du 7 juillet 1875, 22
mars 1886, 28 juin 1889, 3 juillet 1893, 15 mai 1912, 26 mai 1914, 12 juillet
1932, 21 aoüt 1948 et 22 fevrier 1956.
Notons par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne les infractions politiques, Tar-
ticle 6 de la loi du 1er octobre 1833 complete par la loi du 22 mars 1856
et par la loi du 8 juillet 1946 sur l'extradition des collaborateurs de l'en-
nemi.
IIL Definition
La loi beige ne donne pas de definition de l'extradition. Aussi pro-
posons nous celle qui est rclatee dans le Repertoire des Pandectes Bei-
ges, tome XLI, p. 827 : « L' extradition est l'acte par lequel une puissance
livre un individu poursuivi ou condamne pour une infraction commise hors
de son territoire ä la puissance qui a le droit de le juger et de le punir ».
II en resulte que la demande d'extradition peut concemer soit un in-
culpe, soit un condamne.
IV. Principes
II y a dans la legislation beige des principes bien definis qui servent
de base au droit d'extradition en general. En les examinant, nous täche-
rons de voir si notre legislation, apres avoir ete longtemps citee en exem-
ple, ne doit pas etre readaptee par rapport ä l'evolution en matiere de droit
penal international en comparaison avec celle des autres pays.
1. Existence d'un traite conclu sur hase de reciprocite.
La loi beige du 15 mars 1874 fixe au gouvernement les limites dans
lesquelles il est autorise a conclure des traites avec les autres Etats, en
matiere d'extradition. L'article 1'' enumere limitativement les faits pour
lesquels l'extradition peut etre accordee sous reserve de reciprocite. II
sagit d'une enumeration strictement limitative comprenant actuellement
34 delits.
124
Jean KAEMAEKERS
RAPPORT BELGE
125
r
I i
Une teile liste peut engendrer des difficultes d'interpretation et des
dissentiments entre les Etats parce qu'il arrive parfois qu'une qualification
determinee recouvre, selon la legislation ä laquelle on se refere, des faits
differents.
Deja la loi francaise du 10 mars 1927 a prevu la determination des d^-
lits extraditionnels d'apres la gravite de la peine encourue, la loi consultee
etant celle de TEtat requerant.
Notons egalement que la loi allemande de 1929 exige seulement quu
le fait prevu soit qualifie crime ou delit par la loi allemande, et que la
peine comminee par cette loi ne soit pas seulement pecuniaire. Aussi, com-
me nous le verrons plus loin, le Traite Benelux d'extradition (1962) a
abandonne ä son tour Tenumeration limitative des infractions donnant
Heu a extradition.
2. La Belgique ne livre pas ses nationaux. ^
Ce principe tient compte des dispositions de Tarticle 8 de la Consti-
tution qui stipule que : « Nul ne peut etre distrait, contre son gre, du
juge que la loi lui assigne ».
En Opposition, il Importe de citer l'article 128 de cette meme Consti-
tution : «Tout etranger, qui se trouve sur le territoire de la Belgique,
jouit de la protection accordee aux personnes et aux biens, sauf les excep-
tions prevues par la loi ». Parmi ces exceptions se ränge precisement Tex-
tradition.
La regle de non-extradition des nationaux est quasi universelle ; seuls
la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-l-nis livrent leurs nationaux, mais, comme
ils exigent la reciprocite, ce mode d'extradition ne concerne que ces deux
Etats.
Cependant, la regle de non-extradition des nationaux est de plus en
plus sujette ä des critiques parce qu'elle est en contradiction avec le pos-
tulat de la solidarite internationale et qu'elle s'inspire de mefiance ä Te-
gard de la legislation etrangere.
Par ailleurs ce principe provoque quelquefois Finconvenient d'entrainer
une division fächeuse des poursuites. Auteurs ou complices d'un meme
delit peuvent ainsi etre traduits devant des tribunaux differents ; il peut
en resulter une contradiction dans les jugements.
Dejä en 1880 la resolution suivante de Tlnstitut international d'Oxford
plaidait en ce sens : « Entre les pays dont les legislations criminelles repo-
seraient sur des bases analogues et qui auraient une mutuelle confiance
dans leurs institutions judiciaires, l'extradition des nationaux serait un
moyen d'assurer la bonne administration de la justice penale parce qu'on
doit considerer comme desirable que la juridiction du forum delicti com-
uüssi soit autant que possible appelee ä juger». De meme, la Conference
internationale pour l'unification du Droit penal, tenue ä Copenhague en
1935, a emis le voeu que, moyennant reciprocite, Fextradition des natio-
naux soit admise.
En accordant une teile extradition Ton temoigne, evidemment, envers
le juge etranger du respect qui lui est du. Cependant, la plupart des Etats
continuent ä se laisser influencer par le prejuge qui les porte ä preferer
leurs propres jugements a ceux du voisin.
L'Etat, qui refuse l'extradition d'un ressortissant ä cause de sa na-
tionalite, a cependant le devoir de juger Tinfraction en lieu et nom de
TEtat oü Tinfraction a ete commise et dans l'interet de celui-ci. La se
realise le postulat de Grotius selon lequel il faut extrader l'auteur, soit
le punir.
3. Principe de double incrimination.
D'apres ce principe, l'extradition ne peut etre requise que pour des in-
fractions qui sont punies tant par les lois du pays requerant que par celles
du pays requis.
Cette exigence de la double incrimination a longtemps limite de
fagon considerable les possibilites pratiques de l'extradition parce que les
normes penales de l'Etat requerant et celles de l'Etat requis ne corres-
pondaient pas toujours. Mais actuellement, ce principe donne lieu ä moins
de difficultes, car nous voyons que les memes infractions sont punissables
dans presque tous les pays.
4. Pas d'extradition pour delits politiques.
Comme nous l'avons dejä relate, l'extradition pour delits politiques
etait dejä exclue par l'article 6 de la loi beige du 1er octobre 1833.
Par ailleurs, la coutume internationale, issue du mouvement d'idees
liberales du milieu du XIXe siecle, a soustrait les delits politiques de l'ex-
tradition.
Mentionnons egalement la clause d'attentat incluse dans le Traite
d'extradition franco-belge de 1856 qui denie le caractere politique et
soumet au droit d'extradition « l'attentat contre la personne du chef du
gouvernement etranger ou des membres de sa famille lorsque cet attentat
constitue le fait soit de meurtre, soit d'assassinat, soit d'empoisonnement ».
Cette clause a ete reprise dans la plupart des traites d'extradition et est
connue sous le nom de « clause beige ».
La loi beige du 8 juillet 1946 constitue egalement une exception ä
la non-extradition pour delits politiques en ce qui concerne les collabora-
teurs de Tennemi.
% •<
ifl
l\'
•li
126
Jean RAEMAEKERS
5. Lextradition n'est pas advnse pour les injracüons mUHaircs.
Pour la Belgique ce principe est evident du fait que les infractions
militaires ne sont pas incluses dans la nomenclature de la loi. Uextradi-
tion est evidemment possible pour les infractions de droit commun
commises par des militaires.
Nous examinerons plus loin de fagon approfondie les problemes con-
cernant Textradition de delinquants militaires en general.
6. Pas d'extradition en cas de prescription.
L'article 7 de la loi du 15 mars 1874 prevoit que l'extradition ne peut
avoir Heu si, depuis le fait impute, les poursuites ou la condamnation, la
prescription de Faction ou de la peine est acquise d'apres les lois de la
Belgique.
V. La procedure d'extradition
Dans la plupart des cas l'extradition est demandee par l'Etat sur le
territoire duquel Finfraction a ete commise. II s'agit notamment de l'Etat
qui a subi du fait de cette infraction le prejudice le plus direct. En outre.
c'est l'Etat dont les tribunaux sont les mieux qualifies pour connaitre de
rinfraction.
A. Extradition demandee ä la Belgique.
1. Procedure normale.
La demande doit parvenir au gouvernement beige par la voie diplo-
matique. Aussi cette demande sera habituellement remise par le represen-
tant diplomatique de l'Etat requerant au Ministere des Affaires etran-
geres qui la transmet au Ministre de la Justice. A la demande doit etre
jointe soit le jugement ou l'arret de condamnation, seit la decision qui
renvoie le prevenu devant la juridiction repressive competcnte, soit le man-
dat d'arret.
La chambre du conseil du tribunal de premiere instance du lieu de
residence de l'etranger en Belgique rend executoire en Belgique soit le
jugement, soit la decision de renvoi, soit le mandat d'arret.
Ensuite l'etranger sera ecroue sur ordonnance de la chambre du con-
seil et le dossier sera transmis ä la chambre des mises en accusation pres
la Cour d'appel. A l'audience de la chambre des mises en accusation le
ministere public et l'etranger seront entendus. Cc derniej peut se faire
assister d'un conseil. L'avis motive de la Cour, Joint au dossier, est ensuite
transmis au Ministere de la Justice lequel decide librement.
2. Procedure en cas d'urgence.
En cas d'urgence l'etranger pourra etre arrete provisoirement en
RAPPORT BELGE
127
Belgique sur exhibition d'un mandat d'arret decerne par le juge d'instruc-
tion du lieu de sa residence. Ce mandat doit etre motive sur un avis officiel
donne aux autorites beiges par l'autorite de l'Etat requerant.
Ce mandat provisoire est valable pour trois semaines ä dater de son
arrestation ou de trois mois si l'Etat requerant n'est pas un Etat europeen.
B. Extradition demandee par la Belgique.
Vu le postulat de reciprocite, les principes enonces plus haut sont ega-
lement d'application lorsque l'extradition est demandee par la Belgique ä
un Etat etranger.
CHAPITRE III
Conventions et Traites recemment souscrits par la Belgique
en matiere d'extradition et de remise
I. Convention europeenne concernant Textradition
(Paris, 13 decembre 1957)
Ce traite a ete elabore dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe. La revi-
sion du droit de l'extradition y etant venue en discussion, l'Assemblee con-
sultative a commence par approuver une recommandation tendant
ä l'elaboration d'un traite europeen d'extradition. Un comite d'experts fut
cree en 1953 dont les travaux aboutirent ä la Convention europeenne d'ex-
tradition du 13 decembre 1957.
Jusqu'ä present la Belgique n'a cependant pas entrepris de demarches
afin d'obtenir la ratification parlementaire de cette Convention europe-
enfte.
Nous nous bornerons ici a signaler les cas dans lesquels la Convention
europeenne exclut l'extradition :
1. Delits politiques: l'extradition ne sera pas accordee si l'infraction
pour laquelle eile est demandee est consideree par le pays requis com-
me une infraction politique ;
2. Possibilite de refus de l'extradition lorsque le pays requis a de serieuses
raisons de craindre une discrimination de race, de religion ou d'appar-
tenance politique ;
3 Delits militaires: l'article 4 de la Convention prohibe Textradition
en raison d'infractions militaires qui ne constituent pas des infractions
de droit commun ;
4. Exclusion pour les delits fiscaux et analogues :
l.'f
Y
I: (
i\
h .
128 Jean RAEMAEKERS
5. Par application de la regle « non bis in idem » Textradition ne sera
pas accordee lorsque Tindividu reclame a ete definitivement juge par
les autorites competentes du pays requis pour les faits en raison des-
quels Textradition est demandee.
II. Le Traite Benelux d'extradition et d'entraide judiciaire
en matiere penale (Bruxelles, 27 juin 1962)
Ce traite domine tout Ic contentieux d'extradition entre les pays du
Benelux et prime sur le Traite europeen. Par ailleurs, alors que le Traite
europeen n'a toujours pas obtenu Tadhesion parlementaire, un projet de loi
a ete introduit en Belgique le 21 janvier 1963 en vue de la ratification
du Traite Benelux. Cependant, le traite n'entrera en vigueur que deux
mois apres le depot des Instruments de ratification.
II est un fait que les Conventions existant entre la Belgique, le Lu--
xembourg et les Pays-Bas ne repondent plus aux exigences resultant de
relations entre ces pays d autant plus que Tabolition du controle des per-
sonnes aux frontieres interieures du Benelux a cree certains problemes.
En effet la suppression du controle en question a eu pour consequence que
bien des personnes, telles des deserteurs, peuvent plus facilement se sous-
traire aux recherches, aux poursuites et ä Texecution des peines en cher-
chant ref uge dans un des autres pays du Benelux.
L'efficacite de la lutte contre la criminalite ainsi que la solidarite
europeenne exigeaient cependant que la coUaboration souhaitee dans le
cadre du Benelux fut fondee, autant que possiblc, sur la reglementation
multilaterale etablie sur le plan europeen tout en realisant une coUabora-
tion plus poussee sur certains points.
Le Traite Benelux a fait, entre autre, l'objet d'une mercuriale pro-
noncee le 1er septembre 1962 ä la Cour d appel de Liege par son actuel Pro-
cureur general M. Jean Constant (2).Dans ce discours nous relevons notam-
ment sous forme de resume les principales innovations et les caracteristi-
ques essentielles de ce traite d'extradition :
1. Abandon du Systeme de Tenumeration limitative des infractions don-
nant lieu ä extradition ;
2. Admission de Textradition meme pour des faits relativement peu gra-
ves, punissables d'une peine d'un maximum d'au moins six mois. En
ce qui concerne la Convention europeenne, ce maximum est d'un an ;
3. Admission de l'extradition meme lorsque l'individu dont Textradition
est demandee n'a pas ete condamne ä une peine, mais fait simplement
l'objet d'une mesure de sürete privative de liberte ;
RAPPORT BELGE
129
4.
5.
6.
Suppression de la voie diplomatique et transmission de la demande
de Ministrc de la Justice a Ministre de la Justice ;
Procedure sommaire : possibilite de livrer immediatement la personne
arretee ä Tautorite judiciaire du pays requerant, moyennant le con-
sentement du ministere public du pays requis et l'accord de la per-
sonne arretee ;
Obligation de motiver tout rejet complet ou partiel d'une demande
d'extradition.
Contrairement au regime de la Convention europeenne le Traite
Benelux integre les infractions militaires dans la legislation de l'extradition
et stipule expressement que la desertion n'est pas consideree comme delit
politique.
En tant que justification de l'extension en matiere d'extradition, nous
tenons a citer le texte suivant, contenu dans le Projet de traite d'extra-
dition entre les pays du Benelux : « Cette Solution se justifie aisement, les
trois pays du Benelux se trouvant quant ä la defense nationale, dans une
Situation qui implique une solidarite ineluctable ».
III. Convention d'extradition et d'entraide judiciaire en matiere
penale entre le Royaiime de Belgique et la Republique
federale d'Allemagne (Bruxelles, 17 janvier 1958) (3)
11 ressort de cette Convention que les parties contractantes s'engagent
a se livrer reciproquement, selon des regles et des conditions determinees,
les individus poursuivis pour infraction ou recherches aux fins d'execution
d'une peine ou d'une mesure de sürete par les autorites judiciaires d'une
des Parties et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire de l'autre Partie. Bor-
nons-nous ä signaler que les delits militaires ne sont pas prevus comme
doryiant lieu ä extradition.
Cette Convention qui comprend 39 articles s'est grandement inspiree
de la Convention europeenne.
IV. Arrangement entre la France, la Belgique, le Luxembourg,
et les Pays-Bas du 16 avril 1964 sur la prise en Charge des
personnes ä la frontiere (4)
La prise en charge n'est pas un mode d'extradition, eile s'apparente
plutot ä l'expulsion mais merite d'etre citee en tant que moyen d'aide reci-
proque.
II s'agit de la prise en charge de personnes aux frontieres communes
entre la France et les Etats du Benelux. D'apres cet arrangement, le gou-
(2) CONSTANT, J., « Le Traite Benelux d'extradition et d'entraide judiciaire en
matiere penale » Revue de droit penal et de criminologie, 1962-1963, pp. 75 ä
117.
II
(3) Moniteur beige du 19 juin 1959. p. 1600.
C4) Journal ojjiciel jrangais du 2 juin 1964, p. 4701
'.'(
130
Jean RAEMAEKERS
RAPPORT BELGE
131
vernement de chacun des Etats du Benelux reprendra sur son territoire,
Sans formalites et sans l'intervention de sa representation diplomatique,
les ressortissants d'un de ces Etats que les autorites frangaises ont Tinten-
tion d'eloigner. Mutatis mutandis, la France appliquera le meme principe
envers les Etats du Benelux, lorsqu'il s'agira de ressortissants frangais.
Par ailleurs, Ic gouvernement de chacun des Etats du Benelux repren-
dra, ä la demande des autorites frangaises, les personnes qui ne sont pas
des ressortissants d'un des Etats du Benelux lorsqu'ils ont penetre irregu-
lierement sur le territoire frangais par la frontiere commune et cela sur
base de reciprocite.
Par le meme arrangement sont egalement regles les problemes concer-
nant la prise en charge de personnes aux fins de transit et les questions
ayant trait aux points de passage de la frontiere affectes ä la remise des
personnes.
CHAPITRE IV
Historique de Textiadition en matiere de delits militaires
S'il est vrai qu'actuellement les delits militaires ne figurent pratique-
ment plus dans les traites sur la liste des infractions qui donnent lieu ä
extradition, il n'en a pas toujours ete ainsi. Autrefois en effet, les traites
d'extradition eurent precisement pour but la remise reciproque des crimi-
nels politiques et des deserteurs. Pendant longtemps Textradition n'a fonc-
tionne que dans un but politique ; c'etait, notamment, un moyen pour les
souverains de se rendre mutuellement service en se livrant leurs ennemis.
Notons cependant que la pratique de Textradition est apparue assez
tardivement. Avant l'extradition, qui est un acte reciproque, existait un
moyen unilateral de se defaire d'un indesirable notamment le bannisse-
ment. Le role important devolu, durant de longs siecles, au droit d'asile
merite egalement d'etre souligne.
Durant les 17e et 18e siecles ainsi que pendant le premier tiers du
19e siecle, les Etats d'Europe passent entre eux de nombreuses Conventions
de cartel, dont Fobjet exclusif est l'extradition des deserteurs.
En ce temps la la desertion devenait un veritable fleau. Cela ne doit
nullement nous etonner lorsque nous songeons aux conditions inhumaines
de recrutement ainsi qu'au manque de discipline qui caracterisent ces pe-
tites armees composees principalement d'etrangers. II s'agissait souvent de
soldats enroles de force ou par stratageme et dont la solde etait ridicule.
Les punitions prevues en cas de desertion etaient effrayantes, ce qui
n'empechait pas la desertion de se maintenir a un niveau tres eleve. Par
ailleurs, on notait egalement de nombreux transfuges, lesquels rejoignaient
l'armee de l'ennemi ou d'un allie, du moment que la solde y etait plus
elevee.
i
11
i
Le 19e siecle amene cependant un changement dans la Constitution des
forces armees qui deviennent des armees nationales pourvues de nouvelles
armes et de tactiques perfectionnees.
Cependant, jusque vers 1830, on constate encore la conclusion de nom-
breuses Conventions de cartel.
A partir de 1830 nous assistons ä un retournement radical. Dans son
«Traite de TExtradition » (5), Billot nous fournit une explication fort
pertinente : « Avec la Monarchie de Juillet nait le principe que l'extradi-
tion s'applique uniquement aux crimes et delits communs. A partir de ce
moment les traites relatifs ä la desertion cesserent d'etre appliques ; le
chef de desertion est exclu des nomenclatures inserees dans les Conventions
d'extradition et le gouvernement frangais s'est toujours refuse ä autoriser
la remise des deserteurs etrangers ».
Ce sont surtout des considerations d'ordre politique qui ont joue un
role preponderant dans ce changement d'attitude. Sous le regime de paix
armee, qui est celui de l'Europe d'alors, aucun Etat n'est dispose a contri-
buer ä la defense de la puissance militaire d'un Etat voisin, pouvant etre
eventuellement son ennemi de demain.
En ce qui concerne la France, il n'cst de secret pour personnc que ce
pays ne tenait nullement a extrader des deserteurs etrangers, parce que
ceux-ci formaient une precieuse et nombreuse clientele pour sa Legion
Etrangere.
S'il est vrai que depuis 1830 la coutume internationale admet generale-
ment que l'extradition ne s'applique pas aux infractions militaires il sied
ccpencant de remarquer que, dans Tinterct de la navigation, on fait excep-
t'on pour les marins deserteurs. Ici, l'intertt commun resultant des neces-
sites speciales de la navigation et les inconvenients d'equipages affaiblis
ont joue un role preponderant. L'intervention consulaire merite egalement
d'etre soulignee.
En 1914 la premiere guerre mondiale fait naitre une Cooperation mili-
taire entre la France et la Belgique ainsi qu'avec les autres allies ; cette
collaboration fait tout ä coup disparaitre les raisons pouvant necessiter le
refus de toute extradition de deserteurs et insoumis. Aussi plusieurs accords
ont ete conclus au cours de la guerre 1914-1918 pour la livraison reciproque
des deserteurs. Citons ici « l'Accord entre la France et la Belgique concer-
nant la remise de deserteurs beiges aux autorites beiges sur le territoire
frangais du T' decembre 1914».
II est typique que l'on emploie ici le mot « remise » et non plus « ex-
tradition ». Cette pratique de remise coincide, en effet, avec la presence de
troupes etrangeres sur le territoire d'un Etat allie.
La deuxieme guerre mondiale nous offre par ailleurs l'exemple d'un
nombre sans precedent de militaires allies stationnes sur le territoire de
C5) BILLOT, A., Traite de rExiradition, Paris 1874.
132
Jean RAEMAEKERS
RAPPORT BELGE
133
pays etrangers. Finalemenl, apres 1945, nous assistons a une interpenetra-
tion de forces armecs dans le cadre de l'OTAN.
Nous tenons a signaler ici la Situation de la Belgique dont la plupart
des troupes operationnelles sont stationnees sur le territoire de la Repu-
blique federale d'Allemagne. Un exemple eloquent d'assistance mutuelle
entre les autorites d'un Etat d'origine et d'un Etat de sejour est prevu
par l'article VII, 5a de la Convention de l'OTAN et concerne larrestation
et la remise de militaires.
Terminons ce chapitre en signalant que lorsque dans la pratique ex-
traditionnelle Ton traite de delits militaires il sera presque toujours ques-
tion de desertion. Cela n'a rien d'etonnant si Ton considere que le probleme
de l'extradition ne se pose que lorsqu'un militaire delinquant s'enfuit vers
un autre pays, ce qui aura pour consequence que bientöt il deviendra auto-
matiquement deserteur.
CHAPITRE V
L'extradition et la remise dans le Droit des gens
I. Introduction
Le Systeme de la territorialite des lois penales s'applique egalement
comme principe general dans la legislation beige. En effet, l'article 3 du
Code penal beige dispose :
« L'infraction commise sur le territoire du royaume, par des Beiges
ou par des etrangers, est punie conformement aux dispositions des lois
beiges ».
Notons tout d'abord que le droit des gens assimile au territoire : la
mer territoriale, l'espace atmospherique au dessus du territoire, les navires
et les aeronefs.
S'il est vrai qu'en principe la loi penale belgo est territoriale, il y
a cependant des exceptions prevues par la loi et qui permettent ä la juri-
diction beige de poursuivre des infractions bien definies commises hors du
territoire national. Ainsi les articles 6 a 13 de la loi du 17 avril 1878,
formant le titre preliminaire du Code de procedure penale beige, determi-
nent l'exercice de Taction publique ä raison des crimes et des delits
commis hors du territoire du royaume.
Nous examinerons plus loin les possibilites d'application de la loi du
17 avril 1878, notamment par rapport aux infractions commises ä bord d'ae-
ronefs etrangers.
Depuis la derniere guerre mondiale nous assistons ä une evolution
du droit penal international, evolution a laquelle la legislation beige ne
peut rester indifferente. Cette evolution suit celle du droit des gens, qui ne
concerne plus seulement les Etats, mais egalement les individus.
II. La legislation en matiere d'extradition comparee aux lois
et Conventions de droit aerien beige et international
A. Generalites.
Bien que les lois et Conventions que nous allons analyser brievement
ne semblent pas avoir de rapport direct avec Textradition, elles sont en
realite en relation etroite avec celle-ci.
En effet, en matiere d'extradition, la legislation concerne l'extradi-
tion ä un pays requerant d'un etranger apprehende dans le pays requis
et cela pour autant que soient remplies les nombreuses conditions speci-
fiees dans un chapitre precedent.
Dans le droit aerien, que nous allons examiner, il s'agit au contraire
de la poursuite en Belgique d'etrangers ou de Beiges pour des infractions
commises en Belgique (aeronef en vol — independamment du territoire
survole) et la poursuite en Belgique d'etrangers ou de Beiges pour des in-
fractions commises en dehors du territoire beige (aeronef etranger en vol
— independamment du territoire survole).
Lorsque nous traitons plus specialement d'aeronefs militaires il sied
de rappeler qu'un des deux themes du Urne Congres international de notre
Societe (FlorencG, mai 1961) s'intitulait : « L'aeronef militaire et le droit
des gens» (6).
B. Droit aerien beige.
1. Textes.
La Belgique possede une legislation fort complete en matiere de droit
aeronautique. Les lois successives en la matiere ont ete groupees dans la
loi du 27 juin 1937 reglementant la navigation aerienne. C'est seulement
le 31 mars 1954 que ce Code de l'air est entre en vigueur ; le motif de ce
retard est du au fait que plusieurs annexes de la loi, ayant trait a des
pratiques recommandees par l'Organisation Internationale de l'Aviation
Civile, devaient ttre ratifiees par les differcnts membres.
Dans le cadre de ce rapport nous tenons ä citer in extenso Tarticle
36 de cette loi :
« Les infractions commises ä bord d'un aeronef helge en vol sont
reputees commises en Belgique et peuvent y etre poursuivies meme si
l'inculpe n'est pas trouve sur le territoire du royaume.
Sont competents pour la poursuite de ces infractions et de Celles
prevues par la presente loi et par les arretes pris pour son execution.
(6) Receuils de la Societe inlornationale de droit penal militaire et de droit de la
guerre, Tome II, Strasbourg 1963.
J>
134
Jean RAEMAEKERS
RAPPORT BELGE
135
h)
le procureur du Roi ou lofficier du ministere public pres le tribunal
de Police du lieu de l'infraction, celui de la residence de Tinculpe,
celui du lieu oü il pourra i-tre trouve et, a leur defaut, celui de
Bruxclles.
Les articles 6 ä 13 de la loi du 17 avril 1878 formant le titre preli-
minaire du Code de proceduro penale s'appliquent aux infractions
commises ä bord d'un aeronef etranger en vol si le fait s'est accompli
hors du territoire du royaume. En outre, le coupable d'un crime cu
d'un delit commis a bord d'un aeronef etranger en vol pourra etre
poursuivi cn Belgi(}ue, si lui-mtme ou la victime est de nationalite
beige ou si l'appareil atterrit en Belgique apres rinfraction.
Sont competents pour la poursuite des infractions visees ä l'alinea
precedent, le procureur du Roi du lieu de la residence de l'inculpe,
celui du lieu oü l'inculpe aura ete trouve, celui du lieu de Fatterris-
sage et a leur defaut le procureur du Roi de Bruxelles ».
Nous pouvons donc conclure de ce texte que les infractions commises
ä bord d'un aeronef beige en vol sont reputees commises en Belgique et
que, commises ä bord d'un avion etranger en vol, elles sont reputees com-
mises ä l'etranger.
Dans ce dernier cas, elles ne peuvent etre poursuivies en Belgique
que dans les cas et sous les conditions prevues par les articles 6 ä 13 de
la loi du 17 avril 1878 dont question plus haut et auxquels se refere en
son alinea 3 l'article 36 que nous venons de reproduire.
Vu l'importance de ces articles contenus dans le titre preliminaire
du Code de procedure penale (Chap. 11 : De l'exercice de l'action publique
ä raison des crimes ou des delits commis hors du territoire du royaume),
nous nous permettons de les examiner :
art. 6. Pourra etre poursuivi en Belgique tout Beige qui, hors du terri-
toire du royaume, se sera rendu coupable :
T' D'un crime ou d'un delit contre la Sürete de l'Etat ;
2" D'un crime ou d'un delit contre la foi publique prevu par
les chapitres I, II et III du titre III du livre II du Code penal ou
d'un delit prevu par les articles 497 et 497 bis, si le crime ou le
delit a pour objet soit des monnaies ayant cours legal en
Belgique ou des objets destines ä leur fabrication, contrefagon,
alteration ou falsification, soit des effets, papiers, sceaux,
timbres, marques ou poingons de l'Etat ou des administrations
ou des etablissements publics beiges ;
3" D'un crime ou d'un delit contre la foi publique prevu par
les memes dispositions, si le crime ou le delit a pour objet soit
des monnaies n'ayant pas cours legal en Belgique ou des objets
I
destines ä leur fabrication, contrefagon, alteration ou falsifica-
tion, soit des effets, papiers, sceaux, timbres, marques ou poin-
gons d'un Etat etranger.
La poursuite dans ce dernier cas ne pourra avoir lieu que
sur l'avis officiel donne ä l'autorite beige par l'autorite etran-
gere.
art. 7. § 1. Tout Beige qui, hors du territoire du royaume, se sera
rendu coupable d'un fait qualifie crime ou delit par la loi
beige pourra etre poursuivi en Belgique si le fait est puni par
la legislation du pays oü il a ete commis.
§ 2. Si rinfraction a ete commise contre un etranger, la pour-
suite ne pourra avoir lieu que sur requisition du ministere
public, et devra, en outre, etre precedee d'une plainte de l'etran-
ger offense ou de sa famille ou d'un avis officiel donne^ a
l'autorite beige par l'autorite du pays oü l'infraction a ete
commise. Dans le cas oü l'infraction a ete commise, en
temps de guerre, contre un ressortissant d'un pays allie de
la Belgique au sens du deuxieme alinea de l'article 117 du
Code penal, l'avis officiel peut egalement etre donne par l'auto-
rite du pays dont cet etranger est ou etait le ressortissant.
art. 8. Abroge.
art. 9. Tout Beige qui se sera rendu coupable d'une infraction en
matiere forestiere, rurale, de peche ou de chasse sur le territoire
d'un Etat limitrophe, pourra, si cet Etat admet la reciprocite,
etre poursuivi en Belgique, sur la plainte de la partie lesee ou
sur un avis officiel donne a l'autorite beige par l'autorite du
pays oü l'infraction a ete commise.
^rt. 10. Pourra etre poursuivi en Belgique l'etranger qui aura commis
hors du territoire du royaume :
T' Un crime ou un delit contre la sürete de l'Etat ;
2" Un crime ou un delit repris au 2*^ de l'article 6 ;
3' Un crime ou un delit repris au 3'' de l'article 6 ;
La poursuite, dans ce dernier cas, ne pourra avoir lieu que
sur l'avis officiel donne ä l'autorite beige par l'autorite etran-
gere ;
4'^ En temps de guerre, contre un ressortissant beige, un etran-
ger residant en Belgique au moment de l'ouverture des hostilites,
ou un ressortissant d'un pays allie de la Belgique au sens de
l'alinea 2 de l'article 117 du Code penal, une infraction d'homi-
cide ou de lesion corporelle volontaires, de viol, d'attentat ä la
pudeur ou de denonciation ä l'ennemi (Loi du 2 avril 1948,
art. 1er).
136
Jfan RAKMAEKERS
art. 10 bis. Toute personne soumise aux lois militaires qui aura commis
une infraction quelconque sur le territoire d'un Etat etranger,
pourra etre poursuivie en Belgique.
II en est de meme des personnes qui sont attachees ä quelque
titre que ce soit, ä une fraction de Tarmee se trouvant en terri-
toire etranger ou de Celles qui sont autorisees ä suivre un corps
de troupe qui en fait partie (Loi du 14 juillet 1951, art. 1er).
art. 11. L etranger coauteur ou complice d'un crime commis hors du
territoire du royaume, par un Beige, pourra etre poursuivi en
Belgique, conjointement avec le Beige inculpe, ou apres la
condamnat'on de ceiui-ci.
art. 12. Sauf dans les cas prevus aux articles 6 n^ 1 et 2, 10 n" 1 et 2,
ainsi qu'a l'article 10 bis, la poursuite des infractions dont il
s'agit dans le present chapitre n'aura lieu que si l'inculpe est
trouve en Belgique (Loi du 14 juillet 1951, art. 2).
Toutefois, lorsque Tinfraction a ete commise en temps de guer-
re, la poursuite pourra avoir lieu, si l'inculpe est Beige, dans
tous les cas, meme s'il n'est pas trouve en Belgique, et, si l'in-
culpe est etranger, en plus des cas prevus ä l'alinea 1er, s'il est
trouve en pays ennemi ou si son extradition peut etre obtenue
(Loi du 30 avril 1947, art. 2).
art. 13. Sauf en ce qui concerne les crimes et les delits commis en temps
de guerre, les dispositions precedentes ne seront pas applicables
lorsque l'inculpe, juge en pays etranger du chef de la meme
infraction aura ete acquitte ou lorsqu'apres avoir ete condamne,
il aura subi ou prescrit sa peine ou aura ete gracie. Toute de-
tention subie a l'etranger par suite de l'infraction qui donne
lieu ä la condamnation en Belgique, sera toujours imputec sur
la duree des peines emportant privation de la liberte (Loi du
5aout 1943, art. 4).
2. Commentaire.
Une question importante est de savoir si la loi du 27 juin 1937 est
applicable aux aeronefs militaires. La reponse est negative sauf en cas de
stipulation contraire de la loi.
En effet l'article 1er de la loi beige precitee prevoit :
« Pour Tapplication de la presente loi, sont reputes :
• • •
Aeronefs d'Etat, les aeronefs militaires ou allectes ä des Services de
l'Etat, tels que la police ou la douane ;
Aeronefs prives, tous aeronefs a l'exclusion des aeronefs d'Etat ;
RAPPORT BELGE
137
Sauf stipulation contraire, les dispositions de la presente loi ne sont
applicables qu'aux aeronefs prives ».
Retenons egalement l'opinion de M. l'Avocat general H. Bosly, dont
iious citons un extrait du rapport concernant : « L'aeronef militaire et la
protection de la vic humaine » publie dans le rapport general du Ile
Congres international de Florence (7) :
« Actuellement en Belgique, depuis la Promulgation de l'Arrete royal
du 15 mars 1954 mettant en vigueur la loi du 27 juin 1937 relative ä la
reglementation de la navigation aerienne, les regles generales de nayiga-
tion ne sont applicables qu'aux aeronefs prives. Aucune poursuite penale
n'est donc possible contre les pilotes d'aeronefs d'Etat qui ne se confor-
ment pas ä ces regles. Certes, par voie d'instructions generales, les autori-
tes ont edicte des prescriptions en ce domaine. Leur inobservance ne peut
entrainer que des sanctions disciplinaires ».
Signaions, pour finir, que la loi beige sur l'extradition ne mentionne
aucune infraction d'ordre specifiquement aerien parmi la longue nomen-
clature de son article premier, ceci en Opposition avec certaines infractions
commises ä bord de navires.
C. Droit aerien international.
La prodigieuse augmentation du trafic aerien a eu pour consequence
que Ton est appele ä resoudre un grand nombre de problemes internatio-
naux ayant trait au droit penal aerien.
Dans le cadre du droit aerien international, 11 Importe de citer la
Convention de Chicago signee le 7 decembre 1944 car eile constitue le fon-
dement juridique de l'aeronautique internationale. II est dit dans l'article
Premier de cette Convention que chaque Etat « a la souverainete complete
et exclusive sur l'espace atmospherique au-dessus de son territoire ».
> Par ailleurs, l'article 3 dispose que : « La presente Convention s'appli-
que uniquement aux aeronefs civils et ne s'appliquera pas aux aeronefs
d'Etat. Les aeronefs militaires et ceux de douane ou de police seront con-
sideres comme aeronefs d'Etat ».
Vu l'importance de la nationalite des aeronefs par rapport ä la sou-
verainete de l'espace atmospherique, nous croyons utile de rappeler le
texte de l'article 17 : «Les aeronefs ont la nationalite de l'Etat sur les
registres duquel ils sont immatricules ».
Dans le domaine de l'application du droit aerien international
aux aeronefs militaires, nous nous permettons d'emprunter un autre
extrait des travaux du Ile Congres international de Florence. Nous y rele-
vons dans le rapport de M. Missoffe concernant « Le Statut juridi-
(7) BOSI.Y II «L'aeronef militaire et la protection de la vie humaine» m
Recueiis de la Societe internationale de droit penal niilitaire et de droit de la
guerre, Tome II, Strasbourg 1963, p. 73.
II
138
Jean RAEMAEKERS
I' '
que de l'aeronef militaire », le texte suivant : « Un avion militaire ne peut
survoler un Etat etranger que moyennant une autorisation speciale deman-
dee ä Toccasion de chaque vol, par la voie diplomatique. L'avion militaire
pour qui cette autorisation a ete obtenue jouit de l'exterritorialite. En re-
vanche il doit se conformer aux regles generales concernant la circula-
tion, l'atterrissage, la securite du trafic aerien. Application du principe de
l'exterritorialite.
Une des consequences de ce principe est que les infractions commises
ä bord d'un tel avion releveront de la competence des juridictions de
TEtat d'origine.
En revanche ce sont les juridictions de l'Etat de sejour qui con-
naitront des infractions commises a terre et hors Service par les membres
de l'equipage. Les avions militaires jouissent donc, comme les navires de
guerre, de l'exterritorialite reelle, tandis que l'equipage jouit de l'exter-
ritorialite personnelle. Ces regles ne valent qu'autant que le principe de
l'exterritorialite est admis. Si tel n'est pas le cas, Tavion et ses occupants
sont soumis aux juridictions de l'Etat de sejour » (8).
Concernant les conditions de survol du territoire du royaume par des
aeronefs militaires etrangers, la demande d'autorisation est prevue par l'ar-
ticle 3 de la loi beige du 27 juin 1937.
Quant a lapplication des Conventions internationales aux aeronefs
militaires en temps de guerre, nous nous bornerons ä nous referer ä l'ayis
(xprime par M. l'Avocat general H. Bosly dans son rapport dejä
mentionne. Nous citons : « En ce qui concerne le droit de guerre, il n'y
a pas de Convention generale reglant l'utilisation du domaine aerien par
des aeronefs militaires ou des engins militaires en vue d'operation de guer-
re. Cette absence de Convention generale est ä Toppose de ce qui existe
pour la guerre terrestre ou la guerre maritime pour lesquelles les Conven-
tions de La Haye de 1907 entre autres constituent une reglementation d'en-
semble » (9).
D. Conclusions.
Le droit penal de l'aviation est encore loin de repondre aux exigences
du trafic aerien moderne. Aussi, bien des juristes se sont penches sur le
Probleme et il est ä esperer que la Convention internationale (Tokio, 1963)
elaboree ä ce sujet, puisse sortir ses effets au plus tot. II s'agit ici de la
reglementation uniforme et formelle des crimes commis ä bord des aero-
nefs Volant au-dessus d'un territoire de nationalite differente de celle de
l'avion et des passagers.
/!
(8)
MISSOFFE, S., « Le Statut juridique de l'aeronef militaire », in Recueils
de la Societe internationale de droit penal militaire et de droit de la guerre,
Tome II, Strasbourg 1963, p. 47.
(9) BOSLY, H. op. cit., p. 73.
RAPPORT BELGE
139
II
Cependant, en ce qui concerne la question d'extradition ä Toccasion
d'infractions commises ä bord des aeronefs, il ne semble pas opportun d'in-
clure des dispositions de caractere universel dans une teile Conven-
tion. Vu le caractere special de la matiere d'extradition, il semble prefe-
rable de continuer ä observer les regles suivies pour toutes les infractions
dans les traites bilateraux entre les nations et par les legislations natio-
nales. II suffirait aussi de garantir l'observation des droits et de la proce-
dure normale en matiere d'extradition.
III. L'extradition et la remise de marins pour delits militaires
A. Generalites.
Nous avons dejä souligne que la coutume internationale admet la pra-
tique de l'extradition ou de remise de marins deserteurs. Cette pratique
s'etend egalement ä la livraison de matelots appartenant ä la marine mar-
chande.
Dans son « Traite de droit international public», Fauchille explique
les raisons qui, d'apres lui, se trouvent ä la base de l'extradition des ma-
rins deserteurs (10) :
(( Quelques rares traites ont encore, dans le droit moderne, admis l'ex-
tradition des deserteurs de l'armee de terre (traites Bresil — Equateur,
3 nov. 1853, art. 6; Grece et Turquie, 27 mai 1855, art. 6). L'extradition
est, au contraire, usitee ä l'egard des matelots ayant abandonne en pays
etranger, soit un navire de guerre, soit un navire de commerce. On essaie
de justifier cette difference par des raisons economiques empruntees aux
interets de la navigation : des desertions de marins peuvent compromettre
la securite du navire. Le caractere de ces raisons explique pourquoi l'ex-
tradition des matelots est habituellement reglee dans les Conventions con-
sulaires et dans les traites de commerce et de navigation. Ces principes,
en ce qui concerne l'armee de terre et l'armee de mer, ont ete consacres
en 1880 par l'Institut de droit international (XVIe resolution d'Oxford) ».
Avant de nous etendre davantage sur les problemes d'extradition ou
de remise, nous tenons cependant ä emettre quelques considerations au su-
jet du Statut juridique des navires ainsi que de la competence penale des
Etats ä leur egard.
II est notoire que le Statut juridique d'un navire change :
1. Selon qu'il se trouve en haute mer, dans la mer territoriale ou dans
les eaux interieures d'un Etat riverain :
2. Selon la nature de ce navire, publique ou privee.
(10) FAUCHILLE, P., Traite de droit international public, Tome I, l^rc partic,
p. 1028.
14Ü
Jean RAEMAEKERS
RAPPORT BELGE
141
Rappeions ici que, parmi les navires d'Etat, peuvent etre ranges les na-
vires de guerre, les bateaux de police ou de pilotage. Par navires prives
l'on comprend les navires de commerce, les bateaux de plaisance ainsi
que les navires appartenant ä des particuliers.
B. La competence penale envers les navires en haute mer.
Par haute mer on entend la partie de la mer n'appartenant pas aux
eaux territoriales d'un Etat. La pleine mer n'est soumise ä aucune souve-
rainete (11).
En haute mer la loi du pavillon est d'application. Ainsi, lorsqu'une
infraction est commise ä bord d'un navire beige se trouvant en haute mer
les tribunaux qualifies sont ceux de l'Etat beige dont le navire en ques-
tion porte le pavillon.
Ce principe, qui est valable pour les navires de commerce, Test encore
davantage pour les navires de guerre et autres navires d'Etat, lesquels pos-
sedent en haute mer des competences de police telles que le droit d'enquetc
ou de verification du pavillon et des papiers de bord.
Une exception au principe de la competence exclusive de la
juridiction du droit du pavillon concernant des actes commis ä bord
du navire reside dans le cas du « hot pursuit ». On entend par lä qu'un
navire peut etre poursuivi, meme en haute mer, par des vaisseaux
habilites a excrcer des missions de police. Tel est le cas lorsque le navire,
ou une des personnes se trouvant ä son bord, a enfreint la loi de l'Etat
etranger lorsqu'il se trouvait encore dans les eaux territoriales de celui-ci.
Cette poursuite par un navire de guerre ou de police doit cependant
etre consideree comme ayant debute dans ses eaux territoriales. Les navires
de guerre et de police peuvent egalement intervenir en haute mer lorsqu'ils
constatent une infraction en matiere de peche maritime.
C. La competence penale de l'Etat riverain ä l'egard de navires etran-
gers se trouvant dans ses eaux territoriales ou interieures.
La mer territoriale comprend la partie de la mer se trouvant sous la
souverainete de l'Etat riverain. L'etendue exacte de cette portion de mer
est cependant controversee. Suivant la these la plus repandue, il s'agit
d'une distance de trois milles (5556 m). C'est egalement la distance adop-
tee par la Belgique, ce qui ressort de l'arrete royal du 22 janvier 1929 por-
tant reglement de police de la navigation dans les eaux du littoral beige
et de ses ports.
Le droit de juridiction de l'Etat riverain dans ses eaux territoriales est
evidemment une consequence de la souverainete qu'il peut exercer sur
cette partie de la mer qui constitue un prolongement de son territoire.
L'Etat riverain doit cependant respecter le droit de passage inoffensif
(11) NYPELS J.P.G., Le Code penal beige iyiterpreie, t. 1er, ed. 1938, p. 54, n" 3.
qui est accorde generalement aux navires de commerce etrangers. Pour
les navires de guerre, la permission de passage ne constitue pas une Obliga-
tion juridique, mais uniquement un usage de courtoisie internationale
Au sujet de la competence penale de l'Etat riverain dans ses eaux ter-
ritoriales et interieures, il convient egalement d'etablir une distinction
Selon qu'elle concerne des navires d'Etat ou des navires prives.
Lorsqu'il s'agit de navires de commerce et autres bateaux prives, nous
nous trouvons en presence de deux theories. D'apres la pratique anglaise,
la competence entiere de la legislation et de la juridiction de l'Etat rive-
rain est d'application.
La deuxieme coutume, suivie par la plupart des Etats parmi lesquels
la Belgique. est basee sur l'avis du Conseil d'Etat Frangais du 20 novembre
1806. Pour ces pays, la competence penale de l'Etat riverain est limitee aux
trois cas suivants :
P quand Tinfraction a ete commise a bord, par une personne ou contro
une personne ne faisant pas partie de l'equipage ;
2" quand l'infraction a trouble la tranquillite du port ;
3« quand l'intervention des autorites locales a ete reclamee.
Comme, in casu, il importe ä la Belgique de juger si la tranquillite
d'un de ses ports a ete troublee, on peut conclure que ses interets d'Etat
riverain sont garantis. Les memes principes s'appliquent evidemment aux
navires beiges se trouvant dans un port etranger ou dans les eaux territo-
riales etrangeres.
Les theories enoncees ne concernent donc pas les navires de guerre.
II est evident que la seule competence penale, qui puisse s exercer a
Tegard de l'infraction commise ä bord d'un navire de guerre, est celle de
l'Etat dont il porte le pavillon. Meme dans les eaux territoriales ou inte-
rieures etrangeres, le vaisseau de guerre demeure une portion de la puis-
sance militaire de l'Etat dont il represente la souverainete.
II n'empeche que les navires de guerre doivent respecter les regle-
ments d'hygiene ou de police de l'Etat territorial, mais celui-ci ne peut
exercer aucun acte d'autorite ä l'egard du navire de guerre ni de son
equipage, et cela pour les motifs que nous venons d'examiner.
L'Etat territorial n'est pas competent pour intervenir au sujet d'une
infraction commise a bord d'un navire de guerre. De meme, il n'est pas
competent pour une infraction commise a terre par un membre de l'equi-
page lorsque ce membre s'y trouvait pour un service normal relatif au
navire de guerre. Cependant, lorsque l'homme d'equipage se trouve en
dehors du service et qu'il commet une infraction a terre, c'est l'Etat terri-
torial qui est competent.
Dans les eaux interieures existe egalement le droit d'asile ä bord des
navires de guerre, et cela en faveur des delinquants politiques. Lorsque
n'importe quel delinquant se refugie ä bord d'un bätiment de guerre, le
r
142
Jean RAEMAEKERS
commandant juge librement s'il remet ou non ce delinquant. Lorsque
l'Etat territorial conteste le caractere politique de l'infraction, il Importe
que le differend soit resolu par la voie diplomatique.
D. Conclusions.
«
Apres avoir analyse de la sorte le Statut des navires et la competence
penale a l'egard des gens de mer, nous pouvons nous former une idee du
moment ä partir duquel une procedure d'extradition peut etre entamee.
' Nous avons constate qu'en matiere de desertion de marins, le principe
de l'extradition est devenu la regle. Par ailleurs, la qualite de militaire
n'exclut pas Textradition du marin lorsqu'il a commis un delit de droit
commun.
Concernant l'extradition ou la remise de deserteurs provenant de navi-
res de guerre, nous lisons le texte suivant chez Colombos dans son traite
« Le Droit international de la mer » :
«Dans le cas oü des membres de l'equipage desertent dans un port
etranger, l'officier commandant ne doit pas chercher ä les arreter ä terre ;
ce serait une violation de la juridiction du souverain local. La ligne de
conduite qu'il doit suivre est d'adresser une requete pour leur arrestation
ä rautorite locale par Fentremise du consul de son Etat. LI question
est reglee le plus souvent par des accords bilateraux conclus entre Etats,
mais en leur absence, il n'existe aucune Obligation pour l'autorite locale
d'intervenir ; toutefois, la pratique veut qu'en general les deserteurs soient
remis au commandant du navire de guerre. Lorsque le navire de guerre
a dejä quitte le port etranger au moment oü les deserteurs sont arretes
ä terre, Tautorite locale les met habituellement a la disposition du consul
de l'Etat du navire de guerre » (12).
Nous constatons donc que l'extradition de marins deserteurs dans
des ports etrangers, bien qu'elle ne soit pas une Obligation de l'Etat terri-
torial, est cependant devenue une pratique.
Citons pour finir un autre texte du meme ouvrage de Colombos
concernant la Situation du commandant et de lequipage a terre:
«II subsiste un deute sur la Situation des officiers et de l'equipage
lorsqu'ils se trouvent ä terre. La pratique generalement suivie est de leur
appliquer le principe de l'exterritorialite, lorsqu'ils sont a terre, en um-
forme et a titre officiel, pour un service relatif au navire. Mais dans le
cas Oll ils sont a terre, sans etre en uniforme ou sans etre en mission offi-
cielle, ils sont soumis ä la juridiction territoriale de l'Etat riverain, qui
est en droit de les poursuivre pour toute infraction aux lois locales. Pour
les delits mineurs, Tusage est, pour des motifs de courtoisie internationale.
(12) COLOMBOS, C, Le Droit international de la mer, p. 223.
RAPPORT BELGE
143
de remettre les contrevenants ä l'officier commandant afin qu'il en dispo-
.se, mais il n'existe aucune Obligation de le faire » (13).
En etudiant ce dernier texte, il apparait qu'il devient, en quelque sorte,
possible d'appliquer l'extradition ou la remise ä d'autres delits militaires
que la desertion. Nous songeons ici ä des delits tels que les violences ou
les outrages envers un superieur commis ä terre et allant de pair avec un
trouble de l'ordre public.
L'Etat riverain oü accoste un navire de guerre applique generalement
une pratique, non obligatoire, qui permet de remettre au navire en visite
des marins qui ont commis ä terre des delits militaires determines.
Cette pratique est une nouvelle source de droit en matiere d'extradi-
tion pour delits militaires.
CHAPITRE VI
L'extradition et la remise dans le cadre de l'OTAN
I. Le regime penal des forces beiges en Republiqiie federale d'Allemagne
A. Generalites.
Dans les limites que nous analyserons plus loin la Belgique a le droit
de faire juger par ses juridictions militaires, suivant la loi penale beige,
les militaires beiges se trouvant dans les pays occupes par des troupes au
Service de l'OTAN. Pour la Belgique il s'agit principalement de la Repu-
blique federale d'Allemagne oü reside avec un certain caractere de per-
manence la plus grande partie de l'effectif de nos forces armees.
En outre, certaines categories de personnes, non soumises aux lois
penales militaires mais bien ä la juridiction militaire, ont suivi les troupes
beiges en AUemagne et sont egalement justiciables des tribunaux militai
res. Songeons ici ä l'installation en famille de nombreux membres des
forces beiges formant des communautes relativement autonomes, ainsi
qu'aux divers Services civils attaches ä l'armee.
Une limitation de la competence des juridictions militaires beiges
risquerait de poser de nombreux problemes difficiles ä resoudre. Cepen-
dant, commc nous le verrons bientöt, la concurrence de competence entre
les juridictions militaires et les tribunaux de l'Etat de sejour a pu etre
resolue favorablement du fait que la juridiction militaire beige a pu
(13) COLOMBOS, C, op. cit., p. 179 S 352.
144
Jean RAEMAEKERS
conservcr une competence quasi generale. De plus, le bon fonctionnement
de nos juridictions militaires n'y a sürement pas ete etranger.
Notons cependant que depuis 1945 jusqu'au 1"" juillet 1963 le Statut
juridictionnel des forces beiges en Republique federale d'Allemagne a
fait l'objet de nombreuses Conventions internationales. La Situation nee
de ces multiples Conventions est par ailleurs fort complexe. Bien
que le sujet du present chapitre se borne ä l'extradition et ä la remise de
militaires beiges dans le cadre de l'OTAN, il n'est pas possible d'en etudier
les regles sans parcourir le Statut juridique applicable aux forces beiges
d'Allemagne.
Pour une analyse plus approfondie du Statut, nous tenons a en refe-
rer au specialiste beige de la Convention OTAN, M. le Premier avocat
general M. Danse, auteur d'une importante etude sur le Statut penal de
rOTAN (14).
On trouve egalement, sous forme succinte et precise, levolution des
diflerents status juridiques dans la « Chronique annuelle de jurisprudence
militaire » de M. Tauditeur general J. Gilissen (15).
Nous nous sommes interesses plus particulierement, dans ce chapitre,
au cas de la Belgique, Etat d'origine, et de la Republique federale d'Al-
lemagne, Etat de sejour. Nous nous etendrons davantage sur les problemes
de la remise en ce qui concerne les militaires beiges stationnes dans d'au-
tres pays que la Republique federale d'Allemagne et des militaires etran-
gers stationnes en Belgique, Etat de sejour dans ce cas-ci. Mais il va de
soi que dans ce domaine les memes principes sont applicables.
B. Apergu historique.
L'evolution du regime juridique des forces beiges en AUemagne a
connu trois phases essentielles :
1. Le regime d^occupation et ensuite Vattenuatlon de ce regime. (1945 —
5 mai 1955).
Par la « Declaration de Berlin » (5 juin 1945) les puissances d'occupa-
tion assumerent le pouvoir supreme en AUemagne oü toute souverainete
avait disparu. La Belgique, qui n'etait pas intervenue dans cette decla-
ration, n'exergait en AUemagne aucun droit et ne pouvait y garder üne
armee d'occupation que par le truchement d'une Convention signee avec
la Grande-Bretagne, le 23 decembre 1949.
(14) DANSE. M., «Le Statut penal de l'OTAN. R^flexions ä l'occasion de son ap-
plication sur le territoiie de la Republique federale d'Allemagne» in Revue de
droit militaire et de droit de la guerre, Tome II. (1963) pp. 77-125 et 301-364,
Tome IV (1965) pp. 49-101.
n5) GILISSEN. J., Chronique annuelle de jurisprudence militaire in Reime de
droit penal et de criminologie, 1955 ä 1961 ; GILISSEN. J.. et SCHETTER, P..
1962 ä 1964 ; SCHETTER, P.. et vander VORST, F.. 1963 et sv.
RAPPORT BELGE
145
Durant cette phase on ne trouve aucune trace de dispositions juridiques
reglant la question de remise de militaires beiges.
Les Puissances occupantes ont tous les droits. Les cas litigieux de mili-
taires beiges se reglent par des accords particuliers avec les autorites mili-
taires anglaises, les troupes beiges etant stationnees en zone britannique,
en vertu de la Convention du 23 decembre 1949.
A partir de 1949, date de la creation de la Republique federale d'Alle-
magne, les trois Puissances occidentales occupant cet Etat lui rendent
progressivement une certaine souverainete par des actes unilateraux.
Le 26 mai 1952 les trois Puissances occidentales signent avec la R.F.A.
les « Accords de Bonn ». Ces accords avaient ete elabores pour etre soli-
daires du Traite de Paris du 27 mai 1952 creant une Communaute euro-
peenne de defense (C.E.D.). Comme la C.E.D. n'a jamais vu le jour, la
ratification des Accords de Bonn resta en suspens et d'autres Conven-
tions — les Accords de Paris du 23 octobre 1954 — furent elaborees pour
abolir le regime d'occupation en AUemagne et fixer un nouveau Statut des
forces etrangeres dans ce pays.
Entretemps, la Belgique avait ratifie par la loi du 9 janvier 1954 (16)
la « Convention du 19 juin 1951 entre les Etats Parties au Traite de l'Atlan-
tique-Nord sur le Statut de leurs forces». Ce n'est qu'ä partir de cette
Periode que les importantes dispositions de l'article Vll de cette Conven-
tion sont entrees progressivement en vigueur en ce qui concerne la
competence de juridiction et la remise de militaires.
2. Le regime transitoire : abolition du regime d'occupatioyi et souve-
rainete complete de la R.F.A. (mai 1955 — 30 juin 1963).
Par divers accords, la Republique federale d'Allemagne obtint ä nou-
veau toutes les prerogatives propres ä un Etat souverain. Comme la pre-
sence de troupes etrangeres en R.F.A. manquait de fondement juridique,
les trois Puissances signerent une « Convention sur la presence de forces
etrangeres». Cette Convention entrait en vigueur le 5 mai 1955. A cette
meme date la R.F.A. devenait membre de l'OTAN.
Le «Protocole d'accession de la R.F.A. au Traite de l'Atlantique
Nord» a ete approuve en Belgique par l'article T'" de la loi du 16 avril
1955 Par le fait meme la Belgique reconnaissait la cessation du regime
d'occupation. Notons que, des lors, c'est sur une base legale que repose
desormais la presence des troupes beiges sur le territoire de la R.F.A.
3. Le regime definitij (ä partir du 1er juillet 1963).
II avait ete convenu que le regime precedent devait faire place, au
plus tot, ä un Statut def initif base sur la « Convention OTAN sur le Statut
(16) Moniteur beige du 15 mars 1963, p. 1514.
1 1 t
Ifl
'
146
Jean RAEMAEKERS
des forces». Cependant, en raison des conditions speciales existant en
Republique federale, cet Etat s'est mis d accord avec ses allies pour dil'fe-
rer son accession statutaire jusqu'ä ce qu'elle alt pu etre completee par de
nouveaux arrangements.
Ces nouveaux arrangements ont ete signes ä Bonn le 3 aoüt 1959
sous la denomination d' Accord complemtntaire et sont entres en vigueur
le 1"' juillet 1963, apres leur ratification par les parlements respectifs (17).
Ce regime definitif a pour base juridique :
a) des Conventions anterieures ä 1959 non abrogees, notamment, en ce
qui nous interesse, la «Convention OTAN sur le Statut des forces»
du 19 juin 1951 ;
b) des Conventions nouvelles, et en particulier T« Accord completant la
Convention OTAN sur le Statut des forces», communement appele
« Accord complementaire ».
C. Le Statut penal actuel des forces beiges en AUemagne.
Dans le domaine penal, le nouveau Statut des forces beiges en AUe-
magne est principalement fixe par l'article VII de la Convention de Lon-
dres de 1951 et par l'article 19 de l'Accord complementaire de Bonn de
1959.
Ces articles ont pour but de regier les conflits de competence suscepti-
bles de naitre entre les differents pays signataires et en particulier entre
l'Etat de sejour et l'Etat d'origine. Par rapport ä la Belgique, les princi-
pes fondamentaux en sont les suivants :
1. Les «autorites militaires » beiges ont le droit d'exercer sur le terri-
toire allemand les pouvoirs de juridiction penale et disciplinaire que
leur confere leur legislation sur toutes personnes sujettes ä la loi
militaire beige. Elles ont une juridiction exclusive sur ces personnes
en ce qui concerne les infractions prevues par la legislation beige,
qui ne tombent pas sous le coup de la legislation allemande. Pour les
autres infractions, il y a juridiction concurrente.
2. Les autorites allemandes ont le droit d'exercer leur juridiction sur
les membres d'une force ou d'un element civil et les personnes a leur
Charge, en ce qui concerne les infractions commises sur le territoire
allemand et punies par la legislation allemande. Elles ont une juridic-
tion exclusive sur ces personnes en ce qui concerne les infractions
punies par les lois allemandes qui ne tombent pas sous le coup de la
legislation beige. Pour les autres infractions, il y a egalement juridic-
tion concurrente.
(17) Moniieur beige du 22 juin 1963. p. 6463.
RAPPORT BELGE
147
3. Dans le cas de juridiction concurrente, la Convention de Londres
etablit des regles de priorite.
Ainsi les autorites beiges ont le droit d'exercer par priorite leur juri-
diction dans deux cas :
— lorsque l'infraction porte atteinte, uniquement, ä la sürete ou ä la
propriete de l'Etat beige, ou ä la personne ou ä la propriete d'un
membre de la force, d'un element civil ou d'une personne ä charge ;
— lorsque l'infraction resulte de tout acte de negligence accompli
dans l'execution du service.
Pour toutes les autres infractions, les autorites allemandes exercent
leur juridiction par priorite.
4. L'Etat qui beneficie d'une priorite de juridiction peut y renoncer.
Ainsi l'Allemagne a fait en l'article la de l'Accord complementaire
de 1959, une offre de renonciation generale et anticipee de sa priorite.
La Belgique s'est prevalue de cette offre de renonciation par note
verbale adressee le 7 juin 1963 au Ministre allemand des Affaires etran-
geres qui en a accuse reception par note verbale du 14 aoüt 1963.
5. Toutefois, le benefice de cette renonciation generale peut etre retire
ä la Belgique par un acte de revocation, lorsque, dans une affaire
determinee, les interets majeurs de l'administration de la justice alle-
mande exigent que la juridiction soit exercee par les autorites de l'Etat
de sejour en raison de circonstances propres ä l'affaire. II s'agit essen-
tiellement des infractions ayant entraine mort d'homme, des vols
avec violences ou menaces et des viols ainsi que la tentative de ces
infractions. Cependant dans la pratique, depuis le r- juillet 1963, les
autorites allemandes n'ont exerce cette faculte de revocation qu'avec
une grande moderation.
D. Remise et droit de garde.
1. Texte.
L'Art. VII de la Convention dispose en son paragraphe 5 :
(a) Les autorites des Etats de sejour et d'origine se pretent mutuelle-
ment assistance pour l'arrestation des membres d'une force de l'Etat
d'origine ou d'un element civil ou des personnes a charge sur le territoire
de l'Etat de sejour et pour leur remise ä l'autorite qui a ä exercer sa
juridiction conformemcnt aux dispositions ci-dessus.
(b) Les autorites de l'Etat de sejour notifient dans les delais les plus
brefs aux autorites militaires de l'Etat d'origine l'arrestation de tout
membre d'une force ou d'un element civil ou d'une personne a charge.
(c) La garde d'un membre d'une force ou d'un element civil sur lequel
l'Etat de sejour a ä exercer son droit de juridiction et qui est entre les
mains des autorites de l'Etat d'origine demeurera assuree par celles-ci
11?
m
148
Jean RAEMAEKERS
jusqu'ä ce que des poursuites aient ete engagees contre lui par l'Etat de
sejour.
Ces dispositions theoriques seront illustrees dans le chapitre VII par
des cas vecus parmi les Forces beiges en Republique federale d'AUemagne.
2. Procedure.
L'article 22 de TAccord complementaire determine la procedure. Ain-
si lorsque Farrestation a ete effectuee par les autorites allemandes, la
personnc arretee est remise aux autorites beiges si celles-ci en fönt la
demande. Dans ce cas (ou a fortiori lorsque l'arrestation a ete effectuee
par les autorites beiges), ces autorites peuvent ä tout moment transferer la
garde aux autorites allemandes. De plus, les autorites judiciaires beiges
sont tenues d'examiner avec bienveillance toute requete qui leur serait
presentee, dans des cas particuliers, par les autorites allemandes, en vue
du transfert de la garde ä celles-ci.
En ce qui concerne les infractions dirigees uniquement contre la
securite de la R.F.A., la garde appartient d'office aux autorites allemandes.
Enfin, lorsque la garde appartient aux autorites beiges, eile demeure
assuree par ces autorites jusqu a la mise en liberte ou l'acquittement par
les autorites allemandes, ou jusqu'au debut de l'execution de la peine.
Les autorites beiges sont egalement tenues de prendre les mesures
necessaires pour mettre la personne arretee ä la disposition des autorites
allemandes pour les besoins de Tenquete et de la procedure penale.
3. Commeyitaire.
De l'expose qui precede Ton peut conclure que les dispositions qui
reglent la remise de militaires par d'autres moyens que l'extradition, dans
le cadre de la Convention OTAN sur le Statut des forces, assortie de
TAccord complementaire, ne s adressent qu'aux seuls militaires membres
de la force, de l'element civil et des personnes e Charge. Le membre de
la force doit donc se trouver pour l'execution du Service sur le territoire
de la R.F.A.
En vertu de la renonciation au droit de priorite de juridiction faite
par les autorites allemandes, celles-ci remettent donc aux autorites beiges
les militaires beiges membres de la force, sauf dans les cas bien deter-
mines oü les autorites allemandes peuvent revoquer la renonciation. En
cas d'une teile revocation, les autorites beiges remettent le militaire aux
autorites allemandes mais en assurent la garde dans les conditions exposees
plus haut.
4. Les droits d'un militaire remis et detenu.
Lorsqu'un membre d'une force ou d'un element civil ou une personne
ä Charge est inculpe et detenu en vue de poursuites devant une juridic-
RAPPORT BELGE
148
tion allemande, 11 a droit aux garanties reconnues par le paragraphe 9 de
Tarticle VII de la Convention.
II s'agit, principalement, pour l'inculpe du droit d'etre juge rapide-
ment, d'etre defendu par un avocat de son choix ou par un defenseur
repondant aux conditions legales en vigueur dans l'Etat de sejour, de
disposer, s'il l'estime necessaire, d'un interprete competent et de commu-
niquer avec un representant du gouvernement de l'Etat d'origine.
rilAPTTRE Vll
La pratiqiie de remise de militaires par d'autres moyens que l'extraditloii
I. Introduction
Un Probleme particulier de Cooperation internationale concerne le
Statut penal des forces en sejour sur le territoire d'un Etat allie. II faut en
realite considerer que le militaire deplace en territoire etranger peut etre
süumis aussi bien ä la legislation de l'Etat de sejour qu'ä celle de l'Etat
d'origine.
Dans le present chapitre, nous aurons a repondre ä deux questions :
1. y a-t-il une pratique de remise pour les militaires beiges station-
nes ä l'etranger ?
2. y a-t-il une pratique similaire pour les militaires etrangers stationnes
sur le territoire de la Belgique ?
Ici une constatation importante s'impose d'emblee : la disproportion
oj^istant entre le nombre relativement eleve de militaires beiges se trou-
vant a l'etranger (notamment en R.F.A.) et le noml)re minime de militaires
etrangers stationnes actuellement en Belgique.
Ainsi, ä la fin de 1966, la Belgique n'hebergeait que quelques bases
anglaises'et un depot militaire allemand. Ces installations militaires,
situees dans la province d'Anvers, occupent principalement du personnel
civil beige. Depuis plusieurs annees, le nombre de militaires anglais
demeure fixe a quelques centaines ; par ailleurs, le nombre de militaires
allemands stationnes en Belgique est insignifiant.
II est cependant evident que, par suite de Timplantation en Belgique
des Services du SHAPE, le nombre de militaires etrangers y augmentera
de fagon considerable.
La presence militaire beige en Republique federale d'AUemagne offre
un tout autre caractere, car eile represente une fraction capitale de l'effec-
u
150
Jcaii UAEMAKKRRS
hl>
tif total des forces armees beiges. En ne comptant que les « militaires »,
ce total s'elevait ä plus de 32.000 ä la fin de Tannee 1966. Mais en fait, le
nombre des personnes considerees au sens large comme « membres des
forces» par la Convention s'eleve a plus de 63.000. 11 Importe, en effet,
d'y ajouter environ 31.120 personnes que Ton peut subdiviser en « person-
nes ä Charge » et en « personnes attachees ä l'armee » ou « autorisees ä
suivre un corps de troupe ». Par «personnes ä charge », la Convention
comprend les membres des familles des militaires et de l'element civil ; par
ailleurs, il y a les «personnes attachees ä l'armee», dont la notion est
a peu pres couverte par celle de «personnes a la suite» de Tarticle 1,
n" 7(b) de la Convention sur les forces.
Pcuvent elre consideres commo tels : les aumoniers militaires, le per-
sonnel des etablissements d'enseignement installes par le departement de
la Defense nationale, les infirmieres des höpitaux militaires beiges, le
personnel des postes pour les forces beiges d'AUemagne et les autres
civils occupes par les troupes beiges, pour autant qu'ils ne possedent pas
la nationalite allemande. Toutes les categories de personnes susnommees
sont justiciables de la juridiction militaire beige.
Notons que la Belgique compte deux Conseils de guerre en campagne
sur le territoire de la Republique federale d'AUemagne et qu'ils ont res-
pectivement leur siege a Cologne et ä Neheim (Westphalie).
II. Examen de cas pratiques concernant la reniise de militaires
beiges se troiivant a Tetranger
j; 1 : Examen de cas pratiques d'application en
Republique federale d'AUemagne
A. Exemples de remise do militaires bolgos membres de la force a un
tribunal allemand :
1. Cas d'espece.
II s'agit ici de l'application de l'article 19 § 3 de TAccord complemen-
taire oü les autorites allemandes usent de la possibilite de revoquer leur
renonciation au droit de priorite de juridiction.
a) Le Premier cas concerne un militaire beige, stationne en R.F.A.,
qui, le 15 septembre 1963, avait commis une tentative de viol suivie
d'assassinat sur la personne d'une jeune fille allemande. L*affaire a ^te
jug^e par le Schwurgericht de Bonn.
b) Le deuxieme cas concerne egalement un militaire beige, stationne
en R.F.A. Le soir du 19 mars 1966, il avait emmene dans sa voiture person-
nelle deux jeunes filles allemandes ägees de 16 ans. Ensuite, il s'est rendu
coupable de tentative de viol sur la personne d'une des jeunes filles,
pendant que l'autre demeuiait enfermee dans la voiture. Apres que la
premiere victime out reussi a prendre la fuite, il commit un viol sur la
RAPPORT BELGK
151
personne de l'autre jeune fille.
II a ete juge le 21 septembre 1966 par la Große Strafkammer du Land-
gericht d'Arnsberg.
2. Procedure relative ä la detention preventive.
Dans les deux affaires susnonmiees la procedure en matiere de deten-
tion preventive s'est deroulee de fagon identique :
a) Privation de liberte du militaire par la gendarmerie du ressort de
l'auditorat militaire en campagne beige competent, soit celui de
Cologne dans le premier cas, et dans le deuxieme cas, celui de Neheim ;
b) Mandat d'arret decerne par la commission judiciaire au siege de
Fauditorat ;
c) Notification de Taf faire conformement ä l'article 19 § 2 de l'Accord
complementaire faite par l'auditeur militaire beige ä l'Oberstaatsan-
w^alt ;
d) Revocation de la renonciation par l'Oberstaatsanwalt sur base de
l'article 19 § 3. Notification faite par cette autorite a l'Auditeur mili-
taire et a l'inculpe ;
e) A partir de ce moment, 1 mculpe est definitivement soumis au regime
allemand de detention preventive.
Dans chacune des affaires, un Haftbefehl a ete rendu par 1 Amtsgericht
et transmis par TOberstaatsanwalt a l'auditeur militaire. Signitica-
tion de l'Haftbefehl ä l'inculpe a ete faite dans les deux cas par un 3Uge
du Amtsgericht (Amtsgerichsrat) ;
n Immediatement apres la signification du Haftbefehl, il a ete procede
ä la mainlevee du mandat d'arret par la commission judiciaire au
siege de l'auditorat militaire. En meme temps, le magistrat instruc-
teur beige a delivre un requisitoire de mise en liberte avec la mention
« pour autant qu'il ne soit pas detenu en vertu d'un autre requisitoire
d'ecrou » ;
g) Afin de legaliser le droit de garde qui demeurait confie aux autorites
beiges, le magistrat instructeur beige a egalement delivre simultane-
ment un requisitoire d'ecrou portant notamment la mention: « i^ n
vertu de l'article 22 § Ib et S 2 de l'Accord complementaire du 3 aout
1959, approuve par la loi du 6 mai 1963 et en execution du mandat d ar-
ret ci- Joint (Haftbefehl) en date du... de l'Amtsgericht de (avec tra-
duction conforme de l'allemand) ». Ainsi, les autorites judiciaires bei-
ges ont pu executer le mandat d'arret delivre par le magistrat alle-
mand competent ;
h) Transmission du dossier par l'auditeur militaire a rOberstaatsanwalt,
l
152 Jean RAEMAEKERS
pour disposition. Ensuite, application de la procedure allemande ; les
autorites judiciaires allemandes continuent ä tenir l'auditeur militaire
au courant du deroulement de cette procedure et ä transmettre une
copie des pieces de leur dossier. Citons parmi ces pieces la copie de
l'acte d'accusation (Anklageschrift) adresse par l'Oberstaatsanwalt au
Landgericht demandant Touverture du proces devant le tribunal com-
petent. Si,t4nc;lons, pour finir, cjue dans les deux affaires, le transfert
de la garde de l'inculpe a ete accorde avant l'ouverture du proces, et
ceci sur demande des autorites judiciaires allemandes.
3. Comrnentaire.
Les actions paralleles des autorites judiciaires beige et allemande
se sont parfaitement coordonnees, meme en l'absence d'arrangement admi-
nistratif. II est evident que la Convention repose sur la confiance mutuelle
et sur l'assistance reciproque. C'est cet esprit de comprehension que la
justice militaire beige a pu rencontrer aupres des parquets allemands.
II est egalement ä noter que dans un bon nombre de cas rentrant dans
la categorie des affaires susceptibles de revocation, les autorites judi-
ciaires allemandes n'ont pas fait usage de cette faculte, l'examen atten-
tif de l'affaire auquel elles se sont livrees leur ayant fait conclure que
le jugement par la juridiction beige n'etait pas de nature a nuire ä des
interets majeurs de l'administration de la justice allemande.
II en a ete, notamment, ainsi dans des cas d'homicide involontaire.
B. Cas de NON remise d'un militaire beige par les autorites judi-
ciaires allemandes.
l. Expose des faits.
II s'agit d'un sous-officier dont l'unite est stationnee en Belgique. II
est inculpe d'avoir detourne des fonds au prejudice de son unite, dans le
courant de l'annee 1963. Parti pour TAllemagne, il y est decouvert ä Ham-
bourg par la police locale.
La Prevote beige, informee par la police allemande, ne peut proceder
ä Tarrestation de l'inculpe, celui-ci etant hospitalise et intransportable.
Un mandat d'arret par defaut est ensuite decerne le 20 novembre 1963,
ä Charge de l'interesse, par la commission judiciaire de l'auditorat militai-
re beige ä Cologne. La prevote est chargee de l'execution, le transfert
etant prevu en ambulance.
Le 28 novembre 1963, les autorites judiciaires de Hambourg informent
les membres de la prevote beige, qui s'etaient rendus sur place, qu'elles
s'opposaient ä une teile arrestation de l'interesse parce qu'il ne s'agissait
pas d'un membre de la force et que, dans ce cas, il y avait lieu de recou-
rir a la procedure de l'extradition.
RAPPORT BELGE
153
2. Coynmeniaire.
II en resulta un echange de correspondance entre les autorites judi-
ciaires allemandes et beiges. Nous nous abstiendrons d'entrer ici dans le
detail des points de vue juridiques respectifs.
De toute fagon, les autorites allemandes ont prefere s'en tenir aux
textes bilateraux de la Convention OTAN et ont soumis finalement l'affai-
re au Ministere Federal de la Justice. La question de droit a ete tranchee,
en ce sens que le Gouvernement beige a, sur proposition du Gouvernement
federal, introduit une demande formelle d'extradition.
Un tel recours a la procedure d'extradition a eu pour consequence que
l'interesse n'a pu etre poursuivi pour d'autres faits que ceux pour lesquels
l'extradition etait accorde. 11 n'a donc pu etre poursuivi du chef de deser-
tion du fait que le traite germano-belge du 17 janvier 1958 ne prevoit pas
l'extradition pour les delits militaires.
II en resulte qu'un militaire beige, stationne en Republique federale
d'Ailenipgnc, et qui s'enfuit, apres avoir commis un delit militaire, peut
etre remis, par les autorites allemandes, entre les mains de la justice mili-
taire beige en R.F.A. II est pour le moins paradoxal que le meme militaire,
stationne cette fois en Belgique, et commettant les memes faits, pour se
refugier ensuite en R.F.A., ne pourra pas etre remis ni extrade pour etre
traduit en justice de la meme fagon que le premier.
C. Cas de militaires, NON membres de la Force, remis ä la juridiction
allemande.
Les cas de ce genre resultent en general des dispositions de l'article
57bis du Code penal militaire beige (loi du 27 fevrier 1958). Aux termes
de cet article « le militaire qui, sur le territoire d'un Etat etranger oü il
est en service, contrevient ä la legislation de cet Etat en matiere fores-
tiere, rurale, de chasse, de peche, de circulation routiere, de douane, de
chan'ge ou de reglementation des importations ou exportations, sera puni...
etc.. ».
Ainsi, lorsqu'un militaire beige a commis une infraction ä la loi alle-
mande en les matieres precisees par l'article 57bis, il doit, pour pouvoir
etre poursuivi devant la juridiction militaire, etre en service sur le terri-
toire de la Republique federale d'Allemagne.
Le cas suivant met en lumiere une consequence de cette disposition, ä
savoir la non competence de la juridiction militaire beige et la remise du
militaire a la justice allemande.
II s'agit, en fait, d'un militaire beige dont l'unite est stationnee en
Belgique (donc, non membre de la force) implique dans deux accidents de
roulage en AUemagne, au cours desquels il fut seul blesse.
•i'
• 1 1
h\
154
Juan RAEMAEKERS
L'interesse ne circulait pas sur le territoire de R.F.A. sous le couvert
d'un document regulier l'y envoyant pour le service. De ce fait, Tauditorat
militaire se trouve dans rimpossibilite de le poursuivre parce que les infrac-
tions commises sont, selon le droit beige, des infractions en matiere de
circulation routiere, et que d'autre part, pour qu'il y ait application de
l'article 57bis du Code penal militaire, l'interesse doit etre en service aux
forces beiges en Allemagne, ce qui n etait pas le cas en l'espece.
II s'agit donc d'un cas d'infraction punie par les lois de l'Etat de sejour,
mais ne tombant pas sous le coup de la legislation de l'Etat d'origine.
Conformement ä l'article VII (2) (b) de la Convention OTAN sur le
Statut des forces, les autorites de TEtat de sejour, en l'occurrence Celles
de la R.F.A. ont le droit de juridiction exclusive.
D. Cas de NON remise d'un militaire beige aux autorites judiciaires
allemandes.
Le cas present illustre la garantie donnee par la Convention OTAN
sur le Statut des forces pour eviter une extradition deguisee.
II s'agit d'un soldat milicien beige dont l'unite est stationnee en R.F.A.
et ayant ete condamne par un tribunal allemand a une peine d'emprisonne-
ment du chef de delit de fuite. Cependant, les faits, qui se sont passes sur le
territoire de la R.F.A., sont anterieurs au moment oü l'interesse est devenu
militaire en service actif.
Lauditeur militaire beige s'est oppose ä l'execution du jugement
du fait que l'interesse ne se trouvait pas de son propre gre en RFA, mais
pour le service en vertu d'obligations militaires.
Agir autrement eut ete proceder ä une extradition deguisee, d'autant
plus que le delit de fuite, faisant l'objet de la condamnation, n'est pas
prevu par le Traite d'extradition germano-belge du 17 janvier 1958.
§ 2. Cas pratiques de remise de militaires beiges par
d'autres pays de TOT AN que la R.F.A.
A. Generalites.
L'Accord complementaire est uniquement applicable aux forces etran-
geres stationnees en R.F.A. Par consequent, le Statut penal des forces beiges
stationnees dans d'autres pays de l'OTAN que la R.F.A., est exclusivement
regi par la Convention de Londres de 1951 (article VII).
C'est cet article VII qui dispose lequel des deux Etats (d'origine ou de
sejour) est competent pour exercer sa juridiction.
RAPPORT BELGE
155
Les autorites des deux Etats pourront, sur la base de leur propre loi,
exercer leur juridiction penale sur le territoire de l'Etat de sejour ä l'egard
des personnes appartenant aux armees de l'Etat d'origine. Des qu'un fait
est a la fois puni par les deux lois, les juridictions des deux Etats .sont
on concurrence sur ce territoire.
Pour les departager, la Convention attribue aux tribunaux de l'Etat
qu'elle designe un droit prioritaire d'exercer les poursuites. La priorite
revient ä l'Etat d'origine (ici la Belgique) dans deux situations prevues
par l'article VII § 3 et dont nous avons deja traite dans ce rapport.
Rappeions brievement qu'il s'agit ici des infractions commises dans
l'execution du service ainsi que de toute infraction portant uniquement
prejudice au personnel ou aux interets de l'Etat d'origine.
Dans le cas de toutes autres infractions, les autorites de l'Etat de
sejour exercent par priorite leur juridiction, sauf evidemment lorsqu'elles
renoncent, au benefice de la Belgique, a exercer leur priorite de juridic-
tion.
B. Cas d'espece.
1. Par jugement du Conseil de guerre de Bruxelles du 7 decembre
1964 un militaire beige a ete condamne du chef de tentative de vol avec
effraction dans une banque de HuntsviUe, aux Etats-Unis. Au moment des
faits le militaire, tout en etant en mission OTAN aux Etats-Unis, n'etait
pas 'en service. Les autorites judiciaires americaines avaient donc la
priorite de juridiction, mais ils y renoncerent ä la requete des autorites
beiges. Cette requete fut introduite par l'Attache militaue beige et
confirmee par l'auditorat militaire.
2. Un autre militaire beige fut poursuivi et condamne le 6 mai 1963,
par le Conseil de guerre de Liege pour avoir, etant en mission OTAN
aux Etats-Unis, involontairement cause des blessures ä un autre militaire
beige au cours d'un accident de roulage.
11 s'agit ici d'un cas similaire au precedent.
3 Nous nous permettons de nous etendre plus longuement sur un
troisieme cas, parce qu'il concerne en mcme temps les principes du droit
d'extradition :
a) Expose des faits :
II s'agit d'un militaire beige arrive a Fort Bliss (USA) en aoüt 1961
avec une batterie de son unite afin d'y subir un entrainement special
en vue d'utiliser des missiles Nike.
11 y fit la connais.sance d'uno jeune fille mexicaino qu'il decida
d'epouser. Mais en raison des difficultes et des lenteurs administratives
w
156
Jean UAKMAKKERS
qaaurait entrainees rimmißration de sa fiancee en Belgique, il ne trou-
va, dit-il, d'autre Solution que de deserter la veille du depart de son
unite pour la Belgique et de s installer au Mexique.
II alla habiter Chihuahua, ou il trouva du travail. 11 epousa sa fiancee
en juillet 1904. Entretemps, une peilte fille etait nee en mars 1962.
Le prevenu, apres avoir envoye sa femme et sa fille en Belgique,
alla se livrer aux autorites militaires beiges a Fort Bliss le 12 septembre
1964. Rapatrie, il fut am te le 15 septembre 1964 par la gendarmerie de
Zaventem (Bruxelh^s), pour etro onsuitc- juge et condamne par le conseil
de guene.
b) Commentaire :
II est clair que nous nous trouvons ici en presence d'un delit mili-
taire, et notamment de desertion.
Tant que le militaire se trouvait au Mexique, il n'a pas ete inquiete
ä cause de sa desertion, parce que la legislation en matiere d'extradition
n'inclut pas les delits militaires.
Sur le territoire des Etats-Unis, il tombait cependant sous l'application
du Statut des forces beiges se trouvant dans un pays allie. Aussi, depuis
le moment oü il est venu se presenter volontairement a Fort Bliss, il
etait possible de proceder a sa « remise ».
4. T.(^ 4 novembre 1964, un militaire beige pilotait, en sewice coni-
viande, un vehicule militaire sur le territiore de la commune neerlan-
daise de Maalbroek, alors qu'il se trouvait sous Tinfluence de la boisson.
Un de ses deux passagers, egalement un militaire beige, etait en etat
d'ivresse.
Les membres de la marechaussee royale neerlandaise, qui ont cons-
tate les faits, ont remis les delinquants a la frontiere entre les mains de
leurs coUegues de la prevöte beige.
II s'agit clairement ici d'un cas de juridiction concurrcnte oü les auto-
rites beiges (Etat d'origine) ont le droit d'exercer par priorite leur juri-
diction. Tel n'eut pas ete le cas si une atteinte avait ete portee ä la per-
sonne ou aux biens d'un sujot neorlandais.
5. Le 12 decembre 1964, un militaire beige, de passage a Maastricht
(Pays-Bas) durant un conge, s'est rendu coupable d'attentat a la pudeur
et d'outrage public aux moeurs ; les victimes etaient deux petites filles
agees de 7 et de 8 ans.
Nous nous trouvons ici en presence d'un cas de juridiction concurrcnte
pour Icquel la priorite de juridiction rcvi(»nt incontestablement aux
autorites de l'Etat de sejour.
RAPPORT BELGE
157
Cependant, les autorites judiciaires neerlandaises se sont dechargees
de cette af faire en renongant a leur priorite de juridiction, ce qui fut por-
te ä la connaissance des autorites beiges par l'entremise de l'Attache
militaire beige ä La Haye.
C. Conclusion.
Nous esperons avoir demontre, par ces quelques exemples, l'idee fon-
damentale sur laquelle est base le Statut juridictionnel de rOTAN. Mal-
gre les priorites de juridiction nettement etablies par la Convention de
1951 la pratique demontre que l'Etat qui beneficie de cette pnorite use
souvent de la faculte de renonciation, seit d'initiative, soit a la demande
de l'autre Etat.
III. Remise de militaires etrangers stationnes sur le
territoire de la Belgique
A. Generalites.
Le Statut penal des forces etrangeres stationnees en Belgique est
egalement regi par l'article VII de la Convention de Londres de 1951.
Envers ces militaires, les memes principes sont d'application qu aux
forces beiges stationnees dans d'autres pays de l'OTAN que la R.E A.
En regle generale, nous pouvons affirmer que ces militaires etrangers,
pratiquement tous Anglais, provoquent tres peu d'incidents. Cela n a rien
d'etonnant lorsque Ton considere qu'il s'agit ici, exclusivement de mili-
taires de carriere dont l'inconduite eventuelle est menacee de graves
sanctions disciplinaires.
II n'existe point d'accord avec l'Angleterre au sujet d'une renon-
ciation au droit de priorite de juridiction de la part de la Belgique en
tant qu'Etat de sejour. Mais en fait, lorsqu'un cas individuel se presente,
il est generalement fait application d'une teile renonciation, et cela dans
un esprit de bienveillante Cooperation.
A cette maniere de proceder, il n'est fait exception que lorsque la
certitude de dedommagement des tiers n est pas suffisamment garantie
(exemple : accidents de roulagc graves).
B. Procedure d'intervention.
II Importe de souligner le role important rempli par la police mili-
taire britannique. En cas de demande de la part des autorites beiges, eile
n a jamais manque de preter son concours pour collaborer a des recher-
ches et aider a l'execution de divers devoirs d'mstruction.
Conformement aux dispositions de l'article VII 5 (a), les militaires
anglais ayant commis une infraction grave, et dont l'arrestation s impose.
eront remis sur ordre du procureur du Roi a la pohce militaire bri-
y^\
/
IfiS
Joan RAEMAEKERS
tannique qui les emmenera a la base militaire oü ils seront enfermes.
Lorsqu'une incarceration s'impose dans des cas moins graves (exem-
ple : ivresse), la gendarmerie ou la police beige pourront remetlre direc-
tement Tinteresse ä la police niilitaire britannique sans en referer au
procureur du Roi.
La seule difficulte ayant jamais surgi, aü sujet de Tapplication de
Tarticle VII 5 (a) de la Convention, concernait la delivrance d'un mandat
de perquisition afin de pouvoir rechercher et proceder ä rarrcstation d'un
deserteur anglais, lequel n'avait commis aucune infracticn a la legirla-
tion beige. On supposait que le deserteur en question avait cherche refuge
dans rhabitation d'un sujet beige, et pour ce motif, l'autorite miliiaire
anglaise avait demande l'assistance de la gendarmerie beige.
Le procureur du Roi consulte estima cependant qu'il n'y avait pas
lieu de faire proceder a une teile perquisition.
Par ailleurs, la plupart des infractions commises par des militaires
anglais sont traitecs sur le plan disciplinaire, apres indemnisation des
dommages eventuellement causes.
C. Commentaire.
A Toccasion de ces breves considerations. nous avons traile unique-
ment de militaires britanniques pour le motif que, jusqu'ä present, aucun
Probleme ne s'est pose concernant les quelques militaires allemands sta-
tionnes a Arendonk.
Mais, meme a l'egard des militaires britanniques, les interventions
policieres demeurent assez rares.
Comme nous l'avons dejä signale, les cas de poursuite ou de remire
eventuelle se poseront davantage apres Timplantalion du SHAPE en
Belgique.
CHAPITRE VIII
Conclusions
En ce qui concerne les delits militaires, notre grcupe de travail a
conclu, de fagon unanime, qu'il importe de les inclure parmi les delits
extraditionnels, et cela pour autant qu'il s'agisse de traites cntre des Etats
lies par un pacte de defense commun tel que TOTAN. II va de soi qu'un
tel souhait n'a pas de sens lorsqu'il se refere a des Etats qui temoignent
d'une Ideologie politique differente.
II a, par ailleurs, semble logique de n'admettre l'extradition que pour
les infractions militaires present ant un certain caractere de graviie. Mais
RAPPORT BELGE
159
souvenons-nous ici que, dans la plupart des cas, une infraction militaire.
meme peu grave, se doublera, apres un certain delai, d'une desertion
lorsque le delinquant s'est rendu a l'etranger.
L'extradition pour delits militaires est devenue une necessite lorsque
Ton songe aux profondes modifications qui ont marque la structure poli-
tique, economique et militaire de l'Europe. D'une pluralite d'Etats natio-
naux'aux aspirations egoistes est issu en Occident, un regroupement de
pays possedant des interets communs tres etroits et faisant progressi-
vement preuve d'un nouvel esprit c( mmunautaire. Quel interct ces
Etats, professant une Ideologie commune, peuvent-ils encore faire valon*
afin d'exclure les delits militaires de la legislation d'extradition ? II est
exact que, dans un tel climat d'assistance mutuelle et de solidarite, une
distinction entre delits militaires et delits de droit commun n'a pas de sens.
II est en pffet anormal que l'on puisse concevoir qu'un deserteur, qui
par sa desertion a affaibli la puissance defensive de son pays, puisse
trouver refuge dans un pays allie. Une teile anomalie signifie meme un
affaiblissement de la defense commune de ces deux Etats.
Et ce qui est vrai pour le temps de paix Fest encore davantage en cas
de guerre Ici il ne semble pas sans interet de rappeler quo la vision de
Lüdendorff, ä propos de la guerre totale, devient de plus en plus reele.
En effet la conduite d'une guerre moderne n'apparticnl plus uniqucment
au domaine des militaires, car le concept de guerre totale englobe aussi
bien la lutte militaire, eccnomique, politique et psychologique que la
cruerilla et d'autres pratiques subversives. Vue sous cet angle, la guerre
est un evenement complexe dans lequel est engagee leutc la naticn et
non plus, comme autrefois, un groupe restreint.
En outre l'opinion qu'il est necessaire que les Etats se pretcnt une
assistance mutuelle accrue dans la repression de la crimmalite sest
affermie Le monde d'aujourd'hui, en se transformant contmuellement,
permet une augmentation impressionnante du nombre d'occasions de
commettre un delit en territoire etranger. Aussi, une application plus
large de la legislation en matiere d'extradition ne manquerait pas de
rendre plus efficace la defense de la societe contre la crimmalite mter-
nationale.
Notre epoque est egalement caracterisee par une tendance vers l'unite
europeenne. Le Traite de Rome a ete une premiere etape vers la reahsa-
tion de l'unite economique ; dans une teile perspective, l'aspiration vers
une unite juridique plus vaste est egalement justifiee, car il est normal
que le droit evolue en fonction de la societe nouvelle. Et dans ce domaine,
le Probleme de l'extradition est fort important, car c'est dans cette ma-
tiere que Ton relrouve la plupart des contacts avec la loi etrangere et
avec le pouvoir repressif etranger.
En terminant, il nous roste ä proposer sous quelle forme on pourrait
le mieux integrer les delits militaires aux delits extraditiennels Notre
-roupe de travail s'est declare oppose a la methode qui consisterait a
hl
m !
160
Jean RAEMAEKERS
ajouter ces delits militaires aux 34 infractions prevucs par la loi beige
de 1874 sur l'extradition, car nous savons dejä qu'une teile nomenclature
est demodee.
Dans le monde actuel, il nc peut encore etre question d'un traite
d'extradition universel. Meme un accord multilateral conclu dans le cadre
de rOTAN se congoit difficilement au moment du desengagement de la
France vis-a-vis de ses partcnaires de cette AUiancc.
C'est pourquoi les membres du groupe de travail ont admis, comme
Solution la plus efficiente, la conclusion d'accords bilateraux inspires des
principes du Traite Benelux, lequel a trace la voie pour l'extension de
Textradition.
161
Rapport brcsilion
A EXTRADICAO POR
DELITOS MILITARES
por
Herbert CANABARRO REICHARDT
Juge honoraire J.M.
(Bresil)
A. ExtradiQao propriamente dita
1. A negativa ä extradigäo por delitos inilitares estä consagrada vor
alginn texto legal ? Qual?
O art. 4« do C.P.M. estatüe : « a lei penal militar aplica-se ao crime
praticado no territörio nacional ou fora dele, ainda que, neste caso, ja
tenha sido o agente julgado pela justiga estrangeira ».
O Cödigo admitiu, portanto, tanto a territorialidade como a extra-
territorialidade da lei penal em toda a sua plenitude. Nesse ponto, a lei
penal militar e mais rigorosa que a lei penal comun, que so admite
excepcionalmente (C.P.C. art. 5°).
De onde se conclüe que a extradigäo e a regra para crime militar
cometido fora do pais.
2. Tem vosso pais coricertado convenios que derogam essa proihiqäo ?
O Brasil mantem convenios internacionais söbre extradigäo, com reci-
procidade. Logicamente näo os possue derrogatörios.
3. Qual e a tomada de posiqäo em caso de delitos complexos, em que as
infraqöes de direito comum se ericontram indivisivelmente ligados a
infra^öes rhilitares ?
Nos casos de conflitos de jurisdigäo entre tribunais civis e militares, e
0 Supremo Tribunal Federal competente para dirimi-los (Constituigao
Federal — art. 101 — letra f).
4. Qual e a autoridade competente para determinar se uma peti^äo de
extradicäo por delito comum näo e, em realidade, uma jornia disjarga-
da de Imrlar a proibiQÜo de extradigäo por delitos militares? E a
mesma autoridade (judicial, por exeinplo) a que toma tamhem a deci-
säo de denegar ou satisfazer a petigäo de Estado requerente ?
•''!1
162
Herbert CANABARRO REICHARDT
fi ainda ao Supremo Tribunal Federal (Const. Federal — art. 101 —
letra g), atribuido compctencia para conceder a extradigäo dos criminosios,
requisitados por Estados estrangeiros e a homologagäo das sentengas es-
trangeiras.
5. QiiaJ foi, de fato, o nümero de extradigöes requeridas por um Estado
estrangeiro durante os Ultimos anos? Que nümero de requerimentos
joram satisjeitos ? Por quais injraqöes militares ?
No Ministerio das Relagoes Exteriores, por onde passam os pedidos
de extradigäo, nada Consta söbre extradigäo por delitos militares.
6. Uma derogagäo convencional (ou legislativo) deverd introduzir-se
quanto ä proibiqäo de extradigäo por delitos militares ? Para quais deli-
tos e de que jorma ? Apresenta-se o prohlevia de maneira mais urgente
para o caso de förgas integrantes ?
Face ao disposto no art. 4" do C.P.M., e ä resposta ao quesito P de
II parägrafo, de vez que näo ha proibigäo ä extradigäo por delitos milita-
res, fica prejudicada a pergunta.
B. Entrega de militares por outros meios que a extradicao
1. Existe uma prätica de entrega de militares estrangeiros estacionados
em vosso territorio, quando seu aquartelamento estd situado söbre
vosso territörio ?
Nada a responder pela inexistencia da hipotese figurada.
2. Existe wna prätica para os militares de vosso pais estacionados no
estrangeiro ?
As forgas militares brasileiras estacionadas no estranjeiro gozando
da extra-territorialidade, consoante o disposito no art. 4** do C.P.M. ou sao
julgados por örgaos da J.M. junto äs forgas expedicionärias, nos termos do
decreto-ley n" 6.396, de 1-4-1944, ou säo recambiados a seu pais para ai
serem julgados.
3. Eodste uma prätica de entrega na fronteira para os militares estran-
geiros que coyyieterem o delito em seu pais e que fugiram para huscar
rejügio em vosso pais ou nele se encontram em tränsito para buscar
refügio em um terceiro pais ?
Seriam casos täo isolados e raros, que dificilmente se poderia falar em
prätica habitual.
4. Estatisticas comparadas söbre estes tres pontos, se possivel.
Que saiba, nao existem.
V
163
Rapport canadien
L'EXTRADITION ET LA REMISE
DE MILITAIRES PAR D'AUTRES MOYENS
QUE L'EXTRADITION
par
Francis A. LEGER
Lieutenant Colonel
Juge-Avocat General Adjoint
Secteur Europeen - Metz
(Canada)
A. L'extradition proprement dite
1. Le refus de Vextradition pour delits militaires estAl consacre par un
texte de loi ?
Le refus de Textradition pour delits militaires n'est pas consacre par un
texte de loi comme tel. Toutefois «La loi sur l'Extradition» enumere les
delits de droit commun qui peuvent entrainer rextradition. Cette liste varie
§elon que l'Etat etranger a conclu ou non avec le Canada une Convention
d'extradition. Puisque cette liste ne comporte pas de delits militaires
comme lels on peut dire que la loi ne permet pas Textradition pour delits
militaires.
2. Conventions conclues derogeant ä cette Prohibition.
« La Loi sur les Forces des Communautes Britanniques Presentes au
Canada » pourrait etre consideree comme derogeant ä « La Loi sur FEx-
tradition ». Cette loi, par designation du Gouverneur en Conseil, s applique
ä toute nation faisant partie de la communaute des nations britanniques
ainsi que :
a ä regard de toutes forces levees sur un territoire pour lequel
un mandat au nom de la Societe des Nations, est exerce par
le gouvernement de Sa Majeste au Royaume-Uni, et ä l'egard des
off iciers et membres de ces forces ;
:J
\n\
164
Francis A. LEGER
b. ä Tegard de toutes forces levees sur un territoire pour lequel un
semblable mandat est exerce par le gouvernement de Sa Majeste
dans un dominion, et ä l'egard deb officiers et membres de ces
forces ;
c. ä Tegard de toutes forces levees dans une colonie et des officiers
et membres de ces forces ; et
d. ä Tegard de toutes forces levees sur un territoire qui est admi-
nistre par le gouvernement de Sa Majeste au Royaume-Uni ou
par le gouvernement de Sa Majeste dans un dominion, et ä Tegard
des officiers et membres de ces forces.
3. Position prise en cas de delits complexes dam lesquels des infractions
de droit covunun sont individuellement liees ä des infractions mili-
taires.
II semblerait, d'apres la jurisprudence, que la demande d'extradition
serait instruite pourvu que l'infraction de droit commun soit substantiel-
lement la meme au Canada que dans le pays etranger.
4. Autorite covipetente ponr deterininer si une demande d'extradition
pour delit de droit commun n'est pas en realite une maniere deguisee
de tourner la prohihition de Vextradition pour delits militaires.
L'autorite competente sera le juge de l'enquete preliminaire agissant
comme si le fugitif etait accuse d'un delit commis au Canada. Cette meme
autorite prendra la decision de satisfaire ou non ä la demande de TEtat
requerant. Toutefois, le Ministre de la Justice, en dernier ressort, decidera
si le crime pour lequel on demande l'extradition est d'un caractere poli-
tique ou sert de paravent a un crime d'une nature politique.
5. Nomhre d'extraditions requises par un Etat etranger au cours des dix
demieres annees.
II n'existe pas de statistiques concernant le nombre d'extraditions re-
quises par un Etat etranger.
6. Estimez-vous qu'une derogation conventionnelle (ou legislative) devrait
etre apportee ä la prohihition generale de Vextradition pour delits
militaires ?
RAPPORT CANADIEN
165
II semble que « La Loi sur les Forces Presentes au Canada (Traite de
l'Atlantique Nord) » reponde bien ä nos besoins dans ce domaine, d autant
plus que cette loi confere au Gouverneur en Conseil (Executif du Gou-
vernement) le droit de designer tout pays comme Etat associe.
B. La lemise de militaires par d'autres moyens que Fextradition.
1
Pratique de remise de militaires etrangers stationnes au Canada,
En effet, les deux lois dejä citees consacrent une pratique de remise
de militaires d'un pays etranger aux autorites de ^^ Pays lorsque des
troupes etrangeres sont situees sur le territoire canadien. La premiere
de celle-ci, celle appliquable ä la communaute ^''^^''^l^''^^^'^^^^^^^^^^
remise d'un deserteur ou d'un absent apres son arrestation a 1 abtönte
etrangere ä l'endroit convenu de la frontiere ou de la cote du Canada.
2. Pratique de remise de müitaires canadiens stationnes ä Vetranger.
La pratique similaire quant aux troupes ^^^^^^iennes a Vetra^^^^^^^^
trouve dans le Statut des forces de l'Ü.TA.N. En outre, f^^^^^^^f^'^^^
existent quant aux forces canadiennes f aisant partie des forces de 1 0.N.U.
3 Pratique de remise d la frontiere pour les milüaires etrangers qui ont
' commis un delit dans leur pays et se sont enfuis pour chercher refuge
au Canada,
' Toute personne deniandant admission au Canada doit sa^^f^^'Jf /"^
Pxi^ences de la Loi sur l'Immigration. Celle qui se serait mtroduite au
^ays Tidestlnement serait retournee ä la frontiere. Ceci s'apphque
tant au militaire qu'ä tout autre etranger.
4. Statistiques comparees sur ces trois points.
Des statistiques comparees sur ces trois points n'existent pas.
M
LA EXTRADICION POR
DELITOS MILITARES
por
Joaquin HERNANDEZ OROZCO
(Espana)
A. La extradiciön propiainente dicha
167
Rapport espagnol
1. La denegaciön de extradiciön por militares, i estd consagrada en
algün texto legal ? i Cuäl ?
Advirtamos previamente que en el sistema espanol son fuentcs juHdicos
de la extradiciön. sobie la base de los principios fundamentales de la tei-
ritorialidad de las leyes penales y el reconocimiento del asilo territorial (1),
las siguientes :
a) los Tratados internacionales suscritos por Espana en la maleria :
b) la Ley espanola sobre extradiciön de 26 de diciembre de 1958, para
la extradiciön pasiua (Espana es el Estado requerido) ;
c) arts 824 a 833 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal de 1882, que
regula el procedimiento para la extradiciön acixva (Espaüa es el Estado
requirente) en la jurisdicciön ordinaria ;
d) arts. 947 a 953 del CJM (Titulo XX del Tratado III), que regula
*el procedimiento para la extradiciön activa en la jurisdicciön militar ;
e) principio de reciprocidad como supletorio.
Aparte de la exclusion en general de los delitos militares en los Tra-
tados internacionales suscritos por nuestro pais, existe, efectivamente.
una norma interna en derecho espafiol que sigue el prmcipio casi un ver-
salmente aceptado de proUbir la extradiciön pasiva por dehtos milita-
7es ■ La Ley espanola sohre extradiciön de 1958, en su art. 6", esta-
blece que « NO se concederd la extradiciön... 3" Por infracciones de natura-
leza puramente militari).
La cuestiön que se podria plantear el interprete irento e este prc.-eplo
seria la de que se entiende por delito de naturaleza <<P"'-«'"^'^*%™j;^
Parece que ha de ser, desde el punto de vista espanol, el que hemos llamado
mTs ardba « delito militar propio ». es decir, aquel que solo puede ser come-
(1) Conformeal art. 1» de la Ley de 4 diciembre de 1855, « el territorio espaftol
es un I^fo mviolable para todos los extranjeros y sus propiedades... ».
hl
108
Joaquiii UERNANDEZ OROZCO
tido por militares. Mas adelante veremos otros aspectos de esta prohibi-
ciön legal.
2. i Ha cGuduido su jmis acuerdos internavionales que derogucn esia
prohihiciön ?
Anticipemos que, conforme a la propia Ley espafiola de extradiciön de
1958 (articulo l""), las condiciones de la extradiciön pasiva se han de regir
en primer lugar por lo convenido en los tratados internacionales, rigiendo
la Ley cuando no exista tratado con el pais en cuestion o para suplir lo
no previsto en el. En su art. 2^ la Ley de 1958 dispone que « los Tratados de
extradiciön que se concierten en el futuro se ajustaran en lo posible a las
prescripciones de la propia Ley », con lo que dicho queda que en futuros
tratados Espana tendrä que someterse a la prohibicion del art. 6° antes ci-
tado que excluye la extradiciön por los delitos puramente militares.
Actualmente, Espana tiene suscritos tratados internacionales bi-
laterales de extradiciön con treinta y cinco paises principales, todos ellos
anteriores a la Ley de 1958. Por norma general, en estos convenios se sigue,
en cuanto a los delitos objeto de extradiciön, el sistema de enumeraciön
expresa de aquellos en que se permite. La exclusion en estas enumeraciones
de los delitos militares es universal en todos estos tratados, con raras excep-
ciones (2).
Como excepcion a esta regia general cabe senalar el caso del Convenio
con Portugal (Notas de 10 y 12 de mayo de 1884 que interpretan el Convenio
de 25 de junio de 1867), que permite la extradiciön por el delito de deser-
cion ; en efecto, el art. 6" del Convenio con Portugal dispone que « los deser-
tores de los Cuerpos del Ejercito y de la Armada de Espana y Portugal,
serän reciprocamente entregados, siempre que uno de los dos Gobiernos
entable ante el otro, por la via diplomätica, la reclamaciön competente,
acompaiiada de la copia de la sentencia del Consejo de Guerra. Las dispo-
siciones del presente articulo son aplicables exclusivamente a los sübditos
de la naciön reclamante ». Precepto que se aclarö en Nota citada de 12 de
mayo de 1884 en el sentido de que debe entenderse de modo que «la
entrega de desertores espanoles deberä ser concedida en Portugal con
solo la presentaciön del auto de prisiön... comprometiendose por su parte
el Gobierno espanol a ordenar la entrega de los desertores del Ejercito
portugues... mediante presentaciön de copia autentica del auto del
cuerpo del delito ».
Por otra parte, se autoriza, con restricciones, la extradiciön del deser-
tor en los Convenios suscritos con Mejico (17 de noviembre de 1881),
Guatemala (7 de noviembre de 1895 y 23 de febrero de 1897), El Salvador
(22 de noviembre de 1884) y Colomhia (23 de julio de 1892), en supuestos
especiales que expondremos en el apartado siguiente.
RAPPORT ESPAGNOL
169
AI margen de la extradiciön propiamente dicha, existen otros Con-
venios en que se autoriza una especie de auxilio administrativ o respecto de
aquellos individuos que mediante su fuga se han sustraido al servicio mili-
tar obligatorio. Asi, en los acuerdos de Gibraltar (21 de abril de 1838) y
Gran Bretana e Irlanda (27 de diciembre de 1859) (3), o el mismo citado
de Portugal (4). Y lo mismo cabria decir respecto de la entrega de ma-
rinos desertores, que se halla regulada muchas veces en tratados de comer-
cio, navegaciön y consulares (5), estipuländose el arresto de los marines
extranjeros desertores de buques mercantes (e incluso de guerra) y su
devoluciön al buque o bien a su pais de origen, a peticiön de los agentes
consulares. La deserciön de marineres y la reclamaciön en esta via de
auxilio administrativ 0 se preve incluso en alguno de los Convenios de extra-
diciön concertados por Espana ; en los Convenios ya citados con Guatemala
(art. 16), El Salvador (art. 18), Mejico (art. 13), y Colombia (art. 16), se esti-
pula la simple entrega de los desertores de la Marina de Guerra o mer-
cante, a cuyo efecto « los Cönsules generales, consules, vicecönsules o agen-
tes consulares podrän reclamar el auxilio de las Autoridades locales para
buscar, aprehender y arrestar a los desertores de buques de guerra o mer-
cante de su pais», para lo cual « se dirigiran por escrito a las Autoridades
locales competentes y probarän, con la exhibiciön de los registros de los
buques, de la tripulaciön u otros documentos oficiales, que los individuos
reclamados formaban parte de la misma ; justificada asi la demanda,
se accederä a su entrega a menos de probarse lo contrario, o que al tiempo
de SU inscripciön en el rol eran sübditos o ciudadanos del pais en el cual
se pide la extradiciön... »
3. /. Que solucion se adopta en el caso de delitos complejos, en los que las
infracciones de derecho comün aparecen indisoluhlemente unidas
a infracciones inilitares ?
Se habrä de estar en todo caso a lo dispuesto en cada Convenio de
extradiciön. De los suscritos por Espana, por ejemplo, tan solo en cuatro de
ellos se recogen normas especificas en cuanto a la concurrencia de un
delito comün y el militar de deserciön. Nos referimos a los ya citados
Tratados con Guatemala (art. 16), El Salvador (articulo 18), Mejico (art.
13) y Colomhia (art. 16), que si bien disponen que « el delito de sim-
ple deserciön no serä motivo de extradiciön », admiten que esta pueda ser
posible « si el desertor hubiere cometido algün otro delito de los enumera-
dos en este Tratado ».
(3)
(4)
(2) La exclusion de los « delitos de caräcter puramente militar » es expresa en
los Tratados con Bulgaria (17 de julio de 1930). Letonia (8 de marzo de 1930)
y Checoslovaquia (26 de noviembre de 1927), en yus arts. 3".
(5)
Aunque, incluso en este caso limitado, con respecto a Irlanda, indeperidizada
con posterioridad, la cuestion de aplicatoricdad de este Convenio sena dudosa.
« Ademäs de los desertores de los Cuerpos del Ejercito y de la Armada de
Espana y Portugal, serän entregados reciprocamente los profugos del aiisia-
miento militar de los dos paises. Las rcclamaciones dv que trata este articulo se
harän por las Autoridades superiores de las provincias, y vendran siempre
acompanadas de los documentos comprobantes de la identidad, sorteo y
evasiön de los profuses» (Portu^^al, art, 2« adicional de los convenidos en
27 de mayo de 1868). . . «^x .ii • / * 1Ä^
Asi ocurre en los tratados consulares con Francia (art. 25), Alemania (art. 16),
Italia (art. 22). Portugal (art. 23), Belgica (art. 12). Estados Unidos (art. 24).
A
\'i
/
170
Joaquin HERNANDEZ OROZCO
El criterio a seguir habrä de derivarse por analogia con las reglas
expresas establecidas, por ejemplo, en los Tratados para el caso de con-
curso de delito comün y delito politico.
En terminos muy generales, cabe decir :
Si la Ley espanola de extradiciön de 1958 excluye en principio los
delitos de naturaleza «puramente militar» (art.6", nümero 3"), habra
que entender que esta categoria no comprende aquellos hechos Que con
arreglo a la ley penal espanola serian constitutivos de un delito militar
« impropio », es decir, de los que pueden ser cometidos por quienes no son
militares Y esto parece aplicable incluso cuando los hechos imputados
al extranjero refugiado en Espana sean calificados de delito militar pero
de aquellos cuyo nücleo central es de derecho comün (atentado a las perso-
nas o propiedades, por ejemplo), aunque por razones de especialidad y otras
se haya Uevado la figura delictiva a la ley penal militar.
En el supuesto de concurso real de delitos, cuando el inculpado haya
cometido dos o mas infracciones independientes y una o varias de ellas
sean «puramente militares», no existiria inconveniente en conceder la
extradiciön por las infracciones comunes, condicionada a que el reo no
fuese perseguido ni enjuiciado por las especificamente militares, pues
no se puede perder de vista que, en definitiva, la concesion de extradiciön
es siempre condicionada al cumplimiento de los convenios y sus clausulas
generales La Lev espanola de 1958 establece como condiciones genericas
(art 7°) • P. Commutaciön de la pena capital, en su caso ; 2^ Promesa
formal del Estado requirente de que el sujeto no serd perseguido por in-
fracciones ajenas a la solicitud formulada y dentro de los terminos de
SU concesion ; 3". Que la persona que se entrega no sea juzgada por un iri-
bunal de excepcion, salvo consentimiento expreso.
Por ultimo, cabe anadir que siempre serän las autoridades espanolas
competentes las que apreciaran libremente (dentro de los tranaites de pro-
cedimiento que veremos en el apartado siguiente) el caracter de la infrac-
cion imputada en el requerimiento de extradiciön, por lo que enel su-
puesto de delito militar impropio o delito complejo (militar y comun) se
habrä de decidir siempre sobre el caso concreto planteado, teniendo en
cueiJa no solo la natSraleza de los hechos sino tambien circunstancia
tales como la perversidad desplegada en su perpetracion, peligrosidad
del sujeto, etc.
4 iCudl es la autoridad covipetente para determinar si una peticiun
de extradiciön por delito comün no es en realidad mas que una ma-
nera encuhierta de eludir la prohihiciön de extradiciön por dehto
mmtar'^ cEs la misma autoridad (judicial, por ejemplo) la que toma
tamhien la decisiön de rehusar la peticion del Estado requirente o de
satisfacerla ?
RAPPORT ESPAGNÜL
171
Creemos que la primera parte de esta pregunta plantea une cuestiön
que dificilmente se darä en la practica, puesto que el analisis del requeri-
miento de extradiciön siempre sera suficientemente profundo para que
toda posibilidad de extradiciön por titulo ficticio de imputaciön se des-
vanezca, sobre todo por cuanto se habra de atender principalmente a los
hechos cometidos y no a la calificaciön juridica que a ellos otorgue el
Estado requirente.
El procedimiento para la extradiciön pasiva, y por consiguiente, las
autoridades, competentes en todo caso para decidir sobre la oportunidad o
no de acceder a cualquier demanda de extradiciön que formule un Estado
extranjero, queda expuesto resumidamente con la transcripciön de los si-
guientes preceptos de la Ley espanola de 1958 :
Art. 10. «La solicitud de extradiciön se formularä por via diploma-
cica, debiendo acompanarse : P. La sentencia condenatoria o el auto de
procesamiento o de prision o resoluciön anäloga segün la legislaciön del
pais requirente. Estos documentos podrän ser remitidos en original o en co-
pia autentica, y deberän contener relaciön de los hechos imputados a la
persona cuya extradiciön se solicite, con expresiön del lugar y fecha en que
fueron realizados. 2°. Cuantos datos sean conocidos sobre la identidad
y nacionalidad del sujeto reclamado, y, a ser posible, la fotografia y huellas
dactilares. 3° Copia de los textos legales aplicables al hecho o hechos
motivadores de la solicitud de extradiciön, con indicaciön de la pena
mäxima y minima que a los mismos pudiera corresponder ».
Art. 12. «El Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores transmitirä la solici-
tud de extradiciön y documentaciön adjunta al de Justicia, quien exa-
minarä aquellas y reclamarä, si lo estimase oportuno y por conducto del
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, los justificantes o aclaraciones
que considere necesarios. El Ministerio de Justicia, en un plazo mäximo
de ocho dias, computados desde el siguiente a la recepciön de la solicitud
o de los justificantes o aclaraciones por el reclamados, elevarä al Gobier-
no propuesta motivada sobre si ha lugar o no a continuar el procedimiento.
Cuando el acuerdo del Gobierno fuere denegatorio, el Ministerio de Asun-
tos Exteriores lo pondrä en conocimiento del Estado requirente. Si el
Gobierno acordase haber lugar a continuar el procedimiento o las especia-
les circunstancias del caso asi lo aconsejasen, el Ministerio de Justicia ofi-
ciarä a la Direcciön General de Seguridad, sin perjuicio de hacerlo
al Ministerio de la Gobernaciön, para que, en el primer caso, proceda a la
detenciön de la persona reclamada, y en el segundo adopte las pertinentes
medidas de vigilancia, entre tanto el Gobierno decida...».
Art. 15. « Cuando, conforme a lo dispuesto en los articulos anteriores,
continüe su curso el procedimiento de extradiciön y se hubiere practicado
la detenciön, las autoridades gubernativas redactarän el oportuno atestado,
y en el plazo de veinticuatro horas siguientes pondrän al detenido, con los
objetos y papeles que le hubieren sido ocupados, a disposiciön del Juez
de Instrucciön competente en el territorio donde el arresto hubiere tenido
lugar, quien lo participarä a los Ministerios de Asuntos Exteriores y de
Justicia ».
ii
r
\
172
Joaquin HERNANDEZ ÜROZCO
Art 16. «El Juez a cuya disposiciön hubiere sido puesto el detemdo
acordarä la inmediala comparecencia de este, quien podrä hacerlo asistido
de Abogado y, en su caso, de interprete. Se citarä siempre al Mmisterio
Fiscal Verificada la identificaciön del detenido, el Juez le invitara a que
manifieste, con expresiön de sus razones, si consiente en la extradicion o
intenta oponerse a ella ; y en auto motivado, que habrä de dictar antes de
las setenta y dos horas de la detenciön, adoptarä la resolucion que proceda,
bien ordenando la libertad del detenido o bien elevando la detencion a
prisiön, con o sin fianza, a resultas del procedimiento subsiguiente. Con-
tra este auto solo procederä el recurso de reforma per los tramites de la
Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal. Del auto de libertad, de prision o de
reforma, en su caso, se darä traslado a los Ministerios de Justicia y de
Asuntos Exteriores, que acusarän inmediato recibo ».
Art. 17. «Si la persona reclamada consintiera en su extradicion y no
se suscitasen obstäculos legales que se opongan a ella, el Juez podrä ac- ■
ceder desde luego, a la demanda de extradicion, infurmando a los Minis-
terios de Justicia y de Asuntos Exteriores y al de Gobernacion para que
pueda efectuarse la entrega. Si per el contrario el detenido se opusiera a
la extradicion, el Juez elevarä todo lo actuado al Presidente de la Audien-
cia Provincial correspondiente. Este Tribunal pondrä de mamfiesto
A expediente en Secretaria al Fiscal y al Defensor, por un plazo sucesivc.
de tres dias, pudiendo reclamar, a peticiön de cualquiera de ambos o de
oficio los antecedentes que juzgue convenientes sobre los extremes que
autorlza el articulo 18, sin que contra la resolucion del Tribunal sobre este
extremo quepa recurso alguno. Si el detenido no tuviere Defensor se le
nombrarä de oficio. Dentro de los quince dias siguientes al penodo de
instrucciön, se senalarä la vista, que tendrä lugar con asistencia del Fiscal,
del interesado y de su Defensor. Asi mismo deberä asistir un interprete si
f uera necesario ».
Art 18 « El reclamado prestarä declaraciön durante la vista, pero no
se admitirä ni practicarä prueba alguna sobre los hechos que le sean im-
putados, y si solamente sobre los puntos que hagan relaciön a la condiciones
exigidas por los Tratados o por esta Ley para la concesion de la extradi-
cion ».
Art 19 « El Tribunal resolverä en auto motivado y en el plazo impro-
rrogable de tres dias siguientes a la vista sobre la procedencia de la ex-
tradicion, y al propio tiempo, sobre si ha lugar a la entrega al Estado re-
quirente de los valores, objetos o dinero que hubiere sido ocupado al recla-
mado. Contra este auto no se darä recurso alguno, y si fuere denegatono
de la extradicion se pondrä en libertad al inculpado ».
Art 20 «El Juez o Tribunal que hubiere dictado auto accediendo
a la extradicion, o denegändola, librarä sin dilaciön testimonio del mismo
a los Ministerios de la Gobernacion y de Justicia, y este ultimo lo comu-
nicarä al de Asuntos Exteriores para su notificaciön al representante di-
plomätico del pais que formulö la demanda de extradicion. . . ».
RAPPORT E;.>PAGiN'OL
173
5. iCuäl ha sido, de hevho, el nümero de requerimientos de extradicion
recibidos de Estados extranjeros en el curso de los diez Ultimos
anos 'Uy el nüwero de casos en que se concediö ? i Por que infracciones
viilitares ?
Resulta piäcticamente impcsible responder con precisiön a esta cues-
tion, por el hecho de que no conocemos publicaciön alguna que recoja
sistemäticamente datos estadisticos al respecto : por otra parte, no hemos
dispuesto del tiempo que hubiera sido necesario invertir en una mvesti-
gaciön directa, por ejemplo, de los archivos del Ministerio de Asuntos Exte-
riores 0 del Ministerio de Justicia.
6. <: Estiman Vds. que una derogaciön convencional (o legislativa) coo-
vendria a la prohibiciön general de extradicion por delitos militares ?
i. Para que delitos ij en que jorma ? <: Se vresenta el problewa de ma-
nera mas acuciante en el caso de fuerzas armadas integradas ?
Admitida la posobilidad de la extradicion en los delitos militares
« impropios » e incluso en ciertos supuestos de delitos mixtos o complejos,
queda la prohibiciön universalmente establecida para los delitos «pura-
mente militares ».
Desde un punto de vista exclusivamente teorico esta förmula resulta,
sin embargo, excesivamente rigida. Su razön de ser se ha quendo ver en la
ausencia de malicia de los sujetos activos de estas infracciones o en su
falta de peligrosidad en el Estado de asilo o en la conveniencia de atraer
Je esta manera a los desertores de Estados extranjeros para engrosar las
fuerzas armadas propias (caso de la Legion Extranjera, por ejemplo. etc.),
pero creemos que estas razones hoy no son igualniente validas que
hace cincuenta anos. Por eso, parece que la prohibiciön tajante exigiria
una flexibilizaciön mäs en consonancia con la situaciön actual de la cc.mu-
nidad internacional, en que el estado de perpetua suspicacia entre las na-
ciones ha dado paso a estrechas alianzas a escala regional y mundial que
exigen un reforzamiento de la confianza mutua. Teniendo en cuenta,
ademäs, que muchos de estos delitos « puramente militares » imp lican un
ataque a bienes juridicos dignos tambien de proteccion en el orden
internacional.
Ahora bien : creemos tambien que toda iniciativa que pretenda dul-
cif icar la prohibiciön hoy imperante para los delitos « puramente militares »
debe contar antes, si no quiere quedar al margen de la realidad con una
previa labor de unificaciön de las leyes penales militares de los Estados,
lo que permitiria, una vez alcanzada esa unificaciön, intentar mult.late-
ralmente (a traves, por ejemplo, de Convenios tipo) la concrecion de as
infracciones militares susceptibles o no de extradicion. enumerandolas
nominativamente. Mientras esa unificaciön no se consiga. parece utop.^
CO pretender modificar el sistema imperante que, al menos, cuenta ya con
una dilatada practica de aplicaciön sin graves inconvenientes.
(1
174
Joaquin HERNANDEZ OROZCO
^S
B. La entrega de militares por procedimiento distinto a la extradiciön
1. 0 Existe una practica de entrega de militares extranjeros estacionados
en territorio de Vds. cuando su acuartelamiento estä situado sohre
ese mismo territorio ?
Para nosotros, esta cuestiön queda reducida exclusivamente al ünico
caso de estacionamiento en territorio espanol de fuerzas extranjeras :
como consecuencia de los Convenios para la mutua defensa y ayuda eco-
nömica hispano-norteamericanos de 26 de septiembre de 1953 (renovados,
con alguna modificaciön, en 1963 y actualmente vigentes), se da la presencia
en territorio espanol de miembros de las fuerzas armadas de los Estados
Unidos de America y personal de ellas dependiente, tanto en las Bases mili-
tares conjuntas como en los organismos directivos y de asesoramiento crea-
dos de acuerdo con tales Convenios bilaterales (como son, por ejemplo,
el JUSMG, Joint United States Military Group, o el MAAG, Military
Advisory Assistance Group).
Entre los Convenios de 1953 se suscribiö el oportuno Acuerdo sohre
las normas jurisdiccionales que en materia criminal habrian de regir el
estatuto personal de esas fuerzas extranjeras estacionadas en nuestro
territorio, creandose a continuaciön por Decreto-Ley de 23 de diciembre
de 1954 para dar cumplimiento a tales normas, una Comision Mixta de
Compeiencias de composiciön civil y militar (6), que funciona en Ma-
drid (7) y cuyo cometido es el de « proveer con la mäxima rapidez posible,
y conforme a los preceptos del correspondiente Acuerdo y normas que
ulteriormente se convengan, a la resolucion de las cuestiones de juris-
dicciön competencia y de atribuciones que puedan suscitarse o se hayan
suscitado ya en los procedimientos criminales de cualquier orden y fuero,
dentro del territorio nacional y plazas de soberania, cuando alguno de los
presuntos responsables fuere miembro de las Fuerzas de los Estados Uni-
dos, incluso los que dependan de ellas» (art. 2^' del Decreto-Ley citado).
Estando claramente reguladas todas las posibilidades de conflicto ju-
risdiccional, entre ellas se ha previsto el supuesto del militar americano
que cometa en territorio espanol en que estuviere destinado un delito pu-
ramente militar (8), en cuyo caso, atribuida la competencia para juzgarlo
a los Tribunales americanos, previo requerimiento de la autoridad ame-
ricana se pone a su disposiciön el inculpado, procediendose efecti-
(6) La intcgran, conforme a la Orden de la Presidencia del Gobierno de 17 de
febrero de 1955. por parte espanola, un Magistrado del Tribunal Supremo de
Justicia un funcionario de la Carrera Fiscal y tres Auditores pertenecientes
a cada uno de los Cuerpos Juridicos de los Ejercitos de Tierra. Mar y Aire.
(7) Posteriormente. por Orden de la Presidencia del Gobierno de 1" de agosto de
1958 se conslituyo con sede cn Cadiz una Suhcomisxon dependiente de la
Comision de Madrid para facilitar la resolucion de los incidentes de tipo
jurisdiccional que pudieran plantearse en la Base Naval Conjunta de Rota
(Cädiz) ; sus atribuciones se determinaron mäs precisamente por Orden de la
Presidencia de 8 de julio de 1959.
(8) Castigado como tal en el Vnited States Uniform Code of Military Justice 1950.
RAPPORT ESPAGNOL
175
vamente a su entrega si el acusado pretendio eludir sus responsabilidades
saliendo de sus cuarteles propios. Esta norma, quede bien claro, no consti-
tuye una simple « practica » , sino que tiene una base legal derivada de
los oportunos Acuerdos de Procedimiento entre ambas potencias.
2. /. Existe una practica similar para los militares del pais de Vds. estacio-
nados en el extranjero?
No existen hoy fuerzas armadas espaiiolas estacionadas en ningün
pais extranjero, por consiguients, NO cabe tampoco hablar de practica
alguna como la que cita la cuestiön propuesta.
3. <: Existe una practica de «puesta en jronteray) para los militares ex-
tranjeros que hayan comedito su delito en su propio pais y que hayan
huido para buscar refugio en el de Vds. o que por el pasen para buscar
refugio en un tercer pais?
Aparte de cuanto se dijo antes (apartado A, P) respecto a marinos
desertores y otros casos de auxilio administrativo entre Portugal y Espana
con respecto a los profugos del servicio militar, hay que responder aqui que
NO conocemos ninguna practica de apuesta en frontera)) especijica-
mente aplicable a los militares extranjeros que habiendo delmquido en su
pais de origen intenten buscar refugio en territorio espanol.
Claro estä que a estos delincuentes militares les serä aplicable el re-
gimen general espanol en cuanto a extranjeros, es decir, las medidas de
seguridad y sanciones a que hubiere lugar segün su actuacion pero com-
pletamente al margen de su condiciön militar y delito cometido. Asi, por
ejemplo :
a) Aquellas medidas de seguridad que autoriza la Ley de 4 de agosto
de 1933 (Ilamada de « vagos y maleantes»), conforme a la cual (art. 2",
nümero 9") « podrän ser declarados en estado peligroso y sometidos a las
medidas de seguridad de la presente Ley... los extranjeros que quebran-
taren una orden de expulsiön del territorio nacional », asi como los que « de
cualquier manera perturben con su conducta o pusieren en peligro la
paz social o la tranquilidad publica» (art. 2«. nümero 11), estableciendo
la propia Ley (art. 4^\ 4a) entre las medidas de seguridad en cuestiön la
« expulsiön de extranjeros del territorio nacional ». Estas medidas de se-
guridad, que se aplican judicialmente por los Tribunales ordinarios es claro
que se podrian imponer llegado el caso al militar extranjero que fuese de-
clarado peligroso, pero su expulsiön del territorio nacional no implicana
necesariamente su entrega a las autoridades del pais de origen, pues su-
pone solo la salida de Espana, pudiendo autorizarse al extranjero a elegir
frontera.
Si el extranjero peligroso no cumple la orden de expulsiön, « serä in-
temado en un Establecimiento de custodia por un ano » (art. 6^ nümero 9«).
.ti
1
I
176
Joaquin HERNANDEZ OROZCO
b) Le serän de aplicaciön como tal extranjero las sanciones establecidas
por Ley de 22 de diciembre de 1949 para represion de la entrada clandestina
en territorio espanol, lo que podria motivar igualmente y en el caso com-
prendido en el articulo 2'* (presentacion a las autoridades espanolas inme-
diatamente de su entrada clandestina para justificar los motivos de haber-
la efectuado sin cumplir los requisitos legales exigidos por las disposiciones
vigentes sobre pasaportes), la adopciön, como medida de seguridad, de su
expulsiön del territorio nacional.
177
Rapport amerlcain
EXTRADITION FOR
MILITARY OFFENSES
4. Estadisticas ccmparadas sobre estos tres pu7itos, si ello es posihle.
Las respuestas en su mayor parte negativas que hemos dado a las
cuestiones precedentes, determinan consecuentemente la imposibilidad de
establecer ninguna valoraciön estadistica, ya que tales präcticas o no
existen o no resulta posible ningün computo nümerico por ausencia de datos.
by
Robert M. WILLIAMS
Brigadier General
United States Army
A. The properly so-called Extradition
1. 7s the rejusal oj extradition jor militarij ofjenses sanctioned by
law ? Bij which one ?
United States law does not prohibit extradition for military offenses.
United States law requires, however, that extradition be based upon and
be in accord with an extradition treaty. There can be no extradition for
military offenses unless they are specifically included in the applicable
treaty.
2. Has your country concluded Conventions which are affecting this
Prohibition ? If the answer is in the affirmative, please State these Conven-
tions and the contracting parties.
On 1 january 1965, the United States was a party to extradition treaties,
both bilateral and multilateral, with 77 nations. None of them authorize
extradition for military offenses. Only 2 treaties specifically treat the
Problem and both prohibit extradition for «purely military» offenses.
They are :
a) Extradition Convention between the United States of America
and other American Republics, signed 26 December 1933, entered
into force for the United States on 25 January 1935. The other
contracting parties are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nica-
ragua and Panama.
b) Convention on Extradition between the United States and Sweden,
signed 24 October 1961. entered into force 3 December 1963.
178
Robert M. WILLIAMS
RAPPORT AMERICAIN
179
/
3. Which Position has beert taken in case of complex offenses where
the infractions of the common law are indivisibly connected with military
infractions ?
From informalion available here, the problem has not arisen and con-
sequcntly no position has been taken by the United States. Extradition
would only be autorized for offenses enumerated in extradition treaties.
4. Which is the covipetent authority to determine whether a request
for extradition for an offense under the general law is not, in reality, a
veiled manner to evade the prohihition of the extradition for military
offenses? Is this the same authority (legal, for instance) who also mäkes
the decisions as to whether the request of a State he denied or granted ?
In a case arising under the two treaties set out above a question could
arise as to the validity of the request, if the individual concerned is sub-
ject to military Jurisdiction in the requesting state. Persuant to United
States law, the courts must determine that the evidence is sufficient to
sustain a request for extradition under the applicable treaty. If the courts
determine that the evidence is sufficient, the Secretary of State, in his
discretion, may order the individual delivered to the foreign government.
Either the courts or the Secretary of State could deny a requested extra-
dition on the basis that the offense was not listed as extraditable or was
specifically excluded in tho applicable treaty. When, howevcr, the possi-
bility exists that the individual concerned could be tried for a military
offense, as well as for offenses which are properly extraditable, the final
decision of the validity of the request will be made by the Secretary of
State. Therefore, the Secretary of State is the authority which determines
the validity of a request and he also decides, in conjunction with the
courts, whether the request will be granted.
As previously stated, there is no statutory prohibition in the United
States regarding extradition for military offenses. Accordingly the sugges-
ted conventional or legislative derogation would have little effect within
the United States.
B. Delivery of military individuals by other means than Extradition
1. Is there a practice to deliver foreign military individuals who are
stationed on your territory if their harracks are located on the same terri-
tory as yours ?
Information on current practice in the United States when forces of
non-NATO countries are involved is not available. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement Article VII, para 5 (a),
requires the United States to assist in the apprehension and delivery of
individuals belonging to the forces of a NATO signatory who were sta-
tioned in the United States prior to commission of the offense.
2. Is there a similar practice which applies to military individuals of
your country who are stationed in a foreign country ?
United States personnel who are absent without leave in the country
in which they are stationed have been delivered upon special request to
United States military authorities. Within countries where the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement applies, police
authorities are obliged to assist in the apprehension and delivery of
United States personnel who have committed military offenses and who
have been stationed in that country, prior to commission of the offense
'(NATO SOFA, Art. VII, para 5 (a)).
5. Which, in fact, was the numher of extraditions requested hy a
foreign state within the last 10 years ? The numher of requests complied
with ? For which military offenses ?
Information concerning the number of extradition requests, Qr the
offenses for which extradition was requested, received by the United States
is not available here.
3. Does the practice exist to deliver foreign military individuals at
the horder who have committed their offense in their own country, and
who escaped, in order to seek refuge in your country, or who transit to
your country, in order to seek refuge in a third country ?
There is no Information concerning such a current practice in the
United States.
6. Do you helieve that a conventional (or legislative) derogation
should he hrought to the general prohihition of the extradition for military
offenses? For which offenses, and under which form? Is the problem
more urgent in the case of integrated forms ?
4. If possihle, give comparing statistics concerning these three points.
Statistics concerning these three points are not available.
.
1' I
181
Rapport francais
^EXTRADITION POUR
DEUTS MILITAIRES
Rapport stabil sous la direction de
Jean MILLIOT
Magistrat General
(France)
L'extradition etant en France une decision du Gouvernement prise
sur rapport du Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice, apres avis s'il y a
lieu d'une juridiction de droit commun, les reponses aux questions po-
sees ont ete traitees apres consultation du departement de la justice.
A. L'extradition proprement dite
En France, de meme qu'en matiere politique, il n'existe pas de possi-
bilite d'extradition en ce qui concerne les auteurs d'infractions militaires.
1. Le refus de Vextradition pour delits inilitaires esUil consacre par
un texte de loi ? Lequel ?
Le refus de l'extradition pour delits militaires est consacre par les
dispositions de l'article 4 de la loi du 10 mars 1927 relative ä l'extradition
des etrangers. Ce texte est ainsi congu :
« Les f aits qui peuvent donner lieu ä rextradition, quHl s'agisse de la
» demander ou de Taccorder sont les suivants :
» P) Tous les faits punis de peines criminelles par la loi de TEtat re-
/> querant ;
» 2'^) Les faits punis de peines correctionnelles par la loi de TEtat re-
» querant, quand le maximum de la peine encourue, aux termes de cette
» loi est de deux ans ou au-dessus, ou, s'il s'agit d'un condamne, quand la
»peine prononcee par la juridiction de l'Etat requerant est egale ou
» superieure ä deux mois d'emprisonnement.
»En aucun cas l'extradition n'est accordee par le Gouvernement
» frangais si le fait n'est pas puni par la loi frangaise d'une peine crimi-
» nelle ou correctionnelle.
RAPPORT FRANgAIS
183
182
Jean MILLIÜT
h
» Les faits constitutifs de tentative ou de complicite sont soumis aux
» regles precedentes ä condition qu'ils soient punissables d'apres la loi de
» l'Etat requerant et d'apres cclle del 'Etat requis.
» Si la demande a pour objet plusieurs infractions commises par l'in-
» dividu reclame et qui n'ont pas encore ete jugees, Textradition n'est
»accordees que si le maximum de la peine encourue,, d'apres la loi de
» l'Etat requerant, pour l'ensemble de ces infractions, est egale ou supe-
» rieure ä deux ans d'emprisonnement.
» Si l'individu reclame a ete anterieurement l'objet, en quelque pays
»que ce soit, d'une condamnation definitive ä deux mois d'emprisonne-
»ment ou plus, pour un delit de droit commun, l'extradition est accodee,
» suivant les regles precedentes, c'cst-ä-dire seulement pour les crimes ou
» delits. mais sans egard au taux de la peine encourue ou prononcee pour
» la derniere infraction. •-
» Les dispositions precedentes s'appliquent aux infractions commises
» par des militaires, marins ou assimiles lorsqu'elles sont punies par la loi
» frangaises comme infractions de droit commun.
» 11 n'est pas innove, quant ä la pratique relative ä la remise des ma-
» rins deserteurs ».
La Prohibition de l'extradition pour les infractions militaires resulte,
a contrario, des prescriptions du penultieme alinea de l'article 4 cite : ce
texte limite, en effet, l'extradition de militaires, marins ou assimiles aux
infractions de droit commun ; il adopte en outre, conformement aux regles
de la logique, le critere de la loi frangaise.
Une exception est specifiee par la loi du 10 mars 1927 : la remise des
marins deserteurs. Bien que son etude soit plus en rapport avec le cha-
pitre B («remise de militaires par d'autres moyens que l'extradition»).
il est opportun d'en preciser la notion des ä present, du moins en ce que
la pratique en cause trouve son origine dans les dispositions legales : 1 or-
donnance du roi sur les fonctions des consuls dans leurs rapports avec la
marine militaire, faite ä Paris le 7 novembre 1833, et celle sur les fonctions
des consuls dans leurs rapports avec la marine commerciale, en date du
29 octobre 1833.
Ce dernier texte, qui concerne surtout les marins du commerce, eta-
blit ä leur egard des regles analogues ä celles prevues par l'ordonnance
du 7 novembre 1833, qui a seule sa place dans la presente etude et dont
l'article 15 stipule :
« Si des hommes desertent des bätiments de guerre, le consul sur la
» denonciation qui lui en sera faite dans les formes prescrites par les lois
» et reglements, interviendra aupres de l'autorite locale pour qu ils puissent
» etre poursuivis ou arretes.
»En cas d'arrestation, la prime sera immediatement payee aux cap-
» teurs, s'ils la reclament, par les soins du consul.
»Le deserteur sera reconduit ä son bord, si le bätiment auquel il
» appartient n'a pas repris la mer. Si ce bätiment est parti et qu'il y ait
» sur rade d'autres bätiments de guerre, le deserteur sera mis ä la dispo-
» sition de l'officier commandant en chef. A defaut de bätiment de guerre,
» le consul renverra le deserteur en France sur un navire de commerce,
» avec ordre ecrit au capitaine de le remettre en arrivant ä la disposition
»de l'administration de la marine, et il en rendra compte au ministre.
» Les frais de passage seront regles dans ce cas comme il est dit aux
» article 36 et 37 de notre ordonnance du 29 octobre dernier ».
La pratique visee au dernier alinea de l'article 4 de la loi du 10 mars
1927 concerne evidemment aussi la « reciproque » des dispositions de
l'article 15 de l'ordonnance du 7 novembre 1833, en matiere de desertion
de marins appartenant ä des bätiments de guerre etrangers qui relächent
dans des ports frangais.
Cette pratique concerne seulement les marins qui appartiennent ä
l'equipage et qui desertent le bord. Elle n'est pas applicable aux marins
qui se trouvent sur le navire comme passagers.
S'agissant, en definitive, d'une remise, des indications complemen-
taires seront donnees au chapitre B.
2. Votre pays a-Ul conclu des Conventions derogeant ä cette Prohibi-
tion ? En cas de reponse positive, priere de preciser ces Conventions
et les parties contractantes.
La loi du 10 mars 1927 indique dans son article 1er :
«En l'absence de traite, les conditions, la procedure et les effets de
» l'extradition sont determines par les dispositions de la presente loi.
>
» La presente loi s'applique egalement aux points qui n'auraient pas
» ete reglementes par les traites ».
La faculte de deroger aux regles fixees par la loi du 10 mars 1927
resulte donc formellement des dispositions memes de ce texte ; eile est
au surplus stipulee par l'article 55 de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958
qui precise : « Les traites ou accords regulierement ratifies ou approuves
ont, des leur publication, une autorite superieure ä celle des lois, sous
reserve, pour chaque accord ou traite, de son application par l'autre partie ».
Toutefois aucune Convention ne deroge expressement ä la Prohibi-
tion de l'extradition (proprement dite) pour les infractions militaires; en
revanche de nombreuses Conventions autorisent et plus souvent rendent
obligatoires des actions d'assistance, en matiere de police judiciaire mih-
taire ce qui entraine la remise administrative ä leurs superieurs des
militaires, marins ou assimiles coupables d'infractions militaires. Ces
Conventions seront precisees au chapitre B.
J
184
Jean MlLLIüT
RAPPORT FRANCAIS
185
h
II y a lieu cependani de preciser que des Conventions recentes d'extra-
dition (avec la Republique federale d'AUemagne, en date du 29 novem-
bre 1951, article 5: avec l'Empire cherifien du 5 octobre 1957, article 31)
contiennent une disposition precisant que l'extradition pourra ne pas
etre accordee si l'infraction pour laquelle eile est requise consiste uni-
quement dans une violation d'obligations militaires ; cette disposition
qui vise, semble-t-il, plus specialement l'insoumission, ne prohibe donc
pas totalement Fextradition, bien qu'elle Oriente plutöt la pratique dans
le sens d'un refus de l'extradition.
L'article 48 de la Convention d'extradition franco-camerounaise du
13 novembre 1960 contient une disposition analogue ; il est ainsi congu :
« Uextradition pourra ne pas etre accordee si l'infraction pour la-
» quelle eile est demandee consiste uniquement dans la violation d'obli-
» gations militaires et n'est pas punie de peine criminelle ».
Du point de vue frangais, compte tenu de ce que l'insoumission
n'est Jamals punie d'une peine principale criminelle par la legislation
penale militaire frangaise, et qu'il est peu probable que les redacteurs
de la Convention aient pris en consideration Tapplication exceptionnelle
de la peine complementaire de la confiscation, prevue au cas de refuge
de l'insoumis ä l'etranger en temps de guerre (encore qu'alors la confis-
cation piut ne pas etre qualifiee de peine criminelle), il apparait que les
redacteurs de ce texte ont envisage, outre l'insoumission, d'autres in-
fractions militaires, par exemple la desertion, au sujet de laquelle l'extra-
dition proprement dite ne serait donc plus entierement prohibee.
3. Quelle Position est prise en cas de delits complexes, dans lequels des
infractions de droit commun sont indivisiblement liees ä des infrac-
tions militaires ?
La loi du 10 mars 1927 precise dans son article 7 :
« Sous reserve des exceptions prevues ci-apres, l'extradition n'est accor-
»dee qu'ä la condition que l'individu extrade ne sera ni poursuivi, ni
» puni pour une infraction autre que celle ayant motive Textradition ».
Si un militaire etranger fait l'objet d'une demande d'extradition des.
chefs de meurtre, de vol et de desertion (par exemple parce qu'il a
tue le conducteur d'un vehicule pour s'en emparer et deserter), cctte de-
mande ne sera susceptible d'etre agreee par la France qu'en ce qui con-
cerne le meurtre et le vol : l'interesse, s'il est extrade, ne pourra donc
etre juge du chef de desertion. C'est l'application du principe de la spe-
cialite de l'extradition, auquel l'article 26 de la loi du 10 mars 1927 apporte
un temperament en la forme suivante :
«Est considere comme soumis sans reserve ä l'application des lois
» de l'Etat requerant, ä raison d'un fait quelconque anterieur ä l'extra-
» dition et different de l'infraction qui a motive cette mesure, l'individu
» livre qui a eu pendant trente jours ä compter de son elargissement defi-
» nitif la possibilite de quitter le territoire de cet Etat ».
La question posee est en relation directe avec le probleme du critere
juridique determinant les delits militaires par rapport aux delits de droit
commun, dont l'etude a ete faite dans la premiere partie du rapport (Cf.
Les incriminations - domaine des infractions militaires) (1).
En ce qui concerne le delit militaire, c'est-ä-dire prevu par le code
de justice militaire (ou exceptionnellement par une autre loi militaire),
il n'existe pas de difficulte : la qualification penale militaire entraine
refus de l'extradition. II en est ainsi meme pour les delits presentant une
analogie avec des infractions de droit commun, ainsi le detournement
prevu par l'article 416 du code de justice militaire (infractions que cer-
tains ont cherche ä qualifier de delits mixtes).
Lorsqu'une infraction de droit commun, c'est-ä-dire prevue par le
code penal ou une autre loi ordinaire, a ete commise par un militaire. il
est possible de considerer que la Situation est complexe. Mais dans ce
cas, Selon la loi frangaise, il y a lieu a extradition, ce meme si l'infraction
se trouve de la competence d'une juridiction militaire.
La loi penale frangaise constituant le critere auquel il y a lieu de
se referer pour determiner s'il s'agit d'une infraction militaire - ainsi
qu'il resulte du penultieme alinea de l'article 4 de la loi du 10 mars 1927,
comme il a ete specific au paragraphe 1" de la presente etude -, il est
utile de tenter de preciser la Solution adoptee, en examinant pratiquement
une qualification penale, dont l'assise des faits peut en elle-meme presen-
ter un caractere complexe, du fait que, suivant les circonstances de sa
commission ou suivant les consequences entrainees la peine applicable est
prevue soit par le code de justice militaire, soit par le code penal.
L^article 430 du code de justice militaire dispose que: «les voies de
fait envers un superieur ou une autorite qualifiee exercees par un militaire
'ou un individu embarque pendant le service ou ä Toccasion du service,
meme hors du bord, sont punies de la reclusion criminelle ä temps de cinq
ä dix ans ».
Supposons que les voies de fait aient entraine le deces du superieur,
Sans que l'auteur ait ete anime d'une Intention homicide.
II encouit, dans ce cas, la peine de dix ä vingt ans de reclusion crimi-
nelle prevue par le dernier alinea de l'article 309 du code penal frangais.
En effet, l'article 432 du code de justice militaire precise que « si, par
les circonstances dans lesquelles elles ont ete commises ou par leurs
consequences, les violences prevues aux articles 430 et 431 constituent
une infraction plus severement reprimee par le code penal, elles sont
punies des peines que ce code prevoit ».
(1) Recueils de la Soci^te internationale de droit penal militaire et de droit de
la guerre, tome IV, volume 1 p. 293.
t
186
Jean MILLIOT
RAPPORT FRANgAIS
187
f
li
On doit conclure que, dans le cas de voies de fait envers un supe-
rieur ayant entraine la mort de celui-ci sans Tintention de la donner,
l'extradition est susceptible d'etre accordee par la France, alors que si
le deces du superieur ne s'etait pas produit et que la penalite prevue par
l'article 430 du code de justice militaire soit applicable, l'extradition ne
pourrait pas etre envisagee.
En definitive, lorsque des infractions sont indivisiblement liees cntre
clles, l'extradition doit etre obligatoirement refusee ou peut au contraire
etre acceptee, suivant que la peine applicable est, ou non, fixee par la
loi penale militaire.
II est bien evident que les modifications qui interviennent en droit
frangais dans la repartition des qualifications et des peines entre la legis-
lation de droit commun et la loi penale militaire ont automatiquement une
influence sur l'extradition.
C'est ainsi que le code de justice militaire institue par la loi n" 65=-
542 du 8 juillet 1965 ayant integre parmi les infractions militaires le
faux en comptabilite militaire ainsi que son usage (article 414) et le vol
chez rhote (article 417), au lieu de prescrire, comme l'avait fait la loi du
9 mars 1928, qu'ils figurcnt dans le code penal, l'extradition par la France
doit etre presentement consideree comme impossible pour ces qualifica-
tions.
4. Quelle est Vauiorite competente pour determiner si une demande
d'extraditwn pour delit de droit covimun n'est pas en realite une
maniere deguisee de tourner la prohibition de Vextradition pour
delits militaires? Est-ce la meme autorite (judiciaire par exemple)
qui prend aussi la decision de rejuser la demande de VEtat requerant
ou de la satisjaire ?
La demande de l'Etat requerant qui poserait le probleme envisage
par cette question doit etre examinee prealablement par le mmistere
de la justice qui, s'il s'agit manifestement d'un delit militaire, refusera
des l'abord l'extradition.
Si la chancellerie n'estime pas devoir ä priori refuser l'extradition,
l'affaire est soumise ä la chambre d'accusation de la Cour d'appel compe-
tente pour le lieu ou a ete decouverte la personne dont l'extradition est
reclamee.
Cette cour emet un avis favorable ou un avis defavorable ä L'extra-
dition.
Dans le cas d'un avis defavorable, le Gouvernement frangais ne peut
que refuser l'extradition.
Dans le cas d'un avis favorable, le Gouvernement frangais conserve
la faculte de refuser l'extradition ; chaque fois qu'il decide de l'accorder,
la decision revet la forme d'un decret ; il en est de mcme dans le cas
d'une autorisation d'extradition accordee pour certains faits et refusee
pour d'autres ; le refus partiel est alors specific dans le decret.
Le fait qu'il s'agit ou non, d'une demande d'extradition pour delit
de droit commun constituant une maniere deguisee de tourner la prohibi-
tion de l'extradition pour delits militaires est tranche par la meme auto-
rite agissant dans les memes formes que Celles prevues lorsqu'il s'agit
d'accorder ou de refuser la demande de l'Etat requerant.
5. Quel a ete, en fait, le nomhre d'extraditions requises par un Etat
etranger au cours des dix dernieres annees ; le nombre de reqxietes
satisiaites? Pour quelles infractions militaires?
Une statistique en cette matiere n'est pas tenue et s'avere inutile
du point de vue frangais. En effet, a supposcr que des demandes d'extra-
dition aient ete formulees en matiere militaire, elles ont toutes ete re-
jetees, de piano.
6. Estimez-vous qu'une derogation conventionnelle (ou legislative)
devrait etre apportee ä la prohibition generale de Vextradition pour
delits militaires ? Pour quels delits, sous quelle forme ?
Le Probleme se presente-t4l de maniere plus pressante pour le cas
de forces integrees ?
Sans rechercher toutes les raisons qui ont abouti ä la tradition tres
ferme, qui exclut les delits militaires du champ d'application de l'extra-
dition, il est necessaire de rappeler que cette prohibition peut etre no-
tamment justifiee par les arguments suivants :
— la perversite dans la commission des infractions militaires est, en
general, moins grande que celle qui conduit, ä la perpetration des infrac-
tions de droit commun ;
»
— la competence appartient habituellement en matiere d'infractions
militaires ä des juridictions specialisees, auxqueües lopinion accorde
parfois moins facilement credit ;
— le pays de refuge n'est pas interesse par la repression des infractions
militaires, au meme titre qu'il l'est par celle des infractions de droit
commun ; en effet, l'infraction militaire est liee au mamtien de la disci-
pline dans un milieu particulier, en vue d'une mission essentiellement
nationale ; les autres Etats n'ont pas normalement ä apporter une aide a
cette mission; en d'autres termes, les infractions militaires ne sont pas en
rapport avec les regles du droit naturel, ou du droit des gens ; leur re-
pression ne tend pas directement au maintien de l'ordre public mondial ; il
n'en serait autrement qu'ä l'egard des forces armees mondiales ou a voca-
tion mondiale d' Intervention, ce qui pourrait etre considere par certains
comme realise par des forces de l'O.N.U. (sous reserve qu'il ne sagisse
pas de forces nationales mises ä la disposition de cet organisme, mais de
forces statutaires de l'O.N.U.) ;
I.'
RAPPORT FRANgAIS
189
188
Juan MlLLlüT
— le passage d'un militaire dans un pays etranger est d'ordinaire consi-
dere comme lui permettant de pretendre ä un refuge, des lors que seuls
sont mis en cause ses rapports avec les forces armees auxquelles il
appartenait ; encore est-il difficile de determiner si ce dernier point n'est
pas plutot la consequence que la cause de la tradition de refus d'extra-
dition en matiere militaire.
Tüutes ces justifications conservent leur valeur. II est permis tou-
tefois de se demander si, lorsqu'une infraction militaire porte simplement
atteinte aux biens de la collectivite, et ä fortiori lorsqu'elle prejudicie
aux seuls biens d'un particulier, il ne serait pas desirable d'autoriser
l'extradition de son auteur, sous reserve que l'acte soit volontaire et
qu'il n'ait pas ete provoque par des motifs politiques.
II en serait ainsi habituellement du vol chez l'hote.
Une disposition legale modifiant la loi du 10 mars 1927 serait, en
France, süffisante,
Quant ä l'ensemble des infractions militaires, il semble preferable
de maintenir le principe de la non-extradition.
Sans deute ce principe est-il une source de consequences plus graves
au cas de forces integrees ; ä l'egard de telles forces la soluticn parait
devoir etre trouvee, non dans des mesures d'extradition proprement
dites, mais dans des accords autorisant la remisc administrative des
militaires en cause, teile qu'elle se pratique dejä reellement, ainsi qu'il
va etre etudie au chapitre B.
B. La remise de militaires par d'autres moyens que Textradition
Cette remise est normalement effectuee dans le cadre de Conven-
tions entre Etats. Ainsi qu'il a ete indique, precedemment, cette remise
est formellement prevue par l'article 4 de la loi du 10 mars 1927, en ce
qui concerne les marins deserteurs de leur bord, et ä leur egard, eile
trouve son origine dans les ordonnances royales de 1833 (voir chapitre A
paragraphe P).
Mais ces ordonnances ne pouvaient, ä elles seules, creer une teile
pratique ; celle-ci exigeait, en effet, que les Etats etrangers acceptassent
d'appliquer les regles qu'elles avaient adoptees, ce qui entrainait en outre
une reciprocite vis-ä-vis des marins desertant en France le bord de navi-
res etrangers.
Ce fut notamment le role des traites signes par la France le 15
septembre 1846 avec le Chili, le 23 fevrier 1853 avec les Etats-Unis, le
27 juin 1858 avec la Chine. Ces traites disent expressement que l'extra-
dition s'applique aux marins deserteurs, qu'ils appartiennent a la marine
de guerre ou a la marine de commerce ; la Convention interpretative du
8 novembre 1872 avec l'Italie va dans le meme sens.
D'une fagon generale, les traites qui concernent des «matelots»
ayant deserte «un bätiment de leur nation » sont l'objet d'une Interpre-
tation autorisant la remise des personnels de la marine de guerre aussi
bien que celle des marins de commerce.
Par exception, certaines Conventions ont limite expressement l'extra-
dition aux marins du commerce, ainsi la declaration France-Grande-
Bretagne du 23 juin 1854.
Uexemple des marins deserteurs, expressement mentionne dans la
loi du 10 mars 1927, se rapporte ä une pratique internationale vieille de
plus d'un siecle.
La remise de militaires a ete employee depuis 1945 pour pallier la
Prohibition de l'extradition, cette fois dans le cadre d'alliances ou de
l'assistance technique mihtaire ä d'autres pays.
1. Y-a-t-il une pratique de remise de militaires etrangers stationnes
sur votre territoire, lorsque leur caserne est situee sur ce meme terri-
toire qui est le votre ?
Cette pratique est notamment prevue par la Convention ci-apres :
Convention entre les etats parties au traite de l'Atlantique Nord, sur
le Statut de leurs forces, signee ä Washington le 4 avril 1949, article
VII, 5a) :
« Les autorites des Etats de sejour et d'origine se pretent mutuellement
assistance pour Tarrestation des membres d'une force de l'Etat d'origine
ou d'un Clement civil ou des personnes a charge sur le territoire de l'Etat
de sejour et pour leur remise ä l'autorite qui a ä exercer sa juridiction
conformement aux dispositions ci-dessus ».
L'examen de la repartition des competences juridictionnelles semble
depasser le cadre de cette question.
2. Y-a-t-il une pratique similaire pour les militaires de votre pays sta-
tionnes ä Vetranger ?
Cette pratique est notamment prevue par les Conventions ci-apres :
— annexe ä l'accord d'assistance militaire technique entre la Repu-
blique Frangaise et la Republique Centrafricaine, du 13 acut 1960, con-
cernant le Statut des membres des forces armees frangaises sur le terri-
oire de la Republique Centrafricaine (art. V').
— annexe ä Taccord d'assistance militaire technique entre la Republi-
que frangaise et la Republique du Congo, du 15 aoüt 1960, concernant le
l
A
190
Jean MILLIOT
RAPPORT FRANCAIS
191
Statut des membres des forces armees frangaises sur le territoire de la
Republique du Congo (art. 1"').
— annexe ä l'accord d'assistance militaire technique entre la Repu-
blique frangaise et la Republique du Tchad, du 11 aoüt 1960, concernant
le Statut des membres des forces armees frangaises sur le territoire de
la Republique du Tchad (art. V).
— annexe ä l'accord d'assistance militaire technique entre la Repu-
blique frangaise et la Republique de Cöte d'Ivoire, du 24 avril 1961, concer-
nant le Statut des membres des forces armees frangaises sur le territoire
de la Republique de Cöte d'Ivoire (art 4).
— annexe 1 ä l'accord d'assistance militaire technique entre la Repu-
blique Frangaise et la Republique du Niger, du 24 avril 1961, concernant
le Statut des membres des forces armees frangaises sur le territoire de la
Republique du Niger (art. 4).
— annexe 1 ä l'accord d'assistance militaire technique entre la Repu
blique Frangaise et la Republique du Dahovieij, du 24 avril 1961, concer-
nant le Statut des forces armees frangaises sur le territoire de la Repu-
blique du Dahomey (art. 4).
— annexe 1 ä l'accord d'assistance militaire technique entre la Repu-
blique Frangaise et la Republique de Haute-Volta, du 24 avril 1961,
concernant le Statut des membres des forces armees frangaises sur le
territoire de la Republique de Haule-Volta (art. 4).
— annexe II ä l'accord d'assistance technique militaire entre la
Republique Frangaise et la Republique Islamique de Mauritanie, du
19 juin 1961, concernant le Statut des forces armees frangaises sur le terri-
toire de la Republique Islamique de Mauritanie (art. 4).
— annexe III ä l'accord de defense entre la Republique Frangaise et
la Republique Gabonaise, du 17 aoüt 1960, concernant le Statut des mem-
bres des forces armees frangaises sur le territoire de la Republique
Gabonaise (art. 4).
— annexe II aux accords de defense entre la Republique Frangaise
et la Republique Malgache, du 27 juin 1960, concernant le Statut des .mem-
bres des forces armees frangaises ä Madagascar (art. 1"').
— accords particuliers conclus entre la France et le Cameroun, le
13 novembre 1960 - accord concernant l'assistance militaire technique aux
forces armees camerounaises - Convention sur le röle et le Statut de la
mission militaire frangaise au Cameroun (art. 12).
— annexe II ä l'accord de Cooperation en matiere de defense entre
la Republique Frangaise et la Federation du Mali et accords annexes du
22 juin 1960, concernant le Statut des membres des forces armees fran-
gaise au Mali (art. 4).
Ces Conventions ont ete maintenues avec la Republique du Senegal
par decret n" 61-536 du 17 mai 1961, et avec la Republique du Mali, par
decret n" 64-694 du 17 juin 1964.
— Accords de cessez le feu, declarations gouvernementales du 19 mars
1962 - Declaration de principes relatives aux questions militaires -
annexe - article 30 - Algerie.
La redaction des articles vises dans ces accords revet, dans la plupart
des cas, la forme suivante :
« les autorites... ne pourront proceder ä Tarrestation d'un membre des
forces armees frangaises qu'en cas de flagrant delit. El les en aviseront
immediatement les autorites militaires frangaises et remettront Tinte-
resse ä celles-ci dans le delai le plus court requis pour cette remise ».
Dans les accords franco-algeriens, l'article 30 est ainsi redige :
« En cas de flagrant delit, les membres des forces frangaises sont appre-
hendes par les autorites algeriennes et sont remis sans delai aux auto-
rites frangaises en vue de leur jugement, dans la mesure oü celles-ci
exercent leur jugement sur les Interesses».
— en ce qui concerne les militaires frangais stationnes dans un pays
etranger membre de l'O.T.A.N., il y a lieu de se reporter a ce qui a ete
indique dans la reponse ä la question precedente ; les dispositions reglant
les rapports entre Etat de sejour et Etat d'origine sont en effet recipro-
ques, sous reserve de quelques differences de competence juridictionnelle
dues a ce que les legislations repressives des pays en cause n ont pas en
general une assise identique.
.3. Y-a-t-il une pratique de remise ä la jrontiere pour les militaires
etranger s qui cnt commis leur delit dans leur paijs et qui se sont
enfuis pour chercher rejuge dans votre pays ou qui transitent dans
le vdtre pour chercher rejuge dans un troisieme pays?
Une teile pratique n'existe pas. Si des militaires etrangers veulent
regagner la frontiere de leur pays, ils sont laisses libres de le faire.
4. Statistiques comparees sur ces trois points, s'il est possible.
La statistique sur le premier point n'a pu etre obtenue ; les forces
armees etrangeres beneficiaires des remises doivent, du reste, se trouver
en possession des elements reclames et pouvoir en consequence fournir
toutes indications au titre du second point dans les rapports etablis par
leur pays.
h
192
Jean MILLIOT
RAPPORT FRANCAIS
193
La statistique sur Ic troisieme point est inexistante, puisque la re-
ponse est negative.
La statistique sur le second point est comprise dans l'etat Joint.
Conclusion
Les remises administratives viennent pallier la prohibition de l'extra-
dition pour les infractions militaires ; de procedure moins formaliste, elles
sont adaptees aux situations particulieres qu'elles concernent, mais ne
s'appliquent evidemment qu'ä des effectifs militaires limites, les autres
militaires continuant ä beneficier de la faculte de se refugier ä l'etranger,
Sans que puisse intervenir une extradition proprement dite.
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195
Rapport britanniquc
EXTRADITION FOR
MILITARY OFFENCES
William E. STUBBS
Assistant Judge Advocate General
(United Kingdom)
A. Extradition proper
1. The processes of extradition to and from the United Kingdom are,
in the main, governed by the Extradition Acts 1870, 1873 and 1895 and
Extradition treaties are made under the authority of those acts.
For an offence to be an extraditable offence it must be an act of a
kind which, if committed in the U.K., would be punishable by the ordinary
criminal law, and it must not have been an act of a political nature.
Where the extradition of a Briton is obtained from a foreign country
under an Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Acts prohibit his being tried
for any offences other than those proved on the facts for which surrender
was granted and similar safeguards for foreigners surrendered by Britain
are embodied in the treaties.
This last restriction does not apply to the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881,
which regulates the arrest in one part of the British Commonwealth of
fugitives from justice in another part, and their reconveyance for trial.
Such a person may be tried for offences other than the one for which he
was returned.
2. Under the provisions of the Visiting Forces Act 1952 any deserter
or absentee without leave or person suspected of being such deserter or
absentee, from the forces of any country to which the Act has been
applied by Order in Council, may within the U.K. be arrested and detained
just as if he were a person subject to the Army Act 1955 deserting etc.
from the British Forces and handed over to the appropriate authorities
of that country. The Operation of this Act has been extended to certain
British colonies.
These powers of arrest etc. can, however, only be exercised in com-
pliance with the request, either specific or general, of the country to which
the deserter belongs.
i!
•t
196
William E. STUBBS
RAPPORT BRITANNIQUE
197
The countries to which the Act has been applied are Belgium, France,
the Netherlands, Norway and U.S.A. (1954), Luxembourg, Turkey, Greece,
Denmark, Portugal and Italy (1956) and the Federal Republic of Germany
(1961). In addition it is by its own terms, applied to member countries of
the British Commonwealth.
Since it is difficult to envisage any case where a person guilty of any
military offence could be in the U.K., out of the control of his own coun-
try's military authorities, without being a deserter or an absentee without
leave, and since the Act places no restriction on the terms on which such
persons are to be handed over to their country of origin to which the Act
applies, these countries should have füll powers, when the fugitive is
returned to them, to deal with all military offences which he may have
committed.
3. A fugitive who considered that his surrender under the Visitmg
Forces Act was a cover for his being obtained to answer for some non-
extradictable offence could apply to the High Court, by writ of Habeas
Corpus for his release.
No such case has yet arisen and it is impossible to forecast what the
decision of the Court would be, although it seems probable that, if the
fugitive succeeded in proving that there was a danger of his surrender
being required in order to cause him to answer some charge of a political
nature, the surrender would be refused. In other cases it might be arranged
throug'h diplomatic Channels that his surrender under the Visiting Forces
Act should be on condition that he was not to be tried for any non-
military offence : very recently however, the House of Lords, in dealing
with an application for Habeas Corpus by a person detained under the
Fugitive Offenders Act, which deals with persons sought for trial in other
parts of the British Commonwealth in respect of offences committed in
that part, considered that a court should not be affected by any underta-
kings as to trial etc. given by any government who were not subject to
the control of the court.
4. Where the Visiting Forces Act does not apply, it is a Court of
Law, normally a Magistrate, which hears the extradition proceedings and,
if sa'tisfied that a case has been made out, makes the order for extradition.
From his decision appeal may be made to the High Court on any matter of
law or procedura.
The Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act 1933 and associated
Commonwealth legislation provides that, where forces from various parts
of the Commonwealth are serving together, any officer from any contin-
gent has the same powers of command over members of other contingents
as if he were an officer of those contingents.
B. Delivery of military individuals by other means than Extradition
1. Apart from the provisions as to the surrender of deserters, etc.,
given above, which apply to all soldiers of the countries specified, whether
or not there is an actual body of the troops of that country within the
U.K., where there is such a body stationed within the U.K. the Visiting
Forces Act 1952 empowers them to exercise their own military Jurisdic-
tion within their own military courts, subject to certain limitations.
Power is also given by the Act for the British service authorities, at the
request of the sending country, by general or specific orders, to direct
members of the home force to arrest any member of a visiting force who
is alleged to be guilty of an offence punishable under the law of that
country and to band him over to the service authority of that country.
(Orders under this Act have been made relating to Canadian, New Zealand,
South African and Pakistan! forces).
2. Separate agreements have been concluded with all countries
where British troops are stationed and these vary greatly in the degree
of Jurisdiction claimed and allowed.
3 Except for the frontier between Northern Ireland and the Republic
of Eire, where there is no question of putting military offenders across
the border, the border question is one which does not apply to the United
Kingdom There is no practice of handing over foreign soldiers other
' than in accordance with the Statutes set out above, but any foreign soldier
arriving in Great Britain without authority, or the necessary documenta-
tion (passport, etc.) and means of support would be liable to be refused
admission by the Immigration authorities and returned to his port of
departure.
4. There are no statistics available about these three points.
5. There is no Information about the real number of extraditions
requested by a foreign state within the last 10 years.
6. From a practical point of view the Visiting Forces Act procedure
seems to work satisfactorily.
EXTRADITION FOR
MILITARY OFFENCES
199
Rapport irlandais
by
William B. MORAN
Senior Counsel
(Ireland)
1. Section 12 of the Extradition Act, 1965, (N^ 17 of 1965) provides as
follows :
« Extradition shall not be granted for offences ander military law
which are not offences under ordinary criminal law».
2, There is no procedure for the handing over of military offenders to
other countries except when charged with civil offences in accordance
with the provisions in that behalf of the Extradition Act, 1965.
t
ft
201
Rapport israciicn
EXTRADITION FOR
MILITARY OFFENCES
by
Aluf Mishne Meir SHAMGAR (STERENBERG)
Military Advocate General
(Israel)
CONTENTS
1. Extradition — Sorne general principles
2. Military Offences
3. The Harvard Research
4. Extradition in Israel
a) Extraditable Olfences
b) Proccdure
c) Agreements
d) Military Offences
5. Some ref iections on the future prospects of the ru'.c.
*
1. Extradition — Some general prineiples
Extradition has been defined as the surrender by one nation, of an
individual accused or convicted of an offence outside of its own territory
and within the territorial Jurisdiction of another nation, which, bemg
competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender (1).
(1) FÜLLER. Ch. J. in TERLINDEN v. AMES 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902) ; The
Harvard Research in International Law, Extradition, 29 American Journal of
International Larv, Supplement (1935) (hereinafter referred to as the « Harvard
Research») defines extradition as the formal surrender of a person by a State
to another State for prosecution or punishment.
;/
202
Mcir SlIAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
203
The right of states to demand extradition, as far as it exists, does not
derive from any recognised rule of customary international law (2). The
principles of international law recognise no right to extradition apart
from treaty, i.e. the legal right to demand extradition can be based only
on mutual consent, created and defined by bi-lateral or multilateral trea-
ties conduded by sovereign states (3) (4).
Furthermore the prevailing opinion in the United States and Great
Britain has been that in the absence of a treaty, the government had no
authority to surrender fugitives from foreign justice (5) and as far as
Great Britain is concerned (6), there is no such authority in the absence
of legislation. In other words the Executive in these countries does not
possess unfettered authority to effect the arrest and surrender of the
individual whose extradition is demanded and the limits of its authority
are laid down and defined by treaty; in some countries, including
Great Britain and Israel the power to extradite originates in legislation
furnishing the legal basis for the conclusion of treaties and giving effect
in municipal law to these treaties (7). Under these Systems of law, the
treaty may serve as basis for arrest and delivery to a foreign power,
only if within the boundaries of the municipal statutory law. Some other
countries have neither extradition laws nor specific provisions on this
subject matter in their Constitution or other legislation and in such cases
it is usually left to the Executive to decide, according to its discretion, on
the conclusion of extradition treaties or even on the extradition without
any treaty.
Statutory provisions dealing with extradition usually specify the
crimes for which extradition will be granted (8). Furthermore, no extra-
dition is usually granted if the deed or Omission imputed to the person,
whose extradition is demanded, is not defined as an offence according to
the criminal law of the State which is asked to extradite (9). This principle
is known as the rule of double criminality (10). Many extradition treaties
include the Provision that the extradited individual shall be tried only
for the crime or crimes for which his extradition has been asked for and
granted or at least for one of those offences specified in the treaty (11).
The principle according to which treaties provide against the trial for
any offence other than that for which extradition was granted is known
as the « principle of specialty ».
Many countries refuse to surrender persons accused or convicted of
political crimes (12). This tendency has developed since the beginning of
the 19th Century only ; prior to this epoch political offences were in many
respects and in contradistinction to the above mentioned modern rule, the
main objects of extradition. However the French revolution and subse-
quent political developments, accompanied by changes of public opinion
and its impact on the decisions of both Legislature and Executive, gave
rise to the principle of non-extradition for crimes which carry this attri-
bute of «political» (13).
The French Constitution of 1793 proclaimed the grant of asylum to
persons exiled from their country for the cause of liberty. From this
starting point through the heated discussions characterised by Sir James
Mackintosh's and Lord Castlereagh^s declarations of 1815 and 1816, res-
pectively, on the subject of a certain extradition to Spain, further through
Switserland's determination to grant asylum notwithstanding foreign
pressure and tili modern times this principle of non-extradition of political
V
%
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
FACTOR V. LAUBENHEIMER, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) ; League of Nations.
Report on Extradition American Journal of International Law, Supplement
(1926) p. 243.
Harvard Research pp. 51, 222; Oppenheim*s International Law (8th ed.) Vol. I,
sec. 327; O'CONNELL, International Law, Vol. II, p. 792; VERDROSS. Völ-
kerrecht i^th cd.) p. 646; CLARKE, The law of extradition (4th ed.) (1903)
pp. 125-128; MOORE. Extradition and Interstate Rendition (1891) c. 2 ; 4
HACKWORTH, International Law, 1-241, (1942).
The different view of GROTIUS. that states have a duty either to surrender
a fugitive to justice of the offended State or to prosecute, appears to have
had little support in practice and in the thcory as expounded by subsequent
writers. Harvard Research, p. 41. But see VATTEL, The Law of Nations, (1760)
Vol. 1. Bk. II, § 76. p. 145 ; KENT, Commentaries on American Law (1896). Vol.
I, pp. 47-50.
But see the U.S. case of Arguelles, who was charged with selling slaves and
was surrendered in 1864 by the U.S. to the Spanish authorities without treaty
(I Moore id. § 27) and the morc recent case of INSULL (see U.S. v. Samuel
Insull. 8 F. Supp. 310 (1934).
The same rule applies in Israel. As to Great Britain See CLARKE op. cit. pp.
126-128.
The first country to pass an extradition law was Belgium in 1833.
In general descriptive terms or by listing the offences.
(9) But see FACTOR v. LAUBENHEIMER, referred to above.
(10) The offence need not have the same name in both countries and ^ven not the
same Clements but it must be criminal under both Systems of law : COLLINS
V. LOISEL 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922).
(11) See the Spanish case of Fiscal v. SAMPER reported ^riAnn^^^ ^^f^r^rir^^
V. RAUSCHER 119 U.S. 407 (1886) ; U.S. ex. rel. DONNELLY v. MULLIGAN
74 F. 2d. 220.
(12) DEERE. Political Offences in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 Americari
Journal of International Law 247 (1933) ; Harvard Research supra. Oppenheim
ibid. sec. 333.
(13) The extradition law enacted by Belgium in 1833 was apparently also the first
national law expressly prohibiting the extradition of foreign political crin^i-
nals. France included this rule in her treaties with other countries at least
since 1831.
See also i.a. Reflections upon the political offence in international practice by
Prof. A. EVANS, 57 AJ. IL., p. 1 (1963).
204
Mcir SHAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
205
criminals gained more and more general recognition (14). In our
days this principle is generally accepted in theory and practice
i.e. by the majority of text-writers and in the practice of States
as manifested in the treaties concluded by them : Extradition treaties
concluded during the last hundred years, contain, with few exceptions
only, a Provision exempting in mandatory or permissive form, political
offences from their Operation. The same has been expressed in many
municipal extradition Statutes. The Harvard Research expressed this prin-
ciple in a permissive form only (15) but many treaties and draft Conven-
tions contain provisions phrased in mandatory form, either prohibiting
the request by a demanding state or the surrender by the requested state.
The same applies to the majority of municipal extradition Statutes (16). "'"t
is understood that the Harvard Research proposed the permissive form
not in Order to derogate from the above mentioned recognised principle
but only in order to make the draft more adaptable to its mission as a
multipartite Convention. It iö however especially interesting, in antici-
pation of our later examination of the similar provisions relating to milita-
ry offences, that the Harvard Research stated in its commentary that
« there is no reason why a State should be precluded from surrendering
if it so chooses, a person sought for a political offence. It may well be
that some states, because of dose association or because of the dose simi-
larity of their political institutions would find the extradition of political
offenders desirable» (17).
(14) The definition of the term «political crime» has caused some serious diffi-
culties. The main views are : (a) a crime is considered « political » if commit-
ted from political motive ; (b) a crime is considered political if committed
for poitical purimse; (c) purposo and motive must both be political; (d) only
certain serious offences against the State are considered political crimes. See
the British case In Re Castioni (1891) I Q.B. 149 where it was held that
in Order tu prove the political character of a crime it must be shown at least
that th<i act was done in furtherance of, done with the Intention of assistance,
as a sort of overt act in the course of acting in a political matter, a political
rising, or a dispute bctween two parties in the State as to which is to have the
government in its hand. But comparc RE KOLCZYNSKI (1955) I All E.R. 31;
The Harvard Research defined a « political offence » as including treason, sedi-
tion and espionage, whether committed by one or more persons and includes
any offense connected with the activities of organised group directed against.
the security or governmental system of the Requesting State and it does
not exclude other offenses having a political objective ».
(15) Section 5(a) of the Research states : «A requested state may decline to
extradite a person if the extradition is sought for an act which constitutes
a political offence, or if it appears to the requested state that the extradition
is sought in order that the person claimed may be prosecuted or punished for
a political offence. »
(16) See for example sections 2(2) and 10 of the Israeli Extradition Law,
5714-1954, supra Chapter 4.
(17) See also FAUCHILLE, Tratte de Droit International Public (1922) Tome 1er.
n" 464.
2. Military Offences
Concurrently to the rule relating to political offences and to a certain
extent deriving from it, there evolved a rule of non-extradition for purely
military offences (18).
This rule, which is not as universally accepted as the one in connec-
tion with political offences, developed apparently from a rule, more limi-
ted in extent, i.e. pertaining only to one particular offence, namely the
offence of desertion from military service. Some writers confme therefore,
even nowadays, the extent of this rule to military desertion only Lauter-
pacht writes for example in Oppenheim's International Law (8th ed) :
« according to many extradition treaties military deserters are excluded
from extradition... » (Vol. I, Section 331, p. 702)
and states nothing in relation to military offences generally.
Fauchille (19) starts his analysis on this point also only by ref erring
to desertion. He states that desertion of soldiers is not counted between
the extraditable offences. It is considered, so he writes - that this ottence
although serious and severely punished is the result of a lesser degree of
turpitude than the common offences and arouses therefore less mterest in
the State of asylum. France, so he states, ref uses to deliyer up deserters
from a foreign army. He furthermore mentions the Brazilian law of 1911
not permitting extradition for purely military ^^^^^^^^..^f ^^^^f, ^^^^^^^^^^
Swiss practice. Treaties providing the contrary are rare (20). On the other
hand he mentions the usage to extradite deserters from the nayal forces
whether from a warship or the merchant navy. This differentiation he
explains by interests of navigation because the desertion of a sailor might
endanger the safety of the ship (21). According to the opinion of ^auchile
extradition of deserters and absentees from conscription is practiced
(18) See inter alia GUGGENHEIM, Traue de Droit ^^^f ^^^f^^^^^^
Toirc I p 366; VON DER HEYDTE. Völkerrecht p. 286, STARKE Introduciion
^* lomernational Law (1963) p. 294; PATEL. International Law (1964) p. 123.
VERDROSS. Völkerrecht (1964) p. 647. ^ATiruTTTF
(IQ) Traue de Droit International Public, Tome 1er (1922) p. 1028. FAUCHILLE
relies ia ofv. ALPHAND, Uexpulsion des deserteurs et Vextradtxon degms^e,
Rev. de dr. intern, prive, 191Ü, p. 35.
(9m ThP treaties between Brazil and Ecuador of 1853 and between Turkey and
' GrLce of 185^ pTov?ded for the extradiction of deserters from the army.
c9ii Pitt rohbett's Cases on International Law (5th ed.) stated : . * • 4v,„
rsomotreaties also exempt from extradition military deserters ; but in the
ase of both the e and naval deserters the question of surrender appears
to be merelv one of comity and mutual arrangement. As regards seamen
who ha'rdJserted from me'rchant ships, however the P-^tice of su„ender
^ commonly approved and followed. Thus. m the case of Great Bntain
s it now provided by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, that where it appears
h SrfSfes are given by any foreign State ^- »'»^-^^^^f ^f^Ty
deserting from British merchant ships in its territory, the Crown may by
Order in Council bring into force certain provisions of the Act enablmg
deserters from merchant ships belonging to such State, when w.thm British
dor^Intons. to bc apprehended and given up ; and such facilities have now
been mutually conceded in a large number of instances. » (p. 249).
206
Meir SHAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
207
1*.
between allied countries in time of war (22). He admonishes, furthermore
that neutral countries should be wary to observe exactly the same rule,
i.e. of negating extradition or permitting it, towards both belligerent side ;
an agreement to extradite deserters ceases therefore to be effective not
only in case of war between contracting parties but also in case of war
between a contracting party and a third State.
As to military offences other than desertion Fauchille is of opinion,
that they should not be extraditable. Furthermore, if a person has com-
mitted military offences and common offences, the extradition for the
common offence should be granted subject to the condition that he will
not be prosecuted for the military offences (23).
Before continuing the examination of the extent and recognition of
the above-mentioned practice, we should turn to a preliminary question,
namely what were the considerations and interests which gave birth to
the rule, be it the more limited one relating to desertion only or the more
general one dealing with all purely military offences. The answer to this
question is not only of historical interest but might furthermore be of
importance while considering the problem of the adequacy of the principle
or the justification for its continued existence.
As a first test we should ask ourselves if the rule is an outcome of
the relative leniency, from the point of view of the severity of the maxi-
mum punishment, with which these offences are regarded. The Harvard
Research proposed in its Draft, for example, that extradition should extend
only to offences for which the law provides the penalty of death or depri-
vation of liberty for a period of two years or more. May we assume that mili-
tary offences generally or desertion were regarded as less severe in the ave-
rage ? The answer must certainly be in the negative ; first of all the speci-
fic mention of the military offences might have been superfluous in such
case ; secondly desertion for one is and aiways was one of the most serious
offences : The British Army Act 1955 provides for the punishment of
imprisonment (i.e. up to imprisonment for life) for the offence of deser-
tion on active service (section 37) ; Art. 85 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice States that any person found guilty of desertion shall be
punished, if the offence is committed in time of war, by death or such
other punishment other than death, as a court-martial may direct. The
Soviet Military Code (Article 11) provides for a death sentence or impri-
sonment for five to ten years in time of war and imprisonment
from three to seven years in peace time. These punishment do
not represent a change to severity, in comparison with the practice in the
late 19th Century (which witnessed the rise of the rule as to military
offences). On the contrary, we usually witness a process actuated by a
tendency to introduce civilian perceptions of penology into military law ;
(22) During the lirst World War agrocrr.ents ol" such character were signed
between France and Belgium (30th November 1914 and 25th July 1915) and
Germany and Turkey (Uth January 1917) ; see also the declaration of
France and Italy of 9th March 1916.
(23) Livre orange neerlandais, avril 1918 - juin 1919 p. 36.
much the more so, any comparison with punishments prevailing tili the
middle of the last Century (24) brings abundant evidence of the different
approach then extant and of the evolutionary process pointed out above.
Desertion is certainly one of the most serious military offences but it is
not unique in its kind : wilfuUy disobeying an officer, striking a superior,
mutiny or sedition, misbehaviour before the enemy and the like are only
further examples of offences, purely military, carrying with them severe
sanctions.
Not finding the raison d'etre of our rule in the sphere of its relative
lack of severity in punishment we might turn and examine the difference
in mental attitudes or in other words the relative lack of moral depravity
in purely military offences. As mentioned above Fauchille explained the
rule by pointing to the lesser degree of moral turpitude involved in com-
mitting a military offence and inferred hereof the lack of danger to the
State of asylum and the lack of interest to extradite in order to suppress
crime. We may assume that this proposition is right to a certain degree, but
apparently only partly. It certainly may be accepted that refusal to obey
Orders, for example, does not necessarily prove an inclination to crimina-
lity and has quite different sociological implications if compared with
murder or larceny, but as may be observed, many treaties depart from the
System of listing certain serious offences only as extraditable offences and
provide instead for the criterion of the maximum penalty : The Harvard
Draft is the most striking expression of the tendency to apply a more
general norm instead of listing offences, because it proposed in Article 2
to regard each and every offence providing a possible deprivation of liber-
ty for a period of two years or more as an extraditable offence. This being
the approach we must morever take into consideration that criminal
legislation in the modern state, exhibits an everlasting prolificacy and
includes offences providing for imprisonment up to two years, which
carry with them no greater amount of moral turpitude or social danger
than refusal to obey orders of a military superior, but which would be
nevertheless extraditable. Even if we make allowance for the proposition
•that recent trends should not necessarily overshadow the reasonableness
of an explanation relating to times passed, i.e. to the period of the rise of
the rule, we must take into account that criminal offences lacking salient
features of moral turpitude are not necessarily a modern phenomenon. We
might therefore deduce that the explanation of Fauchille is plausible but
not exhaustive. It seems that the main reason for the acceptance of the speci-
fic approach to purely military offences derives from the affinity of military
offences to political offences : The purely military offence is connected,
inherently with a certain breach of loyalty to the State, represented to-
wards the 'individual soldier by his military superiors. Purely military of-
fences, and especially the serious ones and desertion among them, include
as a dominant element the expression of unwillingness to obey rules which
are vital and fundamental to the safety and for the continued existence of
the force defending the State. They feature frequently the abnegation of
self-sacrifice or the refusal to relinquish personal claims, interests
(24) WINTHROP, Military Law & Precedents p. 431.
i
208
Meir SHAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
209
11 ♦
i:t
and objects in favour of the public interest or demand. Impliedly at least,
a person manifests hereby bis disinclination to accept the established
Order in one of the mainstays of the Government and so to serve the State.
If this our proposition as to the inherent characteristic of military offences
is right, namely if the relative lack of moial turpitude in military offences
is entwined with their semi-political character, it is self-explanatory why
the rule of non-extradition for political offences found thus its parallel
in the same rule as to military offences, i.e. why « the common interest
of civilized communities » (25), which is the main motive of surrender,
was relinquished in favour of a rule of non-extradition initiated by the
tendency of « non Intervention » in case of breach of loyalty of an individual
towards a foreign State.
The rule, dealt with above, found expression to a varying extent, in
many multipartite treaties, draft Conventions, bipartite treaties and natio-
nal legislation.
•.»
The treaty of Montevideo (26) one of the first and few multipartite
extradition Conventions does not mention military offences between the
excepted offences, although it mentions political crimes (27) and crimes
which imperil the internal and external security of the State, as not
affording ground for extradition. The Treaty for the Extradition of Cri-
minals and for the Protection against Anarchism signed in 1902 in Mexico
(28) did not exclude military offences but the list of offences did not in-
clude military offences (29) ; in other words military offences were exclu-
ded de facto. On the other band the Agreement on Extradition between
Ecuador, Peru, Columbia, Bolivia and Venezuela signed at Caracas in
1911 (30), included in its list of extraditable offences « desertion from the
navy and army » as well as mutiny, committed on the high seas.
The Bustamente Code (31) excluded extradition for political offen-
ces but did not mention military offences.
The Montevidea Convention of 1933, signed at the Seventh Internatio-
nal Conference of American States, stated (32) that extradition will not
be granted « when the offence is purely military ». Although several
reservations were attached to the Convention, none was in relation to the
question of military offences.
(25) BIRON and CHALMERS, The Law and Practice of Extradition (1903) p. 1.
(26) Treaty of International Penal Law entercd into by Paraguay, Argentine*
Bolivia. Peru and Uruguay on 23rd January 1889 : 18 MARTENS. Nouveau
Recueil (2n ser.) p. 432.
(27) ihid ss. 23, 26.
(28) 6 MARTENS. Nourcau Recueil (3rd ser.) p. 18i.
(29) But « Mutiny or conspiracy by two or more members of the crew » of vessel
on the high seas, mentioned in sec. 5(c) can be looked upon as including a
military offence.
(30) Harvard Research p. 282.
(31) Code of Private International Law, annexed to the Convention adopted at
Habana in February 1928. Harvard Research p. 285.
(32) Sec. 3 (f ).
The Harvard Research shall be dealt with later, but several preceding
Draft Codes need mention : D.D. Field's Outline of an International Code
(1876) included a proviso (33) excluding « desertions from or evasions of
military and naval service » ; offences included in the draft as extraditable
were listed and this list did not mention other specific military offences.
The Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at Ox-
ford (1880) (34) stated (35) that extradition should not be applied to the
desertion of military persons belonging either to the land or to sea forces,
nor to purely military offences. The Project for an American Extradition
Convention drafted by the International Commission of Jurists at Rio de
Janeiro in 1912 (36) stated in Article 4 that extradition shall not be per-
mitted for purely military offences. The same article added however that
« the surrender of naval or land deserters shall be optional », i.e. desertion
was excepted from these military offences, in relation to which denial of
extradition was to be mandatory.
Travers' project lor an Extradition Treaty presented in his Droit
Penal International of 1922 (37) included a footnote in which the author
suggested a peculiar and new norm, namely that fiscal, military, political
and religious offences shall or shall not be mentioned in any treaty of
extradition, as extraditable offences according to identity or divergence of
the conception of these offences in the legislation of the contracting states.
The Draft Extradition Convention approved by International Law
Association (38) did not exclude military offences but the offences inclu-
ded were listed and this list did not comprise purely military offences but
mentioned mutiny on the high seas. The Model Draft of an Extradition
Treaty proposed in 1931 by a subcommission of the International Penal
and Prison Commission (39) stated in Article 7 that «Extradition shall
not been granted for punishable acts consisting solely of the contravention
of military duties ». Article 9 added that in the case of a common punisha-
ble act, which is at the same time a contravention of military duties extra-
dition shall only been granted provided the military nature of the act is
not taken into consideration either in the prosecution or penalty. One may
deduce that the provisions of Article 9 intended practically to exclude trial
by military tribunals.
As to lüi-lateral treaties, most of them list the extraditable offences, and
as military offences are usually not included in the list, the non-extradition
for military olfences can be deduced by implication. Part of them mention
the exclusion of purely military offences, expresses verbis, and a treaty
including military offences specifically is a rarety (40).
(33) Sec. 215 (3).
(34) Annuaire de VInstitut de Droit hUernational (1880). v. p. 127, Harvard
Research p. 300.
(35) ibid. sec. 16.
(36) AJ.LL. Supplement vol. 20 (1926) p. 331-335.
(37) Tome V. pp. 526-530.
(38) Report of 35th Conference of LL.A. (1928) pp. 324-329.
(39) Harvard Research p. 309. ^t o. c
(40) See i.a. the Colombia — Panama Treaty of 1927 (71 L.N.T.S. 409).
210
Mcir SIIAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
211
V «
i'.
At this stage of our analysis, some more detailed mention of the Har-
vard Research would be worth while.
3. The Harvard Research
Tn 1925, the law of extradition was studied by a League of Nations
Committee of experts and a subcommittee consisting of Professors J.L.
Brierly and Charles de Visscher was appointed to report upon it (41).
After studying the report of the subcommittee, plenary session of the
committee reached the conclusion that the difficulties in the way of a
general agreement on this subject were too great for their Solution to be
realizable in the near future, though such Solution « appeared very desira-
ble». Further research on the subject was organized under the auspices
of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School for the purpose of preparing a
draft of an international Convention.
In 1932 the Advisory Committee of the Research in International Law,
proceeding in the above-mentioned framework decided to deal with the law
of extradition ; the Reporter on the subject was Mr. Charles K. Burdick,
Dean of the Cornell Law School (42). The outcome of the work was the
Draft Convention on Extradition published in the 1935 Supplement of the
American Journal of International Law.
The Draft, so has it been stated, represents the collective view of a
group of Americans specially interested in the development of International
Law, concerning the subjects which may be considered in connection with
the codification of international law (43). The subject of Military Offences
is dealt with in Article 6 of the Harvard Draft stating :
« 6 (a) A requested State may decline to extradite a person claimed if
the extradition is sought for an act which constitutes a military
offence, or if it appears to the requested state that the extra-
dition is sought in order that the person claimed may be prose-
cuted or punished for a military offence.
(b) As the term is used in this Convention, a military offence is an
offence which is punishable only as a violation of a military law
or regulation and which could not be punishable as a violation
of a civil law or regulation if the military law or regulation did
not apply».
(41) League of Nations Document C. 51. M. 28 1926. v. 20 AJ.I.L. (Special Supple-
ment) 1926 p. 243.
(42) As Research Assistants acted V.G. TERENTIEFF, Cornell University and
Lucien TIIARAUD. New York City.
(43) AJ.I.L. (Supplement) 1935 p. 8. 119.
This article is phrased similarly to Article 5 dealing with political
offences (44). As stated in the comment accompanying the Draft, the com-
mittee was aware of the fact that the majority of treaties examined by the
committee did not contain any express Provision concerning military offen-
ces but most cüuntries (the United States, France and Greai Britain among
them) entered into treaties containing lists of offences, and these did not
include military offences, i.e. they excluded military offences by implica-
tion. The inclusion of this article seemed to the committee desirable in
view of the general disinclination of states to extradite persons accused of
military offences ; on the other band the comment underlined the
permissive form of the proposed rule which states that extradition may
(not « must ») be declined in the above mentioned circumstances. Moreover
one may add that this facultative wording of the proposal creates a possi-
bility of diverging practices by the same State even in relation to the same
requesting State, endangering any tendency of uniformity of action. Howe-
ver, if a State does not wish to avail itself of the discretion created by
this article it may choose to decline categorically any extradition for
military offences by signing the Declaration according to Schedule B of
the Draft, which states :
« A State may declare that it will not extradite a person claimed if
the extradition is sought for an act which constitutes a political or
military offence, or if it appears to the requested State that extradi-
tion is sought in order that the person claimed may be prosecuted or
punished for a political or military offence and that it will not give
consent to such prosecution or punishment of a person who has been
extradited ».
The article leaves the decision as to the qualitative distinction nearly
entirely to the requested state, empowering it do decide according to the
apparent motive of the request and not only according to its fornial
wording : the requested State may refuse extradition not only if
this is sought for an act which constitutes a military offence but
'also if it appears to the requested State that the surrender is
asked for in order that the person claimed may be prosecuted
or punished for a military offence. This freedom of determination is
obviously the outcome or by-product of the optional character of the
decision : In view of the fact that the requested state is free to grant or
to decline extradition for military offences, it must also be free to deter-
mine itself the preliminary question of whether or not the act is such
as would justify the exercise of discretion in granting or declining the
request (45).
(44) See note 14 above.
(45) Comparc Harvard Research p. 111. Article 17 (3) of the Draft provided in
this connection that a judicial authority of the requested State shall determme
upon an examination of the requisition. the documents submitted by the
requesting State, and the evidence offered by the requesting State, or by the
requested State, or by the person detained. any issues presented. inter aha. as
to the question whether extradition is sought for or claimed for a political or
military offence or for the purpose of piosecutions or punishing the person
claimed for a political or military offence.
1
V
t ■
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
213
212
Meir SIIAMGAR
As to the definition of the term « military offence » the draft expressly
excludes any offence, which is an offence included in a military code
and at the same time, concurrently, a criminal offence defined in the
civil law («civil» as opposed to «military» and not as opposed to «crimi-
nal»). Military offence, according to the draft means an offence which
is known as such to military law only, or in other words, which could
be committed only by a person subject to military law.
The test, therefore, is not if the offence is triable by a court martial
or if the person has been in fact indicted or tried before a court-martial.
Many military codes provide for the trial by courts-martial of regulär
criminal offences committed by persons subject to military law (46),
because the military authorities are interested in effective control over
the behaviour of such persons ; moreover from the point of view of the
interests of discipline and the education of law-abiding citizens-at-arms
many countries consider it difficult to distinguish between purely nriili-
tary offences and criminal offences. It seems that the interests of discipline
and of breeding behaviour, becoming a soldier, are regarded as endange-
red, to a similar extent, whether a soldier hits a military-policeman or
assaults a « civilian » police officer. The Draft provides, as explained
above, that such criminal offences, triable by court-martial shall not be
regarded or military offences for the purpose of extradition. The rule,
explained above, leads furthermore to the conclusion that the draft
excludes from its definition of military offences not only criminal of-
fences, which can be dealt wüth by court-martial if the accused is a
person subject to military law : The draft excludes, so it seems, even
these military offences which are defined specifically in a military code
but which, according to the elements constituting them, are similar
to existing civil offences : e.g. section 121 of the Military Justice
Law of Israel defines the offence of Escape from Custody (47).
This offence has its parallel in the offence against section 133 of
the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936 (48) called Escape, i.e. the act of
escape from arrest (following the commital of a military offence) would
be punishable as a violation of the civil law if the military law did not
apply and therefore according to Article 6 (b) of the draft such offence
could not be considered as a « military offence », although being one of
the military offences according to the definition and meaning of this
term for the purposes of the Israeli Military Law (49). The same would
be true e.g. in relation to Articles 118, 119, 120 etc. of the U.S. Uniform
(46) See intcr alia ss. 14, 15 of the Military Justice Laie of Israel; section 70 of the
Britisch Army Act, 1955 ; section 134 ol the U.S. Uniform Code of Military
Justice : 8 9 ot the Sovict Military Code oi 1953.
(47) s. 121 : « A soldier who, being in the lawful custody of the Army. escapes or
attcmpts to escape therelrom, betöre being i-eleased therefrom is liable to im-
prisonment for a term of two year ».
(48) s. 133 : « Any person who, being in lawful custody for any criminal offence
escapes from such custody etc. », « offence » means any act, attempt or
ommission punishable by law.
(49) Section 1 of the Military Justire Laio, 1515-1955 defines «military offence» as
« an offence under Part Two ». (Part Two includes the definitions of military
offences and section 121 is among thcm).
Code of Military Justice, section 45 of the British Army Act 1955 or
Articles 115-128 of the Swiss Militärstrafgesetz of 1927.
It is generally accepted that the bürden of proof is on the requested
State when the issue of military offence is raised (50).
4. Extradition in Israel
a) Extraditable Offences.
The legal provisions relating to the extradition of a person staying
in Israel, are included in statutory law : The Extradition Law, 5714-1954 (51)
States its basic rule in its first section which stipulates that a person
who is in Israel shall not be extradicted to another State except under
that law and according to its provisions.
Section 2, also including basic Statements of the main legal principles
applicable, provides that a person may be extradicted if the two following
cumulative conditions have been complied with :
(a) an agreement providinß for reciprocity as to extradition of
offenders exists between Israel and the State requesting his
extradition. and furthermore ;
(b) he is accused or has been convicted in the requesting State of an
offence of a non-political character and which, had it been com-
mitted in Israel would be one of the offences set out m the
Schedule to the law (hereinafter referred to as «extradition
offences ») .
The law does not define the term « political offence » or the term
« offence of non-political character » ; in the absence of judicial decisions
we can therefore only assume that the court will tend to apply the same
varied and often contradictory criteria, applied by foreign national courts
in this matter (52), but as we know no satisfactory and generally ac-
(50) In Re Ezeta 0894. 62 Fed. Rep. 972. But see Deere (noto 12) P;^ ^;Ö ^herc^^j
is asserted that the bürden of proof in Swiss law, m relation to the pohtical
character of the offence is on the person claimed.
(Sn Published in Sefer Ha-Chukkivi (Official Gazette containing principal legis-
fatnTNo. "es Ost September 1954. p. 174. The Bill -"d a" fxplanatory note
were published in Hatzaot Chok (Bills) 192. 5714-1954. p. 88. An Enghsh trans-
Tat.^nwa published in the La^rs of ihe State of Israel ü^erclnaner relened to
as «Isi ») Vol. 8 p. 144; Amendments: Sefer Ha-Chukktm 196, 19o6. p.28
lefer Ha-Chulfcim 458. 1965. p. 182. This law replaced the P'^v'S'onson extra-
dition included in the Extradition Ordinance. l^f, /„^«'".^/„^/iSre ^ny
p 677) which were in force tili then. The Ordinance o[ 1^26 did not include any
stipulation as to militnry offences but provided, on the other ha-id tha a tu-
gitive criminal shall not be surrendered it the offence in respect of which his
surrender was dt-mancU-d was one of political character.
(^2) The ruline of DENMAN J. in Re Castioni (1891) 1 Q.B. 149 is apt to be ot
Jersuasive^ value. The only case where the question of a political offence arose
214
Mcir SIIAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
215
IM
ceptable definition of a political offence has been found yet and the
Harvard Draft, has naturally only the standing of a proposal. It remains
therefore only to be added in conclusion that « the question whether a
particular act comes within that category (i.e. of political offences)
is preeminently circumstantial », as stated by Judge Moore (53) (54).
The Schedule of the Extradition Law enumerates the following of-
fences as extradition offences :
(a) every offence for which the death penalty or imprisonment for
a period exceeding three years may be imposed but except '
(1) an offence with which a person can only be charged if at the
time of committing it he is a soldier within the meaning of
the Military Justice Law of Israel ;
(2) offences under section 85 (preventing or obstructing the
making of notification to rioters to disperse) and 181 (bigamy)
(55) of the Criminal Ordinance, 1936 (56) ;
(3) offences under the Penal Law Revision (Assault on Police
Officers) Law, 5712-1952 (57) or under any of the laws speci-
fied in the Schedule to the Prevention of Profiteering and
Speculation (Jurisdiction) Law, 5711-1951 (58).
(b) an offence the penalty for which is lighter than above specified
and which is an offence under the Penal, Revision (Bribery) Law,
in connection with extradition was Cr. A. 2/41, 8. P.L.R. 43 (1941) ABU
DOURRAH V. A.G., whcrc the Supreme Court stated :
« Finally it is said that this is a political offence. Under the law of this
» country, murder is murder pure and simple, whatevcr the motives may be
» which inspired it. We know of nothing in the criminal law of this coun-
» try or of England that creates a special offence called political murder ».
It should however be added that these were not extradition proceedings but a
criminal appeal of an accused who had been extradited to the Palestinian
authorities, on their request.
As to changes in the legal ties between judicia^ decision in Israel and Britain,
in consequence of the establishment of Israel see CA. 81/55; 84/55; 91/55;
92/55 Kohavi v. Baker. 11 Piskei Din (Supreme Court Judgments) 255, 228
(1957).
(53) MOORE, Extradition (1891) vol. I § 208. p. 308.
(54) According to section 8 of the Crime of Gonocide (Prevention and Punish-
ment) Law 5710-1950 Sefer Ha-Chukkim 42, 1950. 137; L.S.L Vol. 4
p. 101), notwithstanding anything contained in any other Law, in considering the
extradition of a person charged with. or convicted of. Genocide or conpiracy
incitement or attempt to commit Genocide or complicity in Genocide. the plea
that the offence with which such person is charged. or of which he has been
convicted, is an offence of a political character. shall not be entertained.
(55) Now repealed and supcrseded by Penal Lair Revision (Bigamy) Law, 5719-
1959, Sefer Ha-Chukkim 285 p. 144 ; L.S.L vol. 13.
(56) Palestine Gazette 1936, Supplement I, No. 652, p. 285.
(57) Sefer Ha-Chukkim 94. p. 144 L.S.L vol. 6, p. 49.
(58) Sefer Ha-Chukkim 68 p. 40 L.S.L vol. 5 p. 27. The Schedule enumerates offences
against financial emergency regulation and economic offences.
5711-1952 (59) or under one of the following sections of the Criminal Code
Ordinance, 1936 :
gg __ Riotously preventing the Sailing of ship ;
109B — Oppression by public servant ;
100-115 — Corruption and Abuse of Office by public servants (60);
120-122 — False Swearing, Deceiving witnesses, Destroying evi-
dence (61) ;
124 — Conspiracy to defeat justice and interference with
witnesses ;
140 _ Frauds and breaches of trust by public officers ;
146 — Insult to religion of any class ;
15(j _ intercourse by husband with girl under 15 years ;
158 — Indecent act without force ;
159 _ Indecent act committed upon child ;
161-163 — Procuration for immoral purposes, procuring defile-
ment of femals by threats etc., keeping of brothel (62) ;
15(3 _ Living on earnings of prostitule (62);
170 _- Detention with intent or in brothel (62);
173 — Woman aiding etc. for gain, Prostitution of another
woman (62) ;
174 —Conspiracy to defile (63);
(59) Sefer Ha-Chukkim 92 p. 126 : L.S.L vol. 6 p. 32.
(60) The enumeration of sections 100 to 109 is apparently the l^^^^^j^^ .^^, \f ^^^^^^^^^
error • sections 100 to 105 include some offences which would not have. been
ncluded intentionally between extraditable «^^-^ <-, t^df rT9'52\y th^
blic place) and sections 106 to 109 wero superseded alreadj ^^l^^^J' The
Penai Revision (Bribery) Law ^^^^'^^^^^'^^^l^.'^^^^^^^^
explanatory note in the Bill referred only to sections 110-115 a fact which also
'"''''^J^^'Z^:'^^^^ certificates) carries now a m^^
mum ptifment of imprisonment for five years iSefer Ha-CUffm 48L 1966
p. 64) and its specific mention here can therefore now be regarded as super
flUOUS. jj j u tu«
(61) An offence of Contradictory Testimony (section 120 A) was added by the
fegis°ftorTnl965 iSefer Ha-ChnUkim 444. 1965 p 51) and .s to be regarded as
part of this list because includod between sections 120-122,
(62) Now repoaled and superseded by Penal Law Amendment ' ^"f'^^l^^^'^^^'!^:
inn^ Law 5722-1962 (Sefer Ha-Chukkim 370, 1962. p. 78; L.S.I. vol. 16 p. 67) ,
Tn^^J^^U^L hoavior than these for ^^eiormer offences agam^^
«nrtinns 161-163 166 170 173 (now five or seven years) and the specitic men
tion of these offences in sub-section (b) has therefore now become super-
flUOUS. /c^/o^
(63) Now carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment for seven years (Sefer
Ha-Chukkim 481, 1966. p. 64) ; see prcvious note.
I
216
Meir SHAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
217
185 — Neglecting to provide food for children (64) ;
186 — Desertion of children (64) ;
195 — Negligent act likely to spread infection or disease ;
218 — Causing death by want of precaution or by carelessness ;
242 — Failure to supply necessaries ;
250 — Assault causing actual bodily härm ;
261 — Unlawf ul compulsory labour ;
262 — False imprisonment ;
270 — Thef t ;
303-306 — Cheating. Obtaining Credit by false pretences, Conspi-
racy to defraud, Frauds on sale or mortgage of property
(65);
310 — Receiving property fraudulently obtained ;
336 — Forgery (65) ;
350 — Imitations of bank notes ;
359 — Uttering counterfeit gold or silver coin ;
360 — Repeated uttering as in section 359 or possession of
several such coin ;
363-366 — Uttering counterfeit coin other than gold or silver ;
Defacing coin by stamping words thereon ; Uttering
foreign coin, medals etc ; Exporting counterfeit coin (66).
b) Procedure.
Where a request for extradition of a person accused or convicted
of an extradition offence has been submitted by a foreign state, the Minis-
ter of Justice may direct that the person be brought before a District
Court in order to determine whether he is subject to extradition. In pur-
suance of such direction the Attorney General or his representative
shall submit to the District Court a petition to declare the person sub-,
ject to extradition. The Court shall dismiss such a petition submitted
to it :
(1) if the person has been tried in Israel for the criminal act for
which his extradition is requested and has been acquitted or
f64) Wording of offences was amended by Criminal Code Ordinance Amendment
Law (No. 24) 5725-1965. Sefer Ha-Chukkim 444, 1965, p. 51.
(65) SS. 303^ 306 and 336 wore repealed and superseded by Penal Laiv Revision
(Oflences of Fraud, Extortion and Oppression) Law 5723-1963 (Sefer Ha-
Chukkim 403. 1963, p. 130, L.S.L vol. 17).
'66) Amended Sefer Ha-Chukkim 481, 1966. p 64.
convicted or if he has already undergone his punishment for it
abroad ; or
(2) if according to the laws either of the requesting State or of the
State of Israel the offence is no longer liable to prosecution, or
the punishment imposed for it is no longer enforceable, owing
to lapse of time ; or
(3) if the person has been pardoned in respect of the criminal act
in question or has had his punishment remitted in the requesting
State ; or
(4) if there are reasonable grounds for the court to assume that the
accusation or the request for extradition arises from racial or
religious discrimination ; or
(5) if there are reasonable grounds for the court to assume that the
request for extradition aims at prosecuting or punishing the
requested person for an offence of a political character, though
prima facie it is not made in connection with such an offence.
If at the hearing of the petition it is proved that the wanted person
has been convicted of an extradition offence in the requesting state or
that there is evidence which would be sufficient for committing him to
trial for such an offence in Israel and that all the other conditions laid
down by the law for his extradition are fulfilled, the court shall declare
the wanted person — subject to extradition.
The person whose extradition has been decided on by District
Court has a right of appeal against the decision of the District Court (67).
The appeal has to be submitted to the Supreme Court sitting as a Court
of Criminal Appeal, within thirty days from the day of the decision of the
District Court. This right of appeal does not derogate from the right of
the person whose extradition has been decided on, to apply, either be-
fore or after appeal, to the Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of
Justice and to ask for relief by way of a writ based on section 7 of the
Courts Law, 5727-1957 (68).
(67) The Attorney General has, concurrently, the same right of appeal against any
decision of the District Court.
(68) L.S.I. vol. 11, p. 157. The Supreme Court sitting as a High Court of Justice deals
with matters in which it deems it necessary to grant relief in the interests of
justice and which are not within the Jurisdiction of any other court or tribunal
and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregomg des-
cription of the powers of the Court it is competent (1) to order the release of
persons unlawfully detained or imprisoned (2) to order State authorities^ local
authorities and their officials and other bodies and persons performmg public
functions under the law, requiring them to do or refrain from doing any act m
the Performance of their functions (3) to make Orders directed to Courts, tribu-
nals and bodies or persons having judicial or quasi-judicial powers under the
law, other than courts to which the Courts Law applies and Religious Courts, to
adjudicate in any particular matter or to continue to adjudicate in any particu-
lar matter and to set aside any proceeding held or decision given, unlawfully.
In other words, the High Court may grant relief by issuing writs similar to
l
218
Meir SHAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
219
h
The declaration of a wanted person as subject to extradition shall
become final if the period of appeal has passed without an appeal being
submitted or if an appeal has been submitted but has been dismissed.
A wanted person shall not be extradited for an offence punishable
with death in the requesting State but not so punishable in Israel, unless
the requesting State gives an undertaking that the death penalty will not
be imposed on him or that the death penalty which has been or may be
imposed on him will be commuted. Furthermore, the law gives füll ex-
pression to the principle of speciality : a wanted person shall not be
extradited unless it has been insured by an agreement with the requesting
State, that he will not be detained, tried or punished in that State for
another offence committed prior to his extradition. This Provision shall
not apply if the person left the requesting state after his extradition
and has voluntarily returned to it or if he has not left the requesting
State within 60 days after being given an opportunity to do so or if
the State of Israel has consented in writing to an act as aforesaid against
the wanted person ; such consent shall not be given unless the person in
question has, in his absence, been declared subject to extradition also in
respect of the other offence after he has been given an opportunity to
be represented in the proceeding aimed at obtaining the declaration.
After the declaration of extradition has become final, the Minister of
Justice may order the carrying out of the extradition. The validity of
the declaration expires if the person is not extradited or transferred
outside the boundaries of Israel within 60 days from the day of the
declaration or within 60 days of the end of any trial or punishment,
undergone by the wanted person for any other offence, whichever date
is the later; if there are special circumstances delaying the carrying
out of the extradition, the Court may extend the declaration for such
additional period as it may determine according to the circumstances
proved.
Where a person has been extradited to Israel by a foreign state, he
shall not be detained or tried for another offence, or extradited to
another state for any offence commited before his extradition, unless
that foreign state consents in writing to such an act or he has not left
Israel within sixty days after being given an opportunity, subsequent to
his extradition, so to do or he left Israel after his extradition and has
voluntarily returned to it.
the writs of Habcas Corpus, Prohibition. Certiorari or Mandamus, known
to all branches of the Anglo-Saxon System oi law. The High Court hearing the
application is, however, not a court of appeal on questions of fact and there-
fore does not review the decision of the judge if there was sufficient evidence
before the court to justify committal for trial. The sufficiency of evidence is a
question for the District Court and for the Supreme Court sitting as a Court
of Criminal Appeal. The High Court will interfere if the crime is not an extra-
dition offence or does not come within the terms of the treaty or if it is of a
political character, or where a person is extiadited in respect of an offence not
specified in the petition (H.C 112/45 ; 13 P.L.R. 120).
)'ti
c) Agreements.
As stated above, one of the basic demands of the law is, that extra-
dition shall be effected only if there exists an agreement between
Israel and the state requesting his extradition providing for reciprocity
as to the extradition of offenders. Section 21 of the Law provides further-
more that an agreement concerning extradition may stipulate that only
part of the offences set out in the schedule shall be extraditable offences
in respect of that state. In other words the agreement may only diminish
the list of extradition offences, but not add to it (compare the ruling in
Re Arton (1896) 1 Q.B.D. 509). The agreement cannot derogate from the
prohibitions on extradition, provided for in the Law or in the Schedule.
An agreement can include furthermore the following specific terms,
notwithstanding that they are not provided for in the Law :
(1) that a wanted person, detained pending his extradition, shall
be released from detention, if a request for his extradition or
evidence sufficient for declaring him subject to extradition is
not submitted within a period fixed in the agreement ; or
(2) that documents or any other material seized from the wanted
person which are or is likely to serve as evidence against him in
court shall be surrendered to the requesting state ; or
(3) that the period of validity of a declaration relating to a wanted
person who has not been extradited, shall be shorter than the
period of 60 days mentioned above.
As stressed above in connection with the permissible special stipula-
tion in relation to extraditable offences, the purpose and effect of such
stipulations may be only to decrease the possibility and ability of extra-
dition and not to increase it.
The agreements signed by Israel are for the most part agreements
listing the extradition offences (69) (70) and only to a small extent do
the agreements apply the norm of the maximum punishment provided
(69) For example the agreement with lialy (signed 24th February 19o6) published m
Kitvei Amana (Publication in Official Gazette including International Treaties
and Conventions) N«. 232 (28th April 1957) vol. 7 p. 667: with Belgium (signed
23th Juny 1956) Kitvei Amana N-. 230 (25th April 1957) vol. 7 p. ^37 ' wüh
Luxembourq (signed 26th July 1956) Kitvei Amami N^. 231 (26th April 1957)
vol 7 p 653: with Holland (signed 19th December 1956) Kitvei Amana N^ 229
(I4th April 1957) vol. 7. p. 625 : with France (signed 12th December 19.58) Kitvei
Amana N- 308 (31th October 1959) vol 10. p. 379: with South Africa signed
18th September 1959) Kitvei Amana N". 354 (3th March i960) vol. 10. p. 649;
and with the U.S.A. (signed lOth December 1962) Kitvei Amana N«. 505 (5th
December 1963) vol. 13 p. 795.
(70) These lists conlorm naturally with the framework and limitations laid down
in the Schedule to the Law.
V.
220
Meir SHAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
221
■M!
for by the Harvard Draft (71) or the even more general norm of renvoi
to the statutory provisions of the signatories (72).
d> Military Offences.
In relation to military offences the Law has not adopted the permis-
sive wording of the Harvard Draft but has chosen the alternative pre-
sentend in Schedule B of the Draft, according to which states may pro-
hibit categorically any extradition for a purely military offence.
The Law does not mention the term « military offence » and the
schedule provides for the non-extradition for military offences by ap-
plying a wording which explains and defines itself expressis verbis i.e.
the Law applies this rule of non-extradition to — «an offence with
which a person can only be charged if at the time of committing it he is
a soldier within the meaning of the Army Code, 5708 » (73).
In other words, the legal possibility of preferment of charges, serves
as an indicator, pointing out if the person is subject to military law ;
but the Law did not intend to extend the rule of non-extradition to each
and every offence with which a person subject to military can be charged :
it appears that the legislator intended to express in the above wording the
aim to exclude from extradition only offences answering the twofold
test laid down by the Harvard Research namely that offences precluded
from extradition are only offences which are punishable merely as
violation of a military law or regulation and which would not be
punishable as a violation of a civil law or regulation of the military law
or regulation did not apply (74). The definition of the Law cited above
answers both tests as it excludes by its wording any offence with which
a person not subject to military law can be charged (75).
Part of the extradition treaties concluded by Israel mention the non-
extradition for military offences explicitly : The treaty with Italy states in
Article 5 that :
« L'extradition ne sera pas accordee si Tinfraction pour laquelle eile
est demandee consiste uniquement dans la violation d'obligations
militaires ».
(71) o.g. The agrecmcnt with Austria (signed lOth October 1961) Kitvei Amava
NO. 454 ( lOth July 1962) vol. 13 p. 1.
(72) e.g. thr agreemont with Siriizerland (signed 31th December 1958) Kitvei
Amana N" 309 (13th October 1959) vo. 10 p. 391 and with Sireden (signed
lOth September 1963) Kitvei Amana N«. 510 (20th July 1965) vol. 15 p. 25.
(73) Repealed and superseded in 1956 by the Military Justice Law, 5715-1955 Sefer
Ha-Chukkim 189, 1955, p. 71 L.S.I. vol. 9 p. 183. Section 14 (a) of the Interpre-
tation Ordinance provides that when an enactment repeals and re-enacts with
or without modification any Provision of any lormer law, references in any
other enactment to the Provision so repealed shall. unless the contrary inten-
tion appears, be constructed as references to the Provision so le-enacted.
(74) Article 5(b) of the Harvard Draft.
(75) See chaptcr 3 supra.
The same proviso appears in the treaty with France. The other
treaties listing extradition offences (76), including the treaty with the
U S A., do not contain any special clause in relation to military offences
(77) and the exclusion of these from the provisions as to extradition can
be therefore deduced only from the fact that the list does not include
any military offence proper.
As to the treaties not listing offences :
(a) the treaty with Sweden provides in section 8 : « A person claimed
shall not be exlradited if the offence in respect of which his
extradition is requested is a military offence, provided however
that extradition may be granted if such an offence also consti-
tutes an offence under the criminal law of the requested party and
in respect of which extradition may otherwise be granted » ;
(b) the treaties with Switzerland and Austria include a Provision
similar to that included in the treaty with Italy, cited above.
There are naturally no treaties derogating from the rule
of non-extradition of military offences as such proviso would be
contrary to the express wording of sections 2 and 21 of the
Law (78).
5. Some reflections on the future prospects of the rule
A mutual interest in the maintenance of law and order and the
administration of justice has led nations to cooperate with one another
by surrendering fugitive criminals to the state in which the crime was
. committed This common interest of civilized communities has many
and manifold motives : it promotes friendly relations with other states,
it protects the inhabitants from the effects of the Immigration of dangerous
elements, it serves as a deterrent against crime and prevents the com-
mission of further crimes by the same malefactor and it furthers the
repression of crime as such.
(76) See note 69 aupra.
(77) The treaty of the U.S.A. with Brazil and Sweden includes ^«"'^hcocpress Pro-
hibition (Article V (5) ot the Brazilian treaty and article V (4) of the Swedtsh
treaty) These treaties do not contain any definition of the term « purely mih-
tary o t'cnces » and presumably this wording would be expla.ned as « violat.ons
of mil tary regulations and discipline ,, as defined in the Brazil.an-Belg.an treaty
of To'k As to the treaties of the U.S. generally See also The Ne^E.vtrad.„on
Treaties of the U.S. by Prof. Alona EVANS, ?>9 A.J.L. p. 351 (196.5).
(78) As to the appropriatc legal forum which would decide on the question, if a
demand for extradition for a military offence would be produced, see section
b (Procedure) above.
y
-4h
««Sä-
222
Meir SHAMGAR
RAPPORT ISRAELIEN
923
M
As we have seen above — political and military offences have been
excluded from this sphere, because other specific motives had overriding
influence. This differentiation between common crimes on the one
band and political er military crimes on the other band has cau-
sed various difficulties — be it in connection with the discern-
ment between the above mentioned different classes of offences or be it
because of the practical difficulties sometimes caused hereby in the reia-
tions of States, especially states carrying on friendly relations with one
another. As to the first point : the politization of large spheres of life
and the utilization of criminal law for securing and carrying out social
and political revolutions — have blurred the boundary line between
criminal and political offences in many states (79). This attributes
for the recurring difficulties in the uniformity of application of
the rules as to political offences. Secondly, the common interest
of states did not stop short of the political or military offence ;
on the contrary, countries having common military interests and some-
times even a common military responsibility were looking for short
cuts of the present procedure, i.e. for pragmatic Solutions furthering the
interests of discipline in allied forces («brevi-manu extradition » (80).
In other words, as mentioned above it may well be that some states,
because of close association or because of the close similarity of their
political institutions would find the extradition of political or military
offenders not only possible but even dcsirable : countries tied by a politi-
cal alliance might be or are apt to be directly interested in the rendition
and punishment of any military offender, who has weakened by his
behaviour the common military cause and the common military alertness.
The dividing line of interest does not follow in these cases the
political boundaries because even these lost some of their impor-
tance in cases where a common military defence has been planned
and executed. The rise of political and military groupings, we are witnes-
sing, might turn the rendition of a military offender, belonging to the
armed forces of a military ally, into a reasonable ancillary to the general
political and military development ; it is not more and not less than an
expression of the common responsibility of these military allies for their
coUective security or even their direct national interest.
Above mentioned specific developments are naturally not applicable
to every possible set of circumstances : they are specific to military
alliances and therefore they need not bring about far-reaching changes
in the existing rule as to non-extradition for military offences. In other
words they need not influence the legislative policy of national legisla-
tions if there are no specific common military interests as explamed
above but in the sphere of international law they would justify the
continued restraint from the creation of hard and fast rules prohibiting
categorically any extradition for military offences. The more flexible
approach, exemplified by the wordmg of section 6 the Harvard Dratt
which made the non-extradition for military offence facultative and not
obligatory should continue to be the more appropriate prototype for any
international multi-lateral agreement..
A
(79) Yougoslav Refugee (Germany) Gase, 54 A.J.I.L. 416^ 418 (i960) and see 56
A.J.I.L. 223 (1962). See also the Ktir casc oi May 1961 (87 Enlscheidungen des
schweizerischen Bundesgerichts, I. 134).
(80) Compare inter alia : Acqtiisition of custody over the Interiiatioyial fugitive
ojjender — Alternatives to Extradition by Prof A. EVANS. Brit. Yearhook of
Iiiteruatioual Law 1964 p. 80.
The question of rendition of a soldier without proper extradition procee-
dings has not arisen in Israel, but the Palestine High Court dealt with this
question during the period of the British Mandate over Palestine : in H.C. 71/44
(11 PLR 355) KATZ ex parte NOVIK v. CO. Polish Forces in Palestine.
Habeas Corpus proceedings were started because of the arrest and delivery of
a deserter from the Polish Forces by the Palestine Police, without proper pro-
ceedings according to the Allied Forces Act then in force in Palestine. The
application was dismissed, the Court ruling :
« Provided the Court Martial is properly constituted and provided the accused,
» who is betöre it. is subject to its Jurisdiction, the circumstances in which he
» was arrested and arrived before the Court are not relevant to the question
» of the Jurisdiction of the Court ».
The same ratio was applied in CA. 14/42 (9 PLR 63) Afoune v. A.C. and
in the British case of ex parte ELLIOT (1949) 1 All E.R. 373.
ii
n
1/
225
Rapport itaiien
ESTRADIZIONE PER REATI MILITARI
di
Gildo RODI
Giudice Militari de Sorveglianza
(Italia)
X
1. 71 rifiuto delVestradizione per reati militari e previsto da qualche
specijica legge ? Quäle ?
Non e previsto da alcuna legge, ma e regulato dalle convenzioni inter-
nazionali.
2. II vostro paese ha concluso delle convenzioni in deroga a questa
proihizione ? Nel caso di riposta positiva si prega di precisare le conven-
zioni e le parti contrastanti.
Non mi risulta.
3. Quäle posoziojie viene presa in caso di reati complessi nei quali i
reati di dirltto comune indivisihilviente legati ai reati miltari ?
^ Se, fatta astrazione della violazione della legge penale militare, rimane
un reato per cui e ammessa estradizione, questa e concessa. Esempio :
insubordinazione con omicidio — fatta astrazione che la vittima e superiore
del colpevole, rimane Tomicidio.
4. Quäle e raxitoritä covipetente per determinare se una domanda di
estradizione per reato comune non sia in realtä un modo indiretto per ein-
dere la proihizione delVestradizione per delitti militari ?
E' la stessa autoritä che prende la decisione di respingere o di acco-
gliere la domanda dello Stato richiedente ?
E' la stessa autoritä giudiziaria preposta alla decisione sull'accogli-
mento o meno della domanda di estradizione e cioe, la Sezione istruttoria
presso la Corte di Appello nel cui distretto si trova l'imputato o il condan-
nato (art. 662 CPP).
li )
226
Gildo RODI
227
\i\
In casi di richiesta di estradizione di imputato o condannato per reati
militari, l'autoritä giudizlaria militarc (Procuratore generale militare), si
rivolge al Ministro della Giustizia trasmettendogli gli atti e i documenti
necessari (art. 433 CPMP).
5. Quäle e stato il numero di estradizioni richieste da uno State
straniero nel corso degli ultimi dieci anni, il nuviero delle richieste accolte
e per quali inirazioni militari ?
Non abbiamo elementi di risposta.
6. Pensate che una deroga convenzionale o legislativa, dovrehbe
essere apportata alla proibizione generale delV estradizione per delitti mili-
tari? — Per quali delitti e sotto quäle forma e se il problema si presenta
piu pressante per i casi di forze integrate.
Si, specie per le diserzioni, tra paesi legati da un vincolo di alleanza
militare.
7. Consegna di militari, in sostituzione delV estradizione.
Non abbiamo dati per rispondere.
Rapport luxembourgeois
L'EXTRADITION POUR DELITS MILITAIRES
EN DROIT LUXEMBOURGEOIS
par
Francois GOERENS
Avocat general
(Grand Duche de Luxembourg)
I. Actes donnant Heu ä extradition. Prohibition de Vextradition pour
infraction niilitaire.
1. La loi du 13 mars 1870 sur Textradition des malfaiteurs etrangers
autorise le Gouvernement ä livrer aux Gouvernements etrangers, ä Charge
de reciprocite, tout etranger mis en prevention ou en accusation, ou con-
damne par les tribunaux des dits pays, pour l'une des infractions enumerees
par cette loi et commise sur leur territoire. Parmi les faits pour lesquels la
loi permet Fextradition ne figurent pas les infractions militaires.
2. La meme loi de 1870 autorise le Gouvernement ä conclure des trai-
tes d'extradition dans les limites tracees par cette loi. Mais le Luxembourg
n'a conclu en tout que deux traites sur la base de la loi de 1870, ä savoir,
avec la Belgique le 23 octobre 1872, et avec la France le 12 septembre 1873.
Des pourparlers engages avec d'autres Etats il resultait que les limites
fixees par la loi etaient trop etroites. Souvent les autres Etats demandaient
Finsertion de clauses non prevues par la loi ou l'extension de l'extradition ä
des infractions non comprises dans la nomenclature legale. De nombreux
traites furent ainsi conclus qui deviaient de la loi generale de 1870 et de-
vaient des lors recevoir la sanction du pouvoir legislatif. De tous ces traites
bilateraux conclus par le Grand-Duche, aucun n'a admis l'extradition pour
infractions militaires.
3. Ceci n'empeche pourtant pas la possibilite d'accorder l'extradition
de militaires etrangers pour des infractions de droit commun prevues par
la loi et les traites d'extradition, ces infractions fussent-elles meme repri-
mees par les lois militaires et justiciables des juridictions militaires. Seule
reste exclue l'extradition pour des infractions purement militaires, telles
que la desertion, l'abandon de poste, le refus d'obeissance, etc. Cependant
la question se pose si l'extradition du chef d'une infraction de droit com-
mun reprimee egalement par la loi militaire dans l'Etat requerant ne doit
pas etre subordonnee ä la condition que cette infraction n'y soit pas punie
plus severement que si eile relevait uniquement du droit penal ordinaire.
li
228
Francois GOERENS
RAPPORT LUXEMBOURGEOIS
229
II. Autorite coinpetente pour accorder Vextradit
lon.
4. II appartient au Gouvernement de determiner si la demande d'ex-
tradition est conforme au traite d'extradition, si Tinfraction pour laquelle
lextradition est demandee figure parmi les infractions pour lesquelles
celle-ci pcut accordec, et si le Gouvernement etranger ne tend pas ä
obtenir sous le couvert d une infraction de droit commun l'extradition pour
une mfraction politique ou militaire au mepris de la prohibition legale.
5 Toutefois le pouvoir judiciaire intervient egalement dans Tinstruc-
tion des demandes d'extradition. Son role reste cependant purement con-
sultatit. En effet la Chambre des mises en accusation de la Cour Superieure
de Justice est appelee ä donner un avis sur la demande d'extradition Elle
le fait apres avoir entendu le refugie, qui peut se faire assister par un avo-
cat. La decision meme appartient au Ministre de la Justice, qui la prend
apres deliberation du Gouvernement en conseil. Le Ministre peut ref user
1 extradition nonobstant un avis favorable de la Chambre des mises en
accusation. II ne peut I'accorder que de l'avis conforme de la juridication
consultee.
III. Applications du principe du refus d'extradition pour delit militai
re.
6. Au dix-neuvieme siede, la Situation geographique du Grand-Duche
avec des frontieres communes avec deux des plus grandes puissances mili^
taires europeennes, a mis le Gouvernement luxembourgeois souvent dans
1 Obligation de prendre une decision quant au sort de deserteur.s etrangers
refugies sur son territoire. Le principe etait simple : la desertion n'etait pas
une cause d'extradition. En consequence, l'extradition du chef de desertion
devait etre ref usee. Si le Gouvernement etranger dcmandait Textradition
d un deserteur du chef de delits de droit commun, il devait prendre soin
d assurer d avance ä l'inculpe l'impunite du chef de desertion. De son cote
le Gouvernement luxembourgeois requis n'accordait, dans ce cas, l'extra-
dition que sous la reserve de l'impunite du delit de desertion. L'extradition
fut-elle volontaire, ne s'etendait pas ä la desertion. L'attention speciale du
deserteur refugie etait appelee sur ce point au moment oü 11 signait la
declaration de renonciation aux formalites diplomatiques et judiciaires (1).
7. Une decision interessante merite d'etre rappelee : le Gouvefne-
ment allemand avait demande en 1888 au Gouvernement luxembourgeois
1 extradition, du chef de vol, d'un deserteur bavarois qui, lors de sa deser-
tion, avait soustrait des effets d'uniforme. Cr, d'apres l'article 140 du code
penal mihtaire luxembourgeois de 1815, alors en vigueur, le deserteur qui
emportait dans sa fuite des effets d'uniforme ne se rendait coupable que de
la desertion avec circonstance aggravante, tandis que d'apres la legislation
allemande il se rendait coupable de deux delits distincts, de la desertion et
du vol. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois ne consentit pas ä l'extradition
du chef de vol parce que ce fait constituait d'apres la loi luxembourgeoise
non pas une infraction distincte, mais uniquement une circonstance aggra-
vante de la desertion qui elle-meme ne donnait pas lieu ä l'extradition (2)
IV. Restitution des ejjets empörtes par un deserteur.
8. Les effets militaires empörtes par le deserteur etaient en pareil
cas restitues ä l'Etat auquel ils appartenaient. L'usage de restituer ces
effets reposait g^neralement sur la courtoisie internationale. Cependant
avec la France le Grand-Duche avait conclu le 19 juin 1858 un arrangement
au sujet de la restitution des armes et equipements des deserteurs des deux
pays. II parait non sans interet de reproduire le texte de cet arrangement (3)
pour preciser l'objet et l'etendue de l'entraide que ces deux Etats se sont
garantis en cette matiere :
« Par suite de l'autorisation de S.M. le Roi Grand-Duc, le Gouver-
nement du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg a conclu avec celui de France
l'arrangement suivant, concernant la restitution des armes et equi-
pements des deserteurs des deux pays :
1« Lorsque des militaires du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg ou ^ de
la France deserteront de leur pays natal pour passer la frontiere,
les deux Gouvernements saisiront les effets militaires empörtes par
le deserteur et les restitueront ä l'Etat auquel il appartient.
2" Seront compris parmi les effets militaires qui devront etre saisis
et restitues :
— les armes d'ordonnance ainsi que les effets d'armement de toute
espece ;
— les chevaux et leur equipage ;
— les tambours et les Instruments de musique ;
— les effets de grand equipement.
3^ -Resteront exempts de saisie et de restitution les effets d'habille-
ment et de petit equipement, lesquels seront laisses au deserteur
pour s'en servir ulterieurement.
4« Le gouvernement qui surprendra sur son territoire un deser-
teur de l'Etat voisin, en donnera immediatement avis par voie
diplomatique ä l'autre Gouvernement.
Cette communication renfermera le nom et le signalement du
deserteur avec l'indication du corps d'armee d'oü il a deserte ; un
\
(1) ULVELING, Extradition, p. 89.
(2) ULVELING. op. cit., p. 90.
(3) Memorial du Grand-Duch^ de Luxembourg, 18o8, p. 141.
'i9
II
}
t
f
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230
Fiangois GOERENS
nf .f ' '"'^' militaires trouves en sa possession avec indication
dt ceux qu, pourront encore servir et de ceux qui sont uses ou
detenores ; 1 enumeration des effets d'habillement et de petit 4uT
usage , des renseignements sur les effets d'armement que le deser-
teur aura,t vendus. ainsi que sur le prix qu'il en aurait tire et sur la
personno de l'acheteur.
^" i.° VF^; '"'■ ^^, ^'"'^'^"i'^'^tion susmentionnee, le Gouvernement
de 1 Etat auquel appartient le deserteur aura demande la remise
seront^^i?rT^°" de quelques-uns d'entre eux, les objets reclames
f T? 1, . ^'^P°«'t.on du Gouvernement reclamant et deposes
a Tlnonvüle alors ville frontiere entre le Grand-Duche et la
France), par les autorites frangaises pour les deserteurs luxem-
bourgeois et a Luxembourg par les autorites luxembourgeoises
dant de place et. s'il n'y en a pas, chez le commandant de 4a gen-
darmerie. 11 en scra donne un regu detail le.
6° Les frais occasionnes par le transport des effets ä la place de depot
resteront a la Charge de l'Etat sur le territoire duquel le deserteur
aura ete arrete. Le Gouvernement dont le deserteur est sujet de-
vra les y faire prendre ä ses propres frais.
7° Les depenses faites pour la nourriture des chevaux saisis seront
appar°t"endra ^^"" ^^ Gouvernement de l'Etat auquel le deserteur
Les autorites et fonctionnaires que la chose concerne sont invites
a tenir la mam a l'execution de cet arrangement ».
retsSVrtT.T'"'"' V^^-'' ^' ^'^"" remarquable ä concilier les inte-
rets de 1 Etat d ongme du de.serteur avec les imperatifs humanitaires de ne
pas pr,ver le deserteur d'effets dont il avait besoin pour son usage person!
V. Excrption au principe de la non-extradition pour delits militaires.
9. Le principe de la non-extradition ä raison d'infractions militaires
dSSon fu\tr\' "l:.''""''- ^"^'^^^ '^ conventirLToSne
dextradition du 13 decembre 1957 l'a consacre, tout en precisant aue
seulement les infractions militaires qui ne constituent pas des Sractions
tlon clenTr '^-«t-nt exclues du champ d'application de cette Conven!
enlorTenlemHe paix!'"^ "°" ""^^"^"^ '"^ *^"^P^ "^ ^--' ^^^
10. Au debut du XIXe siecle, le Grand-Duche de Luxembourg s'est vu
man.que II fit partie en sa qualite de membre de cette Confederation de
la Convention de cartel. conclue Ic 10 fevrier 1831, par laquelle les E aS de
RAPPORT LUXEMBÜURGEOIS
231
la Confederation se sont assure l'extradition reciproque des deserteurs.
L'obligation pour le Grand-Duche de livrer aux Etats allemands les deser-
teurs, n'ayant resulte que de sa qualite de membre de la Confederation,
est venue ä cesser du jour oü la Confederation a disparu (4).
11. Le 27 juillet 1944, ä la veille de la Liberation, le gouvcrnenient
luxembourgeois, alors en exil ä Londres, a conclu avec les Etats-Unis un
arrangement en vertu duquel le Luxembourg a reconnu aux juridictions
militaires americaines la juridiction exclusive, en territoire luxembour-
geois, d'une part, sur tous les membres des Forces alliees, a Texclusion des
mem'bres luxembourgeois de ces Forces servant sous commandement beige
ou luxembourgeois et operant en territoire luxembourgeois, et, d'autre
part, sur tout civil non Luxembourgeois au service ou ä la suite des Forces
alliees. L'arrangement a prevu une Cooperation entre les autorites mili-
taires americaines et la police luxembourgeoise en vue de l'arrestation et
de la remise aux autorites alliees des delinquants et en vue de l'mstruc-
tion de leurs affaires. Un arrangement analogue a ete conclu avec le
Royaume-Uni le memo jour. Ces arrangements n'ont jamais ete publies au
Luxembourg.
12 Le Luxembourg en tant que membre de l'OTAN est partie ä la
Convention entre les Etats parties au Traite de l'Atlantique Nord sur le
Statut de leurs Forces. Ce n'est qu'ä titre exceptionnel que des Forces al-
liees se trouvent au Grand-Duche pour Texecution d'un service. Par contra
les permissionnaires, surtout americains, y viennent nombreux. Le Luxem-
bourg applique a ces permissionnaires la Convention. Les militaires
americains recherches du chef d'infraction militaire par les autorites
militaires americaines et qui se sont refugies au Luxembourg sont remis
par les organes de la police luxembourgeoise aux autorites militaires
americaines sans observer les formalites de Textradition.
13 Le Traite Benelux d'extradition et d'entraide judiciaire en ma-
tiere penale du 27 juin 1962 admet l'extradition pour les infractions aux
lois militaires. Ce traite a abandonne le Systeme classique de 1 enumeration
^limitative des infractions donnant lieu ä extradition et admet dans son arti-
cle 2 l'extradition pour « les f aits punis par les lois de la Partie requerante
et de la Partie requise d'une peine privative de liberte dun maximum
d'au moins six mois ». L'extradition est des lors permise pour les infrac
tions militaires reprimees par les deux legislations. Le Traite refuse bien
l'extradition pour infraction politique ou pour fait connexe a une teile
infraction, mais l'article 3, al. 2 du Traite prend soin de dire que la deser-
tion n'est pas consideree comme une infraction politique pour 1 application
du Traite. Une collaboration tres complete entre les Etats du Benelux
s'imposait dans le domaine de l'extradition en general << en consideration
des liens etroits unissant ces pays et notamment del'abrogation du con-
trole des personnes aux frontieres interieures (V. preambule du Trai-
te) L'extension de l'extradition aux infractions militaires se justifie entre
ces tro? pays qui se trouvent, «quant ä la defense nationale, dans une
Situation qui implique une solidarite ineluctable ».
S
(4) ULVELING, op. cit., p. 5-6.
232
Frangois GOERENS
233
VI. La Prohibition de Vextradition pour delits militaires $e justifie-t-elle
au sein d'une alliance ?
14. Le Systeme admis entre les pays Benelux ne devra-t-il pas etre
generalise ? La Convention europeenne d'extradition a fait un premier pas
en englobant dans son champ d'application les infractions militaires qui
constituent egalement des infractions de droit commun. Mais entre Etats
li6s entre eux par un traite de defense l'extradition devra egalement etre
accordee pour les delits purement militaires qui ne portent atteinte qu'aux
regles de la discipline. En effet toute atteinte ä la discipline risque de porter
atteinte ä Tefficacite de cette armee. Or pareille atteinte portee ä Tune des
armees cooperant ä la defense commune interesse tous les Etats parties
au traite et justifie des lors leur Cooperation ä l'effet d'assurer la repres-
sion de l'infraction commise. Plus l'alliance entre Etats est etroite, plus
Tentraide judiciaire qu'ils se pretent doit etre grande. Dans le cas de forces
integrees, cette entraide doit etre complete.
Rapport norvcgicn
EXTRADITION FOR
MILITARY OFFENCES
by
Alf MONSEN
Judge Advocate General
(Norway)
A. The properly so-called Extradition
\
1 '
i'i
1. Is the refusal oj extradition jor miltary offences sanctioned hij law?
By which one?
Extradition of criminals to foreign countries is regulated by Act of
13 June 1908. § 2 forbids extradition for punishable offences which are
to be regarded as a purely military offence. In other words, offences
which are only dealt with in the military criminal code (§2). Concerning
other offences covered by the military criminal code the condition for
extradition is that the person to be extradited shall not receive
heavier punishment than what would be maximum punishment if treated
in accordance with our civil criminal code (§ 2, paragraph 3).
The injunction on the extradition has been deviated in the Scandi-
navian countries and Finland. The Act of 3 March 1961 on extradition of
criminals to Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden is now in force in
these countries with the exception of Iceland. The Act Warrants extra-
dition for prosecution if the punishable offence in the country that desires
the extradition (requests) can lead to imprisonment (confinement). Thus
it also involves any offence of the military criminal code under same
conditions.
2. Has your country concluded Conventions which are affecting this
Prohibition? If the ansioer is in the affirmative, pleace State these
Conventions and the contracting parties.
Norway has ratified the European Convention on extradition signed
13 December 1957. In article 4 it is stated :
« Extradition for offences under military law which are not offences
under ordinary criminal law is excluded from the application of this
Convention ».
i'i
2'M
Alf MONSEN
RAPPORT NORVEGIEN
235
fe
Concerning the pure military offences only, Norway has not signed
any Convention givin.t? exemption from the extradition Act of 1908. Such a
Convention would not be binding in a Norwegian court of law unless the
Norwegian Act is amended in agreement with the Convention.
For military offences which also come under the civil code — apart
from the military connection — the Convention of 1957 should apply. The
Convention, however, gives an opportunity to make reservations before
signing the ratification. Norway has done this in consideration of the
extradition Act of 1908, § 2, paragraph 3 (see 1 above). Thus there has been
no deviation from Norwegian law on this point.
3. Which Position has been taken in case of complex offences where the
infractions of the common law are indivisibly connected with military
infractions ?
The extradition Act of 13 June 1908 is based upon the understanding
that the person to be extradited can only be punished for crime (s) for
which he is formally extradited or for which the authorities in question
give subsequent consent to. The position is therefore that the extradited
person can only be punished for the civil crimes for which he can be
extradited and not for the pure military ones. This always applies irre-
spective of how close the connection is between the crimes in question.
For instance that they constitute one punishable offence.
After the Scandinavian extradition Act of 1961 this problem does not
3xist. The Act has even a Provision which Warrants extradition for several
punishable acts even if the terms are only met for one of them (§ 3, 3).
4. Which is the competent authority to determine whether a request for
extradition for an offence under the general law is not, in reality, a
veiled manner to evade the Prohibition of the extradition for military
offences ? Is this the same authority (legal, for instance) who also
makes the decisions as to whether the request of a State be denied or
granted ?
A demand for extradition must be forwarded through diplomatic Chan-
nels to the Ministry of Justice which evaluates if the formal conditions
are present. In order to prevent evadement the Act demands :
a) Information about the person's civil relations ;
b) Description of person ;
c) If sentence has been passed (this in original or copy) ;
d) Decision by competent authority with the same result as Norwegian
seizure or indictment ;
e) Copy of penal clauses to be used ;
f ) Proof of persons guilt — valid reasons for suspicion.
If the Ministry of Justice is of the opinion that one should promote
the matter, it must forward the matter to the Court of summary Jurisdic-
tion which will decide whether legal right for extradition is present.
5. Which, in fact, was the number of extraditions requested by a foreign
State ivithin the last 10 years ? The number of requests complied with ?
For which military offences ?
Norway has no official statistics on demands for extradition of per-
sonnel because of military offences.
6. Do you believe that a conventional (or legislative) derogation should
be brought to the general prohibition of the extradition for military
offences ? For lohich offences ? and under which form ? Is the problem
more urgent in the case of integrated form ?
Reference is made to the provisions in the Act of 3 March 1961. One
should assume that — in the future — corresponding provisions might
become a question of interest as concerns extradition to other foreign
countries.
B. Delivery of military individiials by other means than Extradition.
1. Is there a practice to deliver foreign military individuals luho are
stationed on your territory if their barracks are located on the same
territory as yours ?
As concerns Norway there has not yet been extradition of foreign
military persons to foreign military authorities.
Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding
the Status of their forces of 19 June 1951 has a Provision about handmg
over to that authority which is to exercise the Jurisdiction in accordance
with the regulation (Art. VII, par. 5 a). This has not yet been done m
practice but the legal right to such handing over is quite clear.
2. 7s there a slmilar practice which applies to military individuals of your
country who are stationed in a foreign country ?
In Gaza it has happened that a Norwegian soldier who has run away
to a neighbouring state has been deported and handed over to the U.N.
forces.
I f
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236
3.
Air MONSEN
iKi
Does the practice exist to deliver foreign military individuals at tlie
border who have committed their offence in their own country, and
xoho escaped, in order to seek refuge in xjour country, or who transit
to your country, in order to seek refuge in a third country ?
The above practice (procedure) is unknown by Norwegian legal author-
ities. A handing over across the border completely informally would be
clearly illegal as well according to the Act of extradition of 1908 as to
the Scandinavian Act of same of 1961.
There are no statistics available about these three points.
237
Rapport neerlandais
EXTRADITION AND HANDING OVER
FOR MILITARY OFFENCES
LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE IN THE NETIIERLANDS
by
Frifs KALSHOVEN, L LM.
Lt. cdr (S) R. Neth. N.
(Pays-Bas)
\
Preliminary observations
1. Rules in force.
Prior to attempting to answer the questions raised in the question-
naire, some Information should be procured about the structure of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the legislative processes obtaining in it.
The Kingdom is composed of three parts (called Landen, as distinct
from the State «Kingdom of the Netherlands» on the one band, and
their regional and local components on the other). These are : Holland,
Surinam and the Dutch Antilles. Each of these enjoys a large degree of
autonomy, but for the time being they are held together by common
interests and by a desire to aid one another in the promotion of their
respective particular interests. The relation between the Landen is one of
equivalence rather than strict equahty. This is apparent, for instance,
in the Organization and staffing of the Kingdom apparatus, where
Dutch Organs and personnel are dominant.
The regime in question is embodied in the Covenant of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, of 29 December 1954. It is in Operation as from that
date.
In the Covenant, certain matters are designated as matters of com-
mon interest, or «matters of the Kingdom» (Art. 3). These must be
taken care of in co-operation between the Landen, according to a proce-
dure set out in the Covenant (Art. 6ff). As far as legislation is concerned,
cnactment by Statute - or Order in Council - of the Kingdom is
required (Art. 14), unless the law is not designed to govern the issue
in either Surinam or the Antilles : in that case the Land legislator of
Holland is competent (Art. 14 § 3). Thus, in matters of common interest
V
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238
Frits KALSHOVEN
RAPPORT NEERLANDAIS
239
)l
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we may find both Kingdom and Dutch legislation. Furthermore, Kingdom
legislation may apply to the cntire Kingdom, but it may also be appli-
cable only in one or both of the Landen situated in the American hemis-
phere.
Now, among the «matters of the Kingdom» are the general condi-
tions for the admittance and expulsion of foreigners (Art. 3 § 1 sub g),
and the extradition (sub h). It bears some emphasis that, whereas extra-
dition in its entirety is a matter of the Kingdom, only the general condi-
tions of admittance etc. of foreigners are declared to be such a matter.
This leaves the Landen with the competence to legislate in the latter
field, provided the general Kingdom rules in force (if any) are taken
into account. On the other band, legislation concerning extradition always
is a subject of Kingdom legislation (with the exception set out above
relative to Dutch legislative competence).
As, in Order to obtain a complete picture of extradition and handing
over for military offences, cognizance must be taken of the legislatron re-
garding both extradition and the admittance and expulsion of foreigners,
we find ourselves confronted with a complex set of regulations of different
level, which will be set forth according to the territory of application of
each regulation.
Kingdom.
Mention has already been made of the Provision contained in the
Covenant (Art. 3 § 1 sub gi and h). No Act containing general conditions
for the admittance and expulsion of foreigners has yet been brought
about.
It may further be mentioned that the treatymaking power is reserved
to the Kingdom.
Holland.
The basic rules are found in Art. 4 § 2 of the Constitution, reading
as follows :
«The admittance and expulsion of foreigners, as well as the general
conditions on which treaties regarding their extradition can be entered
into with other Powers, shall be regulated by Statute law ».
The Acts concerned, in force at the moment of preparing this report,
are the following :
a) the Act of 13 August 1849, Staatshlad (or S.) 39, relative to the ad-
mittance and expulsion of foreigners (amended) ;
b) the Act of 6 April 1875, S. 66, relating the general conditions on
which treaties with other Powers can be entered into regarding the
extradition of foreigners (amended) ;
c) the Handing Over (War Crimes) Act, 19 May 1954, S. 215, relative to
the handing over of persons suspected of gravc breaches of the
Geneva Red Gross Conventions of 1949.
The Acts referred to under a. and b. being slightly antiquated, their
complete renewal has been initiated. So far, this has resulted in :
d) a new Foreigners Act, 13 January 1965, S. 40, not in force yet, but
which may be expected to come into force soon and which then will
replace a ;
e) a draft Extradition Act, introduced in the Second Chamber of the
States-General on 21 April 1965 and which has been followed since
by a Preliminary Report of the Chamber's Permanent Committee
for Matters of Justice and a Memorandum of Reply of the Govern-
ment (Reports of Proceedings of the 2nd Chamber, Annexes, 1964-65-
66,8054).
Surinam.
Here too the Land Constitution contains the basic norm :
« Art. 4. — Extradition of foreigners may only take place by virtue of
treaties, taking into account the rules established by Statute — or
Order in Council — of the Kingdom ».
«Art. 5. — ... Rules regarding the admittance, the settlement and
the expulsion of foreigners are established by Land regulation, taking
into consideration the general conditions for the admittance and
expulsion of foreigners referred to in Article 3, Section 1, under g of the
Covenant ».
The following regulations are in force :
a) the Extradition Order in Council, 21 September 1926, Gouverne-
mentshlad (or GB.) 103, as amended by the Order in Council of the
Kingdom, 18 November 1958, G.B. 100 ;
b) the Admittance Order in Council, 13 June 1938, G.B. 92 ;
c) the Handing Over (War Crimes) Order in Council, 16 June 1954,
G.B. 69.
The Dutch Antüles.
Again, the basic rules are in the Land Constitution, Articles 4 and 5,
which are identical to those of the Surinam Constitution.
The regulations in force are :
a) the Extradition Order in Council, 21 September 1926, Puhlicatieblad
(or P.ß.) 61, as amended by the Order in Council of the Kmgdom,
18 November 1958, P.B. 167 ;
b) the Land Admittance and Expulsion Regulations, 24 April 1962, as
amended ; published lastly in P.B. 1966, 17 ;
\
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240
Frits KALSHOVEN
RAPPORT NEERLANDAIS
241
fl
y
c) the Handing Over (War Crimes) Order in Council, 16 June 1954
P.B. 115.
Recapitulating, it may be said Ihat :
— the legislation about extradition in force throughout the Kingdom is
rather antiquated : a new project has been introduced, designed to
replace the existing law in Holland ; upon consultation it has be-
come apparent that neither Surinam nor the Dutch Antilles feel any
great urge towards a renewal of the Kingdom legislation operative
in those Landen, and consequently it has been decided that Article
14 § 3 of the Covenant will be applied in this instance ;
— the rules as to admittance and expulsion of foreigners in the Dutch
Antilles are recent ; those in force in Holland are obsolete, but a new
Act is about to enter into force ;
those in Surinam are rather dated ; ""
— the rules concerning the handing over for grave breaches of the
Geneva Red Gross Conventions of 1949 are up to date.
As the questions raised in the questionnaire are of practical concern
mainly for Holland, we will restrict our answers in the body of the report
to the Situation as it exists in Holland. In an annex some information
will be procured regarding the Landen in the American hemisphere.
2. Military offences.
Another point which ought to be clarified beforehand is the sig-
nificance of the term « military offences» in the ccntext of extraditicn.
First, evidently only offences committed by military persons are envisa-
ged in the questionnaire. Secondly, whatever may be understood by mili-
tary offences in Dutch law, extradition or handing over «for a military
offence» must of necessity mean : for an offence which poFsesses the
character of a military offence — solely or also — according to the
legislation of the requesting State.
The war crimes consisting in a grave breach of the Geneva Red
Gross Conventions of 1949 are not military offences in the sense of Dutch
military law, but this report will take those into consideration never-
theless. While it may be said that Insubordination and desertion are the
natural general military offences, the war crimes referred to are the
natural loartime military offences. Of course, those crimes can be com-
mitted by civilians as well, but military persons will be more often
in a Position to commit these. And, more important yet, such a crime
committed by a soldier possesses more or less the character of a profes-
sional delict. Finally, it is not at all improbable that in other legislations
these crimes are classed as military offences.
After these preliminary observations we may set about answering
the questions. In doing so, we will keep to the order of the questionnaire.
A. The pioperly so-called Extradition
1. The statutory texts.
The extradition law in force in Holland is based, first, on the prin-
ciple of enumeration of the extraditable offences, these being defined by
reference to the penal legislation of Holland. The list of extraditable
offences (contained in Article 2 ) is very restricted, only a selection of
the graver crimes being included.
No military offences are included in the enumeration. In the System
applied this amounts to a denial of extradition for these offences.
A second principle underlying the extradition legislation is that of
double incrimination : the act for which extradition is requested, must be
punishable under the legislations both of Holland and the requesting State,
and this not merely in abstracto on the ground of some or other Provision
of the penal laws applicable to it, but in concreto taking into account all
relevant circumstances that in accordance with the legislation in force may
have an influence on the punishability of the act.
While in the draft Extradition Act, referred to above under Holland(e),
the principle of double incrimination has been retained, the system of
restrictive enumeration has been abandoned. Instead, subject always to the
terms of the extradition treaties in force between the Kingdom and other
States (Art 1), extradition will become admissible for any offence punish-
able by imprisonment of a certain duration (normally a maximum of at
least one year) according to the legislation of both the requesting State
and Holland. This general rule is subsequently curtailed in several ways,
a.o. in Art. 11, reading in part :
>*
« 1... military offences not being simultaneously crimes according to
ordinary Dutch criminal law ... cannot lead to extradition, unless
the contrary has been expressly provided by treaty.
«2 ...
« 3. The Provision in § 1 relative to military offences does not apply to
extradition to Belgium or Luxemburg ».
Thus, extradition even for purely military offences will not be strictly
prohibited in future, it being left to the treaty-making authorities
expressly to agree on their extraditability. With respect to Belgium and
Luxemburg the draft goes even further, simply permitting extradition
for all military offences.
As for the grave breaches of the Red Gross Conventions, the legis-
lation in force provides that for those crimes « handing over » is allowed.
This « handing over », it should be pointed out, actually is cqual to extra-
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dition, its motive and procedure being nearly identical to those of
extradition (1).
2. Cojiveyitions.
The bilateral exiiadition treaties to which the Kingdom oi the
Netherlands is a party, all follow the same pattern as the extradition
legislation in force : double incrimination, enumeration of extraditable
crimes and absence of military offences from this enumeration. In the
exehange of notes betvveen ihe Kingdom and the Federal Republic of
Germany restoring the extradition treaty of 1896 into force (1 December
1956, Trattatcnblad ~ or Trb. — 1957, 7) it is even expressly provided
that that treaty is no basis for mutual assistance in cases concerning pure-
ly military offences.
Of the more recent multilateral Conventions in this field the first to
be mentioned is the European Convention on Extradition Paris, 13 Decem-
ber 1957, Trb. 1965, 9. In this Convention a totally different System is
applied : extraditable offences are in principle all « offences punishable
under the laws of the requesting Party and of the requested Party by
deprivation of liberty or under a detention order for a maximum period of
at least one year or by a more severe penalty » (Art. 2 § 1) ; to this general
rule exceptions are made in subsequent articles. As to military offences,
it is stated in Article 4 that the Convention does 7iot apply to «offences
ünder military law which are not offences under ordinary criminal law ».
By implication it does apply to offences under military law which are
also offences under ordinary criminal law, thus allowing extradition for
such complex military offences. This is not compatible with the extradition
law in force. As ratification is for the time being only contemplated for
Holland and then only after the draft Extradition Act will have gained
force of law, no derogation to the legislation in force will actually occur,
however.
The Convention not being applicable to purely military offences,
the States parties to it retain the power to enter into (bilateral or multi-
laeral) agreements regarding extradition for those offences. Neither is
this faculty hampered by Article 28 S 2 of the Convention, according to
which the parties « may conclude between themselves bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements only in order to Supplement the provisions of this
Convention or to facilitate the application of the principles contained
therein», as obviously that Article operates only within the scope of
the Convention.
(1) The main differencc lies in the circumstance that. according to the Criminal
Law (Wartime) Act, 10 July 1952, S. 408. Dutch courts — and namely the
military courts — are alvvays competent to take cognizance of such crimes
irrespective of the locus delicti and the nationality of the accused ; in the
case of other extraditable offences the chanccs are that no Dutch court will
have Jurisdiction with respect to the offence for which extradition is re-
quested. This leads to a difference, a.o. in the designation of the court advi-
sing on the request, either for « handing over » or for extradition.
Also in the Benelux Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters, Brüssels, 27 June 1962, Trb. 1962, 97, any offence
is made extraditable in principle if it is punishable by a certain term of
imprisonment (Art. 2: a maximum of 6 months or more), but this time
not even the purely military offences are excluded.
More than that, in Article 3, dealing with political offences (and accor-
ding to which extradition shall not be granted if the offence in respect
of which it is requested is regarded by the requested Party as a poli-
tical offence or as an offence connected with a political offence), it is
expressly stated that desertion shall not be considered a political offence
(§ 2 sub b) (2). So, the admissibility under the Benelux Extradition (etc.)
Treaty of extradition for purely military offences is beyond any doubt.
As the Treaty will be ratified by the Kingdom (again for the terri-
tory in Europe) only after the aforementioned draft Extradition Act
will have gained force of law, no derogation from the Statute law in force
will arise from it.
As for the relationship between the Benelux Extradition (etc.)
Treaty and the European Convention on Extradition, it is clear that the
former, being a complete extradition treaty in itself, is incompatible
with Article 28 of the European Convention (partly quoted above). On
this account the Netherlands Government intends to make a reservation
to Article 28, so as to put beyond doubt the validity of the Benelux
Extradition (etc.) Treaty (3).
Ratification by the Netherlands Government of the four Geneva Red
Cross Conventions of 1949 without any previous mndification of the
extradition legislation in force, would not have resulted in any deroga-
tion from it. The articles of the Convention dealing with « handing over »
(1 : 49 ; II : 50 : III : 129 ; IV.: 146i begin by putting each of the Contrac-
ting Parties under an Obligation to search for «persons alleged to have
committed, or to have ordered to be committed », grave breaches as def i-
ned in the next articles, and to bring them before its own courts irres-
pective of their nationality. They continue :
(2)
(3)
In the Joint commentary to the Treaty published by the three Governments
(Trb 1964, 108). inter alia the following is said with respect to Article 3:
« Military desertion shall never be considered a political offence. As to other
offences against the military criminal code, whether they have a pohtical
character or not will have to be judged by the concrele circumstances of each
case». — However. even military desertion may constitute an offence connec-
ted with a political offence in the concrete circumstances of the case.
Explanatory Memorandum to the draft Act approving the European Con-
vention on Extradition, the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (Strasbourg, 20 April 1959, Trb. 1965. 10) and the Benelux
Extradition (etc.) Treaty. This draft Act was introduccd simultaneously with
the draft Extradition Act ; Reports of Proceedings, 2nd Chamber. Annexes
1964-65, 8054.
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245
«It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with Ihe provisions
of its üwn le^islation, band such persons over for trial to another
High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting
Party has made out a prima facie case ».
Evidently such handing over would be inconsistent with the pro-
visions of the existing extradition legislation ; handing over jor trial
to another State which has inade outa prima facie case cannot easily
be distinguished from extradition pure and simple, and the grave breaches
of the Conventions were not as such included in the enumerative list con-
tained in the said legislation. This would merely imply that The Nether-
lands would miss the faculty to « band over » the suspected persons con-
cerned, and consequently would be obliged ahvays to try them before its
own Courts, however difficult this might be in the circumstances of the
case. In order to circumvent this undesirable position, the Handing Over
(War Crimes) Act has been brought about, with the result that handing
persons over who are suspected of this species of war crimes will be in
accordance with the provisions of the Dutch legislation.
Has ratification by The Netherlands of the North Atlantic Treaty
and/or its membership of NATO entailed any derogation from the norm,
implied in its legislation, that extradition is not allowed for military
offences ? More particularly, has it enterred into any agreement to the
effect that deserters shall be extradited ?
The fundamental principle governing the issue is found in Article 3
of the Treaty :
«In Order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty,
the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and
effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and dcvelop their
individual and collect ive capacity to resist armed attack ».
Now, while this general norm evidently does not constitute an express
extradition agreement, on the other hand the extradition of offenders
against the military law and particularly deserters would be an instance
of mutual aid and mi^ht also be said lo holp maintain the capacity to
resist armed attack (both as far as sheer numbers are concerned and
on account of its potential impact on discipline). Thus, extradition for
these offences might be considered one of the many smaller means by,
which the parties can contribute to the implementation of the quoted
general principle. However, extradition is, both nationally and- interna-
tionally, jealously guarded and strictly regulated, and it may not lightly
be assumed that a more or less vague and wide principle expressed in a
political Instrument like the North Atlantic Treaty has the effect of
modifying the definite rules concerning that subject.
The most plausible place to look for a more concrete Provision rela-
tive to the subject at issue would be the NATO Status oi Forces Agree-
ment, London, 19 June 1951 (Trb. 1951, 114). The question whether this
Agreement contains such a Provision is referred to by S. Lazareff
in his book entitled Le Statut des forces de V O.TA.N. ei son apphca-
tion en France (Paris, 1964). He connects the issue with two articles of the
Convention, viz. Articles III and VH (pp. 132 ff and 264, respectively).
Both times he points out, however, that the Convention refers only to ^
«sending States» and « receiving States» and that the Situation of the
deserter finding himself in the territory of a third State is not covered
by its literal text.
It is not entirely clear what views the author holds with respect
to the further Solution of the problem in light of the obviously inadequate
conventional text. At one place it is suggested that « Tarticle III para-
c^raphe 4 ne peut recevoir application, mais l'article VII peut etre invoque »
(p 134 • it is added that « II est egalement possible que, outre la Conven-
tion des Conventions d'extradition de type classique existent entre 1 Etat
d'origine et l'Etat sur le territoire duquel se trouve le deserteur ». Evi-
dently ; but not, alas, of a kind that f avours extradition of deserters ;
hinc illae lacrimae).
At another place, and namely in a discussion of Article VII (dealing
ao with mutual assistance in the arrest and handing over of members of
a force), the author states that a serious lacuna is found here and that
Article VII § 5 does not apply to deserters found in third States (p. 264).
This time he goes on to explain how the problem may be solved in prac-
tica. As the suggested Solution appears to belong in the domain of expul-
sion rather than extradition, we will return to it in part B.
The conclusion is that te NATO Status of Forces Agreement does no
more that the North Atlantic Treaty contain an extradition agreement
properly speaking, applying to deserters found in the territory of third
(that is neither sending nor receiving) States. Hence, it cannot be said
that any derogation to the extradition legislation in force in the Kingdom
of the Netherlands derives from it.
Summarizing the above, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a party
to a good many bilateral extradition agreements, none of which includes
military offences among the extraditable offences enumerated therein.
Subsequently it has entered into - or intends to enter into - some agree-
ments which in form or in fact permit extradition for military offences,
viz the European Convention on Extradition (but only as fas as complex
military offences are concerned), the Benelux Treaty on Extradition and
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (all military_off£ncesl. and
taking the term «military offences» in the wide sense set forth above -
the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949. —
This does not i^^sumT^y derogation"^ to the legislation governing
the issue, as this has on the one hand been supplemented with « handing
over » provisions in conformity with the latter Conventions and, on the
other side, it is in the process of being adapted to the former treaties
which will only be ratified subsequent to the completion of that process.
Other international agreements which have a bearing on the subject
and to which the Kingdom is a party, and notably the North Atlantic
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RAPPORT NEERLANDAIS
247
H
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Treaty and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, cannot be said to
include an express or evcn an implied prescription of extradition for
nnilitary offences, pure or otherwise.
Finally, so soon as the extradition legislation in force will have been
replaced by the draft Extradition Act, agreements envisaging extradition
for military offences (and applicable to the territory of Holland only, as
far as the Kingdom is concerned) will not then derogate to the extradition
legislation, the Act expressly permitting the extradition for military
offences if an agreement to that effect has been concluded.
3. Coinplex military offences.
No special provisions are contained in the extradition legislation in
force with respect to complex military offences, in wich ordinary infrac-
tions are indivisibly tied with military infractions. The bilateral ex:tra-
dition agreements to which The Netherlands is a party are equally silent
on the matter. As the System applied in these instruments is that of limi-
tative enumeration, no extradition can be granted if it is requested for
an offence not included in the list, even though it is indivisibly tied
with an extraditable offence. On the other hand, if the request is exclusi-
vely based on the extraditable offence, extradition may be granted under
the customary condition that no charges shall be brought against the
extradited person for other offences committed prior to his surrender un-
less he has been given a reasonable opportunity to leave the territory
(the rule of speciality).
To give an example taken from Dutch criminal law : if extradition is
requested for larceny (an ordinary offence), it can be granted ; a request
based on « larceny committed by a military person in a place under his
special guard » (a military offence) would have to be turned down ; if a
case of larceny has in actual fact been committed under the circum-
stances related in the military code, a request for larceny sec is apt to be
granted as it is based on the ordinary criminal code, if it may reasonably
be expected that the condition referred to will be observed.
As to the draft Extradition Act, this follows the pattern set in the
European and Benelux extradition treaties. As we have seen, the European
Extradition Convention makes offences under military law extraditable
if these are simultaneously offences under ordinary criminal law. The
Benelux Extradition (etc.) Treaty even permits extradition for .all mili-
tary offences. In accordance with this, the draft Act does not exclude
complex military offences from the extraditable offences (Art. 11 ; supra
sub r^).
4. Authority competent to decide.
According to the Extradition Act in force, the decision whether a re
quest of extradition shall be granted or refused is taken by the Minister
of Justice of the Kingdom (w^ho happens to be the identical person as the
Minister of Justice of the Land Holland). The Minister takes his decision
only after having received the advice of a Court of Justice designated by
the Act. Not even the advice not to extradite is binding, however. This
leaves the füll responsibility for the decision in all its aspects with the
political authority, and this responsibility includes that of determining
whether a request of extradition for an ordinary offence is in fact a dis-
guised attempt to circumvent the prohibition of extradition for mihtary
offences.
As pointed out before, granting a request of extradition need not be
frustated by an initial suspicion that the extraditable offence stated in
the request merely serves to cover the Intention to charge the delinquent,
once extradited, with a non-extraditable offence as, e.g., a military offence :
it will suffice for the decisionmaking authority ultimately to gain the
conviction that the requesting State has given up its earlier mtention
and, hence, bona fide accepts the Obligation to comply with the rule ot
speciality. Extradition will have to be refused, however, if the authori-
ty concerned is reasonably convinced that this good faith is lacking.
Under the new legislation as envisaged in the draft Extradition Act,
the Minister of Justice is again competent to decide upon requests of extra-
dition (Art 20, 32) and advice of a Court designated in it must be obtained
previously (Art. 23 ff). This advice has taken on a different character,
however : it will be a decision as to the admissibility or inadmissibility
of extradition in the circumstances of the case (Art 28) and a verdict
of inadmissibility will be binding upon the Minister of Justice (Art. 66).
According to the draft text, extradition will be admissible for complex
military offences unless these are excluded (expressly or by implication)
in the international agreement underlying the request. The Position is
reversed with respect to purely military offences : those will be extra-
ditable offences only if that is expressly provided in the mternational
agreement. Thus, the Situation envisaged in A 4 of the questionnaire is
apt to occur with respect to both kinds of military offences under the
new law as well.
NoW in the supposition that a correct request of extradition is put
forward, based on an ordinary offence and accompanied by reasünably
sufficient prima fade evidence, it seems a moot pomt whether he Court
advising on the request would have the capacity to hold extradition inad-
missible on the ground of a suspicion (or even a strong 'n.^«^^]>o"> ^^at
the requested person, once surrendered, will be charged wUh a miltary
offence committed prior to his surrender Accordmg to the draft (Art^
28) the inadmisibility shall be pronounced, inter aha. if the Court f'nds that
the request is not capable of being granted. The instances of non-extradi-
tabilit? contained in Articles 9 and 11 (^he sole Art.cles which exclude
extradition in a categorical way. not making the exclusion dependent on the
ludgment of the Minister of Justice) do not include the aforementioned sus-
Sron the contrary, application of the rule of speciality is made a con-
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Frits KALSllUVEN
cern of the Minister of Justice (Art. 12). Thus it would seem that also under
the proposed text the political authority, and not the Court, will decide
whether a request of extradition shall be granted notwithstanding initial
misgivings as regards the true intentions behind the request on the part
of the requesting State.
5. Nuviher of extraditions.
No instances have occurred of requests of extradition for mihtary
offences, complex or otherwise. This is not very surprising in view of the
fact that neither the legislation in force nor the treaties to which the
Kingdom of the Netherlands is a party permit extradition for any but
the ordinary offences listed in those instruments.
Nor have any persons been « handed over » for trial on a charge of
grave breaches of the Geneva Red Gross Conventions of 1949.
6. Desirahility of extradition for military offences.
From the above it should be clear that the national aspect of the Pro-
blem of extradition for military offences is about to be solved : so soon
as the draft Extradition Act has gained force of law, extraditability of
those offences will no longer be contrary to the national legislation.
The Situation is different on the international level. Ratification of
the European and Benelux extradition treaties deserves first priority.
Once that step taken, extradition will be possible for all military offences
in the relationship with Belgium and Luxemburg (subject to ratification
of the Benelux treaty by those States) and for complex military offences
in the relationship with those States parties to the European Convention
which have accepted Article 4 without reservation (4).
This a far cry from being a final Solution of the issue, however. Extra-
dition for all mihtary offences will continue to be excluded in relation to
many States parties to extradition agreements with The Netherlands,
however much the possibihty of such extradition might be desirable.
The desirahility of extradition for military offences (even for purely
military offences like desertion) has been expressed in the context of
NATO at an early stage. Yet the NATO Status of Forces Agreement does
not provide for such extradition, although the inclusion of a Provision to
that effect would have been obvious. Of course it is realized that at the
(4) Both Sweden and Deninark have made rcservations to this Article, Sweden
reserving its « right to stipulate that the extradited person may not be
penalized in application of provisions relating to offences committed by
members of the armed Services » and Denmark stating its intention to grant
extradition « only provided the extradited person is not convicted under
military law ».
RAPPORT NEERLANÜAIS
249
time France was (not only a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, but also)
a mcmber of NATO, and to agree to the extradition of deserters from
the French Foreign Legion would certainly have been somewhat em-^
barrassing, a.o. as its mode of recruiting was quite opposed to accepted'
Standards in Europe. However, at the present time this obstacle does not
exist any more, and so the moment seems opportune to reconsider the
issue as to whether an agreement should be brought about concerning the
extradition for military offences as between members of NATO. In ordcr
to make this reconsideration we may start with some observations of a
general nature.
It should be pointed out first that the issue of extradition for military
offences only arises subsequent to the principal acceptance of extradition
in relation to a certain State. In this connection it may be of interest to note
that the Kingdom of the Netherlands maintains bilateral extradition agree-
ments with some twenty-five States — really a small percentage of the total
number of States existing at present.
The fact that in relation to a certain State extradition has been
accepted in principle, obviously signifies that sufficient trust is placed in
the political, legal and judicial regime in force in that State. In exammmg
the issue of extradition for military offences, we may thus take this
confidence for granted.
In the case of two States not bound by any special relationship, no
particulary strong arguments plead, either, in favour of extradition for
military offences, or against it. Evidently it is not extradition of mihtary
persons as such that is rejected : they may be extradited for extradi-
table ordinary offences. Thus, the argument cannot lie in the reluctance
of States to contribute to the maintenance of other States' armed forces
as far as numbers are concerned. It may be found, on the other band, m
the desire to avoid involvement in other States' methods of maintammg
military law and order in their armed forces. This desire, understandable
perhaps at an earlier stage, loses much of its significance in relation to
those States the military criminal and disciplinary law of which has deve-
loped into an integrated part of the body of penal law. Whether in that
Situation extradition shall be accepted for military offences, seems a matter
of political expediency rather than fundamental arguments.
In the presence of a military alliance such as the North Atlantic Trea-
ty an argument in favour of extradition for military offences is added :
the allied States have by their very alliance made the political decision
to co-operate and to give mutual assistance in the military field towards
a common goal. This argument is considerably strengthened if as m the
case of NATO, a peacetime Organization is set up as well which, while
leaving the national armed forces independent in principle, effects a
certain degree of co-operation and even, to a certain extent, Integration
in the fields of military planning, Standards of readiness, exercices etc.
In this constellation the argument in favour of extradition for military
offences (and of deserters in particular) becomes compelling indeed.
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The State within the territory of which the deserter tries to seek
refuge, now has a positive interest in his restitution to the proper autho-
rities and, even, in the possibility of his correction (as this plays a part in
the maintenance of discipline in the allied armed force). On the other
hand, the prohibition to extradite for such offences may result in the
absurd Situation that the State finds itself saddled with a deserter who
de facto is rid of his miHtary duties. The latter Situation will of course
only occur if no other ways are found of returning the deserter to the
armed force where he properly belongs. That such ways and means have
in fact been found by, e.g., the Netherlands authorities, will be set forth
in part B.
The argument thus put forward in favour of extradition for military
offences still has a primarily political character. Accordingly, its strength
is likely to vary in direct ratio to the political assessment of the momen-
tary Situation by each member State : its view of the value of continued
allied military co-operation in light of its particular goals, and in parti-
cular its appraisal of the threat of armed attack inherent in the political
Situation in light of its own means of defence. In this respect it is not
inconceivable ihat at the present time some politicians, in Holland and
elsewhere, might find some difficulty in recognizing the urgency of
concluding an agreement relative to the extradition for military offences.
However, the obvious fact remains that even now direct co-operation
between the member States and particularly between their forces is so
intensive that the military authorities concerned have come to consider
the restitution of deserters, by means other than extradition, a matter of
course. In this light the formal exclusion of extradition for such offences
seems hopelessly inadequate and in fact obsolete. As, however, it has
been kept in force to the present day, it may be observed that the
employment of subsidiary means to the same end must needs be a
poor Solution of the problem from a juridical point of view. This, it may
be added, is a juridical and not a political argument in favour of formally
agreeing upon extradition for military offences.
Evidently even in a Situation like the above arguments may be ad-
vanced against extradition for military offences. These may be drawn
either from the other State's foreign policy or from its internal structure
on relevant points, as assessed by the authorities of the State in the
territory of which the offender is found. Each of the allied States carries
on quite a lot of foreign policy of its own and this may lead to situations
of military tension or of actual armed conflict involving one of them
and severely disapproved of by another. In such a Situation, conceivably
the disapproving State would not be eager to extradite deserters in par-
ticular or to enter into an agreement providing for such extradition. Since
at the moment of preparing this report some of the members of NATO seeni
to disapprove more or less severely of at least certain aspects of United
States policy in Viet Nam, such an obstacle to agreement on the extra-
dition of deserters might actually be present. As for the stand of The
Netherlands in this matter, it is believed that no objections against extra-
dition of deserters would be drawn from the political and military invol-
vement of the United States in Asia.
RAPPORT NEERLANDAIS
251
It is a matter of pure speculation whether other situations might
arise in which NATO members might become militarily involved in such
a way as to provoke the severe disapproval of the Netherlands Govern-
ment. In that occurrence, agreement on the extradition of deserters would
be very difficult to rcach, and an existing agreement might well be
repudiated (or be quietly disregarded for the time being).
It may be useful to point out that the above Situation cannot be met
adequately by applying the customary prohibition of extradition for poli-
tical or connected offences. Desertion (as well as other military offences)
may constitute a political offence by virtue of its motive, and in that
case extradition must be refused. But it may equally be caused by com-
pletely different motives not connected with the political Situation in any
way, and in these circumstances a State may want to turn down a
request of extradition nevertheless, on the ground of its own assessment
of the other State's foreign policy.
All in all, at the present time no political objections against the
foreign policy of other members of NATO seem to be in the way of
agreeing on the part of The Netherlands to the extradition of deserters
in particular and for military offences in general.
Next, the internal factors should be considered that may stand in
the way of extradition for military offences. We already referred to the
Situation where the method of satisfying the personnel requirements of
(part of) a State's armed forces runs counter to human dignity (as inter-
preted by another State) to such a degree as to create an unwillingness on
the part'to the latter to restitute to the former State off enders against its
military laws and deserters in particular. The same may be true if a
State's System and/or severity of repression for military offences is deem-
ed so barbarous by another State as to prevent the latter State from
giving assistance to it by way of extradition. We do not have any mfor-
mation at our disposal warranting the Suggestion that such conditions
. would prevail in any of the States members of NATO at the present
time.
Another internal factor might be found in the State's attitude with
respect to conscientious objectors. This issue ought to be viewed from two
angles: that of the human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that oi
double incrimination. As to the first aspect, this is governed in Holland
by the Conscientious Objections (Military Service) Act, 27 September
1952 S 370. Exemption from military service may be granted on the
grou'nd of «serious conscientious objections», being « insurmountable
conscientious objections against the fulfilment of military service
of a person whose religious or moral convictions prohibit him Irom
taking part in any acts of war» (Art. 2).
A person whose conscientious objections find recognition as the re-
sult of a procedure set out in the Act, may be compulsorily employed
either in a non-combatant Job in the armed forces or in a civil job^Non-
recognition of the objections entails the objector's enlistment m the ar-
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med forces. In the latter instance subsequent desertion may be motivated
by the conscientious objections which, though rejected by the competent
authorities, are experienced as genuine and insurmountable by the
objector. In that case the objections will not constitute a legal ground
excluding punishment under the Military Code.
It is self-evident that desertion motivated by conscientious objections
is apt to occur in significantly greater numbers if such objections are
either honoured to a lesser degree or even completely disrcgarded by the
legislator. If such « conscientious deserters » happen to seek refuge in
Holland, it is equally evident that a certain percentage of them would
have found recognition as conscientious objectors under the Dutch law.
Is this sufficient motive not to extradite them ? As to this, we want to
advance the foUowing arguments.
In the Convention jor the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Rome, 4 November 1950, it is stated that « Everyone
has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion » (etc.; Art.
9 § 1). This implies that whenever a legislator neglects to take into account
even the most fundamental conscientious objections to such of his legis-
lative products as most deeply affect the freedom of conscience, he
cannot be said to have implemented his Obligation to respect the right to
that freedom.
The Dutch Constitution lays an Obligation upon the legislator to statc
the conditions under which exemption from military service shall be
granted on the ground of serious conscientious objections (Art. 196). This
is equal to saying that under the Dutch Constitution the exemption from
military service of recognized conscientious objectors constitutes a funda-
mental right. This fundamental right may further be said to flow direct-
ly from the general right to freedom of conscience granted in the Euro-
pean Convention.
Then, the Netherlands Government intends to make a reservation to
the European Extradition Convention (supra) to the effect that extra-
dition will be refused if granting the request might have the result that
the requested person, having been condemned in his absence, would have
to undergo punishment without a previous opportunity to defend himself,
as is one of his minimum rights under the Human Rights Convention
(Art. 6 § 3 sub c) (5). This brings to light the Government's Intention
to avoid entering without reserve into international agreements in so far
as these might derogate to the human rights and fundamental- freedoms
embodied in that Convention.
In consequence, the Netherlands Government might likewise be
assumed to refuse to agree to the extradition of deserters without Provi-
sion (or a reservation) having been made to the effect that serious cons-
cientious objectors would be excluded. Internal political considerations
would also prompt this attitude : the issue of conscientious objections, not
only to military service but to all kinds of fundamental public obligations
of the Citizen, is a cherished subject in our political and parliamcntary
life and one that is likely to cause waves of profound emotion that might
well endanger a Government attempting to ride them in the wrong di-
rection In other words, the fundamental freedom of conscience is a
highly rated and deeply rooted value in the Netherlands (6).
Some other arguments are to the contrary, however. The European
Human Rights Convention does not specify the freedom of conscience
anv further (this in contrast with the very specific right to an opportu-
nity to defend oneself). This leaves the signatory States free to Interpret it
in accordance with their conceptions of how far this freedom should go
in respect of particular issues, as, e.g., military service, and their Inter-
pretation may be narrower (or more liberal, for that matter) than the
Interpretation laid down in the Dutch legislation.
Stronger, one might even imagine a foreign legislator holding the
View that conscientious objections ought to be taken into account when-
ever possible, but definitely not in respect of military service. His reason-
ing could go along these lines, that the defence of the nation is the mos
fundamental Obligation of every valid Citizen as well as his greatest
privilege, and that anybody who would feel inclined to express moral or
?eligious objections to that sacred duty would by that very fact become
unworthy of the right to call himself a Citizen. Obviously a legislator who
would be convinced of the validity of this reasoning (which we needless
to say emphaticallv reject) might quite legitimately come to the conclu-
sL that Provision for conscientious objections against mihtary service
ought not to be made.
As to the question whether such more or less fundamental deviations
from Dutch convictions. either, ought to preclude the conclusion of an
agrTement relative to extradition for military offences, or ought to lead
(6)
(5) Art. 2 sub a of the diaft Act approving the European Convention on Extra
dition, etcetera ; supra, lootnote 3.
■r, „^int i<: tho verv strone rcaction to the sentonce pronounced in
AUBU^ 96 by a Greek mi itary' tribunal which saw fit to conden^n to
death a conscientious obiector whose objections were apparently based on
hts LmberThip of the sect of the « martyrs for ^f °-;-^°"/^P7>- .l'^rl
sentence has been reversed soon afterwards to a four-and-a-halt yea.s
'Thf pTcture is evidently confuscd in this instance by the intermingling
of two actors tho conscientious objections which soem to have been
dsrelarded and the death sentence. We have the feeling that the latter facor
was very important in determining the intenslty of the reacfons : .mmed.a-
telv upon the reversal. the public lost interest in the case.
It should be pointed out that the possibility of death sentences noed not
bo "aken into sp'ecia, consideration with regard to -'-f '-^/^ ^^^^^
offences. as it is already provided for in a general wav m the d.aft Extradition
^^!; if 'nursuant to the law of the requesting State, the death penalty is
attached "o the* o"fence t„r which extradition is requested. the requested
Person shall not be extradited unless, in the i^^^f -\ °^ -^^f r^:«^'- ^^ " ,°
Justice) sufficient guarantees are ava.lable hat that penaltj shall not
executed if condemnation to death might toUow ».
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Frits KALSHOVEN
to a reservation being attached to such an agreement, il would seem that
the sole factor that a human right is involved is not sufficient to arrive at
a positive answer. It might be argued, on the one hand, that human rights
ought to receive maximum effect whenever an occasion presents itself.
On the other hand, States ought not unduly be interfered with in their
legitimate attempts at interpreting the human rights in conformity with
their own convictions.
Then, the principle of double incrimination must be taken into consi-
deration in this context. According to it, extradition is out of the question
unless the offence is punishable under the terms of the legislation of both
States. To determine wheter desertion is so punishable, it does not
suffice to find that desertion is a military offence in both military codes ;
it will be necessary aLso to examine whether other provisions take away the
punishable character of the concrete act (double incrimination in con-
creto). Now, it may be argued that a deserter, punishable according to
the legislation of his State,, would not be punishable in Holland if he is a
conscientious objector whose objections would have found recognition
here (but, evidently, not in his home country, either because an objections
legislation is lacking there, or because it is less lenient than the Dutch
legislation). This question might be tested summarily by the Court of
Justice which is to advise the Minister of Justice on the admissibility of
extradition. Stronger, under the draft Extradition Act (7) it must be tested
by that Court and its findings will be binding on the Minister : in the
Memorandum of Reply of the Government relative to the draft Extra-
dition Act it is stated that the Court which decides upon the admissibility
of extradition is exclusively competent to judge the question whether
the requirement of double incrimination is met. In consequence, a Coun
of Justice would be charged with assessing conscientious objections that
according to our normal procedure are assessed by a specialized committee
of experts. This objection need not weigh too heavily, however, as the
Court would not pronounce on the validity of the conscientious objections,
but merely on the question whether the prima facie evidence is sufficient-
ly strong to make probable that the objections would find recognition
here.
There is another side to the question, however. According to Dutch
legislation, a certain procedure must be followed in order to obtain recog-
nition of conscientious objections and, hence, exemption from the mili-
tary Service. If a person falls to follow that procedure, or if he does
foUow it but his objections are turned down, and if subsequently, having
been enlisted in the Services, he commits desertion, he will be held
guilty by the military court without regard for his conscientious objec-
tions. In other words, conscientious objections to military service have a
certain well-defined place in the Dutch legislation and, while such ob-
jections find ample recognition in it, these do not constitute a legal ground
excluding punishment for desertion, once committed. Thus, the Court of
Justice charged with advising the Minister of Justice on a request of
RAPPORT NEERLANDAIS
255
(7) supra, Preliminary observations j? 1.
extradition and which in that context has to decide upon the admissibili-
ty of extradition in the concrete circumstances of the case, might take
the View that application of the principle of double incrimination in
concreto need not lead to an examination of the question whether accor-
ding to Dutch legislation the deserter whose extradition is requested would
not have come in the Position to commit desertion if prior to enlistment
he would have pleaded conscientious objections and, hence, would not
have been enlisted. It might be argued on the other hand, however, that
the principle of double incrimination in concreto requires an examination
of the question whether, in view of the entire legislation and all circum-
stances relevant to the case, a concrete instance of desertion would deserve
of punishment, not only in the eyes of the foreign legislator, but also in
Dutch eyes. In that reasoning the conclusion might be that a desertion
which could not even have occurred here, cannot deserve of punishment
either.
All in all, none of the arguments advanced are completely conclusive
in themselves in one direction or the other. The combination of the argu-
ments developed regarding the character of conscientious objections as
human rights and the principle of double incrimination results in a
certain prevalence of the idea that conscientious objections ought to
find a place in an agreement relative to extradition for mihtary offences.
This leads to the following reply to the question put : We believe that
on political and juridical grounds an agreement is desirable Pertaining
to extradition for all military offences in principle as between the NATO-
partners. If this is accepted in principle, we see no reason why the conclu-
sion of such an agreement should be frustrated by differences of opmion
regarding conscientious objections to military Services. On the ground
of the particularly strong convictions with respect to f reedom of con-
science prevailing in Holland, we believe that the Netherlands Government
and Parliament would attach much value to a clause in such an agree-
ment, making extradition inadmissible if the requested person would have
been a recognized conscientious objector according to the legislation ot
the State where he finds himself. If no such clause might be attained, an
express reservation to the same effect seems probable on the part of the
Netherlands Government. The possibiUty cannot be ^^'^^^f^^^^^^^^
that no express reservation would be made on the ground that the princi-
ple of double incrimination already leads to the same result.
Finally some remarks should be made about the (admittedly rather
academic) question of the impact of Integration of the armed forces on
the issue under discussion.
In the supposition of a full-fledged Integration of the armed forces
attended with the creation of the necessary central (or «suprana lona >>)
authoruy clad with, i.a., direct jurisdictional powers with respect to the
membis of the int^grated force, the ^If-cal Problem ofextrad.Uon^^^^^^^^
no loneer exist The national decision of whether or not to grant a request
of SSditron for a military offence is superseded by the supranational
?ecSn to prosecute ; that d'ecision will be bmding on the national autho-
( ;
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Frits KALSHOVEN
RAPPORT NEERLANDAIS
257
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rities of Ihe member State in the territory of which the accused is found
and it will entail their Obligation to co-operate in bringing him betöre
the competent court (which may be a non-national military court of the
integrated force, or a national court). We fall to see how a real Inte-
gration of the armed forces could be accomplished without entailing this
consequence, particularly as regards military offences : Integration of
the armed forces must needs be accompanied with the creation of a
supranational military code applicable to all members of the integrated
force irrespective of nationality or residence, and the application thereof
by the competent supranational authority cannot be reconciled with the
interstate procedure of extradition. This leaves, of course, the possibility
of State Jurisdiction as to ordinary offences, and problems of extradition
might still occur in that respect. Those are outside the scope of this
report, however.
Any lesser degree of « integration » of the armed forces, either with-
out a supranational authority competent to take binding decisions-.con-
cerning the prosecution of members of the force suspected of offences
against the supranational military code, or without such a code, to our
mind does not really deserve of that name : it remains a form of Co-
operation between essentially independent armed forces, and the problems
with respect to mutual assistance in the repression of military offences
remain as set forth above.
As to integration in the true sense of the term, the conclusion is that
no Problem of extradition for military offences will subsist, as supra-
national decisions will take the place of interstate mutual assistance.
•im
This section may be summarized as foUows :
White the extradition legislation in force in Holland bars extradition
for military offences, the draft Extradition Act is not opposed to it.
On the international level, the desirability of extradition for all
military offences has been acknowledged between the Benelux partners.
The issue has been expressly left aside in the European Extradition
Treaty.
The North Atlantic Treaty does not contain a Provision amounting
to an extradition agreement, though it is not opposed to it either. In the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement the issue has been left aside again.
This is surprising, as the desirability of extradition particularly of deserters
had been realized by the authorities concerned already at an early date.
Whether this desirability subsists at the present time and whether it is
sufficiently evident to bring the NATO partners to an agreement on the
issue now, is a matter of political assessment. Political arguments derived
from one or another partner's foreign policy may militate against such
agreement, but is is believed that The Netherlands would not advance
arguments of that nature at the present time. Nor do arguments against
extradition for military offences arise from the internal structure of the
NATO partners : neither their methods of recruiting nor of maintaining
law and order in the armed forces appear to be contrary to human digni-
ty, and as to conscientious objections against military service a special
clause or a reservation would be sufficient to meet the objections of those
in Holland who would find unacceptable the extradition of « conscientious
deserters» to a State the legislation of which is not in accordance with
the norms obtaining here.
No matter how the desirability of extradition for military offences as
between NATO members may be assessed politically, it is accentuated
by the juridically unsatisfactory nature of the present Situation : while
extradition for those offences is prohibited, other methods are applied
that amount to the same thing and that are considered both correct and
necessary by the military authorities concerned.
Finally, while integration of the armed forces seems hardly a pressing
issue as far as Holland is concerned, it may be observed that it would
solve the problems of extradition for miUtary offences by substitutmg a
supranational competence to prosecute for the State power to grant or
refuse requests of extradition.
B. Delivery of military individuals by other means than Extradition
1. Practice in the territory of The Netherlands.
Military persons of several foreign States are stationed in Holland at
the present time. They may be divided into two main categories, viz. those
present here on the basis of NATO arrangements and those present on
a different basis.
Forces of the first category belang to the armed Services of the United
States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, respectively.
The Status of their members is governed by the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, supra. In it, the issue of handing members of these forces over
to the proper authorities is dealt with in Article VII, 5; 5, suh a. :
« The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each
other in the arrest of members of a force... in the territory of the
receiving State and in handing them over to the authority which
is to exercise Jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions».
This is a reciprocal undertaking, as the « authority which is to exercise
Jurisdiction » may be an authority either of the receiving or the sendmg
State However, we are concerned here with one side only, viz. handing
over to the authority of the sending State. Now, from t^e quoted Provi-
sion it is evident that in respect of the forces of the U.S A. and West
Germany The Netherlands is under an Obligation to have its authorities
hand members of these forces over to their own authorities present in
our territory, whenever these are to exercise Jurisdiction. In order to
implement this Obligation, it is provided in the Act approving the Agree-
ment (Act of 7 August 1953, S 438 : Art. 3) that :
RAPPORT NEERLANDAIS
259
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258 Frits KALSHOVEN
« 1. If a suspected person is subject to the exclusive Jurisdiction of
the sending State, or if that State has the primary right to exercise
Jurisdiction, or if The Netherlands, in accordance with Article VII,
S 3, sub c of the Agreement approved by this Act, has decided not to
exercise Jurisdiction, that person shall, if he is taken into custody
or kept in custody by Netherlands authorities, be handed over to the
military authorities of the sending State as soon as possible » (8).
Practice is in accordance with the above conventional and legislative
provisions.
It seems worth while to probe somewhat deeper into the nature of the
above Situation and to examine where it differs from extradition. In the
case of extradition, a State uses its territorial sovereign powers in order
to bring a foreigner, found in its territory, within the reach of another
State so that the latter State may in turn exercice its own territorial pow-
ers in regard of that person. In the case of handing over within the terri-
tory to the authorities of another State, the State voluntarily waives the
right to exercise its territorial powers and suffers that within its territory
power is exercised by the other State, however.
This is not an ordinary Situation at all, States generally being very
careful in warding off encroachments on their territorial sovereignty that
would result from the exercise within their territories of other States'
powers. A case in point is the repugnance of States to admit foreign armed
forces.
If, however, in spite of this repugnance a foreign force is admitted,
this necessarily entails certain consequences. Thus, it iiivolves the recogni-
tion of a right on the part of the sending State to exercise its power of
command with respect to the members of the force in the territory of the
receiving State. It does not automatically follow that the authorities of
the force are entitled to exercice their jurisdictional powers in the crimi-
nal and disciplinary field as well, however. This matter may be settled
by special agreement between the sending and receiving States.
The Solution of the latter jurisdictional problem, reached between
the members of NATO and embodied in the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment, is common knowledge. So, we need only recapitulate that on the
basis of a careful distribution of jurisdictional powers between receiving
and sending States it comprises a limited acceptance of the exercise of
(8) In paragraphs 2-4 of the Article, Provision is made for an appcäl on the part
of the suspected person. He may plead « that he is not the wanted person, or that
he is not subject to the Jurisdiction of the foreign State as described in the
preceding paragraph » (sc. ^ 1). The appeal can be ruled on by the examining
magistrate, « unless he holds that the suspected person is not subject to the
Jurisdiction of the sending State» : in that case the matter is referred to the
Minister of Justice.
Furthermore, a time is lixed in these paragraphs within which tho
suspected person must be taken over by the military authorities of the
sending State : four days of the beginning of his custody or of the final
rejection of his appeal.
jurisdictional powers on the part of sending States in the territory of
receiving States.
Now it bears some emphasis that the Provision quoted above regarding
the handing over of members of a force prescribes such handmg over
inly if the authorities taking them over have power to exercsc .uns-
Soi This leads to the conclusion that in this Agreement the ,ssue of
handTng over within the territory, far from playing an independent role
asa Problem of the waiving of territorial powers, is merely subsid.ary
to the wider jurisdictional issue.
Needless to say. the difference outlined here between extradition and
handing over is not the only one. For some further observat.ons we refer
to section B 3 of this report.
As reeards the category of foreign military stationed in The Nether-
landf not ontie basis Ol NATO arrangements, we exclude from our
Deport thoseVith a diplomatic or similar Status, as they obviously are
outside the question.
This leaves the members of the Belgian navy who, pursuant to bila-
teral arrangements. follow military training courses m Holland. In the
ourse of S training program they may be attached to naval trammg
e tablishments as. e.g., the Royal Naval Academy, ^^ ^^^J^^'^^^^l^J^^^
warships. As regards power of command and Jurisdiction, piactice is as
foUows.
During their stay, they are subordinate to the Dutch officer in com-
mand o the training establishment or man-of-war. They are also sub-
Stto the Dutch disciplinary system, but only to a certain extent : close
Srest and lesser punishments may ^e inflicted on them^ by the Du ch
authority the officer-candidates attached to the Royal Naval Acadeny
are liabL" to the domestic puni.shments obtaining there as well. Shou d
a BeS traiLe become culpable of an offence that cannot saUsfactori y
be met with the aid of the disciplinary means at the disposal of the Dutch
commlding officer, the matter is referred to ^^e naval auth-t,^^^^
ßi„m who then may take the necessary steps which may inc ucle removai
fi^om'the trainrng Any punishment inflicted on a Belgian military person
r^uTt be rep^ ed'by fhe commanding officer : the report is destined ulti-
mately to cor^e into the possession of the Belgian military attache m The
Sague' PractL is slightl y'different as regards the.officer-cand.da es atta h-
ed to the Royal Naval Academy : punishments inflicted on one ot them
will be rep'LrL'd only if the total amount of ^i« Punishmen s^ as wdl as
the nature of the offencesco^^^^^^^^ [^'^^ 1° t thl nav^l tZLs in
come an officer. In that case a lepoii i» ii.a Academv are
Belgium. No reports concerning the Belgians attached to the Academy are
forwarded to the military attache.
The oractice outlined here is remarkable in more than one respect.
T. E It is at variance with Dutch military law : Dutch comman-
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261
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an Order in Council to that effcct (9). No such Order in Council is in
existence at present Then, it is not in conformity with the Belgian rules
on the subject either : according to those, the Belgian military attache
would be the proper disciplinary authority in Holland (a reminiscence
of this is the report to him that we referred to above). Then, the arran-
gements between the respective authorities on which the practice rests,
and which have been entered into shortly after the second World War
and were confirmed and modified several times since, are of most infor-
mal character and cannot be said to have resulted in a valid international
agreement. All in all, the practice, which is reminiscent not so much of
the usual modes of mutual co-operation between States as of the modes
of distributing jurisdictional powers among the military authorities of a
State's armed forces, seems extra-legal from every point of view.
As concerns the issue of handing over, it is apparent from the above
that no practice of handing over to a Belgian authority in our territory
obtains. In the supposition that one of the Belgian military concerned
would be arrested by the Dutch authorities, his offence (whether com-
mon, military or disciplinary under Dutch law) will be assessed by a
Dutch commanding officer and, either, punished by that officer with one
of the disciplinary (or domestic) penalties that may be applied in his
respect, or found too serious for such correction. In the latter instance,
the culprit will be sent back to Belgium and placed at the disposal of
his proper authorities.
Finally, w^e may mention in this Paragraph the procedure applied in
respect of members of the armed forces of the U.S.A. who are found in
our territory while not being members of the force stationed in Holland
(but, generally speaking, of the force stationed in the Federal Republic of
Germany). Pursuant to an arrangement with the U.S. authorities, such
military persons, if suspected of desertion, are apprehended by the Royal
Mounted Constabulary (which is specially charged with tracing military
delinquents) and subsequcntly handed over to the commanding officer of
the U.S. force in Holland. Obviously this is not a direct application of the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement, as the persons concerned are not
stationed in this country in the proper sense. The fiction is that the afore-
mentioned commanding officer is in command of all American military
persons, irrespective of whether they arrived in Holland as members of
the U.S. force stationed here, or otherwise, however. This seems a rather
farfetched fiction particulary with regard to deserters from forces station-
ed outside Holland : «command » necessarly implies some degree of
control and with respect to a deserter no exercise of control is possible
for the duration of his absence. To say that the U.S. force Commander
gains control the moment the deserter is found, is begging the question :
the delinquent is in the hands of the Dutch authorities, and the U.S.*
(9)
Articlc IV of the Statute of the Kingdom relative to the Modification of the
Substantive Military Criminal and Disciplinary Law. 4 July 1963 S 295 •
«We can ordain that, as regards the application 'of statutory provisions
to be designated by Us. foreign military persons and a foreign armed force
are deemed to be Netherlands military and the Netherlands armed force
respectivily ».
Commander can apply his powers only if he is enabled to de so by these
authorities — and whether they should do so is precisely the question.
However this may be, with the aid of the fiction a workable Solution
has been found that is acceptable both to the Dutch and American autho-
rities. If one believes in the fiction, it may even be reasonod that an
American deserter, once found, gains the fictitious Status of a member of
the U.S. Force in Holland, and that hence the Solution as applied comes
under the terms of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. We would pre-
fer the view, however, that this instance of handing over in the territory
constitutes an act of voluntary assistance on the part of the Dutch autho-
rities, no Obligation of this nature resulting from any international agree-
ment to which the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a party.
2. Practice relaüng to Dutch military stationed in a jorelgn country.
Again, the Dutch military stationed abroad may be divided into those
sent to the receiving State on the basis of NATO arrangements, and those
not in that Situation.
Pursuant to NATO arrangements, a Dutch force is stationed in the
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany .In the same category come
the Dutch military stationed abroad as members of NATO military head-
quarters : according to the Protocol on the Status of international mili-
tary Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Paris, 28
August 1952, Trh. 1953, 11, their position in jurisdictional matters is not
significantly different from that of the national NATO forces. Then, Dutch
military persons may be stationed in NATO countries on an individual
basis for training purposes ; in that case the Dutch military attache is
considered the military authority empowered to enforce Dutch military
law in their respect.
In these instances the issue of handing over is governed by the Pro-
vision of Article VII, § 5, sub a of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement,
quoted in the preceding paragraph.
»
A case apart is the Mine Combating School at Ostend, Belgium. This
is a Joint Belgian-Dutch entreprise : military of both countries are trained
there. The establishment is under the Joint supervision of the Belgian and
Dutch ministers of defence. Both the director and the head of training
are naval officers, one of them a Belgian, the other a Dutchman. The
Dutch naval officer (whether he be director or head of training) is also
in command of the Dutch military personnel. The basis of this regime is
an agreement concluded between the ministers ot defence (Agreement of
17 May 1965, Brüssels). It has been elaborated in the Regulations for the
Mine Combating School at Ostend, signed by either minister on 28 March
1966, Brussels/The Hague. In the Agreement it has been expressly provided
that' the NATO Status of Forces Agreement shall apply (Art. 15). This
implies that the Provision contained in the latter Agreement concerning
handing over will be applicable in this instance as well.
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As to other Dutch military stationed abroad, these generally enjoy a
diplomatic or similar Status (military attaches, UN observers). In so far
as other instances might have been overlooked in this report that neither
come under the NATO regulations nor enjoy the immunity of diplomats
and the like, these have not at any rate given rise to any known practice
of handing over in the territory.
3. Handxng over ai the border.
In this Paragraph we will not confine ourselves to those military who
committed an offence in their own country, but we will enlarge the scope
of the question so as to embrace those military who committed an offence
in the territory of the State where they are stationed.
Now, the question put may be answered in this sense, that b. practice
as referred to in the question does indeed exist and notably with regard to
military persons belonging to the forces of NATO partners stationed in the
Federal Republic of Germany. In general, the procedure is as follows ;
the suspected person is taken into custody by the Royal Mounted Consta-
bulary (which, as mentioned previously, is specially charged with tracing
military delinquents) and found to be an undesirable foreigner, on the
ground of lack of papers, insufficient means of support, or danger to order
and morality. As an undesirable foreigner he may be expelled. Thus, an
expulsion order is obtained from the head of the local police and, with
that, the suspected person is transported to the German boundary. There
he is handed over to the German authorities, and these are informed of
the offence presumably committed by him (10).
In so doing the Dutch authorities are of course aware that the suspect
will in turn be handed over to the military authorities of the force (as
this is an Obligation of the German authorities under the NATO Status of
Forces Agreement), and in fact that is precisely what was intended by our
military police authorities.
The practice as set forth is based on the view^s held by the military
authorities concerned with respect to the desirability of this procedure and
the tenability of its justification as an expulsion of undesirable foreigners.
It bears pointing out that these views are not necessarily shared by other
branches of the Dutch government apparatus : this will become apparent
infra. First we want to examine the question whether the practice followed
is in accordance with the legislation in force relative to the admittance and
expulsion of foreigners (supra, Preliminary observations, § 1).
As to this, the Act relative to the Admittance and Expulsion of
Foreigners, of 1849, distinguishes between two categories of foreigners :
(10) In § 1 of this pari of the report reference was already made to the deviating
practice followed in respect of members of the armed forces of the United
States of America who ari' not stationed in Dutch territory (in the true
sense of the term). and who are found here : they are not expelled, but
handed over to the U.S. military authorities in Holland instead.
:
RAPPORT NEERLANDAIS
263
those formally admitted, and those who do not enjoy that Status. Ad-
mittance is effected through the issuance of a visitor's permit (Art. 5). Ad-
mitted foreigners enjoy a certain protection : they can only be expelled un-
der certain conditions and on the order either of the Cantonal Judge or of
the Crown (Art. 10). Foreigners not admitted in the sense of the Act can
be expelled (Art. 9). Any person threatened with expulsion can plead
that he is a Dutch national ; that plea is brought before the High Court of
Justice ; no other remedy is available to him pursuant to this Act (Art.
20). In exceptional cases it might be tried to obtain an injunction from the
President of the Court of Justice, on the ground of tort on the part of the
public authorities ; the chances of success are very slight, however.
Now, the point is that normally no visitors' permits are issued at all,
unless the foreigner intends to settle here and meets the conditions there-
for. So, the overw^helming majority of the foreigners present in Holland
are liable to expulsion at any moment, and expulsion of a foreign military
person found in our territory is not contrary to the aforementioned Act.
Things will be slightly different under the new Foreigners Act, of
1965, in consequence of the introduction of a completely new set of legal
guarantees. Those foreigners who will have entered Holland in confor-
mity with the normal procedures, will have the position of admitted
foreigners (Art. 6, 8 ; those who enter clandestinely and without the neces-
sary papers remain excluded from this privilege). Admitted foreigners wil
be expelled only if they fall to meet the conditions set forth in the Act,
the most important of w^hich are : having sufficient means of subsistence,
and not constituting a danger to public peace, public order, or national
security (Art 8, 22). If their expulsion has been ordered or may be expec-
ted, the foreigners may be taken into custody (Art. 26). Remedies will be
available against these measures : an appeal against the expulsion order
may be lodged with the Minister of Justice and, in the last resort, with
tjie Crown ; the Court of Justice will take cognizance of appeals against
the custody.
This means that summary expulsion will be out of the question unless
the foreigner voluntarily submits to it. It also means more opportunities
for the introduction of a plea to the effect that in the circumstances of the
case expulsion virtually would amount to extradition and that, the latter
mode of acting being excluded by the provisions governing that issue, also
expulsion would be unlawful. Such a plea would be imaginable in the
case of a foreign military person, apprehended in Holland as a probable
deserter and who is threatened with expulsion to the country where he is
stationed as a member of a NATO force : it might be asserted, e.g., that
in so doing the Dutch authorities would deliberately use their pow^er to
expel (a power held by the State to protect the integrity of the internal
legal order) for another purpose, viz. to give assistance to another State
in its endeavours to maintain military law and order among its armed
forces We do not venture to predict the outcome of a procedure in which
this plea would be raised. We merely want to demonstrate that under the
new Foreigners Act the entire problem of the relationship between the
\
264
Frits KALSIIÜVEN
RAPPORT NEERLANDAIS
265
i» '
practice of handing over at the border and the prohibilion of extradition
for military offences is not unlikely to become manifest sooner or later.
The probabiJity of such a confrontation has been greatly enhanced by
a recent Statement on the part of the Government, implying that under the
terms of the new draft Extradition Act a practice of expulsion amounting
to handing over at the border would not be tolerable if extradition would
have been out of the question (11). Prior to dealing with this Statement
in some more detail, we want to make some observations regarding the
more general aspects of the relationship between handing over and extra-
dition, however.
Reference was already made to this issue in part A, §§ 2 and 6. There
we found that as between NATO partners, the practice of handing over
is a very natural mode of giving mutual assistance in criminal matlers and
particularly in combating desertion, but that it cannot easily be reconciled
with the clear provisions as to extradition in force between the States
concerned.
Obviously the act of handing over is not identical with extradition.
For one thing, extradition is usually held to be an act in consequence of
a formal request, and this is lacking in the case of handing over (but a
not-so-formal request may have been put forward nevertheless : the U.S.
Provost Marshall in Western Europe distributes lists of deserters ; other
means are employed in other instances). Then, extradition has a bilateral
character; handing over, on the other hand, is said to be primarily a
unilateral act of expulsion. But again, this difference is hard to maintain in
view of the circumstances that the Dutch authorities either have been
informed or otherwise have obtained knowledge of the offence of which
the person concerned presumably Stands guilty, and that they hand him
over on account of — and with notification of — that offence and with the
Virtual certainty that he will be turned over immediately to the military
authorities who have Jurisdiction over him. Thus, while formally the prac-
tice of handing over may be defended as an application of the State's power
unilaterally to expel foreigners, the position is different when a less for-
mal view-point is taken and the real character of the practice is taken
into consideration. The method of handing over thus becomes of question-
able legality.
In this predicament, S. Lazareff, op. cit, p. 264, offers the following
Solution. Taking an imaginary case of an American soldier v/ho'commits
an offence in France (where he is stationed) and subsequently seeks refuge
in Belgium, he says :
« La Belgique peut spontanement, sur la base de l'article III para-
graphe 5 de la Convention (sc. the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ment), prendre un arrete d'expulsion contre ce militaire qui, par
ailleurs, peut etre considere par les autorites de TEtat d'origine
comme un deserteur. De leur cote, ces dernieres, en vertu de l'Arti-
cle III paragraphe 4, peuvent informer les autorites de TEtat de
sejour de l'absence illegale du militaire en vue d'obtenir un arrete
d'expulsion ».
He adds :
« Toutefois, l'Etat de sejour normal, ä savoir la France, ne peut offi-
ciellement demander aucune mesure ä l'Etat beige. II est regrettable
qu'une teile Situation n'ait pas ete expressement prevue ä la Con-
vention ».
Thus not only would Belgium have power unilaterally to expel the
American soldier, but it would even be possible to find a basis for this
action in an international agreement, viz. in Article III of the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement. We fail to see how that Article can be interpreted
so as to encompass this Situation, however. Like the rest of the Agreement,
Article III applies only between « sending » and « receiving » States, and
Belgium is obviously not the receiving State in the above case ; so, it
cannot be applied directly. But it does not lend itself to an application by
analogy either. The Article deals with the admittance of members of a
force and the impact thereof on the receiving State's policy in regard of
foreigners. The receiving State may request the removal of a member of
a force, and it may make an expulsion order against an ex-member (§ 5).
The implication is that a member of a force cannot be expelled. And a
deserter does not by virtue of his desertion lose his Status as a member of
the force : distinction is expressly made between those who leave the
employ of the sending State (and w^ho become ex-members) and deser-
ters (§ 4). Finally, the purport of paragraph 5 in particular is not to em-
power the receiving State to make expulsion orders regarding a certain
category of foreigners (as it already possesses that power by virtue of its
territorial sovereignty), but to bring out clearly that it is incumbent on
the sending State to give effect to such an expulsion order made in respect
of an ex-member of its force (12).
On these grounds we cannot concur with the view that the State which
finds the deserter in its territory could make an expulsion order on the
basis oj Article III, § 5, or that the authorities of the sending State could
inform the authorities of the former State h^J virtue of Article III , § 4. To
^ cur mind, it is not possible to find a valid ground for the act of handing
over in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, nor in any other interna-
tional agreement in force between e.g. The Netherlands and the States
(11) Memorandum of Reply regarding the draft Extradition Act, supra, Preliminary
observations, § 1.
(12) The text of Article III, §§ 4 and 5, runs as foUows :
« 4. If a member of a force or of a civilian component leaves the employ
of the sending State and is not repatriated, the authorities of the sending
State shall immediately inform the authorities of the receiving State, giving
such particulars as may be required. The authorities of the sending State shall
similarly inform the authorities of the receiving State of any member who
has absented himself for more than twenty-one days.
« 5. If the receiving State has requested the removal from its territory
of a member of a force or civilian component or has made an expulsion
order against an ex-member of a force or civilian component or against a
dependent of a member or an ex-member, the authorities of the sending
State shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned within their
own territory or otherwise disposing of him outside the receiving State...».
'}
266
Frits KALSliOVEN
RAPPORT NEERLANUAIS
267
U^
in respect of which the practica of handing over is applied.
We do not deplore the practica set forth in this paragraph, which to us
seems in accordance with the needs of the Situation. On the other hand :
as it may be attacked as an instance of extradition in disguise and in a
Situation where extradition, if properly requested, would have to be re-
fused, and as furthermore no international instrument — not even Article
III of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement — offers any support for its
legality, we fully endorse M. Lazareff s conclusion : it is not merely
regrettable, it is a disgrace that such a Situation has not found cxpress Pro-
vision in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.
As far as Holland is concerned, the issue will come to a head when
the draft Extradition Act gains force of law. In the course of the written
proceedings, the Government has stated that under its terms the practica
of handing nonextraditable foreigners over will be formally precluded. The
facts are as foUows :
In the draft, extradition is dafined in these terms (Art. 1) : «the remo-
val of a person from Holland, with the purpose to place him at the
disposal of foreign authorities in behalf of, either, a criminal investiga-
tion against him, or the execution of a penalty or penal measure ». This
definition had given rise to questions on the part of the Second Chamber :
was the definition theoretically correct ? and : nead not the words « on the
requast of another Power » be inserted in it ? The Government answered
that no theoretically correct definition was envisaged : it did not serve
to give a general definition of extradition, but merely to convey a specific
signification to the term in the context of the draft Act. The impracticabi-
lity of a theoretical definition became apparent when Article 2 was con-
sidered. This Article reads as follows : « Extradition shall only take place
by virtue of an agreement ». Now, the Government continued :
« If the Clement « request of another Power » were inserted in the
definition of « extradition » in Article 1, then Article 2 would no
longer be in the way of a person being placed at the disposal of
foreign authorities not on the ground of an agreement, and with a
viaw to a criminal prosecution against him or the execution of a
punishment, in cases where the authorities concerned have not made
a (formal) request. For according to the definition, this would not
constitute extradition within the meaning of the Act ».
In other words : as the element « request of another Power » is not -inclu-
ded in the definition of extradition as laid down in the draft, «extradi-
tion » in Article 2 must be taken in a wide sense, embracinga practice of
handing over without formal request of extradition. This is to say that, in
the absence of an agreement, the practice of handing over as that is
applied at present would be in contravention of the new Extradition Act
and would have to be discontinued. This is an added argument for the
early conclusion of an agreement which, either, provides extradition for
military offences, or legalizes the existing practice of handing over.
In summary, a practice of handing over is followed by the Netherlands
military police authorities, mostly at the German border and in respect
of members of forces of NATO partners stationed in West Germany. Such
persons will be handed over to the German authorities, who are also in-
formed of the nature of their offence. Under the terms of the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement, the latter authorities are obliged to turn them over
to the military authorities of the force whenever these authorities have
Jurisdiction.
At present, this practice is not formally contrary to Dutch legislation
concerning the admittance and expulsion of foreigners. It might be challen-
ged as a form of unlawful quasi-extradition, however. Unfortunately, no
international instrument strengthans the weak legal basis of the practice.
This represents a serious lacuna in the NATO legulation. Unless the gap
is filled, the practice will have to be discontinued when the draft Extra-
dition Act gains force of law.
4. Statistics.
It is regretted that no statistics are available concerning any of the
points dealt with in this part of our report.
ANNEX
The Situation with respect to Surinam and the Dutch Aiitilles.
The extradition laws in force in these Landen follow the pattern of
the Dutch Extradition Act. Extradition for military offences (pure or
otherwise) is thus excluded. No change in this legislation is envisaged for
the time being, as that is not desired by the authorities directly concer-
ned.
The authority competent to decide whether a request of extradition
shall be granted or refused is, first, the Minister of Justice of the Kingdom.
^However, also the Governor, acting in his capacity as a representative
in loco of the Kingdom Government, has power to take this decision, but
only in respect of requests addressed directly to him on the part of
American States or - in the terms of the Orders in Council ot 1926 -
colonial governments in America (Art. 8 of the Orders in Council).
The Information available to the present writer leads to the conclu-
sion that no political or juridical arguments are particularly in favour ot
extradition for military offences, as far as these Landen are concerned.
With respect to handing over, it may be mentioned first that no for-
ces are stationed in Surinam or the Dutch Antillas on the basis of NATO
agreements. The few foreign military who are found there, generally enjoy
a diplomatic or similar Status. No practice of handing over in the territory
has developed.
^ ,
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268
Frits KALSHÜVEN
269
Ma
(
The same can be said as concerns handing over at the border. If a
foreign military person might be found in the territory, bis Position would
be that of an undesirable foreigner. In Surinam, under the Admittance
Order in Council, undesirable foreigners can be expelled much as that is
the case in Holland according to the Act in force ; only very summary
guarantees are available. In the Dutch Antilles the newly introduced
Admittance and Expulsion Regulations offer satisfactory guarantees to
admitted foreigners ; those who sneak into one of the islands of this Land
may be expelled summarily by the local authorities of the island, however.
Rapport suisse
DIE AUSLIEFERUNG PUR
MILITAERISCHE DELIKTE
von
Rene KELLER
Oberstbrigadier-Oberauditor der Armee
Herzogenbuchsee
(Schweiz)
1. Im Bundesgesetz betreffend die Auslieferung gegenüber dem Aus-
lande vom 22. Januar 1892 sind u.a. folgende Grundsätze verankert :
— Kein Schweizer darf an einen fremden Staat ausgeliefert werden ;
— Verbot der Auslieferung bei politischen Delikten ;
— Verbot der Auslieferung « reiner Militärvergehen » ;
— Begrenzung der Strafgewalt des ersuchten Staates durch die Spe-
zialität der Auslieferung.
Innerhalb der Grenzen des Auslieferungsgesetzes hat die Schweiz
mit sehr zahlreichen Staaten Auslieferungsverträge abgeschlossen, die meist
das Verbot der Auslieferung hinsichtlich politischer oder militärischer
Delikte enthalten ; deren materiellrechtliche Bestimmungen geniessen den
Vorrang gegenüber dem Auslieferungsgesetz.
2.
Ein « reines Militärvergehen » im Sinne des Auslieferungsge-
setzes liegt dann vor, wenn eine Militärperson sich der Verletzung spezi-
fisch militärischer Rechtsgüter id est der soldatischen Disziplin und der
Dienstleistungspflicht schuldig macht. Ob Delikte gegen die militärische
Landesverteidigung im allgemeinen unter den Begriff des reinen Militär-
vergehens zu subsumieren sind, wäre fallweise zu überprüfen. Eine ver-
räterische Verletzung militärischer Geheimnisse dürfte beispielweise als
gegen den Staat gerichtetes Delikt politischen Charakter besitzen und so
der Auslieferung unzugänglich sein. Delikte, die in Idealkonkurrenz Ele-
mente des gemeinen und des reinen militärischen Strafrechts enthalten,
dürften sich nur schwer finden lassen ; liegt dagegen Realkonkurrenz vor,
so wirkt nach schweizerischem Recht der Vorbehalt der Spezialität.
3. Das Auslieferungsverfahren wird im zit. Auslieferungsgesetz
einlässlich geregelt. Danach ist das Auslieferungsbegehren auf diplo-
matischem Wege der Landesregierung (Bundesrat) zuzustellen. Diese
entscheidet auf Eintreten oder Nichteintreten. Wird Eintreten bejaht,
so wird die Verhaftung angeordnet. Willigt der Verhaftete in die
*•^
U
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270
Ren^ KELLER
Auslieferung ein und steht ihr kein gesetzliches Hindernis entgegen, so
bewilligt der Bundesrat die Auslieferung. Erhebt der Verhaftete dagegen
Einsprache, die sich auf das Gesetz, den Staatsvertrag oder eine Gegen-
rechtserklärung stützt, so entscheidet das Bundesgericht endgültig über
die Auslieferung.
Das Auslieferungsgesetz enthält keine Bestimmung für den Fall, dass
das für ein gemeines Delikt gestellte Auslieferungsbegehren in Tat und
Wahrheit die Auslieferung für ein militärisches Delikt erstrebt. Darüber
dürfte der Bundesrat im Eintretensverfahren entscheiden (sofern er wir-
klich Anhaltspunkte für ein getarntes Vorgehen besitzt). Eine analoge
Anwendung der beispeilsweise in Art. 4 Abs. 1 Auslieferungsvertrag
zwischen der Schweiz und dem Deutschen Reich für politische Delikte
festgelegten Regelung erscheint nicht ohne weiteres möglich. Hinzu-
weisen ist in diesem Zusammenhang auf Art. 3 des Europäischen Aus-
lieferungsabkommens vom 13.9.1957, dessen Ratifizierung durch die Schweiz
möglicherweise in Bälde erfolgt. Dieses Abkomen verschliesst sich übri-
gens einer Regelung für militärische strafbare Handlungen, gibt dadurch
anderseits Raum für Spezialabkommen.
Der Auslieferung strictu sensu steht die formlose, ausservertragliche
Auslieferung gegenüber. Nach herrschender schweizerischer Ansicht steht
dem ausgelieferten Verfolgten kein Recht zu, in der Strafverfolgung ein-
zuwenden, er sei auf regelwidrige Weise in den Bereich des verfolgenden
Staates gelangt. Völkerrechtliches Unrecht wäre nur dann anzunehmen,
wenn der Verfolgte in Verletzung der Gebietshoheit eines fremden Staa-
tes überstellt worden wäre. Formlos gültig ist anderseits das freiwillige
Sichzurverfügungstellen.
Chapitre III
«I
^\
4. Die Schweiz, die keine Truppen auf fremden Boden stationiert
(Korea bildet wiegen dem eher polizeilichen Charakter der Mission kaum
eine Ausnahme) und die auf eigenem Boden keine fremden Truppen
stationiert hat (duldet), stellen sich bezüglich der Auslieferung bzw. Ueber-
gabe bis heute keine Fragen. Ebensowenig besteht eine Praxis hinsichtlich
der Ueberstellung von Militärpersonen, die im eigenen Land ein Delikt
begangen haben und die Schweiz als Zufluchtsort oder als Transitland
aufsuchen. Grundsätzlich ist zu sagen, dass sich hier Auslieferungsrecht
und Fremdenpolizeirecht überschneiden können, indem eine ohne Papiere
versehene Militärperson auf Grund fremdenpolizeilicher Massnahmen,
zumal in Koppelung mit einem Schubabkommen, dem fremden Staat
zurückgestellt und so, entgegen den auslieferungsrechtlichen Bestim-
mungen, der strafrechtlichen Verfolgung preisgegeben wird.
5. Tendenzen, die Struktur des Auslieferun.^srechts im Sinne der
Einschränkung des Auslieferungsverbotes für militärische Delikte zu
ändern, sind in der Schweiz zur Zeit nicht wahrzunehmen. Die Prüfung
der entsprechenden Rechtsfragen würde dann zu erfolgen haben, wenn
die Schweiz sich anschickte, der UNO beizutreten und (oder) wenn eine
politische oder militärische Integration im europäischen Feld Tatsache
würde.
INTERVENTIONS
\ ^f\
273
INTERVENTIONS
prcscntces au cours c?es
seanccs de fravail du 10 mai 1967
V
m
m f
i{
Dennis A. YORK, Lieutenant Colone] (Dr), Judge Advocate General' s Corps, United States Army :
Soine similarities and distinctions hetween the treatrnent of
niilitary extradition in civil law and common law countries
— Preliminary rernarks :
I appear before you today in behalf of Brigadier General Robert M.
Williams, Judge Advocate of the United States Army in Europa. General
Williams asks that I extend to you his greeting and expresses his regrets
that the demands of official duty have prevented him from attending
this IVth Congress of our Society.
One writer in the field of international law has described extradi-
tion as a matter of « imperfect Obligation ». He based his description on
the fact that under international law there is neither a duty to surrender
nor a duty not to surrender and that a grant of extradition depended
solely on reciprocity or courtesy.
The same phrase could as well be used in connection with the sub-
ject of extradition for military offenses. Although strides have been made
in providing for extradition in these cases, the treaty commitments and
obligations of the states which comprise our world Community still remaixi
f ar from perfect or complete.
Perhaps it will be helpful to determine what the term «military
offense» means or conversely does not mean when used in this context.
It does not mean offenses triable by courts-martial or other military trial
forums, because courts-martial in some countries try both civil and «mi-
litary offenses » while in other countries military offenses are tried by
the civil courts. The term does not mean offenses committed by military
personnel, because civilians subject to military law can commit military
offenses and the delicts of military personnel include civil type cases.
If we agree with these propositions, then Article 6 (b) of the Harvard
Research may be acceptable as a common basis for our study.
«6 (b) As the term is used in this Convention, a military offense
is an offense which is punishable only as o violation of a military
law or regulation and which could not be punishable, as a violation
of a civil law or regulation if the military law or regulation did not
apply. »
274
Dennis A. YORK
INTERVENTIONS
275
V^
\i
m »
<4<!
i\
Article 6 (a) of the draft provides :
«A requested state may decline to extradite a person claimed
if the extradition is sought for an act which consiitutes a military
offense, or if it appears to the requested state that the extradition
is sought in order that the person claimed may be prosecuted or
punished for a military (jffense ».
The Harvard Draft's proposed use of the term would make declina-
tion of extradition for military offenses permissive and not mandatory.
If no Prohibition at all existed against extradition based on the mi-
litary offense characterization, we would still face the traditional barriers
adopted by some or all nations founded in part on a recognition of ter-
ritorial Jurisdiction only.
These include :
1. A denial of extradition m the absence of treaty ;
2. A denial of extradition if the crime were committed in whole
or in part within the requested state and if so specified only for listed
crimes ;
3. A denial of extradition if the individual is to be tried a second
time for the same offense ;
4. A denial of extradition if the crime were not committed in the
territory of the requesting state ;
5. A denial of extradition if the individual is under prosecution for ^p
another crime in the requested state ;
6. A denial of extradition by some countries of their own nationals ;
7. A denial of extradition for political crimes. (Some writers have
grouped military offenses with political crimes, and historically, religious
crimes were also included under the prohibition) ;
8. A denial of extradition based on the principle of specialty which
requires that if extradited, trial can be held only for the offenses for which
extradited ;
9. A denial of extradition unless double criminality exists, viz, that
an extraditable crime constitute an offense in both the requested and the
requesting states. (In some cases this would seem to require considera-
tion of Statutes of limitation and other bars to trial).
When these rules are observed, it is apparent that the absence of a
prohibition against extradition for military offenses by no means assures
that extradition can be had.
In approaching a consideration of extradition for military offenses,
a brief background of the history of extradition for military offenses may
be helpf ul.
The term « extradition » def ines the process whereby one state surren-
ders to another state at its request a person accused or convicted of a cri-
minal offense committed against the laws of the requesting state, such
requesting state being competent to try the alleged offender.
Throughout the development of the law of extradition, it became the
usual practice of states not to honor requests for extradition for political,
religious, and military crimes, and in particular not to honor those that
are considered uniquely or purely military or religious offenses. It was
feit that while extradition for ordinary crimes served the best interests
of the Community of states, extradition for the offenses mentioned above
went beyond the scope of crimes common to all nations and ventured into
an area where internal rules and mores varied greatly and where poli-
tical and religious philosophies prevelant in the nations being asked to
extradite might be at variance with those of the requesting state.
After a discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities of practices
of common law compared with civil law states in regard to this issue, con-
sideration should be given to future trends and developments. These prac-
tices will be briefly compared by country within broad general areas of
our inquiry.
— What are the legal bases for extradition or its denial ?
In the United States, extradition must be based upon a treaty. There
can be no extradition for military offenses (or for any offenses, for that
matter) unless they are specifically included in the applicable treaty. There
are presently no treaties to w^hich the United States is a party that pro-
vide for extradition for military offenses.
In Canada, extradition must also be based upon treaty commitments.
Under Canadian treaties in effect, the only crimes for which extradition
is possible are those listed in the «Extradition Act». This act does not
include any military offenses.
In Great Britain, extradition must be based on a treaty or « other
arrangements ». These treaties or arrangements are concluded under the
Extradition Act. The act lists crimes for which a person may be extra-
dited ; however, other crimes specifically provided for in the extradition
arrangement may also be made extraditable. However, for the act to be
an extraditable offense, it must be an act of a kind which, if committed
in the United Kingdom, would be punishable by the ordinary criminal
law, and it must not have been an act of a political nature. Thus, it would
appear that a person cannot be extradited for a military offense.
— What Conventions have been concluded which afject a prohibition
against extradition ? Describe the Convoitions and. list the signatories
to them.
Only two treaties of which the United States is a party specifically
treat the problem, and both prohibit extradition for «pure military» of-
276
Dennis A. YORK
Vi
fenses. One is the Extradition Convention between the United States of
America and the American Republics, signed December 26, 1933, entered
into force the United States on January 25, 1935. The other parties to
the Convention are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, El Salvador, Guatamala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama.
The second treaty is the Convention on Extradition between the United
States and Sweden, signed October 12, 1961, entered into force by the Uni-
ted States, December 3, 1963.
As concerns Canada and Great Britain, the « Visiting Forces (British
Commonwealth) Act » can be considered as a derogation to the extradi-
tion acts of both Canada and Great Britain. Under the provisions of this
Act, any deserter or absentee wiihout leave or person suspected of being
such a deserter or absentee, from the forces of any country to which the
Act has been applied by Order in Council, may be arrested and handed
over to the appropriate authorities of his armed force. These countries
to which this Act has been applied are Belgium, France, Netherlands, Norway
the United States of America (all in 1954) ; Luxembourg, Turkey, Greece,
Denmakr, Portugal, and Italy (all in 1956) ; Federal Republic of Germany
(in 1961). Since it is difficult to envision a Situation where a person guilty
of a military offense could be in Great Britain or Canada, out of the con-
trol of his own country's military authorities without being a deserter
or an absentee without leave ; and since the Act places no restrictions
on the terms under which such persons are to be handed over to the coun-
try of origin to which the Act applies, these countries should have füll
powers to deal with all military offenses that offenders may have commi-
tted when they are returned to them.
— W/iat Position has been taken in case of complex ofjences lohere an
infraction of the ordinary criniinal law is indivisihly connected with
a military injraction ?
In Canada, Great Britain or the United States, this question appears
never to have been adjudicated. However, one may conclude that extra-
dition would be available if the common law offense could stand alone
without the military offense, and if it were an extraditable offense. If
the extradition is accomplished, there would be included an agreement
that the requesting State would try the individual only for the crime or
crimes for which he is extradited.
n
Which is the authority conipetent to deterniine whether a requesi jor
extradition for an offense under the general law is not in reality a
suhterfuge to evade the Prohibition against extradition for military
offenses ? Is this the sarne authority lohich also niakes the decision
whether the request of a State be denied or granted ?
In the United States, the request for extradition may be addressed
either to a federal court or to a State court of general Jurisdiction. The
INTERVENTIONS
277
court to which the request is made first determines whether the evidence
is sufficient to sustain the request for extradition under the applicable
treaty. After this determination, the Secretary of State may, in his dis-
cretion, order the individual delivered to the foreign government. Thus,
either the Secretary of State or the proper courts can deny a requested
extradition on the basis that the offense was not an extraditable crime.
In Canada, the competent authority to hear the request for extradi-
tion is a judge who is competent to hold a preliminary inquiry as if the
fugitive were charged with a crime in Canada. This authority will de-
cide whether or not to grant the request. The Minister of Justice may,
however, refuse to make an order or cancel one already made if he deter-
mines that the offense is of a political character or that the offense is
not an extraditable crime under the applicable treaty.
In Great Britain, the determination whether a person will be extra-
dited is made by the Secretary of State. However, his decision can be ap-
pealed to the High Court as a matter of law.
— 7s it believed that a conventional or legislative derogation should be
made to the general Prohibition against extradition for military offen-
ses ? If so. for which offenses and under which form ? Is the problem
more urgent in the case of integrated forms ?
In the United States, there is no general prohibition regarding ex-
tradition for military offenses.
In Canada and Great Britain, as in the United States, there is no
general prohibition regarding extradition for military offenses. In these
countries there is in effect the Visiting Forces Act, which is in derogation
of any prohibition against extradition for military offenses.
It can be generally stated that while the policies and development
of attitudes toward these questions vary, there is certainly interest in
the Problem itself .
.•I
— Are there icays available providing for the delivery of military per-
sonnel other than by means of extradition ?
The majority of foreign military personnel in the United States are
there in connection with duties under the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization. Article VII, paragraph 5 (a) of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization Status of Forces Agreement requires the United States, assistance
in the apprehension and delivery of individuals belonging to the forces
to this Organization who were stationed in the United States prior to com-
mission of the offense.
278
Dennis A. YORK
INTERVENTIONS
279
j
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if
♦ I
Under this treaty, United States military personnel who are absent
without leave in the country in which they are stationed are delivered
to United States military authorities.
Within countries where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Status of Forces Agreement applies, police authorities are obligated to
assist in the apprehension and delivery of United States personnel who
have committed military offenses and who have been stationed in that
country prior to commission of the offense.
In prefacing a discussion of treaty development in the area of ex-
tradition for military offenses, it can be stated that international agree-
ments may be categorized generally as follows :
a. T^eaties providing for non-extradition of military offenses wit-
hout any definition or qualif ication whereby the « military » character
of the act is to be tested ;
b. Treaties providing for non-extradition for pure military offenses
and setting forth the criteria by which to determine what offenses are
purely military ;
c. Treaties providing for the possibility of extradition for military
offenses if extradition could be granted for the same act had it been com-
mitted by a person not subject to military law.
The Treaty of Montevideo does not mention military offenses, but
only political crimes and those crimes that imperil the internal and ex-
ternal security of the state as not af f ording grounds for extradition.
The Treaty for the Extradition of Criminals and for the Protection
against Anarchism signed in 1902 in Mexico did not exclude military of-
fenses, but the list did not include military offenses.
The agreement of extradition between Equador, Peru, Colombia,
Bolivia and Venezuela signed at Caracas in 1911 included in the list of
extraditable offenses « desertion f rom the navy and army » as well as mu-
tiny committed on the high seas.
The Montevideo Convention of 1933 states that extradition will not
be granted «when the offense is purely military». Although several re-
servations were attached to the Convention, none was made concerning
the question of military offenses.
In the Harvard Research it was noted that at the time of the wri-
ting, the practice of non-extradition for military offenses had not gained
such universal acceptance or at least had not been so universally incor-
porated in treaty or statutory law as had been the practice of non-extra-
dition for political offenses.
As we proceed in time to the present, even the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Status of Forces Agreement, which affects many states, does
not set forth clearly a requirement to extradite for military offenses.
Article VII, paragraph 5 (a) of the Agreement, which has been dis-
cussed earlier, reads :
«The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist
each other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component
or their dependcnts in the territory of the receiving state and in
handing them over to the authority which is to exercise Jurisdic-
tion in accordance with the above provisions ».
While there is generally excellent Cooperation between signatories
to the agreement, it is interesting to note that there are no binding cri-
teria and obligations to this area.
Based upon present non-uniformity in the field and in the conside-
ration of the formulation of future policy in this area, the obvious ques-
tion for the international lawyer is whether there should be a policy of
extradition for military offenses and more specifically, pure military of-
fenses.
A close look at the military offense of desertion can leave no doubt
that it constitutes a serious, if not a grave offense, particularly during
periods of hostility or advanced stages of readiness. The inability to fit
this crime among the list of ordinary criminal offenses does not detract
from its importance. The same analysis is applicable to willful disobedi-
ence, misbehavior before the enemy, and similar unique military offenses.
One argument against a policy of extradition for military offenses
is the lack of moral turpitude inherent in the traditional sense. This is
an Clement which is normally f ound in the classic civilian crimes.
Quaere whether this is a valid basis upon which to deny extradition ?
One must distinguish between the requirements imposed upon private
Citizens to adhere to ordinary precepts of criminal law and those parti-
cular requirements imposed upon members of an armed force. Within the
context of a military society it can be strongly argued that the commis-
sion of an act that is punishable as a military crime may be considered
to involve, for want of a more precise term, military moral turpitude. The
violation of the requirements of discipline, good order, and loyalty that
the soldier must observe has been violated when he commits a military
offense.
The suppression of crime is recognized today as a problem of inter-
national dimensions and one that requires international Cooperation. States
are desirous of punishing those who have broken their law, and they wish
to take custody of those law-breakers who have escaped to other coun-
tries. We see Cooperation developing in many activities. Some courtesy
and comity is advisable because every nation may someday be in the Posi-
tion of requesting assistance. The government of a state may also bear
in mind that in this day of travel and international commerce, the vic-
«i
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280
DtMinis A. YORK
tim of a crime committed in another country may well be a national of
its own.
There is another important point of view that cannot escape the at-
tention of the authorities of the State where an accused person has taken
refuge. The arguments in favor of extradition for civil crimes appear to
apply with equal force to military offenses. A country, in the interest of
its own inhabitants, cannot afford to become an asylum for the alien cri-
minal. In fact, the most effective deterrent to crime is the prompt appre-
hension and punishment of criminals wherever they may be found. For
the accomplishment of Ihese purposes, states cannot act alone. They must
adopt some effective concert of action.
As discussed, military offenses have been historically excluded from
those offenses that are considered as extraditable crimes. However, the
common interest of states does not exclude military offenses. Now, as never
before, states have common military interests and Joint military respon-
sibilities. Because of this close association, extradition of military offen-
ders is not only more practically feasible, but very desirable. Each state
is directly interested in the apprehension and punishment of a military
offender who may jeopardize, by his actions, the Joint defense effort. The
return of military offenders belonging to the armed forces of a military
ally will further the common interest of collective security and benefit
its own national interest.
Tf we were to look at the problem of extradition for military offenses
through the spectacles of a realist, we would find that :
The nature of military forces has changed dramatically since the ruie
against extradition for military offenses was adopted. Priviate armies have
been replaced by national armies maintained and controlled by states.
The Opportunist and the drifter who was available for hire to the highest
bidder finds no place in modern forces of civilized nations that call for
and get the Service of their finest sons. The mercenary has largely disappea-
red, and in his place we find an individual owing allegiance to a respon-
sible State, protected and governed by national and international laws.
To suggest that the requirements for entry into a country be stiffened
in the case of military personnel would work a mischief against the de-
serving vast majority of military personnel who are law abiding, not ba-
lanced by an appreciable gain. Wo would lose a valuable cultural exchange.
The Visits of your service personnel to the United States have been a source
of much real enjoyment to our people.
The acceptance for extradition for military offenses is quicker when
the nations involved have a common heritage, a kindred judicial philoso-
phy, and legal institutions that are similar. The British Commonwealth
experience illustrates the truth of this proposition.
The press of necessity for extradition for military offenses is greater
INTEHVENTIONS
281
when we are bound together in some collective effort f jr a common pur-
pose, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
No matter what our ties may be, the probability of gaining extradi-
tion for military offenses is enhanced by a recognition of the just and hu-
mane nature of the laws, procedures, and trial forums to be utilized for
the trial of persons charged with the commission of military offenses.
— Concluding remarks ;
I thank you for the honor of appearing here today. There is in the
United States a growing reservoir of admiration and active support for
the Society by individuals and leading educational institutions. It is with
considerable pride to observe that participation and support for the Society
in America was initiated first among judge advocates by Major General
Charles L. Decker, and he has been followed by others who are equally
as enthusiastic and known to you, including Generals Hodson and Williams,
and my own predecessor, Colonel Earl Brown.
Aluf-Mishne Meir SHAMGAR, Military Advocate General (Israel) :
With your kind permission I would like to add my compliments to
the learned rapporteur who presented a most interesting and comprehen-
sive report, and to Dr. York who continued this line.
I for my part would like to clarify two points mentioned in the re-
port and relating to my national law, and to express my view on the
Problem of the desirability and practicability of the continued recogni-
tion of the rule of non-extradition for military offences. a rule which, as
was rightly stated, is nowadays more or less accepted in most countries.
First of all as to the points I would like to clarify :
The report mentions (on page 10 of the English translation) coun-
tries, the extradition laws of which did not specifically refer to purely
military offences and includes Israel among them. I would like to point
in connection herewith to pages 26, 38 and 39 of my report (1).
It is stated there that the Schedule of the Israeli Extradition Law
enumerates the following offences as extradition offences :
Every offence for which the death penalty or imprisonment for a
period exceeding three years may be imposed but except, inter alia.
An offence with which a person can only be charged if at the time
of committing it he is a soldier within the meaning of the Military
Justice Law of Israel. In other words, in relation to military offences
the Israeli Law of extradition has not adopted the permissive wor-
(1) supra, p. 214 and 220.
282
Meir SHAMGAK
ding of the Harvard Research on Extradition of 1935, but has chosen
the alternative presented in Schedule B of the Harvard Draft, ac-
cording to which states may prohibit categorically any extradition
for a purely military offence.
The law does not mention the term « military offence » and the sche-
dule provides for the non-extradition for military offences by applying
a wording which explains and defines itself expressis verhis i.e. the Law
applies this rule of non-extradition to « an offence with which a person
can only be charged if at the time of committing it he is a soldier within
the meaning of the Army Code, 5708. »
In other words, the legal possibility of preferment of charges, serves
as an indicator pointing out if the person is subject to military law, but
the Law did not intend to extend the rule of non-extradition to each and
every offence with which a person subject to military can be
charged. It appears that the legislator intended to express in the above
wording the aim to exclude from extradition only offences answering the
twofold test laid down by the Harvard Research namely that offences
precluded from extradition are only offences which are punishable me-
rely as a violation of a military law or regulation and which would not
be punishable as a violation of a civil law or regulation if the military
law or regulation did not apply. The definition of the Law cited above
answers both tests as it excludes by its wording any offence with which
a person not subject to military law can be charged.
Part of the extradition treaties concluded by Israel mention there-
fore the non-extradition for military offences explicity and apply above
mentionned criterion : The treaty with Italy states for example in Arti-
cle 5 that :
« L'extradition ne sera pas accordee si Tinfraction pour laquelle eile
est demandee consiste uniquement dans la violation d'obligations
militaires ».
The same proviso appears in the treaty with France.
My second remark is connected with the applications of the principle
of speciality. The report implies that certain countries, not including
Israel, have referred explicitly to the existance of the principle of specia-
lity. This Statement should include Israel, the Extradition Law of which
gives füll expression to the principle of speciality : According to its pro-
visions a wanted person shall not be extradited unless it has been insured
by an agreement with the requesting state, that he will not be detained,
tried or punished in that state for another offence committed prior to
his extradition.
As a kind of Interpolation I would like to draw your attention to a
third point :
The Norvegian report referred to the rendition of a Norvegian soldier
serving with the U.N. Forces in the Gaza strip. You are certainly aware
INTERVENTIONS
283
of the specific problem arising in this connection and which is certainly
not within the scope of this report, namely the U.N. and the U.N. Forces
are not a « state » and cannot conclude extradition treaties. Furthermore
most national laws are apt to be silent on this point, whatever the legal
conclusion one may deduce herefrom according to the written or unwrit-
ten Constitution of the different states.
My main remark relates to a possible proposition to relinquish the
rule of non-extradition for military offences, as far as it exists. In this
connection if would be worth while to reconsider shortly the raison d'etre
of the above mentioned rule, namely what werc the considerations and
interests which gave birth to the rule, be it the more limited one rela-
ting to desertion only or the more general one dealing with all purely
military offences. The answer to this question is not only of historical
interest but might furthermore be of importance while considering the
problem of the adequacy of the principle or of the justification for its
continued existence.
As a first test we should ask ourselves if the rule is an outcome of
the relative leniency, from the point of view of the severity of the maxi-
mum punishment, with which these offences are regarded. The Harvard
Research proposed in its Draft, for example, that extradition should ex-
tend only to offences for which the law provides the penalty of death
or deprivation of liberty for a period of two years or more.
May we assume that military offences generally or desertion were
regarded as less severe in the average ? The answer must certainly be
in the negative ; first of all the specific mention of the military offences
might have been superfluous in such case ; secondly desertion for one, is
and always was one of the most serious offences : The British Army Act
1955, provides for the punishment of imprisonment (i.e. up to imprison-
ment for life) for the offence of desertion on active service (section 37) ;
Art. 85 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice states that any perscn
found guilty of desertion shall be punished, if the offence is committed
in time of war, by death or such other punishment other than death, as
a court-martial may direct. The Soviet Military Code (Article 11) provi-
des for a death sentence or imprisonment for five to ten years in time
of war and imprisonment from three to seven years in peace time. These
punishments do not represent a change to severity, in comparison \vith
the practice in tho late 19th Century (which witnessed the rise of the rule
as to military offences). On the contrary, we usually witness a process
actuated by a tendency to introduce civilian perceptions of penology into
military law ; much the more so, any comparison with punishments pre-
vailing tili the middle of the last Century brings abundant evidence of
the different approach then extant and of the evolutionary process pointed
out above. Desertion is certainly one of the most serious military offen-
ces but it is not unique in its kind : wilfully disobeying an officer, stri-
king a superior, mutiny or sedition, misbehaviour before the enemy and
the like are only further examples of offences, purely military, carrying
with them severe sanctions.
1 1
284
Meir SHAMGAH
INTERVENTIONS
285
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ii
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Not finding the raison d'etre of our rule in the sphere of its relative
lack of severity in punishment we might turn and examine the difference
in mental attitudes or in other words the relative lack of moral depravity
in purely military offences. Fauchille explained the rule by pointing to
the lesser degree of moral turpitude involved in committing a military
offence and inferred here the lack of danger to the State of asylum and
the lack of interest to extradite in order suppress crime. We may assume
that this proposition is right to a certain degree, but apparently only part-
ly : It certainly may be accepted that refusal to obey Orders, for example,
does not necessarily prove an inclination to criminality and has quite dif-
ferent sociological implications if compared with murder or larceny, but
as may be observed, many treaties depart from the system of listing only
certain serious offences as extraditable offences and provide instead for
the criterion of the maximum penalty : The Harvard Draft is the most
striking expression of the tendency to apply a more general norm instead
of listing offences, because it proposed in Article 2 to regard each and
every offence providing a possible deprivation of liberty for a period of
two years or more as an extraditable offence. This being the approach
we must morever take into consideration that criminal legislation in the
modern state, exhibits an everlasting prolificacy and includes offences
providing for imprisonment up to two years, which carry with them no
greater amount of moral turpitude or social danger than refusal to obey
Orders of a military superior, but which would be nevertheless extradi-
table. Even if we make allowance for the proposition that recent trends
should not necessarily overshadow the reasonableness of an explanation
relating to times passed, i.e. to the period of the rise of the rule, we must
take into account that criminal offences lacking salient features of moral
turpitude are not necessarily a modern phenomenon. We might therefore
deduce that the explanation of Fauchille is plausible but not exhaustive.
It seems that the main reason for the acceptance of the specific
approach to purely military offences derives from the affinity of military
offences to political offences :
The purely military offence is connected, inherently, with a certain
breach of loyalty to the State, represented towards the individual soldier
by his military superiors. Purely military offences, and especially the
serious ones and desertion among them, include as a dominant element
the expression of unwillingness to obey rules which are vital and funda-
mental to the safety and for the continued existence of the force defen-
ding the State. They feature frequently the abnegation of self-sacrifice
or the refusal to relinquish personal claims, interests and objects in fa-
vour of the public interest or demand. Impliedly at last, a person manifests
hereby his disinclination to accept the established order in one of the
mainstays of the Government and so to serve the State. If this our propo-
sition as to the inherent characteristic of military offences is right, namely
if the relative lack of moral turpitude in military offences is entwined
with their semi-political character, it is selfexplanatory why the rule of
non-extradition for political offences found thus its parallel in the same
rule as to military offences, i.e. why « the common interest of civilized
communities », which is the main motive of surrender, was relinquished
in favour of a rule of non-extradition initiated by the tendeny of «non-
intervention » in case of breach of loyalty of an individual towards a
foreign State.
Moreover, the expression « non intervention » might be regarded as
a kind of Understatement. If my supposition is right. i.e. if there is a tight
intrinsic connection between political and military offences in this sphe-
re of extradition and if the rule of non-extradition for political offences
arose hand in band with the recognition and even active support, accorded
to the right of asylum, there is a certain aspect of defence of human rights
in this refusal to extradite.
In case my assumption is corrcct, only overriding and most persuasive
national interests should and could be regarded as favouring a different
practice, and even then, only to such extent as demanded by the above
mentioned interests.
In this connection I would like to examine the specific considerations
and Problems which might induce states to discard the present rule and
practice.
A mutual interest in the maintenance of law order and the admi-
nistration of justice has led nations to cooperate with one another by sur-
rendering fugitive criminals to the state in which the crime was committed.
This common interest of civilized communities has many and mani-
fold motives : it promotes friendly relations with other states, it protects
the inhabitants from the effects of the immigration of dangerous Clements,
it serves as a deterrent against crime and prevents the commission of
further crimes by the same malefactor and it furthers the repression of
crime as such.
As stated before — political and military offences have been exclu-
ded from this sphere, because other specific motives had overriding in-
fluence. This differentiation between common crimes on the one hand and
political or military crimes on the other hand has caused various diffi-
culties — be it in connection with the discernment between the above
mentioned different classes of offences or be it because of the practical
difficulties caused hereby sometimes in the relations of states, especial-
ly states carrying on friendly relations with one another. As to the first
point : The politization of large spheres of life and the utilization of cri-
minal law for securing and carrying out social and political revolutions —
have blurred the boundary line between criminal and political offences
in many states. I refer especially to the Yougoslav Refugee Case in Ger-
many and to the Ktir Case in Switzerland. This attributes for the recur-
ring difficulties in the uniformity of application of the rules as to political
offences. Secondly, the common interest of states did not stop short of
the political or military offence ; on the contrary, countries having com-
mon military interests and sometimes even a common military respon-
sibility were looking for short — cuts of the present procedure, i.e. for
pragmatic Solutions furthering the interests of discipline in allied forces
(«brevi — manu extradition»). In other words, as mentioned above
it may well be that some states, because of close association or because
286
Giovanni di BLASI
H
m
i
of the close similarity of their political institutions would find the ex-
tradition of political or military offenders not only possible but even de-
sirable : Countries tied by a political alliance might be or are apt to be
directly interested in the rendition and punishment of any military of-
fender, who has weakened by bis behaviour the common military cause
and the common military alertness. The dividing line of interest does not
follow in these cases the political boundaries because even these lost some
of their importance in cases where a common military defence has been
planned and executed. The rise of political and military groupings, we
are witnessing, might turn the rendition of a military offender, belonging
to the armed forces of a military ally, into a reasonable ancillary to the
general political and military development ; it is not more and not less
than an expression of the common responsibility of these military allies
for their collective security or even their direct national interest.
Above mentioned specific developments are naturally not applicable
to every possible set of circumstances : they are specific to military al-
liances and therefore they need not bring about far-reaching changes in
the existing rule as to non-extradition for military offences. In other
vvords they need not influence the legislative policy of national legislations,
if there are no specific common military interests as explained above,
but in the sphere of international law they would justify the continued
restraint from the creation of hard and fast rules prohibiting catego-
rically any extradition for military offences. The more flexible ap-
proach, exemplified by the wording of section 6 of the Harvard Draft,
which made the non-extradition for military offence facultative and not
obligatory should continue to be the more appropriate prototype for any
international multi-lateral agreement.
I conclude therefore :
Where no military alliances and interests exist, one should be wary
not to overlook the interests of human rights, involved in this problem,
while in search for pragmatic Solutions, applicable to a defined and spe-
cific set of circumstances only.
* *
Giovanni di BLASI, Magistrato Militare (Italia) :
Mon Intervention est justifiee par le fait qu'il me semble necessaire
de preciser les raisons pour lesquelles la Commission italienne chargee
de repondre aux questions ä Tordre du jour du Congres n'a pas pris Posi-
tion sur le point relatif a la mise ä disposition de militaires par d'autres
moyens que l'extradition.
Je lis a la page 25 du rapport general de ce matin la raison suivante :
« Bien qu'il s'agisse en Toccurrence d'un probleme d'une impor-
tance considerable, il faut pourtant tenir compte du fait que plusieurs
INTERVENTIONS
287
Etats, qui ont presente des rapports, n'ont pu prendre position, a ce
sujet, puisqu'ils n'ont ni stationne des propres forces ä l'etranger,
ni admis des troupes etrangeres sur leur territoire. C'est le cas de
l'Argentine, du Bresil, d'Israel, de Tltalie, de TAutriche et de la
Suisse, seuls les pays appartenant — si j'ose m'exprimer ainsi —
ä la communaute de defense europeenne on fait part des experiences
qu'ils ont recueillies dans ce domaine ».
II faut dire que la raison n'est pas celle-ci.
II est bien connu que Tltalie fait partie de l'OTAN et qu'en tant que
membre de TAlliance de l'Atlantique Nord eile a les memes problemes
qui existent pour tous les autres Etats membres.
Sa participation au dit Traite a souleve et continue ä soulever des
problemes d'ordre theorique et pratique sur le point de la mise ä disposi-
tion de militaires par d'autres moyens que Textradition, etant donne que
le stationnement de forces etrangeres sur son territoire — y comprise,
dans cette notion, celle de la mer territoriale — a lieu et a eu lieu
normalement.
Je voudrais eclaircir, par consequent, que, si la Commission n'a pas
repondu ä toutes les questions qui lui avaient ete posees, ceci n'a pas
ete pour la raison indiquee, mais, tout simplement, pour le fait qu'elle
n'a pas pu disposer en temps utile des renseignements necessaires ä etablir
un point de vue particulier sur Targument dont il s'agit.
D'ailleurs, puisque les elements utiles ä cette fin etaient d'ordre statis-
tique, ils echappaient ä la competence de la Commission.
Avec mon Intervention je n'ai pas voulu, evidemment, justifier la
Commission, de laquelle, d'ailleurs, je n'ai pas fait partie, mais simple-
ment exposer la Situation qui ne lui a pas permis de remplir düment le
questionnaire sur le point relatif ä la position de l'Italie sur le probleme
de la mise ä disposition de militaires par d'autres moyens que l'extradi-
tion, dans le cadre du rapport general.
Gildo RODI, Dotf. Giudice Militari de Sorveglianza (lialia) :
Ullas paJa^ ras en favor de la extradicion por delitos militares
y man particularrnento por lo qiie consierne a estos delitos
La ley militar italiana no pone ningün obstaculo a la extradicion
de acusados o detenidos por procedimientos de competencia del juez mili-
tar, y el articulo 433 del cödigo penal militar de paz regula su actuaciön
por lo que se refiere a la peticiön de extradicion del estranjero.
Sin embargo, como hemos visto, segun una practica internacional
deducida de las clausulas casi constantes de la mayoria de las convencio-
<
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288
Gildo RODI
nes, resulta sancionada la no extradicion de estos delitos que se consideran
asimilados a los crimenes politicos.
A los delitos militares, generalmente, no estä consentida la extradi-
cion porque se cree que estos hechos no suponen perversidad en sus auto-
res quienes, por lo tanto, no constituyen peligro alguno para el Pais de
refugio. Sin embargo la doctrina puede decirse conforme en el opinar que
la no extradicion por dichos delitos no es justificable, por lo menos, desde
el punto de vista cientifico.
No se puede ser indulgente con los desertores, a qualquiera naciön
ellos pertenezcan, que hayan cometido hechos graves contra las personas
o las cosas. La negaciön de extradicion, en este caso, constituye en la
mäs benigna interpretacion, un gesto de mala intenciön por parte del
Estado solicitado, sin la escusa que tal decisiön pueda tener una cual-
quiera eficacia respecto a la eficiencia militar del Estado requerente,
supuesto que un tal espediente fuera admisible entre las relaciones inter-
nacionales.
Cuanto menos no se puede desconocer que el cumplimiento de sus
deberes militares constituya, para el ciudadano, ademäs de una obliga-
ciön impuesta por la ley, un gesto de deber civico que el mismo no puede
violar sin castigo. Afirmacion esta que han tenido que defender muchos
Estados, antes de todo, cuando necesitaban solidariedad en el campo de
la colaboraciön judiciaria. Lo confirman las convenciones militares esti-
puladas entre aliados en la grave hora de la lucha y las convenciones
coloniales estipuladas entre Estados limitrofos, como aquella entre Fran-
cia y Espana sobre los respectivos territorios en Marruecos. Lo confir-
man tambien los tratados de comercio y de navigacion y las convenciones
consulares todavia existentes entre Italia y otras naciones marineras con
quien ha sido disciplinada la captura y la repatriaciön de los marineros
que en puerto italiano hayan desertado, siendo en buque de guerra o mer-
cante.
Es verdad que algo se ha hecho despues de la segunda guerra mun-
dial, cuando con el fin de asegurar el castigo de los llaniados crimenes
de guerra, se ha considerado esta clase de crimenes como delitos de dere-
cho comün facilitando asi la extradicion de estos delincuentes. Sin em-
bargo, con la convenciön europea de extradicion firmada en Paris el 13
diciembre 1957 entre 15 naciones europeas, queda todavia confirmado el
principio de la no extradicion por las infraciones militares, aünque se
deje claramente comprender, en dicha convenciön, que los Estados estan
libres de contraer obligaciones diferentes.
Solo en 1961, es decir el 3 de marzo del 61 algunos Estados nordicos, como
la Dinimarca, Noruega, Finlandia, Suecia e Islanda se ponen de acuerdo
por una mutua extradicion a caracter militar y en el 1962, es decir el 27
de junio del 1962 una convenciön parecida se lograra entre Belgica, Lux-
emburgo y los Paises Bajos.
Tenemos que animarnos para que convenciones similares puedan
INTERVENTIONS
289
seguir se tambien entre otros Estados y estamos convencidos, como
ha dicho el mismo ponente general Günter Pütz, que el problema de la
estradicion por delitos militares, hay que ser regulado en el marco de una
colaboraciön militar entre Estados.
El fundamento de la invocada extensiön es el tradicional del instituto
de la extradicion, es decir, la solidariedad entre los Estados que tiene que
cxistir tambien fuera de los tiempos extraordinanos y de las zonas rodea-
das de exigencias excepcionales. Yä se sabe que la extradicion concedida
por delitos militares plantea como consecuencia, la necesidad de la
ejecuciön de la pena infligida por estos delitos y, por si acaso de las
medidas de seguridad consecuenciales.
Sin embargo, a parte el problema de la extradicion que puede o no
ser concedido, es preciso preguntarse si en general las medidas de se-
guridad impuestas en consecuencia de delitos militares, hoy como hoy,
deben seguir las reglas de la extradicion o bien las reglas internacionales
sobre la asistencia judiciaria en materia penal.
La gran importancia que actualmente han adquirido las medidas de
seguridad y su inclusion en los modernos cödigos penales y en los proyectos
legislatives, plantea el problema de la extradicion de los individuos a
quienes se haya impuesto una medida de este tipo.
Opino que la solucion de este problema seria comun tanto a la ley ordina-
ria que a la militar, supuesto que, por su caracter complementario la ley
militar — me refiero a la italiana — recoje de la ordinaria las normas
relativas a la aplicaciön y ejecuciön de las medidas de seguridad que,
quiero precisar, no se conforman con la calidad militar de la persona,
mäs bien con la peligrosidad social del delincuente yä expulsado del ejer-
cito.
Me refiero a las medidas de seguridad detentivas. De las no deten-
civas non conviene ocuparse puesto que la extradicion conta con la pri-
vaciön de la libertad personal.
Limitando a este campo nuestra investigaciön, pensamos de facilitar
la comprensiön del tema teniendo en cuenta, antes de todo, de las condi-
ciones de los delincuentes abituales, profesionales y por tendencia, a quie-
nes particularmente se aplican las medidas de seguridad.
Si se tiene en cuenta que el fundamento de la extradicion se halla
en su necesidad como medio de defensa social contra el delito, tendrä que
autorizarse la entrega no solo de los individuos sometidos a procedimiento
penal o condenados, sino tambien la de los sometidos a medidas de seguri-
dad, pues la actuaciön del Estado contra estas personas, generalmente
muy peligrosas, tiene un puro sentido de defensa social.
Por efecto de las medidas de seguridad el que esta sujeto a ellas tiene
que volver a su libertad reeducado a la vida social y esto es tal empeno que
el Estado no solamente no debe de trascurar sino que tiene obligaciön de
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290
Gildo RODI
absolver con cualquier medio a su disposiciön y por consiquiente con la
misma extradiciön, que tiene su base en el principio de la asistencia ju-
diciaria en materia penal.
En la legislaciön italiana hay una alusiön a la necesidad de la extra-
diciön en tema de medidas de seguridad en el articulo 670 del cödigo de
actuaciones penales, lo quc esije que las medidas de seguridad, cuya eje-
cuciön ha sido suspendida en consecuencia de la entrega del criminal a
las autoridades extranjeras, sean absolutamente ejecutadas nada mäs que
la persona, a quien ha sido aplicada, regrese por cualquier motivo en el
territorio del Estado.
En campo internacional se puede decir que la citada convenciön
europea de extradiciön del 1957, ratificada en Italia con la ley 30 enero,
1963 n^' 300, ha hecho un paso adelante en la via de la colaboraciön judi-
ciaria admitiendo, por primera vez, el principio de la extradiciön por las
medidas de seguridad.
En efecto el articulo primero de dicha convenciön establece que los
Estados contraentes se obligan a entregarse de mutuo acuerdo y a deter-
minadas condiciones, los individuos perseguidos por una infraciön o soli-
citados para la ejecuciön de una pena o de una medida de seguridad,
entendiento por medida de seguridad cada medida privativa de libertad
que sea ordenada como acesorio o en substituciön de una pena impuesta
por parte de una jurisdiciön penal.
Esto quiere decir que indipendenlemente de la persona del inculpado
o del hecho que forma objeto del delito la extradiciön puede ser requerida
o concedida tambien por las solas medidas de seguridad a las que, segun
el sistema juridico italiano, pertenecen igualmente la medida del mani-
comio judiciario y la de la casa de cura y custodia. — Sin embargo, sin
plantear el problema en toda su inlegridad cientifica, es decir hasta com-
prender las medidas de seguridad para los incapaces penalmente como
los locos y los menores non imputables, nada prohibe por el momento,
que en las convenciones entre los Estados pueda regularse la condiciön
de todas las otras personas que, infinitamente mas numerosas y por cierto
no menos temibles como los delincuentes abituales, profesionales y por
tendencia, deben aün mäs empenar la solidariedad de los Estados en la
lucha contra los delitos.
El interes de resolver afirmativamente la cuestiön es comün a todos
los Estados. A los de origen interesa la reeducaciön social de sus ciudada-
nos y a los otros interesa tambien liberarse de algunos estranjeros ende-
seables que con la facilidad de las modernas comunicaciones pasan con
frecuencia de uno a otro teritorio.
En este modo opinamos que, hoy, en la espera de soluciones generales
la extradiciön, denegada por la ejecuciön de la pena militar, pueda ser
concedida limitadamente por la ejecuciön de las medidas de seguridad,
aunque ordenadas en consecuencia de delitos militares, puesto que estas
medidas no se refieren a la exceptionalidad del delito sino a la persona-
lidad del individuo ya no militar.
INTERVENTIONS
291
Sahir ERMAN, Professeur a l'Universite d'lstanbul (Turquie)
Je prends la parole pour une courte intervention. Je dois preciser
d'abord que le droit turc ne diftere pas des autres legislations en vigueur,
c'est-ä-dire qu'il n'accepte pas Textradition pour les delits purement mili-
taires en laissant au gouvernement le pouvoir d'accorder ou de refuser
l'extradition pour les infractions militaires mixtes ou assimilees, apres
une decision favorable ä Textradition du tribunal correctionnel. Je suis
tout ä fait d'accord avec le rapporteur general pour Tadmission de Textra-
dition pour les delits purement militaires, d'autant plus que la Convention
sur le Statut des forces de l'OTAN peut servir de base ä un Systeme pareil.
Mais il faudrait ä mon avis faire une distinction entre le delit purement
militaire et les delits militaires qui ont des finalites politiques, car la
desertion meme peut avoir une finalite politique. Par exemple, mon pays
a accepte des refugies hongrois pendant la recente revolte hongroise et
parmi ces refugies il y avait aussi des personnes militaires, ainsi que lors
du plus recent coup d'etat grec nous avons eu des refugies militai-
res qui etaient sans aucun doute des deserteurs. Or il faut d'abord
preciser que les delits militaires qui ont des finalites politiques doivent
etre consideres comme des delits purement politiques, c'est-ä-dire que la
qualite de delit politique doit l'emporter. De cette fagon la regle de la
non-extradition doit etre appliquee ä cette categorie de delits militaires.
•
* *
Colonel G. LAD. DRAPER, (United Kingdom) :
We are here confronted with an interesting proposal for a Conven-
tion to govern the extradition of military offenders. I have listened with
interest, and I hope with profit, to the debates that have taken place here
and to which distinguished delegates have made stimulating contribu-
.tions. For my part, I have tried to assess the merits of the proposals in a
detached and constructive manner. In the result, both on grounds of theo-
ry and experience, of political and legal considerations, I find that I can-
not Support the proposal now before us.
Military law is a very special branch of the municipal law of
States. It is a law governing a very special part of the State executive
apparatus, namely, the armed forces. It is commonly agreed that defence,
foreign policy, and economic activities, are, in our modern world, the
three salient and predominant areas of State functions. Each of them
touches a State at its very nerve points, indeed, in the case of defence,
at the roots of its existence.
Every person subject to the Military Law of his State Stands in an
unique relationship to his State. He is not only in the service of that
}t^
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292
G. I.A.D. DRAPER
State but in that pai t of its service upon which the existence of the State
depends in large part. He is no ordinary State official. He owes a degree
of loyalty and obedience to bis superiors shared by no other officials,
and certainly not by ordinary Citizens. It is my contention that when
other States are to play a role in returning military offenders to the Ju-
risdiction of the State upon which they depend we are at once entering
an area of considerable political sensitivity both to the demanding and
retaining State.
We are all well aware, in such a Congress as this, of the difficulties
States have experienced in practice in arriving at what are «political»
offences for the purpose of denying extradition under treaties. Our law
books are littered with the uncertainties which prevail in this zone of
State practice. They reflect, of course, the uncertainties of International
Law itself in this matter. Hitherto, such uncertainties have been confined
to the extradition of common crimes. I ask you all to be cautious before
we attempt the hazard of extending those uncertainties to military law
offences. Up tili now Military Law has been happily exempt from the
difficulties inherent in deviding offences into those which are « common »
and those which are infused with such a degree of political colouring
that they are termed «political», and where extradition is accordingly
denied under existing International Law.
It is proposed, in the project now under debate, that military offences
should be divided into those which are «common» and those which are
not. Where, in such a categorisation, Stands the military offence of de-
sertion, one of the most frequent of military offences ? Deserting the
military service of one's State can be the outcome of a wide variety
of reasons, from purely political motivation to that of pure cowardice. As
so often in life, man's motives are rarely pure and seldom simple.
Consider, again, the considerable differences which prevail in the
military law' Systems of modern States, both in Substantive, procedural
and jurisdictional law. Again, in some States military personnel stand
under a dual and even treble subjcction to law ; in others they stand
exclusively subject to the military law of their State. I venture to suggest
here that States need first to reach a much closer assimilation of their
military law^ regimes before a Convention on extradition for military
offences is a feasible proposition. Otherwise, States will find themselves
committed to obligations which would deny the accepted candn of the
non-extradition of political offenders. Many of the so called « common »
military crimes, whether desertion or striking a superior, or disobeying
a lawful Order, can be charged with a highly political content. Likew^ise,
a demanding State would find little difficulty in seeking the retum of
political refugees by the allegation of military desertion. Let us remember
that it is a matter well within the citadel of State sovereignty that
niunicipal law may determine which of the Citizens of a State are sub-
ject to its military law and how they become so subject. I take it that the
proposed Convention on military extradition is not seeking to limit that
sovereign right of States. If not, then States can use the device of military
INTERVENTIÜNS
293
« subjcction » to seek the return of those of its Citizens whom it does not wish
to be out of their territory at any time. After all, a reservist can be « acti-
vated » by the stroke of the executive pen.
I ask you to reject this proposal until States have reached a far closer
identity of their military law Systems.
Thorsten CARS, Dr, Assistant Professor of Stockholm University (Sweclcn)
Since there has not been issued a Swedish national report it would
perhaps be of some interest for the members of the congress to hear
a little about the Swedish legislation in the field in question.
Sweden has signed the European Convention on extradition of 1957.
On the ground of this Convention and of Scandinavian collaboration (no
formal Convention on extradition, however, has been made by the Scan-
dinavian countries) there have been issued two internal Swedish laws
regulating extradition. The law concerning extradition to other Scandi-
navian States does not specially refer to purely military offences but,
on the other band, does not prevent extradition for such offences. The
other law — concerning extradition to other states than the Scandina-
vian countries — prohibits extradition for purely military offences but
declares that, if an offence against the military laws also includes a civil
offence, extradition may be granted for this offence.
I also want to point out an important difference between the agree-
ment between the Scandinavian states, on one band, and the treaty between
the Benelux-countries, on the other band (mentioned in the ge-
neral report inter alia on page 24 (1). The Benelux-countries are linked
in a common military Organisation but so are not the Scandinavian states.
On the contrary Denmark, Iceland and Norway are members of the Nato
while Finland has made a treaty of defense with the Union of the socia-
list sovjet republics (URSS) and Sweden is an entirely neutral country
situated as it is in the centre of Scandinavia. In spite of this the Scandi-
navian agreement allows extradition for purely military offences. So,
in my opinion, there is np condition for an agreement between two or
more states on extradition for purely military offences that there is a
military alliance treaty made between these states. However, as far
as I know — and I have some experience of the practice of extradition
from Sweden to foreign countries — we have in Sweden not yet received
any request of extradition for neither purely nor mixed military offences.
So the Problem can not be said to be a very important one in Sweden or
— I dare say — in all Scandinavia.
il
(1) supra, p. 67.
'11
t-s
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1
Chapitre IV
RAPPORT DE SYNTHESE
»,•»
fn
297
EXPOSICION DE SINTESIS
por
Jose Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
Catedratico de Derecho Pönal
y Coronel Auditor
Sr. Presidente
Senores :
Los Ponentes generales que me han precedido, los senores Paucot
(Francia) y Pötz (Alemania), merecen la gratitud del Congreso por la im-
proba labor que han realizado con exito. A ellos les ha correspondido or-
ganizar el enorme material, sin precedentes, aportado por las comunicacio-
nes nacionales. Numerosas leyes penales militares, gran numero de Tratados
internacionales, han sido disociados en sus elementos, analizados por exper-
tos del mas alto nivel en los paises que aqui estän representados. En una
confrontaciön que jamäs habia dispuesto de materiales tan copiosos, los
Ponentes generales han establecido analogias y diferencias, coincidencias
y discrepancias de criterios, con gran comprensiön para los Derechos na-
cionales, producto de la historia y de la cultura de cada pueblo y de sus
coyunturas politicas, y con un exacto sentido de las exigencias del Derecho
comparado, han extraido los rasgos y los problemas fundamentales, subray-
ando las diversas soluciones aportadas por los distintos ordenamientos ju-
ridicos. Las magnificas intervenciones que se han producido en los dias de
ayer y hoy, han venido a matizar con sus atinadas observaciones las conclu-
siones a que se ha llegado en las ponencias. Me toca ahora a mi dar un ul-
timo paso e intentar resumir aquellos pensamientos que han quedado, por
decirlo aei flotando en la atmösfera del Congreso en relaciön con los temas
mas sobresalientes — no todos — de los que a el se han traido.
M
Me parece que debemos empezar por el de las concesiones entre el
Derecho peiial militar y el Derecho comün. Creo que todo lo que aqui se
ha dicho sobre la tendencia de aproximaciön del Derecho militar al Derecho
u
«?*•
298
Jose Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
comün, y sobre las pcculiaridades que, no obstante, caracterizaban al De-
recho penal militar, pudiera expresarse de esta manera : El Derecho penal
militar, en cuanto Derecho penal, responde a los mismos principios que el
Derecho penal comün, especialmente al principio de legalidad (nullum cri-
men sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, nulla poena sine legale Judicium) y
al principio de que no hay pena sin culpabilidad {nulla poena sine culpa).
Todo progreso en el Derecho comün se ha traducido histöricamente, se tra-
duce y debe traducirse en el Derecho penal militar. Pero el Derecho penal
militar tiene sus peculiaridades nacidas de la particular coherencia de las
Fuerzas Armadas, de las finalidades que el ordenamiento juridico adscribe
a los ejercitos. No es, por ejemplo, que se niegue la legitima defensa. Pero
el superior, frente a la agresiön de un inferior en un acto del servicio, no
actüa ni puede actuar jamas en legitima defensa, porque la legitima defen-
sa es un derecho y como tal renunciable, mientras que el superior no puede
renunciar a reprimir la agresiön de un inferior ; tiene el deber de recha-
zarla, no actüa en legitima defensa, sino en cumplimiento de un deber, el
deber de niantener la disciplina. Y como este, otros muchos efemplos ser-
virian para mostrar como, respondiendo a los mismos principios, el Derecho
penal militar tiene que diferenciarse del Derecho comün, lo que se intenta
a traves de las variadas tecnicas que hemos escuchado y en las que no me
voy a detener.
El problema del criterio diferencial entre delitos miUtares y delitos
co'uunes, que delitos deben llevarse a las leyes militares y cuäles han de
mantenerse en las leyes comunes, ha revelado aqui una amplisima gama
de soluciones legislativas, dificiles de compaginar unas con otras. Para cla-
rificar la cuestiön habria que distinguir entre una consideraciön ex ante
y una consideraciön ex post. A posteriori es imposible, para distinguir entre
delitos militares y delitos comunes, otro criterio que no sea el meramente
formal : son delitos militares los que contienen las leyes penales militares,
o aquellos a los que las leyes otorgan caracter militar. Si se quiere encon-
trar un criterio de fondo, materia, a priori, de lege ferenda, hay que acudir
a una consideraciön ex ante. Desde este punto de vista, entiendo que solo
deben comprenderse en las leyes penales militares aquellos hechos que
afecten de modo directo e inmediato a los intereses de las Fuerzas Arma-
das. Y me inclino por este criterio porque creo esta en el änimo de todos los
congresistas que la guerra total, esa terrible forma de hacer la guerra y
de prepararse para ella que ha hecho irrupciön en el mundo en los Ultimos
decenios, hace que todas las actividades de un pais tengan que ponerse al
servicio de la guerra o de su preparaciön. Entonces, el nümero de abortos, al
disminuir el potencial demografico, afecta a los intereses militares indirec-
tamente ; la organizaciön de la ensenanza, al depender de ella el nümero
de especialistas con que puede contar el ejercito en tiempo de paz y de
guerra, afecta a los intereses militares ; las ideologias que se entrecruzan
con el amor a la patria, internacionalizando los problemas internos, hacien-
do que el encmigo de la patria sea en algunos casos el amigo de la facciön po-
litica a que se pcrtenece, afecta a los intereses militares, puede perturbar
la movilizaciön, entorpecer las Fuerzas Armadas. Todo, todo lo que ocurre
en un pais tiene una repercusion en su potencial belico : la economia, la
estructura social, la politica. En consecuencia, si tomamos como criterio
EXPOSICION DE SINTESIS
290
para construir los delitos militares el ataque indirecto, mediato, a intereses
militares, no hay ya posibilidad de distinguir entre el Derecho militar y el
Derecho comün : todo tendria que ser Derecho militar. Creo por eso que en
la mente de todos esta que en t'iempo de paz las leyes penales militares no
deben contener mas que aquellas conductas que afecten de modo directo a
los intereses militares del Estado. En situacioncs de emergencia o de guer-
ra, debe proveerse mediante normas procesales ad hoc o leyes penales espe-
ciales.
La aplicacicn de la Leij penal militar a personas no militares es cuida-
do que agita no solo a la sociedad, a nuestra Sociedad, que lo ha incluido en
el tcmariodel Congreso, sino a la opinion publica en todos los paises. Es una
preocupaciön que guarda muy estrecha relaciön con el prestigio de las
Fuerzas Armadas y que, por ello, debe ser tratada con la mayor delicadeza.
Los ejercitos deben cuidar la opiniön publica en la medida que sea compa-
tible con el cumplimiento de las misiones que tienen asignadas dentro del
Estado. 6 Esta justificado o no que se aplican las disposiciones relativas a
delitos militares a personas civiles ? Tambien aqui esta en el änimo de los
congresistas una distinciön. Porque los civiles pueden verse atraidos al äm-
bito de las leyes penales militares por haber participado en un delito mili-
tar propio, esto es, en un delito militar de los que solo puede ser sujeto
activo un militar ; por ejemplo, la deserciön : pueden inducir a una deser-
ciön ; o pueden cometer delitos militares de aquellos que en muchos paises
contienen las leyes militares, cuyo sujeto activo puede ser indistintamente
un militar o un no militar, cualquier persona. En el primer caso, el de par-
ticipacion de civiles en dehtos militares propios, la aplicaciön de la Ley
penal militar es inevitable. La cuestiön ha de trasponerse entonces al ter-
reno procesal, hay que tratar de que tenga las mismas garantias, por ejem-
plo, elecciön de defensor letrado, que si fueran enjuiciados ante la Juris-
dicciön ordinaria. La segunda hipötesis, la de delitos que puedan ser come-
tidos por cualquiera, militar o no militar, deberia resolverse, como lo han
hecho muchos paises aqui representados, llevändolos a la ley comün, sin
perjuicio de rcglas procesales que autoricen la intervenciön de los tribunales
militares en determinados casos y circunstancias. ü bien, convirtiendo esas
conductos en delitos militares propios, delicta propria, es decir, por ejemplo
dejando en las leyes penales militares el espionaje comedito por militares,
y el espionaje, en general, en el Derecho comün. Yo diria : los delitos que
no afectan directamente a intereses militares, y los delitos militares que
pueden ser comeditos indistintamente por militares y no militares, son
falsos delitos militares,
Descendamos ahora a algunos de los problemas concretos que con-
tiene la agenda del Congreso : menores y cumplimiento de ördes superiores.
Tomando la palabra inenorcs no en un sentido estricto de menores
de edad penal, donde los problemas son minimos porque en la mayoria de
los paises no forman parte de los ejercitos y en los demäs se tiende a res-
tringir su admisiön en las Fuerzas Armadas, y empleando la palabra me-
nores en el sentido de jövenes, sean adolescentes, semiadultos, o adultos
jövenes, esta en la conciencia de todos que es de la mayor importancia la
orientaciön del Derecho penal militar con referencia a ellos, porque, cuan-
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Jos6 Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
titativamentc. son el elemento bäsico de las Fuerzas Armadas. La prolon-
ßacion de la vida humana ha hecho que las consecuencias de un tratamien-
to penal defectuoso ten^an unas repercusiones en la comunidad a la que
se devuelven los delincuentcs, iina vez cumplida su condena, que no se pro-
dician antes. En el animo de todos estä que, en esta esfera de actuaciön
del Derecho militar, hay que buscar una coordinaciön con las leyes comunes
en vista a la reincorporacion a la vida social de los jovenes que cometen
delitos militares, sin deterioros o con el menor deterioro posible, y respe-
tando el derecho que tienen a una educaciön adecuada.
La pregunta de si deben excusarse o justificarse los delitos cometidos
en ejecuciön de ordenes superiores, sigue sin tener una contestaciön satis-
factoria, sigue preocupando a todos cuantos nos ocupamos del Derecho pe-
nal militar, y nuestra sociedad ha demostrado una viva sensibilidad para
csta preocupaciön al incluirla en la agenda del Congreso. La problemätica
de los delltos comeditos en cumplimiento de ordenes superiores es suma-
mente compleja y en el estado actual de las discusiones no pedemos pre-
tender llegar a una coincidencia plena de pareceres. Sin embargo, en la
atmösfera de esta Asamblea flota la particular tensiön que caracteriza este
tema vidrioso. De un lado, la repugnancia a que queden impunes dehtos,
a veces atroces, al amparo de ordenes superiores que, en ocasiones, se esca-
lonan indefinidamente diluyendo la responsabilidad. De otro, el temor a
debilitar lo que constituye el nervio de los ejercitos, la subordinaciön jerar-
quica y la obediencia a las ordenes recibidas. Como ya sostuve en Florencia,
entiendo que no hay mäs que un medio de ahviar esta tension. Distinguir
entre lo que es esencial a la subordinaciön jerärquica objetivamente consi-
derada, y las situaciones conflictivas de error, coaccion, necesidad, nacidos
de esa relaciön de subordinaciön y de la costumbre de obedecer, que no son
esenciales y propias de la subordinaciön militar porque pueden darse y se
dan en otros casos. Desprendidas del cumplimiento de ordenes superiores
esas adherencias, considerada objetivamente la subordinaciön jerärquica,
hemos de reconocer que la ordert de covieter un delito no es nunca obliga-
toria y, en consecuencia, no puede alegarse como causa de justificaciön o
excusa para el que obedece. No hay opciön : se admite que la orden de come-
ter un deUto es obligatoria, o no se admite que sea obligatoria. Si admiti-
mos que la orden de cometer un delito es obligatoria en las Fuerzas Ar-
madas, no podremos establecer ninguna diferencia entre un ejercito y una
partida de bandidos. Porque lo que caracteriza a una partida de bandidos
es que las ordenes de cometer un delito dadas por quien la manda son obli-
gatorias para quienes forman parte de la banda. Mas los ejercitos moder-
nes no son bandas armadas, partidas de bandidos. Estan fundados en el
Derecho y estän obligados a respetar el ordenamiento jurkiico. Inter armas
unou)) silent leges. Esto no quiere decir que quien comete un delito en
cumplimiento de ordenes superiores no quede exento nunca de responsa-
bilidad criminal. Por ejemplo, si mediö un error esencial e invencible,
sobre el caräcter delictivo de la acciön que se ordenö ejecutar, o sobre la
obligaciön misma de obedecer (error cada vez mäs dificil a medida que
se asciende en el rango jerärquico) quedarä exento de culpabilidad el
que obedece, mas no por haber cumplido una orden, no por obediencia
debida, sino por el error. Cierto que estas ideas precisan de ulteriores
estudios para encontrar förmulas tecnicas satisfactorias. Las posibles so-
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EXPOSICION DE SINTESIS
301
luciones, sin embargo, han de buscarse y encontrarse por ese camino.
Y ahora, en conexiön general con la totalidad del Derecho penal militar
y el Derecho de la guerra, aunque muy en particular con el acto realizadc
en cumplimiento de ordenes superiores, estä la incidencia de los Convenios
internacionales sohre el Derecho interna. Hemos visto que los sistemas y
tecnicas de los paises representados aqui son muy diversos. Desde el reco-
nocimiento cn las Constituciones de la primacia del Derecho internacional
sobre el Derecho interne, hasta la no admisiön de determinados Convenios
internacionales, pasando por su condicionamiento a que se traduzcan en
leyes internas para que obliguen dentro de la Naciön. Por encimia de esas
divergencia nacionales, creo que se respira aqui una idea que pudiera ex-
presarse asi : suscritos o no, los Convenios internacionales que tienden a
la humanizaciön de la guerra, de esta guerra moderna que ha asumido un
caräcter devastador y una ferocidad como nunca habia conocido la Huma-
nidad, no hay duda alguna, no puede haberla, que la guerra no invalida las
reglas reconocidas, consagradas y admitidas en todos los paises civilizados :
?1 asesinato, el robo, la tortura, siguen siendo delitos con arreglo a nuestro
Derecho intcrno, aunque el pais se vea arrastrado a una guerra. La guerra
solo justifica aquellos males que le son inherentes y por ello inevitables.
Todo sufrimiento causado a heridos, näufragos, prisioneros, poblaciön civil,
innecesarios a los fines de la guerra, sigue siendo durante esta una conducta
criminal, y como tal ha de castigarse. Con independencia de que el enemigo
haya suscrito o no Convenios internacionales encaminados a dulcificar la
suerte de heridos, prisioneros, näufragos y poblaciön civil. Lo cual no quiere
decir que los que pertenecen a las Fuerzas Armadas enemigas beneficien
de una impunidad que no podria acordärseles por las mismas razones que
no se debe conceder a las tropas propias. Se que la teoria de las represalias
puede representar, en algunos casos, un obstäculo para esta tesis que estä
en el änimo de todos. Pero la teoria de las represalias es algo que en este
momento estä fuera de discusiön porque no pertenece al temario del Con-
greso. Aunque no estaria de mäs estudiar esta tecnica de la guerra en las
relaciones con el Derecho interno, pues la represalia representa un residuo
de antiquisimas concepciones sobre culpabilidad y responsabilidad colec-
tivas que han sido borradas hace tiempo de las leyes penales y, por consi-
guiente, de las leyes penales militares. Es curioso que una especie de ver-
güenza y sentimiento del decoro haya impedido que el « derecho » a dar
muerte a personas inocentes no haya encontrado expresa consignaciön en
ninguna ley penal militar.
Dejemos, sin embargo, este tcma, que nos Uevaria muy lejos, para ocu-
parnos de otro de ia mayor trascendencia en un mundo donde los ejercitos
tienden a convertirse en fuerzas interregionales, el tema de la posibilidad
de conseguir un cierto grado de unificaciön en los sistemas legales adopta-
dos para la clasificacion de las infracciones militares. El cotejo de los mäs
diversos ordenamientos ha puesto de relieve que predomina el criterio de
los intereses juridicos protegidos. En funciön de estos intereses se distri-
buyen los delitos militares. Por excepciön, algunos paises toman como cri-
terio el de la indole de los deberes infringidos. De ello se deduce que mu-
chos piensan que hay razones de peso para seguir aquel sistema. Diriamos
aün mäs. Saquemos las conclusiones lögicas de ese criterio. La Ley penal
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Jos6 Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
militar debe reco^er solo aquellas conductas que lesionen o pongan en pe-
ligro esos interescs juridicos. La simple infracciön de un deber militar, que
no lesione ni ponga en peligro ningün interes juridicamente protegido, no
debe trascender de la esfera disciplinaria. Esto supuesto, no seria dificil,
cinendonos a los delitos militares propios, avanzar hacia la meta de una
unificacion sistematica enfocando nuestros esfucrzos y meditaciones en esa
direcciön, tarea previa para llegar a la mäs ambiciosa de homogeneizar
hasta donde se pueda (una homogeneizaciön radical, una Ley penal militar
uniforme no parece hoy posible mientras subsistan los actuales Estados
soberanos) las leyes penales militares, por lo menos, de las naciones que per-
tenecen a un mismo circulo de cultura.
Acabo de hablar de la esfera discipUnaria. Tambien se han puesto de
manifiesto en este Congreso unas tendencias marcadas. Una, a separar neta-
mente el Derecho penal y el Derecho disciplinario. Otra a eliminar del
Derecho disciplinario las formulas vagas e indeterminadas, a « legalizar »
el Derecho disciplinario. Ambas tendencias merecen la mäxima atenciön,
porque a diferencia de lo que ha pasado a constituir un töpico muy difun-
dido, creo que la disciplina y buen orden de las Fuerzas Armadas descansa
mäsen el Derecho disciplinario que cn el penal.
Finalniente, dedicare unas palabras a la extradicwn por delitos mili-
tares. Los excelentes trabajos presentados, la ponencia del Sr. Pötz, digna
del mayor encomio, tienen un nücleo comün que conviene resaltar. La doc-
trina tradicional de la no extradiciön por delitos militares no responde ya,
en todos los casos, a las concepciones actuales. Cuando las alianzas militares
despliegan su eficacia, a diferencia de lo que ocurria antes de la segunda
guerra mundial, en una profunda cooperaciön de las naciones aliadas sin
esperar a que una de ellas se encuentre en guerra con un enemigo comün,
desaparece cualquier argumento sölido contra la entrega de los delincuen-
tes militares entre losaliados. Si el Derecho penal militar tutela el poten-
cial belico, la debilitacion del potencial militar de un aliado es debiltar el
potencal conjunto y, por lo tanto, el propio. Ademäs, el acudir a expedien-
tes de ayuda jurisdiccional, de entrega de facto en determinados casos, no
parece que sea recomendable. El extradido se ve privado entonces de aquel-
las garantias que ordinariamente reviste la extradiciön : no imposicion de
la pena de mucrte, prmcipio de especialidad, etc. La via mäs oportuna para
consagrar la extradiciön por delitos militares, se ha apuntado que es la de
consignar esta excepciön en los Convenios de alianza o de cooperaciön mi-
litar. Parece, que salvo en estos casos, deben mantenerse la regulaciön
actual contraria a acordar la extradiciön por delitos militares. Indudable-
mente, hay que remover los obstäculos que oponga la legislaciön interna.
Tambien merecen subrayarse la tendencia general a referir la extradiciön
por delitos militares a los delitos especificamente militares, es decir, a
aquellas conductas que si se suprimiera mentalmente la Ley penal militar,
no constituirian delito conforme al Derecho comün. Cläre que en los delitos
militares, como en los delitos comunes, puede ocurrir que nos encontremos
ante el delincueiite por conviccion, un concepto criminolögico amplio que
deberia sustituir al de « delincuente politico », tan impreciso. Algunas alu-
siones que hemos oido han hecho referencia a este respecto del problema.
Creo, sin embargo, que en la mente de todos estä que sera forzar con ex-
EXPOSICION DE SINTESIS
303
ceso el concepto de delito politico, afirmar que todos los delitos militares
son delitos politicos. Alli donde se entrecrucen los conceptos de delito pol-
tico, 0 delito por conviccion, como preferiria llamarlo (entendiendo que esta
nociön es mäs amplia que la de delito politico), y delito militar, deben tener
la primacia las excepciones consagradas en las leyes y en los tratados de
extradiciön para los delitos politicos. Por lo demäs, el argumento de que
quienes cometen un delito puramente militar no representan un peligro
para el pais en que se refugian, me parece inconsistente. El Derecho in-
ternacional tiene excesivos problemas para atender los aspectos crimino-
lögicos de la cuestiön. Pero desde el punto de vista criminolögico es incon-
trovertible que la peligrosidad, la proclividad al crimen, puede manifes-
tarse tambien por un delito estrictamente militar. La agresividad, por ejem-
plo, puede revelarse lo mismo por un homocidio que por un delito contra
la propiedad o el ataque a un superior dentro del ejercito ; la indisciplina
social encuentra expresiön en un delito de träfico igual que en una desobe-
diencia militar. El problema de la peligrosidad no puede ni debe rcsolvei'se
con criterios juridico-formales, sino que depende de la personalidad y del
mundo circundante. Por ello, la afirmaciön, sin mäs, de que quien come-
te un delito militar no constituye un sujeto peligroso no estä de acuerdo
con el estado actual de nuestros conocimientos criminolögicos.
Pongo fin a mi intervenciön. Espero que, con el respeto que nuestra
Sociedad muestra a las peculiaridades de los ordenamientos juridico-mili-
tares nacionales de los distintos Estados integrados en el Congreso, este
contraste de informaciön y este intercambio de impresiones que hemos
tenido, constituyan un estimulo para cubrir las muchas etapas que restan
hasta que consigamos Uevar el estudio del Derecho penal militar y del De-
recho de la guerra a la altura cientifica y tecnica que deseamos y que se
propone nuestra Sociedad, y que entretanto las ideas que han quedado ex-
puestas en este IV Congreso sirvan de orientacion en los trabajos legisla-
tives en curso o que se emprendan en el futuro, y, asimismo, en la interpre-
taciön y aplicaciön de las leyes penales militares vigentes cn nuestros res-
pectivos paises.
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RAPPORT DE SYNTHESE
par
Jose Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
Professeur de Droit Cnminel et Colonel Auditeur
m^\
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Les rapporteurs generaux qui m'ont precede, M.M. Paucot (France)
et Potz (Republique Federale d'Allemagne), meritent la reconnais-
sance du Congres pour le travail considerable qu'ils ont accompli avec
succes. Tous deux ont coordonne les nombreux materiaux fournis par
les rapports nationaux. De nombreuses lois penales militai^'es et un grand
nombre de traites internationaux ont ete analyses par des juristes expe-
rimentes des differents pays ici representes. Dans une confrontation
qui n'a jamais dispose de materiaux aussi abondant?, les rapporteurs g^ne-
raux ont etabli les analogies et les differences, les criteres concordants
et divergents, avec une grande comprehension pour les droits nationaux,
produits de l'histoire et de la culture de chaque peuple et de ses conjonc-
tures politiques. Avec un sens aigu des exigences du Droit compare ils
ont aussi mis en lumiere les traits et les problemes fondamentaux, sou-
lignant les diverses Solutions donnees par les differentes legislations. Les
remarquables interventions qui ont ete exprimees aujourd'hui et hier ont,
par des remarques precises, nuance les conclusions qui decoulaient des
rapports. II m'appartient maintenant de faire un dernier pas et d'essayer
de resumer les idees qui sont restees pour ainsi dire flottantes dans l'atmos-
phere du Congres, et qui ont rapport aux themes les plus importants — pas
tous — de ceux qui y ont ete traites.
Je crois devoir commencer par les liens qui existent entre le droit
penal militaire et le droit penal ordinairc. J'estime que tout ce qui a ^te
dit ici de la tendance visant au rapprochement du droit militaire et du
droit commun, et aussi des particularites qui caracterisent le droit penal
militaire, peut etre enonce ainsi : le droit penal militaire, en tant que
droit penal, repond aux memes principes que le droit penal commun,
specialement au principe de la legalite {nullum crimen sine lege, nulla
poena sine lege, nulla poena sine legale Judicium) et au principe selon
lequel il n'y a pas de peine sans culpabilite {nulla poena sine culpa).
Tout progres dans le droit commun s'est traduit historiquement, se traduit,
et doit se traduire dans le droit penal militaire. Mais celui-ci presente
des particularites qui decoulent de la coherence speciale des Forces Armees
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Jos6 Maria RüDRIGUKZ DEVESA
et des buts quc les lois attribuent aux armees. II ne s'agit pas, par exemple,
de nier la legitime defense.Le superieur, en face d'une agression commise
par un inferieur dans le service, n'agit jamais, ni ne peut jamais agir, en
etat de lep:itime defense, car celle-ci est im droit et comme tel renon-
ciable, tandis que le superieur ne peut pas renoncer ä reprimer Tagres-
sion commise par un inferieur ; il a le devoir de la repousser, il n'agit pas
en etat de legitime defense mais dans raccomplissement d'un devoir,
celui de maintenir la discipline. Cet exemple, comme d'autres, demontre
que Ic droit penal militaire, bien que obeissant aux memes principes gene-
raux, doit se differencier du droit ordinaire en suivant les diverses techni-
ques que nous avons entendues et qu'il est superflu pour moi de rappeler.
L'etude de la question du critere differentiel enirc les delits müitaires
et les delits de droit commun, c'est-ä-dire la determination des delits
qui doivent appartenir au droit penal militaire et des delits qui doivent
etre maintenus dans le droit penal commun, nous a montre qu'il existait
de nombreuses Solutions legi.4atives, difficiles ä classifier. Pour clarifier
le Probleme il y aurait lieu de distinguer entre un examen ex ante et un
exanien ex post. A posteriori 11 est impossible, pour differencier les delits
militaires et les delits de droit commun, de reLenir un autre critere que
purement formel : sont des delits militaires ccux qui sont compris dans
les lois penales militaires, ou ceux auxquels les lois attribuent un caractere
militaire. Si on veut trouver un critere plus profond, a priori, de lege
feranda, il faut faire usage d'un examen ex ante. J'entends par la que
les lois militaires ne doivent comprendre que les faits qui d'une fagon
directe et immediate touchent aux interets des Forces Armees. Je penche
pour ce critere parce que je crois que dans l'esprit de tous les congres-
sistes, la guerre totale, cette terrible fagon de faire la guerre et de s'y
preparer,qui dans les dernieres decennies a fait irruption dans le monde,
force toutes les activites d'un pays ä se mettre au service de la guerre ou
de sa preparation. Ainsi, le nombre des avortements affecte indirectement
les interets militaires parce qu'il reduit le potentiel demographique ;
l'organisation de l'enseignement se rapporte aux interets militaires parce
qu'il determine le nombre de specialistes dont l'armee peut disposer soit
en temps de paix soit en temps de guerre ; les ideologies politiques qui se
heurtent ä l'amour de la patrie, en internationalisant des problemes na-
tionaux et en faisant que l'ennemi de la patrie est dans certains cas
l'ami du groupe politique auquel on appartient, affectent les interets mili-
taires parce qu'elles peuvent trcubler la mobilisation et gener les Forces
Armees. Tout ce qui arrive dans un pays a une repercussion sur son poten-
tiel de guerre : l'economie, la structure sociale, la politique. Par consequenl,
si nous prenons comme critere des delits militaires l'atteinte indirecte,
mediate, aux interets militaires, il ne sera plus possible de distinguer le
droit militaire du droit commun: tout devra etre droit militaire. C'est
pour cela que je crois quc nous sommcs d'accord quc, en temps de paix,
les lois pönales militaires ne doivent contenir que les actions qui touchent
d'une fagon directe aux interets militaires. Les situations d'urgence ou de
guerre doivent etre reglees par des normes de procedure ad hoc ou par
des lois penales speciales.
RAPPORT DE SYNTHESE
307
Uapplication de Ja loi penale militaire ä des personnes non militaires
est un Probleme qui non seulement Interesse notre Sociele qui a pris ce
sujet comme theme du Congres, mais aussi l'opinion publique de tous les
pays. C'est un probleme qui se rapporte tres etroitement au prestige des
Forces Armees, et qui, pour cette raison, doit etre etudie avec le plus
grand soin. Les armees doivent tenir compte de l'opinion publique dans
une mesure compatible avec Taccomplissement des täches qui leur sont
assignees dans l'Etat. Est-il justifie ou non que les dispositions re-
latives aux delits militaires s'appliquent aux civils ? Les congres-
sistes fönt ici aussi une distinction. Les civils peuvent tomber dans le
champ d'application des lois penales militaires du fait de leur partici-
pation a un delit militaire proprement dit, c'est-ä-dire, ä un delit mili-
taire qui ne peut etre commis que par un sujet militaire; en matiere
de desertion par exemple : les civils peuvent amener un militaire ä com-
mettre une desertion. Ils peuvent aussi commettre certains delits mili-
taires que connaissent les lois militaires d'un grand nombre de pays,
delits dont le sujet actif peut etre indistinctement un militaire ou un non
militaire c'est-ä-dire, une personne quelconque. Dans le premier cas, celui
de la participation de civils aux delits militaires proprement dits, l'applica-
tion de la loi penale militaire devient inevitable. Le probleme passe alors
au domaine de la procedure, et il faut veiller ä ce que les civils aient
d'egales garanties, par exemple dans le choix d'un avocat, que s'ils etaient
juges par des tribunaux ciivls. La seconde hypothese, celle des delits qui
peuvent etre commis par une personne quelconque, militaire ou non mili-
taire, devrait etre resolue de la fagon dont Tont fait beaucoup de pays
ici representes. Ils leur appliquent le droit commun sans prejudice des
regles de procedure qui autorisent l'intervention des tribunaux militaires
dans des cas et des circonstances determines. Ou bien, on peut trans-
former ces delits en veritables delits militaires, delicta propria ; par exem-
ple : inclure dans les lois penales militaires Tespionnagc commis par des
militaires, et dans les lois penales ordinaires l'espionnage en general. En
resume : les delits qui ne touchent pas directement aux interets mili-
taires et les delits militaires qui peuvent etre commis indistinctement par
des militaires et par des non militaires, sont des faux delits militaires.
Passons maintenant ä quelques-uns des problemes concrets mis ä 1'
ordre du jour du congres : les mineurs et l'obeissance aux ordres des supe-
rieurs.
Prenant Texpression mineur non dans son sens strict de mineur
d'äge penal, dont les problemes sont minimes, car dans la plupart des
pays ils n'appartiennent pas ä l'armee et dans d'autres pays on a tendance
ä restreindre leur admission dans les Forces Armees, et si nous employons
le mot « mineur » dans le sens de jeunes gens, qu'ils soient adolescents
ou jeunes adultes, nous sommes tous conscients qu'il est de la plus haute
importance d'orienter le droit penal militaire cn tenant compte de leur
existence, parce que, quantitativement, ils sont l'element de base des
Forces Armees. La Prolongation de la vie humaine fait qu'un traitement
penal defectueux a, dans la communaute que les delinquants reintegrent
une fois la peine accomplie, des repercussions qui ne se seraient pas
produites auparavant. Nous sommes certainement tous d'accord que, dans
308
Jose Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
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ce domainc du droit militaire, il faut chercher unc coordination avec le
droit commun en vue de la reintegration sans dommage dans la vie sociale
des jeunes auteurs de delits militaires, ou avec le moins de dommage pos^
sible et dans le respect de leur droit ä une education adequate.
La question de l'excuse ou de la justification de delits cormnis en
accomplissant un ordre du superieur reste sans reponse satisfaisante et
eile preoccupe tous ceux qui, comme nous, s'occupent du droit penal mili-
taire. En l'inserant dans le cadre des themes du Congres notre Societe
a montre un tres vif interet pour cette question. Les problemes que soule-
vent les delits commis dans raccomplissement d'un ordre du superieur
sont extremement complexes et, dans l'etat actuel du debat, nous ne pou-
vons pretendre a une complete concordance d'opinions. Cependant, l'atmos-
phere du Congres revele une sini^uliere tension au sujet de ce delicat Pro-
bleme. D'un cote, c'est l'aversion eprouvee pour l'impunite de delits par-
fois affreux, en invoquant Fexcusc tiree d'ordres de superieurs qui, par-
fois, s'echelonnent indefiniment, diluant la responsabilite. D'un autre cote,
c'est la crainte d'affaiblir ce qui forme l'epine dorsale des armees, la Subor-
dination hierarchique et l'obeissance aux ordres regus. Comme je Tai
soutenu lors du Congres de Florence, j'estime qu'il n'y a qu'un seul moyen
de diminuer cette tension : distinguer ce qui est essentiel ä la Subordination
hierarchique consideree objectivement et les situations discutables (erreur,
contrainte, etat de necessite) nees du lien de Subordination et de l'habi-
tude d'obeir, lesquelles ne sont pas essentielles et propres ä la Subordina-
tion militaire car elles peuv^nt exister et existent dans d'autres cas. Si
nous ne tenons pas compte des consequences de l'acccmplissement de l'or-
dre du superieur, et envisageons la Subordination hierarchique d'une fagon
objective, nous devons admettre vque Vordre de comviettre un delit n'est
Jamals obligatoire et que, par consequent, il n'est pas possible de l'invoquer
comme une cause de justification ou d'excuse pour celui qui a obei. II n'y
a pas de choix : on admet que l'ordre de commettre un delit est obligatoire,
ou on n'admet pas qu'il soit obligatoire. Si nous admettons que dans les
Forces Armees l'ordre de commettre un delit est obligatoire, nous ne pour-
rons etablir aucune difference entre une armee et une bände de brigands.
Car , ce qui caracterise cette derniere, c'est que les ordres de commettre
un delit donnes par le chef de la bände sont oblir,atoires pour ceux qui
en fönt partie. Mais les armees modernes ne sont ni des bandes armees
ni des bandes de brigands, elles sont etablies sur le droit et tenues de
rej^pecter les normes juridiques. Inter armas non silent leges. Cela ne
veut pas dire que celui qui a commis un delit en executanL les ordres du
superieur ne sera jamais exempt de responsabilite penale. Si, par exemple,
il y a une erreur essentielle et invincible sur le caractere delictueux de
l'action qu'on lui a ordonne d'executer ou sur Tobligation meme d'obeir,
(une erreur chaque fois plus difficile au für et ä mesure que Ton monte
dans l'echelle hierarchique), celui qui obeit sera exempt de culpabilite
non pas, parce qu'il a agi dans l'accomplissement d'un ordre, ni parce qu il
devait obeir, mais ä cause de son erreur. Ces idees ont certes besom detu-
des plus approfondies pour trouver des formules techniques satisfaisantes.
Les Solutions possibles doivent se chercher et se trouver dans cette voie.
HAFFORT DE SYNTHESE
:^09
Uincidence des Convcntionf^ internationales sur le Droit interne est
un sujet qui ^.c rapporte au droit penal militaire et au droit de la guerre,
et tout particulierement a l'acte commis dans l'accomplissement d'un ordre
du superieur. Nous avons vu que les systemes et les techniques des divers
pays ici representes sont tres varies. Ils vont de la reconnaissance dans
la Constitution de la primaute du droit international sur le droit interne
jusqu'au refus de Conventions internationales determinees, en passant par
un Systeme qui ne leur donne force obligatoire dans le pays que si elles
sont inserees dans les lois internes. Par dessus ces divergences nationales
je crois qu'il y a ici une pensee qu'on pourrait exprimer de cette fagon :
que les Conventions internationales qui ont pour but Thumanisation de
la guerre — de cette guerre moderne qui a pris un caractere devastateur
et une ferocite jamais connue par l'humanite — soient signees ou non, il
n'est pas douteux que la guerre n' invalide pas les regles reconnues, con-
sacrees et admises par tous les pays civilises : l'assassinat, le vol, la torture
sont toujours des delits d'apres notre droit national, meme si le pays est
entrame dans une guerre. La guerre ne justifie que les maux qui lui sont
inherents et de ce fait inevitables. Toutes les souffrances inutiles aux buts
de la guerre, infligees aux blesses, aux naufrages, aux prisonniers et ä
la Population civile sont toujours des conduites criminelles qui comme
telles doivent etre punies, et cela sans tenir compte du fait que Tennemi
a signe ou non des Conventions internationales ayant pour but d'adoucir
la condition des blesses, des prisonniers, des naufrages et de la population
civile. Cela ne signif ie pas que ceux qui appartiennent aux Forces Armees
ennemies jouissent d'une impunite qu'il est impossible de leur accorder
pour les memes raisons qu'on ne peut les accorder aux Forces natio-
nales. Je n'ignore pas que la theorie des represailles peut, dans certains cas,
presenter un obstacle ä cette these admise par tous. Mais la theorie des
represailles est en ce moment hors de discussion car eile n'appartient pas
aux themes du congres. L'etude de telles actions de guerre en rapport
avec les droits nationaux ne serait cependant pas inutile, car les repre-
sailles sont un residu de tres anciennes conceptions sur la culpabilite et
la responsabilite coUective depuis longtemps rayees des lois penales et
par consequent des lois penales militaires. II est etonnant qu une sorte
de honte et un sentiment de dignite ont toujours empeche (lue le « droit »
de tuer les personnes innocentes n'ait jamais trouve une disposition expres-
se dans aucune loi penale militaire.
Mais, quittons ce theme qui nous conduirait tres loin et occupons
nous d'un autre de plus grande importance dans un mondc ou les armees
ont tendance ä devenir des forces interregionales ; c'est le theme de la
possibilite d'atteindre un certain degre d'unification des sijstemes leganx
pour classer les delits militaires. La confrontation des diverses lois
nationales a mis en relief qu'un critere est dominant, : celui des interets
juridiques proteges. C'est en raison de ces interets que sont classes les
delits militaires. Par exception, quelques pays suivent cependant le critere
de la nature des devoirs transgresses. On en deduit qu'il y a de tres
serieuses raisons pour suivre le Systeme des interets juridiques proteges.
Nous dirons plus : tirons les conclusions logiques de ce critere. La loi penale
militaire ne doit reprimer que les conduites qui nuisent ou mettent en
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Josö Maria RüDRIGUEZ DEVESA
danger ces interets juridiques. car la simple transgression d'un devoir
militaire qui ne nuit, ni ne met en danger, aucun interet juridiquement
protege, ne doit pas sortir de la sphere disciplinaire. Ceci etant admis,
si nous nous bornons aux delits militaires propres, il ne serait pas difficile
d'avancer vers l'objectif de Tunification systematique, concentrant nos
efforts et nos reflexions dans cette direction, ce qui est une täche prea-
lable pour arriver a celle plus ambitieuse d'homogeneiser au maximum
(tant que subsistent les Etats actuellement souverains, il ne semble
pas possible d'arriver ä une uniformisation complete, ä une loi penale
militaire uniforme) les lois penales militaires, au moins pour les nations
appartenant au meme degre de culture.
Je viens de parier de la sphere discivlinaire. A ce sujet on a au cours
du congres manifeste des tendances differentes. L'une d'elles tend ä separer
d'une maniere nette le droit penal et le droit disciplinaire. Une autre
tend ä eliminer du droit disciplinaire les formules vagues et ä « legaliser »
le droit disciplinaire. Les deux tendances meritent la plus grande attention
parce que, contrairement ä ce qui est devenu un lieu commun tres repan-
du, je crois que la discipline et Vordre dans les Forces Armees reposent
plus sur le droit disciplinaire que sur le droit penal.
Pour terminer, je dirai quelques mots sur Vextradiüon pour delits
militaires. Les excellents travaux presentes et le rapport general de M.
Pötz, digne d'eloges, coincident sur un point que nous devons souligner. La
doctrine traditionnelle de la non extradition pour delits militaires ne
repond plus dans tous les cas aux conceptions actuelles. Contrairement
ä ce qui etait admis avant la seconde guerre mondiale, les alliances ac-
tuelles montrcnt leur efficacite dans une etroite Cooperation entre nations
alliees, sans attendre que l'une d'elles se trouve en guerre avec un
ennemi commun. Ainsi disparait un argument serieux contre la remise
entre alies des delinquants militaires. Si le droit penal militaire protege
le potentiel de guerre, l'affaiblissement du potentiel militaire d'un allie
affaiblit aussi le potentiel commun et par lä le potentiel propre. D'ailleurs
le recours ä l'aide juridictionnelle en vue d'extrader de facto dans
certains cas, ne semble pas recommandable car l'extrade se voit alon'
depourvu des garanties que l'extradition offre generalement : il n'est pa"
passible de la peine de mort, la regle de la specialite est appliquee, etc.
La voie la plus appropriee pour etablir l'extradition pour delits militaires
est peut-etre de consacrer cette exception dans des accords d'alliance ou
de Cooperation militaire. II semble que, sauf dans ces cas, il faut s'en
tenir ä la regle qui s'oppose ä l'extradition pour delits militaires. II faut,
sans doute, lever les obstacles opposes par la legislation nationale. On
doit aussi souligner la tendance generale ä limiter Textradition pour delits
militaires aux delits specifiquement militaires, c'est-ä-dire aux actions qui
ne seraient pas passibles de devenir un delit de droit commun si on sup-
primait mentalement la loi penale militaire. Dans les delits militaires
comme dans les delits de droit commun, nous pouvons certainement nous
trouver devant un delinquant par conviction, large conception criminolo-
gique qui devrait remplacer celle du « delinquant politique », si imprecise.
Quelques interventions que nous venons d'entendre se referent ä cet
RAPPORT DE SYNTHESE
311
Il II .
aspect du probleme. Je crois cependant que tous nous croyons qu'il
serait errone d'etablir que tous les delits militaires sont des delits poli-
tiques. Dans les cas oü il y a coi'ncidence entre le delit militaire et le
delit politique (ou delit par conviction, tel que je prefere l'appeler
parce que cette notion est plus large que celle de delit politique) il faut
donner la priorite aux exceptions consacrees par les lois et les traites
d'extradition en ce qui concerne les delits politiques. D'ailleurs, l'argument
comme quoi ceux qui ont commis un delit specifiquement militaire ne
constituent pas un danger pour le pays oü ils se refugient, me semble
sans fondement. Le droit international doit actuellement resoudre tant
de problemes que le moment parait peu favorable pour se pencher sur
l'aspect criminologique de la question. Mais, du point de vue criminolo-
gique, il est irrefutable que le danger que represente le delinquant, sa
tendance au crime, peuvent aussi se manifester dans un delit specifique-
ment militaire. L'agressivite, par exemple, peut se reveler aussi bien par
un homicide, par une infraction contre la propriete, que par des voies de
fait envers un superieur dans l'armee ; l'indiscipline sociale trouve son
expression dans un delit contre les regles de la circulation de la meme
fagon que dans une desobeissance militaire. Le probleme du « danger re-
presente » ne peut ni ne doit se resoudre par des criteres juridiques for-
meis mais par la personnalite et l'entourage. C'est pour cette raison que
l'affirmation, sans plus, que celui qui a commis un delit militaire n'est
pas un sujet dangereux se trouve en contradiction avec l'etat actuel de
nos connaissances criminologiques.
Je termine mon Intervention. Avec le respect dont la Societe fait
preuve ä l'egard des particularites des systemes juridiques militaires des
divers Etats representes au Congres, j'espere que cette confrontation de
donnees et cet echange d'opinions que nous venons d'avoir, seront un
stimulant pour parcourir les nombreuses etapes necessaires pour mener
l'etude du droit penal militaire et du droit de la guerre ä la hauteur
scientifique et technique que nous souhaitons et que notre Societe a pour
objet. En attendant, les idees qui viennent d'etre exposees au cours du
IVe Congres serviront bien sur d'orientation pour les travaux legislatifs
en cours ou futurs et aussi pour l'interpretation et l'application des lois
penales militaires en vigueur dans nos pays respectifs.
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SUMMARY REPORT
by
Jose Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
Professor of Criminal Low
Colonel Auditor
rhe general rapporteurs who preceded me, MM. Paucot (France)
and Pütz (GFR), should be thanked by the Congress for the considerable
amount of work they have accomplished with such success. They both
have coordinated the numerous items of Information in the national re-
ports. A great number of military penal laws and international treaties
have been analysed by experienced jurists from the various countries
represented. In a comparison, for which there had never been such abun-
dant material available, the general rapporteurs have indicated the simi-
larities and dissimilarities, the concordanl and divergent criteria, with
a great understanding of national Laws which are a product of the history
and culture of each people and of political evolution. With a keen sense
of the requirements of comparative Law, they have also highlighted the
fundemental characteristics and problems, and have indicated the various
answers given by the different legal Systems. The very interesting State-
ments made yesterday and today, have, with great clarity, weighted the
conclusions of the reports. I am now required to go a step further and
attempt to summarise the ideas which have so to speak permeated the
atmosphere of this Congress and which concern some of the most important
subjects which have been discussed.
I believe I should start with the links which exist between military
penal law and common penal law. I consider that all that has been said
here on the tendency towards a « rapprochement » between military law
and common law, and also on the peculiarities of military penal law, can be
summarised as follows : military penal law, as penal law, follows the same
principles as common penal law, particularly as regard the principle of
legality (nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, nulla poena
sine legale judicimn) and the principle that there should be no punishment
without guilt (nulla poena sine culpa). Any progress in common law
has historically influenced, and should influence military penal law. But
military penal law has specific characteristics which result from the pe-
culiar cohesion of the armed Forces and from the tasks confered by law
to the armed Forces. For instance self-defence is not ignored ; the superior
314
Jos6 Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
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facing an act of agression by an inferior never acts, and can never act
in self-defence, for self-defence is a right and as such can be renounced,
whereas the superior cannot renounce bis right to oppose the agression
of bis subordinate ; bis duty is to oppose it, he is not acting in self-defence
but in the accomplishment of a duty, the maintenance of discipline. This
example and others, show that military penal law, although it conforms
to the same general principles, must differentiate itself from common law
by various techniques which have been explained and on which I will
not come back.
This study of the prohlern of the criterion lohich distinguishes mili'
tary ofjenses and common law offenses, that is to say, the distinction
between the offenses within the ambit of military penal law and of the
offenses coming under common penal law, has shown that there are many
legislative answers, which are difficult to classify. To clarify the problem
one should distinguish between an ex ante and an ex po.st examination.
A posteriori it is impossible to use other than purely formal ^riteria to
distinguish military offenses from common law offenses : military offenses
are those covered by military penal law, or those to which laws confer
a military nature. If one wishes to use a deeper criterion, a priori, de
lege ferenda, an ex ante examination is necessary. By this I mean that
military law should only cover facts which concern in a direct and im-
mediate manner the armed Forces interests. I am in favour of this criterion
as I believe that in the view of all the participants, total war, this terrible
way of waging war and of preparing for war, which over the past decades
has appeared in the world, compels all activities of a country to put
themselves at the service of war or its preparation. The number of abortions
indirectly affects military interests inasmuch as it has an influence on
the demographic potential ; the education System is of concern to military
interests for it determines the number of specialists available for the armed
Forces both in peace and in war ; political ideologies opposing nationalism
by internationalising national problems and considering that the countries
ennemy is in certain cases the friend of the political group to which one
belongs, affect military interests for they may affect mobilisation and
create difficulties for the armed Forces. Every field of activity in a country
has an influence on its war potential : the economy, the social structures,
politics. Therefore, if we use as a criterion for military crimes, what con-
cerns indirectly or immediately military interest, it will no longer be
possible to distinguish between military law and common law ; all will
become subject to military law. This is why, I believe we agree, that
in peace time, military penal law should only cover those acts which
concern military interests in a direct manner. Emergencies or war should
be covered by ad hoc procedures or by special penal laws.
The application of military penal law to non-military persons is a
Problem which is not only of interest to our Society, which has chosen
this subject as the theme of this Congress, but also to public opinion in
all countries. This is a problem which is closely linked with the prestige
of the armed Forces and which, for this reason, should be studied with
great care. The armed Forces must take public opinion into account insof ar
SUMMARV REI^ORT
315
as this is compatible with the accomplishement of the tasks they have been
given by the State. Can one justify the use of military penal law against
civilians ? Here again the participants in the Congress make a distinction.
Civilians may come within the field of military penal law by taking part
in a military offense which can only be commited by military personnel ;
in the case of desertion, for instance, civilians may encourage a soldier
to desert. They can also commit certain military offenses covered by the
military laws of a great number of countries, offenses which can be com-
mitted by military or non-military persons, i.e. any person. In the first
case, the participation of civilians in military offenses stricto sensu, the use
of military penal law is compulsory. The problem is one of procedure, and
one must ensure that civilians have the same safeguards, for instance as
regards the choice of a defense counsel, as if they were before a civilian
court. The second case, that ol offenses which can be committed by any
person, civilian or military, should be solved in the manner adopted
by many of the countries represented here. They apply common law,
without prejudice of rules of procedure which authorise military courts
to intcrvene in specific cases and under certain circumstances. Alterna-
tively, these offenses can be made actual military offenses, dcllcta propria :
for instance, spying by military personnel can be included in military
penal laws and spying in general in common penal law. To summarise :
offenses which do not directly affect military interests and military of-
fenses which can be committed by military or non-military persons, are
not real military offenses,
Let US now come to some of the specific problems on the
agenda of the congress : minors and obeying the orders of superiors.
We shall not take the term minor, in its strict sense of
minor from a penal point of view, for here there are few difficulties,
as in most countries they are not in the armed Forces and in other coun-
tries their entry into the armed Forces is restricted. But if we use the
term « minor » in the sense of youths, whether adolescents or young
adults, we are all conscious of the fact that it is of the utmost importance
that the evolution of military penal law should take their existence into
account, for quantitatively, they are the basic foundation of the armed
Forces. Increased longevity has meant that misconceived penal methods
have had results which previously would not have occurred in the Com-
munity to which the delinquents are returned after serving their sentence.
We certainly all agree that in this field of military law, we must try and
achieve coordination with common law, to return young military delin-
quents to Society w^ith the minimum of disruption, and without prejudi-
cing their right to adequate education.
No satisfactory answer has yet been given to the problem of the
extenuation or justification of offenses commited when carrying out the
nrdrr ni ^sun^rior and this problem is of concern to all those, who, like
US, deäl with military penal law. Our Society, by including it in the
themes of the Congress, has shown how interested it was in this subject.
The Problems raised by offenses commited when carrying out the order
of a superior are extremely complex, and in the present State of the debate.
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Jose Maria RüDRIGUEZ DEVESA
we cannot say that our opinions are convergent. However, the Congress
has shown that divided views are held on this difficult problem. On the
one hand, we have a revulsion for any impunity for crimes, which may
be heinous, based on Orders received from a superior, which as one fol-
lows the chain of command, diiute responsibility. On the other hand, there
is the fear of weakening the backbone of the armed Forces, hierarchical
Subordination and the carrying out of Orders. As I stated at the Florence
Congress, 1 consider that there is only one way in which the dichotomy
can be tempered : distinguish what is esscntial to objective Subordination,
from marginal cases (error, force, necessity) arising from Subordination
and the fact that the person is accustomed to obey, which are not essentially
due to mihtary Subordination for the same situations can and de exist
in other cases. If we do not takc into account the consequences of carrying
out the Order of a superior, and consider Subordination in an objective
manner, we must acccpt that the order to commit a^__ o//^^!:^^ is never
mandatory and that^^ theref ore, the person^who^ejea tRis order cannot
'irivoke it as a jus'tificatTon''Qre";KCuse. Th.^g^ji^na_alternat^ : either
"IKÖ löTdernb commit an offense is mandatory or it is not.^ulwe accept
that in thc'^ärm.ed Forces the order to commit an^"of!ense is mandatory,
we shall not be abk to make a distinction between an army and a band
oT'B^HMläM^^ ^^^^^ latter, is the fact that the Orders
"Tocarry out an offense, given by the leader of the band, are mandatory
for the members of the band. But modern armies are neither armed bands
or bands of brigands, they ar£5aseä""öirT:aw' and must follow legal stan-
^dards. Inte r armas unonyrsilent leges. ^This does not mean that the
"person who has committed an offense by carrying out the Orders of a
superior will always be penally responsible. If for instance, there exists
a fundemental and unavoidable error as to the illegal nature of the act
he has been ordered to commit or as to the necessity of obeying that
order (an error which becomes more difficult to justify as one climbs the
hierarchical ladder) the person who obeys will be absolved from guilt,
not because he acted as the result of an order, or because he had to
(5^ey7burangccount,of his error. These concepts of course must be studied
^üHHef to find satisfactory procedural formulations. The possible answers
must be looked for and found in this direction.
The influence of international Conventions and interna ? Law is a
subject which concerns military penal law and the Law of war, and more
specifically the act committed in carrying out the order of a superior.
We have seen that the System and procedures of the ^earious countries
represented are very different. They ränge from the recognition in the
Constitution of the primacy of international law over internal law to the
rejection of specific international Conventions, through the System which
on only makes Conventions mandatory in the country if they have been
incorporated into internal laws. Over and above these national differences
I believe there is a general concept which could be expressed as follows :
whether International Conventions whose object is to humanise warfare
- modern warfare which has become increasingly brutal and destructive -
have been ratified or not, itjs_ob\dousJj2^tjwar_dQes^^ invalid_ate, re-
cognised rules accepted by alTciyirisedjiountries : murder, plllage, torture
SUMMAKV REPORT
317
are^ahvaya-crimes under national law even if the country is at war. War
onlxjustifies the^vifs which are inherent to it and therefore unavoidatfe
.ny suffering infHeted^^^n the-Aiviauiidci the shrpwreclcMrTHe~pf!sönners
amrrhe civilian population which do not serve thV object ives of the war
are always criminal and as'such must be punished, wheüier or not the
eniemy has signed International (^önvehftöns concerning^he treatment
oT^^öuncte^, prisonners, shipwrecked sailors oF^cTvniäns.'^THis^does not
mean that members of the ennemy armed Forces enjoy an impunity which
cannot be granted to them for the same reasons it cannot be granted to
national Forces. I know that the theory of re^n'isals can, in certain cases,
contradict this principle accepted by all. But the theory of reprisals is
not now undcr discussion, as it is not one of the themes of this congress.
The study of such acts of war with respect to national laws would however
be useful, for reprisals are a survival of the very ancient concepts of col-
lective guilt and responsibility which have long ago disappeared from penal
law and therefore military penal law. It is surprising that shame and a
feeling of dignity have always prevented the « right » of killing innocent
persons from appearing expressly in any military pönal law.
But let US leave this subject, which could lead us very far and let
US consider another matter which is more important in a world where
armes tend to become interregional forces : the possibility of reaching a
certain unification of legal Systems used to classify military offenses. A com-
parison of the various national laws has shown that one criterion is domi-
nant : the criterion of protected legal interests. Military offenses are clas-
sified on the basis of these interests. As an exception, however, certain
countries use the criterion of the nature of the duties which have been
transgressed. It would however appear that there aro valid reasons for
following the system of protected legal interests. We will go even further
and draw logical conclusions from criterion. Military penal law should
only punish acts which endanger these legal interests, for transgression of a
military duty which does not affect or endanger a legally protected in-
terest, is a purely disciplinary matter. If this is agrced, if we limit ourselves
to specific military offenses it should not be difficult to move towards the
goal of systematic unification, by concentrating our efforts and our thoughts
in that direction, which would be a first step towards a maximum co-
ordination (as long as sovereign States remain, it does not appear possible
to achieve complete uniformity, to have a uniform penal law) of military
penal law, at least for those nations having the same level of culture
I have mentioned the disciplinary field. On this subject various ten-
dencies have been expressed during the congress. Some considered that
a clear distinction should be made between penal law and disciplinary
law. Others would like vague formulations to disappear from disciplinary
law and would like to « legalise » disciplinary law. These two tendencies
should be considered carefully, for contrary to what is generally accepted,
I believe that discipline and order in the armed Forces are based more
on disciplinary law than penal law.
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Jose Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
In conclusion, T would like to say a few words on exJradition_Jpr
militarij oiienses. The excellcnt prescntations and the general feport of
Mr. Pötz, coincide on one point which should be stressed.
The traditional doctrine of non-cxtradition for military offenses no lon-
ger corresponds in all cases to present concepts. Contrary to what was ac-
cepted betöre the second world war, present day alliances entail a close
co-operation between allied nations, without waiting for one of these na-
tions to be at war with a common ennemy. This destroys the main argument
against the exchange amongst allies of military delinquents. If military
penal law protects the war potential, the weakening of the war potential
of an ally, also weakens the common potential and therefore one's own
Potential. Recourse to jurisdictionnal criteria to extradite de facto in
certain cases, should not be recommended, as the extradited person loses
the safeguards which are generally connected with extradition : the death
penalty does not apply, the rule of speciality is applied etc. The most
appropriate manner of establishing extradition for military offenses is per-
haps to include this exception in agreements on military co-operation or
in alliances. It would appear, that except in those cases, we should follow
the present rules which do not authorise extradition for military offenses.
No doubt, the obstacles resulting from national laws must be lifted. One
should also mention that there is a general tendency to limit extradition
for military offenses to offenses which are specifically military, i.e. to acts
which would not become common law offenses if military penal law did
not exist. In military offenses, as in common law offenses, we can cer-
tainly find a conscientious delinquent, a wider criniinological concept than
the vague concepTof « political dehnquent », which it should replace. Cer-
tain Statements were made this aspect of che problem. I believe however
that we all consider that it would be wrong to State that all military
offenses are political offenses. When there is coincidence between the mi-
litary offense and the political offense (or conscientious offense as I prefer
to call it for this concept is wider, than the concept of political offense)
priority should be given to the exceptions embodies. in the laws and ex-
tradition treaties as regards political offenses. In any case, the concept,
according to which those who have committed a purely military offense
are not a danger for the country where they take refuge appears to me
to be invalid. International la\Y<iriust now solve so many problems that
the time appears to be ill chosen'c'onsider the criminological point of view,
it is evident that the danger represented by the delinquent, his tenden-
cies to crime, can also manifest itself in a purely military offense. Agres-
sivity for instance, can equally be revealed by homicide or an offense
against property as by strikin« a superior : social indisciplme can be ex-
pressed either by traffic offense or by military disobedience. The problem
of the « danger » cannot and should not be solved by formal legal rules
but by taking into account the personnality of the individual and his
environment. This is why the unqualified statement that the person who
has committed a military offense is not a dangerous subject is m contra-
diction with the present state of our knowledge in the field of criminology.
I will now conclude my statement. Thanks to the respect shown by
the Society for the peculiarities of the military legal Systems of the vanous
SUMMARY REPORT
319
countries represented, I hope that this confrontation of ideas and this
exchange of views will be stimulating and will help us towards our goal
which is to study the scientific and technical foundations of military penal
law and war Law. In the meantime I am certain that the ideas which
have been expressed at this IVth Congress will guide present or future
legislative studies and contribute to the interpretation and application of
military penal law in our various countries.
'!)(l|i
ANNEXE
fM
IUI
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323
LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS
RELACION DE CONGRESISTAS
ALEMANIA :
BARTH, Eberhard, München 27, Ncuberhausorsfrnsso, 3.
BÖTTCHER, Hans Viktor, 5321 Niederbachem (bei Bad Godesbcrg), Am Tossenberg, 7
BUSCH, Richard, 532 Bad Godesbcrg, HohcnTollernstrasse, 25.
FLECK, Dieter, Heinrich, 8 München 2, Amaliens^rasse, 10/111.
GRUNEWALD, Otto, 811 Murnau Westried, Oberer Grainbichl, 21.
HEHNEN, Heinrich, 534 Bad-Honnef/Rh Luisenstrasse, 23.
HINZ, Joachim, 532 Bad Godesberg, Max Löbnerstrasse, 8.
HUTH, Joachim. 53 Bonn. Wiesenweg, 7-9.
KLEIN, Herbert, Limburg an der Lahn, Wciaerdorttstrasse, 15.
KRUGER-SPRENGEL, Friedhelm, 54 Koblen? £rwin Planckstrassc, 1.
MULLER, Rudolf, Bremen, Osterdeich, 21.
OEHLER, Dietrich, 5 Köln Müngersdorf, Franz-Seiwet, 25.
POTZ, Paul-Günter, 5321 Niederbachem (bei Bad Godesbcrg), Büchenweg, 13
RASCHHOFER, Hermann, 87 Würzburg, Domerschulstrosse, 16
SCHAETZLER, Johan-Greorg, Bonn, Graf Stnuffcr.bergstra?se 3.
SCHWENCK, Hans Günter, Köln-Lindental, Goldenfelsstrasse, 10.
SEUFERT, Leo, 87 Würzburg, Domerschulstrosse, 16.
SONNENBURG, Karlhans, 5320 Bad Godesbcrg, Hohle Gasse G.
STEINKAMM, Armin 87 Würzburg, Domerschulstrosse, 16.
THURN, Elmar, 53 Bonn, Landsbergerstrasse, 55.
WALTER, Alfred, 87 Würzburg, Domerschulstrosse, 16.
ARGENTINA :
ABARCA, Alfrede, Victorino de la Plaza, 1857, Buenos Aires.
ßELGICA :
ACKE, Albert, 35, Frans Birontlaan, Bcrchem, Antwerper.
ALEXANDER, Albert, 153, Jon Von Rijswijcklaon, Antwerpen.
ANDRIES, Andre, La Ried, Vert Buisson, 146. — Correspondnnce : Auditorat Militaire
— B.P.S. 7 — F.B.A.
BAAR, Alfred, 48, Quai de Rome, Liege.
BEATSE, Charles, 193, Boulevard des Invalides, Bruxelles 16.
BEQUET, Jose, 13, Schoonzichtlaan, Winkselc.
BOSLY, Henri, 441, Avenue du Tram, Sterrebeek.
r^ CN
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324
LISTE DES FARTICIPANTS
ßELGICA (continuaciön) :
de BRAUWERE, Henri, Auditoiot Militairc — B.P.S. 7 — F.B.A.
CHENUT, Fernand, 17, Frans Holsdreef, Overijse.
GYSBRECHT, Julien, 83, Avenue Leopold Wiener, Watermaal.
DANSE, Mouricc, 39, Avenue des Passcreaux, Bruxelles 16
DEBROUX, Francois, 9, Rue de Tilsitt, Paris 17c. (France).
DEFECHE, Clement, 40, Av. des Tourterelles, Woluwe St. Pierre, Bruxelles IT.
de MOREAU DE GERBEHAYE, Syivoin, 12, Av. Conscicnce, Bruxelles 14.
DE RIPAINSEL, Albert, 173, Av. du Domalne, Bruxelles 19.
EVRARD, Edgard, 150, Av. Lambeau, Bruxelles 15.
FOLLET, Pierre, 52, Av. des Camelias, Bruxelles 15.
GAILLY, A L, 165, Av. Prckclinden, Bruxelles 15.
GILISSEN, John, 155, Av. des Staluaircs, Bruxelles 18.
LION, Oger, 29, Rue de Landelies, Montigny-Le-Tilleul.
MARCHAL, Andre, 378, Av. Brugmonn, Bruxelles 18
PIRET, Jacques, 261c, Croix Andre, Nandrin (Liege).
RAEMAEKERS, Jan ~ Auditorat Militaire — B.P.S. 6 — F.B.A.
RINGOET, Gaston 9, Boulevard Leopold IM, Bruxelles.
ROGGEN, Ivan, 178, Av. Coghen, Bruxelles 18.
RUTTIENS, Ramon, 107, Rue Faiccr, Ixelles.
SCHUERMANS, Georges — Auditorat Militaire — B.P.S. 7 — F.B.A.
VAN GERVEN, Guy, 41, Chaussee d'Anvers, Oostakker (Gand).
VAN WINSEN, Nicolas — Auditorat Militaire — B.P.S. 6 — F.B.A.
VANDER DONCKT, Edgard, 1178, Chaussee d'Haecht, Bruxelles 14.
WERNER, Victor, 24, Av. Jean van Hoelen, Bruxelles 16.
BRASIL :
FIGUEIREDO COSTA, Waldemar, Rua Bcnevenuto Borna, 44, Rio de Janeiro.
MURGEL DE REZENDE, Octavio, Rua Aires de Saldanha, 16, Ap. 501, Rio de Janeiro.
ROMEIRO, Neto Joao, Rua Senador Vergueiro, 92, Ap. 101, Rio de Janeiro.
CANABARRO, Herbert, Praia do Flamengo, 19 h, Ap. 701, Rio de Janeiro.
SEVERO DA COSTA, Luiz Antonio, Rua Barao de Jaguaribe, 237 (Ipanema), Rio de
Janeiro (Est. da Guanabara).
ACCIOLY TENORIO, Oscar, Av. Epitacio, 806, Ap. 1001, Rio de Janeiro (Est. da
Guanabara).
CANADA :
LEGER, Francis, Chateau de Mercy, Metz 57 (France).
ESPANA :
ADAN HERRERO, David, Goya, 46, Madrid-1.
ALGORA MARCO, Abelardo, Segre, 14, 2", Madrid.
APARICIO GALLEGO, Francisco Javier, As. Juridica Ministerio del Aire, Madrid.
AZCARRAGA BUSTAMANTE, Jose Luis, Serrano, 209, Madrid-16.
BRAVO NAVARRO, Martin, Dr. Fleming, 30, 5." A, Madrid.
BUITRON FERNANDEZ, Manuel, Fernando el Catölico, 2, Zaragoza.
CANTOS GUERRERO, Antonio, Lopez de Hoyos, 13, Madrid-6.
CORTES ALVAREZ DE MIRANDA, Juan, Avenida de los Toreros, 55, Madrid.
LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS
32.5
ESPANA (continuaciön) :
DAVILA HUGUET, J.M., Andres Mellado, 72, Madrid.
DIAZ DE AGUILAR DE ELIZAGA, Ignacio, Vallehermoso, 24, Madrid.
ESTEBAN RAMOS, Salvador, Auditoria de Guerra de la 7.a Region Militär, Valladolid.
FERNANDEZ GALLART, Jose, General Mola, 208, A, 7.° dcha, Madrid.
FERNANDEZ DE SANTAELLA, Francisco Javier, Fray Leopoldo, 2, Granada.
GONZALEZ DELEITO DOMINGO, Nicolas, Jose Maranön, 7,3.«, Madrid.
GARCIA SANCHEZ, Amador, Residencia de Oficiales de Plaza, Valladolid.
GARCIA SANTOLALLA, Jose Luis, Encarnaciön, 16, 4.° izda, Valladolid.
GOMEZ CALERO, Juan, Alfonso XI, 23, Algeciras (Cadiz).
GIRGADO DOCE, Jose, Alfonso XII, 58, 3.° dcha, Madrid.
GUERRERO BURGOS, Antonio, Velazquez, 86, Madrid.
GUERRERO BURGOS, Francisco, Consejo Supremo Justicia Mar., Madrid.
HERNANDEZ GARCIA, Matias, Castillo, 24. 3.°, Madrid-10.
HERNANDEZ OROZCO, Joaquin, Duquc de Sesto, 43, 3.°, Madrid 9.
HERRERO SANCHEZ, Pedro, Reina Victoria, 13, Madrid.
JIMENEZ JIMENEZ, Francisco, Bernardo de Boadella, 10, 3.^ Palma de Mallorca.
JULIA DE BACARDI, Camilo, Menendcz Pelayo, 77, 3.°, Madrid.
LANCHA AZANA, Mariano, Alcala, 233, Madrid-2.
LASALA SAMPER, Jose M., Requete Aragoncs, 7, 2.", Zaragoza.
LOPEZ BLANCO, Antonio, Asesoria Gral. Ministerio de Marina, Madrid.
LOPEZ JURADO, Tomas, See. de Trabajo y Acciön Social Ministerio del Ejercito, Madrid.
LOUSTAN FERRAN, Francisco, Maudes, 9, Madrid.
MARTIN SANCHEZ, Felicisimo, Fiscalia Juridico Militär. 7.a Region Militär, Valladolid.
MESA DE MOLINA, Julio, Jose Luis de Arrese, 25, 7.° D, Madrid-17.
MIGUEL ZAMORA, Emilio de, Alberto Alcocer, 14, 1.« C, Madrid-16.
MINON FERREIRO, Eugenio, Avda. de los Toreros, 16, 4.° A, Madrid.
MIRANDA GONZALEZ, Juan, Francisco Lozano, 7, Madrid-8.
MORENO CASADO, Jose, Biba Rambia, 7, Granada.
NO LOUIS, Eduarde de, General Alvarcz de Castro, 25, 3.» 1, Madrid-10.
NO LOUIS MAGALHAES de, Eduardo, Luis Cabrera, 90, Madrid.
ORCASITAS LLORENTE, Luis, Victor Pradera, 10, Madrid
OTERO GOYANES, Joaquin, Velasquez, 24, Madrid.
PARDO CANALIS, Santiago, Hermosilla, 8, Madrid.
PASTOR RIDRUEJO, Antonio, San demente, 25, Zaragoza.
PENA PENA, Virgilio, Paseo Zorrilla, 65, 4.», Valladolid.
ROBLES MIGUEL, Jose, P.« Santa Maria de la Cabeza, 69, Madrid.
RODRIGUEZ DEVESA, Carlos, San Amaro, 8, Madrid.
RODRIGUEZ DEVESA, J. Maria, Fray Luis de Leon, 12 2.^ Valladolid.
ROMERO, Joaquin, Menendez Pelayo, 75, Madrid-7.
RUBIOTARDIO, Pedro, Sagasta, 10, Madrid.
SAINZ BROGUERAS, Julio, Melcndcz Valdes, 63, 1.°, Madrid.
SANJUAN GIL, Jose, M. Av. Reina Victoria, 54, 6.°, Madrid-3.
SAN PIO BONEU, Luis de, Almagro, 10, Madrid.
SERRANO VILLAFANE, Emilio, Moret, 5, Madrid.
SUAREZ DE LA DEHESA, Jose Antonio, Fernando el Santo, 11, Madrid.
SUAY MILIO, Jose, Arapiles, 17.2.» A, Madrid.
TAIX PLANA, Ramon, Pascual y Gcnis, 21, Valencia.
TEJADA GONZALEZ, Luis, Marques de Urquijo, 26, Madrid.
» «'
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{
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Ml|!
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326
LISTE DES PAKTICIPANTS
ESPANA (continuation) :
FEIJEIRO PINON, Balbino, Secretaria de Justicia de \a 8.a Region Militär, La Coruna.
URIARTE REJO, Jose Luis de, Orfega y Gasset, 17, Madrid.
VALENCIANO ALMOYNA, Jesus, Segre, 29, Madrid-2.
VALERA RAYA, Jose Maria, Madre Rafols, 4, l.« B, Sevilla.
VARONA DE LA PENA, Jose, Rosellon, 189, Barcelona.
VIZCAINO MARQUEZ, Miguel, Santander, 3, Madrid-3.
ZUAZO GARNICA, Jose, Balmes, 443, 3 ° 2.a, Barcelona.
FRANCIA :
CAILLIER, Francois — Ministere des Armees, 14, Ruc Saint Dominique, Paris Vlle.
LEAUTE, Jacques, 5, Rue des Ursulines, Paris Ve.
MILLIOT, Jean, 35, Rue du Moulin, Le Plessis. — Robinson.
MOUTIN, Pierre, 9, Rue Deparcieux, Paris XI Ve.
PAUCOT, Rene Marc, 112, Bd. Exelmans, Paris XVIe.
PERRIER, Jean Claude, 19, Boulevard Latour, Maubourg, Paris Vlle.
SINTUREL, Rene — Societe Internationale de Droit Penal Militaire et de Droit de la
Guerre — Institut des Sciences Criminelles et Penitentiaires — Faculte de
Droit — Esplanade, Strasbourg.
HOLANDA :
De GRAAFF, Herman-Hendrik, Albert, Huyghenslaan, 41, Arnhem.
DOBKEN, Eduard, Saffierhorst, 90, Den Haag.
KALSHOVEN, Frits, Juliana-Plein, 75, Den Helder.
KASTEN, Willem, De Laat de Kanterstraat, 21, Leiden
LAMERS, Ernest, van Tedingerbrouckstraat, Den Haag.
MANTE, Cornelis, Rembrandtkade, 264, Rijkswijk (Zn).
VAN EE, Hendrik, Albertus, Lorentzkade, 50, Leiden.
VERMEER, Willem, Henri, Keizergracht, 633, Amsterdam.
INGLATERRA:
BORRIE, Gordon J., Kineton House, Binton, Stratfort-on Avon.
DRAPER, Gerald, 10, Delahay House, 15 Chelsea Embankment, London, S.W. 3.
KINLEY, Geoffre Doran — Faculty of Laws, University of London, King's College,
Strand, London, W.C. 2.
LASKY, John, OBE, Legal advisor to Head Quarters Joint Services Liaison Organisation,
British Forces in Germany, 53 Bonn, Kaiser Friedrichstrasse, 19.
STUBBS, William Eduard, Office of the Deputy Judge Advocate General, British
Forces Post-Office, 39 (via London).
IRLANDA:
MORAN, William B., Ingleside, Sandycove Road, Sandycove, County Dublin.
ISRAEL :
MUSHKAT, Marion, P.O.B. 17027, Tel Aviv.
SHAMGAR, Meir, 5, Ha Alya Str., Ramat Hasharon.
LISTE DES PAKTICIPANTS
327
ITALIA :
AMICIS, Adelfo de — Tribunale Militarc — Padova.
ATTARDI, Stefano, Mattia, 7, Padova.
AZZARI, Dagoberte, Guido Guinicelli, 58, Roma.
BARBATO, Luigi, V. Messina, 36/ A, Palermo.
BENVENUTO, Guiseppe, V. Francesco d'Ovidio, 71, Roma.
BENVENUTO. Rosannu, V. Francesco d'Ovidio, 71, Roma.
BLAS!, Giovanni di., V. Antonio Mordini, 14, Roma.
BILLOTTA, Francesco, V. Villa Panphili, 21, Roma.
BODINI, Vittorio, V. Mangili, 32, A, Roma.
BONIFACIO, Giovanni, V. di Liburni, 2, Roma
CANNAVIELLO, Vittorio, V. Giovanni Gemelli, 16, Rcmo
CARBONE, Carmelo, V. Tito Livio, 15, Roma.
CARNOVALE, Mario, V. Guido Reni, 22, Roma.
CASTORE, Giuseppe, Piazza Umberto I, 41, Noicattaro (Bari).
CATANIA, Vicenzo, V. Simon Boccanegra, 8, Roma.
CELENTANO, Alessandro, V. Foscolo, 8, Macerata.
CHIARIZIA, Ernesto, V. San Valentine, 6, Roma.
CESAREO, Mario, V. Flaminia Nuova, 241, Roma.
CESAREO, Ubaldo, V. Flaminia Nuova, 241, Roma.
CHIEFFI, Salvatore — Ministerio de Defensa, Roma.
CIANCIULLI, Giuseppe, V. Lepanto, 3B, Roma.
CIARDI, Giuseppe, V. della Medaglia d'Oro, 419/G, Roma
CIARDI, Rofaello, V. della Medaglia d'Oro, 419/G, Roma.
COCCI, Enio — Aeropuerto de Capodichino, Napoles.
CURATOLA, Pasquale, V. La Marmora, 14, Florencia.
D'AGATA, Salvatore, V. R. Rinaldi, 18, Padova.
DELLI PAOLI, Gennaro, V. Lorenzo il Magnifico, 85, Roma.
DI lASI, Dante — Tribunale Militare Cagliari, Cagliari.
DORRUCCI, Renate, V. Proceno, 25, Roma.
DRAGOTTO, Gaetano, V. Fascetti, 57, Roma.
FANALI, Duilio, V. Aventino, 102, Roma.
JANNUZZI, Onofrio, V. Ezio, 24, Roma.
LANDI, Guic?o, V. Casperia, 43, Roma.
MAGLIA, Peppino, V. San Erasmo, 5, Roma.
MARCIANTE, Walter, V. Villa Panphili, 21, Roma.
MAROTTA, Aldo — Aeropuerto de Ciampino, Roma.
MAURO Giuseppe, V. Tracia, 2, Roma.
MESITI, Giuseppe, V. Manzoni, 64, Padova.
MESSINA, Daniele, V. Ugo de Carolis, 73, Roma.
MESSINA, Salvatore, V. Ciancinto Gigonte, 140, Napoles.
MONTARULI, Sabine, V. Piccinni, 65, Bari.
MONTESANO, Luigi, V. G. Puccinni, 10, Roma.
MUSTO, Michele, V. Nomentana, 256, Roma.
NICOLOSI, Massimo, V. Corso Trieste, 165, Roma.
OTERO, Roberto Manuel, V. Paolo Falconieri, 13, Roma.
PATRONE, Giovanni, V. Sammartino, 95, Palermo.
328
LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS
LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS
329
ITALIA (confinuaciön) :
PIRAINO, Angelo, V. Sammartino, 22, Palermo.
RICCARDI, Giuseppe, V. Ciacinto Giganfe, 140, Roma.
RICCIOTTI, Giuseppe, V. Angelico, 35. Roma.
RODI, Amadeo, V. Francesco Belloni, 24, Roma.
RODI, Gildo, V. Francesco Belloni, 24, Roma.
RONCHI, Giuseppe, V. Crispolfi, 76, Roma.
DE ROSA, Egidio, V. Mario Turbo, 10, Roma.
SANTACROCE, Enrico, V. Acquasparfa, 2, Roma.
SCANDURRA, Giuseppe, V. Silvio Pellico, 42, Roma.
SCIORTINO, Ugo, V. Scipione Copece, 12, Napoles.
SCUDERI, Francesco, V. Costabella, 26, Roma.
SIGGIA, Elio, V. Oresfe Tommasini, 53, Roma.
SOTIS, Francesco, V. Appio Claudio, 35, Fondi (Latina).
STECCANELLA, Maurizio, V. Carlos Poma, 2, Milano.
TOLOMEO, Ugo, V. Varlo Dossi, 15, Roma.
FRAETTA DE BURY, Armando, V. Giacinfo Giganfe, 140, Napoles.
VALENTI, Angelo, V. Filipo Ermini, 92, Roma.
VEUTRO, Mario, V. Cardinal Pacca, 24, Roma.
VEUTRO, Vittorio, V. Cardinal Pacca, 24, Roma.
ZEMA, Demetrio, V. F. Denza, 19/A, Roma.
LUXEMBURGO :
GOERENS, Francois, 17, Rue Barblc, Luxembourg.
KLEIN, Etienne, Luxembourg
WAMPACH, Camille, Leon, Marius, 34, Rue Glescner, Luxembourg.
MEJICO :
VEJAR VAZQUEZ, Ocfavio, — Parque Crijalva, Colonia Cuauhtemoc, — Mexico 5, D.F.
NICARAGUA :
CAJINA MEJICANO, Gastön, Santiago Bernabeu, 10, Madrid 16.
NORUEGA :
U.S.A. :
GALFY, Joseph J. Jr. — Headquarters 24th. Infantry Div. — (S.J.A.) APO New York
09112, Augsburg, Germany.
GODDARD, James D. — Jus. M.G. — MAAG — Ministrio del Airc, Madrid-8.
PRUGH, George S. — HQS, US European Command, Stuttgart, Vohingen, Germany.
RICCIO, Charles, Ministerio del Aire, Madrid-8.
WILLIAMS, Jack S.J.A. — Section HQ VII Corps. APO 09107, Stuttgart, Germany.
WILLIAMS, Robert M. — Judge Advocate HQ. US Army, Europe, APO 09403,
Heidelberg, Germany.
YORK, Dennis A. — Judge Advocate Division HQS USAREUR 69, Heidelberg, Germany.
BARSTAD, Arvid — Ministry of Defence, Storgata, 33, Oslo.
MONSEN, Alf, Henrik Ibsengst, 5, Oslo 1.
SUECIA :
CARS, Thorsten, Igelkottsvägen, 3, Bromma, Stockholm.
TURQUIA :
AKGIR, Ali Ccmal, — Jugc militaire.
BAYIK, Mustafa, — Juriste aupres le G.Q.G.
EREN, Burhan, — Juge Militaire, Conseiller Judiciaire aupres le G.Q.G.
ERMAN Sahir, Birinci Boro Hon 305/307, Bcyoglu, Istanbul.
GURSEL, Hasan, Juge Militaire, President de la 3e Section de la Cassation Militaire.
/
/
TABLE DES MATIERES
331
Preface par John GIIJSSEN
Preface (translation)
Prefacio (traduccion)
Comite du Congres
Searice inaugurale
Discours de M. Giuseppe CIARDI
Allocutions de MM. Camilo MENENDEZ TOLOSA
et Acisclo FERNANDEZ CARRIEDO
5
15
25
37
41
48
CHAPITRE I
RAPPORT GENERAL
Die Auslieferung wegen militärischer Straftaten
von Paul-Günter PÖTZ
Uextradition pour delits miUtaires (Extraits)
Extradition for offenses under military law (Extracts)
La extradiciön por delitos militares (Extractos)
55
73
81
89
CHAPITRE II
QUESTIONNAIRE ET RAPPORTS NATIONAUX
Questionnaire
Questionary
Cuestionario
RAPPORTS NATIONAUX
Alleniagne Federale par Paul-Günter PÖTZ
Argentine par Carlos J. COLOMBO
Autriche par Oskar ZLAMANA
Belgiqiie par Jean RAEMAEKERS
Bresil par Herbert CANABARRO REICHARDT
Canada par Francis A. LEGER
99
101
103
105
113
117
121
161
163
332 TABLE DES MATIERES
Espagne par Joaquin HERNANDEZ OROZCO
EtatS'Unis d'Amerique par Robert M. WILLIAMS
France, rapport etabli sous la direction de Jean MILLIOT
Graiide-Bretagne par William E. STUBBS
Irlande par William B. MORAN
Israel par Meir SHAMGAR
Italie par Gildo RODI
Luxembourg (Grand Ducke) par Frangois GOERENS
Norvege par Alf MONSEN
Pays-Bas par Frits KALSHOVEN
Suisse par Rene KELLER
CHAPITRE III
INTERVENTIONS
(seances de travail du 10 mai 1967)
de MM. Dennis A. YORK (Etats-Unis d'Amerique)
Meir SHAMGAR (Israel)
Giovanni di BLASI (Italie)
Gildo RODI (Italie)
Sahir ERMAN (Turquie)
G. I.A.D. DRAPER (Grande-Bretagne)
Thorsten CARS (Suede)
167
177
181
195
199
201
225
227
233
237
269
273
281
286
287
291
291
293
l|
n
/
CHAPITRE IV
RAPPORT DE SYNTHESE
Exposicion de sintesis por Jose Maria RODRIGUEZ DEVESA
Rapport de synthese (traduction)
Smnmary report (translation)
ANNEXE
Liste des participants
297
305
313
323
/ ■
RECUEILS
de la
SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL MILITAIRE
ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE
4
ACTION PENALE ET ACTION DISCIPLINAIRE
theme du premier Congres International tenu ä Bruxelles, 14-16 mai
1959, 224 p.
L'AERONEF MILITAIRE ET LE DROIT DES GENS - SUBORDINA-
TION ET COOPERATION MILITAIRE INTERNATIONALE
themes du deuxieme Congres International tenu ä Florence, 17-20 mai
1961, 465 p.
}h /
LES GARANTIES DES DROITS INDIVIDUELS DANS LA REPRES-
SION DISCIPLINAIRE ET PENALE MILITAIRE
theme du troisieme Congres International tenu ä Strasbourg, 20-21 mai
1964, 273 p.
LES DELITS MILITAIRES
theme du quatrieme Congres International tenu ä Madrid. 9-12 mai
1967.
L^EXTRADITION POUR DELITS MILITAIRES
theme du quatrieme Congres International tenu a
1967.
rid, 9-12 mai
On peut se procurer ces ouvrages soit aupr^s du Secr^tariat g^i^ral de la
Soci^t^, Facultö de Droit, Esplanade, Strasbourg (France) soit aupr^s dt Secr^ta-
riat de la Revue de droit penal militaire et de droit de la guerre, Palais^ Justice,
Bruxelles 1 (Belgique).
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19 6,^-1 ^t» 9 . / ^0 V; ^^
Cj ^
A^
C Crime« de gucrrc et criincs conti c rhunianitc
•r'
113
114
Crime« de guerre et crimes contre l'humanitr
Im
^4-
6. Comciilion sur rimprescriplibililc des crimes de guerre
et des crimes coiilre riiumaiiile
Adoptee par VAssemhlee generale des Nations Vnies le 26 novembre 1968'
ENTRfeE EN viGUEUR : H novcmbre 1970, conformement ä rarticle VIII.
Enregistrfment : 11 novcml)rc 1970, n'' 10823.
jp^T-E . Nations Unics, Rccucil des Traitcs, vol. 754, p. 72.
Etat
Alhanie
bulc.arie
CUBA
GUINKE
llONGRIE
Inde
Kenya
Mextque
mongolie
Nigeria
PlIILTPriNES
POLOGNE
Repurlique d^mocratique
ALLEM ANDE
RSS DE Bielorussie
RSS d'Ukraine
RKriTi'.T.inur.-UNiE DU
Camkroiik
ROLT MANIE
RWANDA
1 CTIKCOSLOVAQUIE
TUNISIE
Union des Repurliques so-
cialistes sovietiques . . . .
yougoslavie
Signaiure
21 Jan vier 1969
Ratification, adhesion (a)
25 mars
1969
3 juillet 1969
31 janvier 1969
16 decembre 1968
7 janvier 1969
14 janvier 1969
19 mai
21 mai
13 scptembre
7 juin
24 juin
12 janvier
1" mai
21 mai
P' decembre
15 mai
14 fevrier
27 mars
8 mai
19 juin
6 octo])re
17 avril
1969
15 scptembre
16 avril
l\ mai
1969
13 aoüt
15 juin
6 janvier
1969
22 avril
16 decembre
1968
9 juin
1971a
1969
1972 a
1971a
1969
1971 a
1972 a
1969
1970 a
1973 a
1969
1973 a
1969
1969
1972 a
1969
1975 a
1970
1972 a
1969
1970
I Rc'.olutinn ^301 (XXIII); voir Dncuwnits officirls de VAsscmhlcc fjnicralc viunt-troi^
.nVmr crv.Wr^M^ n- IS (A/7218), p. 44. La Convention a ctc onvcrtc a la s.gnature
a New York Ic 16 dcccniljre 196S.
Declaralioiis et rcpcrves
ALBA NIE
CUBA
Le Goitvcrncnicnt de la Rcpubliquc populairc d A1-
banie declare qtic Ics dispositions des articlcs V et VII
de la Convention sur riniprcscriptibilitc des crimes de
Fuerre et des crimes contre l'liumanitr sont niaccci>-
tablos parcc qnc. cn rnipccbant iin ccrtain nombrc
d'Etat<^ de dcvenir partios a la Convention, rl.cs rc-
vetent im caractcrc discriininnloirc qui viole Ic prninpe
de IV^^nlitc sonverainc des Etats et est mcompatible
avec l'csprit et Ics bnls de la Cnnvcntion.
BULGARIE
"U RqM^^^^'n^Jc populairc de l^ul.i^arie jugc neces-
saire en nienie tomps de declarcr que les dispo^itifs des
articlcs V et Vfl dr la Convention sur hmprescnpli-
bilitc des crinus de c:nerrc et des crimes contre 1 bnma-
nite qui cmixVbcnt iin ccrtain nombre d'Etats de si.c:ner
la Convention ou d'y adhrrer sont contraires au prmcipe
de re<2:alitc sonverainc des Etats."
Le Gouvernement de la Rcpubliquc de Cuba declare
quMl considere les dispositions des articles V et VII
de la Convention sur l'imprescriptibilite des crimes de
j^uerre et drs crimes contre Tbumanitc comme^ etant
clisrriminatoires et contraires au principe de Tcgalite
des Etats.
GUINEE
"I.r r.onvrrnrnicnt de In RrpuMirnie de Giiinee con-
sidere (pie les dispositions des Articles V et Vll de la
Convention sur Timprescriptibilite des crimes de .guerre
et des crimes contre rbunianitc. que TAssemblee pjene-
ralc a adoi)tc'e le 26 novembre 1968, mettcnt un certain
nombre d'Etats dans l'impossibilitc de devenir parties
a la Convention et ont par suite un caractcre discri-
minatoire qui est incompatible avec Tobjet et les buts
de la Convention.
J.
M
i>
V
., I
i"
i
h'
"Le Gouvernement de la Republique de Guinee est
d'avis que, conformcment au principe de l'egalitc son-
verainc des Etats, la Convention doit etre ä la partici-
pation de tous les Etats sans discrimination ni limi-
tation aucune.
HONGRIE
Le Gouvernement de la Republique populairc hon-
groise declare que les dispositions contenues dans les
articles V et VII de la Convention sur rimprescriptibi-
lite des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre l'humanite,
adoptee par TAssemblee generale des Nations Unies le
26 novembre 1968, selon lesquelles un certain nombre
d'Etats se voicnt refuser la possibilite de devenir signa-
taires ä ladite Convention sont de caractcre discrimina-
toire, violent le principe de l'egalite souveraine des Etats
et sont, particulierement, incompatibles avec les buts et
objectifs de ladite Convention.
MONGOLIE
La Republique populairc mongole juge necessaire de
signaler que les dispositions des articles V et VII de la
Convention sur l'imprescriptibilite des crimes de guerre
et des crimes contre l'humanite ont un caractcre discri-
minatoire et visent ä empecher un certain nombre d'Etats
de devenir parties a la Convention, et eile declare que la
Convention a trait ä des questions qui concernent les
interets de tous les Etats et doit donc etre ouverte a
l'adhesion de tous les Etats, sans discrimination ni
limitation.
POLOGNE
La Republique populairc de Pologne considere que les
dispositions des articles V et VII de la Convention sur
rimprescriptibilite des crimes de guerre et des crimes
contre Thumanitc, que rAssemblce generale a adoptee
Ic 26 novembre 1968, mettcnt un certain nombre d'Etats
dans rimpossibilitc de devenir parties a la Convention
et ont par suite un caractcre discriminatoire qui est in-
compatible avec l'objet et les buts de la Convention.
La Republique populairc de Pologne est d'avis que,
conformement au principe de l'egalite souveraine des
Etats, la Convention doit etre ä la participation de tous
les Etats sans discrimination ni limitation aucune.
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE ALLEMANDE
La Republique democratique allemande tient ä faire
rcmarquer que les articles V et VII de la Convention
enlevent a quelques Etats la possibilite d'adherer a la
Convention. Cette Convention regit des question«;
touchant aux interets de tous les Etats, et eile doit
etre ouverte a l'adhesion de tous les Etats qui s'inspircnt
dans Icur politique des principes et des buts de la
Charte des Nations Unies.
REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTE SOVIETIQUE
DE BIELORUSSIE
La Republique socialiste sovietique de Bielorussie
declare que les dispositions des articles V et VII de la
Convention sur rimprescriptibilite des crimes de guerre
et des crimes contre riiumanitc, qui empcchent certains
Etats de signer la Convention ou d'y adlicrcr, sont con-
traires au principe de l'egalite souveraine des Etats.
REPUBLIQUE SOCIALISTE SOVIETIQUE
D'UKRAINE
\Mcwe dcclarahon, mutatis nnitandis, que celle rcpro-
duitc so US "Rcpubliquc socialiste sovietique de BiilO'
russie*' : voir ci-dessus.]
ROUMANIE
"Le Conseil d'Etat de la Rcpubliquc socialiste de
Roumanic declare que les dispositions des articles V et
VII de la Convention sur rimprescriptibilite des crime
de guerre et des crimes contre Thumanite ne sont pas
en concordance avec le principe selon lequel les traite5
intcrnationaux multilatcraux dont l'objet et le but intc-
ressent la communaute internationale dans son ensemble
devraient etre ouverts ä la participation universelle.'*
TCIIECOSLOVAQUIE
La Republique socialiste tchccoslovaquc declare que les
dispositions des articles V et VII de la Convention sur
rimprescriptibilite des crimes de guerre et des crimes
contre Thumanitc, adoptee par TAssemblec generale des
Nations Unies le 26 novembre 1968, sont en contradiction
avec le principe que tous les Etats ont le droit de devenir
parties aux traites multilateraux reglementant des ques-
tions d'interet general.
UNION DES REPUBLIQUES SOCIALISTES
SOVIETIQUES
[Meute drclnration, mutatis mutandis, que celle repro-
duite saus "Republique socialiste sovietique de Biilo-
russie" : voir ci-dessus.]
r>
9
CONVENTION ON THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS TO WAR CRIMES
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
CONVENTION SUR LTMPRESCRIPTIBILITE DES CRIMES DE
GUERRE ET DES CRIMES CONTRE L'HUMANITE
^^nMtattAwmr-m^^'^^^^^
KOHBEHUHH 0 HEnPHMEHHMOCTM CPOKA ^ABHOCTH K
BOEHHLIM nPECTynnEHHHM H RPECTynnEHHHM
nPOTHB HEnOBEHECTBA
n
CONVENCION SOBRE LA IMPRESCRIPTIBILIDAD DE LOS
CRIMENES DE GUERRA Y DE LOS CRIMENES
DE LESA HUMANIDAD
UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS TO WAR CRIMES AND
CRIMSS AOAINST HUMANITY. ADOPTED BY
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS ON 26 NOVEMBER 1968
PRDCES-VERBAL OF RECTIFICATION OF THE
CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE AGREEMENT
I, Constantin A. Stavropoulos, the
Le^al Counsel, having compared the
authentic text of the Convention on the
Non-Apolicability of Statutory Limitations
to War Crimes and Criraes against Humanity,
adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 26 November 1968, vdth
the certified true copies established on
14 May 1969, have found an error in the
Russian text of article V of the Conven-
tion as reproduced in the certified true
copies.
The said article, which appears on
page 3 of the Russian text, should
read as follcws:
47 J^
NATIONS UNIES
CONVENTION SUR L'IHPRESCRIFTIBILITE DES
CRIMES DE GUERRE ET DES CRU-ES CONTRE
L'HUMANITE. ADOFTEE PAR L'ASSEMBLEE
GENERALE DES NATIONS UNIES LE 26 NOVK^BKB
1968
PROCES-VERBAL DE RECTIFICATION DES
EXEMPLAIRES CERTIFIES CÜNFOR^ES ÜE L'ACCOaP
Nous, Constantin A. Stavropoulos ,
Conseiller juridique , ayant compaH le
texte authentique de Li Convention öur
l'imprescripUbiUt^« des crimes de gu.'rre
et des crimes contre l'humanit^, adopt.5e
par l'Assembl^e g^n^rale des Nations Unies
le 26 novembre 1968, avec les exemplaires
certifi^s conformes t^tablis le 14 mal 1969,
avons constat^ vine erreur dans le texte
russe de l'article V de La Convention
reproduit dans les exemplaires certifies
confo rme s .
tf
Cet article, qui apparalt ä la page 3
du texte russe, doit se lire comme suit :
«UM rooyflapcTBO-xneHOM 0praH«3aUHH °«"«""^""''5ewTOapS™oro areHTOTaa
Slf«'o^rL^«^Iu»fSS.?S;;eHK»rSS?l?"i.T-c?r^SrHac.oLe«Ko„Be„u>.«.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have siened
this Proces-Verbal at the Headquarters of
the United Nations, New York this
twenty-fifth day of November 1970.
EN FOI DE QUOI, Nous avons sign^ le
präsent Proces-verbal au Siege de
1' Organisation des Nations Unies, ä
New York, ce vingt-cinquieme jour de
novembre 1970,
n
CONVENTION
ON THE NON-APPLICABILITY
OF STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
TO WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY
UNITED NATIOISS
1969
CONVENTION ON THE NON-APPLICABILITY OF STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
TO WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
Preemble '
The States Parties to the present Convention^
Recalling resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations J (l) of
15 February 19^6 and 170 (ll) of 51 October 19^7 on the extradition and punishment of
war criminals, resolution 95 (l) of 11 December 19^6 affirming the principles of international
law recognized by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, and the
judgement of the Tribunal, and resolutions 2l8U (XXl) of 12 December I966 and 2202 (XXl)
of 16 December I966 which expressly condemned as crimes against humanity the violation of
the economic and political rights of the indigenous population on the one band and the
policies of apartheid on the other,
Recalling resolutions of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
107^^ D (XXXIX) of 28 July I965 and II58 (XLl) of 5 August I966 on the punishment of war
criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity,
Noting that none of the solemn declarations, Instruments or Conventions reLating to
the prosecution and punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity made provision
for a period of limitation,
Considering that war crimes and crimes against humanity are among the gravest crimes
in international law,
Convinced that the effective punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity is
an important element in the prevention of such crimes, the protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the encouragement of confidence, the furtherance of co- Operation nmong
peoples and the promotion of international peace and security,
Noting that the application to war crimes and crimes against humanity of the rules of
municipal law relating to the period of limitation for ordinary crimes is a matter of
serious concern to world public opinion, since it prevents the prosecution and punishment
of persons responsible for those crimes,
Recognizing that it is necessary and timely to affirm in international law, through
this Convention, the principle that there is no period of limitation for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, and to secure its universal application,
Have agreed as follows:
I Article I
No statutory limitation shall apply to the following crimes, irrespective of the date
«
of their commission:
(a) War crimes as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, Nürnberg, of 8 August 19^5 and confirmed by resolutions 5 (l) of 15 February 19^6
and 95 (l) of 11 December 19^+6 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, particulnrly
- 2 -
the "grave breaches" enumerated in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August I9U9 for the
protection of war victims;
(b) Crimes against humanity whether coramitted in time of war or in time of peace
as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nürnberg, of
8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 5 (l) of 15 February 19^6 and 95 (l) of
11 December I9U6 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, eviction by armed attack
or occupation and inhuman acts resulting frora the policy of apartheid, and the crime of
genocide as defined in the 19^8 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, even if such acts do not constitute a violation of the domestic law of the
country in which they were committed,
Article II
If any of the crimes mentioned in article I is committed, the provisions of this
Convention shall apply to representatives of the State authority and private individuals
who, as principals or accoraplices, participate in or who directly incite others to the
commission of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit them, irrespective of the
degree of completion, and to representatives of the State authority who tolerate their
commission.
Article III
The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to adopt all necessary domestic
measures, legislative or otherwise, with a view to making possible the extradition in
accordance with international law, of the persons referred to in article II of this
Convention.
Article IV
The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to adopt, in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes, any legislative or other measures necessary to
ensure that statutory or other limitations shall not apply to the prosecution and
punishment of the crimes referred to in articles I and II of this Convention and that,
where they exist, such limitations shall be abolished.
Article V
This Convention shall, until 5I December I969, be open for signature by any State
Member of the United Nations or member of any of its specialized agencies or of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, by any State Party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, andby any other State which has been invited by the
General Assembly of the United Nations to become a Party to this Convention.
- 5 -
■
Article VI
This Convention is subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article VII
This Convention shall be open to accession by any State referred to in article V.
Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretaiy-General of the United Nations.
Article VIII
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of the
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the tenth Instrument of
ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying this Convention or acceding to it after the deposit of
the tenth instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force
on the ninetieth day after the date of the deposit of its own instrument of ratification
or accession.
Article IX
1. After the expiry of a period of ten years from the date on which this Convention
enters into force, a request for the revision of the Convention may be made at any time
by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addresscd to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any,
to be taken in respect of such a request.
Article X
1. This Convention shall be deposited with the Secretaiy-General of the United Nations.
2. The Secretaiy-General of the United Nations shall transmit certifled copies of this
Convention to all States referred to in article V.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States referred to in
article V of the following particulars:
(a) Signatures of this Convention, and Instruments of ratification and accession
deposited under articles V, VI and VIIj
(b) The date of entiy into force of this Convention in accordance with article VIII;
(c) Communications recelved under article IX.
Article XI
This Convention, of which tho Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts
are equally authontic, shall bear the date of 26 November I966.
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entere into force, a r-'^i^frs'
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^gM^fis stell öeciae iobod
, i;
to be taken in respect of s-.ir. 5 reojsi'^B''.
1. This Convention shall be depositea wi^h the Secretaiy- General of t\v^ Uuitr^. ^^uiMu.,
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transriit cortirif^d r^f^li^r. .> :
Convention to all States referred to in article V.
J. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all St.Tt-.cj x-fif0YTr*.\ i..^, ^yy
article V of the folloving particulars:
(a) Signatures of this Convention, and Instruments of ratificnt,i on nrxl fi(»r*f*rtri
deposited ander articles V, VI and VII;
(b) The date of entry into forco of thir, Convnntlon in nccorc1r^n<^<- vHJ, nrft«^!- **- ■
(c) Communications receivod unde^r nrt.lrlr TX.
Ai l W-l>- M
This Convention, of whlch l.h'- c^hlnf^fit^, ^np.Vlüh, Kv^-nv^h, Hw^-^
are equally authc'ntic, nlmll l)c;ii l.h>' ilwlr .»V ;.H» W.*v»M*ibf^v 1966^
- 1+ -
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duiy authorized for that purpose, have
signed this Convention.
CONVENTION
SUR L'IMPRESCRIPTIBILITE
DES CRIMES DE GUERRE
ET DES CRIMES
CONTRE L'HUMANITE
NATIOISS UNIES
1969
CONVENTION SUR L'IMPRESCRIPTIBILITE DES CRIMES DE
GUERRE ET DES CRIMES CONTRE L'HUMANITE
Pröambule
Les Etats Parties ä la prosente Convention,
Rappe lant les rösolutlons 3 (D et 170 (ll) de l'Assembl^e generale de
1- Organisation des Nations Unles, en date des 13 fävrier I9I+6 et 3I octobre ig»^?,
portant sur l'extradltlon et le chatlment des crlmlnels de guerre, et la r^so-
lutlon 95 (I) du 11 döcembre 191^6, conflrmant les prlncipes de droit international
reconnus par le Statut du Tribunal militalre International de Nuremberg et par le
Jugement de ce Tribunal, ainsi que les räsolutlons 2l84 (XXl) du 12 döcembre 1966 et
2202 (XXI) du 16 decembre 1966, par lesquelles l'Aßsembl^e g^nörale a expressement
condamn^ en tant que crlmes contre l'humanit^, d'une part, la violaticn des droits
^conomiques et politlques des populatlons autochtones et, d'autre part, la politlque
d'apartheld,
Rappelant les resolutions lOT^^ D (XXXIX) et II58 (XLl) du Consell economique et
social de 1 'Organisation des Nations Unles, en date des 28 juillet 1965 et
5 aout 1966, concernant le chStlment des crlmlnels de guerre et des indlvidus coupables
de crimes contre 1 'human! t^,
Constatant que dans aucune des declarations solennelles, actes et Conventions
visant la poursuite et la represslon des crlmes de guerre et des crlmes contre
l'humanit^ 11 n'a ^t^ prevu de llmitation dans le temps,
Conslderant que les crimes de guerre et les crimes contre l'humanite comptent au
nombre des crimes de droit international les plus graves,
Convaincus que la represslon affective des crlmes de guerre et des crimes contre
l'humanite est un ^l^ment important de la Prävention de ces crimes, de la protection
des droits de l'homme et des libertes fondamentales, propre k encourager la conflance,
k stimuler la Cooperation entre les peuples et ä favorlser la paix et la säcurite
internationales,
Constatant que l'applicatlon aux crimes de guerre et aux crimes contre l'humanite
des rögles de droit interne relatives k la prescrlption des crimes ordinaires inqulete
profondöment l'opinion publique mondiale car eile empeche que les personnes
responsables de ces crimes soient poursuivies et chati^es,
Reconnaissant qu'il est nöcessalre et opportun d'affirmer en droit international,
au moyen de la präsente Convention, le principe de l'imprescriptibilitä des crimes de
guerre et des crimes contre l'humanitä et d'en assurer l'applicatlon universelle,
Sont convenus de ce qui suit :
- 2 -
Artlcle Premier
Les crlmes suivants sont imprescrlptibles, quelle que soit la date ä laquelle
ils ont 6t6 commis :
e.) Les crimee de guerre, tele qu'lls sont d^finis dans le Statut du Tribunal
militaire International de Nuremberg du 8 acut 19^5 et confirmes par les
r^solutions 3 (D et 95 (l) de l'Assembl^e generale de 1 'Organisation des Nations
Unies, en date des 13 f^vrier 19^*6 et 11 d^cembre 19^6, notamment les "infractions
graves" enumer^es dans les Conventions de Geneve du 12 aoüt 19^9 pour la protection
des victimes de la guerre;
b) Les crimes contre l'humanite, qu'ils soient commis en temps de guerre ou
en temps de paix, tels qu'lls sont definis dans le Statut du Tribunal militaire
international de Nuremberg du 8 aout 19^5 et confiimäs par les r^solutions 3 (l) et
95 (I) de l'Assemblee generale de 1 'Organisation des Nations Unies, en date des
13 fevrier 19^6 et 11 d^cembre 191^6, l'eviction par une attaque armee ou l'occupation
et les actes inhumalns ddcoulant de la politique d'apartheid. ainsi que le crime de
genocide, tel qu'il est defini dans la Convention de 19^*8 pour la Prävention et la
repression du crime de genocide, mgme sl ces actes ne constituent pas une violation
du droit interne du pays ou ils ont ete commis.
Article II
Si l'un quelconque des crimes mentionnes ä l'article premier est commis, les
dlspositions de la presente Convention s'appliqueront aux representants de l'autorit^
de l'Etat et aux particuliers qui y participeraient en tant qu'auteurs ou en tant que
complices, ou qui se rendraient coupables d'incltation directe a la perpätration de
l'un quelconque de ces crimes, ou qui participeraient ä une entente en vue de le
commettre, quel que soit son degr^ d'execution, ainsi qu'aux representants de
l'autorite de l'Etat qui toläreraient sa perpetration.
Artlcle III
l£s Etats Parties k la präsente Convention s'enga«ent ä adopter toutes les
mesures internes, d 'ordre l^gislatlf ou autre, qui seralent n^cessaires en vue de
permettre l'extradition, conform^ment au droit International, des personnes vis^es
par l'article II de la presente Convention.
Article IV
Ue Etats Parties k la präsente Convention s'engagent k prendre, confora^ment
leurs proc^dures constitutlonnelles, toutes mesures legislatives ou autres qui
a
- 3 -
seralent necessalrns pour assurer l'imprescrlptibilite des crimes vlsös aux articles
Premier et II de la presente Convention, tant en ce qui concerne Je« poursuites
qu'en ce qui concerne la peine; lä oü une prescriptlon existeralt en la matlere, en
vertu de la loi ou autrement, eile sera abolle.
Artlcle V
La presente Convention sera jusqu'au 31 d^cembre 1969 ouverte k la slgnature de
tout Etat Membre de l'Organisatlon des Nations Unies ou membre de l'une quelconque de
ses mstltutlons speclallsees ou membre de l'Agence Internationale de l'^nerglr
atomlque, de tout Etat partle au Statut de la Cour internationale de Justice, ainsi
que de tout autre Etat Invlte par l'Assemblee generale de l'Organisatlon des Nations
Unies ä devenlr partle ä la präsente Convention.
Article VI
La presente Convention est sujette k ratification et les Instruments de ratlfi-
cation seront deposes aupres du Secretaire general de l'Organisatlon des Nations Unies.
Artlcle VII
La präsente Convention sera ouverte ä l'adheslon de tout Etat vlse ä l'article V.
Les Instruments d'adhesion seront däposes aupres du Secretaire general de l'Organisatlon
des Nations Unies.
Artlcle VIII
1. La presente Convention entrera en vlgueur le quatre-vingt-dlxieme jour qui
suivra la date du depot aupres du Secretaire general de l'Organisatlon des Nations
Unies du dixieme Instrument de ratification ou d'adhäsion.
2. Pour chacun des Etats qui ratlfieront la präsente Convention ou y adh^reront
apres le d^pot du dixieme Instrument de ratification ou d'adhesion, ladlte Convention
entrera en vlgueur le quatre-vingt-dlxieme Jour aprfes la date du d^pot par cet Etat de
son Instrument de ratification ou d'adhesion.
Artlcle IX
1. Apres l'expiratlon d'une periode de dix ans ä partlr de la date a laquelle
la präsente Convention entrera en vlgueur, une demande de revision de la Convention
peut etre formulee, en tout temps, par toute Partie contractante, par vole de notifl-
catlon ecrite adressäe au Secretaire general de l'Organisatlon des Nations Unies.
- k -
2. L'Assernblee generale de 1 'Organisation des Natlonr Unies statuera sur les
mesures ä prendre, le cas echeant, au sujet de cette demande.
Artlcle X
!• La oresente Convention sera deposee aupres du Secretaire general de
1 'Organisation des Nations Unies«
2. Le Secretaire general de 1 'Organisation des Nations Unies fera tenir une
copie certifiee conforme a la presente Convention a tous les Etats vises a l'article V.
3. l£ Secretaire general de 1' Organisation des Nations Unies informera tous
les Etats vises e l'article V :
a) Des signatures apposees a la presente Convention et des Instruments de
ratification et d'adhesion deposes conformement aux articles V, VI et VII;
by De la date ä laquelle la presente Convention entrera en vigueur conformement
a l'article VIII;
c) Des Communications reques conformement a l'article IX.
Artlcle XI
La presente Convention, dont les textes anglais, chinois, espagnol, fran-^ais et
russe fönt egalement fol, portera la date du 26 novembre 1968,
EN FOI DE QUOI, les sousslgnes, düment autorises ä cet effet, ont signe la
presente Convention.
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^
K0HBEHI1,HH
0 HEnPHMEHHMOCTH CPOKA flABHOCTH
K BOEHHBIM nPECTynnEHHHM
H nPECTynnEHHHM
nPOTHB HEJIOBEHECTBA
OPrAHH3AUHH
OETiEJlHHEHHblX HAU,Uti
1969
* I ^wi^w— ^wi^wi^M^^i^r
KOHBFHmfl 0 HEITPWMKHMMOCTM CPOKA MBHOCTM K BOEHHHM
nPECTynJTEHMHM M nPECTynJFHMHM nPOTMB ^KJOBK^ECTBA
IIpeaMfiyJia
rooyflapcTBa-ytjacTHHKM HacTOgmeft KoHseHUMM,
ccHjiaHCB Ha peaoJiiomiM TeHepaoiBHOÄ kccsMÖJievi OpraHnsaiiMH OßieflMHeHHHX
Haiai» 3 (I) OT 13 (DeBpa^H 1946 rofla m 170 (n) ot 31 OKTflöpa 1947 ro^a o
BHÄatie M HaKaaaHMM BoeHHHX irpecTjrnHMKOB, na pesojiKiiMio 95 (l) ot 11 fleKa6p«
1946 roÄa, noflTBepxflaranyK) npuHimmi ueKflyHapoÄHoro npaBa, npMSHaHHHe YcTa-
BOM MeKTOTHapoflHoro HiopH6eprcKoro BoeHHoro TpM6yHa;ia m npMTOBopoM aroro
TpM6yHa;ia, m Ha pesojiiomiM 2184 (XXI) ot 12 fleKaÖpfl 1966 rofla m 2202 (XXI)
OT 16 AeKaöpH 1966 rofla, b KOTopHX jicho ocysÄaiorcH KaK npecTyiueHMfl npoTHB
qeJOBe^ecTBa napyineHHe 3KOHOMMxiecKMX m noJiMTMxiecKMX npaB KopeHHoro naceJie-
HHH, c OÄHoft CTopoHH, M noJiMTMKa anapTeMfla, c ÄpyroÄ,
ccHJiaflCB na peaooiwuMH 1074 D (XXXIX) ot 28 mkxäh 1965 rofla m 1158 (XLI)
OT 5 asrycTa 1966 rofla 3KOHOMMwecKoro m ComiaaibHoro CoseTa OpraHMsarcHM
OÖieÄHHeHHHx HaiiMß o HaKasaHMM BoeHHHX npecrynHMKOB m ;nm, coBepniMBnmx
iipecTynjieHMH irpoTWB ^eJioBeqecTBa,
OTMeqaa, uto hm b oähoä TopitecTBeHHOÄ ÄOKJiapaiiMM, aKTe kjik KOHBeHmm,
KacaranMXCK cyAeÖHoro npecjieÄOBaHMH mjih HaKasaHMH aa BoeHHHe npeoTynaieHMH m
npecTynaieHHfl npoTMB qeJiose^ecTBa, He coflep«MTCfl noJioseHKH o cpoKe flaBHocTM,
OqHTaH. xiTO B COOTBeTCTBMM c Me«ÄyHapoflHHM npaBOM BoeHHHe iipecTynJieHHH
M npe^^S^HMH npoTMB xjejroBeqecTBa othochtc« k caMHM thskum npecTynjieHMHM.
HoxoflH H3 y6e«fleHMfl, ^ito 3$$eKTMBHoe HaKaaaHMe aa BoeHHHe npecTynjieHMH
H npecTynjieHMH npoTMB qeaioBetiecTBa HEJineTCH Ba«HHM $aKTopoM b ÄeJie npe^y-
npeKfleHMH TaKMX npecTynzeHMft, samMTH npaB ^eJioBeKa « ochobhhx CBo6ofl, ynpen-
jieHMH flOBepMH, noompcHMH coTpyflHMwecTBa MeKTOT HapoflaMH « o6ecneqeHMa iie«Äy-
HapoflHoro MJipa m 6e3onacHOCTM,
OTMexiaa, xiTo npHMeneHKe R BoeHHHM npecTynjiGHHflM h itpecTynjieHMflM npoTMB
^ejioBetiecTBa BHyTpeHHMx npaBOBHX Hopu, KacaicmHXCH cpoKa flaBHocTH b oTHome-
HMM o6h^hhx npecTyiweHMÄ, HBOifleTCH BonpocoM, BH3HBaKWTM cepteanyio oaaßo^eH-
HOCTB UMpoBoro oömecTBeHHoro MHeHMK, TaK KaK oHo npenHTCTByeT cyAeönoMy
npecjieÄOBaHMio m HaKaaaHUK) jimu, oTBeTCTBeHHHX aa TaKMe npecTynjieHiifl,
•f
- s -
- 3 -
npusHasaH Heo6xofliiMocTB w CBoeBpeMeHHOCTB yTBepjKfleHMH b MesÄyHapoflHOM
npaBe, nocpeflCTBOM HacTOHmefi KoHBeniiMM, npMHmona o tom, tito hs cymecTByeT
cpoKa flaBHocTM B OTHomeHHM BoeHHHX npecTynjieHM» m npecrynjieHM» npoTMB tiejio-
BeiecTBa, a ranxe oöecneweHMfl noBcewecTHoro rtpHMeneHMH aToro npMHmma,
corjracMJiMCfe o HMiecJieayicmeu:
CTaTfcH I
HMKaKM© cpoKM flaBHocTM He irpMMeHHioTca K cjiepyiamu npecrynjreHMHM, Hesa-
BMCMMO OT BpeWeHM MX OOBepffleHM«:
a) BoeHHHe npecTynjieHMfl, KaK ohm onpefleJiinoTCfl b ycTaae HiopHöeprcKoro
MeKÄynapoflHoro BoeHHoro TpMÖynajia ot 8 aBiycTa 1945 rofla m noÄTBepxflaioTCH
peaojrKTOiaMM 3 (I) ot 13 «eBpa^iff 1946 ro^a m 95 (i) ot 11 fleKaöpa 1946 ro^a
reHepajiBHOÄ Accau6jiQK OpraHMsamm OÖieÄMHeHHHX Hamift, a TaK«e, b qacTHOCTM,
"cepBesHHe HapyineHHa", nepexiHCJieHHHe b ÄeHeBCKMX KOHBeHiiHffx o sanpiTe aepTB*
BoÄHH OT IS aBiycTa 1949 rofla;
b) npecTynjieHMa npoTMB HejicBeuecTBa, HesaBiiciiMo ot Toro, 6ujtK jim ohm
coBepmeHH bo speuH boähh hjim b MHpHoe Bpeua, KaK ohh oirpBRBJisayroH b ycTaBe
HiopH6eprcKoro MeKflynapoflHoro BoeHHoro Tpji6yHajra ot 8 aaryoTa 1945 rofla k
noÄTBepxflaiOTCH b peaojiromiflx 3 (l) ot 13 $eBpajiH 1946 ro^a m 95 (i) ot
11 flOKaÖpH 1946 rofla TeHepajiBHoÄ AccaMÖjieM OprannaamiH OßieÄMHeHHHX HarpiÄ,
MarnaHne b peayjibTaTG BoopyseHHoro nanafleHMfl hjim OKKynamiM h ßectiejioBetiHHe
fleÄcTBua, HBJifliaiwecH cjibrotbübu rojimtukk anapTeMfla. a TaK«e npecTynjieHMe
reHODKÄa, onpeflear«euoe b KoHBeniiMM 1948 ro^a o npeflynpe.AeHMM npec^yn^eHHa
reHOiWAa k HaKaaaHH« aa nero, ;,axe ecar« stm fleficTB^n He npeflCTaB^nm co6oÄ
HapynieHMH BHyTpeHHero saKOHo^aTejiBCTBa toä cTpanH, b KOTopoft ohm 6hjim
coBepiueHH,
CTaTBH n
B cjiyqae coBepmeHMH KaKoro-jrM6o Ma npecTyn^eHMÄ, ynouHHyTHx b
CTaTBe I, noaio«eHMa nacToameÄ KoHBenmiM npMMennioTCH k npeflCTaaMTeoraM rocy-
ÄapcTBeHHHx B^acTeft m ,acTHHU mr^u, KOTopne BHCTynaior b Ka^ecTBe mchooihm-
Te^eÄ aTMx npecTynoreHM» motm coytjacTHMKOB TaKMx npeciyn^eHMÄ, m;im nenocpefl-
CTBeHHo noÄCTpeKanr flpyrnx arnn k ooBepmeHMio TaKHX npecTynaieHMÄ, m;.m yxiacT-
ByioT B aaroBope ä^th mx coBepmeHMH, HeaaBHCMuo ot CTeneHM mx aaBepmoHHocTM
paBHo KaK M K npeflCTaBMTeaiau rooyflapcTBSHHHx B^iacTeÄ, flonyoKaKjpiM mx
coBepmGHMe.
CraTBH in
rocyÄapcTBa-yxiaoTHMKM HaoTOflme» KoHBeniiMM o6fl3yioTCH npMHHTB Bce Heo6xo-
ÄMUHe BHyTpeHHMe wepH aanoHCÄaTeJiBHoro mjim mhopo xapaKTepa, HanpasjieHHHe Ha
TO, tiTOßH B COOTBeTCTBMH C MeSflyHapOflHHW npaSOM COSÄaTB yCJIOBMH flJIH BUÄaqM
jiMU, yKaaaHHHX b CTaTBe n HacToameü KoHseHUjiM.
CTaTBH IV
rocyflapcTBa-ynacTHKKK HacTOjmeÄ KoHBeHiwii oßHsyioTCK xipmhhtb b cooTseT-
CTBMM C MX KOHCTKTyilMOHHOit npOUeflypO« JiJ06ue aaKOHOÄaTeJIBHHe MJIM MHHe MepH,
HeoöxoflMMHe Ä^fl oöecne^eHMH Toro. ^toök cpoK «aBHOcTM, ycTaHOBJieHHH» aanoHou
MJiM MHHM nyTGM, He npMMeHHOiCH K cyfleÖHOMy npecJieflOBaHMio m naKaaaHMK) aa npe-
CTynjieHMfl, yKaaannHe b CTaTBHX I m n HaoTonmeft Kohbghhmm, m hto6h Taw, rfle
TaKOft CpOK npKMeHfl©TCfI K 3THM HpeCTyiUieHMflM, OH 6UJI OTMeHeH.
CTaTBH V
HacTOflmafl KoHBeHiiKH oTKpnra ro 31 fleKaßpH 1969 ro^a fljia noflnMcaHua
JII06HM rocyÄapcTBOM-qjieHOM OpraHMsauMM 06rbeÄMHeHHHx Hai^MÜ mjim gJieHOM Jiio6oro
Ma ©e cneiwajiMaMpoBaHHHX yqpeacfleHMfi mjim ujreHou MesflyHapoflHoro areHTCTsa no
aTOMHofi aneprMM, jiio6hm Äpyrnw rocyflapcTBow, npMrjiaiiieHnHM reHepajiBHofi
AccaMÖJieefi OpraHnaaiiMM 06^eflMHeHHHX HauMÄ cTaTB ytjacTHMKOM HacTonmeß KoHBen-
njiM
CTaTBH VI
HacTOHman KoHBeHmiH noflJieKMT paTM(J)MKaiOTM . PaTM$MKaiiMOHHHe rpawoTH
ÄenoHMpyioTCH y renepajiBHoro cenpeTapn OpraHMaauMM 06i,eflMHeHHHX Haipi«.
CTaTBH VII
HacTonmaa KoHBeHiiMH oTKpHTa RJia npncoeÄMHeHMH Jiroöoro rocyflapcTBa, yKa-
aaHHoro b CTaTBe V . AoKT^enTU o npMCoeflMHeHMM ÄenoHMpywrcH y renepajiBHoro
ceKpeTapH OpraHwaaiiMM oe-BeÄMHeHHHX Haujift.
CTaTBH VIII
1. HacTonmaH KoHBeniiMfl BCTynaeT b CMJiy na AeBHHOCTHÄ äbhb nocJie ÄenoHMpo-
BaHMH y renepaaiBHoro cexpeTapa OpraHMaauMM oeieÄMHeHHHX Hai^MÄ flecHToft paTM-
$MKailMOHHOft rpauOTK MJIM AOKyweHTa O npMCOeAMHeHMM.
- 4 -
2. JlJiR KajKfloro rocy^apcTsa, KOTopoe paTM$MiiMpyeT HacTOHmyio Kohbghi^mio mjim
npMcoeÄMHMTCH K Heß nocjie ^©noHPrpoBaHMH ä©chtoä i)aTMcJ)MKaij;M0HH0Ä rpawoTH
MJIM ÄOKyweHTa o irpMcoe/^MHeHMM, HacTOHman KoHBeHiiMH BOTynaeT b CMJiy na ä©bh-
HooTHÄ ;^eHB nocjie ;^enoHMpoBaHMH mm ero paTM$MKaiiMOHHoÄ rpaMOTU mjim ^oKyMeHTa
O npMCOGÄMHeHMM.
CTaTBH IX
1. riocjie MCTeqeHMH ^©CHTMJieTHero nepMo^a oo ot« BCTynjieHMn b CMJiy nacTOH-
meÄ KoHBeHiiMM npocBöa o nepecMOTpe HacTonmeü KoHBGHmiM moägt 6htb BH^BMHyTa
B Jiio6oe BpeMH jhoöhm rocy;^apcTBOM-ytiacTHMKOM nyTGM riMOBMeHHoro yBeflOMJieHMa ,
HanpaBJieHHoro Ha mmh renepajiBHoro oenpeTapH OpraHM3an;MM 06ieÄMHeHHHX Haii;MÄ*
8. PeHepajiBHaH AccaMÖjieH OpraHMsauMM OöteflMHeHHHx HaujMü npMHMMaeT peuieHMe
O TOM, KaKMG MGpH, GCJIM TaKOBHG HG06X0flMMH, CJIG^yGT npOBGCTM B CBH3M O
TaKOÄ iipocB6oJi.
CTaTBH X
1. HaoTOHman Kohbghi3;mh xpaHMTOH y PGHGpajiBHoro CGKpGTapn OpraHMsanMM
06i>g;^mhghhhx Haij^MÄ.
2, PGHGpaJIBHHM CGKpGTapB OpraHM3ar];MM 06l>GAMHGHHHX HaipiÄ npGnpoBOÄflaGT aaBG-
PGHHHG KOnMM HaCTOHmGÜ KOHBGHUMM BCGM TOCy^apCTBaM, yKasaHHHM B OTaTBG V.
3. PGKGpaJIBHHfi CGKpGTapB 0praHM3aii;MM OÖtG^^MHGHHHX HaiJMÄ yBGAOMJIHGT BOG
rooy;^apoTBa, yKaaaHHHG b OTaTBG V, o HMJKGCJiGÄyiomGM:
a) o no^nMcaHMM HacTOfniiiGÄ Kohbghumm m o c^atiG na xpanGHMG b oootbgtct-
BMM CO CTaTBHMM V , VI M VII paTMC^MKaUiMOHHHX PpaMOT MJIM ÄOKyMGHTOB O IipMCOG-
ÄMHGHMMJ
b ) o A^TG BCTynjiGHMH B CMJiy HacTOHmofi Kohbghi];mm B COOTBGTOTBMM CO
CTaTBGÄ VIII;
C) O COOÖmGHMHX, nOJiytIGHHHX B COOTBGTCTBMM CO CTaTBGÜ IX.
CTaTBfl XI
HacTOflmafl Kohbghi^mh, aHPJiMÄCKMfi, McnancKMÄ, KMTaÄCKMfi, pyccKMfi m (J)paH-
Iiy3CKMÄ TGKCTH KOTOpOÄ HBJIHIOTCH paBHO ayTGHTMtIHHMM, flaTMpOBana 26 HOHÖpH
1968 ro^a.
B y^OCTOBEPEHME ^PO HMJKGnoÄnMoaBiiiMGCH, Ha;^JIGÄalIl;MM oöpaaoM ^jir. 3Toro
ynOJIHOMOWGHHHG, UOpjmCQiJlVi HdiOTOSÜSyiO KOHBGHUiMlO.
CONVENCION
SOBRE LA IMPRESCRIPTIBILIDAD
DE LOS CRIMENES DE GUERRA
Y DE LOS CRIMENES
DE LESA HUMANIDAD
NACIOISES UNIDAS
1969
CONVa^CION SOBRE LA IMPRESCRIPTIBILIDAD DE LOS CRIMENES
DE GUERRA Y DE LOS CRIMENES DE LESA HUMAN IDAD
PreÄmbulg
r,
Los Estados Partes en la presente Convenclön.
Recordando las resoluciones de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas 5 (l) de 15 de
febrero de 19lf6 y 170 (ll) de 51 de octubre de 19»H, sobre la extradiclön y el castlgo de los
crUnlnales de guerra, la resoluclön 95 (D de 11 de dlciembre de 19i*6. que confinna los princl-
pios de derecho intemacional reconocldos per el Estatuto del Tribunal Militär Internacional de
Nuremberg y per el fallo de este Tribunal, y las resoluciones 2l84 (XXl) de Vd de dlciembre
de 1966 y 2-^02 (XXI ) de l6 de diciembre de 1966, que han condenado expresamente como crimenes
contra la humanidad la violaciön de los derechos econömicos y pollticos de la poblaciön autöc-
tona, por una parte, y la polltica de apartheid, por otra,
Recordando las resoluciones del Consejo Econömico y Social de las Naciones Unidas
lOrU D (XXXIX) de 28 de Julio de 1965 y 1158 (XLl) de 5 de agosto de 1966, relativas al castigo
de los criminales de guerra y de las personas que hayan conetido crimenes de lesa humanldad,
Observendo que en ninguna de las declaraciones solemnes, instrumentos o convenciones para
el enjuiciainiento y castigo de los crimenes de guerra y de los crimenes de lesa humanidad se ha
prevtsto limitaciön en el tiempo,
Considerando que los crimenes de guerra y los crimenes de lesa humanidad figuran entre los
delitos de derecho intemacional mds graves,
Convencldos de que la represldn efectlva de los crimenes de guerra y de los crimenes de
lesa humanidad es un elemento importante para prevenir esos crimenes y proteger los derechos
humanos y libertades fundamentales, y puede fomentar la confianza, estimular la cooperaciön
entre los pueblos y contribuir a la paz y la segurldad intemacionales,
Advlrtiendo que la aplicacl6n a los crimenes de guerra y a los crimenes de lesa humanidad
de las nonnas de derecho interno relativas a la prescripciön de los delitos ordinarios susclta
grave preocupacl6n en la opiniön publica mundial, pues in^pide el enjuiciamiento y castigo de las
personas responsables de esos crimenes,
Reconoclendo que es necesario y oportuno af imar en derecho intemacional , por medio de la
presente Convenclön, el principio de la ünprescriptibilidad de los crimenes de guerra y de los
crimenes de lesa humanidad y asegurar sn aplicaclön universal,
Convienen en lo siguiente:
Artlculo I
Los crimenes siguientes son imprescriptibles , cualquiera que sea la fecha en que se hayan
cometido : , w^ ^ . ^
a) LOS crimenes de guerra segün la definici6n dada en el Estatuto del l^ibunal Militär
Inter;;acional de Nuremberg. de 8 de agosto de 191.5. y confinnada por las resoluciones de la
Asam.blea General de las Naciones Unidas 5 (D de 15 de febrero de 19«.6 y 95 (D de 11 de
diciembre de 19^.6, sobre todo las "infracciones graves" enumeradas en los Convenios de Ginebra
de 12 de agosto de 19»v9 para la protecciön de las vlctimas de la guerra;
-2-
b) Los crlmenes de lesa human idad cometidos tanto en tlempo de guerra como en tlempo de
paz, segün la definiclön dada en el Estatuto del Tribunal Militär Internacional de Nuremberg.
de 8 de agosto de 19^5 y confinnada por las resoluciones de la Asamblea General de las Naclones
Unldas 5 (I) de 15 de febrero de 191*6 y 95 (D de 11 de diciembre de 19^6, asl como la expulsiön
por ataque armado u ocupe.cl6n y los actos Inhumanos debidos a la polltlca de Apartheid y el
de]lto de genocldio deflnldo en la Convenciön de 19^8 pare la prevenclön y la sanclön del delito
de genocidlo aun si esos actos no constituyen una violaciön del derecho intemo del pais donde
fueron cometidos.
Artlculo II
Si se cometiere alguno de los crimenes mencionados en el artlculo I, las disposlciones de
la presente Convenciön se aplicarän a los representantes de la autoridad del Estedo y a los
partlculares que participen como autores o c&npllces o que inclten directamente a Is perpetra-
ci6n de alguno de esos crlmenes, o que conspiren para coneterlos, cualqulera que sea su grado
de desarrollo, asl como a los representantes de la autoridad del Estedo que toleren su
perpetrac i6n ,
Artlculo III
Los Estados Partes en la presente Convenclön se obllgan a adoptar todas las medldas
mtemas que sean necesarias, leglslativas o de cualquier otro orden. con el fin de hacer
poslble la extradlci6n, de conformldad con el derecho internacional, de las personas a que se.
refiere el artlculo II de la presente Convenciön.
Artlculo IV
Los Estados Partes en la presente Convenciön se ccmprometen a adoptar, con arreglo a sus
respectivos procedimientos constitucionales, las medldas leglslativas o de otra Indole que
fueran necesarias parr. que la prescripclön de la acciön penal o de la pena, estableclda por ley
o de otro modo, no se aplique a los crlmenes mencionados en los artlculos I y II de la presente
Convenciön y, en caso de que exista, sea abollda.
Artlculo V
La presente Convenciön estarfi ablerta hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1969 a la fima de todos
los Estados Miembros de las Naclones Unldas o mlembros de algän organlsmo especializado o del
Organismo Internacional de Energia Atömica. asl como de todo Estado Parte en el Estatuto de la
Corte Internacional de Justicia y de cualquier otro Estado Invltado por la Asamblea General de
las Naclones Unldas a ser parte en la presente Convenciön.
Artlculo VI
La presente Convenciön estÄ sujeta a ratiflcaclön y los Instrumentes de ratiflcaclön se
depositardn en poder del Secretario General de las Naclones Unldas.
-3-
Arttculo VII
La presente Convenciön quedaräl ablerta a le adheslön de cualqulera de los Estados mencio-
nados en el artlculo V. Los Instrumentes de adheslön se deposltardn en poder del Secretario
t
Genera] de las Naclones Unldas,
Artlculo VIII
1. La presente Convenci6n entrard en vlgor el nonag^slmo dla slgulente a la fecha en que haya
sldo deposltado en poder del Secretario General de las Naclones Unldas el d^clmo instrumento de
ratiflcaclön o de adheslön.
2. Para cada Estado que ratlflque la presente Convenciön o se adhlera a ella despu^s de haber
sldo deposltado el d^clmo instrumento de ratiflcaclön o de adheslön, la Convenciön entrard en
vlgor el nonag^simo dla slgulente a la fecha en que tal Estado haya deposltado su Instrumento
de ratiflcaclön o de adheslön,
Artlculo IX
1. Una vez transcurrido un perlodo de diez afios contado a partlr de la fecha en que entre en
vlgor la presente Convenciön, todo Estado parte podrä sollcitar en cualquier momento la revisiön
de la presente Convenciön medlante notiflcaclön por escrlto dlrigida al Secretario General de
las Naclones Unldas,
2, La Asamblea General de las Naclones Unldas decldlrd sobre las medldas que deban tomarse,
en SU oaso, respecto a tal solicltud.
Artlculo X
1. La presente Convenciön serd deposltada en poder del Secretario General de las Naclones
Unldas.
2. El Secretario General de las Naclones Unldas hard llegar coplas certiflcadas de la presente
Convenciön a todos los Estados mencionados en el artlculo V.
3. El Secretario General de las Naclones Unldas comunlcard a todos los Estados mencionados
en el artlculo V:
a) Las finnas puestas en la presente Convenciön y los Instrumentos de ratiflcaclön y
adheslön depositados confonne a las disposlciones de los artlculos V, VI y VII;
b) La fecha en que la presente Convenciön entre en vlgor conforme a lo dlspuesto en el
artlculo VIII;
c) Las comunicaciones reclbidas confonne a lo dlspuesto en el artlculo IX.
Artlculo XI
La presente Convenciön, cuyos textos en chlno, espanol, franc6s, inglds y ruso son Igual-
mente aut4ntlco8, llevarÄ la fecha 26 de novioabre de 1968.
EN FE DE LO CUAL, los suscritos , debidamente autorizados al efecto, han flrmado la
presente Convenciön.
FoR Afchamstan:
PouR l'Afghanistan:
3a A(t>raHHCTaH :
PoR EL Afganistan;
FoR Albania :
PouR l'Albanie:
3a Aji6aHHio:
PoR Albania:
FoR Algeria:
PouR l'Algerie:
3a AjiHCHp:
PoR Argelia:
FoR Arcentina:
PouR l'Arcentine:
3a ApreHTHHy:
Por LA Argentina:
FoR Australia:
Pour l'Australie:
3a ABcrpajiHio:
Por Australia:
FoR Austria:
Pour l'Autriche :
3a ABcxpHio:
Por Austria:
FoR Barbados :
Pour la Barbade :
3a Bap6affoc:
Por Barbados :
FoR Belgium :
Pour la Belgique:
3a BejibTHio:
Por Belgica :
FoR BoLiviA :
Pour la Bolivie
3a BojiHBHio:
Por Bolivia :
FoR Botswana :
PouR LE Botswana :
3a BoTCBany:
PoR Botswana :
Für Burma :
PouR LA Birmanie:
3a BHpMy:
PoR Birmania:
Für Brazil:
Polr lk Bresil:
3a Bpa3HJiHio:
PoK i:l Brasil:
Für Burundi :
PouR LE Burundi:
3a BypyHÄH:
PoR Burundi :
FoR BULGARIA !
PoUR LA BULGARIE
3a BojirapHio:
POR BULGARIA :
FoR THE Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic:
PouR LA Republique socialiste sovietique de Bielorussie:
3a BejiopyccKyio CoBexcKyn) CoiuiajiHCTHHecKyio FecnyÖJiHKy:
PoR LA Republica Socialista Sovietica de Bielorrusia:
M. TapaöaHOB
21 January 19691
r. HepHymeHKO
7 HHBapH 1969 r;
^M. Tarabanov
21 janvier 1969
IG. G. Tchernouchtchenko
7 January 1969
IG. G. Tchernouchtchenko
7 janvier 1969
FoR Cambodia :
PouR LE Cambodge:
mm:
3a KaM6oA^y:
PoR Camboya:
FoR Cameroon:
PoUR LE CaMEROUN
ir^^^i^:
3a KaMepyn:
PoR EL Camerun:
FoR C AN ADA:
PoLR LE Canada:
/JII "?: J< :
3a KaHa^y:
PoR EL CanadÄ:
FoR THE Central African Republic:
PouR LA Republique centrafricaine :
3a UeHxpajibHoacjipHKaHCKyio PecnyÖJiHKy:
PoR LA Replblica Centroafricana :
FoR Ceylon:
PoLR Ceylan:
3a I^eiijioH:
PoR Ceilän:
FoR Chad:
POL'R LE TCH AD :
3a Haff:
PoR EL Chad:
FoK Chile:
PotH LK Chili:
3a Mhjih:
\\)\\ Chilf:
Fou China:
Toi H \A Chink:
t|ili.\cl:
3a KHTaH:
IN>K China:
FoR Colombla:
PouR LA Colombie:
r.ffj[ülti!li:
3a KojiyMÖHio:
PoR Colombia:
FoR THE CoNCO (Brazzaville) :
PouR le Conco (Brazzaville) :
3a KoHro (Bpa33aBiuib):
PoR EL Conco (Brazzaville) :
FoR THE CoNGO (Democratic Republic of) :
Pour le Congo (Republique democratique du):
3a ÄeMOKpaTHMecKyio FecnyÖJiHKy Kohto:
PoR EL Conco (Republica Democratica de) :
FoR Costa Rica :
Pour le Costa Rica :
3a KocTa-Pincy:
PoR Costa Rica:
FoR CuBA :
POUR CUBA :
3a Ky6y:
PoR CuBA :
FoR Cyprus:
PouR Chypre:
3a Kimp:
PoR Chipre :
FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA :
PoUR LA TCHECOSLOVAQUIE :
3a HexocjioBaKHio:
PoR Checoslovaquia:
FoR Dahomey :
PouR L£ Dahomey :
•-
[S1IIJ
3a ^aroMeio:
PoR EL Dahomey:
FoR Denmark :
PouR L£ Danemark :
3a JaHHio:
PoR Dinamarca :
FoR THE Dominican Repubuc:
PouR LA Republique Dominicaine :
3a AoMHHHicaHCKyK) PecnySjimcy:
PoR LA Republica Dominicana:
FoR Ecuador:
PouR l'Equateur:
3a ^KBEAcp:
PoR EL Ecuador:
FoR El Salvador:
PouR El Salvador:
3a CajibBaAop:
PoR El Salvador:
For Equatorial Guinea:
PoUR LA GUINEE EQUATORLiLE :
3a 3KBaTopHajibHyio FsHMeio:
PoR Guinea Ecuatorial:
FoR Ethiopia :
PouR l'Ethiopie:
3a 34>HonHio:
PoR Etiopia :
Für THE Federal Republic of Germany:
PoUR LA RePUBLIQUE FEDERALE d'AlLEMAGNE:
3a 4>eAepaTHBHyK) FecnyöJiHKy repMaiuiH:
PoR LA Repüblica Federal DE Alemania:
For Finland:
PouR LA Finlande:
3a ^HHJiJiHAHio:
PoR Finlandia:
FoR Fkancb:
Poim LA Fiiance:
PoR FmANCu:
FoR Gabon :
PouR LE Gabon :
3r FrSoh:
PoR EL Gabon :
Für Gambia:
PouR LA Gambie:
3a FanCMw:
PoR Gambu:
I
I
Für Ghana :
PoUR LE Ghana :
3a rany:
PoR Ghana:
Für Greece :
PouR LA Grece :
3a rpemuo:
PoR Grecia :
FoR Guatemala :
PouR LE Guatemala :
3a rBaxeniajiy:
PoR Guatemala :
FoR Guinea :
POUR LA GUINEE :
3a rBHHeio:
PoR Guinea :
FoR Guyana:
PouR LA Guyane:
3a FBRany:
PoR Guyana:
FoR Haiti :
PouR Haiti :
3a TaHTH:
PoR Haiti :
I
I
I
I
FoR THE HoLY See:
PouR LE Saint-Siege:
3a CHHTettiuHÜ npecroji:
PoR LA Santa Sede:
FoR Honduras :
PouR LE Honduras :
3a roHAypac:
PoR Honduras :
FoR Hungary :
PouR LA Hongrie :
3a BeHrpHio:
PorHungria:
Käroly Csatorday
New York, March 25, 1969
FoR Iceland:
PouR l'Islande:
3a HcjiaHAHio:
PoR Islandia:
FoR Iran :
PouR lIran:
3a HpaH:
PoR EL Iran:
FoR India :
PouR l'Inde:
mit:
3a Hhahio:
PoR LA India :
FoR Iraq :
PouR lIrak :
3a HpaK:
PoR EL Irak:
FoR Indonesia :
PouR l'Indonesie :
3a HHAoneaHio:
ForIndonesu:
FoR Ireland:
PouR l'Irlande:
3a HpjiaiiAHH>:
PoR Irlanda :
FoR Israel:
PouR Israel :
3a Hapaiuib:
PoR Israel:
FoR Jamaica :
PouR LA JamaIque :
3a flMafticy:
PoR Jamaica :
FoR Italy :
PouR lItaue:
3a HTaJDDo:
PoR Italu :.
FoR Japan :
PouR le Japon :
3a HnoHHio:
PoR EL Japon :
FoR THE IVORY COAST:
PouR LA Cote-d'Ivoire :
3a Eeper CjiohoboA Kocm
PoR LA Costa de Marhl:
FoR Jordan :
PouR LA Jordanie:
3a HopAaüHio:
POR JORDANIA :
(
FoR Kenya:
PouR LE Kenya:
3a KeuHio:
PoR Kenia:
FoR Lebanon :
PoUR LE LiBAN :
3a JiHBaH:
POR EL LiSANO :
FoR Kuwait:
PouR LE Koweit:
>/j
3a KyBeAT:
PoR Kuwait:
FoR Lesotho :
PouR LE Lesotho :
mmn:
3a JlecoTo:
PoR Lesotho :
FoR I Jios :
PouR LE Laos :
mm:
3a Jlaoc:
PoR Laos :
FoR Liberia:
PouR LE Liberia:
3a JlHÖepHio:
PoR Liberia :
I
i
FOR LlBYA :
POUR LA LiBYE :
flJltSg:
3a JIhbmio:
POR LiBIA :
FoR Madacascar:
PouR Madacascar:
3a MAflßncMMp:
PoR Madacascar :
FoR Dechtenstein :
PouR LE Liechtenstein:
3a JlHXTeiiiiiTeftH:
PoR Liechtenstein:
FoR Mazjiwi:
PouR LE Malawi:
3a BlajiaBH:
PoR Malawi:
I
FoR LUXEMBOURC:
PouR LS LuxBMBorac:
3a JIioicoeai6ypr:
POR LUXSMBUIIGO:
FoR Malaysia:
PouR LA Malaisie:
3a MajuiftcKyio 4^Aepai|Hio
PoR Malasu:
I
I
FOR THE MaLDIVE ISLANDS:
POUR LES ILES MaLDIVES:
3a MajibAHBCKHe ocrposa:
POR LAS ISLAS MaLDIVAS:
FoR M AURITANIA :
PouR LA Mauritanie :
3a MaBpHTaimo:
PorMavritanu:
FoR Mali:
PouR LE Mali:
mm:
3a MajiH:
PoR Mali:
FoR Mauritius:
PouR Maurice:
3a MaBpmcHft:
PoR Mauricio:
I
FoR Malta:
PouR Malte:
3a MajDbTy:
PoR Malta:
FoR Mexico :
PouR LE Mexique :
3a MeKcmcy:
PoR Mexico :
fi
ü
.1
FoR Monaco:
PouR Monaco:
3a MoHaKo:
PoR Monaco:
FoR Nepal :
PouR LE Nepal:
3a Henaji:
PoR Nepal:
FoR Mongolia :
PouR LA Moncolie :
^ tJ •
3a MoHTOJiHio:
PoR Mongolu :
FoR THE Netherlands:
PouR LES Pays-Bas:
3a HH^ep JiaHABi :
PoR LOS PaIses Bajos :
M. DUGERSUREN
31/1/69
FoR MoROCCo :
PouR LE Maroc:
3a MapoKKo:
PoR Marruecos :
FoR New Zealand:
PoUR LA NoUVELLE-ZeLANDE
mm m :
3a HoByio 3ejiaHAHio:
PoR NuEVA Zelandia :
i
I
FoR Nicaragua :
PouR L£ Nicaragua :
3a HMKaparya:
PoR Nicaragua ;
FoR Norwa Y :
FoURLANORViCE:
3m Hopaenno:
PoR Noruega:
i
I
1
FoR THE Niger :
Pour le Niger :
3a ÜHrep:
FoR EL Niger :
FoR Pakistan:
Pour le Pakistan :
3a naKHcran:
PoR EL Paquistan:
FoR NiGERU :
Pour la Nigeria:
3a HnrepHio:
POR NiGERU :
»«
I
FoR Panama:
Pour le Panama
3a IlaHaMy:
PoR Panama :
1
FoR Paraguay :
PoüR LE Paraguay
3a üaparsaft:
PoR EL Paraguay :
FoR Poland:
PouR LA Polocne:
mm:
3a Ilojiuuy:
PoR Polonia:
B. TOMORÜWICZ
Dec. 16th 1968
I
FoR Peru :
Pouft LE Perou :
3a Ilepy:
PoR EL Peru :
FoR Portugal:
PouR LE Portugal:
Ä^:5p:
3a nopryrajiHio:
PoR Portugal:
FoR THE Philippines :
PouR LES Philippines:
>«
3a 4^HJiHiiimHBi:
POR FiLIPINAS :
FoR THE Repubuc of Korea :
PoUR LA RePUBLIQUE DE COREE :
3a KopeikcKyio Pecnyftjimcy:
POR LA RePUBUCA DE COREA :
FoR THE Repubuc of Vi£t-Nam :
PouR LA Republique DU Viet-Nam :
3a PecnyÖJiHKy BberHaM:
PoR LA Repübuca de Viet-Nam:
FoR San Marino:
PouR Saint-Marin:
3a CaH-MapHHo:
PoR San Marino:
FoR ROMANIA :
PoUR LA ROUMANIE :
3a PyMbiHHio:
POR RUMANIA :
FoR Saudi Arabia :
PouR l'Arabie Saoudite :
3a CayAOBCKyio ApaaHio:
PoR Arabu Saudita :
G. DiACONESCU
17 April 1969
Für Rwanda :
PouR LE Rwanda :
3a Pyaiwy:
PoR Rwanda :
> *
FoR Senegal:
PouR LE Senegal:
3a GeHeraji:
PoR EL Senegal:
f
FoR Sierra Leone:
PouR LE Sierra Leone:
3a Cbeppa-JIeoHe :
PoR Sierra Leona:
FoR South Africa :
Pour l'Afrique du Sud :
3a lOxayto A^^pncy:
POR SUDAFUCA :
I
i
I
FoR Sing A PORE :
Pour Sing a pour:
3a GHHranyp:
PoR Singapur:
FoR Southern Yemen :
Pour le Y£men du Sud :
^-t&P^:
3a H)xciiBiä HeMen:
PoR EL Yemen Meridional:
FoR Somalia :
Pour la Somalie:
3a GoMajiH:
PoR Somalia:
;•*
ForSpain:
Pour l^Espagne :
3a HcnaHHio:
PoR EsPAftA :
i*
I
FoR THE Sudan :
POUR L£ SOUDAN :
3a CyAftH:
PoR KL Sudan:
FOR S WITZERLAND:
PoUR LA SUISSE :
3a niBeftiiapHio:
PoR Suiza:
FoR Swaziland:
PouR Souaziland:
PoR Swazilandia:
3a CBaaHJieHA:
FoR Syria:
PouR LA Syrie :
3a CnpHio:
PoR SnuA :
n
FOR SWEDEN :
PoUR LA SutDE :
3a IIlRei|HM>:
PoR SUECIA :
FoR Thailand:
PouR LA ThaIlande :
3a TaHJiaiiA:
PoR Tailandia :
I
FoR Togo :
PouR LE Togo
3a Toro:
PoR EL Togo :
FoR Turkey:
PouR LA Turquie :
3a TypipiH):
PoR TüRQUIA :
FoR Trinidad and Tobago :
PoUR LA TrINITE ET ToBAGO :
3a TpHHHAaA h To6aro:
PoR Trinidad y Tabago:
FoR Uganda :
PoLR l'Ouganda:
3a yraHfly:
PoR Uganda :
FoR Tunisia :
PouR LA Tunisie :
3a TsTHHc:
PoR Tunez :
FoR THE Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic :
PouR LA Republique socialiste sovietique d'Ukraine:
3a yKpaHHCKyio CoseTCKyio CouHa.iHcxMHecKyio PecnyÖJiHKy:
PoR LA Republica Socialista Sovietica de Ucrania:
M. IIOJIHHHHKG
14.1. 19691
^M. D. POLYANICHKO
14/1/69
^M. D. POLYANITCHKO
14/1/69
FoR THE Union of Soviet Socialist Repubucs :
PouR l'Union des Republiques socialistes sovietiques:
3a C0103 CoBercKHx GoipiajiHCTHMecKHx PecnyÖJimc:
PoR LA Union de Repüblicas Sociaustas Sovieticas :
FoR THE United Repubuc of Tanzanu:
PouR LA Republique-Unie DE Tanzanie:
3a 06i>ej[VHHeHHyio PecnyfijiHKy TaH3aH
PoR LA Republica Unida DE Tanzanu:
H. MajiHK
6. 1. 69 '
FoR THE United Arab Republic :
PoUR LA RePUBLIQUE ARABE UNIE :
3a Oö'beAHHeHHyio ApaöcKyio PecnyÖJimcy
PoR LA Republica Arabe Unida :
FoR THE United States of America:
PouR LES Etats-Unis d' Amerique :
3a CoeffHHeHHBie UlTaxBi ÄMepmcH:
PoR LOS Estados Unidos de America :
FoR THE United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d^Irlande du Nord:
3a GoeAHHeHHoe KopojieBCTBO BejiHKOÖpBxairaH h CeBepHoft HpjiaHffHH
POR EL ReINO UnIDO DE GrAN BrETANA £ IrL ANDA DEL NORTE :
FoR THE Upper Volta :
PoüR LA Haute- Volta:
3a BepxHK>io BojDbTy:
PoR EL Alto Volta :
^Y. A. Malik
6.1.69
^Y. A. Malik
6.1.69
FoR Uruguay :
PouR l'Urucua Y :
3a ypjTTBaft:
PoR EL Uruguay :
FoR Yemen :
PouR L£ Yemen:
3a HemeH:
PoR EL Yemen :
I
FoR Venezuela :
PouR le Venezuela:
3a BenecydJiy:
PoR Venezuela :
FoR Yugosla vu :
PouR LA Yougoslavie :
3a H)rocjiaBHH>:
POR YUGOSLAVU:
FoR Western Samoa:
PouR LE Samoa-Occidental :
3a 3anaAHoe GaMoa:
PoR Samoa OccroENXAL:
FoR Zambu:
PouR LA Zambie:
3a 3aM6HH>:
PoR Zambu:
Anton Vratusa
Dec. 16, 1968
• I hereby certify that ihe foregoing text is a true
copy of the Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity, adopted by tlie General
Assembly of the United Nations on 26 November
1968, the original of which is deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Je certifie que le texte qui precede est la copie
conforme de la Convention sur Tiinprescriptibi-
lite des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre Thu-
manite, adoptee par TAssemblee generale des
Nations Unies, le 26 novembre 1968, dont le texte
original est depose aupres du Secretaire general
des Nations Unies.
For the Secretary-General,
The Legal Counsel:
Poiir le Secretaire generale
Le Conseiller juridique:
United Nations, New York
14 May 1969
Organisation des Nations Unies, New York
le 14 mai 1969
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V
NAZI CONSPIRACY
AND AGGRESSION
Opinion and Judgment
Office of United States
Chief of Counsel for Prosecution
of Axis Criminality
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United States Government I^intinc Office
Washington : 1947
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FOR Säle by the
SUPEEIINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
U. S. Gm^ERNMENT Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C.
Price 45 Cents (Papek)
$1.25 BUCKRÄM
The United States of America, the French Republic, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Kepublics
— against —
Hermann Wilhelm Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Eibbentrop,
Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Eosen-
bcrg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter Funk,
Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Karl
Doenitz, Erich Eaeder, Baidur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred
Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Artur Seyss-Inquart,
Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath, and Hans Fritzsche, Indi-
vidually and as Members of Any of the Following Groups or
Organizations to Which They Respectively Belonged, Namely:
Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet) ; Das Korps Der Politischen
Leiter Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei
(Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party) ; Die Schutzstaffehi Der
Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (commonly
known as the "SS") and including Die Sicherheitsdienst (commonly
known as the "SD") ; Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State
Police, commonly known as the "Gestapo") ; Die Sturmabteilungen
Der N. S. D. A. P. (commonly known as the "SA") and the General
Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces are as
defined in Appendix B of the Indictment,
Defendants.
II
III
ä
CONTENTS
Page
JUDGMENT 1
The Charter Provisions 3
The Nazi Ee^me in Germany *
The Common Plan of Conspiracy and Aggressive War— 16
Violations of International Treaties 46
The Law as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy — 54
War Crimes and Crimes against Hiimanity 56
The Accused Organizations ^^— ^ 84
The Accused Individuais 1^7
DISSENTING OPINION 166
The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Schacht 166
The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant von Papen 172
The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Fritzsche 175
Concerning the Scntence of the Defendant Rudolf Hess- 178
Incorrect Judgmcnt with Regard to the Reich Cabinet— 180
Incorrect Judgmeiit with Regard to the Geneml Staff
and High Command and the OKW ; — — 183
THE SENTENCES 189
P
\y
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
Nürnberg, Germany
LORD JUSTICE LAW^RENCE, Member f or the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, President
MR. JUSTICE BIRKETT, Alternate Member
MR. FRANCIS BIDDLE, Member f or the United States of America
JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER, Alternate Member
M. LE PROFESSEUR DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, Member for
the French Republic
M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO, Alternate Member
MAJOR GENERAL I. T. NIKITCHENKO, Member for the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
LIEUTENANT COLONEL A. F. VOLCHKOV, Alternate Member
PROSECUTION COUNSEL
Chief Prosecutor for the United States of America :
Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson
Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland :
H. M. Attomey-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, K. C,
M.P.
Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic :
M. Francois de Menthon
M. Auguste Champetier de Ribes
Chief Prosecutor for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics :
General R. A. Rudenko
II
f
I
II
DEFENDANTS AND DEFENSE COUNSEL
Individual Dcfcndanta Counscl
Gocring Hermann Wilhelm Dr. Otto Stahmer
ooci uifc. 111 ■"" Dr. Guenther von Bohrscheldt
Hess. Rudolf ^^^ g February 1916)
Dr. Alfred SeiUl
(from 5 February 1946)
von Blbb3,.trop. Joacblm ^'(.fHa^nC 1046)
Dr. Martin Hörn
(from 5 January 1&46)
, ,,T.„ . Dr. Otto Nelte
Keltol, Wilhelm—- Kauffmann
Kaltenbrunncr Ernst D__ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^
Ilosenberg, Alfred ^^ ^^^^^ ^^.^^
Frank Hans Pannenbecker
Frick Wilhelm ^^^^^
Streicher ^lins ^^^^ ^^^^^^
Funk, Walter ^^ ^^^^^^^ j,,^
Schacht, HJalmar Flottenrichter Otto Kranzbuehler
Doenitz. Karl ^^ ^^^^^ g^^^^^^
Raeder Er.ch—- g^^^^^
von Schirach..BaWur ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
Sauckel Fr.tz — ^^^^^^^^^ ^^ p^anz Exner
jodl, Alfred Dr. Friedrich Bergold
Bormann. Martin Rubuschok
Von Papen, Franz ^^ ^^^^^ steinbauer
Seyss-Inquart ^^ ^^^^^ Flaechsner
Speer. Albert .——-- Freiherr Ton Luedingbausen
von Neurath Constantin J O^^^^ ^^^^^
Fritzsche, Hans
GroMp.s and Organizations Counse
, . . Dr. Egon Kubuschok
J:itr2 ;S;p;'örN;;rra;T;"~:::: d. Robert servatius
sT%:iuLsta;en) and SD (Sicher- Dr. --ig^B-1 _^^_^
heitsdienst). Dr! Hans Gawlik
SA (Sturmabteilung) ^^- ^"■'S Boebm
^ ^ Dr. Martin Loeffler
Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei) Dr. Rudolf Merkel
Serri Staff and High Command of the Dr. Hans Laternser
German Armed Forces.
vi
JUDGMENT
On the 8th August 1945 the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United
States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Eepub-
lic, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
entered into an Agreement establishing this Tribunal for the trial of
war criminals whose offenses have no particular geographica! location.
In accordance with Article 5, the foUowing Governments of the
United Nations have expressed their adherence to the agreement:
Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czcchoslovakia,
Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway,
Panama, Luxemburg, Haiti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela,
Uruguay, and Paraguay.
By the Charter annexed to the agreement, the Constitution, Juris-
diction, and f unctions of the Tribunal were defined.
The Tribunal was invested with power to try and punish persons
who had committed erimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity as defined in the charter.
The Charter also provided that at the trial of any individual member
of any group or Organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection
with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group
or Organization of which the individual was a member was a criminal
Organization.
In Berlin, on the 18th October 1945, in accordance with Article 14
of the Charter, an indictment was lodged against the defendants
named in the caption above, who had been designated by the Com-
mittee of the Chief Prosecutors of the signatory powers as major war
criminals.
A copy of the indictment in the German langiiage was served upon
each defendant in custody at least 30 days before the trial opened.
This indictment charges the defendants with crimes against peace
by the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of ag-
gression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties,
agreements, and assurances; with war crimes; and with crimes against
humanity. The defendants are also charged with participating in
the f ormulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to com-
mit all these crimes. The Tribunal was f urther asked by the prosecu-
1
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tion to declare all the named groups or organizations to be crimiiial
within the meaning of the charter.
The defendant Robert Ley committed suicide in prison on the 25th
October 1945. On the 15th November 1945 the Tribunal decided that
the defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach could not then
be tried because of his physical and mental condition, but that the
charges against him in the indictment should be retained for trial
thereafter^ if the physical and mental condition of the defendant
should permit. On the I7th November 1945 the Tribunal decided to
try the defendant Bormann in his absence under the provisions of
article 12 of the charter. After argument, and consideration of füll
medical reports, and a Statement from the defendant himself, the
Tribunal decided on the Ist December 1945 that no grounds existed
for a postponement of the trial against the defendant Hess becauße of
his mental condition. A similar decision was made in the case of tho
defendant Streicher.
In accordance with Articles 16 and 23 of the Charter, counsel were
either chosen by the defendants in custody themselves, or at their
request were appointed by the Tribunal. In his absence the Tribunal
appointed counsel for the defendant Bormann, and also assigned
counsel to represent the named groups or organizations.
The trial which was conducted in four languages— English, Rus-
sian, French, and German— began on the 20th November 1945, and
plea's of "Not guilty" were made by all the defendants except Bor-
mann.
The hcaring of evidence and the Speeches of counsel concluded on
31 August 1946. ,^
Four hundred and three open sessions of the Tribunal have been
held; 33 witnesses gave evidence orally for the prosecution against
the iiidividual defendants, and 61 witnesses, in addition to 19 of the
defendants, gave evidence for the defense. )
A f urther 143 witnesses gave evidence for the defense by means of
written answers to interrogatories.
The Tribunal appointed commissioners to hear evidence relating to
the oiganizations, and 101 witnesses were heard for the defense bef ore
the commissioners, and 1,809 affidavits from other witnesses were
submitted. Six reports were also submitted, summarizing the Contents
of a great number of f urther affidavits.
Thirty-eight thousand affidavits, signed by 155,000 people, were
sublnitted oTHteMTof the Poirtical Leaders, 136,213 on behalf of the
"iS^TipÖO on behalf of the SA, 7,000 on behalf of the SD, 3,000 on
behalf of the General Staff and OKW, and 2,000 on behalf of the
Gestapo. ^^^*^^
The Tribunal itself heard 22 witnesses for the organizations. ^ The
dociiments tendered in evidence for the prosecution of the individual
)
defendants and the organizations nunibered several thousands. A
complete Stenographie record of everything said in court has been
made, as well as an electrical recording of all the proceedings.
Copies of all the documents put in evidence by the prosecution have
been supplied to the defense in the German language. Tlie applica-
tions made by the defendants for the production of witnesses and
documents raised serious problems in some instances, on account of
the unsettled State of the country. It was also necessary to limit the
^ number of witnesses to be called, in order to have an expeditious hear-
ing, in accordance with Article 18 (c) of the Charter. The Tribunal,
after examination, granted all those applications which in its
opinion were relevant to the defense of any defendant or named group
or Organization, and were not cumulative. Facilities were provided for
obtaining those witnesses and documents granted through the office of
the General Secretary established by the Tribunal.
Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal on behalf of the
prosecution was documentary evidence, captured by the Allied armies
in German Army headquarters, Government buildings, and elsewhere.
Some of the documents were f ound in salt mines, buried in the ground,
hidden behind f alse walls, and in other places thought to be secure from
discovery. The case, therefore, against the defendants rests in a
large measure on documents of their own making, the authenticity of
which has not been challenged except in one or two cases.
1. THE CHARTER PROVISIONS
The individual defendants are indicted under Article 6 of the
Charter, which is as f oUows :
"Article 6. The Tribunal established by the agreement ref erred
to in article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major
war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power
to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the
European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members
of organizations, committed any of the f ollowing crimes :
"The following acts, or any of them, are crimes Coming within
the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility.
"(a) Crimes against peace: Namely, planning, preparation,
Initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation
of international treaties, agi'eements, or assurances, or participa-
tion in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any
of the foregoing.
"(b) War crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs
of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, mur-
der, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
iii
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purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder
or ill-treatmeiit of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing
of hostages, pluiider of public or private property, wanton de-
stniction of eitles, towns, or villages, or devastation not justiöed
by military necessity. •
"(c) Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
niitted against any civilian population, beforo or during the war,
or pcrsecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execu-
tion of or in connection with any crime within the Jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated.
"Leaders, Organizers, instigators, and accomplices participatmg
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the f oregoing crimes are responsible^ f or all. acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan."
These provisions are binding upon the Tribunal as the law to be
applied to the case. The Tribunal will \ater discuss them in more
detail ; but, bef ore doing so, it is necessary to review the f acts. For
the purpose of showing the background of the aggressive war and war
crimes charged in the indictment, the Tribunal will begin by reviewing
some of the events that foUowed the First World War, and in paiticu-
lar by tracing the growth of the Nazi Party under Hitler's leader-
ship to a Position of supreme power from which it controlled the des-
tiny of the whole German people, and paved the way for the alleged
commission of all the crimes charged against the defendants.
ir. THE NAZI REGIME IN GERMANY
(A) Tue Origin and Ams of the Nazi Party
On 5 January 1919, not 2 months after the conclusion of the Armis-
tice which ended the First World War, and 6 months before the sign-
ing of the peace treaties at Versailles, there came into bemg in Ger-
many a small political party called the German Labor Party. On the
12th September 1919, Adolf Hitler became a member of this party,
and at the first public meeting held in Munich, on 24 February 1920, he
announccd the party's program. That program, which remained un-
altered until the party was dissolved in 1945, consisted of 25 points, of
which the following 5 are of particular interest on account of the
light they throw on the matters with which the Tribunal is con-
cerned ;
«Point 1. We dcmand the unification of all Germans in the
Greater Germany, on the basis of the right of self-detcrmination
ofpeoples. . '
»4
"Point 2. Wo demand equality of rights for the German people
in respect to the other nations; abrogation of the peäce treaties
of Versailles and St. Germain.
"Point 3. We demand land and territory for the sustenance of
our people, and the colonization of our surplus population.
"Point 4. Only a member of the race can be a Citizen. A mem-
ber of the race can only be one who is of German blood, without
consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member
of the race . . .
"Point 22. We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and
formation of a national army." ^
Of these aims, the one which seems to have been regarded as the
most important, and which figured in almost every public speech, was
the removal of the "disgrace" of the Armistice, and the restrictions of
the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. In a typical speech
at Muuich on the 13th April 1923, for example, Hitler said with regard
to the Treaty of Versailles :
"The treaty was made in order to bring twenty million Germans
to their deaths, and to ruin the German nation ... At its foun-
dation our movement formulated three demands.
"1. Setting aside of the Peace Treaty.
"2. Unification of all Germans.
"3. Land and soil to f eed our nation."
The demand for the unification of all Germans in the Greater Ger-
many was to play a large part in the events preceding the seizure of
Austria and Czechoslovakia ; the abrogation of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles was to become a decisive motive in attempting to justify the
policy of the German Government ; the demand for land was to be
the justification for the acquisition of "living space" at the expense
of other nations ; the expulsion of the Jews from membership of the
race of German blood was to lead to the atrocities against the Jewish
people ; and the demand for a national army was to result in measures
of rearmament on the largest possible scale, and ultimately to war.
On the 29th July 1921, the party wliich had changed its name to
National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP) was re-
organized, Hitler becoming the fii-st "Chairman." It was in this
year that the Sturmabteilung or SA was f ounded, with Hitler at its
head, as a private paramilitary force, which allegedly was to be used
for the purpose of protecting NSDAP leaders from attack by rival
political parties, and preserving order at NSDAP meetings, but in
reality was used for fighting political opponents on the streets. In
March 1923, the defendant Goering was appointed head of the SA.
The procedure within the party was governed in the most absolute
way by the "leadership principle" (Fuehrerprinzip).
li
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■iia. li^yipy
According to the principle, each Fuehrer has the right to govern,
administer, or decree, subject to no control of any kind and at bis
complote discretion, subject only to the Orders he received from above.
This principle applied in the first instance to Hitler himself as
the leader of the party, and in a lesser degree to all other party of-
ficials. All members of the party swore an oath of "eternal alle-
>
giance" to the leader.
There were only two ways in which Germany coiild achieve the three
main aims above-mentioncd— by negotiation or by force. The 25
points of the NSDAP program do not specifically mention the
methods on which the leaders of the party proposed to rely, but the
history of the Nazi regime shows that Hitler and bis followers were
only prepared to negotiate on the terms that their demands were con-
ceded, and that force would be used if they were not.
On the night of the 8th November 1923, an abortive putsch took
place in Munich. Hitler and some of bis followers burst into a meet-
ing in the Buergeibraeu Cellar, which was being addressed by the
Bavarian Prime Minister Kahr, with the intention of obtaining from
him a decision to march forthwith on Berlin. On the morning of the
9th November, however, no Bavarian support was forthcoming, and
Hitler's demonstration was met by the armed f orces of the Reichswehr
and the police. Only a f ew volleys were fired ; and af ter a dozen of
his followers had been killed, Hitler fled for bis life, and the demon-
stration was over. The def endants Streicher, Frick, and Hess all took
part in the attempted rising. Hitler was later tried for high treason,
and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. The SA was out-
lawed. Hitler was released from prison in 1924 and in 1925 the
Schutzstaffel, or SS, was created, nominally to act as his personal
bodyguard, but in reality to terrorize political opponents. This was
also the year of the publication of "Mein Kampf", containmg the
pohtical Views and aims of Hitler, which came to be regarded as the
authentic source of Nazi doctrine.
(B) Tue Seizure of Power
In the 8 y^ars that f ollowed the publication of "Mein Kampf", the
NSDAP ^reatly extended its activities throughout Germany, paymg
particular attention to the training of youth in the ideas of National
Socialism. The first Nazi youth Organization had come mto existence
in 1922, but it was in 1925 that the Hitler Jugend was officially recog-
nized by the NSDAP. In 1931 Baidur von Schirach, who had jomed
the NSDAP in 1925, became Reich youth leader of the NSDAP.
The party exerted every effort to win political support from the
German people. Elections were contested both for the Reichstag and
the Landtage. The NSDAP leaders did not make any serious attempt
to hide the fact that their only purpose in entcring German political
life was in order to destroy the democratic structure of the Weimar
Republic, and to Substitute for it a National Socialist totalitarian
regime which would enable them to carry out their avowed policies
without Opposition. In preparation for the day when he would ob-
tain power in Gei-many, Hitler in January 1929 appointed Heinrich
Himmler as Reichsfuehrer SS with the special task of building the
SS into a strong but elite group which would be dependable in all cir-
cumstances.
On the 30th January 1983, Hitler succeeded in being appointed
Chancellor of the Reich by President von Hindenburg. The defend-
ants Goering, Schacht, and von Papen were active in enlisting sup-
port to bring this about. Von Papcn had been appointed Reich
Chancellor on the Ist June 1932. On the 14th June he rescinded the
decree of the Bruening Cabinet of the 13th April 1932, which had
dissolved the Nazi paramilitary organizations, including the SA and
SS. This was done by agreement between Hitler and von Papen,
although von Papen denies that it was agreed as early as the 28th May,
as Dr. Hans Volz asserts in "Dates from the History of the NSDAP" ;
but that it was the result of an agreement was admitted in evidence
by von Papen.
The Reichstag elections of the 31st July 1932 resulted in a great
accession of strength to the NSDAP, and von Papen offered Hitler
the post of Vice Cliancellor, which he refused, insisting upon the
Chancellorship itself. In November 1932 a petition signcd by lead-
ing industrialists and financiers was presented to President Hinden-
burg, calling upon him to entrust the Chancellorship to Hitler ; and
in the collection of signatures to the petition Schacht took a prominent
part.
The election of the Gth November, which followed the defeat of the
Government, reduced the number of NSDAP members, but von Papen
made further efforts to gain Hitler's participation, without success.
On the 12th November Schacht wrote to Hitler:
"I have no doubt that the present development of things can
only lead to your becoming Chancellor. It seems as if our attempt
to collect a number o^ signatures from business circles for this
purpose was not altogether in vain * * * '>
After Hitler's refusal of the 16th November, von Papen resigned,
and was succeeded by General von Schleicher ; 'but von Papen still
continued his activities. He met Hitler at the house of the Cologne
banker von Schroeder on the 4th January 1933, and attcnded a meeting
at the defendant Ribbentrop's house on the 22d January, with the de*^
fendant Goering and others. He also had an interview with President
Hindenburg on the 9th January, and from the 22d January onward
he discussed officially with Hindenburg the formation of a Hitler
Cabinet.
11
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Hitler hold his first Ciibinet mecüng oii the day of his appomtment
as Chancellor, at wlüch the defeiidants Goering, Frick, Funk, von
Neurath, and von Papen ^Yere present in their official capacities. Un
the 2Sth February 1933, the Reichstag building in Berlin was set on
firc This fire was used by Hitler and his Cabinet as a pretext for
passing on the same day a decree suspending the constitutional
guarantces of f reedom. The decree was signed by President Hmden-
burg and countersigncd by Hitler and the defendant Frick, who then
occupied the post of Reich Minister of the Interior. On the 5th March,
elections were held, in which the NSDAP obtained 288 seats of the
total of 647. The Hitler Cabinet was anxious to pass an Enablmg
Act" that would give them füll legislative powers, including the
power to deviate f rom the Constitution. They were without the neces-
sary majority in the Reichstag to be able to do this constitutionally.
They theref ore made use of the decree suspending the guarantees of
freedom and took into so-called protective custody a large numbcr
of Communist deputies and party officials. Having done this, Hitler
introduced the ''Enabling Act" into the Reichstag, and after he had
made it clear that if it was not passed, f urther forcef ul measures would
be taken, the act was passed on the 24th March 1933.
(C) The Consolidation of Power
The NSDAP, having achieved power in this way, now proceeded
to extend its hold on every phase of German life. Other political par-
ties were persecuted, their property and assets confiscated, and many
of their menibers placed in conccntration camps. On 26 April 1933,
the defendant Goering founded in Prussia the Geheime Staatspolizei,
or Gestapo as a secret police, and confided to the deputy leader of the
Gestapo that its main task was to eliminate political opponents of
National Socialism and Hitler. On the 14th July 1933, a law was
passed declaring the NSDAP to be the only political party, and mak-
ing it criminal to maintain or form any other political party.
In Order to place the complete control of the machinery of Govern-
ment in the hands of the Nazi leaders, a series of laws and decrees were
passed which reduced the powers of regional and local govcrnmentg
throughout Germany, transforming them into subordmate divisions
of the Government of the Reich. Representative assemblies m the
Laender were abolished, and with them all local elections. The Gov-
ernment then proceeded to secure control of the Civil Service. This
was achieved by a process of centralization, and by a ^^f^f^^J^p^ß
of the whole Civil Service administration. By a law of the 7th April
it was provided that officials "who were of non-Aryan descent' should
be retired; and it was also decreed that "officials who because of their
previous political activity do not offer security that they will exert
theinselves for the national state without reservation shall be dis-
8
charged." The law of the llth April 1933 provided for the discharge
of "all Civil Servants who belong to the Communist Party." Simi-
larly, the Judiciary was subjected to control. Judges were removed
f rom the bench for political or racial reasons. They were spied upon
and made subject to the strongest pressure to join the Nazi Party as
an alternative to being dismissed. When the Supreme Court acquitted
three of the four def endants charged with complicity in the Reichstag
fire, its Jurisdiction in cases of treason was thereafter taken away and
given to a newly established "People's Court," consisting of two judges
and five officials of the party. Special courts were set up to try political
crimes and only party members were appointed as judges. Persons
were arrested by the SS for political reasons, and detained in prisons
and concentration camps; and the judges were without power to inter-
vene in any way. Pardons were granted to members of the party who
had been sentenced by the judges for proved offenses. In 1935 several
officials of the Hohenstein concentration camp were convicted of in-
flicting brutal treatment upon the inmates. High Nazi officials tried
to influence the court, and after the officials had been convicted, Hitler
pardoned them all. In 1942 "Judges' letters" were sent to all German
judges by the Government, instructing them as to the "general lines"
that they must f ollow.
In their determination to remove all sources of Opposition, the
NSDAP leaders turned their attention to the trade unions, the
churches, and the Jews. In April 1933 Hitler ordered the late de-
fendant Ley, who was then staff director of the political Organization
of the NSDAP, "to take over the trade unions." Most of the trade
unions of Germany were joined together in two large federations,
the "Free Trade Unions" and the "Christian Trade Unions." Unions
outside these two large federations contained only 15 percent of the
total Union membership. On the 21st April 1933, Ley issued an
NSDAP directive announcing a "coordination action" to be carried
out pn the 2nd May against the Free Trade Unions. The directive
ordered that SA and ÖS men were to be employed in the planned "oc-
cupation of trade union properties and for the taking into protective
custody of Personalities who come into question." At the conclusion
of the action the official NSDAP press Service reported that the Na-
tional Socialist Factory Cells Organization had "eliminated the old
leadership of Free Trade Unions" and taken over the leadership thein-
selves. Similarly, on the 3d May 1933, the NSDAP press Service an-
nounced that the Christian trade unions "have unconditionally
subordinated themselves to the leadership of Adolf Hitler." In place
of the trade unions the Nazi Government set up a Deutsche Arbeits
Front (DAF), controlled by the NSDAP, and which, in practice, all
workers in Germany were compelled to join. The chairmen of the
unions were taken into custody and were subjected to ill-treatment,
ranging f rom assault and battery to murder.
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In their effort to combat the infliience of the Christian churches,
whose doctrines were fundiimentally at variance with National Social-
ist philosophy and practica, the Nazi Government proceeded more
slowly. The extreme step of banning the practica of the Christian
religion was not taken, but year by year efforts were made to hmit
tlie influenc© of Christianity on the German people, since, in the
words used by the defendant Bormann to the defendant Eosenberg
in an official letter, "The Christian religion and National Socialist
doctrines are not compatible." In the month of June 1941, the de-
fendant Bormann issiied a secret decree on the relation of Christianity
and National Socialism. The decree stated that:
"For the first time in German history the Fuehrer consciously
and completely has the leadership in his own band. With the
party, its components and attached units, the Fuehrer has created
for himself and thereby the German Reich leadership, an In-
strument which makes him independent of the treaty * * *,
More and more the people must be separated f rom the churches
and their organs, the pastor * * *. Never again must an in-
fluence on leadership of the people be yielded to the churches.
Tliis influence must be broken completely and finally. Only the
Reich Government and by its direction the party, its components
and attached units, have a right to leadership of the people."
From the earliest days of the NSDAP, anti-Semitism had oecupied
a prominent place in national socialist thought and propaganda. The
Jews, who were considered to have no right to German citizenship,
were held to have been largely responsible for the troubles with which
the Nation was afilicted following on the war of 1914r-18. Further-
more, theantipathy to the Jews was intensified by the insistence which
was laid upon the superiority of the Germanic race and blood. The
second chapter of book 1 of "Mein Kampf" is dedicated to what may
be called the "Master Race" theory, the doctrine of Aryan superiority
over all other races, and the right of Germans in virtue of this su-
periority to dominate and use other peoples for their own ends. With
the Coming of the Nazis into power in 1933, persecution of the Jews
became official State policy. On the Ist April, 1933, a boycott of
Jewash enterprises was approved by the Nazi Reich Cabinet, and
during the following years a series of anti-Semitic laws were passed,
restricting the activities of Jews in the Civil Service, in the legal
profession, in journalism, and in the armed forces. In September
1935, the so-called Nürnberg Laws were passed, the most important
effect of which was to deprive Jews of German citizenship. In tliis
way the influence of Jewish elements on the affairs of Germany was
extinguished, and one more potential source of Opposition to Nazi
policy was rendered powerless,
10
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In any consideration of the crushing of Opposition, the massacre of
ihe 30th June 1934 must not be forgotten. It has become known as the
"Roehm Purge" or "the blood bath," and revealed the methods which
Hitler and his immediate associates, including the defendant Goering,
were ready to employ to strike down all Opposition and consolidate
their power. On that day Roehm, the Chief of Staff of the SA since
1931, was murdered by Ilitler's orders, and the "Old Guard" of the SA
was massacred without trial and without warning. The opportunity
was taken to murder a large number of people who at one time or
another had opposed Hitler.
The ostensible ground for the murder of Roehm was that he was
plotting to overthrow Hitler, and the defendant Goering gave evidence
that knowledge of such a plot had come to his ears. Whether this
was so or not it is not necessary to determine.
On July 3rd the Cabinet approved Hitler's action and described it
as "legitimate seif -defense by the State."
Shortly afterwards Hindenburg died, and Hitler became both
Reich President and Chancellor. At the Nazi-dominated Plebiscite,
which followed, 38 million Germans expressed their approval, and
with the Reichswehr taki^g the oath of allegiance to the Fuehrer, füll
power was now in Hitler's hands.
Germ.any had accepted the Dictatorship with all its methods of
terror and its cynical and open denial of the rule of law.
Apart from the policy of crushing the potential opponents of their
regime, the Nazi Government took active steps to increase its po\ver
over the German population. In the field of education everything
was done to ensure that the youth of Germany was brought up in the
atmosphere of National Socialism and accepted National Socialist
teachings. As early as the -Tth April 1933 the law reorganizing the
Civil Service had made it possible for the Nazi Government to remove
all "subversive and unreliable teachers"; and this was followed by
nurperous other measures to make sure that the schools were staff od by
teachers who could be trusted to teach their pupils the füll meaning of
the National Socialist creed. Apart from the influence of National
Socialist teaching in the schools, the Hitler Youth Organization was
also relied upon by the Nazi Leaders for obtaining fanatical support
from the younger generation. The defendant von Schirach, who had
been Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP since 1931, was appointed
Youth Leader of the German Reich in June 1933. Soon all the youth
organizations had been either dissolved or absorbcd by the Hitler
Youth, with the exception of the Catholic Youth. The Hitler Youth
was organized on strict mihtary lines, and as early as 1933 the
Wehrmacht was cooperating in providing premilitary training for the
Reich Youth.
The Nazi Government endeavored to unite the Nation in support
of their policies through the extensive use of propaganda. A number
722831*' — 47 2 \\
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of agencies were set up whose duty was to control and influence the
press, radio, films, Publishing firms, etc., in Germany, and to super-
vise entertainmcnt and cultunil and artistic activities. All these
agencies came under Goebbels' Ministry of the People's Enlightenment
and Propaganda, which together with a corresponding Organization
, in the NSDAP and the Reich Chamber of Culture, was ultimately
responsible for exercising this supervision. The defendant Rosen-
berg played a leading part in disseminating the National Socialist
doctrines on behalf of the Party, and the defendant Fritzsche, in con-
junction with Goebbels, performed the same task for the State.
The grcatest emphasis was laid on the supreme mission of the
German people to lead and dominate by virtue of their Nordic blood
and racial purity ; and the ground was thus being prepared for the
acceptance of the idea of German world supremacy.
Thron gh the effective control of the radio and the press, the Ger-
man people, during the years which foUowed 1933, were subjected to
the most intensive Propaganda in furtherance of the regime. Hostile
criticism, indeed criticism of any kind, was f orbidden, and the severest
pcnalties were imposed on those who indulged in it.
Independent judgment, based on freedom of thought, was rendered
quite impossible.
(D) Measures of Re-Armament
During the years immediately foUowing Hitler's appointment as
Cliancellor, the Nazi Government set about reorganizing the eco-
nomic life of Germany, and in particular the armament industry.
This was done on a vast scale and with extreme thoroughness.
It was necessary to lay a secure financial f oundation for the building
of armaments, and in April 1936, the defendant Goermg was appointed
coordinator for raw materials and foreign exchange, and empowered
to supervise all state and party activities in these fields. In this
capacity he brought together the War Minister, the Minister of Eco-
nomics, the Reich Finance Minister, the President of the Reichsbank,
and the Prussian Finance Minister to discuss problems connected with
war mobilization, and on the 27th May 1936, in addressing theso
men, Goering opposed any financial limitation of war production and
added that "all measures are to be considered from the standpoint of
an assured waging of war." At the Party Rally in Nürnberg in
1936, Hitler announced the establishment of the Four-Year Plan and
the appointment of Goering as the Plenipotentiary in charge.
Goering was already engaged in building a strong air f orce and on the
8th July 1938, he announced to a number of leading German aircraft
manufacturers that the German Air Force was already superior in
quality and quantity to the EngUsh. On the 14th October 1938, at
another Conference, Goering announced that Hitler had instructed
12
him to organize a gigantic armament program, which would make
insignificant all previous achievemonts. He said that he had becn
ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air force five times as large as
originally planned, to increase the speed of the rearmament of the navy
and army, and to concentrate on offensive weapons, principally heavy
artillery and heavy tanks. He then laid down a specific program
designed to accomplish these ends. The exten t to which rearmament
had been accomplished was stated by Hitler in his memorandum of
9 October 1939, af ter the campaign in Poland. He said :
"The military application of our people's strength has been
carried through to such an extent that within a short time at any
rate it cannot be markedly improved upon by any manner of
effort . . .
"The warlike equipment of the German people is at present
larger in quantity and better in quality for a greater number of
.German divisions than in the year 1914. The weapons them-
sclves, taking a substantial cross-section, are more modern than
is the case of any other country in the world at this time.
They have just proved their supreme war worthiness in their
victorious campaign . . . There is no evidence available to
show that any country in the world disposes of a better total
ammunition stock than the Reich . . . The A. A. artillery is
not equalled by any country in the world."
In this reorganization of the economic life of Germany for military
purposes, the Nazi Government found the German armament industry
quite willing to cooperate, and to play its part in the rearmament
program. In April 1933^Gustav Krupp von Bohlen submitted to
Hitler on behaTi of the Reich Associatloii of Gei'man Industry a plan
for the reorganization of German industry, which he stated was
characterized by the desire to coordinate economic measures and po-
litical necessity. In the plan itself, Krupp stated that, "The turn of
political events is in line with the wisheswEich I myself and the board
of directors have cherished for a long time." What Krupp meant by
this Statement is fully shown by the draft text of a speech which he
planned to deliver in the University of Berlin in January 1944, though
the speech was in fact never delivered. Ref erring to the years 1919
to 1933, Krupp wrote: "It is the one great merit of the entire Gennan
war economy that it did not remain idle during those bad years, even
though its activity could not be brought to light, for obvious reasons.
Through years of secret work, scientifie and basic groundwork was
laid in order to be ready again to work for the German armed forces
at the appointed hour, without loss of time or experience . . . Only
through the secret activity of German enterprise together with the
experience gained meanwhile through production of peacetime goods,
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13
was it possible after 1933 to fall iiito step witli tlie new tasks arrived
at, restoring Germany's military power."
In October 1933, Germany withdrew from the International Dis-
armament Conference and League of Nations. In 1935 the Nazi Gov-
ernment decided to take the first open steps to free itself from its
obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. On the lOth March
1935, the defendant Goering announced that Germany was buildmg
a military air force. Six days later, on the 16th March 1935, a law
was passed bearing the signatures, among others, of the defendants
Goering, Hess, Frank, Frick, Schacht, and von Ncurath, instituting
compulsory military Service and fixing the establishment of the Ger-
man Army at a peacetime strength of 500,000 men. In an endeavor
to reassure public opinion in other countries, the Government an-
nounced on the 21st May 1935, that Germany would, though renounc-
ing the disarmament clauses, still rcspect the territorial limitations of
the Versailles Treaty, and would comply with the Locarno Pacts.
Nevertheless, on the very day of this announcement, the secret Reich
Defense Law was passed and its publication forbidden by Hitler. In
this law, the powers and duties of the Chancellor and other Ministers
were defined, should Germany become involved in war. It is clear
from this law that by May of 1935 Hitler and his Government had
arrived at the stage in the carrying out of their policies when it was
necessary for them to have in existence the requisite machinery for
the administration and government of Germany in the event of their
policy leading to war.
At the same time that this preparation of the German economy for
war was being carried out, the German armed forces themselves were
preparing for a rebuilding of Germany's armed strength.
The German Navy was particularly active in this regard. The offi-
cial German naval historians, Assmann and Gladisch, admit that tho
Treaty of Versailles had only been in force for a f ew months bef ore it
was violated, particularly in the construction of a new submarine arm.
The publications of Captain Schuessler and Colonel Scherff, both of
which were sponsored by the defendant Raeder, were designed to show
the German people the nature of the Navy's eflfort to rearm in de-
fiance of the Treaty of Versailles.
The füll details of these publications have been given in evidence.
On the 12th May 1934, the defendant Raeder issued the Top Secret
armament plan for what was called the Third Armament Phase.
This contained the sentence :
"All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn
* up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert
"periodP
One month later, in June 1934, the defendant Raeder had a con-
versation with Hitler in which Hitler instructed him to keep secret
14
the construction of U-boats and of warships over the limit of 10,000
tons which was then being undertaken.
And on the 2d November 1934, the defendant Raeder had another
conversation with Hitler and the defendant Goering, in which Hitler
Said that he considered it vital that the German Navy "should be
increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was
not able to saf eguard the ore imports from Scandinavia."
The large orders for building given in 1933 and 1934 are sought to
be excused by the defendant Raeder on the ground that negotiations
were in progress for an agreement betwcen Germany and Great Brit-
ain permitting Germany to biiild ships in excess of the provisions of
the Treaty of Versailles. This agreement, which was signed in 1935,
restricted the German Navy to a tonnage equal to one- third of that
of the British, except in respect of U-boats where 45 percent was
agreed, subject always to the right to excced this proportion after first
informing the British Government and giving them an oppoitunity
of discussion.
The Anglo-German Treaty followed in 1937, under which both
Powers bound themselves to notify füll details of their building pro-
gram at least 4 months bef ore any action was taken.
It is admitted that these clauses were not adhered to by Germany.
In capital vessels, for example, the displacement details were f alsi-
fied by 20 percent, whilst in the case of U-boats, the German his-
torians Assmann and Gladisch say :
"It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction
that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the German-
British Treaty."
The importance of these breaches of the Treaty is seen when the motive
for this rearmament is considered. In the vear 1940 the defendant
Eaeder himself wrote :
"The Fuehrer hoped until the last moment to be able to put
off the threatening conflict with England until 1944r-5. At that
time, the Navy would have had available a fleet with a power ful
U-boat superiority, and a much more f avorable ratio as regards
strength in all other types of ships, particularly those designed for
warf are on the high seas."
The Nazi Government, as already stated, announced on the 2 Ist
May 1935, their intention to respect the territorial limitations of the
Treaty of Versailles. On the 7th March, 1936, in defiance of that
Treaty, the demilitarizcd zone of the Rhineland was enterod by Ger-
man troops. In announcing this action to German Eeichstag, Hitler
endeavored to justify the reentry by references to the recently con-
cluded alliances between France and the Soviet Union, and between
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. He also tried to meet the
P :
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15
I
hostile reaction which he no doubt expected to f oUow tliis violation of
tlie Treaty by saying :
"We have no territorial claims to make in Europe."
m. THE COMMON PLAN OF CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
The Tribunal now turns to the consideration of the crimes against
peace charged in the indictment. Count one of the indietment charges
the defendants with conspiring er having a common plan to commit
crimes against peace. Count two of the indictment charges the de-
fendants with committing specific crimes against peace by planning,
preparing, initiating, and waging wars of aggression against a num-
ber of other States. It will be convenient to consider the question of
the existence of a common plan and the question of aggressive war
together, and to deal later in this judginent with the question of the
individual responsibility of the defendants.
The charges in the indictment that the defendants planned and
waged aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is
essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the
belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world.
To initiate a war of aggression, theref ore, is not only an interna-
tional crime ; it is the supreme international crime differing only f rom
other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated
evil of the whole.
The first acts of aggression referred to in the indictment are the
seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia ; and the first war of aggression
charged in the indictment is the war against Poland begun on the
Ist September 1939.
Before examining that Charge it is necessary to look more closely
at some of the events which preceded these acts of aggression. The
war against Poland did not come suddenly out of an otherwise clear
sky ; the evidcnce has made it piain that this war of aggression, as well
as the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia, was premeditated and
carefully prepared, and was not undertaken until the moment was
thought opportune f or it to be carried through as a definite part of the
preordained scheme and plan.
For the aggressive designs of the Nazi Government were not acci-
dents arising out of the immediate political Situation in Europe and
the World; they were a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign
policy.
From the beginning, the National Socialist movement claimed that
its object was to unite the German people in the consciousness of
their mission and dcstiny, based on inherent qualities of race, and
under the guidance of the Fuehrer.
For its achievement, two things were deemed to be essential : The
disruption of the European order as it had existed since the Treaty
16
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of Versailles, and the crcation of a Greater Germany beyond the |
frontiers of 1914. This necessarily involved the seizure of foreign J
territories.
War was seen to be inevitable, or at the very least, highly prob-
able, if these purposes were to be accomplished. The German people,
therefore, with all their resources, were to be organized as a gi-eat
political-military army, schooled to obey without question any policy
decreed by the State.
(A) Preparation" for Aggression
In "Mein Kampf" Hitler had made this view quite piain. It must
be remembered that "Mein Kampf" was no mere private diary in
which the secret thoughts of Hitler were set down. Its contents were
rather proclaimed from the house tops. It was used in the schools
and universities and among the Hitler Youth, in the SS and the SA,
and among the German people gencrally, even down to the presenta-
tion of an official copy to all newly married people. By the year
1945 over ßy^ million copies had been circulated. The general con-
tents are well known. Over and over again Hitler asserted his belief
in the necessity of f®rce as the means of solving international prob-
lems, as in the f ollowing quotation :
"The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by
Heaven on our forefathers. They had to conquer it by risking
their lives. So also in the future, our people will not obtaiii
territory, and therewith the means of existence, as a favor from
any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a*
triumphant sword."
"Mein Kampf" contains many such passages, and the extolling of
force as an Instrument of foreign policy is openly proclaimed.
The precise objectives of this policy of force are also set forth in
detail. The very fii-st page of the book asserts that "German- Austria
must be restored to the great German Motherland," not on economic
grounds, but because "people of the same blood should be in the
same Reich."
The restoration of the German frontiers of 1914: is declared to be
wliolly insuificient, and if Germany is to exist at all, it must be as a
World power with the necessary territorial magnitude.
"Mein Kampf" is quite explicit in stating whcre the increased
territory is to be f ound :
"Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line
through the line of conduct followed by prewar Germany in for-
eign policy. We put an end to tlie perpetual Germanic march
towards the south and west of Europe, and turn our eyes towards
the lands of the east. We finally put a stop to the coloBial and
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trade policy of the prewar times, and pass ovcr to the territorial
policy of the futiire.
"But wlieu we speak of new territory in Europe today, we must
tliink principally of Russia and the border states subject to her."
'•Mein Kampf" is not to be regarded as a mere literary exercise, nor
as an inflexible policy or plan incapable of modification.
Its importance lies in the unmistakable attitude of aggression re-
vealed throughout its pages.
( B) Tue Planning of Aggression
Evidence from captured documents has revealed that Hitler held
four secret nieetings to which the Tribunal proposes to make special
ref crence because of the light they shed upon the question of the com-
mon plan and aggressive war.
These meetings took place on the 5th November 1937, the 23d of
May 1939, tho 22d of August 1939, and the 23d of November 1939.
At these meetings important declarations were made by Hitler as
to his purposes, which are quite unmistakable in their terms.
The documents which record what took place at these meetings have
been subject to some criticism at the hands of def ending counsel.
Their essential authenticity is not denied, but it is said, f or example,
that they do not propose to be verbatim transcripts of the Speeches
they record, that the document dealing with the meeting on the 5th
November 1937, was dated 5 days after the meeting had taken place,
and that the two documents dealing with the meeting of August 22,
1939 differ from one another, and are unsigned.
Makinc: the füllest allowance f or criticism of this kind, the Tribunal
is of the opinion that the documents are documents of the highest value,
and that their authenticity and substantial truth are established.
They are obviously caref ul records of the events they describe, and
they have been preserved as such in the archives of the German Gov-
ernment, from whose custody they were captured. Such documents
could nevcr be dismissed as inventions, nor even as inaccurate or dis-
torted ; they plainly record events which actually took place.
( C) Conferences of tue 23rd November 1939 and 5tii No\t.mber 1937
It Avill perhaps be useful to deal first of all with the meeting of the
23d November 1939, when Hitler called his supreme Commanders to-
gethcr. A record was made of what was said, by one of these present.
At the date of the meeting, Austria and Czechoslovakia had been in-
corporated into the German Reich, Poland had been conquered by the
German armies, and the war with Great Britain and France was still
in its static phase. The moment was opportune for a review of past
events.* Hitler informcd the conamanders that the purpose of the con-
18
ference was to give them an idea of the world of his thoughts, and to
teil them his decision. He thereupon reviewed his political task since
1919, and referred to the secession of Germany from the League of
N'ations, the denunciation of the Disarmament Conference, the'^order
for rearmament, the introduction of compulsory armed Service, the
occupation of the Rhineland, the seizure of Austria, and the action
against Czechoslovakia. He stated :
"One year later, Austria came; this step also was considered
doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of
the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland.
This Step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign.
First of all, the western f ortification had to be finished. It was
not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me
from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the
Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial Solution.
The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed
the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the
action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite plear at that
time whether I should start first against the east and then in the
west or vice versa . . . Basically I did not organize the armed
forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always
in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Und er
pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first."
This address, reviewing past events and reaffirming the aggressive
intentions present from the beginning, puts beyond any question of
doubt the character of the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia,
and the war against Poland.
For they had all been accomplished according to plan; and the
nature of that plan must now be examined in a little more detail.
At the meeting of the 23d November 1939, Hitler was looking back
to things accomplished ; at the earlier meetings now to be considered,
he was looking for ward, and revealing his plans to his confederates!
The comparison is instructive.
The meeting held at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on the 5t h
November 1937 was attended by Lieutenant Colonel Hossbach, Hitler's
personal adjutant, who compiled a long note of the proceedings, which
he dated the lOth November 1937 and signed.
The persons present were Hitler, and the defendants Goering,
von Neurath, and Raeder, in their capacities as Commander in Chief
of the Luftwaffe, Reich Foreign Minister, and Commander in Chief
of the Navy respectively, General von Blomberg, Minister of War,
and General von Fritsch, the Commander in Chief of the Army.
Hitler began by saying that the subject of the Conference was of
such high importance that in other States it would have taken place
before the Cabinet. He went on to say that the subject matter of
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his Speech was the result of liis detailed deliberations, and of his
experiences during liis 41/2 years of government. He requested that
tho Statements he was about to make should be looked upon m the
case of his death as his hist will and tcstament. Hitlers main thcme
was the problem of living space, and he discussed vanous possiDle
Solutions, only to set them aside. He then said that the seizure of
living Space on the continent of Europe was therefore necessary,
expressing himself in these words :
"It is not a case of conquering pcople but of conquering agri-
culturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose
to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly
adjoining the Eeich and not overseas, and this Solution would
have to be brought into effect for one or two generations . . .
The history of all times— Roman Empire, British Empire— has
proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking
resistance and taking risks. Even set-backs are unavoidable;
neither formerly nor today has space been found without an
owner : the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.
He concluded witli this Observation:
"The.question for Gennany is wliere the greatest possible con-
quest could be made at the lowest cost."
Nothing could indicate more plainly the aggressive intentions of
Hitler, and the events which soon followed shoTved the reality of his
purpose. It is impossible to accept the contention that Hitler did not
actually mean war; for after pointing out that Germany might ex-
pect the Opposition of England and France, and analyzmg the strength
and the weakness of those powers in particular situations, he con-
tinued :
"The German question can be solved only by Way of force,
and this is never without risk ... If we place the decision to
apply force with risk at the head of the foUowing expositions,
then we are left to reply to the questions Svhen' and Jow . In
this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.
The first o"f these three cases set forth a hypothetical international
Situation, in which he would take action not later than 1943 to 194o,
saying :
"If the Fuehrer is still living then it will be his irrevocable
decision to solve the German space problem not later than 1943 to
1945. The necessity for action before 1943 to 1945 will come
under consideration in cases 2 and 3."
The second and third cases to which Hitler ref erred show the piain
Intention to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, and m this connection
Hitler said :
20
"For the improvcnient of cur niilitaiy political position, it
must be our first aim in every case of entanglement by war to con-
quer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaiieously in order to re-
move any threat from the fianks in case of a possible advance
westwards."
He further added: .
"The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and
politically would constitute a considerable relief , owing to shorter
and better fronticrs, the freeing of fighting personnel for other
purposes, and the possibility or reconstituting new armies up to
a strength of about twelve divisions."
This decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was discussed in
some detail ; the action was to be taken as soon as a f avorable oppor-
Uinity presented itself.
The military strength which Germany had been building up since
1933 was now to be directed at the two specific countries, Austria and
Czechoslovakia.
The defendant Goering testified that he did not believe at that time
that Hitler actually meant to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, and
that the purpose of the Conference was only to put pressure on von
Fritsch to speed up the rearmament of the Army.
The defendant Kaeder testified that neither he, nor von Fritsch,
nor von Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually meant war, a con-
viction which the defendant Raeder claims that he held up to the
22d August 1939. The basis of this conviction was his hope that Hit-
ler would obtain a "political Solution" of Germany's problems. But
all that this means, when examined, is the belief that Germany's posi-
tion would be so good, and Germany's armed might so overwhelming,
that the territory desired could be obtained without fighting for it.
It must be remembered too that Hitler's declared intention with re-
gard to Austria was actually carried out within a little over 4 months
from the date of the meeting, and within less than a year the first
portion of Czechoslovakia was absorbed, and Bohemia and Moravia
a few months later. If any doubts had existed in the minds of any of
his hearers in November 1937, after March of 1939 there could no
longer be any question that Hitler was in deadly earnest in his de-
cision to resort to war. The Tribunal is satisfied that Lieutenant
Colonel Hossbach 's account of the meeting is substantially correct,
and that those present knew that Austria and CzQchoslovakia would
be annexed by Germany at the first possible opportunity.
(D) The Seizure of Austria
The invasion of Austria was a premeditated aggressive step in
f urthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries.
21
I ■• (
I
!
|i
As a result Germany's flank was protected, that of Czechoslovakia
being greatly weakened. The first step had been taken in tlie seizure
of "Lebensraum"; many new divisions of trained fighting men had
been acquired ; and with the seizure of f oreign exchange reserves tho
rearmament program had been greatly strengthened.
On the 21st May 1935 Hitler announced in the Reichstag that Ger-
niany did not intend either to attack Austria or to interfere in her
internal affairs. On the Ist May 1936 he publicly coupled Czecho-
slovakia with Austria in his avowal of peacef ul intentions ; and so late
as the llth July 1936 he recognized by treaty the füll sovereigiity of
Austria.
Austria was in fact seized by Germany in the month of Marcli 1938.
For a number of years before that date the National Socialists in Ger-
many had been cooperating with the National Socialists of Austria
with the ultimate object of incorporating Austria into the Germaii
Reich. The Putsch of July 25, 1934, which resulted in the assassina-
tion of Chancellor Dollfuss, had the seizure of Austria as its object;
but the Putsch failed, with the consequence that the National Socialist
Party was outlawed in Austria. On the llth July 1936 an agreement
was entered into between the two countries, article 1 of which stated :
"The German Government recognizes the füll sovereignty of
the Federated State of Austria in the spirit of the pronounce-
ments of the German Fuehrer and Cliancellor of the 21st May
1935." .
Article 2 declared :
"Fach of the two Governments regards the inner political order
(including the question of Austrian National Socialism) obtain-
ing in the other country as an internal affair of the other country,
upon which it' will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence."
The National Socialist movement in Austria, however, continued its
illegal activities under cover of secrecy; and the National Socialists
of Germany gave the party active support. The resulting "incidents"
were seized upon by the German National Socialists as an excuse for
interfering in Austrian affairs. After the Conference of the 5th
November 1937 these "incidents" rapidly multiplied. The relation-
ship between the two countries steadily worsened, and finally the
Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg was persuadeS by the defendant
von Papen and others to seek a Conference with Hitler, which took
place at Berchtesgaden on the 12th February 1938. The defendant
Keitel was present at the Conference, and Dr. Schuschnigg was threat-
ened by Hitler with an immediate Invasion of Austria. Schuschnigg
finally agreed to grant a political amnesty to various Nazis convicted
ot crime, and to appoint the Nazi Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the
Intcrior and Security with control of the police. On the 9th March
22
1938, in an attempt to preserve the independence of his country, Dr.
Schuschnigg decided to hold a plebescite on the question of Austrian
independence, which was fixed for the 13th March 1938. Hitler, 2
(lays later, sent an Ultimatum to Schuschnigg that the plebescite must
be withdrawn. In the afternoon and evening of the llth March 1938
the defendant Goering made a series of demands upon the Austrian
Government, each backed up by the threat of invasion. After
Schuschnigg had agreed to the cancellation of the plebiscite anothcr
demand was put forward that Schuschnigg must resign, and that the
defendant Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor. In conse-
quence Schuschnigg resigned, and President Miklas, after at first
refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, gave way and ap-
pointed him.
Meanwhile Hitler had given the final order for the German troops
to cross the border at dawn on the 12th of March and instructed Seyss-
Inquart to use formations of Austrian National Socialists to depose
Miklas and to seize control of the Austrian Government. After the
order to march had been given to the German troops, Goering tele-
phoned the German Embassy in Vienna and dictated a telegram in
which he wished Seyss-Inquart to send to Hitler to justify the mili-
tary action which had already been ordered. It was :
"The provisional Austrian Government, which, after the dis-
missal of the Schuschnigg Government, considers its task to estab-
lish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government
the urgent request to support it in its task and to help it to prevent
bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to
send German troops as soon as possible."
Keppler, an official of the German Embassy, rcplied :
"Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but every-
thing is quiet."
After some further discussion, Goering stated :
"Please show him (Seyss-Inquart) the text of the telegram,
and do teil him that we are asking him — well, he doesn't even have
to send the telegram. All he needs to do is to say 'Agreed'."
Seyss-Inquart never sent the telegram; he never even telegraphed,
"Agreed."
It appears that as soon as he was appointed Chancellor, some time
after 10 p. m., he called Keppler and told him to call up Hitler and
transmit his protests against the occupation. This action outraged
the defendant Goering, because "it would disturb the rest of the
Fuehrer, who wanted to go to Austria the next day." At 11 : 15 p. m.
an official in the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin telephoned the
German Embassy in Vienna and was told by Keppler: "Teil the
General Field Marshai that Seyss-Inquart agrees."
r '
23
.
At daybrcak on the 12th Marcli 1938, German troops marched into
Austria, and met with no resistance. It was announced in the German
press tliat Seyss-Inquart liad been appointed the successor to Schu-
schni^g, and the telcgram which Goering had suggested, but which
was never sent, was quoted to show that Seyss-Inquart had requested
the piesence of German troops to prevent disorder. On the 13th
March 1938, a law was passed for the reunion of Austria in the German
Keich. Seyss-Inquart demanded that President Miklas should sign
this law, but he refused to do so, and resigncd his office. He was
succeeded by Seyss-Inquart, who signed the law in the name of Austria.
This law was then adopted as a law of the Reich by a Reich Cabinet
decree issued the same day, and signed by Hitler and the defendants
Goering, Frick, von Ribbentrop, and Hess.
It was contended before the Tribunal that the annexation of Austria
was justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the
Union of Austria and Germany ; that there were many matters in com-
mon between the two peoples that made this union desirable; and that
in the result the object was achieved without bloodshed.
These matters, even if true, are really immaterial, for the facts
plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve the object were
those of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of
Germany ready to be used if any resistance was encountered. More- -
over nonc of these considerations appear f rom the Hossbach account
of the meetings of the 5th November 1937, to have been the motives^
which actuated Hitler; on the contrary, all the emphasis is there laid
on the advantage to be gained by Germany in her military strength
by the annexation of Austiia.
(E) The Seizotie of Czechoslovakia
The Conference of the 5th November 1937, made it quite piain that
the seizure of Czechoslovakia by Germany had been definitely decided
upon The only question remaining was the selection of the .suitable
moment to do it. On the 4th March 1938, the def endant von Ribben-
trop wrote to the def endant Keitel with regard to a Suggestion made to
von Ribbentrop by the Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, that possible
war aims against Czechoslovakia should be discussed between the
German and Hungarian armies. In the course of this letter von
Ribbentrop said :
"I havo many doubts about such negotiations. In case we
should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czecho-
slovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would be in-
f ormed about this."
On the llth March 1938, Goering made two separate statements to
M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that
24
'Mi
the developments thcn taking place in Austria would in no way have
any detrimental influcnce on the relations between the German Reich
and Czechoslovakia, and emphasized the continued earnest endeavor
on the part of the Germans to improve those mutual relations. On
the 12th March, Goering asked M. Mastny to call on him, and repeated
these assurances.
This design to keep Czechoslovakia quiet whilst Austria was ab-
sorbed w^as a typical maneuver on the part of the defendant Goering,
which he was to repeat latcr in the case of Poland, when he made the
most strenuous efforts to isolate Poland in the impending struggle.
On the same day, the 12th March, the defendant von Neurath spoke
with M. Mastny, and assured him on behalf of Hitler that Germany
still considered herseif bound by the German-Czechoslovak arbitra-
tion Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.
The evidence shows that after the occupation of Austria by the
German Army on the 12th March, and the annexation of Austria
on the 13th March, Conrad Henlein, who was the leader of the Sudeten
German Party in Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin on the 28th
March. On the following day, at a Conference in Berlin, when von
Ribbentrop was present with Henlein, the general Situation was dis-
cussed, and later the defendant Jod! recorded'in his diary :
'^After the annexation of Austria the Fuehrer mentions that
there is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria
has to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case
Gruen (that is, the plan against Czechoslovakia) will have to be
carried out energetically ; they will have to be newly prepared
on the basis of the changed Strategie position because of the
annexation of Austria."
On the 21st April 1938, a discussion took place between Hitler and
the defendant Keitel with regard to "Case Gruen", showing quite
clearly that the preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were
being fully considered. On the 28th May 1938, Hitler ordered that
preparations should be made for military action against Czechoslo-
vakia by the 2d October, and from then onwards the plan to invade
Czechoslovakia was constantly under review. On the 30th May 1938
a directive signed by Hitler declared his "unalterable decision to
smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near f uture."
In Junc^l93S. as appears from a captured document taken from the
files oJ the SD in Berlin, an elaborate plan for the employment of tliQ
SD in CzechosTovakia had been proposed. This plan provided that
'TCe SD follow, if possible, immediately after the leading troops, and
take upon themselves the duties similar to their tasks in Ger-
many ..."
Gestapo officials were assigned to cooperate with the SD in certain
Operations, Special agents were to be trained beforehand to prevent
25
!
.! ;
I
Sabotage, and these agents were to be notified "before the attack in due
time ... in order to give them the possibility to hide themselves,
avoid arrest and deportation ..."
"At tlie beginning, gucrilla or partisan warfare is to be ex-
pected, therefore weapons are necessary ..."
Files of Information were to be compiled with notations as f oUows :
"To arrest" . . . "To liquidate" . . . "To confiscate" . . . "To de-
prive of passport", etc.
The plan provided for the temporary division of the country into
larger and smaller territorial units, and considered various "sugges-
tions", as they were termed, for the incorporation into the German
Reich of the inhabitants and districtf' of Czechoslovakia. The final
"Suggestion" included the whole country, together with Slovakia and
Carpathian Eussia, with a population of nearly 15 millions.
The plan was modified in some respects in September after the
Munich Conference, but the fact that the plan existed in such exact
detail and was couched in such war-like language indicated a calcu-
lated design to resort to force.
On the 31st August 1938, Hitler approved a memorandum by Jodl
dated 24th August 1938', concerning the timing of the order for the
Invasion of Czechoslovakia and the question of defense measures.
This memorandum contained the f oUowing :
"Operation Gruen will be set in motion by means of an 4nci-
dent' in Czechoslovakia, which will give Germany provocation for
military intervention. The fixing of the cxact time for this inci-
dent is of the utmost importance."
These facts demonstrate that the occupation of Czechoslovakia had
been planned in detail long before the Munich Conference.
In the month of September 1938, the Conferences and talks with mili-
tary leaders continued. In view of the extraordinarily critical Situa-
tion which had arisen, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain,
flew to Munich and then went to Berchtesgaden to see Hitler. On the
22d September Mr. Chamberlain met Hitler for further discussions
at Bad Godesberg. On the 26th September 1938, Hitler said in a
Speech in Berlin, with reference to his conversation :
"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
Problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for
Germany in Europe; and I further assured him that from the
moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to
say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their
other minorities, peacefully and without oppression, I will be no
longer interested in the Czech State, and that as far as I am con-
cerned I will guarantee it. We don't want any Czechs."
26
On the 29th September 1938, after a Conference between Hitler and
Mussolini and the British and French Prime Ministers in Munich, the
Munich Pact was signed, by which Czechoslovakia was required to
acquiesce in the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The "piece
of paper" which the British Prime Minister brought back to London,
signed by himself and Hitler, expressed the hope that for the f uture
Britain and Germany might live without war. That Hitler never
intended to adhere to the Munich Agreement is shown by the fact that
a little later he asked the def endant Keitel for Information with regard
to the military force which in his opinion would bc required to break
all Czecli rcoistänce in Bohemia and Moravia. Keitel gave his reply
on the llth October 1938. On the 21st October 1938, a directive was
issued by Hitler, arid countersigned by the defendant Keitel, to the
armed f orces on their f uture tasks, which stated :
"Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. It must be
possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if
her policy should become hostile towards Germany."
On the 14th March 1939, the Czech President Hacha and his Foreign
Minister Chvalkovsky came to Berlin at the Suggestion of Hitler, and
attended a meeting at which the defendants von ßibbentrop, Goering,
and Keitel were present, with others. The proposal was made to
Hacha that if he would sign an agreement consenting to the incorpo-
ration of the Czech people in the German Reich at once Bohemia and
Moravia would be saved from destruction. He was inf ormed that Ger-
man troops had already received Orders to march and that any resist-
ance would be broken with physical force. The defendant Goering
added the threat that he would destroy Prague completely from the air.
Faced by this dreadful alternative, Hacha and his Foreign Minister
put their signature to the necessary agreement at 4 : 30 in the morning,
and Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on behalf of Germany.
On the 15th March, German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia,
and en the 16th March the German decree was issued incorporating
Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich as a protectorate, and this de-
cree was signed by the defendants von Ribbentrop and Frick.
'i
ti
(F) The Aggression Against Poland
By March 1939 the plan to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia,
which had boen discussed by Hitler at the meeting of the 5th November
1937, had been accomplished. The time had now come for the German
leaders to consider further acts of aggression, made more possible of
attainment because of that accomplishment.
On the 23d May 1939, a meeting was held in Hitler's study in the
new Eöich Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler announced his decision to
attack Poland and gave his reasons, and discussed the elTect tlie deci-
722831*
27
N
f-
^
sion might have on other countries. In point of time, this was the
second of the important meetings to which reference has already been
made, and in order to appreciate the füll significance of what was said
and done, it is necessary to State shortly some of the main events in
the history of German-Polish relations.
As long ago as the year 1925 an Arbitration Treaty between Ger-
many and Poland had been made at Locarno, providing for the settle-
ment of all disputes between the two countries. On the 26th January
1934, a German-Polish declaration of nonaggression was made, signed
on behalf of ihe öerman Government by the defendant von Neurath.
On the 30th January 1934, and again on the 30th January 19o7, Hitler
made speeches in the Reichstag in which he expressed his view that
Poland and Germany could work together in hanhony and peace. On
the 20th February 1938, Hitler made a third speech in the Reichstag
in tlie course of which he said with regard to Poland :
"And so the way to a f riendly understanding has been success-
fully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Danzig,
has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief makers,
succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between
Germany and Poland and transf orming . thera into a sincere,
friendly Cooperation. Relying on her friendships, Germany will
not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the
foundation for the task which is ahead of us — peace."
On the 26th September 1938, in the middle of the crisis over the
Sudetenland, Hitler made the speech in Berlin which has already
been quoted, and announced that he had informed the British Prime
Minister that when the Czechoslovakian problem was solved there
would be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe.
Nevertheless, on the 24th November of the same year, an OKW di-
rective was issued to the German armed f orces to make preparations
for an attack upon Danzig ; it stated :
"The Fuehrer has ordered : (1) Preparations are also to be made
to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German
troops by surprise."
In spite of having ordered military preparations for tlie occupation
of Danzig, Hitler, on the 30th January 1939, said in a speech in the
Reichstag :
"During the troubled months of the past year, the friendship
between Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring
f actors in the political lif e of Europe."
Five days previously, on the 25th January 1939, von Ribbentrop
said in the course of a speech in Warsaw :
"Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future
with füll confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations."
y*
FoUowing the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany on
the 15th March 1939, which was a flagrant breach of the Munich Agree-
ment, Great Britain gave an assurance to Poland on the 31st March
1939, that in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polisli
independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly con-
sidered it vital to resist with their national forces, Great Britain
would feel itself bound at once to lend Poland all the support in its
power. The French Government took the same stand. It is interest-
ing to note in this connection, that one of the arguments frequently
presented by the defense in the present case is that the defendants
were induced to think that their conduct was not in breach of inter-
national law by the acquiescence of other powers. The declarations
of Great Britain and France showed, at least, tliat this view could be
held no longer.
On the 3d April 1939, a revised OirVV directive was issued to the
armed forces, which after referring to the question of Danzig made
reference to Fall Weiss (the military code name for the German in-
vasion of Poland) and stated ;
"The Fuehrer has added the f ollowing directions to Fall Weiss :
(1) Preparations must be*made in such a way that the Operation
can be carried out at any time from the Ist September 1939 on-
wards. (2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been
directed to draw up a precise timetable for Fall Weiss and to
arrange by Conferences the synchronized timings between the
three branches of the Armed Forces."
On the llth April 1939, a further directive was signed by Hitler
and issued to the armed forces, and in one of the annexes to that docu-
ment the words occur :
"Quarreis with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland,
however, adopt a threatening attitude toward Germany, 'a
final settlement' .will be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with
^ Poland. The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength, and
to create in the east a Situation which satisfies the requirements
of defense. The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into
Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. Policy aims
at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible
in view of the internal crisis in France, and British restraint as a
result of this."
In spite of the Contents of those two directives, Hitler made a speech
in the Reichstag on the 28th April 1939, in which, after describing the
Polish Govemment's alleged rejection of an offer he had made with
regard to Danzig and the Polish Corridor,* he stated :
"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of
the Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive fact;
11
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4
I
28
29
^1
r
the worst is that now Poland like Czechoslovakia a year ago be-
lieves, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that
it must call up its troops, although Germany on her part has not
called up a single man, and had not thought of proceeding in any
way against Poland. . . . The intention to attack on the part
of Germany which was merely invented by the international
Press ..."
It was 4 weeks after making this speech that Hitler, on the 23d
^ lilay 19^, held the important military Conference to which reference
has already been made. Among the persons present were the defend-
ants Goering, ßaeder, and Keitel. The adjutant on duty that day
was Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt, and he made a record of whaf
happened, certifying it with his signature as a correct record.
The puri)ose of the meeting was to enable Hitler to inform the. lieads
of the armed forces and their staffs of his views on the political
Situation and his future aims. After analyzing the political Situation
and reviewing the course of events since 1933, Hitler announced his
decision to attack Poland. He admitted that the quarrel with Poland
over Danzig was not the reason for this attack, but the necessity f or
Germany to enlarge her living space and secure her food supplies.
He Said :
"The Solution of the problem demands courage. The principle
by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself
to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be
adapted to needs. This is impossible without invasion of f orei^
States or attacks upon foreign property."
Later in his address he added : , ^
\ "There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are
lef t with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable oppor-
tunity. We cannot expect a repctition of the Czech affair. There
will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the
Isolation will be decisive. . . . The Isolation of Poland is a mat-
ter of skillf ul politics."
Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt's record of the meeting reveals that
Hitler fully realized the possibility of Great Britain and France
Coming to Poland's assistance. If, therefore, the isolation of Poland
could not be achieved, Hitler was of the opinion that Germany should
attack Great Britain and France first, or at any rate should concen-
trate primarily on the war in the West, in order to defeat Great
Britain and France quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness.
Nevertheless, Hitler stressed that war with England and France would
^ be a life and death struggle, which might last a long time, and that
preparations must be made accordingly.
30
During the weeks which followed this Conference, other meetings
^vere held and directives were issued in preparation for tlie war. The
defendant von Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to negotiate a non-
aggression pact with the Soviet Union.
On the 22d August 1939 there took place the important meeting
of that day, to which reference has already been made. The prosecu"^
tion have put in evidence two unsigned capturcd documents which
appear to be reoordä made of this meeting by persons who were pres-
ent. The first document is headed: "The Fuehrer's speech to the
Commanders in Chief on the 22nd August 1939 . . ." The purpose of
the speech was to announce the decision to make war on Poland at
once, and Hitler began by saying :
"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring,
but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few
years, and only afterwards against the Fast ... I wanted to
establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to
fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable
to me, could not be executed since essential points have changed.
It became clear to me that Poland would attack us in case of a
conflict with the West."
Hitler then went on to explain why he had decided that the most f avor-
able moment had arrived for starting the war. ^'Now," said Hitler, /
"Poland is in the position in wliich I wanted her ... I am only '
afraid that at the last moment some Schweinhund will make a proposal
for mediation . . . A beginning has been made for the destruction
of England's hegemony."
This document closely resembles one of the documents put in evi-
dence on behalf of the defendant Raeder. This latter document con-
sists of a summary of the same speech, compiled on the day it was
made, by one Admiral Boehm, from notes he had taken during the
meeting. In substaiice it says that the moment had arrived to settle
the dispute with Poland by military invasion, that although a conflict
between Germany and the West was unavoidable in the long run, the
likelihood of Great Britain and France Coming to Poland's assistance
was not great, and that even if a war in \\\^ West should come about,
the first aim should be the crushing of the Polish military strength.
It also contains a Statement by Hitler that an appropriate Propaganda
reason for invading Poland would be given, the truth or falsehood
of which was unimportant, since "the Right lies in Victory."
The second unsigned document put in evidence by the prosecution
is headed: "Second Speech by the Fuehrer on the 22d August 1039,"
and it is in the form of notes of the main points made by Hitler.
Some of these are as f ollows :
31
\\%
V'--\
•I
1 '
"Everybody shall have to malce a point oi it that we were
determincd from the beginning to fight tlie Western Powers.
Sti-uggle for life or death . . . destruction of Poland m tlie
forecrround. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the
arriv^al at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the
West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective.
I shall give a Propagandist cause for starting the war— never
mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be
asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting
and maJdng a war, not the Right is what matters, but Vic-
tory ... The start will be ordered probably by Saturday morn-
ing." (That is to say, the 26th August.)
In spite of it being described as a second speech, there are sufficient
Points of similarity with the two previously mentioned docuinents
to make it appear very probable that this is an account of the same
speech, not as detailed as the other two, but in substance the same.
These three documents establish that the final decision as to the
date of Poland's destruction, which had been agreed upon and planned
earlier in the year, was reached by Hitler shortly before the 22d
Aucnist 1939. They also show that although he hoped to be able to
avotd having to fight Great Britain and France as well, he fully
realized that there was a risk of this happening, but it was a risk
which he was determined to take.
The events of the last days of August confirm this determmation.
On the 22d August 1939, the same day as the speech just referred to,
the British Prime Minister wrote a letter to Hitler, in which he said:
"Having thus made our position perf ectly clear, I wish to repeat
to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be
the greatest calamity that could occur."
On the 23d August, Hitler replied :
"The question of the treatment. of European problems on ä
peacef ul basis is not a decision which rests with Germany, but
primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles
Dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful
revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the re-
sponsible Powers can there be any real change in the relationship
between England and Germany."
There f ollowed a number of appeals to Hitler to ref rain from f orcing
the Polish issue to the point of war. These were from President
Roosevelt on the 24th and 25th August; from His Holmess the Pope
on the 24th and 31st August; and from M. Daladier, the Prime Minis-
ter of France, on the 26th August. All these appeals feil on deaf
ears.
32
On the 25th August, Great Britain signod a pact of mutual assistance
with Poland, which reinforced the understanding she had given to
Poland earlier in the year. This coupled with the news of Mussolini's
unwillingness to enter the war on Germany's side, made Hitler hositate
for a moment. The invasion of Poland, which was timed to start on
the 26th August, was postponed until a f urther attempt had been made
to persuade Great Britain not to intervene. Hitler offered to enter
into a comprehensive agreement with Great Britain, once the Polish
question had been settled. In reply to this, Great Britain made a
countersuggestion for the settlement of the Polish dispute by negotia-
tion. On the 29th August, Hitler informed the British Ambassaclor
that the German Government, though skeptical as to the result, would
be prepared to enter into direct ncgotiations with a Polish eniissary,
provided he arrived in Berlin with plenipotentiary powers by midnight
for the following day, August 30. The Polish Government were
informed of this, but with the example of Schuschnigg and Hacha
before them, they decided not to send such an emissary. At midnight
on the 30th August the defendant von Ribbentrop read to the British
Ambassador at top speed a document containing the first precise
formulation of the German demands against Poland. He refused,
however, to give the Ambassador a copy of this, and stated that in any
case it was too late now, since no Polish plenipotentiary had arrived.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the manner in which these ncgotia-
tions were conductcd by Hitler and von Ribbentrop showed that they
were not entered into in good faith or with any desire to maintain
peace, but solely in the attempt to prevent Great Britain and France
from honoring their obligations to Poland.
Parallel with these ncgotiations were the unsuccessf ul attempts made
by Goering to efFect the Isolation of Poland by persuading Great Brit-
ain not to stand by her pledged word, through the Services of one
Birger Dahlems, a Swede. Dahlems, who was called as a witness by
Goering, had a considerable knowledge of England and öf things
English, and in July 1939 was anxious to bring about a better under-
standing between England and Germany, in the hope of preventing a
war between the two countries. He got into contact with Goering as
well as with official circles in London, and during the latter part of
August, Goering used him as an unofficial intermediary to try and
deter the British Government from their Opposition to Germany's in-
tentions toward Poland. Dahlerus, of course, had no knowledge at the
time of the decision which Hitler had secretly announced on the 22d
August, nor of the German military directives for the attack on Poland
which were already in existence. As he admitted in his evidence, it
was not until the 2Cth September, after the conquest of Poland was
virtually complete, that he first realized that Goering's aim all along
had been to get Great Britain's consent to Germany's seizure of Poland.
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After all attempts to persuade Germany to agree to a settlement of
her dispute witli Poland on a reasonable basis had failed, Hitler, oii
the 3 Ist August, issued his final directive, in which he announced that
the attack on Poland would start in the early morning of the
Ist September, and gave Instructions as to what action would be taken
if Great Britain and France should enter the war in defense of Poland.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the events of the days immediately
preceding the Ist September 1939, demonstrate the determination of
Hitler and his associates to carry out the declared Intention of invad-
ing Poland at all costs, despite appeals from every quarter. With the
ever increasing evidence before him that this Intention would lead to
war with Great Britain and France as well, Hitler was resolved not
to depart from the course he had set for himself. The Tribunal is
fully satisfied by the evidence that the war initiated by Germany
against Poland on the Ist September 1939, was most plainly an aggres-
sive war, which was to develop in due course into a war which em-
braced alniost the whole world, and resulted in the commission of
count less crimes, both against the laws and customs of war, and against
humanity.
(G) The Invasion of Denmark and Norway
The aggressive war against Poland was but the beginning. The
aggression of Na^i Germany quickly spread from country to country.
In point of time the first two countries to suffer were Denmark and
Norway.
On the 31st May 1939, a treaty of nonaggression was made between
Germany and Denmark, and signed by the def endant von Ribbentrop.
It was there solemnly stated that the parties to the treaty were "firmly
resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Germany under all
circumstances." Nevertheless, Germany invaded Denmark on the 9th
April 1940.
On the 2d September 1939, after the outbreak of war with Poland,
Germany sent a solemn assurance to Norway in these terms :
"The German Reich Government is determined in view of the
friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany,
under no circumstance to prejudice the inviolability and integrity
of Norway, and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State.
In making this declaration the Reich Government naturally ex-
pects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable
neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches of
Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur.
Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ
from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party
o€curs, Üie Reich Government would then obviously be compelled
34
to safeguard the intcrests of the Reich in such a way*as the result-
ing Situation might dictate."
On the 9th April 1940, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, Norway
was invaded by Germany.
The idea of attacking Norway originated, it appears, with the do-
fendants Raeder and Rosenberg. On the 3d Oct^-bt^ 1930, Raeder
prcpr.rccl a r:;'jinorandum on the subject of "gaining bases in Norway,"
and amongst the questions discussed was the question: "Can bases be
gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to
carry this cut without figliting?" Despite this fact, 3 days later, fur-
thcr assurances were given to Norway by Germany, which stated :
^'Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points
of controversy with the Northern States and neither has she any
today."
Three days later again, the dcfendant Doenitz prepared a memoran-
dum on the same subject, namely, bases in Norway, and suggested the
establishment of a base in Trondheim with an alternative of supply-
ing fuel in Narvik. At the same time the defendant Raeder was in
correspondence wdth Admiral Karls, who pointed out to him the im-
portance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. On
the lOth October, Raeder reported to Hitler the disadvantages to
Germany which an occupation by the British would have. In the
months of October and November Raeder continued to work on the
possible occupation of Norway, in conjunction with the "Rosenberg
Organization." The "Rosenberg Organization" was the Foreign Af-
fairs Bureau of the NSDAP, and Rosenberg as Reichsleiter was in
Charge of it. Early in December, Quisling, the notorious Norwegian
traitor, visited Berlin and was seen by the defendants Rosenberg and
Raeder. He put forward a plan for a cowp d^etat in Norway. On
the 12th December, the defendant Raeder and the naval staff, together
with the defendants Keitel and Jodl, had a Conference with Hitler,
wheh Raeder reported on his interview with Quisling, and set out
Quisling's views. On the 16th December, Hitler himself interviewed
Quisling on all these matters. In the report of the activities of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP for the years 1933-43, under
the lieading of "Political prejDarations for the military occupation of
Norway," it is stated that at the interview with Quisling, Hitler said
that he would pref er a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as well
as the whole of Scandinavia, as he did not desire to extend the theater
of war, or to draw other nations into the conflict. If the enemy at-
tempted to extend the war he would be compelled to guard himself
against that undertaking. He promised Quisling financial support,
and assigned to a special military staff the examination of the military
questions involved.
35
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On the 27th January 1940, a memorandum was prepared by the
defendant Keitel regarding the plans for the invasion of Norway.
On the 28th February 1940, the defendant Jodl entered in liis diary :
"I proposed first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer
that 'Case Yellow' (that is the Operation against the Nether-
lands) and Weser Exercise (that is the Operation against Norway
and Denmark) must be prepared in such a way that they will
be independent of one another as regards both time and forees
employed."
On tlie Ist March, Hitler issued a directive regarding the Weser Ex-
ercise which contained the words :
"The development of the Situation in Scandinavia requires the
making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and
Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces. This Operation
should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the
Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and
give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against
Britain . . . The crossing of the Danish border and the landings
in Norway must take place simultaneously . . . It is most impor-
tant that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents
should be taken by surprise by our measures."
On the 24tli March the naval Operation Orders for the Weser Exercise
were issued, and on the 30th March the defendant Doenitz as Com-
mander in Chief of U-boats issued his operational order for the occu-
pation of Denmark and Norway. On the 9th April 1940, the German
f orces invaded Norway and Denmark.
From this narrative it is clear that as early as October 1939 the
question of invading Norway was under consideration. The defense
that has been made here is that Germany was compelled to attack
Norway to forestall an AUied invasion, and her action was therefore
preventive.
It must be remembered that preventive action in foreign territory
is justified only in case of "an instant and overwhehning necessity
for self-defense, leaving no choice of means and no moment of delibcra-
tion." (The Caroline Case, Moores Digest of International Law,
Vol. II, p. 412.) How widely the view was held in influential Ger-
man circles that the Allies intended to occupy Norway cannot be
determined with exactitude. Quisling asserted that the Allies would
intervene in Norway with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Govern-
ment. The German Legation at Oslo disagreed with this view, al-
though the Naval Attache at that Legation shared it.
The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for January
13, 1940, stated that the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff thought
that the most favorable Solution would be the maintenance of the
36
neutrality of Norway, but he harbored the firm conviction that Eng-
land intended to occupy Norway in the near future, relying on the
tacit agreement of the Norwegian Govemment.
The directive of Hitler issued on March 1, 1940, for tlie attack on
Denmark and Norway stated that the Operation "should prevent
British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic."
It is,iiowever, to be remembered that the defendant Eaeder's memo-
randum of the 3d October 1939 makes no reference to forestalling the
Allies, but is based upon "the aim of improving our strategical and
operational position."
The memorandum itself is headed "Gaining of Bases in Norway."
The same Observation applies mutatis mutandis to the memorandum
of the defendant Doenitz of October 9, 1939.
Furtliermore, on the 13th March the defendant Jodl recorded in
his diary :
"Fuehrer does not give order yet for W (Weser Exercise).
He is still looking for an excuse." (Justification ?)
On the 14th March 1940 he again wrote:
"Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for 'Weser
Exercise'."
On tl4e 21st March 1940 he recorded the niisgivings of Task Force
XXI about the long interval between taking up readiness positions
and the close of the diplomatic negotiations, and added :
"Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as othcrwise calls
for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put
up, it must be ruthlessly broken."
On April 2d he records that all the preparations are completed ; on
April 4th the Naval Operational Order was issued; and on the 9th
April the invasion was begun.
Froni all this it is clear that when the plans for an attack on
Norway were being made they were not made for the purpose of
forestalling an imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they
might prevent an Allied occupation at some future date.
When the final orders for the German invasion of Norway were
given, the diary of the Naval Operations Staff for March 23, 1940,
records :
"A mass encroachment by the English into Norwegian terri-
torial waters . . . is not to be expected at the present time."
And Admiral Assmann 's entry for March 26 says :
"British landing in Norway not considered serious.^
Documents which were subsequently captured by the Germans are
relied on to show that the Allied plan to occupy harbors and airports
^W
37
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in westem Norway was a definite plan, although in all points consid-
erably beliind the German plans under wliich the invasion was actually
carried out. These documents indicate that an altered plan had been
finally agreed upon on March 20, 1940, that a convoy should leave
England on April 5, and that mining in Norwcgian waters would
begin the same day; and that on April 5 the sailing time had been
postponed uiitil April 8. But these plans were not the cause of the
German invasion of Norway. Norway was occupied by Germany to
afford her bases from which a more effective attack on England and
France might be made, pursuant to plans prepared long in advance
of the Allied plans which are now relied on to support the argument
of self-defense.
It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in accord-
ance with the reservations made by many of the Signatory Powers
at the time of the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, whether
preventive action was a necessity, and that in making her decision her
judgment was conclusive. 03ut whether action taken under the claim
of self-defense was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be
subject to investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to
be-enforced.
jSI oTüggesti on is made by the defendants tliat there was any plan
by any belligerent, other than Germany, to occupy Denmark. No
excuse f or that aggression has ever been offered. ^ '
As the German armies entered Norway and Denmark, German
memoranda were handed to the Norwegian and Danish Governments
which gave the assurance that the German troops did not come as
enemies, that they did not ihtend to make use of the points occupied
by German troops as bases for Operations against England, as long as
they were not forced to do so by measures taken by England and
France, and that they had come to protect the North against the pro-
posed oceupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French
forces.
The memoranda added that Germany had no Intention of inf ringing
upon the territorial integrity and political independence of the King-
dom of Norway then or in the f uture. Nevertheless, on the 3d of June
1940, a German naval memorandum discussed the use to be made of
Norway and Denmark, and put forward one Solution for considera-
tion, that the territories of Denmark and Norway acquired during
the course of the war should continue to be occupied and organized so
that they could in the future be considered as German possessions.
In the light of all the available evidence it is impossible to accept
the contention that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were defen-
sive, and in the opinion of the Tribunal they were acts of aggressive
war.
38
(H) Tue Invasion of Belgium, tue Netherlands and L^uxemburg
The plan to seizo Belgium and the Netherlands was considered in
August 1938, when the attack on Czechoslovakia was being f ormulated,
and the possibility of war with France and England was contem-
plated. The advantage to Germany of being able to use thcse coun-
tries for their own purposes, particularly as air bases in the war
against England and France, was emphasized. In May of 1939, when
Hitler made his irrevocable decision to attack Poland, and foresaw
"the possibility at le^vSt of a w^ar with England and France in conse-
quence, he told his military Commanders:
"Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied . . .
Declarations of neutral ity must be ignored."
On 22 August in the same year, he told his military Commanders
that England and France, in his opinion, would not "violate the neu-
trality of these countries." At the same time he assured Belgium
and Holland and Luxemburg that he would respect their neutrality;
and on the 6th October 1939, after the Polish campaign, he repeated
this assurance. On the 7th October General von Brauchitsch di-
rected Army Group B to prepare "for the immediate invasion of
Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political Situation so demands."
In a series of Orders, which were signed by the defendants Keitel and
Jodl, the attack was fixed for the lOth November 1939, but it was
postponed from time to time until May of 1940 on account of weather
conditions and transport problems.
At the Conference on the 23d November 1939, Hitler said :
"We have an Achilles heel: The Euhr. The progress of the
war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and
France push through Belgium and Holland into the Euhr, we
shall be in the greatest danger . . . Certainly England and France
will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed.
England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium
and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium
and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England . . .
If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it
will be too late for us. We must anticipate tliem . . . We shall
sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This
mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting
point. England cannot live without its Imports. We can feed
ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts
will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur
if we have occupied Belgium and Holland . . . My decision is
unchangeable ; I shall attack France and England at the most
favorable and quiekest moment. Breach of the neutrality of
Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that
39
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wlien wo have \N'on. We shall not bring about tlie brcach of
neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the
neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack, tlie
war is not to be ended victoriously."
On the lOth May 1940 the German forces invaded the NetherlanJs.
Belgium, and Luxemburg. On the same day the German Ambassadors
handed to the Netherlands and Belgian Govemments a memorandmn
alle^ing tliat the British and French armies, with the consent of
Belgium and Holland, were planning to march througb those coun-
tries to attack the Ruhr, and justifying the Invasion on these grounds.
Germany, however, assured the Netherlands and Belgium that their
integrity and their possessions would bc respected. A similar memo-
randum was delivered to Luxemburg on the same date.
There is no evidence before the Tribunal to justify the contention
that the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg were invaded by Ger-
many because their occupation had been planned by England and
France. British and French staffs had been cooperating in making
certain plans for military Operations in the Low Countries, but the
purpose of this planning was to defend these countries in the event
of a German attack.
The invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg was entirely
without justification.
It was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and pre-
pared, and was plainly an act of aggi^essive war. The resolve to in-
vade was made without any other considerätion than the advance-
ment of the aggressive policies of Germany.
(I) The Aggression Against Yugoslavta and Greece
On the 12th August 1939, Hitler had a conversation with Ciano and
the def endant von Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg. He said then :
"Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for
the neutrals to be liquidated one af ter the other. This process
could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner
of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with the un-
certain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral
of this kind."
This Observation was made only 2 months after Hitler had given
assurances to Yugoslavia that he would regard her frontier as final and
inviolable. On the occasion of the visit to Germany of the Prince
Regent of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler had said in a public
speech :
"The firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to
Yugoslavia, now that owing to historical events we have become
40
neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only
guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and countries,
but can also represent an dement of calm to our nerve-racked
continent. This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to per-
form really constructive work."
On the Gth üctober 1939, Germany repeated these assurances to
Yugoslavia, after Hitler and von Ribbentrop had unsuccessfully tried
to persuade Italy to enter the war on the side of Germany by attacking
Yugoslavia. On the 28th October 1940, Italy invaded Greece, but
the military Operations met with no success. In November, Hitler
wrote to Mussolini with regard to the invasion of Greece, and the ex-
tension of the war in Balkans, and pointed out that no military Opera-
tions could take place in the Balkans before the f ollowing March, and
therefore Yugoslavia must if at all possible be won over by other
means, and in other ways. But on the 12th November 1940, Hitler
issued a directive for the prosecution of the war, and it included the
words :
"The Balkans: The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will
make prcparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of
the Aegean Sea, in case of need entering through Bulgaria."
On the 13th December he issued a directive concerning the Operation
"Marita," the code name for the invasion of Greece, in which he
stated :
"1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Be-
cause of a dangerous Situation in Albania, it is doubly necessary
that the British endeavor be foiled to crcate air bases under the
protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all
to Italy as to the Rumanian oil fields.
"2. My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task
force in Southern Rumania within the next month, (b) after the
setting in of f avorable weather, probably in March, to send a task
force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way of
Bulgaria and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland."
On the 20th January 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Mus-
sohni, at which the defendants von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl, and
others were present, Hitler stated :
"The massing of troops in Rumania serves a threef old purpose :
(a) An Operation against Greece;
(b) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;
(c) Safeguarding the guarantee to Rumania . . . It is desir-
able that this deployment be completed without interference from
the enemy. Therefore, disclose the game as late as possible.
The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the last possible mo-
nient, and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment."
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On the 19th Febniary 1941, an OKW directive regarding the Opera-
tion "Marita" stated :
"On the 18th February the Fuehrer made the f oUowing decision
regarding the carrying out of Operation Marita : The following
datos are envisaged : Commencement of building bridge, 28th
February; Crossing of the Danube, 2d March."
On the 3d March 1941, British troops landed in Greece to assist the
Greoks to resist the Italians; and on the 18th March, at a meeting be-
tween Hithr and the defendant Raeder, at whicli the defendants Keitel
and Jodl wcre also present, the defendant Raeder asked for confirma-
tion that the "whole of Greece will have to be occupied, even in the
event of a peaceful settlement," to which Hitler replied, "The com-
plete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement."
On the 25th March, on the occasion of the adherence of YugoslaTia
to the Tripartite Pact at a meeting in Vienna, the defendant von Rib-
bentrop, on behalf of the Germ an Government, confirmed the detenni-
nation of Germany to respect the sovereiguty and territorial integrity
of Yugoslavia at all times. On the 26th March the Yugoslav Min-
isters, who had adhercd to the'TTripartite Pact, were renioved from
Office by a coup (Vetat in Beigrade on their return from Vienna, and
the new Government repudiated the pact. Thereupon on 27_Marcli,
at a Conference in Berlin with the High Command at which the de-
fendants Goering, Koitel, and Jodl were present, and the defendant
von Ribbentrop part of the time, Hitler stated that Yugoslavia was an
uncertain factor in regard to the contemplated attack on Greece, and
even niore so with regard to the attack upon Russia which was to be
conducted later on. Hitler announced that he was determined, with-
out waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Government,
to make all preparations in order to clestroy Yugoslavia militarily and
as a national unit. He stated that he would act with "unmerciful
harshness." '
On the Gth April, Gern^^n forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia
w^thout wamTngPand Beigrade was bombed by theJLuftwaffe. So
swift was this particular Invasion that there had not been time to
\ estal)lish any "incidents" as a usual preliminary, or to find and publish
any adeqnate "political" cxplanations. As the attack was starting
on the Gth April, Hitler proclaimed to the German people that this
attack was neccssary because the British forces in Greece (who were
helping the Grecks to defend themselves against the Italians) repre-
sented a British attempt to extend the war to the Balkans.
It is clear from this narrative that aggressive war against Greece
and Yugoslavia had long been in contemplation, certainly as early as
August of 1939. The fact that Great Britain had come to the assist-
{Hice of the Greeks, and might thereafter be in a position to inilict
\
42
great damage upon German interests w^as made the occasion for the
occupation of both coimtries.
(J) Tue Aggressive: War Against tue Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
On the 23d August 1939, Germany signed the nonaggression pact
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The evidence has shown unmistakably that the Soviet Union on
their part conformed to the terms of this pact; indeed the German
(lovernment itself had been assured of this by the highest German
sources. Thus, the German Ambassador in Moscow informed his
Government that the Soviet Union would go to war only if attacked
by Germany, and this statement is recorded in the German War Diary
under the date of June G, 1911.
Nevertheless, as early as the late summer of 1910, Germany began
to make preparations for an attack on the USSR, in spite of the non-
aggression pact. This Operation was secretly planned under the code
name "Gase Barbarossa," and the former Field Marshai Paulus testi-
fied tliat on the 3d September 1940, when he joined the German Gen-
eral Staff, he continued developing "Gase Barbarossa," which was
finally completed at the beginning of November 1910; and that even
then, the German General Staff had no Information that the Soviet
Union was preparing for war.
On the 18th of Decembcr 1940, Hitler issued directive No. 21,
initialled by Keitel and Jodl, which called for the completion of all
preparations connected with the realization of ''Gase Barbarossa" by
the 15th May 1941. This directive stated :
"The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet
Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against
England . . . Great caution has to be exercised that the Intention
of an attack will not be recognized."
Before the directive of the 18th December had been made, the de-
fendant Goering had informed General Thomas, chief of the Office of
War Economy of the OKW, of the plan, and General Thomas made
surveys of the economic possibilities of the USSR including its raw
materials, its power and transport System, and its capacity to produce
arms.
In aceordance with these surveys, an economic staff for the Eastern
territories with many military-economic units (inspectorates, com-
raandos, groups) was created under the supervision of the defendant
Goering. In con j unction with the military command, these units were
to achieve the most complete and efficient economic exploitation of the
occupied territories in the interest of Germany.
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The framework of the future political and economic Organization
of the occupicd territories was designed by the defendant Rosenberg
over a period of 3 months, after Conferences with and assistance by
the defcndants Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Goering, von Ribbentrop,
and Frick or their representatives. It was made the subject of a most
detailed report immediately after the Invasion.
These plans outlined tlie destruction of the Soviet Union as an inde-
pendent State, and its partition, the creation of so-called Reich
Commissariats, and the conversion of Esthonia, Latvia, Byelorussia,
and other territories into German colonies.
At the same time Germany drew Hungary, Rumania, and Finland
into the war against the US SR. In December 1940, Hungary agreed
to participate on the promise of Germany that she should have certain
territories at the expense of Yugoslavia.
In May 1941 a final agreement was concluded with Antonescu, the
Prime Minister of Rumania, regarding the attack on the USSR, in
which Germany promised to Rumania, Bessarabia, northern Bukovina
and the riglit to occupy Soviet territory up to the Dnieper.
On the 22d June 1941, without any declaration of war, Glermany
,invaded Soviet territory in accordance with the plans so long made.
The evidence which has been given bcfore this Tribunal proves that
Germany had the design carefully thought out, to crush the USSR
as a political and military power, so that Germany might expand to
the east according to her own desire. In "Mein Kampf," Hitler had
written :
"If new territory werc to be acquired in Europe, it must have
been mainly at Russia's cost, and once again the new German
Empire should have set out on its march along the same road as was
formerly trodden by the Teutonic Knights, this time to acquire
soil for the German plough by means of the German sword and
thus provide the nation with its daily bread."
But there was a more immediate purpose, and in one of the memoranda
of the OKW, that immediate purpose was stated to be to f eed the Ger-
man armies from Soviet territory in the third year of the war, even if
'*as a result many millions of people will be starved to death if we take
ouToTthe country the thirigs necessary for us."
The final aims of the attack on the Soviet Union were formulated
at a Conference with Hitler on July 16, 1941, in which the defendants
Goering, Keitel, Rosenberg, and Bormann participated :
"There can be no talk of the creation of a military power west
of the Urals, even if we should have to fight 100 years to achieve
this ... All the Baltic reg^ons must become part of the
Reich. Tlie Crimea and adjoining regions (North of the Crimea)
must likewise be incorporated into the Reich. The region of the
44
Volga as well as the Baku district must likewise be incorporated
into the Reich. The Finns want Eastern Karelia.- However, in
view of the large deposits of nickel, the Kola peninsula must be
ceded to Germany."
It was contended for the defendants that the attack upon the USSR
was justificd because the Soviet Union was contemplating an attack
upon Germany, and making preparations to that end. It is impossible
to believe tliat this view was ever honestly entertained.
llie plans for the economic exploitation of the USSR, for the re-
moval of masses of the population, for the murder of commissars and
political leaders, were all part of the carefully prepared scheme
launched on the 22d June without warning of any kind, and without
the shadow of legal excuse. It was piain aggression.
;
(K) War Against tue UNrrEO States
Four days after the attack launched by the Japanese on the United
States fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Germany declared
war on the United States.
The Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, had been
signed on the 27th September 1940, and from that date until the attack
upon the USSR the defendant von Ribbentrop, with other defendants,
was endeavoring to induce Japan to attack British possessions in the
Far East. This, it was thought, would hasten England's defeat, and
keep the United States out of the war. «
The possibility of a direct attack on the United States was con-
sidered and discussed as a matter for the future. Major von Falken-
stein, the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations StaflF of the
OKW, summarizing military problems which needed discussion in
, Berlin in October of 1940, spoke of the possibility "of the prosecution
of the war against America at a later date". It is clear, too, that the
German policy of keeping America out of the war, if possible, did not
prevent Grermany promising support to Japan even against the United
States. On the 4th April 1941, Hitler told Matsuoka, the Japanese
Foreign Minister, in the presence of the defendant von Ribbentrop,
that Germany would "strike without delay" if a Japanese attack on
Singapore should lead to war between Japan and the United States.
The next day von Ribbentrop himself urged Matsuoka to bring Japan
into the war.
On the 28th November 1941, 10 days before the attack on Pearl
Harbor, von Ribbentrop encouraged Japan, through her Ambassador
in Berlin, to attack Great Britain and the United States, and stated
that should Japan become engaged in a war with the United States,
Germany would join the war immediately. A few days later, Japanese
representatives told Germany and Italy that Japa^n was preparing to
45
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attack tlie United States, and asked for their support. Germany and
Italy agreed to do this, although in the Tripartite Pact, Italy and
Gennany had undertaken to assist Japan only if she were attacked,
When the assault on Pearl Harbor did take place, tho defendant von
Ribbentrop is reported to have been "overjoyed," and later, at a cere-
mony in Berlin, when a German medal was awarded to Oshiina, the
Japanese Ambassador, Hitler indicated his approval of the tactics
which the Japanese had adopted of negotiating with the United
States as long as possible, and then striking hard without any declara-
tion of war.
Although it is true that Hitler and his coUeagues originally did not
consider that a war with the United States would be beneficial to their
interest, it is apparent that in the course of 1941 that view was revised,
and Japan was given every encouragement to adopt a policy which
would almost certainly bring the United States into the war. And
when Japan attacked the United States fleet in Pearl Harbor and
thus made aggressive war against the United States, the Nazi Govern-
ment caused Germany to enter that war at onee on the side of Japan by
declaring war themselves on the United States.
IV. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
The Charter defines as a crime the planning or waging of war that
is a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties.
The Tribunal has decided that certain of the defendants planned and
waged aggressive wars against 10 nations, and were therefore guilty
of this series of crimes. This makes it unnecessary to discuss the
subject in further detail, or even to consider at any length the extent
to which these aggressive wars were also "wars in violation of inter-
national treaties, agreements, or assurances." These treaties are set
out in appendix C of the indictment. Those of principal importance
are the f ollowing :
(A) Hague^ Conventions
In the 1899 Convention the signatory powers agreed: "before an
appeal to arms . . . to have recourse, as f ar as circumstances allow, to
the good Offices or mediation of one or more f riendly powers." A simi-
lar clause was inserted in the Convention for Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes of 1907. In the accompanying Convention
Relative to Opening of Hostilities, article I contains this far more
specific language :
"The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between
them must not commence without a previous and explicit warning,
in the form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an
Ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war."
Germany was a parly to these Conventions.
46
(B) Versailles Treaty
Breaches of certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty are also
relied on by the prosecution— not to f ortify the left bank of the Rhine
(art. 42-44) ; to "respect strictly the independence of Austria" (art.
80) ; renunciation of any rights in Memel (art. 99) and the Free City
of Danzig (art. 100) ; the recognition of the independence of the
Czecho-Slovak State; and the Military, Naval, and Air Clauses
against German rearmament found in part V. There is no doubt that
action was taken by the German Government contrary to all these
provisions, the details of which are set out in appendix C. With
regard to the Treaty of Versailles, the matters relied on are :
1. The violation of articles 42 to 44 in respect of the demilitarized
Zone of the Rhineland.
2. The annexation of Austria on the 13th March 1938, in violation
of article 80.
3. The incorporation of the district of Memel on the 22d March
1939, in violation of article 99.
4. The incorporation of the Free City of Danzig on the Ist S.^ptem-
ber 1939, in violation of article 100.
5. The incorporation of the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia on
the 16th March 1939, in violation of article 81.
6. The repudiation of the military naval and air clauses of the
treaty, in or about March of 1935.
On the 21st May 1935, Gei-many announced that, whilst renouncing
the disarmament clauses of the treaty, she would still respect the terri-
torial limitations, and would comply with the Locarno Pact. (With
regard to the first five breaches alleged, therefore, the Tribunal finds
the allegation proved.)
(C) Treaties of Mutual Guarantee, Arbitration, and
Non-Aggression
•
It is unnecessary to discuss in any detail the various treaties entered
into by Germany with other powei-s. Treaties of Mutual Guarantee
were signed by Germany at Locarno in 1925, with Bslgium, France,
Great Britain, and Italy, assuring the maintenance of the territorial
Status quo. Arbitration treaties were also executed by 'Germany at
Locarno with Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Poland.
Article I of the latter treaty is typical, providing :
"All disputes of every kind between Germany and Po-
land . . . which it may not be possible to settle amicably by
the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision
to an arbitral tribunal . . .**
Conventions of arbitration and conciliation were entered into be-
tween Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark in 1926; and be-
47
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twecn Gennany and Luxemburg in 1929. Nonaggression treaties wer©
executed by Germany witli Denmark and Russia in 1939.
(D) Kellogg-Brlvnd Pact
The Pact of Paris was signed on tho 27th August 1928 by Germany,
the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan,
Poland, and other countries; and subsequently by other powers. The
Tribunal has made füll reference to the nature of this Pact and its
legal cffoct in another part of this judginent. It is theref ore not neces-
sarv to discuss the matter f urtlier here, save to State that in the
opinion of the Tribunal this pact was violated by Germany in all the
cases of aggressive war charged in the indictment. It is to be noted
that on the 2Gth January 1934, Germany signed a Dv3claration for
the Maintenance of Permanent Peace with Poland, which was cx-
plicitly based on the Pact of Paris, and in which the use of f orce was
outlawed for a period of 10 years.
The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider any of the other
treaties referred to in the appendix, or the repeated agreements and
assurances of her peaceful intentions entered into by Germany.
(E) Tue Law of tue Charter
The Jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the Agreement and
Charter, and the crimes Coming within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
for which there shall be individual responsibility, are set out in
Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding upon the
Tribunal.
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legis-
lative power by the countries to which the German Reich uncondi-
tionally surrendercd ; and the undoubted right of these countries to
legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the
civilized world. The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power
on the part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the Tribunal,
as will be shown, it is the expression of international law existing
at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution
to international law.
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defiined the law it was
to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct of the
-trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one of them
might have done singly ; for it is not to be doubted thai any nation
has the right thus to set up special courts to administer law. With
regard to the Constitution of the court, all that the defendants are y
entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on the f acts and law.
The Charter makes the planning or waging of a war of aggression
"or a war in violation of international treaties a crime; and it is there-
fore not strictly necessary to consider whether and to what extent
48
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V
aggressive war ^as a crime bcfore fhe execution of the London
Agreement. But in view of the great importance of the questions
of law involved, the Tribunal has heard füll argument froni tho
V prosecution and the defense, and will express its view on the matter.
~~SP^ It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a fundamental prm- [^^ilrt
/ ciple of all law-international and domestio-is that there can be no ^^ •(.
^ punishment of crime without a preexisting la^y. "Nullum crtmetisine I
Uae, nulla poena sine lege:' It was submitted that ex post facto
p&ijnent is abhorrent to tho law of all civilized nations, that no
sovereign power had made a-rcssive war a crime at the time the
alleged criminal acts were committed, that no Statute naci uefined
aggressive war, that no penalty had bcen fixed for its commission,
and no court had been created to try and punish offenders.
In the first place, it is to be observed that the niaxim mW^m cnmen
. sine lege is not a limitatiou of sovcreignty, but is in general a prni-
ci^Te of fi'stice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in
d^anoe of treaties and assUJ^es have attacked neighboring statcs
without waming is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the
attacker must Imow that he is doing wrong, and so far from it be.ng
uniust to punish him, it would bejmjust ifjiig wrong were allowed
to CO unpunished. Occupying the positions they did in the govern-
-STentöf Germaii^the defendants, or at least some of them must have
known of the treaties signed by Germany, outlawing recourse to war
for the settlement of international disputes; they must have known
that they were acting in defiance of all international law when m
complete deliberation they carried out their designs of invasion and
aggression. On this view of the case alone, it would appear that the
maxim has no appücation to the present f acts. ^ ^ . . *
This view is strongly reinforced by a consideration of the state of
international law in 1939, so far as aggressive war is concerncd i he
' General Treaty for the Renunciation of War of August 27, 1928, more
generally known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Bnand Pact
was binding on 63 nations, including Germany, Italy, and Japan at
the outbreak of war in 1939. In the preamble, the signatories de-
clared that they were —
«Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare
of mankind; persuaded that the time has come when a frank
renunciation of war as an instrunient of national policy should
be made to the end that the peaceful and f riendly relations now
existing between their peoples should be perpetuated • • • alA
chanees in their relations with one another should be sought on y
by pacific means . . . thus uniting civilized nations of the world
in a common renunciation of war as an Instrument of tiieir na-
tional policy ..."
49
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The first two articles are as f oUows :
"Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare
in the names of their respective peoples that they condenin re-
course to war for the sohition of international controvereies and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations
to one another."
^'Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the set-
tlcnient or Solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature
or of whatever origin they may be^ which may arise among
thcm, feliaii never be souglit except by pacific means."
The question is, what was the legal effect of this paet? The nations
who signed the pact or adhered to it unconditionally condemned re-
course to war for the future as an instrument of policy, and expressly
renounced it. After the signing of the pact, any nation resortiiig to
war as an instrument of national policy breaks the pact. In the opin-
ion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of
national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war
is illegal in internatioiiallawj and that those who plan and wage such
a war"^ with its inevitaBlTand terrible consequences, are^conimitting
^crnne in sodoing. War for the Solution of international contro-
versies un'dertakeiTas an instrument of national policy certainly in-
cludes a war of aggression, and such a war is therefore outlawed by
the pact. As Mr. Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of State of the
United States, said in 1932:
"War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the
Kellogg-Briand Treaty. This means that it has become through-
out practically the entire world ... an illegal thing. Here-
after, when engaged in armed conflict, either one or both of them
must be termed violators of this general treaty law. . . We
denounce them as law breakers."
But it is argued that the^ct does not expressly enact that such
wars are crimes, or set up courts to try those who make such wars.
^^TtHatextenTthe same is true with regard to the laws of war con-
tained in the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention of 1907
prohibited resort to certain^hodsjof waging war. These included
the inhumane treatment of prisoners, the employment of poisoned
weapons, the improper use of flags of truce, and similar matters.
Many of these prohibitions had been enf orced long bef ore the date of
the Convention ; but since 1907 they have certainly been crimes, punish-
able as offenses against the laws of war ; yet the Hague Convention
nowhere designates such practices as criminal, nor is any sentence
prescribed, nor any mention made of a court to try and punish of-
fenders. For many years past, however, military tribunals have tried
and punished individuals guilty of violating the rules of land war-
50
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fare laid down by this Convention. In the opinion of the Tribunal,
those who wage aggressive war are doing that which is equal y illegal,
and of much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules of the
Ilaguo Convention. In interpreting the words of the pact, it must
be rcmembered that international law is not the product of an inter-
national Icgislature, and that such international agi-eements as the
Pact of Paris have to deal with general principles of law, and not with
administrative matters of procedure. The law of war is to be found
not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of states which
gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general prin-
ciples of justice applied by jurists and practiced by mihtary courts.
Tills law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs
of a changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do no mpre than
express and define for more accurate reference the principles of law
already existing. . , ,
The View which the Tribunal takes of the true Interpretation ot the
pact is supported by the international history which pieceded it. In
the vear 1923 the draf t of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance was spon-
Eored by ttfe League of Nations. In Ärticleltliö treaty declared that
a-gressivo war is an international crime," and that the parties would
"undertake tliat no one "3! them will be guilty of its commission.
The draft treaty was submitted to twenty-nine states, about halt ot
whom were in favor of accepting the text. The principal objcction
appeared to be in the difficulty of defining the acts which would con-
stitute "aggression," rather than any doubt as to the cnminality of
aggressive warJl The preamble to the League of Nations 192^ Pi:og£.oI
fSTthTPacific Settlemeut of International Disputes, ("Geneva Pro-
tocol") aft«r «recognising the solidarity of the members of the inter-
national Community," declared that "a war of aggression constitutes
a violation of this solidarity and is an international crime. It went
on to declare that the contracting parties were «desirous of f acilitat-
ine the complete application of the system provided in the Covenant
of the League of Nations for the pacific settlement of disputes between
the states and of ensuring the repression of mternational crimes.
The Protocol was recommended to the members of the League of
Nations by a unanimous resolution in the Assembly of the 48 members
of the League. These members included Italy and Japan, but Ger-
many was not then a member of the League.
Althou^h the Protocol was never ratified, it was signed by the
leadin<r statesmen of the world, representing the vast majority of
Üie civilized States and peoples, and may be regarded as strong evi-
dence of the Intention to brand aggressive war as an international
^t^the mecting of the Assembly of the League of Nations on the 24th
-"'^^ V September 1927, all the delegations then present (includmg the Ger-
k
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man, thc Italian, anJ tho Japanese), unanimously adopted a declara-
tion concerning wars of aggression. The preamble to the declaration
Btated :
"The Assembly: Eecognizing the solidarity which unites the
Community of nations;
Being inspired by a firm desire for the mainteiiance of general
peace ;
Being convinced tliat a war of aggression can never serve as
a mcans of settling international disputes, and is in consequence
an international crime * *
* 9J
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ii
The unanmious resolution of the ISth February 1928, of 21 Ameri-
can republics at the sixth (Havana) Pan-American Conference, de-
clared that "war of aggression constitutes an international crime
^gainst the human species."
"' All tliese expressions of opinion, and others that could be cited, so
solemnly made, reinforce the construction which the Tribunal placcd
upon the Pact of Paris, that resort to a war of aggression is not merely
illegal, but is criminal. The prohibition of aggressive war demanded
by tlie conscience of the world, finds its expression in the series of
Pacts and Treaties to whicli the Tribunal has just referred.
It is also important to remember that Article 227 of the Treaty of
Versailles provided for the Constitution of a special tribunal, com-
posed of i-eprcsentatives of five of the Allied and Associated Powers
which had been belligerents in the First World War opposed to Ger-
many, to try the former German Emperor "for a supreme offence
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties." The
purpose of this trial was expressed to be "to vindicate the solemn obli-
gations of international undertakings, and the validity of interna-
tional morality." In Article 228 of the Treaty, the German Govern-
ment expressly recognized the right of the Allied Powers "to bring
before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts
in violation of the laws nnrl customs of w^r.^^ . _-
t was submitted that international law is concerned with the ac-
%^H^
y^^tions of sovereign States, and provides no punishment for individuals;
and f urther, that where the act in question is an act of State, those
who carry it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by
the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. In the opinion of the
Tribunal, both these submissions must be rejected. That interna-
tional law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as
upon states has long been recognized. In the recent case of Ex parte
Quirin (1912 317 U. S. 1), before the Supreme Court of the United
States, persons were charged during the war with landing in the
United States for purposes of spying and Sabotage. The late Chief
Justice Stone, speaking for the court, said :
52
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"From the very beginning of its history this Court has applied
the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which
prescribes for the conduct of war, the status, rights, and duties of
enemy nations as well as enemy individuals."
He went on to give a list of cases tried by the courts, where individual
offenders were charged with oflences against the laws of nations, and
particularly the laws of war. Many other authorities could be cited,
but enough has been said to show that individuals can be punished
for violations of international law. Crimes against international law
gre^fninitted by nigin?iio t by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who comm
tional law be enforced.
77
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such crimes can tlie provisions of interna-
ThTprovisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles already re-
ferred to illustrate and enforce this view of individual responsibility.
The principle of international law, which under^certain circum-
stances, protects the representatives of a State,Qännot be applied to
acts whicITlEre^ condemned as criminal by international law. The
authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their ofTicial
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josition in order to beTTreed fronTpunishment in appropriate pro-
ceedings. Article 7 of the Charter expressly declares :
"The ofBcial position of defendants, whether as heads of State,
or responsible officials in govemment departments, shall not be
considered as freeing them from responsibility, or mitigating
punishment."
On the other band the very essence^of the Charter isthatj jpdividuals
have international duties whicfi tra^scend tlie national obligations of
obedience imposed by the individual^tate. He wTioviolates the laws
nfwar cannot obtain immunitv while acting m pursuance of thejau;
thority of the Statejf thf -^tf^^^ ^^ anthorizing action moves outside
its competence under international law.
^^
[t was also ^ubmitted on behalf of most of these defendants that in
doing what they did they were acting under the orders of Hitler, and
theref ore cannot be held responsible for the acts committed by them
in carrying out these Orders. The Charter specifically provides in
Article 8 :
"The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Govemment or of a superior shall not free him from responsi-
bility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment."
The provisions of this Article are in conformity with the law of all
nations. Tliat a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation of
tFe international law of war has never been recognized as a defense to
such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter hero provides, the order
may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The true test, which
Is found in varying degr€es in the criminal law
of most nations, is not the existence of the
Order, but whether motal choice was in fact
possible«
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is f üuud in var3Mng dcgrces in the criminal law of most nations, is not
tlio existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact
possible.
V. THE LAW AS TO THE COMMON PLAN CR CONSPJRACY
In the previous recital of the facts relating to aggressive war, it
is clear tliat planning and preparation had been carried out in the
most systematic way at every stage^of thgjiistory.
"nPlanning and preparation are essential to the making of war. In
the opinion of the Tribunal aggressive war is a crime under interna-
tional law. The Charter defines this offense as planning, prepara-
tion, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression "or participation in
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishtnent . . . of the
foregoing." The indictment follows this distinction. Count one
chargcs the common plan or conspiracy. Count two charges the
planning and waging of war. The same evidence has been introdueed
to Support both counts. We shall therefore discuss both counts to-
gether, as they are in substance the same. The defendants have been
charged under both counts, and their guilt under each count must
be determined.
The "common plan or conspiracy" charged in the indictment Covers
25 years, from the formation of the Nazi Party in 1919 to the end
of the war in 1915. The party is spoken of as "the instrument of co-
hesion among the defendants" for carrying out the purposes of the
conspiracy — the overthrowing of the Treaty of Versailles, acquiring
territory lost by Germany in the last war and "lebensraum" in Eu-
rope, by the use, if necessary, of armed f orce, of aggressive w ar. The
"seizure of power" by.the Nazis, the use of terror, the destruction of
trade unions, the attack on Christian teaching and on churches, the
persecution of the Jews, the regimentation of youth — all these are
Said to be steps deliberately taken to carry out the common plan.
It found expression, so it is alleged, in secret rearmament, the witli-
drawal by Germany from the Disarmament Conference and the
League of Nations, universal military Service, and seizure of the Rhine-
land. Finally, according to the indictment, aggressive action was
planned and carried out against Austria and Czechoslovakia in
1936-S8, followed by the planning and waging of war against Poland;
and, successively, against ten other countries.
The prosecution says, in efFect, that any significant participation in
the affairs of the Nazi Party or government is evidence of a participa-
tion in a conspiracy that is in itself criminal. Conspiracy is not defined
in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal the conspiracy
must be clcarly outlined in its criminal pnrpose. It must not be too far
removed from the time of decision and of action. The planning, to
be criminal, must not rest mcrely on the declarations of a party pro-
54 . '
gram, such as are found in the 25 points of the Nazi Party, announced
in 1920, or the political affirmations expressed in "Mein Kampf" in
later years. The Tribunal must examine whether a concrete plan to
wage war existed, and determine the participants in that concrete plan.
It is not necessary to decide whether a single master conspiracy be-
tween the defendants has been established by the evidence. The seiz-
ure of power by the Nazi Party, and the subsequent domination by the
Nazi State of all spheres of economic and social life must of course be
remembered when the later plans for waging war are examined. That
plans were made to wage w^ars, as early as November 5, 1937, and
probably before that, is apparent. And thereafter, such preparations
continued in many directions, and against the peace of many countries.
Indeed the threat of war — and war itself if necessary — was an integral
part of the Nazi policy. But the evidence establishes with certainty
the existence of many separate plans rather than a single conspiracy
embracing them all. That Germany w^as rapidly moving to complete
dictatorship from the moment that the Nazis seized power, and pro-
gressively in the direction of war, has been overwhelmingly shown in
the ordered sequence of aggressive acts and wars already set out in
this judgment.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the evidence establishes the common
planning to prepare and wage war^by certain of the defendants. It is
immaterial to consider whether a single conspiracy to the extent and
over the time set out in the indictment has been conclusively proved.
Continued planning, with aggressive war as the objective, has been
established beyond doubt. The truth of the Situation was well stated
by Paul Schmidt, official Interpreter of the German Foreign Office^ as
follows :
"The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent
from the start, namely the domination of the European Con-
tinent, to be achieved first by the incorporation of all German-
speaking groups in the Reich, and, secondly, by territorial expan-
sion under the slogan "Lebensraum.*' The execution of these basic
objectives, however, seemed to be characterized by improvisation.
Each succeeding step was apparently carried out as each new Sit-
uation arose, but all consistent with the ultimato objectives men-
tioned above."
The argument that such common planning cannot exist where therc
is complete dictatorship is unsound. Ajplanin the execution of which k
Qjiuöüier of persons participate is still a plan, even though conceived \
b^only^^e ofTRem; andThose who execute the plan do not avoid ,
responsibility by showing that they acted under the direction of the
man who conceived it. Hitler could not makejigp^essive war by him-
splf TIoJiadjtaJiayc^the^cQopcra^ '~ ^
diplomats, and businessmen. ^lenthey, with knowledge of bis aims
55
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gavehim their Cooperation, they made themselves partjes to the plan
^ri^had initiated. TTiey are not £o be deemeJ innocent becaüse Hitler
made use of tliem, if they knew what they were doing. Xhat they were
ffssigne^to ^.heiyj^^ks by a^dictator does not absolve them from re-
SDonsibihtv f orahcJE) acts. Tlie relation of leä
leader and follower does
not preclude responsibility here any more than it does in the compara-
ble tyranny of organized domestic crime.
Count one, however, charges not only the conspiracy to commit
aggressive war, but also to commit war crimes and crimes against
humanity. But the Charter does not define as a separate crime any
conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive war. Article 6
of the Charter provides :
"Leaders, Organizers, instigators, and accomplices participat-
ing in the formulation or execution of a common plan or con-
spiracy to commit any of the f oregoing crimes are responsible f or
all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan,"
In the opinion of the Tribunal, these words do not add a new and
separate crime to those already listed. The words are designed to
establish the responsibility of persons participating in a common
plan. The Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges in count one
that the defendants conspired to commit war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and will consider only the common plan to prepare,
initiate and wage aggressive war.
VI. WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The evidence relating to war crimes has been overwhelming, in its
volume and its detail. It is impossible for this judgment adequately
to review it, or to record the mass of documentary and oral evidence
that has been presented. The truth remains that war crimes were
committed on a vast scale, never before seen in the history of war.
They were perpetrated in all the countries occupied by Germany, and
on the high seas, and were attended by every conceivable circumstance
of cruelty and horror. There can be no"^öubt that the majority of
tEem arose from the^Nazi conception of "total war," with which the
aggressive wars were waged. For in thls conception of "total war"
the moral ideasunderlying the conventions^yrfardrgeek to make war
more humane are no longeFregarded as having forcgjor validity.
iverytlung is made subordmate tö the overmastering dictates of war.
Rules^ regulations, assurances, and treaties, all alike, are of no roo-
ment; and so, freed from the restraining^ iii^uence öf international
law, the aggressive warls conducted by the Nazi readersjn the most
barbäric way. Äccordingly, war crimes were committecL^d^^^ftfit
wiierever the Fuehrer and His close associates thought thena to be Jid«,
S«
vantageous. They were for the mostj3iUli|ic_result of cold and crimi-
nal calculation, •
'~T5n some occasions war crimes were deliberately planned long in
advance. In the case of the Soviet Union, the plunder of the terri-
tories to be occupied, and the ill-treatment of the civilian population,
were settled in minute detail before the attack was begun. As early
as the autumn of 1940, the Invasion of the territories of the Soviet
Union was being considered. From that date onwards, the methods
to be employed in destroying all possible Opposition were continu-
ously under discussion. ...^^
Similarlyjfwüen planning to exploit the inhabitants of the occupied ,
countries for slave labor on the very greatest scale, the German Gov-
ernment conceiveä it as an integral part of the war economy, and
planned and organized this particular war crime down to the luSfc ^
elaborate detail.
Other war crimes, such as the murder of prisoners of war who had
escaped and been recaptured, or the murder of commandos or cap-
tured airmen, or the destniction of^the Soviet comniissars, were the
result of direct orders circulatedT&rough the highest official Channels.
The Tribunal proposes, therefore, to deal quite generally with the
. question of war crimes, and to ref er to them later when examining
' the responsibility of the individual defendants in relation to them.
Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered, not only
in defiance of the well-established rules of international law, but in
complete disregard of the elementary dictates of hunianity. Civilian^
populations in occupied territories suffered tEe sämelate. Wliole 1
populations were deported to Germany for the purposes of slave labor
upon defense works, armament production and similar tasks con- J
nected with the war effort. Hostages were taken in very large num-
bers from the civihan populations in all the occupied countries, and
were shot as suited tlie German purposes. Public and private prop-
erty was systematically plundered and pillaged in order to enUrge
the resources of Germany at the expense of the rest of Europe. 'tSities.
and towns and villages were wantonly destroyed without military ^^
justification or necessity. ■
( A) Murder and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners of War
Article 6 (b) of the Charter defines war crimes in these words :
"War Crimes : namely, violations of the laws or customs of war.
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, miu-der, ill-
treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-
treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruc-
iti^
1
57
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tion of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity."
In the course of the war, many Allied soldiers wlio had surrendered
to the Germans were shot immediately, of ten as a matter of deliberate,
calculated policy. On the 18th October 1942, the defendant Keitel
circulated a directive authorized by Hitler, which ordered that all
members of Allied "commando" units, often when in uniform and
whether armed or not, were to be ''slaughtered to the last man,*' even
if they attempted to surrender. It w as further provided that if such
Allied troops came into the hands of the military authorities after
being first captured by the local police, or in any other way, they
shoutd be handed over immediately to the SD. This oi-der was sup-
plemeiited f rom time to time, and was effective throughout the re-
mainder of the war, although after the Allied landings in Normandy
in 1944 it was made clear that the order did not apply to "commandos"
captured within the immediate battle area. Under the provisions of
this order, Allied "comiiiando" troops, and other military units oper-
ating independently, lost their lives in Norway, France, Czecho-
slovakia, and Italy. Manj of them were killed on the spot, and in no
case were those who w'ereexecuted Täter In concentration camps ever
( giyen^a tri^of any kind. For example, an American military mis- •
sion wlncTlanded behind the German front in the Balkans in January
1945, numbering about 12 to 15 men and wearing uniform, were taken
to Mautliausen under the authority of this order, and according to the
affidavit of Adolf Zutto, the adjutant of the Mauthausen Concentration
Camp, all of them were shot.
In March 1944 the OKH issued the "Kugel" or "Bullet" decree,
which directed that every escaped officer and NCO prisoner of war
who had not been put to work, with the exception of British and
American prisoners of war, should on recapture be handed over to
the SIPO and SD. This order was distributed by the SIPO and
SD to their regional offices. These escaped officers and NGOs were
to be sent to the concentration camp at Mauthausen, to be executed
upon arrival, by means of a bullet shot in the neck.
In March 1944, 50 officers of the British Royal Air Force, who
escaped f rom the camp at Sagan where they were confmed as prisoners,
were shot on recapture, on the direct orders of Hitler. Their bodies
were immediately cremated, and the urns containing their ashes were
returned to the camp. It was not contended by the defendants that
this was other than piain murder, in complete violation of interna-
tional law.
When Allied airmen were forced to land in Germany they were
sometimes killed at once by the civilian population. The police were
instructed not to interfere with these killings, and the Ministry of
58
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Justice was informed that no one should be prosecuted for taking
part in them.
The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war \vas characterized by
particular inhumanity. The death of so many of them was not due
merely to the action of individual guards, or to the exigencies of life
in the camps. It was the result of systematic plans to murder. More
than a month before the German Invasion of the Soviet Union the
OICW were making special plans for dealing_^wiÜl_4)olitical repre
sentatives serving with the Soviet armed forces who might be captured.
Ofie~~propösal was that "political Commissars of the army are not
recognized as prisoners of war, and are to be liquidated at the latest
in the transicnt prisoner of war camps." The defendant Keitel gave
evidence that Instructions incorporating this proposal were issued
to the German army.
On the 8th September 1941, regulations for the treatment of Soviet
prisoners of war in all prisoner of war camps were issued, signed by
General Reinecke, the head of the prisoner of war department of the
high command. These orders stated :
'*The Bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim to treat-
ment as an honorable Opponent, in accordance with the Geneva
Convention , . . The order for ruthless and energetic action must
be given at the slightest indication of irtsubordination, especially
in the case of Bolshevist f anatics. Insubordination, active or pas-
sive resistance, must be broken immediately by force of arms
(bayonets, butts, and firearms) . . . Anyone carrying out the
Order who does not use bis weapons, or does so with insufficient
energy, is punishable . . . Prisoners of war attempting escape
are to be fired on without previous challenge. No warning shot
must ever bc fired . . . The use of arms against prisoners of war
is as a rule legal."
The Soviet prisoners of war were left without suitable clothing; the ^
wounded without medical care ; they were starved, and in many cases
left to die. .„.—-,
■^ On the I7th July 1941, the Gestapo issued an order providing for
the killiiig of all Soviet prisoners of war who were or might be danger- imjJai
ous to National Socialism. The order recited : ca««»^^
"The niission of the Commanders of the SIPO and SD sta- li'JKi^
tioned in Stalags is the political investigation of all camp in- ^
mates, tlie elimination and further 'treatment' (a) of all political,
criminal, or in some other way unbearable Clements among them,
(b) of thosc persons who could be used for the reconstruction of
iAH\
theoccupiedterritories .
Further, the con:imandcrs must make
efforts from the beginning to seek out among the prisoners ele-
722831 «»--^T-
59
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ments which appear reliable, regardless of whether there are Com-
munists concerned or not, in order to use them for Intelligenco
purposes inside of the camp, and if advisable, later in the occupied
territories also. \^y use of such informers, and by usc of all other
^ existing possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated
. among the prisoners must proceed step by step at once ...
t «T^ «Above all, the foUowing must be discovered : All important
''■V^y^ functionaries of State and Party, cspecially professional revolu-
ö>^ tionaries ... all People's Commissurs in the Red Army, leading
r Personalities of the State . . . leading persona lities of the busi-
y • ness World, members of the Soviet Russian Intelligence a^l Jews,
O J^ all persons who are found to be agitators or fanatical Commu-
nists. Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the imme-
diate vicinity of the camp ... The prisoners are to be taken for
special treatment if possible into the former Sovict Russian terri-
tory/^
The affidavit of Warlimont, deputy chief of staff of the Wehrmacht
«nd the testimony of Ohlendorf, former chief of Amt III of the
J^ält and iLahousen, the head of one of the sections of the Abwehr,
the We'hrmacht's Intelligence Service, all indicate the thoroughness
with which this order was carried out. „,.,..
The affidavit of Kurt Lindown, a former Gestapo official, states .
There existed in the prisoner of war camps on the Eastern
Frönt small Screening teams (Einsatz commandos), headedby
lower ranking members of the Secret Police (Gestapo) These
teams were assigned to the camp Commanders and had the ]ob of
segregating the prisoners of war who were candidates for execu-
tion according to the orders that had been given, and to report
^ thcm to the Office of the Secret Police."
' On the 23d October 1941, the camp Commander of the Gross Rosen
concen ration camp reported to Mueller, chief of the Gestapo, a hst
of thf "ovi^ prisoners of war who had been executed there on the
""Itacctunt of the geneml conditions and treatment of Soviet
nrtoners of tar durinj the first 8 months after the German attack
S;rRussfa was given^n a letter which the defendant Rosenbe^
sent to the defendant Keitel on the 28th February 1942 .
"The f ate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the
contrarv a tragedy of the greatest extent. ... A large part of
h them l-s «tarv«<i' - ^''^ ^^^^"" °* *' ''''''^' "
Thnimqncls also died from spotted fever.
V ^™camp c^^^^ bave forbidden the civilian popula jon
C ^ to put f ood at the disposal of the prisoners, and they havo rather
let them btarve to death. y^
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"In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer kecp up
on the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were shot
beforc the eyes of the horrified population, and the corpses were
left.
"In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war was
provided at all. They lay under the open sky during rain or
snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes or caves."
In some cases Soviet prisoners of war were branded with a special
permanent mark. There was put in evidence the OKW order dated
the 20th July 1942, which laid down that : '
"The brand is to take the shape of an acute angle of about 45
degrecs, with the long side to be 1 cm. in length, pointing upwards
and burnt on the left buttock . . . This brand is made with the
"" aid of a lancet available in any military unit. The coloring used is
Chinese ink."
The carrying out of this order was the responsibility of the military
authorities, though it was widely circulated by the chief of the SIPO
and the SD to German police officials for Information. --^^
Soviet prisoners of war were also made the subject of medical ex-
permients of thejnost cruel and inhuman kind^_ In July 1943, ex-
peniHintai work was begun in preparation f or a campaign of bacterio-
logical warf are; Soviet prisoners of war were used in thcse medical
expenments,''which more often than not proved fatal. In connec-
tion with this campaign for bacteriological warfare, preparations
were also made for the spreading of bacterial emulsions from planes,
with the object of producing widespread failures of crops and conse-
quent starvation. These measures were never applied, possibly be-
cause of the rapid deterioration of Germany's military position.
The argument in defense of the charge with regard to the murder
and ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, that the USSR was not
a party to the Geneva Convention, is quite without foundation. On
the 15th September 1941, Admiral Canaris protested against the
regulations for the treatment of Soviet ^'isoners of war, signed by
General Reinecke on the 8th September 1941. He then stated :
"The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war
is not binding in the relationship between Germany and the
USSR. Therefore only the principles of general international
law on the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the 18th
Century these have gradually been established along the lines that
war captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but solely pro-
tective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the prison-
ers of war from further participation in the war. This prin-
ciple was developed in accordance with the view held by all
armies that it is contrary to miUtary tradition to kill or injure
61
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helpless people . . . The decrees for the treatment of Soviel
prisoners of war enclosed are based on a fundamentally different
view-point."
This Protest, which corrcctly stated the legal position, was ignored.
The def endant Keitel made a note on this memorandum :
«The obie<;tions arise from the military concept of chivalrous
warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I
approve and back the measures."
(B) liluHDKR AND IlI.-TREATTMENT OF ClVILIAN POPUI.ATION
Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides that "ill-treatment . . . of
civilian Population of or in occupied territory . . . kilhng of hos-
r^es . . wanton destruction of eitles, towns, or v: lages ' shall be a
war crime. In the main, these provisions are merely declaratory of
Z existing laws of war as expressed by the Hague Convention,
Article 46, which stated :
"Family honor and rights, the lives of persons and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected."
The territories occupied by Germany were administered in violation
nf th« laws of war. The evidence is quit« overwhelmmg ot a sys-
tr^iclZ o1 violence, brutality, and terror. On the Tth Decemb^r
1941 Hitler issucd the directive since known as the "Nacht und Nebel
Erlass" (night and fog decree), under which persons who committed
offenses against the Reich or the Gernian forces m occupied terr.
tories, except where the death sentence was certain, were to be taken
s^iret y to Germany and handed over to the SIPO and SD for tna
r^mLhment in Germany. This decree wa. signed by the def endaiv^
Ke tel After these civilians arrived in Germany, no word of them
was p«mitted to reach the countiy from which they came, or their
"el tLs; even in cases when they died awaiting t-l the famihe^^
were not informed, the pul^ose being to create anxiety in the mmds
of the family of the arrested person. Hitler's purpose m issuing
this decree was stated by the defendant Keitel in a covenng letter,
dated 12 December 1941, to be as follows :
«Efficient and enduring intimidation can only be achieved
either by capital punishment or by measures by which the rela-
tives of the criminal and the population do not know the f ate of
the criminal. This aim is achieved when the cnminal is trans-
ferred to Germany."
Even persons who were only suspected of opposing any of the policies
of the German occupatio!! authorities were arrested, and on arrest
were interrogated by the Gestapo and the SD in the most shameful
62
manner. On the 12th June 1942, the chief of the SIPO and SD pub-
lished, through Mueller, the Gestapo chief, an order authorizing the
use of '-third degree" methods of interrogation, where proliminary m-
vestigation had indicated that the person could give inf ormation on
important matters, such as subversive activities, though not for the
purpose of extorting confessions of the prisoner's own crimes. This
Order provided :
". . . Third degree may, under this supposition, ^ only be
employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah's Witnesscs,
Saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute
agents, antisocial Clements, Polish or Soviet Russian loafers or
tramps ; in all other cases my permission must first be ob-
tained . . . Third degree can, according to circumstances,
consist amongst other methods of very simple diet (bread and
water), hard bunk, dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustive
drilling, also in flogging (for more than twenty strokes a doctor
must be consulted) ."
The brutal suppression of all Opposition to the German occupation
was not confined to severe measures against suspected members of
resistance movements themselves, but was also extended to their f ami-
lies. On the 19th July 1944, the Commander of the SIPO and SD in
the district of Eadom, in Poland, published an order, transmitted
through the higher SS and police leaders, to the effect that in all cases
of assassination or attcmpted assassination of Germans, or where Sabo-
teurs had destroyed vital installations, not only the guilty person, but
also all his or her male relatives should be shot, and f emale relatives
over IG years of age put into a concentration camp. ^
In the Summer of 1944 the Einsatz Commando of the SIPO and SD ^{J^^
at Luxemiuirg caused persons to be confined at Sachsenhausen concen- "^^^
tratloTcamp because they were relatives of deserters, and were there-
fore "expccted to endanger the interest of the German Reich if aM
lowed to go free."
The practice of kceping hostagcs to prevent and to punish any form
of civil disorder was resorted to by the Germans ; an order issued by the
defendant Keitel on the 16th September 1941, spoke in terms of fifty
or a hundred lives from the occupied areas of the Soviet Union for
one German life taken. The order stated that "it should be remembered
that a human life in unsettled countrics frequently counts for noth-
ing, and a deterrent eifect can be obtained only by unusual severity."
The exact number of persons killed as a result of this policy is not
known, but large numbers were killed in France and the other occu-
pied territories in the west, while in the east the slaughter was on an
even more extensive scale. In addition to the killing of hostages, entire
towns were destroyed in some cases ; such massacres as those of Ora-
dour-sur-Glane in France and Lidice in Czechoslovakia, both of ^vhich
63
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were described to the Tribunal in detail, are examples of the organized
use of terror by the occupying forces to beat down and destroy all
Opposition to their rule.
" One of the most notorious means of terroiizmg the people in oc-
cupied territories was the use of concentration camps. They were first
established in Gerraany at the moment of the seizure of power by the
Nazi Government. Their original purpose was to impnson without
trial all thosc persons who were opposed to the Government, or who
wei-e in any way obnoxious to German authority. With the aid of a
secret policc force, this practice was widely extended, and in course
of time concentration camps became places of organized and systematic
murder, where nijjlions of people were destroyed.
In the admmistration of the occupied territories the concentration
camps were used to destroy all Opposition groups. Tlie persons
arrested by the Gestapo were as a rule sent to concenüation camps.
They were conveyed to the camps in many cases without any care
whatever being taken for them, and great numbers died on the way.
Those who arrived at the camp were subject to systematic cruelty.
They were given hard physical labor, inadeguatejood, clothes, and
shelter and were subject at all times to the rigors of a soulless regime,
^^i^ß private whims of individual guards. In the report of the
War Crimes Brauch of the Judge Advocate's Section of the Third
United States Army, under date 21st June 1945, the conditions at the
Flossenburg concentration camp were investigated, and one passage
may be quoted :
"Flossenburg concentration camp can best be described as a
factoiy dealing in death. Although this camp had in view the
primary object of putting to work the mas^_sla.ve labor,- another
of its primary objects was the elimination of human lives by the
methods employed in handling the prisoners. Ilunger and star-
vation rations, sadism, inadequate clothing, meduHTneglect, dis-
e'äüTbeatings, hangings, freezing, forced suicides, shooting, etc.,
an played a major role in obtaining their object. Prisoners were
murdered at random; spite killings against Jews were common;
injections of poison and shooting in the neck were everyday occur-
rences; epidemics of typhus and spotted fever were peimitted to
run rampant as a means of eliminating prisoners ; life m this camp
meant nothing. Killing became a common thing— so common
that a quick death was welcomed by the unfortunate ones."
A certain number of the concentration camps were equipped with
gas Chambers for the wholesale destruction of the inmates, £^nd with
furnaces for the burning of the bodies. Some of them were, m fact,
used for the extermination of Jews as part of the "final Solution of
the Jewish Problem. Most of the non-Jewish inmates were used for
labor, although the conditions under which they worked made labor
64
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and death almost synonymous terms. Those inmates who became ill
and were unable to work were either destroyed in the gas Chambers
or sent to special infirmaries, where they were given entirely inade-
quate mcdical treatment, worse food, if possible, tlian the woiking
inmates, and left to die.
The murder and ill-trcatment of civilian populations reached its
height in the treatment of the Citizens of the Soviet Union and Poland.
Some 4 weeks before the Invasion of Kussia began, special task forces
of the SIPO and SD, called Einsatz groups, were f ormed on the Orders
of Himmler for the purpose of following the German armies into
Eussia, combating partisans and members of resistance groups, and
exterminating the Jews and Communist leaders and other sections of
the Population. In the beginning, four such Einsatz groups were
formed— one operating in the Baltic States, one toward Moscow, one
toward Kiev, and one operating in the south of Kussia. Olilendorf,
former chief of Amt III of the RSHA, who led the fourth group,
stated in his alTidavit :
"When the German army invaded Russia, I was leader of
Einsatzgruppe D, in the southern sector, and in the course of the
year during whicli I was leader of the Einsatzgruppe D it liqui-
dated approximately 90,000 mcn, women, and children. The
majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were also among
them some communist functionaries."
In an order issued by the defendantKeitel on the 23d of July
1941, and drafted by the defendant Jodl, it was" stated that—
"in view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the east, the
forces available for estabhshing security in these areas will be
sufficient only if all resistance is punished, not by legal prosecu-
tion of the guilty, but by the spreading of such terror by the
armed forces as is alone appropriate to eradicate every inclma-
^EioiTto resist among the population . . . Commanders must
^ find the means of keeping order by applying suitable draconian
measures.
))
The evidence has shown that this order was ruthlessly carried out
in the territory of the Soviet Union and in Poland. A significant
Illustration of the measures actually applied occurs in the docunient
which was sent in 1943 to the defendant Eosenbcrg by the Koich
Commissar for eastern territories, who wrote :
"It should be possible to avoid atrocities and to bury those
who have been liquidated. To lock men, w^omen, and children
into barns and set fire to them does not appear to be a suitable
method of combating bands, even if it is desired to exterminatc
the population. This method is not worthy of the German cause,
and hurts our reputation severely."
65
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Tlio Tribunal lias before it an affidavit of one Hermann Graebe,
dated 10 November 1945, describing the immense mass murders
which he witnessed. He was the manager and eiigineer in charge of
the branch of the Solingen firm of Josef Jung in Spolbunow, Ukraine,
from September 1941 to January 1944. He first of all described the
attack upon the Jewish ghetto at Rowno :
". . . Then the electric floodlights which had been erected
all round the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details
of four to six members entered or at least tried to enter the
houses. Where the doors and Windows were closed, and the iii-
habitants did not open upon the knocking, the SS men and militia
broke the Windows, forcod tlie doors with beams and crowbars,
and entered the dwelling. The owners were driven on to the
Street just as they were, regardless of whether they were dressed
or whether they had been in bed . . . Car after car was filled.
Over it hung the screaming of women and children, the cracking
of whips and rifle shots."
Graebe then described how a mass execution at Dubno, which he
witnessed on the 5th October 1942, was carried out :
". . . Now we hcard shots in quick succession from behind one
of the earth mounds. The people who had got off the trucks,
men, women, and children of all ages, had to undress upon the
Orders of an SS man, who carried a riding or dog whip . . .
Without screaming or crying, thcse people undressed, stood
around by f amilies, kissed each othcr, said f arewells, and waited
for the command of another SS man, who stood near the excava-
tion, also with a whip in bis band . . . At that moment the SS
man at the excavation called something to bis comrade. The
latter counted off about 20 persons, and instructed them to walk
behind the earth mound ... I walked around the mound and
stood in front of a tremendous grave; closely pressed together,
the people were lying on top of each other so that only their
heads were visible. The excavation was already two-thirds füll ;
I estimated that it contained about a thousand people . . . Now
already the next group approached, descended into the excava-
tion, lined themselves up against the previous victims and were
shot."
^ J.» The f oregoing crimes against the civilian population are sufficiently
^^' appalling, and yet the evidence shows that at any rate in the east, the
mass murders and cruelties were not committod solely for the purpose
of stamping out Opposition or resistance to the German occupying
forccs. In Poland and the Soviet Union these crimes were part of a
plan to get rid of whole native populations by expulsion and annihila-
tion, in ordcr that their Territory could be used for colonization by
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66
Germans. Hitler had wrlttcn in "Moni Kampf" on thcse lines, and
the plan was clearly stated by Himmler in July 1942, when he wrote :
'Tt is not our task to Germanize the east in the old sense, that
is to teach the people there the German language and the German
law, but to see to it that only people of purely Germania blood live
in the east."
In August 1942, the policy for the eastcrn territories as laid down
by Bormann w^as summarized by a subordinate of Kosenberg as fol-
lows :
"The Slavs are to work for us. Insof ar as we do not need them,
• they may die. Theref ore, compulsory vaccination and Germanic
health Services are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is un-
desirable."
It was Himmler again who stated in October 1943 :
"What happens to a ßussian, a Czech, does not interest me in the
slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of good blood of
our type, Ave w411 take. If necessary, by kidnapping their chil-
dren and raising them here with us. Whether nations live in
prosperity or starve to death interests me only insof ar as we need
them as slaves for our Kultur, otherwise it is of no interest to me."
In Poland the intelligentsia had been marked down for exteiroina:
tionas early as September 1939, and in May 1940 the def endanTlfi^
wrote in his diaiy of "taking advantage of the focussing of world in-
terest on the western front, by wholesale liquidation of thousands of
Poles, first leading representatives of the Polish intelligentsia."
Earlier, Frank had been directed to reduce the "entire Polish economy
to an absolute minimum necessary for bare existence. The Poles shall
be the slaves of the Greater German World Empire." In January 1940
he recorded in his diary that "cheap labor must be removed from the
generul government by hundreds of thousands. This will hamper the
native biological propagation." So successfully did the Germans
carry out this policy in Poland that by the end of the war one-third
of the population had been killed, and the whole of the country devas-
tated.
It was the same story in the occupied area of the Soviet Union. At
the time of the launching of the German attack in June 1941, Rosen-
berg told his collaborators :
"The object of feeding the German people Stands this year
without a doubt at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the
east and there the southern territories and the northern Caucasus
will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German
people . . . A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, with-
out any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard
years in störe for the Russians."
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Three or 4 wccks later Hitler discussed ^vith Rosenberg, Goering,
Keitel, and others his plan for the exploitation of the Soviet popula-
tion and territory, which included among other things the evacuation
of the inhabitants of the Crimea and its settlement by Gernians.
A somewhat similar fate was planned for Czechoslovakia by the
def endant von Neurath, in August 1940 ; the intelligentsia were to be
"expelled," but the rest of the population was to be Germanized rather
than expelled or exterminated, since there was a shortage of Germans
to renlace them.
In\he west the population of Alsace were the victims of a Ger-
man "expulsion action." Between July and December 1940, 105,000
Alsatians were either deported from their homes or prevented from
returning to them. A captured German report dated 7 August 1942
with regard to Alsace states that:
"The Problem of race will be given first consideration, and
this in such a manner that persons of racial value will be deported
to Germany proper, and racially inferior persons to France."
(C) PiLLAGE OF Public and Private Property
Article 49 of the Haguc Convention provides that an occupying
power may levy a contribution of money from the occupied territory
to pay for the needs of the army of occupation, and for the admin-
iftration of the territory in question. Article 52 of the Hague Con-
vention provides that an occupying power may make requisitions
m kind only for the needs of the army of occupation, and that these
requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources of the country.
These Articles, together with Article 48, dealing with the expenditure
of money coUected in taxes, and Articles 53, 55, and 56, dealing with
public property, make it clear that under the rules of war, the economy
of an occupied country can only be required to bear the expense of
the occupation, and these should not be greater than the economy of
the country can reasonably be expected to bear. Article 56 reads as
f ollows :
"The property of municipalities, of religious, charitable, educa-
tional, artistic, and scientific institutions, although belonging to
the State, is to be accorded the same standing as private prop-
erty. All premeditated seizure, destruction or damage of such
institutions, historical monuments, works of art, and science, is
prohibited and should be prosecuted."
The evidence in this case has established, however, that the terri-
tories occupied by Germany were exploited for the German war effort
in the most ruthlcss way, without consideration of the local economy,
and in consequence of a deliberate design and policy. There was in
truth a systematic "plunc^er of public or private property," which
68
was criminal under Article G (b) of the Charter. The German occupa-
tion policy was clearly stated in a specch made by the defendant
Goering on the Gth August 1912, to the various German authorities in
cjiarge of occupied territories:
"God knows, you are not sent out there to work for the weif are
of the people in your charge, but to get the utmost out of them, so
that the German people can live. That is what I expect of your
exertions. This everlasting concern about foreigu people nuist
cease now, once and for all. I have here befoi^ me reports on
what you are expected to deliver. It is nothing at all, when I
consider your territories. It makes no difference to me in this
connection if you say that your people will starve."
The methods employed to exploit the resources of the occupied
territories to the füll varied from country to country. In some of the
occupied countries in the east and the west, this exploitation was
carried out within the framework of the existing economic structure.
The local Industries were put under German supervision, and the dis-
tribution of war materials was rigidly controlled. The industries
Ihought to be of value to the German war effort were compelled to
continue, and most of the rest Avcre closed down altogether. Raw ma-
terials and the fmished products alike were confiscated for the needs
of the German industry. As early as the 19th October 1939 the de-
fendant Goering had issued a directive giving detailed instructions for
ihe administration of the occupied territories; it provided :
"The task for the economic treatment of the various adminis-
trative regions is different, depending on whether the country is
involved which will be incorporated politically into the German
Reich, or whether we will deal with the Government-General,
which in all probability will not be made a part of Germany. In
the first mentioned territories, the . . . safeguarding of all their
productive facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well as a
^ complete incorporation into the Greater German economic Sys-
tem, at the earliest possible time. On the other band, there must
be removed from the territories of the Government-General all
raw materials, scrap materials, machines, etc., which are of iise
for the German war economy. Enterprises which are not abso-
lutely necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked exist-
ence of the population must be transferred to Germany, unless
such transfer would require an unreasonably long pcriod of tnne,
and would make it more practicable to exploit those enterprises
^ by giving them German orders, to be executed at their present
location."
As a consequence of this order, agricultural products, raw mate-
rials needed by German f actories, machine tools, transportation equip-
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ment, other finislied products and even foreign securities and Holdings
of foreign exchange were all requisitioned and sent to Germany.
Tliese resources were requisitioned in a manner out of all proportion
to the economic resources of those countries, and resulted in famine,
Inflation, and an active black market. At first the German occupation
authorities attempted to suppress the black market, because it was a
Channel of distribution keeping local products out of German hands.
When attempts at suppression failed, a German purchasing agency
was organized to make purchases for Germany on the black market,
thus carrying out the assurance madc by the defendant Goering that
it was "necessary that all should know that if there is to be famine
any where, it shall in no case be in Germany."
In many of the occupied countries of the east and the west, tho
authorities maintained the pretense of paying for all the property
which they seized. This elaborate pretense of payment merely dis-
guised the f act that the goods sent to Germany from these occupied
countries were paid for by the occupied countries themselves, either by
the device of excessive occupation costs or by forced loans in return
for a credit balance on a "Clearing account" which was an account
merely in name.
In most of the occupied countries of the east even this pretense of
legality was not maintained; economic exploitation became deliberate
plunder. This policy was first put into effect in the administration
of the Government-General in Poland. The main exploitation of the
raw materials in the east was centered on agricultural products and
very large amounts of f ood were shipped from the Government-Gen-
eral to Germany.
The evidence of the widespread starvation among the Polish people
in the Government-General indicates the ruthlessness and the severity
with which tlie policy of exploitation was carried out.
The occupation of the territories of the U. S. S. R. was character-
ized by premeditated and systematic looting. Before the attack on
the U. S. S. R., an economic staff— Oldenburg— was organized to
ensure the most efficient exploitation of Soviet territories. The Ger-
man armies were to be f ed out of Soviet territory, even if "many mil-
lions of people will be starved to death." An OKW directive issued
before the attack said :
"To obtain the greatest possible quantity of food and crude
oil for Germany— that is the main economic purpose of the cam-
^Xy paign."
' Sinülarly, a declaration by the defendant Rosenberg of the 20th
£;P June 1941, had advocated the use of the produce from southern Russia
^ ^and of the northern Caucasus to feed the German people, saying:
"We see absolutely no reason for any Obligation on our part to
feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus
70
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territory. We know that tliis is a harsh necessity, bare of any
feelings."
IVlien the Soviet territory was occupied, this policy was put into
effect; piere was a large-scale confiscation of agricultural supplics,
with complete disregard of the needs of the inhabitants of the oc-
cupied territory. «p-ii
In addition to the seizure of raw materials and manufactured ar- '
ticles, a wholcsale seizure was made of art treasures, f urniture, textiles,
and similar articles in all the invaded countries. ApA<^
The defendant Rosenberg was designated by Hitler, on the_29th '
January 1940, hciid of the Center for National Socialist Ideological
and Educatioiial Research, and thereaf ter the Organization known as
the "Einsatzstab Rosenberg" conducted its Operations on a very great
Scale, öriginally designed for the establishment of a research library,
ircleveloped into a project for the seizure of cultural treasures. On
the Ist March 1942, Hitler issued a f urther decree, authorizing Kosen-
bef g'tö search libraries, lodges, and cultural establishments, to seize
niaterial from these establishments, as well as cultural treasures owned
by Jews. Similar directions were given where the ownership could
not be clearly established. The decree directed the Cooperation of the
Wehrmacht high command, and indicated that Rosenberg's activities ^
in the west were to be conducted in his capacity as Reiclisleiter, and \^ .'^^
in the east in his capacity as Reichsminister. Thereaf ter, Rosenberg's ' ^^^
activities were extended to the occupied countries. The report of
Robert Scholz, chief of the special staff for Pictorial Art, stated :
"During the period from March 1941 to July 1944 the special
staff for Pictorial Art brought into the Reich 29 large shipments,
including 137 freight cars with 4,174 cases of art works."
The report of Scholz refers to 25 portfolios of pictures of the most
valuable works of the art collection seized in the west, which portfolios
were prcsented to the Fuehrer. Thirty-nine volumes, prepared by the
Einsatzstab, contained photographs of paintings, textilos, furniture,
candelabra, and numerous other objects of art, and illustrated the
valne and magnitude of the collection which had been made. In many
of the occupied countries private collections were robbed, libraries
were plundered, and private houses were pillaged. "xJÄ,^
Museums, palaces, and libraries in the occupied territories of the~^^
USSTTwere systematically looted. Rosenberg's Einsatzstab, von Rib- ,^ z^-
bentrop's special "Battalion," the Reichscommissars, and reprosenta-i^^ ^
tives of the military command seized objects of cultural {incIliTsforical ^^0%
valiie belonging to the people of the Soviet Union, which were sent to *^^ C^'
Germany. Thus, the Reichscommissar of the Ukraine removed paint- ^
ings and objects of art from Kiev and Kharkov and sent thcm to East ^ ^^
Prussia. Rare volumes and objects of art from the palaces of Peterhof, "' ^*^
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Tsarskoye Selo, and Pavlovsk were shipped to Germany. In his letter
to llosenberg of the 3d October 1941, Reichscommissar Kube stated
that the value of the objects of art taken from Byelorussia ran into
niilhons of rubles. The scale of this plundering can also be seen in the
letter sent from Koseiibefg^s department to von Milde-Schreden m
wITicTi it IS stated that during the month of October 1943 alone, about
40 boxcars loaded with objects of cultural value were transported to
the Reich. /| ^,^ ^ xi. • 4=
With regard to the Suggestion thaf the purpose of the seizure ot
art treasures was protective and meant for their preservation, it is
necessary to say a f ew words. On the Ist December 1939, Himmler, as
tlie Reich Commissioner for the "strengthening of Germanism, is-
sued a decree to the regional officers of the secret police m the annexed
eastern territories, and to the Commanders of the security service in
Radom, Warsaw, and Lublin. This decree contained administrative
directions for carry ing out the art seizure program, and m clause 1
it is stated :
"To strengthen Germanism in the defense of the Reich, all
articles mentioned in section 2 of this decree are hereby confis-
cated . . . They are confiscated for the benefit of the German
Reich,* and are at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner for the
strengthening of Germanism."
The intention to enrich Germany by the seizures, rather than to pro-
tect the seized objects, is indicated in an undated report by Dr. Hans
Posse, director of the Dresden State Picture Gallery :
"I was able to gain some knowledge on the pubhc and private
collections, as well as clerical property, in Cracow and Warsaw.
It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from
the acquisition of great art works of paintings and sculptures, with
the exception of the Veit-Stoss altar, and the plates of Hans von
Kulnback in the Church of Maria in Cracow ... and several
other works from the national museum in Warsaw."
(D) Slave Labor Policy
Article 6(b) of the Charter provides that the "ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian popu-
lation of or in occupied territory" shall be a war crime. The laws
relating to forced labor by the inhabitants of occupied territories are
f ound Tn Article 52 of the Hague Convention, which provides :
"Requisition in kind and Services shall not be demanded from
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of
occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the
country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in
72
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the Obligation of taking part in military Operations against their
own country."
\The policy of the German occupation authoritles was in flagrant viola-
tion of the terms of this convcntionj Some idea of this policy may
bo gathcrod from the statement made by Hitler in a spcech on
November 9, 1941 :
"The territory which now works for us contains more than
250,000,000 nien, but the territory which works indirectly for us
includes now moro than 350,000,000. In the measure in which it
concerns German territory, the domain which we have taken under
our administration, it is not doubtful that we shall siicceed in
harnessing the veiy last man to this woik."
The actual results achieved were not so complete as this, butithc Ger-
man occupation authorities did succeed in forcing many of tne inhab-
itants of the occupied territories to work for the German war effort,
and in deporting at least 5,000,000 persons to Germany to serve German
' industry and agriculture. *
V In the early stages of the war, manpower ia^the occupied territories
vrasTüicIer the control of various occupatlon^authorities, and the pro-
cedure varied from country to country. In all the occupied territories
compulsory labor service was promptly instituted. Inhabitants of the
occupied countries were conscripted and compellcd to work in local
occupations, to assist the German war economy. In many cases they
were forced to work on German fortifications and military installa-
tions.Xvs local supplies of raw materials and local industrial capacity
beca*ike inadequate to meet the German requirements, the system of
deporting laborers to Germany was put into force. By the middle of
April 1940 compulsory deportation of laborers to Germany had been
ordered in the Government General ; and a similar procedure was
f ollowed in other eastern territories as they were occupied. A descrip-
tion of this compulsory deportation from Poland was given by Himm-
ler. In an address to SS officers he recalled how in weather 40° below
zero they had to "haul away thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds
of thousands." On a later occasion Himmler stated :
'-Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down from ex-
haustion while digging an antitank ditch interests me only insof ar
as the antitank ditch for Germany is finished . . . We must
realize that we have 6-7 million foreigners in Germany . . .
They are none of them dangerous so long as we take severe meas-
ures at the merest trifles."
During the first 2 years of the German occupation of France, Bel-
gium, Holland, and Norway, however, an attempt was made to obtain
the necessary workers on a voluntary basis. How unsuccessful this
was may be seen from the report of the meeting of the Central Plan-
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ning Board on the Ist March 194i. The representative of the def end-
ant Speer, one Koehrl, speaking of the Situation in France, said :
^'During all this time a great number of Frenchmen were re-
cruited, and voluntarily went to Germany." ^ V <o^
He was interrupted by the defendant Sauckel : ^^ jo • '
"Not only voluntary, some were recruited forcibly."
To which Koehrl replied :
"The calling up started after the recruitment no longer yielded
enough results."
To which the defendant Sauckel replied :
"Out of the five million workers wlio arrived in Germany, not
even 200,000 came voluntarily,"
and Koehrl rejoined:
"Let US f orget f er the moment whether or not some slight pres-.
sure was^ised. Formally, at least, they were volunteers."
Committees were set up to encourage recruiting, and a vigorous
Propaganda campaign was begun to induce workers to volunteer for
Service in Germany. This propaganda campaign included, for ex-
ample, the promise that a prisoner of war would be returned for every
laborer who volunteered to go to Germany. In some cases it was sup-
plemented by withdrawing the ration cards of laborers who ref used to
go to Germany, or by discharging them from their Jobs and denying
theni unemployment benefit or an opportunity to work elsewhere. In
some cases workers and their f amilies Avere threatened with reprisals
by the police if they ref used to go to Germany. It was on the 2 Ist
March 1942, that the defendant Sauckel was appointed Plenipoten-
tiary-General for the XJtilization of Labor, with authority over "all
available manpower, including that of workers recruited abroad, and
of prisoners of war."
The defendant Sauckel was directly under the defendant Goering
as Commissioner of the Four-Year Plan, and a Goering decree of the
27th March 1942, transferred all his authority over manpower to
Sauckel. Sauckel's instructions, too, were that foreign labor should
be recruited on a voluntary basis, but also provided that "where, how-
ever, in the occupied territories, the appeal for volunteers does not
suffice, obligatory service and drafting must under all circumstances
be resorted to." Kules requiring labor service in Germany were pub-
lished in all the occupied territories. The number of laborers to be
supplied was fixed by Sauckel, and the local authorities were in-
structed to meet these requirements by conscription if necessary.
That conscription was the rule rather than the exception is shown by
the Statement of Sauckel already quoted, on the Ist March 1944.
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The defendant Sauckel frequently asserted that the workers be-
longing to foreign nations were treated humanely, and that the con-
ditions in which they livcd were good. But whatever the Intention of
Sauckel may have been, and however much he may have desired that
foreign laborers should be treated humanely, the evidcnce before the
Tribunal establislies the fact that the conscription of labor was ac-
complished in many cases by drastic and violent methods. The "mis-
takes and Wunders" were on a vei7 great scale. Manhunts took place
in the streets, at motion picture houses, even at churches and at night
in private houses. Houses were sometimes burnt down, and the f am-
ilies taken as hostages, practices which were described by the de-
fendant Eosenberg as having their origin "in the blackest periods of
the slave trade." The methods used in obtaining forced labor from the
Ukraine appear from an order issued to SD oflicers w^hich stated : A^
"It will not be possible always to ref rain, from using f orce . . .
When searching villages, especially when it has been necessary
to burn down a village, the whole population will be put at the
disposal of the Commissioner by force ... As a rule no more
children will be shot ... If we limit harsh measures through
the above Orders for the time being, it is only done for the f ollow- ^
ing reason . . . The most important thing is the recruitment of
workers." f^^lOW^
The resources and needs of the occupied countries were completely
disregarded in carrying out this policy. The treatment of the labor-
ers was governed by Sauckel's instructions of the 20th April 1942 to
the eflfect that :
"All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way
as to exploit them to the highest possible extent, at the lowest
conceivable degree of expenditure."
The evidence showed that workers destined for the Eeich were sent
under guard to Germany, often packed in trains without adequate
heat, food, clothing, or sanitary facilities. IThe evidence further f^ > ^
showed that the treatment of the laborers in Germany in many cases ^'^ '^^
was bmtal and degrading. The evidence relating to the Krupp Works
at Essen showed that punishments of the most cruel kind were in-
flicted on the workers. Theoretically at least the workers were paid,
housed, and fed by the DAF, and even permitted to transfer their
savings and to send mail and parcels back to their native country ;
but restrictive regulations took a proportion of the pay ; the camps
in which they were housed were unsanitary ; and the food was very
often less than the minimum necessary to give the workers strength
to do their Jobs. In the case of Poles employed on f arms in Germany,
the employers were given authority to inflict corporal punishment and
were ordered, if possible, to house them in stables, not in their own
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homes. They were subject to consta.^t suporvision by tlie Gestapo
and the SS, and if they attempted to leave tlieir Jobs they were sent
to correction camps or conceiitration camps. iThc conccntration camps
were also used to increase the supply of lal^r.~üohceiilratiüii camp
commändors were ordered to work thoir prisoners to th.e liiiiils of their
Ijhysical power. During the latter stages of the war the concen-
tration camps were so productive in certahi types of work that the
Gestäpo^was actually histructed to arrest certain classes of laboiers
0 that they coiild be used in this way. [f Allied prisoners of war were
also regarded as a posslble scurce of labor. Pressure was exercised
on noncommissioned officers to force them to consent to work, by trans-
ferring to disciplinary camps those who did not consent. \TSlany of
the pnj^oncr,^>t^war were assigned to work directly related to mili-
taryo^ralioi^ violation of Artide 31 of the Geneva Convention.
They were put to woik in nnniition factories and even made to load
bombers, to carry ammunition and to dig trenches, often under tho
most hazardous conditions. This condition applied particularly to
the Soviet prisoners of warj On tlie 16th February 1043, at a meeting
of the Central Planning Board, at which the defendants Sauckel and
Speer were present, Milch said:
"We have made a rcquest for an order that a certain percentage
of men in the Ack-Ack artillery must be Kussians; 50,000 will
be taken altogether. ?>0,000 are already employed as gunners.
This is an amusing thing, that Eussians must work the guns."
And fön the 4th Octobcr 1913, at Posen, Himmler, speaking of the
Eussian prisoners captured in the early days of the war, said :
"At that time we did not value the mass of liumanity as we value
it today, as raw material, as labor. Whät, after all, thinking
in terms of genorations, is not to be regretted, but is now deplor-
able by reason of the loss of labor, is that the prisoners died in
tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaustion and hunger^
The general policy underlying the mobilization of slave labor was
stated by Sauckel on the 20th April 1942. He said :
"The aim of this new gigantic labor mobilization is to usc all
the rieh and tremendous sources conquered and secured for us
by our fighting armed f orces under the Icadership of Adolf Hitler,
for the armament of the armed forces, and also for the nutrition
of the Homeland. The raw materials, as well as tho fertility of
the conquered territories and their human labor power, are to
be used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany
and her Allies ... All prisoners of war f rom the territories of
the west, as well as the east, actually in Germany, must be com-
pletely incorporated into the German armament and nutrition
76
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Industries . . . Consequently it is an immediate necessity to use
the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the füllest
extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount
of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute con-
scription or forced labor . . . The complete employment of all
prisoners of war, as well as the use of a gigantic number of new
foreign civilian workers, men and wonaen, has become an in-
disputable necessity for the Solution of the mobilization of the
labor program in this war."
^/((R^renc^ should also be made to the policy which was in existence
in Germany by the summer of 1940, under which all aged, insane, and
incurable people, "useless eaters," were transferred to special institu-
tions wdiere they were killed, and their relatives informed that they
had died f rom natural causes. The victims were not confmed to Ger-
man Citizens, but included foreigii laborers, who were no longer able
to work, and were therefore useless to the üerman war machine. It
has been estimated that at least some 275,000 people were killed in this
manner in nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums, which were under
the Jurisdiction of the defendant Frick, in his capacity as Minister
of the Interior. How many foreign workers were included in this
total it has been quite impossible to determine.
(E) Persecution" of tue Je WS
The persecution of the Jews at the hands of the Nazi Government
has been proved in the greatest detail bef ore the Tribunal. It is a
record of consistent and systematic inhumanity on the greatest scale.
Ohlendorf, chief of Amt III in the RSHA froni 1039 to 1943, and
who was in command of one of the Einsatz groups in the campaign
against the Soviet Union testified as to the methods employed in the
extermination of the Jews. He said that he employed firing squads
to shoot the victims in order to lessen the sense of individual guilt on
the part of his men; and the 90,000 men, women, and children who
w^ere murdered in 1 year by his particular group were mostly Jews.
Wlien the witness Bach-Zelewski was asked how Ohlendorf could
admit the murder of 90,000 people, he replied :
"I am of the opinion that when, for years, for decades, the
doctrine is preached that the Slav race is an inferior race, and
Jews not even human, then such an putcome is inevitable."
But the defendant Frank spoke the final words of this chapter of
Nazi history when he testified in this covirt :
'We have fought against Jewry ; we have fought against it for
years ; and we have allowed ourselves to make utterances and my
own diary has become a witness against me in this connection —
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uttcrances wliich are terrible * * *. A thoiisand years will
pass and this guilt of Gemiany will still not be erased."
The anti-Jewish policy ^Yas formulated in point 4 of tlie party
program wliich declared, "Oiily a mcmber of tlie race caii be a citizoii.
A member of the race can only be one who is of German blood, w ithout
consideration of creed. Coiisequently, no Jew can be a member of
the race." Other points of the program declared that Jews sliould bo
treated as f orcigners, that they should not bo permitted to hold public
oflice, that they should be cxpelled f rem the Reich if it were impossible
to nourish the entire population of the State, that they should be denied
any further immigration into Germany, and that they should be pro-
hibited froin Publishing German newspapers. The Nazi Party
preached these doctrines throughout its history. "Der Stuermer" and
other publications were allowed to disseminate hatred of the Jews,
and in the speeches and public declarations of the Nazi leaders, tho
Jews were held up to public ridicule and contempt.
With the seizure of power, the persecution of the Jews was intcnsi-
fied. A series of discriminatory laws was passed, which limited the
Offices und prof essions permitted to Jews ; and restrictions were placed
on their family life and their rights of citizenship. By the autumn
of 1938, the Nazi policy towards the Jews had reached tlie stage
where it was directed towards the complete exclusion of Jews from
German life. Pogroms were organized, which included the burning
and domolishing of synagogues, the looting of Jewish businesses, and
the arrest of prominent Jewish businessmen. A collective fine of 1
billion marks was imposed on the Jews, the seizure of Jewish asscts
was authorized, and the movement of Jews w^as restricted by regula-
tions to certain specified districts and hours. The creation of ghettoes
was carried out on an extensive scale, and by an order of the security
police Jews were compelled to wear a yellow star to be worn on the
breast and back.
It was contended for the prosecution that certain aspects of this
anti^emitTcpoIicy*Avere connectecTwith the plans for aggi^cssive war.
The violent measures taken against the Jews in November 1938 were
nominally in retaliation for the killing of an official of the German
Embassy in Paris. But the decision to seize Austria and Czecho-
slovakia had been made a year before. The imposition of a fine of
1 billion marks was made, and the confiscation of the financial hold-
ino-s of the Jew^s was decreed, at a tiine when German armament
e::penditure had put the German treasury in difficulties, and when
the reduction of expenditure on arinaments was being considcred.
These steps were taken, moreover, with the approval of the defendant
Goering, who had been given responsibility for economic matters of
this kind, and who was the strongest advocate of an extensive re-
annament program notwithstanding the financial difficulties.
78
It was further said that the connection of the anti-Semitic policy
witli aggressive war was not limited to economic matters. The Ger-
man foreign office circular, in an article of January 25, 1939, entitled
"Jewish question as a factor in German foreign policy in the year
1938," described the new phase in the Nazi anti-Semitic policy in
these words :
"It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has
brought nearer the Solution of the Jewish question simultaneously
with the realization of the idea of Greater Germany, since the
Jewish policy was both the basis and consequence of the evento
of the year 1938. The advance made by Jewish influence and the
deßtructive Jewish spirit in politics, economy, and culture, para-
lyzed the power and the will of the German people to rise again,
more perhaps even than the power policy Opposition of the former
enemy Allied powers of the First World War. The healing of
this sickness among the people was therefore certainly one of
the most important requirements for excrting the force which,
in the year 1938, resulted in the joining together of Greater
Germany in defiance of the world."
The Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany before the war, severe
and repressive as it was, cannot compare, however, with the policy
pursued during the war in the occupied territories. Originally the
policy was similar to that which had been in force inside Germany.
Jews w^ere required to register, were forced to live in ghettoes, to Avear
the yellow stur, and were used as slave laborers. In the summer of
1941, however, plans were made for the "final Solution" of the Jewish
question in Europe. This "final solution^^ meant the extermina-
tion of the Jews, which early^hri939 Hitler had threatened would be
one of the cönsequences of an outbreak of war, and a special section
in the Gestapo under Adolf Eichmann, as head of section B-4, of the
Gestapo, was formed to carry out the policy.
The plan for exterminating the Jews was developed shortly after
the attack on the Soviet Union. Einsatzgrupi>en of the security
police and SD, formed for the piirpose of breaking the resistance of
the population of the areas lying behind the German armies in the
east, were given the duty of exterminating the Jews in those areas.
The'effectiveness of the work of the Einsatzgruppen is shown by the
f act that in February 1942, Heydrich was able to report that Esthonia
had already been cleared of Jews and that in Eiga the number of
Jews had been reduced from 29,500 to 2,500. Altogether the Einsatz-
gruppen operating in the occupied Baltic States kiUed over^l35^0
Jews in 3 months. '
'"TTor^idUTese special units operate completely indcpendently of the
German armed forces. There is clear evidence that leaders of the
79
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I
'I
i
i
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• 1
Einsatzgruppen obtained tlie Cooperation of army Commanders. In
one case the relations botween an Einsatz^uppe and the military
aiithorities was described at the time as being "very close, almost
cordial"; in another case the smoothness of an Einsatzcommando's
Operation was attributed to the " understanding for this procedure"
shown by the army authorities.
Units of the security police and SD in the occupied territories of the
east, which were linder civil administration, were given a similar
task. The planned and systematic character of the Jewish persccu-
tions is best illustrated by the original report of the SS Brigadier
General Stroop, who was in charge of the destruction of the ghetto
in Warsaw, which took place in 1943.. The Tribunal rfeceived in
evidence that report, illustrated with photographs, bearing on its
title page : *'The Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw no longer exists." The
volume "records a series of reports sent by Stroop to the higher SS
and Police Fuehrer east. In April and May of 1943, in one report,
Stroop wrote :
"The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could only be
suppressed by energetic actions of our troops day and
night. The Reichsfuehrer SS ordered therefore on 23 April
1943, the cleaning out of the ghetto with utter ruthlessncss and
merciless tenacity. I therefore decided to destroy and burn down
the entire ghetto, without regard to the armamcnt factories.
These factories were systematically dismantled and then burnt.
Jews usually left their hideouts, but f requently remained in the
burning buildings, and jumped out of the Windows only when
the heat became unbearable. They then tried to crawl with
broken bones across the street into buildings which were not affire
Life in the sewers was not pleasant after the first week.
Many times we could hear loud voices in the sewers . . . Tear
gas bombs were thrown into the manholes, and the Jews driven
out of the sewers and captured. Countless numbers of Jews
were liquidated in sewers and bunkers through blasting. The
longer the resistance continued, the tougher became the members
of the \Yaffen SS, Police, and Wehrmacht, who always discharged
^^' their ^udie^ in an exemplary manner."
Stroop recor Jed that his action at Warsaw eliminated "a provcd total
of 56,065 people. To that we have to add the number of those killcd
through blasting, fire, etc., which cannot be counted." Grim evidence
of mass murders of Jews was also presented to the Tribunal in cinema-
tograph films depicting the communal graves of Uundreds of vic-
tims, which were subsequently discovered by the Allies.
These atrocities were all part and parcel of the policy inaugurated
in 1941, and it is not surprising that there should be evidence that one
or two German ofiicials entered vain protests against the brutal manner
80
in which the killings were carried out. But the methods employed
never conformed to a single pattern. The massacres of Rowno and
Dubno, of which the German engineer Graebe spoke, were examples
of one method, the systematic extermination of Jews in concentration
camps, was another. Part of the "final Solution" was the gathering of
Jews from all German occupied Europe in concentration camps.
Their physical condition was the test of life or death. All who were
fit tdwork were used as slave laborers in the concentration camps; all
wlTo^efe not fit to work were destroyed in gas Chambers and their
bodies burnt. Certain concentration camps such as Treblinka and
Auschwitz were set aside for this main purpose. With regard to
Auschwitz, the Tribunal heard the evidence of Hoess, the commandant
of the camp from May 1, 1940 to December 1, 1943. He estimated
that in the camp of Auschwitz alone in that time 2,500,000 persons
were exterminated, and that a f urther 500,000 died from disease and
starvation. Hoess described the Screening for extermination by stat-
ing in evidence —
"We had two SS doctors on duty at Auschwitz to examine the
incoming transports . of prisoners. The prisoners would be
marched by one of the doctors who would make spot decisions as
they walked by. Those who were fit for work were sent into the
camp. Others were sent immediately to the extermination plants.
Children of tender years were invariably exterminated since by
reason of their youth they were unable to work. Still another
improvement we made over Treblinka was that at Treblinka the
victims almost always knew that they were to be exterminated
and at Auschwitz we endeavored to f ool the victims into thinking
that they were tg go through a delousing process. Of course,
frequently they realized our true intentions and we sometimes
had riots and difficulties due to that fact. Very frequently
women would hide their children under their clothes, but of
course when we f ound them we would send the children in to be
' exterminated."
He described the actual killing by stating :
"It took from 3 to 15 minutes to kill the people in the death
Chamber, depending upon climatic conditions. We knew when
the people were dead because their screaming stopped. We us-
ually w^aited about one-half hour before we opened the doors and
removed the bodies. After the bodies were removed our special
commandos took off the rings and extracted the gold from the
teeth of the corpses."
Beating, starvation, torture, and killing were general. The inmates
were subjected to cruel experiments at Dachau in August 1942 ; victims
wereminiers^d in cold water until their body temperature was reduced
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to 28° C, Avlien tlioy died imniediately. Other experiments included
high altitude experiments in pressure chainbers, experiments to deter-
mine how long human beings could survive in freezing water, experi-
ments with poison bullets, experiments with contagious diseases, and
experiments dealing with sterilization of nien and women by X-rays
and other methods.
Evidence was given of the treatment of the inmates before and af ter
their extermination. There was testimony that the hair of women
Tictims was cut off before they were killed, and shipped to Germany,
there to be used in the manuf acture of mattresses. The clothes, money,
and valuables of the inmates were also salvaged and sent to the appro-
priate agencies for disposition. After the extermination the gold
teetli and fillings were taken f rom the heads of the corpses and sent to
the Reichsbank. After cremation the ashes were used for fertilizer,
and in some instances attempts were made to utihze the füt f roni the
bodics of the victims in the commercial manuf acture of soap. Special
groups traveled through Europe to find Jcws and subject them to the
"final Solution." German missions were sent to such satellite countrics
as Hungary and Bulgaria^to arrange for the shipment of Jews to
extemnSlition camps and it is known that by the end of 1944, 400,000
Jews f rom Hungary had been murdered at Auschwitz. Evidence has
also been given of the evacuation of 110,000 Jews from part of^u-
f) ' mania for "liquidation." Adolf Eichmann, who had been put in
(oU^'^MCU Charge of this program by Hitler, has estimated that the policy pur-
sued rcsulted in the killing of 0,000,000 Jews, of which 4,000,000
were killed in the extermination institutions.
(F) The Law Eelating to War CraMi:s and Ckimes Against
HUMANITT
Article 6 of the Charter provides :
"(b) War erimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs
of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to,
murdcr, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas,
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified
by military necessity ;
"(c) Crimes against humanity: Namely, murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during the war,
or persec'iitions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execu-
tion of or in connection with any crime within the Jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law
of the country where perpetrated.'*
82
^
m
As heretofore stated, the Charter does not define as a separate crime
any conspiracy except the one set out in Article 6 (a), dealing with
crimes against peace.
The Tribunal is of course bound by the Charter, in the definition
which it gives both of war crimes and crimes against humanity. With
respect to war crimes, howcver, as has already been pointed out, the
crimes defined by Article 6, section (b), of the Charter were already
recognized as war crimes under international law. They were covcred
by Articles 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907, and
Articles 2, 3, 4, 46, and 51 of the Geneva Convention of 1929. That
violation of these provisions constituted crimes for which the guilty
individuals were punishable is too well settled to admit of argument.
But it is argued that the Hague Convention does not apply in this
case, because of the "general participation" clause in Article 2 of the
Hague Convention of 1907. That clause provided:
"The provisions contained in the regulations (rules of land
warfare) referred to ia Article I as well as in the present Con-
vention do not apply except between contracting powers, and
then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention."
Several of the belligerents in the recent war were notparties to this
Convention.
In the opinioA of the Tribunal it is not necessary to decide this
question. The rules of land w^arfare expressed in the Convention un-
doubtedly represented an advance over existing international law at
the tinie of their adoption. But the Convention expressly stated that
it was an attempt "to revise the general laws and customs of war,"
which it thus recognized to be then existing, but by 1939 these rules
laid down in the Convention were recognized by all civilized nations,
and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of
war which are referred to in Artide 6 (b) of the Charter.
A f urther Submission wasjnade that Germany was no longer bound
by the rules of land warfurein many oflhe territories occupied dur-
ing the war, becauseLÜ^rmany had completely SüMugated those coun-
tries and incorporatedjheni into theljerm an Reich, a fact which gave
Germany aüthorityTo^deä^ countries as though they
were part of Germany. In the view of the Tribunal it is unnecessary
in this case to decide whether this doctrine of subjugation, dependent
as it is upon military conquest, has any application where the sub-
jugation is the result of the crime of aggressive war. The doctrnie
was never considered to be applicable so long as there was an army in
the field attempting to restore the occupied countries to their true
owners, and in this case, therefore, the doctrine could not apply to
any territories occupied after the Ist September 1939. As to the war
crimes committed in Bohemia and Moravia, it is a sufficient answer
m\
83
that these territories were never added to the Reich, but a mere pro-
tectorate was established over them.
With rcgard to crimes against humanity, there is no doubt Avhatever
that political oppone^ts wcre murdered in Germany before the war,
and tliat many of them were kept in concentration camps in circum-
stances of great horror and cruelty. The policy of terror was cer-
tainly carried out on a vast scale, and in many cases was organized
and systematic. The policy of persecution, repression, and murder
of civilians in Germany before the war of 1939, who were likely to
be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out. The
persecution of Jews during the same period is established beyond all
doubt. To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts relied on
before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of , or in con-
nection with, any crime within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The
Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible as many of these
crimes were, it has not been satisf actorily proved that they were done
in execution of , or in connection with, any such crime. The Tribunal
therefore cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939
were crimes against humanity within the meauing of the Charter, but
from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes were committed
on a vast scale, which were also crimes against humanity ; and insof ar
as the inhumane acts charged in the indictment, and committed after
the beginning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they were all
committed in execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive war,
and therefore constituted crimes against humanity.
VII. THE ACCUSED ORGANIZATIONS
Article 9 of the Charter provides :
"At the trial of any individual member of any group or Organi-
zation the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of
which the individual may be convicted) that the group or Organi-
zation of which the individual was a member was a criminal
Organization.
"After receipt of the indictment the Tribunal shall give such
notice as it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to ask the Tri-
bunal to make such declaration and any member of the Organiza-
tion will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal f or leave to be heard
by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the
Organization. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject
the application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may
direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and
heard."
Article 10 of the Charter makes clear that the declaration of crimi-
nality against an accused Organization is final, and, cannot be chal-
84
lenged in any subsequent criminal proceeding against a member of
that Organization. Article 10 is as f ollows :
"In cases where a group or Organization is declared criminal
by the Tribunal the competent national authorily of any Signa-
tory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for mem-
bership therein before national, military, or occupation courts.
In any such case the criminal nature of the group or Organization
is considered proved and shall not be questioned."
The effect of the declaration of criminality by the Tribunal is well
iUustrated by law No. 10 of the Control Council of Germany passed on
the 20th day of December 1945, which provides :
"Each of the f oUowing acts is recognized as a crime :
« « ♦ * ♦ ♦ ♦
**(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or Organi-
zation declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.
" (3) Any person found guilty of any of the crimes above men-
tioned may upon conviction be punished as shall be determined
by the Tribunal to be just. Such punishment may consist of one
or more of the foUowing :
(a) Death.
(b) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or
without hard labor.
(c) Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard
labor, in lieu thereof ."
In effect, therefore, a member of an Organization which the Tribunal
has declared to be criminal may be subsequently convicted of the crime
of membership and be punished for that crime by death. This is not
to assume that international or military courts which will try these
individuals will not exercise appropriate Standards of justice. This
is a f ar-reaching and novel procedure. Its application, unless properly
safeguarded, may produce great injustice.
Article 9, it should be noted, uses the words "The Tribunal may
declare," so that the Tribunal is vested with discretion as to whether
it will declare any Organization criminal. This discretion is a judicial
one and does not permit arbitrary action, but should be exercised m
accordance with well-settled legal principles, one of the most impor-
tant of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punish-
ments should be avoided. If satisfied of the criminal guilt of any
oi-ganization or group, this Tribunal should not hesitate to declare it
to be criminal because the theory of "group criminality" is new, or
because it might be unjußtly applied by some subsequent tribunals.
85
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'III
1.
/
) \
On the otlier liand, tlie Tribunal sliould make such declaration of
criminality so far as possible in a manner to insure tliat innocent
persons will not be punislied.
A criminal Organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in .
that the essence of both is Cooperation for criminal purposes. There
must be a group bound together and organized for a common purpose.
The group must be formed or used in connection with the commis-
sion of crimes denounced by the Charter. Since the declaration with
respect to the organizations and groups will, as has been pointed out,
fix the criminaUty of its members, that definition should exclude per-
sons who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the
Organization and those who were draf ted by the State for member-
ship, unless they were pei^onally implicated in the commission of
acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as members of the
Organization. Membership alone is not enough to come withiri the
scope of these declarations.
Since declarations of criminality which the Tribunal makes will
be used by other courts in the trial of persons on account of their
membership in the organizations found to be criminal, the Tribunal
feels it appropriate to make the following recommendations :
1. That so far as possible throughout the four zones of occupation
in Germany the classifications, sanctions, and penalties be standard-
ized. Uniformity of treatment so far as practical should be a basic
principle. This does not, of course, mean that discretion in sentenc-
ing should not be vested in the court ; but the discretion should be
within fixed limits appropriate to the nature of the crime.
2. Law No. 10, to which reference has already been made, Icaves
punishment entirely in the discretion of the trial court even to the
extent of inflicting the death penalty.
The de-Nazification law of March 5, 1946, however, passed for
,Bavaria, Greater-Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-Baden, provides definite
sentences for punishment in each type of offense. The Tribunal
recommends that in no case should punishment imposed under law No.
10 upon any members of an Organization or group declared by the
Tribunal to be criminal exceed the punishment fixed by the de-Nazifi-
cation law. No person should be punished under both laws.
3. The Tribunal recommends to the Control Council that law No.
10 be amended to prescribe limitations on the punishment which may
be imposed for membership in a criminal group or Organization so
that such punishment shall not exceed the punishment prescribed by
the de-Nazification law.
The indictment asks that the Tribunal declare to be criminal the
following organizations: The Leadersliip Corps of the Nazi Party;
the Gestapo ; the S. D. ; the S. S. ; the S. A. ; the Keich Cabinet, and the
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.
86
(A) The Leadersuip Corps of tue Nazi Partt
Structure and component paris,—ThG indictment has named the
Loadership Corps of the Nazi Party as a group or Organization which
should be declared criminal. The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Paity
consisted, in effect, of the official Organization of the Nazi Party,
with Hitler as Fuelirer at its head. The actual work of runnmg
the Leadership Corps was carried out by the Chief of the Party
Chancellery (Hess, succeeded by Bonnann) assisted by the Party
Reich Directorate, or Eeichsleitung, which was composed of the
Reichsleiters, the heads of the functional organizations of the pju'ty,
as well as of the heads of the various main departments and offices
which were attached to the Party Reich Directorate. Under the
Chief of the Party Chancellery were the Gauleiters, with territorial
Jurisdiction over the major administrative regions of the party, the
Gaus. The Gauleiters were assisted by a Party Gau Directorate
or Gauleitung, similar in composition and in function to the Party
Reich Directorate. Under the Gauleiters in the Party hierarchy
were the Kreisleiters with territorial Jurisdiction over a Kreis, usually
consisting of a single county, and assisted by a Party Kreis Directorate,
or Kreisleitung. The Kreisleiters were the lowest members of the
party hierarchy who were full-time paid employees. Directly under
the Kreisleiters were the Ortsgruppenleiters, then the Zellenleiters,
and then the Blockleiters. Directives and Instructions were receiyed
from the Party Reich Directorate. The Gauleiters had the function
of interpreting such Orders and issuing them to lower formations.
The Kreisleiters had a certain discretion in interpreting Orders, but
the Ortsgruppenleiters had not, but acted under definite Instructions.
Instructfons were only issued in writing down as far as the Orts-
gruppenleiters. The Block and Zellenleiters usually received Instruc-
tions orally. Membership in the Leadership Corps at all levels was
voluntary. , , , i i <.-
On February 28, 1946, the prosecution excluded from the declaration
asked for all members of the staffs of the Ortsgruppenleiters and all
assistants of the Zellenleiters and Blockleiters. The declaration
sought against the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party thus includes
the Fuehrer, the Reichsleitnng, the Gauleiters, and their staff officers,
the Kreisleiters and their staff officers, the Ortsgruppenleiters, the
Zellenleiters, and the Blockleiters, a group estimated to contain at
least 600,000 people.
Äims and aetivities.-Thc primary purpose of the Leadership Corps
from its beginning was to assist the Nazis in obtaining and, after
JanuaiT 30, 1933, in retaining, control of the German State. The
machinery of the Leadership Corps was used for the widespread
dissemination of Nazi Propaganda and to keep a detailed check on
the political attitudes of the German people. In this actiTity the
87
; «
if
lower Political Leaders played a particularly important role. The
Blookleitcrs were instructed by tho Party Manual to report to the
Ortsgriippeiileiters all persons circulating damaging rumors or criti-
cisni of the regime. The Ortsgruppenleitei^, on the basis of informa-
tion siippliedlhem by the Blockleiters and Zellenleiters, kept a card
index of the people mithin their Ortsgruppe which recorded the f actors
which Avould be uscd in forming a judgment as to their political relia-
bility. The Loadership Corps was particularly active duriiig pleb-
iscites. All mcmbers of the Leadership Corps were active in getting
out the vote and insuring the highest possible proportion of "yes"
votcs. Ortsgruppenleiters and political leaders of higher ranks often
collaborated with the Gestapo and SD in taking steps to determine
those who refused to vote or who voted "no," and in taking steps
ao-ainst them which went as f ar as arrest and detention in a concentra-
tion camp.
Criminal activify.—Th^SQ steps, which rclate merely to the consoli-
dation of control of the Nazi Party, are not criminal under the view
of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war which has previously been
set forth. But the Leadership Corps was also used f or similar steps in
Austria and^those parts of Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Poland, France,
Belgium, Luxemburg, and Yugoslavia which were incorporated into
the Reich and within the Gaue of the Nazi Party. In those terri-
tories the machinery of the Leadership Corps was used for their Ger-
manization through the elimination of local customs and the detection
and arrest of persons who opposed German occupation. This was
criminal under Article 6 (b) of the Charter in those areas govcrned by
the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and criminal under Article 6 (c)
of the Charter as to the remainder.
The Leadership Corps played its part in the persecution of the Jews.
It was involved in the economic and political discrimination against
the Jews, which was put into effect shortly after the Nazis came into
power. The Gestapo and SD were instructed to coordinate with the
Gauleiters and Kreisleiters the measures taken in the pogroms^of
November 9 and 10, in the year 1938. The Lea^lßrsh^
used to prevent Gernian publicjopinjog from reacting against the
measures taken againstTp"trewriiiThe east 'Dn Öctoben)ri942^r '^
bullenn was sent t
leiters entitled "Preparatory Measures for the Final Solution of the
Jewish Question in Europe. Rumors concerning the Conditions of
the Jews in the Fast." This bulletin stated that rumors w^ere being
Started by returning soldiers concerning the conditions of Jews in the
east which some Germans might not understand, and outlined in detail
the official explanation to be given. This bulletin contained no explicit
Statement that the Jews were being exterminated, but it did indicate
they were going to labor camps, and spoke of their complete segrega-
88
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fr*'
tion and elimination and the necessity of ruthless seventy. Thus,
even at its face value, it indicated the utilization of the machinery of
the Leadership Corps to keep Geiman public opinion from rebelhng
at a program which was stated to involve condemning the Jews of
Europe to a lifetime of slavery. This information continued to be
available to the Leadership Corps. The August 1944 edition of Die
Laoe," a publication which was circulated among the political leaders,
desVibed the deportation of 430,000 Jews from Hungary.
The Leadership Corps played an important part in the admmistra-
tion of the slave labor program. A Sauckel decrec dated April 6, 1942,
appointed the Gauleiters as Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization
for their Gaue with authority to coordinate all agencies dealing witli
labor questions in their Gaue, with specific authority over the employ-
ment of foreign workers, includiiig their conditions of work, feedmg,
and housing. Under this authority the Gauleiters assumed control
over the allocation of labor in their Gaue, including the f orced laborers
from foreign countries. In carrying out this task the Gauleiters used
many party offices within their Gaue, including subordinate political
leaders For example, Sauckel's decree of September 8, 1942, relating
to the allocation for household labor of 400,000 women laborers
brought in from the east, established a procedure under which appli-
cations filed for such workers should be passed on by the Kreisleiters,
whose judgment was final. .
Under Sauckel's directive, the Leadership Corps was directly con-
cerned with the treatment given foreign workers, and the Gauleiters
were specifically instructed to prevent "politically inept factoiy
heads" fi^m giving "too much consideration to the care of eastem
workers " The type of question which was considered in their treat-
ment included reports by the Kreisleiters on pregnances among the
female slave laborers, which would result in an abortion if tbe ch.ld s
parentage would not meet the racial Standards laid down by the SS
and usually detention in a concentration camp for the female slave
laborer The evidence has established that under the supervision of
the Leadership Corps the industrial workers were housed in camps
under atrocious sanitary conditions, worked long houi-s, and were
inadequately fed. Under similar supervision, the agricultural
workers, who were somewhat better treated, were prohibited trans-
portation, entertainment, and religious worship and were worked
without any time limit on their working hours and under regulations
which gave the employer the right to inflict corporal punishment.
The political leaders, at least down to the Ortsgruppenleiters, were
responsible for this supervision. On May 5, 1943, a memorandum of
SoLann instructing that mistreatment of slave l«bo-rs cease was
distributed down to the Ortsgruppenleiters. Smilarly, on Novem-
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bor 10, 1944, a Speer circiilar transmitted a Hiinmler directive which
providcd that all niembers of the Nazi Tarty, in accordance with in-
structioiis fr.oiii the Kreisleiter, would be warned by the Ortsgruppen-
leiters of their duty to kcep foreign workers under caref ul Observation.
The Leadership Corps was directly concerned with the treatment
of prisoners of war. On November 5, 1041, Bormann transmitted a
directive down to the level of Kreislciter instructing them to insure
compliance by the army with the reccnt directives of the Department
of the Interior ordering that dead Russian prisoners of war shoiild
be buried wrapped in tar paper in a remote place without any cere-
mony or any decorations of their graves. On November 25, 1943,
Bormann sent a circular instructing the Gauleiters to report any
lenient treatment of prisoners of war. On September 13, 1944, Bor-
mann sent a directive down to the level of Kreisleiter ordering that
liaison be established between the Kreisleiters and the guards of the
prisoners of war in order "better to assimilate the commitment of the
prisoners of war to the political and economic demands." On Octo-
ber 17, 1944, an OKW directive instructed the officer in chargc of the
prisoners of war to confer with the Kreisleiters on questions of the
productivity of labor. The use of prisoners of war, particularly those
f rom the east, was accompanied by a widespread violation of the rules
of land warf are. This evidence establishes that the Leadership Corps
down to the level of Kreisleiter was a participant in this illegal treat-
ment.
The machinery of the Leadership Corps was also utilized in attempts
made to deprive Allied airmen of the protection to which they were
entitled under the Geneva Convention. On March 13, 1940, a direc-
tive of Hess transmitted Instructions through the Leadership Corps
down to the Blockleiter for the guidance of the civilian population
in case of the landing of enemy planes or parachutists, which stated
that enemy parachutists were to be immediately arrested or "made
harmicss." On May 30, 1944, Bormann sent a circular letter to all
Gau and Kreisleiters reporting instances of lynchings of Allied low-
level fliers in which no police action was taken. It was requested that
Ortsgruppenlciters be informed orally of the Contents of this letter.
This letter accompanied a propaganda drive which had been insti-
tuted by Goebbels to induce such lynchings and clearly amounted to
instructions to induce such lynchings, or at least to violate the Geneva
Convention by withdrawing any police protection. Some lynchings
were carriod out pursuant to this program, but it does not appear that
they were carried out throughout all of Germany. Nevertheless, the
existence of this circular letter shows that the heads of the Leadership
Corps were utilizing it for a p)urpose which was patently illegal and
which involved the use of the machinery of the Leadership Corps at
least through the Or.t^gruppenleiter.
90
Condusion.— The Leadership Corps was used for purposes which
were criminal under the Charter and involved the Germanization of
incorporated territory, the persecution of the Jews, the administration
of the slave labor program, and the mistreatment of prisoners of
war. The defendants Bormann and Sauckel, who were members of
this Organization, were among those who used it for these purposes.
The Gauleiters, the Kreisleiters, and the Ortsgruppenleiters partic-
ipated, to one degree or another, in these criminal programs. The
Reichsleitung as the staff Organization of the party is also responsible
for these criminal programs as well as the heads of the various staff
organizations of the Gauleiters and Kreisle itei-s. The decision of
the Tribunal on these staff organizations includes only the Amtsleiters
who were heads of offices on the staffs of the Reichsleitung, Gauleitung,
and Kreisleitung. With respect to other staff officers and party
organizations attached to the Leadership Corps other than the
Amtsleiters referred to above, the Tribunal will f ollow the Suggestion
of the prosecution in excluding them f rom the declaration.
The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the
Charter the group composed of those members of the Leadership Corps
holding the positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph who
became or remained members of the Organization with knowledge
that it was being used for the commission of acts declared criminal
by Article 6 of the Charter, or who were personally implicated as
members of the Organization in the commission of such crimes. Hie
basis of this finding is the participation of the Organization in war
crimes and crimes against humanity connected with the war; the
gi'oup declared criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who had
ceased to hold the positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph
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Ijrior to 1 September 1939.
(B) Gestapo and SD
Stntcture and component farts.—T\\Q prosecution has named Die
Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) and Die Sicherheitsdienst des
Keichsfuehrer SS (SD) as groups or organizations which should be
declared criminal. The prosecution presented the cases against the
Gestapo and SD together, stating that this was neccssary because of
the close working relationship between them. The Tribunal per-
mitted the SD to present its defense separately because of a dann
of conflicting interests, but af ter examining tho evidence has decided
to consider the case of the Gestapo and SD together.
The Gestapo and the SD were first linked together on June 2G,
1936 by the appointment of Heydrich, who was tho chief of the SD,
to the Position of chief of the security police, which was defincd to in-
clude both the Gestapo and the criminal police. Prior to that time the
SD had been the intelligence agency, first of the SS, and, after June 4,
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1934, of the entire Nazi Party. The Gestapo had been composed of the
Tarious political police forces of the several German Federal States
which had been unified under the personal leadership of Himmlei-,
with the assistance of Goering. Himmler had been appomted chief
of tlie German police in the Ministry of the Interior on June 17, 19^b,
and in his capacity as Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German po-
Hce issued his decree of June 26, 1936, which placed both the cnmmal
police, or Kripo, and the Gestapo in the security police, and placed
both the security police and the SD under the command of Heydrich.
This consolidation under the leadership of Heydrich of the security
police, a State Organization, and the SD, a party Organization, ivas
formalized by the decree of September 27, 1939, which united the
various State and party offices which were under Heydrich as chiet
of the security police and SD into one administrative unit, the Eeichs
Security Head Office (ESHA) which was at the same time both one
of the principal offices (Hauptamter) of the SS under Himmler as
Reichsfuehrer SS and an office in the Ministry of the Interior under
Himmler as chief of the German police. The internal structure of the
RSHA Shows the manner in which it consolidated the offices of the
security police with those of the SD. The ESHA was divided into
seven offices (Amter), two of which (Amt I and Amt II) dealt with
administrative matters. The security police were represented by Amt
IV, the head office of the Gestapo, and by Amt V, the head office of the
criminal police. The SD were represented by Amt III, the head of-
fice for SD activities inside Germany, by Amt VI, the head office for
SD activities outside of Germany and by Amt VII, the office for
ideological research. Shortly after the creation of the RSHA, m
November 1939, the security police was "coordinated" with the bS by
taking all officials of the Gestapo and criminal police into the SS at
ranks equivalent to their positions.
The creation of the ESHA represented the f ormalization, at the top
level, of the relationship under which the SD served as the intelligence
agency for the security police. A similar coordination existed in the
local Offices. Within Germany and areas which were mcorporated
within the Eeich for the purpose of civil administration, local offices
of the Gestapo, criminal police, and SD were f ormally separate. They
were subject to coordination by inspectors of the security police and
SD on the staffs of the local higher SS and police leaders, however,
and one of the principal functions of the local SD units was to serve
as the intelligence agency for the local Gestapo units. In the occupied
territories the formal relationship between local units of the Gestapo,
criminal police, and SD was slightly closer. They were organized into
local units of the security police and SD and were under the control
of both the RSHA and of the higher SS and police leader who was
appointed by Himmler to serve on the staff of the occupying author-
92
ity. The offices of the security police and SD in occupied territory
were composed of departments corresponding to the various Amts of
the RSHA. In occupied territories which were still considered to be
operational military areas or where German control had not been f or-
mally established, the Organization of the security police and SD was
only slightly changed. Members of the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD were
joined togeCher into military type organizations known as liinsatz
Kommandos and Einsatzgruppen in which the key positions were held
by members of the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD and in which members of
the Order police, the Waffen SS and even the Wehrmacht were used
as auxiliaries. These organizations were under the over-all control
of the RSHA, but in front line areas were under the operational con-
trol of the appropriate army Commander.
It can thus be seen that f rom a functional point of view both the
Gestapo and the SD were important and closely related groups within
the Organization of the security police and the SD. The security
police and SD were under a single command, that of Heydrich and
later Kaltenbrunner, as chief of the security police and SD ; it had a
Single headquarters, the ESHA ; it had its own command Channels
and worked as one Organization in Germany, in occupied territories,
and in the areas immediately behind the front lines. During the
period with which the Tribunal is primarily concerned, applicants
for positions in the security police and SD received training in all its
components, the Gestapo, criminal police, and SD. Some conf usion
has been caused by the fact that part of the Organization was tech-
nically a formation of the Nazi Party while another part of the
Organization was an office in the Government, but this is of no par-
ticular significance in view of the law of December 1, 1933, declaring
the unity of the Nazi Party and the German State.
The security police and SD was a voluntary Organization. It is
true that many civil servants and administrative officials were trans-
ferred into the security police. The claim that this transfer was
compulsory amounts to nothing more than the claim that they had
to accept the transfer or resign their positions, with a possibility of
having incurred official disfavor. During the war a member of the
security police and SD did not have a free choice of assignments within
that Organization and the refusal to accept a particular position, espe-
cially when serving in occupied territory, might have led to serious
punishment. The fact remains, however, that all members of the
security police and SD joined the Organization voluntarily under no
other sanction than the desire to retain their positions as officials.
The Organization of the security police and SD also included three
special units which must be dealt with separately. The first of these
was the frontier police or Granzpolizei which came under the control
of the Gestapo in 1937. Their duties consisted in the control of pas-
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sage over the borders of Germany. They arrested persons who crossed
iUcgally It is also clear from the evidence presented that
they received directives from the Gestapo to transfer loreign workers
whom they apprehended to concentration camps. They could also
request the local offices of the Gestapo for pernüssion to commit per-
sons arrested to concentration camps. The Tribunal is of the opinK)n
that thö f rontier police must be included in the charge of crimmality
against the Gestapo.
The border and customs protection or Zollgrenschutz became part
of the Gestapo in the summer of 1944. The functions of this organi-
zation were similar to the f rontier police in enforcmg border regula-
tions with particular respeet to the prevention of smugghng. It does
not appear, however, that their transfer was complete but that about
half oi their personnel of 54,000 remained under the Reich Fman^e
Administration or the order police. A f ew days bef ore the end of the
war the whole Organization was transferred back to the Ecich Fmance
Administration. The transfer of the Organization to the Gestapo
was so late and it participated so little in the over-all activities of the
Organization that the Tribunal does not feel that it should be dealt
with in considering the criminality of the Gestapo.
The third Organization was the so-called secret field police which
was originally under the army but which in 1942 was transferred by
military order to the security police. The secret field police was
concerned with security matters within the army in occupied territory,
and also with the prevention of attacks by civilians on military instal-
lations or units, and committed war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity on a wide scale. It has not been proved, however, that it was
a part of the Gestapo and the Tribunal does not consider it as commg
within the Charge of criminality contained in the i^^ictment, except
such members as may have been transferred to Amt IV of the RbHA
or were members of organizations declared criminal by this judgment.
Cnminal activity. -OviginMy, one of the primary functions of the
Gestapo was the prevention of any political Opposition to the Nazi
regime, a f unction which it performed with the assistance of the bD.
The Principal weapon used in performing this function was the con-
centration camp. The Gestapo did not have administrative control
over the concentration camps, but, acting through the RSHA, was
responsible for the detention of political prisoners in those camps.
Gestapo officials were usually responsible for the interrogation of po-
litical prisoners at the camps.
Tlie Gestapo and the SD also dealt with charges of treason and
with questions relating to the press, the churches, and the Jews. As
the Nazi program of anti-Semitic persecution increased m mt^nsity
the rolo played by these groups became increasmgly important. in
the early morning of November 10, 1938, Heydrich sent a t^legram
94
to all Offices of the Gestapo and SD giving instructions for the Organ-
ization of the iX)groms of that date and instructing them to arrest as
many Jews as the prisons could hold "especially rieh ones," but to be
careful that those arrested were healthy and not too old. By Novem-
ber 11, 1938, 20,000 Jews had been arrested and many were sent to
concentration camps. On January 24, 1939, Heydrich, the chief of the
security police and SD, was charged with furthering the emigration
and evacuation of Jews from Germany, and on July 31, 1941, with
bringing ffbout a complete Solution of the Jewish problem in German
clominated Europe. A special section of the Gestapo office of the
RSHA under Standartenf uehrer Eichmann was set up with responsi-
bility for Je\vish matters which employed its own agents to investi-
gate the Jewish problem in occupied territory. Local offices of the
Gestapo were used first to supervise the emigration of Jews and later
to deport them to the east both from Germany and from the territories
occupied during the war. Einsatzgruppen of the security police and
SD operating behind the lines of the eastern front engaged in the
Wholesale massacre of Jews. A special detachment from Gestapo
headquarters in the RSHA was used to arrange for the deport ation
of Jews from Axis satellites to Germany for the "final Solution."
Local Offices of the security police and SD played an important role
in the German administration of occupied territories. The nature of
their participation is shown by measures taken in the summer of 1938
in preparation for the attack on Czechoslovakia which was then in
contemplation. Einsatzgruppen of the Gestapo and SD were organ-
ized to f ollow the army into Czechoslovakia to provide for the security
of political life in the occupied territories. Plans were made for the
Infiltration of SD men into the area in advance, and for the building
up of a System of files to indicate what inhabitants should be placed
under surveillance, deprived of passports, or liquidated. These plans
were considerably altered due to the cancellation of the attack on
Czechoslovakia but in the military Operations which actually oc-
curred, particularly in the war against USSR, Einsatzgruppen of the
security police and SD went into Operation, and combined brutal
measures for the pacification of the civilian population with the whole-
sale slaughter of Jews. Heydrich gave Orders» to f abricate incidents
on the Polish-German frontier in 1939 which would give Hitler suffi-
cient provocation to attack Poland. Both Gestapo and SD personnel
were involved in these Operations.
The local units of the security police and SD contiiiued their work in
the occupied territories af ter they had ceased to be an area of Opera-
tions. The security police and SD engaged in widespread arrests of
the civilian population of these occupied countries, imprisoned many
of them under inhumane conditions, subjected them to brutal third-
degree methods, and sent many of them to concentration camps. Local
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Units of the security police and SD were also involved in the shootmg
of hostages, the imprisonment of relatives, the execution of persons
charged as terrorists, and Saboteurs without a trial, and the enforce-
ment of tlie "Nacht und Nebel» decrees under which persons charged
with a type of offense believed to endanger the secunty of the occupy-
ing forces were either executed within a week er secretly removed to
Germany without being permitted to communicate with their f amily
and f riends. j • •
Offices of the security police and SD were involved in the adminis-
tration of the slave labor program. In some occupied territories they
helped local labor authorities to meet the quotas imposed by Sauckel.
Gestapo offices inside of Germany were given surveillance over slave
laboreis and responsibility for apprehending those who were absent
from their place of work. The Gestapo also had charge of the so-
callcd work training camps. Although both German and foreign
workers could be committed to these camps, they played a significant
role in forcing foreign laborers to work for the German war effort.
In the latter stages of the war as the SS embarked on a slave labor
program of its own, the Gestapo was used to arrest workers for the
purpose of insuring an adequate supply in the concentration camps.
The local offices of the security police and SD were also involved in
the commission of -n^ar crimes involving the mistreatment and murder
of prisoners of war. i Soviet prisoners of war in prisoner of war camps
in Germany were screened by Einsatz Kommandos acting under the
Idirections of the local Gestapo offices. Commissars, Jews, members of
the intelligentsia, "fanatical Communists," and even those who were
considered incurably sick were classified as "intolerablc," and exter-
minated. \The local offices of the security police and SD were involved
in the enf orcement of the «bullet" decree, put into effect on 4 March
1944, under which certain categories of prisoners of war, who were
recaptured, were not treated as prisoners of war but taken to Mau-
thausen in secret and shot. Members of the security police and the
SD were charged with the enforcement of the decree for the shootmg
of parachutists and commandos.
Conclusion.—Tho Gestapo and SD were used for purposes which
were crirainal under the charter involving the persecution and exter-
mination of the Jews, brutalities and kiUings in concentration camps,
exccsses in the administration of occupied territories, the adimnistra-
tion of the slave labor program, and the mistreatment and murder of
prisoners of war. The defendant Kaltenbrunner, who was a member
of this Organization, was among those who used it for these purposes.
In dealing with the Gestapo the Tribunal includes all executive and
administrative officials of Amt IV of the KSHA or concerned with
Gestapo administration in other departments of the RSHA and all
local Gestapo officials serving both iiiside aud outside of Germany,
96
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including the members of the frontier police, but not including the
members of the border and customs protection or the secret field police,
except such members as have been specified above. At the Suggestion
of the prosecution the Tribunal does not include persons employed by
the Gestapo for purely clerical, Stenographie, janitorial, or similar
unofficial routine tasks. In dealing with the SD the Tribunal includes
Amter III, VI, and VII of the RSHA and all other members of the
SD, including all local representatives and agents, honorary or other-
wise, whether they were technically members of the SS or not, but not
including honorary informers who were not membei*s of the SS, and
members of the Abwehr who were transferred to the SD.
The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the
charter the group composed of those members of the Gestapo and SD
holding the positions enumerated in the j)receding paragraph w^ho
became or remained members of the Organization with knowledge that
it was being used for the commission of acts declared criminal by
article 6 of the charter, or who were personally implicated as members
of the Organization in the commission of such crimes. The basis for
this finding is the participation of the Organization in war crimes and
crimes against humanity connected with the war; this group declared
criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who had ceased to hold the
positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph prior to 1 Septem-
ber 1939.
(C) The SS
m
Strukture and component parts, — The prosecution has named Die
Schutzstaffeln Der Nationalsocialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei
(commonly known as the SS) as an Organization which should be de-
clared criminal. The portion of the indictment dealing with the SS
also includes the Die Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrer SS (com-
monly known as the SD). This latter Organization, which was origi-
nally an intelligence brauch of the SS, later became an important part
of the Organization of security police and SD and is dealt with in the
Tribunal's judgment on the Gestapo.
The SS was originally established by Hitler in 1925 as an elite sec-
tion of the SA for political purposes under the pretext of protecting
Speakers at public meetings of the Nazi Party. After the Nazis had
obtained power the SS was used to maintain order and control
audiences at mass demonstrations and was given the additional duty
of "internal security" by a decree of the Fuehrer. The SS played an
important role at the time of the Roehm purge of June 30, 1934, and,
as a reward for its Services, was made an independent unit of the
Nazi Party shortly thereafter.
In 1029 when Himmler was first appointed as Reichs Fuehrer the
SS consisted of 280 men who were regarded as especially trustworthy.
In 1933 it was composed of 52,000 men drawn from all walks of life.
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The original formation of tlie SS was tlie Allgemeine SS, which by
193D had grown to a corps of 240,000 men, organized on military lines
into divisions and regiments. During the war its strength declined
to well under 40,000.
The SS originally contained two other formations, tho SS Verfuen-
gungstruppe, a force consisting of SS menibers who volunteered for
4 years' armed Service in lieu of compulsory Service with the army,
and the SS Totenkopf Verbaende, special troops employed to guard
concentration camps, who came under the control of the SS in 1934.
The SS Verfuengungstruppe was organized as an armed unit to be
employed with the army in the event of mobilization. In the summer
of 1939, the Verfuengungstruppe was equipped as a motorized divi-
sion to form the nucleus of the forces which came to be known in
1940 as the Waffen SS. In that year the Waffen SS comprised 100,000
men, 56,000 coming from the Verfuengungstruppe and the rest from
the Allgemeine SS and the Totenkopf Verbaende. At the end of
the war it is estimated to have consisted of about 580,000 men and
40 divisions. The Waffen SS was under the tactical command of the
army, but was equipped and supplied through the administrative
branches of the SS and under SS disciplinary control.
The SS central Organization had 12 main offices. The most impor-
tant of these were the RSHA, which has already been discussed, the
WVHA or economic administration main office which administered
concentration camps along with its other duties, a race and settle-
ment office together with auxiliary offices for repatriation of racial
Germans (Volksdeutschemittelst eile). The SS central Organiza-
tion also had a legal office and the SS possessed its own legal Systems ;
and its personnel were under the Jurisdiction of special courts. Also
attached to the SS main offices was a research f oundation known as
the experiments Ahnenerbe. The scientists attached to this Organiza-
tion are stated to have been mainly honorary members of the SS.
During the war an Institute for military scientific research became
attached to the Ahnenerbe which conducted extensive experinients
involving the use of living human beings. An employee of this Insti-
tute was°a certain Dr. Rascher, who conducted these experiments with
the füll knowledge of the Ahnenerbe, which were subsidized and
under the patronage of the Reichsfuehrer SS who was a trustee of
the f oundation.
Beginning in 1933 there was a gradual but thorough amalgamation
of the police and SS. In 1936 Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer SS, became
Chief of the German police with authority over the regulär unif ormed
police as well as the security police. Hunmler established a system
under which higher SS and police leaders, appointed for each
Wehrkreis, served as his personal representatives in coordmatmg the
activities of the order police, security police, and SD and Allgemeine
98
SS witliin their jurisdictions. In 1939 the SS and police Systems wero
coordinated by taking into the SS all ofiicials of the security and order
police, at SS ranks equivalent to their rank in the police.
Until 1940 the SS was an entirely voluntary Organization. After
the formation of the Waffen SS in 1940 there was a gradually increas-
ing nuinlx^r of conscripts into the Waffen SS. It appears that about
a third of tlie total number of people joining the Waffen SS were
conscripts, that the proportion of conscripts was higher at the end
of the war than at the beginning, but that there continued to be a high
Proportion of volunteers until the end of the war.
Criminal activities, — SS units were active participants in the steps
leading up to aggressive war. The Verfuengungstruppe was used
in the cccupation of the Sudetenland, of Bohemia and Moravia, and
of Memel. The Henlein Free Corps was under the Jurisdiction of
the Reichsfuehrer SS for Operations in the Sudetenland in 1938 and
the Volksdeutschemittelstelle financed fifth column activities there.
U'he SS was even a more general participant in the commission of
war crimes and crimes against humanity. Through its control over
tlie Organization of the police, particularly the security police and
SD, the SS was involved in all the crimes which have been outlined
in the section of this judgment dealing with the Gestapo and SD.
Other branches of the SS were equally involved in these criminal pro-
grams. l'here is evidence that the sliooting of unarmed prisoners of
war was the general practice in some Waffen SS divisions. On
October 1, 1944, the custody of prisoners of war and interned persons
was transferred to Himmler, who in turn transferred prisoner of war
affairs to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Berger and to SS Obergruppen-
f uehrer Pohl. The race and settlement office of the SS, together with
the Volksdeutschemittelstelle, were active in carrying out schemes for
Germanization of occupied territories according to the racial prin-
ciples of the Nazi Party and were involved in the deportation of Jews
and t)tlier foreign nationals. Units of the Waffen SS and Einsatz-
gruppen operating directly under the SS main office were used to
carry out these plans. These units were also involved in the wide-
spread murder and ill-treatment of the civilian population of occu-
pied territories. Under the guise of combatting partisan units, units
of the SS exterminated Jews and people deemed politically undesir-
able by the SS, and their reports record the execution of enorinous
iiumbers of persoiis. Waffen SS divisions were responsible for niany
massacres and atrocities in occupied territories such as the massacres
at Oradour and Lidice.
From 1934 onwards the SS was responsible for the guarding and
administration of concentration camps. The evidence leaves no doubt
that the consistently brutal treatment of the inmates of concentration
camps was carried out as a result of the general policy of the SS, which
99
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was that the inmates were racial inferiors to be treated only with
contcmpt. There is evidence that where manpower considerations
permitted, Himmler wanted to rotate guard battalious so that all
members of the SS would be instructed as to the proper attitude to
take to inferior races. After 1942 when the concentration camps were
placed under the control of the WVHA they were used as a source of
shvve labor. An agreement made with the Ministry of Justice on 18
September 1942, provided that antisocial elements who had fimshed
prison sentences were to be delivered to the SS to be worked to death.
Steps were continually taken, involving the use of the security pohce
and SD and even the Waffen SS, to insure that the SS had an adequate
supply of concentration camp labor for its projects. I" <^o"f ^<-^«^
with the administration of the concentration camps, the SS embarked
on a series of experiments on human beings which were perf ormed on
prisoners of war or concentration camp inmates. These expenments
included f reezing to death, and killing by poison buUets. The SS was
able to obtain an allocation of Government funds for this kind of
rescarch on the grounds that they had access to human material not
available to other agencies. , . , ^- . ^t
The SS played a particularly significant role in the persecution of
the Jews. The SS was directly involved in the demonstrations of
November 10, 1938. The evacuation of the Jews f rom occupied tern-
tories was carried out under the directions of the SS with the assistance
of SS Police Units. The extermination of the Jews was carried out
under the direction of the SS central organizations. It was actually
put into effect by SS formations. The Einsatzgruppen engaged in
Wholesale massacres of the Jews. SS police units were also involved
For example, the massacre of Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto was carned
out under the directions of SS Brigadef uehrer and Major General of
the Police Stroop. A special group from the SS central Organization
arran-ed for the deportation of Jews from vanous Axis satellites and
their extermination was carried out in the concentration camps run by
^ 'it is impossible to Single out any one portion of the SS which was
not involved in these criminal activities. The Allgemeine SS was an
active participant in the persecution of the Jews and was used as a
source of concentration camp guards. Units of the Waffen SS were
directly involved in the killing of prisoners of war and the atrocities
in occupied countries. It supplied personnel for the Einsatzgruppen,
and had command over'the concentration camp guards af ter its ab-
sorption of the Totenkopf SS, which originally controlled the System.
Various SS police units were also widely used in the atrocities in
occupied countries and the extermination of the Jews there. The bb
central Organization supervised the activities of these various forma-
100
tions and was responsible for such special projects as the human ex-
periments and "final Solution" of the Jewish qiiestion.
The Tribunal finds that knowledge of these criminal activities was
sufficiently general to justify declaring that the SS was a criminal
Organization to the extent hereinafter describod. It does appear that
an attenipt was made to keep secret some phases of its activities, but
its criminal programs w^ere so widespread, and involved slaughter on
such a gigantic scale, that its criminal activities must have been widely
known. It must be recognized, moreover, that the criminal activities
of the SS followed quite logically from the principles on which it was
organized. Every effort had been made to make the SS a highly dis-
ciplined Organization composed of the elite of National Socialism.
Himmler had stated that there were people in Germany "who become
sick when they see these black coats" and that he did not expect that
"they should be loved by too many." Himmler also indicated his view
that the SS was concerned with perpetuating the elite racial stock with
the object of making Europe a Germanic continent and the SS was
instructed that it was designed to assist the Nazi Government in the
ultimate domination of Europe and the elimination of all inferior
races. This mystic and fanatical belief in the superiority of the
Nordic German developed into the studied contempt and even hatred
of other races which led to criminal activities of the type outlined above
being considered as a matter of course if not a matter of pride. The
actions of a soldier in the Waffen SS who in September 1939, acting
entirely on his own initiative, killed 50 Jewish laborers whom he had
been guarding, were described by the statement that as an SS man,
he was "particularly sensitive to the sight of Jews," and had acted
"quite thoughtlessly in a youthful spirit of adventure" and a sentence
of 3 years imprisonment imposed on him was dropped under an am-
nesty. Hess Vrote with truth that the Waffen SS were more suitable
for the specific tasks to be solved in occupied territory owing to their
extensive training in questions of race and nationality. Himmler, in
a series of speeches made in 1943, indicated his pride in the ability
of the SS to carry out these criminal acts. He encouraged his men
to be "tough and ruthless," he spoke of shooting "thousands of leading
Poles," and thanked them for their Cooperation and lack of squeamish-
ness at the sight of hundreds and thousands of corpses of their victims.
He extolled ruthlessness in exterminating the Jewish race and later
described this process as "delousing." These speeches show that the
general attitude prevailing in the SS was consistent with these
criminal acts.
Conclusions.— The SS was utilized for purposes which were criminal
under the Charter involving the persecution and extermination of the
Jews, brutalities and killings in concentration camps, excosses in the
administration of occupied territories, the administration of the slave
101
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labor program and the mistreatment and nnurder of P-^---«^^^^^^^^
The aefendant Kaltenbrimner ^vas a member of the SS ^Pl^^'^te^ '^
S.ese activities. In dealing with the SS the ^^^^i^f^t^^Z,
sons uho have been officially acceptcd as """"bers of üie SS induding
the mombers of the Allgemeine SS, membcL^ of the ^\ =^«^^"„f^S mm
bers of the SS Toteukopf Yerbaende and the members ^--y^^^^
different Police foices who were members of the SS. The iubunai
döe no include the so-called SS riding units ^^^^f-'f^Xt'^
des Reichsfuohrer SS (commonly kno.vn as the SD) is dealt with m
the Tribunal's i udgment on the Gestapo and bU. ■ t ,u^
Th T^nal declares to be criiniual withiu the -eann^g of the
Charter the group composed of those persons who had been oflicially
a^^ceptedls members of the SS as enumerated in the precedmg para-
3 1h: became or remained members of the organ.at.on .. h
k nolvledge that it was b.ing used for the commission of acts declared
riminally Article 6 of the Charter or who .ere personally .^^^^^
.^ members of the Organization in the commission of such ciimes, ex
c «di " h w ver, those who were drafted into memberslup by the
S fte in such a wa as to give them no choice in f « -'^"-' -f^:;^^,^
committed no such crimes. The basis of this fandnig is the participa
Lnof the Organization in war crimes and crimes against humamty
connected with the war; this group declared criminal cannot include,
Wo^e persons who had ceased to belong to the o an.- -^^
enumerated in the preceding paragraph prior to 1 September 19oJ.
(D) Tue SA
Structure and componcnt parfo.-The prosecution has named Die
Sturmabteilungen der Nationakozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpar-
fr clnlTy k^^^ as the SA) as an Organization whichshould be
declared riminal. The SA was founded in 1921 for pohtical pur-
pos s It was organized on military lines. Its members wore their
owi «niforms and had their own disciplinc and regulations Aft r
tlTeN zis had obtained power the SA greatly increased m -embership
due to the incorporation within it of certain -^eran^. -«--^^^^
In April 1933, the Stahlhelm, an Organization of H/s million members,
was tra sf err^d into the SA, with the exception of its members ovcr 45
years o ago and some others, pursuant to an agreement between their
kader Scldte and Hitler. Another veterans Organization, the so-called
ryffhi^ilbund, was transferred in the same manner, together with
a number of riiral riding organizations
Until 1933, there is no question but that membership m the SA was
yoluntarv After 1933 civil servants were under certam po itical and
: nlic'pre-re to join the SA Members of tl^^f;«'; ^^^^^^^^^
KYffliatiserbund and the rural riding associations were transferred
So the SA without their knowledge but the Tribunal xs not satisfied
102
that the members in general endeavored to protest against this trarsf cl-
or that there was any evidence, except in isolated cases, of the con-
sequences of ref usal. The Tribunal therefore finds that membership
in the SA.Avas generally vohmtary.
By the end of 1933 the SA was composed of 41/2 million men. As a
result of changes made after 1934, in 1939 the SA numbered 1 V2 niilHon
men.
Activities. — In the early days of the Nazi movement the storm
troopers of the SA acted as the "strong arm of the party." They
took part in the beer-hall feuds and were used for street fighting in
battles against political opponents. The SA was also used to dis-
seminate Nazi ideology and propaganda and placed particular em-
phasis on anti-Semitie propaganda, the doctrine of "Lebensraum,"
the revision of the Versailles Treaty, and the return of Germany's
colonies.
After the Nazi advent to power, and particularly after the elec-
tions of 5 March 1933, the SA played an important role in estab-
lishing a Nazi reign of terror over Germany. The SA was involved
in outbreaks of violence against the Jews and was used to arrest politi-
cal opponents and to guard concentration camps, where they subjected
their prisoners to brutal mistreatment.
On June 30th and July Ist and 2d, 1934, a purgo of SA leaders
oceurred. The pretext which was given for this purge, which involved
the killing of Roehm, the chief of staff of the SA, and m'any other
SA leaders, was the existence of a plot against Hitler. This purge
resulted in a great reduction in the influence and power of the SA.
After 1934 it rapidly declined in political significance.
After 1934 the SA engaged in certain forms of military or para-
military training. The SA continued to engage in the dissemination
of Nazi Propaganda. Isolated units of the SA were even involved
in the steps leading up to aggressive war and in the commission of
war crimes and crimes against humanity. SA units were among the
first in the occupation of Austria in March 1938. The SA supplied
many of the men and a large part of the equipment which composed
the Sudeten Free Corps of Henlein, although it appears that the
Corps was under the Jurisdiction of SS during its Operation in Czecho-
slovakia.
After the occupation of Poland, the SA group Sudeten was used
for transporting prisoners of war. Units of the SA were employed
in the guarding of prisoners in Danzig, Posen, Silesia, and the Baltic
States.
Some SA units were used to blow up synagogues in the Jewish
pogrom of the lOth and llth of November 1938. Groups of the SA
were concerned in the ill-treatment of Jews in the Ghettos of Vilna
and Kaunas.
103
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OoMlusion.-üi^tn the purge beginning on June 30, 1934, the SA
was a group composed in large part of ruffians and bul les who par-
ticipated in the Nazi outrages of that period. It has not been shown,
ho^N-ever, that these atrocitics were part of a specific plan to wage
aggressive war, and the Tribunal therefore cannot hold that these
flctivities were criminal under the Charter. After the purge, the SA
was reduced to the Status of a group of unimportant Nazi hangers-on.
Although in specific instances some units of the SA were used for the
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity, it cannot be
Said that its members generally participated in or even knevv of he
criminal acts. For these reasons, the Tribunal does not dedare the
SA to be a criminal Organization within the meaning of Article 9 of
the Charter.
(E) The Reich Cabinet .
The prosecution has named as a criminal Organization the Reich
Cabinet (Die Reichsregierung) consisting of members of the ordimry
cabinet after January 30, 1933, members of the council of ministers
for the defense of the Reich and members of the sccret cabinet Coun-
cil The Tribunal is of opinion that no declaration of crimmahty
should be made with respect to the Reich Cabinet f or two reasons:
(1) Because it is not shown that after 1937 it ever really acted as a
eroup or Organization ; (2) because the group of persons here charged
is so small that members could be conveniently tried in proper cases
without resort to a declaration that the Cabinet of which they were
members was criminal. ■, ^i . t ^^
As to the first reason for our decision, it is to be observed that froni
the time that it can be said that a conspiracy to make aggressive war
existed the Reich Cabinet did not constitute a governing body, but
was merely an aggi-egation of administrative officers s"t)ect to the
absolute control of Hitler. Not a singlc meetmg of the Reich Cab.net
was held after 1937, but laws were promulgated in the name of one
or more of the cabinet members. The Sccret Cabinet Council never
met at all. A number of the cabinet members were undoubtedly m-
volved in the conspiracy to make aggressive war; but they were m-
volved as individuals, and there is no evidence that the cabinet as a
eroup or Organization took any part in these crimes. It will be re-
membered that when Hitler disclosed his aims of criminal aggression
at the Hossbach Conference, the disclosure was not made before the
cabinet and that the cabinet was not consulted with regard to it, but,
on the contrary, that it was made secretly to a small group upon whom
Hitler would necessarily rely in carrying on the war. L.lcewise no
cabinet order authorized the invasion of Poland. On the contrary,
the defendant Schacht testifics that he sought to stop the invasion by
a plea to the Commander in chief of the army that Hitler « order was
in violation of the Constitution because not authorized by the cabinet.
•
104
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>♦
It does appear, however, that various laws authorizing acts wliich
were criminal under the Charter w ere circulated among the members
of the Reich Cabinet and issued under its authority signed by the
members whose departments were concerned. This does not, how-
ever, prove that the Eeich Cabinet, after 1937, ever really acted as an
Organization.
As to the second reason, it is clear that those members of the Reich
Cabinet who have been guilty of crimes should be brought to trial ;
and a number of them are now on trial before the Tribunal. It is
estimated that there are 48 members of the group, that 8 of these are
dead and 17 are now on trial, leaving only 23 at the most, as to whom
the declaration could have any importance. Any others who are
guilty should also be brought to trial ; but nothing w^ould be accom-
plished to expedite or facilitate their trials by declaring the Reich
Cabinet to be a criminal Organization. Where an Organization with
a large membership is used for such purposes, a declaration obviates
the necessity of inquiring as to its criminal charactcr in the later
trial of members who are accused of participating through member-
ship in its criminal purposes and thus saves much time and trouble.
There is no such advantage in the case of a small group like the Reich
Cabinet.
(F) General Staff and High Cömmand
The prosecution has also asked that the General Staff and High
Command of the German armed f orces be declared a criminal Organ-
ization. The Tribunal believes that no declaration of criminality
should be made with respect to the General Staff and High Com-
mand. The number of persons charged, while larger than that of
the Reich Cabinet, is still so small that individual trials of these
officers would accomplish the purpose here sought better than a
declaration such as is requested. But a more compelling reason is
that in the opinion of the Tribunal the General Staff and High Com-
mand is neither an "Organization" nor a "group" within the meaning
of those terms as used in Article 9 of the Charter.
Some comment on the nature of this alleged group is requisite.
According to the indictment and evidence before the Tribunal, it
consists of approximately 130 officers, living and dead, who at any
time during the period from February 1938, when Hitler reorganized
the armed forces, and May 1945, when Germany surrendered, held
certain positions in the military hierarchy. These men were high-
ranking officers in the three armed Services: OKH — army, OKM —
navy, and OKL — air force. Above them was the over-all armed forces
authority, OKW — ^high command of the German armed forces with
Hitler as the supreme Commander. The officers in the OKW, includ-
ing defendant Keitel as chief of the high command, were in a sense
Hitler's personal staff. In the larger sense they coordinated and
105
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directed the three Services, with particular emphasis on the functions
of plunning and Operations.
The individual officers in this alleged group were, at one time or
another, in one of f cur categories : ( 1 ) Commanders in chief of one of
the three Services; (2) chief of staff of one of the three Services; (3)
"Oborbefehlshabers," the field Commanders in chief of one of the three
Services, which of course comprised by f ar the largest number of theso
persons- or (4) an OKW officer, of which there were three, defendants
Keitcl and Jodl, and the latter's deputy chief, Warlimont. l^^'^ is the
meaning of the indictment in its use of the terra "General Staff and
High Command." , . , .
The prosecution has here drawn the line. The prosecution does not
indict the next level of the military hierarchy consisting of Command-
ers of army corps, and equivalent ranks in the navy and air force, nor
the level below, the division Commanders or their equivalent in the
other branches. And the staff officers of the four staff commands of
OKW, OKII, OKM, and OKL are not includeJ, nor are the trained
spccia'lists who were customarily called General Staff officers.
In effect, then, those indictcd as members are military leaders of the
Keich of the highest rank. No serious effort was made to assert that^
they composed an "Organization" in the sense of Article 9. The asser-
tion is rather that they were a "group," which is a wider and more em-
bracing tenn than "Organization."
The Tribunal does not so find. According to the evidence, their
planning at staff level, the constant Conferences between staff officers
and field Commanders, their operational technique in the field and at
headquarters was nmch the same as that of the armies, navies, and air
f orccs of all other countries. The ovcr-all effort of OKW at coordma-
tion and direction could be matched by a similar, though not identical
form of Organization in other military forces, such as the Anglo-
American Combined Chiefs of Staff.
To derive from this pattern of their activities the existence of an
association or group does not, in the opinion of the Tribunal, logically
follow On such a theory the top Commanders of every other nation
are just such an association rather than what they actually are, an
aggi-egation of military men, a number of individuals who happen at a
given period of time to hold the high-ranking military positions.
Much of the evidence and the argument has centered around the
question of whether membership in these organizations was or was
not voluntary; in this case, it seems to the Tribunal to be quite beside
the point. For this alleged criminal Organization has one charactenstic,
a Controlling one, which sharply distinguishcs it from the other five
mdicted When an individual became a member of the SS for instance,
he did so, voluntarily or otherwise, but certainly with the knowledge
that ho was joining something. In the case of the General Staff and
106
itler and his
Älthough they
High Command, however, he could not know he was joining a group or
Organization for such Organization did not exist except in the chargc
of the indictment. He knew only that he had achieved a certain high
rank in one of the three Services, and could not be conscious of the f act
that he was becoming a member of anything so tangible as a "group,"
as that word is commonly used. His relations with his brother officers
in his own brauch of the service and his association with those of the
other two branches were, in general, like those of other Services all over
the World.
The Tribunal theref ore does not declare the General Staff and High
Command to be a criminal Organization.
Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the term "group" in
Article 9 must mean something more than this coUection of miUtary
officers, it has heard much evidence as to the participation of these offi-
cers in planninglind w^ging aggressive war, andjn^onunitting war
crimes and crnnes aganJinuimanit;^. This evidence is, as to many of
tITem, clear and convincing.^
They have been responsible in large measurejorjhejnis^^
sufTcrmgThat have fallen on millions ofmenTwo^^
thev have been a disgrace to the honorable p^fession of"^ Witli
'^^^UEeiFmiiitary gül'd'anco the aggressive a^THmSlT --'^^
J^low Nazis would havoiiEeD^iicademic andltinle.
^erenoTa group falling within the words of the Charter, they were
certainly a ruthless military caste. The contcmporary German mili-
tarisin flourished briefly with its recent ally, National Socialism, as
well as or better than it had in the generations of the past.
Many of these men have made a mockery of the ,soldier!s,mtlLQ^
obe^ieKcT^;;^!^^ defense they say
tKeylTäd to obey ; when conf rontea^^vith flitler's brutal crimes, which
are^sliöwiTtoTiave been within their general knowledgfe; they say they
disobeyed. The truth isjhey_a£tiyel^ participatedin all these crimes,
S?)^gsilcnt and^cquiescent^tnesjin^ commission^ofjcr on a
Scale larger and more shocjringthan thejvorld has""ev^rhadjhejn[iis
Jortune'to know. ITiis must be sai(h
""Wherelhe^f acts Warrant it, these men should be brought to trial so
that those araong them who are guilty of these crimes should not escapo
punishment.
VIII. THE ACCUSED INDIVIDUALS
Article 20 of the Charter provides that the judgment of the Tribunal
as to the guilt or innocence of any defendant shall give the reasons
on which it is based.
The Tribunal will now state those reasons in declaring its judgmQnt
on such guilt or innocence.
107
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III
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GOERING
Goering is indicted on all four counts. The evidcnce shows that
after Hitler he was the most prominent man in the Nazi regime. He
was conmiander in chief of the LuftwaflFe, plenipotentiary for the
4-ycar plan, and had tremendous influence with Hitler, at least until
1943, whcn their relationship deteriorated, ending in his arrest in
1945! He testified that Hitler kept him informed of all important
niilitary and political problems.
Cmnes agaimt peace.—Fvom the moment he joined the party in
1922 and took command of the street-fighting Organization, the SA,
Goering was the adviser, the active agent of Hitler, and one of the
prime leaders of the Nazi movement. As Hitler's political deputy he
was largely instrumental in bringing the National Socialists to power
in 1933, and was charged with consolidating this power and expand-
ing German armed might. He developed the Gestapo, and created
the first concentration camps, relinquishing them to Himmler in 1934,
conducted the Roehm purge in that year, and engineered the sordid
proeeedings which resulted in the removal of von Blomberg and von
Fritsch from the army. In 1936 he became plenipotentiary for the
4year plan, and in theory and in practice was the economic dictatoB
of the Keich. Shortly after the pact of Munich, he announced that
he would embark on a five-fold expansion of the Luftwaffe, and speed
rearmament with emphasis on offensive weapons.
Goering was one of the five important leaders present at the Hoss-
bach Conference of 5 November 1937, and he attended the other impor-
tant Conferences already discussed in this judgment. In the Austrian
Anschluss he was, indeed, the central figure, the ringleader. He said
in Court : "I must take 100-percent responsibility ... I even over-
ruled objections by the Fuehrer and brought everything to its final
developnient." In the seizure of the Sudetenland he played his role
as Luftwaffe cliief by planning an air offensive which proved unneces-
sary, and his role as a politician by luUing the Czechs with false
promises of friendship. The night before the invasion of Czechö-
slovakia and the absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, at a Conference
with Hitler and President Hacha he threatened to bomb Prague if
Hacha did not submit. This threat he admitted in his testimony.
Goering attended the Reich Chancellery meeting of 23 May 1939,
when Hitler told his military leaders '^therei^ theref ore, np^uestion
--of-^>aring Poland," and was present at the Obersalzburg briefmg of
22 August 1939. And the evidence shows he was active in the diplo-
matic maneuvers which foUowed. With Hitler's connivance he used
the Swedish businessman, Dahlems, as a go-between to the British,
as described by Dahlerus to this Tribunal, to try to prevent the British
Government from keeping its guarantee to the Poles.
108
He commanded the Luftwaffe in the attack on Poland and through-
out the aggressive wars which followed. 1 . c • f
Even if he opposed Hitler's plans against Norway and the boviet
Union, as he alleged, it is clear that he did so only for Strategie rea-
sons: once Hitler had decided the issue, he followed him without
hesitation. He made it clear in his testimony that these differences
were never ideological or legal. He was "in a rage" about the mvasion
of Norway, but only because he had not received sufficient warning to
prepare the Luftwaffe offensive. He admitted he approved of the
attack: "My attitude was perfectly positive." He was active in pre-
paring and executing the Yugoslavian and Greek campaigns, and tes-
tified that "Plan Marita," the attack on Greece, had been prepared
lon<r beforehand. The Soviet Union he regarded as the "most threat-
ening mcnace to Germany," but said there was no immediate military
necessity for the attack. Indeed, his only objection to the war of
Aggression against the USSR was its timing; he wished for Strategie
reasons to delay until Britain ^vas conquered. He testified : "My point
of vicw was decided by political and military reasons only.
After his own admissions to this Tribunal, from the positions which
he held, the Conferences he attended, and the public words he uttered,
there can remain no doubt that Goering was the moving force for
affccressive war second only to Hitler. He was the planner and prime
mover in the military and diplomatic preparation for war which
Germany pursued. . • mi 1 -^i^ ^ '
War crimes and crimes against hunmnity. -The record is filled withr> ^o, ,
Goering's admissions of his complicity in the use ot slave labor. \Ve
did use this labor for security reasons so that they would not be active
in their own country and would not work against US. On the other
band, they served to help in the economic war." And agam : Workers cdy^ ^^^
were forced to come to the Reich. That is something I have not
denied " The man who spoke these words was Plenipotentiary for
the 4-year plan charged with the recruitment and allocation of man-
power As Luftwaffe Commander in Chief he demanded from Himm-
ler more slave laborers for his Underground aircraft factories: "That
I requested inmates of concentration camps for the armament of the
Luftwaffe is correct and it is to be taken as a matter of course.
As Plenipotentiary, Goering signed a directive concernmg the treat-
ment of Polish workers in Germany and implemented it by regula-
tions of the SD, including "special treatment." He issued directives
to use Soviet and French prisoners of war in the armament mdustry ;
he spoke of seizing Poles and Dut<^h and making them prisoners of ^
war if necessary, and using them for work. He agrees^ussian pris- •
oners of war were used to man antiaircraft batteries. ^
As Plenipotentiary, Goering was the active authority m the spoli-
ation of conquered territory. He made plans for the spoliation of
109
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Soviet territory long before the war on the Sovict Union. Two
months prior tJ the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler gave Goering
the over-all direction for the economic administration in the territory.
Goering set up an economic staff for this f unction. As ßeichsmarshal
of the Greater German Reich, "the orders of the Reich Marshai cover
all economic fields, including nutrition and agriculture." His so-
called "Green" folder, printed by tho Wehrmacht, set up an "Eco-
nomic Executive Staff, East." This directive contemplated plunder-
ing and abandonment of all industry in the food deficit regions and, .
f rom the food surplus regions, a divcrsion of food to German needs. /
Goering claims its purposes have been misunderstood but admits "that
as a matter of course and a matter of duty we would have used Russia
for our purposes," when conqnered.
And he participated in the Conference of 16 July 1941, when Hitler
Said the National Socialists had no Intention of ever leaving the oc-
cupied countries, and that "all necessary measures— shooting, deset-
tling, etc.," should be taken. ^
Goering persecuted the Jews, particularly after the November 1938
riots, and not only in Germany where he raised the billion mark fine
as stated elsewhere, but in the conquered territories as well. His own
ntterances then and his testimony now shows this interest was pri-
marily economic— how to get their property and how to force them
out of the economic life of Europe. As these countries feil before the
German Army, he extended the Reich's anti-Jewish laws to them; the
Reichsgesetzblatt for 1939, 1940, and 1941 contains several anti-
Jewish decrees signed by Goering. Although their extermination was
in Himmler's hands, Goering was far from disinterested or inactive,
despite his protestations in the witness box. By decree of 31 July
1941, he directed Himmler and Heydrich to brin^^^aljout a complete
Solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence m
Europe."
--niere is nothing to be said in mitigation. For Goering was often,
indeed almost always, the moving force, sccond only to his leader.
^He was the leading war aggressor, both as political and as military
•leader; he was the director of the slave-labor program and the creator
of the oppressive program against the Jews and other races, at home
and abroad. All of these crimes he has frankly admitted.; On some
specific cases there may be conflict of testimony but in terms of the
broad outline, his own admissions are more than sufficiently wide to
be conclusive of his guilt. His guilt is unique in its enormity. The
record discloses no excuses for this man.
Conclusion.— The Tribunal fiiids the defendant Goering guilty on
all f our counts of the indictment.
•lalv
110
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\^^'^^Ä<!n y^<^ju' ^'
HESS
Hess is indictcd under all four counts. He joined the Nazi Party
in 1920 and participated in the Munich Putsch on November 9, 1923.
He was imprisoned with Hitler in the Landsberg fortress in 1924 and
became Hitler's dosest personal confidant, a relationship which lasted
until Hess' flight to the British Isles. On April 21, 1933, he was
appointed Depiity to the Fuehrer, and on December 1, 1933, was
made Keichs Minister without Portfolio. He was appointed mem-
ber of the Secret Cabinet Council on February 4, 1938, and a meaiber
of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich on August 30,
1939. In September 1939, Hess was oflicially announced by Hitler
as succossor designate to the Fuehrer after Goering. On May 10,
1941, he flew from Germany to Scotland.
Crimes against peace.— As Deputy to the Fuehrer, Hess was the
top man in the Nazi Party with responsibility for handling all party
matters, and authority to make decisions in Hitler's name on all
questions of party leadership. As Reichs Minister without Portfol.o
he had the authoritv (o approve all legislation suggested by the dif-
ferent Reichs ministers before it coukl be enacted as law. In these
positions Hess was an active supporter of preparations for war. His
si^nature appears on the law of IG March 1935, establishing com-
pulsoiy military Service. Throughout the years he supported Hitler s
policy of vigorous rearmament in many speeches. He told the people
that they must sacrifice for armaments, repeating the phrase, "Guna
instead of butter." It is true that betwecn 1933 and 1937 Hess 5ade
Si)eeches in which he expressed a desire for peace and advocated inter-
national economic Cooperation. But notliing which they contnined
can alter the f act that of all the defendants none knew better than Hess
how determined Hitler was to realizc liis ambitions, how f anatical and
violent a man he was, and how little likely he was to refrain from
resort to force, if this was the only way in which he could achieve
his aims. . ^ •
■ Hess was an informed and willing participant in German aggression
against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. He was m touch with
the ille<ral Nazi Party in Austria throughout the entire period between
the murder of Dollfuss and the Anschluss, and gave Instructions to it
durin<r that period. Hess was in Vienna on March 12, 1938, when the
G'-rman troops moved in ; and on March 13, 1938, he signed the law
for the reunion of Austria within the German Reich. A law of June 10,
1939, provided for his participation in the administration of Austria.
On July 24 1938, he made a specch in commemoration of the unsuecess-
ful putc^ch by Austrian National Socialists which had been attempted 4
years before, praising the steps leading up to Anschluss and dcfendmg
;-the occupation of Austria by Germany.
.1
111
/^
In tlie Summer of 1038 Hess was in active toucli witli Ilenlein, chief
of the Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia. On September 27,
1938, at the time of the Munich erisis, he arranged witli Keitel to
carry out the instructions of Hitler to make the machinery of the Nazi
Party available for a secret mobilization. On April 14, 1939, Hess
signed a decree setting up the government of the Sudetenland as an
integral part of the Reich ; and an ordinance of June 10, 1939, provided
for his participation in the administration of the Sudetenland. On
November 7, 1938, Hess absorbed Henlein's Sudeten German Party
into the Nazi Party, and made a speech in which he eniphasized that
Hitler had been prepared to resort to war if this had been necessary
to acquire the Sudetenland.
On August 27, 1939, when the attack on Poland had been tem-
porarily p'ostponed in an attempt to induce Great Britain to abandon
its guarantee to Poland, Hess publicly praised Hitler's "magnanimous
offer" to Poland, and attacked Poland for agitating for war and Eng-
land for being responsible for Poland's attitude. After the invasion
of Poland Hess signed decrees incorporating Danzig and certain Polish
territories into the Reich, and setting up the General Government
(Poland).
These specific steps which this defendant took in support of Hitler's
plans for aggressive action do not indicate the füll extent of his re-
sponsibility. Until his flight to England, Hess was Hitler's dosest
personal confidant. Their relationship was such that Hess must have
been informed of Hitler's aggressive plans when they came into
existence. And he took action to carry out these plans whenever
action was necessary.
With him on his flight to England, Hess carried certain peace pro-
posals which he alleged Hitler was prepared to accept. It is significant
to note that this flight took place only 10 days after the date on wdiich
Hitler fixed June 22, 1941, as the time for attacking the Soviet Union.
In conversations carried on after his arrival in England, Hess whole-
heartedly supported all Germany's aggressive actions up to that time,
and attempted to justify Germany's action in connection with Austria,
Czeclioilovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands. He blamed England and France for the war.
War crimes and crinws against hunianity. —Tlieve is evidence show-
ing the participation of the party chancellery, under Hess, in the
distribution of orders connected with the commission of war crimes;
that Hess may have had knowledge of , even if he did not participate
in, the crimes that were being committed in the east, and of proposed
laws discriminating against Jews and Poles ; and that he signed decrees
forcing certain groups of Poles to accept German citizenship. The
Tribunal, however, docs not find that the evidence sufiiciently connects
Hess with these crimes to sustain a finding of guilt.
112
As previously indicated the Tribunal found, after a füll medical
examination of and report on the condition of this defendant, that he
should be tried, without any postponement of his case. Since that tnne
further motions have been made that he should again be examined.
These the Tribunal denied, after having had a report f rom the prison
psychologist. That Hess acts in an abnormal manner, suffers from
loss of memory, and has mentally deteriorated during this trial, may
be true. But there is nothing to show that he does not realize the
nature of the charges against him, or is incapable of defending himself .
He was ably represented at the trial by counsel, appointed for that
purpose by the Tribunal. There is no suggestion that Hess was not
completely sane when the acts charged against him were committed.
Conclusion.—ThQ Tribunal finds the defendant Hess guilty on counts
one and two ; and not guilty on counts three and four.
VON RIBBENTROP
Von Ribbentrop is indicted under all four counts. He joined the
Nazi Party in 1932. By 1933 he had been made Foreign Policy Ad-
viser to Hitler, and in the same year the representative of the Na^i
Party on f oreign policy. In 1934 he was appointed Delegate for Dis-
armament Questions, and in 1935 Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, a
capacity in which he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement
in 1935 and the Anti-Comintern Pact in 193G. On August 11, 1936,
he was appointed ambassador to England. On February 4, 1938, he
succeeded von Neurath as Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs as part
of the general reshufile which accompanied the dismissal of von
Fritsch and von Blömberg. ^
Crimes agairist peace.— Von Ribbentrop was not present at the
Hossback Conference held on November 5, 1937, but on January 2,
1938, while still Ambassador to England, he sent a memorandum to
Hitler indicating his opinion that a change in the status quo in the
east in the German sense could only be carried out by force and sug-
gesting methods to prevent England and France from intervening in
a European war fought to bring about such a change. When von
Ribbentrop became Foreign Minister, Hitler told him that Germany
still had four problems to solve, Austria, Sudetenland, Memel, and
Danzig, and mentioned the possibihty of '*some sort of a show-down»*
or "military settlement" for their Solution.
On February 12, 1938, Ribbentrop attended the Conference between
Hitler and Schuschnigg at which Hitler, by threats of invasion, forced
Schuschnigg to grant a series of concessions designed to strengthen
the Nazis in Austria, including the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as
Minister of Security and Interior, with control over the police. Von
Ribbentrop was in London when the occupation of Austria was ac-
tually carried out and, on the basis of information supplied him by
113
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,
Goeriiig, informed tlie British Government that Gennany .had not
presented Austria witli an Ultimatum, but had intervened in Austria
only to prevent civil war. On March 13, 1938, von Ribbentrop signed
the law incorporating Austria into the German R'3ich.
Von liibbentrop participated in tho aggressive plans against
Czechoslovakia. Boginning in March li)o8, he was in close tonch with
the Sudeten German Party and gave thcm Instructions wliich had the
effect of keeping the Sudeten German question a live issue which
might scrve as an excuse for the attack which Gennany was planning
against Czechoslovakia. In August 1938, he participated in a Con-
ference for the purpose of obtaining Hungarian support in tlie event
of a war with Czechoslovakia. After the Munich Pact he continued
to bring diplomatic pressure with the object of occupying the re-
mainder of Czechoslovakia. He was instrumental in inducing the
Slovaks to proclaim their independence. He was present at the Con-
ference of March 11:-15, 1939, at w^hich Hitler, by threats of Invasion,
compelled President Hacha to consent to the German occupation of
Czechoslovakia. After the German troops had marched in, von Rib-
bentrop signed the law establishing a protectorate over Bohemia and
Moravia.
Von Ribbentrop played a particularly significant role in the diplo-
matic activity which led up to the attack on Poland. He participated
in a Conference hehl on August 12, 1939, for the jourpose of obtaining
Italian support if the attack should lead to a general European war.
Von Ribbentrop discussed the German demands with respect to Dan-
zig and the Polish Corridor with the British Ambassador in the period
from August 25 to August 30, 1939, when he knew that the Gc^rman
plans to attack Poland had merely been temporarily postponed in an
attempt to induce the British to abandon their guarantee to the Poles.
The way in which he carried out these discussions makes it clear that
he did not enter them in good f aith in an attempt to reach a settlement
of the difficulties betwecn Germany and Poland.
Von Ribbentrop Avas advised in advance of the attack on Norway and
Denmark and of the attack on the Low Countries, and prepared the
oflicial Foreign OiTice memoraxida atteinpting to justify these aggres-
sive actions.
Von Ribbentrop attended the Conference on January 20, 1941, at
which Hitler and Mussolini discussed the proposed attack on Greece,
and the Conference in January 1941, at which Hitler obtained from
Antonescu permission for German troops to go through Rumania
for Ulis attack. On March 25, 1941, when Yugoslavia adhered to the
Axis Tri-partite Pact, von Ribbentrop had assured Yugoslavia that
Germany would respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. On
March 27, lÄl, he attended the meeting, held after the coup d'etat
« ' ■
114 '
in Yugoslavia, at which plans were made to carry out Hitler's an-
nounced Intention to destroy Yugoslavia.
Von Ribbentrop attended a Conference in May 1941 with Hitler and
Antonescu relating to Rumanian participation in the attack on the
USSR. He also consulted with Rosenberg \\\ the preliminary planning
for the political exploitation of Soviet territories and in July 1941,
after the outbreak of war, urged Japan to attack the Soviet Union.
TFar cHrries and crimes against hurnanity, — Von Ribbentrop par-
ticipated in a meeting of June 6, 1944, at which it was agreed to start a
progi-am under which Allied aviators carrying out machine-gun
attacks on civilian population should be lynched. In December 1944,
von Ribbentrop was informed of the plans to murder one of the French
generals held as a prisoner of war and directed his subordinates to
see that the details were worked out in such a way as to prevent its
detection by the protecting powers. Von Ribbentrop is also respon-
sible for war crimes and crimes against humanity because of his activi-
ties with respect to occupied countries and Axis satellites. The top
German official in both Denmark and Vichy France was a f oreign office
representative, and von Ribbentrop is therefore responsible for the
general economic and political policies put into Effect in the occupation
of those countries. He urged the Italians to adopt a ruthless occupa-
tion policy in Yugoslavia and Greece.
He played an important part in Hitler's "final Solution" of the
Jewish question. In September 1942 he ordered the German diplo-
matic representatives accredited to various Axis satellites to hasten
the deportation of Jews to the east. In June 1942 the German Am-
bassador to Vichy requested Laval to turn over 50,000 Jews for
deportation to the east. On February 25, 1943, von Ribbentrop pro-
tested to Mussolini against Italian slowness in deporting Jews from
the Italian occupation zone of France. On April 17, 1943, he took part
in a Conference between Hitler and Horthy on the deportation of Jews
from Hungary and informed Horthy that the "Jews must either be
exterminated or taken to concentration camps." At the same Confer-
ence Hitler had hkened the Jews to "tuberculosis bacilli" and said if
they did not work they were to be shot.
Von Ribbentrop's defense to the charges made against him is that
Hitler made all the important decisions and that he was such a great
admirer and faithful follower of Hitler that he never questioned
Hitler's repeated assertions that he wanted peace, or the truth of the
reasons that Hitler gave in explaining aggressive action. The Tri-
bunal does not consider this explanation to be true. Von Ribbentrop
participated in all of the Nazi aggressions from the occupation of Aus-
tria to the Invasion of the Soviet Union. Although he was personally
concerned with the diplomatic rather Ümn the military aspect of
t
115
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tliese actions, his dii^lomatic efforts were so closely connected with
war that he could not liave remained unaware of the aggressive nature
of Hitler's actions. In the administration of territories over which
Germany acquired control by illegal invasion, von Kibbentrop also
assisted in carrying ovit criminal policies particularly tliose involving
the extermination of the Jews. There is abundant evidence, more-
over, that von Ribbentrop was in complete sympathy with all the main
tencts of the National Socialist creed, and that his collaboration with
Hitler and with other defendants in the commission of crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity was whole-hearted.
It was because Hitler's policy and plans coincided with his own ideas
that von Ribbentrop served him so willingly to the end.
Conelusion.—The Tribunal finds that von Ribbentrop is guilty on
all four counts.
•-.
KEITEL
Keitel is indicted on all four counts. He was Chief of Staff to the
then Minister of War von Blomberg from 1935 to 4 February 1938;
on that day Hitler took command of the armed forces, niaking Keitel
Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Keitel did not
have command authority over the three Wehrmacht branches which
enjoyed direct access to the Supreme Commander. OKW was in
effect Hitler's military staff.
CriTwes against peace,— Keitel attended the Schuschnigg Conference
in February 1938 with two other generals. Their presence, he ad-
mitted, was a "military demonstration," but since he had been ap-
pointed OKW chief just 1 week before he had not known why he had
been summoned. Hitler and Keitel then continued to put pressure
on Austria with f alse rumors, broadcasts, and troop maneuvers. Keitel
made the military and other arrangements and Jodl's diary noted
"the effect is quick and strong." When Schuschnigg called his plebi-
scite, Keitel that night briefed Hitler and his generals, and Hitler
issued "Gase Otto" which Keitel initialed.
On 21 April 1938, Hitler and Keitel considered making use of a
possible "incident," such as the assassination of the German minister
at Prague, to preface the attack on Czechoslovakia. Keitel signed
many directives and memoranda on "Fall Gruen," including the direc-
tive of 30 May containing Hitler's statement : "It is my unalterable
decision to smash Czechoslovalvia by military action in the near
future." After Munich, Keitel initialed Hitler's dircctive for the
attack on Czechoslovakia, and issued two Supplements. The second
Supplement said the attack should appear to the outside world as
"merely an act of pacification and not a warlike undertaking." The
OKW chief attended Hitler's negotiations with Hacha when tho
latter surrendered.
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Keitel was present on 23 May 1939 when Hitler announced his deci-
sion "to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity." Already he
had signed the directive requiring the Wehrmacht to submit its 'Tall
Weiss" timetable to OKW by 1 May.
The invasion of Noiway and Denmark he discussed on 12 Dccember
1939 with Hitler, Jodl, and Kaeder. By directive of 27 January 1940
the Norway plans were placed under Keitel's "direct and personal
guidiince." Hitler had said on 23 May 1939 he would ignore the
neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands, and Keitel signed Orders
for these attacks on 15 October, 20 November, and 28 November 1939.
Orders postponing this attack 17 times until spring 1940 all were
signed by Keitel or Jodl.
Formal planning for atta^king Greece and Yugoslavia had begun
in November 1940. On 18 March 1941, Keitel heard Hitler teil Raeder
complete occupation of Greece was a prerequisite to settlement, and
also heard Hitler decree on 27 March that the destruction of Yugo-
slavia should take place with "unmercif ul harshness."
Keitel testified that he opposed the invasion of the Soviet Union for
military reasons, and also because it would constitute a viplation of
the nonaggrcssion pact. Nevertheless he initialed "Gase Barbarossa,"
signed by Hitler on 18 Dccember 1940, and attended the OKAV dis-
cussion with Hitler on 3 February 1941. Keitel's Supplement of 13
March established the relationship between the military and political
officers. He issued his timetable for the invasion on 6 June 1941, and
was present at the briefing of 14 June when the generals gave their
'final reports before attack. He appointed Jodl and Warlimont as
OKW representatives to Eosenberg on matters concerning the eastern
territories. On 16 June he directed all army units to carry out the
economic directives issued by Goering in the so-called "Green Folder,''
for the exploitation of Eussian territory, f ood and raw materials.
^Yar crimes and crimes against humanity ,—0i\ 4 August 1942,
Keitel issued a directive that paratroopers were to be turned over to
the SD. On 18 October Hitler issued the commando order which was
carried out in several instances. After the landing in Normandy,
Keitel reaffirmed the order, and later extended it to Allied missions
fighting with partisans. He admits he did not believe the order was
legal but Claims he could not stop Hitler from decreeing it.
\ When, on 8 September 1941, OKW issued its ruthless regulations for
.^ l^^^ the treatment of Soviet POW's, Canaris wrote to Keitel that under
"^ ^ .international law the SD should have nothing to do with this matter.
^'^n this memorandum in Keitel's handwriting, dated 23 September and|
.u^oi/^ri K^T Kitt» io fVia «fnfpmpnf! "Thft ohiections arise from the ^ i, M/*
dij^
/
n
In
\ ^.
initialed by him, is the statement: "The objections arise from the
' ^ <^ military concept of chivalrous warf are. This is the destruction of an
V» ' j^^deology. There fore I approve and back the measures." Keitel tcsti-
y^,^ fied that he really agreed with Canaris and argued with Hitler, but
^ 117
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, *-^ \
y
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lost. The OKW chiof directed the military authorities to cooperate
with the Einsatzstab Eosenberg in looting cultiiral property in occu-
pied territories.
I Lahousen testified that Kcitel told him on 12 September 1939, while
aboard Hitler's headquarters train, that the Polish intelligcntsia,
nobility and Jews were to be liquidated. On 20 October, Hitler told
Koitel the intelligentsia would be prevented from forming a riiling
' class, the Standard of living would remain low, and Poland would be
used only for labor forces. Keitel does not remember the Lahousen
conversation, but admits there was such a policy and that he had pro-
tested without eff ect to Hitler about it.
On 16 September 1941, Keitel ordercd that attacks on soldiers in the
east should be met by putting to death 50 to 100 Communists for one
German soldier, with the comment that huniauJif e was less than noth-
ing in the east. On 1 October he ordered military Commanders always
toTTaveHhostages to execute when German soldiers were attacked.
When Terboven, the Reich Commissioner in Norway, wrote Hitler that
Keitel's Suggestion that workmen's relatives be held responsible for
Sabotage, could work only if firing squads were authorized, Keitel
wrote on this memorandum : "Yes, that is the best."
On 12 May 1941, 5 weeks before the Invasion of the Soviet Union, the
OKW urged upon Hitler a directive of the OKH that political com-
missars be liquidated by the army. Keitel admitted the directive was
passed on to field Commanders. And on 13 May, Keitel signed an order
that civihans suspected of offenses against troops should be shot withr
out trial, and that prosecution of German soldiers for offenses against
civihans was unnecessary. On 27 July all copies of this directive were
ordered destroyed without affecting its validity. Four days previously
he had signed another order that legal punishment was inadequate and
troops should uselterrorism. A
On 7 Decemberl541, as already discussed in this opinion, the so-
called "Nacht und Nebel" decrec, over Keitel's signature, provided that
in occupied territories civilians who had been accused of crimes of re-
sistance against the army of occupation would be tried only if a death
sentence was likely; otherwise they would be handed to the Gestapo
for transportation to Germany.
Keitel directed that Russian POWs be used in German war indus-
try. On 8 September 1942, he ordered French, Dutch, and Belgian
Citizens to work on the construction of the Atlantic Wall. He was
present on 4 January 1944 when. Hitler directed Sauckel to obtain 4
million new workers from occupied territories.
In the face of these documents Keitel does not deny his connection
with these acts. Rather, his defense relies on the fact that he is a
soldier, and on the doctrine of "superior orders," prohibited by
Article 8 of the Charter as a defense.
118
} i^.* *.
ti^'
II! .
There is nothing in mitigation. Superior orders, even to a soldier,
cannot be considered in mitigation where crimes as shocking and ex-
tensive have been committed consciously, ruthlessly, and without mili-
tary excuse or justification.
Conclmion.—ThQ Tribunal finds Keitel guilty on all four counts.
KALTENBRUNNER
Kaltenbrunner is indicted under counts one, three, and four. He
joined the Austrian Nazi Party and the SS in 1932. In 1935 he be-
came leader of the SS in Austria. After the Anschluss he was ap-
pointed Austrian State Secretary for Security and when this position
was abolished in 1941 he was made higher SS and police leader. On
30 January 1943, he was appointed chief of the security police and
SD and head of the Reich security head office (RSHA), a position
which had been held by Heydrich until his assassination in June 1942.
He held the rank of Obergruppenf uehrer in the SS.
Crimes against pcace.—A.s leader of the SS in Austria, Kalten-
brunner was active in the Nazi intrigue against the Schuschnigg Gov-
ernment. On the night of March 11, 1938, af ter Gocring had ordered
Austrian National Socialists to seize control of the Austrian Govern-
ment, 500 Austrian SS men under Kaltenbrunner's comniand sur-
rounded the Federal Chancellery and a special detachment under the
command of his adjutant entered the Federal Chancellery whilc Seyss-
Inquart was negotiating with President Mildas. But there is no evi-
dence connecting Kaltenbrunner with plans to wage aggressive war
on any other front. The Anschluss, although it was an agsres^i^
a£t^ is not charged as an aggressive war, and the evidence against
Kaltenbrunner under count one does not, in the opinion of the Tri-
bunal, show his dircct participation in any plan to wage such a war.
War crimes and crimes against humanitij.—Whan he becamc chief
of the security police and SD and head of the ESHA on January
30, 1943, Kaltenbrunner took charge of an Organization which included
the main offices of the Gestapo, the SD and the criminal police. As
Chief of the ESHA, Kaltenbrunner had authority to order protective
custody to and release from concentration camps. Orders to this eff ect
were normally sent over his signature. Kaltenbrunner was aware
of conditions in concentration camps. He had undoubtedly visited
Mauthausen and witnesses testified that he had seen prisoners killed
by the various methods of execution, hanging, shooting in the back
of the neck, and gassing, as part of a demonstration. Kaltenbrunner
himself ordered the execution of prisoners in those camps and his
Office was used to transmit to the camps execution orders which origi-
nated in Himmler's office. At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner
participated in the arrangements for the evacuation of inmates of
concentration camps, and the liquidation of many of them, to prevent
them from being liberated by the Allied armies,
119
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During the period in which Kalt eiib ruinier was liead of the ESHA,
it was engaged in a widespread program of war crimes and crimes
against humanity. These crimes included the mistreatment and
murder of prisoners of war. Einsatz Kommandos operating under
the control of the Gestapo were engaged in the Screening of Soviet
prisoners of war. Jews, commissars, and others who were thought
to be ideologically hostile to the Nazi system were reported to the
ESHA, which had them transferred to a concentration camp and
murdered. An ESHA order issued during Kaltenbrunner's regime
^iHBTished the "bullet decree," under which certain escaped prisoners
of war who were recaptured were taken to Mauthausen and shot.
The Order for the execution of commando troops was extended by
the Gestapo to include parachutists while Kaltenbrunner was chief
of the ESHA. An order signed by Kaltenbrunner instructed the
police not to interfere with attacks on bailed out Allied fliers; In
December 1944, Kaltenbrunner participated in the murder of one
of the French generals held as a prisoner of war.
During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was head of the ESHA,
the Gestapo and SD in occupied territories continued the murder and
ill-treatment of the population, using methods which included torture
and confinement in concentration camps, usually under Orders to which
Kaltenbrunner's name was signed.
The Gestapo was responsible for enforcing a rigid labor discipline
on the slave laborers and Kaltenbrunner established a series of labor
reformatory camps for this purpose. When the SS embarked on a
slave labor program of its own, the Gestapo was used to obtain the
needed workers by sending laborers to concentration camps.
The ESHA played a leading part in the "final Solution" of the
Jewish question by the extermination pf the Jews. A special section
under the AMT IV of the ESHA was established to supervise this
program. Under its direction apgroximately G million Jewg were
murdered, of which 2inillion were killed by Einsatzgruppen and other
Units of the security'pölice. Kaltenbrunner had been informed of
the activities of these Einsatzgruppen when he was a higher SS and
police leader, and tliey continued to function after he had become
Chief of the ESHA.
The murder of approximatelv 4 million Jews in concentration campa-,
hasheretofore been described. This part of the program was also
under the supervision of the RSHA when Kaltenbrunner was head
of that Organization, and special missions of the ESHA scoured the
occupied territories and the various Axis satellities arranging for the
deportation of Jews to these extermination institutions. Kalten-
brunner was informed of these activities. A letter which he wrote on
30 June 1944, described the shipment to Vienna of 12,000 Jews for.
that purpose, and directed that all who could not work would have
to be kept in readiness for "special action," which meant murder.
120
11
Kaltenbrunner denied bis signature to this letter, as he did on a very
icir^A rmml^r af-a»»4ftrs ou which liis name was stamped or typed,
and, in a few instances, written. It is inconceivable that in matters
of such importance his signature could have appeared so many times
without his authority.
Kaltenbrunner has claimed that, when he took oflfice as chief of the
security police and SD and as head of the ESHA, he did so pursuant
to an understanding with Himmler under which he was to confine
his activities to matters involving foreign intelligeiice, and not to
assume over-all controt over the activities of the ESHA. He claims
that the criminal program had been started before his assumption of
Office; that he seldom knew what was going on; and that when he
was informed he did what he could to stop them. It is true that he
showed a special interest in matters involving foreign intelligence.
But he exercised control over the activities of the ESHA, was aware
of the crimes it was committing, and was an active participant in
many of them.
Conclusion.—ThQ Tribunal finds that Kaltenbrunner is not guilty
on count one. He is guilty under counts three and f our.
ROSENBERG
Eosenberg is indicted on all four counts. He joined the Nazi
Party in 1919, participated in the Munich Putsch of November 9,
1923, and tried to keep the illegal Nazi Party together while Hitler
was in jail. Eecognized as the party's ideologist, he developed and
spread Nazi doctrines in the ncwspapers ''Voelkischer Beobachter"
and "N S Monatshefte," which he edited, and in the numerous books
he wrote. His book, "Myth of the Twentieth Century," had a circula-
tion of over a million copies.
In 1930, Eosenberg was elected to the Eeichstag and he became the
Party's representative for Foreign Affairs. In April 1933 he was
made Eeichsleiter and head of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the
NSDAP (The APA). Hitler, in January 1934, appointed Eosen-
berg his deputy for the supervision of the entire spiritual and ideo-
logical training of the NSDAP. In January 1940, he was designated
to set up the "Hohe Schule," the center of National Socialistic ideo-
logical and educational research, and he organized the "Einsatzstab
Eosenberg" in connection with this task. He was appointed Eeich
Minister for the occupied eastern territories on July 17, 1941.
Cn7?ies against peace.— As head of the APA, Rosenberg was in
Charge of an Organization whose agents were active in Nazi intrigue
in all parts of the world. His own reports, for example, claim that
the APA was largely responsible for Boumania's joining the Axis.
As head of the APA, he played an important role in the preparation
and planning of the attack on Norway.
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Eoscnberg, togetlier with Rae(ler, was one of the originators of the
plan f or attacking Norway. Rosenberg liad become interested in Nor-
way as carly as June 1939, when he conferred with Qiiisling. Quisling
had pointed out the importance of the Norwegian coast in the event
of a conflict between Germany and Great Britaiii, and stated his fears
that Great Britain might be able to obtain Norwegian assistance. As
a result of this Conference Eosenberg arranged for Quisling to col-
laborate closelv with the National Socialists and to receive political
*>
assistance by the Nazis.
When the war broke out Quisling began to express fear of British
Intervention in Norway. Rosenberg supported this view, and trans-
mitted to Raeder a plan to use Quisling for a coup in Norway. Rosen-
berg was instrumental in arranging the Conferences in December 1939
between Hitler and Quisling which led to the preparation of the at-
tack on Norway, and at which Hitler promised Quisling financial as-
sistance. After these Conferences Hitler assigned to Rosenberg the
political exploitation of Norway. Two weeks after Norway was occu-
pied, Hitler told Rosenberg that he had based his decision to attack
Norway "on the continuous warnings of Quisling as reported to him
by Reichsleiter Rosenberg."
Rosenberg bears a major responsibility for the formulation and
execution of occupation policies in the occupied eastern territories. He
was informed by Hitler on April 2, 1941, of the coniing attack against
the Soviet Union, and he agreed to help in the capacity of a "Political
adviser." On April 20, 1941, he was appointed commissioner for the
central control of questions connected with the east-European region.
In preparing the plans for the occupation, he had numerous Confer-
ences with Keitel, Raeder, Goering, Funk, von Kibbentrop, and other
high Reich authorities. In April and May 1941 he prepared several
draf ts of Instructions concerning the setting up of the administration
in the occupied eastern territories. On June 20, 1941, 2 days bef ore the
attack on the USSR, he made a speech to his assistants about the prob-
lems and policies of occupation. Rosenberg attended Hitler's Con-
ference of July 16, 1941, in which policies of administration and
occupation were discussed. On July 17, 1041 , Hitler appointed Rosen-
berg Reich Minister for the occupied eastern territories, and publicly
charged him with responsibilty for civil administration.
War crimes and erimes against hnmanity.—RosenhQrg is responsible
for a System of organized plunder of both public and private property
throughout the invaded countries of Europe. Acting under Hitler's
Orders of January 1940, to set up the "Hohe schule," he organized and
directed the "Einsatzstab Rosenberg," which plundered museums and
libraries, confiscatedart treasures and collections, and pillaged private
^ hojiSßS,-. His cnvn reports show the extent of the confiscations. In
■^iction-IM" (Moebel) , instituted in December 1941 at Rosenberg's sug-
122
gestion, 69,G19 Jewish homes were plundered in the west, 3S,0O0 of
them in Paris alone, and it took 2G,084 railroad cars to transport the
confiscated furnishings to Germany. As of July 14, 1944, more t lan
21,903 art objects, including f amous pamtings and museuin pieces, had
been seized by the Einsatzstab in the west.
With his appointment as Reich Minister for occupied eastern ter-
ritories on July 17, 1941, Rosenberg became the supreme authority for
those areas. He helped to formulate the policies of Germanization,
exploitation, forced labor, extermination of Jews and opponents of
Nazi rule, and he set up the administration which carried them out.
He took part in the Conference of July 16, 1941, in which Hitler stated
that they were f aced with the task of "cutting up the giant cake ac-
cordino- to our needs, in order to be able: first, to dominate it, second,
to admlnister it, and third, to exploit it," and he indicated that ruthless
action was contemplated. Rosenberg accepted his appointment on
the f oUowing day.
Rosenberg had knowledge of the bi;utdjreatme^^ to
which the eastern people were subjectedTHe directed that tlieHague
Rules of Land Warfare were not applicable in the occupied eastern
territories. He had knowledge of and took an active part m strip-
pinnr tho eastern territories of raw materials and foodstuffs, which
Tvert all sent to Germany. He stated that feeding the German people
was first on the list of claims on the east, and that the Soviet people
would suffer thereby. His directives provided for the segregation
of Jews, ultimately in ghettos. His subordinates engaged m mass
killings of Jews, and his civil administrators in the east considered that
cleansing the eastern occupied territories of Jews was necessary. In
December 1941, he made the Suggestion to Hitler that in a
case of shooting 100 hostages, Jews only be used. Rosenberg had
knowledge of the deportation of laborers f rom the east, of the methods
of "recruiting" and the transportation horrors, and of the treatment
eastern laborers received in the Reich. He gave his civil adminis-
trators quotas of laborers to be sent to the Reich, which had to be
met by whatever means necessary. His signature of approval appears
on the Order of June 14, 1944, for "Heu Aktion," the apprehension of
40,000 to 50,000 youths, aged 10-14, for shipment to the Reich.
Upon occasion Rosenberg objected to the excesses and atrocities
committed by his subordinates, notably in the case of Koch, but these
excesses continued and he stayed in office until tho end.
ConclusiorL—The Tribunal finds that Rosenberg is guilty on all
f our counts.
FRANK
Frank is indicted under counts one, thrce, and f our. Frank joined
the Nazi Party in 1927. He became a member of the Reichstag in 1930,
123
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the Bavarian State Minister of Justice in March 1933, and when this
Position was incorporated into the Reich Government in 1934, Reich
Minister without Portfolio. He was made a Reichsleiter of the Nazi
Party in char^e of le^l afFairs in 1933, and in the same year president
of the Academy of German law. Frank was also given the honorary
rank of Obergruppenfuehrer in the SA. In 1942 Frank became in-
Yolved in a temporary dispute with Himmler as to the type of legal
System which should be in effect in Germany. Döring the same year
he wasdismissed as Reichsleiter of the Nazi Party and as president of
the Academy of German law.
Criines against yeace. — The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal
that Frank was sufficiently connected with the common plan to wago
aggressive war to allow the Tribunal to convict him on count one.
War crmies a/nd crimes against Immanity. — Frank was appointed
Chief Civil Administration ofRcer for occupied Polish territory and,
on October 12, 1939, was made Governor General of the occupied
Polish territory. On October 3, 1939, he described the pohcy which
he intended to put into effect by stating : "Poland shall be treated like
a colony ; the Poles will become the slaves of the Greater German
World Empire." pThe evidence establishes that this occupation policy
was based on the complete destruction of Poland as a national entity,
and a ruthless exploitation of its human and economic resources for
the German war effort. All Opposition was crushed with the utmost
harshness. A reign of terror was instituted, backed by summary
police Courts which ordered such actions as the public shootings of
groups of 20 to 200 Poles, and the widespread shootings of hostages.
The concentration camp System was introduced in the General Gov-
ernment by the establishment of the notorious Treblinka and May-
danek camps. As early as February 6, 1940, Frank gave an indication
of the extent of this reign of terror by bis cynical comment to a news-
paper reporter on von Neurath's poster announcing the execution of
the Czech students : "If I wished to order that one should hang up
posters about every seven Poles shot, there would not be enough
forests in Poland with which to makc the paper for these posters.^'
On May 30, 1940, Frank told a police Conference that he was taking
advantage of the offensive in the west which diverted the attention
of the World f rom Poland to liquidate thousands of Poles who would
be likely to resist German domination of Poland, including "the
leading representatives of the Polish intelligentsia." Pursuant to
these Instructions the brutal A. B. action was begun under w^hich the
security police and SD carried out these exterminations which were
only partially subjected to the restraints of legal proccdure. On
October 2, 1943, Frank issued a decree under which any non-Germans
hindering German construction in the General Government were to be
124
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tried by summary courts of the security pohce and SD and sentenced to \
death.
The economic demands made on the General Government were f ar
in excess of the needs of the army of occupation, and were out of all
Proportion to the resources of the country. The food raised in
Poland was shipped to Germany on such a wide scale that the rations
of the Population of the occupied territories were reduced to the star-
vation level, and epidemics were widespread. Some steps were taken
to provide for the feeding of the agricultural Avorkers who were used
to raise the crops, but the requirements of the rest of the population
were disregarded. It is undoubtedly true, as argued by counsel for
for the defense, that some suffering in the general government was
inevitable as a result of the ravages of war and the economic conf usion
resulting therefrom. But the suffering was increased by a planned
policy of economic exploitation.
Frank introduced the deportation of slave laborers to Germany in
the very early stages of his administration. On January 25, 1940,
he indicated his intention of deporting 1,000,000 laborers to Germany/^ ^.^^ ,
suggesting on May 10, 1940, the use of police raids to meet this quota.
On August 18, 1942, Frank reported that he had already supplied
800,000 workers for the Reich, and expected to be able to supply
140,000 more before the end of the year.
The persecution of the Jews was immediately begun in the General
Government. The area originally contained from 2,500,000 to
3,500,000 Jews. They were forced into ghettos, subjected to discrimi-
natory laws, deprived of the food necessary to avoid starvation, and
finally systematically and brutally exterminated. On December 16,
1941, Frank told the Cabinet of the Governor General : |'We must
annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and wherever it is possible,
in Order to maintain there the structure of the Reich as a whole." By
January 25, 1944, Frank estimated that there were only 100,000 Jews
left . .
At the beginning of his testimony, Frank stated that he had a f eelmg r ^>JL^
of "terrible guilt" for the atrocities committed in the occupied terri- ^ ^^-
tories. But his defense was largely devoted to an attcmpt to prove ^vjr»«/
that he was not in f act responsible ; that he ordered only the necessary
pacification measures ; that the excesses were due to the activities of the
police which were not under his control ; and that he never even knew
of the activities of the concentration camps. It has also been argued
' that the starvation was due to the af termath of the war and policies
carried out under the 4-year plan ; that the f orced-labor program was
under the direction of Sauckel; and that the extermination of the Jews
was by the police and SS under direct ordcrs from Himmler.
It is undoubtedly true that most of the criminal program charged
against Frank was put into effect through the police, that Frank
125
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had jurisdictional difficulties with Himmler over the control of the
police, and that Hitler resolved maiiy of these disputes in favor of
Himmler. It theref ore may well be true that some of the crimes com-
mitted in the General Government were committed without the knowl-
edge of Frank, and even occasionally despite his Opposition. It may
also be true that some of the criminal policies put into etfect in the
General Government did not originate with Frank but were carried
out pursuant to orders f rom Germany. But it is also true thatJFrank
was a willing and knowing participant in the use of (terrorism^ in
Poland ; in the economic exploitation of Poland in a way which led to
the death by starvation of a large numberjof peopje; in the deporta-
tion to Germany as slave laBortrrs of over a million Poles ; and in a
program involving the murder of at least 3 million Jews.
ConcJusion.—i:h^ Tribunal finds that Frank is not guilty on count
one but guilty under counts three and f our.
FRICK
Frick is indicted on all four counts. Kecognized as the chief Nazi
administrative specialist and bureaucrat, he was appointed Keichs-
minister of the Interior in Hitler's first cabinet. He retained this
important position until August 1943, when he was appointed Reich
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. In connection with his duties
at the center of all internal and domestic administration, he became
the Prussian Minister of the Interior, Reich Director of Elections,
General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich, and a
member of the Reich Defense Council, the Ministerial Council for
Defense of the Reich, and the "Three man College." As the several
countries incorporated into the Reich were overrun, he was placed
at the head of the central offices for their incorporation.
Though Frick did not officially join the Nazi Party until 1925, he
had previously allied himself with Hitler and the National Socialist
cause during the Munich Putsch, while he was an official in the Munich
police department. Elected to the Reichstag in 1924, he became a
Reichsleiter as leader of the National Socialist f action in that body.
Criynes. against peace,—Axi avid Nazi, Frick was largely responsible
for bringing the German Nation under the complete control of the
NSDAP. After Hitler became Reich chancellor, the new Minister
of the Interior immediately began to incorporate local governments
under the sovoreignty of the Reich. The numerous laws he draf ted,
signed, and administered abolished all Opposition parties and pre-
pal-ed the way for the Gestapo and their concentration camps to
extinguish all individual Opposition. He was largely responsible for
the legislation which suppressed the trade unions, the church, the
Jews. ''Hc perf ormed this task with ruthless efficiency.
Before the date of the Austrian aggression Frick was concerned
only with domestic administration within the Reic>. The evidence
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does not show that lie participated in any of the Conferences at which
Hitler outlined his aggressive intentions. Conscquently the Tribunal
takes the view that Frick was ;ngL^ member of the common plan or
conspiracy to wage aggressive wlFas dofined in this judgment. _
Six months after the seizure of Austria, under the provisions of
the Eeich defense law of September 4, 193S, Frick became General
plenipotentiary for the administration of the Keich. He was made
responsible for war administration, exccpt the military and economic,
in the event of Hitler's proclaiming a state of defense. The Reich
Ministries of Justice, Education, Religion, and the office of Spatial
planning were made subordinate to him. Performing his allotted
duties, Frick devised an administrative Organization in accordance
with wartime Standards. According to his own Statement, this was
actually put into Operation after Germany decided to adopt a policy
Frick signed the law of March 13, 1938, which united Austria
with the Eeich, and he was made responsible for its accomplishment.
In setting up German administration in Austria, he issued dccrees
which introduced German law, the Nürnberg decrees, the military
Service law, and he provided for police security by Himmler
He also signed the laws incorporating into the Reich the Sudeten-
land Memel,Danzig,the eastern territories (West Trussia and Posen) ,
and Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnot. He was placed m charge of
the actual incorporation, and of the establishment of German admin-
istration over these territories. He signed the law establishmg the
protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
As the head of the central offices for Bohemia and Moravia, the
Government General, and Norway, he was charged with obtainmg
close Cooperation between the German officials in these occupied coun-
tries and the supreme authorities of the Reich. He supplied German
civil servants for the administrations in all occupied territories, ad-
vising Rosenberg as to their assignment in the occupied eastern
territories. He signed the laws appointing Terboven Reich Commis-
sioner to Norway and Seyss-Inquart to Holland.
TFar crimes and crimes against humanity.—Myiays rabidly anti-
Semitic, Frick draf ted, signed, and administered many laws designed
to eliminate Jews f rom German lifo and economy. His work f ormed
the basis of the Nürnberg Decrees, and he was activc in enforcing
them. Responsible for prohibiting Jews f rom following various pro-^
fessions. and for confiscating their property, he signed a final dccree .
in 1043,' after the mass destruction of Jews in the east, which placed
them "outside the law" and handed them over to the Gestapo. These,
laws paved the way for the «final Solution," and were extended by
Frick to the incorporated territories and to ccrtain of the occupied
territories. While he was Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia,
127
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thousands of Jews were transferred from the Terezin ghetto in
Czechoslovakia to Auschwitz, where they were killed. He issued a
decree providing for special penal laws against Jews and Poles in
the Government General.
The policc officially feil under the Jurisdiction of the Keichsminister
of the Interior. But Frick actually exercised little control ovcr
Himmler and police matters. However, he signed the law appohiting
Himmler chief of the German police, as well as the decrees establishing
Gestapo Jurisdiction over concentration camps and regulating the
execution of orders for protective custody. From the many complaints
he received, and from the testimony of witnesses, the Tribunal con-
cludes that he knew of atrocities committed in these camps. With
knowledge of Himmler's metliods, Frick signed decrees authorizing
him to take necessary security measures in certain of the incorporated
territories. What these ''security measures" turned out to be has
already been dealt with.
As the Supreme Reich Authority in Bohemia and Moravia, Frick
bears general responsibility for the acts of oppression in that territory
aftcr 20 August 1943, such as|terrorismJof the population, slave labor,
and the deportation of Jews to the concentration camps for extermina-
tion. It is true that Frick's duties as Reich protector were considerably
more limited than those of his predecessor, and that he had no legis-
lative and limited personal executive authority in the protectorate.
Nevertheless, Frick knew füll well what the Nazi policies of occupa-
tion were in.Europe, particularly with respect to Jews, at that timo,
and by accepting the office of Reich Protector he assumed responsi-
bility for carrying out those policies in Bohemia and Moravia.
German citizenship in the occupied countries as well as in the Reich
came under his Jurisdiction while he was Minister of the Interior.
Having created a racial register of persons of German extraction,
Frick conferred German citizenship on certain groups of Citizens
of foreign countries. He is responsible for Germanization in Austria,
^ Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, eastern territories (West Prussia and
Posen)7andTliipen, Malmedy, and Moresnot. He forced on the citi- ^
zens of these territories German law, German courts, German educa-
tion, German police security, and compulsory military Service.
During the war, nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums in which
eutlianasia was practiced as describcd elsewhere in this judgment,
came under Frick's Jurisdiction. He had knowledge that insane,
sick, and aged people, "useless eaters," were being systematically put
to death. Complaints of these murders reached him, but he did noth-
ing to stop them. A report of the Czechoslovak War Crimes Com-
mission estimated that 275,000 mentally deficient and aged people, for
whoso welfare he was responsible, feil victim to it.
128
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Condusion—Tho Tribunal finds that Frick is not guilty on count
one. He is guilty on counts two, three, and four.
STREICHER
Streicher is indicted on counts one and four. One of the earliest
members of the Nazi Party, joining in 1921, he took part in the
Munich Putsch. From 1925 to 1940 he was Gauleiter of Franconia.
Elected to the Reichstag in 1933, he was an honorary general in the
SA. His persecution of the Jews was notorious. He was the pub-
lisher of "Der Sturmer," an anti-Semitic weekly newspapcr, from
1923 to 1945 and was its editor until 1933.
Crimes against p^a(:^.— Streicher was a staunch Nazi and supporter
of Hitler's main policies. There is no evidence to show that he was
ever within Hitler's inner circle of advisers; nor during his career
was he closely connected with the formulation of the policies which
led to war. He was never present, for example, at any of the im-
portant Conferences when Hitler explained his decisions to his leaders.
Although he was a Gauleiter, there is no evidence to prove that he
had knowledge of those policies. In the opinion of the Tribunal,
the evidence fails to establish his connection with the conspiracy or
common plan to wage aggressive war as that conspiracy has been
elsewhere defined in this judgment.
Crimes against hu7?ianity,— For his 25 years of speaking, writing,
and preaching hatred of the Jews, Streicher was widely known as
"Jew-Baiter Number One." In his speeches and articles, week after
week, month after month, he inf ected the German mind with the virus
of anti-Semitism, and incited the German people to active persecu-
tion. Each issue of "Der Sturmer," which reached a circulation of
600,000 in 1935, was filled with such articles, often lewd and dis-
gusting.
Streicher had charge of the Jewish boycott of April 1, 1933. He
advocated the Nürnberg decrees of 1935. He was responsible for the
demolition on August 10, 1938, of the synagogue in Nürnberg ; and
on November 10, 1938, he spoke publicly in support of the Jewish
pogrom which was taking place at that time.
But it was not only in Germany that this defendant advocated his
doctrines. As early as 1938 he began to call for the annihilation of
the Jewish race. Twenty-three different articles of "Der Sturmer"
between 1938 and 1941 were produced in evidence, in which extermina-
tion, '^root and branch," was preached. Typical of his teachings was a
leading article in September 1938 which termed the Jew a germ and
a pest, not a human being, but "a parasite, an enemy, an evil-doer, a
disseminator of diseases who must be destroyed in the interest of
mankind." Other articles urged that only when world Jewry had
been amnhilated would the Jewish problem have been solved, and
129
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predicted that 50 years hence the Jewish graves "will proclaim that
this people of murderers and criminals has after all met its deserved
fate." Streicher, in February li)40, published a letter from one of
"Der Sturmer V readers which compared Jews with swarnis of locusts
which must be exterminated completely. Such was the poison
Streicher injected into the minds of thousands of Germans which
caused them to f ollow the National Socialist policy of Jewish persecu-
tion and externiination. A leading article of "Der Sturmer" in May
1939 shows clearly his aim :
"A punitive expedition must come against the Jews in Russia.
A punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them
that every murderer and criminal must expect. Death sentence
and execution. The Jews in Eussia must be killed. They must
be exterminated root and branch."
As the war in the early stages proved successful in acquiring more
and more territory for the Reich, Streicher even intensified his efforts
to incite the Germans against the Jews. In the rccord are 26 articles
from "Der Sturmer," published between August 1941 and September
1944, 12 by Streicher's own band, which demanded annihilation and
cxtermination in unequivocal terms. He wrote and published on
December 25, 1941 :
"If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the
Jewish blood is finally come to an end, then there is only one
way— the extermination of that people whose father is the devil."
And in February 1944 his own article stated :
"Whoever does what a Jew does is a scoundrel, a criminal.
And he who repeats and wishes to copy him deserves the same
fate — annihilation, death."
With knowledge of the extermination of the Jews in the occupied
eastern territory, this defendant continued to write and publish his
Propaganda of death. Testifying in this trial, he vehemently denied
any knowledge of mass executions of Jews. But the evidence makes
it clear that he continually received current Information on the pro-
gress of the "final Solution." His press photographer was sent to visit
the ghettos of the east in the spring of 1943, the time of the destruc-
tion of the Warsaw ghetto. The Jewish newspaper, "Israelitisches
Wochenblatt," which Streicher received and read, carried in each issue
accounts of Jewish atrocities in the east, and gave figures on the num-
ber of Jews who had been deported and killed. For example, issues
appearing in the summer and fall of 1942 reported the death of 72,729
Jews in Warsaw, 17,542 in Lodz, 18,000 in Croatia, 125,000 in Rumania,
14,000 in Latvia, 85,000 in Yugoslavia, 700,000 in all of Poland. In
November 1943 Streicher quoted verbatim an article from the "Israel-
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130
itisches Wochenblatt" which stated that the Jews had virtually dis-
appeared from Europe, and commented, *'This is not a Jewish lie."
In December 1942, ref erring to an article in the "London Times" about
the atrocities, aiming at extermination, Streicher said that Hitler had
given warning that the second World War would lead to the destruc-
tion of Jewry. In January 1943 he wrote and published an article
which Said that Hitler's phophecy was being f ulfiUed, that world Jewry
was being extirpated,. and that it was wonderf ul to know that Hitler
was f rceing the world of its Jewish tormentors.
In the face of the evidence bcf ore the Tribunal it is idle for Streicher
to suggest that the Solution of the Jewish problem which he favored
was strictly limited to the Classification of Jews as aliens, and the pass-
ing of discriminatory legislation such as the Nürnberg laws, supple-
mcnted if possible by international agreement on the creation of a
Jewish State somewhere in the world, to which all Jews should
emigrate.
Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination at the time when
Jews in the east were being killed under the most horrible conditions
clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in con-
nection with war crimes. as defined by the Charter, and constitutes a
crime against humanity.
Conclusion.—Tha Tribunal finds that Streicher is not guilty on
count one, but that he is guilty on count four.
FUNK
Funk is indicted under all four counts. Funk, who had previously
been a financial Journalist, joined the Nazi Party in 1931, and shortly
thercafter became one of Hitler's personal economic advisers. On
January 30, 1933, Funk was made press chief in the Reich Government,
and on March 11, 1933, became Under Secretary in the Ministry of
Propaganda and shortly thereafter a leading figure in the various
Nazi organizations which were used to control the press, films, music,
and Publishing houses. He took oflice as Minister of Economics
and Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in early 1938 and as
President of Üie Reichsbank in January 1939. He succeeded Schacht
in all three of these positions. He was made a member of the Min-
isterial Council for the Defense of the Reich in August 1939, and a
member of the Central Planning Board in September 1943.
Crimes against peace.—Fimk became active in the economic field
after the Nazi plans to wage aggressive war had been clearly defined.
One of his representatives attended a Conference on October 14, 1938,
at which Goering announced a gigantic increase in armaments and
instructed the Ministry of Economics to increase exports to obtain
the necessary exchange. On January 28, 1939, one of Funk's sub-
ordinates sent a memorandum to the OKW on the use of prisoners of
131
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war to make up labor deficiencies which \\ould arise in case of mobiliza-
tion. On May 30, 1939, the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Eco-
nomics attended a meeting at which detailed plans were made for
the financing of the war.
On August 25, 1939, Funk wrote a letter to Hitler expressing his
gratitude that he had been able to participate in such world shaking
event5; that his plans for the "financing of the war," for the control
of wage and price conditions and for the strengthening of the Reichs-
bank had been completed ; and that he had inconspicuously transferred
into gold all foreign exchange resources available to Germany. On
October 14, 1939, after the war had begun, he made a speech in
which he stated that the economic and financial departments of
Germany working under the 4-year plan had been engaged in the
Beeret economic preparation for war for over a year.
Funk partieipated in the economic planning which preceded the
attack on the USSR. His deputy held daily Conferences with Rosen-
berg on the economic problems which would arise in tlie occupation
of Soviet territory. Funk himself partieipated in planning for the
printing of ruble notes in Germany prior to the attack to serve as
occupation currency in the USSR. After the attack he made a speech
in which he described phans he had made for Üie economic exploitation
of the "vast territories of the Soviet Union" which were to be used
as a source of raw material for Europe.
Funk was not one of the leading figures in originatmg the Nazi
plans for aggressive war. His activity in the economic sphere was
under the supervision of Goering as Plenipotentiary General of the
4:-year plan. He did, however, participate in the economic preparation
for certain of tlie aggressive wars, notably those against Poland and
the Soviet Union, but his guilt can be adequately dealt with under
count two of the indictment.
War crimes and erwies against hvmanity.—lw his capacity as
Under Secretary in the Ministry of Propaganda and Vice Chairman
of the Reichs Chamber of Culture, Funk had partieipated m the
early Nazi program of economic discrimination against the Jews.
On November 12, 1938, after the pogroms of November, he attended
a meeting held under the chainnanship of Goering to discuss the
Solution of the Jewish problem and proposed a decree providing for
the banning of Jews from all business activities, which Goering
issued the same day under the authority of the 4-year plan. Funk
has testified that he was shocked at the outbreaks of November 10,
but on November 15 he made a speech describing these outbreaks as
a "violent explosion of the disgust of the German people, because of
a criminal Jewish attack against the German people," and saying
that the elimination of the Jews from economic life foUowed logically
their elimination from political life,
132
In 1942 Funk entered into an agreement with Himmler under
which the Reichsbank was to receive certain gold and jewels and
currency from tlie SS and instructed his subordinates, who were to
work out the details, not to ask too many questions. As a result of
this agreement the SS sent to the Reichsbank the personal belongings
thken from the victims who had been exterminated in the concentra-
tion camps. The Reichsbank kept the coins and bank notes and sent
the jewels, watches, and personal belongings to Berlin municipal
pawn Shops. The gold from the eyeglasses and gold teeth and fillings
was stored in the Reichsbank vaults. Funk has protested that he did
not know that the Reichsbank was receiving articles of this kind. The
Tribunal is of the opinion that Funk either knew what was being
received or was deliberately closing his eyes to what was being done.
As Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, Funk
partieipated in the economic exploitation of occupied territories. He
was President of the Continental Oil Co. which was charged with
the exploitation of the oil resources of occupied territories in the east.
He was responsible for the seizure of the gold reserves of the Czecho-
slovakian National Bank and for the liquidation of the Yugoslavian
National Bank. On June 6, 1942, his deputy sent a letter to the
OKW requesting that f unds from the French occupation cost f und be
made available for black market purchases. Funk's knowledge of
German occupation policies is shown by his presence at the meeting
of August 8, 1942, at which Goering addressed the various German
occupaüon chiefs, told them of the products required from their ter-
ritories, and added : "It makes no difference to me in this connection
if you say that your people Avill starve."
In the fall of 1943, Funk was a member of the Central Planning
Board which determined the total number of laborers needed for Ger-
man industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually by de-
portation from occupied territories. Funk did not appear to be par-
ticularly interested in this aspect of the forced labor program, and
usually sent a deputy to attend the meetings, often SS General Ohlen-^
dorfj, the former chief of the SD inside of Germany and the former
"^SSimander of Einsatzgruppe D. But Funk was aware that the board
of which he was a member was demanding the importation of slave
laborers, and allocating them to the various industries under its
control.
As President of the Reichsbank, Funk was also indirectly mvolved
in the utilization of concentration camp labor. Under his direction
the Reichsbank set up a revolving fund of 12,000,000 Reichsmarks to
the credit of the SS for the construction of f actories to use concentra-
tion camp laborers. /o • i • •
In spite of the fact that he occupied important oficial positions,
Funk was never a dominant figure in the various programs in which
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he participated. This is a mitigating f act of whicli the Tribunal takes
notice.
Co7wIusion.—ThQ Tribunal finds that Funk is not guilty on count
one but is guilty under counts two, tliree, and four.
SCHACHT
Schacht is indicted undcr counts one and two of the indictment.
Schacht served as Commissioner of Currency and president of the
Reichsbank f rem 1923 to 1930 ; was reappointed president of the bank
on March 17, 1933; Minister of Economics in August 1934; and Pleni-
potentiary General f or War Economy in May 1935. He resigned f rom
these two positions in November 1937, and was appointed Minister
without Portfolio. He was reappointed as president of the Reichs-
bank for a 1-year term on March 16, 1937, and for a 4-year term on
March 9, 1938, but was dismissed on January 20, 1939. He was dis-
missed as Minister without Portfolio on January 22, 1943.
Cri?nes against peace,—^d\fid\i was an active supporter of the Nazi
Party bef ore its accession to power on January 30, 1933, and supported
the appointment of Hitler to the post of Chancellor. After that date
he played an important role in the vigorous rearmament program
which was adopted, using the f acihties of the Reichsbank to the füllest
extent in the German rearmament effort. Reichsbank, in its tradi-
tional capacity as financial agent for the German Government floated
long-term Government loans, the proceeds of which were used for re-
armament. He devised a System under which 5-year notes, known
as M. E. F. O. bills, guaranteed by the Reichsbank and backed, in
effect, by nothing more than its position as a bank of issue, were used
to obtain large sums for rearmament from the short-term money
market. As Minister of Economics and as Plenipotentiary General
for War Economy he was active in organizing the German economy
for war. He made detailed plans for industrial mobilization and the
coordination of the army with industry in the event of war. He was
particularly concerned with shortages of raw materials and started a
scheme of stock-piling, and a System of exchange control designed to
prevent Germany's weak foreign exchange position from hindering
the acquisition abroad of raw materials needed for rearmament. On
May 3, 1935, he sent a memorandum to Hitler stating that "the ac-
complishment of the armament program with speed and in quantity is
the Problem of German politics, that everything eise therefore should
be subordinated to this purpose."
Schacht, by April 1936, began to lose bis influence as the central
figure in the German rearmament effort when G^ering was appointed
Coordinator for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange. Goering ad-
vocated a greatly expanded program for the production of synthetic
raw materials wliich was opposed by Schacht on the ground that the
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134
rcsulting financial strain miglit involve Inflation. The influence of
Schacht suffered further when on October IG, 1936, Goering was
appointed Plenipotentiary for the 4-year plan with the task of putting
"the entire economy in a state of readiness for war" within 4 years.
Schacht had opposed the announcement of Üiis plan and the appoint-
ment of Goering to head it, and it is clear that Hitler's action repre-
sented a decision that Schacht's economic policies were too conservative
for the drastic rearmament policy which Hitler wanted to put into
effect.
After Goering's appointment, Schacht and Goering promptly be-
came cmbroiled in a series of disputes. Although there was an dement
of personal controversy running through these disputes, Schacht dis-
agreed with Goering on certain basic policy issues. Schacht, on
financial grounds, advocated a retrenchment in the rearmament pro-
gram, opposed as ineconomical much of the proposed expansion of
production f acilities, particularly for synthetics, urged a drastic tight-
ening on government credit and a cautious policy in dealing with
Germany's foreign exchange reserves. As a result of this dispute
and of a bitter argument in which Hitler accused Schacht of upsetting
his plans by his financial methods, Schacht went on leave of absenco
from the Ministry of Economics on September 5, 1937, and resigned
as Minister of Economics and as Plenipotentiary General for War
Economy on November 16, 1937.
As President of the Reichsbank, Schacht was still involved in dis-
putes. Throughout 1938, the Reiclisbank continued to function as the
financial agent for the German Government in floating long-term
loans to finance armaments. But on March 31, 1938, Schacht dis-
continued the practice of floating short-term notes guaranteed by
the Reichsbank for armament expenditures. At the end of 1938, in
an attempt to regain control of fiscal policy through the Rcichsbank,
Schacht refused an urgent request of the Reichsminister of Finance
for a special credit to pay the salaries of civil sen^ants which were
-not covered by exisÜng funds. On January 2, 1939, Schacht held a
Conference with Hitler at which he urged hiin to reduce expenditures
for armaments. On January 7, 1939, Schacht submitted to Hitler a
report signed by the directors of the Reichsbank which urged a drastic
curtailment of armament expenditures and a balanced budget as the
only method of preventing Inflation. On January 19, Hitler dismissed
Schacht as president of the Reichsbank. On January 22, 1943, Hitler
dismissed Schacht as Reichs Minister without Portfolio because of his
"whole attitude during the present f atef ul fight of the German Nation
On July 23, 1944, Schacht was arrested by the Gestapo and conhned
in a concentration camp until the end of the war.
It is clear that Schacht was a central figure in Germany's rearma-
ment program, and the steps which he took, particularly in the early
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days of tlie Nazi regime, were responsible f or Nazi Germany's rapid
rise as a military power. But rearmament of itself is not criminal
under the charter. To be a crime against peace under Article 6 of
the Charter it must be shown that Schacht carried out this rearma-
ment as part of the Nazi plans to wage aggressive wars.
Schacht has contended that he participated in the rearmament
program only because he wanted to build up a strong and mdependent
Gcrmany which would carry out a foreign policy which would com-
mand respect on an equal basis with other European countnes; that
when he discoverecl that the Nazis were rearming for aggressive pur-
poses he attempted to slow down the speed of rearmament; and that
after the dismissal of von Fritsch and von Blomberg he participated
in plans to get rid of Hitler, first by dcposiivg him and later by
1SSB,SSllltltlOIl»
Schacht, as early as 193G, began to advocate a liraitation of the
rearmament program for financial reasons. Had the policies ad-
vocated by him been put into effect, Germany would not have been
prepared for a general European war. Insistence on his policies led
to his evcntual dismissal from all positions of economic significance
in Germany. On the other band, Schacht, with his intimate knowl-
edge of German finance, was in a peculiarly good position to under-
stand the true significance of Hitler's frantic rearmament, and to
realizc that the economic policy adopted was consistent only with
war as its object.
Moreover Schacht continued to participate in German economic
lifo and even, in a minor way, in some of the early Nazi aggressions.
Prior to the occupation of Austria he set a rate of exchange between
the mark and the Schilling. After the occupation of Austria he
arranged for the incorporation of the Austrian National Bank into
the Iltichsbank and mado a violently pro-Nazi speech in which he
stated that the Reichsbank would always be Nazi as long as he was
connected with it, praised Hitler, defended the occupation of Austria,
scoffed at objections to the way it was carried out, and ended with
«to our Fuehrer a triple 'Sieg Heil'." He has not contended that this
speech did not represent his State of mind at the time. After the
occupation of the Sudetenland, he arranged for currency conversion
and for the incorporation into the Reichsbank of local Czech banks
of issue. On November 29, 1938, he made a speech in which he pointed
with pride to his economic policy which had created the high degree
of German armament, and added that this armamont had made
Germany's foreign policy possible.
Schacht was not involved in the planning of any of the specific
wars of aggression charged in count two. His participation in the
occupation of Austria and the Sudetenland (neither of which are
charged as aggressive wars) was on such a limited basis that it does
136
not amount to participation in the common plan charge in count one.
He was clcarly not one of the inner circlo around Hitler which was
most closely involved with this common plan. He was regarded by
this group with undisguised hostility. The testimony of Speer shows
that Schachtes arrest on July 23, 1944, was based as much on Hitler's
enmity towards Schacht growuig out of his attitudo before the war
as it was on suspicion of his complicity in the bomb plot. The case
against Schacht therefore depends on the inference that Schacht did
in f act know of the Nazi aggressive plans.
On this all important question evidence has been given for the
prosecution, and a considerable volume of evidence for tho defense.
The Tribunal has considered the whole of this evidence with great
care, and comes to the conclusion that this neccssary inference has
not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion.— ThQ Tribunal finds that Schacht is not guilty on this
indictment and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshai,
when the Tribunal presently adjourns.
DOENITZ
Doenitz is indicted on counts one, two, and three. In 1035 he took
command of the first U-boat flotilla commissioned since 1918, became
in 1936 Commander of the submarine arm, was made Vice Admiral in
1940, Admiral in 1942, and on January 30, 1943 Commander in Chief
of the German Navy. On 1 May 1945, he became the Head of State,
succeeding Hitler.
Crimes agaimt peace.— PMnow^ Doenitz built and trained the
German U-boat arm, the evidence does not show he was privy to the
conspiracy to wage aggressive wars or that he prepared and initiated
such wars. He was a line ofRcer performing strictly tactical duties.
He was not present at the important Conferences when plans for
aggressive wars were announced, and there is no evidence he was in-
formed about the decisions reached there. Doenitz did, however,
wage aggressive war within the meaning of that word as used by the
Charter. Submarine w^arfare which began immediately upon the out-
break of war, was fully coordinated with the other branches of the
Wehrmacht. It is clear that his U-boats, f ew in number at the time,
were fully prepared to Avage war.
It is true that until his appointment in January 1943 as Commander
in Chief he was not an "Oberbefehlshaber." But this statement
under-estimates the importance of Doenitz' position. He was no mere
army or division Commander. The U-boat arm was the principal part
of the German fleet and Doenitz was its leader. The High seas fleet
rnade a few minor, if spectacular, raids during the early years of tho
war but the real damage to the enemy was done almost exclusively
by his submarhies as the millions of tons of allied and neutral ship-
ping sunk will testif y. Doenitz was solely in charge of this warf are.
137
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The naval war corainand reserved for itself only tlie decision as to
the number of submarines in eacli area. In the invasion of Norway,
for exaniple, Doenitz made reconimendations in Octobcr 1939 as to
submarine bases, which he claims were no more than a staff study, and
in March 1940 he made out the operational Orders for the supporting
U-boats, as discussed elsewhere in this judgment.
That his importance to the German war effort was so regarded is
eloquently proved by Raeder's recommendation of Doenitz as his
successor and his appointment by Hitler on 30 January 1943, as
Commander in Chief of the Navy. Hitler too knew that submarine
warfare was the essential part of Germany's naval warfare.
From January 1943, Doenitz was consulted almost continuously by
Hitler. The evidence was that they conferred on naval problems
about 120 times during the course of the war.
As late as April 1945, when he admits he knew the struggle was
hopeless, Doenitz as its Commander in Chief urged the Navy to con-
tinue its fight. On 1 May 1945, he became the Head of State and as
such ordered the Wehrmacht to continue its war in the east, until
capitulation on 9 May 1945. Doenitz explained that his reason for
these Orders was to insure that the German civilian population might
bo evacuated and the army might make an orderly retreat from
the east.
In the view of the Tribunal, the evidence shows that Doenitz was
active in waging aggressive war.
War cri7nes, —Domitz is charged with waging unrestricted sub-
marine warfare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936, to which
Germany acceded, and which reaffirmed the rules of submarine war-
fare laid down in the London Naval Agreement of 1930.
The prosecution has submitted that on 3 September 1939, the Ger-
man U-boat arm began to wage unrestricted submarine w^arfare upon
all merchant ships, whether enemy or neutral, cynically disregarding
the Protocol; and that a calculated effort was made throughout the
war to disguise tliis practice by making hypocritical references to
international law and supposed violations by the Allies.
Doenitz insists that at all times the Navy remained within the
confines~oT international law and of the ProtocoJ. He testified that
""when the war began, the guide to submarine warfare was the German
prize ordinance taken almost literally from the Protocol, that pursuant
to the German view, he ordered submarines U> attack all merchant
ships in convoy, and all that ref used to stop or used their radio upon
sighting a submarine. When his reports indicated that British mer-
chant ships were being used to give Information by wireless, were
being armed, and were attacking submarines on sight, he ordered his
submarines on 17 October 1939, to attack all enemy merchant ships
without warning on the ground that resistance was to be expected.
138
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Orders already had been issued on 21 September 1939, to attack all
ships, including neutrals, sailing at night without lights in the English
Channel.
On 24 November 1939, the German Government issued a warning
to neutral shipping that, owing to the frequent engagements taking
place in the waters around the British Isles and the French coast
between U-boats and Allied merchant ships which were armed and
liad instructions to use those arms as well as to ram U-boats, the
safety of neutral ships in those waters could no longer be taken for
granted. On 1 January 1940, the German U-boat command,
acting on the instructions of Hitler, ordered U-boats^ to attack all
Greek merchant ships in the zone surrounding the British Isles which
was banned by the United States to its own ships and also merchant
ships of every nationality in the limited area of the Bristol Channel.
Five days later, a f urther order was given to U-boats to "make imme-
diately unrestricted use of weapons against all ships" in an area of
the North Sea, the limits of which were defined. Finally on the ISth
of January 1940, U-boats were authorized to sink, without warning,
all ships "in those waters near the anemy coasts in which the use of
mines can be pretended." Exceptions were to be made in the cases
of United States, Italian, Japanese, and Soviet ships.
Shortly after the outbreak of war the British Adniiralty, in accord-
ance with its Handbook of Instructions of 1938 to the merchant navy,
armed its merchant vessels, in raany cases convoyed them w^ith armed
escort, gave Orders to send position reports upon sighting submarines,
thus integrating merchant vessels into the warning network of naval
intelligence. On 1 October 1939, the British Admiralty announced
that British merchant ships had been ordered to ram U-boats if
possible.
In the actual circumstances of this case, the Tribunal is not pre-
pared to hold Doenitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare
against British armed merchant ships.
However, the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking of
neutral merchant vessels which enter those zones presents a different
question. This practice was employed in the war of 1914-18 by Ger-
many and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain. The Washington
Conference of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 1930, and the
protocol of 193G were entered into with füll knowledge that such zones
had been employed in the First World War. Yet the protocol made
no exception for operational zones. The order of Doenitz to sink
neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was,
therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of the protocol.
It is also asserted that the German U-boat arm not only did not
carry out the warning and rescue provisions of the protocol but that
.1
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Doenitz deliboratoly ordered the kiUing of survivors f «^p-^^^^^^^^^
vessels, whethcr cnomy or neutral. The prosecution has intToduced
mS! ovidence surrounding two orders of Docnit., .ar order No^l 4
issued in 1939, and tlie so-callcd "Laconia" order of 1942. Tho de
fcnse argucs that these orders and the evidenco supporting them do
not show^such a policy and introduccd much evidcnce to the contrary
The Tribunal is of the opinion that the evidence does not estabhsh
with the certalnty required that Doenitz deliberately ordered the kiUing
of shipwrecked survivors. The orders were undoubtedly ambiguous,
and dcserve the strengest censure. _
The evidence f uither shows that the rescue provisions were not car-
lied out and that the defendant ordered that they should not be car-
ried out. The argument of the defense is that the security of the sub-
marine is, as the first rule of the sea, paramount to rescue and that tho
development of aircraf t made rescue impossible. This may be so, but
the protocol is explicit. If the conunander cannot rescue, then under
its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should allow it to pass
harmless before his periscope. These orders, then, prove Doenitz is
cuilty of a violation of the protocol. . , . -, t
In View of all of the facts proved and in particular of an order ot
the ßrUish Admiraltj announced on 8^Mayg40, accordmg to
^hichdr?SiÜrs-^Wld be sunk at night in tETSkagcrrak, and the
answers to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz statmg that unre
itrictod submarine warfare was came-d-bli m the Pacific Ocean by tho
United States from the first day that Nation entered the war, the sen-
tence of Doenitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the in-
ternational law of submarine warfare. ,,. , , ,
Doenitz was also charged with responsibility for H.tler's commando
order of 18 October 1942. Doenitz admitted he received and knew ot
the order when he was flag officer of U-boats, but disclaimed respon-
sibility He points out that the order by its express terms cxcluded
men captured in naval warfare, that the navy had no territorial com-
mands on land, and that submarine Commanders would never encounter
commandos. . ^, . - « xt. xt
In one instance, when he was Commander in Chief of the Navy, m
1943 the menibers of the crew of an allied motor torpedo boat were
captured by German naval forces. They were interrogntcd for in-
telli-^cnce purposes on behalf of the local Admiral, and then turned
ovei^by his order to the SD and shot. Doenitz said that if they were
captured by the Navy their execution was a violation of the commando
order that the execution was not announccd in the Wehrmacht com-
munique, and that he was never inf ormed of the incidcnt. Ho pomted
out that the Admiral in question was not in his cham of command,
but was subordinate to the Army general in command of the Norway
occupation. But Doenitz permittcd the order to remain in füll force
140
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when he bccanio Commander in Chief, and to that cxtcnt he is
responsible.
Doenitz, in a Conference of 11 December 1944, said, "12,000 con-
centration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as addi-
tional labor." At this time Doenitz had no Jurisdiction over shipyard
construction, and claims that this was merely a Suggestion at the
mceting that the responsible officials do something about the pro-
duction of ships, that he took no steps to get these workers since it
was not a matter for Ins Jurisdiction and that he does not know whether
they ever were procured. He admits he knew of concentration camps.
A man in his position must nccessarily have known that Citizens of
occupied countries in largo numbers were confined in the concentration
camps.
In 1945, Hitler requested the opinion of Jodl and Doenitz whether
the Geneva Convention should be denounced. The notes of the meeting
between the two military leaders on 20 February 1945, show that
Doenitz expressed his view that the disadvantages of such an action
outweighed the advantages. The summary of Doenitz' attitude shown
in the notes taken by an officer, included the following sentence :
rA
^
U-^
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/
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"It would be better to carry out the measures considered neces- c^ Lt -
sary without wariiing, and at all costs to save face with the outer ^ ^
World." ^
The prosecution insisted that "the measures" referred to moant
the Convention should not be denounced, but should be broken at will.
The defense explanation is that Hitler wanted to break the Convention
for two reasons: to take away from German troops the protection
of the Convention, thus preventing them from continuing to surrender
in large groups to the British and Americans; and also to permit
reprisals against Allied prisoners of war because of Allied bombing
raids. Doenitz claims that what he meant by "measures" were dis-
ciplinary measures against German troops to prevent them from
surrendering, and that his words had no reference to measures against
the Allies; moreover, that this was merely a Suggestion, and that in
any event no such measures were ever taken, eithcr against Allies ,
or Germans. The Tribunal, however, does not believe this explana- ^
tion. The Geneva^onvcnt ion was not, however, denounced by Ger-,
jnany. The defense has introduced several aiUdavits to prove that
British naval prisoners of war in camps under Doenitz' Jurisdiction
were treated strictly according to the Convention, and the Tribunal
takes this fact into consideration, regarding it as a mitigating cir-
cumstance.
Conclitsion.—The Tribunal finds Doenitz is not guilty on count one
of the indictment, and is guilty on counts two and three.
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RAEDER
Racdcr is indictod on counts one, two, and three. In 1928 he became
cSof Naval Cou^aud and in 1035 Oberbefehl.l.aber der Kncjs-
maiire (OIvM) ; in 1939 Hitler made him Gross Admiral. He ^^ as a
ZZZ the ^iLich Defense Council On 30 January 1 A Doo.u^^
replaced him at bis own request, and he became Admiral Inspector of
""^^Il^lX^t^^ the 15 years he commanded it, Eaeder
buül Tnd Xected'the Gennan Navy ; he accepts füll ^^^^
until retirement in 1943. He admits tho navy violatcd tho Vcibaillcs
l^eaty US sting it was "a matter of honor for every man" to do so
and aUe i tbat the violations were for the most part mmor, and
ai^nytuilt less tban her allowable strength. These v.olaU..^,^
v-ell as thoso of the Anglo-Gennan Naval Agreement of 19.., have
alreadv been discussed elsewhere in this judgment.
'' Ä received the directive of 24 June ^^^^^^'^^1^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
roauirin- special preparations for war against Austria He ^^as one
of trfiveleSrs'iresent at the Hossbach Conference of 5 November
1937 He Claims Hitler merely ^vished by this Conference to spur the
army tf faste rearmament, insists he believed the quest.ons of Austria
an7czechosIovakia would be settled peacefully, as they ^yere, and
;lt?^ the new Naval treaty with England -h.ch had ^ust bcen
signed. He received no orders to speed construction of U-boats, in
dicatino- that Hitler Avas not plannmg war. ,,,.,•
üicatmg uidt xiiL ,^^\,^ «iTnil firuen" and the directives on
Eaeder received directives on i'aü ^'^"•^^ ;^, |^ , . dirccted
"Fall Weiss" beginning with that of 3 April 1939; tho lattei ducctea
trenaVyto Support tlfe army by Intervention from tl- s- H« J-
lo one'of the f ew chief leaders present at t^ie -etin^^^^^^^^^ May 1939.
He attended the Obersalzburg briefing of 22 August 1J6J.
The conception of the Invasion of Norway first arose in the mind of
il e conception o Despitc Hitler's desirc, as shown by
jät~\t":.'oc wri;^^toS Sc.ndinavi. „c„tr.., t^
lusdirectiTeoiu ^^^^^ ^ ^^_.,y ^^ Octoter.
-P Kococ in Xorwav A questionnaire, dated 3 üctoDcr IJ^J, Avai^ii
of bases m iNorway. jx ^ i circulated
v^uibiiii^, XV , oirw QtniT officers. Racder received Iveitei s
142
has heretofore been treated in some detail, concluding that
Germany's Invasion of Norway and Denmark was aggressive war. In
a letter to the Navy, Eaeder said : "The Operations of the Navy in the
oceupation of Norway will for all time remain the great contribution
of the Navy to this war."
Raeder received the directives, including the innumerable post-
ponements, for the attack in the west. In a meeting of 18 March 1941
with Hitler he urged the oceupation of all Greece. He clainis this was
only after the British had landed and Hitler had ordered the attack,
and points out the navy had no interest in Greece. He received Hitler's
directive on Yugoslavia.
Raeder endeavored to dissuade Hitler froni embarking upon the
invasion of the USSR. In September 1940 he urged on Hitler an
aggressive Mediterranean policy as an alternative to an attack on
Russia. On 14 November 1940, he urged the war against England
"as our main enemy" and that submarine and naval air force construc-
tion be continued. He voiced "serious objections against the Russian
campaign before the defeat of England," according to notes of the
German naval war staff. He claims his objections were based on the
violation of the Non- Aggression Päct as well as stratogy. But once
the decision had been made, he gave permission 6 days before the in-
vasion of the Soviet Union to attack Russian submarines in the Baltic
Sea within a specified warning area and defends this action because^
these submarines were "snooping" on German activities.
It is clear from this evidence that Raeder participated in the plan-
ning and waging of aggressive war.
War crimcs. — Raeder is charged with war crimes on the high seas.
The AtJienia^ an unarmcd British passenger liner, was sunk on 3
September 1939, while outward bound to America. The Germans 2
months later charged that Mr. Churchill deliberately sank the
Athenia to encourage American hostility to Germany. In fact, it was
sunk by the German XJ-boat 30. Raeder claims that an inexperienced
U-boat Commander sank it in mistake for an armed merchant cruiser,
that this was not known until the U-30 returned several weeks after
the German denial and that Hitler then directed the Navj^ and Foreign
Office to continue denying it. Raeder denied knowledge of the Propa-
ganda campaign attacking Mr. Churchill.
The most serious charge against Raeder is that he carried out un*
restricted submarine w^arfare, including sinking of unarmed mer-
chant ships, of neutrals, nonrescue and machine-gunning of
survivors, contrary to the London Protocol of 1936. The Tribunal
makes the same finding on Raeder on this charge as it did as to
Doenitz, which has already been announced, up until 30 January 1943,
when Raeder retired,
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The commando order of 18 October 1942, which expressly dd not
anply to naval warfare, was transmitted by the Nava War Stall to
Z lü Jer naval Commanders with the direction it should be distnbuted
orally by flotilk leaders and section Commanders to their subordmates
Two commandos were put to dcath by the Navy, and not by the SD, at
Bordeaux on 10 December 1942. The comment of the Naval War
Staff was that this was "in aecordancc with the Fuehrer's speciaj order
but is nevertheless something new in Internationa law, smce the
soldiers were in uniform." Eaeder admits he pnssed the order down
through the chain of command, and he did not object to Hitler.
CoZlu.ion.-The Tribunal finds that Raeder is guilty on counts
one, two, and three.
VON SCHIRACH
Von Schirach is indicted under counts one and four He joined the
Nazi Party and the SA in 1925. In 1929 he became the l^^^der of the
National Socialist Students Union. In 1931 he was made Reichs
Youth Leader of the Nazi Party with control over all Nazi youth
^ga^Hzations including the Hitler Jugend. In 1933, after the Nazi
had obtained control of the Government, von Schirach wa made
Leader of Youth in the German Reich, originally a position withm he
M?nistry of the Interior, but, after December 1, 19 6, an office in the
Reich Cabinet. In 1940, von Schirach resigned as head of the Hitler
Jugend and Leader of Youth in the German Reich, but retamed us
Position as Reichsleiter with control over youth education In 1940
he was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna, Reichs Governor of Vienna,
and Reichs Defense Commissioncr for that territory.
Lls agai^t peace.-Aiier the Nazis had come to power von
Schirach, utilizing both physical violence and official pressure, either
d ote oul of exist'ence or took over all y-^l. groups which compe^^^^^^
with the Hitler Jugend. A Hitler decree of December 1. If ^^n*^«^;
norated all German youth within the Hitler Jugend. By the time
irmal conscription w'as introduced in 1940, 97 percent of those eligible
ToiSfacTutd'he Hitler Jugend to educate German youth "in
tlJpirit 0 National Socialism" and subjected them to - -ten-ve
l o'mm of Nazi propaganda. He established the Hitler Jugend as
Tso^ce of mÄmeltrfoT the Nazi Party formations In October
19^8 Te elred into an agreemont with Himmler under which members
ofth J I^tL Jugend wh^ met SS Standards would be considered as the
-nrimirv source of replacements for the SS. _
^ Von Sdii^ch also used the Hitler Jugend for premihtary traming.
Special Units were set up wliose primary purpose was tra-ng special-
iste for the various branchcs of the Service. On August 11, 1939 he
erired into an agreement with Keitel under which the Hitler Jugend
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agreed to carry out its premilitary activities under Standards laid
down by the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht agreed to train 30,000
Hitler Jugend instructors each year. The Hitler Jugend placed par-
ticular emphasis on the military spirit and its training program
stressed the importance of return of the colonies, the necessity for
Lebensraum and the noble destiny of German youth to die for Hitler.
Despite the warlike nature of the activities of the Hitler Jugend,
however, it does not appear that von Schirach was involved in the
development of Hitler's plan for territorial expansion by means of
aggressive war, or that he participated in the planning or preparation
of any of the wars of aggression.
Crimes agahist humanity, — In July 194:0, von Schirach was
appointed Gauleiter of Vienna. At the same time he was appointed
Reichs Governor for Vienna and Eeichs Defense Commissioner, orig-
inally for Military District 17, including the Gaue of Vienna, Upper
Danube and Lower Danube and, after November 17, 1942, for the Gau
of Vienna alone. As Reichs Defense Commissioner, he had control of
the civilian war economy. As Reichs Governor he was head of the
municipal administration of the city of Vienna, and, under the super-
vision of the Minister of the Interior, in charge of the governmental
administration of the Reich in Vienna.
Von Schirach is not charged with the commission of war crimes in
Vienna, ^^j^J^^h thft pf^prir^ission of crimes against humanity. As
has already been seen, Austria was occupied pursuant to a common
plan of aggression. Its occupation is, therefore, a "crime within the
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal," as that term is used in Article 6 (c) of
the Charter. As a result, "murder, extermination, enslavement, de-
portation, and other inhumane acts" and "persecutions on political,
racial, or religious grounds" in connection with this occupation con-
stitute a crime against humanity under that Article.
As Gauleiter of Vienna, von Schirach came under the Sauckel decree
dated April 6, 1942, making the Gauleiters Sauckel's plenipotentiaries
for manpower with authority to supervise the utilization and treat-
ment of manpower within their Gaue. Sauckel's directives provided
that the forced laborers were to be fed, sheltered, and treated so as to
exploit them to the highest possible degree at the lowest possible
expense.
Wlien von Schirach became Gauleiter of Vienna the deportation of
the Jews had already been begun, and only G0,000 out of Vienna's
original 190,000 Jews remained. On October 2, 1940, he attended a
Conference at Hitler's office and told Frank that he had 50,000 Jews
in Vienna which the General Government would have to tako over
from him. On December 3, 1940, von Schirach received a letter from
Lammers stating that after the receipt of the reports made by von
Schirach, Hitler had decided to deport the 60,000 Jews still remaining
3^
t
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in Vienna to the General Government becnusc o thc ^^o-^^-g^'^^^^
in Vienna. The deportation of the Jews from Vienna was then begun
Ind continued unt 1 the early fall of 1942. On September 15 1942,
von SchS made a speech in which he dcfended his action m Irving
driven "tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the
chetto of the east" as "contributing to European culture
mile the Jews were being deported from Vienna, reports addressed
to L in his official capacity were received m -" Schxrach s offi^
from the office of the chief of the ^cunty pohce and SD ^^hlch con-
tained a description of the activities of Einsatzgruppen - exterm-
natin- Jews. Many of these reports were mitialed by one of von
Sc irtch's Principal deputier On June 30, 1944, von Schn-ach
Office also received a lettcr from Kaltenbrunner mforming hmi that
a S ipment of 12,000 Jews was on its way to Vienna for essentxa
war wm-k and that all those who were incapable of work would have
to be kcpt in readiness for "special action." • • ,„
The Tribunal finds that von Schirach, while he did not ongmate
the nolicv of deporting Jews from Vienna, participated in this de-
portatiT/after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that
the best the Jews could liope for was a miserable existence in the
ghettoes of the east. Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination
were in liis oflice. , -, . ^ j. •
\Vhile Gauleiter of Vienna, von Schirach contmued to function
-VC, Reichsleiter for Youth Education and in this capacity he was in-
formed of the Hitler Jugcnd's participation in the plan put into
effect in tho fall of 1944 under which 50,000 young people between
the a-es of 10 and 20 were evacuated into Germany from areas re-
captured by the Soviet forces and used as apprentices in German
indu^try and as auxiliaries in units of the Gerinan armed foixes. In
Jhe summer of 1942, von Schirach telegraphed Bormann urging that
a bombing attack on an English cultural town be carried out in
retalfation for the assassination of Heydrich which, he claimed, had
'"ÄTl-The?« finds that von Schirach is not guilty on
countone. He is guilty under count four.
SAUCKEL
Sauckel is indicted under all four counts. Sauckel joined the Nazi
Party in 1923, and became Gauleiter of Thuringia in 1927 He was a
member of the Thuringian legislature from 1927 to 1933 was ap-
po'nted Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia in 1932 and Thunngian
S-^ister of the Interior and Head of the Thuringian Sta e Uuu^ry
in May 1933. He became a member of the Reichstag in 1933. He held
the formal rank of Obergruppenf uehrer in both the SA and the SS.
146
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Crimes agahist pedce, — The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal
that Sauckel was sufTiciently connected with the common plan to wage
aggressive war or sufficiently involved in the planning or waging of
the aggressive wars to allow the Tribunal to convict him on counts one
or two.
War crimes and crimes against hwmmiity. — On March 21, 1942,
Hitler appointed Sauckel Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization
of Labor, with authority to put under uniform control *'the utilization
of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited abroad
and of prisoners of war." Sauckel was instructed to operate within
the fabric of the 4-year plan, and on March 27, 1942, Goering issued
a decree as Commissioner for the 4-year plan transferring his man-
power sections to Sauckel. On September 30, 1942, Hitler gave
Sauckel authority to appoint Commissioners in the various occupied
territories, and "to take all necessary measures for the enforcement"
of the decree of March 21, 1942.
Under the authority which he obtained by these decrees, Sauckel
set up a program for tho mobilization of the labor resources available
to the Reich. One of the important parts of this mobilization was
the systematic exploitation, by force, of the labor resources of tho
occupied territories. Shortly after Sauckel had taken office, he had
the governing authorities in the various occupied territories issue
decrees, establishing comj^ulsory labor service in Germany. Under
the authority of these decrees Sauckel's commissioners, backed up by
the police authorities of the occupied territories, obtained and sent to
Germany the laborers which were necessary to fiU the quotas given
them by Saußkel. He dcscribed so-called "voluntary" recruiting by
'*a whole batch of male and female agents jüst as was done in
tKeoIden times for shanghaiing." That real voluntary recruiting was
üie exception rather than the rule is shown by Sauckel's Statement on
March 1, 1944, that "out of 5,000,000 foreign workers who arrived in
Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily." Although he now clainis
that the Statement is not true, the circumstances under which it was
made, as well as the evidence presented bef ore the Tribunal, leave no
doubt that it was substantially accurate.
The manner in which the unfortunate slave laborers were collected
and transported to Germany, and what happened to them after they
arrived, has already been described. Sauckel argues that he is not
responsible for these excessess in the administration of the program.
He says that the total number of workers to be obtained was set by the
demands from agriculturo and from industry; that obtaining the
workers was the responsibility of the occupation authorities, trans-
porting them to Germany that of the German railways, and taking
care of them in Germany that of the Ministries of Labor and xVgricul-
ture, the German Labor Front, and the various Industries involved.
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M
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He testifies that insof ar as lie Lad any authority he ^vas constantly
f or t slave labor p-ogram. At the time of the events m q.jt.on h
did not fall to asscrt control over the fields ^vhich he aow daims .sere
the solo responsibihty of others. His regu ations F^^^e^ that hi
commissionei-s should have authority for obtaimng l'^l^^r'^^f/!^^^^^^
constantly in the field supervising the steps ^hich ^vere bemg taken
Se taf aLre of ruthless methods being taken to obtain laborers, and
"goTously supported them on the ground that they were necessary
^sluckel'fre^lations also provided that he had responsibility for
transporting the laborers to Germany, allocating them to employers
and taking Le of then, and that the other agencies -ol-d ^^^^^^^^^
processes were subordinate to him. He vras mformed of th« bad con
ditions which existed. It does not appear that he ^«i^^tcd b^^^aM^^^
for its own sake, or was an advocate of any program such as Himmler s
p^mToV extermination through work. His attitude_^_as_thus^presse£^
in a regulation :
^' «All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way
as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest con-
ceivable degree of expenditure."
The evidence shows that Sauckel was in charge of a program Avhich
iuolved deportation for slave labor of more than 5,000,000 hunmnbe-
inc^s, many of them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffenng.
VoMon.-T:he Tribunal finds that Sauckel is not guilty on
counts one and two. He is guilty under counts three and f our.
JODL
Jodl is indicted on all f our counts. From 1935 to 1938 he was Chief
of the National Defense Section in the High Command Af ter a year
in command of troops, in August 1939, he returned to become Chief of
the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Although his immediate superior was defendant Keitel, he reported
directly to Hitler on operational matters. In the strict military sense,
Jodl was the actual planner of the war and responsible m large
measure for the strategy and conduct of Operations.
Jodl defends himself on the ground he was a soldier sworn to
obedience, and not a politician; and that his staff and planniug work
left him no time for other matters. He said that wlien he signed or
initialed orders, memoranda, and letters, he did so for Hitler and of ten
in the absence of Keitel. Though he Claims that as a soldier he had
to obey Hitler, he says that he of ten tried to obstruct certain measures
by delay, which occasionally proved successful as ^vhen he resisted
Hitler's demand that a directive be issued to lynch allied "terror flieis.
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Criirves against pcacc, — Entries in Jodl's diary of 13 and 14 February
1938 show Hitler instructed both him and Keitel to keep up miUtary
pressure against Austria begun at the Schuschnigg Conference by
simulating military measures, and that these achieved their purpose.
When Hitler decided ''not to tolerate" Schuschnigg's plebiscite, Jodl
brought to the Conference the "old draft," the existing staff plan. His
diary for 10 March shows Hitler then ordered the preparation of
"Gase Otto," and the directive was initialed by Jodl. Jodl issued sup-
plementary instructions on 11 March, and initialed Hitler's order for
the Invasion on the same date. «^
In planning the attack on Czechoslovakia, Jodl was very active,
according to the Schmundt notes. He initialed items 14, 17, 24, 3C, V^^P^-
and 37 in the notes. Jodl admits he agrced with OKH that the "in- ' ^.
cident" to provide German intervention must occur at the latcst by ^
1400 on X-1 day, the day before the attack, and said it must occur at a
fixed time in good flying weather. Jodl conferred with the Propa-
ganda experts on "imminent common tasks" such as German violations
of international law, exploitation of them by the enemy and ref utations \^ ^ ,
by tlie Germans, which "task" Jodl considered "particularly im-
portant."
After Munich, Jodl wa^ote :
''Czechoslovakia as a power is out . . . The genius of the
Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have
again won the victory without the use of f orce. The hope remains
that the üicredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been
coiiverted and will remain that way."
Shortly after the Sudeten occupation, Jodl went to a post command
and did not become Chief of the Operations Staff in OKW until the
end of August 1939.
Jodl discussed the Norway Invasion with Hitler, Keitel, and Kaeder
on 12 December 1939; his diary is replete with late entries on his
activities in preparing this attack. Jodl explains his comment that
Hitler was still looking for an "excuse" to move meant that he was
waiting for reliable intelligence on the British plans, and defends
the Invasion as a necessary move to forostall them. His testimony
shows that from October 1939, Hitler planned to attack the west
through Belgium, but was doubtful about invading Holland until
the middle of November. On 8 February 1940, Jodl his deputy Warli-
mont, and Jeschonnek, the Air Forces Planner, discussed amongthem-
selves the "new idea" of attacking Norway, Denmark, and Holland,
but guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Many of the 17 orders
postponing the attack in the west for various reasons including weather
conditions, until May 1940, were signed by Jodl.
Ho was active in the planning against Greece and Yugoslavia.
The Hitler order of 11 January 1941 to intervene in Albania was
^
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initi-iled by Jodl. On 20 January, four months before the attack
S told a Conference of German and Italian generals m Jodl
nre ence that German troop concentrations in ßumanm were to be
Lod n^ain Greece. Jodl Ls present on 18 March ^vhen Hitler od
Raedef rGreece must be occipied before any settiement could be
Sed On 27 March when Hitler told the German High Comma>K
TTtt. Xstruction of Yugoslavia should be accomphshed ^vith
Iwer^if «rhaS^^^^^^^^ and the decision was taken to bomb Beigrade
n^trsSrÄ^^^^^^^^^^^
rir S preparation began aW^^^^^ f^ o^^P ^^ tü^s
'•tH;^eThrdTcd:Vt:iVa:^^^
smce Hl 1er l^^d üecme ' postponcd it for military
hehad plannedto attack in Augus F ^^^^^^^^ ^^^q, that
War erimes and crimes against humanity. -On 18 üctober 1J4^,
Hitkr i^ued the commando order and a day later a supplemen ary
exp InaUon to commanding officers only. The covenng -emorandnm
expianauu ^^^^^ ^^^^.^ j^^^^jg l^y jodi s
™ n',o"l and legal grounds, but could not .etus. to poss it on. H.
°„°s- r;ho"td ?o ^itigat. its l»..."e- in P™*-. 5-» ■"^»^
ino. Hitler when it was not carried out. He imtuiiea uie vjivw
mfmfrandum of 25 June 19i4, reaffirming the order after the ^or-
" A'pk"trfuminate Soviet Commissars was in the directive for
"rase Barbarossa.» The decision whether they should be kil ed
ithout trt? waT to be made by an officer. A draft contains Jodl's
lT:ndwr\Sg slgj^^^^^^^ this sho'uld be handled as retaliation, and he
testified this was his attempt to get around it.
Xn in 1945 Hitler considered dcnouncing the Geneva Conven-
tion Jodl argued the disadvantages outweighed the advantages On
21 February he told Hitler adherence to the Convention wou d not
interfere with the conduct of the war, giving as an example the
sinking of a British hospital ship as a reprisal and callmg it a mis-
ake He said he did so because it was the only attitude Hitler
would eonsider, that moral or legal arguments had no effect and
argues he thus prevented Hitler from denouncmg the Convention
There is little evidence that Jodl was actively connected witl the
slave labor program, and he must have concentrated on 1- J^-^^^^^^
planning function. But in his speech of 7 November 1943 to the
150
Gauleiters he said it was necessary to act "with remorseless vigor
and resolution" in Denmark, France, and the Low Countries to com-
pel work on the Atlantic Wall.
By teletype of 28 October 1944, Jodl ordered the evacuation of /?
all person^in Northern Norway and the burning ol their houses so^/|^ y
they could not help the Eussians. Jodl says he was against this, ^y
but Hitler ordered it and it was not fuUy carried out. A document y^
of the Norwegian Government says such an evacuation did take place
in northern Norway and 30,000 houses were damaged. On 7 October
1941, Jodl signed an order that Hitler would not accept an offer
of surrender of Leningrad or Moscow, but on the contrary he insisted
that they be completely destroyed. He says this was done because
the Germans were afraid those cities would be mined by the Eussians
as was Kiev. No surrender was ever offered.
His defense, in brief, is the doctrine of ''superior Orders," pro-
hibited by Article 8 of the Charter as a defense. There is nothing
in mitigation. Participation in such crimes as these have never been
required of any soldier and he cannot now shield himself behind
a mythical requirement of soldierly obedience at all costs as his excuse
for commission of these crimes.
Conclicsion. — The Tribunal finds that Jodl is guilty on all four
counts.
VON PAPEN
Von Papen is indicted under counts one and two. He was appointed
Chancellor of the Eeich on June 1, 1932, and was succeeded by von
Schleicher on December 2, 1932. He was made Vice Chancellor in the
Hitler Cabinet on January 30, 1933, and on November 13, 1933, Pleni-
potentiary for the Saar. On July 2G, 1934, he was appointed Min-
ister to Vienna, and was recalled on February 4, 1938. On April 29,
1939, he was appointed Ambassador to Turkey. He returned to Ger-
many when Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in
August 1944.
Crimes against peace, — Von Papen was active in 1932 and 1933 in
helping Hitler to form the Coalition Cabinet and aided in his appoint-
ment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933. As Vice Chancellor in that
Cabinet he participated in the Nazi consolidation of control in 1933.
On June 16, 1934, however, von Papen made a speech at LIarburg
which contained a denunciation of the Nazi attempts to siippress the
free press and the church, of the existence of a reign of terror, and of
"150 percent Nazis" who were mistaking "brutality for vitality." On
June 30, 1934, in the wave of violence which accompanied the so-called
Eoehm Purge, von Papen was taken into custody by the SS, his ofRce
force was arrested, and two of his associates, including the man who
had helped him work on the Marburg speech, were murdered. Von
Papen was released on July 3, 1934,
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Notwithstandinff tho murder of his associates, von Papen accepted
thc Position of Minister to Austria on July 2G, 1934, the day after
Dollfuss liad becn assassinated. His appointment ^vas announccd m
a Ictter from Hitler which instructed him to direct relations between
thc two countrics "into normal and f ricndly Channels" and assured him
cf Hit Icr's "complete and unlimited confidcnce." As Minister to Aus-
tria, von Papen was active in trying to strengthen the position of the
Nazi Party in Austria for the purpose of bringing about Anschluss.
In early 1935 he attcnded a meeting in Berlin at which the policy was
laid down to avoid everything which would give the appearance of
German Intervention in the internal affairs of Austria. Yet he ar-
ran<red for 200,000 marks a month to be transmitted to "the persecuted
National Socialist suffcrei-s in Austria." On May 17, 1935, he re-
poitcd to Hitler thc rcsults of a Conference with Captam Leopold, the
Leader of the Austrian Nazis, and urged Hitler to make a statement
recognizing the national independence of Austria, and predictmg
that the result might be to help the formation of a coalition between
Schuschnigg's Christian Socialists and the Austrian Nazis against
Starhcmberg. On July 27, 1935, von Papen reported to Hitler that
the Union of Austria and Germany could not be brought about by ex-
ternal pressure but only by the strength of the National Socialist
movement. He urged that the Austrian Nazi Party change its char-
acter as a centralized Reich German Party and become a rallymg
point for all national Germans.
Von Papen was involved in occasional Nazi political demonstrations,
Bupported Nazi propaganda activities and submittcd detailed reports
on thc activities of the Nazi Party, and routine reports relatmg to
Austrian military defcnses. His Austrian policy resulted m the agree-
ment of July 11, 1936, which nominally restored relations between Ger-
many and Austria to "normal and friendly form," but which had a
secret Supplement providing for an amncsty for Austrian Nazis, the
liftin'T of censorship on Nazi papers, the resumption of political ac-
tivities by Nazis and the appointment of men friendly to the Nazis
in the Schuschnigg Cabinet.
After the signing of this agrecment von Papen oifered to resign
but his resignation was not accepted. Thereafter he proceeded to
bring continued pressure on the Austrian Government to bring Nazis
into the Schuschnigg Cabinet and to gct thcm important positions m
thc Fathcrland Front, Austria's single legal party. On September 1,
193C, von Papen wrote Hitler advising him that anti-Nazis in the
Austrian Ministry of Security were holding up the Infiltration of the
Nazis into the Austrian Government and recommended^^bringmg
"slowly intensificd pressure directed at changing the regime."
On Fcbruary 4, 1938, von Papen was notified of his recall as Minister
to Austria, at thc same time that von Fritsch, von Blomberg, and von
152
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Neurath were removed from their positions. He informed Hitler that
he regretted liis recall because he had been trying since November 1937
to induce Schuschnigg to hold a Conference with Hitler and Schusch-
nigg had indicated his willingness to do so. Acting under Hitler's
instructions, von Papen then returned to Austria and arrangcd the
Conference which was held at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938.
Von Papen accompanied Schuschnigg to that Conference, and at its
conclusion advised Schuschnigg to comply with Hitler's demands. On
ilarch 10, 1938, Hitler ordered von Papen to return to Berhn. Von
Papen was in the Chancellery on March 11 when the occupation of
Austria was ordered. No evidence has been offered showing that von
Papen was in favor of the decision to occupy Austria by forco, and
he has testificd that he urged Hitler not to take this step.
After the annexation of Austria von Papen retired into private lif e
and there is no evidence that he took any part in politics. He accepted
the Position of Ambassador to Turkey in April 1939 but no evidence
has becn offered concerning his activities in that position implicating
him in crimes.
The evidence leaves no doubt that von Papen's primary purpose as
Minister to Austria was to undermine the Schuschnigg regime and
strengthen the Austrian Nazis for the purpose of bringing about
Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue
and bullying. But the Charter does not make criminal such ofFenses
against political morality, however bad these may be. Under thc
Charter von Papen can be held guilty only if he was a party to the
planning of progressive war. There is no evidence that he was a party
to the plans under which the occupation of Austria was a step in the
direction of further aggressive action, or even that he participated in
plans to occupy Austria by aggressive war if necessary. But it is not
establislied beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the purpose of his
activity, and therefore the Tribunal cannot hold that he was a party
to the common plan charged in count one or participated in the plan-
ning of the aggressive wars charged under count two.
Co7hcl%ision, — The Tribunal finds that von Papen is not guilty irnder
this indictment, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshai,
when the Tribunal presently adjourns.
SEYS5-INQUART
Seyss-Inquart is indicted under all four counts. Seyss-Inquart, an
Austrian attorney, was appointed State Councillor in Austria in May
1937 as a result of German pressure. He had been associated with the
Austrian Nazi Party since 1931, but had of ten had difficulties with that
party and did not actually join the Nazi Party until March 13, 1938.
He was appointed Austrian Minister of Security and Interior with
control over the police pursuant to one of the conditions which Hitler
153
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liad imposed on Scliusclmigg in tlio Berchtesgadcn Conference of
February 12, 1938.
Activities in Austria. — Seyss-Inquart participated in the last stages
of the Nazi intrigue which preceded the German occupation of
Austria, and was niade Chancellor of Austria as a result of German
threats of invasion.
On March 12, 1938, Seyss-Inquart niet Hitler at Linz and niade a
Speech welcoming the German forces and advocating the reunion of
Germany and Austria. On March 13, he obtained the passage of a
law providing that Austria should become a province of Germany and
succecdcd Miklas as prosident of Austria when Miklas resigned rather
than sign tlie law. Seyss-Inquart's title was changed to Eeichs Gov-
ernor of Austria on March 15, 1938, and on the same day he was given
the title of a gcneral in the SS. He was made a Reichs Minister with-
out Portfolio on May 1, 1930.
On March 11, 1939, he visited the Slovakian Cabinet in Bratislava
and induced them to declare their indepcndence in a way which fitted
in closely with Hitler's offensive against the indepcndence of Czecho-
slovakia.
As Reichs Governor of Austria Seyss-Inquart instituted a program
of confiscating Jewish property. Under his regime Jews were f orced
to emigrate, were sent to concentration camps and were subject to
pogroms. At the end of his regime he cooperated with the sccurity
polico and SD in tho deportation of Jews from Austria to the east.
Whilo he was Governor of Austria, political opponents of the Nazis
were sent to concentration camps by the Gestapo, mistreated and often
killed.
Criminal Activities in Poland and the Netherlands, — In September
^ 1939, Seyss-Inquart was appointed chief of Civil Administration of
South Poland. On October 12, 1939, Seyss-Inquart was made
Deputy Governor General of the General Government of Poland under
Frank. On ]\Iay 18, 1940, Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reicji Com-
missioner for occupied Netherlands. In these positions he assumed
responsibility for governing territory which had been occupied by
aggressive wars and the administration of which was of vital im-
portancc in the aggressive war being waged by Germany.
As Deputy Governor General of the General Government of Poland,
Seyss-Inquart was a supporter of the harsh occupation policies which
were put in offcct. In November 1939, while on an inspection tour
through the General Government, Seyss-Inquart stated that Poland
was to bo so administercd as to exploit its economic resources for the
benefit of Germany. Seyss-Inquart also advocated the persecution of
Jews and was informed of the beginuing of the AB action which in-
volved tho milrder of niany Polish intellectuals.
154
As Reich Commissioner for Occupied Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart
was ruthless in applyingTterrorisml to, suppress all Opposition to the
German occupation, a prograni which he described as "annihilating''
his opponents. In collaboration with the local higher SS and police
leaders he was involved in the. shooting of hostages for off enses against
the occupation authorities and sendmg to concentration camps all sus-
pected opponents of occupation policies including priests and edu-
cators. Many of the Dutch police were forced to participate in these
programs by threats of reprisal against their families. Dutch courts
were also forced to participate in this program, but when they indi-
cated their reluctance to give sentences of imprisonment because so
many prisoners were in f act killed, a greater emphasis was placed on
the use of summary police courts.
Seyss-Inquart carried out the economic administration of the Neth-
erlands without regard for rules of the Hague Convention_whifibJia.
described as obsolete. Instead, a policy was adopted for the maximum
nSGlization of economic potential of the Netherlands, and executed with
smaTl regard für its elTbcronlKe^inhabitants. There was widespread
pillage of public and private property which was given color of legal-
ity by Seyss-Inquart's regulations, and assisted by manipulations of
the financial institutions of the Netherlands under his control.
As Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart imme-
diately began sending forced laborers to Germany. Up until 1942,
labor Service in Germany was theoretically voluntary, but was actually
coerced by streng economic and governmental pressure. In 1942 Seyss-
Inquart formally decreed compulsory labor service, and utilized the
Services of the security police and SD to prevent evasion of his order.
During the occupation over 500,000 people were sent from the Nether-
lands to the Reich as laborers and only a very small proportion were
actually volunteers.
One of Seyss-Inquart's first steps as Reich Commissioner of the
Netherlands was to put into effect a series of laws imposing economic
discriminations against the Jews. This was followed by decrees re-
quiring their registration, decrees compelling them to reside in ghettos
and to wear the star of David, sporadic arrests and detention in con-
centration camps, and finally, at the Suggestion of Heydrich, the mass
deportation of ahnost 120,000 of Holland's 140,000 Jews to Auschwitz
and the "final Solution." Seyss-Inquart admits knowing that they
were going to Auschwitz but claims that he heard from people who
had been to Auschwitz that the Jews were comparatively well off there,
and that he thought that they were being held there for resettlement
after the war. In light of the evidence and on account of his official
Position it is impossible to believe this claim.
Seyss-Inquart contends that he was not responsible for many of the
crimes committed in the occupation of the Netherlands because they ^^
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had iniposed on Schuscliiiigg in tho Berchtesgadeii Conference of
Febriiary 12, 1938.
Activlties in ^W5^n^.— Seyss-Inquart participated in the last stages
of the Nazi intrigue wliich preceded the German occupation of
Austria, and was niade Chancellor of Austria as a result of German
threats of invasion.
On March 12, 1938, Seyss-Inquart niet Hitler at Linz and niade a
Speech wclcoming the German forces and advocating the rcunion of
Germany and Austria. On March 13, he obtained the passage of a
law providing that Austria should become a province of Germany and
succecdcd ]\Iiklas as prcsident of Austria when Miklas rcsigiied rather
than sign tho law. Seyss-Inquart's title was changed to Reichs Gov-
ernor of Austria on March 15, 1938, and on the same day he was given
the title of a gcneral in the SS. He was made a Eeichs Minister with-
out Portfolio on May 1 , 1939.
On March 11, 1939, he visited the Slovakian Cabinet in Bratislava
and induccd them to declare their independence in a way which fitted
in closely with Hitler's offensive against the independence of Czecho-
slovakia.
As Reichs Governor of Austria Seyss-Inquart instituted a program
of confiscatiug Jewish property. Under his regime Jews were f orced
to emigrate, were sent to concentration canips and were subject to
pogroms. At the end of his regime he cooperated with the security
police and SD in tho deportation of Jews from Austria to the east.
Whilo he was Governor of Austria, political opponents of the Nazis
were sent to concentration camps by the Gestapo, mistreated and often
killed.
Crwiinal Activitics in Poland and the Netherlands,— In September
1^*1939, Seyss-Inquart was appointed chief of Civil Administration of
South Poland. On October 12, 1939, Seyss-Inquart was made
Depr.ty Governor General of the General Government of Poland under
Frank. On May 18, 1940, Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reich Com-
missioner for occupied Netherlands. In these positions he assumed
responsibility for governing territory which had been occupied by
aggressive wars and the administration of which was of vital im-
portancc in the aggressive war being waged by Germany.
As Doputy Governor General of the General Government of Poland,
Seyss-Inquart was a supporter of the harsh occupation policies which
were put in offoct. In November 1939, while on an inspection tour
through the General Government, Seyss-Inquart stated that Poland
was to bo so administered as to exploit its economic resourccs for the
benefit of Germany. Seyss-Inquart also advocated the persecution of
Jews and was informed of the beginning of the AB action^hich in-
volved the mifrder of many Polish intellectuals.
154
As Reich Commissioner for Occupied Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart
was ruthless in anplviiigTterrorisnil to suppress all Opposition to the
German occupation, a i)rogram which he described as ''annihilating''
his opponents. In collaboration with the local higher SS and police
leaders he was involved in theshooting of hostages for offenses against
the occupation authorities and sendmg to concentration camps all sus-
pected opponents of occupation policies including priests and edu-
cators. Many of the Dutch police were forced to participate in these
programs by threats of reprisal against their f amilies. Dutch courts
were also forced to participate in this program, but when they indi-
cated their reluctance to give sentences of imprisonment because so
many prisoners were in f act killed, a greater emphasis was placed on
the use of summary police courts.
Seyss-Inquart carried out the economic administration of the Neth-
erlands without regard for rules of the Hague ConventioiTLwhifih^ha-.<^ i^
described as obsolete. Instead, a policy was adopted for the maximum ^ ^
^luHIization of econoTOic potential of the Netherlands, and executed with ^
smaü regard f ur lls -effgCTonTEe inhabitants. There was widespread
pillage of public and private property which was given color of legal-
ity by Seyss-Inquart's regulations, and assisted by manipulations of
the financial institutions of the Xetherlands under his control.
As Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart imme-
diately began sending forced laborers to Germany. Up until 1942,
labor Service in Germany was theoretically voluntary, but was actually
coerced by strong economic and governmental pressure. In 1942 Seyss-
Inquart formally decreed compulsory labor service, and utilized the
Services of the security police and SD to prevent evasion of his order.
During the occupation over 500,000 people were sent from the Nether-
lands to the Reich as laborers and only a very small proportion were
actually volunteers.
One of Seyss-Inquart's first steps as Reich Commissioner of the
Netherlands was to put into effect a series of laws imposing economic
discriminations against the Jews. This was followed by decrees re-
quiring their registration, decrees compelling them to reside in ghettos
and to wear the star of David, sporadic arrests and detention in con-
centration camps, and finally, at the Suggestion of Heydrich, the mass
deportation of ahnost 120,000 of HoUand's 140,000 Jews to Auschwitz
and the "final Solution." Seyss-Inquart admits knowing that they
were going to Auschwitz but claims that he heard from people who
had been to Auschwitz that the Jews were comparatively well off there,
and that he thought that they were being held there for resettlement
after the war. In light of the evidence and on account of his official
Position it is impossible to believe this claim.
Seyss-Inquart contends that he was not responsible for many of the
erimes committed in the occupation of the Netherlands because they
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were either ordered from the Reich, committed by the army, over which
he had no control, or by the Gerinan higlier SS and pohce leader, jho,
he Claims, reported directly to Himmler. It is true that some of the .
excesses were the responsibility of the army, and that the higher Sb
and Police leader, althouyh he was at the disposal of Seyss-Inquart,
could always report directly to Himmler. It is also true that m cer-
tain cases Seyss-Inquart opposed the extreme measures used by th^e
other agencies, as when he was largely successful in preyenting the
army from carrying out a scorched earth policy, and urged the higlM»
SS and police leaders to reduce the number of hostages to be shot.
But the fact remains that Seyss-Inquart was a knowing and voluntary
participant in war crimes and crimes against humanity which were
committed in the occupation of the Netherlands.
üoncIwion.-The Tribunal finds that Seyss-Inquart is guilty under
counts two, three, and f our. Seyss-Inquart is not guilty on count one.
SPEER
Speer in indicted under all four counts. Speer joined the Nazi
Party in 1932 In 1934 he was made Hitler's architect and became a
close personal confidant. Sho.tly thereafter he was made a depart-
ment Lad in the German Labor Front and the officia in charge of
capital construction on the staff of the deputy to the Fuehrer, positions
which he held through 1941. qnFebrua„rjLl5.1942, after the death
of Fritz Todt, Speer was appomESTcETef of the Organizat^ion Todt
and Eeich Minister for Armaments and Munitions (after September
2 1943, for armaments and war production) . Tlie positions were
sipplemented by his appointments in March and April 1942 as General
Plenipotentiary for Armaments and as a member of the Central Plan-
ning Board, both within the 4-year plan. Speer was a member of the
Reichstag from 1941 until the end of the war.
Crirnes against peace.-Th,, Tribunal is of opinion that Speer s
activities do not amount to initiating, planning, or preparing wars of
aggression, or of conspiring to that end. He became the head of the
armament industry well aiter all of the wars had been commenced and
were under way. His activities in charge of German armament pro-
duction were in aid of the war eflfort in the same way that other pro-
ductive enterprises aid in the waging of war; but the Tiibunal is not
nrepared to find that such activities involve engagmg in the common
plan to wage aggressive war as charged under count one or waging
aggressive war as charged under count two. -, a.a
War cri^nes and orinus agaimt A«mmi^y.-The evidence introduced
against Speer mider counts three and four relates entirely to his partic-
ipation in the slave labor program. Speer himselt had no d.rect ad-
ministrative responsibihty for this program. Although he had advo-
cated the appointment of a General Plenipotentiary for the utihzation
156
of labor because he wantecl one central authority with whom he could
deal on labor matters, he did not obtain administrative control over
Sauckel. Sauckel was appointed directly by Hitler, under the decree
of March 21, 1942, which provided that he should be directly responsi-
ble to Goering, as plenipotentiary of the 4-year plan.
As Eeich Minister for Armaments and Munitions and General
Plenipotentiary for Armaments under the 4:-year plan, Speer had
extensive authority over production. His original authority v;ras over
construction and production of arms for the OKW. This was pro-
gressively expanded to include naval armaments, civilian production
and finally, on August 1, 1944, air armament. As the dominant mem-
ber of the Central Planning Board, which had supreme authority for
the scheduling of German production and the allocation and develop-
ment of raw materials, Speer took the position that the board had
authority to instruct Sauckel to provide laborers for Industries under
its control and succeeded in sustaining this position over the objection
of Sauckel. The practice was developed under wdiich Speer trans-
mitted to Sauckel an estimate of the total number of workers needed.
Sauckel obtained the labor and allocated it to the various Industries
in accordance with instructions supplied by Speer.
Speer knew when he made his demands on Sauckel that they would
be supplied by foreign laborers serving under compulsion. He par-
ticipated in Conferences involving the extension of the slave labor
program for the purpose of satisfying his demands. He was present
at a Conference held during August 10 and August 12, 1942, with
Hitler and Sauckel at which it was'agreed that Sauckel should bring
laborers by force from occupied territories where this was necessary
to satisfy the labor needs of the Industries under Speer's control.
Speer also attended a Conference in Hitler's headquarters on January
4p^944, at which the decision was made that Sauckel should obtain
i "at least 4!|0Ö0,OÖÖ ncw workers from occupied territories'' inorder to
1 satisfy the demands for labor niadejjiy Speer^^^
-indicated that he could do this only wnth lieTpfrom Hininiler.
Sauckel continually inf ormed Speer and his representatives that
foreign laborers w^ere being obtained by force. At a meeting of Majich
1, 1944, Speer's deputy questioned Sauckel very closely about his
failure to live up to the Obligation to supply 4,000,000 w^orkers from
occupied territoriei; ^In some cases Speer demanded laborers from
s'pccific foreign countriesr"TTvuspat the Conference August 10-12,
1942, Sauckel was instructed to supply Speer wuth "a further million^
Eussian laborers for the German armament industry up to and in-
cluding October 1942." At a meeting of the Central Planning Board
on April 22, 1943, Speer discusscd plans to obtain Eussian laborers
for use in the coal mines, and flatly vetoed the Suggestion that this
labor deficit should be made up by German labor.
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Spoer has ar/^iod that he advocatcil the reorgaiiization of the labor
prü<^r{im to j)Iace a grenter einphasis oii utilization of German labor
in war procliiction in Germany aiul on tlie use of labor in occupied
coiintries in local production of consumer goods formerly produced
in Germany. Speer took steps in this direction by establishing the
so-called "blocked industries" in the occupied territories whicli were
used to produce goods to be shipped to Germany. Employees of
these industries were innnune from deportation to Germany as slave
hiborers and any worker who had been ordered to go to Germany
could avoid deportation if ho went to work for a blocked indiastry.
Tili» System, although somewhat less inhumane than deportation to
Germany, was still illegal. The System of blocked industries played
only a small part in the over-all slave labor program, although Speer
urged its Cooperation with the Slave Labor Program, knowing the
way in which it was actually being administered. In an official sense,
.he was its principal beneficiary and he constantly urged its extension.
Speer was also directly involved in the utilization of forced labor
as Chief of the Organization Todt. The Organization Todt func-
tioned principally in the occupied areas on such projeets as the
Atlantic Wall and the construction of military highways, and Speer
has admitted that he relied on compulsory Service to keep it ade-
quately stafFed. He also used concentration camp labor in the indus-
tries under Ins control. He origlnally arranged to tap this source of
labor for use in small out-of-the-way factories; and later, fearful of
Himmler's jurisdictional ambitions, attempted to use as few concen-
tration camp workers as possible.
Speer was also involved in the use of prisoners of war in armament
industries but contends that he utilized Soviet prisoners of war
only in industries covered by the Geneva Convention.
Speer's position was sucli that he was not directly concerned with
the cruelty in the administration of the slave labor program, although
he was aware of its existence. For example, at meetings of the Central
Planning Board he was informed that his demands for labor were so
large as to necessitate violent methods in recruiting. At a meeting of
the Ceirtral Planning Board on October 30, 1942, Speer voiced his opin-
ion that many slave laborers who claimed to be sick were malingerers
and stated : "There is nothing to be said against SS and police taking
drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration
camps." Speer, however, insisted that the slave laborers be given ade-
quate food and working conditions so that they could work efficiently.
In mitigation it must be recognized that Speer's establishment of
blocked industries did keep many laborers in their homes and that
in the closing stages of the war he was one of the few men wlio had the
courage to teil Hitler that the war was lost and to take steps to prevent
the senseless destruction of production facilities, both in occupied
158
territories and in Germany. He carried out his Opposition to Hitler's
scorched earth program in some of the western countries and in Ger-
many by deliberately sabotaging it at considerable personal risk.
Oonclusion. — The Tribunal fmds that Speer is not guilty on counts
one and two, but is guilty under counts three and f our.
VON NEURATH
Von Neurath is indicted under all f our counts. He is a professional
diplomat who served as German Ambassador to Great Britain from
1930 to 1932. On June 2, 1932, he was appointed Minister of Foreign
AfTairs in the von Papen cabinet, a position which he held under the •
cabinets of von Schleicher and Hitler. Von Neurath resigned as
Minister of Foreign Affäirs on February 4, 1938, and was made Eeich
Minister without Portfolio, President of the Secret Cabinet Council
and a member of the Eeich Defense Council. On March 18, 1939, he
was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, and served
in this capacity until September 27, 1941. He held the formal rank
of Obergruppenf uehrer in the SS.
Crimes against fcojce, — As Minister of Foreign Affairs, von Neurath
advised Hitler in connection with the withdrawal from the Disarma-
ment Conference and the League of Nations on October 14, 1933 ; the
Institution of rearmament ; the passage on March 16, 1935, of the law
for universal military service ; and the passage on May 21, 1935, of the
secret Eeich Defense Law. He was a key figure in the negotiation of
the Naval Accord entered into between Germany and England on
June 18, 1935. Von Neurath played an important part in Hitler's de-
cision to reoccupy the Ehineland on March 7, 1936, and predicted that
the occupation could be carried through without any reprisals from the
French. On May 18, 1936, he told the American Ambassador to France
that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing in
foreign affairs until "the Ehineland had been digested," and that as
soon as the fortifications in the Ehineland had been constructed and
tlie countries of central Europe realized that France could not enter
Germany at will, "all those countries will begin to feel very differently
about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop."
Von Neurath took part in the Hossbach Conference of November 5,
1937. He has testified that he was so shocked by Hitler's statements
that he had a heart attack. Shortly thereaf ter, he offered to resign,
and his resignation w^as accepted on February 4, 1938, at the same time
that von Fritsch and von Blomberg were dismissed. Yet with knowl-
edge of Hitler's aggressive plans he retained a formal relationship
with the Nazi regime as Eeichs Minister wuthout Portfolio, President
of the Secret Cabinet Council and a member of the Eeichs Defense
Council. He took charge of the foreign office at the time of the occu-
pation of Austria, assured the British Ambassador that this had not
159
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been caused by a German Ultimatum, and informed the Czechoslo-
vakian Minister that Germany intended to abide by its arbitration
Convention with Czechoslovakia. Von Neurath participated in the
last phase of the negotiations preceding the Munich Pact but con-
tends tliat he entercd these discussions only to urge Hitler to niake
every elFort to settle the issues by peaceful means.
Criimnal activities in Czechoslovakia.— Yon Neurath was appointed
Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia on March 18, 1939.
Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by mihtary force. Hacha's con-
sent, obtained as it was by duress, cannot be considered as justifying
the oecupation. Hitler's decree of March 16, 1939, establishing the
protectorate, stated that this new territory should "belong henceforth
to the territory of the German Reich," an assumption that the Republic
of Czechoslovakia no longer existed. But it also went on the theory
that Bohemia and Moravia retained their sovereignty subject only
to the interests of Germany as expressed by the protectorate. There-
fore even if the doctrine of subjugation should bgjconsidered to be
appli^^^to^teratp^ry occupied by aggressive action„ the Tribunal
^..snotbelie've that this procIamatTon amounted to an incorporation
which was sufficient to bring the doctrine into effect. The oecupation
of Boliemia and Moravia must therefore be considered a military
oecupation covered by the rules of warfare. Although Czechoslo-
vakia was not a party to the Hague Convention of 1907, the rules of
land warfare expressed in this Convention are declaratory of existing
international law and hence are applicable.
As Reichs Protector, von Neurath instituted an administration in
Bohemia and Moravia similar to that in effect in Germany. The free
press, political parties, and trade unions were abolished. All groups
which might serve as Opposition were outlawed. Czechoslovakian in-
dustry was worked into the structure of German war production, and
exploited for the German war effort. Nazi anti-Semitic policies and
laws were also introduced. Jews were barred from leading positions
in Government and business.
In August 1939, von Neurath issued a proclamation warning against
any acts of Sabotage and stating that "the responsibility for all acts of
Sabotage is attributed not only to individual perpetrators but to the
entire Czech population." When the war broke out on September 1,
1939, 8,000 prominent Czechs were arrested by the security police in
Bohemia and Moravia and put into protective custody. Many of this
group died in concentration camps as a result of mistreatment.
In October and November 1939, Czechoslovakian students held a
ßeries of demonstrations. As a result, on Hitler's Orders, all univer-
sities were closed, 1,200 students imprisoned, and the 9 leaders of the
demonstration shot by security police and SD. Von Neurath testified
that he was not informed of this action in advance, but it was an-
160
nounced by proclamation over his sigiiature postcd on placards
througliout the protectorate, which he claims, however, was done
witliout his authority.
On August 31, 1940, von Neurath transmitted to Lammers a niemo-
randum which he had prepared dealing with the f uture of the protec-
torate, and a memorandum with his approval prepared by Carl Her-
man Frank on the same subject. Both dealt with the question of
Germanization and proposed that the majority of the Czechs might
be assimilated racially into the German Nation. Both advocated the
elimination of the Czechoslovakian intelligentsia and other groups
which might resist Germanization, von Neurath'sby expulsion, Frank's
by exjmlsion or "special treatment."
Von Neurath has argued that the actual enforcement of the repres-
sive measures was carried out by the security police and SD who were
under the control of his State secretary, Carl Herman Frank, who was
appointed at the Suggestion of Himmler and who, as a higher SS and
police leader, reported directly to Himmler. Von Neurath further
argues that anti-Semitic measures and those resulting in economic
exploitation w^ere put into effect in the protectorate as the result of
policies decided upon in the Reich. However this may be, he served
as the chief German cfficial in the protectorate when the administra-
tion of this territory played an important role in the wars of aggres-
sion which Germany was waging in the east, knowing that war
crimes and crimes against humanity were being committed under his
authority.
In mitigation it must be remembered that von Neurath did inter-
vene with the security police and SD for the release of many of the
Czechoslovaks who were arrested on September 1, 1939, and for the
release of students arrested later in the fall. On September 23, 1941, ^
he was summoned bef ore Hitler and told that he was not being harsh
enough and that Heydrich was being sent to the protectorate to com-
bat the Czechoslovakian resistance groups. Von Neurath attemptod '
to dissuade Hitler from sending Heydrich, but in vain, and when he^
was not successful offered to reshm. When his resiirnation was not
accepted he wentonleave, on September 27, 1941, and refused to act
"as Protector alxer that date. His resignation was formally accepted
in August 1943.
Conclusion. — The Tribunal finds that von Neurath is guilty under
all four counts.
FRITZSCHE
Fritzsche is indicted on counts one, three, and four. He was best
known as a radio commentator, discussing once a week the events
of the day on his own program, ''Hans Fritzsche Speaks." He began
161
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broadctisting in Soptomber 1032 ; in tlie same year he was made the
head of tlie AVircless News Sorvicc. a Reich Government agency.
When on May 1, 19133, this agency was incorporated by the National
Sociahsts into their Reich Ministry of Populär Enlightenment and
Propaganda, Fritzsche became a niember of tlie Nazi Party and went
to Ihat ministry. In December 1938 he became head of the Home
Press Division of the Ministry; in October 1942 he was promoted to
the rank of Ministeri al Director. After serving briefly on the eastern
front in a propaganda Company, he was, in November 1942, made
hea«l of the Radio Division of the Propaganda Ministry and Plem-
potentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater German
Radio. . .
Crimes agaimt peace.—As head of the Home Press Division,
Fritzsche supervised the German press of 2,300 daily newspapers. In
pursuance of this function he held daily press Conferences to deliver
the directives of the Propaganda Ministry to these papers. He was,
however, subordinate to Dietrich, the Reich press chicf , who was m
turn a sub^^dh^^tT^TG^^BBefe. It was Dictficti who received the
directives to the press of Goebbels and other Reich Ministers, and
prepared them as instructions, which he then handcd to Fritzsche for
the press. „ . , t. ^i • ü »
From time to timc, the "Daily Paroles of the Reich Press Chief,
as these instructions were labeled, directed the press to present to
the people certain themes, such as the Icadership principle, the Jewish
Problem, the problem of living space, or other Standard Nazi idoas.
A vigorous propaganda campaign was carricd out before eaeh ma]or
act of aggression. While Fritzsche headcd the Home Press Division,
he instructed tlie press how the actions or wars against Bohemia and
Moravia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union should be dealt
r with Fritzsche had no control of the formulation of these Propa-
ganda policies. He was merely a conduit to the press of the instruc-
. tions handed him by Dietrich. In February 1939 and before the
absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, for instance, he received Die-
trich's Order to bring to the attention of the press Slovakia's efforts
for independence, and the anti-Germanic policies and politics of the
existin^ Prague Government. This ordcr to Dietrich originated in
the Foreign Office. , . xt
The Radio Division, of which Fritzsche became the head in Novem-
ber 1942, was one of the 12 divisions of the Propaganda Mmistry.
In the bUinning Dietrich and other heads of divisions exerted m-
fluence over the policies to be followed by radio. Towards the end
of the war however, Fritzsche became the sole authority within the
ministry for radio activities. In this capacity he formulated and
issued daily radio "paroles" to all Reich propaganda offices, accord-
ing to the general political policies of Üie Nazi regjnie, subject to the
162
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directives of the Eadio-Politicul Division of tlie Foreign Office, and
the personal supervision of Goebbels.
Fritzsche, ^vith other officials of the Propaganda Ministry, was pres-
ent at Goebbels' daily stafT Conferences. Herc they were instructed in
the news and propaganda policies of the day. After 1943 Fritzsche
himself occasionally held these Conferences, but only when Goebbels
and his State secretaries were absent. And even then his only function
was to transmit the GoebbePs directives relayed to him by telephone.
This is the summary of Fritzsche's positions and influence in the
Third Eeich. Never did he achieve sufficient stature to attend the
planning Conferences which led to aggressive war; indeed according
to his own uncontradicted testimony he never even had a conversa-
tion with Hitler. Nor is there any showing that he was informed of
the decisions taken at these Conferences. His activities cannot be said
to be those which fall within the definition of the common plan to wage
aggressive war as already set forth in this judgment.
War cHmes arid ciinies against humanity. — The prosecution has
asserted that Fritzsche incited and encouraged the commissipn of war
crimes, by deliberately f alsifying news to arouse in the German people
those passions which led them to the commission of atrocities under
counts three and four. His position and official duties were not suf-
ficiently important, however, to inf er that he took part in originating or
formulating propaganda campaigns.
Excerpts in evidence from his speeches show definite anti-Semitism
on his part. He broadcast, for example, that the war had been caused
by Jews and said their fate had turned out "as unpleasant as the
Fuehrer predicted." But these speeches did not urge persecution or
extermination of Jews. There is no evidence that he was aware of their
extermination in the east. The evidence moreover shows that he twice
attempted to have publication of the anti-Semitic Der Stürmer sup-
pressed, though unsuccessfully.
In these broadcasts Fritzsche sometimes spread false news, but it
was not proved he knew it to be false. For example, he reported that
no German U-boat was in the vicinity of the Athenia when it was sunk.
This information was untrue ; but Fritzsche, having received it from
the German Navy, had no reason to believe it was untrue.
It appears that Fritzsche sometimes made strong statements of a
propagandistic nature in his broadcasts. But the Tribunal is not
prepared to hold that they were intended to incite the German people
to commit atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be held to
have been a participant in the crimes charged. His aim was rather
to arouse populär sentiment in support of Hitler and the German war
effort.
Conclusion, — Tlie Tribunal finds that Fritzsche is not guilty under
this indictment, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Mar-
shai when the Tribunal presently adjourns.
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BORMANN
Bormann is indicted on coiints one, three, and four. He joined tlie
National Socialist Party in 1925, was a member of tlie staff of the
Supreme Command of the SA f rom 1928 to 1930, was in Charge of the
Aid Fund of the party and was Keichsleiter f roin 1933 to 1945. From
1933 to 1941 he was Chief of Staff in the office of the Fuehrer's deputy
and, after the flight of Hess to England, became head of the Party
Chancellery on 12 May 1941. On. 12 April 1943, he became secretary
to the Fuehrer. He was political and organizational head of the
Volksstiirm and a general in the SS.
Cn7nes against pea^e.— Bormann, in the beginning, a minor
Nazi, steadily rose to a position of power, and, particularly in the
closing days, of great influence over Hitler. He was active m the
party's rise to power and even more so in the consolidation of that
power. He devoted much of his time to the persecution of the churches
and of the Jews within Germany.
The evidence does not show that Bormann knew of Hitler's plans to
prepare, initiate, or wage aggressive wars. He attended none of the
important Conferences when Hitler revealed piece by piece those plans
for aggression. Nor can knowledgo be conclusively inf erred from the
positfons he held. It was only when he became head of the Party
Chancellery in 1941, and later in 1943 secretary to the Fuehrer when
he attended many of Hitler's Conferences, that his positions gave him
the necessary access. Under the view stated elsewhere which the
Tribunal has taken of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, there is
not sufficient evidence to bring Bormann within the scope of count one.
^Yar crimes and orimes against humanity.—By decrce of 29 May
1941, Bormann took over the offices and powers held by Hess; by the
decree of 24 January 1942, these powers were extended to give him
control over all laws and directives issued by Hitler. He was thus
responsible for laws and Orders issued thereaf ter. On 1 December
1942, all Gaue became Keich Defense Districts, and the Party Gau-
leiters responsible to Bormann were appointed Reich Defense Com-
missioners. In eff ect, this made them the administrators of the entire
civilian war effort. This was so not only in Germany but also in those
territories which were incorporated into the Reich from the absorbed
and conquered territories.
Throu^h this mechanism Bormann controlled the ruthlcss exploita-
tions of the subjected populace. His order of 12 August 1942 placed
all party agencies at the disposal of Himmler's program for forced
resettlement and denationalization of pei^ons in the occupicd coun-
tries Three wceks after the invasion of Russia, he attended the con-
fcrence of 10 July 1941 at Hitler's field quarters with Goering, Rosen-
berg, and Keitel; Bormann's report shows that there were discusscd
and developed detailed plans of enslavement and annihilation of the
164
Population of these territories. And on 8 May 1942, he conferred with
Hitler and Rosenberg on the forced resettlement of Dutch personnel
in Latvia, the extermiiiation program in Russia, and the economic
cxploitation of the eastern territories. He was interested in the con-
fiscation of art and otlier properties in the east. His letter of 11
January 1944 called for tlie creation of a large-scale Organization to
withdraw commodities from the occupied territories for the bombed-
out German populace.
Bormann was extremely active in the persecution of the Jews, not
only in Germany but also in the absorbed and conquered countries.
He took part in the discussions which Icd to the removal of G0,000 Jews
from Vienna to Poland in Cooperation with the SS and the Gestapo.
He signed the decrce of 31 May 1941, extending the Nürnberg laws
to the aimexed eastern territories. In an order of 9 October 1942, he
declared that the permanent elimination of Jews in Greater German
territory could no longer be solved by emigration, but only by applying
"ruthless f orce" in the special camps in the east. On 1 July 1943, he
signed an ordinance withdrawing Jews from the protection of the
law courts and placing them under the exclusive Jurisdiction of
Himmlor's Gestapo.
Bormann was prominent in the slave labor program. The party
leaders supervised slave labor matters in the respective Gaue, includ-
ing employment, conditions of work, feeding, and housing. By his
circular of 5 May 1943, to the Leadership Corps distributed down to
the levcl of Ortsgruppenleiters, he issued directions regulating the
treatment of foreign workers, pointing out they were subject to SS
control on security problems, and ordered the previous mistreatment
to cease. A report of 4 September 1942, relating to the transfer of
500,000 female domestic workers from the east to Germany showed
that control was to be exercised by Sauckel, Himmler, and Bormann.
Sauckel by decree of 8 September directed the Kreisleiters to super-
^ vise the distribution and assignment of these female laborers.
Bormann also issued a sories of Orders to the party leaders dealing
with the treatment of prisoners of war. On 5 November 1941, ho
prohibited decent burials for Russian prisoners of war. On 25
November 1943 he directed Gauleiters to report cases of lenient treat-
ment of prisoners of war. And on 13 September 1944, he ordered
liaison between the Kreisleiters with the camp commandants in deter-
mining the use to be made of prisoners of war for forced labor. On
29 January 1943, he transmitted to his leaders OKW Instructions
allowing the use of firearms, and corporal punishment on recalcitrant
prisoners of war, contrary to the rules of land warfare. On 30
September 1944, he signedinlecree taking from the OKW Jurisdiction
over prisoners of war and handing them over to Himmler and the SS.
165
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Bormann is responsible f or the lynching of Allied ahmen. On 30
May 1944, he prohibited any police action or criminal proceedings
against persons who had takeii pari in the lynching of AlUed fliers.
This was accompanied by a Goebbels' propaganda campaign inciting
the German people to take action of this nature and the Conference
of 6 June 1944, where regulations for the application of lynching
"were discussed.
His counsel, who has labored under difficulties, was unable to ref ute
this evidence. In the face of these documents which bear Bormann's
Signatare it is difficult to see how he could do so even were the def end-
ant present. Counsel has argued that Bormann is dead and that the
Tribunal should not avail itself of Article 12 of the Charter which
gives it the right to take proceedings in absentia. But the evidence of
death is not conclusive, and the Tribunal, as previously stated, deter-
mined to try him in absentia. If Bormann is not dead and is later
apprehended, the Control Council for Germany may, under Article 29
of the Charter, consider any facts in mitigation, and alter or reduce
his sentence, if deemed proper.
ConcliMsion.—The Tribunal finds that Bormann is not guilty on
count one, but is guilty on counts three and f our.
1 October 1946
Geoffrey Lawrencje /&/ Norman Birkett
President
N
Francis Biddle /s/
H. DoNNEDiEU De Vabres /s/
NlKITCHENKO /S/
John J. Parker
R. Falco
A. VOLCIIKOV
DISSENTING OPINION
The Tribunal decided :
(a) To acquit the defendants Hjalmar Schacht, Franz von
Papen, and Hans Fritzsche.
(&) To sentence the defendant Rudolf Hess to life imprison-
ment.
(c) Not to declare criminal the foUowing organizations: the
Reich Cabinet, General Staff and OKW.
In this respect I cannot agree with the decision adopted by the
Tribunal as it does not correspond to the facts of the case and is based
on incorrect conclusions.
I. THE UNFOUNDED ACQUITTAL OF DEFENDANT SCHACHT
The evidence, submitted to the Tribunal in the case of Schacht,
confirms the following facts:
(a) Schacht established contact with Goering in December 1930,
and with Hitler at the beginning of 1931. He subsequently estabUshed
U6
I
contact bctween the leadership of the Nazi Party and the foromost
representatives of the German induslrial and financial circlcs. This,
in particular, is confirmed by the testimony of Witness Severing
(Transcript, afternoon session, 23 May 1946; also USA-G15).
(&) In July 1932, Schacht demanded that von Papen resign his post
as Eeich Chancellor in favor of Hitler. This fact is confirmed by
Yon Papen's testimony at the preliminary interrogation and by
Schacht's own testimony in Court (Transcript, afternoon sossion,
2 May 1946).
(c) In N'ovember 1932, Schacht collected signatures of German
industriaHsts, urging them to come out for Hitler's appointment as
Eeich Chancellor. On November 12, 1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler :
"I have no doubt that the way we are directing the course of
events can only lead to your appointment as Eeich Chancellor.
We are trying to secure a large number of signatures among the
industrial circles to ensure your appointment to this post." (EC-
456, USA-773; PS-3901, USA-837.)
(^d) In February 1933, Schacht organized the financing of the pre-
election campaign conducted by the Nazi Party, and demanded at
the Conference of Hitler and Goering with the industrialists, that
the latter provide 3,000,000 marks (D-203). Schacht admitted in
court that he had pointed out the necessity for providing the Nazi
leaders with this sum (Transcript, afternoon session, 3 May 1946),
while the Defendant Funk and the former member of the manage-
ment of 'T. G. Farbenindustrie" Schnitzler, who were present at this
Conference, both confirmed that it was Schacht who was the initiator
of the financing of the preelection campaign (Transcript 4 July
1946, and EC-439, USA-618) .
(ö) Utilizing his prestige, Schacht also repeatedly admitted in his
public Statements that he asked for the support in the elections of boüi
the Nazi Party and of Hitler (USA-615; USA-616; Transcript,
afternoon session, 2 May 1946).
On 29 August 1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler :
"No matter where my activities lead me in the near f uture, even
if some day you see me imprisoned in a fortress, you can always
depend on me as your loyal aide." (EC-457, USA-619).
Tlim^ Schacht consciously and deliherately supported the Nazi Party
and activehj aided in the seizure of power in Germany hy the Fascists.
Even prior to his appointment as Plenipotentiary for War Economy,
and immediately af ter the seizure of power by the Nazis, Schacht led
in planning and developing the German armaments, as f oUows :
(a) On 17 March 1933, Schacht was appointed president of the
Eeichsbank (PS-3021, USA-11), and as he himself stated in a speech
before his Reichsbank coUeagues on 21 March 1938, the Eeichsbank
167
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I
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under his maiiiigement was "none other than a National Socialist In-
stitution" {Transcript, afternoon session, 3 May 194C).
(6) In August 1934, Schacht was appointed Reich Minister of
Economy (PS-3021 ; USA-U). His ministry «was given the task of
carrying out the economic preparation for war" (EC-128, "üSA-623).
A special decrec granted Schacht in his capacity of Reich Minister of
Economy, unlimited authority in the field of economy ("Reichs-
gcsetzblatt" for 1934, part 1, p. 5G5).
(c) Making use of these powers in 1934, Schacht launchcd upon
the cxecution of the "new program" developed by him ("Reichs-
gesetzblatt," 1934, part I, p. 826), and, as Schacht noted in his speech
of 29 November 1938, this Organization played a tremendous part m
the course of Germany's rearmament (EC-611, USA-62).
(d) For the purpose of the most effective cxecution of this "new
program" Schacht used the property and means of those political
cnemies of the Nazi regime, who eithcr became the victims of terror ^
or were forced to emigrate (Schacht's note to Hitler of 3 May 193jJ|,
PS-llf)8, USA-37).
Schacht used swindler's tactics and coercion "in an effort to acquire
raw material and foreign currency for armaments" (affidavit of vice
President of the Reichsbank, Puhl, EC-437, USA-G24) .
(e) Darin" the very first days of his association with Reichsbank,
Schacht issue'd a series of decrees (27 October 1933, 23 March 1934,
19 Febniary 1935), which in the long run hclped realize the broad
program of the financing of armaments, developed by him, and with
the aid of which, as he testified, he "had found the way to finance the
rearmament program." , , .,
In his speech in Leipzig on 1 March 1935, Schacht, while summing
up his preccding economic and financial activities, announced "...
evcrythin.^ that I say and do has the Fuehrer's füll agrecment and
I shall not do or say anything which is not approved by the Fuehrer'
(Transcript. afternoon session, 3 May 1946).
Havin^ bccome the Plcnipotentiary General for War Economy,
Schacht unificd under himsclf the leadcrship of the entire German
economy and through his efforts the establishment of the Hitlerite
war machine was accomplished. ''
(a) The secrct law of 21 May 1935-, which appomted Schacht tho
Plcnipotentiary General for War Economy, states as foUows: "The
task of the Plcnipotentiary General for War Economy is to place all
the economic resources in the service of warfare. Tlie Plcnipoten-
tiary General for War Economy witliin the framework of his functions
is given the right to issue legal Orders, deviating from the existing
laws "... "He is the responsible head for financing wars through
tho Reich Ministry and the Reichsbank" (PS-2261, USA-24).
H
168
/
<
(h) Scliacht financod German armaments througli the MEFO Sys-
tem of promissory iiotes, ^yhich was a swindlin^ venture on a national
Scale that has no prcccdcnt, and the success of which was dependent
upon the realization of the aggressive jolans of the Hitlerites. It was
because of this that Sehacht set 1942 as the dato when the MEFO
notes were to mature, and he pointed out in his speech of 29 November
1938, the relation between "the daring credit pohcy" of the Keichsbank
and the aims of the Hitlerite foreign policy (EC-Gll, USA-G22).
(c) Having niade füll use of his plenary powers, Schacht carefuUy
developed and carried out a broad program of economic mobilization
which allowed tlie Hitlerite leaders to wage war at any time considered
most favorable. In particular, from the report of Schacht's deputy,
Wohltliat, "the preparation for mobilization carried out by the Plcni-
potentiary for War Economy" shows that Schacht provided to the
last detail for the System of exploitation of the German economy in
wartime, all tlic way from the utilization of industrial enterprises, of
raw material resources and manpower down, to the distribution of
80,000,000 ration cards (EC-258, USA-G25). It is significaiit that
this report was drawn up a month after Hitler's statement at the
Conference of 5 November 1937, at which Hitler set f orth this concreto
plan of aggression (PS-386, USA-25).
Summarizing his past activity, Schacht wrote in January 1937:
"I worked out tlie preparation for war in accordance with the principle
that the plan of our war economy must be built in peacetime in such
a way that there will be no necessity for any reorganization in case of
war." Schacht confirmed his statement in court (Transcrii)t, after-
noon Session, 2 May 19-4G) .
Schacht consciously and deliberately preparecl Germany for war.
(d) The former Minister of War, Von Blomberg, testified that:
"Schacht was fully cognizant of the plans for developmcnt and in-
crease of the German arrned forces, since he was constantly in-
formed . . . of all the financing necessary for the development of
the German armed forces" (USA-838).
On 31 August 193G, Von Blomberg informcd Schacht that : "The
establishment of all air force units must be completed by April 1,
1937, and thereforo large expenditures must be entailed in 1936 . . ."
(PS-1301,USA-123).
% In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated in the military exercises
inGodesberg (EC-174).
(e) In his memorandum to Hitler on May 3, 1935, entitled the
"Financing of Kearmament," Schacht wrote : "A speedy f ulfillment
of the program for rearmament on a mass scale is the basis of German
policy, and, therefore, everything eise must be subordinate to this
task ; the completion of this task, the achievement of this purpose must
meet no obstacles . . ." (PS-11G8, USA-37).
169
M»
!>
In his speecTi on 29 November 1938, Schacht announced that Reichs-
bank's credit policy made it possible for Gcrmany to create an "un-
eurpassed machine, and, in tum, this war niachine made possible the
realization of the aims of our policy" (EC-611, USA-622).
One must excludc thc supposition that Schacht was not mformed as
to what purposes these weapons were to serve since he could not but
take into consideration their unprecedented scale and an obvious
preference for offensive types of weapons, heavy tanks, bombers, and
so on. Besides, Schacht knew perfectly well that not a Single country
intendod to wage war on Germany nor had it any reasons to do so.
(a) Schacht utilized the military might growing under his direction
to back Germany's territorial demands which grew in proportion to
the increase in armaments.
Schaclit testified in court that "at first he confined himself (m his
demands) to the colonies \vhich had once belonged to Germany
(Transcript, niorning Session, 3 May 194C).
In September 1934, during his talk with the American Ambassador
Dodd, Schacht pointed out that he «desired annexation if possible
without war, but through war, if the U. S. would stay out of it
(EC-4Gl,USA-58).
In 1935, Schacht announced to the American Consul Füller: l^ol-
onies are essential to Germany. If it is possible, we shall ^cqmrc them
through negotiations; if not, we shall seize them (EC^50,
USA-C29). ■ ^ ,
Schacht admitted in Court that military pressure put upon Gzecho-
Blovakia was "in some mcasure the result and the fruit of his labor
(Transcript, morning Session, 3 May 1946). , . , j
(b) Schacht personally participated in the plunder of private and
State property of the countries which became victims of Hitlerite
''^The m^inutes of the conference of the Military-Economic Staff on 11
March 1938, in which Schacht participated, State that those present
were given Hitler's latest directives about the mvasion of Austria.
Further, the minutes State that : "After this, at the Suggestion of
Schacht, it was decided that ... all the financial accountuig will
be made in Reichmarks at the rate of exchange: 2 Shillings for 1
Reichsmark" (ECM21, USA-645).
Schacht admitted in court that he personally was in Charge of the
seizure of the Czechoslovak National Bank after the occupation of
Czechoslovakia (Transcript, morning Session, 3 May 1946) ._
(c) At tho beginning of 1940, Schacht offered Hitler bis Services
for negotiations with the United States in regard to the discontinu-
ance of aid to England and he informed Goering of his offer (PS-
8700, USA-780).
170
(d) Schacht considered it his duty to greet and congratulate
Hitler pubhcly after the sigiiing of armistice with France, although
Schacht, better than anyone eise, understood the usurpatory nature
of the armistice (German documentary film USA-635).
(e) In his letter to Funk on 17 October 1941, Schacht suggestcd a
niore offective exploitation of occiipied territory. In this case, too,
Schacht acted on his own initiative (EC-504, USA-830).
Schacht also participated in the persecution of the Jews :
(a) IIg testified in court that he "agreed to the policy of the perse-
cution of the Jews as a matter of principle" (Transcript, afternoon
Session, 2 May 1946). Although, he stated, "to a certain extent" it
was a matter of conscience which, however, "was not serious enough
to bring about a break" between him and the Nazis (Transcript, after-
noon Session, 2 May 1946; USA-616).
(b) In his capacity of Minister of Economy, Schacht signed a series
of decrees, in accordance with which the property of the Jews in Ger-
many was subject to plunder with impunity (USA-832 and USA-
616). Schacht confirmed in Court the f act that he had signed a series
of antisemitic decrees (Transcript, afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).
As to the reasons for Schacht's resignation irom the post of the
Ministry of Economy and the Plenipotentiary General for War
Economy in November 1937, and also f rom the post of the president
of the Eeichsbank on 20 November 1939, and finally from the post
of the Minister without Portfolio in January 1943, the evidence sub-
mitted established the following:
(a) The reason is not Schacht's disagreement with the economic
preparation for aggressive wars.
Three weeks before leaving the Ministry of Economy and the post
of Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht wrote to
Goering : ". . .1 also don't consider that my opinion can differ from
yours on economic policy . . ." (EC-497, USA-775).
In his reply Goering states: ". . . You promised me your support
and coUaboration . . . You have repeated this promise many times,
even after differences of opinion began to creep up between us"
(EC-493,USA-642).
Schacht testified in court that Goering and he "differed in matters
of procedure" (Transcript, morning Session, 3 May 1946).
In the preliminary examination Goering testified that Schacht's
leaving the Reichsbank "had no relation to the program of rearma-
ment" (ÜSA-648).
The vice president of the Reichbank, Puhl, confirmed that Schacht's
resignation from the Reichbank can be explained by "his desire to
cxtricate himself from a dangerous Situation" which developed as
the result of Schacht's own crooked financial Operations (EC-438,
USA-G46).
171
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(b) The rcason is not Schacht's disapproval of mass terror con-
ducted by thc Hitlerites.
The witness for the defense, Gesevius, testified that he constantly
infonned Schacht of the criminal actions of the Gestapo, created by
Goering, and that nevertheless, right up to the end of 1936, Schacht
looked for "Goering's support" (Transcript, morning session, 24
April 1946). ' „ , x..
In his letter to von Blomberg on 24 December 1935, Schacht sug-
gestcd that the Gestapo apply "more cautious methods" since the open
terror of the Gestapo "hinders the objectives of the armament
(Transcript, aftemoon session, 2 May 1946).
On 30 January 1937, Schacht was awarded a golden party msigiua
by Hitler (EC-500, Transcript, afternoon session, 2 May 1946). . As
stated in an official German publication, «he was able to be of greater
help to the party than if he were actually a member of the party
(EC-460, USA-617). .
Only in 1943, having understood earlier than many other Germans,
the inevitability of the failure of the Hitler regime, did Schacht
establish contact with the Opposition circles, however, domg nothing
to help depose this regime. Therefore, it was not by chance that
having found out these connections of Schacht, Hitler stdl spared
Schacht's life.
It is thus indisputably established that :
(1) Schacht actively assisted in the seizure of power by the
N^izis
(2) During a period of 12 years Schacht closely coUaborated
with Hitler. . i i • ^ ^i
(3) Schacht provided the economic and financial basis for tne
creation of the Hitlerite military machine.
(4) Schacht prepared Germany's economy for the waging of
aggressive wars.
(5) Schacht participated in the persecution of Jews and m the
plunder of territories occupied by the Germans.
Therefore, Schacht's leading pari in the preparation and execution
of the common criminal plan is proved.
The decision to acquit Schacht is in obvious contradiction with ex-
isting evidence.
IL THE UNFOUNDED ACQÜITTAL OF DEFENDANT VON PAPEN
Tlie verdict does not dispute the f act that von Papen prepared the
way for Hitler's appointment to the post of the Reichskanzler and
that he actively helped Nazis in their seizure of power.
In a speech of 2 November 1933, von Papen said the f oUowing on
the subject :
172
I
^. . . just as I at the time of taking over the Chancellorship
(this was in 1932) have advocated to pave the way to power for
tlie young fighting überation movement, just as I on 30 January
was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands of our Chan-
cellor and Fuehrer into the hands of our beloved Field Marshai,
so do I today again feel the Obligation to say to the German
People and all those who have kept confidence in me :
"The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times of
deep distress a leader. . . ." (PS-3375).
It was von Papen who revoked Bruning's order dissolving the SS
and the SA, thus allowing the Nazis to realize their program of mass
terror (D-631).
Again it was the defendant who, by the application of brüte force,
did away with the Social Democrat Government of Braun and Sever-
ing (Severing's testimony, transcript, afternoon session, 14 June
1946).
On 4 January 1933, von Papen had a Conference with Hitler, Hess,
and Himmler (D-632).
Von Papen participated in the purge of the State machinery of all
personnel considered unreliable f rom the Nazi point of view ; on 21
March 1933, he signed a decree creating special political trihunals;
he had also signed an order granting amnesty to criminals whose
crinies were committed in the course of the "national revolution;" he
participated in drafting the text of the order "insuring party and
State unity ;" and so on.
Subsequently von Papen f aithf ully served the Hitler regime.
After the Putsch of 1934, von Papen ordered his subordinate^
Tschirschky, to appear in the Gestapo, knowing füll well what awaited
himthere (D-684).
Von Papen helped to keep the bloody murder secret from public
opinion (D-717;D-718). ,
The defendant played a tremendous role m helpmg Nazis to take
possession of Austria.
Three weeks after the assassination of Dollfuss, on 26 July
1934 Hitler told von Papen that he was being appointed minister to
Vienna, specially noting in a letter: «You have been and continue to
be in possession of my füllest and most unlimited trust" (PS-2799).
In this connection it is impossible to ignore the testimony of the
American Ambassador Messersmith, who quoted von Papen as say-
ing that "the seizure of Austria is only the first step" and that he, von
Papen, was in Austria for the purpose of "f urther weakening the Aus- .
trian Government" (USA-57)- . n. • i i .^^
The defendant was Hitler's chief advisor m effectmg plans for the
seizure of Austria. It was he who proposed several tactical maneu-
173
722S31'-
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1
vers, to quiet the vigllance of world opinion on tlie one band, and allow
Germany to conclude her war proparations, on the other.
This follows indisputably from von Papen's Statement to the
Austrian Minister Berger-Waldeneck (PS-1760), from the report of
Gauleiter Reuner of 6 July 1939 (USA-Gl), from von Papen's report
to Hitler of 21 August 1936 (D-706), from von Papen's report to
Hitler of 1 September 1936 (PS-2246; USA-G7), and from a series
of other documents which had been submitted in evidence.
Von Papen played this game until the issuance of the order for
alerting the German armed forces for moving into Austria. He par-
ticipated in arranging the Conference between Hitler and Schusch-
nigg of 12 February 1938 (USA-69).
It was von Papen who, in a letter to Hitler, emphatically recom-
mended that financial aid be given the Nazi Organization in Austria
known as the "Freedom Union," specifically for "its fight agarnst the
Jewry"(PS-2830).
Indisputable appeai-s the f act of the Nazi seizure of Austria and of
von Papen's participation in this act of aggression. After tho oc-
cupation of Austria, Hitler rewarded von Papen with the golden in-
signia of the Nazi Party (D-632).
Neither is it possible to ignore von Papen's role as agent provocateur
when, in his capacity of diplomat, he was the German Ambassador to
Turkey — whenever evaluation of his activity there is made.
The post of ambassador to Turkey was at the time of considerable
importance in helping the Nazis realize their aggressive plans.
The official Nazi biographer wrote about von Papen as follows :
"Shortly (after the occupation of Austria) the Fuehrer had
need of von Papen's Services again and on 18 April 1939, he
therefore, appointed him German Ambassador in Ankara"
(D-632) .
It should also be noted that for his Turkish activities, Hitler re-
warded von Papen with the Knight's Gross of the War Merit Order
with Swords (D-632).
Thus evidence submitted establishes beyond doubt that :
(1) Von Papen actively aided the Nazis in their seizure of power.
(2) Von Papen used both his efForts and his connections to solidify
and strengthen the Hitlerian terroristic regime in Germany.
(3) Von Papen actively participated in the Nazi aggression against
Austria culminating in its occupation.
(4) Von Papen faithfuUy served Hitler up to the very end aiding
the Nazi plans of aggression both with his ability and his diplomatic
skill.
It therefore follows that Defendant von Papen bears considerablo
responsibility for the crimes of the Hitlerite regime.
174
For these reasons I cannot consent to the acquittal of Defendant
von Papen.
III. THE UNFOUNDED ACQUITTAL OF DEFENDANT FRITZSCHE
The acquittal of Defendant Hans Fritzsche follows from the reason-
ing that Fritzsche, allegedly, had not reached in Germany the official
Position making him responsible for the criminal actions of the Hitler
regime and that his own personal activity in this respect cannot be
considered criminal. The verdict characterizes him as a secondary
figure carry ing out the directives of Goebbels and von Ribbentrop,
and of the Reich Press Director Dietrich.
The verdict does not take into consideration or mention the f act
that it was Fritzsche who until 1942 was the director de facto of the
Reich press and that, according to himself, subsequent to 1942 ho
became the "Commander in chief of the German radio" (Transcript,
morning Session, 23 January 194G).
For the correct definition of the role of Defendant Hans Fritzsche
it is necessary, firstly, to keep clearly in mind the importance attached
by Hitler and his dosest associates (as Goering, for example) to
Propaganda in generai and to radio Propaganda in particular. This
was considered one of the most important and essential factors in the
success of conducting an aggressive war.
In the Germany of Hitler, propaganda was invariably a factor m
preparing and conducting acts of aggression and in training the Ger-
man populace to accept obediently the criminal enterprises of German
f asci^m
The aims of these enterprises vrere served by a huge and well cen-
tralized propaganda machinery. With the help of the policc controls
and of a system of censorship it was possible to do away altogether
with the freedom of press and of speech.
The basic method of the Nazi propagandistic activity lay m the
false presentation of facts. This is stated quite frankly m Hitler's
«Mein Kampf"; "With tiie help of a skillful and contmuous applica-
tion of Propaganda it is possible to make the people conceive even of
hcaven as hell and also makc them consider heavenly the most miserly
existence" (USA-276). . ^ .
The dissemination of provocative lies and the systematic deception
of public opinion were as necessary to the Hitlerites for the rcaliza-
tion of their plans as were the production of armaments and the draft-
ing of military plans. Without propaganda, founded on the total
eclipse of the freedom of press and of speech, it would not have been
possible for German fascism to realize its aggressive intentions, to
lay the groundwork and then to put to practice the war crimcs and the
crimes against humanity.
175
li
In the Propaganda System of the Hitler State it was the daily press
and the radio that were the most important weapons.
In his court testimony, Defendant Goering named three factors as
essential in the siiccessful condiict of modern war according to the
Nazi concept, namely, (1) the niilitary Operations of the armed forces,
(2) economic warfare, (3) Propaganda. With refercncc to the latter
he said :
"For what great importance the war of propaganda had, cnemy
Propaganda which extended by way of radio f ar into the hintcrland,
no one has experienced more strongly than Germany" (Transcript,
afternoon session, 15 March 194G).
With such concepts in ascendance it is impossible to suppose that
the supreme rulers of the Reich would appoint to the post of the di-
rector of radio propaganda who supervised radio activty of all the
broadcasting companies and directed their propagandistic content— a
man they considered a secondary figure.
The point of view of the verdict contradicts both the evidence sub-
mitted and the actual state of affairs.
Boginning with 1942 and into 1915, Fritzsche was not only chief of
the radio department of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda but also
"Plenipotentiary for Üie PoHtical Organization of Eadio in Greater
Germany." This circumstance is fully proven by the sworn afhdavit
of Fritzsche himself (PS-3169, USA-721) . It thus follows not at all
that Fritzsche was merely "one of the 12 departmental chiefs in the
Ministry of Propaganda" acquiring responsibility for all radio Prop-
aganda only toward the end of the war, as the verdict asserts.
Fritzsche was the poUtical director of the German radio up and into
1945, i. e., up to the moment of German def eat and capitulation. For
this reason it is Fritzsche who bears responsibility for the false and
provocative broadcasts of the German radio during the years of
the war.
As chief of the press section inside Germany it was also Fritzsche
who was responsible for the activity of the German daily press consist-
ing of 2,300 newspapers. It was Fritzsche who created and perfected
the information section, winning from the Reich Government for the
purpose an increase in the subsidy granted the newspapers from
400,000 to 4,000,000 marks. Subsequently Fritzsche participated ener-
getically in the development of the propaganda campaigns preparatory
to the acts of aggression against Czechoslovakia and Pol and (Trans-
script, morning Session, 23 Janiiary 1946). A similar active Propa-
ganda campaign was conducted by the defendant prior to the attack
on Yugoslavia, as he himself admitted on oath in court (Transcript,
morning Session, 23 January 1946).
Fritzsche was informed of the plan to attack the Soviet Union and
was put "au courant" of the military intentions at a Conference with
176
Rosenberg (PS-1030, USA-146. Eosenbcrg's writtcn rcport to Hit-
ler on tho subject of preliminary work on eastcm European ques- ■
tions). ,
Fritzsche headed the German press campaign f alsifying reports of
Gerinany's aggressive war against France, England, Norway, the
Soviet Union, the U. S. A., and tlie other States. '
The assertion that Fritzsche was not informed of the war crimes and
the crimes against humanity then being perpetrated by the Hitlerites
in the occupied rcgions does not agrce with the f iicts. From Fritzsche's
testimony in court it is obvious that already in May 1942, while ni the
Propaganda section of tlie sixth army, he was aware of Hitler's decree
ordering execution for all Soviet political workers and Soviet mtellec-
tuals, the so-called "Commissar Decree." (Transcript, afternoon Ses-
sion, 27 June 1946) . It is also established that already at the begin-
ning of hostilities Fritzsche was fully aware of the fact that the Nazis
were carrying out their decision to do away with all Jews in Europc.
For instance, when commenting on Hitler's statement that "among
results of the war there will be the annihilation of the Jewish raco
in Europe" (Transcript, afternoon Session, 22 November 1945).
Fritzsche stated that: "As Fuehrer predicted it will occuv in tho
event of war in Europe, the f ate of the European Jewry turnod out
to be quite sad" (Transcript, morning Session, 23 January 1946). It
is f urther established that the defendant systematically preached the
antisocial theory of race hatred and characterized peoples inhabitmg
countries victimized by aggression as «subhumans» (Transcript, after-
noon Session, 27 June 1946; Transcript, morning session, 28 June
When the f ate of Nazi Germany becamo clear, Fritzsche came out
with energetic support of the Defendant Martin Bormann and of other
fanatical Hitler adherents who organized the undercover fascist
association, the so-called "Werewolf." • ^ ., .
On 7 April 1945, for example, in his last radio address, Fritzsche
■ ac'itated for all the civilian population of Germany to take active
part in the activities of this terroristic Nazi Underground organiza-
*' He said • "Let no ono be surprised to find the civilian population,
wearing civilian clothes, still continuing the figlit in the regions already
occupied and even after occupation has taken place. We shall call th.s
phenomenon 'Werewolf since it will have arisen without any pre-
liminary planning and without a definite Organization, out of the very
instinctoflife"(USSR-496). f,u„„„
In his radio addresses Fritzsche welcomed the German use of the new
terror weapons in conducting the war, specifically the use of the V'
rockets. On receiving a plan for the introduction of bacterial warfare
177
\
he Immediately forwarded it to the OKW for acceptance (USSK-484;
evidence submitted during the af ternoon Session, 28 Juno 1946) .
I consider Fritzsche's responsibihty fully proven. His activity had
a most basic relation to the preparation and the conduct of aggressive
warf are as well as to the other crimes of the Hitler regime.
IV. CONCERNING THE SENTENCE OF THE DEFENDANT RUDOLF HESS
The judgment of the Tribunal correctly and adequately portrays
the outstanding position which Rudolf Hess occupied in the Icader-
ship of the Nazi party and State. He was indeed Hitler's dosest per-
sonal confidant and his authority was exceedingly great : In this con-
ncction it is sufficient to quote Hitler's decree appointing Hess as his
Deputy: "I hereby appoint Hess as my deputy and give him füll
power to make decisions in my name on all questions of party leader-
sliip" (Transcript, af ternoon Session, 7 February 1946).
But the authority of Hess was not only confined to questions of
party leadership.
The oflicial NSDAP publication "National Socialist Year Book for
1941," States tliat : "In addition to the duties of party leadership, the
deputy of the Fuehrer has far-reaching powers in the field of the
State. These are first: participation in national and State legisla-
tion, including the preparation of Fuehrer's order. The deputy of
the Fuehrer in this way validates the conception of the party. . . .
Approval of the deputy of the Fuehrer of proposed appointments
for official and labor service leaders. Third, securing the influence
of the party over the self-government of the municipal units" (USA-
255,PS-3163).
Hess was an active supporter of Hitler's aggressive policy. The
crimes against peace committed by him are dealt with in sufficient
detail in the judgment. The mission undertaken by Hess in flying to
England should be considered as the last of these crimes, as it was un-
dertaken in the hope of facilitating the reahzation of aggression
against the Soviet Union by temporarily restraining England from
fighting.
The failure of this mission led to Hess's Isolation and he took no
direct part in the x)lanning and commission of subsequent crimes of the
Hitler regime. Tliere can be no doubt, however, that Hess did every-
thing possible for the preparation of these crimes.
Hess, together with Himmler, occupied the role of creator of the SS
police organizations of German fascism which afterwards committed
the most ruthless crimes against humanity. The defendant clearly
pointed out the "special tasks" which faced the SS f ormations on oc-
cupied territories.
When the Waffen SS was being f ormed, Hess issued a special order
through the party chancellory which made aiding the conscription of
178
> ;
party members into these organizations by all means compulsory for
party organs. He outlined the tasks set before the Waffen SS as
follows :
"The Units of the WafFen-SS composed of National Socialists are
more suitable than other armcd units for the specific tasks to be solvcd
hl the occupied eastern territories due to the intensive training in
regard to questions of race and nationality" (GB-267, 3245-PS).
As early as 1934 the defendant initiated a proposal that the so-called
SD under the Eeiclisfuehrer SS (sccurity service) be given extraor-
dinary powers and thus become the leading foree in Nazi Germany.
On the 9th of June 1934, Hess issued a decree in accordance with
which the ''security service of the Reichsf uehrer SS" was declared to
be the "sole political news and defense service of the Party" (GB-257).
Thus the defendant played a direct part in the creation and consoli-
dation of the System of special police organs which were being pre-
pared for the commission of crimes in occupied territories.
We find Hess to have always becn an advocatc of the man-hating
"master race" thcory. In a speech made on the 16th January 1937
while speaking of the education of the German nation, Hess pointed
out : "Thus, they are being educated to put Germans above the sub-
jects of a foreign nation, regardless of their positions or their origin"
(GB-253,3124-PS). ' .^ „
Hess si^ned the so-called "law for the protection of blood and honor
on 15 September 1935 (3179-PS). The body of this law states that
"the Fuehrer's deputy is authorized to issue all necessary decrees and
directives,'' for the practica! realization of the "Nürnberg decrees.''
On 14 November 1935, Hess issued an ordinance under the Reich
citizenship law in accordance with which tlie Jews were denied the
right to vote at elections or hold public office (GB-258 ; 1417-PS) .
On 20 May 1938, a decree signed by Hess extended tlie Nürnberg
lawstoAustria(GB-259,2124-PS).
On October 12, 1939, Hess signed a decree creatmg the admmistra-
' tion of Polish occupied territories (Eeichsgesetzblatt No. 210, 1939
p. 2077) . Article 2 of this decree gave the defendant Frank the power
ofdictator. ^ i- j
There is sufRciently convincing evidence showing that this de-
fendant did not limit himself to this general directive which intro-
duced into the occupied Polish territories a regime of unbridled terror.
As is shown in the letter of the Keichsminister of Justice to the Chief
of the Reichschancellory dated April 17, 1941, Hess was the Initiator
in the f ormation of special "penal laws" for Poles and Jews in occupied
eastern territories. The role of this defendant in the drawing up of
these "laws" is characterized by the Minister of Justice in the f ollowing
words :
179
"In accordancc with tlie opinion of tlie Fuolirer's deputy I
Started from the point of view that the Pole is less susceptible to
the infliction of ordinary punishment . . . Under these new
kinds of punisliment, prisoners are to be lodged outside prisons in
camps and are to be forced to do heavy and heaviest labor . . .
The introduction of corporal punishment which the deputy of
the Fuehrer has brought up for discussion has not been included
in the draft. I cannot agree to this type of punishment . . .
The procedure for enforcing prosecution has been abrogatcd, for
it seemed intolerable that Poles or Jews should be able to instigate
a pubhc indictment. Poles and Jews have also been deprived of
the right to prosecute in their own names or join the public prose-
cution in an action . . . From the very beghming it was intended
to intensify special treatment in case of need. When this necessity
became actual a supplementary decree was issued to whicli the
Fuehrer's deputy refers to in his letter . . ." (GB-268, R-9C).
Thus, there can be no doubt that Hess together with the other major
war criminals is guilty of crimes against humanity.
Taking into consideration that among political leaders of Hitlerite
Germany Hess was third in significance and played a decisive role in
the crimes of the Nazi regime, I consider the only justified sentence
in his case can be death.
V. INCORRECT JUDGMENT WITH REGÄRD TO THE REICH CABINET
The prosecution has posed before the Tribunal the question of
declaring the Reich Cabinct a criminal Organization. The verdict
rejects the claim of the prosecution, unfoundedly refusing to declare
the Hitler Government a criminal Organization.
With such a decision I cannot agree.
The Tribunal considers it proven that the Hitlerites have comitted
innumcrable and monstrous crimes.
The Tribunal also considers it proven that these crimes werc as a
rule committed intentionally and on an organized scale, according to
previously prepared plans and directives ('Tlan Barbarossa," "Night
and Fog," "Bullet," etc.).
The Tribunal has declared criminal several of the Nazi mass or-
ganizations founded for the realization and putting into practica
the plans of the Hitler Government.
In view of this it appears particularly untenable and rationally in-
correct to refuse to declare the Reich Cabinet, the dirccting organ of
the State with a direct and active role in the working out of the crim-
inal enterprises, a criminal Organization. The members of this di-
recting stafT had great power, each headed an appropriate govern-
ment agency, each participated in preparing and realizing the Nazi
program.
180
In confirmation it is dccmed proper to cite several facts:
(1) Immediately after the Nazi accession to power— on the 24th of
March 19^3— there was a law passed entitled "The Law of Defense
of the People and the State" whereby the Reich Cabinet, besides the
Reichstag, was empowered to enact new laws.
On the 26 of May 1933, the Reich Government issued a decree
ordering the confiscation of the property of all Communist organi-
zations and on the Hth of June, the same year, it also confiscated the
property of the Social Democrat organizations. On the Ist of De-
cember 1933, the Reich Government issued the law "Ensuring Party
and State Unity."
Following through its program of liquidating democratic institu-
tions, in 1934 the Government passed a law of the "Reconstruction of
the Reich" whereby democratic elections were abolished for both
central and local representative bodies. The Reichstag thereby be-
came an institution without functional meaning (Transcript, after-
noon Session, November 22, 1945) .
By the law of 7 April 1933 and others, all Reich Government
employees, including judges, ever not^d for any anti-Nazi tendencies
or ever having belonged to leftist organizations, as well as all Jews,
were to be removed from the Government Service and replaced by
Nazis. In accordance with the "Basic Positions of the German Law
on Government Employees" of the 26th of January 1937, "the inner
harmony of the official and the Nazi party is a necessary presupposition
of his appointment to his post . . . govemment employees must
be the executors of the will of the National Socialist State, directed by
the NSDAP" (Defense Exhibit No. 28). '
On the Ist of May 1934, there was created the Ministry of Education
instructed to train students in the spirit of militarism, of racial
hatred, and in terms of reality thoroughly f alsified by Nazi ideology
(PS-2078). * z. 1 1
Free trade unions were abolished, their property confiscated, and
the majority of the leaders jailed.
To suppress even a semblance of resistance the Government created
the Gestapo and the concentration camps. Without any trial or even
a concrete charge hundreds of thousands of persons were arrested
and then done away with merely on a suspicion of an anti-Nazi
tendency.
There were issued the so-called Nürnberg laws agamst the Jew3.
Hess and Frick, both members of the Reich Government, implemented
these by additional decrees.
It was the activity of the Reich Cabmet that brought on the war
which took millions of human lives and caused inestimable damage
in property and in suffering borne by the many nations.
ti
■i'
/
On the 4th of February 1938, Hitler organized the Secret Council
of Ministers, defining its activity as f ollows : *'To aid me by advice on
Problems of foreign policies I am creating this secret Council" (ßeiclis-
gesetzblatt 1938, part I, p. 112; PS-2031). The foreign policy of
the Hitler Government was the policy of aggression. For this reason
the members of the secret Council should be held responsible for this
policy. There were attempts in court to represent the secret Council
as a fictitious Organization, never actually functioning. This how-
ever, is an inadmissible position. It is sufficient to recall Rosenberg's
letter to Hitler where the former insistently tried to be appointed
member of the secret Council of ministers — to appreciate fuUy the
sii^nificance of the Council.
Even more important practically in conducting aggressive warf are
was the Reich Defense Council headed by Hitler and Goering. The
following were members of the Defense Council, as is well known:
Hess, Frick, Funk, Keitel, Raeder, Lammers (PS-2194; PS-2018).
Goering characterized the function of the defense Council and its
role in war preparations as follows, during the court Session of 23
June 1939 : "The defense Council of the Reich was the deciding Reich
Organ on all questions conceming preparation for war^^ (PS-3787,
USA-782).
At the same time Goering emphasized the f act that "the meetings of
the defense Council always took place for the purpose of making the
most important decisions." From the minutes of these meetings,
submitted as evidence by the prosecution, it is quite clear that the
Council made very important decisions indeed. The minutes also
show that other cabinet ministers sometunes took part in the meetings
of the Defense Council alongside the members of the Council when
war enterprises and war preparedness were discussed.
For example, the following Cabinet Ministers took part in the meet-
ing of 23 June 1939 : Of Labor, of Food and Agriculture, of Finance,
of Communication and a number of others, while the minutes of the
meeting were sent to all the members of the Cabinet (USA-782).
The verdict of the Tribunal justly points out certain peculiarities
of the Hitler Government as the directing organ of the State, namely :
the absence of regulär cabinet meetings, the occasional issuance of
laws by the individual ministers having unusual independence of
action, the tremendous personal power of Hitler himself. These
peculiarities do not refute but on the contrary further confirm the
conclusion that the Hitler Government is not an ordinary rank and
file Cabinet but a criminal Organization.
Certainly Hitler had an unusual measure of personal power but this
in no way f rees of responsibility the members of his cabinet who were
his convinced followers and the actual executors of his program until
and when the day of reckoning arrived.
182
^^*>
■^''«
I consider that there is every reason to declare the Hitler Govern-
ment a criminal Organization.
VI. INCORRECT JUDGMENT WITH REGARD TO THE GENERAL STAFF
AND THE OKW
The verdict incorrectly rejects the accusation of criminal activity
dirccted against the General Staff and the OKW.
The rejection of the accusation of criminal activity of the General
Staff and of the OKW contradicts both the actual Situation and the
evidence submitted in the course of the trial.
It has been established beyond doubt that the Loadership Corps of
the armed forces of Nazi Germany together with the SS-Par(y nia-
chine, represented the most important agency in preparing and rcaliz-
ing the Nazi aggressive and mau-hating program. This was con-
stantly and forcefuUy reiterated by the Hitlerites themselves in their
official bulletins meant for the officcr personnel of the armed forces.
In the Nazi Party Bulletin called "Politics and the oflicer in the III
Reich" it is quite clearly stated that the Nazi regime is founded on
"two pillars : the Party and the Armed Forces. Both are forms of
expression of the same philosophy of life," "the tasks before the party
and the armed forces are in an organic relationship to each other and
each bcars the same responsibility . . . both these agencies depend
oneachother'ssuccessorfailure"(PS-4060,USA-928).
This organic interrelationship between the Nazi Party and the bb
on the one band and the Nazi Armed Forces on the other band, was par-
ticularly evident among the upper circles of military hierarchy which
the indictment groups together ander the concept of crimmal Organ-
ization—that is, among the members of the General Staff and the
The very selection of members of the Supreme Command of the
army in Nazi Germany was based on the criteria of their loyalty to
the regime and their readiness not only to pursue aggressive mil.ta-
ristic policies but also to fulfill such special directives as related to
treatment meted out to prisoners of war and to the civilmn populations
of oceupied territories.
The leaders of the German Armed Forces were not merely officers
who reached certain levels of the military hierarchy. Tliey repre-
sented, first of all, a closely knit group which was entrusted with he
most secret plans of the Nazi leadership. Evidence submitted to the
Tribunal has fuUy confirmed the contention that tho military leaders
of Germany justified this trust completely and that they were the
convinced followers and ardent executors of Hitler's plans.
It is not accidental that at the head of the air force stood the
«sccond man" of the Nazi Eeich, namely Goering; that the com-
183
manclcr in cliicf of Ihe Nr.vy Tvas Doenitz, subsequently designated by
Hitler to be the kitter's successor; that the command of tlie ground
forces was concentrated in the hands of Keitel, wlio signed the major
l^art of the decre<is concerning the execution of the prisoners of war
and of the civilians in occupicd territories.
Thiis the comparisons made with the Organization of the supremo
commands in Allied countries cannot be considered valid. In a demo-
cratic country, not onc self-respecting military oxpert would agree
to prepare plans for mass reprisals and merciless IdlUngs of prisoners
of war side by side with plans of the purely military and Strategie
character.
Meanwhile it is precisely such matters that occupied the Siipreme
Command of the General Staff and the OKW in Nazi Germany. The
commission by them of the heaviest crimes against peace, of the war
crimes, and of the crimes against humanity is not denied but is parti-
cularly emphasized in the verdict of the Tribunal. And yet the
commission of these crimes has not brought the logical conclusion.
Tho verdict states :
"They have been a disgrace to the honorable prof ession of arms.
Withoiit their military guidanco the aggressive ambitions of
Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and
sterile ..."
And subsequently:
"Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath
of obedience to military Orders. AVhen it suits their defense
they say they had to obey; when confronted with Hitler's brutal
crimes, which are shown to have been within their general
Imowledge, they say they disobeyed. The truth is they actively
participated in all these crimes, er sat silent and aequiescent,
witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and more
shockinfT than the world ever had the misfortune to know. This
must be said."
All these assertions in the verdict are correct and are based on
numerous and reliable depositions. It remains only incomprehensible
why *'these hundred or so higher officers" who have caused the world
and their own country so much suffering should not be acknowledged
a criminal Organization.
The verdict advances the following reasons for the decision, reasons
quite contradictory to the f acts :
(a) That the crimes were committed by representatives of the
General Staff and of the OKW as private individuals and not as mem-
bers of a criminal conspiracy.
184
(5) That the General Slaff and the OKW were merely weapons In
the hands of the conspirators and intcrpreters or executors of the
conspirators' will.
Considerable evidence disputes such conclusions.
(1) The leading representatives of the general staff and of the
OKW^ dong xoith a small circle of the higher IlitleHte oßcials^ were
called upon hy the conspirators to participate in the developmejit and
the realization of the plans of aggression^ not as passive functionanes^
hut as active participants in the conspiracy against peace and
humanity,
Without their advice and active Cooperation, Hitler could not have
solved these problems.
In the majority of cases their opinion was decisive. It is impossible
to imagine how the aggressive plans of Ilitler's Germany could have
been realized had it not been for the füll support given him by the
leading staff members of the armed forces.
Least of all did Hitler conceal his criminal plans and motivations
f rom the leaders of the High Command.
For instance, while preparing for the attack on Poland, as early as
29 May 1939, at a Conference with the high military Commanders of
the new Reich Chancellory, he stated :
"For US the matter consists of the expansion of 'Lebensraum' to
the east."
"Thus the question of sparing Poland cannot be considered,
and instead, we have to consider the decision to attack Poland
at the first opportunity" (L-79).
Long bef ore the seizure of Czechoslovakia, in a directive of 30 May
1938, Hitler, addressing the representatives of the High Command,
cynically stated :
"From the military and political point of view, the most f avor-
able time is a lightning attack on the basis of some incident, by
which Germany will have been strongly provoked and which will
morally justify the military measures to at least part of the world
opinion" (PS-388).
Prior to the Invasion of Yugoslavia, in a directive dated 27 March
1941, addressing the representatives of the High Command, Hitler
wrote :
"Even if Yugoslavia declares its loyalty, it must be considered
an enemy and must, thereforo, be smashed as soon as possible"
(PS-me).
While preparing for the Invasion of USSR, Hitler invited the rep-
resentatives of the General Staff and the OICW to help him work out
y85
I 1
tho related plans and direciives not at all as simply the military
expcrts.
In the instriictions to apply Propaganda in the regioa "Barbarossa,''
issued by the OKW in June 1941, it is pointed out that :
"For the timc we should not have propaganda directed at the
dismemberment of the Sovict Union" (USSE-477).
As early as 13 May 1941, OKW ordered the troops to use any terror-
ist measures against the civilian poi)ulations of the temporarily occu-
pied regions of the Soviet Union.
And the sanie order read : "To confirm only such sentences as are
in accordancc with the political intentions of the High Command"
(G-50).
(2) OKW and the General Staff issued the most brutal decrees and
Orders for relentless measures against the unarmed peaceful popula-
tion and the prisoners of war.
In the "decree of special liability to punishment in the region
'Barbarossa' while preparing for the attack upon the Soviet Union,"
the OKW abolished bef orehand the Jurisdiction of the military courts,
granting the right of repressions over the peaceful population to indi-
vidual officers and soldiers.
It is particularly stated there that: "Crimes of hostile civilians are
excluded from the Jurisdiction of the court martials ..." "Sus-
pected elements must be immediately delivered to the officer. The
latter will decide whether they should be shot . . ." "It is absolutely
forbidden to hold suspects for the purpose of bringing them to trial."
There are also provisions for "the most extreme measures, and, in par-
ticular, 'Measures for mass violence,' if circumstances do not permit
the rapid detection of the guilty."
In the same decree of the OKW the guarantee of impunity was
assured in advance to the military criminals from the service persomiel
of the German army. It states there as f ollows : "The bringing of
suits of actions, committed by officials of the army and by the Service
personnel against hostile civilians is not obligatory even in cases where
such actions at the same time constitute military crimes or offences
)j
• • •
In the course of the war the high command consistently foUowed
this policy, increasing its terroristic actions with regard to prisoners of
war and the peaceful populations of occupied countries.
The OKW directive of 16 September 1941 states :
"At the same time, it must be borne in mind that a human life
in the countries in question is f requently held to be of no account
and that a warning example can be made only by measures of
exceptional severity" (PS-389).
Addressing the Commanders of the army groups on 23 July 1941, the
OKW simply briefed them as f ollows: "It is not in tho demand for
186
additional security detachments, but in the application of appropriate
draconic measures that the commanding officei-s must use to keep
Order in the regions under their Jurisdiction" (PS-459).
The OKW directive of 16 December 1941 states:
"The troops . . . have the right and are obliged to apply
, . . any measures whatsoever also against woinen and children
if this contributes to success . . . (USSR-16).
Among the most brutal OKW dircctives concerning the treatment
of prisoners of war one must consider the order entitled "Kugel"
(Bullet). The reasons for resorting to capital punishment for pris-
oners of war were offenses, which according to international Conven-
tions, generally should not carry any punishment; (for example,
escape from the camp).
Another order "Nacht und Nebel" states :
"Penalty for such offenses, consisting of loss of freedom and
even a life scntence is a sign of weakness. Only death sentence
or measures w^hich entail ignorancc of the fate of the guilty
by local population will achieve real effectiveness" (L-90, USA-
224; Transcript, afternoon session 25 January 1946).
In the course of the present trial a great deal of evidence of appli-
cation of the "Kugel'' order has been submitted. One of the examples
of this kind of crime is the minder of 50 ofTicer-pilots. The fact that
this crime was inspired by the High Command cannot be doubted.
OKW also distributed an order for the destruction of the "Com-
mando" units. The original order was submitted to the court (PS-
498, USA-501). According to this order, officers and soldiers of the
"Commando" units had to be shot, except in cases when they were to
be questioned, af ter which they were shot in any case.
This order was unswervingly carried out by the commanding officers
of army units. In June 1944 Kundstedt, the Commander in Chief of
the German troops in the west, reported that Hitler's order in regard
to "the treatment of the commando groups of the enemy is still being
carried out" (PS-531,USA-550).
(3) The High Command, along with the SS and the police, is guilty
of the most brutal police actions in the occupied regions,
The instmetions relating to special regions, issued by OKW on
13 March 1941, contemplated the necessity of synchronizing the activi-
ties in occupied tcrritories betwecn the army command and the Reichs-
fuehrer of the SS. As is seen from the testimony of the chief of the
third department of RSHA and who was concurrently chief of the
Einsatzgruppe "D," Otto Ohlendorf, and of the chief of the VI
department of ESHA, Walter Schellenberg, in accordance with OKW
instructions there was an agreement made between the General Staff
and the KSHA about the Organization of special "operational groups"
187
m
ii
of the security police and SD— "Einsatzgruppen," assigned to the ap-
propriato army dctachmonts.
Crimes connnitted by the Einsatzgruppen on the territory of the
temporarily occupied regions are countless. The Einsatzgruppen were
acting in closc contact with tlie commanding ollicers of the appropriate
army groups.
The following excerpt from the report of Einsatzgruppe "A" is
extremcly charactcristic as evidence:
"... among our functions as the cstablishment of per-
sonal liaison with the commanding officer both at the front and
in the rear. It must be pointed out that the relations with the
army were of the best, in somc cases very close, ahnost hearty, as,
for instance, the Commander of the tank group, Coloncl-Gcneral
Hoppner" (L-180).
(4) The rcpresenfativcs of the high €onimand actcd in all the
echelons of the army as mcmhers of a crimhial group.
The directivos of the OKW and the General Staff, in spite of the
manifest violations of international law and customs of warfare,
not only did not provoke any protest on the part of the higher staff
officers of the command of the various groups of the armies but were
inflexibly applied and supplemented by still more cruel orders in the
devclopment of such directives.
In this conncction it is cluiracteristic to note the directive of Field-
marshal von Ileichenau, army group Commander, addressed to his
soldiers : "The soldicr in the castern territories is not only a warrior
skilled in the art of warfare but a bearcr of merciless national ideol-
ogy." And elsewhere, calling for the extermination of the Jews,
von Reichenau wrote : "Thus the soldier must be in füll cognizance
of the necessity for harsh and just revenge on those subhumans, the
Jews" (USA-556).
As another example the order of Fieldmarshal von Mannstein
addressed to his soldiers can be referred to. On the basis of the
"l^olitical aims of the war" the Fieldmarshal cynically appealed to
his soldiers to wage tlie war in violation of the "recognized laws of
warfare in Europc" (USA-927) .
Thus, in the coursc of the hcaring of evidence it has been proven
bevond all doubt that the General Staff and the High Command of the
Hitlerite army comprised a highly dangerous criminal Organization.
♦ ♦ * * ♦
I consider it my duty as a Judge to draw up my dissenting opinion
concerning those important questions on which I disagree with the
decision adopted by the members of the Tribunal.
Soviel Member IMT, Major General Jurisprudence.
[signcd] I. T. Nikitcuenko.
1 October 1946.
188
n.
THE SENTENCES
In accordance with Article 27 of the Charter, the President of the
Internationa! Military Tribunal, at its concluding Session of 1 October
1946, pronounced sentence on the defendants convicted on the in-
dictment: , ^ n xi •^^;^f
Defendant Hermann Wilhelm Goering, on the counts of the indict-
ment on which you have been convicted, the International Military
Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging.
Defendant Eudolf Hess, on the counts of the indictment on which
you liare been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to impnsonment
• 1*1«
"^Defendant Joachim von Kibbentrop, on the counts of the indict-
ment on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to
"^^tfendant Wifhelm Keitel, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by
^ üTfendant Ernst Kaltenbrunner, on the counts of the indictment
on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
^^DeTenSt Alfred Rosenberg, on the counts of the indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
^^DeTendSt Hans Frank, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by
^ üSendant Wilhelm Frick, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by
^Defendant Julius Streicher, on the count of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by
^'^Mendant Walter Funk, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to imprisonment
^Defendant Karl Doenitz, on the counts of the indictment on whicli
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 10 years
'"üXiIdant Erich Raeder, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to unprisonment
for life
Defendant Baidur von Schirach, on the count of the indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 20 years
imprisonment
189
• ^
■'^l
I
Defendant Fritz Sauckel, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by
hanging.
Defendant Alfred Jodl, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by
haiiging.
Defendant Arthur Seyss-Inquart, on the counts of the indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
by hanging.
Defendant Albert Speer, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 20 years'
imprisonment.
Defendant Konstantin von Neurath, on the counts of the indictment
on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 15
years' imprisonment.
The Tribunal sentences the Defendant Martin Bormann, on the
counts of the indictment on which he has been convicted, to death by
hanging.
o
■'r
i
\
I
*
i
190
#
'#
Defendant Fritz Sauckel, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by
hanging.
Defendant Alfred Jodl, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death by
haiiging.
Defendant Arthur Seyss-Inquart, on the counts of the indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
by hanging.
Defendant Albert Speer, on the counts of the indictment on which
you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 20 years'
imprisonment.
Defendant Konstantin von Neurath, on the counts of the indictment
on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to 15
years' imprisonment.
The Tribunal sentences the Defendant Martin Bormann, on the
counts of the indictment on which he has been convicted, to death by
hanging.
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190
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED GROSS
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SECOND REVISED EDITION
GENEVA
July 1960
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INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED GROSS
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF AUGUST 12, 1949
PRELIMINARY RE MARKS
The International Committee of the Red Gross has,
from the outset, been the Sponsor of the Geneva Conven-
tion for the protection of wounded miUtary personnel,
and of the humanitarian Conventions v^hich Supplement
it. Each of these fundamental international agreements
is inspired by respect for human personahty and dignity ;
together, they estabHsh the principle of disinterested aid
to all victims of war without discrimination — to all those
who, whether through wounds, capture or shipwreck, are
no longer enemies but merely suffering and defenceless
human beings.
Throughout the years, the International Gommittee
has laboured unremittingly for the greater protection in
International Law of the individual against the hardships
of war ; it successively elaborated the humanitarian
Conventions and adapted them to current needs, or
instituted new ones. In the period between the two
World Wars, the Gommittee's main achievement lay in
the establishment of a number of draft Conventions,
Chief among which was the Convention on the Treatment
of Prisoners of War ; this was signed in the summer of
1929 and, during the last conflict, protected millions of
captives. Other new or revised draft Conventions were to
have been submitted to a Diplomatie Conference which
the Swiss Federal Council planned to convene early in
1940 ; hostilities, unfortunately, intervened.
u^
il
I
The year 1945 marked the close of a war waged on an
unprecedented scale ; the task had to be faced of developing
and adapting the humanitarian elements of International
Law in the light of the experience gained. The Inter-
national Committee's proposals met with the early approval
of Governments and National Red Gross Societies, and it
immediately set to work.
Three former Conventions had to be revised : the
Geneva Convention of 1929 for the Relief of the Wounded
and Sick in Armies in the Field, the Xth Hague Convention
of 1907 for the adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the
Principles of the Geneva Convention, and the 1929
Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Further-
more, there was urgent need for a Convention for the
protection of civiUans, the absence of which had, during
the World conflict, led to such grievous consequences.
The International Committee worked on the Hnes it
had followed after the 1914-1918 War. First, it coUected
the füllest possible prehminary information on those
aspects of International Law that required confirmation,
enlargement, or amendment ; then, with the help of
experts from various countries, it prepared the revised
and new drafts which were submitted, first, to an Inter-
^^\^-J^ V national Red Gross Conference, and then to a Diplomatie
v> ^" ' Conference empowered to give these treaties finaLi^alidi^.
The first meeting of experts was held in October 1945
and comprised the neutral members of the Mixed Medical
Commissions which, during the confliict, had visited
wounded or sick prisoners of war, to decide about their
repatriation.
The second meeting was the '' Prehminary Conference
of National Red Gross Societies for the study of the Conven-
tions and of various problems relative to the Red Gross ",
which the International Committee convened at Geneva,
in July and August 1946, and before which the first drafts
were laid.
Having gathered the suggestions of Red Gross agencies
on points which were within their particular fields, the
/
Committee made a close study during the months that
followed, and collected very füll data on all matters
dealt with in the proposed Conventions. Consultations
includedjQiie,inJiIarch 1947, with representatives of the
religious and secular bodies which had collaborated with ^
the Committee in giving spiritual and intellectual aid to _
victims of the War.
■^From April 14 to 26, 1947» the '' Conference of Govern-
ment Experts for the study of Conventions for the Protec-
tion of War Victims " was held in Geneva. This was
attended by seventy representatives of fifteen Govern-
ments which had held large numbers of prisoners and
civilian internees during the War, and were therefore
particularly experienced in the matters under discus-
sion. Combining the Committee's proposals, the
suggestions made by the Red Gross Societies, and drafts
prepared by several Governments, the Conference agreed
to the new texts proposed and to the first draft of a
Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons m
Time of War. .
The International Committee also sought the advice
of several Governments which were not represented at
the April Conference ; some sent experts to Geneva m
June 1947. The drafts in preparation were also submitted
by the Committee to a Special Commission of National
Red Gross Societies, which met at Geneva in September
of the same year. . t^ i.
After careful editing early in the year, the Dratt
Conventions were sent by the Committee, in May 1948,
to all Governments and National Red Gross Societies,
in preparation for the XVIIth International Red Gross
Conference.
This Conference sat in Stockholm from August 20 to
31, 1948; the representatives of fifty Govermnents and
fifty-two National Red Gross Societies were present. With
some amendments, the drafts were adopted.
After passing through the many preparatory stages
briefly described, these texts were eventually taken as the
IL
L^ J'
.
■Hl
MI
■111
sole Working Documents of the Diplomatie Conference
of Geneva ; out of these grew the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The Diplomatie Conference for the Estabhshment of
International Conventions for the Protection of Victims
of War, convened by the Swiss Federal Council, as
trustee of the Geneva Conventions, was held in Geneva
from April 21 to August 12, 1949.
Of the sixty-three Governments represented at the
Conference, fifty-nine had sent plenipotentiaries ; four
sent observers only. Representatives of the International
Committee were invited to participate in the capacity
of experts.
After four months of continuous debate, the Conference
established the following four Conventions, which are
given below :
Geneva Convention for the AmeHoration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, of August 12, 1949.
Geneva Convention for the AmeHoration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, of August 12,
1949.
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, of August 12, 1949.
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of August 12,
1949.
I. —
II. —
III. —
IV.
The Conference at once divided into four Committees ;
the First, for the revision of Conventions I and II ; the
Seeond, for the revision of Convention III (Prisoners
of War) ; the Third, to establish the new Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons ; and lastly.
the Joint Committee, to deal with provisions common to
the four Conventions. Co-ordination and Drafting Com-
mittees met towards the end of the Conference, to harmo-
nize the four texts. When necessary, the Committees
formed Working Parties.
At the elosing meeting, Delegations of the following
States signed the Final Act :
Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Chile, China,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guate-
mala, the Holy See, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Jugoslavia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg,
Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania,
Slam, Soviet Socialist Republie of Bielorussia, Soviet
Socialist Republie of Ukraine, Spain, Sweden, Syria,
Turkey, Union of Soviet SociaUst Republics, United
Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Switzerland.
Seventeen Delegations also signed the four Conventions ;
forty-four other States had signed when the agreed six-
months period expired on Febmary 12, 1950.
Aceording to their provisions, the new Geneva Conven-
tions come into force six months after the deposit of
at least two instruments of ratification. Thereafter, they
come into force for eaeh Contracting Party six months
after it ratifies.
*
PROVISIONS COMMON
TO THE FOUR CONVENTIONS
The Geneva Diplomatie Conference made an innovation
in grouping together and amplifying the common provi-
sions, up to then dispersed and rudimentary. Now practi-
cally identical in the four Conventions, they may be
considered under three headings :
i)
(i) — General Provisions
The General Provisions are given in a dozen Articies
of great importance at the beginning of each Convention
laymg down the mode of application. They deal with
respect for the Conventions and their application in
international conflict, enemy occupation or civil war
They are followed by provisions about the duration of
application. special agreements which Contracting Parties
may conclude. the inalienability of the right of protected
persons, the duties of Protecting Powers or their sub-
iT''^^^ activities of the International Committee
of the Red Gross, and conciliation procedure between
the Contracting Parties.
(2) — Repression of Breaches of the Conventions
(Articies 49 to 52 of the First ConveiUion, 50 to '(■^
of the Second, 129 to 131 of the Third, and 146 to 149 of
the Fourth). ,\ ,0 ^ ^.V\
The Stockholm Conference had expressed the view thtt
the provisions it had approved were still inadequate
and had requested the Internationa] Committee to con-
tmue its study of this important question. After Consulting
lawyers of mternational repute, the Committee prepared
suggestions which appeared in the volume " Remarks
and Proposais , submitted for consideration. The
Conference used these suggestions as a basis for its delibe-
rations. «jcuuc
breaches of the Convention, in particular for '' grave
breaches , as defined in the succeeding Article
tJ^lTTT ^'^^ '^"''^'^''' ^' "^ ^^P^^^^^^ contribution
towa ds defimng <' war^^^^s ^' in International Law.
The term is frequentl?^S^and seen in print, but still
awaits an acceptable legal definition: ^
vi
W
O
(3) — Final Provisions
The Final Provisions appear at the end of each Con-
vention and define the procedure for the Signatare, ratifi-
cation and entry into force of the Conventions, and for
accession to them.
FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION
(WO UND ED AND SICK)
The traditional '' Geneva Convention '\ brought into
being by the newly created International Committee of
the Red Cross in 1864, is the source of the " Geneva
Conventions *' which are now universally accepted. The
original Convention gave the impetus to the Red Cross
movement throughout the world ; it likewise inspired the
impulsion in International Law towards an increasing
regulation— and, eventually, the restriction and final
Prohibition— of war itself. This first international treaty,
the fundamental principles of which have remained
unshaken, was nevertheless marked by omissions and
imperfections, and as early as four years after signature,
a Conference was convened to discuss its revision. On
October 20, 1868, the Conference proposed a number of
additional Articies, providing in particular for the exten-
sion of the Convention to maritime warfare, but they were
never ratified. A recommendation by the First Hague
Conference in 1899 raised the question of revision again.
The 1906 Diplomatie Conference established a revised
text which recast and considerably developed the 1864
text.
After the first World War, it was clear that the Geneva
Conventions needed adapting to the conditions of modern
warfare. During the 1929 Diplomatie Conference at
Geneva, the text was once more revised, although to a
lesser extent than on the first occasion.
.1!
^ I^ I937> after renewed discussion h.r a r
international Experts c^UeTT T / ^^^"^^^^^^n of
the Diplomand; Conf;rni^pia".P\^" °" l'"' ^^^"^^ «^
by the second World War " '^^' ''"' P°^'P°"^^
We have shown how the xq^t dr^it «,00 k
experience of the six mnrn. ! ^^^P^"^ ^^ ^^^
t^r^ >, "^ momentous war vear« ti,« u 1
of the National Red Cro<5^ Q..- * ^ , ^^ '^^^P
historically in thelni . ^'"'^^^^^' «^^osely involved
^ciuy in the apphcation and develonmpnf- r.f +»,
Convention, was particularly valuable ^ '^'
^ *
grea.es. dfvergence arisef frot ,h verv'L" iv"'' ""=
modern warfare «7h,Vh j ^ conditions of
Privileges of Tedila nerT , "T'^'^ *° ^-^"^^^ the
hands. On thTothe iTf '"^ '^^^Prnent in enemy
made „.ore precle ' ''"'^^ ^" ^^^^^^^ ^^^ ^een
dealI^;^rt2w!nnZTnd^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ --- "•
of the armed forces and h"" ^" "^""^ ^°°""S '' "^«"^bers
the Convention Whe"l'T^^ "''"'' *° P^°^^^*-" ""der
and protection onTyfortie' "'"^ l"f ''™^"^^^ ^^P-^
-ew.givesahst^ft^?— -^^^^^^^^^^
8
torture, wilful abandonment and so on. The Information
to be given about wounded captives, and the duties to
the dead have been defined (Art. 16 and 17). A new
Provision (Art. 18) guarantees to the inhabitants and to
Relief Societies the right of assisting the wounded and sick.
Chapter III (Medical Units and Establishments) has
not undergone alteration. except for the introduction of
Article 23 (Creation of Safety Zones and Localities).
Chapter IV (Medical Personnel and Chaplains) has
been greatly modified. Hitherto, such personnel falling
into enemy hands, had to be immediately repatriated.
The 1949 Convention provides that they may, in certain
circumstances, be retained to care for prisoners of war.
Their special status and the conditions for the repatriation
of those not required (Art. 30 to 32) have been carefully
defined (Art. 28), thus filling a serious gap.
Chapter V (Medical Equipment) has been substantially
altered. to take changes regarding personnel into account.
Equipment need no longer be handed back to the belligerent
to whom it belongs.
In Chapter VI similar provision is made for transport
vehicles (Art. 35). It should be noted that medical aircraft
are now authorized, in certain circumstances, to fly over
neutral countries (Art. 37).
Chapter VII (Distinctive Emblem) marks no change
in principle. Nevertheless Article 44, the wording of
which left so much to be desired in the 1929 text, is now
stated in logical and balanced terms. While the " protec-
tive " emblem is subject to strict safeguards, the purely
" indicatory " emblem may be widely used by Red Cross
Societies.
Chapter VIII (Application of the Convention) calls
for no comment.
Reference has already been made to Chapter IX (Repres-
sion of Abuses and Infractions), and to the Final Provisions.
Article 53, which is peculiar to the First Convention.
is intended to prevent abuse of the distinctive emblem.
SECOND GEN EVA CONVENTION
(MARITIME)
The 1868 Diplomatie Conference, at Geneva, formulated
the first provisions for the adaptation to maritime warfare
of the principles of the Geneva Convention. This draft
was not ratified, but later became the Hague Convention
of 1899, and afterwards the Xth Hague Convention of
1907, which was ratified by forty-seven States and still
remains in force.
Nevertheless, evolution in the methods of warfare
and the fact that the First Geneva Convention was revised
in 1929, made a recasting of the Xth Hague Convention
essential. After preUminary study, the International
Committee, with the help of a Conference of Naval Experts,
drafted in 1937 a Revised Convention, which was placed
on the agenda of the Diplomatie Conference seheduled
for 1940.
This draft, extended after 1945 in the light of war
experienee, was used as a basis by the Diplomatie Confe-
rence in 1949.
The Maritime Convention, as it is called, is an extension
of the First Convention (Wounded and Sick), the terms
of which it applies to maritime warfare ; it is therefore
natural that it should be included among the Geneva
Conventions, out of which it originally developed.
As the general plan of this Second Geneva Convention
Covers the same field and protects the same categories of
persons as the First, no comment is necessary on its basic
principles. It contains, however, no less than sixty-three
Articles, whereas the 1907 version had only twenty-eight.
This is because the 1949 text (similar to the 1937 draft)
adapts the provision of the Land Convention and elosely
follows them. It has thus become a complete and inde-
pendent Convention, whereas the 1907 Hague text was
chiefly coneerned to adapt humanitarian provisions to
naval warfare.
Following the General Provisions common to the four
Conventions, Chapter II protects the shipwreeked in
addition to the wounded and sick.
Members of the Merchant Navy are proteeted under
the terms of Article 13, insofar as they are not entitled
to more favourable treatment under other provisions in
International Law. The qualifieation, new in treaty law,
is in conformity with ordinary practice.
Chapter III, obviously applicable only to maritime
warfare, deals with Hospital Ships and other relief craft.
Chapter IV. At sea, medical personnel, on aeeount of
conditions prevailing, are given wider protection than on
land. In particular, the medical personnel and crew, vital
to the hospital ships as such, may not be captured or
retained. The personnel of other ships, while they may
in some cases be retained, must be put ashore as soon as
possible and will then come under the First Convention.
Chapter V (Medical Transports) has its parallel in the
First Convention, but the Maritime Convention makes no
special provision for the equipment, which is, in a sense,
part and parcel of the vessel itself.
There were no fighting aircraft in 1907. Hence the
addition, in Chapter VI (Distinctive Emblem), of provisions
' for the more efiicient marking of hospital ships, as a safe-
guard against air attack.
Chapters VII (Execution of the Convention) and VIII
(Repression of Abuses and Infractions), as well as the
Final Provisions, call for no special comment.
THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION
(PRISONERS OF WAR)
The Third Convention contains one hundred and
forty-three Articles, besides the Annexes. The corres-
ponding 1929 Convention had ninety-seven Articles, and
IG
II
ili
K
the Chapter on prisoners of war in the Hague Convention,
only seventeen. This extension is no doubt due, in part,
to the fact that, in modern warfare, prisoners are held
in very large numbers, but it also interprets the desire of
the 1949 Conference, representing all nations, to submit
all aspects of captivity to humane regulation by Inter-
national Law.
The aspiration is not new. The nineteenth Century saw
new concepts of natural law and a new humanitarian
movement — in particular theideas of Henry Dunant, who
applied himself to the prisoner of war problem after the
wounded and sick had been provided for. The civilized
World finally accepted the principle that the prisoner
of war is not a criminal, but merely an enemy no longer
able to bear arms, who should be Uberated at the close
of hostilities, and be respected and humanely treated while
in captivity. Far-seeing and broad-minded legal and
diplomatic action has since translated concept into
practice, through a series of codifications accepted as
binding by States, and successively extended or amplified
when experience showed them to be inadequate. The
Brüssels Draft of 1874, the Hague Conventions of 1899 an
1907, the special agreements made between belligerents
in Berne in 1917 and 1918, and the Geneva Conventions
of 1929, which devote all or part of their clauses to prisoners
of war, represent the principal stages of this evolution.
Wherever it was applied, the 1929 Prisoners of War
Convention effectively helped to protect the milUons of
men who relied upon it during the last conflict. Never-
theless, it was quite evident, both to those who benefited
and to those by whom it was appUed, that the Convention
required revision on many points ; there have been changes
in the methods and the consequences of war, and even in
the living conditions of peoples. It was necessary to
broaden the categories of persons entitled to prisoner of
war Status, so that such status is in fact granted to members
of forces which capitulate, and that prisoners may not be
arbitrarily deprived of it, at any time. A more precise
12
definition of the conditions of captivity was also required
which would take into account the importance assumed
by prisoner of war labour, the relief they receive, and the
judicial proceedings instituted against them. The principle
of the immediate liberation of prisoners on the close of
hostihties had to be reaffirmed. Finally, it was essential
that the agencies appointed to look after prisoners'
interests and ensure that regulations concerning them are
applied in füll, should be as independent as possible of
the political relations existing between the belligerents.
These were the most urgent only of the problems that the
War revealed.
Thus, before hostihties had ceased, and concurrently
with the even more urgent task of preparing a CiviUan
Convention, the International Committee began to work
upon the revision of the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention.
As already pointed out, the 1949 Convention is far
longer than the agreement it replaces. But, whilst many
of its provisions represent a logical development of the
1929 Convention, experience has shown that the daily lives
of prisoners may depend of the Interpretation given to a
general rule. An attempt has therefore been made to give
certain regulations an explicit form, precluding the mis-
interpretation to which they were formerly open. More-
over, principles which it was feit would have greater force
for being tersely worded— e.g. Article 2 of the 1929 text—
had been so seriously violated that the Conference has
recast them in terms comprehensive and clear enough to
make any future infringement immediately apparent.
Another group of provisions is designed to provide a
satisfactory Solution for the numerous problems outhned
above. This task was more diflficult. In many instances,
the Conference had to devise entirely new regulations—
as in the Section dealing with the financial resources of
prisoners of war— or deliberately to break with certain
13
the Chapter on prisoners of war in the Hague Convention,
only seventeen. This extension is no doubt due, in part,
to the fact that, in modern warfare, prisoners are held
in very large numbers, but it also interprets the desire of
the 1949 Conference, representing all nations, to submit
all aspects of captivity to humane regulation by Inter-
national Law.
The aspiration is not new. The nineteenth Century saw
new concepts of natural law and a new humanitarian
movement — in particular the ideas of Henry Dunant, who
applied himself to the prisoner of war problem after the
wounded and sick had been provided for. The civilized
World finally accepted the principle that the prisoner
of war is not a criminal, but merely an enemy no longer
able to bear arms, who should be liberated at the close
of hostilities, and be respected and humanely treated while
in captivity. Far-seeing and broad-minded legal and
diplomatic action has since translated concept into
practice, through a series of codifications accepted as
binding by States, and successively extended or amplified
when experience showed them to be inadequate. The
Brüssels Draft of 1874, the Hague Conventions of 1899 an
1907, the special agreements made between belligerents
in Berne in 1917 and 1918, and the Geneva Conventions
of 1929, which devote all or part of their clauses to prisoners
of war, represent the principal stages of this evolution.
Wherever it was applied, the 1929 Prisoners of War
Convention effectively helped to protect the miUions of
men who relied upon it during the last conflict. Never-
theless, it was quite evident, both to those who benefited
and to those by whom it was appHed, that the Convention
required revision on many points ; there have been changes
in the methods and the consequences of war, and even in
the living conditions of peoples. It was necessary to
broaden the categories of persons entitled to prisoner of
war Status, so that such status is in fact granted to members
of forces which capitulate, and that prisoners may not be
arbitrarily deprived of it, at any time. A more precise
12
definition of the conditions of captivity was also required
which would take into account the importance assumed
by prisoner of war labour, the relief they receive, and the
judicial proceedings instituted against them. The principle
of the immediate liberation of prisoners on the close of
hostilities had to be reaffirmed. Finally, it was essential
that the agencies appointed to look after prisoners'
interests and ensure that regulations concerning them are
applied in füll, should be as independent as possible of
the poHtical relations existing between the beUigerents.
These were the most urgent only of the problems that the
War revealed.
Thus, before hostiUties had ceased, and concurrently
with the even more urgent task of preparing a CiviUan
Convention, the International Committee began to work
upon the revision of the 1929 Prisoners of War Convention.
As already pointed out, the 1949 Convention is far
longer than the agreement it replaces. But, whilst many
of its provisions represent a logical development of the
1929 Convention, experience has shown that the daily lives
of prisoners may depend of the Interpretation given to a
general rule. An attempt has therefore been made to give
certain regulations an explicit form, precluding the mis-
interpretation to which they were formerly open. More-
over, principles which it was feit would have greater force
for being tersely worded— e.g. Article 2 of the 1929 text—
had been so seriously violated that the Conference has
recast them in terms comprehensive and clear enough to
make any future infringement immediately apparent.
Another group of provisions is designed to provide a
satisfactory Solution for the numerous problems outlined
above. This task was more diffiicult. In many instances,
the Conference had to devise entirely new regulations—
as in the Section dealing with the financial resources of
prisoners of war— or deliberately to break with certain
13
rules which, in 1929, had been transferred more or less
bodily from the Hague Regulations. One instance is the
tule concerning the liberation of prisoners at the close of
hostiHties.
Some of the details may seem superfluous ; repetition
and lack of harmony between certain provisions may also
cause surprise. It should, however, be remembered that,
whilst throughout concerned with the Convention as an
instrument in International Law, the Conference had
constantly in mind a special use to which it was to be put—
regulations to be posted in prisoner of war camps and com-
prehensible not only to the authorities, but to the ordinary
reader. Furthermore, the Conference did not hesitate to
sacrifice neatness in the interests of unanimous agreement.
These are reasons, which with the difficulty of estabUshing
official legal texts simultaneously in two languages, may
account for, and even justify, most of the textual imper-
fections to be found in the Prisoners of War Convention.
The Table which appears at the end of the volume and
the marginal notes to each Article make it easy to grasp
the general plan, which is, as far as possible, similar
to that of the 1929 Convention. The general outline is as
follows :
Amongst the General Provisions (Art. i to 11), which
have already been dealt with, Article 4, defining the
categories of persons entitled to prisoner of war treatment,
is a vital dement of the Convention.
Part II (General Protection of Prisoners of War, Art. 12
to 16) contains the essen tial principles which shall, at all
times and in all places, govern the treatment of prisoners.
Part. III (Art, 17 to 108) deals with the conditions of
captivity and is divided into six Sections. The first, (Art.
17 to 20) Covers events immediately after capture and deals
with such matters as interrogation of prisoners, disposal of
their personal effects, and their evacuation. The second,
comprising eight Chapters (Art. 21 to 48), regulates living
conditions for prisoners in camp or during transfer, and
deals with the places and methods of internment, accom-
14
modation, food and clothing, hygiene and medical attention,
medical and religious personnel retained for the care of
prisoners (a new Chapter, which partly reproduces the
provisions of the First Convention), religious needs,
intellectual and physical activities, discipline, prisoner of
war ranks, and transfer after arrival in a camp. Prisoners'
labour is dealt with in the third Section (Art. 49 to 57) ; the
fourth Section (Art. 58 to 68) is new and concerns the
financial resources of prisoners. The fifth Section (Art. 69
to 77) Covers everything concerned with correspondence and
relief shipments. The sixth and last Section (Art. 78 to 108) ,
which is in three Chapters, Covers the relations between
prisoners of war and the detaining authorities, complaints
regarding captivity, prisoners' representatives, and penal
and disciplinary sanctions. This last Chapter (Art. 82 to
108) constitutes in itself a brief code of penal and dis-
ciplinary procedure.
The various measures for the termination of captivity
are contained in Part IV (Art. 109 to 121), which is divided
into three Sections. The first (Art. 109 to 117) refers to
repatriation and accommodation of prisoners in neutral
countries during hostilities, the second (Art. 118 and 119)
to repatriation at the close of hostiHties, and the third
(Art. 120 and 121) to the death of prisoners of war.
Part. V (Art. 122 to 125) contains provisions about
Prisoners of War Information Bureaux and all organiza-
tions formed to assist prisoners.
Part. VI (Execution of the Convention, Art. 126 to 143)
contains, in the first Section (Art. 126 to 132), a variety of
most important stipulations requiring belligerents, inter
alia, to give neutral organizations free access to prisoner
of war camps for nspection purposes, and to disseminate
the text of the Convention as widely as possible. Articles
129 to 131 further contain the provisions common to the
four Conventions for the repression of breaches.
Five Annexes are closely connected with the Convention.
Annex I (Model Agreement concerning Direct Repatriation
and Accommodation in Neutral Countries of Wounded and
15
Sick Prisoners of War). Annex III (Regulations concerning
Collect! ve Relief), and Annex V (Model Regulations con-
cernmg Payments sent by Prisoners to their own country)
are mtended to Substitute in the absence of specific
agreement on these questions betvveen the belligerents
concerned. Annex II (Regulations concerning Mixed
Medical Commissions) is prescriptive. Annex IV proposes
Standard model documents, such as identity or capture
Cards, correspondence cards, death notifications etc.
FOURTH GEN EVA CONVENTION
(CIVILIANS)
The Fourth Convention forms an important contribu-
tion to written International Law in the humanitarian
domain.
Strictly speaking, this Convention introduces nothing
new in a field where the doctrine is sufficiently well estab-
hshed. It adds no specifically new ideas to International
Law on the subject, but aims at ensuring that, even in the
midst of hostilities, the dignity of the human person
universally acknowledged in principle, shall be respected!
The original humanitarian legislation represented by
the First Geneva Convention of 1864 provided only for
combatants, as at that time it was considered evident that
civihans would remain outside hostilities.
The Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of
1907, made no provision for civilians (apart from spies),
except where there was occupation of territory byenemy
armed forces. They merely set forth a small number of
elementary rules, in pursuance of the principle that the
occupant shall " take all the measures in his power to
restore, and as far as possible ensure public order and safety
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country - (Art. 43). Thus : - Family honour
and rights, the hves of persons and private property, as
16
well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected " (Art. 46) ; " Pillage is formally forbidden "
(Art. 47) ; " No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise,
shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the
acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as
jointly and severally responsible '' (Art. 50). Such were the
main and essential provisions, tersely expressed, governing
the occupation of territory.
The development of arms and the increased radius of
action given to armed forces by modern inventions have
made it apparent that, notwithstanding the ruling theory,
civihans were certainly " in the war ", and exposed to the
same dangers as the combatants— and sometimes worse.
The Xth International Red Cross Conference (1921)—
the first after the World War— set forth certain general
principles, on the proposal of the International Committee,
in regard to deported, evacuated or refugee civiHans , these
prohibited deportation en masse, or without preliminary
trial, and the taking of hostages ; they enjoined liberty of
movement, and the right to correspond and to receive
relief. In 1923, the Xlth International Conference called
for a Convention to Supplement the Hague Regulations.
The Xllth Conference devised regulations for the pro-
tection of civilians on the territory of an enemy State ;
these recognised the right to leave the territory, unless the
• safety of the State was involved, and provided for speedier
enquiries, Mixed Medical Commissions for the examination
of men unfit for service, transmission to the International
Committee of list', 01 retained civilians, the grant to
civiHans of the sam.e Privileges as to prisoners of war, inspec-
tion of places cf internment, and agreements between
belligerents for ^:he benefit of civilians.
The 1929 Diplomatie Conference, which revised the
First Convention and drew up the Convention for the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, unanimously recommended
that '' careful study should be made with a view to the
conclusion of an international Convention on the con-
ditions and protection of civiHans of enemy nationality in
17
the territory of a belligerent, or in belligerent-occupied
territory ".
The International Committee whole-heartedly entered
into the task thus defined, setting up a Legal Commission
which prepared a draft Convention in forty Articles. This
draft, generally known as the " Tokyo Draft ", was
approved by the XVth International Red Gross Conference
(Tokyo, 1934). It was intended for Submission to the Dipl-
omatie Conference planned for 1940, but postponed on
account of the War. The International Committee was,
at best, able to obtain an undertaking from the belligerent
States that the essential provisions of the Prisoners of War
Convention would be extended to interned civilians who
were in enemy territory at the outbreak of hostilities — as
was in fact prescribed in the Tokyo Draft.
The events which foUowed were to show the disastrous
consequences of the failure to provide — in addition to the
few principles embodied in the Hague Regulations — an
international Convention for the protection of civilians
in wartime, particularly of those in occupied territories ;
this tragic period was one of deportations, mass extermina-
tion, taking and killing of hostages, and pillage.
Immediately hostilities ceased, therefore, the Inter-
national Committee, in keeping with its humanitarian duty,
informed all Governments and Red Gross Societies of its
intention to resume its efforts to set up an international
Convention for the protection of civilians. This Statement
met with universal approval.
The Geneva Diplomatie Conference was not called to
revise the Fourth Hague Convention. The Civilian Con-
vention of August 12, 1949, therefore in no way invalidates
the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land ; it is not a Substitute for that agreement, which
remains in force. As happily expressed by the Conference,
the Convention " shall be supplementary to Sections II
18
and III " of the said Regulations. (See Fourth Convention,
Art. 154.)
The new Convention contains one hundred and fifty-
nine Articles and two Annexes. According to the text of a
draft Preamble submitted by the French and Finnish
Delegations— but not adopted, as the Conference decided
to follow the precedent of the other Geneva Conventions,
which contain no Preamble— it is inspired by '' the eternal
principles of that Law which is the foundation and the saf e-
guard of civilization ", and is designed to '' ensure the
respect of human personality and dignity by puttmg
beyond reach of attack those rights and liberties which are
the essence of its existance '\
It prohibits in particular :
(a) — Violence to life and person, in particular torture,
mutilations or cruel treatment.
(h) — The taking of hostages.
(c) — Deportations.
(d) — Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating or degrading treatment, or adverse
treatment founded on differences of race, colour,
nationality, religion, beliefs, sex, birth or social
Status.
(e) — The passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced
by a regulariy constituted court affording all the
judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.
In the present edition, a Table is appended showing the
division into Parts, Sections and Chapters, and reproducmg
the marginal notes to each Article. Reference to this Table
will afford a complete outUne of the subjects dealt with,
and the position they occupy in the Convention.
19
Amongst the General Provisions, Articie 4 gives the
following definition of the persons who will have the benefit
of the Convention :
" Persons protected by the Convention are those
who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever,
find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of
which they are not nationals.
" Nationals of a State which is not bound by the
Convention are not protected by it.
" Nationals of a neutral State who find themselves in
the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals of a
co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected
persons while the State of which they are nationals has
normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose
hands they are/'
The last two clauses were added by the Conference to the
draft, which was found too narrow on this particular point.
Part II (Art. 13 to 26) concerns the general protection
of populations against certain consequences of war. It goes
beyond the limits set up by Articie 4, and Covers the popul-
ation as a whole, i.e. not only "protected persons", but
also those who cannot avail themselves of this protection
and, in particular, those who are nationals of the Party to the
conflict, or of the Occupying Power by whom they are held.
There is thus provision for hospital and safety zones and
localities, and neutralized zones (Art. 14 and 15), for the
protection of civilian hospitals (Art. 18), for measures in
behalf of children (Art. 24), and for the exchange of family
news (Art. 25). In all cases these measures are quite general
in scope, giving neither the grounds, nor indeed any
practical opportunity, for discrimination.
Part III (Art. 27 to 141) defines the Status and treat-
ment of protected persons, and the manner of the applica-
tion of the Convention.
Following the precedent of the Tokyo Draft, it dis-
tinguishes between foreign nationals on the territory of a
.
Party to the conflict, and the population of occupied
territories.
It is divided into five Sections.
Section I contains provisions common to the above two
categories of persons, deahng with the responsabilities of
the State and of its agents (Art. 29), application to Pro-
tecting Powers and relief organizations (Art. 30), prohibi-
tion of corporal punishments (Art. 32), of collective pen-
alties, terrorism, pillage and reprisals (Art. 33), and of the
taking of hostages (Art. 34).
Section II relates to aliens in the territory of a Party to
the conflict, and deals with the right to leave the territory
(Art. 35), protection in case of inteinment (Art. 41), and
refugees (Art. 44).
Section III contains the prescriptions for occupied
territories, on such subjects as inviolability of rights (Art.
47), deportations, transfers and evacuations (Art. 49),
children (Art. 50), labour (Art. 51), food (Art. 55), hygiene
and public health (Art. 56), spiritual assistance (Art. 58),
relief (Art. 59 to 63), penal legislation (Art. 64 to 75), and
treatment of detainees (Art. 76).
Section IV deals with internment. It is divided into
twelve Chapters, the contents of which are in general
analogous to the provisions adopted for prisoners of war.
.(Chapter I— General Provisions; Chapter II— Places of
internment ; Chapter III— Food and clothing ; Chapter IV
—Hygiene and medical attention ; Chapter V— ReHgious,
intellectual and physical activities ; Chapter VI— Personal
property and financial resources ; Chapter VII— Adminis-
tration and discipline ; Chapter VIII— Relations with the
exterior ; Chapter IX— Penal and disciplinary sanctions ;
Chapter X— Transfers of internees ; Chapter XI— Deaths ;
Chapter XII— Release, repatriation and accommodation
in neutral countries).
Section V is devoted to Information Bureaux and the
Central Agency, the functioning of which is to follow that
of the Central Prisoners of War Agency.
20
21
Part IV (Art. 142 to 159) concerns the execution of the
Convention. Section I (General Provisions) contains,
amongst others, the provision on the repression of breaches
of the Convention, already mentioned.
Finally, the 1949 Diplomatie Conference passed eleven
Resolutions which refer to the Geneva Conventions, but
do not form part of them ; they will also be found in the
present edition.
22
GENEVA CONVENTION FOR
THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION
OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARM ED
FORCES IN THE FIELD OF AUGUST 12, 1949
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments
represented at the Diplomatie Conference held at Geneva from
April 21 to August 12, 1949» for the purpose of revismg the
Geneva Convention for the Relief of the Wounded and Sick
in Armies in the Field of July 27, 1929, have agreed at follows :
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE I .
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.
Respect for
the Convention
, . ARTICLE 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented
in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases
of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the State of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party
to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto
shaU remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the
said Power, if the latter accepts and appHes the provisions
thereof.
23
Application
of the
Convention
Conflicts not
of an
international
character
Application by
neutral Powers
li
ARTICLE 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurnng in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum;
tiie foUowing provisions :
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without anv
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion er
taith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
10 this end, the following acts are and shall remain-
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons :
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture ;
(b) taking of hostages ;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humihating and degrading treatment ;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out oi
executions without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court,
affordmg all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Cornmittee of the Red Gross, may offer its Services to the Parties
to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to
bring in o force, by means of special agreements, all or part
ot the other provisions of the present Convention
fi..T f^f^!''^^'? ?^ ^^^ preceding provisions shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 4
th.ü^"*''^V^°'^^''!-'^^" apply by analogy the provisions of
the present Convention to the wounded and sick, and to members
of the medical personnel and to chaplains of the armed forces
of the Parties to the conflict, received or interned in their terri-
tory, as well as to dead persons found.
24
ARTICLE 5
For the protected persons who have fallen into the hands
of the enemy, the present Convention shall apply until their
final repatriation.
ARTICLE 6
In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in
Articles lo, 15. 23, 28, 31, 36, 37 and 52, the High Contracting
Parties may conclude other special agreements for aU matters
concerning which they may deem it suitable to make separate
Provision. No special agreement shall adversely affect the
Situation of the wounded and sick, of members of the medical
personnel or of chaplains, as defined by the present Convention,
nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
Wounded and sick, as well as medical personnel and chaplains.
shaU continue to have the benefit of such agreements as long
as the Convention is applicable to them, except where express
provisions to the contrary are contained in the aforesaid or
in subsequent agreements, or where more favourable measures
have been taken with regard to them by one or other of the
Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 7
Wounded and sick, as well as members of the medical personnel
and chaplains, may in no circumstances renounce in part or
in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention,
and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing
Article, if such there be.
, . ARTICLE 8
The present Convention shall be applied with the Cooperation
and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty
it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict
For this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart
from their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst
their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers.
The Said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power
with which they are to carry out their duties.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest
extent possible, the task of the representatives or delegates of
the Protecting Powers. ^ , ^- r>
The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers
shall not in any case exceed their mission under the present
Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the
Duration of
application
Special
agreements
Non-
renunciation
of rights
Protecting
Powers
25
Activities
of the
International
Committee of
the Red Gross
Substitutes
for Protecting
Powers
c7rro,irtw'T r'' °i,«^^""ty of the State wherein they
carry out their duties. Their activities shall only be restricted
n:c:L:rv"Ev?rn'n:r"t-''"PTr "^^^"^^ "'^^ tliis !s re'iSed
necessary by imperative military necessities.
ARTICLE 9
ohsIXnlfT ''^■!^' P"""''"* Convention constitute no
Srim tt e om^lT^,'^'^"^" ^'''''''''' ^^'^»^ '^' International
committee of the Red Gross or any other impartial humanitarian
Organization may. subject to the consent of the ParUes to he
conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of woLnded
and sick, medical personnel and chaplains, and for theTr relTef
ARTICLE 10
The High Contracting Parties may at any time aeree to entru<;t
to an Organization which offers all guarantees offmpaJtia^^S
and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protect^rPowers
by virtue of the present Convention "^oiecung Towers
When wounded and sick, or medicaJ personnel and chaDlain.
do not benefit or cease to benefit, no matter for what reio"
by the activities of a Protecting Power or of an ^rganizS
provided for in the first paragraph above, the De^aS W
ake t^ fun^t^o "'"' '^^'' 7 ^"'^^ ^" Organization to under-
ht ! ^'^«/""ctions performed under the present Convention
by a Pro ec ing Power designated by the Parties to a conti et
Pow r^s'hä ;ea"ue:r°* \' T""^^^ -cordingly, the Deta"S ng
of this Irü de ?hfnff '. S "'"'?*' '"'^J^'^* ^° '^^ Provision!
Ol tnis Article, the offer of the Services of a humanitarian or^ran
iza lon, such as the International Committee of "^5?^"
to assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protect^;
Powers under the present Convention ^ iTotecting
Any neutral Power, or any Organization invited bv thf^
Power concerned or offering itself for these purpo es shall b^
tXlonrcfon IV T" °' -P--bility fowEhe Party'
to the conflict on which persons protected by the present Ton
aru':nce'sThTt''itis"in^''" "l' '"''''''' ^o'iurlSr:!^^
assurances ttiat it is in a position to undertake the annronriat^
func lons and to discharge them impartiallv ^PP'^opnate
No derogation from the preceding provisions shall be made
evVn'relSr ■? ff 7^/-- o'ne of which is reSriTted
Power r^ffir^V ^' ^'^^^'"^ *° negotiate with the other
wW tL whnlf ^ ""^"T "^ ""'^''^'y ^^^"*^- '"o^^ Particularly
s^S'potrttupier '^^^""^^ ''''' °^ ''' '^"^'^^y «^ '^^
26
Whenever in the present Convention mention is made of
a Protecting Power, such mention also applies to Substitute
organizations in the sense of the present Article.
ARTICLE II
In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of
protected persons, particularly in cases of disagreement between
the Parties to the conflict as to the application or interpretation
of the provisions of the present Convention, the Protecting
Powers shall lend their good ofhces with a view to settUng the
disasreement .
For this purpose, each of the Protecting Powers may, either
at the invitation of one Party or on its own initiative, propose
to the Parties to the conflict a meeting of their representatives,
in particular of the authorities responsible for the wounded
and sick members of medical personnel and chaplains, possibly
on neutral territory suitably chosen. The Parties to the conflict
shaU be bound to give effect to the proposals made to them for
this purpose. The Protecting Powers may, if necessary, propose
for approval by the Parties to the conflict a person belongmg
to a neutral Power or delegated by the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, who shall be invited to take part in
such a meeting.
CHAPTER II
WOUNDED AND SICK
ARTICLE 12
" Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned
in the f oUowing Article, who are wounded or sick, shall be respected
and protected in all circumstances.
They shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Party
to the conflict in whose power they may be, without any adverse
distinction founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political
opinions, or any other similar criteria. Any attempts upon
their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be strictly pro-
hibited ; in particular, they shall not be murdered or exter-
minated, subjected to torture or to biological experiments ;
they shall not wilfully be left without medical assistance and
care, nor shall conditions exposing them to contagion or infection
he crpated
Only urgent medical reasons will authorise priority in the
Order of treatment to be administered.
27
Conciliation
procedure
Protection
and care
H
Protected
persons
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their
sex.
The Party to the conflict which is compelled to abandon
wounded or sick to the enemy shall, as far as military consider-
ations permit, leave with them a part of its medical personnel
and material to assist in their care.
ARTiCLE 13
The present Convention shall apply to the wounded and sick
belonging to the foUowing categories :
(i) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming
part of such armed forces ;
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
Corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in
or outside their own territory, even if this territory is
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer
Corps, including such organized resistance movements,
fulfil the following conditions :
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates ;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recogniz-
able at a distance ;
(c) that of carrying arms openly ;
(d) that of conducting their Operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regulär armed forces who profess allegiance
to a Government or an authority not recognized by the
Detaining Power ;
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without
actually being members thereof, such as civil members
of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply
contractors, members of labour units or of Services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided
that they have received authorization from the armed
forces which they accompany ;
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and appren-
tices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil
aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit
by more favourable treatment under any other provi-
sions in international law ;
28
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who on the
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to
resist the invading forces, without having had time to
form themselves into regulär armed units, provided
they carry arms openly and respect the laws ^d customs
of war.
ARTICLE 14
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the wounded and
sick of a belligerent who fall into enemy hands shall be
prisoners of war, and the provisions of international law con-
cerning prisoners of war shall apply to them.
ARTICLE 15
At all times, and particularly after an engagement, Parties
to the conflict shall, without delay, take all possible measures to
search for and collect the wounded and sick, to protect them
against pillage and iU-treatment, to ensure their adequate care,
and to search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.
Whenever circumstances permit, an armist ice or a Suspension
of fire shall be arranged, or local arrangements made, to permit
the removal, exchange and transport of the wounded left on
the battlefield. , , ^ . .
Likewise, local arrangements may be concluded between
Parties to the conflict for the removal or exchange of wounded
and sick from a besieged or encircled area, and for the passage
of medical and religious personnel and equipment on their way
to that area.
, ARTICLE 16
Parties to the conflict shaU record as soon as possible, in
respect of each wounded, sick or dead person of the adverse
Party falling into their hands, any particulars which may
assist in his Identification.
These records should if possible include :
(a) designation of the Power on which he depends ;
(b) army, regimental, personal or serial number ;
(c) surname ;
(d) first name or names ;
(e) date of birth ;
(f) any other particulars shown on his identity card or disc ;
(g) date and place of capture or death ;
29
Status
Search for
casualties.
Evacuation
Recording arid
forwarding of
information
(h) particiilars concerning wounds or illness, or cause of
death.
Mi
As soon as possible the above mentioned information shall
be forwarded to the Information Bureau described in Article 122
of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War of August 12, 1949, which shall transmit this inform-
ation to the Power on which these persons depend through
the intermediary of the Protecting Power and of the Central
Prisoners of War Agency.
Parties to the conflict shall prepare and forward to each
other through the same bureau, certificates of death or duly
authenticated lists of the dead. They shall likewise collect and
forward through the same bureau one half of a double identity.
disc, last wills or other documents of importance to the next
of kin, money and in general all articles of an intrinsic or sen-
timental value, which are found on the dead. These articles,
together with unidentified articles, shall be sent in sealed packets,
accompanied by Statements giving all particulars necessary
for the identification of the deceased owners, as w^ell as by a
complete list of the contents of the parcel.
Prescriptions
regarding the
dead.
Graves
Registration
Service
ARTICLE 17
Parties to the conflict shall ensure that burial or cremation
of the dead, carried out individually as far as circumstances
permit, is preceded by a careful examination, if possible
by a medical examination, of the bodies, with a view to con-
firming death, establishing identity and enabling a report to
be made. One half of the double identity disc, or the identity
disc itself if it is a Single disc, should remain on the body.
Bodies shall not be cremated except for imperative reasons
of hygiene or for motives based on the religion of the deceased.
In case of cremation, the circumstances and reasons for crem-
ation shall be stated in detail in the death certificate or on the
authenticated hst of the dead.
They shall further ensure that the dead are honourably
interred, if possible according to the rites of the religion to which
they belonged, that their graves are respected, grouped if
possible according to the nationality of the deceased, properly
maintained and marked so that they may always be found.
For this purpose, they shall organise at the commencement of
hostilities an Official Graves Registration Service, to allow
subsequent exhumations and to ensure the identification of
bodies, whatever the site of the graves, and the possible trans-
portation to the home country. These provisions shall likewise
30
apply to the ashes, which shall be kept by the Graves Registration
Service until proper disposal thereof in accordance with the
wishes of the home country.
As soon as circumstances permit, and at latest at the end
of hostilities, these Services shall exchange. through the Inform-
ation Bureau mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 16,
lists showing the exact location and markings of the graves
together with particulars of the dead interred therein.
ARTICLE 18
The military authorities may appeal to the charity of the
inhabitants voluntarily to collect and care for, under their
direction, the wounded and sick, granting persons who have
responded to this appeal the necessary protection and facilities.
Should the adverse party take or retake control of the area,
he shaU likewise grant these persons the same protection and
the same facilities.
The mihtary authorities shall permit the inhabitants and
rehef societies, even in invaded or occupied areas, spontaneously
to collect and care for wounded or sick of whatever nationality.
The civilian population shall respect these wounded and sick,
and in particular abstain from offering them violence.
No one may ever be molested or convicted for having nursed
the wounded or sick.
The provisions of the present Article do not relieve the
occupying Power of its obhgation to give both physical and
moral care to the wounded and sick.
Role of the
population
CHAPTER III
MEDICAL UNITS AND ESTABLISHMENTS
ARTICLE 19
Fixed establishments and mobile medical units of the Medical
Service may in no circumstances be attacked, but shall at all
times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.
Should they fall into the hands of the adverse Party, their
personnel shall be free to pursue their duties, as long as the
capturing Power has not itself ensured the necessary care of
the wounded and sick found in such establishments and units.
The responsible authorities shall ensure that the said medical
estabhshments and units are, as far as possible, situated m
such a manner that attacks against mihtary objectives cannot
imperil their safety.
31
Protection
Protection of
hospital
ships
Discontinu-
ance of
protection of
medical
establishments
and Units
( (
Conditions not
depriving
medical units
and
establishments
of protection
Hospital zones
and localities
ARTICLE 20
Hospital ships entitled to the protection of the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of kunded
S ck and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces atSea
of August 12, 1949, shaU not be attacked from the land
ARTICLE 21
cease only after a due warning has been given nam ne in all
ARTICLE 22
The following conditions shall not be considered as decrivin^
by^ArS T,': " -^^^"^»^--t of the protection guaTanS
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
That the personnel of the unit or estabhshment are
orTnlh^f ;'.'.* ^'^^ "f *'^ ^™^ ^" *heir own defence!
or in that of the wounded and sick in their charge.
Hl^lvl ^^^ ^.''^^"''^ °^ ^™^d orderlies, the unit or
"ty^fn^orr '™^"^^' '^ ^ '''^'' «^ '^^ -"^^^^
That small arms and ammunition taken from the
wounded and sick and not yet handed to the prope?
Service, are found in the unit or establishment. ^
That personnel and material of the veterinary service
are found in the unit or establishment. without form^ne
an integral part thereof. lorming
That the humanitarian activities of medical units and
establishments or of their personnel extend o t he care
of civihan wounded or sick.
ARTICLE 23
f h« ^ü Ü'"^ ,°^ ?T^' *^^ "'^'1 Contracting Parties and after
the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties to the conflict mlv
estabhsh in their own territory and, if the need arLs.Tn SuI^S
32
areas hospital zones and localities so organized as to protect
the wounded and sick from the effects of war as well as the
personnel entrusted with the Organization and administration
of these zones and localities and with the care of the persons
therein assembled. x-i m „ tu„
Upon the outbreak and during the course of hostilities, the
Parties concerned may conclude agreements on mutual recogni-
tion of the hospital zones and localities they have created.
Thev may for this purpose implement the provisions of the
Draft Agreement annexed to the present Convention, with such
amendments as they may consider necessary ^^^^...^p
The Protecting Powers and the International Committee
of the Red Gross are invited to lend their good offices in order
to facilitate the institution and recognition of these hospital
zones and localities.
CHAPTER IV
PERSONNEL
ARTICLE 24
Medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or
the collection, transport or treatment of the wounded or sick,
or in the prevention of disease, staff exclusively engaged in the
administration of medical units and establishments, as well as
chaplains attached to the armed forces, shaU be respected and
protected in all circumstances.
" ARTICLE 25
Members of the armed forces specially trained for employ-
ment, should the need arise, as hospital orderlies, nurses or
auxiliary stretcher-bearers, in the search for or the coUection,
transport or treatment of the wounded and sick shaU likewise
be respected and protected if they are carrying out these duties
at the time when they come into contact with the enemy or
fall into his hands.
ARTICLE 26
The staff of National Red Gross Societies and that of other
Voluntary Aid Societies, duly recognised and authonsed by
their Governments, who may be employed on the same duties
as the personnel named in Article 24, are placed on the same
33
Protection of
permanent
personnel
Protection of
auxiliary
personnel
Personnel of
aid societies
footing as the personnel named in the said Article, provided
that the staff of such societies are subject to military laws and
regulations.
Each High Contracting Party shall notify to the other,
either in time of peace or at the commencement of, or during
hostilities, but in any case before actually employing them,
the names of the societies which it has authorized, under its
responsibility, to render assistance to the regulär medical
Service of its armed forces.
Societies of
neutral
countries
ARTICLE 27
A recognized Society of a neutral country can only lend
the assistance of its medical personnel and units to a Party
to the conilict with the previous consent of its own Govern-
ment and the authorisation of the Party to the conflict concerned.
That personnel and those units shall be placed under the control
of that Party to the conflict.
The neutral Government shall notify this consent to the
adversary of the State which accepts such assistance. The
Party to the conflict who accepts such assistance is bound to
notify the adverse Party thereof before making any use of it.
In no circumstances shall this assistance be considered as
interference in the conflict.
The members of the personnel named in the first paragraph
shall be duly furnished with the identity cards provided for
in Article 40 before leaving the neutral country to which they
belong.
Retained
personnel
ARTICLE 28
Personnel designated in Articles 24 and 26 who fall into the
hands of the adverse Party, shall be retained only in so far as
the State of health, the spiritual needs and the number of
prisoners of war require.
Personnel thus retained shall not be deemed prisoners of
war. Nevertheless they shall at least benefit by all the provisions
of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War of August 12, 1949. Within the framework of the
military laws and regulations of the Detaining Power, and
under the authority of its competent Service, they shall continue
to carry out, in accordance with their professional ethics, their
medical and spiritual duties on behalf of prisoners of war,
preferably those of the armed forces to which they themselves
belong. They shall further enjoy the following facilities for
carrying out their medical or spiritual duties :
34
ra) They shall be authorised to visit penodically the pri-
^ ^ soners of war in labour units or hospitals outside the
camp The Detaining Power shall put at their disposal
the means of transport required.
(b) In each camp the senior medical officer of the highest
rank shall be responsible to the military authorities
Sthe camp for the professional activity of the re tamed
medical personnel. For this purpose, f^«"" t\^, °f ^/j;^;
of hostilities. the Parties to the .^^^^''^t sh^j^^g'^S
regarding the corresponding senionty of the rankb ot
;E medical personnel, including those of the societies
des gn^ted in Article 26. In aU questions arising out
o Ihdr duties. this medical officer. and the chaplains
shaU have direct access to the military and medical
futhoriües of the camp who shall grant them the facihties
they may require for correspondence relating to these
questions.
(c) Although retained personnel in a camp f ^^ be^"^J\^^
to its internal discipline. they shall not however be
required to perform any work outside their medical or
religious duties.
During hostilities the Parties to the conflict shaU make
arrangemLts for relieving where possible retained personnel.
and shall settle the procedure of ^^-^h/^ 'e Detaining
None of the preceding provisions «hall reUeve the Ue^^^" |
Power of the obUgations imposed upon it with regard to tne
melcal and spiritlal welfare of the prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 29
Members of the personnel designated in Arüde^^^^^^^^^^^ have
fallen into the hands of the enemy. shall be prisoners ot war
but ShaU be employed on their medical duties in so far as the
need arises.
ARTICLE 30
Personnel whose retention is not indispensable by virtue
of the nrovisions of Article 28 shall be returned to the Party
to h ?onmS to whom they belong. as soon as a road is open
for their return and military requirements permit.
Pendins their return, they shaU not be deemed prisoners of
war NeÄkss they shaU at least benefit by all the provisions
35
Status of
auxiliary
personnel
Return of
medical and
religious
personnel
Selection of
personnel for
return
Return of
personnel
belonging to
neutral
countries
of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949. They shall continue
to fulfil their duties under the Orders of the adverse Party
and shall preferably be engaged in the care of the wounded
and sick of the Party to the confiict to which they themselves
belong.
On their departure, they shall take with them the effects,
personal belongings, valuables and instruments belonging to
them.
ARTICLE 31
The selection of personnel for return under Article 30 shall
be made irrespective of any consideration of race, religion or
political opinion, but preferably according to the chronological
Order of their capture and their state of health.
As from the outbreak of hostilities, Parties to the confiict
may determine by special agreement the percentage of personnel
to be retained, in proportion to the number of prisoners and
the distribution of the said personnel in the camps.
ARTICLE 32
Persons designated in Article 27 who have fallen into the
hands of the adverse Party may not be detained.
Unless otherwise agreed, they shall have permission to
return to their country, or if this is not possible, to the territory
of the Party to the confiict in whose service they were, as soon
as a route for their return is open and military considerations
permit.
Pending their release, they shall continue their work under
the direction of the adverse Party ; they shall preferably be
engaged in the care of the wounded and sick of the Party to
the confiict in whose service they were.
On their departure, they shall take with them their effects,
personal articles and valuables and the instruments, arms and
if possible the means of transport belonging to them.
The Parties to the confiict shall secure to this personnel,
while in their power, the same food, lodging, allowances and
pay as are granted to the corresponding personnel of their
armed forces. The food shall in any case be sufücient as regards
quantity, quality and variety to keep the said personnel in a
normal state of health.
CHAPTER V
BUILDINGS AND MATERIAL
ARTICLE 33
The material of mobile medical units of the armed forces
which fall into the hands of the enemy, shall be reserved for
the care of wounded and sick.
The buildings, material and stores of fixed medical establish-
ments of the armed forces shall remain subject to the laws of
war, but may not be diverted from that purpose as long as
they are required for the care of wounded and sick. Never-
theless, the Commanders of forces in the field may make use
of them, in case of urgent mihtary necessity, provided that
they make previous arrangements for the welfare of the wounded
and sick who are nursed in them.
The material and stores defined in the present Article shall
not be intentionally destroyed.
ARTICLE 34
The real and personal property of aid societies which are
admitted to the Privileges of the Convention shall be regarded
as private property.
The right of requisition recognised for belligerents by tue
laws and customs of war shall not be exercised except in case
of urgent necessity, and only after the welfare of the wounded
and sick has been ensured.
CHAPTER VI
MEDICAL TRANSPORTS
ARTICLE 35
Transports of wounded and sick or of medical equipment
shaU be respected and protected in the same way as mobile
medical units. . 1 i j ir
Should such transports or vehicles fall mto the hands ot
the adverse Party, they shaU be subject to the laws of war,
on condition that the Party to the confiict who captures them
shall in all cases ensure the care of the wounded and sick they
contain.
Buildings
and Stores
Property of
aid societies
Protection
36
37
Medical
aircraft
Flight over
neutral
countries.
Landing of
wounded
The civilian personnel and all means of transport obtained
by requisition shall be subject to the general rules of inter-
national law.
ARTICLE 36
Medical aircraft, that is to say, aircraft exclusively employed
for the removal of wounded and sick and for the transport of
medical personnel and equipment, shall not be attacked, but
shall be respected by the belligerents, while flying at heights,
times and on routes specifically agreed upon between the belli-
gerents concerned.
They shall bear, clearly marked, the distinctive emblem
prescribed in Article 38, together with their national colours,
on their lower, upper and lateral surfaces. They shall be
provided with any other markings or means of identification
that may be agreed upon between the belligerents upon the
outbreak or during the course of hostilities.
Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy-
occupied territory are prohibited.
Medical aircraft shall obey every summons to land. In
the event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its occu-
pants may continue its flight after examination, if any.
In the event of an involuntary landing in enemy or enemy-
occupied territory, the wounded and sick, as well as the crew
of the aircraft shall be prisoners of war. The medical personnel
shall be treated according to Article 24 and the Articles.
following
ARTICLE 37
Subject to the provisions of the second paragraph, medical
aircraft of Parties to the confiict may fly over the territory of
neutral Powers, land on it in case of necessity, or use it as a
port of call. They shall give the neutral Powers previous
notice of their passage over the said territory and obey all
summons to aUght, on land or water. They will be immune
from attack only when flying on routes, at heights and at tinies
specifically agreed upon between the Parties to the confiict
and the neutral Power concerned.
The neutral Powers may, however, place conditions or restric-
tions on the passage or landing of medical aircraft on their
territory. Such possible conditions or restrictions shall be
applied equally to all Parties to the confiict.
Unless agreed otherwise between the neutral Power and the
Parties to the confiict, the wounded and sick who are disem-
barked, with the consent of the local authorities, on neutral
38
territory by medical aircraft, shall be detained by the neutral
Power, whereso required by international law, in such a manner
that they cannot again take part in Operations of war. The
cost of their accommodation and internment shall be borne
by the Power on which they depend.
CHAPTER VII
THE DISTINCTIVE EMBLEM
ARTICLE 38
As a compHment to Switzerland, the heraldic emblem of the
red cross on a white ground, formed by reversing the Federal
colours, is retained as the emblem and distinctive sign of the
Medical Service of armed forces.
Nevertheless, in the case of countries which already use as
emblem, in place of the red cross, the red crescent or the red
lion and sun on a white ground, those emblems are also recognized
by the terms of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 39
Under the direction of the competent military authority,
the emblem shaU be displayed on the flags, armlets and on all
equipment employed in the Medical Service.
ARTICLE 40
The personnel designated in Article 24 and in Articles 26
and 27 shall wear, affixed to the left arm, a water-resistant
armlet bearing the distinctive emblem, issued and stamped by
the military authority. .
Such personnel, in addition to the identity disc mentioned
in Article 16, shall also carry a special identity card bearing
the distinctive emblem. This card shall be water-resistant
and of such size that it can be carried in the pocket. It shall
be worded in the national language, shall mention at least the
surname and first names, the date of birth, the rank and the
Service number of the bearer, and shall State in what capacity
he is entitled to the protection of the present Convention.
The card shall bear the photograph of the owner and also either
his signature or bis finger-prints or both. It shall be embossed
with the stamp of the mihtary authority.
39
Emblem of the
Convention
Use of the
emblem
Identification
of medical and
religious
personnel
Identification
of auxiliary
personnel
Marking of
medical units
and
establishments
Marking of
units of neutral
countries
The identity card shall be uniform throughout the same
armed forces and, as far as possible, of a similar type in the
armed forces of the High Contracting Parties. The Parties to
the conflict may be guided by the model which is annexed,
by way of example, to the present Convention. They shall
inform each other, at the outbreak of hostilities, of the model
they are using. Identity cards shoiild be made out, if possible,
at least in duplicate, one copy being kept by the home country.
In no circumstances may the said personnel be depnved of
their insignia or identity cards nor of the right to wear the
armlet. In case of loss, they shall be entitled to receive duph-
cates of the cards and to have the insignia replaced.
ARTICLE 41
The personnel designated in Article 25 shall wear, but only
while carrying out medical duties, a white armlet bearing in
its centre the distinctive sign in miniature ; the armlet shall
be issued and stamped by the military authority.
Military identity documents to be carried by this type of
personnel shall specify what special training they have received,
the temporary character of the duties they are engaged upon,
and their authority for wearing the armlet. .
«
ARTICLE 42
The distinctive flag of the Convention shall be hoisted only
over such medical units and establishments as are entitled to
be respected under the Convention, and only with the consent
of the military authorities.
In mobile units, as in fixed establishments, it may be accom-
panied by the national flag of the Party to the conflict to which
the unit or estabhshment belongs.
Nevertheless, medical units which have fallen into the
hands of the enemy shall not fly any flag other than that of the
Convention.
Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary steps, in so
far as military considerations permit, to make the distinctive
emblems indicating medical units and establishments clearly
visible to the enemy land, air or naval forces, in order to obviate
the possibility of any hostile action.
ARTICLE 43
The medical units belonging to neutral countries, which
may have been authorized to lend their Services to a belligerent
40
under theconditions laid down in Article 27, «^f» flyv^\°"g ^'^\^
the flag of the Convention, the national flag of that belligerent,
wherever the latter makes use of the faculty conferred on him
by Article 42.
Subject to Orders to the contrary by the responsible military
authorities, they may on all occasions fly their national flag,
even if they fall into the hands of the adverse Party.
.\RTICLE 44
With the e.xception of the cases mentioned in the following
paragraphs of the present Article, the emblem of the _Red
Cross on a white ground and the words "Red Cross , or
^ Geneva Cross " may not be employed. either in Urne of peace
or in time of war, except to indicate or to protect the medical
units and establishments, the personnel and matenal protected
by the present Convention and other Conventions deahng with
similar matters. The same shall apply to the emblems menton^
in Article 38, second paragraph, in respect of the countries
whici u e them. The National Red Cross Societies and other
Societies designated in Article 26 shall have the right to use the
dhtTnctive emblem conferring the protection of the Convention
only within the framework of the present paragraph.
Furthermore. National Red Cross (Red Crescent Red Lion
and Sun) Societies may. in time of peace, in accordance with
their na ional legislation, make use of the name and emblem
of the Red Cross for their other activities which are in conformity
'v4th the principles laid down by the Internationa Red Cros
Conferences. When those activities are carned out in time of
war the conditions for the use of the emblem shall be such
That t cannot be considered as conferring the Protection 0
he Convention ; the emblem shall be comparatively smal
in size and may not be placed on armlets or on the roofs of
buildings. , ^v • j ,
Ihe international Red Cross organizations and their duly
authorized personnel shall be permitted to make use, at all times.
of the emblem of the Red Cross on a white ground.
As an exceptional measure, in conformity with «ationa
leeislation and with the express permission of one of the National
Sd Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) Societies, the
emblem of the Convention may be employed in time of peace
rSify vehicles used as ambulances and to mark the position
of aid stations exclusively assigned to the purpose of giving
free treatment to the wounded or sick.
41
i'.
Restrictions
in the use of
the emblem.
Exceptions
Detailed
execution.
Unforeseen
cases
Prohibition of
reprisals
Dissemination
of the
Convention
Translations.
Rules of
application
Penal
sanctions
I. General
observations
CHAPTER Vril
EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION
ARTICLE 45
Each Party to the conflict, acting through its commanders-
in-chief, shall ensure the detailed execution of the preceding
Articles, and provide for unforeseen cases, in conformity vvith
the general principles of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 46
Reprisals against the wounded, sick, personnel, buildings or
equipment protected by the Convention are prohibited.
ARTICLE 47
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace
as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Con-
vention as widely as possible in their respective countries,
and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their pro-
grammes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that
the principles thereof may become known to the entire popu-
lation, in particular to the armed fighting forces, the medical
personnel and the chaplains.
ARTICLE 48
The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one
another through the Swiss Federal Council and, during hostilities,
through the Protecting Powers, the ofhcial translations of the
present Convention, as well as the law^s and regulations which
they may adopt to ensure the application thereof.
CHAPTER IX
REPRESSION OF ABUSES AND INFRACTIONS
ARTICLE 49
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legisla-
tion necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons
committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave
breaches of the present Convention defined in the foUowing
Article.
42
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the Obligation
to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordcred to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
Courts It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, band such persons over for
trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided
such High Contracting Party has made out a pnma facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary
for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the
present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in
the following Article. , „ , c, u
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall beneht by
safeeuards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less
favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those
following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
ARTICLE 50
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall
be those involving any of the following acts, if committed
against persons or property protected by the Convention :
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious mjury
to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropnation
of property, not justilied by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly.
ARTICLE 51
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself
or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred
by itself or by another High Contracting Party m respect of
breaches referred to in the preceding Article.
ARTICLE 52
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall
be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested
Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure
for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an
umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be followed.
Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the
conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the
least possible delay.
43
i{
IL
Grave
breaches
III.
Responsibil-
ities of the
Contracting
Parties
Enquiry
procedure
Misuse of the
emblem
Prevention of
misuse
Languages
ARTICLE 53
The use bv individuals, societies, firms or companies either
public or private, other than those entitled thereto under the
present Convention, of the emblem or the designation Red
Gross" or "Geneva Gross", or any sign or designation con-
stituting an Imitation thereof, whatever the object of such use
and irrespective of the date of its adoption, shall be prohibited
Bv r^son of the tribute paid to Switzerland by the adoption
of the reversed Federal colours, and of the confusion which
may arise between the arms of Switzerland and the distinctive
emblem of the Convention, the use by private indiyiduals,
societies or firms, of the arms of the Swiss Confederation or
of marks constituting an Imitation thereof, whether as trade-
marks or commercial marks, or as parts of such marks, or for
a purpose contrary to commercial honesty, or in circumstances
capable of wounding Swiss national sentiment, shall be pro-
hibited at all times. .
Nevertheless, such High Contracting Parties as were not
partv to the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, may grant
to prior users of the emblems, designations, signs or marks
designated in the first paragraph, a time limit not to exceed
three years from the coming into force of the present Convention
to discontinue such use, provided that the said use shall not
be such as would appear, in time of war, to confer the protection
of the Convention. ,
The Prohibition laid down in the first paragraph of the
present Article shall also apply, without effect on any rights
acquired through prior use. to the emblems and marks men-
tioned in the second paragraph of Article 38.
ARTICLE 54
The High Contracting Parties shall, if their legislation is
not already adequate, take measures necessary for the prevention
and repression, at all times, of the abuses referred to under
Article 53.
FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 55
The present Convention is established in English and in
French. Both texts are equally authentic.
The Swiss Federal Council shall arrange for official transla-
tions of the Convention to be made in the Russian and Spanish
languages.
ARTICLE 56
The present Convention, which bears the date of this day,
is open to signature until February 12, 1950, in the name of
the Powers represented at the Conference which opened at
Geneva on April 21, 1949 : furthermore, by Powers not repre-
sented at that Conference but which are parties to the Oeneva
Conventions of 1864, 1906 or 1929 for the Relief of the Wounded
and Sick in Armies in the Field.
ARTICLE 57
The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible
and the ratifications shaU be deposited at Berne.
A record shall be drawn up of the deposit of each Instrument
of ratification and certified copies of this record shall be trans-
mitted by the Swiss Federal Council to all the Powers in whose
name the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has
been notified.
ARTICLE 58
The present Convention shall come into force six months
after not less than two Instruments of ratification have been
'^^'^Thlreafter, it shaU come into force for each High Contracting
Party six months after the deposit of the Instrument of rati-
fication.
» ARTICLE 59
The present Convention replaces the Conventions of Aug-
ust 22, 1864, July 6, 1906, and July 27, 1929. in relations
between the High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 60
From the date of its coming into force, it shall be open to
any Power in whose name the present Convention has not been
signed. to accede to this Convention.
ARTICLE 61
Accessions shaU be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal
Council, and shaU take effect six months after the date on which
they are received.
45
.,
Signatare
Ratification
Coming into
force
Relation to
previous
Conventions
Accession
Notification
of accessions
44
Immediate
effect
Denunciation
Th. 9wi« Federal Council shall communicate the accessions
to all the Powe^:twhose name the Convention has been s.gned.
er whose accession has been notified.
ARTICLE 62
Th^ .ituations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall giye
fied by the Farties lo luc Federal Council shall
ärS: r. r,Ä. Äy ramca... o, acce,.
sions received from Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 63
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to
nrde^n^^nSS^ stu t Totihed in wriUng to the ^wiss
Federal Council, which shall transmit it to the Governments
of all the High Contracting Parües^ ^^^ ^^^.^_
The denunciation shall take «ttect one y
IS r .au. eSect -.U pe.» h,s bj» --'", ^ ; -«o"»""!
terminated. , • j-espect of the
The denunciatxon shall haveeffe^^^^ the obUgations
Registration
with the
United Kations
ARTICLE 64
The Swiss Federal Council shall register the präsent Con-
vention with the Secretariat of the United Nations^ .JJ^^u Jed
Fpderal Council shall also inform the Secretariat o the United
Natns of all ratifications. accessions and denunciations received
by it with respect to the present Convention.
T,. wiTNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, having deposited
thei rerpecüve füll powers, have signed the present Convention.
46
DoNE at Geneva this twelfth day of August 1949. m the
English and French languages. The original shall be deposited
in the archives of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss Federal
Council shall transmit certified copies thereof to each of the
signatory and acceding States.
ANNEX I
DRAFT AGREEMENT RELATING TO HOSPITAL ZONES
AND LOCALITIES
ARTICLE I
Hospital zones shaU be strictly reserved for the persons
named in Article 23 of the Geneva Convention for the Amehor-
ation of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick m the Armed
Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949. and for the personnel
entrusted with the Organization and administration of these
zones and localities, and with the care of the persons therein
assembled.
Nevertheless, persons whose permanent residence is within
such zones shall have the right to stay there.
ARTICLE 2
No persons residing, in whatever capacity, in a hospital
Zone shall perform any work, either within or without the zone,
directly connected with military Operations or the production
of war material.
ARTICLE 3
The Power establishing a hospital zone shall take all necessary
measures to prohibit access to all persons who have no nght
of residence or entry therein.
ARTICLE 4
Hospital zones shall fulfil the foUowing conditions :
ra) They shall comprise only a small part of the territory
governed by the Power which has established them.
(b) They shall be thinly populated in relation to the pos-
sibilities of accommodation.
47
Ü
' (
(c) They shaU be far removed and free from aU rnüitary
objectives, or large industrial or administrative estabhsh-
ments.
(d) They shall not be situated in areas which, according
to every probability, may become important for the
conduct of the war.
ARTICLE 5
Hospital zones shall be subject tothe f ollowing obligations :
(a) The lines of comnaunication and means of transport
which they possess shall not be used for the transport
of military personnel or material, even in transit.
(h) They shall in no case be defended by military means.
ili
11
II
ARTICLE 6
Hospital zones shall be marked by means of red crosses (red
crescents, red lions and suns) on a white background placed
on the outer precincts and on the buildings. They may be
similarly marked at night by means of appropriate lUumination.
ARTICLE 7
The Powers shall communicate to all the High Contracting
Parties in peacetime or on the outbreak of hostilities, a list of
the hospital zones in the territories governed by them. They
shall also give notice of any new zones set up during hostihties.
As soon as the adverse Party has received the above-men-
tioned notification, the zone shall be regularly constituted.
If however, the adverse Party considers that the conditions
of the present agreement have not been fulfilled, it may refuse
to recognise the zone by giving immediate notice thereof to
the Party responsible for the said zone, or may make its recogni-
tion of such zone dependent upon the institution of the control
provided for in Article 8.
ARTICLE 8
Any Power having recognized one or several hospital zones
instituted by the adverse Party shall be entitled to demand
control by one or more Special Commissions, for the purpose of
ascertaining if the zones fulfil the conditions and obhgations
stipulated in the present agreement.
48
For this purpose, the members of the Special Commissions shall
at all times have free access to the various zones and may
even reside there permanently. They shall be given all facilities
for their duties of inspection.
ARTICLE 9
Should the Special Commissions note any facts which they
consider contrary to the stipulations of the present agreement,
they shall at once draw the attention of the Power governing
the said zone to these facts, and shall fix a time limit of five
days within which the matter should be rectified. They shall
duly notify the Power who has recognised the zone.
If, when the time limit has expired, the Power governing
the zone has not complied with the warning, the adverse Party
may declare that it is no longer bound by the present agreement
in respect of the said zone.
ARTICLE 10
Any Power setting up one or more hospital zones and local-
ities, and the adverse Parties to whom their existence has been
notified, shall nominate or have nominated by neutral Powers,
the persons who shall be members of the Special Commissions
mentioned in Articles 8 and 9.
1%
^^
ARTICLE II
In no circumstances may hospital zones be the object of
attack. They shall be protected and respected at all times
by the Parties to the conflict.
p
ARTICLE 12
In the- case of occupation of a territory, the hospital zones
therein shaU continue to be respected and utilised as such.
Their purpose may, however, be modified by the Occupying
Power, on condition that all measures are taken to ensure the
safety of the persons accommodated.
ARTICLE 13
The present agreement shall also apply to locaHties which
the Powers may utilise for the same purposes as hospital zones.
49
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o
GENEVA CONVENTION FOR
THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION
OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED
MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA
OF AUGUST 12, 1949.
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments
represented at the Diplomatie Conference held at Geneva from
April 21 to August 12, I949> ^ov the purpose of revismg the
Xth Hague Convention of October 18, 1907 for the Adaptation
to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1906, have agreed as foUows :
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE I
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.
ARTICLE 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in
peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the State of war is not recognised by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not beaparty to
the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto
shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the
said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.
51
Respect for the
Convention
AppUcation of
the Convention
\
Conflicts not
of an
international
character
Field of
application
ARTICLE 3
In the case of armed confiict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the confiict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions :
(i) Persons taking no activc part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in aU
circumstances be treated humanely, without any
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion
or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar
criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons :
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture ;
(h) taking of hostages ;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humihating and degrading treatment ;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be coUected
and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Gross, may offer its Services to the Parties
to the confiict.
The Parties to the confiict should further endeavour to
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part
of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect
the legal Status of the Parties to the confiict.
ARTICLE 4
In case of hostilities between land and naval forces of Parties
to the confiict, the provisions of the present Convention shall
apply only to forces on board ship.
52
Forces put ashore shall immediately become subject to the
provisions of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field of August 12, 1949.
ARTICLE 5
Neutral Powers shall apply by analogy the provisions of the
present Convention to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and
to members of the medical personnel and to chaplains of the
armed forces of the Parties to the confiict received or interned in
their territory, as well as to dead persons found.
ARTICLE 6
%
In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in
Articles 10, 18, 31, 38, 39» 4«» 43 and 53, the High Contracting
Parties may conclude other special agreements for all matters
concerning which they may deem it suitable to make separate
Provision. No special agreement shall adversely affect the Situa-
tion of wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, of members of
the medical personnel or of chaplains, as defined by the present
Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
Wounded, sick, and shipwrecked persons, as well as medical
personnel and chaplains, shall continue to have the benefit of such
agreements as long as the Convention is apphcable to them, except
where express provisions to the contrary are contained in the
aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more favourable
measures have been taken with regard to them by one or other
of the Parties to the confiict.
* ARTICLE 7
Wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, as well as members
of the medical personnel and chaplains, may in no circumstances
renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by
the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred
to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
ARTICLE 8
The present Convention shall be applied with the Cooperation
and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it
is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the confiict. For
this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from
their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst their
own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said
53
Application by
neutral Powers
Special
agreements
Non-
renunciation
of rights
Protecting
Powers
Activities
of the
International
Committee of
the Red Gross
Substitutes for
Protecting
Powers
delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with
which they are to carry out their duties.
The Parties to the conflict shall faciHtate to the greatest
extent possible the task of the representatives or delegates of
the Protecting Powers.
The repräsentatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers
shall not in any case exceed their mission under the present
Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the
imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they carry
out their duties. Their activities shall only be restricted as an
exceptional and temporary measure when this is rendered neces-
sary by imperative military necessities.
ARTICLE 9
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no
obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanita-
rian Organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to
the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of wounded,
sick and shipwrecked persons, medical personnel and chaplains,
and for their relief.
ARTICLE 10
The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to
entrust to an Organization which offers all guarantees of impar-
tiahty and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting
Powers by virtue of the present Convention.
When wounded, sick and shipwrecked, or medical personnel
and chaplains do not benefit or cease to benefit, no matter
for what reason, by the activities of a Protecting Power or of
an Organization provided for in the first paragraph above, the
Detaining Power shall request a neutral State, or such an Orga-
nization, to undertake the functions performed under the present
Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the Parties to
a conflict.
If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining
Power shall request or shall accept, subject to the provisions
of this Article, the offer of the Services of a humanitarian Orga-
nization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross,
to assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting
Powers under the present Convention.
Any neutral Power, or any Organization invited by the Power
concerned or offering itself for these purposes, shall be required
to act with a sense of responsibility towards the Party to the
conflict on which persons protected by the present Convention
54
depend, and shall be required to furnish sufhcient assurances
that it is in a position to undertake the appropriate functions
and to discharge them impartially.
No derogation from the preceding provisions shall be made
by special agreements between Powers one of which is restricted,
even temporarily, in its freedom to negotiate with the other
Power or its allies by reason of military events, more particularly
where the whole, or a substantial part, of the territory of the
said Power is occupied.
Whenever, in the present Convention, mention is made of a
Protecting Power, such mention also applies to Substitute
organizations in the sense of the present Article.
ARTICLE II
In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of
protected persons, particularly in cases of disagreement between
the Parties to the conflict as to the application or interpretation
of the provisions of the present Convention, the Protecting
Powers shall lend their good offices with a view to settling the
disagreement.
For this purpose, each of the Protecting Powers may, either
at the invitation of one Party or on its own initiative, propose
to the Parties to the conflict a meeting of their representatives,
in particular of the authorities responsible for the wounded,
sick and shipwrecked, medical personnel and chaplains, possibly
on neutral territory suitably chosen. The Parties to the conflict
shall be bound to give effect to the proposals made to them for
this purpose. The Protecting Powers may, if necessary, propose
for approval by the Parties to the conflict, a person belonging
to a neutral Power or delegated by the International Committee
of the Red Cross, who shall be invited to take part in such a
meeting.
CHAPTER II
WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED
ARTICLE 12
Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned
in the following Article, who are at sea and who are wounded,
sick or shipwrecked, shall be respected and protected in all
circumstances, it being understood that the term " shipwreck "
means shipwreck from any cause and includes forced landings
at sea by or from aircraft.
55
Conciliation
procedure
Protection
and care
Protected
persons
1
i
I
Such persons shall be treated humanely and cared for by
the Parties to the conflict in whose power they may be, without
any adverse distinction founded on sex, race, nationality,
religion, political opinions, er any other similar criteria. Any
attemps upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be
strictly prohibited ; in particular, they shall not be murdered or
exterminated, subjected to torture or to biological experiments ;
they shall not wilfully be left without medical assistance and
care, nor shall conditions exposing them to contagion or infection
be created.
Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the
Order of treatment to be administered.
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex.
ARTiCLE 13
The present Convention shall apply to the wounded, sick
and shipwrecked at sea belonging to the foUowing categories :
(i) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict,
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps for-
ming part of such armed forces ;
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer
corps, including such organized resistance movements,
fulfil the following conditions :
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates ;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance ;
(c) that of carrying arms openly ;
(c) that of conducting their Operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war ;
(3) Members of regulär armed forces who profess allegiance
to a Government or an authority not recognized by the
Detaining Power ;
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without
actually being members thereof, such as civil members
of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply
contractors, members of labour units or of Services
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided
56
that they have received authorization from the armed
forces which they accompany ;
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and appren-
tices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil
aircraft of the Parties to the conflict who do not benefit
by more favourable treatment, under any other pro-
visions of international law ;
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the
approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms
to resist the invading forces, without having had time
to form themselves into regulär armed units, pro-
vided they carry arms openly and respect the laws
and customs of war.
u
ARTICLE 14
All warships of a belligerent Party shall have the right to
demand that the wounded, sick or shipwrecked on board mihtary
hospital ships, and hospital ships belonging to relief societies or
to private individuals, as well as merchant vessels, yachts
and other craft shall be surrendered, whatever their nationahty,
provided that the wounded and sick are in a fit State to be moved
and that the warship can provide adequate facilities for neces-
sary medical treatment.
Handing over
to a belhgerent
ARTICLE 15
If wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons are taken on board
a neutral warship or a neutral military aircraft, it shaU be
ensured, where so required by international law, that they can
take no further part in Operations of war.
Wounded
taken on board
a neutral
warship
ARTICLE 16
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the wounded, sick
and shipwrecked of a beUigerent who fall into enemy hands
shall be prisoners of war, and the provisions of international
law concerning prisoners of war shall apply to them. The
captor may decide, according to circumstances, whether it
is expedient to hold them, or to convey them to a port in the
captor's own country, to a neutral port or even to a port m
enemy territory. In the last case, prisoners of war thus returned
to their home country may not serve for the duration of the
war.
Wounded
falling into
enemy hands
57
Wounded
landed in a
neutral port
Search for
casualties after
an engagement
Recording and
forwarding of
Information
ARTICLE 17
Wounded, sick or shipwrecked persons who are landed in
neutral ports with the consent of the local authorities, shall,
failing arrangements to the contrary between the neutral and
the belligerent Powers, be so guarded by the neutral Power,
where so required by international law, that the said persons
cannot again take part in Operations of war.
The costs of hospital accommodation and internment shaU
be borne by the Power on whom the wounded, sick or ship-
wrecked persons depend.
ARTICLE 18
After each engagement, Parties to the conflict shall without
delay take all possible measures to search for and collect the
shipwrecked, wounded and sick, to protect them against pillage
and ill-treatment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search
for the dead and prevent their being despoiled.
Whenever circumstances permit, the Parties to the conflict
shall conclude local arrangements for the removal of the wounded
and sick by sea from a besieged or encircled area and for the
passage of medical and religious personnel and equipment on
their way to that area.
ARTICLE 19
The Parties to the conflict shall record as soon as possible
in respect of each shipwrecked, wounded, sick or dead person
of the adverse Party failing into their hands, any particulars
which may assist in his identification. These records should
if possible include :
(a) designation of the Power on which he depends ;
(b) army, regimental, personal or serial number ;
(c) surname ;
(d) first name or names ;
(e) date of birth ;
(f) any other particulars shown on his identity card or disc ;
(g) date and place of capture or death ;
(h) particulars concerning wounds or illness, or cause of
death.
As soon as possible the above mentioned information shall
be forwarded to the information bureau described in Article 122
of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Pris-
58
soners of War of August 12, 1949» which shall transmitthis Infor-
mation to the Power on which these persons depend through
the intermediary of the Protecting Power and of the Central
Prisoners of War Agency.
Parties to the conflict shall prepare and forward to each
other through the same bureau, certificates of death or duly
authenticated lists of the dead. They shaU likewise collect
and forward through the same bureau one half of the double
identity disc, or the identity disc itself if it is a Single disc, last
wills or other documents of importance to the next of km
money and in general all articles of an intrinsic or sentimental
value which are found on the dead. These articles, together
with unidentified articles, shall be sent in sealed packets, accom-
panied by Statements giving all particulars necessary for the
identification of the deceased owners, as well as by a complete
list of the Contents of the parcel.
ARTICLE 20
Parties to the conflict shall ensure that burial at sea of the
dead, carried out individually as far as circumstances permit
is preceded by a careful examination, if possible by a medical
examination, of the bodies, with a view to confirmmg death,
estabhshing identity and enabling a report to be made. Where
a double identity disc is used, one half of the disc should remain
on the body. . . r ^-u n
If dead persons are landed, the provisions of the <^eneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Pield of August
12, 1949, shall be applicable.
Prescriptions
regarding the
dead
ARTICLE 21
The Parties to the conflict may appeal to the charity of
Commanders of neutral merchant vessels, yachts or other craft
to take on board and care for wounded, sick or shipwrecked
persons, and to collect the dead. , -, .1
Vessels of any kind responding to this appeal, and those
having of their own accord coUected wounded, sick or ship-
wrecked persons, shall enjoy special protection and facihties
to carry out such assistance.
They may, in no case, be captured on account of any such
transport ; but, in the absence of any promise to the contrary,
they shall remain liable to capture for any violations of neutrality
they may have committed.
Appeals to
neutral vessels
59
r
1^
Notification
and protection
of military
hospital ships
-i I
1 1
i
Protection of
medical
establishments
ashore
Hospital ships
utilized by
relief societies
and private
individuals of
I.
Parties to the
conflict
II.
Neutral
countries
CHAPTER III
HOSPITAL SHIPS
ARTICLE 22
Military hospital ships, that is to say, ships built or equipped
by the Powers speciaUy and solely with a view to assisting the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to treating them and to trans-
porting them, may in no circumstances be attacked or captured,
but shall at all times be respected and protected, on condition
that their names and descriptions have been notified to the
Parties to the conflict ten days before those ships are employed.
The characteristics which must appear in the notification
shall include registered gross tonnage, the length from stem
to Stern and the number of masts and funnels.
ARTICLE 23
Establishments ashore entitled to the protection of the
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August
12, 1949, shall be protected from bombardment or attack from
the sea.
ARTICLE 24
Hospital ships utiUzed by National Red Cross Societies, by
ofhcially recognized relief societies or by private persons shall
have the same protection as military hospital ships and shall
be exempt from capture, if the Party to the conflict on which
they depend has given them an official commission and in so
far as the provisions of Article 22 concerning notification have
been complied with.
These ships must be provided with certificates of the res-
ponsible authorities, stating that the vessels have been under
their control while fitting out and on departure.
ARTICLE 25
Hospital ships utilized by National Red Cross Societies,
officially recognised relief societies, or private persons of neutral
countries shall have the same protection as military hospital
ships and shall be exempt from capture, on condition that
they have placed themselves under the control of one of
the Parties to the conflict, with the previous consent of their
own governments and with the authorization of the Party
60
to the conflict concerned, in so far as the provisions of Article 22
concerning notification have been complied with.
ARTICLE 26
The protection mentioned in Articles 22, 24 and 25 shall
apply to hospital ships of any tonnage and to their lifeboats,
wherever they are operating. Nevertheless, to ensure the
maximum comfort and security, the Parties to the conflict shaU
endeavour to utihze, for the transport of wounded, sick and
shipwrecked over long distances and on the high seas, only
hospital ships of over 2,000 tons gross.
ARTICLE 27
Under the same conditions as those provided for in Artkles 22
and 24, small craft employed by the State or by the ofiicially
recognised lifeboat institutions for coastal rescue Operations
shall also be respected and protected, so far as operational
requirements permit. . 1 • 4. 1
The same shall apply so far as possible to fixed coastal instal-
lations used exclusively by these craft for their humani-
tarian missions.
ARTICLE 28
Should fighting occur on board a warship, the sick-bays
shall be respected and spared as far possible. Sick-bays and
their equipment shall remain subject to the laws of warfare,
but mav not be diverted from their purpose so long as they are
required for the wounded and sick. Nevertheless, the Commander
into whose power they have fallen may, af ter ensuring the proper
care of the wounded and sick who are accommodated therein,
apply them to other purposes in case of urgent military necessity.
ARTICLE 29
Any hospital ship in a port which falls into the hands of the
enemy shall be authorised to leave the said port.
ARTICLE 30
The vessels described in Articles 22, 24, 25 and 27 shall
afford relief and assistance to the wounded, sick and ship-
wrecked without distinction of nationaUty.
The High Contracting Parties undertake not to use these
vessels for any military purpose.
Tonnage
Coastal rescue
craft
!
Protection of
sick-bays
Hospital ships
in occupied
ports
Employment
of hospital
ships and small
craft
61
II
Right of
control and
search
fi
Stay in a
neutral port
Converted
merchant
vessels
Discontinu-
ance of
protection
ii
Such vessels shall in no wise hamper the movements of the
combatants.
During and after an engagement, they will act at their own
risk.
ARTICLE 31
The Parties to the conflict shall have the right to control and
search the vessels mentioned in Articles 22, 24, 25 and 27. They
can refuse assistance from these vessels, order them off, make
them take a certain course, control the use of their wireless and
other means of communication, and even detain them for a
period not exceeding seven days from the time of interception,
if the gravity of the circumstances so requires.
They may put a commissioner temporarily on board whose
sole task shall be to see that Orders given in virtue of the pro-
visions of the preceding paragraph are carried out.
As far as possible, the Parties to the conflict shall enter in
the log of the hospital ship, in a language he can understand,
the Orders they have given the captain of the vessel.
Parties to the conflict may, either unilaterally or by particular
agreements, put on board their ships neutral observers who
shall verify the strict Observation of the provisions contained
in the present Convention.
ARTICLE 32
Vessels described in Articles 22, 24, 25 and 27 are not classed
as warships as regards their stay in a neutral port.
ARTICLE 33
Merchant vessels which have been transformed into hospital
ships cannot be put to any other use throughout the duration
of hostilities.
ARTICLE 34
The protection to which hospital ships and sick-bays are
entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside
their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection
may, however, cease only after due warning has been given,
naming in all appropriate cases a reasonable time limit, and after
such warning has remained unheeded.
In particular, hospital ships may not possess or use a secret
Code for their wireless or other means of communication.
62
\
(2)
(3)
ARTICLE 35
The following conditions shall not be considered as depriving
hospital ships or sick-bays of vessels of the protection due to
them :
(i) The fact that the crews of ships or sick-bays are armed
for the maintenance of order, for their own defence or
that of the sick and wounded.
The presence on board of apparatus exclusively intended
to facilitate navigation or communication.
The discovery on board hospital ships or in sick-bays of
portable arms and ammunition taken from the woun-
ded, sick and shipwrecked and not yet handed to the
proper Service.
The fact that the humanitarian activities of hospital
ships and sick-bays of vessels or of the crews extend to
the care of wounded, sick or shipwrecked civilians.
The transport of equipment and of personnel intended
exclusively for medical duties, over and above the
normal requirements.
CHAPTER IV
(4)
(5)
PERSONNEL
ARTICLE 36
The religious, medical and hospital personnel of hospital
ships and their crews shall be respected and protected ; they
may not be captured during the time they are in the Service of
the hospital ship, whether or not there are wounded and sick
board.
on
ARTICLE 37
The religious, medical and hospital personnel assigned to the
medical or spiritual care of the persons designated in Articles
12 and 13 shall, if they faU into the hands of the enemy, be res-
pected and protected ; they may continue to carry out their
duties as long as this is necessary for the care of the wounded
and sick. They shall afterwards be sent back as soon as the
Commander-in-Chief, under whose authority they are, considers
it practicable. They may take with them, on leaving the ship,
their personal property.
63
Conditions not
depriving
hospital ships
of protection
Protection of
the personnel
of hospital
ships
Medical and
religious
personnel of
other ships
Ships used
for the
conveyance of
medical
equipmcnt
Medical
aircraft
i!
If, however, it prove necessary to retain some of this per-
sonnel owing to the medical or spiritual needs of prisoners
of war, everything possible shall be done for their earliest possible
landing.
Retained personnel shall be subject, on landing, to the
provisions of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field of August 12, 1949.
CHAPTER V
MEDICAL TRANSPORTS
ARTICLE 38
Ships chartered for that purpose shall be authorized to trans-
port equipment exclusively intended for the treatment of woun-
ded and sick members of armed forces or for the prevention
of disease, provided that the particulars regarding their voyage
have been notified to the adverse Power and approved by the
latter. The adverse Power shall preserve the right to board the
carrier ships, but not to capture them nor to seize the equipment
carried.
By agreement amongst the Parties to the conflict, neutral
observers may be placed on board such ships to verify the equip-
ment carried. For this purpose, free access to the equipment
shall be given.
ARTICLE 39
Medical aircraft, that is to say, aircraft exclusively employed
for the removal of wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and for the
transport of medical personnel and equipment, may not be
the object of attack, but shall be respected by the Parties to the
conflict, while fiying at heights, at times and on routes specifically
agreed upon between the Parties to the conflict concerned.
They shall be clearly marked with the distinctive emblem
prescribed in Article 41, together with their national colours,
on their lower, upper and lateral surf aces. They shall be provided
with any other markings or means of identification which may
be agreed upon between the Parties to the conflict upon the
outbreak or during the course of hostiUties.
Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy-
occupied territory are prohibited.
Medical aircraft shall obey every summons to alight on land
or water. In the event of having thus to alight, the aircraft
64
with its occupants may continue its flight after examination,
if any.
In the event of alighting involuntarily on land or water m
enemy or enemy-occupied territory, the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked, as well as the crew of the aircraft shall be prisoners
of war. The medical personnel shall be treated according to
Artides 36 and 37.
ARTICLE 40
Subject to the provisions of the second paragraph, medical
aircraft of Parties to the conflict may fly over the territory of
neutral Powers, land thereon in case of necessity, or use it
as a port of call. They shall give neutral Powers prior notice of
their passage over the said territory, and obey every summons
to alight, on land or water. They will be immune from attack
only when fiying on routes, at heights and at times specifically
agreed upon between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral
Power concerned.
The neutral Powers may, however, place conditions or res-
trictions on the passage or landing of medical aircraft on their
territory. Such possible conditions or restrictions shall be applied
equally to all Parties to the conflict.
Unless otherwise agreed between the neutral Powers and the
Parties to the conflict, the wounded, sick or shipwrecked who
are disembarked with the consent of the local authorities on
neutral territory by medical aircraft shall be detained by the
neutral Power, where so required by international law, in such
a manner that they cannot again take part in Operations of war.
The cost of their accommodation and internment shall be
borne by the Power on which they depend.
i
FHght over
neutral
countries.
Landing of
wounded
CHAPTER VI
THE DISTINCTIVE EMBLEM
ARTICLE 41
Under the direction of the competent military authority,
the emblem of the red cross on a white ground shall be dis-
played on the flags, armlets and on all equipment employed in
the Medical Service.
Nevertheless, in the case of countries which already use as
emblem, in place of the red cross, the red crescent or the red
lion and sun on a white ground, these emblems are also recognized
by the terms of the present Convention.
Use of the
emblem
65
Identification
of medical and
religious
personnel
Markin g of
hospital ships
and small craft
ARTICLE 42
The personnel designated in Articies 36 and 37 shall wear,
affixed to the left arm, a water-resistant armlet bearing the dis-
tinctive emblem, issued and stamped by the mihtary authority.
Such personnel, in addition to wearing the identity disc
mentioned in Article 19, shall also carry a special identity card
bearing the distinctive emblem. This card shall be water-
resistant and of such size that it can be carried in the pocket.
It shall be worded in the national language, shall mention at
least the surname and first names, the date of birth, the rank
and the Service number of the bearer, and shall State in what
capacity he is entitled to the protection of the present Conven-
tion. The card shall bear the photograph of the owner and
also either his signature or his finger-prints or both. It shall
be embossed with the stamp of the military authority.
The identity card shall be uniform throughout the same armed
forces and, as far as possible, of a similar type in the armed forces
of the High Contracting Parties. The Parties to the conflict
may be guided by the model which is annexed, by way of
example, to the present Convention. They shall inform each
other, at the outbreak of hostilities, of the model they ate
using. Identity cards should be made out, if possible, at least
in duplicate, one copy being kept by the home country.
In no circumstances may the said personnel be deprived
of their insignia or identity cards nor of the right to wear the
armlet. In cases of loss they shall be entitled to receive dupli-
cates of the cards and to have the insignia replaced.
ARTICLE 43
The ships designated in Articies 22, 24, 25 and 27 shall be
distinctively marked as foUows :
(a) All exterior surfaces shall be white.
(h) One or more dark red crosses, as large as possible, shall
be painted and displayed on each side of the hüll and
on the horizontal surfaces, so placed as to afford the
greatest possible visibility from the sea and from the
air.
All hospital ships shall make themselves known by hoisting
their national flag and further, if they belong to a neutral state,
the flag of the Party to the conflict whose direction they have
accepted. A white flag with a red cross shall be flown at the
mainmast as high as possible.
66
Lifeboats of hospital ships, coastal lifeboats and all small
craft used by the Medical Service shall be painted white with
dark red crosses prominently displayed and shall, in general,
comply with the identification System prescribed above for
hospital ships.
The above-mentioned ships and craft, which may wish to
ensure by night and in times of reduced visibihty the protection
to which they are entitled, must, subject to the assent of the
Party to the conflict under whose power they are, take the
necessary measures to render their painting and distinctive
emblems sufflciently apparent.
Hospital ships which, in accordance with Article 31 are
provisionally detained by the enemy, must haul down the flag
of the Party to the conflict in whose service they are or whose
direction they have accepted.
Coastal lifeboats, if they continue to operate with the consent
of the Occupying Power from a base which is occupied, may be
allowed, when away from their base, to continue to fly their own
national colours along with a flag carrying a red cross on a white
ground, subject to prior notification to all the Parties to the
conflict concerned.
All the provisions in this Article relating to the red cross
shall apply equally to the other emblems mentioned in Article 41.
Parties to the conflict shall at all times endeavour to conclude
mutual agreements in order to use the most modern methods
available to facilitate the identification of hospital ships.
ARTICLE 44
The distinguishing signs referred to in Article 43 can only be
used, whether in time of peace or war, for indicating or protecting
' the ships therein mentioned, except as may be provided in
any other international Convention or by agreement between
all the Parties to the conflict concerned.
ARTICLE 45
The High Contracting Parties shaU, if their legislation is
not already adequate, take the measures necessary for the preven-
tion and repression, at all times, of any abuse of the distinctive
signs provided for under Article 43.
67
»
Limitation in
the use of
markings
Prävention of
misuse
Detailed
execution
Unforeseen
cases
Prohibition of
reprisals
Dissemination
of the
Convention
Translations.
Rules of
application
Penal
sanctions
I.
General
observations
CHAPTER VII
EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION
ARTICLE 46
Each Party to the conflict, acting through its Commanders-
in-Chief shall ensure the detailed execution of the preceding
Articles and provide for unforeseen cases, in conformity with
the general principles of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 47
Reprisals against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons,
the personnel, the vessels or the equipment protected by the
Convention are prohibited.
ARTICLE 48
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as
in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention
as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in parti-
cular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military
and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof
may become known to the entire population, in particular to the
armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains.
ARTICLE 49
The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one
another through the Swiss Federal Council and, during hostilities,
through the Protecting Powers, the official translations of the
present Convention, as well as the laws and regulations which
they may adopt to ensure the application thereof.
CHAPTER VIII
REPRESSION OF ABUSES AND INFRACTIONS
ARTICLE 50
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the foUowing
Article.
l
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the Obligation
to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, band such persons over for
trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided
such High Contracting Party has made out a prima jacie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary
for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the
present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in
the foUowing Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by
safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less
favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those foUowing
of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War of August 12, 1949.
ARTICLE 51
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall
be those involving any of the foUowing acts, if committed
against persons or property protected by the Convention :
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly.
ARTICLE 52
p No High Contracting Party shall be aUowed to absolve itself
or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred
by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of
breaches referred to in the preceding Article.
ARTICLE 53
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shaU
be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested
Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure
for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an
umpire, who wiU decide upon the procedure to be foUowed.
Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the
conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the
least possible delay.
\
II.
Grave
breaches
III.
Responsibil-
ities of the
Contracting
Parties
Enquiry
procedure
68
69
Languages
Signature
Ratification
Coming into
force
Relation to the
1907
Convention
FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 54
The present Convention is established in English and in
French. Both texts are equally authentic.
The Swiss Federal Council shall arrange for official trans-
lations of the Convention to be made in the Russian and Spanish
languages.
ARTICLE 55
The present Convention, which bears the date of this day,
is open to signature until February 12, 1950, in the name of the
Powers represented at the Conference which opened at Geneva
on April 21, 1949 ; furthermore, by Powers not represented
at that Conference, but which are parties to the Xth Hague
Convention of October 18, 1907, for the adaptation to Maritime
Warfare of the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1906, or
to the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906 or 1929 for the
Relief of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.
ARTICLE 56
The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible
and the ratifications shall be deposited at Berne.
A record shall be drawn up of the deposit of each instru-
ment of ratification and certified copies of this record shall be
transmitted by the Swiss Federal Council to all the Powers in
whose name the Convention has been signed, or whose accession
has been notified.
ARTICLE 57
The present Convention shall come into force six months after
not less than two instruments of ratification have been deposited.
Thereafter, it shall come into force for each High Contracting
Party six months after the deposit of the instruments of rati-
fication.
ARTICLE 58
The present Convention replaces the Xth Hague Convention
of October 18, 1907, for the adaptation to Maritime Warfare of
the principles of the Geneva Convention of 1906, in relations
between the High Contracting Parties.
70
ARTICLE 59
From the date of its coming into force, it shall be open to
any Power in whose name the present Convention has not
been signed, to accede to this Convention.
ARTICLE 60
Accessions shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal
Council, and shall take effect six months after the date on which
they are received.
The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate the accessions
to all the Powers in whose name the Convention has been signed,
or whose accession has been notified.
ARTICLE 61
The situations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall give
immediate effect to ratifications deposited and accessions noti-
fied by the Parties to the confiict before or after the beginning
of hostilities or occupation. The Swiss Federal Council shall
communicate by the quiekest method any ratifications or
accessions received from Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 62
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to
denounce the present Convention.
The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Swiss
Federal Council, which shall transmit it to the Governments
\)f all the High Contracting Parties.
The denunciation shall take effect one year after the notifi-
cation thereof has been made to the Swiss Federal Council.
However, a denunciation of which notification has been made
at a time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict
shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until
after Operations connected with release and repatriation of
the persons protected by the present Convention have been
terminated.
The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the
denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations
which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by
virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.
71
Accession
Notification of
accessions
Immediate
effect
Denunciation
Registration
with the
United Nations
ARTICLE 63
The Swiss Federal Council shall register the present Con-
vention with the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Swiss
Federal Council shall also inform the Secretariat of the United
Nations of aU ratifications, accessions and denunciations received
by it with respect to the present Convention.
In witness whereof the undersigned, having deposited
their respective füll powers, have signed the present Convention.
DONE at Geneva this twelfth day of August 1949, in the
English and French languages. The original shall be deposited
in the Archives of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss Federal
Council shall transmit certified copies thereof to each of the
signatory and acceding States.
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72
GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT
OF PR ISO NE RS OF WAR
OF AUGUST 12, 1949
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments
represented at the Diplomatie Conference held at Geneva from
April 21 to August 12, 1949, for the puipose of revising the
Convention concluded at Geneva on July 27, 1929, relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, have agreed as follows :
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE I
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.
Respect for
the Convention
ARTICLE 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented
in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, evenif the
State of war is not recognised by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party
to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto
shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the
said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.
ARTICLE 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions :
Application
of the
Convention
Conflicts
not of^an
international
character"^
75
(I)
Prisoners
of war
(2)
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith,
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons :
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture ;
(h) taking of hostages ;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment ;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognised as indispensable by civilized peoples.
The wounded and sick shall be coUected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Gross, may off er its Services to the Parties
to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring
into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the
other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect
the legal Status of the Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 4
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention,
are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have
fallen into the power of the enemy :
(i) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict
as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming
part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or
outside their own territory, even if this territory is
76
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer
corps, including such organized resistance movements,
fulfil the following conditions :
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates ;
(h) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recog-
nizable at a distance ;
(c) that of carrying arms openly ;
(d) that of conducting their Operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regulär armed forces who profess allegiance
to a government or an authority not recognised by the
Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without
actually being members thereof , such as civilian members
of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply
contractors, members of labour units or of Services
responsible for the weif are of the armed forces, provided
that they have received authorization from the armed
forces which they accompany, who shall provide them
for that purpose with an identity card similar to the
annexed model.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and ap-
prentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil
aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit
by more favourable treatment under any other pro-
visions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the
p approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to
resist the invading forces, without having had time to
form themselves into regulär armed units, provided they
carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs
of war.
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of
war under the present Convention :
(i) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed
forces of the occupied country, if the occupymg Power
considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to
intern them, even though it has originally liberated
them while hostilities were going on outside the territory
it occupies, in particular where such persons have made
an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to
77
Beginning
and end of
application
Special
agreements
which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or
where they fail to comply with a summons made to
them with a view to internment.
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumer-
ated in the present Article, who have been received by
neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and
whom these Powers are required to intern under inter-
national law, without prejudice to any more favourable
treatment which these Powers may choose to give and
with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth para-
graph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations
exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral
or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles
concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplom-
atic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom
these persons depend shall be allowed to perform
towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as
provided in the present Convention, without prejudice
to the functions which these Parties normally exercise
in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and
treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical
personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the
present Convention.
ARTICLE 5
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred
to in Article 4 from the time they fall into the power of the
enemy and until their final release and repatriation.
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having com-
mitted a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4,
such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention
until such time as their status has been determined by a com-
petent tribunal.
ARTICLE 6
In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in
Articles 10, 23, 28, 33, 60, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73, 75, 109, iio, 118,
119, 122 and 132, the High Contracting Parties may conclude
other special agreements for all matters concerning which they
may deem it suitable to make separate provision. No special
agreement shall adversely affect the Situation of prisoners of
war, as defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the
rights which it confers upon them.
'^
Prisoners of war shall continue to have the benefit of such
agreements as long as the Convention is applicable to them,
except where express provisions to the contrary are contained
in the aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more
favourable measures have been taken with regard to them by
one or other of the Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 7
Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part
or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Conven-
tion, and by the special agreements referred to in the fore-
going Article, if such there be.
ARTICLE 8
The present Convention shall be applied with the Cooperation
and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it
is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. For
this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from
their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst their
own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said
delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power with
which they are to carry out their duties.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest extent
possible the task of the representatives or delegates of the
Protecting Powers.
The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers
shall not in any case exceed their mission under the present
Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the
imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they carry
* out their duties.
ARTICLE 9
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no
obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian
Organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the
conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners
of war and for their relief.
ARTICLE 10
The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to
entrust to an Organization which offers all guarantees of impar-
tiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting
Powers by virtue of the present Convention.
Non-
renunciation
of rights
Protecting
Powers
Activities of the
International
Committee
of the
Red Cross
Substitutes
for
Protecting
Powers
78
79
Conciliation
procedure
When prisoners of war do not benefit or cease to benefit, no
matter for what reason, by the activities of a Protecting Power
or of an Organization provided for in the first paragraph above,
the Detaining Power shall request a neutral State, or such an
Organization, to undertake the functions performed under the
present Convention by a Protecting Power designated by the
Parties to a conflict.
If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detaining
Power shall request or shall accept, subject to the provisions
of this Article, the offer of the Services of a humanitarian Orga-
nization, such as the International Committee of the Red Gross,
to assume the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting
Powers under the present Convention.
Any neutral Power or any Organization invited by the Power
concerned or offering itself for these purposes, shall be required
to act with a sense of responsibility towards the Party to the
conflict on which persons protected by the present Convention
depend, and shall be required to furnish sufficient assurances
that it is in a position to undertake the appropriate functions
and to discharge them impartially.
No derogation from the preceding provisions shall be made
by special agreements between Powers one of which is restricted,
even temporarily, in its freedom to negotiate with the other
Power or its allies by reason of military events, more particularly
where the whole, or a substantial part, of the territory of the
Said Power is occupied.
Whenever in the present Convention mention is made of a
Protecting Power, such mention applies to Substitute organiz-
ations in the sense of the present Article.
ARTICLE II
In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of
protected persons, particularly in cases of disagreement between
the Parties to the conflict as to the application or Interpretation
of the provisions of the present Convention, the Protecting
Powers shall lend their good offices with a view to settling the
disagreement.
For this purpose, each of the Protecting Powers may, eithef
at the invitation of one Party or on its own initiative, propose
to the Parties to the conflict a meeting of their representatives,
and in particular of the authorities responsible for prisoners of
war, possibly on neutral territory suitably chosen. The Parties
to the conflict shall be bound to give effect to the proposals
made to them for this purpose. The Protecting Powers may, if
necessary, propose for approval by the Parties to the conflict
80
a person belonging to a neutral Power, or delegated by the
International Committee of the Red Cross, who shall be invited
to take part in such a meeting.
PART II
GENERAL PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 12
Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but
not of the individuals or military units who have captured them.
Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist,
the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.
Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining
Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after
the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and
ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When
prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances,
responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on
the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.
Nevertheless if that Power fails to carry out the provisions
of the Convention in any important respect the Power by whom
the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified
by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the
Situation or shall request the return of the prisoners of war.
Such requests must be complied with.
Responsibility
for the
treatment
of prisoners
ARTICLE 13
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any
unlawful act or Omission by the Detaining Power causing death
or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its
custody is prohibited and will be regarded as a serious breach
of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war
may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific
experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical,
dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried
out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected,
particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against
insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.
81
Humane
treatment
of prisoners
Respect for
the person
of prisoners
Maintenance
of prisoners
Equality of
treatment
Questioning
of prisoners
ARTICLE 14
Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect
for their persons and their honour.
Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex
and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favourable as
that granted to men.
Prisoners of war shall retain the füll civil capacity which
they enjoyed at the time of their capture. The Detaining Power
may not restrict the exercise, either within or without its own
territory, of the rights such capacity confers except in so far as
the captivity requires.
ARTICLE 15
The Power detaining prisoners of war shall be bound to
provide free of charge for their maintenance and for the medical
attention required by their state of health.
ARTICLE 16
Taking into consideration the provisions of the present
Convention relating to rank and sex, and subject to any privileged
treatment which may be accorded to them by reason of their
State of health, age or professional qualifications, all prisoners
of war shall be treated alike by the Detaining Power, without
any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious
belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on
similar criteria.
PART III
CAPTIVITY
SECTION I
BEGINNING OF CAPTIVITY
ARTICLE 17
Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is
bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of
birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or
failing this, equivalent information.
82
If he wilfuUy infringes this rule he may render himself liable
to a restriction of the Privileges accorded to his rank or status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons
under its Jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war,
with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names,
rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent
information, and date of birth. The identity card may, further-
more, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the
owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party
to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to
its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure
6.5x10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity
card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but
may in no case be taken away from him.
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion
may be infiicted on prisoners of war to secure from them infor-
mation of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental
condition, are unable to state their identity shall be handed
over to the medical Service. The identity of such prisoners shall
be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions
of the preceding paragraph.
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a
language which they understand.
ARTICLE 18
All effect and articles of personal use, except arms, horses,
Tnilitary equipment and military documents, shall remain in
the possession of prisoners or war, likewise their metal helmets
and gas masks and like articles issued for personal protection.
Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall
ikewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and
articles belong to their regulation military equipment.
or At no time should prisoners of war be without identity
cuments. The Detaining Power shall supply such documents
o prisoners of war who possess none.
Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles
having above all a personal or sentimental value may not be
taken from prisoners of war.
Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may not be taken
away from them except by order of an officer, and after the
amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a
special register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly
Property
of prisoners
83
Evacuation
of prisoners
inscribed with the name, rank and unit of the person issuing
the Said receipt. Sums in the currency of the Detaining Power,
or which are changed into such currency at the prisoner's request,
shall be placed to the credit of the prisoner's account as provided
in Article 64.
The Detaining Power may withdraw articles of value from
prisoners of war only f or reasons of security ; when such articles
are withdrawn, the procedure laid down for sums of money
impounded shall apply.
Such objects, likewise the sums taken away in any currency
other than that of the Detaining Power, and the conversion
of which has not been asked for by the owners, shall be kept
in the custody of the Detaining Power and shall be returned
in their initial shape to prisoners of war at the end of their
captivity.
ARTICLE 19
Prisoners of war shall be evacuated as soon as possible after
their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the
combat zone for them to be out of danger.
Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sick-
ness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by
remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in
a danger zone.
Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger
while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone.
Conditions
of evacuation
ARTICLE 20
The evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected
humanely and in conditions similar to those for the forces of
the Detaining Power in their changes of Station.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are
being evacuated with sufficient food and potable water, and
with the necessary clothing and medical attention. The Detain-
ing Power shall take all suitable precautions to ensure their
safety during evacuation, and shall establish as soon as possible
a list of the prisoners of war who are evacuated.
If prisoners of war must, during evacuation, pass through
transit camps, their stay in such camps shall be as brief as
possible.
84
SECTION II
INTERNMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR
CHAPTER I
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
ARTICLE 21
The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to intern-
ment. It may impose on them the Obligation of not leaving,
beyond certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the
said camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter. Subject
to the provisions of the present Convention relative to penal
and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be held
in close confinement except where necessary to safeguard their
health and then only during the continuation of the circumstances
which make such confinement necessary.
Prisoners of w^ar may be partially or wholly released on parole
or promise, in so far as is allow^d by the laws of the Power
on which they depend. Such measures shall be taken parti-
cularly in cases where this may contribute to the improvement
of their state of health. No prisoner of war shall be compelled
to accept liberty on parole or promise.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each Party to the conflict
shall notify the adverse Party of the laws and regulations
allowing or forbidding its own nationals to accept liberty on
parole or promise. Prisoners of war who are paroled or who
have given their promise in conformity with the laws and regula-
tipns so notified, are bound on their personal honour scrupulously
to fulfil, both towards the Pow^er on which they depend and
the Power which has captured them, the engagements of their
paroles or promises. In such cases, the Power on which they
depend is bound neither to require nor to accept from them
any Service incompatible with the parole or promise given.
ARTICLE 22
Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located
on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and health-
fulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the
interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned
in penitentiaries.
Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the
climate is injurious for them, shall be removed as soon as possible
to a more favourable climate.
Restriction
of liberty
of movement
Places and
conditions of
internment
S5
Security
of prisoners
Permanent
transit camps
Quarters
The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in
camps or camp Compounds according to their nationality,
language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not
be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed
forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture,
except with their consent.
ARTiCLE 23
No prisoner of war may at any time be sent to, or detained
in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat
Zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points
or areas immune from military Operations.
Prisoners of war shall have shelters against air bombardment
and other hazards of war, to the same extent as the local civilian
Population. With the exception of those engaged in the pro-
tection of their quarters against the aforesaid hazards, they
may enter such shelters as soon as possible after the giving
of the alarm. Any other protective measure taken in favour
of the Population shall also apply to them.
Detaining Powers shall give the Powers concerned, through
the intermediary of the Protecting Powers, all useful Information
regarding the geographical location of prisoner of war camps.
Whenever military considerations permit, prisoner of war
camps shall be indicated in the day-time by the letters PW
or PG, placed so as to be clearly visible from the air. The
Powers concerned may, however, agree upon any other system
of marking. Only prisoner of war camps shall be marked as
such.
ARTICLE 24
Transit or Screening camps of a permanent kind shall be
fitted out under conditions similar to those described in the
present Section, and the prisoners therein shall have the same
treatment as in other camps.
CHAPTER II
QUARTERS, FOOD AND CLOTHING
OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 25
Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as
favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who
are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make
86
allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall
in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the
dormitories of prisoners of war as regards both total surface
and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding
and blankets.
The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war indi-
vidually or coUectively, shall be entirely protected from damp-
ness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between
dusk and lights out. All precautions must be taken against
the danger of fire.
In any camps in which women prisoners of war, as well as
men, are accommodated, separate dormitories shall be provided
for them.
ARTICLE 26
The basic daily food rations shall be sufhcient in quantity,
quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health
and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional
deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet
of the prisoners.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who
work with such additional rations as are necessary for the labour
on which they are employed.
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of
war. The use of tobacco shall be permitted.
Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with
the preparation of their meals ; they may be employed for
that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given
the means of preparing, themselves, the additional food in their
possession.
Adequate premises shall be provided for messing.
Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.
ARTICLE 27
Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to
prisoners of war in sufficient quantities by the Detaining Power,
which shall make allowance for the climate of the region where
the prisoners are detained. Uniforms of enemy armed forces
captured by the Detaining Power should, if suitable for the
climate, be made available to clothe prisoners of war.
The regulär replacement and repair of the above articles
•shall be assured by the Detaining Power. In addition, prisoners
of war who work shall receive appropriate clothing, wherever
the nature of the work demands.
87
Food
Clothing
Canteens
Hygiene
Ül
Medical
attention
ARTICLE 28
Canteens shall be installed in all camps, where prisoners of
war may procura foodstuffs, soap and tobacco and ordinary
articles in daily use. The tariff shall never be in excess of local
market prices.
The Profits made by camp canteens shall be used for the
benefit of the prisoners ; a special fund shall be created for
this purpose. The prisoners' representative shall have the right
to collaborate in the management of the canteen and of this
fund.
When a camp is closed down, the credit balance of the special
fund shall be handed to an international welfare Organization,
to be employed for the benefit of prisoners of war of the same
nationality as those who have contributed to the fund. In case
of a general repatriation, such profits shall be kept by the
Detaining Power, subject to any agreement to the contrary
between the Powers concerned.
"li
CHAPTER III
HYGIENE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION
ARTICLE 29
The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary
measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness
of camps, and to prevent epidemics.
Prisoners of war shall have for their use, day and night,
conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene and are
maintained in a constant State of cleanliness. In any camps
in which women prisoners of war are accommodated, separate
conveniences shall be provided for them.
Also, apart from the baths and showers with which the camps
shall be furnished, prisoners of war shall be provided with
sufficient water and soap for their personal toilet and for washing
their personal laundry ; the necessary installations, facilities
and time shall be granted them for that purpose.
ARTICLE 30
Every camp shall have an adequate infirmary where prisoners
of war may have the attention they require, as well as appropriate
diet. Isolation wards shall, if necessary, be set aside for cases
of contagious or mental disease.
88
Prisoners of war suffering from serious disease, or whose
condition necessitates special treatment, a surgical Operation
or hospital care, must be admitted to any military or civil medical
unit where such treatment can be given, even if their repatria-
tion is contemplated in the near future. Special facilities shall
be afforded for the care to be given to the disabled, in particular
to the blind, and for their rehabilitation, pending repatriation.
Prisoners of war shall have the attention, preferably, of medical
personnel of the Power on which they depend and, if possible,
of their nationality.
Prisoners of war may not be prevented from presenting
themselves to the medical authorities for examination. The
detaining authorities shall, upon request, issue to every prisoner
who has undergone treatment, an official certificate indicating
the nature of his illness or injury, and the duration and kind
of treatment received. A duplicate of this certificate shall be
forwarded to the Central Prisoners of War Agency.
The costs of treatment, including those of any apparatus
necessary for the maintenance of prisoners of war in good
health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances,
and spectacles, shall be borne by the Detaining Power.
ARTICLE 31
Medical inspections of prisoners of war shall be made at
least once a month. They shall include the checking and the
recording of the weight of each prisoner of war. Their purpose
shall be, in particular, to supervise the general State of health,
nutrition and cleanliness of prisoners and to detect contagious
diseases, especially tuberculosis, malaria and venereal disease.
fJ'or this purpose the most efficient methods available shall be
employed, e.g. periodic mass miniature radiography for the
early detection of tuberculosis.
ARTICLE 32
Prisoners of war who, though not attached to the medical
Service of their armed forces, are physicians, surgeons, dentists,
nurses or medical orderlies, may be required by the Detaining
Power to exercise their medical functions in the interests of
prisoners of war dependent on the same Power. In that case
they shall continue to be prisoners of war, but shall receive the
same treatment as corresponding medical personnel retained
by the Detaining Power. They shall be exempted from any
other work under Article 49.
89
Medical
inspections
Prisoners
engaged
on medical
duties
Rights and
Privileges
of retained
personnel
CHAPTER IV
MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND CHAPLAINS
RETAINED TO ASSIST PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 33
Members of the medical personnel and chaplains while
retained by the Detaining Power with a view to assisting pri-
soners of war, shall not be considered as prisoners of war. They
shall, however, receive as a minimum the benefits and protection
of the present Convention, and shall also be granted all facilities
necessary to provide for the medical care of, and religious
ministration to prisoners of war.
They shall continue to exercise their medical and spiritual
functions for the benefit of prisoners of war, preferably those
belonging to the armed forces upon which they depend, within
the scope of the military laws and regulations of the Detaining
Power and under the control of its competent Services, in
accordance with their professional etiquette. They shall also
benefit by the following facilities in the exercise of their medical
or spiritual functions :
(a) They shall be authorized to visit periodically prisoners
of war situated in working detachments or in hospitals
outside the camp. For this purpose, the Detaining
Power shall place at their disposal the necessary means
of transport.
(b) The senior medical officer in each camp shall be respon-
sible to the camp military authorities for everything
connected with the activities of retained medical
personnel. For this purpose, Parties to the conflict
shall agree at the outbreak of hostilities on the subject
of the corresponding ranks of the medical personnel,
including that of societies mentioned in Article 26 of
the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field of August 12, 1949. This senior medical
officer, as well as chaplains, shall have the right to deal
with the competent authorities of the camp on all
questions relating to their duties. Such authorities
shall afford them all necessary facilities for correspond-
ence relating to these questions.
(c) Although they shall be subject to the internal discipline
of the camp in which they are retained, such personnel
may not be compelled to carry out any work other than
that concerned with their medical or religious duties.
During hostilities, the Parties to the conflict shall agree
concerning the possible relief of retained personnel and shall
settle the procedure to be followed.
None of the preceding provisions shall relieve the Detaining
Power of its obligations with regard to prisoners of war from
the medical or spiritual point of view.
CHAPTER V
RELIGIOUS, INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL
ACTIVITIES
ARTICLE 34
Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise
of their religious duties, including attendance at the Service
of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary
routine prescribed by the military authorities.
Adequate premises shall be provided where religious Services
may be held.
ARTICLE 35
Chaplains who fall into the hands of the enemy Power and
who remain or are retained with a view to assisting prisoners
of war, shall be allowed to minister to them and to exercise
freely their ministry amongst prisoners of war of the same
religion, in accordance with their religious conscience. They
shall be allocated among the various camps and labour detach-
ments containing prisoners of war belonging to the same forces,
speaking the same language or practising the same religion.
They shall enjoy the necessary facilities, including the means
of transport provided for in Article 33, for visiting the prisoners
of war outside their camp. They shall be free to correspond,
subject tö censorship, on matters concerning their religious
duties with the ecclesiastical authorities in the country of
detention and with the international religious organizations.
Letters and cards which they may send for this purpose shall
be in addition to the quota provided for in Article 71.
ARTICLE 36
Prisoners of war who are ministers of religion, without
having ofiiciated as chaplains to their own forces, shall be at
liberty, whatever their denomination, to minister freely to
the members of their Community. For this purpose, they shall
Religious
duties
Retained
chaplains
Prisoners
who are
ministers
of religion
90
91
Prisoners
without a
minister
of their
religion
Recreation,
study, Sports
and games
Adminis-
tration.
Saluting
receive the same treatment as the chaplains retained by the
Detaining Power. They shall not be obliged to do any other
work.
ARTICLE 37
When prisoners of war have not the assistance of a retained
chaplain or of a prisoner of war minister of their faith, a minister
belonging to the prisoners' or a similar denomination, or in
his absence a qualified layman, if such a course is feasible from
a confessional point of view, shall be appointed at the request
of the prisoners concerned to fill this office. This appointment,
subject to the approval of the Detaining Power, shall take place
with the agreement of the Community of prisoners concerned
and, wherever necessary, with the approval of the local religious
authorities of the same faith. The person thus appointed shall
comply with all regulations established by the Detaining Power
in the interests of discipline and military security.
ARTICLE 38
While respecting the individual preferences of every prisoner,
the Detaining Power shall encourage the practice of intellectual,
educational, and recreational pursuits, Sports and games amongst
prisoners, and shall take the measures necessary to ensure the
exercise thereof by providing them with adequate premises and
necessary equipment.
Prisoners shall have opportunities for taking physical exercise
including sports and games and for being out of doors. Suffi-
cient open Spaces shall be provided for this purpose in all camps.
CHAPTER VI
DISCIPLINE
ARTICLE 39
Every prisoner of war camp shall be put under the immediate
authority of a responsible commissioned officer belonging to
the regulär armed forces of the Detaining Power. Such officer
shall have in his possession a copy of the present Convention ;
he shall ensure that its provisions are known to the camp staff
and the guard and shall be responsible, under the direction
of his government, for its application.
Prisoners of war, with the exception of officers, must salute
and show to all ofhcers of the Detaining Power the external
marks of respect provided for by the regulations applying in
their own forces.
92
Officer prisoners of war are bound to salute only ofhcers
of a higher rank of the Detaining Power ; they must, however,
salute the camp Commander regardless of his rank.
ARTICLE 40
The wearing of badges of rank and nationality, as well as
of decorations, shall be permitted.
ARTICLE 41
In every camp the text of the present Convention and its
Annexes and the contents of any special agreement provided
for in Article 6, shall be posted, in the prisoners' own language,
at places where all may read them. Copies shall be supplied,
on request, to the prisoners who cannot have access to the copy
which has been posted.
Regulations, Orders, notices and publications of every kmd
relating to the conduct of prisoners of war shall be issued to
them in a language which they understand. Such regulations,
Orders and publications shall be posted in the manner described
above and copies shall be handed to the prisoners' representative.
Every order and command addressed to prisoners of war indi-
vidually must likewise be given in a language which they
understand.
ARTICLE 42
The use of weapons against prisoners of war, especially
against those who are escaping or attempting to escape, shall
constitute an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded
by warnings appropriate to the circumstances.
CHAPTER VII
RANK OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 43
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties to the conflict
shall communicate to one another the titles and ranks of all
the persons mentioned in Article 4 of the present Convention
in Order to ensure equality of treatment between prisoners of
equivalent rank. Titles and ranks which are subsequently
created shall form the subject of similar communications.
The Detaining Power shall recognize promotions in rank
which have been accorded to prisoners of war and which have
been duly notified by the Power on which these prisoners depend.
93
Badges and
decorations
Posting of the
Convention,
and of
regulations
and Orders
concerning
prisoners
Use of
weapons
Notification
of ranks
^
Treatment
of ofiBcers
Treatment
of other
prisoners
Conditions
ARTICLE 44
Officers and prisoners of equivalent status shall be treated
with the regard due to their rank and age.
In Order to ensure Service in officers' camps, other ranks of
the same armed forces who, as far as possible, speak the same
language, shall be assigned in sufficient numbers, account
being taken of the rank of officers and prisoners of equivalent
Status. Such orderlies shall not be required to perform any
other work.
Supervision of the mess by the officers themselves shall be
facilited in every way.
ARTICLE 45
Prisoners of war other than officers and prisoners of equi-
valent Status shall be treated with the regard due to their
rank and age.
Supervision of the mess by the prisoners themselves shall
be facilitated in every way.
CHAPTER VIII
0
TRANSFER OF PRISONERS OF WAR
AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN CAMP
ARTICLE 46
The Detaining Power, when deciding upon the transfer of
prisoners of war, shall take into account the interests of the
prisoners themselves, more especially so as not to increase the
difficulty of their repatriation.
The transfer of prisoners of war shall always be effected
humanely and in conditions not less favourable than those under
which the forces of the Detaining Power are transferred. Account
shall always be taken of the climatic conditions to which the
prisoners of war are accustomed and the conditions of transfer
shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.
The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war during
transfer with sufficient food and drinking water to keep them
in good health, likewise with the necessary clothing, shelter
and medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take adequate
precautions especially in case of transport by sea or by air,
to ensure their safety during transfer, and shall draw up a com-
plete list of all transferred prisoners before their departure.
94
ARTICLE 47
Sick or wounded prisoners of war shall not be transferred
as long as their recovery may be endangered by the journey,
unless their safety imperatively demands it.
If the combat zone draws closer to a camp, the prisoners of
war in the said camp shall not be transferred unless their transfer
can be carried out in adequate conditions of safety, or if they
are exposed to greater risks by remaining on the spot than by
being transferred.
ARTICLE 48
In the event of transfer, prisoners of war shall be officially
advised of their departure and of their new postal address.
Such notifications shall be given in time for them to pack
their luggage and inform their next of kin.
They shall be allowed to take with them their personal
effects, and the correspondence and parcels which have arrived
for them. The weight of such baggage may be limited, if the
conditions of transfer so require, to what each prisoner can
reasonably carry, which shall in no case be more than twenty-
five kilograms per head.
Mail and parcels addressed to their former camp shall be
forwarded to them without delay. The camp Commander
shall take, in agreement with the prisoners' representative,
any measures needed to ensure the transport of the prisoners'
Community property and of the luggage they are unable to
take with them in consequence of restrictions imposed by
virtue of the second paragraph of this Article.
The costs of transfers shall be borne by the Detaining Power.
SECTION III
LABOUR OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 49
The Detaining Power may utilize the labour of prisoners of
war who are physically fit, taking into account their age, sex,
rank and physical aptitude, and with a view particularly to
maintaining them in a good state of physical and mental health.
Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war shall
only be required to do supervisory work. Those not so required
may ask for other suitable work which shall, so far as possible,
be found for them.
95
Circumstances
precluding
transfer
Procedure
for transfer
General
observations
I;
Authorized
work
Working
conditions
i
I '
If officers or persons of equivalent Status ask for suitable
work, it shall be found for them, so far as possible, but they
may in no circumstances be compelled to work.
ARTiCLE 50
Besides work connected with camp administration, Installa-
tion or maintenance, prisoners of war may be compelled to
do only such work as is included in the following classes :
(a) agriculture ;
(b) Industries connected with the production or the extrac-
tion of raw materials, and manufacturing Industries, with
the exception of metallurgical, machinery and chemical
Industries ; public works and building Operations which
have no military character or purpose ;
(c) transport and handling of stores which are not military
in character or purpose ;
(d) commerclal business, and arts and crafts ;
(e) domestic Service ;
(f) public Utility Services having no military character or
purpose.
Should the above provislons be infringed, prisoners of war
shall be allowed to exercise their right of complaint, in conformity
with Article 78.
ARTICLE 51
Prisoners of war must be granted suitable working condi-
tions, especially as regards accommodation, food, clothing and
equipment ; such conditions shall not be Inferior to those
enjoyed by natlonals of the Detalning Power employed In
similar work ; account shall also be taken of climatic conditions.
The Detalning Power, in utillzing the labour of prisoners
of war, shall ensure that in areas in which prisoners are employed,
the national leglslation concerning the protection of labour,
and, more particularly, the regulations for the safety of workers,
are duly applied.
Prisoners of war shall receive training and be provided with
the means of protection suitable to the work they will have to do
and similar to those accorded to the natlonals of the Detalning
Power. Subject to the provislons of Article 52, prisoners may
be submitted to the normal risks run by these clvllian workers.
Conditions of labour shall In no case be rendered more arduous
by disciplinary measures.
96
ARTICLE 52
Unless he be a volunteer, no prisoner of war may be employed
on labour which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature.
No prisoner of war shall be assigned to labour which would
be looked upon as humiliating for a member of the Detainmg
Power's own forces. .
The removal of mines or similar devices shall be considered
as dangerous labour.
ARTICLE 53
The duration of the daily labour of prisoners of war, Including
the time of the journey to and fro, shall not be excessive, and
must in no case exceed that permitted for civilian workers m
the district, who are natlonals of the Detalning Power and
employed on the same work. . t ^ .
Prisoners of war must be allowed, in the middle of the day s
work a rest of not less than one hour. This rest will be the
same' as that to which workers of the Detalning Power are
entitled, if the latter is of longer duration. They shall be
allowed In addition a rest of twenty-four consecutive hours
every week, preferably on Sunday or the day of rest m their
country of origin. Furthermore, every prisoner who has worked
for one year shall be granted a rest of eight consecutive days,
during which his working pay shall be paid him.
If methods of labour such as piece work are employed, the
length of the working perlod shall not be rendered excessive
thereby.
ARTICLE 54
The working pay due to prisoners of war shall be fixed in
accordance with the provislons of Article 62 of the present
Convention. .
Prisoners of war who sustain accidents in connection witn
work, or who contract a disease in the course, or in consequence
of their work, shall receive all the care their condition may
require. The Detaining Power shall furthermore deliver to
such prisoners of war a medical certificate enabling them to
submit their claims to the Power on which they depend, and
shall send a duplicate to the Central Prisoners of War Agency
provided for in Article 123.
ARTICLE 55
The fitness of prisoners of war for work shall be periodically
verified by medical examinations, at least once a month. The
examinations shall have particular regard to the nature of the
work which prisoners of war are required to do.
97
Dangerous
er
humiliating
labour
Duration
of labour
Working pay.
Occupational
accidents
and diseases
Medical
supervision
Labour
detachments
Prisoners
working for
private
employers
<H!
Ready money
If any prisoner of war considers himself incapable of working,
he shall be permitted to appear before the medical authorities
of his camp. Physicians or surgeons may recommend that the
prisoners who are, in their opinion, unfit for work, be exempted
therefrom.
ARTICLE 56
The Organisation and administration of labour detachments
shall be similar to those of prisoner of war camps.
Every labour detachment shall remain under the control
of and administratively part of a prisoner of war camp. The
military authorities and the Commander of the said camp shall
be responsible, under the direction of their government, for the
observance of the provisions of the present Convention in labour
detachments.
The camp Commander shall keep an up-to-date record of
the labour detachments dependent on his camp, and shall
communicate it to the delegates of the Protecting Power, of
the International Committee of the Red Gross, or of other
agencies giving relief to prisoners of war, who may visit the
camp.
ARTICLE 57
The treatment of prisoners of war who work for private
persons, even if the latter are responsible for guarding and
protecting them, shall not be inferior to that which is provided
for by the present Convention. The Detaining Power, the
military authorities and the Commander of the camp to which
such prisoners belong shall be entirely responsible for the
maintenance, care, treatment, and payment of the working
pay of such prisoners of war.
Such prisoners of war shall have the right to remain in com-
munication with the prisoners' representatives in the camps on
which they depend.
SECTION IV
FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 58
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, and pending an arrange-
ment on this matter with the Protecting Power, the Detaining
Power may determine the maximum amount of money in cash
or in any similar form, that prisoners may have in their pos-
session. Any amount in excess, which was properly in their
98
possession and which has been taken or withheld ^^om them
shall be placed to their account, together with any monies
deposited by them, and shall not be converted mto any other
currency without their consent.
If prisoners of war are permitted to purchase Services or
commodities outside the camp against payment in cash, such
payments shall be made by the prisoner himself or the canip
Administration who will charge them to the accounts of he
prisoners concerned. The Detaining Power will establish the
necessary rules in this respect.
ARTICLE 59
Cash which was taken from prisoners of war, in accordance
with Article 18, at the time of their capture and which is m
the currency of the Detaining Power, shall be placed to their
separate accounts, in accordance with the provisions of Article
64 of the present Section. , ^ . . • o ^ ^„^
The amounts, in the currency of the Detaining Power due
to the conversion of sums in other currencies that are taken
from the prisoners of war at the same time, shall also be credited
to their separate accounts.
ARTICLE 60
The Detaining Power shall grant all P/I^oners of war a
monthly advance of pay, the amount of which shall be fixed
by conversion, into the currency of the said Power, of the
following amounts :
Prisoners ranking below sergeants : eight
Swiss francs.
Sergeants and other non-commissioned offi-
cers, or prisoners of equivalent rank : twelve
Swiss francs. .
Warrant officers and commissioned officers
below the rank of major or prisoners of
equivalent rank : fifty Swiss francs.
Majors, lieutenant-colonels, colonels or pri-
soners ' of equivalent rank : sixty Swiss
francs.
General officers or prisoners of war of equi-
valent rank : seventy-five Swiss francs.
However, the Parties to the conflict concerned may by
special agreement modify the amount of advances of pay due
to prisoners of the preceding categories.
99
Category I :
Category II :
Category III :
Category IV :
Category V :
Amounts in
cash taken
from
prisoners
Advances
of pay
Supplemen-
tary pay
Working pay
Furthermore, if the amounts indicated in the first paragraph
above would be unduly high compared with the pay of the
Detaining Power's armed forces or would, for any reason,
seriously embarrass the Detaining Power, then, pending the
conclusion of a special agreement with the Power on which
the prisoners depend to vary the amounts indicated above,
the Detaining Power :
(a) shall continue to credit the accounts of the prisoners
with the amounts indicated in the first paragraph
above ;
(b) may temporarily limit the amount made available
from these advances of pay to prisoners of war for their
own use, to sums which are reasonable, but which,
for Category I, shall never be inferior to the amount
that the Detaining Power gives to the members of
its own armed forces.
The reasons for any limitations will be given without delay
to the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 6i
The Detaining Power shall accept for distribution as sup-
plementary pay to prisoners of war sums which the Power
on which the prisoners depend may forward to them, on condi-
tion that the sums to be paid shall be the same for each prisoner
of the same category, shall be payable to all prisoners of that
category depending on that Power, and shall be placed in their
separate accounts, at the earliest opportunity, in accordance
with the provisions of Article 64. Such supplementary pay
shall not relieve the Detaining Power of any Obligation under
this Convention.
ARTICLE 62
Prisoners of war shall be paid a fair working rate of pay by
the detaining authorities direct. The rate shall be fixed by
the Said authorities, but shall at no time be less than one-
fourth of one Swiss franc for a füll working day. The Detaining
Power shall inform prisoners of war, as well as the Power on
which they depend, through the intermediary of the Protecting
Power, of the rate of daily working pay that it has fixed.
Working pay shall likewise be paid by the detaining author-
ities to prisoners of war permanently detailed to duties or to
a skilled or semi-skilled occupation in connection with the
administration, installation or maintenance of camps, and to
100
the prisoners who are required to carry out spiritual or medical
duties on behalf of their cornrades.
The working pay of the prisoners' representative, of his
advisers. if any, and of his assistants, shall be paid out of the
fund maintained by canteen proftts. The scale of this working
pay shall be fixed by the prisoners' representative and approved
by the camp Commander. If there is no such fund, the detaining
authorities shall pay these prisoners a fair working rate of pay.
ARTICLE 63
Prisoners of war shall be permitted to receive remittances
of money addressed to them individually or collectively.
Every prisoner of war shall have at his disposal the credit
balance of his account as provided for in the following Article,
within the limits fixed by the Detaining Power, which shall make
such payments as are requested. Subject to financial or mone-
tary restrictions which the Detaining Power regards as essential,
prisoners of war may also have payments made abroad. In
this case payments addressed by prisoners of war to dependents
shall be given priority.
In any event, and subject to the consent of the Power on
which they depend, prisoners may have payments made in
their own country, as follows : the Detaining Power shall
send to the aforesaid Power through the Protecting Power,
a notification giving all the necessary particulars concerning
the prisoners of war, the beneficiaries of the payments, and the
amount of the sums to be paid, expressed in the Detaining
Power's currency. The said notification shall be signed by the
prisoners and countersigned by the camp Commander. The
Detaining Power shall debit the prisoners' account by a cor-
responding amount ; the sums thus debited shall be placed
by it to the credit of the Power on which the prisoners depend.
To apply the foregoing provisions, the Detaining Power
may usefully consult the Model Regulations in Annex V of the
present Convention.
ARTICLE 64
The Detaining Power shall hold an account for each prisoner
of war, showing at least the following :
(i) The amounts due to the prisoner or received by him
as advances of pay, as working pay or derived from any
other source ; the sums in the currency of the Detain-
ing Power which were taken from him ; the sums taken
lOI
Transfer
of funds
Prisoners'
accounts
I
IL;
Management
of prisoners'
accounts
Winding up
of accounts
from him and converted at his request into the currency
of the Said Power.
(2) The payments made to the prisoner in cash, or in any
other similar form ; the payments made on his behalf
and at his request ; the sums transferred under Article
63, third Paragraph.
ARTICLE 65
Every item entered in the account of a prisoner of war shall
be countersigned or initialled by him, or by the prisoners'
representative acting on his behalf.
Prisoners of war shall at all times be afforded reasonable
facilities for Consulting and obtaining copies of their accounts,
which may likewise be inspected by the representatives of the
Protecting Powers at the time of visits to the camp.
When prisoners of war are transferred from one camp to
another, their personal accounts will follow them. In case of
transfer from one Detaining Power to another, the monies
which are their property and are not in the currency of the
Detaining Power will follow them. They shall be given cer-
tificates for any other monies standing to the credit of their
accounts.
The Parties to the conflict concerned may agree to notify
to each other at specific intervals through the Protecting Power,
the amount of the accounts of the prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 66
On the termination of captivity, through the release of a
prisoner of war or his repatriation, the Detaining Power shall
give him a statement, signed by an authorized officer of that
Power, showing the credit balance then due to him. The
Detaining Power shall also send through the Protecting Power
to the government upon which the prisoner of war depends,
lists giving all appropriate particulars of all prisoners of war
whose captivity has been terminated by repatriation, release,
escape, death or any other means, and showing the amount
of their credit balances. Such lists shall be certified on each
sheet by an authorized representative of the Detaining Power.
Any of the above provisions of this Article may be varied
by mutual agreement between any two Parties to the conflict.
The Power on which the prisoner of war depends shall be
responsible for settling with him any credit balance due to
him from the Detaining Power on the termination of his
captivity.
ARTICLE 67
Advances of pay, issued to prisoners of war in conformity
with Article 60, shall be considered as made on behalf of the
Power on which they depend. Such advances of pay, as well
as all payments made by the said Power under Article 63, third
Paragraph, and Article 68, shall form the subject of arrange-
ments between the Powers concerned, at the close of hostilities.
ARTICLE 68
Any Claim by a prisoner of war for compensation in respect
of any injury or other disability arising out of work shall be
referred to the Power on which he depends, through the Pro-
tecting Power. In accordance with Article 54, the Detaining
Power will, in all cases, provide the prisoner of war concerned
with a Statement showing the nature of the injury or disability,
the circumstances in which it arose and particulars of medical
or hospital treatment given for it. This statement will be signed
by a responsible ofhcer of the Detaining Power and the medical
particulars certified by a medical officer.
Any Claim from a prisoner of war for compensation in respect
of [Wsonal effects, monies or valuables impounded by the
Detaining Power under Article 18 and not forthcoming on his
repatriation, or in respect of loss alleged to be due to the fault
of the Detaining Power or any of its servants, shall likewise
be referred to the Power on which he depends. Nevertheless,
any such personal effects required for use by the prisoners
of war whilst in captivity shall be replaced at the expense of
the Detaining Power. The Detaining Power will, in all cases,
provide the prisoner of war with a statement, signed by a
responsible officer, showing all available information rcgarding
the reasons why such effects, monies or valuables have not
been restored to him. A copy of this statement will be forwarded
to the Power on which he depends through the Central Agency
for Prisoners of War provided for in Article 123.
SECTION V
RELATIONS OF PRISONERS OF WAR
WITH THE EXTERIOR
ARTICLE 69
Immediately upon prisoners of war falling into its power,
the Detaining Power shall inform them and the Powers on
which they depend, through the Protecting Power, of the
Adjustments
between
Parties to the
conflict
Claims for
compensatioa
Notification
of measures
taken
102
103
Capture card
i
Corres-
pondence
1 1
ili
measures taken to carry out the provisions of the present
Section. They shall likewise inform the parties concerned of
any subsequent modifications of such measures.
ARTICLE 70
Immediately upon capture, or not more than one week
after arrival at a carnp, even if it is a transit camp, likewise
in case of sickness or transfer to hospital or another camp,
every prisoner of war shall be enabled to write direct to his
family, on the one band, and to the Central Prisoners of War
Agency provided for in Article 123, on the other band, a card
similar, if possible, to the model annexed to the present Con-
vention, informing bis relatives of bis capture, address and
State of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly
as possible and may not be delayed in any nianner.
ARTICLE 71
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to send and receive letters
and cards. If the Detaining Power deems it necessary to limit
the number of letters and cards sent by each prisoner of war,
the said number shall not be less than two letters and four cards
monthly, exclusive of the capture cards provided for in Article 70,
and conforming as closely as possible to the modeis annexed
to the present Convention. Further limitations may be imposed
only if the Protecting Power is satisfied that it would be in
the interests of the prisoners of war concerned to do so owing
to difficulties of translation caused by the Detaining Power's
inability to find sufficient qualiiied linguists to carry out the
necessary censorship. If limitations must be placed on the
correspondence addressed to prisoners of war, they may be
ordered only by the Power on which the prisoners depend,
possibly at the request of the Detaining Power. Such letters
and cards must be conveyed by the most rapid method at the
disposal of the Detaining Pow^r ; they may not be delayed
or retained for disciplinary reasons.
Prisoners of war who have been without news for a long
period, or who are unable to receive news from their next of
kin or to give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well
as those who are at a great distance from their homes, shall be
permitted to send telegrams, the fees being charged against
the prisoners of war's accounts with the Detaining Power or
paid in the currency at their disposal. They shall likewise
benefit by this measure in cases of urgency.
As a general rule, the correspondence of prisoners of war
shall be written in their native language. The Parties to the
confiict may allow correspondence in other languages.
Sacks containing prisoner of war mail must be securely
sealed and labelled so as clearly to indicate their contents, and
must be addressed to offices of destination.
ARTICLE 72
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to receive by post or by
any other means individual parcels or collective shipments
containing, in particular, foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies
and articles of a religious, educational or recreational character
which may meet their needs, including books, devotional articles,
scientific equipment, examination papers, musical instruments,
Sports outfits and materials allowing prisoners of war to pursue
their studies or their cultural activities.
Such shipments shall in no way free the Detaining Power
from the obligations imposed upon it by virtue of the present
Convention.
The only limits which may be placed on these shipments
shall be those proposed by the Protecting Power in the interest
of the prisoners themselves, or by the International Committee
of the Red Cross or any other Organization giving assistance
to the prisoners, in respect of their own shipments only, on
account of exceptional strain on transport or Communications.
The conditions for the sending of individual parcels and
collective relief shall, if necessary, be the subject of special
agreements between the Powers concerned, which may in no
case delay the receipt by the prisoners of relief supplies. Books
may not be included in parcels of clothing and foodstuffs.
Medical supplies shall, as a rule, be sent in collective parcels.
ARTICLE y^
In the absence of special agreements between the Powers
concerned on the conditions for the receipt and distribution
of collective relief shipments, the rules and regulations con-
cerning collective shipments, which are annexed to the present
Convention, shall be applied.
The special agreements referred to above shall in no case
restrict the right of prisoners' representatives to take possession
of collective relief shipments intended for prisoners of war, to
proceed to their distribution or to dispose of them in the interest
of the prisoners.
Nor shall such agreements restrict the right of representatives
of the Protecting Power, the International Committee of the
Relief
shipments
I.
General
principles
II.
Collective
relief
104
105
Exemption
from
postal and
transport
charges
Special
means of
transport
Red Gross or any other Organisation giving assistance to pri-
soners of war and responsible for the forwardiiig of collective
shipments, to supervise their distribution to the recipients.
ARTICLE 74
All relief shipments for prisoners of war shall be exempt
from import, customs and other dues.
Correspondence, relief shipments and authorized remittances
of money addressed to prisoners of war or despatched by them
through the post office, either direct or through the Information
Bureaux provided for in Article 122 and the Central Prisoners
of War Agency provided for in Article 123, shall be exempt
from any postal dues, both in the countries of origin and destin-
ation, and in intermediate countries.
If relief shipments intended for prisoners of war cannot be
sent through the post office by reason of weight or for any other
cause, the cost of transportation shall be borne by the Detaining
Power in all the territories under its control. The other Powers
party to the Convention shall bear the cost of transport in their
respective territories.
In the absence of special agreements between the Parties
concerned, the costs connected with transport of such ship-
ments, other than costs covered by the above exemption, shall
be charged to the senders.
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to reduce,
so far as possible, the rat es charged for telegrams sent by pri-
soners of war, or addressed to them.
ARTICLE 75
Should military Operations prevent the Powers concerned
from fulfilling their Obligation to assure the transport of the
shipments referred to in Articles 70, 71, 72 and ^t, the Pro-
tecting Powers concerned, the International Committee of the
Red Cross or any other Organization duly approved by the
Parties to the conflict may undertake to ensure the conveyance
of such shipments by suitable means (railway wagons, motor
vehicles, vessels or aircraft, etc.). For this purpose, the High
Contracting Parties shall endeavour to supply them with such
transport and to allow its circulation, especially by granting
the necessary safe-conducts.
Such transport may also be used to convey :
(a)
correspondence, lists and reports exchanged between
the Central Information Agency referred to in Article
123 and the National Bureaux referred to in Article 122 ;
106
(h) correspondence and reports relating to prisoners of war
which the Protecting Powers, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross or any other body assisting
the prisoners, cxchange either with their own delegates
or with the Parties to the conflict.
These provisions in no way detract from the right of any
Party to the conflict to arrange other means of transport, if
it should so prefer, nor preclude the granting of safe-conducts,
under mutually agreed conditions, to such means of transport.
In the absence of special agreements, the costs occasioned
by the use of such means of transport shall be borne propor-
tionally by the Parties to the conflict whose nationals are
benefited thereby.
ARTICLE 76
The censoring of correspondence addressed to prisoners of
war or despatched by them shall be done as quickly as possible.
Mail shall be censored only by the despatching State and the
receiving State, and once only by each.
The examination of consignments intended for prisoners of
war shall not be carried out under conditions that will expose
the goods contained in them to deterioration ; except in the
case of written or printed matter, it shall be done in the presence
of the addressee, or of a fellow-prisoner duly delegated by him.
The delivery to prisoners of individual or collective consign-
ments shall not be delayed under the pretext of difiiculties of
censorship.
Any Prohibition of correspondence ordered by Parties to
the conflict, either for military or political reasons, shall be
* only temporary and its duration shall be as short as possible.
Censorship
and
examination
ARTICLE 'J']
The Detaining Powers shall provide all facilities for the
transmission, through the Protecting Power or the Central
Prisoners of War Agency provided for in Article 123, of Instru-
ments, papers or documents intended for prisoners of war or
despatched by them, especially powers of attorney and wills.
In all cases they shall facilitate the preparation and execu-
tion of such documents on behalf of prisoners of war ; in
particular, they shall allow them to consult a lawyer and shall
take what measures are necessary for the authentication of their
signatures.
Preparation,
execution
and
transmission
of legal
documents
107
Complaints
and requests
Election
SECTION VI
RELATIONS BETWEEN PRISONERS OF WAR
AND THE AUTHORITIES
CHAPTER I
COMPLAINTS OF PRISONERS OF WAR
RESPECTING THE CONDITIONS OF CAPTIVITY
ARTICLE 78
Prisoners of war shall have the right to make known to the
military authorities in whose power they are, their requests
regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected.
They shall also have the unrestricted right to apply to the
representatives of the Protecting Powers either through their
prisoners' representative or, if they consider it necessary, direct,
in Order to draw their attention to any points on which they may
have complaints to make regarding their conditions of captivity.
These requests and complaints shall not be limited nor con-
sidered to be a part of the correspondence quota referred to
in Article 71. They must be transmitted immediately. Even
if they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not give
rise to any punishment.
Prisoners' representatives may send periodic reports on the
Situation in the camps and the needs of the prisoners of war
to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.
CHAPTER II
PRISONERS OF WAR REPRESENTATIVES
ARTICLE 79
In all places where there are prisoners of war, except in
those where there are officers, the prisoners shall freely elect
by secret ballot, every six months, and also in case of vacancies,
prisoner's representatives entrusted with representing them
before the military authorities, the Protecting Powers, the
International Committee of the Red Cross and any other Organ-
ization which may assist them. These prisoners' representatives
shall be eligible for re-election.
In camps for officers and persons of equivalent Status or
in mixed camps, the senior officer among the prisoners of war
shall be recognised as the camp prisoners' representative. In
108
camps for officers, he shall be assisted by one or more advisers
chosen by the officers ; in mixed camps, his assistants shall
be chosen from among the prisoners of war who are not officers
and shall be elected by them.
Officer prisoners of war of the same nationality shall be
stationed in labour camps for prisoners of war, for the purpose
of carrying out the camp administration duties for which the
prisoners of war are responsable. These officers may be elected
as prisoners' representatives under the first paragraph of this
Article. In such a case the assistants to the prisoners' represent-
atives shall be chosen from among those prisoners of war who
are not officers.
Every representative elected must be approved by the
Detaining Power before he has the right to commence his duties.
Where the Detaining Power refuses to approve a prisoner of
war elected by his fellow prisoners of war, it must inform the
Protecting Power of the reason for such refusal.
In all cases the prisoners' representative must have the
same nationality, language and customs as the prisoners of
war whom he represents. Thus, prisoners of war distributed
in different sections of a camp, according to their nationality,
language or customs, shall have for each section their own
prisoners' representative, in accordance with the foregoing
paragraphs.
ARTICLE 80
Prisoners' representatives shall furthcr the physical, spiritual
and intellectual well-being of prisoners of war.
In particular, where the prisoners decide to organize amongst
themselves a System of mutual assistance, this Organization
will be within the province of the prisoners' representative, in
'addition to the special duties entrusted to him by other provisions
of the present Convention.
Prisoners' representatives shall not be held responsible,
simply by reason of their duties, for any offences committed
by prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 81
Prisoners' representatives shall not be required to perform
any other work, if the accomplishment of their duties is thereby
made more difficult.
Prisoners' representatives may appoint from amongst the
prisoners such assistants as they may require. All material
facilities shall be granted them, particularly a certain freedom
of movement necessary for the accomplishment of their duties
(inspections of labour detachments, receipt of supplies, etc.).
109
Duties
i'l
Prerogatives
i[
'11
il
Prisoners' representatives shall be permitted to visit premises
where prisoners of war are detained, and every prisoner of war
shall have the right to consult freely his prisoners' representative.
All facilities shall likewise be accorded to the prisoners'
representatives for communication by post and telegraph with
the detaining authorities, the Protecting Powers, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Gross and their delegates, the
Mixed Medical Commissions and with the bodies which give
assistance to prisoners of war. Prisoners' representatives of
labour detachments shall enjoy the same facilities for com-
munication with the prisoners' representatives of the principal
camp. Such Communications shall not be restricted, nor con-
sidered as forming a part of the quota mentioned in Article 71.
Prisoners' representatives who are transferred shall be
allowed a reasonable time to accjuaint their successors with
current affairs.
In case of dismissal, the reasons therefor shall be com-
municated to the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 84
A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court,
unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit
the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to
have been committed by the prisoner of war.
In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be
tried by a court of any kind which does not offer the essential
guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally
recognized, and, in particular, the procedure of which does not
afford the accused the rights and means of defence provided
for in Article 105.
ARTICLE 85
Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining
Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even
if convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.
Courts
Offences
committed
before capture
Applicable
legislation
Choice of
disciplinary
er judicial
proceeding
CHAPTER III
PENAL AND DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
/. General Provisions
ARTICLE 82
A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations
and Orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power ;
the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or
disciplinary measures in respect of any offence committed by
a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations or Orders.
However, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the pro-
visions of this Chapter shall be allowed.
If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power
shall declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be punish-
able, whereas the same acts w^ould not be punishable if com-
mitted by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power,
such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.
ARTICLE 83
In deciding whether proceedings in respect of an offence
alleged to have been committed by a prisoner of war shall be
judicial or disciplinary, the Detaining Power shall ensure that the
competent authorities exercise the greatest leniency and adopt,
wherever possible, disciplinary rather than judicial measures.
•»*
ARTICLE 86
No prisoner of war may be punished more than once for
the same act or on the same Charge.
ARTICLE Sy
Prisoners of war may not be sentenced by the military
authorities and courts of the Detaining Power to any penalties
except those provided for in respect of members of the armed
forces of the said Power who have committed the same acts.
When fixing the penalty, the courts or authorities of the
Detaining Power shall take into consideration, to the widest
extent possible, the fact that the accused, not being a national
of the Detaining Power, is not bound to it by any duty of
allegiance, and that he is in its power as the result of circum-
stances independent of his own will. The said courts or author-
ities shall be at liberty to reduce the penalty provided for the
violation of which the prisoner of war is accused, and shall
therefore not be bound to apply the minimum penalty prescribed.
CoUective punishment for individual acts, corporal punish-
ments, imprisonment in premises without daylight and, in
general, any form of torture or cruelty, are forbidden.
No prisoner of war may be deprived of his rank by the
Detaining Power, or prevented from wearing his badges.
'* Non bis
in idem "
Penalties
HO
III
-— --•<^-
Execution
of penalties
General
observations
I.
Forms of
punishment
II.
Duration of
punishments
ARTICLE SS
Officers, non-commissioned officers and men who are pri-
soners of war undergoing a disciplinary or judicial punishment,
shall not be subjected to more severe treatment than that
applied in respect of the same punishment to members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power of equivalent rank.
A wornan prisoner of war shall not be awarded or sentenced
to a punishment more severe, or treated whilst undergoing
punishment more severely, than a woman member of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar offence.
In no case may a woman prisoner of war be awarded or
sentenced to a punishment more severe, or treated whilst
undergoing punishment more severely, than a male member of
the armed forces of the Detaining Power dealt with for a similar
offence.
Prisoners of war who have served disciplinary or judicial
sentences may not be treated differently from other prisoners
of war.
//. Disciplinary Sanctions
ARTICLE 89
The disciplinary punishments applicable to prisoners of
war are the following :
(i) A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the advances
of pay and working pay which the prisoner of war
would otherwise receive under the provisions of Articles
60 and 62 during a period of not more than thirty
days.
(2) Discontinuance of Privileges granted over and above
• the treatment provided for by the present Convention.
(3) Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.
(4) Confinement.
The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be applied
to officers.
In no case shall disciplinary punishments be inhuman,
brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 90
The duration of any single punishment shall in no case
exceed thirty days. Any period of confinement awaiting the
hearing of a disciplinary offence or the award of disciplinary
punishment shall be deducted from an award pronounced
against a prisoner of war.
The maximum of thirty days provided above may not be
exceeded, even if the prisoner of war is answerable for several
acts at the same time when he is awarded punishment, whether
such acts are related or not.
The period between the pronouncing of an award of disci-
plinary punishment and its execution shall not exceed one month.
When a prisoner of war is awarded a further disciplinary
punishment, a period of at least three days shall elapse between
the execution of any two of the punishments, if the duration
of one of these is ten days or more.
ARTICLE 91
The escape of a prisoner of war shall be deemed to have
succeeded when :
(i) he has joined the armed forces of the Power on which
he depends, or those of an allied Power ;
(2) he has left the territory under the control of the Detain-
ing Power, or of an ally of the said Power ;
(3) he has joined a ship flying the flag of the Power on which
he depends, or of an allied Power, in the territorial
waters of the Detaining Power, the said ship not being
under the control of the last named Power.
Prisoners of war who have made good their escape in the
sense of this Article and who are recaptured, shall not be liable
to any punishment in respect of their previous escape.
ARTICLE 92
A prisoner of war who attempts to escape and is recaptured
before having made good his escape in the sense of Article 91
shall be liable only to a disciplinary punishment in respect
of this act, even if it is a repeated offence.
A prisoner of war who is recaptured shall be handed over
without delay to the competent military authority.
Article 88, fourth paragraph, notwithstanding, prisoners of
war punished as a result of an unsuccessful escape may be
subjected to special surveillance. Such surveillance must not
affect the state of their health, must be undergone in a prisoner
of war camp, and must not entail the suppression of any of the
safeguards granted them by the present Convention.
Escapes
I.
Successful
escape
II.
Unsuccessful
escape
112
113
III.
Connected
offences
IV.
Notification
of recapture
Procedure
I.
Confinement
awaiting
hearing
II.
Competent
authorities
and right
of defence
ARTICLE 93
'Escape or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence,
shall not be deemed an aggravating circumstance if the prisoner
of war is subjected to trial by judicial proceedings in respect
of an offence committed during his escape or attempt to escape.
In conformity with the principle stated in Article 83, offences
committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of
facilitating their escape and which do not entail any violence
against life or limb, such as offences against public property,
theft vvithout intention of self-enrichment, the drawing up or
use of false papers, the wearing of civilian clothing, shall occasion
disciplinary punishment only.
Prisoners of war who aid or abet an escape or an attempt
to escape shall be liable on this count to disciplinary punishment
only.
ARTICLE 94
If an escaped prisoner of war is recaptured, the Power on
which he depends shall be notilied thereof in the manner defined
in Article 122, provided notification of his escape has been made.
ARTICLE 95
A prisoner of war accused of an offence against discipline
shall not be kept in confinement pending the hearing unless a
member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power would be
so kept if he were accused of a similar offence, or if it is essential
in the interests of camp order and discipline.
Any period spent by a prisoner of war in confinement awaiting
the disposal of an offence against discipline shall be reduced
to an absolute minimum and shall not exceed fourteen days.
The provisions of Articles 97 and 98 of this Chapter shall
apply to prisoners of war who are in confinement awaiting the
disposal of offences against discipline.
ARTICLE 96
Acts which constitute offences against discipline shall be
investigated immediately.
Without prejudice to the competence of courts and superior
military authorities, disciplinary punishment may be ordered
only by an officer having disciplinary powers in his capacity
as camp Commander, or by a responsible officer who replaces
him or to whom he has delegated his disciplinary powers.
In no case may such powers be delegated to a prisoner of
war or be exercised by a prisoner of war.
Before any disciplinary award is pronounced, the accused
shall be given precise information regarding the offences of
which he is accused, and given an opportunity of explaining
his conduct and of defending himself. He shall be permitted,
in particular, to call witnesses and to have recourse, if necessary,
to the Services of a qualified interpreter. The decision shall be
announced to the accused prisoner of war and to the prisoners'
representative.
A record of disciplinary punishments shall be maintained
by the camp Commander and shall be open to inspection by
representatives of the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 97
Prisoners of war shall not in any case be transferred to
penitentiary establishments (prisons, penitentiaries, convict
prisons, etc.) to undergo disciplinary punishment therein.
All premises in which disciplinary punishments are undergone
shall conform to the sanitary requirements set forth in Article 25.
A prisoner of war undergoing punishment shall be enabled to
keep himself in a State of cleanliness, in conformity with
Article 29.
Offtcers and persons of equivalent status shall not be lodged
in the same quarters as non-commissioned officers or men.
Women prisoners of war undergoing disciplinary punishment
shall be confined in separate quarters from male prisoners of
war and shall be under the immediate supervision of women.
ARTICLE 98
A prisoner of war undergoing confinement as a disciplinary
punishment, shall continue to enjoy the benelits of the provisions
of this Convention except in so far as these are necessarily
rendered inapplicable by the inere fact that he is confined.
In no case may he be deprived of the benefits of the provisions
of Articles 78 and 126.
A prisoner of war awarded disciplinary punishment may not
be deprived of the prerogatives attached to his rank.
Prisoners of war awarded disciplinary punishment shall be
allowed to exercise and to stay in the open air at least two
hours daily.
They shall be allowed, on their request, to be present at
the daily medical inspections. They shall receive the attention
which their state of health requires and, if necessary, shall be
removed to the camp inlirmary or to a hospital.
Execution of
punishment
I,
Premises
II.
Essential
safeguards
114
115
H
They shall have permission to read and write, likcwise to
send and receive letters. Parcels and remittances of money
however, may be withheld from them until the completion of
the punishment ; they shall meanwhile be entrusted to the
prisoners' representative, who will band over to the infirmary
the perishable goods contained in such parcels.
///. Judicial Proceedinos
Essential
rules
I.
General
principles
ARTICLE 99
No prisoncr of war may be tried or sentenced for an act
which is not forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power ör
by International Law, in force at the time the said act was
committed.
No moral or physical coercion may be exerted on a prisoner
of war in order to induce him to admit himself guilty of the
act of which he is accused.
No prisoner of war may be convicted without having had
an opportunity to present his defence and the assistance of a
qualified advocate or counsel.
II.
Death
penalty
ARTICLE 100
Prisoners of war and the Protecting Powers shall be informed
as soon as possible, of the offences which are punishable by the
death sentence under the laws of the Detaining Power.
Other offences shall not thereafter be made punishable by
the death penalty without the concurrence of the Power upon
which the prisoners of war depend.
The death sentence cannot be pronounced on a prisoner
of war unless the attention of the court has, in accordance with
Article 87, second paragraph, been particularly called to the
fact that since the accused is not a national of the Detaining
Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance, and that
he is in its power as the result of circumstances independent
of his own will.
III.
Delay in
execution of
the death
penalty
ARTICLE lOI
If the death penalty is pronounced on a prisoner of war
the sentence shall not be executed before the expiration of a
penod of at least six months from the date when the Protecting
Power receives, at an indicated address, the detailed commu-
nication provided for in Article 107.
116
ARTICLE 102
A prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sen-
tence has been pronounced by the same courts according to
the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions
of the present Chapter have been observed.
Procedure
I.
Conditions
for validity
of sentence
ARTICLE 103
Judicial investigations relating to a prisoner of war shall
be conducted as rapidly as circumstances permit and so that
his trial shall take place as soon as possible. A prisoner of war
shall not be confined while awaiting trial unless a member of
the armed forces of the Detaining Power would be so conlined
if he were accused of a similar offence, or if it is essential to do
so in the interests of national security. In no circumstances
shall this confinement excecd three months.
Any period spent by a prisoner of war in confinement await-
ing trial shall be deducted from any sentence of imprisonment
passed upon him and taken into account in fixing any penalty.
The provisions of Articles 97 and 98 of this Chapter shall
apply to a prisoner of war whilst in confinement awaiting trial.
II.
Confinement
awaiting
trial
(Deduction
from sentence,
treatment)
ARTICLE 104
In any case in which the Detaining Power has decided to
Institute judicial proceedings against a prisoner of war, it shall
notify the Protecting Power as soon as possible and at least
three weeks before the opening of the trial. This period of
three weeks shall run as from the day on which such notification
reaches the Protecting Power at the address previously indicated
by the latter to the Detaining Power.
The said notification shall contain the following information :
(i) Surname and first names of the prisoner of war, his
rank, his army, regimental, personal or serial number,
his date of birth, and his profession or trade, if any.
(2) Place of internment or confinement.
(3) Specification of the charge or charges on which the
prisoner of war is to be arraigned, giving the legal
provisions applicable.
(4) Designation of the court which will try the case, like-
wise the date and place fixed for the opening of the
trial.
117
III.
Notification
of proceedings
\\
IV.
Rights and
means of
defence
■iii
h
The same communication shall be made by the Detainini?
l^ovver to the pnsoners' representative.
fh ^^ "V'^i^"''''^ i' submitted, at the opening of a trial, that
the notification referred to above was received by the Pro-
tecting Power, by the prisoner of war and by the prisoners'
representative concerned, at least three weeks before the opening
ad'ourned ^^^^'' '^''''''^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ ^"^ ""^'^ ^^
ARTICLE 105
The prisoner of war shall be entitled to assistance bv one
of his prisoner comrades, to defence by a qualified adv^ocate
or counsel of his own choice, to the calling of witnesses and
if he deems necessary, to the Services of a competent interpreter!
He shall be advised of these rights by the Detaining Power in
due time before the trial. 8 wti m
Failinga choice by the prisoner of war, the Protecting
Power shall find him an advocate or counsel, and shall have
at least one w-eek at its disposal for the purpose. The Detaining
Power shall dehver to the said Power, on request, a list of
persons qualified to present the defence. Failing a choice of
an advocate or counsel by the prisoner of war or the Protecting
Power, the Detaining Power shall appoint a competent advocate
or counsel to conduct the defence. vucdte
The advocate or counsel conducting the defence on behalf
of the prisoner of war shall have at his disposal a period of two
weeks at least before the opening of the trial, as well as the
necessary facihties to prepare the defence of the accused.
He may, in particular, freely visit the accused and interview
him in private He may also confer with any witnesses for the
defence, incuding prisoners of war. He shall have the benefit
of these facihties until the term of appeal or petition has expired
Particulars of the charge or charges on which the prisoner
of war LS to be arraigned, as well as the documents which are
generally communicated to the accused by virtue of the laws
in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power shall be
communicated to the accused prisoner of war in a'langua^
which he understands, and in good time before the opening
of the trial. The same communication in the same circumstances
shall be made to the advocate or counsel conducting the defence
on behalf of the prisoner of war. ^ aeience
in J^ 'F.l'T^'.^'Tu''^ ^^' Protecting Power shall be entitled
to attend the trial of the case, unless, exceptionally, this is held
rn Camera in the interest of State security!^ In suck a case the
Detaining Power shall advise the Protecting Power accordingly!
118
ARTICLE 106
Every prisoner of war shall have, in the same manner as
the members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, the
right of appeal or petition from any sentence pronounced upon
him, with a view to the quashing or revising of the sentence
or the re-opening of the trial. He shall be fully informed of
his right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within
which he may do so.
ARTICLE 107
Any judgment and sentence pronounced upon a prisoner of
war shall be immediately reported to the Protecting Power in
the form of a summary communication, which shall also indicate
whether he has the right of appeal with a view to the quashing
of the sentence or the re-opening of the trial. This communica-
tion shall likewise be sent to the prisoners' representative con-
cerned. It shall also be sent to the accused prisoner of war in
a language he understands, if the sentence was not pronounced
in his presence. The Detaining Power shall also immediately
communicate to the Protecting Power the decision of the prisoner
of war to use or to waive his right of appeal.
Furthermore, if a prisoner of war is finally convicted or if
a sentence pronounced against a prisoner of war in the first
instance is a death sentence, the Detaining Power shall as soon
as possible address to the Protecting Power a detailed com-
munication containing :
(1) the precise wording of the finding and sentence ;
(2) a summarized report of any preliminary investigation
and of the trial, emphasizing in particular the Clements
of the prosecution and the defence ;
(3) notification, where applicable, of the establishment
where the sentence will be served.
The Communications provided for in the foregoing sub-
paragraphs shall be sent to the Protecting Power at the address
previously made known to the Detaining Power.
ARTICLE 108
Sentences pronounced on prisoners of war after a conviction
has become duly enforceable, shall be served in the same
establishments and under the same conditions as in the case of
members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. These
conditions shall in all cases conform to the requirements of health
and humanitv.
119
V.
Appeals
VI.
Notification
of Undings
and sentence
Execution
of penalties.
Penal
regulations
General
observations
iilli
A woman prisoner of war on whom such a sentence has been
pronounced shall be confined in separate quarters and shall be
under the supervision of women.
In any case, prisoners of war sentenced to a penalty depriving
thcm of their liberty shall retain the benefit of the provisions
of Articles 78 and 126 of the present Convention. Furthermore
they shall be entitled to receive and despatch correspondence'
to receive at least one relief parcel monthly, to take regulär
exercise m the open air, to have the medical care required by
their State of health, and the spiritual assistance they may
desire. Penalties to which they may be subjected shall be in
accordance with the provisions of Article 8y, third paragraph
PART IV
TERMINATION OF CAPTIVITY
SECTION I
DIRECT REPATRIATION AND ACCOMMODATION
IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES -
ARTICLE 109
Subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of this
Article, Parties to the conflict are bound to send back to their
own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded
and seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them
until they are fit to travel, in accordance with the first paraffranh
of the following Article. ^ ^ ^
Throughout the duration of hostilities, Parties to the conflict
shall endeavour, with the Cooperation of the neutral Powers
concerned, to make arrangements for the accommodation in
neutral countries of the sick and wounded prisoners of war
referred to in the second paragraph of the following Article
They may, m addition, conclude agreements with a view to
the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country
of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long
period of captivity. ^
No sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for re-
patriation under the first paragraph of this Article, may be
repatriated against bis will during hostilities.
ARTICLE IIO
The following shall be repatriated direct :
(i) Incurably wounded and sick whose mental or physical
fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.
{2) Wounded and sick who, according to medical opinion,
are not likely to recover within one year, whose condi-
tion requires treatment and whose mental or physical
fitness seems to have been gravely diminished.
{3) Wounded and sick who have recovered, but whose
mental or physical fitness seems to have gravely and
permanently diminished.
The following may be accommodated in a neutral country :
(i) Wounded and sick whose recovery may be expected
within one year of the date of the wound or the beginning
of the illness, if treatment in a neutral country might
increase the prospects of a more certain and speedy
recovery.
(2) Prisoners of war whose mental or physical health,
according to medical opinion, is seriously threatened
by continued captivity, but whose accommodation in
a neutral country might remove such a threat.
The conditions which prisoners of war accommodated in a
neutral country must fulfil in order to permit their repatriation
shall be fixed, as shall likewise their status, by agreement
between the Powers concerned. In general, prisoners of war
who have been accommodated in a neutral country, and who
belong to the following categories, should be repatriated :
(1) Those whose State of health has deteriorated so as to
fulfil the conditions laid down for direct repatriation ;
(2) Those whose mental or physical powers remain, even
after treatment, considerably impaired.
If no special agreements are concluded between the Parties
to the conflict concerned, to determine the cases of disablement
or sickness entailing direct repatriation or accommodation in
a neutral country, such cases shall be settled in accordance with
the principles laid down in the Model Agreement concerning
direct repatriation and accommodation in neutral countries of
wounded and sick prisoners of war and in the Regulations
concerning Mixed Medical Commissions annexed to the present
Convention.
Cases of
repatriation
and
accommoda-
tion
120
121
'•^ «M>
Internment
in a neutral
country
Mixed
Medical
Commissions
«Hü
Prisoners
entitled to
examination
by Mixed
Medical
Commissions
ARTICLE III
The Detaining Power, the Power on which the prisoners
of war depend, and a neutral Power agreed upon by these two
Powers, shall endeavour to conclude agreements which will
enable prisoners of war to be interned in the territory of the
said neutral Power until the close of hostilities.
ARTICLE 112
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, Mixed Medical Commissions
shall be appointed to examine sick and wounded prisoners of
war, and to make all appropriate decisions regarding them.
The appointment, duties and functioning of these Commissions
shall be m conformity with the provisions of the Regulations
annexed to the present Convention.
However, prisoners of war who, in the opinion of the medical
authorities of the Detaining Power, are manifestly seriously
mjured or seriously sick, may be repatriated without having
to be examined by a Mixed Medical Commission.
ARTICLE 113
Besides those who are designated by the medical authorities
of the Detaining Power, wounded or sick prisoners of war
belongmg to the categories listed below shall be entitled to
present themselves for examination by the Mixed Medical
Commissions provided for in the foregoing Article :
(i) Wounded and sick proposed by a physician or surgeon
who is of the same nationahty, or a national of a Party
to the conflict allied with the Power on which the said
prisoners depend, and who exercises his functions in
the camp.
(2) Wounded and sick proposed by their prisoners' repre-
sentative.
(3) Wounded and sick proposed by the Power on which
they depend, or by an Organization duly recognised by
the said Power and giving assistance to the prisoners.
Prisoners of war who do not belong to one of the three
foregoing categories may nevertheless present themselves for
exammation by Mixed Medical Commissions, but shall be
exammed only after those belonging to the said categories.
The physician or surgeon of the same nationality as the
prisoners who present themselves for examination by the
Mixed Medical Commission, likewise the prisoners' representative
of the said prisoners, shall have permission to be present at
the examination.
ARTICLE 114
Prisoners of war who meet with accidents shall, unless the
injury is self-infiicted, have the benefit of the provisions of this
Convention as regards repatriation or accommodation in a
neutral country.
ARTICLE 115
No prisoner of war on whom a disciplinary punishment has
been imposed and who is eligible for repatriation or for accom-
modation in a neutral country, may be kept back on the plea
that he has not undergone his punishment.
Prisoners of war detained in connection with a judicial
prosecution or conviction and who are designated for repatriation
of accommodation in a neutral country, may benefit by such
measures before the end of the proceedings or the completion
of the punishment, if the Detaining Power consents.
Parties to the conflict shall communicate to each other the
names of those who will be detained until the end of the pro-
ceedings or the completion of the punishment.
ARTICLE 116
The costs of repatriating prisoners of war or of transporting
them to a neutral country shall be borne, from the frontiers
of the Detaining Power, by the Power on which the said pri-
soners depend.
ARTICLE 117
' No repatriated person may be employed on active military
Service.
SECTION II
RELEASE AND REPATRIATION
OF PRISONERS OF WAR
AT THE CLOSE OF HOSTILITIES
ARTICLE 118
Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without
delay after the cessation of active hostilities.
In the absence of stipulations to the above effect in any
agreement concluded between the Parties to the conflict with
Prisoners
meeting with
accidents
Prisoners
serving a
sentence
Costs of
repatriation
Activity
after
repatriation
Release and
repatriation
122
123
i
lii
Details of
procedure
a View to the cessation of hostilities, or failing any such agree-
ment, each of the Detaining Powers shall itself establish and
execute without delay a plan of repatriation in conformity
with the prniciple laid down in the foregoing paragraph.
In either case, the measures adopted shall be brought to the
Knowledge of the prisoners of war.
The costs of repatriation of prisoners of war shall in all
cases be equitably apportioned between the Detaining Power
and the Power on which the prisoners depend. This apportion-
ment shall be carried out on the following basis :
(a) If the two Powers are contiguous, the Power on which
the prisoners of war depend shall bear the costs of
repatriation from the frontiers of the Detaining Power.
(b) If the two Powers are not contiguous, the Detaining
Power shall bear the costs of transport of prisoners of
war over its own territory as far as its frontier or its
port of embarkation nearest to the territory of the
Power on which the prisoners of war depend. The
Parties concerned shall agree between themselves as
to the equitable apportionment of the remaining costs
of the repatriation. The conclusion of this agreement
shall in no circumstances justify any delay in the
repatriation of the prisoners of war.
ARTICLE 119
Repatriation shall be effected in conditions similar to those
laid down in Articles 46 to 48 inclusive of the present Convention
for the transfer of prisoners of war, having regard to the pro-
visions of Article 118 and to those of the following paragraphs.
On repatriation, any articles of value impounded from
prisoners of war under Article 18, and any foreign currency
which has not been converted into the currency of the Detaining
Power, shall be restored to them. Articles of value and foreign
currency which, for any reason whatever, are not restored to
prisoners of war on repatriation, shall be despatched to the
Information Bureau set up under Article 122.
Prisoners of war shall be allowed to take with them their
personal effects, and any correspondence and parcels which
have arrived for them. The weight of such baggage may be
limited, if the conditions of repatriation so require, to what
each prisoner can reasonably carry. Each prisoner shall in all
cases be authorised to carry at least twenty-five kilograms.
The other personal effects of the repatriated prisoner shall
be left in the Charge of the Detaining Power which shall have
them forwarded to him as soon as it has concluded an agree-
ment to this effect, regulating the conditions of transport and
the payment of the costs involved, with the Power on which
the prisoner depends.
Prisoners of war against whom criminal proceedings for an
indictable offence are pending may be detained until the end
of such proceedings, and, if necessary, until the completion
of the punishment. The same shall apply to prisoners of war
already convicted for an indictable offence.
Parties to the confiict shall communicate to each other the
names of any prisoners of war who are detained until the end
of proceedings or until punishment has been completed.
By agreement between the Parties to the confiict, commissions
shall be established for the purpose of searching for dispersed
prisoners of war and of assuring their repatriation with the
least possible delay.
SECTION III
DEATH OF PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 120
Wills of prisoners of war shall be drawn up so as to satisfy
the conditions of validity required by the legislation of their
country of origin, which will take steps to inform the Detaining
Power of its requirements in this respect. At the request of
,the prisoner of war and, in all cases, after death, the will shall
be transmitted without delay to the Protecting Power; a
certified copy shall be sent to the Central Agency.
Death certificates, in the form annexed to the present Con-
vention, or lists certified by a responsible officer, of all persons
who die as prisoners of war shall be forwarded as rapidly as
possible to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau established
in accordance with Article 122. The death certificates or cer-
tified lists shall show particulars of identity as set out in the
third Paragraph of Article 17, and also the date and place of
death, the cause of death, the date and place of burial and all
particulars necessary to identify the graves.
The burial or cremation of a prisoner of war shall be preceded
by a medical examination of the body with a view to confirming
death and enabling a report to be made and, where necessary,
establishing identity.
Wills, death
certificates,
burial,
cremation
124
125
I-I,.
1
Prisoners
killed or
injured in
special
circumstances
I
The detaining authorities shall ensure that prisoners of war
who have died in captivity are honourably buried, if possible
accordmg to the rites of the religion to which they belonged,
and that their graves are respected, suitably maintained and
marked so as to be found at any time. Wherever possible
deceased prisoners of war who depended on the same Power
shall be interred in the same place.
Deceased prisoners of war shall be buried in individual
graves unless unavoidable circumstances require the use of
collective graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative
reasons of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased
or m accordance with his express wish to this effect. In case
of cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in
the death certificate of the deceased.
In Order that graves may always be found, all particulars
of burials and graves shall be recorded with a Graves Reeistra-
tion Service established by the Detaining Power. Lists of
graves and particulars of the prisoners of war interred in ceme-
teries and elsewhere shall be transmitted to the Power on which
such prisoners of war depended. Responsibility for the care
of these graves and for records of any subsequent moves of
the bodies shall rest on the Power Controlling the territory if
a Party to the present Convention. These provisions shall also
apply to the ashes which shall be kept by the Graves Registra-
tion Service until proper disposal thereof in accordance with
the wishes of the home country.
ARTICLE 121
Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused
or suspected to have been caused by a sentry, another prisoner
of war, or any other person, as well as any death the cause of
which IS unknown, shall be immediately followed by an ofiicial
enquiry by the Detaining Power.
A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately
to the Protecting Power. Statements shall be taken from
witnesses, especially from those who are prisoners of war and
a report including such Statements shall be forwarded to the
Protectmg Power.
,, ^i !^^ .^""^ll^^y indicates the guilt of one or more persons,
the Detammg Power shall take all measures for the prosecution
Ol the person or persons responsible.
126
PART V
INFORMATION BUREAUX AND RELIEF
SOCIETIES
FOR PRISONERS OF WAR
ARTICLE 122
Upon the outbreak of a confiict and in all cases of occupation,
each of the Parties to the confiict shall institute an ofiicial
Information Bureau for prisoners of war who are in its power.
Neutral or non-belligerent Powers who may have received within
their territory persons belonging to one of the categories referred
to in Article 4, shall take the same action with respect to such
persons. The Power concerned shall ensure that the Prisoners
of War Information Bureau is provided with the necessary
accommodation, equipment and staff to ensure its efficient
working. It shall be at liberty to employ prisoners of war in
such a Bureau under the conditions laid down in the Section of
the present Convention dealing with work by prisoners of war.
Within the shortest possible period, each of the Parties to
the confiict shall give its Bureau the information referred to in
the fourth, fifth and sixth paragraphs of this Article regarding
any enemy person belonging to one of the categories referred
to in Article 4, who has fallen into its power. Neutral or non-
belligerent Powers shall take the same action with regard to
persons belonging to such categories whom they have received
within their territory.
The Bureau shall immediately forward such information
by the most rapid means to the Powers concerned through the
intermediary of the Protecting Powers and likewise of the
Central Agency provided for in Article 123.
This information shall make it possible quickly to advise
the next of kin concerned. Subject to the provisions of Article 17,
the information shall include, in so far as available to the Inform-
ation Bureau, in respect of each prisoner of war, his surname,
first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number,
place and füll date of birth, indication of the Power on which
he depends, first name of the father and maiden name of the
mother, name and address of the person to be informed and the
address to which correspondence for the prisoner may be sent.
The Information Bureau shall receive from the various
departments concerned information regarding transfers, releases,
repatriations, escapes, admissions to hospital, and deaths, and
shall transmit such information in the manner described in the
third Paragraph above.
127
National
Bureau X
■üto
>BrT>r»j I >^ ..^
lfm
Central
Agency
Exemption
f rom charges
Likewise, information regarding the state of health of pri-
soners of war who are seriously ill or seriously wounded shall
be supplied regularly, every week if possible.
The Information Bureau shall also be responsible for replying
to all enquiries sent to it concerning prisoners of war, including
those who have died in captivity ; it will make any enquiries
necessary to obtain the information which is asked for if this
is not in its possession.
All written Communications made by the Bureau shall be
authenticated by a signature or a seal.
The Information Bureau shall furthermore be charged with
collecting all personal valuables, including sums in currencies
other than that of the Detaining Power and documents of
importance to the next of kin, left by prisoners of war who have
been repatriated or released, or who have escaped or died, and
shall forward the said valuables to the Powers concerned.
Such articles shall be sent by the Bureau in sealed packets
which shall be accompanied by Statements giving clear and
füll particulars of the identity of the person to whom the articles
belonged, and by a complete list of the Contents of the parcel.
Other personal effects of such prisoners of war shall be trans-
mitted under arrangements agreed upon between the Parties to
the confiict concerned.
ARTICLE 123
A Central Prisoners of War Information Agency shall be
created in a neutral country. The International Committee of
the Red Cross shall, if it deems necessary, propose to the Powers
concerned the Organization of such an Agency.
The function of the Agency shall be to collect all the inform-
ation it may obtain through oflicial or private Channels respect-
ing prisoners of war, and to transmit it as rapidly as possible to
the country of origin of the prisoners of war or to the Power
on which they depend. It shall receive from the Parties to the
conilict all facilities for effecting such transmissions.
The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose
nationals benefit by the Services of the Central Agency, are
requested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require.
The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as
restricting the humanitarian activities of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, or of the relief Societies provided
for in Article 125.
ARTICLE 124
The national Information Bureaux and the Central Inform-
ation Agency shall enjoy free postage for mail, likewise all the
128
exemptions provided for in Article 74, and further, so far as
possible, exemption from telegraphic charges or, at least, greatly
reduced rates.
ARTICLE 125
Subject to the measures which the Detaining Powers may
consider essential to ensure their security or to meet any other
reasonable need, the representatives of religious organizations,
relief societies, or any other Organization assisting prisoners of
war, shall receive from the said Powers, for themselves and their
duly accredited agents, all necessary facilities for visiting the
prisoners, distributing relief supplies and material, from any
source, intended for religious, educational or recreative purposes,
and for assisting them in organizing their leisure time within
the camps. Such societies or organizations may be constituted
in the territory of the Detaining Power or in any other country,
or they may have an international character.
The Detaining Power may limit the number of societies and
organizations whose delegates are allowed to carry out their
activities in its territory and under its supervision, on condition;
however, that such limitation shall not hinder the effective
Operation of adequate relief to all prisoners of war.
The special position of the International Committee of the Red
Cross in this field shall be recognized and respected at all times.
As soon as relief supplies or material intended for the above-
mentioned purposes are handed over to prisoners of war, or
very shortly afterwards, receipts for each consignment, signed
by the prisoners' representative, shall be forwarded to the
relief society or Organization making the shipment. At the
same time, receipts for these consignments shall be supplied
by the administrative authorities responsible for guarding the
prisoners.
PART VI
EXECUTION OF THE CONVENTION
SECTION I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 126
Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall
have permission to go to all places where prisoners of war may
be, particularly to places of internment, imprisonment and
129
Relief
societies
and other
organizations
Supervision
w
I
' '
f t
^
M
Dissemination
of the
Convention
1
^
Translations.
Rules of
application
I
Penal
sanctions
I. General
observations
labour, and shall have access to all premises occupied by pri-
soners of war ; they shall also be allowed to go to the places
of departure, passage and arrival of prisoners who are being
transferred. They shall be able to interview the prisoners,
and in particular the prisoners' representatives, without wit-
nesses, either personally or through an interpreter.
Representatives and delegates of the Protecting Powers
shall have füll liberty to select the places they wish to visit.
The duration and frequency of these visits shall not be restricted.
Visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative
military necessity, and then only as an exceptional and temporarv
measure.
The Detaining Power and the Power on which the said pri-
soners of war depend may agree, if necessary, that compatriots
of these prisoners of war be permitted to participate in the visits.
The delegates of the International Committee of the Red
Gross shall enjoy the same prerogatives. The appointment of
such delegates shall be submitted to the approval of the Power
detaining the prisoners of war to be visited.
ARTICLE 127
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace
as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Con-
vention as widely as possible in their respective countries
and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their pro-
grammes of military and, if possible, civil Instruction, so that
the pnnciples thereof may become known to all their armed
forces and to the entire population.
Any mihtary or other authorities, who in time of war assume
responsibilities in respect of prisoners of war, must possess the
text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its
provisions.
ARTICLE 128
The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one
another through the Swiss Federal Council and, during hostilities
through the Protecting Powers, the official translations of the
present Convention, as well as the laws and regulations which
they may adopt to ensure the application thereof.
ARTICLE 129
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legisla-
tion necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons
committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the grave brea-
ches of the present Convention defined in the following Article,
130
Fach High Contracting Party shall be under the Obligation
to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for
trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided
such High Contracting Party has made out a prtma facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary
for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the
present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in
the following Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by
safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less
favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those follow-
ing of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 130
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be
those involving any of the following acts, if committed against
persons or property protected by the Convention : wilful killing,
torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of
the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the
rights of fair and regulär trial prescribed in this Convention.
ARTICLE 131
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself
or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred
by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of
breaphes referred to in the preceding Article.
ARTICLE 132
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall
be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested
Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure
for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an
umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be followed.
Once the violation has been established, the Parties to the
conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the
least possible delay.
131
II.
Grave
b^eaChes
III.
Responsibi-
lities of the
Contracting
Parties
Enquiry
procedure
I
1
Languages
M •
Relation
to the 1929
Convention
Relation
to the Hague
Convention
Signature
Ratiücation
Lf
l'i*
SECTION II
FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 133
The present Convention is established in English and in
French. Both texts are equally authentic.
The Swiss Federal Council shall arrange for official transla-
tions of the Convention to be made in the Russian and Spanish
languages.
ARTICLE 134
The present Convention replaces the Convention of July
27, 1929, in relations between the High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 135
In the relations between the Powers which are bound by
the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, whether that of July 29, 1899, or that of October
18, 1907, and which are parties to the present Convention, this
last Convention shall be complementary to Chapter II of the
Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned Conventions of
the Hague.
ARTICLE 136
The present Convention, which bears the date of this day,
is open to signature until February 12, 1950, in the name of the
Powers represented at the Conference which opened at Geneva
on April 21, 1949 ; furthermore, by Powers not represented
at that Conference, but which are parties to the Convention of
July 27, 1929.
ARTICLE 137
The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible
and the ratifications shall be deposited at Berne.
A record shall be drawn up of the deposit of each Instrument
of ratification and certified copies of this record shall be trans-
mitted by the Swiss Federal Council to all the Powers in whose
name the Convention has been signed, or whose accession has
been notified.
132
ARTICLE 138
The present Convention shall come into force six months
after not less than two instruments of ratification have been
deposited.
Thereafter, it shall come into force for each High Contracting
Party six months after the deposit of the instrument of rati-
fication.
ARTICLE 139
From the date of its coming into force, it shall be open to
any Power in whose name the present Convention has not been
signed, to accede to this Convention.
ARTICLE 140
• Accessions shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal
Council, and shall take effect six months after the date on
which they are received.
The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate the accessions
to all the Powers in whose name the Convention has been signed
or whose accession has been notified.
ARTICLE 141
The situations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall give
immediate effect to ratifications deposited and accessions
notified by the Parties to the conflict before or after the begin-
ning of hostilities or occupation. The Swiss Federal Council
shall communicate by the quiekest method any ratifications
or accessions received from Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 142
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty to
denounce the present Convention.
The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Swiss
Federal Council, which shall transmit it to the Governments
of all the High Contracting Parties.
The denunciation shall take effect one year after the noti-
fication thereof has been made to the Swiss Federal Council.
However, a denunciation of which notification has been made
at a time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict
133
Coming
into force
Accession
Notification
of accessions
Immediate
effect
Denunciation
I
Registration
with the
United Nations
'il
15
k
shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until
after Operations connected with release and repatriation of the
persons protected by the present Convention have been ter-
minated.
The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the
denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations
which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil
by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.
ARTiCLE 143
The Swiss Federal Council shall register the present Con-
vention with the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Swiss
Federal Council shall also in form the Secretariat of the United
Nations of all ratifications, accessions and denunciations received
by it with respect to the present Convention.
In witness whereof the undersigned, having deposited
their respective füll powers, have signed the present Convention.
DoNE at Geneva this twelfth day of August 1949, in the
English and French languages. The original shall be deposited
in the Archives of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss Federal
Council shall transmit certified copies thereof to each of the
signatory and acceding States.
ANNEX I
MODEL AGREEMENT CONCERNING DIRECT
REPATRIATION AND ACCOMMODATION IN NEUTRAL
COUNTRIES OF WOUNDED AND SICK PRISONERS
OF WAR
(see Article iio)
I. — PRINCIPLES FOR DIRECT REPATRIATION
AND ACCOMMODATION IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
A. DiRECT REPATRIATION
The following shall be repatriated direct :
(i) All prisoners of war suffering from the following disa-
bilities as the result of trauma : loss of limb, paralysis,
articular or other disabilities, when this disability is at
least the loss of a band or a foot, or the equivalent of
the loss of a band or a foot.
Without prejudice to a more generous interpretation,
the following shall be considered as equivalent to the
loss of a band or a foot :
(a) Loss of a band or of all the fingers, or of the thumb
and forefinger of one band ; loss of a foot, or of
all the toes and metatarsals of one foot.
(h) Ankylosis, loss of osseous tissue, cicatricial con-
tracture preventing the functioning of one of the
large articulations or of all the digital joints of
one band.
(c) Pseudartbrosis of the long bones.
(d) Deformities due to fracture or other injury
which seriously interfere with function and
weight-bearing power.
(2) All wounded prisoners of war whose condition has
become chronic, to the extent that prognosis appears to
exclude recovery — in spite of treatment — witbin one
year from the date of the injury, as, for example, in
case of :
134
135
^tJ^mmmtm^^-^iti^mt- m*-^rr^ ^m
1
(a) Projectile in the heart, even if the Mixed Medical
Commission should fall, at the time of their
examination, to detect any serious disorders.
(b) Metallic splinter in the brain or the lungs, even
if the Mixed Medical Commission cannot, at the
time of examination, detect any local or general
reaction.
(c) Osteomyelitis, when recovery cannot before seen
in the course of the year following the injury, and
which seems likely to result in ankylosis of a Joint,
or other impairments equivalent to the loss of a
hand or a foot.
(d) Perforating and suppurating injury to the large
joints.
(e) Injury to the skull, with loss or shifting of bony
tissue.
(f) Injury or burning of the face with loss of tissue
and functional lesions.
(g) Injury to the spinal cord.
(h) Lesion of the peripheral nerves, the sequelae of
which are equivalent to the loss of a hand or foot,
and the eure of which requires more than a year
from the date of injury, for example : injury to
the brachial or lumbosacral plexus, the median or
sciatic nerves, likewise combined injury to the
radial and cubital nerves or to the lateral popliteal
nerve (N. peroneus communis) and medial
popliteal nerve (N. tibialis) ; etc. The separate
injury of the radial (musculo-spiral), cubital,
lateral or medial popliteal nerves shall not,
however, Warrant repatriation except in case of
contractures or of serious neurotrophic distur-
bance. *
(i) Injury to the urinary system, with incapacitating
results.
(3) All sick prisoners of war whose condition has become
chronic to the extent that prognosis seems to exclude
recovery— in spite of treatment— within one year from
the inception of the disease, as, for example, in
case of :
136
(a) Progressive tuberculosis of any organ which,
according to medical prognosis, cannot be cured,
or at least considerably improved, by treatment
in a neutral country.
(b) Exudate pleurisy.
(c) Serious diseases of the respiratory organs of non-
tubercular etiology, presumed incurable, for
example : serious pulmonary emphysema, with
or without bronchitis ; chronic asthma * ; chronic
bronchitis * lasting more than one year in cap-
tivity ; bronchiectasis * ; etc.
(d) Serious chronic affections of the circulatory
System, for example : valvulär lesions and myo-
carditis *, which have shown signs of circulatory
failure during captivity, even though the Mixed
Medical Commission cannot detect any such signs
at the time of examination ; affections of the
pericardium and the vessels (Buerger's disease,
aneurisms of the large vessels) ; etc.
(e) Serious chronic affections of the digestive organs,
for example : gastric or duodenal ulcer ; sequelae
of gastric Operations performed in captivity ;
chronic gastritis, enteritis or Colitis, having
lasted more than one year and seriously affecting
the general condition ; cirrhosis of the liver ;
chronic cholecystopathy * ; etc.
(f) Serious chronic affections of the genito-urinary
organs, for example : chronic diseases of the
kidney with consequent disorders ; nephrectomy
because of a tubercular kidney ; chronic pyelitis
or chronic cystitis ; hydronephrosis or pyonephrosis;
chronic grave gynaecological conditions ; normal
pregnancy and obstetrical disorder, where it is
impossible to accommodate in a neutral country ;
etc.
(g) Serious chronic diseases of the central and peri-
pheral nervous system, for example : all obvious
psychoses and psychoneuroses, such as serious
* The decision of the Mixed Medical Commission shall be based
to a great extent on the records kept by camp physicians and
surgeons of the same nationality as the prisoners of war, or on
an examination by medical specialists of the Detaining Power.
^37
! 1
t
(h)
(i)
hysteria, serious captivity psychoneurosis, etc.,
duly verified by a specialist * ; any epilepsy duly
verified by the camp physician * ; cerebral arte-
riosclerosis ; chronic neuritis lasting more than
one year; etc.
Serious chronic diseases of the neuro- vegetative
System, with considerable diminution of mental
or physical fitness, noticeable loss of weight and
general asthenia.
Blindness of both eyes, or of one eye when the
Vision of the other is less than i in spite of the use
of corrective glasses ; diminution of visual acuity
in cases where it is impossible to restore it by
correction to an acuity of % in at least one eye * ;
other grave ocular affections, for example :
glaucoma, iritis, choroiditis ; trachoma; etc.
Auditive disorders, such as totalunilateraldeafness,
if the other ear does not discern the ordinary
spoken word at a distance of one metre * ; etc.
Serious affections of metabolism, for example :
diabetes mellitus requiring insulin treatment ; etc.
(m) Serious disorders of the endocrine glands, for
example : thyrotoxicosis ; hypothyrosis ; Addison's
disease ; Simmonds' cachexia ; tetany ; etc.
Grave and chronic disorders of the blood-forming
Organs.
Serious cases of chronic intoxication, for example :
lead poisoning, mercury poisoning, morphinism,
cocainism, alcoholism ; gas or radiation poisoning ;
etc.
Chronic affections of locomotion, with obvious
functional disorders, for example : arthritis defor-
mans ; primary and secondary progressive chronic
Polyarthritis ; rheumatism with serious clinical
Symptoms ; etc.
Serious chronic skin diseases, not amenable to
treatment.
Any malignant growth.
(k)
(i)
(n)
(0)
(P)
(q)
(r)
* The decision of the Mixed Medical Commission shall be based
to a great extent on the records kept by camp physicians and
surgeons of the same nationality as the prisoners of war, or on
an examination by medical specialists of the Detaining Power.
138
(s) Serious chronic infectious diseases, persisting for
one year after their inception, for example :
malaria with decided organic impairment, amoebic
or bacillary dysentery with grave disorders ;
tertiary visceral Syphilis resistant to treatment ;
leprosy ; etc.
(t) Serious avitaminosis or serious inanition.
B. ACCOMMODATION IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
The foUowing shall be eligible for accommodation in a
neutral country :
(i) All wounded prisoners of war who are not likely to
recover in captivity, but who might be cured or whose
condition might be considerably improved by accommo-
dation in a neutral country.
(2) Prisoners of war suffering from any form of tuberculosis,
of whatever organ, and whose treatment in a neutral
country whould be likely to lead to recovery or at least
to considerable improvement, with the exception of
primary tuberculosis cured before captivity.
(3) Prisoners of war suffering from affections requiring
treatment of the respiratory, circulatory, digestive,
nervous, sensory, genito-urinary, cutaneous, locomotive
Organs, etc., if such treatment would clearly have better
results in a neutral country than in captivity.
(4) Prisoners of war who have undergone a nephrectomy in
captivity for a non-tubercular renal affection ; cases of
Osteomyelitis, on the way to recovery or latent ; diabetes
mellitus not requiring insulin treatment ; etc.
(5) Prisoners of war suffering from war or captivity neuroses.
Cases of captivity neurosis which are not cured after
three months of accommodation in a neutral country,
or which after that length of time are not clearly on the
way to complete eure, shall be repatriated.
•
(6) All prisoners of war suffering from chronic intoxication
(gases, metals, alkaloids, etc), for whom the prospects
of eure in a neutral country are especially favourable.
(7) All women prisoners of war who are pregnant or mothers
with infants and small children.
139
The following cases shall not be eligible for accommo-
dation in a neutral country :
(i) All duly verified chronic psychoses.
(2) All organic or functional nervous affections considered
to be incurable.
(3) All contagious diseases during the period in which they
are transmissible, with the exception of tuberculosis.
■*■
II.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
(i) The conditions given shall, in a general way, be iiiter-
preted and applied in as broad a spirit as possible.
Neuropathie and psychopathic conditions caused by
war or captivity, as well as cases of tuberculosis in all
stages, shall above all benefit by such liberal interpre-
tation. Prisoners of war who have sustained several
wounds, none of which, considered by itself, justifies
repatriation, shall be examined in the same spirit, with
due regard for the psychic traumatism due to the number
of their wounds.
(2) All unquestionable cases giving the right to direct
repatriation (amputation, total blindness or deafness,
open pulmonary tuberculosis, mental disorder, malignant
growth, etc.) shall be examined and repatriated as soon
as possible by the camp physicians or by military medical
commissions appointed by the Detaining Power.
(3) Injuries and diseases which existed before the war and
which have not become worse, as well as war injuries
which have not prevented subsequent military Service,
shall not entitle to direct repatriation.
(4) The provisions of this Annex shall be interpreted and
applied in a similar manner in all countries party to the
confiict. The Powers and authorities concerned shall
grant to Mixed Medical Commissions all the facilities
necessary for the accomplishment of their task.
(5) The examples quoted under (I) above represent only
typical cases. Cases which do not correspond exactly
' to these provisions shall be judged in the spirit of the
provisions of Article iio of the present Convention, and
of the principles embodied in the present Agreement.
140
I
ANNEX 11
REGULATIONS CONCERNING
MIXED MEDICAL COMMISSIONS
(see Article 112)
ARTICLE I
The Mixed Medical Commissions provided for in Article 112
of the Convention shall be composed of three members, two of
whom shall belong to a neutral country, the third being appointed
by the Detaining Power. One of the neutral members shall
take the chair.
ARTICLE 2
The two neutral members shall be appointed by the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Gross, acting in agreement with
the Protecting Power, at the request of the Detaining Power.
They may be domiciled either in their country of origin, in any
other neutral country, or in the territory of the Detaining Power.
ARTICLE 3
The neutral members shall be approved by the Parties to
the confiict concerned, who shall notify their approval to the
International Committee of the Red Gross and to the Protectmg
Power, lipon such notification, the neutral members shall be
considered as effectively appointed.
ARTICLE 4
Deputy members shall also be appointed in sufficient number
to replace the regulär members in case of need. They shall be
appointed at the same time as the regulär members or, at least,
as soon as possible.
ARTICLE 5
If for any reason the International Committee of the Red
Gross cannot arrange for the appointment of the neutral members,
this shall be done by the Power protecting the interests of the
prisoners of war to be examined.
141
i;
i, !
ARTICLE 6
So far as possible, one of the two neutral members shall
be a surgeon and the other a physician.
ARTICLE 7
The neutral members shall be entirely independent of the
Parties to the conflict, which shall grant them all facililities in
the accomplishment of their duties.
ARTICLE 8
By agreement with the Detaining Power, the International
Committee of the Red Gross, when making the appointments
provided for in Articles 2 and 4 of the present Regulations.
shall settle the terms of Service of the nominees.
ARTICLE 13
If there is no neutral physician in a country where the
Services of a Mixed Medical Commission seem to be required,
and if it is for any reason impossible to appoint neutral doctors
who are resident in another country, the Detaining Power,
acting in agreement with the Protecting Power, shall set up a
Medical Commisssion which shall undertake the same duties as
a Mixed Medical Commission, subject to the provisions of Articles
I, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 of the present Regulations.
ARTICLE 14
Mixed Medical Commissions shall function permanently and
shall Visit each camp at intervals of not more than six months.
ARTICLE 9
The Mixed Medical Commissions shall begin their werk as
soon as possible after the neutral members have been approved,
and in any case within a period of three months from the date
of such approval.
ARTICLE 10
The Mixed Medical Commissions shall examine all the prisoners
designated in Article 113 of the Convention. They shall propose
repatriation, rejection, or reference to a later examination.
Their decisions shall be made by a majority vote.
ARTICLE II
The decisions made by the Mixed Medical Commissions in
each specific case shall be communicated, during the month
following their visit, to the Detaining Power, the Protecting
Power and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The
Mixed Medical Commissions shall also inform each prisoner of
war examined of the decision made, and shall issue to those
whose repatriation has been proposed certificates similar to the
model appended to the present Convention.
ARTICLE 12
The Detaining Power shall be required to carry out the
decisions of the Mixed Medical Commissions within three months
of the time when it receives due notification of such decisions.
142
ANNEX III
REGULATIONS CONCERNING COLLECTIVE RELIEF
(see Article yj)
ARTICLE I
Prisoners' representatives shall be allowed to distribute
collective relief shipments for which they are responsible, to
all prisoners of war administered by their camp, including those
who are in hospitals, or in prisons or other penal establishments.
ARTICLE 2
The distribution of collective relief shipments shall be
effected in accordance with the instructions of the donors and
with a plan drawn up by the prisoners' representatives. The
issue of medical stores shall, however, be made for preference
in agreement with the senior medical officers, and the latter
may, in hospitals and infirmaries, waive the said instructions,
if the needs of their patients so demand. Within the limits thus
defined, the distribution shall always be carried out equitably.
ARTICLE 3
The said prisoners' representatives or their assistants shall
be allowed to go to the points of arrival of relief supplies near
143
their camps, so as to enable the prisoners' representatives or
their assistants to verify the quality as well as the quantity of
the goods received, and to make out detailed reports thereon
für the donors.
ARTICLE 4
Prisoners' repräsentatives shall be given the facilities neces-
sary for verifying whether the distribution of collective relief
in all sub-divisions and annexes of their camps has been carried
out in accordance with their instructions.
ARTICLE 5
Prisoners' representatives shall be allowed to fill up, and
cause to be fiUed up by the prisoners' representatives of labour
detachments or by the senior medical officers of infirmaries and
hospitals, forms or questionnaires intended for the donors,
relating to collective relief supplies (distribution, requirements,
quantities, etc.). Such forms and questionnaires, duly completed,
shall be forwarded to the donors without delay.
ARTICLE 6 '
In Order to secure the regulär issue of collective relief to the
prisoners of war in their camp, and to meet any needs that may
arise from the arrival of new contingents of prisoners, prisoners'
representatives shall be allowed to build up and maintain
adequate reserve Stocks of collective relief. For this purpose,
they shall have suitable warehouses at their disposal ; each
warehouse shall be provided with two locks, the prisoners'
representative holding the keys of one lock and the camp Com-
mander the keys of the other.
ARTICLE 7
When collective consignments of clothing are available
each prisoner of war shall retain in his possession at least one
complete set of clothes. If a prisoner has more than one set of
clothes, the prisoners' representative shall be permitted to
withdraw excess clothing from those with the largest number of
sets, or particular articles in excess of one, if this is necessary
in Order to supply prisoners who are less well provided. He
shall not, however, withdraw second sets of underclothing,
socks or footwear, unless this is the only means of providing for
prisoners of war with none.
144
ARTICLE 8
The High Contracting Parties, and the Detaining Powers
in particular, shall authorize, as far as possible and subject to
the regulations governing the supply of the population, all
purchases of goods made in their territories for the distribution
of collective relief to prisoners of war. They shall similarly
facilitate the transfer of funds and other financial measures of
a technical or administrative nature taken for the purpose of
making such purchases.
ARTICLE 9
The f oregoing provisions shall not constitute an obstacle
to the right of prisoners of war to receive collective relief before
their arrival in a camp or in the course of transfer, nor to the
possibility of representatives of the Protecting Power, the
International Committee of the Red Gross, or any other body
giving assistance to prisoners which may be responsible for the
forwarding of such supplies, ensuring the distribution thereof
to the addressees by any other means that they may deem useful.
145
i|:
II
Ü
ANNEX IV
A. IDENTITY CARD
(see Article 4)
•uoi;BDgi;n9pi siq ui ;sissb o; 'S9i;u
-oq;nv Suiurer^aa aq; o; piBO aq; pii^q
8DUO ;b n^qs aq 'lauosud uaifB; si jojBsq
aq:^ JI 'panssi si ;i uioqM o; uosjod aq:^
Xq sauii; hb ;b paujBO aq ;snai pjBD aqx
•taaq:^ jo :^j'Bd :^ou ajB ;nq
jo S9DJo^ pauLiv aq; ÄuBdoioooB oqAv
suosjdd o:^ panssi si pjBD X:^i;u9pi siqx
3DIX0N
uoiSn9H
cd
o
4-»
u
a
a
o
2
;nudrai
IB9S IBID^O
adX; poo[g
.0
JP^H
saXg;
ö
o
o
•pH
Ö
(1)
T3
»H
Cd
S
u
o
-4-»
o
;qSi9M.
^qSpH
Photograph
of the
bearer
(Name of the country and mihtary
authority issuing this card)
IDENTITY CARD
FOR A PERSON WHO ACCOMPANIES
THE ARMED FORCES
Name
First names
Date and place of birth
Accompanies the Armed Forces as
Date of issue
Signatare of bearer
J
Remarks. — This card should be made out for preference in two or
three languages, one of which is in international use. Actual size of the
card: 13 by 10 centimetres. It should be folded along the dotted line
I. Front
ANNEX IV
B. CAPTURE CARD
(see Article yo)
PRISONER OF WAR MAIL
Postage free
CAPTURE CARD FOR PRISONER OF WAR
IMPORTANT
This card must be completed
by each prisoner immediately
after being taken prisoner and
each time his address is changed
(by reason of transfer to a hos-
pital or to another camp).
This card is distinct from
the special card which each
prisoner is allowed to send to
his relatives.
CENTRAL PRISONERS
OF WAR AGENCY
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED GROSS
GENEVA
SWITZERLAND
2. Reverse side
Write legibly and in
block letters
I . Power on which the
prisoner depends
2 . Name
3 . First names (in füll)
4 . First name of father
5 . Date of birth 6 . Place of birth
7. Rank
8 . Service number
9 . Address of next of kin
10
'II
Taken prisoner on: (or)
Coming from (Camp No., hospital, etc.)
(a) Good health — (h) Not wounded — (c) Recovered—^'dfj Convalescent-
(e) Sick — (f) Slightly wounded — (g) Seriously wounded.
12 . My present address is : Prisoner No
Name of camp
13. Date 14. Signature.
♦ Strike out what is not applicable — Do not add any remarks — See explanations
overleaf.
Remarks. — This form should be made out in two or three languages,
particularly in the prisoner's own language and in that of the Detaining Power.
Actual size : 15 by 10.5 centimetres.
I. Front
ANNEX IV
C. CORRESPONDENCE CARD AND LETTER
(see Article yi)
I. CARD.
Prisoner of War Mail
Postage free
POST CARD
To
Sender :
Name and first names
Place of Destination
Place and date of birth
Prisoner of War No.
Street _
Country
Province or Department
Name of camp
Country where posted
2, Reverse side.
^
NAME OF CAMP
Date
11 'i
1
ANNEX IV
C. CORRESPONDENCE CARD AND LETTER
(see Article yi)
2. LETTER
Write on the dotted lines only and as legibly as possible.
Remarks. — This form should be made out in two or three languages, par-
ticularly in the prisoner's own language and in that of the Detaining Power.
Actual size of form: 15 by 10 centimetres.
PRISONER OF WAR MAIL
Postage free
To
Place
Street
Country
Department or Province
po^sod ojaqAv Xj^unoQ
duiBO jo 9m'B^
•0>I J13AV JO J9UOSUJ
qtpiq JO QO'Bid puB ö^bq
ssraBU ;sjg puiB quib^
: japuas
4t * 4! « « * >t> 41 ♦ ♦ ♦ <*( ♦ ♦ « ♦ 4t * ♦
5 2 S o
> -^ rd ^
O T3 u
<L» d) >
O •'-' a> V
0) Cfl yj
>
o
CO
••H
o
^ So
03
> ^
£ o;
CO
W)^ o^
05
Vi
O
o
0 rri O <^
/1^ ^^ —
(D
<D
0} O
? ^^ (1) CO
a
o
o
Ö
u
CO
CO
Co
S3 I— I '^
O Ö
CO
v
Vh
-♦->
O
6
^ tüD'co* CO >»
^ CO
O (ü CO H ••
CO MH C
2 S N
C S o ü
^1
i
Sr
■f.
^1«
in
ANNEX IV
D. NOTIFICATION OF DEATH
(see Ar tick 120)
(Title of responsible
authority)
NOTIFICATION OF DEATH
Power on which the
prisoner depended ...
Name and first names
First name of f ather
Place and date of birth
Place and date of death
Rank and Service number (as given on
identity disc)
Address of next of kin
Where and when taken prisoner
Cause and circumstances of death
Place of burial
Is the grave marked and can it be found
later by the relatives ?
Are the personal effects of the deceased
in the keeping of the Detaining Power
or are they being forwarded together
with this notification?
If forwarded, through what agency ?
Can the person who cared for the deceased
during sickness or during his last
moments (doctor, nurse, minister of
religion, fellow prisoner) give here or
on an attached sheet a short account
of the circumstances of the death and
burial?
(Date, seal and signature of responsible Signature and address of two witnesses
authority.)
Remarks. — This form should be made out in two or three languages, par-
ticularly in the prisoner's own language and in that of the Detaining Power.
Actual size of the form: 21 by 30 centimetres.
ANNEX IV
E. REPATRIATION CERTIFICATE
(see Annex II, Article 11)
REPATRIATION CERTIFICATE
Date:
Camp :
Hospital :
Surname :
First names :
Date of birth :
Rank :
Army number :
P. W. number :
Injury-Disease :
Decision of the Commission :
Chairman of the
Mixed Medical Commission :
A = direct repatriation
B = accommodation in a neutral country
NC = re-examination by next Commission
151
i
/
ANNEX V
MODEL REGULATIONS CONCERNING PAYMENTS SENT
BY PRISONERS TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY
(see Article 63)
(i) The notification referred to in the third paragraph of
Article 63 will show :
(a) number as specified in Article 17, rank, surname
and first names of the prisoner of war who is
the payer ;
(b) the name and address of the payee in the country
of origin ;
(c) the amount to be so paid in the currency of the
country in which he is detained.
(2) The notification will be signed by the prisoner of war,
or his witnessed mark made upon it if he cannot write,
and shall be countersigned by the prisoners' representa-
tive.
(3) The camp Commander will add to this notification a
certificate that the prisoner of war concerned has a
credit balance of not less than the amount registered as
payable.
(4) The notification may be made up in lists, each sheet of
such lists witnessed by the prisoners' representative and
certified by the camp Commander.
152
GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN
PERSON S IN TIME OF WAR
OF AUGUST 12, 1949.
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments
represented at the Diplomatie Conference held at Geneva from
April 21 to August 12, 1949, for the purpose of establishing a
Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War,
have agreed as foUows :
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE I
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to
ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.
ARTICLE 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented
in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases
of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the State of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party,
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party
to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto
shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
153
Respect for the
Convention
Application of
the Convention
I«(
Confiicts
not of an
international
character
'H\
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the
thereof'''^^'"' '^ ^^^ ^^**^'" ^^^^^^^ ^""^ ^PP^^^' *^^ provisions
ARTICLE 3
In the case of armed conilict not of an international character
occuiTing m the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,'
the lollowing provisions :
(i) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, includ-
ing members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distmction founded on race, colour, religion or faith,
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture ;
(h) taking of hostages ;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment ;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its Services to the Parties
to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to
bring mto force, by means of special agreements, all or part
Ol the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect
the legal Status of the Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 4
Persons protected by the Convention are those who, at a
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves,
in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to
the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.
Nationais of a State which is not bound by the Convention
are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral State who find
themselves in the territory of a belligerent State, and nationals
of a co-belligerent State, shall not be regarded as protected
persons while the State of which they are nationals has normal
diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.
The provisions of Part II are, however, wider in application,
as defined in Article 13.
Persons protected by the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of
August 12, 1949, or by the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, shall not
be considered as protected persons within the meaning of the
present Convention.
ARTICLE 5
Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter
, ; is satisfied that an individual protected person is defmitely
suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security
of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to
Claim such rights and Privileges under the present Convention
as would, if exercised in the favour of such individual person,
be prejudicial to the security of such State.
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person
is detained as a spy or Saboteur, or as a person under definite
suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying
Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military
security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of
communication under the present Convention.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated
with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of
the rights of fair and regulär trial prescribed by the present
Convention. They shall also be granted the füll rights and
Definition of
protected
persons
Derogations
154
155
Beginning
and end of
application
I
Privileges of a protected person under the present Convention
at the earliest date consistent with the security of the State
or Occupying Power, as the case may be.
ARTICLE 6
The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any
conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2.
In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application
of the present Convention shall cease on the general close of
military Operations.
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the
present Convention shall cease one year after the general close
of military Operations ; however, the Occupying Power shall
be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent
that such Power exercises the functions of government in such
territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the
present Convention : i to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53,
59, 61 to y^, 143.
Protected persons whose release, repatriation or re-establish-
ment may take place after such dates shall meanwhile continue
to benefit by the present Convention.
Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the
foregoing Article, if such there be.
ARTICLE 9
The present Convention shall be applied with the Coopera-
tion and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose
duty it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict.
For this purpose, the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from
their diplomatic or consular staff, delegates from amongst
their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers.
The said delegates shall be subject to the approval of the Power
with which they are to carry out their duties.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate to the greatest
extent possible the task of the representatives or delegates
of the Protecting Powers.
The representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers
shall not in any case exceed their mission under the present
Convention. They shall, in particular, take account of the
imperative necessities of security of the State wherein they
carry out their duties.
Protecting
Powers
Special
agreements
'' /
Non-renuncia-
tion of rights
ARTICLE 7
In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in
Articles 11, 14, 15, 17, 36, 108, 109, 132, 133 and 149, the High
Contracting Parties may conclude other special agreements for
all matters concerning which they may deem it suitable to make
separate provision. No special agreement shall adversely aflect
the Situation of protected persons, as defined by the present
Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
Protected persons shall continue to have the benefit of
such agreements as long as the Convention is applicable to
them, except where express provisions to the contrary are
contained in the aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or
where more favourable measures have been taken with regard
to them by one or other of the Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 8
Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in
part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present
ARTICLE 10
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no
obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial hunianitarian
Organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the
conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of civilian
persons and for their relief.
ARTICLE II
The High Contracting Parties may at any time agree to
entrust to an international Organization which offers all guarantees
of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protect-
ing Powers by virtue of the present Convention.
When persons protected by the present Convention do not
benefit or cease to benefit, no matter for what reason, by the
activities of a Protecting Power or of an Organization provided
for in the first paragraph above, the Detaining Power shall
Activities of the
International
Committee of
the Red Cross
Substitutes for
Protecting
Powers
156
157
•
II
M
) I
Conciliation
procedure
request a neutral State, or such an Organization, to undertake
the functions performed under the present Convention by a
Protecting Power designated by the Parties to a conflict.
If protection cannot be arranged accordingly, the Detain-
ing Power shall request or shall accept, subject to the provisions
of this Article, the offer of the Services of a humanitarian
Organization, such as the International Committee of the Red
Gross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed by
Protecting Powers under the present Convention.
Any neutral Power or any Organization invited by the
Power concerned or offering itself for these purposes, shall
be required to act with a sense of responsibility towards the
Party to the conflict on which persons protected by the present
Convention depend, and shall be required to furnish sufficient
assurances that it is in a position to undertake the appropriate
functions and to discharge them impartially.
No derogation from the preceding provisions shall be made
by special agreements between Powers one of which is restricted,
even temporarily, in its freedom to negotiate with the other
Power or its allies by reason of military events, more particularly
where the whole, or a substantial part, of the territory of the
Said Power is occupied.
Whenever in the present Convention mention is made of a
Protecting Power, such mention applies to Substitute organiza-
tions in the sense of the present Article.
The provisions of this Article shall extend and be adapted
to cases of nationals of a neutral State who are in occupied
territory or who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent
State in which the State of which they are nationals has not
normal diplomatic representation.
ARTICLE 12
In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of
protected persons, particularly in cases of disagreement between
the Parties to the conflict as to the application or Interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the present Convention, the Protect-
ing Powers shall lend their good ofhces with a view to settling
the disagreement.
For this purpose, each of the Protecting Powers may, either
at the invitation of one Party or on its own initiative, propose
to the Parties to the conflict a meeting of their representatives,
and in particular of the authorities responsible for protected
persons, possibly on neutral territory suitably chosen. The
158
Parties to the conflict shall be bound to give effect to the pro-
posals made to them for this purpose. The Protecting Powers
may, if necessary, propose for approval by the Parties to the
conflict a person belonging to a neutral Power, or delegated
by the International Committee of the Red Cross, who shall
be invited to take part in such a meeting.
PART II
GENERAL PROTECTION OF POPULATIONS
AGAINST CERTAIN CONSEQUENCES OF WAR
ARTICLE 13
The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations
of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction
based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political
opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused
by war.
ARTICLE 14
In time of peace, the High Contracting Parties and, after
the outbreak of hostilities, the Parties thereto, may establish in
their own territory and, if the need arises, in occupied areas,
hospital and safety zones and localities so organized as to
Protect from the effects of war, wounded, sick and aged persons,
children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mothers of
children under seven.
Upon the outbreak and during the course of hostilities,
the Parties concerned may conclude agreements on mutual
recognition of the zones and localities they have created. They
may for this purpose implement the provisions of the Draft
Agreement annexed to the present Convention, with such
amendments as they may consider necessary.
159
Field of
application
of Part II
Hospital and
safety zones
and localities
I
Neutralized
zones
Wounded
and sick
I.
General
protection
II.
Evacuation
The Protecting Powers and the International Committee
of the Red Gross are invited to lend their good Offices in order
to facilitate the institution and recognition of these hospital
and safety zones and localities.
ARTICLE 15
Any Party to the conflict may, either direct or through a
neutral State or some humanitarian Organization, propose to
the adverse Party to establish, in the regions where fighting
is taking place, neutralized zones intended to shelter from the
effects of war the foUowing persons, without distinction :
(a) wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants ;
(b) civilian persons who take no part in hostilities, and
who, while they reside in the zones, perform no work
of a military character.
When the Parties concerned have agreed upon the geo-
graphical position, administration, food supply and supervision
of the proposed neutralized zone, a written agreement shall
be concluded and signed by the representatives of the Parties
to the conflict. The agreement shall fix the beginning and the
duration of the neutralization of the zone.
ARTICLE 16
The wounded and sick, as well as the infirm, and expectant
mothers, shall be the object of particular protection and respect.
As far as military considerations allow, each Party to the
conflict shall facilitate the steps taken to search for the killed
and wounded, to assist the shipwrecked and other persons
exposed to grave danger, and to protect them against pillage
and ill-treatment.
ARTICLE 17
The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local
agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas,
of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and
maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions,
medical personnel and medical equipment on their way to
such areas.
ARTICLE 18
Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded
and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circum-
stances be the object of attack but shall at all times be respected
and protected by the Parties to the conflict.
States which are Parties to a conflict shall provide all
civilian hospitals with certificates showing that they are civilian
hospitals and that the buildings which they occupy are not
used for any purpose which would deprive these hospitals of
protection in accordance with Article 19.
Civilian hospitals shall be marked by means of the emblem
provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, but only if so
authorized by the State.
The Parties to the conflict shall, in so far as military con-
siderations permit, take the necessary steps to make the
distinctive emblems indicating civilian hospitals clearly visible
to the enemy land, air and naval forces in order to obviate the
possibility of any hostile action.
In view of the dangers to which hospitals may be exposed
by being close to military objectives, it is recommended that
such hospitals be situated as far as possible from such objectives.
ARTICLE 19
The protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall
not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their human-
itarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may,
however, cease only after due warning has been given, naming,
in all appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit and after such
warning has remained unheeded.
The fact that sick or wounded members of the armed forces
are nursed in these hospitals, or the presence of small arms and
ammunition taken from such combatants which have not yet
been handed to the proper service, shall not be considered to
be acts harmful to the enemy.
ARTICLE 20
Persons regularly and solely engaged in the Operation and
administration of civilian hospitals, including the personnel
engaged in the search for, removal and transporting of and
caring for wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity
cases shall be respected and protected.
III.
Protection
of hospitals
IV.
Discontinuance
of protection
of hospitals
V.
Hospital
staff
160
161
VI.
Landjand sea
transport
II
VII.
Air transport
In occupied territory and in zones of military Operations,
the above personnel shall be recognisable by means of an
identity card certifying their status, bearing the photograph
of the holder and embossed with the stamp of the responsible
authority, and also by means of a stamped, water-resistant
armlet which they shall wear on the left arm while carrying out
their duties. This armlet shall be issued by the State and shall
bear the emblem provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949.
Other personnel who are engaged in the Operation and
administration of civilian hospitals shall be entitled to respect
and protection and to wear the armlet, as provided in and
under the conditions prescribed in this Article, while they are
employed on such duties. The identity card shall state the
duties on which they are employed.
The management of each hospital shall at all times hold
at the disposal of the competent national or occupying author-
ities an up-to-date list of such personnel.
ARTICLE 21
Convoys of vehicles or hospital trains on land or specially
provided vessels on sea, conveying wounded and sick civilians,
the infirm and maternity cases, shall be respected and protected
in the same manner as the hospitals provided for in Article 18,
and shall be marked, with the consent of the State, by the
display of the distinctive emblem provided for in Article 38
of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
of August 12, 1949.
ARTICLE 22
Aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded
and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases or for the
transport of medical personnel and equipment, shall not be
attacked, but shall be respected while flying at heights, times
and on routes specifically agreed upon between all the Parties
to the conflict concerned.
They may be marked with the distinctive emblem provided
for in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field of August 12, 1949.
Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy
occupied territory are prohibited.
Such aircraft shall obey every summons to land. In the
event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its occupants
may continue its flight after examination, if any.
ARTICLE 23
Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage
of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects
necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians
of another High Contracting Party, even if the latter is its
adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all con-
signments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended
for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity
cases
The Obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the
free passage of the consignments indicated in the preceding
Paragraph is subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied
that there are no serious reasons for fearing :
(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their
destination,
(h) that the control may not be effective, or
(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military
efforts or economy of the enemy through the Substitu-
tion of the above-mentioned consignments for goods
which would otherwise be provided or produced by
the enemy or through the release of such material,
Services or facilities as would otherwise be required
for the production of such goods.
The Power which allows the passage of the consignments
indicated in the first paragraph of this Article may make such
permission conditional on the distribution to the persons
benefited thereby being made under the local supervision of
the Protecting Powers.
Such consignments shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible,
and the Power which permits their free passage shall have
the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which
such passage is allowed.
ARTICLE 24
The Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures
to ensure that children under fifteen, who are orphaned or are
separated from their families as a result of the war, are not
left to their own resources, and that their maintenance, the
Consignment
of medical
supplies, food
and clothing.
Measures
relating to
child welfare
162
163
i
\*^M
i\
I
m
Family news
1 1
i
ii
(i
Dispersed
families
exercise of their religion and their education are facilitated
in all circumstances. Their education shall, as far as possible,
be entrusted to persons of a similar cultural tradition.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate the reception
of such children in a neutral country for the duration of the
conflict with the consent of the Protecting Power, if any, and
under due safeguards for the observance of the principles stated
in the first paragraph.
They shall, furthermore, endeavour to arrange for all
children under twelve to be identified by the wearing of identity
discs, or by some other means.
ARTiCLE 25
All persons in the territory of a Party to the conflict, or in
a territory occupied by it, shall be enabled to give news of a
strictly personal nature to members of their families, wherever
they may be, and to receive news from them. This correspond-
ence shall be forwarded speedily and without undue delay.
If, as a result of circumstances, it becomes difhcult or
impossible to exchange family correspondence by the ordinary
post, the Parties to the conflict concerned shall apply to a
neutral intermediary, such as the Central Agency provided
for in Article 140, and shall decide in consultation with it how
to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations under the best
possible conditions, in particular with the Cooperation of
the National Red Gross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun)
Societies.
If the Parties to the conflict deem it necessary to restrict
family correspondence, such restrictions shall be confined to
the compulsory use of Standard forms containing twenty-five
freely chosen words, and to the limitation of the number of
these forms despatched to one each month.
ARTICLE 26
Each Party to the conflict shall facilitate enquiries made
by members of families dispersed owing to the war, with the
object of renewing contact with one another and of meeting, if
possible. It shall encourage, in particular, the work of organisa-
tions engaged on this task provided they are acceptable to it
and conform to its security regulations.
9-
PART III
STATUS AND TREATMENT OF PROTECTED
PERSONS
SECTION I
PROVISIONS COMMON TO THE TERRITORIES
OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
AND TO OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
ARTICLE 27
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to
respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights,
their religious convictions and practices, and their manners
and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated,
and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence
or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack
on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced Prostitu-
tion, or any form of indecent assault.
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state
of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treated
with the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in
whose power they are, without any adverse distinction based,
. in particular, on race, religion or political opinion.
However, the Parties to the conflict may take such measures
of control and security in regard to protected persons as may
be necessary as a result of the war.
r
'• ■ ARTICLE 28
The presence of a protected person may not be used to
render certain points or areas immune from military Operations.
ARTICLE 29
The Party to the conflict in whose hands protected persons
may be, is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by
its agents, irrespective of any individual responsibility which
may be incurred.
Treatment
I.
General
observations
II.
Danger
zones
III.
Respon-
sibilities
164
165
Application to
Protecting
Powers and
relief
organizations
\i\
"t
i :
V
ll 1.1
y
Prohibition of
coercion
Prohibition of
corporal
punishment,
torture, etc.
Individual
responsibility,
collective
penalties,
pillage,
reprisals
ARTICLE 30
Protected persons shall have every facility for making
application to the Protecting Powers, the International Com-
mittee of the Red Gross, the National Red Gross (Red Grescent,
Red Lion and Sun) Society of the country where they may be,
as well as to any Organization that might assist them.
These several organizations shall be granted all facilities
for that purpose by the authorities, within the bounds set by
military or security considerations.
Apart from the Visits of the delegates of the Protecting
Powers and of the International Committee of the Red Gross,
provided for by Article 143, the Detaining or Occupying Powers
shall facilitate as much as possible visits to protected persons
by the representatives of other organizations whose object is
to give Spiritual aid or material relief to such persons.
ARTICLE 31
No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against
protected persons, in particular to obtain information from
them or from third parties.
ARTICLE ^2
The High Gontracting Parties specifically agree that each
of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a
character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination
of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies
not only to murder, torture, corporal punishments, mutilation
and medical or scientific experiments not necessitated by the
medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any other
measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military
agents.
ARTICLE 33
No protected person may be punished for an offence he or
she has not personally committed. Gollective penalties and
likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are
prohibited.
Pillage is prohibited.
Reprisals against protected persons and their property are
prohibited.
ARTICLE 34
Hostages The taking of hostages is prohibited.
SEGTION II
ALIENS IN THE TERRITORY
OF A PARTY TO THE GONFLIGT
ARTICLE 35
All protected persons who may desire to leave the territory
at the outset of, or during a conflict, shall be entitled to do so,
unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of
the State. The applications of such persons to leave shall be
decided in accordance with regularly established procedures
and the decision shall be taken as rapidly as possible. Those
persons permitted to leave may provide themselves with the
necessary funds for their journey and take with them a reason-
able amount of their effects and articles of personal use.
If any such person is refused permission to leave the territory,
he shall be entitled to have such refusal reconsidered as soon
as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board
designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.
Upon request, representatives of the Protecting Power
shall, unless reasons of security prevent it, or the persons con-
cerned object, be furnished with the reasons for refusal of any
request for permission to leave the territory and be given, as
expeditiously as possible, the names of all persons who have
been denied permission to leave.
ARTICLE 36
Departures permitted under the foregoing Article shall
be carried out in satisfactory conditions as regards safety,
hygiene, sanitation and food. All costs in connection there-
with, from the point of exit in the territory of the Detaining
Power, shall be borne by the country of destination, or, in the
case of accommodation in a neutral country, by the Power
whose nationals are benefited. The practical details of such
movements may, if necessary, be settled by special agreements
between the Powers concerned.
The foregoing shall not prejudice such special agreements
as may be concluded between Parties to the conflict concern-
ing the exchange and repatriation of their nationals in enemy
hands.
Right to
leave the
territory
Method of
repatriation
166
167
Persons in
confinement
Non-
repatriated
persons
I.
General
observations
ARTICLE '^^
Protected persons who are confined pending proceedings
or subject to a sentence involving loss of liberty, shall durin^
their confinement be humanely treated.
As soon as they are released, they may ask to leave the
territory in conformity with the foregoing Articles.
ARTICLE 38
With the exception of special measures authorised by the
present Convention, in particular by Articles 27 and 41 thereof
the Situation of protected persons shall continue to be regulated
in principle, by the provisions concerning aliens in time of peace'
In any case, the following rights shall be granted to them •
\
II.
Means of
existence
(I)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
They shall be enabled to receive the individual or collec-
tive rehef that may be sent to them.
They shall, if their state of health so requires, receive
medical attention and hospital treatment to the same
extent as the nationals of the State concerned.
They shall be allowed to practise their religion and to
receive spiritual assistance from ministers of their faith.
If they reside in an area particularly exposed to the
dangers of war, they shall be authorised to move from
that area to the same extent as the nationals of the
State concerned.
Children under fifteen years, pregnant women and
mothers of children under seven years shall benefit
by any preferential treatment to the same extent as
the nationals of the State concerned.
ARTICLE 39
Protected persons who, as a result of the war, have lost
their gainful employment, shall be granted the opportunity
to find paid employment. That opportunity shall, subject
to security considerations and to the provisions of Article 40
be equal to that enjoyed by the nationals of the Power in whose
territory they are.
Where a Party to the conflict applies to a protected person
methods of control which result in his being unable to support
himself, and especially if such a person is prevented for reasons
of security from finding paid employment on reasonable con-
ditions, the said Party shall ensure his support and that of his
aependents.
168
Protected persons may in any case receive allowances
from their home country, the Protecting Power, or the relief
societies referred to in Article 30.
ARTICLE 40
Protected persons may be compelled to work only to the
same extent as nationals of the Party to the conflict in whose
territory they are.
If protected persons are of enemy nationality, they may
only be compelled to do work which is normally necessary to
ensure the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transport and health
of human beings and which is not directly related to the con-
duct of military Operations.
In the cases mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs,
protected persons compelled to work shall have the benefit of
the same working conditions and of the same safeguards as
national workers, in particular as regards wages, hours of
labour, clothing and equipment, previous training and com-
pensation for occupational accidents and diseases.
If the above provisions are infringed, protected persons shall
be allowed to exercise their right of complaint in accordance with
Article 30.
ARTICLE 41
Should the Power in whose hands protected persons may
be consider the measures of control mentioned in the present
Convention to be inadequate, it may not have recourse to any
other measure of control more severe than that of assigned
residence or internment, in accordance with the provisions
of Articles 42 and 43.
In applying the provisions of Article 39, second paragraph,
to the cases of persons required to leave their usual places
of residence by virtue of a decision placing them in assigned
residence elsewhere, the Detaining Power shall be guided as
closely as possible by the Standards of welfare set forth in
Part III, Section IV of this Convention.
ARTICLE 42
The internment or placing in assigned residence of protected
persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining
Power makes it absolutely necessary.
If any person, acting through the representatives of the
Protecting Power, voluntarily demands internment, and if
his Situation renders this step necessary, he shall be interned
by the Power in whose hands he may be.
169
III.
Employment
IV.
Assigned
residence.
Internment
V.
Grounds for
internment or
assigned
residence.
Voluntary
internment
1
VI.
Procediire
u
t I
^1
I I
I
'
VII.
Kefugees
ARTICLE 43
Any protected person who has been interned or placed in
assigned residence shall be entitled to have such action recon-
sidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administra-
tive board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.
if the internment or placing in assigned residence is maintained
the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at
Jeast twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case with
a View to the favourable amendment of the initial decision
it circumstances permit.
Ihiless the protected persons concerned object, the Detain-
ing Power shall, as rapidly as possible, give the Protecting
l^ower the names of any protected persons who have been
interned or subjected to assigned residence, or who have been
released from internment or assigned residence. The decisions
Ol the courts or boards mentioned in the first paragraph of the
present Article shall also, subject to the same conditions, be
notified as rapidly as possible to the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 44
In applying the measures of control mentioned in the present
Convention, the Detaining Power shall not treat as enemv
ahens exclusively on the basis of their nationality de jure of
an enemy State, refugees who do not, in fact, enjoy the pro-
tection of any government.
ing Power, take effective measures to correct the Situation or
shall request the return of the protected persons. Such request
must be complied with.
In no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred
to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecu-
tion for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs.
The provisions of this Article do not constitute an obstacle
to the extradition, in pursuance of extradition treaties con-
cluded before the outbreak of hostilities, of protected persons
accused of offences against ordinary criminal law.
ARTICLE 46
In so far as they have not been previously withdrawn,
restrictive measures taken regarding protected persons shall be
cancelled as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.
Restrictive measures affecting their property shall be
cancelled, in accordance with the law of the Detaining Power,
as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.
SECTION III
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Cancellation of
restrictive
measures
VIII.
Transfer to
another Power
ARTICLE 45
Protected persons shall not be transferred to a Power which
IS not a party to the Convention.
This Provision shall in no way constitute an obstacle to
the repatriation of protected persons, or to their return to
their country of residence after the cessation of hostilities
Protected persons may be transferred by the Detaining
Power only to a Power which is a party to the present Con-
vention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of
the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to applv
the present Convention. If protected persons are transferred
under such circumstances, responsibility for the application
of the present Convention rests on the Power accepting them
while they are m its custody. Nevertheless, if that Power fails
to carry out the provisions of the present Convention in anv
important respect the Power by which the protected persons
were transferred shall, upon being so notified by the Protect -
ARTICLE 47
Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not
be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the
benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced,
as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institu-
tions or government of the said territory, nor by any agree-
ment concluded between the authorities of the occupied terri-
tories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by
the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.
ARTICLE 48
Protected persons who are not nationals of the Power whose
territory is occupied, may avail themselves of the right to leave
the territory subject to the provisions of Article 35, and deci-
sions thereon shall be taken in accordance with the procedure
which the Occupying Power shall establish in accordance with
the said Article.
Inviolability
of rights
Special cases
of repatriation
170
171
: (
Deportations,
il
transfers,
evacuations
•
Children
I
(.1
ARTICLE 49
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as weU as deportations
of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory
of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country occupied
or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.
Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total
or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the popula-
tion or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacua-
tions may not involve the displacement of protected persons
outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for
material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement
Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes
as soon as hostiHties in the area in question have ceased
The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacua-
tions shaU ensure, to the greatest practicable extent that
proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected
persons that the removals are effected in satisfactory condi-
tions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members
ot the same family are not separated.
The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers
and evacuations as soon as they have taken place
The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons
in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless
the security of the population or imperative military reasons
so demand. ^
The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of
its own civihan population into the territory it occupies.
ARTICLE 50
The Occupying Power shall, with the Cooperation of the
national and local authorities, facüitate the proper workin^
of all mstitutions devoted to the care and education of children
The Occupying Power shaU take aU necessary steps to
facüitate the identification of children and the registration of
their parentage. It may not, in any case, change their personal
Status, nor enlist them in formations or organizations subordinate
to lt.
Should the local institutions be inadequate for the purpose
the Occupying Power shall make arrangements for the main-'
tenance and education, if possible by persons of their own
nationahty, language and religion, of children who are
orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of the
war and who cannot be adequately cared for by a near relative
or friend.
172
A special section of the Bureau set up in accordance with
Article 136 shall be responsible for taking all necessary steps
to identify children whose identity is in doubt. Particulars of
their parents or other near relatives should always be recorded
if available.
The Occupying Power shall not hinder the application of
any preferential measures in regard to food, medical care and
protection against the effects of war which may have been
adopted prior to the occupation in favour of children under fifteen
years, expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven
years.
ARTICLE 51
The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons
to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or
Propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is
permitted.
The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons
to work unless they are over eighteen years of age, and then
only on work which is necessary either for the needs of the
army of occupation, or for the public utility Services, or for
the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation or health of
the population of the occupied country. Protected persons
may not be compelled to undertake any work which would
involve them in the Obligation of taking part in military Opera-
tions. The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons
to employ forcible means to ensure the security of the installa-
tions where they are performing compulsory labour.
The work shall be carried out only in the occupied territory
where the persons whose Services have been requisitioned are.
Every such person shall, so far as possible, be kept in his usual
place of employ ment. Workers shall be paid a fair wage and
the work shall be proportionate to their physical and intellectual
capacities. The legislation in force in the occupied country
concerning working conditions, and safeguards as regards, in
particular, such matters as wages, hours of work, equipment,
preliminary training and compensation for occupational acci-
dents and diseases, shall be applicable to the protected persons
assigned to the work referred to in this Article.
In no case shall requisition of labour lead to a mobilization
of workers in an Organization of a military or semi-military
character.
ARTICLE 52
No contract, agreement or regulation shall impair the right
of any worker, whether voluntary or not and wherever he may
-^n
EnUstment.
Labour
Protection of
workers
1'!
'
1
be, to apply to the representatives of the Protecting Power
in Order to request the said Power's Intervention.
All measures aiming at creating unemployment or at restrict-
ing the opportunities offered to workers in an occupied territory,
in Order to induce them to work for the Occupying Power, are
prohibited.
Prohibitcd
destruction
ARTICLE 53
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal
property belonging individually or coUectively to private
persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to
social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by jniHtary
Operations.
Judges and
public
officials
ARTICLE 54
The Occupying Power may not alter the status of pubHc
officials or judges in the occupied territories, or in any way
apply sanctions to or take any measures of coercion or
discrimination against them, should they abstain from fulfil-
ling their functions for reasons of conscience.
This Prohibition does not prejudice the apphcation of the
second paragraph of Article 51. It does not affect the right of
the Occupying Power to remove pubhc officiäls from their posts.
Food and
medical
supphes for
the population
j
i
ARTICLE 55
To the füllest extent of the means available to it, the Occupy-
ing Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies
of the population ; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary
foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of
the occupied territory are inadequate.
The Occupying Power may not requisition foodstuffs,
articles or medical supplies available in the occupied territory,
except for use by the occupation forces and administration
personnel, and then only if the requirements of the civilian
population have been taken into account. Subject to the pro-
visions of other international Conventions, the Occupying
Power shall make arrangements to ensure that fair value is
paid for any requisitioned goods.
The Protecting Power shall, at any time, be at liberty to
verify the State of the food and medical supplies in occupied
territories, except where temporary restrictions are made
necessary by imperative military requirements.
174
i
ARTICLE 56
To the füllest extent of the means available to it, the Occupy-
ing Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the
Cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and
hospital establishments and Services, public health and hygiene
in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adop-
tion and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures
necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and
epidemics. Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed
to carry out their duties.
If new hospitals are set up in occupied territory and if the
competent organs of the occupied State are not operating
there, the occupying authorities shall, if necessary, grant them
the recognition provided for in Article 18. In similar circum-
stances, the occupying authorities shall also grant recognition
to hospital personnel and transport vehicles under the provi-
sions of Articles 20 and 21.
In adopting measures of health and hygiene and in their
implementation, the Occupying Power shall take into con-
sideration the moral and ethical susceptibilities of the popula-
tion of the occupied territory.
Hygiene and
public health
ARTICLE 57
The Occupying Power may requisition civilian hospitals
only temporaiily and only in cases of urgent necessity for the
care of military wounded and sick, and then on condition that
suitable arrangements are made in due time for the care and
treatment of the patients and for the needs of the civilian
population for hospital accommodation.
The material and stores of civilian hospitals cannot be
requisitioned so long as they are necessary for the needs of
the civilian population.
Requisition
of hospitals
ARTICLE 58
The Occupying Power shall permit ministers of rehgion
to give Spiritual assistance to the members of their religious
communities.
The Occupying Power shall also accept consignments of
books and articles required for religious needs and shall facilitate
their distribution in occupied territory.
Spiritual
assistance
175
Relief
I.
Collective
relief
I
IL
Responsibilities
of the
Occupying
Power
ii
III.
Distribution
!
1
ARTICLE 59
If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory
is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to
reUef schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate
them by all the means at its disposal.
Such schemes, which may be undertaken either by States
or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Gross, shall consist, in parti-
cular, of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical
supplies and clothing.
All Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of
these consignments and shall guarantee their protection.
A Power granting free passage to consignments on their
way to territory occupied by an adverse Party to the conflict
shall, however, have the right to search the consignments, to
regulate their passage according to prescribed times and routes,
and to be reasonably satisfied through the Protecting Power
that these consignments are to be used for the relief of the
needy population and are not to be used for the benefit of the
Occupying Power.
ARTICLE 60
Relief consignments shall in no way relieve the Occupying
Power of any of its responsibilities under Articles 55, 56 and
59. The Occupying Power shall in no way whatsoever divert
relief consignments from the purpose for which they are
intended, except in cases of urgent necessity, in the interests
of the population of the occupied territory and with the con-
sent of the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 61
The distribution of the relief consignments referred to in
the foregoing Articles shall be carried out with the Cooperation
and under the supervision of the Protecting Power. This duty
may also be delegated, by agreement between the Occupying
Power and the Protecting Power, to a neutral Power, to the
International Committee of the Red Cross or to any other
impartial humanitarian body.
Such consignments shall be exempt in occupied territory
from all charges, taxes or customs duties unless these are
necessary in the interests of the economv of the territory. The
Occupying Power shall facihtate the rapid distribution of these
consignments.
All Contracting Parties shall endeavour to permit the transit
and transport, free of charge, of such rehef consignments on
their way to occupied territories.
ARTICLE 62
Subject to imperative reasons of security, protected persons
in occupied territories shall be permit ted to receive the individual
relief consignments sent to them.
ARTICLE 63
Subject to temporary and exceptional measures imposed
for urgent reasons of security by the Occupying Power :
(a) recognized National Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red
Lion and Sun) Societies shall be able to pursue their
activities in accordance with Red Cross principles, as
defined by the International Red Cross Conferences.
Other relief societies shall be permitted to continue
their humanitarian activities under similar conditions ;
(h) the Occupying Power may not require any changes in
the personnel or structure of these societies, which
would prejudice the aforesaid activities.
The same principles shall apply to the activities and personnel
of special organizations of a non-military character, which
already exist or which may be established, for the purpose of
ensuring the living conditions of the civilian population by the
maintenance of the essential public utility Services, by the
distribution of relief and by the Organization of rescues.
ARTICLE 64
The penal laws of the occupied territory shaU remain in
force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended
by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat
to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present
Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the
necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice,
the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function
in respect of all offences covered by the said laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the popula-
tion of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential
to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under
the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government
IV.
Individual
relief
National Red
Cross and other
relief societies
Penal
legislation.
I.
General
observations
i
176
177
t*
II.
Publication
III.
Competent
courts
IV.
Applicable
provisions
t
li
V.
Penalties.
Death
penalty
of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying
Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces
or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines
of communication used by them.
ARTICLE 65
The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall
not come into force before they have been published and brought
to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language.
The effect of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive.
ARTICLE 66
In case of a breach of the penal provisions promulgated
by it by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 64, the Occupy-
ing Power may hand over the accused to its properly constituted,
non-political military courts, on condition that the said courts
sit in the occupied country. Courts of appeal shall preferably
sit in the occupied country.
ARTICLE 67
The courts shall apply only those provisions of law which
were applicable prior to the offence, and which are in accord-
ance with general principles of law, in particular the principle
that the penalty shall be proportionate to the offence. They
shall take into consideration the fact that the accused is not
a national of the Occupying Power.
ARTICLE 68
Protected persons who commit an offence which is solely
intended to härm the Occupying Power, but which does not
constitute an attempt on the life or limb of members of the
occupying forces or administration, nor a grave collect ive
danger, nor seriously damage the property of the occupying
forces or administration or the installations used by them,
shall be liable to internment or simple imprisonment, provided
the duration of such internment or imprisonment is propor-
tionate to the offence committed. Furthermore, internment or
imprisonment shall, for such offences, be the only measure adop-
ted for depriving protected persons of liberty. The courts provid-
ed for under Article 66 of the präsent Convention may at
their discretion convert a sentence of imprisonment to one of
internment for the same period.
The penal provisions promulgated by the Occupying Power
in accordance with Articles 64 and 65 may impose the death
penalty on a protected person only in cases where the person
is guilty of espionage, of serious acts of Sabotage against the
military installations of the Occupying Power or of intentional
offences which have caused the death of one or more persons,
provided that such offences were punishable by death under the
law of the occupied territory in force before the occupation began.
The death penalty may not be pronounced on a protected
person unless the attention of the court has been particularly
called to the fact that since the accused is not a national
of the Occupying Power, he is not bound to it by any duty
of allegiance.
In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced on
a protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time
of the offence.
ARTICLE 69
In all cases the duration of the period during which a protected
person accused of an offence is under arrest awaiting trial or
punishment shall be deducted from any period of imprisonment
awarded.
ARTICLE 70
Protected persons shall not be arrested, prosecuted or con-
victed by the Occupying Power for acts committed or for
opinions expressed before the occupation, or during a temporary
Interruption thereof, with the exception of breaches of the
laws and customs of war.
Nationais of the occupying Power who, before the outbreak
of hostilities, have sought refuge in the territory of the occupied
State, shall not be arrested, prosecuted, convicted or deported
from ' the occupied territory, except for offences committed
after the outbreak of hostilities, or for offences under common
law committed before the outbreak of hostilities which, accord-
ing to the law of the occupied State, would have justified extra-
dition in time of peace.
ARTICLE 71
No sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts
of the Occupying Power except after a regulär trial.
Accused persons who are prosecuted by the Occupying
Power shall be promptly informed, in writing, in a language
which they understand, of the particulars of the charges pre-
ferred against them, and shall be brought to trial as rapidly
VI.
Deduction
from sentence
of period spent
under arrest
VII.
Offences
committed
before
occupation
Penal
procedura
I.
General
observations
178
179
$
fl
( 1
m
II.
Right of
defence
i
as possible. The Protecting Power shall be informed of all
proceedings instituted by the Occiipying Power against pro-
tected persons in respect of charges involving the death penalty
or imprisonment for two years or more ; it shall be enabled,
at any time, to obtain Information regarding the State of such
proceedings. Furthermore, the Protecting Power shall be
entitled, on request, to be furnished with all particulars of these
and of any other proceedings instituted by the Occupying
Power against protected persons.
The notification to the Protecting Power, as provided for
in the second paragraph above, shall be sent immediately,
and shall in any case reach the Protecting Power three weeks
before the date of the first hearing. Unless, at the opening of
the trial, evidence is submitted that the provisions of this
Article are fully complied with, the trial shall not proceed.
The notification shall include the following particulars :
(a) description of the accused ;
(b) place of residence or detention ;
(cj specification of the charge or charges (with mention
of the penal provisions under which it is brought) ;
(d) designation of the court which will hear the case ;
(e) place and date of the first hearing.
ARTICLE 72
Accused persons shall have the right to present evidence
necessary to their defence and may, in particular, call witnesses.
They shall have the right to be assisted by a qualified advocate
or counsel of their own choice, who shall be able to visit them
freely and shall enjoy the necessary facilities for preparing
the defence.
Failing a choice by the accused, the Protecting Power may
provide him with an advocate or counsel. When an accused
person has to meet a serious charge and the Protecting Power
is not functioning, the Occupying Power, subject to the consent
of the accused, shall provide an advocate or counsel.
Accused persons shall, unless they freely waive such assist-
ance, be aided by an interpreter, both during preliminary
investigation and during the hearing in court. They shall have
at any time the right to object to the interpreter and to ask
for his replacement.
ARTICLE 73
A convicted person shall have the right of appeal provided
for by the laws applied by the court. He shall be fully informed
of his right to appeal or petition and of the time limit within
which he may do so.
The penal procedure provided in the present Section shall
apply, as far as it is applicable, to appeals. Where the laws
applied by the Court make no provision for appeals, the con-
victed person shall have the right to petition against the find-
ing and sentence to the competent authority of the Occupying
Power.
ARTICLE 74
Representatives of the Protecting Power shall have the
right to attend the trial of any protected person, unless the
hearing has, as an exceptional measure, to be held in camera
in the interests of the security of the Occupying Power, which
shall then notify the Protecting Power. A notification in respect
of the date and place of trial shall be sent to the Protecting
Power.
Any judgment involving a sentence of death, or imprison-
ment for two years or more, shall be communicated, with the
relevant grounds, as rapidly as possible to the Protecting Power.
The notification shall contain a reference to the notification
made under Article 71 and, in the case of sentences of imprison-
ment, the name of the place where the sentence is to be served.
A record of judgments other than those referred to above shall
be kept by the court and shall be open to inspection by
representatives of the Protecting Power. Any period allowed
for appeal in the case of sentences involving the death penalty,
or imprisonment of two years or more, shall not run until notifica-
tion of judgment has been received by the Protecting Power.
ARTICLE 75
In no case shall persons condemned to death be deprived
of the right of petition for pardon or reprieve.
No death sentence shall be carried out before the expira-
tion of a period of a least six months from the date of receipt
by the Protecting Power of the notification of the final judg-
ment confirming such death sentence, or of an order denying
pardon or reprieve.
The six months period of Suspension of the death sentence
herein prescribed may be reduced in individual cases in circum-
stances of grave emergency involving an organized threat to
III.
Pight of
appeal
IV.
Assistance
by the
Protecting
Power
V.
Death
sentence
180
181
II
lii ^
«
I
Treatment of
detainees
Handing over
of detainees at
the close of
occupation
Security
measurcs
Intern ment
and assigned
residence.
Right of
appeal
the security of the Occupying Pow^^r er its forces, provided
always that the Protecting Power is notified of such reduction
and is given reasonable time and opportunity to make
representations to the competent occupying authorities in
respect of such death sentences.
ARTICLE 76
Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in
the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their
sentences therein. They shall, if possible, be separated from
other detainees and shall enjoy conditions of food and hygiene
which will be sufiicient to keep them in good health, and which
will be at least equal to those obtaining in prisons in the occupied
country.
They shall receive the medical attention required by their
State of health.
They shall also have the right to receive any spiritual assist-
ance which they may require.
Women shall be confined in separate quarters and shall be
under the direct supervision of women.
Proper regard shall be paid to the special treatment due
to minors.
Protected persons who are detained shall have the right
to be visited by delegates of the Protecting Power and of the
International Committee of the Red Gross, in accordance with
the provisions of Article 143.
Such persons shall have the right to receive at least one
relief parcel monthly.
ARTICLE yy
Protected persons who have been accused of offences or
convicted by the courts in occupied territory, shall be handed
over at the close of occupation, with the relevant records, to
the authorities of the liberated territory.
ARTICLE 78
If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for impera-
tive reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning
protected persons, it may, at the most, subject them to assigned
residence or to internment.
Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment
sliall be made according to a regulär procedure to be prescribed
by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of
182
the present Convention. This procedure shall include the right
of appeal for the parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided
with the least possible delay. In the event of the decision being
upheld, it shall be subject to periodical review, if possible
every six months, by a competent body set up by the said
Power.
Protected persons made subject to assigned residence and
thus required to leave their homes shall enjoy the füll benefit
of Article 39 of the present Convention.
SECTION IV
REGULATIONS FOR THE TREATMENT
OF INTERNEES
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 79
The Parties to the conflict shall not intern protected persons,
except in accordance with the provisions of Articles 41, 42,
43, 68 and 78.
ARTICLE 80
Internees shall retain their füll civil capacity and shall
exercise such attendant rights as may be compatible with
their status.
ARTICLE 81
Parties to the conflict who intern protected persons shall
be bound to provide free of charge for their maintenance, and
to grant them also the medical attention required by their
State of health.
No deduction from the allowances, salaries or credits due
to the internees shaU be made for the repayment of these costs.
The Detaining Power shall provide for the support of those
dependent on the internees, if such dependents are without
adequate means of support or are unable to earn a living.
183
Cases of
internment and
appUcable
provisions
Civil
capacity
Maintenance
Hill
t\fi
Grouping of
internees
iii
^f
I
1
(
\
\
\
i
1
1
1
i
' t
m
Location of
places of
internment.
Markiiig of
camps
m
II
Separate
internment
ARTICLE 82
The Detaining Power shall, as far as possible, accommodate
the internees according to their nationality, language and
customs. Internees who are nationals of the same country
shall not be separated merely because they have different
languages.
Throughout the duration of their internment, members of
the same family, and in particular parents and children, shall
be lodged together in the same place of internment, except
when Separation of a temporary nature is necessitated for
reasons of employment or health or for the purposes of enforce-
ment of the provisions of Chapter IX of the present Section.
Internees may request that their children who are left at liberty
without parental care shall be interned with them.
Wherever possible, interned members of the same family
shall be housed in the same premises and given separate accom-
modation from other internees, together with facilities for
leading a proper family life.
CHAPTER II
PLACES OF INTERNMENT
ARTICLE 83
The Detaining Power shall not set up places of internment
in areas particular ly exposed to the dangers of war.
The Detaining Power shall give the enemy Powers, through
the intermediary of the Protecting Powers, all useful informa-
tion regarding the geographica! location of places of internment.
Whenever military considerations permit, internment camps
shall be indicated by the letters IC, placed so as to be clearly
visible in the daytime from the air. The Powers concerned
may, however, agree upon any other System of marking. No
place other than an internment camp shall be marked as such.
ARTICLE 84
Internees shall be accommodated and administered separately '
from prisoners of war and from persons deprived of liberty for
any other reason.
184
ARTICLE 85
The Detaining Power is bound to take all necessary and
possible measures to ensure that protected persons shall, from
the outset of their internment, be accommodated in buildings
or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regards
hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against
the rigours of the climate and the effects of the war. In no case
shall permanent places of internment be situated in unhealthy
areas or in districts the climate of which is injurious to the
internees. In all cases where the district, in which a protected
person is temporarily interned, is an unhealthy area or has a cli-
mate which is harmful to his health, he shall be removed to a more
suitable place of internment as rapidly as circumstances permit.
The premises shaU be fully protected from dampness,
adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk
and lights out. The sleeping quarters shall be sufiiciently
spacious and well ventilated, and the internees shall have suit-
able bedding and sufficient blankets, account being taken of
the climate, and the age, sex, and State of health of the internees.
Internees shall have for their use, day and night, sanitary
conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene, and are
constantly maintained in a State of cleanliness. They shall be
provided with sufficient water and soap for their daily personal
toilet and for washing their personal laundry ; installations
and facilities necessary for this purpose shall be granted to
them. Showers or baths shall also be available. The necessary
time shall be set aside for washing and for cleaning.
Whenever it is necessary, as an exceptional and temporary
measure, to accommodate women internees who are not
members of a family unit in the same place of internment as
men, the provision of separate sleeping quarters and sanitary
conveniences for the use of such women internees shall be
obligat Gry.
ARTICLE 86
The Detaining Power shall place at the disposal of interned
persons, of whatever denomination, premises suitable for the
holding of their religious Services.
ARTICLE 87
Canteens shall be installed in every place of internment,
except where other suitable facilities are available. Their
purpose shall be to enable internees to make purchases, at
prices not higher than local market prices, of foodstuffs and
185
Accommoda-
tion, hygiene
Premises for
religious
Services
i|
Canteens
I
»
.1 . h
1
: !
, i
f
1
'' ' 1
,1
[
• \'
■ |i
\
Pl^
f
Air raid
shelters.
Protective
measures
I
Food
articles of everyday use, including soap and tobacco, such as
would increase their personal well-being and comfort.
Profits made by canteens shall be credited to a welfare
fund to be set up for each place of internment, and administered
for the benefit of the internees attached to such place of intern-
ment. The Internee Committee provided for in Article 102
shall have the right to check the management of the canteen
and of the said fund.
When a place of internment is closed down, the balance of
the welfare fund shall be transferred to the welfare fund of a
place of internment for internees of the same nationality, or,
if such a place does not exist, to a central welfare fund which
shall be administered for the benefit of all internees remaining
in the custody of the Detaining Power. In case of a general
release, the said profits shall be kept by the Detaining Power,
subject to any agreement to the contrary between the Powers
concerned.
ARTICLE ^S
In all places of internment exposed to air raids and other
hazards of war, shelters adequate in number and structure to
ensure the necessary protection shall be installed. In case of
alarms, the internees shall be free to enter such shelters as
quickly as possible, excepting those who remain for the protec-
tion of their quarters against the aforesaid hazards. Any protec-
tive measures taken in favour of the population shaU also
apply to them.
All due precautions must be taken in places of internment
against the danger of fire.
^ CHAPTER III
FOOD AND CLOTHING
ARTICLE 89
Daily food rations for internees shall be sufficient in quantity ,
quality and variety to keep internees in a good state of health
and prevent the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account
shall also be taken of the customary diet of the internees.
Internees shall also be given the means by which they can
prepare for themselves any additional food in their possession.
Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to internees.
The use of tobacco shall be permitted.
Internees who work shall receive additional rations in pro-
portion to the kind of labour which they perform.
Expectant and nursing mothers and children under fifteen
years of age, shall be given additional food, in proportion to
their physiological needs.
ARTICLE 90
When taken into custody, internees shall be given all facilities
to provide themselves with the necessary clothing, footwear
and change of underwear, and later on, to procure further
supplies if required. Should any internees not have sufficient
clothing, account being taken of the climate, and be unable
to procure any, it shall be provided free of charge to them by
the Detaining Power.
The clothing supplied by the Detaining Power to internees
and the outward markings placed on their own clothes shall
not be ignominious nor expose them to ridicule.
Workers shall receive suitable working outfits, including
protective clothing, whenever the nature of their work so
requires.
CHAPTER IV
HYGIENE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION
ARTICLE 91
Every place of internment shall have an adequate infirmary,
under the direction of a qualified doctor, where internees may
have the attention they require, as well as appropriate diet.
Isolation wards shaU be set aside for cases of contagious or
mental diseases.
Maternity cases and internees suffering from serious diseases,
or whose condition requires special treatment, a surgical Opera-
tion or hospital care, must be admitted to any institution where
adequate treatment can be given and shall receive care not
inferior to that provided for the general population.
Internees shall, for preference, have the attention of medical
personnel of their own nationality.
Internees may not be prevented from presenting themselves
to the medical authorities for examination. The medical author-
ities of the Detaining Power shall, upon request, issue to every
Clothing
Medical
attention
186
187
♦ ;
Medical
inspections
Religious
duties
internee who has undergone treatment an official certificate
showing the nature of his illness or injury, and the duration
and nature of the treatment given. A duplicate of this certifi-
cate shall be forwarded to the Central Agency provided for in
Article 140.
Treatment, including the provision of any apparatus necess-
ary for the maintenance of internees in good health, particularly
dentures and other artificial appliances and spectacles, shall
be free of charge to the internee.
ARTICLE 92
Medical inspections of internees shall be made at least once
a month. Their purpose shall be, in particular, to supervise
the general state of health, nutrition and cleanliness of internees.
and to detect contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis,
malaria, and venereal diseases. Such inspections shall include,
in particular, the checking of weight of each internee and, at
least once a year, radioscopic examination.
CHAPTER V
RELIGIOUS, INTELLECTUAL AND PHYSICAL
ACTIVITIES
' ARTICLE 93
Internees shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of
their religious duties, including attendance at the Services of
their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary
routine prescribed by the detaining authorities.
Ministers of religion who are interned shall be allowed to
minister freely to the members of their Community. For this
purpose the Detaining Power shall ensure their equitable alloca-
tion amongst the various places of internment in which there
are internees speaking the same language and belonging to
the same religion. Should such ministers be too few in number,
the E)etaining Power shall provide them with the necessary
facilities, including means of transport, for moving from one
place to another, and they shall be authorized to visit any
internees who are in hospital. Ministers of religion shall be at
liberty to correspond on matters concerning their ministry
with the religious authorities in the country of detention and,
as far as possible, with the international religious organizations
of their faith. Such correspondence shall not be considered as
forming a part of the quota mentioned in Article 107. It shall,
however, be subject to the provisions of Article 112.
When internees do not have at their disposal the assistance
of ministers of their faith, or should these latter be too few in
number, the local religious authorities of the same faith may
appoint, in agreement with the Detaining Power, a minister
of the internees' faith or, if such a course is feasible from a
denominational point of view, a minister of similar religion or
a qualified layman. The latter shall enjoy the facilities granted
to the ministry he has assumed. Persons so appointed shall
comply with all regulations laid down by the Detaining Power
in the interests of discipline and security.
ARTICLE 94
The Detaining Power shall encourage intellectual, educa-
tional and recreational pursuits, sports and games amongst
internees, whilst leaving them free to take part in them or not.
It shall take all practicable measures to ensure the exercise
thereof, in particular by providing suitable premises.
All possible facilities shall be granted to internees to con-
tinue their studies or to take up new subjects. The education
of children and young people shall be ensured ; they shall be
allowed to attend schools either within the place of internment
or outside.
Internees shall be given opportunities for physical exercise,
sports and outdoor games. For this purpose, suflicient open
Spaces shall be set aside in all places of internment. Special
playgrounds shall be reserved for children and young people.
ARTICLE 95
The Detaining Power shaU not employ internees as workers,
unless they so desire. Employment which, if undertaken under
compulsion by a protected person not in internment, would
involve a breach of Articles 40 or 51 of the present Convention,
and employment on work which is of a degrading or humiliat-
ing character are in any case prohibited.
After a working period of six weeks, internees shaU be free
to give up work at any moment, subject to eight days' notice.
Recreation,
study, sports
and games
Working
conditioas
188
189
^1
f«
l
Labour
detachments
i
These provisions constitute no obstacle to the right of the
Detaining Power to employ interned doctors, dentists and
other medical personnel in their professional capacity on behalf
of their fellow internees, or to employ internees for administra-
tive and maintenance work in places of internment and to
detail such persons for work in the kitchens or for other domestic
tasks, or to require such persons to undertake duties connected
with the protection of internees against aerial bombardment
or other war risks. No internee may, however, be required to
perform tasks for which he is, in the opinion of a medical ofhcer,
physically unsuited.
The Detaining Power shall take entire responsibility for all
working conditions, for medical attention, for the payment
of wages, and for ensuring that all employed internees receive
compensation for occupational accidents and diseases. The
Standards prescribed for the said working conditions and for
compensation shall be in accordance with the national laws
and regulations, and with the existing practice ; they shall in
no case be infeiior to those obtaining for work of the same
nature in the same district. Wages for work done shall be
determined on an equitable basis by special agreements between
the internees, the Detaining Power, and, if the case arises,
employers other than the Detaining Power, due regard being
paid to the obhgation of the Detaining Power to provide for
free maintenance of internees and for the medical attention
which their State of health may require. Internees perman-
ently detailed for categories of work mentioned in the third
Paragraph of this Article, shall be paid fair wages by the Detai-
ning Power. The working conditions and the scale of compen-
sation for occupational accidents and diseases to internees, thus
detailed, shall not be inferior to those applicable to work of
the same nature in the same district.
ARTICLE 96
All labour detachments shall remain part of and dependent
upon a place of internment. The competent authorities of the
Detaining Power and the commandant of a place of intern-
ment shall be responsible for the observance in a labour detach-
ment of the provisions of the present Convention. The comman-
dant shall keep an up-to-date list of the labour detachments
subordinate to him and shall communicate it to the delegates
of the Protecting Power, of the International Committee of
the Red Gross and of other humanitarian organisations who
may visit the places of internment.
190
CHAPTER VI
PERSONAL PROPERTY AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES
ARTICLE 97
Internees shall be permitted to retain articles of personal
use. Monies, cheques, bonds, etc., and valuables in their posses-
sion may not be taken from them except in accordance with
established procedure. Detailed receipts shall be given therefor.
The amounts shall be paid into the account of every internee
as provided for in Article 98. Such amounts may not be con-
verted into any other currency unless legislation in force in
the territory in which the owner is interned so requires or the
internee gives his consent.
Articles which have above all a personal or sentimental
value may not be taken away.
A woman internee shall not be searched except by a woman.
On release or repatriation, internees shall be given all articles,
monies or other valuables taken from them during internment
and shall receive in currency the balance of any credit to their
accounts kept in accordance with Article 98, with the exception
of any articles or amounts withheld by the Detaining Power
by virtue of its legislation in force. If the property of an internee
is so withheld, the owner shall receive a detailed receipt.
Family or identity documents in the possession of internees
may not be taken away without a receipt being given. At no
time shall internees be left without identity documents. If
they have none, they shall be issued with special documents
drawn up by the detaining authorities, which will serve as
their identity papers until the end of their internment.
Internees may keep on their persons a certain amount of
money, in cash or in the shape of purchase coupons, to enable
them to make purchases.
ARTICLE 98
All internees shall receive regulär allowances, sufhcient to
enable them to purchase goods and articles, such as tobacco,
toilet requisites, etc. Such allowances may take the form of
credits or purchase coupons.
Furthermore, internees may receive allowances from the
Power to which they owe allegiance, the Protecting Powers,
the organisations which may assist them, or their families, as
191
Valuables and
personal effects
Financial
resources and
individual
accounts
!l !l
well as the income on their property in accordance with the law
of the Detaining Power. The amount of allowances granted by
the Power to which they owe allegiance shall be the same for each
category of internees (infirm, sick, pregnant women, etc.) but may
not be allocated by that Power or distributed by the Detaining
Power on the basis of discriminations between internees which
are prohibited by Article 27 of the present Convention.
The Detaining Power shall open a regulär account for every
internee, to which shall be credited the allowances named in
the present Article, the wages earned and the remittances
received, together with such sums taken from him as may be
available under the legislation in force in the territory in which
he is interned. Internees shall be granted all facilities consistent
with the legislation in force in such territory to make remittances
to their f amilies and to other dependants. They may draw
from their accounts the amounts necessary for their personal
expenses, within the limits fixed by the Detaining Power. They
shall at all times be afforded reasonable facilities for Consulting
and obtaining copies of their accounts. A statement of accounts
shall be furnished to the Protecting Power, on request, and
shall accompany the internee in case of transfer.
CHAPTER VII
ADMINISTRATION AND DISCIPLINE
Camp
administration.
Posting of the
Convention
and of Orders
ARTICLE 99
Every place of internment shall be put under the authority
of a responsible officer, chosen from the regulär military forces
or the regulär civil administration of the Detaining Power.
The officer in charge of the place of internment must have in
his possession a copy of the present Convention in the official
language, or one of the ofiicial languages, of his country and
shall be responsible for its application. The staff in control of
internees shall be instructed in the provisions of the present
Convention and of the administrative measures adopted to
ensure its application.
The text of the present Convention and the texts of special
agreements concluded under the said Convention shall be posted
inside the place of internment, in a language which the internees
understand, or shall be in the possession of the Internee Com-
mittee.
192
Regulations, orders, notices and publications of every kind
shall be communicated to the internees and posted inside the
places of internment, in a language which they understand.
Every order and command addressed to internees individually
must, likewise, be given in a language which they understand.
ARTICLE 100
The disciplinary regime in places of internment shall be
consistent which humanitarian principles, and shall in no
circumstances include regulations imposing on internees any
physical exertion dangerous to their health or involving physical
or moral victimization. Identification by tattooing or imprint-
ing signs or markings on the body, is prohibited.
In particular, prolonged standing and roU-calls, punish-
ment drill, military drill and manceuvres, or the reduction of
food rations, are prohibited.
General
discipline
ARTICLE lOI
Internees shall have the right to present to the authorities
in whose power they are, any petition with regard to the
conditions of internment to which they are subjected.
They shall also have the right to apply without restriction
through the Internee Committee or, if they consider it necessary,
direct to the representatives of the Protecting Power, in order
to indicate to them any points on which they may have com-
plaints to make with regard to the conditions of internment.
Such petitions and complaints shall be transmitted forth-
with and without alteration, and even if the latter are recognized
to be unfounded, they may not occasion any punishment.
Periodic reports on the Situation in places of internment
and as to the needs of the internees may be sent by the Internee
Committees to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.
Complaints
and petitions
ARTICLE 102
In every place of internment, the internees shall freely
elect by secret ballot every six months, the members of a Com-
mittee empowered to represent them before the Detaining and
the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the
Red Cross and any other Organization which may assist them.
The members of the Committee shall be eligible for re-election.
Internees so elected shall enter upon their duties after their
election has been approved by the detaining authorities. The
reasons for any refusals or dismissals shall be communicated
to the Protecting Powers concerned.
Internee
committees
I.
Election of
members
193
II.
Duties
III.
Prerogatives
rilli
\'\i'
Notiflcation
of measures
taken
ARTICLE 103
The Internee Committees shall further the physical, spiritual
and intellectual well-being of the internees.
In case the internees decide, in particular, to organise a
System of mutual assistance amongst themselves, this Organisa-
tion would be within the competence of the Committees in
addition to the special duties entrusted to them under other
provisions of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 104
Members of Internee Committees shall not be required to
perform any other work, if the accomplishment of their duties
is rendered more difficult thereby.
Members of Internee Committees mav appoint from amongst
the mternees such assistants as they may require. All material
facihties shall be granted to them, particularly a certain free-
dom of movement necessary for the accomplishment of their
duties (Visits to labour detachments, receipt of supplies, etc.).
All facilities shall likewise be accorded to members of Internee
Committees for communication by post and telegraph with
the detaining authorities, the Protecting Powers the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross and their delegates, and
with the orgamzations which give assistance to internees.
Committee members in labour detachments shall enjoy similar
facihties for communication with their Internee Committee
in the principal place of internment. Such Communications
shall not be limited, nor considered as forming a part of the
quota mentioned in Article 107.
Members of Internee Committees who are transferred shall
be allowed a reasonable time to acquaint their successors with
current affairs.
CHAPTER VIII
RELATIONS WITH THE EXTERIOR
ARTICLE 105
Immediately upon interning protected persons, the Detain-
ing Powers shall inform them, the Power to which they owe alleg-
lance and their Protecting Power of the measures taken for
executing the provisions of the present Chapter. The Detaining
Powers shall likewise inform the Parties concerned of any sub-
sequent modifications of such measures.
194
ARTICLE 106
As soon as he is interned, or at the latest not more than
one week after his arrival in a place of internment, and like-
wise in cases of sickness or transfer to another place of intern-
ment or to a hospital, every internee shall be enabled to send
direct to his family, on the one band, and to the Central Agency
provided for by Article 140, on the other, an internment card
similar, if possible, to the model annexed to the present Con-
vention, informing his relatives of his detention, address and
State of health. The said cards shall be forwarded as rapidly
as possible and may not be delayed in any way.
Internment
card
ARTICLE 107
Internees shall be allowed to send and receive letters and
Cards. If the Detaining Power deems it necessary to limit the
number of letters and cards sent by each internee, the said
number shall not be less than two letters and four cards
monthly ; these shall be drawn up so as to conform as closely
as possible to the modeis annexed to the present Convention.
If limitations must be placed on the correspondence addressed
to internees, they may be ordered only by the Power to which
such internees owe allegiance, possibly at the request of the
Detaining Power. Such letters and cards must be conveyed
with reasonable despatch ; they may not be delayed or retained
for disciplinary reasons.
Internees who have been a long time without news, or who
find it impossible to receive news from their relatives, or to
give them news by the ordinary postal route, as well as those
who are at a considerable distance from their homes, shall be
allowed to send telegrams, the charges being paid by them in
the currency at their disposal. They shall likewise benefit by
this Provision in cases which are recognized to be urgent.
As a rule, internees' mail shall be written in their own
language. The Parties to the conflict may authorize corres-
pondence in other languages.
Correspon-
dence
,
ARTICLE 108
Internees shall be allowed to receive, by post or by any
other means, individual parcels or collect ive shipments con-
taining in particular foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies,
as well as books and objects of a devotional, educational or
recreational character which may meet their needs. Such
shipments shall in no way free the Detaining Power from the
Relief
shipments
I.
General
principles
195
'1
IL
Collective
relief
m^
III.
Exemption
from postal
and transport
charges
obligations imposed upon it by virtue of the present Conven-
tion.
Should military necessity require the quantity of such
shipments to be limited, due notice thereof shall be given to
the Protecting Power and to the International Committee of
the Red Gross, or to any other Organization giving assistance
to the internees and responsible for the forwarding of such
shipments.
The conditions for the sending of individual parcels and
collective shipments shall, if necessary, be the subject of special
agreements between the Powers concerned, which may in no
case delay the receipt by the internees of relief supplies. Parcels
of clothing and foodstuffs may not include books. Medical
relief supplies shall, as a rule, be sent in collective parcels.
ARTICLE 109
In the absence of special agreements between Parties to
the conflict regarding the conditions for the receipt and distribu-
tion of collective relief shipments, the regulations concerning
collective relief which are annexed to the present Convention
shall be applied.
The special agreements provided for above shall in no case
restrict the right of Internee Committees to take possession of
collective relief shipments intended for internees, to under-
take their distribution and to dispose of them in the interests
of the recipients.
Nor shall such agreements restrict the right of representa-
tives of the Protecting Powers, the International Committee
of the Red Cross, or any other Organization giving assistance
to internees and responsible for the forwarding of collective
shipments, to supervise their distribution to the recipients.
ARTICLE HO
All relief shipments for internees shall be exempt from
Import, customs and other dues.
All matter sent by mail, including relief parcels sent by
parcel post and remittances of money, addressed from other
countries to internees or despatched by them through the post
Office, either direct or through the Information Bureaux pro-
vided for in Article 136 and the Central Information Agency
provided for in Article 140, shall be exempt from all postal
dues both in the countries of origin and destination and in
intermediate countries. To this effect, in particular, the exemp-
tion provided by the Universal Postal Convention of 1947
196
and by the agreements of the Universal Postal Union in favour
of civilians of enemy nationality detained in camps or civilian
prisons, shall be extended to the other interned persons pro-
tected by the present Convention. The countries not signatory
to the above-mentioned agreements shall be bound to grant
freedom from charges in the same circumstances.
The cost of transporting relief shipments which are intended
for internees and which, by reason of their weight or any other
cause, cannot be sent through the post office, shall be borne
by the Detaining Power in all the territories under its control.
Other Powers which are Parties to the present Convention
shall bear the cost of transport in their respective territories.
Costs connected with the transport of such shipments,
which are not covered by the above paragraphs, shall be charged
to the Senders.
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to reduce, so far
as possible, the charges for telegrams sent by internees, or addres-
sed to them.
ARTICLE III
Should military Operations prevent the Powers concerned
from fulfilling their Obligation to ensure the conveyance of the
mail and relief shipments provided for in Articles 106, 107,
108 and 113, the Protecting Powers concerned, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross or any other Organization
duly approved by the Parties to the conflict may undertake
to ensure the conveyance of such shipments by suitable means
(rail, motor vehicles, vessels or aircraft, etc.). For this purpose,
the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to supply them
with such transport, and to allow its circulation, especially
by granting the necessary safe-conducts.
Such transport may also be used to convey :
(a) correspondence, lists and reports exchanged between the
Central Information Agency referred to in Article 140
and the National Bureaux referred to in Article 136 ;
(b) correspondence and reports relating to internees which
the Protecting Powers, the International Committee
of the Red Cross or any other Organization assisting
the internees exchange either with their own delegates
or with the Parties to the conflict.
These provisions in no way detract from the right of any
Party to the conflict to arrange other means of transport if it
should so prefer, nor preclude the granting of safe-conducts,
under mutually agreed conditions, to such means of transport.
197
Special means
of transport
' '
li'ii
m^
> $
Censorship and
examination
The costs occasioned by the use of such means of transport
shall be borne, in proportion to the importance of the shipments,
by the Parties to the conflict whose nationals are benefited
thereby.
ARTICLE 112
The censoring of correspondence addressed to internees or
despatched by them shall be done as quickly as possible.
The examination of consignments intended for internees
shall not be carried out under conditions that will expose the
goods contained in them to deterioration. It shall be done in
the presence of the addressee, or of a fellow-internee duly
delegated by him. The delivery to internees of individual or
collective consignments shall not be delayed under the pretext
of difficulties of censorship.
Any Prohibition of correspondence ordered by the Parties
to the conflict either for military or political reasons, shall be
only temporary and its duration shall be as short as possible.
Exccution
and
transmission
of legal
documents
Management
of property
Facilities for
preparation
and conduct
of cases
ARTICLE 113
The Detaining Powers shall provide all reasonable facilities
for the transmission, through the Protecting Power or the
Central Agency provided for in Article 140, or as otherwise
required, of wills, powers of attorney, letters of authority, or
any other documents intended for internees or despatched
by them.
In all cases the Detaining Powers shall facilitate the execu-
tion and authentication in due legal form of such documents
on behalf of internees, in particular by allowing them to consult
a lawyer.
ARTICLE 114
The Detaining Power shall afford internees all facilities to
enable them to manage their property, provided this is not
incompatible with the conditions of internment and the law
which is applicable. For this purpose, the said Power may
give them permission to leave the place of internment in urgent
cases and if circumstances allow.
ARTICLE 115
In all cases where an internee is a party to proceedings in
any court, the Detaining Power shall, if he so requests, cause
the court to be informed of his detention and shall, within
legal limits, ensure that all necessary steps are taken to prevent
198
him from being in any way prejudiced, by reason of his intern-
ment, as regards the preparation and conduct of his case or
as regards the execution of any judgment of the court.
ARTICLE 116
Every internee shall be allowed to receive visitors, especially
near relatives, at regulär intervals and as frequently as possible.
As far as is possible, internees shall be permitted to visit
their homes in urgent cases, particularly in cases of death or
serious illness of relatives.
Visits
CHAPTER IX
PENAL AND DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
i
ARTICLE 117
Subject to the provisions of the present Chapter, the laws
in force in the territory in which they are detained will continue
to apply to internees who commit offences during internment.
If general laws, regulations or Orders declare acts committed
by internees to be punishable, whereas the same acts are not
punishable when committed by persons who are not internees,
such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only.
No internee may be punished more than once for the same
act, or on the same count.
General
provisions.
Applicable
legislation
ARTICLE 118
The courts or authorities shall in passing sentence take as
far as possible into account the fact that the defendant is not
a national of the Detaining Power. They shall be free to reduce
the penalty prescribed for the offence with which the internee
is charged and shall not be obliged, to this end, to apply the
minimum sentence prescribed.
Imprisonment in premises without daylight, and, in general,
all forms of cruelty without exception are forbidden.
Internees who have served disciplinary or judicial sentences
shall not be treated differently from other internees.
The duration of preventive detention undergone by an
internee shall be deducted from any disciplinary or judicial
penalty involving confinement to which he may be sentenced.
Penalties
199
Disciplinary
punishments
Escapes
Connected
offences
Internee Committees shall be informed of all judicial proceed-
ings instituted against internees whom they represent, and of
their result.
ARTICLE 119
The disciplinary punishments applicable to internees shall
be the following :
(i) A fine which shall not exceed 50 per cent of the wages
which the internee would otherwise receive under the
provisions of Article 95 during a period of not more
than thirty days.
(2) Discontinuance of Privileges granted over and above
the treatment provided lor by the present Convention.
(3) Fatigue duties, not exceeding two hours daily, in con-
nection with the maintenance of the place of intern-
ment.
(4) Confinement.
In no case shall disciplinary penalties be inhuman, brutal
or dangerous for the health of internees. Account shall be
taken of the internee's age, sex and state of health.
The duration of any Single punishment shall in no case
exceed a maximum of thirty consecutive days, even if the
internee is answerable for several breaches of discipline when
bis case is dealt with, whether such breaches are connected
or not.
ARTICLE 120
Internees who are recaptured after having escaped or when
attempting to escape, shall be liable only to disciplinary punish-
ment in respect of this act, even if it is a repeated offence.
Article 118, paragraph 3, notwithstanding, internees punished
as a result of escape or attempt to escape, may be subjected ta
special surveillance, on condition that such surveillance does
not affect the state of their health, that it is exercised in a
place of internment and that it does not entail the abolition
of any of the safeguards granted by the present Convention.
Internees who aid and abet an escape or attempt to escape,
shall be liable on this count to disciplinary punishment only^
ARTICLE 121
Escape, or attempt to escape, even if it is a repeated offence,,
shall not be deemed an aggravating circumstance in cases
where an internee is prosecuted for offences committed during
his escape.
200
The Parties to the conflict shall ensure that the competent
authorities exercise leniency in deciding wether punishment
inflicted for an offence shall be of a disciplinary or judical
nature, especially in respect of acts committed in connection
with an escape, whether successful or not.
ARTICLE 122
Acts which constitute offences against discipline shall be
investigated immediately. This rule shall be applied, in parti-
cular, in cases of escape or attempt to escape. Recaptured
internees shall be handed over to the competent authorities as
soon as possible.
In case of offences against discipline, confinement awaiting
trial shall be reduced to an absolute minimum for all internees,
and shall not exceed fourteen days. Its duration shall in any
case be deducted from any sentence of confinement.
The provisions of Articles 124 and 125 shall apply to internees
who are in confinement awaiting trial for offences against
discipline.
ARTICLE 123
Without prejudice to the competence of courts and higher
authorities, disciplinary punishment may be ordered only by
the commandant of the place of internment, or by a responsible
officer or official who replaces him, or to whom he has delegated
his disciplinary powers.
Before any disciplinary punishment is awarded, the accused
internee shall be given precise information regarding the offences
of which he is accused, and given an opportunity of explaining
his conduct and of defending himself. He shall be permitted,
in particular, to call witnesses and to have recourse, if necessary,
to the Services of a qualified interpreter. The decision shall be
announced in the presence of the accused and of a member of
the Internee Committee.
The period elapsing between the time of award of a dis-
ciplinary punishment and its execution shall not exceed one
month.
When an internee is awarded a further disciplinary punish-
ment, a period of at least three days shall elapse between the
execution of any two of the punishments, if the duration of
one of these is ten days or more.
A record of disciplinary punishments shall be maintained
by the commandant of the place of internment and shall be
open to inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power.
201
Investigations.
Confinement
awaiting
hearing
Competent
authorities.
Procedure
fi
I
■ fr
Premises for
disciplinary
punishments
Essential
safeguards
Provisions
applicable to
iudicial
proceedings
Conditions
ARTICLE 124
Internees shall not in any case be transferred to penitentiarv
estabhshments (prisons, penitentiaries, convict prisons etc )
to undergo disciplinary punishment therein. '
The premises in which disciplinary punishments are under-
gone shall conform to sanitary requirements ; they shall in
particular be provided with adequate bedding. Internees
undergoing punishment shall be enabled to keep themselves
in a State of cleanliness.
Women internees undergoing disciplinary punishment shall
be confined in separate quarters from male internees and shall
De under the immediate supervision of women.
ARTICLE 125
Internees awarded disciplinary punishment shall be allowed
to exercise and to stay in the open air at least two hours dailv
They shall be allowed. if they so request, to be present atthe
daily medical inspections. They shall receive the attention which
their State of health requires and, if necessary, shall be removed
to the mfirmary of the place of internment or to a hospital.
Ihey shall have permission to read and write, likewise to
send and receive letters. Parcels and remittances of monev
however. may be withheld from them until the completion of
their punishment ; such consignments shall meanwhile be
entrusted to the Internee Committee, who will hand over to
the mfirmary the perishable goods contained in the parcels.
No internee given a disciplinary punishment may be deprived
of the benefit of the provisions of Articles 107 and 143 of the
present Convention. ^^
ARTICLE 126
The provisions of Articles 71 to 76 inclusive shall applv
by ana ogy, to proceedings against internees who are in the
national territory of the Detaining Power
CHAPTER X . •
TRANSFERS OF INTERNEES
ARTICLE 127
Ae l^f ^'^T^^'", °f.!"tf "^f Shall always be effected humanely.
As a general rule, it shaU be carried out by rail or other means
of transport, and under conditions at least equal to those obtain-
202
n
ing for the forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of
Station. If as an exceptional measure such removals have to
be effected on foot, they may not take place unless the internees
are in a fit state of health, and may not in any case expose
them to excessive fatigue.
The Detaining Power shall supply internees during transfer
with drinking water and food suificient in quantity, quality
and variety to maintain them in good health, and also with
the necessary clothing, adequate shelter and the necessary
medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take all suitable
precautions to ensure their safety during transfer, and shall
establish before their departure a complete list of all internees
transferred.
Sick, wounded or infirm internees and maternity cases
shall not be transferred if the journey would be seriously detri-
mental to them, unless their safety imperatively so demands.
If the combat zone draws close to a place of internment,
the internees in the said place shall not be transferred unless
their removal can be carried out in adequate conditions of
safety, or unless they are exposed to greater risks by remaining
on the Spot than by being transferred.
When making decisions regarding the transfer of internees,
the Detaining Power shall take their interests into account
and, in particular, shall not do anything to increase the diffi-
culties of repatriating them or returning them to their own
homes.
ARTICLE 128
In the event of transfer, internees shall be officially advised
of their departure and of their new postal address. Such notifica-
tion shall be given in time for them to pack their luggage and
inform their next of kin.
They shall be allowed to take with them their personal
effects, and the correspondence and parcels which have arrived
for them. The weight of such baggage may be limited if the
conditions of transfer so require, but in no case to less than
twenty-five kilograms per internee.
Mail and parcels addressed to their former place of intern-
ment shall be forwarded to them without delay.
The commandant of the place of internment shall take, in
agreement with the Internee Committee, any measures needed
to ensure the transport of the internees' community property
and of the luggage the internees are unable to take with them
in consequence of restrictions imposed by virtue of the second
Paragraph.
203
t i
i ■
! t
Method
n
, i
t <
Wills. Death
certificates
Burial.
Cremation
CHAPTER XI
DEATHS
ARTICLE 129
The wills of internees shall be received for safe-keeping by
the responsible authorities ; and in the event of the death of
an internee his will shall be transmitted without delay to a
person whom he has previously designated.
Deaths of internees shall be certified in every case by a
doctor, and a death certificate shall be made out, showing the
causes of death and the conditions under which it occurred.
An ofiicial record of the death, duly registered, shall be
drawn up in accordance with the procedure relating thereto
in force in the territory where the place of internment is situated,
and a duly certified copy of such record shall be transmitted
without delay to the Protecting Power as well as to the Central
Agency referred to in Article 140.
ARTICLE 130
The detaining authorities shall ensure that internees who
die while interned are honourably buried, if possible according
to the rites of the religion to which they belonged and that
their graves are respected, properly maintained, and marked
in such a way that they can always be recognized.
Deceased internees shall be buried in individual graves
unless unavoidable circumstances require the use of collective
graves. Bodies may be cremated only for imperative reasons
of hygiene, on account of the religion of the deceased or in
accordance with his expressed wish to this effect. In case of
cremation, the fact shall be stated and the reasons given in the
death certificate of the deceased. The ashes shall be retained
for safe-keeping by the detaining authorities and shall be
transferred as soon as possible to the next of kin on their
request.
As soon as circumstances permit, and not later than the
close of hostihties, the Detaining Power shall forward lists of
graves of deceased internees to the Powers on whom deceased
internees depended, through the Information Bureaux provided
for in Article 136. Such lists shall include all particulars neces-
sary for the identification of the deceased internees, as well as
the exact location of their graves.
204
ARTICLE 131
Every death or serious injury of an internee, caused or sus-
pected to have been caused by a sentry, another internee or any
other person, as well as any death the cause of which is unknown,
shall be immediately foUowed by an official enquiry by the
Detaining Power.
A communication on this subject shall be sent immediately
to the Protecting Power. The evidence of any witnesses shall
be taken, and a report including such evidence shall be prepared
and forwarded to the said Protecting Power.
If the enquiry indicates the guilt of one or more persons,
the Detaining Power shall take all necessary steps to ensure
the prosecution of the person or persons responsible.
CHAPTER XII
RELEASE, REPATRIATION AND ACCOMMODATION
IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES
ARTICLE 132
Each interned person shall be released by the Detaining
Power as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment
no longer exist.
The Parties to the conflict shall, moreover, endeavour
during the course of hostihties, to conclude agreements for the
release, the repatriation, the return to places of residence or the
accommodation in a neutral country of certain classes of
internees, in particular children, pregnant women and mothers
with infants and young children, wounded and sick, and
internees who have been detained for a long time.
ARTICLE 133
Internment shall cease as soon as possible after the close
of hostihties.
Internees in the territory of a Party to the conflict against
whom penal proceedings are pending for offences not exclusively
subject to disciplinary penalties, may be detained until the
close of such proceedings and, if circumstances require, until
the completion of the penalty. The same shall apply to internees
who have been previously sentenced to a punishment depriv-
ing them of liberty.
By agreement between the Detaining Power and the Powers
concerned, committees may be set up after the close of hostili-
205
Internees
killed or
injured in
special
circumstances
During
hostihties or
occupation
After the close
of hostihties
I r ii
1
I
l;
M
r
Repatriation
and return to
last place of
residence
, , 'r
Costs
National
Bureau X
ties, or of the occupation of territories, to search for dispersed
internees.
ARTICLE 134
The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour, upon the
close of hostilities or occupation, to ensure the return of all
internees to their last place of residence, or to facilitate their
repatriation.
ARTICLE 135
The Detaining Power shall bear the expense of returning
released internees to the places where they were residing when
interned, or, if it took them into custody while they were in
transit or on the high seas, the cost of completing their journey
or of their return to their point of departure.
Where a Detaining Power refuses permission to reside in
its territory to a released internee who previously had his
permanent domicile therein, such Detaining Power shall pay
the cost of the said internee's repatriation. If, however, the
internee elects to return to his country on his own responsibility
or in obedience to the Government of the Power to which he
owes allegiance, the Detaining Power need not pay the expenses
of his journey beyond the point of his departure from its
territory. The Detaining Power need not pay the cost of
repatriation of an internee who was interned at his own request.
If internees are transferred in accordance with Article 45,
the transferring and receiving Powers shall agree on the portion
of the above costs to be borne by each.
The foregoing shall not prejudice such special agreements
as may be concluded between Parties to the conflict concern-
ing the exchange and repatriation of their nationals in enemy
hands.
SECTION V
INFORMATION BUREAUX AND CENTRAL AGENCY
ARTICLE 136
Upon the outbreak of a conflict and in all cases of occupa-
tion, each of the Parties to the conflict shall establish an official
Information Bureau responsible for receiving and transmitting
information in respect of the protected persons who are in its
power.
206
Each of the Parties to the conflict shall, within the shortest
possible period, give its Bureau information of any measure
taken by it concerning any protected persons who are kept in
custody for more than two weeks, who are subjected to assigned
residence or who are interned. It shall, furthermore, require
its various departments concerned with such matters to provide
the aforesaid Bureau promptly with information concerning
all changes pertaining to these protected persons, as, for example,
transfers, releases, repatriations, escapes, admittances to hospi-
tals, births and deaths.
ARTICLE 137
Each national Bureau shall immediately forward informa-
tion concerning protected persons by the most rapid means
to the Powers of whom the aforesaid persons are nationals, or
to Powers in whose territory they resided, through the inter-
mediary of the Protecting Powers and likewise through the
Central Agency provided for in Article 140. The Bureaux shall
also reply to all enquiries which may be received regarding
protected persons.
Information Bureaux shall transmit information concern-
ing a protected person unless its transmission might be detri-
mental to the person concerned or to his or her relatives. Even
in such a case, the information may not be withheld from the
Central Agency which, upon being notified of the circumstances,
will take the necessary precautions indicated in Article 140.
All Communications in writing made by any Bureau shall
be authenticated by a signature or a seal.
ARTICLE 138
The information received by the national Bureau and trans-
mitted by it shall be of such a character as to make it possible
to identify the protected person exactly and to advise his next
of kin quickly. The information in respect of each person shall
include at least his surname, first names, place and date of birth,
nationality, last residence and distinguishing characteristics,
the first name of the father and the maiden name of the mother,
the date, place and natiu-e of the action taken with regard to
the individual, the address at which correspondence may be
sent to him and the name and address of the person to be
informed.
Likewise, information regarding the State of health of
internees who are seriously ill or seriously wounded shall be
supplied regularly and if possible every week.
207
Transmission
of information
Partie ulars
required
I
,1
» ;
DI
Forwarding of
personal
valuables
u
'■ I
Central Agency
Exemption
from charges
ARTICLE 139
Each national Information Bureau shall, furthermore, be
responsible for coUecting all personal valuables left by protected
persons mentioned in Article 136, in particular those who have
been repatriated or released, or who have escaped or died ; it
shall forward the said valuables to those concerned, either
direct, or, if necessary, through the Central Agency. Such
articles shall be sent by the Bureau in sealed packets which
shall be accompanied by Statements giving clear and füll identity
particulars of the person to whom the articles belonged, and
by a complete list of the contents of the parcel. Detailed records
shall be maintained of the receipt and despatch of all such
valuables.
ARTICLE 140
A Central Information Agency for protected persons, in
particular for internees, shall be created in a neutral country.
The International Committee of the Red Gross shall, if it deems
necessary, propose to the Powers concerned the Organization
of such an Agency, which may be the same as that provided
for in Article 123 of the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
The function of the Agency shall be to collect all informa-
tion of the type set forth in Article 136 which it may obtain
through official or private Channels and to transmit it as rapidly
as possible to the countries of origin or of residence of the persons
concerned, except in cases where such transmissions might be
detrimental to the persons whom the said information con-
cerns, or to their relatives. It shall receive from the Parties
to the conflict all reasonable facilities for effecting such trans-
missions.
The High Contracting Parties, and in particular those whose
nationals benefit by the Services of the Central Agency, are re-
quested to give the said Agency the financial aid it may require
The foregoing provisions shall in no way be interpreted as
restricting the humanitarian activities of the International
Committee of the Red Gross and of the relief Societies described
in Article 142.
ARTICLE 141
The national Information Bureaux and the Central Informa-
tion Agency shall enjoy free postage for all mail, likewise the
exemptions provided for in Article 11 o, and further, so far as
possible, exemption from telegraphic charges or, at least, greatly
reduced rates.
208
PART IV
EXEGUTION OF THE CONVENTION
SECTION I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 142
Subject to the measures which the Detaining Powers may
consider essential to ensure their security or to meet any other
reasonable need, the representatives of rehgious organizations,
relief societies, or any other organizations assisting the protected
persons, shaU receive from these Powers, for themselves or
their duly accredited agents, all facilities for visiting the pro-
tected persons, for distributing relief supplies and material from
any source, intended for educational, recreational or religious
purposes, or for assisting them in organizing their leisure time
within the places of internment. Such societies or organizations
may be constituted in the territory of the Detaining Power,
or in any other country, or they may have an international
character.
The Detaining Power may limit the number of societies
and organizations whose delegates are allowed to carry out
their activities in its territory and under its supervision, on
condition, however, that such limitation shall not hinder the
supply of effective and adequate relief to all protected persons.
The special position of the International Committee of the
Red Gross in this field shall be recognized and respected at all
times.
ARTICLE 143
Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers
shall have permission to go to all places where protected persons
are, particularly to places of internment, detention and work.
They shall have access to all premises occupied by protected
persons and shall be able to interview the latter without wit-
nesses, personally or through an Interpreter.
Such Visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of
imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional
and temporary measure. Their duration and frequency shall
not be restricted.
209
Relief
societies and
other
organizations
Supervision
,!■
I
i
> '
Dissemination
of the
Convention
Translations.
Rules of
application
Penal
sanctions
I.
General
observations
I
Such representatives and delegates shall have füll liberty
to select the places they wish to visit. The Detaining or Occupy-
ing Power, the Protecting Power and when occasion arises
the Power of origin of the persons to be visited, may agree
that compatriots of the internees shall be permitted to partici-
pate in the visits.
The delegates of the International Committee of the Red
Gross shall also enjoy the above prerogatives. The appoint-
ment of such delegates shall be submitted to the approval of
the Power governing the territories where they will carry out
their duties.
ARTICLE 144
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace
as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Con-
vention as widely as possible in their respective countries,
and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their pro-
grammes of mihtary and, if possible, civil instruction, so that
the principles thereof may become known to the entire popula-
tion.
Any civilian, military, poHce or other authorities, who in
time of war assume responsibilities in respect of protected
persons, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially
instructed as to its provisions.
ARTICLE 145
The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to one
another through the Swiss Federal Council and, during hostilities,
through the Protecting Powers, the official translations of the
present Convention, as well as the laws and regulations which
they may adopt to ensure the application thereof.
ARTICLE 146
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the follow-
ing Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the Obligation
to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own
Courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for
210
trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided
such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary
for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the
present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in
the foUowing Article.
In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by
safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less
favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those follow-
ing of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.
ARTICLE 147
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall
be those involving any of the following acts, if committed
against persons or property protected by the present Conven-
tion : wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer
or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a
protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or
wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and
regulär trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of
hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of pro-
perty, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlaw-
fully and wantonly.
ARTICLE 148
No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve
itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability
incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in
respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article.
ARTICLE 149
At the request of a Party to the conflict, an enquiry shall
be instituted, in a manner to be decided between the interested
Parties, concerning any alleged violation of the Convention.
If agreement has not been reached concerning the procedure
for the enquiry, the Parties should agree on the choice of an
umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be followed.
Once the violation has been estabUshed, the Parties to the
conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with the
least possible delay.
211
II.
Grave
breaches
III.
Responsi-
bilities of the
Contracting
Parties
I
Enquiry
procedure
Languages
Signature
Ratification
' ^
Coming
into force
Relation with
the Hague
Conventions
SECTION II
FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 150
The present Convention is established in English and in
French. Both texts are equally authentic.
The Swiss Federal Council shall arrange for official transla-
tions of the Convention to be made in the Russian and Spanish
languages.
ARTICLE 151
The present Convention, which bears the date of this day,
is open to signature until February 12, 1950, in the name of
the Powers represented at the Conference which opened at
Geneva on April 21, 1949.
ARTICLE 152
The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible
and the ratifications shall be deposited at Berne.
A record shall be drawn up of the deposit of each instru-
ment of ratification and certified copies of this record shall
be transmitted by the Swiss Federal Council to all the Powers
in whose name the Convention has been signed, or whose acces-
sion has been notified.
ARTICLE 153
The present Convention shall come into force six months
after not less than two instruments of ratification have been
deposited.
Thereafter, it shall come into force for each High Contract-
ing Party six months after the deposit of the instrument of
ratification.
ARTICLE 154
In the relations between the Powers who are bound by the
Hague Conventions respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, whether that of July 29, 1899, or that of October 18,
1907, and who are parties to the present Convention, this last
Convention shall be supplementary to Sections II and III of
the Regulations annexed to the above-mentioned Conventions
of The Hague.
ARTICLE 155
From the date of its Coming into force, it shall be open to
any Power in whose name the present Convention has not
been signed, to accede to this Convention.
ARTICLE 156
Accessions shall be notified in writing to the Swiss Federal
Council, and shall take effect six months after the date on
which they are received.
The Swiss Federal Council shall communicate the acces-
sions to all the Powers in whose name the Convention has
been signed, or whose accession has been notified.
ARTICLE 157
The situations provided for in Articles 2 and 3 shall give
immediate effect to ratifications deposited and accessions
notified by the Parties to the conflict before or after the begin-
ning of hostilities or occupation. The Swiss Federal Council
shall communicate by the quiekest method any ratifications
or accessions received from Parties to the conflict.
ARTICLE 158
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall be at liberty
to denounce the present Convention.
The denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Swiss
Federal Council, which shall transmit it to the Governments
of all the High Contracting Parties.
The denunciation shall take effect one year after the notifica-
tion thereof has been made to the Swiss Federal Council. How-
ever, a denunciation of which notification has been made at
a time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict
shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until
after Operations connected with release, repatriation and re-
establishment of the persons protected by the present Conven-
tion have been terminated.
The denunciation shall have effect only in respect of the
denouncing Power. It shall in no way impair the obligations
which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfil
by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.
Accession
Notification of
accessions
Immediate
efEect
Denunciation
212
213
}
I
II
im
:^
\\\ •$
Registration
with the
United Nations
ARTICLE 159
The Swiss Federal Council shall register the present Conven-
tion with the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Swiss
Federal Council shall also inform the Secretariat of the United
Nations of all ratifications, accessions and denunciations received
by it with respect to the present Convention.
In witness whereof the undersigned, having deposited
their respective füll powers, have signed the present Convention.
Düne at Geneva this twelfth day of August 1949, in the
English and French languages. The original shall be deposited
in the Archives of the Swiss Confederation. The Swiss Federal
Council shall transmit certified copies thereof to ^ach of the
signatory and acceding States.
ARTICLE 4
Hospital and safety zones shall fulfil the following condi-
tions :
(a) They shall comprise only a small part of the territory
governed by the Power which has established them.
(b) They shall be thinly populated in relation to the pos-
sibilities of accommodation.
(c) They shall be far removed and free from all military
objectives, or large industrial or administrative establish-
ments.
(d) They shall not be situated in areas which, according
to every probability, may become important for the
conduct of the war.
«f
i
i»
I
ANNEX I
DRAFT AGREEMENT RELATING TO HOSPITAL
AND SAFETY ZONES AND LOCALITIES
ARTICLE I
Hospital and safety zoneS shall be strictly reserved for the
persons mentioned in Article 23 of the Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, and in Article
14 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, and for
ihe personnel entrusted with the Organization and administration
of these zones and localities, and with the care of the persons
therein assembled.
Nevertheless, persons whose permanent residence is within
such zones shall have the right to stay there.
ARTICLE 2
No persons residing, in whatever capacity, in a hospital
and safety zone shall perform any work, either within or without
the zone, directly connected with mihtary Operations or the
production of war material.
article 3
The Power establishing a hospital and safety zone shall
take all necessary measures to prohibit access to all persons
who have no right of residence or entry therein.
ARTICLE 5
Hospital and safety zones shall be subject to the following
obligations :
(a) The lines of communication and means of transport
which they possess shall not be used for the transport
of military personnel or material, even in transit.
(b) They shall in no case be defended by military means,
ARTICLE 6
Hospital and safety zones shall be marked by means of
oblique red bands on a white ground, placed on the buildings
and outer precincts.
Zones reserved exclusively for the wounded and sick may
be marked by means of the Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion
and Sun) emblem on a white ground.
They may be similary marked at night by means of approp-
riate illumination.
ARTICLE 7
The Powers shall communicate to all the High Contracting
Parties in peacetime or on the outbreak of hostilities, a list
of the hospital and safety zones in the territories governed by
them. They shall also give notice of any new zones set up
during hostilities.
As soon as the adverse party has received the above-men-
tioned notification, the zone shaU be reguiarly established.
If, however, the adverse party considers that the condi-
tions of the present agreement have not been fulfilled, it may
214
215
II
I
■
m
refuse to recognize the zone by giving immediate notice thereof
to the Party responsible for the said zone, or may make its
recognition of such zone dependent upon the Institution of
the control provided for in Article 8.
ARTICLE 8
Any Power having recognized one or several hospital and
safety zones instituted by the adverse Party shall be entitled to
demand control by one or more Special Commissions, for the
purpose of ascertaining if the zones fulfil the conditions and
obhgations stipulated in the present agreement.
For this purpose, members of the Special Commissions shall
at all times have free access to the various zones and may even
reside there permanently. They shall be given all facilities for
their duties of inspection.
ARTICLE 9
Should the Special Commissions note any facts which they
consider contrary to the stipulations of the present agreement,
they shall at once draw the attention of the Power governing
the said zone to these facts, and shall fix a time limit of five
days within which the matter should be rectified. They shall
duly notify the Power who has recognized the zone.
If, when the time limit has expired, the Power governing
the zone has not complied with the warning, the adverse Party
may declare that it is no longer bound by the present agree-
ment in respect of the said zone.
ARTICLE 10
Any Power setting up one or more hospital and safety
zones, and the adverse Parties to whom their existence has
been notified, shall nominate or have nominated by the Protect-
ing Powers or by other neutral Powers, persons eligible to be
members of the Special Commissions mentioned in Articles 8
and 9.
ARTICLE II
In no circumstances may hospital and safety zones be the
object of attack. They shall be protected and respected at all
times by the Parties to the confiict.
ARTICLE 12
In the case of occupation of a territory, the hospital and
safety zones therein shall continue to be respected and utilized
as such.
216
Their purpose may, however, be modified by the Occupy-
ing Power, on condition that all measures are taken to ensure
the safety of the persons accommodated.
ARTICLE 13
The present agreement shall also apply to localities which
the Powers may utilize for the same purposes as hospital and
safety zones.
ANNEX II
DRAFT REGULATIONS
CONCERNING COLLECTIVE RELIEF
ARTICLE I
The Internee Committees shall be allowed to distribute
collective relief shipments for which they are responsible to
all internees who are dependent for administration on the said
Committee's place of internment, including those internees
who are in hospitals, or in prisons or other penitentiary establish-
ments.
ARTICLE 2
The distribution of collective relief shipments shall be
effected in accordance with the instructions of the donors and
with a plan drawn up by the Internee Committees. The issue
of medical stores shall, however, be made for preference in
agreement with the senior medical officers, and the latter
may, in hospitals and infirmaries, waive the said instructions,
if the needs of their patients so demand. Within the limits thus
defined, the distribution shall always be carried out equitably.
ARTICLE 3
Members of Internee Committees shall be allowed to go to
the railway stations or other points of arrival of relief supplies
near their places of internment so as to enable them to verify
the quantity as well as the quality of the goods received and
to make out detailed reports thereon for the donors.
ARTICLE 4
Internee Committees shall be given the facilities necessary
for verifying whether the distribution of collective relief in all
subdivisions and annexes of their places of internment has been
carried out in accordance with their instructions.
217
Kr
i
I
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!
ARTICLE 5
Internee Committees shall be allowed to complete, and to
cause to be completed by members of the Internee Committees
in labour detachments or by the senior medical officers of
infirmaries and hospitals, forms or questionnaires intended
for the donors, relating to collective relief supplies (distribu-
tion, requirements, quantities, etc.). Such forms and question-
naires, duly completed, shall be forwarded to the donors without
delay.
ARTICLE 6
In Order to secure the regulär distribution of collective relief
supplies to the internees in their place of internment, and to
meet any needs that may arise through the arrival of fresh
parties of internees, the Internee Committees shall be allowed
to create and maintain sufiicient reserve Stocks of collective
relief. For this purpose, they shall have suitable warehouses
at their disposal ; each warehouse shall be provided with two
locks, the Internee Committee holding the keys of one lock,
and the commandant of the place of internment the keys of
the other.
ARTICLE 7
The High Contracting Parties, and the Detaining Powers
in particular, shall, so far as is in any way possible and subject
to the regulations governing the food supply of the popula-
tion, authorize purchases of goods to be made in their territories
for the distribution of collective relief to the internees. They
shall likewise facilitate the transfer of funds and other financial
measures of a technical or administrative nature taken for the
purpose of making such purchases.
ARTICLE 8
The foregoing provisions shall not constitute an obstacle
to the right of internees to receive collective relief before their
arrival in a place of internment or in the course of their transfer,
nor to the possibility of representatives of the Protecting
Power, or of the International Committee of the Red Cross
or any other humanitarian Organization giving assistance to
internees and responsible for forwarding such supplies, ensur-
ing the distribution thereof to the recipients by any other
means they may deem suitable.
2i8
INTERNMENT CARD
ANNEX III
I . Front
►. Reverse
side
ClVILIAN INTERNEE MAIL
Postage free
POST CARD
IMPORTANT
This Card must be completed
by each internee immediately
on being interned and each time
his address is altered by reason
of transfer to another place of
internment or to a hospital.
This Card is not the same as
the special card which each
internee is allowed to send to
his relatives.
CENTRAL INFORMATION AGENCY
FOR PROTECTED PERSONS
International Committee
OF THE Red Cross
Write legibly and in block letters—i. Nationality
2. Surname
3. First names (in füll)
4. First name of father
5. Date of birth
7 . Occupation
8. Address before detention
9. Address of next of kin
6. Place of birth
♦10. Interned on :
(or)
Coming from (hospital, etc.) on :
♦11. State of health
12. Present address
13. Date
14. Signature
♦Strike out what is not applicable — Do not add any remarks — See explanations
on other side of card
(Size of internment card— 10x15 cm.)
* 1
CORRESPONDENCE CARD
ANNEX III (continued)
ANNEX III (continued)
LETTER
I. Front
CiviLiAN Internee Service
Postage free
220
To
Street and number
CiviLiAN Internee Mail
Postage free
Place of destination (in block capitals)
Province or Department
Country (in block capitals)
ssajppB :^u9uiuja;ui
g;iiq jo ooB^d puB a^BQ
sauiBU :^sjg puB guiBUing
; A9pU9£
(Size of letter — 29 x 15 cm.)
na
SS
CO
2. Reverse
side
a
a
9
a
ö
5
d
ü
•s
a
i
a
4)
S 5
POST CARD
To
Street and number
Place of destination (in block capitals)
Province or Department
Country (in block capitals)
(Size of correspondence card — 10 X 15 cm.)
i:
1 1
V,,
RESOLUTIONS
OF THE DIPLOM AT IC CONFERENCE
OF GEN EVA, 1949
Resolution i
The Conference recommends that, in the case of a dispute
relating to the interpretation er appHcation of the present
Conventions which cannot be settled by other means, the High
Contracting Parties concerned endeavour to agree between
themselves to refer such dispute to the International Court of
Justice.
Resolution 2
Whereas circumstances may arise in the event of the out-
break of a future international conflict in which there will be
no Protecting Power with whose Cooperation and under whose
scrutiny the Conventions for the Protection of Victims of
War can be applied ; and
whereas Article 10 of the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, Article 10 of the
Geneva Convention for the AmeUoration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea of August 12, 1949, Article 10 of the Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949,
and Article 11 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection
of Civihan Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, provide
that the High Contracting Parties may at any time agree
to entrust to a body which offers all guarantees of impartiality
and efiicacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers
by virtue of the aforesaid Conventions ;
the Conference recommends that consideration be given as
soon as possible to the advisability of setting up an international
body, the functions of which shall be, in the absence of a
Protecting Power, to fulfil the duties performed by Protecting
Powers in regard to the application of the Conventions for the
Protection of War Victims.
223
l I
mi
'( '
Resolution 3
Whereas agreements may only with difficulty be concluded
during hostilities ;
whereas Article 28 of the Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, provides that the Parties
to the conflict shall, during hostihties, make arrangements for
relieving where possible retained personnel, and shall settle the
procedure of such relief ;
whereas Article 31 of the same Convention provides that,
as from the outbreak of hostilities, Parties to the conflict may
determine by special arrangement the percentage of personnel
to be retained, in proportion to the number of prisoners and the
distribution of the said personnel in the camps,
the Conference requests the International Committee of the
Red Cross to prepare a model agreement on the two questions
referred to in the two Articles mentioned above and to submit
it to the High Contracting Parties for their approval.
Resolution 4
Whereas Article 33 of the Geneva Convention of July 27,
1929, for the Relief of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the
Field, concerning the identity documents to be carried by
medical personnel, was only partially observed during the course
of the recent war, thus creating serious difiiculties for many
members of such personnel,
the Conference recommends that States and National Red
Cross Societies take all necessary steps in time of peace to have
medical personnel duly provided with the badges and identity
Cards prescribed in Article 40 of the new Convention.
Resolution 5
Whereas misuse has frequently been made of the Red Cross
emblem,
the Conference recommends that States take strict measures
to ensure that the said emblem, as well as other emblems referred
to in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field of August 12, 1949, is used only within the limits
prescribed by the Geneva Conventions, in order to safeguard
their authority and protect their high significance.
224
Resolution 6
Whereas the present Conference has not been able to raise
the question of the technical study of means of communication
between hospital ships, on the one band, and warships and
military aircraft on the other, since that study went beyond its
terms of reference ;
whereas this question is of the greatest importance for the
safety and efficient Operation of hospital ships,
the Conference recommends that the High Contracting
Parties will, in the near future, instruct a Committee of Experts
to examine technical improvements of modern means of com-
munication between hospital ships, on the one hand, and war-
ships and mihtary aircraft, on the other, and also to study the
possibility of drawing up an International Code laying down
precise regulations for the use of those means, in order that
hospital ships may be assured of the maximum protection and
be enabled to operate with the maximum efficiency.
Resolution 7
The Conference, being desirous of securing the maximum
protection for hospital ships, expresses the hope that all High
Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces on Sea of August 12, 1949,
will arrange that, when ever conveniently practicable, such ships
shall frequently and regularly broadcast particulars of their
Position, route and speed.
Resolution 8
The Conference wishes to aflftrm before all nations :
that, its work having been inspired solely by humanitarian
aims, its earnest hope is that, in the future, Governments may
never have to apply the Geneva Conventions for the Protection
of War Victims ;
that its strongest desire is that the Powers, great and small,
may always reach a friendly settlement of their differences
through Cooperation and understanding between nations, so
that peace shall reign on earth for ever.
225
I ;
Resolution 9
Whereas Article 71 of the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, provides
that prisoners of war who have been without news for a long
period, or who are unable to receive news from their next of kin
er to give them new^s by the ordinary postal route, as well as
those who are at a great distance from their home, shall be per-
mitted to send telegrams, the fees being charged against the
prisoners of war's account with the Detaining Power or paid
in the currency at their disposal, and that prisoners of war
shall likewise benefit by these facihties in cases of urgency ; and
whereas to reduce the cost, often prohibitive, of such tele-
grams or cables, it appears necessary that some method of
grouping messages should be introduced whereby a series of
Short specimen messages concerning personal health, health
of relatives at home, schooling, finance, etc., could be drawn up
and numbered, for use by prisoners of war in the aforesaid
circumstances,
the Conference, therefore, requests the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross to prepare a series of specimen messages
covering these requirements and to submit them to the High
Contracting Parties for their approval.
Resolution 10
The Conference considers that the conditions under which a
Party to a conflict can be recognized as a belligerent by Powers
not taking part in this conflict, are governed by the general
rules of international law on the subject and are in no way
modified by the Geneva Conventions.
CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES
IN THE FIELD of August 12, 1949
General Provisions
\
Article
I.
Article
2.
Article
3.
Article
4-
Article
5.
Article
6.
Article
7.
Article
8.
Article
9.
Article
10.
Article
II.
Page
I
Chapter I
Respect for the Convention 23
Application of the Convention .... 23
Conflicts not of an international character 24
Application by neutral Powers .... 24
Duration of application 25
Special agreements ^5
Non-renunciation of rights 25
Protecting Powers • • 25
Activities of the International Committee
of the Red Cross 26
Substitutes for Protecting Powers . . 26
Conciliation procedure 27
Resolution ii
Whereas the Geneva Conventions require the International
Committee of the Red Cross to be ready at all times and in all
circumstances to fulfil the humanitarian tasks entrusted to
it by these Conventions,
the Conference recognizes the necessity of providing regulär
financial support for the International Committee of the Red
Cross.
Wounded and Sick
Article 12
Article 13
Article 14
Article 15
Article 16
Article 17
Article 18. —
Chapter II
Protection and care
Protected persons
Status *. ' * *
Search for casualties. Evacuation . .
Recording and forwarding of Information
Prescriptions regarding the dead. Graves
Registration Service
Role of the population
27
28
29
29
29
30
31
226
227
I
♦
/
'ü<
!l
t'
Chapter III
Medical Units and Establishments ,
Article 19. — Protection
Article 20. — Protection of hospital ships
Article 21. — Discontinuance of protection of medical
establishments and units
Article 22. — Conditions not depriving medical units
and establishments of protection . .
Article 23. — Hospital zones and localities
Chapter IV
Pevsonnel
Article 24. — Protection of permanent personnel . .
Article 25. — Protection of auxiliary personnel . . .
Article 26. — Personnel of aid societies
Article 27. — Societies of neutral countries
Article 28. — Retained personnel
Article 29. — Status of auxiliary personnel
Article 30. — Return of medical and religious personnel
Article 31. — Selection of personnel for return . . .
Article 32. — Return of personnel belonging to neutral
countries
Chapter V
Buildings and Material
Article 33. — Buildings and stores
Article 34. — Property of aid societies . . . . ...
Chapter VI
Medical Transports
Article 35. — Protection
Article 36. — Medical aircraft
Article 37. — Flight over neutral countries. Landing
of wounded
••
Chapter VII
The Distinctive Emblem
Article 38. — Emblem of the Convention
Article 39. — Use of the emblem
Article 40. — Identification of medical and religious
personnel
Article 41. — Identification of auxiliary personnel .
228
Page
31
32
32
32
32
33
33
33
34
34
35
35
36
36
37
37
37
38
38
39
39
39
40
Article 43.
Article 44.
Article 42. — Marking of medical units and establish-
ments
- Marking of units of neutral countries . .
- Restrictions in the use of the emblem.
Exceptions
Chapter VIII
Execution of the Convention
Article 45. — Detailed execution. Unforeseen cases. .
Article 46. — Prohibition of reprisals
Article 47. — Dissemination of the Convention . . .
Article 48. — Translations. Rules of application. . .
Chapter IX
Repression of Abuses and Infractions
Article 49. — Penal sanctions :
I. General observations
Article 50. — II. Grave breaches
Article 51. — III. Responsibilities of the Contracting
Parties
Article 52. — Enquiry procedure
Article 53. — Misuse of the emblem
Article 54. — Prevention of misuse
Final Provisions
Article 55
Article 56
Article 57
Article ^^
Article 59
Article 60
Article 61
Article 62
Article 63
Article 64
Languages
Signature
Ratification
Coming into force
Relation to previous Conventions . .
Accession
Notification of accessions
Immediate effect
Denunciation
Registration with the United Nations
Annex I
Draft Agreement Relating to Hospital Zones and LocaUties . .
Annex II
Identity Card for members of Medical and Religious Personnel
attached to the Armed Forces
Page
40
40
41
42
42
42
42
42
43
43
43
44
44
44
45
45
45
45
45
45
46
46
46
47
50
229
'1
m
11
GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMEUORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED
MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA of August 12, 1949
P^ \
General Provisions
Article I
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6
Article 7
Article 8
Article 9
Article 10
Article ii
Woundedy Sick and
Article 12
Article 13
Article 14
Article 15
Article 16
Article 17
Article 18
Article 19
Article 20
Article 21
Chapter I
Page
Respect for the Convention 51
Application of the Convention .... 51
Conflicts not of an international character 52
Field of application - 52
Application by neutral Powers .... 53
Special agreements 53
Non-renunciation of rights 53
Protecting Powers 53
Activities of the International Committee
of the Red Cross 54
Substitutes for Protecting Powers . . 54
Conciliation procedure 55
Chapter II
Shipwrecked
— Protection and care
— Protected persons
— Handing over to a belligerent ....
— Wounded taken on board a neutral
warship
— Wounded falling into enemy hands . .
— Wounded landed in a neutral port . .
— Search for casualties after an engagement
— Recording and forwarding of Information
— Prescriptions regarding the dead . . .
— Appeals to neutral vessels
Hospital Ships
Article 22. —
Article 23. —
Chapter III
Notification and protection of military
hospital ships
Protection of medical establishments
ashore
230
55
56
57
57
57
58
58
58
59
59
60
60
Article 24. —
Article 25
Article 26
Article 27
Article 28
Article 29
Article 30
Article 31
Article 32
Article 33
Article 34
Article 35
Personnel
Article 36.
Article 37.
Medical Transports
Article 38.
Article 39.
Article 40.
Hospital ships utilized by relief societies
and private individuals of
I. Parties to the conflict
II. Neutral countries
Tonnage
Coastal rescue craft
Protection of sick-bays
Hospital ships in occupied ports . . .
Employment of hospital ships and small
craft
Right of control and search
Stay in a neutral port
Converted merchant vessels
Discontinuance of protection
Conditions not depriving hospital ships
of protection
Chapter IV
Protection of the personnel of hospital
ships
Medical and reUgious personnel of other
ships
Chapter V
Ships used for the conveyance of medical
equipment
Medical aircraft
Flight over neutral countries. Landing
of wounded
Chapter VI
The Distinctive Emblem
Article 41. — Use of the emblem
Article 42. — Identification of medical and religious
personnel
Article 43. — Marking of hospital ships and small craft
Article 44. — Limitation in the use of markings . .
Article 45. — Prevention of misuse
Page
60
60
61
61
61
61
61
62
62
62
62
63
63
63
64
64
65
65
66
66
67
67
231
Chapter VII
Execution of the Convention
Article 46.
Article 47.
Article 48.
Article 49.
Detailed execution. Unforeseen cases
Prohibition of reprisals
Dissemination of the Convention . .
Translations. Rules of application .
Chapter VIII
Repression of Abuses and Infractions
Article 50. — Penal sanctions :
I. General observations
- II. Grave breaches
- III. Responsibilities of the Contracting
Parties
- Enquiry procedure
Article 51.
Article 52.
p^
f
l«li
I
Article 53.
Final Provisions
Article 54
Article 55
Article 56
Article 57
Article 58
Article 59
Article 60
Article 61
Article 62
Article 63
Languages
Signature
Ratification
Coming into force
Relation to the 1907 Convention . .
Accession
Notification of accessions
Immediate effect
Denunciation
Registration with the United Nations
Annex
Identity Card for members of Medical and Religious Personnel
attached to the Armed Forces at Sea
im
Page
68
68
68
68
68
69
69
70
70
70
70
70
71
71
7«
71
72
73
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR of August 12, 1949
General Provisions
Article i
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6
Article 7
Article 8
Article 9
Article 10
Article ii
Part I
Page
Respect for the Convention 75
Application of the Convention .... 75
Conflicts not of an international character 75
Prisoners of war 76
Beginning and end of application ... 78
Special agreements 78
Non-renunciation of rights 79
Protecting Powers 79
Activities of the International Committee
of the Red Cross 79
Substitutes for Protecting Powers ... 79
Conciliation procedure 80
Part II
General Protection of Prisoners of War
Article 12. — Responsibility for the treatment of pris-
oners
Article 13. — Humane treatment of prisoners . . . .
Article 14. — Respect for the person of prisoners .
Article 15. — Maintenance of prisoners
Article 16. — Equality of treatment
Part III
Captivity
Section /. — Beginning of Captivity
Article 17. — Questioning of prisoners
Article 18. — Property of prisoners .
Article 19. — Evacuation of prisoners
Article 20. — Conditions of evacuation
81
81
82
82
82
82
83
84
84
232
233
«T<^-
Page
Seciion IL — Iniernmeni of Prisoners of War
Chapter I. — General observations
Article 21. — Restriction of liberty of movement . .
Article 22. — Places and conditions of internment
Article 23. — Security of prisoners
Article 24. — Permanent transit camps
Chapter II. — Quarters, food and cloihing of prisoners of war
Article 25. — Quarters
Article 26. — Food
Article 27. — Clothing
Article 28. — Canteens
Chapter III. — Hygiene and medical attention
Article 29. — Hygiene
Article 30. — Medical attention
Article 31. — Medical inspections
Article 32. — Prisoners engaged on medical duties
Chapter IV. — Medical personnel and chaplains retained to
assist prisoners of war
Article 33. — Rights and Privileges of retained personnel
Chapter V. — Religious, intellectual and physical activities
Article 34. — Religious duties
Article 35. — Retained chaplains
Article 36. — Prisoners who are ministers of religion
Article 37. — Prisoners without a minister of their
religion
Article 38. — Recreation, study, Sports and games. .
Chapter VI. — Discipline
Article 39. — Administration. Saluting
Article 40. — Badges and decorations
Article 41. — Posting of the Convention and of regula-
tions and Orders concerning prisoners
Article 42. — Use of weapons
Chapter VII. — Rank of prisoners of war
Article 43. — Notification of ranks • • •
Article 44. — Treatment of officers
Article 45. — Treatment of other prisoners
Chapter VIII. — Transfer of prisoners of war after their arrival
in camp
Article 46. — Conditions
Article 47. — Circumstances precluding transfer . .
Article 48. — Procedure for transfer
85
85
86
86
86
87
87
88
88
88
89
89
90
91
91
91
92
92
92
93
93
93
93
94
94
Section III
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Section IV. —
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Section V. —
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Latour of Prisoners of War
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
General observations
Authorized work
— Working conditions
— Dangerous or humiliating labour
— Duration of labour
— Working pay. Occupational accidents
and diseases
— Medical supervision
— Labour detachments
— Prisoners working for private employers
- Financial Resources of Prisoners of War
58. — Ready money
59. — Amounts in cash taken from prisoners
60. — Advances of pay
61. — Supplementary pay
62. — Working pay
63. — Transfer of funds
64. — Prisoners* accounts
65. — Management of prisoners' accounts . .
66. — Winding up of accounts
67. — Adjustments between Parties to
conflict
68. — Claims for compensation
the
Relations of Prisoners of War with the Exterior
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
— Notification of measures taken ....
— Capture card
— Correspondence
— Relief shipments :
I. General principles
— II. Collective relief
— Exemption from postal and transport
charges
— Special means of transport
— Censorship and examination
— Preparation, execution and transmission
of legal documents
Page
95
96
96
97
97
97
97
98
98
98
99
99
100
100
loi
lOI
102
102
103
103
103
104
104
105
105
106
106
107
107
94
95
95
Section VI. — Relations between Prisoners of War and the
Auihorities
— Complaints of prisoners of war respecting the
conditions of captivity
78. — Complaints and requests
Chapter I.
Article
108
234
235
I
Page
Chapter IL — Prisoners of war representatives
Article 79. — Election ^^^
Article 80. — Duties ^^9
Article 81. — Prerogatives 1^9
Chapter III. — Penal and disciplinary sanctions
I. — General provisions
Article 82. — Applicable legislation no
Article 83. — Choice of disciplinary or judicial pro-
ceeding ^^^
Article 84. — Courts ^^^
Article 85. — Offences committed before capture . . iii
Article 86. — " Non bis in idem " m
Article 87. — Penalties ^^^
Article 88. — Execution of penalties 112
II. — Disciplinary sanctions
Article 89. — General observations :
I. Forms of punishment 112
Article 90. — II. Duration of punishments 112
Article 91. — Escapes :
I. Successful escape 113
Article 92. — II. Unsuccessful escape 113
Article 93. — III. Connected offences . 114
Article 94. — IV. Notification of recapture .... 114
Article 95. — Procedure :
I. Confinement awaiting hearing ... 114
Article 96. — II. Competent authorities and right of
defence ^^4
Article 97. — Execution of punishment :
I. Premises 1^5
Article 98. — II. Essential safeguards 115
III. Judicial proceedings
Article 99. — Essential rules :
I, General principles n6
Article 100. — II. Death penalty 116
Article ioi. — III. Delay in execution of the death
penalty ^^
Article 102. — Procedure :
I. Conditions f or validity of sentence . 117
Article 103. — II. Confinement awaiting trial (Deduc-
tion from sentence, treatment) . . 117
Article 104. — III. Notification of proceedings ... 117
Article 105. — IV. Rights and means of defence . . 118
Page
Article 106. — V. Appeals HQ
Article 107. — VI. Notification of findings and sentence 119
Article 108. — Execution of penalties. Penal regulations 119
Part IV
Termination of Captivity
Section I. Direct Repatriation and Accommodation in Neutral
Countries
Article 109. — General observations 120
Article iio. — Cases of repatriation and accommodation 121
Article iii. — Internment in a neutral country . . . 122
Article 112. — Mixed Medical Commissions 122
Article 113. — Prisoners entitled to examination by
Mixed Medical Commissions ... 122
Article 114. — Prisoners meeting with accidents . . 123
Article 115. — Prisoners serving a sentence 123
Article 116. — Costs of repatriation 123
Article 117. — Activity after repatriation 123
Section II. — Release and Repatriation of Prisoners of War at
the dose of Hostilities
Article 118. — Release and repatriation 123
Article 119. — Details of procedure 124
Section III. — Death of Prisoners of War
Article 120. — Wills, death certificates, burial, cre-
mation ^25
Article 121. — Prisoners killed or injured in special
circumstances 126
Part V
Information Bureaux and Relief Societies for Prisoners of War
Article 122. — National Bureaux 127
Article 123. — Central Agency 128
Article 124. — Exemption from charges 128
Article 125. — Relief societies and other organizations 129
Part VI
Execution of the Convention
Section I. — General Provisions
Article 126. — Supervision ^29
Article 127. — Dissemination of the Convention ... 130
Article 128. — Translations. Rules of application . 130
Article 129. — Penal sanctions :
I. General observations 13»
Article 130. — II. Grave breaches ^31
237
236
i •«
Article 131. —
Article
Section II. —
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
132. —
- Final
133. —
134. —
135. —
136. —
137. —
138. —
139. —
140. —
141. —
142. —
143. —
Page
III. Responsibilities of the Contracting
Parties 131
Enquiry procedure 131
Provisions
Languages ^3^
Relation to the 1929 Convention . . 132
Relation to the Hague Convention . 132
Signature ^32
Ratification 132
Coming into force ^33
Accession ^33
Notification of accessions I33
Immediate effect * ^33
Denunciation ^33
Registration with the United Nations 134
Annex I
Model agreement concerning Direct Repatriation and Accom-
modation in Neutral Countries of Wounded and Sick Prisoners
of War
/. — Frinciples for Direct Repatriation and Accommodation
in Neutral Countries
A. Direct Repatriation ^35
B. Accommodation in Neutral Countries i39
//. — General Observations ^4^
Annex II
Regulations concerning Mixed Medical Commissions .... 141
Annex III
Regulations concerning Collective Relief I43
Annex IV
A. Identity Card 146
B. Capture Card ^47
C. Correspondence Card and Letter . 148
D. Notification of Death 150
E. Repatriation Certificate 151
Annex V
Model Regulations concerning Payments sent by Prisoners to
their own country 152
238
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF
CrVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR of August 12, 1949
General Provisions
Article
I.
Article
2.
Article
3.
Article
4.
Article
5.
Article
6.
Article
7-
Article
8.
Article
9.
Article
IG.
Article
II.
Article
12.
an
General Protection of
Article 13.
Article 14.
Article 15.
Article 16.
Article 17.
Article 18.
Article 19.
Article 20.
Article 21.
Article 22.
Article 23.
Article 24.
Article 25.
Article 26.
Part I
Page
Respect for the Convention 153
Application of the Convention .... 153
Conflicts not of an international character 154
Definition of protected persons .... 155
Derogations 155
Beginning and end of application ... 156
Special agreements 156
Non-renunciation of rights 156
Protecting Powers 157
Activities of the International Committee
of the Red Cross 157
Substitutes for Protecting Powers ... 157
Conciliation procedure 158
Part II
Populations against certain consequences of war
— Field of application of Part II ... . 159
— Hospital and safety zones and localities . 159
— Neutralized zones 160
— Wounded and sick :
I. General protection 160
— II. Evacuation 160
— III. Protection of hospitals 161
— IV. Discontinuance of protection of
hospitals 161
— V. Hospital staff 161
— VI. Land and sea transport 162
— VII. Air transport 162
— Consignments of medical supplies, food
and clothing 163
— Measures relating to child welfare . . 163
— Family news 164
— Dispersed f amilies 164
239
I
Part III
Status and Treatment oj Protected Persons
Section I. — Provisions common to the Territories of ihe Parties
to the Conflict and to Occupied Territories
Article 27. — Treatment :
I. General observations
Article 28. — II. Danger zones
Article 29. — III. Responsibilities •
Article 30. — Applications to Protecting Powers and
relief organizations
- Prohibition of cocrcion
- Prohibition of corporal punishment,
torturc, etc • •
- Individual responsibility, collective
penalties, pillage, rcprisals ....
Article 34. — Hostages
Sediofi IT. — Aliens in the Territory of a Party to the Conflict
Article 35. — Right to Icave the territory
Article 36. — Method of repatriation
Article 37. — Persons in confinement
Article 38. — Non-repatriated persons :
Page
Article 31.
Article 32.
Article 33.
I.
Article 39. — II.
Article 40. — III.
Article 41. — IV.
Article 42. — V.
VI.
VII.
General observations
Means of existence
Employment
Assigncd residence. Internment .
Grounds for internment er assigned
residence. Voluntary internment
Procedure
Refugees
m
Article 43. -
Article 44. -
Article 45. — VIII. Transfer to another Power . . .
Article 46. — Cancellation of restrictive measures . .
Section III. — Occupied Territories
Article 47. — Inviolability of rights
Special cases of repatriation .....
Deportations, transfers, evacuations . .
— Children •
— Enlistment. Labour •
— Protection of workers
— Prohibited destruction
Judges and public oöicials
— Food and medical supplies for the popu-
lation
Hygiene and public health
Article 48
Article 49
Article 50
Article 51
Article 52
Article 53
Article 54
Article 55
Article 56.
165
165
165
166
166
166
166
166
167
167
168
168
168
169
169
169
170
170
170
171
171
171
172
172
173
173
174
174
174
175
240
Article
Article
Article
Article 60. —
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Article
Section IV. -
Chapter /.
Article
Article
Article
Article
Chapter II.
Article
Article
Article
Page
57. — Requisition of hospitals 175
58. — Spiritual assistance 175
59. — Relief :
I. Collective relief 176
60. — II. Responsibilities of the Occupying
Power 17Ö
61. — III. Distribution 176
62. — IV. Individual relief I77
63. — National Red Gross and other relief
societies i77
64. — Penal legislation :
I, General observations 177
65. _ II. Publication 178
66. — III. Competent courts 178
5y, — IV. Applicable provisions 178
68. — V. Penalties. Death penalty .... 178
69. — VI. Deduction from sentence of period
spent under arrest 179
yo. — VII. Ofifences committed before occupa-
tion 179
71. — Penal procedure :
I. General observations 179
72. — II. Right of defence 180
73. — III. Right of appeal 181
y4. — IV. Assistance by the Protecting Power 181
75. — V. Death sentence 181
76. — Treatment of detainees 182
yy, — Handing over of detainees at the close
of occupation 182
y8. — Security measures. Internment and
assigned residence. Right of appeal 182
- Regulations for the Treatment of Internees
— General Provisions
79. — Cases of internment and applicable
provisions 1^3
80. — Civil capacity 1^3
81. — Maintenance 183
82. — Grouping of internees 184
— Places of Internment
83. — Location of places of internment. Marking
of camps 1Ö4
84. — Separate internment 184
85. — Accommodation, hygiene 185
241
^ '1
1
M'
Page
Article 86. — Premises for religious Services .... 185
Article 87. — Canteens ^^5
Article 88. — Air raid shelters. Protective measures. 186
Chapter III. — Food and Clothing
Article 89. — Food ^^^
Article 90. — Clothing 187
Chapter IV. — Hygiene and Medical Attention
Article 91. — Medical attention 187
Article 92. — Medical inspections 188
Chapter V. — Religious, Intellectual and Physical Activities
Article 93. — Religious duties 188
Article 94. — Recreation, study, sports and games . 189
Article 95. — Working conditions 189
Article 96. — Labour detachments 190
Chapter VI. — Personal Property and Financial Resources
Article 97. — Valuables and personal efiEects .... 191
Article 98. — Financial resources and individual
accounts 191
Chapter VII. — Administration and Discipline
Article 99. — Camp administration. Posting of the
Convention and of Orders .... 192
Article 100. -- General discipline i93
Article ioi. — Complaints and petitions i93
Article 102. — Internee committees :
I. Election of members I93
Article 103. — II. Duties i94
Article 104. — III. Prerogatives 194
Chapter VIII. — Relations with the Exterior
Article 105. — Notification of measures taken .... 194
Article 106. — Internment card i95
Article 107. — Correspondence I95
Article 108. — Relief shipments :
I. General principles I95
Article 109. — II. CoUective relief 196
Article iio. — III. Exemption from postal and trans-
port charges 196
Article iii. — Special means of transport i97
Article 112. — Censorship and examination 198
Article 113. — Execution and transmission of legal
documents 198
242
Pag«
Article 114. — Management of property 198
Article 115. — Facilities for preparation and conduct
of cases 198
Article 116. — Visits 199
Chapter IX, — Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions
Article 117. — General provisions. Applicable legis-
lation 199
Article 118. — Penalties 199
Article 119. — Disciplinary punisLments 200
Article 120. — Escapes 200
Article 121. — Connected offences 200
Article 122. — Investigations. Confinement awaiting
hearing 201
Article 123. — Competent authorities. Procedure . . 201
Article 124. — Premises for disciplinary punishments 202
Article 125. — Essential safeguards 202
Article 126. — Provisions applicable to judicial pro-
ceedings 202
Chapter X. — Transfers of Internees
Article 127. — Conditions 202
Article 128. — Method 203
Chapter XI. — Deaths
Article 129. — Wills. Death certificates 204
Article 130. — Burial. Cremation 204
Article 131. — Internees killed or injured in special
circumstances 205
Chapter XII. — Release, Repatriation and Accommodation
in Neutral Countries
Article 132. — During hostilities or occupation . . . 205
Article 133. — After the close of hostilities 205
Article 134. — Repatriation and return to last place of
residence 206
Article 135. — Costs 206
Section V. — Information Biireaux and Central Agency
Article 136. — National Bureaux . 206
Article 137. — Transmission of information 207
Article 138. — Particulars required 207
243
I.ij
Page
Article 139. — Forwarding of personal valuables. . . 208
Article 140. — Central Agency 208
Article 141. — Exemption from charges 208
Part IV
Execution of the Convention
Section L — General Provisions
Article 142. — Relief societies and other organizations 209
Article 143. — Supervision * * * ' ^^^
Article 144. — Dissemination of the Convention . . . 210
Article 145. — Translations. Rules of application . . .210
Article 146. — Penal sanctions :
I. "üeneraTobservations 210
Article 147. — II. Grave breaches 2^11
Article 148. — III. Responsibilities of the Contracting
Parties 211
Article 149. — Enquiry procedure 211
Section II. — Final Provisions
Article 150. — Languages 212
Article 151. — Signatare . . 212
Article 152. — Ratification 212
Article 153. — Coming into force 212
Article 154. — Relation with the Hague Conventions 212
Article 155. — Accession • 213
Article 156. — Notification of accessions 213
Article 157. — Immediate effect 213
Article 158. — Denunciation 213
Article 159. — Registration with the United Nations 214
Annex I
«
Draft Agreement relating to Hospital and Safety Zones and
Localities ^^^
Annex II
Draft Regulations concerning CoUective Relief . 217
Annex III
Internment Card 219
Letter ^^^
Correspondence Card 221
RESOLUTIONS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA,
1949
Page
Submission of disputes to the International
Court of Justice 223
Crcation of an International Body in the absence
of a Protecting Power 223
Preparation of a Model Agreement on the per-
centage and relief of Retained Personnel . . 224
Badges and Identity Cards of Medical Personnel 224
Misuse of the Red Cross Emblem 224
Improvement of means of communication
bctween Hospital Ships and Warships, and
preparation of International Regulations for
the use of such means 225
Notification by Hospital Ships of their position
by wireless 225
Pacific Settlement of International Differences . 225
Specimen telegraphic messages for Prisoners of
War 226
Recognition of a Party to a conflict by Powers
not taking part in such conflict 226
Financial support for the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross 226
Resolution
I.
Resolution
2.
Resolution
3-
Resolution
4-
Resolution
5.
Resolution
6.
Resolution 7.
Resolution 8.
Resolution 9.
Resolution 10.
Resolution 11,
The marginal notes included in the present edition of the Geneva
Conventions, as well as the above titles given for the Resolutions, have no
offfcial character and were not adopted by the Diplomatie Conference.
They were drafted by the Conference Secretariat, and the International
Conunittee of the Red Cross feels ihat their insertion will aid the study of
the Conventions.
245
244
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vnfer otbnnng feiner ctf wnbeit wirket.
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verl>achtd eygentUchen in fcbüjftei» berichten.
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ben / fo$n erfinbwng bcv warhert 6 in jlltcb i(J / anch mit rechtfertig/
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vnbgeoj^nctiff.
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j^one ober hnrch peinlich f rafl nit berentlicb fein ivxxb er boch bc^
jSEen iiberwifen werben mocbt/ 60 fotl ed mit ber felbigen weifnng"
xinb recbtfertignng Daranff /ber tobtffrajf halben gebalten werben
wicaucb HerlicbbernacbgefAfttijl von ben jhcnen biebnrcbantle/y
ger einbiachttperben»
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wegen entlieh an ^rem leib ober glibern geflrafft werben folte/ alfo
baf bte felbig ilraff nit jnm tobt ober ewiger gefencPnn^ f ür^enon»//
wen wiirb /miterPantnn^ folcher jirajf /öoU ed fonbcrltcb auch ge//
halten werben/alß im h»nb«rt vnb fecbö x>nnb nennQigften articrel
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fo ber fUger recht begert.
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(bat / vnb ber felben rebltchen argl^won vnb verbacht bie peinlich
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fonberlich>umercPw / ba^biegefengPnn^^n behaltnng/ vnb nit|u
fchwercrgenerlicher ipKxni^xm^ ber gefangen follengctiwcht vnb jn//*
gericht \tm . ^nnb wati anch ber gefangen mer bann cyner ifl/foll
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ni^mlobw wie fte jre thatt befchonen wollen vnberrcben magert.
börgfchajftgethan bati
^
nit^ angenommen i(l / foll bee anklaget ober fcinge//
waltbaber / mit {äntm leib verwart werben / btp eit
v^*->v mit bürgen/ Cantion/ bejianbt x>nb ftchernng b'xt bee
rtcbteemitfampt vier fch^pffen nach gdegenbeyt ber fachen vnn?>
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nach volgt.X>nb nemlicb alfo /baß er ber anfUger/ wo er bte petnlt/
che recbtfertignng nit anßfürm/ ober bm rechten verfolgen wnrd /
vnb bte geklagten migthat/ober aber reblich vnnb etitngfam an^vpii
<ttth<t vnnb vermntimg ber felben in ^imlicher $eit/bte )m ber rtcl^ee
fetten würbe/nitbermalfenbewieg/bagber richtet vnb gericht/obee
bS mererthey l Mf^ i«en für gnngfam erf antm /ober funfl tm rech//
ten fellig würbe / algbantt bm f oflen / fo baranff 5<m3«» »1^ / *»cb
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(bact be^etttlicb t(t/ vn6 reMtcb entfcbtllbt//
dun^ folcbctrcb^t b<tlb fiirgibt*
^cm fo {)cr (^eccct* 6cr #ae on taugnert
wer/abet; beßb<tlben reblicb entfcbulbi^itn^/bte )n tvo
tv i>te betvi^ von pctnltcbet; iftaffmtUitism mocbten/
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mt^uricbtm / nacb errentnwß beffelbigengertcbce (cbulbig (an/ vn
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bacbt bewifen b4t / ober bie geflaut milfetbat AtnffvH//
vi^ läiigbar i(l / vnnb ber tbetter gnngfant chtfcbnlbignhg
berb<ilb/äU votberartift/nitaugfiirenran/ öo foll ber aneUger/
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nie abfcbeyDcn foU / er bab Dan $u f^;Der(l eyn ncm^
lieb ffatt wobin inan jm gericbtlicb ver//
ftinDen folt benanr»
cbem annemett Ded beklage«» / von Dem'X.tcbternitabAf
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foll Der gericbtfcbwibcr / attcb i» ^\i gericbtd acta fcbiäben.
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lieb ailes»befcb«ibcn/ JDamitaber DennocbtDieamptUttt/ricbtetJ
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cyner mi^banDlungfommm / fo feinDtDeßbalbenDienacbwolgenDe
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J>aö eyn jeDer nacb f«mt»te»t(cb<n nennen oDer ernennen ran/b<r//
«acbgefcQt.
^^^ £cm tpo tt)iV nac§ma(6 rcMic§ mk^m
mclDcn/ Da wollen wir alwcgen/reD lieb warieicbm/argf «
won/verDaebt/vnD vermntnng ancbgetiteynt baben/vn
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vnb vmbjten&ejubefcb^ibcn»
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gen/ fo ftcb 4»ff 4IU milfetbAC jiebcn.
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ifcb^eiben ^an.
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f^wm ftbenben/fo iemanteyner mtffetbat b<ilb fiiicbti^ wUr^.
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vnb |>einlicb fragen.
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tb<y l ober (f ücf famentUcb ober fonbcrlicb evn
gnugfam an^eygen $u ]>einlicber
firage n^ocben»
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lieberfrag gnugfam iff.
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?:utter vermncmn^ / bie fte von ber miffetbac entfcbulbtgen m^genf
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fachen be6 arg^ibon« eftf^ffer (einb ban bie vtfocb ber entfcbnlbtgug
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ber mtfcbMlbigtingcyn merer anfcben x>nb acbtnng baben / bau et//
Ucbegeringe argrwonfgf eye / fo erfnnben fdn l &o foll bie petnlicb
frag nie gebmncbt werben. iPnbfo in bifenj^ingen gezweifelt: wüt^
be/ioUen bie jbenen fo |>einlicber frag balber M^^enncnvnb^uban//
belngebiirc/ bei ben recbctterfienbigen vnnb an enben vnb otten Vfii
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wefm ift I mit er^nnbignng / wer folcbd am necbff en vot ber verlud
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licb/bÄß b<m \<tsttfMt bcfUoc tJrtfon / in t>tv martcr mit namm ntc
füraeb«lt<n / vnnb <t\ioaunbit(Ahi^ptrf6ti ^öitbtvlichnits^tASti
^l^ttsmamvt vcotbctl f« / {onbtt ba$ ttiii eymv gcmcyn St^fws«
tt>«t im jtt fciiwn mt^brtttm «cbolff <n/b(tn bcf^atm von jm fclbd bc^
tÄcbt vrtb bmant b«br* i" 56m Äti6ctn /gcbürt ficb oag bjtfilb
ffcnbc/bi< nach g<lc5cnbcyc vnb gcffalt jcbcr f<icb/<illctr bcfljtt nAcb'
ttolÄatbct «ftnbiina btv tcatbtn binflUcb fein m^gm / bit albic nie
äIU b<fcb«cbm werben /ahtt tyn iebet Peilftger r n verff cnbiger fclbft
wol bcbencPen Un* f 5wm btitren gebütt ftcb jiSerf unben ob ber
fageir inn fonber ftihbtfcbAfft/ vnwilUn/ ober wiberwertig^er t mic
bem verfaßte (l^e. 5b4n wo foUb6»nbrfcb«frc/ tnwillen ober wtbcir
xctttiQfcrt offentUcb were ober erf ünbige würbe / fo wer ban fagcr /
folcbe füg / wtber bcn befagten nit jSgUttben/er jeygt han/ bi^W»
fttn(l/fo gUubltcb reblicb vjfdcb vnb warjercben anfbit man anck
in whxnbisung erfünbe/bie ern reblicb «n^ey^ims macben.f 5u it»
vierbten / b4(j bit b<f«gt perfon Alfo Ärgwinig f« / bof man ficb bvf
bcfagwi migtbAtS» jr verfeben mige» f 3^ttm fänffcen/fo foU bct;
f^gcr / au(f ber befagung / befienbig bleiben / febocb fo babcn erlief
hwkm^tttt cyn mifbmucb/ba^ fte bte mtm mn ber bcicbt vnberAr
ivcifen / tv«
weifen/ tre fug fo (te mit warbeyr d^rban b4bm/4m letffen^fiwtber//
rttffm/2>4dfollm4ttfowilb4dgefein.f4n/beibcnb<tcbttt4tt«rfiir//
lomme» / W4ttnhiem4ntgrtitHpt / wib<r eynett genkvnen niüij beti
iibelcb4ttem ire bo^bfiyt bettert jubelffen/bubien vtifcbulb^ meii
fcben $tt n4cbcbey l tom w^n nwg . IPo «ber ber f4gcr fetti bef4gnnd
ober b4t^ben/4m letden wiberrfiflFt / bk er bötb vot mtcgutm crjä
ten vmb({eribeng^4n bett / vnb^4icbtniocbtwerbcn/er woU (äff
iien b^(fem.b4mtt iu güc b4nbeln/ob<r b4^ er vüktcbc bee bnrcb fet
nenbetcbnt4tter 4[d.obgemelti(l / vnbcrwifm wcr/4l^b4ntt mu^
in4h 4nfcben bed f4gertt «n^cy gtc rnb 4nbcrc et^nbigte vthbffen//
t)</ vnnb b4r4ng crmcffen /ob btc v<rf4ttttng eyn reblicb 4n5cvgnn^
ber mijfctb4tt/ geb ober nit . 'Vnb In foTcbwn i(t fonberlicb 4ucb <yti
4»jf ^bertd Jttb4ben vnb snerfAren / bengiitm ober b^fen f74nbc vn
Icnmntbed verfagten / vnb W4d gem«ynfcb4flpc ober gcfelfcb4|fce^
km( bttn vcr(4gergeb4b( b4be».
Tttm fo erner/ wie vot vZgAnntt: wetfttnggef4gt i^/snus^am ^^^^
^.^ »berwtefen wirbet/b4^ er von jm felbd römd ober 4nbere xo^r
vngen^tter binggef4ttt bett:/b4ger bie bcH4gten ober verb4cbtemtf
feä)<tttgecb4n/ ober jolcbe mt|fetb4tt vot berflefcfeicbt jntbwngebto
benbett/vrtb bie tb4»4ücb b4r4iiff m hirijerjeiteriio^ Wer/vnb
wwerje^it folcbe |>erfott/b4gttwn ftcb berfabienrf)4«: mm»? verfeben
In4g/ wikb 4ttcb |^r eyn reblicb 4n3eyg»tigl>etJrtii(fetb4tgeb4lten/
1?nb t((|>cmltcb b4r4»fFit!»f r4g€»^
ber Ärttcpa / jttreblicber 4ii3eygnngberfelbOT
mf(retb4tgn6gf4m/vnb b4r4nff
|>ctnlicb^6Ngcm
j>i
iir^
Sn»gf4ftl tm^lüins
3 n
fpyjMtj.
VF >^^^-,^ b<n v«^<cbtUcb<r wci^ / mit blÄrigm Reir^<m/ob<r
toaflfw a<W>m wi>ri>c/X>5«r ober Dcä awwjbtdi babc/gmoimn/ txr
ratifft/ v<rg<bm/obcr nccb p« jm b<tt/^4ö t(l fKr «yn rc^Ucb Anjey//
am anjttnemm vti6 ?>cinlicb fraffc^ttgcbmtttbm/cr f önbtt oan fol//
cb<n t>ert>4cbc mit gUubUcb«: anjcygeo^ bm^ctfwtS HbUyncn/
h^^ Mi «at aller t^einltcber fr<iail<b«;c iMt^ttt;
##'•
e?55«»i
!?»??*"
*^tr trumoflm irttb^ vücn Uucem acfcbcb«»/
^d» nittnant <(etb4tt wtO bobmA
Co« t<^(6(a$/fo «tt off«nbar<tt fcglo^m
obernimo:m befcbcb^ / ^e^ nicnrnnt tbcccct; fein wilt.
3(1 ^attn ^<l; vcifl»4cbt b«i bcm fcbUb«« / aacb mit bctti
^_^ ctttUibfm wibctwcmg ^<t^c(l / ^»iwflrar gcwdfinm/
»nb attflf ^<tl crttlcibtm g«(f ocbm/gtb<»w<n/ö^«r fwnff mit g wcrliob
«nftrcycb^rtgcfebUbeijbat/ 0olcb^iflf<ynrci>Ucb<anSmttng/ ^€tr
geübten tb<«tt balbcir/vnb peinlich i^ fvaMt» / vnb witbt fölcber vcc
Sacbt/nocb mergeffcrcf t / wo fein wabtbltttiggefcbcn wo:dw wer»
ITo aber folcb« o6er berglcicbm nit voih<tnbm /ob er baß gleicb v»
geucrltcbcv W(ip bei bcmbAnbelflewerm / foUer i^nlicb nit gefvAgt
sperren«
Im
^em fo man c^ t)tm fo (utrcpttf uttcsfVaw
gebt /im argf won bat /ba$ f« b<y mltcb eyn linbt gebabt/
^.^ »nnb ert^^t bobe/foU nwn ^on^erlicb «rfwnbeti/ ob (te mit
trncmgtoiien vngewonUcbcii leib gefebm vooibtn fei/<V:><ryob jr bei:
lablleyner wot^eti / vnbbarnacb bleycbvnnb fcbwacb gewefffei^
60 foUb« Vi»^ ^crgleicb crf lüibrn wiri^et/ wo ban ^ie felbig t>iin ey »
l^erfo»
i^etfi^n iil/tar^u man jtcb ^er verbacbtm tbatt verfebm m<ts I &o\\
f ie 6ttrcb ^ti^tcnbxß f raweti ati bcy mltcbm (letcen / ald )iS weitber er
farnng 6icnf(Ucb i(l/beftcbtigt werben/ würb 0« bt^nn bafelbfi aucb
argf w^nig erfunben/ vn2> will ber tbatt bannocbt nit bef enne/mag
man (U pctnlicb fragen**
f^tim wo aber bad rinbtlein/ fo f iirijltcb etthot WOtben i(f / baß
_^^'&er iniicter ble milcb iß ben pm|Ten nocb nit vergange / bte mag 5J?2?^^
an iren pmjf en geniolc^cn werben/ welcber batt inti bm p;ü(Ten recbt
volPommene mucb f Unben Wirbit/bie bat bel^balb eyn (tarcP vetmil
tungj^elnltcbcr frag balberwiber (leb /H^cb ^tx^ aber etlicbe leib/>
ättüc fagen / ba^ atl^ etlicben nac&rlicbm ^oifacben etwan cytic / bk
^eyn tinbt getragen / milcb inn pmf^en babcn möge/ barumb fo (tcb
leyn birn in bifen feilen alfo entfcbulbigt / foll be^balb 2>urcb t>ic beb^
ttmtmn ober f tin(t weitber erfarnng gefcbebcn;
ttnjeygnhg.
ba^ergtfftfaitffc/oberfttiijlbamitvmbgrtngcrt/vnb ^'^^^
ber verbacbt/mitbem vergijften / inn tmey nigFey t gc//
__^ weil/ober aber vonn feinem tobt / vottb<yld ober nnt^
Itartcnb wer/ ober fund eyn leicbtf ercig perfon / jn ber man ftcb bcr
tbat verfebc tnUhtl ^m niacbt ey ti reblicb anjeygnng/ ber mi^tbat
tc fiinbt bann mitglanblicbcm fcb«n anjeygen/ ba0 er folcb gijfc %n
Wibtm vnff raff Ucbm facbw gebmncbt bctt/ober gcbtaucbe wollen;
.'ZCdtt fo cynir gijft f anff t/ vnb beö voJ her ober? eyt in laiignen
. ^^wni /vi» bocb bee fanffiß öberwiefen wiirb / macht ancb gniig
fom vtfacb jii fragen/ wat^n er folcb gi|f tgebmwcbt / ober bmwcb/*
cnw^Uettv
.'Uem eft foUen ancb alle oberPey ten Mi ]thm ottcn/bte apotecPer
,^vnb anber/fogiflpt verf atiffen/oberbamit banbtieren/tnglwbt
vnb eybe mmtnl ha% fte niemanbtö ey nicb gifft verf anffen nocb ^nii
ftelUn/ött anxeygen/ vowiffen vnb erUwbwng ber felbenobetf eyr.
3^ Vfi
f^wi^
'P2?5%<
ffl
ß, Karte Ue ftJnffcm t)Rt) J^ce ^q)%tt
Cm fo orfitnbcn tt)tV5cc / bag jcmöii^e
6<r ^ttcr / fo $emiib^ fein / Ui ftn / oberste (Ahm vcr^
^4ttfjft/übetrct(ben/obi(r in <inb€t$t^A\t bamittetbtdot
lieber xdaf^Qchänbdt I vn6 fdtim vcif auff d? vnb wer//
man nie ani«f 5<n wdk/ bcr b^e «Vit rcMicbd attjcrgctt fölcbe rattb*
halber wii>d; ftcb /i>i<t»>«l <r nvc auf^fünbig macbt/l>a^ er nitwtoi^f
^a^ folcb3i»«erÄcra»btr«i<rt/ fonberbi« miteyncm guten gUttbtt^
Atiftcbb^acbcbobe»
'ZTemfo reyftg ober fn^ecbt ejewonltcb bei ben Wirten Ugen/
. vnb jem / vnb nie folcbe rcMtcbe bienfl/ banbricrnng ober oiite
bic{le baben / anicygen donnert / baiion fie folcb ieruna simlicb ^6«
itioaen / Ht feinbt arcjPtoonig vnnb verbetbtHcb jutiifb^jen facben/
vnb alUrmey (l / iii raubercr / aU fonberlicb attß vnferm vnnb bc^
TleicbdÄemernen tanbtfiribert jöhtercfen/ ^Mmnms^(<inti^l ha^
m<in (olcbe buben nit leiben/ fonber ännemeh/ bertiglicb fragen/ xn
vmb jre mi^banbel mit ernfi flraffeti foll / be^gleicben fdU etnieb^
obcrPert anff hit verbecbtiflct» betler vnn^ UnbtfererAticbnetmJ^
nuff (ebene baben»
bem ober bteben belff en*
Cem fo eprtcv tt)tifm((tcg wt) gcudicgrt
wei^ vongeranbtemobergeffolnemgilc / beueobercbevt
nimbt/ober fo ey ner hü tbemr wiffentlicb vn^ gctlerltcb^
er wet^ e^t ober btenclt / attcb ^vt tbetter ober öbgentele t>nrecbcg&t
Sar oberjnmtbeyl wiffentlicb atinimpt/ beymltcb verbirgt/ bcber^r
ergt/verf anfft ober vertreibt /ober fo ytmant ^tn tbettem/ftin(ltft
Mi^ttt bergletcben weg / geuerlicb fürberitng /rabtober beiffanb^
ebut / ober itt jren tbatten vn^imlicbg«mcyn|cbafft mit \n bette/3(C
«ittcb eyn an^ergung |»einlicb3^fragen*
3tem(#
^
SA'XLtm fo eyner gefangen b<y mlicb beit/ bie |m enttanffen/ vttn^
«Sf anjeyg<n/WH> fiegdegen feinbt / mber fo eyn v<rb<cbtUcber bett
man in ber facb wit vilg&t« vertrawet / aber j>aitbeiUg vn awff ber
tbetter fcitten/ avi$ göten wfacben belt / oni votwijfen bed gefangei»
oberPeyt vertreg vmb fcboQttng macbt/ vnbbiefcbaQitng mmmpt
ober bürg barnber wirbet/ btfe bingalle / in bey ben obbmtclten atrt
ticPeln/famentlicb vnb fnnberlicb ifdn^t t&Arjeycben / bie«ynreb/>
Ucbanjeygttngber mtßtbettiger büff Ulbermacbenvnnb i>emlicb
^ttfragenv
anieygnng*
verbacbt/ober bePtagt tteürbe/wd bann ber fellng fnnfi
eyn argf wonig gefellift / ^n^ than ficb errunbm mag/
baß erlttrQUcb vo> bcm ipiM^t I beliger vn^ wTbecbt//
Ittber wei^/ mk: vngewonlicben vet^ecbtlicbengenerltcbenfinerw«
cfen/bamit man btvmlicb iß bjmne t^Jegt / vmbgange »(f /ba« gtbe
rebUcb amcyaung ber migtbat/er f ünbt ban mitguten glaubUcbe«
vtfacben anjc^gen / baji er folcbe jö vnffrafflicben focbm seb;attcb«
Ijett ober gebtaucben wollen»
gpott twcttcrcp (^tih^m o»kp^g*
^m fo l(X t)er&acgc^dt?!ert)ttgcft)on(t# «t*«
er vngef erltcber weig/ bei benjbenigen/ benm er 5<f J«»
%& bähen in verbatbt (f ebt/gefd)ert wotben/ vnb ficb bocb
ff«Uet/<tUfeiervotbe«ftlbmV»rtcber/vaifl^n|«rfonbarittma»
ftcb folcbe verfebe» mag/ i(l eyn anjeygwng jn pemlicber frag.
Ccm fo N^5t#4/W^emt>cr^a(6»ttc(« ^ijn,
fnnbenobererfamwirbet/bajjerbmgar/oberjSmtbeyl
gebebt/ ver^attfit/ vergebe»/ obar otfW»»bm l>abe/ ^ttn>
glv<
(dtttn wrPrtiifFer vnb vowmaii nie anicfsm wolt / 0o hart btv (d/t
hiseynvdt lieb atiicps^ ^<r miffahüt vot^er (ich / bwwcil «r nit aup
fiirt / ^4^ ctfokhtsücceif i vng««trIicbor vnff wfflicbcr wd^ mit cy//
mmsimn5Utiben4n ftc{> bmcb( babe.
,ir<m fo ^«: btebif al / mit fonbmt fjjcrr / o^er l»t<cb j<«g«it / b<//
_ Tcb<bm wer / fo t>an 6cr vetbacbt am relbmeni>eden>c(f / vnnb
micMcbcttgmcrUcbw rpcrtro6cr b«cb iciism vmbgattgm / damic
^<tr^iebf?al bcrcbcb<n/vn6 bct v«rb4cbtey rt folcbe jxrjon i(l / X>av>Ä
mun ftcb &<r mi^^M vcrfcbm ma^/ t(f j)<mltcb ^a^^wacbuittcbcn.
.'Zi:em fo eyn mctcFttcborgtofT«: bwbflal fr^rcbicbt / vlt^ Km<tne
.^;j>e6 v<r^(^cbt witr5rt:/ bcr iwcb 6er tb<tct/ mit feinem Äugaeben f
rctcblicljer erfunoen wirbet/ 6<iitn fitnd aii fferbalb bee btcbflaU feilt
»errnftcren ^m Univnb 6er verbaebt titt 4n6er5«t v:f4cberi «w^a
£rett f 4n /wo im 64« 4imejey3t 4raf wonicf erwt berHommen/ 3(1 ed
i)4n ey» folcbe perfon jii 6er matt (tcb 6er mifretb4t verficbt/fo i(l re6
Ucb 4»j<y5«»£r i>«? mijretb4t wt6er fte rojb4tt6eit«
en J4ttberet5it leme/o6er icm4n6ö j« bc34ubcrtt bc6 wbct
vn 6em be6j4beteii 6er3leicbett befcbtebt / 4itcb fon6erlich
flemevnlcbafrt mtt J4itber« o6ers4wberitt b4t/o6er mit folcben ver//
6ecbtltcl>mJ)m5eit/cfeber6eti/wotten vn6 weifen/ vmbo<bt/6icuit//
berey 4w|frtcb tragen /vn6 6ie felbig perfon 6ed fdben ixm^ aucb b<//
mbttst/ 646 cftbt eyn re6licb 4n5eyerttncf 6er34ttberey / vn6 Änu«//
f4mwf4cb3»!><wltcberfr4ae* ^
beHafften rn6 vemernt«mt^b4n6liincr/ 4U votflfebt er//
r«»Oci» vn6 f »r bcwtefen «wsettomm«»/ o6cr bewtfen erv
f 4tit würi>
f 4ttt wtir6 / 00 (oU 6em ottHeiger 4t>ff fett» i>e5em / 4l^4tt eyn ta^
)ii petnUcbev fr49e b<n4nc werpen*
XI
■'ZTeii» fo m4» 64« 6engef4nd«n petnltcb fr43en will/ vo 4mptd lyvf»
_ ' we3en/o6er 4tt(f anfßcben 6ed flauer« / foll 6er felbig jöno j inn
«ecjenwwrttgPevt 6ed Tlicbterd / j weyer 6ed gericbtd vn 6e6 geriebt
fcbmbetö (leifftglicb jß re6egebalteH wer6e mit wo;tett/6te nacbge//
legenbcyc 6er perfon/ vn6 facben ju weitberer erfamng 6er tibeltbac
06er argfw^nigtevt 4Uerb4il 6tenenm6gen /4ticbmit be6tobnng
2>er m4rter befpt4cbt wer6en / ob er 6er befcbttltigtm miffetb4tbe//
fentlicb feto6ernit/vnn6 W4d im folcbermigtb4t halber bewtifl fei/
v»6 VOM er 4l^64n bc0eitt/o6er verneint/ foll «uffgefcbnben wer6e*
^45e3n erm4nen/t>nn6 wcitb<rc b<(n6//
Ittng64r4u|f.
^Ugt/tie 4nge^ogen ttbeltb4t vemeynt/fo foll i'm 4lg// ^l*«! •
64tt fitrctebalten wer6en/ob er4n$eygen ^itn6t/64f)er
^ — ^er 4ttffgclegten midetb4tt vnfcbnlöig fei/ vnn6 man
foll 6en gef4nsen fon6erlicb erinnern / ob er Bunt weifen vn6 4n3ey //
gen / 64g er 4uff 6ie jeit / 4ld 6ie 4nge$ogen miflctbatt gefcbeben / bei
lettten/4wcb <^ti en6en 06er o«en gewe(lfei/6ar6ttrcb ver(lan6en/
l)4g er 6<r rer64cbten mi(retb4t nitgetban b4ben Fttn6t/'t>ntt6 fol//
cb«? erinnerwng i(l 64rttmb not/ 64g mancber m.^ eynf4lt 06er fcb/»
recPen/nit fiir^nfcblagen wei(l/ob erglcicb vnfcbwl6ig iff /wieer ftcb
^e« entfcbwl6igen vn6 awgfüren foll. Tn6 fo 6ergef4ngert beriirter
m4(fett 06er mit 4n6erh 6ienillicbett \>tf4cbe/fein vnfcb»l6t 4n$eygt
folcber 4ngejeygten entfcbnl^igung / foll ftcb 4lg64nn 6er Xicbter
4u(f 6ee verfl4gtett 06er fetner rreittt6tfcb4|ft f off <n / 4ttfr 646 füxii
terlicb erf ttn6igen / 06er 4ber 4t»ff jöUfTting 6ed Tlicbterö 6ie jw//
gen fo 6er geJF4ngen 06er feine fretw6 6egb4lb (feilen wolten/ xok ftcb
gebürt/ vn6 hmiaA) von weifttng4n 6em jwen vn6 fecb^i^ff«« <»r//
Sc0el 4nf4ben6t. 3«»» wo 6er bef Ugt nicbtu berennen :c. vnc>
In etlicbcn 4rticPeln 64rn4cb gef4Bt i(f /4ttjf ir beger verb$« wer6e/
folcbe obgemclte Pttn6tfcb4Jft (f ell»ng/4ttcb 6en gcf4ngen / 06er fet//
iic»fmin6tm/Äi>ff ir b^crtjongöt recbtimfltg Vff4cb mt^bge//
fvctmbcichaWt [okhcn chscbachcen Poffm/ armae falber ttit ertr«//
ttcn oJ>cr ctrlcii>m mocbt / öamitban nicbw bcflmtn^or 640 übd q</f
fivafft obev tcv vnfchtmQ wider mb t ntt öborrilt werde / fo folßte
cbcrFevt o5rtr drtd flcricbt Dm foffm dorUcrm / vnnd Der rtebfcr/ int
vecbtcn ftirfAirett*
l'Zremromttderieftffemetett tifamns ^<«bcR(tcrteftvn^cbttl^e
mt f tmden wirdet/fo foU er rtigdann auff vo:5emelt erfiitditit«
rcöhcbd ars^wone oder verdacbw pemücb «refrajrt werden in «eae»
werttgPeyc dcd Tltcbrere / vnd jtim went«r(le$weTer deo ffcrichw vü
Deö gcricbte fcbmberö/vnd we« ftcb in der vtgicbtcder feiner bePaiic
J»P vnnd aller «fttndtminergndet / foll evaentUcb Ättfgefcb«ben;
J>em Heger foutl m betriftt eroflpcnt vnt> unfffein beger übfchliStQtf
Sibm I vnd gcwerlicb hit verlose» oder verb<iIteJi werden.
j?lviü.
-^
ttc§m frage« e^ttcrm#cM(^cttttm/na4
ttolgendtö weither aitfferbalb marter vmb vif//
dcrricbt gefragt werden foUen.
vn
f k sFur • l"c^^«^fJ^^««^f«««^*><^«»w»^Wbergar vnder//
fcbtedlicbCwoum tbeyl bernacb berwrt wtrdet) vnnd däaletcben f«
«$ erfarimg der warbest dinflUcb/HetfllgfrÄgen/ vnnd nemlicb be//
FentdrevM «to;dw / man foll in fragen/ an^ w<w wfacben er die
tbÄtcgctban/ anff welcben tag vt^ flßndt/ aucb m welcbcm endt/
Ol) im lemantö vnd wer )m darjn gebolffen / ^ncb wo er bm todtm
bm vergraben oder getban/mte wod waffw folcber motdt befcbebetc
fci/wievnndwAdttdcmwdttnfnrfcbU»eoderwiiiidengebenS«
gcbdwe»/;
^hm^(l^<\x^d(^i^^Ui^^ XII
gebawen/oderfwttjfenvmbbtacbtbabe/waödercrinotdtbeijmge//
bapt von gelt oder anderm / vnd wad er }msmon\tnml wo er auch
folcbenambingeeban/verFaufft/ vergeben/ on worden/ oder verbo;
gen babe/ vnd folcb frag Rieben ftcb «neb in vtl (f iic^en wol auff rati
bervnddieb*
0 &cr jgclVa£C t)cmccrcp ^ftm*
Ccm 6cfcrt( t)ct ^efattgm t)cmcm|>/ma« ^uj.
foll in fragen / wer in dar^ befielt / vnnd wad er darutnb
entpfangen/aticb wo/ wie/ vnnb wan folcbd befcbeben {äl
vnd xoM in dar^i» vernrfacbt b^be«
ütcm bcfcttc ^er #ao(c/ ^a(| er jcmanbc u
vergifft babe/oder vergifften xohWtniCOan foll jn aucb
fragen aller vtfacben x>nb vmbjlende (aU ob(f ebt) vnd
^^^ dee mber/wad in dar^w bewegt/ ancb wo mit/ vnd wie
er^ievjgijftunggebmticbt / oder jwgcbtaucben vo^febabt / vnnb
#0 er folcb giffc befommcn/vnd wer im daringebolffen/odcrgcra//
tenb<tbc*
^em bcfettt §er gcfracsc 0n.6mn&e/matt ij.
foU inen fonderltdf der vtfacb/ jeit/ vnd gcfelfcbaflpt balb
^ISI^ ( <»l« obfJebt fragen ) vnnd deö mer mit wae fenrwercg
«r btn bmndt «etban/ von wem/wie/oder wo er folcb feurwcrcr odeif
den jeng dar^ö jn wegen btacbt b«be.
0ö(ccscfVa«c)xrfottoatt^cp
berenc*
c \s
I«.
Ut).
^em 6cfme immk knfxtcp /mm fof
auch n<uh ^m v^facbcn Tnnb vmbi?en^en/ ala obflebe
frrtctcn/vnt> 6cd imr/wo mit/ wie vnb n>Ati/tit<34uk(#
rcy tcfcbcbctt /mit wae woJtco^cr wercPm.jo« San bU
flefragt i^erfott rtnicr3t/^4ß (tc axcae eingtahtn/ ober behalten bett
^^^$u fotcber sauberer bten^licb fein folt/ (Oan foU bamacb fucb//
cnob mun folcb^^ finben f unbt / wer aber folcba mitanbem binden/*
btrrcb trottober wercF^etb*»»/ COan rollbiefelbenattcbermejfen/
ob (te sauberey auff intn tvastn* QU foll aucb aufragen (tin/ t>o<ns
wem Oe folcb jaitberey gelernt / vnb wie fte batan rommen fä/ ob fite
awcb folcb jaubercy gegen mer perfonen gebmucbt / vnb «fege wem/
wao fcbabend aucb bamitgefcbebcn (<i*
^Pon gcmcpttm mbcnmm frac((i^m /aufF6<^
Fanbtnnß bicau^marter gefcbicb^
ricbtnngen Pan eyn jeber verf^enbiger wol mercPen /
wad nacb gelecfenbert ieber focben / auff bte beFanten
mtflTetbÄt bed gefragten weitber vnb nter ^ufra^en fei/
tM iit erf arung ber warbey t bicn^Ucb ifl / welcb^ altee i& Un3%w
kefcb^eiben wer / 3lber eyn jeber verfJenbiger / awß bcm obgemelrot
itnjeygen wol vo;(lebt / wie er folcbe beifrag inn anbetn feilen tböti
foll/ SDammb folcb warieycben vnnb vmbff enbe von bcm ibenett
ber er n mtfletbat bePent bat/ gefragt werben/ bic fern vnfcbwlbiger
wiffen ober (Mm f ati/ vnnb wie ber gefragt bU fürgebalten vnbcr;»
fcbicbtcr$elt/|oU a»cb eygcritUcb awffgefcbwben werben.
befantcfi vmbffenbm«
£em fo o63cmc((|Vac(fJttcfaii|f (KfanenufJ
bit ait^ ober on marter «tefcbicbtgebmncbfc werben / ©o
folUl^anber ricbter anbieenb fcbicFen/ vnnb nacb bat
vmbiJcnJ>cn/fo ber^cfragt/ ber h^atiun mtfiecb4t b«lbcr erjelt bat
(o»il 1»
fottil jw gewt^bert ber warbeit btenflltcb /mit allem flei^ fragen lap
fenobbie befantnu^ ber obbcrürten vmb(?enbe war (dnobctnitf
ban fo er ner an^ergt bU ma^ vnnb foxm ber miffetbat aU vo: ^nm
tberlgemelti(l/vnb ftcb bit fdhtn vmbffenbealfo erfinbcn/fo i{lbat
auß wol^imercFen / ba^bet gefragt biebefanten miffetbat getbot»
bat / fonberlicb fo er folcb vmbff enbe fagt / bit ftcb inn bergefcb -cbt
baben begeben/ bi« Per» vnfcbttlbiger wijfen !^<in*
crf »ttbigiing nit wab J erf nnben wti rben*
^ rch /folcb vn warbeit foll man bcm cjcfancjen fiitrbalte
^|5y jn mit crn jlltcbcn wo:tcn öarutnb ^raffen /vnb mag
f n al^ban mit pcinlicber fta<t aucbjum anbcrn mal angrciflpcn/ ba(/
mit er 6ic oban^e^cy^tcn vmbflcni>e / rccbt vnb mit ber warbey t an
icysc/baii icitiicittm bie fcbulbi^en bit vmbfJmbe ber miffetbat vn
warlicb anfersen i vnb vermeynen fte wollen jlcb bamit vnfcbttlbiS
Mtacbcn/fobieerfwnbiattng nit wab? crfnnben werben*
gittern (jcfangm t)tc t)mfcftcnt)c Ux miffc^
tbat vof jwfagett / fonber \n bit ganQ von jm
felbft fagen laden*
^cm rnttbrn y>oxb(xmxüM\x ifi Mx^
lieb gcfeQt/wie man eyncn/ ber einer miffetbat bie^wei **»•
fellig ifl^/au^4narter ober bebrobtsng ber marter be/r
V, -^ Hent/ nacb allrn vmbff enben berfelben miffetbat fra«/
gen/ vnb baranfferFünbigung tbi»« / vnb alfo anjf bm grunbc ber
warber t kommen tc. folcbd würbet aber etwa bamit verberbt/ wati
bcn geipangcn )nanmtnm ober fragen/bie felben vmbflenbe ber mif//
fetbat vo jgcfagt vnb barauff gefragt werben. SDartimb wolle»
wir b<i^ bit ricbter folcbd f ürPomme/ ba^ ed nit gefcbeb«/ fonber be»
verfugten nit anberd vo; ober in ber frag/ fürgebalten werbe / bavi
nacb ber wei^aUfUrltcb innbm voigeenben itrticf ein / gefcbmbet»
f
{£♦ garfö iK$ fSnffcm mb i^$ ^U^m
'TLtm 6cr cfefattgm foU auch inm min^m nhet btn <tn^mt/o^(t
_^'m<tr t43 nrtcb ^ct: marcctr / vnnb ferner bclanmti^ fiÄcb «utbe//
bmtc^en^ed rtcbcer^ In bte büctelf{ubcnö{>erat»^er9emacbfttri>ett
ban rtcbtcr / vnnbixcm btB ^ertcbtd s^ün/vnt im fetttbe^enmuf
5ttrcb ^m sertcbtrcb^eiberftirgeUfe» / Y>itb 4l^^4n<ln^<1:1ver^ bar//
Auff ^fra^t / ob fem hdanmu^ xoaht fä i vrntb vom tt b4Qii fa^e
atKb Auflpcrefcbiilxn wcrbcit.
Ivij.
(viij.
votier Uustiet*
mifletbatUtignet/ vtinb 6ocb bcr argPwon/ 4!d votv
(lebt vo> ait^cn wer/fo foU man \n wtber tnn^efengP//
mt^ füren/ vni> weitbcr mit »einltcbcr frage ge^cn fm banbeln / vn6
bocb mit erfarun^ 5er vmbftenbe/ ab roiflebt/iii alwetf ftcifltg fett»
itacb bem ber grttnbt peinlicbcr fraae/5arattflF(?ebt/ iiö wer %wmx
ba^ 5er gefangen folcb« vtfacbttt (eined Xfiw^t^ fürwcnbet / barv
bwrcb i)cr Tlicbccr bewegt würbe/^uglauben/ba^ 6cr gefange fotc^
bcFantn»0 aw^ trrfal getban /al^5an maa ber 'Kicbter 5en fclbm ge
fatigen/5il a»0fürung vn5 bcweifiing folcbd irrfabjalalfm*
^ott Jcr maß panltcgcv jVa^c
x-v^ bcyt bee argtwon« ^vcptis^an i vil / offt oKer wenig/
fr) j bart ober linber nacb crirnffiing eynd guten verniinff//
r-^ "3^" Tltcbterd /fürgenommen werben/ vnb foU bie fa«
beö gefragten nit angenommen ober auffgefcbuben werbe»/ fo er it»
ber marter/ fonbcr foll fei» fag tbun/ fo er vo ber mÄrtcrgelafleit i(?.
0 {)cr am / i^ctt man fVa^m tt)(ff
Scticrlicb wtinbm b<ic»
^cdnoti
Si*mtTc?m5lac§öpa'n(tc§5m'cg(0otbttmt£^ xnn
Cemobt>ct6cÖagec!ctter(t(§tt>un{)cno5(t ug.
anber fcb<ben/an ^tmm leib bctt/fo foll b\t peinlicb frag
\fe^ bermaffen gegen jm f ürgwommen werben / b<Km\t <r o»
fblcbw verwttnben oberTcb<b<» am mtnffm valept würbe.
£pn t)cfci(ug/tt>an 5ctr f)cfanm«(|/fo auff
pcinlicbe frag befcbtcbt/mtltcb suglanben t(¥.
<yner milfetbat balb /peinlicb frag fürgenommen /ancb
auff bef entnu^ beö gcf roatcn / wie ^<i& fclbig alled init
^^^ t>tn volgeenben articreln flerlicb gefaxt t(l/ flcifftgc m%
liebe er^nnbigung vimb nacbfragc befcbtcbt / vnti^ in bcr fclbcn/
bePenter tbatt balb folcb« warbeyt bef nnben wirbt bie Fern vnfcbui
bitter alfo fagen nnn^ wiflen tun^t I cX^ban i(l bcr felben beten tnug
tjmweiffelicb beffenbiger wci^Sttglaiiben/vnb nacbgcjlalt ber fach
m »einlicb (Irafipbarauff jw vjtbeylen/ wie bernacb bei btm bnnber//
ften vnt> vierbten articFcl anf abenbt. 3^ctn fo f emant xn\\ivn ge//
meynef t gefcbtiben recbten nacb tc. vnnb in etUcbeti articteln/bar/^
iiacb von peinlicben (f raff cn erf»nben wirbt.
,0 {)cr cjcfart^m auf rcMicgc« t)cr^a(5c mw pcin
lieber fragangriflpen/ vnnb nit vngerecbc fwn//
ben ober überwunben wtrt.
Cott fo txt ^acjt / att|F<ptt<tt fo((^tt w.
argf won vnb verbacbt ber jn peinlicher f ragCalö vom
(lebt)gnttgfam erfiinbcn/peinlicb einbwcbt/mit mar//
tergefragt / vnb bocb bnrcb eygen bePentnu^ ober be//
weifttng ber bePfagtm milfetbat nit überwnnben wirbt/baben bocb
'Xicbter vnb anBleger mit obgemelte otbenlicben vnb in recbt .^nleflt
ttcn/peinlicben fragen /feyn (frajf verwürcN/baß t^a b^fen erf nnbe
anieygilg/babe ber gefcbeben frag entfcbulbigte vtfacb geben / wan
matjfoUßcb iwcb^r<»3 ^« recbt mt Älley» voi volbwigwng b«v
ebtv anicysm 6er mtffecbatt machen/ bwttm/vti tt?er bad nit thctt/
btv tcüvbc 6cf?balb5cmclter fdticr btfrcbn>ctr6 fclbd vtfacb fem/ "ibn^
foll in Eifern fall / dcranf U^cr alUyn feinen Sofien / vn6 {>eirbe0l4se
berglefcben fein atuwQ / nach 6em er feinem verbacbt vjfacb geben/
auch cnctricbcen / vnn^ bic ober^erc bic iibericfen gericbcd Fo(tcn/aU
für 5en n4cbrtcbtctr vnb anbete bimev bee gericbtö oScr gcfeng^nu^
halber felbd tragen . "IPo aber folcb peinlich frag/ biSv vnnb be^
bcyltge Tleicbd recbtmejitgcn ot^n^^g wiberwertig geb:aucbc würbe
fo tteren 6ie felben ricbter/ ab vjf4cber folcber vnbtllicber peinlicher
frag (f rafflieb / "X)ni) foUcn barnmb nach gejialt vnb geiegenbeyc
bev libcrfarwng/ wie recht i({/ üvaffvnb abtrag leiben / vnb m%et»
darumb vo; iretn necbf?cn ojbcnlichen obergerichtgerecbrferrigc
werbe»»
'2?»i-
IjPÜj
t •#* •
iCem wo bct fccflacjc ntc^ce bcfcnnm / mb
6er anf leger / bte geplagten mi^banMung beweifen xooltß
bamit foll er/aU recht il^/^ngelalfen werben.
2:m t>n6efamc k^cn/foffm auff anfccg
tung beegwentbeylö nit^ilgelaffen werben/ee würb bati
bnrcb ben/lo bie jengen fJellet/flattlicb förbwcht/baß fte
rebitch vnb vn»erUumbt weren*
STcm bdonec Jaigm/fcin awcg wö)o:lfm/t)tt{i
»itiulelTtg/fottber peinlich itt (Jraffeii .
§^tc Joigm fagm foffw.
7c€mbt(
Sl&mifcßctt 5^ac^$ panlicg^wcßce o^^tttms.
XV
£:em bk kitten foffcn facjm/ t^ott jrcm {db$ i^v.
eygen waren wiflcn/ mit anjeygung fwö wiffen grwnbt//
_ Ikh«? vtfach. 00 f« aber vonn frembben hhm fagcn
foürben / baa foll nit gnßgfamgeache werben.
K^vnb (mift mit Peyner rechwKlfigen v^fach 5»ncrwcrff en Uin* »^^I*
2:cm fo cpn mtMac ton tomt#n mic
jweyen ober bieten glanbhajf tigen guten jewgcn / bk von lJ?^W'
eynem waren wiflfcnfagen/ bewiefen wirbt/ baraufffoll/
«ach S^{i<^^t ber verhanblttng mit peinlichem rechten volnfarn vnb
gettrth<ylt werben.
?Pon falfcgcn ic«£cm
2:^ too Jcucimcr|tin{)cnt>nnt>u6crtt)un^ ij,^a,.
bcn werben /bieburchfalfch bo(jbafftig ^cngPfchafft |c//
.r-,..^^ manbtjtt peinlicher ff raff vnfchulbiglichen büngen ober
»fibnngen vnber|liinbe« /bie haben bit flraff verwürcFt/in welche fw
^e» vnfch»lbigen/alö obffeht / b^ben bezeugen wollen.
nit bePennen wolt*
Ccmfo^crbeftagc/nacg^ttögfamorbctt^afunäf kus^
oSjnoch nit bef cnne wolt /foll jm angejergt werben/ ba|cr ber mif
SSatt bewiefen [d I ob man barbnrch fem beFantnuß beffer er auch
Ägcn Unbtl ob w «»ber biwnocht barwber nochmab mt benenne
tco\tfbc6 et bocl? /aU oh(icht/3mts(am htwifcn xctv I fo fo!t<tr ntc^
te
5Pon jtcßlinot t)nnf> t)cr^§mtt£
2>et: ^cu^cit*
fcbajft 64r4t}ff iemant jw peinlicher fJmfffoll vemr//
tb<vlt werben / ^ar UuteiJ vnnb rechtfertig fei / Öo>
wollen wir xot eyne belUgtcn wiffethat verbotge werA
vn^ er bcrfelbigen auff frag wie vojflebt / nit bcPentlicb ^cin i vnn^
bocb bcr 4nf leger bi e Qä\aQtm verneinten miffctbat bewerfen woft^
vnb bÄmitsngclaflTen wiirbc/ba^er^eranRegcr feincarcicPel/ bieer
xo6,{m will otbenlicb auff^eicbm Irtfle / vnni> bemricbter iit fcb«(fte»
aberantwo« mit mtlbun^ixcit biciengen bcyflcn/ vn wo fic woncn/
J>4mit al^bann barrtuff burcb etliche anß btn vttberlcrn/ ober aber
Anbere vero»bente Commiffarien/wie vnberfcbicblicb bernacbbo/^
ttongefcbmbcn ffebt / f »nbtfcbÄfft noctarfftiaer vnnb acbörlicb«
tef*
im gericbu
(ö nön b<^ f46iöf pethd (§ gmc§( mrt
^>erfonett / hk folcb« ^nntfcbafft recbttncfliger weif jft
verboten etefcbicft t>nb verffenbtg fetnb /befaijt ifl / fo
oll ber rtcbtcr \<impt jweye» auf ben felben barjü tu«
• r L ^ L ^^ V!»"^ ^em tfericbtfcb:<iber gemelte rnnbtfcbafl^
wte rtcb tft recbtgebwrt / mit (Icig verbljen/ vn fnnberlicb cygentlicb
ÄttffmercPen/ob ber ieiitt in feiner fage warb WÄncPelmütig vnb vn//
bepenb w erf unben/folcbe y mff «nbe/ viib wie er ben $eiwe« iß cttflcr/i
licbwgcberbcv<rm«rcro»i>cmbÄiibaa»flFfcbmb<fi.
bed gericbte*
.(£) aber c^n pctnltc§ ^mc6t(tt)t^ ^<^ti tttt i$sif.
TVeici) an vil o:ten bef unben ) mit fol«bm obgemeltcrt
b4rj« vcrjf cnbigen perfonen / nitbefeijt wer / wiewol
^ f b Alt fiinfl nach verm% gemcy ncr recbtm in pctnlicb
tn fachen / 4 nfferbälb ber felben geriebt» perfoneit / mt Funbrlcb Aftc
verbo:er/oberCommiflaw«"3«5cbcn werben folUn. ptcweilaber
AnverftcnbigcttfnnbtfcbafftvcrbiKrnvilgelegentft/barmttbaft/
Attgvttiierftanbt bifer funbtfcbafft verbowrfern verfiiröwngge//
fcbebc. 00 o^bwm vnnb wollen wir wo obgemclter mattgel er//
fcbcinbt / b«^ bi^ m bit obaebacbten vepeic-beten weifitng amcFel
bnrcb btn Siebter vnt> vier fcb^ffen / bocb on nacbtbeyl ober Popci»
bcrpartb«cnber votgemeltennecbdettoberteytjttgefcbtcPt/ vnb b<5
beiiclegenbcTtvnbgeflraltber fachen fonil fte ber bcncbt «npfangc
Anaetevett werbe/ barauff ban bit felbig oberPeyt verflenbtge f unbt
ftbaffc rerb$«r/ vngcacbt A ob fte nit bce gerichtd weren/ auff 4nfiv/
ibting beß ber 0»nb tfcb^ff t füren will / verotben/ vnb ob e» bte not^
tnr^ erfotbert vnb begert würbe / Compulfonal / vnnb Comp4^
bmflp / g<ben foll / b aburcb biz jengm ui gcburltcbcr f^S« 5«b«nge«
feinbt/^nb foll bemnach gcmelte oberPeyt ( foml an jr t(l) allen flet^
Mnivn wed fie felbd nit verpttnbt/bei recbtnerff enbtgen «^^Jtd »n«
«en /b4mit folcbe Fimtfcbaflt ban recbtegemeg verböte wcrbe/bocly
Such 0» ber |>4rtb«<» ^ o(fm vnb nacbtbcTl»
^on offttttttä J)cr fttn{)(fcgafft*
(& öaü folcgc fattt)tfc6affc wM <'f?/f^ff
<d mit croffnnng ber felben alfo gebrtltm werben/ nm»
lieh wttrbc PnnbtfcbAfft vot etlichm eyn« peinltcbmge//
V55^^— richte i>crfone»bt«biferf4cbmverffenbig/gebo«/ ©-»
Wlber richtcriucrojfnwngber felben fnnbtfcMfl^^^^
fchtifftUcbc änrebe/ vnb fchMö«b</JttU(r<»«»trfow vnb ma^wu
bemach volst^
(Ct
tS. fötftö tx$ ßittfftm t>tt^ U^ ^i^
^^'mht^ huvcb Commtffart atilfar^mb be^ «mcbtd^/tvU oben ^«
ttott Acfcb^t&m ^c\9tftunbt0jafft vttrb^tc würae/ober bte €Scl7$flrm
2>ce (cibm pdrilicbcn ^mcbce nie bei eynat^a ßeftffm wtttn / alfo
b^M^ff j^ i^ßntmen htingat I übm^ vnfofrvnn^ vet^ua^d)»
X9ü(5(* lbuxoä\^an fr vafamlntt^^ü eyner jebm foldxn b<»nbü^
htn^ nie fiiraregltcb nocb" von n^ccn i(i/ vn{^ ^erbalb vnf ojl vni> vo:
^ilct b<e r<cbcm verbuc xverbe / ^tbm vnb w^Km n>ir 2>4^ tit bx^m
f4U/bie CommilTatri vnb 0nDbcfcbAf{tvcrb^)ct:/b(irb4lEvtt4cbuaU
^mbcr muffen btwbcln folUn«
^
^m/vni>attflFroicb<n bej^impcen ta^bcyben tbcyUn aHcb«ffe/4«ff
IdMicbe belonnng b4tf on^cbm / vnt> vfn ^tmlicb ^«c 2>ic fte n4cbd<^
genbcvt btt f4cb/für not anfebcn vnb crfotnen/ 3<bm/b4mit jolcb«
an bic r4cb W4ltb<tr/vn6 fon6er{ict>4n b(ns<fan^n htac\)t Jxnh fo|
len 6<ft 5ef 4n3Ctt bciftcnbee J>i^ f 4I6 ^w im gcUffm wcrbm / vhb w<*
b4nn ict>crtbcyli« ober in folcbcn Funbefcbafftm rcben wtU/b4d fott
tt vot3cb4cbKn f Mnbtrcb4fFt tith^xvcn / in fcbtiflFten gc^wetfocbt/
4tt(f cyncn namhafte t4Ct/benim bit tnnbt^chmt vcrfö«tr berb4lk
n4cb 5<k5^nbcy t bcr r4cbcn / in ^imltcbetr^etc 4nfeQm foUw / fnrbtiti
«m/ TPnb fUrtb«: hie eyn fcbüffit: bei ben f unbtrcb4|ft vcrb^tem be*
t)4lcen / vnb bte 4nbet; bcm wtbercbeyl bc^cnbist werben/ feiti^eseiM
fcbnff c(ob er n'iU)b4r4ufFittcbi}n*
C 4ber bte patthd 5erb4lben wetrber (cbmben wollen / b45 4tr
lee foll in fcbtiflF «n gebnpplirt / vnb in jett fo bie f ttnbtfcb<^
verboter b4rittbe(ltiwen/bercbcben / vnb bocb tcfn rey l eyner fnnbe
fcb4ffeb4lb/iiber5w<> fcbJtflftitttbim (b4rin (le4Ueirbebelffimnot
tnrifcfarbtingen vnnb b4mitbercbUeirenrollen)nit jß^eUffen fowa
bm/ite wer b«n r4cb/b4^ berverb^Jer/4tt^mersRtcben tref enlic^
m vnb bewwenbcn vtr4cben beftnben wftrbe / b4^ er<»54rnit vmb#
Sebtt Ponte/ (o foll er ie<flicb<m tberl/ nocb ey n fcbtiffc vnnb nkmcvf.
attcbinjtmltcberfarberlicberjettjttUffe«. eob4nnnHn4irobie
rttnbtrcb4ttt verbott/eroffenc vnb von beyben tbeylen/ ir evn / vnb
jn rebenein^ebtÄcbt vnnb befcbloffen werben / foll ber rnnbtrcb4ffii
verbowr ober CommtflÄriwd folcbd 4lled ber oberPeyt bic in jn foUl^
«: verbdwng verotbent/ißm fttrberlicbffen öberfenbefi/ welcbeober
rey e 4l^b4n Iren r4b tfcbU^ ban Siebter / vet bmt folcbe recbtwer//
PSnns msni VOM in folcbcr Mm jöerren ne» (<m foU/jöfcbicPe«
V'
5^Mr(§<tt 5^«(§6 ponltcg 3<rt(§w 0}?>tt«its[. xvii
Vm fiitttftgajft {>« brflögtctt Jß femtr
entfcbttlbi^un^.
fwncf füren wolt / bie in von feiner verf Ugten miffahtttl
entfcb wlbiffen folt / So b4n ber Tlicbtcr folcbe erbottme
weifnns für bienfllicb 4cbt/ fo foll ee mit volnf ttwna ber felbe 4»cb
votgemelter nutifm I vnb bat^n wie von folcbcr 4ttgf «rnng ber yn//
f cbulb bern4cb in btm bunbertfJen ey n vnb fiinff ßigjf cn 4rticrel 4n
f4benb / 3tem fo )mi<inbt ey ner tb4tt bePentlicb i(l :c. ^nt> in etlicb
cn 4rticPeln b4m4cb f lerlidjer mer vnb weitb« fwnbcn wiirber/se//
^m v>tt m pctn(t(§m fachen fiimfc^affc i^^^
^- fürt/ ber foll eynemjedicben sengen/ vongemeynenlent//
^^:Jb> ten xnb f nfeenaern für feinen l?off en eynen jeben t4S/bK
weil er in folcbcr 5enflfcb4|ft i({/4cbt frenQer ober fonil wertbö t»4cb
«y nd xtUn Unbtd münij gelectenbeyt geben/ 2lber mit 4nbern vn^
werern »erfonen foll ed berbÄib n4cb ert4nmu^ ber f »ntfcbaffwer//
bo;ergeb4lten werben*
gcptt ^ciigm für rccgc Jöucr^lattm*
o^lVtemoberCommifl4rien vot jjeinlicber recbtfeftigwng vereide
5&crt / 2lber für gewalt m^&m ^ie i>4rtbcie« vnnb jcugcn fwPS^/^
riebe vergley t werben*
@40 r# (Tir{>dt<§ <»3# Jfl(4ir<Jt
3>
fe^^vtj.
tejeviif.
tej?»j?-
^^^^'
ß. M^ i^c$ fünften mb k$ ^Ugß
^m mfofm iäummUn/^ctytn mb otb^
.^^ mn voivlba^ inn allm »<tnltcbcn facbot bctn vechttn (chitnnic^
lieb nacbdc54il;gcn/varbolffm vnbgeucrltcb nitvtv^ostnxotx^t»
ht^emun I ober eitibmcbtc vnnb volnfurte ^tinbtfcboffc
vn^ befcbltt^/ tvte ob(?ebc/ vmb eymtt entlkbm recbtt<i|$
biet / i>cr foU im fiirbetrUcb txnmt xoatbm I tV^ ahtt ^wantiA^ct
vmb 6m cntltcbcn rccbtca^ nit bitte n>olc/ro foU 6er felb ctttlicb recbc
tAS <tu[f {>e0 be^Uc^ren birr aucb ertient teerten*
cm 6cflag(m {>ctt n(§((ac( Jöiicrfun^m*
^m bm I fo ittjart auf W« &C0 anfla^
cferö mir entUcber petnlicber r(cbmert%ttti^ (traffett
will y foll bad )uf lo: {»tet m^ an^ef4C(t: werben / barmte
er 3u rechter $eic fein ffittb bebencf en /be^n^en vnb beti/
cbtenm^cfe/vnb fo erb(dbeylicte64cramettC0$ttempf4benbe^ert/
b4ö foU man jm on we^eruna^tl reteben fcbulbt^ fein/man foll aucb
n4cb folcber beicbt/t>(le5licb (olcbc perfonen in bem verlb^ten in bte
Sefeng^nn^ verotbnen/bie in^u^tten feli^en ^vx^/m. toermanen/ v»
im in bem «n^füren vnb funjl nit ^iltiil ju trinc^cn sebcn barburc^
fein vem»hfft3eminberc werbe.
^^iMm^ Jörn gm(§(*
Ccm Jörn gmc§t foffwfönWgt wc^r^m/ wft
4n )ebem ott mitd^cter ^etoonbcTt b<i^«tnmai i(f .
^^m^m$ b^ t)u^cp(c»r m bm
rccbtt45*
3c<>tt<^
Sl$m#rt Q^cttOo pcjtt(t(§ «!m(?(0 0}{>nMtt£. x v m
ler vot bem recbtta^ alUd einbringen bo:en Icfcn / ba ji
allee /wie bcrnacb in bem bwnbcrtcn vnb cy n vnb acb
>-^ >^ Qigf^et» articPel 4n5e5cyfft wirt / oibcnlicb bcfcbnben
i&xv^xib für Tltcbter ^vlfy vttbeyler bmcbt werben/ iDarÄiiffficb T^t
cbter vnb wtbevler mit eyn4nber vnberreben "onb befcbltcfT«» / W4d
fte ju recbtfptecben wolUtt/'Ünb wo rtejwciffaiigfwn/roUcn ftc wct//
tber rabtd pflegen/bei ben rccbtiterff enbigcn / vnb an enbcn vnb oitc
wiejt» ^'^ bifer vnfcr otbnnng 4n3eieygt / vnb 4l|iban bic bcfcblor'/
fen vttberlj» ^^xn^ anbcti» gcricbte b4nbel ancb 4itffrcb«tben laflcre
fiacb ber fotmen wie bcmacb in ^kx^ bnnbercen •^xt^ ncnnQigjlen ait
fabenbt/3«ni \o n4cb laut bifer vnfer vnb bed bcyUgm Tlcicbj o:{>
itungtcfnnbenwirbet/ barmit folcbe vttbeyl nacbmaU auff bert
entlicbett recbttag;/ wie bemacb von ojf niW0 folcber vttbcyl3«lcb»''
ben liebt/ vnfenmUcb alfoseolfnet werben.
cntlicb^tt gericb^^*
?f^ £:cm am csmc§cf|ca0i/f0t)tcc(cto)c>n(t(^ wg ij^^^ij,
teiterfcbetttt / mag man baö peinlich gebebt nnt bcr gc//
-,«^ wortUcben glocf en belmtten/ vnb follen ftcb T^icbtcr \>\x^
»ttbeyler an biegertcbtö (f att ftigen/ba man baö gcricbt nacb gitter
«ewonbcvt pfleS jwA^w/ vnb ftll ber Tltcbter bte vitbey ler bey (Ten
SSn /ÄeraScbrtem feinen (f4beo^
lenbUcbem berPomme eyne ytUn ottö ixi hm benben b4ben/ vnb eb J//
Jamltcb Ö^e» bleiben/bi^t^ cnbeber fachen.
tfc t)nfcr t)n& t>c6 ^\xpx $Kcicg$ ott>ttung,
oeflenwiirtigittbaben/aucb benüartbcien/ hwM
\t t^ottttrfft vxt jt^nerbergen.
rm in affm petnltc^m ö<^fcgt(tc§m k^hMxi
foUen Tlkbter vnb Bchoffen bifer vnfer ojbnnng vnb famtn«
tte«enwerti?b4betfvnbbarnacbb4ttbeln/aucbbmpartbet
••y,
tricbtwngscbm/ftcb bamach wiffm Jttb4ltm / 4!fo b4rmtc ^e^t$trc|r
vnwi(fcnb<vc l>crr<lbt5m nitvittümt ober flcwcrbc werben / (VDait
foll auch bm parcbcien bte arocPel / foft« 4U^ btfer vfiferotbrnma
nottür jftifl feirt / aiiff ir begeri» vmb leiMicb belonwng abfcbiijfts«^
bcti*'
'^ rccbt befe^ fei»
%J?W'
(5j?j?t.
%J?2?vi.
<tem fo t)a0 cjcncic a(fo c(cfc|fctt ift / f<>
mag ber Tlicbttr jeben fcboff en befonber «Ifo fragen/
tt. icb frag bicbob baeencUcb geriebt $» j)etnlicb<*?
^.^ banblnng wol befee« fei/TPo banbad felbig «ericbt nie
Vnber ftben ober acbc jcboffen befe^t iff/ foll jeber fcb^ff Alfo «»ntwuir
ren / lOerr Tlicbter baö petnltcb entUcb ga;icbt iit nacb Uut ^crfci?
ÜarU beu fünften vnb bee b«ylt5<» Tictcbe otbnwng wol befeQt*
^m b<x (Kflacje offenrftcß mn t)m @(ocf/
ptanger ober t^al^eifen gefielt werben folU
peinlicber ffraff entlicb befcblo (fen werbet / wo bann bcr//
rommen ijl/ben itbeltbetter/ bauot ober nacb am marg^
ober plaQ/etlicb $<tt offencUcb in ftod£f p^anger ober b^lieifen^u (fei
len/bie felbig gewonbey t foll 4ucb gebalten werben«
m kflagem für gmc^t JujiJrm*
_ \Der0lagt burcb ben nacbricbtev vnnb gericbtd rnecbt wol vor//
voavt/fnv bM geriebt b^ocbt werbe*
SPott bcfcg^am {>ce tcflagcm*
Jixmmk
^Mfd^m S^ctcie pcmltcg jgmc^cö ^xUmng.
XIX
lyjpjvüf«
^:C^cm mtc bm bcfc^Ktcn t^ct u6c((|ccccr lys^vti«
foll eö im fclbigm fliicH aiiff g(fgcnwcrtigF«ic vn bcgcr
^ beö auHlcgerö nach jcbcd gcncbtd guter gcwonbcrtge
balten werben / TVo aber bcr bctUgt vnfcbwlbigerfunben würbe/
o^fo b4$ ber anFleger bcin rechten nie nacbPomimn wolt / vnnb nit
be(?weniger ber bef lagt rccbtß begert / fo wer folcbe befcbtcienönic
not*
5Pon furfptccßcii»
Ccm f lcc(cm mt> mtmnan / foff jcöcm
tbcrl Mtff (ein bcgerncyrt fürfptccbawjibem geriebt er//
latibt werben / bie fclbcn foUen bei iren.evbcn biegcrecb//
^ _^ tigHcyt vnb warbcTtrtucb^ic o:bnuiigbifcr vnjcr fat^//
tin<t fiivbern / vnb burcb Pernerlcr gcucrltcbey t mit wiftcn vnb willc
verbini>c»^«» ober verb'cru/ bae foll in alfo burcb bcn Tlicbter bei )ren
«fliehten beuolben werben /boch t>a^ ^er felbig fcbopff ber alfo beö
anPUgcrö furfp:cch gcwcfl / ficb binfiirtcr fcblielfen 6er v:thcyl ent/»
balt/ vnt> bic anbcm ricb'ter vnb fchopffcn ixichtö be(tommber voln
f arcn follcn / J)och foU in ber FUger vnb antwurrcr willen (tcbn
Iren re6ner an^ bcn fcbopjfcu/ober funjl$uncmen/o6er in felb(l|5u re
bcn I welcher aber ey neu rebner auflTerbalb bet> gcfcbwomeu gericbc
fcbopffen nimbt/ ber felb rebner foll 5«»o j bcm richtcr fcb weren /ficb
mit fblchem feinem rebeu^uhalteu/ wieobeniil bi^cm articFel/ber für
fptecbcn b^lb/fo an^ bcn fchoffen genommen werben/gefaxt i(f .
L'Uem in bcm necbflf nacbgcfaQten articPel / ber riag/föll ber für//
Wfptech/ wo erfflicb tyn 31. (lebt bee Bagere namm/ vnb bei bem
:ä bee bef lagten namcn melben / fürther bei bcm C foll er bte übel//
Chat/ aU mo:bt/ rauberrey / bieberey / bmnbt/ ober anbere/ wteiebe
tbat namcn bat / anff bae ^ür^ed an^ey gen / V mib i^ nemltcb jw
mercf en/fo bie Plag von ampte wegen gefchehen/ baß allwegen m ey
ner teben folcbm flag 56 (amvt bcm namcn bee auFlagerd / foll alfo
aefeQt werben / 2^lag von ber oberf ey t vnb «mpt^ wegen.
^ iii
feSSW
Qtn o^ev r»n(( flagt*
a Tir dcrmifTctbat halb fo ettntt Cgctibc / wie folcb ^U^
-^^" Mli) vo^maU rot ciKb fiivhiochtift/ vnb hitc ^a^ fr bctrfcl
bcn ^U^b^lb alUcinbrncbte han&K>n5 vnb 4ttffrcbmbm / xcic ba^
AlUenacb Ublicb«? mbtwclftgctr iÄ-crfctr ^rtrU bee funfftm vnn^
b<d bcrUjm "Kdcbö j>«nttcbcit gcncbtö ojbnttitg vojtiwld gnugv
famlicb 3<fcb<b«t/ (l<»lft9 «^m<ftcn wollet/ v»n6 i>«^ 2>at;Attff ^ct: bc</
(Udc vmh 6te übctrwtinbm iibeicb<ic/mtc mtltcber vtcbcy l vnb rccbe
petnltcb gefirafft; wec^e / tote ftcb n^cb o;{>nttn05ctmlt(r5ie»cbt$ei^
bürcvn^recbcid«
L'Tte wo bcr furf]^ttcb Meob^etmle Httf c^ t>nb bttt muntUcb nie
rcbetr ^ünbe/fo nm^ ctr ^fe fcbnffcUcb inJtfM gmcbt Ic^m / vnni>^
a\i'o^aS<n/fr>ttrvi<htctich biet atcbjir wollet ewern fcbmbct: 5<d
an§l4aer«n4^vn»^bt(t/Att^^(rem5cU5t(n5€ttetoffcnrUcbvd;lo'
fmUffcn*
i?c
§^a0 t)tt& tote t)cr kfla^c t>nt(l^ fcrnm fur^
bAtiö» beilmM^woß bcPottltcbdeweff /obd;2>e05nJS^
fitm tibenn) tfm tvo^ixtt war / wie vo( von Qtiügiamtt b<
^»^^ weifttn^ vtt^ folcbem b<fobi«ett; benennen mtikhsca
latiti^f €^om4g<t;mcbt0(ln^ar(^^an vmbmta^bittmo^et; bitten
ia((cn I bete er aber 5et; miffecb^tt alfo nie harnt i o5ar wo er Me an//
^oetm tbrttt befant/vn^ 6erbal&en folcbe vtfacben inxhtacht bat/
^4t^>utcb er verboffet von petnlicb<r (Iraff entfcbtri^i^Stt wer^en/,
|b m^fl er {»»vcb fönen ftirfpKcbm biccenUfTc» wie bct^ntfcb vol<tt.
5^Sm»f(§ett5R«t(§6p<m(((^cj<«<§<«^^tt«tt^- xx
i^ZTem woiinn<cb(lf«»n4cbuol5enb<n arttcFeleynlJ.flcbt / foU
_ wr bcÖagt/ b« bem 2t. l><r flauer/ vnnb bei bem C t>ie bef Ugc
libeltbÄt/Pnre gemelt vnb verdanken warben.
if\ i£rr "Jlicbtet / 13. ber beHoat «ntwnrt jß ^«r beRaflten milfeir
■^Vcbat/fo bwrcb ^««l« PUaer/ wi6er ingefcbeben ifl/lvie er mit C.
iJübt Üben foU /in aller maflen wie er vo:inaU «eantwwrt b<tt/ vÄ
onu<tf<tm f ürbmcbt i(l/ X>nb bitt/baß jr 6er fclben befcbeben Haa/
vnb antwurt balb/ alle banMnng vnb aufffcbmbm / wie t>M allcd
nach liblicber recbtmcjftgcr Äeyfer 'Kat\^ 6ee fünfften vnnb 6ed
l>evli<t«7^«cbö öcinlicben gertcbte otbnung votmaU gnugfamlicb
für ?nb eiHb:acbt/(lei(|tg wolt ermeflen/ vfi bag er a« jf Uxn erfunbc
iie vnfcbulc mit entlicber v;tberl t>nrt6 recbt / fampt erffattuns be^
Ättff <tan3Ctt ^cricbc^f offm vrtl> fcbe6en lebt^ errent werbe / ,vttn^^cr
im^Ucrcrilraflpvtt^ abtraabalb ftrtcblauc6trer pcmltcben 2leyrcr//
lieben scricbtö otbnwn^ju cntUcbent auf trag vo;{)emsct«bt/Al*
cb Anseierst/ v^^^P^^^^* ^^^^'
Sä'^«nwo^er erlangt fürri)tec!?t>ifeob5emelteantwort vnb btt
o^'miintlicb nitre6eii tnnbt/ mag er bie fcbtifFclicb für bcnTlicbtet:
beten / vnb bi'it mcvnnng ^<tQ€n. i J^err Siebter icb bitt eucb laf tbed
brflattten antwnrt vtib bitt/ an^ bifer citmelegten ^ettel/ cwcm fcb//
wiber off entlicb vcrlefen. anff folcbe bitt (oll 5er Siebter tem q^h
cbtö fcb wber benelb« bie gemelten eingelegten jettel iunerlefen.
maU befent wölben i(f*
item t»wb tw (»cttacjt auf öcm mtlic^ ^50.
_^ ^ recbttag ber milfetbatt lencfnen / bie er bocb votmaU om
bewUcber bejlmbiger weiß bcPant /i>er TUcbter aitcb ang fokbem be
f entnnß in erfawwg allerbanbt vmb(f ertbe fonU befnn6cn bett/baf
folcb IcttcHncn von dem befUgtcn al eyn jw verbtnbemng be« recM
würb fürgenommywiebienotim r<cbßt)nfiin(f^g(tear«crd/vnm
tdtcbctt areicf ein b<w4cb biß Ättjf bert jwe» vn fecbßigffen AWicf el/.
Jg. garie ke fiJttfftett mb {w ^l%tt
Ton b<jlmbi5rt? bcFcnmu^ funbm vcivt 1 fo foU btt Xicbt«? 6ie$t»m
^otbmtm fcb^f ffm / fo mit jm folcbe vcrlr^ne vtcftcbt vnnb bef «nr
titt^ gcbott b^be au jf jr ey ^e frage / ob fic 5 w wrUfen v;crtcbtgebo<e
babm / Tn5roftcib<ii>4>i«r<WOT/ fo follt)crttcbrcrinalw<g<ttb<l
2>m recbtucr(lm6tctcn ober funff an o;cen x>nnb mbm I ab bemacb
maU ange^eygt rat) w pflegen / vnnh nach bem foUbe jwcn fcb^^e«
n btfem fall nie aU ^etigen / fonber aU mit Tlicbretr bandeb / foUe»
te berbalb vomgericbc o^ev bcv vxthcfX nxt an^gefcbloffen votx^ctu
0^
l
# •
2?«I<
bey t>er tbey l / vnt> allem f tirbungcn ancb entltcbem befcbUl^
t>ie vtcbevl faffen / vnb wie aucb nacbmaU bte
fcb^ffen ober vjtbeyler i>»rcb ben "Xicb//
ter gefragt werbet» (ollen.
ancb entlicbem befcbln^ betr facbcn / follen ber Tlicbter
Öcboffen vnb vitberler alle gertcbtlicbe fürtreg rnn^
banMimg füt (icb nemen / mit flci^ bcftcbtigcn vnb erwege» / xnn^
baranjf nacb \tv(v^ bep verfJcnbtnng bifct vnfer peinlicbcr geriebt*
ojbnnng / nacb geUgenbey t eynd leglicben faU / <m aller gleicbe^eit
vnb gemefftgffen v«beyl/jn fcbnfft faflfen laffen/ \>nnb fo die vttbcil
alfo vcrfajfcc: / foU barawjf t>er ricbter fragen H. icb fr^g bicb bc*
recbcend*
• # 9
tm^
fpucber vngeiierlicb alfo antwoitm*
-«. -^ anff alled gcricbtlicb wxUin^m vnb UnMnng / wad
n c- «f ^^«ö.3<«cbtd^öf ^«tt»S tccbt / vnb anff «i2gfame
nUed fwrtrage beftcbttgung m fcbJiffteniil vjtbeyl verjp<»feiff.
S=i&tttt'r<^ ^««'c§o P«nl»<§ Ö«tt'<§w w^ttMtti.
XXI
Sem (»uif obc|emcltm bef^ugberfcO^f^^ 8da^
fen vnb vttbeylcr/ foll bcr 'Kicbter 6ie enclicben v:tbey l
fo alfo iit fcbnfFte» verfa|fet i(l/ burcb bengcfcbwomen
geriebe fcb:eiber / van ye^iKit^xi beber )>arcbeien ojfentUcb
verlefenlajfen/VttbwopanUcbflralferfancwiröet/fofollotbcnlicb
gemelt werben wie vnb welcber maflfcn bie cw. leib ober leben gefcbebc
foU/wteban }>einlicber (Irajf b<tlb bernacb im bnnberccn ^n^ vierb//
ten articfel/ vnb etlicben plcttern barnacb fnnben -^nb anjcygt wire
^nb wie ber fcbteiber folcbe vztbeyl bie ftcb obgemelter maflc» ^u oflf
nen vx\b lefengebürc / formen vnnb befcb>eiben foll/ wirt bemacb ini
^unberten "on^ newn^igllen arcicfel fwnbcn»
,3^ 'ben follen / Unten aU anjf cy nen Hleger ^nb auff ey ncn antwur
S/ 2tber ea i(l nemlicb 5«mercBcn / wo mer ban eyn Bager ober ey n
Ärttwurter im recbten ^w\X>m I t><t^ alßban hit felben w$:ter wie ficb
von mcr pcrfonenj« rebcn gcjimpt/ gebtawcbe werben foUen.
§San ^ 3Eltc§ ccr fernen f^abe krtecgen \m^
^cm watl^er 6cf(ac(c etidic^ Jöpcmlicgof
fljPrtjf ^«trtbeylt wirbet/foll ber Xicbtcr an t>m oiten ba ^cvf.
^ _^ eö gewonbeye / feinen ffabe jerbiecben / vnr)i> bm armen
bcmnacbricbterbenelben/vnnbbeifeinemeybegebicten/biege^ebert
«ttbevl etetrewlicb jönoln^ieben / bamit vom <jertcbt aitffftebn vnb
^arobbalten/ bamit bernacbricbterbiegefptocbenv;tbcyl/mtt3W/>
««rgewarfam 'onb ficbcrbey t volniicbw mnge.
@e6 m^if^m |Vte{> außtouffett.
«Cem fo 5er Q?ltc§(cr nacg 5er en5c t)ufcej)t feitt ^,j,.
JSff ob gebjocben b^t / befoleicben ancb fo ber nacbmbter bcn ar//
SSiaiijf bic ricbtflattbwngt/foUberXtcbterolfentltcban^ruff^^
ober verfünben lalfcit / vnb vo» ber cberfey t w^cn bei letb tmb gwc
»» •
fCVUJ-
5«?
^cm wati hm hct nacgnegccr frcigco6crrc(fc
_ 'geweht bÄbe/fo foU bct: fclbig Xicbtcr vn^vtttM) 4uff 6ife mey
niing antxcnntn i &o 6a gerieft b^fl wtc v;tb<yl vn^ r«cbt3<b<»
biic/T' l^j^ (cb c<) t>Abct blctbcit*
cm to)urö atct 5ctr f^acfc mtc tncM
vti6 recbt leMg crf cnt/mtt vom ma$ bM scfd)thc vnb hie
rjtbcy l Ätt^ergcn würft / 6cm folt wie ticb gebart attcksc»
folgt vnJ> nacbgeganejen xottbrn/ 3lber 6ed abtragd balb/ fo 6er le//
6tgerHant4ld H4ger beger» wiir6 / foUea 6tetbeyUU64ajaettclt/>t
cbettt bargerucbem rccbtea für 6rt6 gericbtwtc kicUQi<>auonnnstff
jcygt Vft6 gcmelt tll/gebAltea werben*
5?0n wrtocturffctcscn mnum gmdic§m
fragen fo votgericbc befcbcbcn*
Ccm ttacg ^cm aucgctn wgcjeiattaeif?
64|bi^beraaetlicben peinlicben gericbtea / vtfaber//
[»ttmgcr fr4g vmi6 4a6ioganggebj4t!cbt/6te 5a Per//
r V •• "^*^^»T4raog 6er w4rberto6eirgerecbtigfeyr not fett»
|on6er alley w 640 recbt »erlengem vn6 verbin6ern / folcbe vn6 an0
6er< vn^tmUcbe mi^bteacb/fo 64« recbt on not verjiebe 06er verbtn//
6ettt/o6er6telewi:gef?m/ wollen wir 4ttcb biemit 4n(fgeb4beit
vn6 4bgetD4nbabeft/Tn6 wo 4n 6ieoberfeytgel4ngt/64g64rwi//
Ton leiV
5^§mtfc§crt2ia(i0jWrt(tcg5m*c§(^ xxii
^m (a6(trafferi bic nit Jörn tobt otKt Jö cö)tga^
gefcngf nttßgefptocbett wer6ert / vn6 vo»
amfte wegen befcbeben.
^m ft)tc jtmff an (et6 o5cr #ern6tctttc ^,
jtttn to6t ober ewiger gefengf na^ fdn 1 vnn6 offendicber
__ cb4tt b4lb von 4mi>t0 wegen gcfcbeben/ 6arcb 6en Xicb
ter erf 4nt mögen wer6en/64aon wirt 6ie fo:m 6ed vttbeyU bctn4cb
in 6cm ban6crtilen vxv fccbd va6 nennQigften 4rtic0el fan6en 4nf4
ben6t/3tem fo eyn pcrfon ;c»
1p0tt tctcicm t>n^ t)emattm/nacO ^^
Verartbcylang»
^cm nac^ ^cr wurt^cpdmg&ceatmctt «j.
$am to6t/ToU m4n jn 4n6erwey6e beichten l4(fen/4«cb
jumwenigffeneynen |>«eff er 06er jwen 4m4a(5fiiren/
^■^^^ 06er 4a^(cbley (f en bei ^m fein / 6ie jn 5a 6cr lieb gottcö /
irecbtemgUaben vn6 vertr4wen ja (ßott Vtt6 6em ver6icn(l Cb«f^t
vnferö ratgm4cberd/4acb $a berewang feiner fän6 vermane/ 00«»«
m4g ]tn 4acb in 6em füren für gcrtcbc vn6 4ußf ären sam to6t ffct//
tige eyn Crucifiy f ärtr4gen»
$a Ungnen nie weifen follät«
Ccm ^tc 6ac§ai4(ccr ^cr utclc^cccer/fol^
len fte nie weifen /W4ö fte mit 6er w4rbeit/4afF ftcbfelbd
06er 4n6er i>erfon/bePettt b4be/wi6er 56 Ungnen/ W4n
^^^ menmntgejimpt / 6ert äbcltbettern / fre bo^bey t wt6er
«entevnettrttttt Vnn6 frommen leatenja n4cbtbeyl/ mit i>nw4rbeyt
be6eclen/ t>n6 weither Übel ff ercPen 5a belff ert / wie 4m eyn vn6 6mf//
rtgjfen4rttcN4nf4bcnt/ 3f<mfoeytt äbetWttn6ttcrmtgtbetter;c,
iml6i»ns befcbicbt« ^ ••
atf«
90» •<
etn|.
^(xAi U^ fun|f(
€^ mu^i mt matf tt#
pan(tc§ftra|f(
fcbtibenttcbtcn ti«cl?/J)tti^cI) cyn vcrbairMwngbad le<^
bm verwürcfc bÄt / fdU man mtcb gwtfct awonbm/
^^ ober nacb otbriung c^md gfiecn wcbtutrjrcndigrn «»^
dbKrd/fogdcömbcvcvnb cr^crrtuß ^«fffbcltbatf ctrmeffcnfan/bfe
fo;m vn5 wct^dctr fclbcn t^bmiicr baltm vttb vjtb<rlcn . 3lbce tnrt
fclUn e>4r«mb(o6ctr bctrfclbcrt gletcbm) tiefer .l^^fciHicb fccbc nie fc//
^mobcrjttUflm/jcmanbtsilm tobten ffmflPmy babm wir inn bifcir
vnfcr rn«6 6w Tleicbö ot^nung anlb %ntrlc^ rptt(!rÄff gtfcBct/
Aber tnn etlicbcn mi^tb<itten / laffen bie «cbt peinlich (Tr<t(f am leib /
ober «libernjw/bamit t>annocbt öieseflr^fftcn bei J)cm leben bletbcre
=0« felben fJraflp wafl man awcb crFcnnen vnb gcb;aucbe» / nacbgi*
ttr gewonbert er n# jeben lande /ober ilber nacb ermefliinff eyne jeb«
gßten vcrUenJigeti ricbterd / aUoben von tobten sefcbubenftebt/
"TPan vnfer 2l«Tferlicb recbt/etUcb pcinllcb (Iraff fe^en / bie wacb «
lesenbeye bifcrjricvnb Unb vnbe^uem / vnb eym» rbeyU «acbbem
jjttcblrabett mt wol mö^licb swscbmncbc» rocren/ bar^u aiicb bte fei
bcn recbt bie fotm vnb mag / cr»cr ie^UcbeH peinlicben ffraff nie cni^
ievgen / fonberaucb guter «rewonbeyt ober erFantnwß verff enbige»
•Siebter bcitelben/rnb iii ber fiiben wilf örs (e^en/bte ffraff nacb «!<"
legenbeyt vnb ergemu^ 6er übeltbatt/anß lieb bergerecbtigPeyt/v»
vmbgemeynee nuQ willenjö otbnen rnb %\\ macben. aber fonbcr//
lieb mju tnercFcn / mn xom facben ( ober ber felben gleicben ) vnfer
2{.eyfeiltcb recbt/feynerley pcinlicber flraff <^m leben/eb:cn/leib obe«
öUberti fcQen/obcr terbcngen / bag "Kicbter xn^ vttbeylet borwibcr
rtttcbnientantMtm tobt ober rcm(lpeinlicb(lra|fen. y>nh bamic
jtcbtervnxntbcrlerbiefolcberrecbtennitgelertliin/mitereantnug
folcber (traflF befJoweniger wtbcr btegemelten recbten / ober «nte^u//
Uflkgewonbevmftbmtbel»/ fo wirt bemacb vonn etlicbcn »ei«//
Itcben ffraffcn/wan vnnb xoxt ^xt «ebacbten recbtgwtcraewonbcy tA
*»n^ v<rn»nff c nrtcb s«rcb<bm foUm/gcfaQt.
^w wtmamcn pct'n(rc§m fcffm
vnnb (?r^ffm*
JlRÖH f<W>
^Jmtfcgctt 9fjac§0pctn(tc§c!m*cg(0 o^^mmöt. xxui
Ccm ferrer tf? iöucrmcrcfm/trt tvaepctn cv*
lieben feilen ober verFlagungen / ^k peinlicben (Graffiti
hi^vx nacbttolgenben articFeln nit gefegt ober gnugfam
^»^ erf lert ober verflenbig wer/ follen Tiicbter >bx\^ vtr bey//
ler (fo ed ju fcbtilben 0ompt)rabtd pflegen /wie xnn folcben ^ilfelligen
dber vnttcrflcnbtlicben fellen/vnfem2^eyferltcben recbten /t>nb ^i^v;
xn\tt Qxhxxwn^Mti gemelTigffen geb^nbeltvnnb genrtbcvlt werbe«
foU/vnb algban |re erFantnwg bftrnacb tbßn/'HJan nitalle $ufcUig<
cr^antnng tn\> (Ira jf ifrbifer vrtfcr oibnunggnitgfam m$gen bcbo/^
cb( "^n^ befcbuben werben»
^tc (Bo(cgf%ercr of^cr cjoccßlcpcrurtcj
geflraflpe werben follen*
Ccm fo Carter (Boec Jumtft/ ^dö ^oct ttte cw«
bequem i(l/o6er mxt{6x\m woteengott/ bad jm^ufTebc
abfcbncibet/bcr almecbtigFeytgotted/ {6x\. bcyligemßc
^.^^ ter bic inngFfraw COMx<^, fcbenbee/follen burcb bic atn
ptlent ober "Xicbter von amptd wegen angenommen/eingelegt vnb
^arnmb an leib/leben ober glibern /nacb gelegcnbeyt txv^ gejialebcr
perfon y>n^ leflerttng gcff r<\lf t werben ♦ iDocb fo tiXi folcber lefJerer
angenommen x>xxh eingelegt x^l^M foU Mi ^xt ober^ey t mitnottürjf
tiger vnberricbtung aller vmb(lcnbegclangen/bie barauflp Tlicbece
vnnb v;tbeylern befcbcy begeben/ wie folcbe leflerungbcitgcmcyneit
vnfern ;K.eyfct lieben webten ^tmi^lx>nti^ fonberlicb nach inbalt be//
fonbcrer articFeln vnfer Tlcicb« otbnwnggeff rafft werb<f» follen*
craff ()er j^mm fo c^nm gclmett cp{)( t>ot
"Siebter vnb geriebe meyneybig fcbwcrn»
gelcrten meyneybt fcbwert/fo ber felb eybtseitlicb gut <mi
trifft/ ^M inn bed/ b^r alfo feifcblicb g«fcb wotn b<«t/«uij
kommen/ ber i(^ jnuoiber jl fcbiUbig/ wo er Xxie, vermag/fokb fdfcb//
Ucb Ab bcfcbwo?» guc J>em verlebten wibcr 5» f«««/ fol^ <»"<^b «^^»^i»»
;J£ iij
vcrUttmbc vn^ allctr (ht<n eitefmc fein/ *t>n6 nach 5em im hiylism
Tlcicb eyngcmcynctrgcbtaucb t(t / fölchm falfcb fcbwetm» ^« jwm
fitiscrbamtcfugefcbfvombiibenab^ubAwen / dtefelbtcfmdomrtt«
^CYVotiltcbcn Icibfiraff Yv^Km voiv aucb ntl:dt^<m/ IPo aber cyntr
Öutrcb fetnen falfcbeit ev^c jematib $u pctnltcber^aff ^cbwür(/^er fd
hi3 foll mit 6ctr {»«iy / bic ev felfcbUcb auff cvnm 4nb<m fcbwüresc/»
({raffe Yoet:^€n/ ll^er folcb falfcb fcbn^trcr mtctei^/ fiitfcQltd; vtt2>
nvQi^iiftisUck ^iiQu anncbtcl;/^a; UitktsUtcb peco«
* 0 •
CVtt|.
(raff t)^/fo c5cfc§»omc t)^p^c^c ()^cc§m*
^m 6«c§( cptter cpn cjcfc^tt^o^rtc t)t)>^e
mit facbcti vrtnb tb^mn / ^arumb <r vnfci; ^cy fcrltcbc»
vccht vnbbi(cvoibmtnQ nach /itttn tobton t)4ö mocbc^c
firaffc w«rbm/5rtr fdbeti tobtfiraff foU vokgcfcbcbcn. 0o aber cy//
twr <yn t>:pbcbe mit facbm öarumb er baöTcbm nitvevxoiivch b4t/
fürfcQlicb vnt> frcitcnlicb v<rbtccb/5cr foU ab eyn m<yftcy6ittcr mit
ahhaxcttns bcr banbt o{>er fin^cr v»6 anberm / reu im necbfr ob^c/
mcltm articf cl bcrürt/(jc(?raft-t werbe« / TOo mau ftcb aber weitW
tmflTctbatt vo j im befot^en miifl/ foll ee mit im^ebaltett werbe»/ als
im bwnbertm vnb fecbö vn fiben^ig articfel btrtwcb bänon gefchti
ben (lebe anfabmb/^tem fo eyner tyn Vl)^bc^< frctteulicb vuSfütfu
Qlicb vcrb;ocbm*
cij?
Scraff {)cr kvlt^^.
fcbaben ober nacbtb<y l jiifüflt/ foll man fhraflpett vom U//
ben jßm tobt / vnnb man foll folcb« (f raflp mit bcm fewei?
tbim . "XPo aber temanbt tauberer ^ebmttcbt/vnnb bumit nicmant
fcbaben getb<inb<tt/follfttn(l^(Jra(ft: werben/ nacbffcle^btfttber
jacb /barinnen bit vttberler rabtd flcbiancbm follm / wie vom robc
]ucb<n bcmacb gefcbnben (lebt*
lieber fc^tm^un^t*
^5mtfc§ett^<t<§öp<tnlt(§3m'<g(60J^ttlltts. xxiin
ii«
fcbnjf e jtt latein Übel famo^ genant/ btc er an^bwittet
x>nnb ftcb nacb otbnuns ber recbt mit feinem recbten
^^ tauff vnb ^tmamen nit vnbcrfcb«ibt / vnrecbtlicb«;
vnfcbttlbiger wei^ laffer vnb übel iftmiff / wo bU mit warbest erfni»
ben würben/ba^ ber gefcbmecbt an {cimm leib / leben ober ebtcn pcirt
lieb 5e(frafFt werben micbt/ ber felbig bogb<iff «3 UffcJ^«? foU nacb et
finbnna folcberübeltbatalö bierecbt fa^en / mitberpecn/ tn welcb«
er bcn vnfcbwlbigen gefcbmccbten bnrcb itin b^fe vnwarbaffttge U/t
fterfcbnfftbatbüngenw^Uen/sejlrafft werben/ Tnbob ftcbanch
«leicb wol bic attlfgelegt fcbmacb ber juÄemeflRn tbae in ber warbar
«rfanbc / foU biinnocb ber anßrftlf« f<>lcber fcbmacb nacb vcrm^S
ber recbc vnb «rmefliind bce ricbtcre geUrafft werben.
@(rajf t)cf muncifclfcgcr mb aucg i>cto fo on
b4ber>b freibcy t mnntim*
0?.
felfcbt/ i£r|llicbwannetncrbetrieglicbcrwci(5eyn6an//
^ ^ bemjeycbenbarattfffcbUcbt/ ^timanbernwanneyner
vnrect)t metallbar$n fc^t/^nm bnttöt/fo eyner ber münij ire rccbtc
fcbwere geuerlicb benimbt / folcbernttn^felfcber foUen nacbnoljen//
Ict mafm geff rafft werben/ Oemlicb welcbc fa fcb munt^ macben/
jeicbm obe? bit felbi^m f alfcb mnnij <»»ff w^bget o?>{»^ /«"(^ M» Heb
htitm I vnnb wibernmb geuerltcb vnb bo^baff «slicb bim necbpe»
»& nacbtbevl wiflentlicb an^gibt/ bie foUen nacb gewonbcy t ancb f«
«itntf her recbt mit btm fewer vom leben jiim tobt geflrafft werben/
SÄ S tcilfenaicb kibm/ bie felbe beufer follm fte ba mit
veJwüWt b4ben . TPelcber aber ber tnünij jre recb« fcbwere/ Qvi
uerUcber weig bmtmbtAober ancb on babenbefretbert mnngte ibtt
ISl «efenSlicb citmelest vn nacb rabt an leib ober gnt / nacb gcMt
berfacbentfeifrafft werben / ITo aber irsmternererneanberif
«tüntt vSeaet / ober wibernmb in tiegel b:ecbt vnb germ« mwn^
rSmecb? Vcr foll am leib ober gut nacb ^eff^ f ber fachen / «e^
ftrÄTrbm/ Bo aber mit ber berrfcbafft willen vnnb wifTeit
folc^gefcbcbe/fofoU bie felbifl hw^i^t {mmmt^ fretbeytvcr*
wörcf t vitb vcrlo«» b^bm» ^
€}0ii
00 •
<s»i
ß. gdrfö {W iüttf «tt t)ttt> t>C6 ^cp%m
tmjf tw j^m fo fa(f(^|i(;(je(/htcff/t«(««f/
rettet o^er Mn^bOcbctr oi>er ««siftctr macben*
vtbÄt / rmtb obei? iin^bwcbcr / ob«? «giff <r macbcn / 6te
„,^.^^B;^foUm<w Uib obct: Ubm / nacbbcm btefclfcbttttff vtl ob<r
wcnia boßbaffttS vti fcbcMicb n^fcbicbt/nacb r<i6tb«r wcbtt$<rjlm/ir
J)igcit/ot>erfttnilAld jucnbcbtfcrotbnims vermeldet /jxmltcbsor
(vaff t>cv fa(fc§<)' mit m<»g / «»og t>«nt>
frtw(fmÄnfcb<»(ft»
w<i^/m4^/wa5/gcwicbt/fpcarcyob€r4nbcrf<ttt(fiim
fcbafft fclfcbt/ viib bic facgctrcobtscbtaucbt vnb 4»f /r
gibt / bcr foU $u pcinlicbcr (lra(f atigmommm / im t)4»
lanb vcfbottm / ober 4n feinem UibaUmic mtcn außb^wcnober
bcrglcicbcn/ nacb gcUgcnbcyt vnb gcff Alt bet übcrf Atuttg/ ttcflraffc
tvctbm/ vimb cd mocbt folcbcr falfcb aU offtgt^f^licb vitb b«j»bÄfr"
tiggcfcbcbm /brtjjbcr tb4ttcr 5i5m tobtgcffrafft wctbcn foU / äIU*
nacb mbt wies» wbc bifct vufct oibnutig vctmclbec.
• #* •
C2?ut|
iicbvnbctmdtcPttng/wTnttnS/mal/obct;
mrtrcf(f<y» vctrucfcn.
- ,^ <y» viibcrmrttcFttng/tey ttttttg/ mal ober matc^f^ern vctritcpe
Abb4tt>ct/ abtbut/ obctr vermbctt/ bct foll bavumb pdnltcb 4m letb
nacbgmctlicbcrt cfto^g((l4lt vttnbgeUgenbcyc bcr focbc» vnb b<r
perfon / nacbmbtgciiraliptwetbcti.
(b<]^l gcif etrltcbet f tirfeQlicbct w<i^ bm Yvibei:
cb^TUn^i^ B^^ bAnbcltt*
S^SmtfcgcttSf^acß^panlicg^ert^^^ xxv
liebet wei^ feiner j>4rtb^ / i" burgerlicbcn ober j>cinlicbcn
f4cben$un4cbtbeTl / vB ^tm wtbertbevl|w afit b4nbelte/
^n^ folcbcr iibeltb4tt überwunben wiirb / ber foU jttuotbetfl feinent
:tbeyl/n4cb4llem vermögen feiiien fcbttben foerfolcber facben balb
'«ntpfecbt / TOtbetlegen / vnnb b4rjit inn pjanger ober b4lMf<n ge//
l^elt/mitrilten 4U^geb4wen/ bed Unbö verbotten / obet; fttn({tt4cb
0<l<Scnbeic ber mißbi^nbltit^ tu anbere we^geflralft tvcrbm*
(raff 6rt t)nfcufc§/f0 tw^cr H
ti4tttrbe(cbtcb&
_^'m4n/weib mit weib / vnPeufcb treiben/ bit boten aiicb b46 leb«
VerwürcFt / vnb m4n foll fte ber gemeinen gcTPonb^KnAcb tnii^im
ferne vomleben^^um tobt ricbcctt*
craff t)cr t>itf^ttfc§ mtc na^mk gc^
ftpten freunben.
^T'^ r;cm fö cpftcr wfmfcg mtc feiner fneffc
ter / mit^dwi^ (und ebeweib / ober mit fetner jfieffmtttter
^^.«^ treibt/in folcbcn vn nocb nebern fipfcb4Jften foll W (Irajf
wie b4tion iit vnfern vo:f4m ^nni> vnfäm Äey ferlicbcn gefcbnbei»
reebtMtS«fct5C /gebmncbt / vnnb bcrbolb bei bm vu\)tnif^mHs^
t!<ä>fe gepflegt werben»
(raff {)er jf)mm fo e^tt)ci6tr
f r^tven entf ütreit*
^cm fo epncr jemantx fan c^db ober epn w^ ^^^^''
. nerlenmbte jttn^f fr4 wen wiber bee ebem4nd ober bed ebelicben
vottere wilü»/ cyner vnebtlicbcn wei^ entpf»ret / barumb mag ber
«bciiiÄ» ober VÄttcr y vimngefebm obbtc«b<(^<»w^J>«f jwngrfrÄW«
hm willen batiu Qtht/ptinUch l^iaQm/ifinb foU ^er tbetmr/ nach (a^
un^ vnfcr votfavtt/ vn^ vnrctr^cyrcrlichm vecbc ^4rttmb se({r4fi^
VftO ^erb^lb bei i>eltrccb(ttctr(]Nn^j;Scttm^c0: sebmucbrwetrOot«
cjtj?-
C?2?'
craff {)cr ttoccJttc§(.
^cm fo jcman^c cpnor wudcitmkcrt
cbcfrawen/ wieweit obcv jiwglfmwett/mit^ewaft v»
wiSct: ireit willen/ jriwttgHftrcwlicbpJXt? frewUcb «b*
mme / ^er fclbi* iibelcbettctrbAt ^a0 leben venwövcFt/
vnb foll anff bef lagiin^öccbenottigtcft in anljf ürting 5etr mi^tb^t/'
eyncm rawber gleich mit bem fcbtt>etrc vom leben ^umtobtßmcht
xcev^m ► Öoltcb abeireyner folcbö obgemeltö mißb4n^cb fcenelt//
cber vnb «jcwalciger weif? / gegen ey ncr vnif erleumbtcn frawen o^e^r
inngPfmwen vn^erfliin^c / vnnb ficb ^ie fraw obetr inngf fraw fei»
(trweette /o^et; von folcber befcbwernnß funff etrretb voävb/bct felbig
tibelcbetrer foll auflp bcf lagwng i>etr benottigten/ inn an^fiivung betr
tnißbanMnng / nacbgcle<tenbevt vi»ge(falt6er perfonen vnt> vnbetr
(fanden mi(fecb4t gefltraffc wet:^en / vnt> foUenbarinricbter vnnb»
V;f:beylet; r^^t^ gebmucben wieuo; in anbern feilen tnergefeQC i^*
^ 'btncbd willen/ben et mit (iimm ebeweib verbtacbt bAt/)>einlicH
beklagt vnb be6 übetrwinbet/6er felbig ebeb^ecber fami^t bet ebeb:ecb
ivin follen tmcb fagc vnfet; vo;f4m / vnb vnfev ^cyfcrlicbcn recbtei»
ge({r<i(ft werben*
l'^Tem ^<t$ c6 auch gletcbetwet^ in htm fall / fo evn cbeweib f rett
mann/ober 6i< perfon/ 2>amit6er cbeb$ucb volnbiAcbtbctc/bC'v
Flogen will/gebaltcn werben foU.
t\)t gefcbtcbc*
"Jttm fo
§>lM(&tt 5^cic§6 panlt(6 ^m^w o^?^mrrw[.
XXVI
eyn ebeweib eyn 4n^ern m4n / inn gcdalt bet; bey ligen ebe
^ bei leben Sed etficn ebegefellen nimbt/ welcbe übelcb4C 64n
Ättcb ey n ebebmcb vnb gtr^flTer ban bM felb^ U(ler ifl / vn6 wie wol
tit Aey fetlicbcn recbt / 4«ff folcb übeltb4t tey n flmff 4m leben UtiC
€)o wollen wir 6ocb weichet» folcbe kdetd betruglicbet wei^ / mit
xoiif^in vnb willm v:f4cb gibt vnnb volnbnngt/ ba^ bie nit weuiget
t4n bk ebeb;iicbigen jjeinlicb geff r4ff t wetbcn follen.
@(raff t>cr j^cncn fo }xc cfietocikr ^h^xMct
bnrcb b^fcd genieß willen williglicb 5w vnte»//
fcben weichen vetrp4tt|f en.
vmb eynicbetlev Qcnk^ willen /wie bet n4men bett/ willig//
__ lieb $tt vnebtUcben vnl?cufcben vnb fcbenbtlicben wercPen
geb;4ucben lejl/bet; iff ebfloß/ vnb foll n4cb vennogegemcy net recb^
cen geffmfft votvbm^
inm ebeb;»cb.
5ilc^ i>m Jörn t)ic^ermal/ ^tc t>nucr|tm^ crs«!*
bigcn weibßbilbe / vnb %nuot bie vnfcbnlbigen mey b//
.lein / bit fnnjl vniierlcnmbt ebtUcb perfon fein / bntcb
- vr » Ta etliche b$femenfcben/m4fivnbweiber/b$fei;betwg//
Hebet? xoä$/bamitin jt inng^frewlicb obet frewlicb ebt cmnommmf
»6 fiinbclichen fleyfcblicbett wercf en gebogen wetben/bie felbtge bop//
feafftigen f nplet vnb Püj>leritt/4ncb bit jbenen fo wiflentlicbetgenet;
lieber vnb bo^b4flFtiget; wei^ jrc bewfer b4r5n leiben/ ober folcbe intt
Irmbewfem jubefcheben ge(l4tten / follen n4cbgelegenbeytb er ver//
l)4nbUmg vnnb vabt ber recbtnerflenbigen / eö fet mit verwetfnng
^cel4nbtß/ (fellnng innbmnger/ 4bfcbnetbttngbero«n/ober4Wp//
|?4W vmg mit tttctm/obcr 4nbcrm ge(fr4frc werben»
•»» »
c^j^mi
^m Md^^mü b^H^af^ä^ct mtamp
mi^b^ttbclc/ foll bcvstxoonhcyt nach/ bttrcb vtcrcb^V**
[ünQ^ümco^tQcilvaffcxocvbc/lCOctceabevcpnvetihsi
hiibe/bic folt m4it tttvcnchn/ vn^ wo folcb« vcrrctcrey
j^odcn fcbabm obci? er^crnu^ b:tngmm^ct>c/aUfo2>t<cynUnbcf
ftatt/fcinm cpgen hctvn /htttsnoffcn / o^cv nahttQtfipttn frcimbt bt
twffc/foitt4ai>ic(fr4ff 6urcb rcblcrff<Doi>cr54ngciirciffcn /gcti««/
vnnb alfo^u cot>tUcbct f^traff ^cfü&c werben / ii^d mocbt auch ^i^
vtttcutey alfo j^efFalt fcitt / man tn^cbc cfnm folcbcn mt^tbcttcr er^
Ucb H^pffm vriö iJÄttwcb vtcrtbcyler^/^4ß rtcbtci; vB rjtbcTi«*^ "<»c^
gelegen bevtbevtb^ttctmcffm v^^c^rfcHnen / vnnb wo (i«5wciflpcln;
r4tb fucbm follw/ 3lbcr 6tc jbencn/burcb wclcbct: vorrunötfcbaff//
tttngricbtcrobcrobcrFcytbicübcltbcttcrjwgcbiirmbcr (frafp b««t*
9?5V.
(raff {>ar ^Kuno**
Uti mit &cn> fewct; )^om leben^üm to^e^erkbc wcr2>a»«
crajf t)cr rauf)cr*
^ zy t^<«»bet/foltnÄcbvmno5ct)iif«?votf<im/vnn5vnfctrdr
^6(Jf^ flwwyitct: Äerfcrlicbm trccbtcn / mit e><mfcbwctr5tol>a^
wü «n jedem ojt m J)ir<m feilen mttflwter sewcnb^yc^ctf ^mmöi i#/
pocb 4m Icben^ef^rAfc werben*
3tet»(«
gi6mir<^tt5^a(i0paWicgjöm'c§wo^^^^
XXVII
2:cm fo cptto* me|)m (att^/ftaec/oBcrfcpt/
obctr^epiet ge»ecltcbc futrfeQlicbe vni> bo^b^fftifle Äwflp//
^ r&tren t>ee 0emey nen volcfd widev die oberFcyt macbt:/ vii
daö alfo attflPin etf unden wiirde/betr foll nacb gro^ vn^ gcleacttbey t
fetttetrmi^b^ittMimg je ju jeittertmitÄbfcbUbttngreitidbÄttpwse//
(Iraffc ob«? mit rßtten gcfbricben/ vnb 4«^ dem Unb /gcgendt/ geri//
cbt/(i4W/fUcf en oder gepiet/darinnen er ^k auffrwtren erweckt/ vcr//
wei(i werdm/d4rtti'Kicbter vnd vttbeyler gebiirltcbd r4dte/d4mie
ntem4ndtd vnrecbt gefcbeb« / vnd folcb b^ßlicb «mb^wng verbüc/
l>fiegen folletf »
«raff {>cf %txm fo (>0f|(t(§ außtmtm.
mätwtlUge perfon/dte leur wider recbt xv^n^ bilUcbey c
betroben/entweicbert "Xfnb Ätt^trctten/ xnb ftcb 4nend
vttd 5u folcben Icitten tbftn / ha inut willige bcfcbcdigcr
cntb4lc/ biiff / fiirf cbnb vnnd beiff 4ndt fmhmi von denen b\t lent je
jwjcittcn wider rccbtvtmd billicbeye mergflicbbefcbed igt werden/
AWcbfAt^bc vnd befcbedigtmg von den fclbcn leicbtfertigen i^erfonett
W4rten mülfen / die 4«cb merm4U bxt letit / dnrcb folcbc b wbe tnix^
f o:cbt wider recbt \>nnb bilUcbey t tringen / 4ucb an glcicb "tv^^ recbc
ftcb nit Uffert benügcn/derbalb folcbe für recbt Unb^ winger gebÄlte
werden foUm . t^iernmb wo die felben 4n verdecbtUcbe mh /4U ob//
ffebt 4tt^tretten/dte lent bei jimlicbem recbten y>nh billicbcyt nit Wut
ben Uifen/fonder mit bemeltem 4tt^tretten/ von bvM> recbtei» x>nh bil
licbevt $« bed joben oder fcb«cf en vnderff ebn / die felben wo f« w ^cii
f engl n»0 fernen / mit btM fcb wert 4ld Und^winger vom leben j»«»
todt geriebt werde/ vn4ngefeben/ob fte funff nit rtnderfl mit der tb4C
<reb4ndelt bitten . ÜDefeleicben foll eö aucb gebalten werden gege»
Sen ibenen/ die ftcb ftmd durcb etlicb wercf mit der tbatt 51» bandeltt
vnderfiebtt. T^o aber jemandt ang f o?cbt eynö gewaltd / "o^^^^^
ter m^wm^ gemeynt vom recbten^n hm9,m^ I an vntterdecbtlicb
«nde entwicb/der bat dardurcb dife vojgemeltc (lr4f nit verwörcTt/
vnd ob darin eynicberleviweifeleinftel/follvmb weitbervnderrtcb^
tung axi die rccbt:tt«r(?cndig<tt oder fiinff / wie bcmrtcb S«m<lt wtrde«
gelangen. ^
IS« ^tk ix$ lünfjtm mt> Ik$ ^^tic^m
btlUcb^yt mutwtlUjlicb bcvbebet / 6m rtchKcmatt mir
6cm fcbwcrc vom Ubm jumcobi: / 2)od) ob cyttei; feiner
vb<i>< b<tlj> vonn vtmß ober vttfem nacb^ommen «m?
Tleicb Tlomtjcbeft Äerfem ober Äinigeti etrUubnu^
bett/ober ber/be« er alfo bevbcbct/f««/ feiner geftpte/ freunbcfcbafff
ober berrfcbÄfft / ober ber jren feitibe tver/o6er fun^^tr folcber vbebe
rccbrnteHi^dcbtun^m vtfacb bete / fo foll er auff fein att|füruna ber
felben^ucm vtfacben / peinlicb ntC5c({raffc tverben . Jnn fofcben
fdlen t>nb ^weiff ein foll bei htf^ recbcuerl^enbi^en tmb an vn^vx vn2>
o;ten / Yoiesu enb bifer t>nfer o;bniin0 Angcscy^t / rtibc^ geb^auc^r
ipcrben«
tb4«:er«
!JS:r(i(tc§ t)on (tmff ^/^te mt( gtfe o^or
vcnen ^eymlicb vergeben*
<!?!?5
♦ >
^cm tw jcmatt&c&ttrc6 ötfit o&er t)enert/
An leib ober leben befcbebigt/ift ed cyn mann^bilb/ber folt
cynem ftir^f4Qcen m^tber £[Utcb mit bemracb^nm tobe
gefirafft werbe/ "tTbep aber e^n folcbe mietbar er nweibßbilb/bte foll
manerbmt^m/ober in 4nberetve9n4cbd<l<9<nbeit vom leben .u^m
robc ricbten * ^ocb in merer f otcbc Mieten /Jollen folcb boßbAfftigt
mi^betti^e perfonen/ vot ber endicben cobcfirAff ^efcbleyfft ober et//
ltcb<5t^ff inn jre leib nwt^viitxihtn%wiiQm ^e^eben werben / t>il ober
wmis/n4cb ermeiftin^ ber perfon vnb t^rnng/ wie vom mo;b( bep
l^alb sefeQt \%
ÖtTAlfb«
alibm«^ empfangen bett:/b<T»wlicber boßb^ffciger wil
liger wei^ ercibcec / "^vt werben getvonlicb lebenbta bcü'
^ graben vnnbgepfelc/ ^Slber barinnm vcr^weiff elung
%\\}Mx\)ViVcml vx^^m bte fclben übelcb^tcerin inn welcbem geriebe ^it
beoin^mlicberc beö waffer« bar$» vo:banbm i(t / ertrencFc werben*
"tPo aber folcbe übel offc gefcbebe/ wollen wir bte gemeltege wonbey C
bcd vergrabend vnnb pfelend / vmb mer foicbr willen / folcber bo^//
baffeigen weiber atf cb ^nlaffen /ober aber Xkx^ vo: bem erb:cnc^en Vvt
&belcb4cterin mit glüenbe» iiM\^m gertffcn vt^erbc / alle« nacb rabc
iber recbmcrf^enbJgcn*
t> aber «Trt weibpbilb/aU obflebteTnlebenbigglibmefllg \\n^
- *tein/baö nacbmalö tobt erf nnbm/ beymlicb gebom xnn^ ver//
botgcn bete / vnnb fo ^vi felbigerfunbigtemßtterbe^balb befptacbe
würb/ enefcbwlbigwnge wci^ fürgcben / aU bergleicben je jusetctcn/
an vnn^ gelange / wie "^ci,^ ^in^tXim on \t fcbulb eobe von fr gebom
fein fole / wole fteban folcb fr vnfcbulbe burcb reblicbgne v:facbcn/
x>n^ vmbflenbc bnrcb Piinbefcbaff t an^fftm / ^amit foll ee gebalten
•x>x\^ gebanbele werben / wie Mny>vix^nh ftbenijigffen articrel anfa//
benb /3tem fo eyn beKogeer f »nbefcbaff c :c. f unben wire/ancb be^//
balb 51» weitber fttcbwng/anQeygwng^efcbicbe/waiion obbeflimpee
önngfame bewcifnng iff berangeregecvermeyntenenefcbnlbigung
nie 5» glauben /fnnfl m^cbt ftcb V9^ S^^t. eb4eterin rnxt ey ncm fo leben
ctcbicbeen fürgeben lebigen. iDocb fo eyn weib^bilb eyn lebcnbi^
Subemefitg ftnbelein alfo bcymlicb erege/ancb tnxt willen allern/vn
on i>ilff anberer weibergebiire/ welcbe on bilfflicbegcbttre/mie wbe//
ober nacb ber gebitrc fcbwl^iff wirt / iregeubce leicbewcretgreyc ver//
bo:gm jnbaleen. SDammb wann eyn folcbe m^x^cnn anff g</'
bacbeer irer angemafJen vnbtweiflen frenenlicben enefcbrnbigung
bejlebnbleibettwolc/fo foll man fte anff obgemelee gmigfame mhi
ccygnng bc^mpte vncbwflUcbw v»«6 vnmenfcblttb<n<rr»nbert
ubeU vitb YWi^^i^ b<*lber / mit pcthlicber cwilllicbcr frag 5» bePantv
ju attUchtt tobtflmlf / aU obp^ebc ritbevlm. iDocb wo cyn^ folcb«
wctbd fcbult) oi>ctr vnfcbuli) b<»lb ativoeifftit würb/fb foUen 6i< Tlicb
rar vnö vitbcy Icr / mit an^iysunQ aiitt vmbf!m^( b« ^cn recbmcr«
f^m^i^en oi>erfwnfl wk bf w<icb£r«tt<U wir^ct/mt^cd i>^d<n*
*^?J?y^^
Abbmm<n/tn fcrltcbert von jnm Usen/bic alfa
Sefun^m vttb crnert wer2>m<
• ♦
Cem fo cpn tt)ct6 jrc fiinb/vmb bci$ fic Jce
abFuiri von jr Itgt/ vnb b<i6 Kn^ wirtftinbm vno emctt
_ t>ic fclbt^ mitmv foU / wo f« 6eö öberwttn^en vni> bcd:ec//
tcn Wirt / nacb gcUgmbcy t bcr facb vnni> ra5t der vcr(f mdigcn «e</
llrafft wcrbm/ ötürb aber bae \^int> von folcbcm binicgm / fo U>tl
in^n bi< muttcr / ttrtcb ScU^wbcyt deöscwcrltcbc» bwlcÄWö Äin leib
oder üben (Iraffen.
«* I
fifSS»!
(raff tw i^m fo fcgttjatigem MbMbm
fini>er abcreiben»
$wan3 / eflen ober t>jincfen / eyn Uben%Pinbt abtreibt/
«L r^ r ?^ ^^^^^ !"/*"ü*'^ weibvnfVttCbtbÄrmacbt/fo folcb
ttbcl f ttrfeQltcbct vnhb hom<tfäsae wei^ befcbicbt/ foU der man mie
^em fcb werc/alö «ytt tobefcbw^er / vnnd bie fraw fo fte ee ancb an ii;
felbö tbettt / emertcPtober (un^iüm tobt geffraffi werben . 60
«ber eyn f inb / bad rtocb nit Ubenbig wer / von tyntm weibßbtlb <te//
mbeti wütbe /follmbt« vttbeyler ber ffraff balber bei btn recbtner//
irenbise» obct? fiinjl wie j» cnb btfer o^bnun^flemelt / vabu pfegem
©cw(f fo 9tt arcje t^urcg fa« ar(K«^'
tobtet*
3«mfÄ
55$mif(§mS^ac§0pan(tc^ömciwo^^niin£. xxix
„^'vnnb bocb vnfurfeQlicb femanbt rtitt feiner ar^enei tobtet / er//
f wnbt ficb i^Mt bnrcb bit gelerten x>nb verff enbigen ber avt^md /ba^
«r^ieocQenet letcbtfertiäHcb vn verw^genltcb mi^btaucbt / ober ftcb
vn^egrünbeer vnjnleflfeer 4rQenei / biejmnitgesimbcbat vnber//
(lanben/ vnb bamittyntm^utn tobt vtfacb ffeben / ber foU nach g«//
fJalt vnb gel^enbey t ber facben vnb nach rabt ber ver(?enbigen /ge//
(Irofft werbe / vnb in bifem fall allermeyfl acbtunggebabt werbe»/
anff leicbtnertigetettt/ bit ftcb 4rQenei vnbcrffcbn/ vnb ber mit fcya
fiemdrunbtaelemet baben.t^ett aber eyn art^t folcb tibtnng willig
4icb getban/|o wer er aU eyn förfeelicber m$;ber jö (?ra|f en.
@crajf95tter(^(Utt2.
erfo:bert ober b»atbt würbe/ von facben xoesm/(o er ber
übetwunben {an leib vnb gut verwitrtFt bett/ vnb au^
fotcbtfoliDber verfcbttibter (?raff ftcb felbd ert^bt/ bcd er
ben folle» in bi(em fall feine gute nit vebig ober empfengf licby fon//
J>er folcb erb vnb gittter ber oberPeit ber bie peinlicben (Iraff /bn^/ vü
f<tt jilff eb«/ber mgefalle f«n. Tl^o ftcb aber ey n ^erfon anffcrbalb
obgemeber offenbaren vjfacben ancb inn feilen ba er (an leib allcy n
yerwtrc^t/ ober fnnjf an^ franclbey ten bee leibö melancolei/ gebte//
cblicbey t i'rer fm ober anber bergleicbe bl^b wPey ten fclbfl tobtet / ber
felben erben follen begb<»lbanirererbfcbafft nit Vcrbinbert werben/
tmnb barwiber leyn alter gebwucb / gewonbeyt ober mms ftatt
l)aben/fonber biemit renoärt/ cafltrt vnb abgetban fein/ vnb in bia
(imvnbanbtm berglocbe» feile»/ vnfer Äey ferlicb gefcb;iben recbt
^el^aUm werben*
jemanbt ottUibt»
l «(
ß^ ^(Xtl$ b($ Wri jfcctt t)n^ k$ ^Ugm
^^^i'
^ctnß4t cpttcrcpn t^ktMe iul^bcmap
_ fcb4^m tbßn mocbc / foU 6cr hmrbe^ fdben cbtcrs folcb
tbkr von tm cbtlrt/^4nn>o (okhthuteiananbtfchabm thtctobet mt
Idbt/ Soll bei: b«Ti)etftbwi^* ^(ttMnbtutchs^leQtnhtytvnbsdEtiih:
bor f<tcbctt vn2> r4be6<ir»cbcttarffettdt^c / obcratt enben 4(0 bcrtt4c^
vmnctbftscihafftvia^m . Ttti^ foutt dcf&trttttrfo er^nctot vo»
bcm Xtcbcet? ober 4n^(trobct;0(i^cbe0$ütto» vcrnMtibcober ^W4tr»
(raff t^or m$t^er mb to^cfcf^cr ^tc fcp« gnßg
(am (nrfcbulbi^tttts b4bm m^<3en*
«ifJ^ifVif^
wo <t?bcgb4lb tticmbtmeOta mt(chu\bismts au^füve
^4tf /b4t 2>4d Icbm vertvnrcFc . 3lbcr n4cb gcwonbcr t
— etlkhcvscscnt / wctrbeti btc farfeislicbcn mU^cte vnb bie
tobtUhUsctcynanbttskkhmitbem vabtsmcht/bavinnm foU v»
i>ct:rcbeybt3<b4ltm.wcrbcn/TnbAiro54^bargcwottb<li^«4cb/evi»
fürfcftltcbcr mutwiUt^cr mkbevtnkbtmvabtrvnnbepnanbttbcif
tvntobt(d:){<i3f<>b(Kau^3(chcytvniötnst^an/vnb(ttn(iawhs«f^
matccMJchttitnsuns nit hatf mit bcm&>xoctt vom khen^mtobt
S€Vtvaftc wc^e follcn/ t>nb man moQ iii füt^^efcQttmmoibc / fo bw
jinbobm crefjpltcbeti pet(önmbc& tbectet^ cygw berm/^tvifcbm ebc/»
Ictttcii ob(t nahend 3<(iptm fwunb« ttcfcbtcbt/ bwrcb ctUcb Uib(f r4flP
4l<nt«c i4n3cn wiffctittobctf 4»grcbreTfftttt<f vojb« cttdtcbenc^b/»
w»3 vmb at^ffcr fotcbt willen bk ^ftmam.
V)r4cb<ttaercb<bm/(b tnt(chuibitmnsbaf
ivv^(fA»(f inen (r4£ten»
'^cetne»
S^$mtfc^n ^ac§0 pciuKcgscr tcß« c^^^nUtti-
XXX
i^cm ce gcfc§c^tt je Jö tom ent(a6un£/ ^m^^h
vnb wcl•^c bocb bie ibcncn/ fo folcb mtldbun^ tbun / 411^
<^ jMT^ jiirtnvtCachai a\» edicb rtlUyrtvottpcinlicbctrvMbbwr//
gcaicbec fimff entfcbi»lt>tcjt. TOnb b4mic ftcb 4bct: Tvicbttt vnb vt^
thcylct an bm pdnlkhcnQcüchwiibk btv webe nitscUvm bahth/tn
folcben fclUn beffcr cccbttnciTigcc 51» b<*ltm wiflc«/ Tnb 6urcb vitwif
fmbeTC 6 ic Unt nie befcb wmii ober vcrFütrQC»/ 0o tft von s^mcU
tm €n4c\)n\bi3tin wtleibuusctt gcfcbüben vnb gefaxt / wie b«r»4cl>
Jgr(t(t(g t>c^n rechter noewcor/ »tc t^t^
mtfcbttlbigt«
it^cm welcher epn rechte ttoct5)ccr / Jß mmng csjo^tj^*
cfc.Jreittd leibo vnb Ubenö tbßc/ vnnb ben fbrncn/ bcr jn 4lfo bcn^t//
j^in joUbcr notwcct entleibt / ber i(? b4rttmb nicinonte ntt imU
<Ccm fo cpncr jcinanc mtt cmmMid^^ ,^i
en W4|fcnobct;wectrabcrl«iuffc / anftcbtoberfcblccbt/vn
x^ ber ben$ttt«tH4» f Ü^Ucb 4n f ctrlicbf cy t ober verlern n<t/
Rind labö/lebenö/ebnvib gute» Uwmutönicbtentwcicbcn/betrma^
fein leib vnnb leben on 4lle mff bmch tyn richte f^enwecr retten /
^nb fo er 4iro btn ben^tiger cntletbt/er tfl b4r»mb ntcbtö fcbwlbts/
idaucb mit (iimt «egenweer/ l^iK^^rcbUgen mrbt jw w^rtm mc
fcb»lbi5/ vn4nser3}enobed gefcbfibenrecbten vnnbflcwonbeyte»
entgegen wer«
'«n« gab«««""™«» bcriimbt oi>«g*(«iKbOT »ill/»n& >«:
.»Sf 143» f« nitflcdoit-ig ili/ fo Ugt > A6 k*c it"» «b*«« «"ff /f»l«
qcUi,
ß* ^wle U^ fünf cm vt^ U$ ^U$ß
ö)t hetnmu notwtaf/ohQcmdm maffm/i^ mb(S*>^ i^ hmdftnt
I>ct9€t(l (t ^u nidjt/a Witt (d^uibiQ Qtüifdtm»
^m mb wie in facgcn ba notttw t>ie tt)d^
tn anfcchrnng o^(r bett^t^ung ^Ar4ttff / aU ob^eht/
^c nocn>eer £fe({trüttb(/b(0mdtcb ift/c^a ht^tnbiQ nie
Scr bavumh ftvn tcchu mtfc^nibistc nortfccr «fctbAti b^bcn foll/
«94» der entleibe bcc fiitrgewen^^tet bercntlicber anfecbti^tm^ o^etr bc
it^ti^tmg/recbmteflt^ v^fAcb ^b^bc/iilö «icfcbeben mUht/ 60 <y^
tier eynen vn^eufcbet: xcctc^ b^lbcn bei (änem ebelicbcn xctih/ tocbter
6^etr 4» antttn b^jen fhreffltcben übcltbatcen ftinbe / vnnii bavumb
{fecfen ^cm felben tibeltb4ti^r t^6clicb h^tn^iuns^xcansobcfS^m^
tw$ reit bte trecbc ^uUffett / fiimcm / o^et; tem cndeibten b^tc^ebürc
bm vwfiastm co^tfcbU^er / von ampte xe^m $» fahtn/ vnnb ^t<
ttorcutift afotbitc fn mit nxiffcn foUbetr^engbnu^ b^lb ^n be5:o//
l)en/^wtn^en vn n^cct^en / ba^ er «Ifo in rccbt ^nlefp^er xcä$ ctecbott
hctt lobet fo btv ^I4aetr in bifem fall cyn folcbe meyitun^ fwQw/ 64^
tetans^ioQ^ to^tTcbleaet; d4trumb Peyn recbt notxotev ^etb4n bcc/
«t>4n er bce entleibten / ole er in erfcbUgen bett/ cf4nQ mecbti^ vnnb^
von ber ben^tignn^ erlebi^t e(ewe({ / o^<r meldet 54^ ^er entleibt/
n4cbd(tb4ner erffen ben^tti^nncf ^cttoicben / 2>ember tobtfchl^stt
4uß f reibem willen vnb vn^enotter bing n4cb0ettolgt/ vnb )n Aller//
«r(l m biv nacbnolg erfcbUgen bett / <*Der / fo f ürc^ewen^t wirbt/
bcv tobtfcbUgcr wer bcm ben^tti^en wol fti^licber wei^ vnb en fer//
licbert {eine Uibd/lebend/ebten vnb sutm leumutd b4lben entwicb//
cn/b4mmb bk entleibun^ bnrcb bm vetf lachte tobtfcbUaer nit 4n^
crner recbten (ntfcbul^i^ten notweer/ fonber bo^licb ^efcbeben wer/
vnb 64rumb f cinlicb 3e(lr4|ft werben folt tc. Öollicb obgemclt vn
ünbet beir^leicben füraeben/ (oll ber 4nll45er/wo er bteg^ieffm will
Se^en erf tnbting/ ^4^ J>er tobtfcbUser bnrcb bat entleibten / erfJlicb
äU voi ffebt ben^tti^t wo)ben t(l/ bewctfen/ vnb (0 er er ne berfelben
obgemelten ober 4nber ber^leicben/ recbtmeflt^en vertirfacbung cfe//
cfenber etilen vnUuabAr 4nfecbtttn9 ober ben^tti^uncf ^U9r4nf
teweifl/fo l4n(tcb foTcber tobtfcbU^er f eigner recbten ober5enQlicbS
«tttfcbttlbisten notweer bebelffen / vn^ngefeben / ob 4tt^3ef iirt obet?
btfianben Vfüvb ! b^^in ber mclcibc (aU vo; vo ber notweer gefcb^i//
bcn i?cbt)
SfiJmtfc&n Q!^a<06 p€ttt(t(§ c!«((gw ojkwndf. xxxi
hm (f ebt)er(Hicb mit cfntc tibtlicben weer Angefocbten vnb ben^t//
tigt b4t / 00 Aber ber ^49er ber erff en erf nnben ben^tctgung balb /
f eyn folcbe rccbtmefft^e verttrf4cbnn9 bcwie^ / fonber ber va^Xagt
Cobt(cq4c(er fetner bcrttmbten notweer b4lb 4tt^f tinbtg ntAcbt/ bA^
er von bem entleibten miteyner tibtlicben weer / aIö vot von rccbter
notweer gefAQt iijtl er(f lieb Angcfocbten wo:ben wer/ Öo ijl bit not
weer bnrcb bcn vcrf Ugte eobefcbUger An^gefitrt/ vnb foU bocb ffe/'
fnelte PwnbtfcbAflft bey ber tbcyl mit eynAnber jugelAflen vnb gefiele
werben-rTetnlicb i(l bierin jumcrcHen /fo eyner ber erflen benotignng
bAlb reblicb vtfacbM^r notweer geh Abt/ vnb boeb i" bettbAtnit aIU
vmbjlenbe/bieM» eyner gAnijen cntfcbnlbigten notweer geboten /ge//
bAlten bett/ijl not gAr eben ju ermeflfen / wie vil ober wenig ber th^tit
ter^ur tbAttvtfAcb gebAbtbAb / vnnb bA^ fiirtberbiejIrAJf Anletb
leben ober Aber 5» bu|? vnb bcfferung erpAnc werb /Allee nAcb fonbe«
lieber rAbtttebUng ber rccbt»eri?enb igen/ AU bernAcb gentclt wirbcc
WArtbife feil gAr fnbtilvrfberfcbeybbAben/ bArnAcb bierin AnberflJ
vn^ anberjl / fcbwcrlicberober liri ber genrtberlt werben foll/ welch«
ynberfcbc)^b / bemgeiney nen mAn verjfcntlicb nit^nerBeren (cinb*
SDon mc(a()U(tö bae mmm anbete gefeiert
bAt/ vnb vtn notweer fitrgewenbt würbe«
^m fo mit jman&c miok i &aö nte^ ^»^"i'
mAnbt gefeben bAt / vnb will ficb erner notweer gcb j a«
eben /ber )m bk tl4ger nit^e(Jebn/iii folcben feilen t(f a«
_ jßfeben / ber gut vnnb biß flAnbt ieber |>erfon/bie ff atc
bA ber tobtfcbUg gefcbeben ift/ w aö Attcb ieber für wnnben vn trcer
ttebAbt / vnnb wie ftcb ieber tbeyl in bergleicben feilen/ voj vnb nach
ber tb At geb alten bab / welcber tb<y l ancb 4n0 voigeenben gefcbicbt?
mer glanbene/ vtfAcb/bewegtmg/ vojtberld obernuQ bAben mog/
bcn anbecn an bem o:t aU bie tbat gefcbeben iff / jöerfcbUge ober jti
benötigen/ jDArAtt^ Pancyngutter verffenbiger ricbter ermcfTtge/ob
ber f ürgewenbtcn notweer jnglAuben fei / vn wo bit vermutnncj ber
notweer wiber bie beFentlicben tbAt flAtt bAben foll/ fo mn% biefclbig
vermurnnggargfit ff Are? beffmbi« vtfAcb Üben/ Aber ber tMtter
mocbt wiber bm entleibten foitil bifer / vn fem felbd bAlb foutl gntcr
ftarcPer vermfttnng bArbtincfen /fm wer ber notweer jngUnben.
eolcb« vtfAcb Alle 511 erHern ) Un burcb bi{t ojbnnng nit wol grimt
lieb vnbiebcrnuin verflentlicb befcbebe/2lber nemlicb iff J« mercfen
^4§ in bifem fall/aUer obgemelcen vermnttting b^lb/ bii bewetfnnfl
f '*• »
brttt tb4ttctr rtttffecUejt wcr^en foU/iDocl? vtiahotfchnittm 5«n R4#
g<r ^ct; xcäiimsi ^i( er 6<trwi2>(r (ü»i:b:iitam tvoTc / vn^ wo bifer f aU
votstmAuv ma lfm rcMrcb J wcifficl b4t / fo iff not hm b€t vtthp\ ^«?
vcv^fnbigm tabt mit fütUsuns aUer vmb^cnbe ft<tttltcb $» gebmt»
cbm/ "VOan ficb Mf<r fall/ mttgar t>il swcijptU vnb vn^<r^cbu^ für
vn6 xcibtv bit bemmbcen norweer begebe mas I bü V9i ^er gefcbicbt
mc All3ub(2><nclm o6er5»r<Qett fein.
?Pott tcrumkcr nottocer gcgm cpricm
svcib^bil^c*
ftcb eyncr txQtxottt berümbt / tnn tyntm folcbm fall tfl^
4tfß$uft}rmt>nn^an$u^ebm^te9elcs(nbett^<^v^eib0
y vn^ ni4n0/ awcb itit beybergababcm wter vnb tb4tt/
Titb ^<lrt^ imcb radt i)cr tecbtitcrff enbi^cn wie bct^^^cb (lebt/ J» v»/r
tbcylcn / ban n>i<wol nie Ictcbdtcb ern tteib cynem WMiiu tynvetnpf
^cbtU^i^mt noctveer vtfacbett ttia^ / @o wer bocb müslicb b4^$ eTt»
gratvfatn wetb ey ttcn weycben m4rtn/$u eyrter tioctteci; mn^cft mo^r
q^r/ vn{> foni>erlicb fo (le f^i^licbe vni> er fcblecbt<^c vipeer bect«
So cpnct* tnrt rechter noeü)ccr cpncn wf#(6tc!ett
vpt2>er feinen /^ed tb^ccer^ willen enrUtbc«
s/^ jjw ^^^ wtbcr feinen willen cpnm vnfcbwlbtgm mit (lieben/
^&r^ (Irey cbe/ würflptn ober fcbieffen / (o er ben n^crijtcr meynt/
crcff vnb entleibt b^/ ber ifl aucb von peinlicber (Iralf entfcbtilbi^#
tb^ttcr^ willen 5efcbicbtAti(jerb Alb eyncr notweer*
«si^f- ^Ccm f0(jpn<tc|ynJtmli<gt)ttud)oamft)ercfö«
'cy^oem cn^ o^er o?t ^a folcb werc^iii üben/iimlicb i(( tbdt/ vn^
&Ar2>»rc^
I
^4r^ttrcb Vdn vngefcbicbtm ganQ vnffenerltcber wci^/wiberbed
tb<lttere willen femanbt entleibt/ ber felbig würb in vil wea Ibk nit
tnftglid? in benennen fein entfcbulbigt/ t>nn6 bamit bifer fall bcflcr
leicbter vcr(tan6en/fcQen wir bifegleicbnnß. it^n balbirer fcbicre cy
nem ben bart iii feiner (f uben/aU gewonlicb i» fcbem iff/ vnb würi>
^nrcb ernen alfo gedoffcn ober gewo:jf cn/5a^ er bem foer fcbiert/6te
«nrgel wiber feinen willen abfcbneibcc/ iSy n anber gleicbnuß/ fo eyn
fcbii« in eynergewonlicbenjiljlactilebt/oberftQt/vitjnbemgcwort
lieben bUtt fcbend / vnO ee lan(f c \m eyner vnber ben fcbn^/obcr jn»
le(l vngenerlicber wei^ vnnb wiber ^dn willen fein biicbd ober arm//
bm(l/ebe vnb er recbt anfcblecbt vnb ab0ompt/vnnb fcbcujl alfo je//
tnanbtjn tobt/bife beybe feinb entfcbnlbicjt . 'Pnberdttnb ftcb abctr
bcr balbirer anber gaifenober ^wn^an eymr rngewonlicben (lacc
tcmanbte $» (^bem/ober bcr fcbüQ <^n eyncr berglcicben vngewonli//
eben (latt/ba man ftcb verfebcn mocbt b(($ lent wanbcrccn / $u fcbtef
fen/ ober bieleftcb ber fcbüijinber$il(laet vnfwrftcbtigcr weig/vnttb
würbe alfo vo bem balbirer/ ober btm fcbüQen/aU obflcbt/ jemanb t
entleibe/ber tb^ttcr feyner warb ^nüaentfcbnltigt/^lbcr bannocbc
t(i mer barmber^igf eit bei folcben endeibnngen/bie vngmerltcb an^
tteTlbeyt ober vnfiirftcbtigPevt / bocb wiber beö tb^tterö wtllmge//
fcbcben /jnbaben/ itan wae arsUdiff vH mit willen gcfcbicbt/ "Cnb
wo folcbeentUtbimaffefcbcben/follen t>ic vttbey er bei hm v<r(!enbt^
eten fo ed vo* jn 5Ö fcbulben f om^^t/ber (f ra(f b4lb rabte t>(te3c. j^np
bifcn obangejeygten gUicbnulfen/mag in Anbmt vnbcnanten feilen
er n ver(f enbiger wol mercf en vmb erPennen/ was eyn vn^eucrlicbe
entleibnna i(l / vnb wie bie entfebttlbtgung an(f ir trcgt. T nnb
imcb bem bife feil o(fi: $t» fcbnlben kommen/ vnb bnrcb bk vniterff en
bieten barinnen etwo gar vngleicb geriebt wirbet/tUbteanctejevgt
Iwrtj er^lernng vnb xe<i,mnns berbalb mx^ gnten vifacben gefcbcbe/
hamxtbw atmtyn manetwae verjlanbtd berrecbtenbaraußnem/
Icbocb brtben bi'it fA\ jit jwtten gar fnbtil vnberfcbiebt/ bxt bem ge//
fiey nen man/ fo an t>m peinlicben gewebten ftisenverffetib^ ober be
«ri(f lieb nit %n macb^n fein/ biernmb follen bte v:tbey ler in btfen ob//
Setnelten fdlen allen ( wan ee j& fcbnlben fompt) angejeygter erHle-<;
?nng bolb/ber vojgemeUxr verjlenbiger lent robt ntt verac^ten/jort
^er geb;a»cbeti«
mÄi> Jwet(Felt ob er an ber wimbe» flc//
ffoibenfei.
tj^lvtf.
tjohüji
Z^m (ocm<t (0^imn v^m/mnb übet
ttUch |etc 64trn4cb (hirb / AÜÜbae jiwetflpcltcb wer / ob <tr
^.«•^ 5er ^crU^ce» f?reycb bAlb^gef^otbm wer ober mc / tii jölcb
ftt feilen mögen beyJ) tbeyKwie von weirtmadefaQC tfD^itnbtfcbaflRrr
Sßr facb btenftUcb (Mim / vnb follen bocb (onberlicb t>UwunbMte^t
j^er facb verflcnbtg vnii2> anbete pafonen i hu. ba wtfTen/wtc ftcb bt»
gejfotben n4cb bem fcblagen vnb rumotgeb^leenbab/^n teugen^/y
b;aucbt Tveri>e/mtt: anity$wiQ tvte Ung i>er geiloiben nodb ben fmy
eben gelebe b^b/vnb in folcben vtcbevten/dte vtcberler bei t>en recbc/'
tterftenMgen / vn an cnben vnb oicen wie^u mb biUx vofer otbnun^
«nge^eygc / tabt^ pflegen*
ben vnn^ ntmo:en fü rfe^Ucb ober vnfür/i/
fe^licb beiÜdnbc cbtm*
'Ccm fo cc(t(0pcrfonmmtefur#ejemi
vni> rereymgtem willen vnb mnt jemanbt bißlieb jö
ermojben etnanbcr bilff vnb beiflanb t tbün / bk felbert
, cb4rcev alle bdbenbaö leben vevwtrc^c. €lo(iberec/y
lieb iptt^on vngcfcbicbtö in einem fcblagenobergefecbt/ beretnanbet
weren/ eynanber belffm/ vnnb iemanbr atfo ongnncffam vifacber/y
fcblagc xcüvbti 0o man ban bm recbtentb4eter wey^/ vo bet b^nt»
iJieentleibttnfj gefcbeben iff /ber foU alö eywf tobtfcbleger mit dem fcb/»
wert jumtobtgeflraflpc werben. "IV>eraberberentletbt/b»rcb mte
ban ey nen bie man wwlf generlicber weiß tibdicb Äcfcblagen/flewo jf
fen obergewnnbe wo»ben/ vnnb man Hnbt nit bewn^licb macben/
von welcber fonberlicben banbt vnb tbatt ergeffoiben wer/ 0o ^«
Jie fclben / fo bie verle^nn« wie ob(f ebtgetban baben / alle «U tobt//
fcbwger votffemelter ma^en i ^ßm tobt jn ({raffen. 3tber btr anber
beijtenber/beljfer vn vjfacber (Iraff balber/ von welcb« banbtobbe//
ftimbtermaffen ber entleibt nit tibtlicb verlebt wo:ben i({ / ancb f*
eyner in eyner auffriir ober fcblaejen entleibt würb/ xnb man mocbe
J^"?* ^^f^" ^ Atton er old vo:(f ebt verlebt wotbe wer/ QolUn bie v$
tbeyler bei bm recbtncrflfenbigc vn an tnbm vn otten/wie bernacb Qt
melt wirbet/ rab w üflcttm/mit eriff nung aller vmblfenbe ^nb «ele//
Scnbcy t folcber facbwi/foiiil fit crfaroif ünbcn/ W4n iii folcben ^llew
itacb ermefltgnntt mancberl<y vmb(¥enbe / baf nit alUd In fcb;cib<it
vnbericbiebltcb 5» v;tbeylen i({.
i>er be^rebnuß*
bürlicb erme(rnn3 "^nb erf antnuß folcber vnberfcbieb
lieben verwnnbiing b^lb / nacb ber begrebnnß bee ent
leibte beffer mmbtc mangel fei/follberTlicbter/rampt
jweyen fcb^lfen bem gcricbtfcbJeiber tnb eyncm ober mer Wttnbt4r//
Vi>m (fo man bie 3eb4ben vnb folcbe gefcbeben l<wC)bk ban\nno% b at
xn beeybiat werben follen /ben felben tobtenPotj>er vo: ber begrebnn^
mit (leiß beficbcigert/ vnb alle \eme entpfangene wunben/fcbleg/ vni>
wiitflF/ wie ber jebe« \nnbm vnrtl> ermeflTen wörbe / mit fleip merctett
xnb verjeycben lajT^rt»
rart/bieattcbentfcbnlbigttngaufFjn tragen migen/
fo bariB o;bcnlicber weißgcb^^nbelt wirbt»
bieetwoanf vn(lre|flicbeft vtf4ebenbefcbcb<tt /fobie
felbm vjfacben recbt ^nb oibenlicb «ebmucbt werben/
. _ aU ba eyner lemanbt vmb vnPenfcber wercr wtllm /
bie er mit ^mexn cbweib ober tocbtetr übet/erfcbUtbt / wie vot in bcm
bnnbe^en vnnb eyn \>nb jwen^ierden articPel bed ebebmcbd an\<X
ifinb I Jtcm fo eyn ebeman ey nem anbem ;c. flefcQt i(r*
'Uemfo eyner j5 rettung eynetf anbem teib/ leben ober gittje//
-^nwnbterrcblecbt/3tem]olmtt$bem/bteirfinnttbaben;<Wer
fo ey nem iemanbt von amptd wegm^nfaben cfebnrt/ ber vnjtmhcb
in f renenlicben vnb (JtglicbenwiberflÄnbt tW I i>nb ber felbtg xou
^erfejftsbarob entleibt wnrbe. ^
_
'''■.•'*■»•
g. &<xtl$ bc$ liitiffcctt mb iK$ ^ligß
(tinttn bauß finbct vnnb «(chUcht I ober fo tyntc ey n cbtctr bat/
^4d icmanbc t66cec / vnb er ^er oldcbm b^ßbeyc bauo: vo bcm tbtar
nicdefcben ober^b^c b4C / tvte bicoo» in 6ctH bunt^ercttt vonb fecb«
vn2> bmfft^m arcicfd atif4b(ttb * 3^^ hat tytiw tpn cbior bauott
gcfeQt i(t/b« rtccbfl obcfcmelttf<lUUeb4bm garvil vitberfcbeyb/
xoan^u encfcbttlbt^un^ober ^eyn ettcfcbulbtgun^ a»flPittm tx<^lr
bM (tlled )n lattd^ttfcb^ctben vnb $u erf lerm tv<r/ vnn6 bem^artfy//
ticn man «web irrig vnn5 er^rticb fein micbc / tx>o folcbd alle« ttiM//
fero:6ntm5 folc hgriff en werbe. iOicr umb fo bifer facb eyne fwe J)etf
Siebter vnnb vttbeyler Fompc / fallen fte bei J>e« recbcuerf?enbt^«tt
vni> an m^tn vnnb o:cen wie in enb bifer vn(er otbnnncf Mi^t^vpst
vabcd gcbtaucben / vnb ^ nicbr cfQtn vnttemüttfri^ regel ober <je//
svonbeTC barin 311 f|>:ecben macb^/ ^it htm recbten wiber werct^ feilt
aU )e$d yircen an ben {»einlicben ^ricbren bi^ber befcbebcn / ba^bit
vtcberler ber vnberfcbieb feber facb nit b^^en vnnb bewegen / hfiA i^
«in <jn>(fe cbotb^Tt/ ^^^ volgt barati^ t><i^ fte ftcb S» vil maln irren/
rbnn h<n lenccen vnrecbt/vmtb werben an frem bluit fcbnlbig/fo gtn
fcbicbt aucb vil ba^Xicbter vnb vjcbeyler Ut mi^tb4rcer bcgi»nKi'>
gen/ vnnb jrebanbluna barauff ricbren / wie fte \n b<i^ recbtjugiit
verleiigcn/ vnb wiflendicb übeltb4tter barbnrcb lebicj macben wol//
len/ vernurnen viUeicbceclicbeynfeltig lenc/fte cbim wol baran/{^0
fte h<n fclben leuccen i'r leben retten. 0 te folUn wiffen /ba^ fte f icb fcb//
werlicb barmit vcrfcbwlben/ vnnb fein bai anFt^ern berbalber voi
gocc vnb ber weit wiberFeritng fcbulbig / wati tyn jcber ricbter vntv
vttbeyler i(! bei feinem eybt vnb feiner feel felt^Fey t fcbnlbia/ nocb Ux
Item bcffen ver(?ebngleicb tnh recbt$u ricbtcn/ Tnb wo eyn fa(j>
über fein vcr({entnup ijt/bei ben tecbtuerflenbigen/vnb <i,n mbm x>xi
ctten wie bernajcb ixxoxb bifervnfer ot^nunggemeltwirbet/rabt^
pflegen/ wan jtt^offen facben aU jwifcben bem gemcrnen nnQ vnl>
ber menfcben blutjuricbtengrojfer ernfilicber (lei^/gebott vnnb m»
Qätctc werben folU
^ic t>tc x>\\<x^ti I fo Jß m^cfcgulcjicjutta kfcm(t>
cber tbatt fürgewenbt/ anfeefürt w«rbeo folle».
**' • ^berbalben vtfacbe an^ergt/ bie folcb tbatt vo> jjeinltcber ff raff
<nc|cb»lbt3<n mJcbtcn / ab voj bei jebcr geo>b«»t«r pctnlicben flraff
V
wie vnb wan bie entfcbulbigt wirbt «cfcQt i(l / fo foll ber rtcb«r bert
tb4tter fragen/ob er folcb feine fwrgebefie entfcbnlbi^ung^nngfani
betfreifen Bnn. 0o er baß bc^;^ I biircb ftcb ftirberlicb jn tbnn vtpnt//
ti«i|t/fo foll er/ we« fttfiirentfcbwlbigungfolcber tbatt balb weifen
wolten 7 burcb red)tuer(f enbig Unt ober burcb beh gertcbtßfcbteiber
in gegenwertigFey t bed ricbtere auff^evcben lajfen. Qo ban ber ri/
cbtcr mit gebähtem rabtber recbtaer(lenbigen bie felbcn weifung ar
ticPel barfiir erFent/wo ^xt bewiefen würben /ba^ bte felben My^f^ix^
ten vtfacben/ bie bcFlagten vnb beFanten tbatt von j>cinlicb<r (Iraff
eiitfcbwlbtaeii / 0o foll ber tbetter auff jr anfitcben mitfolcbcn etboc
ten weifnng / aitcb wed ber anFUger bienlllicbö barwiber wetfa»
wolc/swgelaflTm/aiicb bnrcb bie felbcoberFeyt beßbalb Funbtrcbaffc
verbaler vnb anberd verotbnct gebalten \>nb gebanbelt tterben/ wt«
vof im 5 wen vnnb fecbQtgff <n atticFel anfab^b / ^ttm w 0 ber b<//
FUgt jc. vnb ttltcbenarticFeln barnacb vonfö;mvnb nta^berw«
fwnggefaQtifl/famptetUcbenbernacbitolgmbenarticFeltt/foeejij
fcl)»lbenFom»t angcfeben vnb barnacb gebanbelt. TX>oge$wet|taft
warbe/foUrabW xouhmnwihQmtXtxoitbttl gepjtegt werben.
@0 {)C0 e^dctere gcgct^ne toctfungarctcf^
(elnnicbefcbUeffem
*
cFeln /bnrcb ben TVicbwr mit gcbabte rabt ber verff en//
bigert / barfiir erFant würben / ob gleicb folcbe erbotne
^_^ weifnng gefcbebm / h<(% bie bannocbt nit bienfflicb jü
6ed tbAttetd entfcbttlbigiwg wer / fo f»ll bie weifnng nit jngelaffe^
fonber aberFant/ vnb old baii bnrcb ben rtcbt« vnb gertcbt/ ba beU
tMttcrinnenleg/mit fürberlicb<m recbten weitber gebanbelt wer ^
t>tn. I wie ftcbfl^S«» eynem folcbci» beFantltcbw offenbar«» rb^tteif
Sebürt*
9p(w 'cm t>ii Atmi »tt
%j i:i
[cmc(w
(6 tttf
ß. ß(«r(0 J w futtffcm t)ft J) {K0 fi<j)(iä<tt
be^b^lb iti ^cn^mi]^ P«n/ 4ttch bcr oftlctbtttt^ be^mt
lieb toer/ vnnb ^ocb bttrvMQondtm vt{achtntymc^tc
mttMtin (oichcv tntidhtms Mb/^ar o^a^cyn»cb(TU
«"!• (nt^cbttl^tSte mit Ptti»btrcb<»fft/w« ^4tt■on3<fcQt t(f / atsßftttre wob/
^o foltett de^ htdagun freunde ^em Pt4s(r^iittot6€t:(l/ vot 5<m Tlt
cbcet vnn^ vi«; fcboffcn / »<icb ctrmtflfttn^ btv (c\hm notciirlfcisUcI^
caueion/ (tcbcrunä vitti^ he^nbt cb»»/ ob ftcl> foEcb« fürdtbncmc^
(chuibiQttns bt6 be^a^tm in ^ct; att$fümn3 mit nebt ntt (tfnnde/
^4^ bann bee b<0Uctmt ftctinbt bie ^tt^ung bt6 h^ü3tm/amk bitn
^isevfQÜvnb (chäbenfnach etmcffun^bei^fclbmsencbt^ Auftrieb
tm tvoUen / 2>4rdn bor r€lbt9 HA^er / butcb ^ie vnt>a:(f4nbm vnev//
f inbdicbm at^ftitSs btv bctiimbten mtfcbtilbwmnd bmcbt würbe/
2>amit sebenctetf wtt$ufut^ommm/b4^betrl4gerb»rcb hetavu
»nwarbaffti^e vnb betrü<tlicb^4uß^iictntt$tf fcbabcn bMcbtwerbc*
t>nnb follcn in bffemfall/ ber befrtivtm mefffsnnd bi« fclbcn feb^ffe»
vnnb vtth^yl (pu^tt hti bcn teebttMtp^enbi^cn vnb an cnbcn vnn^
o;cm/Tipi( bemocb ficmelt wirbet/ AAcb r4b(^ i>flescn*
5Dott gr oflcr <tmöc 6ee t)er fi(§ obgmtcfeor
tnadkn AU$fuvm voolt*
Z<ttt wer a6er Ux bcftagt fo ganej arm /
lueb nitfreunb bett/bteieQ^mtelte c4tition ftebetuns xn
. ^e({anbt3» tbßn vermkbt / vnb bocb $wcijflieb tow I ob
et feiner befcbtilbi^tenentleibttnabAlb reblicbentfcbttlbtaunabett/
foU (tcb ber Tltcbter / nocb ^(f alt ber facben / mit allem flei^ toutl er
lan/ erPtmbiaen / vnh ber oberPeyt folcbd allee fcbteiben vnb befcb^/
(ybte be^balb erwarten / alfo ba^folcbeer^unbiaunginnbemfall
amptd b^lb auff be^^ericbt^oberbea fclbenoberreycbarkscnvn^
folgen befcbcbe.
Bo 9ttcr in &cr moi^wcgcttw/iHacfcttjgmißfcm
vnb fein vnfcbtil^ M^^tm xowc*
Jxm{^
%M{^ti 5^ci*c§0 pcm(tc§ ^m'cgc^ o^^nu«^. xxx v
Ccm fo cpntx m gcfcttgfn«(| fem/ {>cr öat* dv.
uo» in bxt motbt aebt erPant wer /wie an ctlicben oiten ge//
tvonbett/*n^t«^«^3^^"3f»M^rei«cncrcbttlbi3ung/wie
tnn bm votgemelcen articFeln von btn encfcbulbigttitsen^cfaQC i(l/
Attßjttfürcn ftcb erböte / ber foU vn<inQtUh<n l bag er bieiiot inn bte
titoibt 4cbc erPant wer/ mit be|?imi>«r m^fnv^tiQ jugclaflen werbe*
^Pon außfuritrtc; kfcßulbtcsccv petnltcgen uWc^ae
ebe ber beFlagt in gcfcngFniv^ Pomp t»
^ctt» fo ftci cpm e|c « trtn gcfcngf tmß
Fompt / er ncr pcinlicben übettbatt / mit rccbc aufjfiircn ''
will/b40 foller tb«n an o:bcnlichenpctnUcbcrtsmcbtctt
xok in bifcn feilen |cbcö o:tö recbt '»nti^ bcrFowrtim ijl/
vnb foll in bifen auf^furnn^en beyben tbcvlcn recbcmcfftge verHwn//
bartägefcbeben/itttcb berbertbcyl nottürjfti^fürbtingen/ v;Fbwnb^
vnb f imbtfcbafft/wie ftcb in recbtgcbiirt ^uaclaflcn /t»nb nit (wie in
itUcben otten mi^b;aucbt)ab3ercbi"ttctt werben / vnb foll ber fclbt^
$»m recbten/fi»r vnrecbter Gewalt vnb nit weitber ver^lcy t werben.
§ernacf ÄSctfic^ articf cT
f«n jf sülben wertb / "onb ber bieb mit folcbem biebiTall ebe
,,,^^5,^ er b<^mit inn \tin gewarfam Pompt/ nit befcbüen/bcrücb//
tjgt oOer betretten würb /ancb JA«* biebffall nit geizigen obergeb jo*
^m bot/ vnnb ber biebfJall vnber fwnff ctiilben wertb/ ifl evn beym^
lieber vnb geringer bieb (lall/ vnb wan folcber bieb(?all nocbmaU erv
f arif wirbet / vnnb ber bieb mit ober on biebffall einf ompt/ fo foll \n
Av%
dvlij.
bistm bm ^kbjlrtUmit^<r jwtfpUiß b<$alm. tPo abctrb<r6t(b fdit
folcbeselcbu^ vcvmA^/foU er mit bem Forcier batiii w (dich i<ttUns
lwm/g<(fr4ffic werben » TP i»6 fo bet buh nit nuv vttmas ober jS wc//
g<rt bUnffw ran / fo foU er boclr ^«»w weniÄflen bem befcbcbigten bat
i>ieb(lAll wiber^eben / ober nocb eynfacb wertb bemalet» ober verölet//
eben/ vnnb foll ber befcbebtgt mttber felben einfachen vergldcbuna
2>cd bkbfialö (aber mit ber übermannte ) berober^eycdcUbu^ von/
Äebn. ^ocb foU bcr bieb jm attßlaffen fein a^ung/ fo er iiut berge//
f enÄrPntt^ gemacbt bat/ aucb ju bemalen fcbwlbtg (ein / vnb ^en bi»t//
telttCob er cd bat))ren gewonlicben gebäre für jr müb vnt> fletß tntnit
thtm/vnb $n bem allen/nacb ber beften fomt / vmb mthdlMns roüa
Im bed flcmeynen f ribed /ewige vjvbebe tb«»*
SPom (xfm offcttdtc§m {)tc6f?aß/t)awu J)cr
bteb befcbuben wirt i({ fcbwerer«
biebflall / ber vnber fünff gülben wercb i(i I ebc vnnb ee
an ^dnQcxowU^ fompt becretten würb / ober eynge^
fcb«y ober nacbrbertwacbte/ vnnb b>ocb0>n btcbflall
megeb:ocben ober gefliegen bar/iff eyn offner bieb((all/ vntib befcb"
werbt in biegemelc anffmr Xfttb beritebtigung bü cbaralfo/ ba^^w
bvüb in bmnger gef(elc/mit rScen an^geba wen t>n^ ba^ lan^ verboc
reit / vn t>o( allen binge btm befcbebigten ber biebfl^at ober ber wertb
barfär/fo cd in bee bicbö vermögen i$/ wiberumb werbcn/t>ttb foll
3n bem allem inn bcr be({en f otm ewige v» vbebe tbun . 'tDer aber ber
bieb er n folcbe anfebenlicbe {»crfon/ babet ftcb bcfferungsäucrboffe»
mag yn ber ricbterCjebocb on ber oberfeit ^ulaffen vnb verwtllignng
trit ) burgerlicb vnnb alfo fhraffen/ba^er bem befcbebigten ben bieb//
({all vierseitig bellen/ vnb fünft ollentbalbcngcbalten werbett foUf
Ale oben in necbflem articm von bey mlicbem biebftaU gefcQt i(l«
etn(|eige» ober b«cbm/tf| nocb fc|;wercr«
jcmtf*
$^$mtTc§ctt5Ja(§$paWi(5ö«<c^<oj^tttm^^ xxxvi
^m fo a()af ^n t)wb titn mgmtdccm cu^*
flelm/jemanbte bei tag ober nacbt/in fein bebaufung
•ber bebalmng bliebt ober (leigt/ ober mit tl^affen/ba
w - mit er i'emanbt ber im wiberfJaiibttbnnwolt/ verleg
ti% mkbt/^tW ({elen eingebe/ folcbd fei ber erf( o^ mer biebflall/aucb
ber bieb^all gro^ ober tletn/barob ober bamacb beriicbtigt ober be
tretten/fo if{ bocb ber biebflall bar$ts/aU obftebt/gebiocbm ober gc//
fliegen wirbt/ etngeflinnergeuerltcber bicbftalU .60 iflin btm bieb
ff atl /ber mit w«|f en gefcbicbt/ty ner Vergewaltigung vit Verlegung
Sn befolgen. SDarnmb inbifcmfall/ ber matt mit bem ff rang/ vnnb
txit weib mit bem wajfer ober fttnltnacbgelcgmbeyt ber perfonen/
vnnb crmcffung beö ricbterd itt anber weg/mit an^ff ecbnng bcr ait//
j^en/ober abbawnttgcyncr banbt /ober einer attbern bergletcbcn fcb^r
tveren leib|ira|f geffrafft werben foH*
^ott erf^en Wb^(x
t»erc^/o^ {><>?'
ü
über vnb ftinH on befcb werlicb vmbflenbt
foll man rabtd ip^i^*
Cew fo iik( 5(t # t^l^affeiwH . ,
fünffgülbenoberbartibcr wertb wer/vitbbervmbffcttb
^•s^^is^- fo ben biebftall/ wie obm banongcmelt iff /befcb werm/Pc.
iter babei ctfitnben würb / Sjber banndcbt aitgcfeb«n bu gr^fTc bc*
bicbff aU / fo bat cd merer flraff ban wx biebff all bc^ geringer iff ♦ t> n
•ttn jölcbm feilen mß^ man anfebcH bat wettb bea biebff ald/attcb ob
bcr bieb barob beriicbtigt ober betretten fetv <^cr foll ermefreft wer
bm ber ff anbt vnb bM wefm ber perfo^l / (b geff ölen bat / vnnb xc\%
fcbebUcb btm befcbebigten bcr btebflaU fein mag/ vnb bk firaff bar//
ftacb/ an leib ober lebm Vftbeylert* "t>nb bieweil «ber folcb crmcfV
fang iß recbtwcrjf enbiger lewt Vernttnfft (f ebt/ 60 w^Un wir ba^ i«
folcbem icQgcmeltcm faWl fo offt ftcb bcr alfo begibt / bit ricbter Vnb
vttbeyler bei btn rccbttierfimbigen vnb an oiten vnb cnben wie ber^
ttacb gemclt wirbt/rabw pflegen mit mbecfiing bcr bernttm vmb^
Ifenbc/vnb nocb folcbem öfttnbcn rabt/ir vitbetlgcben. TPo aber
J>er bieb jtt folcbem biebff all gefligen ober geb jocben/ober mit waffeit
nXe. voiff ebc / ge(f ölen b<tt /To ^<tt er b4mi« wie obgemclt / ba# Ub«i
verwirc^c*
jis«
V^m andern bidMt.
•I%10
r
d^if.
Icn hcttfvnnb ftcb folcb beybe 6teb(f «l/auff etmitbctge
ttfutung ^(tr warbeye / aU hituot I von folcbev df ar//
ntxQ Flarlicbd^fcQCtfl/crfutt^cn/ 3ttcb ^u fdbm^wcti ^i(bi{4^/mc
f iinff gülbm ot>«r ^4mber wcrtb ^dnb I fo befcb wert ^<r «r(l ^Mb({4l
bai Aitbmi/2>4rttmb ma^ 5er felbtcf 2>ieb in blander 3e(lelt:/vtt5 6ai$
ian^ vet:botcen/o5er mn 5en felbeit$irc^o5eroic/5artner verwircfc
bac/en>t^ltcb $6 bleiben verfhrtc^i:wer5en / nacb gefallen ix^Tlicb//
ttx^ 1 4ucb nacb t>cr befle fotm txoxQt vtfbebe cbun / vn mag 5en 5ie&
in 6ifem f iill ntcbc f urcragen / ob er mit 5em 6teb(f all / aU vo; vont
cr(!cn i>tcb(i^4ll gemelt t(f / nit bcfcbnen ober betretcen ttürb . "XVo
aber folcbestoen biebftall fünff gül6cnot>er2>arUber treffen/fofolU^
mit erfarung aller vmbftenbe / aucb gebmucbuna 6er recbtuerflen//
bigcn / wie bemacb gefcbübcty / At}cb aU tm nccbÜen ^bem arctcEcl
((cecb/gebalten i9jert>en*
$nm bacten mal gefl^olen bet/ vnb folcber bmfocbttger
biebdal/ mit gutem gnmbcAU vo» i>on erfarung bev
warberc gefaxt i(l/ erfunden xoütb / 640 iil eyn merer
verleumbterbieb/ vnaucbetne vergewaltiger gUicbge4cbt/vn foll
barumb/ nemlib 5er mantt miesem |ir4ng/ vnn5 5te rr4n> mit 5em;
«oaffer ober ^nn^in 4n5ere weg/ itü^ iebee Unbcd 0cb;4ucb vom U
bdt^Sm cobtgelirafjpt werben«
0
^imbtcb^Ugcfiiiibm wti^
^Mtl«^
v
Si§mifc?m 5?lct'c^0 pctnü'cg %<xi^i$ ox^mwg.
oäybefcbwerttng / fo iimben vorgefaßten articPelnvnbtrfcbtcblicb
gcmelt fein/ erfunbm würben/ iflbie ({raff n4cb bcr meyni?en befcb^r
n^tmgbed biebflaU 3» ernennen»
2^cm fo ^cr t)ic6ot)cv5tc6mfr0a((cr6t)m
ber vieri$chen laren werm / ^k folUn vmb btcbflall / on
jbnber vtfocb / 4ucb nit vom Icbm $nm tobt / geriebt/
jonber ber obgemelten Icibflrajf getnc^ / mit fampt e wi//
gcr vtpbebegeff ra jft werben. TPo abet ber bieb nab^nt bei vierte
m jarm alt wer / vnb bet biebflall gro^ ober obbeflimpt bcfcbwet//
lieb vmbflenbc / fo gcitcrlicb babei gefunbcn würben / alfo ^a^ i>xi
bo^bevtbaö alter erfüllen m^cbt / öofollen "Kicbter vnb v:tbeyler
^e^balb aticbCwie bernacb gettielt)r4btd pflegen/wie vfn folcber \\m
gerbi^b an ^ut/ leib ober leben ^üf^taffen U^*
XXXVI]
clj?üii"
tem/ber er eyn necbi^er erb t(?.
^m focpttcrattglac^cuerciöfcpco^er w
,_^ tierflanbt etwaö berw^licb ntm vonQntutn I ber er fnnfl
-J^ eyn necbf^er erb ijl / ober fo ftcb bergUtcben 5 wifcben man
vtib weib begeb / vn eyn tbey l bm Mtbven berbolb 4nHlage wörb/fol
ImTlicbter vnb vttbeyler init enbecFüg 4ller vmff enbe bei bm recbt//
iierflenbigen / vnb an oittn vn mbm wie jn enb bifer vn^iv otbnwng
angejeygt/rabte i)|legm/4Ucberf4m/W4d iit folcbm/ellen b46 ge//
meyti recbt Wvnb ficb barnacb bolten / SDocb foll bic oberteyt ober
"Siebter in bi{m feilen von ampte wegen nit ^a^m nocb (Iraffen»
cl^v.
tc(m ttttt wcgccr ^iingcr^ mu
t>
ß» gavte b<$ funffectt mb i^c$ ^oi>U^m
c^vf. >/^ ^M ^iecr/^dl»wcibo^crFm^etrld^cll/<tW4^vollc(^cft^m^^«
^4^^^ ^en iiv (tcUn atut^acht votitbc l xoo b<inn btt felb ^tcb(?<iU
tapffct groj? vn6 Pün^tTicl? wct^/follcn ^bcrttmU ricbtcr vnb vttbey
IctCäIö obllcbt)f<tbtö j>pc5cn.Cb abet;{>et: ^elbt5c^teb einer vn(lv4flF
UcbcdalTcn xonvb I (<>U )tni>ccb biv^\^Qttvmh bMaQbt%\ia\^ ^it*
tbrt» nicbtö rcbwll>ig fcirt.
cljvij«
clyvti|.
«V4n bwmit t>ttl)t^aU ^ebmucbt tvetr2>e.
Uin frücbt ober duff bem fcl5 fein nwijimcj/ wie 640 4I
ied namen bat / bevmticber vti ^euerlicber xeti^ nimpc
Vtti> bie bi» weg tregt ober füret / öae iff aucb eyn bieb
ffall/vnbwicanbcrbiebflallvomemeltermrt^^ujlraffert/beßgleicb//
en wo eyncr bei taQ jemanbte an beriit^tc» feinen friicbtc/ bk er bcyn»
lieb nem vnb bittweg trüg/groffen mcrcf licbm vnb geuerlicbc» fcb<t
btti tVtt/i(l Äucb wie obffebt für er n biebf^all jn ff raffen/ ^x> aber
iemanbt bcit^g e(fent>t f tiicbt nem / vnnb bamit burcb wegtragen A
berfelben nit groflen generlicbcn fcbaben tb<tt / 6er i(l nacb gelegen//
beyt J>er perfonen vni> Der facb/burgetlicb ju (f raffen/ wie «n Dewfet
ben enbe Da bcr fcb^b g^fcbicbt/ i>wrcbg<wonbcyt obcrgefe^ l^r^on^
tnen.
Abbawen.
ICctti f<> jcmatiöc fem ctc^att)en ^olej Um
ati^ern bcrntUcb binweg füret/ bae i|l eynem btebflall
glcicb nacb geflalt ber facbm j» fimffen/'lpelcber aber in
eynd anbem bolQbelicbcr vn verboener weißb^wet / t^foUgeff raffe
werben nacb gewctnb^yt: )e2><$ lanbrö ober otcd. iDocbi wo eyner^ii
vngewonltcber-obervcrbotner^eic/ 4!« beider nacbc ober 4n feirt4//
gen eynem 4n6ern reinl7olQ/gatcrlicb(r vnb bicblicbcr wci^4bb4W//
a / berlff ti4cb tr^bc better 5»i?r4ffcft.
Ötraffb«;
§i6mtfc§m 9^ctc§0 pcmltc§ csmcßc^ o^^nimä. xxx v m
fifcb (Jilt/ifl4»cbeyn biebffaUgleicb5tt(J*^<tfF«n/öoaber
^ eyneratt^ eynem fiieffenben angefangen wafjcr fifcb fteng
bas eynem 4nbem 5Ü flünb / ber i(l an feinem leib ober gut nacb gele//
fenbfy t vnb geflalt bed f ifcbene / ber perfon vnb facbcn/ nacb rabc
er recbttierflcnbigen jw ff raff en.
j*
@(taff &cr j^mm fo mtc t)crcratj)ccr ot)cr ^m5er
legter babc vngetrewUcb b4nbcln.
iü guttem glau ben ixx bebalten vn verwaren gegeben ^^n / wil//
Uger Xfnnb geuerlicber wei^/ bem glaubiger $tt fcbaben b4nbclt/folcb
miffetbAtc/tfl eynem biebffallgleicbiu ffraffen.
vnb vngewcicbten ffctren*
Ccm fielen t)on geto)eic§(ett ^m^eno^erf?c((m d^^i.
_ i({ fcb werer bait anber biebflall/ vnb gefcbicbt in bteierlcy xoti^l
^nm erflen / wann eyner etwa« b«ylig« obergetveicbtß fliclt an ge//
weicbtm ff etten/ '^nm anbern / wan eyner etwae geweicbt« <in vn//
geweicbteu jfetten ffielt / "Znm buttcn/ xom eyner vngeweicbtc bmg
4n gcweicbtcn ffetten ff iclt.
Cem fo eptier epn ^^onftratteien flielc/ba t^ae cw.
beylig Öacrament bid altard in iff / foU mit btm f etver vom le//
b(n$um tobrgcffraff t werben . ötel rtber eyner funfl gülbm ober
g. Karle U^ fun^t<n t>tt5 ke ^igm
üihem ttewetcb« ««feg fmitohttcn bctltbumb /obaahcv fdch otftr
P4tmen / vmb folÄ ^«b(l4a äIU/ f« fei» acUhthtnan gtxctUhtt o^<J
vnacwcicbttti ottm/ 4ucb fo «yncr vmb Nmö wdlm w «yngcwctc^
te Pitrcbm/eacrammt baug o^<r facnjl« bmbt / o^cr tnttsmeir^cb
m5ctt5tn*ttfffp<tT<t / bttrc&icb fei« jum tobtiwc^ scleflcnbcyt &<*?
auß mit / o^ctr folcbe mit ctUcbcn waxFm Mwbtm vnberitcbt / Oct i(l:
Attcb an Uib oDer Ubm jw t^P^ffc« / ii4cb VAt>tt>tv rccbmctUenDtflcn.
<Sytmt
iict Brcbe ddc/ald wacbö/lcttcbtcr/altÄt; tucbcr / batrjuixjcb 5y>Kb
nit (licq / btccb o6ctrmit gciwrlicbw mS(nMmpcftctffct{o)ti
manbt wcltUcbcsattct/ bic in cyn Hiccbengcflobcc wcte/ jlcU/ J)ocb fo
^cr^icbit^^icft«rcbeoi? facriff« nit bucht ober die seiKrlicUufflper
m/ T m bif« bicbMl alle baue in bifcm atrttcN gemelt / t(l 6 te ^raff
<te<tenben^ bieb mittlen vmbffertben vnb vnberRbcyben/fnrjttne/A
mm vnb ^u b^ltett / wie bieno; von watlicben btch\U\mfUvUa>Scif
(mti{t I bocb foll in folcben Pitcben rnnber vnnt> bicbpalcn vocms^
l)Ätmb<tQtS^<y t hcxoiiÜt wetbco/ban in weltUclycö PiebltÄlen.
djSTSV,
2rem e$ foffm auc§ bk J)t#aff/ fo an cicti)etcg^
^ ten btngeti vnb (Letten belange/ bic b»nffer6 nett /.auch jugent
vnb tbo»bevt ber j>et:fonen/ wo ber eyn$ mtegrimbt <«»S WSt wmt//
be/ 4ttcb Ängefeben/ vn wie vo» wdtlicbw bieblTmcn Qt^t)Mh S^m^
i({/bÄwngebÄ«belt werben.
!Oott ftmff o^ctr wfotcjuna &cr pcrfonm von
>m fiwn Ättg erijeygten viM)tnitthd$ v»b
mijTetbÄttWÄrKnmttf. ^ ^
5f^$n«'f<?<n^ö(§6p«'n(((§ü<vtcßwöi&tt«(t£. xxxix
fürfeijlicb vetbtocben/facbcn balben / barnmb et bad
leben nit vetwitcf e b<»t/3tem ob eyncr über t)o:geübte
^ ,^ nach gclajfene vnb «ericbt« mi(iretb<»t mit wottcn oi>tt
fcbtiflpten anbem bevglcicben ttbewjutbu« /bocbfwnflon wcittbet
bcfcb werlicb vmb(?enbe ttobet / X> nnb aber bavmic nit foiiil gctban
bctt/b4^ jm bÄttttttb b4» lebenCwie bemacb im bwnbet(?cn vnb 4cbt
'vnb rtbcnQigjlert4rttcfel4nf4benb/3«m fo |icb |ettT4nbteTnet mij>
tb4tt :c. von vnbcv^anbm miflTctbAtten gefcbubcn (lebt) genommen
werben mkbt/ vnt> au^ jetjgemelten ober 4nbetngnugr4meit vtr4//
eben/ evnet perfoi» nitju v<rtr4wen ober jfi glauben wer/ ba^ fic btc
lentgewaltfamer tb^tlicber bcfcbebigung vnt> iibcld^vcrtrügc / vnb
bei rccbrvitb bilUcbey t bleiben Ite^ / vnb [ich folcbe $tt rccbtgnng er//
fiinbc/vniib bati biefelbig perfon / bcßbalb Fcyn notturjfccawtion/
ttcvoi^hcyt ober ficberbey t macbcn f üubt/folcben Fanflpttgcn vnrccbt
ficbcn fcbabcit vnb übelj« fürPommen / foll bic felbig vnglaubbafip//
tictt bo^baff tigc perfon in gefengfnwg/aU lang big bit nacb er? ant//
itii^bcft fclbcn gcricbtögnttgramecätttion ftcberung/ vnb bcff4nbt
für folcbc vitrecbtlicbe tb Atlicbe b4nblwng tbnt/ bnrcb bic fcboplfcrt
recbtlicb ctPant werbe/ jebocb fol folcb flraff nit leicbtttertiglicb obet;
Ort mcrgflicb verbecbtUcbert Pünfiptige übeU (aUobfJcbt ) fonbetJ
mit rabt ber recbmaflccnbi^en befcbeben. 'Vnb foll folcber gefan//
gen iii bcm gcrtcbt / barin er alfo bePlagt vnnb überwnnben wirbctr
entbalten werbcn.Tnb wo er ftcb von feinen felb« güttem/ in folcbci:
gcfengl?nu^$tt entbalten nit vcrmkbt/ fo foll algban bnrcb bcn an//
füger 5« feiner entbaltnu^ b(m bnttel fein gebürlicb wartgclt/nacb
ermelfitng be6 ricbtcru gegeben werben/ vnb er ber anPl4ger berbalb
iimlicben be(lanbr tbnn / "XVo nun ber anFldger folcben tojTcn ancb
nit vermocbt / foll bic ober^ey t bcn felben f offen tragen. Öo aber
ber acmelt gefangen tnnbem felben ober anbem gericbten an feinen
olittern/aU vil bette/ banonobgemeltc fein entbaltung vnb verwa^
rnnggar ober ^nm tbeyl befcbeben Hünbt/ bic follen $tt bet; felben vnt*
Derbaltttttg on ber ober? eyt verbinberi»ncjgcbf awcbt werben«
ffanbt ber mi^tb4tter»
^:Ccm fo jemand <^nmmfi(!^kt(xMbun^ct> ^fes^«-
»er mt^tbrtW/ wilfcntlicbet vn «jewcrlicbcr wei^einicberley bilflf /.
1^ wj
hciiianbt ob<v fütbctung I tck ha» aWt» namtn hat I tbuc / ifti^tim/
lieb 5« (f rajfen/alft aber VQxftthtlin cynon faWanbt}^ bann in i>em
An^(rn/^at:umb folUtt inn bif<n feilen /^i( vtcberlct mtcbeiricbcuns
ber verlxtnMun^/ Aucb tvtc folcb^ an leib o^et: leben foU se^r äfft wer
^mla\t ob(?ebcr<i2>(e pjlesenr
cl??svtij.
tmff t)rt&ctf?an{)ncr mtflce^cc*
ctlicbm fcbctnltcbm tvcrcFcn/^ie5wvol^bnn3u^5^cr
mtffetbÄtt i>im(f lieb fcttt mo^cn/ vnbcrficbt/ v^itnb bocb
„ an volnbungimg bcr fclbcn mt(|ctbar 6tircb anöctrc mic
tcl/wibeir feinen willen vcrbinöcrt würde / folcbcr bofci: will/barau^
€tlicb wcrcf /ald obflcbt volgcn/ iff peinlich 5n (f raffen / 2lber in ey//
nttn fall bortet dait iii bein andern angefebengeUgenbett vnt> geilali:
J>er facb / barnmb feilen folcbcr (f raff balben die vttbcvler / wie b^r//
nt^cb ({cbc/rad(e pflegen/ wie die an leib oder leben ^ucbun scbiirt«.
cte^j?»
5[)on uf)cltf)a«em Ut f u^ettc ober anderer fachen
balb/jre ftnn nie ^aben»
$Ccm totVct)onjcman5c/{)crjuc5mc Operon
betretr debtecblicbere halben/ wiffentlicb feineir fyn ntt bctt/
evn übelcbatt hiQanQmlba» foU nticallen vmflenbcn/an
bic otten vnnb enben/ wtesw enbe bifer vn^tt oxbnnn$ an^ejeygt^e//
Ungen / x>nnb nach tabtbtt felbcn vnb anbetic ver^cnt>tden^At:tti
Scban^dc o^et; ^effrnff c vcerbcn.
eynemsefan^en au^btiflft.
"^wti fd
„^^ nem 6er jpeinltcb ffrafP verwircPt au^bilff c / 6cr bat 6ie fclbig
»cliiltcb(^raffan(la«bcdübeltb4teer6/5cncralfoau|5gclafrctt ivtt
Yvirc^c. i^em aber 6er aefangen J>«rcb bemelte buttere vnfiet^ an^
gefcngPnu^ / folcber vnflet^ ijl nacb geffalt 6er facben vnni) ra6c fo
an 6en ojten/ale bcrnacb flcmelt wirket/ 5» jirajfen»
ber 6ie»ctnlicbengcricbt^b4n6clgenQUcb vn6 oibenlicb
befcbtciben follen/ volfjt in {>em necb(?<n vn6
ecUcbc» arcicFeln bcriwcb»
pctnlicben fachen bei feiner pfllcbt alle banblnug / fo
j>cinlicber Plag Vit <intwiire balb gefcbicbt/gar ergenc
_ ,^ licb/vn6errcbicMtcbvno:6enUcbau|frcb:cibcit/'!On6
nemlicb foU 6tc f lag be« anFUgerö vot 6em verbürge / 6aö über bcn
beBagten befcbicbt/ober aber wo 6er anlflcger nit bürgen bett/ vnn6
berbalben gcfengPUcb bei 6em beklagten verhelft tter / in all weg ul//
ttöt Äwjfgefcbtiben wer6en/ cbe6an peinlich frago6cr peinlich han6
Inng gegen 6em besagten geübt wttr6et.'X>nn6 foll folcbe alleu juin
wcnigfien vot 6em Trichter 06er idnim verwefer vn6 5 wcy en 6e6 ge
richtö befchebcn/ vnn6 bemeltc befcbmbnng 6ttrch 6engericbtfcbJct//
W 6ed felben gerichtd öt6enlich vn6 vn6tfrrchie6ltcb gctban weröe/
barnacb foll befchebcn weröen/ ob vrt6 wie 6cr anPläger feiner Flag
t)alb /laut 6tfer vnfer oj6nunii ^nm recbten verbürgt/o6er wo er nie
Bürgen gehaben mag / ob vn6 wie er ficb vmb volfürung willen 6ed
«cbtengcfengf lieb b^t Uflcn lajfen.
«icVS« antwnrtgibt/fo er erfllicb on martcr 6erbalb befp:acbt wütr
6e/6a6 foll aneh nach 6erfclben PUg bcfcbuben wer6en/ vn6 folUi/y
wegen 6nrch 6en fchteiber jar /tag vn6 (lun6t/6aratt|f eyn je6e/ vot
06er nach bcrürte han6lnng befcbiche/ aiub wer ie6e6 mal 6abeigev
weil fei/gemclt wer6en / vn6 er 6er feh«iber foll ftch /6a|? er folcbö ge//
bö:t vn6 befehnben b^b/ mit feinem tau jfvn6 jimÄincn felbö awcb
vn^crfch?cib<»«
^"smv
cte5«T
\att5tnbt I vttnb bmt anFle^er t>w bcBa^m mtffecb^tt biilber
reblich an^cv^tmdCtvüttot vo folcber rcMtcber 4rt$(ratmcf gcfcQC i(l>
fwc $ub:tnscn ^cbürt/wad bann bor <m^\aQ<x betr-fclben anRcy^nncf
ober argwonting halber vox bem ^ertcbc ober verotbenten (cb^pffen
fiirbtingc / aucb xoa6 folcbcr ftirbtacbtc anQcv^un^ b^lb nocb Unc
ttfer otbentm^ betotfcn tvirr/joU 4IU0 ey^nrltcb/ n>te vo; <{emclc i(l/
befcb^iben werben*
(<>iS) bmx md^ (öuc t)ifcr t^nfctr w^^ce ^(tgm
XX-^Xcicbd o:bnitn3 reblicb anQey^ung vnb verbacbt ber mtfli//
thMt betvtfcn /crPanc/ vnb bar^it ^ornpc/ ba^ niMi al^bati / Uuc iitf
fer vnfer otbntitta ben gefangen erftltcb on martetr / vnb mit beb:aw
ung ber fclbcn bcTptecben/aucb an^fttrung feiner vnfcbnlb ermanen
foU/tvaö ^<in bafelb(l<jefracjt/ermant vnb entlicbgeancwnrc/anclr
«vad baratiff alled nacb lanc bifer t>nfer vnnb bee Xeicbd Qxbnun^
crfaren vnnb erFünbigr xoivt I foU alle» / tvie ob(?ehc / Awcb befc^tt//
km werben«
S\5Tttb fo c$ ^ö {)cr pct'nltcgm frag fompc / toxiij
cljpjjjv. -s^ijati ber beklage barburcb benennet/ attcb wad er bef anter tbat
balb vnberfcbicbt T agt/bie ju erfarung ber warbeyt (wie iB bifer v«
(er otbnungbanon gefegt) bienflUcb x^n^ ftirtreglicb fein/ vnnb we*
(Fürter/anch nacb laut bifer vnfer o;bnung/ von et farttng ber war//
bey t barait jf gebanbelt "^nh erfunben wirt / ba^ alled vi^\t^t& intt
fonberbey t foU ber gericbtfc^ieiber o;benlicb vnn2> vnbcrfcbieblicli^
nacb eynanbcr befcb;eiben*
kmv iiC^tk ckt hix bcfla^c au|f fernem XKxncpmt
•^^'bcr HUtt beflebn/ vnb ber anHager ^ic ban)>tfacb ber miffetb^t;
nacb laut bijcr oxhnxma weifen wolt / fouil ftcb "^ann berbalb itt btnt
felben geriebt $u banblen gebürt / ^a^ foll ber gericbifcb^lber aucb
wie ob(lebt/flei(ftg befcb:eiben.6o aber be^b^lb votgemelte oberf eic
Coittmilfarien geben/bie foUen bad/fo vot inen gcbanbelt wirc/aucb
Alles vnb wie ftcb gebürt/bcfcbieibeti Uffen.
IPoabct
S^&mifc§ett 5Eerc§6 petn((<i s(ertc§C6 ^Mm^.
XU
((;\(& aber btt befla^c t)er c^acc befettttee/t)ni) ^o^ ^k^"^^^^
iX^folcbe vtfacben/biefn von ber tbattentfcbulbigenm^cbten/an
jeygt/ ^m felbig/ aucb alle vjPunbt/ Hunbtfcbafft/ weifung/ erfa//
irung "cn^ erfinbung berbalb / foll aucb fouil ftcb in ^itn felben ipcinit
lieben gericbt^ub^ubelngebürt vnb funif 4llee/wieoblleb(/ bcfcb^i
ben werben*
:^^ aber btc flacj t)onrt ampee ft)ec(en Verfeme/
^-^ vnb nit von fonberlicben anlUgerngefcbcbe / wie han bic f lag
ÄU bteÜtcbter fommen/aucb wa* ber benagt bar$u antwnrt/ vnb
wae fiirtber in allen (lücPen / nacb l^ut bifer vnfeter otbnung / bcf?//
t)alb gebanbelt würbt/ foll wie oben inn anberm fall/ bc$ antlAgcrö
falben gemcltif^ / befcbnbcn werben»
fej?j?vüi^
1^
ft\5Tö fc>ff^tcbef(i^etbttncs affer o^tourcen^anb
'^^lung/jte gefcbebc von ampt^ wegen ober auff anf I4g<r/ burcb "^^*S'
tyntn jeben gericbtfcbtetber ber peinlichen geriebt/ votgemelrer ma^ii
fen / gar (leiillg x>n^ vnbetrfcbieblicb nacbeynanber vni> ItbcU wci^
gefcbüben werben/ vnb alweg bei f^er b4nblang/wan biegefcbebcn
ijl^/iar/tag/vnb (funb/aucb wer b<^eigewe(l fet/melben/bar^n foll
ftcb ber fcbteiber felbjl / aucb wie objlebc bermaflen vnbcrfcbtciben/
ba^ er folcbd alleö gebo;t vnb gefcbnben bab / bamit auff folcb f «tut
liebe 3<?t>nbtlicbe befcbtcibung (lattltcb vnnb ftcberlicb geurtbeylt/
ober wo ee notttbun würbe / barau^ nacb «Her notturfft gerabt//
fcblagt werbet» möge / tnnfolcb^maUem foUeyn)eber gericbtfcbm//
ber bei feiner i>|iicbt«U votflebt / allen möglichen (lei^ tbun / aucb
«vod gebanbelt iflitigebeym halten f^nnh bedalle^ nach laut feinet^
i>jltcbe verbunben iitm.'Vv^ fdll folcb gertcbte buch /ober Übel alwe^
nacbenbungbee gerich(d t:agsbefchlofren vnnb verwartgeb^ltcrt
£ptt oxhmxi^ mn^ 6ertc6c/tt)Kt>er^t(ic
fcb^ber bte endtcbm vttbeyl<tt ber tobt//
(f raf b<ilh/fo;men foU«
3
ß. jSarf0 U$ funffcctt mb tx$ ^(pUsß
CSC
2:cm fo ttac§ (aut J)^<r mfor t)ttn5 iK$
berufen Xcichd o^bnu of er n ühtU^M tfMh<tiftigM^k
arftllt^eno^cr überwanden/ vn6 6eßhal(» f«» wcttrottt
_ mcn ift I t>a$ ^u encltcb vttb^l ^erb4lb ii&m (obt / tvte
b« vo jgcmclwr mafTm /nacb Uue bifer vttfer ot^nttnct / gcTcbebm fol
lm/bcfcbioflmi|l/ 60 follrtl^^Än^c^Jgcrtcbt^cbmba;^«VJrb<ylb</»
fcbtctbci» / vii vn^ewctrltcb nacbttcIgenbrtrmcynttngtifiÄU^rcbmbttt
fotmim/ tarnte er ^w alfo 4uff 6(m endtcbm rccbccaa / wu inn ^<n»
vt«r t>n^ mim^tsffen amcW anfohinb fjttm attff obs«m<lt tcvo»
effWotf^ folcbcv entheb«; vtci^y len gefcbtiben ({eb( / <tu$ huM) ^
"^icbterd oflFwtlicb verlefen»
Ccm tt)o tnn &cm ttc#tta%fae^marefc^^^
^2?^»* eSK tyn ^.(f ebt/ 1>ä foH ^er5ettcl)C^cb«tber in fo^mtmnet vnnb b«»'
fcbmbun^ ^ct; vicbevl / ^<tt namen 6ed übeitbettero betientieti / <iber
ha t>€m C foU er ^U übcU^tt liirQltcb mel^ei?*
qsdi
£in|Turutt3 eptier jcJcn t>t(^l ^öm «*( <*cr
«Off flööS/dWtom'f /t>h(> affw öert(0rf((g
fUtrbun^n / Aticb noectirff ttge tV4trb4ffct^e etrfdtrun^
vnn^ erjptnbttna/ robe^b4lb 4Uee n4cb l4ttc ^cyfer
> ^4rU 6(d fiinfltctt vn ^e5 bey U^en Tleicb^ ^t^nwm
Sf![cU\)tnf i(t burcb ^Uvtthrpitff vnb fcbefjfcn ^iQ gertcbr^ mdichi»
vecbt cr04n(/b4^ T^^fo ^ettwiitts vpi Eifern S^t^icbc (f ebt/^er iibeW
tb4t b4lben/fo er mit Csmbt b^t tc«
lerrft We «(ttf uofeettoeS
txfcgluß 9W |<{)m t)^4>9t*
ar^ni
f <^ic ^<m fcwcr vom lebenjum tobtst^vafft xcct^en foll.
f (iOit beiw (cbwett vom leben jwm tobtffcHmfft wttbtn folU
f ^tttrcb feirtensaneen lab jtt vier (lücFen ju fcbnitten vnb Jer
fcdwm / vn^ 4iro5ttmto6t geffrafft werben foU / vnnb foUen folcb*
viertbeyl 4ii|f gcmeyne vier w>e3Jlr4Jren offentUcb seb4tt3cn vm\>
f <«5tt^emrrt^e^llrcb ^erflolfnnff feiner gUbet vom leben jwitt
eot>t geriebt/ vnt> f örwr offendicb ^4r4ttff geleflt werixn foUcn»
XLll
§öm 3%rt*
H" 13(n ben flÄlgeit mit hm (f r4ng 6^er toe vom leben ^5m to^e
tifolU
gericbc werbe» foll
6m mvmcfm*
f <^it bm W4(fer vom leben^wm tobt ffeflrÄff t werben foll.
ff Hthmbis ver«rr4bett mh gipfelt werben folU
ceTleyiier Jtiwtobt creent/befcbloffw W»>rbe/b40 ber nbelcbcc^'
^attj,
ttt 4tt hk nc!)t(l4et3<rcl?loc|fc wcrbm foU / öo follm bie nacNot*
om6en w^ttlin an ber 4nber vttbcrl/ wie obflcbc/ aucb ban<^en aljW
laticmb/ t>nb foll bar^u auff bü rtc(^(l}4C( ^ttrcbbu vnuarttüöjf^
?)on mfim ntft cj(acn{>m Jattgcft
urtbcrlt jJctfon voi 6et thbtnns mxtüXü«nbtn%CMSttkQtt0
. _ rtffcrt wcrbctt folt / fo folUn J)tc nacb uoT^mbm to^tter wei/A
tber tii bcr vjcbeyl (fcbn/alfo Uwwiii»/ X>nn5 foll 641311 voj bctcnc//
Ikbcn til>t:un5 offmcUcb 4w(f cyrtm wa^m bt^ 511 btv ricbc(74tr vin
^cfürt / vnitb öcr leib mitalambmsaitsmscrijfc» wcr^m / ncmlit^^
mit rt.sri|fcii.
ingcfcngfnnpi» vcr waren.
•Tl^r4m«: anicrsmig ju bolcm^Uubm / Fttnflpctger ubcltbctogeir
l«rcb<6im»«5 oalbcr/ 1({ ju rccbtctf4ttt/ ba,$ Ib, fo gejctt wcrcig vot
Smcbtjtcbt/itincfcfcngFnwgmtbalKtt wetzen fotl/ biß er gfiwgf4«t
vnb gebürlicb c4tttion vnb be(J4tt{>c tbut/^Äiiiic Uitbt vti^ lewt Vöj
%m vcrftcberc Tveri>en«
fPort (a6(?ra|f /öic ntt iöm co6c o6cr gcfcttgf*^
lieber verwarwng/ wie obflebt/ v<rurtb«y Ic
werben folU
cjjcvf<
hebe ttberwmbttnejCbi<4ttcb n4cb laut bifer vnfer otba
A ^ 1**"? ^l'^^S^"* ^ <*" l""» ^"^ o^<^ «liberri / peinlicb 5W
flrafft werben foflybaf fte bannocbt bei htm leben bleibeti m^se/f<3cb
Wfbcyl bcrT^Kbw bocb ntt4nbcr|(/bA»nmitwifle«tlicbemrae>t
«berbe«
ober benelcb H^^ oberlert vnnb ber recbmerjlenbigcn^um wenttf «>
fJen mit vier <in^ bett v>tbeylern ober fcb^ffen / bie er für bit tit<jlicb//
{ttn bar^u erfo;bert / bU. \m aucb berbalb gebotfam ^än follen bcfcb//
lt(:(^n / tnib v6n feitid rtcbterlicben am|>ts we;^en an htm ^ericbt er//
^ffnen/vnbburcbbeftgtticfctfcbteibet/oiferttlicbvcrlcfcnlafrcn/ii^d
fott aucb bet "Jltcbat^/in obgcimltcn feHen / b4r4n fein / b4ß bcr nacb
ricbter fein vjtbeyl voln^ieben / bk fclben vttbeyl follen/ wie bernacb
«ol^t/im attif fcb«ii>a» burcb btn fcb?eiber f o;miert werben.
f 3» f otmtmn« ber necbjf nacbejemetten vttbeyl/foll berge*
tkbtfcb«iber / wo im ielben ortic^el crn ^ . (lebt/ beö bePUgten fi4//
i^en benennen/ aber babod C9e|«QCi|{/foU(rbt(f4cbber t>belcbae
m^ bA^ Puröe{( mdbm*
l«b(f raff b4lb /bie ntcbt jum tobtgefpto//
eben werben»
HK Vlaut 3^eyf<r Äarl^ bed fi»tt|pten vnb be« berligw "Heicbö ozb
it ung befcbeben / \^i^ recbeor ant/ baf :Ö . fogegenwirri« vo; bem
Tlicbter (f ebe / bcr ttiiifetMctsai vmbuicben b4»blung b4lb imt C.
5eübc*
fcgUid q^ncr )(i>«n t>)^(.
uns t><i: oM^«o»«(»il>cin Itui^t vcnvifcft «Nviiai r«U.
"3 «I
§ C>ffmt\ickin brntt^dr^ef^de / vnnb ^atnach hkixcen uchtm
fins<t I ^Amicarmi0^4n^elcvn^^(un^t^tb4C/4b^Awm /aud^
fütthfx ^e^ \anbt9 hi^ 4u|f 0tm^tBcb(rlAttl>tms^<rotxt:0eT(vcr/»
§■ ^ffcntltcb in hxanQvc cfcff c(t/bcv^c o?m ab^fcbnittm/ vnnl>
6cd Unbce biß4tlfF^»n^cUc^et;Uubun3 i>etr oberrcyt verwci^ tvcr/^
2>m folU
^t rotte« <j«g^aft)«tt.
S" Äffctitltcb m btiirtcfctr gcff dt / vn6 fürtbct? mit rattert nufe«//
I^AWCrt/ 4ttcb t>cö Un^td bi^ Ättff fun^tlicb «tkttb»«^ ^cr obcrbÄ»ö>
S'(V5ctcHfo cy« iibc(tb4tt<t; 5« famgt cyncrÄiiflfgclcstctt recbtltcbm
l«b(Jraff jentÄntd fcwaitt wt^<t? jö cete/ ob«? abctetwaö von reine»
crgcngüttetjßcfebe verwttcft/ wicbc^b^lb bwitonnetUcbefltajfert
XTemlicbvonMrcbHcbemabfcbwetrenÄttt butt{>etten vnb ftbende»
rttticfcUnfabmJ>/3temwelcbervotXicbtet;o^ergettcbt/Ättcb^et:
vnf ettfcb balbcn/fo eyn ebeman mit eyner (ei>t^n J>im Obet/am buii
Letten vnD iwen^tgffen atttcf el Änfobent / ^tem fo cpn ebemrtn ey //
nem anl>ern/ vnnJi öan bte b^fen be(leltntt^$wtfacbet ebe betteffent/
am bwn6ertert vn^ eyn ^nb^xemtii^m avücH 4nf<;bcn6 / 3tem \o
cyn cbeman eyn «tnbetr wetb tcgefe^t t(f / bergleicbc» iii etUcben 5icb//
Itekn/ wie oben angeseyattcoberfo fnnfBin vnbenanten feilen /^er//
gleicben jutbtl» Vecbtlicb etrfnnben xoiktbt l €5o foll folcb wibetFe//
rnng obet ^ araebting ^e0 ante mit Uutern wo»tc 4n 6ie vttbey l wie
^MQi{i\)^m \o\t IQ^ivnQm l befcbubm vn{>5eo|fncnt wer^en#
cy ney beFU^ten )>erromft<
^rmiw#
Si^m#n5J^c<<?0pelrt(t<^5m'<§(0o^^n^ xum
Tletcbö otbnnngeyn ijerfon/ fo vmb |>einlicben ff raff wil
w^^,<^y-^lenMngenommen t>nb bePlagt wer/mit vttbeylvnbrecbt
Ie6tff5tt erFennen befcblolfen wwrb /bie felbig vitbeyl foll vngcmrliclj
ttacbttolgenber mvvflcn bcfcbüben / vnnb n^cb bewclcb bed Tlicbtcrd
Äitff ^em entUcben recbtt<ia; aU vo: in bem neun ynnb neuneigffetf
Ätticf el alfo itnfabenbt / Jtem wwrbc Aber i>er bef U^t ;c. gemcU
Wirt / offentlicb gclefen werben.
^
ec*
ra icein m ne(6(^a%f<»tjtem artttfet Ja etnf
c^mntteyner vttbeyl/ foll 5er sericbtfcbwber in befcbjeibnitg fol//
aS VJtbcyl an bcö 3- . ffatt ben namen bee Fl%crö /für bae ^. bcn
txamtn bed bef laflten/ vnb ba b aö C (Jebt/ bee bcFUfften abcltbatt
melbcn.
C^V^^k flocj fo C ^I()ettw>ttt»ecsctt5l.t»it»ei? cd.
"4^ :ö. fo %i\ gegen vot bicfem gericbt (lebt / gcfcbeben iff / aucb bed
befugten Atttwwrt vnb allee nottürfftig cinbnngcn grünbige flctf//
ficteerfarnng "onh erf inbung / fo alUd nach Unt 2^eyfer ÄarU bed
fnnfften vnnb bee T^eicbö o;bnung bc^b^lb gcfcbeben / i|l ber fclbtg
ttemelcbeFlagtmit cntUcber vttheyl vnnb rccbt von aller peinlicber
«rafflebig erFant / ed wer bann facb / baß ber anFWgcr feiner tlag
recbtme(fig vjfacb gcbabt / batbnrcb ber Tlicbter bewegt werben
mkbt / bit Foff m vnb fcbcben anßreblicben gegrwnbten recbtlicben
Vtfacben ju compenftren vnb 56 vcrdeicbe». *X> nb waö fürtbcr b\t
»artbeien fcbaben ober abtrage balbg<gencynanber$u r lagen ver^
ineynen / b<Ki!> follen ftenacb außwcifnng obgemelter otbnnng / fnit
cnbtlicbein burgerlicbem recbten vo; h<tn fclbengertcbt / ober fo vot»
amptd wegen geFlagt wirbt vot ber felben/ fö von ampte wege Plag
tm/necbffen otbenUcbe» obetFey t auftragen»
^^^^ vo j von befcbteibnng ber aller gemelt wirbet/ foll fwrtber nacb
«nbttrtg beö recbten geni^Ucb in betngericbt bebalwn / vitb von geri-/
cbtö wcgcit in cyner fonbern bebaltnnß verwart werben barmttCwo
<d Fanfl?iglicb not tb»« wö«fbc) folcber gericbtö b4nbcll bafelbff jit«.
f inben wa%
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g. Karte i>c$ funffem t>tt{) t)C0 ^cplfgjjtt
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^Aratt^cynict>cn ^an^ciigmcbtö b<ittt>clob<t?v«b<Tlfo»m<nMt£
hit foll crflUcb rojgcmclt fein oberPcvt vmb «rFlaima anfucben/ v»
too <ibetr vot^emclc ober^cyc t>cd attcb ntc^u^fame verf^an^c b<tt/
fo foUcnftebetAti^ctrn vcr(?m^i^ct>rA^t(ucben«'
Ucbcttcjertcbteti»
5^
ticbt/ foll folcbcrgcrtcbtd Fojlttng vnJ) nijwtis b^lb jittt
liebe rn^ gUtcbmcflTtgc 02i>nunc( macbctt /b4^ ^itr^ttrcb
^_^ nwm<int>c übcrflitfllg bcfcbwetrt / vtmb 6« vcrfcbultt«
nbcUb^ttcrbcficrUicbtUcbct: jö gcburUcbctrffmfFbmcbt/ rttbait^
f otcht vnbtllicbö vnf o(lcn /tfccbt vn^ gcrccbtigPeyt ntcbt vcrbinbot^
^vcr^cn/'X)n^ foll fonl>crlicb er t» anPlcact: für cynö bcf Uawti OQttng
Vttb wÄtrtgclt bctn büttcl Mcf vttb rtÄcbt ttbctr ftcbm FrcttQci: $u gebe
nit fcbttl^i5 fei"« '^X'o abctr bcrf otnmcn wer/ in folcben feilen minder
*tt ncmen/lxibei foll ee bleiben/ vn^ wae aber funff gertcbw vnb 4n//
J>cr hoffen / aitjf befc^ung bee gericbtd / ber fcbeffen ober vjtbeyUu
fofeelt / Ättcb gericbf^fcbteibcrn/ bittteln/ tburbütter/ nacbricbter
vnt> feinem fnccbt Äftfflanffcn würbe / foll bnrcb beö^cricbtö /ober
i>ed felbengericbrö obcrFeyi: on bed f W^erd nacbtbeyl be^rtlt werben.
^tc Wc $Rt(f (er t)0n f^affiinci kr ubcU^ccccr
^eyn fonberltcbe bclonung nemcn folUn^
€CV<
^
Cm tt)tV fcmt> {)ertci(/tt>tc an cdtcgm cn
ben mißbtancbt werbe / ba^ bi< "Kicbter vonn tynte, fcbei»
_ tibelcb4ccere wegen/fo peinlicb <je(lra(f t wirbet/fonbcre be
lonitn^ von ^twi 4nH45er begern vnb nemen / bae flan^ wiber b<td
ampt vnb wirbe eyned Xicbterd/aucb bad recbc vnb alte billtcbeye
i|i / wan ey n folcber 'Siebter wo er vo jebem (IncP {im belonnng bee/
mkbtbemnacbricbterberbalb wol innergletcben {w% I SDarnrnb
wollen wir/bae furo alle folcbcTlicbw Feyn belonung von ben rl4//
acrn fo;bcrn ober ttcmen folUn.
K'
^W^d^w Sflctc§6 pan(((§ cjcrt(§(6 oxUw% xlv
^ic C0 mit {)cr |B4(§agenö()c(c^c((crgu(^
rer ^fcbalten werben foll.
Sem fo cptt u6e(c^c(ccr a«ßtt)etc§c/fo foff ^^^.
ber Xtcbter jwen ober bxälbt^ fei ben flitcbti^e frennb
erfotbern/ vnb ingcaenwirtifl^ ey t ber felben vnb jwei
er fcboffen hte gericbtii ber (acben vnnerbacbt / alU
fein bab vnb fliitter/fo in feinem gcricbtgelegen/bttrcb ^in gefcbwot
nm gmcbtfcb«tber ey^entlicb bcfcb^ciben vn^ anff^eycben / vn beni
übcltbctter nicbte bawon vollen kiffen/ 2lber welcbegiitrer verberb
lieb weren/ vn^ nicht ligen mocbten/ ^it folt ber "Kicbter mit^weyett '
2>eesericbtö / vn^ obtfcmclten von ber freimbfcbaff t verf anffcn/ vn
wad alfo baran^gclo^c wirbt /aneb befcb:ciben/ vxvC> ba^ ^atifr^jele
fampr ber ver^eycbnujj bi»ber hM geriebt legen / alba eö weib vnnb
Finben/ober anbern {mun neebf^en erben^iim beftcn vnnerrite^t foll
crbalten werben» IPolten aber i^i& flüebttgen frcwnb t foleb bcfebti//
bengnt^uno» vnnb cbeeö btwbcr ^m gcricbt gelegt / ober aber aneb
barnacb $» iren hanbtn ntmtnl vnb ey n nottiirff eigen bejlanbt vnb
}>Äicbttbnn/berürt gut alfo in bajftnng^u bebalten/ vti^ bcm jliieb
tigen/bieweilervnnertragen oberbiefacb vnan^gefiirt i(f/nicbtd
2>auon volgen^ulalfen / i>a$ folt jnenge(fatt werben / bocb follenbii
febacbtenannemer / ber beriirten giitter beö tbetterd ebeweib vnn\>
in^tvn (ob er bie bett) nottnr jftigc Icibö narnng vo foleben güttertt
reycben / vnb ba^ alleö mitrabc vnb wijfen b^ ricbterd vnb voiQtii
tnelter oberf ey t tbun / vnb follen awcb bit Siebter vnnb oberfeyt j»
|r<m ntiQ/ben flücbttgen von jren gii'tterngar nicbcd mmm'
fpott #0(ncr oöcr geraubter f)a() /fo m
bie gertcbt ^ompc»
Ccttt fo ge(to(en o6er ^erau6c göc imx eptt
geriebt bmcbt / vnb ber übeltbetter niebt babei betretten/
vnb verbefft wirbt/foll ba0felbigberi>cinlicbXicbter5iJ
feinen banben nmKnivnb getrewUeb verwaren/ vnb fo jemanbt ber
felben bab bcgert vn fouil an$eygt/ b<4 j w bk vn^weijfelieb gcranbc
ober gejlolen fei/fo foll \m bxt wiber verfcbaff t werbe / vngcaebtet ob
<6 glcicb an etUcbcn ojten anberö g<b«l«tt/ba0 ntcbt ey n gewonbeyd
fon^ce <rtt mtf bmttcb iü • 6(0 (tch 4t»a; büfh^ih itmns hU\t /Toll
f)«r triebt« folcbcm f leger ^burltcbe fcbleittttcfe recbtwd vetbelffm.
iPnt>ö fo an eyttem foTcbctt otttfn obetrpercpeinitcb vn^ bürgerlich
ßericbtbarfeytbet« / vn ^te fcb^ffcn 5ee »emlicbesericb« weiriewif
fiSiMamntm iubiinatn weren / folt ber telbterpeiftltcb Xtcbter vm
weniger vntoftme wulen / ^te felben facb an fetner ober? er t burger//
(tcb geriebt /^af<lb(Bwet^cn/vnn^^oll5^fo•^erfl/^er alfo recbtlicb
^arjw PUgen will/ vo: folcbemgertcbt ern Uff an^rwit bürgen /o6«r
»um wenigd en mit feinem ey be tbßt» / wo er folcber focbm b^lb ver//
Iniltg tvür^e/5em 4n^em tbeyl feinen gefügten fcb4^enn4cbme(^^
fung bc^ gericbtd ab^ttlege/be^gleicbett foU btvantwmuxJ fo folcb«
ab in recbrett vmrettm tvUl / Aucb tb^n«
l'^em fo ^4ll ber Fteger bewetHf / haf b'u felbtg bab fettt / vn^ fm
raublicb ober ^teb lieb genommen (et / foll jm bieburcb recbt^ß//
erFant vnb reibet werben * t) nb fo (tcb eyn antwurter bte bei lagtet»
bab im recbten $tttterbretten vnberffttnbe / vnnb (tcb ^e0balb lo(leit
vnb (cb46en betreff ent/ wie ob((ebt/ vert>fitcbtet/ vnb ban mtcb vt»//
luff 6er felben babe/ mit feinem ey^e nit betewent m^cbt / ba$ er vn//
wiffent bed vnrecbten ber^ommen^/ biegemelcen vet^uffigen bab att
(tcb biacbt bat/ober aber folcbd wiffene iibcrwifen würb/fo foll bem
felben antwurterCob nottiirfftia atittnß att (f bie arreffircen ober bc//
r^mmerten babgangf wer) $u|ampt$tmltcbeg<rtebt6 fcbaben ollea
naeb mefftgung beo gericbtd ^ft bemalen / im rechten auflpgelegt wer//
]>en / t^ett aber ber antwttrter tß bem an ftcb bttngen / ber verlufltgc
hab/be^ vnrecbten herkommen nit gen>i(i / fo foltjcbertbeyl feingc//
ricbtfcbaben fclbd bemalen / vnnb ber Hager bem bie beflagg bab alfoi
volget/ob c& vi<cb wer/ vnnb ^tmticbe atjunggemocbt bett/wtc bo«
mrtcbterfent vnb mefltgt außricbten/ IPer aber obgemclter maOett
fern »erffiicbter antn>urter votbanben / (0 gebttrt bermaffen betit
Ilager ber b'u bab entlicb nimbt / abermaU sitnlicb aQUttg ( wo '^ '
<iU vo{(lcbt baratiff gangen v9Pf)iuhti<t\m*
• 09
(JCVUI-
Al£tt)tfe aber cptt ficgcr tnnotomeltem faff^cr
'X--'anfj>mcbtgen bab halben/ bit eyg«nfcbafft snu0(Am/vn fHinbt
bocb babei nit beweifen / ba^ jm bit burcb raub ober btebflall / enttf
wwt wölben wer / vimb bic antfburcer machten ^argegen i^ recht
^nilsnic.
XLVl
5l&nufc§cn m^^ pctnltc^ ^mc^cö ^x^n^.
«nttg ntt barb«ngcn/bag bie felbig Fricgifcb habe/ mit gutem recht//
tnc(ligem tittel/vonbem Reger bmcbt vnb an fic|ommcn wcr/fo foll
bem Hlegcr auff fein bctewruttg mit bem eybeCbaH jm folcbegiitterge
raubt obergejlolen wotben jeicn)gcglaubt werben/ vnb jm bte felbert
Äbewnalö in maifen/old obftebt barauff volgen«
£\?i:Manattfo(c0crgcfto(ttcrot)cr gcra«6(cr ^i c^^
Wi>ttt:cb ernicb Unge ber %eit Feyn gcweererfejfen werben /lünbe
Aber ber anFlcger (ein gebüreubc weifuitg ( vtie ob(?ebt) nit volnf iin»
foUct» a[$b<in bie antwurter lebig crFanc werben / vnbin bie bc|lag//
tcn gütter wiber volgcnntit Mmlicber ablcgüng 5uS«f »ffter rofrett
vnb fcbaben / bamn ^cr vnbc(lcnbtg Flegcr »acb crmc(jigung ber vt
t\)ey\tv<vHnt werben folU
^ aucO ^tc (ittcscflagcm ^ab in obpndm fcl^ «$*
-^^len aQung balb ober fünft / on mercFUcbcn fcbaben / biß %u en//
bnns vot bc(iitttpter rcchtfcrttgung/ In geriebt nit (lehn bleibe Font/
welcbcrtbe^l ban naeb ertncjfuiigbeö gmcbte fjmptlieb / ober bed
riebtttrd vnb jwcyer bed ttcttcbc* nottürfftiggritlgfameatition/ be//
ffanbt ober ftcbtrbcy t thwt / bie felben babe^u bcn gcricbcfitagen / fo
berbalb Funbtfcb4ff t gcf iirc werbett foll / wiber int^ae geriebt iu (^l
len / vnb weder in bem felbigm geriebt berbalb vcrluff ig würbe/ iEd
wer vmb bie b4u^)tfaeb / ober fcbaben v»igeweygcrtvolgM«bun/
vnb wo bie felbig bab vot entuitgVnbvoln^iebimgbcörccbteHab//
ttienctobergcergertwftrbe /folcben übgaug ober crgcmug naeb er//
lentSuß bee gmebtd Ut erflactcn / bem folt bie auj^btücbig bab vmb
wenicter vnFoflcne vn fcbabend Willen barauf alfo auß betagt wetf
bert/ vnb auff folcbe wibcrffellung völgeu /po aber obgeutebmbej
ffanbt beybe tbcyl tbim woltcrt / fo folleu bii antwitTter Mif^^ber^
bamitjugeUffen/ vnnb wo in bifer banbluttgge^ weiffeit Wurbe/foll
tAbti bei bert recbtuerflmbigen vnb a» etibett vnb oxten l wti J» mbi
bifer vrtfer otbnung ange^eygt/ gebtattcbt werbeti»
ÜC^x^ aber ob^emclcer artcjc?o|!nar cjcjtolner
XX»%b<rg«rattbt«ttgütterhalb/iemattbttttit b^fem glauben viib
v«> Ach« barbci betttttert / vnb ber <tüFUflr«Ä<3<rt bem ober bm felb«
«gij.
pdnlicbd rccbtmi» htQm/ J^<t<thtt btt tidjttt be^Mb von ampt^
we^cn^ge fotcbcn V(t:^«l7tltcb<n Icuttm/ |»ctnltcb6 nebten^ 5(bmif
eben woU/tn folcbm ^^etnltcben facbm folUo^egm ^en berürnn txr//
t>4cbcm i^fomn / g^aUm vnni^ ^cban^^lc tk>(tr6m/ wu vo» in ^t^(r
t^nfer o^bnung/ von ^cr ^«tcl^cn {^cinltcbcn fümemm vn^ bonMtinj^
llerUcb^faQCti^«
(i\S^ ^^^ tt)attt)annatt(§ jcntam t^Mvkctci^cf
iVgeflolrtetsiittcr b<«lb / ^5 ^nnlichtt frag Qnüsfam an$vp3»ttg^
«uff im b4Ct/^ae xoitbtt im acbc vnb btcifft^flm amcM anfa^mb t
^Ktn fo of nn^cit voüxbaivnnb im necb^eo ArncFcUAvnAcb Angc//
'^^Inn^/ ^eftolne vnn6 QtcMihtc farmbe^ceer in <y ntm gevtcbs^
%xoan$ crfunbcn / ^tc foUen bem ber ^alfo varlotm b<tt / vnnb Wftf
votflebc bctverec/ 1>4^ jm folcbc^flolnc ober gemubte b<tb ^(le^tg/
AbcrtnaU on befcb wetrung ( d4n 4Ueyn ob fblcb^ cHenb* vtecb / vnnN
5tmUcb( nomiirfrciffe4Qung barauffcfan^cn war / bit felbtg o^nn^
docb on tibcrfluS sn bellen) wtbcr vctrfcbam: wetrbm . tli^o abet: itit
tn4n6c bxtQimtiun bab / vmb wentacr vnro^^n« vnb fcb4t>en0 xeii
Un/vot ^ünbclicber crftnbttnggemelce vnrecb^enbei^otnmcnd/vnb»
wem ^te 3ä({tin^(/4U^$ubür5m/ vnb ^ü bcta^n htotttl ba^ (ÖU in
bifem fall mit berma^ / wievot ^(ßb4lb von buraetHteben tvA)a^/t
mm vnb ^bs d€(f olncr olbtvsfXfMhwe Qütttx b<ub /5er(^t iil/ (i,wk
befcbebcn.
M«j. csf^cm 06 e^tt kfcic^tgto* fctn f)<i6c /^ic jm t)tt^
4^3toci(fltcb3i>f{üttb(/vnn&6utxb6ieb(f4U o^er rnttb encwmbee
«i^otbm xottimitg^un vn6 vnbcn^tter 6ing von bam tb4tter toiber
^tttücsen bmcbte/^4mmbfoUi>ar rclbt96ar4lfob4d fein /bocbtnte
bevma^ / aU obffebt/ wi^(rdrl4nefc/nt(m4n^tnicbt0 fcbulbi^fctn/
4ucb in {eifern abvc anbcm ^ctr^eicb(n fdlm /^ß^A^en / mbtt fcinttt
wiUen/mtamict(Cwa;^(n/ Tnb wopcrb<rcbc6t5C,ni(|><tnlicbfU'/
gcnwolt/fofolcbannocbc^ieoberPeVC bm. thtttitiniiht btl^oitoM
nifler von 4nM>M wegen recbtf eretgen/ vn^ »Acb flelcgenbey« btc pa
fon vn^ Üb(trf4rttn5 i?r4ffm lAffen*
Sfi$m(fc§ctt 5iac§$ pattl((§ cjcrtc^e w^n ttttg* xl vii
^tt tt)ae mag t)tc öocrcftcue m t>m pcmttcgctt
^etricbten no^etürfftige galten $um4cben
vn^ 3» beffem fcbul^tg fein»
lieben getriebnen / gewonbeytiff / fo man eynen newert
galgen macben / ober cpnm alten be(|ern will / ba^
- , ^ alle^immerUnc bie in btm felben }>einlicben geriebe wo
nmlhM^h beljfen muffen/ i>a^ bMin eynen^roffen vn^imlicben vn//
^o(f en maebt/folebcr vnf ofl je $w Jetten anffbie ibenen/ fo eynen übel
tbetter )>einlicben be^la^en / mit nocb mer vnbillicbeye gefcblagett
«virbet/bad fclbigju fürrommen/ "XP^llen wir/fo fiirtber biircb voi
^emele necbf^er peinlicbe ober^ey c ey n newer galg $n ixmmtxn fürge
r^ommen vnnb verfcbajfc wirbec / ba^aU ban gebacbceober^eyten
ober i'rc bewclbabcr/ alle bic fo (tcb jimmcr banbtwercPe vmb Ion ge//
biaucben / vnb in foleber |)einliebengericbtö oberFeyt fefjbaffc feinb/
Inbief^att/mareEcober bo:if /barinnen ba^ peinlieb geriebcgewon//
lieb gebaltren wirber/ bnreb bt^ felben peinlicben geriebca büttel ober
rtmprfneebtanlf eynen nambafftigcn tagcrfo:bcr / vnb in bae ^nm
wenigflen viergeben cagjuno: vertnnb(nla(}en/ vnb wclcbe mitbin
fer erfotbernng/ alfo anbey mifeb bctretten/ober innxccnbigbtd mcil
svege von jrer ben^Ucben wonnng arbeyccen/ folUnanff be(lim|>ce
jeit "^nb malffatterfebeinen/ vnb Peyncr on Uibd not/ bieer auff wi//
berfpKeben bei idnmi eybe betbewret / bei (Iraff seben gülben anfiblct
ben* %\\^ obgebaebtcn jimmetrlentm/follber peinlieb riebtcr ber enb
cyn ^al / fouil jn ya gemelter arbey t not bebnnef t / beflimmen/vnnt>
alßban bic felb bt& ricbterd beftimpte jal vongebaebten jimmerleuc
cen bttreb cyn loß/ ba^ er ber peinlicb ricbter b4rjn verotbent / er we//
len/bie bei vermeibnng obgeb4cbter peen vmb eyn gewonlieben tag//
lon/baßfneberfelbiggeriebtöberr/on berH4ger feb4ben bemalen/
volg jutbun febnlbig vnb pflicbtig {tin 1 4neb berbalb von niem4nc
^efcbmecbt / veraebt 0 ber verf leint werbe« follen. 0o 4ber ey ncr
von i'emanbtd berbalb verlUgt/verfebmeebt ^ber ver0leinet wurb«
^er foll eyn m4rcf golbte/ 4U oflpt b46 befcbicbt / b<tlb ber oberf eye/
in bed peinlicben geriebtd 5W4ng ber überf 4rer ftQt/ vnb ben 4nbem
t4lben tbeyl bemgefebmecbten verfallen ^zini barjii jm aiicb von g<
melter obcrfeyt foll mitrecbt verbolffen werben/ Tnb foll folebö voi
xnb nacb gemelter recbtlieber bilff bem felben gefcbmecbten «,n feiner
tb^en/guten leumttbc vnb b^nbcwcrc^ / in 4llweg vnnerleQlicb vnb
♦»fcbÄ^mfei«« ^ ,,^
CQ^Vf.
cqovii
^«•-^ ^een tttt v<trm$cbt/ 6er foll tm ^crcl^cr 4U lang geäfft werbmt
tig er^cm txtrlcQtcn »otmrffrig mtfcbwlbtsuiwf tbiwt/6Ä^ tr i«<
<tn feinen cbten/ bamic nie woll gtichmecht h<thcn/ vn ftcb vcrpfitcht
fiivuv betsUich fcbmacb ^uttermctben/folcber übctf 4rer foll attcb ^
tvi^er von nietnan^c bcfcbüQC obcr^ebanbcbabc werben/ bei vcrlt*»
tntiQ ohsmiAtcv ptm ey n er m4rc0sot6c0«
5^m fo matt ^citttt epttm^aCgett o6ctcpttcnt^
r^bAMptff<*tt ttiÄwrett will / foll cd i>ar$u nottürff tiger «irtwtrrtf
botbinnfb lebet? peinlicben stricht ohtthyt(i$h<iffta\[evm<ti\'enxci«
oben von tun ^tnmerUuten scfaQC i($/iiucb seb^Uen vo{> 5ebAn^el(
«csvitj.
Spott m#:cuc§ctt t)tti) bofm t)ttiterni5ttffcic$cK
5ewonb(l^(<i^/r^ <^n ecUcben otcen vnt> cnbeti
^cb4Ucn xoii^mi)
cbct vnb deb^lcett wiirbe/fo tyn iibcltbctter mtc^ef^ol//
rutr obet? geraubter babe betrecten vnb gefengPlicb ein/?
, Fompc/bAd4l^bAnfolcb<fcf(otno{>er geraubt gttcbent
jbencn/ (oce alfo gcfloln ober abgeraubt wo:ben / ntt wtberumb ju//
ge({elt fonber 6er oberFer t bce ottd eingejiogen/ it>c|?glcicben an vile«
tnbm 6er mt^bmucb fo cvn fcbtffmait mitUinctn fcbiff vetferet/fcb'^
tff btücbtg würbe/ 6aß er ai^bann 6er oberf er 1 6ed felbigen ottd /mit
fcbiflp / leib v»6 gütttcrn verfallen fein folt/jitein fo eyn furmait mit
cpmtnxooQtn vmbwürjfe / vnn6 erncn vnuerfebenltcben t^6t/ 6ae
«ilß6an 6er felbtg furman 6er oberHeyt mit wagen / pfctben vti6 güe
(em aucb verfallen fein roll.€^o wer6en aucb 4n vilen petnltcbenge//
rtcbten vn6 6er felben mancbcrler mt^b:eucb erfunben / aU 6ad 6te
gefengFnw^ nit %& 6er verwarung fon6er mer {xintgung 6er gefan<^
7en vn6 eingelegten jugericbt / Jtem 6a^ 6urcb 6ie oberFert etwan
cicbdicb 4ucb erbäte perfonctt ou vctgecnb bcrticbtisun^/ l>^r<n let«
g
l
iwtttvnb anbete 3mi3(am anjeygungaimegrtffen vnbingefcftgF//
miß btacbt werben / vnb in folcbcm angriff etwan bwrcb 6ic obcrtcit
jcrcbwin6tlicb vn6 vnbe6ecbtltcbgeban6elt/6arburcbberangegrif
,cn an feinen eb«n nacbtbeyl erleibet/ 3««>6aß5ie v:tbeylburcb
bcn nacbricbter vnnb ntt ben ricbteröber vitbevlcr aii^gcfi^tocben
Vn6 croffcnt wer6en/3«ttt an etlicben oJten/fö tyn übeltbctrer an^/r
fcrbalb 6ed lafferd vnfer bclei6igten (Waieffet ö6er fim(l tnn an6crrt
feilen / fo 6er übeltbetter leib vnnb gilt titt verwitcf t vom leben jfim
ro6tge(^ra|f4:/wer6en weib vnb ttnbevan bettelffabe/vnn6 6adgut
t>cm berrcit jugewifen/ vn6 6ie vn6 6ergleicbengewonbcy t / IPollen
xtir/baß eyn je6e obcr^eyt abfcbaflprtt vnb bavan (ein foll/baß fte bin
f ürtbcr nit geübt /gebtaucbt ober gebalten werben/ ale wir t>an au^
:t^cy ferltcber macbt bie felben biemit auflFbcben / vernicbtigcn vnn6
¥ibtbim/ v*^^ binfürter nitetngcfürt werbenfollc».
ratb Sefttcbt werben foU.
vnfer vn6 6cd beyligen Tleicbö o:6n«ttg6er j^einlicb//
m geriebt von ratb fwcbcngcmelt wirbct/fo follcn all//
- - - wegen bie geriebt /fo in jrcn^cinlicbenptoceflfen/seri//
cbtd Übungen vnb v:tberlen / 6arin inen jweincl $uficl/ bei )ren ober
bofen/6a fte au$ altem vericrtem gebtatteb bijjbet vn:6erricbt begetc
iren ratb 5u fi^cben fcbulbig (ein/ "XOckhc aber nit obei'boff e betten/
vnbauffcvne peinlicben anFlegcrcbegembiegcricbtdubuttgfür*'
etenommen wer / follen inn obgcmeltem fall bei jrer oberf ey t bie 6a^
fclbitt veinlieb geriebt fürnemlteb vnb on alle mitteljw bannen/ vnt>
41^ begen macbt bvit / ratb fucben . "TPo aber 6ie ober^er t e» offictd
ittb von amptö wegen wiber eynen mi^benb lern/mtt pemhcber ait//
f lag ober b^nblung volnfüre/fo follen 6ie Tlicbter/wo fnenjweifelrt
»uficle/beibeunecbtlenbobenfebulen/Stette/ Commtmen oberan/>
bcrtt reebtuer jlenbigen / ba fte bic vnberriebt mit 6em weniggenjoj
ßen5it«rlangcnvcrmevnen/ratb5u(uebenfebul6tgretn. TPnJ> t(t
J)abei nemlicb $«* mercf en/ ba^ in allen sweiuelicben feilen/ nit allerrt
richtet vnb febojf en/fonber aucb wea eyner jeben folcbeu oberreyt tu
|>cinlicbei> ffmffeujt» ratb«» vnb 5» b4n6eln gebütt / berbalb recbt/'
% iiij
ccj?ij?<
follm/cd bt3t\> (kh t>ann / ba^ cfn panUdfCf AnBegtt ^<n rkbtcr ttff
(ttdftt in Uintn p<m\id)tn ptoctffat i banMunom t>nb ü^nnstn ^er
tr(cbmcr((mdt|m rabc^u M^bm / t>ad folUttf 6ce feltm ht^mi»
^m tbeyfd Poflcn ^cfcbebm. "VOo 4b«r d« bepfa^n bn^fcbaÄt/
freunde oder betflent)«; im ^(m^cf4nam $&Aonm^ar^(icbmr4C^
fttcbtttter b« htm tricbter bcgoftm/ fo foll er 4llflF^(^ oefaitactt freund
fcb^lf t o^(r hdUtmbtt Sofien inm ^4mit mllfMren. wo 4ba; ^<5 fcl//
bt3<»5«f<»»»5<« f rcttn^fcb«fft i<ijg«meltm bffm 4«^ 4minr nit vtt
tndcbt/fo foU er 4uff iXr obcrf cy c re(?m folcbe r4^CM» <rlm»m fcbttl
tiq ^^n I IDocb fo fen; ^cr fclbtcr rtcbrar nit vmtt(rctt/b4^ bk Mtb//
fucbtttt^ awctrltcbct; wci^ j« vcrjucj t)«r r4cbc/4Hcb mcr ?«ffm 4uf¥
jutrdbmilcrcbcbe/wekbe ^ie o\>Qti>achtm frettndtfcb4ffc vnnb bd/s*
^mi»ar 4ucb mir dem eybe crb4lcm follm / vnb in bem 4U(m Fcynot
mwfflicbm jlci^ vn^arUffctt / ^4mtt nimutnht vnrccbt^fcb(b< / 4U
Attcb ju dtfm gtrofifm r4cbert3ro(fct: fld^gcb^Jct/ b4rttmb d4n in fol//
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The Graduate School and University Center
of The City University of New York
prouäly announces the establishment of
The John H. E. Fried Memorial Fellowship
in International Law and Human Rights
The Fellowship will be awarded annually to a graduate Student
in Political Science, including those students affiliated with
the Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations.
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The Graduate School and University Center
of The City University of New York
33 West 42 Street
New York, NY 10036
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