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The Journal
OF
PHILOLOGY.
EDITED BY
W. ALDIS WRIGHT, MA:
INGRAM BYWATER, MA.
AND
HENRY JACKSON, M.A.
VOL, VIII,
London and Cambridge ;
MACMILLAN AND CO,
DEIGHTON, BELL AND CO, CAMBRIDGE,
1879
CONTENTS.
No. XV.
How were the Bodies of Criminals at Athens ait of after
Death? Herman Hager
Upon Notices of ee rea in Ameleee Greek Warfare. H.
Hager : : :
‘Shall’ and ‘Should’ in Protasis, ‘aid their Greek Bauivalents W.
W. Goodwin ‘ ;
Lucretius’ Procemium and Epicurean Nolig? J ahi Maton
Notes on the Aeneid. H. Nettleship
An Interpretation of O° 71. Is, lit, 15. C. Taylor
A Word on Lucilius. R. Hillis...
On the Dirae. R. Ellis .. Sh oy Sar
On some Passages in the Medea of Euripides. “Ww. C. Green .
On some Peculiarities in the use of the Future eres of Greek
Verbs. F. A. Paley . : :
‘On Choephoroe 472—3 (481—2 Dind). BR A. Paley
On the MS. of Sophocles in the Library of ee Baio Ohm
bridge, L. Campbell :
The Antigone of Sophocles. Two Criticisms, ‘Evelyn Abbott
‘Note on Odyssey v. 368. Henry Malden. ;
Note on Xenophon’s Hellenics. I. c. vi. § 2. Henry Malden
On the word Bovydos and the Prefix Bov-. J. P. Postgate
Some New Latin Fragments, R. Ellis . . . .
Judges and Litigants. Perceval M. Laurence .
On Early Greek Written Literature. Henry Hayman
Some Further Observations on Ancient Theories of Causation. D.
D. Heath ., ‘ ; .
William George Clark, H, A. J. ane ;
PAGE
112
114
116
122
125
133
154
173
iv | CONTENTS,
No. XVI.
Notes on Aristophanes Acharnians 1—578, W. G. Clark. ° be
continued) , ; . . : } . , a
Another word on Lucilius. H. A. J. Munro vs
On the Aegritudo Perdicae. R. Ellis ,
On the Pro Cluentio of Cicero. H. Nettleship
Tone and other Characteristics of Chinese. G. E. Moule
I.—On Licentia Poetica (momriu} éoveia or adea), John E, B.
Mayor . a ee ; , hs ‘ ° ‘3
II.—On Hemina — in Seneca and Jerome. John E. B.
Mayor : ‘ .
II1—On Condicio and Conditio. John E. B. ince
On the Date and Integrity of a Letter ascribed to D. Brutus, (ad
Familiares xI. 13a.) A. Watson ; : , d
Juvenal x. 54,55. Joseph B. Mayor ,_,
Adfectus and Adfictus. H. Nettleship .
The Number of Plato. D. B. Monro
On the Genuineness of the Sophist of Plato, and on some of its
Philosophical Bearings. W. H. Thompson
Princeps or Princeps Senatus? H. F. Pelham 4
Catullus’ 68th Poem. H.A.J.Munro .
PAGE
177
201
226
233
249
260
263
265
269
272
273
275
290
323
333
THE JOURNAL
OF
PHILOLOGY.
HOW WERE THE BODIES OF CRIMINALS AT ATHENS
DISPOSED OF AFTER DEATH?
(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society,
_ February 8th, 1877.)
"ANG 76 ye &v TH lila wh ecivar rapfvar, wSs odk Bverdos; Kal was méAde
tovro Svetdos elvae 6 ruis dplatos wodAdKis cuvéBy;
Teles repli puyjjs.
THIS question is answered by the Rev. Prof. J. P. Mahaffy,
‘Social Life in Greece, p. 266, in the following way: ‘The
corpses of criminals were either given back to their relatives
to be decently and privately buried, as was the case with
Socrates; or when there was added to the simple sentence
of death the refusal of funeral rites’,—which he considers
however to have been outside the strict letter of the law—
‘they were cast into the barathrum.’ This answer implies what
the learned author states more fully in a review of Prof. C,
Wachsmuth, ‘Die Stadt Athen im Alterthume’ (in the
Academy, May 22nd, 1875): ‘Executions were always, I
believe, conducted in prison, and then if the relatives did not
recover the body, it was carried out to the barathrum,’
Journal of Philology. vou. y1u. 1
>
2 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
There was however a third way of disposing of the corpses
of criminals, viz. they were allowed to be buried, but not
in Attica. The sentence passed on Archeptolemus and Anti-
phon, who had been found guilty of treason, contained the
clause : ‘That they be delivered to the Eleven,—that it shall
not be lawful to bury Arch. and Ant. at Athens, or in any
land of which the Athenians are masters!’ This sentence -
was in all probability in Craterus cuvaywy) Wydiocpatov
(cf. Harpocr. s.v. "Avdpwv). Caecilius most likely copied it
thence and so it found its way into the Lives of the x Orators
wrongly ascribed to Plutarch (Wydiopa Kal 0 édofev ’Avti-
davra KpiOnvat 6 Karxidvos waparéGertar). To the same law
Euryptolemus refers in his speech in favour of the generals
after the battle of Arginusae, ‘that if any one either betray
the state or steal what is holy, he shall be tried in a court
of justice, and if condemned, shall be refused burial in Attica *’
And we learn from Lycurgus c. Leocr. 113°, that traitors
might be proceeded against even after their death; this was
done at least in the case of Phrynichus: condemnation was
formally passed upon him, his bones were dug up and cast.
out of Attica, and those who had pleaded for him were like-
wise refused burial within the boundaries of Attica. The same
refusal of burial in Attica seems to me to have been the lot
of those who were proceeded against by an eisangelia and
1 rodrow ériyunOn Tots &vdexa rapasobj-
va...Kal uh éfetvar Odwar’ Apx. Kal Avr.
"AOjvnce und Bons ’AOnvaia Kparoicr.
[Plut.] vitae x oratt. p. 833 D; ef. vit.
Antiph. eicayyehOels 5¢ éEddw kal rots
Tv mpodoraw UraxGels éririplos drados
eppion.
2 édy ris f thy whrw mpokdg Ff Ta
lepa krXérryn, KpiOévTa év Sixacrnply, av
Karayvwod, uh Tapivar év TH ArriKg;
cf. Stob. Floril. ii. p. 68, Meineke
Kal Dwxpdrnv wey érawotow, bray ém-
apBavduevos ’AOnvalwy éyy of pev
yap orparyyo 颒 ofs xadd\wrlgfovrat
drepbpin- TeOaupévor eicl.—Diod. Sic.
Evi. 25, of 5¢ Aoxpol tiv dvalpecw ob
ovyxwpobvres, dmdxpiow eiwKay Sr. mapa
maot tots "EX\not Kowds vduos éorlp
ardgous plrrecbat Tovs iepootXous.
3 kal Wodigera 6 SHuos Kpiriov el-
mévros Tov pev vexpdy Kplvew mpodoctas,
kav 60& mpodéirns Gv ev TH xwpe
TeOdpba, Tad Te dora adrod dvoptia
Kal étoploa: iw. ris ’Arrixfjs, Srws dv
wh Kégrae €v TH xepa mynde Ta. doTe
TOU Thy xépay kal Thy wédw TpodidédrTos,
and § 114,115 éWndtcavro dé cal dav
dronoyavral twes wept rod TeredeuTy-
Kéros, €ay XG 6 TeOvnkds, évdxous elvat
kal tovrous Tots av’ro:s émcriulots...cat
rods dmrohoyounévous wbrép av’rod “Apl-
orapxov kal “Adeiik\éa dréxrewav xat
ovd &y TH XMpe Tapiva: érérpear.
DISPOSAL OF BODIES OF CRIMINALS AT ATHENS. 3
condemned by a court or the assembly of the people, as I have
attempted to show in a paper printed in the Journal of Philol.
No. 7, p. 105: adywrifouévm Kal Kivdvvevovts od povov rept
@avatov-—arr vrép tod é€opicOjvas kab amobavovta pundé év
TH watpids tadjvac Hyper. pro Lyc. c. 16; cf. pro Eux. c. 31
tov 5é KataxdiOévta eis TO iepov Tod Sypwou KedXevcavTos pnd év
th Arricn Set reOadOar and Aesch. iii. 252 érepos 8 (i.e.
Leocrates) mpaénv mor’ eionyyéXOn Kal tcas ai Wijdor avTo
éyévovto’ ef Sé pia povov petémecev UTrepopior av. *EE€opivew
and vzrepopifey are used in this sense of throwing the corpse
beyond the frontier after sentence of death has been executed.
Thus Suidas (s. v. darepdpiov) explains direpdpiov TO capa pirat
by pdxpov amd tis médews or Ew Tov bpav; and drepopifew
is used in the sense of removing the instruments of homicide
beyond the frontier (Aesch. iii. 244; Pausan. vi. 11. 6; Poll.
vill. 120). The whole proceeding is illustrated by Plut.
Phocion c. 37*: Phocion’s enemies decreed that his dead
body should be excluded from burial within the boundaries
of the country and that none of the Athenians should light
a funeral pile. None of his friends, therefore, ventured to
concern himself about the corpse, but a certain Conopion who
used to do these offices for hire, carried it beyond Eleusis and
procuring fire from over the frontier of Megara burned it.
Prof. G. F. Schoemann’ mentions the refusal of burial in
1 rots éxOpots @50te Kal 7d cpa Tod
Pwxiwvos eEopica: cal unde wip évadoar
pniéva mpds Thy Tadhv ’AOnrvalwr. 84d
piros pev ovdeis éerdrunoery dacOa Tod
oduatos, Kwywriwy 5é tis troupyeiv
elOiopévos Ta ToLrabra picOod KomoFévra
Tov vexpov Urép Thy ’EXevoiva rip A\aBav
é€x THs Meyapixijis éxavoev; ef. Diod.
Sic. xviii. 67 6a 52 rijs Tov” Kwvelouv
mwosews Kata 7d wdrpiov 00s tov Blov
Katradvcoavtes éppipnoav drapoe waves
é€xk trav rhs ’Atrixfis Spwy and Corn.
Nep. Phoc, 6. See also Valesius on
Harpocr. s.v. dpyds* Helladius Be-
santinous iii. dri dpyas wer Kowds pyoe
waca h yi, oon émirHdera wpds Kapray
yovds. dpydda dé lilws éxddouv of *AOn-
vaio. Thy Talv Beaty dveymévnvy ris ’Ar-
Tihs peTtacd Kal THs Meyapldos. In
eum locum projiciebantur sacrilegi et
proditores, quos in agro Attico sepeliri
jus non erat. Teles quidam in libro
de exilio ap. Stobaeum serm. 158 ovx«
dndds ydp tis T&v ’AtrikGy gvyddwy
Aowdopounévov Twos avrov xal éyorTos,
GXN’ od5é radon év TH lila, GAN worep
ol doeBeis "AOnvaiwy év tH Meyapicg,
wWomep wev obv, pn, of edoeBets Meyapéwv
év TH Meyapixg.
2 Griech. Alterth. ii. p. 508: Ver-
weigert wurde ein Grab in der Heimath
nur schweren Verbrechern: solche
wurden, weun sie schon begraben und
erst nachher schuldig befunden waren,
1—2
i THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Attic soil and the throwing of the bodies of criminals down the
barathrum, without attempting to determine when the one
was done rather than the other. It seems to me, however,
that we are not without evidence to settle this point. These
two practices existed side by side at the time the generals
were brought to trial after the battle of Arginusae. For
Euryptolemus quotes two laws by which they could be tried:
the decree of Cannonus’* ordering, ‘that if any one wrong the
people of the Athenians, he shall plead his cause in chains
before the people and, if condemned as guilty, shall be put to
death and thrown into the barathrum,’ and the law against
traitors and sacrilegious men, which orders that such should
be tried in a court of justice and if condemned, shall be refused
burial in Attica. But since the practice of casting into the
barathrum is not mentioned after that trial, whilst the law
against traitors, refusing them burial in Attica, was in force
shortly before (in 411) and continued to be so ever after that
time, the conclusion may be drawn, that some time after the
trial of the generals the practice of throwing the bodies of
criminals into the barathrum was discontinued. Other cir-
cumstances which point to the same conclusion, will present
themselves in the course of our inquiry.
We have an instance recorded of the substitution at Sparta
of a kind of burial for the throwing of a corpse into a pit,
in the case of Pausanias. The Spartans relented, the intention
of casting his body into the Caeadas was abandoned, and he
was buried somewhere near according to Thucydides, whilst
according to Aelianus who quotes from Epitimides, they cast
his corpse out of the country °,
auch wieder ausgegraben und iiber
die Grenze geschafft: Hingerichtete
wurden bisweilen an einen dazu
bestimmten Platz, eine Schlucht, wie
das Barathron bei Athen war, hinge-
worfen.
18 xKedeva, édvy tis rov ’AOnvalwy
Sjuov adicy, Sedeuévov drodixeiy ev TH
dnuy, Kal éav Katayvwoby ddixety, dtro-
Gavéyra els TO Bdpabpov EuBAnOjvar Xen,
Hell. i. 7, 20,
2 Thue. i, 134: kai éfaxOels drébave
mapaxphua’ Kal avroy éué\\noay pev
els Tov Katdéav, ovrep tods Kaxovpyous,
éuBddr\ew* érera edote mAnolov mov
Karopvia. Ael, V.H. iv. 7: Aaxedaiudroe
Ilavoaviay pniicavra ov pdvov iyw@
dméxrewav, G\\Q yap Kal Toy vexpor
飀Barov avrov éxros Tar Spur.
DISPOSAL OF BODIES OF CRIMINALS AT ATHENS. 5
Lysias* has the following in his speech against Eratos-
thenes: ‘And when his (i.e. Polemarchus’) dead body was
carried away from prison, although we had three houses, they
(i.e. the Thirty Tyrants) did not allow him to be buried from
any one of them, but having hired a shed, there they laid
out the corpse.’ The regular mode of procedure would have
been for the relations or friends to remove the body from
prison and bury him; thus Crito provided for Socrates’ burial
(Plat. Phaedo, p. 115 D.£.*); but here as in some other
instances, the Thirty Tyrants themselves had the corpses laid
out and the interment arranged, probably to prevent a gather-
ing of the relatives and friends of the deceased. Yet without
these a funeral was not tad? vourfowévn, and Lysias calls those
who were buried in this way atadous*.
When on the other hand burial within the boundaries of
Attica was forbidden, the corpses were probably carried out
from prison by the iepa mvAn to where the dros lived and
there they were exposed. Thus Leontius as he was walking
up from the Piraeus and approaching the northern wall from
the outside, observed some dead bodies on the ground and
the executioner standing by them*. Thence the relations or
friends, I suppose, removed the corpses to bury them beyond
the frontier or commissioned others to do so; it is a significant
fact that a man like Conopion could make a trade of providing
such burial for pay.
1 kat éredh dmredépero éx Tov Seouw- 32.—Liys. xii. 21 obroe ydp—oddods
Tnptov TeOveus, Tpudv tiv oikiav obody
€& ovdeulas elacay ékevexOjvat, adda
KAelovov pucOwoduevor mpotOevro avror.
§ 18.
2 ard Oappetv re xph kal pdvac Tovmov
oGua Odrrev, Kal Odrrew ovTws drws
dy co pidov 7 xal wddvore typ vopcmov
elvat.
' 8 Aesch. iii, 235 oe 5é Kal avrot
Tév Tpidkovr’ éyévovro, ol—xal ovd’ éml
rds tadds Kal éxpopds Tay TedevTyTAay-
Twy elwyv Tos TpocHKovTas TapayevérOac;
for tis Traps Thy émipédecav tapadl-
SocOat elkds éote Tots olxetors Dem. xliv.
5 ddixws droxrelvarres ard ous erolnoay,
and 96 ovdé rags THs voufouévys elacav
TUXEY.
4 Aedvris 6 ’Aydalwvos dvi éx
Tlecparis bard To Bdpecov Tetxos ExTOs
aicOouevos vexpods mapa re Syuly
keévovs etc, Rep. iv. p. 439 8, cf.
Plut. Them. 22 mdnciov 6é ris olxlas
xarecxevacev év MeNirp TO tepov, ob viv
Ta owHyara Tay Oavaroupévew of Shucor
mpoBadrove. kal Ta indria Kat rods
Bpéxous Twv dmrayxoupévww Kal Kabacpe-
Oévrew Expépovew.
6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
I spoke above of the corpses being removed from prison ;
for there can be no doubt that hemlock was administered in
prison, and it seems very probable that criminals were strangled
there as well—in Rome strangling always took place in prison,
and generally in the Tullianum. A sentence of death by
amrotuutavicos, however, was probably not carried out there,
but near the abode of the executioner. For from the name
xapwvetos* being given to one door of the prison, it is
evident that criminals must in some cases have been led
out to execution by that door, and no sentence of death is so
likely from its very nature to have been carried out without
the prison as drotuutavicués. Thus we understand also why
according to Bekk. Anecd. p. 28, 10 the dwelling-places of the
dypytot might be called avdpoxtoveta®. I should not like to
go so far as to think with M. G. Perrot (Daremberg and Sazglio,
‘Dict. des Antiquités,’ s. v.), that this mode of judicial death
was confined to slaves and foreigners—this seems to be incon- —
sistent with Lys. xiii. 56; yet in by far the majority of instances
it was the lower classes at Athens who were dispatched in
that way, and if nobody claimed their bodies, I suppose they
were buried in some sort of way. The demiarchi, who were
required to bury or cause to be buried any dead bodies found
in their district ({[Dem.] xliii. 58), had perhaps to look after
these corpses also. I may mention here that in the United
States of America, after death has been officially testified,
the corpses are regularly restored to the relatives; if they are
not claimed, they are disposed of in a way only possible in
our time, viz. they are sent to the medical schools.
Prof. E. Curtius® is of opinion that originally criminals
1 Pollux viii. 102—rov 3é¢ vowopvda-
Ktov Ovpa pla xapdveov éxadetro, 6’
qs Thy é€wl Oavdrw driyyovro; cf. Suid.
8. V. xapwyre.os Ovpa etc.
2 réyorro 8 dv advipoxroveia xal ra
Tav Snulwv évdvarrjuara, év ols Tovs Tov
erOavdrav Katadixacbévras KaTaxpav-
ta. As to the dwelling-place of the
djpstos, Mr Mahaftfy says in a letter with
which he has favoured me: ‘There
is in the N.E. side of the barathrum
a deep cavern, in which I suspect the
Snudcios lived. This cavern is near
the top, and easily accessible as you
come from the city.’
3 Attische Studien (Abhandl. der
Gottinger Ges. der Wissensch. xi,
1862—63, p. 59 foll.): ‘Es wurden
in Melite auch die Todesstrafen ur-
spriinglich gewiss so vollzogen, dass
sie den Charakter von Gottesurtheilen
trugen. Spater wurde die Todesgart,
DISPOSAL OF BODIES OF CRIMINALS AT ATHENS. 7
were thrown into the barathrum alive and that this mode of
execution bore the character of a trial by ordeal; but he adds:
‘Later on that peculiar mode of execution, for which the spot
on account of its physical features had been used, was dis-
continued,’ yet the place remained what he calls ‘die Richtstitte,
or ‘der Leichenanger’ and ‘die Scharfrichterei.’
When the practice of killing a criminal by hurling him
down the barathrum was discontinued, it seems impossible to
determine for want of information. I scarcely think that we
can draw an inference on that point from the fate of Darius’
herald at Athens*. It is true, he was cast into the barathrum,
but this was evidently an instance of the people taking the
law into their own hands in a moment of intense excitement;
for as Mr Grote has it (‘ Hist. of Greece, iii. p. 272), ‘The
inviolability of heralds was so ancient and undisputed in Greece,
from the Homeric times downward, that nothing short of the
fiercest excitement could have instigated any Grecian com-
munity to such an outrage. Nor can any conclusion as
to the mode of death, be drawn from Plat. Gorg. p. 516 D
Maatcadnpy eis T6 Bapadpov éuBarety eyndicarto, cai ei pr) Sia.
Tov mpvTaviv, évéerrecev av, Plato’s language being too vague.
Dr W.H. Thompson is of opinion, that if this decree had been
carried out, his corpse would have been thrown down the
barathrum after execution. If we adopt this interpretation,
we shall find that the same offence—according to Herod. vi. .
136, Miltiades was charged with having deceived the people—
which in the days of Miltiades was punishable with death and
throwing the body into the pit, was visited at a later period
with death and refusal of burial in Attic soil; for Demosthenes
quotes an old law ordaining death for that offence, and states
that it was to be proceeded against by an eisangelia*. Accord-
zuwelcher das Local seiner Eigenthiim-
lichkeit nach benutzt worden war,
aufgegeben; aber der Ort blieb bis in
die spiteste Zeit die Richtstitte der
Athener.’ Cf. Erliuternder Text der
7 Karten z. Topogr. v. Athen, p. 11.
1 Herod. vii. 133 mpdrepov Aapelov
méuavtos ém’ avtd Tovro ol wey avrav
rovs alréovras és Td Bdpabpov,—euBa-
Novres éxéXevor ete,
2 xx, 1385 égorw tyuiv vomos dpxatos,
dy tis bworxduevds Te TOv Shuov ééa-
mwaThon, Kplveyv, Kav ONG, Oavdrw gnutodr,
ef. § 100; and xix. 103 buds é&nrdrnxer,
Gdoke?, Sikatos dmwodwdévac Kplvera. et
yé Te Tov wWpornkdvTav eylyvero, &
8 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
ing to the Scholiast on Arist. Rhet. p. 232 the Athenians
eloayyenia mdédar dv nv, and xlix. 67
ds ody 000 dpas yoxtvOn ééawarioa
vrocxouevos, vouwy bvtwyv, édv Tis TOV
_ ORuov vrrocxépevos ééararhoy, eloayye-
Nav elvat mepi avrov. I must have
overlooked these passages, when in
my paper on the Hisangelia, p. 96, I
wrote that Demosthenes does not
mention that delusion of the people
by false promises was to be proceeded
against by eisangelia. I take this
opportunity to add also a passage from
Plut. Pericl. 32 where we learn that
Diopeithes of Aristophanic fame (Vesp.
380) proposed elgayyéA\X\ecOar rods Ta
Ocia un voulgovras 4 Adyous mepl ray
yerapoluv didexovras.— Whilst this
paper was passing through the press
I received the dissertatio inauguralis
of Dr M. Bohm, entitled ‘de elcay-
yerias ad comitia Atheniensium dela-
tis.’ I had maintained in my Quaes-
. tiones Hyperideae that the prosecutor
who had resorted to an eisangelia was
‘dxtvduvos, if he failed to get the fifth
part of the votes, until this impunity
was discontinued, as Pollux says 8:4
Tovs pgdiws eloayyéddAovras, and that at
the time when Demosthenes was assail-
ed by prosecutions of all kinds after
the disaster of Chaeronea, this im-
punity had already been abolished.
Of this Dr Bohm approves ; yet from
the case of Dioclides he concludes that
there was a time when capital punish-
ment awaited the prosecutor. I can-
not follow Dr Bohm in his conclusion;
for Dioclides’ case seems to me to have
nothing to do with the question before
us, cf. Andoe. i. 65, duets 5¢ dxovcavres
Tatra Acoxreldqv péev TG Sixacrnyply
mapaddvres dmexrelvare. My second
point in my Quaest. was to show that
eisangelia was not applicable to xawa&
ai aypada déixjuara, as Caecilius says,
but to such crimes only as were enu-
merated in the véuos eicayyeATixds and
to all others when referred to some
section of that law and proceeded
against under the name of that section.
Dr Bohm takes exception to this opi-
nion; he distinguishes three periods:
the first reaching to the expulsion of
the Thirty Tyrants, the second to the
wars with Philip, and the third to the
end of Athenian jurisdiction. In the
second the véuos el¢ayyeATikés, as re-
constructed, so far as our knowledge
admits, in my paper, was in force, but
in the first period Dr Bohm believes
elcayyeNas were applicable to all
crimes committed against the people,
without any reference to any law, in
other words card kaway kal dypddwv
adicnudrwy, Thus with regard to the
trial of the Generals after the seafight
of Arginusae he has: ‘ut duces accu-
sati sunt did7: ovx dvelNovro Tovs vava-
yous, ita ob idem crimen nullius legis
disertae ratione habita, capitis dam-
nantur. Ne in ceteris quidem <icay-
yeNlats ex illo tempore memoriae tradi-
tis, ut in Alcibiadis accusatione, ad
certam legem ecrimen refertur.’ I still
think the charge in the former case
was mpodocla, cf. Xen. Hellen. i. 7, 33
mpodoclay Kararyvévres ayti Tis déuva-
pias etc., and as regards the charge
brought against Alcibiades ete. the
gntnrat loudly proclaimed that the
whole had been done éml rf rod Shuov
xaradvcet (Andoc. 1, 36, cf. Thue. vi. 61,
Isocr. xvi. 6). Even at the time when
Hyperides defended Euxenippus, he
chad to complain that by eisangelia
many crimes were prosecuted, which did
not come under the vduos elcaryyeATiKOs,
and to quote one instance, the fact that
the adulterer Lycophron was proceeded
against by an eicayyeNla xaradicews
Tov djpov shows how lax the practice
was and that almost any crime might
DISPOSAL OF BODIES.OF CRIMINALS AT ATHENS. 9
would have had Miltiades thrown down the pit alive, but
I think that as Dr Thompson very justly remarks the more
sanguinary view of the uses of the barathrum has found favour
with scholiasts generally. The Schol. on Arist. Plut. 4317
describes the barathrum as a pit in the sides of which spikes
were fixed at various distances, which tore to pieces those
who were thrown into it; but he informs us also that it had
been filled up after a Phrygian was thrown into it. The
Schol. on Arist. Eccles. 1081, quotes the decree of Cannonus
as follows: Hevoday dé eis TO Bapabpov euBrnPévta atroPaveiv
Kal Thy ovclay amedécavta; but this authority alone did not
warrant Prof. L. Dindorf in altering the reading of the MSS.
of Xenophon (Hell. i. 7, 46) from ao@avovta eis TO B. EuBrn-
Ojvac to atroOaveiv cis TO B. EuBANOevta. Already in 430 the
Peloponnesian ambassadors to the court of Persia who had
been seized in Thrace, were first killed and then thrown down
a precipice ; and considering that these men were condemned
axpiroc in retaliation for similar acts committed by the
Spartans, we may safely conclude that if a more cruel mode
of death, viz. throwing a criminal alive into the barathrum,
had still existed at that time, it would have been resorted to
in this case (Thuc. vii. 67°). The main difference between
be referred to some section or other of
the law. The definition of Caecilius
seems to have taken its rise in the
men quoted by Xen. Hell. i. 7, 22 was
passed about 460, and that soon after
415 an old law about -déccety rov Sijuov
schools of the rhetoricians, the term
Kawa Kal dypada ddixjuara being quite
foreign to the language of the law-
courts. Cf. Schoemann de com, Athen.
p. 183. We have, as it were, two
versions of this definition in the Lex.
Rhet. Cantabr. s.v. eloayyeNa* Kara
Kawpv Kal dypadey adicnuadrww—K. dé
ovrws wploaro’ eicayyedia éorly 6 rept
Kawov ddiKnudrwv Sedwxacw adreveyxelv
ol vopo. ore 5é TO wederapevor év Tails
tév cogictav diarpiBats.—Dr Bohm
thinks that eisangeliae against traitors
and sacrilegious men were sometimes
submitted to the Areopagus, that the
law against traitors and sacrilegious
was reenacted by Cannonus ; but this
is not the place to enter into a full
review of his pamphlet. If Dr Bohm
had read my paper on the eisangelia
in this Journal (1872) he would have
found, besides many additions, the
correction of some inaccuracies into
which I had fallen when writing my
Quaest. Hyp.
1 ydoua te ppear@des xal oxorewdv
év Tn Attixn—eév 62 Te xaoware TovTH
Umipxov dykivot, of pev dvw, ol Ge
KaTW.
2 dxplrovs xal BovNouevous éorw ao
elmety avOnuepov amréxreway mavras Kal
és ddpayyas éc€Bador, etc.
IO THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
the decree of Cannonus and the law against treason, for our
present inquiry, seems to me to lie not in the mode of death
but in the way of disposing of the corpse, and this also points
to the decree of Cannonus as the older of the two, forming as
it were the link between killing a criminal by hurling him
down the barathrum alive, and the practice of later times as
stated in the law against treason.
There can be no doubt that xaévecov was by this time in
use as the mode of inflicting judicial death from the well-
known joke in Arist. Frogs, 123 (B.C. 405) :
HP. aan éorw arpamos Evvtomos Terptmpéevn
» Ota Oveias. AI. dpa Ke@vevov réyers ;
HP. padiota ye. Al. yuypav ye kat Svoxelmepov.
evOvs yap atToTHyyucl TAaVTLKYN LA. .
Cf. Andoe. iii. 10; Lys. xvii. 24; Xen. Hell. 11. 3, 56; and
the experience of the executioner as given in Plato’s Phaedo.
—The word Bapa@poy is often used by Aristophanes* but I
believe in a metaphorical sense only; the gloss of the Cod.
Dorvill. to Plut. 431 and 1110 being o adns. Demosthenes
similarly limits the use of the word; viii. 45 and [x], 167,
cf. Harpocr. s.v. BapaOpov. AnpuooBévns Sé év Didermixois
ov Kupiws avTo réyet, GAN ex petadpopas, olov év TS odEOpo.
When Plutarch puts the following words in the mouth of
Aristides, there could be no safety for Athens, e¢ mu) kat
OcuictoKréa Kal avtov cis TO Bapabpov éuBarovev (Arist. 3);
he may likewise be supposed to have used the term in a
non-literal sense, unless we assume that he is reproducing
exactly what he had found in an older writer, and then
Dr Thompson’s explanation of Plat. Gorg. 516 D may be
applied to this passage also. He evidently does so in Coriol. 13
1 Nub. 1449 ovdév ce kwrtoer ceavrov _ecclesiastici scriptores, neque rarum
éuBarety és 7d Bapabpov wera DwKpdrovs
kal Tov Adyov Tov ATTw: equit. 1362;
ran. 574. Cf. Hemsterhusius to the
gloss Cod. Dorvill. to Plaut. 1110: hoe
quidem in Aristophane declarando
nimis Christiane: orcum inferorum-
que sedes infaustas Bdpafpov adpellant
eis Bapapov roo gdov vel rijs yeévyys
é€uBrnOqva, alias non secus ac Graeci
pro certissima pernicie, vel exitio po-
nunt.
2 [xxv] 76: rovr@ & ovdéva 6p rav
Toru TobTwv Baoimov bvra, a\AG wavTa
drdxpnuva, pdpayyas, Bapabpa.
DISPOSAL OF BODIES OF CRIMINALS AT ATHENS. 11
évictavto Sé Aowov of Trepl Lixlviov Kat Bpodrov Syuaywyor,
Bodvres — avOpwrrovs tmévntas womep eis Bapabpov abety,
exméutrovtas eéls Tod aépos Te vooEpod Kal vexpav atddwv
yéumoveay, etc.
The orators call the pit in question dpvyua* from which
the executioner derived his euphemistic name of ‘the man
at the pit,’ by which he is known to the orators?. In this
we see the same tendency at work which made Plato use
the phrase 6 pédAX\wy cot dwcew TO dPappaxoy, ete. to avoid.
the repulsive term dynos, and speak of ddppaxoy instead
of xwvetov (Phaedo, p. 63 D etc.), and which induced the
Athenians to call the prison of«nwa (Plut. Sol. 15). Prof. E.
Curtius is of opinion that the same pit is called gdapayyes
by Thuc. ii. 67, whilst Dr K. W. Kriiger doubts this
assumption, as in that case the article would be required.
That other pits occasionally served the same purpose as the
barathrum, seems to me not improbable. The story that the
barathrum had been filled up, could only arise in this way.
The Schol. on Arist. Plut. 431 informs us that it was filled
up after a Phrygian had been thrown into it®. Suidas* gives
a fuller account of the Phrygian’s death, and by means of the
buildings which according to him were erected on the ground
gained by filling up this pit (@ovArevTnpiov and pntp@ov’),
1 Harp. s.v. Spvypua* ldtws otrw éxa-
Xeiro éd’ 08 of KaKkotpyo. Exoddfovro
’"AOhwyet.
2 Lye. ec. Leocr. 120 6 éml rot épty-
paros; Din. c. Dem. 62 6 émi 7G dpty-
part; cf. Poll, viii. 71 6 wpds r@ dpty-
part. J
3 évratda tov Bpbya Tov THs uyTpos
tiv Oewy évéBadov ws peunvora, érerdh
mpoédeyev Ore épxerat f rnp els emegi-
Thow THs Kopns. } 5é Beds dpyicbetoa
dxaprias éreuve TH Xwpa* Kal yvorres
Tiv airlay dia Xpnomod TO wey Xdoma
katéxwoay, thy 6é Gedv Ouciats tdaov
érroinoay.
4s. Vv. pntpayvprns’
Thy ’Artikhy éuber Tas yuvaixas TH
pnrpt Trav Pedy, ws Exeivol dacw. oi Se
€\Ouv Tis eis
"AOnvato. dméxreway avrov, éuBaddovtes
els Bdpabpov émt Kepadjy. Rouod dé
yevonévou &haBov xpnopuoy, thdcacar Tov
mepoveupévov. Kal dia ToUTO wKoddunoay
BovuNeurhpiov, év @ dvethov Tov wntpayvp-
Tv, Kal mepippdrrovres avTé Kabtépwoav
TH pntpl Tav Oewv, dvacricarres Kal
dvipidvra Tob untpaytprov. éxpwvro 5é
TQ pntpop apxeiw Kal vowodvrakely,
Karaxwoavres Kal Td Bapaépov.
5 Am Kerameikos wurden die am
Stadtmarkte unentbehrlichen Staats-
gebiaude eingerichtet. Ihre Lage und
Reihenfolge gehért zu den sichersten
Punkten der attischen Topographie,
Sie bildeten eine nahe verbundene
Gruppe am Siidrande des Marktes,
unterhalb des Areopags, dessen Fel-
12. THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
we are enabled to fix its locality and to say that the Schol.
and Suid. s.v. Bapa@pov, etc. have confounded the barathrum
with some other pit far more to the east; for the barathrum is
on the west side of the Hill of the Nymphs.
To sum up, in very early times criminals were thrown
down the pit alive—then, sentences of death were carried
out in prison, and the corpses were thrown into the barathrum
—until at last, they were allowed to be buried, but not within
the boundaries of Attica, those cases excepted when the bodies
were restored to the relatives to be buried in Attic soil itself.
It was for sanitary reasons, according to Mr Mahaffy, that
the Athenians discontinued the practice of throwing the
corpses into the barathrum*. May we not just as well see
in this another proof of that humanity which prompted the
Athenians to fix upon poisoning by hemlock as that mode
of judicial death which was, as Grote happily puts it, ‘the
minimum of pain, as well as the minimum of indignity;
a humanity which also led them to accord to a suicide the
burial which was denied him in other States of Greece (ef.
K. F. Hermann, Privatalt. 62, 28), the law stipulating only
that the right hand should be severed from the body and
buried separately (Aesch. iii. 244) ?
sen nach dieser Seite hin, wie man with Mr Mahaffy’s permission, a sug-
heute noch sieht, geradlinicht bear-
beitet sind. Hier lagen von Westen
nach Osten die 3 Gebiiude : Metroon,
Buleuterion, Tholos, ete. Prof, E.
Curtius Erliuternder Text, etc. p. 27. °
1 Since this paper was read before
the Cambridge Philological Society I
have received a note from Mr Mahaffy,
by which he has placed me under very
great obligations. He writes, ‘I since
examined the barathrum again with
two friends. We made it out ‘about
200 yards long, 60 wide at the widest
part, and at the same place, which is
also the deepest, about 35 feet deep.
Near the steepest part of the rock is
the little cave, which I hold to be the
den of the dyudxowos. —To this I add,
gestion made in a former letter to me,
‘If you will examine Soph. Antig.
1015 sqq. you will see that one great
objection to having bodies unburied
was the possible pollution of altars
ete. by birds of prey which had just
left the bodies. Hence I feel sure the
Snudxowos was obliged to bury the
bodies in some sort of way in the
barathrum and not to leave them un-
guarded for a prey. Sanitary reasons
point to this, and is it not possible
that the gradual filling in of the bara-
thrum may have caused the change
you have so clearly shown? This too
would account for its being now shal-
lower.’
DISPOSAL OF BODIES OF CRIMINALS AT ATHENS. 13
. To be deprived of a last resting-place in Attica appeared a
great hardship to an Athenian; this may account for the fact
that, contrary to law, after the death of Themistocles his
relations brought his bones to Athens and buried them secretly
(Thue. i. 138, and Corn. Nep. Them. 10, Pausan. i. 1, 2) and
that the same was done with Hyperides ([Plut.] p. 849 c) and
Phocion (Plut. Phoc, 38).
HERMAN HAGER.
MANCHESTER.
UPON NOTICES OF ARMY-SURGEONS IN ANCIENT
GREEK WARFARE,
(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society,
November 29, 1877.)
My attention was drawn some time ago to the question whether
the Greek armies in their expeditions were accompanied by sur-
geons. In all books I was able to consult, I found no answer to
this question and indeed have never seen it discussed at all,
except in an article on ‘ Pre-Christian Dispensaries and Hos-
pitals’ in the last number of the Westminster Review (No. Cry.
p. 442): ‘We read of military surgeons as early as the time of
Homer. “In those days,” says Plato (Rep. iii. 406), “the sons
of Asclepius were heroes as well as physicians; for when the
arrow of Pandarus wounded Menelaus, they sucked the blood
out of his wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies (Il. iv. 218):
these remedies they thought to be enough to heal any man
whose constitution was healthy and sound.” The state physi-
cians of Egypt were forbidden to take fees, when attached to
the army in time of war (Diod. i. 82). Cyrus employed surgeons
to march with his army; so did the Spartans. Among the
Romans, soldiers dressed each others’ wounds until the time of
Augustus, when we first hear of military surgeons. —However
since the writer of this most instructive article necessarily
only touches on this subject, I will not refrain from laying
before you these notes which I had put together before, and
inviting your opinion on the point in question. To begin with
Homer, where we find the intpés highly appreciated :
intpos yap avip mwoAA@Y avtaEvos aGAXor,
ARMY-SURGHONS IN ANCIENT GREEK WARFARE. 15
A. 514, In B. 732 Podaleirios and Machaon are called inrjp’
aya0e, but when Diod. Sic. says adtedeis 8 avtovs adeivar tav
Kata Tas payas Kwdvvev Kal Tév Gdd\wY AeELTOUpyLav Sia THY
vmepBorny THs ev TO Ocpatrevey evypnotias (iv. 71), he seems
to me to transfer what was true of a later period to the Homeric
age. For these two men were leaders as well as intpol and
shared in the fight, as Paley has it on A. 518, ‘like Asclepius
himself in Pind. Pyth. iii. 6,7, he (Machaon) is a warrior as well
as a leech. When Menelaus was wounded and the herald
looked out for Machaon, he found him surrounded by the brave
ranks of the shield-bearing hosts that followed him from Trica,
A. 207, and A. 835 we learn that Machaon lay in his tent
xpnifov Kat avTos ayvpovos intipos,
while Podaleirios was yet engaged in warfare. From the word-
ing of this passage it might appear that these two were -the
only intpot with the Greek army; for Eurypylos, after mention-
ing that he cannot get any professional assistance from them,
asks Patroclos to cut out the arrow, &c., whilst in N. 213 intpot
are mentioned as receiving instructions from Idomeneus, where
Machaon at all events cannot have been meant (cf. &. init.),
and II. 28 Patroclos speaks of intpol modAvdapuaxos employed
about the persons of Diomedes, Odysseus, Agamemnon and
EKurypylos. Is Faesi’s suggestion (to II. 28) that possibly the
different parts of the army had their respective éyrpol, likely to
contain any truth, or must we not look upon the tnrpol rather
as warriors who possessed some knowledge of surgery ?
In Xenophon there are several passages bearing on the
question. In the Anabasis (iii. 4. 30) we read that the Greeks
who had been considerably harassed by: the enemy in their
march through hilly country, on arriving at villages latpods
KATéETTNTAV OKTH TOAD yap joav ot TeTpwpévot. ‘Were these
professional surgeons, or merely soldiers who had gained some
experience in the treatment of wounds, as Rehdantz, if I remem-
ber rightly, suggests? In another passage (de Laced. rep. xiii. 7)
iatpoi are mentioned as a distinct class accompanying the
Lacedaemonian army, by the side of wavres and avAnrai, &e.
In the discourse on the art of war which Cyrus has with his
16 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
father before starting for Media, the following occurs: epi dé
iytelas dxodwv Kai épdv bre Kab Tores ai ypHfovear tryaivev
iatpovs aipodvrat kal of oTpaTHYOL TOV OTPATLMTAD EvEeKEV
iatpovs é£ayovcty, ottw Kal éya—evOvs TovTov émewednOny,
&e. (Cyr. i. 6. 16). By Cyrus’ order, these surgeons attend to
the wounded prisoners (iii. 2. 12: & 5€ to’tT~ mpocayovet TO
Kup@ tods aixuaradtous Sdedeuévous, Tovs O€ TiVas Kal TETPO-
pévous. ws Oé eldev, evOds AVEWwW pev exéXevcE Tovs SedepEevous,
Tous O€ TeTpwpévous iaTpods Kadécas Oepatrevetv éKé-
Nevoev); and as an illustration of the treatment of the wounded
I refer to v. 4.17: Kdpos dé &s AaOero TO yeyovos, amnvTa TE
tots Kadovaios xai dvtwa idot TeTpwpméevov, avakapPBavev
tovtov pev ws Tadarav éreprwev, O67ws OepatrevoiTo, Tous
& addous cvyxatecknvouv kat 6tas ta émitndeca EEovor ovve-
TewedeiTo, TaparauBavev Iepody tov 6potimev cuveTipEedntas
év yap Tots TowovTots of ayaboi émitroveiy éOédovor*. Now
whatever we may think of the historical value of the Cyropae-
deia, we must allow that these passages go a long way towards
proving that in Xenophon’s days surgeons were with the armies
in the field; granted that the picture he draws of Cyrus is
ideal—then he would only ascribe to him, perhaps in a higher
degree, the humane qualities of generals in his own time as
shown in their care for the wounded. From Cyrop. i. 6. 16 it
would appear that it was the general’s duty to choose the éatpot
who were to accompany him, yet nothing of the kind is men-
tioned in the long dissertation on the duties of a general in
Memor. ii. 1. From this silence, however, we need not, I think,
conclude that the Athenian armies were unaccompanied by
surgeons; for is it not possible that, as at that time the armies
were composed of citizens, the state-paid physicians and their
assistants would accompany them as a matter of course? Thus
it seems to have been in Egypt: xard dé ras otpatelas Kai Tas
THs x@pas éxdnulas Ocparrevovtar Tavtes ovdéva pucbov idia
didovtes* of yap iatpoi tas ev Tpodhas éx Tod KoWwod AayBa-
vovat, &c., Diod. Sic. i 82. Kings and generals were probably
1 See Liv. ii. 47,12 (Fabius) saucios habiti: and Caes. de B. Civ. iii, 78,
milites curandos dividit patribus. Fa- Caesari, ad saucios deponendos—ne-
biis plurimi dati, nec alibi majore cura _cesse erat adire Apolloniam, &c.
ARMY-SURGEONS IN ANCIENT GREEK WARFARE, 17
attended by their own physicians during a campaign; see Xen.
Anab. i. 8. 26; Plut. Cato 70; when Alexander the Great was
wounded, he was treated by Critodemus fatpds Kaos 10 yéves
"Ackdyriadys, or, as others say, by Perdiccas of the body-guard
od mapévtos év TH Sew@ iatpod (Arrian vi. 11), whilst Qu.
Curtius (ix. 5) calls the medical attendant Critobulus ‘inter
medicos artis eximiae.’
H. HAGER,
Since this paper went to press, my attention has been
directed to two articles bearing on the question: one by M. Ch.
Daremberg, La Médecine duns Homére (Paris, 1865), an ex-
haustive treatment of the state of medicine at the time of
Homer; and the other by Dr M. Schmiedt, “Das Muilitar-
Sanitats-Wesen der Alten,” in the Allgemeine Militdérdrztliche
Zeitung (Wien, 1866). The latter believes with me that the
Athenian armies were likewise accompanied by surgeons; he
says: “ausserdem (besides these state-paid surgeons) diirfte es
wahrscheinlich sein, dass manche vornehmere Arzte um chirur-
gische Erfahrungen zu sammeln, dem Heere sich anschlossen.
So schlug z. B. Hippocrates den Athenern zur Begleitung auf
einer Expedition nach Sizilien seinen Sohn Thessalus vor, den
er selbst ausstatten und unterhalten wollte.” This is, I suppose,
founded on a passage from the mpecBevtixds Qeacadod ‘Irmo-
kparous viod (Dr Schmiedt does not quote his authority) : ore
gap ’ArkiBiadny éEéreprrev él Luxerins ToAAH ev Svvaper—ev
éxernoin vmép intpod mpootecovtos Ov Séot akorovbeiv TO
otpatevpatt, TapehOav 6 TaTIip vrécyeTo ewe ETL TA UpéTEpAa
capata Sacew, Tots idiows Satavnwact KatecKevacpévory, etc.
(Hippocr. Op. ed. Kiihn, iii. p. 844).
| i. E,
Journal of Philology. vou. VIII.
‘SHALL’ AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS, AND THEIR
GREEK, EQUIVALENTS,
Proressor J. B. Sewall and Professor C. D. Morris, in the
“Transactions of the American Philological Association” for
1874 and 1875, have criticised especially that part of my classi-
fication of conditional sentences in which I maintain that the
optative in ordinary protasis (i.e. in all conditions in which it
does not express a past general supposition) is “merely a vaguer
or less vivid form than the subjunctive for stating a future
supposition’.” In opposition to this view, they agree in main-
taining some form (though not quite agreed upon the precise
form) of the distinction commonly made between the two
moods in protasis, based upon the greater or less possibility or
probability that is implied, or upon the presence or absence of
an expectation or anticipation of the fulfilment of the condition.
Professor Morris further suggests an important limitation to
the use of the subjunctive in protasis, by expressing “a strong
opinion that no case can be adduced from the best writers in
which a future supposition demanding for its fulfilment a viola-
tion of physical laws is expressed by éav with the subjunctive.”
These attacks are both directed against what I have always
felt to be the weakest point in my classification, a point on
which I am myself a convert from the doctrines of my oppo-
nents. And although I find myself now unable to see the
distinction which I once thought I could see, and which most
scholars still think they can see, between day yévnras and «
yévotro, I am by no means disposed to be intolerant toward
those who are of a different opinion. One gain has thus far
1 See Journal of Philology, Vol. vy. No. 10, pp. 186—205.
‘SHALL’ AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS. 19
“come from the discussion—the clearer statement of one im-
portant point in the controversy; for I understand it to be
generally admitted that the difference between éay with the
subjunctive and e¢ with the optative is essentially the same as
that between ‘if he shall’ and ‘if he should’ in English, and
that if we can determine the principle that underlies the
latter construction, we have the key to the former. The use
which all scholars constantly make of these English forms to
translate and explain the Greek constructions in question,
whatever may be their theories of the latter, shows the general
feeling on this point. If this is once admitted, it will aid us
greatly in understanding the Greek form of protasis to ask
ourselves what distinction we are in the habit of making
between ‘if he shall go’ and ‘if he should go” in English.
But here unfortunately we meet an obstacle. The modern
English, in which we think and express our thoughts, has
substituted for the future form ‘shall’ in protasis the colorless
present, so that we now say ‘if he goes, ‘if he reads,’ ete.
for the more exact ‘if he shall go’ (or ‘if he go’), ‘if he
shall read’ (or ‘if he read’), etc., which the translators of
the Bible in the seventeenth century would have used. Fur-
ther, this same present form, though we seldom use it to
express a purely present condition (for which we should gene-
rally say ‘if he is reading, not ‘if he reads’), is yet constantly
used in general present conditions like ‘if any one (ever) reads,’
which are entirely distinct from the future conditions we are
considering. We must therefore confine ourselves to cases in
which we use either ‘if he goes,’ ete., in the sense of ‘if he
shall go,’ etc., or the latter form itself. Fortunately the trans-
lation of the Bible makes every English scholar familiar with
the older and more exact form, even if he never uses it in
speaking or writing.
It will be understood that, when I compare the optative
with the subjunctive in conditions in this paper, I shall con-
fine myself to the optative in its fixed usage in Attic prose,
excluding, for example, all notice of the present optative in
Homer used to express a present unfulfilled condition, like the
imperfect indicative in Attic Greek.
2—2
20 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Professor Morris very properly asks for a more exact defi-
nition of the term ‘vividness,’ which I use in stating the dis-
tinction between the subjunctive and optative in protasis. I
have generally called the statement of a future condition which
is made by the subjunctive, corresponding to ‘if he shall go’
(or ‘if he go’) in English, “more distinct and vivid” than that
which is made by the optative, corresponding to ‘if he should
go. By this I mean that the picture (so to speak) of the event
or the circumstances supposed which is presented to the mind
when the former expression is used is a “more distinct and
vivid” one, a picture with outlines more sharply defined and
more distinct and definite in its whole conception, than that
which the latter form presents. On the other hand, as it seems
to me, when the optative form is used, i.e. when we state a
supposition in the form ‘if he should, the whole conception is
vaguer and presents to the hearer a “less distinct and vivid”
picture of the event supposed. For example, it seems to me
that the supposition ‘if some barbarian shall ever drag thee
away weeping into slavery,’ differs from ‘if some barbarian
should ever drag thee away weeping into slavery,’ simply in
this, that the former presents a more distinct and vivid con-
ception of the event than the latter; and I do not believe that
any one who had no theory of Greek syntax in view would ever
think of distinguishing them by saying that one implies “an
anticipation of the possible realization” of the supposition,
while the other implies “an imagination of the possible reali-
zation” of the supposition; or that the one is “a supposition
relating to contingent fact,” while the other is “a supposition
of conceived fact.” T say merely that 7c seems to me so; and
the more I think of the matter, the less I am able to see either
of the last mentioned distinctions in the two expressions,
If, however, others, when they use such expressions, feel that
either of these distinctions is in their mind, it is impossible
to appeal from this decision to any tribunal which will have
higher authority with them. Let it be understood that I doubt
whether any one who thought merely of the English expres-
sions in question would ever make either of these distinctions
between them by his own suggestion; I do not doubt that wit-
‘SHALL? AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS. 21
nesses without number, if they were asked directly whether
they did not make these distinctions, would testify that they
did so; for where it’ is so difficult to state or conceive clearly
a distinction in language, it is extremely easy to imagine it to
be almost any one which is plausibly given on high authority, —
We need not go far from the subject now under discussion for
striking examples of this tendency. How many have quietly
and in perfect confidence assented to the doctrine that the
subjunctive in final clauses after past tenses “brings the action
of its verb down to the present time,” although there is hardly
a page of Thucydides which would not demonstrate its utter
absurdity! It seems to me, further, that the distinction of the
optative as a “less distinct and vivid” form of expression than
the subjunctive and equivalent forms (e.g. the imperative)
appears in most of the constructions which admit the optative.
In independent sentences, compare 7) 7a@nre, Dem. Lept. § 50
(p. 472), with the common pu) 7ra@orre, the former being do not
suffer, the latter may you not suffer. The same may be seen
in the Homeric use of the independent optative compared with
the imperative; e.g. in “EXévnv Mevédaos aryorto, Il. Iv. 19, and
yuvaica te olkad ayéoOo, Il. 11. 72, the former being may he
carry, the latter let him carry. In the double construction of
oratio obliqua after past tenses, where an option is allowed
between a subjunctive of the direct form and the same tense of
the optative, the latter is evidently the weaker and less vivid
form of expression, differing in no other respect from the former,
The fact that two cases of this distinction have been inadver-
tently cited to illustrate the assumed distinction between the
subjunctive and optative in protasis, although the direct forms
in both cases would have been identical in construction, has
been already used by me’ to
1 See the remarks in Journal of
Philology, Vol. v. No. 10, p. 198, on
el cuumeOu and ei elonyotro as com-
pared with day aipeOy and édv @ in
Dem. Cor. p. 276, §§ 147, 148, where
the two optatives are due entirely to
the oratio obliqua and represent éav
gupreiOy and édv eianynrat of the di-
confirm my argument against
rect discourse. And yet these are
standing examples of the “ essential
and inherent distinction” between the
subjunctive and the optative! See, for
instance, Dissen’s and Holmes’s notes
on the passage, and Kiihner, § 576,
Anm. 7.
22 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
admitting any other distinction in direct discourse than is gene-
rally allowed to exist in these indirect quotations. The prin-
ciples of oratio obliqua, as regards the choice of moods, apply,
as I have already shown‘, to the distinction between the sub-
junctive and optative in final and object clauses (with iva, ores,
py, ete.) after past tenses, to which I have referred above.
These analogies drawn from the other uses of the optative have
given a strong and (I may add) an unexpected confirmation to
the opinion to which I was led originally by a consideration of
the subjunctive and optative in protasis and relative clauses
alone.
If now the distinction which I have tried to establish is the
true one, the question recurs, when will a speaker naturally
use the subjunctive and when the optative in stating a future
condition? In most cases he will use the more vivid form to
express a supposition which for any reason is more vividly con-
ceived and so more prominent in his own mind, or one which
he wishes to bring more distinctly before the mind of the
hearer; and the less vivid form for one which for any reason
is less prominent or which he wishes to present less distinctly.
His choice, therefore, may be influenced by various considera-
tions. He will naturally form a more vivid conception of a
supposition which he thinks highly probable in its nature or
likely to be realized in a particular case, or of one which he
especially desires or especially dreads to have realized. He will
naturally express with greater distinctness a supposition which
he wishes to mark as especially absurd; or one which for any
reason he wishes to make especially emphatic in comparison
with others in the same sentence, whatever may be the nature
of the supposition itself; while he will naturally express with
less distinctness one which he wishes to make less emphatic.
Cases in which the subjunctive and optative in protasis are
brought into contrast in successive sentences are very rare, so
that we can generally supply the alternative form only in
imagination. It must be remembered too that neither the
subjunctive nor the optative expresses any absolute amount of
1 See Journal of Philology, Vol. v. No. 10, p. 199.
‘SHALL’ AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS. 23
vividness or distinctness, still less any absolute amount of pro-
bability or desire; these qualities are merely relative, and are
made obvious chiefly by contrast. We must not be surprised,
therefore, to find precisely the same supposition expressed in
different forms by different persons who need not differ in their
opinion of the nature of the supposition, or by the same person
at different times without any necessity of a change of mind
on his part: of this examples will be given below. Now if the
distinction between the two moods were essential and funda-
mental, as Professor Sewall and Professor Morris believe it to
be, it seems to me hardly possible that this variety of expression
could be allowed: in that case, most conditions would fall by
a fixed principle into one class or the other, and any change in
the form would involve a grammatical error of the same nature
(though of course not of the same degree) as that which an
Athenian would have committed if he had said e¢ €\@ocus in the
sense of ‘if I had gone.’ There are some conditions, involving
an extreme amount of absurdity or improbability, which would
more naturally be stated by the optative alone unless special
emphasis were intended; to this class belong most of the excel-
lent and pertinent examples collected by Professor Morris, —7f
the house should find a voice,—if the moon should never rise
again,—if I should go on with my story for ten days,—if they
should get a power like that of Gyges—if a man should have
three talents of gold in his stomach, one in his head, and a stater
of gold in each eye. In English as well as in Greek such
conditions would in most cases be stated in the vaguest possible
form, to correspond to the vagueness of such conceptions in the
mind, But I hope to show below that all these conditions
might under certain circumstances be stated in the more vivid
form, without involving any grammatical or logical absurdity.
Before proceeding to state another consideration which often
influenced the choice of mood in conditions, I will give examples
of suppositions in which the choice of mood appears to be af-
fected by one or more of the considerations already mentioned.
1. In Plato’s Republic (v1. 494 B—E) we have a famous
description of the career of a bright and handsome young man,
of high birth and great wealth, exposed to the flattery and
24 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOSY.
adulation of a populous city, and of the fate of any philosophic
friend who may attempt to divert him into the path of wisdom.
We should say that this might be selected as a strong case of
“conceived fact” as opposed to “contingent fact,” or of the
“imagination” rather than the “anticipation” or “expectation”
of the condition being realized. If this case had been supposed
in the optative form, all would have called it a striking instance
of a purely ideal supposition. But here it is plain that Plato
had in mind the career of Alcibiades and the relation of the
fast young Athenian to Socrates; and he adds a most striking
dramatic effect to his sketch by making Socrates imagine the
course of the young man in the more graphic and impressive
form of supposition. JI feel sure that Professor Morris will
agree with me in saying that it was optional with Plato to give
or withhold this artistic touch; and we shall agree in thinking
that the use of the subjunctive makes the sketch more life-like
and implies that it is less of a fancy sketch than the optative
would have done. He will, however, maintain (I fear) that the
“expectant” form, the subjunctive, implies by its own nature
necessarily a looking forward to realization; while I hold that
the “vivid and distinct” form can be used to express emphasis
in many other ways, even when there is no thought of realiza-
tion; as in L Cor, xii. 15, 16: éay ely 6 mors, if the foot shall
suy ; éav ely 70 ovs, if the ear shall say; or in Matth. xv. 14:
tupros 5é tuprdov éav odnyh, duhotepos eis BOOvvov wecvdvtat,
and if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.
Let us see what effect would be produced by a change of mood:
e.g. by substituting ef tus npéua mpocedav TadyO7 réyol,...ap°
evmereés av oleu eivat elcaxovoat; for éav Tis Aéyy, K.T.X., Le. if
some one should go to him and tell him the truth, for if some one
shall go to him and tell him the truth. I can see in the former
only the natural form of expression for such a supposition,
which any of us would use in a similar case, and which any
Greek would have used who had never known a career like the
_ one supposed or who had no desire to make his sketch particu-
larly impressive ; in the present case, however, Plato wishes to
paint as impressive a picture as he can of a most striking
historical event, and he therefore uses a more vivid form of |
‘SHALL AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS. 25
statement, precisely as an artist might have used brighter
colors in a real picture for an analogous purpose. That Plato
could not have felt that the optative form would have been
absurd here appears plainly from a parallel passage (Rep.
‘vu. 517 A), where Socrates is made to refer to himself quite
as pointedly as before, under the character of the man who
attempts to release the prisoners in the cave and to lead them
up to the light, and whom they would kill ¢f they could in any
way get him into their hands, et mas év tats yepoi Sdvawrto
NaBety Kal atroxteiverv, atoxteiveww av. This could have been
expressed by éav trws dvvwrtat amoxteveiv, i.e. will they not
kill him of they can? If it had this form, it would be simply a
more lively picture of the fate of Socrates than we now have,
and this would explain (as in the other case) what might other-
wise seem too distinct and vivid a statement of a condition
which in itself seems eminently fitted for the other form of
expression.
2. In Plat. Gorg. 521, 522, Socrates is represented as pre-
dicting his own trial and condemnation; and in contrast with
this definite foreboding he supposes, merely for illustration, the
case of a physician tried by a jury of boys with a pastry-cook
as accuser. The outline of the construction is as follows (521
C—522 A): 7dde pévTor ed 015 Ste, éavtrep ciciw eis SuKacTnpior,
movnpos Tis me EcTat 6 Eicaywv" Kal ovdév ye AToTrOY (sc. av ein)
ei amroPavoupu....ovy Ew 6 Tr Néyw ev TO Sixactnpiv. Kplvodpat
yap ws €v Tatdious latpos ay Kpivoito KaTryopodVTOS OWorTroLOd.
oxoTe yap, TL av atroNoyoiTo 6 ToLovTOsS avOpwiros ev TovTOLS
AnPGels, et avrovd KaTnyopot Tis Aéyov OTL, K.T.r....TL AV olet
yew elmety; 1) €¢ elrroe THY aAnOeLav, STOcOV oles dv avaBojoat |
Tors TotovTovs ducactay; Here we have a marked distinction
between the more vivid form in which Socrates imagines him-
self brought before a court and the less vivid conception of the
plysician on his trial; and I believe that this distinction was
based upon anticipation in one case and imagination in the
other, a contrast in feeling which found its most natural ex-
pression in this contrast of forms. Further, I have no doubt
that the change to ef dwo@avouw in the second supposition,
where €av dro8avw would certainly have been permitted, if not
26 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY,
expected, indicates a less vivid anticipation of being condemned
to death than of being brought to trial. Just below (522 B) he
applies the comparison to his own case by an apodosis in the
optative: towodrov pévtat Kal éy@ oida Ott Taos maBoupe av
eicehOav eis Sixactypiov. But he returns immediately to the
other form, with which he began: ore yap nSovas...€€a Aéyeuv"
...€ay TE Tis pe 7) VewTEpous 7H SiapGelpery...7) Tovs TpecBuTEpous
Kaxnyopeiv.. oUTe TO GAnOEs EEw eitrety...ovTe GAO ovdev’ WaTE
icws 0 TL av TUX TovTO Teicouat. In replying to the next
question of Callicles, however, Socrates uses the optative form
in reference to the same subject, his anticipated trial: ef wév
otv éué Tis e&edéyyou TavTnv THY BorGevav advvarov dyTa éwavTe
kat addr Bonbeiv, aioyvvoiuny av..., Kat eb Sia TavTny Thy
aduvaulay aroOvncKount, ayavaxtoiny av’ ei dé KoNaKLKHS pNTopt-
ans évdela TEeNeUTONV Eywye, Ev oida STL padlws iSous dv we hépov-
ta Tov Gavarov. All these conditions could have been expressed
in the subjunctive form quite as properly as the earlier ones;
indeed the last one, e@ 5é...reXevTeyv, might naturally have had
a subjunctive to express contrast with the preceding e ey,
kK.T.X., Since one makes a supposition abhorrent to the speaker's
feelings, which he regards as impossible, while the other refers
to what actually took place and had already taken place when
Plato wrote the words. It seems to me that no theory of the
two forms of condition which assumes that there is in almost
all cases a predetermined form in which alone a given future
condition can be properly expressed can be applied consistently
to these cases.
3. In Plat. Phedr. 259 A, Socrates imagines that the
cicade are watching his conversation with Phedrus to see
whether their chirping will lull the speakers into a noonday
nap. He naturally hopes this will not be the case; and his
‘change from the less vivid to the more vivid form of suppo-
sition seems to indicate this hope. He says: ef ovv iSovev Kab
v@ Kalarep Tovs TodXovs ev pweanuBpia pr) Svadeyopuévous, ad\Xd
vuotavovtas Kal Knroupévous bd’ adtav 80 apylav tis Siavolas,
dikalws av Katayed@ev'...€av S€ dpdou Siadeyouévous...tay’ av
dotev ayacOévres. It may perhaps be thought that the antithe-
sis here implies a stronger expectation of the latter condition
‘SHALT? AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS. 27
being realized; and. such examples are too rare to decide the
question. In most cases, however, in which expectation, desire,
or hope is more prominent in one of the two successive con-
ditions, the same form is found in both, as in Dem. Cor. § 178
(pp. 287, 288): dav pév deEwvtar tadra Kai TecPadow jyiv, and
av 8 dpa py ovpRy Katatvyeiv.
4, Cases of the more vivid form in suppositions the reali-
zation of which the speaker strongly dreads, and is trying by
his argument to prevent, are found in Dem. Aphob. 1. § 67
(p. 834): éav yap amrodvyn pe odTos, 0 pn yévoiTo, THY érra-
Bediay ChrAjnow pvas Exarov. But the use of this form was
optional here also; for we find in Aph. wu. § 18 (p. 841) mo? &
av TpatroimeOa, et TL adAXO WuydhioatoOe (referring to the same
danger of an adverse vote), and within three lines of this we
have TrovTov yiyverat, tv éeTwBerdiav dav ObrXwper, and still
again in § 21 (p. 842), referring to the orator’s sister in the
same contingency, ef 5 vweis GAXO TL yvooedOe, 0 pr) yévotTo,
tiva olecOe avtnv Woyny ew, trav ewe pév idy, x.7.r.; I shall
speak of these passages again below.
5. Cases in which the more vivid form is chosen to
heighten the absurdity of an already absurd supposition some-
times occur, although they are naturally rare. Such seems to
me to be Plat. Repub. x. 610 A: éav pn) cadpatos Tovnpia uy}
uyis wovnpiav éwrorn, unless a bodily vice shall engender im
a soul a mental vice,—a supposition which is at once stigmatized
as absurd in 610 C: todré ye ovdels mote SeiEex. Even after
this the supposition follows: édv Sé Tis dudce TH AOYH TOAMG
iévat Kab Aéyerv, x.7.rX. Again, in 612 B, it is said of the soul
Kal jointéov eivat atth Ta Sixata, day T éxn Tov Vvyou Saxti-
Aiov éay TE pu2), Kal Tpds TOLOVT@ SaKxTUAL@ THY “Aidos KUVTD, 1.e.,
that the soul must do what is just, whether she have or have not
the ring of Gyges, and besides such a ring the cap of Hades. In
a previous passage (359 Cc) the former miracle had been men-
tioned in the other form: ei avrois yévorto olav toré dacs
Sivapww TS tod Avdod tpoyéve yevéoOas, and again (360 B):
el ovv dv0 Totovtw Saxturdtw yevolcOny, x.T.r., but with less
emphasis. See also Eurip. Phceniss. 1215, 1216: ATT. ov« av
ye réEauw em ayaboiar cois kaka. LOK. jv py ye pevywr
28 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
éxhuyns mpos aidépa. And Orest. 1592, 1593: OP. dyolv
ciwtav’ apxécw & éyo Aéywv. MEN. add’ ovte yalpwor, Hv
ye “ dvyns wrepois. Under this head, as it seems to me,
might very properly come a Greek version of the proverb, ‘If
the sky fall, we shall catch larks, in which the absurdity of the
condition is heightened by expressing it in the more vivid form
in English, and I feel confident (after carefully considering
Mr Morris’s argument) that the effect would be the same in
Greek. Similar to the examples just quoted is the sarcastic
reply of Socrates (Plat. Gorg. 470 C) to the taunt of Polus that
even a child could show him to be in the wrong; to which
Socrates replies: woAAnv apa éyo TO tradi yapw Ew, ionv Sé
kab aol, éav pe édéyEns Kal atradraEns hrvapias, i.e. I shall be
much obliged to the child, and equally so to you too, if you shall
refute me, etc. I will refer also to two conditions from Plat.
Euthyd. 299 B, c, which are quoted below (p. 32), one of which
supposes a cartload of hellebore to be given at one dose, and
the other supposes the patient who drinks it to be as big as
the “statue at Delphi.” Both are expressed by the subjunctive
with éav.
6. Occasionally the subjunctive form seems to mark a
supposition as more emphatic than others with which it is
contrasted, and the optative form to mark one as less emphatic
than others, when there is no apparent distinction on the score
of probability, expectation, desire, fear, or sarcasm. Thus in
Plat. Protag. 330 c—331 A we have a series of conditions stated
by Socrates in the optative form: ef tus Epouvro éué, amroxpwvat-
Env av,—et ovv peta TOvTO Epoito, daiwev av,—ei ovy el7roL,
elTouL av,—ei ovv elmrdt, Ti av amoxpivato; But here all at
once he changes to the subjunctive form, and says: ti ovv
aToxpwovpela arte, TadTa Gworoynoartes, cav Huds éravépynrat,
x.T..; The argument had here reached a point at which
Socrates felt he had gained an advantage, and he therefore
puts this question with special emphasis. The whole conver-
sation is purely imaginary, and certainly there was no greater
probability or expectation of this question being asked than of
the others, which indeed were a necessary introduction to this;
the simple truth, as it seems to me, is that a more vivid form
‘SHALL? AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS. 29
was chosen to state a supposition which was to be made more
prominent in the argument than the others. After this vivid
statement of the condition, with a repetition of the apodosis 7/
avT@ amoxpwovpeba ; Socrates returns to the other form and
Says: vmép ye €uavtod dainy av...xal brép cod 5é, el we wns,
TavTa av Tadta aroxpivoiuny. In Plat. Crit. 51 D the laws are
supposed to say: xal ovdels judy... amayopever, éav Té TIS
BovAnrae bper eis atrockiay iévat, et wy) apécKotwev Npels TE
Kal 7 TONS, éav Te peToLKEly AAXOGE ToL EXOOY, iévat exeioe SrroL
av BovdAntat, Exovta Ta avTov. There the single optative seems
to indicate a condition which is less emphatic than the main
one, although there is no other apparent ground for the change
of form. We may produce the same effect in English: and if
any one of you shall want to go off to some colony,—supposing
we and the state should fail to please him,—or if he shall want
to go to some foreign country and live, none of us forbid him to
go, etc. No one would have been offended surely if any of the
conditions quoted under this head had been expressed in the
other form.
In the passages already quoted, the choice of mood in the
protasis appears to have been affected more or less by the con-
siderations mentioned, sometimes perhaps by several of them at
once, and in each case some peculiar effect is produced by the
mood chosen. Now it seems to me that these various consider-
ations can hardly be reduced to the single one of ‘ probability,’
‘expectation,’ or ‘anticipation of realization, although I admit
that this is one of the most common grounds of distinction
where any can be seen. I have already stated* that this and
the other grounds of distinction “seem to me to stand to the
more comprehensive one of greater and less vividness in the
relation (if I may be allowed the expression) of species to a
genus”; in other words, I think the mistake commonly made
here lies in confounding a very common (perhaps the mosé
common) use of the distinction between the subjunctive and
optative in protasis with the distinction itself. It will hardly
be denied, I think, that, with the exception of the one relating
1 See Journal of Philology, Vol. v. No. 10, p. 197.
30 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY. —
to the physician before the jury of children, in Plat. Gorg. 521 £
(of which below), all these conditions could have been stated in
the other form without essential change of meaning, though
often not without the loss of some special emphasis or effect.
Now, if there were “a distinction in essence and fundamental ”
between the two forms, I hold that this interchange would be
impossible, except on the assumption that the examples quoted
are exceptional and too infrequent to cast doubt on an estab-
lished principle of the language. But if the distinction is such
as I have stated it, this interchange is just what would naturally
be expected.
It will still be urged, however, that exceptions are as fatal
to my principle as to the other, and that, if there is no essen-
tial and fundamental distinction between the two forms, every
future supposition should admit of a double statement. I have
indeed said that most of the conditions quoted by Professor
Morris are more naturally stated in the optative form, because
this vaguer form is in most cases better adapted to an impro-
bable supposition, which must needs be more vaguely conceived
than one which is distinctly anticipated. But I have given
cases of the subjunctive in conditions which are quite as im-
probable and even absurd as any in Mr Morris’s list. Surely
‘escaping into the air,’ ‘taking flight on wings, and ‘having
the ring of Gyges with the cap of Hades’ could not be expressed
by the subjunctive if absurdity or violation of physical laws
were a bar. And yet every one must feel, with Professor Morris,
that most of his examples could not be changed to the sub-
junctive form without violence to the thought. Why now is
this so? Even if it is said that the subjunctives just mentioned
are due to “rhetorical effect” (which has long been a deus ex
machina in Greek syntax), the question remains, why will not
this potent agency transform Mr Morris’s examples for me as
well as my own? To begin with the strongest case, Aesch.
Agam. 37: oixos & avtos, ef hOoyynv AaBot, cadéctar dav
AeEevev, and the parallel passage in Plat. Protag. 361 A, where
it is said of the issue of the argument: e¢ davnv AdBot, elzreiv
av, «.T.r.,—I would remark that there is nothing intrinsically
more impossible in a house or the essue of an argument speaking
‘SHALL’ AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS. 31
than in laws speaking; and yet in Plat. Crit. 50 c we find ci
ovv, av eimwotyv oi vouot; The supposition of the laws address-
ing Socrates had first been made by e¢ gpowro (50 A). Now
why is there no absurdity in this sudden change to the more
vivid form? Merely because the apodosis is a simple future ri
(sc. €podpuev); so that the whole sentence means what shall we -
reply uf the laws (shall) say? If, on the contrary, the sentence
were they (the laws) would astonish us by their eloquence if they
should speak, there would be the same objection to changing
this to the subjunctive form which is felt in the other case of
the house speaking. To say the laws will astonish us by their
eloquence if they shall speak to us would be felt at once to be
unnatural; but there is, as we have seen, no valid objection
to be made to the protasis. So also in the changed form of the
passage from Aischylus the apodosis the house will speak most
plainly is the only objectionable part; and this offends us
because ‘will speak’ is too absolute and unqualified an assertion
to make of a house, the more contingent and weaker form
‘would speak’ being the only one appropriate under ordinary
circumstances. If now we substitute an apodosis here in which
a simple future can stand, e.g. dark deeds will come to light,
then grammatically (though not dramatically) all objection to
nv POoyynv AaB oixos is felt to be removed. Compare “ Foul
deeds will rise, though all the earth o’erwhelm them.”
In Aristoph. Nub. 754, e¢ unxér’ avatérXor ceAnvyn pndapod,
ovK av atrodoinv Tods TéKous, the optative is perhaps necessary,
as Mr Morris intimates, to account for the patience of Socrates
with the stupidity of his pupil, which would (he thinks) have
been intolerable in. the subjunctive form; nevertheless, what-
ever grammatical or logical objection there may be to the
subjunctive will be at once removed if we substitute in the
apodosis ov pe Senoes arodovvas Tos Toxovs. If a similar change
is made in all the examples in the next fifty lines, to which
Mr Morris refers, no one can object to stating the conditions
in the subjunctive except on the excellent ground that their
impudence would be thereby greatly enhanced.
In Aisch. Pers, 431 the same principle holds; and if the
apodosis be made future, e.g. half my tale will not be told, the
32 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
subjunctive can stand in the protasis. I may add that, in my
own judgment, the changed form which Professor Morris gives
as erroneous is not only correct, but elegant.
Of the next example (Plat. Repub. 11. 359 c) I have already
spoken; and I think it will be evident that this could have
‘been stated éoras 8 éEoucia...nv avtois yévytat. ¢
As to the striking example from Plat. Euthyd. 299 g,
already mentioned: ein av evdampovéctatos, ei éyor ypvaoiou mev
Tpla TadavTa év TH yaoTpl, TaXaVTOV ev TO Kpaviw, staTHpa Sé
xpucod év éxatépw THPOaAuno ;—I am encouraged to think that
IT am right in saying that it might be written éorat...éav éy7;
by two conditions which precede (299 B and C): xal Karas Exe?
é£er, éav Tus avT@ Tpivas éyxepacn éAreBdpov Gpakav; to
which Ctesippus adds: wrdvu ye opodpa, édv 4 ye 0 Tivev bc0g
6 avdpias 6 év Aeddois. Surely whoever can swallow this “cart-
load of hellebore’’ will not be troubled even by “three talents
of gold in his stomach!” I may add here, as a proof that no
amount of absurdity or impossibility can make the subjunctive
incorrect in protasis, Dem. Phil. 11. § 68 (p. 128): éore, nS
av OtLovy 4, Sevov telcecOat, where otiody is a sort of x for
which we are at liberty to substitute anything imaginable.
The more common formula would undoubtedly be ovS av e
étLobv yévorto, but here the irregular future infinitive after
@ate makes the subjunctive in the dependent clause more
natural,
In the argument cited from Plat. Phed. 72 B, c, we cannot,
it is true, suppose the conditions to be changed to the subjunc-
tive form without injury to the argument, because the apodoses
are not of a kind to be stated absolutely in the future indica-
tive; but I can see nothing in the conditions themselves which
would be repugnant to the other form. In Phedr. 245 p, how-
ever, I cannot doubt that either form could be used in the
sentence ef yap &x.Tov apyn yiyvolTo, ovK av &€ apyns yiyvorto.
For in the corresponding sentence just below, which on every
ground should be parallel in construction, we have apyjs yap
&n atroXomevns, ovTe avTnH ToTe €k Tov ovTEe GAO EE exeivns
yevnoetat, where the participle is clearly equivalent to éday
aTrONNTAL,
‘SHALL’? AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS. 33
In the quotation from Pericles in Arist. Rhet. m1. 10, 7
(where three of Bekker’s four MSS. read é&éXy), the optative
seems clearly the more natural form, not only from the nature
of the supposition, but from the implied apodosis, which would
be in the optative with dv. With an appropriate apodosis, I
think even this condition could have the other form.
In Xen. Anab, 111. 2. 24, the last of Mr Morris's examples,
I cannot see anything in the protasis, cal ef odv tePpimmois
BovowrTo amiévas, to exclude the subjunctive form; but the
apodoses are all better expressed by the optative with dv than
they would be by the future indicative. Indeed, it may be
safely said that the implied protasis which conditions the first
two optatives is also understood with the third, so that the
expressed protasis states only part of the condition.
I fear that the doctrine of the effect of the apodosis upon
the protasis may be considered even more heretical than the
main proposition which I am defending. I must therefore give
a few examples to illustrate this effect. It is especially evident
In conditional relative sentences when the apodosis precedes
the protasis and consists of an optative in a wish: in such cases
the force of the optative in assimilating the dependent verb
will be generally admitted. As examples may serve Odyss. I.
47: ws amodotTo Kal Gddos 6 Tis ToLadTa ye PéCoe may and
other man likewise perish who shall do the like of this; and
Mimnermus Fr. 1: te@vainv bre pot wnxéte tadta wéror, may I
die when I shall no longer care for these. Here few will deny
that if the wish had been expressed by any other form than
the optative—even by a weaker expression, like BovAouar with
an infinitive—the dependent verbs would have naturally been
in the subjunctive, without any essential change in meaning.
In Il. v. 212-15 we have one protasis in the subjunctive pre-
ceding the apodosis (an optative in a wish), and another in the
optative following it: the assimilation is here very marked.
> a
et O€ Ke vooTHow Kal écorouat ob0arpoiow
LANG > ‘ vw . \ ¢ \ / a
matpiO éunv adoyov Te Kai wrrepehées péya Sadua,
> re yy > > > > a ‘ U ] U \
QUTLK eTEelT aT éuelo KAN TAapwol AdXOTpLOS Hos,
> \ ’ \ Ul , A 3 ‘ ,
el pn éya Tade TOka hace ev Tupi Oeiny.
Journal of Philology. vou. vu. 3
34 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
But in I]. 11 258-261, a passage otherwise parallel, the assimi-
lation is not effected. In Aisch. Prom. 979: eins ghopnrds ovx«
av, eb Tpadcaols Kados, you would not be endurable if you
should ever be in prosperity, who can doubt that a change of
eins av to état would have caused a change of ei rpdcaas to
nv mpacons, f you shall ever be in prosperity? In Dem. Aph.
11. § 18 (p. 841), quoted above (p. 27): wot 8 dv tparroipeba,
el Tt GAXNO WhndicataGe; what possible reason can be given
for the optative in a condition which is twice expressed by
the subjunctive and once by the future indicative, except the
assimilating force of the apodosis? The same effect is quite
as striking in English as in Greek. We should say ‘Turkey
will beg for mercy, if Russia shall take (takes) Constantinople’;
but we should also say, with no change in our view of the con-
tingency, ‘England would be in danger of war, if Russia should
take Constantinople. The form which the apodosis takes
(which may be determined by various considerations not affect-
ing our view of the realization of the condition which is to
follow) in such cases naturally determines the form of the
dependent protasis. That is, the greater or less absoluteness
with which we state the apodosis often (though not always)
affects the “distinctness and vividness” with which we state
the same condition at different times.
Though this assimilating effect is more apparent and pro-
bably more powerful upon a protasis which follows its apodosis,
it is by no means confined to such cases. I cannot see any
other ground than assimilation. for the distinction in the two
conditions in Odyss. Vit. 352, 358, and 355, 356 :—
TOS av eyo ce Séoips pet alavatoics Oeoiaw,
el kev “Apns olyoito xpéos kal Seopov arvéas;
"Hdoator’, ef mep yap Kev "Apns ypeiws vradvEas
olyntat hevywy, avTés Tou eyo Tade Tic.
Here Poseidon, the last speaker, who proposes to be surety
for Ares, would naturally be expected to state his supposition
in the weakest form; but the apodosis ticw, I will pay, is an
absolute statement compared with déo.ue av, and this decides
the form of the protasis by an influence as strong and as unfelt
‘SHALL’ AND ‘SHOULD’ IN PROTASIS. 35
(by the speaker) as that which would cause every schoolboy to
translate one protasis by if Aves shall depart (or departs), and
the other by ¢f Ares should depart, without dreaming of one
expressing more probability or implying more expectation than
the other. I am sorry that I cannot see the ground for the
distinction between the two suppositions of Philip’s death, av
obtos Tt TaOy and ef Te-maor, in Dem. Phil. 1. §§ 11, 12 (p. 43),
for which Professor Morris argues so persuasively; but I can-
not be convinced that an orator could use within a single minute
and with reference to the same future contingency two forms of
expression which differed essentially and fundamentally in the
manner in which the supposed event was conceived, with regard
to its probability or to the expectation or anticipation of its
realization. I believe, on the contrary, that here too the pro-
tasis was assimilated in each case to the apodosis: in the former
case this was tayéws Erepov Pidurrov roumoerte; in the latter
it was a complicated sentence consisting of two distinct apo-
doses in the optative with day, each conditioned specially by a
participle. If the former apodosis had been sromjoacr’ dv (as
it might easily have been), and the latter had been simply ovédé
"Auditor SéEac@at Suvycec Ge, I feel confident we should have
had the two forms of protasis reversed.
The strong evidence I have given of the effect of the apo-
dosis on the fourm of the protasis will, I trust, strengthen the
position already taken (p. 21), that the subjunctive differs from
the optative in common future conditions very much as it does
in oratio obliqua after past tenses in conditions which in direct
discourse have the subjunctive, and in the indirect form allow
either subjunctive or optative. This is also an effect of the
leading verb on~the dependent mood, which is as plain in
English as in Greek. Thus we say ‘he says he will tell her
if she comes ;’ but ‘he said he would tell her «f she came’ (i.e.
‘should come’); corresponding to the Greek éav é\@n and
érOot. The distinction of the Greek is that its greater freedom
allows both ed é\@ou and édv én in the latter case, while the
English allows only the weaker form; that is, in Greek the
assimilation is optional, in English it is compulsory. Perhaps
the most striking cases of this principle in Greek are those in
3—2
36 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
which the apodosis and the leading sentence on which the
oratio obliqua depends are united in one sentence; as in Dem.
Cor. § 145 (p. 275): ov« jv tod mpos twas moréwou répas ovd
aranrayn Pirie, et 7) OnBaiovs Kal Oerrarodrs eyOpovs
mounoece TH TONE, 1.e. Philip saw no way of ending or escaping
the war, unless he should make, etc. Here éav ux toujnon would
have been equally proper, as is plain from sentences like Thuc.
ur. 24: qv Sé tis cin éeriWndhion Kweiv Ta ypnpyata...,
Oavatov Enuiav éréfevro. I am very skeptical of any theory
which assumes a more fundamental distinction between 7p
mroujon and ef troujoee in ordinary cases than is universally
admitted to exist here.
The same principle is illustrated by the double form of pro-
tasis allowed after final clauses which depend on past tenses;
but this is really another form of protasis in oratio obliqua.
See Dem. Aph. I. § 53 (p. 830); Thue. 1 58, 91.
I must leave many points of detail both in Professor Sewall’s
and in Professor Morris’s paper unnoticed. I will briefly allude
in conclusion to what seems to me a fatal objection to the
system of classification advocated in both those papers. The
fundamental idea assigned to the subjunctive, that of “con-
tingency” or that of “anticipation” or “expectation” of reali-
zation, in my opinion, fails utterly to explain the nature of the
“present general suppositions” expressed by éay and the sub-
junctive. Professor Morris does not allude to these, and he
has perhaps little occasion to do so in his argument; Pro-
fessor Sewall mentions them as suppositions of “uncertain
fact,” and quotes two in illustration of this explanation. I
cannot see, after carefully considering his interpretations of
these passages, how his doctrine would enable us to distinguish
between the cases which require the subjunctive and those
which require the present or perfect indicative. Why is if
ever they have fought a battle any more a “supposition of
uncertain fact” than if these men have fought a battle to-day
(the fact supposed being uncertain)? I fear, however, I have
failed to understand this part of Mr Sewall’s paper, for he
speaks of jv mpoopui—twou (Thue. 11. 39) as “in the past, not
future.” It certainly is not future; but it seems to me
‘SHALL’ AND ‘SHOULD IN PROTASIS. 37
impossible to conceive of it as past, or even as strictly present.
It rather refers indefinitely to any one of a series or class of
acts; and the Greek is perhaps the only language which ever
undertook systematically to distinguish this indefinite “gen-
eral” supposition by construction from the simple present
supposition. Now I hold it to be impossible to bring these
conditions under one head with the future suppositions which
take the subjunctive by any such sweeping definitions as the
one just mentioned. The subjunctive in the latter case is
generally interchangeable with the future indicative, and can
be translated by this tense in both English and Latin; the
other is regularly expressed in both English and Latin by the
present indicative, and sometimes takes this form even in
Greek. I have already described the quasi-present general
condition as a “variation (so to speak) of the ordinary present
condition,” while the corresponding past general condition is
a variation of the ordinary past condition expressed by the
past tenses of the indicative’. This important relation, with
its consequences, must be apprehended, as it seems to me,
before the true force of the subjunctive in protasis can be
understood. It will be borne in mind that I refer here to
the distinction between the use of the subjunctive in future
conditions (where it may be either particular or general) and
its use in present general conditions, and not to the ‘general’
character which may be given to any class of conditions
without essentially changing their nature. A distinction
based upon this latter: character has been recognized in the
subjunctive in protasis by Baumlein, as I have already stated’;
‘but it led him to no important result, as it is the basis of no
1 See Journal, v. 10, p. 192. and he seems to have no suspicion
2 See Baumlein, Untersuchungen
tiber die griech. Modi, p. 211. For
remarks on his views of this subject,
see Journal, v. 10, p. 193. It is there
said: “ Baiumlein leaves the subjunc-
tive in general conditions, as well as
in other kinds of protasis, to be ex-
plained on his single principle as de-
noting a ‘Tendenz zur Wirklichkeit’ ;
that the two subjunctives stand in
different relations to the present in-
dicative.” It is no wonder, therefore,
that he found his distinction ‘‘ un-
essential” (unwesentlich) and “ without
effect in changing the meaning of the
construction” (die Bedeutung dieser
Construction nicht dndert). Modi, p.
221; cf. p. 224,
38 _ {HE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
distinction in construction. Baumlein shows in his first
statement of the subject that he has no such distinction in
mind as that which I have used in my classification; for his
very first example is 6 6€ Kev xeyorodsetas ov Kev ixwpat (I. 1.
139), and of eighteen other Homeric examples cited to
illustrate the general use of the subjunctive with Gs xe,
“wonach eine Gattung von Fallen als eintretend gesetzt
wird,” no less than sixteen contain subjunctives referring to
the future. It is absolutely necessary to recognize distinctly
the element of tvme in order to appreciate the relations of the
subjunctive in its two uses, first, to the future and the present
indicative, secondly, to the two corresponding uses of the
optative. I cannot feel, therefore, that the two systems of
classifications which I have discussed in this paper, as they
are based on other considerations and exclude wholly or in
great part the element of time, can possibly give just promi-
nence to these important relations.
W. W. GOODWIN.
LUCRETIUS’ PROGMIUM AND EPICUREAN
THEOLOGY.
Marter is utterly dead, Lucretius has told us over and over
again. The world and all that is on it, from the inert mass
to the wonderful human form, instinct with life and thought,
everything, look as fine as it may, is made but of scraps of this
dead matter in which no slightest admixture of life dwells or
works. Of this Lucretius is most firmly convinced. What
then are we to think, when, having mastered his whole system,
we return to his opening lines? There, at the portal of the
poem, as it were, stands an apparition and a lovely one—
the figure of Venus joyous and full of life. We are utterly
startled at the sight, and almost expect it to vanish, for how
comes this beautiful presence here, where the realm of death
is, and none but dead things should be seen? It is an appari-
tion indeed.
All lovers of Lucretius have been perplexed and puzzled by
the apparent inconsistency of this opening of a poem, one chief
feature of which is to prove that “all things are done without
the hand of the gods,” that they have no possible control over
the world or men. All have been puzzled here—we might
assume it to be a mere imitation of ancient poets who invoked
the Muse to their aid—but something in the tone and matter
has forbidden nearly all to view it as such. And yet, if it be an
actual prayer for Divine aid, how can that be reconciled with
Lucretius’ system? One recent writer, Mr Robert Buchanan’,
has solved the question very simply. According to him, this
Invocation is merely “in the highest sense a parody, because it’
_ 1 New Quarterly Magazine, April, 1876, p. 5, also p. 3.
AO THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
is the mere imitative conjuration of a divine entity in whom
the singer has no faith.” Thus the knot is loosed in a very
easy way. But could we feel nothing too earnest for a parody
in the passage, apart from this entirely, Mr Buchanan’s verdict
that Lucretius has no faith in any Divine existence is in entire
contradiction to those who have studied both Lucretius and
Epicureanism most thoroughly.. There is, as we shall shortly
see, unquestionable evidence that both Epicurus and Lucretius
firmly believed that Gods of a kind did exist. Another opinion,
partly similar to Mr Buchanan’s, is expressed by Lange in his
justly well-known “ History of Materialism.” “Lucretius in-
vokes the Gods, and at the same time combats religion,”
says Lange, “while yet it is impossible for us to discover in his
system even a shadow of doubt or contradiction in respect
of this.” The meaning of these words it is impossible to under-
stand till we turn to his chapter on Epicurus’, where we find
the following explanation: “There can be no doubt that
Epicurus in reality reverenced the conception of the Gods as
being an element of a noble human origin, and did not reve-
rence the Gods themselves as externally existing Beings.” “He
worshipped the Gods on account of their perfection: he could
do this no matter whether this perfection manifests itself in
their external actings, or whether it unfolds itself solely as an
ideal in our thoughts: and it is the latter which appears to
have been his standpoint.” ‘‘Epicurus never came into con-
flict with religion, for he worshipped the Gods sedulously
(fletssig) in the customary way, yet without on. this account
pretending a view of them which was not his.”
We must not think that his worship of the Gods was a
“mere pretence in order to keep himself safe with the mass
of the people and with the dangerous priesthood, it came truly
from the heart, since in fact his Deities who live without care
or suffering represented the ideal of his philosophy as it were
embodied, It was at the utmost a concession to the existing
order of things,’—from a moral point of view we must say _
a most dangerous concession—“ if Epicurus thus complied with
1 Geschichte des Materialismus. Erster Abschnitt. Cap. 4, 1873.
LUCRETIUS AND EPICUREAN THEOLOGY. 4\1
forms of worship which he must have thought at the least
arbitrary or indifferent.” The peculiar ‘consistency’ and
honesty which lay in being entirely a disbeliever in the Gods’
existence, for such Lange declares him to have been, and at the
same time ‘sedulously’ going through the ordinary forms of
pagan worship, seems to us very hard to understand. Indeed
the morality of this passage appears to us absolutely incom-
prehensible. According to Lange, Lucretius does not believe in
the existence of Venus. She is no reality, she is but the
merest picture—yet he can pray to her “without even a
shadow of inconsistency,” for is she not an “ embodied ideal of
his philosophy”? Such mock worship of a popular deity,—
under the reservation that all the time it implied the worship
of something else, namely, of an ‘ideal’ which did not ob-
jectively exist,—seems to us the most contemptible insincerity
possible. The notion of a parody is repulsive enough, but
such a ‘concession’ as this is positively hideous. (Moreover
Lange’s emphatic assertion, for which he offers no word of
proof, that Epicurus did not hold the actual existence of the
Gods, is entirely contradictory to historical evidence’.) <A dif-
ferent explanation, which does not reduce the Invocation
either to a parody or to a concession, is offered by a French
writer, M. Martha®. According to him we have here an alle-
gory :—the goddess Venus is a personification of the great law
of life and reproduction in Nature—the sovereign law which
rules the world. “These beautiful images, borrowed from the
national religion, enclose a profession of faith and a funda-
mental doctrine of Epicureanism.”
prays to Venus*® to beg from Mars, her lover, peace for the
Romans, in this Lucretius more and more confounds Venus
with the mythic ancestress of the Roman. race—but this is a
As the poet proceeds and -
1 See Zeller’s Philosophie der Grie-
chen, Theil 111. p. 395.
2 Le Poéme de Lucréce, 1873, pp.
100—106.
3 In the Appendix (p. 358) Martha
makes the suggestion—a very natural
one—that in this beautifnl picture
Lucretius has reproduced some statu-
ary group of Venus soothing Mars,
It is probable that the two were fre-
quently represented in the attitude
here described. Certain phrases, such
as ‘tereti cervice reflexa,’ suggest this,
he says.
42 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
simple play of imagination’. The Venus of the opening lines is
only a law of Nature personified’.
Before we can decide what Lucretius meant here, it is plain
that we must first answer a question which it is not easy at
once to settle, namely, Did Epicurus and Lucretius really
believe that their assumed Deities existed, or did they not?
Historical evidence asserts that Epicurus did, but the Epicu-
rean Gods are such meaningless, impotent shadow-deities, and
so superfluous are they in particular for his atomic explanation
of the world, that some have thought Epicurus simply pro-
fessed a belief in them for appearance’ sake, and really believed
in no Divine existence whatever. But as the profession of
Atheism would have made his system too unpopular (would
have been ‘dangerous’ as Lange asserts), he nominally re-
tained the ancient deities while depriving them of all their
power. But for the entire superfluousness and impotency of ©
these deities, the question whether Lucretius and his master
were atheists could never have been raised at all.: Lucretius
asserts repeatedly his belief that the Gods exist, and promises®
more than once to prove ‘at full length” what their nature is.
Their bodies, he says, are material, being formed of the smallest
_kind of atoms, but of supersensual—almost inconceivable—
fineness, and they dwell far, far away from earth, in their sedes
quiete, a stormless, cloudless, Epicurean heaven,
1 Probably it is not even this. No Lucretius’ petition for peace is directed
mythological tone need necessarily be
seen in the address Aineadum genetrix.
It is probably here but a title of Venus,
and of all her names the one dearest
to Roman ears. Lucretius did not
believe that she was ancestress of the
Romans, and had he been a modern
author would not have used the
phrase,
2 Bockemiiller in his recent edition
of Lucretius (Part 1. p. 10, 1874) also
holds Venus to be a mere personifica-
tion of natural law, but offers a dif-
ferent and somewhat novel explanation
of the passage. According to him
in reality and under cover of the
figures, Venus and Mars, to the recently
wedded pair, Julia and Pompey, who
were for Romans of that period the
“‘ universally acknowledged representa-
tives of supersensual power.” ‘ Julia
(Julus, Aineas, Venus)=Venus and
- Pompeius M. = Mars.”’—It was, we be-
lieve, Martha who first called attention
to the fact, as bearing on this pas-
sage, that the Roman emperor and his
consort were often represented in
statuary under the guise of Mars and
Venus.
_ ® See v. 155, and 1. 57 too.
LUCRETIUS AND EPICUREAN THEOLOGY. 43
‘*Where falls not hail, or rain, or any snow,
Nor ever wind blows loudly.”
Munro says, “it is certain that Epicurus and Lucretius
firmly believed in the existence of these Gods',” and Zeller?
emphatically asserts the same. There is but one passage in
the poem which does indeed seem to imply the opposite.
Lucretius proves at length that Cybele is but the Earth
personified. If any one thinks fit to be so foolish, he may call
the sea Neptune, corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, but he must
remember all the time that these are but names of things
without life. Yet in this passage Lucretius by no means rejects
an actual Neptune, or Ceres, or Bacchus. It is merely the
connection of these deities with the sea, corn, or wine which he
denies. The Epicurean shadow-deities—the new Pantheon—
do in verity exist, but their counter-parts, which a former
theology supposed to have power over nature, have no exist-
ence whatever. It is apparently on a misunderstanding of this
passage that Lange has based his opinion.
According to the facts of the case, grossly and absurdly ©
inconsistent as it may appear to us, Lucretius did firmly
believe in the existence of Gods of a kind. It is inconsistent
because his Gods are utter nonentities, and because his system
leaves them no part to play. But how frequent, even now,
especially in matters of belief and practice, some similar incon-
sistency is! It is plain that while Lucretius invokes Venus in
the procemium, he has before his mind a principle, the exist-
ence and constant transmission of life in Nature. This is a
Law of Nature. But is it impossible that the thought should
occur to the poet, “May not this Law be a person too? a
Deity?” Who can say that in some moment this thought may
not have seized him? Is it not true that Lucretius’ ardent recog-
nition of Law (and thereby of Unity) in Nature in defiance of
Polytheistic caprice prepared the way for Theism? and if so,
is it impossible that he himself should have had a glimpse of
the truth towards which he had, though unwittingly, been
working? It seems bold to deny the possibility of this,
1 See his note on 11. 646.
2 Philosophie der Griechen. Theil 11. p. 398. .
44 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
To recognise one Life in Nature would, it is true, utterly
contradict Epicurus, whom Lucretius has almost always fol-
lowed so closely, yet he need not have so followed him every-
where: and here, for once, he may have taken a long stride in
advance of his master. Doubtless, even Lucretius felt occasion-
ally, in presence of the beautiful world, that there was some-
where a contradiction between Nature and fis darling De
Rerum Natura—that the first contained something which was
wanting in the other.
It is not fair to say that ch: supposition of an allegory can
entirely explain this invocation—for the address to Venus
contains something in its tone more like a prayer for Rome and
his countrymen, if we are not mistaken, than like a make-
believe address to a mere conscious and intended allegory.
A Roman worshipper in a temple raising his eyes to some
marble statue of a god might form such mental pictures of
Deity and use some such phrases as here suggest to us mere
pictorial description. Fatal again to the notion of a parody
are the words
‘*Quz quoniam rerum naturam sola gubernas,”
* Since thou alone governest nature.” The word ‘alone’ makes
the passage no parody, but a distinct expression of Lucretius’
protest against the belief in many deities who all alike in-
terfere with nature. Lucretius, it seems to us, here distinctly
avows one ruling power in the world, and, whether this be
taken for a Law or a person, in either case it is not an “imita-
tion” of the popular creed, but an expression of his own.
(Lucretius attributes no control over Nature to Mars.)
Possibly too the passage may be more fairly viewed as the
expression of some mood, earlier or later, than as spoken from
Lucretius’ habitual stand-point. His earliest inspiration—and
evidently a very strong one—was derived not from Epicurus
but from Empedocles, a thinker of a very different order.
Lucretius speaks of him with the most fervent admiration, as
alraost more than a mortal. The divinity named Love or
Aphrodite’, a most prominent figure in Empedocles’ poem,
1 Zeller insists on this name not Philosophie der Griechen, Vol.1. p. 697.
representing a mere personification. (Vierte Auflage, 1876.)
LUCRETIUS AND EPICUREAN THEOLOGY. 45
who produces life and brings all things into being, is very like
the Venus of the Invocation. Another Greek poet who
strongly influenced Lucretius was Euripides; and he too re-
peatedly extols the power of Aphrodite; for him she is almost
omnipotent; she is, he sometimes says, the all-ruling power
both in nature and in the heart of man*. And in this pro-
cemion we seem to have a wild reconciliation between Epicu-
reanism and the religious nature-speculations of Empedocles
(influenced possibly by Euripides also)—an Epicurean Venus
who is yet at the same time the Life of the whole world. At
any rate the whole introduction of the poem bears a most
unfinished character: the paragraphs composing it, though in
strict sequence of thought, come in severally with a jerk as it
were, and it seems as if it had been written not all at once, but
in parts and at different times®. Thus the address to Venus may
possibly have been composed at a different time and stage of
thought from the rest of the poem.
(The notion that Venus and Mars are merely two allegorical
figures, Love and Strife, or the motions of destruction and
renewal ever at work in nature, in spite of Professor Sellar’s
eloquent vindication, appears to us artificial, or at least without
sufficient evidence. At the same time we must beware of
attributing to Lucretius ideas which are foreign to him, for
instance, Mr Symonds says that Lucretius “dropping the phrase-
ology of atoms, void, motion or chance, spoke at times of
Nature as endowed with reason and a will,” but no one of the
passages which he quotes (Vv. 186, 811, 846) appears to have
this meaning. ‘Nature,’ as Lucretius uses the word, means
express here the indebtedness to Mr
Munro’s edition felt by all who have
endeavoured to grasp the thought of
1 See Reisacker’s pamphlet, Der
Todesgedanke...bei den Rémern, pp. xx.
and xxi.
2 So Munro in his second edition (see
Vol. 1. pp. 346—7) thought it possible
that the poem originally opened with
the passage now beginning at v. 62
(Humana ante oculos, &¢c.), but that
Lucretius subsequently composed an-
other opening passage, that with which
the poem at present begins. (He has
since retracted this opinion.)— We
Lucretius, which is often a difficult
matter. It required some qualities of
mind which are rarely united, to pro-
duce so trustworthy a work. Much
as Lachmann performed for the text,
it must be remembered that he left
almost all undone for the explanation
of the poem, a task of excessive diffi-
culty.
46 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
but the laws of Nature, the habits of the world; that is all.
Yet it is true that having discarded the old Divine agencies,
the notion of Nature as a new self-working power might easily
come.)
In conclusion, we can only mention that it is not certain
whether Epicurus did not allow of prayers to the Gods—how
to be answered, we can barely conceive—possibly merely in
keeping the mind open to the influence of the Divine ‘images’’.
Epicurus’ relation to religion seems to have been, as Martha
says, a kind of ‘obscure mysticism’ of which we know but
little. After all the question is one that it seems not possible
to solve entirely. Lucretius did believe in Divine existences, of
however strange a kind, and perhaps we may view the picture
of Venus and Mars (vv. 31—39) as a single scene out of his
promised description of the new Pantheon and the Epicurean
heaven. The promise remains unfulfilled, but as the sixth
(which he intended for the concluding) book is manifestly
incomplete’, stopping abruptly in the course of a description of
the plague, and as in its beginning he again refers to the Gods
at some length, it seems fair to infer that, had he lived, he
would have concluded the poem with a description of the
Epicurean deities and their abode. Doubtless a wonderful
piece of painting that would have been (for Lucretius has gor-
geous colours at command) and not entirely uninfluenced by
the old mythology. Would it have resembled the picture of
the Epicurean Gods by our great English-poet in the ‘ Lotos-
Eaters’? Yet what contemptible Deities for any man to
worship! with neither heart nor hand to help, lower far
than the Heroes worshipped of old with all their sins, for
they, if suffering men called to them, would labour or die to
help and deliver them. But with these no man’s soul could ever
1 See Book v1. 75—78.
2 Lange (page 120) says that ‘‘ per-
haps intentionally” Lucretius con-
for the conclusion. It seems plain
(from vi. 92 f.) that he intended the
sixth book for the last, and as his
cludes his work with a description of
the power of death as he began it with
an Invocation of the Goddess of Life.
But we have absolutely no reason to
suppose that Lucretius intended this
express promise to describe the Gods
and their seats is nowhere fulfilled,
he must apparently have reserved this
subject for the conclusion of this book
and of the poem.
LUCRETIUS AND EPICUREAN THEOLOGY. 47
have been satisfied, and who can say that Lucretius, dogmatic
Epicurean as he was, would have used no bitter tone, such as
marks Tennyson’s vivid picture :
** Careless of mankind ;
For they lie beside their nectar and their bolts are hurled
Far below them in the valleys, and the clouds are lightly curled
Round their golden houses girdled with the gleaming world.
There they smile in secret, looking over wasted lands,
Blight and famine, plague and earthquake, roaring deeps and fiery sands,
Clanging fights, and flaming towns and sinking ships and praying hands,
But they smile; they find a music centred in a doleful song,
Steaming up a lamentation, and an ancient tale of wrong,
Like a tale of little meaning, though the words are strong.”
Before concluding, we wish to touch on one central but
little understood dogma of Epicurean physics. Thoroughgoing
in his Materialism as Lucretius is, there is one particular where
he comes into most striking agreement with recent specula-
tions, starting from an utterly different stand-point. In the
course of the recent controversy between Tyndall and Marti-
neau, the latter has discussed the nature of Force’. Science,
he tells us, cannot answer the question, What is Force? To
find an answer to this we must look within ourselves. We are
conscious that we ourselves exercise Power. This is the one
thing we immediately know, and our whole idea of Power
is identical with that of Will or reduced from it. Any causal
Power other than Will is “absolutely out of the sphere of
thought.” Lucretius strikingly illustrates this conception ac-
cording to which Will is the source of Energy. When on a
former occasion we gave an account of Lucretius’ Atomic
Theory, we did so with especial reference* to the Declination
of the Atoms and its philosophical consequences—a subject
before hardly touched on. In Epicurean theory, the motion of
the atoms is the source from which the whole Energy of the
Universe is originally derived. The atoms which are con-
ceived to fall straight downwards, in parallel lines, like drops of
1 Contemporary Review, March,1876. Quarterly Review, October, 1875, pp.
2 «The Atomic Theory of Lucretius, 335—377. See here pp. 355—363 and
contrasted with modern Theories of p. 371.
Atoms and the Origin of Life.” British
48 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
rain, would never meet, but that occasionally they swerve a
very little from their proper path and so come into collision.
The slightest declension is quite sufficient, as we pointed out,
to bring the atoms into universal collision and so render them
a source of Power. This swerving— Declination’ Lucretius calls
it—comes entirely from their own volition, which is governed by
no laws, but impels them to move of their own accord, “at no
fixed place or time.” Thus, according to Lucretius as well as
according to that living thinker, to whom Lucretius appears
so completely antagonistic, Will is most closely connected with
the original source of all the Energy, or Power, or Forces
acting in the world. It is Will, even though it be the will of
the atoms. True, Lucretius, as we have said, most emphati-
cally insists that Matter is “utterly dead*.’ After having
reduced the whole universe to atoms, he makes merry with
somewhat ghastly laughter over the notion of these little parti-
cles having life. Ifso, you may think of them “laughing and
weeping and learnedly discussing Epicurean doctrines.’ To do
this and conceive them living is “raving madness,” he says.
Yet surely that is not more absurd than his own conception
of atoms that have wills of their own and can move to the right
or left, “as they wish,” sponte sud, but which are at the same
time “utterly dead.’ It is for this reason, because his atoms
act as if they were alive, and because a dead Will is an ab-
surdity, that we formerly said that Lucretius wrtwally conceives
Matter as living, and that really his theory of Matter involves—
certainly in a very low form, perhaps in the very lowest form
possible—Pantheism.
This statement may seem somewhat startling, especially
when we consider what Lucretius’ creed was, how thorough-
going in many ways his materialism is. We may call to mind
that he has most emphatically asserted the existence of Free
Will, which he supposes to be rendered possible only through
Declination. This power in the atoms he supposes to be the
cause of Free Will action in men. Now, the question strikes
one, Is his theory of Volition as a source of Energy connected
with his strong belief in individual Free Will? and, if so, may
1 Seminibus carentibus undique sensu.
LUCRETIUS AND EPICUREAN THEOLOGY. 49
not the connection be strictly logical? Is it not entirely in
harmony with the thought expressed by Martineau, that all
phenomena are the expression of living Energy? that our
whole idea of Power is derived from that of living Will? It
is true, the volition of the atoms is not, nominally, what one
calls a living Will. A dead Will is indeed an absurdity, but
Will without life was one of the Epicurean dogmas which
Lucretius, as a convert, had felt himself bound to swallow.
He will not even admit to himself that there is anything
unnatural in it. Yet, putting this aside, Lucretius does
indeed furnish an assent from an unexpected quarter to the
conception of recent thinkers that Will is the only source of
Energy.
When we examine the subject we see that the part played
by Declination in his system is most subtle ;—especially we
refer to his notion of an Increase of moving force’, starting
from the infinitely slight swerving of the tiny atoms of the
fourth principle of the soul, and growing gradually stronger and
stronger till the whole body moves. Space does not permit
us to show how curiously this notion is adapted to Epicurean
psychology. Thus, however, and in a most subtle way, does
his system link the mightiest efforts of the moving body
with the Declination of the atoms, a motion so inexpressibly
slight.
If then it be true that he too assigns Will as the source
of the world’s Energy, does not this to some extent alter
Lucretius’ position among the philosophic systems? Though
at the cost of utter inconsistency, has not even he been com-
pelled to admit within his scheme of evolution something
besides dead matter? for it must not be forgotten that the
Matter which, he says, is so potent to evolve Life, is Matter
+ Free Will.
JOHN MASSON.
1 Lange has referred to this, but even Zeller should both entirely fail
with some misconception of its force. to indicate the philosophical conse-
(Geschichte des Materialismus, note, p. quences of Declination.
141.) It is strange that Lange and
Journal of Philology. vou. vit. 4
NOTES ON THE AENEID.
I.
36. COMPARE Lucr. 2. 639, “aeternumque daret matri sub
pectore volnus.”
63. With lazas dare, vasta dare and the like, comp. Sall.
Jug. 59, dare victos = vincere.
104. averto intrans. Plaut. Mil. 202, 1065 (Lorenz.).
122—3. For the language generally, comp. Lucr. 6. 1071,
quam laxare queant compages taurea vincla: for accipiunt Liv.
35. 26. 8, “omnibus compagibus aquam acciperet,” and Aen. 6.
414, “multam accepit rimosa paludem.”
148. See Cic. Cluent. § 138, from which it appears that the
converse of this simile was a common one.
168. Luer. 5. 948, “silvestria templa tenebant Nympharum,
quibus e scibant umore fluenta Lubrica preiiye larga lavere
umida saxa.”
190,191. Luer. 2. 921, “ praeter volgus turbamque animan-
tum.” The use of turba may perhaps be illustrated by Plaut. :
Aul. 338, 340, where the word is used of a number of slaves.
195. Cadis onerarat vina, I incline to take not as an in-
version for cados onerarat vinis, but as = “had put (on the
ships) in casks :” onus appears to have been the technical word
for a cargo (Cic. Inv. 2, § 153, Verr. 5, § 145), and Petronius
76 says, “quinque naves aedificavi, oneravt vinum,’ i.e. “I put
wine into them as their cargo.”
203. The passage in the Odyssey (12. 211—12), from which
the words “forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit” are appa-
rently translated, is susceptible of a very different interpre-
tation. Odysseus says:
ara cal évOev (from the Cyclops) éuj apetn BovdAn Te vow
NOTES ON THE AENEID. 51
te ‘Exdvyouer, kai tov tavde pvncecOat oiw. May not this
mean “and I think that in this case too we shall remember
(i.e. know how to put to good use) these, viz. my manhood and
counsel and wit”? Comp. wrncacbe 5é Ooupidos dda.
214. For implentur, which seems to have been a colloquial
expression, comp. Petron. 16, “nos implevimus cena,” and Juv.
5. 75, “vin tu consuetis audax conviva canistris Jmpleri.”
262. Volvens: comp. Livy 34. 5. 7, “tuas adversus te
Origines revolvam.”
293. The meaning of iwra in such phrases as iwra dare
does not seem to have been sufficiently examined and illus-
trated. There seems no question that the word is often used in
the sense of ordinances, decrees in particular cases, provisions of
law to meet particular cases, rules of law. Cic., Inv. 2, § 67,
distinguishes iwra naturae, iwra consuetudinis and cura legitima,
provisions or ordinances of nature, of custom, and of leges or writ-
ten formulae: comp. Rosc. Com. § 24, “sunt iwra, sunt formulae
de omnibus rebus constitutae” (rules, ordinances): Top. § 23,
“aequitas, quae paribus in causis paria tua desiderat:” Quint.
§ 45, “quis tandem nobis ista zwra tam aequa describit?” 7b.
§ 48, “ad haec extrema et inimicissima iwra tam cupide decur-
rebas:” Top. 23, “valeat aequitas, quae paribus in causis paria
wura desiderat:” Verr. 5, § 27, “pretio, non aequitate wwra —
descripserat:” 7b. § 34, “cwra omnia praetoris urbani nutu...
Chelidonis...gubernari:” Prop. 4. 12 (13). 49, “auro venalia wwia,
Aurum lex sequitur:” Liv. 34. 3. 1, “muliebria cura quibus
alligaverint licentiam eorum maiores vestri:” Gaius 1. 47,
“cetera vero iwra eius legis ad peregrinos non pertinere.”
Lura condere seems to have thus originally meant “to put
together isolated decisions,” and so “to establish precedents” or
“found rules of law” (which must be based on precedents):
Plaut. Epid. 3. 4. 90, “omnium legum atque iwrium fictor, condi-
tor cluet:” Liv. 34. 6. 8, “decemviris ad condenda iura creatis:”
Sen. Ep. 14. 14, “ad cwra condenda humano generi sapientes
recesserunt.” Gaius 1. 2. 9, “responsa prudentum sunt senten-
tiae et opiniones eorum quibus permissum est ¢wra condere:
nam antiquitus institutum erat ut essent qui dura publice
4—2
52 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
interpretarentur.” Vergil’s condere fata (Aen. 10. 35) seems a
phrase formed on the analogy of condere ura. Lucer, 5. 1144,
wuraque constituere ut possent legibus uti might be taken to
mean “they established single precedents or provisions, that
they might be able to use written formulae.”
From meaning “binding ordinances” “iwra” comes to be used
for “authority” in general: Prop. 4. 10 (11). 2, “trahit addic-
tum sub sua zwra virum:” and wwra dare, so common in verse
and later prose, or iwra reddere (Liv. 7. 1. 6, “praetorem twra
reddentem:” 31. 29. 9, “‘ praetorem excelso ex suggestu iura
superba reddentem”),=“to give decisions” so “to administer
justice,” and lastly, “to govern.” The correlative of twra dare
is tura petere, which, from meaning “to ask for decisions,”
comes to mean “to submit oneself to.” Catull. 66. 83, (if the
true reading be not rather colitis,) “casto petitis quae tura
cubili,” (i.e. submit yourselves): comp. Liv. 23. 5. 13, 10. 2:
(“cura petere a Roma, a Carthagine’’). Statius Silv. 1. 4. 12,
“quae tua longinquis implorant iura querellis.’ In Pliny 3.
141—2, “petere wura in aliquam urbem,” is used as=to be
under the iurisdiction of a city; literally, to go there for the
decision of cases. Thus “iura dare” here, as elsewhere in
Vergil, will simply mean “to govern.”
297. “Demittit—ut terrae pateant, ne Dido finibus arce-
ret.” Precisely the same sequence of tenses is found in Cic.
Cluent. § 71, “capit hoc consilii ut pecuniam polliceatur...
supprimat; ut...hos...destitutione iratos Oppianico redderet :”
the immediate object being expressed by the present, the re-
moter object by the imperfect, subjunctive. |
407. Lucr. 4. 571, “interdum frustratur image verbi.”
426. Lucr. 5. 1144, quoted above.
439. “Infert se...miscetque:” Ov. Am. 3. 5. 29, “illic se
rapuit, gregibusque ¢tmmiscuit illis.”
441. Sall. (Hist. 8. 91), quoted here by Serv., said “laetus
frugum:” for laetus =“abundant:” comp., among other pas-
sages, Lucr. 1. 255, “hinc laetas urbes pueris florere videmus.”
450. Caes. B. C. 2. 12, “qua nova re oblata.”’
465. Aristotle, Poet. p. 1455 a 2, év tots Kumpiou tots Ac-
NOTES ON THE AENEID. 53
Katoyévous’ idav yap THY ypadyy Exravoe: a further hint of
Vergil’s obligations to the Cyclic or tragic tradition.
639. Cic. Quint. § 10, “ut multis iniuriis iactatam atque
agitatam aequitatem in hoc tandem loco consistere et confirmari
patiamini.”
660. Lucr. 3. 250, “ postremis datur ossibus atque medullis
sive voluptas est sive est contrarius ardor.”
IT.
99. Cato ap. Front. ad M. Aur. 2. 6, p. 32 (Naber), “dum
se intempesta nox...praecipitat.”
103. For iamdudwm with imper. comp. Sen. Ep. 84. 14,
“iamdudum relingue ista:” with the future indic. ib. Ep. 17. 9,
“jamdudum exibit.”
169. Lucr. 2. 69, “et quasi longinquo fluere omnia cerni-
mus aevo, ex oculisque vetustatem swhducere nostris,”
176. Livy 7. 6. 2, “id enim illi loco dicandwm vates cane-
bant.”
201. Cic. Rep. 1. § 51, “si e vectoribus sorte ductus ad
gubernacula accesserit:” the phrase is also found in legal
documents, and cannot therefore be taken as a poetical in-
version.
283. Sall. Hist. 1. 48. 15, “ Ut te neque hominum neque
deorum pudet quos per fidem aut periurio violasti !”
377. Cic. Att. 4, 5.1, “senseram, noram, inductus, relictus,
proiectus ab iis.”
425. Accius 127, “ Minocras armapotent.”
516. Eur. H. F. 97, adAros Sé Bapor, dpvis as, Ertn€ t7o.
572. Lucr, 3. 1018, “at mens sibi conscia facti Praeme-
tuens adhibet stimulos.”
622. Luer. 3. 18, “ Apparet divum numen.”
638. Plaut. Merc. 550 (Ritschl), “‘tum quom est sanguis
integer.”
746. Catull. 62. 24, “quid faciunt hostes capta crudelius
urbe ?”
54 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
IIT.
43, Luer. 1. 885, “manare cruorem.”
68. Lucr. 4, 575—6, “palantis comites cum montes inter
opacos Quaerimus et magna dispersos voce ciemus.”
196. Varro, Sat. Men. p. 211 (Riese), “quodsi pergunt
diutius mare volvere.”
208. “Verro,” properly “to pull about,” so “to tear up:”
Lucr. 6. 624, “validi verrentes aequora venti :” Ov. Am, 3. 8. 43,
“non freta demisso verrebant eruta vento.”
223. “Partem,” a share of the food, “portion:” comp.
Sueton. Calig. 18.
228. Lucr. 3. 581, “taetro odore.”
284. Luer. 5. 644, “quae volvunt magnos in magnis orbibus
annos.”
331. Cic. Verr. 2. 1, § 6, “quorum scelerum Poenis agi-
tatur:” 5.§ 118 (from the letter of Furius), “ Poenas scelerwmque
Furias.” |
372. Luer. 2. 869, “ipsa manu ducunt.”
408. Lucr. 2. 610, “antiquo more sacrorum.”
658. Luer. 3. 1033, “lumine adempto animam moribundo
corpore fudit.”
i.
1. “Cura” of love, Plaut. Epid. 1, 2. 32.
22. Ter. And. 266, “dum in dubio est animus impellitur.”
71. Luer. 4. 1137, “verbum iaculata religuit Quod cupido
adfixum cordi vivescit ut ignis.”
158. Lucr. 5. 985, “spumigert suis adventu validique
leonis.”
250. Soph. Trach. 13, é« 5€ Sacxiov yeverados Kpovuvoi
Sueppaivovto Kpnvatiov torov.
427. The manes appear to have been conceived as the ma-
terial part of what survived after death: comp. Liv. 31. 30,
“omnium nudatos manes:” Prop. 5. 53, “nec sedeant cinert
manes :” 3. 5. 30, “inde ubi suppositus cinerem me fecerit ardor,
NOTES ON THE AENEID. 55
Accipiat manes parvula testa meos:” and other passages in
which cints and manes are connected.
450—1. Lucr. 2. 1038, “quam tibi iam nemo, fessus satiate
videndi, Suspicere in caeli dignatur lucida templa: Desine
quapropter novitate exterritus ipsa, &c.”
V.
5. Cic. Phil. 11, § 29, “polluere deorum hominumque iura.”
15. Plaut. Merc. 192, R. “armamentis complicandis compo-
nendis studuimus :” Caes. B. G. 5. 1, and elsewhere has “ armare
naves.”
80. As “sanctus” is almost technically applied to the dead
(see Aen. 12. 648 and elsewhere), so “sanctitas’” seems to have
been the name of the feeling with which the dead were to be
regarded: Cic. Top. § 90, “aequitas tripartita dicitur esse: una
ad superos deos, altera ad manes, altera ad homines pertinere.
Prima pietas, secunda sanctitas, tertia iustitia aut aequitas
nominatur.”
137. Lucr. 3. 141, “hic exultat enim pavor ac metus.”
212. Catull. 64. 6, “ausi sunt vada salsa cita decurrere
puppi:”’ for the construction, comp. “ quorum aequora curro,”
235 below.
317. Plaut. Cist. 4. 2. 27, “certe eum signat locum ubi ea
(cistella) excidit” =“has her eyes on the place:” confirming
Serv.’s interpretation of this passage,
426. Lucilius 8 fr. 13 Miiller: “gallus (se) sustulit in
digitos.” |
537. “In magno munere:” comp. Cic. Verr. 2. 3, § 115,
“hoc vix ab Apronio in swmmo beneficio pro iis...impetratum
est;” 1.e. “as, or by way of, the greatest kindness.”
VI.
165. “ Crere viros,” Catull. 68. 90.
179. Catull. 63. 53, “ ferarum gelida stabula.”
302. With “velis ministrat,” comp. Liv. 34. 6. 6, “ adminis-
tratio navis.” :
56 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
304, “Viridis:” comp. Cic. Lael. § 11, Tuse, 3. § 75: Hor.
C. 1. 9. 17, Epod. 13. 4, Sen. Ep. 66.
423. “Fusus,” Lucr. 4.757, “cum somnus membra pro-
Fudit.”
481, “Caducus,” probably transferred from the usage com-
mon in Cato’s Res Rustica, “caducae oleae” = fallen olives,
“caduca folia,” and the like. Ad superos esse =vivere, Inser.
Lat. 6. 2968.
533. “Fatigat ut...adires:” Catull. 102. 1, 2, “ advenio ut
.. .adloquerer.” |
622. Cic. Att. 14. 12. 1, “ecce autem Antonius accepta
grands pecunia fiart legem.”
640. Lucr. 5. 281, “* Zargus...fons luminis, aetherius Sol :”
Cic. N. D, 2. 149, “cum (Sol) terras larga luce compleverit.”
646. Varro Atacinus, “et septem aeternis sonitum dare
vocibus orbes.”
729. ‘Marmoreo,” evidently “of dazzling whiteness :”
Lucr. 2. 767, “ vertitur in canos candenti marmore fluctus :”
772, “quod si caeruleis constarent aequora ponti Seminibus,
nullo possent albescere pacto: Nam quocumque modo per-
turbes caerula quae sint, Nunquam in marmorewm possunt
migrare colorem.”
746. “Concretam labem,” perhaps “the taint of matter :”
Cic. Tim. § 8, “ quod erit concretum atque corporeum” (= “ ma-
terial’).
803. Monum, Ancyr. 5. 1, “mare pacavi a praedonibus.”
VIL.
37. Tempora rerwm, the times at which events happen,
Lucr. 5. 1276, “sic volvenda aetas commutat tempora rerum.”
Hor. Sat. 1. 3, 112, “tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi.”
66. The construction of per mutua has naturally puzzled
commentators. Is it possible that we have here the neut. pl.
of a lost adjective permutuus, which stood to permutare as
mutuus to mutare? The construction of permutua would then
be the same as that of mutua in Lucr. 5. 1100 (quoted by
Conington). So possibly adprima, not ad prima, should be
read Georg. 2. 134.
“= tg!
NOTES ON THE AENEID. 57
111. “Augent,” comp. Lucr. 5. 1417, “ cubilia...herbis et
frondibus aucta.”
235. Cic. Deiot. § 8, “ per dexteram istam te oro...non tam
in bellis neque in proeliis quam in promissis et fide firmi-
orem.” Comp. Caes. B. C. 1. 32, “se vero (Caesarem) ut operi-
bus anteire studuerit, sic iustitia et aequitate et prudentia.”
307. I should be disposed to explain the difficult phrase
“scelus merentem” on the analogy of “ merere,” “commerere
noxiam” found several times in Plautus: Most. 5. 2. 56, “ com-
meream aliam noxiam:” Trin. 1, “amicum castigare ob me-
ritam noxiam:” so Epid. 1. 1. 60, “commeruisse in te aliquid
mali:” Merc. 816 (Ritschl), “ quae in se culpam commerent.”
345. For coquebant comp. Plaut. Trin. 225, “egomet me
coqguo et macero et defetigo.”
372. Cic. Deiot. § 10, “nos in media republica nati sem-
perque versati.”
407. Vertisse as Lucr. 1. 105, “somnia quae vitae rationes
vertere possint.”
436. For invectas with acc. comp. Liv. 35. 8. 9, “ut trium-
phanti sibi wrbem invehi liceret.”
470. Plaut. Pers. 26, 27 (Ritschl), “advorserne deis quasi
Titani, guibus sat esse non queam ?”’
588. Plaut. Trin. 835, “ita iam quast canes, haud secus,
circumstant navem turbine venti.” .
596. Triste supplicium: Livy 7. 28. 9, “iudicia eo anno
populi tristia in feneratores facta.”
722. Lucr. 2. 251, “pars terrai nonnulla, perusta Solibus
adsiduis, multa pulsata pedum vi.”
772. Varro Res Rustica 1. 2. 19, “ Libero patri repertors
vitis.”
VITl.
1. Livy 7. 32. 5, “ Valerius signum pugnae proposuit.”
23. If“radiantis imagine Lunae” can mean the moon, a
parallel to the expression may be found in the Ibis 78, “ side-
raque, et radiis circumdata solis imago, Lunaque quae nun-
quam quo prius orbe micas,’ where “ solis imago” apparently
stands for “Sol.”
58 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
215. “Discessu:” comp. Caes. B. C. 1. 18, “quorum adventu
(= qui cum advenissent) castra ponit:” so 7b. 1. 27, and elsewhere.
227. For fultos comp. Ov. Am. 1. 6. 27, “roboribus duris
ianua fulta riget.”
239. “Impulit, impulsu quo,” &c. Luer. 6. 289, “nam
tota fere tum Tempestas concussa tremit—Quo de concussu
sequitur gravis imber et uber.”
318, “Asper victu venatus :’
meus victus sane est.”
343. No satisfactory explanation has been given of “ Asylum
rettulit.”. I am inclined to suspect that a verse has dropped
out between vv. 342. and 343, and that rettulit refers to some-
thing in the lost verse: the story, perhaps, of the founding of
the Asylum.
353. “Cum saepe concuteret, cieret,” can be simply taken
as=“saepe concutientem, cientem,” as in the common idiom
“audivi eum cum diceret” = “dicentem:” comp. Cic. Verr. 5,
§ 165, “se vidisse...cum is...in crucem ageretur.”” So Verg. A.
3. 623, “ Vidi egomet...cum...corpora...frangeret ad saxum.”
The cum saepe of this passage would then be different from
that of 1. 148. .
429. With “imbris torti” comp. Varro Sat. Men. p, 211
(Riese), “ agwam e nubibus tortam Indicat fore.”
610. “Gelido flumine,” apparently a local abl. as 5. 38,
“Crimiso flumine:” Prop. 1. 14. 1, “abiectus Tiberina molliter .
unda.”’
?
comp. Plaut. Capt. 188, “asper
IX.
22. Livy 7. 26. 4, “si divus, si diva esset quo sibi praepetem
misisset, volens propitius adesset.”
30. Sedatis amnibus: Cic. Orat. § 39, “quasi sedatus amnis
fluit Herodotus.”
56. Livy 32. 33. 11, “in bello non congredi aequo campo.”
112. “Idaei chori.” Prop. 4. 17. 36.
255. “Mores dabunt vestri:” Cic. Att. 9. 12. 2, “illum
uleiscentur mores sut.”
348. “Multa morte recepit,” if it means “welcomed with
NOTES ON THE AENEID. 59
abundance of death,’ may be compared with Lucr. 6, 146, “haec
(nubes) multo si forte wmore recepit Ignem.”’
502. “Inter manus:’’ Plaut. Most. 2. 1. 38, “ abripite hune
intro actutum inter manus: Cic. Verr. 5. § 28, “ut alius
inter manus e convivio tamquam e proelio auferretur,”
601. Catull. 40. 1.3, “quaenam te mala mens...quis deus
tibi non bene advocatus ?”
630. Lucr. 6. 99, “ caeli de parte serena.”
736. Ira with gen. of cause: so dolor Sall., Cat. 28, Cic.
Phil. 14, § 5, Caes. B. C. 1. 4.
775. “Musarum comitem:’ Lucr. 3. 1037, “Heliconiadum
comites.”
X.
9. Suet. Iul. 43, “qui obsonia contra vetitum retinerent :”
so Cod. 11. 11. 1.
160. With “quaerit sidera” =“ quaerit de sideribus,” comp.
Caes. B. C. 1. 74, “imperatoris fidem quaerunt” = “de fide.”
212. “Semiferus,” Lucr. 2. 702.
289. “Inoffensus:” so Varro Marcopolis 9 (Riese) “ currum
a carcere intimo missum labi inoffensum per aequor :”’ Ov. Am.
1, 6. 8, “inoffensos derigit ille pedes.”’
306. Luecr. 2. 553, “ disiectare solet magnum mare transtra
guberna...per terrarum omnis oras fluitantia aplustra.”
361. Eur. Heracl. 836, Td Sevrepov dé rods éraddayeis
moot, Avnp & én dvdpl oras, éxaptéper payn.
446. “Stupet in Turno:” Ter. Hee. prol. 5, “populus
studio stupidus in funambulo Animum occuparat :” comp. Cic.
Fin, 1, § 4, “hoc primum est in quo admiror.”
488. Liv. 2. 46. 4, “praeceps Fabius in vulnus abiit.”
509. “Acervos:” Varro Mysteria 7 (Riese), “ una pestilen-
tia aut hostica acies puncto temporis immanis acervos facit.”
652. Catull. 30. 12, “dicta omnia factaque Ventos inrita
ferre.” :
809. “Caelum” in its old sense of “aer:” see Lucr. 4. 133,
Plin. 2, § 102.
832. Eur. H. F. 233, “raBav av éyyos tovde tovs EavOovs
mroxous Ka@nuatwo’ av.”
60 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
a4.
18. Plaut. Bacch. 942, “ armati atque animati probe:” Acc.
308, “cum animatus iero, satis armatus sum.” The Romans
seem to have liked the combination ; Livy 7. 13. 6, “exercitum
tuum sine animis, sine armis, sine manibus iudicas esse.”
152. Catullus 64, 139, “at non haec quondam nobis pro-
missa dedisti.”
277. “Violavi volnere:” Cic. Sest. § 140, “invulnerati in-
violatique vixerunt.”
282. “Vertite ad Aeneam:” Tac. H. 1. 74, “imperium ad
Othonem vertissent.”
407. With “artificis scelus” comp. Plaut. Cure. 614, “scelus
viri!” Ter. Ph. 978, “hoc scelus,” (= this villain).
495, “ Perfundi” of cattle, Varro, R. R. 1. 13. 3.
548, “Seruperat:” so Varro, Sat. Men. pp. 162, 197 (Riese),
“se erumpo, irrumpo.” :
620. “Turmas inducit:” Plaut. Amph. 239, Ussing (s:
lectio certa) “ equites iubet dextera inducere:” Sall. Cat. 60. 5,
“ cohortem praetoriam in medios hostes inducit:” Liv. 30,18. 4,
“ego inducam in pugnam equites.”
634. Lucr. 5. 1313, “permixta caede calentes Turbabant
saevi nullo discrimine turmas.”’
791, Liv. 33. 40. 4, “non spolia ulla se petisse.”
829. “Exsolvit se corpore:” comp. besides the passages
quoted in Conington’s note Lucr. 1. 810, “vita quoque omnis
Omnibus e nervis atque ossibus exsoluatur:” 3. 577, “ videtur
Ire anima ac toto solvi de corpore velle.”
833. “Crudescit:” Liv. 10. 19, 20, “interventu Gellii re-
cruduit pugna.”
896. “Implet,” Liv. 34, 12. 8, “hostes fama Romani auxilii
adventantis ¢mpleverat.” :
XII.
28. “Animus” in the sense of “generosity,” “ will to give,”
Cic. Agr. 2, § 22, “antmorum ac magnificentiae :” Q. F. 1. 1. 3,
NOTES ON THE AENEID 61
“animo ac benevolentia:” Sen. Ep. 16: 7: “non est quod
mireris animwm meum: adhuc de alieno liberalis sum.”
39. “Proelia tollo:” Ov. Am. 1. 8. 96, “non bene, si follas
proehia, durat amor.”
72. Eur. Erechtheus Gr. 62. 28 (Nauck), ra pntépwr 5é
Saxpv’ btav téumrn Téxva, IlodXovs €OnrvY’ és wayny 6ppwpévors.
171. “Admoveo:” so Livy 10. 38. 9, 35. 19. 3.
181. Cic. N. D. 3, § 52, “itaque et Fontis delubrum Maso
ex Corsica dedicavit, et in augurum precatione Tiberinum,
Spinonem, Almonem, Nodinum, alia propinquorum fluminum
nomina videmus.”
258. Petron. 108, “illinc Tryphaenae familia nudas expedit
manus.”
559. Ov. Am. 2. 14.1, “quid iuvat tmmunes belli cessare
puellas:” so immunis without gen. Georg. 4. 244.
568. “Parere fatentur:”’ Ov. Am. 1. 2. 18, “qui servitium
ferre fatentur.”
591. Can ater be a mere mistake for acer? Lucr. 1. 153,
“acrem odorem,” so 6. 1217, 6. 747, “acrt sulpure,” 791, “acre
nidore offendit nares.”
603. For “nodum leti,” comp. Cic. Cluent. § 31, “iam
exhausto illo poculo mortis.”
669. For the metaphor comp. Plaut. Cist. 2.1.7, “ita nu-
bilam mentem animi habeo:” Epid. 5. 1. 36, “animo liquido
et tranquillo es.”
685. Luer. 5. 313, “non ruere avolsos silices a montibus
altis, Nec validas aevi vires perferre patique Finiti.”
793. Livy 7. 8. 2, “quid deinde restaret, quaerentibus.”
801. “Hdit:” Catull. 91. 6, “cuius me magnus edebat
amor.” |
817. “Reddita,” “assigned:” so often in Lucr. (see Munro
on 2. 96): Cic. N. D. 1, § 103, “ut...... ignibus altissima ora
reddatur.”
894. Plaut. Mere. 600. R. “tristis cedit, pectus ardet, haeret
pes, guassat caput.” |
H. NETTLESHIP.
AN INTERPRETATION OF 5%} =P.
THE Jewish interpretations of the prophecy,
2 say ow? man
have lately been published in Hebrew and English by Dr
Neubauer and Mr Driver, and analysed in an Introduction by
Dr Pusey. One of the most difficult expressions in the prophecy
is O°) My (Isaiah lit. 15), of which I have never seen a satis-
factory explanation, except perhaps that of the LXX.:
ovtw Oavpacovtat €Ovn ToAAA ET’ aT,
Kal auvéfovot Bacireis TO oTOma avToV
itt ols ovK avnyyédn wept avtod dortat,
« ? / ,
Kab Ol OUK GkNnKOaGL TUYNTOVCL.
Aquila and Theodotion render M1° by pavticer. Symmachus
by amoBare?, and the Targum by 3’, ‘he shall scatter
(= sprinkle like drops of water)’. These and the later inter-
preters refer the word to the root M13—hiphil, AIT, to sprinkle
(blood, water, &c. wpon a person or thing)—but the LXX,
perhaps refer it to some other root, or may even have had a
different reading before them, since they render M7} itself, in
the Pentateuch and 2 Kings ix. 3, by fpavrifew, érippavritew,
paivery, Tepippaivev, mpocpaivev, and in Isaiah lxii. 3 (ef.
ver. 6) by catayeuv.
The Constructions of F173.
1. The root M3, according to Fuerst’s Concordance, occurs
twenty-four times, viz.,
AN INTERPRETATION OF p 3 >}. 63
(i) Once in the disputed passage, Isaiah lii. 15, and
(ii) Twenty-three times, in the following verses; Exodus
xxix. 21; Leviticus iv. 6,17; v. 9; vi. 20; viii. 11, 30; xiv. 7,
16, 27, 51; xvi. 14, 15, 19; Numbers viii. 7; xix. 4, 18, 19, 21;
2 Kings ix. 33; Isaiah xiii. 3.
It is found most frequently in the hiphil, the normal con-
struction being: FADS by WS mM (Lev. xvi. 15), with
an accusative of the liquid sprinkled, and with by, or some
corresponding preposition, of that upon, or towards, which it is
sprinkled. Sometimes, instead of STN, we have DM ff (iv. 6).
Or the thing sprinkled may be understood from the immediate
context, as in Lev. iv. 17: “And the priest shall dip his finger
in some of the blood, DYSY5 yaw mim.” But in no case does
rim occur absolutely, without mention of the liquid sprinkled.
The constructions of the root in the kal are similar:
Lev. vi. 20. Ta9n Sy ADT AP ws
2 Kings ix. 38. Yom Sx mpts 1
Is, Ixiii. 3. tpbyare ead Soy aa Sy nya
We see then that there is nothing in the Biblical uses of 7173
to justify the rendering of BY) 71’, “he shall besprinkle
nations.” The construction ought rather to be OJ by. Dr
Kay indeed replies (Speaker’s Commentary) that in Is. lu. 15:
“the verb refers, not to a literal process of sprinkling, but to an
act of purification analogous to that which was effected by
ceremonial sprinkling.” But there is nothing to shew that M73
of itself implies anything more than “the literal process of
sprinkling.” It is used in the Pentateuch of a sprinkling which
purifies: it is used in 2 Kings ix. 38 of a sprinkling (of the
blood of Jezebel) which defiles. In the latter sense it occurs
in the book of Isaiah itself, within a few chapters of the
passage under consideration :
“ And their blood shall be sprinkled upon my garments, and
I will stain all my raiment” (Is. Lxiii. 3).
64 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
2. These objections to the rendering BESPRINKLE might be
waived if the context obviously required that meaning. But
the context is so far from suggesting it that it is rather an
additional argument against it. If it were required to supply
from conjecture the missing word in the passage:
“ As many were astonied at thee; his visage was so marred
more than any man, and his form more than the sons of men:
So shall he...many nations; the kings shall shut their mouths
at him: for that which had not been told them they shall see;
and that which they had not heard they shall consider.”
who would think of proposing to insert “ besprinkle” ?
3. The word required is one which describes an act pro-
ducing a PASSIVE condition of wonderment, on account of the
final clause, “ kings shall shut their mouths at him.” If it had
been said of them that they should break forth into singing, or
the like, we might accept the interpretation of M1’, “he shall
cause to spring,’ (for joy, or amazement). But since it is said
that they shall be reduced to silence, the proposed meaning is
inappropriate. In support of the meaning “ spring ”—especially
for joy—reference is made to the Arabic root |, which, accord-
ing to the lexicons, may mean, “ Exultavit pre hilaritate”—
not however, so far as I am aware, unless “ pre hilaritate” is
actually expressed in the context. It is thus used of asses
which bound “pre alacritate,” in a passage quoted in the
Muhit el Mulat of el Bustani (Beyrout), and other lexicons:
ees Gap sl cll oye ty sls
but it does not appear that there is any adequate support for
the absolute use of 7}, in the sense, “cause to spring” (for
joy, &c.), or “startle.”
On the root Min.
4. “His watchmen are BLIND: they are all ignorant, they are
all DUMB dogs, they cannot bark ; pid Dank Day pn”
Isaiah lvi. 10.
AN INTERPRETATION OF 3 MM’. 65
This is Targumised 979 pM pPIDW ]2...dozing,
lying-down, loving to sleep.
The Greek versions have for DM, évutviafipevar, davtati-
fevol, opayatictat. The meaning of the word is doubtful within
certain limits, but, as I suggested some years ago, it may be
explained in such a way as to suit the two passages, Isaiah li,
15, and lvi. 10. We may conjecture that (ij) is for FIM, as
my (Ex. iv. 2) for 7 MS, and perhaps nad (Ex. iii. 2) for
Fanm>. As in Ex. iv. 2 there are different views about the
relation of the 3'N3 (M15) to the “IP (MT Md), so in Is. lit. 15
there is room for the two opinions
(i) that MY!, for MIM, is the original reading:
(ii) that 7M, the original reading, was phonetically
corrupted into 71}?.
The latter hypothesis would go far to account for the @avya-
govrat of the LXX., which has been supposed to imply a
reading FIM, from Mh, to gaze (with admiration).
There are now two ways of explaining M7.
a. We may suppose that in Is. lvi. 10 there is a play upon
rim, and that MiA refers to the vacant stare of stupefaction, as
opposed to true vision. “His watchmen are BLIND:” they are
not OF but DA: they-do but stare drowsily, lie down, and
love to sleep. The hiphil of MIM might be rendered, to agast
(or aghast)—in the sense set a gaze (on which see Richardson's
English Dictionary) thus:
So shall he AGAST many nations;
Kings shall shut their mouth at him;
For that which had not been told them they shall SEE;
And that which they had not heard they shall consider.
Here we have a perfect parallelism, M71)’ denoting (i) a
passive display of wonderment, corresponding to the speechless-
ness described in the clause immediately following; and (ii) a
visual impression, answering to the $8" of the third clause, and
Journal of Philology. vou. vit. 5
66 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY. —
following naturally upon the 3 SAND of the preceding verse.
Observe that in Is. lvi. 10 the watchmen are described as BLIND
and DUMB. So here the nations and the kings stand agazed
and speechless with admiring awe.
b. Or we may suppose MIM to imply a condition of trance
or stupefaction, The meaning entrance is very suitable in
Is. lu, 15:
So shall he ENTRANCE many nations, &c.
As a connecting link between the renderings a and b com-
pare the very natural combination,
“ AGHAST IN SPEECHLESS TRANCE,”
in one of the lines cited by Richardson s.v. AGAST.
: C. TAYLOR.
A WORD ON LUCILIUS.
Mr Mowro’s remarks in the preceding number of this Journal
p- 302 might lead an incautious reader to suppose that I
had maintained the monstrous position that nomen hdc nobis
was admissible in Lucilius. I of course said and meant no such
thing: I tried to show—proof is almost impossible—that the
use of hdc in Plautus and Terence as a virtually short syllable
in such positions as sed hoc mihi molestumst and sed quid
hoc clamoris is comparatively of more frequent occurrence
than the use of /ic in similar situations; and that this may
have corresponded with a similar feeling in these writers as
to the comparative weight of the syllables hoc, hic: that there
are, besides, cases such as hoc hoc est where, without a pre-
determination to treat hoc as inherently long, the metrical
bias is in favour of its being short: that hoe and hic are ac-
tually regarded as standing on an equal footing as communes
syllabae by Probus and Diomedes; that they certainly could
not have arrived at this conclusion from Catullus and Lucretius
on the one hand, or from Virgil and his followers on the
other, that therefore they arrived at it from the earlier poetry,
including Lucilius: hence that it was justifiable to retain any
instance of short hdc before a vowel, which the Mss in which
Lucilius’ fragments are preserved seem to make probable.
Whether in the passage quoted by Velius it is probable, is
doubtful, and more doubtful since Mr Munro’s most ingenious
emendation. But in the longer passage from Nonius [ still
prefer my own reading to either Munro’s *Eros or Lachmann’s
"Ezros, if for no other reason than that the words of the Mss
then need no change at all. But I would not deny that if
the quantity of hdc rested on this alone, the support is certainly
a very slender one. I am not disposed to make the same
5—2
68 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
concession as to Probus and Diomedes. Mr Munro indeed
asserts that Probus and Diomedes ‘knew no authority but
Virgil; and that Adc is a mere blind assumption, taken pro-
bably from an older authority.’ Putting aside the fact that
this is itself an assumption of a startling kind, it seems to
do little but shift. the statement to an older source. Even if
we knew—which we do not—that Probus and Diomedes would
of course have quoted other authority for their statement if
they had known it, and that as they only quote Virgil, Virgil
was their only authority—would this be enough to prove
that the older writer from whom Mr Munro supposes them
to draw had no authority but. Virgil for Ais statement?
Surely it is more reasonable to believe that the same wide
range of reading which we find for instance in Charisius or
Priscian was the ultimate basis of the statement in Probus
and Diomedes. And if so, my inference is to say the least a
natural one. .
_ Again my assertion that tamétst was used by Lucilius, may
no doubt be explained away by supposing tam elided or by
writing tam etst. But the question is not settled by these obvious
remarks. We cannot be sure that the comic writers elided
tam and made etst long: on the contrary it would seem pro-
bable, that the same syllable which was heard in tamen etst
would be heard in tam etsi, and that the e would be slurred
before ts, as in magistratus ministerus ministremus vetistate
fenéstras sceléstus &c. If this was the scansion of comedy,
may it not have been retained by Lucilius in the doubtful
region of satire? An occasional exception in the case of a
common word would not materially affect the generally careful
laws by which his prosody was bound.
That the sound of hoc was short may I think be inferred
from the Greek mode of writing it, as seen in Plutarch’s 0«
aye (Numa 14, Coriol. 25) compared with his transliteration
of other words, émiwia otrew Otrovs for opima opem opus
(Romul. 16). There seems to be no reason why if the sound
had been definitely long it should not have been expressed
by a long w. As a rule the instances of Greek spelling of —
Latin words given by C. F. Weber prove that Greek 9 cor-
A WORD ON LUCILIUS. 69
responded to Latin 6, Greek w to 6. Thus Byr\wF rpaltwpos
KvalaTwpes XOpwvoy axtiaviBus dtroptéBit voBddus Bova ovp-
KloXap voTa voTapios oTOXAaTOUS ToyaTous. There are no doubt
exceptions, such as the recurring use of short o under the
later Roman empire in the genitive plural ¢iderxouprocdpoup,
Bovopovs parropovp, and again Sovovy for donwm. But these
do not materially shake the general truth of the position;
and so far as anything can be made out from this source,
the sound which Plutarch expressed by 0« was not in itself
long, and may therefore have been used short in metre even
by a writer of hexameters, in the earlier period of literature
before the Augustan poets had determined the quantity long.
I take the occasion to reexamine some passages of
Lucilius.
Non. 546. Vrceus aut longe gemino mixtarius paulo. Read
haut and palo: the mixing-jar was supported on two stakes.
Palo is sufficiently obvious and has already been conjectured
by Quicherat, as I find now for the first time. Quicherat has
also anticipated Munro in his explanation of xxvi. 46 M.
Non. 398. Samiwm rursus acutum; unde et samiare dici-
mus acuere, quod in Samo hoc genus artis polleat. Lucilius
Satyrarum lib. vu. hance ubi wult male habere, ulcisci pro
cele (Scelere Junius) eius Testam sumit homo Samiam bi (sibe
Gifanius) an uno telo inquit Praecidit caulem testisque una
amputat ambo. . |
For the corrupt an uno telo Munro (Journal of Philology
vil. 295) reads anw noceo, quoting Gell. Iv. 16. 6. I venture
to differ from him on three grounds: (1) The improbability
of so common a word as noceo being corrupted into no telo;
(2) the frequency with which Gellius adds inquit after the
first or first two words of a quotation, cf. v. 14. 5, vi. 12. 6,
vil. 6. 6, rx. 12. 17, x1. 11. 2, 3, x11. 2. 5; (3) the weakness of
the expression. Several years ago I conjectured what I still
prefer to any of the proposed emendations, aniinetero, i.e.
anumne tero? The indignant question and the instant action
following as in emphatic protest seem not unworthy of that
lively and incisive style which made Lucilius so popular with
his countrymen.
70 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Non. 260 and 308, vir. 2 M.
Lachmann Miiller and Munro all correct the Ms. fictrices
as if it must contain some part of fingere, the word under
consideration, It is at least as probable that Nonius did here
what he often does elsewhere, introduced a word derived from
jingere. If so, fictricis may be right, especially as from Nonius’
explanation ‘ Fingere est lingere’ the word in this sense would
be likely to be rare. :
Non. 533, vi. 15 M. Cercurus nauis est Asiana pergran-
dis....Lucilius Satyrarum. lib. vit. Verum flumen uti atque
ipso diuortio igneis pedibus cyrcerum concurret equis.
diuortio aquarum Iligneis is an old emendation, universally
accepted: for concurret perhaps contuere: utt seems to be
an error for whi, as Lachmann, whose roboret for concurret
is improbable. |
Non. 165, Festus p. 270. It is clear from Nonius’ citation
of the last half of the line wt uulgus redandruet inde that he
did not follow the same version as Festus, who gives the whole
verse Praesul ut ampiruet inde uulgus redamplauit at, i.e. as
seems most probable Praesul ut amptruet inde, et wulgus
redamptruet ev. In such a case, the version of Festus is obvi-
ously the preferable.
Non. 227, xt. 1 M.
Conuentus pulcher braces saga fulgere torquem
+Datis magni.
For torquem Datis perhaps torques Phremdatis (Pheren-
datis). The breeches would be quite in keeping with an as-
sembly dressed in the style of Persia.
Non. 344, meret militat. Lucilius Satyrarum lib. xv. dum
miles Hibera terras ac meret ter sex aetate quast annos.
Munro emends terra fractus. May not a proper name lurk
in 8 ac, possibly Sacsa or Seica ?
Cic. Fin. um. 8. 23, After all the discussion on this ob-
scure passage, it still remains unsettled. Can Lucilius have
written
Diffusum e pleno siet, hir-siphon cui nildum
[Demp]sit uis et [nil] sacculus abstulerit ?
A WORD ON LUCILIUS. 71
‘whose wine is drawn from a full cask, from which the
hand-pipe or the strainer has as yet taken no part of its
strength.’ Lucian Miiller’s version of this seems to me
deplorable.
Non. 351, Mutare transferre. Lucilius ib. xxvi. doctior
quam ceteris is asa mittis mutes aliquo tecum sacra facta uitia.
It is wonderful that after Scaliger had conjectured symmistis
for the corrupt asamittis, the rest of the line should have sug-
gested anything so far from probability as Diintzer’s sartas
tectas di(ui)tias. Can there be any reasonable doubt that sacra
facta witia is simply sacra facticia? The whole passage then
may have run thus,
doctior quam caetert
Sis symnustae, mutes aliquo tecum sacra facticia,
‘be cleverer than the rest of the confraternity of initiated,
transfer yourself and your false rites somewhere else.’
Non. 38, xurx. 10 M,
ut si eluwiem facere per uentrem uelis
Curare omnibus distento corporé expiret uis.
utis is obvious and long accepted: for Curare read Aura de
(Sudor de, L. Mueller, Cura ne, Lachmann).
Paulus 335 M. Schedia genus. nawigit inconditum, id est
trabibus tantum inter se nears factum, unde mala poemata schedia
appellantur, A xiIth century glossary in Sir Thos. Phillipps’
collection gives this passage thus, Sechedia genus nawigit incon-
ditum trabibus tantwm inter se wnctis unde et wciosa atque
incomposita carmina schedia appellantur. Now Festus, in whom
the passage is imperfect, has preserved the beginning of a line,
probably by Lucilius, Qui schediwm fa. The Phillipps glossary
seems to have been copied, not from Paulus, but either from
Festus directly, or, as is perhaps more likely, from another
abridgment containing more of the original than that of Paulus.
At any rate the verse suggested by the words of the glossary
would be thoroughly Lucilian Qui schediwm fa-ciwnt incom-
positum ac uttiosum.
R. ELLIS.
ON THE DIRAE.
9. Trinacriae sterilescant gaudia uobis
Nec fecunda senis nostri felicia rura
Semina parturiant segetes, non pascua colles.
For senis nostri read sent, nostris, ‘the farm fruitful to our
labourers, unfertile to the old man’ now become its new
occupant.
40. Quom tua cyaneo resplendens aethere silua
Non iterum dicens herebo tua lydia diate.
The reading of 41 is from a Ms in the Bodleian Auct. F. 1.
17, interesting as containing at intervals the same capital letters
at the commencement of the verse which Ribbeck found in his
Bembinus, and which he considers to mark the metrical di-
visions of the poem. I would read
Non iterum dicetur, heri ‘tua, Lydia, diate,
‘when your forest, Lydia, wrapt in flames shall no longer be
called yours, the title you gave it yesterday. This is Scaliger’s
interpretation, but he read Non «terwm dicent, crebro.
50. migret Neptunus in arua ;
Fluctibus et spissa campos perfundat harena.
Qua Vulcanus agros pastus Louis wgnibus arcet
Barbara dicatur Inbycae soror altera Syriis,
So the Bodleian Ms, I believe rightly. The poet contrasts
the marshy bog into which the sea is to change part of his farm
with the sandy waste into which the other part, which the fire
keeps apart from the waters (arcet), is to be converted.
s
ON THE DIRAE. 73
74. Coculet arguti grylli caua garrula rana.
- One of Ribbeck’s Mss reads Cogulet. Surely this is right
= coagulet, cf. coperio colesco in Lucretius and Lachmann on II.
1061. The picture is a very defined one; land is to become
water, and where the cricket chirped the frog is to spawn. The
e for g I have found in a Bodleian Glossary, Auct. T. 1. 24,
coaculum * agogendo * (cogendo) et colligendo, and again coaculautt .
constringit, coaculatus * constrictus. Possibly a trace of the same
corruption coaculare coculare then conculare (as some of Rib-
beck’s Mss read here) may be found in the fact that the Balliol
Glossary places the gloss coagulat, conserit, coniungit between
conclusio and conglutinat, as if the word had in the earlier codex
from which the glossary is copied been written congulat.
146, 7.
Phoebe gerens in te laurus celebrawt amorem.
Et quem pompa deum, non siluis fama, locuta est ?
Omnia wos estis: secum sua gaudia gestat
Aut insparsa widet mundo, quae dicere longum est.
By making 147 a question, much of the difficulty is re-
moved, I think the poet both in 146 and 147 has a procession
in his mind. ‘Phoebus, thy bearer has made thee famous as
feeling love for a bay; and where is the god whom his procession
has spoken of and rumour has not also declared (as a stealthy
lover) to the forests?’ i.e. Phoebus is declared the lover of
Daphne by the bay borne in his processions; and most of the
gods we see carried through our streets haye pursued some
scandalous amour in the woods.’ The two following lines I
would explain (partly with Wernsdorf) thus: ‘Ye (the gods)
are everywhere (all nature is identified with your presence and
your amours); each of you carries with him the reminiscence of
his love (a flower, a pipe, &c.), or else sees them sprinkled over
the heavens as constellations (e.g. the Corona Ariadnes). Rib-
beck’s nisi siluis fama locuta est Somnia pro ueris is very clever,
but, with deference to so great a man, has little verisimilitude.
156. Ausus ego primus castos uiolare pudores
Sacratamque meae uittam temptare puellae ?
Inmatura meae quoque nece soluere facta.
74 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
- For nece facta (both in the Bodleian Ms) other Mss give
nexe, noxe, necis and fata. Ribbeck emended
Inmatura meaeque est noxae soluere uota ?
in which the position of que, as well as of est, appears to me ex-
ceptional and strange. I suspect a far deeper corruption. The
first point which strikes one in the line as given by the Mss is
the meaninglessness of guogue. If we suppose the original to
have been
INMATVRAMEAEVENERISDISSOLVERE
it is not difficult to conjecture how it may have assumed its
present shape: we became dissevered from neris, then neris was
changed to nects or nece, and ue enlarged to guoque. But Rib-
beck seems right in his view that facta (fata) at the end of the
line changed places with wota at the end of 164. Reading
therefore wota, I would translate ‘was I the first who ventured
to pay before their time the vows of my love?’ ie. to forestal
the maturity of Lydia’s womanhood by cohabiting with her
whilst still only a girl. The lover pays his mistress’s vows by
fulfilling the condition on which they were made, viz. union.
For dissoluere in this sense cf. Catullus’ Pristina wota nouo
munere dissoluo, LXVI., 38,
R. ELLIS.
ON SOME PASSAGES IN THE MEDEA OF EURIPIDES.
WHILE lately reading the Medea with the advantage of
_ Paley’s school edition, I found myself differing from him in my
view of some few passages. Hence these notes. On a play so
well known one cannot hope to say much that is both new and
true: my explanations may be the same as others already in
print. But former editors seem to me rather to fail in pointing
out the plain bearing, argument, and connexion of passages.
In this respect Paley is excellent; how I agree with him almost
always may be inferred from these few instances where I
venture to differ.
(1) mérepov para Séua vupdiKdy cruph,
) Onxtov dow ddayavoyv Si’ Hratos
avyy Sdopovs éoBac iv éctpwras réyos.
vv. 378—80.
If the two last lines be genuine here (and I see no strong
objection to their repetition from v. 40), Paley would prefer to
transpose them: surely without reason. Medea says ‘Shall I
set the house on fire and burn it, bride, bridegroom and all; or
steal into their bed-chamber and stab them?’ daa vupdixdv
may be ‘the whole house’ not only the ‘chamber.’ And ‘to
enter the room stealthily and set it on fire’ (Paley’s rendering),
is a curious procedure. It would be more conveniently fired
from without.
(2) Av pév tis huiv mupyos acphadys havi
Sdr@ péterps Tovde Kal ovyn pdvor.
vy. 889—90.
Paley thinks that this does not refer to such a refuge as she
76 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
found with Aegeus, but to the prospect of some Corinthian
offering her a home. Of this however there is no trace, The
connexion of thought in Medea’s speech seems this: ‘I will kill
them by poison as the best way. But what refuge can I find
when they are dead?’ None at present. Well I will wait.
a while [less than a day, for she must go within that time]: and
if I can find any refuge [which she does find in Aegeus], I will
poison them and depart: if not, I will use the sword even
though I die for it.’
(3) é7revdy, Kat Alay wupyois yapuv.
v. 526.
Paley first renders ‘since you build too much on the gratitude
due to you.’ But zrupyovv te is rather ‘to build a thing up, to
exaggerate, extol.’ Perhaps the metaphor may include the idea
of raising the ydpis into a tower of defence, fortifying and
entrenching oneself behind favours conferred.
(4) ‘E\Aa& avti BapBapov y@ovds
yaiav KatoKels, kal dikny érictacat
vonoi Te ypnobar, pr) Tpds iayvos yapw.
vv. 536—8.
The two halves of this last line must be in contrast. Medea
is able, by being in Greece and not in a barbarian land, véu@
xpioOat pur) Bia, to live by law not by force, to enjoy laws not
to live according to the capricious pleasure of might or brute
force. Were it necessary to define a word to be supplied in the
second clause, it should be an infinitive, oixe?y for instance or
some similar word.
(5) xpiv yap addobév mroev Bpotovs
maioas Texvovabar.
vv. 5738 —4.
I cannot in the least approve of Nauck’s dp’ for ydp. In
numberless passages ydp is used where it is useless to speculate
on the exact ellipse necessary in order that we may render ydp
by ‘for.’ Rather suppose (with Shilleto on Thue. 1. 25) that
yap bears, as its original meaning, the sense ‘truly, verily,
indeed.’ In this passage ‘you women are most obstinate and
SOME PASSAGES IN THE MEDEA OF EURIPIDES. 77
perverse. Why (In fact, Truly) children should have been sup-
plied in some other way,’
(6) wn pot yévorTo sina! evdal noon Bios,
pnd was datis THv éunv Kvitor dpéva.
vv. 598—9.
‘Be it far from me, the painful prosperous life, the wealth
that would ever be chafing my soul!’ Medea means ‘I do not
want the prosperity you speak of (gained by the royal alliance)
purchased by the vexation of having a rival in my husband’s
affections.’ Jason had said that Medea would acknowledge his
wisdom ef my) Kvifot Néxos. Paley explains Avmpds ‘attended
with remorse’: Medea would not have external prosperity
purchased by injustice, wealth that would reproach her con-
science. “This does not seem to suit so well the sense of «vifor
as determined by v. 568 ovd’ dv ov pains ei ce pur) Kvifou dExos.
Nor is it so suitable to Medea’s character. °
(7) M. te dpdca; pov yapodca Kal mpododcd ce;
I. apas tupavvows avociovs apwpévn.
M. kai cois apaia y otca tuyydva Somos.
vv. 606—8.
Without doubt dapaia is active in sense here. But the con-
nexion and argument need explanation. Paley’s view does not
satisfy me. He says “ye shows this is ironically said ‘I suppose
I am cursing your family,’ i.e. it is ae as right to charge me
with that as with cursing Creon’s.” Medea would thus be
made to deny that she had cursed Creon’s family. But this
she could not and would not do: nor is it the usual force of
kal...ye, Which expresses assent and adds something more.
Rather Medea sneering at Jason’s selfishness allows that she
did curse the royal house, adding that it was of course tanta-
mount to cursing his house, as he was now marrying the king’s
daughter. ‘Did I betray you?’ she asks: ‘you curse the royal
family, he rejoins: ‘yes, and yours too no doubt you think’, she
replies. As in fact she did in v. 163.
(8) éywol te yap Tdd éotw acpadéotata,
ckiplv tw éyOpois cois éyovta Secxvivat,
TO coy T dpape maddov.
vv. 743—5.
78 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Aegeus says ‘It is safest for me that I should swear an oath,
and so have a justification for my conduct in receiving you, if
your enemies question me; while at the same time you will
feel more secure. Paley thinks that Medea also takes an oath
and that Td cév 7 dpape wadXov means ‘and your part of the
compact (to procure me children) is better secured, if you too
swear. But nothing is said of Medea’s swearing. Aegeus
is nervously anxious not to involve Athens in a quarrel: he
wishes to befriend Medea, and when once sworn, will have
colourable grounds to allege for doing so.
(9) @s dpridaxpis cipt Kai pdBou mréa.
v. 903.
Paley explains this in connexion with the following line,
‘How late it is to weep, when I think how long our dispute has
existed.’ This is a new interpretation of apridaxpus. Hesychius
explains it evyepr)s pds Sadxpvov. The Scholiast by tpoodaras
daxptvovoa. Medea seems to be excusing herself for her tears,
either because she is naturally ‘quick to shed tears, having
tears ever close at hand and ready to well up,’ or because she
has been ‘lately bathed in tears’ when remembering her long
quarrel which she is now laying aside.
(10) adda Ths euns KaKns
TO Kat TpoécOar parOaxors Acyous dpevi.
v. 1051—2.
‘Nay it is of my weakness (it argues weakness in me) even
to propose in my mind words of softness.’ SoI prefer to take
it. The genitive of indignation ete. is of course common
enough, but it does not seem to come well after adda. ‘The
very thought of relenting argues weakness’ is a better sense
than the two exclamations ‘Alas! my cowardice, to think that I
should ete,’
W. C. GREEN.
-
ON SOME PECULIARITIES IN THE USE OF THE
FUTURE PARTICIPLES OF GREEK VERBS.
(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, 19th April, 1877.)
Ir is a rather curious fact, and one that has not been sufficiently
observed, that, as a general rule, the Greeks use the future par-
ticiple only in the sense of the Latin supine in -wm, and not in
that of the future in -rus.
In other words, it is used only with verbs implying motion,
in the nominative with passive or neuter verbs, as the subject,
in the accusative with transitive verbs, as the object.
Thus éveumounv cot dpacav, @yeTo Ocacopevos, ereprré
fe ayyeXovvTa, as the Romans said ewibat spectatum, lusum
Mecenas, misit eos exploratum, &c.
But the Romans did not say abit spectaturus, or misit me
venditurum, and the Greeks did not say 7&wyv 6 matp, venturus
pater, or TaAncwy immov é&jtet Tov Oédovta wveicba, equum
venditurus quaerebat emptorem. Such a phrase as non missura
cutem nist plena cruoris hirudo they had no very direct way
of expressing; they would have said ove av adueioa, perhaps.
Hence dpacwy is by no means the same as facturus.
Nevertheless, it is often so used with the addition of es,
as mepliéuevey ws H£€o1Tos Tov matpos, ‘he waited under the
hope his father would return,’ radta éwole os TaXXAa arrodécar,
‘he did this with the intention of paying the rest’; and it
is used with verbs of knowing, &c., as 75es oe tadta Spacovta,
‘he knew you would do this” In the latter instance, it is
merely an idiomatic way of saying #der ors Spacos. Thus
Antigone says @avoupévn yap é&ndn, sciebam mihi moriendum
esse, Soph, Ant. 460. But no Greek would say @avovpevos 6
80 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
matnp tovs maidas Euvexadece. The idiom would require
aToOuncKwr. : .
Assuming that the above rule is generally true, what are
we to say of a passage in the Agamemnon (60—67), where I
have pointed out the difficulty in a brief note ?—
ovtw & ‘Atpéws traidas 6 Kpeiocwr
er “AdeEavdpm réutres Bévios
Zevs Tworvavopos audi yuvarkcs
ToAAa Tadaicpata Kal yuuo8apy
Oncwv Aavaociow
Tpwci & opoiws.
Here, clearly, if @jcwv is right, it is precisely the Latin
Danais impositurus labores. But the Greek usage requires
méumet traidas Ojcovras, and when we consider how very
awkwardly, and I believe unprecedentedly, the ictus falls on the
mere suffix of the dative Aavaoicw, we shall be disposed to
entertain the question if Aavaois éai@jcovtas is not the right ©
reading, especially if we compare Iliad 11. 39, Oncew yap ér
éwedrev er” adyed TE oTovayas te Tpwoi te xal Aavaoior
Sid Kpatepas vopivas.
For some time I could find no example to justify the
reading @jcwv in the above passage. But some few instances
do occur, which are sufficiently anomalous to deserve some
discussion.
In the Hecuba, 517, the captive queen says to Talthybius,
who is about to relate the sacrifice of Polyxena,
elmré, Kaitrep ov ACEw ira. :
Now here, though dictwrus would render the sense, the
participle is in fact influenced by kaimep, which does not
take the finite verb. It is but another way of saying eize, et
kat py dirta éotly & réEes. In v. 633 of the same play
we read
"[Saiav OTe Tpetov Urav
’AdéEavdpos eiAativav
éraucO, Gdwov er vidua vavoTorAncov.
Here vavatorjcav is iva vavoTodncee, OY OTWS VaUvETO-
Aynoet, by the use of the prasens historicum. I should say
FUTURE PARTICIPLES OF GREEK VERBS. 81
this is an instance of the omission of ws from metrical ne-
cessity ; for with ws, as I have already remarked, the future
participle is common enough, even without a verb of motion,
to express intention. Thus in 1146 of the same play, Hecuba
brought Polymestor to the ladies’ tent, os Kexpuppévas Onxas
dpacovea. Nothing is commoner than such a phrase as eizé,
ws éwod réEovTos ovdév, Ke.
One other example occurs in this play, very similar to the
last. It is in v. 1202, where Hecuba asks the Thracian king
why he was so eager to kill her son Polydorus. Was it, she
asks, to make an alliance with some family? worepa kndevowv
twa; Here it would be equally easy to read «ndevav, and to
supply es xndevowr.
In Eurip. Electra 1025, Clytemnestra says that if Agamem-
non had killed her daughter to cure some evil in the state,
or to benefit the family, some allowance might have been
made for him;
> \ , idA I] ,
Kel fev TrOAEWS GAwoty EeELWpEVOS,
) OOM ovnowv, Ta\rAA T éexoalwv TéKVA
&xtewe TOAN@Y piav UTEep, cvyyveoT av Hp.
Here we observe,
(1) That ovivnus has no present participle in use.
(2) That dvjcwr, thus used by a kind of necessity, stands
between two present participles. It was natural for a critic
who may not have considered the rarity of the usage, to pro-
pose éxawcwv, as Nauck has done. I have little doubt the
poet wrote éxowfov, and that ovjowy again stands for ta
évnoee, Which a prose writer would have used.
I am not aware of any other instance in Aeschylus, Sophocles,
or Aristophanes, and the result of my investigation so far is,
that the identity of the Greek future participle and the Latin
participle in -rus is altogether rare and exceptional.
The future participle not unfrequently represents the finite
verb with ei or dors. Thus in Soph. El. 317, |
ToD KacLyyntrou Ti bys,
nEovtos, n pméddoVTOS ;
t.e. motepov Ee, 7) Ere pérrEL ;
ce
Journal of Philology. you, VII.
82 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
And in Antig. 260,
Kav éyiryveto
TrNY) TEevTAG, OVS 6 KwAVTwY TapHy,
nec aderat qui prohiberet.
So ov« eiye tov odernoovta, &c., ‘he had no one to help
him. But these uses are entirely distinct from a meaning
equivalent to the Latin future in -rus.
Hence great doubt is thrown on such emendations as tuyn
5€ gwTip vaiv oterodo’ épéfero, navim servatura, for Oédove’,
in Agam. 647, as suggested by Dr Oberdick. I see no objection
to 6éXovea in the sense of libens or sponte insidebat.
F. A. PALEY.
ON CHOEPHOROE 472—3 (481—2 DIND.).
(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, 8th February,
1877.)
OnE of the most perplexing iambic passages in Aeschylus is the
couplet referred to: it is spoken by Electra in a dialogue with
her brother, who has just invoked the spirit of his murdered
father to give him the possession of his rightful home. She
then says,
Kayo, TAaTEp, ToLade’ Gov ypeiay exw
guyeiv péyav mpocbcicay AiyicO@ [popor].
The last word, wanting in the Medicean MS., has been intro-
duced into the editions from the conjecture of Turnéebe, who
also first gave tovavde for tovade. It now appears to me that
Towdoe is quite defensible, and ought to be retained. Thus in
Agam. 1331 (1360 Dind.) one of the elders in deliberation at
the murder of the king says ckay@ Towo0TOs €ipt, 1.€. TOLOUTOS THY
yvounv. This formula, caye tovodtos, ‘I too am so-minded,’
occurs also in Eur. Heracl. 266 and Orest. 1680 (both quoted in
my note), and tovade rv yvounv in Soph. El, 1022. This
is one of many examples of a plausible alteration which, when
carefully examined, appears to be unsound.
The difficulty however which I propose to discuss lies in the
second verse, which is usually understood thus: ‘I too, my
father, have this request to make to you, that I may escape
when I have inflicted an awful fate on Aegisthus.’ Here pweyav
is supposed to represent Sevdv, a sense which is certainly de-
fensible. Miss A. Swanwick accordingly translates,
“I too, my father, need thy gracious aid,
When wrought is base Aegisthus’ heavy doom.”
6—2
84 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Still, the reading seemed to me so unsatisfactory, that in the
last edition I marked the verse as corrupt. Nor is any cor-
rection of it hitherto made either satisfactory in itself, or
consistent with the explanation of the Scholiast, dare guyeiv
tas émiBovdds Atyiobou, timmpnoapéevny avror.
Hermann reads,
KaY@, TATEP, TOLMVOE Gov ypelay Exw
TuxElV, weyav Tpocbeicav AiyicOw hOdpov.
Franz,
Tvyelv me NaptTrpas Ocicav AiyicOw Twayas.
Weil,
peéeyav tas Ocicav AiyicO@ Sorov.
But none of these seem at all probable, though mayas and
dovxov have a certain resemblance to tas émuBovAas in the
Scholium.
It is important to bear in mind that the Scholia of Aeschy-
lus undoubtedly belong to a different recension of the text from
that given in the Medicean MS., into which they were copied
by another hand, probably from another source. On a careful
consideration of the above words, which were evidently a com-
ment on the verse in its integrity, and from an examination of
the tragic use of rpoaGeivat, I have come to the conclusion that
we must read, |
guyeiv we yv, tpocbcicav AiyicGov Sikn.
‘That I may get safe out of the land, after punishing Aegisthus
as he deserves.’
The last words are correctly explained by tiymwpycapevny
avtov. By ¢duyeiv yiv he also rightly saw that Electra prayed
for an immediate escape from a country in which her life was
in constant danger from the plots of Aegisthus and Clytem-
nestra. And he added tas éwiBovrds because in itself duyeiv
ynv might have been taken to signify ‘to be banished from the
land, which could not be really a part of her prayer.
It remains to show that the tragic usage is mpoo@ecivai twa
Sixn, &c., not rpocGetvar Sixnv tit, and therefore that Aiy:o@ov
and not A’yic$@ must be read.
ON CHOEPHOROEH 472—3. 85
(1) Eur. Bacch, 675,
Toa@oe “AAXov Tov UrobEévta Tas Téyvas
yuvakl tovde TH Sikn mpocOncoper.
Here we have the exact expression, mpocQeivai twa Sixy, ‘to
put a man on his trial,’ ‘to bring him to justice. And as the
correlative of the transitive Oetvau or PéoOat vopor is KetoOar and
Keiwevot voxot, So in Soph. Ant. 94 we have rpockeicOar dixn,
‘to be given up to punishment.’ Antigone there says to her
suitor,
el Taita Nékeus, €yOapet pev é& euod,
éyOpa Sé Td Oavovte mpockeioes Sixn.
‘If you persist in talking so, you will incur hatred from me,
and when you have to undergo the punishment of your disobe-
dience, you will be hated (instead of being loved and pitied) by
your brother also.’
Commonly, but I think erroneously, this is rendered, ‘ You
will justly be hated besides,’
(2) Phoenissae 963,
éy® yap ovtror’ eis 708’ els ovudopas,
ote ohayévta Traida TpocOcivar Tronet,
‘to devote a murdered child to the service of the city.’
(3) Andromache 1014,
tivos elvexa—attmov dpyavav yépa Textoatvas ‘Evvandio Sopi-
pnotope mpocbévres Tadaway peOeire Tpolav ;
These words are addressed to Phoebus and Poseidon, ‘ Why did
ye make over to the war-god your own handy-work, and give
up Troy to destruction 2’
It is true that in this passage the thing is devoted or given
up to the person, and not the person to the thing. Yet it is the
same logical idea, ‘to give up Troy to the war-god,’ as ‘to give
up a person to justice.’ So also in
(4) Hecuba 368, where Polyxena says,
“Ady mpootileia’ euov Séuas,
i.e. Guautiv Oavate.
86 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
(5) Troad. 492,
& & Ett ynpa Td aovphopotata,
TOUTOLS [Le apocOirovcw,
exclaims the aged captive Hecuba. ‘ ove will set me to per-
form duties most unsuited to my old age.’
(6) Eur. Suppl. 948,
drav dé rovade TpocOawev Tupi,
‘when we have consigned these captives to the pyre.’
. (7) Iph. Aul. 540,
mp “Ain maid éuov mpoc8d rAaBov,
‘till I have devoted my daughter to the sacrifice,’ Agamemnon
says.
(8) Ion 1545,
68 werav ce TpooctiOno’ add TaTpi.
‘Apollo to benefit you assigns you to another father.’
I find nothing to justify wpooriPévar Sixny rin, though a
few passages occur, as may be seen in Liddell and Scott’s Lexi-
con, where the imputing a charge, the doing harm or giving
pleasure, is expressed by rpooriOévar ti tu. Hence I conclude
that in the verse of Aeschylus under discussion we must read
AlyioOov and not AiyicO@. And I think it is easy to explain
the cause of this corruption. When ye y4v (written, perhaps,
from the scribe’s familiarity with the Doric accusative, ye yav)
had been mistaken for wéyay, and the necessity of construing
péyav AlyicOov, ‘the mighty Aegisthus, had perplexed some
grammarian or some reviser of the text, he tampered with the
passage, and got over the difficulty by writing Alyic@@. But,
as neither dé«n nor dixnv could be reconciled with such a read-
ing, with wéyayv in the first part of the verse, the last word was
assumed to be corrupt, and omitted altogether. ‘The Scholium
however, tiwwpnocauévnv avtov, could only have been founded
on the reading which I now propose to restore, mpooQetcay
AiyicOov Sixn. If the Schol. had found péyav, he would not so
entirely have ignored it, = 4
F. A. PALEY.
UnIversity oF Lonpon,
Jan. 8th, 1877.
ON THE MS. OF SOPHOCLES IN THE LIBRARY OF
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
THE Codex of Sophocles in the Library of Trinity College,
Cambridge, R. 3. 31, is a composite MS., of which the greater
part is of the 14th century. It contains (roughly speaking) the
complete text of the Ajax, Electra, and Cidipus Tyrannus.
1. Of this Aj. 811—1125, El. 914—0O. T. 1355, belong
apparently to a 14th century MS., of which the rest has pe-
rished, :
2. Aj. 13896—EI. 913, belonged originally to a different and
perhaps somewhat older MS. The three quires on which this
part is written are marked ¢’, =’, &’.
8. Aj. 1126—1395, were written by a hand of the 14th
or early 15th century evidently for the purpose of connecting
the two fragments. This is proved by the fact that Il. 1360
—95 are crowded together in double columns, Line 1395 has
been partly cut off in binding.
4, O.T, 1356—1520, are again taken from a different MS.,
written in various hands, and possibly older than the main part
of the volume. The first page began with line 1330, but as
this and the following lines were also on the last page of the
preceding MS., they are cancelled with strokes of the pen, and
the pieces are thus roughly joined.
That the two MSS. whose fragments are thus pieced toge-
ther were of different classes, appears from the fact that while
in the passage as it stands, dy@os is read in 1. 1355, in the
passage as cancelled the same line has dyos.'
1 In the following collation the readings of this part of the MS. are enclosed
in square brackets.
88 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
This part contains one remarkable reading, 1463, judy pr.
un corr.
5. The MS. thus completed seems to have once more
suffered, for a late 15th century hand has supplied the initial
portion as far as Aj. 810, and has also re-written Aj. 1360—95
on a separate leaf.
The portion first spoken of (1) is well furnished with scholia
and glosses, interlinear and marginal.
The Cdipus is also ornamented or rather disfigured with
quaint illustrations, in which Dodona and Corinth are oddly
substituted for Delphi and Thebes.
On the margin of O. T. there is some cryptographic writing.
Having had occasion to consult this MS. with a view to an
edition of the O. T., and being enabled to do so through the
kindness of the authorities of Trinity College, I observed the
following readings not mentioned by Burton in his Pentalogia,
ed. 1779. I have also transcribed some glosses that drew my
attention. The text used for comparison was that published by
the Oxford Clarendon Press in 1876. I add L to readings
agreeing with L and differing from A, and A to those agreeing
with A but differing from L. Where a reading differing from
both agrees with some other MS. I add the indication of this.
OED. TYR.
line 10. gloss on xaféorate, €meortnKare (sic pr.).
» 22. om. in text, ins. in mg.
» 29. Kadpelov pr. A.
» 42. tw’ nptv evpetv L.
» 7. bea Snrot L.
» 89. are dé roto
» 118. OvnoKover yap martes THY
» 124. om. in text, ins. in mg.
» 184. ec? ériotpodyy
» 158. x«ékXopuas(?) pr. M (Ambros. G 56 sup.).
» 179. @avatadéopa pr. L 31, 10, Pal. btthcradbeae corr.
, 182. wapaBomov LA.
_,, 198. gl. ef re yap 4 vdE dh Todt Sia Tédovs 1
nmMepa ETEPYETAL.
line 200.
201.
211.
212.
221.
222.
227.
245,
261.
281.
287.
294.
296.
297.
300.
315.
322.
326.
328,
342.
345.
360,
372.
375.
380.
382.
396.
397.
400,
407.
413,
441,
A MS. OF SOPHOCLES. 89
ov av
Tuppopwv aotparav (aotpatrav Vat. 40).
7G o@
kpatet (?) pr. Kparev corr. Kparn corr. 2. (Kpates A’).
viov (?) pr.
gl. rov cvvdptror,
avro(?) pr. L. avros corr. A: ib. éyovte pr.
aoros om. pr. sed ins. eadem m.
gl. on vre£ehov, ExBarav Tov PoBov.
2nd T@ om.
Kowav Oe
ay
dvvar’
GAN’ ovv pr.
Setuatos T
Spdvte om. pr.
6 éEehéyyov pr.: ov£ehéyyer corr. L.
TavTs vwuav (a, v in erasure).
move (?) pr. movos corr.
évvonov L,
atrootpagels pr.
Tap as ay, clrw, pa Tad éexdnve: Kakd. gl. od
pnmoTe elr@ Ta éu“a, nyodY THY éunV pwar-
TELAV, OS AV pH ExXharvyncw, nyody havepa
TOLjoW, TA OA KAKA.
a¥ (y in erasure).
mapyicw pr.: ib. os épyfs (op in erasure of 3 letters),
gl. on éxreipa Néyeuy, eis Teipay NOywv TpoTpEeTy.
EKTELP@ LAL.
avy aOrL6s TE )
Brdéras (but a in erasure).
Téxyn Téxvns’ (sic interpunct.)
Huw: yp. Tap vyiv.
Gedy Tod
ads (ef in erasure).
mapacraticewy (7 in erasure).
Avaowpev
# (not 7).
evpicels
90
line 445.
446,
448,
464.
478.
483.
484,
494,
516.
525.
528.
530.
532.
537.
543.
557.
558.
571.
583.
586.
598.
609.
616.
630.
631.
656.
658.
660.
670.
673.
690.
695.
699.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY. —
(gl. on cuOeis) Exrrodav 5é kal waxpav.
adyuvols: yp. adyuvass.
d7rov in erasure.
évTiwa pr. dvTwa 7H corr.: ib. ef wérpa pr.
Kaba
(gl. on ws) ws Vat. 140.
a
oiwvobérns
> U
atopackav?
OTouv om. pr.
Tt
mpos T éuod Ven, 472.
mpds Tod in erasure.
€& oupatov 8 opdr &é
dpaoww
ovtos’ od mas pr. L., otros ov" was corr. Vat. 40,
ev om. I’.
Toimow pr. womowy corr. A.: gl. olo@ ws ToL7-
weLs. €oTiv O€ aTTLKLO MOS.
ér’ autos
jTocov ovv pr. Tocov vbr Corr.
oida y (y in erasure). (oidas A.)
ei Svdoéns in erasure (sic interpunct.).
é&ev (c in erasure).
avtots amrav
XPHTTOVS pI., KAKODS COIT.
cel
eviaBovpév@ co. we (cot mre in erasure).
povoy
péreots THAD ovyL col.
Kuptay pr. Katpiay corr.: ib. nuiv Ven. 468.
Ayr pr. Laur. 31,10. Aoyw corr. Par. E.
xentns: yp. Sirns. (xprngeis T.)
Oedv pr. Gedy corr. (for Bedv Oeor).
ataocOnvat: o om. pr.
oTuyvés (os in erasure).
dpovnua pr. L.
n
oUpacas
a
54 ~ s
EXELS OTNTAS
A MS. OF SOPHOCLES. gI
line 709. @ywy pr.
» (12. y¥ d@ advrod corr.
» 124. ay om.
» 730. tpumdais A.: yp. Sudais (by 2nd hand) L.
» 740. trav Se pr.
5, (48. é£elzrovs pr.
, 753. dann oy Hye
» 195. nip
» 763. dEvos yap 68 adynp Ven. 468.
» 166. gl. on rapectw, bs Tapovta vote avrov.
» 774, omitted by Ist hand.: ins. 2nd, omitting pév.
» 775. nyopny (2)
» 186. Tovd
» (91. pev om, p, m.: ib. ype?’ 7
» 193, qovedoaytos pr. putevoavtos corr. (cp. Amb. G.
56 sup.)
» 796. orroiwny: ov in erasure.
» 199. drvcbat
got
», 800. Kat od pr. Kat od corr.
» 816. eyOpodainwv av yévotto péddov avnp (o madd in
erasure of aynp)
», S17. pnde Eévav
» 818, pnte rpocdwveiy
» 827. &&éOpefe xakéducé we. Amb. G. 56 sup.
» 829. rT@de Kav dpOoin
» 836. (apos todTov): yp. Tocobror,
» 845. onrois icos
» 846. otaf@vor (2)
$ os
» 866, 7. ovpaviav Sv aifépa corr. A.
» 890. &€erar (not eferav).
» 891, Ep&eras pr. éEeTax corr,
ou
» 892—5. ris—riutat om. but add. in mg. (Ovpe)
» 896. gl. on ti Sef pe yopeveww, avTi Tov tl mpéres
mavnyupiverv tots Geots (the letters have nearly
faded), Cp. Dind. Schol. in Soph. 11. p. 168.
92
906.
926.
941.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Tanais Kalov Oéchata éEaipovow (last a of radad
added by 2nd hand).
xatowo? pr. L. catic@ corr, A.
ovyl mpéaBus (6 om.)
943, 4. 1 6€ un Aéyw “yo (not Aéyw xy’ eyo) Ven. 468.
957.
968.
985.
991.
998.
999.
1001,
1002.
1011.
1014,
1029.
1037.
1044.
: Mnvurhs | i
@ Eév’: ib. onuavtap (unvuTns by 2nd hand.)
6) om.
KUpEL
hépwr pr.
aT OKeLT pr. -
oual
yépov pr. yépwr corr.
eywy ovxt
TapBe: ye om.
onta mpos om. pr.
oicOa pr.: jo8a corr.
@ om.
ovTos Om.
The notes of persons in this scene have been confused and
then corrected.
??
1050.
1063.
1072.
1084,
1085.
1100.
1111,
1130.
1137.
1156.
1157.
1167.
1173.
1177.
onunvac?
n
paTpos Corr.
wv >
ov7roTO
Tolocd exus
fn) OM. pr.
,’ ’
opeotBara
gloss on mpéoPur, Tov ynpatov.
9 Evvadrdkavti Te pr.
Seiegpows corr. (« by 2nd hand) Ven. 617: gl.
MNVLaloves. .
”
édoxas
@herrov TH S ev nwépa.
f
Toivuy om.
7 yap 8 Sidwcww
mas 8 adnKas TO yépovTe ov pr.
line 1193.
1214,
»”»
1218.
1220.
1231.
1245.
1252,
1264.
1270.
1288.
1311.
1337.
1339.
1340.
1345.
1347.
1348.
1350.
1355.
A MS. OF SOPHOCLES. 93
TOC OVTOL ,
Os Suxafes (ds extra versum in margine).
eldov '
idolunv (eidov by 2nd hand).
iayatwy (but aé in erasure of ¢ 2).
al ’v maveo’ in erasure.
Kade: ib, a letter erased before ov of Adi-ov.
eioétrecev L.
gl. rec. €wpa Sid Tod E Wirod d0ev Kai peTew-
pos.
recev pr.
Kadpelous
Xo. id daipov
[ré Symor] LL.
ér om. ...|
érayet : [...amTayeT ...]
Katapétatov pr.: [...KaTapoTarov...]
[Seirec]
ws nOéAnooa...7oT av L: [ads o OédAnoa...
qote| A.
érvoé p E [...€dvcev...] A: poPov [...povov...]
ayOos L: [...dyos...] A.
1359, 60. [azo rod viv]
1365.
1373.
1380.
1395.
1401.
1412.
1413.
1426.
1432.
1436. —
1441,
1442.
1454,
1456.
1459.
[ébuv kako |
[untépa |
[els @vye pr.]
[apa]
[ors pr. ére corr.]
[expirpate évOa]
[ire a€wwoar |
[reove |
[wu om.]
[éx om.]
[arroAvvat|
[radTa’ Suws|
THY
[dmroddvvT@v: yp. aT@AXUTHY CorT. |
[unr addov]
[raév éuav appévor|
94 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
line 1460. [mpéc0n]
» 1461. [eorr] |
» 1463. [nur pr. nun corr.: gl. rd yopls TO dvev Ta-
parrAnrov Tpodys.] }
» 1469. [@cydr]
» 1472. [roty éuotv didoiv}
» 1477. [iv etyes] A.
» 1492. [nxer’]
» 1493. [mappier: yp. tapappivre:.]
» 1498. [kak révd’ ico]
» 1505. [un pO rapidns pr. (ode corr.)]
» 1510. [Evvevcor]
, 1513. [rod Biov]
» 1517. [oic® otv éf’ ofs eiut]
» 1518. [wéurbns am’ oixav yp. arotxov.]
pucnrés
» 1519. [aloyioros]
» 1520. [dpover pr.]
The greater part of these readings are of no value, and
Burton is not to be blamed for ignoring them; although in
a few instances he has neglected the Ist hand, and he has for
the most part not cared to notice alternative readings, whether
given by the first hand or inserted subsequently. Yet even the
worst readings are of some interest, as showing the naif cha-
racter of the MS. or MSS. There are few important divergences
from L: yet this MS. has a8da§$1s in 1. 229, and has 1. 800 in
its place (with od for ooi):—indeed, which of the so-called
‘apographa’ has not? In 1, 1137, éxunvous, it has preserved
the true reading (with a change of the breathing) in common
with the first hand of Ven. 617. The loss of the aspirate and
the subsequent alteration to éupnvovs in both MSS., together
with the gloss pnviaiovs, show that éxunvovs is not a 14th
century emendation. Another trace of independence is the
gloss on |. 896, wavnyvpifewv tots sots, a corruption of which,
woveiy 7 tots Oeots, has found its way into the text of L. (ze,
jTav 7......has been read as fon 7.) In comparing Burton with
my notes of the Trin. MS, I see it mentioned by him that the
A MS. OF SOPHOCLES, 95
Laud and Selden MSS. in the Bodleian (alone so far as known
to me) have in the text the curious reading tyvde Oeorifer
ypadnv, given as a marginal alternative for tyvd’ Bec émi-
otpodnv in O. T. 134 by the diorthotes of L. Can any scribe
have deliberately preferred the margin in this case, or are these
late MSS. from a pre-Laurentian source ?
The Ajax and Electra are not in Burton’s Pentalogia, and I
am not aware that the readings of the Trinity MS. in these
plays have anywhere been recorded,
L. CAMPBELL.
THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. TWO CRITICISMS.
I.
In his ‘Social Life in Greece,’ p. 173 (ed. 1), Professor Mahaffy
thus describes the character of Antigone in Sophocles. ‘There
is something masculine in all her actions, and hard inher words.
The way in which she repels the sympathy of the gentle, but
common-place, Ismene is very unpleasing, and shows a heroism
vastly inferior to that of Euripides’ Alcestis, or Macaria, where,
as we shall presently see, equal heroism was not sustained by
the excitement of a violent conflict, or by that av@adéa which
is anything but feminine. So, again, the coldness of her rela-
tions to Haemon must strike every modern critic—a defect
which Euripides very naturally avoided when he wrote his own
Antigone. She is in Sophocles, at least in this play, little else
than a man in female dress, undertaking female duties, but
with no trace of female tenderness, or weakness, in any of her
actions. And Professor Mahaffy draws the conclusion that in
the time of Sophocles ‘the ideal of female character had de-
generated, the notion of a true heroine was no longer natural,
but was supplanted by a hard and masculine type,’ etc. (p. 174).
There is no better way of gaining an insight into the cha-
racter of Antigone, as Sophocles has made it for us, than to
take this criticism and examine it by the light of the evidence
to be obtained from the drama. And, first: ‘There is some-
thing masculine in all her actions, and hard in her words.’ |
In the opening scene of the drama Antigone comes before
us, leading out her sister beyond the gate in order to be alone
with her, and have her sympathy and help in the plan now
THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. 97
agitating her breast. She addresses her by the closest appel-
lation ‘my own, my very sister, my Ismene.’ She dwells on the
lonely situation of herself and her sister as the last remaining
descendants of a doomed race, and on the woes which they have
seen and suffered together. She tells her of the new sorrow,
the unjust proclamation of Creon, and enquires whether her
sister also is aware that evil is coming on their friends,
Throughout she speaks in a tone of gentle sadness, and looks
forward with undoubting confidence to her sister’s sympathy.
Ismene may not have heard the news; when she has heard it,
she will join Antigone in her action.
But on revealing her plan, which is to bury Polynices in
spite of the proclamation, Antigone meets with no response to
her own deep feeling. Ismene has heard nothing for good or
evil; the intelligence that her brother is to lie unburied on the
battle-field awakes in her no sense of indignation. She does
not, like her sister, picture to herself the mangled corpse torn
by dogs and birds of prey; she does not think of the spirit dis-
honoured by the loss of burial rites. She dwells rather on the
misery of past days, and the woe of the house of her father
Oedipus; on the necessity of cautious eonduct under present cir-
cumstances. Could it be done with impunity, she would indeed
tell her mind to her enemies, but she is a woman and not
framed to contend with men; she may not transgress the law,
or search after the impossible, which is at all times a foolish
errand. Thus for Antigone, the hope of her sister’s help and
sympathy is dashed to the ground: the pious affection which
will not be restrained by conventionalities or unjust edicts is
met by selfish timidity and proverbial wisdom. Antigone
must stand alone: she has no sister nor kindred among the
living. The dead are still hers and will answer her affection.
Rather than betray these she will die, and join them in the
under-world. Such devotion is irresistible. Even Ismene,
while she condemns her sister’s action as foolish, confesses that
she is a true friend to her friends.
This opening scene is of itself sufficient to prove the ten-
derness which underlies the passionate vehemence of Antigone,
and is indeed the cause of that vehemence ; but other passages,
Journal of Philology. vou, y111 7
98 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
stronger still, may be quoted. When Creon is forced by An-
tigone into a defence of his edict, he entrenches himself behind
the ordinary moral feeling of the Greek. ‘An enemy is never a
friend, not even in death. With the Greeks the feuds of life
are not extinguished in death on either side.. In the Ajaz
Odysseus is the enemy of Ajax when alive, and therefore Teucer
fears to let him join in the burial of Ajax when dead, ‘lest
perchance in this I do what is displeasing to the dead;’ while
the Atridae, from motives of enmity, are anxious to prevent the
burial of Ajax altogether. This commonplace Antigone an-
swers by a sentiment which very possibly startled the audience
in the Athenian theatre—a sentiment widely different from
the practice of Greek women. ‘My nature is not to join in
hating but in loving.’ As a woman, Antigone has no part in
the feuds of the state, but only in the love of the family. This
is precisely the feeling which governs the Antigone of the Oedi-
pus Coloneus when she attempts, so far as is possible, to heal
the feud between Oedipus and Polynices. How does Creon
meet this strange declaration? ‘If loving be a necessity of
your nature, go down to that other world and be loving there;
in this life such woman’s laws shall never govern me.’ The
statesman has no sense of the deeper truth so plain to Antigone,
He is full of ‘wise saws and modern instances, but ignorant of
the truths which come to us through the heart. How could
the contrast of masculine and feminine be marked more
strongly ? |
Secondly, we are told that:. The way in which Antigone
repels Ismene is ‘very unpleasing, and shows a heroism vastly
inferior to that of Euripides’ Alcestis, or Macaria, where equal
heroism was not sustained by the excitement of a violent con-
flict, or by that av@aéia which is anything but feminine,’
We have seen how deeply injured Antigone is by ber sister’s
behaviour; how it left her alone in the world, and how she took
it to be a renunciation of love and duty on the part of one
nearest and dearest to her. The reasons given for that renun-
ciation are timidity, worldly prudence, and the desire to live a
comfortable life. In a later scene Ismene changes; she wishes
now to die with her sister, who has been detected and con-
‘es
wit
THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. 99
demned to death; shé cannot live without her; she is, she
pleads, equally guilty—had not prudence held her back. She
even casts aside her natural timidity, and at the risk of rousing
an angry tyrant pleads with Creon for her sister’s life. But
Antigone is unmoved by the heroism of an exalted moment.
When the question was the burial of a dead brother at the
risk of life, Ismene held back and would have no part in the
deed. With such weakness Antigone has no sympathy: the
sacrifice of such a life is little worth. Ismene may live; she
has betrayed her kindred on earth, what service can she do
them in the under-world? It is no matter for compromise or
concession. The false decisions of life are not to be rectified at
the last moment, and Ismene will not gain a share in the action
of Antigone by sharing in her death. Nor is it Antigone only
who pronounces this stern refusal of her repentant sister’s wish:
it is justice. ‘Justice will not suffer this: you would not, and
I had no partner in the deed.’
The way in which Antigone repels her sister, however ‘ un-
pleasing’ it may be, is not a mere mistake or misconception on
the part of Sophocles. It has a deep meaning, altogether wor-
thy of a place in the great tragedy. If it is sad that death
should remove from Antigone what is near and dear to her, it
is sadder still that weakness and selfishness—and, till roused,
Ismene is both weak and selfish,in spite of her amiability—
should place an everlasting bar of separation between the sisters.
Thus there is deep pain mingled with the contempt with which
Antigone turns aside from her sister’s course of action. She
also has something to renounce.
Professor Mahaffy contrasts the Antigone of Sophocles un-
favourably with the Alcestis of Euripides. The characters are
indeed widely different, perhaps so different that no real com-
parison can be made between them. The pathos of a domestic
scene, in which the death is self-chosen, is not to be compared
with the tragic situation of the Antigone. The mild gentleness
of Alcestis, a wife and mother, submitting quietly to her self-
chosen doom, has nothing in common with the maiden spirit of
Antigone, with her daring, her freshness, her fulness of life.
The objects also for which these two persons are supposed to
7—2
100 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
die are widely different. The death of Alcestis serves absolutely
no purpose but to keep in life a coward who goes the round of
his relations beseeching each in turn to take his place at the
fatal moment; the death of Antigone is a sacrifice on the ‘altar
of men’s highest hopes, winning recognition for the laws of
affection and eternal justice. There is therefore nothing similar
in the characters or in the situations in which they are placed.
We must not quarrel with white because it is not black.
Macaria is a less well-known person than Alcestis. She is
the daughter of Heracles, who in the Heracleidae of Euripides
(L 474 ff) dies in order to save her race from destruction.
Here again the situation is not like that in the Antigone. Ma-
caria dies to gain a certain good, she gives one life for many.
Antigone perishes because she has performed a solemn duty.
She goes te her death ‘because of her reverence for piety, the
victim of a tyrannical edict. Antigone does not fight against
her doom, but she speaks very plainly of the injustice of it.
Macaria parts with her life so readily that she hardly seems to
know the value of it. Moreover in her case, as in that of
Alcestis, the divine power has ordained that the sacrifice is
needed. Antigone, on the other hand, acts with perfect freedom.
Only her own love and sense of justice prompt the burial of her
brother. Creon’s law and Ismene’s prudence forbid it.
Even if we go beyond the instances given by Professor
Mahaffy aud quote the Iphigeneia of Euripides, we shall find
differences which make a comparison of the character with
Antigone impossible. When, on her arrival at Aulis, Iphigeneia
learns that she has been brought not, as was said, to be the bride
of Achilles, but to be sacrificed in order to secure a fair voyage,
she entreats her father Agamemnon to spare her. The speech
is touchingly pathetic, but net by any means heroic. She re-
minds her father of the past days in which she first called him
father, and was called his daughter; when as a child she sat
upon his knee, and together they planned the future. ‘Shall I,
my child, behold thee happy in a husband’s halls, full of life and
joy, in state worthy of me?’ And she replied, looking on to
her father’s old age; ‘Shall I welcome thee, my father, with
loving reception in my halls, repaying thy toil with care and
THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. IOI
tendance?’ But these memories of childhood are forgotten
now, Iphigeneia says; and she concludes her appeal thus: * This
light of day is very pleasant to behold, the under-world is
nothing worth; it is madness to pray for death; better a life of
misery than a glorious death. Later on in the poem, when
the princess finds that her death is a necessity, and that the
chieftains of the army are resolved on it, even though Achilles
should resist them, she abandons with some inconsistency. her
love of life, and reasons in favour of death, as she had before
pleaded for life. ‘It is not meet, she says to her mother,
‘that I should love my life too dearly; not for thyself only, but
for all the Hellenes, did’st thou bear me. Warriors without
number, shield and oar in hand, will venture daring deeds and
die for Hellas. Shall my one life hold them in check? What
just answer can be made to a plea like this?’ This deserves
the praise of heroism and devotion, but it is out of harmony
with the love of life set forth in the preceding speech. So sud-
den a change is more in the manner of Ismene than Antigone.
It shows a somewhat weak and impulsive nature, widely dif-
ferent from the steady resolution which marks Antigone’s action
from first to last. Moreover, it is the act of Antigone when
alive which is of the first importance in her character; her
death is to her of secondary importance. In Iphigeneia, as in
all the cases quoted from Euripides, the death is a necessity;
a sacrifice made to avoid a great calamity. The heroism of
these characters is in a measure passive; the princesses suffer .
nobly, as becomes a royal nature, when the suffering is a
necessity. Antigone’s heroism is of a more active kind; it
brings a new and higher law into the world.
If then Antigone perishes in performing a sacred duty and
by reason of her persistent clinging to justice, what becomes of
her ‘wilfulness’ (av@ad/a), ‘which is anything but feminine?’
To be obstinate in the observance of right, to love at the risk
of death, are not qualities wholly masculine. ‘ Wilfulness’ in
the Greek sense of the word is the sin of Creon; it is only a
false judgment which ascribes it to Antigone. She is not
‘wilful, she is absolute in her obedience to a higher law.
Thirdly, Professor Mahaffy tells us that: ‘the coldness of
102 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Antigone’s relations to Haemon must strike every modern
critic, a defect which Euripides very naturally avoided when he
wrote his own Antigone.’
We do not know very much about the Antigone of Euri-
pides. Aristophanes, the grammarian, in his argument to the
play of Sophocles, says: ‘The story will also be found in the
Antigone of Euripides, only there Antigone is detected with
Haemon, and given in marriage, and she has a son Maeon,’
At the end of the Antigone also the Scholiast informs us that
‘this play differs from the Antigone of Euripides, because in
that play Antigone was detected, and, owing to the love of
Haemon, given in marriage. Welcker has attempted to give a
sketch of the plan of the Euripidean tragedy in his ‘Griechische
Tragoedie’ 2, 563 ff. He believes that the events of the play of
Sophocles were contained in the prologue of the drama of Euri-
pides, and that the latter is taken, in point of time, from a
period when the son of Haemon and Antigone was grown up.
The plot may be guessed from the story in Hyginus (Fab. 72).
‘Creon, the son of Menoeceus, published an edict that no one
should bury Polynices or those who came with him, inasmuch
as they had come to besiege their country. But Antigone, his
sister, and Argia, his wife, secretly by night take up the body of
Polynices and place it on the same pyre on which Eteocles was
burnt. They were detected by the watchmen: Argia escaped,
Antigone was brought before the king. He puts her in the
hands of Haemon, to whom she was betrothed, to be put to
death. Haemon was induced by his affection to disregard his
father’s commands; he placed Antigone among the shepherds,
and falsely gave out that he had put her to death. Antigone
bore a son who on coming to full age repaired to Thebes, to the
games. Creon recognized him by the mark which is on the
bodies of all who are sprung of the serpent’s seed. Hercules
entreated for Haemon, but in vain; Haemon put himself and
his wife Antigone to death. But Creon gave his daughter
Megara to Hercules to wife, and from her was born Therimachus
and Ophites.’ If Welcker is right. in the theory that this
extract from Hyginus gives the plot of the drama of Euripides,
we may assume that this Antigone stood to the Antigone of
THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. 103
Sophocles in much the same relation that the Electra of Euri-
pides stands to the Llectra of Sophocles, Antigone is here
placed among the shepherds, as Electra is married to a man of
low rank: Haemon and Antigone become in secret the parents
of a son Maeon or Maemon, who is subsequently discovered by
Creon, through bearing on his body ‘the spear which the earth-
born carry. So that though Euripides has undoubtedly made
more of the love of Haemon and Antigone than Sophocles, he
has not, by so doing, contributed to the nobility of either cha-
racter, and he has made Creon a monster of cruelty, not merely
a wrong-headed and self-willed statesman. But, in truth, we
do not know enough of the drama of Euripides to pass any
sentence upon it. One thing is clear; the account given by
Aristophanes and the Scholiast is confused and incomplete. If
Antigone is detected in burying Polynices, and then given to
Haemon to wife, the tragedy disappears altogether, and we
have nothing left but a comedy.
Sophocles knew well the power of Eros; he had felt it, if
report speaks true, in his own life, and he has described it in
many passages of his dramas. If, therefore, there is a coldness
in Antigone’s relations towards Haemon, it is not because So-
phocles is ignorant of the power of love, but because he has not
chosen to give that passion authority over Antigone in the
situation in which he places her... Or rather, he has not chosen
to allow Antigone to speak of her love, for of the depth of affec-
tion existing between her and Haemon he has left us in no
doubt. This ‘masculine’ woman has such reserve and modesty
that even in the last moments of life she will not speak of her
lover. She thinks rather of her father, her mother, and her
brother; these she hopes to join in another world, and reap the
reward of her piety by unbroken intercourse with them; but
of her lover personally she says nothing. This is, no doubt,
- strange to a modern reader; but it would not be equally strange
to a Greek; nor in any degree inconsistent with the fact that
the love of Haemon and Antigone is of the utmost importance
in the drama. The Greeks, as is well known, did not look on
the love of the sexes even in married life, in the same light
that we do. They placed the relationship of blood above the
104 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
relationship formed by marriage, and filial or sisterly affection
took with them the higher place. Thus it may be that in the
mind of Sophocles love, ¢.e. love of the kind which leads to
marriage, was not calculated to become the motive and spring
of the highest moral action. In modern society a great deal is
made of this passion, and almost everything else in life is re-
garded as giving way to it; yet no one will deny that there are
other motives more exalted. Sophocles then wishing to raise
his heroine into a spiritual world has raised her above this.
motive, and supplied her with another. It is justice which
penetrates every thought and action of Antigone—justice as-
serting the claims of affection. In all the great writers of
antiquity we find this sense of an ideal justice; this striving
after a perfect judgment which shall reward a man according to
his deserts. Justice, so Antigone thinks, though Creon declares
otherwise, demands the burial of Polynices. Justice will not
allow Ismene to share in an action which is not really hers. If
Antigone has done wrong she is willing to suffer, for suffering
justly imposed is better than a life of impunity : if her enemies
are wrong, may they suffer to the full measure which ideal jus-
tice demands. In other characters of Sophocles we find the
same feeling: in Electra justice has wholly triumphed over af-
fection for a mother; Ajax feels that nothing but his death will
satisfy the claims of justice; Oedipus is resigned in the same
feeling; and the native force of justice compels Neoptolemus to
restore the bow to Philoctetes.
There is also another consideration. The characters of Greek
tragedy are for the most part one-sided, as Arnold Passow has
shown. They display one trait; they are filled with one emo-
tion. This the poet brings into prominence, and leaves the rest
out of sight; he does not wish, any more than the sculptor of
a relief, to give a rounded and perfect whole. Antigone is
filled with the thought of what is due to her dead brother; and
she regards nothing else. Creon has declared that the body shall
not be buried, but he has no right to keep her from her own.
His laws are not to be set against the divine laws which enjoin
burial. So absorbed is she in this feeling that, when carried
away to her tomb, she speaks of herself as the sole remaining
eo
THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. 105
princess of the royal house, entirely ignoring the existence of
her sister Ismene, It is the same intensity in one direction
which makes it impossible for her to dwell in any manner on
Haemon and his affection.
Once more let us hear Professor Mahaffy: Antigone ‘is in
Sophocles, at least in this play, little else than a man in female
dress, undertaking female duties, but with no trace of female
tenderness or weakness in any of her actions.’
Weakness, no doubt, will not be found in Antigone; if this
quality is necessary to a heroine, we must give up the case. Of
tenderness we have already spoken; it is the depth of her ten-
derness which makes Antigone what she is. But we have still
to ask—‘ Are there grounds for separating the Antigone of this
play from the Antigone of the Oedipus Coloneus?’ Professor
Mahaffy, in the words ‘at least in this play, implies such a
separation, and indeed it is absolutely necessary for his point.
No one could say of the foot-sore sun-burnt girl, who never left
her father in his wanderings, who laments that he has not died
in her arms, and weeps that she may not see his grave—that
she is ‘little else than a man in female dress,’
The Antigone was brought out in the poet’s middle life;
and, if tradition can be trusted, it won such applause that So-
phocles was in consequence chosen to be one of the generals. in
the expedition to Samos. Whatever be the value of such a
tradition it supports us in assuming that the Antigone was
regarded as a masterpiece, even in the author's life-time, as it
certainly was after his death. Another legend—that Sophocles,
an old man, perished under too sustained an effort in reading
his Antigone—points in the same direction. But the Oedipus
Coloneus belongs to quite the latest period of the poet’s life, and
was not brought out till after his death. It is then improbable
that in the later play he should have drawn an Antigone incon-
sistent with the great creation which won such renown. His
effort would rather be to delineate a character which should have
the force and fire of his earlier Antigone, and at the same time
display greater gentleness in so far as she is not, in the later
play, called upon to act in such trying circumstances as in the
earlier one. And this is, in fact, what we find in the Antigone
106 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
of the Oedipus Coloneus, where she is, of course, but a little
younger than in the Antigone. She has abandoned everything
at Thebes for her father, she is regardless of the conventionalities
of life, and wanders with her father, resting how and where she
can. She speaks with courage to the elders of Colonus in her
father’s behalf, appearing before them as one of their own blood.
She entreats her angry father for Polynices. She shews through-
out a vigorous independent spirit; she is ‘no woman when help
is needed.’ As if to connect the plays closely together and shew
under what pressure Antigone lies in burying her brother,
Sophocles has chosen in the Oedipus Coloneus to represent
Polynices as especially laying this charge of burial upon her.
And in such a nature a last request is not lightly forgotten.
There is therefore no reason to speak of the Antigone in the
play of the same name as different from the Antigone of the
Oedipus Coloneus. The character is the same, but in different
circumstances. If the separation is necessary for Professor
Mahaffy’s argument, so much the worse for the argument.
Such an one as Antigone, if we met her in daily life,
might not be an attractive woman. She might have fancies,
crotchets, and prejudices. She might not be soft or gentle;
she certainly would not gain the praise due to the woman
of whom least is said for good or bad among the men. But
we must not on that account condemn the character or the
age in which it was created. We cannot measure the heroines
of great poets by standards such as these. No one would say
of a sculptor’s creations that they are ‘cold’ because of marble,
or lifeless because immovable. The standard of ordinary life is
not applicable here, or all ideals will be equally unreal and un-
satisfactory. ‘he women of Sophocles are not the women of
his own time or of any time. They are ideal creatures such as
might be in an ideal world, such as are not and cannot be in
the circumstances of ordinary life. A poet who has delineated
for us a heart filled to overflowing with the purest earthly
affection, with the love of a sister for a brother, of the living for
the dead, a nature passionate and unyielding in the sense of
right and duty, can hardly be said to have joined in the de-
graded ideas of the female sex current in his day, whatever
these may have been.
THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. 107
A,
Another critic, on widely different grounds, arrives at a con-
ception of the character of Antigone, not indeed so low as that
formed by Professor Mahaffy, but still to some degree unfavour-
able. In the papers reprinted in his edition of the Antigone,
A. Boeckh endeavours to shew that the poet did not intend
Antigone’s action to be regarded as wholly blameless, and that
such a view is necessary to the unity of the drama.
As the thought which underlies the whole and gives unity
_ to the piece, Boeckh gives us the following (p. 160): ‘ Immode-
rate and passionate effort, when rebellious, leads to destruction ;
let a man measure his capacity (Befugniss) with sobriety so as
not to overstep human and divine rights in his rash self-will,
and suffer severe blows in punishment; reason is the best ele-
ment in happiness’ The thought that want of moderation
brings men to their ruin is to be found, no doubt, in the
Antigone; indeed, it will be found to a greater or less degree in
almost any Greek play, at least, any play of Sophocles, for on
it is founded the Greek idea of a virtuous life. It is the leading
thought of the Ajax, expressed plainly by Athena at the end of
the prologue (1. 127 ff). ‘Look then on this, and let thy lips
utter no high words against heaven: be not puffed up, if so be
that thou art more than another in strength of hand, and abun-
dance of wealth. All that is human a day may bring down or
a day may set up: but the gods cherish the prudent, and hate
the evil.’ In this drama the self-restraint of Odysseus is con-
trasted with the proud and rebellious spirit of Ajax. And when
Ajax has perished, the moderation of Odysseus is needed to
bring about his burial, so that here, beyond a doubt, the unity
of the play may be sought in the idea expressed by Boeckh.
But is it so in the Antigone? If it is, we must find the
spirit of rebellion and rashness in Antigone no less than in
Creon, for both are involved in ruin; indeed, if death is the
worst of evils, Antigone suffers more than Creon. Boeckh does
108 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
find it. He allows that Creon’s edict with regard to the burial
of Polynices is harsh and tyrannical, an infringement on the
rights of Antigone, and an offence against the gods and the
dead ; yet Antigone is also guilty in transgressing the law of
the state. To support this view of Antigone’s action he quotes
the words of Ismene, which point out to her sister her duty as a
woman. ‘The poet,’ he says, ‘wished to delineate Antigone as
grand and noble, not commonplace or poor; but she was in-
tended to be ignorant of moderation.’ ‘The harshness of both
sides shews itself towards Ismene, whom Creon will involve in
destruction though she is guiltless, while Antigone rejects her
sympathy. And again, p. 167, ‘The poet is far removed from
any wish to glorify Antigone absolutely; the grandeur and
_ firmness of her resolve are justly brought into prominence, but
hints of reproach are not wanting.’
Undoubtedly Ismene regards her sister’s action in the first
instance with disapprobation. It is, in her eyes, a breach of
law (IL. 44, 46, 60). It goes beyond the reserve natural to, and
proper for, women (1. 61). It is impossible in the present help-
less and subject condition of the sisters (1. 63). Yet she admits
that it is prompted by genuine affection (1. 99). She has, in
fact, only motives of a lower order, and maxims of worldly or
proverbial wisdom to oppose to the lofty resolution of her sister.
And in a later scene she owns that these prudential maxims are
false. So far from regarding her sister’s action as wrong, she
wishes to join in the results of it. To die as Antigone dies
is better than life. The character of Ismene is gentle and
amiable, but too weak to give us the measure of right and
wrong. In this respect, as in many others, it may be compared
with the Chrysothemis of the Electra, who, also, while dis-
suading her sister from her course of action confesses that
justice is on the other side (ll. 338, 466, 7). The language of
Ismene, therefore, even if we admit it to imply reproach on
Antigone, cannot be regarded as the utterance of the poet’s own
thoughts. It is intended to point out, and does point out with
perfect truth, the fact that the action of Antigone is above the
level of the ordinary Greek woman, not that it is blameable
in itself.
THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. 109
- But the chorus, who are often taken to be the alter ego
of the poet, speak in more than one passage with severity of
Antigone—severity in spite of a certain sympathy. ‘ Having
caught thee in foolishness’ (I. 383). ‘Truly the child is stern
after the sternness of her sire; she knows not how to bend to
misfortune’ (1. 471). ‘Thou hast advanced to the edge of
daring, and dashed heavily against the lofty throne of justice’
(l. 853 f) ‘A self-decided temper has been thy undoing’
(1. 875). It is not a little remarkable that the Antigone should
be the only extant play of Sophocles in which the chorus is not
of the same sex as the principal character. In the Electra the
chorus are women, and have the strongest sympathy with the
heroine: ‘in all things they answer love for love’ (1. 134). To
Antigone such sympathy is denied. Are we to interpret this
singular fact as meaning that the poet’s sympathy also was not
with Antigone in her action ?
The chorus are old men, and as such are naturally opposed
to any expression of feeling which disturbs the existing order of
things. They are also absolutely under the control of Creon.
‘You, I suppose, have the power to put in force any law, both
in regard to the dead and to us who live’ (ll. 213,14). ‘They
too see this, but they pay lip-service to thee’ (1. 509). Yet
even they do not approve the action of Creon; they give,
from time to time, a little timid advice; and when at length
Creon has insulted Teiresias and drawn from him menaces of
evil, they venture on open and serious remonstrance (1. 1092—
11), urging the king to obey his better feelings, or rather the
feelings of dread which the prophet’s words have aroused in his
mind. Finally, when the punishment of his self-will has come
upon Creon, they take quite a different view of Antigone’s act
and Creon’s conduct, ‘methinks, thou art too late in perceiving
justice’ (1. 1270, cf. 1849—50).
Can the judgment of such wavering and time-serving men
be regarded as the judgment of the poet? If so, we must sup-
pose that the poet is inconsistent in his view of the action of
his heroine, condemning her so long as it is possible to do so, and
relenting only when the gods have declared on her side. Or
could the hand which has sketched this grand character write
IIO THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
down as the rule of action, ‘There is a kind of piety in paying
due reverence; but power is not to be transgressed’? (1. 872).
No! we must look elsewhere for the mind of Sophocles. The
free people of Thebes, speaking their thoughts without fear
of Creon and uninfluenced by motives of worldly prudence,
declare in her favour, ‘she who would not suffer her brother to
lie unburied on the field of carnage for dogs and birds to feed
upon, is she not worthy of a golden meed of honour?’ (Il. 696—9).
Antigone herself has no doubt about it. She does indeed allow
her action to be called in question in the passage ll. 905 ff,
if that passage is genuine, but only to justify it more com-
pletely and shew how absolutely necessary it was for her to act
as she did. She is carried away from the stage declaring to
the last that she perishes by a tyrannical act ‘because of her
reverence for piety.’ On the other hand, Creon’s action is from
first to last thoroughly unjustifiable, and is so spoken of by the
poet. Antigone declares when speaking of the proclamation
that Creon has no right to keep her from her own, 7.e. he has
no right to interfere with the duties of affection. When in-
formed by Creon of his intention, the chorus do not approve of
it, but merely remark that life and death are in his hand.
Teiresias speaks of the death of Antigone as an impious act no
less than the refusal to permit burial to Polynices. Creon,
even, confesses his error when too late, and hastens to retrieve
it: ‘I too, now that my determination is so set, will in presence
set her free as with my own lips I entombed her; for I am sore
afraid that it may perchance be best to go to the end of life
observant of established laws’ (Il. 1111 ff).
Creon’s act, then, is a distinct outrage. Antigone opposes it.
There is no doubt vehemence on both sides; but Creon is vehe-
ment in the cause of wrong, Antigone in the cause of right.
When compelled to defend himself by Haemon, Creon is forced
back upon maxims of absolute tyranny: ‘Am I to rule this land
for another than myself?’ Antigone, in her defence, appeals to
the everlasting laws of Zeus.
There is a certain peremptoriness in the character of Anti-
gone; without it the drama would be impossible. But it cannot
be maintained that Sophocles wished to imply that her action in
THE ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES. 111
burying Polynices against the decree of Creon is at all blame-
able. Nor is such a conception of her character necessary to
the unity of the play. The leading idea round which all the
parts are gathered, and from which they all spring, is that the
ordinances of the state are not to be at variance with human
nature and religion. An absolute king may lay down laws with
a certain air of wisdom and statescraft, but if those laws are at
variance with higher ordinances they will come to nothing and
involve their author in ruin. Throughout the Antigone the
pedantic statescraft of Creon is in contrast with the natural
humanity which governs the actions of Antigone, of Haemon,
of Eurydice. That statescraft has to give way: it is founded
on selfishness and ignorant obstinacy. It consumes all who
come within its reach. It is a principle of death, not of life. It
ends in utter desolation.
Professor Lehrs (Populdre Aufsdtze, ed, 2, p. 69) thus criti-
cizes—in his somewhat peculiar manner—those who regard
Antigone as to blame. “‘The law of the state? say the modern
philologists and aestheticists, in dealing with the Antigone,
‘comes into conflict with the divine and moral law; both sides,
equally justified in themselves, equally fall into error through
obstinate persistence, This conception of the Antigone is, with
permission, a piece of Philistinism for which Sophocles is not to
blame, for he speaks plainly enough to an unprejudiced mind,
and ina higher key. The law of the state dashing against the
divine and moral law cannot be justified more than any other
immorality, and though passion and prejudice may be blinded
to this, the pure heart of a maiden perceives it, suddenly, with
direct certainty and divination *.”
1 When this criticism was written, been treated by Mr Dyer in the Classi-
I was not aware that the subject had cal Museum, Vol. 2.
EVELYN ABBOTT,
NOTE ON ODYSSEY V. 368,
ws 38 dveuos fads jiov Onudva rwdtg
Kapparéwy, Ta pev dp Te Siecxédac’ addAvdis GAXY.
Od. vy. 368, 369.
THE word yiwy occurs only in this passage, for it is manifestly
a different word from 7ia, jia, or ja, which occurs elsewhere
in all these forms in the sense of “provisions”, or “food”. The
old commentators interpret it as dyvpa, and modern lexicons
translate it by “chaff”; but I believe that this interpretation
is derived only from the context and adopted because it suits
the sense of the passage. Now I conceive, from the addition
of the epithet waxpa to Sovpara in v. 370:
as THs Soipata paxpa SiecKédace,
“so he scattered the long beams of the raft,”
that the simile will appear much more graphic if we understand
by ia not merely minute particles like chaff, but something
long and resembling the beams in shape, and yet light enough
to be blown away by a violent gust of wind. Upon this inter-
nal evidence I would translate the word by “straw”, “stubble”,
or “reeds”. But there is another word in another passage,
likewise a Gra Xeyouevov, but one which has attracted greater
notice, which determines me to adopt the last meaning. In
the ‘fifth book of the Iliad, v. 36, Athene withdraws Ares
from the battle and seats him én’ jidevts Xxapavdpo. This
epithet has sorely puzzled the commentators. Buttmann, in
his Lexilogus, has shewn, what indeed scarcely wanted shew-
ing, that the vulgar derivation from nidy, “sea shore”, is good
NOTE ON ODYSSEY V. 368, 113
for nothing; and chiefly from the internal evidence of the
passage itself he suggests “ grassy” as the meaning. I submit
that the adjective ides is regularly formed from the sub-
stantive jiov; that jiov is “a reed,” and ides “reedy”; that
nlov Onudva is “a heap of reeds,” and én’ jidevte Yxaudvdpo,
“on the bank of the reedy Scamander.” This interpretation
suits perfectly the passage in which Quintus Smyrnaeus has
used the word, better even than Buttmann’s: B. v. v. 299,
XNVETW 7) YyEpdvotoly EoLKoTES, ols éropovon
aieTos nidev trediov KataBooKopévotowy,
“a reedy or rushy plain,”
HENRY MALDEN.
. Journal of Philology... vou, v1. 8
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NOTE ON XENOPHON’S HELLENICS. I. c. vin § 2.
In the beginning of the account of the prosecution of the six
admirals the clause tijs Aexerelas émripedovpevos (according
to the common text) has caused great trouble to commentators;
and it is so inexplicable that there is good reason to suspect
that it is corrupt: We want a better collation of MSS. than
we have in order to lay a foundation for a sound text. But if
Aexédelas be the reading best supported by MSS., then I con-
jecture the true reading is dexare/as, and that the office of
Archidemus is to be explained by reference to what we are
told in c. I. § 22: évted0ev & addixouevdr tis Xadkndovias
és Xpvodmonuy, ételyicav avtny, kal Sexatevtnpioy KaTecKe-
acav év avtn Kal thy Sexatny é&edéyovto Tay éx Tod Llovrov
Trolwv, Kat dudraxiny éyKkatadiovTes vads TplaKovta Kal
atpatny® Svo. The Athenians stationed a force at Chryso-
polis, and exacted a toll of one-tenth of the value of the cargo
from all merchant ships which passed out of the Pontus. Of
this dexate/a, or exaction of tithe, I conceive Archidemus to
have had the charge; and if this were his office we see at
once that it was in the discharge of his ordinary duties that
he accused Erasinides of embezzling monies from the Hel-
lespont which were the property of the state; and we can
understand how he had the power by his own summary
jurisdiction to impose a fine upon him (éiBodjv ériBadev)
to a certain amount.
I observe, however, that Schneider reports as the reading
of two MSS., and as a marginal reading in Stephen’s edition
Avwxerelas. This would lead me to conjecture ts diaBerelas
émriperoumevos. According to this conjecture Archidemus would
NOTE ON XENOPHON’S HELLENICS. I. o.vu.§2 115
have the management of a most important part of the Theorica,
a very fitting office for a demagogue, and one which would
give him a good excuse for looking sharp after any peculation.
I find from Dindorf’s edition, that among the various readings
noted by Victorius, on the margin of a copy of the Aldine
edition and taken from some MS., is Avwxedlas in this pas-
sage. This confirms me in my opinion that AvwPedias is the
true reading. |
Professor Dobree (Adversaria, I. p. 125) conjectured tis
Sexatns or THS elas or THS Sexatns TIS Aelas. The addition
of THs Aelas to THs Sexatns makes me conclude that his notion
was not the same as mine.
HENRY MALDEN.
ON THE WORD BOYTAIOS AND THE PREFIX BOY.
~<e.,
SoME new light has been thrown on this word by Mr Nettle-
ship in the Journal of Philology, Vol. v. p. 18. To some of
his statements, however, exception may be taken. In exa-
mining them I shall for brevity’s sake assume an acquaint-
ance with the substance of his paper.
Now, in the first place, Mr Nettleship rejects the usual
explanation of Bovyduos as “great boaster”, on two grounds,
one valid, but the other questionable. First, no doubt, yaio
and its root GAV (yaF) do not mean “to boast”, but originally
“to rejoice” (cf. Latin gaudeo), and then “to exult”. Even in
the later use of the connected words yadpos, &c., in a bad sense
the idea is still that of proud consciousness, not that of boastful
expression. His second ground is that “there is nothing to
shew that Bov- is ever used as a prefix in Homer as it is in
later Greek.” Now waiving BovSpwaris and Bodmis as capable
of other explanations, and supposing that Bouvyasos is the only
instance of the prefix in Homer, we may regard that fact
from two different sides. On the one hand, when we consider
how small is the bulk of the Homeric poems compared with
that of the rest of Greek literature, and again how very few
words there are altogether containing the prefix, and that
of these few (v. infr.) a considerable part like BovveBpos, Bov-
peAla are names of particular animals and plants, while others,
like Bovrais, “bouncing boy”, seem to belong to familiar talk,
we shall conceive that so far from the fact of there being only
one instance of it in Homer casting any doubt upon his use
of it, that one instance is more than we can expect. Indeed,
one might fairly claim from those who press an ea svlenito
BOYTAIOS AND THE PREFIX BOY-. 117
argument in such a case, that they should shew that the poems
comprise either the whole or the greatest part of the current
vocabulary of their times; which we may safely say they will
never do. On the other hand, the character of the prefix
itself furnishes some anterior probability that it would occur
in Homer. It indicates size by a reference to a concrete ex-
ample or typical individual of sense, viz. the ox—a mode of
indication characteristic of the simplicity of early thought. To
‘take one illustration from Homer himself, xotudjputov alua
(Il. 23. 24), “ blood which can be drawn in cups,” is “ copiously
flowing blood.” So that I think that we may without violence
say that these two contending probabilities are fairly repre-
sented in the fact of our finding one instance of the prefix in
Homer, but not more than one. |
Still this prefix does furnish an argument against the
common explanation. Bov- and the other similar prefixes are
almost exclusively used of material size only: their applica-
tion to objects out of the sphere of sense is very late and very
rare, and therefore on @ priori grounds unlikely to be found in
Homer.
The following are the words in which Pov-, im7o-, horse-,
pferde-, ross- seem to denote absolute size.
Bov- in
BovBaros (BovBarov' péya xai word, Hesych.)
BovBapas (weyadovairns, id.), cf. BovBapa* péyada, Bov-
Bapac’ wéyaran, id.
BovBoots, Hesych., Etym. Magn., ravenous hunger, = fov-
Bpworis, which is also the name of a bird, Nic. Ther.
— 4097,
Bovyépwov (Writer in Boisson’s Anecd.)
Bouxéputa, a severe cold, Hesych.
Bovxopvéos, adj. Suid.
BovrAtpos, ravenous hunger, BovAuuidy -wrTeLv -la, K.T.r.
Bovpacrtos, large kind of grape.
Bovpenia, large ash.
1 This use and the other words Bov- to resist the conclusion that in Aov-
Boots, BovAcuos, Bovrewa, make it hard Spworss the prefix is the Bov- of size.
118 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
BovveBpos, large fawn.
Bovrrats, big boy.
Bovrrams, hard-struggling.
Bovrados péyas, Hesych.
Sov7rewva, ravenous hunger.
Bourpoves’ Kpnuvol wéyanrot kal Aogor, Hesych.
¢Bovpvyxos, with a large snout, an iy@0s xnTw@dns, Hesych.
Bovputos’ trotapos péya péwr, id.
Bovovxa, large kind of figs: and add
Boca pnuata, Ax.’
" Umrto- in
immoxpnuvos, very precipitous.
immoxatrabor, large kind of sorrel.
irmopuapabpor, large kind of fennel.
immotrapyos, with large cheeks.
immocédwor, large kind of parsley.
immoruypus, a large tiger.
irmotudia (Lucian, Diog. Laert.), excessive conceit.
immopdopos, a large kind of mullein.
Compare xpévir7os, an utter dotard, Ar., and perhaps
immotropvos, an utter prostitute.
Horse- in
Horse-bean,
horse-chestnut,
horse-cucumber,
horse-emmet,
horse-laugh,
horse-leech,
horse-marten,
horse-mint,
horse-mushroom,
horse-mussel,
horse-play (“great rough” play).
1 The idea of size might come in dos, ‘‘eating oxen;” Bovripos, Bow-
various ways as in the following: Bov- yyros, ‘the price of an ox;” and
tépos, Bourdpos, ‘fit to pierce an ox;” perhaps Bodmis, ‘‘ ox-eyed.”
Bovxav dys, ‘fable to hold an ox;” Bov-
BOYTAIOS AVD THE PREFIX BOY.. 11g
Pferde- in
Pferde-ameise,
Pferde-arbeit (cf. Eng. “ work like a horse ”)
Pferde-bohne,
Pferde-gliick,
Pferde-kastanie,
Pferde-miinze,
Pferde-nuss,
Pferfe-raupe,
’
Ross- in
Ross-dill,
Ross-egel,
Ross-fern,
Ross-kiimmel,
Ross-pflaume.
In Sanskrit hasti, elephant, is used in the same way; e.g.
in hasti-karanja = mahd-karanja, large kind of tree: hasti-
ghosha (or hasti-ghoshatakt) for mahd-kos'adtakt, large kind of
creeper’.
These considerations lead us to reject the ordinary inter-
pretation of Bovyavos as “great boaster”: and the context of
the two passages in which it occurs offers at least no impedi-
ment. In Il. 13. 824 it is certainly more in keeping with the
context that Hector should deride Ajax as “great blundering
fool”, than as “great boaster”: the other epithet which he
addresses to him, duaproemes, and the clumsy incoherent
character of Ajax’s speech, esp. 810—813, which is no doubt
intended, point in this direction. So too does the Homeric
conception of Ajax as the slow giant, the vwOys édvos of the
simile in Il. 11. 559 (comp. the “ beef-witted lord” of Shakspere,
Tro. and Cress. 1. i. 15). In Od. 18. 79, too, the reference
may well be to Irus’ vast but weak and ungainly frame: ovdé
1 I owe these two instances to the often very difficult to decide whether
kindness of Professor Cowell. They the prefix originally denoted size or
seem certain: which perhaps cannot some other connexion with the par-
be said of all the others that I have ticular animal.
given of the other prefixes, as it is
120 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
of Hw ts ov8é8 Bin’ eiSos 88 dda péyas jev dpac0ar. We may, »
therefore, put the old derivation finally aside and seek for
something more satisfactory.
Mr Nettleship suggests that the Bov- is the vocative of
Bods, and yawos an adjective agreeing with it. I have already
replied to his argument against Bov- being the prefix: that
it should not be so, I think improbable on other grounds. .
All our authorities take Bouvydsos as one word, and not as two:
and in the case of the Cretan nickname Bovyazot it must be so
taken. The force of the epithets and the rhythm of the line
are considerably impaired by its being split up into two words
apaptoeres | Bod | yave. That this can be done is, I think,
an accident, the two phrases Bouvyasos and Bods yauos happen-
ing to agree-in the vocative, that being the case in which,
as epithets of abuse, we expect to find them most frequently
used. With regard to the second part of the word, I do not
think that we can do better than accept Mr Nettleship’s sug-
gestion, that it is related to the Sanskr. gavaya, bovis species
and gavyas, bubulus bovinus, Gr. yaids, Bods épyatns, Hesych.
Eustath. and Lat. Gaius (Gavius which preserves the v should
be added), and, of course, ultimately with the Sanskr. gads
Bods, cow: and consequently reject the alternative he offers
of connecting it with yafa and making it = “ belonging to the
field,” a sense of yaios or yyuos without example. The next
question is whether -ydos is a subst. or adj. The evidence
which may be gathered from Mr Nettleship’s paper is inde-
cisive. Still the balance seems to me in favour of taking it as
a substantive. Mr Nettleship however says, “If ydaios then
= yaFios it must mean properly ‘belonging to an ox’:” I
cannot see the necessity, unless the “properly” refers
to primitive times which our analysis cannot reach. It is
certainly not at all uncommon for a suffix to be used without
any specific meaning; eg. er and er-in-aceu-s both mean
“hedgehog”, and xampios = xampos. This adjective he would
take to mean either (1) “loud” (comparing Av. Ran. 678, Roeva
pypata, where however Boea is not “loud”, but “big, mon-
strous words”), which is an unexampled change of meaning,
or (2) “hulking” or “stupid” (both notions should be com-
BOYTAIOS AND THE PREFIX BOY-.. 121
bined), which gives a satisfactory sense to the adjective, or (3) as
“two words to express one thing, like ods xampios”: in this
case, apparently, taking ydsos to be a substantive, and = Bods.
His example however is quite inconclusive, because in it the
ads is generic and the xamptos specific, “the wild swine”: and
it is hard to belive that such a tautology is possible.
This suggests the last point that I need touch upon, the recur-
ring of the same element [@ov, ya(F)] twice in the same word.
This may happen if the meanings and forms of the two parts
are, as in the present instance, so altered or obscured that
they are no longer felt to be the same. Unfortunately, I
cannot offer any parallels from the classical languages: but
the following from modern ones may be interesting. Fr. cor-
moran (cormorant) = Fr. corb (crow) + Bret. mér-vran (mor
sea, bran crow): loup-garou=loup+garou (L. L. gerulphus
= G. wihr-wolf): so Bret. bletz-garé (bleiz =loup): so in Ital.
Mongibello gibello Ar.= mon It. (Diez, Romance Dict. s. v. lowp-
garow): so Eng. saltcellar is said to =salt-saliére, and court-
yard is another example.
To sum up then, Bovydios is one word, a compound, of which
the first part is the prefiw Bov-, used to denote material size,
and the second the substantive ydaos, an ox, so that the whole
means a “great ox”, a “ lumbering brute”.
J. P. POSTGATE,
SOME NEW LATIN FRAGMENTS.
In the course of this summer I found whilst examining some of
Sir Thos. Phillipps’ MSS. at Cheltenham a Latin glossary of
the x11th century (No. 4626) containing a large number of the
words in Paulus, most of those in Fulgentius, and much matter,
more or less valuable, drawn from Priscian, from other gram-
matical writers, or glossaries of an early period. My extracts,
which were tolerably copious, I hope to publish at some future
time: meanwhile the following fragments of verse, some of
which wider reading than mine may perhaps identify, will be
interesting to readers of the Anthologia Latina.
Admirabilis per d non per duo m m scribi debet. Vnde
lisorvus im ortographia dicit quod d ante omnes consonantes
mutari potest praeter m et g ut-adquiro admitto atlmodum quem-
admodum. Adbreuio quoque dicendum non abbreuio.
This Orthographia must have been a prose treatise, it would
seem by the same Luxorius to whom the verse-fragments below
are ascribed.
Basterna. Basterne etiam dicuntur quaedam matronarum
in itinere uehicula quae desuper cooperta et mollioribus stramentis
composita a duobus equis trahuntur.
This explains an epigram in the A. L. 101 Riese.
Berillinus...Possidonius hic specular renitens fert et cristal-
lina mira. et alibi has inter species operum smaragdina tota
Prata wrent.
The last quotation seems to be from Prudentius Psychom.
862.
SOME NEW LATIN FRAGMENTS. 123
Candaces olim uocabantur regine ethiopum vnde lisorius Can-
dacis ethiopum ditant eraria paruos.
~ Duum aliquando pontur pro duorum sed in metro tantum.
in quo tamen metro auctores magis in usu habent duorum dicere
quam duum. Ouidius... (M. m. 197, v. 165) liwius quoque
aspice monstrorum praceuntia signa duorum. |
-Lauacrum...sic a tenere tenebras corripitur. Meque sub his
tenebris numiwm urdisse quereris (Ouid. M. 111. 525) faustus quoque
in epylogo de lauacro redeunt numerantur et inde uidentes.
Molosst sunt rustici canes. unde qudam poeta art et raucos
timuit discernere damma molossos.
Obrizum dicitur aurum optimum rubrum uel ut alv dicunt
rude. hoc obrizwm 1% uel haec obriza e. lisorius prompserat
obrizum dum licida (2 lycidas dum) sterteret awrum.
Osculum fit inter amicos basiwm inter coniuges suauium
autem inter eos qui se turpiter amant. Vnde qudam ait, Basia
coniugibus sed et oscula dantur amicis Suauia lasciwis miscentur
grata labellis.
Anth. Lat. 681 Riese.
Peritus a uerbo pereo ris corripit penultimam peritus i doctus
ab eo quod est perior iris producit quod utrumque ostendit lisorius
uno breut uersiculo dicens non peritum tendis si uis audire
peritum.
Recens aliquando pomtur pro recenter nomen pro aduerbio
Virgilius (!) sole recens orto numerus ruit omnis in tee Pasto-
rum reboant saltus siluaeque cicadis.
Reditus 2. pensio unde lisorius Annuus ut reditus quo pascar
uestiar ungar.
Siliqua tunica leguminum t. folliculus Virgilius unde prius
letum siliqua quassante legumen Item Grandior haud fetus sili-
quarum follibus esset.
Is this variant found elsewhere ?
Sirma dicitur caudum mulierum praediuitum unde qudam
ait terramque tpresso sirmate uerrat.
Sorex mus unde Sofocles (cl altered in darker ink from first
hand) Catus in obscuris cepit pro sorice picam.
Anth. L. 181. 3 where i obscuro.
124 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Supina...frondui tum...florui tum Lisorius nec fronditura
pinus nec floritura ficus. :
Tribula flagellum quo frumenta excutiuntur cuius penultima
aliquando producta aliquando correpta inuentur Affranius exui-
tur peplis celerans agitatque tribulas.
Ysopus est herba pectori mundatiua unde lisorius pectus
ysopo mundatur cerebrumque sinapr.
There can be little doubt that the Lisorius of the glossary is
the Luxorius of the Anthologia (18, 203, 287—375 Riese).
Luxorius is believed, but hardly on sufficient evidence, to have
lived in the reign of the Vandal king Thrasamund (A.D. 496—
523). Teuffel 468, Riese A, L. p. xxvi.
R. ELLIS.
JUDGES AND LITIGANTS.
(A Paper read before the Philological Society, Nov. 9, 1877.)
Totow ere jiscov, duotBndls 5é dixafor.
ketro 8 dp év péccowor dio xpvcoio TddayrTa,
TE Sduev ds wera rotor Sikyny lObvrara elo.
Tl, xvii. 506—508.
I SHOULD not have ventured to occupy the time of the Society
with any remarks on this passage, had it not been that its
right interpretation appears to have an important bearing
on our appreciation of ancient legal procedure, while the
view of its meaning which I desire to support has not been
formed in reliance on my own judgment alone. I have
the satisfaction of being able to substantiate it by what
will I feel sure be here regarded as the very highest
authority. It was communicated to me not many months
before his lamented death by one of the most gifted scholars
that this society has ever numbered among its members—
Mr Shilleto. He took occasion in doing so to point out what
he believed to be a grave error on the part of Sir Henry Maine ;
and he added that it was the only mistake in point of scholar-
ship which he had been able to detect in Sir Henry’s most
admirable work on “Ancient Law.” I need hardly say that
Mr Shilleto was one of the very few philologists whose com-
mendations, bestowed on so brilliant a scholar as Sir Henry
Maine, would be other than absurd.
The first line in the passage quoted above is not free
from difficulty. The most probable translation appears to be
“with these”—or “leaning on these”—“they rose to speak”
—or “hastened forwards ”—“and each after other pronounced
judgment.” It has however been suggested that the mean-
126 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
ing is “to these,” 2.e. the judges; “they ”—sc. the litigants—
“hurried forwards and pleaded each his cause in turn.” So
Doederlein, causam suam agebant, and Heyne, alter post alterum
causam egerunt. The abrupt change of subject which this inter-
pretation involves would perhaps present a sufficient objection
to its being accepted; but a far graver difficulty lies in the
assumption that dixafov is here equivalent to dicafovro, an
hypothesis which, as I shall subsequently endeavour to shew,
is unwarrantable, and is not really supported by a passage
in Thucydides which has been explained by several editors
and commentators in that sense. I therefore adhere to the
translation which I first gave, and which is adopted by Mr
Paley in his edition of the Iliad.
“ And in the midst of them were set two talents of gold,
to give to him who before the elders should plead his cause
with most justice.” This is also substantially the view taken
by Mr Paley of the following lines; although he does not
appear to speak with complete confidence. Similarly Doeder-
lein :—qui causam swam optime orasset ; while the Schol. Ven.
furnishes a similar interpretation :—dvo 6€ tadXavtTa ypuciov
KatéGevto woTe Tov arodciEavtTa TO adnOés AaBeiv duorepa.
This explanation, though itself not free from ambiguity, is
I believe undoubtedly correct; and I think this will appear
from a somewhat detailed examination of the other view,
which is certainly supported by the weight of several eminent
authorities.
Liddell and Scott for instance s.v. d/kn give the following
note on this passage: Siknv iOivtata eimeiv “to give the most
upright judgment.” Similarly Spitzner. Again, I find that a
recent translator—Mr E. W. Simcox—in lines which I must
say do not strike me as remarkable either for excellence
of English, for fidelity to the original or for metrical beauty—
renders as follows :—
Two golden talents lay in the mid senate awaiting
Him who the best among them all should utter his
judgment.
I now come to two other exponents of the same opinion.
JUDGES AND LITIGANTS. 127
The view which they take of the passage is especially impor-
tant, because from their—I believe mistaken—interpretation
they proceed to deduce some rather striking consequences. Mr
Gladstone in describing the scene writes as follows :—
Quite apart from this fine there lies in the midst duly ‘ paid into
court’ two talents of gold. to be given at the close to him of all the
judges who should deliver the most upright, that is the most ap-
_proved, judgment. However righteous the original intention of a
payment in this form, it is easy to estimate its practical tendencies
and curious to remark how early in the course of time they were
realised. (Homeric Studies, Vol. 111. pp. 60, 61).
I regret to find that Mr Gladstone, who appears to have
had in his mind a well-known passage in a much later poem—
the Works and Days of Hesiod—considers that bribery and
corruption played their part in the judicial proceedings of his
favourite Homeric age. The inferences which Sir Henry
Maine draws from the words of the author of the Iliad are of a
somewhat different kind. It may perhaps be convenient for
me to quote the passage in which he refers to the line in
question :—
The point of detail, however, which stamps the picture as the
counterpart of the archaic Roman practice is the reward designed
for the judges. Two talents of gold lie in the middle, to be given to
him who shall explain the grounds of the decision most to the satis-
faction of the audience. The magnitude of this sum, as compared
with the trifling amount of the Sacramentum, seems to me indicative
of the difference between fluctuating usage and usage consolidated
into law. The scene introduced by the poet as a striking and
characteristic, but still only occasional, feature of city life in the
heroic age has stiffened, at the opening of the history of civil process,
into the regular, ordinary formalities of a lawsuit. It is natural,
therefore, that in the Legis Actio the remuneration of the Judge
should be reduced to a reasonable sum, and that, instead of being
adjudged to one of a number of arbitrators by popular acclamation,
it should be paid as a matter of course to the State which the Preetor
represents. But that the incidents described so vividly by Homer,
and by Gaius with even more than the usual crudity of technical
language, have substantially the same meaning, I cannot doubt; and,
in confirmation of this view, it may be added, that many observers of
the earliest judicial usages of modern Europe have remarked that the
fines inflicted by Court on offenders were originally sacramenta.
The State did not take from the defendant a composition for any
wrong supposed to be done to itself, but claimed a share in the com-
128 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
pensation awarded to the plaintiff simply as the fair price of its time
and trouble. (A. L. p. 377, 378).
It will be seen that the whole of this argument depends on
what Sir Henry rightly describes as a “ point of detail,” and, as
it seems to me, a point of detail as to which he labours under a
grave misapprehension. In the first place I need scarcely say
that the ordinary usage of Séeny eizrety is not “to pronounce
judgment,” but “to plead a cause.” Mr Shilleto indeed con-
fidently assured me that there was no instance of the phrase
being used in any other sense. 6/xn in Homer is doubtless a
very complex word, used in many different ways. As Sir
Henry Maine elsewhere points out, the word vdéuos was un-
known to the poet, and belongs to a subsequent stage of social
life. When the isolated @éus, the result of the law-giver’s
momentary inspiration, began to be developed, through fre-
quent repetition under more or less analogous circumstances,
into a kind of customary law, Séen was the word used to
signify the new state of things, as an equivalent for just
decision, or judgment according to the custom which pre-
vailed. Hence I am not prepared to affirm that dicnv eimeiv
could not possibly be used with the sense of “to pronounce
what is just”; but it may at least be asserted that in order
to justify us in departing from the ordinary rendering of the
phrase, the necessity of doing so ought to be abundantly, nay
conclusively, proved by the context in which it is used. Now
it certainly seems to me that if we examine the context
with any care, the probabilities will be found to be all the
other way.
Among other reasons, if Sir Henry Maine and Mr Glad-
stone are right, there must have been not one trial but two.
The merits of the suit had first to be adjudged and then the
merits of the respective judgments. The talents were to be
given “to him who shall explain the grounds of the decision
most to the satisfaction of the audience.” Further on Sir
Henry Maine speaks of “the remuneration of the judge..
being adjudged to one of a number of arbitrators by popular
acclamation.” We do not learn whether the judges were
to be rewarded in proportion to their knowledge of precedent,
JUDGES AND LITIGANTS. 129
the skill which they displayed in mastering and grouping the
facts of the case, or the elegance of the Greek in which their
decisions were respectively pronounced. Whichever point was
selected for determining the award, it is at least possible that
the spectators would not be invariably unanimous in_ their
preference ; and there certainly appears to be no little incon-
gruity in assigning to the ignorant bystanders of the agora the
duty of rewarding the elders and the functions of a kind of
ultimate Court of Criminal Appeal. If for instance there were
four judges, two of whom pronounced in favour of the plaintiff,
- and two in favour of the defendant, the ultimate decision would
clearly have depended on the suffrage of the mob.
Moreover, the amount of the reward certainly seems alto-
gether disproportionate to the services rendered by the judge;
for one judge alone, we are told, was to receive the whole sum,
while his less fortunate fellows, who had confused the merits of
the case, or pronounced their decision in an inelegant style,
were to go home empty-handed, and console themselves with
the conviction that they had gratuitously performed an emi-
nent public service. Two talents of gold—whether we regard
the talent as a weight or a coin, a point which does not
appear to be altogether certain—would, I should fancy, form
a very suitable compensation for an accidental homicide,
though I am myself inclined to believe that the injured rela-
tive of the deceased did not receive more than a single talent
in compensation for his bereavement; but as a fee for a
judicial decision the amount would seem to be most prepos-
terous. It is clear from the passage which I have read that
Sir Henry Maine himself felt this difficulty. He speaks of the
remuneration of the judges being reduced in the Legis Actio
“to a reasonable sum”; it is surely on the whole more likely
that in early days the judges received no pecuniary re-
muneration at all. In his interesting account of the legis
actio sacramentt Sir Henry, speaking of the dramatization of
ancient justice, shews that, in his own words, “the magistrate
carefully simulated the demeanour of a private arbitrator casu-
ally called in”, The “dispassionate bystander”, “casually
called in” to appease and adjust an angry dispute, would
Journal of Philology. vou. vit. 9
130 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
scarcely expect a couple of talents for his trouble. It is, I
imagine, pretty certain that in the Homeric period the kings
and elders considered it part of their duty at stated times to
sit in the judgment-seat and judge the people; they had not
yet relegated this vocation to paid functionaries, acting in their
name. 3
I may in conclusion briefly mention my own view of the
conditions under which the judicial procedure mentioned in
the Iliad was probably carried on. A., a relative of the
deceased, sued B. for the price of homicide; B. alleged in
reply that he had already paid the proper sum—a talent.
A. averred that he had not received it, and in order to obtain
a judicial decision of his claim himself deposited another
talent as a sacramentum or proof of bona fides. If he proved
his case, he of course received the amount claimed, while his
own deposit was returned to him. If on the other hand the
judges came to the conclusion that the amount had been
already paid, the defendant L. would not only receive back the
talent he had deposited but A.’s talent as well; the object
of thus fining the plaintiff being of course the discourage-
ment of frivolous and unjustifiable litigation. It is also quite
possible that the amount of the sacramentum was half a talent
and that it was paid by both parties alike. In this case, if A.,
the plaintiff, won the suit he would receive a talent and a half
from B., the latter being thus punished for his perversity
in refusing to pay the talent due at first; while if B. were
successful the result would be the same as before; only that
the amount he would receive in compensation for the annoy-
ance to which he had been unwarrantably subjected would be
only half a talent. Whichever of these plans may have been
adopted is really immaterial. The point which I have en-
deavoured, I trust successfully, to establish is that the two
talents went not to the most learned or most eloquent among
the judges, but to the successful litigant. |
The expression in Thucydides to which I referred at the
beginning of this paper occurs in the 49th chapter of the 5th
Book, in the passage where the historian commemorates the
JUDGES AND LITIGANTS. 131
exclusion of the Spartans from the Olympic festival by its
presidents, the Eleians. al AaxeSatpoviot Tod iepod 7d ’Hdelwv
elpyOncav...ovn éxtivovtes thv Siknv avtois hy év td "Odvp-
miak® vow Hretor xatedixacayto avtév. “And the Spartans
were excluded from the festival by the Eleians on refusing to
pay them the fine for which the Eleians had sued them”—or
“ procured judgment against them”—“ according to the Olympic
_law.” I think it will here be generally agreed that there is
no objection to either of the two translations I have men-
tioned, and that they are the only possible translations. Owing
to the use of the preposition, the latter is perhaps more strictly
correct. Among other passages where the compound verb is
used, there is a sentence in Demosthenes against Meidias,
§ 223:—Sinnv éuropixnv Katadicacapevos tod Mevirrou,
“having obtained a verdict against Menippus in a mercantile
suit”; and again in the speech against Euergus and Mnesi-
bulus for perjury, § 22 :—éuod adixws katedixacaro, éEaTatncas
rors Sicactas, “he obtained a verdict against me by unjust
means and by deceiving the judges”, where the force of the
middle is well illustrated. There is not the slightest particle
of evidence that xcatadicafecOar was ever used in the sense of
Katadixatery, “to pronounce a verdict against any one”; and yet
it has been very generally taken in the present passage in that
sense. Goeller and Arnold do not notice any difficulty there
may be; but Poppo in the Prolegomena to his larger edition,
in the course of some observations on peculiar usages in
Thucydides of the middle voice, gives the following render-
ing :—multam quam Ele (in suum commodum) ws trrogave-
rant, which I suppose can only mean “the fine which the
Eleians—to their own profit—had imposed on them.” Even -
as a mere statement of fact, this would seem to be incorrect:
for it appears from a subsequent paragraph that only one
moiety of the fines so levied went to the Eleian revenues, the
other moiety being appropriated to the treasury of the Olympic
Zeus. The Eleians in fact afterwards offered, in return for
some territorial concessions, to remit their own portion of the
fine and pay the portion which belonged to the god out of
their own pocket. In a word, the Eleians, as plaintiffs, had
9—2
132 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
no power to rescind the sentence which the Eleians, as judges,
had imposed. In the smaller Poppo, I find that an alternative
translation—is irrogandam curaverant—is suggested, which is
practically free from objection. |
That the Eleians had as judges pronounced the sentence
is perfectly clear both from the context and from what we
know from other sources of their position as arbiters of the
Olympic law and proclaimers of the Olympic truce. It is
perhaps precisely because this is otherwise so clear that Thu-
cydides did not mention it in the present passage and pre-
ferred to call attention to the fact that in such trials the men
of Elis stood in the somewhat anomalous position of being
plaintiffs as well as judges. The misunderstanding of the
verb has possibly arisen from the circumstance that in the
next section we read of the Spartans complaining of the judg-
ment pronounced against them by the Eleians as unjust :—
mpéaBes méurpavtes avtéheyov pn Sixaiws oddv Karaded.-
xacbat, § 2. It is perhaps just worth while to observe that
the double part which the Eleians played in this matter is
singularly well illustrated in their rejoinder to this contention,
"Hr<cios 5é thv Tap avtois éxexyeiplav 7On Epacay eivat—rperots
yap odicw avtois érayyéddovow. “The Eleians rejoined that
the truce was already in force among themselves—for they
always proclaimed it to themselves first.” Just as certain
Eleians proclaimed the truce, while the rest listened to the
proclamation, so certain Eleians constituted a judicial tribunal
before which citizens of Elis might implead another nation-
ality, and from whose decision, as it would seem, there was
no appeal. The position was in fact much the same as that
of the respective parties before a modern Prize Court. A
belligerent man-of-war seizes a hostile vessel, or a neutral
vessel engaged on “un-neutral service”, and claims it as “good
prize” before a tribunal in the captor’s country; and from
the wrongful decision of such tribunal, if confirmed on appeal
to the superior courts, there is no judicial but only a diplo-
matic remedy.
PERCEVAL M. LAURENCE.
ON EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE.
(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society, 7th March, 1878.)
THE question at what period Greek authors began to commit
their works to writing has the greatest interest for literature
generally. It may be settled with a reasonable amount of proba-
bility. The oldest allusion to any subject connected with writing
is, I believe, the ayvupévn cxvtadn of Archilochus, fragm. 89,
Bergk. The expression has no meaning, save on the condi-
tion of written serolls, as being familiar, and in connection with
the appellative xnpyxidn points to a despatch sent by hand.
I take the onpara Avypa, OvuopOopa of Il. vi. to refer to
picture writing rather than alphabetic characters. I have
shown (see Pref. to Odyssey, Vol. 1. p. cxxiv.), that the poet
probably regarded such transmission of intelligence as a magic
mystery and had no familiarity with its methods. The age
of Erinna is so far dubious, that I refrain from citing the re-
ferences to letters in her remains.
But the general argument is strong. of Archilochus, the
early Iambographi and Lyrists we have many fragments sur-
viving from a large assortment of pieces, They appear to have
been nearly all of a personal and fugitive character. There was
no general interest, no central occasions, no fixed institutions,
connected with them, such as gave to Epos and drama a per-
manent hold on the popular mind. © How could they have
floated over the precarious stage of their unwritten existence
if it had lasted more than one or two generations? When once
written, they certainly lived in considerable bulk through many
generations of transcription. All that now survive are quoted
134 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
fragments embedded in the writings of others, or short pieces
received into miscellaneous collections. In their first stage of
unwritten existence these resources, ex hypothesi, would not
exist. It is reasonable to infer that that first stage was a very
short one. If with the aid of those resources so little has
reached us, how can we account for the prolonged life of so
large a bulk in an unwritten age? True, they were the
popular songs of their own period. But popularity would follow
novelty. All would be new in turn, none for long. Unless
fixed at once by ms. they must have died an early death. No
doubt they accumulated in copy by driblets and without
design. But if Polycrates, or any man of wealth and taste,
desired to possess such ware, he might easily send his ypappa-
tiaTns about to collect them in Paros, Lesbos and Ionia. If
we take the age of Archilochus somewhere in the 8th century
B.C., it will follow that so much of him as reached Alexandria,
must have been written down soon, certainly in the first half
of the 7th century. The wonderful polish and refined points
which his mutilated remains exhibit, rivalling Euripides in
their terseness and smartness, are wholly astounding for an
age that knew not of writing. But whatever we may deem
of the conditions of their origin—and it is undoubtedly dif-
ficult to measure the sudden degree of refinement which the
Greek mind in the spring time of its poetry might have
reached—the long preservation without ms. can scarcely be
believed in even by the most credulous. I hope to develope a
similar argument more fully in the case of Pindar.
To come to prose, Pherecydes of Syros and Cadmus of
Miletus, both probably 550—540 B.c., divide the credit of the
earliest efforts in it. See Pliny, V. H. v. 31, vir. 56. The
former was philosophical, the latter historical, writing on “the
founding of Miletus and the whole of Ionia.” The former is
classed by Aristotle, Metaphys. x11. 4, among the “ancient
poets*.” Strabo ranks him with Cadmus and Hecatzus who
dropped metre, but retained other characteristics of poetical
style (Strabo, 1. 18). Pliny is positive, “Prosam orationem
1 In a rather qualified way, how- meaning apparently something ‘ be-
ever, by the curious term of meuiypéva, twixt and between” (prose and verse).
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. 135
condere Pherecydes Syrius instituit.” He says the same thing
of Cadmus.
It has been supposed that Pherecydes was the first prose
philosopher* and Cadmus the first prose historian. But then
in Themistius’ Oration xxv, a somewhat late authority, we
have a positive and circumstantial statement that the first
Greek who wrote wepi dvcews was Anaximander of the same
Ionian school and period. Pherecydes’ principal work, called
émTapvyos, is believed to have been extant in the Alexandrian
period, and to have been a digest of his philosophical views.
It is probably this to which Cicero refers, in Tusc. Quaest,
I. 16, whose language might be understood equally of a prose
or a verse writer. I think it likely on the whole that he wrote
prose, but that his mythological bias (see the last note for a
specimen) and poetic style, which indeed the title érrdapuyos
suggests, may account for Aristotle’s classing him with the
poets. Of course Aristotle’s authority would on such a question
have great influence, and those who deferred to it, would put
Anaximander in the place thus vacated by Pherecydes,—that
of the first prose philosophic Greek writer. The fact of Anaxi-
mander’s writing is more specifically attested than that of some
of his contemporaries. His book was a summary exposition
of his views, and Apollonius seems to have picked it up by
chance*, Anaximenes, supposed his pupil (but probably this
rests on some false general assumption as well as particular
ignorance), is said to have written a book in which he used the
simple unsophisticated Ionic dialect*®.
Aristotle cites the opinions of Anaximander and Anax-
imenes as though he had no more doubt about them than about
those of Empedocles or Anaxagoras (Metaph. 1. 3, x1. 2; de
phys. auscult. 1. 4, 11. 4; de Coelo. m1. 3). Ritter and Preller
Histor. Phil. Gr. et Rom. p. 8, 9, cite from Simplicius, Phys.
1 rotrov pyot Ocdrouros rp&rov rept
gicews kat Gedy "EXAnot ypdat, Diog.
Laert. in Pherec. 1. 11, who adds
owgerar 6¢ rod Luplov rote BiBAlov 6
ouvéypavev ov 9 apxh, ‘ Zeds méev cal
xpovos écael kal xfav jv xOovl dé
ovvoua éyévero 1H, ered) adry Zeds
yépas 5.507.” The Zvplov is distinc-
tive, as there was an Athenian writer
named Pherecydes.
2 Diogen. Laért. 1. 1.
3 xéxpyntal Te yAdooy “Idd dai xal
awepirrp. Ibid. 1. 2.
136 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
fol. 6a, a passage on the nature of Anaximander’s depor,
yéveots and POopa, containing what they believe to be an actual
fragment’ of his. It speaks of physical agencies under terms
borrowed from the then infancy of ethics. This gives a presump-
tion of its genuineness. Philosophy had not till long after a voca-
bulary of its own, and was obliged to make shift with a lan-
guage in which poets had as yet been the only masters. The
obscurity which this caused, was perhaps the reason of a differ-
ence in the exposition of his views on the dzrespov between
later writers on philosophy: see Simplicius, Phys. 1. p. 34,
Hardouin. But this only shows more clearly that those views
existed in a tangible form. Anaximenes, it seems, taught that
air, rarefied, becomes fire, but, gradually condensed, becomes
successively wind, cloud, water, earth, and even stone. Had
it not been for the determination of system-mongers of later
times to know more than could be known about these early
forerunners of methodical investigation, and arrange them all
in sequences of schools, the suspicions, which prevail in some
quarters as to all details about them, would perhaps never
have arisen, It makes hardly any difference for my purpose,
whether Anaximander wrote or his pupils took notes of his
discourse. Of course all early teaching was oral; and the accu-
mulation of brief notes, embodying results rather than pro-
cesses, would be the first step. But with mechanical facilities
at hand in the AvBrou and the earlier 6u60épar mentioned by
Herodotus—of which more anon—that first step would be very
short. The statement therefore is perfectly credible that a
summary exposition of his apéoxovta = placita was put forth by
Anaximander. And, unless the chronologists are all wrong,
this takes us back to the middle of the 6th century, B.c. I
will venture a word on the absurdity of discrediting evidence,
in toto, because we cannot reconcile it in detail. It is no
reason for doubting that Pherecydes, Cadmus and Anaximander
all wrote early Greek Prose, that each is claimed by some
writer as the earliest. As if there had been no modern rival
1 «Vides excerpta quaedam exopere riots, dixn, ddikia, quamquam ad mores
Anaximandri exstare quae deprehen- pertineant ad rerum naturam referen-
duntur etiam in sequentibus...voces das esse patet,”
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. 137
claims to the invention of gunpowder, or the discovery of a
planet! Josephus, I know, disparages Pherecydes’ remains.
His object in writing was to disparage the genuineness of all
early Greek remains. He is to be viewed as an advocate who
holds a brief.
_ Anaximenes lived to teach Anaxagoras, the earliest philo-
sophic name at Athens, the teacher of Pericles and Euripides,
It is mentioned of Pythagoras that he left nothing in writing,
which would be a perfectly otiose statement, unless the custom
of so embodying their views had been common amongst con-
temporary philosophers. Cadmus and Hecatzus, both of
Miletus, certainly left written works, the latter of considerable
bulk. They were contemporaries of Anaximenes of the same
place. It is against all probability that they used writing and
that he refrained. Indeed this large and bright array of intel-
lectual names clustering round Miletus is its own evidence of
such mental culture as bespeaks fixed literary habits, and may
alone convince us that we have reached an age of manuscript.
It seems to me that we have to choose between the extreme
scepticism of rejecting the whole tradition that such a school
flourished, and the extreme credulity of supposing that they
could have so flourished without the aid and use of writing.
The testimony of Strabo and Pliny to Cadmus the histo-
torian, as having written as aforesaid, seems to me decisive, as
there is nothing to set against it. From him downwards we
have a catena of prose history writers of the Ionian school in
Hecatzeus, Hellanicus, Dionysius of Miletus, Charon, Xanthus,
the first being the most remarkable in the influence which he
exercised on contemporaries and successors.
Before quitting the subject of early prose, I may remark
on the ambiguity of the word XAdyo. and its kindred of
Aéyot, Pindar* uses thrice one or other of these, coupled in
two places with dodo), as equivalent to “In story and in
song.” It means tales, first as told orally, then as written
1 Pyth. 1. 183, Nem. v1. 51 and 75. seem to refer to a habit of cheering
2 The words dold:uos, repi\ecx}vevros, leisure with song and gossiping anec-
Herod. 11. 136, support the view of dote, the demand for which doubtless
those above cited from Pindar. They called forth a supply of professionals
138 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
down. Thus Xoyororcs may mean either story teller or prose
writer, as collateral evidence may determine. Herodotus more
than once so designates Hecatzeus', and prose writer is un-
_ doubtedly the sense in which he so applies it. With regard
to Aisop, who belongs to an earlier generation, I hesitate so
to interpret it, although applied to him too by Herodotus.
ischylus’ plays show the art of writing familiar to him
and to his audience. Papyrus, with the Egyptian trade open
now for over a century and a half, must have been cheap and
plentiful in Greece and Sicily. If any one pleases to think
that, with this resource open to abridge his toils, the poet pre-
ferred composing a trilogy of between 3000 and 4000 lines,
together with the lyric music and choral movements, memo-
riter, it is hardly worth while arguing with him. Before noticing
in detail such passages as are noteworthy, I may remark that,
of Phrynichus, his earlier contemporary, there is a respectable
handful of fragments, enabling us to trace, inter alia, his in-
fluence on the Perse, although no long piece, much less entire
drama, has been preserved. Of Thespis, the earliest known
master, there survives not a single line. The easiest way of
explaining this difference in the fortune of two poets so nearly
contemporary is, that Phrynichus wrote his plays and that
Thespis did not, which opinion as regards Thespis was expressed
by Bentley in Phalaris 1. 289. This gave occasion to the ear-
liest wholesale forgery on record by Heraclides Ponticus; but
again, we hear of no such fraud attempted in the name of
Phrynichus. From Bentley’s saying this so pointedly of Thespis
I should suppose that he held the contrary view of Phrynichus,
as above stated.
Phrynichus was familiar with Ionia, as his “Capture of Mile-
tus” shows. Assuming the fact then to be that he wrote, this
familiarity would readily account for it through the intimacy
of Ionia with Asiatic sources of literary culture.
who sung and told tales. They doubt- most rash to infer that he did not
less both survived—the doiéol we know also embody much from written au-
did—into the ageof manuscript. Hero- _thorities,
dotus seems to embody many such 1 Herod. 11. 1438, v. 36, 125, v1. 137,
tales orally told. But it would be’ 1. 134,
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. 139
The words ypadw and ypad), with compounds of the latter,
occur in Aischylus in the familiar sense of painting, tracery or
embroidery, as well as in that of writing: Agam. 1329, Choéph.
205—7, 232, Humen. 50 are the passages. I will cite only the
third. The two words @npiwv (Onpeov) ypadny seem to show
that the technical term Swypadia was not yet current. It was
in fact the infancy of art in Greece. The use of writing-tablets,
however, to assist the memory was so well established that they
furnish a rather trite metaphor in Prom. V.789 jv éyypadov
ov pynuoow dérTos dpevav, Choéph. 451—2 totadr’ drovwv év
gpeciv ypadouv, Humen. 275 Sertoypadw dpevi. In Suppl. 179,
991, durakat tap’ ern SeAtovpévas, and tadta pév ypawacbe
Tpos yeypapmévots x.7.r., it seems likely that no metaphor but
literal record is intended’, To our notions it seems strange for
the heroines to be bidden by their father to keep a record
of his wise maxims, and “add these to the many recorded
already.” But this seeming oddity is our key to one of the
literary habits of the age. Such books were doubtless made
and became family treasures. The saws and shrewd sayings of
Thales collected in an early chapter of Diogenes Laértius are a
sample of the sort of thing intended*. Notice also, of written
laws, 76 yap texovtav céBas Ttpitov Tod év Oecpulois Sixas
yéyparrat, Suppl. 707—9, thought by Mr Paley ad locum to
refer to Draco’s code, and similarly the bronze tablet nailed in
the temple or public place, embodying the decree of the Bound)
or of the people. The earliest extant example is that of the
treaty between the Eleians and Hereans. Further, Aschylus
in the passage last referred to puts this side by side with
another mode of permanent record—‘“not inscribed on tablets
nor sealed up in scrolls of papyrus’.
1 The somewhat startling metaphor
involved in Suppl. 463, véos mivake
Bpérea kooufjoa Tdde, may refer merely
to painted votive tablets, although
these too may probably have been in-
scribed, as commonly were dva@juara.
2 It seems that Danaiis, the father, ©
is meant to be such an impersonation
of wisdom; see Suppl. 969 Aavadv mpo-
*.” In two other passages
voov kal BotAapxov, and for some of his
gnomes 190, 203, 230—1, 760—1, 769
—70, especially the phrases ws Adyos,
230, addr’ ore Pin, 760.
3 Suppl. 943 foll. Doubts have been
expressed as to the genuineness of this
line, if I remember right, by Mr Paley,
in some of his writings on the Homeric
question since his edition of Aischylus,
140 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
this plant is mentioned. Against papyrus diet the poet con-
temptuously holds up the bread-stalk of his nation (Suppl. 761).
But in the epithet Bu8Alver dpév of Prom. V. 811 he shows us
the Egyptian landscape of his fancy clothed with this vegeta-
tion. In short it was to him the typical plant of Egypt, as tea
is to us of China at this day. How came it thus to possess his
mind? If he and Athens knew and used it the answer is easy.
We may compare the ypvody cpav of Aristoph. Acharn. 82.
Gold was to the Greek mind the characteristic yield of Persia
(as shown abundantly in that passage), just as the papyrus was
the special product of Egypt. I suppose that the difference
between ABv8ros and BiBros will not be deemed serious enough
to call for remark here. I pass on to the passage Prom. V. 460,
~ in which Prometheus claims to have given mankind the dis-
coveries of calculation and letters’. This is a patriotic attempt
to repudiate indebtedness to Phoenician sources. I take the
phrase wdvTwy povcountop épyavnv as in one construction,
opposed to the previous one, ypauparwv te ovvbéoes wvnpnr 0,
which I view as in hendiadys, meaning “written record,” or
memory as resting on documents, He cannot mean that he
taught men to remember..
Thus “written record” is the “busy mother of all intellectual
(uovco-) effort.” These are weighty words, and the poet, we
may conclude, made Prometheus utter them because he believed
them himself, and believed them, because he had found their
truth. If it be asked, what evidence was within his reach ?
The rapid growth of Ionia and the adjacent islands in culture
and mental development under the influence of literature, for
more than a century, is the ready answer; above all, perhaps,
the influences, literary and political, summed up in the name
of Hecateeus of Miletus.
This leads me on to a kindred phrase dropovcws yeypappe-
vos Agam. 801, which Mr Paley renders, “painted very unskil-
when no such doubts seem to have 1 Compare Erinna, é draddv xeupov
troubled him. The absence of caesura 7ade ypduparas AGore II pouaded, evre
is a fact in favour of its genuineness. xal dv@pwra rly duadol codiay, Epi-
An interpolator would probably not gramm. 4, Bergk, p. 927.
have given a lame line,
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. I4!I
fully.” Of course Aischylus, who does not shrink from such a
startling image as xturov dSéd0pxa", might as readily have com-
bined painting with a word which relates to sound. But I
wish to point out that, to a Greek, it would be a startling com-
bination, and that “written down uncongenially,” i.e. censorious-
ly, would not. Aischylus and Euripides use amépovaos, mapa-
provaos and their adverbs, so far as they have any definite use
of them, in reference to sownd*—discordant;” thence genera-
lizing the notion of “repulsive, uncongenial.” Now any word
of sound is less remote from writing than from painting, be-
cause letters stand for sounds, Further, as written record
is called povcopntropa above, it seems to me more agreeable to
analogy to unite the sense of writing than of painting with
atrowovaws here. In fact the poet seems in this expression to
borrow a metaphor from his own trade. Written poetry was
for the voice to utter; inharmonious verse would be amopovcws
yeypaumévos. To what indeed could the terms be more fitly
applied? It yields then a presumption in favour of written
poetry as then existing. |
The phrase obscure through the corruption of a single word
—the emphatic word—rapotcay éyypahe: (Choéph. 699), need
not detain us long. The verb éyypadev is as in Shakespeare’s
“write-me down an ass;” and the notion seems that of classify-
ing rateable values of persons or chattels.
In the Septem c. Thebas 434, 468, 647—8, we have the
remarkable shield mottoes, merely reproducing the word ypap-
para several times, with nearly two lines of writing in one
instance, supposed written on the shield’s metallic surface.
These stand quite by themselves; and when we turn to fact,
the inscribed helmets found, which are all votive, are obviously
no parallel. Whencesoever the notion reached the poet (possi-
bly from the inscribed Herme, &c., of the Pisistratid period’),
it shows that to him and to contemporary Athens the conveying
a sentiment to the general public by the use of written words
1 Sept. c. Theb. 104, 467, rapdpovcos” Aras aiuaroeroa wharyd.
2 See Eurip. Med. 1085, xovx amduou- 3 Mvjua rod’ ‘Immdpxouy wh sévov
gov To “yuvatkav, Phoen. 797, Bpoulov étardra is a pentameter from one
mapduovcos éoprais, Aisch. Choéph. of their pedestals,
142 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY. |
was a perfectly familiar idea. Indeed the written Oecpot of ©
Solon had been before their eyes for a century.
I come next to the fragments of Aischylus. Among those
incertae sedis 359, Dindorf, are two worth noting. The first is
@s Neves yépov ypaypa, “as an old record says.” Of course the
captious here might argue that the poet appealed to some saw
or maxim as ancient, not necessarily implying the antiquity of
the writing. This, however, is not the simple sense of the
words. When the poet speaks of the venerable character of
the saying, he has the expression, tpuyépev ptOos, Choéph. 314.
I think that he uses it as Catullus, whom Nauck aptly com-
pares, uses charta loquatur anus. But the second fragment,
359 Dindorf, adds weight to the first. It is corrupt, perhaps
hopelessly, but the meaning is made plain by the introductory
remark of Plutarch who quotes it, Moral. p. 625 D, of yap
mpeaBvTepot TOppw TA YpdupaTa TOV OoupdT@Y amdayorTes ava-
yweoKxovow, éyyd0ev & ov Svvavtav Kal todTo mapadndav 6
Aicyvros dnoiv. Then follows the fragment’. This shows
either that reading and writing were no recent acquisitions,
since an old man might be expected to possess them; or that
they had become so strongly popular that an old man might be
supposed to acquire them. The previous fragment, yépov ypap-
pa, shows that the first alternative is the right one.
But besides all these direct lines of converging evidence, the
poet gives us an itinerary of geographical terms supposed. de-
tailed to 16 by Prometheus. A large part of this is real geo-
graphy, including the coasts of the Euxine and Caucasian
region. The rest is mythical, but was no doubt accepted as real
at the period of the poet. It gives the haunts of the Gorgons,
Arimaspians, &c., which latter we find in great detail in Hero-
dotus. The presumption is that the poet and the historian
both were led by the same authority which was perfectly acces-
sible to both, in their mention of the Arimaspians. Similarly
the fragments Dind. 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184 are from the
1 Given as ovS¢ dwd atrov ob yap 62 x.7.dX. but the last two or three
eyyibev yépwvw 58 ypaypareds yevod words are corrupt also. However, for
cagys. For which Dind. edits, drw@ev my purpose the sense is plain enough.
eles aurov ov yap éyyi0ev opas yépwr
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. 143
Avopevos, and presumably related to the wanderings of Herakles
(cf. wagus Hercules Hor.). Whence did the poet derive this
geographical knowledge? It can hardly have been generally’
current in Athenian society. There was only one source from
which it could have reached him—the ys epiodos of Heca-
tus or one of his school. That eplodos was doubtless the
greatest literary stimulant of its age. A mind like that of
Zischylus, soldier-poet, papafwvopayns, who, in celebrating
Xerxes’ defeat, celebrated his own victory, would not be likely
to miss the work which magnified the éclat of that victory by
exhibiting the wide scene affected by the struggle from the
banks of the Indus to the pillars of Hercules. The ethnical
characteristics of the two rival races which led their two con-
tinents come out broadly in the Persw. In the Prom. V. the
Bosporus appears as their limit, in fragm. 177 the Phasis; and
the catalogues of local names on the Asiatic mainland give a
strongly geographical flavour to the drama. I question whether
there is any one poem ancient or modern which could in this
respect match the Perse. This information is exactly what.
the mepiodos of Hecateeus would furnish him with. Herodotus
has been understood to have Hecatzeus in view in one passage,
Iv. 36, in which he censures the incorrectness of a statement
about the relative size of Europe and Asia. Thus the poet
would be likely to find in Hecatzus’ veplodos a geographical
interpretation of his own line of thought. Of the details in
which it was clothed I will presently speak. A wonderful book
it must have seemed to the young world in that fresh age. Is
it not certain to have instantly found congenial readers at
Athens? We know how deep the feeling for Ionia and her
sufferings was there from the story of Phrynicus’ fine; and even
earlier still Peisistratus may be believed on mere grounds of
literary tradition to have hastened the means of culture at
Athens by forming a circle of readers for the Ionian geogra-
phers and philosophers. |
So far is mere general probability. But the fragments of or
references to Hecatzus in later writers, of which Miiller has
collected several hundred", give a strong confirmation in detail.
1 In his BibliothecaGraccorumScrip- rum. See especially Fragm. 195, 170,
torum, Vol, 1, 11, Fragmenta Historia- 278, 350, 352, 78, 11, 33, 212.
144 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
We find mention there of the Chalybes, the Araxes, Themiscyra,
Thermodon, Caucasus, a “Cimmerian” city, the Dodoneans; and |
several places recalling the memory of the Amazons. All these
occur in the Prom. V. As regards the wanderings of Herakles,
which seem as prominent in the Avduevos as those of 16 in the
Prom. V., Miiller’s judgment is (on Fragm. 298), “Hecatzeeum
tractavisse res Herculis et commemoravisse locos singulos ubi
ille labores suos perfecerit ex iis constat quae de Erythia disse-
ruit.” The last phrase refers to fragm. 349 where Hecatzus
(ap. Arrian. Alex. Exped. U1. 16) is cited as holding that
“Geryon’s realm was near Ambracia, that Herakles drove his
cattle from there, and did not go to any island Erytheia outside
the great sea.”” Compare Strabo vit. 524 (ap. Miiller), ‘Exaratos
dé 6 MiAnowos érépous Aéyer THV ’Helwy Tods ’Emelous’ TO yoo
“Hpakrei cvotpatedoat tods ’Emeious ért Avyeiav x... We
know moreover’ that local mythology formed one staple of the
older geographers; and that 16 and Herakles and the voyage of
the Argé would be duly traced by them is highly probable. If
any one prefers to believe that Aischylus picked up his geo-
graphy in the slave-market at Athens, or among the Cartha-
ginian harbour-masters in Sicily, of course I cannot prove that
he is wrong. I infer that Adschylus was a diligent student of
Hecateus; and that he was not likely to neglect in his own
compositions that aid to memory on which he so strongly
dwells.
Thus there are reasonable grounds for thinking that the
Ionic school of geographers—and why not of philosophers?—
found congenial relish at Athens at the time, and that the
encouragement of literature and formation of a library by the
Pisistratide is no fiction. As regards Homer’ I have already
given my reasons for thinking that at Solon’s period or earlier,
a Homeric text under the influence, unacknowledged at first, of
written copies in aid of recitation had silently sprung up, and
will not repeat them here.
1 Diod. 1. 37 ‘of pwév yap wepl Tov
‘Ed\Advixov kal Kdduov ére 8 “Exaratoy’
kal mavres of Tovolro., madaol rayTa-
mwacw bres, els Tas pvOdders dropaces
dmréxdway (ap. Miiller ad Fragm. 278).
The Mmote (Madrac 2xi@a) of the
Palus Meotis were mentioned by
Hellanicus, also the Amazons, as
entering Attica over the frozen Bos-
porus (Fragm. 92, 146, 84, Miiller).
2 Preface to Odyssey, Vol. 1. p. xiii—
KY.
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. 145
Herodotus says (Vv. 58) that the Phoenicians “who came
with Cadmus” introduced letters to the Hellenes who had
none before, as he believes. These letters were first such as
all Phoenicians use, but as time progressed dua rH dovyn
petéBadov Kal Tov puOuov Tov ypauparwv. I think aya 7H
govy must mean “together with the language,” meaning that
the Phcenicians adopted Greek speech, and together with
that change altered the fuv@uds. What is this? Not the alpha-
betical order, for this was unchanged save that the v derived
from the vocalized Semitic baw, took its place at the end after r.
Not the phonetic value, for the writer probably knew not
Pheenician, and without that knowledge could have no notion
of the original phonetic value of a Semitic alphabet. It is not
likely he refers to so slight a matter as saying “alpha” for
“aleph,” etc.. It might possibly refer to the direction in which
they were read, but we could not then understand the qualifi-
cation éAdya in the next sentence, of the Jonians, werappuOui-
cavtés ohewy Oriya éypéwvto. It refers then to the form
of the character, the proportions of which, and special fea-
tures, underwent some slight alterations. Thus the Semitic
<{ aleph, became the early Hellenic A\ or A, the Semitic
4 beth, became the Hellenic Q or @, or, reversed, B. He
says that the Ionians, their neighbours, learned the letters
of these Pheenicians, and then adds the statement (the Greek
is given paul. supr.) that, “after making some changes in
the puOuds, of a few of them, they continued to use the
Pheenician letters.” Now the evidence of inscriptions shows
that the changes—those just given in the aleph and beth
are nearly the most extreme—were nearly all slight. There
seems no room then (the result or outcome leaving them
still so far similar) for two stages of change, first by the
naturalized Phoenicians, then by their Ionian neighbours. I
take him to mean that substantially the same changes which
were made by the former were made by the latter—accepted,
one might rather say in such a case—but that, since with
the Ionians there could be no change of the ¢wv7), the careful
historian restates the particular in which there was a change,
under the form of petappuOpicavtes, adding the word drLya,
Journal of Philology. vou. vut. 10
146 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
to guard against the notion of any sweeping or transforming
change. He adds that they continued still to call them
dowixnia, “as was but just,” which remark again confirms
the slightness of the change, and the fact that*they took over
the alphabet, substantially as it was. The calling them dowzxyjia
is confirmed very remarkably by an early Ionian inscription,
in which the clause occurs, denouncing “ whoever shall break
this stone or deface the lettering;” the word for this last is
dowixnia’.
As regards the small extent of the change, any one
without any knowledge of Greek or Phcenician may, from a
comparison of early alphabets, verify the words as literally
true. I have looked carefully through Gesenius’ earliest ex-
tant Phoenician alphabet, through the characters given as
recorded on the Moabite stone, the earliest, but latest found
and greatest of Semitic monuments, and through the letters
and alphabets of and from inscriptions figured in Boeckh
and Franz. But I should add that I have included with the
first a teth and a jod from coins’? given by Gesenius, Table 3.
Not only are the variations small on the whole as between
Greek and Semitic, but where two diverse types of Phoenician
were extant, as in the pe, corresponding diversities are found
in the type of the Greek wi*. The only important diversity
which I have not found Greek to match is in the lamedh. It
has two types, a round and an angular one. The latter only
is represented in the Greek records. Probably the scantiness
of sufficiently early monuments is the reason of the deficiency.
But it seems likely that the ox-goad, regarded as the natural
type of this letter, was itself of variable shape, including a
1 The monument, Franz, Elementa
Epigraph. Graecae, p. 107, is known
as ‘*The Imprecation of the Teians.”’
2 A coin indeed here is our very
earliest authority, dated 394 B.c. by
Gesenius, Monum. Phoenic. § 5, p. 10.
3 On a coin a pe is found of the
square type. is the common Greek
form to a late period. The Phoenician
is a having the converse leg (as
should be in reading the opposite
way, from right to left) a little longer.
So a coin gives A for hheth, which
in Gesenius’ alphabet is H ; the former
is exactly reproduced in the name
‘Hiero’ on a Doric inscription, Franz
No. 27. The latter by reducing the
two joining strokes to one becomes
the normal H, eta.
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. 147
round and an angular handle, Further, in Gesenius’ Table 1,
a form of the Hebrew teth is found to be coincident with a
form of the ’ain, just as the Greek @ and o which spring
from these respectively have a coincident form ©. With re-
gard to the vau or bau Gesenius gives his opinion that, although
no certain example of it in the shape of the Greek digamma
and Roman F, occurs on Phcenician monuments, “ nullus tamen
dubito quin primaria huius litterae figura ea fuerit quam Bau
digamma habet apud Graecos antiquiores” (p. 27, § 17).
He adds that this form is a key to the discrepancies of type
which this letter shows in Hebrew and Samaritan. However
this may be, no form approaching the F is found on the
Moabite stone. The nearest approach to it is on some Hebrew
coins, Gesen. Table 3, where the baw is like a three-pronged
stick. Gesen. developes from it the digamma’ thus, 7474;
but he gives no actual specimen of the intermediate form. I
incline to view the F as the most decided instance of the
change of puyOuds admitted by Herodotus.
The differences of type, as far as inscriptions now extant
show them, are more and more serious between those of the
Moabite stone and the Pheenician earliest as given by Gesenius,
than between the Moabite and the earliest alphabets which
Greek inscriptions show. I should tabulate the results of the
various comparisons thus :—
serious slight
differences differences
- Date of Between Pheenician
Moabite, and
circ. 890 B.c, Greek 10 7
Date of Between Moabite
Greek, and
circ. 600 B.c, Pheenician 8 6
1 The F gives the consonantal force
of the bau, the v its vowel force. In
a singularly interesting Ionic No, 44
inscription, referred by Franz to Ol.
58, both appear in afutro=atrod,
Both types of v, Y and Y, are found
on highly ancient inscriptions and
come clearly from the form of bau
on the Moabite Stone Y by removing
the stem of which we get the ordinary
v, just as the Y came from the Y.
The quiescence of the ‘‘Ehevi” letters
is said to be perfect on the stone,
i.e, the bau appears with vowel force
10—2
148 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
serious slight
differences differences
Between Moabite
and
Greek a 6
Date of Between Phoenician
Pheenician, with Moabite, taken
circ. 400 B.C. together, and Greek 3 6
Now, as the Moabite and Pheenician must have been
practically identical at some time, it is remarkable that they
offer greater divergency than do the Moabite and the Greek.
This offers a strong presumption that the further we went
back the closer would the oldest Ionian be to the oldest
Semitic type, and that the dowxnia and iwmxa of 700 B.c.
would be all but absolutely identical. The oldest extant Greek
is probably 100 years later. But take for instance the “ Nanian
Column*” as a probably very early sample. All the letter
forms on it can be found approximately in the alphabets of
Gesenius and of the Moabite stone, unless any one were to
take exception at the T, which, however, see previous note,
is plainly deducible from the Moabite bau. This is Dorian.
Take the probably oldest Ionian, the “ Burgon” vase*, the
only difference which could arrest the eye is the O=9, which
in Franz’s and Gesenius’ earliest Phoenician is ©, an oblique
oval with a bar across, for a circle with a dot in the centre.
There is therefore a reasonable probability that higher antiquity
instead of causing difficulty would reconcile even these slight
diversities of later forms, and that if we could find an inscrip-
tion as early as those seen by Herodotus they would well-nigh
vanish. It is worth noticing that, judged by the Moabite
stone, the tradition of the early Greek 16-lettered alphabet
is a patriotic delusion intended to minimize the debt due to
the Phoenicians. The Semitic alphabet of 890 B.c. had its
twenty-two letters, and except the tsaddi, the Greeks took
there. Thus the Greeks found in it 1 Franz, No, 21, p. 57—9.
their v, and perhaps developed from 2 ib. No. 42, p. 101.
it also their F.
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. 149
them all. They soon dropped the koph and adopted a some-
what similar sign for phi’, which appears on some of the very
earliest inscriptions, e.g. the Thersean epitaphs (Franz, p. 51),
as does also the H for long @, ¢.g.in the name mpoxAjs (ib. 1 a).
They split up the baw into the F and the T, and they confused the
samech and shin, and eventually reduced them to one, retaining,
however, two forms of the samech for & and yZ respectively,
and adding later ~ and w. The » and ow did not come in
together. In the Therzean epitaphs 7» appears repeatedly for
long e, but the o long or short is always © as in pn&avop.
Thus, when Herodotus says, “I saw Phoenician (Cadmeian)
letters on certain tripods in a certain temple, the most of them
like the Ionian letters,’ we need feel no doubt that he could
judge for himself and verify the lettering. This confirms his
authority when in the same passage he proceeds to speak of
the writing materials used. “The Ionians from of old call
BuBrot, dipOépast, because once in default of the former they
used to employ the latter.” Many barbarians, he adds, used
such dup@épar down to his own time. Material fit for literary
purposes is what he notices first, and the tripods only, I
think, because they were accessible evidence, and therefore he
appeals to them as such. But he speaks of these BuBroz
and dupfépar, not to prove the fact of their having been in
use of old—ga va sans dire with him, but only to explain an
obscure point of language, how one word got into the place
of the other. This reads as though the Ionian use of papyrus
from an early period, and of skins from one still earlier, was
so notorious as to need no proof. He probably had found
what he deemed adequate evidence of the retention of the
earlier name under the later usage; and if I am right in sup-
posing that the Iambic and Lyric poetry from Archilochus _
downwards was early reduced to writing, such evidence might
easily have been contained in its literary form.
But Herodotus goes on to give the Inscriptions which he
1 Both ¢ and x oceur on the Eliac chipped out, the rest looking as if the
bronze, the former square. Indeedall graver had had the letter forms set
the letters of this inscription are angu- up for him in wooden skewers pegged
lar, the o being a small button-form together.
150 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
says he saw. He mentions the names of Amphitryon, Skaios,
and Laodamas, as the three dedicators of as many tripods
inscribed with their names and mementoes, The “ Phoenician”
letters in these names, if executed with moderate clearness,
would be perfectly legible. That myths had grown up round
the names of Labdacus, Gidipus’, and Eteocles,. with which
he associates, and by reference to which he attempts to date
the dedications, is no argument at all against the verity of
the readings and the identity of. the persons. How could we
reasonably impugn the reference of any archaic remain to
the period of Charlemagne on the ground that Charlemagne
has been made a hero of romance, and a crusading warrior
with a whole career of anachronisms ?
I think, then, there is no reasonable doubt that in the sixth
century B.c., by about the middle of it, Greek Prose began
to be written by Pherecydes or Anaximander, or both; that
Zischylus composed his plays by the aid of writing, and,
as well as other more highly educated Athenians, had access
to the works of Hecateus and Hellanicus in writing. It
is, I think, highly probable that the Iambic and Lyric poetry
of from 710 B.c. began to be written down even earlier, viz.
in the prior half of the seventh century B.c., and that the
plays of Phrynicus were written. It is probable from Herodotus’
criticisms on the “Cyprian Epic,” and the Jliad (11. 116), that
standard epic texts were by his time (450 B.C.) established,
which implies that writing had been for some time of use
1 I have shown in the preface to
Vol. 11. of the Odyssey, p. cxii, that
the early tale of Gidipus in particular
was simple, and had no Sphinx in it,
That came later ;—nay, very probably
the Sphinx, a female monster and her
riddle, originated in some Egyptian
figure of a woman-headed lion, with a
hieroglyphic insciption on the base of
the statue which no Greek could read.
In the same way, ib. p. xc—xci. I have
_ shown that the omission of Thebes,
which should have been first among
the thirty Boeotian towns, from the
Homeric catalogue in which Beotia
takes the lead, points to the oblitera-
tion of Thebes temporarily as a his-
torical fact; and, coupled with the
foreign surroundings of the Kdépecoe
of the Iliad, harmonizes with the truth
of their having been expelled by the
Argives, and suggests for the legen-
dary war of the Epigoni a nucleus of
historical truth. Thus the Iliad tends
to confirm Herodotus, and his ‘‘Lao-
damas son of Eteocles” may probably
be a real person. :
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. I51
in fixing them. And all this gives a probability to the state-
ments which rest on later authority, that literature flourished
in Athens under the patronage of the Peisistratids, and in Samos
under that of Polycrates, and that the attention of competent
men was directed to the constitution of the Corpus Homericum,
although a great deal besides the Iliad and the Odyssey were
probably included in it.
HENRY HAYMAN.
P.S. Since the above was read, I observe in the report of
the meeting of this Society on March 21, 1878 (Cambridge
University Reporter, pp. 403—404) some remarks by Mr Fennell
on some few points of my argument. He is reported as saying
“Tt seems strange that papyrus was not used in Italy before
the time of Alexander the Great, as Varro stated according to
Pliny WV. H. x1. 21.” I italicize “in Italy” because, on re-
ferring to Pliny, I cannot find that in the text. The words are
“ante ea (z.e. ante conditam Alexandriam) non fuisse chartarum
usum: in palmarum foliis primo scriptitatum, dein, etc.” Of
course Mr F. may have explained that the statement of Varro
must in his opinion have referred to Italy, and the report may
have omitted, for brevity, his explanation. If Varro meant
that, his statement can have very little to do with the question
of the use of papyrus in Greece. If Varro meant to deny the
use of papyrus generally before the age of Alexander, his state-
ment is worthless, as being contradicted by abundant evidence,
Mr F. also says that. I “take no notice of arguments against
the notion that Herodotus consulted written authorities.” The
locus Classicus of Herod. v. 58 I have noticed at some length,
vindicating the identity of gownia with iwvixa ypappata
which Herodotus claims for them. Beyond this there is hardly
' any argument to notice. Mr Fennell had himself previously
recognized the Ilepaéwy of Aoytoe (I. 1), Noyiwratot, as applied
to the “ corn-growing Egyptians” (11. 77), the roll of papyrus
giving 330 names of kings (11. 100), and the probable quotation
152 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
from Hecatzus. To these might be added the statement, that
the Heliopolites were said to be Aéyurtiwv XNoyeétator (I. 3),
given as a reason why Herodotus specially sought conference
with them. The mention that the “corn-growing Egyptians”
were AoyidTatot TavTwY, aS pyynunyv avOperev TavTwY émac-
KéovTes padtota, may be probably interpreted of the exercise
of memory on written records, in a country notoriously at the
time so rich in them, no less than on oral tradition. To exclude
the former would indeed be highly arbitrary. As regards the
written records themselves, alike in Egypt and in Persia, the
probability is that Herodotus could not have understood them,
and was obliged to trust to the oral statements of their custo-
dians. Hence his perpetually recurring @s dact, dbs Aéyouar,
but we need not therefore exclude the fact of written records
having been, through that medium, the basis of his state-
ments, J am not sure that I apprehend the ground of the
criticism of Mr F. on the word povvapyéwy in one of the in-
scriptions as recorded by Herodotus, whether on the score of
the word itself, or of his spelling of it, The ypappariorys
of Polycrates presumably had to do with whatever ypdppata
that monarch eared for. But nothing turns on the question
of whether he was personally employed on the errand of
searching for MSS. Further, I have merely inferred it as pro-
bable from the arguments which I have deduced from Aischylus
himself, that that poet did not “compose his trilogies me-
moriter.” To speak of my “denial” as “ begging the question”
is therefore incorrect. As regards “taking yeypapypévos in Agam.
801 in an impossible sense,” that statement seems to me to be
“a begging of the question.” As, however, no reason is given
why the “sense” should be “impossible,” it is not easy to carry
the question further. The reading of wynpnvd or prnywns in
Prom. V. 461 does not seem to me to affect in any way the
result arrived at. Finally the ascribing Aischylus’ geographical
knowledge to “hearing Aristeas’ Arimaspeia, instead of to his
reading Hecatzeus,” carries us into a field of which we know
very little, while what little we glean about the Arismaspeia
does not lead to the inference that they could have supplied
more than a very small portion of the A%schylean geography.
EARLY GREEK WRITTEN LITERATURE. 153
The legend of the Arimaspians and Gryphes might no doubt
have been so derived. But the wide area which the poet
traverses was covered, so far as our knowledge serves us, by
Hecatzeus alone. There are the fragments of Hecatzeus before us,
and they are manifestly adequate. Where can we similarly
verify the supposed connexion with the Arismaspeia ?
H. H.
AupincHAM, Dec. 10, 1878.
SOME FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON ANCIENT THEO-
RIES OF CAUSATION.
In a paper in the seventh volume of this Journal, which was
brought to a conclusion somewhat abruptly, I endeavoured to
shew that Mill and Grote had mistaken the meaning of 7é
avTduarov and 9 tvyn used as technical words in Aristotle:
that they were not “agencies” at all, or “influences,” but names
for results resembling those produced by design or special
organization, when produced accidentally—that is, without
such design or organization: freaks of chance, as we may call
them, without being set down as holding any particular opinion
about causation}.
But I did not proceed to examine the more general question,
whether not only Aristotle but. Plato also did, as Grote and
Mill assert, recognize lawless self-determined agencies in Na-
ture, by whatever other name. I propose now to examine this
question; so far, at least, as to shew that the grounds of Grote’s
opinion are fallacious.
The opinion, however derived, seems to have become a fixed
dogma in his mind. I see no evidence that he had begun any
special study of the Physics up to the time of his death; but he
repeats the main substance of the passage I extracted in several
places in the existing text of his Aristotle (e.g. 1. 192, 296:
11. 322); so that there is no reason to suppose he was changing
1 I might have remarked that ro tion, copy and emulate nature: indeed,
airouarov is so far from being an in the opinion of Democritus and of
‘‘agency frustrating nature” that r@ Grote himself, constitute nature: atra
dd Tod avroudrov, by the very defini- dv dv 7 voids yévarro airios H pvats.
ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION. 155
his view. And in his matured Plato he seems to lose no op-
portunity of enforcing it. I extract some passages and refer-
ences.
The principal is the one referred to in my former paper
(Plato, Vol. 111. p. 497). “Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,” he
says, “all maintained that regular sequence of antecedent and
consequent was not universal, but partial only”—and here he
gives references, as below—‘“that there were some agencies
essentially regular, in which observation of the past afforded
ground for predicting the future—other agencies (or the same
agencies on different occasions) essentially irregular, in which
the observation of the past afforded no such ground.” And then
he gives a sketch of Aristotle’s scheme almost identical with
that which I extracted, followed by further references. And he
continues “This Chance of Aristotle—with one of two contraries
sure to turn up, though you could never tell beforehand which
of the two—was a conception analogous to what logicians some-
times call an Indefinite Proposition, or to what some Gramma-
rians have reckoned as a special variety of genders called the
doubtful gender. There were thus positive causes of regularity
and positive causes of irregularity”—the italics are here mine—
“the co-operation or conflict of which gave the total manifesta-
tions of the actual universe. The principle of irregularity, or
the Indeterminate, is sometimes described under the name of
_ Matter’—here another reference—‘“as distinguished from, yet
cooperating with, the three determinate causes, Formal, Effi-
cient, Final. The Potential—the Indeterminate—the May or
May not be—is characterized by Aristotle as one of the inherent
principles operative in the Kosmos.”
The references are for Socrates Xenoph. Memor. 1.1: for Plato
Timaeus, p. 48,7 ravapévn aitia, &c. As regards Aristotle, he
enlarges thus (note s): “1) ruyn—ro Omdtep érvye—TO avTopaTov
are independent apyai, attached to and blending with avayxn
and To as éi tO mordv. See Phys. 11, 196 b. 11; Metaph. v.
1026, 1027. Sometimes 76 dzétep’ érvye is spoken of as an
apxn, but not as an aitiov, or belonging to #An as the apy,
1027, b. 11, Sjrov dpa bt péxps Tivos Badifer apyys, avt) dé
ovKeT €s GXO' EgTat ovY 1) TOD btréTEp ETUYEY AUT) Kal aiTLOV
156 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
THs yevérews avtov* ovdév.” And in note ¢t he cites from the
preceding chapter (p. 1027 a. 10) dote Extae 7 VAN aitia,
évdeyouevn Tapa TO ws emt TO TOAD adXas, TOD cupBERnKOTOS:
and adds, I presume by way of interpretation, “matter is re-
presented as the principle of irregularity, of td dmérep’ éruye— _
as the dvvayis tév évavtiwv.”
He in like manner connects Aristotle and Plato as holding
this doctrine and “neither of them including even the idea of
regularity as an essential part of the meaning of Cause”
(Phaedo, Vol. 11. p. 184). And he has further remarks on Plato’s
doctrine in the Zimaeus (Vol. 111. 249). After observing that
“Plato's Demiurgus is not conceived as a Creator, but as a
Constructor or Artist...contending with a force superior and
irresistible, so as to improve it as far as it will allow itself
to be improved,” he proceeds: “We ought here to note the
sense in which Plato uses the word Necessity” (avay«yn).
“The word is now usually understood as denoting what is
fixed, permanent, unalterable, knowable beforehand. In the
Platonic Zimaeus it means the very reverse—the indeter-
minate, the inconstant, the anomalous, that which can neither
be understood nor predicted. It is Force, Movement or Change,
with the negative attribute of not being regular or intelligible,
or determined by any knowable antecedent or condition—Vis
consilt expers. It coincides in fact with that which is meant by
Free Will in the modern metaphysical argument between Free
Will and Necessity. It is the undetermined or the self-deter-
mining as contrasted with that which depends upon some given
determining conditions known or knowable.”
Although Aristotle is not named here, and his understand-
ing of avayxyn is elsewhere described as the reverse of this (Arvst.
1. 167), yet I think it clear that Grote would apply all this
‘description of Plato’s dvayxn to Aristotle’s indeterminate
agency, however named. I believe him to be entirely mis-
taken as to the thought and meaning of both philosophers,
1 There is apparently no authority and is adopted by Bonitz. The Berlin
for avrov, which I suppose he means Edition inserts dAdo after it, on the
to refer to 7d dmdrep’ Ervxe. adrfs is authority of one ms.
the only reading in the Berlin Edition,
ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION. 157
But Plato’s real doctrine seems to me clearer than Aristotle’s,
and Grote’s mistake about it simpler. So I will begin with it.
Vis consili eapers, taken by itself, may be used to express
very well what I understand Plato to mean:—a blind force, not
directed to a purpose by an independent intelligence, nor con-
trolled by an organization of materials and other forces con-
spiring to a definite, orderly, result.
Neither Socrates, Plato, nor Aristotle conceived it possible
that the Kosmos, the fair order of Nature, could be explained by
any such laws of movement and interaction of material sub-
stances as any contemporary or earlier speculators had presented
to philosophers. For Socrates’ opinion I may refer to the
Memorabilia i. c. 4. I have cited that of Aristotle in my former
paper (p. 106) from the Metaphysics; and I may further refer
to the 2nd Book of Physics, chap. 8, for a most interesting
exposition of his view of the opposite doctrine. For Plato’s the
whole scope of the Timaeus is a voucher.
But this does not imply any belief that, when you mentally
abstract the notion of Design or Control from Nature, you
leave “self-determined” or “undetermined” agencies: but only
that there would in such a case be no Kosmos, no visible har-
mony of parts, nor orderly cycles of phenomena. Let me take
some examples.
The very type of unvarying law is the Law of Gravitation.
And, as matters are in fact arranged, the result in our Solar
System is a very close approximation to a visible uniformity of
cyclically recurring positions and motions, securing to us a
similar, though less perfect, recurrence of heat and cold, rain
and sunshine, and stages of vegetable and even animal life.
Not such an uniformity as would have satisfied Plato and
Aristotle—rather would Heraclitus have rejoiced to find that
one cannot twice sweep a telescope over the same celestial orbit
‘—hbut sufficient for a working science of Astronomy.
But it does not appear that this is the necessary result of
the Law considered in itself: it requires some special adapta-
tions of the proportions and collocations of the bodies subjected
to it. Even if the system were simplified by reduction to but
three bodies, yet if these were of about the same order of mag-
158 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
nitude, and were at any time at about equal distances apart, I
am not aware that any mathematician has ever attempted to
calculate what these paths would be’. And if they are ever
calculated, I know no reason for anticipating that there would
be any approximation to a cyclic, orderly, recurrence of relative
positions and consequent seasons in each of them. Here, then,
primeval collocation is all-important.
Take another case in another department, not so far removed
from the ken of the age of Plato and Aristotle:—the Laws of
Organic Life, and their results. ;
According to the latest and, I suppose, most generally ac-
cepted theory, Life began in the existing Kosmos, in an undif-
ferentiated mass of “ protoplasm;” that is in a chemically and
physically homogeneous body, endowed, no one knows from
what source or by what mechanism, with powers and capacities
of assimilation and excretion, growth and decay, from and back
to the surrounding medium, and also of motion and of division
into separate similar masses. To get anything out of such a
body, we require some determinate shape, and some determinate
variation in the medium—that is, some determinate Collocation
—and, of course, some specific law or laws of interaction both
between the protoplasm and the medium, and also between
the particles of the protoplasm itself when once disturbed by
the former influence*, Now can any reason be assigned @ priori
for expecting from such an origin anything more than a con-
tinuing chaos of living organisms, vegetable and animal, or of ©
some intermediate nature, becoming, it may be, more and more
rich in specialized forms, but incapable of scientific classification,
and rapidly changing the character of such semblances of
species as might from time to time occur: tyvn pév éyovta
avTOV aTTa, TavTaTract pry SiaKxeimeva @s Tep elds Exew Grav
1 Since this was written Mr Spottis-
woode has told us that a machine has
been invented by which ‘‘the problem
of finding the free motion of any
number of mutually attracting parti-
cles is reduced to the simple process
of turning a handle.” But he does
not tell us what kind of orbits they
describe in any such case as I have
put, | :
2 Perhaps the nearest analogon in
Greek Philosophy is the Anaxagorean
duotouépera, as described by Aristotle,
or by Grote, developing its latent capa-
cities under the influence of vous.
ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION. 159
dtav.amn tivds Geos (Timaeus, p. 53)? Mr Darwin thinks that
the control of two guiding principles—an internal law of Jn-
heritance or Atavism (itself not shewn to be necessarily con-
nected with the laws of growth, motion, and decay,) and the
scarcity of a fit surrounding medium (described as the Law of
the Survival of the Fittest) have sufficed to bring about the
present approximately permanent order. Professor Huxley
more cautiously leaves the question open whether the original
capacity for variation was not “definite, and determined in
certain directions rather than in others by inherent conditions”
—that is, by some further controlling law of internal change
(Encye. Brit. Hvolution). Take either view, my point is that
the conception of a continuing chaos, of Elements or of orga-
nisms, does not necessarily involve that of the absence of definite
laws of action.
Plato had no such examples to refer to; but I think they
illustrate his line of thought. ’Avay«n is the sum of the laws of
interaction primevally imposed on the materials with which the
Demiurge is to work out his “constructive” or “artistic” pur-
pose: laws which he cannot alter, but must bend and guide
skilfully to work his Will as far as possible. Left to itself it is
a TAavwpévn aitia, producing only shifting scenes as of a dream,
incapable of fixing them in any permanent form. I can find
no trace of any fancied “self-determining” power in it; but on
the contrary, both in the Zimaeus, the Phaedrus, and the later
Laws, the only power in Nature to originate motion is attributed
to Life (rvy7), which he certainly does not class with avayxn
and the mAavepévn aitia.
To prove my point, it may perhaps be best to begin with
the plain prose of the Laws. Grote may be right in asserting
(Plato 111. 416) that the Theology of the two works is not iden-
tical, and perhaps the supremacy assigned to Life in the latter
Work is more absolute than in the former’; but I cannot admit
1 Grote attributes to the Socrates of | the craving for explanations by Final
the Phaedo the belief that the Kosmos Causes—the Design of a Creator or
was a living Being (Plato 11. p. 176 Disposer.
mote). I cannot see it: but only
160 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
that there is any real discrepance in the views taken of the
primordial chaotic movements.
In the 10th Book of the Laws (p. 889, &c.), the Athenian
tells his companions that the common opinion of the codoé
seems to be that duvaus Kai tUyn are the great powers in the
universe, and that réyvy is but subordinate and imitative of
them: that the primary elements exist duce. xal tUyn; and
that each being borne as it may chance by its proper power—
Tuy Pepopeva TH THS Svvapews Exacta éxdorwv—whenever the
natural opposites, hot and cold, wet and dry, &c., happened to
meet in fitting state and proportions—dpydtrovta oixefws—and
so Kata TUynY &€& avayKns cuvexepdoOn, they there and thus
produced the universe and all its contents—without Intelli-
gence (they say) or Divine Power, or Art, but (to repeat it)
dices kal TVYN.
This coupling of tux and dvais seems to me clearly to shew
Plato’s meaning. dvovs is the natural law of interaction among
material bodies, which must produce its effect, according to their
relative conditions and proportions, whenever they come in
contact: and this is properly ava@yxn, the fixed law of Nature.
But the motions in space by which they are brought into con-
tact is an arbitrary datwm, to tvydv; Mill’s “Casual Primeval
Collocations,” dimly referred in this place to the previous action
of something living (Wvy7); which again in the Timaeus is
represented as the natural vehicle of vods.
The Athenian proceeds (pp. 895, 896, 897) to refute this
opinion of the sufficiency of these natural powers for the con-
struction of the universe, by shewing that these interactions pre-
suppose motion, and that the only original source of motion
known to us is Wuy7, of which the proper definition, according to
him, is “that which can give itself motion” (p. 896 line 1) ; that
therefore yuy was prior to any of these actions of gvous, and
that therefore the operations of yuy7, Counsel, Reason, Emotion,
and so forth, are also prior to these physical actions, and are the
mpwtoupyo. Kuwyceis (p. 897) which lay hold of the secondary
material agencies and guide them to all the physical operations
of growth, decay, &c., wisely or unwisely according to the quality
of the originating yvy7. He is so far from questioning the
ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION. 161
reality of the tendencies of matter to unite in definite ways, as
alleged by those he is opposing (Empedocles and Democritus I
suppose), that in a long continuous passage (pp. 893, 4) he .
expounds their mode of working according to his own theory of
yéveois, POopa, avEnows, &e., very much after the fashion of
Timaeus, p. 56.
I turn now to the Timaeus, the meaning of which seems to
me equally clear if we do but follow the course of the text, and
make fair allowance for its professedly fanciful imagery. Only
Grote, as is his wont, has selected one particular poetic passage
and taken it literally, without connecting it with the plainer
passages (Plato 111. 249 note, quoting Timaeus pp. 47, 8).
Having laid down that “all that comes into existence must
do so by the action of some cause” Plato proceeds (at the end of
_p. 29) to say that the design of the Demiurge to make an Uni-
verse as nearly as possible in his own likeness must be taken by
all wise men as in the most proper sense the originating cause
—apynv. When he undertook this work, he is represented as
having to take in hand a natural chaos in motion—rav dcov jv
opatov mapadaBev ovx navylav dyov, Xda KWwovpevoy TANLpE-
A@s Kal aTaxtws—and bringing it into order.
Timezeus does not at once make any use of these motions,
but takes up the establishment and development of Life, as the
necessary vehicle of Intelligence, in the Kosmos as a whole, and
in the Mundane Gods, Mankind,-&c. But at p. 46, having ex-
pounded his theory of the mechanism of vision, he finds himself
again in the region of Physics and observes: tatr’ ody mavt’
éote Tov Evvattiwv, ols Oecs UmNpeTovaL ypHTat tv Tov
dpictov kata TO Suvatov idéav arroterav’ SoEaferas Sé Uro TeV
Trclotav ov Evvaitia aX aitia civat Tov TavTeV WiyovTa Kal
Oepualvovra, &c. And what precedes clearly shews that these
are fixed laws, not capricious motions.
Timaeus, however, as before, maintains the supremacy of
Final Causes (to use the scholastic term) over these secondary
physical or mechanical causés (oat vm’ aAd@v pév Kiwovpéever.
érepa 8 €& avaykns Kwovvtev ylyvovtat: which same physical
causes are again, a few lines below, described as ocas povwbeioar
dpovncews TO TUYXOV ataKxTov Exactote é&epyatovrac—“perform
Journal of Philology. vou. v1. b ah
162 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
in no orderly course the work which happens to fall to them.”
And again, in the following section, having, as he says, con-
cluded his account of the work of Intelligence in the production
of the Kosmos, he addresses himself to expounding the part
which avayxn has in it, “for the birth of this Kosmos was from
the combination of avayxn and vods;”’ which sentence is follow-
ed by that about Intelligence persuading Necessity which Grote
cites; and then comes in the wAavwpévn aitia as a synonym
for avayxn:—ei Tis ovv 9 yéyove KaTa TadTa dvTwS EpEl, WLKTEOV
Kal TO THS TAaVwpEeVNS Eldos aitias, } pépew méduKev.
The description of the work of avayxn which follows con-
tains much matter for interesting comparison with other physi-
cal speculations ancient and modern. The point I am here
concerned with is, that the explanations are all geometrical or
mechanical, whatever “self-determined” or otherwise inscrutable
First Cause may lie in the back ground. Thus we have at the
close of p. 52 a picture of the chaotic stage before avayxn had
come under the sway of vods. Space, or the something in space
—7 yevécews TiOnvyn—is kept in a state of irregular motion
because no equilibrium is possible in the forces or masses—6.a
TO un? cuolwv Svvapewy unt icoppoTav éuritracGa: and the
motion reacts on the contents and keeps them continually
running into a kind of inchoate order, as the heavy corn and ~
light chaff in a winnowing machine’; but only in an unstable
way, much needing the intervention of a Divine Power to es-
tablish it eiSect re Kai apiOyois.
This machinery still continues to work in the Kosmos and is
the cause that gives to each element its proper Place—dréornxe
Tod yévous Exaotou Ta TANON KaTa TOTov idvov Sid THY THs Sexo-
pévns (space) xivnow. And the sustained, never-ceasing,
processes of motion and change are kept on foot by the very
ingenious conception of a surface tension at the boundary of the
universe compressing the mass of elements chemically as well
as mechanically unstable (pp. 57, 58); so that what would,
1 The image seems to be borrowed the thing; while Democritus draws
from Democritus. Frag. Phys. 2. the fanciful and false inference that
Mullach. But it is remarkable that ‘‘like seeks its like.’
Plato sees the dynamical reason of
ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION. 163
acting alone, produce equilibrium in one sense, disturbs equi-
librium in the other—not unlike Sir Charles Lyell’s theory of
the maintenance of heat in the Earth (Principles of Geology,
1847).
I think, then, that I have sufficiently proved that Plato
recognized no self-determining force in Matter, nor called Free
Will by the name of Necessity. And the way in which Grote
associates the two philosophers in this supposed tenet seems
enough to suggest that he may be mistaken as to Aristotle
also’, I proceed to examine the grounds on which he founds his
statements, so far as he has furnished us with them.
Aristotle does certainly recognize the existence of contin-
gency—of the uncertainty of future events, or some of them.
But Grote asserts that this belief is “founded” on the onto-
logical or physical doctrines of which he gives the summary I
extracted in my former paper. Whereas it will be found that
in all the passages which Grote cites or refers to where this
uncertainty is spoken of, it is assumed as a notorious fact, and
is itself made the foundation on which some logical, physical, or
ontological doctrine is raised by an argument ex abswrdo.
Thus in the passage in the De Interp. c. 9 (pp. 18, 19),
Aristotle’s thesis is that the Rule of Logic which asserts that
“with certain exceptions, in every Antiphasis one proposition
must be true and the other false” is only true in regard to
matters past or present; that it is not true in regard to events
particular and future. For “to admit it in regard to these
latter would be to affirm that the sequences of events are all
necessary, and none of them casual or contingent.”
I am obliged here to abandon Grote’s analysis, though it is
in the middle of a sentence. The bias under which he wrote
(howsoever derived) begins here to work, and imports.a mean-
ing which is not in the text. He makes Aristotle single out
the consequences of deliberation and voluntary action as
1 Aristotle criticizes this theory of ments must be determinate and sin-
primeval movement, De Cacloim.e. 2, gle—dice, and pia. The source of
p. 300, entirely from his own point of any capriciousness, therefore, did not,
view ;—the first feature in which is in his opinion, lie here.
that the primary motion of the ele-
11—2
164 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
“known” to be contingent, and thence to argue and infer a
“class of sequences which are not uniform.” The text runs
simply (p. 19 a. 7): «¢ 6) radta advvata—opadpev yap OTe Ect
apxn TOV écopévav Kal amd Tod BovAevecOar Kal amd Tod mpa-
Eau Tt, Kal Ott bdXws EoTLV ev Tots p71) Gel évepyodor (not
in classes of sequences, but in Things) 76 dvvarov eivar nab pr)
Cpolws, év ols dudw évdéyerat, Kal TO elvat Kal TO un Elva Bote
kal TO yevéoOar Kal TO py yevér Oar (Kal ToArAGa nuiv Ora éoTLV
ovTws éyovta, olov Ort TouTl TO iwatiov Svvatov éors SsatunOjvas
Kal ov SiatpnOnoetar, GAN Eurrpocbev KataTpiBnoetat.... ).+
davepov dpa ort ovy Gravta é& avayKns ovT ectiv ovTE yiveTat;
GANG Ta ev OTroTEp’ ETUYeV Kal OVSev MWAANOV 7) KaTahacis } 7
atrodacis adnOns, Ta Sé wadXov pev Kal ws emt Td TOAD Oatepor,
ov pny arn’ évdéyeTat yevécOar kal Odtepov, Oatepov Sé pn.
This passage is the only one in the chapter which can be
said to contain any physical or ontological doctrine. The rest,
as I read it, is addressed to proving the logical inference;—to
maintaining that, if the facts are so, it must be incorrect to say,
before the event, that one member of the antiphasis is already
true and the other false. If Aristotle had, or imagined an
opponent who asserted the doctrine of necessity (as Grote thinks),
the only argument he uses is dp@uev yap, and an example.
I am not asserting the force of the argument, only pointing
out what it is. Aristotle himself would seem never to have
become conscious of how far it would carry him: though he had
the knowledge necessary for seeing it’. But for the unlucky
blunder of the Ancients in taking Fire to be an Element—a
Body, instead of an action, I cannot bring to mind any Thing
in Nature of which, according to Aristotle’s own conception of
Nature, it can be said that in respect of all its capacities for
action under various circumstances, ael évepye?. If, therefore,
the dependence of action on surrounding circumstances, not
1 See the amusing surprise with the other hand, that it must act when
which Grote discovered that Aristotle these conditions are fulfilled, Plato m1.
is quite orthodox as to the power of p. 495, 6, note (n.). He did not, how-
the agent being conditional for its ever, cancel or defend what he had
exercise on the presence and suit- first said to the contrary ; and seems”
able state of the patient, &c. and, on to have forgotten it in his later work.
ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION. 165
merely on the development of the agent, makes the future un-
certain, pretty well every event is uncertain.
I shall examine the other passages in which contingency is
referred to presently. But I have extracted this one almost at
full length, because it is a very plain one, and shews what mean-
ing Aristotle, sometimes at least, attached to the phrases 16
omorep érvye and Td ws él TO modu, which, as we have seen,
Grote takes for natural agents.
“Tt is clear then that not all things are, or come to exist of
necessity; but some as it may happen (ordtep’ étvye), so that
the asserting proposition is no nearer to truth than the denial;
some with more approach to certainty and for the most part
(és emt 7d modv) one way, yet with a possibility that the-other
event may occur.” The fate of the coat is an example of
the first case; the general course of the seasons, which leads
us to expect heat in July, though we may experience wintry
weather, is an example of the second. Aristotle is not thinking
of the causes which bring about the events, either way, but of
their observed course—opamev yap. And the part which he
saw wrong was not the imperfection of the cycles of weather, or
of vegetable or animal life, but the imaginary perfection of the
cycles of the Heavenly bodies.
The only other passage, among Grote’ s references, which
speaks of the uncertainty of the future, is Metaph. v. c. 2 and 8,
pp. 1026—27. It is strictly parallel with Book x. ¢. 8, p.
1064, 5, which Bonitz takes to be a first sketch of the subject.
It is somewhat simpler, and I take it first. It reproduces
(1064 b. 32) the division of events into necessary, usual, and
casual successions—é£ avayxns, os éml TO Todd, dTrws Ervye—
which we had in the De Jnterp., and also in the 2nd Book
of the Physics (p. 196, &c.), on which I commented in my paper.
And it confines the name of td cuywBeBnKds to the last class:
and, having thus defined it, he says érz 8¢ tod kata cupBeRnkos
évTos ovK eiciv aitias Kal dpyal ToladTas oialrep Tod Kal adTo
dvTos SnAov’ Eotar yap amavra é& dvayKns.
Here again, the absence of necessary connection is assumed,
and the physical or ontological doctrine inferred. And so the
parallel passage (1027 a. 30) «¢ yap py rtovr €& avayKns
166 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
mavT éorat, and again (b. 8) €€ avayxns dpa wavta éotar Ta
éoopeva. |
But Grote, as cited above, uses this passage to prove that
TO Omotep éruyxe is, sometimes at least, “spoken of as an apy7
but not an aitvov, or as belonging to dn as the dpyy.” The
words cited as authority for the first part of this description
form part of chapter 3. I must leave it to the reader to dis-
cover how Grote got this sense out of them, even with the
silent alteration of the text from avtis to avtod; and also to
settle what distinction is here meant to be drawn between
aitvov and apy. But the sense of the chapter is more difficult
to determine.
I must confess that it appears to me more like a marginal
note by Aristotle, meant to be worked into a revised text, than
intended to stand as it does. Chap. 2 closes a discussion with
the usual formula—ré pév odv gore TO cupBeBnxods elpnrar; and
chap. 4, also in the usual way, proceeds from it to a fresh one—
mept pev orv Tod Kata oupBeBnkos adelcOw Sidpictar yap
ixaves. But this interposed chapter—cognate no doubt in
subject—begins abruptly with proposing to prove that there are
such things as dpyal cai aitia yevrnta Kai pOapta dvev tod
yiyvecOat Kail P0eipecPa’, taking it for granted, apparently,
that this must be the proper description of whatever causes
are not olaizep Tov Ka? avo dvtos (p. 1065)—and the sentences
seem to me rather dislocated—and it ends with starting a dis-
cussion which it does not follow up—adrnr’ eis apynv moiav Kal
altiov Trotov 1) avaywy) 1 ToLa’TN, TOTEpoV ws Els VAHV 7 OS els
To ov veka 7) Ws eis TO KiWiCaY, WaNtoTAa OKETTTEOD.
I must plead with Bonitz “difficile est ea interpretari quae
philosophus ipse non satis distincte et perspicue explicuerit:”
and I must add that, while attempting to give Aristotle’s mean-
ing, I do not mean to say it is altogether sound. My own con-
ception of its purport is something of this kind.
“Events and collocations are causes of change and action as
well as Matter, Form, and Purpose, or the nature and specific
For the phrase, meaning changes a. 16, De Caelo p, 280, b. 27, Metaph.
or movements not involving any modi- vit. ¢. 4, 5.
fication of Udy, see Phys. vit. p. 258,
ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION. 167
qualities and capacities of the things acted on. Otherwise, if
there were no Moving cause but these latter, all changes would
be determined by the present or some past state of things, and
there would be no such uncertainty in the future as we know
there is. But the truth is that the natural capacities of Things
are called into action, and directed one way or the other (for each
natural capacity is a capacity for movement in reversed direc-
tions, hot to cold and cold to hot, &c.), by circumstances favour-
able or unfavourable; and so these circumstances are causes in
one sense; but the nature and capacities of the Thing are the
ultimate cause of whichever turn the thing takes, tod omorep’
érvye. Thus ‘Man is Mortal’—must die somehow—because
he has évavtia év TO a’T@ oopate—‘Composita solvuntur.’
But whether he will die to-day, or by this particular kind of
death, depends, perhaps, upon whether he leaves home; and
this on whether he is thirsty; and this on what he may eat, or
have eaten. These circumstances are in one sense causes of the
future event, if « does happen: but there is nothing in the
nature of them to make them causes in themselves; they are
‘causes by accident:’ the nature of Man is the essential cause,
whatever the kind and time of his death. This is the ultimate
datum, beyond which our investigation cannot ascend: péype
tiwos Badifer apyns, atrn 8 ovKétse és GdAXdo. Eotar odv 7» TOD
OmoTep étvyxev avTn, Kal altiov THs yevéoews avTHs [AAXO] ovOér,
As regards the other description of 76 o7orep’ étuvye, as “belong-
ing to vAm,” I do not. see where Grote found the two connected.
But in the preceding chapter the sentence does occur wore 7
UAH eortat aitia, n evdexouevn Tapa TO ws eT TO TOAD Gros,
ToD oupBeRnxoTos, which, and the similar one p. 1071 (also
cited by Grote), appear to have troubled Bonitz as well. To
me the meaning of chap. 2 seems much the same, on this point,
as of chap. 3. Accidents are, in the one as in the other, de-
scribed as caused, in the sense of moving or occasioning cause,
by some circumstance unconnected with the essential character
of the agent or patient: but that which makes the occasion
efficient as a cause, is the composition of all things subject to
change—their vA7. By its definition, this is “that which is
susceptible of change.”” The Form tends to permanence, to
168 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
keeping all the proximate material principles in due harmony,
to regulate the growth and changes. But the Matter retaining
its capacity for change, what is hot can become cold, what is
healthy can become diseased, if disturbing’ circumstances are in
sufficient force to interrupt the usual course—rd os éml 7d
modv. Therefore ‘the Matter, as susceptible of other phases of
change besides the usual course of Nature, is the ultimate cause
of accidents.’ ”
I think this review of the passages on which Grote relies
shews that he has made the same mistake as to To é7rdéTep éruxe
and 76 ws émi To 7oAv which in my former paper I pointed out in
regard of Té avrouatrov:—that none of these phrases are names of
any self-determining agency, or agency of any kind, but only of
the character of the changes we see around us, some moving in
approximately regular cycles, some with no tendency of the
kind. And if one looks at the examples which he gives, one
sees (what Bonitz complains of) that nowhere does Aristotle
point out this capricious moving cause, so as to shew what there
is in the universe having this supposed character: “ nimirum
quales non sunt causae rerum fortuitarum Aristoteles per ex-
empla illustrat, quales sint in medio relinquit.” Only, according
to my view, though he is guilty of vagueness in explaining
himself, and of inconsistency in his doctrine, his examples, of
the destruction of the coat, the death of the man, the meeting
with the debtor, suffice to shew what he was really thinking of.
What remains is, that Aristotle did recognize uncertainty in
the future. And we may still inquire how he came to do so,
and what place he found for this belief in his physical system.
The answer to the first question I take to be that he received
the belief and accepted it without question, as all the world did
and does, except those who are trained and led to believe the
contrary—op@yuev yap: it was part of the “common sense”
of society. And the fundamental reason for his retaining the
belief in spite of the tendency of his philosophy, I take to be
the imperfection of his Physical System, which by no means
answered to the modern requirement of being a “working” or
workable hypothesis, from which you may draw inferences which
can be brought to a practical test. But the explanation, or
ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION. 169
argument, with which he satisfied himself was no more original
than the belief itself. If we may trust Euripides, it was fami-
liar in the days of Hercules, The hero was proud of his know-
ledge:
Acip’ &@ bras av Kal copwrepos yévn.
Ta Ovnta mpaypar’ oldas iv exes piow;
Oiwar pev ov" wo0ev yap; adN axové pov.
Bpotots Gracu xatOaveiv odelrerat,
Kove éote Ovntav ootis é&etrictatat
Try avptov pérXdovoav et Bidcertat.
To tis TUXNS yap adavés of rpoBnceTat,
Kado?’ ov didaxrov ov8 adicKketac Téxyvy.
But it was no novelty to the slave
’"Emiotapyer0a tadta’,
The necessity that man should die, and the uncertainty whether
it will be to-morrow, remind one of the chapter in Aristotle I
have discussed at length. But this may be a mere accident.
What I think cannot be so is the immediate connection, here
and in Aristotle, of this truth with the impossibility of any
science or art relating to accidental events: mp@tov wept tod
Kata ovpSeBnKos Nextréoy OTe ovdemia EoTL TrEepi avTOD Oewpia.
onuetov dé, ovdemia yap éemioTHn émipedes Tepl avTov ovTe
TpakTiKH oUTE ToinTiKH ovte Oewpntixy (Metaph. v. 1026 b.
3); and so below (1027 a. 19) ore & émiotypn ovK eote Tod
cupBeBnxotos davepov, and in the parallel passage (1064, 5)
the same assertion is made over and over again.
The step from the fact that we cannot follow out and classify
the circumstances which bring about irregular series or casual
events to the doctrine that they are beyond the reach of know-
ledge (or at least of human knowledge, as he sometimes seems
inclined to limit it—aénros avOpor@ Phys. u. 197 a. 10, and
elsewhere,) is a wide step. But I think it quite in accordance
with Aristotle’s habits of mind. He does, however, now and
1 Tf Professor Jebb’s view of this sophist may be part of the intentional
scene be true—that it is ‘‘a distinctly fun: anyhow, it surely represents the
satyric scene” (Encyc. Brit. Euripides) talk of the wise men of the time.
this exhibition of Hercules as a
170 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
then all but break out from these habits, and the places where
he does so are among the ‘most interesting in his Physical and
Metaphysical Works ;
Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in Worlds not realized, .
In this very 2nd Chapter of Metaph. v. he starts, if I mis-
take not, on a road which might have led him to see that his
cupBeBnxéra, in the sense we are here concerned with, are
relative to our actual state of knowledge, and may diminish
indefinitely, if not absolutely vanish, as it improves.
The reasoning of the chapter is fairly consecutive up to
1027 a. 15, at which point he seems to have sufficiently explained
his theory of td cupSeRnxos. But then he suddenly opens
a wider question, as to the whole constitution of the universe,
only to drop it again, and bring in a fresh illustration of the
unteachableness of the accidental. Suchlike breaks, which are
not uncommon, are, I think, very generally followed by obscure
sentences, which puzzle scholiasts and modern commentators
alike: and though it may seem too easy a way out of the diffi-
culties, I confess I am often inclined to conjecture that we have
here a marginal note to an unedited text—quite a likely
thing, if Grote is right as to the history of Aristotle’s Works,
Be this as it may, neither the scholiasts in the Berlin Edition
nor Bonitz (who proposes an emendation) make much of lines
24, 6; 7d dé mapa rodTo ovy eeu Néyewv, TOTE Ov, obov voupnvia’
) yap adel 1) Os emt TO TOAD Kal TO TH voupnvia’ TO dé cUMBEBHKOS
éoTt Tapa TavTa.
I think what Aristotle meant to jot down was this train of
thought: “All knowledge is of the constant or the usual. For
can one either learn or teach anything which is not so? For
the only distinct proposition that can be taught or received
from teaching is, that this or that always, or at least usually,
happens in such or such a state of things—for instance, that a
mixture of honey is usually beneficial to a patient in a fever:
the physician cannot go on to define all the circumstances under
which the medicine will fail. Or suppose he can; that, for
instance, this occurs at new moons; he will then only have
established a new general rule, and relegated 7d cupBeBnxos to
ANCIENT THEORIES OF CAUSATION. I7I
the cases, if any, of failure in this new rule: he will not be
teaching a law of accidents as such; the proposition relating to
the effect at new moon will be either constantly or usually
true, and the accidental will be the exception.” Which, had
Aristotle but considered it, would have shewn him how loosely
_ he was reasoning in favour of a preconceived notion.
I hope I have succeeded in shewing, in continuation of my
former paper, that Aristotle, no more than Plato, taught that
there is Free Will in Matter, or self-determined agencies in
Nature. However different their principles in other respects,
they both held that when natural bodies come together their
interactions are necessarily determined by their specific charac-
ters and the particular conditions in which they find themselves.
What they both invest with some degree of vague uncertainty
—but Aristotle more than Plato, mm the passages to which »
Grote calls attention—is the circumstances that bring them to-
gether. Had he been in the habit of following out his thoughts -
to their utmost consequences, or had Grote been there to press
him, I think he would have been driven to see that these cir-
cumstances must be determined by the collocations of the
Kosmos—daArou pév AéyovTos cuvédycev av €E avayKns, cadas dé
ov« elpnxev. But to shew this would require another paper. I
will conclude with an observation on the “laxity in the use.of
the word cvuP_eBnxos” in respect of this question, which Grote
notices in another connection.
The proper Aristotelian meaning of the word, as a term of
art, I take to be, a predicate which happens, now, to belong to
a particular subject, but is not connoted by its name. Taken
in this sense, to deny that there is any science of accidents
seems to mean no more than to say that, to reason about things,
you must use such names as are appropriate to the particular
enquiry on which you are engaged. “Something white is walk-
ing” may be perfectly true; but no science can give you rules
for ascertaining whether it is probable. But if by something
white you mean a man, some Science—Medicine or the like—
may enable you to say under what circumstances such an event
happens os él To woAv. The logical rule is true; but it does
not help physics or ontology much. But Aristotle uses this
172 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
same word, in the places I have been discussing, not for predi-
cates but for sequence of events. And the proposition, in this
sense, has quite a different bearing, and requires quite a differ-
ent proof.
D, D. HEATH,
P.S. The last chapter of the treatise De Generat. &c. ought
to throw more light than I think it does on Aristotle’s doctrine
about rd évdeyduevov yn yevécOat. The question proposed is
whether in the whole course of change which constitutes nature,
anything whatever is of necessity, or whether all things are not
contingent. But, as so often happens, he rides off—so it ap-
pears to me—on a logical or verbal argument, deserting the
question of physical fact. What I wish to call attention to is
that, even here, where the larger question is at issue, he still
appeals to common experience as proving that some things at
least are contingent—ére wév yap évia Sjdov, Kal evOds TO Eorat
Kal TO wéAXov Erepov Sia TodTO' 0 wév yap adnOés eizretv OTe Eorat,
Sef todo elvai wrote adnOées Ott Ext" 9 Sé viv adnOes eimetv Ste
pérrer ovdéev Korver pur) yevécOar' wédrwv yap av Badifew tis
ovx av Badiceev. St Hilaire, it is true, construes this sen-
tence so as to make it mean that we know some things are é&
avayxns: but I do not suppose any one will agree with him.
WILLIAM GEORGE CLARK.
On the 6th of last November died W. G. Clark, one of the
first editors of our Journal, at the age of fifty-seven. Many
interesting details of his life, his character and his work will
be found in two notices, written by intimate friends of his
and published soon after his death in the Obituaries of the
Athenaeum and the Academy.
Intimately acquainted with him almost from his boyhood,
for a space of nearly 40 years, I am disposed to think that,
taking him all in all, his was the most accomplished and
versatile mind I ever encountered. Whatever he undertook
to do, was always executed with a surprising tact and readi-
ness. I cannot remember the time when he had not at his
command a finished English style, wielded with consummate
ease and mastery. The same ease.and mastery were displayed,
whenever he chose to exert them and however varied the
occasion might be, in Greek and Latin composition, prose and
verse alike; nor was he a mean proficient in French. For
many years he was a conspicuous figure in the University
and in Trinity, as Public Orator and as a Lecturer and Tutor
of his College. During his vacations he was an untiring
traveller in France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Poland, Ireland and
elsewhere, and shewed his power of acute observation and the
readiness of his pen in more than one complete book and in
many shorter papers.
In the large circle of his friends and acquaintances the
feeling I believe was quite universal that, as a charming com-
panion and brilliant yet gentle talker, he had no superior,
174 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
The late Lord Clarendon, who knew him and liked him well,
told a friend of mine that Clark was the most agreeable man |
in society he had ever met. And Lord Clarendon had spent
his life in the very choicest social circles, not of London only,
but of Paris, Madrid and other capitals as well. —
And yet, unless I greatly err, Clark never was quite
satisfied with his life in Cambridge, and during the greater
portion of it at-least refused to concentrate his energies and
faculties on some single adequate object. Whether he knew
the actual words of the famous Cynic I cannot say; but he
had often I fancy in his thoughts the purport of that profound ©
maxim of La Rochefoucauld: La souveraine habileté consiste a
bien connoitre le prix des choses. A few powerful intellects
grasp at once the vast significance of this golden truth, and
a prudent choice leads to successful performance. But for
many a year it was not so with Clark: he contented himself
with brief occasional efforts, and schemes were thought of only
to be abandoned. Some such feeling perhaps induced him
long to vacillate and finally to give up his promised edition
and commentary of Aristophanes, for which his various gifts
better qualified him I believe than any other living En-
glishman.
At length in 1860 he designed a work which was destined
to be brought to a successful conclusion, the critical edition
of Shakespeare. With the cooperation of his able colleague this
edition was completed in 1866, and at once superseded all former
critical editions of the poet. For a few years longer he was
able to join the same colleague in editing single plays of
Shakespeare for the Clarendon Press; and had health and
strength not failed him, he might have done much in many
ways to illustrate him whom he looked upon as the greatest
of mankind. But, from what he told me himself more than
once, I believe that the severe mechanical work involved in
the collations for his critical edition had irritated his nervous
system and brain. In February of 1871 he had a severe
attack of pleurisy from which he never completely rallied.
He passed the last years of his life in a state of great physical
weakness and nervous depression ; but his intellect retained its
WILLIAM GEORGE CLARK. 175
vigour, at all events until he was struck down by paralysis
some three months before his death.
I was with him in York for some days last April: his
mind was clear; his conversation as interesting as in his best
time. I sent him a small book of mine on Catullus, and at the
end of April I received from him a letter of careful and acute
criticism. Catullus turned his thoughts to hendecasyllables,
and I got from him in May an elegant version of Carew’s
charming song, ‘He that loves a rosy cheek,’ the words of
which his powerful memory had retained. He sent me too the
following lines, a reminiscence of a visit to Farringford, where
he saw the Laureate with an armful of laurels which he was
carrying to plant in his new garden:
Quod laurus geris hortulo inserendas,
paulisper cithara, Catulle, omissa,
laudo: nam citius virens poetae
quavis arbore fama crescit; idem
scis, vates, fore ut olim Apollinares
rami deficiant tuis coronis.
H. A. J. MUNRO,
NOTICE.
ArrfeER the appearance of seven volumes of the Journal of Phi-
lology, it became necessary, for financial reasons, to consider whether
the publication should be continued. The question was discussed by
the Philological Societies at Oxford and Cambridge, and a desire was
expressed that some effort should be made to relieve the Journal
from its immediate difficulties, and to maintain its existence in
-the future. The accession of many additional subscribers in Oxford
and the promise of substantial assistance from the Cambridge
Philological. Society have encouraged the Editors to issue another
number of the Journal, in the hope that among the many who
are interested in the subjects discussed in its pages the circulation
may be sufficiently increased to make it self-supporting.
In consequence of Mr Clark’s withdrawal from Cambridge for
several years before his death, and the many literary undertakings in
which Professor Mayor was engaged, the editorship for some time
was practically left in my hands. As my own occupations are suffi-
ciently numerous, I was desirous of retiring from the office of Editor
in favour of some one who could devote more leisure to the conduct
of the Journal; but for the present I have consented to remain in
charge, and with the able assistance of Mr Ingram Bywater and
Mr Henry Jackson I hope that the character of the Journal may be
maintained as a vehicle for the discussion of questions connected
with all branches of Philology.
In the next number will appear the first portion of Mr Clark’s
notes on the Acharnians, in the form in which they were left by
himself when he still contemplated an edition of Aristophanes.
WILLIAM ALDIS WRIGHT.
THE JOURNAL
OF
PHILOLOGY.
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES ACHARNIANS 1—578.
[THE following notes are printed just as they were left by
Mr Clark in 1867, when he finally abandoned the work upon
which he had been so long engaged. The numbering of the
lines is that of Dindorf’s text. To facilitate reference, I have
made out the following table of abbreviations: Rav. = Ravenna
MS; Amb.1= Bibl. Ambrosiana (Milan), 41; Barb. 1 = Bar-
berini 289 (in the Library of the Barberini Palace, Rome) ;
Laur. 1 = Bibl. Laurentiana (Florence), Pluteus xxxr. Cod.
xv; Laur. 2 = Cod. xvi (ibid.); Mod. 1 = Bibl. Palatina
(Modena), iii D 8; Mod. 2=111 D 14 (ibid.); Pal. 1 = Pal.
67 (Vatican); Pal. 2 = Pal. 128 (ibid.); Par. 1 =Bibl. Nat.
(Paris) 2712; Par. 2 = 2715 (ibid.); Par. 3= 2717 (ibid.); Ven.
1 = Bibl. di San Marco (Venice), Cod. 474.
Par. 1, 2,3 are referred to by Dindorf as A, B, C, and
Laur. 1, 2, as T, A. W. A. W.]
1, Hermogenes (epi peQodou Sewvdtntos, c. XXXVI; Walz,
Rhetores Greci, Vol. 11. p. 443) refers to the beginning of
the Acharnians for an illustration of the mixture of wixpa and
yeXota in comedy, and Gregorius of Corinth (Walz, Vol. vu.
p. 1345) in his commentary on Hermogenes quotes the first
Journal of Philology. vou. VII. 12
178 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
four and portions of the next twelve lines, copying the
scholia.
2. naoOnv| nicOnv Rav. So also in lines 4 and 13.
HoOnv Sé| HoOnv pwev Amb. 1, Laur. 1 (8 written above
m.r.), Mod. 1, and Barb. 1.
mavu S€| mdvu ye Elmsley. An unnecessary change. For
the repetition of 5é, see Matthiz, Greek Grammar § 622. 5.
Baa, tértapa| There is a colon after Bara in Rav., Mod. 1,
Pal. 1, and Pal. 2: no stop in Par. 1, Laur. 1, &. Brunck
(though he translates ‘ pauca, perpauca, quatuor omnino’) has
no stop. So Bekker and Dindorf, as if Bad and térrapa
were predicate and subject; which cannot be the case here.
Porson (Advers. p. 130) refers to this line for an instance of
repetition. As only two occasions of joy are mentioned after-
wards, lines 6 and 13, rérrapa must mean ‘some four’, an
indefinitely small number. So zpeis is used line 598 of this
play. So ‘duo’ in Latin: ‘ Vel duo vel nemo’ (Persius, Sat.
1.3). So ‘quattro’ or ‘due’ in modern Italian and ‘due’ in
Spanish.
3. w@duvnOnv|] wdvvydnv Rav. )
Waupaxocvoyapyapa| So Par.1. All other MSS. have
Wappoxoowyapyapa. The MSS. of Suidas and Hesychius vary
similarly. As manuscript authority goes for very little on such
a point I have followed Elmsley in writing Wappax. as con- —
formable to the analogy of é£axocwos, &e. Wapupaxdcotos, or
vaupoxdcwos, has been used, as the scholiast tells us, perhaps
invented, by Eupolis.
4. d&wv] d&ov Rav. Cf. line 205 rH wore yap akvov.
The disgrace of. Cleon leader of the war-party was a service
rendered to all Greece, Cf. Pax 269, 270, awéron ’AOnvaiorow
anretpiBavos, 6 Bupcotr@rns 0s éxiKa THv “ENAdOba.
xatpnddovos| xepndovos Laur. 1, Par. 1, Barb. 1.
5. éy@d] éyo & Rav.
evdpavOnv| nudppavOnv Aldine, Scholiast and Elmsley.
6. é&nuecev] e&npuece Pal. 2 and Ald. -
The scholia give two inconsistent accounts of the incident
here referred to; first that Cleon was fined for insulting the
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. 179
‘Knights’: which like many other scholia is merely an absurd
inference from the text; and secondly that the Knights had
forced Cleon to restore five talents which he had received from
the islanders (i.e. the subject allies of Athens) fva rein tovs
’"AOnvaious Kovpicas avtods THs etohopas. For this Theopompus
is cited as authority: wéuvntas Ocdroutros. By thisis probably
meant the historian, not the comic poet. The former may have
mentioned it incidentally in his continuation of Thucydides,
and perhaps on the authority of our poet. The circumstance
does not appear to have caused much scandal, else Thucydides
would not have passed it over in silence. It may be that Cleon
in consideration of a speech in the assembly had received
a present, which, being threatened with prosecution by some of
the equestrian order, he sent back. The word éfeety is used,
line 1148 of the Equites, probably with especial reference to this
transaction.
7. tav@ os| Elmsley suggests rovtois. But the accusative
is as admissible here as in lines 1, 2, 3, 9, &c. Meineke suggests
Tavd ws pw éyavace.
8. adfov yap “EdXad:] Parodied, according to the scholiast,
from the Telephus of Euripides, the complete verse being :
Kakos odor av. akiov yap “EXdads. Elmsley suggests xaxds
droitnv. Perhaps cards onrort’ av.
The dative, dativus commodi, with a&ov occurs again line
205; TH moder yap aévov.
10. *xeyynvn] Bentley. xeynver Rav. xeynvn the other
MSS. Brunck reads ore 547’ éxeynvn without authority.
tov Aioyvror] “Scriptor vitee Aischyli: "AOnvaior 5¢ tocodrov
nyarnoav Aicyvrov, as Whdicacbat peta Oavatoyv avtod tov
Bovropevoy Sidackewy Ta Aicyvrov yopov NapBavew. Quincti-
lianus x. 1. 66, “Correctas ejus fabulas in certamen deferre
posterioribus poetis Athenienses permisere, suntque eo modo
multi coronati.”” Elmsley. Euphorion, Aischylus’s son, is said
by Suidas to have gained four victories by representing post-
humous tragedies of his father’s, but as Aischylus had been dead
more than thirty years the list must have been by this time
12—2
180 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
exhausted, and there can scarcely be, as Elmsley suggests, a
reference to Euphorion in this passage.
11. 68 avetrev] 6 Knpv& Sndovote Schol. Mod. 1, Laur. 1
(originally), Amb. 1, Pal. 2, Barb. 1, and Pal. 1 (by correction),
and Suidas have aveim’. Rav. has av elev. Par. 1 aveizev.
® Oéoyu] Theognis, a tragic poet, mentioned again, line
140, and Thesm. 170, 6 8 aid @€oyus yuypos ay yruype@s Tote.
According to the scholiast he was nicknamed yi@v. The scholiast,
Suidas and Harpocration state that he was one of ‘the thirty
tyrants’, but the text of Xenophon, who is doubtless the sole
authority for the statement, has @coyévns (Hell. 11. 3. 2).
12. mw@s TovT écece] Brunck adopts Valcknaer’s correc-
tion mas Tov’To ceicat. ‘Non male’ says Elmsley, retaining
however the old reading. There is a mixture of constructions
very natural in the colloquial language of comedy. ‘Think
what a heart-quake this gave me’.
pov] ‘ Elegantius esset wor quam pov’. Brunck, Why ?
13. él pooym] “Avti tod peta tov Mocyov. nv 8é obtos
dadros KiOapmdos, moda amvevott ddwv. So the ancient
scholiast, copied by Suidas. A more recent scholion, neither
found in the ‘Ravenna MS. nor in Suidas, adds 6 Mocyos
xiBapwdds “Axpayavrivos, Tiwés ovTws, OTe 0 viKnoas aOdov
éhauBave pooyov. The latter interpretation was adopted by
Bentley in his ‘ Dissertation upon Phalaris ’ (Works, ed. Dyce, .
Vol. 1. p. 348). This, he says, is ‘the true meaning of the
passage, as the language and the sense sufficiently shew’, ‘as
the dithyrambic poets contended for a bull, so the harpers,
x.Oapwdol, contended for a calf’. But his vast erudition has
not supplied him with any other authority for the assertion.
The existence of a harper called Moschus is only vouched for
by our scholiast who perhaps invented him to explain the
passage. He apparently supposes the name to have been
given because his singing resembled the continuous lowing of
a calf. That he was an Agrigentine may be a circumstance
added to the original lie, suggested by the fact that the
bucolic poet Moschus was a Syracusan. That éwi jomed with
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. 181
the dative case of a person can mean ‘after’ I do not be-
_ lieve.
Mitchell in his note ad loc. says: “An opinion of Welcker
seems to be gaining ground that nothing more is intended here
than a mere jest; the poet, in allusion to the derivation of the
word Bovdtios, playfully combining a calf with the vopos
Bowwdtw0s””.
The meaning seems to me simply this: Dexitheus dressed
as a rustic came upon the stage mounted on a young bull or
heifer. The Boeotian voyuos, said by the scholiast to have been
invented by Terpandros, was probably of a bucolic nature.
14. Ac&iOeos] Ao&/Gceos Laur. 1. “An excellent harper
and Pythian victor”, Schol.
Bowwtiov] Meineke proposes ro Boudtiov. But there may
have been more than one Bowtiov pédos (if, as the scholiast
says, wéAos, and not voyos, be the word understood). In any
case the article may be omitted as it constantly is with words in
very familiar use.
18. After xovias Pal. 1 and the first corrector of Laur. 1 in-
sert ye, as do the Aldine and all subsequent editions to Brunck’s
inclusive. Porson in his review of Brunck (Maty’s Review,
Iv. p. 65) shewed that it should be-omitted, the « in xovias
being long, as in Lysistr. 470. The best MSS. and Suidas
omit it. The meaning is: ‘Never since my washing days
began have my eyelids so smarted with soap as they do now
with vexation’. He is ready to cry.
19. Oot] Omor Rav.
kupias éxxAnolas| Kupia éxxdnoia was a meeting of the
Athenian assembly competent to pass bills, elect. officers and
generally to transact business of state in contradistinction to
other meetings at which, as is probable, only matters of local
and municipal interest were dealt with. As to the number of
such meetings at this period we have no information. The
scholiasts and lexicographers of later times are only authentic
so far as they preserve the statements of Aristotle in his lost .
work, the zroAvrefas, and these doubtless referred to the usages
of his own time. The statement of Pollux (vul. 95) that of
182 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
four meetings in each mpuraveia the first alone was called
xupla, while the third was appropriated to the reception of
envoys and ambassadors, is inconsistent with what we find in the
Acharnians, where the Persian ambassadors are introduced in
a Kupia éxxdnoia. From a passage in the speech of Aischines
against Timarchus, quoted in full at line 44, we may infer that
envoys and ambassadors were received at any xupia éxxAnola
previously to the transaction of the other business. The scholiast
on this passage is wrong in considering vopuipos éxxAnola and
kupia éxxrAnoia to be equivalent, and equally erroneous is the
distinction sometimes made between ovyxAntos and xupia.
The truth is that certain meetings held on fixed days were
voutyot, others summoned on emergencies ovyxAnTtor. Of the
voppot some were Kupiat, some not. The oiryxAntot, by the
nature of the case, would generally be xup/ar. It would rarely
happen that an emergency would arise requiring a special
meeting for the transaction of municipal business. From
Thesmoph. 373 sqq. it would appear that the PovAn had
the right of fixing the time of meeting.
20. éwOwvijs] The assembly of women in the Thesmo-
phoriazusze is held also at daybreak. Thesmoph. 376.
mvv&| mvié Laur.1. The site of the Pnyx is to my mind
one of the most certain points of Athenian topography, and
the arguments of Welcker and others entirely fail to shake
my belief in the conclusions of Leake. The votive tablets to
Zeus found on the spot, and formerly inserted in the face of
the escarpment on either side of the ‘bema’, prove indeed that
the place was sacred to Zeus but do not disprove its having
been the place of assembly also. The fact that the Pnyx was
sacred to Zeus gives a new significance to the exclamation of
Agoracritus when he has triumphed over Cleon (Equites 1253),
‘EAXavie Led, cov TO vexntypiov.
avtni] Aldus. atryi MSS., except Laur. 2, which has 76dez.
21. of 8] of & Ray. and others. This is not to be taken
as necessarily implying that the ayopa is visible from the Pnyx.
I have no doubt that the a@yopd was on the north side of the
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. 183
Hill of Ares, which thus stood between it and the Pnyx. A
street doubtless led from the Agora to the Pnyx below the
western end of the Hill of Ares.
22. Compare Eccl. 378, 9, cal Sita moddy 4 pidrtos, @
Zed dirtate, yékwv Tapecyev iy mpocéppaivov Kikry. The
roforat under the direction of the AnE/apyou (Pollux vit. 104)
removed all wares exposed for sale; opened the gates leading to
the Pnyx, closed all the other issues and with a rope rubbed
over with red-lead swept the loiterers towards the place of
assembly. Those marked with the red-lead were fined. Such
is the account given by the scholiast, and copied in full by
Suidas. There is a minute exactness in it which distinguishes
it from the imbecile inventions which fill so large a space in the
scholia. Very likely it is derived from Aristotle. Nor need it
surprise us to find so primitive a method of effecting ‘a call of
the house’ still practised in times of great refinement and civiliz-
ation. The Athenian democracy was very tenacious of old
forms. This line, 76 cyowviov, x.7.r., had become a proverb,
according to Suidas.
23. dwpiav] dwplav Rav. eplav Par. 1. Corrected in
other MSS. dwpia Suidas. The accusative is used as im
the phrase xaipov 8 édnxes (Soph. Ajax, 34). Matthiz Gr.
Gr. 425. See also Asch. Eum. 108, 109, cat vueticeuva Seirv’
én’ éoydpa Tupos éOvov, dpav ovdevds Kowny Gedy, and Paley’s
note.
24, 25. The redundancy in jxcovtes...€XOovres and the use
of & as if a finite verb, not a participle, had preceded, have
thrown suspicion on this passage. Dobree, referring to the
scholiast’s S:wOyncovtat, proposed to read eita Suwotiodvtat,
and Ribbeck thinks that something is wanting before or after
HKovtes, or else that the word itself is corrupt. He says: “ Man
vermisst nach adda ein neues Praedicat zu mpuvtavers, woraus -
zu ersehen ware, was sie zur Unzeit thun. Denn dass sie auf
dem Markte die Zeit todt schlagen und sich nachher driingen
werden, ist unstatthaft, da sie sich unmdglich zepi mrpwtou
Eunov stossen kénnen”. But the Prytanes came not from the
ayopa but from the zputavetov, where doubtless they met pre-
184 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
vious to each é€xxAnola. Perhaps they were not unfrequently
detained by preliminary business so long as to try the patience
of such of the people as were punctual in their attendance in
the Pnyx. The road from the Prytaneum to the Pnyx, sup-
posing the former to have occupied the place assigned to it by
Leake, would pass not through the market-place but between
' the Hill of Ares and the Acropolis. Meineke, Vindic. Arist.,
regrets that he had not admitted Dobree’s emendation dva-
otvovvtas into his text, as eira dé cannot be used after a par-
ticiple. Certainly not, according to strict rules of grammar,
but we are not bound to correct every anacoluthon we find in
ancient texts. In Aisch. Agam. 423 Hermann says, Plena oratio
esset evT av éo Oda Tis Soxdév opav 6pad. So we may say here
‘plena oratio esset awplav jKovtes Eovow’.
It may be remarked that Suidas read wotiodyta: and so
probably did the scholiast for he says: SswOycovras dio éve-
GTOTOS TOV woTifw (not duwoTifw).
I read Ssw@otiodvras not to avoid the anacoluthon but
because the compound verb is almost necessary to the sense.
The corruption is owing to the tendency transcribers had to
change and accommodate the comic iambic to the tragic
rhythm. So line 107 has been altered in modern times.
25. Meineke reads: addAnAols epi TOU mpwTov EvAov' an
unnecessary change. mp@tov Evdo», first place, no more re-
quires the article than would zpoedpia. Pollux in two places,
Iv. 121, and vu. 133, has mp@érov EvAov without the article,
having perhaps this passage in his mind.
While the people sate below on the bare rock (Equit. 783)
él taiot métpats, or on stone seats, of which the supporting
wall may still be seen, the Prytanes and Secretaries probably
had wooden benches along the ledge behind the bema, where
there are no traces of seats cut in the rock.
26. a@poot] A late scholion tells us that the proper Attic
form is G@poot, which Elmsley adopts. Suidas recognizes
another form d@por as also in use. Meineke reads @Opou.
cipnvn © | eipnvno, at first, in Rav., corrected by the same
hand to eipynvn &.
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. 185
29. voordy] ‘ Returning on each occasion’, ‘coming regul-
arly’. Compare the use of vdoros Soph. Philoc. 43, adv 7
‘al hopBis voorov é&erAnrvOev,
Kat éredav ®| Kat éreid av ov Rav.
32. eis] és Dindorf, who makes the same change when-
ever eis is followed by a consonant.
33. otvyév...7obdv| “Stobeus 54. recte, si legas in versu
priore adzoSXérrwv 6.” Porson.
35. dev] dec Laur. 1 and Mod. 1 (a correction). id
ev Rav., Par. 2. 75 Laur. 2. dec the rest.
Suidas reads 7Sev, and interprets ovdé éyivwoxov td mpiw
pnua. The scholiast ovdé éyivwoxe tT. 7. p. ~‘ Stobsei libri
partim ovy 7 6) partim ody) Sez’ Dindorf. 7dnv Elmsley.
Whatever the form adopted, the third person is required here.
Had the subject been changed éyé must have been added for
clearness: I have adopted the form which is found in the
Ravenna MS. in the Pax, line 1182, ov yap 7dev é&tev" where
the metre shews that the form cannot be 7de: and it is
more probable that in other places where the final consonant
was not required it was omitted by transcribers than that both
_ forms were concurrently in use.
36. yo mpliav anjv| “ Valde frigida et invenusta mihi
videtur hec serree mentio: presertim cum mpiwy priorem
syllabam producat mpim corripiat...Propemodum adducerer ut
suspicarer nostrum scripsisse, aX avros pepe TwavTa pev TO
mplo & amv, nisi recepte scripture accederet Stobei auc-
toritas”. Elmsley. And he might also have added ‘that of
Suidas’, A difference of quantity would scarcely stand in the
way of a pun, and the jest is not so bad if we suppose mpiwv
to mean the instrument of the cvuworpiotns: “there was no
skinning of flints”. Ribbeck supposes that the poet jocosely
makes from wpiw a participle mpéwv meaning “one who cries
mpio”, also alluding to the saw. This I think would not have
been intelligible to the audience.
39. tis] Omitted by Rav.
wv] mplv Par. 1, Laur. 1 and Barb. 1.
éyn] Aéyeo Amb. 1 and Pal. 1.
186 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
41, ovyod Aeyov] diye Aéywv Rav. (the syllable yw having
both an acute and a grave accent). All other MSS. have ’Aeyov
or Aeyov, varying in the breathings and accents over ovy#. In
Ray. there is no stop after nydpevor.
43. mdpit | wap? Pal. 1.
44, capi?] mapit’ Rav., Pal. 1, Pal. 2.
Tov Kabapuatos| A young pig, xorpidiov Suid. dér¢a£é Schol.,
was sacrificed and the blood carried round and sprinkled on the
outskirts of the place of assembly. The blood was called ca@appa
or caOapouov, as was the victim. The ceremony was ta qepiotia,
the person who officiated aepuctiapyos (Eccles. 128). The
passage of Atschines alluded to in the note on line 19, is so
important to the understanding of what follows here that I
quote it entire. (Aischines against Timarchus, p. 4, Steph. p. 406,
ed. Zurich, 1839.) cat mas 5é Kedever Tods mpoédpous ypnmari-
few; émrevdav 70 KaOdpovoy Trepievex Oh Kal 6 KipvE tas Tatplous
evyas evEnTal, TpoxetpoTovely KedeVeL Tods mMpoédpous mept
lep@v Tav Tatpiov Kat Knpv&t Kal mpecBelats Kal dciwv, Kai
peta tadta émepwTd 6 Kijpv& “tis ayopevew BovreTaL TOV
vrép TevtnKovTa éTn yeyovotwv;’ émeidday Oé ovToL mWavTeEs
eimwol, TOT On KEeAEVEL AEyeLY TOV GrrAwWv *AOnvaiwy Tov
BovArcuevoy. Amphitheus’ speech, lines 47—54, is not, I think,
intended as a parody upon the genealogies of which Euripides
is so fond, but is designed to shew that as he was a descendant
of Gods and Demigods, his business came under the head of
Ta watpia tepa and therefore should take precedence of all
other.
I have sometimes thought that there might have been an
Attic ‘hero’ called Amphitheus, whose 7p@ov had been spared
by the Lacedzmonians, when they devastated the country
round, but the meaning of the name ‘God on both father’s and
mother’s side’ makes it more probable that it was invented
by the poet, and the scene may have been suggested by some
recent incident in the assembly, when some one tried to get a
hearing for his own grievances on the ground that they related
to the national rites. At any rate, from the question of the
herald ov« dv@pw7os; line 46, we may infer that Amphitheus
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. 187
appeared in archaic dress such as heroes and demigods were
represented with, in fresco paintings.
_ A good idea of the preliminary proceedings of the assembly
may be gained from Eccles, 128 sqq. and from Thesmoph.
295—382.
45. ime] Pal. 1 and Pal. 2. The other MSS. have cizrev.
The note of interrogation was first given in the Leyden edi-
tion of 1624. Amphitheus, who has just arrived, addresses
the question to a neighbour. The herald’s words render an
answer unnecessary.
46. The line is given thus in Rav.—éye: tle dv: aupibeos:
ovk avOpwroc ; ov. In Mod. 1 ap. eyo: xn. Tis Ov: am.
ovx avOpwtos:, xn. ov. Laur. 1 originally made the same
omission, reading audi. ove avOpwiros ov (corrected above).
Par. 1 omits the three last names of the speakers. The line is
substantially right in Pal. 1, Pal. 2, and Amb. 1.
Dindorf, in his note ed. Oxon. 1837, says, ‘ Preeconis partes
prytani sunt tribuenda’, though he has retained the old ar-
rangement in the text in this and the edition of 1851. Here
and elsewhere the «jpv£ pronounces in a loud voice the orders
given him by the presiding mrputavers.
47. adr daOavatos’ 6 yap apy.] Dawes (? R. P.), Miscell.
Crit. (p. 465, ed. 1827), laid down a rule that a tribrach could
not precede an anapest. lmsley accordingly reads aA
a@avatos y" 0 yap ’Aw. Hermann proposed a@AX abdvatos’
66 ‘Ay. (Reisig, Conjectanea, p. 13). Reisig himself suggests
avn abavatos, 6 y’Au. The rule seems to me very doubtful
as applicable to Aristophanic senarii. Even admitting it, the
pause after a@avatos would be sufficient to justify an exception.
In the Aves 108, though a new speaker intervenes, mwodam@ 76
- yévos; has been changed for the same reason, to moda 76
yévos 8; to the detriment of the sense.
48, yiyverat] All the MSS. have yiveras.
52. sotetc@ar] So all MSS. Meineke, following a sug-
gestion of Elmsley’s, gives qoujoar here, moujoae line 58,
and zroimoov line 131. Elmsley says: “oovdas rovodytwy
de Diis induciarum auctoribus dicitur in Pac. 212 et
188 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
eodem sensu epyjynv touoas de Trygeo v. 1199”. But in
the latter case rounoduevos might have been used, as Trygeus
was himself included in the peace which he brought about.
So in the case of Amphitheus, the middle voice seems equally
appropriate. I therefore in lines 52, 58, 131 adopt the reading
which has the highest authority: Compare the use of ézrezrouy-
peOa, line 145.
mpcs A.| mpos tovs A. Pal. 1.
53. a@avaros ov] Brunck, asserting that the first syllable
of a@avaros cannot be long in dramatic poetry, conjectures
@v a0avatos to avoid the concurrence of dactyl and anapest,
which by Dawes’ rule is inadmissible. So he would read ety’
aQavatos Aves 1224, and dvr abavarov Rane 629.
avSpes] @vypes Pal. 2. or'dpes Ald.
54. KHPYS] Omitted in Rav. «np. or «yn. in the rest,
except that in Par. 2 it is corrected by the same hand to
mpuTavis, in accordance with the scholium: todro dyow els trav
T puTavewv.
Brunck recommends and Bekker reads IIPT. for KHPT.
But see the note to line 46. Mod. 2 gives the whole line ov
yap...tofoTar to the Herald.
55—58. These lines have been erased and re-written by
the same hand in Laur. 1.
AM®.] Omitted in Ray.
58. ouicba:] Ray. omoat the rest. The authority of
the Ravenna MS., in a case of doubt, outweighs that of all the
others put together. The transcribers altered vrovetoPar to the
first aorist active because of xpeuacan.
59. otya] Rav., Laur. 2, Pal. 1, and Pal. 2. olya Laur. 1,
Amb. 1, Par. 1, and Mod.1. Elmsley adopts o/ya, putting a
colon after «a@noo.
AIK.] Omitted in Rav.
ov] ov« Brunck and Elmsley.
60. ye] ve Barb. 1. In Laur. 1, it is doubtful, whether
te or ye. It is omitted by the scholiast: Dobree proposes re.
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. 189
mputavevonté| Meineke gives, silently, rputave’nté, perhaps
a misprint.
61. of...Baciréws] of mapa Bacihéws mpéoBers Laur. 2,
- and Pal. 1. ;
62. AIK.] Omitted in Rav.
‘yo| Barb. 1. So corrected in Laur. 1 and Mod. 1. In
Laur. 1 the original was, I think, yap ws. yo Rav. «& os
(i.e. wal os) in Par. 1. ydp Pal. 1 and Laur. 2. ydp ds
Pal. 2.
63. tador] Atheneus (1x. 57, p. 397 e), on the authority
of Tryphon, a grammarian of the Augustan time, says that
the Athenians aspirated the second syllable of tas, and he
seems to imply that he himself had a MS. of the Aves of
Aristophanes where the word was written ta#s. Both he and
the grammarian Seleucus thought them wrong.
On the authority of this passage Dindorf says we ought
to write here tact, though he does not write it so either in
his earlier or later text. Meineke however does. Considering
that the pronunciation of a foreign word may well have
changed in the four centuries which elapsed between Aristo-
phanes and Trypho, that written accents were not in use for
more than two centuries after Aristophanes, and that, if we
write tasot, we ought also to write dcéxewv, I have adhered to
the reading of all MSS. Elmsley writes ta@ov.
64. KHP...] —otya BaBaidé Rav. In Par. 1, also, ATK.is
omitted.
65. péyav,] péya’ Ray. ?
66. dépovtas] Rav., Pal. 1, and Laur. 1 (as corrected).
gépovta Amb. 1, Mod. 1, Pal. 2, and Laur. 1 originally.
Ts| tas Laur. 1, and Barb. 1.
67. Euthymenes was archon from Midsummer 437 to
Midsummer 436; eleven years before, not twelve, as the
scholiast says. This was an important date for comic poets,
being that of the repeal of the law prohibiting comedy which
had been passed three years previously, él Mopuyidov. It is
probable that some embassy, of which history has preserved
190 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
no record, had been sent from Athens to Persia, whose long
absence was still fresh in the memory of men.
68, 69. érpvyowecPa wapa Kaicrpiov rotapov] Blaydes.
érpuyouccOa Tapa tév Kavotplov Tediwv’ Rav. étpvxoperOa
Sia Tov Kavotpiov wediov Laur. 1, Barb. 1. érpuyoueba dia
t.«.7. Par. 1, Amb. 1, Laur. 2, Pal. 1. érpuydpuea Sia rt.
kactpiov m. Pal. 2. érpvyduec0a trav Kaiotplav rediov
Elmsley. étpvyowecOa mapa Kaiorpiov mediov Dindorf.
Meineke conjectures é. wept Katotpiov mediov. I had once
thought of reading répa xavotpiov mwediwv, but I now prefer
Blaydes’ conjecture. He refers to Herod. v. 100, ropevopevos
mapa Totapov Kaiotpiov. An additional touch of caricature
is given by the statement that the carriage-road skirted the
banks of a river, and that a river celebrated by Homer, flowing
through the ‘Asian meadow’ (IL 1. 460). The ‘plain of
Cayster’, a very different place, was probably unknown in
Greece till Xenophon’s Anabasis, 1. 2,§ 11, made it famous.
69. odo:mAavodytes| ddoimrdXavevTes Laur. 1, Barb. 1.
6Snravobvres Par. 1. éSouropodvres (corrected to éSourdavody-
tes by another hand) Amb. 1.
70. dppayatdv] appagdv Ray. and Amb. 1 (corrected).
parOaxeés| Kuster actually proposes to read od pada-
KOS.
71. ATK.] Here, as in line 67, and frequently elsewhere,
the sign : is used to indicate a new speaker, the name not being
given, in Rav.
yap] y dp Brunck and Elmsley. tap Meineke (Mehler
conj.). Ribbeck suggests opodp’ dpa xy éc. ydp seems to me
quite right. Dicopolis assents to the proposition, and illus-
trates it by his own case. ‘Riding in a cushioned carriage is
killing work’ says the exquisite. ‘Yes’ says the other,
‘for health and comfort there’s no bed like a good heap of
rubbish’. Diczeopolis is not here alluding to his duties as
sentinel on the wall, for a sentinel would not be allowed to lie
down—he, like the other fugitives from the country, was
obliged to find a bed where he could. Compare Thucyd. m1. 17, |
xateckevacavto S€ Kal év Tols TUpyois TaY TELYa@Y TOAXOL
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. IOI
Kat ws €xaotos tov édvvato’ ov yap éydpnoe EvvedOovtas
avTovs 1 mods, GAN Votepov 6) Ta Te paxpa Telyn OKnoTav
KaTavepamevor Kal Tod Iletparés Ta modAda. Compare Eccles.
243, év tais huyais eta Tavdpds @Kno ev Tru«Kvi.
73. pos Biav érivoyev] Ahasuerus seems to have done
what was proverbially impossible; changed a law of the Per-
sians. See Esther 1. 8, ‘And the drinking was according to the
law; none did compel: for so the king had appointed to all
the officers of his house, that they should do accurding to
every man’s pleasure’.
74, éxt@patev] éxtowatov Rav. ‘And they gave them
drink in vessels of gold’, Esther 1. 7.
75. AIK.] Omitted in Rav.
76. aicOave] Pal. 2, Par. 2 and Ald. aicOavne Rav.
aicQavy the rest.
77, 78. Laur. 1, and Barb. 1, give these lines to the
Knpvé.
78. duvvapévovs dayeiv te Kal mietv] This is Brunck’s conjec-
ture, to which Elmsley objects because the scholiast recognizes
katapayetv. But the scholion is not found in Ray. and there-
fore probably is of more recent origin. The simple verb
dayeiy seems more suitable here than the compound, and Te can
ill be spared. duvayévous xatadhayeiv te nal mieiv Rav., Par. 1,
Mod. 1, Amb. 1, and Pal. 2. duvayévous Kkatadvyetv te Kab meetv
Laur. 1 originally (corrected xcatagayeiv cai muciv by a later
hand). dvvapévous xatadayeiy cai wieiy Laur. 2, Par. 2, Pal. 1.
duvapévous Katadvyciv te kal trovety Barb. 1. Aldus and sub-
sequent edd. follow Rav., &. Elmsley reads duvatovs x. te kal
mw. Bergk conjectures tods micior eOéXovtas Kk. TE Kal Tr.
79. nets 5 Aark.] vyuels Sé Aare. Par. 1. vets aux.
Amb. 1, corrected by another hand tpets 5é reve. Par. 1 has
also catamrvywvas. So also Mod. 2.
te] Elmsley in his additional note says: ‘Manifesto le-
gendum rye’.
80. 6] Omitted in Ray.
I92 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
ra] Omitted in Pal. 1.
82. "Opdv] dopév Brunck. dppwv Rav. (the first p being
struck through with a pen). opoyv Laur. 1, Par. 1, Barb. 1.
dpev the other MSS., the Aldine and early edd. dpwv ed.
Leyden, 1624. I have written the words ypuvody épév with
capital letters. Bergler quotes Plautus, Stichus 24,
‘Neque ille mereat Persarum sibi montes, qui esse perhibentur
aurei ’. |
84. ILPESBT2. 77 rwavcedAjve'|] Elmsley reads rh ravee-
Anvw; continuing the words to Dicxopolis, as the ambassador
nowhere else takes notice of the interruptions. The speakers
in this and the previous line are indicated by dashes in Rav.
85. smaperider 5] All MSS. except Ray., which has «at
mapetider’. Dindorf has given wapetifes @ from Athenzus
Iv. 6, p. 130 f., where this and the four following lines are
quoted. But some of the MSS. of Atheneus have zraperie 8,
which is more euphonious than -@e 6’.
ddrous] Pal. 1, Laur. 2, Par. 2. omrots Rav., Par. 1, Pal. 2.
Omrovs (yp. Kal GAouvs above) Laur. 1, Mod. 1, Amb. 1.
87. Bods] revs Par. 1. ‘Oven-baked oxen’. The Athe-
nians knew dptous xpiBavitas. Atheneus Il. 74—83, pp.
109—116, enumerates the different kinds of dprtot. Those
named from the respective modes of baking are ésvirns, éoya-
pitns, ataBupirns, axaivas, KpiBavitns, éyxpvdias, Nayavov (70)
and érav@pakis (7).
88. Kyrewviyov] Cleonymus is one of Aristophanes’
favourite butts. He is described as a giant Ach. 88, Av. 1474,
as a coward who had thrown away his shield Nub. 353,
Vesp. 19, &c., as a toady, codaxdvupos, Vesp. 592, as a perjurer
Nub, 400, as effeminate Nub. 673, 680, and a glutton Equit.
1292. He is mentioned in many other passages of the earlier
plays. After the Thesmophoriazuse, we hear no more of
him.
89. jv] Omitted in Par. 1, and originally, I think, in Mod. 1.
In Laur. 1, #v is added by a later hand.
dévaé] The name is suggested by Pheenix.
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. 193
90. The second syllable of ébevadxctes is blotted in Laur. 1.
It is converted into épeorvaxifes in Barb. 1.
91. ayovtes nxomev] HKovtes ayopuev Rav.
92. tov Baciréws opdarpdov] Herodotus 1. 114 tells us
that Cyrus when chosen king by his young playfellows distri-
buted offices among them, tov dé xkov twa aitav édhOardpov
Baotnéos eivat. There were many so-called officers. Xenophon,
Cyroped. vil. ii. 10, 11, e¢ 8€ Tus oleras &va aiperoy eivat
OpOarpudv Bacire? ovK dpOds oleras x.7.r. Aristotle, Politica
IIL. 16, df@arpods morrXods of povapyor Towvow aitav Kat
@ta Kal xeipas Kal médas. One King’s Eye, Alpistus, is men-
tioned as having perished in the Persian war by Aéschylus,
Persze 980 sqq. Milton borrows the image Par. Lost 1. 651,
‘the seven, Who in God’s presence nearest to his throne Stand
ready at command and are his eyes’.
93. matra€as| Omitted at first, but added in margin by
the same hand, in Rav.
tov ye gov] Elmsley, to avoid the repetition of ye, reads
tov te odv. But why should it not be repeated when two
separate words require to be emphasized? See Aves 171, 584;
Kecles. 189. The ‘King’s Eye’ had given Diceopolis no
offence, not having even appeared as yet.
94. A late Scholion says: éoxevacpévos nv 6 Iépons Sépya
éyav Kabewévov eis TOTOV TOU Te Twywvos Kal TOD oTOpaTOS
... And another: od@arpov éyov &va ert ravtds tod Tpocd Tov.
This description probably rests on no authority other than the
fancy of the scholiasts and seems scarcely reconcilable with
Diczopolis’s comments. The mask worn by the King’s Eye
was a caricature of the type of face represented in Persian art,
some samples of which on tapestries or ‘ painted cloths’ had
probably found their way to Athens. (See Vespa 1143, éy
*ExBaravowct tad? vdaiveras.) The eyes would be enormously
large and the beard would cover the whole cheek, as it nearly
does in the Nineveh sculptures. The ships’ eyes referred to by
Dicseopolis were probably not the rowlocks but the holes one
on each side of the prow through which the cables passed,
and the aox@para are either leather pads to prevent the
Journal of Philology. vou. vi1t. 13
194 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
_ cables wearing away the wood, or else ‘fenders’ to prevent the
ship suffering damage by collision, or as a temporary means of
repairing some damage already done. We must suppose the
King’s eye to enter ‘attended’, and to salute the assembly with
profound bows to right and left. Hence D.’s question ‘ Does
your aspect mean that you are prepared for action, or are you
wearing round a headland and looking out for a dry-dock ?”
95. vatdpaxtov] Dindorf following Photius writes vav-
gapxtov as the more Attic form.
Bdéreis,| Ribbeck puts a colon at Arézeus and says that
he cannot conceive how the line can be taken interrogatively.
But mpos trav Gedy is always prefixed to a question or a
command, v7) tods Geovs to an affirmation.
96. vewootxoy| All the MSS. read veds oixov and Rav. has
vews KaUTTwY oiKoy (originally caurrev).
98, 101. IIPEZBY2] Rav. indicates the speaker by a
dash. Par. 1, Pal. 2, and Pal. 1, by a recent hand, «jpvé. The
rest mpéoBus 7 xnpvé. In line 102, the speaker is marked by a
dash in Rav.; in some omitted, in others «jpvé.
98. atta o amémep ev] Par. 2. att av o amémepyev
Ray. atta ao améxrewe Pal. 1. attra o’ éreuwe Pal. 2, Barb.
l. &tta o drémeue the rest. Barb. 1 omits dpacov, which is
written above the line in Laur. 1. |
100. I have given this line as it stands in Laur. 1. In
Ray. it is daprapyav éEapEaomicovactpa. It is not worth while
to record the variations of the other MSS., or the attempts
which have been made to get sense out of it. Such attempts
are sure to prove equally fruitless whether applied to the
Pheenician in the Poenulus of Plautus, the ‘ Raphel bai ameth’
of the Giant in Dante (Inferno xxx1), the ‘Boskos Thromuldo
Boskos’ which perplexed M. Parolles in All’s Well that ends
Well (rv. i. 73) or the Turkish in the Bourgeois Gentilhomme
Iv. 5 if any reader is not satisfied with the translation which
contented M. Jourdain.
Aristophanes was doubtless as ignorant of Persian as his
1 vaprayav ekapkay: amicovar cdrpa hand (old) has accented the 4th and
is the reading of Laur. 1. Mr Clark 7th syllable erased a and inserted a
adds in another note book, ‘another before carpa.’ [W. A. W.]
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. — 195
audience. He wanted words conveying no continuous sense
but sounding like words in Persian with which they were
familiar, as ‘ Artabas, Xerxes, Pisuthnes, Satrap’.
102. duiv] Laur. 1, Par. 1, Amb. 1, Laur. 2, Pal. 2. nyiv
Rav., Pal. 1, Mod. 1.
104, Aji] Ago Pal. 1. Ayes Rav. Ann or Any the
rest. )
xpia0] xpica Von Velsen, Rheinisches Museum, xvitt. 127.
105. IIPESBYT>] Omitted in Rav., Laur. 1. & Pal. 1.»
wr
dixat . Pal. 2. «4. the rest. Some similar errors are made in
the next line.
tt dai] Elmsley.. ri & ad all MSS. except Par. 1 and,
originally, Laur. 1 té 0 fav. Brunck reads ri ody,
106. 67z;] So pointed by Brunck on Reiske’s suggestion.
There is no stop after 67 in the MSS. Pal. 2 has a curious
mistake here, reading ti 8 avd Aéyet kfjpv& ore y., and ending the
lines 6’ av and éaovas.
107. ypuotov] ‘Numerosius esset ypvodv é« rt. 8. Elms-
ley. Dindorf adopts the suggestion in his edition of 1835—7,
rightly recurring to the old reading in the edition of 1851.
108. 6d¢ ye] A correction of Bentley’s. 68¢ ye MSS.
Brunck taking the second syllable in ayavas to be short. alters
ev in the next line to yyy. Fritzsche proposed pév y'. A more
probable correction would have been to/as 68, or rolas wor
ayavas; but the ya is probably long as yav is in line 104.
110. dari] amir Rav., Par. 1. a0 or dmifc the rest.
povos| Perhaps podvor, ‘ by himself, unprompted ’.
111. A dash is prefixed to this line in Rav., as if a new
speaker began. So also to lines 114, 115.
mpos Tovtovi] mpos tovtove Ray. ‘In the face of the
ambassador’, He confronts those whom he supposes to be
accomplices in a fraud. Dindorf takes it otherwise: ‘Post
éuot mutata constructione intulit pds rovrovi, quod tantundem
valet quantum simplex dativus tovrwi’. Reiske conjectured
mpos Toutovi ‘per hunc iuavta quem simul ostendit’. Meineke
13—2
196 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
adopts mpds tovtovi, explaining ‘by this staff’. But in that
case we should have expected wpds tautnai, i.e. THs Baxtn-
plas.
112. capdvavixév'] Rav., Laur. 1, Mod. 1, Barb. 1 and a
corrector in Pal. 1. capdavaxov Par. 1, Par. 2, Pal. 1, Pal. 2.
cavoaviaxov Par. 3. caprewiaxoy Ald. Later edd. capécuviaxov.
The scholiast copied by Suidas, who writes capdwvixov, inter-
prets it wrongly ‘Sardinian’ instead of ‘Sardian’. Hesychius
writing capdavixdyv explains rightly. Scarlet was probably a
predominant colour in the stuffs manufactured at Sardis. ‘The
form is capdvviaxov in Clemens Alex. Paed. I. p. 235’,
Kuster.
113. 6 péyas nuiv] piv o péyas Rav.
anotréuet] atroméume Pal. 1, Pal. 2. The MSS. have
after line 113 avaveve, after 114 émivever, rare examples of
stage-directions.
114, GddXas] aA os Par. 1. °
: ol
115. Laur. 1 has érévevcev dvdpes ovtoot. The copyist in
Barb. 1 mistaking the contraction for es in dvdpes writes é7é-
vevoev avopa ovToict.
&vdpes| Elmsley. avdpes MSS.
118. éy@d’ do éort, K.] Rav. has éyod’ Goris éorl K.
whence Meineke éyo8’ Ori éozi K.
Kleisthenes who is ridiculed by Aristophanes as effemi-
nate (Nub. 355 and frequently elsewhere) is ironically called
Son of Siburtius who was a famous trainer zrasdotpiBns and
doubtless a great athlete himself. Antiphon charged Alcibiades
with having killed one of his attendants in the palestra of
Siburtius, Plutarch Alc. c. 3. Kleisthenes had no more rela-
tionship to Siburtius than he had beard. See Equit. 1373, 4
ovo ayopdacer ayévetos ovdels ev ayopd. tod Sita Krevobévns
ayopace Kal Xtpatwv; The scholiast and Suidas say that he
shaved to appear young.
119. é£upnyéve] So Suidas in two places s. v. Krevobévnv
elsov and Xtpatwyv. First put in the text of Aristophanes
by Bisetus 1607. All MSS. have é£euvpnuéve. The scholiast
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. 197
quotes 6 OepuoBovrov ordayyvov from the Medea of Euripides,
No such words are found there. Perhaps, as Elmsley suggests,
they come from the Peliades. They would be fitly addressed to
Medea.
120. tordey’, 6] Rav., Par. 1, Mod. 1. tovdvdé 0 Laur. 1
and Barb. 1. rovovd’ 6 Amb. 1. tovdvde & @& Pal. 1, Pal. 2,
and Suidas s.v. =tpatwv. rovde 8 Suidas s.v. Krevobévnv
op and Elmsley. The scholiast says this line is parodied from
Archilochus.
121. Aes] 7AOev Laur. 1, Par. 1, Mod. 1, and Barb. 1.
123. ciyal| otya Rav.
126. otpayyevowar} Kuster’s emendation. orpayevyouas
Ray. otpatevouas all the rest. In Nubes 131 Rav. Ven. 1 and
others read otpayevouat, but the great majority have otpay-
rysvopat.
127. ovdéroté y toyer Odpa| This reading was first pro-
posed by Elmsley in his Auctarium. In his text he took, as
Brunck had done, ovdéror’ icyes y 1 Ovpa, given by Suidas
(s. v. lryewv). ovdérot’ icyes Oupa Rav. ovdéroré y tox’ 7 Ovpa
Par. 1, Laur. 1, Mod. 1, Amb. 1, Par. 2, Laur. 2, Pal. 1. ovdézror’
icy’ 9 Ovpa Par. 3, Pal. 2, which also has €eviGeov for Eevi-
Sew.
The phrase was proverbial as the scholiast says. He quotes
a line of Eupolis: v7 tov Wocedé, ovdémor toxes 4 Ovpa,
amended by Elmsley xovdéroré xy’ taxes Oipa. He quotes also
in a very corrupt form Pindar, Nem. Ix. 4, év@ dvatemtapévat
feivwv vevixavtat Ovpas. ‘The Prytanes keep open house as
they do it at the state’s expense’.
131. olnca] Par. 1, Mod. 1. wonoas Rav., Amb. 1, Pal. 2.
mouoat Pal. 1. wovjoas Laur. 1, Laur. 2 and Barb. 1. In this
and other MSS. the first syllable of vroveiy is frequently but
not uniformly written mo when the metre requires it to be
short. Some modern edd. adopt Elmsley’s suggestion soinaov.
133. xeynvete] Rav. Elmsl. xeynvare other MSS. Schol.
Suidas. Cheeroboscus, Bekker’s Anecdota p. 1287, says that
Herodian recognized the form xeyyvere in this passage, quoting
198 ‘THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
it however as from the Aves. As Herodian lived in the second
century A.D. his distinct testimony outweighs all MS. autho-
rity. Besides, the imperative is required here.
B
This line is given to mp (1. e. rpéoRus) in Pal. 2.
134. mapa] wa Par. 1. Omitted in Mod. 1, Amb. 1.
@®ENPOS. 68i.] Ogwpos is omitted in Rav. Other MSS.
have 061 Qéwpos, as part of the text, an error which doubtless
arose from the speaker’s name being omitted and inserted in
the margin of the original. Attempts at correction have pro-
duced great confusion which reaches its climax in Pal. 2,
Oéwpos doi xn Oewp’. The mission of Theorus is probably .
a fact, though not mentioned by Thucydides.
135. eloxnputtetat] eioxexnpvxtar Rav. Elmsley proposes
ovTool KnpUTTETaL.
136. av jpev] Elmsley proposes av Ewevoy or guew ay.
Blaydes amv av. Meineke av 7 wa A’. I venture to suggest
av Hyov. The objection to the original is that Theorus every-
where speaks of himself in the singular number, and Diceeopolis
uses épepes not épépere in his interruption.
137. This line is omitted in Laur. 1, Par. 1 and Mod. 1.
138. xatéviye yiovi] Kxaréviye TH xLCvn Par. 1. xatévenpe
7) xvovn Laur. 1, Mod. 1. xKxaréverwe 7H yvove Amb. 1.
139. émné&] érnéev Laur. 1, Par. 1, and originally Mod. 1.
139, 140. tm’ avrov...nywvifero] Meineke, adopting Nauck’s
conjecture, gives these words to Diceopolis. See Thesm. 170
68 avd Oéoyvis Wrypts oy yruypas Trote?. Theognis was so cold
’ a poet that when he produced a play at Athens he froze even
the rivers of Thrace. The absurdity seems more comical when
gravely stated by the envoy himself. The same charge of
coldness was made against Araros the son of Aristophanes by
Alexis in the Parasite: mpdypa 8 éoti pow péya | —
évdov yruypotepov “Apapotos. Athenseus Il. p. 123 e.
140. jv] y jv Rav. vy iw Laure: 3) (Pals <2: Elmsey,
offended by es repetition of 7#v, proposes pirabjvaros Oo pey
vreppuas.
NOTES ON ARISTOPHANES. - 199
143. adnO)s] Rav., Pal. 1, Pal. 2. The rest have arnOas.
144. éypad’] éypadoy Laur. 2, Pal. 1, Par. 2, and Suidas
in xados. He repeats the scholiast’s note : (soy épactaév jv Ta
TOV épwpéevov ovdpata ypadeww év Tois Tolyols xK.T.X. Compare
Vespx 98—100.
. 145. é:rerroinueba] mretroimpeOa Rav. érrerovnpcba Pal. 2.
For the middle voice see Thucyd. 11. 29 Nuydodwpor ot ’AQn-
a /
vaio. mpokevov eTroinoavTo.
146. dayetv] Blotted in Pal. 1. gaciv Laur. 2.
adddvtas}| Amb. 1, Mod. 1, Pal. 1, Pal. 2, and, by correc-
tion, Laur. 1. So also Suidas in azarovpia. adXavtas Rav.,
Laur. 2. addavtos Laur. 1 originally, and Par. 1. Brunck
adopts a\Adytos and Elmsley quotes a similar construction in
Equites 1181, 1182 tovrovi dayeiv éXarijpos.
The festival of azatovpia, in which only citizens, duly
enrolled as members of dparpiéat, could take part, was held on
the 11th and two following days of the month Pyanepsion.
VY. Smith’s Dict. of Antiq. s.v. Sadocus, son of Sitalces, King
of the Odrysz, had been made an Athenian citizen in the
summer of 429, but had not, it seems, come in person to
Athens to enjoy the privileges to which he was entitled. It
was in 429 that Nymphodorus of Abdera Sitalces’ brother-in-law
Thy Te TOD YiTadKouv Evypayiay éroince Kat Yadoxov tov vidv
avtov “A@nvaiov Thuc. 11. 29. In this passage the zeugma
is remarkable: ésroinve would not have been used with the
second clause had it stood alone. It is to be observed also that
the genitive of SvtadX«ns is SutadXxov in Thucydides, YuradrKous
in Aristophanes. For the extent of Sitalces’ kingdom see
Thucyd. 11. 95—101. In the autumn of the year 424 Sitalces
was defeated and slain by the Triballi (Thucyd. tv. 101). The
reputation they thus gained probably suggested to Aristophanes
to give their gods a voice in the councils of Olympus (Aves
1567 sqq.). Sitalces was succeeded by Seuthes, his nephew,
who is mentioned by Thucydides, 11. 101, as being next in
favour to the king.
147. nvtTiBorer] Meineke, after Cobet, reads nvteBoneu.
All MSS., both here and in Equites 667, read nvTsBore. The
200 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Etymologicum Magnum quotes 7vTe8dAnce from the Amphia-
raus of Aristophanes (Fragments 101), apparently noting it as
exceptional, It is very doubtful whether an absolute rule ever
obtained as to the use of the double augment. Being in doubt
I follow the manuscripts.
148. @poce] euooev Ray.
152. This line, which is found in all MSS., was omitted in
the Aldine and all subsequent editions till Brunck’s.
évtav0i] Elmsley. évtad@a Rav. évtavOot the rest. The
form évrav@i is found in the Ravenna MS. Lysist. 570 and
Thesmoph, 646.
153. €Ovos] yévos Pal. 1, Pal. 2, Par. 2, Par. 3, and,
originally, Mod. 1. So also Aldus and his followers.
154, rovto...capés] Continued to Theorus in Rav. Rav.
has pévt’ 76n, Pal. 1 pévt’ 18m corrected to pévr’ 76n, Barb. 1
pév & ayn, the rest wév y on. Par. 1, Par. 2, Laur. 2 read
cages, the rest capés. Elmsley reads roiro pév y 76n cadas,
which does not yield a suitable sense. Translate: ‘ Well here’s
something definite at last’.
155. Hyayev| mryaye Pal. 2.
156. tovti...caxov;| TodTi Ti eotw TO Kakov: Rav. The
words ‘Odouavtwy otpatos are given to Theorus in Mod. 1,
Par, 2, to the «jpvE in most MSS. and edd. The speaker's
name is omitted in Ray. and Par. 1. "Odoyudvytwy is written
with an aspirate in Pal. 2. The Odomanti (called Odomantes
by Suidas and Pliny), as Thucydides tells us 11. 101, were an
independent tribe inhabiting the plains beyond Strymon, north-
wards. This description can only be reconciled with Herodotus
vil. 112, Livy xuiv. 46, xLv. 4, and other authorities by
understanding Thucydides to mean the lower Strymon. Ac-
cording to Herodotus they occupied part of Mt. Pangzeus.
Whether in 425 they were still independent or had become
subjects of Sitalces was a question which neither Aristophanes
nor his audience cared to settle.
oTpatos’| otaros, originally, in Ray.
[To be continued. ]
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS.
I sEEM to see a smile stealing over the face of any scholar
who may have read the points in dispute between Mr Ellis and
myself; but, as he continues the controversy in the last num-
ber of the Journal, I think it worth while to endeavour once
more to. shew him how greatly he misapprehends the grounds on
which the argument between us ought to rest. And here I
cannot help thinking that I have some reasonable cause for
complaint. In an article in the Academy I made afew remarks
on the quantity of hoc which Mr Wordsworth in his very valu-
able work, ‘Fragments of early Latin’, had been induced by Mr
Ellis, against all authority external and internal, no less than
three times to shorten in two passages from Lucilius. Surely
the Academy was the right place in which to question my
remarks, if they were to be questioned. Instead of that, Mr
Ellis occupied no less than nine pages of our Journal in replying
to my few lines. Asa sane controversy must not be carried on
at a length so monstrously disproportioned to the subject-
matter, I contented myself with giving what I believe was
generally thought an adequate rejoinder in a nute to my Lucili-
ana, in p. 302 of the last vol. of the Journal. It will really
conduce to brevity if I here reprint the greater part of that
note :
When I reviewed Mr Wordsworth in the Academy (July 3, 1875), I
said that hoe (nom. and acc.) was as long as hoc abl. or hinc or haec; and
in Plautus and Terence as well. That it was exceedingly common for the last
two to treat such monosyllables, when preceded by a short monosyllable or by a
pyrrhic with the last syllable elided, like the final syllables of iambi: Et id
gratum, Sed hoc mihi molestumst, commencing two consecutive lines near the
beginning of the Andria, where id and hoc are slurred over in the same way as
the final syllables of iambi so often are when they immediately precede or
follow the syll. on which the metrical ictus falls. Mr Ellis I presume would not
think ‘nomen hic nobis’ admissible in Lucilius. However he has devoted nine
202 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
pages in the Journal of Philology (v1 p. 263—272) to questioning this brief
passing assertion of mine. The greater part of these pages is taken up with
quoting from C. F. W. Mueller a number of passages from Plautus and Terence
which exactly bear out what I said, that hoc is as long as hune or hane.
Lucilius appears from L. Mueller’s index to use hoc (nom. and acc.) 8 times
before a vowel, and always long. In none‘of the three cases where Mr Ellis
writes hdc, is his reading found in the Mss...Mr Ellis observes (p. 269): ‘ Lucilius
shortens tamétsi just as Plautus or Terence might; to Horace such a liberty
would have seemed impossible’! as if tametsi were not a spondee as much as
teipso, am being elided; as if @st were not as impossible to Lucilius as to
Horace ; as if it matters the least whether we write tametsi or tam etsi ; as if
tam, =tamen, does not occur again and again by itself in the old writers. It
is hard to have to dispute on questions like this.
I did think that the modest form and proportions of this
rejoinder would save further controversy. But no: in the last
number Mr Ellis came out with a surrejoinder of more than two
pages (67—69). ‘Mr Munro’s remarks’ he begins by saying
‘might lead an incautious reader to suppose that I had main-
tained the monstrous position that nomen hdc nobis was admis-
sible in Lucilius’, He must be an ‘incautious reader’ indeed to
suppose I charged Mr Ellis with maintaining it, when my words
are ‘Mr Ellis I presume would not think nomen hdc nobis admis-
sible’, and when the very gist of my remark was to shew how
utterly irrelevant it was to argue from the peculiarities of the
old scenic prosody as to what Lucilius might admit. It is per-
fectly true that if Terence’s sed hoc miht molestum est be made
to support hdc ali in Lucilius, it might just as well be made to
support hdc nobis. When Mr Ellis goes on to say that ‘the use
of hoc in Plautus and Terence as a virtually short syllable in
such positions as sed hoc mihi molestum est is comparatively of
more frequent occurrence than the use of hic in similar situa-
tions’, can he not see that the simple and sole reason of this is
the fact that hoc occurs much more frequently than Ade in
Plautus and Terence and other writers ? what other explanation
can be needed? For the same reason we have hdc 8 times, hic
only 4 times in Lucilius before a vowel, simply because hoc on
the whole occurs more than twice as often as hic. |
Well, and after all Mr Ellis surrenders two of his three
Lucilian hdcs. I feel a good confidence therefore that he will
soon surrender his ‘atque si hdc ununst’ as well; for I am sure
that any scholar will tell him, that the words in their context
have no meaning at all. When he says ‘I still prefer my own
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 203
reading to either Munro’s”Etos or Lachmann’s”Ezrs, if for no
other reason than that the words of the Mss. then need no
change at all, he is here I can assure him under a complete
misapprehension : stoc is not st hoc, and the Harleian itself
carefully expunges the hoc in the next verse which no other
Ms. contains, and which Mr Ellis should not have therefore
snatched at. If too he had observed how the Harleian a few
words before writes gecic, he might have seen that my etoc is
nearer stoc (ctoc) and that my text generally is closer to the
Mss. than his own unmetrical, ungrammatical and meaningless
reading is. I do not hesitate to say that hdc in Lucilius would
be a greater portent than in Virgil or Horace. Virgil admits
hic; Lucilius only hie.
What has brought this endless controversy upon me was
an observation, contained in a few lines, that all the evidence
we possessed, especially that of his own fragments, as well as
the unvarying usage of all subsequent classical poets, proved
Lucilius to have known only hdc. Mr Ellis never attempted to
disprove this, the real point at issue; but filled page after page
with irrelevant quotations from C. F. W. Mueller, which simply
demonstrated what I had myself said with regard to the usage
of the old scenic poets. He has abandoned as untenable two
of his three Lucilian hécs, and admits of the third that ‘the
support is certainly a very slender one’. He now seeks to
change the venue to the grammarians Diomedes and Pseudo-
Probus whose words have no more apparent bearing on Lucilius
than on Shakespeare. One of them is utterly unknown; the ~
other belongs to the latter half of the 4th century and is styled
by Reifferscheid a ‘miserrimus grammaticus’. My words, to
which Mr Ellis now shifts the controversy, were meant for a
mere contemptuous reference, not intended for argument at all.
He is quite welcome to the pair, as well as to Plutarch’s ox aye,
which I cited ages ago. Let hoc or oc be as short to them as
Mr Ellis pleases; but ‘ignoratio elenchi’ is a terrible engine for
prolonging controversy. |
Again, when I turn to the next page, my hopes that he will
soon entirely abandon his hdc are sadly dashed. In his former
204 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
disputation he had, to support this comic prosody, made the
singular assertion that Lucilius used the scansion tamétsi.
The reader will see what I say of this in my note quoted above.
Lucilius has for instance ‘Quo me habeam pacto, tam etsi non
quaeri’ docebo’. How does Mr Ellis (p. 68) take my correction?
. ‘My assertion that tamétsi was used by Lucilius may no doubt
be explained away by supposing tam elided or by writing tam
etst. But the question is not settled by these obvious remarks.
We cannot be sure that the comic writers elided tam and made
etsi long’. ‘Explained away’! ‘obvious remarks’! Am I to under-
stand from this that Mr Ellis was aware of this explaining away
and ‘these obvious remarks’, when he made his curious statement,
and chose to connect it with comic peculiarities, as alien to
Lucilius as to Virgil? I am now disposed to withdraw what I
said above and to think that even a cautious reader might sup-
pose he would be ready to defend nomen hdc nobis in Lucilius,
if some other misapprehension rendered this a convenient hypo-
thesis. Let us see: it is not unusual for metrists of a peculiar
turn of mind to scan té7psum, séipsum. If one of these were to
bring me an hexameter ending with nosce teipswm, I should say
to him, My good friend, metrically, if not morally, you should
lay this maxim to heart: don’t you know teipswm is a spondee ?
Take for instance, out of 50 examples, Horace’s ‘Tutus et in
seipso totus teres atque rotundus’. I should now expect to
hear him reply, ‘oh, it may no doubt be explained away by
supposing se elided or by writing se ipso. But the question is
not settled by these obvious remarks: I prefer to scan sé%pso in
Horace after the example of Plautus and Terence’. Lucilius’
prosody was identical with Horace’s ; and his scansion of tametsi
the same as Horace’s scansion of seipso. I cannot help reite-
rating once more, ‘it is hard to have to dispute on questions
like this’. |
In the same ‘ Luciliana’ of mine I began (p. 294 foll.) my
emendations by what I venture to say almost every scholar
will look upon as a certain correction of a passage on which
many fruitless conjectures have been made. AIl who choose
to turn to what I say there will see why I speak thus confid-
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 205
ently: I ground the certainty of my correction solely on the
fact that I have discovered it in Gellius: ‘anu noceo, inquit’
for the absurd ‘anunotelo inquit’ of Mss.’ I repeat that my
restoration is certain. But what thinks Mr Ellis? He says
(p. 69) ‘I venture to differ from him (Munro) on three grounds:
(1) The improbability of so common a word as noceo being
corrupted into no telo; (2) the frequency with which Gellius
adds inguit after the first or first two words of a quotation,
cf. v 14 ete.; (8) the weakness of the expression’. And he
prefers his own anumne tero, inquit.
Let me say a few words on these three objections. I
appeal to any one who knows anything of Nonius’ Mss. or
of any medieval Mss. whether they might not offer noceo or
noteo with perfect indifference, the sounds being in those times
identical, as facies or faties, spatiwm or spacium and ten
thousand similar cases sufficiently attest. I would ask further
whether the meaningless anwnoteo might not readily pass into
an uno telo to give the semblance of Latin words.
As for the second objection, it is perfectly true that Gellius
often attaches znguit to a quotation ; but it is not his custom to
attach it in a case like the present. I will quote what he does
say here: Sicuti Lucilius in eodem casu wictu et anu dicit,
non victui nec anut, in hisce versibus: ‘Quod sumptum atque
epulas victu praeponis honesto’: et alio in loco ‘anu noceo,
inquit’. Let me add what immediately follows: Vergilius
quoque in casu dandi aspectu dicit, non aspectui: ‘teque
aspectu ne substrahe nostro’: et in georgicis: ‘Quod nec
concubitu indulgent’. C. etiam Caesar, gravis auctor linguae
Latinae, in Anticatone : ‘unius’ inquit ‘arrogantiae, superbiae
dominatuque’. item in Dolabellam actionis 1 lib. 1: ‘isti
quorum in aedibus fanisque posita et honori erant et ornatu’.
And so in 50 other places it is seen not to be Gellius’ rule,
when he quotes two or more successive passages from an author
to repeat the dicit or inquit after the first passage. And more-
over, when he speaks as here of citing a versus, he never con-
tents himself with quoting two words like anw noceo, which
give no indication of metre. The least he would cite is anu
noceo inquit, which shews itself to be at least part of a verse.
206 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
I unhesitatingly assert then that inquit is a portion of the
quotation, and that Gellius is quoting from our passage.
As for Mr Ellis’ third objection, I greatly prefer in itself
anu noceo to his anumne tero; but, as I said before, every
corrector thinks his own correction best; and now, as then,
I appeal to Gellius alone in maintaining that my emendation
is certain. Mr Ellis may refer it to any scholar he likes: I
have no doubt of the verdict being on my side.
In my Luciliana no. 11, Journal vii p. 299, I proposed ficta
ices (i.e. icens) for the unmeaning fictrices of Nonius’ Mss.
which is only the change of a single letter. Mr Ellis in p. 70 of
our present volume observes: ‘Lachmann, Mueller and Munro
all correct the Ms. fictrices as if it must contain some part of
jingere, the word under consideration’, On the contrary we all
of us assert that Nonius blunders and that the word comes from
figo. Mr Ellis then argues that fictricis ‘may be right, especially
as from Nonius’ explanation Fingere est lingere’. But the
question is what Lucilius, not what Nonius, thought; and I
fancy Mr Ellis will get no one to believe that Lucilius could
employ jfictriz in such a sense. If I am not mistaken, I can
disabuse him of such a notion.
On looking at what the editors of Nonius and Lucilius say,
I am much surprised that none of them have observed what
was clear to me when I first came across the passage in Nonius,
p. 308, 17: Fingere est lingere. Vergilius lib. vimm1-Cum poclo
bibo eodem, amplector, labra labellis Fictrices conpono, cet. The
VIII is a mistake for vi1I which is rightly given in another part
of Nonius. Both Mueller and Lachmann change lingere to
wungere. 'This is what Nonius probably wrote: Fingere est
lingere. Vergilius [lib. vii illam tereti cervice reflexa Mulcere
alternos et corpora fingere lingua. Fingere, iungere. Lacilius]
lib. vit Cum poclo cet. And then he goes on to illustrate
four other senses of fingere. The cause of the omission is
obvious. Of course the words ‘fingere, iungere’ are not cer-
tain, as he may have perversely given the sense of lingere to
Lucilius’ jicta, which is really the archaic partic. of figo, tho’ we
need not gratuitously thrust such a blunder on him. The
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUVS. 207
jingere in Virgil has nearly the meaning which is assigned to it:
Medic. p. m. has indeed lingere for fingere.
Ibid. no. 22 I proposed ‘dum miles Hibera Terra fractu’
meret ter sex, aetate quasi, annos’ for the ‘Terras ac meret cet.’
of Mss. Mr Ellis observes on this: ‘May not a proper name
lurk in s ac, possibly Sacsa or Seica ?’ If anything in so short a
fragment can be clear, it must be clear that Lucilius is here
speaking of the long and hard service of the Roman soldiery in
Spain, miles having its collective sense; and that Sacsa or
Seica, whatever may be their meaning, can have no place
here. Comp. the precise parallel in x1 8 Annos hic terra iam
plures miles Hibera Nobiscum meret: which is surely decisive’.
I will now bring together and discuss several passages of
Lucilius, which may have a more general interest than this
thrashing anew of grain which I had fancied was already safely
housed :
. Cic. de finibus 1 7 Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo
quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius! Scipio
vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis: quorum ille iudicium re-
formidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere.
facete is quidem, sicut alia: sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad
quorum iudicia elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut
urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina~mediocris.
Cic. de orat. 11 25 Nam ut C. Lucilius homo doctus et perur-
banus dicere solebat neque se ab indoctissimis neque a doc-
tissimis legi velle, quod alteri nihil intellegerent, alteri plus
fortasse quam ipse; de quo etiam scripsit ‘Persium non curo
legere’—hic fuit enim, ut noramus, omnium fere nostrorum
hominum doctissimus— Laelium Decumum volo’, quem cog-
novimus virum bonum et non illiteratum, sed nihil ad Persium ;
1 Tbid. no. 18, I showed that both
Mueller and Lachmann had corrupted
this fragment; and I explained with
some care its probable meaning and
relation to the context. Mr Ellis ob-
serves; ‘Quicherat has anticipated
Munro in his explanation of xxvi. 46 Mm.’
On referring to Quicherat’s Nonius I _
find that he retains the Ms. reading
which is unquestionably right; but
not one single word of comment does
he give.
208 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
sic ego, si iam mihi disputandum sit de his nostris studiis,.
nolim equidem apud rusticos, sed multo minus apud vos. malo
enim non intellegi orationem meam quam reprehendi.
Pliny Nat. Hist. Praef. 7 Praeterea est quaedam publica
etiam eruditorum reiectio. utitur illa et M: Tullius extra omnem
ingenii aleam positus, et (quod miremur) per advocatum de-
fenditur: ‘Nec doctissimis—Manium Persium haec legere nolo,
Tulium Congum volo’. quod si hoc Lucilius, qui primus con-
didit stili nasum, dicendum sibi putavit, Cicero mutuandum,
praesertim cum de republica scriberet, quanto nos causatius ab
aliquo iudice defendimus ?
Lachmann, and after him with more precision Lucian
Mueller, have proved that the last five books of Lucilius were
written and published before the first twenty-five. The latter
has shewn that books 26—29 were the earliest; then after an
interval came 30 which refers to books already published. In
the 7th there is a plain reference to a passage in the 29th.
Various notes of time, to which I will recur later, as well as the
metres in which the different books were written point perhaps
to like conclusions. We have copious fragments of the last five
books, mostly from Nonius. 26 and 27 were wholly composed in
the favourite old Latin septenarius or trochaic tetrameter cata-
lectic: 28 and 29 were written chiefly in the old Latin tri-
meter iambic, but at the same time contained each of them
both septenarii and hexameters. As all, or certainly most of
the books, were made up, like Horace’s, of several satires, this
mixture of metres is natural enough. The 30th book was
wholly composed of hexameters; and so were the first twenty.
Of the other five books, we are certain that 22 was partly
written in elegiacs ; whether entirely, the very scanty fragments
do not allow us to decide: in fact we have only three penta-
meters; at least I hope later on to expel one of its distichs,
and Mueller has, wrongly I think, admitted another, which
Lachmann forms into trimeters. Of the four remaining books,
21, 23,24 and 25, we possess no known fragment, except a single
hexameter quoted by Priscian from the 23rd; and it Mueller
relegates to the 13th. For some reason or other Nonius, to
whom we owe most of the fragments to which the number of
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 209
the book tliey belong to is attached, does not give us a single
line from these four books. They were probably hexameter or
elegiac, or both, as Lucilius is not likely in his latter years to
have returned to his earlier metres; and doubtless a portion of
the 200 hexameters, more or less, ‘ex libris incertis’ belonged
to them.
We may assume then that the fragments quoted above from
Cicero and Pliny belonged to one or other of the four books
26—29 ; and in my judgment Mueller is quite right in assigning
the one from Pliny to 26, and to the earliest satire of that book,
in which Lucilius would first come before the public and would
naturally set forth the purpose he had in view and the style he
designed to adopt. The passage of the De Finibus too Mueller
makes to refer to this first satire. But the line quoted in the
De Oratore he puts in the 29th book at the end of the sep-
tenarli there. My feeling certainly is that it too belongs to the
first satire of 26 and formed part of the same passage to which
the De Finibus and Pliny refer. Again there is a manifest blunder
in the Pliny extract, whether the author or his copyists are in
fault ; for we know from Cicero that Persius’ praenomen was
Gaius, not Manius.
_ Mueller lays the blame on the Mss. and thus reforms the
passage :
~v-v-~ nec doctissimis, nam Gaium | Persium haece legere
nolo, Iulium Congum volo. This I-cannot accept: we get an
uncouth verse with no caesura, and an inadequate meaning.
Pliny is pleading to Titus the example of Cicero, who at the
opening of his Republic had declared he was writing for those
who had neither too much nor too little learning, and had
called in as his ‘advocatus’ Lucilius, from whom he had cited
what Pliny cites and also what he himself refers-to in the
De Oratore m1 25. Pliny therefore I feel sure gives the be-
ginning and the end of Cicero’s quotation in his De Republica :
Nec doctissimis—— Manium cet. In error too he has written
down Persiwm instead of another name; and this is natural
enough, if the name occurred in the same passage as Persiwm,
and, like his, was that of a very learned man. What Cicero
Journal of Philology. vou. vutt. 14
210 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY..
quoted then, and what Pliny refers to, must I should think
have run thus:
Nec doctissimis scribuntur haec neque indoctissimis:
Persium non curo legere, Laelium Decumum volo:
*
Manium
[Persium] haec ego legere nolo, Iulium Congum volo.
The name for which Pliny has wrongly put Persiwm had
probably the same quantity. If it were like Curionem or Caeso-
ninum, then ego is not wanted ; but ego is I think more energetic
than Mueller’s haece. Pliny’s mistake however in Persiwm
may have involved one in legere as well, and Lucilius may
have written something like ‘Gellium aestumare’ or ‘haec
censere’. Maniwm was probably added because there was more
than one known person of the name, just as Decumum is added
to Laelium to distinguish him from the more famous Gaius.
The fact that Pliny quotes the passage in his Preface, and that
Cicero doubtless did the same, is another argument in favour of
placing it near the beginning of Lucilius’ first written satire.
I now proceed to another fragment, which Mueller and
Lachmann place in the ‘libri incerti’, but which I think be-
longs like the preceding to the first satire of 26. Festus p. 273
Redarguisse per e litteram Scipio Africanus Pauli filius dicitur
enuntiasse, ut idem etiam pertisum, cuius meminit Lucilius,
cum ait ‘Quo facetior videare et scire plus quam ceteri, per-
tisum hominem, non pertaesum, dicere ferum nam genus’,
For the three corrupt words at the end Lachmann reads ‘ erum-
nam est opus’; the erwmnam is a certain and brilliant cor-
rection, the est opus only a makeshift. Mueller adopts of course
erumnam, but reads ‘hominum—dices erumnam genus’; which
I do not much like. I have thought of negas? for genus, which
is not much more than transposing two letters :
Quo facetior videare et scire plus quam ceteri,
pertisum hominem, non pertaesum, dicere erumnam negas ?
‘Do you refuse to say ‘pertisum, n. p., er.’, so as to shew
yourself thereby more witty and more knowing than your neigh-
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 211
bours?’ The construction ‘nego dicere’ for ‘nego me dicturum’
or ‘recuso dicere’, tho’ it is rare and tho’ Forcellinus and his
followers give no instance of it, is well enough attested: Plaut.
Casina 111 5 55 negat ponere alio modo ullo; Ter. Andr. 379 si
tu negaris ducere; Virg. georg. 111 207 negabunt Verbera lenta
pati et duris parere lupatis; Ovid met. xiv 250 Ire negabamus
et tecta ignota subire. In xx1Ix 83 Lucilius himself used ‘negat
reddere’ or rather ‘se reddere’ in the same sense.
That this first satire of 26 was a dialogue between Lucilius
and somebody with whom he discussed and to whom he ex-
plained his style of writing, is, as Mueller shews, clear from
many of the fragments. /Persius’ first satire in fact is an
imitation of the Lucilian method. The ‘Quis leget haec? of
v.2 the scholiast tells us was taken from Lucilius’ first book ;
so that he must have opened it, as well as 26, with a dialogue.
Is it possible that the interlocutor in this his earliest satire, the
first of book 26, was Scipio himself, and that the verses which
we have just discussed were addressed by him to Lucilius and
have some reference to the passage cited above from Festus ?_
But this we must leave for the present, and may revert to later on.
Meanwhile I go on to another and a very corrupt fragment
which belongs to this 26th book and I believe to the first and
introductory satire of the book, and which assumes very diverse
shapes in the hands of different scholars. It has this form in
the oldest and most genuine Mss. of Nonius, p. 351, 4, Mutare
transferre. Lucilius lib. xxvI. doctior quam ceteris is asa mittis
mutes aliquo tecum satrafa acutia. The very ancient Harleian
Ms. in the British Museum very carefully alters ‘satrafa acutia’
to ‘satra facta uitia’, a change made by some others of the
older MSS.; and the more interpolated ones further change
‘satra’ to ‘sacra’, thus giving the words a semblance of Latin,
For ‘is asa’ the Harleian p.m. has ‘issa’, ‘corrected by another
hand into is asa’? E.M.T. As Nonius cites the passage to
illustrate muto in the sense of transferring from one place to
another, it is pretty clear that ‘mutes aliquo tecum’ as well as
‘doctior quam ceteri’ and perhaps ‘mittis’ are uncorrupted ; the
other words have given rise to widely different conjectures,
14—2
212 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
To take as samples those of the two latest editors of Lucilius,
of the latest editor of Nonius, and of Mr Ellis in the last number
of the Journal, it is thus Mueller reforms it after Duentzer:
doctior quam ceteri
sis et mutes aliquo tecum sartas tectas ditias.
The ‘mittis’ he says is doubtless a dittography of ‘mutes’,
with which I do not agree, any more than with the meaning
he assigns to the whole fragment. This correction is founded
on the first stage of interpolation ‘satra facta vitia’: the others
all rest on the further palpable interpolation ‘sacra facta vitia’,
Lachmann presents us with
doctior quam ceteri,
siqua mittis, mutes aliquo tum sacra face a via:
which he illustrates from Ovid. Quicherat too finds his way
into the Sacra via, but robs it instead of buying as Lachmann
does :
doctior quam ceteri,
saxa mutes aliquo tecum, sacra furata via.
Mr Ellis, p. 71, holds that, after Scaliger had conjectured
‘symmistis’, there can be no reasonable doubt that ‘sacra facta
vitia’ is simply ‘sacra facticia’, which he translates ‘false rites’.
‘The whole passage may have run thus,
doctior quam ceteri
sis symmistae, mutes aliquo tecum sacra facticia’.
I have my doubts on all these points: cuppvtarns is a late
patristic word which does not occur in classical writers and
which it is not likely Lucilius would know: ‘sacra facticia’—a
conjecture founded on the worst form of the interpolation—does
not mean ‘false rites’, but rites made by the hand, by the art of
man, not by nature, and has nothing ‘false’ about it. It too is
a late word, first occurring in Pliny, perhaps coined by him,
These adjectives in -tcius, with long i, formed from participles,
‘novicius’ and Plautus’ ‘caesicius’ being the only ones I know
which come from an adjective, are peculiar and entirely to be sepa-
rated from adjectives in -tcvws, such as ‘tribunicius, praetoricius, -
pastoricius, natalicius’. Some of the former class are found in
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. ~ Orns
the older writers, ‘novicius, caesicius, commenticius, suppositi-
cius, insiticius, commendaticius’. Others are late and technical
formations, such as ‘facticius, ficticius, pigneraticius, missicius’ :
‘sacra ficticia’ would give the meaning Mr Ellis wants, but
then Lucilius would not have employed the word.
As soon as I observed the genuine Ms. reading, I felt that
‘satrafa acutia’ represented ‘satirafactua’, and was scarcely more
than the transposition of an 7 But when I had got ‘doctior
quam ceteri...mutes aliquo tecum satiram fac tuam’, it was by
no means so easy to divine what ‘s is asa (or, s issa) mittis’
might stand for. At least three or four conjectures presented
themselves which for the moment struck their deviser as more
or less plausible, a pretty sure sign that the right one had not
been hit upon. It then struck me that the ‘doctior quam
ceteri’ of this fragment, which we know to belong to the 26th
book, formed part of the same discussion as the fragment which
T have above transferred, ‘mutavi’, from the ‘libri incerti’ to the
26th: the ‘doctior quam ceteri’ is so like the ‘Quo facetior
videare et scire plus quam ceteri’. It would then come from
the same interlocutor who there tries to force on Lucilius the
modern and learned refinements of ‘pertisum’ and the like.
If this be so, would not the following supply the sense at least
of what is wanted ?
. doctior quam ceteri
si esse omittis, mutes aliquo tecum satiram fac tuam:
‘If you neglect to be more learned than your neighbours, you
had better take your satire and yourself off somewhere else’;
you wont do here in Rome. It would then be connected pro-
bably with the passages which we have cited above from the
De. Finibus, the De Oratore, and Pliny’s Preface’.
There are two or three other passages belonging to the 26th
book or to the ‘libri incerti’ which may have some connexion
with those we have been discussing; but as they are vague, I
1 The elision of a syllable at the alone I have noted ‘Re in secunda, Ne
beginning of averse iscommon enough hoc faciat, Cum ipsi, Tum illud, Qui
in Lucilius and the older poets, even et.’ ‘Esse si omittis’ would not be
Catullus and Horace in his satires. quite so near the Mss.
In Lucilius’ trochaics and iambics
aia * THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
will pass them over and go on to say a few words on the dates
of Lucilius’ life.
Jerome, whose additions to the Eusebian chronicle, copied
from Suetonius, so often perplex us through some seeming care-
lessness or ignorance on his part, gives two very distinct and
authentic-looking notices, one of the birth, the other of the
death of Lucilius. Under the year which corresponds to U.C.
606, B.c. 148, (as the two best Mss. attest, the others assigning
it to the following year) he tells us the poet Lucilius was
born. Again in the year which answers to 651 (103), as
all the Mss. give it except the Amandinus, which assigns it to
the year following, he says ‘C. Lucilius satyrarum scriptor
Neapoli moritur ac publico funere effertur anno aetatis XLVI’.
The date of his death seems to be correctly given. Tho’ this
was formerly questioned, scholars are now agreed that there is
nothing in his fragments that need be assigned to a later date
than several years before B.c. 103 or 102: see L. Mueller’s
edition, p. 288.
But could he have been born so late as B.c, 148, and have
died at the age of 45 or 46? We know from Cicero, Horace
and others that he was an intimate friend of the younger Scipio;
we know that he went with him to Spain B.c. 134 and served
as an ‘eques’ in the Numantine war. He would then have
been a boy of 14, which seems almost an absurdity. Scipio
is spoken of as serving very young; but he was 17 when he
fought under his own father Paulus at Pydna. Then could
Horace write ‘quo fit ut omnis Votiva pateat veluti descripta
tabella Vita senis’ of a man who died in his 46th year? It has
been said that we are all disposed to think of men of the olden
time as ‘senes’, But Horace was born 37 or 38 years after the
other’s death, and his Satires were written less than 70 years
after that time. I observe that the publishers of the Beaumont
and Fletcher of 1679 promise, if it succeeds, ‘to reprint old
Shakespeare’; but these are rather words of homely endearment.
But argue as we may about Horace’s ‘senis’, there is a
passage of Cicero which in my judgment is decisive on the
point in question, tho’ I have never seen it taken sufficiently
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 215
into consideration. I refer to the De Finibus 1 7, cited above.
Cicero says there ‘Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo quo
minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius! Scipio
vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis; quorum ille wudicium re-
formidans, Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere’.
The Rutilius here spoken of is P. Rutilius Rufus, the cele-
brated statesman and Stoic writer. At this time he was quite a
young man and, together with Lucilius, accompanied Scipio to
the Numantine war as military tribune. As Seipio was dead
when Lucilius published book 1 of his Satires, the passage here
referred to must have occurred in one of his earlier books,
26—30; probably, as I have argued above, in the earliest of
all, the 26th, in more or less close connexion with the other
passages I have so fully discussed, especially with the ‘doctior
quam ceteri —— mutes aliquo tecum satiram fac tuam’, if I
have at all hit the right meaning of those lines. Lucilius says,
in jest of course, that he shrinks from the judgment of Scipio
and intends to write for folks who could scarcely understand
Latin. The first published book or books then of his Satires
must have been written between the time of the Numantine
war and B.C. 129, the year of Scipio’s death. If therefore
Jerome’s chronology be correct, Lucilius, who earned such great
renown by inventing a new style of satire, the peculiar glory of
Rome, must have composed some of his works between the
ages of fourteen and nineteen: a thing incredible surely.
I am disposed to adopt a simple conjecture which has been
put forth, that Jerome in copying out Suetonius’ precise
account of the death and funeral of Lucilius, through his own
negligence or a faulty Ms. for Suetonius’ ‘anno aetatis LXIv’
or ‘LXVI’ wrote down ‘XLvVi’ and then adapted the year of
birth to the ‘annus Abrahae’ which would correspond to this
false reading. Every thing would now run smooth. Luci-
lius, when he went with Scipio to Spain, would be in the
prime of manhood, 32 or 34 years of age. Soon after that
time he would be writing and publishing his earliest books,
26—29, and then 30. Some of these at all events would be
published before the death of Scipio, when the poet would
be 37 or 39. His ready pen, tho’ engaged on a novel
216 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
style of writing, would not need ‘much scratching of the head
or biting of the nails’ to set it in motion. Fragment 47
Muell. of our 26th book, ‘Percrepa pugnam Popili, facta Cor-
nelt cane, proves that it was not published till after the
capture of Numantia. A comparison of the fragments I have
discussed above makes it appear to me not improbable that
Scipio may have been the poet’s sportive opponent in the
dialogue of the Ist Satire of 26.
We have next an excellent terminus ex quo for the date
of book I: its 10th fragment speaks of Carneades as dead.
He died B.c. 129, the year of Scipio’s death. This book there-
fore was completed certainly after that date, as is pointed out
by Fischer in his Roem. Zeitt. for that year. We may assume
then that books 1—25 were composed during the 20 years
or so, beginning a year or two after B.c. 129 and ending a
very few years before the poet’s death in 103 or 102. His
whole career as a satirist would then occupy some 25 years.
This would harmonise well with Horace’s picture, ‘ut omnis
Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella Vita senis.’
Mueller, p. 289, prefers another hypothesis which has been
started, that Jerome has confounded the consuls of U.c. 606
- with those of U.c. 574 whose names were almost the same.
Lucilius would thus be born B.c. 180, and would be 77 or 78
at the time of his death. This would involve the consequence
that the poet would be nearly fifty when he began to write or
publish; which is perhaps a little improbable in the case of
so voluminous an author. Liucilius would then too be ten
years older than the poet Accius who preceded him at all
events as an author. Mueller gives two main reasons for ~
adopting this view, neither of which I can accept. Lucilius
in the 46th fragment of 26 mentions the Lusitanian chief
Viriathus who after years of successful warfare with Rome
was murdered B.c. 140. Mueller argues that the poet’s men-
tion of him must have been contemporary with the events
spoken of. But that is quite impossible: in a single line of
this same book he mentions the defeat of M. Popilius by the
Numantines B.c. 138, and Scipio’s capture of their city five
years later; and it seems certain that he must likewise have
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 217
brought into the same satire the former exploits of that ‘ bar-
barian Hannibal’ in order to enhance the glory of Scipio. We
see from the four first fragments of 29, that he must there
have spoken at length of the deeds of the real Hannibal and
of the elder Scipio. Mueller next asserts that -the Lupus, so
bitterly assailed by Lucilius, was Lentulus Lupus, who was
consul B.c. 156, censor in 147; and that the poet satirises
his conduct when he was censor. But this cannot be the fact:
Fischer, as we said, has pointed out that book I was published
after the death of Carneades B.c. 129; and in that book the
gods hold a council to effect the destruction of Lupus, who
is also alive in the 4th book. Lentulus Lupus must have been
an elderly man when he was censor B.C. 147; and Lucilius
can hardly have been attacking him for other misdeeds as a
judge 20 years or more after that time. Tho’ others have
‘ also identified the two, they can scarcely be the same; and
we must be content not to know who Lucilius’ enemy was.
The cognomen is not an uncommon one, and our knowledge of
the times in question is exceedingly scanty.
Lucilius ap. Cic. de Finibus 11 8 23,
No editor of Cicero or of Lucilius has treated this frag-
meut with a satisfying result. Madvig himself, tho’ as usual
he has well comprehended and -well explained the drift of
Cicero’s argument, has quite failed to correct Lucilius’ own
words which are very corrupt in the Mss. Cicero, in reply
to the Epicurean Torquatus, is denying that in any sense
merely ‘iucunde vivere’ can be ‘bene aut beate vivere.” He
will not deign to take into consideration those ‘asoti’ ‘qui
in mensam vomant’ and so on. But he will not allow it
even of those who may be said really ‘iucunde vivere’ in an
Epicurean sense and who display the utmost refinement of
luxury and self-indulgence: mundos, elegantis, optimis cocis,
pistoribus, piscatu, aucupio, venatione, his omnibus exquisitis,
vitantis cruditatem, quibus vinum defusum e pleno sit, hrysi-
zon, ut ait Lucilius, cui nihil dum sit vis et sacculus abstu-
lerit, adhibentis ludos et quae secuntur, illa quibus detractis
218 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
clamat Epicurus se nescire quid sit bonum: adsint etiam for-
mosi pueri qui ministrent, respondeat his vestis, argentum,
Corinthium, locus ipse, aedificium :—hos ergo asotos bene qui-
dem vivere aut beate numquam dixerim.’ I take the ‘hrysi- ~
zon’ of Madvig’s best Ms. as the oldest and most genuine
form of the corruption: then comes ‘hirsizon.’ Morelius in
his commentary of 1546 cites from his Ms. a strange reading
‘hirsyphon’, which has greatly affected the criticism of the
fragment, and in my opinion most mischievously.
Madvig has clearly shewn that the commentators before
him, with their ‘nil dempsit’ and so on, had quite misunder-
stood the purport of the quotation, the ‘sacculus’ being in-
tended to soften the harshness of the wine, and he suggests
‘nil duri sit’ for ‘dum sit’. He proves too triumphantly that
‘hir’ can have no place here. This word, which is not found
in the classical authors, is explained by the old grammarians
to mean Gévap, ‘the flat or hollow of the hand, the palm without
the fingers.’ Mueller adopts Madvig’s ‘duri’ and Lambinus’
‘nix’; but will not accept the former’s refutation of ‘hir’;
and gives us this distich: Defusum e pleno siet hir sipho-
neve, cui nil Durist, cum nix et sacculus abstulerit: the syntax
calls I think for Madvig’s ‘ sit’, not ‘est’’,
Tho’ it may be presumptuous to say so, when Madvig is of
the number, I assert that none of the critics of Lucilius or
of Cicero has taken a correct view of this citation. Cicero is
adapting the poet’s words to his own argument and to his
own context, and turning them into the oratio obliqua. Luci-
lius must have praised what Cicero, playing the stoic, here
condemns. He was commending no doubt some fine and
well-kept wine. In the first part therefore ‘quibus’ and ‘sit’
are Cicero's own words, not Lucilius’; and the 2nd ‘sit’ and
‘abstulerit’ were ‘est’ and ‘abstulit’ in the original. Varro has
similarly turned Lucilius’ words into the ‘oratio obliqua’ in
1 Mr Ellis, supra p. 70, calls Muel- the sense of his own lines. How can
ler’s version ‘deplorable’: he returns ‘hir-siphon’, any more than ‘ manus-
to ‘dempsit’ and to the old interpre- siphon’, ‘palma-siphon’, or ‘xelp-
tation, exploded by Madvig. Idonot olgwv’, mean ‘a hand-siphon’? and
understand the Latin, the syntax or whata rhythm! ;
Ee le a i a _—s
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 219
the fragment which follows ours in Mueller. Cicero is not
citing a whole elegiac couplet; but two fragmentary hexa-
meters. Again and again, when he is quoting his favourite
poets, an allusive imperfect sentence is enough for himself and
his hearers, more emphatic often than a complete citation
would be. Look at ‘Licinius, ferrewm scriptorem’ and what
follows in 1 § 5 of this very work; on which Madvig remarks
‘illud non nego, Ciceronem alibi, ubi pauca huiusmodi verba,
non integram sententiam, a poeta sumat, suis verbis gramma-
tice annectere solere’. Observe too three lines lower the ‘an
Utinam ne in nemore—cet. Look at m 106 ‘ Desine, Roma,
tuos hostes’—reliquaque praeclare—‘ Nam tibi moenimenta
mei peperere labores’: he felt sure every listener would at
once complete the first imperfect clause, which gains in energy
by being left incomplete both in sense and in metre. In our
very chapter, just below in § 24, observe how he pulls to pieces
a favourite passage of Lucilius; nay twists it, as Madvig shews,
from its real meaning by attaching to ‘cenare’ the ‘ bene’, which
belongs to ‘cocto’, as Cicero himself proves when he cites the
same words in a letter to Atticus.
But what is ‘ hrysizon’ with its three Greek letters? ‘ hrysi-
zon’ is ‘hrysizon’, ypvoifov; of which I will presently say
something. In the next line ‘vis et’ represents ‘vi set’; and
I believe I give the poet’s true meaning, and follow the manu-
scripts more closely than others, when I read as follows:
Defusum e pleno, ypvaior,
cui nihilum est viri, set sacculus abstulit [omne].
Tho’ omne is not necessary, I think it very probable that
Lucilius so ended the verse; for it will be granted I think
that, when Cicero had adapted the language to his own syntax
and so destroyed the metre, it would have produced an
awkward halting effect to quote the verses in full: for in-
stance thus
Defusum e pleno sit ypuoifov parOaxdy Sv,
cui nihilum sit viri, set sacculus abstulerit omne:
such at least is the effect on my ear. Our fragment must now
be ousted from the 22nd and placed in the ‘incerti libri’; and
220 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
so must the fragment which follows it in Mueller, if, as I
believe, Lachmann’s senarii are to be preferred to Mueller’s
elegiac couplet.
_ Varro loved Lucilius perhaps as much as Cicero did: in a
former number a passage from him was referred to, which
Nonius quotes in connexion with a like passage from Lucilius,
Now in Keil’s gram. Lat. v p. 590 we read: Saccus generis
masculini ut Varro ‘vinum cui nihil sacculus abstulit. This
is a manifest allusion to Lucilius: Varro appears to be con-
trasting some common wine kept and used by common folks
with the poet’s as it passed through the ‘saccus’ and ap-
peared in the ‘cratera’, refined and softened, with a bright
golden hue.
I must add some words of illustration : ‘defusum e pleno’ is ©
well explained by Madvig and illustrated by him from Cicero pro
Scauro. def. of course has nothing to do with diffusum which is
said of wine racked off from the huge ‘dolium’ into the ‘ cadus’
(or ‘amphora, lagoena, seria, testa’), answering to our modern
bottling. defundere is the decanting of the ‘cadus’ into the
“cratera’, Wealthy gourmets, like those here spoken of, would
have their wine fresh from a full ‘ cadus’, not vapid from a half-
empty one; just as now-a-days wine is decanted from a full bottle.
Madvig calls for a ‘cado’ or some other word to agree with
‘pleno’ :as I have given the words, it, like vwinwm, may have been
expressed in a preceding clause; possibly in the same verse;
as ‘e pleno’ can hardly perhaps mean ‘e pleno cado’, as ‘de
plano, ex aequo’ mean ‘de plano loco’, and the like. Clear
as the meaning of defusum is, I believe there is only one other
instance in Latin, in which it has the same sense, Horace Sat. 11.
2 58 Ac, nisi mutatum, parcit defundere vinum: which, plain
as it is, all the editors of Horace whom I have referred to
boggle over, except Macleane who alone sees that this, and
this only, is the meaning. Lucilius and Horace will therefore
illustrate each other. (In his odes Horace uses ‘defusus’ in
quite another sense, of pouring a libation out of a cup.) In
Greek vioyeiv has the same force: it too I believe is found
only twice, in Sophilus ap. Meineke Com. Gr. m1 p. 381 and in
————————
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 221
Menander ib. Iv p. 72: see Meineke, and Cobet Var. lect.
p. 123 and Nov. lect. p. 601. But Martial, whom I will cite
presently, has ‘ Defluat’ in the same sense.
For ypvoifov comp. Athen. p. 27 b 6 Ywwrntivos Sé oivos
Kal tTivopevos ndvs Kal TO ypwpate ypvaifer. Some of the
best Italian wines, such as Orvieto, much drunk in Rome, have
when clear a gold-like hue; and the ypvoifov here is less
pedantic than many other Greek words in Lucilius which have
not the same excuse; for I do not know any single Latin
word which expresses exactly the same thing, ‘taking a golden
hue’, Thus, lib. inc. 129 M, we meet with @yorpiBes oleum
Casinas, there being no single Latin word with the same force,
Pliny xiv 80 colores vini quattuor, albus, fulvus, sanguineus,
niger: comp. ‘fulvum aurum’, The Greeks and Varro use
Kippos of wine in the same sense. Mart. vit 45 2 Defluat et
lento splendescat turbida lino Amphora, centeno consule facta
minor; XII 60 8 et, ut Aquidum potet Alauda merum, Turbida
sollicito transmittere Caecuba sacco.
virt: this word often expresses what is acrid, pungent in
taste or smell: Lucr. 11 476 taetri primordia viri, of the brine
of sea-water; 852 he uses ‘viro’ of a strong odour. Pliny
XIV 124 applies the word to wine: e diverso crapulae con-
pesci feritatem nimiam frangique virus, aut, ubi pigra lenitas
torpeat, virus addi: so that ‘virus’ comes to be almost the
same as ‘vires’: Plin. xIv 138 ut plus capiamus, sacco fran-
gimus vires; XXIII 45 utilissimum omnibus [vinum] sacco
viribus fractis; and xIx 53 (in his favourite tone of ascetic
bitterness) inveterari vina saccisque castrari, nec cuiquam adeo
longam esse vitam ut non ante se genita potet. What the
natural Pliny and the Stoic-affecting Cicero flout, Lucilius
would like,—and the world in general too.
nihilum may be objected to, because it seems soon to have
become obsolete as a nominative. But-Cicero pro Caecina 95
cites from a law of Sulla’s time ‘si quid ius non esset rogarier,
elus ea lege nihilum rogatum’, where ‘nihilum’ is followed by
a genitive, as in my version of Lucilius; as well as in Corp.
Inscr. Lat. 1, 204, 2, 30 eius hac lege nihilum rogatur (about
71 8.¢c.). It would pass very readily into ‘nihil dum’, because
222 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
it was unusual: it is more emphatic than ‘nihil’, I had
thought of ‘nil iam’ which gives an excellent sense ‘nothing
more’; but I prefer ‘nihilum’.
xXxvi. fr. 49 M.
Nonius 38, 26 Expirare dictum est vel ab spiritu effuso,
vel ab spiraminibus. Lucilius lib. m1 Expirans animam pul-
monibus aeger agebat. idem XXvVI ut si eluviem facere per
ventrem velis Curare omnibus distento corpore expiret viis
(viis Dousa. vis cdd.). In p. 103 he explains ‘eluviem’ to be
‘ purgationem.’
Nonius’ words must be noted: he expressly states that in
the second passage ‘expirare’ has its meaning, not ‘ab spiritu
effuso’, but from what comes out of the pores or vent-holes
of the body. Mueller, noting this, for ‘curare—expiret’ reads
‘sudor se—expirat’: but that is almost rewriting. Lachmann,
v. 539, gives us ‘cura ne’: I hardly catch the sense of the
imperative after ‘ut’; or if it has any sense, that sense is
very feeble. Ellis, p. 71, offers us ‘aura de’: I do not see
the meaning of this ‘aura’: if it has any, it must run directly
counter to what Nonius asserts. |
Without the context we cannot perhaps be certain of Luci-
lius’ drift; but he seems to be giving some rough coarse illus-
tration by this ‘purgatio ventris’, which should be let to come
out by its proper channel, not through the pores of the body.
Such a meaning may I think be obtained by a different division
of the words, without the change of a letter, thus:
ut, si eluviem facere per ventrem velis,
cur ab re omnibus distento corpore expiret viis?
‘why, the body stretched to bursting, should the ‘eluvies’ mis- -
chievously escape through all its pores?’ I say without the
change of a letter, because, tho’ Lucilius no doubt would write
‘ab re’, the best Mss., and probably Nonius himself, would use
indifferently ‘ab re’ and ‘are’. This use of ‘ab re,’ the oppo-
site of ‘e re’, occurs in Plautus again and again: see the
lexicons of Pareus and Weise, who cite four instances: trin.
238 subdole ab re consulit.
a
i i a
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 2
WN
xv. fr. 3 M.
In numero quorum nunc primu’ Trebelliu’ multost Luciu’;
narcesibai febris, senium, vomitum, pus. Mueller praises with
good reason Lachmann’s fine emendation ‘multost Lueius’
for the ‘multos Titos Lucios’ of Mss. His ‘nam (na)’ too -is
probable. But, as Mueller points out, ‘nam sanat’ for the
monstrous ‘narcesibai’ has nothing to commend it, as Nonius
explains ‘senium’ by ‘taedium et odium’. Mueller reads ‘nam
‘ 8S
arcesit’: ‘nempe fuerat antiquitus traditum hoc: arcebat,
It may be so; but I should be more inclined to accept this,
if some Mss. read ‘arcebat’, others ‘arcessit’, the two words
having exactly opposite meanings. I believe he is right in
thinking that Lucilius is speaking of some tiresome fellow,
orator or poet perhaps, like the Sestius of Catullus’ 44th
poem with his ‘orationem...plenam veneni et pestilentiae,’ to
which Catullus gives so humorous a turn. For ‘narcesibai’
I suggest ‘nam creat ibw febris, senium, vomitum, pus.’ Pliny
1x 155 ut in lepore, qui in Indico mari etiam tactu pestilens
vomitum dissolutionemque stomachi protinus creat’’.
I find an analogy between my ‘satirafactua’ above for
‘satrafa acutia’ and ‘nacreatibu’ for ‘narcesibai’: in both cases
a letter is put in its wrong place; in the former an 7 which
was marked to be put above ‘satra’ got, from the loss of
the mark, to be placed above the last letter; in the other
case an @ which was marked to be placed above ‘cret’ got
placed above the final w of ‘ibu.’ Both zbus and tbus were in
use among the old writers, Plautus, cet.: in fact the 7 is, if any
thing, better attested than 7 In lib. inc. frag. 83 thus is a
very uncertain conjecture, the Mss. having ‘ Atque aliquos ibi
ab rebus clepsere foro qui’: I am not indisposed to think the
sentence there imperfect and
1 Tt would be absurd to claim for
the emendation of an isolated passage
like this more than a certain amount
of probability. If we had the context,
we might find Trebellius occupying
quite another position. Thus the cor-
rections of two scholars like Lachmann
to read ‘Atque aliquoius ibi
and Mueller, sanat and arcessit, give
diametrically opposite meanings. I
once thought ‘ nanctus ibei’ or ‘nanc-
tu’ sibei febris cet.’ specious. The
lexicons give examples of ‘nanctus est
febrem’ ‘morbum’,
224 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
ab rebus clepsere, foro qui cet.’, the ‘qui’ referring to ‘ali-
quoius’.
xi. fr. 1 M.
Conventus pulcher, bracae, saga fulgere, torques datis
magni.
Nonius quotes this twice: in one place his Mss. have tor-
quem; in the other they omit the corrupt ‘datis’. It is
manifest that Lucilius is speaking of a provincial ‘conventus’,
the governor and the Roman officials coming at stated times
to the chief city of a district and there meeting deputies from
the different towns of the district. It is no less manifest from
the ‘bracae’ and ‘torques’ that the poet is speaking of a
Gaulish people. Mueller reads ‘Induti magni’, Lachmann
‘Sat magni’: I suggest ‘ torques Donatis magni’: comp. Pliny,
speaking of ancient times, XXXIII 37 auxilia quippe et ex-
ternos torquibus aureis donavere: at cives non nisi argenteis.
The ‘donati’ would be likely to appear with their ‘ torques
magni’. If the corruption ‘torquem’ means anything, ‘ torques
Mandatis magni’ might suggest itself, the ‘mandati’ being the
deputies of the towns,
vit. fr. 15 M.
Verum flumen uti, atque ipso divortio aquarum,
iligneis pedibus cercyrum conriget aequis.
aquarum add. Iunius. aquae sunt Mueller. [Tlignis Iunius. Igneis edd.
conriget scripsi. concurret cdd. conferet Mueller. roboret Lachmann,
‘But where it is river, ay and already at the division
between the salt and the fresh water, he will keep the galley
on its right course by the help of the oaken evenly adjusted
pedes. ‘aquarum’ and ‘Iligneis’ seem to be pretty certain
conjectures. But I have seen no satisfactory explanation given
of the whole, and some at least of the corrections of “con-
curret’ I do not comprehend. The ‘ cercurus’ had been sailing
in the open seas under canvas: Plaut. Stich. 367 conspicatus
sum interim Cercurum...In portum vento secundo, velo passo
pervenit. If the wind was favourable, then it would have
f%
—_—
ANOTHER WORD ON LUCILIUS. 225
sailed before the wind, and the two ‘ pedes’, ‘ sheets’ or ‘ropes’,
attached to each clew or lower corner of the square sail, would
be ‘aequi’, i.e. ‘braced to the same length’: comp. Rich, s. v.
' ‘pes veli’: he cites Cic. ad Att. xvI 6 1 duo sinus fuerunt,
quos tramitti oporteret...; utrumque aequis pedibus trami-
simus. But when the vessel got into the river, and even at
the junction between sea and river, it could-no longer use
its sails, and its ‘stuppei pedes’ so to say: it had to take
to its ‘iligni.pedes’, which had to perform the same office.
The skipper therefore ‘conriget’, ‘will keep it ‘on its course’
by these; and, as the expression is metaphorical and taken
from the ‘ pedes veli’, it may mean the oars, tho’ ‘pedes’, liter-
ally. taken, seems never to have that sense; or, as I am inclined
to guess, it may refer to two long sweeps, one on each side of
the vessel, such as those by which I have sometimes seen
barges managed in ariver. With ‘conriget’ comp. Livy xxIx
_ 27 14 inde aegre correctum cursum exponit. The context leaves
no doubt that ‘div. aq.’ means the separation between the salt
and the fresh water, tho’ in Cicero and Livy the words denote
the ridge on which the streams part in opposite directions.
I do not with Lachmann change ‘uti’ to ‘ubi’, because in
old Latin ‘ut’ oftener than many think means ‘where’, as
twice in Catullus, and our passage at once recalls 17 10 Verum
totius ut lacus putidaeque paludis Lividissima maximeque est
profunda vorago. Perhaps ‘est’ is understood from a pre-
ceding clause; else I think we must read ‘ Verumst flumen
=
uti .
H. A. J. MUNRO.
Journal of Philology. vou. vit. 15
ON THE AEGRITUDO PERDICAE.
THIS is the title of a poem of 290 Latin hexameters edited
for the first time in 1877 by Dr Emil Bahrens. It was
transcribed for the editor by Mr E. M. Thompson of the
British Museum, from a MS of the 15th cent. Harl. 3685. The
author, whose name is unknown, is believed to have belonged
to that schoel of African versifiers who within the last few
years have become more widely known through the public-
ation of the poems of Dracontius (see Journal of Philology,
V p. 252).
The editor has discharged his task with some skill: but a
good many passages appear to me to admit of simpler correc-
tions than they have yet received. The subject of the poem is
the incestuous passion of Perdica for his mother, a story alluded
to by Dracontius (Hylas 36—44) and Claudian (p. 686 f. Gesner);
and: briefly told by Fulgentius (Mythologica 1. 2. p. 105
Muncker).
31. Fonsque regit medio nota per gramina lapsa.
Perhaps |
Fonsque rigat medio rorans per gramina lapsu.
52. Nec mora nota deo est.
Bahrens longa: why not nata ?
59. Jam sole menso radiis librauerat orbé.
Bahrens reads [am sol emenso radios librauerat ortu. May
not orbe be right? ‘By this the sun had reached the top of his
circuit and poised his rays evenly’ at mid-day (seta hora).
THE AEGRITUDO PERDICAEL. 227
, 64. lymfasque regentes followed in 66 by lucos rigentes is
strange. Accepting the editor’s recentes in 64, I would suggest
wirentes in 66. |
72—5. All is perfectly straightforward if the passage is
read thus:
Heu, Perdica, grauis aestus radiosque micantes
Solis te fugisse putas lucosque petisse ?
Ignoras! intus grawior tibt flamma paratur.
I need not say that fugisse and lucos petisse are a totepov
™ POTEpoV.
80. Compleaxusque dedit per somnia tristis imago. Tristis is
not to be altered to tristia in spite of somnia tristia in 96,
There is no difficulty in supposing the sadness which in one
line is ascribed to the dreams transferred in the other to the
image presented by them. On the other hand the elision of a
at this place in the verse, especially as a correction of a rhythm
so faultless as per somnia tristis vmago, is improbable.
97. Sed ego quam uidi, quae somnia tristia demens ?
Mater erat? aut ista tibi paretur imago
Est, sed caeca...... The rest of the line is blank.
B. reads,
Hew ego quam uidi: per somma tristia demens,
Mater erat? haut ista tubt parentis imago
Est, sed caeca.
Accepting Heu I would keep the rest of 97 unchanged.
In vy. 98, 99 the sudden apostrophe which Perdica makes to
himself suggests that this name as a vocative may have fallen
out: then imago may have stood at the end of the following
line :
haut ista tibi, Perdica, parentis
Est, sed caeca [rapit sensus absentis| umago.
104. Sola tebe dulei numquam Perdica quieti
Tradidit ardentis ardentia lumina flammas.
Not solum te as B., but sola tibet. ‘Thy eyes alone, Perdica,
night never consigned to sweet repose, kindling them into a
15—2
228 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
glow to match thy own.’ B. seems right in correcting fammans.
The construction tibi followed by ardentis is unusual, but may
be explained by the distance of the two words from each other,
as well as the close connexion between ardentis and ardentia
lumina. |
107. Suspirat numquam requiem +daturus amori.
Obviously laturus.
109. Fluminag ; tenet nec non maris imperat undis.
For quogue which B. keeps (cf. 91 oscula quoque dedit)
possibly aguasque. I believe aquam to be the right reading in
Lucret. VI 954 denique aquam circum caeli lorica coercet, where
the Mss give qua.
112. Tune quoque Perdica premit igne Cupido
Vt possit nec ferre uocem.
E. Rohde rightly keeps nec ferre, altering wocem to facem.
May not B.’s wicem be retained ‘so that he cannot even bear
his fortune,’ i.e. so that his anguish became actually beyond
endurance. V. 112 Biahrens fills up thus Tune quogue Perdi-
cam diro premit igne Cupido perhaps rightly, nec ferre he alters
to refferre, a quantitative licence which seems over-hazardous.
119. Tu (Nox) nosti quid possit Amor : sine te nthil ille Cupido
Seu Veneris pars est, sew Venus aut Venus in te est.
Cupido is rightly omitted by Bahrens as a gloss. In
120 he adds a second est following pars est. But it is
difficult to believe that any one would have written est seu
when he might write the more simple and euphonious siue est,
and the antithesis of sew Venus in te est is to the identification ~
of Night, not of Love, with Venus. Hence I would propose to
read
Seu Veneris pars est, seu tu Venus aut Venus in te est.
122. At matri narrabo nefas? tamen tbo coactus ?
‘ Mater, aue’ dicturus ero? quid deinde? tacebo.
Cedamus. Quid? tu hoc poteris componere uerbis ?
Aut uox qualis erit? Adgressus namque parentem,
a
THE AEGRITUDO PERDICAE. 329
131. Vt proprium miserando nefas inceste labores /
So I would punctuate and read this obscure passage. A¢
for Et in 122, Cedumus for Credamus in 124 (Rohde), Vt for
Et in 131, lubores for laboris are sufficiently obvious corrections.
V. 131 which in the Ms follows Tals Perdicam per noctem
cura premebat, and is there written thus Et proprium miseranda
nefas incesta laboris, I believe to be out of its place.
Translate. ‘But suppose I tell my guilty passion to my
mother: suppose I go to her despite my better judgment: am
prepared to say ‘Hail, mother.’ What will ensue? My tongue
will be mute. Well; let me yield after all. What, Perdica!
will you bring yourself to frame the avowal in words? or what
sort of voice will that be? So then you have solicited a
mother, only that you may be agonized, guilty wretch that
you are, in commiserating your own crime.’
138. Famulosque uocauit
Ad sese tussitque artis medicinue requirt
Primores qui forte forent.
B. emends guaeri medicinae, a very improbable remedy in
so careful a poem. I think the Goddess of Medicine is ad-
dressed (cf. 155) and would read artis, Medicina, requirz: see
my note on Catull. Liv. 2, and cf. Manil. 11. 440.
142. Ingressique fores atque abdita tecta +caciantis.
B. iacentis or cubantis. Considering the medical character
of the passage it seems not impossible that this word was
cacantis, which would certainly suit abdita. An examination
of the excrement or urine might naturally precede that of the
various organs which immediately follows.
147. Sed iecor et splenis temtanda cobilia +patri
Quae fellis metuenda domus.
Patri, which B. has ingeniously altered to et atri, is all that
calls for change. The rest of his correction is violent and
improbable. Transl. ‘what seat of the dark gall gives ground
for apprehension.’
230 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
161. Non momenta suas per mollia wiscera sedes
Non corda uagi pulmonis anhelant,
Intercepta se non nilia concita costis
Incuciunt seuos taculata sepe doloris.
It is noticeable that each new phase of the diagnosis is
introduced by non: hence it would seem probable that Intercepta
se is to be connected with what precedes, not with what follows.
. I would read then
Non omenta suas per mo'lia wscera sedes
Excedunt, non corda uagi pulmonis anhelant
Intersepta sero, non ilia concita costis _
Incutiunt saeuos taculantia saepe dolores.
Intersepta sero would refer to the serous surrounding of the
heart which accompanies some phases of heart-disease, e.g.
pericarditis.
166. Sic fatus fessae scrutatur +conscia wenae
Ingreditur mater. tum quae fuit + ille tenenti
Mitis et in lentos motus aequaliter acta
Improbiter digitis quatiens pulsatibus urguet.
For conscia perhaps compita. For ille, which B. alters to
ante, there can be little doubt that ile should be read. Lach-
mann’s restitution of the word to Catull. Lxm1. 5 would then
have the support of an actual instance, and a very respectable
Ones |
174. Hic animi labor est: hebeo. tam cetera dicant.
So the Ms. May not the meaning be ‘I have no power to
deal with a disease of the mind. Now let them declare the
other cases’ which call for my attention. I must be off to visit
other patients.
200. Inde Cupido monet secreta referre furoris.
Inde Pudor prohibet uocis exordia rumpr
Famamgq ; surgenté reuocit fneanillans
Ire iubet propriumque nefas exponere mentis.
Verbaque multa docent, quae uoces pectore + labi
A Perdice misera moriuntur im ore pudico.
THE AEGRITUDO PERDICAL. 231
The general meaning is clear; love and shame struggle for
the mastery: shall he rise from his bed and declare his passion,
or remain passively tortured by it? Hence perhaps Famane
surgentem mittat reuocetne wacillans ? a reminiscence of Lucr. Iv
1124. For quae uoces pectore labi B. writes g. u. p. clausae,
a rather violent change. Perhaps the corruption is traceable
to a different cause. The last word was l/abori, written in some
or .
copy labi. The or was transferred to the word before it, and
united with it to form pectore. Read then quae mox expressa
laborz, ‘wrung from his distress,’ In 205 B. is no doubt right
in correcting Perdicae misert, in 204 docet.
215. totas in me consume sagittas
Quotquot amoris habes, et si tubi tela furoris
Defuerint, et si de ioe fulmina sumas,
Vincere non poteris sanctum, scelerate, furorem.
So I read, following the Ms throughout, and adding wel
before de iowe. B.'s change et, si t. t. furoris Defuerint, summo
dein de wove f. s. is gratuitous: the double et si is obviously
genuine,
230. Ditior haec Danae, fulgentior altera Glauce,
Candidior + Coigne +peruenit altera +disce. |
Bahrens’ Chione and Dirce are probably right: for perwendt
Rohde suggests procerior: less remote from the Ms would be
potior uenit, ‘a better Dirce.’
249. +Iussistt mandasti iam possum expromere musam,
Probably Zu st mandasti, as he had said in the preceding
line Ni tu das animos wiresque in carmina fundis.
254. Longaque testantur ietunia uiscera +famem.
Probably ramez.
257. Produnt, qudquid homo est uel quod celare a oe
Mors secreta solet. sufficit tibi, saeue Cupido,
Materialam +nttu sit atrox ubi flamma moretur.
Perhaps suffis tibi, s. C., Materiam ; nullast a.u. f. moretur.
‘You are burning your own fuel, Love: none remains for your
me fe) T+ Re THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
flame to smoulder in.’ The body of the lover is so emaciated
that it can no longer support the functions of love, ‘ consumed
with that which it was nourished by.’ For nullast compare 271
where B. rightly edits nullast for the Ms reading ntta sit.
260. Denique defessos artus ac membra calore
Molitur gestare uictusque uirorum.
B.’s mollitur is no doubt right: after gestare he adds nequit,
for which I would substitute negat ; wirorum, which B. changes
to ciborum, is, I think, right: ‘the food of healthy men.’ Per-
dica can only take the light food of a patient or a woman.
284. Terruit et laquewm metuis? mihi redde tenebris.
B. me redde. I should prefer mihi redde tenebras.
R. ELLIS.
[This article was written in 1877. ]
ON THE PRO CLUENTIO OF CICERO.
I.
The motive of Cicero's professed change of opinion.
Cicero himself, according to Quintilian 2 17 21, said that in
the defence of Cluentius he had thrown dust in the eyes of
the judges; and as eight years before the delivery of the speech
he had appeared as a strong advocate of the attack on the
senatorial zwdicia which followed the iudiciwm Iunianum, there
can be no doubt that he really believed throughout that the
agitation of 74 B.c, was justified by the facts of the case. I do
not know whether any attempt has been made to explain his
professed change of opinion. In the following remarks I hope
to make it probable that political considerations had a great
deal to do with the matter. Cicero has been too hastily
charged with inconsistency in the earlier part of his career.
A careful examination of the facts will shew, I think, that
there was a method in his changes. His politics are those of
the ordo equester, whose interests he, as himself belonging to it,
naturally made his own. The death of Sulla in 78 B.c. gave
to this important body the hope of recovering something of the
position which they had held from the time of the Gracchan to
that of the Sullan constitution; and in 74 B.C. an opening was
given them (in the corruption of the senatorial zudicva) for an
attack on the dominant position of the senate. The scandal
of the wdiciwm Iunianwm was turned to good account by the
tribune Publius Quinctius, and although the tumult was laid
for a time, only four years elapsed before the iwdicia changed
hands. The attack of Cicero on Verres was in reality the
attack of the eqwites on the senate ; the consulship of Pompeius
234 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.,
and Crassus in the year 70 sealed the triumph of the equittes.
Their interests were now and for some years afterwards repre-
sented by Pompeius, with whose cause we find accordingly that
Cicero for some time identifies himself.
But the eguites with their champion Pompeius were by no
means safe either against the jealousy of the nobility or the
attacks of the democratic party. The bad case of Fonteius,
defended by Cicero so soon after the attack upon Verres, may
merely shew that the orator was willing to defend any Roman
official against the complaints of barbarous provincials; but
it must not be forgotten that the accused was a friend of
Pompeius, and that to have deserted him would very probably
have been to Cicero a desertion of his own political colours.
Moreover it would appear that Fonteius was supported by
Roman merchants and men of business, who presumably be-
longed to the equestrian order. Of the interests of these men
Cicero is evidently very tender. The attack on Fonteius may
perhaps, therefore, be taken as in some sense an attack on the
equites. There are signs also that in the years between the
first consulship of Pompeius and Crassus and the first trium-
virate (70—59 B.c.) attempts were made -to extend to the
equestrian order the action of the leges Corneliae, which as
they stood applied only to senators. Much of the motive of
Cicero’s defence of Cluentius in 66 B.c. is, I think, revealed in
an instructive passage, §§ 143—160. “I will not,” he says,
“argue that the equestrian order is not bound by the provisions
of the lex Cornelia in this matter. I should have done so but
for the generosity of my client, who would not allow it. If, as
Attius says, it is shameful that an eques should be able to
offend where a senator may not, I answer that it is a far more
serious matter to depart from the letter of the leges. Attius
would himself complain if any one were to attempt to bring
him, a mere egues, under the provisions of lex Cornelia repe-
tundarum. Observe that the lex Cornelia de veneficiis, in the
section relative to poisoning, includes all orders in liability to
punishment: while in the section relative to conspiracy for
procuring the condemnation of an innocent person’ it includes
only certain high functionaries. Cluentius is not one of these
—
THE PRO CLUENTIO OF CICERO. 235
high functionaries ; yet he refuses to take advantage of the lea.
I follow his instructions in the matter, although I do not
approve of them.
“Attius may think it unfair that all orders are not alike
included under the same lex. But surely the case of a senator
is different from that of an eques; the former has greater
privileges, and therefore ought to have greater responsibilities,
Tbe law under which we are now acting here—ne quis tudicio
circumveniretur—was passed by Gaius Gracchus, and in the
interest, not against the interest, of the plebs. When Sulla
came into power and took over this lea with its provisions into
his own lex, he still did not venture to extend its provisions
beyond the class of high functionaries, although his hatred of
the equestrian order would have made him willing enough to
do so. The fact is that an attempt is being now made to in-
clude the equestrian order in the provisions of the lex Cornelia.
Only, be it observed, by a few factious individuals, who wish to
separate the interests of the equiztes from those of the senate,
and who are using this engine to terrify the eguites. Seeing
how much the verdicts of the equestrian order are respected,
they wish to take the sting out of them by making it impossible
for an eques to give a fearless verdict. Remember how the
equites resisted Livius Drusus when he tried to bring the wudices
of their order within the reach of a quaestio of this kind. They
argued rightly that, as they had renounced the honours and
advantages of public life, so they ought to be relieved from its
responsibilities.” :
From this passage it would appear that the clause of the
lex Cornelia de sicaris et veneficiis, under which Cluentius was
now accused, did not technically apply to the equestrian order.
That clause referred not to murder, but to the procuring, by
corrupt means, the condemnation of an innocent man. It is
difficult in the absence of anything like full and direct evidence
to ascertain the exact state of the law with perfect clearness,
Cluentius was being tried under a clause of the lex Cornelia:
yet Cicero says, § 154, alli (equites) non hoc recusabant ea ne
lege accusarentur qua nunc Habitus accusatur, quae tune erat
Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia: and again, § 151, hanc ipsam
236 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
legem ne quis iudicio circumveniretur OC. Gracchus tulit, 1.
infer from these passages that the clause against conspiracy in
the lex Cornelia was taken over from a lex of Gaius Gracchus
referring to the same point. Again, if Cicero may be trusted,
this lex of C. Gracchus did not apply to the equestrian order.
§ 154, alle enim non hoc recusabant, ea ne lege accusarentur quae
nunc Habitus accusatur, quae tunc erat Sempronia, nunc est
Cornelia, intellegebant enim ea lege equestrem ordinem non tenerv.
The inference would apparently be that the lex of C. Gracchus
was an enactment against conspiracy on the part of persons in
high office to procure the corrupt condemnation of innocent
men. And this supposition would agree with Cicero’s language
§ 151, eam legem pro plebe, non in plebem tultt.
I do not think that the Sempronian law in question can be
identical with that quoted in the pro Rabirio Perd. § 12: ne
de capite civium Romanorum iniussu vestro iudicaretur. The
wording of the titles is entirely different: cudicio cirewmvenire
must surely mean to set a judicial process in motion in order
to compass a person’s ruin; a provision ne de capite civiwm
iniussu populi Romani iudicaretur would be intended to pre-
vent a special quaestio or iudicium being set up without the
consent of the people in their comitia.
The lex of C. Gracchus not applying to the equestrian —
iudices whom he created, but only to the nobility, had therefore
nothing to do with his leges tudiciariae: and in consequence it
was of no assistance to Livius Drusus when he proposed to
transfer the iwdicia to his newly constituted senate. The great
obstacle in the way of the reforms of this statesman was the
determined opposition of the eguites: Appian B. 0. 1 35 ry Te
Bovry Kat rods imméas, of padiota 81) TOTe aAAHAOLS Oia TA
Sicactnpia Siepépovto, emi Kowm@ vow cvvayayeiy émerpato, |
cadas pev ov Suvapevos és tHv Boudry émaveveyxeiv Ta diKa-
oTnpla, Teyvalwv & és Exatépous ade. TOV BovrevTav dia Tas
oTacels TOTE OVTWY LOALS ahi Tors TpLaKoa lous, ETEpous ToTOVGbE
avtois amd Tov imméwv éeonyeito apiotivdny mpocKaTaneyhvat,
Kal éx TaVvde TavTwy és TO pédXAOV elvat Ta SixacTHpLa. EvOUVaS
Te ér avtav yiyverOat Swpodoxias mpocéypadhev, eyKAnMaTOS
ica 8» Kal ayvooupévou Sia TO 0s THs SwpodoKias avédnv ért-
THE PRO CLUENTIO OF CICERO. 37
moratovens. Drusus then added to his lex iudiciaria a clause,
both retrospective and prospective as it would appear, creating
a new quaestio to deal with cases of judicial corruption. The
measure was vehemently opposed by the corrupt ordo equester,
and naturally enough, for as retrospective it threatened the
peace of those who had already offended, evidently a very
numerous class; as prospective it would include all those
members of the order who under the lex Livia should be from
time to time drafted into the senate. O viros fortes, says Cicero
Cluent. § 153, equites Romanos, qui homini clarissimo ac po-
tentissimo M. Druso tribuno plebis restiterunt, cum ile nihal
aliud ageret cum illa cuncta quae tum erat nobilitate, nisi ute
gui rem iudicassent huiuscemodi quaestionibus in vudicium voca-
rentur...ne nova lege alligarentur, laborabant. Pro Rabir. Post.
16 potentissimo et nobilissimo tribuno plebis M. Druso, novam
in equestrem ordinem quaestionem ferenti si quis ob rem iudi-
candam pecuniam cepisset, aperte equites Romani restiterunt.
Whether the lex Plotia iudiciaria, brought forward during
the Civil War, contained any clause against conspiracy to
procure a corrupt verdict is not known: that such a clause,
taken from the lea of C. Gracchus ne quis iudicio circumveni-
retur, was added by Sulla to his lex de sicaris et veneficiis, we
have already seen: but there is no sign that the matter was
seriously taken up by the authors of the new revolution in the
iudicia brought about by the lex Aurelia of 70 B.c. This
lex, which restored to the eguites some of their old influence in
the law-courts, does not seem to have increased their liabilities.
Thus the law with regard to conspiracy for procuring a corrupt
verdict was in the year 66 B.c.—the date of our speech—in
an anomalous state. Any one, not being one of the high
functionaries named in the lex Cornelia, who should enter
into such a conspiracy, was technically safe as against the
provisions of that lex. The enemies of the unjust privileges
of the equestrian order had mo intention of letting matters
rest in this position; they made efforts to bring the equztes
under those provisions of the leges Corneliae from which they
had previously been exempted. The case of Oppius seems,
from what little evidence remains on the subject, to have been
238 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
similar in this respect to that of Cluentius. Cicero’s speech in
defence of Oppius is generally assigned to a time not earlier
than three years, and perhaps not more than two or even one,
before the year of the pro Cluentio. According to Quintilian
5 13 21, Cicero made an appeal to the iudices on behalf of his
order of precisely the same character as that which he made
in the pro Cluentio. Pro Oppio monet pluribus ne ilud actionis
genus im equestrem ordinem admittant. Perhaps Oppius was
accused under the lex Cornelia repetundarum, which like the
lex Iulia on the same subject afterwards only applied, techni-
cally, to high officials: Rab. Post. § 11 sed est arreptus (Postwmus)
unus eques Romanus de pecunis repetundis reus. .
I think therefore that Cicero’s attitude in the Pro
Cluentio may be explained by the altered position of the
equestrian order. Eight years before, in 74 B.c., they were
excluded from the iudicia, and were therefore willing enough
to take any opportunity of attacking the exclusive privileges
of the senate. The unjust condemnation of Oppianicus gave
them such an opportunity. But the same facts wore a different
complexion in the eyes of the equites in 66 B.c. To attack the
officials who had taken part in the zudiciwum Iunianum in 74
was one thing: it was quite another thing to use the case of
Cluentius eight years afterwards as a precedent for bringing
the eguites under the provisions of the conspiracy clause in the
lex Cornelia de sicariis.
The position taken up by Cicero in the pro Oppio and the
pro Cluentio is well illustrated by his action in the case of
Rabirius Postumus twelve years later. Rabirius was a simple
eques, who was charged with having received part of the money
unlawfully taken from Ptolemy by Gabinius as the price of
restoration to his kingdom. Cicero contends that the lex Iulia
de repetundis, like the lex Cornelia and the lex Servilia, applied —
only to the holders of certain high offices (§§ 13—18). Com-
pare Cluent. § 148. Turning to the eguites on the bench he
adds, scitis me ortum e vobis omnia semper sensisse pro vobis ;
nihil horum sine magna cura et summa caritate vestri ordimis
loquor. <Alius alios homines et ordines, ego vos semper complexus
sum.
THE PRO CLUENTIO OF CICERO. 239
II.
Analysis and examination of Crcero’s present account of the
iudicium Iunianum and its consequences.
§§ 66—116.
§§ 66—76.. “Oppianicus,” says Cicero, “frightened by the
condemnation of Scamander, had recourse to Staienus, as a man
who had already (76 B.c.) taken six hundred sestertia from a
pupillus in the case of Safinius Atella, and then kept it himself.
He encourages Oppianicus to give him 640 sestertia; then de-
termines to keep the money and let Oppianicus be condemned.
His method of proceeding is to promise, but not. to give, the
money to some of the most worthless of the zudices, thus ren-
dering them hostile to Oppianicus. When Bulbus, one of these
-tudices, asks him for it, he says that Oppianicus had played him
false, and that he accordingly meant to vote guilty... Some sus-
picion arising in court on the matter, Cannutius, the accuser of
Oppianicus, suddenly gets the iudex quaestionis to declare the
argument at an end; Staienus, who happened to be absent and
engaged in a private case, is brought back into court by Oppi-
anicus and Quinctius his advocate. In the open voting which
followed, Bulbus, Staienus, and Gutta at once vote guilty.
(There were only a few corrupt zudices on the bench, but all of
these were incensed against Oppianicus: nummariw paucr sed
omnes irati). Some prudent men, namely (see § 107) Octavius
Balbus, Q. Considius, M. Iuventius Pedo, L. Caulius Mergus,
M. Basilius, C. Caudinus, L. Cassius, Cn. Heius, P. Saturius
(nine in all), say in the prima actio, not-proven: five vote not-
guilty, the rest (eighteen in all) vote guilty, some because they
were bribed, some because, in spite of the corruption of these
others, they thought it their duty to stand by their former
verdicts given in the praeiudicia.”
On this it seems natural to observe that the account of the
conduct of Staienus towards Oppianicus, Bulbus and Gutta is
exceedingly strained and unnatural, and hardly to be accepted
without further warrant than the mere statement of Cicero.
240 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
But supposing Staienus and the rest to have been also bribed
by Cluentius, all becomes plain. As to Cannutius, the accuser
of Oppianicus, suddenly declaring the argument at an end, the
fact can very well be explained by supposing that he was in
league with the zudex quaestionis to procure the condemnation
of his adversary. The conduct of Staienus in voting condemno
is far more simply accounted for by Cicero himself, Verr. Act. 1
37, quod inventus est senator qui cum iudex esset, in eodem
iudicio et ab reo pecuniam acciperet quam wudicibus divideret, et
ab accusatore ut reum condemnaret. It is clear from this pas-
sage that in the general opinion at least there had been bribery
on both sides. Cicero observes in § 83 that it was Cluentius
and Cannutius who allowed Staienus to go out of court, Oppi-
anicus and his advocate who wanted him and brought him back
again; and that the vote of Staienus was explained by the fact
that he wished to convince Bulbus and the rest that Oppianicus
had failed him. This really proves nothing. Supposing it
true that Staienus was brought back, not by Cluentius, but by
Oppianicus, all that need be supposed is either that Cluentius
and his friends thought Staienus’ absence immaterial, his
money having been promised to a sufficient number of cudices;
or that they feared the counter-efforts of Oppianicus, and had
begun to distrust Staienus in the matter. Oppianicus on the
other hand may either have been ignorant of the bribery prac-
tised by Cluentius, or, if he knew of it, he may have thought
that his own counter-efforts had influenced Staienus in his favour.
On Cicero’s account of the way ia which the various iudices
voted it may be remarked that it is not absolutely consistent
with a sentence in the pro Caectna § 29. There were thirty-
two iudices: according to Cicero in the pro Cluentio five voted
not-guilty and nine (§ 107) not-proven: eighteen therefore must,
according to this statement, have voted guilty. Had Staienus
been absent Oppianicus would thus have been condemned by a
majority of 17 to 14. But in the pro Caecina we are told that
Fidiculanius Falcula was in a hurry to give his vote guilty
because it was necessary to make up the majority: cwm si uno
minus damnarent, condemnari reus non posset, non ad cognos-
cendam causam, sed ad explendam damnationem praesto fuisse,
THE PRO CLUENTIO OF CICERO. — 241
Is Cicero simply forgetful, or is he in the pro Cluentio purposely
exaggerating the numbers of the dudices who voted guilty?
Certainly, if his earlier account in the pro Caecina be correct,
there was motive enough for Oppianicus and his friends to send
out of court for Staienus. One vote might have made all the
difference.
Cicere’s argument from § 77—82 proceeds as follows: “The
occasion was at once seized on by the tribune Quinctius as a
means of attacking the senatorial tribunals. Staienus met
Oppianicus at the house of T. Annius, and promised to restore
him the money; some respectable individuals overheard the
interview, the money was found in Staienus’ possession, and he
was forced to disgorge it. The populace had and could have no
idea that Staienus had in reality taken the money to vote not-
guilty, and then kept it back; all that they saw was that
Staienus had voted guilty, and from their knowledge of his
character they supposed that his vote was not given gratis. So
with Bulbus, Gutta and others. Nor again did they know the
character of Oppianicus. All this, aided by the fiery agitation
ef Quinctius, raised such a strong popular feeling that Iunius
was clamoured out of his expected praetorship, and finally
driven into exile. At that time so strong was the excitement
that no one saying what I am now saying would have hada
chance of a hearing: at the present time, on the contrary, all is
quiet, and men will listen to the voice of reason, What are the
real facts? All agree that there was bribery somewhere. The
prosecutor pleads ‘I had very serious charges to bring; my adver-
sary had already been as good as condemned in two praeiudicia ;
had he been acquitted, I had nothing to fear.’ The defendant
replies, ‘My conscience made me afraid; I had been as good as
condemned twice already ; I had everything to fear from an ad-
verse verdict.’ If, again, you will examine Cluentius’ accounts,
you will find that he has kept them carefully; this matter has
now been sifted and discussed for a period of eight years. No
trace of any corrupt expenditure can be found in Cluentius’s
books; whereas at the house of Staienus there were found 640
sestertia.” a
On this it may be remarked that the interview of Oppiani-
Journal of Philology. you. vit. 16
242 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
cus with Staienus has nothing to do with the question. There
was no doubt that Staienus had received money from Oppiani-
cus, and under the circumstances it was very natural that
Oppianicus should wish for an interview with his treacherous
friend. Oppianicus may have gone to the house of Annius to
convict Staienus, and the wviri boni may have been there to
detect him in Oppianicus’ interest. The remark about the
account-books of Cluentius may be dismissed as unworthy of
serious consideration. The only strong point in Cicero’s case
seems to be the condemnation of the accessories to the supposed
guilt of Oppianicus in two praevudicia: yet how can we be sure
that there was no foul play in these cases? Cicero had himself
defended Scamander: and Quintilian, 11 1 74, justly observes,
difficilior ei ratio in tudicio Cluentiano fuit, cum Scamandrum
necesse haberet dicere nocentem, cuius egerat causam.
§§ 84—88. “But, you say, granting that Oppianicus gave
the money, it was not to bribe the jury but to effect a compro-
mise. I am surprised at so foolish an argument being used at
this time of day; Staienus naturally said this at the time, per-
haps on the advice of his advocate Cethegus; but the plea was
laughed down; no compromise was possible between two such
enemies; there was no chance on the one hand of Oppianicus
escaping by the setting up of a man of straw to accuse him
(elabi alio accusatore), nor on the other hand could Cluentius
abandon the case without incurring the odium of calwmnia.
“Again, it may be said that Oppianicus was trying to arrange
a praevaricatio, and therefore offered the money to Staienus.
In that case, why should he have gone to a iudew as sequester
and not rather to some respectable friend? But in fact this
argument requires no answer: for the sum of 640 sestertia
fotthd at the house of ans speaks for itself: 16 tudices, to
receive 40 sestertia apiece.”
There is no antecedent improbability that the money was
offered conciliandae gratiae causa, for the sake of effecting a
compromise: none again that Oppianicus was trying to arrange
a praevaricatio. Cicero here merely trifles with his opponent’s
statement; and, as to the number of 640 sestertia, how do we
know that that was all the money that was offered to Staienus?
¥
THE PRO CLUENTIO OF CICERO. 243
§§ 88S—96. “I.now come to the many iudicia which were
brought to bear upon this case.
(1) “The condemnation of the cudex quaestionis C. Iunius,
No time was allowed him by the tribune Quinctius; he was
hurried off to trial without mercy. According to the general
opinion, the reason for this was that he had corruptly procured
the condemnation of an innocent man. In that case I say that
he ought to have been accused under the lex Cornelia de
sicarits. If this was on technical grounds impossible, Quinctius
might have waited a few days: but this he would not do for
fear of losing the flood-tide of popular feeling. He preferred
to take formal grounds; asked for a multa because Junius had
omitted to take his oath of office, and because there was some
irregularity about a subsortitio. Trivial grounds enough, shew-
ing that Iunius was condemned not on the merits of the case,
but owing to the accident of the time and circumstances (non
causa sed tempore). And what has his case to do with that of
Cluentius? Junius, you virtually say, was condemned under
one lex because he had offended against another. How can you
call that a iudiciwm? It was all due to popular excitement,
fanned by the employment of that dangerous engine the tribun-
icia potestas.”
The answer to this argument would be, I suppose, that it
was easier and more convenient to attack Iunius on formal
grounds, and that in fact this method of attack proved perfectly
effective, for Junius was never able to take part in public life
from the time of his condemnation.
(2) §§ 97—103. “Bulbus” you say “was condemned. He
was, but it was on a trial for mazestas. You will argue that it
was his conduct in the tudictum Iunianum which did him most
harm in the eyes of his iudices. This, I reply, is merely ycur
inference.
(3) “You urge the condemnation of P. Popillius and Ti.
Gutta. But these men were condemned not for tampering
with iudices but for ambitus, for their accusers were men who
had themselves been condemned on a charge of ambitus and
had subsequently turned king’s evidence. These accusers were
restored to their civil rights as a reward for their conduct; but
16—2
244 . THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.”
their restoration was, I maintain, due to the fact that they had
informed against Popillius and Gutta, not for taking bribes, but
for ambitus. Their case‘ then, being a case of ambitus, has
nothing to do with that of Cluentius.
_ (4) “Staienus was found guilty: yes, of maiestas. All that
I will say here is that the plea which he then used, that the
money was offered him for the purpose of effecting a compro-
mise, met at that time with a very different reception from that
which is now accorded to it: it was in fact laughed down; in
spite of it Staienus was found guilty, and the Cominii, taking
the same ground as I am taking, gained their point. I have
shewn that if Oppianicus was guilty of bribery, Cluentius was
not, and vice versa. But there is no trace of any corrupt act on
the part of Cluentius: it is clear then that the condemnation of
Staienus is all in favour of my client.
(5) § 103 foll. “Fidiculanius Falcula was accused mainly
on the ground that he had sat on the bench as a substitute, and
had only heard part of the case. First his enemies tried to get
him fined because he had acted as a cudex out of his own decuria
and in violation of the lex by which the proceedings of the
quaestio were regulated. In the first actio he was easily ac-
quitted: but subsequently he was in due form accused under
the lex repetundarum, and acquitted; the dudzces holding it
sufficient that a iuder should be acquainted with the prae-
iudicia bearing on the case.
§§ 113, 114. “You who quote zwdicia, what do you make of
the acquittal of Fidiculanius Falcula? It is not to the point to
collect instances of men who were condemned for ambitus, who
ought rather to have been tried by the quaestio repetundarum.”
From this passage it would appear that all the quaestiones
were set in motion for the purpose of reaching various persons
who had been implicated in the scandal of the dudictum Tunia-
num. Bulbus was prosecuted and found guilty by the quaestio
maiestatis; P. Popillius and Ti. Gutta by the guaestio ambitus:
others by the quaestio peculatus: Verr. Act. 1 37 quod in C.
Herennio, quod in C. Popillio, qui ambo peculatus damnati sunt
...hoc planum factum est, eos pecuniam ob rem iudicandam
accepisse. The only two qguaestiones under which their cases
~—
li ante — se
4
phy
THE PRO CLUENTIO OF CICERO. 245
could technically have come would seem to have been the
- quaestio de sicariis and repetundarum. The lex de sicarws
contained, as we have seen, a clause against conspiracy to procure
a corrupt verdict: the lex repetundarum must, if Cicero's argu-
ment here can be trusted (and there seems no reason in this
case for distrusting it), have contained clauses against a dudes
receiving a bribe, such as appear later in the lex Iuka repetun-
darum; Dig. 48 11 7, lex Iulia de repetundis praecipit ne quis
ob iudicem arbitrumve dandum mutandum iubendumve ut iudicet,
neve ob non dandum non mutandum non iubendum ut wudicet...
neve quis ob hominem condemnandum absolvendumve, neve ob
litem aestimandam, tudiciumve capitis pecuniaeve faciendum vel
non faciendum aliquid acceperit.
Fidiculanius Falcula seems to have been prosecuted and
acquitted under the lex repetundarum. It is not clear how the
trials of the others under the quaestiones ambitus, peculatus, and
mavestatis were made to bear on the question of judicial corrup-
tion. We have Cicero’s own admission or very nearly his own
admission, that though Bulbus was accused under the lex
mavestatis it was his conduct in the matter of the iudiciwm
LIunianum that prejudiced his case more than anything else.
What is exactly meant by this is not clear; whether for instance
it was the statements of witnesses during the course of the trial
that brought out these damaging facts. Nor is it indeed plain
why, when these men might have been legally tried either
by the guaestio de sicariis or by the quaestio repetundarum,
their cases should have been brought before the other quaes-
tiones. It is manifest however that in the Roman usage of this
epoch a man might be prosecuted under one lex, and condemned
partly in consequence of the revelations of misdeeds which
would properly have brought him under another. Thus Cicero —
says with regard to the iudictwm Iunianum, Verr. Act. 1 37,
quod in C. Herennio, quod in C. Popillio, qui ambo peculatus
damnati sunt, quod in M. Atilio qui de maiestate damnatus est,
hoc planum factum est, eos pecuniam ob rem tudicandam accepisse.
In § 98 Cicero lays stress upon the fact that P. Popillius
(not to be confused with the C. Popillius of Verr. 1. c.) and Ti.
Gutta were condemned for ambitus, and proceeds to observe
that their accusers were men who had themselves been con-
246 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
demned for ambitus. The thread of the reasoning in the text
of our oration is not very clear: qui causam de ambitu dixerunt,
gut accusati sunt ab ws, &e. The gist of the argument as given
by Quintilian 5 10 108 is as follows: Cicero pro Cluentio P.
Popillium et Tr. Guttam dicit non tudicw corrupt: sed ambitus
esse damnatos. Quid signi? quod accusatores eorum qui erant
tpst ambitus damnati, e lege sint post hanc victoriam restituti.
They must have been condemned not for tampering with cudices
but for ambitus, because their accusers, who had themselves been
condemned for ambitus, were subsequently restored to their
civil rights. Cicero does not put the case exactly in this way,
but says that these accusers, who had been condemned for
ambitus, were in his opinion restored to their civil rights, not
because they had revealed a case of judicial corruption, but
because they had publicly shewn their disapproval’ of an offence
similar to their own, namely ambitus. Some link is required
between the clauses qui causam de ambitu dixerunt and qui
accusati sunt, &c. Taking into consideration the passage in
Quintilian, I would suggest the possibility that the second
clause began with guia, not with guz, and that between the
two clauses some words have been lost. Qui causam de ambitu
dixerunt [non de iudicio corrupto] guia accusati sunt, &e. .
The argument of these sections is worth very little. The
fact that some of these offenders were accused under leges not
strictly pertinent to their offence is technically in Cicero’s
favour: but only technically. Cicero had himself, eight years
before (Verr, Act. 1 § 37), used the very same argument which
he now tries to parry when employed against him. The fallacy
of the dilemma (§ 102) “either Cluentius or Oppianicus must
have been guilty of bribery, and if one, not the other” need
not be pointed out. With regard to Fidiculanius Falcula, it is
sufficient to refer to the pro Caecina § 29.
§ 115. “You say that damages were assessed against P.
Septimius Scaevola on the count of his having received money
for his judicial vote (litem eo nomine esse aestimatam). I need
hardly remind you that a litis aestimatio is not a iudiciwm. It
1 Reprehendere is apparently used quaestionis, accusatos et reprehensos
here as in Pro Fonteio § 3 atqui ho- _videmus primum testibus.
mines, st qui [tenentur] hoc genere
THE PRO CLUENTIO OF CICERO. 247
often happens that after a man is found guilty, his judges think
that he is thereby made their enemy, and therefore (lest they
should be acting under the influence of personal feeling?) refuse
to admit an assessment which involves his civil status (litem
capitis). Or it may happen that they think that having once
done their duty, they need not trouble much about the further
proceeding of the litis aestimatio. And so it often happens that
when a man is found guilty de pecunus repetundis, and an
assessment involving the offence of mazestas is entered against
him, he is acquitted on the charge of mavestas. Again, in cases
of repetundae, persons who are mentioned in the litis aestimatio
as accessories to the guilt of the principal offenders are often
subsequently acquitted on a regular trial by the. very tudices
who tried the first case. Scaevola was found guilty on other
charges, but every effort was made to make this litis aestimatio
involve his civil status. Had this proceeding really carried with
it the moral weight of a regular iudiciwm, he would have been
brought to trial afterwards under the lex Cornelia de sicariis.”
It will be observed that in this difficult passage I have fol-
lowed Classen’s two best MSS., not the old vulgate defended by
Ramsay. I suppose the case to stand thus. The /itis aestimatio
was in all cases a proceeding following upon the verdict of guilty
(iudicitum) and quite distinct from it. It was not a mere assess-
ment of damages, but might also contain a statement that the
accused was guilty of an offence which should be tried under
another quaestio. Thus a man found guilty under the lex
repetundarum might in the litis aestimatio be said to have
been guilty of offending against the lex mavestatis. or de
sicartis. Or again, the litis aestimatio might state that other
persons besides the accused were guilty of the same offence for
which he had been tried. In either case the result might or
might not be a new trial on the new charges. These statements,
going beyond the subject immediately in question, were not
made without previous discussion between the prosecution and
defence. And in a case where persons other than the accused
were charged (appellati) as accessories in the litis aestimatio it
seems to have been considered fair that they should be present
and have the chance of defending themselves then and there, or,
if they preferred it, of studying the bearings of the case with a
248 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
view to defending themselves later. The proceeding is clearly
described in the pro Rabirio Postumo § 9. Ita contendo, nemi-
nem unquam quo ea pecunia pervenisset causam dixisse, qui in
aestimandis litibus appellatus non esset. In litibus autem nemo
appellabatur nist ex testium dictis aut tabulis privatorum aut
rationibus civitatum. Itaque in inferendis litibus adesse sole-
bant qui alaquid de se verebantur, et cum erant appellati, si vide-
batur, statim contradicere ‘solebant; sin eius temporis recentem
invidiam pertimuerant, respondebant postea. Quod cum fecis-
sent, permulti saepe vicerunt.
I suppose the case of Septimius Scaevola to have been as
follows: He was accused and condemned under the lex repetun-
darum, and was stated in the litis aestimatio to have been guilty
of conspiracy to corrupt a jury, which offence would have ren-
dered him liable to prosecution under the lex Cornelia de sicariis.
Verr. Act. 1 37 quod Septimio senatore damnato, Q. Hortensio
praetore de pecuniis repetundis, lis aestimata sit eo nomine quod
alle ob rem iudicandam pecuniam accepisset. But Scaevola, it
would appear, was not brought to trial again on the strength of
this litis aestimatio. Well, says Cicero, it is notorious that a
litis aestimatio is not a tudicium; and he was right on the
technical point, which had, however, very little to do with the
real bearings of the case.
Cicero's whole argument is a mere web of fine legal tech-
nicalities skilfully arranged so as to hide the real facts at issue.
Even with our imperfect knowledge of the facts it is, as I hope
I have in some measure shewn, not impossible to divine where
his fallacies lie; and I am sometimes tempted to think that the
iudices were not really so blind as Cicero supposed that he had
rendered them, and that the acquittal of Cluentius, like Cicero’s
advocacy of his cause, may have been due to political calculations.
In § 82 the two best MSS. read an ad wpsum eubile, vobis
iudicibus, venire possumus? The other MSS., followed by Baiter,
read ducibus for iudicibus. The true reading I suspect to be
indicibus: Verr. 2 1 § 105 iste praetor designatus, utrum ad-
monitus, an temptatus, an, qua est tpse sagacitate in his rebus,
sine duce ullo, sine indice, pervenerit ad hanc improbitatem,
NeSCLO.
H. NETTLESHIP.
i
ce Ee
TONE AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE.
THE following short paper* was suggested by what seemed
to me an imperfect apprehension of certain characteristics of
Chinese on the part of some comparative Philologers; and it
was some sentences in Mr Peile’s interesting ‘Primer’ which
directly suggested my remarks. The importance of tone, and
the paucity of the vocables, in Chinese, are admitted facts.
Mr Peile, from a combination of these facts, seems to have
concluded that the Chinese succeed in talking intelligibly on
all subjects, difficult as the feat must be, with their poor five
hundred vocables eked out and defined by variety of intonation.
Collocation, indeed, is mentioned by him as an additional help,
but he assigns the chief efficacy to tone.
He says (Primer, p. 47) ‘There are less than 500’ vocables
‘in all in Chinese, but they are eked out by difference of tone
in pronunciation : the same sound represents different parts of
speech, connected with the same general idea, according as tt is
spoken in a high or low, a rising or a falling tone. (The italics
are my own.) After an illustration of the effect of intonation
in English in varying the meanings of the component words in
the sentence John who is there, he proceeds ; “There is no rule
in English fixing the variation of tone, it is only a common use.
But you may see from it that it would be easy to lay down
rules of the sort, so that the same sound should have different
meanings according to its tone, and in this way the Chinese
manages to be perfectly intelligible.’
Mr Sayce in his ‘Principles of Comparative Philology’
writes to the same effect, although more cautiously and cer-
1 Originally a letter to Professor Cowell.
250 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
tainly with less clearness. He says (p. 31) ‘Chinese depends
almost wholly upon tone, and its syntax may be compressed
into a few lines.” Again (pp. 141, 142), ‘Phonetic decay
has been at work at the (Chinese) vocabulary, dialects have
sprung up in the empire, new words have been applied to
denote the relations of grammar’ [whatever that may mean]
‘(more especially in writing), and yet the sentence is still con-
fined to the individual vocable, and position and tone must
determine the meaning of the speaker.’
Both writers, I think (in spite of one doubtful clause of
Mr Sayce’s and in spite of Mr Peile’s illustration (p. 47) wo-chae,
which is literary, not colloquial Chinese), had in view Chinese
as a spoken language. Otherwise they could hardly have failed
to take account of the function of the word-symbols or ‘charac-
ters’ in multiplying the capacity of the language for literary
purposes. This is too well known to need illustration ; but the
following, taken from Dr Wells Williams’ * Syllabic Dictionary,
will serve, besides, as an illustration of the need of something
besides tone to discriminate vocables of the same sound. Dr W.’s
article on the syllable I (Ee) embraces 145 different characters
of the same sound (if we disregard tone). Eighty of these be-
long to the first tone, twenty to the second, and forty-five to
the third. The first and third tones are subdivided; so that
five tones share amongst them the 145 characters; giving an
average of nearly 30 characters to each tone or semitone !
In the literary Chinese, tone is rather a grammatical tradition
than a living reality ; in this respect something like the Greek
accents, or the Hebrew points, but of infinitely less service
than the latter in respect of intelligibility. Chinese composi-
tion, both prose and verse, is read or recited aloud, not to be
understood, which it can hardly be unless you have the charac-
ters before you or know them by heart, but as an exercise of
memory, or for the pleasure of the rhythm. For rhythmic
purposes there is a strict tonic prosody, observed in due
measure in prose as well as verse. And a false tone, though it
may vitiate sense as well as rhythm, is only sure of spoiling the
1 T have followed the orthography of Dr Williams throughout this paper,
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE. 251
latter. For intelligibility the essentials are the choice of words
and their collocation.
The tones, one of which is inherent in every word, are four,
the Level, Rising, Vanishing, and Entering, which I will call
the First, Second, Third, and Fourth tones. For purposes of
prosody however they are reduced to two main divisions; the
oblique, consisting of the second, third, and fourth, and the level
division, coinciding with the first tone. Verse rhythm depends
on the due proportion and arrangement of levels and obliques;
and dictionaries with a view to tone are furnished to tiros, of
the same nature as our Gradus ad Parnassum.
In the North and West the fourth tone, which comprises all
the short syllables, disappears; all words assigned to it in the
Standard Dictionaries being distributed among the other three
tones. In the South-eastern provinces the short syllables all
end in k, p, or t; and each of the four tones is subdivided into
an upper and lower class, making eight tones or semitones in
all. It will be seen that, excepting the regions where the
northern idiom prevails, the fourth tone virtually increases the
number of vocables distinguishable by European orthography ;
and Syllabic dictionaries accordingly treat such vocables sepa-
rately, e.g. ko and koh, where the final f is written by way of
representing the k, p, or ¢, still heard in Fuhkien and Kwang-
tung, and believed to have been anciently universal.
One more remark as to literary Chinese.-—Table A which I
append to my paper will shew I think that ditonic words—
words in which one character is read in two tones—are but a
small percentage of the materials of a literary composition;
barely (taking my example) five per cent. And it would be
hard to infer any such rule, as Mr Peile seems to have thought
of, from these remains of primitive Chinese. It attained to
intelligibility and precision, not by the tone system, but. by
choice of words and word symbols, and by their arrangement in
the sentence.
Spoken Chinese, the Colloquial in its many dialects, is un-
doubtedly much more beholden to tone than is the language of
books ancient or modern. I have mentioned the eight tones of
the South, In Chekeang, my own province, five or rather six
252 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
are well recognized; and we have besides the use of the initials —
b, d, g, 2 and dz (unknown in the South) in addition to 9, #, &, s,
and ts both aspirated and unaspirated. Table B, constructed at
random out of Dr Williams’ Dictionary, will serve as a specimen
of the real importance of tone, and the liability to mistake
when it is neglected. It will help to shew also, I think, the
absence of any general principle associating certain tones with
certain parts of speech; since very many words in each tone are
nouns, adjectives, and verbs, according to circumstances; and
of words limited to one part of speech, examples may be found
under each tone. It must be borne in mind, of course, that
several of the syllables illustrated have, each, a large number of
meanings different from and unrelated to those given, discrimi-
nated, when written, by their word-symbols, but not by tone. For
example*, Chdn, which in Williams has but one or two repre-
sentatives in the upper division of the first tone, has i the
lower division six of widely different meaning, all in common
use, besides others less usual.
The analogy between tone in colloquial English and in
Chinese is, I think, real only so far as to illustrate the fact of one
and the same word being sometimes variable by intonation. In
English this depends always on some emotion, or some process
of thought, in the speaker’s mind. In Chinese there are a few
cases of this kind, but they (I think my tables will shew it) have
very little to do with the tonic system in Chinese. The pro-
noun na-ko spoken (as to its first syllable) in the second tone is
interrogative (who? or, what?); spoken in the third it is demon-
strative (that). But the vast majority of words have their tones
independent alike of sentiment and of logic. Here, for instance,
are four nouns meaning Father, Mother, Elder and Younger
brother, Fu®, Mu*, Hiong*, Tv”, whose tones are marked by the
numerals on the right. Good and Evil (shan’, ngoh*) are respec-
tively of the third and fourth tones, but the synonyms hao’, tai”
are both of the second. Once more in k‘an* to look, fing* to
hear, hiu® to smell, kih* to taste, it would be hard, I think, to
account logically for the difference in tone assigned to ‘hearing,
* In the Chekeang dialects, the Tsing), the six of the lower-level tone
Chin I have.given would be Tsdén (or would sound Dzén (or Dzing).
eee eee ee ee ee
se
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE. 253
‘smelling,’ ‘tasting’ (or ‘eating’), and the identity in this respect
between ‘looking’ and ‘smelling,’
The part of speech is certainly not indicated with any regu-
larity or precision by the tone. This is done, as Marshman,
Julien, and others earlier and later than either, have observed,
almost wholly by the context. Julien, after illustrating by means
of the English word set, says (Syntaxe Nouvelle, p. 4), “Tout
mot Chinois peut passer par les mémes états (i.e. as those in-
stanced in the case of sef) et changer aussi souvent de significa-
tion suivant les mots auaxquels on Vassocie.
Under the general idea of context, however, two methods of
arrangement deserve a special notice, as they are of essential
service in promoting intelligibility, and characteristically Chinese,
though perhaps partial analogies to each of them may be ob-
served elsewhere. When it is borne in mind that e.g. the vo-
cable sin, without change of tone, may mean ‘bitter,’ or ‘new, or
‘firewood,’ or ‘the heart,’ it will be seen that mere arrangement
of words will hardly preclude confusion, without some special
device besides. The two characteristic methods I mean are,
Classifiers and Coupling.
Numerals, in Chinese colloquial, seldom stand alone before
the noun they qualify. ‘One man’ is not yth jin but yeh-Ko jin;
ko (seen in na-ko just above) nearly answering to ‘unit’ or ‘in-
dividual,’ and corresponding much more nearly to a real enclitic
than Mr Peile’s chae (Primer p. 47). For ‘four horses’ they say
8z-P'EIH ma, where peih has a meaning connected with ‘pairing’
or ‘matching. And ‘two towers’ is rh-TSo leu, tso being akin
to ‘seat’ or ‘place. A heart sin and a star sing in several dia-
lects are almost identical in sound, the g being added to both,
or omitted in both, alike, They are effectually distinguished
however by the classifier, or special affix to the numeral, a heart
being yih-KO sin, a star yth-K‘O sin; where ko is the common
enclitic mentioned above, but ko a special one used of spherical
- objects, pearls, fruits, and the like, including stars. So much
for the classzfiers, or enclitics which attach themselves to the
numerals and to pronouns also in some cases.
By coupling I mean the association of one vocable with
another of kindred meaning so as to form a disyllable. Refer-
aS Seay THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
ring to table B, chdn, a pillow, in colloquial takes the affix teu
a head, perhaps for euphony, but probably by allusion to its
use. Chdn, to shake, associates fung to move, forming the
disyllable chdn-tung to shake. Chang, the palm, prefixes sheu
the hand (sheu-chang). Cht, knowledge, occurs as chi-shih or
chi-hwui with very slightly different meanings, shih and hwut
having senses akin to ‘knowledge. Ling is-‘spirit’ and also
‘subtile’; in the latter sense it often affixes A iaw clever, and
becomes ling-kiau. Ling, a‘pass, has its meaning fixed by the
prefix shan a mountain, and Ling an order, by hao ‘a call,
‘password, &c., making the disyllables shan-ling, hao-ling
respectively. Jaz* ‘to buy, and Maz* ‘to sell, both belonging
to the general branch of oblique tones, are not always said so
accurately as to leave no room for mistake; but the affixes tsin
‘to enter, or lai ‘to come’ for the first, and ch'uh ‘to go out, or
ki ‘to depart’ for the other, put them out of doubt; as maz-
tsin ‘to buy, mai-ch'uh ‘to sell.’ Rh’ ‘a child’ usually has as
affix tsz its synonym, but sometimes another synonym haz
as prefix (Rh’-tsz or Hai-rh’). Ri’ ‘an ear’ takes to ‘a lobe, &c,
after it (Rh’-to), and Rh’ ‘two’ agglutinates ko or one of the
many other classifiers, as rh’-ko ‘two (men), rh-teu ‘two (cows),
rh’-wei ‘two (gentlemen, guests, et sim.)’ &e,
The usefulness of this tendency to form disyllables by a
prefix or affix of kindred meaning is great and various. It dis-
tinguishes between vocables of identical tone, or of similar tone,
or where the tone (as often in the case of foreigners) is wrongly
given. It also forms abstract nouns, by coupling two words
of contrasted meaning; thus ‘newness’ sin-k iu (lit. ‘new-old’);
‘height’ kaou-ti (lit. ‘high-low’); ‘distance’ yuen-kin (lit. ‘far-
near’); and ‘intercourse’ lai-wang (lit. ‘come-go’).
I imagine these features of Chinese are to be found in all
manuals, grammars, &c. on the subject, though I have none at
hand to refer to. It was because they seemed to me to have
been undervalued, or perhaps overlooked, by English compara-
tive philologers, whose attention was attracted too exclusively
to the tones, which, at the same time, they appeared partly to
misunderstand, that I have ventured to write this very im-
perfect paper.
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE. 255
The chief practical use of tone—it is this I wished to point
out—is in the colloquial, not the literary, language. In that its
services are rendered rather in the vocabulary than the grammar.
And for even.that limited service it is inadequate, and has to be
supplemented by the context, by the method of classifiers (or en-
clitics to numerals) and that of coupling. This last may perhaps
be illustrated though very imperfectly by the bi-lingual com-
pounds found in English, e.g. Hampstead, Hampton, where one
syllable helped, I suppose, to give definiteness to the other.
And the classifiers find a partial analogy in the specific nume-
ral words, a couple or pair or brace, a leash, a dozen, a score ;
as also a head (of cattle), a flock, a covey, a drove, etc. Only
none of these words in English are as indispensable as the
corresponding words are in Chinese.
Tone in the literary language is a valuable and interesting
tradition, and is cultivated by native scholars for the sake of
rhythm, and the logical force or poetical grace which rhythm
subserves. It contributes something to the enlargement of the
dictionary, and something much less to the grammar, The
strength of the dictionary for literary purposes, however, lies in
its vast array of word-symbols; and, to quote Marshman as
quoted by Julien, nearly ‘the whole of the grammar depends
on position,’ 2
G. E. MOULE, Missionary C. M. S.
256
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
TABLE A.
§ aA
poe
=. Scie
Words affected by tone in the ‘Great Learning,’ ‘Doctrine of the Mean,’ and
* Analects’ of Confucius, as shewn in Dr Legge, Vol. 1. Index.
Vocablel.| First (or Level) Tone. _| Second (or Rising) |Third (or Vanishing) Biapesies Enter-
C,
Chan sag A pillow To pillow
Chan (lower) To arrange oe Ranks, Array
Ch‘ang Long Elder More than
Chao (upper) Morning =n sax
, (lower) Court, Dynasty
Chi To know Knowledge ‘
Chi To rule To be ruled Sie
Ching | Title of first Month Correct :
Ch‘ing To designate se To weigh
Ch‘u oa To place A place
Chung The middle ins To hit (target or
other mark)
F.
Fang To accord with To let go a
Feu ae To cover Fih, To over-
turn
Fu (upper) a man Ss
(lower) initial particle
‘as to...’
Fu oad Father ‘Good Father’ ees
Fuh ate (Feu) Again To repeat
H.
Hao ae Good To approve
Hi | (read Hu) Alas! affixed Sr A play. To play
to another syllable
Hia fae Below To descend
Hing To walk or do oak Conduct
Hwa Flower, Glorious Name of
mountain
Hwa A picture (Hwah) to
draw
Hwo Peace, Harmony To accord, a
sing with
I.
I Clothes To dress eh
I ae Easy (Yih) to
change
J.
Jan To endure To entrust,
an officer
1 It should be understood that each vocable
in this column stands for one Character, read,
according to context, in either of the two or
more tones and meanings given in the other
- columns. It has not been possible to print the
Chinese characters.
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE.
257
Fourth (or
Vocable. First (or Level) Tone. Second (or Rising) |Third (or Vanishing)| “}yntering).
K.
Kiang | (K‘iang) To compel Violent vat
Kien a? ase To see, read
Hien To shew
Kien A crack are To separate
Kung ae Toturn towards, |(lower) Together
To give
K‘ung Empty a To empty
Ki ie To dismiss | To depart
Kiien To roll up A scroll (also
. used as verb)
Kwan A cap To invest with F
the eap of
manhood
Kwo To pass by To transgress,
A transgression
L,
Li To part To leave
Liang | Used in a technical Certainly
. phrase about mourning
a, *)
Moh Ja (Mu) Quiet, | Negative
. Evening particle
Nan Difficult Difficulty
Ni Mud Bigoted
ta
Pi To compare | To harmonize
8.
San Three To do thrice
Sang To mourn cis To lose
Shang ‘ap To ascend {Above (cp. Hia)
Shao Few Young Ay
She és To shoot (Shih) to
aim at
Sheu The head To confess ‘eas
Shi ai To send A messenger
Shi To grant vei To distribute he
Shih ae (Sz’) To feed To eat
Shih (Chi) To re- To know
member
Shing To ride A team,
A carriage
Shing Able a To conquer ee
Shu eee To count An account | (Shdéh) fre-
quently
Shwai A chief (Suh) to
lead on
Siang Mutual Se To assist
Sien és First, Former To lead
Sun A grandson iia Docile
Journal of Philology. vou, VII. 17
258
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
First (or Level) Tone,
Vocable. | Second (or Rising) Third (or Vanishing)} Fourth (St
‘i
Taou Way, Principle To speak oe
Tu fe A measure (Tuh) to
estimate
Tsang To hide, store A storehouse a
Pitaka
Tsao To make,(7's‘ao)
To arrive at
Ts‘i A wife To give in
marriage
Ts‘oh (T's‘6) Wrong, To file
To wrong
Tsuh (Ts‘ii) Excessive) A foot, Full
Ww.
Wan Lines, Literature To gloss
Wan To hear To be heard of
Wang A prince To rule
Wei To make On account of nie
Wu (Int®.) Ah! To hate (Ngéh) ma-
licious
a
Yang To nourish To support
one’s parents
or elders
Yen (upper) How ? ts
(lower) forsooth *
Yin us Todrink /To give to drink sia
Yoh sé (Yaou)Delightin| Music
Yin. To have And :
Yu To tell, A word To speak,
A saying
Yuen Distant To retire from
1 Here Dr Legge inverts Dr Williams’s statement.
The words exhibited above are 76 in number, occurring amongst 1520 which
form the Index to Dr Legge’s Ch. Classics, Vol. 1 The spelling is that of
Dr Williams,
SOME CHARACTERISTICS. OF CHINESE.
TABLE B.
A few examples of tone distinction important in the Colloquial; taken at
random from Dr Williams’s Dictionary.
259
Vocable 1. First Tone. . Second, Third.
Chin True Pillow To shake
Chang A chapter Palm of hand A bill
Chao To beckon To seek To radiate
Chi A branch Paper Knowledge
Ling Spirit, Subtile A pass in hills | To order, An order
Ma Hemp A horse To scold
Mai To cover with earth To buy To sell
Pin Betel, Areca A petition Hair-locks
Ping Soldier Cake A handle
Rh Child Ear Two
Si West To wash Fine
Siao To melt Small To laugh
Sing A star To awake Nature
Sz Silk To die Four
Tan Single To brush off Morning
Tang A lump To wait, A class A bench
Tao A knife To upset To arrive
Ti To lower, Low The bottom Ruler, God
Tien To upset A canon A shop
1 Tn this table each vocable stands for a dif-
Ferent Character in each of the three successive
columns. No fourth tone is exhibited. These
are virtually distinct yocables, and are so ar-
ranged by Dr Williams. The Chinese however
connect them with the tone system, reckoning,
e.g., Pin (1), Pin (2), Pin (3), Pih (4), to form a
set.
i7—2
I—ON LICENTIA POETICA (rourixy égovoia or adea).
(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society 1 May 1879.)
THE lexicons under licentia cite one example from Cicero and
one from Quintilian. No commentator, so far as I know, has
felt called upon to illustrate the phrase. It seems worth
while therefore to submit to our society such examples as I
have met with, in the hope of eliciting further information.
Cic. de or. 111 § 153 inusitata sunt prisca fere ac vetusta ab
usu cotidiani sermonis iam diu intermissa, quae sunt poetarum
licentiae liberiora quam nostrae.
Phaedr. Iv 24=25 8 usus poetae, ut moris est, licentia
(Miller poetae more est et).
Sen. n. q. 11 44 § 1 poeticam istud licentiam decet.
Colum. 1x 2 § 2 ea, quae Hyginus fabulose tradita de origi-
nibus apum non intermisit, poeticae magis licentiae quam nostrae
fidei concesserim.
Quintil. 1 14 § 3 ut sit ea [marrandi ratio] neque arida
prorsus atque ieiuna...neque rursus sinuosa et arcessitis de-
scriptionibus, in quas plerique imitatione poeticae lcentiae
ducuntur, lasciviat. § 19 graecis historiis plerumque poeticae
similis licentia est.
x 1 § 28 meminerimus tamen, non per omnia poetas esse
oratori sequendos nec libertate verborum nec licentia figurarum.
ib. 5 § 4 verba poetica libertate audaciora.
Tert. adv. Marc. I 3 pr. principalis itaque et exinde tota
congressio de numero, an duos deos liceat induci, si forte, poetica
et pictoria licentza et tertia iam haeretica. ;
Mamertini paneg. Maximiano dictus 1 neque enim fabula est
de licentia poetarum.
LICENTIA POETICA. 261
Lact. vit 22 § 6 corruperunt igitur poetica licentia quod
acceperant.
Auson. grat. act. 4 ades enim locis omnibus nec iam miramur
licentiam poetarum qui omnia Deo plena dixerunt.
Macrob. comm. 11 8 § 5 an forte poetica licentia particulam
pro simili paene particula posuit et pro swb ambas dicere maluit
per ambas ? ?
id. Sat. v1 9 § 13 scire vellem in equi fabrica casune an ex
industria hoc genus ligni nominaverit? nam licet unum pro
quolibet ligno ponere poeticae licentiae sit, solet tamen Vergilius
temeritatem licentiae non amare.
Martianus Capella § 297 poetarwm vero licentia haec nomina
pluraliter dixit.
Serv. Aen. 1 15 ingenti arte Vergilius, ne in rebus fabulosis
aperte utatur poetarwm licentia, quasi opinionem sequitur.
ib. 54 translatio est per poeticam licentiam facta. So ib.
227. 550 (p. 169 8), 111 3. 349.
Beda de metris 2 ad fin. (xc 153? Migne) r littera liquens,
eodem modo sicut et /, cum in medio sermone brevem sequitur
vocalem, praecedente qualibet consonante, potest hance poetica
licentia facere longam. ib. 3 bis (153*°).
For what follows I have used the note of Marcilius on Hor.
a, p. and Erasmi adagia. ;
In Greek we find é£oucia ascribed to tas Diphil. in Ath.
223°
ws of Tpay@dol daciv, ois féuela
éoTw eye ArravTa Kal ToLeiy povots.
Strabo p. 25+ cal ra év TH Mnvuyye Sé toils wept trav Awro-
payov eipnuévos cupdpaveiv. et dé Twa ur) cvpdovel, weTaBo-
Ras aitidcbar Seiv 7} ayvoray H Kal Tointixny éEovcilay, 4)
cuvéotnkev €& iatopias Kal diabécews Kal pvOov.
Luc. Dem. enc. 10 xairot AXaBopevos av éyd toév >AOnvav
émt THS REPS TERT S efouclas eareverryev av &pwtas Oedy Kal
Kpices Kal earovenaess Kab Seopeas kat Thv ’EXevoiva: and a
little below tod pév 87 rountixdv PdXov érXevVOepor.
1 I was guided to Strabo and Luc. earlier, I might have been spared a
Dem. enc. by Marcilius. If I had good deal of research.
looked in the lexicon of Sophocles
262 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Freedom of poets also in Hermotim. 72 ovédév raév immoxev-
Tavpwv Kal xipaipav Kal yopyovev Siadéper, Kal boa dAda
dvetpot Kal ToinTtal Kal ypadels éeXevOEpot SvTEs avaTAaT-
Tova oUTE yevomeva ToeTroTe OTE yevioOar SuVapeva,
Irresponsibility in pro imag. 18 wandaids odtos 6 Adyos
avevOvvous eivat Kal ToLNnTas Kal ypadéas.
The technical term in the grammarians is ddeva. Fix in
- HSt. has five references and Sophocles two. Add (regulae de
prosodia 122 fin. in Herm, de emend, rat. gr. gr. 448) 7d dard
TOV TTOTIKOY OVTWS pHKUVETAL, WS Eyet TO axoviTi...€aTt be STE
TOLNTLKH Adela TUVETTAApEVOY TrPOpEepETar.
Compare also:
Ov. amor. 111 12 41 42
exit in immensum fecunda hcentia vatum,
obligat historica nec sua verba fide.
Hor. ad Pis. 9 10
pictoribus atque poetis
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas,
Prudent. ¢. Symm. 1 39 40
aut vos pictorum docuit manus adsimulatis
iure poetarwm numen componere monstris.
Cf. Quintil. 15 § 12 in eiusdem vitii geminatione Mettoeo
Fufettioeo dicens Ennius poetico ture defenditur.
JOHN E. B. MAYOR.
Il—ON HEMINA SANGUINIS IN SENECA AND
JEROME.
(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society 1 May 1879.)
SENECA trang. an. 14 § 3 minabatur Theodoro philosopho
tyrannus mortem et quidem insepultam: “habes,” inquit, “cur
tibi placeas. hemina sanguinis in tua potestate est: nam quod
ad sepulturam pertinet, o te ineptum, si putas mea interesse,
supra terram an infra putrescam.” Hieron. ep. 147 8 pr. (1 1091°
ed. Ven. 1766, a severe letter to Sabinianus a deacon, who had
been guilty of adultery) iaces itaque advolutus genibus meis et
heminam, ut tuis verbis utar, sanguinis deprecaris. The editor’s
note is “sic legendum videtur ad Veronensis exemplaris fidem
heminam, non, ut vulgo hactenus obtinuit, misericordiam. est
autem hemina mensura fere omnium minima, quae sextarii
dimidia pars est. ei Sabinianus qui et marcidulus, pallidus et
exsanguis supra dicitur,ad movendam Hieronymo misericordiam,
sanguinem suum comparat...vocem obscuriorem aut minus
obviam critici depraverunt.”” Had the editor known of the
passage of Seneca (which I had noted in my lexicon, and can
find in no lexicon but Miihlmann’s’), he might have added
authority to the grounds which make the new reading certain.
For misericordiam sanguinis is nonsense; whereas heminam
sanguims deprecaris makes good sense whether you take depre-
caris in the sense of ‘beg off,’ ‘pray against,’ ‘pray to be let off’
as in letum deprecor, or in that of ‘pray for, ‘pray not to be
1 This very day the new edition of Georges vol. 1 has come to hand, which
contains this passage.
aS ed ne ee BM ED?
264 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
deprived of;’ cf. vitam, pacem deprecart. In the first case the
meaning is, ‘you beg me to be content with your present morti-
fication, not to reduce you to a half-pint of blood, to mere skin
and bone.’ In the second case translate: ‘you beg me not to
rob you of the half-pint of blood which alone remains to you.’
The palaeographical interest of the variant misericordiam is
very great. Either the he* of heminam was omitted by accid-
ent, and mtam which remained was expanded as usual into
misericordiam, or the miam was first expanded into the well-
known word, and then he* omitted as unintelligible. It is
plain that hemina sanguinis became proverbial and it is not
likely that it is extant only in these two texts.
1 Or rather e. Georges has two examples of emina.
JOHN E. B. MAYOR.
IIl.—ON CONDICIO AND CONDITIO.
(Read before the Cambridge Philological Society 15 May 1879.)
ANTONIO Augustino, abp. of Tarragona in the 16th century,
asked the question (dial. ant. Ix) whether condicio should be
written with c or ¢, ‘et quaesito contentus est. The Jesuit
Claude Dausque in his antiqu novique Latl orthographica
(Tournai 1632 fol. 1 92) is more dogmatic: ‘CONDITIO con-
sona T, nec aliter. Ratio in exemplis est, amatio, lectio, dictio,
latio, alia, quibus urgetur competentia. Origo sic imperat,
conditus, conditor, conditrix, conditio. Conditi sumus bona con-
ditione, inquit Seneca 1. 5 de consol. (?) Qui libros veteres aut
epigrammata in contrarium iurant, scripti crimen iurant. Pan-
dectae Flor. cum C, uti lapis Ancyranus per C,’
The Jesuit’s reasoning falls to the ground with his deriva-
tion of the word. Isidore (origg..v 24 29) conditiones sunt
proprie testium, et dictae conditiones a condicendo, quasi con-
dictiones, quia non ibi testis unus iurat, sed duo vel plures...
item conditiones, quod inter se conveniat sermo testium, quasi
condiciones, It is now generally allowed that condicio and
dicio belong to the family of Seixvupus, dico, disco, dicis causa
Curtius l 134, Corssen 1? 52. Vanitek 1° 330. Yet of the lexi-
cographers only Klotz and his pirate Corradini (in his Forcellini)
spell the word with ac, and separate it entirely from conditio’.
Faber and Gesner class it among derivates of do, and even
Georges follows Scheller Freund and De-Vit’s Forcellini in the
1 Corradini’s slavish dependence on Klotz was) to this head a passage of
Klotz appears in his assigning (what ic. which is rightly given under con-
is amazing in an editor of Cicero, as _ ditio.
266 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
spelling conditio. Fleckeisen (Fiinfzig Artikel, Teubner 1861
p. 14) yields to authority, but with a bad grace; ‘ condicio
nicht conditio, so ungern man sich auch den von Déderlein
(Reden u. Aufsatze I 368) fiir die Schreibung mit ¢ geltend
gemachten inneren Griinden entzichen mag; aber die Auto-
ritat der Inschriften (s. E. Hiibner in den Jahrb. f. class. Philol.
1858 S. 354 ff. 1859 S. 437) und der altesten Handschriften
(Ambrosianus des Plautus, Bembinus des Terentius, die besten
des Vergilius, die Palimpsesten von Cic. de re publica und
Gaius) ist durchaus fiir condicio’. A brief comparison of the
examples collected in the lexicons of condicio and condico, will
shew that the terms belong to one another; still we find in
many editions, as Haase’s Seneca, the old mumpsimus holds its
ground. :
A very few traditional examples of conditio from condo are
given by the lexicons. They will be found with others in
Rénsch Itala u. Vulgata 309 (from vulg. and Tert. Iren. Prud.).
I have noticed the following:
Commod. apol. 121 sic deus omnipotens, dominus suae con-
ditionis.
Tert. adv. Mare.1 15 pr. cum dixeris esse et illi [creatori]
conditionem suam et suum mundum et suum caelum.
ib. 16 p. m. conditionis universitas. id. apol. 19 pr. [the
passage from cod. Fuld.] Moyses, qui mundi conditionem et
generis humani pullulationem...exorsus est.
Victorini tractatus de fabrica mundi pr. (Cave hist. lit. Basil.
1741 1 148) in libro Mosis quem de conditione ipsius [mundi]
scripsit, qui genesis appellatur. |
Iren. 11 6 § 1 deum patrem et filium eius, qui dominium
accepit a patre suo omnis conditionis. id. v 18 § 1 saepe. 2.
Aug. de gen. ad litt. Iv § 43 illi tres dies, qui ante conditio-
nem istorum luminarium commemorati sunt.
id. tract. in Io. ep. 1 § 4 quantum deus a creatura, quantum
conditor a conditione, quantum sapientia ab eo quod factum est —
per sapientiam, longe ultra omnia debet esse lux ista.
id. civ. dei 112 (1 22 24 Dombart) proinde ista omnia, id
est curatio funeris, conditio sepulturae, pompa exequiarum,
magis sunt vivorum solacia quam subsidia mortuorum,
CONDICIO AND CONDITIO. 267
Hier. comm. in Eph. 1 4 (vit 548° ed. Ven. 1769) volens
itaque Paulus ostendere quod deus universa sit machinatus ex
nihilo, non conditionem, non creaturam atque facturam, sed
KataBorny, id est, initium fundamenti ad eum rettulit.
ib. 2 10 (578°) ita et in nobis et in Christo per singula opera
et profectus creatura atque conditio accipi potest.
ib. 4 23—4 (626 fin.) creatio quippe apud nos generatio vel
nativitas dicitur: apud graecos vero sub nomine creationis ver-
bum facturae et conditionis accipitur. et quod apud nos con-
ditio, hoc apud graecos creatio sonat.
Oros. 112 et a primo anno Procae, cum regnare -coepit, usque
ad conditionem urbis.
ib. vit 20 p. 514 Hav. millesimus a conditione Romae annus
impletus est. ib. 43 p. 586 fin. si quid a conditione mundi
usque ad nunc simili factum felicitate doceatur. cf. Beda h. e.
i
Phoebad. c. Arian. 1 ad hanc tractatus conditionem neces-
sitate descendimus. Barth ad loc. (pp. 57—8 Francof. 1623, ef.
advers. VI 27 p. 306) conditio non est id quod vulgo solet, sed
compositio, conditura, scriptio. condere autem peculiare libro-
rum scriptoribus attribuitur, quod ii nimirum in lucem pro-
ducant quid cuius antea non erat nota conditio. ......... conditio
autem pro conditura aut opere quo condito Tertulliani est de
corona militis c. 4 [read 6 and compare a little before ‘natura-
lem usum conditionis’] ‘quaeris an conditioni eius fruenda
natura nobis debeat praeire, ne illa rapiamur qua dei aemulus
universam conditionem certis usibus homini mancipatam cum
ipso homine corrupit?’ idem adversus Hermogenem cap. 10
[read 11] ‘cum praeses eius diabolus abierit in ignem quem
praeparavit illi deus et angelis eius, prius in puteum abyssi
relegatus quam revelatio filiorum dei redemerit conditionem a
malo, utique vanitati subiectam, cum restituta imnocentia et
integritate conditionis pecora condixerint bestiis, et parvuli de
serpentibus luserint, hoc est ‘omnem creaturam’ ut vocat
apostolus quicquid vivit, sic etiam capiam apud Valerianum
Cimelenensem sermone I ‘vereor dicere ne nostram neglegen-
tiam pulset ista sententia. non autem cognoscit dominum qui
conditionis suae non agnoscit officium.’
268 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
Hil. in ps. 53 12’ (1v 344° Migne) et quamquam passio illa
non fuerit conditionis et generis, quia indemutabilem dei natu-
ram nulla vis iniuriosae perturbationis offenderet.
ib. 68 251 (486) quia neque evacuatio illa ex dei forma na-
turae caelestis interitus est, neque formae servilis assumptio
tamquam genuinae originis conditionisque natura est.
Druthmar expos. in Matt. c. 12 pr. (cv1 1314” Migne)
duobus modis est nobis pater deus: conditione, quia condidit
et creayvit nos.
- In some passages it may be a question whether we should
read conditio ‘creation, make,’ or condicio ‘state’ (e.g. Tert.
apol, 48 p.m. ‘ergo’ inquitis ‘semper moriendum erit et sem-
_ per resurgendum.’ si ita rerum dominus destinasset, ingratis
experieris condicionis tuae legem.) But it seems plain that
editors and lexicographers should distinguish words of such
different origin and use, and that the modern languages should
follow the example of Spanish in writing ‘ condicion’ and all
its family with a medial c.
1 Possibly I owe these two examples to Paucker,
JOHN E. B. MAYOR.
ON THE DATE AND INTEGRITY OF A LETTER
ASCRIBED TO D. BRUTUS. (ap Famiiarzs x1. 13 a.)
THERE is no direct evidence in this letter as to the date of
its composition. The superscription found in some editions
‘Ser. Pergae rv. Nonas Iunias A. v. c. 711’ is clearly wrong, and
has perhaps been transferred by an oversight from ad Fam. XII.
15 which is placed next to this letter in chronological order
by Schiitz.
Can then the date of the letter be mBEVS from its con-
tents ?
§ 4 seems to show
1. That the writer had crossed the Alps—(neque ex Italia
tam cito exercitum traici posse credebant).
2. That Plancus was on the right bank of the Isara, and
we learn from ad Fam. x. 23, 3 that he recrossed that river
from its left bank on June 4.
§ 5 seems to imply that the armies of D. Brutus and
Plancus were, if not united, at least within easy reach of each
other. Now Plancus, writing on June 6, expected D. Brutus
to join him in three days (ad Fam. x. 23, 3).
§§ 4 and 5 both seem to imply that D. Brutus had heard
of the defection of Lepidus, which took place on May 29
(cp. ad Fam. x. 23, 2). For though the concluding words of
this letter (qui quidem...converterunt) may seem to describe
the behaviour of Octavian more accurately than that of Lepi-
dus, yet there does not appear to be any evidence that the
disaffection of Octavian bad shewn itself in an active form
before the date of this letter—(cp. ad Fam. x1. 10, 4; x1. 20,
1 and 4), and Plancus even on July 28 does not seem to have
given up all hope of his support—cp. ad Fam. x. 24, 4—6,
270 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
It seems then that the portion of this letter beginning with
the words ‘in spem venerant’ in § 4, can hardly have been
written before the 7th or 8th of June. A further question
arises, viz. whether all the letter was written at one time.
Now in § 2 the writer speaks in a very slighting way of
his forces, ‘recurri ad meas copiolas ...sunt extenuatissimae ’—
but in ad Fam. x1. 23, 1, a letter written on May 25, while
he still entertained hopes of Lepidus, and therefore before § 5
of the present letter, D. Brutus speaks of his forces as form-
ing one of three considerable armies—‘tribus tantis exerci-
tibus ’.
It seems therefore that § 2 of this letter was written be-
fore ad Fam. xI. 23. Perhaps it was written soon after the
writer had received information of the discontent caused at
Rome by his apparent dilatoriness.
Now such discontent would not be expressed at Rome be-
fore reports had arrived there that D. Brutus was wasting
the days which immediately followed the relief of Mutina: and
as Mutina was probably relieved on April 27 (cp ad Fam. xt.
9, 2), such reports would not leave its neighbourhood before
April 29, nor arrive at Rome before May 4, as a message
seems to have taken about five days to reach Rome from
Mutina (cp. ad Fam. 10. 30, 1 and Philipp. 14. 5).
The criticisms then to which the earlier part of this letter
seems to have been a reply can hardly have been made before
May 4 or 5, nor can they at the very earliest have reached
D. Brutus before May 11; between which date and May 25
the earlier portion of the present letter seems to have been
written. It must have been written at some place visited by D.
Brutus on his march from Pollentia to Eporedia. He was at
Eporedia on May 24 (cp. ad Fam. x1. 20, 4).
The Medicean MS. (M), from which Mr C. B. Heberden
has been good enough to make a. transcript of this letter for
me, does not appear to suggest any doubt as to the continuity
of the letter; nor, so far as I have been able to discover, has
any previous editor been struck by its internal inconsisten-
cies.
I must add (1) that the conclusion of the first of the two
DATE OF A LETTER ASCRIBED TO D. BRUTUS, 271
fragments which, according to my view, make up the present
letter is very abrupt — whether we suppose it to end at ‘cum
equitibus’, or at ‘consistere’: (2) that the beginning of the
second fragment is, on either supposition, equally abrupt:
(3) that on any supposition the language of § 2 with regard
to the state of the writer’s forces is hardly reconcileable with
that of ad Fam. xr. 10, which is dated May 5, and must there-
fore have been written before any portion of the present letter.
In ad Fam. x1. 10, D. Brutus speaks of his difficulty in find-
ing supplies for an army of seven legions.
I append a list of the dates of D. Brutus’ letters written
after the relief of Mutina.
Ad Fam. x1. 9, April 29, Regium [Lepidum] (Reggio).
no» », 10, May 5, Dertona (Tortona),
Bate , ll, ,, 6, ex castris, finibus Statiellensium,
a . ise. the letter now under consideration.
Ss » 19, ,, 21, Vercellae (Vercelli),
” ” 2 20, ” 25, Eporedia (Ivrea).
»? 22. »? 23, » » »? ”
Age , 26, June 3, ex castris.
A. WATSON.
JUVENAL X. 54, 55.
Mr Monro seems to me to have been less happy than usual in
the two emendations he has proposed for 1. 54. According to
that which he now prefers he would read
ergo supervacua aut ut perniciosa petuntur,
propter quae fas est genua incerare deorum?
translating “Well then, to come back to our subject, even as
superfluous or hurtful things are, as we have seen, asked for in
prayer, what things may we with propriety ask for?’ His
other emendation was to read haut, haut after supervacua,
translating “Are then the things asked for in prayer not super-
fluous, not pernicious, things for which we may with propriety
petition the gods 2?” |
I think we may get a more simple and natural meaning by
adopting Doederlein’s aut vel and changing petuntur into pu-
tantur,
ergo supervacua aut vel perniciosa putantur
- propter quae fas est genua incerare deorum.
which I should translate “accordingly (i.e. in accordance with
the blindness which has been illustrated in the preceding part
of the Satire) those things for which it is really right to pray
(such as honesty and modesty) are reckoned superfluous or
even injurious.” They had so perverted their judgment by
indulging in wishes for what was wrong, that what was right
seemed no longer desirable.
I confess that this reading leaves a harshness in the con-
nexion both with what precedes and with what follows; but
that is a general defect of Juvenal’s style, and I think the
passage is open to the same objection on any interpretation
yet proposed.
Perhaps an easier form of Mr Munro’s emendation might be
ergo supervacua ut vel perniciosa petuntur.
JOSEPH B. MAYOR.
ADFECTUS AND ADFICTUS.
UnveER the word adficio the Lexicons quote from Cicero's
Topica § 8 the following words: in ws locis in quibus argu-
menta inclusa sunt, alit in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent, ali
adsumuntur extrinsecus. In ipso tum ex toto, tum ex partibus
eius, tum ex nota, tum ex ws rebus quae quodam modo adfectae
sunt ad id de quo quaeritur. The last words recur in § 11.
The words adfectae sunt are explained by the lexicographers,
who follow Boethius, as = standing in relation to.
An unknown commentator on Cicero's De Inventione 1
cap. 24—28 (ap. Halm, Rhet. Lat. Min. p. 305 foll.) has an
apparently similar use of adfectus (Halm, p. 309), quae res
possunt in ipsum factum adfectione quadam convenire, has res
adfecta nominamus: verum adfecta accipimus nunc de upso
negotio, id est de omni causa rebusque in causa gestis, nunc ad
res in causa gestas alia quast quodam modo extrinsecus quae
convenire videantur, aut inde ut proveniant aut ad alla contuncta
sint. In the passage of Cicero (Inv. 1 § 37), on which the
commentator is remarking, we find however the following
words: negotiis autem quae sunt attributa, partim sunt con-
tinentia cum tpso negotio, partim in gestione negoti conside-
rantur, partim adiuncta negotio sunt, partim gestum negotium
consequuntur. Continentia cum ipso negotio sunt ea, quae
semper adfixa esse videntur ad rem neque ab ea possunt separart.
I would suggest that the word adfecta, which cannot,
without great straining, be made to give the required sense,
was written by pure mistake for adficta. The MS. of Cicero
which the commentator had before him probably contained
adfecta, i.e. adficta, and, not understanding the word, he ex-
Journal of Philology. vou. vit. 18
274 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
plained it as= quae res possunt in ipsum factum adfectione
guadam convenire. <Adfictus=adfixus occurs in Varro, R. R.
332;39 7; Cic. De Orat. 2 325: fictus = fieus in Lucr.
3 4, where see Munro. But the passage in the De Inventione
throws some light on that in the Topica, where it appears to —
me that we should read ex ws rebus quae quodam modo ad-
fictae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur: “things which may be said —
to be inseparably connected with the question.” At least I do
not find that the lexicons quote, from classical Latin, any other
instance of adfectus in a similar context, or in the sense
required.
H, NETTLESHIP.
THE NUMBER OF PLATO.
Rep. p. 546. gore 8 Delp pev yervnt@ mwepiodos jv apiO wos
TeptiapBaver TéreL0s, avOpwrreio Ss ev & TPOT@ avEnoets SuVa-
peval te Kal Svvacrevdomevar tpeis amootdces TétTapas Sé
dpous AaBodcat, GuovovvTwy Te Kab dvomowovyTeY Kal avfovTwV
Kal Owovrav, TavTa mpooryopa Kat pnta mpos GdAHAa
amépnvav’ av éritpitos muOunv teumads ovbuyels Svo appo-
vias tapéyetar tpls av&yOeis, thy pev tony icdkis, éxaTov
Tocavtakis, Tv dé icounkn pev TH, Tmpounkn Sé, ExaTov pev
apiOwav aro Stapétpov pntav Tweptrasos, Seouévav évds ExdoTor,
appntav oe dveiv, éxatov Sé KUBov tpiddos’ Edpmas 5é ovTos
apiOuos yewpmeTprKds, ToLoVTOU KUpLOS, auEelvovaV TE Kal YELPOVOV
yEeverewy K.T.Dr.
This passage is part of an answer supposed to be given
by the Muses to the question, put to them in Homeric fashion,
how strife first entered the State, and caused it to fall away
from its ideal condition. The language is mock-oracular; the
Muses treat the enquirers like children, and provoke them
by talking loftily and gravely when all the time they are only
jesting (ws mpos mraidas nuds maidas mafovcas Kal éperxn-
Noveas ws 8) crovd7 Neyovaas tirnAoAoyoupévas eye). And
the oracle which they utter is to this effect :—
“All that is created is liable to perish, our State like the
rest, And since all creatures have their orbits or periods of
fertility and decay, as plants have their seasons, it will come
to pass some day that our rulers with all their philosophy will
miss the secret law which governs human seasons, and will
allow children to be born out of season. Now this period
18—2
276 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
is not expressed by a perfect number (since the State is only
a human product) but by a number”—and then follows the
passage in question.
fee
The first clause (év 6 rpoto...amépnvav) speaks of a series
of four terms, which most interpreters have taken to be a
geometrical progression, formed by two cube numbers with the
two mean proportionals between them, such as 8: 12:18: 27
(Schneider *), or 27 : 36 : 48: 64 (K. F. Hermann’). This view
is supported by the wording of the clause, so far as it can be
explained, and by the great importance which Plato elsewhere
attaches to this kind of progression. In the Zimaeus he bases
the ratios of the musical intervals on the two series 1:2:4:8
and 1: 3:9: 27°, and he applies the same principle to the
four elements, earth and fire being the extremes, and water
and air the mean proportionals which unite them (p. 32 B).
And the Pythagorean writer Nicomachus says (Introd. Arithm.
p- 143) that solid figures are called tpvyf Siacrara, plane
figures Svy# Siactard, and that this receives full light from
the Republic of Plato, cara tov Tod Neyouévov yapou Torov.
In the expression duvapevai te kal Svvactevopevas all that
is certain is that Svvdmevas implies the process of finding either
a square or a square root. A number is said ‘to have the
power of’ (Stvac@ar) its square: and accordingly numbers
are ‘commensurable in power’ (duvayet cvpperpot) when their
squares (Ta érimeda a SUvaytat) are commensurable. So cara
Svvayw means ‘when the square is taken’ (opposed to cata
Tov Tod punKovs apLOuov ‘in the linear number,’ Rep. p. 587 D).
Again, dvvajus is applied in the concrete to denote an irrational
1 De Numero Platonis Commenta- dmoordcess. The more general sense
tiones duae, 1. p. 21.
2 Indices lectionum, Marburgi, 1839:
ep. Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. 17. p. 546.
3 The term dadcracis is applied to
these series, Tim. p. 43 B: rds Tov dt-
mractov Kal tpirdaclou rpeis éxarépas
of ‘ratio’ or ‘interval’ appears in
Phaed. p. 111 B, quay ddecrdva TH
airy dmocrdce. qrep anp te vdaTos
ddésrnxe kal alOnp dépos mpds Kada-
pornra.
djs eee he
THE NUMBER OF PLATO, 277
square root, because the root is only known as that which has
the ‘power’ to produce an actual number. But the combina-
tion av&nows Suvvapévyn is not found elsewhere, and its meaning
is hardly to be elicited from any of the uses mentioned.
It appears from the Theaetetus (p. 147 D) that the enquiry
into the irrational quantities had made some progress before
Plato’s time. The geometer Theodorus is there said to have
shown the irrational character of the square roots from 4/3
to /17. The proof that ./2 is irrational had probably been
given long before. Aristotle quotes it as a stock example of
reductio per tmpossibile (Anal. Prior. p. 41a 26, p. 50a 37),
And the importance of understanding irrational quantities is
insisted upon in the Laws (VII. p. 820) ra rdv petpntav te Kat
apétpov mpos GAANAG| TW PUcet yéyovE K.T.D,
The Verb dvvacrevec Oar is found in two places, viz. :—
Procl. in Eucl. p. 2 (ed. Bas.) cat 60a kata tas Suvdpers ava-
dhaiverat Tacw bpmolws Tpoon Ket Tots waOnuact, TOV ev Suvapévov
tov dé duvactevopévov. Proclus has been saying that the abstract
principles of Mathematics meet us alike in Arithmetic, Geome-
try, and the science of Motion, and the words quoted exemplify
this from the properties of squares, which are necessary in all
branches of Mathematics, ‘one set of quantities being capable
of producing, the other of being produced, by the process. of
squaring.’
Alexander Aphrod. in Arist. Metaph. p. 35 (Berol. 1837),
émel Tolvuy 9 UToTetvouca icov dvvatat audorépars aya, Sia
TovTO » wey Suvapévyn Kareirar ai Sé Svvacrevopevar. Accord-
ing to this statement, in the right-angled triangle whose sides
are as 3, 4, and 5, the hypotenuse 5 is the dvvapévy, and the
two sides 8 and 4 the Suvacrevdpevan.
The result of examining these two passages is purely nega-
tive. It is pretty evident that they are both suggested by the
passage in the Republic, and as they give contradictory ex-
planations it would seem that nothing was known of the mean-
ing of the term éuvacrevduevar from any independent source.
Probably it was adopted by Plato, simply to express the reverse
process to the process denoted by dvvapevar, whatever that
may be. :
278 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
The words duovovytwv te Kal avopotovytwv Kat avédvTav
kat dOwdvrev describe the terms (dpovs) of the progression.
For the use of the genitive compare Rep. p. 443 D @o7rep
OPOUS TPEIS...+6. peaTns Te Kal UTratns Kal wéons ‘like the three
terms, which consist of the vearn, the tmdrn and the péon.’
The meaning is to be sought in the Pythagorean theories; cp.
Proclus in Eucl. p. 7: tovs te Katpovs Taév TpaEewy avapetpov-
péevnv Kal Tas Tovkinas Teptodsovs TOU TavTds Kal Tods Tmpocn-
Kovtas aptOuods Tois yevécect, TOUS TE AhomoltwmpaTLKods
Kat TODS THS AGVOMOLOTHTOS aiTiovs, TOUS Te yovimous Kal
Terelous, Kal Todvs évayTiovs TovTOLS, TOs Te évappovlov
Lois xopnyovs Kab Tovs THs oi sens TAPEKTLKODS Kal Od@S
gopas kal apoplas oiatixous.
What, then, are the numbers that ‘make like’ and ‘make
unlike’? It seems that ‘like’ and ‘unlike’ are the same as
‘square’ and ‘oblong’ numbers, as K. F. Hermann shows
from Iamblichus ad Nicom. p. 115, of 8 wadawol ravtods te
kal opolous éxddouv Tovs TeTpayavous Sia THY Tepl Tas TrEUpds
Te Kab yovias dmoidtnta Kal icoTrnta, avomolovs 8 é« Tod
évavtiov kai Oarépov Tovs érepounxess. And the numbers that
make these two sets like and unlike are themselves the odd
and even numbers respectively: for the Pythagoreans attached
ereat importance to the property by which the odd numbers
produce the series of squares, and the even numbers the series
of ‘oblongs.’ The two series are as follows :—
Squares Oblongs (érepounxers)
14+3= 4 2+4= 6(=2 x 8)
4+5= 9 64+6=12(=8 x 4)
9+ 7=16, &. 12+8=20(=4 x 5), &.
(Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. 1°. p. 253 note).
It is possible that avfovray Kxai d@wvovrwy is only another
way of describing the antithesis odd and even. The odd numbers
were regarded by the Pythagoreans as ‘ generative. On the
question why the Romans named their male children on the
ninth day from birth, and the females on the eighth, Plutarch
says (Qu. Rom. 102, p. 288 C), 7 Ka@azep ot UvOayopixoi tod
b] a \ \ v n ” \ \ \ 9: ff
apiOuod Tov wév aptiov OnrAvvY appeva Sé Tov TepeTTov évomston ;
THE NUMBER OF PLATO. 279
yovuos yap éote Kal Kpated Tod aptiov ovyTiOéuevos, And
in the Pythagorean ovotosyia, ‘odd’ and ‘square’ are on
the side of good, ‘even’ and ‘oblong’ on the side of evil.
§ 2.
The series so obtained is now submitted to a further process,
described by the words oy éwitpitos muOunv treprdds cvluyels
Svo tapéxeTar appovias tpis av&nOeis, x.7.r. These words
are quoted, as being the kernel of the whole problem, by
Aristotle, Pol. v. 12, 8, with the explanation, Xéywr orav 6 Tod
Svaypappatos apiOucs TovTov yévntat otepeds ‘when the
number of this figure becomes solid’ Aristotle apparently
thinks it needless to say what figure is intended. Later writers
are unanimous in taking the figure to be the right-angled tri-
angle in which the sides are in the proportion 3, 4, and 5
(since 3° + 4° = 5°), This figure, often called the Pythagorean
triangle, was probably used in practical geometry from a very
early period. It is found in a Chinese work on geometry
the date of which is at least some centuries earlier than our
own era (Hankel, Zur Geschichte der Mathematik, p. 82).
According to Heron of Alexandria (Geom. 12), and Proclus
(in Hucl. 1. 47), Pythagoras gave a general method of finding
right-angled triangles with commensurable sides, and Plato
himself was the author of another. The method of Pythagoras
proceeds by taking an odd number. Let be such a number,
then the three sides are represented by the numbers n, $ (n? — 1),
and $(n’+1). The method of Plato takes an even number,
2 2
and gives as sides n, (5) —1, and (5) +1. Both are probably
generalised from the equation 3°4+4°=5% (See also Plut.
Is. et Os. p. 373 F; Aristides Quintilianus, p. 152 Meib.)
The word mv@uyv is employed by Theon Smyrnaeus to
denote the first and simplest of a series of equal ratios (De
Mus. ¢. 29 nptodtov pev NGyov rpAtos cal wuOunv 6 TaV ¥ Tpds
7a B, éitpitwv 88 6 rév & mpds ta y). Thus the émizpetos
muOuny is the pair of numbers 4 and 3, regarded as the basis of
the ratios 8 : 6, 12 : 9, and so on.
280 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
These two numbers are ‘coupled by 5’ in the Pythagorean
triangle, since they form the two sides while 5 is the hypote-
nuse. The word ocufuyeis seems chosen expressly to avoid
suggesting either addition (cvv@ecrs) or multiplication’ (in Plato
avénots OY Tod\XNaTAaciwots): cp. Plut. p. 1017 E ai cuguyias...
Kata Te cvvOcow Kal ToANaTAacLacpmov 連 GAOL. |
Next, in what sense can the Pythagorean triangle be said
to be tpis av&nGeis ?
The phrase tpis avEnOecis may be translated ‘raised to the
third dimension, since it may imply either ‘solid’ numbers
(products of three factors) in general, or the cube, which is the
solid number par eacellence. (For the former use, see Rep.
528 B; for the latter, Rep. 587 D.) Aristotle (/.c.) paraphrases
tpis av&nOels by the words 6tav 6 Tod Svaypappmatos aprOmos
Touvtov yévntat otepeos. By the ‘number of this figure’ he
cannot well mean any single number; probably he uses apsOuds
in the sense of ‘linear measurement, as opposed to surfaces
or solids (cf. Rep. p. 587 D, where cata Tov Tod punkous apiOuov
is opposed to cata dvvamwv Kat tpitnv avénv). Now the most
natural way of raising the Pythagorean triangle to the third
dimension is by cubing each of the sides; and this process leads
us at once to the remarkable fact that 3°+ 4° + 5° = 216 = 6%.
It is difficult to resist the impression that this is what was
in the mind of Plato, though there is singularly little evidence
that the property in question was known. It is mentioned
by Aristides Quintilianus, who says, speaking of the Pytha-
gorean triangle (De Mus. p. 151 Meib.), adn’ ef cal rév wrevpav
éxaotny Kata Babos avEncaimev—Babos ydp 7 cwpatos dicts
—Tomoatmev av tov ots’, Also, it is said, on the authority
of several Pythagorean authors referred to by Anatolius (Theol. .
Arithm. p. 41), that 216 years was the period of the metem-
psychosis.
83.
We have next to consider how the process now applied to
the triangle 3, 4, 5 can be said to give two ‘harmonies,’ one
square and one ‘oblong.’ The most obvious difficulty is that
appovia does not mean a number at all, but a relation between
THE NUMBER OF PLATO. 281
quantities, especially a proportion. The nearest approach to
the use of dppovia for a single number seems to be in a passage
of Plutarch wepi rijs év Tiywaim wuyoyovias (p. 1017 ff.), In
Pythagorean language, according to Plutarch,—
5, being 2 + 3, was called tpodos or POdrvyos.
13, being 2? + 3”, was called Xetupa (a musical term),
35, being 2* + 3°, was called apyovia, because it is the sum
of the first two cubes, and also of the series 6:8:: 9 : 12, which
gives the musical consonances. Similarly Nicomachus (Theol.
Arithm. p. 47) says that the best of dppyoviat is cata Tov re
dpvOnov (not that the number 35 7s a harmony), because that
number is not only made up of the two cubes 2° + 3°, but is
also the sum of the three first perfect numbers, 1 + 6 + 28,
and again of those which exhibit in the lowest terms (wv@yew-
xo@s) the scheme of the musical consonances, viz. 6 +8 +9 +12.
Something of this sort is what we look for in the words vo
mTapéxetat dpyovlas — some coincidence arrived at through
progressions or series of numbers.
What then are the two ‘harmonies’? They are described
in a sentence which may be arranged as follows:
THY pv lonv icaKis, éxaToy TocavTaKis,
Thy 8é icounkn pev TH, Tmpounkn Sé, —
éxaTtov pev aptOuadv arro....dveiv,
éxaTov 5€ KUB@v Tpiados.
The only satisfactory explanation of this part of the passage
is given by K. F. Hermann (p. vuil.), who is followed by Otto
Weber’ and Zeller. The first ‘harmony’ is a square, viz.,
100 times 100. The second is ‘of equal length one wan?
i.e. one factor is 100, as before; the other factor is given in two
parts, each described as multiplied by 100 (éxarov pév...éxarov
dé...). It would have been more natural to have said éxardy
éxatovtaxis, but the parallelism with tonv icaxis leaves no
doubt that tocavtaxis means ‘a hundred times. So éxardv
aptOyoi amo «.7.r, is a slightly awkward way of saying ‘a
hundred times the number,’ Plato is evidently avoiding the
word éxatovraxis, which perhaps was not in use in his time,
1 De Numero Platonis, Cassel, 1862,
282 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
The first of the two parts of this unequal factor of the
oblong is the ‘number from the rational diagonal of 5’ (i.e.
the square of the rational diagonal of 5, used as a ‘linear’
number), less by one. This, as I shall proceed to show, gives
us 7? — 1 = 48.
Theon Smyrnzus, in his chapter vrepi mXevpixedv kcal Scape-
tpixav apiOuev (De Arithm.c. 31) shows how to form a double
series, composed of numbers and their respective ‘ rational
diagonals,’ such that the square of each rational diagonal is
either greater or less by unity than the square of the true
diagonal; thus 2 x 5°=7°+1,2 x 127=17’—1. &. Some
such series may have been known to Plato; cp. Polit. 266 a
7H Swapétp@ Symov kal wadw TH THS Svapétpov Siapétpo.
Formulae of this kind would naturally be discovered in the
course of attempts to find an expression for the ratio of the
diagonal to the side, i.e. for /2. In any case we may be sure
that by the ‘rational diagonal of the number 5’ Plato means
7, which is the nearest whole number to 5,/2.
The words appytwv 5é dvetvy have caused some difficulty
from the doubt—to put it shortly—whether Sé means ‘and’
or ‘but. If we complete the sentence in strict parallelism
to the preceding clause, only putting dppytwv for pnrév, and
duely for évds, we obtain éxatov apiOudv amd dppntov svapé-
Tpwv TeuTados Seouévav Sveiv Exaotwov. ‘100 into the square
of the irrational (or true) diagonal of 5, less by 2.’ Now the
square of the diagonal of 5 is 2 x 57=50; hence we have
50 —2 = 48, the same number as before. It seems to follow
that the words appjtwy dé dvety give an alternative calculation :
‘but if irrational, then deduct 2.’
The second of the two parts of the other dimension or
factor of the oblong is the cube of 3. Thus the oblong or
second harmony is 100 x (48 + 27) = 7500.
Adding the two harmonies (as implied by the words
Evyrras Sé obtos ‘this makes in all’), we obtain 10000 + 7500
= 17500: and this is now called ‘a geometrical number,’
determining the issue spoken of, ‘the better or worse bearing
of children.’ For the phrase tovovtouv xvpsos refers us back
to the beginning of the passage, where it was said that a
THE NUMBER OF PLATO. 283
certain number represented the orbit or period of the avOpa-
metov yevvntov. This ‘geometrical number’ then is the secret
which the Guardians must know in order to make the right
use of the seasons of growth and decay in the State. .
§ 4.
It remains to enquire whether this total number can be
connected with the provisional interpretations which have been
given of the earlier clauses. It is evident that if those inter-
pretations are right, the number obtained from the two har-
monies ‘must fulfil two main conditions: (1) it must be a
number 7m which a geometrical series can be formed in the
manner described by the first clause (év 6... admédnvay) ; and
(2) it must be somehow connected with this series by means
of the relation 3° + 4° + 5° = 6° (ev émitpitos...avEnbeis).
The first of these conditions is best fulfilled perhaps by the
series
6400 + 4800 + 3600 + 2700 (= 17500),
which was put forward by Weber. The two harmonies are
obtained in it by taking the terms in pairs, 6400 + 3600
= 10000, and 4800 + 2700 = 7500. As two of the terms are
Squares and two are ‘oblongs, a fair meaning is given to the
words dpuovovvTwv Kat avowowovvtay. And if (with Weber),
we take the explanation of Suvameval te kal Svvactevdpevar
given by Alexander Aphrod. (supra), and translate avEnoes
6. t. x. 6. ‘products of the numbers 3, 4, 5, it will be found
that this series is the ‘first,’ 2. e. is in the lowest terms, fulfilling
the conditions (1) that each term is a product of some powers
of 3, 4, 5, and (2) that the first and third terms are products
of even powers (and are consequently squares ').
It seems probable so far that Weber’s numbers are those
which were in the mind of Plato. We have to consider how
1 Weber’s statement of these con- merus quadratus quam is quem tertius
ditions (p. 24, 1. 19 ff.) is obscure, if progressionis terminus continet non
not incorrect. He says: ‘ex potentiis producitur.’ But 900 (=5?x4x 3?)
quibuslibet quinarii quaternarii ter- satisfies the conditions so stated.
narii inter se multiplicatis minor nu-
284 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
they fit the next clause. Weber explains éitpitos muOunv
meuTrade culuyeis as the ratio or pair of numbers 4 x 5:3 x5,
and takes tpls av&Oeis to mean that each is multiplied
separately by the numbers 3, 4, and 5; the result being—
from 4 x 5 (= 20), the ‘solid’ numbers 60, 80, 100,
from 3 x 5 (=15), the ‘solid’ numbers 45, 60, 75.
Each of these sets of three numbers also represents a
Pythagorean triangle ; and accordingly, by squaring the first
three numbers we get the square terms of the geometrical
series, with their sum (3600 + 6400 = 10000), and by multi-
plying each of these three numbers by the corresponding one
in the next set we get the ‘oblong’ terms and their sum; for
60 x 45 = 2700, 80 x 60 = 4800, and 100 x 75 = 7500.
Tempting as these results are, it is impossible to reconcile
them with the language of Plato, especially with the phrase
tpis avénbels. Weber rightly maintains that these words do
not necessarily imply cubing of the sides of the supposed figure :
but they must denote the process of multiplying three factors
together, and not three separate multiplications. Moreover
the three numbers 3, 4, 5, by which 20 and 15 are multiplied,
' are chosen arbitrarily. They appear to be suggested by the
words émitpitos muOunv meumads cvgvyeis, to which Weber's
scheme gives a different meaning. Finally, the striking rela-
tion 3° + 4° + 5° = 6° is ignored by him.
It may be affirmed with some confidence that the explana-
tion proposed by Weber is the nearest approach possible to a
solution of the problem on the basis which we have adopted,
viz., the assumption that the two ‘harmonies’ are 10000 and
7500 respectively. All attempts starting from that assumption
must fail to account for the phrase tplis avénOeis in the sense
in which Aristotle understood it.
On the other hand the solutions which start with the notion
-of the Pythagorean triangle ‘becoming solid, ie. with the
relation 3° + 4° + 5°= 6° = 216, fail to give a plausible inter-
pretation of the two ‘harmonies. For example; Schneider
points out that 216 = 8 x 27, and that these two cubes give
the series 8: 12: 18 : 27, which offers a tolerable key to the
THE NUMBER OF PLATO. 285
first. part of the passage. But the concluding sentence (from
Sv0 mapéyeTat adppovias to the end) is explained by him in a
way that is violent in the last degree.
§ 5.
If, then, there is no solution—if the conditions of the pro-
blem are inherently contradictory or impossible —are we to
fall back upon the supposition that the passage is a deception,
a mere jargon of mathematical phrases ?
Mr Jowett has given strong reasons against this view of the
case. “Some have imagined” he says (Vol. m1 p. 113) “that
there is no answer to the puzzle, and that Plato had been prac-
tising upon his readers. But such a deception as this is incon-
sistent with the manner in which Aristotle speaks of the
number, and would have been ridiculous to any reader of the
Republic who was acquainted with Greek mathematics.” And
we may be sure that Plato would not have left the passage in
his text unless it had contributed either to the argument or to
the artistic form in which it is presented.
But between these alternatives it may be possible to find a
middle course. Although there is no complete solution—be-
cause there was no consistent meaning in Plato’s mind—it does
not follow that partial and inconsistent solutions, such as have
been given above, are without value. It is plain that Plato
made a serious effort to base the cycles of growth and decay in
States upon a mathematical expression; and this passage may
represent the results or suggestions which he had arrived at in
his enquiries. He was especially attracted by the cases in
which properties of number had been found susceptible of a
geometrical meaning, and accordingly we find the passage
dealing mainly with two groups of such properties—those of the
geometrical series of the form 2°+a°y+ay’+y’, and those of
the ‘Pythagorean’ triangle. It is not unnatural to suppose that,
failing to satisfy himself, and yet persuaded that he was on the
right track, he chose to throw some of the most promising
formulae into the half-playful form of an arithmetical puzzle.
And it may be shown (I believe) that this view of the passage
286 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
is in harmony both with the style in which it is composed and
with other examples of Plato’s philosophical method.
The language is characterised by affected obscurity. Mr
Jowett indeed denies this, and considers that ‘the obscurity only
arises from our want of familiarity with the subject’ (p. 113).
But the manner in which the passage is introduced seems to
show that it was intended to be a puzzle, whether there is an
explanation or not. The Muses are represented as pretending
to speak seriously when all the time they are only mocking us.
Such a preface would be out of place if it were followed by a
piece of ordinary mathematics. I do not suppose indeed that
the language is quite unintelligible, but that Plato assumed a
mock-oracular style, as being well suited to set off to advantage
a certain number of curious coincidences, and at the same time
to disguise the gaps and contradictions in the scheme.
As indications of deliberate obscurity of language I would
mention the following points :—
(1) SvvacredecOas is probably a fanciful word, devised for
the occasion. Itis very unlikely that any common mathema-
tical term of Plato’s time should have fallen out of use again.
Euclid, it must be remembered, is only about half-a-century
later.
(2) The combination of words in avéjoes Suvduevas is
open to the criticism that both are words denoting operations,
not quantities. Hence it is like speaking of the square of a
multiplication. And the same may perhaps be said of éirpsros
mvOunv tpis av&énOels—a phrase in which Aristotle evidently
felt some obscurity, if we may judge from his paraphrase in the
Politics.
(8) The word appyovla means a relation between quantities,
especially a proportion, and cannot with any propriety be applied
to single numbers. To speak of a harmony as a square or
oblong number is a clear departure from ordinary usage.
These instances show that the language of the passage is
not such as Plato would have used if he had had a coherent
scheme in his mind. If he had merely fragments of such a
scheme, there was an obvious motive for dressing them up in
the convenient disguise of a piece of playful irony.
THE NUMBER OF PLATO. 287
It will probably strike readers of Plato that this view of the
famous Number is not alien to his philosophical manner. It
would be interesting, if space permitted, to examine other
instances in which he appears to be putting forward speculations
of a tentative kind, and to consider how far they indicate the
adoption of a method, either of enquiry or of exposition, It
occurs to us at once that such a method was found by Plato in
the use of mythology. The myth derives its probability or
‘likeness to truth’ from the circumstance that it is a copy or
‘shadow’ of truth; it is therefore a type of probable or popular
reasoning, a form adapted to those cases in which scientific
knowledge is unattainable, or in which the mind is unable to
grasp the ‘reality’ (i.e. the truth in its abstract form). Hence
the usefulness of myths in education. So, too, the persuasion
‘of rhetoric is spoken of as a kind*of mythology, Polit. p. 304 c:
tive TO TeLoTLKOY OY aTroddaopev émiaTHnun TANOOUS TE Kal
byAou Sid pvOoroyias aGddad pu Sia Siday7s; pavepov, oipas,
Kal Todto pyntopixn Sotéov dv (see Dr Thompson’s Phae-
drus, p. xvi.). In the Timaeus, again, the whole cosmogony,
with its elaborate numerical schemes, is expressly said to be
only a conjecture or likelihood or piece of mythology. Since
the visible world is an image (eékwv) of the real, our ‘words’ in
order to correspond with it need only be ‘likely’ (eixdras ava
Aoyov Te exelvwy), representing not truth but persuasion (wlotus).
We are human, and should be satisfied with a probable myth
(rov eixdta pdOov atrodexopévovs). The Number in the Republic
may be similarly explained as a piece of ‘mythical’ arithmetic.
It differs indeed from the arithmetic of the Timaeus in being
put forward ostensibly as a mere jest, not as a serious conjecture.
But this makes less difference from Plato’s point of view than
from ours. Plato draws no clear line between the scientific
probability of a good hypothesis and the vraisemblance of a pious
fraud, or of a story which conveys a true moral. And the ban-
tering tone of the passage is in harmony with this account.
Playfulness is a distinguishing mark of the order of thought of
which the myth is the type; cf. Phaedr. p. 276 D: waidiav.. Tod
év Noyous Suvapévou trailew, Sixavocvvns Te Kal GAXwV wv éyeLs
mépt uv0oroyovvta. It is opposed to the earnestness of dia-
288 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
lectic (o7rovd)) .. dtav Tis TH SiadextixH Téxvyn KpOpevos, K.T.d.).
The jesting of the Muses therefore, is not a mere illusion, but a
likeness or reflexion (ecxov), the fruit of the faculty of ‘likening’
or guessing (etxacia), which may serve to guide us towards the
reality.
§ 6.
It remains to notice one serious objection to which the fore-
going theory appears to be open, viz. that it is inconsistent
with the manner in which Aristotle speaks of the Platonic
Number in the Politics. Aristotle, it is said, was evidently in
possession of the key to the puzzle; and there was therefore a
key.
An examination of the passage in the Politics (v. 12, 8)
hardly bears out the supposition that Aristotle had a distinct
view of Plato’s meaning. Aristotle is arguing against the Pla-
tonic scheme of the stages of degeneracy through which States
pass, from the Ideal State down to Tyranny. His first point is
that the suggested cause of change is not appropriate (ov Aéyee
Tv peTaBorny idiws). To prove this he quotes the words dv
éritpiros TuOunv meutrads ovbuyels Svo0 apyovias Tapéxerat,
with the explanation Aéywv btav 6 Tod Siaypapparos aptOpuos
rovTou yévntat orepeds, and then, admitting that the natural
inferiority of a particular generation may be a cause of decay;
he asks how this cycle in human things explains the degenera-
tion of Plato’s State more than of any other state, or any other
human creation. His objection is an @ priori one, valid without
reference to the particular number or cycle proposed. He there-
fore notices the numerical scheme very cursorily: the short
explanation which he gives seems intended only to show that
Plato’s theory turned upon a geometrical figure and the numbers
furnished by it. It does not seem unlikely that in such a case
Aristotle would hardly enquire whether the scheme was intel-
ligible as a whole, or not.
In the time of Cicero the obscurity of the passage had
passed into a proverb (Ep. ad Att. vil. 13, 5 est enim numero
Platonis obscurius). Later arithmetical writers, especially the
THE NUMBER OF PLATO. 289
Neo-Pythagoreans (as Nicomachus, Theon, Iamblichus, Proclus),
refer to it in cautiously mysterious language, which leads us to
suspect that they were as far from being able to explain it as
the rest of the world.
‘The point of interest, as Mr Jowett says, ‘is that Plato
should have used such a symbol.’ To which I may add that the
mathematical ideas, which Plato sought to combine and apply
in so fruitless a manner, had a history of which enough remains
to furnish a study of genuine interest’. The Number of Plato,
like other dreams, was woven of fragments from waking realities,
- and may still serve to indicate what these realities were,
D. B. MONRO,
1 Two books on this subject may Zur Geschichte der Mathematik in
be mentioned; C. A, Bretschneider, Alterthum und Mittelalter, Leipzig,
Die Geometrie und die Geometer vor 1874,
Euklides, Leipzig, 1870; H. Hankel,
Journal of Philology. vou, yu. 19
ON THE GENUINENESS OF THE SOPHIST OF PLATO,
AND ON SOME OF ITS PHILOSOPHICAL BEARINGS.
[THE following paper is reprinted nearly as it appears in the
Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, Vol. x. Part 1. As these
bulky and rather expensive volumes are not generally in the
hands of classical scholars, persons whose judgment I respect
have more than once urged me to reprint it. I had already
obtained the permission of the Council of the C. P. S. to make
what use I pleased of the paper, but have hitherto felt un-
willing to expose to the criticism of persons better acquainted
with the most recent Platonic literature a fugitive production
like the present. I am told however that its publication is
desired by some of our younger students, to whom the dialogue
seems a maze still in need of a clue. If it should appear to
any one that there is an unfairness in printing a partly con-
troversial paper without at the same time reprinting that which
it is designed to impugn, I may answer that my able pre-
decessor has stated his views of the Sophist and similar
dialogues with his usual vigour in his Platonic Dialogues for
English readers. W.H. T.]
In selecting the Sophist of Plato for the subject of this
paper, I have been influenced by certain passages in an in-
teresting contribution to our knowledge of some parts of the
Platonic system which was read by the Master of Trinity at.
a former Meeting’. I have principally in view to assert what
was then called in question, the genuineness of this dialogue,
and the consequent genuineness of the Politicus, which must
1 Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, Vol. 1x. Part tv.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 291
stand or fall with it; but I am not. without the hope of
throwing some new light upon the scope and purpose of the
Sophist in particular, and upon the philosophical position of
Platoniisth in reference to two or three now forgotten, but in
their day important schools of speculation. Such an inquiry
cannot fail, I think, to be interesting to those members of the
Society whose range of studies has embraced the fragmentary
remains of the early thinkers of Greece, as well as the more
polished and mature compositions of Plato and Aristotle: for
such persons must be well aware that it is as impossible to
account for the peculiarities of these later systems without a
elear view of their relation to those which went before them,
as it would be to explain the characteristics of Gothic archi-
tecture in its highest development without a previous study of
those ruder Byzantine forms out of which it sprang; or to
account for the peculiar form of an Attic tragedy without a
recognition of the lyrical and epic elements of which it is the
combination. Nor is this all. Thé writings both of Plato and
Aristotle abound with critical notices of contemporary systems,
with the authors of which they were engaged in lifelong con-
troversy: and whoever refuses to take this into account will
miss the point and purpose not only of particular passages, but,
in the case of Plato; of entire dialogues. In the search for
these allusions to the writings or sayings of contemporaries, we
have need rather of thé microscope of the critic than of the
sky-sweeping tube of the philosopher: and a task so minute
and laborious is not to be required of any man whose literary
life as loftier aims than the elucidation of the masterpieces
of classical antiquity.
I say then at the outset of this inquiry, that I not only
hold the Sophist to be a genuine work of Plato, but that it
seems to me to contain his deliberate judgment of the logical
doctrines of three important schools, one of which preceded
him by nearly a century, while the remaining two flourished in
Greece side by side with his own, and lasted for some time after
his decease. I hold the Sophist to be, in its main scope and
drift, a critique more or less friendly, but always a rigorous and
searching critique of the doctrines of these schools, the relation
19—2
292 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
of which to each other is traced with as firm a hand, as that of
each one to the scheme which Plato proposes as their sub-
stitute. These positions I shall endeavour to substantiate here-
after, but I shail first produce positive external evidence of the
authenticity of the dialogue under review.
1. The most unexceptionable witness to the genuineness
of a Platonic dialogue is, I presume, his pupil and not over-
friendly critic Aristotle. Allusions to the writings of Plato
abound in the works of this philosopher, of which the industry
of commentators has revealed many, and has probably some
left to reveal*, These allusions are frequently open and ac-
knowledged; the author is often, the dialogue occasionally
named*: but in the greater number of instances no mention
occurs either of author or dialogue, and the daci twes of the
philosopher has to be interpreted by the sagacity of his readers
or commentators. I shall begin with an instance of the last
kind, where however the identity of phraseology enables us to
identify the quotation. In the treatise De Anima, II. 3. 9, we
read thus: qavepov Ott ovdé dda pet’ aicOncews ovdée SV
aicOnceas, ode GvuTrOK) SOEns Kal aicOncews pavtacla
dv ein. A “combination of judgment and sensation” is evi-
dently the same thing as “judgment with sensation ;” why then
this tautology? It is explained by a ‘reference to Plato’s
Sophist, § 107, p. 264 B, where we are told that the
mental state denoted in a previous sentence by the verb
gaivetas is “a mixture of sensation and judgment,” cvpprkis
1 “ Quo diligentius Aristotelem evol-
vo, eo frequentius, ut aliorum, ita
Platonis sententias cireumspectas in-
venio....Haec quidem loca, ubi tacite
Plato respicitur, magis ut res fert, in
Platone refellendo et diiudicando, quam
exponendo et enucleando versantur.”
Trendelenburg, Platonis de ideis et
numeris doctrina, p. 21.
2 Sometimes without Plato’s name,
as év r@ ‘Inia, é&v 7@ Paliwn. It is
remarkable that these are the only
two dialogues quoted by name in the
Metaphysics: though Plato’s entire
system comes under review in that
work, of which one book is appro-
priated to the theory of ideas alone.
The Parmenides, which is largely
‘drawn from, is not once named. It
may be observed generally that when-
ever the author’s name is omitted
before the title of a work cited, the
allusion is always to the most generally
celebrated of works so entitled. Thus
when Aristotle speaks of the Antigone,
he means the Antigone of Sophocles,
not of Euripides.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 293
aia@noews Kal SoEns; and just before, that when a judgment is
formed, one of the terms of which is an object present at the
time to the senses, we may properly denote such judgment as a
davracia. “Otay px kal aitnv adda 80 aicOnoews Taph
Tit TO ToLodToOV avd maOos, ap oldv te bpOds eimeiv Erepdv TL
mryv pavtaciav; A davtacia is, it will be seen, according
to Plato a variety of doa. The distinction was perhaps not
worth making, but it is perfectly intelligible; and in restrict-
ing a popular term to a scientific sense, Plato is taking no
unusual liberty. Aristotle, however, needs the word for another
purpose, and accordingly pushes Plato’s distinction out of the
way.
The only word used by Aristotle which Plato does not use
is cuumAoxyn: Plato wrote cvpmcéis, but it is remarkable that
the word cuprAoxn does occur two or three times over in this
part of the dialogue; hence Aristotle, writing from memory,
substitutes it for the cvumsEs of the original. One of the
most learned and trustworthy of his commentators, Simplicius,
has the gloss: tod UXdtwvos & te TO Yodhiory Kal ev TO
DarynBo tHv davtaciav év pikes Sons te Kai aisOnoews TiOe-
pévou, évictacbat mpos thv Oéow Sia tovTwv Soxet. Now in
the Philebus the definition in question does not occur, though
the mental act which Plato calls ¢avtacia is graphically de-
scribed, and the cognate participle davtafowevoy is used in the
description (p. 38 c). The passages quoted from the Sophist
are therefore here alluded to, for there are none such in any
other dialogue, and the restricted use of the term is peculiar
to the author of the Sophist.
2. The next passage I shall quote refers not to the Sophist,
but to the Politicus or Statesman, which is a continuation of it.
It is familiar. to readers of the Politics, in the first chapter of
which Aristotle writes thus: “Ogos pév odv olovtar troduTLKOV
Kal BaoiduKov Kal oixovoustxov Kal SeomrotiKoy elvat TOV avToV
OU KAS Néyouow" TANOeL yap Kal OduydoTHTL vopifover Sia-
dhépewy Arr ovK eldee To’Twv ExacTov...6s ovdéev Siapépovcay
eyadnv oikiav 7 oytxpav mortv. “Those persons are
mistaken who pretend that the words statesman, king, house-
master and lord mean all the same thing, differing not specifi-
294 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
cally, but only in respect of the number of persons under their
controul; for, say they, a large household is but a small state.”
With this compare Plato’s Politicus, 258 E: qworep’ ovv tov
TomTiKoyv Kat Bacihéa Kal SecrroTny Kai ét oixovopuov Oncopev
os év TavtTa TadTAa TpocayopevorTeEs, ToTa’Tas Téyvas avTas
civar Oper, OcaTrep ovopata éppyOn ; “ Are we then to identify
the statesman with the king, the lord, or the master of a
family ; or are we to say that there are as many separate arts
as we have mentioned names?” The young Socrates is not
prepared with an answer, whereupon he is further asked:
“What? can there be any difference, as regards government,
between a household of large and a town of small dimensions ?”
(ré 5é; meyaAns oxHpa oiknocews, 7) TuLKPas av TOAEWS
OyKoS pov Te pds apyx7v Stoicerov;). ‘There can be none,”
says the facile respondent. “Is it not then clear,” rejoins the
other, “that there is but one science applicable to all four, and
that it is a mere question of words whether we choose to call
such science Kingcraft or Politic or Giconomic?” (ete Bagidt-
hy elite mwoduTiKi elTe oiKovomixny Tis ovowater pmdéev avT@
SuahepapeOa).
3. There is a passage in Aristotle’s treatise De Pose
Animalium (I. ¢. 2), too long for quotation, in which he de-
scribes and criticizes that method of division or classification of
which the author of this dialogue gives us specimens, styling it
pecoTopia or dexoTou/a, the method of mesotomy or dichotomy.
“Some persons,” says Aristotle, “ get at particulars by dividing
the genus into two differentiz: but this method is in one point
of view difficult, in another impracticable.” “It is difficult in
this process,” he observes, “to avoid discerption or laceration
of the genus (Suacmay To yévos); for example, to avoid classing —
birds under two distinct heads, an error is committed in the
‘written divisions’ (yeypaymévar dtatpécets), in which some
birds come under the genus Terrestrial, and some under that of
Aquatic Animals (eet yap Tovs mev peta TOV évvdpwv cupBaiver
SinpncOas tovs 8 év add yéver), so that birds and fishes are
both classed under the term Aquatic Animals.” In a zoological
treatise, nothing could. have been worse, than such a classifica-
tion; which occurs both in this dialogue and in the States-
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 295
man*. Again, in the latter work, (264 A,) animals are divided into
tame and wild, dijpyro Evprav 16 foov TS Tac Kal aypio.
This distinction does not escape Aristotle, who in the treatise re-
ferred to proceeds to observe that a classification of this popular
kind mixes up creatures widely diverse in structure (éc?
otiobv Edov év tavTats [Tals Siacpécecw] vrdpyewv), and not
only so, but the distinction itself is a conventional one: for
nearly all tame animals exist also in a wild state; for mstance,
man, the horse, the ox, cuves év rH “lvdiKh, ves, abyes, wpdBara.
In the Aristotelian treatise itself I am not aware that any
system of classification is proposed which would obtain the ap-
probation of modern zoologists. The Statesman and the Sophist
are not zoological works, and Aristotle's censure is therefore
irrelevant. But the coincidences seem too special to have been
accidental.
4. In a work similar in its scope to the Sophzst, the
curious treatise vrepi Lodiotixav édXéyxe@v, occurs a definition of
“Sophistic,” which to my ear is an echo of the Platonic
Dialogue. I allude to the often-repeated definition, éorw 7
copiotixn awouévn codia aX ovK ovca, Kab 6 codiotis
KPnMaTLaTHS aro hawopévns codias arN ovK ovons (S. LE. 1. 6).
“ Sophistic is a wisdom seeming but not real, and the Sophist
is a tradesman, whose capital consists of such unreal wisdom.”
What is this but an abridgment of the dcarpetixds Adyos of the
Sophist, a definition identical with the véwv kal mrovelov
éupuicbos Onpevrns—“ the hireling hunter of the rich and
young,” with the very addition which Plato proceeds, with an
affectation of logical accuracy, to graft upon it?
5. In the same treatise, c. 5, § 1, we read as follows:
“Other paralogisms depend on an ambiguity in the terms em-
ployed, whether used absolutely or only in a certain sense:
for instance, if you say “that which ‘is not’ may be a term
1 Soph. 2204: 7d wev refgot yévous
7d 5° repov vevorikov fgov. Politic.
264 co: rys uev dyedalwy Tpodys ore uev
évudpov, ore 5¢ EnpoBarixdy. The
words ‘written divisions’ are supposed
to refer to a work now lost, a collection
of Platonic ‘Divisions’ similar perhaps
to that of the ‘Definitions’ attributed
by some to Speusippus, which were
probably compiled partly from the
Dialogues and partly from Plato’s oral
teaching.
296 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
in a judgment,” they infer the contradiction, ‘That which is
not, is:’ but this is a fallacy, for ‘to be this or that’ and ‘to
be’ in the abstract are not the same thing. Or conversely,
they argue that that which 7s, is not, if you tell them that any
entity 7s not so and so—say that A is not a man. For not to
"be this or that is not the same as absolute non-existence*.”
This is but an Aristotelic translation of the following in the
Sophist: ‘Let no one object that we mean by the p dv the
contrary of the dv, when we dare to affirm that the su év is:
the truth being, that we altogether decline to say anything
about the contrary of the év, whether any such contrary is or is
not conceivable by the reason.” pels wév yap mept évaytiov
TWOS aUT@ (Sc. T@ Gvtt) yalpew Tora Aéyouer, elt EoTW eElTE
fn Adyov exov 7) Kal TavTaTacw aroyor, p. 258 E.
To this same passage I suppose Aristotle to allude in the
Metaphysica (vi. 4. 13, Bekk. Oxon.) GAN Somep é« Tod jm)
OvTos NoytKa@s haci tives elvac TO pr) OY OVY aTAGS AAA 7) Or,
K.T.r%. (Where Aoyixas=‘sensu dialectico,’ as distinguished
from ducks.)
6. I shall have more to say on these passages hereafter:
for the present they are mentioned for the sake of the coin-
cidence. The gaci tives, as already observed, is Aristotle’s
frequent formula of acknowledgment. If any one doubt that
the tuvés are in this instance a tis, or if he doubt who the tis
may be, let him hear Aristotle in another part of the same
work ; 80 IlXatwv tporov twa od Kaxas THY codioTiKny Tept
TO pon) Ov érakev", Met. Vv. 2, § 3, and then turn to the Sophist,
pp. 235 A, 237 A, 258 B, 264 D, passages which it would be
tedious to quote, but the upshot of which is the very distinction
to which Aristotle alludes. Add p. 254 A of the same dialogue,
where the Sophist is described as “running to hide himself
in the darkness of the Non Ens,” (dzrodvSpacxwv eis tHv Tod |
je?) OvTOS oKoTEWoTHTa), taking into account that the descrip- .
1 Grd@s rhde H rH A€yecOa Kal wy 4% wadw Bre 7d Ov ovK Eorw dv el Tov
kuplws, drav 7d év péper Neyduevoy ws byTwv Tt uy eT, olov el wy dvOpwros.
ards elpnuévov nGOq, ofov ef 7d wn 2 «*Plato was right to a certain ex-
bv éore Sotacrév, Sri 7d wn Ov Ecrw* tent, when he represented the Non-ens
od yap Tabrov elvai té 7. kal elvac amdGs. _as the province of the Sophist.”
297
tion occurs in no other part of Plato’s writings, and nothing
will be wanting to the proof that Aristotle had not only read
with attention two dialogues answering to those which bear the
titles of the Sophist and the Statesman’, but that he knew or
believed them to have been written by his Master.
The recognition of a dialogue by Aristotle is at least strong
evidence of its genuineness: and it would require stronger
internal evidence on the other side to justify us in setting such
recognition at defiance’. Of the dialogues generally condemned
as spurious, some owe their condemnation to the voice of anti-
quity ; others betray by their style another hand; while those
of a third class have fallen into discredit on account of the com-
parative triviality of their matter or the supposed un-Platonic
cast of the sentiments they contain. To objections founded on
the matter of a suspected dialogue I confess that I attach com-
paratively little weight, except when they are supported by
considerations purely philological. We need have little scruple
in rejecting a dialogue so poor in matter and dry in treatment
as the Second Alcibiades, when we find the evidence of its
spuriousness strengthened by the occurrence of grammatical
forms which Attic writers of the best times avoid*®. But it
would be rash criticism to condemn the Second Hippias, (the
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO.
Hippias of Aristotle,) merely
1 T cannot but think that had the
Master of Trinity examined the States-
man with the same caré which he has
bestowed on the Sophist, he would
have formed a different opinion of
the genuineness of the two dialogues,
The former contains passages full not
only of Platonic doctrine, but of Pla-
tonic idiosyncrasy. I may mention,
as a few out of many, the grotesque
definition of Man as a “featherless
biped” (Pol. p. 266. 99) which ex-
posed the philosopher to a well-known
practical jest, the somewhat wild but
highly imaginative mythus, redolent of
the Timeus, (p. 269 foll.); and finally,
the fierce onslaught on the Athenian De-
mocracy, (p. 299), breathing vengeance
because it contains paradoxes
against the unforgiven murderers of
Socrates. On reading these and simi-
lar passages, it would be difiicult for
the most sceptical to repress the ex-
clamation, ‘‘Aut Plato aut Diabolus!”
2 The Sophist is also recognized,
as we have seen, by the vigilant and
profoundly learned Simplicius, also by
Porphyry (ap. Simp. ad Phys. p. 335,
Brandis}. Clemens Alexandrinus and
Eusebius quote it as Plato’s. If it is
not named by Cicero, neither are the
Philebus and Theetetus. The omission
of any mention of this latter dialogue
by the Author of the Academic Ques-
tions is remarkable.
3 e.g. dmoxpiOnvac for daroxplvac@at,
oxémrecOa for cxoreicPat.
298 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
apparently inconsistent with other parts of Plato’s writings.
Tried by this test, the Lysis and the Laches, and perhaps the
Charmides, would fare but ill. Yet in them, those who have
eyes to see have not failed to recognize the touches of the
Master’s hand, and the perfection of the form has outweighed
the doubtfulness of the matter.
Now I am not aware that any philological objections have
been urged against the Sophist. So far as the mere style is
concerned, there is no dialogue in the whole series more
thoroughly Platonic. In their structure the periods are those
of Plato, and they are unlike those of any other writer.
Throughout, as it seems to me, the author is writing his very
best. His subject is a dry one; and he strives to make it
palatable by a more than ordinary neatness of phrase, and by a
sustained tone of pleasantry. His style is terse or fluent, as
terseness or fluency is required: but the fluency never degene-
rates into laxity, nor the terseness into harshness. The most
arid dialectical wastes are refreshed by his humour, and bloom
in more places than one with imagery of rare brilliancy and
felicity. Few besides Plato would have thought of describing
the endless wrangling of two sects who had no principle in
common, under the image of a battle between gods and giants;
and fewer still, had they conceived the design, would have
executed it with a touch at once so firm and so fine. What
inferior master could have kept up so well, and with so little
effort, the fiction of a hunt after a fierce and wily beast, by
which the Eleatic Stranger sustains the ardent Thezetetus amid
the toil and weariness of a prolonged logical exercitation? Or
who could so skilfully have interwoven that exercitation itself
with matter so grave and various as that of which the dialogue
in its central portion is made up? If vivacity in the conversa-
tions, easy and natural transitions from one subject to another,
pungency of satire’, delicate persiflage, and idiomatic raciness of
phrase are elements of dramatic power, I know no dialogue
more dramatic than the Sophist’. The absence of any elabo-
1 As a specimen of this, take the the ‘Ens’ of the elday giro is de-
argument with the yyeveis, 246, seq., scribed, 249 4. ;
and the mock solemnity with which 2 [One of the arguments against the
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 299
rate exhibition of character or display of passion is, under the
circumstances, an excellence and not a defect: as such elements
would have disturbed the harmony of the composition, and have
been as much out of place as in the Zimeus, or in some of the
later books of the epublac—to say nothing of the Cratylus and
Parmenides, which resemble this dialogue in so many par-
ticulars that those who condemn it, logically give up the other
two also, |
The Sophist, it is well known, is professedly a continuation
of the Theetetus. The same interlocutors meet, with an addi-
tion in the person of an Eleatic Stranger, and they meet by
appointment: for at the conclusion of the Thectetus Socrates
bespeaks an interview for the following day, of which he is
reminded by Theodorus in the opening sentence of the Sophista.
The Politicus or Statesman is, in like manner, a professed con-
tinuation of the Sophist. The connexion, however, between
these two is on the surface much closer than that between the
Theetetus and the Sophist. In the Thecetetus we are not
informed what is to be the subject of the next day’s talk, but in
the Sophist* three subjects are proposed for consideration—the
Sophist, the Philosopher, and the Statesman ; and the choice is
left to the new-comer, who selects the Sophist as the theme of
that day’s conversation. The third day is devoted to the
Statesman, who is made the subject of an investigation similar
to that pursued in the case of the Sophist. In both dialogues
the professed object of the persons engaged is to obtain a defi-
nition, and the method pursued is that called by the ancient
Logicians, and by the Schoolmen after them, the method of
Division, We are left to infer that the Philosopher was to be
handled on the fourth day in like fashion. Instead of this
projected Tetralogy, we have only a Trilogy. No dialogue
exists under the title of PiAdcodos, and the ingenuity of com-
mentators has been taxed to account for the deficiency*. It is
dialogue advanced by Dr Whewell and 2 Schleiermacher, for instance, con-
its German impugners is founded on _ ceives that the omission is intentional,
the alleged absence of the dramatic and that we must look for the missing
element. ] portrait in the Symposiwm and Phedo;
EP ALi de of which the first teaches us how a
366 = THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
tolerably certain that Plato never wrote a dialogue under this
title, and it seems idle to speculate on the causes or motives of
the omission. It is more to the purpose to observe, that there
is no connexion apparent on the surface between the subject-
matter of the Theewtetus and that of the two succeeding
dialogues: and no resemblance between the method of investi-
gation pursued in the Sophist and in the Theetetus. A defini-
tion, it is true, is the professed object of both: the question
proposed in the one being, “ What is knowledge ?” in the other,
“What is a Sophist?” Each dialogue is, therefore, a hunt
after a definition; but the instruments of the chase are not the
same in both instances.
I propose the following as a plausible, though I do not put
it forward as a certain explanation of the connexion between
the two dialogues intended by Plato.
The art of Definition, it is well known, was an important
constituent of the Platonic Dialectic. It held its ground in
the Dialectic of Aristotle, who, however, devotes a larger
share of attention to the Syllogism; a branch of Dialectic for
which Plato had omitted to give rules, Both are elaborately
investigated by the Schoolmen, as by Abelard in his Dvalectice ;
nor was it, I believe, until the commencement of this century,
or the end of the last, that Definition dropt out of our logic
books’, and the art of Syllogism reigned alone, or nearly alone.
Now, in the Phedrus of Plato, a dialogue in which the art of
dialectic is magnified at the expense of its rival, Rhetoric,
occurs a passage in which two methods are marked out for the
dialectician to pursue in searching for definitions*. Either, it
is said, he may start from particulars, and from these rise to
generals: or he may assume a general, and descend by succes-
sive stages to the subordinate species (the species specialissvma)
philosopher should live, the latter how me probable.
he should die. This is one of those 1 It was first re-instated, so far as
‘*Schleiermachersche Grillen” which I know, by Mr J. S. Mill, whose father
contribute to the amusement even of Mr James Mill highly extols Plato for
his admirers. Stallbaum seems to insisting on the importance of its
think that the title of the Parmenides subsidiary d:alpeors.
may originally have been @:\ocod¢gos, 2 See Appendix I. Phedr. 265 p,
a conjecture which does not seem to foll.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 301
which contains the thing or idea which he seeks to define. He
may begin, to take the example given in the dialogue, with
examining the different manifestations of the passion of Love,
and after ascertaining what element or elements they possess in
common, and rejecting all those in which they differ, he may
frame a definition or general conception of Love, sufficiently
comprehensive to include its subordinate kinds, and sufficiently
restricted to exclude every other passion. Or he may reverse
the process, and divide some higher genus into successive pairs
of sub-genera or species, until he “comes down” upon the
particular kind of Love which he seeks to distinguish. The
first of these processes is styled by Plato cvvaywy7, Collection :
by Aristotle évraywy7, Induction: the second is called by both
Plato and Aristotle d:aipecis, or the dcatpetixn é00d0s, Division,
or the Divisive method. Whoso is master of both methods is
styled by Plato a Dialectician, and his art, the Art of Dialectic’.
We have, therefore, in this passage of the Phedrus a Platonic
organon in miniature.
Now it so happens, that the Theatetus and the Sophist
pretend, each of them, to be an exemplification of one of these
two dialectical methods: the Theetetus of a cvvaywyn, the
Sophist of a Siaipecis®. It is this fiction which gives life and
unity of purpose to the Theetetus, a dialogue which is in reality
a critical history of Greek mental philosophy as it existed down
to the fourth century, just as the Sophist is virtually a critique
of the logic or dialectic of the same and previous eras. The one
1 Those who are unskilled in the
application of these processes are
termed épiorixol in the Philebus, 16 E.
of 6¢ viv T&v avOpwrwv cogol év pév,
érws dv tixwot, Kal Oarrov Kal Bpadv-
Tepov Towotor Tov Séovros, pera Se Td
év dreipa ev0ds* ta 5é péoa adrovs
éexgpevye’ ols dtaxexwpiorac 7h Te Sta-
NexTikws wad Kal 7d épioTixds huas
movetcbac mpds addAHAoUS Tods Adyous.
It is needless to enlarge on the im-
portance of this quotation towards the
illustration of the Sophist, as well as
of the passage from the Phedrus now
under review. In the received text, it
should be observed, we read xal rod\Xa
Oarrov, x.t.. The sense manifestly
requires the omission of wo\\d. The
Eristics admit a One and an Infinite:
the Platonists divide the One into
Many, and define the number of the
Many (Phileb. paulo eupra). In other
words, they employ the method of
Division or Classification, as well as
that of Collection or Induction.
2 Compare Theet. 145 p—148, with
Sophist, init. and 253, §§ 82, 83,
Bekk.
302 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
dialogue exposes the unsoundness or incompleteness of the
mental theories of Protagoras, of the Cyrenaics, whose founder
Aristippus was Plato’s contemporary and rival; and of certain
other schools whose history is less known to us’. The Sophist,
in like manner, passes under review the logical schemes of the
Eleatics, of their admirers the semi-Platonic Megariahs, and
probably of Antisthenes and the Cynics: Both dialogues, as I
have said, profess to be at the same time exemplifications of the
processes which the true dialectician, or, as he is styled in the
Sophist, 216 £, 253 D, the true philosopher, must adopt in his
search for scientific truth. The one is a hunt after the true
conception of éxvernpn or science, the other an investigation of
the genus and differenti of the conception implied in the term
Sophist ; and this fiction’ serves in both cases to bind together
the critical and polemical investigations which make up the
main body of either dialogue. It lends to each the unity of an
organic whole*; and infuses into a critical treatise on an
abstruse branch of philosophy the vivacity and interest of a
drama, Add to this, that the Sophist helps materially towards
a solution of the question, What is Science? which is the pro-
fessed aim of the dialogue which precedes it. It attains this
object in two ways. First, by enlarging the conception of that
which is not Science, treating the subject on its logical or
dialectical, as the Thecetetus regarded it chiefly on its real or
psychological side: and, secondly, by giving rules, illustrated by
example, for what Plato considered, as we have seen, one of the
main elements of scientific method. And the same analogy
holds in respect of the critical or controversial portion of either
dialogue. As im the Thectetus it is shewn that the Protagorean
1 The theory that “ Science is right
Opinion combined with Sensation ” is
given by Zeller to Antisthenes on
grounds which seem not improbable.
2 I would not be understood to mean
that the pursuit of the Definition is a
mere feint in either case, but only that
it serves as a mpdpacis—a natural and
probable occasion for the introduction
of important controversial discussions.
It constitutes the framework or “ plot ”
of the drama. At the same time I con-
ceive that the end Plato had most at
heart in these two dialogues was the
confutation of opponents. In the
Politicus, on the other hand, a didac-
tic or constructive intention appears
to predominate,
3 Comp: Phedr. 2640: de mavra
Noyov @omwep (Gov gvveordvat, K.T-X.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 303
dictum, that Truth exists only relatively to its percipient
(ravtwv wétpov avOpwrros), and the kindred, though not iden-
tical Cyrenaic dogma, that sense is knowledge, and the sensa-
tions the sole criteria of truth (xpstnpia ta maOn), so far from
furnishing tenable definitions of Science, in effect render Science
impossible: so in the Sophist the ,Logic of the Cynics and
Eleatics is proved to be more properly an Anti-logic, annihil-
ating all Discourse of Reason, and rendering not only Inference
but Judgment, or the power of framing the simplest proposi-
tions, a sheer impossibility.
I have said that the Sophist is first a dialectical exercita-
tion, and secondly a critique more or less hostile of three rival
systems of dialectic; two of which, it may be added, evidently
sprang out of the third, and presuppose, if they do not assert,
the false assumptions on which that third is founded. It may
conduce to greater clearness if I take this critical portion of the
dialogue first in order. In defending my position, I shall make
no assertions at second hand; an indulgence to which there is
the less temptation, as Plato himself tells us pretty plainly
what he means, and where he fails us, Aristotle and the ancient
historians of Philosophy supply all that is wanting.
The oldest, and in the history of Speculation the most im-
portant of these three schools was the Eleatic, founded, as the
Stranger from Elea tells us in this dialogue, by Xenophanes ’,
though its doctrines underwent.some modification and received
extensive development in the hands of Parmenides and Zeno,
his successors. When Plato wrote this dialogue, there is every
reason to suppose that the Eleatic school had ceased to exist.
The latest known successor of Parmenides, Melissus, flourished,
as the phrase is, about the year B.c. 440, and Zeno is placed a
few years earlier. The earliest date which it is possible to
assign to the Thewtetus, and a fortiort to the Sophist, is about
392”. There can therefore be no question of an Eleatic author
1 Soph. 242 D: 7d 6¢ wap’ tjudv’EXea- et Zenonis studiosius executus) after
tikdy €Ovos ard Revoddvous...apédmevovr. his second visit to the Pythagoreans in
2 Apuleius, de Dogm. Plat. 569, says Italy: haying been compelled to give
that Plato took up the study of Par- up his intention of visiting Persia and
menides and Zeno (inventa Parmenidis India. by the wars which broke out in
304 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
of this dialogue, an “opponent of Plato,” resident in Athens,
and writing in the Attic dialect. Socrates may have had such
opponents, though we read of none; but the hypothesis is inad-
missible in the case of his disciple.
The Eleatic Stranger however leaves us in no doubt. of his
intentions. In the course,of his investigation of the attributes
of the Sophist, he is on the point of obtaining from Theztetus
an admission that his, the Sophist’s, art is a fantastic and
unreal one: but he affects to hesitate on the threshold of this
conclusion, because, as he says, “The Phantastic Genus,’ to
which they are about to refer the Sophist, is one difficult to
conceive; and the fellow has very cleverly taken refuge in a
Species the investigation of which is beset with perplexity’.
Thesetetus assents to this mechanically, but the Stranger, doubt-
ing the sincerity of his assent, explains his meaning more fully.
The word ¢avraczixds implies that a thing may be not that
which it seems, and it is a question with certain schools whether
there is any meaning in the phrase, to say or think that which
is false, in other words, that which is not: for, say they, you
imply by the phrase that that which is not, 7s—that there exists
such a thing as non-existence : and thus you involve yourself in
a contradiction’. But if we assert that ‘ Not-being is’ (quod.
Non Ens est), then, says the speaker, “ we fly in the face of my
Master, the great Parmenides, who both in oral prose and
written metre adjured his disciples to beware of committing
Asia at the time. Does this imply that
he visited Elea instead? If so, and
if he composed the Sophist and its
sister-dialogues on his return, we ob-
tain a clue to the fiction of an Eleatic
Stranger,
The circumstance that the conduct
of the dialogue devolves upon this
Stranger is pointed to as one proof
that the Sophist was not written
by Plato, whose custom is to make
Socrates his Protagonist. The second-
ary part which Socrates plays in the
Timeus and his entire absence from
the colloquy in the Laws seem fatal to
the major premiss in this reasoning. :
It should also be observed, that the
author of the Sophist, if not Plato,
took pains to pass himself off as Plato ;
else why did he tack on the Sophist to
the Theetetus? But if the author of
the Sophist wished to pass for Plato,
why did he deviate from Plato’s ordi-
nary practice, by putting a foreigner
from Elea into the place usually occu-
pied by Socrates?
1 "Eel kal viv udN 8 wal Koupas els
Gmopov eldos diepevyjoacbar karamépev-
vyev. 236 dD.
2 Terddunxev 6 Adyos ovTos brobécOar
76 wh Ov elvar* Wetdos yap ovx dv ddXws
éylyvero by. 237 A.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 305
themselves to this contradiction’. To extricate ourselves then
from the azropéa in which the Sophist has contrived to plant us,
it is necessary,” proceeds the Stranger, “to put this dictum of
our Father Parmenides to the torture, and to extort from it the
confession that the contradiction is in fact no contradiction, but
that there is a sense in which the ju) dv is, and in which the ov
ws not’.” In this passage the Eleatic, who is Plato’s mouth-
piece, formally declares war against the logical system of his
master Parmenides, in one of its most vital parts. His words,
I conceive, admit of no other explanation. A question here
suggests itself as to the meaning of this Eleatic denial of the
conceivableness of non-entia. “You can never learn,’ says
Parmenides, “that things which are not are®.” Does he mean
to forbid the use of negative propositions? His words will bear,
I think, no other sense, and so, as we shall see, Plato under-
stands them. In fact two misconceptions, both arising from the
ambiguity of language, seem to lie at the root of the Eleatic
Logic. Parmenides first confounds the verb-substantive, as a
copula, with the verb-substantive denoting Existence or the
Summum Genus of the Schoolmen. He secondly assumes that
in any simple proposition the copula implies the identity of
‘subject and predicate, instead of denoting an act of the mind by
which the one is conceived as included in the other in the
relation of individual or species to genus. It may seem strange
that so great a man should have thus stumbled in limine. But
enough is left of his writings to enable us to perceive that he
was notwithstanding a profound, or if that be questioned, cer-
tainly a consistent thinker. In the first place he altogether
repudiates the distinction of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective.’
“ Thought,” he says, “and that for which thought exists are one
and the same thing* ;” and more distinctly still, “ Thought and
1 *Areuapttparo metp re woe éxdorore
Aéywr kal werd wérpwv*
ov yap whore Tobro Sajs, elvar uy
ébvra,
GAG od THT ap’ 6500 Sithoros elpye
vonua, Ib. Z
4 Tov rod marpds Tappyevldov déb-yov
dvaykatov hyiv duvvopévas éora Bacavi-
Journal of Philology. vou. v11.
few, kal BidgecOar 7b Te wh dv ws kore
kard Tt, Kal Td Ov av mddkw ws ovK
gore wy. p. 241d. Comp. Arist. Soph.
El. c. 5, § 1, quoted above.
3 ob} yap uhmrore Totro Says, elvar mh
édvra.
4 rabrov 8 ort voeiy re Kal ouvvexév
Frag. v. 94, Mullach,
20
éort vonua.
306 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
being are the same,” Td yap avo voeiy éotiv te Kal eivat: and,
Xp) TO Néyetv Te voety T edv Eupevar’, “Speech and thought con-
stitute reality.”. A man who thus thought must therefore have
repudiated the antithesis between Logic and Physics, between
Formal and Real Science, a distinction which appears to us ele-
mentary and self-evident. Logic wasto Parmenides Metaphysic,
and Metaphysic Logic. That which is conceivable alone 7s, and
that is which is conceivable. The abstraction “to be” is the
same as Absolute Existence. The “ Ens logicum” and the “ Ens
reale” are the same thing. The only certain proposition is the
identical one “ Being is,” for “not-Being is Nothing*®.” Hence
the cue which wetben as the Eleatic watchword : év Ta
mavra, “unum omnia.”
If it be asked, what did Parmenides make of the outward
universe ? we are at no loss for an answer. He denied its claim
to reality, or any participation of reality®, And on the princi-
ples of his Logic he was bound so to do. For every sensible
object, or group of sensible objects, being distinct from every
other object or group of objects, is at once an Ens and a Non-
ens, it is this and it is not that; e.g. If Socrates is a man,
Socrates is not a beast: for the genus “man” excludes the
genus “beast.” (advOpw7ds éore 7) Onpiov, as Parmenides would
have expressed it.) But a sx) jpop is, according to his logic,
a yn ov; therefore all so-called dvra are at the same time p
ovta; non-existent, and therefore inconceivable, and so alto-
gether out of the domain of Science.
From the dicta of Parmenides which I have been endea-
vouring to explain, the Eleatic Stranger in the dialogue proceeds
to deduce various conclusions: the most startling of which is,
that Being is, on Eleatic principles, identical with Not-being,—
that the worshipt dy is after all a pitiful 7) dv*! He is enabled
to effect this reductio ad absurdum by the incautious proceeding
of Parmenides, who instead of entrenching himself in the safe
1 Frag. v. 43, ed. Mullach, 3 Ibid. v. 110,
F aikestiones Eort yap elvai, wndev 5 otk - * Soph. 245 0, § 64 Bekk.: wy dvros
elvat. 5é ye 7d wapdray Tod ddov, Tabrd Te
aod Aa obdev yap 4 éorw } eorar = Tabra vrdpxe TH dvr, Kal mpds TE Uy
“ANXo mapék Tod édvros, Ibid, elvas und’ av yevéoOas more by.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 307
ground of an identical proposition, and thence defying the
‘world to eject him, must needs invest his Ens with a variety of
attributes calculated to exalt it in dignity and importance. It is
“unbegotten,’ it is “solitary,” it is “immoveable,” it is “a
whole,” it is even “like unto a massive orbed sphere’.” (Soph.
246.) In one of these unguarded outworks the Stranger
effects a lodgment, and by a series of well-contrived dialectical
operations, succeeds, as we have seen, in carrying the citadel.
Having shewn the nothingness of the Eleatic Ontology, the
Stranger proceeds to pass in review two other systems of specu-—
lative philosophy. “We have now,” he says, “ discussed—not
thoroughly it is true, but sufficiently for our present purpose,
the tenets of those who pretend to define strictly the dy and the
pn ov: we must now take a view of those who talk differently
on this subject. When we have done with all these, we shall
see the justice of our conclusion that the conception of Being is
quite as puzzling as that of Not-being’®.” Of one of the two
sects who “talk differently,’ I venture to hold an opinion vary-
ing from that generally received—an opinion formed many
years ago in opposition to that advanced by Schleiermacher and
adopted by Brandis, Heindorf and others. Careful students of
Plato are aware that his dialogues abound with matter evidently
polemical, to the drift of which his text seems on the surface to
offer no clue. I mean that, like Aristotle, he frequently omits to
name the philosophers whose tenets he combats: characterising
them, at the same time, in a manner which to a living contem-
porary, versed in the disputes of the schools and personally
acquainted with their professors, would at once suggest the
true object of his attack®, Such well-informed persons con-
1 wdvrobev evKixrov odalpns évanly-
kiov byxw. Parm. v. 103.
2 éx mdvrov Bwuev bri 7d dv Too
ph dvros ovdéy edtropwrepov eimety 6 Th
mor éorw. p. 2455.
3 This reticence, of which it is not
difficult to divine the motives, is most
carefully practised in the case of the
living celebrities who claimed like him-
self to be disciples of Socrates, such
as Euclides, Aristippus and Antisthenes.
A cursory reader of Plato has no con-
ception that such men existed as the
heads of rival sects with which the
Platonists of the Academy were en-
gaged in perpetual controversy. On
the other hand, Plato never scruples
to name the dead, nor perhaps those
living personages with whom he stood
in no relation of common pursuits or
20—2
308 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
stituted doubtless the bulk of Plato’s readers and formed the
public for whom he principally wrote. It was they who ap-
plauded or smarted under his sarcasms, as they happened to
hold with him or his adversaries. It is to place himself in the
position of this small but educated public that the patient
student of Plato should aspire: neglecting no study of con-
temporary monuments, and no research among the scarcely
less valuable notices which the learned Greeks of later times
have left scattered in their writings. Of these notices, ema-
nating originally from authorities contemporary or nearly con-
temporary with the philosopher himself, many have been
embalmed in the writings of Eusebius and Sextus Empiricus,
the Aristotelian Commentators, Cicero, and others; not to
mention the vast store of undigested learning amassed by
Diogenes Laertius. : |
Now of the two sects who here come under revision, and
who enact the part of Gods and of Giants in the famed Giganto-
machy’, which is familiar to most readers of Plato, the occupants
of the celestial regions are rightly, as I think, judged to mean
the contemporary sect of the Megarics: They are idealists in a
sense, but their idealism is not that of Plato. They so far relax
the rigid Eleatic formula “unum omnia” as to admit a plurality
of forms (e/5n or évta or ovaia). They are complimented in the
dialogue as »epwrepor, “more civilized” or “more humane,’
than their rude materialistic antagonists: but they are at the
same time taken sharply to task by the Eleatic Stranger : and for
what? For the absence, from their scheme of Idealism, of that
very element which constitutes the differentia of the Platonic
Idealism. “They refuse to admit,” says the Stranger, “ what
we have asserted concerning substance, in our late controversy
with their opponents:” ov cuyywpodow yuiv to viv 5) pnOev
common friendships, e.g. Lysias, Gor-
gias, &c. The Pythagoreans, though
remote in place, were his friends and
correspondents, and in speaking of
them he observes the same rule as
in the case of his living Athenian con-
temporaries, indicating without ex-
pressly naming them. Thus, in the
Politicus, p. 285, they are merely de-
noted as couol, “ingenious persons.”
This, by the way, is a passage of great
importance, as indicating the limits
within which Plato ‘‘ pythagorized,”
and the particulars in which he dis-
sented from his Italic friends.
1 Soph, 246 4, § 65 Bekk.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 309
mpos Tovs ynyevels ovaolas mrépt, 248 B; the thing they refuse to
admit being neither more nor less than that cowavila or wéOeEus
Tov etowv*, which Aristotle cannot or will not understand in his
critique of the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas. Like Plato, they dis-
tinguish the two worlds of sense and pure ideas, the yéveous from
the ovola (yéveow rv 6é ovalav ywpls tov Siedomevor NéEyeTe,
248 A), but, unlike him, they deny that the one acts or is acted
upon by the other: they even deny that Being (e/8n or ovcta) can
be said to act or suffer at all; nay, when pressed, they seem to
admit that it is impossible to predicate of it either knowledge
or the capacity of being known*. The arguments by which the
“Friends of Forms” (eddy diro, 248 A) are pushed to this
admission may not ring sound to a modern ear ; but our business
is not with the soundness of Plato’s opinions, but with their
history : and it would be easy to produce overwhelming evidence
both from his own writings and those of Aristotle to the truth
of the statement, that however the phrase is to be interpreted,
there is, according to Plato, a fellowship, cowwwvia, between the
world of sensibles and the world of intelligibles, and that the
conception of this fellowship or intercommunion distinguishes
his Ideal Scheme from that of the Eleatics*, and, as appears from
1 Aristotle objects to the term péGekts
on the ground that it is metaphorical.
Now as a logical term, the Platonic
péGcés is but the counterpart of dzap-
és, the Aristotelian word denoting the
relation of subject to predicate. The
one term is as metaphorical as the
other, and not more so. ‘A belongs
(vrdpxe) to B” and “B partakes of
A” (weréxe:) are both in a sense meta-
phorical phrases, and the metaphor
employed is the same in both cases.
The Platonic term marks the relation
between subject and predicate as not
one of identity, and thus serves to
distinguish the Dialectic of Plato from
that of the Eristics, who denied that
the ‘‘One”’ includes a ‘‘ Many.” The
same purpose is equally well, but not
better answered by the vumdpye of
Aristotle.
2 Thy ovclav 5) Kara Tov Néyov ToUTOV
yeyvwokouévny b1d Tis yvwoews, Kad’
Soov yryvwoKeTat KATA TOTOUTOY KivEeto Oat
dias sds wdoxew, 0 Oh payey ovK av
yevérOat tept Td hpewodv. p. 248 EB.
3 Compare 249 p, § 75: 7@ 59 gi
hocddy kal Tatra madera TimavTL Taca
ws goxey dvdyKn dia TavTa pire Tv
év 4 Kat Ta moda clin AeydvTwv 7d
may éornkos amodéxecOat, THY T ad Tay-
Tax TO év KwotvTwy pndée TO Tapamay
dxovew, d\Aa Kara THY TeV Taldwy EdXP,
boa (as?) dkivnra kal Kexwnuéva To
bv Te kal TO wav, Evvaddrepa Eye.
This passage, as I understand it, ex-
presses Plato’s dissent alike from the
Eleatics and Megarics, and from those
Ephesian followers of Heraclitus whom
he had discussed in the Theetetus.
This is not the only echo of that
dialogue heard in the Sophista.
310 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
this passage, from that of the semi-Platonic school of Megara
also’. | |
We pass now from the heavenly to the earthly; from the
serene repose of the transcendentalists, u@Xa evraBas avabev é&
dopatou Tobey auvvopéver, to the violence and fury of the giant
brood below, who seek to eject these divinities from their
august abodes, “actually hugging rocks and trees in their
embrace,’ tats yepolvy ateyvas tétpas Kal dpis tmepthauBa-
vovTes, 246 A,
Of these materialists—for such in the coarsest sense of the
word they are—I remark, first, that they are evidently the same
set of people as those described in terms almost identical by
Plato in the Theetetus, p. 1555. At this point of the last-
named dialogue Socrates is about to expound the tenets of the
Ephesian followers of Heraclitus; whose sensational theory, as
he afterwards shews, agrees with that of the Cyrenaics in essen-
tials, though it was combined with cosmical or metaphysical
speculations in which it may be doubted whether they were
followed by the Socratic sect®. Before, however, he enters upon
these highflown subtleties, he humorously exhorts Theztetus to
look round and see that they were not overheard by “the unini-
tiated:” “those,” he says, “who think nothing real, but that
which they can take hold of with both hands’® : those who ignore
the existence of such things as ‘ actions, and ‘ productions, —in a
word, of anything that is not an object of sight,” (adv Td adpa-
1 This epithet I conceive to be justi- denotes as Limit, the Unlimited, the
fied by Cicero's notice, ‘‘ Hi quoque
(sc. Megarici) multa a Platone,” Acad.
Qu. 11. 42, and also by the brief state-
ment of the Megaric dogmas which
Cicero gives us in the context of this
passage.
2 In the Philebus—a dialogue which
treats of the relation of otctia to yé-
vests in its moral and physical, that
is to say its real, in distinction from
the purely logical or formal aspect
under which it is presented in the
Sophist—Plato postulates a Tetrad,
composed of the principles he there
Mixed or Concrete, and Cause, The
third principle he calls yéveois eis
ovsiav, the possibility of which pro-
cess is precisely what the eidav dihka—
the pure idealists of this dialogue—
deny. Phileb. p. 24, foll. The dis- -
tinctness of the Causal Principle from
the Ideas is clearly laid down in the
Philebus, and is recognized in the
Sophist also, p, 265, §§ 109, 110.
3 Compare Soph. 2470: diarelvowr’
dy wav 6 wn Suvarol rats xepol Evp-
miécery eloly ws apa TovTo ovdey TO
mwapamav éoriv.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 311
TOV OUK aTrodexduevot ws év ovalas péper). These persons are
garnished with the epithets “ hard,” “stubborn,” “ thoroughly
illiterate,” oxAnpol—avtituTor—panr ev dpovaot.
Now the only contemporary philosopher to whom these
epithets of Plato are applicable is the founder of the Cynic
school, Antisthenes, a man whose nature corresponded with
his name, and to whose name, as well as to his nature, the
avtitutos of the Theetetus would be felt to convey an allusion
“intelligible to the intelligent.” The par’ ed duovoor finds
its echo in the synonymous epithet azaidevros, which Aristotle
in the Metaphysica bestows on Antisthenes and his followers’.
It seems to me obvious that the description in the Thectetus
tallies in all points with that in the Sophist and that both
are in agreement with what we know from Diog. Laertius
and a host of others, of the moral characteristics of the
Cynic school*, The materials of the comparison may be
found in any manual of the history of philosophy. For our
present purpose it were to be wished that some portion of the
voluminous writings of Antisthenes had been preserved, in
addition to the meagre declamations, if they are really his,
which are commonly printed with the Oratores Attici, The
notices, however, which Aristotle and his commentators have
preserved to us, countenance the assumption just made, that the
Earth-born are the Cynics. Hatred of Plato and the Ideal-
ists seems to have been the ruling passion of Antisthenes,
and this passion drove him into the anti-Platonic extremes of
Materialism in Physics, and an exaggerated Nominalism in
Dialectic. “He could not see Humanity, but he could see a
Man,” is one of his recorded sarcasms upon the doctrine of
ideas*, “Your body has eyes, your soul has none,” was the
curt reply of Plato. Many similar pleasantries were inter-
changed by the leaders of the two schools: and Antisthenes, less
guarded than his antagonist, wrote a dialogue “in three parts,”
1 vit. 3. 97: of ’AvricOévecoe kat of out of the question here.
ovTws dmaideuTot. 3 Tzetzes, Chil. vit. 605; Schol. in
2 T have shewn in Appendix II. that Arist. Categ. ed. Brandis, p. 66 b,
the only other schools who can in 45 and 680, 26; Zeller, G. P. mm.
fairness be called “materialist,” are pp. 116, note 1,
312 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
entitled SaOwv, which was avowedly directed against Plato in
revenge for a biting reply (Diog. Laert. 111. § 35 ; v1.§ 16). The
subject of this dialogue has been recorded, and it is not a little
curious that it was written to disprove the very position which
Plato devotes a large proportion of the Sophista to establishing ;
viz. that there is a sense in which “the Non-ens is,” in other
words, that negative propositions are conceivable. Antisthenes
maintained in this book, 6ri ove éotw avtiréyew. If we add,
that he also wrote four books on Opinion and Science (zrepi
d0Ens cal éemvotnuns), we shall hardly think the conjecture ex-
travagant, that the remainder of this dialogue is, in the main, a
critique of the Cynical Logic. Another paradox of this school,
closely connected with the last, is recorded by Aristotle’, and
sarcastically noticed at page 251 B of the Sophist, in terms which
leave little doubt as to the object of Plato's satire. If Anti-
sthenes really pushed this paradox to its legitimate results—and
from the character of the man it is not unlikely he did—he must
be understood as maintaining that identical propositions are
the only propositions which do not involve a contradiction: a
theory which, as Plato shews, renders language itself impos-
1 Metaph. v. 29: ’Avricbévns wero
evnOws pnbev diidv NéyerOar ri TO
olxely Ady ev ép’ évds CE Gy cuvéBawe
pn elvac avriréyew, oxedov 5 ode pev-
deoOar. Plat. Soph. 1.1: ovx édvres
dyabov Aéyew dvOpwrov, add TO pev
Gya0ov ayaboy rov 5é dvOpwrov dyOpw-
mov. The latter passage explains the
oixely Adyw of Aristotle, and the
allusion is further determined by the
duovcou Twos Kal addiiocddov applied to
the upholder of the similar sophisms
noted at p. 259p. In the latter pas-
sage occur the following words: ov ré
Tis EXeyXos ovVTos GAnOwos, apre Te TOV
dvTwy Tivos Edamropuevou Sidos veoyerys
wy. ‘This is no genuine or legitimate
confutation: but the infant progeny
of a brain new to philosophical dis-
cussion.” This hangs together with
the yepévrwy rots éypaléo.—*‘ the old
gentlemen who have gone to school
late in life,” p. 2513, and both pas-
sages are illustrated by a notice in
Diog. Laert. vi. 1, init. that Anti-
sthenes, having been originally a hearer
of Gorgias, became at a later period
a disciple of Socrates, and brought
with him as many of his pupils as he
could induce to follow his example,
A similar sarcasm is flung at Dio-
nysodorus and Euthydemus, in the
Euthyd. p. 272.0, which not improbably
was designed to glance off from them
upon some contemporary Eristic. An-
tisthenes, we know, was present at
the battle of Tanagra, in s.c. 426. He
may therefore have been Plato’s senior
by some 20 years.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 313
sible’, as well as that inward “discourse of reason ’,” of which
language is the antitype.
The resemblance of the Cynical Logic to the Eleatic is
usually accounted for by the circumstance that Antisthenes had
been a hearer of Gorgias, who wrote a treatise, preserved or
epitomized by Aristotle, in which the paradoxes of Parmenides
and Zeno are put forward in their most paradoxical form, and
pushed to their consequences with unflinching consistency.
Gorgias was also a speculator in physics, and so was Anti-
sthenes*; in whom, moreover, we may observe other character-
istics of those ingenious men of letters of the fifth century, who
are usually called “the Sophists.” © His ethical opinions on the
other hand were borrowed from Socrates ; but in passing through
his mind they took the tinge of the soil, and seem to the
common sense of mankind as startling as any of his dialectical
paradoxes. It is remarkable, however, that when Plato handles
the Cynical Ethics, he treats their author with far more leni-
ency than in this dialogue. In comparing it with the Pleasure
Theory of Aristippus, he speaks of the Cynical system with
qualified approbation. Avoyepys* “austere or morose,” is the
hardest epithet he flings at Antisthenes in the Philebus: he
even attributes to him a certain nobleness of character (pvow
ov« ayevv7,), which had led him, as Plato thought, to err on the
side of virtue. The Philebus is a work of wider range and
=
1 kal yap ® ’yabé, 7b ye wav dro
mavTos émixetpeiy droxwpliew, d\dws TE
otk éuuedés Kal 8) kal wavTaracw
dmovcou Tivds kal dditocdgov. 9. Ti dy;
=m. Tedeworarn wavrwv Adywv éeoriv
agdviors Td diadvew Exacrov dws mav-
dia yap Thy addAjAwY Tov €lddv
ouut)okhy 6 Nbyos yéyovev huiv. Soph.
259 D.
2 Siddoyos dvev mwvijs yryvduevos érw-
vondcn didvoa. Soph. 263 5. Van
Heusde first pointed out the infamous
etymology lurking in this passage (d:d-
vora=diddoyos dvev). The sentiment,
without the etymology, occurs in Theat.
189 E: (rd 5é diavoeicar Kaw) Adyov
dv aith mpos abriy 7 puxh desépxerac
Toy"
mepl wv av oKoTi.
3 Hence the explanation of Philebus,
448: kal wddra Sewods Aeyoudvous Ta
mwepi piow.
4 Phil. 440: pavrevouévas od téxvn
GAG tun Svoexepela Picews ovK aryev-
vous, Niavy pemonkdtwv Thy THs hoov7s
diva, Kal vevouixdrov obdév byiés......
oxeyduevos ére kal Tad\d\a airav dvo-
xepdouara. Ib. D: xatdrd ris duc-
xepelas airav txyvos. The accom-
plished and unfortunate Sydenham
first pointed out the reference in these
epithets to the Cynics and their master.
The ov réxvy of Plato tallies with the
draldevro of Aristotle, and with his
own dpuovoan, &e.
314 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
profounder bearings than the Sophist, but the dialogues have
this in common, that in both the broad daylight of reason is
shed on regions which had been darkened by the one-sided
speculations or the wilful logomachy of earlier or inferior
thinkers. The way in which, at the close of the present dia-
logue, Antisthenes is dragged from his hiding-place among the
intricacies of the Non-existent into the light of common-sense,
is a favourable specimen of Plato’s controversial ability ; and
the broad and simple principles on which he founds the twin
sciences of Logic and Grammar’ stand in favourable contrast
to the sophistical subtlety of his predecessors and contem-
poraries.
At this point of the discussion I would gladly stop: but
I feel bound to say a few words on what I have ventured to
call the “logical exercise,” which is the pretext under which
Plato takes occasion to dispose of the doctrines of his for-
midable antagonists. That the Scapetixol doyou, the “amphi-
blestric organa’,” in which he endeavours to catch and land first
the Sophist and then the Statesman, were regarded by Plato
himself in this light, we learn from his own testimony in the
Politicus, 285 D, § 26 Bekk. “Is it,” ‘asks the Eleatic Stranger,
“for the Statesman’s sake alone, that this long quest has been
instituted, or is it not rather for our own sake, that we may
strengthen our powers of dialectical enquiry upon subjects in
general? §. J. It was doubtless for this general purpose.
E.S. How much less then would a man of sense have sub-
mitted to a tedious enquiry into the definition of the art of
weaving, if that had been his sole or principal object !” He then
proceeds to apologize for the prolixity of this method of classifi-
cation: but adds, “The method which enables us to distinguish
according to species, is in itself worthy of all honour; nay, the
very prolixity of an enquiry of this kind becomes respectable, if
raries.
1 P, 262p. Simple as the analysis
of the Proposition into dvoua Kal pjua
(subject and predicate in logic, noun
and verb in grammar) may seem to
a modern reader, it appears to have
been a novelty to Plato’s contempo-
Plutarch expressly attributes
the discovery to Plato (Plat. Qu. v.
1. 108, Wyttenb.), Apuleius Doctr.
Plat. 111. p. 203. Comp, Plat. Crat.
431 B.
2 Soph. 235 s.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 315
it render the hearer more inventive. In that case we ought not
to be impatient, be the enquiry short or long.” If we say it is
too long, “we are bound to shew that a shorter discussion
would have been more effectual in improving the dialectical
powers of the student, and helping him to the discovery and
explanation of the essential properties of things*” “Praise or
blame, founded on any other consideration, we may dismiss with
contempt.”
This passage, the importance of which for the appreciation
of these two dialogues it is superfluous to point out, derives
unexpected illustration from an amusing fragment of a contem-
porary comic poet, preserved by Athenzus*, In this passage
we are introduced into the interior of the Academic halls, and
the curtain rises upon a group of youths who are “improving
their dialectical powers” by a lesson in botanical classification.
1 ds Bpax’repa dv yevouéva rods ctv-
ovras dmeipydgero StadexTiKwrépous
kal ris Tay bvTwy Adyw Syrdcews edpe-
Tixwrépous. Polit. 286 5.
2. p. 59. As this fragment has
not yet received the attention it de-
serves, it is printed in full.
A. Té WiAdrwvy
kal Zrevoirmos Kal Mevédnuos,
mpos Tiat vuvt SuatptBovow ;
mola @povtis, motos dé Néyos.
OvepevvaTat Tapa Toto ;
Tadd por WivuTds, el Ti KaTELOwS
qxets, AéEov, mpds yast * 7
B. GX olia Néyew repl rdvde cagiss*
Tlavadnvalos yap liv dyédny
[rev] wecpaxtwy
év yuuwaclas ’Axadnulas
qKovca Noywv dddrwv arérwr"
wept yap picews adopt gdmevor
Srexwpifov fgwy re Biov
dévipwrv Te picw Naxdvwv Te yévn.
Kar’ év Tovras Thy KoNoKbvT ny
é&jragov tlvos éort yévous,
+ L. mpis yas cat Pear, coll. Athen. m1. p, 118 zB.
dvipds, & yH Kal Geol.
A. kal rl mor dp’ wpicarro Kal rtivos
ryévous
elvan Td Hurdv; Shrwoor, ef kdrow Od Te.
B. mpdéricra pev obv wavres dvaviets
Tor éréoryncay, kal kbwavres
xpévov ovdK dNlyov Steppédrrigov,
xdr é£algyns ére kurrévrwv
kal ¢nrovvTwy Tov meipaklav
Adxavév tis Epy orpoyyvrov elvat,
molav 5° &\dos, Sévdpov & Erepos.
Tatra 5 axovwy iarpéds Tis
~ ZexedGs amo yds xarérapd atrév
@s AnpovvTwr.
A. 7 Tov Savas dpyloOnoay
xrAcvagerOal 7” éBinoay’
TO yap év Aéoxaus Tatode roar
Woveiy amperes.
B. ob8 éuéXnoev rots werpaxiors*
6 T\drev 5é rapov cal udd\a mpdws,
ovdév dpivOels, éréraé avdrois
mad [é& dpxfs Thy kodokivryy}
dpoplferbat tlvos éorl yévous*
of 5¢ Sunpovy.
Com. Gree. Fragm. Y. 111. p. 370, ed.
Meineke,
GAN’ érpidunv wap’
316 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
The subject proposed is not a Sophist, but a pumpkin, and the
problem they have to solve is, to what genus that natural pro-
duction is to be referred. Is a pumpkin a herb? Is it a
grass? Is it a tree? The young gentlemen are divided in
opinion—each genus having its supporters. Their enquiries,
however, are rudely interrupted by a “ physician from Sicily,”
who happened to be present, and who displays his contempt for
their proceedings in a manner more expressive than delicate.
“They must have been furious at this,” says the second speaker.
“Oh!” says the other, “the lads thought nothing of it: and
Plato, who was looking on, quite unruffled, mildly bade them
resume their task of defining the pumpkin and its genus. So
they set to work dividing.”
The result of these researches, could it be recovered, would
probably add little or nothing to our knowledge of pumpkins.
But one thing the passage proves; and that one thing is enough
for our present purpose. The dvarpetixol Aoyor of the Sophista
and Politicus represent what really occurred within the walls of
the Academy : and we can have no doubt that Plato regarded
such long-drawn divisions in the light of a useful exercise for
his pupils. They became “more inventive” and “more dia-
lectical” by the process.
I may add that the invention of the Divisive Method is
traditionally attributed to Plato by the Greek historians of phi-
losophy. Aristotle devotes several chapters of his Posterior
Analytics to the discussion of this method: he points out its
uses and abuses, and defends it against the cavils of Plato’s
successor Speusippus, who abandoned the procedure because, as
he alleged, it supposed universal knowledge on the part of the
person employing it. The method discussed is that which we
have been considering, for Aristotle describes it as Division by
contradictory Differentiz’. He also replies to the objection that
1 Anal. Post. 1. ¢c. xm. § 6, and pp. 451, 461) distinguishes between
Schol. in loc. So Abelard (Ouvrages those divisions which imply dichotomy
Inédits. Op. 569, ed. Cousin: coll. and those which do not: e.g.
animal. animal.
BA L
Z a r ,
man, horse, ox, &¢. man, not man.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 317
this process is not demonstrative—that it proves nothing—by
the remark that the same objection applies to the counter pro-
cess of collection or induction. This defence, I presume, would
not in the present day be accepted as satisfactory; for, as the
able translator of the Analytics observes, ‘“ This is the chief flaw
in Aristotle's Logic : for some more vigorous method than the
Dialectical, the method of Opinion, ought to be employed in
establishing scientific principles.” At the. same time, I must
confess my inability to discover the flaw in the principle of.
dichotomy, as a principle of classification, in cases where the
properties of the objects to be classified are supposed to have
been ascertained. A Class can exist as such only by exclusion
of alien particulars. The Linnean Class Mammalia for instance,
implies a dichotomy of Animals into. Mammal and Non-
Mammal—into those which give suck and those which do not.
The distinction may or may not be a natural or convenient one,
but in any other which may be substituted, some “ differentia,”
some property or combination of properties must be fixed upon,
_ which one set of species or individuals possesses, and which all
-. others want. And this is all that is essential in “dichotomy,”
or the “method of Division by contraries’.” The application
Porphyry attributes the latter or di-
chotomous method to Plato. It could
not be *‘ Eleatic,” for each of the con-
traries would be in that scheme a
‘*non-ens.”’ It is remarkable that a
similar Divisio Divisionum occurs in
Act ody ias...... det pilav idéav rept
mavros éxdorore Oeudvous fnreiv...éay
ctv [uera]AdBwwev, pera plav Svo, ef
mws elol, oxomeivy, ef 5é wh, TpeEts
H Tu’ Gov aprOudy, Kat rav &
éxelywy éxacTov Tadw woatTrws wéexpiTep
the Politicus, p. 287, § 27, where in
lieu of the regular dichotomy a rougher
form of classification is for once
adopted. This Plato, keeping up the
original metaphor in the Phedrus,
describes as a medoToula. Kara wédXn
tolvuy avtas olov iepetov diatpwueda,
érevdh Sixa ddvvaroduev, Set yap eis
Tov éyytrara bre wadwora Téuvew dpib-
pov del, The division he proceeds to
make is a distribution of ‘‘ accessory
arts,” cuvvairio. réxvat, into seven co-
ordinate groups. A similar relaxation
is permitted in the Philebus, p. 16D:
dv 70 kar’ dpxas év ph ore év kal dreipd
éore povov idy tis, adda Kal 81roca.
I understand this passage as con-
veying Plato’s distinction between his
own method and that of the Eleatics
and their Eristic successors, who ac-
knowledged only a év and an dzrecpov.
1 For the length of the process will
evidently depend on the distance, so to
speak, between the Species generalis-
sima and the Species specialissima,
between the remote and the proximate
class in the tabulation of species. The
very brief dichotomy in the Gorgias;
318 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
of the method will, as Plato acknowledges, be more or less
successful in proportion to the insight and knowledge of the
person employing it. The specimens with which he favours us
in these dialogues may be arbitrary, ill-chosen, or even gro-
tesque: but as logical exercises they are regular—and logic looks
to regularity of form rather than to truth of matter. And even
in judging of these particular divisions, we must bear in mind
the object in view. In the Sophist it is Plato’s professed
intention to distinguish the Sophist from the Philosopher, the
trader in knowledge from its disinterested seeker: surely no
unimportant distinction, nor one without its counterpart in
reality, either in Plato’s day or in our own. The ludicrous mi-
nuteness with which the successive genera and sub-genera of the
“acquisitive class” are made out in detail, would not sound so”
strange to ears accustomed to the exercises of the Schools;
while it subserves a purpose which the philosophic satirist takes
no pains to conceal, that, namely, of lowering in the estimation
of his readers classes or sects for which he harboured a not
wholly unjust or unfounded dislike and contempt. It serves,
at the same time, to heighten by contrast the dignity and im-
portance of the philosophic calling, and in either point of view
must be regarded as a legitimate artifice of controversy in a
dialogue unmistakeably polemical.
p. 464, is evidently the same in princi-
ple as the long-drawn divisions in the
Sophist, as will be seen from the
following scheme:
Ocparrela.
»
=
TOU cwparos.
oi
yunvacrixh.
Where it is implied that all ‘‘ten-
dance” is either corporal or mental;
that all tendance of the body is com-
prised in the “antistrophic aris” of
the gymnast and the physician, and
all tendance of the soul in those of the
legislator and the judge. There is,
therefore, no room under either for the
four pretended arts of the sophist, the
rhetorician, the decorator of the person,
and the cuisinier. In Politicus, 3025,
the dichotomy is comprised in a single
larpuxt.
n q nw
7 THS WuxXNS.
,
ih oF
vouobeTixkh. SixacrTiKh.
step: év ‘ratrais 5) 7d mapdvouov Kal
évvowov éxdorny SixoTouel TOUTWY.
[In all this I have no desire to im-
pugn the soundness of Dr Whewell’s
theory of classification as given in his
Philosophy of Inductive Science, indeed
so far as I understand his views, they
seem not essentially inconsistent with
my own. His main theory is Platonic
in spirit, though founded on a scientific
experience quite inaccessible to Plato.]
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 319
APPENDIX I.
In the foregoing discussions it is assumed that the method of
Division sketched in the Phedrus is the same with the
Dichotomy or Mesotomy of which examples are furnished in the
Sophist and Statesman. This I had never doubted, until- the
Master of Trinity gave me the opportunity of reading his
remarks on the subject, in which a contrary opinion is expressed.
I have therefore arranged in parallel columns the description of
the process of Division, as given in the Phedrus, and in the two
disputed dialogues; from which it will appear that the onus
proband, at any rate, lies with those who deny that the pro-
‘cesses meant are the same. I must premise that the Master of
Trinity’s question, “ If this,” viz. the method in the Soplusta,
“be Plato’s Dialectic, how came he to omit to say so there ?”
has been already answered by anticipation in p. 15, note 3, but
more fully in Soph. 253, quoted presently.
Phedrus, 265 e, § 110,
BAT. Td & erepov 5h eldos ri Aéyers
@ DwHpares ;
2Q. Td wddw kar’ lin dvvacba
Téuverv, Kar dpOpa, 7 wépuxe, Kal wh
émtxempely KaTaryvivar wépos undév, Kakod
Maryeipou Tpbrw xpwyevov’ GAN wWomep
dipre TH NO6yw Td pev Adpov Tis Siavolas
& rt Kowy eldos édaBérnv, worep be
odpatos €& évds Stra kal duovuna
mégpuke, xatd, TH 5¢ SeELa KANOEvTA:,
ovTw Kal Td THs Tapavolas ws ey iyiv
mepuxds eldos trynoapevw Tw byw, 6 pev
TO ém dpiorepd Teuvdmevos pépos,
mwddw Toiro Téuywy odk éwavijxe, mplv
év avrots épevpdy dvouatbuevov oKxardv
Tw épwra éhovddpynoe par’ év Slky. 68
els Ta év SeEtg THs mavias dyayav Huds,
duavupov pev éxelvy Oetov S avd tw’
épwra épevpow Kal mporeivdmevos ér-
qvecev ws weylorw alriov huiv dyabar.
Sophist, 264 =.
HE. Iddw rolvuw émixeipapev, oxl-
fovres Six y Td mporeOev yévos, roped-
ecbae Kara Tovml Sekia del pepos Tod
Tunbévros exduevoe THS TOV cogicTod
Kowwvlas, ws dv atrod Ta Kowa mwavra
mepteddvres, THY olkelay AumdvTes PUow
éridelEwmev pddoTa pev Huiy avrois,
érecra 5& wal Trois éyyuTdtrw yévet Tis
Towavrns weOd5ou mrepuKdow.
‘Ib. 2538p, § 83. TO xard yévy diate
peicbar, Kal pyre rabrov eldos erepov
fryfjoacOa pi erepov dv ravrov pav
od Tis SueadexTLKNS Pjcopev emioT Huns
elvac; ©. [Nal,] gjcomev... He adda
pq 76 ye SteaNeKTeKdy odK GAAW ddoets,
ws éyGuat, mriv Te Kadapws Te Kal
Sixalws pidocopovrtt.
Ib. 229 B, § 81. TH dyvoay lddvres
el rp Kara wécov airas Touny exe
Twd. OSirdrH yap avryn yeyvouévn Shdov
THE JOURNAL
@AI. "Adnbécrara réyes.
22. Toirwr 5h bywye airéds re épac-
Ths, @ Paidpe, THv diaipécewy Kal ovva-
ywyav, Ww’ ols 7 & déyew Te kal
gpovelyv’ édvy ré Tw Gdrov Fyjowmat
Sivarov els & Kal él roddd wepuKsd
320
OF PHILOLOGY.
bri kal ri Sidackarixyy Sto dvarykdter
popia exew, ev ép” evi yéver trav abras
éxarépy.
Politicus, 263 B, Eldos pév bray F
Tov, Kal pépos aird dvaryKkaiov elvat Tod
mpdyuatos 8rov wep dv eldos Aéynra’
opav, Todrov Sudkw “Karédmice per’
txviov ote Oeoio.” Kal pévror xai rods
duvayévous avrd Spay ef péev 6p0Gs 7
uh mpocayopedw Beds olde, KaAo 8 odv
péxpe Tose StarexTiKods.
Mépos 6é eldos ovdeula dvdyxyn. (This
explains the xar’ dpOpa 7 wépuxe of the
Phedrus.)
Ib, 2654. Kat phy éf’ & ye pépos
Gpunxcev 6 Adyos én’ éxeivo dvo twe
Kadopay ob rerauéva dalverat, Thy ev
OdrTw, mpos péya mépos ourxpdv Srarpov-
pevov, THv & Srep ev TH wpbobev édé-
youer, bre det pecoTomety brt wddiora,
Tobdr éxovcay uaddov, waKxporépay ye wiv.
Ib. 262 p, occurs a specimen of the .
*‘unskilful carving” (xaxod paryelpouv
tpomov) of the Phedrus.- Ei tis rdv-
Opwmwov émixeipnoas Slxa SiehéoOar yé-
vos Siatpoln Ka@daep of odol...7d mev
“EdAnuxdv (7d 5é) BapBapov...9 Tov dp.b-
pov Tis av voulfou Kar’ eldn SU0 Siaupeiv
pupidda drorewvomevos ard mayTwr
ws év eldos daroxwpl fw, K. Td.
In allusion to Xen. Mem. tv. § 11, a passage noticed by the
Master of Trinity, p. 595 of his paper, I may observe that the
etymology of Dialectic, ard trod Sdvadéyerv, is undoubtedly
vicious, and is nowhere countenanced by Plato. On the con-
trary, Dialectic is described in the Philebus, 58 E, as 4 Tod
dScaréyeor Oar Sivapis. He could not have adopted Xenophon’s
etymology, for, as we have seen, the Platonic Dialectic includes
cuvaywy? as well as dvaipecis. The etymology was tempting,
and Xenophon, who writes very much at random upon philo-
sophical subjects, was unable to resist the temptation. A
similar error is that of Hegel, who in his History of Philosophy,
derives codiorns from codpiferv instead of copifer@as, an error
in which he has been followed by English scholars who ought
to have known better.
THE SOPHIST OF PLATO. 321
APPENDIX II.
On the Earth-born (ynyeveis) of Sophist 246.
Of the three contemporary sects professing some form of
Materialism, I have singled out the Cynic as that which alone
answers the conditions of Plato’s description. The following
extracts from the fragments of Democritus, and from Aristotle’s
notices of his opinions, seem conclusive against his claim to a
share in the Gigantomachy.
1. The sect in question held that, 1. Democritus, on the contrary,
Tovro wovoy éorw, 8 mwapéxet mpooBodnv
kal éragpjy Tiva.
2. rairiv cdma cai ovclay wplfovro*
they defined ‘‘substance” to mean
corporeal substance only,
says, vouw mavra Ta alcOnrd, éréy
droua Kal xevdv.—Frag, ed, Mullach,
p. 204. :
2. Democritus denies that the sense
of touch conveys any true knowledge.
“Hueis r@ wev éovre ovddév arpexés Evvlewer,
peranimrov 6é kata Te obpmaros Siabiyn
kal Tv émrevoidvrwv Kal Tov dvTiornpi-
fovrwv.
8. Democritus held ‘‘ 87: obfév par-
Nov TO Ov TOU py bvros eoTw, Bre ovdE
TO Kevdv TOU owparos. —Arist. Met. 1. 4.
In other words, that vacuum (his 7}
8v) was in every respect as real as cor-
poreal substance,
3. They despised rods packovras py
capa éxov elvat.
The Cyrenaics are not the ynyeveis, for they admit nothing
to be real except the affection (waéos), of which we are con-
scious in the act of sensation, an affection produced by some
cause unknown. The objects of sense are to them as unreal as
they were to Berkeley. Sext. Empir. adv. Matth. vu. 191:
Paclv of Kupyvaixol xputnpia elvas ta dn, Kab pova KaTadap-
Bavec@at kai ddiarpevota tvyyavew' tev dé TeromKotov ta
ma0n under evar KatadnTrov pndé adiarpevaror.
The case of the Ephesian péovres is not worth considering,
for they acknowledged no ovoia, as the Earth-born know
nothing of yéveows, which they properly class with the adpartor,
Journal of Philology. vou. vu. 21
322 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
The view I have adopted, that the passages in the Thecetetus
and Sophist both refer to Antisthenes, and that the latter’
dialogue is in the main a hostile critique of his opinions,
occurred to me in the course of my lectures on the Thewtetus
in 1839, as I find from MS. notes in an interleaved copy. I
mention this, because Winckelmann in his Fragments of Anti-
sthenes, published in 1842, observes in a note: “Omnino in
multis dialogis ut in Philebo, Sophista, Euthydemo, Platonem
adversus Antisthenem celato tamen nomine certare, res est
nondum satis animadversa.” Some of the allusions to this
philosopher which Winckelmann detects in the Theetetus ap-
pear to me doubtful, but I observe that he acknowledges the
double bearing of the epithet avrtituros. The doctrines of
Antisthenes were harsh and repulsive enough—only less so
than those of the “dog” Diogenes. The objection that the
person or persons alluded to are described in Theetetus as
Sewol rept dvovv, whereas Antisthenes can hardly be so cha-
racterized, may be met by the fact that he did write a treatise
wept duoews, and that a sneering allusion to this may be implied
in Plato’s words.
W. H. THOMPSON.
PRINCEPS or PRINCEPS SENATUS?
THE title of ‘princeps’ borne by the Roman Emperors has
been generally explained as an abbreviation of the fuller title
‘princeps senatus’ and the latter is usually supposed to have
been conferred upon or assumed by Augustus as a conveniently
constitutional designation and one which would not be likely to
‘wound Roman susceptibilities by any military or despotic asso-
ciations connected with it. Now that the majority of the
emperors, and very possibly all, at any rate all the earlier ones,
were ‘principes senatus’ may be granted at once, but are we
to look in this quarter for the origin of the widely-used title of
‘princeps’ or is this something perfectly distinct and inde-
pendent ?
That ‘princeps’ was merely ‘princeps senatus’ written
short, is the view taken by Merivale, Romans under the Em-
pire, chap. 31, by Bekker and Marquardt, in their Rémische
Alterthiimer I. iii. 282, 293, and I believe by most authorities
(e.g. Capes, Early Empire, p. 13). The opposite theory that
‘princeps’ is a perfectly distinct title is adopted by Rein
(Pauly, Real-Encyclopiidie, s. v. Princeps) and more recently by
Prof. Mommsen in his Roémisches Staatsrecht 11. ii. 711, 733.
By neither however are their reasons for their own view given
at all fully, or the rival hypothesis and its grounds discussed. Yet
the issue involved is not merely the precise origin of a particu-
lar title, for with each of the two theories we have mentioned
is naturally connected a particular view of the system of govern-
ment which Augustus established, and in this respect it be-
comes extremely important to decide whether Augustus really
posed before the Roman public as ‘Father of the Senate,’ or as
21—2
324 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
‘First Citizen’, in other words, as the leader of the Roman
nobility, or as the elect of the Roman people. Did he, as for
instance Pertinax did afterwards, merely profess to associate the
senate with himself in the government of the empire, or did his
constitutionalism rest on a wider and a more popular basis?
The first of the two theories we are considering is most fully
stated by Merivale (l.c.). According to him the title of ‘princeps
senatus’ or ‘princeps’ was selected as conveying “the idea of
the highest civil preeminence consistent with the forms of the
old constitution,” an idea, by the way, conveyed as we shall see
by ‘princeps,’ but not at all by ‘princeps senatus. “It was
the policy of Augustus to lead the senate, the chosen instrument
of his will, by indirect agency.” The title moreover was “modest
and constitutional” and at the same time connected its bearer
with the aristocratical party. Then, according to our author,
followed the abbreviation of the title, the original character of
the appellation was forgotten and its proper limits merged in a
vague and general notion of preeminence. And this change is
already accomplished early in the reign of Tiberius, so that
aftér the death of Augustus at any rate the title, on Merivale’s
own showing, is simply ‘princeps’ and nothing more, and im-
plied or was understood to imply no sort of connection with the
senate in particular. According to the other and as I believe
the truer view, this notion of general preeminence is the ori-
ginal and the only one contained in the title, and the supposed
abbreviation is simply a myth.
Is there then any evidence for the assumption that ‘prin-
ceps’ was originally ‘princeps senatus’? Merivale apparently
thinks the abridgment so easy and natural a one as scarcely to
require any external proof, but on turning to Bekker and Mar-
quardt, it becomes clear that virtually the only ancient authority
for this view is Dio Cassius, from whom three passages are_
quoted in support of it. The first is in Bk. 53. 1, where Dio is
describing the measures taken by Augustus in 726 A.V.¢.,
28 B.c. He there states that the latter xal tds amoypadds
éEeréxece, Kal ev avtais mpoxpitos THs yepovalas émrexdyOn, a
1 Momms. Rom. Staatsrecht, u. ii. 711, “* der erste der Biirger.”
PRINCEPS or PRINCEPS SENATUS? 325
statement which proves nothing more than the acknowledged
fact that Augustus was ‘princeps senatus’ and does not neces-
sarily identify this title with that of ‘princeps.’ Secondly in
Bk. 57. 8, we are told that Tiberius adopted for general use the
title of Czesar, adding occasionally that of Germanicus, and that
further mpoxpitos THs yepovolas Kata TO apyaiov Kal bd éav-
Tov wvowatero. Here Dio does apparently intend to identify
the general title of ‘princeps’ with the more special ‘princeps
senatus:’ for he goes on to quote in illustration a common say-
ing of Tiberius a7 Seomorns péev Tav SovrAwv, av’ToKpatwp é
TOV oTpaTLwTaVv, Tav Sé 8) AoLTaeY TPOKpLTOS eit, Which how-
ever is if anything unfavourable to his own view, in so far as
Tiberius himself here connects the title not with the senate, but
with the general mass of citizens. In the third passage Bk. 73.
4, we are told that Pertinax (193 A.D.) €\aBe tds Te adXas éri-
KAnTELS TAS TpoonKovaas Kal Etépay emt TH SnuoTixcs elvat
BovrecOar’ mpcKpitos yap THs yepovelas KaTa TO apxaiov éTa-
vowaclm. And this passage implies that in fact Pertinax
assumed the new or rather the obsolete title of ‘ princeps sena-
tus’ and not the ordinary title ‘princeps.’ That he really did
so is proved, as will be seen further on, by the evidence of the
inscriptions: and I hope to show also why the assumption of
this title was naturally regarded by Dio as expressive of
Pertinax’ popular tendencies, and may even have been so re-
garded by that emperor himself. But as evidence for the
connection between ‘princeps’ and ‘princeps senatus’ the pas-
sage is of little value. Granting however, what these three
passages barely prove, that Dio himself believed in such a con-
nection, this belief of his may have been a mistaken one, and in
Dio’s time such a mistake was eminently natural and likely.
But setting aside for the moment the opinion of Dio, let us
pass to one or two other considerations which appear to tell
strongly against Merivale’s theory.
And first of all, if ‘princeps’ is an abbreviation of ‘princeps
senatus, the abbreviation must have taken place remarkably
early, for no trace exists of the full title as applied even to
Augustus. So far as the evidence of literature and of the in-
scriptions goes the title is from the first ‘primceps’ and nothing
326 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
more. Ovid and Horace use ‘princeps’ but with no hint of an
understood ‘senatus*.’ It must have been ‘princeps’ alone that
Strabo translated by ayeuev, nor can it be the principate of
the senate merely to which he refers when he tells us that his
country committed to Augustus tiv mpoctaciay Tis Hryepovias’.
The title is ‘princeps’ only in Velleius Paterculus, as well as in
Tacitus and Suetonius. And by no writer of the first century
after Christ is the slightest hint dropped that this familiar
appellation of ‘princeps’ had any connection whatever with its
supposed original.
Now had the ‘princeps senatus’ of Republican times been
generally known and addressed in Rome as simply ‘princeps,’
the suppression of the latter half of the title in the case of the
Emperors would have been quite intelligible. But of this there
is no proof whatever: and on the contrary when Republican
writers use the term ‘princeps’ by itself, in no case is any refer-
ence intended to the ‘princeps senatus’: whereas in the com-
paratively few passages where the latter is mentioned the title
is given in full’,
Turning to the inscriptions, we find in the first place
that ‘princeps senatus’ occurs in connection with one emperor
only, the emperor Pertinax*, of whom we are explicitly told
that he assumed this title. Secondly had ‘princeps, as Meri-
vale’s theory would imply, been strictly an official designation, we
should have expected to find this form at least, if not the fuller
one, among those imperial titles which are usually prefixed or ap-
pended to the emperor’s name. But only in one instance during
the first century do we find ‘princeps’ included in these almost
stereotyped lists of imperial honours and offices*. This is in-
telligible enough if it was merely a title of courtesy, expressive
of nothing more special than preeminent dignity, and that this
was so is made clearer still by its use in the comparatively few ‘
1 Ovid, Fasti, 2. 142. Hor. Od.1. 27. 11, where the context places the
2. 50. Momms, Staatsr. m. ii. 733 meaning beyond doubt.
note 6. 4C. 1. L. wm. 4125.
® Strabo, xvii. 3, for tryeuovla as 5 A decree of the senate in honour
equivalent to principatus, see Momms, of Titus, Willmanns, Ex. Inscr. Lat.
t. €, 922. For the emperors’ fullofficial style,
3 Except in such a passage as Livy see Acta Fratrum Arvalium passim.
PRINCEPS or PRINCEPS SENATUS? 327
inscriptions in which it occurs. On consulting the Monumen-
tum Ancyranum, ‘we find that on p. i. 44 Augustus mentions
his having been for 40 years ‘princeps senatus’ mp@tov a€ia-
patos TéTrov €xyov THS cuKAHTOV, but when p. ii. 45 he alludes
to his general principate, the Latin version has simply ‘me
pri{ncipe], which the Greek consistently renders éwi dé éwod
nyewovos. Similarly p. v. 44, we get in the Latin ‘[a]nte me
principem,’ and in the Greek mpd éwod nyeuovos. The other
inscriptions in question suggest the same idea of a title of
courtesy which was ‘princeps’ and nothing more, e.g. C. I. L. v.
4867. Commodus is ‘princeps nobilissimus,’ 2b, 4318 ; ‘princeps
fortissimus, C. I. L. 11. 2038, where Tiberius is spoken of as
‘principis et conservatoris;’ so of Domitian ‘pro salute optimi
principis’ (Willm. Ex. Inscr. Lat. 95). In short there is nothing
in the inscriptions to suggest that the title was ever anything
but ‘princeps,’ or that it ever denoted any specific official func-
tions.
Lastly Merivale himself allows’ that in post-Augustan litera-
ture the term never conveys any idea but that of constitutional
preeminence, though he contends unreasonably, as I think, that
this later use was a perversion of its original meaning.
We have next to consider how far it was likely that Augus-
tus would have selected ‘princeps senatus’ as the appellation by
which above all others he was to be known and addressed. For
this a title was needed that should not merely be inoffensive,
but should at once carry with it the requisite amount of dignity
and clearly express the leading idea of the new system. For
these purposes ‘princeps senatus’ would have been utterly inade-
quate and misleading. It is not clear that any great prestige
had ever attached to the position of ‘Father of the Senate’ out-
side the walls of the senate-house itself. Nor had the office
ever played a prominent part in Roman politics, while it had
recently become almost obsolete*. And if its general reputation
was neither very exalted nor very widespread, the actual powers
it conferred were extremely limited and shadowy, for after all
the possible privilege of giving his ‘sententia’ before the rest
1 Romans under the Empire, chap. 2 Since the death of Q. Lutatius
31. Catulus, 60 B.c.
328 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
was of little value to the emperor who as consul could state his
views fully in introducing a question to the Senate at the very
opening of the sitting’. That the emperor’s name should head
the roll of senators was natural enough, but that Augustus
should have made this position typical of his presidency of the
Roman Commonwealth it is difficult to believe. But the fact
that ‘princeps senatus’ was too weak a title to bear the strain
which Merivale puts upon it, is not the only objection to his
theory. The attitude implied in its adoption would have been
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Augustus’ policy.
He professed to be restoring the old Republic in its entirety,
and not merely, as Su'la had temporarily succeeded in doing,
establishing a senatorial government. What his advent to
power marked was not the final triumph of one of the two
parties whose rivalry had for a century distracted the state, but
the absorption of them both in a united and restored Repub-
lic. The adoption by Augustus of the title of ‘Father of the
Senate’ would have been a direct challenge to the democrats
and almost a confession that after all he was at heart a Sulla.
For we must remember that when Augustus inaugurated the
principate, the senate was still associated inseparably with one
party in the state: and was by no means generally regarded as
representing the Republic as a whole. It was not till the
comitia had ceased to exist, and the ‘Populus Romanus’ become
a mere name, that the senate stood forth as the one centre of
Republican sentiment in Rome, and the one representative of the
institutions cf the free commonwealth. It was natural enough
that Pertinax, living in days when the struggles of optimates
and populares had been forgotten, and when the senate seemed
the only remaining obstacle to absolute despotism, should adopt
as a popular measure the title of ‘princeps senatus®.’ It is
equally inconceivable that Augustus should have done so in the
presence of men who remembered the Sullan restoration, and
1 According to the usual procedure exercised his own discretion in tle
in Cicero’s day, not only had the ‘“‘con- matter. See Rein, Paul. Real-Encycl,
sules designati” a preferential claim to s. v. Senatus.
be asked first, but in default of these 2 Dio Cass. 73. 4.
the presiding magistrate scems to have
PRINCEPS or PRINCEPS SENATUS? 329
who must have associated the supremacy of the senate not with
Republican freedom, but with the rule of a hated oligarchy.
And the same change in the condition of affairs which
explains the policy of Pertinax, explains also Dio Cassius’
misconception of the true significance of the title ‘ princeps.’
He wrote, as Pertinax ruled, when all Republican traditions
had been absorbed by the senate as the only surviving Re-
publican institution which retained even the show of inde-
pendence. And finding, as he must have done, that the title
symbolized a constitutional and civil government as opposed
to a military despotism, he easily enough inferred that its
constitutionalism consisted in recognising what the opponents
of Imperialism in the second century so ardently upheld, the
right of the senate to be regarded as joint-sovereign with the
emperor himself. But this ‘duarchy’ of emperor and senate’
is post-Augustan, its commencement dates from the suppression
of the comitia by Tiberius, and it is utterly inconsistent with
that complete restoration of the old Republic which Augustus
himself claimed to have accomplished.
But what are the arguments for the rival theory, for the
view that ‘princeps’ is a complete title, with the meaning not
of ‘Father of the Senate’, but of ‘First Citizen’? It has in
its favour first of all the use of the term by Republican writers.
Instances will be familiar to all in which ‘ princeps’ and ‘ princi-
pes’ are applied to a citizen or to citizens holding at the time a
foremost place in the state; but it has not been sufficiently noticed
that we find also instances in which there is a very close ap-
proximation to the Augustan sense of the term—and an almost
literal anticipation of the Augustan ‘principatus.’ In other
words it seems that before the time of Augustus men had
already grasped the idea of placing at the head of the Re-
publican system a constitutional primate—a first citizen—
as the best means of securing administrative stability and
1 As to the claim of the senators to coordinate criminal jurisdiction of em-
be o0T:mot With the emperor, see Dio, peror and senate. In any wider sense,
67. 2. Mommas. Staatsrecht, 1.ii.900, the term is certainly inapplicable tc
speaks of “der Dyarchie August” but the Augustan system.
apparently only with reference to the
330 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
order without relinquishing Republican freedom. No man
could be more entirely devoted to the old constitution than
Cicero, and yet Cicero himself seems to have contemplated
with approval the addition to the existing system of a ‘ prin-
ceps, as necessitated by the anarchical confusion which pre-
vailed. The De Republica was apparently written between
the years 54 B.c.—51 B.c.", a period during which the power-
lessness of the old constitutional authorities to enforce order
had become only too evident. Rumour in Rome suggested
the appointment of Pompey as dictator®, and in 52 he was
actually made sole consul. In significant connection with this
state of affairs we find that Cicero introduced into his sketch
of an ideal polity a novel figure, that of a single ‘moderator
reipublicae®;’ such, no doubt, as he hoped Pompey might
have proved himself, but such, as by Cicero’s own reluctant
confession, he signally failed in being*. An important link
between this ‘moderator reipublicae’ and the Augustan ‘ prin-
ceps’ is supplied by a passage in Augustine, de civ. Dei, v. 13,
where he alludes to that part of Cicero’s De Republica, “ubi
loquitur de instituendo principe civitatis.” It is at least pos-
sible that Augustine is here quoting the actual title of this
part of the work, but even if he is not, clearly Cicero’s ‘mo-
derator’ must have been sufficiently like a ‘ princeps’ as Augus-
tine understood the term, to suggest the latter as its equivalent.
That Cicero, however, may himself have used ‘princeps’ or
‘princeps civitatis’ in this sense is rendered more probable
by a passage in his letters, where the word is distinctly used
to express the idea of constitutional primacy in a free state.
Cicero, writing in 46 B.C., is contrasting Caesar’s unconsti-
tutional position as dictator, with what might have happened
had his own advice been taken three years before, and the
final rupture thus avoided. Caesar would never have put
1 Teuffel, Gesch. d. Rém. Lit. 281,
where the authorities are fully given.
2 Plut. Pomp. 54.
3 Ad Att. 8. 11, “tenesne igitur
moderatorem illum reipublicae quo
referre velimus omnia? nam sic quin-
to, ut opinor, in libro loquitur Scipio:
Ut enim gubernatori cursus secundus,...
sic huic moderatori reipublicae beata
civium vita proposita est.”
4 Ad Att. 2. c. “ hoc Gnaeus noster
cum antea nunquam tum in hac causa
minime cogitavit,”
PRINCEPS or PRINCEPS SENATUS? 331
himself out of court by crossing the Rubicon—he would not
it is true have been the military despot he had since become—
but he might have enjoyed the great position of first citizen,
“esset hic quidem clarus in toga et princeps” (ad Fam. 6. 6).
The idea of simple primacy, though without. the distinctive
element of constitutional rule, appears again ad Att. 8, 9
(49 B.c.), where Caesar is said to wish for nothing better than
“principe Pompeio sine metu vivere’,” and ad Fam. 9. 17
(46 B. c.), where Caesar himself is spoken of as “ipsum prin-
cipem.” Once more, if Suetonius may be trusted, Caesar
actually used the term ‘ princeps civitatis’ of himself in 51 B.c.,
“difficilius se principem civitatis a primo ordine in secun-
dum quam ex secundo in novissimum detrudi” (Suet. Jul.
29). It may then be safely assumed that the notion of a
First Citizen at the head of affairs, of a ‘princeps’ or ‘ princeps
civitatis,’ was already familiar to the Roman public when
Augustus set to work to reorganise the shattered fabric of
the state.
And it is easy to show how closely the ‘ principatus’ which
he established corresponded with the ideas already connected
with the term. By Imperial writers it is carefully distinguished
from ‘ dominatio,’ ‘regnum,’ and ‘dictatura’ as a constitutional
authority*. It describes in particular the emperor’s relation
to his fellow-citizens, as himself only the foremost among them,
“dominus in servos, imperator in milites, princeps in cives*,”
or as Pliny puts it*, “obsequeris principi civis, legatus im-
peratori.” Of Vespasian’s letters to the senate Tacitus re-
marks’, “ceterum ut princeps loquebatur civilia de se et reipub-
licae egregia.” Again, the title clearly carried with it the
notion rather of general pre-eminence and supervision than
of any specific official authority. With Strabo’s 7 mapoora-
cia THS Hyemovias®, we may compare on this head the
1 Cf. ad Fam. 1. 9, ‘tcum autem 3 The obvious original of the pas-
in republica Cn. Pompeius princeps sage in Dio, 57. 8.
esset.” 4 Plin. Paneg. 9, cf. ib. 45, “‘scio
2 Tac. Ann. i. 9, “non regno ta- ut sunt diversa natura dominatio et
men neque dictatura sed principis principatus.”
nomine constitutam rempublicam.” 5 Tac. Hist. iv. 3.
Ovid, Fasti, 2. 142. 6 Strabo, xvii. 3.
332 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
words of Tiberius himself’, “non aedilis aut praetoris aut
consulis partes sustineo, majus quidem et excelsius a prin-
cipe postulatur.”
With this view of the nature of the ‘principatus’ agrees
also what we know of Augustus’ own aims in its establish-
ment. The problem before him was that of reconciling with
the old Republican system an executive authority capable of
ensuring order. That the latter was needed the anarchy of
twenty years sufficiently proved’, that the former could not
be violated with safety had been shown by the fate of Julius.
His solution of the problem was, as I have said, much what
we may imagine Cicero to have sketched by anticipation in
the De Republica. The old system was restored, “restituta
vis legibus, senatui majestas, antiqua reipublicae forma revo-
cata®,” or as he says himself, “rempublicam ex mea potestate
in Senatus Populique Romani arbitrium transtuli*;” but to it
was added a chief magistrate chosen by the people and sub-
ject to the laws, but pre-eminent above all others in the state,
“post id tempus praestiti omnibus dignitate*” To this high
dignitary belonged special powers, and therefore special titles,
he was imperator, consul, etc.; but to describe his general
relation to the whole citizen body—as merely the first of
themselves—no term was so suitable as that of ‘ princeps,’
recalling as it did what Pompey for a short time was, and
what Julius might have been. Such was the system esta-
blished by Augustus, “quis pace et principe uteremur®.” It
was an attempt to reconcile the requirements of a vast empire
and a distracted commonwealth with the cherished traditions
of the Republic. By the side of the senate, at the head of the
magistracy, was placed the ‘princeps,’ the elect of the people
like his fellow-magistrates’, like them bound by the laws
1 Tac. Ann. iii. 53. 6 Tac. Ann. iii. 28.
2 Tac. Ann. i. 9, “non aliud discor- 7 Tac. Ann. i. 7, of Tiberius, “ut
dantis patriae remedium quam ut ab vocatus electusque potius a republica
uno regeretur.” videretur.” Suet. Otho 7, “ gesturus
3 Vell. ii. 89, communi omnium arbitrio.” Cf. Gaius,
4 Mon. Aneyr. 6. 14, 15. i. 5, ‘cum ipse Imperator per legem
5 Mon. Ancyr. 6. 21, 22. imperium .accipiat.”
PRINCEPS or PRINCEPS SENATUS? 333
unless specially exempted’, and known to the Roman com-
munity not by the inappropriate title of ‘Father of the Senate,
but as the First Citizen of the State. It was a solution of the
great difficulty which besets a popular government, which more
recent Republics have in principle adopted. The Presidents
of the United States® and of the French Republic so far hold
the position which Augustus claimed for himself. That the
Augustan principate remained for a short time only true to
its original theory was a result due to the same causes
which led to the absorption of the Republic of Rome in the
Roman Empire.
H. F. PELHAM.
1 For the case of Vespasian, see 2 See De Tocqueville, Democracy
Mommas. Staats. 1. ii. 711, note 2. in America, i, 128,
CATULLUS’ 68TH POEM.
Tuo’ I would gladly discuss here a number of passages in
Catullus, yet ‘spatiis exclusus iniquis’ I hasten, as in duty
bound, to make a retractation and to do justice to Mr Ellis in a
case where he was right and I was wrong. In my book on
Catullus I have given a copious exposition of both parts of
the long and difficult 68th poem, an exposition to which I still
adhere in all its essential features. There are however two
obscure, perhaps designedly obscure, passages, closely connected
with one another, of parts of which I now perceive that I have
missed the true meaning. These passages are 66—69
Tale fuit nobis Allius auxilium.
is clausum lato patefecit limite campum,
isque domum nobis, isque dedit dominam,
ad quam communes exerceremus amores :
334 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY.
and 155—160
Sitis felices et tu simul et tua vita,
et domus in qua nos lusimus, et domita ;
et qui principio nobis terram dedit aufert,
a quo sunt primo mz omnia nata bona ;
et longe ante omnes, mihi quae me carior ipso est,
lux mea, qua viva vivere dulce mihi est.
The first passage I give exactly as it is in the Mss. and I now
think that not a letter is to be changed: ‘ Allius threw open a
fenced field and made a broad way through it; he gave to me
a house, he gave to me the lady of that house, in whose mansion
he and I might both indulge in common each his own love’.
Allius therefore rendered Catullus the same essential service of
which I spoke so fully; but not in the way spoken of. It was
not his own house to which he brought Catullus and Lesbia,
but the house of a lady his friend, who allowed him and Catul-
lus each to meet his mistress there. Ellis is therefore right in
his explanation of ‘Ad quam’ and ‘dominam’. But why does
he give so strange an interpretation to v. 67, which I have fully
illustrated in my Elucidations? ‘Ad quam (domum)’ in fact
could hardly have any other meaning than ‘beside which’, as
Plaut. truc. 11 2 26 quid ad nostras negoti, mulier, est aedis tibi.
I could increase the number of examples from Plautus, in
Draeger quoted by Ellis, of ad aliquem=apud: a good one for
our present purpose is Asin, 825 Cum suo sibi gnato unam ad
amicam de die Potare. And what is more to the point for
Catullus, Cicero has ‘fuit ad me’, ‘in Cumano ad te’. Perhaps
Livy vil 7 4 neque segnius ad hostes bellum apparatur, is also
to the purpose. What led me to think Catullus might use
‘domina’ for ‘amica’ was his very marked employment of
‘erae’ for Lesbia in v. 136. But Tibullus seems to be the first
who thus abuses the noble ‘domina’, and Propertius and others
probably follow him. Horace keeps strictly to its older mean-
ings, manifestly so in most of his instances, but really just as
much in od. 1118 19; 12 13; epist. 1 2 25.
I now come to the other passage which I have printed as it
is in the Mss., only adding the nos and mi in Italics, tho’ 157 is
CATULLUS’ 68th POEM. 335
of course corrupt. ‘A blessing on you one and all, on you and
her who is your life’—his mistress of course, not his wife as I
once explained it—‘ and the house in which you and I toyed’—
referring back to v. 69—‘and the lady of that house, and on
him who in the beginning gave to you and me’—I am disposed
now to think ‘terram’ genuine—‘firm ground’, tossed about
before as we had been on the sea of uncertainty, unable to meet
our mistresses. mictov yh, amictov Oddacca, says Thales,
Comp. too for instance Plaut. most. 737 (Tr.) Set, Simo, ita
nunc ventus navem nostram deseruit...(Si.) Quaene subducta
erat tuto in terram ?; id. mercat. 195 Nequiquam mare subter-
fugi...Equidem me iam censebam esse in terra atque in tuto
loco: Verum video me iterum ad saxa ferri saevis fluctibus ;
rudens 824 Non hercle quo hinc nunc gentium aufugiam scio:
Ita nunc mi utrumque saevit et terra et mare; Cic. pro Murena
4 quo tandem me esse animo oportet, prope iam ex magna
-iactatione terram videntem, in hunc cui video maximas reipub-
licae tempestates esse subeundas? Virgil’s ‘In manibus terrae’
and the similar passage in Kur. Heracl. 427 are also perhaps in
point. I freely confess that Catullus’ use of the metaphor
would be bolder than any of the above, tho’ he aims here at
nervous brevity*. If it be judged inadmissible, then I would
not give up my ‘te et eram dedit’ for any of the other editors’
corrections. For the manifestly corrupt ‘ aufert’ it is probable
enough that a proper name such as ‘ Anser’, or my ‘ Afer’ is to
be read. It is possible too that Catullus may have chosen to
conceal the name, as he has concealed that of the ‘domina’; in
which case I would suggest ‘auctor, A quo etc.’; the ‘quo’ being
then neuter : ‘the first author of that blessing from which all my
happiness first flowed’. In any case the ‘qui principio’ was he
who first brought Allius and through him Catullus into commu- —
nication with the ‘domina’?.
H. A. J. MUNRO.
1 In the mercator, quoted above, 2 I have just read Mr Palmer ‘on
‘atque in tuto loco’ defines and ex- Ellis’ Catullus’ in the Hermathena,
plains ‘in terra’; and‘tutum-locum’ no. vi. I have neither space nor
is precisely what ‘terram’in Catullus time to shew how highly I value
_ ought to mean, much of his criticism ; tho’ I hope to
336 THE JOURNAL
find another occasion to point out
both what I admire and what I dis-
agree with in his remarks, His criti-
cism however of our 68th poem I am
quite unable to accept, both its details
and the theory that the Allius of the
second part is a pseudonyme for the
Manlius of the first; tho’ I remem-
ber that a year or two ago Professor
Nettleship casually suggested the same
to me. But Mr Palmer’s arguments
appear to me totally inadequate to
meet the far stronger arguments on
the other side. But here I must touch
only on what is personal to myself.
With reference to my remark that it
was ‘bold to assert that any one in
Catullus’ days could have borne two
gentile names’, Mr Palmer (p. 348)
observes: ‘Mr Ellis never asserted
this, and I do not think he ever enter-
tained such an idea’. This has indeed
taken me by surprise. We have, first,
this negative proof to the contrary,
that Mr Ellis never hints throughout
his commentary that Allius is a pseu-
donyme for Mallius; next his express
words, cited too by Mr Palmer, ‘ that
the Mallius of the first part is the
Mallius and Allius of the second’;
thirdly the fact that in v. 66 (68) all
his texts give us ‘Tale fuit nobis
Mallius auxilium’; just the very verse
which introduces the most compromis-
ing lines in the poem. Again (p. 349)
Mr Palmer’s explanation of ‘ tua vita’
seems to me not to be Latin, or, if
Latin, the direst prose. I am certain
the words mean ‘ your darling’. Every
Roman must have made daily use of
this ‘vita’ in a hundred ways; tho’
OF PHILOLOGY.
we can only expect to meet with it
in certain written styles. We find
the vocative ‘mea vita’ three times
in Plautus, not in Terence; twice in
Cicero in two impassioned letters to
Terentia ; in Catullus, Propertius and
Ovid, not in Tibullus—perhaps too in
other places unknown to me. Twice
Propertius, rather strikingly, has the
voc. ‘vita’ without ‘mea’; twice too
Ovid, probably after him, in amor. m1
8 11 Hunc potes amplecti formosis,
vita, lacertis? Huius in amplexu, vita,
iacere potes? once Apul. apol. 9 salva,
Charine, Pars in amore meo, vita, tibi
remanet. We find the word so used
more than once, not in the vocative ;
Plaut. asin. 614 certe enim tu mihi
vita es; Stich. 372 tuum virum et
vitam meam; Ter. ad. 330 nostrumne
Aeschinum ? Nostram omnium vitam?
Catullus here, and 104 1 Credis me
potuisse meae maledicere vitae? What
difference is there here? From the
nature of the case ‘mea’ is likely to
be more common than ‘tua’; but,
just as Catullus addresses Allius, so
surely Calvus could have said to
Catullus ‘potesne tuae maledicere
vitae?’; or the woman addressed in
the Stichus could have answered ‘me-
um virum et vitam tuam’; as Terence
says ‘nostram omnium vitam’. Quin-
tus or Atticus must have said to
Cicero ‘tua vita Terentia’, ‘ Tulliola
tua vita’ as often as Cicero said to
them ‘mea vita Terentia, ect.’ Mr
Palmer’s conjecture ‘dominae’ ‘our
- ladies (your Aurunculeia, my Lesbia)’
gives me a qualm.
CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M,A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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