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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE JOURNAL or PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY
AND
EDITED BY
FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE
AND
WENDELL T. BUSH
VOLUME III
JANUARY-DECEMBER, 19O6
NEW YORK
THE SCIENCE PRESS
19O6
PRESS OF
THE NEW ERA PRINTING
LANCASTER, PA.
VOL. III. No. 1. JANUARY 4, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE TRANSCENDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE
AS an unaccounted-for agent of protest, the transcendence of
knowledge has been playing a role like that of the moral con-
science. Pragmatically, it is definable as something which embar-
rasses every newly proposed division of experience. The former
division of experience into ideas had grasped a very real unit, but
not the elusive thing that makes knowledge knowledge. Empiricism
at present, in practise, divides experience into experiences, outlining
a given judgment, for instance, as 'an' experience. The validity of
the judgment is hereby confined inevitably to its psychological
career, and the sense of the truth-error contrast is lost. The mean-
ing of 'a cognitive experience,' referring beyond itself for verifica-
tion or correction, can not accommodate itself to these limits : such is
Professor Bakewell's contention. 1 But empiricism has still a third
category of division : experience is a genus ; there are several kinds of
experience } of which cognition is one, coordinate and alternative with
the rest. 2 Granting the category, exception is taken to the implied
ranking in behalf of the transcendence of knowledge. For these
several kinds are presumably known or knowable, i. e., embraced or
embraceable in a cognitive experience, and without alteration;
hence cognition can not be of the same stuff or in the same field with
lr lhis JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 19, p. 521.
2 It is not difficult to recognize here the problem of Brentano, and to some
extent his solution. For Brentano, the ultimate consideration in psychological
classification is the mode in which consciousness refers to its object, Urteil be-
ing but one of these modes. For Dewey, the real is ' that which is experienced,
as it is experienced,' that is, experience has a what and a how, ultimate char-
acters, not reducible to one another and cognition is but one of several hows,
modes, or sorts. This word in whatever form kind, mode, quality is always
a word of last resort in classification. A doctrine which falls back upon it
is essentially empirical, and the test of such a doctrine lies in the attempt to
reduce the alleged ultimate ' sorts ' to one, whether of their own number or
otherwise. (Professor Dewey's article in Vol. II., No. 24, of this JOURNAL,
tends to modify somewhat this interpretation of his position. I let the com-
ment stand for what it is worth.)
5
6
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
any other 'sort,' Indeed, the distinguishing mark of its sort, if we
are so to speak of it, must be negative it is stuffless, not to say un-
conscious. With this touch of paradox in characterizing the experi-
ence which once enjoyed the status of consciousness par excellence
Professor Woodbridge 3 has taken an important step toward meeting
Professor Dewey's requirement that the transcendence of knowledge
shall appear and be defined: transcendence is non-appearance;
knowledge, as a peculiar sort, is non-phenomenal.
If this be true it is not obvious how Professor Dewey's other re-
quirement, that cognition per se be subjected to empirical study, is
to be complied with. The foregoing results are all gotten by logic
and are all negative. It is indeed impossible to determine empir-
ically whether or not cognition alters its object; the difficulty lies in
gaining knowledge of the object apart from cognition. But it is
possible to observe the development of experience (a) from Vorst el-
lung to Urteil, (b] from problematic judgment to verified judgment,
(c)~ from an attitude in its first intention ethical, esthetic or other-
wise to self-consciousness, i. e., to reflexive judgment upon that ex-
perience; and it is possible to distinguish the invariant from the
variable elements in that development. These are all experiences
which rise to the point of cognition, properly so called, from some-
thing else or from something less. The result of such observation
is partly to confirm and partly to correct the results of the aforesaid
logic.
I.
It is the nature of knowledge to supervene upon an experience
that is not yet knowledge. At the moment of cognition, that is, at
the moment of judgment, or of certainty, a distinct change takes
place in experience, but it takes place upon an invariant core: the
experience which at that moment becomes 'object' in full standing is
undisturbed in quality, intensity and continuity with its context.
These inclusive and non-interfering characters of cognition seem
especially conspicuous in the case of reflexive judgments; but they
are equally true of all judgments of current experience. Every
cognizance of an object' is expressible in terms of the judgment, Ab
(the Thing A with the predicate b) is: and by that 'is' purports to
come upon and report the thing as independent of and beyond not
experience, but the act of judging. If by transcendence we mean
these non-displacing, non-transforming, transparent, superventive
characters of the cognitive experience, transcendent is a title which
can not be denied it.
From this account it may appear (1) that experience and cogni-
tion are by no means coextensive, and yet (2) that cognition is the
3 This JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 21, pp. 573 ff.
. PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 1
consummation of every other experience. That my present experi-
ence in so far as it is immediate or uncertain should pass into an
object-experience and be knowledge or known is an ideal of every
moment. Objectification is in some sense a step nearer reality,
though it be, with Miinsterberg, in another respect a step away
therefrom. Further, it is but the obverse of the frictionless super-
vening of knowledge that every experience is from its incipiency
adapted to be known; it comes into existence bearing the organ of
attachment for knowledge, the schema of knownness, in situ at its
outside, so that only a change in the lighting, the suggestion of a
question perhaps, is necessary to make the inclusive cognition appear.
If, then, we admit vanishing degrees of knowledge, we may still say
that all experience is cognitive qua known: at least a surface-film of
knowing plays over every inch of its contour. This position of pri-
macy should also be taken up into the concept of its transcendence.
But what is it that supervenes ? Are we unable empirically to get
beyond the negative results of our logic? If cognitive experience,
like other experience, is essentially subject to be known and under
the same condition that it shall not be altered ; if, therefore, in being
known it must retain the transparent, non-evident character which
differentiated it from known experience, it can not be known. Is this
the conclusion? The doubt which such a knot creates about the
finality of our contrast between stuff of experience and stuffless ex-
perience is strengthened by the following facts. There is no experi-
ence, whether cognitive or otherwise, which may not in turn be made
subject to ethical consideration or esthetic judgment; and in these
value- experiences, just as in cognitive experience, the object-experi-
ence must exist unaltered. Whatever title the cognitive experience
may have had to transcendence must be shared equally with these
others. And while the several kinds of experience seem to make for
hierarchy and unity rather than for severalty and coordinacy, that
hierarchy is ambiguous. But if the relative transparency which we
called transcendence pertains to value-experience with reference to
its material core or object quite as much as to cognitive experience
with reference to its core, then none of these transcendencies can be
unconscious-experiences in the sense of experiences without con-
tentotherwise there would be several distinguishable kinds of un-
conscious experience, which is absurd. And this is, indeed, the
crux of the problem : how cognition as a peculiar type of experience
can be referred to anything of the 'content' class; and the per-
plexity of it lies, I believe, in misapprehending the conditions of
translating knowledge into terms of the category ' experience, ' a cate-
gory whose claim to ultimateness is yet to be made good.
8
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
II.
Cognitive experience, as a category, is a reflexive and secondary
accomplishment of the mind. This does not mean that it is a crea-
tion, nor that it is a discovery, as of some elusive and almost invisible
content, but that it is as a category an after- view. In direct living
we are in presence of things; we know nothing of cognition. The
cognitive experience, as direct, reports not itself, but its object ; and
its most immediately empirical language is, 'The thing is,' or 4s
here, ' or ' I know the thing, ' but never ' The thing is held in cogni-
tive experience. ' Whatever the change may be that makes this last
language possible, it is a change which throws into relief a new
environment of the object. Previously, a thing was known by virtue
of its simple presence ; 4 now it is seen to be known quite as much ~by
virtue of the presence of something else than itself. The necessary
conditions of knowledge are, first, that the thing known be present
in some way in the stuff of experience ; but, second, that it be present
under specific inner auspices. Knowledge, from this angle, is no
longer transparent, and its transcendence is wrapped up in these
now visible auspices of the thing therein known. In fact, it is here
that we come upon that ingredient of transcendence which Professor
Bakewell has brought into the field: to this envelope, as other than
the experience known, is referable in some way that 'pointing be-
yond itself which is characteristic of experience as known.
Neither the office nor the precise relevance of this environing
something-else has yet its perfect explanation. The essential phe-
nomena broadly described are these: In the case of sense impres-
sions, this contextual furniture, in the role of fringe, or perhaps of
conductor for pragmatic radiations, has something to do with lifting
that impression in its own right a mere immediate sign to the
dignity of 'object.' 5 The more elaborate experiences, in their im-
mediate (as yet unknown, but knowable) condition, are like nascent
atoms or chemical radicals with unsatisfied valences, which require
only the juxtaposition of their proper 'others' to enter into the state
of knownness. 6 In sum, and apart from all theories, it is an em-
pirical datum that without the presence of ' other contents, ' be their
*'The thing Ah is ' = 'The thing Ab (here now) is (beyond here-now)'
= ' I know Ab,' in which the ' I ' absorbs merely the here-now elements, and
the ' know/ the not-here-now elements, of the original ' is.' It is as if one had
said cabalistically, ' Here not-here Ab.'
5 In which the paradox of placing the burden of objective reference upon
what is, by the only possible distinction, inner, has to be met.
6 In which the paradox of placing the burden of cognition, regarded as a
function, upon contents which are prima facie irrelevant to the object, has to
be met.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 9
action no more than catalytic, is nothing known that is known. And
the essential difficulty of the situation is that of empowering these
other contents of experience at the moment of cognizance with any
other value than that of plain other contents; whereas it is precisely
not in their capacity as other contents that they are functional in
knowing the given object of attention. It is here that association
fails, and that the other theories which have superseded it share in
its failure: they assume that whatever knowing-power these other
contents have lies in their face- or content-value as like, contiguous;
or in some way of kindred motive, to the contents known. They
thus assume a double knowledge to explain a single one. If it were
possible so much as to conceive contents, as such face-values, actively
engaged in 'knowing' incoming contents, such a cognitive experi-
ence would by no means be transparent to itself; these other contents
would be part of the denned object, contrary to hypothesis. This
entire landscape of face-value-meanings (upon which aspect of ex-
perience the thought of the psychological empiricist tends to termi-
nate ) is barren for the understanding of cognition : everything here
is a logical natwash within which the essential epistemological dis-
tinctions of true and false, certain and uncertain, inner and outer,
ideal and real, can find no tenable hold. In whatever sense it is
possible to speak of knowing as an experience, in that sense it is
necessary to regard it as a process with a physiology of its OWTL; in
whatever sense it is possible to regard knowing as a process, it is
necessary to distinguish functions that conspire in that process ; and
since functions are non-empirical (not to say metaphysical) things,
it is necessary to find structural differentiations in experience as
their empirical signs. It is not the stuff, primarily, but the struc-
ture of experience which is significant for the description of know-
ing the stuff only as embodying or manning the structure. An ob-
ject is known not alone by virtue or presence in experience, nor by
virtue of the presence of something else, but by virtue of being taken
up into the structure of experience as, at that moment, a specific
organ thereof. 7
7 It is a fair subject for possible experiment how much of the self could
be of different stuff without affecting a given cognition. It might seem that
any substitution of content would alter the new object in some degree; but
the identity of a judgment is determined solely by the placing which it effects,
and it is conceivable that there might obtain a perfect interdependence of super-
ficial contents of experience, and yet a large degree of indifference thereto
in the course of judgments. The removal of an office from a noisy to a quiet
quarter would doubtless have an effect on the average of the bookkeeper's
errors; but there is a conceivable range of variation in the auditory context
whose effect on a particular series of judgments would be not approximately,
but absolutely, nil.
10
TH1E JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
III.
If this is the right methodic clue a little rapid sketching ought
to make definite what we mean by the transcendence of knowledge.
Knowing, as process, is essentially the work of placing a given ex-
perience within the entire system of experience. For the placing of
a given experience it is a matter of relative indifference what its
immediately neighboring experiences have been and are; absolutely
necessary is only that they be, and that a systematic continuity exist
between them and such other past or present experiences as in struc-
tural order belong nearest the experience to be known. Abstractly,
this continuity is the sufficient as well as the necessary condition for
accurate knowledge ; but the conductivity of experience, so to speak,
is imperfect. Hence error; and hence it is that an experience is
never finally known until it has been experienced as neighbor to all
its possible systematic neighbors. Experience never presents all
these combinations ; and such as it presents are distributed unevenly ;
things in physical groups have enormously better natural chances
for getting into correct order, in all the various series that pass
through them, than have esthetic experiences, for instance. But in
any case the thing that makes knowledge knowledge is the structural
interest in the whole interplay between focal and environing ma-
terials in experience. 8
The various aspects of the transcendence of knowledge, then, come
naturally together as follows : ( 1 ) Knowing is transparent in action,
i. e., structure and function are not visible in experience as ma-
terials in the same fieldi with the contents then and there being
placed; structure is relatively abstract, function (if we dare say so)
relatively metaphysical, and both relatively independent, with refer-
ence to these contents. (2) Knowing concerns materials beyond
those belonging to the presented object. It is possible to locate at a
particular point in the time-field, etc., the subject-matter of an act
of knowledge ; but the act of knowledge can not itself be located : it is
omnipresent. If, indeed, we prefer here to extend the range of the
word 'present' rather than use the word 'transcendent,' we may do
so. In knowing a physical object, we are indeed in presence of the
whole of space; and our experience of space is not an aggregate of
numerous experiences, but is one continuous experience from birth
8 Structure, in the person of the environing contents, acts, and in the
person of the focal contents is acted upon : the thing is * understood ' to a
degree, and to a degree means a new line in structure for further understandings.
These are the fundamental functional relations in knowledge. A cognitive
experience is true when environing materials can assume focal functions with-
out altering the established systematic relations. See this JOURNAL, Vol. II.,
No. 18, pp. 480-482.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 11
to death. But with this understanding of presence, we should have
to distinguish various 'presences,' the psychological moment of judg-
ment indicating the minimal and nuclear presence with which that
cognition is concerned. Knowing does not change its object; it
creates it. It neither changes nor creates the stuff of experience.
The object is created not as subject-matter, or stuff, but (a) as an
outlined mass of stuff (6) having its roots in the remote corners of
the real universe of my experience. The structure of experience as
belonging to the object is the accomplishment of the knowing proc-
ess: in this respect the object likewise is omnipresent, and by no
means confined to the psychological here-now. 9
' Of what sort, ' then, ' is cognitive experience ? ' The possibility of
knowing knowledge depends on the fact that the structure of experi-
ence, as concerned in the knowing of physical things, is compound-
able: the situation between contents and 'other contents' observable
in the current cognition of things may be repeated as between this
whole situation and still other contents. Cognition, as a sort, is
known, therefore, with reference to a world that envelopes it. What
is this world beyond cognition? Is it the world of the value-judg-
9 In psychological reflection the stuff actually belonging to the object ap-
pears to diminish. The nucleus of presented material that has prompted a
given judgment may turn out to be surprisingly small. All the further ma-
terial that went to fill out its rounded objectivity has lost itself in the
environing arena or penumbra, which under the same sort of scrutiny attains
proportions equally surprising, as if in compensation. In brief, the original
object appears dismembered and unrecognizable. In view of this, Professor
Miinsterberg does not hesitate to use the word transformation: real is the
object as we experience it in the full current of (what I beg leave to call)
teleological synthesis; the scattered elements which psychological reflection
discovers are artifacts.
Apart from the language of illusion in such a view of cognition so much
is unimpeachable: Each thing as known in experience is not known at any
psychological point, but has its roots in the utmost corners of the eternal
person. Reflection finds members of what was a unitary stroke of cognition
dispersed throughout the whole universe of a mind, though the thing known
has its nuclear sign at a particular point in that universe.
But the hypothesis of transformation has no enlightening power. It is
requisite, and, therefore, possible, to express the facts of cognition in terms of
experience without losing grasp upon the conceptual identity of contents. The
situation is analogous to that which gives rise in the physical world to the
problem of actio in distans and the comment of Carlyle is equally to the
point : ' Yon say a thing can not act where it is not with all my heart, but
pray where is it?' There is this difference, however, that whereas hypothesis
is the essence of physical construction, the elements with which a theory of
knowledge deals must remain real as experienced.
12
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ment, perchance, or the world of feeling ? Doubtless these are struc-
tural neighbors of cognition in certain series. 10
But it must be noted that this 'world beyond' is not a fixed order:
these kinds of experience seem to a certain extent to play the role
of world beyond for each other, so that cognitive experience is known
by value experience, and value experience in turn by cognition. This
suggestion receives some color from the apparent need of explaining
the norms of cognition, if at all, by the norms of action (pragmatism,
action theory, etc.), and the ethical 'ought' by an 'is.'
WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.
ANDOVEB.
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LOGICAL JUDGMENT WITH
REFERENCE TO REALISM
~TN various quarters there has lately been a renascence of ' realism '
-*- so called. Mr. G. E. Moore's realism of concepts is made the
epistemological basis -of Mr. B. Russell's imposing work 'The Prin-
ciples of Mathematics, ' and it finds an answering echo in this country.
Professor Woodbridge proclaims himself a realist and asserts that the
addition of knowledge to a reality hitherto without it is simply an
addition to it and not a transformation of it. Dr. Montague tells us
that consciousness is simply a relation between things, but does not
tell what is the differentia of this peculiar relation by which things
get a cognitive consciousness added to them. Presumably things
would be just the same without consciousness and, if so, why and
iiow does this peculiar relation called consciousness get superimposed
on reality? How does consciousness get born into a world that
"would perhaps get along better without this disturbing factor which
'can not seem to rid itself of the illusion that it too has a determinate
reality? Again we seem to have another variant of realism in the
''immediate' empiricism of Professors Dewey and James, who agree
in eliminating the transcendent reference from cognition.
I confess at the outset that I have not been able to make out just
what these various writers mean by realism. For Professor Wood-
bridge and Dr. Montague cognitive thought seems to be an epiphe-
nomenon ; for Professors Dewey and James, a single phase of imme-
diate psychic process on a level with all other psychic processes.
10 It is worth while observing that the fact that an object is known never
as a species, but always as an individual, plays a role in the knowing of know-
ing different from the r6le it plays in the knowing of anything else; knowing is
known always in particular acts, and it is known first as physical knoivledge.
Knowledge of the last attained degree of reflection can not, in the nature of the
case, be known and reckoned with the species.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 13
Now, the Platonic view aside, realism in epistemology means that
human thought somehow gets into right relation with reality,
whereas realism in metaphysics means that the real is wholly external
to and independent of thought. And in recent discussions one seems
to find a confused shifting from one to the other of these uses of the
terms. I suppose we are all realists in the sense of holding that
cognitive thinking is not shut up with itself as a psychical process,
but is in contact with a real world. But if it be maintained that
there is a real world entirely independent of thought which may be
passively mirrored or represented in thought, but which in itself goes
on entirely irrespective of whether thought is at work in it, I find
such a notion contradictory to the very notion of cognitive conscious-
ness. For in such case thought is an otiose excrescence in a world
which would still be the same without it. In such case cognitive
consciousness must be an unaccountable by-product of the cosmic
machinery. This sort of metaphysical realism strikes me as a violent
attempt to get out of an impasse created by a confusion of the psy-
chological and the logical treatments of cognition. It is, therefore,
perhaps opportune to reiterate some truisms on this point.
Judgment is the fundamental act of thought, and a right notion
of the nature and function of judgment is indispensable to an ade-
quate conception of the logical function and ultimate position of
thought with reference to reality. I, therefore, propose to start from
the definition of judgment as the reference of an idea to reality, or
the ' intellectual function which defines reality by significant ideas, ' *
and to show that the assumption of a reality entirely independent of
thought has its roots in a fallacious conception of thought.
In the definition of judgment as the reference of an idea to reality,
' idea ' is used not in the psychological sense of a mere mental existent,
but as meaning. We must be on our guard against confusing these
two uses of 'idea.' Even Mr. Bradley seems to drop back into the
psychological mode of treatment when he says, "A meaning consists
of a part of the content (original or acquired) cut off, fixed by the
mind and considered apart from the existence of the sign." 2 To
speak thus as if reasoning and judgment were static, psychologically
given contents, is to obscure the true bearings of a conception of
judgment that is in itself entirely adequate. I prefer to say simply
that it is the 'meaning' of an idea that refers to reality and that
meaning is dynamic, a matter of active tendency and direction. In
cognitive thinking judgment is the act of cognitive reference to
reality, and hence not to be regarded as in any sense a psychological
1 Bosanquet, ' Logic,' Vol. I., p. 104.
2 ' Principles of Logic/ p. 4.
14 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
content. Let us consider for a moment the distinction between the
psychological and the logical points of view.
It is necessary for the descriptive analysis of psychology that
conscious process be regarded as having separate and independent
existence sundered from the world of social and physical existence.
This sundering of consciousness from its world-context is absolutely
indispensable to the work of exact analysis. Analytic psychology
treats the individual consciousness as if it flowed on independent of
anything else. This artificial isolation is applied alike to the mental
processes which have cognitive, esthetic or ethical reference. Now
if the logician or epistemologist sets out from this standpoint of
psychological abstraction he will never find a clear or straight road
back to the real world with which consciousness as cognitive deals.
The reference of thought to reality in the act of judgment is at
some point an immediate reference or it is no reference at all.
Thought for logic is primarily and fundamentally thought-referring-
to-an-existent-order, not thought as idea simply entertained in some-
body's head. Nothing but confusion can result if the logical and
epistemological consideration of thought set out by sundering, in the
fashion of psychological analysis, thought from its object of refer-
ence. It is this initial error in the treatment of judgment that
makes plausible the recent 'realisms' which maintain that thought
makes no sort of difference to the existence and reality of outer
things, and that even the abstract propositions of mathematics must
be entities existing independently of any knowing mind. Truly, if
judgment be primarily a conscious process having mere psychical
existence in individual heads, if cognition consists in the entertain-
ing of ideas by a consciousness sundered from the universe of things,
then thought is but the passive reflector of a world of entirely inde-
pendent entities. In this case thought may in some mysterious
fashion represent things, but it does nothing. It makes no differ-
ence to reality. There is, then, no way of bridging the chasm from
the thought-side to the real world outside, and our so-called universal
truths those of logic and pure mathematics either are mere in-
dividual psychic existents like any other content of consciousness or
they have a mysterious existence as independent entities. (Analo-
gous problems arise in regard to the concepts of ethics and esthetics
when these two are treated in psychological fashion as mere contents
of consciousness. Duty, goodness and beauty are then either purely
subjective or they are independent entities.)
I should be the last to deny that we may derive aid in the de-
v lopment of a logical theory of cognition from psychological
analysis. But we shall surely be led astray unless we bear in mind
that thought in its actual functioning as instrument of cognition is
15
an act of immediate and indivisible reference to reality. And, on
the other hand, if we keep in mind that judgment as the immediate
reference of a meaning to reality is the act of a moving or fluid
mind in relation to an environment only relatively stable. We shall
be able to understand why logical thinking, too, undergoes an evolu-
tion, and we need not be greatly troubled by the problem of erro-
neous judgment. An erroneous judgment is a reference to reality,
erroneous either because the mind in making this reference has not
taken sufficiently into account the systematic context of its imme-
diate meaning or because meanwhile the real context has shifted in
some respect. The failure of the immediate meaning can only be
discovered by an actual reference of it to reality; and the test con-
sists in trying to fit the particular judgment into a more or less con-
nected system of judgments that have proved themselves workable
and consistent.
The objection to the above conception of judgment from the ex-
istence of such judgments, as a ' centaur has the lower body of a horse
and the head and shoulders of a man,' rests on a confusion. The
above proposition is a judgment with reference to a mythological
universe 'of discourse,' which again is related to the real world
through the implied assertion of the real existence of men and horses.
All false ideas and erroneous judgments have psychical existence,
and the assertion of their existence is a true judgment since it refers
to reality in which every individual mind has a place. Again, the
judgment, 'there is truth,' is the assertion that what is meant or
signified by 'truth' is involved in the world of fact or reality. (I
should say that the judgment, ' truth exists, ' is badly put, and that it
is better to differentiate truth 's actuality from the actuality of other
things by saying 'truth is valid' or 'knowledge means or signifies
reality. ' ) A serious difficulty seems to arise from the case of mathe-
matical and logical judgments. It may be said that the judgment
2 -(- 2 = 4 is true even if two things do not and have not anywhere
existed and the truth of such judgments can not be constituted by
any one's thinking them. For if they were made true by being
thought, they might be false, since thought is as likely to be false as
true. The latter objection rests again on the confusion of judgment
as a cognitive and over-individual act of reference to reality and
propositions as mere psychical existents. To judge that 2 + 2 = 4
is to mean that the real world is so constituted that whenever a
rational mind performs the operation of adding two things to two
things the result will be four, and the assertion that this judgment is
true whether there are really in the world any minds to think four
things derives its specious force from failure to observe that the
bare symbols mean and refer to actual operations of thought in
16
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
counting. Merely to think of two things is at least to assert the
universal operation of thought meant by the figure 2. Without this
minimum of reference the statement 2 + 2 = 4 is meaningless.
Either the truths of mathematics and logic are principles of actual
thinking or they are material entities. The latter supposition is
meaningless. The former means that the principles of logic and pure
mathematics are expressive of universal conditions of valid thinking
in normal minds. If one 's thought is to be normal and have a place
in that consistent or systematic whole by which alone thought can
validly mean reality, one must follow the condition of this common
or over-individual thought-structure.
The reality of abstract truths, then, is a thought-reality, but not
a mere psychological existence. Like all actual judgments, the
judgments of mathematics are logical acts which transcend psy-
chological existence and take their places in an organic and self-
consistent system, which latter is the determining ideal that is, at
least in part, actualized in the body of science. And the simplest
hypothesis on which to ground the validity of this ideal system and
by which to account for the common or over-individual thought-
structure involved in all judgment will perhaps, after all, prove to
be that of a general thinking consciousness. I do not advance this
doctrine as the inevitable outcome of reflection on the basis of judg-
ment, but simply to insist that it is a theory seriously to be reckoned
with.
J. A. LEIGHTON.
HOBAET COLLEGE.
SOCIETIES
SECTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
AT a meeting held in conjunction with the New York Section of
the American Psychological Association, on the afternoon
and evening of November 27, 1905, with Professor Woodbridge in
the chair, Professor Robert MacDougall was elected Chairman for
the coming year and Professor R. S. Woodworth Secretary. The
following are abstracts of the papers read :
Smell Discrimination of Two Hundred and Fifty-five Students:
WILL S. MONROE.
Students were provided with sets of small phials filled one third
full of common odors, chiefly essential oils. Each set contained
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 17
20 odors. Nostrils were alternately used; five seconds were given
for the stimulation, and one minute was allowed for recording the
result and resting the nostrils. After every seven tests, the windows
were opened and the room aired. In all, 255 students were tested.
The average number of odors correctly named was 6.72. Four stu-
dents named 12 correctly; two students, 11; and 5 students, 10.
Two of the students were able to identify but 1 odor each; 15 stu-
dents, but 2 odors each ; and 17 students, but 3 odors each.
Wintergreen was correctly identified by 77 per cent, of the
students; camphor, 75 per cent.; peppermint, 75 per cent.; vanilla,
74 per cent. ; cloves, 65 per cent. ; cinnamon, 56 per cent. ; spearmint,
38 per cent. ; turpentine, 36 per cent. ; tar, 36 per cent. ; lemon, 30
per cent; nutmeg, 27 per cent.; anise, 26 per cent.; pennyroyal,
21 per cent. ; sassafras, 15 per cent. ; bay rum, 9 per cent. ; hemlock,
4 per cent. ; bergamot, 3 per cent. ; asafoetida, 2 per cent. ; worm-
wood, 1 per cent. ; and lavender, half of one per cent. A census of
color names showed that the students believed themselves familiar
with certain odors, such as lavender, which they were unable to
recognize.
Linguistic Standards: FREDERIC LYMAN WELLS.
A historical standard is necessary for the regulation of linguistic
usage, but the present literary interpretation of it is open to many
objections, being reactionary in character and inconsistent in its
admissions and exclusions. Models of linguistic excellence, as de-
terminative of that body of elements to be considered good use, are
to be sought among works whose criteria of value are more objective
in character than is the case at present, as their value can be more
rapidly and more accurately determined, and they are in closer
touch with the actual needs of the language. The introspection of
the author of the average 'Principles of Rhetoric' should not be
accepted as final in determining the interrelationship of these ele-
ments of good use. It is possible to determine linguistic values of
all sorts by statistical methods, which give not only the most valid
determination possible, but also the measure of this validity. De-
terminations of so apparently subjective a character as linguistic
force can be made with a validity that approximates practical cer-
tainty. These experimental determinations do not coincide with
any of the definitions of force which the introspective grammarians
have laid down.
Preliminary Report on 'A Threshold Study of the Reading Pause' ':
F. M. HAMILTON.
Previous investigators of the problem of reading have agreed
18
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
upon the short exposure method as best for psychological analysis.
Introspection is facilitated most when the exposure is less than the
shortest reading pause, i. e., when all eye movements are excluded.
The apparatus most generally used is the tacljistoscope of the fall
screen variety. The word has been uniformly treated as the unit
of perception in reading, the effort being to determine the factors
or 'cues' of word recognition their character and order of occur-
rence.
Previous tachistoscopic studies have confined themselves chiefly
to the reading of isolated words; the present study has attempted
to adapt the method to reading in context.
A second adaptation is its use in analyzing processes at the thresh-
old of word recognition by reducing the exposure time to a period
approximating the time differences of the perceptibility of their
attributes, the presupposition being that various attributes of objects
lie at varying distances from the threshold.
And still a third untried possibility of this method consists in
reports upon the marginal field of perceptual regard in addition to
the reports upon the field of distinct vision.
The experiments have already proceeded far enough to give
assurance that the completion of the study will shed additional light
upon the questions of literal reading, reading cues, value of con-
text, etc.
Vision and Localization During Rapid Eye Movements: R. S.
WOODWORTH.
An attempt was made to throw some additional light on the
question first raised by Cattell 1 as to what is seen during movements
or jumps of the eye from one fixation point to another. Two op-
posing views are those of Holt, 2 who holds to a complete anesthesia
or inhibition of the visual center during the movement, and of
Dodge, 3 who believes that vision there is possible but under ordinary
conditions not actualized, because the faint blur produced by moving
the eye across a variegated field is so brief and meaningless as to be
ignored, just as entoptic phenomena are ignored. Proceeding on
the supposition that if the latter view were correct it should be
possible by attention and practice to become conscious of the stimuli
that affect the eye during movement, the author has convinced
himself of the following facts :
1 Psychological Review, 1900, VII., pp. 325-343, 507-508.
2 Ibid.; Monograph Supplements, 1903, IV., pp. 3-45; Psychological Bul-
letin, 1905, II.
8 Psychological Revieto, 1900, VII., pp. 454-465; Psychological Bulletin,
1905, II., pp. 193-199.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 19
1. During head movements, an object held in the mouth may
remain in clear vision.
2. During convergence, the two monocular fields may be seen to
move across each other.
3. During eye-jumps proper, after-images may remain in con-
sciousness if the lids are closed (Exner), or if the background is
dark or plain ; it is also possible, in short jumps, or at the beginning
and end of longer ones, to see entoptic spots move across the back-
ground.
4. External objects moving in the same direction as the eye are
distinctly seen when their angular velocity with respect to the eye
coincides with that of the eye at any part of its jump (Cattell,
Dodge). With reference to Holt's objection that what is seen may
be the positive after-image, appearing after the eye has come to rest,
it should be noted that the objects so brought to clear vision are
correctly localized in space, instead of being projected against the
background at the new point of fixation, as would be the case with
after-images. Thus not only vision, but correct localization of ob-
jects seen, is possible during eye-jumps.
5. Stationary objects over which the eye passes can also be seen
after practice. Fusion, flicker, and especially apparent motion of
the objects, corresponding to the actual motion of their images across
the retina, can all be seen. A peculiarity which calls for further
discussion is that the apparent extent of the object's motion is much
less than the actual motion of the eye as measured against the back-
ground.
The author's conclusion is that vision with the moving eye is
essentially the same as that with the fixed eye when the external
field moves.
The Measurement of Scientific Merit: J. McKEEN CATTELL.
The speaker explained how he had selected a group of one thou-
sand scientific men for the study of individual differences and the
conditions on which success in scientific work depends. In each of
the twelve principal sciences the students who had done original
work were arranged in the order of merit of their work by ten com-
petent judges. Thus was obtained the order of merit and also the
probable error of each position, it being based on ten independent
observations. This probable error is inversely as the differences in
scientific method, it being small where the differences are marked
and becoming larger as the differences are less. It is thus possible
to construct a curve representing the distribution of scientific merit
in these thousand scientific men, and this curve agrees rather closely
with the positive half of the curve of error. The first hundred men
20 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
differ among themselves about as much as the next two hundred or
the last seven hundred.
Data were also given in regard to the distribution of the thousand
leading scientific men of the country. The birth-rate of these
scientific men was 27 per million of the population, it being 50 in
cities and 24 in the country. It was 109 in Massachusetts, 47 in
New York, 23 in Pennsylvania, 12 in Missouri and 1 in Mississippi
and in Louisiana. Their present distribution is somewhat similar.
Thus 134 scientific men were born in Massachusetts and 144 reside
there ; 183 were born in New York and 192 reside there. The central
states, with the exception of Illinois, tend to lose their scientific men.
Thus 75 were born in Ohio, and 34 now reside there. The distribu-
tion of these scientific men among different institutions is as follows :
Harvard, 66 ; Columbia, 60 ; Chicago, 39 ; Cornell, 33 ; U. S. Geolog-
ical Survey, 32; U. S. Department of Agriculture, 32; Johns Hop-
kins, 30 ; California, 27 ; Yale, 26 ; Smithsonian Institution, 22 ;
Michigan, 20 ; Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 19 ; Wisconsin,
18; Pennsylvania, 17; Stanford, 16; Princeton, 14; Minnesota and
Ohio State, 10 each.
Temperament as Affecting Philosophic Thought: BROTHER CHRYS-
OSTOM.
It is impossible either to understand the great philosophers or
to appreciate their influence if we limit ourselves to a purely scien-
tific standpoint. Temperament enters so largely as a factor both
in determining the principles on which they lay special stress and in
gaining disciples for their respective schools, that we are forced to
consider them also from a literary view-point if we would do them
justice. The ingredients that form temperament may be arranged
under the following heads: (1) Heredity, which is especially helpful
in tracing tendencies favoring the pursuit of the concrete; (2)
environment, which is closely interwoven with heredity and may be
called a condition of its development as a factor in mental life;
(3) race and nationality. No Frenchman will treat a subject in
the same manner as a German; (4) the attraction exercised by the
first philosopher who interests a thinker; (5) the time or epoch in
which the philosopher lived ; for history is governed to a great extent
by the law of reaction and adjustment, which results in the forma-
tion of cycles of thought; (6) the personality of the founder. This
leads him to lay emphasis upon certain phases of truth to the neglect
of others. To estimate his influence we must attend to the elements
of truth contained in his system of thought.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 21
Are Mental Processes in Space f W. P. MONTAGUE.
The speaker protested first against the current paradoxical view
of mental processes as real occurrences that occur nowhere. They
should be located in space for the following reasons: (1) They are
naturally felt to be within the body; (2) they form no exception to
the generally accepted rule that an invisible event, such as an electric
current, is to be located in the visible object that directly conditions
it; (3) their phenomenal existence in space (like their existence in
time) is not in conflict with the transcendental view that space and
time are appearances; (4) that they are neither punctiform nor
figured is no argument against their location in space, for many
things notably, sounds and odors are definitely located in space
without being regarded as either punctiform or figured; (5) the ob-
jection that there is no room in space for anything but matter and
motion, and that thoughts and feelings if they were -really in the
brain would have to be regarded as visible substances between or
alongside of the brain molecules, is invalid, for it disregards the fact
that sensations are intensive and not extensive, and that they must,
therefore, occupy space in the same way as other intensities, such as
stresses, velocities and accelerations, which exist in space along with
their matter and not alongside of it.
The last part of the paper explained and defended the hypothesis
that mental states are the modes of potential energy (expressible in
terms of the higher derivatives of space with regard to time) into
which the kinetic energy of the nerve currents must be transformed
in order to be redirected. The theory, if true, would justify the
belief in interaction without violating the parallelists ' contention
that the spatial can only be causally related to what is in space.
E. S. WOODWORTH,
Secretary.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Das Farl>enempfind.uiigssystem der Hellenen. W. SCHULTZ. Leipzig:
J. A. Earth. 1904. Pp. 227; 3 colored tables.
This book returns to the old subject, discussed several decades ago by
Gladstone, Geiger, Magnus and their opponents, of the color sense of the
Greeks as revealed in their use of color names. The author, primarily a
philologist, has informed himself regarding the psychology of color, and
stands in this respect on a distinctly higher level than his predecessors.
His studies lead him also to quite a different conclusion from the famous
one of Geiger and Magnus, for whereas the older authors hold that the
Greeks, at the dawn of their history, sensed red and yellow only, and only
slowly developed a sense for green and blue, Schultz rejects the notion of
such a development, since he finds the same looseness of color naming to
22
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
obtain from the earliest writers to the latest. He reaches, however, the
scarcely less startling conclusion that the Greeks were as a race color-
blind, and yellow-blue blind at that.
The author seeks first of all to establish general criteria for inferring
sensory defects from looseness of nomenclature. Where a color name is
primarily the name of an object which itself presents different colors
such as the apple an apparent confusion in the use of the name is no
proof of true sensory confusion. Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish
between the range of application of the name (its ' Spielbereich ')> and a
genuine manifoldness of usage (' Vieldeutigkeit '). To include under one
name colors that shade into each other, such as green and blue, is no proof
of sensory confusion ; but to include discontinuous colors is proof. [Even
this refined criterion is not above criticism, since, as Myers 1 has shown
for present-day Scots, as well as for various primitive peoples, and Cham-
berlain 2 for North American Indians, the same word may be applied to
discontinuous tastes, sour and bitter, or salt and bitter, though it is very
unlikely that these races lack any of the four primary taste sensations.
A continuity may indeed be felt between sour and bitter, or between salt
and bitter, but it is of an emotional rather than of a purely sensory char-
acter. It is a mistake to suppose that people who have not made a psy-
chological analysis of sensations should use sense names to denote purely
sensory qualities, or that the continuity which they feel between their
different applications of the same name should necessarily be a purely
sensory continuity.]
The author proceeds (pp. 16-82) to examine the usage of 51 color names.
In distinction from his predecessors, he lays comparatively little stress
on citations from the poets, believing that prose writers, and especially
scientific writers, furnish the more exact and literal sense. He makes
use especially of Aristotle and his commentators, of Plato, Theophrastus,
Democritus, Galen and the lexicographers. Of the 51 color names, 19
showed two or more discontinuous meanings, and of these 8 are strictly
abstract names, not naming the color by reference to any object; they
include the common names for red, yellow, green, blue and violet. From
these linguistic facts, the author believes it possible (p. 94) to infer that
the Greek color sense was deficient in comparison with what we know as
the normal. Incidentally he asserts that no similar conclusion can be
drawn from the Latin.
Although the linguistic material shows the color sense of the Greeks
to have been abnormal, it does not, alone, permit an exact diagnosis of
the abnormality. The author, therefore, turns to other sources of in-
formation. The descriptions of the rainbow by Xenophanes, Anaximenes,
Aristotle, Metrodorus and Posidonius are utilized; most of these do not
give a detailed description, but Aristotle and Posidonius seem to aim at
completeness. Aristotle's description is correct, but that of Posidonius
1 ' The Taste-Names of Primitive Peoples,' British Journal of Psychology,
Vol. I., p. 117.
2 ' Primitive Taste Words,' American Journal of Psychology, Vol. XIV.,
p. 410.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 23
appears to err in the order of the colors, by interchanging green and violet.
Aristotle's account of after-images is also considered, and his curious state-
ment is pointed out that the after-image has the same color as the original
light, for which Aristotle gives the examples of white and green lights.
Next, the author turns to the detailed accounts of simple and mixed colors
given by Plato and Democritus. It is argued that Democritus would be
likely to base his statements on experiment, but when the Democritean
components for a given color are mixed, the result is often quite different
from that color. It would appear that Democritus was color-blind; and
the same would apply to Plato but for the doubt whether Plato would
experiment. A colored table shows the striking discrepancies between the
Democritean results of color mixture and the normal results.
A start is also made towards an archeological study of the Greek color
sense as revealed in their paintings. Only one example was available,
and that in a lithographed reproduction, of which a copy is inserted a
fresco unearthed at Eleusis, representing Zeus wearing a violet robe, on
which, however, there are green streaks, and resting his feet on a wooden
stool, the top of which is, however, green. The author concludes (p. 149)
that the painter, and also those who accepted the painting and who enjoyed
it, were unable to distinguish green from violet and from wood-color. As
regards all but the painter himself, however, it should be noted (p. 192)
that our author showed the picture to about 100 persons, only one of
whom spontaneously noticed anything wrong in the coloring.
After a chapter devoted to the description of different types of color-
blindness, the author proceeds to a diagnosis of the Greek color-sense.
He decides that the most striking confusion is between greens and violets,
as seen in the painting of Zeus, in Posidonius's description of the rainbow,
in one of Democritus's false mixtures, and in the interchangeable use of
words for green and violet. As these are confusion colors in blue-yellow
blindness, he diagnoses the Greek anomaly in that way; and finds his
diagnosis confirmed by the lack of definite, unequivocal terms for yellow
and blue in the language (for xuavoov he decides to have meant a luminous
black, with which blue was confounded; av06\> meant orange rather than
yellow, while d)%pov covered the whole range from red through yellow to
green). In an appendix, he seeks to meet objections raised on the score
of probability by pointing out that every people is in part color-blind,
i. e., contains color-blind individuals and strains; the Greeks may have
had so large a proportion of the color-blind as to determine the language
of color.
If, however, the author's argumentation is critically examined, it falls
of its own weight. It proves too much. Bather arbitrarily, in making
his diagnosis, he has emphasized one class of confusions (green-violet),
to the neglect of others which he had established fully as well. This will
be seen from the list of color names on which he bases his linguistic proof
of abnormality, with their proper and anomalous uses :
, properly red; also green.
properly orange, yellow, or ~brown; also green.
red, orange, yellow, green.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
, properly yellowish green; also green, brown,
oy, properly light blue, green; also red.
xuavouv, blue and black.
dAoi>py$, properly violet; also green.
yXa.ux.6v, red, orange, green, blue.
From this list it will be seen that green is not confused with violet
only, but often with red, and also with orange, yellow and blue, in fact,
with every color of the spectrum. Red is confused with orange, yellow,
green and blue; yellow with red, orange, green and blue; and blue with
red, orange, green and black. All in all, it would seem that no two colors
were clearly distinguished, and the proper diagnosis would be total color-
blindness. About the same thing can be said of the color mixtures of
Democritus : some are correct, some show yellow-blue blindness, but others
red-green blindness. Probably the correct diagnosis in his case is that
he was not experimenting after all, but speculating, as Aristotle was
when he derived all the colors from a mixture of black and white.
Aristotle's after-image statement would seem to show that the negative
after-image of any color since white and green are simply examples
appeared to him like the original; therefore he was unable to distinguish
any color from its complementary, and was totally color-blind. Even the
painter of the Eleusinian Zeus confused green not only with violet (yellow-
blue blindness), but also with the brown of wood (red-green blindness).
For a people who developed a large color vocabulary, and used it in the
main with little evident confusion, the diagnosis of total color-blindness
would be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument; yet that was what the
author's evidence led him to, if taken in all seriousness, rather than to his
comparatively weak-kneed diagnosis of yellow-blue blindness.
Evidence which, taken at its face value, leads to an absurd conclusion
must be worth less than at first appears. In fact, a rereading of the
author's work shows a possible escape from nearly every piece of evidence
presented. If Democritus did not base his statements on experiment; if
Posidonius, in asserting the rainbow to contain ' first, red ; second, purple
and violet; third, blue and green,' was thinking of some other than the
spatial order of the colors; if the lining of Zeus's robe, in the Eleusinian
painting, was intended to be green then nearly all but the linguistic
evidence would disappear. The confusions in color names are scarcely
better established. Thus ipoOpov is used so consistently to mean red
as to leave our author no doubt of its proper application; but he finds
Theophrastus, in speaking of a group of red flowers, describing one as
IfX^wporepov, ' more tinged with green,' than another ; still, a red corolla
may have green streaks on it. %av06v had apparently a wide range of
application, running from red to greenish yellow; the author asserts, how-
ever, without of course being able to present his evidence for this uni-
versal negative, that it never meant pure yellow; so that as orange and
as yellowish green it would have discontinuous applications. Practically
the same applies to a>%p6v ; it should be said that the equation av#ov =
d)%p6v = %Xwp6v seems to be founded only on the late lexicographer
Hesychius. %Xwp6v clearly meant a yellowish green; difficulty arises
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 25
from its occasional application to such things as blood, roses and the
nightingale, but the other meaning * fresh ' may perhaps explain these
cases. For gapo-nov the different meanings are only very indirectly estab-
lished. aXoopYls usually meant violet, and the meaning green is only
got from Posidonius's description of the rainbow, discussed above. Our
old friend ^auxov is shamefully treated; first it is denied its traditional
meaning of bright or light (as in fXaux&Kis AOujvr) ), and compelled to do
duty as a color name; then it is caught referring to objects of several
different colors, and so overwhelmed with confusion. On the whole, there
are very few of the instances quoted for which a plausible explanation
does not readily occur to mind. And there is one general consideration
that should be borne in mind: here and there an author may indeed have
been color-blind. Out of 70 authors cited, probably some two or three
were red-green blind, provided this defect were as prevalent among the
Greeks as among modern Europeans. But as for showing that the Greeks
as a race were defective in the color sense, the evidence adduced amounts
to practically nothing. The close relation between xvavouv (blue) and
black is, indeed, curious, but it is of common occurrence in the speech
of other peoples, who, on being tested, are found not to be yellow-blue
blind, nor specially defective in the perception of blue.
K. S. WOODWORTH.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
Ueber die Erzeugung physiJcalischer Kombinationstone mittels des Sten-
tortelephons. KARL L. SCHAEFER. Annalen der Physik, Bd. 17,
1905. Pp. 572-583.
This paper is of interest to psychologists by reason of certain tech-
nical suggestions. Schaefer finds that various pairs of tuning-forks
sounding in front of a Stentormikrophon are reproduced with great dis-
tinctness in a telephone that may be in a distant room, and that the first
and sometimes the second difference-tone are actually emitted from the
transmitter, and so strongly as to excite resonators or even tuning-forks
of the corresponding vibration rates. An objective summation-tone
coming from the telephone was also in several cases demonstrated. It
seems certain that these difference- and summation-tones are produced
by the telephone diaphragm and not by the microphone, and Schaefer
suggests that, in spite of numerous adverse criticisms, Helmholtz may
have been right in supposing that ' subjective ' difference-tones and com-
bination-tones originate in the ear-drum, which is in many respects
similar to the diaphragm of a telephone.
E. B. HOLT.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
Eine virtuelle stereoskopische Tduschung. PAUL CZERMAK. Zeitschrift
fur den physikalischen und chemischen Unterricht, XVII., Jahrgang.
S. 341.
After briefly reviewing the optical illusions described by Koget, Pla-
teau, Faraday and Emsmann, the author described a new illusion that
&*,>' .^^: : ^^ t i&^^!^^i^M^.. ;.-U$3&&fe,J
26
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
depends on the same principles as the illusions of Plateau and Faraday;
and that is specially adapted to demonstration before large classes. Two
polished rods are fixed vertically on a disk that rotates in a horizontal
plane, and at different distances from the center of the disk. The rota-
tion produces (by virtue of after-images) the appearance of two concen-
tric, shimmering cylinders, of which the smaller is generated by the rod
that is nearer the center of rotation. Within this inner cylinder there
appear two dark vertical rods that seem to be at rest as long as the rate
of rotation is kept constant, but to move if the rate is varied. The width
of the two rods is not the same. Their appearance is due only to the
persistence of after-images and the momentary concealment of one rod
by the other as the disk rotates; their apparent position within the inner
cylinder is a true stereoscopic phenomenon. The appearance of the rods
rests on precisely the same principles as those of what has sometimes
been called the Miinsterberg-Jastrow illusion; and like this latter, Czer-
mak's illusion can be photographed. The author describes mathematically
the position and number of the rods seen, together with several interesting
complications that may be introduced by the use of several rods, etc.
E. B. HOLT.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. November, 1905. Les lois de la solidar-
ite morale (pp. 441-471) : G. RICHARD. - Solidarity is implied in the con-
cept of moral value. The moral life is a collective effort to save society
from dissolution. In this effort society exaggerates its own type and so
makes individuals in so far automatic, with the result that when new con-
ditions arise criminality develops. Criminality is the result of weakened
automatic sociality. Les abstraits emotionelles (pp. 472-485) : L. DUGAS.
- Feelings are not generalized by ' fusion.' Two types are distinguished :
emotional abstractions, which are generalizations resulting from the
grouping of various objects around a feeling-quality; and abstract emo-
tions, which are names for the laws binding together experiences. As
interest directs our acts, so the framework of these act-series is an abstract
feeling. The abstraction of feelings explains that of ' ideas.' La
moralite de I'art (pp. 486-510) : P. GAULTIER. - Art is neither moral nor
immoral, but amoral. It is not limited to the representation of ethical
objects, but only to that of enjoyable ones. In such objects sensuous
enjoyment appears, but only as one of many types. The esthetic and the
ethical attitudes show structural similarities in that each subordinates
desires to an end. This may account for the uplifting, quasi-moral effect
of art. Yet art has no moral mission. Revue generate: Le materialisme
historique et son evolution: C. G. PICAVET. -A criticism of the works of
Marx and Engels. The development of Marxism under Engels was away
from dogmatism. Engels recognized finally the weaknesses in the material-
istic view of history, and modern Marxists throw off the Hegelian scheme
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 27
entirely, regarding the economic view as simply a ' canon of historical
interpretation.' Analysis et comptes rendus: Gustave le Bon, U evolu-
tion de la matiere: JULES SAGERET. Paul Sollier, Le mecanisme des
emotions: JANKELEVITCH. J. Grasset, Les centres nerveux: JANKELEVITCH.
Ossip-Lourie, La psychologie des romanciers russes du XIX, siecle: L.
ARREAT. A. Michotte, Les signes regionaux: B. BOURDON. Wallin,
Optical Illusions: B. B. Revue des periodiques etrangers.
Del Vecchio, Giorgio. I presupposti filosoftci della nozione del diritto.
Bologna: Zanichelli. 1905.
Guastella, Cosmo. Saggi sulla teoria della conoscenza. Palermo: San-
dron. 1905.
Raich, Maira. Fichte seine Ethik und seine Stellung zum Problem des
Individualismus. Tubingen: Mohr. 1905. 4 M.
Schmid, Bastian. Philosophisches Lesebuch. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
1905. 3.40 M.
NOTES AND NEWS
DR. WENDELL T. BUSH, lecturer in philosophy at Columbia University,
has been associated in the editorial management of this JOURNAL. Com-
munications may be addressed to him at the office of the JOURNAL, Sub-
Station 84, New York City.
1 IN accordance with announcements already made, the American Philo-
sophical Association and the American Psychological Association met on
invitation of the department of philosophy of Harvard University, in
Cambridge, December 27-29, 1905. Addresses were made by the retiring
presidents, Professor Dewey addressing the Philosophical Association on
1 Beliefs and Realities,' and Professor Calkins the Psychological Associa-
tion on 'A Reconciliation of Structural and Functional Psychology.' The
meetings were well attended, and the discussions particularly active and
interesting. Members of both associations enjoyed a most generous
hospitality extended to them by the members of the department of phi-
losophy of Harvard University and by the Harvard Corporation. Officers
for the ensuing year were elected as follows : For the Philosophical Asso-
ciation President, Professor William James, of Harvard University;
Vice-president, Ernst Albee, of Cornell University; Secretary-treasurer,
Professor J. G. Hibben, of Princeton University; new members of the
Executive Committee, Professor A. K. Rogers, of Butler College, and Pro-
fessor Frank Thilly, of Princeton University. For the Psychological
Association President, Professor J. R. Angell, of the University of Chi-
cago; Secretary-treasurer, Mr. W. H. Davis, of Lehigh University; new
members of the Council, Professor Mary W. Calkins, of Wellesley College,
and Professor C. E. Seashore, of the University of Iowa. A detailed
report of the meetings may be expected in subsequent numbers of this
JOURNAL.
28
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
IN the AstropTiysical Journal for October Mr. F. R. Moulton, of the
University of Chicago, brings forward a new theory to account for the
evolution of the solar system. Mr. Moulton and Professor T. C. Cham-
berlin have studied the theory of Laplace from the dynamical standpoint,
and the many contradictions which they have found lead them to reject
it. In the new theory a spiral nebula is assumed, containing primitive
nuclei about which the planets and their satellites subsequently formed.
We may account for the original spiral nebula by assuming a star to
approach the sun, producing tides in the sun's matter, and the continua-
tion of these tides might cause large masses to be ejected and drawn
into a spiral. A work soon to be published promises a fuller statement
of the hypothesis.
IN a review in Nature of Duhem's l Les Origines de la Statique ' occur
the following suggestive comments : " The main result and this is estab-
lished beyond all reasonable doubt is that the mechanics of the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries must not be regarded as a sudden achievement
but as a development of ideas current in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries, many of which were unscrupulously reproduced without ac-
knowledgment. . . . And although this conclusion may somewhat dim
our mental picture of the Renascence, it will deepen out piety towards
those obscuri viri who cultivated science and learning when they were
most in danger of extinction."
THE Philosophical Society of the Ohio State University announces the
following calendar for the winter of 1905-06: Tuesday, October 17,
president's address ; Tuesday, November 14, ' The Value for Consciousness
of Bodily Reactions,' Burtis Burr Breese ; Tuesday, January 9, ( The Non-
Euclidean Contribution to Philosophy,' George Bruce Halstead; Tuesday,
February 13, ' The Conservation of Energy,' William Henry Scott ; Tues-
day, March 13, ' Recent Studies in Heredity,' Edward Loranus Rice ;
Tuesday, April 10, ' Religion in Education,' William Oxley Thompson.
The officers of the society are A. E. Davies, president; D. R. Major, vice-
president; F. L. Landacre, secretary; J. E. Hagerty, treasurer.
AT the last meeting of the Board of Regents of the University of Mich-
igan President Angell reported the receipt of a gift of $450 for the Uni-
versity from Mrs. George S. Morris, of Ann Arbor. Of this amount
$350 is to establish a fellowship in philosophy bearing the name of the
late George S. Morris. Professor Morris was a member of the depart-
ment of philosophy in the University from 1881 until his death in 1889,
and professor of modern languages and literature nearly all of the pre-
ceding decade.
MR. JAMES CARLETON BELL, Ph.D. (Harvard), for one year a student
in the Leipzig psychology laboratory, has been appointed instructor in
experimental psychology at Wellesley College. With Dr. Gamble, asso-
ciate professor in psychology, Dr. Bell directs the research work and
superintends the second year training course in laboratory psychology.
VOL. III. No. 2. JANUARY 18, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE NATURE OF FEELING
OEC. 1. Dr. James Ward in his Encyclopedia Britannica article
^ has called attention to four distinctly different meanings given
to the term ' feeling, ' it being employed as the .equivalent of touch, of
the organic sensations, of the emotions and of pleasure-pain. To this
list I would add the use of the word to express what Ward would
call mere presentation itself, i. e., mere cases of psychic emphasis
according to my terminology, cases of mere emphatic experience
as such, which for the sake of brevity I shall usually speak of in
what follows as mere experience. It is thus, for instance, that Pro-
fessor James uses the word in his 'Psychology' where, 2 in searching
for 'some general term by which to designate all states of conscious-
ness merely as such,' he states his partiality for either 'feeling or
thought'; and where again 3 he speaks of 'feelings of relation,' and
tells us ' we ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of */, . . . quite
as readily as we say a feeling of Hue or a feeling of cold.'
The fact that this word 'feeling' is thus employed would in itself
make our problem sufficiently troublesome, but an indefinite con-
fusion is added when we find writers using the term in different
senses at different times, and without adequate warning to the
student.
I have just quoted Professor James's usage of 'feeling' in his
'Psychology' as the equivalent of mere emphatic experience as such;
but surely this is not what he means by ' feeling ' in his ' Varieties of
Religious Experience,' 4 where he tells us that 'in religion feeling is
deeper than intellect.'
1 Paper read before the American Psychological Association at its four-
teenth annual meeting, at Cambridge, December, 1905.
2 Vol. I., pp. 185 and 186.
3 Ibid., pp. 245 and 246.
* Chapter XVIII., and Index reference.
29
30
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Nor does Professor James stand alone in this rather, reckless
use of the term; a large proportion of our best psychologists must
also plead guilty to the same indictment. To take a late instance :
in the thirteenth chapter of his excellent 'Psychology/ Professor
Angell uses the word feeling, as he says (p. 257), 'to designate
in a general way those processes which represent and express
the tone of our consciousness.' He does not give us any specific
definition of the word tone, but he leaves us in no doubt by the
context that he means by it the pleasure-pain aspect of our presen-
tations. Yet he at once adopts the word affection as a synonym
of feeling, and the word affection certainly has an emotional
twang. Beyond this, while he happily separates his treatment of
feeling as pleasure-pain as widely as possible from his treatment
of the emotions, nevertheless we find in these later pages many ex-
pressions which seem to indicate that emotion and feeling are
identifiable: as, for instance (p. 327), 'the peculiar feeling which
marks each emotion off from other emotions is primarily due to the
different reactions which various objects call forth'; (p. 337) 'when
we speak of sympathy we sometimes mean to indicate a definite
feeling which has many characteristics of emotion,' 'the moral feel-
ing of obligation or the feeling of conscience affords a further in-
stance of our emotional psychoses.' In this last case it may be
that feeling is used as the equivalent of mere experience, as it ap-
pears to be where he speaks in this connection of 'the feeling of
dependence' and of 'feelings of reverence and of faith.'
Our psychological masters having thus set the example, it is
natural to find the writers of the rising generation following them
with even less care to restrict the meaning of the word. In late
numbers of one of our psychological journals we find a serious
article concerning feeling, in the body of which we find feeling
identified with affection, emotion, 5 and passion ; 6 again, with pleasure
and pain; 7 and again, with mere experience, in such expressions as
'I feel a conscious restraint,' 8 'my anticipatory feelings,' 9 etc.
It seems to me that this is a favorable opportunity to enter my
vigorous protest against this nefarious practice on the part of my
fellow psychologists, and as I am calling attention to a real difficulty
I may perhaps be allowed to suggest a means of avoiding it which
Ijfind effective. It is simply this: when I mean emotion or passion
and nothing else, I use the words emotion or passion, and no.t the
5 This JOUBNAL, Vol. II., p. 618.
6 Op. cit., 646.
7 Op. cit., 647.
8 Op. cit., 647.
9 Op. cit., 648.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 31
word feeling ; when I mean pleasure-pain I use the phrase pleasure-
pain, and not feeling; when I mean mere experience, I use some
other word or phrase than feeling. When one has followed this
rule he is surprised to find how seldom he actually needs to employ
the word feeling ; when it is necessary to use it, then I find it to have
a signification which I shall attempt to explain later on. To be
sure such a procedure as I thus recommend deprives us psychologists
of a word we are all fond of, and would result in the abandonment
of many essays which in the preliminary writing would under such
a rule appear to be inconsequent and inconsistent, but in the end I
am convinced that our generous sacrifice would tend to true advance.
If I have hostile critics in this company I am going to insist that
they follow this rule in their attacks upon me, and I am convinced
that in so doing I shall be found to have spiked most of their guns.
Sec. 2. Let us now briefly consider the five usages above noted.
The common man may use feeling to refer to touch and to the
organic sensations, but the psychologist at once finds himself avoid-
ing this usage. We must agree that we shall be bound in the end
to ask how it happens that the term is thus applied by the common
man, but it is very evident that feeling itself is fuller and deeper
than any special type of the sensations.
In like manner we are bound in the end to ask how it happens
that we so often employ the term feeling when we mean to speak
of mere experience; but I do not think that any special student of
this subject will deny that there is a psychic somewhat which we
may and do designate as feeling, which is not mere experience as
such, but a very specific kind of experience, and it would thus
appear that if we are to apply the word to this very specific type
of experience we are not justified in employing it when we refer to
experience in general.
Sec. 3. Turning now to the use of the word feeling to refer to
the emotions and to pleasure-pain, it may be well to note that we
can not allow ourselves to assume any form of total or partial identi-
fication of the emotions and pleasure-pain. The emotions, one and
all, are psychic coincidents of instinctive reactions of the organism
as such ; they are a special type of what we may call instinct-experi-
ences. But certainly neither pleasure nor pain as such is the psychic
correspondent of a reaction of the whole organism upon its environ-
ment, as becomes apparent when we consider that very simple forms
of impression upon us may give us keen sensational pleasure or pain.
The most we can say is that our emotions are usually distinctly
pleasant or painful; but even to this rule there are notable excep-
tions, as in the case of the usual forms of surprise, which is clearly
32
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
an emotion, yet is one that is usually classed as indifferent. It
appears thus that in the analysis we are to make we must consider
separately the application of the term feeling to the emotions and
to pleasure-pain.
Sec. 4. That a large number of highly intelligent people habit-
ually identify feeling with their emotional experiences is clear. The
artist and critic of art for the most part use the word in this way;
for them the man who 'feels things' is one who is keenly susceptible
to nice changes of emotional reaction. But careful consideration
surely serves to show that feeling is something quite different from
emotion.
I think it will be generally agreed that what we mean by feeling
is very closely related with pleasure-pain. But if, as we have just
said, the emotions are not to be identified with, or are not developed
from, pleasure-pain, with which feeling is thus closely related, then
feeling must be in some sense broader than the emotions. Beyond
this, the emotions are reactive experiences, and as such are only very
indirectly influential in relation to the flow of thought ; while feeling
is appreciated as more than an immediate reactive experience, and
as very directly influential in relation to the flow of thought. It
is a well-recognized fact, for instance, that feeling greatly influences
belief. But it can not be said that our emotions in themselves
directly influence our beliefs; when they influence them at all they
do so indirectly through the arousal of this feeling which is liable
to appear in connection with some of them, but not with all of them.
Love, fear and anger thus indirectly influence belief, but, so far as
I can see, such emotions as surprise and ennui, for instance, do not.
So it would appear that what we mean by feeling is not emotion,
although clearly emotion is liable to carry feeling with it, if we
may so speak.
Sec. 5. When we turn to consider the identification of feeling
with pleasure-pain, we meet with questions which require more care-
ful study. Dr. James Ward speaks of pleasure and pain as 'feel-
ing proper,' and as in this position he is in accord with a large
number of eminent psychologists, one who ventures to express un-
qualified dissent from this view, as I am compelled to, can not do
so without caution, nor without acknowledging at once that the fact
that this notion is maintained by men of keen insight implies that we
find in pleasure and pain a very clear exemplification of the special
mental qualification of the state which we may properly designate
as feeling ; and this, as we shall presently show, turns out to be true.
If pleasure-pain is 'feeling proper,' then it would seem either
(1) that all the special mental forms which we naturally speak of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 33
as phases of feeling must be distinctly pleasant or painful ; or must
be summations of pleasures and pains; or else, (2) pleasure-pain
is the simplest form of feeling, and in our complex life develops
beyond this simple form into something radically different from
pleasure-pain. Let us consider each of these hypotheses as briefly
as may be.
Sec. 6. The first hypothesis need not delay us, for it is perfectly
obvious that many of the special mental forms which we commonly
speak of as feelings are neither appreciated as distinctly pleasant
nor as distinctly painful, nor even as algedonic summations ; but are
often so thoroughly lacking in pleasure or pain that they are
described as completely indifferent. Clearly the mass of the sensa-
tions of touch determined by the clothing I am now wearing can not
be claimed to be either pleasant or painful, they are entirely indif-
ferent ; the same is true of the great body of organic sensations which
I may note in attention at this moment if I choose to do so ; and it
is as certainly true of a vast proportion of the psychic items which
I have described as mere emphatic experiences as such.
And turning to the emotions with which feeling is so often identi-
fied we find the same situation, for it certainly can not be said either
that all of them are pleasant or painful, or that they always appear
as pleasure-pain summations. For, as I have already said, sur-
prise, which is clearly an emotion, is usually indifferent, so notably
indifferent, in fact, that Bain takes surprise as the best example of
what he calls * neutral excitement.'
It seems to me that we must grant that when we sift matters down
we find that what we mean by feeling is really a special form of
presentation, meaning by this term a special psychic emphasis, a
peculiar and significant mental item : and that as such it is qualified
by pleasure-pain, as all presentations or specific mental items are.
But it is just as clear that other mental items, our sensations of
taste, for instance, which are not types of feeling at all, are also
qualified by pleasure and pain : and this fact in itself suffices to prove
that feeling and pleasure-pain can not be identified.
Sec. 7. We may pass then to the consideration of the second
hypothesis, viz., that pleasure-pain is the simplest form of feeling,
and that in our complex mental life it develops into mental forms
which are radically different from itself.
This view seems to be that very generally accepted by those who
hold that in pleasure-pain we have 'feeling proper,' although they
treat the whole question with such vagueness that one can scarcely
be too confident in this regard. At all events, I am able to find no
other hypothesis to justify their position, and it is one the acceptance
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of which is not unnatural for psychologists who in their youth were
deeply influenced by the teachings of the associationists and who
thus became accustomed to treat the doctrine of mental chemistry
with more respect than was its due.
But upon careful examination we do not find this second hypoth-
esis in any measure satisfactory. Touch and the organic sensations
and the emotions, to which the term feeling is so commonly applied,
while often noticeably pleasant or painful, vary very much from
time to time in their algedonic qualification ; the self -same sensations
and emotions are sometimes pleasant and sometimes painful. And
clearly this variation of pleasure-pain qualification could not occur
without any noticeable change in the essential nature of the mental
states referred to if the pleasure or the pain were of their very
essence.
And turning, finally, to that mere emphatic experience as such
to which the term feeling is often applied, we may note, as we shall
see later, that there is some little ground for the assumption that
this mere experience is developed out of what we have a right to
call feeling. But to argue that this mere experience is developed
out of pleasure-pain as 'feeling proper' involves at the outset a
begging of the very question just here at issue, viz., whether pleasure-
pain is 'feeling proper'; in favor of which position I am unable to
discover any evidence whatever.
Feeling, as I have said, is a special presentation or mental item;
and it is to be granted that it is one in connection with which pleas-
ures and pains of marked form are commonly given, but there is no
more reason for holding that feeling is itself a pleasure-pain develop-
ment than there is for holding that presentations other than feeling,
all of which are also algedonically qualified, are developed from
pleasure-pain.
II
Sec. 8. We have thus found that we gain no satisfactory result
by an attempt to discover the essence of feeling in any one of those
special mental items to which the common man applies the term in
every-day speech. Our study of the problem, however, certainly
suggests that this feeling is distinctly noticeable in connection with
all the special mental forms we have been thus considering, and we
are naturally led, then, to ask whether there is any psychic charac-
teristic which is peculiarly marked in connection with the special
mental states to which the term feeling is so commonly applied.
Such a characteristic I find in what we call 'subjectiveness'; and
in using this word we express the fact that the mental states referred
to bear very close relation with that special presentation which we
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 35
describe as the ego of self-consciousness the empirical ego the
every-day self of the common man.
Sec. 9. Let me at first ask you to note how true it is that this
subjectiveness is involved with each of those mental items which are
commonly described as types of feeling.
We have noted that in careless speech we often identify feeling
with touch and the organic sensations. In such cases I think we
usually use the word feeling to refer to mere emphatic experience
as such, to which usage we refer below. But apart from this, touch
and the organic sensations are closely associated with the body, with
which in turn, as all recognize, the sense of subjectiveness is closely
associated. In other words, touch and the organic sensations are not
naturally considered to have any extrinsic or objective connotations,
as is the case with sensations of sight and hearing. That it is for
this reason that the common man thus applies the term feeling is
made clearer when we note that so soon as the psychologist comes to
look upon touch and the organic sensations as objective to the ego
of self-consciousness, he finds no more tendency to apply the term
feeling to them than to any other of the sensations, e. g., sight or
hearing.
Our emotions, which are so often spoken of as feelings, are
notably subjective, as involving the reaction of the whole psychic
system upon perceptual states.
The most frequently noted characteristic of our pleasures and
pains, which Ward and others speak of as 'feeling proper,' is cer-
tainly their subjective reference.
And finally when we use feeling to refer to mere emphatic ex-
perience as such when we say we feel cold, or feel despondent, for
instance we refer to what is inherently appreciated as our own,
and disconnected from the field of presentations, which are identified
with the field that is objective to the empirical ego.
Sec. 10. The thesis, then, which I present for your consideration
is this : that the experience which the psychologist properly describes
as feeling is a certain form of presentation, a certain special psychic
emphasis, which is vague and elusive in its content, but which when
more clearly defined develops into what we call the empirical ego,
or the every-day self of the uninstructed man. The 'feeling atti-
tude' is the attitude of the empirical ego not yet become explicit.
Sec. 11. It is, of course, impossible in the few moments still at
my command to present to you the full evidence favorable to this
view ; it will appear in a book I have lately finished. But the thesis
is so simple that it will be easily carried in mind, and I shall ask
those interested to note, first, that an analysis of the empirical ego
36
THE JOURNAL OF' PHILOSOPHY
and of feeling discloses the same general characteristics in each,
although these are less distinctly given in feeling, as under our
theory we should expect would be the case ; second, that, on the one
hand, the action of presentations within the field of attention in rela-
tion to feeling is found to be like that in relation to the empirical
ego ; third, that, on the other hand, the efficiency of feeling in rela-
tion to the presentations within the field of attention is markedly
similar to the efficiency of the empirical ego in relation to these same
presentations. For instance, the effect of feeling upon belief is
almost identical with the effect of the empirical ego upon belief in
states of self -consciousness. But, as under my view, feeling is less
explicit than the empirical ego we are prepared to find no evidence
of voluntary efficiency in relation to belief until the feeling develops
into the more explicit empirical ego, which is given in the field of
attention as the agent in the act of will.
Sec. 12. One point referred to above I must mention here.
Consciousness in my view is a vastly complex systematized psychic
mass, in which during our active life psychic emphases occur which
are commonly spoken of as presentations. These psychic emphases,
or presentations so called, must, of course, appear as arising out of
this complex psychic mass.
If any indefinite systematized psychic mass, narrower than the
psychic mass as a whole, can itself appear as a presentation or
psychic emphasis, we shall have in it a simulacrum of the whole
broad, systematized, psychic mass out of which our normal flow of
psychic emphases or presentations appears to arise.
But under our hypothesis feeling is just such a minor, indefinite,
systematized psychic mass which, as a whole, appears as a presen-
tation or psychic emphasis. We are, therefore, not surprised to find
that careful introspectionists, like Horwicz, for instance, have been
led to hold that in feeling we have the fundamental psychic situation
out of which all forms of psychic emphasis or presentation arise.
Sec. 13. In conclusion, I may be allowed to refer very briefly
to certain views of important psychologists of which I have not
spoken thus far.
Dr. James Ward, and in this particular he represents many
others, tells us that in his experience 'feeling intervenes between
sensory and motor presentations,' is 'a purely subjective state, at
once effect of a change in receptive consciousness, and the cause of a
change in motor consciousness, and is not in itself a presentation':
that 'feeling as such is, so to put it, matter of being rather than of
direct knowledge. ' 10
10 Encyclopedia Britannica article, p. 67.
word ' being ' ) .
(Italics mine except in case of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 37
In my view this statement is inaccurate. When I speak of feel-
ing as I have above, as a presentation of a certain form, I mean, of
course, that it is given as a presentation to the non-presentable Self.
That feeling is a presentation in this sense I do not think Dr. Ward
could deny. What Dr. Ward apparently means to indicate in the
above quotation is the fact that in states of self-conscious reflection
feeling does not appear as a presentation to the empirical ego, but
breaks away from this presentation and attaches itself firmly to the
empirical ego itself, or loses itself in the empirical ego, or appears as
absorbing the empirical ego. This is clearly in accord with my own
introspection, and it is as evidently corroborative of the thesis here
presented; for under my theory feeling is subjectiveness pure and
simple, and this means that as the empirical ego becomes explicit
feeling necessarily attaches to, or is resolved into, this empirical ego.
Sec. 14. That the doctrine of those who follow Dr. Ward has
failed to carry conviction is evidenced in the fact that some of our
ablest psychologists have in late years rejected it, and have suggested
others, which, however, appear to me to be equally unsatisfactory.
Two of these, those presented by Professor Wundt and by Professor
Royce, seem to demand our serious consideration.
Professor Wundt looks upon feeling as a complex state which
varies in three directions: (1) as to pleasure-pain; (2) as to excite-
ment-depression; (3) as to tension-relief.
Now, as we have already seen, feeling does display pleasure-pain
very markedly; but if Wundt 's position is to be defended it would
seem to be necessary to show in relation to his first 'direction' that
all pleasure-pain is feeling, and this, as we have seen, can not be
maintained. Of the second of Wundt 's 'directions/ it is to be said
that excitement-depression is a distinctly emotional series, and as
such is, as we have seen, of necessity closely bound up with the em-
pirical ego, and therefore under our view with feeling; but, as we
have already shown, in itself, as emotional, it can not be held to be
of the essence of feeling. In Wundt 's third 'direction' tension-
relief we have a series which conditions the appearance of emo-
tional states, of which we have just said all that is necessary; but
surely in tension-relief itself we have, so far as I can see, no essential
or unique qualification of feeling as such.
In turning to Professor Eoyce's theory, 11 I am inclined to apolo-
gize for the few words devoted to it. But this brevity is accounted
for partly by the limits of time at my command, partly by the fact
that what I have already said concerning Wundt 's theory applies in
part to Professor Royce 's, but mainly by the fact that Professor
Royce does not claim that his theory is more than tentative. He
11 'Outlines of Psychology,' pp. 177 and 178.
38
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
holds that 'our feelings differ from one another in at least two de-
cidedly distinct and relatively independent ways,' first, as to their
pleasantness and unpleasantness, and, second, 'as being more or less
either feelings of restlessness or feelings of quiescence. '
As to the first point, what I have said above of the relation of
feeling to pleasure-pain will suffice. As to the second point, it is to
be noted that feelings of restlessness and quiescence are special emo-
tional states (if the latter can be called a special mental state at all),
and as such are, as we have seen, not of the essence of feeling as such.
Finally, I may say a word in reference to the relation between
this thesis and esthetic theory in which I am especially interested.
We must assume, I think, that no theory will be upheld by care-
ful thinkers unless they find in their experience an explicit or
implicit corroboration of their view. The esthetic experience of an
appreciative person in the presence of a great work of art might
well be described as a resolution of consciousness into pure feeling.
As I see a great Rembrandt or hear a Beethoven symphony, I am
overwhelmed, and in retrospect find my state of mind difficult to
state in terms of normal experience. But all will agree that the
state given is one of feeling, a state of saturated feeling, one might
call it. And, as such feeling, it is given as a mental item, or ' presen-
tation/ as we say. At the same time self -consciousness seems to
disappear. In the moment of my ecstasy feeling is there, but I do
not appreciate myself as feeling. Nor does my ego appear as dis-
criminating. Beyond this the object which brings the feeling state
becomes of no importance. I care not who painted or who com-
posed, nor do I care through what means or by the emphasis of what
elements the glorious result is gained. Self-consciousness is dis-
solved away and in its place we have as a psychic emphasis that mere
psychic mass which under my view is identical with feeling, and
which is, as I hold, of the nature of the empirical ego not yet explicit.
We thus have in my view the experience upon which is based
that general movement of thought with which I may say, by the
way, I do not find myself in sympathy which from its germ in
Kant developed through Schiller, and Schelling, and Hegel, and
which looks to esthetics to the realm of beauty for a reconcilia-
tion between the outer world and inner consciousness between
nature and the self a view which finds its latest interpretation in
Miss Puffer's 'Psychology of Beauty,' where we are taught that
'the beautiful object possesses those qualities which bring the per-
sonality into a state of unity and self -completeness ' (p. 49), the
nature of beauty being ' in relation of means to an end ; the means,
the possibilities of stimulation in the motor, visual, auditory and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 39
purely ideal fields ; the end, a moment of perfection, of self-complete
unity of experience, of favorable stimulation with repose.'
HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.
NEW YORK CITY.
THE TERMS 'CONSCIOUS' AND 'CONSCIOUSNESS'
IN an early number of this JOURNAL 1 I gave a brief account of the
historical evolution of the significations of the term 'idea' in
the English language. I wish now to consider the terms 'conscious'
and ' consciousness ' ; not, however, so much with reference to their
historical development as to the different types of meaning they
represent and convey. I think this discrimination will be found not
altogether irrelevant to current problems and discussions. I take
my material again from Murray's Oxford Dictionary.
' 1. An early use emphasizes the 'con-' factor: a social fact. Con-
sciousness means joint, or mutual, awareness. 'To be a friend and
to be conscious are terms equivalent" (South, 1664). 2 While this
use is obsolete, it persists in poetic metaphor as attributed to things,
e. g., the 'conscious air,' etc. It also clearly influences the next
sense, which is,
2. That of being 'conscious to one's self: having the witness to
something within one's self. This is naturally said especially of
one's own innocence, guilt, frailties, etc., that is of personal
activities and traits, where the individual has peculiar or unique
evidence not available to others. "Being so conscious unto myself
of my great weakness" (Asher, 1620). Here is a distinctively
personal adaptation of the social, or joint, use. The agent is, so
to speak, reduplicated. In one capacity, he does certain things;
in another, he is cognizant of these goings-on. A connecting link
between 1 and 2 is found in a sense (obsolete like 1) where conscious
means 'privy to,' a cognizant accomplice of, usually, a guilty
knowledge. It is worth considering whether 'self-consciousness,'
in both the moral and the philosophic sense, does not involve this
distinction and relation between the self doing and the self reflect-
ing upon its past or future (anticipated) doings to see what sort
of an agent is implicated; and whether, in short, many of the diffi-
culties of self-consciousness as a 'subject-object' relation are not due
to a failure to keep in mind that it establishes connection between a
1 Vol. I., No. 7, p. 175.
2 1 owe to the Editor of the JOURNAL this interesting reference to Hobbes
('Leviathan,' ch. VII.) : "When two, or more, men know of one and the same
fact, they are said to be conscious of it one to another; which is as much as
to know it together." Hobbes then uses this to explicate the moral meaning of
conscience.
40
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
practical and a cognitional attitude, not between two cognitional
terms.
3. 'Conscious' is also used to discriminate a certain kind of being
or agent, one which knows what it is about, which has emotions, etc.,
e. g., a personal being or agent, as distinct from a stone or a plant.
' Consciousness' is then used as short for such a being. It denotes
all the knowledges, intentions, emotions, etc., which make up the
differential being or activity of such a being or agent. This prac-
tical and empirical reference to a specific thing is seen clearly in
sub-sense (a) where 'conscious' means intentional, purposive, and
(&) where it means undue preoccupation with what concerns, in-
vidiously, one's self (the bad sense of 'self -consciousness'). 'Con-
sciousness' thus marks off in general the difference of persons from
things, and in particular the characteristic differences between per-
sons, since each has his own emotions, informations, intentions, etc.
No technically philosophical sense is involved.
4. 'Conscious' means aware: 'consciousness,' the state of being
aware. This is a wide, colorless use ; there is no discrimination nor
implication as to contents, as to what there is awareness of, whether
mental or physical, personal or impersonal, etc.
5. The distinctively philosophical use (that defined as such in
the dictionary) appears to be a peculiar combination of 2, 3 and 4.
It is, in the words of the dictionary, "the state or faculty of being
conscious, as a condition and concomitant of all thought, feeling and
volition." The words I have italicized bring out the difference
between thoughts, etc., characterizing the peculiar quality of a spe-
cific being or agent, and something which in general lies back of
and conditions all such thoughts. Consciousness is now one with
mind, or soul, or. subject, as an underlying condition hypostasized
into a substance. This identification of 'mind' and 'consciousness'
leads to Locke's familiar doctrine (1690), "Consciousness is the
perception of what passes in one's own mind." Awareness is bor-
rowed from sense 4, but is limited to what is 'in the mind' only.
Meanwhile the 'private witness' sense of 3 more or less intentionally
colors the resultant meaning. Consciousness is distinctly 'one's
own' perception of 'one's own' mind. As a net result, we get a
private type of existence (as distinct from private cognizance) ; of
which alone one is directly or immediately aware (as distinct from
the anything and everything of 4), while, moreover, enough is re-
tained of the concreteness, the thingness, of 3 to make this a special
stuff or entity, although the specific and practical character of the
personal agent is eliminated, a 'condition' back of particular pur-
poses, emotions, etc., being substituted.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 41
6. Then we have a comparatively modern adaptation of 3, illus-
trated in a quotation from Dickens (1837) : "When the fever left
him and consciousness returned, he found," etc. The formal defini-
tion given is, "The state of being conscious regarded as the normal
condition of a healthy, waking life." (Italics naturally mine.)
The corresponding term 'conscious' is defined as "having one's
mental faculties actually in an active and waking state." (It is
interesting to note that here, too, the earliest quotation dates no
further back than 1841.)
I hardly think that any one who is aware of the ambiguous senses
in which the term consciousness is habitually used in philosophical
discussions and of the misunderstandings that result, possibly of
one's self and certainly of others, will regard the foregoing as a
merely linguistic contribution. It is no part of my present inten-
tion to note the implied philosophical bearings, save to suggest that
meaning 5 begs as many metaphysical problems as is likely ever to
be the privilege of any one word; that considerations based exclu-
sively on 4 are not likely to be conclusive against positions that have
3 especially in mind, and vice versa; and that 6 seems to give the
sense which underlies the psychological use of the term and to give
(either by itself or in connection with 3) a standpoint from which
the psychological sense can be kept free from the logical implications
of the 'awareness' problem in general, and from the metaphysics
of 5. To take the term 'by itself is perhaps more appropriate for
'structural' psychology, while to take it in connection with a person
or agent (sense 3) is appropriate for 'functional' psychology. But
in the latter case, it should be understood that ' consciousness ' means
not a stun 3 , nor an entity by itself, but is short for conscious animal
or agent, for something which is conscious.
In making these suggestions I do not mean to indicate a belief
that the different senses have no common qualities or appropriate
cross-references. On the contrary, I believe that the connection of
the logical meaning of 'awareness' with the facts involved empiric-
ally and practically in the existence of a certain sort of agent (espe-
cially as the latter, itself becomes the subject-matter of natural
science) determines one of the most real problems of present philos-
ophy. But in discussing these problems nothing but good could
come from stating explicitly the prima facie or immediate denotation
of the terms used.
JOHN DEWEY.
COLUMBIA UNIVEBSITY.
42
DISCUSSION
REJOINDER
XPERIENCE contains objects not accidentally, but essen-
tially, private, and it contains objects essentially public/
To illustrate this ' empirical, ' 'commonplace' distinction of private
from public objects Dr. Bush names my views, since he could never
have known them had I not informed him of them; and, again, the
teacher's opinions in contrast with his physical person, as he silently
faces a class. The obvious answer seems to be that opinions that
can be made known to others are but * accidentally, ' not ' essentially '
private like one's back teeth.
I objected to Dr. Bush's statement (parentheses mine) : 'the
actual test whether my visual object (i. e., a private object, for no
public object could be an hallucination) be chair (i. e., public object)
or hallucination (i. e., private object) would be to find out whether
you too see what I do (i. e., have a private object like mine.) ' But
if a private object can be public it is not 'essentially' private. And
to speak of such private objects, I urged, is to return to the con-
sciousness of an object as distinct from the object, the very distinc-
tion Dr. Bush denied. Even dreams, I said, are not essentially
private, because they can be known to others. And again, accord-
ing to Dr. Busk's account, as above quoted, our first-hand knowl-
edge is of private objects, and publicity is tested by and means a
certain character of private objects. What then becomes of the
'empirical' and 'obvious' distinction between private and public
objects, which Dr. Bush in his reply merely reasserts ?
PERCY HUGHES.
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.
THE PRIVACY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
~^\R. HUGHES may well object to my statement as thus inter-
preted. In that objection he has my heartiest support. Yet
I must acknowledge, and I do so with pleasure, that he has made
me realize that the phrase 'private object' is a more ambiguous one
than I had supposed. Let me see if I can fairly represent the
position which claims that whatever privacy may attach to con-
sciousness is a matter of accident and does not touch the nature or
constitution of psychical objects. I never meant to deny that the
consciousness of one person, his ideas, emotions and sensations are
objects in the experience of others. All social relations, probably
all moral relations, depend upon the fact that the consciousness of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 43
my fellows provides objects in my own experience and vice versa.
How absurd to say that the consciousness of the wife is not an
object in the experience of the husband a matter of his constant
and intimate concern! The ambition of young writers is to make
their thoughts public. We might fairly say that in normal life
an idea is essentially something to communicate, and that the more
publicity an idea demands and succeeds in getting, the more intense
and energetic and worth having it is. A world in which the con-
sciousness of one could not become an object in the experience of
another would be a world without the possibility of society or of
human culture. Why, then, say of consciousness that it is char-
acterized by a property of essential privacy a statement that seems
to fly in the face of any normal experience.
One can illustrate until one is tired this publicity of conscious-
ness. It does not, however, in the least contradict the fact which I
intended to indicate by using the term 'privacy.' It seems to me,
therefore, that my critic summons me to defend rather a word than
an idea. For the idea is simply that we can not look into one an-
other's minds. Empirically, at least, a stream of consciousness can
have but one owner. Could it conceivably (without resorting to
metaphysical theory) have two owners? Can your toothache con-
ceivably be my toothache? Or can your enthusiasm or regret con-
ceivably be mine in the same sense and the same way that it is
yours? Of course, we say 'your joy is my joy and your sorrow is
my sorrow,' but that is a manner of words. And, of course, one
suffering pain seeks a physician and the pain of the sufferer forth-
with becomes an object in the physician's experience, and it might
become an object in anybody's experience, while only the one per-
son in all the world can suffer this identical pain. The pain surely
presents itself as the kind of fact that only one person can experi-
ence directly and immediately; it is characterized by a property
which I have called privacy, a property which seems to characterize
the object here in question in an essential way. However many
persons make this object (the pain or any other sensation) an object
of will attitudes or of scientific curiosity, there is but one who can
experience its content in the way of direct inspection. And why?
Simply, it seems to me, because it is that kind of a fact.
But the characteristic mark of privacy in the above sense (and
I never proposed any other sense) certainly does not attach to
physical objects. There is nothing in their nature to prevent their
content being perceived immediately by as many observers as you
like. Whether or not they are ever perceived at all, they are of an
essentially public type.
44 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Perhaps I should say something in defense of my use of the word
'object.' I mean only any fact, thing, feeling or situation, any
simple portion of experience or any experience-complex to which
I can attend, of which I can say 'that thing there' or l that fact' or
' that group of facts. ' I have in mind what Professor Dewey means
when he writes 'Experience is always of thats; and the most com-
prehensive and inclusive experience of the universe which the
philosopher can obtain is the experience of a characteristic that/ 1
It may be that in the minds of many the word 'object' is so closely
associated with the word 'objective' that to talk of subjective objects
seems, to say the least, a fantastic usage. I should be surprised,
however, if any one should object to the notion of a subjective or a
psychical that. I mean, therefore, by an object simply a 'that.'
As Dr. Hughes, so far as I can see, has not yet denied to con-
sciousness the property that I intended to point out in my use of
the adjective 'private,' nor the property I intended to point out in
calling consciousness object or objects, I conclude that his criticism
is really that the word 'private' is misleading or, at the best, am-
biguous. I admit the ambiguity ; I hope, however, that my meaning
is now clear. As to the word, I care nothing for that and I will
look for a better one.
If now I try to improve upon the term 'essentially private object'
with a view to avoiding its evident ambiguity I might say : any case
of consciousness is a that or a group of thats of such a nature that
their content can be immediately experienced by only one. Of
course this one, when it forms an item in the experience, is another
'that.'
I must beg not to be understood as claiming that the above defini-
tion is either helpful as leading to inferences or new observations,
or would be maintained in any final statement about reality. To
return to my first example, the chair on the opposite side of the
room. Whatever the chair may be from a final and absolute point
of view, that chair is empirically a chair, made of wood, manufac-
tured at Grand Rapids, Michigan, shipped to New York and pur-
chased by me. So far as its nature is concerned, anybody else
might have purchased it. It is a public object, not metaphysically
and ultimately perhaps, but empirically. But the sensations I
have when I sit in it, my recollection of how it looked in the
store where I bought it, my intentions with regard to it, can not
be shipped in a freight-car and delivered by a van at my door,
while I, perhaps, am asleep. With logical implications or meta-
JOURNAL, Vol. II., p. 398.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 45
physical consequences, I am wholly unconcerned here. 2 I seek only
to give an empirically accurate description of a type of experience.
The chair is in the first place a public object. What it is in the
second place, I do not know yet. And if some one say this is indeed
so obvious and commonplace as to be not worth mentioning, I reply
that it may indeed be so. But an important principle is involved.
We can not expect to have much success in saying what experience
is in the second place until we have taken pains to say what specific
experiences are in the first place. We must describe specific ex-
periences, and specific types of experience without regard to meta-
physical consequences, and take our chances as regards philosophical
results. And I certainly do not deny that in the relation of the
object which I popularly call myself to other objects, both public
and private, we have the logical and metaphysical problem par
excellence.
In closing may I beg the readers of this JOURNAL not to believe
that I claim any originality for the opinions I have sought to defend ?
The criterion of 'privacy' I take directly from Professor Royce and
Professor Miinsterberg. The idea that the entire content of experi-
ence is object, I got, I think, from a paper by Dr. Miller in the
Psychological Review.
WENDELL T. BUSH.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
DR. BAIRD'S CRITICISM OF THE IOWA STUDIES IN
PSYCHOLOGY
DR. BAIRD'S review of my paper in the University of Iowa
Studies in Psychology 1 seems to be seriously misleading.
My article describes 'A Case of Vision Acquired in Adult Life.'
The reviewer persistently attacks the incompleteness of the study,
but fails to mention that I expressly state it to be 'a brief pre-
liminary report.' And I add, " Unfortunately, as yet there has
not been time to prepare the group of normal records for com-
parison, so that the conclusions expressed in this paper must be
largely tentative in nature." In regard to omissions, it should
be further stated that Dr. Baird completely overlooks two sum-
marized conclusions in the paper which were most important. The
irradiation illusion was found to be reversed and color vision was
abnormally keen. The reversal of irradiation I have been able to
2 To be sure, in my first discussion of this subject (this JOURNAL, Vol. II.,
No. 21), I was interested in seeing how the definition bore upon a metaphysical
problem, but the two undertakings are wholly distinct.
ir This JOUENAL, Vol. II., No. 25.
46 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
demonstrate again recently in another case of congenital blindness
shortly after the operation for cataract.
Misrepresentation becomes more direct when he takes the 'hap-
hazard' nature of my tests on passive touch as an illustration of lack
of accurate and quantitative tests in the other sensory fields. He
neglects to give the reason why the tests on passive touch were not
made more systematically. Miss W. showed 'no peculiar sensitivity'
here. We, of course, had no reason to suppose that she would be
different from other trained blind people. Time was too precious to
waste on unnecessary tests. The reviewer describes a test for active
touch (omitting the vital part of the description so far as method
and accuracy are concerned) and says such a test is 'unmeaning as
it stands.' (Yes, as Dr. Baird states it.) As described in my
paper, however, the test was to tell under how many sheets of paper
of specified texture and thickness the position of a piece of wire of
specified size, which was laid horizontally or vertically on a piece of
glass, could be distinguished. I believe that it is the best test for
active touch that has been devised. Dr. Baird is amused by the
statement that Miss W. 's pitch discrimination was 'not unusually
keen.' Her record when tested by tuning forks was a discrimina-
tion of 8 vibrations at international a. It may be added that the
average record of 19 women students, using exactly the same method,
was 9 vibrations. 2 A discrimination of .3 vibrations, which Dr.
Baird claims to be 'normal,' is certainly not confirmed in this
laboratory. The records here indicate that that degree of keenness
does not occur more than once in a hundred subjects. Besides the
tests on touch and hearing, he gives no other instances of ' haphazard
and inaccurate' work, unless it be an experiment devised to show
that Miss W. had acquired single binocular vision. The test con-
sisted in judging when two balls were 'at the same distance' from
the subject. By focusing both eyes together, instead of using one
alone, her accuracy doubled. The reviewer says, "It seems unfor-
tunate that Dr. Miner does not take the reader into his confidence at
least to the extent of stating the size of the balls and the absolute
distances at which they were suspended." These two facts have little
bearing upon the characteristic demonstrated, namely, the change
in her accuracy. So far as he is concerned, Dr. Baird admits that
'what this experiment is intended to demonstrate is not clear,' but
he criticizes the result without understanding the purpose of the
experiment. Finally, the reviewer misrepresents even the condition
of Miss W. 's eyes by stating only that she had ' a ( ! ) cataract re-
moved,' whereas she had cataracts removed from both eyes.
2 University of Iowa Studies in Psychology, II., p. 56.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 47
In view of Dr. Baird's criticisms, it is perhaps necessary to ex-
plicitly state that a series of experiments on an adult is limited by
the time which the subject can give for the tests. Although Miss
W. generously gave six weeks of her time without compensation, her
frail physical condition forbade prolonged experiments. The pre-
liminary and brief report was thought advisable to draw forth sug-
gestions for further experiments which may yet be made.
JAMES BURT MINER.
THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.
La filosofia di Schopenhauer. GIUSEPPE MELLI. Firenze, 1905. Pp. 320.
This is a careful and clearly put presentation of Schopenhauer's world-
view. It obviously aims to be nothing more than just this, for it avoids
all aggressive criticism and, for the most part, detailed historical com-
parisons. Nevertheless, much is said which is the fruit of patient think-
ing; but, as this thinking falls chiefly in line with the usual interpreta-
tion of Schopenhauer, it can not be discussed without inquiring into all
Voluntarism. The following few points are those which seem to be the
most original contributions of the little volume: after admitting (p. 11)
that Schopenhauer's critique is in no sense a psychology, but rather an
intuition, the writer seeks to show that it is equally far from being a meta-
physics in the classical sense, inasmuch as the Kantian hypothesis of
Dinge an sich is abandoned for ' a system of inner meanings of phe-
nomena ' (p. 67-68). Schopenhauer has no Absolute, not even an absolute
Will; his doctrine of the will is only an analysis of immediate experience,
nothing more. In distinguishing between spiritualistic and empirical
doctrines of the will, the writer shows Schopenhauer's view to be wholly
different from either in that it regards all motion not as the effect, but
as the phenomenal aspect, of will (p. 77). Here, though, the critic agrees
too uncritically with his hero in saying that voluntary motion is the only
fact of nature which we can know through and through. It is time that
this favorite ' bluff ' be called. In the chapter on Spontaneity in Nature,
too, the usual Schopenhauerian error is repeated of confusing spontaneity
in nature with spontaneity of nature. It may well be questioned whether
all voluntaristic metaphysics does not rest upon this very confusion; all
so-called spontaneity may belie its name in so far as it may, perhaps, be
local and essentially so. We have, at all events, no good grounds for
assuming more than this, even if we do feel that spontaneity is possible.
Most unfortunate, though, is the critic's failure to clear up an ancient
difficulty in Schopenhauer's theory of conceptual knowledge; consistently
with this theory, the critic reiterates that scientists do not deal with
reality itself, but only with conceptualized nature, but he, like Schopen-
hauer, does not undertake to explain that volition itself, however much
it may be immediate in individual experiences, is, for all purposes of dis-
48
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
cussion and investigation, equally well a ' mere concept.' The futility of
ingenious intuitions appears here most glaringly. And when it is said
(p. 103 f.) that known forces and laws are mere descriptions, why must
the reader be supposed to infer that these are hence misrepresentations?
In the chapters on Platonic ideas and esthetic intuition (especially p.
155 f.) it is held that Schopenhauer solved the esthetic problem over
which Schiller and Korner could not agree. It is quite right, at least, to
say (p. 159) that Schopenhauer initiated the interpretation of esthetic
experiences now known as Einfuhlung. The ethical is the dominant ele-
ment in Schopenhauer's world-view, we are told ; ' negating will ' is itself
a positive act (p. 308), and in saying this it is probable that the critic
passes beyond Schopenhauer, of whom it is hard to say that t he kept intact
all the original ethical motives of Platonism and Kantianism' (ib.).
That he did virtually grant to will the power of self -transcendence is now
obvious, but it may be questioned whether he fully realized this. His
expounder, however, is not willing to regard him as a pessimist in any
sense of the word ; knowledge, a product of will, can control and, if neces-
sary, crush the will that creates it, which is to say that the intellectual
life in the broadest sense altruistically colored, is ( serene, unselfish,
disillusioned, fearless' (p. 320). Schopenhauer is called, in conclusion,
a classicist and not a romanticist; a classicist because he has written the
theory of an ever-living romanticism. " He has renewed for philosophy
its feeling for the marvelous . . . and has said much about life and death
that can not be denied " (ib.). Perhaps these views, too, can not be af-
firmed ; and this ought to be taken into consideration before we withdraw
Schopenhauer from the class of philosophical impressionists.
The exposition, on the whole, is admirable, particularly when viewed
as a sympathetic popular presentation of a German thinker to a large and
eager reading public such as Italy is now able to boast of.
WALTER B. PITKIN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals: A Study in Mental and Social
Evolution. FREDERICK MORGAN DAVENPORT. New York: The Mac-
millan Company. 1905. Pp. xii-f 323.
This volume is part of the present movement to understand religion
through studying it inductively. It is to be associated with the volumes
of James, Coe and Starbuck on religious matters, though the author here
is a sociologist, and not without a Spencerian vein. The preface quotes
approvingly the saying of Harnack that ' religion has its secrets, but no
mysteries.' The business of the author is to lay bare the secrets of the
old-time religious revival. The process of analysis goes on under our
eyes, critically, yet sympathetically and constructively. The material
gathered from wide sources is interesting in itself and the style is easy
and natural. One may regret that not many first-hand observations of
revivals in process are made by the author, that his material is almost
exclusively historic; still his work of interpretation is vital throughout,
there are no dead pages.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 49
The content of the book admits of a brief statement; some readers,
indeed, may find its message somewhat repetitious and long drawn-out.
The secret of the revival, as the authors discovers it, is the stirring of
man's primitive nature. His primitive nature includes such elements
as fear, joy, imitation, suggestion and imagination. The seed-thought is
the instability of the nervous system of primitive man. The revival is held
to be ' essentially a form of impulsive social action.' Illustrations of
these primitive forces are shown in the cases of revivals among Indians,
Negroes, the Scotch-Irish in Kentucky in 1800, the Scotch-Irish in
Ulster in 1859 ; also in the revivals conducted by Jonathan Edwards, John
Wesley and Nettleton, Finney and Moody. For all the results of such
revivals the passional element in man has been mainly, though not ex-
clusively, the explanation. Though not expecting the passional to be
eliminated from man's nature, the author does expect and desire the
rational to come in and control it. He holds that religion is normal
and natural, and not merely abnormal and supernatural, as revivals tend
to reveal it. " I would take straightforward issue with those who still
hold that the subconscious, the imperfectly rational, the mystically emo-
tional, in spite of all its vagaries, is, par excellence, the channel of the
inflow of divine life" (p. 279).
The good temper and constructive character of the whole is illustrated
in the final chapter on ' The New Evangelism,' the program of which the
author finds in ' the earnest preaching of great truths in their modern
light, a straightforward appeal to the intellect and conscience of men,
liberalism attuned to faith and spiritual service, a passionate devotion to
the highest ethical ideals, a social rather than an individualistic church
that shall truly set men on [at?] work for the kingdom of heaven.'
The volume may come with practical profit into the hands of students
and teachers of religion, and ministers. It will somewhat offend those
who conceive of themselves as living in the natural world and of God as
living in the supernatural world, whence upon occasion He visits men in
unusual states, while at the same time it will gratify those who in in-
creasing number hold to-day that all the world is one supernatural order
and does not become less so through man's partial success in under-
standing it. In the end we may comprehend that the so-called * natural '
is only what man can grip of the one l supernatural ' life.
There is no index, and the book with its few topics and informal pres-
entation hardly needs one. Typographical errors appear in the words
' but,' p. 181, and ' psychological,' p. 190.
H. H. HORNE.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.
L'agrandissement et la proximite apparents de la lune a I'horizon.
ED. CLAPAREDE. Extrait des Archives de Psychologic, Tome V., No.
18, October, 1905. Pp. 121-148.
The horizontal moon again, and another explanation offered for that
baffling illusion! And this time no appeal is made to the apparent form
50
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of the heavens nor to the direction of one's gaze. The essential cause of
the illusion is sought in the region of affective influences.
After a very clear and compact survey of the nine most dignified ex-
planations that, from time to time, have given temporary satisfaction,
each summary being followed by a statement of the most weighty objec-
tions to each view, the author proceeds to the statement of his own
position.
The primary fact that seems incontestible to the author is that the
moon appears nearer when at the horizon. Thus it seems to him and
to those whom he has questioned. If one sees otherwise, it is hinted that
auto-suggestion is operating in the direction of the demands of the
usual theory. Here, then, we have 'a fact that is incompatible with the
doctrine of physiological optics that the distance to which a retinal image
of a given size is projected determines the perceived size of the object.
In approaching a solution of the matter that shall resolve this last-named
incompatibility, a factor of the situation is noted which, in the author's
opinion, is an important element in the final explanation. We have a
feeling, he says, that the heavenly bodies when at the horizon are ter-
restrial objects. This feeling is most marked in the case of the moon.
When, not expecting to see the latter, the ball of light suddenly strikes
the eye from behind houses or trees, its size appears enormous. It is
then an object among objects, and we reckon with it accordingly. Once
recognize it, however, as the moon and deliberately force it back upon the
sky, and its magnitude decreases. A fact that contributes largely to the
tendency to regard the horizontal moon as a terrestrial object is that it
belongs to the ' terrestrial zone,' the zone of objects with which we
have to do.
But how may the moon appear both nearer and larger at the same
time? In particular, why should the giving of a terrestrial character
to the horizontal moon cause an apparent increase of its magnitude?
The author's reply is simple and direct. The solution of the difficulty
must be sought in the affective life of the individual. Terrestrial objects
interest us more. They are matters of our concern, for we must adjust
our conduct to them. And this interest, this concern, gets itself ex-
pressed in terms of perceived magnitude. " On the contrary, what
happens in the sky interests us but little. Having had no occasion to
adapt ourselves to objects there, we have not learned to represent to our-
selves their size. By the very fact that they cease to concern us, these
objects lose their importance for us; and this diminution of importance
is, for our perception, translated into a diminution of size."
In support of the general contention that affective states may in-
fluence spatial perceptions, the author cites the cases of children and
travelers who are prone to overestimate what most moves them. Even
the well-known ' illusion of the silk hat ' is explained on the basis that
hats are interesting objects with personal and social significance.
By this appeal to affective factors the author believes that we have
an explanation for those variable features of the illusion so hard to ex-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 51
plain on any other theory, those variations of size that appear from
day to day arid from individual to individual.
It is admitted that other than affective factors may collaborate in the
production of the illusion. But as to what these other factors may be
we are not informed.
The reviewer sympathizes strongly with any attempt to explain the
illusion of the horizontal moon in other terms than those of the perceived
form of the sky. But he finds himself quite unconvinced by the presen-
tations of this paper. To be sure, our perceptions are sometimes in-
fluenced by our feelings. The fish that we finally lose after moments
of exciting struggle is never described as diminutive. And the moose
that we fail to bring to earth possesses, we feel sure, a record head.
But just as true is the further fact that these subjective magnifications
are at once corrected when we get a calm view of the object in question,
though our enthusiastic interest in this particular object is still great.
If the fish is really caught, or the moose captured, the first exaggerated
impressions of magnitude are modified. And still our interest and our
concern may remain keen. Assuredly we often think of eminent person-
ages as large of stature, as the author reminds us. But when they are
actually present before us, do we perceive them larger than they really
are? Does the lover, when first be becomes aware of his passion, experi-
ence a marked illusion in respect to the physical size of his maid?
Moreover, the question arises whether the difference in interest with
which we regard the horizontal and the zenith moons is sufficiently great
to account for the difference in the perceived magnitudes, this difference
sometimes amounting (so it is alleged) to a fivefold or even to a tenfold
magnification of the horizontal moon. And, furthermore, it is question-
able whether the zenith moon is so far behind the horizontal moon in inter-
est as our author would have us think. In certain respects the zenith moon
is much more an object of our interest, since the various fanciful mark-
ings on its surface are usually studied at elevations where the illusion has
vanished. And if one object that such interest is by no means a true
concern, one may point to cases where perceptions of the disk high in the
heavens are made under conditions of genuine and profound concern for
the moon as a light-giving object in one's visible world of objectsi
But as great as is the difficulty in correlating the perceived differences
of size with the grades of interest bestowed upon the moon in its two
extremes of position, a yet greater difficulty remains. For if this theory
is held, it must do something more than account for that amount of
magnitude which is expressed by the difference between the horizontal
and zenith moons. This amount of difference it must indeed explain.
But the real amount to be explained is the difference between the per-
ceived disk of the horizontal moon and the magnitude that it would have
for perception if its size were determined exclusively by the factors of
retinal image and distance of projection. For manifestly the usual law
of physiological optics is here, as elsewhere, operative. And since the
horizontal moon is seen as nearer, its disk would appear smaller than
52
that of the zenith moon were the perceived size determined solely by pro-
jection factors. The influence of Claparede's affective factors must,
therefore, be great enough to advance the magnitude of the horizontal
moon from the size which its near localization would give it on the
basis of projection to the size which it actually does have for perception.
To expect this, it seems to me, is to foist upon l interest ' and { concern '
a far greater burden than they are able to carry.
The reviewer comes away from the reading of the paper with the
decided opinion that, while Claparede's factor may well be cooperative,
the chief determining conditions of the illusion are still to be sought.
The paper closes with the best bibliography of the topic known to the
reviewer. And this, together with the brief summaries at the beginning,
gives it a high value for handy reference.
A. H. PIERCE.
SMITH COLLEGE.
TJeber Urteilsgefuhle : was sie sind und was sie nicht sind. A. MEINONG.
Archiv fur die Gesammte Psychologie. August, 1905. Pp. 22-58.
The function of what Herr Meinong calls ' judgment-feelings ' is pre-
sented by him in a more or less clear manner. Taking for granted the
supposition that in an emotion of joy we have some object over which
we rejoice, Herr Meinong gives a close analysis of a given situation in
which such joy is felt. " One can not," says he, " feel any joy without
apprehending a ' something/ an object, and it is evident that such appre-
hension is an essentially intellectual operation. It is, moreover, of special
importance to determine more closely the nature of this intellectual
process. I can not apprehend an object cognitively without mentally
presenting it; on this point there is a consensus of opinion. But for this
purpose will a bare idea do? " (p. 25, 26). This is the point which Herr
Meinong proceeds to investigate and for this purpose takes as a given
situation the case of a boy rejoicing over the possession of a steam-engine.
Now it is evident that before his possession of the toy the boy may have
wished for it and thought of it, but such wishes and thoughts did not give
him the taste of real possession. On the cognitive side the joy arising
from the act of possession is due to a conviction, a judgment that the
engine is his own. This conviction, this judgment need not necessarily
be formulated or expressed. It may exist as a ' judgment-feeling.'
Now supposing the emotional state to have a content, such content
may be subject to further analysis. We can hardly represent the boy's
joy over his toy with the words, ( I rejoice over my steam-engine.' In
fact, what is usually taken as the subject of the judgment is not the sub-
ject at all. The feeling is not directed to ' 0,' but rather to the ' exist-
ence of 0,' to the fact that i exists ' or to the fact that ' has the char-
acteristic N ' and the like. We may differentiate these two moments
by naming the one. l object ' and the other ' the objective.' The ' objective '
differs from the l object ' in that it refers to existential characteristics,
functional properties, specific meanings, etc., which may reside in the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 53
object and to which the judgment-feeling is directed. If, for example, I
look upon the snow-covered street and venture the judgment, l There is
snow outside/ ' snow ' is the object of my knowledge, ' that there is snow '
its objective. 1 An emotion of the kind chosen presupposes, therefore, a
judgment-feeling directed to some objective. Herr Meinong does not
bring out the difference between object and objective as well as he might,
and one must go to his ' Ueber Annahmen ' for further light.
The latter part of his discussion is taken up with a criticism of Herr
Lipps's strictures on his views, and as I do not wish to drag the reader
through a review of a review of a review, I shall here end my interpreta-
tion of Herr Meinong and add a few comments of my own.
The conviction, the judgment-feeling of which Herr Meinong speaks,
can, I think, be analyzed still further. The point which seems to me of
interest is just wherein the vague feeling of ' desire-f or ' is different from
the stronger conviction or feeling of possession in the case taken for
illustration. How does the boy's conviction or judgment-feeling that the
toy is his own differ from his dim desire for it? It seems to me that
the difference is primarily in the state of vividness produced by the more
intense motor attitude roused in the former case, and I should suggest
the term 'judgment-attitude' for that of ' judgment-feeling.' In the
attitude excited by actual possession a series of motor adjustments is on
the point of being realized, and the feeling exists that such series can be
realized. The mere attitude of possession, the idea that the thing is one's
own, starts a series of innervations which are on the point of explication
in serial order and are accompanied by a body attitude which gives rise
to more or less dim feelings of a kind like those roused in actual serial
adjustments. The dilettante longing of a youth for the maiden of his
choice is far different in vividness and in the attitude roused from the
more intense conviction of a man who feels sure that the prize is his own.
In the former case the motor attitude which tends towards serial explica-
tion and the body feeling roused in dim form by the conviction of pos-
session (such conviction being the ' feel ' of the body attitude) are absent,
and in place may be a more or less vague wish, a pleasing picture, perhaps,
or a wishy-washy sort of body state. The reverse is the case where the
feeling of conviction is present.
It is just this judgment-feeling, this body attitude, which gives validity
to the ideation concerned, to the ' reasons ' involved. ' Bare ' ideas may
slide and slip around and still remain cold and meaningless, mere shades
of the sensations, without this attitude which gives depth and backing to
the ideas. Herr Meinong is eminently correct in enforcing the function
of the ' judgment-feeling ' in acts of judgment. Reason is by no means
as ' pure ' as some would have it. It would seem that even in the ' cool
air and dry light of reason' there is a little warmth, even if not of the
more torrid kind.
FELIX ARNOLD.
NEW YORK CITY.
1 See Meinong's ' Ueber Annahmen,' p. 153.
54
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
JOURNAL FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UNO NEUROLOGIE. Band L,
Heft 1 u. 2, 1903-4. Zur Einfuhrung in die Neue Folge unseres Journals
(pp. 1-3) : OSKAR VOGT. - This journal, formerly the Zeitschrift fur Hyp-
notismus, is now to be devoted to psychopathological problems, special
problems in clinical psychology, or matters of especial significance in any
allied field. There will thus be attempted a cross-fertilization of medical
and psychological data. Die Berechtigung der vergleichenden Psychologie
und Hire Objekte (pp. 3-10) : A. FOREL. - The natural sciences are grad-
ually becoming more exact and critical in their methods. They have also
their methods of biological experiment, which may lead to new discoveries,
while it is quite possible to experiment most carelessly and inaccurately
by formally exact methods. Plethysmographische Studien am Menschen
(pp. 10-71) : K. BRODM ANN. - Both in the sleeping and waking states occur
rhythmical variations in volume of both brain and forearm or either
which are independent of deep breathing or of any traceable external
stimulus, which are termed, after Mosso, undulations. At the transition
between sleeping and waking in either direction, and whether the transi-
tion is quiet or disturbed, the circulation tends in one subject to a series
of successive variations. The individual movements of the blood-vessels
in the single organs are independent of one another, and the vasomotor
activities in various parts of the body must be in a high degree auton-
omous. Tables descriptive of the plethysmographic curves in sleeping,
waking and transitions. Ueber den Muskeltonus, insbesondere seine Be-
ziehung zur Grosshirnrinde (pp. 72-90) : M. LEWANDOWSKY. - Refers espe-
cially to the * Alten und Neuen Untersuchungen iiber das Gehirn/ of
Hitzig, and this investigator's remarks regarding the supervention of
tonus upon injury to the cortical motor zone. The explanation given by
Hitzig for the results of Bianchi appears insufficient. Characteristic for
the symptom involved is only this: that the tension of that member
operated upon varies from the normal, and that this variation is some-
times positive, sometimes negative. What is the most satisfactory defini-
tion of tonus? Whether there is a state of tonus during rest is an ines-
sential question ; there is, in fact, no rest, but the tension is every moment
conditioned by efficient sensible stimuli.
Band L, Heft 3. Friederich Goltz (pp. 89-99) : M. LEWANDOWSKY. -
Obituary of Friederich Leopold Goltz, biographical and critical. Beispiele
phylogenetisclier Wirkungen und Rilckwirkungen bei den Instirikten und
dem Korperbau der Ameisen als Belege fur die Evolutionslehre und die
psychophysiologische Identitatslehre (pp. 99-110) : AUG. FOREL. - The
cumulative perfectibility of humanity exhibits three historic and pre-
historic stages, leading from the arithmetical to the geometrical progress
of civilization: (1) oral tradition, (2) monumental tradition, (3) written
language. Analogies of human activities in the insect kingdom, agri-
culture, slavery and lestobiosis. The machinery of life is quite unknown
and unformulable. It is entirely unjustifiable to describe as mechanical
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 55
the functionings of the insect brain. Ein Fall von hysterischem Stupor
bei einer Untersuchungsgefangenen (pp. 110-112) : G. G. JUNG. - Detailed
study of the case, which is purely hysterical in character. The principal
symptoms are inconsequent use of language, high suggestibility and sus-
ceptibility to fatigue, lack of orientation, paresthesia, and the absence of
katatonic manifestations. Clinically, the case is to be classed with
Raecke's observations, through the medium of Ganser's symptom-complex.
Kleine Beitrdge zur Neuropathologie (pp. 129-146) : H. OPPENHEIM. -
(1) Zur Differentiation der Neuritis und Neuralgic. (2) Zur Symptoma-
tologie der Paralysis agitans. (3) Bemerkungen zur Lehre von Tic.
Die moglichen Formen seelischer EinwirJcungen in ihrer drztlichen Bedeu-
tung (pp. 146-160) : OSKAR YOGT. - Part 3. C. Intellectual processes effi-
cient through their emotional tone. (1) General effects of the emotions.
(2) Intellectual processes efficient through their emotional associates.
Ueber discontinuirliche Zerfallsprocesse der peripheren Nervenfaser (pp.
169-200) : ERWIN STRANSKY. - Historical and Experimental. Hebung
epileptischer Amnesien durch Hypnose (pp. 200-225) : FRANZ EIKLIN. -
Study of cases. Amnesia is favorably affected by a proper employment
of hypnosis. Epileptic amnesias are not irreparable, but of purely func-
tional nature. Experimenteller und klinischer Beitrdge zur Psycho-
pathologie der poly neuritis chen Psychose (pp. 225-246) : K. BRODMANN. -
Study of cases. Both are Cerebropathia psychica toxemia (Korsakoff).
Characterized by grave disorientation, and disturbance of the associative
processes (to be continued). Ein spiritistisches Medium, (p. 247):
RINGIER. - Autohypnosis as. an explanation of mediumistic phenomena.
Binet, Alfred. L'ame el le corps. Paris: Flammarion. 1905. 12mo.
Pp. 288. 3.50 fr.
Boltzmann, Ludwig. Populdre Schriften. Leipzig: Barth. 1905. 8vo.
Pp. vii + 440. 8 M.
Chamberlain, H. S. Immanuel Kant. Die Personlichkeit als Einfuhrung
in das Werk. Miinchen : F. Bruckmann. 1905. 8vo. Pp. xii + 786.
12 M.
Duhem, P. Les origines de la statique. Tome I. Paris: A. Hermann.
1905. 8vo. Pp. iv + 360. 10 fr.
Freidmann, H. Ueler ein physikalisches Endlichkeitsprincip aus den
allgemeinsten Ausdruck der Naturgesetzlichkeit. Leipzig: J. G.
Kriiger. 1905. 8vo. Pp. 64. 1.80 M.
Eucken, Rudolf. Beitrdge zur Einfuhrung in die Geschichte der
Philosophic. Der 'Beitrage zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophic'
zweite umgearbeitete und erweiterte Auflage. Leipzig: Durrschen
Buchhandlung. 1906. 8vo. Pp. v + 194. 4.50 M.
Frazer, J. G. Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship. London:
The Macmillan Co. 1905. 8vo. Pp. xi + 309. 8s. 6d.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Glawe, Walter. Die Religion Freidrich 8chlegels. Ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte der Eomantik. Berlin : Trowitzsch und Sohn. 1906. Pp.
viii + 111.
Jowett. The Socratic Dialogues of Plato, with an introduction by E.
Caird. Oxford: University Press. 1905. 3s. 6d.
Mayer, Adolf. Los vom Materialismus. Bekenntnisse eines alten
Naturwissenschaf tiers. Heidelberg: Carl Winter. 1906. 8vo. Pp.
260. 5 M.
Keinke, J. Die Welt als Tat. Umrisse einer Weltansicht auf natur-
wisserschaftlicher Grundlage. Berlin: Gebriider Paetel. 1905. 8vo.
Pp. 505. 12 M.
Salvadori, Guglielmo. Das Naturrecht und der Entwicklungsgedanke.
Einlietung zu einer positiven Begrundung der Rechtsphilosophie.
Leipzig : Theodor Weicher. 1905. Pp. viii + 108.
Schmid, B. Philosophisches Leseluch. Leipzig: Teubner. 1906. 8vo.
Pp. viii + 166. 2.60 M.
Sollier. Le mechanisme des emotions. Paris : Felix Alcan. 1905.
Wasemann, E. Comparative Studies in the Psychology of Ants and of the
Higher Animals. 8vo. London: Sands. 4s. 6d.
NOTES AND NEWS
PROFESSOR H. K. WOLFE, formerly professor of psychology in the
University of Nebraska, has been appointed to a new chair of educational
psychology in the university. Professor Wolfe is now in the department
of philosophy in the University of Montana.
DR. J. G. FRAZER has anticipated his new edition of ' The Golden
Bough,' by publishing a series of extracts from it under the title ' Lec-
tures on the Early History of the Kingship/
THE French Association for the Advancement of Science will hold its
next meeting at Lyons from August 2 until August 7, 1906. Professor
Lippmann will be president.
DR. RICHARD HODGSON, secretary of the American Branch of the So-
ciety for Psychical Research, died suddenly at Boston on December 20.
GLASGOW UNIVERSITY will hold a memorial to Francis Hutcheson, pro-
fessor of moral philosophy in the university from 1730 to 1746, on April
18, 1906.
PROFESSOR C. H. JUDD, of Yale University, has been appointed director
of its summer school.
VOL. JII. No. 3. FEBRUARY 1, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE DEFINITION OF ' FEELING' 1
n ^HE Oxford English Dictionary groups under ten rubrics twenty
different varieties of meaning in the use of the word * feeling. '
The first meaning given is, the action denoted by the verb 'to feel/
and the verb 'to feel' has assigned to it, under sixteen rubrics, thirty-
three varieties of meaning. The variety in the shades of meaning
attached to these terms is probably much greater. Such terms are
evidently very ill adapted to form parts of the technical language of
science. Any limitation of their meaning must be arbitrary; it is
also likely to prove inconvenient.
The various meanings of the term 'feeling' seem all to be derived,
directly or indirectly, from the primary meaning of perception by
touch. To 'feel' an object is, in the first instance, to touch it or be
touched by it. 'Feeling' denotes the act or process of such percep-
tion, or, again, the capacity for it, or, finally, its 'content,' i. e., the
content of the specific present modification of the experience of the
individual percipient, as distinguished from the perceived object,
the felt quality, or thing. Closely connected with this primary
meaning is the reference of the term to all experiences which, like
those of touch proper, are brought about by the direct contact of
objects with the sensory surface of the body, but which are not
obviously assignable to any special organ. All other meanings of
the term appear to be derived from some likeness in the experience
to which it is applied to these contact experiences. Certain features
of the latter seem to be particularly operative in the derivation, e. g.,
(1) the peculiarly vivid sense in many of them of the immediate,
real presence of the object. Hence, analogically, 'feeling' denotes
any apparently unmediated conviction of a fact, truth, etc.; 2 (2)
1 Paper read before the American Psychological Association at its four-
teenth annual meeting, at Cambridge, December 27-29, 1905.
2 Cf. the case reported by d'Allones ('Role des sensation internes dans les
emotions,' etc., Revue Philosophique, December, 1905), where the patient
recognizes that the object or situation is one of affection, disgust, etc., but
complains that it does not ' touch ' her.
57
58
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the frequent indefiniteness of the perception, and (3) the active
exploration required to make it definite. The content of 'feeling' is,
for the most part, badly localized, or not at all, and its internal and
external relations are obscure. Almost any consciousness possessing
this character may be called feeling. We have a feeling, e. g., of
the void to be filled in the effort to recall a forgotten name, a feeling
of what the solution of a problem would look like, if we had it, of
the direction to be taken in getting it, etc. And along with this, in
all cases where we attempt to transform this vague consciousness
into clear consciousness, we have a feeling of our activity in this
regard akin to the experience of active exploration in touch. This
possibly is one of the motives which have brought under the term all
immediate experience of tendency, impulse and movement, as well
as of the obstruction of such tendency, impulse or movement.
But apparently the chief motive in the extension of the meaning
of this term lies (4) in the fact that experiences brought about by
direct contact usually involve a more or less clear distinction between
the modification of the body's own sensitiveness, as ways in which
we are affected, and the qualities perceived as belonging to the
impinging object, and that, in many cases, awareness of these, our
states of being, is even more prominent an aspect of the experience
than the perception of what is taken as their exciting cause. Hence
the term 'feeling' is preeminently applied to all those sensory ex-
periences bodily sensations and appetites, pleasures and pains, emo-
tions, passions, sentiments and moods, desires, convictions and re-
solves, and all kinds of appreciations which are intimately identified
with the self as its dispositions, active or passive, whether having or
not having a reference also to ' objects. ' The feeling may be a feel-
ing 'of or a feeling 'that,' a feeling 'for' or a feeling 'how': what-
ever the expression used, it seems in all cases to contain a reference
to an immediate and intimate qualification of the subject's own
sensitive awareness. Where, on the other hand, the reference to the
.object is emphasized, the consciousness, except in the special case of
touch, is designated by some other term. We do not 'feel,' we 'see'
colors and 'hear' sounds, 'taste' tastes and 'smell' smells. Yet
formerly tastes and smells were 'felt,' and are so in dialect still; 3
and we may clearly have a 'feeling' for colors and perspective, and
may 'feel' the sound which is a buzzing in our ears. The distinctions
are sufficiently significant.
Now I do not see why, without prejudice to any of the problems
of psychological science, the term should not be used by psychologists
*E. g., ' suete spiceri to fell and smell' (c. 1300) ; 'there was no smell of
fyre felt upon them ' (Coverdale, Bible) ; ' he felt a nasty smell ' (English news-
paper, 1884). See Oxford Dictionary.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 59
with the same wide latitude of meaning which it has in common
life. The facts denoted by it would be various; various, therefore,
would have to be the description and explanation of them. But
in this regard we should be in no worse case than we now are when,
with bewildering diversity of definition, the term is variously ap-
plied, apart from its special reference to perceptions of touch, to
pleasure and pains, to emotions, to organic sensations and appetites,
or again to only one or to several of these classes, 4 or still again to
some wider class of facts or to some still more inclusive aspect of
mental life generally. Over against such diversity of usage which,
were technical precision important, would constitute a veritable
scandal in psychological nomenclature, it can not be too strongly
insisted that the facts are precisely what they are and stand in pre-
cisely the same need of careful psychological treatment, however
they may be named. Why not name the states here in question by
their specific class names, call them pleasures and pains, emotions,
appetites, etc., leaving the term 'feeling' to be freely applied, as
occasion suggests, in all the variety of untechnical meaning which
it has in common life? I can not but think that in this matter we
have been unduly influenced by the Kantian doctrine of Gefuhl and
the vicissitudes of the whole German Gefuhlslehre consequent
thereon. Our best text-books now, happily, abandon the attempt to
group the facts of the mental life under the three rubrics of cogni-
tion, feeling and will. It is to be hoped that this emancipation from
the German tradition will leave us free to apply the term 'feeling'
in a more natural, English sense, and either to abandon it as a
technical term altogether or to find for it some new definition at
once agreeable to the facts and to the genius of the language.
Two conditions seem to me indispensable for any more restricted,
yet manageable, use of the term in psychology: (1) it must denote
some particular class of facts, or some more general aspect of con-
sciousness, for which the term would be appropriate; and (2) to be
appropriate, it must not depart too widely in meaning from the
established usage. Now the most general characteristics of the
states referred to by the term in its common use appear to be, as
we have seen, intimacy and immediacy in the connection of the con-
tent with the experiencing individual. If, therefore, the term is
to be appropriately used, it must be used to designate such states
or such aspects of mental life generally as possess this intimacy and
* Frequently the term is limited by definition to pleasure and pain, but
usually the emotions and like states are included. A recent writer, seeking an
' exact ' terminology, limits it to pleasure-pain and the obscure, unlocalized
sensations of ' common feeling,' excluding the emotions, except as they contain
these (Lagerborg, 'Das Gefuhlsproblem,' p. 36, 1905).
60
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
immediacy. These qualities are, of course, preeminently character-
istic of our experience of pleasure and pain. Everybody agrees in
calling these feelings. But the qualities mentioned are not char-
acteristic of them alone, and to limit the term 'feeling' to them,
either to the concrete pleasure and pains or to the pleasant and un-
pleasant phases of these experiences, besides being arbitrary, would
be exceedingly inconvenient. 5 In this reference the question whether
there may not be other primary qualities of feeling is of secondary
importance. Nor are the marks by which it is commonly sought to
oppose these states as 'feeling' to other modes of consciousness
really determinative. They are 'subjective,' indeed, but so is every
other mode of consciousness. They inform us 'of our own internal
mental condition' (Angell), but they are not the only states in
which our mental condition is revealed to us. Besides, if feeling is
thus informatory, it can not be sharply distinguished from cognition,
unless cognition is arbitrarily limited to knowledge of external ob-
jects and relations. 6 The most thoroughgoing way of distinguishing
feeling, limited to pleasure and pain, is to deny that it can ever
be directly cognized at all (Ward). But this surely is flying
straight in the teeth of the facts. Feeling is a mode of consciousness,
and all consciousness is awareness. How could one feel pleased
without being conscious of pleasure'? And similarly of pain.
One of the most plausible definitions of feeling is given by
Royce, who defines it 7 as 'our present sensitiveness to the values of
things'; but the only values recognized under the definition are
those which experiences possess as pleasing or displeasing, as dis-
turbing or composing, and as variously combining these qualities.
These qualities may be allowed, indeed, to have unique generality
and importance, but to limit the values directly present in conscious-
ness to them seems to involve a questionable psychological theory.
Is the sense of beauty, for example, merely the feeling of a quiescent,
or acquiescent, pleasure in line, color and idea, together, let us say,
with the balance of muscular tensions involved"! Possibly; but the
opposite assumption is at least equally probable, that it is a unique
feeling into which these, and any other elements that may be dis-
covered in the experience, enter in their systematic unity. More-
over, the term 'value' in the definition is ambiguous. Everything
whatever has some value in some respect. In what respect are
the values recognized in feeling valuable? We can not answer for
Cf. Stout, 'Analytic Psychology,' I., p. 121.
' ' Cognition informs us of objects and relations external to ourselves,
whereas feeling informs us of our own internal mental conditions.' Angell,
' Psychology/ p. 257.
7 ' Outlines of Psychology,' p. 167.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 61
feeling or for the self, for the self here in question is the feeling self,
since that would involve us in an obvious circle. But, unless some
other explanation is forthcoming and I do not see what it could be
-the definition only amounts to saying that we arbitrarily choose
to call states of being pleased and displeased, restless and quiescent,
etc., states of feeling, and no others.
All such qualities as pleasantness and unpleasantness, so far as
they qualify the contents of consciousness generally, may fittingly
be called feeling tones. The emotions, on the other hand, are char-
acteristically feeling attitudes. Equally immediate and intimate,
and equally symptomatic of the condition of the experiencing indi-
vidual, are the so-called bodily sensations and appetites, such as
hunger and thirst, drowsiness and fatigue, freshness and vitality.
These, therefore, on our principle, must be reckoned among the feel-
ings. But if we include these 'sensations,' where are we to stop?
Must we not go on and include also all sensations, of every kind and
description, since these too are, in the first instance, immediate and
intimate modifications of the individual's consciousness? I think
that we must. Unless blue and green, for example, affected us as
different, how could we ever recognize and name them as such?
But the principle applies to every content of consciousness, and to
the whole 'stream of consciousness,' as immediately experienced. I
see no reason whatever why we should hesitate, as certain psychol-
ogists do, to assume feelings of relation, of contrast, of judgment,
of phantasy, etc.
From this point of view I would define 'feeling' as the im-
mediate consciousness of the modification of individual experience,
as such ; and I would define a feeling as any content of consciousness,
however constituted, regarded as the immediate present modification
of such an individual experience. What is important to distinguish
is the immediate modification of the individual's consciousness from
the functions of knowledge and action it subserves. The term
'feeling,' as thus used, denotes no class of mental facts or contents
of consciousness in particular, but refers to a general aspect of con-
sciousness. From the genetic point of view the distinction between
object and subject, which leads us to refer cognition to the objective
side of the relation and the feelings to the subjective, did not
originally exist. Instead, we have reason to assume a qualitatively
distinct manifold, related and held together in some sort of unity,
which persists amid its experienced changes ami tendencies to ehaiiue.
Such a consciousness, according to our definition, would be a wholly
feeling consciousness. As mental life develops, the functions of
monition and conation become variously modified and increasingly
important. But the functions of consciousness can never be sepa-
62 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
rated from its immediate content. Distinctions in the content are
purely distinctions of reference. The content of cognition and the
content of conation, viewed psychologically, are precisely the same
content as the content of feeling, except that in the one case it is
considered relatively to its place in the function, while in the other
it is considered as part of the immediate conscious experience of the
individual. H N GABWNEK .
SMITH COLLEGE.
"A /T~Y conception of the common element involved in the various
-*^J- applications of the term 'feeling' does not greatly differ
from Mr. Marshall's 'subjectivity.' I should define feeling as the
unanalyzed and unlocalized part of experience; meaning by un-
analyzed that which is not introspectively resolved into qualitatively
different components, and by unlocalized that which is not referred
to a definite region in space, whether on the body or beyond it. We
should further, it seems to me, distinguish between conscious proc-
esses which are not, as a matter of fact, analyzed and localized at a
given moment, and those which by their essential nature resist
analysis and localization. As an example of the former class, take
a name which one is endeavoring to recall. It hovers on the border
line of clear consciousness, but the conditions are not favorable for
its entrance into the focus of attention; it is unanalyzable at the
moment, and may be described, therefore, as a feeling; but if it
comes into clear consciousness it can be analyzed and is not a feeling,
but an idea.
Between a case of this kind and the group of mental processes
which always and through their very nature resist analysis and local-
ization there lies an intermediate group : namely, processes which are
not, under ordinary circumstances, analyzed and localized, but which
may be, under special conditions. Here I would place the character-
istic groups of organic sensations which form part of emotion, as
well as the so-called 'feeling of effort.' Ordinarily, as they occur
in our experience, these form unanalyzed masses. The reason for
this fact is, of course, that when they occur there is not only no
need to analyze them, but urgent need to analyze, or at least to
attend to, something else. The individual's mental energies are,
in emotion or mental effort, directed of necessity to something other
than his own organic processes. But the psychologist, with his
1 Discussion before the American Psychological Association at its fourteenth
annual meeting, at Cambridge, December 27-29, 1905.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 63
more or less artificial conditions, has nevertheless succeeded in
analyzing the conscious effects of these processes and localizing their
components; when he does so, they are removed from the realm of
feeling and placed in that of sensational fusion.
In the third place, the ultimately and absolutely unanalyzable and
unrealizable processes include two classes. On the one hand, there
is that group of mental facts called by Professor Calkins 'relational
elements/ some of whose members are referred to by Professor
James as 'the feeling of but,' 'the feeling of if,' and so on. The
significance of these, it appears to me, is the following. They are
remnants of remotely ancestral motor attitudes, and they resist anal-
ysis now because of their vestigial nature. Take the ' feeling of but, '
for example : the sense of the contradiction between two ideas, present
when we say 'I should like to do so and so, but here is an objection.'
If we trace this back, what can it have been originally but the ex-
perience of primitive organisms called upon by simultaneous stimuli
to make two incompatible reactions at once, and what can that ex-
perience have been but a certain suspended, baffled motor attitude?
Similarly with 'the feeling of if,' 'I should like to do so and so,
if a certain condition favors'; the primitive representative of this
must have been the experience of an animal called upon to suspend
all reaction until a definite added stimulus was given. Space for-
bids further illustration, but it seems to the present writer that
most, if not all, of the relational elements have had a similar origin.
Finally, pleasantness and unpleasantness occupy a unique position
among the unanalyzable and unrealizable processes, as representing
the most fundamental of all primitive motor attitudes, the positive
and negative reactions. It will be seen, by the way, that the
antithesis 'pleasure-pain' is incompatible with the conception of
feeling as essentially unlocalized. Pain, being localized, and in the
case of dermal pain very accurately so, should, I think, be classed as
a sensation ; the proper opposite of pleasure being the unpleasantness
which attaches to pain, as well as to many other sensations and
sensational complexes.
MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.
VASSAB COLLEGE.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
DISCUSSION
PKOFESSOR JAMES'S 'HOLE'
But continuous transition is one sort of a conjunctive relation; and to be
a radical empiricist means to hold fast to this conjunctive relation of all others,
for this is the strategic point, the position through which, if a hole be made,
all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical fictions pour into our
philosophy. ' A World of Pure Experience,' by William James, this JOURNAL,
Vol. I., p. 536.
WHEN a mind knows its own so-called 'past states,' Professor
James explains the cognitive function so involved to be one
of 'continuous transition.' When two minds 'know one thing,' he
explains the cognitive function here involved to be one of 'meeting.'
He characterizes the former as 'continuous,' as 'unbroken,' as in-
volving no ' gap. ' It performs wholly within one mind. In a word,
it is purely solipsistic. The later function, that of 'meeting,' he
describes as 'discontinuous,' as involving a 'gap' or 'break' that is
'positively experienced and noted.' It performs between minds.
In a word, it is the 'hole' that bridges his pluralism. Finally,
Professor James attempts to explain his 'meeting' in terms of his
'continuous transition.' Plainly the intelligibility of his entire
system hangs upon this upon his success in constructing his 'meet-
ing' by means of his 'continuous transition,' or in identifying them
as one and the same sort of ' hole. '
By way of examining this we first note him declaring, unequiv-
ocally, that 'consciousness' or cognition 'stands for function and
not for entity ' ; stands for the non-entitative function of ' continuous
transition.' And we next recall that Professor James, in his 'Psy-
chology,' pretty well exhausts the parliamentary stock of the English
language and much of that of several other languages, in demon-
strating that the 'addition' or 'association' or like gluing of any
sort of mental entities, in order to make of them the 'integral' and
'unbroken' unity of any mind or state of mind, is unqualifiedly
'unintelligible,' 'inadmissible,' etc.; as, for example, when Mill
'associates' entitative sensations, and Clifford 'adds' entitative
mind-stuff atoms. In short, the continuous, unbroken unity of the
mind, and this rejection of entities and of their addition, are the dis-
tinctive feature of Professor James's 'Psychology.' 'Transition' is
his function for getting rid of such entities and additions, and for
continuously preserving the mind's unity. By it alone 'the torch is
handed on,' a continuously unbroken unit. And now in his philos-
ophy it is 'to hand the torch' between units.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 65
But this ' transition, ' if it means anything at all (and I, for one,
accept it fundamentally), means that when one speaks of the 'suc-
cessive states' of any transition or of any mind, the word 'is' applies
to the present one of these states in a way it does not apply to any
others of them, or to any and all of the preceding states. Unless
this be the meaning of 'transition,' all past states must exist, if not
eternally as entities, yet for longer or shorter reaches of time, in the
manner of entities. And for Professor James to be found 'intelli-
gible,' or as he says of other writers, not to be found 'lobsided and
blowing now hot, now cold,' he must never be caught juggling with
the verb 'to be' in a way to contradict this meaning of 'transition'
or to make it thus apply to past states entitatively. When he says
any states or experiences 'go,' thereafter the words 'is' and 'exist'
must not apply to them otherwise than figuratively and fictitiously.
No metaphysical use must be made of them. Literally, they must
remain 'gone' out of existence absolutely and forever. Literally all
the 'former states' have passed by 'continuous transition' into the
one 'is' state. In this sense they no longer 'sleep undisturbed in
their past'; they have been 'disturbed' by transition into something
absolutely new which, alone of that mind, 'is/ All else of that
mind, in the sense of 'undisturbed sleep,' absolutely 'is not.'
Moreover, since Professor James is to construct his universe 'em-
pirically' or on the same plan by which he constructs each mind,
therefore all minds whatsoever that he postulates be they man
minds, monkey minds, infusoria minds, protoplasmic minds, thing
minds, ion minds, interstellar minds, vacuum minds, universal-fluid
minds, or whatever sort of mind he will explain our plenum physics
and present evolutionary science by, 'when he comes to panpsy-
cliism'm short all existence whatsoever, throughout his universe,
must be this same sort of present-tense existence that 'transition'
alone permits anywhere. His 'sheet of india-rubber' universe must
have no past-tense series. If he speak of 'the intersection of two
series' both series must ~be simultaneously. All must be one 'con-
temporaneous' is.
Anything less than this as well for his individually transitive
mind, for his 'two minds,' or for the universe would simply com-
mit Professor James to such entitative mind-stuffs and 'additions'
as he has exhausted human language in rejecting, deriding and
proving 'unintelligible.' How are we surprised, then, in turning
to his account of how two minds 'meet' and 'know one thing' to find
him explaining this by postulating that the thing does remain in its
'undisturbed sleep,' in precisely this sense that his 'continuous
transition' forbids?
66
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
After explaining how a 'pure experience,' 'the pen,' transforms
by 'continuous transition' into 'my-consciousness-of-that-pen-of-my-
youth, ' he continues :
"If this pass muster as an intelligible account of how an experi-
ence originally pure can enter into one consciousness, the next ques-
tion is as to how it might conceivably enter into two.
"Obviously no new kind of condition would have to be supplied.
All that we should have to postulate would be a second subsequent
experience [or mind] collateral and contemporary with the first
subsequent one [or mind], in which a similar act of appropriation
[or 'transition'] should occur. The two acts [or 'transitions']
would interfere neither with one another nor with the originally pure
pen. It would sleep undisturbed in its own past, no matter how
many successors went through their several appropriative acts 1 [or
' continuous transitions '] . ' '
Behold, herein, how the words I have italicized ('subsequent,'
'collateral,' 'contemporary,' 'originally,' 'sleep undisturbed,' 'suc-
cessors,' etc.) juggle with the verb 'to be' in precisely the way we
found should not be done for Professor James to remain intelligible !
Moreover, I exclaim : How are we surprised ! because, with all due
respect to Professor James, 'obviously' a 'new kind of condition'
has to be supplied, when we turn from the postulate of 'one mind'
to that of 'two minds.' Under the first, the 'pure experience,' 'the
pen,' is assumed not 'to sleep undisturbed in its own past'; while
under the second he is 'obliged' to assume and to say it ' would' so
sleep. Otherwise his explanation of how the two minds 'meet' in
it by 'continuous transition' would have no least appearance of
intelligibility.
This becomes the more apparent if we recall that Professor
James explicitly specifies a 'positive break' or 'gap' between all
minds. Any sort of transit from one waking mind to another
waking mind, therefore, must involve something fundamentally
different from his 'continuous transition' of one state into another
of the same mind. The latter is transformation, rather than transi-
tion. It is also purely solipsistic. And solipsistic transformation
is as utterly unlike transition from mind to mind across a gap as
any two occurrences possible to imagine. Whether or not 'pure
experience' may go from waking mind to waking mind, or as to how
they could be conceived to do this without involving the sort of
'additions' that he derides, Professor James, in so far as I recall,
has never given the slightest intimation. Undoubtedly he will tell
us of this, 'when he comes to panpsychism. ' Meanwhile it should
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. II., p. 179.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 67
be obvious that his 'sleep' is utterly irreconcilable with his present-
tense ' transitions '; that transition from mind to mind is something
fundamentally different from the continuous transformation of a
single mind ; and that his explanation of ' how two minds know one
thing' is both inconsistent and inadequate for these double reasons.
Of course I do not found this criticism of Professor James on the
single quotation I have given. The same juggling of the verb 'to
be' or between waking 'is' and sleeping 'is not,' runs palpably
through all his late philosophical writing. Here are further in-
stances :
In his 'paint pot' simile, the same paint, the same 'undivided
portion of experience' is made to appear now in a 'thing,' anon in
a 'thought,' then again subsequently in a 'knower,' and still again
subsequently in 'both groups simultaneously.' 2 But let the pure
experience or 'paint' be the Great Pyramid of Khufu; strive to
apply 'the same,' 'is' and 'exists' to 'it,' now in 'a thing,' now
'simultaneously' in the 'broken apart' minds of a multitude of
ancient Egyptians, and now simultaneously in a multitude of mod-
ern 'knowers'; and the juggling with 'the same' 'is' and 'exists,'
so required, becomes as vastly apparent to the careful reader as the
pyramid itself to the beholder's naked eye.
On the next page, and following, Professor James discusses 'the
one identical room' that may be 'both in outer space and in a per-
son's mind.' In the former it may have 'had that environment for
thirty years.' 'As your field of consciousness it may never have
existed till now. ' In the first ' it will take an earthquake and a cer-
tain amount of time to destroy it.' In the second, 'the closing of
your eyes will suffice.' It can be 'spoken of loosely as existing in
two places, although it would remain all the time a numerically
single thing.' Now, obviously, the latter half of this sentence is
spoken as 'loosely' as the first. Literally, and in accord with 'con-
tinuous transition,' no 'single thing' ever does 'remain all the time.'
It quickly ceases to exist absolutely. It can not be spoken of as
existing, or as 'the same room,' save figuratively, fictitiously, and by
juggling with the verb 'to be.' It is only by reason of this sort of
juggling that Professor James's lengthy discussion of paradoxical
somersaults and contorting convulsions is given the least appearance
of philosophic reasoning. And the clear-minded ought to see that
its final import reduces to 'pure' unintelligibility the moment that
all minds and all things be held to the present-tense 'is,' as his 'con-
tinuous transition' strictly requires.
Further along our author makes merry with 'mental knives that
2 This JOURNAL, Vol. I., p. 480.
68
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
will not cut real wood,' with 'mental triangles that will not wound,'
and with 'real' objects that do 'the contrary.' And then, by way of
showing how this difference between 'mental' objects and 'real'
objects has genesis within his 'continuous transition,' our pictur-
esque philosopher (or psychologist?) breaks forth into this noble
immensity : 3
"With 'real' objects, on the contrary, consequences always ac-
crue ; and thus the real experiences get sifted from the mental ones,
the things from our thoughts of them, fanciful or true, and precipi-
tated together as the stable part of the whole experience-chaos, under
the name of the physical world. Of this our perceptual experiences
are the nucleus, they being the originally strong experiences. We
add a lot of conceptual experiences to them, making these strong
also in imagination, and building out the remoter parts of the phys-
ical world by their means; and around this core of reality the
world of laxly connected fancies and mere rhapsodical objects floats
like a bank of clouds. In the clouds, all sorts of rules are violated
which in the core are kept."
Now as a piece of solipsistic psychology this is one of the finest
and truest things ever written. But never, for one moment, should
it deceive any one into conceiving that the 'real knife,' the 'real
triangle' or the 'real world' here mentioned 'is' the real knife, tri-
angle or world of which philosophy treats. The 'real things' and
'real world' of Professor James's poem 'are' affairs of a single mind.
Does he deny that there 'is' any other world or mind? If not, how
confusing to juggle the words 'real' and 'is' in two senses!
Finally, since I can not fill this JOURNAL with quotations, let us
look at Professor James's definitions and uses of 'experience'!
From his 'Psychology' we get this: 4 "As universally understood . . .
experience means experience of something foreign supposed to im-
press us." Plainly 'something foreign' is not solipsistic. But from
this JOURNAL we get these : 5 ' ' The instant field of the present is at all
times what I call the pure experience." Plainly this is solipsistic;
otherwise why 'the pure experience'? Again: 6 "The instant field
of the present is always experience in its 'pure' state." The con-
text seems to make this 'experience' not solipsistic; but in any case,
since by 'continuous transition' one's whole field of mind always is
'the instant field of the present,' how then "is the instant field of
the present always experience in its 'pure' state?" For, again: 7
8 This JOURNAL, Vol. I., p. 489.
4 Vol. II., pp. 618-619.
8 Vol. I., p. 485.
6 Reprint, ' A World of Pure Experience,' p. 14.
7 This JOURNAL, Vol. I., p. 566.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 69
" 'Pure experience' is the name I give to the original flux of life
before reflexion has categorized it. Only new-born babes, etc.,
have the experience pure in the literal sense." Again: 8 "A pure
experience can be postulated of any amount whatever of span or
field. ' ' And again : 9 * * I called our experiences, taken all together, a
quasi-chaos." And again: ''Experience is only a collective name
for all these sensible natures"; that is for 'all the primal stuffs'
with which Professor James 'starts his thesis.' While finally 'Ex-
perience, ' with a capital ' E, ' is the name he gives to the entire com-
pleted 'Weltanschauung' or rational world, whose 'cognitive' func-
tion between minds his philosophic writings are supposed to explain.
Now I ask if it is not plainly evident that it is this continual
'substitution' between 'present field' and 'original flux'; 'pure field'
and 'whole or conscious field'; 'primal world stuffs' and 'united
mind'; between 'experience quasi-chaotic,' and 'experience orderly
and conscious'; between 'experience foreign,' and 'experience immi-
nent,' and between experiences pure, experiences transitional, ex-
periences solipsistic and experiences pluralistic is it not this alone
that makes the word experience appear to do consistent service
among such varied contexts, and throughout Professor James's
philosophical writings in attempting to construct a present-tense
Universe of Experience, wherein unit experiences or minds experi-
ence or cognize each other by means of transitive experiences that
bridge the 'gap,' 'break' or 'hole' that forever 'is' between them and
never can be an experience f Are not ' all rules broken ' here, as well
in ' the core ' as ' in the clouds, ' and is it not all clouds ?
Of course these criticisms are not made without due heed of what
Professor James says about 'substitution.' 10 Well may he emphasize
substitution, since his fundamental process of 'continuous transi-
tion' is mainly one of substitutions always. But obviously substi-
tutes can no more wander from mind to mind than can 'originals.'
Therefore 'substitution,' instead of sufficiently explaining 'knowl-
edge between minds,' as Professor James apparently would have us
take for granted and believe, merely emphasizes all the more the
need of explaining how either originals or substitutes can give us
such knowledge.
Professor James's root difficulty is precisely that of every
philosopher who conceives that some sort of 'pouring,' entitative,
contential, or functional, from one mind to another, is requisite for
explaining cognition between them. But if it be clearly recognized,
as since Hume it should be, that the validity of any theory of knowl-
8 This JOURNAL, Vol. II., p. 181.
This JOURNAL, Vol. I., p. 543.
10 This JOURNAL, Vol. L, p. 541.
70 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
edge can only be assumed, and forever must remain hypothetical
under any and every case of assumption, then it should be as clearly
recognized that any sort of 'pouring' between minds is entirely
superfluous for explaining cognition between them. Professor
James tells us that he 'postulates your mind' because he 'sees
your body acting in a certain way. ' But if this postulate is correct,
that your body and mind do exist, and do act in the proper way
and moment for his 'seeing,' then his 'seeing' is correct, however
solipsistic all things and minds may be; and, given this fact, there
is no need of any 'functional' pouring between minds, or of any
further and duplicate postulate to establish its validity. Sim-
ilarly, if he postulates the universe, and this postulate is correct
if the universe does exist and does perform in lawful accord with
one's perceptions and conceptions, however solipsistic these may be-
then the validity of our knowledge of the universe rests sufficiently
on the correctness of this postulate, and needs no Qther in turn to
validate it. In a word, lawfulness is sufficient for knowledge. No
'pouring' of any sort is needed.
In short, the validity of any theory of knowledge is one thing.
The expansion of any theory of knowledge, to cover all the details
of the universe in accord with that theory and to complete our con-
ceptions of it, is quite another thing. If all knowledge is necessarily
hypothetical (and surely the history of philosophy has given suffi-
cient warning that it is) then this truth can not be got over by
making any sort of hypothesis of details. And finally, since the
existence of things and minds other than one's own mind, and their
lawful performance in accord with one's perceptions and conceptions
must be postulated in any case; therefore it should be obvious that
the further assumption of 'sleeps' that are forbidden, by 'continuous
transformation,' and of 'meetings' that are fundamentally incon-
gruous of it, in no least way substantiate the validity of Professor
James's transitional philosophy and render his necessary primary
postulates incredible just in proportion as these additional postulates
are superfluous and contradictory. HERBERT NICHOLS.
CHESTNUT HILL, MASS.
SOCIETIES
THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
HHHE American Philosophical Association held its fifth annual
meeting at Cambridge, December 27-29, 1905, on invitation
of the Department of Philosophy of Harvard University, on the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 71
occasion of the formal opening of Emerson Hall. The exercises in
connection with the opening of this building which Harvard Uni-
versity has devoted to philosophy and psychology were held on the
afternoon of December 27, with Professor Miinsterberg, chairman of
the department, presiding. Addresses were made by President
Eliot and Dr. Edward Emerson. The exercises were followed by a
joint discussion with the American Psychological Association of * The
Affiliation of Psychology with Philosophy and the Natural Sciences. '
The discussion was led by Professors Miinsterberg, Hall, Angell,
Taylor and Thilly. The Association was hospitably entertained by
the Harvard Corporation at luncheon at the Harvard Union at one
o'clock of the same day, and in the evening by Professor and Mrs.
Miinsterberg at their home. Professor Dewey, president of the
Association, read his address on the evening of December 28, on the
subject, 'Beliefs and Realities.' The address was followed by a
smoker of the philosophical and psychological associations at the
Harvard Union. At the business meeting, the following officers
were elected for the ensuing year: President, Professor William
James, of Harvard University; Vice-president, Professor Ernest
Albee, of Cornell University; Secretary-treasurer, Professor J. G.
Hibben, of Princeton University. The following is the program
of the meeting with brief abstracts of the greater number of the
papers read:
Swedenborg's Influence upon Goethe: FRANK SEWALL.
Swedenborg's work in philosophy and science was the source of
Goethe's conception of the world-as-a-whole. There is a close con-
nection between Kant and Swedenborg in the matter of their re-
spective 'two world' doctrines, and Goethe was indebted for his
acquaintance with Swedenborg to Kant, Herder and Schiller, but
chiefly to Franklein von Klettenberg, who, in the early seventies, at
the beginning of the Faust conception, introduced Goethe to the
' Arcana ' of Swedenborg. A parallel was exhibited between Goethe's
'Deutseher Parnass' and the little-known work of Swedenborg, *De
Cultu et Amore Dei,' in which man, the microcosm, reflects all the
forces and activities of the universe. Goethe's discovery of the
'Book of Mystery' throws light upon the Faust monologue. Striking
parallels exist between Swedenborg's 'Heaven and Hell' and Faust's
translation to the spirit world. Goethe, in his letters and in a review,
expresses sentiments identical with those of Swedenborg, and a lively
interest in the latter 's thought. The author finds in Faust's realiza-
tion of the 'fair moment' in his vision before he dies an echo of
Swedenborg's doctrine of mutual service. To Swedenborg, then,
Goethe owed the Weltamckauung in which man accomplishes his
development through nature to the world of spirit, a conviction
summed up in the closing lines of Faust. Recent literature was
specified.
The Conditions of Greatest Progress in American Philosophy: D.
S. MILLER.
The social development of philosophy has only begun. We are
here still in an age of individualism, in which the favorite product
is a 'system' bearing the personal stamp of its author. In its social
development philosophy must be international, but a national branch
may have a growth and fruit of its own. Philosophy will not
be a science until it has achieved a consensus of experts, i. e.,
a tested method and tested principles. It will not advance con-
sciously toward this end until it is roused, i. e., until we, its
laborers, are roused to a sense of public responsibility. Thus
roused, our first and constant endeavor must be to reach common
ground. As steps toward this end, let us (1) use as plain English
as we can; let us (2) practice a searching mutual criticism in the
interest of an accurate method; let us (3) study the divergent tem-
peraments that find expression in philosophy; let us (4) draw our-
selves, on one side, closer to life by cultivating in common, as an
essential part of philosophy, that Lebensweisheit toward which un-
philosophic thought in America has contributed so powerful an
impulse.
The Influence of American Political Theories upon the Conception
of the Absolute: I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY.
The conception of the absolute in America assumes the form of
monism in the seventeenth century, dualism in the eighteenth, pan-
theism in the nineteenth. Under Puritanism there is one, supreme,
self-sufficient being, the sole ruler and disposer of all things; under
deism a deity whose powers and functions are limited by a law out-
side himself, the law of nature, inviolable and immutable; under
transcendentalism the deity, becoming immanent, is submerged in
nature, can scarce be distinguished from the cosmic processes. As
with Spinoza, so with Emerson, the concept of God and the concept
of the world-ground are identical, the absolute is one with the order-
ing and creative power of the universe. The problem is to show
how these conceptions were influenced by the current theories of
government under absolute monarchy sovereignty being conceived
as given by God to the king, under limited monarchy as shared
between ruler and subject in a dual control, under representative
democracy as vested in the people through the inalienable right of
the law of nature. Here chief reference is made to such writers as
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 73
John Wise, Jonathan Mayhew and William Livingstone, who, rely-
ing on the European jurists of the naturrecht school, formed a
genuine philosophic background for the whole movement.
The Kantian Doctrine of God as Compared with that of Plato and
Aristotle: WILLIAM T. HARRIS.
A Philosophical Pilgrimage. Reflections of a Visit to the Homes
and Abodes of Berkeley, Hume, Locke and Descartes: FRANCIS
B. BRANDT. (Read by title.)
The Significance of Methodological Principles: ERNEST ALBEE.
Rationalism has been a far more persistent tendency in modern
thought than is commonly recognized. While the critical philos-
ophy, logically developed, carries one beyond rationalism, Kant's
own system is rationalistic in important respects, both on the theo-
retical and on the practical side. This is plainly true of his so-called
'constitutive' principles, in so far as these are involved with his
table of quasi-logical categories; but his actual use of 'regulative'
principles, as applied to the solution of the problems of ethics, is
open to much the same criticism. Yet regulative principles, in the
larger sense of the methodological principles of science and philos-
ophy, are the salvation of idealistic philosophy, if properly inter-
preted. In what relation, then, do these regulative or methodo-
logical principles stand to reality? Assuming, as we nearly all
practically do, that reality can only mean experience in the largest
sense, the difficulty seems to be that science becomes progressively
abstract, while experience remains concrete. As our scientific prin-
ciples become accurately formulated they seem to depart from the
'reality' of immediate experience. We forget that, in proportion
as our methodological principles are practically helpful in organ-
izing our knowledge and thus enabling us to deal effectively with
concrete experience, they are necessarily informing us with regard
to the organic constitution of reality. Not brute experience, but
organized experience, is the real, though in a sense also ideal.
Induction and the Disjunctive Syllogism: W. P. MONTAGUE.
This paper will be printed in full in this JOURNAL.
Connection between Logic and Mathematics: MRS. C. LADD
FRANKLIN.
Experience and Thought: J. E. CREIGHTON.
This paper refers to certain fundamental doctrines regarding the
nature of experience which are involved in the current discussion
of pragmatism. Its main thesis is, that completely to get rid of
dualism, and to attain to a truly functional standpoint, it is neces-
74
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sary to regard knowledge as the process through which a subject
expresses and realizes a rational life.
Evolution and the Absolute: H. HEATH BAWDEN.
Conservation and evolution seem to present a fatal dilemma: the
universe is either a closed system or a progressive growth. We can
not believe that something has evolved out of nothing; this strikes
at the rationality of the universe. But to regard the universe as a
completed system strikes at its morality. The only recourse is to
recognize the functional character of the distinction between essence
and origin. The question of absolute origin can not be answered
because it can not rationally be asked. The ideas of unity (con-
servation) and continuity (evolution) are true only when interpreted
in terms of each other. Science must assume the conservation of
the system within which she is working in order to make the evolu-
tionary statement useful, while, on the other hand, the continual
evolution of new meanings is necessary to make the conservation
doctrine intelligible. This point of view reconciles evolutionism
and absolutism by showing the functional nature of the absolute.
Consciousness and Evolution: FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE.
To regard consciousness as an outcome of evolutionary processes
involves a radical transformation of many of the fundamental prob-
lems of modern philosophy, because these problems have been con-
trolled by an initial conception of consciousness which is not evolu-
tionary. This conception involves the positing of the mind as an
original capacity or receptacle endowed with certain constitutional
powers and needing the operation of some agency to give it the
content known as the content of consciousness. The mind is thus
conceived as an end-term of a relation. To the resulting line of
thought the evolutionary conception of consciousness presents a
striking contrast. Here the mind is not posited as an end- term, but
rather processes of various sorts are conceived, undergoing continual
reorganization until they become conscious, and thus lead to the
recognition that as conscious processes they are not original but
derived. Although the evolutionary conception has not been as
clearly worked out as the other, it tends to render the general
philosophical problems arising from the end-term conception of
mind largely meaningless. This is significantly illustrated in the
body-mind controversy, the doctrine of mental states and the cur-
rent conception of evolution.
The Formal Fallacy in Subjectivism: A. E. TAYLOR.
Pure subjectivism, a doctrine still expressed by philosophical
physicists and biologists, and occasionally by professional philos-
ophers, is the doctrine that what each state of mind knows is its
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 75
own occurrence as a mental process. This amounts to holding that
the relation of percipient to percept is logically of such a nature as
to have itself, and nothing but itself, as its sequent or second term.
But there seems to be a logical impossibility of the existence of such
a relation, since it inevitably involves an indefinite regress, and this
regress is of an illegitimate kind, inasmuch as its completion would
be necessary before we could even say what we mean by the second
term of the perceptual relation, i. e., the perceived object. To escape
the illegimate regress, we are bound to assume that there is at least
one instance of a process of perception in which the relation (the
process) and its sequent (the perceived object) are not identical.
Thus the theory of knowledge must necessarily start from the stand-
point of natural realism, though it does not follow that it must also
end there.
Pure Science and Pragmatism: E. G. SPAULDING.
Certain branches of science, e. g., the 'New Physics,' are pointed
to by the pragmatist as exemplifying his theory of procedure.
Accordingly let us examine the presuppositions, structure, etc., of
physical science, and ask if they are compatible with pragmatistic
assertions and especially with the philosophy of pure experience.
Firstly, it is found that, by the symbolic judgments, qualities not
given in perception are known. Nor can the meanings here be
imaged. Secondly, to satisfy 'alogical' needs, knowledge has the
purpose of conserving and furthering life; this by inferring, pre-
dicting. Such knowledge is a mental transition from perceived
to unperceived. What is the ground for the validity of the in-
ference? Not the plan itself! Necessity, in variableness, un-
equivocal connection are demanded. These are not found in the
conscious series. Therefore only in an 'other,' a non-immanent,
i. e., transcendent, object. This is 'Denkobject' as opposed to
* Denkinhalt. ' In knowing it the act of cognition transcends itself.
Examination of the kinds of cognition shows self -transcendency to
be an essential characteristic, and that the 'other' referred to may be
independent of and different in kind from the cognitive act. So in
perception the object of perception is not content. The false, e. g.,
hallucination, implies the true, and this is implied by all. The ob-
ject of perception is the transcendent causal ' Regelmassigkeit. '
Examination of the philosophy of pure experience shows this to
be inconsistent with the realism which the success of knowledge as
an 'instrument' implies. The ground for the validity of knowledge
(physics) is, therefore, external to knowledge itself, and is also
object and source of knowledge. Experience must be defined in the
light of this. Cognitive experience is different from the others; it
76 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
has transcendency; and scientific knowledge is different from per-
ception. There is knowledge of the 'not-given,' if ' given * means
consciousness.
Scholasticism and Reaction: BROTHER CHRYSOSTOM.
Scholasticism has too often been considered in its purely static
phase ; its dynamic side is far more in touch with our age. Its fun-
damental principles of act and potency, form and matter, present
firm points of contact with modern science. While potency in gen-
eral and matter in particular have traits in common with the ac-
cepted doctrine of the indestructibility of matter in the present
meaning of that term, act and form are in striking harmony with
the principles of modern biology. There was a dictum of the school-
men to the effect that, 'Whatever is received is received according to
the nature of the receiver. ' Its truth receives confirmation, not only
in the mineral kingdom, in the various kinds of motion classified by
Aristotle, but also in the domain of the plant and the animal. Living
organisms receive from heredity and environment, and this central
nucleus they modify by their innate spontaneity and adaptability -
a line of thought leading naturally to histology and morphology.
Sensation and intellection were both held by the schoolmen to be
reactions, but reactions of so excellent a nature as really to express
in their perceptive phase some portions of external reality. On sen-
sation depended passion, with its attendant muscular reactions; on
intellection hung deliberate exercise of the will. Both these forms
of cognition, as well as the resultant appetitions, contributed to build
up habit, whereby many reactions gradually lapsed from conscious-
ness and gave room for new reactions and new habits.
A Criticism of Psychophysical Parallelism as an Ontology: H. H.
HORNE.
The theory of parallelism serves in three fields, viz., psychology,
the philosophy of evolution and ontology. As an ontology parallel-
ism appears in a harmonizing role, agreeing with the materialist,
the idealist, the dualist and the agnostic monist in their character-
istic positions. In this role parallelism is too vague as an ontology
to satisfy the adherents of any of the older systems. Essentially,
parallelism as an ontology is dualistic, and, as such, is subject to the
objection that being is a unity; for the unity of consciousness gives
unity to any proposed dualism or pluralism; for unifying relation-
ships must exist between the supposed dual parts: for, further, only
a unitary being can be infinite. Again, parallelism does not explain
why there should be any reality at all, nor why it should take the
parallelistic form ; it only formulates. And it makes a poor formu-
lation in maintaining a parallelism between the psychical and the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 77
physical, for individuality characterizes the psychical but not the
physical, while extension, quantity and space characterize the phys-
ical but not the psychical. Thus parallelism takes seriously a mathe-
matical figure of speech. Again, in denying causal relation between
mind and body while affirming this concomitant variation it violates
one of Mill 's methods for determining causal connection. In justifi-
cation it transforms the causal concept from equivalence, or identity,
into concomitance. Further, no parallelist has been able to show how
the unity of human consciousness can have arisen through the fusion
of the psychic sides of atoms. And, if parallelism is right in main-
taining that mind does not influence body, it can hardly maintain
that evolution has proceeded along parallelistic lines, for in evolu-
tion the useless is eliminated.
The Affiliation of Philosophy and Psychology in Esthetics: ETHEL
D. PUFFER.
The Quality of Psychical Dispositions: E. A. PACE.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Problems of Philosophy. HARALD HOFFDING. Translated by Galen
M. Fisher, with a preface by William James. New York: The Mac-
millan Co. 1905. Pp. xvi + 201.
This little work is the outcome of a series of Gastvorlesungen deliv-
ered by its distinguished author in Upsala, Sweden. In 1903 it appeared
in German. Now it is published in an excellent English translation
which has been prepared under the direction of Professor James, who
also introduces Holding's discussion with a characteristically incisive
preface.
As a whole the book forms an * introduction ' to philosophy or ' out-
line ' of philosophy conceived from the constructive, rather than the
descriptive point of view. It presents in epitome Professor Hoffding's
mature opinions on the various philosophical questions ' so to speak, his
philosophical testament,' James calls it 1 with abundant references to the
more detailed discussions given in his larger works and to current philo-
sophical literature of importance from other hands.
The problems of philosophy are reckoned four: the problem of con-
sciousness, the problem of knowledge, the problem of being and the prob-
lem of values, which last is subdivided into the ethical problem and the
religious problem. At bottom these several problems may be considered
one, for they all involve the fundamental question of the relation between
continuity and discontinuity in the knowledge and the being of the world
(pp. 5, 8). In general, Professor Hoffding ranges himself among the
1 Preface, p. v.
78
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defenders of continuity, but always in a critical, rather a dogmatic
fashion, and with express recognition of the presence in thought and
being of ' irrational ' factors. In psychology, he criticizes the attempt
which some have made to class him with the associationalists (p. 18),
defends the rights of descriptive against purely experimental or physio-
logical psychology, and emphasizes the merely hypothetical and method-
ological character of his acceptance of parallelism or ' identity ' (pp. 51-
54). In epistemology, he prefers the economic theory of Mach and
Avenarius (pp. 71 F.) to the empiricism of Mill or the evolutionism of
Spencer; and declares himself a symbolist, for whom truth is not static
but dynamic, and who finds, in spite of the growing congruity between
thought and its object, that ' there is always an irrational remainder,
mz., in the relation of quality to quantity, in the significance which the
time-relation has for the causal concept, and in the relation between sub-
ject and object' (p. 85, cf. pp. 85-115). The form of metaphysical in-
quiry is analogy. The problem of being, therefore, or the ( cosmological '
problem, does not admit of complete solution, and metaphysics is more
art than science (p. 127). The attempts at a solution depend upon the
employment of i type-phenomena/ In regard to the question of monism
or pluralism, Hoffding defends a doctrine of ' critical monism,' which,
though it t asserts the reality of time and hence the permanent unfinished-
ness both of being and of knowledge, can nevertheless still quite properly
make of causality and rationality the type-phenomena of its view of the
world' (pp. 136-137). In regard to the nature of reality, materialism is
unsatisfactory, but there is ground for hesitation in adopting mind as
our type-phenomenon. For we can not be sure whether, besides material-
ism and idealism, there may not be further possibilities of existence which
our experience does not reveal (p. 143). In regard to being and becoming
evolution through conflict is found wherever we penetrate the order of the
world, and so we are entitled to class forms of being as lower or higher
according to their places in the scale of development, though here most of
all it becomes evident that it is impossible to attain ' an absolutely final
concept of being as a whole' (p. 150). In ethics, also, the standard of
continuity and coherence is used as the test of conduct, and the philos-
ophy of religion is considered under the rubric of the conservation of
values.
The rich suggestiveness of Holding's treatise is indicated by this
summary account of its contents. That it suggests points for criticism
as well as of agreement enhances rather than diminishes its value. On
the side of method, questions of completeness arise, in view, for instance,
of the entire omission of esthetics from the discussion of the value-prob-
lem; and questions of precision: are the concepts of continuity and dis-
continuity carried through, or can they be carried through so many
different fields without ambiguity of meaning? On the side of doctrine,
many of Hoffding's results will encounter dissent from thinkers of dif-
ferent schools. Thus the absolute idealist will oppose, or perhaps resent,
the defense of the objectivity of the temporal order. And even critics
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 79
who, like the present reviewer, favor the conclusion which is reached,
may doubt whether Hoff ding's argument is here at its best, although they
will not fail to appreciate his final sentences : " If the time-relation is an
illusion, it is another illusion of the second potency if we imagine that
we can lightly rid ourselves of it. For us, existence can never be absorbed
in thought without remainder" (p. 107).
The most general criticism, however, as James suggests (pp. viii-ix),
and the most general regret, will be that the compass of the work is so
restricted. The translation, as already intimated, is well done. Here
and there roughnesses appear, and even sentences of doubtful meaning
in their connections. But without the original at hand, it is impossible
to determine whether such difficulties may not spring from the compact-
ness of the author's treatment rather than from infelicities of rendering.
A. C. ARMSTRONG.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.
Great Pedagogical Essays: Plato to Spencer. F. V. N. PAINTER. New
York: American Book Co. 1905. Pp. 426.
The source method, which has been so fruitful in the study of gen-
eral historical problems, has finally been applied to the study of the
history of education, but the student and teacher, with limited library
facilities and meager language training, do not find readily accessible
adequate source materials, and the need of books giving judicious and
typical selections is widely felt in normal schools and teachers' colleges.
Professor Paul Monroe, of the Teachers College, Columbia University,
published a couple of years ago (Macmillan) a capital handbook giving
the very best source materials for the Greek and Roman periods, and he
has promised a companion volume dealing with early Christian and
medieval education.
Mr. Painter, in the volume at hand, has sought to compress within
a little more than four hundred pages selections representative of educa-
tional thought and practice from the Greeks to our own day. He has
failed signally in his purpose, and not wholly or mainly because of space
limitations, but rather because of manifest lack of broad historic scholar-
ship and clear pedagogic insight. His selections are in the main incon-
sequential fragments, and the translations are often poor. The scholarly
student would at the very outset desire to know the source of the trans-
lations of the selections, but only in a few instances are we told. The
selections from Plato's ' Laws ' (rather than from the ' Republic ') are
in no sense typical and give .no adequate notion of the great Greek
idealist's views concerning educational theory; and the biographical
sketch which precedes this selection (and the criticism holds true of them
all) could not well have less value for the scholarly student.
The treatment of Rousseau's 'Emile' well illustrates the general
weakness of the book. We are given but three pages of book one, in
which Rousseau outlines his principles of education; and these three
pages are apparently taken (without credit) from the rather poor trans-
80
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
lation by Eleanor Worthington. Random fragments are given from the
other four books of the ' Emile ' ; but certainty one would search in
Tain in the thirteen-line selection from book five to get Rousseau's views
on the education of women. If the treatment of Rousseau had to be
compressed within fifteen pages, Mr. Painter would have rendered greater
service to the student if he had confined his selections to Rousseau's
general principles in book one, and he would have found Professor
Payne's translation much more scholarly and authoritative than the one
he uses. Of even less value are the excerpts from Pestalozzi, Frobel,
Horace Mann and Fenelon. But it would avail little to continue the
criticism of a book of source materials that violates at every turn the
fundamental principles of the source method of historical study.
WILL S. MONROE.
STATE NORMAL SCHOOL, WESTFIELD, MASS.
Empiricism, and the Absolute. F. C. S. SCHILLER. Mind, July, 1905.
Pp. 348-370.
This article is in substance a criticism of two important aspects of
Taylor's ' Metaphysics,' its relation to pragmatism and its doctrine of
the absolute. Mr. Schiller considers that Professor Taylor attempts to
restate the orthodox Oxford intellectualism in terms that will be accept-
able to the humanist, but that he fails in this because the positions are
incompatible.
The doctrines which Professor Taylor, according to Mr. Schiller,
takes directly from humanism, with more or less clear recognition of
the fact, are, the purposiveness of human thought and experience, which
he seems to concede by his use of the language of purpose and teleology;
the representation of metaphysics as the product of an instinctive demand
of our intellect for coherency and consistency of thought ; the recognition
of the fact that science makes use of postulates which serve its practical
purposes without being ultimately true; the denial of the possibility of an
a priori theory of knowledge; and the use of expressions that can be
interpreted only as radical empiricism, especially the statement that
' the real is experience and nothing but experience, and experience con-
sists of psychical matter of fact. Proof of this proposition can only be
given in the same way as of any other ultimate truth, by making trial
of it.' Mr. Schiller considers that these doctrines can not be bodily
transferred from humanism to intellectualism, and that in his attempt
to transfer them Professor Taylor has only made clear the incompati-
bility of the two positions. Mr. Schiller discusses at length this incom-
patibility as manifested in Professor Taylor's account of the relations of
appearance and reality ; in his two criteria of metaphysical reality, ' the
real is experience . . . and experience is psychical matter of fact ' and
i reality is not self-contradictory ' ; and in his account of the relations
of axioms and postulates. He claims that these views are in opposition
to pragmatism in not recognizing that the true is useful and the useless
untrue; in overlooking the fact that for the pragmatist it is not the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS si
question of origin, but of past history, that determines validity; and in
the claim that the intellect is not wholly practical and that logical con-
sistency in thinking is its final criterion of ultimate truth, rather than
that the intellect is practical throughout and that, thus, the truths of
metaphysics are just as practical as the rules of conduct and methods of
science; and in the other elements of intellectualism, for which the aim
of philosophy is to understand rather than to transform experience.
Professor Taylor's doctrine of the absolute is rejected in its entirety
by Mr. Schiller, who criticizes its derivation as perfunctory, and as de-
pending really on the ontological argument, the validity of which is
assumed rather than proven. For Professor Taylor the absolute is out
of time and space, and so can not evolve. Our experience is, thus, only
contradictory appearance, a position which is carried to its logical con-
clusion in the denial of the reality of evil, and from which we are not-
saved by the Bradleian doctrine of degrees of reality. Mr. Schiller
criticizes the ontological argument and claims that Professor Taylor's
absolute reduces to a mere postulate, which does not even stand the
pragmatist test of usefulness. The only absolute that would be of use
in explaining the facts of experience is one that is plastic, not rigid and
unchangeable. But the demand for apriority which is characteristic of
all rationalism precludes this alternative. Mr. Schiller concludes : " It
would seem, then, that regarded as a postulate the absolute is a bad one
because it does not work, nor secure us what we wanted: regarded as an
axiom it stands and falls with the ontological fallacy."
The main contention of the article, that Professor Taylor's meta-
physical position is incompatible with humanism, may be granted with-
out accepting the conclusion, implied in the discussion, that empiricism,
expressed either as humanism or pragmatism, is the only alternative to
the metaphysical doctrine of an immutable substance.
WILLIAM L. RAUB.
KNOX COLLEGE.
Die Pseudomotorische Funktion der Hirnrinde. Dr. RICHARD STERN*.
Leipzig: F. Deutiche. 1905. Pp. 27.
The author proposes the extraordinary hypothesis that all nervous
impulses are centripetal. At all times the muscles are generating some
kind of energy, which tends to flow from the periphery to the motor
ganglia. These, however, can spontaneously assume various states of
conductivity, that is, of increased or decreased resistance. If this is high,
little energy is thus drafted away from the muscle and the latter relaxes:
but if the resistance is low, much energy is conducted away from the
muscle and the latter contracts. Somewhat similarly the cerebral cvlU
that mediate consciousness spontaneously vary their resistance. But
here when the resistance is high the incoming energy is transformed into
conscious energy, as in a highly resisting wire electricity is transform^!
into heat. Many facts speak for the varying resistance of cerebral
nervous paths, and among these, notably, that the same bodily activitu s
82
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(presumably, therefore, involving the same nervous paths) can be per-
formed either consciously or unconsciously. Such are most of our semi-
automatic movements, like walking. For persons of orthodox physiolog-
ical opinions this last is the main point of interest in the paper.
E. B. HOLT.
HABVABD UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE
DER SINNESORGANE. August, 1905, Band 39, Heft 4 u. 5. Ueber
zusammengesetzte Wellenformen (pp. 241-268) : C. STUMPF. - A study of
tables of wave-forms which are produced by a combination of two sine
curves in the same plane and of the same amplitude and starting-point,
when the relative frequency is between 1 and 12. Also minor considera-
tion of curves resulting from non-simultaneous starting-points, or from
more than one elementary vibration. Mathematical discussion. Possible
applications to the facts of hearing. Dijferenztone und Konsonanz (pp.
269-283) : C. STUMPF. - A partial rejoinder to the work of Krueger, who
replaced Helmholtz's theory of overtones in consonance by difference-
tones. The principal source of error in Krueger's work is his treatment
of the discord. In the discords of the octave and the fifth the difference-
tones certainly play an important part. Bestimmungen uber das Men-
genverhaltniss komplementarer Spektralfarben in Weismischungen (pp.
284-285) : ROSWELL P. ANGIER and WILHELM TRENDELENBURG. - Tables of
wave-lengths of complementary colors. Das Ich im Traume, nebst einer
kritischen Beleuchtung der Ich-Kontroverse (pp. 294-313) : CARL MAX
GIESSLER. - The nucleus of the Ego in dreams is the familiar feeling of
direction or regulation which is opposed to the vague images of subcon-
scious adaptations and to the inexactly localized stimuli which give rise
to the non-Ego. Wird die Lichtempfindlichkeit eines Auges durch gleich-
zeitige Lichtreizung des anderen Auges verandert? (pp. 314r-326) : GEZA
REVESZ. - The question is answered negatively, no uniform relation appear-
ing. Beitrdge zur Kenntnis von der entoptischen Wahrnehmung der
Netzhautgefasse (pp. 327-331) : ROBERT STIGLER. - If, with both eyes closed
and directed towards a source of light, the lower eyelid is depressed so
as to admit light into the eye through the lower segment of the pupil, the
shadows of the retinal blood-vessels can be clearly seen. Methods of
observing other entoptic phenomena. Eine neue subjektive Gesichtser-
scheinung (pp. 332-340) : ROBERT STIGLER. Literatur'bericht.
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR~ PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE
DER SINNESORGANE. October, 1905, Band 40, Heft 1 u. 2. Ueler
Annahmen (pp. 1-54) : A. MARTY. - A critique of Meinong's theory of
Annahme or ' supposition ' as an ultimate mental function intermediate
between cognition and belief (JJrteiT), the classification being based on
Brentano's principle of the manner in which consciousness refers to an
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 83
object. Meinong's arguments, based chiefly on negative judgments, are
analyzed in detail, and the hypothesis of a special class of suppositions is
held to be unnecessary. Zur Frage uber den zeitlichen Verlauf des
Geddchtnisbildes fur verschiedene Sinnesreize (pp. 55-73) : GISELA
ALEXANDER- SCHAFER. - A comparative study of the course of the memory-
image with visual, auditory and tactual stimuli. Memory of time-in-
tervals with auditory stimuli, under three conditions of experimentation,
is decidedly better than with visual and tactual stimuli. The reactions
in general tended to become quicker in the course of an experiment, espe-
cially with auditory stimuli. The reproduction of intervals with tactual
stimuli very variable. Ueber den Einfluss der Blickrichtung auf die
Gestalt des Himmelgewblbes (pp. 74-101) : ALOYS MULLER. - Criticism of
Reimann's and Deichmiiller's results and methods. Especially, Reimann's
accepted value of 22 for the zenith-horizon angle is held to be wrong.
It is nearer 40. Measurement of illusion due to direction of regard as
the chief factor in the illusion. Liter uturbericht.
REVISTA FILOSOFICA. May-June, 1905. L'infuenza della mate-
matica sulla teoria della conoscenza ecc. (pp. 293-323) : G. VAILATI. - A
review of Descartes, Malebranche, Pascal, Hobbes, Locke and Leibniz
exhibits an increasing disposition to rest the validity of knowledge on
the validity of deduction from axioms, and at the same time a growing
sense that such axioms must not be arbitrary definitions. The investiga-
tion of the nature of axioms thus becomes important with reference to
the problem whether they in turn are subject to demonstration. La fine
del positivtsmo (pp. 324355) : B. VARISCO. - The title is ironical and the
article is a somewhat polemical defense of the author's type of positivism,
which consists in ' assuming science as point of departure, datum and
criterion of philosophical investigation.' Varisco means by science 'the
totality of certain cognitions, including mathematics and natural science.'
Varisco protests equally against the claim to substitute science for philos-
ophy or philosophy for science, and against the proposition (Croce) that
' the methods of natural science and philosophy have nothing in common.'
Science holds such a central position in modern life that no philosopher
can ignore it. The appreciation of existing science for which Varisco
contends has been, he says, characteristic of all philosophers of any
authority. Tertulliano e la filosofia pagana (pp. 356-376) : G. BONFIGLIOLI.
- Tertullian has been unjustly regarded as hostile to philosophy per se.
His hatred was really for the Gnostics, and as these based their theories on
Greek philosophy, he denounced the latter for the aid it rendered to the
former. Tertullian was a learned man and was forced into the philosoph-
ical defense of Christian doctrine, and here he is much indebted to the
Stoics and particularly to Seneca. Rassegna Bibliografica. Notizie e
Pubblicazioni. II V. Congresso Iniernazionale di Psicologia.
Dilthey, Wilhelm. Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, Lessing, Goethe,
Novalis, Holderlin. Leipzig: Teubner. 1906. Pp. 405.
Diihring, E. Der Ersatz der Religion durch Vollkommeneres. Leipzig:
Theod. Thomas. 1906. Pp. viii -f 239.
84
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NOTES AND NEWS
THE following observations occur in Nature, in the course of a review
of * Biometrika,' Vol. IV., Parts 1 and 2 : " It is not a raid, but a victorious
invasion, that Professor Karl Pierson and his school have made into the
realms of anthropology, with the result that all that part of it which
deals with men in the mass becomes an annex of the mathematician. The
invasion occurred at a most opportune time; great collections of data
which had been accumulated by the anthropologist threatened to bury
him, for he had neither the method nor the appliances for welding them
into a composite whole. Especially was this the case with the endless
measurements of brain-weights obtained most laboriously by the anatomist
and pathologist ; they urgently required an application of the ' mathe-
matical science of statistics/ Hence the series of articles which occupy
the greater part of a number of * Biometrika ' published a few months
ago are particularly welcome; they lay a foundation for an exact knowl-
edge of this subject. . . . Looking widely at the labors of the bio-
metricians on human brain-weights, they appear to the writer, who views
them as an anatomist rather than a mathematician, to have accomplished
three things : They have fixed accurately the mean brain-weights for five
subraces of Europeans, and shown that mean brain-weight is a racial
character; they have estimated by a definite standard the degree to which
the brain varies in size and weight according to the individual, the sex
and the race; they have worked out the extent to which various features
of the head and body are correlated with the weight of the brain, and
expressed them in definite, permanent terms. They have laid a sound
foundation for future statistical work on the subject, and yet, even at
the risk of appearing ungracious, it is the writer's opinion that the
full explanation of the relationship which exists between intelligence,
brain-weight and other characters is more likely to be discovered by
those who investigate the individual than by those who study the mass."
DR. JAMES H. HYSLOP, of New York City, has been offered the secre-
taryship of the American branch of the Society for Psychical Research,
vacant by the death of Dr. Richard Hodgson.
DR. L. FROBENIUS, the well-known German ethnologist, has undertaken
an expedition to the region of the Kasai to study the native tribes of that
part of Africa.
PROFESSOR RHYS DAVIS, secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society, has
been appointed professor of comparative religions at Manchester Uni-
versity.
PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES, of Harvard, is now lecturing at Stanford
University, where he will remain until June.
DR. MAX HEINZE, professor of philosophy at Leipzig, celebrated his
seventieth birthday on December 13.
VOL. III. No. 4. FEBRUARY 15, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
IS ABSOLUTE IDEALISM SOLIPSISTIC?
THE possibility of solipsism and its consequences is one of many
important philosophic questions which after long and undue
neglect seem now at length to be attracting attention. The question
of solipsism in its various aspects has a most vital bearing on the
ultimate problems of metaphysics. It is easy to see that every ideal-
istic way of interpreting experience can not honestly avoid an explicit
and exhaustive discussion of its relations to solipsism. For every
approach to idealism is so closely beset on either side by the precipices
of solipsism that every step has to be careful, and a false step must
at once be fatal. The course of realistic philosophies, no doubt, is in
this respect less dangerous ; but they, too, are interested in the prob-
lem. They have a direct interest in precipitating all idealisms into
solipsism. They tend, however, to treat it too lightly as a reductio
ad dbsurdum, without sufficiently explaining why. Its absurdity
appears to be regarded as practical rather than as theoretical, but
even so the instinctive feeling that solipsism 'won't do' should be
elaborated into a conclusive proof that it must of necessity lead to
impracticable consequences. Lastly, as a final proof of the prevalent
vagueness of philosophic thought on this subject, it may be mentioned
that it has even been debated whether radical empiricism is not
solipsistic. 1
It would seem, therefore, decidedly opportune to inquire further
into the philosophic affinities of solipsism, and more particularly
into its unexplored relations to absolute idealism. For that form
of idealism has hitherto escaped suspicion by reason of the loudness
of its protestations against solipsism. But such excessive protests
are themselves suspicious, and it should not be surprising to find
that whether or not solipsism is a bad thing and an untenable,
whether or not other idealisms can escape from it, absolute idealism,
at all events, contains implications which reduce it to a choice be-
tween solipsism and suicide.
1 See this JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 5 and Vol. II., No. 9.
85
86
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
To show this, our first step will have to be the amending of the
current definition of solipsism. For by reason, doubtless, of the
scarcity or non-existence of solipsists interested in their own proper
definition, its statement is usually defective. When solipsism is de-
fined as the doctrine that as all experience is my experience, I alone
exist, it is taken for granted (1) that there can be only one solipsist,
and (2) that he must be 'I' and njot 'you.'
Both of these assumptions, however, are erroneous. Indeed, the
full atrocity of solipsism only reveals itself when it is perceived that
solipsists may exist in the plural, and attempt to conceive me as
parts of them. The definition, therefore, of solipsism must not con-
tent itself with providing for the existence of a single solipsist, i. e.,
with stating how 'I' could define 'my' solipsism (if I were a solipsist).
It should provide me also with a basis for argument against 'your'
solipsism and that of others. For that is the really intolerable an-
noyance of solipsism. If I felt reckless or strong enough to shoulder
the responsibility, I might not object to a solipsism that made me
the all by emphasizing the inevitable relation of experience to an
experient : the trouble comes when other experients claim a monopoly
of this relation in the face of conflicting claims, and propose to re-
duce me to incidents in their cosmic nightmare.
Solipsism, therefore, should be conceived with greater generality.
It should cover the doctrine that the whole of reality has a single
owner and is relative to a single experient, and that beyond such an
experient nothing further need be assumed, without implying that
I am the only 'I' that owns the universe. Any 1 V will do. Any I
that thinks it is all that is, is a solipsist. And solipsism will be true
if any one of the many 'IV that are, or may be, solipsists is right,
and really is all that is. Provided, of course, he knows it.
How, now, can this amended definition be applied to the case of
absolute idealism? We must note first that my (our) experience is
not to be regarded as wholly irrelevant to that philosophy. Indeed,
in all its forms it seems to rest essentially on an argument from the
ideality of my (our) experience to the ideality of all experience. For
the former is taken as proof that all reality is relative to a knower,
who, however, is not necessarily the individual knower, but may (or
must) be an all-embracing subject, sustaining us and all the world
besides. Indeed absolute idealists have so convinced themselves of
the moral and spiritual superiority of their absolute knower that
they habitually speak in terms of contemptuous disparagement of
their 'private self as 'a miserable abstraction.' 2 And from the
standpoint of their private self such language is no doubt justified :
Z E. g., Mr. Bradley: 'Appearance and Reality,' p. 259.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 87
it inflicts on it salutary humiliations and represses any tendency it
might otherwise have to expand itself solipsistically into the all.
But how does it look from the standpoint of the absolute self?
For that, too, has been conceived as a self, and therefore as capable of
raising solipsistic claims. Can the absolute self be deterred from
excesses of self-elation by the reflection that it is not, after all, the
totality of existence 4 ! Assuredly not: for ex hypothesi that is pre-
cisely what it is. It includes all things and is all things in all things.
If it can not be said to ' create ' all things, it is only on the technical
ground that since a subject implies an object, and the world must be
coeternal with its 'creator,' 'creation' is an impossible idea. Never-
theless, the dependence of all things on the absolute self must be
absolute. And if it is conscious, it must know this. For else the
ultimate truth about reality would be hidden from the absolute
knower, though apparently revealed to the (comparative) ignorance
Of quite a number of philosophers.
But is not this equivalent to saying (1) that the absolute must be
a solipsist, and (2) that solipsism is the absolute truth?
The inference is plain, and confirmed also by the admirable fitness
of the absolute to play the solipsist in other ways. For the argu-
ments against solipsism have derived what success they have achieved
from the habit of conceiving it as the freak of an individual self:
they recoil helplessly from an absolute solipsism. Even Mr. Bradley
would probably admit, e. g., that the absolute, being out of time,
would not be perplexed by the necessity of transcending its present
experience in order to complete itself. 3
8 Though it is not perhaps strictly necessary, I may here note that Mr.
Bradley's refutation of solipsism in 'Appearance and Reality,' ch. XXI., seems
to fail for (at least) three reasons. (1) Solipsism no doubt does not rest
upon ' direct ' experience merely, i. e., it is not a congenital, but an acquired,
theory. Still ' indirect ' experience must sooner or later return to and enter
into direct present experience, under penalty of ceasing to be ' experience ' at all.
And so the solipsistic hypothesis, though doubtless it is not what any one
starts with, may suggest itself as the explanation of experience and be con-
firmed, even as the solipsistic interpretation of part of it, viz., our dream-
experience, is now confirmed, namely by the discovery that there is after all
nothing in direct experience which forbids its adoption. Mr. Bradley, there-
fore, fails to pin solipsism down to the alternative ' based either on direct or on
indirect experience.' It can rest on both. (2) He objects to the enriching
of the ' this ' of direct experience by the results of indirect experience, on the
ground that they are imported, i. e., were not originally in it (p. 251). Yet
on p. 254 he disavows the relevance of the argument from origins! (3) His
argument never really gets to, and consequently never really gets at, the
solipsistic standpoint, and he always presupposes the more usual assumptions
as to ' a palpable community of the private self with the universe.' But the
solipsist has not, and can not have, a private self to distinguish (except in
appearance) from the universe, just because he is a solipsist and includes all
things. His position, therefore, leaves no foothold for Mr. Bradley's argument.
88
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
But though the inference from absolute idealism to solipsism
seems unavoidable, it would be affectation to pretend that it involves
no difficulties. I do not count among these the fact that it will prob-
ably be exceedingly unpalatable to absolute idealists, and may even
compel them to temper their denunciations of subjective idealism.
For, after all, they are men (by their own confession) accustomed
to follow truth wheresoever she flits, and to sacrifice their personal
feelings. But there does seem to arise a deplorable difficulty about
bringing into accord the absolute's point of view with our own.
For the absolute, solipsism is true and* forms a standpoint safe,
convenient and irrefragable. But for us there arises an antinomy.
We have on the one hand to admit that solipsism is absolute truth,
seeing that the standpoint of the absolute is absolute truth, and that
our imperfect human truth is relative to this standard. If, therefore,
solipsism is true sub specie absoluti, and we can know it to be so, we
ought to think it so. We ought, that is, to think it true that ' I am all
that is.' The absolute has proved it. And not only for itself, but
equally for any other 'I.' For regarded as a function to which all
experience is related, no 'I' differs from any other. Any 'I,' there-
fore, may claim to profit by the truth of solipsism. It will be awk-
ward, no doubt, at first to have to conceive a plurality of solipsists,
each claiming to be the sole and sufficient reason for the existence of
everything but I suppose we might get used to that. It seems,
however, a more serious implication that each of them, if his claim
were admitted, would render superfluous the assumption of an abso-
lute knower beyond himself. Instead of being absorbed in the
absolute, as heretofore, each individual solipsist would swallow up
the absolute. This consequence may seem bizarre, but does it not
follow from the premises?
The same conclusion follows also in another way. The absolute
ex hypothesi is and owns each 'private self.' And the absolute
is a solipsist. This feature, therefore, of the truth must be reflected
in each private self. They must all be solipsists. But this is
merely the truth of solipsism looked at from the standpoint of the
private self. It must claim to be all because the absolute is all
and it is the absolute as alone the absolute can be known. The
absorption of the absolute and the individual thus is mutual, because
it is merely the same truth of their community of substance dif-
ferently viewed.
On the other hand, it seems most unfortunate that in practice
we all negate the truth of solipsism, and, absolute or no, must con-
tinue so to do. Even if the impracticability of solipsism had been
exaggerated, and philosophy had been too hasty in assuming this,
the working assumptions of ordinary life would be rendered ridicu-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 89
lous, and our feelings would be hurt, if solipsism were true. It
may be said, however, that the practical absurdity and incon-
venience of a theory is no argument against it, at least in the eyes
of intellectualism.
But even waiving this, does it not remain an intellectual diffi-
culty that we have ourselves destroyed the path that led from ideal-
ism to the absolute? The absolute was reached (rightly or wrongly)
as a way of avoiding the solipsistic interpretation of experience,
which it was feared idealism might otherwise entail. It now turns
out that the absolute itself insists on the truth of solipsism. And
yet if solipsism is true, there is no reason at all for transcending the
individual experience of each solipsist! It would seem, therefore,
that we can not admit the truth of solipsism without ruining our
absolute, nor admit our absolute without admitting the truth of
solipsism. We are eternally condemned, therefore, either to labor
under an illusion, viz., that that is false which is really true, and
which we really know to be true though we can not treat it as true
without leaving our only standpoint, the human, or to reject the
very source and standard of truth itself.
In conclusion, I can only very briefly indicate what seems to me
to be a way by which absolute idealism can escape these difficulties,
even though it may perhaps lead to further troubles. Of course,
from the standpoint of absolute idealism the truth of solipsism is
only valid if the absolute is assumed to be conscious. We can,
therefore, avoid the fatal admission by assuming that it is not. The
absolute, that is, is unconscious mind, as von Hartmann long ago
contended. But what is unconscious mind ? The inherent weakness
of the 'proof of absolute idealism lies in its proceeding from the
finite human mind, which we know, to an 'infinite' non-human mind
very imperfectly analogous to it, and (apparently) incapable of
being known by us. This transition becomes more and more hazard-
ous the further we depart from the analogy with human minds.
It may fairly be disputed, therefore, whether there is any sense in
calling an unconscious mind a mind at all. But if the unconscious
absolute ceases to be conceived as mind, what becomes of the ideal-
istic side of absolutism? Among the absolutists many, no doubt,
would be quite willing (under pressure) to move towards the con-
clusions thus outlined; but would not this involve a final breach
with their theological allies, to whom the chief attraction of absolute
idealism has always been that it appeared to provide for a 'spiritual'
view of existence 1 ? But possibly neither philosophy nor theology
would suffer irreparable loss by the self-elimination of absolute
idealism. F. C. S. SCHILLER.
CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD.
90
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
THE INTERPRETATION OF A SYSTEM FROM THE POINT
OF VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
\ \7 E may assume two attitudes towards the works of men ; we
may interpret them, or, going a step farther, estimate them
according to our own or the artist's ideal. The one is the function
of the historian, the other the function of the critic who is to edu-
cate men to do better next time. You interpret the Zeus of Phidias,
Dante's Divine Comedy, or Wagner's Parsifal. You apply your
criticisms to works that pretend to contribute to modern progress,
as, for instance, a play by Maeterlinck, a new cure, or a new system
of philosophy.
Sometimes, however, the very latest systems defy the critic; he
may adjudge them stillborn because they do not conform to his
standard: nevertheless they will prove very much alive. Buechner's
'Force and Matter' was in its time the gospel of many thousands.
Haeckel's * Riddle of the Universe' was not swept into oblivion by
a flood of most expert criticism. Of these two I was vividly re-
minded by Mr. Franklin's 'Socialization of Humanity.' 1 All three
are the work of amateurs in philosophy, and have been or are still
satisfying the demands of a large class of people for a systematic
arrangement of experience. The most profitable thing, then, seems
to be an attempt at interpretation. The more so because the works
of the amateur in their unguarded boldness of reasoning offer
splendid opportunities for trapping and snap-shooting the philoso-
phizing mind when it transforms by secret processes the raw ma-
terial of experience into the finished product of a system of meta-
physics.
Now if science is first of all an ever-increasing minuteness of
description by differentiation, if it is this to-day from the point of
view of evolution, history of philosophy will not fulfill this modern
requirement unless it describes philosophizing man in his evolu-
tionary stages. The amateur philosopher, then, if I may use the
terms of anthropogeny, represents the still extant, though yet un-
appreciated, link between the expert of to-day, on the one side, and
the layman who has ever reasoned and is still reasoning from anal-
ogy to systems of anthropomorphic imagery, on the other. The
amateur employs the abstract language of the former, but, neither
grasping the difficulty of his problems nor familiar with the extent
of their solution, reveals by the recklessness of his reasoning the
1 ' The Socialization of Humanity.' An analysis and synthesis of the phe-
nomena of nature, life and society through the law of repetition. A system of
monistic philosophy, by Chas. Kendall Franklin. Chicago: Chas. H. Kerr
& Co., 1904. Pp. viii + 477.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 91
personal equation almost as clearly as the layman manifests his will
to believe without hiding behind clever argumentation. Mr. Frank-
lin appears to be an amateur in philosophy. Let us see whether he
lays bare some of the hidden ways of the philosophizing mind.
He says (187) the popular view of our situation was correctly
stated by a laboring man when the author was a child of seven; he
still remembers the striking words : "It is live hard, work hard, die
hard, and go to hell at last !" He himself seems still to hold a similar
view ; our every-day life with its struggle for existence, its panics, its
poverty, its insecurity, its wars, is in his opinion little better than
savagery (186). The church is said to be the cause of all this
misery; her theological conception of the universe prevents man
from improving this earthly life. The bits of description strewn
over more than four hundred pages, and some information received
in answer to my questionnaire concerning the natural history of the
thinker, make me infer that the church here denotes the conception
and political organization of Christianity against which Voltaire
declaimed his ' Ecrasez 1'infame,' against which the German Social
Democracy thundered her ban up to the year 1885, and which the
materialist thinkers and politically interested scientists of Europe
about 1860 feared and hated as the staunch supporter of all reaction-
ary policies. Witness, as the last survivals of that metaphysical
mood, Haeckel in his earlier philosophical writings, Renan in the
preface to his 'Souvenirs' and still to-day Bertholet in his last vol-
ume on ' Science et Libre Pensee. ' Whence, however, so much bitter-
ness and misjudgment in our author, especially here in America,
which has never known the political contrast between a conservative
majority within the state church and the followers of liberalism?
When Franklin was about thirteen, one day coming home from
work with an elder companion, he denied the existence of God because
he could not reconcile the evil he saw in nature and society with the
idea of an all-powerful God ; and still to-day he thinks the argument
from injustice most convincing and indisputable. 2 To mention a
greater name, J. S. Mill thought so too, and never ceased to think
so even when in later life he had to accept an evil and a good God.
As regards our philosopher, two causes seem to have contributed to
making permanent the sway of this argument. The first is his
being struck by life's misery too hard in his boyhood days. When
still an immature boy of eleven he was forced to quit. school and
earn a living. Any drudgery will be painful to a boy of that age
and interfere with his smooth development from the self-centered
boy to the society-centered adolescent. The boy has social instinct
2 Chap. XVI., ' The God and Immortality Hypothesis.'
92
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
enough to respect the group of boys to which he belongs. The only
demand he makes upon that group is the demand for a square deal;
.justice or, better, equality is the supreme law of his life. Any com-
munity, small or large, be it even God's, in which a boy must work
more than he is able or in which man suffers without good reason,
appears to the boy as an unjust organization. However deeply
religious the child may have been, the boy rebels against an unjust
God like the primitive man who punishes his idols for neglect or
misdemeanor; the more so because for the first time conscious of his
power to handle a few abstract terms, he judges all things, merci-
lessly applying the Procrustean bed of his narrow system of thought.
The second cause is a low degree of the teleological vision in the
adolescence of our philosopher. When at seventeen be became
'thoughtful about life, what it meant and what his duty was,' he
was forced during a Methodist revival to surrender his scepticism
and for a time acknowledge the truth of orthodox Christianity. He,
however, commenced at once to study the Bible, and the more he
studied it the less he believed in it, without having yet looked into
the writings of men like Conybear, M. J. Savage, W. H. Mallock
and Tom Paine. If I may state in a few words what other indi-
vidual analyses shall bring out more fully, this continued critical
attitude of the adolescent philosopher means to me that the five
features of the teleological vision the emotion of optimism, the
emotion of the unity of the universe, the emotion of one's humble
place in a purposeful universe, the communistic emotion of love,
and the communistic volition of equality and sacrifice were not so
intensely experienced in his 'first conversion' as to undo his boyhood
reasoning by opening a view into a vaster and more purposeful uni-
verse than the boy had ever known. The several individual pur-
poses of this spiritual world may be hidden from our vision, but
appear as firmly established as the whole mental experience which
announces to the boy the advent of his adolescence. Thus Carlyle
('Sartor Resartus'), although for ten years rather believing in the
Devil and a society subject to him and hostile to the struggling
youth, finally, in his twenty-fourth year, had his 'conversion' or
'fire-baptism' on Leith walk and realized the larger spiritual world
of the German idealists. Franklin himself seems to think that his
having had no particular religious training determined the light
transitory character of his first 'conversion.' Herbert Spencer
rather felt the other way, that his mental make-up would never have
responded to any religious training, however judiciously applied.
Leaving aside Mill's case as one-sided over- feeding and artificial
deformation of the mind, both may be right, representing different
species of mental constitution, especially so because our author now,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 93
in the maturity of his manhood, knows, like any true positivist, the
ecstasies of religion.
But whatever have been the causes, the boyhood reasoning from
the analogy of tribal equality to man's place in the universe has
been firmly fixed once for all. So the author's preachment on man
as 'a being unfavored, unfriended by the Infinite' (4) still reveals
a metaphysical mood that since his boyhood feels, as it were, the
world to be split into two hostile camps. This mood manifesting
itself from time to time in emotions of a dualistic view of life ap-
pears to be an especially common, though transitory, disease of the
adolescent, a disease which results from his struggle to adapt him-
self to life under the new stimulus of his ideals. However, it may
also become chronic or at least permanently affect the intellectual
life of the mature man; it is then accompanied by, or evident in,
a tendency to antithetical reasoning which leaves the affected indi-
vidual unaware of the relativity of values and knowledge, and pre-
vents him in many cases from conceiving impartial judgments.
Witness Saint Paul and Augustine, or Tolstoy and Carlyle. Tolstoy
was not able to adapt himself for any length of time to the life of
the upper classes of Russian society, because it was not suited to his
spiritual nature ; therefore he began to hate and to reject not only
that life, but also western civilization represented by it, as altogether
immoral, and to love and to believe in the life of the peasant and its
spiritual possibilities. Carlyle struggled for ten years with what
he called the materialism and atheism of Edinburgh society; it did
not satisfy his metaphysical and spiritual needs and, worst of all,
it did not seem to have a place for him. When the final unification
of his mind started in with reaching the 'Center of Indifference,'
he had grown the antithetical thinker and moralizing critic which
he remained to the end. An almost perfect record of such growth
has been written by a master hand in ' Sartor Resartus, ' especially in
the 'Sorrows of Teufelsdrokh' and the chapters following. A
similar struggle seems to resound in page 246 of Mr. Franklin's
book, where the author tells us that religion is the joy of man's life.
When a youth he desires to do something for the betterment of the
race, being by nature a reformer. He is intoxicated with his dream.
But he attempts to do things and fails. His enthusiasm dies out,
and at thirty all the dreams of his youth disappear and his ideals
are dead. To venture a psychological interpretation, at thirty Mr.
Franklin had completed the critical period of adolescence which, in
his case, at first modified, later on destroyed, the metaphysical system
taught to the child and the boy by his surroundings during the years
of mental dependence. He must have been for years without faith
in any satisfactory order of the universe. When at twenty-two the
94 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
constructive period of his adolescence set in, overlapping the critical
one, it took him yet at least eight years to conceive the central idea
of his system around which his metaphysical thoughts might crystal-
lize into unity. These eight years of his life without spiritual unity
and support may easily have worn out the ideal will for a time.
However, most people do not take up the work of their manhood
without any faith. So it is only natural that, as I am told, the
positive beliefs of his manhood came to our thinker between his
thirtieth and his fortieth year. It must have been at thirty or
shortly thereafter that he 'experienced the profoundest surprise' in
learning God to be an allegory only for tribe or nation or humanity
(249). With this equation he had conceived the central ideal of
his system and his practical philosophy: humanity the final cause
of the individual 's life ; this life to be socialized, that is, to be lived
in complete devotion to humanity.
This constructive reasoning of his thirties Franklin has called
his third conversion his second conversion had invaded conscious-
ness at eighteen in the form of a moonlight illumination that told
him he was then free from the orthodox conception of the fall of
man, the atonement and hell. The happiness resulting from the
third conversion is said to have been much more intense than that
accompanying the first two. This statement agrees very well with
the positive beliefs gained by the third which are so necessary to a
healthy life; his manhood reasoning had then been completed in a
way satisfactory to the individual.
The method, however, employed in it still bears the marks of the
antithetical effect upon his reasoning of the metaphysical struggle
of his youth. He reasons thus: the hideousness of modern civiliza-
tion with its poverty, its struggle for existence, its wars, is due to
the inefficiency of Christianity (177). The religion of the church
is chiefly superstition, fanaticism, bigotry, hypocrisy (333). Chris-
tianity does not recognize that governments may do wrong (361).
Society, owing to its traditional theology, makes no effort to remedy
the social tragedies (367). The thought-stopping answers of the-
ology have stultified man in his investigations (261). Religion is
taken advantage of by designing individuals (127). Hypocrisy is
the philosophy of the leaders of men to-day as it has been in all past
ages in transitional periods, as from mythology to theology (144).
The lace has ever been the victim of its great individuals, nobilities,
priesthoods, professions (151). It is the avowed object of college
training to hold persons in their childhood beliefs instead of making
them original thinkers (183). Every revolutionizing genius and
scientist has suffered as the martyr of his cause (168). And last,
not least, Christianity does not fit the individual's acute intellect
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 95
(338). In short, the Christian church stands for a theory of things
which considers man to be a slave to an imaginary God and his vice-
gerents and minions here on earth, and existence to be a fixed condi-
tion of servitude, instead of a glorious career of development. It is
either Rome or reason, as Cardinal Newman said (194). The author
has chosen reason; for him science, the work of man's reason, has
taken the place Of our effete theology.
Eeason apparently denotes with Franklin something that will
assist in realizing the ideals the youth dreamed of, the betterment of
the race. Reason, highly appreciated in the matter-of-fact attitude
of manhood, leads to a rational or scientific conception of the uni-
verse and permits of conceiving a rational system of living (6).
This scientific knowledge begins with matter and energy, and ends
by describing all nature in their terms. While the scientist of to-
day will be glad to reduce all knowledge to mathematical equations,
Mr. Franklin seems to hold the fond hope of the eighteenth century
that it will be possible to mechanize science; his enthusiasm, not
sobered by either epistemology or even an amateur philosopher like
Du-Bois-Reymond, carries him away to the assertion that even the
ultimate secrets of the universe are within the limits of our investi-
gation (7) ; life will not be a mystery but a science (256).
Empedocles would have satisfied his demand for light on the
process of knowing by his answer: ^anyc /JLSV yap yalav 6na>xa/J.v (we
know the like by the like). Knowing meant to the Greek thinker
(if I understand it at all) nothing less than to know as much of a
thing as you may know of yourself by introspection; his way and
his theory of knowing had not yet outgrown the anthropomorphizing
attitude of primitive man. The same method of knowing is used
by Mr. Franklin when he rises against the scientists who do not
admit that the internal vibrations registered in the nervous system
of animals are identical with the external vibrations of the environ-
ment. From his point of view they must be identical or else we
would have unlike knowing like for the first time in all nature (44).
If the mind is not the residual representations of external energies
so as to be identical with it, then it is inexplicable, then the universe
is unknowable, then science is but a dream, and man the sorry dupe
of his own nature. Such is not the case (46). He is certainly not
a pragmatist; he is an enthusiastic rationalist; he will not submit
to the relativity of human knowledge, but believes in our ability to
arrive at absolute knowledge; and since he unknowingly reasons
from the analogy of his own inner aspect to the life of the things
about him, he insists on knowing the like by the like as the only
method that satisfies 'his longings for absolute knowledge' (80).
On the other hand, Mr. Franklin has given up in despair the
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
task of forming a concept of a purposeful universe out of the ap-
parent chaos and realizes that man is a being unfriended by the
Infinite (4) ; his teleological vision lacking in intensity, he has re-
signed himself to that knowledge that describes nature in terms of
matter and energy. But since these external phenomena are silently
understood to have an inner aspect according to the above principle
of knowing the like by the like, the thinker may easily take mechan-
ical energies to be identical with mind as their residua in the brain ;
nor is the inference to be wondered at that we shall finally know
what we are and what everything else is in terms of our own being
(256) ; then we shall also know what matter is because we know what
emotions and ideas are (85) ; thus the gap between mind and matter
is spanned, and the whence, whither and why of humanity deter-
mined (129).
The hidden anthropomorphism comes out more clearly in his
chapter on 'Aspects of Scientific Morality,' where the various forms
of the will are given as chemical affinity, appetite, desire, will, love,
religion (348). Mr. Franklin illustrates his way of reasoning by
referring to Bacon's 'Advancement of Learning.' 3 However, we
need not go back into the past. This anthropomorphic stage of
scientific reasoning with its belief in absolute knowledge and its
inability to perceive the outer as well as the inner aspect of this
world as psychic realities may still be studied in life. Professor E.
Haeckel, of Jena, regarded in 1892 4 all matter as endowed with feel-
ing and the power of motion, and, as a true rationalist demanding
an explanation of chemical affinity, accepted the Empedoclean sup-
position that the molecules or atoms feel each other. To-day his
hylonism, or hylozoism, is, according to 'The Wonders of Life/
meant to express 'the fact that all substance has two fundamental
attributes; as matter it occupies space, and as force or energy it is
endowed with sensation.' In the same way, Professor W. von
Bechterev 5 needs for his scientific reasoning a psyche (innere Verar-
beitung ausserer Riickwirkungen ) as the inner aspect of the most
simple living beings, but he more cautiously arrests his anthropo-
morphizing bent where the series of living substances ends. Neither
do I think that Herbert Spencer in making the equation, ether =
consciousness, passed beyond this hylozoism ; and Diogenes, of Apol-
lonia, generalizing primitive thought, for instance, that of the ancient
Hebrew, endowed all the air with an inner aspect.
However, before we go on with the analysis of the philosopher in
hand, we must state here in justice to him that quitting the common
3 Book IV., Chap. 3.
4 Monist, III., p. 234.
5 Journal fur Psychologic u. Neurologic, V., p. 211.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 97
school when still a boy of eleven, he has not had the opportunity for,
and guidance in, developing so rich a system of concepts as one who
attends school until he enters upon a profession at about twenty-five.
Thus there was a limited range of concepts and a limited capacity
for receiving new ones at his disposal while he was constructing a
vast metaphysical system. This limitation of intellectual content
accounts for the fact that our rationalist is, on the one hand, so
easily satisfied with anthropomorphic ways of reasoning, though
determined on a rigorous mechanization of all science, and, on the
other hand, manifests a certain unwillingness to stand the 'showers
of scientific technicalities' and an inability to understand the in-
tricacies of modern science. For instance, he thinks that the various
definitions of society proposed by sociologists are due to a capricious
desire to be original rather than to express the facts in the case
(373). It is no wonder that at the age of eighteen he was at first
not able to understand Mallock's 'Is Life Worth Living?' and that
he read Comte's 'Positive Philosophy' in Martineau's abbreviation
'many times' since his twenty-second year before he understood his
' greatest philosopher. '
With such mental make-up, holding fast to the true rationalist
method that he had followed since his boyhood days, he looked out
upon the universe. In the eyes of the anthropomorphizing thinker,
the universe is a being the only business of which is to economically
expend energy, and, like a householder or economist, he assumes the
utilitarian attitude of mind, asking ' what for ? ' and ' to whose bene-
fit ? ' The answer is not favorable to that being, because the conception
of an economical expenditure of energy does very well when applied to
living beings that succeed best in preserving life by greatest economy
along with the vigorous play of their biological functions, but can
never be deduced from the life of a universe which as a whole is not
accessible to scientific analysis. Nature is the most wasteful organ-
ization (12). Its seemingly intelligent arrangement does not amount
to much when we estimate all of the waste. If man had the power,
he could make improvements in the solar system, arrange to better
advantage the rainfall upon the earth and economize the sunlight.
Man might plan such wonderful things because the energies of nature
in their fortuitous combinations have resulted in a new world, the
life of the individual controlled by the conscious or subconscious
mind; the test for this mind is order resulting from an ever more
economical expenditure of energy that goes to preserve the indi-
vidual and the race (96). Thus, according to Mr. Franklin, pur-
posive mind appears a stranger in a strange world which has no
purpose. Only in a few places we may come across a larger vision
that recalls Hegel (whom the author never felt inclined to study) ;
98 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
for instance, where Franklin sums up the universal process by saying
that the individual comprises within himself all of nature and all
of society by being the object in which nature returns upon itself in
self-consciousness (161 ) .
In general, however, and consistent with the whole system, the
narrower vision prevails. A part of the universe has been sur-
rendered as inaccessible to the purposive interpretation of the ideal
will or teleological vision. The remainder is not, as one should infer
from his biological test for mind consisting in economical expenditure
of energy, the whole animate world, to which modern scientists, in
contrast with eighteenth-century rationalism, feel inclined to extend
the fellowship of kin ; the remainder is humanity only, that part of
the animate world which is capable of planning a greater perfection
of its life and conceiving of the socialization of humanity as its final
cause and chief concern. Since Mr. Franklin has learned to his joy
that society is the author and perfecter of our being, he demands
that all prayers, all songs, all praises, all service, be inspired by
humanity and directed to humanity (270), 'in which we live and
move and have our being. '
Thus religion is the very climax of mental life, because it is the
emotion of race-protection (95), because the most exquisite ecstasy
possible to a human being comes from the performance of his social
functions (155). Without religion no socialization! Only the
supreme ecstasy of religion will overcome selfish individualism, the
immediate cause of all social misery (251). Therefore one should
make religion the basis in our system of education ( 105 ) , so that no
scholar may leave school without the vision of humanity. On this
basis, the educator is to consciously and consistently build up his
educational practice after the demands of biology and sociology. He
should teach what nature is and how to live in it, what society is
and how to adjust one's self to it; he should teach these subjects,
even sociology, by the experimental methods (181).
After this practical philosophy had been worked out, or at least
conceived in its main features, Mr. Franklin seems to have felt the
need of unifying his ideas about life into one homogeneous system,
or, as he says, 'to interpret everything in the terms of some one
thing.' When at the age of twenty-two he decided to construct his
own system of philosophy it was with him a matter-of-course that
he reject the conception of God as unsuited to guide to ultimate
terms, because the inner aspect was, for lack of vision, not the pre-
dominant factor of his experience. As we saw above, he accepted
as suited for the purpose the terms of the space or outer aspect. He
found it easier to arrive at an ultimate substance and an ultimate
law than his master. Comte, too well informed to believe in the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 99
mechanization of science, yet gifted with too narrow a vision to look
at ultimate questions from the psychical point of view Comte in
the 'Introduction' holds out no hope that he might be able to reduce
the vast variety of experience as proceeding from a single principle
and as subjected to a single law.
Mr. Franklin then began, quite up to date, with energy as the
ultimate concept, as if he were familiar with Ostwald's speculations
on matter and followed him in not seeing the heterogeneity and
reciprocity of matter and energy, that is, that neither term can do
without the other nor take the place of the other. Energy, we are
further told, manifests itself as gravitant and radiant. Gravitant
energy produces the forms of -matter, radiant energy the conditions
of matter. The latter is 'expended' (1) by inanimate nature, (2)
by the self-interested individual under the direction of the intellect
(fourth law of motion), (3) by the same under the guidance of the
emotional 'moral sense' (fifth law of motion), and (4) by the same
according to the 'social sense' or scientific knowledge (sixth law of
motion) ; each form more and more approaching the perfectly eco-
nomical method of the last. Gravitant or internal energy manifests
itself (1) in nature as chemical affinity, (2) as the instinct of self-
preservation in the animate world, (3) as sexual love in man, and
(4) as religion, holding men together in a social organization. From
the fact that both kinds of energy behave everywhere and at all
times in the same way, the author deduced and discovered, after
seventeen years of thought, the law of external and internal repeti-
tion as the ultimate law. It seems to mean that there are uniformi-
ties of nature; nature follows up the same causes with the same
effects: Mr. Franklin wants to have here subsumed Tarde's and
Baldwin's laws of imitation. Only the varied combination of the
two kinds of energy produce change, evolution and progress.
So much for the general character and growth of this 'monistic
system of philosophy,' which is as much a monism as Professor
Haeckel's or any other hylozoism.
If I were finally asked to give an opinion on the practical edu-
cative value of the work that embodies the system, I should point out
these three of its features. First, it is all through a passionate plea
for the ever more thorough application of science to the functions
of individual and social life: let us eat and drink scientifically, let
us work and rest scientifically, let us engender offspring scientifically,
let us organize society scientifically. What the author means may,
in part, I think, be well illustrated by the exceedingly scientific con-
duct of the Japanese commissariat and medical service during the
late war. I wish, indeed, some academy of sciences would compile
a moral code, something parallel to the civil code of the courts; a
100
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
code which prescribes rules of conduct regarding the various func-
tions of the individual and society ; which could be revised at stated
intervals like the official dictionary of the French Academy; a code
which would infinitely assist the anxious inquirer to live a healthier,
more useful and happier life and thus prevent many evils arising
from the ignorance of those who are willing to do better.
Second, the book forces upon us the conclusion that the very
application of science to the problems of social life will contribute
to tighten the social fabric in order to preserve and increase the life
of the social body and the individuals composing it. Mr. Franklin
is not a socialist of this or that brand ; well, he is as much of a
socialist as we all are who want to consciously and scientifically
guide the evolution of society to forms of organization in which the
individual reaches his highest development and is thereby enabled
to serve society in the most efficient way. Mr. Franklin, though
better appreciating the function of society than Herbert Spencer,
is still at heart an Anglo-Saxon individualist, he is not kin to the
German socialist, because with Franklin the socialization of humanity
is not an end in itself, but a means to create conditions favorable to
perfect the life of the individual. The German socialist represents
a racial admixture to the Teuton stock which is not made for an
individualistic society; his vision of the state is not so differentiated
as to include the most intense individualization as a means of in-
creasing the life of the body politic.
And third, education ought to be more rigorously planned and
practiced from the biological point of view of efficiency to preserve
and increase life ; and since skill is developed and efficiency attained
by practice or experiment only, Mr. Franklin wants to have the
laboratory methods extended even to the subject of sociology. I
suppose he has in mind something like the 'school city' political
organizations of high school pupils tried successfully in several larger
cities of the east and middle west and resorted to already by
the great educators and character-builders of eighteenth-century
rationalism.
This is his sermon, and I am sure a large and congenial congre-
gation is ready to listen to its preacher.
EDWIN TAUSCH.
OHIO UNIVERSITY.
101
A REPLY TO DR. MINER
"A yf~Y recent review of the Iowa Studies in Psychology has called
-J-'-*- forth a rejoinder from Dr. Miner. It will be remembered
that Dr. Miner's paper in the Studies sought, in part, to determine
whether 'the loss of sight in a blind person is compensated for by
greater keenness in the other senses.' Such an investigation could,
of course, be accomplished only by first making an accurate and
thorough determination of the (congenitally blind) patient's sensi-
tivity in the various sense departments, and then comparing these
results with data similarly obtained from normal subjects. My
review pointed out in detail that Dr. Miner's work failed to meet
either of these requirements.
The author now replies that his paper is entitled to favorable con-
sideration because the condition of his patient's health prevented
'long-continued experiments,' and because the publication professed
to be nothing more than a preliminary report. Dr. Miner seemed to
be favored with an unusual opportunity to contribute to the solution
of a much-disputed problem. And every psychologist must regret
that the complete accomplishment of his purpose was prevented by
circumstances over which he had no control. Yet the fact remains
that half a loaf is better than no bread. Under the peculiar circum-
stances of the case, Dr. Miner found himself confronted by two
alternatives; either he might make a superficial examination of the
whole field, or he might confine his efforts to a thorough investigation
of a circumscribed part of the problem. And our criticism would
have been forestalled if he had chosen the latter alternative.
It is not clear to me why the fact that a paper is a preliminary
report should absolve it from criticism. One is under no compulsion
to publish a half-finished product ; and the utility of immature publi-
cation may well be called in question, particularly in these days of
strenuously active production. No doubt there may, in certain cases,
be adequate reasons for such a preliminary report. Dr. Miner
assures us that his was published in the hope of obtaining suggestions
for further work. But has he forgotten his patient's feeble health?
One can not eat one 's cake and have it too. Was the patient available
for additional experiments, or was she not? If she was, then the
excuse given for lack of thoroughness of experimentation is unjusti-
fied. If she was not, then the reason assigned for premature publica-
tion is idle.
Dr. Miner charges my review with a twofold omission, and with
various 'misrepresentations.' As for the omission, it is to be borne in
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mind that a review is, in the nature of the case, a brief summary and
criticism of a more lengthy publication. Certain omissions must be
made; and there may be room for difference of opinion as to what
points are to be included and what omitted. A single omission, even
if it be twofold as in the present instance, is not of necessity an un-
pardonable sin. Moreover, if Dr. Miner will look again he will find
that his report of an abnormal color sensitivity which I am charged
with 'completely overlooking' is not omitted from the review.
I am said to 'misrepresent' the condition of his patient in that I
referred to her disorder as 'a cataract.' The affection was not con-
fined to a single eye, and hence I should have said ' cataracts. ' But
if Dr. Miner will consult the literature he will find that I have
abundant authority for the form of expression which I employed.
Would he maintain that Ware, Franz and other writers of equal
prominence have persistently 'misrepresented' the condition of their
patients?
Exception is taken to my criticism that the author dismisses the
problem of passive touch with a single short sentence. It is explained
that the pith-ball test revealed ' no peculiar sensitivity, ' and .that ' time
was too precious to waste on unnecessary tests.' Truly! But why
select the uncertain pith-ball test, rather than employ the much more
accurate and much more refined esthesiometer of von Frey? It
seemed to the reviewer to be an essential part of the investigation to
determine accurately whether the patient's training in the school for
the blind had refined the sensitivity of her finger-tips. Hence my
criticism of Dr. Miner's treatment of passive touch and of dual im-
pression.
It is further charged that I described the test of active touch as
unmeaning, and that my criticism is based upon my misrepresentation
of the experiment. Here, again, Dr. Miner is in error ; for if he will
reread the review he will find that I passed no criticism whatever
upon this test, and that I neither misrepresented his experiment nor
described it as unmeaning. What I did criticize was the form in
which he expressed his results. These are not presented in relative
terms. And since no normal records are given for comparison, the
reader is wholly at a loss to know whether the author's statement
means that his patient's sensitivity to active touch was normal, was
abnormally acute, or was abnormally obtuse. Hence my criticism:
"The stimulus limen of active touch is expressed in terms of the
number of sheets of paper through which a fine wire could be felt, a
statement which is unmeaning as it stands, and no normal records are
presented for comparison."
Dr. Miner and I are widely at variance as to what constitute the
essential features in an investigation of depth perception. He
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 103
describes his sole experiment as follows: " Different sized balls were
hung at varying distances from her. Using only one eye, she judged
them to be at the same distance when one was 15 cm. farther away.
But the difference was narrowed down to 6 cm. when both eyes were
converged on one ball and then on the other. Her error was thus cut
in half by using both eyes together." The description of the
conditions under which this determination was made is, as will be
seen, exceedingly meager. It seems probable, however, that the ex-
perimenter was attempting to test the influence of the primary cri-
teria upon his patient 's estimation of distance. Now, it is agreed by
all investigators of the visual perception of distance that the primary
criteria whether they be conceived in terms of muscular sensations,
or of purely retinal data are effective in proportion as the visual
object is near the eye. It is clear then that Dr. Miner's statement is
defective in that no mention is made of the distance from the eye
at which his test was made. Moreover, in any investigation of the
influence of the primary criteria, it is essential that secondary
criteria be excluded. Dr. Miner's experiment, as described in his
paper, did not provide for the exclusion of change of visual angle
nor of other secondary clues to distance. The reviewer noted this
defect and suggested that an adequate statement of the conditions
would have specified the diameters of 'the different sized balls/
Dr. Miner assures us that the absolute distances and the varying
sizes of the balls 'have little bearing upon the characteristic demon-
strated, namely, the change in her accuracy. ' The reviewer is unable
to share this disdain of established facts.
In reporting his tests of tonal discrimination, the author brings
forward but a single set of numerical results. "With the tuning
forks she distinguished, nine times out of ten, a difference of eight
vibrations from the international a (435 vibrations)." Since, here
again, no data for normal subjects are presented, the reviewer was
obliged to turn to the literature for comparative results. It has
been established that the normal difference limen for this region of
the tonal scale is, after preliminary practice, considerably less than
one vibration. Inasmuch, then, as Dr. Miner found that his patient's
difference limen was some twentyfold greater than that of the normal
subject, and yet in the face of this fact concluded that she possessed a
normal sensitivity, the reviewer ventured to suggest that there seemed
to be a discrepancy between the author's premise and his conclusion.
Dr. Miner replies by introducing new data which he has obtained
from normal subjects, and which he finds to bear witness to the
normality of his patient. Why were these data not included in the
original paper, to which they properly belong? It is just this failure
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
to present comparative results which has been a chief factor in
rendering the publication abortive. Moreover, the fact that the
author's determinations of the normal difference limen for tones are
twentyfold greater than the normal determinations of the most re-
liable workers in the field of psychological acoustics shows that there
is something radically wrong with Dr. Miner's conditions of practice
or of experimentation.
I believe that I have met all of the objections raised against my
review. It is unnecessary to add that I stand by my original criti-
cism. Dr. Miner seems to me to have been guilty of an error of
judgment in the planning and conduct of his whole investigation.
I am convinced, too, that he merits criticism for the imperfect char-
acter of his presentation. Whether I am right or wrong in these
contentions I can only leave to the competent to decide.
J. W. BAIRD.
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Philosophy of F. H. Jacobi. ALEXANDER W. CRAWFORD. Cornell
Studies in Philosophy, No. 6. The Macmillan Co. 1905. Pp.
iii + 90.
A new presentation of this philosophy of realism, immediacy, experi-
ence and faith is certainly welcome in view of the prominence of these
catchwords in contemporary discussion. Not that Jacobi throws any
new light upon our controversies, for his thought is ill-defined, but it is
interesting to note the form which the reaction against rationalism and
sensationalism assumed in his writings. His personality, also, has
much in it that is akin to some of the modern leaders of the new thought.
Professor Crawford's monograph is the result of an exhaustive study
of his subject and his quotations and references give ample material for
the reconstruction of Jacobi's system. His work appears to be a labor
of love, and where he errs it is largely due to his desire to give his subject
the benefit of the most liberal interpretation possible. This is, indeed,
to a certain extent justifiable in the case of men of the Platonic tem-
perament whose contribution is an attitude rather than a system, yet
when done it should be done explicitly and clearly. There seems to be,
also, a certain looseness in the use of such fundamental terms as realism,
idealism and immediate, which makes the author's interpretations mis-
leading. The term realism, especially, seems to irritate him as applied
to Jacobi's philosophy because it suggests to him a materialistic inter-
pretation of reality, its colorless epistemological meaning, which is that
emphasized by Jacobi himself, being but grudgingly recognized. Cer-
tain inconsistencies of statement naturally result from these ambi-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 105
guities but, taken as a whole, the book gives an extremely readable and
complete account of this faith philosophy.
Jacobi's starting-point was the primacy of the heart over the head,
and his whole philosophy was an attempt to interpret the world in such
fashion as would validate life's practical ideals. The particular form
of his doctrine was determined by his opposition to the prevailing
rationalism of his day, the logical outcome of which he believed to be
a Spinozistic pantheism incompatible with individual personality. As
against such a conceptual system Jacobi stood for the primacy of life
and experience as alone furnishing the reality which must be the corre-
late and standard of our thinking. But in this experience he discovered
other elements than those furnished by sensation. Certain spiritual
realities are presented immediately in feeling or reason which have as
great a certitude as those of sense. God, as well as the world, is present
in our lives, and of His reality we need, and can have, no other proof
than that we find Him there. Sense and feeling are thus the coordinate
sources of the data upon which all our thinking rests.
It is in the interpretation of the nature of this immediate spiritual
intuition that our author's position seems doubtful. Criticizing the
present reviewer's assertion that in the act of perception Jacobi makes
the mind passive toward its object and that his whole doctrine of knowl-
edge is really an attempt to rid knowledge of the thought element in it,
Professor Crawford says, " This would be true only of Jacobi's earlier
expositions of perception, when he called it a form of feeling, but it is
the contention of this study that his later adoption of the word ' reason '
in place of ' feeling ' is a recognition, or a restoration, of the thought
element in reason or judgment" (p. 47). It might be enough to place
alongside of this passage the following : " The real, then, is given in
perception rather than in thought or in ratiocination. Perception is real
because it gives both thought and being. . . . Conception can not give
objectivity; this is found only in perception, where alone actuality is given.
In the same way reason (faith), as a form of perception, creates no con-
cepts, builds no system, passes no judgments, but, like the external sense,
merely reveals and positively makes known" (p. 59). Jacobi's whole phi-
losophy is built upon this contrast between mediacy and immediacy, be-
tween that knowledge which is the result of reflection and subject to
proof, and that which is given and not susceptible to proof. That the
receptivity of the mind may itself be viewed as a kind of activity does
not affect his position that the objects of faith are not known through a
process, or that perception and thought are distinct. That such a con-
ception of pure immediacy is not capable of being consistently carried
out is no ground for denying that it was actually held. This the author
appears to recognize when he says, " If Jacobi's view of immediacy were
possible at all, it would render seZf-consciousness impossible. . . . All
this Jacobi felt in a way; and only in so far as he got beyond the stand-
point of immediacy did he formulate a philosophy at all." Which is
only to say that he failed to hold fast to what was his real principle.
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The author's discussion of Jacobi's realism is even more uncertain in
tenor. He is uneasy at the idea of classing him as a realist and yet is
forced to do so, formally at least. His trouble lies in his failure to
understand what this realism means in this connection. Jacobi believed
that our experience is not a mere train of subjective mental states,
sensations and ideas, but that real objects are given us immediately and
are the objects to which out thought refers. " In the first and simplest
perception there must be the ' I ' and the ' thou,' inner consciousness and
external object existing together in the soul: both in the same indivisible
moment, without before or after, without any operation of the under-
standing, nay, even without in the slightest degree beginning the pro-
duction of the concept of cause and effect" (p. 57). Real objects, not
ideas, are thus the primary data of knowledge and, though independent
of us, given in our experience. They are revealed to us as things be-
yond us, yet within us. Their being known by us adds nothing to their
reality, which is the condition of our accidental knowing of them. And
this reality which objects have is not a mere phenomenal reality, such
as Kant ascribed to the objects of knowledge, but is a complete noumenal
reality, so that our author's assertion that Jacobi is no ' more of a realist
than Kant ' is hard to understand. It is quite true that the most im-
portant, if not ultimately all, realities are for Jacobi of a spiritual nature,
subjects rather than substances, yet this is obviously beside the question
of the relation of our knowledge to its object. With his insistence upon
the ultimate significance of the individual person and the impossibility
of turning faith into knowledge, Jacobi would have been the last to
accept the monism of the Hegelian idealism. Such a monism was for
him always the type of a rational philosophy, but, as such, always the
proof that a rational philosophy was inadequate as a formulation of
reality. As an upholder of the doctrine of the primacy and independence
of spiritual reals, Jacobi must be looked upon as the founder of the
realistic opposition to that line of idealists of whom Kant was the first.
NORMAN WILDE.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.
Mathematical Emancipations. C. J. KEYSER. Monist, January, 1906.
Pp. 65-83.
The clear and elementary account of the concept of dimensionality
which Professor Keyser has given us under the above somewhat mysti-
fying title is especially welcome, inasmuch as writers in our philosophic
journals are wont to drag Kantianism into the discussion and so confuse
the issue. We regret, however, to find the paper confined, for the most
part, to the exposition of mathematical facts, ignoring the work of Poin-
care, 1 who has presented essentially the same material and interpreted it
with great philosophic insight.
The creation of manifolds by the act of discrimination, says Professor
Keyser, is the most primitive manifestation of mind. The dimension-
1 Cf. especially ' Science et Hypothese,' Part 2. Paris, 1902.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 107
ality of a manifold, mathematical or otherwise, depends upon the number
of independent facts which must be known to distinguish any element
of it from all the other elements. But the dimensionality depends in
part upon the will of the investigator; the plane is two-dimensional in
terms of either points or lines, but if treated as a collection of circles, as
is perfectly permissible, it is three-dimensional, since two independent
data are required for position and one for size in the case of each element.
It is four-dimensional in parabolas, five-dimensional in conies, etc., * with-
out limit' (p. 75). We can in like manner analyze any configurations of
space in many different ways. The mystery of hyperdimensionality
vanishes in the simplicity of these considerations, and we see that our
preference for the point among possible elements is to be explained
through the fact that 'practical man precedes man rational and deter-
mines for the latter his rational choices' (p. 77). 2
Dimensionalities exceeding three in points have a special interest.
Such manifolds are created in thought and have genuine conceptual
existence (p. 80). Just as we can posit the point manifold which we call
a plane, and a point outside of it which we connect by lines with every
point of the plane, and so generate a three-dimensional manifold in
points, we can also posit a point outside of this manifold and connect it
similarly with every point already given, thus obtaining a four-dimen-
sional manifold in points. But, " Is it possible to intuit configurations
in a hyperspace of points?" (p. 81). While admitting inability to an-
swer with absolute confidence, Professor Keyser thinks that with practise
and acquired skill " the parts of a familiar fourfold configuration may be
made to pass before the eye of intuition in such swift and effortless suc-
cession that the configuration seems present as a whole in a single instant.
If the process and result are not, properly speaking, fourfold imagination
and fourfold image, it remains for the psychologist to indicate what is
lacking" (p. 82).
A more satisfactory treatment of this problem could have been derived
from the study of Poincare, 3 or even from taking Russell's* account of
geometry to heart. The geometry with which Professor Keyser deals is
pure geometry not yet applied in our world of experience. In pure geom-
etry, the problem of intuiting a space is the problem of holding a complex
of logical relations before the mind, and it is certain we can not do this
for complex configurations of three- or even two-dimensional point mani-
folds. In applied geometry, on the other hand, to intuit space as four
dimensional would mean to have our experience different from what it is ;
thus, if the feelings of convergence and accommodation of the eyes, as
factors in our perception of depth, varied independently, visual space
would be a four-dimensional point manifold; yet while we can state the
condition, we can have no idea what the new experience would be like,
and so there is no possibility of intuiting our space as four-dimensional
2 Cf . Poincare", op. cit., pp. 67, 91.
*Loc. Cit.
4 ' Principles of Mathematics,' Ch. LX1V. Cambridge, 1003.
108
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
in this sense. The paper closes with the usual vindication of the study
of ' hypergeometries ' through esthetic joy in reasoning.
HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
Role des sensations internes dans les emotions et dans la perception de la
duree. G. R. D'ALLONES. Revue Philosophique, December, 1905.
Pp. 592-623.
The case is here reported of a woman, fifty-three years of age, unedu-
cated but intelligent, and without any discoverable hereditary taint, who
from being naturally of a highly emotional disposition had come, in con-
sequence of sickness and various depleting conditions, to feel, apparently,
no emotions at all. The interesting feature of the case is that at the
very moment when she declares that she does not feel a certain emotion,
she nevertheless shows all the signs of it in their normal intensity. The
suspicion, however, that we are dealing here with a ' psychasthenic,' or
with the victim of a fixed idea, is not well grounded; there is good reason
to believe that her statements about her feelings are true. The author
has examined the patient with reference to her sensibility and finds that,
while there are no defects such as to cause an appreciable modification
of external perception and little perturbation of the motor functions,
visceral sensibility is practically abolished and organic sensibility gen-
erally profoundly affected. Thus, while tactile sensibility is only lowered,
there is complete anesthesia to heat and pain over almost the entire sur-
face of the body. The gustatory sensations are defective; the patient
never feels hunger or satiety, thirst rarely, fatigue hardly at all and
never the benefit of repose; a sensation serves as a signal when the
bladder or rectum is full, but without distress, and the discharge of the
function is never attended with the feeling of relief; purgatives cause no
colic and no increased sense of need, etc. Castor oil produces nausea,
but no feeling of disgust. On one important point the evidence seems
defective, namely, as to the sensations accompanying respiration and
circulation; but we are assured by the author (p. 614) that the internal
reflexes are totally unconscious.
The main inference drawn from these facts coincides with the result
previously reached by Sollier, 1 that the essential thing in emotion is the
visceral sensibility, and that sensations from l movements of relation '
are only accessory. The author, however, writes from the point of view
of the peripheral theory, which Sollier, with his ' cerebral ' interpretation
of the facts, discards. Whatever the interpretation, the intimate and
essential connection of visceral and emotional susceptibility seems to be
one of the most certain results of investigation in this field.
Another inference is that we have to distinguish among organic sen-
sations the affective, i. e., visceral and cutaneous painful and thermal,
and the non-affective, i. e. } sensorial, tactile and external motor.
A further, and important, inference is that we must distinguish emo-
1 ' Mcanisme des Emotions,' pp. 178 if.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 109
tions and inclinations. The patient is still capable of ' intellectual '
inclinations, she f fears ' without suffering, * desires ' without pleasure or
distress. Such inclinations are explained as the residua of previous emo-
tions devoid of their affective nucleus, the internal sensations. They are
constituted, it is held, of sensations of external movements, special sense
data, memories, ideas, judgments, reasonings, the whole capable of cohe-
sion and systematization and of being externalized, without emotion, in
words, mimic movements and acts.
A further peculiarity of the patient is that she has no sense of the
lapse of time. This the author also connects with the loss of visceral
sensibility, and concludes that the living sense of duration, of the con-
tinuity in succession of the daily events, is nothing but visceral sensi-
bility. But as the patient is able at times to distinguish difference in
rate of two compared series of beats, though hardly after the first few
strokes, unless the difference is very marked, he distinguishes visceral
duration, which extends only to some few hours, from infinite intellectual
time, on the one hand, and from sensori-motor time, which does not
extend beyond a few seconds, on the other.
H. N. GARDINER.
SMITH COLLEGE.
Erzeugung kurzdauernder Lichtreize mit Hilfe des Projektionsapparats.
KARL MARBE. Archiv fur die gesammte Physiologic, Bd. 107, 1905.
S. 585.
The author describes an interesting and relatively inexpensive appa-
ratus for giving simultaneous and successive visual stimuli, that admits
of a wide range of variation. The main features are a projection appa-
ratus, a rotating disk with motor, a screen with a small window that is
opened and closed by an electrical release, and a revolution-counter with
electric contacts. This apparatus without the projection lantern or the
motor that propels the disk can be had of a Wiirzburg manufacturer for
M. 85. Among the possibilities of this apparatus are the production of
a ' Talbot field,' in which the intensity and duration of the light phase
and the duration of the dark phase can be very widely varied, and beside
it a periodically illuminated field of varying duration and intensity; of
two Talbot fields in which a considerable range of conditions may be
specified ; of a single field in which the duration and intensity of illumina-
tion can be varied to almost any extent, etc. The apparatus should be
useful in a wide variety of psychological experiments, and it is equally
adapted for demonstration work.
E. B. HOLT.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
ARCHIY FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. October,
1905, Band 12, Heft 1. Mechanismus und Teleologie in der Philosophie
Lotzes (pp. 1-98) : K. WEIDEL. - That events occur according to universal
laws is not learned from experience, says Lotze, but is a presupposition
based on the law of identity itself. Organisms are strictly mechanical,
and their germs contain no multiplicity of detail to account for future
development. The human soul, however, is genuinely active, both in the
physical and in the psychical realms, though in accordance with universal
laws. The mechanical view of the world requires as a starting-point a
definite systematic character, not an accidental or chaotic condition, so
that it presumes purpose. Hence it itself points to a rational order, to a
systematic unity and to a living absolute. The personality of God, how-
ever, is not demonstrable, and the union of mechanism with the moral
and esthetic character of the world is a perpetual riddle. The freedom
of the will is a fact similar to the original creation of things. What the
will originates is, like all else, connected as to its parts under universal
laws. Dr. Weidel objects particularly that Lotze contradicts himself in
assuming f soul-substance ' and ' will-origination.' The only solution of
the relation of mechanism and teleology is through the theory of energy.
Kants Antinomien und Zenons Beweise gegen die Bewegung (pp. 99-
122) : R. SALINGER. - The chief problems of Zeno reappear in Kant's anti-
nomies, and the solution of them still waits on the definition of continuity.
Die polnische Philosophie der letzten zehn Jahre, 1894-1904 (pp. 125-
147) : H. VON STRUVE. - No one philosopher is singled out for special at-
tention. Die neuesten Erscheinungen. Eingegangene Bucher. Zeit-
schriften.
MIND. October, 1905, N. S., No. 56. Pragmatism vs. Absolutism
(II.) (pp. 441-478): R. F. ALFRED HOERNLE. -The central doctrine of
pragmatism is the insistence on the purposiveness of our whole mental
life. As absolutism errs in separating truth from our acceptance of it,
so pragmatism errs in making the latter our sole criterion of truth. The
conception of an Arbeitswelt, or common life, of which all human activi-
ties, theoretical or practical, are but forms, does justice to pragmatism
and at the same time corrects its failure to find a unifying element, or
whole, to which all manifestations of purpose contribute. On Denoting
(pp. 479-493) : BERTRAND RUSSELL. - The exposition of a confessedly com-
plicated theory by which the author would solve what he regards as the
puzzles involved in propositions in which the subject is a nonentity.
Predetermination and Personal Endeavor (pp. 494-506) : W. R. BOYCE
GIBSON. - If knowledge means simply knowledge of objects, it stands in
direct antithesis to volition; but if knowledge includes knowledge of a
developing subject or self, the gulf between will and intellect is bridged.
7s Humanism a Philosophical Advance? (pp. 507-529) ; S. H. MELLONE. -
" Does humanism in effect explain away intellect into emotion and will ?
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 111
Does humanism in effect deny to the object any independence of the
subject's will and action on it ? " The author shows very convincingly
that these difficulties have not been adequately or even frankly dealt with
by James and Schiller, and he tells us that " until they have been fully
dealt with, humanism leaves us with the same ambiguities on our hands
as did the absolute idealism which it claims to replace." Critical Notices:
A. Meinong, Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologic:
B. RUSSELL. G. Simmel, Die Problems der Geschichtsphilosophie : eine
erkenntnistheoretische studie: D. MORRISON. E. Spranger, Die Grund-
lagen der Geschichtswissenschaft: eine erkenntnistheoretisch-psycholo-
gische Untersuchung : D. MORRISON. J. Petzoldt, Einfilhrung in die
Philosophic der reinen Erfahrung: J. L. M'!NTYRE. New Books. Philo-
sophical Periodicals. Notes: Lewis Carroll's Logical Paradox (E. E. CL
JONES). The Existential Import of Logical Propositions (H.
Heymans, G. Die Gesetze und Elemente des Wissenschaftlichen DenJcens.
Zweite verbesserte auflage. Leipzig : Earth. 1905. Pp. x + 421.
Leroy, Eugene-Bernard. Le langage: Essai sur la psychologic normale
et pathologique de cette fonction. Paris : Felix Alcan. 1905. Pp. 293.
5 f r.
Lotsy, J. P. Vorlesungen uber Deszendenztheorie, Erster Theil. Jena:
Gustav Fischer. 1906. Pp. xii -f 384.
Morgan, C. Lloyd. The Interpretation of Nature. London: The Mac-
millan Co. 1905.
Oman, J. Campbell. The Mystics, Ascetics and Saints of India. Lon-
don : T. Fischer Unwin. 1905.
Pauly, August. Darwinismus und Lamarckismus. Entwurf einer psy-
chophysischen Teleologie. Munich: Ernst Reinhardt. 1905. Pp. 335.
Raeder, Hans. Platons Philosophische Entwickelung. Leipzig: Teubner.
1905. Pp. 435.
Small, Albion W. General Sociology: An Exposition of the Main De-
velopment of Sociological Theory from Spencer to Ratzenhofer.
Chicago : The University of Chicago Press. 1905. Pp. xiii -f- 739.
Wasa, Rafael Karstein. The Origin of Worship. A Study in Primitive
Religion. Press of F. Unggren. 1905. Pp. 142.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE following is from Nature for January 11 : " In the Biologisches
Centralblatt (December 15, 1905) Professor Gorjanovie-Kramberger dis-
cusses the relationships of the race of men whose remains have recently
been discovered at Krapina, south of the Styrian frontier. From the
examination of these remains it appears that the Krapina race is identical
with the one from Neanderthal, Spy, La Naulette, Schipka, etc., for which
the name Homo primigenius has been proposed. From this primitive
112 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
type there seems to be a complete transition in cranial characters, through
the upper diluvial H. sapiens fossilis, to modern man, who occasionally
exhibits some of the peculiarities of the ancestral form, such as the
absence of the chin prominence and the presence of wrinkles in the
enamel of the molars. The prediluvial race of Galley ( ? Gallows) Hill,
England, presents a difficulty, since, although this is the oldest, it is at
the same time the most modern type. This is explained by the theory
of the existence at this early date of two distinct types of mankind,
namely, Homo sapiens fossilis at Galley (?) Hill, which had attained a
relatively high development, and H. primigenius at Krapina, Neanderthal,
etc., the advance of which may have been prevented by unfavorable con-
ditions of existence."
IN the same number of Nature Mr. Charles E. Benham, of Colchester,
points out that the theories of Rumford and Young to account for the
phenomena of light and heat are anticipated by some sixty years in the
' Principia ' of Swedenborg, published in 1733. Part III., chapter VIII.,
of the ' Principia ' contains the following : " Whatever the ether presents
to our organs by means of colours', the air presents to us by means of
modulations and sounds. Thus nature is always the same, always similar
to herself, both in light and in sound, in the eye and in the ear ; the only
difference is that in one she is quicker and more subtle, in the other slower
and crasser." Other references are to Part III., chapter V., No. 21, and
chapter VIIL, Nos. 8, 9, 10, 16.
IN accordance with the terms of a fund established anonymously, a
course of lectures will be delivered at Yale by professors from Harvard.
The introductory lecture by President Eliot was on November 13, on
1 Resemblances and Differences among American Universities.' Professor
Palmer will give seven lectures on ' Some Aspects of Ethics,' and Pro-
fessor Miinsterberg will give one lecture.
PROFESSOR WILHELM OSTWALD, of the University of Leipzig, has com-
pleted his courses at Harvard University, and since January 25 has been
giving two series of lectures at Columbia University, one on ' The Rela-
tions of Energy to Life and Thought' before the department of psy-
chology, and one on ' Physical Chemistry ' before the chemical depart-
ment.
THE Frankfurter Zeitung announces that the faculty of philosophy
at Giessen will issue hereafter its diploma in the German language in-
stead of in Latin. This innovation by a German university body will,
the Zeitung hopes, result in discarding the extravagant laudation of the
budding vir doctissimus incidental to the Latin tradition.
ROMUALDO BOBBA, one of those who have helped the Italian philosophy
of to-day to win respect, died on December 14 of the past year. Bobba
began life as an ecclesiastic, but gave up this career in 1850. He was
an active writer on subjects connected with the history of philosophy and
with pedagogy.
VOL. JII. No. 5. MARCH 1, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE NATURE OF CONSISTENCY
/CONSISTENCY is a queer thing, a jewel among the virtues and
^-^ the bugaboo of little minds. We count the man who lacks it
insincere, immoral or insane, but the one who pursues it too deliber-
ately we regard as morally and intellectually priggish. It may be
that disrepute has come upon the term because it has been used too
abstractly, or because it has been pursued too formally. Like most
virtues it is most admirable where it is least conscious of itself, and
where it is most obviously attained it exists less as an abstract
maxim of the will than as a growing harmony of activities based
on a subtle unity of judgmental processes. In the game of life each
must abide by its rules, but consistency is no mere conformity to
rules, and life is at bottom not a game to be entered into or not as
we choose.
1. To be consistent is to act consciously so as to maintain the
system of activities of which each is a function. Consistency is a
quality of self-maintaining activities, or again it is an immediate
sense of self -maintenance in activities. Consistency is identity, but
not the abstract identity of the schoolmen, not the mere absence of
difference and variety. Scholastic tradition in logic favors a theory
of consistency which makes truth a barren form, and reality either
a day of dazzling brightness or a night of Cimmerian darkness.
Modern logicians have pointed out that abstract identity can not
be made the law of thought without reducing the syllogism to a
petitio principii, the psychological process of inference to a sort of
shorthand memory, and the absolute to an infinite vacuum.
Let us elaborate briefly. If the proposition, All men are mortal,
be taken to mean merely that every man is a mortal man, the mere
statement of a fact and nothing more, it can not warrant a conclusion
that Socrates is mortal, because the latter statement is part of the
former. The syllogism can be at best a process of teasing out of
113
114 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
major premises what we had already syllogistically packed into them,
a process of marching down hill after we have laboriously marched
up. If this were the meaning of the major premise, if it asserted a
mere identity between subject and predicate, no possible finite ex-
perience could establish the truth of such a proposition as that all
men are mortal, because no possible finite experience could compre-
hend the mortality of all men. On this theory of identity all gen-
eral statements are mere records of past experience and are valid
only for past experience : they do not serve, therefore, as the bridge
from the known to the unknown, from the experienced to the unex-
perienced. If the subject and predicate of every true proposition
are identical, no characterization of the absolute is possible, because
all characterization implies some difference between subject and
predicate.
The identity which underlies the syllogism is not an abstract
identity of terms, but rather the consistency of the system of func-
tions of which any set of terms is a case, the consistency of nature
as a whole, for example. The facts and meanings of any particular
mediate judgment are processes of nature or other determinations
of reality which maintain the system of which they are a part, and
such maintenance involves, not abstract identity merely, but
identity in difference, identity of function in difference of content.
Psychologically speaking, inference is not merely an identification
of two terms because each is identical with a third. Such a process
does not occur and would not constitute inference if it did occur.
The inference Socrates-man-mortal is a single judgment, dominated
by a single interest, and involving but one object of attention,
namely, Socrates. It is unity of process rather than abstract
identity which makes the inference possible. Moreover, if con-
sistency rather than abstract identity be taken as the formal mark
of reality, the real becomes no characterless continuum destitute of
internal distinctions and variety, but a self-maintaining system of
activities within which all activity falls.
Whether the real be regarded as one with experience or as tran-
scending experience is at bottom a question of consistency. If we
took up the question we should probably find that reality is simply
consistent experience, that is, continuous and self-maintaining ex-
perience, so rich in resources and so organized in activities as to lack
nothing which it really needs, an experience with no unsolvable
problems and no unattainable goods, an experience whose content
is completely at one with its existence. Whatever lacks anything can
not be completely consistent with itself. The real is a whole which
is its own end : it is to be found, not by eliminating needs and mani-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 115
foldness, but by increasing manifoldness as long as need remains,
that is, forever.
2. As an actual experience, consistency is an immediate relation
felt as satisfaction, ease and peace of mind. It is not intoxicating,
but as a pleasure it is vastly superior to any intoxication, because
it draws no refuse of pain in its wake and because it is an index
to all goods and to the avoidance of all ills. When children have
been naughty, they are unhappy, embarrassed and uncertain of
themselves; and they exhibit much the same emotional state when
they find themselves in the presence of unfamiliar objects and situa-
tions. All that is new and unassimilated, all that is unusual and
out of harmony with the existing organization of the self, is im-
mediately distressing. Sometimes a child is aggressive and boldly
tries to make his ordinary ways of reacting suffice for the new thing
or situation : sometimes he meekly tries to reconstruct his habits of
action. Analogous situations arise in adult thinking. We revise
our classifications and remove our discrepancies with embarrassment
and anxiety: and when we find an object which seems to possess
inconsistent attributes, we are by turns perplexed and aggressive.
If I try to think of a book as weighing both three pounds and three
pounds and a half, a destructive impulse is the result. The experi-
ment is only possible by a sort of make-believe, but when it succeeds
I feel as I would in a real situation, that the book is not what it
pretends to be and that I am being insulted by some cheap fraud.
What would be the emotions of a twentieth-century American in the
presence of Faust's poodle swelling and contracting, taking now one
shape and now another behind the stove? Faust takes it as calmly
as though such strange phenomena were every-day manifestations
of the presence of spirits, but Faust is supposed to have been ac-
customed to thoughts of magic. Charles Lamb once asked a servant
who carried home a hare for dinner, 'Is that your own hair or a
wig?' The faithful servant opened his mouth to reply, stammered,
grew frightened and took to his heels. These are supposed objects
to which no adjustment is possible, and the result is attitudes of
aggression, fear and fright. Emotion is the natural result of a
situation which presents self-contradictory aspects, a restless casting
about accompanied by rising fear, anger, destructiveness or disgust.
Inconsistency is immediately felt, as a rule, before it is seen and
judged. Hence we incline to say that inconsistency is primarily a
felt impossibility of reacting to the object or situation. Secondarily
it is a characteristic of the situation in idea.
In logic consistency is inferred. Two conceptions consist with
each other because both consist with a third, and the relation does
116 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
not here appear to be immediate. This, however, is logic and not
immediate experience: it is logic, moreover, of a very formal and
scholastic sort. It is undoubtedly possible to represent consistency
in logical forms as mediate, but this does not prove that it is pri-
marily mediate. Moreover, even for logic, inference is based upon
certain underlying presuppositions which are themselves not infer-
ences but demands and postulates of the inferential process, demands
which remain demands to the end. For example, the law of identity.
Any object of conception or judgment per se is eternally the same :
conceiving it is representing it as the same, as universal, and this
is a necessity of conception, a condition of there being any conception
at all. Before there can be mental life on the conceptual plane, and
in order that there may be such mental life, there must be intel-
lectual habits, the possibility of reacting to many objects in one
way. But this fact does not prove that the law of identity is valid.
It merely proves, if it proves anything, that without identity we
could have no experiences involving conceptions. No proof of the
validity of the law of identity is possible, for all proof must assume
it. Another illustration is the law of causation, whose universal
validity is assumed in all reasoning. There is no proof of it which
does not rest upon assumptions involving its validity. For further
illustrations we might take such general hypotheses as the law of
conservation, the maxim ex nihilo nihil fit, the principle of suffi-
cient reason, and many more. They are demands for consistency
as a necessity of judgment, and they are constitutive forms of the
world of judgment for that reason. Either they are true or no
judgment is possible, because judgment is essentially social. That
which I now conceive must be the same for all intelligence. Before
any relation can now mean anything for me, it must mean the same
for all intelligence. All this is true, but these ultimate premises
express at bottom, not demonstrable conclusions, but universal intel-
lectual dispositions and attitudes which reflective judgment can not
do without. Consistency is the fundamental demand of the mental
life, a demand backed up by some of the strongest and most insistent
emotions, a demand which aims at the continuity and self-main-
tenance of the activity in which the life of the mind consists. The
discovery of consistency in a manifold of details is a joy, and the
development of inconsistencies a brutal disappointment over which
we are annoyed, anxious, frightened or angry.
3. Some light may be thrown on the nature of consistency by
comparing it with the analogous laws of accommodation and habit.
Within certain limits organisms can react into the conditions of life
in such ways as to alter the conditions and maintain themselves.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 117
and as conditions are sometimes such as no organism can cope with,
they react so as to preserve the species or the life principle itself.
But such purposiveness is not purposeful ; that is, organisms are not
as such aware of the ends which their actions tend to realize, and
herein lies one difference between organic accommodation and con-
sistency. Consistency is always conscious and reflective. It is a
function of the social consciousness, being essentially an awareness
of the compatibility or incompatibility of the object or situation
to be judged with the social self. It is a sense of the harmony of
the object with the organization of an ideal social self.
Consistency is not to be identified with the biological law of
accommodation. Neither is it to be confused with the biological and
psychological law of habit. All life, whether organic or mental,
involves processes of selection and repetition going on among the
reactions which the individual makes to stimuli. Habit is the tend-
ency of actions to repeat themselves. Accommodation, the tendency
of the more adequate mode of reaction to get selected for repetition
in the future history of the individual. Consistency is not habit,
for much the same reason that it is not accommodation. Habitual
activities are for the most part unconscious and unreflective, be-
coming more unreflective as they become more habitual. Reflection
begins when habit proves inadequate to cope with the conditions of
life and happiness : and reflection is selection based upon and guided
by habit. Consistency is the tendency of reflective beings to react
into the conditions of life in such ways as to maintain the self of
organized habit, a tendency to be realized through the reorganization
of habit. It thus partakes of the nature of both habit and accom-
modation, differing from both in being conscious and reflective, in
being free, purposeful and self-determined.
The machinery of the reconstruction of habit and the reorgan-
ization of the self-conscious life exhibits some aspects of consistency.
Habit is often represented as a closed system of bodily change re-
sulting from past activities and involving nothing more. This
strictly mechanical view does not closely represent what actually
takes place in the life history of individuals, and throws little or no
light on the methodology of judgment. It is too formal. In
Spencer's psychology this view of habit as a law of growth is made
fundamental. Reactions to stimuli are determined in the first place
by the nature of the stimulus and the physical characteristics of the
organism. The wave of molecular change within the organism takes
the line of least resistance, and issues in movements, the energy of
which is quantitatively equivalent to the energy of the stimulus
acting under the conditions of its transmission through the organism.
118
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Repetitions of the stimulus result in repetitions of the movement,
because the line of molecular change first followed is made more
permeable by the first process. Thus habits are established, and
habits induce nerve fibers and psychophysical organization.
But stimuli do not occur in the regular and periodic manner
which this conception of the origin and nature of habit assumes.
Growth takes place, not so much by favor of a fostering environ-
ment, as in spite of one which does not foster growth. Life is a
process of getting the proper stimuli, rather than a passive receiving
of them from the environment. There is, moreover, a certain pur-
posiveness in all organic reactions which is not reducible to purely
mechanical terms. Mechanism is only one form, and that a low
form, of consistency. Such sciences as logic are under the necessity
of stating the phenomena of life in purposive terms. Organisms
react to stimuli, not only according to the nature of the stimulus,
but also according to their own nature. Moreover, growth proceeds
by reacting to old stimuli in new ways as well as by reacting to
new stimuli in old ways, rather than by adding one mechanical
process to another as variations in stimuli demand.
As all organic activities are purposive and possess a prospective
reference, genetic theory must revise the notions of habit and the
reflex arc (which stands for habit) so as to include the purposive
factor. Habit is not merely an arc which begins with a stimulus
and ends with a movement. It is rather an aspect of a spiral process
which repeats its own stimulus, and so maintains and develops
itself. Old and habitual movements are continually bringing the
individual into situations for which no habitual movement is ade-
quate. There are, thus, conflicts and discrepancies of habit which
lead to new departures in the activities of the individual and the
species. If a new situation or stimulus is pleasure-giving or satis-
fying to a greater degree than the old, it is sought again and again,
the variation from habitual movements is repeated, the old process
becoming a memory, a thing of the past. As the new reaction, is
verified by further actions, the new stimulus becomes a reconstruc-
tion of the old, the new purposiveness a reconstruction of the old,
and the new movement likewise. Thus successive variations in
activities arise and lead to a series of reconstructed stimuli and
movements, both of which make contributions to the purposive factor
of the process.
It is presupposed in this view that habit is not in fact entirely
distinct and separate from the process called in biology accommoda-
tion, and in psychology selection. Stereotyped repetitions of pre-
vious activities seldom occur in actual life histories. Habit is as
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 119
much a scientific abstraction as the laws of motion or the doctrine
of conservation. Habit is an indispensable way of conceiving bio-
logical and psychological phenomena, but it is not the only way of
conceiving them. Life is a continual reformation of habits, a con-
tinual process of acquiring life-maintaining activities.
In the sphere of sentient life the pleasure-pain value of a sensa-
tion is fused with the sensation and counted as part of the 'given
data' of the process. The motor processes are altered. The pur-
posive attitude is changed from get-this-sensation to get-that-sensa-
tion. Old and partly abandoned processes become memories, things
of the old and familiar past. These are immensely significant when
the individual finds himself, as he is continually doing, in the
presence of data which for him are new and unfamiliar. The new
situation starts old memories into activity. Assimilation begins,
association processes flit acrass consciousness, alternative possibilities
and the rudiments of deliberation appear in the form of hesitation,
restlessness, tension, emotion and attention. This is not the place
for an extended account of these processes. Functional psychology,
written from the genetic point of view, inclines to hold that the
entire order and organization of mind depends upon the mind's
response to its world. The individual's response to a stimulus,
rather than the stimulus, determines the object. The kinesthetic
results of movement, together with the more remote results of it,
give the mind its motor ideas and cues. The total results of past
activities determine present purpose.
4. Consistency is in some respects closely akin to assimilation,
for the latter is the influence of the past over the present in mental
process. In assimilating a stimulus to some past object of experi-
ence we vindicate the existing organization of the intellect. Con-
sistency is, however, a characteristic of judgment and reflective
mental activities, as we have seen, and assimilation is not primarily
a reflective process. In judgment we establish correspondences be-
tween subject and object in ways which are of great importance to
the entire mental life of the individual. In the other process no such
correspondence is present to consciousness. In assimiliation there
is no conciousness of the likeness of present to past stimuli, and the
process does not involve a sense of objectivity or universality such
as is involved in all judgment and consistency. Closely akin to
assimilation is suggestion in which a given stimulus is the cue for a
motor response determined either by past experience or by the
actions of others. The flame which burns the hand of the child
becomes a pain-giving thing for the future, and the little one reacts
to it, not by the original movement through which he learned to
120 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
know it, but by the recoil which followed the burn. Through imi-
tation of the movements of others, a hat becomes a thing to put on
the head, a door-knob a thing to turn. Not that the thing and its
attributes are distinct to the child and the lower animal at the
suggestion stage of mental growth. They are not distinct. The
thing is its attributes, or rather the distinction has not yet arisen
at all. There is here no consciousness of the object per se, no judg-
ment and no consistency. Assimilation and suggestion go to make
judgment and consistency possible, but they are not themselves
forms of consistency. They come nearer being forms of intellectual
habit, and we have yet to inquire how consistency can arise out of
such habits.
It does not appear how objectivity and generality could arise
out of the process of reconstructing habits as we have referred to it
above. The mere addition of one particular experience to another,
no matter how habitual they might become, can not account for
the rise of the general and the uniform. The general is no mere
sum of particulars. It comprehends the future as well as the past,
the unexperienced as well as the experienced. Generality and ob-
jectivity involve a different mode of consciousness from the mere
acquaintance with things which minds in the prereflective stage of
development possess. Prereflective acquaintance with things in-
volves reaction into rather than to things, through which things
undergo transformation. Before the individual can be conscious
of the transformation as such, or of things as such, or of his ac-
quaintance with them, he must be able to reflect upon his own
activities. That is to say, his own activities must become the ob-
jects of another activity of the mind, he must become the observer
and critic of his own processes. The particular is generalized by
what we might call a generalizing reaction, by reflection, before it
acquires universal and objective significance. The circle of habit
with its stimulus, purposiveness and movement, both as a whole and
in its separate arcs, becomes the datum and condition of a reflective
activity, the standpoint of which is the self of all experience.
The rise of objectivity and consistency can not, therefore, be
prior to the rise of the self-thought and social consciousness. It is
one phase of the genesis of reflection. The term object, as currently
used in modern philosophy, seems to possess three meanings. (1)
It is the presented datum of immediate experience, the empirical
property or properties (not known as such) which my present in-
terest selects as the significant feature of a present situation. 2)
It is the empirical property or properties of an object (known as
such) present and significant in all experience involving a certain
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 121
type of situation (the definition of substance as the empirical prop-
erties of a thing, which figures so largely in Locke's discussion).
(3) The object as bare existence, the thing in itself, independent
of all particular experiences (the 'substratum' of empirical prop-
erties or the 'being' of the object, which also plays a large part in
Locke's discussion). These three meanings of the term object arise
in connection with three corresponding meanings of the term subject.
There is, first, no distinction between subject and object. Then the
object appears as both a state of consciousness, a subjective thing,
and as independent of all consciousness, a mere existence. A large
part of modern philosophy, indeed the whole of it, is concerned
with the relations of these various objects and subjects to each
other. Ancient Greek and Medieval philosophy returns again and
again to the relation of the universal to the particular as the all-
absorbing problem of reflection, while modern philosophy has shown
a predominating interest in the relation of object to subject in ex-
perience. Some logicians have assumed that the universal or mean-
ing is entirely subjective, while the bare existence to which meanings
attach is particular and objective. The solution of the problems
growing out of these fundamental distinctions depends upon recog-
nizing that the latter are essentially genetic, functions of the social
consciousness and demands of consistency. The universal and the
particular are both of them subjective and objective.
One is forced to speak as though the consciousness of self and
the consciousness of the objective world were two different conscious-
nesses. They are both reflective and they come separately. They
do not come together. They belong, however, to the same plane of
development. They are functions of the self -thought. This thought
brings with it, not simply a consciousness of social relations and
obligations, but also a consciousness of objects as such. The ob-
jective world is a function of the same development as the moral
law and the institutions of society. The socialized individual real-
izes that all genuine objects are universal in experience by the
same sort of reflection as that all sanctioned conduct is demanded
by experience.
5. The self maintained by consistency is always the ego-alter,
bipolar self of society, the self of socially significant activities, and
consistency is characteristic, not only of valid thinking, but also of
valid movements and emotions. Just as we think in universal terms
and hold our judgments to be universally valid, so we try to act as
all must act and enjoy those things which all may enjoy. If we were
trying to trace the origin of consistency, we should find it closely
bound up with the origin of the self-thought. The consciousness
122 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
that experience ought to be universalizable, and in this sense social,
is the consciousness of consistency as an ideal which includes one's
entire personal activity. The marks of first and fundamental truth
of which the Scottish school makes so much are all definable in terms
of consistency the universal as that which maintains the universal
self of experience, the self-evident as that which is immediately com-
patible with the existence and organization of the self, the necessary
as that which the self demands for its maintenance. The difference
between the judgment 'I like it' and the judgment 'It is beautiful,
or good, or true' is a difference made by the absence of consistency
from the former, and its presence in the latter. Universality, self-
evidence and necessity are characteristic of the latter and not of the
former, so that we may say, that which is beautiful or true or good
ought to be so to all men and minds. The demand for consistency
is that activity continue without let or hindrance from itself. The
laws of number and space, the oneness of the universe as a whole,
the universality of causal relations, the principle of non-contradic-
tion, the laws of duty and of love, may be regarded as forms of this
demand. They must be true if thought and action are to continue
and maintain themselves. The ultimate purpose which underlies
and determines all forms of consistency must be its own end and
satisfaction, much as it may demand for its realization. Perhaps
the end of the purest love is love, as the end of any iterative process,
like the number series, is the process itself unhindered. In the vari-
ous aspects of experience this demand for self-maintaining activity
exhibits itself in norms.
6. The nature of consistency may become clearer if we pause for
a glance at inconsistency. There could be no inconsistency in a
bare fact, if such a thing entered into the experience of a reflective
being, because a bare fact could exist only as an immediate datum
of experience. It would necessarily be purely private. It could be
neither true nor false. It would be simply there. Neither could
two or more such facts be said to contradict each other. They, too,
would be simply given. "We believe it impossible to find a bare fact
in reflective experience. Mere fact and mere value are alike ab-
stractions. The truth is that consistency is a matter of value, rather
than a matter of fact, and all values are social. Contradiction arises
first when we judge and conceptually interpret facts for further
experience. It arises because such activity must take its place in a
system of social activities. Such activity is essentially social. The
principle of selection in judgment is no longer the private interest
of the individual, but the interest of society, the interest of universal
experience as represented in the socialized individual who judges.
The individual can never be absolutely sure that any variation from
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 123
accepted and organized conceptions will be available for purposes of
control in further experience, that is, be ultimately accepted and
adopted. He can at most seek an ideal of consistent response to the
conditions of reflective experience from moment to moment, trusting
his immediate sense of consistency as a guide. To this effort the
fact of inconsistency and contradiction in the conditions of life is
the great incentive. Here is the sphere of opinion, worry and belief.
Here the noblest solicitudes and the profoundest struggles arise.
Here the deepest peace is found.
We should carefully distinguish between contradiction and other
logical oppositions. Some of these are mutually exclusive, and some
are not. Contraries sometimes include a contradiction within them,
but subcontraries do not, and terms which are merely opposite, like
happiness and misery, heat and cold, may without contradiction be
affirmed or denied of the same subject. Mere difference is not con-
tradiction. The grass may be both green and cool. A man may be
both tall and miserable. There can be no contradiction without some
sameness. All this belongs to the elements of logic, to be sure, and
there could be no apology for introducing it here were not these
simple considerations often overlooked in philosophical discussions.
Contradiction has been too often defined as the absence of abstract
identity, a definition which leads straight to the abattoir of philo-
sophical nihilism. The gloomy, taciturn Heraclitus and the far-see-
ing Parmenides alike seem to have conceived the real in objective
terms only, and consistency as abstract and absolute identity. The
contention that where we have terms in relation we do not have
reality loses its force if reality covers all that is consistent with the
self, all that is self-maintaining. A reality entirely apart from the
self is inconceivable. The first book of Bradley 's 'Appearance and
Reality' proves just this, that apart from experience nothing is real,
while within experience everything is real which consists with the
self. Everything is real just where it stands in and of the context
of the experience of a reflective being. It is the response aspect of
experience which discovers contradiction in the data of judgment.
G. A. TAWNEY.
BELOIT COLLEGE.
FEELING AS THE OBJECT OF THOUGHT
~T is said that thought transcends itself, points beyond itself, or
seeks its own other. The question is: what does it point at?
and my answer is, that it points at feeling which reciprocates by
pointing back at thought. The philosophical situation has been
that at various times people have asked what is the relation between
124 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the universal and the particular, the possible and the actual, nature
and freedom, society and the individual? My belief is that the
question is also adequately expressed in the distinction between
feeling and thought, and that whatever solves this question solves
also the others. Feeling I should define as the experience of unity,
internally simple and homogeneous, but as understood by thought,
the index of conflict or the stress of diverse things. 1 Feeling is
synthetic, emphatic, intense. Whatever is felt is grasped not 'by
a successive synthesis, but all at once.' 2 These predicates suggest
certain predicates given to the absolute, and with this I shall try to
compare feeling. If feeling can support the comparison, then it
may serve as well as the absolute to be the object, the stimulus, the
fulfillment, or the other of thought.
To have any faith in the ultimateness of the feeling-thought dis-
tinction, I think one must agree that there are two attitudes which
are equally final and equally characteristic of 'the human predica-
ment.' The one attitude would be called that of sincere and
rational striving for some special end. We find ourselves involved
and we long to get out, to finish the business or discharge the obliga-
tion, and to have the stimulus let up. This might be called the
work-attitude. On the other hand there is the no less real leisure-
attitude. At first sight this appears perhaps more flippant than
the other; it is the case of the person who, in vulgar parlance, is
looking for trouble. One of the critics of pragmatism has asked:
1 'But do we never judge except to get out of some scrape V s And
it must be admitted that we frequently do take thought for the
express purpose of getting into some scrape. More seriously, we
call this frame of mind intellectual curiosity. What we are all
after in this situation is sheer excitement or stimulation. We want
stimulation without much caring what sort to be doing something,
irrespective of the outcome. One of Henry James's heroines says:
"A swift carriage, of a dark night, rattling with four horses over
roads that one can't see that's my idea of happiness." Now in
the first attitude what , we desire is some thought-out conclusion,
some express and special thing. But in the second attitude we are
not at all particular about conclusions, we want indiscriminately so
long as what we get shall be intense enough, that is, we do not
know what we want, but we want it very badly. In the work-atti-
tude, feeling is the thing given and what we desire is thought; but
in the leisure-attitude our datum is work accomplished and what
1 See the writer's articles in this JOURNAL, Vol. II., Nos. 23 and 24, on
the relation of feeling to discrimination and conception.
2 Century Dictionary, definition of * intensity.'
8 Sheldon, this JOURNAL, Vol. I., No. 4.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 125
we want is feeling. Living is for us, then, a rhythm of these two
situations.
The two attitudes we have described find expression in the two
most ultimate social processes, namely, the artistic and the scientific.
The scientist finds problems and necessities on his hands, which
constitute his stimulus and his emotion. He tries then to work
out solutions, quantitative statements and complete controls, he dis-
sects, expresses and flattens out his situation and at length presents
us with instruments and means. The scientist does not, as scientist,
want any emotion, because that is what he starts with. He wants
thought, analysis and solution, and his results are mechanical be-
cause he is analyzing and not constructing the situation. The artist,
on the contrary, starts from a perfected situation and builds up
for us a new problem. He persuasively points out the inadequacy
of the perfect situation, and gives us so a shock or a new qualitative
experience. He presents a conflict, and therefore an emotion.
While the scientist finds solutions, the artist finds problems.
In saying that the artist sets problems I am assuming a certain
point of view about the esthetic experience. That point of view
is that the appreciation of beauty is, in part at least, essentially
painful, that the work of art is not primarily a satisfaction, but a
problem. Those who themselves find only abundant joy in the
esthetic experiences would probably admit that there are many
persons who may be pained by the best art, and one must of course
wince at the implication. Nevertheless, I, for one, fail to find in
the apprehension of the beautiful the traditional absorption of
subject in object, the perfect moment, the translation into a clearer
medium, or the grand reconciliation of every warring element.
This description applies well enough to the more commonplace
esthetic experience, but in the presence of something which even
without the assistance of 'some blabbing book' I know to be greatly
beautiful I feel unmistakably some painful emotion. There are,
of course, numerous incidental satisfactions in it, but the thing as
a whole is stimulating beyond my capacity.
The artistic and scientific interests do not, of course, always
inhabit separate individuals. The artist himself must treat his
material in a scientific way, and the scientist in his quest of the
unknown is following an artistic impulse, but the artistic and
scientific attitudes remain, nevertheless, distinct.
Metaphysics, it seems to me, should be classified among the
artistic as opposed to the scientific pursuits, in fact as a branch of
the art of letters. The structural resemblance is not so apparent,
but the function of metaphysics and of art is the same. Metaphysics
does not solve, but only sets problems; its function is stimulative,
126 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
suggestive, emotional, and it affords distinctions which are chiefly
felt, not known. 4 But to reproach metaphysics on this account for
its non-productivity is like reproving the Sistine Madonna for not
doing the cooking. Certain teachings of the pragmatic philosophy
illustrate this view of metaphysics. Dewey says: "Immediate em-
piricism postulates that things . . . are what they are experienced as." 5
James says: "Experience as a whole is self-containing and leans
on nothing." 6 And is this not exactly the standpoint of the artist
in regard to the experience which he offers? In the action of
Whistler vs. Ruskin, the question is put to Whistler concerning his
'nocturne in blue and silver.' 7
"Do you say that this is a correct representation of Battersea
Bridge?"
"I did not intend it to be a 'correct' portrait of the bridge. . . .
As to what the picture represents, that depends upon who looks at it.
To some persons it may represent all that is intended; to others it
may represent nothing. ' '
"The prevailing colour is blue?"
"Perhaps."
"Are those figures on the top of the bridge intended for people?"
' ' They are just what you like. ' '
If one grants that metaphysics is justly considered a branch
of art, and that what art does is to put to us a qualitative prob-
lematic experience, then I should say one must accept pragmatism
as an adequate expression of philosophic method. This desidero
ergo sum philosophy makes conflict the ultimate thing. The fact
of conflict we experience as feeling or emotion, the meaning of
conflict is understood by thought or experienced as a cognitive
process. Coming back to the question whether feeling is adequate
to play the part of the other of thought, I should say that it seems
to answer, with one exception, the demands actually made upon
the absolute. The absolute must unify experience, but feeling as
a simple, abstract, intensive synthesis does that very creditably.
The absolute must also be 'stubborn' and emphatic, but feeling is
just as refractory, just as intense and brutally real as anything
imaginable. If it seems that since feeling and thought both come
out of one's own self the conflict must be lacking in dramatic in-
terest, I should reply that from the modern standpoint a conflict
* What, for instance, is Kant's ' simple conformity to law in general ' ex-
cept a certain temperamental docility; or what is Hegel's method of negation
more than contrary suggestibility?
5 This JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 15.
9 This JOURNAL, Vol. II., No. 5.
* ' The Gentle Art of Making Enemies,' p. 8.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 127
within a self is the only real struggle. For vividness of dramatic
interest, for power to stir terror and pity and a sense of the inevi-
table stubbornness of things, there are few cases more striking than
Dr. Prince's 8 record of Miss Beauchamp and her alternating per-
sonalities. The one characteristic of the absolute which feeling
does not exhibit is its superiority to thought. But I see no reason
for assuming that thought in pointing beyond itself necessarily
points up. Why should the real other of thought be any better
or more real than thought itself? "There is an absolute experi-
ence," says Royce. 9 'This absolute experience is related to our
experience as an organic whole to its own fragments." "The con-
ception now reached I regard as the philosophical conception of
God." If, however, feeling is the experience of unity, what is the
use of another unity on top of it, or if we must have an absolute,
why not absolute conflict? Feeling and thought seem to me ade-
quate to support one another without the need for any third thing
to join them or differentiate them. I am indeed quite of Mistress
Quickly 's mind "So 'a cried out God, God, God! three or four
times: now I, to comfort him, bid him 'a should not think of God;
I hoped there was no need to trouble himself with any such thoughts
yet."
KATE GORDON.
MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE.
DISCUSSION
THE MEANING OF IDENTITY, SIMILARITY AND NON-
ENTITY: A CRITICISM OF MR. RUSSELL'S
LOGICAL PUZZLES
IN Mr. Russell's article 'On Denoting,' published in Mind, N. S.,
No. 56, certain logical puzzles are stated which the author
believes are only to be solved by his own confessedly complicated
theory. These puzzles seem to me to be soluble by a different and
simpler method, which it is my purpose in this paper to explain.
Mr. Russell's first puzzle runs as follows: "If a is identical with
&, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be
substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the
truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now George IV. wished to
know whether Scott was the author of Waverly; and in fact Scott
was the author of Waverly. Hence we may substitute Scott for
the author of Waverly, and thereby prove that George IV. wished
' The Dissociation of a Personality.'
9 ' The Conception of God,' pp. 43-44.
128 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
to know whether Scott was Scott. Yet an interest in the law of
identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe. ' '
The trouble here, I think, is in the wrong meaning which Mr.
Russell attaches to the concept 'identity.' It is surely false to say,
as he does, that if a is identical with &, whatever is true of the one
is true of the other. Identity is the name for an incomplete duality.
To say that a and b are identical in every respect, and substitutable
for one another in every system, is always contradictory, regardless
of what a and b may be. For in so far as one is called a it is not
identical with the other in so far as the other is called b or, more
generally, the sense in which they are two is not the sense in which
they are not two things, but one thing. The two things ' named
Scott' and 'wrote Waverly' coexisted as attributes of the same real
individual. They are identical only in that respect, and can only
be substituted for one another when so considered. To change the
statement 'George IV. wished to know whether Scott was the author
of Waverly' into 'George IV. wished to know whether Scott was
Scott, ' is to assume that whatever things were identical as objects in
the order of nature were also identical in the imagination of George
IV. Instead of constituting a puzzle requiring an esoteric solution,
we have only a neglect of the truths (1) that the terms of a proposi-
tion are always members of more than one system or universe of
discourse, (2) that difference in one system is not incompatible with
absence of difference or identity in another system, and (3) that
identity of two terms in one system actually presupposes their non-
identity or duality in some other system. We refer an identity of
terms to one system by means of their duality in another. The system
referred to is always the real, objective or primary system, while the
system by which the reference is accomplished is the instrumental,
subjective or secondary system. We testify to the primary or ex-
istential character of the system to which a propositional relation,
a is b, is referred by the use of the verb to be both as a copula and
as symbol for existence.
The notion of absolute identity on which this puzzle is based has
of course been often criticized, but the criticisms have usually been
made by Hegelians, who have tended to go to the opposite extreme
and defend the view that a and b are different in the same system
as that in which they are identical, the conflict of the two relations
producing a dialectical advance to a third. It may well be that
Mr. Russell and Mr. G. E. Moore have been led to their Eleatic exag-
geration of the identity principle by a laudable dislike for the
Hegelian confusion. The truth, as we have tried to show, lies be-
tween the two. Identical things are (contra Russell) always also
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 129
non-identical, but the identity and non-identity subsist (contra
Hegel), not in the same, but in different universes of discourse.
Before leaving this question, I wish to show the bearing of the
'two-system' theory of the judgment upon the dispute as to whether
perfect similarity is identity or something quite different. The
judgment of perfect similarity is like the judgment of identity in
so far as it involves two systems, in one of which there is a duality
of the terms and in the other an absence of duality. The difference
consists precisely in this: In 'identity' the duality of the identical
terms is present in the instrumental or subjective, and absent in the
existential or objective, system; while in 'similarity' the duality of
the similar terms is present in the objective and absent in the sub-
jective system. In identity the sense in which the terms are dual
is subjective and incidental, while in similarity the sense in which the
terms are two is believed to be real and the sense in which they are
one is regarded as secondary or subjective. This definition helps
us to see how people in virtue of their different metaphysical views
can differ as to whether a given relation is one of similarity or
identity. To the Platonic realist, for example, Tweedledum and
Tweedledee are identical, while to the nominalist they are merely
similar. Tweedledum and Tweedledee are here taken as affording
an instance of two beings possessing identical qualities, but differing
in the positions which they occupy in the spatio-temporal order. To
the Platonist, for whom qualities are the ultimate realities, the
only objective or real difference is difference of quality; difference
of spatio-temporal position is subjective or accidental. For the
nominalist the situation is the reverse; the real universe is the uni-
verse of spatio-temporal positions, hence if there is duality of posi-
tion as there is between Tweedledum and Tweedledee there is also
a duality of being, and what the Platonist describes as one essence
exemplified in two places, an identical reality possessing different
accidents, he, the nominalist, will describe as different realities pos-
sessing identical accidents, and so being merely 'similar.' We are
thus able by means of the two-system doctrine to define the dif-
ference between similarity and identity without, as is too often the
case, prejudging in any way the issue between a nominalism such
as that of Professor James and a realism such as that of Mr. Bradley.
We may now pass to another of the puzzles mentioned by Mr.
Russell, which may be solved by the method used in dealing with the
first. "Consider the proposition 'A differs from B.' If this is
true, there is a difference between A and B, which fact may be ex-
pressed in the form 'the difference between A and B subsists.' But
if it is false that A differs from B, then there is no difference be-
tween A and B, which fact may be expressed in the form 'the dif-
130 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
f erence between A and B does not subsist. But how can a nonentity
be the subject of a proposition? . . . Thus if A and B do not
differ, to suppose either that there is, or that there is not, such an
object as 'the difference between A and B' seems equally impossible. "
Now, just as we found before that 'the difference between Scott
and the author of Waverly' was perfectly capable of subsisting in
the system of 'objects considered by George IV.,' and that that sub-
jective difference, so far from being incompatible with the identity
of the terms in the system of 'persons living on the earth,' was
actually necessary to its assertion, so now we may say that 'the dif-
ference between A and B' is, in the example cited, a truly subsistent
object in the system of 'objects considered by Mr. Russell and his
readers,' and that this fact is not incompatible with, but rather a
necessary condition of the assertion of the non-existence of 'differ-
ence between A and B ' in the objective system to which the proposi-
tion refers.
Both of these puzzles are thus solved by the application of the
two-system view of judgments. But whereas the application of the
theory to the first puzzle showed the absurdity of the concept of
'absolute identity,' its application to the second shows the equal
absurdity of 'absolute nonentity.' A thing can be a nonentity in
the primary system of existent objects only if it is at the same time a
positive content in the secondary or thought system of Meanings,
i. e., objects which are subsistent and not necessarily actual or even
possible.
Mr. Russell's third puzzle involves again the concept of non-
entity, only instead of relating to our right to make nonentity the
subject of a proposition whose predicate is non-existence, it concerns
the apparent necessity of making affirmative judgments about non-
entities. The puzzle is stated as follows: "By the law of excluded
middle, either 'A is B' or 'A is not B' must be true. Hence either
'the present king of France is bald' or 'the present king of France
is not bald' must be true. Yet if we enumerated the things that
are bald and then the things that are not bald, we should not find
the present king of France in either list. Hegelians who love a
synthesis will probably conclude that he wears a wig." It seems
to me that a being that is not, is of necessity a being that is not
anything in particular. Of impossible beings like 'the present
king of France' or 'round squares' every affirmative judgment will
be false and every negative judgment will be true. In the list of
beings who are not really bald, we must include all those beings
who are not really anything. Thus (treating baldness as a positive
attribute) the class non-bald includes all the real beings who are not
bald and all the unreal or merely definable beings, whether bald
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 131
or non-bald or both or neither. The only judgments that can be
truly made about impossible objects are negative. We may then
qualify Mr. Bradley 's doctrine that reality is the subject of every
judgment by saying that the subject of every judgment whose
copula is affirmative is real. This means, however, that existence
is in itself neither a predicate, as Anselm seems to have held, nor
a subject, as Mr. Bradley holds, but rather, as Leibniz believed,
a relation between subject and predicate. For a content to be,
it must be compossible, i. e., coexistent with other contents. And
here, again, we see the significance of the same word 'is' being used
as an affirmative copula and as a symbol of existence.
In conclusion, we may state that between the universe of real
existence and the universe of mere subsistence there intervene a
number of systems, membership in which confers a relative existence.
For example, some one may have dreamed of a present king of
France or written a romance in which he figured, and in such sys-
tems the terms may sustain to one another such relations as their
authors may choose, without any limitations whatever. Affirmative
judgments expressing such relations will always be false, except
when accompanied by the statement of the unreality of the system
to which they are referred.
W. P. MONTAGUE.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Tertulliano e la filosofia pagana. G. BONFIGLIOLI. Revista Filosofica,
May-June, 1905. Pp. 356-376.
La Psicologia di Tertulliano nei suoi rapporti colla psicologia Stoica.
G. BONFIGLIOLI. Revista Filosofica, September-October, 1905. Pp.
467-493.
The writer's purpose is to do belated justice to Tertullian. He begins
his second article with a clear statement of his thesis. " Tertullian . . .
when better studied in detail reveals himself as not deserving the common
judgment which confounds his name with the multitude of Christians
of the early centuries who hated and denounced the pagan world without
discussing it. In treating of his general argument I sought to show
that notwithstanding the anathemas launched against the philosophers
of antiquity, notwithstanding his contempt for ancient wisdom, Tertullian
was, nevertheless, unable to evade the influence of philosophical theories,
and that in particular he imitated the Stoics. But it is in his psychology
that his dependence on the Stoic school is most evident, since it was in
the materialism of this school that Tertullian found the most effective
means of opposing what lie regarded as the common basis of the Gnostic
doctrines, the hated Platonic theory."
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To be sure, Tertullian regarded ' philosophy ' as the work of the devil,
as the parent of all heresy, as prepared solely for the glorification of its
human inventors, and he exults in the prospect of seeing the philosophers
burn in hell fire. But we may ask : To whom is the term ' philosopher '
applied, and what is the ground of so much bitterness?
Philosopher and heretic are equivalent terms for Tertullian, and the
1 heretics ' are the Gnostics, who had undertaken to inject elements de-
rived from pagan philosophy into the Christian doctrine. And since the
Gnostics made use chiefly of the Platonic tradition, it is natural that
Tertullian should feel toward this an especial animosity. He would destroy
Plato in order to demolish the philosophical arguments which supported
the Gnostic heresies. Wherever Tertullian breaks into one of his fiery
invectives against Greek philosophy, he is pretty sure to use some epithet
which shows that he has in mind the sect hostile to the traditional church.
Aristotle, too, is denounced, since from him the Gnostics get the concept
of matter, and the Stoics offend in daring to attribute matter to the
divine substance.
Yet in spite of the fact that the philosophers of ancient Greece were
without the revelation of Christ, and therefore knew not God, Tertullian
makes abundant use of their opinions in so far as these help him to
attack the Gnostics. For Tertullian was a learned man, familiar with
pagan literature and acquainted with Greek philosophy; and the study
of law, to which he seems to have early devoted himself, must have helped
him to appreciate the practical spirit of the ancient thinkers. His re-
flective attitude appears in his respect for ' nature.' " Nature is our first
school ; whatever is contrary to nature is monstrous." And " All that is
born is of God; all that is invented (fingitur) is of the devil." In spite
of corruption, a part of that nature which was like God has been pre-
served. This is reason. God is its guide and master. When the ancient
thinkers follow the guide of reason, then their thoughts do not merit
derision; for the soul will instinctively declare the truth. In this way
Tertullian shifts his position so as to be able to appeal, on occasion, to
the philosophers. Numerous citations from the physicians show how
he had looked for psychological evidence in harmony with his own
doctrines, and even from Plato and Aristotle something is taken.
But it was in the Stoic materialism and sensationalism that Tertullian
found the best weapons with which to combat the Platonic immaterialism.
"Paene nobiscum sunt" he wrote, thinking of the Stoics. Bonfiglioli
thinks the sentence would be more sincere without ' paene/ and he quotes
with approval the following from Havet (' Le christianisme et ses orig-
ines ') : " Tertullian, instead of saying ' Seneca belonged to us,' ought to
have said * It is from Seneca that I and my own masters have received
the greater part of our doctrine, and it is to him and to other philosophers
of the Stoic school, more than to the sacred books that we owe our theory
of the spiritual life.' '
Accordingly, whatever is, is body: " Omne quod est, corpus est sui
generis"; "Nihil est incorporate nisi quod non est"; " Nihil enim Anima
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 133
si non corpus"; "Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie"; and
all ' substantia ' must be ' corpus' Substantia is for Tertullian precisely
equivalent to bxuxetfjLevov in the Stoic usage, the material substrate which
nearly coincides with their highest concept '-n'.' In the writings of Ter-
tullian the same relation exists between substantia and res.
Not only is the divine nature corporeal; so is the word, the /w^o?.
They must be corporeal, since in the Stoic doctrine, adopted by Tertullian,
only corporeal things can act upon other things and be effected by other
things. According to Diogenes, Trdv fap TO KOIOUV <rwfj.d iariv and
Sextus Empiricus defines awtia as 8 tilftv re -xoie'tv 3y Tra^eci/, and Cicero:
"Nee vero out quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non
corpus" Also Tertullian's idea of corpus is identical with the Stoic
notion of <ro)//a. Even such things as virtue and vice, true and good,
anger and love, friendship and hate, are corporeal; they are cases of
tension (rv<r) of the pneumatic soul substance (TrveD/jta).
Tertullian is most concerned to prove that the soul is a body, and resorts
to many ingenious arguments. Since the soul is derived from God, and
is ' deo propinqus,' ' deo proximo,' it is corporeal like the divine substance,
and also because it can act and be acted upon. Again, since, in the Stoic
doctrine, the arts are corporeal and the soul nourishes itself by them,
the soul must be of the same nature. The soul, although derived from
God, is differentiated from God. The soul is flatus, God is spiritus.
The soul is not, as the Gnostics said, a part of God. On the other hand,
the soul is as intimately related to man. The body of the flesh and the
pneumatic body make up together what is called man. The pneumatic
body is in many respects a duplicate of the carnal body; it has a definite
sex. In the act of generation the soul reproduces itself and the body
reproduces itself. It reaches sexual maturity when the body does. It
differs from the carnal body ' tenuitate sola vel subtilitate,' and it has
the color suitable to such subtile corporeality, viz., the blue of the heavens.
That this pneumatic body does not reveal itself to the carnal eye is no
proof that it does not exist. It does not follow that it is invisible to
God and the saints. In addition to the above-mentioned arguments for
the corporeality of the soul, Tertullian appeals to the sacred writings
wherein there is mention of pains in hell and joys in heaven. But only
a body is capable of these. Nor was there lack of direct human testi-
mony. A prophetess of the Montanist sect had declared that while in
an ecstasy she had beheld the Savior, the angels, the souls of the dead;
these were soft to the touch, transparent, of a bluish color, and similar
in form to our own bodies. Tertullian appeals also to various empirical
demonstrations drawn from the physicians and naturalists.
Tertullian was at pains to demonstrate the unity and simplicity of
the soul, being anxious to combat the doctrine of Valentinus that in the
first man the soul was indeed of a single uniform type, but that in the
course of time it had become multiform. In this mood Tertullian identi-
fies anima, animus and spiritus, regarding them as different aspects or
determinations of the one original substance.
134
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Nevertheless Tertullian admits the division of the soul into rationale
and irrationale. The distinction is not so sharp, however, as the loytffTixov
and the aXoXov of Plato. Tertullian affirms that the soul, being from
God, is rational by nature, and the property of irrationality is a corrup-
tion accomplished by the devil. And within the soul there is a dominant
factor, a ^ye^ovcxov, having its seat in the heart. On the whole, however,
" huiusmodi autem non tarn paries animae habebantur quam vires et
efficaciae et operationes . . . non enim sunt substantiae animalis, sed
ingenia, etc.," each of which corresponds to a TTW? fyov y-yefjLovtxov.
In his theory of dreams and in his theory of the intuitive power of
the soul, Tertullian closely follows the Stoics. The soul, being im-
mortal, can never cease from activity; it neither needs repose nor could
possibly take it. Sleep, far from hindering the spontaneity of the soul,
leaves it free, just as 70/09 was denned by Diogenes as the liberation of
the soul from the service of the senses. Tertullian explains that during
sleep the soul 'in the fullness of its liberty displays its full activity in
dreams, which are states of ecstasy in which the gift of divination
(' periculi aut gaudii augurem ') is enjoyed. In combating Hermogenes,
Tertullian is willing to cite even Plato in order to prove the ' divinitas
animae quae in praesagio erumpitS
The articles are provided with abundant references to the texts. Who-
ever should look them all up ought to find himself thoroughly orientirt.
WENDELL T. BUSH.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
Hirnphysiologie und Willenstheorien. PAUL FLECHSIG. Annalen
Naturphilosophie, Bd. 4, Heft 4, 1905. S. 475-498.
By way of introduction to his discussion of the relation of body and
mind, the author points out certain important stages in the progress of
brain physiology. Constantin Varoli's belief that 'the mind of the ani-
mal resides in the substance of the brain ' served as a stimulus toward
efforts to localize brain functions. But the work of several generations
of physiologists, whose chief contributions to their science were improve-
ments of method, was completed before brain physiology really began to
make progress. In the last third of the nineteenth century the silver
method of Golgi and Cajal revealed structural facts which made possible
the development of the present tendencies of neurology.
Pathology and embryology, especially the process of myelogenesis, and
experiments with animals, have made numerous and invaluable contribu-
tions to our knowledge of the anatomy of the nervous system, its growth
and significance. Comparative studies of the structure and functions of
the nervous system have revealed facts concerning the brain cortex which
render our knowledge of the relations of the various parts of the brain
fairly satisfactory. These comparative studies uniformly indicate a par-
allelism between the structure of the nervous system and mental processes.
Forms of mind, the author states, vary regularly with forms of brain.
Although our knowledge of the details of this parallelism is incomplete,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 135
the progress of comparative neurology has brought us nearer and nearer
to the old, but perennially interesting, problem of the relation of mind
and body. Indeed, Flechsig thinks that the recent work of comparative
psychologists and physiologists far outweighs all previous work in its
value for the solution of this problem.
The author is not blind to the fact that many philosophers and scien-
tists contend that psychology is independent of brain physiology, and can
gain nothing from it. He, in fact, quotes Wundt to this effect, and then
proceeds to attempt to prove that the contention is not justified by the
history and status of our knowledge of brain and mind. The history of
the development of the individual, the physiology of the brain and the
attempted correlation of physiological and psychological facts have done
much, in Dr. Flechsig's opinion, toward the analysis of complex psycho-
logical processes. Voluntary acts are chosen by the author as material
for discussion, because their relation to consciousness is most insistently
before us, and also because, in connection with them, has arisen the view
that brain physiology may contribute to our knowledge of mental life.
Proofs of the importance of brain physiology for psychology are fur-
nished, granting the assumptions which are implicit in the whole of the
author's discussion, by the work of Broca on motor aphasia, of Fritsch
and Hitzig on localization in the cortex and of similar work by a number
of investigators.
The startling discovery of the existence of motor centers by Varoli,
and the progress in the direction of the localization of brain functions,
have been, in a sense, carried to completion by the work of Sherrington
on the anthropoid apes. It has been found that the number of motor
centers constantly increases as one passes from the simple to the more
complex forms of brain. Their number and the degree of differentiation
reached are far greater in the chimpanzee and gorilla than in any of the
lower mammalia, and the statements of surgeons indicate that a still
greater differentiation is to be found in man.
A review of the facts of specialization of function within the brain,
as indicated by the investigations of many prominent physiologists, is
neither necessary nor desirable for the appreciation of this article, and I
shall omit, therefore, mention of all details. After stating that the move-
ments of the extremities, for example, are due to the functioning of a
particular portion of the cortex and that in this region of the brain we
find certain large motor cells in connection with motor tracts, the author
goes on to state that in these motor cells we have the very center of the
organ of mind. Apparently he feels confident that the volitional process
has been definitely located in the cortex. That many psychologists or
physiologists will agree with this seems extremely doubtful. The above
will serve as an illustration of the way in which Flechsig refers a par-
ticular form of consciousness to a limited region of the brain.
The facts of pathology and neural degeneration under experimental
conditions show that only a small portion of the cerebral cortex is consti-
tuted by the sense spheres; the remainder Flechsig deals with under the
three types of associational spheres which he has distinguished. Pay-
136 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
chology must lay stress upon the localization of sense impressions, and
at the same time it must investigate the relations of the associational
spheres to consciousness. In commenting upon the criticisms which
have been passed on his contention that brain localization aids psychology,
the author merely says that we must not begin with the wrong sort of
question ; that the facts speak for themselves ; that he is convinced of the
importance for psychology of the minute study of the brain with refer-
ence to the dependence of mental processes upon its functional activity;
and that only further investigation of the subject is worth while.
The remainder of the article is concerned with the examination of our
knowledge of certain motor and sensory defects which have been studied
to advantage by brain physiologists, with the facts of ontogenic develop-
ment in their bearing upon the subject in hand, and, finally, with the
significance of studies of the phylogenetic series. In all of these facts
the author finds something of value for psychology.
By way of general comment upon the article, it may be added that no
one can deny that brain physiology is of more or less value to psychology
if this subject be not defined as the science of the subjective fact. For
those who contend that psychology is a purely introspective science, brain
physiology can no more have value in advancing our knowledge of mental
life than can the study of lower animals. Flechsig's article emphasizes
certain of the important facts, physiological and psychological, which
have been discovered by the researches of the brain physiologists, and
indicates how they have influenced the study of psychic processes and
modified psychological theories.
ROBERT M. YERKES.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
Stages of the Discussion of Evolutionary Ethics. T. DE LAGUNA. Philo-
sophical Review, September, 1905. Pp. 576-589.
The discussions of the bearing of the theory of evolution upon ethics
have passed through several fairly distinct phases. First, there was the
problem of the validity of morality in view of an evolutionary theory of
the world, but it was soon realized that moral experience remains what it
is whatever view we may take of the relation of man to the lower crea-
tures; evolution may be read as a leveling up as well as a leveling down.
Next, there arose the question of whether the principle of the struggle
for existence could be assumed as the principle of moral development.
Against such a purely selfish reading of the social struggle as might be
represented by a Nietzsche it was maintained either that (a) the biolog-
ical struggle was not a purely selfish one or that (fe) morality arises in
opposition to this natural law of the lower life and does not profess to
follow its principle. The third phase of the discussion is complex and
difficult to characterize briefly. It is represented by Spencer, Stephen,
and perhaps Alexander, who attempt to express moral experience in
biological terms, maintaining that rational action brings with it no new
functions or ends, but is valuable only as effecting a better adjustment
to the older biological ends. The intelligent agent recognizes the value of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 137
social cooperation, but only as a means to life. Accidentally connected
with the thought of this group are the ideas of hedonism, of the transitory
nature of the sense of obligation, of a completely evolved society and of
the equivalence of good to more developed action.
The fourth phase concerns the value of social inheritance as a factor
in the higher stages of evolution. With the recognition of this comes
the relegation of the study of organic evolution to a very secondary place
in ethics and the placing of a much higher importance upon the direct
study of social and individual development, especially upon the latter.
The specific character of moral development as the direct outcome of
individual moral struggle thus receives adequate recognition. Finally,
the problem now under discussion is the place and value of the genetic
method in ethics. On the one hand is the claim that development throws
no light on the moral question, since both good and evil are evolved and
success is no test of value; on the other is the reply that the persistence
of a moral sentiment in society must be considered as indicating its rela-
tion to social welfare and that the present can not be understood apart
from its history. " The truth is that evolutionary ethics, as a peculiar
variety or school, has almost ceased to exist. What has emerged from the
half -century-long discussion is a method of research that is used, with
more or less freedom, by almost every recent ethical writer of importance."
NORMAN WILDE.
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.
Ueber die Funktionen der Stabchen und Zapfen und uber die physi-
ologisclie Bedeuiung des Sehpurpurs. H. PIPER. Medizinische Klinik,
Nos. 25-26, 1905. Pp. 19.
This is an admirable and concise summary of the experimental evi-
dence for von Kries's theory of the function of the retinal rods and cones,
the so-called Duplizitdtstheorie. While the apparent fact that even the
periphery of the retina responds with color sensation to sufficiently intense
color stimuli may constitute a genuine difficulty for this theory, it must
not be forgotten that the researches of Piper himself on dark-adaptation,
quite aside from the experimental evidence offered by von Kries, seem to
confirm the view, beyond any possibility of contradiction, that the retinal
rods afford sensations of white light and the cones primarily of colored
ligKt. Piper finds ground for believing (p. 14) that even the cones of
the extreme periphery are incapable of giving color sensations. The
recent work of Trendelenburg has also confirmed the duplicity theory by
showing that the spectral absorption-curve for visual purple that has been
extracted from the retina is practically identical with the curve of gray
values given by the spectrum to the dark-adapted eye.
If there should be any unfavorable criticism to make of this summary
it would be that Piper perhaps minimizes the importance of the reoont
work of Nagel and Schaefer, which seems to show that the fovea itself is
capable of a certain amount of dark-adaptation, which is more than a
138 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
mere recovery from partial exhaustion. If this fact is established it may
have important consequences for the duplicity theory.
E. B. HOLT.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
MIND. January, 1906, N. S., No. 57. Contradiction and Reality
(pp. 1-12) : BERNARD BOSANQUET. -" The purpose of this paper is to insist
on the familiar view which treats negativity as a fundamental character-
istic of the real; to exhibit this view in connection with one or two points
in logical theory; and to insist that its value depends on the principle
being pressed home in its full force." Avenarius's Philosophy of Pure
Experience (I.) (pp. 13-31 ): NORMAN SMITH. -A valuable and interesting
exposition and criticism of some of the fundamental doctrines of Avena-
rius, such as his distinction between subjective and objective, his theory
of the relation of mind and brain, his materialistic intention and final
unwitting testimony in favor of subjective idealism. Psychology and
Philosophy of Play (I.) (pp. 32-52) : W. H. WINCH. - " I discuss the psy-
chology of play . . . perception and imagination in their bearing upon
play, play as fictitious belief . . . play in language, play as art . . . philo-
sophical theories of play, . . . summary . . . and a few educational corol-
laries." Presentation and Representation (pp. 53-80) : HENRY RUTGERS
MARSHALL. -A constructive criticism of the general theory that images
are copies of impressions, and of the Herbartian view that mental presen-
tations are conserved. The author defends the paradox that mental states
occurring at different moments can have no identical parts or aspects.
Discussion: Truth and Consequences (pp. 81-93): A. E. TAYLOR. -A
trenchant criticism of pragmatism, followed by a rejoinder to Mr. Schil-
ler's criticisms of the author. The author answers specifically and very
effectively the reiterated challenge of the pragmatists to produce examples
in which propositions are true without having any practical consequences.
Critical Notices: J. A. Stewart, The Myths of Plato: JOHN BURNETT.
D. G. Ritchie, Philosophical Studies: J. S. MACKENZIE. Mary Whiton
Calkins, Der doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologic : W. R. BOYCE GIB-
SON. New BooTcs. Philosophical Periodicals. Notes and Correspondence.
Mind Association: Directory.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. November, 1905, Vol. XIV.,
No. 6. Appreciation and Description and the Psychology of Values (pp.
645-668) : WILBUR M. URBAN. - "Appreciation and description represent
merely ideal limits of an antithesis which is never complete ... all de-
scription involves some element of appreciation. . . . The purpose of the
psychology of the worth consciousness is primarily interpretation. It can
not dispense with functional categories, which, in the last analysis, are
refinements of appreciative description." The Psychological Self and the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 139
Actual Personality (pp. 669-683): J. A. LEIGHTON. - After pointing out
the meagerness and inadequacy of the concept of the self adopted by psy-
chologists of to-day, the author makes a not uninteresting plea for the
systematic treatment of the self in so far as ' it is actualized and mani-
fested in its individual reactions as a member of a historical culture/
The Concept of Pure Experience (pp. 684695): B. H. BODE. -"I have
tried to show that the concept of pure experience, instead of forming a
proper datum for thought, has no standing-ground whatever. The new
doctrine has done valiant service by its criticism of theories which relate
sensation and thought in an external way." Discussion: Radical Em-
piricism as a Logical Method (pp. 696-705) : GEORGE H. SABINE. - " The
essential weakness of radical empiricism is that it attempts to develop a
logic and metaphysics from a point of view which entitles it only to a
psychology. It continues not only the method but the vice of English
empiricism." Reviews of Books: Die Philosophic im Beginn des zwan-
zigsten Jahrhunderts, Festschrift fur Kuno Fischer, Band I.: J. A.
LEIGHTON. Studies in Philosophy, Prepared in Commemoration of the
Seventieth Birthday of Professor George Holmes Howison: JOHN GRIER
HIBBEN. Johannes Volkelt, System der Aesthetik, Band I.: JAMES H.
TUFTS. George Simmel, Kant: WALTER G. EVERETT. Notices of New
Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.
Bastian, H. Carleton. The Nature and Origin of Living Matter. Phila-
delphia: J. B. Lippincott. Pp. 344.
Brotheren. Kants Philosophic der Geschichte. Helsingfors. 8vo.
Calderoni, Mario. Disharmonie economiche e disharmonie morali. Saggio
di un' estensione della teoria ricardiana della rendita. Florence:
Francesco Lumachi. 1906. Pp. 110. 2 1.
Dehove, H. Sur le perception exterieure. Extrait de la Revue de Lille.
Paris: Charrney, Arras. 1906.
Eisler, Rudolf. Kritische Einfuhrung in die Philosophic. Berlin: E. S.
Mittler und Sohn. 1905. Pp. viii + 470. 7.50 M.
Fouillee, A. Les elements sociologiques de la morale. Paris : F. Alcan.
Hermant, P. Les mystiques. Etude psychologique et sociale. Paris:
L. Cerf. 1905. Pp. 62.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Acad-
emy of Sciences met in conjunction with the New York Section of the
American Psychological Association at Princeton University, on the after-
noon and evening of February 26, at the invitation of the departments
of philosophy and psychology of the university. The following papers
140
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
were read : ' Method in Esthetics,' A. L. Jones ; ' Some New Points of
View in the Psychology of Valuation,' W. M. Urban ; ' A Psychological
Theory of the Origin of Religion,' Irving King; ' The Detection of Color
Blindness,' Vivian A. C. Henmon ; ' Color Sensations and Color Names,'
R. S. Woodworth; ' The Practise Curve as an Educational Method,' J.
McK. Cattell ; ' A New View of Mental Functions,' H. C. Warren ; < The
Four Powers of Life,' D. S. Miller; < The Nature of Judgment,' W. H,
Sheldon ; ' Reality as Possible Experience,' M. Phillips Mason ; ' Miscon-
ceptions of Realism,' W. P. Montague.
THE ' Deutscher Monistenbund ' has been organized in the Zoologica
Institute of Jena, with Professor Ernst Haeckel as honorary president.
The first chairman is Pastor Kalthoff, of Bremen, and Dr. Heinrich
Schmidt, of Jena, is general secretary.
LEAVE of absence for the second half of the academic year has been
granted to Professor George S. Fullerton, of the department of philosophy
of Columbia University, and Professor G. A. Tawney, of Beloit College,
Wisconsin, has taken charge of Professor Fullerton's work during the
latter's absence.
PROFESSOR GEORGE T. LADD is beginning his work as professor at Adel-
bert College, of which he is a graduate. He will give courses in ethics
and the philosophy of religion at the State University of Iowa during the
coming summer session; afterwards he will go to Japan for a year's stay,
during which time he will lecture and study.
THE Western Philosophical Association will hold its sixth annual
meeting at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, on April 13 and 14.
Professor J. H. Tufts will preside.
PROFESSOR ROYCE gave a series of lectures on post-Kantian idealism
before the department of philosophy of Johns Hopkins University during
the mid-year recess.
IN honor of the forty-seventh birthday of Emperor William of Ger-
many, celebrated on January 27, a Leibnitz medal has been established,
to be awarded annually by the Berlin Academy of Sciences for notable
scientific achievements.
MR. BENJAMIN KIDD delivered at the Royal Institution, on February
1 and 8, lectures on ( The Significance for the Future in the Theory of
Evolution.'
THE Society for Philosophical Inquiry at the George Washington Uni-
versity is to give a public meeting on Spinoza, on March 6.
PROFESSOR GEORGE L. RAYMOND, formerly of Princeton, has been made
professor of esthetics in the George Washington University.
VINCENZIO LILLA, professor of the philosophy of right at the Univer-
sity of Messina, died on the thirtieth of November, 1905.
VOL. III. No. 6. MARCH 15, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE MORAL INDIVIDUAL
experience may be graded in the following manner: sense-
experience, the perception of objects, the presence of articulate
ideas, and the awareness of self. The field of ethics is possible only
in the last stage, for reflective self-consciousness is necessary to the
rise of an ought.
The stream of consciousness moves along freely until it reaches
the stage of thought. Here ideas present to consciousness dis-
tinct objects of choice. And the greater the conflict, the more in-
tense the consciousness of self. It is not a conflict of these ideas,
strictly speaking. Each one of these ideas reveals to consciousness
some definite object, and through contrast with this object, conscious-
ness is keenly aware of itself as a choosing and determining subject.
It is not a question simply of something to be done. Were some one
else to do the same thing, it might not be a question at all to this
consciousness. No; it is a question of the self as doer and of the
significance of the thing to be done for him. Experience has become
self-conscious. It is in its own keeping. No one else can own this
will. No one else can be just this self. And this is the essence of
the feeling of individuality. It is the foundation of religion, of
ethics and of all self-conscious initiative. Such an individual is
his own center of reality. This birthright he can not sell. And
just because he is such an individual he stands out absolutely unique.
He is a reality duplicated nowhere else.
We can understand that famous discourse of the ancient Brah-
man hero who, although riding to war, confesses to his charioteer
that it is only a question of casuistry who ought to be killed and who
ought not. What philosopher including within his premises a
balancing of ego over against alter has ever justly decided in favor
of either? If he has, what are his grounds? What logic is there
for self-denial, if my neighbor is simply one self and I another?
You love us because we die for you ! So much the meaner you : so
mean that we think ourselves better, and live. He who runs can
141
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
not read the meaning of that Buddhaship that came from sacrifice
of one's self to a hare. Either a doctrine can be followed out to
its full or it ought to be given up. Was it not, therefore, the true
Buddha who gave himself up 1 What else could a true Buddha do 1
This problem is more serious than at first sight it appears to
most students of ethical doctrine. Altruism is as irrational as a
doctrine as egoism. And compromise, such as the greatest good
of the greatest number theory, is only a makeshift. And there
seems to be absolutely no way out. The subject, just because he is
a subject, can not be a mere object. The will within is his own.
And, therefore, just so far as he is a real individual he is inde-
pendent of you and me. Mark the following from Hamlet:
Hamlet. Will you play upon this pipe?
Guildenstern. My lord, I can not.
Ham. I pray you.
Guil. Believe me, I can not.
Ham. I do beseech you.
Guil. I know no touch of it, my lord.
Ham. "Tis as easy as lying: govern these ventages with your fingers and
thumb, give it breath with your mouth, and it will discourse most excellent
music. Look you, these are the stops.
Guil. But these can not I command to any utterance of harmony; I have
not the skill.
Ham. Why, look you now, how unworthy a thing you make of me. You
would play upon me; you would seem to know my stops; you would pluck out
the heart of my mystery; you would sound me from my lowest note to the top
of my compass: and there is much music, excellent music, in this little organ;
yet can not you make it speak. Why, do you think I am easier to be played
upon than a pipe? Call me what instrument you will, though you can fret
me, you can not play upon me.
Here, now, the whole thing is beautifully brought out. A person
is real because he belongs to himself alone. He has music of his
own. He has ideas that you may or may not get. He may lie; he
may deceive. The key to his music is in his own keeping. If he
so choose, you and I shall never so much as hear it. He is not an
instrument played upon from without, but a life that comes forth
from within. It is the eternal beauty and glory of the Brahman
system that it brings to the front this however incomplete abso-
lutely fundamental truth, that the self is not to be found within
the world of objects, because it is, first of all, its own immediate
world, in that it is subject. There is an inner world of our own
subjectivity that is absolutely ineradicable. No matter what the
particular content, whether Shylock's miserable ducats or St. Paul's
moral will, this feeling, usually unconscious and almost always
logically unjustifiable on the part of most people, is an ineradicable
characteristic of selfhood. And moral insight is nothing else than
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 143
the being able not only to know we all know it but to feel that
other individuals have this same kind of experience just as in-
eradicably as we ourselves.
"When the object of feeling is great and complex, sensuous per-
ception is impossible. Even with the feeling for a single personality
this is so. A personality is never fully given in any single moment,
or in any single situation. The feeling acquires an ideal character
so soon as it seeks to embrace the personality in its totality and
unity, which is as soon as it gets beyond the stage at which the
object is only a means of personal gratification." Just as one can
have no proper conception of self unless one's sensuous immediacy
is apprehended as a moment in an ideal whole, so, as this fine passage
from Hoffding states, the ability to apprehend other selves implies
this same process of idealization. Notice, we say 'other selves.'
Other realities, as mere objects, as tools for our use, realities con-
ceived as things, exist primarily for us. Another self, on the other
hand, although it may be a means for us, must first of all exist as
the fulfillment of its own ideas, not our own. It may well be that
its own ideas and our own are fulfilled in common through one and
the same will-act, this activity of will being either its own or ours;
but it is because it is fulfilling its own ideas that the other self has
chosen this part in common with us. This is the explanation of
the seemingly paradoxical character of love, of altruism and of
worship. Where this independence as end is degraded into means
we have indeed not two selves but one, for the one has become a
means to, and is lost in the other, and has as such ceased to be a
self. If the self is the only end it is always so, and by what con-
ceivable logic can one such self be sacrificed to another? The alter
to whom this sacrifice is to be made is himself an ego : and so altruism
is itself egoism under the cover of a sentimental terminology! If
the selfhood of both alter and ego is not preserved, the personality
of the one is wholly relative to that of the other, and quantity is
supreme. If the self as subject is to be an end in itself, there can be
no limit beyond which its quality of selfhood is degraded into
quantity. But how can each individual person be an end in himself
and, at the same time, unity in the world of persons be possible?
Every individual, just because he is an individual, must be a
unique fact. Each individual is a reality which can be duplicated
nowhere else. But this character of uniqueness is not peculiar to
the human individual. Everything whatever possesses just this
character. The beautiful gourd over which Jonah wept was just
such a fact. The breath of the lily, the tint of the rose, is just such
a fact. Those who lay stress on the indefinable character of the
human individual can find an object of equal awe and wonder in
144
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everything which exists. And further, exclusiveness is an accident
of will; it is not its essence. If one love one's friends, it is not
because one wishes to exclude others from one's affection. One's
vote does exclude candidates not voted for, yet the aim of the vote
is primarily not to exclude particular men, but to represent certain
principles. A will which is indefinable is anything else but a truly
self-conscious will. Only when the individual ceases its militant
exclusiveness and becomes definable does it become positive. The
little child, says Professor Baldwin, 1 not only notices that, as con-
trasted with things, persons are irregular in their actions, but he
also notices that each one has his own regular kind of irregularity.
Will is possible only when the stream of consciousness becomes an
object to itself. And only so are individuals intelligible to each
other.
In discussing the nature of the human individual there are two
aspects to be noticed, and both must be treated with equal consider-
ation. There is the aspect of instinct, impulse, heredity and all
that makes for organization ; and there is the aspect of intelligence,
choice, will and all that makes for individuality.
Instinctive activity is not only first in order of time, it is more
fundamental in the life of the organism. Will, individual choice,
is the result of development; it is secondary and presupposes the
realm of instinct and impulse as its foundation. When the optic
mechanism of a newly hatched chick is stimulated by some object,
the chick pecks at it instinctively. Some of the things it pecks at
turn out to be bitter, some to be good. The sight of the former are
associated with bitter sensations. Such objects come in time to be
avoided. Here instinct is modified by individual experience. The
chick, we say, reveals individual intelligence. The function of this
individual experience is to modify, to inhibit and to guide instinctive
activity.
Instinctive differs from reflex activity according to the extent of
the organization involved. If the whole organism be involved, we
speak of the behavior as instinctive; if only an incoming nerve, a
ganglion and an outgoing nerve be involved, we have the typical
reflex. Stout also speaks of the sensation-reflex. It is a form of
impulsive activity set going by some sensation. Ideo-motor activity
is a still higher form of mental activity. Every idea tends to carry
itself into some active experience. But even here we do not have
will, for the ideas carry themselves out mechanically, that is, with-
out deliberation or choice. Now ideas are abstracts from the con-
tinuum of immediate experience, hence when called up even ab-
stractly they represent some bit of experience. Impulse is stirred,
lt Mental Development/ p. 126.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 145
sometimes strong emotions are called forth by ideas. When, there-
fore, an idea representing or standing for some bit of interesting
experience is inhibited by the presence of some other idea standing
for its bit of experience, what happens? There is deliberation and
there must be some choice before activity can result. This choice,
this will, is itself an outgrowth of instinctive behavior. Will is
dependent upon the fundamental processes of instinctive, reflex and
ideo-motor activities. One does not choose to eat, although one may
choose what particular things one will eat. One does not choose to
live, although one may choose to live well. Will presupposes organ-
ization. One can will only what has been in some way first ex-
perienced. Learning to skate, swim or play tennis, like any kind
of learning, is possible only by striking the proper activities and
inhibiting the useless ones. A strong, enduring will is based upon
some fundamental impulse; the idea comes in to guide, the original
tendency to act. The idea lights up the way for the impulse.
The will is not coterminous with the individual self. It is the
individuating aspect of the self, but instinct, impulse, the aspect of
organization, is fundamental. Will is the wave, instinct the body
of the stream. Will, therefore, and organization are not two con-
tradictory facts. Each individual is himself an extremely complex
organization. And the will is so far from being antagonistic to
organization that it has its excuse for being wholly in the service of
organized life out of which it has been evolved. When one idea is
chosen rather than another, we have will. But each idea if left to
itself would carry itself into conduct. This is so because all con-
scious experience is impulsive, motor. Will is never independent
of organization. A willed act is always one of two or more im-
pulsive tendencies which gets expressed through some idea. Plato's
doctrine of the individual is the same as his idea of the state. Sense-
experience corresponds to the laborers, reason to the thinking class
and the will to the executive department. Each individual is an
organization in himself. The primal characteristic of life is action.
Ideation, reflection, is the product of development found only in
man. When concepts are reached and actions take place in accord-
ance with such concepts, we have voluntary conduct. But such
conduct is not independent of its ground-plan, which is instinct,
impulse and emotion.
As psychology, and particularly animal psychology, shows, in-
stinctive behavior is the fundamental form of activity in all life.
But instinctive behavior is a racial form of activity, and not the
expression of individual experience. Instincts express the experi-
ence of the group, not that of the individual. And as instincts are
primary and will secondary in the life of the individual, so in the
146 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
history of the group the social or instinctive is prior to the indi-
vidualistic type of behavior. Virtues which are preeminently of
social value are recognized first ; virtues which are particularly indi-
vidual in their significance are later. Will, self-consciousness, indi-
viduality, being a late development, the individualistic type of be-
havior does not exist in the early history of human life. The typical
group life is seen in animals. Horses unite in common defense
against an enemy. Wolves hunt in packs. Geese feed under the
protection of a sentry.
If instinct is fundamental and will secondary, it follows that in
primitive man the social instincts, such as we see in animals, were
more fundamental than individual, voluntary actions. Only grad-
ually did the individual will differentiate itself from the group.
Such differentiation is the origin of man. It is the beginning of self-
conscious will. The origin of man is synonymous with the differ-
entiation of the individual will from the instinctive behavior of the
group. In the animal no such differentiation takes place. His
social conduct is performed instinctively. Man is an individual self.
He distinguishes himself from, contrasts himself with, sets himself
over against, his group. This may lead to real opposition between
the individual and the group. Such opposition is coincident with
the very existence of the individual will. As possessing his own will,
man has a unique experience of his own individuality. But this is
only one aspect of the human individual. Man has all the instincts
of the animal. These instincts are the inescapable ties which bind
him to his group, ties of family, social customs and religion. And it
is the function of reason to get these fundamental instincts expressed
in terms of will. Reason is not opposed to the instincts of the indi-
vidual. The social instincts are fundamental in the individual;
reason is an instrument evolved out of experience for its interpreta-
tion and further guidance.
Mr. Morgan, in his 'Habit and Instinct/ regards imitation as
instinctive. The newly hatched chick comes to drink first by hap-
pening to peck at the water or through instinctively imitating the
hen. But once experience is gained through instinctive imitation,
later behavior is possible which is guided by individual experience.
The resemblance of the imitative activity to the model gives pleasure.
Failure means pain. " Instinctive imitation is thus an organic re-
sponse independent of experience; intelligent imitation is due to
conscious guidance, the result of experience, and based upon the
innate satisfaction which accompanies the act of reproductive im-
itation. ' '
Imitation plays an essential part in the development of the indi-
vidual. It lifts the animal to the level of its species and the child
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 147
to the traditional level of its social group. Mr. Fiske has made us
familiar with the meaning of what he has called the prolongation
of infancy. It means the development of individuality. The indi-
vidual animal, in so far as he is the creature of instinct, is largely
fitted out early in his career with the means and ways of his behavior.
In the child, on the other hand, there is comparatively little fixed
response. His long period of growth makes possible his individual
development.
The distinguishing feature in Baldwin's view of the self is that
it develops, not through reflection, but through imitation; that its
own individual sense of self is not first developed and is afterwards
seen to develop on its social side. Through the innate tendency to
imitation the child develops his own sense of self through imitating
other selves. He does not mean that he has a knowledge of other
selves before he knows anything of himself ; he means that the child
imitates others before he has any real knowledge either of himself
or of others and that through this process of imitation he develops
his own sense of self. The sense of self, therefore, fundamentally
is just as social as it is individual. Baldwin 's theory brings us back
to the psychological position with which we began: that reflection
and will are a late product of development, are secondary, and that
impulse and instinct are primary in the development of experience.
The groundwork of the individual, reflective mind is the organ-
ized, instinctive life of the race. Will is secondary ; instinct, reflex-
action and impulse are primary. Abstract ideas are secondary;
immediate experience is primary. What seems to be a will separated
from the unity of life is merely an aspect, an individual phase of
the total self. The will is not independent of instinct; its purpose
is not to usher in a separation from the group, but to guide the
organized life of the individual in its relation to the group. Will
means individuality, but individuality does not mean exclusive inde-
pendence. Will means that the organized totality of the self which
earlier in the scale of evolution has been a matter of instinct is now
partly in its own keeping. A share in the government of things is
given over to the moral self, but because of the aspect of organiza-
tion, the individual consisting of systems within systems, each is
inescapably a member of his group. Will means control over rela-
tions, not independence of relations.
The movement of life prior to the appearance of human person-
ality is continuously toward such an individual will. As we pass
from the inorganic to the organic world and through the latter to
man, we move from the more to the less general; we go more and
more toward the particular. Mr. Spencer says that development is
from indefinite homogeneity to definite heterogeneity. There is a
148
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
constant decrease of exactness as we pass from physics and chem-
istry on through the sciences of physiology, biology, psychology,
ethics. Mathematics means less and less as we move along in the
series, physical bodies, living organisms, individual minds. There
is less and less universality, more and more differentiation, as we
move through the spheres of physical law, plant life, animal instinct,
human will. And within the human sphere development reveals
increasing differentiation. The higher the civilization, the greater
the individuality do we find in its members. In a gallery of rogues,
it has been said, the individuals are more on a dead level than in a
company of cultured gentlemen. Degeneration levels down our
human individuality to the common level of instinct. Development,
on the other hand, subordinates the general, the physical, the in-
stinctive the common to all to the particular, will, choice the
distinctively individual. Herein is the separation of the human
from the brute, the origin of freedom as contrasted with mechanical
instinct. In short, herein is the origin of man.
But let us see what we have said. For we have traced develop-
ment to a mere point. This free will, this individual, etymologically
indivisible unit is so narrowed down that it has become a veritable
abstraction. No such thing as a separate individual could exist. The
human being has by no means ceased to be a member of the physical
and animal worlds. And, besides, persons have a world of endless
relationships, such as the family, the state, the church, of which
the animal knows nothing.
The way out of this difficulty is not to get into it. And we shall
not get into it if we do not regard the human individual as a separate,
by-itself-existing reality.
The will is but the individual aspect of each individual self,
which in other respects is as deeply grounded in the unity of life
as any member of the animal world. But through a reflective,
self-conscious will the self is partly in its own keeping. And this
may lead, and commonly does lead, to an attempted separation from
the unity of life in which the self is grounded. What differentiates
the self from the world of nature, what makes it an individual, is
the possession of a self-conscious will. But this does not unmake
the unity which the self has with all the orders below it in the scale
of life. At the same time it must be none the less an individual
because of this underlying unity. The problem of human life, then,
is to express in terms of will the fundamental unity of life which
in the infra-human world is expressed in terms of law and instinct.
Through the prism of thought the stream of life is individuated,
differentiated into self-conscious wills. But the underlying unity
remains. The problem is to get this deeper unity expressed through
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 149
and in these multitudinous wills. The instinct of sex expressed in
terms of will is love. Upon this rests the institution of the family.
The relationships with other beings, which in the animal world are
controlled by more or less modifiable instincts, must be lifted into
what has been called the world of appreciation, where they are vol-
untarily assumed. Upon this rests the state. The recognition of
the source of life must be one of voluntary acceptance. Upon this
rests the development of religion.
J. DASHIELL STOOPS.
IOWA COLLEGE.
ON 'FEELING'
I. In my judgment, we should gain in scientific accuracy and
contribute toward progress were we to discard from our psycholog-
ical and philosophical vocabularies the term 'feeling' altogether.
'Feeling,' like certain other terms constantly employed by psychol-
ogists and philosophers, among them 'consciousness,' 'perception'
and 'sensation,' is unsuited for use in a scientific terminology. What
has been said recently by Professor Perry and others regarding
'consciousness' may suffice so far as that term is concerned. As
for 'perception,' most of us surely would join in the wish expressed
by Professor Titchener in his St. Louis address, that the word 'per-
ception' might be 'banished to the limbo reserved for unregenerate
concepts and be replaced by a round dozen of concrete and descrip-
tive terms.' As for 'sensation,' one who seriously strives to reach
a definite, consistent and usable scientific meaning for that term
will doubtless go through an experience somewhat like that which
Professor Cattell related of himself at a meeting of the Psycho-
logical Association some years ago. As I recall his statement, it
was that in his student days he and others took up with the late
Groom Robertson the question, 'What is the meaning of sensation?'
They continued their studies throughout an entire winter, meeting
at Robertson's rooms fortnightly, and at the end of that time were
no nearer a satisfactory answer than when they began. And no
wonder, for the term means pretty much everything: with some,
sensation is affective, the affective aspect of our mental reactions to
sense stimuli; with others, it is not affective, but intellective (pre-
sentative) ; with others, among them Robertson himself, it is neither,
but a stage of mentality below the rational and embracing conative
as well as intellective and affective factors; and, not to prolong the
list of meanings, with some experimental psychologists, no attempt
is made to give the term any definite meaning at all. Now ' feeling, '
with its many, and popular, connotations, is, like these other terms,
150 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
unsuited for scientific use, and only contributes to confusion instead
of to clear thinking and scientific progress.
II. I am not, however, very sanguine that 'feeling' will be dis-
carded altogether from our scientific vocabulary. I would remark,
therefore, in the second place, that the meaning given to 'feeling' by
the Associationists and by Mr. Spencer, Professor James and others
seems to me to be especially unsatisfactory, and to be one which
we can and ought to discard. These writers give 'feeling' the
widest possible generic significance, and make it stand for every
form of mental state, change or activity. This makes it equivalent
to 'thought' as used by the Cartesians and as still used in such a
phrase as 'the stream of thought,' and to 'idea' as used by Locke and
as still used in the phrase 'association of ideas.' Now, of course,
we must have such a generic term. But such a term should be as
devoid of other and more specific connotations as possible; and
surely 'feeling,' like 'thought' and 'idea,' is not. [For myself,
I strongly believe that psychology and philosophy would be the
gainers were we to follow the admirable suggestion made by Pro-
fessor Huxley in his little volume on Hume and, in the interests of
improved terminology, adopt the word 'psychosis' (with the ad-
jective 'psychosial') as our generic term. Then we should have a
strictly scientific and fairly unambiguous term for every mental
state, change or activity, corresponding to the neurologist's 'neurosis'
for any and every brain change or state.]
III. Assuming that we are to continue to use the term ' feeling, '
it should be in the sense of 'affection' or 'affective psychosis,' terms
much to be preferred to 'feeling' itself. Taking it in that sense,
I would remark, in the third place, that I have never been able to
accept the widely prevailing view which identifies 'feeling' with
pleasure-pain or pleasantness-unpleasantness (Lust-Unlust). To
say that all our feelings are constituted by elements of pleasure
and pain and nothing else; that 'feelings qua feelings are merely
particular modifications of the agreeable or disagreeable'; that 'feel-
ing as such has no quality, apart from the radical difference of the
pleasant and the unpleasant' (Sully), seems to me to be due to
imperfect psychological analysis or to philosophical preconceptions.
More accurate and unprejudiced analysis shows, I believe, that
feeling as feeling has quality as well as tone (intensity of pleasure-
pain) ; that our feelings can be ranged along a scale as base or noble ;
that ideal categories and categories of value hold of them as affective
states and not merely of the underlying or accompanying intel-
lectual elements. With Stuart Mill, it seems to me absurd that
while quality is considered as well as intensity in estimating all
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 151
else, the estimation of feeling should be supposed to depend upon
intensity alone.
IV. The Wundtian tridimensional (or tridirectional) theory of
the nature of feeling, that feeling takes three elemental forms
or directions pleasantness-unpleasantness, excitement-repose and
strain-relaxation which may be experienced in some cases inde-
pendently of one another, does not seem to me to be sustained by
the evidence, introspective and experimental. For example, I find
no satisfactory evidence that there are states of feeling, whether
called excitement-repose, strain-relaxation or by any other name,
that are experienced wholly apart from pleasantness-unpleasant-
ness; that is, that have no pleasure-pain shading or tinge. As for
Wundt's second and third elemental characteristics or directions,
excitement-repose (Royce's restlessness-quiescence) and strain-re-
laxation, I can not rid myself of the conviction that they are not
feelings proper at all, but are effects or accompaniments, organic or
mental, which are confounded with affective states proper.
V. Finally, while I am not prepared to accept Dr. Marshall's
doctrine that 'feeling is the empirical ego which has not yet become
explicit,' I find myself in full agreement with much of the psycho-
logical matter in his interesting paper and especially with the
emphasis laid upon the characteristic of 'subjectivity' as of the
essence of feeling. In Hamilton's well-known phrase, 'feeling is
subjectively subjective.' GEORGE M. DUNCAN.
YALE UNIVERSITY.
SOCIETIES
THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMER-
ICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
American Psychological Association held its fourteenth
annual meeting on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, De-
cember 27-29, 1905, in Emerson Hall, at Harvard University, in
affiliation with the American Philosophical Association. The meet-
ing was one of the most successful in the history of the Association,
in point of attendance and in the general interest in the program
presented. The wealth of papers precluded the possibility of such
discussion as would seem desirable at the meetings of the Association.
The papers were grouped and distributed at the various sessions with
a view to giving, as far as possible, unity to the program of each
session. Wednesday morning was given over largely to comparative
and abnormal psychology, Thursday morning to general psychology
and Friday to experimental psychology, followed by a conversazione
152 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and demonstrations of apparatus and methods used in the researches
in progress at the Harvard Psychological Laboratory.
The president of the Association, Professor Mary Whiton Calkins,
of Wellesley College, presided at all of the sessions. At the opening
session on Wednesday, Professor G. V. N. Dearborn, of Tufts Col-
lege, first presented a paper on ' The Relations of Muscular Activity
to the Mental Process.' Professor Dearborn held that there was no
ground for the universal acceptance of brain protoplasm as the sole
physical correlate of mind and suggested the claims of muscle pro-
toplasm to be considered as representing a partial, and it may be the
more important, correlate of the mental process. The various prop-
erties of muscle protoplasm satisfy the criteria of correlation better
than does the cerebral cortex. Dr. Irving King's paper, 'How can
the Relation of the Conscious to the Subconscious be Best Conceived ? '
was a criticism of the conception of consciousness after the analogy
of the visual field. Consciousness is best conceived as a point cor-
related with a certain degree of organization of neural processes.
The point of consciousness is modified by outlying neural processes
and dispositions which in a vague way affect the movement of the
central organization. These outlying neural processes and disposi-
tions are the subconscious. The five following papers were devoted
to comparative psychology. Dr. Robert M. Yerkes reported the
results thus far obtained in a study of 'The Senses and Intelligence
of Japanese Dancing Mice.' These mice appear to be degenerate
forms. Tests of the various senses and of ability to discriminate
and learn have yielded almost entirely negative results. Dr. J. P.
Porter, of Clark University, presented two papers, one being a brief
report of a 'Further Study of the English Sparrow and other Birds,'
the other on 'The Habits and Instincts of Spiders, Genera Argiope
and Epeira.' The first was a study of the learning-process in a
vesper sparrow, a cow-bird, four English sparrows and two pigeons,
with notes on individual differences. The second paper, illustrated
by the stereopticon, showed the great variability in the web-spinning
instinct of spiders as to the selection of a place for the web, and, in
the case of those that build one, of the nest and its material. Varia-
tions in time of spinning, in adaptations in feeding habits, variability
in courtship and evidences of intelligent control were discussed.
Professor Wm. Harper Davis followed with a discussion of 'Varia-
tions in the Nests of a Spider, with a Comment on the Measure-
ment of the Variability of Instincts.' Professor Davis exhibited
a series of nests of another species of spider which binds grass or
sedge blades to form boxes for the protection of its eggs, and dis-
cussed the variations and their causes. The marked individual dif-
ferences which appear probably represent variations in instincts and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 153
adaptations to unusual conditions. It was pointed out that a study
of such variations .may furnish an objective measurement of varia-
bility in instincts, if the numerous other factors which are undoubt-
edly present can be eliminated. Considerable interest attaches to
these preliminary discussions in view of the fact that it is usually
held that variability in instincts can not be determined quantita-
tively. Professor William Morton Wheeler's paper on 'The Ant
Queen as a Psychological Study ' indicated the great psychological
changes which take place at the various stages in the life history of
the ant queen. The striking contrast between the ant queen and
the queen honey-bee was interestingly set forth. The queen honey-
bee is a degenerate, a mere reproductive machine ; the ant queen is a
perfect exemplar of the species, taking up vicariously most of the
characteristic functions of the workers. The three succeeding papers
dealt with some of the problems of abnormal psychology. Dr.
E. Cowles's paper on 'Conscious Experiences and the Somatic Group
of Senses' called attention to the importance of the somatic group of
senses for psychiatry, which has hitherto concerned itself largely
with the motor aspects of mental life and expression to the neglect
of the inner sensory field. The somatic sensations are added to the
experiences from the physical group of senses to the outer 'life of
relation ' and exert a controlling influence upon the mind ; hence the
importance of their study. In a paper on * The Nature of Hypnotic
and Post-Hypnotic Hallucinations,' Dr. Boris Sidis questioned the
validity of the hypnotic hallucination and the central origin of hal-
lucinations. Experiments and observations on many subjects tend
to prove that hypnotic or post-hypnotic hallucinations are neither
peripheral nor of the alleged central origin, but are spurious in char-
acter, in a word, delusions. Dr. Morton Prince's paper on 'The
Psychology of Sudden Conversion' gave a report of a case of sudden
conversion similar to the Ratisbonne case discussed by Professor
James. By putting the subject into two different hypnotic states
the processes antecedent to the crisis were discovered. The subject
had gone into a trance during which various dream states connected
with ecstatic emotions had developed. The persistence of the ecstatic
emotions after waking as a state of exaltation accounts for the con-
version. There was accordingly no incubation of ultramarginal or
subconscious ideas as James's theory holds.
After the adjournment of the session, the members of the Asso-
ciation were entertained at a luncheon given by the Harvard Cor-
poration at the Harvard Union.
Inasmuch as this meeting was the occasion for the formal opening
of Emerson Hall, the new building at Harvard devoted to philosophy
and psychology, special dedicatory exercises were held on Wednesday
154 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
afternoon, Professor Miinsterberg, chairman of the department o
philosophy, presiding. Addresses were made by President Eliot
and Dr. Edward Waldo Emerson. Following these exercises there
was a joint discussion with the American Philosophical Association
on 'The Affiliation of Psychology with Philosophy and with the
Natural Sciences,' Professor Dewey, president of the Philosophical
Association, presiding. The participants in this discussion were
Professors Miinsterberg, Frank Thilly, James R. Angell, A. E.
Taylor, Wilhelm Ostwald and President G. Stanley Hall. Professor
Miinsterberg strongly contended for the affiliation of psychology
with philosophy as typified in Emerson Hall. He urged the im-
measurability of mental phenomena and the impossibility of apply-
ing to them the methods of the natural sciences. President Hall as
warmly contended for the affiliation with the natural sciences.
Psychology is 'a description as accurate as may be of all those facts
of psychic life, conscious and unconscious, animal and human, nor-
mal and morbid, embryonic and mature, which are demonstrable and
certain to be accepted by every intelligent, unbiased mind which fully
knows them.' The best principle of organization of these facts
is evolutionary. "Psychology is excluded from no field of experi-
ence, inner or outer, or of life, conscious or unconscious, religious,
social, genetic, individual, that can be studied on the basis of valid
empirical facts. ' ' Its closest allies are to be biology, physiology and
anthropology. Professor Thilly insisted that the fact that mind can
be studied in connection with matter does not make psychology a
natural science. Psychology is concerned with a unique body of
facts, and a knowledge of their material antecedents would not give
a knowledge of mind as such. That psychology is a natural science
because it employs the methods of science is also untenable. Pro-
fessor Angell urged the affiliation with both philosophy and the
natural sciences. Psychology has a philosophical lineage and certain
highly important philosophical foundations. On the other hand, in
many of its methods and ideals it approaches the position of the
natural sciences. Professor Taylor held that the affiliation of psy-
chology is with the natural rather than with the philosophical sci-
ences. Psychology is dependent upon empirical premises based upon
the testimony of direct perception, and hence resembles the empirical
sciences. The fact that it is concerned with 'individual objects' and
non-quantitative processes does not make it the less a natural science.
Moreover, it makes no use of the concept of ideal norms of value.
On Wednesday evening President Calkins read her address on
'A Eeconciliation of Structural and Functional Psychology.' The
abstract of this address is here reproduced in full.
"Psychology is the study of the conscious self. Not the psychic
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 155
event the mental process or idea is the basal fact of psychology,
but the self from which every psychic event is a mere abstraction.
This self of the psychologist must be sharply distinguished, first,
from the philosopher 's self, the object of metaphysical study ; second,
from the biologist's self, the animal body which 'has consciousness,'
and, finally, from the sociologist's self, the self regarded as member
of a community.
"The scientific study of the conscious self involves two essential
procedures: first, the analysis of its consciousness into structural
elements, sensational, affective and the like, and, second, the enumera-
tion and classification of its relations with its environment, that is,
with other selves and with objects. The first of these procedures is
the distinctive feature of structural psychology; the second is the
fundamental motive of functional psychology. The essentials both
of structural and of functional psychology are, thus, combined in
psychology as study of a self; for this self is both a complex of ele-
mental experiences and a complex of relationships to its environ-
ment. ' '
Immediately after the address the members of the Association
were entertained at a reception at the home of Professor and Mrs.
Miinsterberg.
The Thursday morning session began with an interesting 'Dis-
cussion on the Definition of Feeling.' The discussion was opened
by two papers on this subject ; the first by Dr. Henry Rutgers Mar-
shall, the second by Professor H. N. Gardiner. Dr. Marshall called
attention to the various uses of the term feeling to designate (1)
touch, (2) the organic sensations, (3) emotion, (4) pleasure-pain
and (5) mere emphatic experience as such. Feeling can be identified
with no one of them. The emphatic characteristic of all experiences
which are described by the word is found in 'subjectivity.' "Feel-
ing proper is a certain vague mental form which when more clearly
defined develops into the empirical ego of self-consciousness. Feeling
is thus the empirical ego which has not yet become explicit." Pro-
fessor Gardiner's examination of the various meanings of the term, as
commonly used and which the psychological use of the term should
cover as far as possible, led to the following definition: "Feeling
may be defined as the immediate consciousness of the modification of
the individual experience, as such; a feeling, as the content of con-
sciousness, however constituted, regarded as the immediate modifica-
tion of such experience." A set discussion followed the reading of
the papers, the general trend of which can only be briefly indicated.
Professor Angell held that subjective reference must be the most
important element in any definition. Feeling must be defined more
or less arbitrarily. If it is to have psychological status, emphasis
156 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
must be placed on its subjective character and in what this consists.
Professor Duncan was of the opinion that there would be a gain in
accuracy and in scientific progress by discarding the term feeling
entirely as unsuitable for a scientific terminology. 'Affection' or
'affective psychosis' are better terms, being free from popular con-
notations. The essence of feeling lies in 'subjectivity'; feeling is
'subjectively subjective.' President Hall considers that it is entirely
delusive to attempt to define feeling. Definitions are the last product
of development. Knowledge and description of the facts is the
important thing and the best possible definition. If feeling must
be defined, the definition must cover the whole of mental life. Con-
sciousness as in strong feeling is subordinate to feeling. Feeling is
wider and older genetically than intellect or will. Professor Wash-
burn suggested one of the most specific definitions as follows: "Feel-
ing in its broad sense may be defined as the unanalyzed and unlocal-
ized part of consciousness." It is necessary to distinguish between
processes which are not analyzed or localized at a given moment
because they are not in the focus of attention, processes which are
not normally analyzed or localized, such as the organic sensations,
and processes which resist all analysis and localization. Professor
Judd criticized the ascription of vagueness to feeling. Feeling is
vague only when the attempt is made to submit it to the categories
of cognition. It has a distinctness and clearness of its own. 'Atti-
tude' is one of the essential constituents of every mental state and
this term characterizes better than feeling its subjectivity, univer-
sality and relation to the empirical ego.
The two papers which followed were on Attention; the first by
Professor William H. Burnham on 'Attention and Interest.' Atten-
tion and interest are to be regarded as different aspects of the same
process. Attention is a reaction of the whole organism comparable
to the tropisms, while interest is the affective state correlated with
this reaction. ' ' The feeling of the organic adjustment in attention is
the interest. ' ' The second paper, by Dr. J. P. Hylan, on ' Excursive
Attention,' was an argument, based on the impossibility of a simul-
taneously divided attention and on the rapidity of mental fatigue,
for the use of the term ' excursiveness ' to characterize the wandering
or shifting of direction in the varying states and degrees of attention.
This excursiveness may be either of the reflex type, as in perception,
or conscious and voluntary, as in adjustments to various complex
conditions of life. Professor I. Madison Bentley's paper on 'The
Psychology of Organic Movements' was a systematic analysis of the
treatment of organic movements in psychologies. The motor ele-
ments where they enter in as primary factors in mental life may be
referred to the general psychological system or subsumed under some
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 157
single motor theory. 'Motor' theories are of two general types; the
first type emphasizing the motor conditions of consciousness, the
second the motor consequences. The paper was a plea for a more
careful study of the psychology of 'coordination' and 'adjustment'
and the conscious activity which seems to be its primary postulate.
Professor Stratton's paper on 'Modified Causation for Psychology'
was deferred until Friday morning. Professor Stratton urged that
'concomitant variation' might well be taken as the chief criterion of
causation in psychology without requiring quantitative equivalence
or qualitative continuity. Psychology need not feel bound to accept
the idea of causation of physics any more than philosophy.
At twelve o'clock Professor Wilhelm Ostwald addressed the
Association on 'Psychical Energy.' Professor Ostwald maintained
the possibility of extending the concept of energy so as to in-
clude mental as well as physical facts. Just as every physical
fact can be best described by defining the kind and magnitude of
energy involved in it, so there seems to be no contradiction in con-
sidering psychic facts also as being the results of transformations
of energy of some sort. This energy may be unique in kind or the
combination of two or more energies. If we knew the exact amount
of energy contained in the human body at any instant, the trans-
formation of energy resulting from a mental process at the next
succeeding instant which did not appear in any other known form
would constitute psychic energy. The theory proposed has a dis-
tinct advantage over psychophysical parallelism, providing as it
does for a functional relationship between the mental and physical
worlds. Following the address of Professor Ostwald there was a
general discussion participated in by Professors Royce, Ladd,
Hibben, Marvin and President Hall.
After the business meeting of the Association in the afternoon,
there followed a conference on the subjects, 'Cooperation be-
tween Laboratories and Departments of Different Institutions' and
'Elementary Instruction in Psychology.' Professor Judd opened
the discussion with a paper on the first topic. He held that each
laboratory must determine its own problems and methods, and that
in this respect cooperation was impracticable. It would be profit-
able, however, for laboratories to cooperate in matters concerning
apparatus and in the publication of psychological results. The
division of the Association meetings into sections for the more thor-
ough consideration and discussion of particular papers and prob-
lems is desirable, and at the general meetings more discussion of
methods and courses of instruction. Professor Sanford outlined
a 'Sketch of a Beginner's Course in Psychology.' The subject-
matter of the course suggested, which must begin with what is closely
158 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
related to the habits of thought and interests of the students, might
be included under the following topics and in the following order:
(1) Psychology of Learning and Acquisition; (2) Psychology of
Truth and Error; (3) Psychology of Emotion; (4) Psychology of
Personality and Character; (5) Facts of the Interdependence of
Mind and Body; (6) Psychogenesis ; (7) Systematic Psychology.
In the general discussion which followed cooperation between psy-
chological laboratories and hospitals for the insane and feeble-
minded was emphasized by several speakers. There is here a wealth
of opportunity which university laboratories have not availed them-
selves of. Cooperation in mutual criticism of psychological results
was also suggested. The discussion of elementary instruction em-
phasized the importance of concreteness in subject-matter, the neces-
sity of experimental demonstrations and laboratory work and the
shortcomings of the lecture method of instruction.
The address of the president of the Philosophical Association,
Professor John Dewey, on 'Beliefs and Realities/ occupied the
evening session. This was followed by the smoker of the two Asso-
ciations at the Harvard Union. The lady members of the Asso-
ciations were entertained at the home of Professor and Mrs. Royce.
The papers read at the Friday morning session discussed various
problems in the psychology of vision, the first three dealing with
color vision, the remaining four with eye movements and related
mental processes. Professor Will S. Monroe reported the results
of experiments on the ' Color Sense of Young Children. ' Tests had
been made on 400 children between the ages of three and six in the
matching and naming of colors and in color preferences, single and
in combinations. Sex differences were not marked. The standard
red was at all ages oftenest matched, named, preferred and used in
color combinations, with blue second. Marked individual differences
appeared. Dr. J. W. Baird, in a paper on 'Primitive Color Names
and the Primary Colors,' summarized the arguments which have
been made to prove the color-blindness of the early races of man-
kind and the evolution of the color sense in the spectral order from
red to blue. Both conclusions were held to be erroneous. The
phenomena of color-blindness and of indirect vision support the view
that the color senses were developed in pairs in the following order,
black and white, yellow and blue and, finally, red and green. Dr.
Kate Gordon reported 'A Study of After-images on the Peripheral
Retina,' based on experiments made by herself in conjunction with
Dr. Helen B. Thompson in the Mt. Holyoke Laboratory. The influ-
ence of back-grounds of varying brightness on the color-tone of the
after-image and on the stimulus-color was indicated. The striking
result was obtained that a subliminal color stimulus may produce a
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 159
supraliminal after-image of appropriate color-tone. Finer discrim-
inativeness was shown in the red-yellow end of the spectrum than in
the blue-green, both in the stimulus and in the after-image.
Of the papers on eye movements, Professor C. H. Judd's on
'Photographic Studies of Convergence' brought out the fact that in
the movements of convergence the two eyes move at different rates.
In divergence the differences in rate of movement are not so marked.
A sympathetic lateral movement, on the part of the eye which con-
verged more slowly, in the direction of the movement of the other
eye was frequently noted. "These facts show that even in fully
developed adult convergence the movement is not wholly automatic
and independent of the retinal images which arise during the move-
ment." Professor Robert MacDougall reported an investigation
'On the Influence of Reflex Stimulations to Eye Movement upon
Judgments of Number.' Comparative estimates of two groups of
stimuli simultaneously presented, one of which was arranged with
a view to producing a greater reflex stimulus than the other, seemed
to show that the estimates were affected by such arrangements,
though no quantitative results were obtained as to the various
factors involved. Professor Edwin B. Holt presented a paper on
'Vision during Dizziness.' The nystagmic movements of the eyes
during dizziness are slow in one direction and more rapid in the
other. The speed and extent of these movements were measured.
The rapid movements allow no visual sensations to reach conscious-
ness, while the slow do. This accounts for the movement of the
visual field in one direction during dizziness. The rapid movements
are held to occasion or occur concomitantly with a 'central anes-
thesia.' Professor R. S. Woodworth, in a paper on 'Vision and
Localization during Eye Movements,' maintained that vision during
'eye- jumps' does not differ essentially from vision with the resting
eye, given the same retinal stimulation. The principal evidences
adduced in favor of this view were, that if by movement of a mirror
the field of view is shifted past the fixed eye, the same appearances
are observed as in eye-jumps; and that a clear image thrown on the
retina during an eye- jump by an object moving in the same direction
is correctly localized in space and not as an after-image, as the
theory of 'central anesthesia' would suppose. Moreover, the re-
action-time to an object so seen is not long enough to include any
considerable period of anesthesia or inhibition. Following Professor
Woodworth 's paper there ensued a discussion of visual consciousness
during rapid eye movements which was continued into the afternoon
session.
The first paper read in the afternoon was by Professor E. A. Kirk-
patrick on 'Growth of Vocabularies.' This was a preliminary re-
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port on the size of vocabularies, from the second grade to the uni-
versity. A hundred words, selected by chance from the dictionary,
were marked as 'known,' 'unknown' or 'doubtful.' It was sug-
gested that this test might serve as a measure of the general intel-
ligence of pupils. Professor C. E. Seashore's paper on 'Training
in Singing by Aid of the Voice Tonoscope,' described various recent
improvements in the tonoscope. Tests by this instrument were
reported, showing that training for accuracy in control of the pitch
of the voice in singing progresses much more rapidly and may reach
a higher degree of efficiency than training without it. "It was
also demonstrated that the least producible change in the pitch of
the voice, in the different parts of an octave within the middle range,
is a constant fraction of a tone." Mr. Frederic Lyman Wells, of
Columbia University, reported some of the more important results
from a study of 'Linguistic Lapses.' Linguistic lapses are always
involuntary, central, not necessarily conscious, and referable to a
physiological basis. They fall into five general types, the assimila-
tion, the dissimilation, the omission, the substitution and the meta-
thesis. Various general conclusions, on a basis of a comprehensive
study of the lapse, were drawn concerning these types and their
causes and concerning the relations of sensory and motor lapses.
Mr. Wells holds that the study of lapses substantiates the view of
individual localization for individual motor linguistic elements. Dr.
Charles T. Burnett's paper on a 'Comparison of the Maximum Bates
of Actual and of Imagined Voluntary Rhythmic Muscular Move-
ment' brought out the fact that the maximum rate of imagined
rhythmic movement is much smaller than that of the corresponding
actual movement. Practise effect was found to be greater with the
imagined movement. Variability is greater with the actual move-
ment. The relation of these results to the classical theory of volition
was pointed out. Dr. J. P. Hylan gave a demonstration of 'A
New Kymograph,' following which the last paper on the program
was read, by Dr. J. E. W. Wallin, on 'Investigations on Rhythm,
Time and Tempo.' The limens of rhythmical interval were found
to follow approximately the Weber-Fechner law. The time limen,
which is lower than the rhythm limen, is relatively lower for the
longer intervals. Preferred tempos as determined by the method
of paired comparisons average about half a second.
In addition to the papers read at the meeting, the following were
read by title: 'The Doctrine of Specific Energies,' by Mrs. C. Ladd
Franklin; 'Visual Adaptation in Tachistoscopic Experimentation/
by Professor John A. Bergstrom; 'The Possibility of Retinal Local
Signs of the Third Dimension,' by Dr. W. P. Montague; 'A Simple
Method of Measuring Relationships,' by Professor E. L. Thorndike;
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 161
'Sex Differentiation in the Sense of Time/ by Professor Robert
MacDougall; 'Some Psychological Aspects of Success,' by Brother
Chrysostom; 'Early American Psychology,' by Professor I. Wood-
bridge Riley.
At the regular business meeting the following officers for the
year 1906 were elected : President, Professor James Rowland Angell,
University of Chicago; Members of the Council, Professor Mary
Whiton Calkins, Wellesley College, and Professor C. E. Seashore,
University of Iowa.
The following new members were elected: Dr. Elizabeth Kemper
Adams, Smith College; Professor Bird Thomas Baldwin, West
Chester Normal School, West Chester, Pa.; Dr. J. Carleton Bell,
Wellesley College; Mr. Edward Herbert Cameron, Yale University;
Mr. Donald John Cowling, Yale University; Dr. Kate Gordon, Mt.
Holyoke College; Professor Edmund B. Huey, Western University
of Pennsylvania ; Professor Charles Hughes Johnston, State Normal
School, East Stroudsburg, Pa. ; Dr. Irving King, Pratt Institute ; Dr.
Adolf Meyer, New York State Pathological Institute; Dr. Naomi
Norsworthy, Teachers College, Columbia University; Dr. James
P. Porter, Clark College ; Dr. Morton Prince, Tufts College Medical
School; Miss Margaret S. Pritchard, Philadelphia Normal School;
Dr. James Putnam, Harvard Medical School; Dr. Eleanor Harris
Rowland, Mt. Holyoke College ; Professor Henry A. Ruger, Colorado
College; Dr. Boris Sidis, Brookline, Mass.; Dr. Theodate L. Smith,
Clark University; Professor Edward G. Spaulding, Princeton Uni-
versity; Professor Herman Campbell Stevens, University of Wash-
ington; Professor Herbert Stotesbury, Temple College, Philadel-
phia, Pa.
It was voted to accept the invitation of Columbia University to
hold the next annual meeting in New York, in affiliation with the
American Association for the Advancement of Science and the
American Society of Naturalists.
VIVIAN A. C. HENMON.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Ueler Musilcalische Einfuhlung. H. LIEBECK. Zeitschrift fur Philos-
ophic und Philosophische Kritik, Band 127, Heft 1. Pp. 1-18.
This article is a further addition to the rapidly growing literature on
the subject of Einfuhlung, or esthetic sympathy. Its aim is the examina-
tion of Einfuhlung as it occurs in music and the application of the results
of this investigation to the general problem. The author holds that music
gives us a more or less definite picture of our own feeling life uninfluenced
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by the accidents of real life, and hence in a kind of ideal purity. Music
thus becomes for us an idealized analogon personalitatis, a favorite term
with this author. These feelings are not aroused in their full reality,
though this may sometimes happen. But in the esthetic experience music
presents us with images of feelings; these pictured feelings do not lead
to action or willing. The feelings in question may be those with which
we are familiar, though many namable ones, such as envy, jealousy,
embarrassment, etc., can not be produced, and others for which we have
no names may be brought about.
Music expresses not simply the dynamic side of feeling, changes in
intensity, etc., but feelings which are qualitatively different; and this is
not merely by virtue of the association of tones and their relations with
form qualities : it can arouse them directly.
In every perception there are two moments, one subjective, mz., the
feeling tone of the perception; the other objective, its cognitive aspect.
In esthetic as opposed to other perceptions these two are approximately in
equilibrium. This is closest in the perception of a human personality:
feeling and objective qualities are combined in one object. The esthetic
object is analogous to this and is thus something which is felt to be akin
to ourselves, something which we can enter into, in short, something in
whose presence we experience this EinfuTilung.
If I understand the author's meaning aright, there is first what might
be described in the language of Professor Santayana and Dr. Thomas
Brown as ' the objectification ' of the feelings which the object arouses,
except for the fact that the feelings are still thought of as feelings and
not as qualities. These objectified feelings are united with the qualities
of the object and seem to belong to it, to be its feelings. Hence it
becomes a quasi-conscious being, and this allows us to enter into sympathy
with it or even to identify ourselves with it. All of which may be true
sometimes, but as Mr. Wernaer has recently pointed out in the same
journal, it does not describe all esthetic experiences or even those that
are most frequent.
Music, as we have seen, is endowed with the power (or so our author
maintains) of picturing for us certain feelings. Other arts can do this
only indirectly, through the medium of objects and ideas of objects:
music does it directly. With other arts there is a fourfold process, sensa-
tion, perception of an object, feeling on occasion of this perception,
Stimmung. In music the second member of this series is omitted, the
feelings are pictured directly. This can be accomplished in a measure,
though very imperfectly, in combinations of pure line and color. And
music may employ discursive relations, but in general it produces its
effect through intuitive relations, and the other arts work through dis-
cursive relations. We can get at the spirit of a painting or poem only
after getting its various parts, just as we know an object only after get-
ting its various qualities and relations; only after these latter processes
have occurred can we really become intuitively aware of the object, while
the spirit of music is intuitively grasped from the beginning.
The author maintains that Schopenhauer's distinction, on metaphysical
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 163
grounds, between music and the other arts is unnecessary and also too
subjective. In all arts the essential thing is that the natural object no
longer seems to belong to a strange world. This has a metaphysical
ground, which is the same for all arts. Music is peculiar simply in the
degree of immediacy with which this effect is produced.
The article closes with a brief discussion of the qualities which con-
stitute a musical as distinguished from an unmusical nature in man.
The possession of the audible or motor type of imagination is the first
of these. To this must be added the capacity to represent the world of
feeling in an immediate pictorial manner by means of tones, and also the
need of overcoming in this way the duality and opposition of appearance
and nature. The article is by no means easy to interpret. The author's
style is none of the clearest and some of his positions would have been
improved by further exposition. The whole thesis that feelings can be
really pictured seems to the reviewer to demand further analysis and
justification. ADAM LEROY JONES.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.
The Practical Deductions of the Theory of Knowledge. D. H. MAC-
GREGOR. International Journal of Ethics, January, 1906. Pp. 204r-
227.
The ' practical deductions ' here discussed relate to the assumption of
teleology and the consequent optimism; the theory of knowledge presup-
posed is that of Professor Ward's ( Naturalism and Agnosticism,' which
has for its main position " the substitution of the ' duality of matter and
spirit ' for the ' dualism ' of science and common sense."
Mr. MacGregor first deals with the presuppositions of teleology, finding
them summed up in a certain coincidence between nature and thought,
which in turn implies dualism, or at least the absence of necessary
agreement. "In order that there may be a teleological interpretation,
processes must coincide which are inherently distinct. But idealism does
not grant the distinctness of thought and nature. According to it, these
two in inseparable union constitute reality. But we may not condition
reality" (p. 209). "We are entitled, therefore, when we see the demon-
stration of this unity by the idealists, to take them at their word; and,
since the twin poles of the magnet are quoted as analogous to the rela-
tion of thought and nature, to ask whether it would be allowable to treat
the positive and the negative poles as teleologically adapted. It belongs
to the nature of the case. They could not exist otherwise than as they
do. There is no contingency, but inherent and thoroughgoing interde-
pendence between them."
After thus disposing of * formal ' teleology, the author addresses him-
self to the assumption of a more concrete teleology expressed in the phrase
that f nature is amenable to human ends.' He points out the want of
logical connection between the two kinds of teleology. The latter, in so
far as it is demonstrable and has real significance, is not so much a matter
of epistemology as of ethics. The argument at this point is, however, of
such a nature as not readily to admit of summary statement. Suffice it
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to say that the incongruity between the implications of the psychology of
effort and the epistemology of idealistic monism of the absolutist type is
clearly brought out.
We have here an acute and conclusive criticism of the teleological
doctrines of idealism. The problem of teleology is, however, only a single
aspect of the comprehensive question as to the one and the many con-
fronting the monist who regards the one as absolute and the many as
relative. This is as true of the materialist as of the idealist. The terms
being correlative, both must be regarded either as fixed or as functional.
In default of a definite pronouncement or of a knowledge gained from
other sources, one naturally tries to read between the lines to divine the
author's own position. So largely critical is this study that the conclusion
is not clear. There is, however, much that might be taken to indicate
sympathy with the views of the pragmatists. W. A. HEIDEL.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.
La Conscience. PAUL ' HERMANT. Revue de Philosophic, November,
1905. Pp. 495-511.
The thesis of this article is that consciousness corresponds to the
activity which marks the development or the regression of the psychical
life as a whole. Consciousness is the realization of a new equilibrium,
a synthesis of the new with the old, or the process by which a new psy-
chical state establishes connections with the ' unconscious ' or subcon-
scious psychical mass which is in the background and which represents
our anterior attainments or I'ensemble du moi. It appears, then, that
consciousness is a function of the psychical life as a whole. The sub-
conscious is constituted by states which, for various reasons, necessitate
no readjustment of the psychical whole and which for this reason fail to
establish the associations required for recall in memory. But the author
offers no suggestion as to the nature of the subconscious, beyond the
vague statement that it differs from the conscious only in degree, nor
does he at any point take account of the possibilities of interpretation in
terms of neural processes. B. H. BODE.
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE MONIST. January, 1906, Vol. XVI., No. 1. On the Form
and Spectrum of Atoms (pp. 1-16) : FERDINAND LINDEMANN. - It is known
that the distribution of spectral lines in the spectrum of any gas is a
function of the form, density and elasticity of the atoms of that gas.
The inverse problem of determining the form of an atom from a knowl-
edge of its spectrum is possible in certain comparatively simple cases.
The author illustrates by means of diagrams the probable shape of cer-
tain atoms and the structure of the molecules in which they are com-
bined. Manifestations of the Ether (pp. 17-31) : W. S. ANDREWS. - A
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 165
popular account of the ether of the electron as an ether vortex, of the
atom as a congeries of electrons and of radioactivity. Heredity and the
Origin of Species (pp. 32-64) : DANIEL TREMBLY MAcDouGAL. - An elab-
orate and valuable exposition of the origin of species by hybridization
and, more particularly, by mutation. Most interesting, perhaps, is the
author's account of some experiments of his own, in which, by the inter-
vention of external agents during the critical period, he induced mutations
in a species not hitherto active in that respect. Mathematical Emanci-
pations. The Passing of the Point and the Number Three: Dimension-
ality and Hyperspace (pp. 65-84) : CASSIUS J. KEYSER. - Defining n-
dimensionality as that feature of any assemblage whatsoever, in which,
to distinguish an element, it is necessary to know n facts about it, the
author proceeds to show that by taking the line or plane or circle as an
element, spaces which are ordinarily regarded as having three or less
dimensions may be regarded as having four or even more dimensions.
The author closes his paper by suggesting that by becoming very familiar
with the properties of a four-dimensional space of points we may pos-
sibly gain a quasi intuition of it. Fechner' s View of Life After Death
(pp. 84^95) : EDITOR. - The author takes this occasion to expound and
defend his own view of immortality as consisting in the preservation of
an individual's ideals in the minds of those who live after him. Inci-
dentally, he declares Fechner's conception of individual immortality to be
fantastic and wholly unsupported by any evidence. A Scientific Sketch
of Untruth (pp. 96-119) : G. GORE. - A rambling account of the view that
man's mind and will depend upon the material universe and its mechan-
ically necessary laws. Criticisms and Discussions: Haeckel's Theses for
a Monistic Alliance (pp. 120-123): P. C.-The author condemns Haeck-
el's theses as being likely to give offense because they declare dualism and
pluralism to be incompatible with monism, and free will to be incom-
patible with determinism. Reflections on Magic Squares^ Mathematical,
Historical and Philosophical (pp. 123-147) : EDITOR. - An elaborate ac-
count of magic squares, with remarks upon the symmetry of the universe.
Mr. Petersons Proposed Discussion (pp. 147-151) : CHARLES SANTIAGO
SANDERS PEIRCE. - The author urges the need of a discussion of philosoph-
ical terminology and gives an account of the meanings of the word ex-
perience. Book Reviews and Notes: J. Bahnsen, Wie ich wurde was ich
ward. Shailer Matthews, The Messianic Hope in the New Testament.
Lucien Arreat, La Morale dans le drame, I'epopee et le roman. Francis
Galton and others, Sociological Papers. H. H. MacDonnell (tr.), Brhad-
devata. G. Th. Fechner, On Life After Death. L. Arreat, A Correction.
Galton and others, Sociological Papers. H. H. MacDonnell (tr.), Brhad-
devata. G. Th. Fechner, On Life After Death. L. Arreat, A Correction.
McDougall, W. Physiological Psychology. (Temple Psychological
Primers.) London: J. M. Dent & Co. 1905. Pp.172.
Milhaud, G. Etudes sur la pensee scientifique chez les Grecs et chez les
modernes. Paris: Lecene-Oudin. 1906. 8vo. Pp. 273.
166
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Picard, E. La Science moderne et son etat actuel. Paris : Ernest Flam-
marion. 1905. Pp. 299.
Prat. Le caractere empirique et la personnalite. Paris : F. Alcan. 1906.
8vo. Pp. 452.
Ragnisco, Pietro. Pietro Abelardo e S. Bernardo di chiaravalle (Atti del
Reale 1st.). Venice. 1905.
Ralla, Guiseppe. Avanzamento d'ipotesi. (Pensiero o fantasia?) Car-
rara. 1905. Pp. 36.
Renouvier, Ch. Critique de la doctrine de Kant. Paris: F. Alcan.
Stern, L. William. Beitrdge zur Psychologie der Aussage. Zweite Folge,
Zweites Heft. Leipzig: Earth. 1905. Pp. 154.
Ziehen. Leitfaden der physiologischen Psychologie. 7th edition. Jena :
Fischer.
AII02TOA1AHZ. QuffioXoix-r 'AiffOrixT. Athens. 8vo.
NOTES AND NEWS
IN the article entitled ' Lucretius and his Times ' in the Edinburgh
Review for January, the author approaches his subject as follows : " Not
a few of those finer spirits have had it borne in upon them that they
lived upon the brink of a new era, when the world, weary of ages of
falsehood and wrong, will suddenly accept their message and society all
at once be regenerated. But though Lucretius preaches his gospel with
triumphant joy and faith, before him no such golden vista expands. He
was possessed by the conviction that the end of the world was nigh at
hand. It was one of the leading doctrines of Epicurean science that the
world, like all organisms, was born and must have its period of growth,
maturity and inevitable decay. To his boding mind the frequent earth-
quakes in Italy and elsewhere and the increasing barrenness of his own
country indicated that the world had reached its extreme old age and was
exhausted, and must soon break up."
lamque adeo fracta est aetas effetaque tellus
Vix animalia parva creat quae cuncta creavit
Saecla dedique ferarum ingentia corpora partu.
De Rerum Natura is, in the writer's opinion, ' a genuine record of human
experience, as direct and sincere ' as the i Pilgrim's Progress ' of Bunyan.
In a time of moral chaos Lucretius found spiritual satisfaction in the
conception of physical order.
THE article ' Plato and his Predecessors/ by F. C. S. Schiller, in the
Quarterly Review for January, is interesting for a brief but telling appre-
ciation of Protagoras. After commenting on the logical difficulties of
Plato's ' Theory of Ideas/ Mr. Schiller exhibits his own well-known posi-
tion in the following conclusion : " Even if by some strange chance he
[Plato] had caught a glimpse of this way out he would have averted his
eyes from the impious spectacle. The view that concepts are not unal-
terable and are only relatively constant (like mere material things), being
essentially tools slowly fashioned by a practical intelligence for the mas-
tery of its experience, whose value and truth reside in their application
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 167
to the particular cases of their use, and not in their timeless validity nor
in their supra-sensible otium cum dignitate in a transcendent realm of
abstractions, would have seemed to him as paradoxical and monstrous and
unsatisfying as it still does to his belated followers. . . . Quite recently,
indeed, the banner of what may prove to be a final revolt has visibly been
raised ; but is it not still inscribed with the hallowed Hellenic watchwords
of Fvwdt ffeaurov and "AvOpurxos fxlrpovT 1
Nature for February 8 calls attention to two papers in the Journal
of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Vol. LXIII.) and summarizes them as
follows : " Mr. J. E. Friend-Pereira has discovered totemism among the
Khonds, where the wider totemic exogamy has been hidden by the nar-
rower and probably newer rule of the l local, communal, or family type/
The l septs/ as the author terms the totem groups, have the ordinary
totem taboos of feeding, use and marriage, and myths of origin. He be-
lieves totemism ' serves to mark to a primitive people who possess no
written characters to record kinship and descent as they begin to get
more remote in time the distinction between separate stocks of blood.
In other words, totemism is merely a guide for the observance of the
rules of exogamy: it is not the cause that originated or evolved these
rules.' He holds that the explanation of the origin of totemism must be
sought for, not in its social, but in its religious aspect. Among the
Khonds 'the totem ranks as the spirit of the ancestor founder of the
stock, who is also the chief tutelary deity of the stock, and the totem
class is considered as a manifestation of the chief tutelary deity.' Major
P. K. T. Gurdon has a valuable short paper on the Khasis, Syntengs and
allied tribes of Assam, among whom mother-right so predominates that
males can own only self-acquired property. There are traces of totemism.
Ancestors are worshipped by the erection of remarkable memorial stones,
of which two illustrations are given; this form of worship largely under-
lies the Khasi religious system. Divination by the breaking of eggs is
very common. Major Gurdon is superintendent of ethnography in Assam,
and is apparently preparing a monograph on the peoples under his charge
which, judging from these notes, should be a valuable work."
THE first number of the Biologisches Centralblatt for 1906 is devoted
to evolutionary conceptions of development and embryology. In a paper
by Mr. Henriksen it is argued that everything in nature tends toward its
own type of equilibrium. The author undertakes to show that Weis-
mann's theory of germ-plasm structure is unnecessary and, when worked
out in detail, absurd.
THE Western Philosophical Association will hold its sixth annual
meeting at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, on Friday and Satur-
day, April 13 and 14, 1906, in conjunction with the meeting of the North-
Central Section of the American Psychological Association. Five ses-
sions will probably be held, of which one will be devoted to the annual
presidential address, and one will be a joint session of the two associa-
tions. It is planned to set apart one session for a general discussion of
the topic, ' Recent Arguments for Realism with Especial Reference to
the Relations of Realism and Pragmatism.' Members intending to
168 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
present papers are asked to notify the secretary, Arthur O. Lovejo;
Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., of their titles and the probable
length of time required in delivery, not later than March 15. A detailed
program will be issued to members about April 1.
WE take the following from the New York Evening Post: "A class
exclusively for patients afflicted with mental disease has been organized
in the dispensary of the Cornell University Medical College. This de-
partment will be under the charge of Professor Adolf Meyer. Hitherto
there has been no such class in the city, though there are many of the
poor not sufficiently deranged to be committed to asylums, who need more
expert attention than can be given them at home. In addition to the
philanthropic advantage, the new clinic will enable the student to observe
in the early stages when mental disorders are most curable. On account
of inexperience the average practitioner is likely to overlook these cases
until they have passed the curable stage. Technically the clinic is known
as the department of psychopathology."
PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES and Dr. James H. Hyslop, vice-presidents
of the American Branch of the Society for Psychical Kesearch, have
issued the following letter : " In the death of Dr. Kichard Hodgson, the
secretary of the American branch since its foundation, the society, as
well as his personal friends, has suffered a great loss. The work of the
branch, however, will be continued under the direction of its vice-presi-
dents or those appointed by them for the purpose until a satisfactory and
efficient permanent arrangement can be made. In the meantime it is
important that past subscriptions to the society's work should be con-
tinued, and new ones obtained if possible, as there is a mass of docu-
mentary material collected by Dr. Hodgson which awaits the completed
critical treatment he would have given it had he lived, and which should
now be dealt with. And there are also certain new and important possi-
bilities of investigation which have just come into sight."
THOSE concerned with methods of pedagogy may be interested to know
that the Cambridge University Press is publishing a series of short works
on various subjects in pure mathematics and physics. The aim is to assist
in maintaining a high standard in the English teaching of mathematics
by presenting in a handy shape accounts of new methods and of recent
mathematical research. The series bears the title of ' Cambridge Tracts
in Mathematics and Mathematical Physics.'
THE National Educational Association will hold its forty-ninth annual
convention at San Francisco, July 9 to 13. The department of superin-
tendence met at Louisville, Ky., from February 27 to March 1.
THE first number of the Zeitschrift fur Aesthetik und allgemeine
Kunstwissenschaft, edited by M. Dessoir, has been published by F. Euke,
Stuttgart.
AT Harvard University it has been decided to organize as a separate
department the work in education, hitherto included under the depart-
ment of philosophy.
PROFESSOR J. MARK BALDWIN is to lecture on genetic logic at the Uni-
versity of Chicago during the first half of the next summer quarter.
VOL. III. No. 7. MARCH 29, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
RECENT DISCUSSION OF FEELING
word 'feeling' as a psychological term is a sin of the fathers
* which has been visited upon long generations of sons and bids
fair to make trouble for generations yet unborn. Surely the effort
to free ourselves from this inherited incubus is eminently praise-
worthy and the discussions recently published in this JOURNAL can
not fail to contribute efficiently toward this end. Personally I am
somewhat pessimistic as to the speedy attainment of any thorough-
going relief from the difficulties at issue, because of the insidious
influence of long linguistic tradition. But I arn heartily in sym-
pathy with the attempt to better matters, even if the betterment
should consist in so drastic a measure as the general agreement to
abandon all pretense of employing the term in a technical manner.
I shall address myself first to the very instructive suggestions of Mr.
Marshall and Mr. Gardiner, both of whom have called attention to
certain of the ambiguities and inconsistencies which vex current
usage, and with both of whom I partly agree. 1
Two questions are really at stake in this affair. (1) Is it possible,
without indulging illicit liberties with language, to divest the word
'feeling' of a sufficient number of its various connotations to permit
its use as a technical term? (2) If the word be thus retained with
a technical meaning, to what specific class of psychical conditions
shall it be applied and confined? The writers whom I mention are
agreed as regards the first point, that the term can be saved for tech-
nical service, albeit with difficulty. But they do not altogether
agree as to the significance which it shall convey, nor as to the
psychical conditions to which it is properly applicable.
Mr. Marshall, as I understand him, would make feeling an un-
developed form of presentation which if fully evolved reveals itself
as the empirical ego. "The 'feeling attitude' is the attitude of the
empirical ego not yet become explicit." (A formulation, by the
way, strikingly similar to one advanced by Dr. Gordon in an earlier
1 Marshall, this JOURNAL, Vol. III., p. 9; Gardiner, ibid., p. 57.
169
170
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
number of this JOURNAL.) 2 And again "Feeling is subjectiveness
pure and simple, and this means that as the empirical ego becomes
explicit feeling necessarily attaches to, or is resolved into, this
empirical ego." From this statement it appears that Mr. Marshall
applies 'feeling' to special contents of consciousness, to a zone of
consciousness, so to speak, but not to any isolated partial content
like pleasantness.
Now for my own part I am unaware of harboring toward the
empirical ego any sentiments other than those of respect. But I
fear lest Mr. Marshall's suggestion, if adopted, should lead us
perilously near the margin of psychological 'chasms fathomless to
man.' Certainly we must admit that the present usage as regards
the term feeling is tortuous and unconvincing. But the empirical
ego implicates regions still dimmer and less palpable, so far at
least as concerns terminology. To attempt to clarify the meaning
of an ambiguous term by relating it to a term still more shady in its
connections appeals to me as likely to be somewhat futile in its out-
come. Possibly Mr. Marshall and my other professional brethren
will overrule me in my contention that the empirical ego enjoys so
unstable a status as my words imply. In any case as regards this
point my reservation affects simply the modus operandi of Mr.
Marshall's effort to orient the terminology. I shall mention in a
moment a difficulty of psychological fact which is in my judgment
far more serious.
Mr. Gardiner suggests that we define feeling as 'the immediate
consciousness of the modification of individual experience as such.'
"The term 'feeling' as thus used denotes no class of mental facts
or contents of consciousness in particular, but refers to a special
aspect of consciousness." He quotes from my 'Psychology' to the
effect that pleasantness and unpleasantness inform us 'of our own
internal mental condition.' Upon which he comments that they are
not the only states which give us such information and consequently
my definition is defective in precision. And he continues, "If feel-
ing is thus informatory it can not be sharply distinguished from
cognition, unless cognition is arbitrarily limited to knowledge of
external objects and relations." To which I reply, that whether or
not pleasantness and its contrary are the only conscious qualities
immediately indicative of our internal mental condition as internal,
feeling is precisely that aspect of consciousness which has this
mediatory function as its primary business. It is, if you please
with apologies to Mr. Ward a kind of subjective cognition. The
difficulty in distinguishing it from cognition as dealing with ex-
ternal objects is no greater and no less than that which attaches to
2 See Vol. II., p. 617, ff.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 171
any nice piece of introspective analysis. As a matter of terminology
there need be no difficulty at all on this score. Nor can I think it
to the point to urge, as Mr. Gardiner does, that 'ideas often inform
us of our mental condition. In the moment of experiencing them
they always function in our minds as meanings set over against the
mind which thinks them, a fact which Wundt long ago brought out.
Feeling as such gives us mental attitude itself toward these contents
and meanings.
Despite our animated differences of opinion in regard to the
details of our doctrines, I take it that we are all substantially agreed
that feeling should designate the distinctly personal, internal aspects
of conscious life. But whereas certain of us straightway set out
to seek this in specific forms of conscious process, as does Mr. Mar-
shall, others of us, like Mr. Gardiner, undertake to locate it not in
such special contents, but rather in an envisagement of the whole
range of mental activities from the side of their internal meaning and
import. Both modes of procedure have no doubt their sufficient
warrant, but it must be obvious without argument that the results
of these two forms of psychological method are not likely, if they
are conducted independently, to issue in a unified and harmonious
doctrine.
Feeling viewed as merely an internal aspect of all conscious
process is a category of interpretation rather than one of immediate
conscious deliverance. It belongs to the psychical rather than to
the psychological. By which I mean to say that it does not corre-
spond, as do pleasure and pain, for example, to any specific item
in our actual life as we are immediately aware of this. From a
reflective and philosophical point of view we discern that a portion
of our psychical activity purports to reflect external objects of
some kind, or at all events that we can so regard it. Similarly we
find on reflection that every mental experience is owned by some
one. It is my experience or yours, or Henry's. As such we regard
it as being felt. From this standpoint, as Mr. Gardiner in common
with many others insists, feeling is not a mental stuff different from
ideational material. It is rather a particular way of viewing this
material ; i. e., as internal and personal in its significance.
My own theory, partially developed in my 'Psychology/ at-
tempts to kill two birds with one stone thereby missing both, I
imagine some of my critics will urge. It maintains not only that
feeling is properly and primarily attributable to the subjective and
personal side of conscious processes, but also that this internal phase
of consciousness (Mr. Royce's 'present sensitiveness to the values of
things') has a definite and distinguishable representative in mental
life, just as the knowledge phase of the mind has. I have personally
172
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
held that these representatives were probably restricted to pleasant-
ness and unpleasantness, but, so far as the general view is concerned,
these elements might readily be far more in number. When and
in so far as a total state of consciousness is dominantly marked by
these features, I speak of it as feeling. If I do not desire specifically
to call attention to this phase of the mental condition, I try to em-
ploy some other word. My failure to carry out this program with
entire consistency in my ' Psychology ' is fairly attributable to human
frailty and the treachery of words, rather than to any inherent
defect in the scheme. I could, if necessary, revise the text so as to
purge it of all these blemishes. This usage retains for the term its
significance as an index of peculiarly private personal relations, and
although arbitrary in the limitations which it imposes, it is never-
theless explicit and does no violence to linguistic traditions so far
as concerns its positive import. It has the further merit, as it seems
to me, of bringing out overtly that which is actually implicit in the
usage of many of our best authorities, among others the authors of
the article on feeling in the 'Dictionary of Philosophy and Psy-
chology. '
My indisposition to speak of 'relational feelings,' as Miss Calkins
and others do, is not that I question the experiential reality of the
conscious items thus designated, but that they seem to me to belong
distinctively to the cognitive and motor aspects of mental process.
I regard them as immediately indicative to us of cognized relations
rather than of our subjective sentiments toward these relations.
Often they are deeply colored with feeling elements (in my sense of
the word feeling), especially in cases of indecision and hesitation.
But this does not justify us in confusing with one another the several
kinds of conscious process thus conjoined. I shall refer again briefly
to the matter at the end of this paper.
My chief objection to Mr. Marshall's doctrine, in so far as it
necessarily diverges from the one I have just formulated, is that it
apparently relegates feeling to the limbo of the altogether vague and
inarticulate. Now I do not doubt that much feeling is vague and
elusive, but I do not find this an invariable nor indispensable quality.
Feeling is, to my thinking, often a matter of the very foreground of
consciousness, forming at times a positive pinnacle in the mental field.
Which is evidently another way of saying from my view-point that
its momentary representative in the mind is thus in the high light.
If pleasantness and unpleasantness are merely incidental concomi-
tants of feeling, as Mr. Marshall seemingly maintains, it is difficult
to see how he can satisfactorily account for the vividness which
undoubtedly attaches to that which he and I would both, I fancy, in
any concrete case call feeling, e. g., acute anxiety. Mental processes
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 173
of a vivid character tend always, so far as I am aware, to push them-
selves into the foreground of apperceptive consciousness, and this
from Mr. Marshall's standpoint would inevitably result in their
cessation as feeling and their translation into some other form of
consciousness, i. e., in this case the empirical ego.
I quite agree with Mr. Marshall that pleasantness and its con-
trary taken alone do not constitute feeling. They are, however, in
my opinion the specific indices of just that internal significance which
gives the peculiar individualistic tang to every experience. They
are the automatic gauges by which is immediately registered the
internal evaluation put at each moment by the psyche upon the ex-
perience of the moment. That they often emerge from vaguer to
clearer conditions I can not question, nor that in this process of
emergence they often change somewhat their features. But in none
of these considerations, nor in any others, do I discover reason to
restrict feeling to the marginal and subliminal regions outside the
jurisdiction of apperception. I welcome any disposition on the part
of competent persons like Mr. Marshall to write more fully than has
yet been done the history of the outlying territory of the mind.
But I can not look with enthusiasm upon the looting, as it seems to
me, of the central storehouses of the mind in the interests of this
project.
In conclusion, just a word as to certain suggestions of Professor
Washburn, who proposes 3 to characterize feeling by two differentiae,
one the familiar negative quality of being unrealizable, the other
the less familiar Wundtian sensation differentia of being unan-
alyzable. This definition instantly implicates the search for specific
contents of consciousness against which Mr. Gardiner has set his face
and to which reference was made when I was pointing out the two
main sources of divergence in current doctrines of feeling. Mr.
Marshall, it will be remembered, also makes feeling applicable to
certain contents of consciousness, but they are entire moments of
certain stages of conscious process, not isolated elements like Miss
Washburn 's. Miss Gordon's position already referred to is in this
particular akin to Mr. Marshall's. Her very stimulating paper
raises, however, an entirely different issue in addition to the one now
under discussion, and I make no attempt to evaluate it in the present
connection.
My own view obviously contemplates assimilating the positive
contributions of both types of theory, for I regard the one view, e. g.,
such a position as Dr. Washburn 's, as conveying the beginnings of
a structural psychology of feeling, whereas the other standpoint
This JOURNAL, Vol. III., p. 62.
174 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
affords me what I consider one phase of a functional doctrine,
hold both to be not only true, but equally indispensable to a complete
account of feeling. I should not wish to call pleasantness and its
opposite feeling as such. I prefer, as I have already indicated, to
follow the usage which I think accords more nearly with our lin-
guistic tradition, and I should, therefore, reserve the term for a total
psychosis in which the factors just mentioned are dominant. I am
by no means certain that these elements will indefinitely resist
analysis, nor can I admit that relational psychoses are even now
wholly unanalyzable, but nevertheless in the main I agree with Dr.
Washburn so far as her view gives a statement provisionally accept-
able for a structural psychology. Her connection of relational feel-
ings with congenital motor attitudes is thoroughly congenial to my
whole point of view, and I should only insist that this connection is
no exclusive prerogative of such feelings. Every psychosis can, in
my judgment, be stated in terms of motor activity and must be so
stated in order to appreciate its full significance.
JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL.
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
COGNITIVE THOUGHT AND 'IMMEDIATE' EXPERIENCE
F~N a former discussion I maintained that the genesis and plausi-
bility of some recent metaphysical realisms were due to a con-
fusion between the psychological and the logical treatments of
thought. In the present discussion I shall endeavor to point out
that the doctrine known as 'pure' or 'immediate' empiricism derives
its plausibility in part from the same confusion. There is, indeed,
to-day a widespread tendency to hypostatize experience, to regard it as
the all-comprehending reality of which men and things are elements,
from which thought sets out on its reflective quest and into which
in the end it is somehow absorbed. But one does not find a distinc-
tion made and kept between experience as 'actual' and 'personal'
and experience as 'possible.' What in strict logic holds only of
the latter is asserted of the former, and v ice versa. This treatment
of experience one finds with varying contexts in Bradley and his
desciples and in Professors Dewey and James. It is with the views
of the latter two alone that I shall be herein concerned.
Professor James tells us that a physical object, e. g., his pen, is
an experience which may be taken in two contexts: (1) in the per-
sonal context of my or your experience; (2) as a pure experience or
pen experience in itself. 'The pen experience,' we are told, 'in its
original immediacy is not aware of itself: it simply is,' 1 etc. Now
JOURNAL, Vol. I., pp. 538, 566, etc.; Vol. II., p. 180, etc.
what does this latter expression mean? I have some notion of the
existence of a physical object when no one thinks it. I have even
a glimmering notion of what it might mean for the pen's existence
to depend on the thought of an all-thinker. But I can frame no
intelligible notion of what a pen is as a bit of pure 'physical' ex-
perience which no person has and which has itself no feeling. Surely
it can only conduce to confusion of thought to apply the term
experience to anything that actually figures in no consciousness. 2
If the personal quale be eliminated from experience there is nothing
left but the bare possibility of experience, and surely it is a mistake
to call an unconscious possibility experience? Words should have
some sort of definite meaning even in philosophy, and the following
definition of experience taken from the Century Dictionary states
the actual historical meaning of the term and brings out its personal
quale : ' ' The state or fact of having made trial or proof, or of having
acquired knowledge, wisdom, skill, etc., by actual trial or observation.
Personal and practical acquaintance with anything."
The consequence of the loose use of this term 'experience' is
that so short and easy a road is found to some all-comprehending
unity of experience. We are told by James that the sum-total of
experiences is a 'pure' experience on an enormous scale, undif-
ferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing. 3 Now this
sum-total of experience, this 'pure' experience, either is had by some
psychic center or it is not. In the latter case we are landed in a
mist (I was about to say 'mysticism') which is fatal to clear think-
ing. We are told that experiences are 'confluent,' etc. Now qua
experience my psychic life is uniquely and unsharably my own. As
experiencing centers,
" in the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
We mortal millions live alone."
The interrelations of selves, the common truth and the social activity,
doubtless do refer to common or over-individual conditions or im-
plications of experience. But these common conditions must tran-
scend any actual experience. 4 I do not get my individual experiences
by taking a slice out of a social or cosmic common-sensorium, nor can
I without further ado logically 'pool' my experience in a social
'pot.'
2 Ibid., Vol. II., p. 181, etc.
'Ibid., Vol. II., p. 181.
* When Professor James says that ' experience itself, taken at large, can
grow by itself,' that it * proliferates ' by ' continuous transitions,' etc., does he
mean in the individual or is he talking about the totality of experience?
176
Professor Dewey does not assume that experience is a compre-
hensive flux or matrix in which all separate experiences meet and
blend. Experience for him is always determinate. 5 Every ex-
perience is a real thing and every change in experience is a change
in reality. Determinate experiences are conterminous with things.
There are just as many reals as there are experiences. He says that
when I am frightened by a noise, that is one experience or 'thing/
and when I discover that the cause of the noise is the flapping of
the window-blind, that is another real thing. And when I see
Zollner's lines as convergent they really are convergent. When the
experience is corrected we have a new real. Now, of course, all my
experiences, whether judgments true or false, hallucinations, emo-
tions good and bad, and what not, are actual in the sense of having
psychical existence. The plausibility of Professor Dewey 's con-
tention that reality = immediate experience is due to the paralogism
of identifying the psychically existent with the total reality, ' ac-
tual' with 'possible' experience. In logic, as I have previously in-
sisted, reality is primarily that which judgment means or refers to.
In the Zollner line illusion my experience as cognitive gets the wrong
reference. My percept does not mean what I take it to mean. And
I reconstruct or transform this particular bit of cognitive experience
by a reference to other conditions of the perception, i. e.. by refer-
ence to a more systematized experience of reality. Similarly, when
I discover the cause of the noise I may not alter at all the fact of
1 window-blind-wind-blowing. ' I make a new judgment by a sys-
tematic reference and so alter my personal state. In such cases we
rectify our cognitive relations, not the external reality. These
rectifications mean that the references of our meanings to the reality
which has not changed must be altered in order that cognition may
work.
Professor Dewey insists that any experience is determinate. He
says the vague impression of something in the dark "is as 'good'
a reality as the self-luminous vision of an absolute." But it isn't
if it does not work as well. If I take this vague impression for a
soft couch and it turns out to be a coil of hot steam-pipes or a bathtub,
I do not consider my former judgment to be 'good.' I say it was
an erroneous experience and the steam-pipes are and were real all
the time. Professor Dewey insists that to find the meaning of any
philosophic concept we must go to experience. True! but how? to
whose experience 1 ? and how shall experience be controlled? We
must think in order to make experience yield its fruitage, and be-
cause it fails to yield complete fullness and harmony our thought
must continue ever to transcend actual experience in its own inter-
5 Hid., Vol. II., p. 393, ff.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 177
ests. The urge and stress of thinking is born of the partial failure
and partial promise of actual experience. Professor Dewey says
that the method of immediate empiricism is identical in kind with
that of the scientist. But the scientist is continually remaking experi-
ences and by thought constructions transcending the actual. The
all-pervading frictionless, massless fluid and the electric corpuscles
of the physicist certainly transcend immediate experience. Actual
experience, which always belongs to a self and hence is not a sub-
stantive reality, does not stand self-sufficient on its own feet. If
every determinate experience did so stand, like Professor James's
'pure' pen experience, unconscious and absolute in its own right,
of course there would be no occasion for thought's corrective and
supplementary work. Things would be just what they seem even
when there was no one for them to 'seem' to. The sun would go
round the earth, there would be two marbles when the finger-tips are
crossed in the Aristotelian experiment, two moons in the sky for the
extreme devotees of Bacchus, etc. The strictly theoretical parts of
physical science abound in thought constructions by which actual
experience is corrected, made more consistent, supplemented. Of
course the value of these constructions has reference to a 'possible'
self-consistent or complete experience, but this is an ideal which be-
comes actualized only in part. And even in the case of a perfect
' possible ' experience, if we do not presuppose an experiencing center
or self, we are assuming an unconscious experience had by no one.
Such a conception seems to me to have about as much meaning as
'wooden iron.' In short, pure or immediate experience is the hy-
postatization of the psychological abstraction of consciousness or
experience 'in general.' It is legitimate for the psychologist to treat
consciousness as a fact by itself, but is it legitimate to assert that
experience is the bed-rock of reality apart from whether any self has
consciousness of it or not ? And if we stick to the personal quale of
experience all philosophical concepts will not be found on the same
level or yield their meanings in the same terms. So-called imme-
diate experience is simply the indifferent starting-point for all philos-
ophy as for all science and rational activity. But it is shot through
and through with mediacy, and it is the function of reflective thought
to justify the element of mediacy in each specific case.
Our 'immediate' experiences are being constantly corrected by
thought. This is notoriously the case with perceptual experience.
But it is quite as true that esthetic, personal and religious ex-
periences do not yield their full fruitage without the interpreting
and transforming activity of cognition, an activity that does its work
by developing the element of mediation already there and without
which experience would be a meaningless 'brute' datum.
178
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Just herein lies the dynamic and constructive quality of thought.
The vital function of thought consists in submitting immediate
experiences to a reflective treatment by which they are made to yield
up to thought interpretation of their meanings and submit to control
and transformation at the hands of thought. Mere thought is not
life, but thought's contribution to life consists in interpreting, trans-
forming, harmonizing and supplementing actual experiences. This
work logical thinking performs just because it is not a mere psy-
chological existent on a dead-level with every sort of grain and smut
that may be grist for the psychological mill. In the performance
of this work cognitive thinking transcends a mere psychical existence
and reaches beyond actual experience. It develops implications in
regard to the real that are required to render more consistent and
harmonious actual experiences that are in themselves fragmentary.
These implications, we may say, refer to some self's possible experi-
ences, but they are not now convertible, and we may not understand
the conditions under which they may become convertible, into the
current coin of our immediate experiences. In this sense, reality
for thought that goes to the bitter end must include implications
that are only 'possible' experiences.
Every immediate experience has, without further consideration,
whatever reality may belong to any psychical process. In this sense
cognition is just one element in experience. But when we remind
ourselves that thought as psychological fact and thought as valid
meaning or reference are two different things, and that it is in the
latter sense alone that thought in its dynamic actuality is adequately
conceived, we shall not make the mistake of putting cognition on a
level with other psychical facts and so eliminating its transcendent
reference.
The psychological treatment of thought is responsible for the
assumption that reality equals experience. It is one thing to say
experience is real (and, of course, all experience is real in the sense
of being actual psychical process, although we hardly need a new
philosophy to convey this very obvious bit of information) and quite
another thing to say that all reality is immediate experience. Our
immediate experiences, cognitive and non-cognitive, are often mis-
leading, fragmentary and inharmonious. Reality in the fullest sense
means the objective system of conditions in relation to which these
experiences may get corrected, enlarged, harmonized. Of course,
thought must make a difference to reality, both extra-experiential
and intra-experiential, and some reality must be of the sort to which
thought can make a difference. Thought both transforms experience
and alters some elements in reality, so making way for a readjust-
ment of experience. Of what sort this reality must be so to undergo
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 179
the action of thought is a question remaining over the metaphysical
problem of logic.
In his latest discussion 6 Dewey lays emphasis on the end-state of
knowledge as saturated with emotion. Knowledge mediates activi-
ties whose aims are the development of emotional substrates or con-
tinua into perfect feeling-harmonies, moral, esthetic, personal. Now
it seems to me perfectly true that the goal of a completed cognition is
always a personal state suffused with emotional coloring. But I
should deny that the differentiae, of cognitive feeling are reducible to
moral and esthetic terms. Since all higher feeling is a reaction of
the unity of self to a content, cognition involves feeling, and the
articulation of knowledge is the articulation of feeling. But I
should maintain that the personal feeling which accompanies any
relatively complete insight in science or philosophy may have a
unique quote due to the specific character of the cognitive reaction.
In other words, cognitive feeling may be and often is sui generis,
i. e., not reducible to moral, esthetic, or religious terms. And I
should agree with the contention that thought has always personal
reference, while insisting that 'pragmatism' ignores the ontological
implications of this reference.
Thought is never wholly external to any personal experience.
'Pure' experience devoid of thought is a Grenzbegriff. There are
two chief desiderata in the epistemological treatment of experience:
(1) the explication of the chief logical stages, through which, in the
individual and the race, experience passes by the action of reflective
thinking, and which stages run, of course, from a beginning in which
thought is inchoate to a relative conclusion in which it has become
definitely articulated; (2) the explication of the objective or uni-
versal implications of the individuals having experience. This is
the problem of the definition of an environing world or reality, social
and physical. The fact that my experience is uniquely my own, as
well as determinate, does not abolish but rather sets a metaphysical
problem.
We are repeatedly told that pragmatic empiricism is a new
'method' of treating philosophical concepts. But, so far, we have
been given only vague generalities, and those of us who are not con-
vinced thereby are told that it is because we are irretrievably mired
in the bog of transcendentalism. 'By their fruits ye shall know
them.' Let the pragmatical, or immediate, empiricists give us a
thoroughgoing treatment by their method of one or two fundamental
philosophical concepts, substance, causality, thinghood, selfhood, etc.,
and then perhaps the actual demonstration of the pragmatic uses of
this 'method' will let light into our skulls. In the meantime, per-
8 This JOURNAL, Vol. II., pp. 707-711.
180 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
haps one may be pardoned for the perversity of holding on to a
point of view which seems both to be more in harmony with the
whole procedure and function of reflective thought and to have
yielded some definite results. And I will be specific and say that I
mean that the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Hegel have yielded
definite results in rendering the actual world more intelligible in
terms of an idealistic 7 rendering of experience.
J. A. LEIGHTON.
HOBAET COLLEGE.
DISCUSSION
THE QUARREL ABOUT TRANSCENDENCY
TDROFESSOR JAMES has said: "Does it not seem as if the
quarrel about self -transcendency in knowledge might drop?
Is it not a purely verbal dispute ? Call it self-transcendency or call
it pointing, whichever you like it makes no difference so long as
real transitions toward real goals are admitted as things given in
experience, and among experience's most indefeasible parts." 1 I
believe these words apply to more than one philosophic issue, but I
take up now only that about transcendent objects. The arguments
on both sides grow so numerous and complicated that one feels the
need of stopping to ask: What does it all amount to? The radical
empiricist is concerned to define externality in experiential terms:
the realist is equally concerned to show that in this definition some-
thing is omitted, unaccounted for, namely, the transcendent external
object. But does it make any difference to practical life or to one's
system of philosophy whether the realist is right or wrong in this?
Let us state very roughly what has resulted from the discussion
so far, so as to get the issue before us. The empiricists began by
defining knowledge in practical terms. It was objected that this
laid so much stress on the subjective side as to exclude real external
things and standards. Doubtless the word 'experience' was partly
to blame for this, since it has usually signified a personal and sub-
jective affair in contrast with the things with which it was con-
versant. If given a definite meaning, it would naturally mean the
experience limited to one's own body. 2 But the empiricists replied
that theirs was no such narrow view. They have, after all, as much
good common sense as the realists, and believe in a real objective
world. For them * experience' is no more subjective than objective;
7 When I use the term ' idealism ' without qualifying phrase I mean meta-
physical, not epistemological or psychological idealism.
1 Thia JOURNAL, Vol. II., p. 237.
2 W. Fite, Philosophical Review, January, 1906.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 181
it insists, indeed, on the correlation of the two. It is not a question
of affirming or denying the reality of objects, but rather of what
objectivity and reality mean. And whenever an opponent says that
a transcendent real object out of all experience is implied in knowl-
edge, they can tell what that object's externality means, in experi-
ential terms. 3 Whoever asserts that there are residua in knowledge
which immediate experience can not embrace will be asked what these
residua are, and then the empiricists will state their meaning in
experiential terms; whether the residua be transcendent objects or
thought-relations 4 or some other kind of transcending something. 5
In any case it is possible to tell what the transcendent term is, what
it means to us, by referring to the various contents and relations of
experience which are concerned with it. Yet in spite of all these
experiential definitions the realist doubtless feels that something
itself external to experience has been omitted. And so the circle
revolves and, it seems to me, must always revolve. For as soon as
you assert your belief in something other than what experience pos-
sesses, you must either describe this by intelligible words or refer
to immediate experience to signify what it is. The latter is what
the empiricist wants you to do ; the former also plays into his hands,
because words are intelligible only when they refer to suggested pos-
sible or actual experiences. And just in so far as the realist asserts
that something more is implied (which he infallibly will do), the
empiricist will meet him with experiential definitions. Thus an in-
definitely long argument may arise : the empiricist always defining
in empirical terms, the realist always asserting a new residuum.
I do not mean to say that any one is to blame or that this endless
argument can be avoided, if we once enter upon this kind of discus-
sion. The empiricist will continue to feel that everything we believe
in must be capable of formulation in experiential terms, if it is to
mean anything to us. I think he is right. The realist will continue
to feel that there is always something beyond and outside what we
have attained at any stage in our empirical formulation. I think he,
too, is right. Knowledge and its objects seem to me to offer an
inexhaustible field for investigation, and the modes under which we
can describe externality to be endless in number. But what causes
the trouble is, that this inexhaustibility and endlessness are supposed
to be due to a difference in kind, a separation, between externality
and any content or relation of experience. Externality is, I think,
surreptitiously taken to mean existence in separation from experi-
ence, actual or suggested. If it were understood to imply merely a
M. Dewey, this JOURNAL, Vol. II., pp. 707-8.
*C. M. Bakewell, this JOURNAL, Vol. II., pp. 520-522.
8 Cf. W. B. Pitkin, Philosophical Review, January, 1900.
182 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
possible infinity (i. e., an indefinitely great number) of experiential
descriptions in order to exhaust the nature of an external object,
there would be no quarrel between the two views. But when the
above definition of externality or transcendence is lugged in, the
endless argument is inevitable.
This description of the problem is by no means new. Fichte has
dealt thus with the problem of idealism versus realism, and the like-
ness of the above to the Kantian antinomies is apparent. But the
solution of the difficulty lies, I think, in a different direction from
that taken by either of these thinkers. For them the endless an-
tinomy was inevitable, but I think it rests on a misconception.
Note, first, that the question whether externality means existence
in separation from actual or possible experience is one which can
not be answered by any 'knowledge of acquaintance' or by 'knowl-
edge about' what is given to experience. It is not in question what
facts are found or what contents and relations they display, but
whether those contents and relations are apart from experience.
Kant has taught us that the describable character of a thing in no
way determines its existence apart from the mind. Since now there
is in the nature of the case complete independence between the two,
the proposition may be converted. So we may say that its existence
apart from experience, actual or possible, has no effect whatever on
the characters or relations which the thing offers to us. It makes
no difference whatever, either to our knowledge of acquaintance
with or to our knowledge about objects, whether they exist apart
from experience. No new information is gained if they are proved
to do so, for no property of the contents or relations offered in ex-
perience follows therefrom which would not follow from the things
in experience as they are experienced. Permanence, unity, causality,
all such properties which have been supposed to depend upon exist-
ence apart from experience, these can be guaranteed just as com-
pletely by the contents offered in experience and can themselves be
wholly defined in terms of possible experience. In other words, the
conception of existence apart from, and independent of, actual or
suggested experience, which, as we saw above, leads to the endlessly
revolving circle of dispute, does so because it is supposed to make
a difference to knowledge which it really does not make. The settle-
ment of the issue one way or another does not add to or take away
from our knowledge at all. That is, it is no real issue, but a spe-
cious one.
The statement that existence apart from experience makes no
difference to knowledge will doubtless be felt by the realist to rob
6 ' Grundlage der gesammte Wissenscliaftslehre,' first part of ' Practical
Part,' Jena, 1795.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 183
knowledge of all that gives it sense. But consider an example. Sup-
pose I entertain an idea of a certain book lying on my table, and the
question is raised whether the book actually lies on my table. Here,
if anywhere, its existence apart from experience would seem to make
a difference to knowledge. But here the whole issue is, whether the
idea fits into that particular context of experience which I call look-
ing at the table. This context is possessed by experience just as
much as the one called subjective, in which I have merely the idea.
And, on the other hand, the idea exists just as much as the external
book ; but it has different relations, a different context. The question
is, will it fit into that other context which I call physical which comes
when I look to see. It is the context in which the idea lies, not its
existence or non-existence, outside of experience, which makes the
difference to knowledge and to practise. This is, I think, a type of
what always holds. The issue is always decided, not by an affirma-
tion of existence or non-existence, but by a statement of what context
the thing exists in. If the radical empiricist prefers to say that this
context is what we mean by existence, I am willing to agree. The
point is that the whole matter can be described in experiential terms.
It is often shorter, indeed, to speak in realistic terms and say 'ex-
ternal' rather than 'in the physical context' or 'the ground of suc-
cessful action.' But the two modes of expression are, so far as they
convey real information to us, but two different languages express-
ing essentially the same belief : there is really no issue between them.
This should, I think, be evident from the nature of the case, but
if illustration is needed, we find it in the history of thought. Ideal-
ists and realists alike have believed in the same outer world and the
same objects and persons. The experience-philosopher to-day admits
permanent objects, believes in the past history of the world, and in
other personalities than his own, quite as earnestly as the realist.
He simply defines them in terms of actual or possible experience, as
felt or suggested goals or sources of thought, emotion, or conduct,
whose value and meaning consist wholly in their actual or possible
effects on our own experience.
Any matter of belief can be formulated in either experiential or
realistic language. Professor Woodbridge's realistic definition of
consciousness as a relation between physical things or processes can
be put in experiential terms, if the physical things be described as
suggested goals of a cognitive process or grounds of successful action.
Or, take the case of a past fact which we believe in such as tin 1
history of the earth before man existed. This, which is commonly
stated in realistic terms, admits of translation into experiential
language. The early history of the earth (which of course 1 is not
now real as the present is real) is real in the sense that inquiry into
184
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the ground of present phenomena in which we believe leads us, by
our customary modes of inference, to believe in certain other contents
not in the present external context. These other contents (past
earthly history) are objects of my present belief, and their existence
before I came to believe them is also object of my present belief,
and the whole meaning and value of such objects of belief are not
to be understood except in their bearing upon my belief. Thus
radical empiricism can describe the matter though individual
radical empiricists may prefer to use other experiential terms than
those I have used. But there is no more real difference between the
two modes of description than between 'the day is clear' in English
and in French.
I do not deny that real issues are raised by radical empiricists or
realists. Whether knowledge can be defined wholly in practical and
esthetic terms or whether it is an irreducible kind of experience is,
I think, a genuine issue, for it can be decided by observation of given
contents and relations. And doubtless there are many other real
issues. But the issue between radical empiricism and realism, as
understood by many of the recent disputes, has nothing to do with
these. That dispute is irrelevant to any other, because the given
contents and relations of things alone determine their place in life
and in one 's system of knowledge.
Is not a similar misunderstanding at the root of some other old
controversies of philosophy? Of course philosophy can not expect
to progress as fast as science, because its problem is so much bigger,
but at least we may walk straight ahead faster, and not keep stopping
to disentangle our feet, if we can rid ourselves of some of those old
disagreements which have brought so much reproach upon us. For
instance, the old quarrel about substance and its attributes turns, I
think, upon a mistaken issue. Is the substance something transcend-
ing its attributes or not ? It makes no difference, so long as we can
define the substance in terms of its attributes so as to guarantee their
permanence, coexistence and other concrete properties. Again, take
the old issue about universals. Is the universal anything external
to the series of possible cases ? It makes no difference, so long as an
indefinite number of possible cases is provided for in the character
and suggestiveness of one or more actual concrete cases. And per-
haps there are some other time-honored issues which would have to
go by the board. I know well that he who thinks he has escaped an
old problem usually finds it again on his hands in a new form. And
yet there have been such things as mistaken issues; and there is, I
suppose, a chance that those I have mentioned may be such. We
have everything to gain and nothing to lose by accepting the terms
of peace here proposed. We can not be worse off than before, and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 185
we can gain time and energy to acquire some more systematic in-
formation about the structure and functioning of the universe.
Philosophy may then hope to become, what we fear it is now only to
a slight extent, a fixed body of doctrine which will command the
respect of all who desire to acquire knowledge.
W. H. SHELDON.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ' ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Concept Action in History and in the Natural Sciences. PERCY
HUGHES. Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy, Psy-
chology and Education, Vol. X., No. 3. New York: The Macmillan
Co. 1905.
With the exception of the presidential address of Professor Miinster-
berg, delivered some years ago before the American Philosophical Society,
this monograph of Dr. Hughes is the first serious contribution of American
scholarship to a discussion that is looked upon by many of the guild of
philosophers across the water as one of the most important in the whole
history of logic. A group of German thinkers has arisen who deny that
the natural science method is the only method that may be legitimately
employed in the search for truth, who emphasize the i antithesis between
history and the natural sciences ' and who believe that they have laid the
foundations of the logic of the historical sciences. Professor Rickert has
given the most comprehensive account of this logic. It is, as he teaches,
the logic of individuals as opposed to the logic of universals.
Dr. Hughes is in sympathy with the work of the Germans. He does
not deny the antithesis between history and the natural sciences, but
would set it out along lines that seem to him l more clear, at least to
English-speaking people, than those adhered to by German logicians/ In
1 the common word and concept action' he believes that he has found f an
instrument of speech and logic to which no German term, in its common
use, is equal for this particular purpose/ Rickert, according to Dr.
Hughes, " in asserting the bald antithesis of the sciences of individuals
and of universals, fails to grasp the wealth and positive character of the
historian's work, or really to unite under one concept the full purpose of
historical as contrasted with naturalistic construction. My thesis is
that to describe the content and purpose of historical construction, the
concept action is fully adequate. . . . Action, then, as contrasted with
law is to be the central theme of this essay."
In his first chapter, Dr. Hughes traces rapidly the history of the
theories of the nature of history from Aristotle to Rickert, noting that
before Kant, who * laid down the general principles of historical as con-
trasted with mechanical or natural science/ philosophers failed to grasp
the logical character of the historian's work. Droysen's contribution to
the discussion he ranks very high, but criticizes him because he * wrongly
marks off the moral world from histories in general, as history's peculiar
186
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
field,' arid second, because 'he keeps in the background the essential
feature that gave unity to his treatment, the fact that history deals with
objects as determined from within by latent tendencies, with activity, with
agencies and actions, not with objects void of character, determined by
circumstances, by their relations, not with passivity, not with atoms
and motion.' In presenting his own theory as a development of the
preceding, Dr. Hughes contends that ' the content of any history is funda-
mentally that action which characterizes the one agent, and in which the
lesser agents appear as members of that one agent. The actions of those
lesser agents are histories, and together make up the one action and the
one history.' This concept action covers all past events, of which there is a
record, denotes the freedom that characterizes the objects of history and
the relation between the elements of any given history in which the activity
of those elements is not only conserved but increased. It indicates the
purpose and point of the historical scientist in his construction, and
finally, it permits the temporal character that common usage gives to
history and the inclusion of mechanical relations between the several
elements, subordinated to the teleological relation which the history aims
to present.
Dr. Hughes objects to Rickert's statement that ' history is nearer
reality than natural science ' and observes, " They both are real if truly
science." Going on, he asserts that " the natural sciences in all cases
start from a history, whether it be an observation or an experiment, for
the fact from which the naturalist starts and to which he returns is a
past, of which there remains only the evidence. The naturalist starts
by employing historical concepts, inner causes, potentialities, and do
what he may, never escapes from them wholly. The direction of the
naturalist's effort is to refer all events to the motion of the thing as con-
ditioned by the ' totality of circumstances ' a reference that reduces the
thing to a condition of passivity relative to the immeasurable totality."
" The physicist starts with simple histories, e. g., the fall of, a ball through
different distances; and, noticing resemblances and differences between
these past processes, these histories, finds a law which applies to all such
histories, whenever they shall have occurred. . . . On the other hand,
histories direct the common perception of man to the existence of agents
and actions greater than it knew, presenting us with beings of greater
and greater complexity and internal significance. It seeks the unity of
action of a nebula or of the Milky Way."
The historian " can not run counter to universal law. ... If he would
write the history of the earth, of a man or of a nation, his account must
be confirmed by its accordance with the laws of geology, sociology or of
psychology, etc." " Such manifold interrelations, such interdependence
and supplementation of each other's labors, exist, I would show, between
historical and natural science, rather than the neat but barren antithesis
between sciences of the universal and the individual, of the abstract and
the real. A further advantage of characterizing action rather than indi-
viduality as the concept of history is that in the former not only is indi-
viduality included, but also the temporal, developing, continuous char-
acter of historical content, the peculiar character of historical causation,
the teleological character of historical construction and the practical
purpose of historical study are implied. That one term, action, in anti-
thesis to law, thoroughly distinguishes the field and purpose of history
from that of natural science."
In his second chapter Dr. Hughes deals with historical invention,
seeking to show that the content of a history is action; in the third
chapter he treats of historical construction and would demonstrate that
* in this construction the concept governing the historian must be action/
After presenting action as the content of histories and the concept
governing historical construction, in his fourth and fifth chapters, he
turns to mechanics, chemistry and biology and shows that although they
start with histories, they work away from and tend to eliminate action
from the scientific concepts employed. While this is practically accom-
plished in mechanics, it becomes impossible as we pass into the region of
the more complex sciences, like chemistry and biology, whose laws have
a limited range.
In a sixth chapter a scheme of the concepts that have been employed
is given, and in a concluding chapter the relation between history and
ethics, the dependence of ethical on historical construction, is briefly but
suggestively touched upon.
I realize that this analysis of Dr. Hughes's monograph is very in-
adequate, that much has been omitted that should have been included to
make clear his position, especially the distinction between possibility and
tendency that plays such an important part in his argument.
Before touching on his position as whole, I wish to say just a word
about the manner in which Dr. Hughes employs the two terms ' histories '
and ' evidence.' Everything that has happened is history, he tells us.
That is, to be sure, the first use of the term and the vulgar use. The
scientific use, however, suggests, not isolated past events, but important
past events organized into a complex and unique whole. I am thoroughly
convinced that we shall never reach daylight in the discussion of the
relation of history to the natural sciences until we substitute some word
for that first term. All past acts are no more history than they are
natural science; they are simply the material with which both sciences
work. This is Kickert's position, and the work of the historian and of
the sociologist seems to me to bear him out. When Dr. Hughes takes
exception to Bickert's statement that historical science is closer to the
reality than natural science, he does not discuss his grounds for that state-
ment, namely, that the external world is known to us through perception,
that historical science tends to retain the perceivable, while natural
science tends to eliminate it. Both history and natural science start with
perceivable objects, but all perceivable objects are not history nor are they
natural science.
The use of the word evidence as meaning f the present fact ' is a use
that must strike the historian as incomplete. Evidence is a rather defi-
nite thing for the historian and a logic of history ought to conform to
scientific practise. It is true that all the ' sources ' with which the his-
[88
"HE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
torian works are present facts, but for the most part Dr. Hughes uses the
term in a very limited sense, meaning the existence of a constitution, of
a state, of a political party or of a religion whose existence needs to be
explained. Such a fact, undoubtedly, is proof of action, but it is not the
evidence that enables us to trace the stages of the action, its evolution
or history.
As to Dr. Hughes's general position, I can speak with less confidence.
Unquestionably action is the content of history. Not only do all historical
works prove it, but writers upon method betray it often in their use of
terms. It is also true, I believe, that the historian seeks for unity, that
a history should present a single action, but is action a necessary anti-
thesis of generalization (law) ? It is not possible to generalize upon
actions, to have a law of actions ? In that case how would the content of
histories differ from the content of sociologies, unless that difference
rested on the individuality, i. e., uniqueness and unity of the historical
act? Does history merge almost imperceptibly into natural science?
For Dr. Hughes, history does not have humanity for its center. For
him the content of history is not necessarily Kuliur, the result of man's
activities in society, and it would be quite possible to have a history with
man left out. Rickert holds that humanity is the center and Kultur the
content of all history. It may be possible to reconcile these views.
Bernheim remarked long ago that ' wir konnen alle Objecte historisch
betrachten,' but that only man in society was the natural object of
Geschichtswissenschaft. The distinction here is based upon content and
not upon method, and it might reasonably be insisted that an account of
the unique evolution of the earth is, from the point of view of method,
as much a part of historical science as the unique evolution of man in
society. If this be true, will it not be necessary to invent new terms to
distinguish the action of man in society from the action of the planets?
Will distinctions not become necessary in historical science not unlike
those that have arisen in natural science between biology and sociology?
If so, what would be the foundation of such distinctions? Here an
examination of Gottl's interesting study would be valuable. These ob-
servations call attention to the incompleteness rather than to the un-
soundness of the work of Dr. Hughes, and as he expressly denies all
claims to completeness, does not form a fair ground for criticism.
Finally, I am not convinced that the word action will do all that
Dr. Hughes claims for it as the concept of historical construction. All
actions are unique, but the historian is interested in the action that is
important because of its uniqueness or individuality. Important, be it
understood, not in its isolation, but in its relation to a larger whole, and
important for that larger whole by just those characteristics that dis-
tinguish it from other acts. The sociologist in dealing with past acts is
concerned with what they have in common and neglects the features that
the historian seizes upon. Both deal with action, but in the one case
the action is general, common to several series, in the other it is unique,
happens but once, can not happen again, and is valuable on account of its
individuality. If a generalization on social evolution may have action
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 189
for its content, i. e., if laws of social action may be formulated and I
can see nothing to prevent such formulation it must be evident that the
term action does not supply us with a formal concept by which we can
distinguish the work of the historian from that of the sociologist. The
only escape, it appears to me, would be to decline to classify sociology with
the sciences of generalization or of law.
While it does not appear to me that Dr. Hughes has found in the
word action a term that is the clear antithesis of law and sums up the
work of the historian as the latter term does the work of the natural
scientist, it is still true that he gives us a valuable new point of view, in
distinguishing between possibility and tendency, in pointing out clearly
for the first time that action is the content of history and that the synthesis
must be characterized by unity of action. From such a brilliant begin-
ning we may reasonably hope that he will give us in the future a treatise
on the logic of history that will be complete, dealing with all the problems
for which he could not find space in his thesis, and especially with the
relation of history to sociology.
FRED MORROW FLING.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.
Faith, Reason and Religion. F. C. S. SCHILLER. HMert Journal, Vol.
IV., No. 2, 1906. Pp. 329-345.
The growing influence of the will-to-believe philosophy suggests the
need of a careful estimate of its bearings upon the problems of religion
and theology. From the standpoint of its critics, the new humanism
may be viewed as the foe of a reasonable faith and the possible ally of
the most extreme obscurantism or superstition, or as an excuse for the
most unbridled subjectivism. Mr. Schiller, in dealing with the relations
of faith and reason, seeks to meet these objections and to show that the
new view does not mean the systematic demolition of the reason. Faith
can not be regarded as antagonistic to reason, because faith is necessarily
involved in the exercise of reason itself. As a name for intellectual in-
dolence or complacency, faith may be the foe of reason, but with faith in
the proper sense, that is, with the attitude which takes a desirable belief
on trust and acts upon it in the hope of verifying it by action, reason
can have no quarrel. The truths of reason were originally postulates
assumed to meet a certain situation, and only established ex post facto
by the experience of their practical success. Further, the faith which
engenders knowledge is not a principle of unbridled individualism, for
before it can be accepted as knowledge it must prove itself by works and
interfere effectively in the conduct of life. While the sifting process is
going on no final agreement in religious belief is to be looked for, and it
may even be questioned whether there is an ultimate truth, the same for
all. The plurality of opinions suggests that truth may ' prove more
subtly flexible and adjust itself to the differences of individual experi-
ences/ Both science and religion begin with postulates of faith, and
transmute them through the verification of experience into axioms of
reason. Theology has lagged behind science in its development, but the
190
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
religious attitude toward the facts of life has equal validity with the
scientific, and rests upon imperishable foundations in the nature of the
human soul.
The reader may question whether Mr. Schiller's ' flexible ' and adapt-
able truth will really satisfy the thirst for ontology which seems to be a
part of the religious nature, and so be able to meet his own pragmatic
test. Again, if the growing universality of an opinion is to be taken as
a test of its truth, what of the beings who hold the opinion? Are they
real beings of the old-fashioned kind? Professor Royce thinks that
pragmatism is a ' lonely ' doctrine, and Mr. Schiller argues 1 that abso-
lute idealism is solipsistic. The situation is interesting, and it would
seem that an investigation is necessary before either side can make good
its claim to so valuable a philosophical asset as a society of other selves.
It is to be feared that the realist will cling to the naive delusion of an
external world until his more accomplished philosophical brethren can find
some better reason for believing in the existence of their neighbors than
an equally naive ' feelin' for you.' For the rest, Mr. Schiller leaves us
where Plato left us: we must take the beat of human opinions, and upon
that as a raft, not without risk, venture out upon the voyage of life.
WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.
LINCOLN UNIVERSITY, PA.
Les anomalies mentales chez les ecoliers. J. PHILIPPE et G. P. BONCOUR.
Paris : Alcan. 1905.
Leicht abnorme Kinder. W. WEYGANDT. Sammlung zwangloser Abhand-
lungen aus dem Gebiete der Nerven- und Geisteskranlcheiten, 1905,
VI., No. 1.
Ueber Idiotie. W. WEYGANDT. Ibid., 1906, VI., Nos. 5 and 6.
In these three monographs the authors have considered most of the
recent literature on the causes, symptoms and treatment of the feeble-
minded. The first article of Weygandt and the book of Philippe and
Boncour are of particular interest to students of psychology and educa-
tion. In these the authors discuss the mental condition of those children
who have a sense of morality and who are sufficiently intelligent to attend
school, but who are 4 backward.'
These children can profit from instruction in the public schools,
but not to the extent that perfectly normal children can do. Most of
them have a mental awkwardness and slowness, and consequently they are
difficult to teach in classes with normal pupils. They either retard the
progress of the normal or are left to themselves to remain uneducated.
They are apathetic, easily fatigued, with unstable attention, often nervous.
With sufficient individual attention, however, and in schools especially
fitted for them, these children can be educated to a comparatively high
degree of efficiency and made useful to themselves and to the community.
Often when their physical defects or ailments adenoids, obstructions to
hearing, defects of eyesight, etc. are corrected, there is an immediate
improvement in mental condition.
a This JOURNAL, Vol. III., No. 4.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 191
In Germany and France much attention is being given to these back-
ward children. In Germany alone there are seven journals devoted partly
or entirely to the consideration of this class. It is a matter for regret
that in this country comparatively little is being done for improvement
and in study of these curable cases.
SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ.
MCLEAN HOSPITAL, WAVEBLEY, MASS.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1906,
Vol. XVI. The Dangers of Democracy (pp. 129-145) : J. S. MACKENZIE.
-An exposition of the advantages and disadvantages of democratic gov-
ernment, maintaining the thesis that its one great danger is that it may
fail to realize its own ideal of government of the people, by the people
and for the people. Ethical Influences in University Life (pp. 145-157) :
C. H. TOY. -An address to Harvard students. The relative isolation of
the college community is viewed as tending to a relaxation of outside
obligations, and to social and academic seclusion, while promoting re-
pose and concentration, simple and clear thought, high ideals, intellectual
sincerity and a free interchange of constructive criticism. Ten Years
of War and the Hague Treaty (pp. 158-171) : W. L. COOK. - The writer
argues that the Hague Treaty can best be made effective as a preventive
of war by providing that the interposition of a buffer period of thirty
days between the breaking off of diplomatic engagements and the out-
break of hostilities, which the Treaty now recommends, be made manda-
tory. The Retail Method in Reform (pp. 171-179) : MARY E. RICHMOND.
-Historical and contemporary illustrations are adduced to show that the
most effective method of social reform is that which takes its rise from
an interest in individual cases, suggesting a general program leading to
changes in legislation and public opinion, completing the circle by atten-
tion to the complete and effective application of the principle thus gained.
Suicide : Some of its Causes and Preventives (pp. 179-189) : C. F. YONGE.
- Gives representative opinions on suicide, discusses some of its condi-
tions and emphasizes the value of religious faith and a strong sense of
duty as a preventive. The Industrial Millennium (pp. 190-198) : IRA W.
HOWERTH. - We need a scientific industrial ideal. A rational industrial
order involves economy of force, cooperation in the spirit of love, made
effective through intelligent democratic control. Its coming depends on
the growth of the spirit of universal brotherhood, which latter is not inde-
pendent of external conditions. Ethical Forces in the Practise of Medi-
cine (pp. 198-203) : RICHARD C. CABOT. - The moral advantage of the
physician's work lies in peculiar opportunities for achieving skill, science
and friendship. The Practical Deductions of the Theory of Knowledge
(pp. 204-227) : D. II. MACGREGOR. - Idealistic epistemology seeks to estab-
lish a formal teleology, based not on special adaptations, but on the gen-
192
eral adaptation of mind to nature. But this relation is viewed as inner
and necessary, whence it fails to prove design, which has meaning only
when the mutually related factors are really distinct and contingent.
The further appeal to the existence of subjective effort in reality weakens
rather than strengthens the argument for objective teleology, since it
tends to explain the adaptations causally. The So-called Hedonist Para-
dox (pp. 228-234) : FELIX ARNOLD. - Pleasure is a real and attainable end
of action. Boole Reviews (pp. 236-262) : J. H. Hyslop, Problems of
Philosophy: JOSIAH ROYCE. J. A. Stewart, The Myths of Plato: J. S.
MACKENZIE. A. Messer, Kants EthiTc: W. J. EGBERTS. A. C. Pigon,
Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace: C. J. HAMILTON. Aylmer
Maude, A Peculiar People The Doukhobors: M. A. HAMILTON. J. A.
Green, The Educational Ideas of Pestallozzi. Jessie White, The Educa-
tional Ideals of Froebel. R. E. Hughes, School Training: W. J. GREEN-
STREET. Thomas Stephens, The Child and Religion: M. MACKENZIE.
Sir Oliver Lodge, School Teaching and School Reform: M. MACKENZIE.
A. V. Dicey, Law and Opinion in England: C. J. HAMILTON. David J.
Ritchie, Philosophical Studies: JAMES GIBSON. Henry Sidgwick, Lec-
tures on the Philosophy of Kant, and Other Philosophical Lectures and,
Essays: J. S. MACKENZIE.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. December, 1905. Le prejuge intel-
lectualiste et le prejuge finaliste dans les theories de I'expression (pp.
561-582) : G. DUMAS. - Darwin's theory of emotional expressions is fal-
laciously finalistic, and Wundt's theory is with equal fallaciousness intel-
lectualistic. The antithesis of pain and pleasure, joy and anger, etc., is
wrongly taken by these scientists as a logical one; the reactions are then
forcibly regarded as opposites, an unconfirmable assumption. Psychology
can not explain expressions. Reflexion et Introspection (pp. 583-591) :
H. LUQUET. - The writer makes a plea for introspection as a psychological
method. Introspection is related to reflection as art is to science; and
just as art gives us the full individual meaning of its objects, while sci-
ence renders only a practical abstraction, so too introspection gives us a
disinterested presentation of the fluid whole of experiences, avoiding the
one-sidedness of reflection, which ends inevitably in a psychological
atomism (psychophysics or associationalism). Role des sensations in-
ternes dans les emotions et dans la perception de la duree (pp. 592-623) :
REVAULT D'ALLONNES. - A study of a patient suffering from visceral anes-
thesia. The outward expressions of emotions were found to be intact,
but the emotions themselves were absent. Perception of short time-
intervals very weak, that of longer intervals wholly lacking; hypoesthesia
of all organic appetites, temperature and pain senses. The writer holds
that the James-Lange theory of emotions must be narrowed so as to make
internal sensations alone affective and essential to emotional life, while
tactile and external motor sensations are merely contingent and largely
cognitive expressions. Time-conception may persist after loss of time-
perception. Likewise inclinations, which are residues of emotions, may
persist after the loss of all true emotions. La haine (pp. 624635) : E.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 193
TARDIEU. - An appreciation of hate, which is regarded as proceeding from
the instinct of self-preservation. Its manifestations in family and social
life are described; it is often a stimulus to action where other stimuli fail.
Patriotism is the obverse of hatred of strange peoples. Analyses et
comptes rendus: Pillon, L'Annee philosophique : JULES DELVAILLE; Bel-
langer, Les concepts de cause: M. MAUXION; Motora, An essay on eastern
philosophy: TH. EIBOT; Heymans, Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik: M.
MAUXION; Petronievics, Principien der Metaphysik: G. M.; Schrader,
Elemente der Psychologie des Urteils: ABEL REY; Weisengriin, Der neue
Kurs in der Philosophic : LEON POITEVIN; Basch, Uindividualisme an-
archiste: FR. P.; de Gaultier, Nietzsche et la reforme philosophique:
GEORGES PALANTE; Ranzoli, Dizionario di scienze filosofiche: ANDRE LA-
LANDE ; de Gourmont, Promenades philosophiques : L. ARREAT. Review of
foreign periodicals: The Psychological Review, Vol. XI.
REYISTA FILOSOFICA. September-October, 1905. Per una
scienza normativa morale (pp. 445-466) : E. JUVALTA. - A normative
ethical science can include a system of relations and laws which have
the value of norms only on the initial assumption that they are moral
ends. The determination of an ethical norm requires (1) that it be
humanly possible, and (2) that the preference given to the norm in ques-
tion over other possible norms is a moral necessity. The moral necessity
assumed by the author and argued in previous articles is universal justice,
and the means to this end is a human society such that all its members
find in their own conditions of life the same or equivalent opportunity
to devote their activity to a search for the goods for the attainment of
which social cooperation is a means. La Psicologia di Tertulliano nei
suoi rapporti colla Psicologia Stoica (pp. 467-493) : G. BONFIGIOLI. - Con-
tinues the author's account of Tertullian's indebtedness to Greek philos-
ophy, chiefly to the Stoics, for material wherewith to combat the Platonic
tradition used by the Gnostics. Vicende del termine e del concetto di
legge nella filosofia naturale (pp. 494-513) : A. PAGANO. - From a review
of the Greek and Latin words which have had the signification of * law '
or related significations, the author concludes that the concept of law
has passed through three phases: (1) a significance of strict legality; (2)
the manifestation of a divine will which is, however, limited in two direc-
tions, (a) by a mysterious power ruling over things, the germ of the idea
of necessity, (fr) by an unalterable specific nature of things which consti-
tutes the physical world; (3) the will which produces the law ceases to
be attributed to a hyperphenomenal being, but is identified with the order
of phenomena themselves or is wholly eliminated. The characters of
efficiency, predetermination and necessity persist, however, but opposed
by critical reflection which reduces cause to temporal succession and law
to uniform and constant sequence. The two tendencies, natural de-
terminism and indeterminism, are at present opposed one to the other.
II mecanismo delle emozioni (pp. 514-524): S. MONTANELLI - A protest
against the recent work of M. Paul Sollier because of his reduction of
psychology to physiology. Multa Renascentur (apologo) : F. BONATELU.
Rassegna Billiografica.
194
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EEVIEW. January, 1906, N. S., Vol.
XIII., No. 1. The Relations of Logic to Allied Disciplines (pp. 1-22) :
WILLIAM A. HAMMOND. - The paper first states briefly the conceptions of
logic held by various leading philosophers from Aristotle to the present
time. It then discusses in their order (1) the relation of logic as a
science to logic as art, (2) the relation of logic to psychology and (3) the
relation of logic to metaphysics. The author believes that, for the sake
of progress in each, a strict line of distinction should be maintained be-
tween these branches of knowledge. Some Effects of Incentives on WorTc
and Fatigue (pp. 23-34) : WILLIAM R. WRIGHT. - The experiments con-
sisted of ergographic tests with and without incentive. The results show
that more work is accomplished under the former condition and that
known impossibilities tend to decrease the total amount of work pro-
duced. The fatigue effects are likewise greater under such conditions.
Discussion: The Problem of the Subconscious (pp. 35-49) : IRVING KING.
- The author takes exception to those current theories of consciousness
which introduce psychic elements in one form or another for its explana-
tion. He conceives the subconscious not as dim consciousness, nor as
anything psychic or self-conscious, ' but rather as a physical mass of
neural dispositions, tensions and processes.' This material is perhaps
to some degree organized, and includes l remnants of habits, experiences,
both those which have lapsed from consciousness and those which have
never penetrated to the central plexus.' Here are also included ' heredi-
tary traits and tendencies which have never chanced to be sufficiently
relevant to the trend of processes which lay back of consciousness to
succeed in contributing to them.' The Place and Value of the Marginal
Region in Psychic Life (pp. 50-59) : JAMES BISSETT PRATT. - The feeling-
mass is held to be the source of sensory and ideational experience. It
is deeper and broader than these and is more closely identified with per-
sonality and character. It is also the source and guide to most of our
practical activity. In a sense it seems to be more universal than all
other forms of experience, for we are unable to set any limits beyond
which it does not extend. In this way we seem to be linked to the whole
of sentient life.
Clemens Baumker and Georg. von Hertling. 1st Duns Scotus Indeter-
minist? Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters :
Texte und Untersuchungen. Bd. 5, Heft 4. Miinster. 1905. 8vo.
Pp. xi + 139. 4.75 M.
Couturat, Louis. UAlgebre de la logique. Scientia, No. 24. Paris:
Gauthier-Villars. 1905. Pp. 100.
Davidson, John. A New Interpretation of Herbart's Psychology
and Educational Theory through the Philosophy of Leibniz. Edin-
burgh and London. 1906. Pp. xviii -f- 191.
Landry, Adolphe. Principes de morale rationelle. Paris : F. Alcan.
1906. Pp. x + 278.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 195
Meinong, A. Ueber die Erfahringsgrundlagen unseres Wissens. Abhand-
lungen zur Didaktik und Philosophic der Naturwissenschaft. Heft 6.
Berlin: Springer. 1906.
Rand, Benjamin. Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, edited by
Mark Baldwin. Vol. III. Parts I. and II. Bibliography of Phi-
losophy, Psychology and Cognate Subjects. New York: The Mac-
millan Co. 1905. Part I. Pp. xxiv + 542. Part II. Pp. vi +
650. $10.
Eignano, E. Sur la transmissibilite des caracteres acquis. Paris : Alcan.
1906. Pp. 320.
Santayana, George. The Life of Reason, Vol. V. Reason in Science.
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. Pp. ix + 320.
Semon, Richard. Die Mneme als erhaltendes Prinzip im Wechsel des
organischen Geschehens. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann. 1905. 6s.
Thompson, J. A. Herbert Spencer. English Men of Science Series.
London: Dent. 1906.
NOTES AND NEWS
PROFESSOR G. V. N. DEARBORN considers that the summary of his paper
read before the American Psychological Association, at Cambridge, De-
cember 27, 1905, which was printed in the sixth number of this Journal
for the current year, is unjust to the opinions actually expressed in the
paper presented. Professor Dearborn objects to being understood as
saying that ' the various properties of muscle protoplasm satisfy the
criteria of correlation better than does the cerebral cortex.' He prefers
to say that the muscles are only one of several sorts of protoplasm com-
posing the organism, and his discussion of the muscles was intended to
give one example of the fitness for correlation of protoplasm generally.
Professor Dearborn objects to the assumption in current text-books that
the seventeen grams of cells in the cortex cerebri correlate all the phe-
nomena known as consciousness.
" L'UNE des decouvertes les plus etonnantes que les physiciens aient
annoncees dans ces dernieres annees, c'est que la matiere n'existe pas."
Thus H. Poincare begins his article entitled t La fin de la matiere ' in the
Athenaeum for February 17. He continues: "The essential attribute of
matter is its mass, its inertia. It is the mass which everywhere and
always remains constant, which persists when a chemical transformation
has altered all the sensible qualities and seems to have made another
body. If, then, one were to prove that the mass, the inertia of matter,
did not really pertain to it ... that this mass, the constant par excellence,
is itself variable, one might well say that matter does not exist. Now
this is precisely what is announced." Professor Poincare examines the
effect which the researches and conclusions of Abraham, Kaufmann and
Lorentz and the doctrine of electrons should have in discrediting matter.
In the light of these inquiries mass appears as a phenomenon due to
electrical activity, and in this case M. Poincare concludes, " il' n'y a pas
de vraie matiere, il n'y a plus qua des trous dans 1'ether."
196
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
THE Royal Academy of Science and Letters, of Denmark, makes the
following announcement of the topic for 1906 proposed by the section
of philosophy for competitive discussion : " During the latter part of
the nineteenth century philosophy has been, to a great extent, con-
cerned with the nature of knowledge, its value and its limits. Dur-
ing this period the term ' theory of knowledge ' became a current
one. In studying this question, philosophers, particularly in Ger-
many and France, have adopted in a greater or less degree principles
laid down by Kant. The aim of their inquiry has been primarily to
find by methods of analysis the fundamental forms and conditions of
knowledge, and it has been assumed for the most part that these forms
and conditions must be determined ultimately by the nature of the hu-
man cognitive faculties. Recently, however, the problem has been treated
from an opposite point of view, namely, that the actual development of
knowledge, its conditions and its processes, must be determined wholly
by necessities which have to be met, and by goals to be reached. This
method known variously as the ' economical/ ' biological/ ' pragmatic/ etc.,
theory has had already a certain success. For the sake of brevity we
will call the two theories in question criticism and pragmatism. Since
it is clear that there must be, on the one hand, a certain relation between
the forms and the conditions in accordance with which the human
faculties of knowledge manifest themselves, and the necessities, on the
other hand, which knowledge is called upon to meet, and the tasks that it
succeeds in performing, the Academy of Science at Copenhagen proposes
the following problem for competitive discussion: To examine, from the
point of view of the theory of knowledge and from the point of view of
psychology, the relation between criticism and pragmatism" The gold
medal of the Academy will be awarded as a first prize, and competing
essays must be ready by October 31, 1907. Further particulars may be
had from the Secretary of the Academy, Professor H. G. Zeuthen, at the
University of Copenhagen.
IN the Yale department of philosophy, R. P. Angier, Ph.D. (Har-
vard), at present assistant in the Berlin laboratory with Professor Nagle,
has been appointed instructor in psychology. Mr. E. H. Cameron, M.A.
(Yale), at present fellow in psychology and philosophy at Yale, has also
been appointed instructor in psychology. Professor G. H. Palmer, of
Harvard, has been appointed lecturer in ethics, and Dr. Henry Rutgers
Marshall lecturer in esthetics and psychology.
PROFESSOR HUGO MUNSTERBERG gave the last of the Harvard lectures
for this year at Yale University, on March 16. His subject was ' Science
and Idealism/
DR. F. KRUGER, decent in philosophy at Leipzig and assistant in the
laboratory of Professor Wundt, has accepted a chair of philosophy in
Buenos Ayres.
PROFESSOR GEORGE H. HOWISON, of the University of California, will
give a course of lectures at Yale University on ' The Human Import of
Philosophy/
VOL. III. No. 8. APRIL 12, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE GROUND OF THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE 1
I. NEEDS AND THE TRANSCENDENT
[~N these days, when it would perhaps not be incorrect to speak of
-*- at least an increase of interest in the epistemological problem,
as indicated by current discussions in England, France and America,
the problem of the cause of this increase is an attractive one to the
social psychologist. Disclaiming any attempt to have studied this
question exhaustively, I venture, however, by way of introduction
to the discussions of this paper, to state the results of some reflection
on the matter. When we find it stated, for example, that 'psychol-
ogy is the key to the question of truth/ that ' truth is a form of
value,' a 'gradual achievement and construction of a common world,'
the thought is suggested that that view which has been of such pre-
dominating influence on practically all other fields of thought,
namely, the Darwinian theory of evolution, has at last, though some-
what tardily, reached the field of philosophy and is the leaven to the
rising loaf. My conviction that 'evolution' is the new standpoint,
quite strikingly different in its logical import, from which knowledge
and experience are now being studied, is strengthened when I find it
stated, also, that 'thought is an instrument of adaptation/ which,
however, 'need not always copy its objects' and in which 'what
works best is truest.' 2 This is indeed the language of the evolu-
tionary theory, and is, as I believe and shall endeavor to demonstrate,
on the whole quite realistic in its implications. Examination of the
1 The present is the first of a series of four papers in which I purpose to
deal with the various aspects of the above problem; this I might also state as
the Epistemology of Scientific Knowledge and Knowing. The present article
is to a certain extent introductory, and, therefore, I trust its incompletenesses
will be pardoned. The subsequent papers will treat of such matters as im-
plication, the meaning of ' in experience,' the transcendence of knowledge, per-
ception and the ' correctness ' of data, and the ' structure ' of scientific knowing.
a Professor William James in the preface to the English translation of
Hoffding's ' Problems of Philosophy.'
197
198
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
many other similar characterizations of the purpose and nature of
knowledge and of other experiences shows them to be, without ex-
ception, I think, only restatements of, if not deductions from, the
same general standpoint. Realism is, however, not always accepted
as being implied in these views.
There is, nevertheless, one charge which can with perfect justice,
I believe, be brought against both the new epistemology and the old,
namely, that so far both have been almost exclusively concerned with
an investigation of our knowledge of pencils, chairs and the usual
classroom paraphernalia, and very little with that kind of knowledge
in the possession of which men actually know and can do most,
namely, scientific knowledge, especially physics. The charge is par-
ticularly deserved in one quarter, since it is especially this kind of
knowledge which also most closely fits the pragmatistic definitions
which I have quoted. Convinced, then, that the knowledge and
knowing of a Mach, a Boltzman, or a Duhem is as worthy of epis-
temological study, both for the above and for other reasons, as that
of the man in the street, I purpose to consider the epistemology of
scientific knowledge and knowing. 3
The point of view from which I shall at present proceed is that
which even the writers on the philosophy of pure experience really
assume in their propagandas and appeals, namely, the common sense
view that there is a plurality of individuals of the 'genus homo'
endowed with something called minds, in that they are capable of
having concrete experiences of various kinds, concerning which each
individual may communicate with other individuals.
Concerning this point of view two statements can be made. First,
if experience be regarded in those figurative ways which seem to be
in such high favor with some of the ' radical empiricists, ' namely, as
a 'living flow,' etc., then on the whole it is in the above-mentioned
stage that the problems concerning experience, its nature, meaning,
etc., first arise. Secondly, it may be said that, even if the answer by
way of the resolution of these problems should, on the one hand,
point to a preceding experience more simple and without such prob-
lems, and, on the other, to a subsequent, more complex one, never-
theless the experience in which the occurrence of the problems takes
place is within certain individual and subjective limits. By that I
mean, as I shall later endeavor to make more clear, that the experi-
ence which forms our real starting-point, and for the resolution of
3 This is undoubtedly a large problem, including as it does such subdivisions
as the purpose, validity and success, content, structure and conditions, and
origin and psychology of knowledge and knowing. Some of the first of these
I shall make the subject-matter of the present series of papers; the others I
hope to treat of subsequently.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 199
whose problems the acceptance in some way of experiences both
before and after is demanded, is always within the limits of the
physiological and empirically conscious 'you' or 'me,' to which the
philosophical writer makes appeal, and which may be called, without
misunderstanding, the subject.
At any rate, whether this view be regarded as tentative and
demanding of much discussion, or even, as a result of this, it appear
questionable, nevertheless it will serve to make our initial use of the
term 'experience' fairly unambiguous, so that if, in the resolution
of certain problems, it be found necessary to modify or extend the
meaning of the term, the relation of this new to the first meaning
will be capable of exact formulation.
Thus, on the one hand, the charge which can be brought against
many current discussions, that use is made of the term experience
without having removed the ambiguities in any way, will be avoided ;
and, on the other, it can not be urged that we are proceeding incor-
rectly by defining a term rigidly at the outset of an investigation
whose very purpose is to find out, if possible, those characteristics
by means of which the term should be defined. For while we may
admit that our primary definition, although in keeping with common
sense, is, nevertheless, tentative, it gives us the advantage of some-
thing definite with which to start, and from which the more detailed
nature of the cognitive experience, important both of itself and for
its relations to other experiences, may be made gradually to crystal-
lize out.
Accordingly, I think that there will be little opportunity
for misunderstanding or ambiguity if I begin with the statement,
that among the many experiences which conscious individuals may
have there is one important class, that of needs. As to this last
term, however, I do not know that it has been sufficiently defined,
although the origin of needs may have been discussed somewhat as,
possibly, one of conflict, etc. 4 But the connotation of the term
makes its consanguinity with evolutionary theory evident. In gen-
eral, it may be said that 'need' in the sense in which I shall use it
means a felt, conscious demand; a demand, too, for that which is
other than the need itself and which shall satisfy it. This last is in
accordance with the general principle which may be laid down here
that the need of satisfaction is not the satisfaction of the need.
Now it is undoubtedly a difficult matter to get at the psychology of
needs, at least to make statements concerning them which shall hold
good of all. Yet I shall venture the presentation of some of their
important characteristics.
%
4 Cf. Dewey, ' Studies in Logical Theory/
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In general, it may be said that the presence of the need is char-
acterized or accompanied by a 'feeling' or experience of 'conflict/
of discordance, or of discrepancy. Keeping to our view of experi-
ence as subjective, the 'conflict' is not one of need with need in
every case, but may be between experiences of another kind, or of an
individual with his environment. The range is perhaps almost un-
limited. But either accompanying or immediately subsequent to
the 'conflict experience/ which may perhaps be taken as typical,
there is the felt-need of a readjustment. If the readjustment is
effected, either this is to be regarded as a new experience or the
original experience has persisted in the 'living flow' and, as modified,
has changed.
As concerning this, two important principles are to be noticed.
First, that that to which, or according to which, the readjustment is
to be made or is to take place may vary as the demand for readjust-
ment varies. Secondly, that the need for readjustment dictates
nothing immediately and directly as to the way in which the read-
justment shall or may be effected.
Now, without attempting to get at the meaning of 'need' further
than that which the above discussion presents, in virtue of the first
of the above principles I shall venture to offer a classification of
needs which will suggest at the same time differences in that to
which the readjustment relates. The scheme which I present may be
faulty in many ways, incomplete, and the classes may be not mutually
exclusive; but I do not offer it as to any great extent final; few
classifications have that honor. But it would seem to be of ad-
vantage to, if not even necessary for, our subsequent discussions,
especially if, in treating of the problems which have been enumer-
ated, at least one kind of knowledge is to be regarded as 'an instru-
ment of adaptation,' to indicate important differences between the
need of which this may be the means of satisfaction and other needs.
The most important classes of needs may be arranged as follows :
(1) Sensuous-physiological, (a) native, (&) acquired; (2) emotional,
(a) religious, (&) ethical; (3) esthetic; (4) intellectual, (a) log-
ical, (6) alogical. The alogical, possibly also the logical, I would
divide into (a) theoretical, (&) practical. Of the first three main
divisions of this classification I shall not make much use; they are
presented chiefly for the sake of completeness. But important and
worthy of special attention are the intellectual needs and the means
of their satisfaction.
Now it may be that all needs are those of readjustment and of
means to this ; and if so, and if the readjustment be looked upon as
furthering and conserving life and so the very possibility of subse-
quent and additional experience, then all may be looked upon as
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 201
biological in the broad sense of the term, and their close relationship
to evolutionary theory becomes evident. Yet such a view carries
with it the subordination of certain needs as means to others as ends
and, finally, of all as means to one as an ultimate end, which may
well be, indeed, just this furthering and conserving of life. But if
this view is taken, then there is certainly one class, the alogical needs,
whether, if many, they be coordinate or some subordinate, which,
together with the means for their satisfaction, are of all the most
appropriately designated as biological. It is just these which are
implied by the view that 'thought is an instrument of adaptation '
and that ' what works best is truest. '
That this is so will be made clearer, perhaps, by an explanation
and a contrast of ' alogical ' with ' logical. ' By * logical need ' there is
meant the generic felt-demand for formal consistency, so that when
in the concrete case a conflict or discordance is experienced there is
also the need experienced of readjusting the first experience so that
it or the new experience will conform with this ideal of consistency.
The concept of readjustment here evidently is meaningless unless it
involves both conflict and removal of this; and both these can be
stated in this case only in terms of an ideal consistency. The latter
is presupposed in some way, as in some respect 'other' than the con-
crete experience which should conform to it ; and although the ques-
tions of its nature and origin may be most important and admittedly
difficult of answer, yet for the purpose of this paper it is not neces-
sary to consider them.
By the 'alogical need' I may say that, first, and especially if all
other needs are subordinate as means to the furtherance, and preserva-
tion of life as end, that this last might be regarded as a felt alogical
need, namely, the need to live. But whether this be called end or
need the terminology is indifferent it may well be also that the
ideal of logical consistency itself has originated by abstraction and
generalization from that which has proved to be a successful means
to such an ultimate end ; and that even now in special cases the logical
need is to be subordinated to this.
However, even if we admit all this, there yet appears side by side
and coordinate with the logical need an alogical in the narrower
sense of the term, as indicated in our classification. This alogical
need arises, or is experienced primarily, in the conflict or discrepancy
between an individual and his environment. The latter may press
and threaten, and accordingly there is the need, even the necessity,
of readjustment, by way of acting, of doing something, hit or miss.
Hence formal consistency is not here the ideal, but, whether this be
observed as a means as far as it will go, or whether it be limited or
given up, success is what is wanted, needed in the process and means
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and result of readjustment; in fact the latter is meaningless here
without that realization. The generic felt-need here is for success,
and in the specific case the readjustment must conform to this ideal.
But, in turn, it can be said that for success there must be also another
* conforming' which shall constitute its very nature and conditions
and origin, and the characteristics of that which in the specific case
is the successful readjustment.
Accordingly, the justification of calling the needs here involved
alogical comes, first, from the ideal, success as opposed to formal
consistency ; secondly, from the difference in the means to this adjust-
ment ; formal consistency shows itself to be impotent after a certain
point to satisfy the need ; after that action is necessary, but can pro-
ceed only on a non-rational basis, by trial and the finding out of that
which works best ; thirdly, and accounting perhaps for the first two,
at least in part, from the nature of that to which the cognitive ex-
perience as readjusted in some way conforms, in which i conforming '
success consists or on which it is dependent.
It is to these needs, then, that, chiefly for the sake of raising cer-
tain questions in as pointed a manner as possible, I shall refer here-
after as biological or alogical. They appear most sharply outlined
when, granting the preservation and furtherance of life to be the
ultimate end, there is the need for a means which will bring about
or constitute the readjustment ; for a means, therefore, through whose
reliability, purely logical methods having failed or being known to
be fallible, success in meeting the demand can be counted upon.
Now, undoubtedly, that kind of knowledge which is most capable
of filling this role of a reliable means, etc., is scientific knowledge, in
the usual specific sense of the term. Science can do this, because,
side by side with or through the medium of that which may be called
1 theoretical ' science, yet in which the alogical element is also present,
it gives us a foreknowledge of things and events. This is especially
true of the physical sciences, and so, for the purpose of making my
points as clear and in as simple a form as possible and yet illustra-
tively, I shall consider the foreknowledge made possible by the phys-
ical sciences.
It is of importance to note that as concerning this capability sci-
ence appears in marked contrast with philosophy and other knowl-
edges. The former can and does 'make a difference' when appeal is
made to it, for example, in the case of life and death. For that
reason, and in that respect, it is important, and philosophy is not.
And if it is all a matter of need, and although success in satisfying
one need may be as high a good as the satisfying of another for
men have preferred death to subversion of their convictions never-
theless upon success in meeting the demands of a threatening environ-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 203
merit may depend even the having of the other needs, to be satisfied,
if possible. Either succeed or succumb is a very real and unmis-
takable dilemma. But before I enter upon the discussion of this,
the main question of my paper, I would refer briefly to the structure
of that science which has been chosen as an example, namely, physics.
It may be said that in this use is made almost exclusively of
'symbolic methods.' The symbols stand for, in part at least, the
qualities of things. Through the use of instruments of measurement
they get a definite numerical value, giving both 'intensities' and
' extensities, ' and it is made possible to discover empirical and causal
laws, expressible in the form of algebraic equations. For these,
oftentimes at least, a choice between different principles of inter-
pretation is presented. Similarities and analogies among these laws
lead up by repeated steps to abstract and general laws and prin-
ciples, e. g., those of thermodynamics. The latter form, too, the
domain of theory, which is a kind of classification of empirical (in
the broad sense) laws, and of hypotheses. From the theorems and
propositions in this domain, the laws must be deducible according to
the rules of the calculus and of logic, and be capable of exact con-
firmation again by the use of instruments. 5
Although this account is brief, it serves to illustrate and make
clear that which is one of the important purposes of science as a
means or method of readjustment. It is to discover and describe
connections between qualities or changes of the same or of different
things in such a way and by such methods that, starting, say, with
the perception of one, it will be possible to go in inference to one as-
yet-unperceived, but under certain conditions to-be-perceived. This
constitutes prediction, 'knowledge' of the future. Only if a reliable
means for meeting this first need of a foreknowledge, which shall
constitute an 'instrument of adaptation,' is discovered, can the more
important need of establishing conditions favorable, or of inhibiting
those unfavorable, to life be met.
If the inference-prediction, as it may be called in order to indicate
both its nature and the way in which the general alogical purpose of
scientific knowledge is attained best, is to be the means of or is to
constitute the readjustment, then the question as to what constitutes
the conditions and the procedure of successful prediction is of the
utmost importance. For even upon the conviction that success is
possible or not, as well as upon knowledge or ignorance of its condi-
tions, there may depend alternative practical outcomes. In answer-
ing this, at the same time that it is to be recognized that the 'need
5 Cf. Duhem's * La The'orie physique ; son objet et sa structure,' Paris, 1906,
and ' L'e volution de me'canique,' Paris, 1903. Also the writings of Mach, Poin-
care" and Helm.
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of readjustment' is in no case the satisfaction of that need, it can be
said also that the need itself dictates nothing directly and imme-
diately as to the way in which the readjustment is to be effected.
Success alone is the goal.
First, then, let us ask: Can the mere system of inferences, taken
on the one hand as a plan or a means of foresight, and on the other
as a logical and psychological (natural) event, be of itself the suffi-
cient condition of the ensurement of success?
To this the reply may be made, by some at least, that it may be
this provided that 'correct data' have formed the starting-point of
our inductions and that the deductions are formally correct. Even
admitting this in a general way, the status of our question is only
slightly altered to that of what constitutes the correctness of data.
This I shall discuss in detail in a later paper of this series. But
aside from this reply, and perhaps, as it will turn out, the one lead-
ing into the other, it may also be answered that, granting the formal
correctness of the inference and the correctness of the data, the
ground for its validity in the sense of 'successful working' is external
to the inference itself as a 'logical and psychological event.' If this
were not the case, then were all formally correct inferences success-
ful. This necessity of an external ground is indeed admitted, as I
shall endeavor to establish, in the very demand for 'correct data,'
whether this term, on the one hand, be used in a limited sense or, on
the other, the 'correctness' be a characteristic dependent upon or de-
rived from, and so a part of, a system.
In these problems I believe that we are biting very near to the
kernel of the epistemological nut, which I shall now take my turn in
attempting to crack.
Let us start with the consideration of the actual procedure of
making the inference, and assume that this is a case of predicting on
the basis of a present perception that at a definite future time a per-
ception will either take place or be possible. The inference here is,
then, a sort of 'mental transition' in time.
Psychologically the making of the inference consists of a succes-
sion of symbolically formulated propositions, accompanied, let us
grant, by a rational feeling of their formal correctness. The sym-
bols are either perceived or, in the case of silent thinking, presented
as symbol concepts, and they have a meaning. Yet there is evidence
to show that this meaning is given or is presented very inadequately
in the form of images (Auschauungen) . But if not in images, the
meaning is either in the 'fringe' or not in consciousness at all. Yet
the propositions are understood ! To this I shall recur.
It may also be of great importance that by virtue both of being
able to use and of making actual use of such symbolic methods, rela-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 205
tions are known which are never gotten in perception or anything
patterned after it, and known, furthermore, with a certainty and
exactness obtainable in no other way than by these methods. But, be
this as it may, it will be granted for our present purposes that the
inference consists of a series of propositions each of which follows of
necessity, by virtue of the principles of logical implication and the
rules of the calculus, from the preceding. That is, it is to be granted
that the inference process is absolutely formally correct, so that by
its every possible repetition the same conclusion is reached. It pre-
sents, then, a concrete case of logical necessity, uniformity and regu-
larity.
Assuming now that the whole inference process has conformed to
these requirements, what, we may ask, is our actual attitude psy-
chologically toward the 'coming true' of that which is thereby pre-
dicted? Suppose it to be one of 'fair' certainty because it is felt
that, side by side with formal correctness, the data also from which
the premises have been derived have been correct. Then is not this
certainty based on the further conviction that the correctness of the
data carries with it or consists in their connection according to uni-
versal laws with that which is to occur in the future? Or that, if
correctness of data means something else, namely, an unequivocal
and determinate relation between the act of perception and the object
perceived, is not our certainty based on the conviction that there is
also a regularly and uniformly acting something which, as either im-
plied by the uniformity or as supplementing this, will also persist,
and bring about the predicted occurrence and so the possibility of
its perception, and for which the inference process in some way
stands? Is not our attitude also this, and do we not act upon it as
a conviction, that, having set up certain conditions, perceived there-
with, it makes no difference with the 'coming true' of the prediction
what the order of intervening perceptive acts may be; that be this
order what it may, the predicted events, say, will take place and be
perceived, provided certain subjective conditions of perception are
present? Is it not part of that attitude too that the prediction as
a psychological event may cease to exist, may in fact be forgotten,
without this interfering with its coming true?
With the acceptance of the implied affirmative answer to these
questions, it may also be admitted that this is perhaps a devious way
of putting very trite matters. But I wish to indicate therewith, as
pointedly as possible, first, that the practical attitude, one acted
upon and in general justified by experience, is that the ground of
the success of inference is external to this both as formally correct
and as a psychological or, if one prefer, as a natural event. And
secondly, that this ground is to be found (how, we shall see later) in
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an order and uniformity, permanent and persistent, and ' other than '
and yet in some way 'corresponding to' the logical and psychological
order of the inference itself. What the manner of this correspond-
ence is, is, of course, one of the fundamental problems of knowledge.
I will take it for granted, then, that the practical attitude is that
such an order, universal, without exceptions, in some sense persist-
ing, is demanded. What is the source of this demand, or in what
conflict of discordance does it arise as something needed? The an-
swer to this can, I believe, be stated in a twofold way.
In the circumstances of a 'readjustment' by way of prediction
and foreknowledge, the desideratum is, evidently, success. Now in
the first place, it is clear that, for example, with a certain event pre-
dicted, if this should not occur and so make possible its perception,
assuming the subjective conditions for this to be present, there would
be conflict or discordance. For the removal or avoidance of this
there must be, accordingly, something persisting, for one thing, and,
for another, acting with a regularity and uniformity to bring about
the event and, with the cooperation of subjective conditions, its per-
ception. Such a persisting regularity and uniformity does not mean
necessarily that, for example, the same causes are to be present and
are to bring about the same effects. It may mean this, but also that
there is an accumulative action analogous to that of a series. In this
way the regularity and uniformity can be made entirely compatible
with individuality. And, in the second place, whatever may be the
origin of our * universal laws, ' it will be admitted that they as judg-
ments in some way express, or point to in the manner of transcend-
ing themselves, as I shall show later, an order and regularity and
unequivocalness of causation. Accordingly, with an event predicted
as a special case of or as derived from such a universal law, if for
any reason, particularly a subjective one, the perception does not
take place, then seemingly there would be a conflict by way of an
exception, a case negative to universality, unless this last could be
saved in some way. If, accordingly, it is only by such universal
judgments that inference and alogical knowledge in general are pos-
sible, then an order and regularity with no exceptions is demanded
to resolve such a possible conflict as the above, to 'correspond to'
the universality expressed in the judgment, and to 'fill out 9 those
negative cases constituted by the absence of the act of perception.
With such possible 'conflicts' and the means demanded for their
resolution in mind, and admitting that the order, etc., implies per-
sistence or permanence, as in a 'series,' let us ask where it can be
found.
Evidently it is not legitimate to look to the inference itself
in its psychological or logical aspects for the order which is de-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 207
manded. But may not this be in the series of conscious events?
Now undoubtedly there is some order to be found here. But in the
first place, as we have seen, the practical attitude is that the order
of the conscious events intervening between the time of the inference
and that of the predicted event is indifferent. Conversely, and as a
justification of this attitude, it will have been experienced that the
event takes place after a preceding lack of such order. Is it not pos-
sible, then, to find the required order somewhere or in some way
within the entire series of conscious events? To this it must be
replied that there the order is always a limited one. And limitation,
even to the extent of one exception, amounts to an absence of that
uniformity which is demanded under the circumstances.
The required order is not to be found either in the inference itself
or in the series of conscious events. May it not, then, be 'in' the
concept of order or 'in' the universal judgment as a causal law,
admitting the concept to have originated as above suggested? To
this it must be said, anticipating our future discussions somewhat,
that the required order is not ' in ' the concept or the judgment in the
sense of ' contained in, ' but that it is in some sense * beyond. ' It can
be 'in' the concept or the judgment, only in a manner quite com-
patible with its being ' beyond ' at the same time. In this simultane-
ous relation of 'in' and 'beyond' the concept and judgment can be
shown to transcend themselves. What the nature of this transcend-
ence is, forms one of the important questions of my paper, to be
discussed fully later. Since now the order is not one of conscious
events taken either as an entire or as a partial series, and yet an order
somewhere is absolutely necessary for the success of the inference,
we must go elsewhere for it. It can be found only in that which, if
conscious events be called immanent, may be termed the transcend-
ent, namely, that which is 'other' than any and every concrete con-
scious event in you or me or any one else. The appropriateness of
this term appears in its correlation with that characteristic which I
shall endeavor to show holds good of all cognition, namely, its 'tran-
scending itself,' its 'pointing' to an 'other.' Thus it will result that
it is the transcendent order 'beyond,' to which the causal law and
the concept of causal uniformity and regularity refer in transcend-
ing themselves, at the same time that they express it, and that it is in
some manner 'in' them. Accordingly, as standing in this relation,
it must be admitted that the 'transcendent' is known. The further
details of this, constituting as they do the 'structure' of the 'know-
ing experience,' I shall endeavor to develop. The problem may be
stated: How is it possible (or in what manner is it) that that which
is transcendent to consciousness and is order, regularity, etc., should
be known 'in' consciousness, whose events are characterized by a
208 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
lack of uniformity, etc.? But that it is known I hope further to
prove.
Accordingly, too, I hope to anticipate the possible criticisms of
the use of the term transcendent which might be made because of its
historical implications, etc. From the above it is evident that by
it I do not mean ' thing-in-itself . ' Furthermore, its use is justified
not only through its correlation with the reference of the cognitive
experience beyond itself, but also because of its convenience as a
term which shall include in its meaning the characteristics of order,
regularity, unique and unequivocal causation, permanence, unaltera-
bility and independence. All these, I shall endeavor to prove, are
both known of it, and demanded as conditions for the success of
alogical knowledge. And because of them the transcendent will
appear to be also the source of knowledge and of needs. But the
order as a 'demanded' order is not one experienced in all its ele-
ments. It is experienced completely only in the sense that it is
demanded as complete. Perception, it might be said, granted that
it transcends itself and points to an object of perception, gives us
only a limited order from which we abstract the concept. But the
concept in its reference points to an unlimited and universal order,
which, filling in the 'negative cases,' is 'there' whether the percep-
tion is or is not.
In general we may conclude, then, that the need for a reliable
means for the resolution of either one of the two typical conflicts
which have been presented can be met only by a 'transcendent'
which is itself order and regularity, causal agent, persistent and
permanent. Such a transcendent may be said to be the fundamental
condition for the success, and therefore truth, of all alogical infer-
ence and thought. It is the ultimate cooperating means by which
all alogical readjustment is to be effected, the fundamental postulate
or implied presupposition of all physical science.
Further considerations of the nature of the demand for the tran-
scendent and of its relation to experience will form the subject-matter
of the next paper of this series.
EDWARD G. SPAULDING.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.
DISCUSSION
PROFESSOR CALKINS 'S MEDIATION
TO the uninitiate hearer, Professor Calkins 's President's Address
may well have seemed to be a 'reconciliation' not unlike that
of the wolf and the lamb when they lay down together, the lamb in-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 209
side. For while she appeared to maintain that functional psychol-
ogy has a field that structural psychology can not occupy, there
was no corresponding defense of a peculiar domain for structural
psychology. Whether or not such an interpretation is ultimately
correct, the proposed treaty of peace contains articles that could
hardly be satisfactory to either party.
For example, the functional psychologist ought surely to deny
as emphatically, at least, as the structural psychologist that there
are functional differences to which no structural differences cor-
respond. Even though it be proved, as the argument of the address
implies, that in a case of visual hallucination the visual imagery is in-
distinguishable from that of a case of normal imagination, we shall
still not be driven to conclude that the self has intervened by royal
prerogative; it is quite open to suppose that there are concomitant
structural features, due to various bodily organs, that condition the
abnormal functioning. This hypothesis could hardly be disproved
by introspection, though Professor Calkins 's uniform reluctance to
admit the presence and importance of features of consciousness too
vague to be discriminated as definitely this or that sensation would
doubtless lead her to reject it. There would still remain, however,
other hypotheses more in accord with her own system, for the whole
field of non-visual structure lies open. In any case the presumption
in favor of some sort of structural modification seems irresistible.
Again, some structural psychologists will maintain as strenuously
as any functional psychologist (though for partly different reasons)
that to cut off structure so completely from process is to abolish even
its structural character. They would hold this, to be the fallacy at
the root of her treatment of the 'attributes' of sensation as 'ele-
ments,' and would say that such an analysis misses the structure of
consciousness as such, as if bricks and mortar rather than floors
and walls and roof were called structural elements of a house.
Even more important, however, is the question whether she does
not read the abstraction of structure from function so strictly as to
undermine all scientific psychology whatsoever. In the first place,
if the divorce is made complete, all tests are at once ruled out. When
one observer says that blue differs from red more than from yellow
and another says that blue and yellow differ from each other more
than either from red, both statements are doubtless authentic auto-
biography, but neither is by itself science. If I try to choose between
them, ignoring all functional relations, I simply add a third autobiog-
raphy. Unless I can find out what is the function operating in each
case, there is no further progress except by counting heads and say-
ing, 'Blue differs from yellow more than from red to most people/
In regard to the more important differences the case is not a whit
210
otherwise ; we must say, 'As far as psychologists have reported, blue
is more like green than like sour, and is therefore probably a color. '
Indeed, the whole ground for a distinction between the important
and the unimportant has disappeared. Red is in one way more like
warm than like blue, and there is left no means of knowing with
which to classify it. Classification is, of course, always teleological,
and the end that determines sound scientific classification is ulti-
mately explanation, else the Linnean system of botanical orders
would be on a par with the natural system, indeed, 'natural' would
be a misnomer. Now Professor Calkins, at least, would hold that
'explanation' and ' function' refer to a backward and a forward
reading of the same relations. Or one may say that a classification
is of worth just in so far as it is based on 'significant' features, and
significance is a matter of function.
But the thoroughgoing functional psychologist maintains, I sup-
pose, not only that function directs our selection as we classify, nor
even merely that it has created the likenesses and differences that we
select (as we imply when we say that the present characters of con-
sciousness have arisen through experience), but also that it consti-
tutes those likenesses and differences. If we say, e. g., that red is like
warm in one way and like blue in another way, 'way' seems to throw
us back upon function, whatever view we take of likeness. Hence
the proposed reconciliation, though it might appear to the casual
reader to offer terms favorable to the functional psychologist, really
asks him to abandon his central position. For if the reply were
made that, even though every phase of consciousness were thus consti-
tuted by function, in the study of structure we abstract from that
constitution, he would still insist that if there is any sense in which
we can perform the remarkable feat of ignoring constitution in or-
der to study structure, that sense must at best throw us back into the
region where our statements, even if taken as mere autobiography,
become either invalid or meaningless. He will defy us to perform
.any introspective abstraction that will so cut off red from its func-
tional relations as to assure us that if we got it through our tongues
it would still seem like blue. He will further maintain, if I under-
stand his meaning, that the quality red is itself functional, and that
tto this fact the universality that makes it namable bears witness.
There is nothing to show that Professor Calkins expected her ex-
position to be accepted by the two classes of psychologists. The con-
tention that she does make, viz., that her view of the self as the
primary psychological fact furnishes all that either structural or
functional psychology needs, seems amply justified. In fact, so long
as we keep clear of the metaphysical implications which she her-
self excludes from the province of psychology, this doctrine of the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 211
self, if read sympathetically and not polemically, may be taken as
only another way of putting the view of, e. g., either Professor
Titchener or Professor Angell. Thus in its central point the address
is really mediatory. But it would appear doubtful whether this
mediation could be accepted in the form in which she proposes it ; for
many psychologists on both sides would agree, in part for coincident
reasons, in rejecting her view of the relation of structure to function
and of the nature and range of each.
MARY S. CASE,
WELLESLEY COLLEGE.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Life of Reason or The Phases of Human Progress. GEORGE
SANTAYANA. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. Vol. L,
Reason in Common Sense, pp. ix -j- 291. Vol. II., Reason in Society,
pp. ix ~f- 205. Vol. III., Reason in Religion, pp. ix -f- 279. Vol. IV.,
Reason in Art, pp. ix -f- 230.
In the addresses delivered last year at the many memorial celebra-
tions of the late Herbert Spencer's life and work, there was one very
common theme: it was the anachronism of such an encyclopedic pro-
gram as Spencer attempted an anachronism which even the Hegelians
of Spencer's day discovered in the similar ambition of their master, and
one, it was said, which Spencer would have avoided had he possessed a
larger historical knowledge and appreciation. And it was freely pre-
dicted that Spencer's attempt would be the last of the kind to be seen for
many generations.
In the face of the extended currency of such comment among philos-
ophers, to say nothing of the cynical attitude of scientists, it must be
as significant as it is interesting that one who can not be suspected of
any lack of large historical orientation one, indeed, whose method is
historical deliberately, l with malice aforethought,' sends through the
press within a year a volume of what may be called first principles, a
philosophy of society, a philosophy of religion, a philosophy of art and
a philosophy of science.
To be sure, we are in the midst of a great revival of metaphysical
interest. But the products of this revival thus far, as presented in the
works of Mr. Bradley, Professor Royce, Professor Fullerton and Professor
Taylor, have been in the main of the systematic formal type inevitable in
abstract metaphysics. Professor Santayana's work, however, is of a dif-
ferent character. He is interested in tracing the effect of the method
upon the content. He is concerned in showing the connection between the
general conceptions of reality, truth and goodness and their conditions
and effects in society, religion, art and science. In his own sentences,
" The problem is to unite a trustworthy conception of the conditions
under which man lives with an adequate conception of his interest " ;
again, " Starting with the immediate flux in which all objects and im-
212 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
pulses are given, to describe the life of reason; that is, to note what
facts and. purposes seem to be primary, to show how the conception of
nature and life gathers around them, and to point to the ideals of thought
and action which are approached by the gradual mastering of experience
by reason" (I., p. 32).
And Professor Santayana is fully aware of the proportions of his
task. He hastens to nip in the bud any suspicion of quixotism
by saying that such a program ' would be beyond the powers of a
writer in this age, either to execute or conceive, had not the Greeks
drawn for us the outlines of an ideal culture at a time when life was
simpler than at present and individual intelligence more resolute and
free.'
In general, of course, Professor Santayana's courageous attempt, as
all others, must be justified by its fruits. But I can imagine it quite
possible for him to say that such an attempt is not only justified but
necessitated in advance by his very conception of the place of reason
in experience. An inkling of this appears in the subtitle itself, the
whole caption being ' The Life of Reason, or the Phases of Human
Progress.' The implication is that the character and function of
thought is to be discovered not by isolating it and attempting an
analysis of it as ' pure ' reason, but by observing reason at work in the
world, catching it in the act, taking it in its context in the whole con-
crete stream of experience. The attempt to discover the nature of
reason apart from its products leads to a monstrous misconception of it
and the proposal to substitute this changeling for normal reason, for
reason as it is in operation, is called i visionary insolence.' " Retro-
spective self-consciousness is dearly bought if it inhibits the intellect
and embarrasses the inferences which in its spontaneous operation it
has known perfectly how to make" (I., p. 29). If, then, the nature of
reason is to be discovered only by observing it at work in science, in
religion, in art and in social organization, is it, after all, presumptuous
to propose to describe the processes, the phenomena and the results in
which the nature of reason, even for one proposing to give the most
abstract account of it, must be revealed?
What, then, is the life of reason, or, conversely, what is the role of
reason in life? The reviewer has to confess that in the end the answer
does not appear so univocal as the introduction promises. The problem
centers in the relation of reflection to impulse. In other words, in the
sort of t efficacy ' ideals have. In the introduction ideals, ends, con-
structed in reflection, are apparently regarded as actually organizing the
material of habit and instinct. Here reason is defined as ' efficacious
reflection.' And the ' efficacy ' here consists not merely in an ( added
content' which it brings, but in the added function of control. Hence
we read, " To the ideal function of envisaging the absent, memory and
reflection will add . . . the practical function of modifying the future.
Vital impulse, however, when it is modified by reflection and veers in
sympathy with judgments pronounced on the past, is properly called
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 213
reason" (I., p. 2). "The life of reason will, then, be a name for that
part of experience which perceives and pursues ideals, all conduct so con-
trolled, and all sense so interpreted as to perfect natural happiness " (p.
3). Again, " In the life of reason, as it were brought to perfection,
intelligence would be the universal method of practise and its con-
tinual reward. All reflection would then be applicable in action and
all actions fruitful in happiness" (p. 5, italics mine). Here we are
very properly warned that this controlling, instrumental character of
thought does not make it a mere means. It does not prevent its having
an immediate value of its own. But though reason may in this sense be
* its own excuse for being/ yet in order to be, it must do; and its ' doing '
is just the work of converting isolated impulses and instincts into a
mutually stimulating and checking, i. e., controlled, system.
But when we reach the chapter on f How Thought is Practical,' one
is puzzled to find thought losing this character of control and becoming
a mere ' expression,' ' effect,' ( register,' f celebration ' of t mechanical,'
' material ' activity, into which now all dynamic efficacy is transferred.
We now read, " Thought is nature's concomitant expression or entelechy,
never oiie of her instruments" (I., p. 223). " Consciousness itself is not
dynamic. ... It is merely an abstract name for the actuality of its
random objects. All force, implication or direction inhere in the con-
stitution of specific objects" (I., p. 220). "Preferences are in them-
selves, if the dynamic order alone be considered, works of supereroga-
tion, expressing force but not producing it, like a statue of Hercules "
(p. 221). Yet near the close of this puzzling chapter we read that the
function of thought is ' to lend utility to its causes ' (p. 233), which here
are material. " It is potential energy producing life and becoming an
actual appearance." Again, in Chapter XI., on ' Conditions of the Ideal,'
" Reason and the ideal are not active forces, nor embodiment of passion
at all" (p. 265). Yet on the same page, " This suggested peace (for the
conflict of impulses) ... is the ideal which borrows its practical force
from the irrational impulses which it embodies" (italics mine).
It may be said that the mere appearance of a ' sense of value ' in a
process l bestows utility,' simply by giving the process a limit, a terminus
ad quem. But even so this involves some sort of reaction of this ' sense
of value' upon the mechanism, otherwise why should the process not
simply go on grinding out ( senses of value,' without using them as limits ?
It is Aristotle's problem of the unmoved mover.
This discrepancy, as it appears to the reviewer, can be charged to an
oversight of the distinction between consciousness in general and re-
flective, cognitive consciousness. ( Consciousness/ l thought/ ' mind/
' reason/ are freely interchanged throughout the chapter. Recognizing
that the ' sense of value ' belongs to consciousness-mind, it is apparently
inferred that this is all that belongs to it and that all dynamic efficacy
must therefore be referred to material nature, of which thought is the
mere ' symbol/ and which even ( can hardly lie in the same plane of reality
with the thought to which it appears' (p. 219). Value is obviously a
214 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
category of conscious activity, and as immediate ' content ' is perhaps not
dynamic. But is it not just the business of reflection to convert this
c sense of value ' into an ideal, an end ? And as an ideal it surely must
be regarded as dynamic in the sense of being an essential factor in a sys-
tem conceived as i dynamic.'
In its more general form this question which divides the first and the
last four chapters of Volume I. is, How can the ideal be both an ' expres-
sion ' and a reconstruction of instinct and habit ? How can it arise out of
and yet be the standard for impulse? In logic it would be the old prob-
lem of universals. Now one of Professor Santayana's theses, indeed,
one might say, the fundamental one, is that the ideal, whether in gov-
ernment, religion, ethics or art, must grow out of, must be an ' expression '
of, impulse. The clearness and force of his exposition of the vanity of
an absolute ideal given to the impulses from without could not be sur-
passed. " Demands could not be misdirected, goods could not be false, if
the standard by which they are to be corrected were not constructed out
of them" (p. 258). Again, "Whence fetch this seminal force and cre-
ative ideal ? It must evidently lie already in the matter it is to organize.
Otherwise it would have no affinity to that matter, no power over it, and
no ideality or value in respect to the existences whose standard and goal
it is to be" (III., p. 83). The ideal, then, must be an expression of
the matter, in order that it may have enough ' affinity ' with it to organize
it; this despite what is said above about thought not lying in the same
plane with its material.
Corresponding to these two conceptions of the ideal, the one as an
' expression,' the other as control, there are two conceptions of the
1 matter ' to be organized. Where the controlling, organizing char-
acter of the ideal is emphasized, as in the introduction and in Volume
III., impulse, instinct, immediate flux, etc., constitute the ( matter.'
But where the ideal is expounded as an ' expression' of impulse,
the matter appears as ' physical,' as l body,' in opposition to con-
sciousness and as the latter's ' cause,' and this, too, apparently in quite
an ontological Cartesian sense. Indeed, the whole treatment of the dis-
tinction of mind and body is to the reviewer as equivocal as that of
reflection. Sometimes the distinction appears to be a rational construc-
tion within a process of experience which can not be described as either
or merely both (e. g., I., pp. 39, 234). But again, and perhaps oftener,
( matter ' appears as an existential prius, as * the antecedent of human
life ' (II., p. 200) to which somehow ' mind accrues.'
The present writer is well aware of the enormous capacity of reviewers'
quotations for misrepresentation. He is also aware that there are many
passages which could be cited to show that what has been described as
different and discrepant conceptions of reason and its place in experience,
are simply two supplementary phases of one conception, namely, that
reason is both an ' expression ' and a control, and must be the one in
order to be the other. However, the reviewer can only record his impres-
sion of ambiguity in the account as it stands.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 216
To many such captious, logic-chopping criticism as this may appear
mal apropos in a review of a work whose style makes the reader feel much
of the time as if he were following a brilliant impressionistic commentary
on i phases of human progress/ rather than a systematic treatise. But
Volume I. is obviously intended as an exposition of general principles,
and must, therefore, be held to the canons of systematic criticism.
Passing to the treatment of reason in society, religion and art, we find
that the indigenous relation of the ideal to impulse so forcibly, if not alto-
gether consistently, expounded in the first volume, is the nerve of the
doctrine of these volumes. The history of these aspects of human prog-
ress is the story of the reciprocal creation and maintenance of impulse
and reflection which constitute the process of human life. Accounts of
its defeats are invariably descriptions of the failure to maintain an
organic relation of these factors, of attempts to appropriate a ready-made
ideal in either an absolute or an anachronous historical form.
Thus the ideal side of love does not merely ' add ' a larger and more
permanent value to the instinctive side, but it constitutes the salvation of
the instincts. It is the method whereby any instinctive expression of
love can be ' converted ' in order to be saved under the new conditions
which its own previous activity has created. Instinctive love, therefore,
must be reformed in order to survive. This does not mean that it be-
comes less instinctive. It means only that the instinct shall emerge
enriched in quality and extent of its content. When the need of con-
version, of idealization is unrecognized, or unheeded, or when the conver-
sion is attempted through extrinsic ideals of another race or clime, or
when it becomes virtual annihilation, then all sorts of ' perversions ' occur.
Obviously one of the results of immediate, instinctive love, which
calls for expansive reconstruction, is the presence of offspring. The
family is the ideal construction through which the reproductive impulse
is expanded into interest in the protection and development of life. But
just because it is thus necessarily one of the earliest organizations of
impulse, ' it becomes a point of departure for many other institutions/
And ' it often assumes offices which might have been allotted to some other
agency had not the family preempted them/ The annexing of these
' adventitious, parasitic functions ' to the family so overloaded it that it
did none of them well. With more stable occupation of land, the reverse
process of unloading these functions on new institutions begins.
Here we face again the perennial problem of balance. On the one
hand, the refusal to surrender old prerogatives in the face of a new world,
or the attempt to conduct the new family by the rules of the old, leads
inevitably to dualism and disintegration. This is a problem for experi-
ence to solve. It can not be solved in a Utopia. The statesman in his
sphere and the individual in his must find as they go the best practical
solution. On the other hand, this unloading upon other institutions, as
the school, church, the factory, etc., may go on until the family may be
emptied of almost everything but the reproductive function, bringing
up again the problem of maintaining the control and value of the latter.
This, perhaps, may be effected by the reaction of these emigrated func-
216
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tions l in stimulating a larger social, philosophical, scientific and artistic
interest.'
In view of what precedes, one is somewhat surprised at the beginning
of the discussion of government to find it identified with * what in physics
is inertia, in psychology habit/ " In society it (habit) takes the form
of custom, which, when codified in law and when enforced, is government.
Government is the political representation of a natural equilibrium of
custom, inertia; it is by no means a representative of reason" (II., p. 70).
But, the reader may ask, if custom were really effective as a custom, why
codify it? And what need to enforce it if it is already enforced as a
habit? Codification surely is a process of reconstruction, therefore of
idealization. And this is really implied in statements which imme-
diately follow. " But like any mechanical complication it (government)
may become rational. . . . Government can by its existence define the
commonwealth it tends to preserve." But if it is government through
codification, the ' can ' should be * must.'
This is also implied in an interesting and suggestive discussion of the
various forms of government which follows. The problem is presented
as just that of the best method of constructing and presenting a social
ideal. The answer, as Aristotle saw, depends upon the specific conditions.
" All just government pursues the general good. The choice between
aristocratic and democratic forms touches only the means to that end.
One arrangement may well be better fitted to one place and time than
another" (II., p. 121), Where there is stratified stagnation, some form
of aristocracy, theocracy, monarchy or oligarchy may be the best means
to get reconstructive idealization started. However, history seems to
warrant the claim of democracy that these forms of aristocracy i have
been unable to remain representative.' But the inferences which demo-
cratic theory often draws, that * eminence is therefore not representative,
and that representative character is bestowed by the mechanical expedient
of universal suffrage,' do not follow.
Many stimulating things are said in the discussion of the distinction
between ' political ' and ( social ' democracy. Political democracy is ' a
symbolic extension of aristocratic privileges in the form of universal
suffrage.' " It is quite compatible with complex government, great em-
pire, and may retain, as in England, many vestiges of aristocratic insti-
tutions " (II., p. 115). Social democracy, on the other hand, ' is a gen-
eral ethical ideal looking to human equality and brotherhood.' " It is
the democracy of Arcadia, Switzerland and the American pioneers."
Instead of measuring our prosperity by the quantity of wealth produced,
as our present system of economy does, it decries this enormous produc-
tion, demands less labor, a simpler and more rural life. " It would aban-
don the great cities to ruin, as seats of Babylonian servitude and folly,
leaving the railway bridges to collapse, the tunnels to choke and the hulks
of steamers to rust in the harbors." In the present high tide of com-
mercialism such anticipations may seem fantastic. " But does any
thoughtful man suppose that this commercial tendency will be eternal or
that the present experiment in civilization is the last the world will see ? "
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 217
(II., p. 127). If social democracy would take a more liberal form and
permit the benefits of civilization to be integrated in eminent men, whose
influence should direct and temper the general life, it would become a
timocracy and would, in the author's opinion, ' unite the advantages of
all forms of government and avoid their respective abuses ' (II., pp. 128,
129).
Despite the fact that some readers are sure to renew the complaint of
dualism in the character of the relation between the ideal and its material,
they may possibly find the author's brilliant power of analogical analysis
at its best in the volume on religion. " Another world to live in, whether
we expect ever to pass wholly into it, is what we mean by having a re-
ligion " (III., p. 6). What, now, is the relation of religion to the life of
reason? Let us recall that the essence of reason is the construction of
an ideal. And what is the ' other world ' of religion but this ideal ?
"Religion thus exercises a function of reason" (p. 7). What, then, are
the differentiae? First, religion carries over into the ideal a part of the
material of experience, while in scientific reason the ideal is conscious
of its formal and hypothetical character. Further, in its attempts to
carry up the material, the masses of sentiment and ideas, into the ideal,
it must construct its ideal through the intuitive instead of the conceptual
image. Here lies both the real strength and the historical weakness of
religion. The statement of the ideal in terms of the material, i. e., in
terms of instinctive and perceptual imagery, gives a richness and fullness
to religious idealization impossible in science where idealization is more
abstract. Indeed, * religion has the same original relation to life that
poetry has.' The only difference between poetry and religion, purged of
its errors, is that ' religion deals with higher and more practical themes,
with sides of life which are in greater need of some imaginative touch
than are those pleasant and pompous things which ordinary poetry dwells
upon.' Historically, however, * the religious pursuit of the life of reason
has been singularly abortive.' This because it has constantly confused
the perceptive instinctive material which it utilizes to embody the ideal
with the unidealized, that is, the actual existent material, and has accord-
ingly often tried to usurp the work of science (II., pp. 8-13).
Here the reader wishes the volume on science were at hand. From
what is here said of science, one suspects that in science, at any rate, the
ideal constructions of reason are likely to be something more than mere
* additions ' of value and l celebrations ' of work done by reflexes. Doubt-
less they are all this, but one gathers that in science, as in the passages
above cited in Volume I., the ideal controls as well as t celebrates ' ; that
the distinction between i efficient ' and l final ' cause is likely to break
down. 1
The fact that ideal construction in religion, as elsewhere, must, on
the one hand, be loyal to the impulses out of which and for the sake of
which it arises, and yet can only be loyal by ' remodeling ' them, de-
termines the two fundamental phases of religious experience ' piety '
1 The volume on science has appeared since this review went to press.
218
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and ' spirituality.' Piety is l man's reverent attachment to the sources
of his being and the steadying of his life by that attachment ' (III., p.
179). "It drinks at the deep elemental sources of power and order. It
studies nature, honors the past, appropriates and continues its mission."
Spirituality is the creative or rather recreative function of the ideal.
Piety is retrospective. Spirituality has its face toward the future, while
piety dwells in the realms of established order. Spirituality pitches its
tent out on the frontier, not in order to gain a worldly advantage over
piety, for ' competitive worldliness is the most deadly foe of spirituality/
but it abides there by virtue of the demands of its free recreative work.
By that same token is its habitation also on the borders of mysticism.
Mysticism arises out of the element of failure in the work of recreation.
It serves to tide over a period of intellectual arrest until there is recupera-
tion sufficient for the work of reconstruction to again become articulate.
Maintenance of spirituality therefore depends upon a proper balance
between impulses and ideal. Hence a too rapid differentiation, multipli-
cation of impulses, or a too great sophistication destroys spirituality.
However, some readers may experience difficulty in following Professor
Santayana to the conclusion that brute life ( may be as truly spiritual
as human,' and that ' the only pure mystics are the brutes.' For, while
mysticism is a renunciation of discursive reflection, the latter must after
all first be there to be renounced. The neo-platonist reaches the summit
of his mount of transfiguration by the tortuous path of discursive intel-
lection. As a preparation for the ecstatic vision he must first experience
the impotence and vanity of reflection.
As for individual immortality, Professor Santayana regards most
of the empirical evidence as ' beneath consideration.' " The palpitating
mood in which it is gathered and received make gullibility and fiction
play a very large part in the report; for it is not to be assumed that a
man, because he speaks in the first person and addresses a learned society,
has lost the primordial faculty of lying" (III., p. 230). Even at their
face value these reports show only more subtle and subhuman sensibilities
than ordinarily appear. They would show only that the process of dying
is more complicated than is supposed, rather than point to the existence
of disembodied spirits. " A disembodied life would not betray itself
in specters, rumblings and spasms " (p. 234). That operations more
subtle than ordinary should occur is entirely consonant with reason and
experience. But ' only a hankering tenderness for superstition, a failure
to appreciate the function both of religion and science, can lead to
reverence for such oracular gibberish as these influences provoke " (p.
233).
The moral and metaphysical grounds of individual immortality are
but little less convincing to Professor Santayana than the empirical evi-
dence. What reason is there to suppose that more justice or that better
fulfillment of ideals can take place in another life than here? If there
is any continuity in content and method with this life and without
such continuity nothing remains of individual existence life elsewhere
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 219
must involve the same reference of ideals to specific conditions and the
same possibility of their lapsing and yielding to others more capable of
execution (p. 248). Individual immortality is an hypostasis of * the
vision of eternity in time.' When a fact is idealized through reflection
it acquires ' a status in eternity.' But ' having a status in eternity does
not mean being a part of an eternal existence petrified and congealed
into something real, but motionless.' It means only that 'every fact
in being recognized takes its place in that ideal sphere of truth which
is the common and unchanging standard for all assertions' (p. 267).
In view of what is said (p. 248) concerning the basis of the ideal in
1 a dynamic world,' and more especially concerning its relevance to
' specific tendencies ' and the consequent necessity of its i lapsing and
yielding to others,' some will question this conception of an ideal sphere
of truth which is ' the unchanging standard for all assertions,' and
wonder whether, despite the illumination which Professor Santayana
turns on in his exposition of the indigenous ideal, the ghost of absolutism
does not still walk in places.
Following the general plan of the entire work, between the initial
chapters of definitions and principles and the closing chapters of general
conclusions and applications to current problems, are a number of
chapters devoted more conspicuously to historical and genetic interpre-
tation, in which the author's unusual ability in suggestive epigrammatic
generalization has large play. Many will find these the most attractive
part of the volume. The reviewer would note especially the chapters on
1 The Christian Epic ' and * The Christian Compromise.'
It was to be expected that Professor Santayana's volume on art would
be authoritative; and in the main this expectation is not disappointed.
Especially is this true of the chapters presenting the specific contents
of art ' music,' ' poetry and prose,' etc. ; and of the chapters on ' The
Justification of Art ' and ' The Criterion of Taste.'
In its largest sense, art is simple, practical reason or reasoned practise.
"It is plastic instinct, conscious of its aim" (IV., p. 4). But here
again we encounter the issue between the epiphenomenal and the instru-
mental character of consciousness; and again the outcome seems am-
biguous. On the one hand, this consciousness of aim ' simply accom-
panies ' instinct (p. 5). It is not an instrument of control. It is a
mere ' expression.' " Only by virtue of a false perspective do ideas
seem to govern action " (p. 6). " All invention is automatic, ideas come
of themselves, dropping in their sudden form from the blue" (p. 7).
" All useful things have been discovered as the Lilliputians discovered
roast pig" (p. 10). On the other hand, ' art is reason propagating itself '
(p. 13) and l reason with the order in every region it imposes on life is
grounded on an animal nature and has no other function than to serve
the same' (p. 191, italics mine). Also we read of objects of art as
i things which would not only have betrayed the agent's habits, but would
have served and expressed his intent ' (p. 4) . This seems to make overt
action the expression of the intent, instead of the converse.
220
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
In view of the remarks already made on this issue in the dis-
cussion of Volume I., we must leave it here with these observations : (1)
Of course, from the standpoint of experience regarded as a whole, all
activity within it, whether viewed as conscious or unconscious, must be
' automatic,' in the sense of being self -active. From this standpoint
the operation of ideas is as * automatic ' as that of the heart or lungs.
But (2) this does not prevent ideas being ' instrumental ' from exer-
cising real control, any more than the automatic action of the heart and
lungs destroys their interaction. One stage of activity may condition
another without either becoming thereby less l spontaneous ' in its im-
mediate activity. (3) On Professor Santayana's own most excellent
showing, ideas can not quite ; drop from the blue/ They must ' express/
' grow out of,' be ' relevant to ' some instinct or set of instincts. While,
in the stock instance, the forgotten name * just comes ' when it does come,
yet it would not come even f in its sudden form ' were it not for the want
and for the agonizing effort which precedes, fruitless as the latter may
appear at the time.
But, after all, this binomial conception of the general relation of
art to reason does not seriously affect the rest of the treatment. For in
such a case it is always possible when danger threatens from one side to
pass instinctively to the other.
Eesuming then the account of art in general as activity mediated by
an aim, it is evident that, contrary to much current opinion, art is not
to be defined by mere correlative contrasts with industrial utility, science
or morality. Nor is it to be identified with immediate esthetic valuation,
which is only a prominent element in i fine art ' as distinguished from
i industrial art,' It is not a specific sort of experience, coordinate with
other sorts. It is rather the concrete whole of consciously mediated life
of which industry, fine art, science and morality are differentiations.
The general basis of art, then, lies in the fact that in the end an un-
mediated or a completely mediated activity is an impossible conception.
" Activity, achievement, a passage from prospect to realization, is evi-
dently essential to life. If all ends were already reached and no art were
requisite, life could not exist at all, much less a life of reason" (p. 28).
In art in this large sense, as the art of living, there are obviously two
fundamental factors : the i material ' in the form of the structural prod-
ucts of past activity, which are demanding opportunity for further func-
tion ; and the ' ideal ' which supplies this opportunity. But once more
we must beware of an ideal imposed from without. " The ideal is a con-
comitant emanation from the natural, and has no other possible status "
(p. 28).
The organic relation between these two constituent functions of
activity furnishes also the basis for the distinction between l servile ' and
' liberal,' or * fine ' art. If the demand of some particular part or organ
of the total structure for expression, or for maintenance, is so immediately
urgent that a comprehensive organization, i. e., idealization of the re-
sponse, is impossible, the result is a ' servile ' art in the form of the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 221
barren automatisms of savage dance and song, or a utilitarian struggle
for mere existence. Liberal, or fine art, is the result of a balanced inter-
action between the activity of that part of the structure calling for ex-
pression and maintenance and the idealizing activities of the response.
This means that the demands for expression and maintenance are them-
selves more ideal, less immediate in their insistence; and, on the other
hand, that the ideals are more effective because they embody more ma-
terial.
From this standpoint it is evident that no impassable distinction can
be drawn between ' industrial ' and ' fine ' art. For, " Every proximate
end in being attained, satisfies the mind and manifests the intent which
pursued it, while every operation upon a material, even one so volatile
as sound, finds that material somewhat refractory. ... A certain
amount of technical and instrumental labor is thus involved in every
work of genius, and a certain genius in every technical success " (p. 33).
In so far as the distinction is to be made, it is simply one of stages in one
continuous process. The industrial stage is the one l in which untoward
matter is being better prepared or impeding media are overcome/ In
the liberal stage, the prepared matter ' is appropriated to ideal uses and
endowed with a direct spiritual function' (p. 32).
After this identification of the essential elements of art with those
of other rational functions, one is not surprised to find the volume closing
with an eloquent arraignment of the modern separation of art from its
industrial, moral, religious and social matrix. As usual, Professor
Santayana's own words can not be improved, hence I quote freely. " The
great obstacle which art finds in attempting to be rational is its func-
tion isolation." At present art ' too much resembles an opiate or a
stimulant/ Our museums are ' mausoleums in which a dead art heaps
up its remains/ " Art whose products are so collected and exhibited is
gratuitous and sophisticated and the greater part of men's concern about
it is affectation" (p. 209). "Art, like religion, needs to be absorbed in
the life of reason. ... It needs to have its processes diffused through-
out all life activity, instead of being confined to abstract productions
called ' works of art ' : " (p. 208). At present art is symbolic and vicarious
and stands in contrast with reality. But if ' it were knit more closely
with other rational functions, to beautify things might render them more
useful, and to represent them most imaginatively might be to see them
in their truth ' (p. 213). Then, " No work would be called in a special
sense ' a work of art,' for all works would be such intrinsically. There
would need to be no division of mankind into mechanical, blind workers
and half -demented poets, and no separation of useful from fine art, such as
people make who have understood neither the nature nor the ultimate
reward of human action. All arts would be practised together and
merged in the art of life, the only one wholly useful or fine."
A. W. MOORE.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
222
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Contradiction and Eeality. B. BOSANQUET. Mind, January, 1906, N. S.,
57. Pp. 1-12.
Professor Bosanquet argues that contradiction, in its phases as bare
contradiction, dissatisfaction and pain, has a place in our finite reality,
and inclines to the view that we can not exclude it altogether from abso-
lute reality. As a matter of fact, we find most experiences capable of two
interpretations. Progress consists largely in a resolution of this contra-
diction and, furthermore, Dr. McTaggart to the contrary notwithstanding,
the solution of the contradiction must leave its effects upon the real
whole that results. Every real implicitly contains both the affirmation
and the negation from which it has been derived. Professor Bosanquet
finds in the same principle an argument for the real existence of external
reality. It is true that advance in civilization is a resolution of contra-
dictions in experience, but these resolutions do not render the contra-
dictions illusory. The contradictions are implicit in the highest experi-
ence and serve to give it piquancy and vividness. One might even argue
that the highly developed mind has a more complete realization of the
external other than the lower. Persons are not sufficient alone to provide
opposition in the form of ' pain, conflict, sacrifice and satisfaction.' Real
things are necessary to provide for true development. In finite reality,
then, contradiction is not an illusion, although it exists only to be tran-
scended. Even in Divine Being contradiction is involved, if only as an
implication of the release from the burden of the finite. Since in com-
monplace experience pain alone can give real depth of experience, and
poetical tragedy gives the highest form of esthetic pleasure, the suggestion
is made that even the absolute can not be altogether without some form
of negativity, or at least of negativity transcended.
W. B. PlLLSBURY.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE
DER SINNESORGANE. October, 1905, Band 40, Heft 3. Beitrage
zur Lehre von der emotionalen Phantasie (pp. 145-159) : ROBERT SAXINGER.
- The emotional background of representative ideas, just as in the case
of general ideas and word-ideas, does not consist of a revival of real
feelings. The feeling-tone in all these cases is due to feelings of fancy
or imagination. Emotional setting of ideas due to special emotional
dispositions is capable of being reinstated by various ideas indifferently.
Untersuchungen uber das periphere Sehen (160-186) : STANISLAW LORIA. -
This research is concerned with the question whether the accommodation
of the lens in attention to peripherally situated objects, as found by W.
Heinrich, is unequivocally determined by the position of the paraxial ob-
ject or not and the limits within which accommodation takes place. The
results are: (1) the accommodation of the eye to paraxial distances is
unequivocally determined by the position of the object and is independent
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 223
of the fixation-point; (2) the eye is paraxially strongly myopic; (3) the
breadth of accommodation decreases with the paraxial angle; (4) for
every state of the lens an accommodation line may be drawn represent-
ing the points which are conjugate; (5) the limits of accommodation
depend upon the nature of the eye. Ueber den Wettstreit der Sehf elder
und seine Bedeutung fur das plastische Sehen (pp. 187-195) : W. LOH-
MANN. - Experiments on retinal rivalry under conditions of daily life are
held to show that the parallax of objects before and behind the fixation-
point resulting from the rivalry is the chief factor in the perception of
solidity. Literaturbericht.
Alexander, H. B. Poetry and the Individual. New York and London:
G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. Pp. x + 240.
Bush, Wendell T. Avenarius and the Standpoint of Pure Experience.
Archives of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, No. 2.
Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy and Psychology,
Vol. X., No. 4. New York : The Science Press. 1906. Pp. 79. 75
cents.
Hoffding, Harald. The Philosophy of Religion. Translated by B. E.
Meyer. New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1906.
Sterrett, J. M. The Freedom of Authority. New York: The Macmillan
Co. 1905. 8vo. Pp. vi -f 319. $2 net.
Van Vloten and Land. Benedicti de Spinoza Ethica. Hagae: Comitum
Nijhoff. 1905. 8vo.
Wagner, Charles. The Gospel of Life. London : Hodder and Stoughton.
1906. 3s. 6d.
Wallaschek, R. Psychologic und Pathologic der Vorstellung. Beitrdge
zur Grundlegung der AesthetiJc. Leipzig: J. A. Barth. 1905.
Westermarck, Edward. The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas.
In two volumes. Vol. I. London: The Macmillan Co. 1906. 8vo.
14s.
Withers, J. W. Euclid's Parallel Postulate: its Nature, Validity and
Place in Geometrical Systems. Chicago : The Open Court Publishing
Co. 1905. Pp. vii + 192. $1.25.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE following remarks occur in the course of a review in Nature of
Dr. Radl's ' Geschichte der biologischen Theorien seit dem Ende des
siebzehnten Jahrhunderts ' : " Although biology is now permeated by the
evolution idea, and has continually before it the ideal of giving a genetic
description of the present phase of the animate world, there is some
reason to fear, as Dr. Radl indicates, a growing apathy towards the
study of the evolution of the science itself. Whether it be that many
workers share Nietzsche's view that the study of history paralyzes the
intelligence, or that they feel it their primary business to make history,
224
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
not to read it, or that they regard historical inquiries as the philosopher's
task, not theirs, it seems certain that too little attenion in our investiga-
tions, theories and teaching alike is paid to the historical evolution of
the science. A notorious example may be found in the biological work
of Herbert Spencer, who, though he had almost accidentally found in-
spiration from a slight acquaintance with the work of von Baer, deliber-
ately set his face against looking for more. As we lay aside the volume
some general reflections remain convincingly with us that the history of
biology is a rational evolution, and at the same time inextricably inter-
twined with social evolution; that the same general ideas are reincar-
nated century after century in more evolved forms; that each genera-
tion meets the same old difficulties on a higher turn of the spiral; that
clearly thought-out conceptions which seem for a time to be vanquished
reassert themselves with renewed vigor, and find their position in a more
complete synthesis. The modern biologist, intent on new discoveries,
has no use for Aristotle, Descartes and Leibnitz, but their influence may
be upon him none the less. In speaking of the aqueduct of Sylvius, the
Malpighian tubules, the Graafian follicle, or the Cuvierian organs, we
quaintly acknowledge our debt to the past, but perhaps we betray our
indebtedness more when we are least conscious of it, for even the most
modern system of biology is, like our own body, a veritable museum of
relics."
VICE-CONSUL SCHLEMMER, of Mannheim, tells of the establishment of
an Academic Information Bureau in Germany for the benefit of foreign
students and visitors. It is located at the Berlin University, and its
sphere embraces all public institutions of the empire as well as of other
countries. Information will be furnished as to all the particulars neces-
sary to be observed in entering a university or attending lectures or in
regard to schools, laboratories, museums, libraries, hopitals, art galleries,
etc. Dr. W. Paszkowski is at the head of the institution, and all ser-
vices are furnished without charge.
PROFESSOR W. OSLER, F.R.S., has been elected a member of the
Athenaeum Club under the provisions of the rule which empowers the
annual election by the committee of nine persons ' of distinguished
eminence in science, literature, the arts, or for public services.'
PROFESSOR ERNST HAECKEL, of the University of Jena, is prevented
by ill health from attending the meeting of the American Philosophical
Society this month, in memory of the two hundredth anniversary of the
birth of Franklin.
DR. JAMES BURT MINER, B.S. (Minnesota, '97), Ph.D. (Columbia, '03),
has been appointed assistant professor of psychology at the University of
Minnesota. Dr. Miner is at present assistant professor of philosophy
at Iowa University. He will have charge of the new laboratory now
being equipped at Minnesota and also of the work in educational psy-
chology.
VOL. III. No. 9. APRIL 26, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THOUGHT REVEALED AS A FEELING PROCESS IN
INTROSPECTION
WHAT is here attempted to establish is:
1. That the whole of what we are in the habit of consider-
ing as intellectual operations may be revealed in introspection as
feeling process only. But to make this appear, we have to advance
the theory that what in these operations are usually termed images
are in ultimate analysis but specialized feelings having the charac-
teristic of prominence in contrast to the characteristic of agreeable-
ness and unagreeableness as composing emotional feelings.
2. That every intellectual operation may reveal itself in intro-
spection as wholly consisting of manipulations of emotional states
and specialized feelings.
3. That in all thought which is not directly influenced by what
are usually termed sense effects, the emotional states in introspection
appear as the primary factors therein, as determining the character
of the process and effecting the revival and subsidence of the whole
imagery phenomena.
In introspection it would seem that the greatest difficulty is ex-
perienced in catching the whole process in its ultimate phases, as it
is in most cases interfered with by the more complex thought con-
structions. The intellectual operations which take place in the in-
vention of mechanical contrivances seem to give the best results : for
here the manipulation consists mainly of concrete images and emo-
tional states.
The best case of this kind which occurred to the writer is given
below. In this experience every phase of the process was noted at
the time and conjointly with the constructed thoughts involved in
the inventive process, so that the observing of the ultimate phases in
this occurrence was no more retrospective than the constructed intel-
lectual phenomena involved.
When a young man, there once flashed on the writer 's mind a
strong desire to invent a flying-machine. There then immediately
225
226
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
followed, without further stimulus or any previous knowledge of
what had been accomplished in this direction, the following some-
what complex intellectual operation: There came first into prom-
inence the impression of a bird in flight, with the wings most distinct,
the body always remaining so blurred that at no part of the opera-
tion did the thought of a particular name for the total impression
bird come into prominence. But a series of rapid changes of the
wings was very manifest. It was as if a real bird were rapidly
changing its position so that one could obtain a view of the wings
from all the varying positions of the body. In fact, the whole intel-
lectual performance was as if it were a real performance, only the
changes seemed much more rapid than could have taken place in
reality. There existed all through a sense of alertness and a slight
sense of strain, similar to what one may have in watching an interest-
ing operation to see how it will come out. These changes seemed to
last just long enough to bring a characteristic, something of value,
i. e., a presentation with an agreeable feeling accompaniment, into
prominence; and the time element in each seemed to vary in a pe-
culiar way, i. e., with the importance of the presentation for furnish-
ing appropriate, satisfying characteristics. The subject remembers
distinctly the rise of agreeable feeling when the variation in the time
of the change was first experienced or felt.
Emotional activity was here manifest, which seemed to blend in a
most peculiar way with every intellectual presentation which came
into consciousness. This blending or osculation seemed to effect the
rise and subsidence of the intellectual presentations.
The longer duration of the blending process seemed to constitute
a value, a registratory value, in a later summary of all the agreeable
encounters, while all the intellectual presentations met by unagree-
able feeling seemed to be lost with reference to any future value.
This will be made more clear when we come to the constructive part
of the process. All through this part of the process there existed a
permanent and slightly unagreeable feeling above the varying feel-
ings continually osculating or blending with the incoming intellectual
presentations, and which seemed to be the stimulus to this incoming.
This seemed to be the stimulus which makes one assert, 'I want to
see the ins and outs of this process.' But so far from there being
any assertion here, as is sometimes considered necessary to all think-
ing processes, we can positively assert that there was no thought of a
word as such, no presentation of a linguistic sign during the whole
procedure. It was an intellectual process recording itself, unaccom-
panied by any superfluities. The whole intellectual phenomena
seemed to be brought into existence by, and to be obedient to, the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 227
varying emotional states. And when the unagreeable state gave
place to a sense of easement, or more agreeable feelings, the state
was such that, if it had compelled expression, the expression would
have been as, 'I have made a discovery,' and the feeling of the
former uneasiness might be conveyed by the expression, 'I want to
terminate this state for one of a more quiet or agreeable nature/
And yet this unagreeable, undesirable feeling seemed, from the
prompt way in which the intellectual phenomena would come into
prominence and join with the feelings, to be absolutely necessary for
the continuance of the operation. For the cessation of unagreeable
and the rise of agreeable feeling seemed to effect the subsidence
of the intellectual presentations. There were other effects in-
volved in these operations. While the wings were displaying them-
selves, there was a vague sense of the resistance and yielding of the
atmosphere under the strokes of the wings. After these manipula-
tions had continued for some time, there seemed to persist a summa-
tion of the values, i. e., a complete conception of the wings' move-
ments, their shape, the angular position in the upward and down-
ward strokes, and the conception of the work that might, by these
particular movements, be accomplished, seemed to come into prom-
inence. There seemed to come out, as the work accomplished, a
vague pictorial representation of a bird pushing itself up an inclined
plane, which plane was continually yielding, so that the actual line
of travel seemed to be more or less straight. The whole phenomena
seemed to consist of these manipulations of the feelings with the
intellectual presentations ; and of the intellectual presentations, those
only seemed to persist as having value more permanent registra-
tion which were embraced by or blended with the agreeable feel-
ings; and the total resultant feeling, if the subject had at the time
attempted to give it expression, might have been expressed as, *I
have picked out what was useful from this miscellaneous collection,'
and, at a still more advanced stage in the summation of these feel-
ings, as, 'I have now a complete conception of how flight is accom-
plished by birds. ' But no articulation and no muscular movements,
as such, formed any part of the phenomena we are here attempting
to describe.
Another peculiarity seemed to arise, in the fact of an increase in
the agreeable feeling the rise in the subject's interest as the pe-
culiarities of the phenomena came into prominence, e. g., the rapid
inhibition of intellectual presentations which seemed to possess slight
value in the summation, and the lingering, the longer duration, of
those presentations which seemed to have a greater value. This
seemed to be characterized by variations in emotional states. The
whole feeling might be described as the satisfaction arising from the
228
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
complete discovery of the phenomena. We have said that the gen-
eral feeling throughout the operation seemed more or less unagree-
able, irritating, thus acting as a stimulus to further intellectual
activity. This irritation being now present seemed to bring into
existence representations of mechanical contrivances, but these were
at first of so vague a nature that no permanent registration of them
occurred; instead, the feeling of irritation, unagreeableness, was
enhanced, which increased to a strain, and a momentary deadlock
seemed to exist. Then in a flash the bird's wing was obliterated, and
a bat's wing suddenly presented itself. And with the same rapidity
did the feeling change ; the former unagreeable strain on this point
now gave place to a feeling of easement; that change of feeling
which might make one exclaim, 'That's more like it; I must have
been on the wrong track before. '
But there soon arose again the feeling of irritation, incomplete-
ness, followed by the appearance of changing intellectual phenomena.
First the skin covering of the bat's wing came into prominence, and
almost immediately a substitution in the way of a silk fabric arose,
and with this the feeling of agreeableness easement was distinctly
discerned, and with it the cessation of any further selective move-
ment in this particular direction. But on the rise of further irrita-
tion, i. e., unagreeable, unsatisfactory feeling, there occurred a
change in the presented phenomena, although no decided intellectual
activities were at first very clear. There was a decided feeling of
strain, a feeling of something wanting, an emptiness seemed to per-
sist for a moment. The subject's previous experience had given out;
he possessed no definite knowledge of the anatomical structure of a
bat's wing. But means were at hand whereby the desired informa-
tion was soon obtained, and the mental manipulation started up
again into new life, bringing first the skeleton of the bat's wing into
prominence, and before this presentation had completely faded there
arose, as if in a side view, the rapid presentation in various forms
of the more common metals used in the arts. This stage of the opera-
tion seemed particularly interesting. It seemed as if the subject was
actually passing through more or less of his whole former experience
of the nature and manipulation of metals. The skeleton framework
seemed never to wholly disappear during this part of the operation,
or was so readily revived as to give that impression, so that the
requirements in a substitute for an artificial wing, such as lightness,
strength, elasticity, etc., seemed to impress themselves more readily
by imaginary experiments continuously made on the pictured frame-
work; and these effects seemed to have their influence on the in-
coming effects, as will soon be manifest.
There did not seem to be any particular order in the presentation
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 229
of the various metals, but the time they would stay in prominence
seemed to have a specific relation to their prospective utility for the
purpose under consideration. For instance, when a soft metal came
into prominence, which it did, it was obliterated with such rapidity
as to require the greatest alertness to feel sure that it had been pre-
sented. This assurance was psychically manifest as the heightening
of the agreeable feeling. This process went rapidly on until steel
presented itself in a variety of forms, and here there seemed to be a
more hesitating movement as the feelings seemed to warm up to it.
And a variety of modifications, such as round, square and hollow
bars, came into prominence. Then various manipulations with
tempered and untempered steel took place. The whole phenomena
seemed like a complex operation which might have taken place in
actual practise somewhat as follows: having discovered that I re-
quire a material, light, strong, elastic and durable, I set to work
experimenting with the various metals, quickly discarding every
metal which comes before me, with the exception of steel. Here my
procedure is more careful. I temper it; I try to break it; I also try
steel of various sections, and tube steel, but none as yet seems to
answer my requirement exactly. Now if we substitute for what is
here assumed to be accomplished physically by manipulation and
what we think of as judgment, the interaction of intellectual phe-
nomena with the characteristics of the primary feelings which we
have here termed agreeable and unagreeable, we may get a fairly
accurate psychical representation of the phenomena under consid-
eration. The intellectual phenomena, so called, apart from the feel-
ings, seem to have a value only in their prominence. And this char-
acteristic is, as we have seen, stimulated into existence by the emo-
tional states.
To resume. We arrived at a point where there was as yet no
definite outcome as a result of the manipulations of the metals.
There was again a slight hesitancy and strain; then suddenly the
appearance of steel of a U section presented itself, and just as
rapidly did the agreeable state seem to rise and spread over, as
it were, the intellectual effect, bringing about a sort of agreeable
quiescence, and seemingly inhibiting further activity in this par-
ticular manipulation. But this process seemed tantamount to the
registration of a value in the whole. The subject remembered after-
wards what seemed to him as the cause of this particular termina-
tion. He had previously been informed that steel with a U section,
when properly tempered, was difficult to rupture, while being
elastic; and when bent to a curved form before tempering, was
difficult to turn inside out ; it being, at the same time, comparatively
light and strong, which is the reason for its use in the frames of
230
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
umbrellas. Now these, as we may see, are characteristics which
might be useful in the mechanical construction of wings, and so
required to bring about harmony in some way in this psychical
process. We have mentioned that the skeleton wing seemed not
wholly to disappear, or to become so easily revived as to give the
appearance of continued presentation. This phenomenon still per-
sisted, although there now commenced a further intellectual manip-
ulation of a somewhat changed nature, seemingly in response to a
still persistent feeling of unagreeableness or incompleteness. Struc-
tural arrangements began to form themselves, following out some-
what closely the presented structure of the skeleton bat's wing. For
instance, plates of metal suitable for the attachment of appro-
priate joints double eyes for the long fingers presented themselves
as substitutes for the wrists. To these on the one side were con-
nected the four digits, and to the opposite side the forearm appeared
as jointed, and the whole structure soon built itself up in imagina-
tion very similar to the way we might suppose a person going to work
in actual practise, only much more rapidly, with a model to guide
him close at hand. As can be readily seen, having observed the
structure of a bat's wing, it could be imitated mechanically with
little difficulty: there arose the imaginary trial and rejection. Then
again an agreeable feeling would arise with some definite presenta-
tion, this being the psychical state for completion by its seeming to
effect a registration of this particular effect. Then another part
would be presented and a similar process gone through. There
was some slowing down of the process when the articulation at the
shoulder was approached, but finally there arose certain presenta-
tions of ball-and-socket joints which were immediately succeeded
by agreeable feelings, and the operation ceased.
Then from this built-up thought models were constructed, and
as these were approaching completion their complex nature began
to manifest itself. This may psychically be called the rise of un-
agreeable feeling on the presentation of the created intellectual
complex. While nature had been fairly well followed here, the dis-
contented feeling which sometimes arises when one has done too much
was very manifest. It was becoming apparent for the first time
that the complication of folding the wings was unnecessary to flight.
The feeling of strain and uneasiness seemed again to persist for a
brief period, when all of a sudden the appearance of an insect's
wings came into prominence, and the former irritation was as sud-
denly changed for a feeling of agreeable quiescence. The remainder
of this psychical process seemed to proceed now with less effort, and
after various combinations taking place under influences similar to
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 231
those already described, there arose the appearance of a compromise
between a bird's wing and an insect's wing; and with this appear-
ance the whole activity seemed to subside and the psychical-complex,
the psychosis, now regained its normal state. There seemed now no
incentive to stir it further.
Models were constructed from designs conceived in these latter
activities, and although thirty-five years have since elapsed the
writer has never been able to improve upon these designs.
E. A. NOERIS.
ALBANY, N. Y.
MEMORY TYPES OF COLORADO PUPILS
| N connection with the work in educational psychology and child
-*- study in the Colorado State Normal School during the past
year, studies have been made of the memory types and memory
spans of both normal school and training school pupils, the results
of which, while revealing nothing wholly new, may be valuable for
purposes of comparison or as hints for further investigations. The
subjects of the investigation were 100 boys and 154 girls of the
training school, distributed through the grades from three to eleven,
inclusive, and some 300 juniors, mostly girls, in the normal school.
I. The Tests. The tests were those used by Smedley, 1 with some
modifications, which are apparent in the descriptions. Five sets of
ten cards each were prepared, one set for each test. The cards were
of dark gray cardboard, 3.5 inches wide by 18 inches long. On each
card a number was printed in white digits 2.5 inches high and 2
inches wide, the numbers ranging from four digits to eight digits,
and two numbers of each length constituting one set of test cards.
In the arrangement of the nine significant digits to form the num-
bers, care was taken to avoid familiar sequences, thus minimizing
the number of natural associations among the digits. The object
was to discover what differences, if any, existed in the students'
ability to remember combinations of digits when the stimulus was
purely auditory, purely visual, or audio-visual, audio-visual-articu-
latory and audio-visual-articulatory-hand-motor to use Smedley 's
terms.
II. The Method. A different set of cards was used for each test.
To regulate the rate of reading the digits in the auditory test and to
determine the length of exposure of the card in the other tests, a
metronome beating 72 times per minute was used. One beat was
allowed for each digit in the number exposed, and five seconds
1 See the Chicago report, No. 3, of the Department of Child Study and
Pedagogic Investigation, 1900-1901, pp. 43-60.
232
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
elapsed between the end of the exposure and the writing of the
number from memory. In the auditory test the number was read
aloud distinctly and without rhythm to the beating of the metronome.
In the visual test the card was exposed in easy view of the pupils
for a period determined by the length of the number five sixths of
a second for each digit. In the audio-visual test the number was
read aloud while the pupils were regarding it, the rate of reading
and length of exposure being determined as in the first two tests.
For the audio-visual-articulatory experiment the pupils read the
number on the exposed card aloud and in concert. Our final test
of the five differed from Smedley's in that we included in the stim-
ulus the articulatory element which he omitted : he had his subjects
write down the numbers from dictation, and later reproduce them;
our subjects read the numbers from the exposed cards in concert,
as in the articulatory test, and at the same time wrote them with
the blunt ends of their pencils.
Since the numbers of each set of cards aggregate 60 digits, the
computation of the per cent, of error was an easy matter. One error
was scored for each digit misplaced, substituted, omitted or inserted.
III. Results in the Grades. 1. The memory span determined
as in Smedley's report (pp. 52, 53) for auditory memory was
found to be four digits for the third grade, five digits for grades
four to seven, inclusive, and six digits for grades eight, nine, ten
and eleven ; 2 for visual memory the span is five digits in grade three,
six in the next three grades and seven in the highest four grades.
These averages seem slightly below those of the Chicago children of
Smedley's test, though his computations were on the basis of age
rather than grade.
2. This study gives no evidence of a special memory period.
Every type of sense memory improves steadily through the ages
covered by the investigation, although auditory memory has attained
almost its maximum by the age of fifteen.
3. Auditory memory is distinctly inferior to every other type
here studied, in every grade and at every age (eight to twenty-one).
Its curve runs from 5 per cent, to 15 per cent, below the others.
Smedley found auditory memory superior to visual until the age
of nine.
4. There is very little difference in sense-memory of the other
four types. While they all improve as we ascend the grades, their
curves all lie within a zone which averages not more than five per
cent, in width as platted on the familiar gridiron. The articulatory
and hand-motor curves are slightly above the visual and audio-visual
curves at most ages.
2 The high school is organized in three grades.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 233
5. Among the subjects of this study beyond the age of fifteen,
the boys show a decided superiority to the girls in every type of
memory tested. Below fifteen there is no apparent sex difference,
except that girls average about 5 per cent, better than boys in audio-
visual-articulatory memory throughout. In one class of 166 normal
school juniors the boys graded from 3 per cent, to 9 per cent, better
than the girls in every test. In another class of the same rank,
numbering about 140, the boys excelled the girls in every type of
memory except the articulatory and hand-motor. In both these
classes, however, the proportion of boys was too small to afford a
safe basis for generalization.
6. Generally speaking, the better students in each grade exhibited
better ability to remember than the poorer ones, though the contrast
is not nearly so marked or so constant as in Smedley's results, and
there are so many individual exceptions that one is forced to ques-
tion somewhat the value of the generalization. The chief superiority
of the good students lies in the articulatory and the hand-motor types.
7. The most striking and decided conclusions of this study arose
from a comparison of the abilities in sense memory of pupils of the
same age found in different grades. Fifteen-year-old pupils were
selected because they were found to be most widely distributed,
ranging from the sixth to the eleventh grade. While there were but
thirty-seven of these pupils, quite evenly distributed as to grades,
their papers brought out a very regular but decided improvement
in every form of memory, except the auditory, with school advance-
ment. To give exact figures auditory memory improves only 1.5
per cent, from 67.5 per cent, in the sixth grade to 69 per cent, in
grade eleven ; visual, from 68.5 per cent, in the sixth grade to 87 per
cent, in the eleventh; audio-visual-articulatory, from 74 per cent, to
88 per cent, in the same interval; audio-visual-articulatory-hand-
motor, from 69 per cent, to 95 per cent. If it were safe to gen-
eralize from such limited data, we should be forced to conclude that
memory power is a matter of general mental development rather
than of age, and further that articulatory and hand-motor memory
are types most characteristic of the more advanced students.
IV. Further Results from Older Subjects. 1. For auditory mem-
ory the span of normal school juniors was found to be seven digits ;
for visual, eight digits.
2. The averages of a class of 166 juniors are typical of the results
obtained from all the older subjects tested. They are as follows:
auditory, 76.4 per cent. ; visual, 84.4 per cent. ; audio-visual, 90 per
cent. ; audio-visual-articulatory, 92.1 per cent. ; audio- visual-articu-
latory-hand-motor, 92.9 per cent. These figures seem to indicate
that for mature students that is best remembered which makes its
234 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
appeal through the greatest number of sense channels a belief
which is by no means new.
3. After all the above tests had been completed, in order to dis-
cover whether the superiority of the later-tested types of memory
might be due to any extent to practise, a second auditory test was
given which resulted, for the 166 juniors, in an average of 85.3 per
cent.; an improvement over the first auditory test of nearly 9 per
cent., but still below all other types.
4. To test the effect of repetition on memory, the last-mentioned
auditory test was followed immediately by another in which the
numbers were twice repeated after the first reading; this yielded an
average of 92.2 per cent. A third auditory experiment was then
given in which the numbers were repeated but once after the first
reading ; the average for this test was 90.4 per cent. The figures are
self-explanatory.
WILL GRANT CHAMBERS.
COLORADO STATE NORMAL SCHOOL.
DISCUSSION
THOUGHT AND IMMEDIACY
HPHE point raised by Professor Bakewell in his comments on
Professor Dewey 's account of Immediatism 1 seems to me to be
so interesting and so vital to the epistemological controversy of the
day as to deserve further elucidation and discussion, even after
Professor Dewey's admirable replies, with which, so far as they go,
I am happy to find myself in cordial agreement.
But though Professor Dewey entirely succeeds, to my thinking,
in upholding his own point of view, he does not attempt to account
for the genesis of what we both consider an error, or to explain how
very natural and plausible Professor Bakewell's contention is bound
to appear from certain presuppositions. It seems worth while, there-
fore, to examine it more closely and to exhibit the underlying con-
fusion from which it seems to arise. For so long as this confusion
is allowed to persist, it is impossible to understand the plain meaning
of immediatism, or to appreciate the position of Professor Dewey,
against which baseless accusations of inconsistency are therefore
bound to spring up.
Professor Bakewell generously disclaims, on behalf of 'the
idealist' in general, what I fear can be true only of his own particular
school of idealism, viz., any desire to despise experience, assuring us
1 See this JOURNAL, Vol. II., Nos. 19, 22, 25, 26.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 235
that 'from experience he starts, to experience he ever returns/ 2 and
infers that the issue between him and immediatism really hinges upon
the interpretation of the ' treacherously ambiguous word ' experience,
and the character of its immediacy. So far there is no difficulty.
But he goes on to betray the source of his prepossession against
immediatism by indicating the ground for his intellectualist con-
victions. His conception of the relation of thought to perception
differs profoundly from ours. Perception to him is permeated
through and through with thought and dependent upon it in all its
characters. The immediate experience, therefore, upon which we
rest our case is and remains 'always a complex of the immediately
perceived and the mediately conceived.' 3 It follows, of course, that
' the facts of experience are, one and all, and from first to last, tainted
with mediation, ' that there is no ' sheer immediacy, ' 4 and that imme-
diatism is an absurdity. Experience simply can not be construed
without thought, and thought imports into it the whole array of
'categories' and necessitates a rationalistic account of them.
Now the whole of this attitude follows logically from its presup-
position, and the latter has not been contested by Professor Dewey.
He has contented himself with pointing out what is indeed a very
important fact and one which rationalism habitually ignores, namely,
that ultimately all reasoning processes are directly experienced and
that hence there is an immediate side to all mediation, and that imme-
diatism recognizes thought and its ' categories ' as they occur and are
known in experience. This Professor Bakewell admits, 5 but it does
not and can not remove his fundamental difficulty. To clear this
away we must dig deeper.
We may point out, therefore, in the first place that it is psycho-
logically false to treat thought as immanent in the greater part of
our perceptual experience. Only such experiences are to be regarded
as 'mediate' which require to be actually thought about, and are
such as to set up a mediation-process (which, of course, must itself
be an immediate experience, as Professor Dewey has shown). 'But
if so,' I may be asked, 'do you mean to search in perception for a
pure immediacy untainted by thought, for a perceptual experience
which would have been what it is if no mediation had ever occurred,
if no thoughts had ever entered it? Surely you can not deny that
our percepts have been made by our thoughts to an unlimited extent ? '
1 am not, however, searching for the impossible or denying the
obvious. I am pleading only for the proper psychological descrip-
2 Vol. II., p. 688.
Vol. II., p. 688.
'Vol. II., p. 690.
8 Vol. II., p. 690.
236 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tion of present facts and the proper attention to tenses. To say that
percepts have been made by thoughts is not to prove that they now
are thoughts, and to deny their 'mediate' character is not to deny
that they have been mediated. In the light of its history the ration-
alist's description of immediate experience is quite intelligible. Our
perceptions would not have come to be what they are if thought had
never entered them, and no factor in the immediate fails to disclose
the effects of mediation to a careful scrutiny. But is not all this
past history totally irrelevant to the present situation and to the
descriptive purpose of the psychologist? Does not the appeal to it
rest on a confusion between what is mediate and what has been
mediated? How is the psychical immediacy of what is now experi-
enced impaired by the reflection that much thought has gone to its
making and that it can boast of a highly intellectual ancestry?
Might it not conversely have been regarded as a slur upon the purity
of thought that it was predestined in the course of nature to suffer
transformation into an immediate experience? The rationalist's
argument, in short, is one from past history to present value, from
'origin' to 'validity,' and claims perception for 'thought,' because
it once was thought. And in view of the strenuous opposition which
rationalism offers to genetic psychology, is there not a charming
flavor of inconsistency about this mode of explaining away the
present facts ?
If then we dismiss the rationalistic description of the immediate
as psychologically unwarranted, it must be admitted that there are
many experiences which are immediate and purely perceptual, and
that these form a sufficient basis for immediatism. If, in addition,
we realize that the 'mediations' also are immediate as actually experi-
enced, we shall wonder further where the ground for a rationalistic
interpretation of experience is to come from.
At the same time it is not difficult to foresee that the rationalist,
when he realizes the situation, will instinctively flee from the hard
facts of psychology to the more fluid formulas of logic. He will
truly urge that a logical evaluation of our immediate experience is
indispensable, and that in such an evaluation its past history can not
be ignored. But he will falsely add that such evaluation will neces-
sarily restore the supremacy of the mediate over the immediate.
This assertion, however, is merely a survival of intellectualistic
prejudice. There is no logical necessity about reducing perception
to thought on the score of its historical antecedents. All that the
historical genesis logically requires us to do is to conceive them as
connected. The connection itself may be viewed the other way
round. It is just as logical, and just as easy, to conceive thought as
culminating in perception, as aiming at a return into the immediate
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 237
form of cognition, in short, to conceive mediation as arising and per-
sisting for the sake of enriching the immediate. Instead of saying
that perception is made by thought, why not say thought is percep-
tion in the making?
In contending that this view of the logical connection was as
valid as that of the rationalist, I was, however, greatly understating
my case. For really its logical value and convenience are far greater
than that of its traditional rival. For the true significance and
value of our rational procedures surely lie in their power to enrich
and improve direct perception, and to adjust and guide our actions.
It is fortunate for us that our thoughts have this power to develop
gradually into immediate perceptions, to abbreviate and finally to
eliminate themselves and to be absorbed in higher functions which are
easier and more serviceable. Their essential function is to promote
and facilitate new responses adjusted to new situations, and the
quicker and more unhesitating these responses can become the more
valuable they are. In this respect, however, perception excels
thought. It seems absurd, therefore, to regard thought as a ' higher '
process than perception merely because it is more difficult and more
expensive. The perceptual and immediate form is as such prefer-
able, and it would indeed be a fool who would prefer the protracted
progress of reasoning to the rapid insight of perception, in cases
where either could lead to the right decision. But as a rule our per-
ceptions are initially inadequate. They require to be mediated and
developed by painful ratiocination, and hence arises the rationalistic
prejudice in favor of the 'thought' process which so often displays a
superior value.
This whole antithesis, however, is a mistake, a sinister survival
from the philosophy of Plato. Perception is not as such ' irrational, J
nor is thought ultimately separable from perception. Instead of
abusing the senses, philosophers should learn to use them. They
should open their eyes to the fact that in actual knowing the media-
tion of the immediate and the perfecting into immediacy of the
mediate form one continuous process, which rises from the lowest
levels of congenital perception through the labor of reflective analysis
to the unerring insight of the master mind, but exhibits in all its
phases one unbroken harmony, and is controlled throughout by the
purpose of sustaining and enriching life. And then, perhaps, it will
at last be recognized how prescient Aristotle was in discarding Plato 's
false antithesis, in conceiving vou? } the highest mental faculty, as
immediate, in equating it with atffOyffts and in connecting rather than
dissevering them by the mediation of the ^0?.
F. C. S. SCHILLER.
CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD.
238
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
A NOTE TO PROFESSOR ANGELL.
"DROFESSOR ANGELL 'S appreciated discussion 1 of my paper
on the 'Nature of Feeling' 2 seems to call for an explanation
of my position, rather than for a reply to his argument; for it is
evident that I have not succeeded in making clear the main points
I wished to present.
I had intended to call attention to the fact already noted by other
psychologists, that the word 'feeling' is used with various diverse
meanings ; and to show that writers of authority are wont to employ
the word to express one meaning at one time, and another meaning
at another time, and this without giving proper warning to their
readers, and apparently without recognition of the fact that they
are guilty of inconsistency.
From this I meant to argue that the word is unfitted for use in
careful psychological discussions; for the reason that even if the
writer employing the term explains the meaning he attaches to it,
and even if he avoids all inconsistent usages, some of his readers are
almost certain to attach to the word connotations of their own prefer-
ence which are utterly unwarranted.
I am surprised, therefore, to find that I have left in Professor
Angell's mind the impression that I agree 'that the term can be
saved for technical service' (p. 169) ; for I had intended, on the
contrary, to indicate that I am convinced that it is not only desirable,
but perfectly possible, to eliminate the word from our psychological
vocabulary, and that this may be done without finding ourselves
lacking adequate and expressive words to take its place.
In this connection I may say that I should never think of speak-
ing of 'acute anxiety' (bottom of p. 172) as feeling. I should de-
scribe it as an emotional state.
What Professor Angell speaks of as my doctrine was intended
to be merely a description of what is really meant by the term 'feel-
ing' as it is employed in careful writing by psychologists whose
-words we must accept as authoritative and must treat with respect.
Nothing could have surprised me more than the discovery that a
psychological district attorney, whom I respect, and whose evidently
friendly attitude I appreciate, should find himself called upon, in
the interests of psychological morality, to institute an inquiry as to
whether I was implicated in an attempted 'looting of the central
storehouses of the mind in the interests of this project' (p. 173).
Of any such intention I must plead not guilty; and if in the
opinion of Professor Angell I have been caught in the aforesaid act
JOUBNAL, Vol. III., No. 7.
/&id., Vol. III., No. 2.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 239
of psychological burglary, and with the loot in my possession, I de-
sire at once to make full and complete reparation : and I hereby
express my desire to turn over to the court (perhaps the readers of
this JOURNAL will consent to act in that capacity) all such use of
the word ' feeling' as I may have made in the past; giving to the
philosophical public all possible assurances that I shall never again
employ the word in psychological writing except where I may find
it desirable to attempt to explain the meaning other writers intend
to convey by its use.
HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL.
NEW YORK CITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Freedom of Authority; Essays in Apologetics. J. MACBRIDE STERRETT.
New York: The Macmillan Co. 1905. Pp. 319.
Of the eight chapters of this book the first four are new, while the
last four are reprints of former publications. In Chapter I., * The Free-
dom of Authority,' the writer contends for human solidarity vs. abstract
individualism. " Authority is the right of the species man over its
individuals; and conformity is a duty of the individual" (p. 6). The
individual is an organic member of his kind, he is part of a system. He
is an unknown x until defined by his social relations of heredity and
environment. Non-conformity has the value of the negative: it is
criticism mediating a higher conformity; it both destroys and fulfills.
Freedom is found in the performance of peculiar function. Man is
essentially heteronomous, the law of his life has a real basis beyond his
own ego. Conformity to the genus is the only way to realize the ideal
generic self. The doctrine, however, transcends conventional morality:
every form is imperfect and the reformer protests by the authority of
the universal character which he apprehenols. It also transcends morality,
as such, in its advance to the persuasive authority of the divine Father.
Chapter II. reviews the attitude of Sabatier (in his ' Outlines of a
Philosophy of Religion ' and his ' Religions of Authority and the Re-
ligion of the Spirit '), of Harnack (in his ' The Essence of Christianity *)
and of the Ritschlians as a group. The position of all alike is that of
( immediacy, pectoralism, subjectivity' (p. 67). Negatively, they believe
in a Christianity that is non-miraculous, non-Christocentric, non-creedal,
non-ecclesiastical, non-cult, and whose Deity is non-knowable (p. 75).
Their religion is based on judgments of value rather than of existence;
it is rooted in the human rather than the divine. While condemning
all religious authority as destructive of the spirit of religion, they yet
' accept modern thought as authoritative/
They regard the evolution of Christianity as its degeneration and
would return to its primitive form. They deny the religious value of
the environment (Greek, Roman and Teutonic culture) in its influence
240 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
on the religious germ. But ' the crab-cry back to the beginning of any-
thing that is in a process of development is irrational, . . . patholog-
ical and pessimistic ' (pp. 82-83). In this case it means back to the
simple unmediated feeling of mysticism.
Sabatier's psychology of religion can give it no rational justification.
The Christian philosophy of history is the doctrine of the incarnation
of the immanent Logos, the living Christ, as the spirit eternally inform-
ing the earthly church. There is neither soul without body nor body
without soul, and the body has a spatial-temporal existence, a history.
The test of Christianity is this : " How much reason in it, how much
reality? Not how much abstract reason of the 18th or the 20th century,
but how much of the absolute reason does it embody, incarnate, mani-
fest?" (p. 101).
Chapter III. discussess Loisy's views (' L'Evangile et L'Eglise ' ;
'Autour d'un Petit Livre'). Like Sabatier, Loisy writes in defense of
Christianity, feeling the need of harmonizing religion with modern cul-
ture. He is also a Kantian agnostic, a fideist. But as a liberal Catholic
he defends religious authority, and views the history of Christianity as
its progressive development.
He regards the Gospel story as largely faith's idealization of the his-
toric Jesus, and a legitimate one. There is, he holds, no historic evidence
of the miracles as facts. The historic Jesus founded no church and in-
stituted no sacraments. But a pagan origin of many Christian rites is
nothing to their discredit. In Loisy one sometimes finds 'two dis-
connected developments with no organic relation between them ' (p.
118). There is the historical development of the church as the body of
religion and the super-historical development of faith as its soul, a
dualism of fact and meaning; but each of these is social in its nature.
Again, it is even a question whether his view, like Harnack's, does not
assimilate to that of Feuerbach, for whom religion is the self-deifica-
tion of humanity and ' the gods are wish-beings ' (p. 120). For Christ is
sometimes exhibited as nothing but the objectification of the community's
faith. But his ultimate meaning is probably that of the immanence of
the divine spirit in the church; though it is faith and not knowledge
that affirms, Christ lives and is real.
Dr. Sterrett maintains that religion is not called ' to abdicate its
specific work at the bidding of the scientific culture of any age' (p. 151).
If her teachings involve antiquated scientific conceptions, these should
be purged away ; but not too quickly, for f ecclesiasticism is ultra-con-
servative,' even to a fault, and its function in society is revealed by its
nature. " The religious interpretation of experience given by any re-
ligion of authority, pagan or Christian, is more concretely true than that
given by any agnostic form of modern culture" (p. 154). "At least
... all interpretations of experience scientific, ethical and religious
are on a par as to validity though not concreteness " (p. 193).
Chapter IV. discusses the historical method, which is regarded as either
scientific or philosophic. The former shows the influence of positivism.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 241
it lays too great stress on external circumstance to the neglect of inner
tendency (cf. Buckle, Spencer, Taine). If the mechanical theory does
not purport to be metaphysics, if it adopts positivism merely as method,
if it treats its concepts of matter and force not as real entities but as
economic descriptions of phenomenal experience (cf. Mach, Pearson), it
has a pragmatic sanction and it comes into no conflict with the religious
attitude. But it must remember its limitations. Philosophy as an at-
tempted comprehension of the whole of experience as a system must insist
on the subjective or mental factor as important ; ' nothing external exists
except plus me ' (p. 174), and this plus me factor can not be evolved
from the external world.
Mechanical evolution is invalid as an ultimate interpretation, for
organic development implies qualitative change, progress and teleology.
The mechanical explanation involves the infinite regress. In referring
changes to the mere addition of external environments, it gets only the
series x, xy, xyz, but discovers no ground, no sufficient reason of develop-
ment. " The ground is the concrete unity of identity and difference."
The philosophical form of the historical method is teleological. " For
anything to transcend its present sensuous form, there must be a factor
that is spatially and temporally unreal, immanent within it" (p. 198).
The ideal of the best is inexplicable by the mere past or present. Philos-
ophy must rise from the relativity of the empirical view to the category
of the self -related. The God-principle alone can logically banish pessi-
mism and validate the worth of the finite. The individual who can not
realize his identity with the world-principle is without ground for hope.
The remaining chapters treat of i Ecclesiastical Impedimenta,' ' The
Ethics of Creed Conformity/ ' The Ground of Certitude in Religion ' and
1 The Ultimate Ground of Authority.' " The historical method is the
category of rationality in the humanities to-day . . . with its concep-
tion of reason expanding and developing under the stimulus of subjective
needs and changing environments" (pp. 236-237). "Past forms of creed
and cult are estimated by their own contemporary situations, problems
and solutions " (p. 238). " The personality of the Christ is the ultimate
touchstone by which we must estimate all creeds " (p. 241). They have
worth so far as they reveal him who is greater than any creed. This
revelation is social, organic, historic, rather than individual. Creedal
conformity is thus subscription to the verdict of history. The ideal is
no literal conformity to an inflexible creed which would prevent growth,
but the Nicene Creed, on account of its universality and its historic
vindication, deserves to be taken as an ' ultimate statement of doctrine '
(p. 247).
There are two bases of certitude: authority and reason, the organic
social process and the individual person. Religion is ' the reciprocal
relation or communion of God and man ' (p. 256) ; its two sides are revela-
tion and faith, which can not be abstracted from each other. Religion
passes through three psychological forms : (1) feeling, (2) knowing, (3)
willing. (1) The unreasoned certitude of feeling is no measure of its
242
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
worth. (2) Here religion takes first the form of imagination, then
dogma (a mixture of reason and authority), then criticism and, finally,
positive synthetic comprehension. Mere negative criticism, ' thought ab-
stracted from action and institution,' is of the devil. The real ground
of criticism is faith's apprehension of a deeper truth. Many conceptions are
now really problematic, and conformity to true authority will treat them
as open questions and attempt their solution ; e. g., the nature of the Bible.
The precise content of authoritative truth changes with the age. One
authority may transcend another. The rationality of each is appre-
hended * after the experience of having our best self educed by the
process 7 (p. 287). Rationality implies unity with self, with society and
with God. ' The real is the rational ' though it contradict individual
reason. Yet the actual at any time is not to be identified with the
rational. Historical perspective and a social check on individual reason
are demanded.
Our space permits only a brief comment on this interesting book.
First, it exhibits no single standard by which religious validity may be
tested. As shown above, several factors figure jointly. Are they all
indeed capable of unification in the category of the absolute? and would
this be a working criterion ?
The writer reiterates the invalidity of the abstract use of reason. Yet
the historical method to which he appeals goes far to justify the un-
historical rationalism dominant from the Renaissance to the 18th century,
when thought was using the best method then at its command to free
European society from the outgrown authority of the middle ages. Ab-
stract reason is able to isolate its problems and to reach a clearer
definition of concepts and their relations, needs that metaphysics must
always feel. To be sure, a total neglect of content and context, analysis
without synthesis, is illogical in that it forgets the bearing of its ab-
stractions on the very purpose that gave them birth, and this is just what
every absolutist as such is in danger of doing.
Our author is by intent equally opposed to a mere faith philosophy.
The dualism of faith and reason is to be overcome in concrete knowledge
in which each are factors. " Human reason to date is the organic sum
total of the esthetic, ethical, religious, scientific and philosophical mani-
festations of the human spirit" (p. 221). The reader's query is whether
the dialectic between faith and reason is put to rest in the author's
attitude or whether this vibrates between a living mediated faith and an
ontological absolutism which is abstract because it can not, in the nature
of the case, honor the human needs which are its source.
Many passages (pp. 105, 241, 287) show the pragmatic phase of the
author's thought, without which a philosophy of religion would be impos-
sible. He appears, however, to lean both toward pragmatism and toward
absolutism; and does not this mean a rejection of each in turn? In an
important note in the appendix, too narrow a concept of the practical
leads to a misapprehension of pragmatism; and it is condemned because
it maintains that there is ' no absolute system of truth independent of the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 243
needs of men/ i. e. } because of its opposition to the abstract reason!
One would fain have a system of knowledge that is instrumental in
human experience and one that is above all vulgar (and sacred) use; but
can one have both?
The doubt may then be expressed whether Dr. Sterrett's metaphysical
assumptions are necessary and sufficient to validate science, epistemology
and the other divisions of philosophy, and the arts of life, whether, in-
deed, they may not be found, when more closely scrutinized, to be in con-
flict with the genuine motives and meanings of life. One would hardly
look for a clear-cut technical statement of a writer's epistemological posi-
tion in a book of this purpose. But we may venture to doubt whether
the ground of certitude there developed could be deemed adequate save
on pragmatic assumptions; but if these are admitted, the statement of
that ground would of necessity suffer some alteration.
If the book offers the technical philosopher little material and few
view-points that are new, yet here much that is not new receives virile,
suggestive, stimulating treatment. Its logic is robust, but to a compre-
hensive survey it does not always appear discriminating and convincing.
The author explains, however, in his preface, that his book was * written
in a heat ' and that it is both ' semi-technical ' and l semi-popular/
E. L. NORTON.
WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.
Le Darwinisme n'est pas I'Evolutionnisme: RENE BERTHELOT. Bulletin
de la, Societe frangaise de Philosophic, August, 1905. (Seance of
April 6, 1905. Discussion by MM. Giard, Houssay, Lalande, Pecaut
and Rauh omitted in review.)
The proposition that Darwinism and the evolution theory are not
identical will be accepted as a truism by any one having even a superficial
acquaintance with the literature of philosophical biology; and M. Berthe-
lot might well have spared himself the labor of demonstrating that l one
may conceive of forms of the evolution hypothesis which discard in whole
or in part the doctrine of Darwinism.'
Evolutionism and mechanistic evolutionism are synonymous for the
author, who thereby comprehends any ' theory of the origin of species
which does not introduce finality, but which explains facts by their rela-
tion to past or present facts, never to future facts.'
According to Berthelot's analysis, " Darwinism consists in the com-
bination of four fundamental ideas: (1) the idea of the struggle for life;
(2) the idea of natural selection; (3) the idea of accidental individual
variation ; (4) the idea of small variation, of slow and continuous change."
These prepositions may all be contested, he says, without compromising
the evolution theory. It need not be pointed out by the reviewer that this
analysis, while perhaps true of ' Darwinism ' in the narrower sense in
which the term is often used, does not fairly represent Darwin's own
account of the origin of species.
The doctrine of Lamarck is similarly analyzed into several inde-
pendent theses: " (1) The formation of new species is a consequence of
244
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
physicochemical changes produced in the environment; (2) there result
variations acquired by the organism, during the individual life, under the
influence of external changes and accumulated by heredity during many
generations; (3) these variations are acquired in part consciously, in
part unconsciously consciously in the higher animals, unconsciously in
all other living beings. It follows from this that for Lamarck specific
variation is collective from its origin, while for Darwin it is primarily
individual. And it results that for Lamarck as well as for Darwin spe-
cific variation is not abrupt, but gradual."
The idea of * accidental individual variation ' is regarded by the
author as a grave defect in the Darwinian theory, and he asks whether
'the changes which are produced in the physicochemical environment,
acting at once in the same way on many individuals/ may not ' produce
analogous modifications simultaneously among these diverse individuals/
Many misinterpretations of ' Darwinism ' would doubtless be avoided
by a timely reference to Darwin's own writings; and in this case it will
be instructive to cite, by way of comparison, a few extracts from the
( Origin of Species/ After stating that at first he l did not appreciate
how rarely single variations, whether slight or strongly marked, could be
perpetuated/ Darwin proceeds to say : " It should not ... be overlooked
that certain rather strongly marked variations, which no one would rank
as mere individual differences, frequently recur owing to similar organ-
ization being similarly acted on of which fact numerous instances could
be given with our domestic productions. . . . There can also be little
doubt that the tendency to vary in the same manner has often been so
strong that all the individuals of the same species have been similarly
modified without the aid of any form of selection. Or only a third, fifth
or tenth part of the individuals may have been thus affected. ... In
cases of this kind, if the variation were of a beneficial nature, the original
form would soon be supplanted by the modified form, through the survival
of the fittest." Here both the agency of the environment in calling forth
variations, and the collective character of these (in Berthelot's sense) are
distinctly affirmed.
To the principle of ( natura non f acit saltum/ which undoubtedly
dominated Darwin's ideas of evolution, the author devotes considerable
attention. The relevancy of his allusions to the work of de Vries will
be readily admitted, for most biologists will probably agree that Darwin
greatly underestimated the importance of discontinuous variation.
" The advances of geology," likewise, " have disappointed the hope
which the Darwinians founded on them, and seem hard to reconcile with
the thesis of small continuous variations." On the contrary, the ' fixity
and discontinuity of geological faunas and floras ' are supported by recent
investigations.
The discontinuity of chemical changes is regarded as furnishing an
instructive parallel, for chemical, as opposed to physical, interpretations
of vital phenomena are now most in favor. " It is not improbable that
^Origin of Species/ 6th ed., pp. 112, 113.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 245
/
what originates a new species resembles rather the synthesis of water or
the explosion of a cartridge of dynamite than the progressive heating of
a bar of iron." A species exists in a state of stable equilibrium, which
can be thrown abruptly into a new state of equilibrium, but not altered
gradually. Such metaphors are of course abundant in mutationist
literature.
Darwin's bias in favor of the continuity principle is attributed by
Berthelot to his historical setting, more immediately to the influence of
Lyell. It was one of the fundamental scientific dogmas of his day.
" This belief in universal continuity appears to have a double origin :
mathematical on the one hand or, more exactly, physicogeometrical
on the other hand, social." As regards the latter, 'the instincts and
prejudices of the triumphant bourgeoisie' gave support to the theory of
gradual change as opposed to abrupt or revolutionary change.
After having effected the dissociation of the principal evolution
hypotheses of the day, the author proceeds to recombine certain of the
elements thus obtained by a twofold act of synthesis. There result two
new hypotheses which Berthelot offers under the paradoxical designations,
' Lamarckian Weissmannism ' and ' Evolutionistic Cuvierism.'
As regards the first of these he says : " One may hold at the same time,
on the one hand, that specific variations are abrupt and congenital; on
the other, that these variations are due to changes of the environment,
and in consequence that they are from their origin collective, common to
many organisms placed in the same environment. For Weissmann all
specific variations are congenital, but they are small, purely individual
variations, which selection accumulates little by little, and the influence
of the environment plays no part in their appearance."
The theories of Weissmann have undergone so many changes in the
hands of their author, that one who is not primarily a biologist may
perhaps be pardoned for not having followed them through all of their
transformations. It is worth while to point out, however, that in his
later writings Weissmann distinctly recognizes the influence of environ-
ment in evoking changes in the germ plasm, and the cumulative and
collective character of the resulting variations. For example, he tells
us that the immense number of adaptations of an organism can not be
attributed to 'rare, fortuitous variations, occurring only once. The
necessary variations from which transformations arise by means of selec-
tion must in all cases ~be exhibited over and over again by many indi-
viduals/ 2 These variations, we are further told, 'must be due to the
direct effect of external influences on the biophors and determinants."
He even goes so far as to concede that ' climatic and other external influ-
ences are capable of producing permanent variations in a species,' inde-
pendently of selection ; though he remains convinced that ' the countless
majority of modifications ' result from selection.* " ' The accumulative
action of changed conditions of life' suggested by Darwin, is conse-
1 ' Germ Plasm/ p. 432.
Op. cit., p. 415.
Op. cit., p. 422.
246
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
quently theoretically supported to a certain extent by the theory of the
continuity of the germ plasm." It is far from the purpose of the re-
viewer to defend the system of Weissmann, in either its earlier or its
later form, but fairness as well as historical accuracy demands this cor-
rection.
The second of Berthelot's twin hypotheses rejects ' the belief of Cuvier
in providential intervention, in a creative action of the Divinity/ while
preserving ' the idea that the origin of species has occurred in the greater
number of cases, at least with higher species, in a sudden and collective
manner, since it appears difficult otherwise to explain the paleontological
facts in which Cuvier found support, and which are not less true to-day
than they were eighty years ago.'
We are not told how great a modification Berthelot thinks may be
fairly attributed to a single act of mutation; and we are left to wonder
whether he would regard any of the larger gaps in the paleontological
record as due to the non-occurrence of transitional forms, past or present.
Some of the references to geology and to Cuvier would seem to imply this.
Finally, by a supreme act of synthesis, the author proposes to com-
bine the two hypotheses just developed. By this means, ' we should ob-
tain a view of the ensemble of biological evolution which would be neither
that of Darwin nor that of Lamarck, since we should abandon the pos-
tulate of continuity, which is common to both of them, and since we
should attribute the origin of new species neither to selection nor to the
inheritance of acquired variations, whatever may be the influence of these
two factors to call forth diverse changes, but of less amplitude, among
living beings/
To the reviewer these hypotheses of Berthelot's appear to be logical,
rather than biological, creations. One looks through the paper in vain
for new facts, and, indeed, for any really original interpretations. This
is far from saying, however, that it is entirely lacking in interest or in
suggestiveness.
FRANCIS B. SUMNER.
COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
Les mathematiques et la logique. H. POINCARE. Revue de metaphysique
et de morale, November, 1905. Pp. 815-835.
Sur la relation des mathematiques a la logistique, avec une note de M.
Whitehead. B. RUSSELL. Revue de metaphysique et de morale,
November, 1905. Pp. 906-917.
M. Poincare, discussing M. Couturat's denial of any appeal to intui-
tion in mathematics, 1 puts the issue with French clearness. Admit that
from beginning to end the deductions of mathematics are interrupted by
no intuitions: what is the source and meaning of the starting-points,
yes, of the whole process ? Whenever a new starting-point, a new ' arbi-
trary convention,' is adopted, why is it preferred to others? These con-
ventions would need an accompanying axiom asserting their existence.
8 Op. cit., p. 437.
1 Revue de metaphysique et de morale, 1905, seriatim.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 247
This existence, of course, is not psychological nor physical, but logical;
i. e., such that the conventions may be so stated that no contradictions
issue from them or any of their consequences (which consequences are in
mathematics infinitely numerous). Now until you have proved the
validity of complete induction, you can not argue with respect to an
infinite series. But to prove complete induction you must show that
none of an infinity of cases would offer in itself a contradiction. This
you can not do without complete induction as a basis. Thus mathematics
has no means of proving the logical existence of its concepts, except by
an appeal to the intuition. Again, what guarantee have we that our
definitions apply to the entity defined, e. g., that the definition of number
applies to those entities we call numbers? Surely it needs an intuition
to perceive the identity of the two. Again, the definitions of pasigraphy
do but give over again what we intuit directly, e. g., the definition of one
as the class of two members which are identical for what is two unless
we first know one?
Mr. Russell's indemonstrable axioms, not being shown by him to be
incapable of self-contradiction, are again intuitions. M. Couturat indeed
admits that we need a special axiom in each case to assert their existence.
This amounts to admitting that we intuit them. We think M. Poincare
might say that even the deductions themselves have force to us because
we intuitively perceive their value. Who can prove that proof is bind-
ing? Is it not an immediately felt certainty? In short, as, if I re-
member correctly, Professor Royce once remarked, intuition there is in
plenty in mathematics, but the real issue is, is it the kind of intuition
we have in space-perception and daily experience with the outer world?
We do not see that M. Poincare has here raised a point which Mr. Russell
need deny. What the former calls an intuition the latter calls an in-
demonstrable proposition. But so long as M. Poincare and (as quoted
in the paper named above) M. Boutroux define intuition in a purely
logical sense, not in an experiential sense, we do not see that there is an
important difference between the two schools, and we must class both
over against the school of radical empiricism which believes that exist-
ence, concept, truth, proposition, can be defined in psychological or phys-
ical terms. This question, we regret to say, the devotees of logistic do
not explicitly examine. It is a fault common to the whole school, that
they start from certain philosophic presuppositions which admit of much
controversy, and then think that their methods and results must have
fundamental philosophic value. The same criticism, we think, pertains
to Mr. Russell's reply to M. P. Boutroux. Mr. Russell shows that corre-
spondence is not an ultimate indefinable, that there is no gap in the
reasoning which leads to it, needing to be filled by an appeal to intuition.
And yet M. Boutroux, who defines intuition as 'not the result of sense-
experience, nor of combination of or deduction from anterior knowledge ' '
could reply, we think, in the spirit of M. Poincare, that it is a guiding
force which leads us to combine or deduce from anterior knowledge, or
even to set up new indefinables. We agree with Mr. Russell in finding
2 Revue de me'taphysique et de morale, XIII., p. 624.
248
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
this definition hard to understand, for we do not see that there is any-
thing in it which could not be expressed in logistic terms. Indeed, Mr.
Russell admits that if by intuition you mean the discovery of a new inde-
finable, you are consistent enough. M. Boutroux also accuses Mr. Russell
of not getting all the detailed results of mathematics. The latter replies
(justly, we think) that when you have defined a class like number in-
tensionally, you have essentially deduced all the particular numbers: the
general rule being given, that is enough. He accuses M. Boutroux in
turn of confusing intension with extension. If the extension is not
completely deduced, the intension may be: the latter alone is the subject-
matter of mathematics. Again, M. Boutroux is said to confuse the act
of discovery with the thing discovered. The thing discovered may be
an object of intuition even while it is discovered by means of logistic
processes. Of course; but is intuition after all essentially different from
logistic proof ? It seems unimportant, how we are led to discover a truth ;
the important question is, do the truths discovered, when reduced to
lowest terms, show mutual independence, or are they logically dependent
upon a small number of concepts and axioms? It is this connectedness
or disconnectedness that we want to discover, and if logistic has shown
that the complex i subject-matter of exact thought' stands upon a very
few simple truths, it has done a great thing. The real problems for dis-
cussion are, we think, not the issue between logical intuition and logical
deduction, but the philosophical presuppositions of logistic, and the cor-
rectness of the definitions and deductions it contains.
W. H. SHELDON.
PBINCETON UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE
DER SINNESORGANE. November, 1905, Bd. 40, Heft 4. Ueler
das Verstehen von Worten und Satzen (pp. 225-251) : CLIFTON O. TAYLOR.
-By observing the introspection of a number of subjects in the compre-
hension of various texts and in the solution of problems, the following
conclusions are reached: The comprehension of sentences of concrete
content may be aided by the development of congruent imagery. These
auxiliary images become less frequent as the matters treated of in the
text are more familiar. The comprehension of sentences of abstract
content is not facilitated by such imagery, but rather hindered. Pauses
not occupied by special experiences appear necessary to comprehension.
The influence of context may aid in comprehension without the appear-
ance in consciousness of any special contextual experience. Die Orien-
tierung der Brieftauhen (pp. 252-279) : G. H. SCHNEIDER. - The problem
to which this study was limited was whether the carrier-pigeon possesses
an innate sense of direction, or whether it is guided by the eye, and in
this case what factors in topography and the like are significant. The
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 249
method was to release pigeons of varying ages at different distances, and
under varying topographic conditions, and to note the time and nature
of the flight homeward. The conclusion is that there is no innate sense
of direction. Young pigeons find their way home even at short distances
with great difficulty, and often require days to return, and in many cases
they never do return. Groups of houses and valleys seem to be the chief
guides. The nature of the flight varies widely. If the home environ-
ment is clearly seen, the flight is in a straight line. When the home en-
vironment can not be seen, and the direction is unknown, the pigeon flies
about for some time in a circle. When two villages similar in appear-
ance to the home environment are seen, the flight alternates for a long
time back and forth. This study was made by Dr. Schneider in 1886
at the suggestion of the Prussian Ministry of War. Literaturbericht.
KEVISTA FILOSOFICA. November-December, 1905. La Finalitd
della vita (pp. 589-621) : B. VARISCO. - A defense of final causes in biology
and a criticism of Reinke's * Philosophic der Botanik.' In opposition
to Reinke, Varisco holds that a living organism has something life not
found in inorganic nature. In physiology neither causality nor finality
can be ignored. To overlook finality is to overlook the organism. In-
deed, in the case of organisms finality is much more evident and certain
than causality. La Sociologia e I'insegnamento Secondario e superiore
(pp. 622-648) : A. PAGANO. - The majority of those Italians who guide
the political affairs of their country receive their education under one of
the faculties of law in an Italian university. Their previous education
has been chiefly literary, their university training is chiefly ' legal.' In
both they are provided with traditional conceptions for deductive appli-
cation to present conditions which the student has not been properly fitted
to understand. Literary training should not be diminished, but it should
bo so selected and combined with the study of history broadly conceived,
that the student becomes acquainted with the geneses and tendencies of
the social forces with which the lawmaker has to reckon. Sul Nietzsche
(pp. 649-668) : A. FRANZONI. - A review of recent works on Nietzsche.
Rassegna Bibliografica (pp. 669-717). Necrologio: Romualdo Bobba;
Vincenzo Lilla.
Arreat, Lucien. Art et psychologie individuelle. Paris: Felix Alcan.
1906. Pp. vii + 158. 2.50 fr.
Binet, Alfred. L'ame et le corps. Paris: Ernest Flammarion. 1905.
Pp. 288.
Boulanger and Hermant. Association des idees chez les idiots et les
imbeciles. Ghent. 1906. Pp. 138.
Cassirer, Ernst. Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophic und Wissen-
schaft der neueren Zeit. Erster Band. Berlin : Bruno Cassirer. 1906.
Pp. viii + 608.
Edmunds, W. Sound and Rhythm, and Box of Models of the Human Ear.
London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox. 1906. Pp. xii-f-96. 2s. 6d.
250 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Gramier, Camilla. La femme criminelle. Paris: Octave Doin. 1906.
Pp. 468.
Grasset. Le psychisme inferieur. Paris: Chevalier and Biviere. 1906.
Pp. 516. 9 fr.
Haeckel, Ernst. Darwinism and the Problems of Life. Translated by
Joseph McCabe. London: A. N. Owen and Co. 1906. 6s.
Hoffman, Abraham. Rene Descartes. Stuttgart : Fromann. 1905. Pp.
x + 194. 2 M.
Hyslop, James H. Enigmas of Psychical Research. Boston: Herbert
B. Turner and Co. 1906. Pp. x -f 427.
Loeb, Jacques. Dynamics of Living Matter. New York : The Macmillan
Co. 1906. $3 net.
NOTES AND NEWS
A. H. BUCHERER, writing from the University of Bonn to the
Athenaeum (of March 24), makes the following observations in the course
of his rather technical communication. " It is the fate of all important
physical theories that, after inaugurating a period of brilliant discoveries,
they are taken to task by an array of new experimental facts, accruing
from the continually refining process of our methods of observation.
The Maxwellian theory has not been exempt from this fate. It is the
absence of the effects of the annual motion of the earth through the
ether on terrestrial optics, and in general on terrestrial electromagnetic
phenomena, that causes so much difficulty, and it is to-day the foremost
aim of all theorists working in the field of electromagnetism to find a
plausible hypothesis accounting for this absence, which has been estab-
lished to an astounding degree of accuracy. To speak strictly, the Max-
wellian theory in its original form can not offer any explanation, and
we have to turn to its natural outgrowth, the electronic theory. It can
be shown that, unless the structure of matter undergoes a certain change
by moving through the ether, the negative results of all the experiments
undertaken with the view of discovering the influnce mentioned would
be incomprehensible. Now, whenever we appeal to the structure of
matter for an explanation of electromagnetic phenomena, we really appeal
to the electrons of which we consider matter to consist. . . . An electron
at rest is a small charged sphere of a diameter of about one-ten-billionth
part of a centimeter, the electric charge residing on the surface or being
distributed in the interior. The electric force of this electron is easily
expressed by applying the ordinary laws of electrostatics. If we impart
a uniform motion to the electron we must assume the laws of flowing
electricity. For the motion of a charge constitutes an electric current,
and to start this with its magnetic field a certain expenditure of energy
is required. We can view this electromagnetic energy in the light of the
ordinary kinetic energy of masses, and ascribe it to some ideal mass of the
electron, which is then termed its electromagnetic mass. There is this
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 251
difference, however, that if compared with the masses we are familiar
with in mechanics, it varies with the velocity, becoming infinite when the
velocity of light is reached. This difference may, nevertheless, be only
apparent, since we have no experience with ordinary masses moving
with velocities sufficiently great to exhibit their dependence on velocity.
And there is yet another distinction. If we accelerate a moving electron
in its line of motion, its mass behaves differently from that which is
called into play when we impart to it an acceleration perpendicular to the
direction of its velocity. So we are forced to distinguish between a longi-
tudinal and a transverse mass, besides the mass mentioned above in
connection with the kinetic energy of the electron. For slow motion
these three masses assume identical values. The manner in which these
masses increase with velocity depends on the shape of the electron. . . .
He (Kauffman) established beyond any doubt that the Lorentz electron
described above does not satisfy the experimental data. The Lorentz
deformation being claimed to be the only one to account for the absence
of any influence of the earth's motion on terrestrial optics, it would
appear that the Maxwellian theory, which forms the basis of Lorentz's
analysis, stands condemned. The writer does not quite share this opinion.
Matter is not so simply constituted that we should venture to make
absolutely final statements as to the effects of a rectilinear motion upon
its structure; nor is the Maxwellian theory so inelastic as to break down
at once under the weight of these brilliant experiments of Kauffmann."
IT is a pleasure to note the appearance of the Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, of which the first number has been issued. It is to be pub-
lished bi-monthly from April 1, 1906, and the editorial management will be
under the direction of Dr. Morton Prince with the cooperation of Pro-
fessor Hugo Miinsterberg, Dr. Boris Sidis, Dr. Charles L. Dana, Dr. J.
Putnam, Dr. August Hoch and Dr. Adolf Meyer. The prospectus makes
the following statement : " The Journal is meant to subserve the inter-
ests of both medical science and psychology. It is primarily intended
for the publication of articles embodying clinical and laboratory re-
searches in abnormal mental phenomena. At present reports of observa-
tions in this field are scattered throughout the medical and psychological
literature of the world, and not only escape attention, but it is difficult
to find them when wanted. Until now there has been no such periodical
printed in English. It is intended that the Journal, though printed in
English, shall be international in character. Articles may be printed in
French or German if expressly requested by the author." The first
number contains articles by Dr. Pierre Janet, Professor W. von Bechterew,
of St. Petersburg, Dr. James J. Putnam and Dr. Morton Prince. Edi-
torial communications should be addressed to Dr. Morton Prince, 458
Beacon St., Boston, and subscriptions (three dollars a year) and all
business correspondence should be sent to the Old Corner Bookstore, 27
Bromfield St., Boston, Mass. The publishers deserve decided credit for
the material qualities of the Journal and its general appearance.
252 PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE Harvard University Gazette announces the appointment of Pro-
fessor Eugen Kiihnemann, of Bonn University, as Germany's represen-
tative at Harvard for 1906-7, the second year of the international inter-
change now regularly established between Harvard University and the
German government. Harvard's representative for next year has not
yet been announced. During the current year Germany was represented
at Harvard by Professor Wilhelm Ostwald, of Leipzig; and Professor
Francis G. Peabody was Harvard's representative at the University of
Berlin. Both of these professors went into residence as members of
the teaching staff for one semester, giving a stated number of exercises
every week. The success of the first year's experiment as shown by the
regular attendance of students and their sustained interest is a favorable
indication of the benefits to be derived from the interchange in the
future. The interchange is carried on under an academic protocol or
treaty between Harvard University on the one hand and the German
government on the other, which is to continue in force until withdrawn
by mutual consent. Professor Kiihnemann's courses at Harvard Uni-
versity next winter will probably deal chiefly with the classic epoch of
German literature in the eighteenth century and with German literature
and thought of the present day.
THE Psychological Bulletin reports that " a special alcove has been
set aside in the philosophical library of the Johns Hopkins University,
to be called the Royce Collection of Philosophical Americana. The
alcove is endowed by a fund donated by Professor Josiah Royce, of Har-
vard University. It will comprise especially works, editions, manu-
scripts, etc., illustrating the sources and progress of philosophy in
America."
THE Western Philosophical Association met conjointly with the North-
Central Section of the American Psychological Association, on Friday,
April 13, at the University of Wisconsin. Abstracts of the papers read
will be published in a later number of the JOURNAL.
DR. E. C. MOORE, professor of education at the University of Cali-
fornia, has been appointed dean of the coming session of the University
of California Summer School. After the summer session Dr. Moore
will go to Los Angeles to assume the duties of superintendent of schools
of that city.
PROFESSOR ROBERT FLINT has received the appointment of Gifford
lecturer at Edinburgh for two years, and Professor James Wood has
been appointed Gifford lecturer for three years at St. Andrews.
DR. HANS DREISCH, of Heidelberg, has been appointed Gifford lecturer
in Aberdeen University for 1907-9.
DR. GUSTAVE LE BON has been elected foreign associate of the Academie
Royale, of Belgium.
VOL. III. No. 10. MAY 10, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
EEALITY AS EXPERIENCE
ri ^HERE are those who find that the assimilation to each other of
the ideas of experience and reality is seriously hampered or
even put out of court by the fact that science makes known a chron-
ological period in which the world managed to lead a respectable
existence in spite of not including conscious organisms. Under such
conditions there was no experience, yet there was reality. Must we
not, then, either give up the identification of the two conceptions,
or else admit we are denying and sophisticating the plain facts of
knowledge ?
One is entitled to enter a caveat against any attempt to impose
science, whether physical or psychological, as philosophy. One is
moved to suggest that the greater the accumulation of interesting
and professedly important details, the more urgent the question of
what the import and interest are: the philosophic meaning of it all.
Yet most empiricists would hardly be willing to adopt any philo-
sophic position of which it could be clearly shown that it depends
upon ignoring, denying or perverting scientific results.
Let us, then, analyze the situation which is offered to justify such
charges. It is a situation of which, by scientific warrant, it always
is to be said that it is on its way to the present situation, that is, to
'experience,' and that this way is its own way. The conditions
which antecede experience are, in other words, already in transition
towards the state of affairs in which they are experienced. Suppose
one keep in mind the fact of qualitative-transformation-towards,
and keep in mind that this fact has the same objective warrant as
any other assigned trait (mechanical and chemical characteristics and
relations, etc. ) . What, then, becomes of the force of the objection ?
If, at some point, one shoves a soul-substance, a mind or even a
consciousness 1 in between the prior condition of reality and experi-
ence, then, of course, the suggested implication of identification of
1 Consciousness is " the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing ' soul '
upon the air of philosophy," James, this JOURNAL, Vol. I., p. 477.
253
254
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
reality and experience does not hold. Reality and experience are
separable, because this heterogeneous factor interposes and makes
their difference. It, not reality, is responsible for the transforma-
tion; it somehow modifies reality and makes experience out of it,
the resultant experience being heterogeneous to reality in the degree
in which the intervening mind, subject, or substance, is inter jective
in its nature, and sudden or catastrophic in its workings. I am not
concerned here with all the hopeless puzzles that now emerge
puzzles which constitute 'metaphysics' in the popular, pejoristic
sense of that word. I am not even concerned with pointing out the
difficulty, with respect to an experience so constituted, of picking out
the features which belong to reality pure and uncontaminated, and
those for which mind or consciousness, or whatever, is held account-
able. I am only pointing out that such a conception is incompatible
with the idea that the earlier chronological condition of reality is
for philosophic purposes henceforth identifiable with reality. For
philosophy, reality, on this basis, must include 'mind,' 'conscious-
ness, ' or whatever, along with the scientifically warranted early-dated
world ; and philosophy must worry through, as best it may, with the
questions of a reality so hopelessly divided, by conception and defini-
tion, within and against itself. It is in any case a notion irrelevant
to the particular problem under discussion.
I return to the supposedly strictly scientific objection. Unless
some heterogeneous kind of reality is shoved in, then the early reality
is at any and every point on its way to experience. It is only the
earlier portion, historically speaking, of what later is experience.
So viewed, the question of reality versus experience turns out to be
only the question of an earlier version of reality against a later ver-
sion, or if the term 'version' be objected to, then, of an earlier
rendering or expression or state of reality compared with its own
later condition.
We can not, however, say an earlier reality versus a later reality,
because this denies the salient point of transition towards. Contin-
ual-transformation-in-the-direction-of this is the fact which excludes
on the basis of science (to which we have agreed to appeal) any
chopping off of the non-contemporaneously 2 experienced earlier
2 1 insert this word because it is essential. By hypothesis, this prior
state now is experienced, namely, in science, or so far as experience becomes
critical. This is the scientific fact on which are wrecked all strictly objectivistic
realisms. It is also the fact which, on the basis of a psychological analysis of
reality and the substitution of psychological science for physical science as a
methodological clue, is perverted into idealisms. Of course, it may be pointed
out that this psychological procedure always starts from the body and its
organs, the senses, brain, muscles, etc.; so that, as Santayana says, idealisms
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 255
reality from later experience. So viewed, the question for philos-
ophy reduces itself to this : What is the better index, for philosophy,
of reality : its earlier or its later form ?
The question answers itself : the property or quality of transition-
towards, change-in-the-direction-of, which is, to say the least, as ob-
jectively real as anything else, can not be included in the statement
of reality qua earlier, but is only apprehended or realized in experi-
ence. In a very real sense, the present experience of the veriest
unenlightened ditch-digger does philosophic justice to the earlier
reality in a way which the scientific statement does not and can not :
can not, that is, as formulated knowledge. As itself vital or direct
experience, as man's experience (which as geologist's or physicist's
or astronomer's formulation is ignored), the latter is more valuable;
and is truer in the sense of worth more for other interpretations,
for the construction of other objects and the basing of projects upon
them. The reason the scientist can suppress in his statement of the
reality factors which the reality possesses, is just because (1) he is
not interested in the total reality, but in such phases of it as serve
as trustworthy indications of imports and projects, and because (2)
the elements suppressed are not totally suppressed, but are right
there in his experience: in its extra-scientific features. In other
words, the scientist can ignore some part of the man's experience
just because that part is so irremediably there in experience.
Suppose a theoretically adequate cognition of the early reality
as early (prior to the existence of conscious beings) is attained: call
this 0. Call its properties a, b, c, d, etc. Call its laws, the constant
relations of these elements, A, B, C, D, etc. Now since, by the evolu-
tionary theory to which appeal is made, this is in qualitative trans-
formation towards experience, is not reality complete, is not R,
but is a selection of certain conditions of R. But, it may be replied,
the theory of evolution does recognize and state these factors of
transformation. So be it. But where is the locus of this recogni-
tion? If these factors are referred to 0, to the prior object, we
hold that because we get our experience through a body, therefore we have no
body. But, on the other hand, it may be pointed out that this body, the
organism and the behaviors characteristic of it, is just as real as anything else,
and hence that an account of reality based upon systematically ignoring its
curious attitudes and responses (that is, a philosophy based preferentially upon
physical sciences) is also self-contradictory. In such a situation, the important
point would seem to be the significance of science or experience in its critically
controlled forms, whether physically or psychologically directed. And here is
where the pragmatic variety of empiricism with its interpretation of the place
of reflective knowledge, or thought, in control of experience, seems to have the
call.
256
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
have the same situation over again. We just have certain additional
properties, e, f, g, etc., with additional functions, E, F, G, etc.,
which as referred to are still in qualitative transformation. Some-
thing essential to reality is still omitted.
Recognize that this transformation is realized in present experi-
ence, and the contradiction vanishes. Since the qualitative trans-
formation was towards experience, where else should its nature be
realized save in experience and in the very experience in which 0,
the knowledge object, is present.
The as scientifically known is thus contained in an experience
which is not exhausted in its quality of presenting as object. And
the surplusage is not irrelevant, but supplies precisely the factors of
reality which are suppressed in the O taken as the chronologically
prior thing. The only reason this is not universally recognized is
just because it is inevitable and universally so. Only in philosophy
does it require recognition; elsewhere it is taken for granted. The
very motive and basis for formulating R as is in those features of
the experience which are not formulated, and which can be formu-
lated only in a subsequent experience. What is omitted from reality
in the is always restored in the experience in which O is present.
The O is thus really taken as what it is a condition of reality as
experience.
This immersion of a knowledge-object in an inclusive, vital,
direct experience (which terms, like ' immediate,' are tautological,
serving only as warnings against taking experience partially or ab-
stractly) is the solution, I take it, of the problem of the transcendent
aspect of knowledge. What is said of the overreaching, diaphanous
character of knowledge in relation to its object is something which
holds of the experience in which knowledge-and-its-object is sus-
tained, and whose schematized, or structural, portion it is. Every
experience thus holds in suspense within itself knowledge with its
entire object- world, however big or little. And the experience here
referred to is any experience in which cognition enters. It is not
some ideal, or absolute, or exhaustive experience.
Thus, the knowledge-object always carries along, contemporane-
ously with itself, an other, something to which it is relevant and
accountable, and whose union with it affords the condition of its
testing, its correction and verification. This union is intimate and
complete. The distinction in experience between the knowledge por-
tion, as such, and its own experienced context, as non-cognitional,
is a reflective, analytic distinction itself real in its experienced
.content and function. In other words, we can not dispose of the
'margin' or 'surplus' of the experience in which knowledge is im-
merged as being emotional and volitional (and therefore just psycho-
logical, and hence philosophically irrelevant) because the distinction
between knowledge-in-relation-to-its-object, qua known, and other,
supposedly irrelevant, features is constituted in one and the same
subsequent reflective experience. The experience in which O is pre-
sented is one in which is distinguished from other elements of the
experience as well as held in vital connection with them; but it is
not one in which the knowledge-function is discriminated from other
functions, say, the emotional and volitional. If the later experience
in which this discrimination is made is purely psychological, then
the knowledge-function itself, as well as the emotional and volitional,
is merely a psychological distinction, and again the whole case falls.
In other words, whether taken directly as the scientist's experience
or later as the philosopher's (or logician's) experience, we have the
same type of situation: that of something discriminated as a condi-
tion of experience over against and along with those features of
experience of which it is the condition.
If one is inclined to deny this, let him ask himself how it is
possible to correct (supposed) knowledge of the earlier history of
the globe. If O is not all the time in most real connection with
the extra-scientific features of its experience, then is it isolated and
final. If, however, it has to square itself up with them, if it enters
as just one factor into a more inclusive present reality, then there
are conditions present which make for accountability, testing and
revision. To take as an adequate statement of reality (adequate,
that is, for philosophy) is to exalt one scientific product at the ex-
pense of the entire scientific procedure by which that product is
itself legitimated and corrected.
JOHN DEWEY.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
THE GROUND OF THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE
II. IMPLICATION AND THE MEANING OF *!N EXPERIENCE'
n^HE origin of the demand for a transcendent has been presented
in some detail in the preceding article of this series. There
it was found that to guarantee the success of inferences of the alog-
ical kind neither merely correct .data in the sense of 'correspondence*
nor the formal correctness of the inference process itself is suf-
ficient. For the success of inference as a means of readjustment
1 This is the second of a series of four articles dealing with this subject.
The first appeared in this JOURNAL, Vol. III., No. 8.
258
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
there is demanded as external to it, and therefore as in some respect
independent, a regularity and uniformity, persistent and perma-
nent; and since this 'order' is not to be found in the series of con-
scious events, that is, in the immanent, a transcendent, which shall
be identical with or 'bearer' of this permanent regularity, etc., is in
turn demanded. 2
In the first place, and perhaps side by side with other ways of
regarding it, this demand for a transcendent can be formulated as
an implication. Put in a propositional form, which may be not
undeserving of criticism, it may be stated that if alogical knowledge
is to be true, i. e., successful, there must be a transcendent as agent,
etc. Yet it must be emphasized that, although the implication can
be stated in this way, it does not follow that it is itself one as be-
tween propositions. Rather the implication itself is of that which
is the very condition of the success of alogical inference and knowl-
edge put in propositional form; consequently its nature and 'root'
may be of a kind widely different from that of the logical implica-
tion holding good of propositions and of classes. It may be an
implication by a proposition of something which is not a proposition.
To consider this matter in detail is, accordingly, my present purpose.
Now there are two ways in which, perhaps, not only both the
demand for a transcendent and the response to this will each be
looked upon, but also according to which it may be legitimate to
regard each. Firstly, and admitting the demand to be one of impli-
cation, it may be held by some that this is to be met by assuming or
postulating the transcendent; or, secondly, by others it may be con-
sidered that it is wholly a matter of implication with which we are
dealing; that for the success of the inference an 'external' order is
implied, and that this order implies a transcendent. But as an
addendum to this second position it may be insisted upon by some
that the bare implication is sufficient and that the existence of the
transcendent can not be proved and is, in fact, indifferent, since we
can and do make successful predictions without settling that point.
In order now to have a basis, as well for the possible criticism
of a position like the last as also for the solution of our general prob-
lem, it is evident that the nature and structure of implication in
general must be examined. With that done it may result that there
are two species of this genus, both having to do with the 'coming
true' of an inference-prediction or of alogical knowledge, but yet
concerned in different ways with the success of such an instrumental-
2 That in general this is the case may be both a well-known and a frequently
accepted position. Compare, for example, Venn, ' Principles of Empirical
Logic,' in various places.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 269
adaptive and furthering-of-life means of readjustment. The two
species may be traced back to different 'roots,' and in turn these
roots found to supply different proximate needs, and although going
to a common soil, drawing from this, however, a different sustenance.
To proceed to this examination, then, I begin with logical impli-
cation, because of the advantage offered by its greater familiarity.
By logical implication I mean that which includes or is identical
with the two kinds sometimes designated as formal and material
respectively. 3 The material implication is simply a particular case
of the formal. It is that relation in virtue of which it is possible,
for example, to infer validly one proposition from one or more others
or, in the case of a series, each member follows from the preceding
according to a law. It holds without reference to that truth (or
falsity) which consists in 'correspondence with an object' or in suc-
cess. Logical implication, then, concerns the formal correctness of
an inference-process consisting of 'material' propositions. If it be
regarded as something, the discovery of which may serve as a means
for the satisfaction of some need, say that of the readjustment of
an experience at present characterized by conflict, then that need is
in general one for consistency, although, as has been developed in
my first article, this may in turn serve as a means for the satisfaction
of an ultimate alogical need or end. But the readjustment would
consist, first, in the removal of conflict and so in the conforming of
the readjusted experience to the ideal of consistency or of rigorous
logical implication.
We may now pass to the matter of the nature and structure of
implication in general; in the attempt to state this, logical implica-
tion, as a possible species, will be of help. The characteristics of
the genus, and therefore the ' conf erentia ' of the species, may be
said to make up the following generic structure, difficult though it
be to state this satisfactorily, and necessary as it is to put it in
prepositional form: That if it be asserted that p implies q, then
(1) that which is implied is both 'other than' and 'beyond' the
implier and yet in some way 'in' the implier; (2) that 'this way' is
characterized by the 'beyond' and the 'in' constituting, as it were,
two points in a relation, which (3) relation is accordingly absolutely
determinate and unequivocal, binary and asymmetrical. Although
it is necessary under the circumstances to state this generic structure
in prepositional form, and although likewise, if species of implica-
tion are found, the statement of these must be prepositional, never-
8 Compare, for example, Russell, ' The Principles of Mathematics,' in vari-
ous places, especially Chapters II. and III. Also Couturat, ' L'Algebre de la
logique,' Scientia Series.
260 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
theless the reference in the meaning of some of these statements, as
they transcend themselves, may be to something not prepositional
or dependent on propositions, and yet implicative in nature.
With the logical as one possible species of implication, is it pos-
sible now to find another? In the logical the above generic struc-
ture must, of course, be present, but it is present as holding good
between propositions and, perhaps, classes. Present and observed,
or, let us say, with that which is implied made explicit, it constitutes
the formal correctness of an inference procedure. Yet essential as
such formal correctness may be, it does not constitute the sufficient
condition for the success of alogical knowledge. For this a tran-
scendent agent is implied as external to the inference, as something
not prepositional in nature and as in some respect independent,
since the inference may cease to exist as a natural and temporal
event, but the agent for its success must continue to exist, must per-
sist. Now, since truth in the sense of this formal consistency may
be possible without this transcendent ground, but success, even with
formal consistency present, impossible without it, it may be said
that if the demand for a transcendent be formulated as an implica-
tion, it is that which when traced to its roots is found to originate
from a source having to do with the satisfaction of a need quite
distinct from that for formal consistency, namely, the need for suc-
cess in the termination of the process of readjusting subjective ex-
perience to something environmental. Accordingly, I conclude that
there is another species of implication, coordinate with the logical,
but, as springing from a different need, having its own differentia.
This kind of implication, in agreement with the terminology of the
previous paper and from its ' root, ' may be called alogical or biolog-
ical. Furthermore, the justification, first, of calling the demand
for a transcendent an implication appears from its agreement with
logical implication in respect to generic characteristics ; in both some-
thing 'other than' and ' beyond' and yet in some way 'in' the judg-
ments of an inference as implier is necessitated. Secondly, the justi-
fication of recognizing two species appears, for in logical implication
this 'something,' which is both 'in' and 'beyond' that which implies
it, is like in kind; both implier and implied are propositional. On
the other hand, in 'biological' implication this 'something' 'other
than' and 'beyond' the inference for whose success it is necessitated,
even as independent, is unlike in kind to its implier; it is in some
respect 'wholly external' to anything inferential or propositional in
character and contrasts with this in its unexceptional uniformity
and persistence. The inference transcends itself, pointing to an
'other' external to its own internal logical implication; yet the im-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 261
plicative relation here as elsewhere bears the generic characteristics
of determinateness and unequivocalness and asymmetry.
Regarding now the demand for a transcendent as such a biolog-
ical implication, we can return to the consideration of the possible
criticism above suggested, namely, that the bare implication is suffi-
cient, that nothing need exist to ' fill it out, ' etc. This is something
like what the Kantian position would be substance and cause im-
plied but the thing-in-itself as real causal agent left out. It is one
possible type of pragmatism or of radical empiricism.
As concerning such a possible position it may be said that if it is
a proof for the existence of a transcendent that is asked for, then
there is as much proof in this case as in any other. For that which
is implied is, in general, at least, provable, indeed, in one sense,
proved. Also in the case of purely logical implication, for example,
in a series, that which is implied has as 'full' an existence, ideal or
subjective or what not, as that which implies, and this 'existence' is
therewith proved. Quite analogously with another kind of implica-
tion, one whose basis concerns success and not merely formal cor-
rectness, and which is of something external to the inference itself
and to conscious events and different in kind from these, the fact of
the implication may be regarded as a proof for the existence of that
which is implied. But it is a proof for that which of itself is not of
the nature of proof, i. e., of propositions. Its formulation may be
capable of propositional proof, but, with that, such a proof may
transcend itself, referring to something extra-propositional. On the
other hand, if we return to the first possible criticism, that it is
merely an assumption or postulate that the transcendent exists,
made, indeed, as the most general presupposition of all the physical
sciences and as a means of meeting the demands for a regularity,
etc. ; but that, therefore, there is no proof for this, at least a tergo,
because not deducible from any more general principle, then this
last critical conclusion may perhaps be admitted.
But the necessity of the assumption for all the physical sciences
remains ; and the reply may be offered that science does not attempt
to do the impossible, namely, in this case to get an infinite regressus
of propositional proof. For this reason and in this respect all truth
is independent of proof, else were no truth possible ; nor is absence
of proof disproof; nor does an assumption determine the existence
or non-existence of that which is assumed. Accordingly, from this
standpoint, the justification of the assumption of the transcendent
is not a logical, but a biological one; 'instrumental' knowledge is
possible and of use provided only that more is assumed than is
262
proved ; the assumption contains no contradiction ; and that which is
assumed may exist independent of the assumption. 4
Free from being affected by criticisms from either of these
sources, the existence of the transcendent as the Inbegriff of all not-
individually-conscious in nature and as an independent, permanent,
regular and uniquely causal agent, stands, proved by its 'biological'
implication, as the ground for the validity, that is, the success of one
kind of cognitive experience, the prediction-inference. Upon this
existence the purely formal correctness of the inferential process in
no way depends or is decided; upon the two together with correct
data, success does depend.
At this point it is possible, however, that another objection may
be raised by the radical empiricist and others that the transcendent
as a matter either of assumption, or of implication, or of derivation
from the concept of uniformity, is for these very reasons as well as
for others 'in' experience.
In the first place, as bearing thereon, that which can not be de-
nied is that the transcendent is not 'contained in' the same experi-
ence, the particular inference-experience, whose success it conditions.
It is in some respect 'other' than this latter, whether, if regarded
as an assumed transcendent it is 'in' the assumption, or as 'implied'
it is in some way 'other' than and yet 'in' the implier, or as derived
from the concept of regularity it is 'in' the concept. But that is
not to say that as 'in' it is 'contained in' any of these. Indeed, the
transcendent itself may be 'other' than these and anything purely
psychological, prepositional, or logical upon which they may depend,
so that, with an indefinite regressus of assumptions and inferences,
etc., it is always 'beyond.' This can mean only that just as we have
seen that nothing can be deduced from its existence, but only from
the general assumption of this, and, conversely, that its existence has
nothing to do with the formal correctness of the deduction but only
with the success of this last, the transcendent is wholly 'outside' this
logical and psychological series, in the sense that it is different in
kind from and independent of it. In fact, that there was this differ-
ence in kind we have already seen to be implied and so proved biolog-
ically; it is implied that the transcendent is permanent, uniform,
self -determining, etc. ; the inference and conscious events are irregu-
lar, fleeting, etc.
And yet, if in this sense the transcendent is 'beyond' each and
any and every cognitive experience, whether this be assumption, or
* Compare, as in essential agreement with the views expressed in this para-
graph, some of the discussions contained in ' Die Dogmen der Erkenntniss-
theorie,' F. Bon, Leipzig, 1902.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 263
judgment, or concept, there also seems to be undeniably some man-
ner of its being 'in' these individually and in general, and therefore
'in experience.' How can it be both 'in' and 'beyond' at the same
time? And if it is a case of assuming or implying a transcendent,
how can it be independent? Yet that it is this is necessitated as a
condition of success. Otherwise each and every inference, if for-
mally correct, would be the ground of its own success. How then
can it be simultaneously dependent and independent? Both these
questions and the answers to them strike, I believe, to the very root
of the 'nature and structure' of the cognitive experience. Yet I
would venture to suggest that the analysis both of the implications
of alogical cognition and of implication itself enables us to under-
stand how these seemingly paradoxical relations are possible.
To restate one of these problems somewhat, it may be said that,
on the one hand, cognition, both as a matter of implication and for
other reasons also, as I shall show subsequently, transcends itself,
'points to' an 'other' 'beyond' itself, and demands this 'other' as an
'independent' agent. Yet how can this 'other,' 'transcendent' as it
is called, be 'independent' when, on the other hand, as implied, it
must be 'in' experience? The possible solution of this difficulty
comes first from the generic characteristic of implication; that that
which is implied is 'in' the implier and yet 'beyond' in the sense
that the very structure of the relation of implication is constituted
by an, in some respects, really existing 'other,' which in some way
also makes the implier what it is ; and that the relation is at the same
time determinate and unequivocal. Secondly, however, a solution
emerges from the fact of there being two kinds of implication, spring-
ing from different bases; consequently, there is the possibility of
two kinds of 'beyonds,' each with its differentia of really existing
qualities, in one case fleetingness, etc., in the other permanence,
regularity, but in both cases proved existences.
With the species, then, the generic paradox of implication that
the essence of the implier should in some way be constituted by that
which is 'beyond' and 'other than' itself, etc., grows in wonder. In
one species, the logical, there is a mutual determination between
implier and implied ; the latter constitutes the essence of the former
in much the same way as the former does of the latter ; still the rela-
tion is asymmetrical.
But in 'biological' implication the paradox is most marked. Here
the 'other,' the transcendent, implied as the condition for success,
can not imply 'reflectively.' In fact, it is implied as that which is
the very ground of the existence, that is, as the determinant of that
which implies it; as that which is independent of, and yet the
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ground of, its own implication. It is implied as the self-existent, to
be brought 'into experience' only when it determines the existence
of an experience which shall imply it. All this constitutes the
asymmetry of biological as opposed to that of logical implication.
Thus the question is answered as to how the transcendent can be
both 'beyond' and 'other than' and yet 'in' an assumption, or judg-
ment, or inference process. It is one ' term ' in the relation of biolog-
ical implication in which the subjectively limited experience is the
other term. But there remains the question, how the transcendent
can be independent, when, as either assumed or implied, it is 'in
experience.' Is it not, therefore, dependent? The solution of this
problem comes from the peculiarities of biological implication as a
species. In accordance with the very distinctive asymmetry here
it may be said that only the implication of the transcendent and not
its existence is immediately dependent on that which implies it.
Likewise, it may be said that as that which is known it is dependent
on that which knows only for its being known. It does not 'follow
from ' that which implies it ; only the statement of its existence does
this. In general, to admit or assert that the transcendent is de-
pendent in one respect on its implier, namely, in respect to its being
implied, does not necessitate or warrant the assertion of or carry
with it a dependence on this implier in all respects. If A is de-
pendent on B in so far as it bears a certain relation to B, the de-
pendence may be limited to the extent of this relation ; it may be a
dependence only in respect to and for this relation. A simultaneous
dependence in one such respect and independence in all others is
quite possible. ' Really existing things ' can get into and out of dif-
ferent relations. They are dependent on other things only for their
relation to other things. All this may be asserted to hold good of
implication. We can, accordingly, conclude that, dependent for its
implication upon an experience implying it, and for its being known
upon an experience knowing it, the transcendent is independent in
all other respects, as it is implied that it must be as a condition for
the success of alogical knowledge. Thus, the second of our above
questions is answered.
It may be admitted, then, that, at whatever point in the re-
adjustment of experience the demand for a transcendent or the
assumption of it may appear, it is 'in' this new experience in
some respects. But an exact formulation of this relation is always
possible, namely, that the transcendent is 'in' such a readjusting
experience in the way that the implied is 'in' the implier; in a
way, therefore, perfectly compatible with its being also 'beyond'
at the same time. The further formulation is possible that, as
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 265
'beyond,' the transcendent is independent of its implier in every
respect except for its implication and, therefore, for its being known.
Both the 'in' and the 'beyond,' and the dependence and independ-
ence, in general, the nature of the relation between the transcend-
ent and alogical cognitive experience, of whatever specific type the
latter may be, can thus be stated definitely and exactly. It is a re-
lation with the generic characteristics of all implication and the spe-
cific ones of 'biological.' The relation, constituted by a simultane-
ous 'in' and 'beyond' and quite compatible with a 'dependence' in
one respect and an independence in others, is identical with 'tran-
scendence' from one standpoint, and with implication from another.
It is, too, determinate and unequivocal, and the asymmetry is of a
kind specifically different from that of logical implication. The
alogical cognitive experience as a term in this specific relation tran-
scends itself in accordance with the peculiarities of the relation.
Accordingly, although 'beyond' experience, the transcendent as im-
plied 'in' experience is known. It is not a thing-in-itself.
As a result of the distinctions and formulations which have been
made in expounding the nature of the demand for a transcendent
and of the response to this, etc., it is possible, therefore, to state the
nature and structure of 'experience' with a sharper terminology.
Thus, in my former article 'experience' was by definition limited to
the bounds of the individual.
If, now, both because no one is willing to accept 'in' experience
to mean 'contained within' these bounds, and because in the resolu-
tion of the conflicts in a first, purely subjective, experience, a second
experience, in which a transcendent is assumed or implied, follows
or is necessary, it be claimed that, therefore, with the transcendent
'in' this experience, the bounds of the individual experience have
been broken or extended so as to include the transcendent; if this
claim be advanced, even then a perfectly definite statement (1) of
the relation of the new and so-called wider experience to the first,
and (2) of the relation of the transcendent to the subjectively
bounded experience and in the wider experience, can be made. The
basis for such an exact formulation is contained in the analysis
presented in the preceding paragraphs.
As to this claim, however, I think it is essentially the posi-
tion advanced by some of the radical empiricists, but not always
stated by them in a way to eliminate the obscurity of their meaning.
It is their view that everything is 'in experience' and that nothing
'beyond experience' can be known; but they do not define the 'in.'
For them experience at first is in some way impersonal, and out of
it, by way of getting order and harmony and adjustments, etc., sub-
266
ject and object, self and not-self, the conscious and the non-conscious,
the transitory and the constant appear in functional relation to each
other, and as necessary to the resolution of the conflicts in the * living
flow' of experience. But in criticism of this it is to be emphasized
as an undeniable fact, I think, that it is not this experience with
which we actually start, but that such an impersonal experience is
one constructed by way of solving the problems presented in a purely
subjective and individual experience.
Accordingly, it is possible with clearness and definiteness, first,
to define and retain this individual experience as a term; then to
define this wider experience as that beyond which nothing is known,
and as that which contains both the self, with its subjective experi-
ence, and the transcendent, the universal not-self or whatever it may
be called, as the necessary correlative function of self or subject, etc.
Then such a wider and all-inclusive experience will bear the same
relation to the individual experience as, put in another way, the
whole as a wider experience consisting of individual experience plus
its implications bears to individual experience as a part. In a sim-
ilarly exact manner it is possible to formulate the other relations
which were suggested above.
In reality, the difference is largely one of terminology, and the
relations are essentially the same ; but it is relations with which we
are most concerned and which we wish to get at, while terminology
is a matter of advantage or disadvantage. Here, however, the dis-
advantage seems to lie with those who use experience in the wider
sense as including all. The disadvantage comes from the twofold
extension of, and therefore possible ambiguity in the use of, the term
experience. It becomes especially noticeable, when, because of this
ambiguity, the statement that everything is 'in experience' is inter-
preted to mean that it is within the bounds of individual experience.
Such an interpretation, identical as it is with that of subjective
idealism, is not undeserved nor should it be unexpected by those
who, although they make extensive and most frequent use of the
term experience as designating the balm for all our metaphysical
woes, nevertheless fail to tell us, except in a very nebulous way, both
what they mean by it and what its 'formula' and structure are.
In my next article I shall consider the questions of the 'tran-
scendence of knowledge' and the 'correctness of data.'
EDWARD G. SPAULDING.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 267
SOCIETIES
SECTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
r pHE Section met at Princeton, on February 26, 1906, in con-
-- junction with the New York Branch of the American Psy-
chological Association. Professor MacDougall occupied the chair.
The following are abstracts of the papers read :
Method in Esthetics: A. L. JONES.
A discussion of the relative value of the empirical and the meta-
physical methods.
A Psychological Theory of the Origin of Religion: IRVING KING.
Psychologically, religion can not be considered as the outgrowth
of a special instinct or perception. It is rather a construct in vari-
ous individuals, appearing in successive generations through the
agency of certain stimulating social situations which are perpetuated
by social heredity. The religious consciousness may be called an
attitude which has been built up with reference to certain types of
objective conditions. It is most nearly related to the valuational
attitudes, of which it may be said to be a specialization. The par-
ticular aim of this paper was to show how the origin of the sense of
value could be traced in primitive life and how the religious con-
sciousness could be shown to be differentiated therefrom. It was
held that the problem was chiefly one of determining the influences
which would tend to deepen and render permanent the value of con-
sciousness. It was pointed out that the tribe or social group fur-
nishes all the conditions needful for the transformation of simple
fleeting values into permanent religious ones.
The Detection of Color Blindness: VIVIAN A. C. HENMON.
This paper will be published in full in a later issue of this
JOURNAL.
Color Sensations and Color Names: R. S. WOOD WORTH.
The results of Woodworth and Bruner tend to the conclusion that
the color sense is essentially the same in widely different branches of
the human species, and in particular that the more primitive races
show no special deficiency in the perception of blue. The contrary
conclusion of Rivers, based on his tests of different races, is sus-
ceptible of some adverse criticism. The absence of a name for blue
in many languages, and its late development in all, are to be ex-
268
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plained on psychological rather than physiological principles. The
fundamental principle involved is that of the objective reference of
sensations. Color is conceived and named not as a quality of sen-
sation, but as a quality of objects. Moreover, it is not a directly
practical quality of objects, but owes its importance to its power of
serving as a ready sign of more practical inner qualities and condi-
tions of objects. The tendency is to name the inner and practically
important quality rather than the sign; thus, we speak of well-done
and under-done meat rather than of brown and red meat, and of
clear and cloudy skies rather than of blue and gray skies. A further
principle that must be borne in mind is the 'law of dissociation by
varying concomitants.' Unless a color appears in a variety of ob-
jects it is not likely to receive an abstract name. In primitive con-
ditions of life, red and yellow, being the colors and distinguishing
marks of animals and animal substances, as well as of ripe fruits,
appear in sufficiently varied and important situations to account for
their having received names early. Green is principally important
as a sign of growing vegetation, and need, therefore, have no name
except that which distinguishes the growing from the dead or dried
condition. Blue is principally important as a sign of the weather,
and is, therefore, represented by a weather name rather than by a
color name. The development of an abstract name for blue seems 1
to have resulted from the multiplication of blue objects, dependent
on the introduction of blue pigments.
The Practise Curve as an Educational Method: J. McKEEN CATTELL.
Curves were shown giving the records of two children copying at
maximum speed the same passage and a new passage on the type-
writer for 365 consecutive days, and for memorizing ten German
words and the English equivalents for 140 days. Experiments were
made once a month to measure the transference of practise to other
functions, and the curves were shown. It was argued that the prac-
tise curve has certain advantages as an educational method. The
child plots his curve and becomes interested in his progress, viewing
his performance in an objective fashion; he works with maximum
effort and attention for a short time; his main competition is with
himself as he seeks to surpass his record. The experiment can be so
arranged that all the work of the child centers about it the three
R's and the rest supplying a unity and an interest that are often
lacking in our schools.
A New View of 'Mental Function': HOWARD C. WARREN.
From the genetic standpoint the biological functions may be
classed as specific or general. The latter include nutrition, repro-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 269
duction and defense, which occur in various forms throughout all
species. The distinction suggests a similar division of the functions
of consciousness. The problem of the paper was to distinguish the
fundamental or general mental processes from the complex. Psy-
chologists lay too much stress on the human senses, which are only
particular evolutionary products and furnish merely the natural-
history material of the science. Even the division into cognitive,
affective and conative is unsatisfactory, since these processes are
combinations of more fundamental ones. The discussion led to the
formulation on genetic and analytic grounds of five fundamental
functions, viz., sensibility, intensity modification, quality differentia-
tion, association and discrimination, as the simple processes which
the data furnished by sensory and central stimulation undergo. The
reader examined the character of these and showed their lack of
adequate physical analogy. He analyzed the part they play in atten-
tion, perception (association of differentiated elements), imagination,
conception, judgment, reasoning, appreciation, self-consciousness,
etc. From the standpoint of these functions, the relation between
genetic and analytic psychology appears in a new light, as does also
the distinction between mental functions and elements. The study
of physiology, though important for psychology, is involved in it
only as physics and chemistry are involved in physiology. The
recognition of such fundamental functions affords the only satisfac-
tory starting-point for an independent science of psychology.
The 'Four Powers': D. S. MILLER.
Arnold tells us that human nature in its civilized completeness
requires the development of four powers: the power of conduct, the
power of intellect and knowledge, the power of social life and man-
ners, the power of beauty. This involves (what Arnold hardly
acknowledges) the independence of beauty as # a form of well-being,
an end-in-itself. And to the list, on a fair survey of human life, we
must add the power of the affections, the power of religion, the power
of bodily life and the senses. Finally, it has to be noted that conduct
in its full sense includes all; it compasses human life and assigns a
place to each of the powers, from morals, in the narrower sense, to
beauty.
The Nature of Judgment: W. H. SHELDON.
The linguistic expression of judgments, in so far as it is uniform
throughout all languages, can be used as a guide in detecting the
essential features of the process of judgment.
Reality as Possible Experience: M. PHILLIPS MASON.
The concept of reality as possible experience, developed in Royce's
'The World and the Individual,' is not, as Royce would have us
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believe, the same in spirit as it is in Kant. For Kant the interest
lies in the possible, the fundamental conditions of experience, while
for Royce the emphasis is laid rather on experience itself; and for
that reason he makes a distinction between actual and possible ex-
perience, between experience which is actually experienced by human
beings and that which is not experienced by any human being, but
which might be if conditions were other than they are. Since Royce
finds possible experience, taken in this sense, equivalent to no ex-
perience so far as human beings are concerned, it seems to him
necessary to assume an absolute experience to include the purely
possible experience, thus setting aside possible experience as an in-
adequate concept of reality. Had he taken the concept in the
Kantian sense it would not have been necessary for him to develop
a concept of the absolute. For possible experience as a system of
the conditions of experience is a sufficient solution of the problem
of experience. A higher unity of what these conditions involve with
experience is unnecessary and based on a mistaken motive. The
only reason there is for developing a concept of reality is to unify
experience, and such a unity we have in the fundamental conditions
of experience, the world of possible experience.
Misconceptions of Realism: W. P. MONTAGUE.
Realism is the theory that esse is not per dpi, that objects do not
depend for their existence on being experienced, and that, as a con-
sequence, they can exist continuously through those intervals when
no one is aware of them. This view is often falsely interpreted to
mean (1) that consciousness can not change or in any way affect
objects; (2) that real objects are transcendent things-in-themselves,
lacking all experienced qualities; (3) that real objects can only be
inferred and not perceived. In answer to the first of these supposed
implications, which would commit realism to the doctrine of the epi-
phenomenality of consciousness, it is sufficient to point out that one
thing can, so far as its existence is concerned, be independent of
another thing or of its relations to that thing and can yet be affected
by it. Knowledge of an object at one moment can enable the knower
to change it at a later moment without prejudice to its continued
existence during the intervals when it is not known. As regards the
second implication, it may easily be seen that the quality of a thing
has no necessary connection with the fact that it is perceived, except
on the idealist's assumption that consciousness confers qualities as
well as existence upon its objects, which is just what realism denies.
As to the third misconception of realism, it is somewhat more ex-
cusable than the others because the majority of philosophical realists
have been tempted by the supposed exigencies of the physiological
theory of sense-perception to adopt an epistemological dualism or
representative theory of knowledge. Realism is not, however, bound
up with dualism and might without the slightest inconvenience de-
fend the common-sense view that perceptual consciousness extends
to and reveals real objects outside the organism and is not confined
to the comprehension of internal copies or ideas of these.
R. S. WOODWORTH,
Secretary.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Afferent Nervous System from a New Aspect. HENRY HEAD, W. H.
R. RIVERS and JAMES SHERREN. Brain, 1905, XXVIII. Pp. 99-115.
The Consequences of Injury to the Peripheral Nerves in Man. HENRY
HEAD and JAMES SHERREN. Ibid. Pp. 116-338.
These two articles are important to psychologists and should be read
by all who are interested in the analysis of pressure and skin sensations.
The material upon which the articles are based is a series of cases in
which there was injury or division of some of the peripheral sensory
nerves.
A sample observation which led to the research is as follows : " When
the median nerve is divided, sensation is entirely lost over a consider-
able part of both index and middle fingers. Over the palm, within the
area said by anatomists to be supplied by this nerve, sensation is usually
diminished and not completely abolished. In a similar manner, division
of the ulnar nerve produces complete insensibility of the little finger and
of a variable portion of the ulnar aspect of the palm; but partial loss of
sensation is found over a large area of the palm and the ulnar half of
the ring finger. Such is the usual statement of surgeons and anat-
omists " (p. 100).
This statement of the results of injury led the authors to put to them-
selves two questions : ' What is meant by diminished sensibility ? ' and
' To what is it due ? ' Accounts of conditions in various forms of nerve
lesions are given which indicate the answers to these questions. The
diminished sensibility was found to be a true loss of certain sensations
and the retention of others. Thus from careful study of the cases the
authors have been able to differentiate some sensory elements which in
normal people are with difficulty or not at all discriminated.
The experimental results are given from about eighty cases of injuries
to the peripheral nerves, particularly to those of the hand and arm. Forty-
six text figures illustrate the result, and there are eight excellent tables.
The first article gives a general theoretical consideration of the results
of all the work, and the second article is an account of the observations
272
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and experiments. We shall consider first the results of the experiments.
In this article the work is divided as follows :
1. Nerve supply of the palm of the hand.
2. Recovery of sensation after injury to the nerves of the hand.
3. Recovery of sensation after incomplete division of the nerves o
the hand.
4. Nerve supply of the forearm.
5. Injuries to the brachial plexus.
6. Loss of sensation in the arm from division of posterior nerve roots.
7. Nerve supply of the lower limb.
8. Deep sensibility.
9. Sensations of heat and cold.
10. The compass test.
11. Hair sensibility.
12. Hyperalgesia.
13. Changes in the skin that follow injury to peripheral nerves,
14. Changes in the nails after injury to peripheral nerves.
15. Paralysis and other muscular changes.
16. Theoretical.
Most of these sections have observations of interest to psychologists,
but we shall consider only the main points.
If a mixed (sensory and motor) nerve supplying any portion of the body
is cut, there is found to be a complete loss of all kinds of sensation from
part of the region supplied by the nerve. Pain, pressure, light touch and
temperatures are not felt, muscles can not be moved, and the positions of
the parts are not appreciated. If, however, only the branches supplying
the skin be divided, the muscular branches remaining intact, the muscles
can be moved, movement properly sensed, and the part is sensitive to
pressures. In such a case (pp. 214, 327), in which the radial and ex-
ternal cutaneous nerves were divided in the forearm, the authors found
that all the movements of the hand and fingers were perfect, but " the
skin over the back of the thumb and the radial half of the back of the
hand were insensitive to light touch, to prick and to all forms of heat and
cold. But over the whole of this area pressure was at once appreciated.
. . . Touch with the blunt head of a pin was localized with remarkable
accuracy, but our patient could not distinguish pressure with a head
from a prick with a point of a pin, nor could he distinguish between
pressures with a point of a pin and with a steel rod 2 c.m. in diameter
(p. 327). Even when separated to 5 c.m. and applied transversely, the
compasses were appreciated as a single ' push ' or focus of pressure. Any
stimulus dragged across the surface so as to move the skin over under-
lying parts was at once appreciated. . . . But if the skin was lifted
the same method of stimulation entirely failed to evoke any response,
a proof that whatever sensation had been previously present was due to
the underlying structure." A number of cases which were observed
demonstrate that the pressure sensations are carried by the nerves which
supply the muscles, etc., and that these nerves accompany the tendons.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 273
This condition, in which all forms of skin sensibility are lost, but pres-
sures are appreciated, has been called deep sensibility. The conclusion
which is psychologically important is ' that so long as the sensibility of
the skin is unaffected, it is impossible to investigate the sensations evoked
by pressure/ It is even difficult to determine with certainty the condi-
tion of the sense of passive position in the joints when superficial sensi-
bility is present. The skin should be totally insensitive to all stimuli
before deep sensibility can be satisfactorily tested, a condition which
greatly limits the possible opportunity of examination.
Bounding such an area in which there is present only deep sensibility,
there is a zone, of varying extent in individual cases, in which there is
loss of sensory appreciation of light touch and of medium temperatures.
Such sensibility has been called by the authors protopathic. In this area
a prick may be so disagreeable that the patient withdraws his hand. " He
complains that it causes a feeling of pins and needles, not only at the
point pricked, but also widely over the intermediate zone. Asked to
locate the spot pricked, he may be able to do so, but complains that the
pain produced seems to him to be spread over a large surface, or even to
be in two places at once, such as the base of the finger and the middle
of the palm. Moreover, when tested with compasses, the points can not
be distinguished as causing two sensations, even when separated from
one another to the greatest extent possible within the intermediate zone."
Water below 20 C. is felt as cold, but it makes no difference whether
the water be C. or 18 C. Above 45 C. or 50 C. water is felt as hot,
but it is doubtful whether or not there is true heat sensation. The
patients call the sensation hot or burning. Intermediate temperatures
are not felt. In the normal area, of course, all forms of sense stimuli
are appreciated. Those which are peculiar to the normal area are light
touch, the appreciation of twoness, as for example in the double-point
threshold, and the medium temperatures. This form of sensibility is
given the name epicritic.
Occasionally patients were found in whom the area of loss of proto-
pathic sensibility did not entirely cover the area of loss of deep sensibility.
In such a case the skin is sensitive to light touches, but there is no
appreciation of pressures as such. One instructive case of this char-
acter is that (p. 108) of a patient in whom an operation ' produced pro-
found loss of sensation to prick over the one half of the face, unaccom-
panied by an equivalent loss of sensibility to light touch. Here there
could be no doubt that the patient could appreciate warmth, but not
heat, and he many times stated that a temperature of 55 C. was neither
hot nor cold, but that 34 C. was undoubtedly warm/
If a nerve which has been cut is sutured and the wound heals well,
there is a gradual return of normal (epicritic and protopathic) sensi-
bility to the anesthetic and partially anesthetic areas. First, the totally
anesthetic area gradually grows smaller, and there is a return of the
pressure sensation. The recovery begins in about ten weeks, and in
about ten weeks later pressures may be felt over the whole area. Then
274
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
there is a restoration of the sensibility to prick, to pain, to extremes of
heat and cold. At this time the disagreeable radiating effects of the
stimuli are present. Finally, the forms of epicritic sensibility begin to
be felt in the area. The line of demarkation between the normal and
abnormal is no longer well marked, and the area gradually grows smaller.
Eventually, after two to four years, there is a complete return to normal
function.
The characters of the lesions in most of the cases which appear at
the hospitals are such that the results are not simple. Moreover the
patients are not good observers. Experiments must be made of the
conditions as they are, not as one would like to have them. The authors
felt the necessity, therefore, of a caref uly localized lesion and of a skilled
observer for the determinations of the sensory changes. For this reason
one of them (Head) had his radial and external cutaneous nerves divided
near the elbow to be able to compare the normal sensitivity and the sensory
changes following the operation. The results of this experiment which
was most painful and not without considerable danger are given in part
in the present article, but a fuller account is promised. We shall await
with much interest the complete report of this work. " The knowledge
of the properties of deep sensibility gained from this experiment," it is
said (p. 282), "enabled us to understand the full significance of the
various forms of residual sensation discovered after division of peripheral
nerves." The promise is made that ' in a subsequent paper it will be
shown that, so far as protopathic sensibility is concerned, at least three
end organs exist and each of these reacts only to a specific stimulus.'
The conclusions which seem justified from the experimental results
are as follows (pp. Ill, 114, 298) : The sensory mechanism in the peri-
pheral nerves is thus found to consist of three systems : *
I. "Deep sensibility, capable of answering to pressure and to the
movement of parts, and even capable of producing pain under the in-
fluence of excessive pressure, or when the joint is injured. The fibers,
subserving this form of sensation, run mainly with the motor nerves,
and are not destroyed by division of all the sensory nerves to the skin."
II. "Protopathic sensibility, capable of responding to painful cutane-
ous stimuli and to the extremes of heat and cold." " It also endows the
hairs with the power of reacting to painful stimulation." " This is the
great reflex system, producing a rapid, widely diffused response, unaccom-
panied by any definite appreciation of the locality of the spot stimulated."
" These fibers regenerate rapidly after the ends of the nerves have been
reunited; if the operation has been successfully performed sensation
begins to return within from seven to ten weeks. In any peripheral
nerve the distribution of the protopathic fibers usually overlaps greatly
the area supplied by the fibers of the adjacent nerves."
IH. " Epicritic sensibility, by which we gain the power of cutaneous
localization, of the discrimination of two points, and of the finer grades
1 These excerpts are taken from both papers, and as here given do not con-
form in every instance to the sequence in which they originally occur.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 275
of temperature, called cool and warm." " These fibers regenerate more
slowly than those which subserve protopathic sensibility after reunion of
a divided nerve, and sensation does not usually begin to return in less
than six months under the most favorable conditions. The distribution
of these fibers in the larger peripheral nerves, such as the median and
ulnar, overlaps little compared with a great overlapping of the protopathic
supply." "As soon as a sensory impulse reaches its first junction in the
spinal cord, it becomes shunted into tracts devoted to the conduction of
impulses grouped in a way different from that found in the peripheral
nerves. It is no longer a question of protopathic, epicritic or deep sensi-
bility; the tracts in the central nervous system are devoted to the con-
duction of impulses concerned with pain, heat, cold and touch."
" The system we have called protopathic in the skin is one with the
afferent fibers of the sympathetic as they supply the viscera. In both
cases the sensation is badly localized, radiates widely and is frequently
referred to parts other than those stimulated. . . . The whole body
within and without is supplied by the protopathic system. The fibers
of this system in the skin may be spoken of as somatic, those to the
internal organs as visceral protopathic fibers. . . . Another set of
afferent fibers peculiarly associated with impulses of movement and
pressure exist in connection with the Pacinian organs. In the body
and limbs, an analogous system is found peculiarly susceptible to pres-
sure, to the localization of movement and to the appreciation of position.
The fibers of this system run in conjunction with the motor nerves. In
addition to these two systems, which are distributed to all parts of the
body within and without, the surface of the body only is supplied by a
third system, which we have called epicritic."
This work illustrates well the value of a study of the abnormal for
the understanding of normal processes. Not only is normal psychology
of value for the understanding of the abnormal, but pathological or
abnormal psychology can give new points of view to the student of nor-
mal mental life. It is safe to say that the work of Head and his col-
laborators is the most important contribution to the study of skin and
pressure sensation which has appeared in many years.
SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ.
MCLEAN HOSPITAL, WAVERLEY, MASS.
The Experience Philosophy. WARNER FITE. Philosophical Review,
January, 1906. Pp. 1-16.
Professor Fite is convinced that a fundamental fallacy underlies all
' experience-philosophy/ by which term he means any philosophy based
exclusively on experience and declaring that the object of consciousness
has no real existence apart from its presence in consciousness. His
critique is directed, first, against the assumption of the series of experi-
ences as real and, second, against the reality of the present experience.
The series of experiences, although taken only as a working basis,
must still involve a belief that the past fact of experience is in some
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way more valid than a past fact which can be inferred, but has not been
experienced. The author questions the validity of this belief. Accord-
ing to his analysis, the only difference in the two factsi is in the recogni-
tion which may attach itself to the past experience, and recognition is
found to be only a degree of clearness which the image possesses together
with the idea that the experience is mine, which means that my body is
the central figure of the experience. In so far as this distinction
signifies anything beyond the degree of clearness, it means that my body
is a reality apart from experience. The past fact that the tree which
I see felled before me once stood, is equally real, and my judgment is
reached by the same sort of reasoning from the same sort of premises.
That recognition is a variable phenomenon we must all admit, yet
practicaly we do attach greater value to things remembered and recog-
nized than to things unrecognized or inferred, and without departing
from the author's own terms, it would seem that a clearly recalled experi-
ence might fit into one's scheme of thought more conclusively than would
be possible in the case of an inference denied the factor of recognition.
The second point, concerning the reality of the present experience,
turns on the question as to what is really ' given ' on which one may
proceed to build. The present state of consciousness may be largely a
matter of sense-perception, so called; it may also be inferential, im-
aginative or reproductive in nature. Are these all equally ' given/ and,
if so, why not build one's world on imaginary as well as on sensational
elements ? As a matter of fact, one restricts the real or i given ' to the
perception of objects in the outer world. On what is this distinction
of validity based? Here, again, it is merely a matter of clearness, i. e.,
mechanical relations of my body and other bodies, and if this means
anything beyond additional associations it means a reality outside my
own consciousness.
Now it is freely admitted that this step from conscious object to
object of consciousness is not easy. Indeed, nothing less than the
problem of knowledge is here involved. But, questions the author, is
there any more reason for throwing away the tree which inference tells
me produced the sensation, than the man in whom it was produced? In
so far as the distinction subject-object is valid, the series is valid. But
neither is an ultimate. Indeed, the search for an ultimate is an ignis
fatuus. There is no such thing. How can one conceive a foundation
stone which supports all, yet which nothing supports? There is not
even a logical necessity to search for an ultimate, as most philosophers
have wrongly apprehended. Induction and deduction are not two opposed
methods, but two phases of one. Let us, then, accept all such data as
seem useful, judging validity by usefulness. It is not a firm foundation
that we need strive for, but a democracy of data all leading equally well
from one to the other an idea which, by the way, is not new to students
of modern positivism.
And so our author concludes we should, ( with the realists, hold that
reality is not limited to experience, and that the progress of science
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 277
represents ... an advance in genuine knowledge of an external world ;
and, with the idealist, we should hold that, nevertheless, our objective
world is a construction; and, with the pragmatist, that it has been con-
structed in response to the demands of practical life.'
It is a rather hard pill to swallow, this mixture of realism and idealism.
Realism it is, apparently, whenever I take the standpoint of external
observer and look at myself and others, idealism it is when in propria
persona I become the percipient subject. Still, since Professor Fite re-
gards these only as more or less temporary foundations on which he
proposes to build to be consistent he might have said, data which he
intends to expand we can perhaps abide the further question until the
structure has been reared, or the field at least surveyed.
ROBERT MORRIS OGDEN.
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE.
Les etats mystiques. BRENIER DE MONTMORAND. Revue Philosophique,
July, 1905. Pp. 1-23.
In the first ten pages of this article the mystical ecstasy of the
orthodox mystics is described in four degrees: quietude, union, ecstasy,
spiritual marriage. It is the division made by Ste. Theresa in the
1 Chateaux Interieurs.' In the second section (pp. 10-14) are summa-
rized the views of Ribot, Godfernaux, Recejac and Leuba on ecstasy. In
the third and last section (pp. 14-23) Montmorand states his conception
and his explanation of the mystical ecstasy.
His first claim is that the psychologists named above ' confuse under
the name ecstasy phenomena of very different nature.' He would make
the following five classes:
1. Physiological ecstasy, or the ecstasy of philosophers. It is the out-
come of hypertrophied attention. Archimedes during the capture of
Syracuse is given as an instance.
2. Hypnotic, or Buddhic, ecstasy.
3. Cataleptic ecstasy.
4. Hysteric ecstasy.
5. Mystic ecstasy, of the orthodox mystics.
Although these five kinds of ecstasy show marked external analogies,
they have, we are told, evidently no common measure. Physiological
ecstasy is characterized by extreme intellectual activity, while Buddhic
ecstasy and cataleptic ecstasy are accompanied by loss of consciousness.
Hysterical ecstasy ' is made up of hallucinations which follow each other
in two alternating tableaux,' while physical ecstasy is devoid of hallucina-
tion. We need not stop to examine the adequacy of his classification
and the correctness of the accompanying descriptions. Let us simply
say that Montmorand did well to remind those of us who treated ecstasy
a little too much ' in the lump ' of the more or less important differences
which exist between its several varieties.
The main thesis of the author is not that there are several sorts of
ecstasy, but that the orthodox mystical ecstasy differs essentially and funda-
278
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
mentally from the other kinds. It differs from them in its cause and in
its effects. Mystical ecstasy is neither the result of a direct stimulation
of the nervous system (Buddhic ecstasy) ; nor of an hypertrophied atten-
tion (ecstasy of philosophers) ; nor yet a ' detached fragment ' of a morbid
process (hysterical ecstasy). Its effects separate it also from the other
kinds of ecstasy: they are singularly beneficent, physically as well as
morally. Mystical ecstasy is ( a kind of vivifying- bath out of which one
issues humbler and more courageous, better tempered for effort and for
action.'
In order to account for what seems to him peculiar in the apparition
and in the effects of the mystical ecstasy, Montmorand uses the familiar
conception of subconscious activity. " In the first period of ecstasy,
subconscious activity brings to the self, in the form of symbolic hallucina-
tions (visions, revelations, internal speech), what Meyers calls sub-
liminal messages. Later on, the ordinary consciousness [la conscience
personnelle], becoming somnolent, is enriched, unbeknown to itself, by
emanations from the subliminal consciousness, which, when the trance
is over, blossom forth in generous resolves, holy desires, in virtues appar-
ently spontaneous." To this explanatory use of the subconscious probably
no one would object, provided nothing extrasubjectif be meant by subcon-
sciousness. But that may not be the meaning of the author. On page 20
there is a surprising paragraph, somewhat ambiguously worded, which may
mean that the author is not satisfied with a purely subjective conception
of the subconscious, that he holds rather to the views of Meyers or to the
hypothesis of James (conclusions of ' The Varieties of Religious Ex-
perience 7 )- The suspicious sentence runs thus, "Those theologians ap-
pear to me to be better advised who admit that in the mystical ecstasy,
knowledge is realized by supernatural means rationally inexplicable and
quite incompatible with the process by which knowledge is usually
gained."
One would have to be either very ignorant of the resources of psy-
chological science or passionately desirous of believing in the supernatural
to find support for this theological opinion in the facts described in this
article. The independence of the mystical ecstasy from voluntary con-
trol and its two effects, physical well-being and moral elevation, do not
call for a supernatural explanation.
JAMES H. LEUBA.
BRYN MAWE COLLEGE.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
VIERTELJAHRSCHRIFT FUR WISSENSCHAETLICHE PHI-
LOSOPHIE UNO SOZIOLOGIE.. November, 1905, Band 29, Heft 4.
Die Grundlagen des naturlichen Monismus bei Karl Christian Planck,
Schluss (pp. 447-494) : H. PLANCK. - A rather detailed discussion of space
and time, causality, morality and human life, in which Spencer and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 279
Planck are compared, with the conclusion that the latter is, first, more
successful in showing the necessary relation between the fundamental
law of identity and the law of evolution, and, second, more consistent in
recognizing the consequences of the theory of evolution for any theory of
society. Zur sozialwissenschaftlichen und socialpolitischen Bedeutung
der Naturwissenchaften, besonders der Biologie (pp. 495-512) : W.
SCHALLMEYER. - The deficiency among office-holders in scientific and espe-
cially biological knowledge is noted, and the resulting conservation, and
failure to discover and apply scientifically the means, or to determine
scientifically the ends, of the state. Besprechungen. F. Jodl, Lehrbuch
der Psychologic: F. KRUEGER. J. A. Earth, Wissenschaftliche Beilage
zum XVI. Jahresbericht (1903) der Philosophischen Gesellschaft an der
Universitdt zu Wien: C. VON BROCKDORFF. P. Natorp, Platos Ideenlehre,
Eine Einfuhrung in den Idealismus: A. AALL. Philosophische Zeit-
schriften.
Earth, P. Die Elemente der Erziehungs- und Unterrichtslehre auf
Grund der Psychologic der Gegenwart dargestellt. Leipzig: J. A.
Earth. 1905. Pp. xii + 515.
Bohme, Jacob. Morgenrote. Herausgegeben von Joseph Grabisch.
Munich: K. Piper und Co. Pp. xxii -f 280.
Brotherus, K. R. Immanuel Kants Philosophic der Geschichte. Hel-
singf ors : Aktiebolaget Handelstryckeriet. 1905. Pp. vii + 136.
Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904. Vol.
III., History of Language, History of Literature, History of Art.
Pp. x -f 682.
Frost, Walter. Der Begriff der UrteilsJcraft bei Kant. Halle : Max Nie-
meyer. 1906. Pp. 135.
Mach, J. Kritik der Freiheitstheorien. Leipzig: J. A. Earth. 1906.
Pp. viii -f 287. 4.50 M.
Olle-Laprune, Leon. La raison ou le rationalisme. Paris: Perrin. 1906.
Pp. liii -f 269.
Ostwald, Wilhelm. Individuality and Immortality. New York : Hough-
ton, Mifflin and Co. 1906. 75 cents.
Revel, P. Camille. Le hasard, sa loi et ses consequences dans les sciences
et en philosophic. Paris: Chacormac. 1905. Pp. 393.
Rivaud, N. Les notions d'essence et d'existence dans la philosophie de
Spinoza. Paris: F. Alcan. 1906. Pp.216.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE following is the preliminary program of the conference of col-
lege and normal school teachers of psychology in Wisconsin and Michigan,
to be held at Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, on May 24 and 25 : < Ideals in the
Organization of Elementary Courses in Psychology/ J. R. Angell ; ' Ele-
280
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
mentary Courses from the College Point of View/ J. R. Farley; ' Courses
in Psychology for Students of Education/ N. A. Harvey; t The Purpose
of an Elementary Course in Psychology/ R. C. Hughes ; ' The Relation
of Psychology to Pedagogy/ E. G. Lancaster, John McManis ; ( Some
Advances in the Teaching of Pedagogy/ George Randels ; ' Differences
between College and Normal School Courses/ H. H. Schroeder; i What
Experiments are of most Value in Cultivating Careful Introspection/
M. A. Small; ' The Teaching of the Concept/ E. N. Spindler; <A Phase
of Genetic Psychology/ W. A. Trettien ; evening address * The Educa-
tional Value of Psychology/ J. R. Angell. Changes desired in state-
ments of subjects announced in this program, or additional subjects,
should be sent to E. C. Rowe, Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, or to J. R. Farley,
Appleton, Wisconsin, before May 1, when the final program will be issued.
In order that arrangements may be made for entertainment, all persons
expecting to attend the conference should send their names to E. C. Rowe,
Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, before May 20, if possible.
THE Philosophical Society of Berlin is preparing to honor the philos-
opher Fichte by the dedication of a monument to his memory. Fichte
was largely influential in the organization of the Berlin University. He
was its first rector, and the unveiling of his monument will celebrate the
centennial of his entrance upon the duties of that office. Professor
Gabriel Campbell, of Dartmouth College, is a member of the committee
to receive contributions for the Fichte monument. He will be glad to
receive offerings large or small which may be credited to an institution
or to an individual. So many of our professors and teachers recognize
in the University of Berlin an alma mater that some expression of appre-
ciation from America would be a well-deserved and graceful courtesy at
the Berlin centennial.
THE Academy of Moral and Political Science, at Naples, offers a prize
of one thousand francs for the best unpublished essay on either of the
three following topics: (1) ' The Concept of the Infinite in the Light of
Recent Investigation ' ; (2) ' The Doctrine of Self -consciousness in Psy-
chology, in Epistemology and in Metaphysics'; (3) ' The Philosophy of
Language in Patristic and Scholastic Philosophy.' All papers must be
written in either Italian, Latin, or French, and must be received by the
Segretario, Filippo Masci, not later than September 30, 1907. Com-
peting contributors may put their names upon their papers submitted, or
papers may be presented anonymously ; in the latter case, however, the
paper must be designated by a motto which shall be enclosed also in a
sealed envelope containing the writer's name. The papers for which
prizes are awarded will be published in the Atti, and the authors will
receive one hundred reprints. The envelopes containing the names of
the authors of the papers which receive neither tne prize nor the accessit
will be destroyed. All competing papers will be preserved in the archive
and no one will be permitted to copy from any paper except the author
of it after satisfactory identification.
VOL. JII. No. 11. MAY 24, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
ON THE NATURE OF INDUCTION 1
A NY proposition is susceptible to two sorts of proof. We can
-*-*- adduce premises that directly imply it, or we can adduce
premises that indirectly imply it because they imply the falsity of
its contradictory alternatives. In inductive reasoning we prove uni-
versal propositions by adducing as premises the particular proposi-
tions furnished by experience. Formal logic tells us that the value
of a particular proposition consists in its power to disprove its con-
tradictory universal rather than to prove its subalternate universal.
We might naturally suppose that the evidential function of experi-
ence as a knowledge of particulars, was to disprove universal state-
ments rather than to prove them, and that if a universal conclusion
was proved true by appeal to experience, the proof would be based
upon the disproof or elimination of alternatives. That induction is
actually and always of this indirect type of inference, and that as
such it is properly expressed by a disjunctive syllogism in the nega-
tive mood (modus tollendo ponens), is what I wish to show.
There is, of course, no novelty in the conception of induction as
a process of elimination. Mill's canons are efficacious because they
embody implicitly the eliminative principle. In Hobhouse and
Aikins, to mention only two of the modern logicians, the principle
is explicitly recognized, and the chief problems of induction are
treated, especially by Hobhouse, from that point of view. Yet so far
as I am aware there has been nowhere an attempt to identify induc-
tion in all its phases with the kind of indirect inference known as the
reductio ad absurdum, and it has seemed to me worth while to make
that attempt for two reasons: First, because the several inductive
methods when viewed from this standpoint appear not as a group of
disconnected principles, but as an organic system and hierarchy
which is applicable in its entirety to every inductive problem and in
which each principle has its own function and virtue by which it
*Read at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association,
at Cambridge, December, 1905.
281
282
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
supplements the defects of the principles that precede it ; second, on
account of the new light thrown by the indirect theory of induc-
tion upon the general epistemological problem of deriving universals
from particulars.
And now, by way of introduction to the more positive treatment
of the subject, let us consider some of the difficulties involved in
what is still, I think, the usual conception of induction. Induction
when treated as a mode of direct inference is divided into two kinds,
perfect and imperfect. In perfect induction, we reason that as
these A 's are B 's and as these A 's are all the A 's, it must follow that
all A's are B's. It is clear that what is called perfect induction is
only possible when the total number of individuals making the class
is limited. Thus we can prove by this method that all the months in
the year have less than thirty-two days, or that all the flowers in the
garden are fragrant, but not that all bodies gravitate or that all men
are mortal. In these latter propositions, which are genuine univer-
sals, the classes contain an unlimited number of members, and ex-
perience can never supply us with more than an insignificant frac-
tion of them. In imperfect induction, which is supposed to be a de-
generate form of perfect induction, we boldly conclude that because
an infinitesimal portion of a class has been observed to possess a cer-
tain property the whole class will have that property. The methods
or canons of induction are the principles that inform us when we can
and when we can not take the inductive leap.
Now there is one circumstance in particular which might lead us
to suspect that there was something radically wrong with the notion
that induction is a degenerate form of perfect induction. Neither
the actual number of positive instances observed nor the ratio of that
to the total number has anything whatever to do with the degree of
validity possessed by the induction. Perfect induction is essentially
quantitative, depending, as it does, upon observation of all the mem-
bers of a given class. The canons that guide us in making the so-
called imperfect induction are, on the other hand, essentially qualita-
tive, and not, as we might suppose, imperfectly quantitative. That
is to say, it is never a question of observing almost all, or a bare
majority, or even an appreciable fraction of the whole number of
material bodies, for example, as evidence for the inductive generaliza-
tion that all bodies gravitate. We contrive in the few cases under
our control to eliminate by the methods of difference and especially
of agreement all the characteristics of bodies that could possibly
cause their gravitation except those of extension and inertia, and
on the strength of this elimination we unhesitatingly conclude that
a material body, merely as such (and hence all material bodies), will
gravitate.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 283
And now that we have briefly considered the contradiction be-
tween inductive theory as exemplified in the supposedly archetypal
syllogism of perfect induction, and inductive practise as exemplified
in Mill's canons, we may look to see how this contradiction can be
removed by treating induction as belonging essentially and exclu-
sively to the indirect type of inference.
Every inductive problem indirectly, and the usual inductive
problem directly, concerns the determination of a causal relation.
A phenomenon occurs in which we are for some reason interested and
we at once seek among its antecedents and consequents for phenom-
ena which are related to it as cause and as effect. Defining a causal
relation as the relation of universal concomitant presence, absence
and variation of two phenomena, we must assume as the basal postu-
lates of all induction (1) that every event has an antecedent and a
consequent with which it is causally or universally related, and (2)
that we can enumerate these possible causal relations, by the aid of
perception and previous knowledge. Now let M be a phenomenon
whose causal relations we are seeking to discover, and let A be an
antecedent or consequent phenomenon which we suspect, or provision-
ally assume, to be, and which in reality is, causally related to M; we
can then classify the possible causal relations of M with respect to A
under five heads. This division may be briefly stated in the form of
a disjunctive proposition which will constitute the major premise of
a typical inductive syllogism. Thus we can say that
The cause or effect of M is either (1) a phenomenon symbolized
by X that is related to A only casually or by chance; or (2) a
phenomenon symbolized by B, C or D, which is collocated with A
but not indissolubly ; or (3) a complex phenomenon symbolized by
A B, A C or A D, of which A is an indispensable part ; or (4) a phe-
nomenon symbolized by a which is an aspect, phase or degree of A;
or (5) A itself. The four inductive methods of simple enumeration,
difference, agreement and concomitant variation express the types of
particular negative propositions furnished by experience, and as such
they constitute the complex minor premises of the syllogism and
serve to contradict or eliminate all but one of the alternatives set
forth in the major premise. The conclusion is, of course, the cate-
gorical affirmation of the only alternative not eliminated. I shall now
try to show how each of the inductive methods is especially suited to
eliminate one of these alternatives and that the eliminative function
is the only function that they could or do perform: First, then,
to remove the possibility that A and M are connected merely by
chance, we use the method of simple enumeration. We observe the
frequency with which M occurs in conjunction with A, and compare
this with the frequency with which M might be expected to occur
284
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
with A if they were quite independent. If the former frequency
greatly exceeds the latter we consider the conjunction to be something
more than casual. The number of observations required to eliminate
the hypothesis of chance is thus strictly determined by the joint inde-
pendent probability of the events in question.
Having eliminated chance by the method of simple enumeration,
we next eliminate by the method of difference the possibility that M
is causally related, not to A, but to the antecedents and consequents
with which A is collocated. We find, let us say, cases in which B, C
and D are simultaneously or successively present when the event M
is absent. The results of such observations may be stated in the form
of a particular negative proposition, as follows : Some cases of B, C
and D are not cases of M, which means that the universal affirmative
proposition : All cases of B, C or D are cases of M which expresses
a possible causal relation is eliminated.
Supposing, now, that the phenomenon A has not been found pres-
ent in the absence of M, and consequently has not been eliminated,
it becomes necessary to apply the method of agreement in order to
decide whether M is not causally related to a complex phenomenon
such as AB, AC or AD, of which A is only a part, for the weak
point in the method of difference lies in the fact that it can only
prove that A is at least a part of the cause or effect of M, not that it
is the whole. We observe by the method of agreement that B, C and
D can be simultaneously or successively absent when M and A are
both present. This again eliminates B, C and D, but it also elim-
inates the possibility that A needs to cooperate with B, C and D in
order to be causally related to M.
We have now proved that M is causally related either to A or to
some phase of A which we called a. And to secure the elimina-
tion of this fourth alternative we use the last and most powerful of
the inductive canons, viz., that of concomitant variation. If we
find that M and A vary in perfect concomitance we know that every
phase or degree of A, rather than some particular phase such as a,
is causally related to every phase or degree of M. If, on the other
hand, we had discovered that A did not vary with M in any manner,
we should have proved that the true cause or effect of M was a and
not A 9 as such. Or, again, if we had found that M did not vary di-
rectly with A, but with some function of A, we should conclude that
the cause or effect of M was A in conjunction with a.
The universal affirmative conclusion of an inductive syllogism is
thus in any case the result of successive eliminations in the form
of the particular negative propositions furnished by experience of
all but one of the alternative universals set forth in the disjunctive
major premise as hypotheses. And each of the inductive methods is,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 285
as we have seen, adapted to the elimination of a certain type of al-
ternative.
And now a word must be said in regard to the two methods which
we have not mentioned the method of residues and the joint method
of agreement and difference. The method of residues is confessedly
a method of elimination; it is, however, hardly worthy of being
ranked with the other methods, for it is applicable only when both
the antecedents and consequents are quantities of matter or energy,
for in no other case can we apply the conception of a cause exhaust-
ing its causality in the production of a given effect. As for the
joint method, its continued existence in logical text-books affords a
good illustration (1) of the fact that logicians have failed to recog-
nize the exclusively eliminative nature of induction and (2) of the
results of that failure. The joint method bids us supplement the
method of agreement, by the collection of as many different instances
as possible of the absence of a phenomenon along with the absence of
its supposed cause. Now it can easily be shown that these cases of
concurrent absence are as such quite worthless as evidence of causal
connection. If we are considering whether a protective tariff causes
national prosperity we do not adduce as evidence the generation of
Roentgen rays or the constructing of a sonnet, and yet these are dif-
ferent cases of the concurrent absence of protection and prosperity
and as such perfectly conform to the requirements of the joint
method as worded by Mill and as symbolized by Jevons. What we
actually seek to find in such an investigation are always cases in
which not merely the supposed cause is absent, but in which the alter-
natives to the supposed cause are present along with the absence of
the effect, and hence are eliminated. In the method of difference as
usually schematized this is done in a single pair of instances in which
ABC followed by M is compared with BC followed by the absence
of M; but it can equally well be done piecemeal or by a succession of
instances, one showing simply the presence of B, a second the pres-
ence of C, a third the presence of D, etc. ; along with the absence of
M. Now as the so-called joint method is, when rightly understood,
nothing whatever but a combination of the method of agreement and
the method of difference where each is applied successively in several
instances, rather than simultaneously in a single pair, it does not de-
serve to be classed as a separate canon. 2
The claim was made at the beginning of the paper that the identi-
2 By way of illustration I subjoin ( 1 ) the incorrect and meaningless
symbol ization of the joint method given by Jevons, * Lessons in Logic,' p. 247 ;
(2) the correct symbolization substantially as given by Aikins, 'The Principles
of Logic,' p. 275; (3) the symbolization in a single pair of instances of the
286
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
fication of induction with the indirect type of argument, or reductio
ad absurdum, possessed two advantages, ( 1 ) the unification of the in-
ductive methods, (2) the exhibition in a new light of the general epis-
temological problem of deriving universals from particulars. I have
said what I could in regard to the first of these advantages, but I
should like in conclusion to speak further as to the second.
The attacks upon the possibility of reasoning from particulars,
that have been made by the sceptics on the one hand and by the ex-
treme apriorists on the other, are based in the main upon a quite
proper realization of the gulf between a subaltern proposition and its
subalternates. The number of cases exemplifying a genuine uni-
versal or law of nature is, as we have said, always infinite, and hence
the direct inference from some to all is not only uncertain (which
would be admitted by inductive logicians), but would seem to be not
even probable to be, in fact, infinitely improbable. For we can, of
course, never observe even an appreciable fraction, to say nothing of
a majority of the members of an infinite series. Now when we give
up this attempt at direct inference and exorcise from inductive
theory the specter of a so-called perfect induction as an ideal to be
approximated, the whole problem appears in a less paradoxical and
more hopeful light. For the experiential evidence in the form of
particular propositions, which was worthless as a means of direct
proof of the subalternate, is perfectly capable of disproving the con-
tradictory and thus indirectly establishing a hypothesis as a survival
of the fittest. Of course this does not mean that we have merely, by
the substitution of the intensive for the extensive view of the subject,
removed uncertainty from generalizations from experience, but only
that from our point of view we may more clearly see why it is that
the degree of probability of any inductive conclusion is measured by
the number of antecedently possible alternative conclusions and by
the ease with which they can be isolated, enumerated and eliminated
rather than by the mere number of instances observed.
W. P. MONTAGUE.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
The substantial identity
method of agreement and of the method of difference.
of (2) and (3) is obvious.
(1) (2)
ABC abc ABCD abcd
ADE ade ABGH abgh
AFG afg ACGK acgk
AHK ahk
PQ pq
RS rs
TV tv
DDE Me
CDG cdg
BEF bef
(3)
ABC abc
ADE ade
ABC abc
BCbo
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 287
THE FINAL EDITION OF SPENCER'S 'FIRST PRIN-
CIPLES: PART I'
TTTHBN in 1896 Mr. Spencer had finished the task he laid out
* * for himself in 1860, he set out to do what the more impor-
tant work of completing his system had hitherto prevented, namely,
to revise the earlier parts of the synthetic philosophy. The revised
edition of the 'Principles of Biology' appeared in 1898-9, and of the
'First Principles' in 1900. Declining strength and health prevented
any further work on the revision.
The changes made in the 'First Principles' are exceedingly nu-
merous, and some of them of considerable importance. Nevertheless
but little attention has been paid to them, in spite of the significance
of the work and the influence which it has exerted. The present
writer has made a complete collation of the fourth edition, 1880,
with the sixth, definitive edition of 1900, the alterations introduced
in the fifth edition, 1884, being few in number and negligible in
character. 1 In this paper the results of the investigation are given
so far as they concern the variations in Part I., 'The Unknowable.'
The discussion of the variations in Part II. will be given in a later
article. Though it has been often regarded as the basis for the
acceptance or rejection of Spencer's system as a whole, Part I., as
Mr. Spencer himself points out, both in the new 'Postscript' to Part
I. and in his 'Autobiography,' 2 is an unessential part of the syn-
thetic philosophy. This may account in part for the fact that,
though it forms obviously the weakest part of the system and has
been subjected to the most searching criticism, through all the
changes which were made in the 'First Principles' in 1866 and 1875
Part I. received but two trifling verbal alterations. And even in the
revised edition of 1900 the importance of the changes made in Part
I. is notably less than of those in Part II. This does not imply,
however, that Spencer did not make many changes : rather the enor-
mous number of them is the first thing that attracts the attention.
There is hardly a paragraph, indeed on some pages not a sentence,
that has not been cut into or rearranged. In the vast majority of
instances and the same is true of Part II. as well the alterations
are stylistic. Spencer says in the preface (p. vi), "While the
changes of substance in this edition constitute improvements of some
significance, the changes of form constitute a greater general im-
1 For material assistance in the investigation and in the preparation of
this paper, the writer is indebted to Professor A. C. Armstrong, of Wesleyan
University.
2 Vol. II., p. 86.
288
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
provement." Altogether the largest number are due to a desire to
eliminate redundancies, so that, notwithstanding considerable addi-
tions, the size of the 'First Principles' is reduced by fifty pages, of
which Part I. loses seventeen. The whole forms a good example of
Mr. Spencer's method of literary work as it is described in the
'Autobiography': "So far from disliking the process of polishing as
most writers do, I had a partiality for it and can not let any piece
of work pass so long as it is possible to improve it. ' ' And speaking
more particularly of the 'Study of Sociology': "Every sentence
in the work had passed under my eye for correction five times, and
each time there was scarcely a page which did not bear some erasures
and marginal notes. ' '
The second class of changes, which, however, Mr. Spencer men-
tions first in the preface, are those due to advances made in science
since the book was first written. An example of these is found in
the removal of the argument drawn from philology against the origin
of religious ideas before the dispersion of mankind. 4 Such a nega-
tive statement later philology would not attempt; rather it has
brought forth arguments to prove that so far as its evidence goes
such an origin is possible. Among the rare additions is a foot-note
on the subject of Lord Kelvin's hypothesis of vortex-atoms; 5 this is
introduced in connection with the discussion of the incomprehensi-
bility of matter. Kelvin's theory is dismissed, along with those of
Newton and Boscovich, as involving elements which 'can not be truly
represented in consciousness.' An obvious correction, which should
have been made long before, is the suppression of the following sen-
tence, "The influence conveyed through the nerves to the muscles is,
though not positively electric, yet a form of force nearly allied to
the electric." 6 Corrections due 'to scientific changes, however, are
naturally much fewer in Part I. than in Part II., since the subject-
matter involves fewer scientific illustrations.
A third class of alterations is described in the preface as due to
further developments of the author's own thoughts. This class is
well illustrated by two substitutions in the section which bases the
argument for relativity on Spencer's celebrated definition of life.
The sentence, "Divesting this conception of all superfluities and
reducing it to its most abstract shape, we see that life is definable
as the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external rela-
tions," becomes in the sixth edition, "So that passing over its
noumenal nature, of which we know nothing, life is definable as the
3 Vol. II., p. 423.
4 4th ed., p. 14.
5 6th ed., p. 46, note.
8 4th ed., p. 72.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 289
continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." 7
Similarly, "If, then, life in all its manifestations, inclusive of intel-
ligence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment
of internal relations to external relations, the necessarily relative
character of our knowledge becomes obvious," is changed to, "If,
then, life as knowable to us, inclusive of intelligence in its highest
forms, consists, etc. ' ' 8 These changes evidently refer to the doctrine
set forth at greater length in a new chapter in the revised edition of
the 'Principles of Biology/ 'The Dynamic Element in Life,' 9 a
chapter which has received all too little attention. In this Mr.
Spencer acknowledges the inadequacy of his former definition of
life as the continuous correspondence between inner and outer rela-
tions. It recognizes, he argues, in self-criticism, only the form 10 of
our conception of life, and that incompletely, while it ignores the
body 10 of life altogether. The essential element has been neglected
in the earlier discussion. When it is said that life consists in the
continuous maintenance of relations, the question must be asked, rela-
tions between what things? For a relation of which the terms are
unspecified gives us no true thought, but only the blank form of
thought. Some principle of activity, some dynamic element, must
be the substance and essential part of our idea of life. Then, after
arguing that life can not be conceived either as a vital principle, a
vis vitae, or in physicochemical terms, he adopts as the only possible
alternative that it is another inexplicable manifestation of the un-
known and ultimate reality, a conclusion that is not only dubious
philosophically, but questionable from the scientific standpoint as
well.
In connection with the further development of Spencer's think-
ing some notice should also be given of the apparent softening of
statement which at times accompanies the improvement in diction.
References to 'inexorable logic' almost disappear, as do many strong
adjectives and adverbs, such as ' absolutely, ' ' positively, ' ' rigorously, '
'inevitably' and the like, of which he formerly made abundant use.
'And this assumption is made by the immense majority of philos-
ophers, past and present,' becomes more simply 'most philos-
ophers.' 1 But the illustrative passages are too numerous to cite.
The question naturally arises, is this variation in statement accom-
panied by or indicative of any softening of doctrine, any change
of feeling towards religion, for example, or mitigation of his
T 4th ed., p. 84; 6th ed., p. 70.
4th ed., p. 85 ; 6th ed., p. 72.
"Principles of Biology,' 1898, Vol. I., Part I., Chap. VI. A.
10 Original italics.
11 4th ed., p. 33 ; 6th ed., p. 27.
290
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
agnosticism? Such a substitution as 'rudest beliefs' for 'grossest
superstitions/ perhaps does indicate a calmer attitude towards
religion, a modification like that recorded in the pathetic 'Reflec-
tions' that close the 'Autobiography.' 12 But any change in his
agnosticism, in spite of the fact that nearly one half of the passages
containing the words 'Inscrutable Power' or 'the Unknowable' have
been expunged from Part I., must be denied. The changes have
been made equally on the positive and the negative side of the dis-
cussion. The crucial passages in the chapters on the 'Relativity of
All Knowledge' and the 'Reconciliation' all remain and are rein-
forced in the new 'Postscript.' To the question, then, did Spencer
moderate his agnosticism, we must give a decidedly negative answer.
The principal addition to Part I., the 'Postscript,' is especially
mentioned in the preface as coming under this class of changes. In
it Mr. Spencer notices what he terms the two chief criticisms which
Part I. has called forth: that it is illegitimate to assert of the
ultimate reality that it is unknown and unknowable, first, ' as putting
an arbitrary limit to human faculty,' and second, as involving a
contradiction by 'asserting something concerning that of which we
are said to know nothing.' The first criticism, it is replied, had
already been sufficiently answered in 24 and 25; thinking being
relationing, any knowledge of the absolute is excluded, not arbi-
trarily, but by the very nature of thought. But the second criticism
is acknowledged to contain greater difficulties, since it is true 'that
saying what a thing is not, is in some measure saying what it is,'
as is illustrated in the game of Twenty Questions. So that 'it can
not be denied that to affirm of the ultimate reality that it is un-
knowable is, in a remote way, to assert some knowledge of it, and
therefore involves a contradiction.' And yet, it is held that this
very contradiction itself shows the impossibility of any knowledge
beyond phenomena. Intellect being capable of dealing only with
phenomena, involves us in contradictions just as soon as we attempt
to use it for anything beyond phenomena. Not only so, but we can
not complete any such process of thought, nor even conceive any
connection between a noumenon and a phenomenon, for here one
of the terms of the relationing which constitutes thought is a blank,
and 'such a relation is not truly imaginable.' This last clause de-
serves to be emphasized. For it shows that Mr. Spencer has never
advanced beyond his initial error: he still fails to distinguish be-
tween thinking and imaging. Nevertheless, after thus affirming that
thought concerning the infinite is impossible, in the next paragraph
he argues, "Yet by the very nature of our intelligence we are com-
pelled continually to ascribe the effects we know to some cause
12 Vol. II., pp. 544-549. ,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 291
which we do not know, to regard the manifestations we are con-
scious of as implying something manifested. ' ' Then he asserts once
more that the endeavor to think a relation between appearance and
reality, though foiled, implies the existence of such a reality; and
complains that his critics have overlooked the distinction he makes.
" Their arguments," he says, "are directed against one or other
element in a conception which they ascribe to me; forgetting that,
equally with them, I deny the possibility of any conception, and
affirm only that after all our futile attempts to conceive there re-
mains the indefinable substance of a conception a consciousness
which can not be put into any shape." Again, a knowledge that
is not knowledge at all, but something between that and nescience,
is made superior in positiveness and necessity to real knowledge. In
fine, the remarkable thing is not the change in the thought of Mr.
Spencer, but the absence of change.
But the 'Postscript' ends by pointing out the truth which the
author saw clearly, 13 but which has escaped the attention of many
of his readers, namely, that the value of Part II. is quite independent
of Part I. The latter was written merely with the intention of
preventing any misunderstanding of his purpose in the synthetic
philosophy, lest any one might think he was propounding a purely
materialistic philosophy. 14 Understanding that this is not his in-
tention, the reader is at liberty to reject or adopt so much as he
likes of it, without thereby rejecting or adopting the conclusions of
Part II. And in this, of course, Spencer is abundantly right.
FRANK C. BECKER.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.
DISCUSSION
FINAL STATEMENTS IN THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN
PROFESSOR MINER AND DR. BAIRD
IN the controversy 1 which has arisen between Dr. J. W. Baird
and myself over my investigation of * A Case of Vision Acquired
in Adult Life, ' 2 Dr. Baird has made several statements in his recent
reply which, it seems to me, should not be left unanswered.
One of these statements suggests that there may be a misunder-
standing among psychologists as to what is normal pitch discrimina-
13 Cf. above, p. 287.
"Cf. 'Autobiography/ II., p. 86.
'This JOURNAL, Vol. II., p. 692; Vol. III., pp. 45, 101.
'Monograph Supplement, Psychological Review, VI., pp. 103-118.
292
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tion. In my paper I said regarding Miss. W. : ' ' Although she has
this wide range of tone sensations, we found that her discrimination
between simple tones was not unusually keen. With the tuning-forks
she distinguished, nine times out of ten, a difference of eight vibra-
tions from the international a' (435 vibrations. )' : Dr. Baird in his
review said : ' ' Other investigators have found that the normal differ-
ence for this region of the tonal scale is less than .3 vibration;
Dr. Miner confined [ ?] his tests to a stimulus difference of eight
vibrations and naively remarks that his patient's discrimination of
simple tones was not unusually keen." In my reply to the review,
I referred him to the University of Iowa Studies in Psychology, II.,
p. 56, published in 1899, where data were given on 19 women. This
group showed an average discrimination of 9 vibrations, a median
of 8. In his answer to this reference Dr. Baird said as follows :
"Dr. Miner replies by introducing new 5 data which he 3 has ob-
tained from normal subjects, and which he finds to bear witness to
the normality of his patient. Why were these data not included in
the original paper, to which they properly belong? It is just this
failure to present comparative results which has been a chief factor
in rendering the publication abortive. Moreover, the fact that the
author's determinations of the normal difference limen for tones are
twentyfold greater than the normal determinations of the most re-
liable workers in the field of psychological acoustics shows that there
is something radically wrong with Dr. Miner's conditions of practise
or of experimentation." I would call attention to the facts that
the data were not new, were referred to by page reference, were not
obtained by me, and showed that it is possible to make at least a
rough comparison with results on normal groups found by other
investigators.
As to the literature on pitch discrimination, Spearman 4 has
pointed out the contrast between the records that have been an-
nounced by Delezenne, Siebeck, 5 Preyer, Luft, Meyer, etc., in tests
made mainly on themselves, and the norm for groups of individuals
published by Cattell and Farrand, Wissler, Seashore, Gilbert, Myers
and Spearman. Although the acute and trained ears of the expert
investigators of acoustics may attain a discrimination of .3 vibra-
tion, such results are not comparable with records on groups of
individuals. I tested Miss W. without practise to make the records
easily comparable with a general group. Spearman gives a table
which he says 'appears to bring the various results of the best
3 Italics mine. .
* American Journal of Psychology, XV., p. 228 ff.
6 For references not given by Spearman, see Titchener's ' Instructors' Man-
ual, Quantitative,' p. 235 ff.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 293
workers into very good harmony with one another and also with my
own. ' The table suggests that, with a minimum of fore-exercise, non-
musicians of general culture discriminate normally 10 vibrations;
musicians, 4 vibrations; specially practised reagents, .5 vibration.
After fifteen minutes of good fore-exercise, non-musicians of general
culture dicriminate normally 4 vibrations; musicians, 2 vibrations;
specially practised reagents, J vibration. Spearman's tests, made
with a monochord, with a maximum of fore- exercise, show a median
of 3 vibrations for 27 adults, and of 7 vibrations for 24 children
(11-13 years). A group test given simultaneously on 83 children
(9-13 years) gave a median of 11 vibrations. Myers, using tuning-
forks, gives records on 18 adults, without fore-exercise, which show
a median of 5 vibrations. The Columbia records, obtained on a
monochord, published by Wissler, show an average discrimination
for a group of 265 men students, 17 vibrations; 42 women students,
11 vibrations. The above records were for tones near the middle of
the scale where the absolute pitch of the standard makes little differ-
ence. From the published results we may, therefore, suppose that
practise is so important as to make the most available method for
comparing an individual with a group to be a test with a minimum
of fore-exercise. This was the form of test given Miss W.
As for records taken after the limit of practise has been reached,
we have none for a group of any size, so far as I have been able to
discover. Titchener, in his quantitative manual for instructors,
gives the Cornell laboratory records for his experiment on pitch
discrimination to be as follows: "The value of DL (absolute) as
observed under the described conditions has never exceeded 2 vibra-
tions for either set of forks, and has fallen as low as .75 vibration.'*
But, he says of the laboratory records that they 'represent only a
certain stage of psychological training and are intrinsically valueless
whether for theory or for practise' (124). Whipple has published
records which show the effect of practise on three or four subjects
who discriminated poorly at first. None of these records, it seems to
me, justify Dr. Baird's claim that 'the normal difference limen for
this region of the tonal scale is, after preliminary practise, consid-
erably less than one vibration.' What the norm for a group might
be, after the limit of practise, has not yet been determined. Without
practise, we are sure that it is considerably above one vibration.
Dr. Baird refers to the literature to corroborate another conten-
tion. He admits that he should have used the word 'cataracts' in-
stead of describing the patient as 'a young lady who had a cataract
removed'; yet he believes that he was justified in the use of the
singular when she had two removed. He says: "If Dr. Miner will
consult the literature he will find that I have abundant authority
294
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
for the form of expression which I employed. Would he maintain
that Ware, Franz and other writers of equal prominence have per-
sistently 'misrepresented' the condition of their patients?" In re-
reading the reports of Ware and Franz 6 I find that Ware does men-
tion the operation as an operation for 'the cataract.' But, if I read
aright, neither Ware nor Franz describes 'the condition of his
patient' as having 'a cataract.' On the contrary, they use 'cata-
racts' or 'cataract of both eyes' when telling about their patients.
Moreover, it is to be noted that these cases bring out the importance
of the distinction which Dr. Baird neglected in his description of
Miss. W. The patient mentioned in the title of each of these English
reports was successfully operated on for cataract in only one eye.
Miss W. had a complete congenital cataract removed from each eye.
I regret that Dr. Baird and I did not use 'keenness' of vision
with the same meaning. It has led to his making the unpleasant
charge that I criticized him for an omission he did not make. I
called attention to the fact that, among other important omissions,
he completely overlooked the summarized conclusion that 'color
vision was abnormally keen.' His sole reference to color vision in
his review was to mention that the patient's 'spectrum is about one
fifth longer than the average of ten students. ' By keenness of color
vision, I referred to color discrimination. This was stated at the
conclusion of my paper as follows: "Color vision is so far above
normal as to contradict any supposition that twenty-two years of
disuse would cause degeneracy. On the contrary, either the color
process deteriorates with use or the removal of the lens and unusual
interest produce a remarkable ability to discriminate colors."
Something must have been wrong with my presentation of the
facts or Dr. Baird would not have discussed, as a test for measuring
the perception of depth, an experiment which was to determine
whether Miss W. was actually able to use both eyes together. From
the medical standpoint, it was important to know whether an adult
could really attain single binocular vision. Such an experiment was
largely qualitative in its nature. In the middle of a paragraph
where I was discussing this subject of single binocular vision, Dr.
Baird found my statement about a test to compare the subject's
single and binocular vision. Because I said 'her accuracy doubled'
when she used both eyes in judging the relative distance of two balls,
he was led to suppose that I was interested in measuring her percep-
tion of depth. My form of expression was employed to emphasize
that she was actually using a different method, and not merely neg-
lecting the image on one retina, when she thought she was using both
eyes. While the detailed description of the test, which is yet to be
"Transactions of the Royal Society,' 1801, 1841.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 295
published, might justify the test as one for the perception of depth,
such a test was not planned. It would give no basis for comparison
with a normal group, unless it could be supplemented by an extended
investigation of the secondary factors which Dr. Baird mentions.
From the fact that the subject had no lens in either eye and used
spectacles, such an inquiry was wholly beyond the scope of what I
could expect to do. The problem whether or not she could use both
eyes together in judging distance was the important general question
to be determined.
While I am still struggling with the practical question whether I
shall be able to make further tests on Miss W., and whether the
promise of other results makes further experiments advisable, Dr.
Baird seeks to pierce me with one or the other horn of a logical
dilemma 'Was the patient available for additional experiments or
was she not?" When the experiments began, I thought she would
be available for three days, then for a week, then for a longer time.
Unfortunately, I am not very sure yet what the answer to his ques-
tion is, except that it is not unconditional. I published the prelim-
inary report, hoping that it would call forth suggestions from those
whose special work might be definitely reached by this case. Dr.
Baird has given me the suggestion that I test her limen for pressure
and also for twoness, which I postponed for practical reasons. I
now hope to have Miss W. at the university for a few days the first
of May, and I shall be glad to receive any other suggestions before
that time.
In the conduct of my investigation, the effect of the disuse of
sight on the subject's other senses was a wholly subordinate matter.
Only one page of my report was devoted to tests on other senses than
sight. My effort was directed to the study of the subject's vision
and her learning process. In the discussion in this JOURNAL, alto-
gether too much emphasis has been placed on tests of hearing and
touch. Dr. Baird, in his review, mentions that these were 'inci-
dental,' yet he devoted to them about one half of his page-review of
the paper. He did this, no doubt, because he felt that the tests, or
the description of them, needed criticism. Whether, in general, the
loss of sight is compensated by increased capacity in other senses is
an interesting question on which the case has a bearing. Where
Miss W. might rank with a normal group would be, however, only
an introduction to the problem of how a group of blind people would
compare with a group having sight. Through the discussion of the
incidental problem of compensation, Miss W. 's eyesight has been left
in the background, although it is of vastly more importance in this
case. In my report I tried to emphasize certain rather surprising
results in the field of sight, such as the reversal of irradiation, the
296
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
patient's remarkable color vision, the absence of retinal rivalry, the
unexpected attainment of single binocular vision by an adult, the
development of the perception of number, etc. The main subject of
the investigation was necessarily the acquisition of vision.
In his review Dr. Baird severely criticized the incompleteness of
my investigation and the absence of normal records for comparison ;
but he gave the reader no intimation that my paper was declared to
be 'a brief preliminary report.' Moreover, I stated in it that 'before
the more complete technical description of the experiments and the
quantitative results are published, it is desirable that the tests should
be repeated on a representative group of normal adults.' Because
of the bad impression this omission from his review would create, I
believe it was misleading. Because he used the absence of sys-
tematic experiments in passive touch as an illustration of * haphazard
and inaccurate' tests, I suggest that he further confused incomplete-
ness with lack of thoroughness. Because he said that the results of
a test on active touch were 'unmeaning' when normal records for
comparison were not given in the paper, I question his criticism.
Because he compared the pitch record of Miss W. with that of long-
practised experts, I take the opportunity of correcting a possible
misconception about normal pitch discrimination. Because he sup-
posed that I tried to quantitatively determine the subject's percep-
tion of depth when I was studying whether she acquired single vision
with two eyes, I defend myself. Because he misrepresented by de-
scribing the patient as having 'a cataract removed,' I corrected him.
Because the problem of compensation has become over-emphasized,
I plead for a reading of the report, where that problem is sub-
ordinate. I have not claimed and do not believe that any misrep-
resentation has been intentional. So far as Dr. Baird was misguided
by the way in which I presented my results, I am willing to take
the blame. I am mainly concerned, however, that his criticism
should not prevent attention to this rare case. I feel that it has
several important features which have not previously been studied
after successful operations for complete congenital cataracts.
JAMES BURT MINER.
THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.
WHEN a discussion has reached a certain stage, the main
issues, which were clear-cut and definite at the outset, tend to
become diffuse and obscure as a result of the controversial atti-
tude assumed on both sides. I can not but feel that this stage has
been reached in the present discussion. I shall endeavor, in my
reply, to confine myself to points originally in dispute between
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 297
Dr. Miner and myself. And I shall take up these points in the order
followed in the closing paragraph of the foregoing rejoinder.
1. Dr. Miner's first point, which refers to the preliminary char-
acter of his paper, has already been met. 1
2. The review pointed out in detail that Dr. Miner's work was
neither thorough nor complete. This criticism was not based upon
a single group of experiments, as the rejoinder implies; the review
specified some six other groups of experiments which were vitiated
by the same defects.
3. Dr. Miner 's report of his ' test on active touch ' gives no insight
into the degree of sensitivity possessed by his patient. The results
of this test, as reported by the author, are, therefore, unmeaning.
4. It need scarcely be mentioned that practise tends to refine sen-
sory function. No measurement of sensory capacity can have value
unless the conditions of practise are specified. In describing his
test in tonal discrimination, Dr. Miner made not the slightest refer-
ence to the degree or character of practise attained by his subject at
the time when the test was made. His description leaves the reader
wholly in doubt as to what was the degree of sensitivity possessed by
his subject. 2
5. Apropos of color discrimination, as Dr. Miner here confesses
to an inaccuracy of phrasing, I can only regret a misunderstanding
for which I am not in the least responsible.
6. The question of 'cataract' or 'cataracts' is a merely verbal
issue. There is abundant authority in Ware and in Franz for the
1 See this JOURNAL, Vol. III., No. 4, p. 101.
2 The reader may be reminded that it comes to light only in Dr. Miner's
second rejoinder that this test was made * without practise ' and ' with a
minimum of fore-exercise.' That such initial records can not be regarded as
furnishing a measure of discrimination is well illustrated by Professor Whipple's
records, now referred to by Dr. Miner himself. As to the experimental data
which he here brings into comparison, I need only call attention to the wide
divergence of their conditions. Spearman and Myers deliberately planned to
exclude, so far as possible, the influence of memory, in order that they might
obtain a measurement of the purely sensory limen. The standard and the com-
parative tones were both sounded by the experimenter; the time interval be-
tween the two tones was reduced to a minimum, two seconds in the one case,
three quarters of a second in the other. Wissler had a wholly different prob-
lem, and he attacked it by a wholly different method. Here the standard
tone was sounded, and then the instrument was mistuned and given into the
hands of the subject, who was required to retune it to unison with the standard
tone. Wissler himself says of his method: "The test for pitch is in many
respects a test of memory " ( loc. tit., p. 33) . I regret that in my former ' Reply '
I ascribed to Dr. Miner certain results obtained in the Iowa laboratory before
the publication of his paper. This was a mistake. But I must insist that it
does not in the least affect the questions at issue.
i>98
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
form of expression which I employed; and the context in which I
employed the term is neither equivocal nor misleading. 3
7. As regards Dr. Miner's experiments in the visual perception
of depth, the original paper stated that 'accurate tests were made
upon her ability to discriminate distances with both eyes, compared
with her monocular ability' (p. 114). And the results of these tests
were expressed in quantitative terms, the liminal determinations
being 6 cm. in the former case and 15 cm. in the latter. The author
now points out that I was mistaken in supposing that he 'was inter-
ested in measuring her perception of depth'!
I quite agree with Dr. Miner's statement that a great deal of
interest attaches to this case of acquired vision, and I have already
pointed out that the investigation of such cases may throw light upon
psychological problems. It is true that, in the present instance,
upwards of three years elapsed between the date of the operation for
cataract and the beginning of the examination of the patient. Yet
it can not be doubted that the psychologist is in need of enlighten-
ment upon just the topic which Dr. Miner chose for investigation.
J. W. BAIRD.
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.
WHILE I shall not prolong this controversy by meeting Dr.
Baird's last statements, I would give the following references: In
regard to Dr. Baird's second point, see this JOURNAL, Volume III.,
p. 46, line 26; and as to point '3,' see my original paper in the
Monograph Supplement, Psychological Review, Volume VI., p. 108.
JAMES BURT MINER.
3 In the sentence next succeeding the one in which Dr. Miner finds the ob-
jectionable expression, I twice referred to his patient as a ' blind person.' And
I afterwards spoke of her as a * born-blind ' patient. In describing the experi-
ments in which she acted as subject, I referred to her * capacity to discriminate
distance with both eyes ' and spoke of her converging ' both eyes ' upon the
visual object. I pointed out that her binocular estimation was more than
twice as accurate as her monocular estimation. I spoke of the fact that her
two retinal images did not fuse into a single image ( in the earlier experiments ) ,
and I stated that * each retinal image persisted independently of the other and
her visual objects appeared in duplicate.' Could the most obtuse reader under-
stand from my review that Miss W. was blind in but a single eye before the
operation, or that she saw with but a single eye after the operation? Wherein
then have I 'misrepresented' the condition of his patient?
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 299
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
I presupposti filosofici della nozione del diritto. GEORGIO DEL VECCHIO.
Bologna: Ditta Nicola Zanichelli. 1905. Pp. 188.
Das Naturrecht und der Entwicklungsgedanke. GUGLIELMO SALVADORI.
Leipzig : Theodor Weicher. 1905. Pp. viii + 108.
Owing, no doubt, to the continuity in political and social conditions,
the theory of right is in Germany and Italy perhaps the topic in philos-
ophy most seriously cultivated. Nevertheless the lack of agreement on
fundamental points has caused the phrase l the crisis in the philosophy
of right ' to become almost a technical term. According to Del Vecchio,
and the host of writers cited by him, the confusion centers about the
question, ' What is right ? ' Gierke (' Naturrecht und Deutsches Recht ')
puts it thus : " Am Eingange und am Ausgange der Rechtswissenschaft
steht begrifflicherweise die Frage ' Was ist das Recht ? ' Der Rechtswis-
senschaft geht es nicht besser und nicht schlechter als ihren meisten
Schwestem: in vielhundertjahrigen Bemiihen ist es ihr nicht gelungen
eine endgiiltige und einwandfreie Antwort auf diese Frage zu finden,
von deren Losung doch fiir sie das Verstandniss ihrerselbst abhangt.
Nicht einmal zu einer allgemein anerkannten ausserlichen Definition,
mit deren Hiilfe die sichere Abgrenzung des Rechtsgebiets gegen andere
Gebiete des menschlichen Gemeinlebens nach formellen Merkmalen
moglich ware hat sie es gebracht." Signer Del Vecchio will accordingly
undertake to point the way out of the labyrinth for which the posi-
tive and empirical historical school is apparently chiefly responsible.
Whether or not he succeeds depends upon whether the Kantian philosophy
still has power to convince.
If we look to history to discover the nature of right, she exhibits a
multitude of different and contradictory standards. Herodotos observed
that every people upholds its own laws as the best ones ; and this diversity
of ideals has been an object of curious speculation ever since. It was a
large item in the evidence appealed to by the Greek sophists and skeptics,
and its recognition is a point of departure for perhaps every Auf kid rung.
Its first effect is in the direction of enlightened liberalism or skepticism,
as seen in Montaigne and Pascal. Skepticism, however, does not dispose
of the problem, but rather emphasizes it.
Accordingly this instability of notions of right led in antiquity to
attempts to conceive a stable and authoritative criterion of justice,
superior to the various systems of particular peoples, a criterion, namely,
defined from the point of view of nature. The application of such a
criterion would yield a system of * natural ' justice. But such a system
is just one more system of right and adds itself to the already existing
group. It neither overcomes the diversity which underlies the problem
nor sums up the whole of right within itself. Hence the author concludes
that the problem of ' natural right/ which is at present in his own
country an object of such lively discussion, has nothing to do with the
problem of his own present inquiry.
300
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
A doctrine closely related to that of l natural justice ' proceeds by
distinguishing constant and variable elements. The purpose is really to
give content to the idea of ' natural right.' Thus Aristotle distinguished
what is <poffsi dixatov from what is vo/j.a> or Ol<rst dtxatov. Those elements
in the concept of justice which are derived from nature are common to
the laws of all states. The criterion of empirical universality was the
foundation of the Roman conception of jus gentium. But so far as the
notion of natural right is made to depend upon a consensus gentium, its
character of independent authority is denied. Moreover, an adequate
concept of right must do justice to all of its object and not merely to the
invariable part of it.
The philosophy of history has sought to systematize the diverse
standards by exhibiting them as stages in an evolutionary journey which
every nation is obliged to accomplish. The facts refuse, however, to
follow one another in the ways that such theories demand. The theories
are indeed grand imaginative constructions, but where there is gain of
theoretical precision there is loss of truth.
More promising is the attempt to explain right by examining the rela-
tion it bears to its physical and social environment. This is the char-
acteristically modern point of view, and here the influence of the more
concrete evolutionary conceptions has been valuable, as well as the his-
torical habit of mind cultivated by the Hegelian school, and the methods
of historical positivism. In proportion, however, as this undertaking
meets with success, the essence of the concept of right seems to be lost.
Thus a survey of history gives us not 'right, but rights, and the author
complains that modern speculation labors not so much to discover the
i pure substance ' of the concept as its history and function. The reader
wonders from the beginning why Signer Del' Vecchio never thinks,
apparently, of defining right in terms of function. He never once asks
what right does, but always what it is. It is a little hard to feel the
reality of his problem. Apparently the nature of right exists in im-
peratives of a certain type. The concept of right must, then, be a ' thou
shalt ' something ; but what is it that ' thou shalt ' ? It is impossible to
discover any one imperative which shall explain the particular actual
imperatives as the universal explains the particular. But the formal
concept of right, whatever content it may have, is logically prior to all
concrete manifestations of it, and can not be understood from them. It
is, therefore, a category of reason, making ' juridical experience ' (p. 132)
possible. Nevertheless, the idea of right is not a constructive spontaneity
(una potesta attiva, una gestaltende macht, p. 181). How, then, it can
be effective in the way demanded, the author will perhaps make clear in
his next work. In this one he certainly oscillates between formal logic
and Kantian epistemology. Yet to be quite fair, we must note that the
title announces not a study of the concept of right, but of its 'philo-
sophical presuppositions.'
Dr. Guglielmo Salvadori is more consistent. He criticizes the his-
torical school in the same spirit and from the same point of view as
Del Vecchio. He discusses the ' crisis ' in the philosophy of right, and he
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 301
accounts for the same with a theory that is probably better than a brief
review can make it appear. In the world of intellectual constructions
there is an oscillation between a relatively Eleatic and a relatively
Heracleitean position. The history of empiricism and positivism, since
the days of great philosophical systems, has been a movement away
from the interest in eternal principles toward an interest in the flux of
empirical facts. In this flux of the matter of right the form of right has
almost disappeared. It is accordingly high time to reassert the claims of
the Eleatic position, in the definition of which a real philosophy of right
must consist.
The weak side of the historical school has appeared in its lack of
psychological insight. To say this is not to question the immense serv-
ice rendered by the historical school. Dr. Salvadori does not wish to
complain because historians stick faithfully to their own business. He
does insist, however, that a philosophy of right must rest upon something
which the historian, as such, is unable to supply. Right exists in the
experience of individuals, as a factor in psychical human nature, and
finds expression in will-activities. Psychology must accordingly ally
itself with history in order to seek in human nature the real source of
all ethical phenomena. This appeal to the science which studies the
psychical individual is justified by the history of right which describes
the primitive conception of right as a communistic consciousness, and the
most developed conceptions as involving self-conscious individuality.
And since man is not merely a psychical and a social, but a biological
organism as well, biological science must come to reinforce history, psy-
chology and sociology. All the time, however, the contrast between form
and matter is evident, and while all the sciences of man contribute to
the explanation of particular rights, the essence of right can be under-
stood only as the operation of a mental spontaneity, as a typical activity
of the ' schopferischen Vernunf t.'
By thus grounding the form of right in human nature, the basis is
secured for a legitimate concept of natural right. This, however, does
not give the form of right or state its essence. In order to arrive at a
statement of the concept of natural right it is necessary to describe an
ideal society, not by any a priori procedure, but by empirical observation.
Such an ideal society is a community in which every member is in full
possession of all the rights which issue from the principle of justice be-
cause these are the necessary presuppositions for every social advance.
They constitute the freedom that must be guaranteed to the human indi-
vidual in order that he may realize his highest ethical purposes; they
are the right to freedom, the right to dignity and the right to complete
individual development.
WENDELL T. BUSH.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
302
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The Principles of Descartes's Philosophy. BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA. The
philosopher's earliest work, translated from the Latin, with an intro-
duction by Halbert Hains Britan, Ph.D. Chicago: The Open Court
Publishing Co. 1905. Pp. Ixxxi + 177.
This work of Spinoza's contains (1) an attempt to demonstrate cer-
tain portions of Descartes's ' Principia Philosophic ' (not ' the principles
of Descartes's philosophy,' as the translator puts it) more geometrico,
and (2) an appendix containing certain ' Cogitata Metaphysica ' of
Spinoza's. It is prefaced by a lively and illuminating letter to the reader
from Ludwig Meyer, to whom Spinoza had entrusted the work of publi-
cation. The first ' Part ' of the main work is concerned with God, and
the second with space, matter and motion; the third is a mere fragment.
The sixty-two pages of ' Cogitata Metaphysica ' contain a preliminary
discussion of such subjects as being, essence, existence, necessity and
eternity, a series of short chapters on the attributes of God, and a few
pages at the end on immortality and the freedom of the will.
In these ' Cogitata ' the geometrical method is dropped, but the
topics are those of the ethic, and the question we naturally ask is, How
far do they express Spinoza's own thought at the time and how far are
they mere attempts to interpret Descartes? That Spinoza himself did
not regard them as satisfactory expressions of his own thought is evident
enough from his explicit statement that he holds i the exact contrary to
much that is there written,' for example, to the doctrine of the freedom
of the will, and that the treatise is published in the hope that ( some of
those who hold the foremost positions in my country will be found
desirous of seeing the rest of my writings, which I acknowledge to be my
own,' and make it possible to publish them without breaking the law.
What these other writings were Dr. Britan does not tell us.
So much for Spinoza. Dr. Britan's introduction to the translation
covers some eighty pages, and would have been much improved if he had
condensed it into eight or ten. As to the translation itself, it is extremely
slipshod, even where we have the right to expect the most painstaking
care. Thus we find this definition at the beginning of Part I:
" VII. Substance, which is the immediate subject of extension, and
of accidents, which presupposes forms of extension as figure, position
and motion, etc., is called body (corpus)." This is hard to understand;
but it would have been clear enough if the translator had not inserted a
comma after ' accidents,' and had left ' presuppose ' in the plural. The
Latin reads, ' extensionis, et accidentium quae extensionem preesupponent.'
So with Definition IX. "When we say that something is contained
in the nature of the thing itself or in its concept, it is the same as to
affirm that this is true." But true of what ? The Latin reads, ' idem
est, ac si diceremus, id de ea re verum esse, sive de ipsa posse vere
affirmari.'
Once more, in the discussion of Zeno's argument against motion (p.
73) we read : " For if you reply that a body does not move in the place it
is, but from that place to another, he will ask whether it does not also
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 303
move through the intervening places. We reply by making a distinction
if through the term was we understand to be at rest, then we deny that
the body was at any of the places through which it moved: but if by was
existence is meant, then we say," etc. But where is this ambiguous term
' was ' on which the whole point depends ? It ought to be in the clause
which reads, ' whether it does not also move through the intervening
places' (rogabit: An in locis intermediis non fuit?).
These are rather extreme examples, to be sure, but they do not give an
unfair impression of the general character of the translation.
Some authors might be translated in this free and easy way without
serious harm, but with Spinoza every word tells, and it is a pity that
the translation should be less clean-cut and unambiguous than the
original.
H. AUSTIN AIKINS.
WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.
A Reconciliation between Structural and Functional Psychology. MARY
WHITON CALKINS. The Psychological Review, March, 1906. Pp. 61-81.
Professor Calkins's article is the presidential address at the Cam-
bridge meeting of the American Psychological Association. It includes
(1) a defense of the ' conscious self as basal fact in psychology,' (2) a
reconciliation, through the offices of this self, of structural and functional
psychology and (3) a description of consciousness in terms of structure
and of personal relation. The object of the paper is ' to show that the
two conceptions, structural and functional, are readily combined if only
the basal fact of psychology be conceived as a conscious self, that is,
as a self -being-conscious.' The possibility of the ' combination ' or ' rec-
onciliation ' or ( harmony ' of the two conceptions lies in the alleged
fact that ' a self -being-conscious is not only analyzable into elements,
but is also a complex of relations to its environment, social and physical.'
The most noteworthy feature in the address is the new position taken
by the author with regard to the doctrine of ' selves.' In earlier exposi-
tions, the ' psychology of selves ' has been made coordinate with i struc-
tural ' or l process ' psychology. Any mental experience whatsoever, it
has been urged, may be treated either as an idea or event l without any
reference at all to any self,' or as an experience of a ' self ' or * ego.' l
Now, however, Miss Calkins declares that ' in spite of the abstract pos-
sibility of conceiving consciousness as a series of ideas and psychology
as the science of this stream of ideas, I am none the less convinced that
not the idea, but the self, should be taken as the basal fact of psychology.'
This conviction is defended in two ways : (1) ' the idea is itself an ab-
straction which invariably implies a self ' and (2) no description in terms
of process gives ' a full and adequate account of actual conscious experi-
ence.' These defects of process psychology may be eliminated by sub-
'Cf. 'An Introduction to Psychology/ 1901, pp. v, 12, 149 ff.; also, ' Der
doppelte Standpunkt in der Psychologie,' 1905.
304 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
suming both structural and functional under self psychology. The
author is careful to repeat that by ' self as fundamental fact of psychol-
ogy ' she means neither the psychophysical organism nor the philosophical
or sociological self, but the l psychological self ' t an object of immediate
experience/ Thus conceived, the self is the instrument of the promised
reconciliation. The argument runs as follows : First, self psychology is
structural psychology because it employs the method of analysis into ele-
ments, which is the essential feature of structural psychology. Secondly,
self psychology is functional psychology because it regards and sets a
value to the experienced relations of self to environment. To be sure,
functional psychology, in so far as it forms an alliance with biology,
alienates itself from the more generic form; but, in so far as it remains
true to its ' cardinal conception,' that of l consciousness as involving in-
ternal relation to environment,' it falls naturally under self psychology,
and the reconciliation is complete. " Consciousness, which always im-
plies a conscious self, is a complex alike of structural elements and of
relations of self to environment."
It is, perhaps, captious to suggest that, in the proposed settlement of
differences, the arbiter rather absorbs than ' reconciles ' the disputants.
Assuming, however, that the latter were willing to be devoured in the
interests of harmony, it would behoove outsiders to rest content were it
not that the quarrel if quarrel there really be is far more a matter
of psychologists than of psychologies. The dispute, so far as dispute
exists, springs more from temperamental diversity and from disparity of
interest than from any incompatibility of structure and function. Prac-
tically all psychologists would, I believe, if the distinction in question
became general, acknowledge the validity and value, under some form,
of both procedures. What is of primary importance is not that the dif-
ferences of structure and function should be moderated by a tertium quid,
but that the investigator should know when he is dealing directly with
consciousness itself and when with relationships, dependencies and func-
tions, and that he should be able, in either case, to use appropriate instru-
ments and methods.
To revert to the ' reconciliation ' itself, it may fairly be asked whether
the assumption of a ' self ' serves to establish more than a formal harmony
of the alleged differences. Is it not as simple and as natural to regard
conscious experience from both points of view under discussion, but with-
out reference to the self? Moreover, can the self, once discovered and
admitted, as ' basal fact,' into psychology, be made to stand in any vital
relation to both structure and function ? The relationship with the former
is not unlike that of foster-parentage. Structural analysis has not, as a
matter of fact, usually been regarded as analysis of the ' self,' nor does
the method depend for its existence upon the ' self.' At most (as the
argument of the address concedes) the self is only supplementary: it can
adopt and protect and improve, but it can not originate. To functional
psychology, on the other hand, the psychology of selves stands in a much
more intimate relation. The parentage in this case is real. Indeed,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 305
we may pass beyond the figure of generation and say that self psychology
is a species of functional psychology. But we must not confuse the
species with the genus. There is also the psychophysical kind, which,
however much its ' biological excrescences ' need ' pruning/ is to be
reckoned with. Then there is the function that springs, independently
of the t self/ from the mental process as such or from the organized group
of processes. Again, function may imply not conscious relation of self
to self, but f transcendence ' in general or, finally, the reaction of con-
sciousness upon itself (a kind of function common, e. g., in the writings
of Stout and Lipps). These types of function are, in all probability, not
all coordinate, and the list lays no claim to finality, but the very fact
that the word ( functional ' is employed in psychology in so many different
senses should serve as a warning against hasty generalizations regarding
the use of the term.
Despite the author's intentions, the address seems, then, to the present
writer, strongly to indicate that self psychology is essentially a type of
the psychology of function; that it is, therefore, as in the earlier exposi-
tions it appeared to be, coordinate with and not inclusive of structural
psychology. Thus regarded, it is, without doubt, in a position to perform
or, better, to complete an important and timely service for psychology,
namely, to supply a systematic and psychological account of the functions
and relationships of the conscious individual.
I. MADISON BENTLEY.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. January, 1906,
Vol. XVII., No. 1. The Psychology of the Simple Arithmetical Proc-
esses.- A Study of Certain Habits of Attention and Association (pp. 1-
37) : CHARLES E. BROWNE. - Attention is involved in the data and the
result of a problem, association in the process of solving it. In addition
and subtraction the association is less rapid and direct, and is generally
accompanied by a tendency to articulation on account of the derivation
of these processes from simple counting. In multiplication and division
the association is more rapid and direct, the tendency to articulation
disappears, and the result is accompanied by a sense of accuracy. Peda-
gogical inferences. The Time of Some Mental Processes in the Retarda-
tion and Excitement of Insanity (pp. 38-68) : SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ. -
Experiments made on normal, depressed and excited subjects by taking
their time for certain simple processes show that in the maniacal condi-
tion there is no increase of motor ability, but simply a diffusion of the
motor impulse, and that in the depressed condition the retardation tnkos
place in the peripheral organs rather than in the central. Acquisition of
Written Language "by Primitive Peoples (pp. 69-80): ALEXANDKII F.
CHAMBERLAIN. - The various attempts made by white men and by Indians
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
to reduce the different Indian languages to writing are interesting in
themselves and valuable for the light they may throw upon the general
problems of reading and writing. Bibliography. An Experimental
Examination of the Phenomena usually Attributed to Fluctuations of
Attention (pp. 81-120): C. E. FERREE. -A long series of careful experi-
ments show that the changes in the intensity of the visual field com-
monly attributed to fluctuations of attention are in reality due to inter-
ruptions in adaptation caused by eye movements. A Comparison of
Methods for the Determinations of Ideational Type (pp. 121-126) : ALMA
BELL and LORETTA MUCKENHAUPT. - The different methods used agree, on
the whole, in their results, though the deviations seem to point to imper-
fections in some or all of the methods. The Kinesthetic Element in
Endophasia and Auditory Hallucination (pp. 127-133) : CLARA HARRISON
TOWN. - The view that thinking is carried on mostly by the aid of auditory
and motor images, i. e., is a sort of an internal speech, is confirmed by
some cases of insanity, in which the internal thinking becomes external
and hallucinatory. The Negative Aspect of Hallucinations (pp. 134-
136) : CLARA HARRISON TOWN. - On account of the negative aspect of
hallucinations their power to inhibit sensations from the periphery
Dr. Stoddard explained them as due to a dissociation of the sensory
centers from the sense organs, but since the author found cases of hal-
lucination lacking the negative aspect she regards them as due rather to
a concentration and diminution of attention. New Books. Notes and
News: The Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association.
ANNALEN DER 1ST ATURPHILO SOPHIE. December, 1905, Band
V., Heft 1. Grundzuge des modernen Seelenlebens in Deutschland (pp.
1-50) : K. LAMPRECHT. - From 1500 to 1800 A.D., individualism, having ex-
pelled the medieval view of man as a mere member of a genus, glorified
understanding at the expense of the unifying influence of affection and
imagination. Its two stages and its workings in many fields. The de-
velopment of subjectivism: new emotions arise from introspection, the
love of nature, morbidity; psychology arises and free personality is
achieved, finding in itself the source of objective laws and seeking, in
sports and dilettantism, activities beyond those of mere necessity. Kant's
criticism of the mechanical conception and Darwin's demonstration of the
mutability of species alike magnify personality because they emphasize life.
Tolerance, democracy and cosmopolitanism, are based on the one spirit
of subjectivism. Ueber Harmonie im Weltraum (pp. 51-110) : V. GOLD-
SCHMIDT. - The distances of the planets from the sun result from the prop-
erties of a condensing ball of gas, and also follow the ' law of complica-
tion,' which prevails also in vibrating chords, in all tonal harmonics and
in the development of colors and crystals, and sense and thought. So,
also, the sizes of the planets follow this law, as do the satellites in their
relations to their planets. Die zwei Hauptprobleme der Wirtschafts-
wissenschaft (pp. 111-118) J. ZMAVE. - The problems are those of value
and of labor, of which the latter is altogether fundamental. Die ErJcennt
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 307
niskritische Betrachtungsweise in der Biologie unserer Zeit (pp. 119-133) :
P. OPPENHEIM. - The problem of all naturalistic speculation is the ex-
planation of some dualism; in biology the monistic reality can only be
explained dualistically, whether we regard the dualism of reality and the
way in which it is experienced, or that of the modes of observation, of
which the author distinguishes four. Neue Biicher (pp. 134-136): II.
DINGER, Dramaturgic als Wissenschaft.-'W. O.
Abraham and Langevin. Les Quantites elementaires d'Electricite; Ions,
Electrons, Corpuscles. Memoires reunis. Two volumes. Paris:
Gauthier-Villars et Fils. 1905. Pp. xvi + 1138. 35 fr.
Bolin, Wilhelm. Pierre Bayle, sein Leben und seine Schriften. Stutt-
gart: Frommann. 1905. Pp. 111. 2 M.
Bonucci, Alessandro. La derogabilitd del diritto naturale nella scolastica.
Perugia: Vincenzo Bartelli. 1906. Pp. 292.
D'Alfonso, N. R. / limiti dell esperimento nella psicologia. Rome:
Loescher and Co. 1905. Pp. 21.
Freytag, W. Entwicklung der griechischen Erekenntnistheorie bis
Aristoteles, in ihren Grunrzilgen dargestellt. Halle a/S: Max Nei-
meyer. 1905. Pp. iv -+- 126.
Jastrow, Joseph. The Subconscious. Boston and New York: Houghton,
Mifflin and Co. 1906. Pp. ix + 549. $2.50.
Kuberka, Felix. Kants Lehre von der Sinnlichkeit. Gekronte Preis-
schrift der Krug-Stiftung der Univ. Halle-Wittenberg. Halle a/S:
Kaemmerer und Co. 1905. Pp. viii -}- 146. 2 M.
NOTES AND NEWS
DR. WILLIAM TURNER, a former professor at the St. Paul Seminary
and at present in charge of St. Luke's parish in St. Paul during the
absence of Rev. Ambrose McNulty, has been appointed professor of
philosophy at the Catholic University of Washington, D. C., and he will
begin his new duties on October 1. Dr. Turner was born in Limerick,
Ireland. He was a student at the Jesuit college of his native city, and
at the age of seventeen he was graduated from the Royal University, in
Dublin, taking second honors in philosophy. He went to Rome, in id
while pursuing his theological course also studied philosophy, and was
awarded the Benemerenti medal, given for special elections in philosophy.
He next went to Paris and studied at the Sorbonne until 1894, when he
went to St. Paul, and for ten years was professor of philosophy in Si.
Paul's Seminary. Dr. Turner is the author of the well-known ' History
of Philosophy.'
THE following is from Nature, April 19: "Sir Thomas Browm-. ih>
author of ' Religio Medici,' who lived at Norwich in the middle of tln>
M'venteenth century, was buried in the church of St. Peter M;incroft
308
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
during the early part of the last century. It is believed that his skull
was abstracted from the grave and is now preserved at the Norfolk and
Norwich Hospital. We learn from the Times that recently there has
been a considerable expression of opinion in Norwich that the skull
ought to be returned to the tomb whence it was taken. The hospital
governors on Saturday unanimously passed a resolution agreeing to this
course, on condition that the tomb shall be opened in the presence of
representatives of the hospital with the view of satisfying them that the
remains therein are without a skull."
IT is proposed to erect a memorial to the late Mr. Frederic W. H.
Myers in the chapel of Cheltenham College, his old school. Mr. Water-
field writes, " The memorial will take the form of a wall picture in an
arched recess surmounting some emblematic wood-carving, the whole
designed to illustrate the Resurrection and the Doctrine of Immortality,
which, during the best years of his life, Mr. Myers strove so earnestly to
make more real to his fellow men." Contributions may be sent to Mr.
F. J. Cape, The College, Cheltenham.
IN a paper read by Baron de Haulleville before the Colonial Club, of
Antwerp, on the religions of the natives of the Congo, the writer declared
that for the negroes water represents all that is mysterious, just as fire
does to the eastern imagination. Tizambi, the supreme being, lives below
the waters and cares nothing about the welfare of his followers. The
negroes feel confirmed in their belief in the mysterious power of water by
the fact that white men came to them across the ocean and up the Congo.
THE Cambridge University Press has in preparation ' The Axioms of
Geometry,' by Dr. A. N. Whitehead. Swan-Sonnenscheim and Co.
promise ( Thoughts and Things A Genetic Study of Logical Process/
in two volumes, by Professor J. Mark Baldwin, Vol. L, ' Theory of Knowl-
edge, Functional Logic,' Vol. II., ( Theory of Reality, Real Logic.'
THE Ravizza prize of two thousand five hundred francs is offered for
the best study of ' The Psychology of the Normal and of the Abnormal
Child in Relation to Education.' As Italians only are admitted to the
competition, we do not publish the conditions.
AT the last meeting of the French Institute ten thousand francs (from
the Prix Debrousse of thirty thousand francs) was devoted to publishing
the works of Leibniz.
PROFESSOR FRANK T HILLY, professor of philosophy in Princeton Uni-
versity, has been made professor of philosophy in the Sage School of
Philosophy of Cornell University, succeeding Professor E. B. McGilvary,
who was last year called to the University of Wisconsin.
PROFESSOR WILHELM OSTWALD, of Leipzig, has been elected a foreign
member of the Danish Academy of Sciences. According to the New
York Times, he has resigned the professorship of chemistry at the Uni-
versity of Leipzig and will establish a private laboratory.
DR. B. H. BODE has been appointed assistant professor in philosophy
at the University of Wisconsin.
VOL. III. No. 12. JUNE 7, 1906.
III. THE TRANSCENDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE CORRECTNESS
OF DATA
A T the close of my last paper it was possible, after having up
-* to that point used the term l experience' to denote those
conscious events, adjustments, etc., which are limited to the bounds
of the individual, to formulate sharply the structure and meaning
of 'in experience/ and to state clearly the relation of a wider all-
including experience if there be any advantage in such a use to
the narrower individual experience of every-day life.
With this clearly indicated exception, 'experience' then has so
far been made the generic term for those 'individually bounded'
needs, adjustments, events, etc., all of which agree, at the same
time that they may have other conferentice, in being characterized
by the presence of consciousness or ' awareness '. The act of alogical
inference, to which the implied transcendent stands in the relation
of a simultaneous 'in' and 'beyond,' is one kind of cognition, which
in turn is one species of such a conscious experience; but it is my
purpose to show that this relation holds good of all cognition.
Now it may be that in accepting consciousness as common and
essential to all experiences, although I admit that the differentiation
of 'object' and consciousness may be reduced to a 'mere datum,' I
am taking a position that will not meet with general assent. As
against this the claim may be advanced by some that conscious ex-
perience, of which as genus there are many species, is in turn a
species coordinate with other events, adjustments, etc., forming 'un-
conscious experience'; and accordingly that both these species arfe
subordinate to the genus experience as denoting all events and
adjustments, etc., in the organism, both conscious and unconscious.
first two articles appeared in this JOUBNAL, Vol. III., Nos. 8 and 10,
respectively.
309
310
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
If this view be adopted, and it certainly is permissible, it is
surely incumbent that the classification and the implied definitions
be strictly observed. The specific connotation of ' conscious experi-
ence' must not be transferred either to the other species or to the
genus ; and this last should be regarded simply as a class name.
In some recent discussions, however, these principles are not
followed ; such a generic experience is made use of, but it soon comes
to be viewed as something realiter, out of which, in the development
of adjustments, etc., 'conscious experience' separates; and yet the
generic experience is often, invalidly, treated as if it were conscious.
But the more important question is, if it is a justified procedure
to make of this generic experience, or of the even wider all-including
one previously mentioned, something realiter, a sort of universal and
homogeneous menstruum, out of which conscious and not-conscious
(physical) shall crystallize as functions of each other, etc. I believe
that it is not, but that this ' experience ' is only a conceptual product,
with the only real experiences those either concrete conscious or
physiological events. To view experience in such a way, realiter, is,
I think, to slip back into scholastic realism.
Yet the view that experience is this menstruum, neither conscious
nor physical, and in which differences are done away with, is some-
times held to be proved because psychology may point to a period
in which, for example, subject and object are not distinguished, and
because ' things are to be taken as they come'. Upon this the criti-
cism may be passed that 'awareness' may be present without aware-
ness of itself, and that to fail to distinguish is not to be without
distinction; accordingly, even at periods when they are not dis-
tinguished, two kinds of experience, conscious and physiological, may
be present and yet quite distinct. 2
Any other meaning of 'experience' than this last or that which
I have chosen and endeavored to observe, namely, as denoting those
events and adjustments which are conscious, is, I think, almost bound
to lead to misinterpretations and ambiguities. For example, let ex-
perience be so defined as conscious ; ' in ' experience means then either
'contained in' or 'biologically implied in'; only according to this
second manner can the transcendent be related to that species which
I have emphasized, namely, alogical inference. Nobody is willing
to accept the transcendent as ' contained in ' individual consciousness.
But let it be insisted, as it is by the 'pure empiricist,' that every-
thing is ' in experience ' ; let the character of the ' in ' be not explicit-
2 The question is really one of the ' appearance of diversity ' ; but the ' pure
empiricist ' accepts without proof the premise that ' to fail to distinguish is
to be without differences.'
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 311
ly determined, but with this accepted implicitly as meaning 'con-
tained in'; then, to avoid the solipsism of 'everything contained in
individual consciousness,' let experience be used in the wider sense
of a distinction-annihilating and all-containing something over and
above and different from consciousness. Let all this be done, and
then the slip be made, as it frequently and easily is, of regarding
experience as conscious, and we are landed in idealism, either
solipsistic or otherwise, according as the experience and the con-
sciousness are made individual or not. It is essentially such a pro-
cedure on the part of the 'pure empiricist' that leads to and justifies
the accusation that his empiricism is solipsistic or idealistic.
These difficulties and confusions are avoided by keeping to 'ex-
perience' as conscious and individual, and by regarding the relation
of at least one species of this, the alogical inference, to the tran-
scendents as a 'biological implication.' Whether or not the tran-
scendent is implied by all the other species and so by all alogical
cognition is a problem to be discussed very presently.
In virtue, however, of the presence of implication, either logical
or biological or both, as constituting in part at least the 'structure'
of all cognition which is scientific knowledge, it is an essential char-
acteristic of all such cognition that it transcends itself. Will, now,
the examination of other types of cognition than those of inference
reveal this characteristic for them also, and bring to light, perhaps,
other types of transcendence than that of implication ?
By way of answering this, let us consider first and briefly the
memory experience. Now, it is a generic characteristic of this, that
that which is undoubtedly 'in' the memory-act in some way (how? is
the important question) is, however, also 'beyond'; for it is some-
thing past, something which, to be remembered, need no longer as
beyond the act of memory exist realiter. It is 'beyond,' therefore,
both as 'other' than and as unalterable by that act. This simul-
taneous and determinately related 'in' and 'beyond' constitute the
'transcendency' of memory. Yet from this standpoint the 'tran-
scendency' would seem to be not that of implication, although, per-
haps, well typified by this, but an original and unacquired psycho-
logical reference to an ' other. ' As such it may be alogical, but even
so it may also be different from the reference of the alogical infer-
ence-process to a transcendent. For the present it will be regarded
as different, although later the question of the 'standing' of this
distinction will be raised.
In the second place, and only to make the scheme complete, it
may be remarked that imagination, as the type of cognition whose
reference may be to the future, has the same general characteristic of
312
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
transcendence, with the exception of the temporal difference, as has
memory. Under it the inference-prediction may be subsumed at
least in part.
The third kind of alogical cognitive experience which transcends
itself, and in the examination of which further details as to the
nature both of biological implication and of the correctness of data
will appear, is perception, or, if one prefers, mature 'simple appre-
hension.' That which is established for perception will mutatis
mutandis supplement that which has been stated concerning memory
and imagination. Now, in the first place, here, even granting that
that which is perceived may not always be distinguished, but main-
taining that it still may be distinct, the type of all those perceptive
experiences which here concern us is undoubtedly that in which it is
'felt' that the 'external world' is experienced and in which the
reference to an 'other' takes a spatial and 'now present' form.
Whether this 'other' is unalterable or not, independent or not, etc., is
a question to be considered later. The type is, however, the normal
perception, of which subsequent reflection and correction are con-
firmatory. This means that even hallucinations are after this model.
As Professor James says of them: "We act as if a real object were
there, which, however, there is not"; "there is no objective
stimulus." Sense perception, then, is no exception to the rule,
so far found, that the cognitive experience is one which transcends
itself. As a normal and original characteristic of it, there is psycho-
logically, and perhaps therefore biologically, a reference from
'within' to an 'other' beyond.
Finally, that the concept, as a cognitive type, is characterized in
a generally similar manner needs only to be mentioned here. As an
act unitary to a large degree in that it is not made up of a 'Hinter-
grund' or of a collection of individuals, it transcends itself in that
it stands for not only something 'other' than itself, but for a mani-
fold of 'others' actual and possible. 4
The above examination leads to the conclusion, that characteristic
of that kind of alogical knowledge which may be said to be distinct
in some respects from knowledge by judgment and inference is its
transcendence of itself. It is an original and underived psycholog-
ical mark of it, as we are acquainted with it in the experience in
which problems arise, that it is its very nature to know something
3 James, 'Principles of Psychology,' Vol. II., p. 115.
4 There may well be other cases of transcendency of the alogical kind in-
volved in one way or another in cognitive experience (compare, for example,
' The Self-Transcendency of Knowledge,' W. B. Pitkin, The Philosophical Review,
January, 1906), but at this point they do not concern us intimately.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 313
'other than' and 'beyond' and yet in some way 'in' itself. Alogical
judgment and inference may show this characteristic, and this and
biological implication may prove to be one and the same thing re-
garded from different view-points. In distinction from alogical
knowledge, there is, too, the purely logical inferential process, in
which each element by virtue of the formal implication present tran-
scends itself. All knowledge and cognition, then, is characterized
by transcendency. 5 But with two kinds, the logical and the alogical
cognition, the transcendency must differ in some respect, so that it
may be that the essential characteristic of all alogical cognition con-
sists in its transcending itself in a direction to know something other
than itself in kind.
Evidence for this view has already been presented, but further
support is to be derived from other sources also, namely, from the
examination of the nature both of the ' other ' of sense perception and
of the 'correctness of data.'
Is that 'other' to which the act of sense perception makes a
reference in transcending itself like in kind to the perceptive act
or not? According as this question is answered negatively or
affirmatively, we have bases for different philosophical systems;
whence its importance.
The evidence for our answer converges from many sources.
Firstly, the reference is not one of logical implication; it is imme-
diately psychological in nature ; accordingly, it may or may not be
like or identical with 'biological implication.' Secondly, evidence
comes from our analysis of memory. In the very nature of the case,
that to which the memory-act refers is not only 'other' than but it
is also in some respects 'beyond' the influence of that act, 'unalter-
able' by and 'independent' of it. By analogy, it is possible that the
perception is of an object which, in every respect except for its being
perceived, is unalterable by and independent of that act. This may
not be an absolute independence, for the perception does undeniably
'make some difference.' But the thing may be 'really there' first,
to be made just this 'difference with' subsequently, that it is per-
ceived, provided that the conditions for this are present. Analogous
to the 'axiom of free mobility,' there may be that of 'free percep-
tion.' 6
5 Compare the discussion between Professor Woodbridge and Professor
Dewey in this JOURNAL, Vol. II., Nos. 21 and 24, under the titles 'Of What
Sort is Cognitive Experience ? ' and ' The Knowledge Experience and its Rela-
tionships.'
8 Compare Professor Woodbridge's article, ' The Nature of Consciousness,'
and Dr. Montague's, * The Relational Theory of Consciousness and its Realistic
Implications,' this JOURNAL, Vol. II., Nos. 5 and 12, respectively.
314 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Furthermore, it is possible that the numerical difference there-
with demanded extends to a difference in kind; yet, in order to re-
move this from the realm of possibility to that of actuality, it is
necessary to show that the independence and unalterability are sup-
plemented by or are 'one with' permanence and uniformity, etc.
The evidence for this comes from a still different source and must be
gained gradually.
Now, it will be accepted, I think, that normal perception is the
type to which also that which subsequent corrective cognition dis-
tinguishes from it, namely, hallucination, conforms. This distinc-
tion, which is one of correct and incorrect, or of true and false, is
possible and is made validly only by there being for the act of normal
perception something 'other' than that act, yet to which the percep-
tion points, and which exists external to and 'beside' this. The
failure to make this distinction at the time of the perceptive or
hallucinatory events is not the same as the absence of a difference
between the two. This can not be done away with, nor can either
be reduced to the other. They are of one type simply in their
primal psychological form. Furthermore, with the example before
us of the inability of the memory-act to alter its object, it can not
be claimed, at least without further proof, that the subsequent
cognitive act in which the above distinction is made alters the original
real status, namely, of an object present in one case and not in
another. The distinction made stands for a real distinction, present
independently of the making of the distinction. To take the con-
tradictory position, in general, that subsequent cognition alters that
which it knows in transcending itself, germinates a self-repeating
series which results in complete skepticism unless the law of that
series is discoverable. 7
Now, this distinction between correct and incorrect, or between
true and false, either itself is, or involves, a further and most im-
portant one, namely, between the content and the object of percep-
tion. Heretofore it has not been always possible either to make or
to keep this distinction a sharply drawn one, nor is it one which has
met or will, perhaps, meet with general approval. But, now that it
can be stated clearly, to do this will be conducive to a greater ac-
curacy and exactness, and even correctness, in our subsequent dis-
cussions.
That the difference stated is legitimate, valid and necessary is
shown, I believe, by the following considerations. It is admittedly
characteristic of hallucination that the psychological reference to an
'other' takes place and yet that there is no object present. The act
1 Cf. the discussion between Woodbridge and Dewey, previously cited.
is in this respect 'purely subjective.' Yet it is also undeniable that
hallucinations differ qualitatively among themselves. Such qualita-
tive differences must, then, be entirely subjective, that is, they are
'contained within' the hallucination itself as a psychological and a
subjectively limited natural event. In this respect, and for this
reason, therefore, the hallucination has content.
In normal perception, there is likewise an unacquired reference of
the act beyond itself to an object whose actual presence is, however,
subsequently confirmed. And yet, with this distinction drawn be-
tween 'object' and 'act,' it may be regarded as valid, in fact it seems
necessary to assert, that, in analogy to the 'content' of hallucination,
there are in addition to the qualitative differences among the objects,
also qualitative differences among the perceptive acts as subjective
events. Such differences, then, may be said to constitute the content
of perception as distinct from the object. The former is 'contained
in ' ; the latter is both ' beyond, ' as real, and ' in, ' as known, according
to the manner of biological implication. The unique and determi-
nate connection of this simultaneous 'in' and 'beyond' constitutes
the transcendence of the perceiving act, present in it prior to any
critical or reflective knowledge of it, and in this respect an original
and native characteristic. Furthermore, it is, indeed, just those
qualitative differences among the subjectively emanating references
that constitute, along with other things, perhaps, the differences
among the 'contents' of perception and help to justify the distinc-
tion which has been drawn between content and object.
Can it be shown now that this psychological reference, at least
when it is 'correct,' as in normal perception, coincides with implica-
tion logical or biological? That it has some of the characteristics of
that has already been seen. In answer thereto, it may be said, first,
that from the purely logical or prepositional standpoint the halluci-
nation as false implies the normal perception as true; or, from the
factual view-point, as incorrect it implies biologically the normal as
correct. The normal, as true, is implied logically by that system of
propositions which is accepted as 'true knowledge' because at the
same time that it conforms to the norms of consistency it is also
successful. Not to consider here what is implied for success but
simply to take the system as a successful one it is found that, in
that it implies the normal perception as true and as correct, there
is also implied a transcendent object of perception as present when-
ever the same subjective conditions of perception are repeated.
The truth and correctness of the perception mean, then, that,
with qualitative and quantitative differences in the object on the one
hand, and in the 'content' on the other, there is between the percep-
316
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tive act and the object to which it refers an unequivoealness and
determinateness of the relation of transcendence. Such a refer-
ence and relation are the ideal for every perceptive act, and con-
stitute that ideal 'correctness of data' which, in addition to the
other conditions already expounded, is also necessary for the suc-
cess of alogical knowledge or inference as a means of readjustment.
Herewith is a question raised in our first article duly answered.
Not only this, but, also, a solution to another problem appears. The
perceptive act's transcendence of itself, the unequivocal and deter-
minate pointing from within itself to an 'other' beyond, this refer-
ence now emerges as at least a special case of biological implication.
For although, as put in prepositional form, it may be said that the
system as true implies logically that a transcendent object is present
to normal perception, the real psychological status of the relation
between the two is other than prepositional ; it is adaptive, biological.
It is now possible also to give an answer to the important question
raised some paragraphs back, as to whether the 'object' of sense
perception is like or unlike in kind to this as a conscious, subjective
experience. It has already been found that it may be that the
object is independent and unalterable. Now it appears both that the
object is implied 'as present to' and yet that as known it is 'in' that
act of perception which is implied by the system as normal. But it
is this very system which implies biologically, or logically if put in
prepositional form, as a necessary condition for its success, an inde-
pendent, unalterable, permanent and uniquely causal transcendent.
It would, therefore, seem that these characteristics must be and are
compatible with a manifoldness within the transcendent; for suc-
cess demands not only consistency, and a transcendent, but 'correct-
ness of data ' ; but correctness of data is constituted, as has been seen,
by a determinateness and unequivocalness of relation between sub-
jective, conscious event and object. Such a relation is possible only
if there are objective differences which 'make out' a sort of point-
to-point correspondence with differences among the perceptive acts.
It is implied, then, that the transcendent is a manifold; that the
object of perception itself is an element in this manifold and, ac-
cordingly, that it must in some way share the characteristics of
permanence and causal regularity as well as those of independence
and unalterability. These last two, which formerly appeared only
as possible for, now emerge as demanded in the perceived object, as
characteristics necessary for the success of alogical knowledge.
To consider how these four characteristics can coexist, etc., does not
lie within the range of this paper, but, since the object of perception
must, as an element in the transcendent whole, participate in all of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 317
them in some way, it is different in kind from the perceptive act
and its content.
At this point, also, there appear further details as to the very
character of the 'transcendence* in perception. This last is * ob-
jectively certain' -when it is correct. This certainty and correct-
ness, together with the fact that the perceptive event takes place
independent of and even against our 'willing/ and that for it cer-
tain definite subjective conditions must be present, demand that the
perceptive act be regarded as the result of a unique causal action be-
tween transcendent elements, some of which are within the limits of
the individual organism. This causal action mediates or is the basis
for the psychological reference which takes place, as it were, in the
opposite direction, and which has been found to be also a case of
'biological implication.' To discuss how such a mediation can take
place or is possible does not, although it admits, I believe, of a fairly
definite answer, fall within the purpose of this paper. However,
the reference, so mediated, may be said to be a quality of a percep-
tive event standing in a certain relation to really existing 'things.'
These 'things,' whatever their further 'nature' may be shown by sub-
sequent philosophical criticism to ~be, are known 'in' this self -tran-
scending perceptive act as things, qualities, events, relations, as the
' elements ' and ' constituents ' of a permanent, unalterable, causal tran-
scendent. They are also independent in the sense of 'being already
there,' to be made 'the difference with,' under definite transcendent
conditions, of being perceived or, in some other way, known. They,
accordingly, get 'into' consciousness in a way which is quite com-
patible with their being also 'beyond,' namely, in the way that the
implied is both 'in' and 'beyond' the implier. Their relation to
consciousness is accordingly that of being implied, known and pointed
to by it when they, or some of them, as 'already there' bring about
the conditions to mediate this implying, knowing and pointing.
Consciousness, then, would seem to have just this last threefold func-
tion, and also perhaps, in that in it implication immediately origi-
nates, the further function of making knowledge by inference possible.
Given the above-mentioned transcendent conditions, including an
essentially similar perceptive organization in all human individuals,
and there will be, and in fact only on this basis can there be, a con-
sistent and harmonious social living and organization such as in-
cludes science itself, with its 'Allgemeingultigkeit' and 'Denknot-
wendigkeit. '
EDWARD G. SPAULDING.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.
318
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
SOCIETIES
THE SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WESTERN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
E Western Philosophical Association held its sixth annual
4- meeting conjointly with a meeting of the North Central Sec-
tion of the American Psychological Association, at the University of
Wisconsin, Madison, on Friday and Saturday, April 13 and 14,
1906. Forty members of the two Associations were present, repre-
senting some twenty-nine universities, colleges or other institutions.
The meeting was in every respect an uncommonly successful one, the
arrangements for the lodging and entertainment of visiting members
provided by the hospitality of the members of the University of
Wisconsin being admirably adapted to promote a better acquaintance
amongst the members, and to make possible an unusual amount of
that informal discussion in which the value of such a meeting largely
consists. The visiting members were lodged as the guests of the
University in the Y. M. C. A. Building, and dined together at Chad-
bourne Hall. Four joint sessions were held, and the Associations
each held one separate session. Of the joint sessions, one was de-
voted to a discussion on 'Recent Arguments for Realism, with espe-
cial reference to the Relations of Realism and Pragmatism ' ; another
to a group of papers on the 'Psychology of the Moral Conscious-
ness'; and another to an extremely interesting address by the re-
tiring President of the Western Philosophical Association, Professor
J. H. Tufts, of the University of Chicago, on 'Some Contributions
of Psychology towards the Conception of Justice.' At most of the
sessions there was extended and vigorous discussion of the papers
read, especially at that devoted to 'Pragmatism and Realism.' For
this discussion a special bibliography of recent papers on the sub-
ject had been prepared and sent to members in advance of the meet-
ing. At the business meeting of the Western Philosophical Associa-
tion, W. B. Pillsbury was elected president; Norman Wilde, vice-
president; J. E. Boodin, secretary-treasurer; and J. H. Tufts and
A. 0. Love joy members of the executive committee. Dr. B. H. Bode,
Dr. Percy Hughes, Dr. J. R. Farley, Professor E. B. McGilvary, were
elected to membership. The treasurer's report showed a balance of
$66.52. The selection of the next place of meeting was again left to
the executive committee. Abstracts of papers, so far as the secretary
has been able to secure them, are appended.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 319
Discussion: Recent Arguments for Realism, with especial reference
to the Relations of Realism and Pragmatism.
1. H. W. STUART. Realists impute to idealism the belief that the
object of knowledge is in the last analysis naught but one's own
mental image. Whether or not this be a caricature of idealism, it
is at least tolerably evident that the realists do not themselves suc-
ceed in keeping clear of it. The essence of their difficulty lies in
their professing two incompatible principles: (1) In the knowing
experience the object known is immediately present without the
intervention of any mental image, and (2) knowledge is an aware-
ness of a simultaneously existent real object. One of the principal
motives of realism is, apparently, a dread of solipsism. This ex-
plains its insistence upon the representational theory of knowledge
the object must be simultaneously present, and unmodified by the
fact that it is known. This is a falsification of the analysis given
of the knowing experience. As if by way of adjustment between
these conflicting views, we find realists talking of 'diaphanous' or
'perfectly transparent' mental images, or of a 'unique element of
awareness' present in all sense-experiences as the distinctively
conscious element in them. The banished mental image has been
let in again by the back-stairs. Pragmatism tries to take seriously
the analysis of knowing which realism also professes to believe in.
It rejects the representational theory of knowledge and thereby
avoids the danger of being cut off, like realism and idealism, from
any possibility of distinguishing truth from error in detail, taking
thus to heart the warning of the Theaetetus against so defining truth
as to have no way of identifying true judgments. Pragmatism has
this fault to find with the so-called relational theory of conscious-
ness nowadays associated with realism that it is either a mere meta-
physical theory of the status of consciousness in a reflective scheme
of cosmology, and so gives no significant account of consciousness
from within as immediate experience ; or else it slips back, in trying
to do this latter, into the use of terms suggestive of the 'mental
image' theory, as when consciousness is said to be a 'glow' in which
real things are lighted up for knowledge. Pragmatism takes it as
a matter of course that experiences empirically occur, and fixes its
attention on the problem of determining the logical and ethical
significance of these. Realism and idealism in the end succeed in
saying no more than that experiences actually do occur they can
not account for these empirical qualities. If these are real things,
it would seem to the pragmatist that they can not be known in ex-
perience in the face-to-face representational way, but rather that
320
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
experience is, as a metaphysical process, the ultimate import or
fruition of them.
2. B. H. BODE. 'The realism which asserts that experience brings
us face to face with an independent external order is reducible to
two types, of which the first recognizes two forms of knowing, while
the second recognizes but one. These two forms of knowing may be
indicated as respectively ' acquaintance with ' and * knowledge about. '
The distinction between the two lies in the fact that in the former
the object is a modification of the conscious state itself, while in the
latter it is not. As yet the realism of the first type has not recon-
ciled its contention that knowledge is twofold in form with the
affirmation that experience brings us into the immediate presence of
objects. On the other hand, the second type of realism has failed
to reduce all knowing to the form of knowledge-about. Pragmatism
may be considered as mediating between the two types of realism.
The difficulties of realism, it is held, originate from the fact that
the object of knowledge is treated as a ready-made datum. Accord-
ing to pragmatism, all the difficulties may be obviated if we dis-
tinguish between pure experience and consciousness. This distinc-
tion enables us to affirm both that objects are experienced directly,
since they are synonymous with pure experience, and that conscious^
ness is reducible to one form, since it consists of relational elements.
This view, however, necessitates a derivation of consciousness, and at
this point pragmatism fails. The only positive conclusion that ap-
pears to emerge from these various considerations is that a twofold
form of knowing must be assumed. The metaphysics involved in this
assumption remains as a separate problem.
3. S. S. COLVIN. The critics of pragmatism find in it the im-
plications of subjective idealism; its supporters, on the other hand,
are outspoken in the assertion of its fundamental realism. Defining
realism for the purposes of this discussion as the belief that with
every noetic state there is something that exists independent of this
state, which is extramental and to which the noetic state points, let us
inquire whether the pragmatist reaches a realistic basis. Pragma-
tism speaks of pointing, of the growth of one experience into another,
of a total experience of which the present is merely a part. This
transcendence is, however, from one experience to another. The
pragmatist nowhere finds room for a pointing to an extraexperiential
reality. The pragmatist by his doctrine of experience does not
therefore reach a realistic basis, as the term realistic is used in this
discussion. The pragmatist, however, makes pure experience a
reality independent of the noetic state, and conditioning it. Here he
has reached a realistic basis, but without warrant. From experience
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 321
as we know it we can never arrive at pure experience. It is an
abstraction. The absolute idealist interprets thought in its highest
terms and reaches an absolute thinker. The pragmatist interprets
thought in its lowest terms and arrives at pure experience. Neither
idealist nor pragmatist can deduce his ultimate from experience as
we know it. The pragmatist asserts that many minds can know the
same thing, just as many lines may have one point in common. This
is an argument from analogy, and is imperfect. The pragmatist
also asserts that space is the same for all minds, while he admits
that objects in space are just a little different for each individual.
These two assertions seem inconsistent. Pragmatism has failed to
recognize the transcending element in the noetic psychosis, and it
must share the fate of all philosophies that regard merely the flow of
experience and ignore the realistic attitude of knowing. It reaches
a real only by forcibly transcending the flow of individual experi-
ence. Pragmatism, therefore, should be interpreted as essentially
idealistic.
Humanism and Absolute Sub consciousness: F. C. DOAN.
The paper concluded as follows: With Hartmann the automatic
character of subconsciousness is concealed under terms of soothing
evasion. Nevertheless, by his own showing every articulate connec-
tion between absolute and human self -consciousness breaks down.
An experience so faultlessly automatic, so perfectly instinctive, so
smoothly functional that it never falls ill, is never weary, is never
sensuous, never vacillates, requires no time for reflection, never errs,
never has occasion to remember or anticipate, and in which will
and representation are in inseparable unity, an experience so
smooth as all this eludes the grasp of the finite, coarse-grained experi-
ences of men. The self-consciousness of the latter consists in the
very fact that they do fall ill, do grow weary, are sensuous, vacil-
lating, erring, and in need therefore of guidance and chastening
through memory. Human self -consciousness exists on the sole con-
dition that will and idea remain thus mutually contradictory. A
rigorously remedial transcendentalism does indeed relieve the sick-
ness and pain of finite self-consciousness, but only by administering
to finitude an absolute anesthetic a thoroughgoing euthanasia no
human convention is ever likely to legalize. The very moods in
which under pain of self-diremption men have become self-conscious,
these incertitudes, these tragedies, these sicknesses of the soul, are
symptomatic, according to cosmic humanism, of the self-diremptive
and imperfectly self -sacrificial character which persists as an eternal
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defect, a fundamental stimulus in the very heart even of ultimate
experience.
The Feelings as a Source of Knowledge: E. D. STARBUCK.
The truth quality in art, morality and religion must be admitted
to be inadequately exploited by our sensation-cognition-intellection
psychology. The usual explanation, viz., that the 'worth,' or
1 values,' and the totality- feeling involved are due to the creaming
oft' of a multiplicity of dimly perceived associations, seems more
ingenious than satisfactory. It may be logical, but it is not true to
introspection. In the light of recent developments in psychology
this view is becoming altogether untenable. The view herein pre-
sented is that the truth that seems to arise through love, art, conduct
and religion, comes through the feelings, i. e., that it is a conative-
affective process that is reported directly to consciousness through
the feelings and not through the mediation of cognitive processes.
These latter, of course, demand satisfaction, but in these particular
fields their demands are secondary both in time and importance, and
the satisfaction is essentially a sense of fitness, harmony and adjust-
ment. The truth that comes from these forms of 'appreciation' is
real information; it is, in its elaboration, of the nature of 'knowl-
edge,' and this without abusing the accepted use of that term.
The lines leading to this view are: 1. The subliminally right in-
terpretation of imperceptible stimuli. These may be, since not ca-
pable of introspection, either cognitive or predominantly conative-
affective. The latter view is the least inharmonious. 2. The facts
of comparative and genetic psychology. The conative-affective
states and processes must have been originally about the only forms
of consciousness. Still they led to 'knowledge,' i. e., such a repre-
sentation to the self (through feeling) of the elements of experience
that may, on occasion, be used more or less consciously for the ends
of life, chiefly for the sake of fuller adjustment. 3. The facts ac-
cumulated since Mosso's early experiments, in regard to organic
responses to stimuli. These have made something like the James-
Lange theory of the emotions inevitable. The somatic response is
immediate and instinctive, and appropriate to the stimulus. There
is much such evidence that the organic reaction is as apt to precede
as to accompany or follow the stimulus. The anatomical work of
Oppenheimer, ('Das Gefiihl') and experiments such as those of
Fere and Jael upon musical appreciation, seem to show that 'appre-
ciation' is but the immediate apprehension of the presence and qual-
ity of organic responses. 4. A truer analysis of the feelings. They
seem to be as manifold as the variety of experiences, and not two-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 323
fold or fourfold or sixfold. They are also as truly 'objective' as
are sensations and perceptions. Any fair analysis of a feeling
shows that it reflects subjective conditions, external facts and the
relation of subject to object; just as do sensations. The latter are
mediated through association because their data are discrete, while
the former are immediate. The truth that comes through feeling
is as 'objective' as is that through intellection. 5. The facts of
physiological psychology. The sympathetic nervous system and the
vasomotor mechanism have become distinctly and progressively dif-
ferentiated, in the course of evolution, from the central nervous
system. Until this long course of development can be retraced or
eliminated, both nervous systems will probably continue to do busi-
ness somewhat on their own account, and we shall have a world of
'appreciation' set off against a world of 'description,' the esthete
and religionist inharmonious with the logician and scientist, and
the truth of feeling opposed to the truth of intellection. This point
of view has significance, not only for psychology, but for epistemology.
It is psychological dualism or pluralism which may, upon reflection,
tend to at least make more credible a philosophical monism.
Ideas and Conduct: JOSEPH HERSHEY BAIR.
Every idea has an image which serves as a stimulus in determin-
ing our conduct. An idea is often so potent a factor that we are
swayed by it, and ignore our immediate surroundings. Our view of
life is the background in which our ideas are set, and through which
our ideas and perceptions have value. In dealing with our fellow men
in an efficient and satisfactory manner, it is indispensable to be able
to take an inventory of this background of valuation. In order to
modify or control their actions, it is necessary to modify and control
their imagery. In communicating with others, we do so also through
imagery. If the images do not correspond, communication is indef-
inite. This rich field for inquiry, into which the psychologist is
often unwillingly forced through his contact with the educator, has
great possibilities. The practical side of psychology would yield
great results to the trained specialist if he could be induced to enter
it,
Meaning: W. B. PILLSBURY.
Meaning in the logical use is a term that must be given also a
psychological value. We find historically that meaning is treated
as something added to or substracted from the given, as in judgment,
or that it has been used to designate the fact that we immediately
pass from the given image to a connected order interpretation.
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Both uses are shown by introspection to designate events that actu-
ally go on in the mind. In perception there is always some one
phase or attribute that stands out most clearly and, furthermore,
it is seen that in perception there is nothing but this phase or as-
pect. The background or image from which abstraction is made
simply does not exist, but is an ex post facto interpretation to ex-
plain the event. In the same way, when selection is made, we im-
mediately tend to see, not the sensation or perception itself, but the
earlier development construction that explains and makes consistent
this and other sensations or perceptions. This again is not an ex-
ceptional event, but is involved in all perception. Meaning, then,
is a fruitful way of regarding the mental states, but is not in itself
a new process.
Space and Reality: JOHN E. BOODIN.
There are two aspects to the development of the space concept.
One emphasizes space as series or ideal construction. This is the
case with the Kantians. In so far as space is serial, I would agree
with Kant that it is ideal. This, however, does not exhaust the
space concept. On the contrary, the convenience of this conception
implies another aspect, the ontological or non-being aspect. This
is already implied in the hypothesis of the void made by ancient
atomism. It was, however, merely dogmatically asserted, and un-
warranted deductions were drawn from it, as was shown by Aristotle.
Critical philosophy, however, is forced to acknowledge a real space
zero: (1) because, in spite of Parmenides, it is conceivable; (2) be-
cause it is convenient to presuppose it as a limit, both in experiments
that have to do with approximation to a vacuum and in conceiving
Newton's first law of motion; (3) because it is presupposed by
geometry in its axiom of free mobility; (4) because it makes pos-
sible the conception of distance which conditions both the equations
of the astronomer and intersubjective intercourse; (5) because it
simplifies the problem of the attributes of space, the only attributes
that can be regarded as spatial being non-resistance, or the possi-
bility of free mobility, and distance. Extension, continuity, divisi-
bility, dimensionality, etc., must be dealt with as physical attributes
according to our convenience in manipulating physical things. Thus,
the stock antinomies brought against space as quantitative, infinite,
etc., become irrelevant. Quantity and infinity belong to our ideal
tools, not to reality as such. (6) Aristotle's arguments against the
void, while valid as against the conception of the atomists, would
have no force as against this conception. On the contrary, his own
conception must be regarded by us as merely ideal. (7) The con-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 325
ception of distance can not be regarded as the property of things,
but conditions the behavior of things. (8) This conception satisfies
our space intuition. (9) Finally, this conception satisfies the
criterion invoked by the Kantians themselves, viz., that those condi-
tions which limit, and must be taken account of in the realization
of purpose, must themselves be real.
The Psychological Basis of Ethics: J. DASHIELL STOOPS.
Three things must be dealt with in the problem of the will.
There is the mechanism of motor response; in the second place, the
response is influenced by feelings; and, finally, motor responses and
feelings must be guided by the intellect to make possible voluntary
activity. The motor and feeling elements we treat together. The
foundation of the mind is in motor responses and coincident feel-
ings. Reflex and instinctive actions, with their correlative feelings,
constitute the foundation upon which rests the developed moral will.
Non-voluntary forms of activity and feeling elements are accord-
ingly fundamental in the treatment of ethics. The significance of
habits and instincts is vital for the evolution of the moral life. The
function of the intellect is to guide and organize these non-voluntary
and emotional phases of experience. Voluntary action is itself a
higher form of motor response, expressing itself through general
ideas. For ethics we may speak of two types of non-voluntary re-
sponse; individualistic and social. Both forms must be under the
control of the will before they can be regarded as constituent factors
in the moral self. The moral life is largely a matter of proportion.
The world is not made up of people who are good or bad, but of
those who are better or worse. The same ingredients of character
are in the criminal and the good. Ethics must learn from psychol-
ogy and sociology. Its method should be psychological, and not
metaphysical.
t
<
Determinism in Motives: BERNARD C. EWER.
The naive interpretation of decision involves two apparently con-
tradictory ideas; determinism and indeterminism. The latter is fre-
quently rejected as absurd, yet the former depends upon a quantita-
tive conception of psychical activity which is not revealed by intro-
spection, nor logically implied in the conception of causality. The
analysis of motives shows qualitative, not in general quantitative,
relations among desires, hence an absolute determinism is fictitious.
Decision is influenced by truly efficacious motives, but it is always to
some extent experimental, and, indeed, a 'chance' occurrence. This
does not imply that it is uncaused, since the ordinary absolute dis-
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junction between law and chance applies only to the abstractions
themselves, not to the real facts. Hence caricatures of indetermin-
ism as pure lawlessness, non-moral, etc., are irrelevant. The truth
is double: we are creatures of habit, and we create the habit; from
one point of view, our conduct is determined ; from the other, unde-
termined; but neither aspect is absolute. To understand how ap-
parently contradictory conceptions can both be true of reality we
must refer, as in all ultimate comprehension, to the fact itself.
The Self and the Selves: PERCY HUGHES.
The term ego should be reserved for the individual who is self-
conscious, who says or feels, 'this is I.' The term self stands for
many ideas which, while of all of them we say 'this is I,' yet are
more diverse than commonly is thought. Indeed, how the term self
applies to them all is hard to say. Each with its corresponding
not-self makes up a universe in which no other self is found. These
ideas are here called categories of self, and of them eight are dis-
tinguished: the 'knower,' the ' experiencer, ' the 'will,' the 'his-
torical,' the 'bodily,' the 'ideal,' the 'realization' and the 'socius'
self. The value of such a list is shown in many ambiguities which
are to be found in most assertions made of self when the distinction
between selves is not noted. In the definition of those emotions in
which ethics particularly is concerned, these distinctions should ren-
der much service. Pride is always a sense of the superiority of
self over the not-self, but it is only in the kind of pride which is
concerned with the historical self, a pride that is always best called
vanity, that the comparison with other people is involved.
The Influence of Self -Consciousness upon Volition: ARTHUR 0.
LOVEJOY.
The older psychology of volition assumed that reflective volition
always involved the representation of some future situation, and of
some satisfaction of the self of the chooser, to be realized at the con-
ceived future moment. We now, however, have become familiar
with the fact that the self which must be satisfied in order that
volition should take place is not the represented self of the future
moment, but the representing self, or ego, of the moment of deci-
sion; that it is, in the familiar phrase, not the idea of greatest
pleasure, but the most pleasant idea, that normally determines choice.
Assuming this much to be established, the question arises how this
volitional situation is affected by self-consciousness ; for if all profit-
able ethical theory must take its point of departure in a psychology
of volition, it must a fortiori take its point of departure in a con-
sideration of the effect of man 's power of self -representation upon his
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 327
volition. This subject has not yet been adequately treated by either
psychologists or ethical theorists. It has been held by some (not
only by hedonists, but also by the school of Green) that self -con-
sciousness makes man necessarily egoistic or self-referring in his
choice of future situations. In reality, however, the most significant
function of self-consciousness is to bring it about that the ego is
capable of being interested in its own ejective self as an object of
possible approbation or disapprobation, and of finding any repre-
sentation of the ejective self in which it possesses qualities that the
ego does not admire or approve, an unpleasant idea. The dominant
desire of the self-conscious animal is to think the right kind of
adjectives or epithets as attachable to its ejective self conceived as a
doer. So far from being an unimportant or secondary factor in the
determination of volition, this desire to conceive of the self as acting
in a manner which the ego can, at the moment of choice, regard
with satisfaction is the ultimate motive in all deliberate choosing.
All moral discussion presupposes the existence of this solicitude, not
about the end of action, but about the character of the agent, upon
the part of the participants in that discussion ; the moral ' ought ' is
meaningless except in so far as this kind of desire is presupposed
in the person to whom the 'ought' is addressed. The desire in ques-
tion has distinctly the 'when me they fly, I am the wings' character.
He who denies that he is actuated by such a motive, or who declares
such a motive to be something else than moral, is obviously doing
so precisely because of his unwillingness now to think of his self
as the subject of unadmired predicates, such as 'irrational' or 'self
conscious' or the like. There are, in short, only two fundamentally
distinct forms of interest that determine deliberate choice: (a) the
direct or spontaneous interest in a conceived future situation that
may result from one's action; (&) interest in having the self in
action the subject of approved predicates. The former is not strictly
ethical at all ; one in this situation either does or does not now desire
some conceived future situation, and if one does desire it the word
'ought' is irrelevant. As soon as discussion arises as to what a
rational object of desire is, the implicit appeal is always to this other
kind of interest in the predicates of the self conceived as chooser
or doer.
The Alleged Blindness of the Common Moral Consciousness: FRANK
CHAPMAN SHARP.
According to many contemporary moralists, the moral judgments
of common sense are blind, in the sense that they arise without any
accompanying consciousness of their rationale. The paper presents
328 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the results of an attempt made to test the truth of this view, by an
examination of the answers to certain questions in casuistry given to
students in the University of Wisconsin. The questions always
stated in concrete form involved the following principles: the per-
missibility of lying, of breaking a promise, of breaking a contract, of
stealing in order to preserve life, of killing those hopelessly sick with
cancer. The records supplied by the written replies were supple-
mented in many cases by personal interviews with the writers.
Eighty-four answers were obtained from students in the College of
Letters and Sciences, and forty-nine from first-year students in the
'Short Course in Agriculture.' In addition, eleven college students
reported that they failed to reply because in some or all cases they
could give no reasons for their answers. Four of these were inter-
viewed in order to discover the exact significance of this statement.
The conclusion reached from the examination of the data supplied by
the members of the College of Letters and Science was that not more
than twenty-five answers out of a total of over four hundred could
possibly be counted as immediate, and of this small number only one
or perhaps two could be so considered with any degree of certainty.
While the existence of unreasoned moral judgments was thus ren-
dered highly probable, they were shown to be, in this group of
persons at least, an isolated phenomenon. The results obtained from
the students in the 'Short Course in Agriculture' were even more
striking. Not a single answer was found that could plausibly be
considered 'blind,' in the sense of immediate or wholly unreasoned.
The Relation of Sentiment to the Taste of Foods; a Chapter in Ap-
plied Psychology : W. D. SCOTT.
Our appreciation of food depends only in part upon the gusta-
tory sensations. With our rural ancestors these gustatory sensa-
tions were the principal factor in the selection of what should be
eaten. With us of sedentary habits and more highly developed
esthetic sense, the appearance of the food and sentimental associa-
tions have assumed a fundamental importance. Certain parts of
turkey can not be discriminated from pork by gustatory sensations,
but we all greatly prefer the turkey because of the sentimental as-
sociations which enshrine turkey. As a result of this change in our
standards of selecting our foods, the American people are annually
eating less and less of those foods which are unesthetic in appearance
and association. On the other hand, there is a decided increase in
the consumption of certain foods which appeal to the esthetic judg-
ment of the purchasers. The producer and the salesman are begin-
ning to appreciate this fact and to present their products to us in
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 329
such a form that they satisfy our changed standards. Provisions
are delivered in neat packages and not in bulk. The most effective
advertisements have as their object to create a sentiment for a food
comparable to the sentiment which has grown up around turkey and
quail. In certain instances such a purpose has met with pronounced
success. In such instances the advertiser not only induces us to buy
his commodity, but he has a nobler function, and a more profitable
one, of causing us to enjoy the food after we have secured it.
A Stereoscopic Demonstration: JOSEPH JASTROW.
The demonstration included (a) a group of devices for class in-
struction in stereoscopic principles; (&) an historical series showing
the development of the stereoscope and the variety of devices in
which the common underlying principle has been applied; (c) recent
improvements in the instrument, for the purpose of approximating
the relation of the retina to the photograph to that of the eye or eyes
in viewing the actual scene; (d) a series of specially arranged views
to illustrate the several points concerned in the psychology of visual
interpretation of the third dimension of space, such views attempt-
ing as well the evaluation of the importance of the contributing
factors in isolation and in combination. In the first group were
demonstrated groups of models, two-dimensional and three-dimen-
sional, and devices for acquiring stereoscopic vision of photographs
with the eyes alone, unaided by an instrument; the second group
included the several refracting and reflecting varieties, color-stereo-
scopes, and approximations to depth- vision with one eye; the verant
lenses for monocular and binocular vision and the Zeiss stereoscope,
as also the relations of the focal length of the photographic camera
to the view, were considered in the third group ; the views exhibited
in the fourth group included demonstration of the effect of light and
shade, background, familiarity, transposition, contour-lines, inter-
position of objects, subjective inference and related points. A
manual of stereoscopic vision is in preparation in which these views
will be published.
A Visual Illusion of Motion: E. JENNER.
The illusion begins with the vision of a rolling disk with radia-
tions like the spokes of a wheel, seen by interrupted light or as
through the pickets of a fence. According to time-relations of the
interruptions of the 'pickets' and the 'spokes,' the wheel breaks into
multiple striations, that themselves as a whole move forward, or back-
ward, or stand still. By making the ' fence ' pass by under regulated
speed, a revolving disk may be substituted for the rolling wheel, and
the whole phenomenon carefully and conveniently studied. When
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viewed through a rotating wheel with open sectors, a portion of the
phenomenon may be resolved. While the whole range of appear-
ances may be derived from the mathematical relations of rate of
travel and interruptions and the duration of the after-image, the
complexity, variability and brilliance of the effect give the demon-
stration of the illusion by these devices a peculiar interest.
Problems in the Analysis of the Memory Consciousness: F. KUHL-
MANN.
The problems in the analysis of the memory consciousness that
seem at present most significant may be stated under three heads:
A. The analysis of the memory consciousness into its elements; B.
The function of these elements in the memory consciousness ; C. The
nature and causes of memory illusion. A. Recent progress in the
analysis of perceptive experience offers new problems in memory
analysis. Biological interpretation in both gives new views on their
interrelation. There are animal minds without memory, and prob-
ably several different forms of memory. The more special problems
here concern (1) images of sensations through the special sense
organs, (2) organic images in general, (3) the elements in the recog-
nitive consciousness. (1) In our ordinary memory we image only a
small portion of readily discernible sensory qualities. There is also
a great difference in the ease with which images for the different
special senses are aroused. Interpretation of the latter calls for a
number of further considerations. (2) The first general question
concerns the part played in memory of complexes of organic sensa-
tions that are not connected with the perception of objects, but are
expressive of bodily states and in general enter into the moods and
dispositions of consciousness. The second concerns the reproduc-
tion in memory of organic reactions set up in the perception of an
object. B. The elements of memory may be considered with refer-
ence to their function in (1) recall and (2) in recognition. (1) If
in recalling how a thing looks, we call its visual image primary and
all others secondary, our first questions concern, first, the part sec-
ondary images in general play in the production of primary, and,
second, how this is dependent on whether the primary is in one or
the other sense department. (2) When secondary images follow the
primary they may, in the recall of meaningless visual forms, (a)
strengthen the memory certainty, or (b) they may leave it unaffected,
or (c) they may be of such a nature as to contradict the primary
image, resulting in uncertainty. C. Three general suggestions can
be made at present. (1) Much of our so-called memory is not
memory, but inference. (2) There is a tendency to remember things,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 331
in any particular case, as we are accustomed to experience them.
(3) Esthetic influences produce memory illusion. All of these sug-
gestions are of interest, not so much because of the facts they indi-
cate, as because of the problems they present.
Accuracy in the Judgment of Size and Distance: A. M. RUGGLES
and F. KUHLMANN.
The purpose of the experiment was to determine the accuracy
in judging the relative sizes of two squares, e. g., when they were
(1) at the same, and (2) at different, distances, and how this de-
pended on the several factors entering into the judgment of dis-
tance. Two methods were employed. In the apparatus of the first,
the subject saw one square through a double convex lens, and im-
mediately after chose one that seemed its equal from a series pre-
sented simultaneously. The square seen through the lens was set
for three different accommodation distances, one, two and three
meters, determined from the focal length of the lens and the distance
between lens and square. In the second method the apparatus con-
sisted of two movable cars in a dark room, with inside lights illu-
minating square openings at their ends. Distances from the subject
of from one to ten meters were used. The car lights were turned on
in immediate succession. Their intensity could be varied at will. In
both methods the objective factors entering in judging the distance of
one of the squares seen can be reduced to accommodation and con-
vergence. The main results for both methods, so far, show a relatively
very great influence of purely subjective factors in the judgment of
distance, and hence of the relative sizes, when only accommodation
and convergence entered. In extreme instances, in the latter
method, the subject might judge the two lights to be at the same dis-
tance when they were distant one and ten meters, respectively.
Some Experiments on the Localization of Sound: DANIEL STARCH.
The apparent variation of intensity and of distance of a sound
uniform in intensity and distance with change in direction, was de-
termined by finding the threshold of hearing for a series of direc-
tions level with the ears, 15 apart, passing from front around on
the right to the back. The source of sound was one meter from the
observer. The experiments show that the threshold is lowest on the
side, 90 right, and gradually rises in passing toward the front or
toward the back. Consequently sensitivity is keenest on the side.
A sound passing from in front or from the back toward the side
would seem gradually to become louder, reaching its maximum at
90 right. This change in intensity with change in direction is an
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essential datum for the localization of sound. Similarly the dis-
crimination for pitch and for intensity was tested. The experiments
show that the ability to discriminate between intensity of sound
is the same for all directions. But pitch discrimination is poorest
at the side. The difference limen for three well-trained observers
was 1.4 v. d. at the side, 8 v. d. in front, and 1 v. d. in the back.
The poorer discrimination at the side may be due to the fact that
the ear catches more overtones when the source of sound is on the
side. This may be confusing and consequently cause poorer dis-
crimination. Another series of experiments in which a variety of
stimuli were used demonstrated that the richer and more complex
a sound is the more accurately it can be localized. It is very difficult
to localize an approximately pure tone. The estimation of angular
differences between directions was tested. Small angles are over-
estimated in front and underestimated at the side. We overestimate
in front probably because we can discriminate between directions
more accurately than we think we can, and we underestimate on
the side because we do not discriminate between directions as ac-
curately as we naively suppose.
Color Perception of Certain Animals: S. S. COLVIN.
During the year 1904-05 a series of experiments were conducted
by the department of psychology at the University of Illinois for
the purpose of gaining some facts in regard to the color perception
of certain higher animals. The animals tested were three dogs, a
cat and a squirrel. The animals were tested in the first place with
receptacles containing food and alike in every respect except in color.
Only one receptacle could be opened, however, and the food obtained.
This receptacle was painted a standard red and was kept constantly
through the first series of tests. Other colors used and varied from
time to time were blue, green, yellow, orange, violet, red orange,
red red orange and two reds, one being just observably different
from the standard red in saturation. Dog No. 1 showed the great-
est number of right choices, but with all the animals the curve was
far above expectancy. Dog No. 3, the cat and the squirrel were
lowest. The animals showed the greatest ability to distinguish be-
tween red and blue, and red and yellow. As the variable colors
approached red the discrimination fell off, but never was as low
as fifty per cent, even with the red just observably different from
the standard red. The most significant results were obtained in a
series of experiments in which the standard red was kept constant
but attached to various receptacles from day to day, and the animal
was required to select the receptacles when they appeared in a
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 333
variety of forms, and with often only a strip of color or a flag bear-
ing the color. The results seem to show that the animals tested in
this experiment (two dogs and the kitten) had a rudimentary ability
to form abstract ideas, an ability that has often been denied by ani-
mal psychologists. ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY,
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY. Secretary.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
On Kant's Reply to Hume. ARTHUR LOVEJOY. Archiv fur Geschichte
der Philosophic, Band XIX., Heft 3, 1906, pp. 380-407.
This is an important and illuminating analysis of Kant's argument
for the a priori necessity of the principle of causation. The criticism of
the argument as set forth in the ' Second Analogy ' is prefaced by an
account of its historical antecedents. Professor Lovejoy shows that
Leibniz and Wolff were both aware of the sceptical objections which Hume
later urged against the necessary universality and invariability of the
causal nexus, so that in view of their dealing with the question, Kant's
sharp antithesis between l criticism ' and ' dogmatism ' loses much of its
point. Leibniz expressly states that this principle can not be based on
that of contradiction, but holds that its practical necessity and its re-
peated empirical verification afford it sufficient justification, in spite of
the absence of any strictly logical proof. And Wolff adduces an argu-
ment in its support which anticipates essentially Kant's own transcen-
dental proof. The sole criterion of reality, Wolff asserts, rests upon the
presence of a definite order in the changes of things, which the real world
exhibits, but the dream world lacks. Hence, without the principle of
sufficient reason, there can be no truth. This is also the backbone of
Kant's argument that causality is a necessary condition of all possible
experience having objective validity.
Kant clothes Wolff's argument in technical phraseology. But he also
blends with it a contribution of his own, whose exact relations to the
main argument he does not carefully distinguish. Taking his point of
departure from the antithesis of the psychological process involved in
perception, on one hand, and the objective meaning or epistemological ref-
erence of this process, on the other, he describes the elements of the former
as always successive, while the moments of the latter may be either actu-
ally successive, as when we watch a ship moving down-stream, or actually
coexistent, as when we successively apprehend the parts of a house. How
is it possible to distinguish successive apprehensions meaning a perma-
nent object from successive apprehensions meaning an objective event?
Kant's answer is that the permanent may be perceived in any order, but
that a change in the object determines an irreversible sequence of per-
ceptions. Subjective change is thus distinguished from objective change
334
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
by the fact that the latter presupposes a rule according to which the
change necessarily occurs.
Professor Lovejoy shows that this argument involves a double con-
fusion. First, there is an ambiguity in the notion of subjectivity. In
Wolff's argument, and here and there in Kant's involved presentation,
the antithesis subjective-objective lies wholly within the realm of objects
perceived, the antithetical poles being objects or events as perceived with
objective validity, and objects or events as perceived in dreams and illu-
sions. In Kant's own contribution to the argument the antithesis is not
within the realm of objects, but between the whole realm of perceived
objects, real or illusory, on one hand, and the psychological processes in-
volved in their apprehension, on the other. The order of the psycholog-
ical processes, while not identical with the order of the objects known by
means of them, is equally objective. Psychology seeks to assign these
processes as definite a place in the caused series of changes within the
organism as the objects themselves may find in the caused series outside
the organism.
The second confusion lies in the conclusion that Kant attempts to
draw, making the argument, in Professor Lovejoy's words, ' one of the
most spectacular examples of non-sequitur to be found in the history of
philosophy.' For the rule that Kant describes as leading us to distinguish
between a series of perceptions determined by changes in the perceiving
organism, and a series of perceptions determined by changes in the object,
is that in each single instance of the latter the succession is irreversible.
But the principle of causation demands a uniformity of succession in
repeated instances. It is easy to see that the two ' rules ' are entirely
distinct. Kant jumps from the irreversibility of a sequence in a par-
ticular case to the idea of the necessary uniformity of that sequence in
all cases in which the same kind of an event appears as antecedent.
Kant's peculiar contribution is thus, in Professor Lovejoy's opinion,
quite irrelevant to Hume's scepticism. The main argument itself would
be valid if causal connection were the sole test of objectivity. The argu-
ment would then be that any principle employed as the sole criterion for
distinguishing subjective illusion from objectively valid judgments of
perception, must necessarily be true a priori of all possible (objective)
experience. Professor Lovejoy maintains that a uniform causal order is
not the sole test of objectivity. An unmitigated miracle would be recog-
nized as objective if the vivid perception of it were corroborated by the
perception of other men ; that is, objectivity and causal connection are not
interchangeable terms. What Kant assumes as the supreme criterion of
objectivity is a convenient but not exclusive rule " bred of an illogical
but natural habit of expecting nature to repeat herself, and encouraged
by past success in prophecies based upon that expectation. That is to
say that there is nothing in the argument which in any way replies to
Hume."
It occurs to the present reviewer to question the independence of the
two criteria of objectivity recognized by Professor Lovejoy. Does not the
335
criterion of corroboration in the last analysis rest upon the criterion of
causal connection? We believe that several observers are less likely to be
deluded than one, because if the object really were there, it would causally
evoke corresponding perceptions in the observers, while if it were not
there, the presence of so many illusions would demand the coincidence of
an unusual number of exceptional subjective conditions in different ob-
servers, all operating causally to produce the same result. But if no
causal connections are admitted, this consideration entirely loses its force.
There is, then, no reason why A and B should under similar conditions
perceive the same world. DAVID F. SWENSON.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. January, 1906. L'effort (pp. 1-14) :
B. BOURDON. - Effort is only the felt intensity of muscular contraction ;
all forms of mental effort are so reducible. Reactions to pain and to
effort are often alike because pain is represented as an obstacle to be over-
come. The notion of the externality of the world can not be derived
from feelings of effort, even when resistance and touch are used to help
out the hypothesis. De I'avarice (pp. 15-40) : R. DE FURSAC. - Clinical
and historical studies of misers. Avarice distinguished from cupidity
and parsimony by being love for property in itself. The collecting mania
is not a mark of avarice. But low imaginative power, combined with
good memory, and a low judgment power are uniformly present. An
inability to form abstract notions, absence of feelings and love of solitude
are further common characteristics. La religion du doute (pp. 41-62) :
G. PREVOST. - Doubt is a vital function in active, progressive life; it is
the means of improving the soul and hastening its evolution toward the
Infinite. Morality and justice may both be based upon such a theory of
doubt. Revue generate: La philosophic du droit au po^nt de vue so-
ciologique (pp. 63-87) : G. RICHARD. - A review and criticism of the fol-
lowing works is incorporated in this article: Posada, Teorias politicas;
Jorro, Socialismo y re forma social; Levi, Per un programme di filosofia
del diritto; Loria, Verso la justizia sociale; Miceli, Le fonti del diritto
dal punto di vista psichico-sociale; Jellinek, L'etat moderne et son droit
(original German) ; Carle, La filosofia del diritto nello Stato moderno;
Stein, Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophic; Del Vecchio, I pre-
supposti filosofici della nozione del diritto. Analyses et comptes rendus:
Schultz, Die Bilder von der Materie: ABEL REY. Jerusalem, Gedanken
und Denker: L. ARREAT. Philippe et Paul-Boncour, Les anomalies men-
tales chez les ecoliers: PH. CHASLIN. Pfister, Die Willensfreiheit ; LEON
POITEVIN. Ingegnieros, La simulacion en la lucha por la vida: J. PERES.
Finot, Le prejuge des races: HENRI JOLY. E. Durkheim et ses collabora-
teurs, L'annee sociologique : G. BELOT. Sociological papers: JANKELEVITZ.
Wallaschek, Psychologic und Pathologic der Vorstellung: CHARLES LALO.
Rollo, Storia delle idee estetiche in Italia: CHARLES LALO. Revue des
periodiques etrangers.
336
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Baumann, Julius. Anti-Kant. Mit Benutzung von Tiedemanns
' Thedtet ' und auf Grund jetziger Wissenschaft. Gotha: F. A.
Perthes. 1905. Pp. vi + 195. 4 M.
Fanciulli, Giuseppe. La coscienza estetica. Turin: Fratelli Bocca.
1906. Pp. 319.
Huber, Sebastian. Orundzuge der Logik und Noetilc in Geiste deshl.
Thomas von Aquin. Mit Kirklicher Druckerlaubniss. Paderborn:
Ferdinand Schoningh. 1906. Pp. viii -f 168.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE minister of public instruction in Italy has issued a list of ques-
tions formulated by the commission for the reform of secondary education.
Training in philosophy is remembered in the following questions, which
we copy from the Revista Filosofica. (l)What is the educative func-
tion and value of philosophy in the different types of secondary schools?
(2) Through how many years, and in which years, should such instruction
be imparted? (3) In what order should subjects in philosophy be
studied? (4) Is it feasible, as some have maintained, to precede the
analytic study of the subject-matter of philosophy with a synthetic out-
line of the general problems of the world and of man? (5) Would it not
be advisable in teaching philosophy to give more importance to the read-
ing of selected portions of the philosophical classics, ancient and modern,
and to prepare good collections for reading? (6) What arrangement
will assure to the study of philosophy the greatest profit from the study
of the sciences of history and of ancient and modern literature? (7)
Ought the study of philosophy, as now pursued, be increased by the addi-
tion of other subjects, such as esthetics and the history of philosophy?
Ought any of the subjects taught at present by the professor of philos-
ophy be transferred to other departments, such as the department of his-
ory, of mathematics, of natural science ? (8) How to provide that students
may not be graduated, as they are at present, from the secondary schools
for general culture without any notion of the economic and social
mechanism of modern life? Remarks and proposals.
A NEW course in pedagogy will be established at Swarthmore College
next year. The work will be in charge of Dr. Martin G. Brumbaugh,
professor of pedagogy, of the University of Pennsylvania, Professor Ed-
ward B. Rawson, principal of the Friends' Seminary, of New York City,
and Dr. Bird T. Baldwin, professor of psychology at the West Chester
State Normal School.
PROFESSOR H. H. HORNE has been granted a Sabbatical year of leave
by Dartmouth College, which he will spend abroad in study and travel.
His place will be filled by Dr. Charles H. Johnston, of the State Normal
School, in East Stroudsburg, Pa.
VOL. III. No. 13. JUNE 21, 1906.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
G. PAPINI AND THE PRAGMATIST MOVEMENT IN ITALY
A MERICAN students have so long had the habit of turning to
-^"*~ Germany for their philosophic inspiration, that they are only
beginning to recognize the splendid psychological and philosophical
activity with which France to-day is animated; and as for poor
little Italy, few of them think it necessary even to learn to read her
language. Meanwhile Italy is engaged in the throes of an intel-
lectual rinascimento quite as vigorous as her political one. Her sons
still class the things of thought somewhat too politically, making
partizan capital, clerical or positivist, of every conquest or concession,
but that is only the slow dying of a habit born in darker times. The
ancient genius of her people is evidently unweakened, and the tend-
ency to individualism that has aways marked her is beginning to
mark her again as strongly as ever, and nowhere more notably than
in philosophy.
As an illustration, let me give a brief account of the aggressive
movement in favor of 'pragmatism' which the monthly journal
Leonardo (published at Florence, and now in its fourth year) is
carrying on, with the youthful Giovanni Papini tipping the wedge
of it as editor, and the scarcely less youthful names of Prezzolini,
Vailati, Calderoni, Amendola and others, signing the more con-
spicuous articles. To one accustomed to the style of article that
has usually discussed pragmatism, Deweyism, or radical empiricism,
in this country, and more particularly in this JOURNAL, the Italian
literature of the subject is a surprising, and to the present writer
a refreshing, novelty. Our university seminaries (where so many
bald-headed and bald-hearted young aspirants for the Ph.D. have
all these years been accustomed to bore one another with the
pedantry and technicality, formless, uncircumcised, unabashed and
unrebuked, of their 'papers' and 'reports') are bearing at last the
fruit that was to be expected, in an almost complete blunting of the
literary sense in the more youthful philosophers of our land. Surely
no other country could utter in the same number of months as badly
written a philosophic mass as ours has published since Dewey's
337
338
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
'Studies in Logical Theory' came out. Germany is not 'in it' with
us, in my estimation, for uncouthness of form.
In this Florentine band of Leonardists, on the other hand, we
find, instead of heaviness, length and obscurity, lightness, clearness
and brevity, with no lack of profundity or learning (quite the re-
verse, indeed), and a frolicsomeness and impertinence that wear the
charm of youth and freedom. Signor Papini in particular has a
real genius for cutting and untechnical phraseology. He can write
descriptive literature, polychromatic with adjectives, like a decadent,
and clear up a subject by drawing cold distinctions, like a scholastic.
As he is the most enthusiastic pragmatist of them all (some of his
colleagues make decided reservations) I will speak of him exclusively.
He advertises a general work on the pragmatist movement as in
press; but the February number of Leonardo and the last chapter
of his just published volume, 'II Crepuscolo dei Filosofi, ?1 give his
program, and announce him as the most radical conceiver of prag-
matism to be found anywhere.
The 'Crepuscolo' book calls itself in the preface a work of 'pas-
sion,' being a settling of the author's private accounts with several
philosophers (Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Comte, Spencer, Neitzsche)
and a clearing of his mental tables from their impeding rubbish, so
as to leave him the freer for constructive business. I will only say
of the critical chapters that they are strongly thought and pungently
written. The author hits essentials, but he doesn't always cover
everything, and more than he has said, either for or against, remains
to be said about both Kant and Hegel. It is the preface and the
final chapter of the book that contain the passion. The 'good rid-
dance,' which is Papini's cry of farewell to the past of philosophy,
seems most of all to signify for him a good-by to its exaggerated
respect for universals and abstractions. Reality for him exists only
distributively, in the particular concretes of experience. Abstracts
and universals are only instruments by which we meet and handle
these latter.
In an article in Leonardo last year, 2 he states the whole pragmatic
scope and program very neatly. Fundamentally, he says, it means
an unstiffening of all our theories and beliefs by attending to their
instrumental value. It incorporates and harmonizes various ancient
tendencies, as
1. Nominalism, by which he means the appeal to the particular.
Pragmatism is nominalistic not only in regard to words, but in re-
gard to phrases and to theories.
2. Utilitarianism, or the emphasizing of practical aspects and
problems.
1 Milano: Societt\ Editrice Lombarda.
2 April, 1905, p. 45.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 339
3. Positivism, or the disdain of verbal and useless questions.
4. Kantism, in so far as Kant affirms the primacy of practical
reason.
5. Voluntarism, in the psychological sense, of the intellect's sec-
ondary position.
6. Fideism, in its attitude towards religious questions.
Pragmatism, according to Papini, is thus only a collection of
attitudes and methods, and its chief characteristic is its armed
neutrality in the midst of doctrines. It is like a corridor in a hotel,
from which a hundred doors open into a hundred chambers. In one
you may see a man on his knees praying to regain his faith; in
another a desk at which sits some one eager to destroy all meta-
physics; in a third a laboratory with an investigator looking for
new footholds by which to advance upon the future. But the cor-
ridor belongs to all, and all must pass there. Pragmatism, in short,
is a great corridor-theory.
In the 'Crepuscolo' Sig. Papini says that what pragmatism has
always meant for him is the necessity of enlarging our means of
action, the vanity of the universal as such, the bringing of our
spiritual powers into use, and the need of making the world over
instead of merely standing by and contemplating it. It inspires
human activity, in short, differently from other philosophies.
"The common denominator to which all the forms of human
life can be reduced is this : the quest of instruments to act with, or,
in other words, the quest of power."
By 'action' Sig. Papini means any change into which man enters
as a conscious cause, whether it be to add to existing reality or to
substract from it. Art, science, religion and philosophy all are but
so many instruments of change. Art changes things for our vision ;
religion for our vital tone and hope; science tells us how to change
the course of nature and our conduct towards it; philosophy is only
a more penetrating science. Tristan and Isolde, Paradise, Atoms,
Substance, neither of them copies anything real; all are creations
placed above reality, to transform, build out and interpret it in the
interests of human need or passion. Instead of affirming with the
positivists that we must render the ideal world as similar as possible
to the actual, Sig. Papini emphasizes our duty of turning the actual
world into as close a copy of the ideal as it will let us. The various
ideal worlds are here because the real world fails to satisfy us.
They are more adapted to us, realize more potently our desires. We
should treat them as ideal limits towards which reality must ever-
more be approximated.
All our ideal instruments are as yet imperfect. Arts, religions,
sciences, philosophies, have their vices and defects, and the worst
340
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of all are those of the philosophies. But philosophy can be regen-
erated. Since change and action are the most general ideals possible,
philosophy can become a 'pragmatic' in the strict sense of the word,
meaning a general theory of human action. Ends and means can
here be studied together, in the abstractest and most inclusive way,
so that philosophy can resolve itself into a comparative discussion
of all the possible programs for man's life when man is once for all
regarded as a creative being.
As such, man becomes a kind of god, and where are we to draw his
limits? In an article called 'From Man to God' in the Leonardo
for last February Sig. Papini lets his imagination work at stretching
the limits. His attempt will be called Promethean or bullfroggian,
according to the temper of the reader. It has decidedly an element
of literary swagger and conscious impertinence, but I confess that I
am unable to treat it otherwise than respectfully. Why should not
the divine attributes of omniscience and omnipotence be used by man
as the pole-stars by which he may methodically lay his own course ?
Why should not divine rest be his own ultimate goal, rest attained by
an activity in the end so immense that all desires are satisfied, and
no more action necessary? The unexplored powers and relations of
man, both physical and mental, are certainly enormous; why should
we impose limits on them a priori f And, if not, why are the most
Utopian programs not in order ?
The program of a Man-God is surely one of the possible great
type-programs of philosophy. I myself have been slow in coming
into the full inwardness of pragmatism. Schiller's writings and
those of Dewey and his school have taught me some of its wider
reaches; and in the writings of this youthful Italian, clear in spite
of all their brevity and audacity, I find not only a way in which our
English views might be developed farther with consistency at
least so it appears to me but also a tone of feeling well fitted to
rally devotees and to make of pragmatism a new militant form of
religious or quasi-religious philosophy.
. The supreme merit of it in these adventurous regions is that it
can never grow doctrinarian in advance of verification, or make
dogmatic pretensions.
When, as one looks back from the actual world that one believes
and lives and moves in, and tries to understand how the knowledge
of its content and structure ever grew up step by step in our minds,
one has to confess that objective and subjective influences have so
mingled in the process that it is impossible now to disentangle their
contributions or to give to either the primacy. When a man has
walked a mile, who can say whether his right or his left leg is the
more responsible? and who can say whether the water or the clay
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 341
is most to be thanked for the evolution of the bed of an existing
river? Something like this I understand to be Messrs. Dewey's and
Schiller's contention about 'truth.' The subjective and objective
factors of any presently functioning body of it are lost in the night
of time and indistinguishable. Only the way in which we see a new
truth develop shows us that, by analogy, subjective factors must
always have been active. Subjective factors thus are potent, and their
effects remain. They are in some degree creative, then; and this
carries with it, it seems to me, the admissibility of the entire Italian
pragmatistic program. But, be the God-Man part of it sound or
foolish, the Italian pragmatists are an extraordinarily well-informed
and gifted, and above all an extraordinarily free and spirited and
unpedantic, group of writers.
WILLIAM JAMES.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
THE DETECTION OF COLOKr-BLINDNESS *
A T the recent Cambridge meeting of the American Psychological
-*"*- Association, in the course of a discussion of color vision and
especially of color-blindness, one of the speakers made the claim that
a person deficient in color sense could be trained in a short time so
that he could pass successfully the Holmgren test for color-blindness,
which in some form or other is the one usually employed where it
is practically important to determine defective color vision. If
this is the case, and there are numerous evidences in the literature
of color-blindness substantiating the claim, then it would seem to
be desirable and important to discover a test which can be applied
at once expeditiously and with greater certainty of detection. Forty
or more tests of a scientific or practical character have been devised.
All of these methods are based on the naming or matching of colors,
the confusion of colors being in fact the basis of all of them.
Professor Cattell, in various discussions of the time of perception
as a measure of differences in sensations, has suggested the value of
this method in determining sense deficiencies. So far as I know, no
application of the method to testing color vision has been made
except in the experiments and results to be reported here. They
form part of a general investigation into the application of this
method to the measurement of differences in sensations. 2
1 Paper read at the Princeton meeting of the Section of Anthropology and
Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences, in conjunction with the New
York Section of the American Psychological Association.
2 To be published shortly in the Archives of Philosophy, Psychology and
Scientific Methods.
342
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
It may well happen that a color-blind person may be able to
pass the Holmgren test or some other naming or matching test with-
out confusion of colors and also without showing such hesitancy that
it would be safe to conclude from it that there is a defective color
sense. If, however, the one tested is red-green blind, it will take him
a longer time to distinguish the reds and greens than the blues and
yellows, and, on the other hand, if he is blue-yellow blind, the reverse
will be the case. The person of normal color vision, as experiments
have shown, takes about as long to distinguish one pair of colors as
the other. If, then, we have a measure of the time of perceiving
differences between each of these pairs of colors, we have an indica-
tion of the nature of the color sense. Should the time be markedly
longer for one pair than for the other, it is almost certain that there
is defective color vision or color-blindness. As a matter of fact, a
test based on the time of perception would seem to approach more
nearly the actual conditions to be met where it is necessary for
practical reasons to determine defects than methods based merely
on the inability to distinguish colors.
In the application of the method it is possible by the use of
colored lights or the lanterns actually found in the railway service
to simulate these conditions exactly. The time required for this
mode of procedure makes the application cumbersome. As is well
known, it is necessary to use a variety of reds and greens, for the hues,
tints or shades that are confused or are difficult to distinguish vary
widely in color-blind persons. The following method used in this
study seemed to be entirely satisfactory. One hundred and thirty-
two cards were prepared, on sixty-six of which were mounted three
blues and three yellows in equal numbers, and on the remainder,
three reds and three greens. The colored surfaces, the Milton-
Bradley papers being used, were 3 cm. square. With pigments it
would be possible to secure greater purity in color-tone and one could
define the relations of the colors more exactly. Such surfaces are,
however, difficult to prepare and some of the pigments quickly rub
off in handling. In each color the Milton-Bradley standard together
with one tint and one shade was used. These were selected so that
the person of normal color vision could distinguish them as rapidly
as he could distribute the cards. Numerous tests on such persons
showed that for them the times of distribution were almost exactly
equal. A second set of reds was also prepared, made up of the Milton-
Bradley orange-red series. The method of giving the test was to
place before the subject one each of the blues and yellows, or of the
reds and greens, arranged in a fixed order. The time required to
distribute the sixty cards, first the blues and yellows and then the
343
reds and greens, and so on alternately, was taken with a stop-watch.
A fixed order was adopted to prevent interference in associations,
which would have lengthened the time without giving any new in-
formation as to color vision. Alternation provides for equalizing
practise effects in distribution.
Experiments were made on five color-blind persons, ranging in
degree of deficiency from what would perhaps be termed a reduced
color sense to extreme confusion of the reds and greens. Ten series
were taken on each subject with the standard reds and greens and
the standard blues and yellows, and five with the orange-reds sub-
stituted for the standard reds, except in the case of one subject.
There were, thus, 1,800 reactions to color by each of four subjects
and 1,200 by one.
The results of the experiments go clearly to show the validity
and value of the test. The person of normal color vision, as stated
above, takes no longer to distribute the reds and greens than the
blues and yellows. The color-blind person takes much longer, ap-
proximately 12 seconds, when the time of distribution for the blues
and yellows is approximately 40 seconds. More specifically, the
averages of the gross differences with the standard red series for the
five subjects are 12.2, 13.7, 15.4, 16.6 and 6.1 seconds, respectively,
with the average difference for the group 12 seconds. For the orange-
red series the differences are 11.7, 13.0, 7.4 and 18.8 seconds, with
an average of 12.7 seconds. Expressed in terms of percentage of
increase in the times of distribution of the reds and greens over the
blues and yellows, the median differences in the first series are 25,
35, 43.5, 21.5 and 10.5 per cent., and for the group 24.5 per cent.
In the second, or orange-red, series these values are 33, 42, 24 and
44 per cent., and for the group 33.5 per cent.
On a basis of these results it can be safely said that if a person
takes markedly longer to distribute one pair of colors than the other,
there is evidence of a reduction in color sense or of color-blindness.
"With a larger number of cases on individuals of normal color vision
and on color-blind persons these limits can be definitely fixed. This
will, then, make possible a convenient method of measuring the color
sense. It is one of the valuable features of the method that it
furnishes a means of measuring rather exactly individual differences
in color perception, and not only the fact of color deficiency, but the
degree of the deficiency as well. Various tests on persons of sup-
posedly normal color vision show this and give ground for the
belief that a reduction in color sense is more common than is usually
supposed and that there are all degrees of ability to discriminate
colors, ranging from the highest discriminativeness down through
344
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the reduced color sense to the extreme forms of color-blindness. It
is, I think, mainly held that the color-blind form a separate species
marked off from those of normal color vision, but it seems probable
that this is not the case, but that the color-blind form rather the
lower end of a normal distribution curve.
This method combines the methods based on the confusion of
colors with a measure of the time of perception. This becomes ap-
parent when one takes into consideration the errors made. Wherever
the differences in time of distribution are small this is due to the
errors and confusions in the reds and greens which would disclose a
defect. It is important to note, however, that in most of the stand-
ard red series no errors occurred, and in practically all the orange-
red series there were no errors. Moreover, the colors could be dis-
tinguished if sufficient time was taken in order to secure accuracy,
for on running over the results of a distribution errors were detected
by differences in brightness, and particularly so when the colors were
side by side.
The test is of such a character that it can be given rapidly and by
any one. If in the first series the time differences do not appear,
the test need not be continued. If they do appear, five or more
series should give a sufficiently accurate measure for all practical
purposes. Improvements in the test can be made by defining the
colors more exactly with reference to each other, as suggested above.
In order that equal differences for consciousness be obtained through-
out, all that it would be necessary to do would be to apply the method
of the time of perception. The time of discriminating the standard
blue and the standard yellow and the corresponding standard red
and green is about equal. We can determine a difference for con-
sciousness between blue and a blue tint which will be equal to the
difference between red and a red tint, and so on for all desired com-
binations. The preparation of such a series of colors would give
the conditions for the very best application of this method.
VIVIAN A. C. HENMON.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
DISCUSSION
WHY SOLIPSISM IS REJECTED
AFTER Mr. Schiller's recent pithy presentation of some of the
dangers with which solipsism confronts the absolute idealist, 1
it may appear superfluous to discuss the general grounds for the re-
jection of solipsistic hypotheses. There is a further needlessness, ap-
a This JOURNAL, Vol. 111., p. 85.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 345
parently, in that virtually nobody is really a solipsist, so that every
attack upon the theory is a battle with windmills. Nevertheless,
there seems to be one good reason for delving into the matter afresh.
For at bottom we find in the conception of solipsism a theory of one-
to-one correspondence which serves to account for the existence of
other selves within my the solipsist 's experience. And just in
this one-to-one correspondence lurks a fallacy whose seriousness
seems little to be recognized.
Before turning to this point a distinction must be drawn between
two kinds of solipsism, the positive, absolutistic species and the rather
negative sort which is content with declaring that we have no true
proof of the existence of other selves. Each kind deserves a special
criticism ; the former puts the critic on the defensive, the latter gives
him the offense. Against out-and-out dogmatic solipsism we can
only raise the protest of facts ; in reply to negative solipsism we are
given the responsibility of searching out possible disproofs. It is
clear that a refutation of solipsism must start with an attack on the
more radical and positive species.
Absolutistic solipsism claims that I alone am all reality. It
denies every kind of objectivism, not merely objective idealism, whose
incompatibility with it Mr. Schiller has shown. It is then con-
fronted with the task of showing what relation those systems within
my all-inclusive system bear to the whole of which they are, by
hypothesis, but parts. And, as Mr. Schiller puts it, ''The full
atrocity of solipsism only reveals itself when it is perceived that
solipsists may exist in the plural and attempt to conceive me as parts
of them." To this point, however, the consistent solipsist would
retort as follows : "I do not deny that I find with my universe, the
only real one, systems which I label 'fellow citizens' and which
present the peculiarity of claiming for themselves individually the
same all-inclusive uniqueness which I know is my own and nobody
else 's. But it is one thing to find solipsistic philosophers within my
world and a very different thing to admit that the contentions of
those thinkers are anything more than occurrences within my uni-
verse. If the thinkers themselves are only phases or moments in my
world, how can their beliefs be anything else ? ' '
This retort has not been adequately met by Mr. Schiller's criti-
cism; for, unless I am very much mistaken, he has confused 'real
solipsist' with 'believer in solipsism' or 'thing or system declaring
in favor of solipsism.' We must avoid identifying solipsism, a form
of belief, with solipsism, a real state of affairs. The consistent
solipsist insists upon this most strenuously, for the distinction is his
court of last appeal. Upon this distinction the solipsist bases his
belief, rarely, if ever, clearly uttered, that in an all-inclusive system
346 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
peculiarities of the parts are (a) either peculiarities of the whole
and nothing else, or (6) representations of peculiarities of the whole,
and nothing but representations. It is this belief into which we
must probe, if we wish to understand all the implications of solipsism.
Now, the most remarkable peculiarity of the parts of the solip-
sistic system is that they claim to be independent of this system. We
shall not bother at present about the detailed content of this claim ;
we shall notice merely its type, which may be described as follows:
in an all-inclusive system a part of this system may be characterized
by an intention whose content can not possibly be, without self-con-
tradiction, the content of an intention of the system as a whole. To
put this concretely, we find in an assumedly all-inclusive solipsistic
system certain parts which ~by intention contain parts within them-
selves which are not at the same time parts of that solipsistic system.
The solipsist can not deny that other individuals, parts of his ex-
perience, claim to be 'the whole thing' by themselves, claim the
right of reducing him to a part of themselves. The solipsist attempts
to explain their intentions as really nothing more than so many ex-
periences of his ; by this device he escapes, in his own mind, the full
force of those insistent claims. But we must proceed cautiously in
giving ear to this new plea. Looking again at the typical mark of
the individual parts or subsystems, we find implied either (a) that
the part's intention is an intention of the whole, so that the whole
claims to contain in its own parts certain subparts which are them-
selves not merely within the whole, or (&) that the part's intention
is, as such, something essentially different from any possible inten-
tion of the whole. Worded thus, the first alternative is a pure con-
tradiction, so that we are forced to accept the second unless we are
willing to throw all scruples to the winds.
How is it that the solipsist has failed to see the absurdity of his
defense? I should say that he has done so because of his confusion
of intention with awareness of an intention, on the one hand, and
because of a fallaciously facile divorcement of intention as act of
will from intention as the meaning content of such volition. If I
say that A 's act of will is my experience, I seem to mean, according
to conventional solipsism, that the willing done by A is done by me.
But this is manifestly not the case ; as solipsist, I could not possibly
mean this, inasmuch as that would involve the downfall of my solip-
sistic universe ; for what A wills, intends, means, is that he is some-
thing more than a fragment in my experience-system. If I were to
admit this, I would have to admit the essentially self-contradictory
character of my universe, if I wished still to retain that universe
with its all-inclusiveness. Feeling the difficulties in which such a
defense ends, the solipsist turns to the only other hypothesis, viz.,
347
that A 's very intention, meaning-act and meaning-content combined,
is not really a peculiarity of the part of my system I call A, but is
a peculiarity due somehow to my system as a whole. The part A
does not will (mean something) independently, but does so simply
as a part of my solipsistic universe. But this does not help matters
much, for here, too, we discover the part claims to be something
which the whole denies it can be even in intention. Thus a pure
contradiction results: the part A claims that its own very claim
(intention) is independent of my experience-system, while this latter
insists that this new claim in turn is dependent upon the whole sys-
tem; andthis process of mutual recrimination now appears to involve
the fatal infinite regress.
The dilemma reduces to this, then : the intention of a part is, with
reference to its position in the whole, not a true intention but an
experience of some other sort, so that it is to the part something that
it can not be to the whole; and in settling the respective claims of
the part and the whole an insoluble regress indicating a latent con-
tradictionis set up as soon as the logical intention of the former is
reduced to some other type of experience for the whole, and vice
versa, for we have no criterion by which we can judge the priority
of claims made by the part and the whole.
Throughout these remarks, which, I fear, reek of something sus-
piciously like dialectic, we have not stated the case any more disad-
vantageously than the solipsistic defense itself permits. The admis-
sion that there are real intentions of other orders than my own
'proper' ones involves me, the solipsist, in the further fatal confes-
sion that there are phases in the parts of my system which are in
direct conflict with the whole import of the whole itself. And, on
the other hand, any denial that there are really intentions of other
orders brings with it the equally fatal admission that things are not
what they are experienced as, e. g., that what is genuinely experi-
enced as the meaning or intention of another individual is not only
not a property or expression of such an individual, but is not even
so much as an intention at all. What I feel with startling regularity
to be the expression of another's opinion is not even an opinion, in
so far as I do not myself hold this same something to be my opinion.
What seem to be conflicting views, then, are not views at all.
We are thus brought face to face with the general problem form-
ing the causa belli for idealism and pragmatism: if things are not
precisely what they are experienced as, if, in short, they change in
significance, if experience is self -corrective, must we not conclude
that experience, as such, is not ultimate nor all-inclusive in the strict
sense? Can we say that experience at any given cross-section is all
that it can become 1 Now, we are not going to attack this huge issue,
348 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
involving so much of little interest to solipsistic problems. Only one
concrete aspect of the matter is of vital importance here ; the fact
that, in the course of experience, situations arise in which the appar-
ently bona fide and objectively real intentions of other individuals
are transformed by criticism into mere modes of the solipsist's own
experience, shows clearly that there is no wisdom in saying dogmat-
ically that intentions, as such, are ever to be taken at face value.
The solipsist, in short, has no positive reason for believing that only
his intentions are exempt from transformation. Indeed, he has
direct proof of the opposite in the common phenomenon of ' changing
his mind. ' For, let us say, he meant one thing yesterday, but to-day
believes the opposite to be true; intentions of the first order may
transform, then, so as to cease being intentions at all. Where, then,
the unique security of the opinion that he is the absolute? Neither
intuition nor argument can go bond for it.
There is no help to be found in the idealist's distinction between
the phenomenal and the transcendental selves. It will not do to say
that the intentions of the first order are peculiarities of the phe-
nomenal self alone ; for in the first place this very distinction is itself
only intended, or, more exactly, is given through an intention. We
can not, therefore, separate its truthfulness from the way in which it
is experienced, inasmuch as we are by hypothesis making truth a
function of experience. More serious in its implications, though, is
the acceptance of two phases in the solipsistic self. For now con-
tradiction and conflict are lugged in with cool deliberateness. The
true transcendental self reappears within itself, but under cer-
tain peculiar limitations, commonly met with in historical incarna-
tions. What can the solipsist do if his phenomenal self claims to
be 'the real thing'? Shall he declare that this intention is really
his own? Or shall he say that in reality he doesn't mean what he
says? The dilemma needs no comment.
Viewing experience in its dynamic character, we finally discern a
kind of relation between it and its parts which renders the cata-
clysm complete. At a given moment a part can claim to have its
own unique experiences, which the whole, so long as it is conceived
as conscious, has not; and that part can change the intention of the
whole by adding experiences ('symbols' of its own unique ones) to
the whole's stock. Thus A can convince me that he is thinking of
something I am ignorant of ; he invites me to guess, and tells me my
guess is wrong, supplementing this with a true account of what he
had in mind. So we have a contradictory situation for the solip-
sist! a part of an all-inclusive and conscious system 'contains' some-
thing not contained even representatively in the system itself. It is
because we are all rationalists, in the last analysis, that we reject
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 349
instinctively as hopelessly untenable every hypothesis scented with
solipsism. For solipsism inhibits every empirically demanded i. e.,
self-consistenttheory of experience.
After this endeavor to show the irrationality of absolutistic solip-
sism, we may well notice the sad plight in which it leaves objective
idealism. Let us waive the issue raised in Mr. Schiller's article
already referred to ; let us refrain from proving the impossibility of
conceiving a solipsist in an objective ideal world. If we make the
idealist assume an objective, solipsistic absolute, it will be child 's play
to drive both him and his toy into corners, quagmires and other quan-
daries. Suppose we set no traps, then, but merely criticize the
bearing that a chastened pluralism has upon the relation which some
noted idealists conceive to exist between the absolute and the indi-
vidual. To say that the latter reflects the former so that there is a
curious one-to-one correspondence between the two systems is equiv-
alent to saying that the individual's intentions are true correspond-
ents to intentions in the absolute ; accepting realistic pluralism, this
would mean obviously that the absolute is self -contradictory. The
idealist with this correspondence theory prefers, I imagine, either
individualistic or absolutistic (objective) solipsism, in either of
which cases he accepts the fallacies already discussed. The reason
why the one-to-one correspondence theory seems tenable is to be
found in the venerable confusion of real intention (volition, mean-
ing-act) with awareness of an intention. It may well be that the
supposed absolute is in some uncanny fashion aware of all individual
opinions, so that these are doubly present, once cognitively in the
whole and once volitionally in the various parts. I fancy that some
such interpretation, laying all the stress upon a cognitive corre-
spondence, is the favorite one. But as soon as we set up a true
structural and content correspondence, we reduce the absolute to a
vast protoplasm, burdened with inner contradictions and blind con-
flicts, a pathetic Titan smitten with locomotor ataxia by its own
warring members.
An illustration of this point : I believe I am independent, in cer-
tain of my activities, from certain cosmic influences at certain times.
Now suppose we assume that I am laboring under an illusion,
being really determined in every act by every event of every or
in the universe. In what sense is my belief, qua belief, a correspond-
ent to something in the absolute? The content-meaning, viz., my
freedom, is not the content-meaning of any belief-attitude in the
absolute; which means that the correlation between meaning and
attitude in me is positively misrepresentative of the correlation of
the same 'things' in the absolute. I feel that I am free, but the
absolute does not feel that way. It will prove a fruitful line of
350 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
criticism to investigate the type of error here involved, for the whole
matter has a vital bearing upon the general concept and use of ' one-
to-one correspondence.' Professor Woodbridge's suggestion un-
published, but deserving of print that there is a fallacy underlying
the mathematical notion of i one-to-one correspondence' between two
infinite series, of which the second is a part of the first, points, I
believe, to precisely the same sort of difficulties which we have tried
to hint at above in the case of absolute idealism. And the whole
phenomenon reappears in every consistent species of solipsism.
WALTER B. PITKIN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
A REPLY TO MR. MARSHALL
AM glad to have Mr. Marshall correct my unintentional mis-
representation of his views about the term 'feeling.' 1 I had
stated that Mr. Marshall thought the term could be saved for tech-
nical service. To which Mr. Marshall replies: "I had intended, on
the contrary, to indicate that I am convinced that it is not only
desirable, but perfectly possible, to eliminate the word from our
psychological vocabulary, and that this may be done without finding
ourselves lacking adequate and expressive words to take its place."
: What Professor Angell speaks of as my doctrine was intended to
be merely a description of what is really meant by the term 'feeling'
as it is employed in careful writing by psychologists whose words
we must accept as authoritative and must treat with respect. :
I was somewhat in doubt as to Mr. Marshall's purposes in the
matter, for although he began his paper with a very explicit an-
nouncement that he was set for the overthrow of the term, the latter
portion of his discussion apparently involved a less drastic course.
A sentence or two from his first paper will perhaps explain my
misunderstanding without detracting from the force of Mr. Mar-
shall's later and more definite expression of his meaning:
'To be sure such a procedure as I thus recommend deprives us
psychologists of a word we are all fond of but in the end I am
convinced that our generous sacrifice would tend to true advance. "
' ' The thesis, then, which I present for your consideration is this :
that the experience which the psychologist properly* describes as
feeling is a certain form of presentation . . . ' " But as under
my view, 2 feeling is less explicit than the empirical ego . . . etc."
These sentences will, I hope, suggest the grounds for my interpre-
tation, even if they do not justify it.
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. III., Nos. 2 and 7.
2 Italics mine.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 351
As to Mr. Marshall's raids upon the inner storehouses of the
mind, the prosecuting attorney has, in view of the declaration of
intentions on the part of the accused, entered a nol. pros.
JAMES R. ANGELL.
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
SOCIETIES
SECTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
A MEETING was held on April 23, 1906, in conjunction with
-*- the New York Branch of the American Psychological Associa-
tion. The afternoon session was held in the psychological laboratory
of Columbia University, and the evening session at the American
Museum of Natural History. The following are abstracts of the
papers read:
Esthetic Value of Lower Sense Qualities: W. B. PITKIN.
The reason for the low esthetic value of touch, temperature, taste
and smell qualities may be found in the peculiarly weak imagery
and, much more conspicuously, in the rapid disappearance of after-
images. It is the power of after-imagery in the narrow sense of
the persistence of a quality with relatively high intensity (compared
to the original sensation's intensity) which determines whether or
not the quality in question shall be called esthetic. The conspicuous
fact about our judgments about lower sense qualities is that we are
wholly at a loss, in most cases, to say whether they are esthetic or
not ; this difficulty is not connected with the low pleasure-pain values,
but seems to be strictly an inability to pass any definite judgment
whatsoever. It is not a question of being esthetically pleasing or
esthetically displeasing, but rather of being contemplated at all.
As all distinct judgment refers to a content which is not a pure
sensation at the moment of judging, and as, furthermore, it is well
established that those three quality-species which are exclusively
used in the fine arts (viz., visual, auditory and kinesthetic) are re-
markably superior in after-imagery to all other species (for most
persons), it seems fair to conclude that absence of strong after-
imagery involves not so much a change or difference in pleasure-pain
tone as it does a mere inhibition of judgment and, in cases of
attempted judgment, mere inability to decide.
352 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
A Comparison of Mental Processes in the Horizontal and Vertical
Positions of the Body: E. E. JONES.
The tests have been made for the most part in the psychological
laboratory of Columbia University. The general plan has been to
place the subject on a Mosso balance in the horizontal position and
give him a series of tests which are duplicated in the vertical position.
Change from one position to another was frequent enough to dis-
tribute equally what fatigue might occur, and the results were then
statistically compared. In the discrimination of pitch the mono-
chord and tuning forks were used, by the method of right and wrong
cases. About fifty subjects were used, mostly university students,
and a comparison of results shows a decided advantage for the ver-
tical posture. The mean P. E. for the subjects tested in the hori-
zontal posture is about one and one half times as great as the
vertical P. E. Tactile discrimination was tested by the esthesiometer
by the method of right and wrong cases. The results for eighteen
subjects show a P. E. in the vertical position of the body one and one
half times as great as the P. E. in the horizontal. In the adding
tests subjects did quicker work in the horizontal position of the body
and were about twenty per cent, more accurate. The average time
of adding problems of theoretically equal difficulty in the horizontal
position was 30.6 seconds; for the vertical 32.9 seconds. In the
tapping tests enough experiments were made in each position to
form good averages, and the subjects were timed for one hundred
taps. For the fourteen subjects tested the average time for 100 taps
in the horizontal position was 14.2 seconds, with an M. V. of 1.5.
For the vertical position the average time was 13.6 seconds, with an
M. V. of 1.59.
Colored After-images of Unperceived Peripheral Color Stimuli:
GRACE M. FERNALD.
In a series of experiments carried out by Dr. Baird 1 it was found
that after-images were not aroused by the stimulation of the pe-
ripheral portions of the dark-adapted retina. Very decided after
effects, however, were shown to exist and to be influential in deter-
mining the effects of succeeding color stimuli, unless sufficiently long
rest intervals were allowed between stimulations. These fatigue
effects' were made the basis of an explanation of Hellpach's 'Gegen-
farbige Zone,' i. e., an extreme peripheral zone in which colors ap-
peared in their complementary instead of their true color tone. 2
Very different results from those just described were obtained in our
1 ' The Color Sensitivity of the Peripheral Retina/ published by the Carnegie
Institute, May, 1905.
2 Philosophical Studies, Vol. XV., pp. 524-554.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 353
work on the light-adapted eye. 3 After-images were perceived, almost
without exception, as far out as any color could be distinguished, and
in many cases were clearly seen though the stimulus color was not
recognized. These appearances could not have been due to fatigue
produced by previous color stimuli, since the after-image, which ap-
peared as soon as the stimulus was removed, was, in every case, the
color complementary to the stimulus color, even when the latter was
not recognized. Moreover, these after-images were repeatedly seen
when the two or three preceding stimuli had been colorless, or of such
a nature that they could not have produced the after-effects observed.
Our results suggested at once that Hellpach's * gegenf arbige ' colors
were simply the colored after-images of unperceived color stimuli,
since in dark-room work it might be difficult to tell whether the
color was perceived during an exposure of three seconds' duration
or immediately afterwards. Whichever explanation of Hellpach's
results may prove to be correct, it is certain that after-images follow
the stimulation of the peripheral retina of the light-adapted eye,
and that in many cases the after-image is perceived though the
stimulus color is not distinguished.
On Simultaneous Color Contrast: MILDRED FOCHT.
The usual experiments in simultaneous color contrast are per-
formed with colored papers, which reflect much white light mingled
with the colored rays. Experiments with the light transmitted by
colored glass, in which the admixture of white light is at its mini-
mum, seem to show that unless spectral white light is mixed with
the colored light from any surface, that surface will exhibit no
change in color quality due to its surroundings. The presence of
white light brings about the phenomenon of color contrast in this
way: As spectral white light may be regarded as consisting of a
number of pairs of complementary colors, elimination of one color
leaves its complement alone, though somewhat weakened by the
white light composed of the other pairs. Such elimination takes
place in simultaneous color contrast; since, in accordance with the
law of relativity, the strong color sensation caused by the light-rays
from the inducing surface swallows up the much weaker sensation
caused by similar light-rays from the reacting surface. Hence only
the rays dissimilar to those from the inducing surface are perceived
as coming from the reacting surface. Thus, gray on blue appears
yellow because the blue background absorbs the blue in the gray,
and leaves only the resultant of the remaining rays to enter con-
sciousness. This explanation, which is a purely psychical one, ac-
cords with any theory of color vision in which different retinal
processes corresponding to different wave lengths are presupposed.
8 Psychological Review, Vol. XII., pp. 386-425.
354
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Statistical Method and Literary Values: F. LYMAN WELLS.
Measurement by relative position is the most practical method
for a scientific determination of literary preferences. This was ap-
plied to ten stories by Edgar Allen Poe, which were returned by
forty women undergraduates in the following order and positions :
'The Fall of the House of Usher/ 3.6; 'The Murders in the Rue
Morgue/ 4.0; 'Ligeia,' 4.1; 'The Purloined Letter/ 4.6; 'William
Wilson/ 5.1; 'The Telltale Heart/ 5.8; 'The Cask of Amontillado/
6.0; 'Metzengerstein/ 6.6; 'Loss of Breath/ 7.1; 'Le Due de
L 'Omelette/ 7.7. The obvious pairing of the stores from the stand-
point of accepted literary criticism is not indicated by correlations
in the judgments. The attitude toward the 'Purloined Letter' tells
nothing of the attitude toward the ' Rue Morgue. ' A preference for
'Loss of Breath' tells nothing about 'Le Due de L 'Omelette/ but
if a subject prefer 'Loss of Breath/ 'William Wilson' and 'Ligeia'
are disproportionately favored. Preference for 'William Wilson'
means a dislike of the 'Rue Morgue/ and a dislike of the 'Purloined
Letter' means a preference for the 'Telltale Heart' and the 'Cask of
Amontillado.' Such results as these, compared with the usual crit-
ical attitude, show how little reliance in such matters can be placed
upon the subjectivities. From any objective standpoint, most pres-
ent-day literary criticism is 'three fifths suggestion and two fifths
sheer fudge.'
The Type in Psychophysical Data: CLARK WISSLER.
The results of a practise test were considered as presenting a
curve varying from the type curve, and in such a curve the indi-
vidual seems to vary in period as well as in efficiency. The condi-
tions are then the same as have been found for growth in stature,
weight, etc., where an increased variability is found for the maxi-
mum period of growth due to the combination of variability in
stature and in period. The interesting point is that the variability
in period seems to represent a constant from which it follows that a
correlation of stature, weight, etc., will result in increased coefficients
for the time of maximum growth. It was suggested that in correla-
ting the results of a test where practise is a factor and where there
is a greater variability in the group at the first trial than in the
succeeding trials, the conditions are the same as in the value for
stature, weight, etc. The import of this is that the coefficients of
correlation for the first trials will be artificially increased and that
the small positive correlation found in psychological data represents
only a condition of development concealing a state of no correlation.
It was suggested that the apparent greater individual variation in
355
the first trials at a test would tend to reduce correlation so that in
opposition to the former tendency the correlation obtained for the
first trial would approach the true result. All this is based upon the
assumption that a capacity to learn exists that tends to be constant.
On the other hand, if such capacity is not constant, but is distributed
among the individual 's functions according to chance, the correlation
for the first trials would be approximately the true correlation.
From this it follows that the preliminary trials in a test are suffi-
cient for the study of interfunctional relations. However, the above
rests upon theoretical conditions and must be tested empirically.
An Experiment in Habit Formation: JAMES E. LOUGH.
The first twenty letters are arranged alphabetically. Opposite
each letter is placed a different letter which is called the 'equiva-
lent letter.' On another sheet are printed rows of the first twenty
letters in random order, the order being different in each row. The
subject is required to write the equivalent letter under each letter
in these rows, always going from left to right. The key of equiva-
lent letters is not memorized, but is consulted as frequently as neces-
sary. The total time required to write each row of equivalents was
recorded. It was found that the time required to write such series
diminished as the association between each pair of letter equivalents
became more habitual. The resulting curves exhibited all the char-
acteristics of the typical practise or habit curve. Practise curves
were obtained from three groups of subjects: (A) ten-year-old
pupils; (B) fourteen-year-old pupils; (C) adults. Group A re-
quired the longest time to write the initial series, but formed the
habit most rapidly. Group B required less time for the initial
series and formed the habit less rapidly. Group C required still less
time for the initial series and formed the habit very slowly. There
was relatively little variation within each group to correspond to
considerable variation in the class standings of the pupils. Dis-
tractions, weather conditions, etc., produce slight modifications in
the practise curve, but the general form of the curve is not materi-
ally altered.
The Functional Psychology of Sensation and Image: H. HEATH
BAWDEN.
Since the time of Kant it has been recognized that sense and
thought are not separate faculties of the mind. But their wholly
organic and functional character has not been fully appreciated.
This is due to the fact that the true relation between thought and
action has not been made clear. Knowledge is a process which goes
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on within action. The psychology of sensation and volition (the
culminating image) is a discussion of the breaks and remaking of
connections in the process of experience. Looked at negatively sen-
sation presents the whole experience in the act of breaking down,
while from the positive side it furnishes the basis for readjustment.
The cognitive process is experience undergoing reconstruction at the
point of specific need ; it begins with the conflict of opposing aspects
and consists of the attempt to reorganize the experience by the
mutual interaction of these factors. Stated objectively in physi-
ological terms, these factors are stimulus and response. When
these do not function as such they come to consciousness and are
then stated psychologically as sensation and image. Delayed co-
ordination is the occasion at once of the presentation of the problem
in sensational terms and the formulation of a solution in terms of
image or idea. Thinking is the balancing of tendencies represented
in the inhibition of the processes of stimulation and response, in
which a certain phase of the coordination or situation is taken for
granted and another phase is undergoing modification. There is
a tension set up between what has been achieved up to date (repre-
sented in consciousness by certain sensations and images vestiges
of instincts and habits which are undergoing disintegration) and a
new coordination or situation which is present as yet only in in-
cipient form (represented by these same sensations and images in
so far as they are dynamogenic or ideomotor). Knowledge is this
process of interaction and internal metamorphosis of the experience
or situation. Sensation in so far as it is the necessary condition and
initial stage in the transformation is itself an element in the total
response, while the image in so far as it may be regarded as a
reverberation of some previous sense experience is a factor in the
total process of stimulation. When the stimulus does not stimulate,
i. e., call out the appropriate response, we have a checking of the
response, and this recoils upon the stimulus, modifying it in the
conscious experience we call sensation. This checking of the re-
sponse thus is at once the definition of the stimulus in the sensational
experience, and of the response in ideational terms. As a revival
of past sensational experience, the image is a part of the phenomenon
of the stimulus coming to consciousness. As calling out latent
dynamogenic tendencies and ideomotor cues, the image is a part of
the phenomenon of the response coming to consciousness.
The Distinction between Heart and Head: D. S. MILLER.
The domain of the head is fact, the domain of the heart is value.
The paper endeavored, on the basis of this interpretation, to dis-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 357
engage permanent truth from error in current doctrines of the
relation of the two.
R. S. WOOD WORTH,
Secretary.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Relation of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry.
J. ROYCE. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, July,
1905. Pp. 353-415.
The subject of this essay is not so broad as a glance at its title might
suggest. For, first, by the ' principles of logic ' are meant simply the
formal rules of an algebra of logic, the canons governing the manipula-
tion of assumed concepts of absolute distinctness and fixity. In other
words, it is the logic of the l exact sciences ' with which we have to deal,
understood as a deduction from a definite set of ultimate (and, therefore,
mutually independent and indifferent) premises. Secondly, by the
i foundations of geometry ' are to be understood such a set of premises,
selected with a view to their sufficiency as a source for the derivation
of geometrical truths. . Finally, by the * relation ' between these l prin-
ciples ' and ' foundations ' is meant a remarkable similarity, the extent
and significance of which it is the chief object of the essay to determine.
The general nature of this similarity may be briefly explained as
follows : The terms of the fundamental propositions, upon which an exact
science (according to the above-mentioned interpretation) is based, can
have no meaning other than that which their place in those propositions
gives them. The words used to denote these terms are, therefore, in
themselves absolutely meaningless, and no loss is suffered when they are
replaced by algebraic symbols. The only relation which is regarded as
ultimately subsisting between such terms is that of copresence in deter-
minate groups; and the fundamental principles of the science are simply
postulates establishing the existence of these groups and exhibiting the
conditions under which the elements of one group may enter into other
groups. Now when the postulates of logic and of geometry are stated
in this symbolic fashion, it is possible to present them in a form, in which
they are almost entirely identical.
Professor Royce's paper is largely a restatement of a theory advanced
by Mr. A. B. Kempe in an essay of similar scope, in the Proceedings of
the London Mathematical Society for 1S90. 1 In this essay Mr. Kempe
sets forth a development of the algebra of logic, using as the funda-
mental relation between classes not (as ordinarily) that of inclusion, but
a peculiar sort of ' between ' relation. This relation, as denned in ordi-
1 The reviewer regrets that prolonged illness has prevented 'his reading Mr.
Kempe's essay, for knowledge of which he is dependent upon Professor Royce's
account.
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nary terms, is that which one class bears to two others when it includes
their common extent and is included within their total extent. Mr.
Kempe, however, does not so define it, but, on the contrary, regards in-
clusion as a mere special case of the between-relation ; i. e., the included
class simply lies between the including class and a particular class called
zero. The between-relation is itself defined without reference to the
idea of inclusion at all, solely by means of a set of symbolic postulates.
On the basis of these postulates, the whole algebra of logic is readily
developed but with one important peculiarity. No means are provided
for distinguishing the zero class and the universe class from any other
similarly related pair of classes. They must, therefore, be regarded as
arbitrarily fixed upon. This, however, does not appear to Mr. Kempe
(or to Professor Royce) as a defect in the theory. It is regarded as a
decided advantage, indicating the superior generality of the discussion
to that based upon the relation of inclusion.
It is well known that in the modern logic of geometry the between-
relation of points in a straight line occupies a place of fundamental im-
portance comparable to that which the between-relation of classes occupies
in Mr. Kempe's logic. In many respects these two relations are re-
markably similar. A surprisingly long list of elementary properties can
be given which belong equally to both. But there are two fundamental
differences.
I. If the points 1) and c are both different from a and d z and lie be-
tween them, neither a nor d can lie between b and c. This does not hold
for logical classes; and furthermore,
II. For every class b between a and d, another class c exists between
a and d, such that both a and d lie between b and c. 3 Such classes as
b and c will be referred to below as i conjugate mediators.'
There are various other differences between the logical and the spatial
order, but all more or less closely connected with these two. The most
remarkable is the existence of logical ' negatives ' or ' obverses/ which
(like opposite points in a spherical surface) have every other class in the
universe between them.
From reasons such as these, Mr. Kempe, followed by Professor Royce,
concludes that the system of logical classes may be regarded ' as much
more general and inclusive than the system of the points of space/ That
is to say, " One may view the points of a space as a select set of logical
elements, chosen, for instance, from a given ' universe of discourse.' '
This thought Professor Royce recognizes as the essential conception
at the basis of Mr. Kempe's discussion, and it is equally essential to his
own. The importance of the thought he explains as follows : " The
relations amongst logical entities are, in any case, the most fundamental
relations that we know. Experience shows us in the outer world those
2 In Mr. Kempe's usage, every element lies ' between ' itself and every other.
For brevity's sake we shall hereafter ignore this fact.
3 To verify this law, substitute m -f- n + o for a, o + P + q for d, and
n -f- o -}- p for 6, a perfectly general supposition. Then c = m + o + q.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 359
ordinal space relations which geometry generalizes in the concept of
' between.' But our own thinking processes show us the meaning of the
logical relation [of inclusion]. The latter relation, then, is more suited
to be the basis for a theory of the logic of an exact science, in case we
can only so define and restrict its application 4 that our ideal geometrical
relations can come to be viewed as special instances of those forms which
we can develop by the use of pure logic" (p. 355; italics mine).
If space permitted, we might be pardoned for stopping to question
Professor Royce's antithesis of * experience,' on the one hand, and ' our
own thinking processes,' on the other. This inquiry is rendered unneces-
sary, however, by the fact that Mr. Kempe's essential thought involves a
very serious confusion, due apparently to his not having observed the
very different logical significance of the two differences between the
logical and the spatial order which we numbered I. and II. above. The
confusion in question is that of the inclusiveness of a system with its
generality. The proposition contained in I. does indeed place a specific
limitation upon the system of points in space, from which the system of
logical classes is free; and the latter system is in so far the more general.
But it is to be noted, that the mere freedom from this limitation is by
no means equivalent to the proposition of II.; just as the denial of the
application of this latter proposition to the points of space is by no means
equivalent to I. In other words, II. imposes as veritable a specific limita-
tion upon the system of classes as I. imposes upon the system of points.
This fact seems to have been concealed by the circumstance, that whereas
I. is clearly a restriction upon the otherwise possible multitude of points,
II. apparently (though only apparently) enlarges the possible multitude
of classes. The fact remains, however, that it is as positive a specifica-
tion of the system of classes, that it shall contain conjugate mediators,
as it is of the system of points, that it shall contain nothing of the sort.
We can not, therefore, follow Mr. Kempe (and Professor Royce) in the
opinion, that ' our ideal geometrical relations can come to be viewed as
special instances of those forms which we can develop by the use of pure
logic.' What we have here is two mutually exclusive species of the same
genus.
While, however, the logical system is no whit more general fhan the
spatial system, it is truly much more inclusive. That is to say, the
spatial system would have to be extraordinarily enlarged if it were to
be made completely parallel to the logical system. There is in what we
have said nothing at all to oppose the suggestion, that we regard ' our '
space (or any other space) as a selection from a space thus ideally en-
larged. But, for the reasons above given, such a procedure would appear
to be wholly uninstructive.
4 As he believes Mr. Kempe has done by reducing it to the logical between-
relation.
8 The reader should understand that this ' enlargement,' t. e., the addition
of conjugate mediators, means much more than the addition of infinite dimen-
sionality to space.
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
There are, moreover, other serious difficulties attaching to Mr. Kempe's
conception. Our whole knowledge of the multidimensionality of the
logical system depends (as is apparent from Professor Royce's treatment
in 122 and 123) upon the assumption of conjugate mediators. Hence,
when the system of logical classes is reduced (essentially by the elimina-
tion of conjugate mediators) to the inferior complexity of the system
of points in a space, it remains an open question whether the reduction
may not have gone too far. That is to say, there remains no warrant for
asserting the multidimensionality of the logical system thus reduced.
It may be of infinite dimensions, but we can demonstrate the existence
of no more than a single line. Professor Royce and his predecessor
apparently assume without questi 
