THE JOUENAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
3
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY
AND
SCIENTIFIC METHODS
EDITED BY
FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE
AND
WENDEIJQ T. BUSH
VOLUME VII
JANUARY-DECEMBEB, 1910
NEW YORK
THE SCIENCE PRESS
1910
s
PRESS OF
THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY
LANCASTER, PA.
VOL. VII. No. 1. JANUARY 6, 1910
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE EGO-CENTRIC PREDICAMENT 1
I SHALL deal in the present paper with a problem that is suffi-
ciently limited to justify the hope that it may be solved on its
merits. I shall seek to discover whether a certain circumstance,
which has never been disputed, does or does not constitute evidence
for a theory that has been much disputed. The circumstance I shall
call the ego-centric predicament, and the theory, ontological idealism.
I shall not attempt to determine the truth of ontological idealism,
except in so far as that theory is established by an appeal to the ego-
centric predicament. Furthermore, I do not attribute either the
theory or the argument, in the form in which I present them, to any
individual philosopher. My statement is intended to contain propo-
sitions that approach as exactly as any proposition can to a theory
and an argument that are among the commonplaces of philosophy.
But since the attempt to state the theory has raised doubts in my
mind as to the possibility of stating it at all, and since I have found
an exact statement of the argument to be equivalent to its refuta-
tion, I can not reasonably suppose that any one ever deliberately
assented to such statements. Inexact discourse can not be criticized
until it has first been converted into definite propositions ; and these
can never, with any certainty, be identified with the original asser-
tions. For this reason polemics directed against historical opinions
are like to prove unconvincing and futile. I propose, then, to ex-
amine certain propositions which I have myself defined. But, at the
same time, I hope that what I have to say will be recognized as hav-
ing an important bearing on traditional issues.
What I mean by ontological idealism is best expressed by the
proposition: Everything (T) is defined by the complex, I know T.
For the purposes of this proposition the "I" is in no need of any
definition beyond what it contains from its being the initial term in
1 Read before the American Philosophical Association, at New Haven,
December, 1909.
5
this complex. In order to make it plain that the term is generalized,
I shall substitute ego, or E, for the pronoun. The term T is pri-
marily distinguished from other terms only in that it has unlimited
denotation; it refers to anything and everything. It is desirable
that the operation or relation "know" should be freed from its
narrower intellectualistic meaning; and it will, therefore, prove
convenient to use the expression R c , to mean any form of conscious-
ness that relates to an object. Thus R c may refer to thinking,
remembering, willing, perceiving, or desiring. I am justified in de-
nominating it as a relation, because in the theory and in the argu-
ment which I am examining it plays the part of the connecting link
through which E and T form one complex. Ontological idealism is,
then, a name for the proposition: (E)R C (T) defines T.
It will be observed that the proposition asserts that the specific
relation R obtains between E and T. Ontological idealism is not
to be confused, therefore, with a theory which simply asserts that
some relation to E is definitive of T. Such a theory might be offered
on the following grounds. No item in the universe can escape being
related to every other item in the universe. Therefore, since there
is at least one E in the universe, no T can escape being related to it.
But a term is defined by all of its relations, hence every T is defined
by its relation to an E. But such a theory would be trivial, because
it would attach no peculiar importance to the relationship singled
out for special mention. On the same ground one could construct a
theory to the effect that T is defined by its relation to the number 7,
or to Washington's crossing the Delaware, or to the flower in the
crannied wall. There is an interminable series of such ontologies,
and if established on such grounds, idealism would be only one of
infinitely many negligible alternatives.
Not only does Ontological idealism assert the specific relation R,
but it asserts that this relation defines T as T 's other relations do not.
In other words, "definition" is intended in a sense in which some,
but not all, relations are definitive. Otherwise, the theory would
again become trivial and negligible. No theory of relations can
neglect the difference, for purposes of definition, between a relation
lixc that of a moving body to the masses of surrounding bodies, and
a relation like that between a man's fortunes and his horoscope (or,
"that part of the ecliptic which is on the eastern horizon at the in-
stant of his nativity"). If the latter type of relation were as
definitive as the former, then there would be no ground for prefer-
ring astronomy to astrology, or an idealistic ontology to any one of a
number of others. Thus, every T is in the same universe with the
number 7. Expressing the relation "with" by the symbol R w , we
can construct an ontological proposition to the effect that, (7)R W (T)
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 7
defines (T). If ontological idealism is to be distinguished from the
infinitely many negligible propositions which may thus be asserted,
it must be contended that R C (E), is in some sense necessary to T,
while R w (7), R"(8), etc., are not.
Any remaining doubt of this must be dispelled, when it is ob-
served that the only ground on which it would be possible to assert
the universal proposition, every (T)R(E), is the discovery of the
necessity of the relationship in particular instances. For complete
induction is evidently out of the question. Speaking generally, the
assertion that a thing is definable by all of its relations, can never
throw any light on the relations that it does in truth possess. For
that purpose the thing must be regarded as defined by some relations
only. Before, then, it can be shown that everything possesses the
relation 7? c , that relation must be regarded as peculiarly indispen-
sable to it. R C (E) must be shown to be necessary to T, as two di-
mensions are necessary to a plane, or hydrogen and oxygen to water.
I desire in the present investigation to leave out of consideration
a rapidly growing doubt as to the possibility of any such branch of
knowledge as ontology in the traditional sense. Thus it may well be
that the failure of the materialistic ontology is due not so much to the
special limitations of the concept matter, as to the impossibility of
obtaining any concept that shall have the unlimited denotation and
connotation attributed to being or reality. Indeed, I do not feel at
all sure that the words "being" and "reality" mean anything in
exact discourse. But I waive that general question for the sake of
isolating a narrower issue.
Ontological idealism, then, is a theory to the effect that T neces-
sarily stands in the relation R c to an E, or that the relation-
ship R C (E) is indispensable to T. Now the attempt to prove this
theory at once reveals a predicament that might otherwise escape
notice. One must attempt to discover the precise nature of the
modification of T by R C (E) ; but one promptly encounters the
fact that R C (E} can not be eliminated from one's field of
study, because "I study," "I eliminate," "I think," "I observe,"
"I investigate," etc., are all cases of R C (E). In short, R C (E}
is peculiarly ubiquitous. There can be no question concern-
ing the fact ; it owes its importance in the estimation of philosophers
to its being one of the few facts to which philosophy itself originally
called attention. Science has occasion, to eliminate errors of judgment
and relativities of sense, but has no ocoasion to eliminate consciousness
altogether; and therefore has not discovered that it is impossible.
We can not, then, disagree as to the fact, nor as to its peculiarly
philosophical or epistemological significance. But we are still left
in doubt as to what the fact proves with reference to the problem
8 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
which revealed it. My contention is that it proves nothing; or
rather that it proves only the impossibility of using a certain
method to solve the problem. In other words, it is not an argument,
but a methodological predicament. Let me further elaborate this
predicament.
In order to discover if possible exactly how a T is modified by
the relationship R C (E), I look for instances of T out of this rela-
tionship, in order that I may compare them with instances of T in
this relationship. But I can find no such instances, because "find-
ing" is a variety of the very relationship that I am trying to elimi-
nate. Hence I can not make the comparison, nor get an answer to
my original question by this means. But I can not conclude that
there are no such instances ; indeed, I now know that I should not ~be
able to discover them if there were.
Again, with a view to demonstrating the modification of T by
R C (E), I compare T before and after it has entered into this rela-
tionship with some E other than myself. 'But in making the com-
parison, I institute the relationship with myself, and so am unable
to free T altogether from such relationships.
Again, within my own field of consciousness, I may attempt to
define and subtract the cognitive relationship, in order to deal exclu-
sively with the residuum. But after subtracting the cognitive rela-
tionship, I must still ' ' deal with ' ' the residuum ; and ' ' dealing with ' '
is a variety of the very relationship which I sought to banish.
Finally, just in so far as I do actually succeed in eliminating
every cognitive relationship, I am unable to observe the result. Thus
if I close my eyes I can not see what happens to the object ; if I stop
thinking I can not think what happens to it ; and so with every mode
of knowledge. In thus eliminating all knowledge I do not experi-
mentally eliminate the thing known, but only the possibility of know-
ing whether that thing is eliminated or not.
This, then, is what I mean by the ego-centric predicament. It is
a predicament in which every investigator finds himself when he
attempts to solve a certain problem. It proves only that it is impos-
sible to deal with that problem in the manner that would be most
simple and direct. To determine roughly whether a is a function of
1), it is convenient to employ Mill's "Joint Method of Agreement
and Difference," that is, to compare situations in which & is and is
not present. But where & is "I know," it is evidently impossible
to obtain a situation in which it is not present without destroying
the conditions of observation. In other words, the problem of deter-
mining the modification of things by the knowing of them is a
uniquely difficult problem. The investigator here labors under a
peculiar embarrassment. But this fact affords no proper ground
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 9
for any inference whatsoever concerning the true solution of the
problem ; hence it affords no argument for any theory in the matter,
such as ontological idealism.
For the purpose of further illustration, and in order to suggest
specific historical applications, let me consider several varieties of
ontological idealism that gain illegitimate support from this predica-
ment. The varieties which I propose here to examine are distin-
guished by the type of dependence on E(E] which is attributed
to T. The creative theory asserts that E creates T; the formative
theory asserts that E forms or organizes T; the identity theory
asserts that E is T.
It is characteristic of creative idealism, the most naive variety
of the theory, to dispense wholly with analysis of E, T, and R.
In other words, the necessity of the relationship is not deduced from
the nature of its elements. One is held to be justified in asserting
it without any previous definition of thing or ego or consciousness.
Thus one might assert that ' ' esse est percipi, ' ' or that ' ' die "Welt ist
meine Vorstellung ' ' without express reference to the nature of ' ' esse, ' '
' ' percipi, " ' ' die Welt, " " meine, " or ' ' Vorstellung. ' ' There would
remain as evidence for the assertion only the invariable agreement
of the elements denoted by these words. One finds no ' ' esse ' ' that is
not perceived, no "Welt" that is not an ego's idea. But the method
of agreement, unless tested by the method of difference, affords no
proof; especially when, as in this case, there is an accidental reason
for the invariability of the agreement. To rely on or employ
invariable agreement when unsupported by other evidence is to
commit that elementary fallacy, of which post hoc ergo propter hoc
is the most common case. It is unnecessary for me to urge that this
fallacy has been not infrequently committed, and that it has served
on the whole as the favorite means of beguiling innocent minds into
the vestibule of subjectivistic philosophies. But the degree to which
this fallacy is virtually involved in the more advanced reasoning of
idealism, is not, I think, sufficiently recognized.
Let us consider, for example, what I have called the "formative"
theory, reducible to the proposition, E forms T. This epistemology
owes its chief claim to distinction to the fact that it starts from an
analysis of T, and is therefore more rational than the creative theory.
It is shown that every T involves the same group of ideas or cate-
gories, so that it is possible to define thing in general in terms of
that group. More specifically, it is shown that everything involves
such formal characters as shall enable it to stand in determinate
relations with all other things. Since everything must belong to
truth, and since truth is one and systematic, everything must possess
the logical qualifications for membership in one universal system.
10 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Now it is evident that this is not as yet idealistic. And yet, for some
reason, it is often regarded as equivalent to idealism, or as being only
one inevitable step short of idealism. This is easily explained if we
allow for the surreptitious or unconscious use of the ego-centric pre-
dicament. Thus, the categories may be introduced not as the condi-
tions of being, but as the conditions of "experience," or conscious-
ness of being. But this means that things are already construed as
instances of the (E)R C relationship. Doubtless whatever is neces-
sary to things is necessary to the knowledge of them; so that one
may regard ontological constants as cognitive constants. But this
proves that knowledge is a function of things, and not that things
are a function of knowledge. The latter assertion, unless new evi-
dence is introduced, is simply a petit io principii. That this fact
should so easily escape notice is due, I think, to the presumption that
since things are severally found in the (E)R C relationship, that rela-
tionship must be necessary to them. It is easy to beg the question
because whatever one makes the starting-point of the analysis is in
fact "my object." Building the results of the analysis about this,
the total system becomes a system of consciousness.
But there is another motive that contributes to a looseness of
reasoning here. The categories are ideas rather than sensations ; they
are the fruit of analysis, detached from the empirical context by
thought. They do not belong to the individuals of nature. But
where, then, do they belong? Now most modern philosophers
scarcely regard it as necessary to prove that categories, relations,
and ideas, are essentially modes of thought; and in this they are
aided and abetted by common sense. For, since the overthrow of
scholasticism, philosophy and common sense alike have been habit-
ually nominalistic. Empiricists and rationalists differ only in that
with the former nominalism is given a sceptical emphasis, while with
the latter it is given a constructive emphasis. But to adopt a nom-
inalistic interpretation of the categories, to regard them as acts of
consciousness, is to commit oneself forthwith to idealism. Are
categories necessarily related to a knower, are they conditioned by
the relationship R C (E)1 Here again we meet with the ego-centric
predicament. It is impossible to find a relation without a compari-
son of terms, it is impossible to find a fundamental logical concept
that is not conceived. Since I can not find a category without know-
ing it in the manner required by categories, I can find no category
that is not a mode of thought. But since this clearly has to do with
the circumstances conditioning my investigation, it must be dis-
counted in my conclusions concerning the thing investigated. If I
allow it to create the slightest presumption cne way or the other, and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 11
rely on that presumption in further inferences, my construction is
vicious and ungrounded.
"While I very much doubt if any idealistic theory is untainted by
this error, it is possible to define a third variety of the theory in
which the error is much less conspicuous. This variety I have called
the "identity" theory, because it reduces to the proposition : E is T.
This theory also bases itself on an analysis of T, or of T so far as
intelligible and true. It is held that every T is definable in terms of
relations through which it is connected with every other T. So far
formative and identical theories agree. But in the latter more at-
tention is given to the implications of a relational definition. If T'
is definable in terms of R(T 2 ), then R(T 2 ) must be internal
to T, or, (T')R(T 2 ) must be identical with T'. At the same time,
(T')R(T 2 ) must be identical with T 2 . Furthermore, since T' and
T 2 are defined by (T')R(T 2 ), and not (T')R(T 2 ) by T' and T 2 , or,
since (T')R(T 2 ) is intelligible per se, while T' and T 2 are intelligible
only in terms of (T')R(T 2 ), the latter must be held to be prior to
the former, as their ground, source, or explanation. In other words,
in order that being shall be definable, it must be construed as a
whole which is both identical with its parts, and also prior to them.
Now this conclusio'n may be regarded as equivalent to a reductio ad
absurdum of the relational definition; in which case it is necessary
to establish idealism on entirely different grounds. 2 But what some
idealists regard as beneath reason, other idealists regard as the ideal
of reason. It is conceded that the conception of a whole which is
both prior to, and identical with, its parts will not hold of any whole
of nature, such as mechanism or organism. Nor is it possible to
define it abstractly, using symbols for terms and relations. If the
attempt be made it will result only in such self-contradictions as
T' is identical with (T')R(T 2 ), or (T')R(T 2 ) is prior to T'. In-
deed, if it were possible to discover this type of whole and part
relationship in nature or the realm of logic, it would be impossible
to infer idealism from it. 3 But it is contended that there is a unique
- 1 am thinking of Mr. Bradley in particular. For him the absolute is a
means of dispensing altogether with relations, and hence is not argued from
the necessity of a consciousness that shall supply relations. Mr. Bradley's
idealism ("We perceive, on reflection, that to be real, or even barely to exist,
must be to fall within sentience." "Appearance and Reality," p. 144) is, so
far as I can see, either a pure assumption, or a loose and unwarranted infer-
ence from the ego-centric predicament.
3 Thus Professor Royce's contention that the part is equal to the whole in
an infinite system, would prove only that being is infinite, and not that it is
in any sense conscious. His subjectivism is, so far as I can see, not proven at
all. In " The Conception of God " and in certain more recent verbal utterances
he would seem to be exploiting the ego-centric predicament. In " The World
12 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
complex in which this relationship is directly and luminously ex-
hibited, that complex being consciousness. 4
The crucial and more neglected question yet remains, however.
Why should it be asserted that the self, subject, or ego is both
identical with each of its objects and also prior to them? "Why
should knowledge be construed as "self-representation," "self-
externalization " or "self-positing"? Now the answer to this
question lies, in part, I am convinced, in a certain readiness among
philosophers to assert anything of consciousness. It would appear
that there is no conception too paradoxical to be harbored there.
The proposition, gold is gold, is redundant, and the proposition,
blue is its own other is nonsense; but the propositions, I am I,
and, the self is its own other, somehow pass for intelligible discourse.
Similarly, while a planetary system which is identical with each
planet and prior to them, is clearly a doubtful proposition, men nod
their heads sagely when they hear of a self which can dispense with
its own parts, and also be wholly present to each of them. So long
as the self remains obscure and unanalyzed, loosely denoted by such
terms as "I," "ego," or "subject," it will doubtless afford a refuge
for logical lawlessness.
But apart from this general disposition to laxity and high-hand-
edness, how are we to account for the assertion that the thing known
and the knower, the T and the E, are identical. Unless there is
ground for such an assertion the conception of a whole that is
identical with each of its parts and prior to them, can not be saved
and the Individual," he relies mainly on the contention that, since nothing in
the universe can be strictly independent of anything else, objects can not be
independent of ideas. But, as I have endeavored to point out above, this would
prove that the universe can be denned in terms of anything you choose.
4 " The unity is at once the whole of which the individuals are parts, and
also completely present in every individual." " It still remains true that it is
that particular relation of which the only example known to us is conscious-
ness." McTaggart, " Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology," pp. 14, 19.
" There is need of a single term to describe a One which is not a system, and
for this purpose the capitalized word Individual, as qualified by the indefinite
article, answers as well as any other known to the writer. It will later appear
th.".t only a self can be, in this sense, an Individual. . . . An Individual, on the
other hand, has an existence fundamental, logically prior, to that of the parts
or of the members. It is not separate from them, but it is distinguishable from
them. It is fundamental to the parts, whereas the parts, though they are real,
are not absolutely essential to it: it expresses itself in the parts, instead of
being made up of them." Calkins, " The Persistent Problems of Philosophy,"
pp. 378-379.
I should regard this as a rather incautious statement of the argument;
not untrue to Hegel, but so express in its recognition of the priority of the
whole self over its several acts or objects as to be exposed to the charge of
naive spiritualism.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 13
from its inherent self-contradictions. As a general conception it
is not to be distinguished from the obsolescent notion of substance,
or of a thing-essence which is all of its attributes, and yet none of
them. That it does not share the hard fate of the latter notion is
due to the supposition that it is saved by special revelation. Al-
though in general it is absurd, we are supposed to be unable to
deny it because of the discovery of an unmistakable case of it. The
fact being so strange, we must overcome our prejudice against
fiction. We should not be entitled to invent a universal or absolute
knower, identical with its objects severally, and prior to all of them,
unless we had evidence that a knower, and a knower alone, is capable
of just that sort of relationship. Hence everything is staked on an
examination of such instances of knowing as can be observed.
It is asserted that in any typical case of knowing (E)R C (T), the
knower (E) and the thing known (T) are identical. But if we
mean by E and T the terms of this relationship, then they are clearly
not identical ; for their identity would destroy the relationship, and
the operation would lose its complexity. If, on the other hand, I mean
by E and T the complete or essential natures of the entities referred
to, then they do not stand in the cognitive relation. Thus I may
assert that E is really (E)E C (T), and that T is also really (E}E(T],
and that E and T are therefore really identical. But (E)R C (T)
does not stand in the relation R c to (E}R(T) ; in other words, I
know T does not know / know T. In any case, then, it is impossible
to assert that the knower and the thing known are identical, where
these are defined as the terms of one cognitive relationship. 5
Now if it be so simple a matter to refute the assertion that in the
complex (E)R(T), E is T, how are we to account for that asser-
tion? Only, I think, through the characteristic confusion of mind
created by the ego-centric predicament. The T of the complex
(E)R C (T) does, as a matter of fact, stand in the relation R to E.
This can not be denied, albeit it is a redundant proposition when
affirmed. It is only necessary to proceed, loosely and as may suit
one's convenience, to substitute (E)(R)(T) for T, or thing qua
known for thing, and one has accomplished the miracle of identify-
ing a complex with one of its own elements. Then, the other ele-
ment having been dealt with in the same manner, the two elements
are made equal to an identical complex, and hence to each other.
But the whole question of the extent to which (E)(R C )T can be
substituted for T, depends on a very precise knowledge of the bear-
ing of this relationship on T. The original problem, What does
5 It is evident that such considerations as these would necessitate a revision
of certain current notions of " self-consciousness." But I can not follow up the
suggestion here.
14
(E)R C (T) mean to Tf has, in all this elaborate dialectic, only been
prejudged and confused. And the solution offered is not only
without a shred of evidence, but is charged with the support of a
logical abortion.
I have not undertaken to do more than to isolate a species of
dangerous reasoning that infests a certain region of philosophical
inquiry. The question of the precise modification which a thing
undergoes when it is known, is a proper problem; and the theory
that that modification is profound, or even in some sense definitive,
is a legitimate speculative alternative. But nothing whatsoever can
be inferred from the mere ubiquity of that modification, from the
mere fact that nothing can be found which is not thus modified. This
self-evident fact simply defines the means that must be employed
for the solution of the problem. We can not employ a method
which in other cases proves a convenient preliminary step, the
empirical, denotative method of agreement and difference. There
remains, however, the method which must eventually be employed
in any exact investigation, the method of analysis. The mere fact
that T is invariably found in a certain complex, since it can not be
corrected by the method of difference, must be set aside, and not
allowed to weigh in our calculations. But we may still have re-
course to that analysis of all the elements of the complex, of T, E,
and -B c , which would be required in any case before our conclusions
could assume any high degree of exactness. Having discovered just
what an ego is, just what a thing is, and just what it means for an
ego to know a thing, we may hope to define precisely what transpires
when a thing is known by an ego. And until these more elementary
matters have been disposed of we shall do well to postpone an
epistemological problem that is not only highly complicated but of
crucial importance for the whole system of philosophical knowledge.
RALPH BARTON PERRY.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SECONDARY
SCHOOL 1
nnHERE seem many reasons to believe that educational psychol-
ogy has at the present day reached a critical stage in its
development. Having for some years past enjoyed the approval of
theorists on education, it is at length beginning to attract the atten-
tion of those actually engaged in the practise of teaching. Should
it fail now to justify itself in the eyes of the latter, there can be no
1 Paper read before the British Psychological Society.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 15
doubt that it will suffer a setback from which it will take many
years to recover. Should, on the other hand, experienced teachers
admit its claims, the results of school practise, expressed accurately
in psychological terms, will go to swell the science itself, and we
shall at last have what we have not at present an applied psy-
chology of education.
The general objection to psychology brought forward by masters
is that it teaches them little or nothing definite which they did not
know originally or could not quickly gain from school experience.
The majority would probably be willing to admit that the science is
of general use in setting the mind in a certain direction, much as
logic and methodology are. Their distrust of it for direct applica-
tion is due mainly, I think, to the unsatisfactory state of the psy-
chology of reasoning. The science of psychology fails just where
the science of education has principal need of it. One of the prime
functions of education is supposed to be the general or formal train-
ing of the intellect; but not even the possibility of such a formal
training has yet been demonstrated. Much vague talk is indulged
in by the unpsychological master about the "training of the logical
faculty" imparted by different school disciplines. From a psycho-
logical point of view, reasoning is a question of matter as well as of
form, and only scientific observation and experiment are competent
to decide the relative importance of each. Theories of mental sys-
tems, apperception masses, etc., are far too general and vague for
practical application. The division of conceptual process into com-
parison and abstraction on the one hand, and various forms of
constructive process (as it is called) on the other both classes being
recognized as productive process working on the material supplied
by memory and association is likewise too vague a schema as it
stands, although full of suggestion for more thoroughgoing analysis.
Modern experimental psychology, by employing experiment, sim-
plifying the conditions, and, above all, by endeavoring to obtain
quantitative answers to its questions, has placed itself in a much
more promising position. Its ideal comes much closer to that of an
applied science, such as the educational psychology of the future
must be. Its methods, too, are such as must command ultimate
success, if granted sufficient opportunity of application in the schools.
An enumeration of the more prominent of these methods will show,
however, that there is reason to fear that such opportunity may not
be forthcoming to any great extent.
There is, in the first place, a large class of experiments for the
investigation of the phenomena of practise and fatigue. Apart from
the internal criticisms that can be passed on the ergographic,
esthesiometric, and other tests employed, the fatigue measured in
16
cases where no such criticism is applicable has been that produced
by mechanical processes such as addition and multiplication under
artificial conditions of interest, etc., so that the results can hardly be
taken as typical for intellectual work done under school conditions.
For the determination of individual differences in mental ca-
pacity, innumerable tests have been devised, such as the relative
and absolute thresholds in the various realms of sensation, the mean
variation for these thresholds (taken as a measure of the attention),
the estimation of space and time, reaction-times, the crossing out of
words containing certain stated letters in a page of print, tachisto-
scopic experiments on perceptual processes (e. g., reading), deter-
mination of association times; and so-called combination tests, such
as those of Ebbinghaus, in which omitted words and syllables of
pieces of prose have to be supplied by the subject. To many of these
the objection can be made that they do not directly measure general
mental capacity, and that the interpretation of their results as symp-
toms or signs of such is very uncertain; others do directly measure
mental processes involved in intellectual work, but under conditions
so artificial and so greatly simplified that their results are not readily
applicable to ordinary experience.
In theory all these methods are justifiable, and in pure psychology
they all find a rightful place. Yet it is extremely doubtful whether
secondary schools will be ready, either now or in the immediate
future, to devote the requisite amount of time for the application of
such methods. 2 Schools have their own methods of measurement in
the marking system, if system it can be called ; and reform is more
likely to come from within this system than from artificial experi-
ment. Such a reform would have to be based on a most detailed
analysis of the psychological processes involved in the learning of
the various school subjects, and allocation of marks accordingly. The
present system of taking the entire subject (e. g., Latin or mathe-
matics) as the unit is useless for scientific purposes, and the deter-
mination of correlation-coefficients for different pairs of subjects on
the basis of aggregate marks is simply waste of time and trouble.
Yet knowledge of the precise relations between one subject and
another would be of the greatest help in the drawing up of a cur-
riculum, and such knowledge would be obtainable from the correla-
tion-coefficients 3 of corresponding fundamental mental processes
involved in the learning of the two subjects. Assuming sufficient
2 In primary schools the experiments and tests above mentioned would in
themselves possess considerable educational value, so that the objection pro-
pounded in the text would not apply in their case.
8 For explanation of the principle of correlation and methods of calculating
correlation-coefficients, see Karl Pearson: "Grammar of Science," 2d edition,
Ch. X.; also see below.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 17
constancy of marking and a sufficient number of measurements, the
correlation-coefficients calculated might in their turn be used to throw
light on the accuracy of the original psychological analysis.
Of course, the scientific analysis of a school subject, such as Latin
or mathematics, is essentially a logical analysis, but if considered
with reference to the demands made on the mind of the learner by
the subject and the method of teaching the subject, and also with
reference to the matter in which the logical forms are inherent, a
psychological analysis emerges, which indeed closely follows, al-
though it does not altogether coincide with, the logical one. Method
has systematized each subject as a body of knowledge in which any
one stage is logically as important and indispensable as any other;
but for the learner these stages are of different values make unequal
demands on his memory, attention, etc., as is shown by the varying
amounts of time and practise needed to surmount them.
Let us take mathematics as an illustration. Has mathematics a
psychology as well as a logic? The subject is held to be unrivaled
in its power of training the reasoning faculty. Now, Professor
James, in his treatment of the psychology of reasoning, sums up the
process as follows : 4
"1. An extracted character is taken as equivalent to the entire
datum from which it comes.
' ' 2. The character thus taken suggests a certain consequence more
obviously than it was suggested by the total datum as it originally
came."
The psychological factors at work are, then, according to Pro-
fessor James, "dissociation by varying concomitants" and "asso-
ciation by similarity. ' '
These processes certainly occur at all stages of mathematical
reasoning, but practical experience points to the need of a more
extended analysis. The difference between problems and theorems
in geometry, the exceptional difficulty experienced by many boys in
grasping the mathematical principle of proportion, the astonishing
variations in memory, apart from variations of interest, attaching
to different parts of mathematics, stand out so prominently in prac-
tise and with such uniformity that psychological factors of great
constancy and generality must be assumed to account for them.
Introspection gives little help in the analysis. Beyond individual
differences in the form and vividness of the mental imagery em-
ployed, little can be thus directly distinguished. So much of the
process seems to be subconscious, or even unconscious, that the greater
part of its dissection will be achieved, if at all, only by the applica-
tion of indirect methods.
* " Principles of Psychology," Vol. II., p. 340.
18 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The method which I wish to suggest in this short paper is one
based on the determination of correlation-coefficients, deriving its
measurements from a differential system of marking. Of course,
such a differential system of marking in itself presupposes some
amount of preliminary analysis, but for this the logical analysis of
the school-subject and the broad psychological distinctions already
recognized by teachers provide an adequate first step. The sub-
sequent course of the investigation would be, as it were, circular
and yet progressive. The correlation-coefficients first calculated
would point to more detailed psychological analysis, and this in its
turn would increase the number and accuracy of coefficients subse-
quently obtained. Even after the limits of direct psychological
analysis had been passed, the coefficients might yet serve to draw
attention to the existence of psychological factors only observable in
their physiological effects. The principle of this form of analysis
by correlation-coefficients is common to all the objective sciences,
though probably better known as ' ' the method of concomitant varia-
tion. " For the purposes of this paper it may be briefly stated thus:
presumption of connection between any two processes, i. e., of the
existence of a still deeper-lying process common to both, will vary
in strength in direct proportion to the size of the coefficient of cor-
relation between them, calculated according to any of the well-known
and approved methods.
The program sketched in outline above is one suited rather for
the secondary than for the primary school, since it is one to be car-
ried out, if at all, by the masters themselves. That it is a workable
scheme, assuming psychological qualification and psychological in-
terest on the part of the masters, I have little doubt. 5 Control
experiments with trained subjects in the psychological laboratory
would of course be simultaneously necessary, i. e., the student of
applied educational psychology would need to work hand in hand
with the psychological specialist; but here again there should be
found no insurmountable difficulty.
WILLIAM BROWN.
KINGS COLLEGE, LONDON.
"Towards the close of last year (1908), the writer applied the correlation-
method indicated above to the analysis of elementary mathematical ability as
displayed by a set of about eighty boys in an English public school. All the
boys were examined on the same papers, and the coefficients that have been
obtained show a tendency to harmonise with one another and with practical
experience to a degree very encouraging for the method. The evaluation of the
results (with corrections for the effects of extraneous conditions) is still in
progress. An account of the research will be published shortly.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS " 19
DISCUSSION
A PHILOSOPHICAL PLATFORM FROM ANOTHER
STANDPOINT
discussion concerning the question of a philosophical plat-
-- form by Professor Schmidt, 1 aside from its intrinsic interest
suggests a related if not dependent problem. What is the situation
which presents itself to the student with specialized equipment who
would enter the field of philosophical research? To answer this
query let us turn aside from the more systematic world views and
consider the discussions of the minor problems in current literature
and more particularly in the periodicals. The first point to be re-
marked is the arbitrary nature of the choice in many of the subjects
investigated. It appears that any topic in the whole realm of phi-
losophy which may happen to appeal to the author becomes the
object of attention. Granted that valuable conclusions may be
reached, I question if much, if not the major part, of such effort does
not fail in its service because of its isolated character, because the
investigation lacks integration in some greater problem which has
consciously originated it and which will eventually absorb its con-
clusions. In these cases such integration is largely a matter of
chance and by no means a necessary or even probable outcome of the
study. Again, it is observed that owing to fundamental differences
in methods of procedure substantially the same point may come up
repeatedly for consideration and individual results be obtained, and
yet the fact is obscured by lack of unity in expression. In order,
therefore, to appreciate the bearings of a conclusion, and thereby
render it a contribution one must first translate the material into the
logical form consistent with another context.
Now this absence of direction in the multiplicity of philosophical
efforts results in a perplexing outlook to the would-be-investigator
and is scarcely an inspiring situation. For the impetus to endeavor
must lie in the hope of some definite achievement, some positive con-
tribution, however small that may be. One may be informed in the
history of philosophical doctrines and be cognizant of the develop-
ment of ideas therein embodied and thence obtain little or no light
upon the solution of these difficulties.
Is it impossible from the nature of the subject to establish some-
thing akin to the method employed in a biological laboratory? The
chief of a laboratory may suggest problems to be investigated or the
subordinate worker himself may originate the subject, but in either
case the question is one which finds its place in some larger problem ;
individual contributions are coordinated into a greater whole.
1 This JOUBNAL, Vol. VI., p. 673.
20* TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
If the coordination in philosophical inquiry prove not immedi-
ately feasible in the shape of one "philosophical platform," perhaps
an approach to this as an ideal would be the establishment of a
limited number of schools of philosophy, differentiated by their
fundamental diversities in the formulations of problems. Then at
least within the limits of each school similar methods would be
employed and a common language spoken and combined efforts
would crystallize in a single body of truth. The resulting explicit
statements of the distinctive attitudes of the various schools would
itself be a step toward the elimination of the differences in standpoint.
But whatever this may be worth as a suggestion, the main purport
of these remarks is to call attention to the condition of affairs which
confronts the student in philosophy and the connection of this situa-
tion with the absence of definite coordination among philosophers.
SAVILLA ALICE ELKUS.
NEW YOKK CITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Philosophy of Change. D. P. RHODES. New York: The Macmillan
Co. 1909. Pp. xxv + 389.
If the passion to set one's house in order never reached the attic ; if it
left one's intellectual furnishings where the deliveryman dropped them,
the paper and string about them, the varnish dull with the shipper's
thumbprints, or even the packing-cases unopened, there would be neither
philosophers nor philosophy. When, therefore, as in the instance of Mr.
Rhodes and his book, this passion flares up in the heart of a small house-
holder who, the reviewer judges, does not earn his salt by practising it in
the schools; when, in short, such a one tries to arrange his ideas in that
neatness of pattern which is called philosophical, it ill becomes profes-
sional thinkers to stay his hand, be it by violence, scoffing, or neglect. Let
the labor union, if it will, brickbat the " scab " and the amateur of its
trade; the philosophical band that does likewise sins against its own
spirit (and, if it persists, may some day find itself to be a suicide club).
But writers like Mr. Rhodes make open-mindedness a hard virtue for
his critics. He ignores, as a matter of conscience, all other philosophers;
neither their names nor their opinions appear in his pages, even for re-
proof. Emulating Descartes unwittingly? he destroyed even the notes
in which he had recorded his own arguments for and against the views of
his " notable predecessors," banished all books from his study, " and with
no implements further than pencil and spotless paper, a few brass pins,
and a tennis-ball, I set about inquiring seriously into the destiny of man.
I even tried to forget who they were that had said anything on the sub-
ject before, or that there were such things as jealousies and fashions in
philosophy." This method having been tried often enough since Augus-
tine and found weak, the philosopher who sets his house in order by it
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 21
will tempt few visitors over the threshold in these fact-surfeited days.
Nor will the first chapter of "The Philosophy of Change," where Mr.
Rhodes applies his method, encourage the few to inspect the rest of the
edifice. Here the windows are slits, and only two; the glass in them is
very blue, and the antechamber chairs creak pitifully under the weight of
the leanest critic. Here we find that there are no certainties in life and
only two truths of highest probability. These are (1) that " every par-
ticular experience is illusory," and (2) " experience, illusory though it be
in every particular, must nevertheless possess some significance." It is
neither Plato nor Kant nor Hume that speaks, though, but Heraclitus,
and Heraclitus Revividus outdoes his elder self. Mr. Rhodes would have
gone lost in the common run of idealists and subjectivists, and he stopped,
after discarding into the trash-pile of illusion substance, matter, and
things in general. But he deals a stroke of genius albeit genius of the
kind most nearly allied to madness when he serves with the same rude
toss the holiest of holy philosophical entities, the idea. Thus runs the
blasphemy :
" Ideas must be interdependent and incapable of being isolated . . . from
the most remote appearances of the substance-world (which is itself all illu-
sion). Each idea exists solely by virtue of the change in its relations to all
other ideas and substance-appearances. The idea of a pebble is conditioned by
all other pebbles and ideas of them. An idea of altruism is conditioned by the
equally general ideas of egoism, humanity, love, etc., all of which are continu-
ously changing. The existing idea of change is conditioned by the equally
general idea of the impossible, and is made up of the invariably unexploited
factors in particular ideas and substance-appearances. An idea can not endure;
it is continuously being supplanted, . . . even the idea of change. . . . Ideas, in
sum, are not things changing, but change."
This, of course, means only one thing as to consciousness itself, and
Mr. Rhodes clearly sees what that is : " Consciousness is not a thing
apart nor an essential property of, or resident in any thing; it is a symbol
popular in the present age." The broom-work in his housecleaning is
now done; nothing is left save change. And his discussion of change
proves that he has well emancipated himself from all previous philosophy.
" There can not be more than one kind of change ;" what appear to be
varieties of change " consist in differences of position in the fixed order
of change." Again, " Change can not be derived from something else, for
the fact of derivation would merge its antecedent with itself." " Change
could have no kind of beginning or end. If it began, it must already have
been changed by virtue of the beginning; if it ended, the end would
show that it still existed." In brief, there is only one immutable, and that
same is change itself ! Mr. Rhodes holds in reserve for us only one more
audacious exhibition of Zenonian dialectic, to wit, the argument, from the
above doctrine of change, that reality is the limit of existence (limit here
carrying itsr mathematical significance). Or, as his formula puts it:
a Reality = that which is = that which may not become = the impossible."
Before all this school-bred critics must stand dumb. Mr. Rhodes's
calm hypostases and swift equivocations are most repulsive. Not more
22 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
so in their lineaments than Mr. Bradley's ; but, unlike Mr. Bradley's, they
do not wear the garment of some long-loved orthodoxy. They bring up
in none of " Uberweg's pigeonholes." No amiable, book -fearing old
bondholder has endowed a university chair anywhere for their dissemina-
tion. Their absurdities are too new, too original, and too little suited to
keep alive any tradition, good or bad. What possible interest, for ex-
ample, can schoolman or laic find in the third chapter, the book's core, on
" The Fiction of a Universe " ? Mr. Rhodes here assumes at the outset
that " there existed at a certain time in the past a universe which, as a
whole or in any part, was devoid of geometrical form and which con-
sisted of a measurable amount of continuous, homogeneous substance."
This, we are told, is a hypothesis set up, not on astronomical or other
facts, but only for the sake of avoiding the paradoxes of space and time.
Just what it leads to, the reviewer has not been able to discover. Among
other things, it revives the theory of continuous destruction and fresh
creation of the physical universe. And, in the explanation of his " real
cosmoids " (the elements of reality) as " the least possible changes of
position," which themselves disappear when they have lived out their
minimum change, Mr. Rhodes seems to have struck upon that most un-
usual notion of a " time atom," which an acute Persian philosopher
named al-Baqilani once worked out in a fascinating atomistic monadism
while Leibnitz's forebears were eating acorns in the European wilderness.
Whether the formulas of Mr. Rhodes's hypermechanics are truer or
more fanciful than those which many theoretical physicists and mathe-
matizing philosophers have been copiously writing of late, I do not know.
They resemble these as homespun resembles factory stuff; indeed, whole
pages from Mr. Rhodes echo, in the vernacular, the highly technical rela-
tivism of the " lines of force " theorists and the hypergeometers. Though
loose and uninformed, they are plainly the residue of a prodigious amount
of hard, earnest thinking. They are of the stuff that a teacher of philos-
ophy might sigh for in undergraduate essays ; they are the " poor but
honest parents " of useful speculation. And what they lack in marked
value they make up for with the grace of sincere modesty.
WALTER B. PITKIX.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
The Meaning of Truth : A Sequel to " Pragmatism." WILLIAM JAMES.
London, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1909.
Pp. xxi + 298.
The paramount issue raised by pragmatism concerns the meaning of a
true idea; and it is because this truth-question is a pivotal one, and be-
cause the " definitive settlement of it will mark a turning point in the
history of epistemology," that this latest volume from Professor James
has been prepared. The book is a collection of papers and addresses con-
tributed by him at various times during the past twenty-five years, to
which are added a few that are now published for the first time. The
special purpose of this collection of writings is best stated in Pro-
fessor James's own words : " In order to make my own thought more ac-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 23
cessible to those who hereafter may have to study the (truth) question
I have collected in the volume that follows all the work of my pen that
bears directly on the truth-question " (Preface, p. viii). One effect which
the massed impression of these writings should produce, is a sensible
diminution in the number of the " misunderstanders " of pragmatism.
Certainly, if this misunderstanding persists, it can not, I think, fairly be
attributed to Dr. James himself. But whether the striking and luminous
presentation of the doctrine of pragmatism in this volume and in its
fellow volume, " Pragmatism," will effect any conversions, is another
story. My own experience as an anti-pragmatist makes me sceptical of
such a result. I know too well from personal experience the hardness of
the unregenerate heart in these matters; the strength of mental habits
and prepossessions, and the seductive power of the logic of " abstraction-
ism," to expect that this new gospel will gain many converts in the pres-
ent generation. Had this same volume fallen into my hands in my un-
regenerate days, I know well how it would have fared; I should have
seen inconsistencies between the earlier and the later writings of James,
I should have found, despite the vigorous disclaimer of its author, a
radical divergence between the pragmatism of James and the Schiller-
Dewey pragmatism; the epistemology would have been pronounced
solipsistic, and the implied and consequent metaphysics, mere slush.
If I now venture to say, that to-day I can discover in the writings of
Dr. James, in this volume or elsewhere, none of these things, I think it
not unlikely some of my quondam anti-pragmatist friends will say, I may
have experienced a change of heart, but certainly not an improvement in
my understanding. However, I will add in way of apology, that this
change of mental view, I attribute mainly to my own attempts to remain
an anti-pragmatist, and as such to meet the counter-attack of the pragma-
tist; to answer the crucial question relating to the meaning, the content,
of a true idea, and the possibility of distinguishing between a true and a
false idea. It dawned upon me at last, that to go on answering this
pivotal question after the manner of intellectualism was about as effective
in the way of defense as the device of the ostrich in protecting itself
from assault by hiding its head under its wing.
But to return to this book. I think Dr. James has clearly carried the
war into Africa, and distinctly put the rejecter of pragmatism upon the
defensive. It is this aggressive front, this note of challenge, this forcing
upon the anti-pragmatist an alternative that constitutes the strength and
the strategic advantage of James's position. To begin with the truth-
question, pragmatism gives a definition of the truth-relation, and the
trueness of an idea in definite, concrete terms; he claims that this state-
ment of what the idea actually does, or has the capacity for doing, ex-
hausts the content of its meaning. The anti-pragmatist rejects this view ;
then the pragmatist challenges him to specify any significant and relevant
element of meaning which his own definition of the terms true agree-
ment with reality, etc., does not contain ; and how does the anti-pragmatist
meet this challenge? I must confess, that up to date, I know of no
answers that are not either words without meaning or which do not in-
24 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
volve postulates, or assumptions that, when scrutinized, are found to be as
useless as they are insusceptible of verification. In thus rejecting the
pragmatist's definition of a true idea, the anti-pragmatist faces an alter-
native; and, to judge from my own endeavors in the past and from what
I have read, it looks very much as if all that the pragmatist's opponents
have yet done is to shut their eyes to the fact that a real alternative is
there for them to face.
Again, the anti-pragmatist rejects, as the quintessence of error and
confusion, the pragmatist's identification of the truth of an idea and the
verification of that idea; to him, snugly ensconced in his logical cate-
gories and distinctions, there is a vital difference between the trueness of
an idea and the knowledge of the fact that this idea is true. Is not the
idea true the moment it is framed in somebody's mind? And does not
this idea remain true even should no human knower at least ever discover
that truth ? The pragmatist replies by a counter-question : " If I have not
given the correct account of truth and verification, show me what there is
either in your idea itself, or in this supposed relation to its object, which
gives any meaning to the statement. This idea was true prior to its veri-
fication." Here is the crux, the anti-pragmatist must face this alterna-
tive, either to give up his attempted distinction between the truth of an
idea and the verifiability of this idea, or he must postulate some super-
human knower of this true idea; and then how will he show that this
postulated knower is of any use to us would-be human kiiowers, either in
enabling us to know whether our ideas are true or not true, or in giving
us any consolation for our failure to know?
Once more, the pragmatism of James meets the objection that his
epistemology issues in solipsism and achieves no true transcendence by
the counter-question : If the object in the cognitive relation is not a
kind of reality that can be led up to in experiential processes, if it be not
the terminus ad quern of experiential workings, if it must possess some
sort of perseity, thing in itselfness, a transcendency pragmatism does not
recognize then tell us in what way this truly real-being, this really tran-
scendent can become known to us mortals. How is the chasm of your
transcendence to be crossed? If the transcendence which knowledge in-
volves is something which is not passable by our human ideas, as experi-
ence in posse, how can we ever know whether or not our ideas have
bridged the chasm and made fast to a reality there? Again, the anti-
pragmatist faces the alternative; either the epistemology of pragmatism
or the unknowable.
Such, I think, is the legitimate force of the presentation of prag-
matism made in this latest volume from the pen of William James.
And the conclusion of the whole matter is : If the anti-pragmatists are
to continue the fight, they must bring into action better artillery and
better gunners ; they must choose more strategic positions for attack ; they
must look well to their defenses, and at least provide for the contingency
of a retreat.
JOHN E. EUSSELL.
WILLIAMS COLLEGE.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 25
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. November, 1909. French
Works on the History of Philosophy During 1907-08 (pp. 583-599) :
VICTOR DELBOS. - The works described show a good historic method and
a sufficient spirit of objectivity, the most important treat of the history of
philosophy in connection with the history of science. It is hoped that
future historians will take greater account of the links between philo-
sophic doctrines and the diverse manifestations of the religious spirit.
Individuality and Freedom (pp. 600-614): ELLEN BLISS TALBOT. -The
concept of individuality may be analyzed into unity, uniqueness, and self-
sufficiency. The denial of real alternations is not inconsistent with the
affirmation of each of these factors, and, therefore, of individuality.
The Postulates of a Self-critical Epistemology (pp. 615-641) : EDWARD
GLEASON SPAULDING. - A self -critical epistemology, as is revealed by the
absolutist's typical criticism of pragmatism: (1) must make a consistent
use of terms; (2) must be free from contradictions, either of part by part,
or of part by whole, or conversely; (3) must presuppose and imply itself;
(4) each postulate of a self-critical system will be implied by each of the
others and by the system as a whole, and conversely each will be ap-
plicable to each and so, collectively, to the system as a whole, and the
system as a whole, both to itself and to each; (5) by its own postulates
and the definition derived from them, a self -critical system must antici-
pate and refute all external criticism. Three logical doctrines being set
up experimentally, the foundations of such a self-critical epistemology
can be set forth in fifteen postulates. Such a system can be described as
an evolutionary realism and empiricism. Reviews of Books: Willy
Kabitz, Die Philosophic des jungen Leibnitz: FRANK THILLY. John Wat-
son, The Philosophy of Kant Explained: NORMAN SMITH. Albert Leclere,
La Morale rationelle dans ses relations avec la philosophic generale:
RALPH BARTON PERRY. H. A. Pritchard, Kant's Theory of Knowledge:
WALTER T. MARVIN. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles.
Notes. Index.
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. Band XV.,
Heft 4. July, 1909. Die Reihenfolge der Platonischen Schriften (pp.
435-456) : A. GOEDECKEMEYER. - The Republic is treated as the product
of two different periods of Plato's life. The dialogues are classified ac-
cording to their relation to Plato's socratic point of departure, his inde-
pendent development, first, " erotic," and, second, dialectic, and his final
submission to alien influences. Die Tendenzen der platonischen Dialoge
Theaitetos Sophistes Politikos (pp. 456-492) : J. EBERZ. - The Sophist is
directed at Aristotle, who, having been gently corrected in the Parmen-
ides, is here, after his secession, condemned. Thesetetus is Dion, and
and Socrates the younger is Speusippus. Further identifications are to
follow. Der xoD? naOrjTtzo? bei Aristoteles (pp. 493-510) : P. BOKOWNEW.
- The passive reason, as an hypothesis to explain the interaction of soul
and reason, and so the unity of the soul, fails, because of Aristotle's
26 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
wavering between the rationalist and empiricist viewpoint. Kant's Kritik
der Reinen Vernunft und die Geschichte der Philosophic (pp. 510-532) :
H. EOMUXDT. - The distinction between the history of criticism and that
of the system of science was rightly grasped by Kant, and also his own
place in that former history, as the modern counterpart of Socrates, the
synthesis succeeding dogmatic thesis and sceptic antithesis. Drittes
Preisausschreiben der " Kantgesellschaft " (pp. 533-535) : The competi-
tion for these prizes closes April 22, 1910, and has for its subject. " What
are the real advances that metaphysics has made in Germany since Hegel
and Herbart?" II Problema metafisico secondo Aristotle e I'interpre-
tazione d'un passo della metafisica (pp. 436-450) : P. EUSEBIETTI. - The
passage is, Met. Lambda, 10, 1075, b 17-24. Jahresbericht uber die Phi-
losophie im Islam III. (pp. 553-563): M. HORTOX. -Die neuesten
Erscheinungen.
Carus, Paul. Philosophy as a Science. Chicago: The Open Court Pub-
lishing Co. 1909. Pp. ix + 213. $0.50.
De Wulf, Maurice. History of Medieval Philosophy. Translated by P.
Coffey. London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta : Longmans, Green,
& Co. 1909. Pp. xii + 519.
Garrigou-Lagrange, Fr. K. Le sens commun, la philosophic de I'etre, et
les formules dogmatiques. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne & Cie. 1909.
Pp. xxx -f- 311.
Poulton, Edward Bagnall. Charles Darwin and the Origin of Species:
Addresses, etc., in America and England in the Year of the Two
Anniversaries. London, New York, Bombay, and Calcutta: Long-
mans, Green, & Co. 1909. Pp. xiv + 302.
Read, Carveth. Natural and Social Morals. London : Adam and Charles
Black. 1909. Pp. xxv + 314.
NOTES AND NEAYS
THE following abstract is from the Athenwum for December 24 of a
paper by Professor W. R. Sorley on " The Interpretation of Evolution,"
read before the Section of Philosophy of the British Academy at its meet-
ing on November 24 : " The paper stated that the influence of ' The Origin
of Species' was not restricted to biology; it extended to all the human
sciences, and modified the philosophical attitude; through it emerged
' the philosophy of evolution ' as (in Huxley's words) ' claimant to the
throne of the world of thought.' The nature and validity of this claim
require examination. The term ' evolution ' itself is used with a variety
of emphasis, and even of meaning. Sometimes the reference is to the
theory of natural selection introduced by Darwin and Wallace; at other
times the reference is to the theory of Organic Evolution, which gained
precision and verifiability from the doctrine of natural selection, but is
much older than, and possibly independent of, that doctrine; at yet other
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 27
times the reference is to the theory of Cosmic Evolution which, as worked
out by Kant, and afterwards by Laplace, has a clear meaning only in
application to inorganic nature. If evolution is to be set on ' the throne
of the world of thought,' inorganic evolution and organic evolution must
be somehow brought into line. The two processes have, as common char-
acteristics, (1) continuity, (2) advance through antagonism, (3) alter-
nating periods of stability and instability. But there is a prima facie dis-
tinction between the operative causes between the mechanical forces in
inorganic evolution and the vital processes postulated by organic evolu-
tion. The mechanical interpretation of evolution attempts to break down
this distinction, and to account for vital processes in terms of physico-
chemical process. But the difficulties in the way of this method of inter-
pretation have not diminished during the last fifty years: (1) The origin
of life remains an unsolved problem ; careful experiments and the advance
of microscopical science have shown that abiogenesis does not take place
in the cases in which it was formerly thought that it did occur or might
occur. (2) Physiologists are, on the whole, less satisfied than they were
in Darwin's lifetime with the adequacy of the physico-chemical explana-
tion of the characteristic activities of the living body. (3) The theory of
natural selection gave an impetus to the mechanical interpretation; but
natural selection requires non-mechanical factors on which to act ; and the
rejection of the view that ' acquired characters ' can be inherited has made
the mechanical explanation of heredity almost unthinkable. If these
points are admitted, the explanation given by mechanical causation is
seen to be incomplete; the external factors have to be supplemented by
the internal principle of life. In virtue of this principle the organism
develops and preserves a certain structure, and reproduces its like; per-
haps the same principle also influences the direction of evolution in inter-
action with environing conditions. Vital activity is therefore teleolog-
ical, although the end which the organism realizes is not present to it in
the form of idea. A vitalistic interpretation of evolution, however, is
inadequate, because it leaves inorganic evolution out of account, and be-
cause it has no theory of the adaptation of external to internal factors;
the conception of unconscious purpose is besides full of difficulty. If a
unified interpretation of the whole course of evolution can be attained,
and if it is granted that mechanism is inadequate, it will be only by means
of the conception of conscious purpose. The difficulties of this interpre-
tation consist chiefly in the conflict of ends and the imperfection of
adaptations. No detailed solution of these difficulties can be offered; to
some extent they arise from an assumption which must be guarded
against; the purpose shown in evolution does not realize itself after the
fashion of human design, which works mainly in an external and me-
chanical manner. In principle what is involved in the interpretation is an
inversion of Spencer's postulate that ' we must interpret the more de-
veloped by the less developed.' Observations on various aspects of the
problem were made by Mr. S. H. Hodgson, Professor Bosanquet, and the
president."
28 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
THE program of the meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy
and Psychology held at Charlotte, North Carolina, on December 28 was
as follows : " The Functions of the Anterior and Posterior Association
Areas of the Cerehrum " Shepherd Ivory Franz ; " Tests with a Modified
Binet-Buzenet ^Esthesiometer," David Spence Hill; "Voluntary Isolation
of Control in a Group," Jasper C. Barnes; "The Visual and the Joint-
muscle Source of the Size-weight Illusion," Eobert H. Gault ; " The Dis-
crimination of Articulate Sounds by Kaccoons," William T. Shepherd;
" The Eelative Value of the Affective and the Intellectual Processes in
the Genesis of the Psychoses called Traumatic Neuresthenia," Tom A.
Williams ; Informal Reports from Psychological Laboratories ; '' The Con-
sciousness of Meaning " and " Experiments on the Thought Process,"
Eobert M. Ogden ; " The Psychology of Prejudice," Josiah Morse ; " The
Concept of Laws of Nature," Edward E. Eichardson ; " The Evolution of
the Sense of Beauty from the Point of View of Genetic and Social Psy-
chology," William D. Furry; Address of the President: Subject, "The
Concept of Evolution Among the Greeks," Albert Lefevre.
THE celebration of the eigth centennial anniversary of St. Anselm
which was held on the twenty-first of last April at the church of Saint-
Anselme at Eome has furnished the occasion to the Revue de Pliilosophie
for an elaborate discussion of his personality and doctrines. The table of
contents of the December issue is perhaps of interest as indicating the
possibilities and limitations of such discussion. We quote it in full :
" ' Saint Anselme, son temps, son role,' A. Duf ourcq ; ' Le Milieu phi-
losor>hique a 1'epoque de saint Anselme,' Comte Domel de Verges;
' L'Ecole du Bee et Saint Anselme,' A. Poree ; ' Sur la question des sources
d'Anselme,' A. Draseke; 'La preuve ontologique de 1'existence de Dieu
et saint Anselme,' A. Lepidi ; ' La demonstration a priori de 1'existence
de Dieu chez saint Anselme,' J. Geyser; 'Anselme et Gaunilon,' B.
Adlhoch ; ' Les rapports de la raison et de la f oi dans la philosophie de
saint Anselme,' E. Beurlier ; ' La Theologie de saint Anselme,' J. Bainvel ;
' La Saintete en saint Anselme. Theorie et pretique,' B. Marechaux ;
Notes sur les fetes du centenaire a Aoste."
ACCORDING to previous announcements, the American Philosophical
Association held its annual meeting at New Haven, on invitation of Yale
L T niversity and its department of philosophy, December 27-29, 1909. A
report of the meeting of the Association will appear in a subsequent issue
of the JOURNAL. Officers for the ensuing year were elected as follows :
president, Professor C. M. Bakewell, of Yale University; vice-president,
Professor A. O. Lovejoy, University of Missouri ; secretary-treasurer, Pro-
fessor E. G. Spaulding, of Princeton University ; new members of the
executive committee, Professor W. H. Sheldon, Dartmouth College, and
Professor Norman Smith, Princeton University. Professor Frank Thilly,
of Cornell University, was elected to fill the unexpired term of Professor
Bakewell on the executive committee.
DR. MORTON PRINCE, of Boston, will give at the University of Cali-
fornia from January to April a course of lectures on abnormal psychology.
VOL. VII. No. 2. JANUARY 20, 1910
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
BRADLEY OR BERGSON?
DR. BRADLEY has summed up his Weltanschauung in last
October's Mind, in an article which for sincerity and brevity
leaves nothing to be desired. His thought and Bergson's run par-
allel for such a distance, yet diverge so utterly at last that a com-
parison seems to me instructive. The watershed is such a knife-
edge that no reader who leans to one side or the other can after
this plead ignorance of the motives of his choice.
Bradley 's first great act of candor in philosophy was his breaking
loose from the Kantian tradition that immediate feeling is all dis-
connectedness. In his "Logic" as well as in his "Appearance" he
insisted that in the flux of feeling we directly encounter reality, and
that its form, as thus encountered, is the continuity and wholeness
of a transparent much-at-once. This is identically Bergson's doc-
trine. In affirming the "endosmosis" of adjacent parts of "living"
experience, the French writer treats the minimum of feeling as an
immediately intuited much-at-once.
The idealist tradition is that feelings, aboriginally discontinuous,
are woven into continuity by the various synthetic concepts which
the intellect applies. Both Bradley and Bergson contradict this
flatly; and although their tactics are so different, their battle is the
same. They destroy the notion that conception is essentially a uni-
fying process. For Bergson all concepts are discrete; and though
you can get the discrete out of the continuous, out of the discrete
you can never construct the continuous again. Concepts, moreover,
are static, and can never be adequate substitutes for a perceptual
flux of which activity and change are inalienable features. Concepts,
says Bergson, make things less, not more, intelligible, when we use
them seriously and radically. They serve us practically more than
theoretically. Throwing their map of abstract terms and relations
round our present experience, they show its bearings and let us plan
our way.
29
30 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Bradley is just as independent of rationalist tradition, and is
more thoroughgoing still in his criticism of the conceptual function.
When we handle felt realities by our intellect they grow, according
to him, less and less comprehensible; activity becomes inconstruable,
relation contradictory, change inadmissible, personality unintel-
ligible, time, space, and causation impossible nothing survives the
Bradleyan wreck.
The breach which the two authors make with previous rationalist
opinion is complete, and they keep step with each other perfectly
up to the point where they diverge. Sense-perception first develops
into conception ; and then conception, developing its subtler and more
contradictory implications, comes to an end of its usefulness for both
authors, and runs itself into the ground. Arrived at this conviction,
Bergson drops conception which apparently has done us all the
good it can do ; and, turning back towards perception with its trans-
parent multiplicity-in-union, he takes its data integrally up into
philosophy, as a kind of material which nothing else can replace.
The fault of our perceptual data, he tells us, is not of nature, but
only of extent ; and the way to know reality intimately is, according
to this philosopher, to sink into those data and get our sympathetic
imagination to enlarge their bounds. Deep knowledge is not of the
conceptually mediated, but of the immediate type. Bergson thus
allies himself with old-fashioned empiricism, on the one hand, and
with mysticism, on the other. His breach with rationalism could
not possibly be more thorough than it is.
Bradley 's breach is just as thorough in its first two steps. The
form of oneness in the flow of feeling is an attribute of reality which
even the absolute must preserve. Concepts are an organ of mis-
understanding rather than of understanding ; they turn the ' ' reality ' '
which we "encounter" into an "appearance" which we "think."
But with all this anti-rationalist matter, Bradley is faithful to his
anti-empiricist manner to the end. Crude unmediated feelings shall
never form a part of "truth." "Judgment, on our view," he
writes, "transcends and must transcend the immediate unity of
feeling upon which it can not cease to depend. Judgment has to
qualify the real ideally. . . . This is the fundamental inconsistency
of judgment, . . . for ideas can not qualify reality as reality is
qualified immediately in feeling. . . . The reality as conditioned in
feeling has been in principle abandoned, while other conditions have
not been found." 1
Abandoned in "principle," Mr. Bradley says; and, in sooth,
nothing but a sort of religious principle against admitting "untrans-
f ormed ' ' feeling into philosophy would seem to explain his procedure
1 Mind, October, 1909, p. 498.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 31
from here onwards. "At the entrance of philosophy," he says,
"there appears to be a point at which the roads divide. By the one
way you set out to seek truth in ideas. ... On this road what is
sought is ideas, and nothing else is current. ... If you enter here
you are committed to this principle. . . . [This] whole way doubtless
may be delusion ; but, if you choose to take this way ... no possible
appeal to designation [i. e., to feeling] in the end is permitted. . . .
This I take to be the way of philosophy. ... It is not the way of life
or of common knowledge, and to commit oneself to such a principle
may be said to depend upon choice. The way of life starts from
and in the end it rests on dependence upon feeling. . . . Outside of
philosophy there is no consistent course but to accept the unintel-
ligible. For worse or for better the man who stands on particular
feeling must remain outside of philosophy. ... I recognize that in
life and in ordinary knowledge one can never wholly cease to rest
on this ground. But how to take over into ultimate theory and to
use there this certainty of feeling, while still leaving that untrans-
formed, I myself do not know. I admit that philosophy, as I con-
ceive it, is one-sided. I understand the dislike of it and the despair
of it while this its defect is not remedied. But to remedy the defect
by imparting bodily into philosophy the 'this' and 'thine,' as they
are felt, to my mind brings destruction on the spot." 2
Mr. Bradley 's "principle" seems to be only that of doggedly
following a line once entered on to the bitterest of ends. We en-
counter reality in feeling, and find that when we develop it into ideas
it becomes more intelligible in certain definite respects. We then
have "truth" instead of reality; which truth, however, pursued
beyond a certain practical point, develops into the whole bog of
unintelligibilities through which the critical part of "Appearance
and Reality" wades. The wise and natural course at this point
would seem to be to drop the notion that truth is a thoroughgoing
improvement on reality, to confess that its value is limited, and to
hark back. But there is nothing that Mr. Bradley, religiously loyal
to the direction of development once entered upon, will not do sooner
than this. Forward, forward, let us range ! He makes the desperate
transconceptual leap, assumes beyond the whole ideal perspective an
ultimate "suprarelational" and trans-conceptual reality in which
somehow the wholeness and certainty and unity of feeling, which we
turned our backs on forever when we committed ourselves to the
leading of ideas, are supposed to be resurgent in transfigured form ;
and shows us as the only authentic object of philosophy, with its
"way of ideas," an absolute which "can be" and "must be" and
therefore "is." "It shall be" is the only candid way of stating its
'Ibid., pp. 500-502.
32 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
relation to belief; and Mr. Bradley 's statement comes very near to
that.
How could the elements of a situation be made more obvious?
Or what could bring to a sharper focus the factor of personal choice
involved ?
The way of philosophy is not the way of life, Mr. Bradley admits,
but for the philosopher, he continues, it seems to be all there is
which is like saying that the way of starvation is not the way of
life, but to the starveling it is all there is. Be it so ! Though what
obliges one to become either such a philosopher or such a starveling
does not clearly appear. The only motive I can possibly think of for
choosing to be a philosopher on these painful terms is the old and
obstinate intellectualist prejudice in favor of universals. They are
loftier, nobler, more rational objects than the particulars of sense.
In their direction, then, and away from feeling, should a mind con-
scious of its high vocation always turn its face. Not to enter life is a
higher vocation than to enter it, on this view.
The motive is pathetically simple, and any one can take it in.
On the thin watershed between life and philosophy, Mr. Bradley
tumbles to philosophy's call. Down he slides, to the dry valley of
"absolute" mare's nests and abstractions, the habitation of the fic-
titious suprarelational being which his will prefers. Never was
there such a case of will-to-believe ; for Mr. Bradley, unlike other
anti-empiricists, deludes himself neither as to feeling nor as to
thought: the one reveals for him the inner nature of reality per-
fectly, the other falsifies it utterly as soon as you carry it beyond the
first few steps. Yet once committed to the conceptual direction. Mr.
Bradley thinks we can't reverse, we can save ourselves only by hoping
that the absolute will re-realize unintelligibly and "somehow," the
unity, wholeness, certainty, etc., which feeling so immediately and
transparently made us acquainted with at first.
Bergson and the empiricists, on the other hand, tumble to life's
call, and turn into the valley where the green pastures and the clear
waters always were. If in sensible particulars reality reveals the
manyness-in-oneness of its constitution in so convincing a way, why
then withhold, if you will, the name of "philosophy" from percep-
tual knowledge, but recognize that perceptual knowledge is at any
rate the only complete kind of knowledge, and let "philosophy" in
Bradley 's sense pass for the one-sided affair which he candidly con-
fesses that it is. When the alternative lies between knowing life in
its full thickness and activity, as one acquainted with its me's and
thce's and noiv's and here's, on the one hand, and knowing a trans-
conceptual evaporation like the absolute, on the other, it seems to
me that to choose the latter knowledge merely because it has been
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 33
named "philosophy" is to be superstitiously loyal to a name. But
if names are to be used eulogistically, rather let us give that of
philosophy to the fuller kind of knowledge, the kind in which per-
ception and conception mix their lights.
As one who calls himself a radical empiricist, I can find no pos-
sible excuse for not inclining towards Bergson's side. He and
Bradley together have confirmed my confidence in nonh" transmuted"
percepts, and have broken my confidence in concepts down. It seems
to me that their parallel lines of work have converged to a sharp
alternative which now confronts everybody, and in which the reasons
for one's choice must plainly appear and be told. Be an empiricist
or be a transconceptualist, whichever you please, but at least say
why ! I sincerely believe that nothing but inveterate anti-empiricist
prejudice accounts for Mr. Bradley 's choice ; for at the point where
he stands in the article I have quoted, I can discover no sensible
reason why he should prefer the way he takes. If he should ever
take it into his head to revoke, and drop into the other valley, it
would be a great day for English thought. As Kant is supposed
to have extinguished all previous forms of rationalism, so Bergson
and Bradley, between them, might lay post-Kantian rationalism
permanently underground.
WILLIAM JAMES.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
THE DURATION OF ATTENTION, REVERSIBLE PER-
SPECTIVES, AND THE REFRACTORY PHASE
OF THE REFLEX ARC
IT would seem that one of the most assured conclusions of psy-
chological research is about to be surrendered. The doctrine
of the intermittent character of attention is proving to be only an
' ' idol of the cave. ' ' Recent experiments on touch, electrical stimula-
tion, and vision indicate that there is no fluctuation in the sensation
if care is taken to exclude distracting stimuli, movements, twitch-
ing, etc.
The weak point in the old experiments, and in some of the new
ones, is that only minimal stimuli can be employed the weakest
sounds, pressures, grays, electrical stimulations. Besides, the in-
tensity of these can not always be kept uniform. It is rather curious,
therefore, that most, if not nearly all, of the recent discussions of the
question have entirely overlooked the contributions which the experi-
mental study of reversible perspective illusions has already yielded,
and the effective contributions which their study under improved
34 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
experimental conditions promises to yield toward the solution of this
question. In these illusions we have stimuli which undergo the same
process of fluctuation as pressures, sounds, or brightnesses. But
while the fluctuation in the case of the latter is not readily noticed
unless the stimuli are so weak as to disappear entirely, or almost
entirely, in one phase of the intermittence, with reversible illusions
we can work with stimuli of almost any intensity. That the rever-
sions are quite independent of the intensity of the stimulus is a
matter of common observation. But it has also been subjected to
experimental test. In a series of experiments upon various re-
versible figures (drawings) it appeared that a maximal intensity is
even better than a minimal. Thus a white drawing on a black
ground (where accordingly there is a maximal brightness of the
lines) is preferred to the opposite arrangement, because the rever-
sions are more clearly and readily perceived. 1 With the drawings
placed at three distances from the eye, four, fifteen, and thirty-six
inches, the middle distance, corresponding to the normal reading dis-
tance, was preferred by most observers, because it yielded clearer
and less ambiguous perceptions. The one observer who preferred
the greater distance did so for the same reasons. Here, then, in-
tensity of sensation rather furthers than hinders the fluctuation.
This would seem to contradict the results of Schroder, Sinsteden,
Mohr, and others, who found a certain " unclearness, " or "obscura-
tion of details" essential for many reversions. It will be found,
however, that this applies to reversions of tridimensional objects in
which, if the binocular details were perfectly obvious, no reversions
at all would occur.
What, now, are some of the aids and suggestions offered by the
study of these illusions to the solution of the question of the inter-
mittence of attention?
If the reversions were due solely to the fluctuation of attention
it would seem that the perception of one of the perspectives should
be weaker than the other. Specifically, the anomalous or non-pre-
dominant perspective (which it is found practically all figures pos-
sess) should appear less distinct than the predominant. It should
appear somewhat hazy. But experiments show that it comes to con-
sciousness with the same clearness, primacy, coerciveness, and spon-
taneity as the predominant. 2 The only blurring observed in my own
case was during the moment of reversion. This occasional blurring,
which did not affect the clearness of the supervening perspective,
would point to some important physiological change as its cause.
1 Wallin, " Optical Illusions of Reversible Perspective," 1905, pp. 154, 156,
158, 260 f.
'Op. tit., pp. 289, 310.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 35
That this change does not appear to reside in the lens or the
ciliary muscle appears from Loeb's and my own experiments upon
subje.cts whose muscles of accommodation had been temporarily par-
alyzed. On the other hand, numerous experimenters (Sinsteden,
Necker, Loeb, Hoppe) have experienced sensations, usually sensa-
tions of a sudden movement or twitching, simultaneous with the
reversion. In my own case these sensations were quite prominent in
reversing a tridimensional loop. 3 In another series with skeleton
models the sensations were found to differ for the two eyes, and for
different fixations. 4
Moreover, Loeb and Wundt have both observed that eye move-
ments increase the instability of the figure, and I frequently observed
that the tendency of a drawing to become flat after being steadily
regarded for some time could be largely counteracted by eye move-
ments. Loeb also noticed that when one eye was screened it was seen
to move at the moment of reversion. In an experiment with momen-
tary exposures, lasting .03 sec., I had hoped to exclude the movement
factor, but it appeared from the introspections that half of the
observers were conscious of the fact that the eye swerved or dropped
or tended to exploit the figure. Even if these movements or move-
ment tendencies did not occur until after the exposure they would
probably exert some influence upon the after-image, and since this
behaves like the primary impression, the resulting sensation or per-
ception would necessarily be modified.
If we may assume, as Gordon did, that a more complex figure
holds the attention longer, the case for attention is not helped; for
in my own series of experiments the simplest drawing reversed the
slowest. 5 It reversed the slowest because it offered less motives for
eye movements.
With these presumptions in favor of a peripheral explanation of
the fluctuations (as due to instability of the eyes) it would be well
if one of our psychological laboratories would attack the problem
anew with the greatly improved forms of apparatus which now exist
for the accurate recording of eye movements. From such records it
should now be possible to ascertain whether eye movements invariably
coincide with the period of reversion, or whether they precede or
follow it, or occur quite independently of the reversion.
At the same time, it is quite doubtful whether an explanation in
terms of eye movements (once they have been indubitably estab-
lished) will tell the whole story, as indicated by the following
considerations.
"Op. dt., p. 26.
4 Op. tit., pp. 241, 242, 263.
8 Op. tit., p. 254.
36 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
In another experiment 6 in which the time of the perspectives in
my own case was found to be 1.97 sec. for the non-predominant and
3.30 sees, for the predominant, it appeared that the time of the fluc-
tuations for the reversible illusions corresponded with my efficiency
curve, which in turn corresponded w^ith the respiratory and Traube-
Hering blood pressure undulations, as measured by Pillsbury. 7 Like-
wise Bonser found a similar correspondence by comparing parallel
plethysmographic and sphygmographic tracings w r ith the reversions
of a pyramid. The crest of the ' ' attention wave, ' ' as he viewed it,
corresponded with the valleys in the blood pressure curve. So it
seems that there is a connection between the fluctuations and the
Traube-Hering blood pressure oscillations.
With these facts at my disposal the conclusion followed that the
explanation of the so-called fluctuations of attention observed in
reversible illusions and other stimuli has a common twofold ground :
certain disturbances in the peripheral organ and certain bodily
cycles, notably the blood pressure rhythm, possibly the respiratory
rhythm, and possibly the cortical cell fluctuations. The fluctuations
are thus simply the psychical correlates of bodily processes of fatigue
and recuperation. The predominant perspective, which is the most
stable and the easiest to envisage, represents the resting or recupera-
ting period.
Latterly it has seemed to me that some of the more recent investi-
gations 8 in neurology may throw some light upon the problem, espe-
cially studies of the reflex arc conduction. The laws which govern
the reflex arc will apply, it would appear, to the stimuli under
consideration.
In distinction from the nerve trunk, the reflex arc shows a latent
time, which, according to Sherrington, has its seat in the gray matter
of the synapsis; and a response which is rhythmical in character.
The fluctuations vary from 7.5 to 12 per second in the flexion reflex
(the rate given by Schafer is from 10 to 12), irrespective of the
nature of the stimulation. The periods are thus fixed within limits.
The rhythmical reflexes show periods of excitation and refractory
slates. These refractory states periods when the mechanism mani-
fests lessened excitability are an essential part of most reflexes.
They are found in the nerve fibers, once a second, in the flexion reflex
of the spinal dog (2.3 per sec.), the cross-stepping reflex in the
spinal dog (2.5 per sec.), in the scratch reflex (4.5 per sec.), the
Op. dt., pp. 245 f .
7 Pillsbury, "Attention Waves as a Means of Measuring Fatigue," Amer-
ican Journal of Psychology, XIV., 1903, Table IV.
8 Admirably summarized in Sherrington, "The Integrative Action of the
Nervous System," 1906.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 37
reflex movements of swallowing in the narcotized cat (2 per sec.),
and eye reflexes. With the latter it is found that the chances of a
stimulus releasing a reflex is 50 per cent, less for one second during
the refractory phase than one second later. The refractory phase is
longer for visual than tactual and thermal stimuli, and is about the
same for weak and strong stimuli (4.5 as against 5.8 per second).
It sometimes lasts six times as long as the "period of activity"
(Sherrington).
It would thus seem that the fluctuations which we observe in
reversible illusions (or with faint gray rings or sounds) are the
psychic correlates of the rhythmical and refractory phases of the
reflex arc. The fact that the refractory phase differs for visual,
tactual, and thermal stimuli accords well with the differences in time
which have been found in psychological laboratories on fluctuations
for the corresponding stimuli. The fact that there is a variation in
the rhythm, or time of the refractory phase, of the reflex arc, within
certain limits, accords with similar variations observed in psycholog-
ical experiments on fluctuations. The fact that the refractory phase,
which represents a period of lessened efficiency, a fatigue or re-
cuperative period, is longer (sometimes six times) than the "period
of activity," accords well with the measurements of reversible illu-
sions, in which it was found that the one perspective lasted longer
than the other, and in which it was inferred that, since it was the
normal, predominant perspective which was the most stable, this was
a period of recovery. 9 The fact that the time of the refractory phase
is almost constant under weak or strong stimulation finds a parallel
in these illusion fluctuations. Furthermore, the refractory phase
varies with conditions of fatigue, practise, and the use of certain
drugs. Likewise in one series of experiments with skeleton models
practise made itself manifest in a shortening of the time needed to
reverse of from 25 to 50 per cent., and in a special practise experi-
ment the percentage of successes in the second half was nearly twice
that of the first half. Effects of fatigue appeared in another experi-
ment, where the slowing of the reversions in the second half affected
especially the predominant perspective, which would correspond with
the recuperative or refractory period of the reflex arc.
It- would therefore appear that further control experiments on
these illusions under conditions of decided general fatigue and under
the influence of strychnine (which seems to convert inhibition into
excitation, producing quickened reactions, sometimes eventuating in
a condition of tetanus) should offer a fruitful method of solving the
Wallin, op. tit., p. 253.
38 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
problem by some one with the ingenuity to perfect a sufficiently
refined experimental procedure.
J. E. WALLACE WALLIN.
CLEVELAND NORMAL TRAINING SCHOOL.
SOCIETIES
THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
fin HE Yale sessions of the Association on December 27, 28, and
-- 29 last were more than ordinarily successful from first to last.
Though regrets were heard that the philosophers had encamped far
from the psychologists in Boston, nobody seemed to take it much to
heart, for the attendance was fully up to the normal, if not above it.
Considering the inevitable diversity of themes, the papers were
admirably grouped, so as to permit those of a session being discussed
together; this was particularly true of the second session and some-
what less so of the first. Partly because of this good management
by the executive committee and partly by reason of the absence of
other distracting scientific meetings, the general interchange of
criticism and opinion became conspicuously full and lively; and yet
the burden of responsibility for this stimulating outcome lay else-
where. It was the sharpening of questions and the concentration
upon two of these that told most. Of the fourteen papers read on
Monday and Tuesday, seven may fairly be described as having
focused, more or less clearly, upon methodology, in its widest
sense. Three of these seven, three of the remaining other seven
and the three leading papers on Wednesday morning pitted realist
against idealist in a series of encounters lacking nothing of brisk-
ness. Most striking and singular what, too, must have puzzled
the laity who attended the sessions was the invisibility of prag-
matist badges and the almost unbroken silence on those topics prag-
matic with which reading-room gossip has identified the new move-
ment. Save in one or two addresses, which were explicitly his-
torical or classificatory, not so much as the name appeared. In
reality, though, it had vanished only from the surface of events;
its "isms" had evaporated, along with looser first generalities from
its nascent stage, but its spirit lived at a deeper level in the argu-
ments of the realists. Their reiterated insistence upon the necessity
of facing concrete situations and solving them on the basis of con-
sciously accepted, definite, well-narrowed presuppositions was but the
practising, rather than the preaching of pragmatism. This attitude
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 39
was particularly vigorous and determined in the discussions about
methodology.
Mr. Charles Gray Shaw opened the meeting Monday afternoon
with a paper on "Renunciation and the Ethics of Rigorism."
Describing eudaemonism and rigorism as the two basic types of in-
stinctive morality in the past history of conduct, Mr. Shaw pointed
out the inaedquacy of each to explain the facts of behavior; ethics
goes on without promise of pleasure or threat of pain, and against
each theory violent reactions are repeatedly setting in, according to
the times. There is a new tendency to-day to get beyond the old
alternative of acquiescence and self-assertion ; value and dignity are
displacing rectitude and duty as ethical categories. But there is a
genuine value in renunciation which must always be reckoned with.
In comment Mr. W. H. Sheldon questioned Mr. Shaw's description
of renunciation as an instinct, but suggested that courage might be
an example supporting that interpretation.
An acute and lively analysis of the American situation, past and
present, was Mr. Morris R. Cohen 's ' ' The Conception of Philosophy
in Recent Discussion." The St. Louis movement marked an era of
system-building ; its end came with the founding of the Philosophical
Review which represented criticism in the classic German sense of
the term ; the third epoch dawned with the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY,
PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS, standing for the scientific
handling of philosophical problems. Mr. Cohen declared this last
school has solved no problems, but has only encouraged scientists
to encroach upon philosophy. No other thinkers, however, have
accomplished much more, because now academic courtesy and now
timidity keeps them away from the special sciences. For the sake of
culture, which is the supreme need of the American college, philos-
ophers must make bold to sweep through the many fields of research
and begin building systems anew. In doing this, they will perforce
come to recognize their kinship with the artist and the literary
essayist.
"Metaphysical Movements in Science," by Mr. James H. Hyslop,
depicted the physicists' struggle toward a clear understanding of
matter. The Greeks explained material actions by internal forces
and so came to panpsychism. Newton, on the contrary, allowed
matter no self -movement, but conceded to it the power of limiting
the motion of other matter. Modern physics is now but a step
removed from the Hellenic belief; chemistry professes to find com-
pounds which induce actions without entering into the processes of
the latter, while it is even claimed in some quarters that all chemisms
must be induced by such an external stimulus. Ether is fast being
vested with the attributes of orthodoxy's God; already omnipresent
40 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and omnipotent, it may soon be counted omniscient. Contemporary
physicists are talking old-school theology in a new speech.
Brother Chrysostom, speaking on "The Mathematical Habit in
Philosophy," criticized the great historical exemplars of this atti-
tude; as Descartes and Spinoza, so too Kant was mathematically
minded, built on too few postulates, and worked these to the bitter
end. These errors of procedure inhere in the mathematical habit,
which, therefore, must be condemned for philosophical purposes.
Mr. Herbert Martin presented a new way of interpreting the syllo-
gism to students ; it was said to prove advantageous in that it spared
beginners the trouble of memorizing the traditional valid forms.
In objection Mr. Royce declared that Mr. Martin 's devices for reduc-
tion varied from case to case, so that the old difficulty of learning
many applications was only shifted, not removed.
After this paper, the general discussion turned to Mr. Cohen's
and Mr. Hyslop's addresses. Touching the former, Mr. Perry
granted the propriety of speculation and system building, but in-
sisted that this enterprise be held rigorously apart from scientific
method. Mr. Ladd, referring to both papers, declared that there is
no breach between science and philosophy.
A very large and alert audience heard the three papers of Tues-
day morning, and the debate these aroused was the warmest and
most prolonged of the entire meeting.
Mr. E. G. Spaulding set forth "The Logical Structure of Self-
refuting Systems." His arguments the ear followed with difficulty
because of their extreme condensation and intricacy; their main
point was that neither phenomenalism nor absolutism can consist-
ently locate itself in the world as described by itself or, what is the
same thing, either theory nullifies itself as soon as it applies its own
conclusions to its own existence or to its own procedures. The
development of this point carried Mr. Spaulding through the ques-
tion about the intern ality or externality of relations and then through
the kindred one about the infinite regress. By eliminating other
possible interpretations, Mr. Spaulding reached the conclusion that
relations are external to their terms; that the infinite regress can be
truly given and conceived, not in a series of mental acts, but all at
once by intention ; and that only some kind of realism is not a self-
refuting system. In the extensive criticism from the floor which
ensued, Miss Calkins and Mr. Creighton led the idealists' attack,
their most emphatic protest being that Mr. Spaulding had simply
defined phenomenalism and absolutism to suit himself and then
deduced their own destruction from them ; genuine idealism, how-
ever, did not correspond at all to the picture Mr. Spaulding drew.
Mr. Woodbridge and Mr. Pitkin, from the realistic side, centered
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 41
their objections about the speaker's apparent willingness to give rela-
tions position in space and so to make entities of them.
Its deductive methods assailed by Mr. Spaulding, idealism next
heard its inductive reasoning no less severely arraigned by Mr. Ralph
Barton Perry, in his discourse on "The Ego-centric Predicament."
Mr. Perry's demonstration that the only inductive method, namely,
that of agreement, which the idealist can use at all for his main thesis
can not be used so as to prove anything drew fire from more quarters
than any other single paper did. That experience determines its
objects (symbolically, that (E)R(T) defines T) is absolutely beyond
proof, inasmuch as every investigation of the matter itself involves
the constant presence of the experience-object relation. Mr. Lovejoy
said that, however this might be, idealism might still find powerful
support in the antinomies of space, especially in the fact that infinity
can not be truly given in thought. Mr. Montague cited from Mr.
Bradley a misuse of the ego-centric predicament. Mr. Creighton
said that, so long as the ego is regarded as an item or a thing in the
world, all realistic criticism of idealism misses fire ; the ego is not a
thing, but a principle. Miss Calkins found peculiar significance in
the ubiquity of the subject-object relation ; but Mr. Perry, replying,
confessed that, to him, ubiquitous characteristics often seem the least
important. Further comments, too long to quote here, were made
by Mr. Woodbridge, Mr. Aikins, Mr. Hibben, Mr. Hume, and Mr.
Pitkin.
Novel analogies were brought to light in Mr. W. E. Hocking 's
essay on "The Ontological Worth of Ideas and Feelings." Limit-
ing himself to epistemology and to a finite knower, Mr. Hocking
compared the independence of an object from thought with the
independence of a sovereign from his subjects. The independence
of the self is measured by the degree of externality of its objects.
Ideas are to sensations as the state is to its natural data, such as its
economic circumstances, its customs, institutions, etc. Like the
state's laws, ideas confer freedom and individuality upon sensations.
Sense qualia are nature, while ideas are at once an instrument of
the self and of nature. Mr. Hocking developed also an interesting
analogy between the tendency toward angularity of form away from
roundness in organic evolution and the tendency toward discontinuity
in the evolution of knowledge. He conceived sensation as the osmosis
between the Ding an sicli and the ego; this, he said, was Kant's own
opinion. Idealism has its valid ontological argument; the object of
knowledge finds its proof of existence in the very knowledge of it,
inasmuch as the object, as idea, is forced upon the knower by nature.
Logic itself is nature. Unfortunately, Mr. Hocking 's hearers had
battled so lustily over the two previous essays that they had no
42 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
strength left to discuss him as fully as he deserved. Mr. Urban
pointed out the limitations of Mr. Hocking 's political analogy.
The afternoon session began with Mr. C. A. Bennett's paper,
"In what Sense can an Experience in Time be Timeless?" The
speaker described various types of esthetic experience in which the
sense of drag, succession, and anticipation goes lost.
Mr. W. P. Montague's "Mind and Life as Forms of Energy"
outlined a hypothesis making consciousness potential energy and the
qualia higher derivatives of the same. Ten analogies between con-
scious states and potential energy were indicated, among them the
following: as potential energy accumulates when a moving body or
force is redirected, so too does consciousness occur when the nervous
impulse is turned down motor tracts; potential energy is not phys-
ically actual, nor is consciousness; neither has position in space;
each has intensity; and each displays polarity (e. g., the magnetic or
electric positive-negative and the empirical subject-object relation).
This hypothesis, if accepted, puts an end to the two great contro-
versies, that between mechanism and vitalism, and that between
parallelism and interactionism. Mr. Marvin doubted the wisdom of
trying to advance by such analogies; only a physical theory which
would clear up some difficulty in psychology, or a psychological
theory doing as much for physics would be worth considering. In
reply, Mr. Montague said that from the physical equations for poten-
tials "Weber's law may be deduced. Mr. Creighton objected to all
such speculation on the ground that "potential energy" is a mere
conceptual abstraction and so recognized by physicists; it is not a
reality in any more than empirical sense. Mr. Woodbridge, on the
other hand, was perplexed by the apparent implication that con-
sciousness was somehow equally distributed throughout and between
all objects "in" it or contributory to its eventuation, just as mag-
netic or gravitational stresses and pulls are exerted by all bodies in
the system and somehow by the intervening ether.
Similar disapproval was shown toward Mr. Walter B. Pitkin's
paper on "The Epistemological Dilemma of Biology in Reference
to Space." The contention of this essay was that, in the light of
the processes of reflex and voluntary imitation, biologists must
accept space as more than empirically real and as the setting in
which those problems arise to whose solving all organic evolution is
supposed to contribute, provided biology is to use, as its fundamental
categories of explanation, "agent," "environment," "adaptation,"
"selection," "heredity," and the like. Mr. Bakewell pronounced
the account Mr. Pitkin gave of the idealistic space theory a cari-
cature. Mr. Perry asked whether the criticisms founded on a study
of the imitative reflex held against objective or absolute idealism;
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 43
to which the reply was made that, in strict logic, only the more
than empirical reality of space was a necessary assumption, if any
current biological category of explanation is to be used : whether some
types of idealism are compatible with a theory of real space, is a
question which may perhaps be answered affirmatively.
"The Generating Problem," the next topic, was handled by Mr.
Karl Schmidt along lines continuing the development of his previous
studies which look toward the building of "A Philosophical Plat-
form." His endeavor was to depict the facts and doubts out of
which philosophical inquiry properly arises.
Some impressive statistics were adduced by Mr. J. G. Hume in
his practical address on ' ' The Significance of Suicide, ' ' which demon-
strated the need of revising the educational program in order to
cope with the evil of self-destruction.
Tuesday evening in Lampson Hall, the President of the Associa-
tion delivered his official address on "The Philosophical Aspects of
Evolution." Mr. Hibben came out squarely against the "intellec-
tual mysticism" of James and Bergson. After sketching the evo-
lution of consciousness, the qualitative differences of function that
accompany quantitative changes of organic structure, and the
enormous gap which must always lie between reasoning mind and
the next lower type, Mr. Hibben broached the question whether
reason measures up to its self-set task of conceiving clearly the most
intimate and elusive processes of life itself. In opposition to Berg-
son's thesis that change, the continuum and flux of events, can only
be appreciated in an intuition higher than conceiving, he protested
that ideas are not discontinuous, lifeless things, but rather organic,
growing continua which take up fresh particulars indefinitely and
transform themselves in adaptation to these latter. Intellect will
never be displaced nor fail irretrievably in any problem of biology
or any other science which can be formulated. A complete mathe-
matical expression of life processes is theoretically possible, and, if
never attained, then only because of purely technical or experi-
mental obstacles.
Following this address was a smoker at the Yale Graduates'
Club, where most of the philosophers joyfully forgot time, space,
the absolute, and other office-hour worries.
Wednesday morning turned out to be a somewhat unpropitious
time for the general discussion of time, inasmuch as many members,
trying to serve two masters, left for the psychologists' convention
before or during the debate. None of the three leading papers there
read received fair attention from the floor. Mr. Arthur 0. Lovejoy
led off with an illuminating analysis of tendencies in Anglo-American
philosophy with respect to the problem of time. He found two groups
44 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
whose members oppose each other, pair by pair, as follows : rational-
ism versus anti-intellectualism ; eternalism versus temporalism ; ideal-
ism versus realism; and "this-worldliness" versus pragmatic nom-
inalism. The main issue is between eternalism and temporalism.
Idealism is the refinement of the naive man's eternalism, which he
derives from the timelessness of truth, as truth. The strong point of
radical empiricism is that real time resists conceptualization ; while
this is no positive disproof of the reality of time, it does argue suc-
cessfully against intellectualism. Mr. F. J. E. Woodbridge said that
the classical opinion about time, as typified by Kant and Royce, is
suspected to-day largely because the ego as a world-knower is
doubted. The absolutist view is taken from the vantage-point of
Newtonian physics, which allowed the space concept to dominate
the time concept; whereas now it is to the biologist and his cate-
gories of time that we turn for a profounder interpretation. Knowl-
edge is accordingly looked upon as a natural event, with the find-
ing of whose antecedents and consequences one should be wholly
concerned. ' ' How can experience give us knowledge of reality ? " is
an obsolete question, for knowledge has no reference to anything
save its own antecedents and consequents, being not at all a repre-
sentation of nature. Time is, therefore, not a mystery, but a
perfectly natural peculiarity, to be naturally investigated. Mr.
Josiah Royce, in a delightful anecdote, expressed his general agree-
ment with Bergson and other defenders of real time, but at the
same moment his belief that they have only elaborated the obvious
and the indisputable. What they have altogether missed is that
real novelty, which can never be perceived directly or described, is
a supersensuous interpretation based on willed presuppositions about
the world. The unique, the truly individual, can never be a datum
of sense; hence the time series is a product of will, an artefact for
the conceptualizing of reality. In the ensuing discussion of these
three papers, Mr. Perry raised the question as to the imperceptibil-
ity of duration, and Mr. Lovejoy set forth his difficulties in the
matter; but, owing to the dwindling audience and the lack of time
for the business meeting of the Association, debate languished, much
to the regret of the faithful few who tarried.
WALTER B. PITKIN.
COLUMBIA UNIVEBSITY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 45
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Attention. W. B. PILLSBURY. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1908.
Pp. 346.
This book is an extended exposition of the facts bearing on the nature
and conditions of attention, its relation to other conscious processes, and
of theories concerning it. The intention is not to present new experi-
mental facts or to launch a novel theory but, rather, " to bring together
in an orderly way the results of the different researches " and " to har-
monize the known facts with one another" (preface). It is, therefore, in
no sense pioneer work, but a survey of fields already traveled.
Attention as a conscious state is " an increased clearness and prom-
inence of some one idea, sensation, or object, whether remembered or
directly given from the external world, so that for the time it is made to
constitute the most important feature of consciousness" (p. 308). The
important term here is, of course, " clearness." Regarding its relation
to intensity the author says that most authorities regard the effects of
attention as different from those of an increased intensity of external
stimulation. Structural differences between intensity and clearness it
appears, however, difficult to exhibit. But they seem certainly to differ
in their effects and, perhaps chiefly, in their conditions. Increase in in-
tensity, for instance, makes discrimination more difficult, increase in
clearness easier. Further, concerning conditions, "we might define the
intensity as the degree of efficiency of a sensation in consciousness due to
the energy expended upon the sense organ, attention as an increase in
efficiency due to subjective conditions alone" (p. 9). This means, since
clearness is the structural substitute for attention, that the quest for the
peculiar conditions that determine the becoming clear of any conscious
state must lie among subjective elements alone.
Among conditions, be it specially noted, motor activities do not
figure (p. 27). Motor activities, which "succeed, or at most accompany,
the attention " (p. 25) are : movements of adaptation of the sense organ ;
general correlated movements depending on the nature of the stimulus
having, however, " no influence upon the efficiency of the attention," but
being, nevertheless, " different enough to mark that particular act of the
attention off from every other " (p. 18) ; overflow effects on the voluntary
muscles not dependent on the nature of the stimulus and neither useful
nor symbolic of the nature of attention (p. 20) ; and, finally, the movements
of respiratory and circulatory processes. That none of these processes,
although many of them serve as differential marks for any "particular
act of the attention," are listed as conditions is a point to which shall
recur later.
The real conditions of attention are classified as subjective and ob-
jective. Objective are those that " depend upon the nature of the ex-
ternal world at the time " (p. 27) and subjective, the resultants of " the
earlier impressions that the individual has been subjected to, including,
of course, the influences that have affected the ancestors and have given
the individual in question his hereditary bent" (p. 28). Objective con-
46 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ditions favorable to attention include intensity (chiefly changes in in-
tensity) of sensation, the summation effects of weak stimuli, a rapid rate
of change in intensity, greater rather than less extensity of sensation
for sight and touch and moderate duration. We must, I take it, reckon
with these as conditions only in the sense that they favor the activity of
the more weighty subjective conditions, for attention is " an increase in
efficiency due to subjective conditions alone." One effective subjective
condition is the idea or image in mind just previous to the act of atten-
tion; the others are more remote the general mood of the moment, the
general training of the individual, the social forces that have influenced
him and his inherited characteristics both racial and individual.
Neither interest nor the feeling of activity is a proper condition of atten-
tion, since the former is either a mood accompanying all attention or a
general name for the subjective conditions when attributed to the object,
and the latter consists of movement sensations.
The pages thus explicitly devoted to an isolation of the subjective
conditions of attention admittedly those alone of vital significance re-
sult, as it seems, in the general statement " that the conditions of the
attention are as wide-spread as the conditions of consciousness itself,"
that, indeed, " every event that has at any time affected the individual in
any way is at some time likely to determine in some degree the direction
and efficiency of his attention," that, furthermore to go beyond the
individual " through heredity and social environment everything that has
helped to select for survival his ancestors or the race at any time will
play some part, great or small, in deciding between the many stimuli
offered on any occasion" (p. 52). This view of the conditions of atten-
tion receives in nearly every chapter such cumulative emphasis that it
finally figures as perhaps the dominating motif of the book, although it
does not, as may readily be seen, isolate any specific complex of processes
as conditions of the clarifying and selective essence of attention apart
from those of the rest of consciousness.
Under the caption, " The Effects of Attention in Consciousness,"
Pillsbury reviews investigations on the number of separate objects that
can be attended to, on the duration of a single act of the attention, and
on fluctuation. For a theory of fluctuation he is inclined to favor an
hypothesis of central rather than peripheral processes, involving a fatigue
of sensory cells, of reinforcing cells (corresponding, for instance, to the
ideas that precede changes in the interpretation of ambiguous geometrical
figures) and including, finally, the physiological rhythms originating in
the circulatory and respiratory centers in the medulla.
We come next to methods of measuring the attention. Measures of
attention are divided into three groups: direct, the measuring of accom-
plishments in some allotted task (discrimination of two points on the
skin, reaction times, marking letters of one kind on a page, etc.) ; in-
direct, through fluctuation or through the mean variation in a series of
measurements; and by the amount of stimulus necessary for distraction.
None of these, however, appears to give a univocal test of attentive
capacity. They are open chiefly to two objections that some special
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 47
facility acquired through training, rather than attention, is involved,
and that the test may be in part dependent on other capacities acuteness
of the sense organ, retentiveness, etc. Certain tests are, therefore, sug-
gested which, the author thinks, it would be well to try (p. 92). The diffi-
culties mentioned, however, appear to be inherent, since attention " is a
word that covers so many different processes that no single test will
probably ever be devised that shall measure all the part processes satis-
factorily" (p. 91).
The discussion up to this point (pp. 1-93) might be taken as one
logical division of the book. It attempts, essentially, to analyze the
nature and the conditions of attention. The next seven chapters (pp.
94-218) more than a third of the book are different, the analysis being,
not of the attentive process itself, but, rather, of the rest of consciousness.
The motives of this analysis are two: first, to state the author's own
doctrine of ideas, perception, memory, will, reason, feeling, and the self
(to each of which subjects a chapter is given), and, secondly, to canvass
these various processes in an attempt to show just where and how atten-
tion functions in each one. It is really an examination of the field of
psychology with the emphasis on the functional significance of attention.
Since nothing new is added to the previous analysis of the attention
process itself; since, further, the author reduces, in each chapter, the
conditions that determine the particular mental capacity under discus-
sion to the conditions that he had before enumerated as determining
attention, we may pass over these chapters briefly. The conclusion, in
any one chapter, may be substituted, with appropriate variations, for that
of another. A few quotations will show this : " We find that they too
(ideas) are subject to the control of the same factors which we found to
be active in the control of sensorial attention " the ideas in mind, the
general attitude of the hour, etc. (p. 112). " The conditions of attention
are at the same time the conditions of reason. One involves the other
and can not be separated from it" (p. 182). "Taken together, the self
and attention are so closely related as to be scarcely distinguishable.
Conditions of attention and what we know as the self are for practical
purposes identical" (p. 217).
The attempt in these chapters, it is clear, is to identify so far as pos-
sible the conditions of attention with those of other conscious processes.
The identity can not, however if the term " attention " is to retain
significance be complete, and it would have been more fruitful, the
reviewer thinks, if the emphasis had been laid rather on the respects in
which they are not identical. Such an emphasis might have helped
towards an isolation of the differential conditions of attention, an isola-
tion not attained in the discussion specifically devoted to conditions.
As it is, one feels that little of importance is done in reiterating the
identity of the conditions of all conscious processes. We are primarily
interested in differentiae; if investigation has not yet disengaged those of
attention it would seem that the discussion of it, particularly of its func-
tional relations, could be compassed in small space.
Following the excursus on the functions of the attention we find, in
48 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the closing chapters of the book, a return to what might be called the
main theme the analysis of the attention process itself in a series of
discussions of theory. Only two of these chapters (" Attention in
Pathology and in Development " and " Applications to Education ") form
exceptions to this statement. At the outset of his theoretical discussions
the author states and accepts the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism.
A consideration of the structure and functions of the nervous system
following, so far as the cortex is concerned, Flechsig's view of the func-
tions of the association areas then leads him to conclude that " the
anatomical seat of attention is apparently the frontal lobes" (p. 235).
More important, however, than any attempt to assign to attention a local
habitation, is the discussion of the physiological basis of the attention.
To this chapter, since it reveals, at least to the reviewer, the author's
fundamental position more clearly than any of the other discussions, our
further remarks will be given. The other theoretical chapters are devoted
to apperception in relation to attention, and to a history and critique of
psychological theories.
The problem is, of course: What physiological processes are involved
in the selecting and clarifying of one mental content at the expense of
others? Such a process must be due, as many authors have shown, to
reinforcement (or facilitation), to inhibition, or to both. The author
includes both. An examination of certain phenomena of reinforcement
and inhibition enables him to conclude that any cell, sensory or motor,
will, by its mere activity, increase or decrease the activity, or tendency
thereto, of any other cell, sensory or motor, however separated, however
devious, apparently, the connection between them may be (pp. 240, 248).
There is, namely, exhaustive reciprocal inhibition and reinforcement
among all sensory and motor cells. One sees, thus, an ample mechanism
in the nervous system for reinforcement and inhibition. The intimate
character of either of these processes is not discussed; certain phenomena
are exhibited, merely, which are interpreted as demonstrating the exist-
ence of the neural mechanism.
Any cell may, then, indifferently reinforce or inhibit any other cell.
As for the differential process, that would account for the reinforcement
or inhibition of any particular group of cells for the clarifying or select-
ing of any particular conscious content we find the following statements :
" If every sensation has an influence upon every other sensation, it would
only be natural to suppose that it would have a more marked influence
upon the related sensations than upon those which are entirely foreign "
(p. 250). "Earlier experiences," furthermore, "tend to organize the
cells affected into groups, and so to determine the paths along which any
reinforcement from a given stimulus will extend " (p. 252) . These
organized groups are " systems which are closely related on the nervous
side to what Stout calls apperceptive systems on the mental side " and,
" when any general or specific stimulus arouses one part of the system
the other parts are thrown into a state of greater or less activity " (p. 255).
It would appear, therefore, by applying these principles appropriately, that
a perception or idea is reinforced by the presence of a related idea, a
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 49
related mood, related past experience, related social experience, etc. In a
word, the various subjective conditions of attention and, it may be added,
of other conscious processes as well, are, thus, brought within the physio-
logical theory.
Now of what constituent elements are these neural systems or organ-
izations, of which the author speaks, composed? This is a most vital
problem, for one's answer to it must inevitably determine one's main pro-
cedure in matters psychological. The author's presuppositions concern-
ing the physiological nature of such organizations are unmistakable, both
from explicit statement and from implicit emphasis. " Each system . . .
is made up of a certain number of sensory cells together with the asso-
ciatory cells of the frontal lobes" (p. 256). And, although at the begin-
ning of the chapter reinforcement and inhibition were said also to obtain
reciprocally between motor and motor and between sensory and motor
cells, one finds, as the discussion progresses, that the interrelations of
sensory cells, sensory areas, and sensory systems, figure more and more
exclusively as the physiological basis of attention. Throughout the book,
indeed, one is struck with the permeating emphasis on the sensory, or
impression, aspect of experience. The reactive aspect is almost wholly
neglected. Motor processes do not, as we have seen, figure as conditions
of attention. Sensory impressions appear, furthermore, to persist unal-
tered throughout one's experience instead, for instance, of fusing and
losing their identity in neural organizations that result in turn from
unitary adaptive reactions (see, particularly, chapters VII. and VIII.) .
Everywhere one is impressed with the implicitly axiomatic attitude that
experience consists only of impressions, revivals of impressions, and inter-
relations of impressions. This, one may think, might with fairness be
called an example of the sensation bias in psychology.
Although, in short, the book sincerely aims to be a representative
account of the various views that are held about attention, it shows no
trace of the fundamental thought, however different the specific theories,
underlying the work of Dewey, Baldwin, Miinsterberg, W. MacDougall,
or Judd. This fundamental thought is that not impression only, but
reaction as well, must be included in any adequate account of conscious-
ness ; that not merely the afferent nervous system, but likewise the efferent,
is involved, and is involved directly, not simply indirectly, through the
motor sensations which the reactions arouse. Is it not probable, since an
organism's chief concern is selective adaptation to an environment, that
its reactions, or the neural organizations that represent them, are among
the physiological determinants of its experience? Is it not possible, for
instance, when eye movements appear to determine which of two com-
peting colors in retinal rivalry shall persist in consciousness, that it is not
a case of reinforcement or inhibition of one sensory center by another
(p. 246), but an inhibition of one adaptive response by another? that, in
general, so-called sensory reinforcement or inhibition is between reac-
tions (or the totality of cortical organizations underlying them) and not
between sensory organizations direct? It seems, further, quite appropri-
ate to think, if an " object " is chiefly determined in consciousness by the
50 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
use to which it is put (p. 66), that such "use" means one's selective
system of reactions towards it, and that, when the total nervous organiza-
tion corresponding to such reactions is aroused, we have a perception or
an image of the object. This implies, of course, that no mere organiza-
tion of sensory systems is adequate. Is it not, finally, a suggestive view
which regards our discriminative reactions on our environment as the
selective mechanism in experience and that it is the rearousal of cortical
organizations at the basis of these reactions, rather than sensory organiza-
tions merely, that determines whether or no an object shall engage atten-
tion, whether or no, consequently, it shall become " clear " in conscious-
ness? According to such a view the author's subjective conditions of
attention (idea in mind, mood of the moment, whole past experience, etc.)
would reduce to systems of individual selective habits of reaction, or
corresponding mental attitudes, each with its correlate of definitely organ-
ized cortical processes.
These few suggestions are meant merely to remind any who needs
reminding that the motor interpretation in psychology is still active ; they
are also symptomatic of the lively surprise that many have felt on finding
in the present work, which sincerely, and in certain directions successfully,
seeks to give an adequate resume of representative facts and theories, no
indication that the force of the underlying thought of a growing group
of workers had been at all felt.
KOSWELL P. ANGIER.
YALE UNIVERSITY.
Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind. CHARLES HORTOX
COOLEY. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1909. Pp. xvii + 426.
Social psychology, like its cognate sister sociology, is still in a forma-
tive state. It is, nevertheless, works of the merit of Professor Cooley's
" Social Organization " that will hasten its recognition as one of the
accepted psychological disciplines.
In a previous book on " Human Nature and Social Order " Professor
Cooley presented society as it exists in the social nature of man; in the
present volume, on the other hand, he conceives life as one human whole,
and approaches it from the mental rather than from the material side.
" If we cut it up," he says in his preface, " it dies in the process ; and so
I conceive that the various branches of research that deal with this whole
are properly distinguished by change in the point of sight rather than by
any division in the thing seen." Hence, the view-point of the author in
the book before us is focused on the enlargement and the diversification
of intercourse.
Mind, as defined by Professor Cooley, is an organic whole made up of
cooperating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the music
of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds; so, in the
study of the social mind, he fixes his attention on the larger relations of
mental experience.
The unity of the social mind he holds consists not in agreement, but
in organization, " in the fact of reciprocal influence or causation among
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 51
its parts, by virtue of which everything that takes place in it is connected
with everything else, and so is an outcome of the whole." This differ-
entiated unity of mental and social life is what he characterizes as social
organization.
Professor Cooley's method of approach is what he calls sympathetic
introspection, in which the student puts himself into intimate contact
with various sorts of persons and allows them to awake in himself a life
similar to their own, " which he afterwards, to the best of his ability,
recalls and describes."
The primary aspects of social organization, including social and in-
dividual aspects of mind, primary groups and ideals, and the extension
of the latter, are treated in Part I.; communication, its growth and en-
largement, and its relation to individuality, superficiality, and strain, is
the central theme of Part II.; democracy, the enlargement of conscious-
ness, theories of public opinion, crowd excitement, and the trend of senti-
ment are discussed with marked clearness in Part III. ; the social classes,
hereditary and caste principles, the growth and outlook of caste, the
open classes, and the ascendency of wealth and a capitalistic class are
judicially treated in Part IV.; Part V. deals with institutions in rela-
tion to the individual, the family, the church, education, fine arts, and
economic conditions; and Part VI. discusses the public will in relation
to government and the extension of state functions.
This topical summary will give the reader a notion of the wide scope
of this altogether able treatment of social organization in relation to
the larger mind. It may be added in closing that the book is a notable
contribution to the new and growing science of social psychology and
that it is certain to be welcomed by students of education and the philo-
sophical disciplines, as well as by the larger public interested in prob-
lems of social welfare, philanthropy, and government.
WILL S. MONROE.
MONTCLAIB (NEW JERSEY) NORMAL SCHOOL.
Education Through Music. CHARLES HUBERT FARNSWORTH. New York:
American Book Co. 1909. Pp. 208.
Both by the soundness of its general principles and by the careful and
always practical working out of its details in relation to the successive
years of music work in schools Professor Farnsworth's book is an admir-
able guide for teachers, and should exert a wide and wholesome influence
on our school music-teaching.
The first five chapters concern themselves with the fundamental prin-
ciples. Thus chapter I. insists that experience must always precede formal
instruction; where it is lacking it must be supplied by the teacher, and
in all cases it must be her aim to organize it in such a way that all par-
ticular facts may be seen by the pupils in their relation to broad musical
effects. In chapter II. the relations of interpretation and structure are
first made plain, and then these are analyzed into seven constituents, viz. :
interpretation into (1) quality of tone, (2) quantity of tone, (3) rate of
movement, and (4) articulation; and structure into (1) pulsation, (2)
52 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
duration, and (3) pitch. The next two chapters are devoted to a
more minute discussion of interpretation and structure respectively,
and contain much admirably enlightening matter. The fifth chapter
shows in a general way how all musical ideas are to be developed by ex-
perience, in the natural sequence of observing, acting, picturing, and
writing the symbols.
On this foundation the rest of the book builds, discussing in regular
order the work to be taken up in each of the eight school years. This part
of the discussion is too detailed to summarize. Suffice it to say that the
methods for making real to the child such subtle matters as the ratio of
tone durations to metrical pulse, the characteristics of the seven scale-
steps, the nature of harmony, and the complex ways in which repetition
is used as the basis of musical design are at once ingenious and simple,
and the basic rule of having all effects observed before they are described
is never lost sight of.
One adverse criticism suggests itself. Although the point is well
made (see pages 16 and 22) that " while at first thought music seems
to appeal directly to the feelings, it really does not do so, but reaches the
feelings through ideas which deal with definite forms " a point, by the
way, which needs constant emphasis in view of the wide-spread tendency
to narrow music down to a mere " language of the emotions " the au-
thor, when he comes to close quarters with these definite forms, as for
instance at page 24, seems to fall somewhat into the very fallacy he has
been deprecating, identifying the musical idea too much with the liter-
ary idea with which it is associated. (" A wise teacher will lead the
pupil to conceive first what the music means as a whole. Is it a brisk
winter song, or does it regret the passing of the flowers?", etc.) On the
whole, however, the untranslatability of music, its uniqueness in our
mental experience, is well apprehended.
Not the least interesting chapter in Professor Farnsworth's thought-
ful book is the concluding one on " The Broad and the Narrow View of
Education in Eelation to Music." One wishes that all school principals
and all parents might read it.
DANIEL GREGORY MASON.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. November, 1909. Some Ex-
periments on the Color Perceptions of an Infant and their Interpretation
(pp. 363-376) : HELEN THOMPSON WOOLLEY. - Baldwin's method used with
a child throughout its seventh month showed the perception of red, blue,
and yellow as colors. Preference for red and indifference to green were
striking. After the seventh month interest shifted from relatively pas-
sire sense impressions, such as color perception, to the more active aspect
of manipulative experience. Other descriptive adjectives are understood
before those of color because of their superior practical import in the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 53
child's experience. On Ocular Nystagmus and the Localization of Sen-
sory Data during Dizziness (pp. 377-398) : EDWIN B. HOLT. - Question :
What organs yield the sensation of rotation? Answer: This is not a
sensation in the ordinary meaning of that word, but the process most
nearly parallel to the feeling of rotation is one kind of innervation proc-
ess. A two-page bibliography accompanies. Mental Diagnosis by the
Association Reaction Method (pp. 399^109) : FREDERICK G. HENKE and
MILTON W. EDDY. - A series of experiments from which it is concluded
(1) that correct diagnosis by this method is reasonably certain in simple
cases; (2) in such cases, impartial observers, e. g., an American jury,
could draw right conclusions; (3) the subject's knowledge of the method
does not prevent a correct diagnosis; (4) the situation may be so compli-
cated as to render diagnosis impossible. Binocular Rivalry (410-415) :
B. B. BREESE. -A series of experiments giving (1) the effect of variation
in the size of the stimuli ; (2) the effect of distinctness of the images upon
rivalry; (3) peripheral rivalry. Minor Studies from the Psychological
Laboratory of Wellesley College: communicated by ELEANOR A. McC.
GAMBLE. I. Intensity as a Criterion in estimating the Distance of
Sounds (416-426) : ELEANOR A. McC. GAMBLE. - There is found consider-
able evidence for, and little or no evidence against, the ordinary belief
that intensity is the main factor in estimating the distance of sound. II.
The Perception of the Distance of Sounds (427-430) : DANIEL STARCH. - The
least perceptible difference in distances is 15 cm. for sounds a meter away.
Accuracy is the same for all directions tested. Introspections in 5,200
cases indicate as bases of judging differences in intensity, in pitch, and in
quality, by far the most important being intensity. Discussion: Darwin-
ism and Logic: A Reply to Professor Creighton. J. MARK BALDWIN
(431 436). - Mechanism and teleology are naturalistic or empirical
categories, both valid, but both restricted, in their proper use, and both
superseded in a hyperlogical mode of experience.
AKCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. Band
XIV., Heft 1. October, 1909. Sur la conception Aristotelienne de la
causalite (pp. 1-28) : L. ROBIN. - An explanation of Aristotle's assimila-
tion of causal to syllogistic necessity, in spite of his recognition that we
may often know the fact without knowing the cause of the fact. To be
continued. Uber die Platonischen Brief e (pp. 29-52) : R. ADAM. - A de-
fense of the authenticity of the seventh letter, and perhaps the thirteenth,
with rejection of the second, third, and eighth, and doubt concerning
other letters. Plato als politisch-pedagogischer Denker (pp. 53-88) : R.
STUBE. - Plato is to be considered as the prophet of European culture,
because he looked upon the State as the instrument of an education for
life eternal. Ein Beitrag zu Heracleits Fr. 67 und 4a (PP- 88-91) : E.
LOEW. - Democrit und Platon (pp. 92-105): L H. JENSEN. - Plato does
not ignore or supplant the teaching of the atomists, but subordinates that
teaching to a teleology, which is based upon a new theory of knowledge.
Der Geist Hegels in Italien (pp. 106-116) : C. D. PFLAUM. - Benedetto
Croce's interpretation of Hegel to Italy. Marx's Hegelian influence on
64 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the mass of Italians. Spinozas Bildnis (pp. 116-140) : A. LEVY. - The
authenticity of the newly discovered portrait is disputed especially on the
ground of the proportions of nose and lips, and the character of the hair.
Die neuesten Erscheinungen. Historische Abhandlungen. Eingen-
angene Biicher.
EEVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. September,
1909. L 'orientation de la pensee philosophique de David Hume (pp.
596-619) : L. LEVY-BRUHL. - The work of Hume is that of a geographer.
Any attempt at a further explanation of experience would have been felt
by him as an attempt to solve the unsolvable. Les theories logico-meta-
physiques de MM. B. Russell et G. E. Moore (pp. 620-653) : H. DUFUMIER.
-A systematic presentation of Mr. Russell's general conception of logic
and its relations to neo-realism. Sur le pragmatisme de Nietzsche (suite
et fin) (pp. 654-702) : R. BERTHELOT. - Discusses the question of the use-
fulness of Nietzsche's theoretic and moral philosophy. Etudes critiques.
Les etudes de M. Delacroix sur le mysticisme: H. NORERO. Supplement.
Crawley, A. E. The Idea of the Soul. London : Adam and Charles Black.
1909. Pp. viii + 307.
Heck, W. H. Mental Discipline and Educational Values. New York:
John Lane Company. 1909. Pp. 147.
Hoffman, Georg. Die Lehre von der Fides Implicata. Band III. Leip-
zig: J. C. Hinrichssche. 1909. Pp. 536.
O'Sullivan, J. M. Old Criticisms and New Pragmatism. London, New
York, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1909. Pp.
xiii + 317.
Remacle, Georges. La philosophic de 8. 8. Laurie. Bruxelles : Henri
Lamertin and M. Weissenbauch. 1909. Pp. xxxii -f- 521. 7 fr. 50 c.
Sawicki, Franz. Das Problem der Personlichkeit und des Uebermensclien.
Paderborn : Ferdinand Schoningh. Pp. viii + 446.
Schulze, Rudolf. Aus der Werlcstatt der experimentellen Psychologic und
Pddagogik. Leipzig : R. Voigtlanders Verlag. 1909. Pp. x -{- 202.
Smith, Eugene Randolph. Plane Geometry Developed by the Syllabus
Method. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago : American Book Co. 1909.
Pp. 128. $0.75.
Tocco, Felice. Studi Kantiani. Milano, Palermo, Napoli: Remo Sandron.
1909. Pp. xix -f 271. L.7.50.
Von Uexkiill, J. Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere. Berlin: Julius
Springer. 1909. Pp. 259.
Ziegler, Th. Geschichte der Pddogogik. Munich: C. H. Becksche Ver-
lagsbuchhandlung. 1909. Pp. x -f 416.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 55
NOTES AND NEWS
THE number of students at Russian universities during the year 1908-
1909 reached the figure 76,900. This number is exclusive of those in the
many private higher colleges in the various towns in Russia, which is
estimated roughly at about 20,000. The 76,900 students at the universi-
ties are distributed as follows: at St. Petersburg in the various depart-
ment, 28,550; at Moscow, 13,250; at Kharkov, 7,000; at Kiev, 5,900; at
Kazan, 3,600; at Tomsk, in the University and the Technological Insti-
tute, 2,700;. at Warsaw, in the University and the Polytechnic Institute,
1,500; at Odessa University, 3,300; at the Novocherkask Polytechnic
Institute, 700 ; at Helsinf ors, in the University and the Technical College,
2,750; at the Riga Polytechnicum, 1,700; at Yuryev, at the University
and the Veterinary Institute, 3,350; at the Novaya Alexandria Agricul-
tural Institute, 400 ; at the Yavoslavl Lyceum, 1,050 ; at the Yekaterinoslava
Mining Institute, 500; at the Nezin Philological Institute, 150; at the
Saratov University, established this year, 200; at the Vladivistock Insti-
tute of Oriental Languages, 300. It was noted in the " Notes and News "
of this JOURNAL for August 19 that the foreign students in German uni-
versities for the last academic year numbered 3,594. Of this number,
1,578 were Russians. These facts have, it is believed, bearing on an
interest in the present educational opportunities and development of
Russia.
THE following abstract of a paper on " The Subject-Matter of Psychol-
ogy" was read by Mr. G. E. Moore before the Aristotelian Society on
December 6. " When anything is said to be ' mental,' one or other of five
different things may be meant, viz. (1) that it is an act of consciousness;
(2) that it is a quality of an act of consciousness; (3) that, though not an
act of consciousness, it is related to some mind in precisely the same way
in which a person's acts of consciousness are related to mind; (4) that it
is a collection of things which are mental in senses (1) or (3), or both;
(5) that it is a subject of acts of consciousness, different from any single
act or collection of acts. It was contended that some things certainly are
' mental ' in senses (1), (2), and (4) ; but that it is doubtful whether any-
thing is so in senses (3) and (5). Of sense-data it was contended that
they are not mental in any of these five senses, even though it may be
true of them that they exist only at moments when some one is conscious
of them." (The Athenaeum, Dec. 25.)
THE British Medical Journal announces that the Pasteur Institute
of Paris will soon receive the capital sum of 30,000,000 francs, the product
of the estate of the late M. Osiris. In 1903 M. Osiris founded a triennial
prize of 4,000 to be given to " the person who had rendered the greatest
service to the human race during the three preceding years." The prize
was awarded to Dr. Roux, director of the Pasteur Institute, for the dis-
covery of the anti-diphtheria serum. Dr. Roux, instead of using the sum
for his own interests and purposes, gave over the money to the Pasteur
Institute. This act, it is rumored, so impressed M. Osiris that he left the
bulk of his fortune to the Institute as token of his admiration for the
achievements and the generous spirit of Dr. Roux.
56 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
AT the fifth annual meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy
and Psychology, held at Charlotte, North Carolina, December 23, 1909,
the following officers for the year 1910 were elected: President, Edward
Franklin Buchner, Johns Hopkins University; vice-president, Shepherd
Ivory Franz, George Washington University; secretary-treasurer, Robert
Morris Ogden, University of Tennessee. A. Caswell Ellis, University of
Texas, and David Spence Hill, Peabody College for Teachers, were elected
members of the council to serve two years, and Bruce R. Payne, Univer-
sity of Virginia, and Haywood J. Pearce, Brenau College, to serve three
years.
IT is stated in Nature that the inaugural meeting of the China Philo-
sophical Society as held at Tientsin on September 18 under the presi-
dency of the president of the Pei Yang University, Mr. Wang Shoh Lian.
Mr. Lian, in his presidential address, pointed out the importance of the
existence of such a society in the present stage of China's development,
when western learning is being spread over the empire. Papers were also
read by Dr. G. Purves Smith on agricultural possibilities of north China,
and by Dr. Wu Lien Teh on an example of scientific farming in Chili.
W. DAWSON JOHNSTON, librarian of Columbia University, is preparing
for the United States Bureau of Education a report on special collections
in libraries of the United States. It is planned to make the publication
a record of all collections in public libraries which are of special value,
either because of their completeness or because of the rarity of their con-
tents. In order to collect the material for this report the Bureau of
Education is sending circulars to all libraries which are thought to possess
such collections.
A NEW edition is offered by the Macmillan Company of Edward
Cair J's " Essays on Literature," which first appeared as a collection in
1892. Of special interest is the essay entitled " The Problem of Philoso-
phy at the Present Time," which compares the reconciliation between re-
ligion and sophistry attempted by Plato and Aristotle, with the recon-
ciliation between religion and science needed in 1881, when this lecture
of Caird's was first delivered.
THE American Psychological Association has elected the following
new officers for the ensuing year : President, Professor Walter B. Pills-
bury, of the University of Michigan; members of the Council to serve
three years, Professor Ernest H. Lindley, of Indiana University, and Pro-
fessor Robert M. Yerkes, of Harvard University. Professor A. H. Pierce,
of Smith College, was elected secretary-treasurer of the Association.
THE chair of experimental biology at the University of Budapest has
been offered by the medical faculty of that University to Professor Jacques
Loeb, of the University of California. Professor Loeb lectured last Sep-
tember before the International Congress at Budapest and also delivered
a course of lectures in June at the University of Budapest.
AN international subscription is being organized for the purpose of
erecting a statue of Lombroso in the city of Verona.
VOL. VII. No. 3. FEBRUARY 3, 1910
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
NOTES ON THE DISCERNMENT OF LIKENESS AND OF
UNLIKENESS
THIS research aimed to help the analysis of the mental process
by which we become aware of similarity and of dissimilarity.
Its method is experimental and it reports the simplified laboratory-
judgments as to the likeness and unlikeness experienced in the case
of a series of visual forms. The experiments of the work were per-
formed in the psychological laboratories of Columbia and of Har-
vard universities. The simple-enough apparatus employed consisted
of the blots of ink introduced into experimental psychology by the
writer and described in the Psychological Review of July, 1897.
From about five hundred of these largely chance ink-blots made OIL
paper 4 cm. square and mounted on thick pasteboard of like size,,
one hundred were taken as they chanced to lie in a box, that is, quite
at random. The backs of the blot-cards were numbered consecu-
tively from one to one hundred for ready identification. Besides
these, four other ink-blots were selected to constitute the norms with
which the others were to be compared as to their respective likeness
or unlikeness. A wire frame to hold fixed the norm-blot convenient
to the subject's vision and a table on which the century of blot-
cards could be arranged ten-square in numerical order completed
the apparatus employed.
The subjects employed in this research were twenty in number;
two were philosophical professors, one an instructor, and two assist-
ants in psychology, while the rest, with one exception, were students
in the two laboratories where the experiments were performed, the
exception noted being a college graduate. The subjects were all
males ranging in age between twenty and forty-three. The chief
interest and work of one of the subjects lay in the art of music a
circumstance whose influence will be noted later on. The interests
of the others were certainly sufficiently varied to prevent the occur-
rence of bias in any direction in their subjective reports, no one
avowing or evincing any particular prejudice as regards the nature
57
58 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of the processes under inquiry. All the subjects employed were
sufficiently familiar with psychological analysis to afford both their
introspection and their subjective reports the requisite accuracy.
Here, as nearly always, however, the chief stress was laid on actual
reactions rather than on more or less uncertain and ambiguous
mental images and ideas, on the principle that bodily reactions
express better than other means, even to the subject himself, his real
meaning and intention a fact too often overlooked, perhaps, in the
laboratory of psychology.
The method of experimentation in detail was simply as follows :
The hundred blot-cards being placed in order ten-square on the table
before the seated subject and the norm in its frame conveniently
before his eyes and above the blots, he proceeded to select within
fifteen minutes the ten blot-cards out of the hundred most similar in
form or shape to the norm, and to place them one side arranged
carefully and deliberately in the order of their judged similarity to
the norm. Meanwhile the subject reported how he apperceived the
norm and what he considered its most essential form characteristics
and peculiarities. These subjective notes were recorded and the
numbers of the ten blots judged most like the norm, and in their
chosen order. The time required for a selection satisfactory to the
subject was also recorded, and at the end of the selection the reason
why each of the ten had been preferred, concisely as possible. The
process in the case of judgments as to unlikeness was precisely the
same, with the appropriate change in intention to keep dissimilarity
instead of similarity in mind. The subject was not allowed to turn
any blot-card about or to observe the characters from more than one
view-point, that, namely, directly in front, but no objection was
made to orientation in imagination if the subject seemed impelled to
so vary its meaning to himself. This was allowed for the sufficient
reason that with characters so full of suggestive meaning as are
many blots of ink it is impossible to prevent their adjustments in
imagination without disturbing deeply the judging and selecting
process. On this matter of position lay one of the interests of the
experiments, for, in the complexity of psychic association, to turn a
blot a few circular degrees is often to make it seem an entirely dif-
ferent object with quite different meaning for a particular percip-
ient.
Altogether, about nine hundred judgments were recorded and
explained, the details of these explanations from introspection on a
basis of precise objective stimulus constituting an interesting study
in themselves, which here we shall not touch upon. We shall be
content to indicate the general nature of the judgments as a whole
and the principles of likeness and unlikeness which these judgments,
69
so far as they go, empirically demonstrate in the range of the
experiments.
The nature of the apparatus employed is obviously such that
statistical results are for the most part of little use and photographic
reports of the judgments made would have to be so numerous as to
be impracticable. Careful and extended study and comparison of
the sets of blots selected by the various subjects, however, brings out
several striking facts as to the mental process concerned, the most
interesting of which are as follows :
The average size of these visual objects was such that ocular
contour-movements probably were not much concerned in perceiving
them. The projections, to be sure, tend after a while to be counted
in an indefinite sort of way and their general shapes and directions
noted. The blots are, however, too small to need outlining and are
at once apprehended as units, just as are long words familiar to us.
Be that as it may, the most conspicuous criterion of likeness and of
unlikeness alike in these selections was what we may call relative
massiveness. If the norm-blot happened to be noted as massive or
as attenuated or as a mixture of these two, selection was made
accordingly. This appears continually in the results of the experi-
ments. This difference was noted immediately in practically all the
cases where animal associations did not occur, thus crowding it out.
It implies, apparently, a fundamental criterion in comparison-judg-
ments of form and gets its bodily basis in the relative number of
retinal local signs bunched in the perception, rather than in ocular
contour-movements. This is apparently the most conspicuous of the
sorts of "change of consciousness" which underlie our apprehension
of likeness and unlikeness.
Another result of these judgments appears to be our excessive
dependence on language-concepts for a clear awareness even of pure
form. In almost every case the choices had their criteria of same-
ness or of difference sharply defined in words, expressed or not, of
the subject. However pragmatic in their life-philosophy, all these
subjects save one were obviously strong conceptualists. They made
no progress in characterizing the norm-blot to themselves until words
had arisen in their minds to make its character or characters definite
and sharp. The sensational basis of the apperceiving process (a
mass of retinal local signs plus a tendency to contour-movements)
by itself led to no clear apperception of the blots. "Whatever the
confused experiences might be on perception of the blots, there was
no clear notion of likeness or of unlikeness, no decided change in
consciousness, until ideation had had its say. This would probably
not be looked for in a set of subjects outside of college influence,
where ideation is taught too often as the end-all and the be-all here.
60 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Indeed, the only subject who claimed to have a true feeling of like-
ness and of unlikeness was a student of music, naive enough as a
student of psychology. He, too, had the concepts associated with the
respective blots, but he avowed a distinct feeling of similarity and of
dissimilarity which persisted. It needs only a glance at the sets of
blots chosen by him and compared with those of others to show that
his choices were by far the most satisfactory of all the subjects ' sets.
The explanation is not afar off: Exen these simple bluish-black
forms in only two dimensions have so many characters that to
specify one, or two, or three, and compare them by these leads to
imperfect and misleading results. On the other hand, the "feeling"
of likeness or of unlikeness implies a much wider -acquaintance with
the blots and is, therefore, the basis of a better comparison. Related
here is obviously an important educational principle which he who
runs may read.
These experiments, again, illustrate the high stage which sym-
bolism has reached in our social mental process. In nearly every
case the subject found difficulty in inhibiting the reproductive imag-
ination of animals, starting from the norm and extending to the blots
chosen as like or unlike it. This process was interesting, but, being
foreign to the topic in hand, was excluded because it led to com-
parisons obviously artificial. It was, however, often only with diffi-
culty that most of the subjects could be induced to perceive the char-
acters as mere chance-blots of ink, as masses of black color filling in
an absolutely meaningless outline on a bit of white paper. If this
inhibition were not insisted on (as at first it was not) the subject
compared imagined animals rather than blots. One man, for ex-
ample, promptly said the norm was a bird and thereupon chose ten
"birds" flying, standing, roosting, swimming, swans and eagles,
storks and humming-birds. However, it was not difficult for the
subjects to overcome this symbolic menagerie-habit, so to say, and to
use other criteria than those suggested by the associative imagination.
The two preceding results from these simple experiments (namely,
the highly conceptual, and highly symbolic, characters of the class of
perceptions here concerned) lead to suggestions as to the subjectivity
of likeness as a mental fact. One thinks of Bradley's surprising
collection of "objects that do not exist" when one sees how various
are the qualities ascribed to this set of objects. As a matter of fact,
these differ, for the most part, only in mere outline, by which they
may be arranged as like or as unlike. One tends pro tanto to lose
faith in mere ideas raised in the idea-overburdened mind when out
of a hundred blots compared with a norm one sees seventy-one
chosen as "similar" to it. Three blots were chosen by each of seven
subjects, one by six subjects, six by five subjects, seven by four sub-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 61
jects, ten by three, sixteen blots by two subjects, and twenty-six by
only one subject these numbers applying to one norm, but being of
average sizes. When one lay out the sets chosen by the concept-cri-
teria the differences in the blots often struck him more forcibly than
did their sameness. Yet each subject had all the time he wished for
his selection and made a deliberate choice, as deliberate at least as
real life would usually allow of his making in comparing actual ex-
periences. Only very rarely, moreover, would the actual objective
similarity in life be as narrowly confined as in the conditions of
these simple experiments.
Within the number of those subjects who chose their similar and
dissimilar blots by ideal (rather than by affective) criteria, there is
a considerable range of formal accuracy, dependent on the ideas
employed. Some ideal criteria were obviously more essential than
others and led to the selection of a set of blots evidently like each
other and the norm. Ideal criteria gave more accurate results in
the dissimilarity choices than in the similarity choices. This is, as
we should expect, on logical principles. The awareness of unlikeness
is an easier, if not a simpler, process apparently than that of likeness,
for the change of consciousness is greater and so easier to appreciate.
At any rate, the sets of blots chosen as unlike the norm were much
more certainly unlike it than were the "similar" blots chosen like it.
As we pass, it is not improper to note the indirect evidence
afforded by these experimental results of the motivity of even con-
ceptual consciousness. Ignoring the larger questions as to under-
standing, there is here ample illustration that such a cognitional
process as the comparison of bidimensional forms does not ordinarily
find issue until the actual word symbolic of a concept is fairly clear
in consciousness. If it gives the subject the impression that it
"appears" out of his vague subconsciousness (as often is the case)
that is another problem that need have here no further mention.
This conscious-becoming of an actual word can mean nothing else,
it seems, than the innervation of those muscles and glands whose
proper coordination would utter the word. Such dependence of an
intellectual process as general as that of a judgment of likeness or
of unlikeness upon the activity of the neuromuscular mechanism of
speech is not any too frequently at hand. Here it can be taken for
what it is worth in the doctrine of the relations of body and mind.
Were we to summarize and fuse the notions inductively suggested
by this little research we could emphasize that judgments of bi-
dimensional forms, when not geometric, are more accurately made
by "feeling "-criteria than by conceptual criteria. The subjects who
paid most attention to the actual visual sensations (retinal and oculo-
motor) as objectified in looking at the blots instead of thinking about
62 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
them, made the best, that is, most similar and most dissimilar, selec-
tions. The former in choosing similar forms kept the change of
consciousness at a minimum by their method, for they retained in
mind a more or less true image of the norm. The latter, the con-
ceptualists, on the contrary (but only after innervating for the
word), replaced the original visual image with a more or less partial
concept and repeated it in their choices, but more or less forgot
meanwhile the shape of the norm. The practical application of this
principle, familiar to psychologists, to affairs, for example in the
taking and evaluation of evidence in legal trials, should not be
further delayed, especially since rather numerous researches along
various similar lines (that of Cattell, for example) have all pointed
to the same really important fact that what we see or hear or feel is
often determined as much from within as from without ourselves.
Another result of this work that may be mentioned is its emphasis
on the practical value of affective impressions in comparison with
knowledge that is purely cognitional. It is outside of the experi-
mental results somewhat, of course, but it may be strongly believed
that this principle is continually acting often to our disadvantage,
and especially in education, in our relations with our generally
experienced environment, and with each other. As demonstrably
here, the learning mind, through too little attention to this matter,
is led frequently to errors that might be often avoided did it allow
greater and more nearly natural freedom to the sensational and
especially to the affective aspects of our mental process. In educa-
tion we are undoubtedly apt to overdo ideation and to underdo the
affective phases of the developing mind. Greater objective activity
in the free realms of feeling and less reliance on the "apperception-
mass" would surely lead the child to see things as they are rather
than as a more or less formal and hereditary association of ideas
compels him to think them.
The one other result that appears most noteworthy of those sug-
gested by this work is its evidence for the neuromuscular basis of
conceptualization evidence coming, it is true, perhaps not less from
within than from without! These chance-characters as a rule have
in them a minimum certainty of conceptual symbolism that is, on
the average, they are about as far away in shape from language-
symbols as any forms that could be devised. None the less, as we
have seen, they usually start some conceptual associations, more often,
on the whole, than trains of imagination, and they start these asso-
ciations, so to say, without a push, without giving them more than
the needful minimum of bias in any one direction they introduce
the energy but do not guide its course. Under these circumstances
the association-time and especially the wholly subconscious start is
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 63
very long oftentimes. Often, as we have seen, the consciousness was
to introspection a mere confused and scarcely conscious jumble of
more or less unpleasant strains in and about the head, eventuating,
however, sooner or later in a word clearly thought or even spoken
aloud. In the usual form of word-association measurements, in the
formerly so numerous researches on reaction-time, the symbol used
as a stimulus was either a printed or a spoken language-symbol and
therefore in the closest cerebral connection with the muscular inner-
vations, etc., of language-expression as developed in the brain when
the individual learned to understand and speak and write. In these
cases, on the other hand, the stimuli were no such familiar symbols,
practically part of the language-expression mechanism, but were
rather almost unrelated stimuli, abstract, so to say, rather than con-
crete. None the less, after a time the speech-innervations were suit-
ably set going.
It is hard to believe that this difficulty of language-association
under these circumstances is other than the difficulty of making
"new" pathways, combinations, in the expression-neurones of the
brain. This means, probably, each time a new struggle through
unaccustomed innervations of speech-muscles. There is apparently
no other neurologic basis for the confusion and the delay. These last
were both experiences unpleasant to the subject and tended, there-
fore, to be eliminated by repetition and habit, if it were possible;
yet they were neither eliminated nor much shortened, at least within
the limits of these experiments. Neurologically this is interesting,
this slow and unpleasant fumbling around of a sense-impression
among the infinite possibilities of cortical (and nuclear?) routes. It
is interesting, too, in a broader way, philological and psychological,
in so far as it suggests that, in the human mind as of old in the great
empire, all roads, even the most unlikely trail of a chance ink-blot
form, lead sooner or later into the (mostly muscular and epithelial)
innervations of language-expression the one function characteristic
of humanity. As has already been suggested, these stimuli were as
far as possible from language-symbols of any language, and the out-
come of the association-process was, therefore, all the more striking
and suggestive, however inferior the determination of likeness and
unlikeness by this process as compared with the few cases where
the cerebral association remained of the affective aspect.
Recent advancement in biochemistry and especially in neuro-
metabolism has made possible suggestions more definite by far than
ever before as to the real nature in scientific terms of these in-
numerable influences darting through the cerebral maze that psy-
chologically we discuss as subconscious associations. However in-
teresting, however, such speculations may be, the broader questions
64 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
as to the relationship of mental ''energies" to the forces we know
as chemie and electric must outweigh in interest the purely physio-
logic problem. How can we designate for proximate scientific use
the ultimate nature of the neurogram, the memory-trace, the end-
less and perhaps ineffaceable "vestigia" of ever unique experi-
ences? And if we could and did "connote" them, should we not
forthwith find it quite impossible to discriminate the energies we
described from the thing we speak of as consciousness, ~with its
sthenic and asthenic conditions, its dynamogeny, its varying quali-
ties and quantities and durations, and the other numerous char-
acters which it shares with the "somewhats" that even the avowed
dualist (if he truly exists still) speaks of as energies'? In fine,
then, why do we not give up this two-faced terminology of a bygone
time and speak the straight language that leads to clear thinking
and to real knowledge in terms that are ultimate? To the present
writer it is unknown what proportion in general of the psycholog-
ically informed consider that ideation (as well as feeling and will-
ing) is immediately interknit with ("dependent on") the innerva-
tion of the muscles and glands that would express the concerned
ideas. One would almost assume that nearly all psychologists who
know their physiology fairly well (they are none too numerous)
would nowadays thus presume the basis of thought, for gradually
the psychophysiologic chasm is narrowing, or, at least, many firm
bridges are being thrown across it; perhaps before we fully realize
it we shall look in vain for the chasm itself !
However all this may be (the "physiology" of ideation and
thought), here in this little research is adequate evidence, so far as
it goes, that an idea comes plainly ' ' into the mind, ' ' that it becomes
clearly conscious, only with definite innervation and more or less
deliberate and complete occurrence of the muscular movements that
would express the concept in words. One can dimly feel the simi-
larity or dissimilarity between two chance shapes, but in most per-
sons, too many, perhaps, the feeling is useless and even oppressive,
until definitely expressible in neuromuscular terms more definite
and distinct than those of a feeling-tone: that is, articulated.
GEORGE V. N. DEARBORN.
TUFTS COLLEGE MEDICAL AND DENTAL SCHOOLS.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 65
A PHASE OF THE PROBLEM OF CONTINGENCY
aim of this paper is to discuss a phase of the very old prob-
-- lem of contingency; not the contingency of the acts of the
individual man as such, but one sub-case of what might be called
cosmic contingency. The precise problem will, I hope, be made clear
as we proceed.
On the one hand, it is desired to admit and use universal natural
law, but on the other to find, if possible, an escape from the nee
quando nee ante nee post, sub specie ceternitatis point of view which
Spinoza took to be the logical outcome of his determinism. It is
desired in this paper to accept determination in the fact of eventua-
tion, but not before that fact. In other words, the writer objects to
the position that determination, definite and final, exists antecedent
to the act of eventuation. His thesis is that such determination
antecedent to the fact is shown only for a closed situation, a finite
universe ; and that, accordingly, the logical process whereby the mind
has historically gone to a universal and all-inclusive system of ante-
cedent determination is blocked, if the actual universe be conceived
as quantitatively infinite.
The program as stated is a problem of ethics or perhaps more
exactly of philosophy as philosophy essays to mediate in the conflict
between a certain extension of physical science on the one hand and
an apparently essential demand of ethics and practical life on the
other. But, although the problem is philosophical, the discussion
will be more scientific, because the writer believes that the assertion
of the above-mentioned extension of law is scientifically neither neces-
sary nor justifiable.
One who fixes his attention on natural scientific explanation easily
becomes so enamored of the certainty with which "effect" follows
"cause" as to feel that in this uniform and invariable succession
there does lie and must lie the key to "the riddle of the universe."
At least so far as the riddle can properly be put for solution, and so
far as a key may wisely be sought. Especially does this key appear
to be the true and only one in proportion as it enables the student
of nature to foretell future eventuation, whether in the artificially
devised experiment of the laboratory or in the observation of nat-
urally occurring phenomena. This line of thought might be devel-
oped somewhat as follows.
If it be true that each event finds its entire character determined
exactly by previous events, then a knowledge of those previous events
and the general operations of nature would enable us to foretell
exactly the entire character of the event in question. We do not now
66 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ask whether human ability shall ever be equal to such a task; the
present point is that the character of the event is completely deter-
mined in advance of eventuation, and, under certain ideal, even if
unattainable, conditions, could have been foretold. Any event that
is thus exactly determined by a set of conditions is actually deter-
mined as to both its character and occurrence as soon as the deter-
mining conditions are themselves exactly and exclusively determined,
and this is true even though time must elapse before the determined
event becomes actual. In this sense the event may be said to exist
potentially in its determining conditions. If, then, the state of
affairs S 2 exists thus potentially in the state of affairs S r and $ 3
similarly in 8 Z , does it not also follow that S 3 exists in the same way
in $!, and so for all succeeding $'s? That is, this line of reasoning
seems to make us conclude that in the present is contained even now
the whole future, determined in minutest detail both as to character
and as to occurrence.
"When these implications begin to take hold of one, interest some-
how seems to shift from the long-drawn-out process and its unfolding
to the formula which implicitly contains the whole. If we choose to
use an unphilosophical expression, God has the formula and sees all
things as present. Spinoza, who thought much along this line, ap-
plied the word eternity to the timelessness of the formula, asserting
that "in eternity there is no when, no before, and no after." For
him "imagination" may see things sub duratione, but "intellect"
and "reason" must see them sub specie ceternitatis. Naturally and
necessarily, he goes on to deny any objective reality to contingency
or possibility. They exist only relatively to man 's ignorance.
But our introduction is, perhaps, already too long. Repeating
from the first page, what we wish to establish is that final and exact
determination prior to the event is shown only in and for such a
closed and finite situation and universe as is substantially different
from what science assumes our actual universe to be. In the dis-
cussion of this, let us first assume that the situation out of which any
event has grown is separable into mathematically distinct elements.
Later we shall reject this limitation and repeat in part the con-
sideration.
1. It will be convenient to divide again this case of mathemat-
ically distinct elements into two sub-cases, according as the number
of elements are or are not numerically infinite. 1 We consider the
former first.
(1) The conditions given in this case seem to me to be such as to
1 1 use the word infinite here and elsewhere throughout the paper, in the
mathematical sense, to indicate, that is, such a variable number as may surpass
any arbitrarily assigned number, however great.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 67
lead undoubtedly to predeterminism of the complete type. The uni-
formity of nature, assumed throughout our discussion, can not mean
less than that, any set of conditions being given, the next succeeding
event is uniquely determined. To fix ideas, let us suppose that the
universe, for this case, is composed of exactly six mathematically
distinct elements. For my part, I can not but think that mathe-
matics itself, or something very like it, would express for us the whole
subsequent history of such a system. An inclusive uniformity of
nature would certainly mean that the next succeeding state of affairs
would be uniquely fixed in the case of the given simple system of
six elements. Whether mathematics would fail, as in the problem of
three bodies, to tell us the solution has no bearing on our point. The
resulting status would be fixed whether or not we could previse or
predict it. And if this would be true, for the next succeeding state
of affairs, we have again the discussion of the S's as given above.
All succeeding states and movements of the system would be included
potentially in the given conditions. All the future of such a system
would be included in one formulation. Spinoza's world view would
hold. True reason would see things sub specie ceternitatis.
And if this be true for a system of six elements, it would be quite
as true for one of sixty or six thousand or six million. So long as
the number of elements is fixed, one all-inclusive formula contains
the whole future 2 history of the system.
(2) But if we have an infinite number of elements, the situation-
appears very different. As I see it, we can not longer say that the
conditions which determine any (arbitrarily chosen) event are fixed
in advance of the actual eventuation. As this is the crux of the
whole argument, we may with propriety dwell on the consideration
of this point.
An illustration may help. Consider Halley's comet. The as-
tronomer tells us in justifiable shorthand that this comet will reap-
pear in 1985. Does he mean to assert this absolutely ? By no means.
Three possible "contingencies" prevent the absolute assertion: (a)
the calculation may be incorrectly made; (&) the data existing within
our solar system may not all have been taken into account; (c) some
additional body, another comet, or a "dead sun" may "enter" our
system to disturb the existing conditions. The first two contingen-
cies do not here interest us, the third is vital to our discussion. How
shall we deal with it? The astronomer would doubtless say that if
'Although I have used in this discussion such expressions as the future,
subsequent history, next succeeding, it is not to be understood that such terms
with their ordinary content would be applicable to the assumed system. Their
inaptness in the description is a part of the reductio ad absurdum of the
assumption.
68 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
only he could have been given, sufficiently in advance, the data of
the new body, its effect would have been included, and so we agree.
"What is then the new situation? The solar system is larger by the
new body. The determination in the larger system is exactly as
definite as it was in the smaller system, and no more so. The comet
is now scheduled for, say, 1990. Will it come on time? Again the
same three "contingencies" present themselves. Apparently this
method of inquiry leads to an infinite regress.
Suppose we take another line of procedure. In the paragraph
just concluded we seemed to be asking about foretelling, let us now
confine our attention exclusively to fore-determination and ask: At
what stage in the comet's history is the date for the next appearing,
in fact, determined ? Perhaps some more trivial instances may lead
us to the answer. One sets an alarm clock to awaken him at six
in the morning. The time of its going off is, we say, fixed the night
before by the proper adjustment of the machinery. The event is,
barring ' ' accidents, ' ' determined thus considerably in advance of the
eventuation. A miner sets a slow fuse. At what point in the process
is the time for the explosion fixed? The structure of the fuse, the
length cut off, the general arrangements, the time when the fuse is
lit such are some of the factors that enter into the determination of
the event and accordingly of its date. With a modification later to
be made, we seem to be authorized to say that as soon as the conditions
for an explosion are arranged in place, the time and character of the
explosion are fixed. Or more exactly, the results and the time neces-
sary to intervene are fixed, each and all, finally and uniquely, just so
soon as the determining conditions are in final and exclusive posses-
sion of the field of operations.
But when are the determining conditions in exclusive possession
of the field? In the case of the explosion this can only be after the
arrangements are made and no outside interference is possible. But
with man a factor, the problem takes a turn that we do not care now
to follow out. Let us then return to the consideration of the comet.
When are the determining factors of its appearing in finally exclusive
possession of the field? The terms "determining factors" and
"exclusive possession" alike and together point to the same consid-
eration that we had above of possible "additional" elements, with a
like fall into the infinite regress. With an infinity 3 to draw from,
at any particular instant of time an additional element may "enter"
into any assumed system, however large. However large the system
be conceived, there is nothing within which shall limit the "deter-
mining factors" to the elements already within the system at the
given time. Or, to use the other term, never can it be said that
8 This is assumed throughout the paper.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 69
finally "exclusive possession" prior to eventuation belongs to any
given set of conditions. Since, then, any given system is liable to
inference from what is immediately without, no inner determination
of the result is final apart from a consideration of what is without;
and since on our assumption there is no end to what is without, there
is no limit to this ever-widening of the area of determination. The
infinite regress that we found previously repeats itself here.
2. There remains now for consideration the other case in which
we should no longer assume that the determining situation is decom-
posable into distinct elements. There appears no reason to doubt
an equal applicability of the same line of reasoning. In the actual
world there is no such separateness and atomism of "things" and
"forces" as our vocabulary, following common sense, would imply.
But the inaccurate speech so far used does not, I think, take any
advantage of the position here controverted. Indeed, in the writer's
own experience it was in connection with the more fluid view of
things that the position here advocated came to mind.
It may be remarked a certain suspicion naturally, and probably
justly, attaches to discussions in which the mathematical infinity
plays an important role. Zeno and many less capable followers have
left the warning sign of danger against this. The writer feels, how-
ever, that in the present case he is but tracking the steps of those
whose position he attacks; and this to show that it is they, and not
he, who have misused the concept. They have found determination
to exist antecedent to the fact in certain finite and isolated systems,
and have unwarrantably extended that concept to apply to situations
infinite in both time and space. The writer 's use of the mathematical
infinity is but the pointing out of their misuse of it.
The scientific method has been devised with reference to control,
and control depends on determination antecedent to the eventuation ;
but there is here no criticism of the scientific method properly under-
stood. Science takes a world which is (apparently) infinite and not
(exactly) decomposable into distinct elements, and by abstraction
simplifies this actual world into an ideal world wherein are a finite
number of distinct elements. Its conclusions, thus consciously
hypothetical, are conditioned always on the assumptions (1) that
the situation is adequately analyzed and (2) that all the factors are
included. With growth of knowledge comes growth of this ideal
world, i. e., more factors are included in the consideration. With
each such addition the ideal world accords more nearly with the
actual by an amount equal to the influence of the added factor.
Always the ideal (for the time being) is finite and accordingly pre-
determinism does reign in it. But if the actual world be infinite, the
70 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
addition of factors to the ideal world will be an endless process, and
the ideal world can never coincide in all points with the actual.
In conclusion, any event is thus determined to be what it is in
every detail by the conditions that are on hand at the time of even-
tuation. Looking at the present and past, determination is always
discernible to appropriate scrutiny. Looking ahead, there is only
the approximate determination such as we know in science. To
speak absolutely, any event is finally and exactly determined only
in the fact of actual eventuation.
AY. H. KlLPATRICK.
TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
CHANCE AS A CATEGORY OF SCIENCE
rriERMS slip easily from popular usage into the technical vocabu-
-L lary of logic. We often employ the word chance as a general
synonym of ignorance, while science has accepted a usage which
makes chance the antithesis of law. There arises, therefore, the prob-
lem of the nature of chance as a category of thought, for upon a
distinct and unequivocal interpretation of the term depends alone its
legitimate use in science.
There are two possible attitudes we may assume regarding the
concept of chance. On the one hand, we may look upon a usage
which simply passes over the logical issues and regards chance as
merely a shroud for obscuring our veritable ignorance of the true
causes of an event. Such a point of view makes chance subjective.
On the other hand, we may regard the term as indicating a service-
able, scientific concept, having a significance in the logic of the sci-
ences, a significance which gives chance a distinct and definable
value. This point of view makes chance objective.
The usage of chance which makes it depend solely on human
ignorance is the immediate postulate of a metaphysical assumption.
If we presume, as a fact of reality, that law and order are universal
throughout nature, then nothing ever occurs by chance, but is the
immediate result of definable laws. If, with this in mind, we speak
of the chance occurrence of an event we simply imply that we fail
to comprehend the laws upon which the event depends, although we
recognize that somewhere in the vast totality of nature's order the
event would find an adequate and full explanation. There is no
chance from the point of view of the absolute; the postulate of the
ultimate uniformity of nature destroys chance with one stroke of
the pen and makes all lapse of regularity the lapse of human
knowledge.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 71
But this brushing away of chance from our speech is merely a
postulate of a deeper metaphysical theory. It has not touched the
problem of its logical value as a scientific category. The fact re-
mains, over and above the postulate of absolute law, that science
and the demands of our ordinary speech require a concept that shall
express the permanent doubt of an event, whatsoever our ultimate
world-formula may be. Five red balls and five black balls are in a
bag. From the arrangement of the balls, the folds of the bag, the
movement of my fingers, and the configuration of the dendrites of
my brain, it may be determined in an absolute sense which ball I
first draw out, but these considerations are not part of the immediate
circumstances at issue. We want a term which shall express the
indeterminate character of the forthcoming event. That term is
chance. Science demands its employment in a thousand instances,
and the logic of the sciences must prescribe a usage which makes it
legitimate. And all this without any reference to absolute law and
regularity.
The problem of chance is not concerned with the organization and
uniformity of all nature, for the simple reason that no scientific
problem ever embraces the universe. The chemist must deal with
the molecular constitution of quartz without discussing the period
of the earth 's history in which the quartz congealed, nor the seismic
convulsions which accompanied its formation. In an absolute sense
all knowledge may be relative that is a metaphysical issue but in
the precise sense of a scientific investigation all the facts of the prob-
lem are restricted to a limitable universe of discourse. In these defi-
nite confines chance arises. It can, therefore, have an objective and
valid meaning in a world ultimately causal and sequential, simply
because the scientific problem in which chance occurs is not the prob-
lem of all human knowledge. We may accept or reject the meta-
physical premise of an absolute world-order, where at the last ex-
tremity all is law and nothing chance. Nevertheless, the logical prob-
lem remains.
Chance is bound up with certain types of scientific categories
which enable us to describe experiences. In describing experience
we must first limit it. When DeVries speaks of the occurrence of a
mutant or sport variety of a species as the result of chance, he is
contrasting chance with law in the limited sphere of germ cells, in-
heritable characters and similar biological phenomena. McDou-
gall's observations that the occurrence of mutants can be influenced
by salt solutions is a chemical fact not included originally in the
definitely limited universe of discourse in which the chance mutant
may be said to occur. This chemical fact may be added to the orig-
inal universe of discourse of germ cells and inheritable characters
72 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
by enlarging it by just so much. The fact remains, however, that the
universe of discourse, in which the chance mutant occurs is, to the
minds of the students of genetics, limited and precise.
This limiting of the sphere of a scientific problem determines the
solution of the problem. If the biologist so defines the problem of
heredity that chemical phenomena are excluded from its definite
boundaries, then chemistry can have no effect on the solution which
the biologist ultimately reaches. It is out of the matter by arbitrary
exclusion. Of course, a scientist will make his original universe of
discourse as large as he deems necessary, but it will always remain
arbitrary and determined, simply because it can not include all na-
ture. It must be small to be workable. It must be precise to be
thoroughly understood.
This determines for each scientific problem a limited horizon
within which the conditions of solution are supposed to lie. The
labor in solving the problem is the labor of categorizing and system-
atizing the facts within this limited universe of discourse. And a
solution arises when some regularity is observable. "We call that
observed regularity a law. When no observed regularity is evident,
one event happening apparently without sequential relations to
other events of the universe of discourse, we may call the occurrence
of that event chance. It is, therefore, merely the absence of sequen-
tial regularity within the universe of discourse of the problem.
According to this interpretation, law is the successful reduction
to some principle of order of certain phenomena within a limited
universe of discourse. Chance arises when no regularity is observ-
able. The occurrence of a mutant in the limited universe of dis-
course with which DeVries and other biologists deal in their prob-
lems of genetics is a chance occurrence simply because these biologists
are unable to discover any regularity underlying the occurrence of
such phenomena. Were the universe of discourse to be much en-
larged, say by the introduction of many chemical and physical facts,
it is possible that what now appears as chance would then become
lav. But for the universe of discourse at present considered the
event can only be explained in terms of chance. This theory of
chance, therefore, makes chance and law relative terms dependent
upon the extent of the universe of discourse within which the scien-
tist hopes to solve his problem.
Such a theory of chance indicates that the step between chance
and law may depend on nothing more vital than the limits by
which the problem was originally circumscribed. Chance and law
are not antitheses of one another, but simply terms which are rela-
tive to the success or lack of success with which we find regularity in
the universe of discourse of any scientific problem. Moreover, the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 73
occurrence of a chance event may be explained without denying the
general uniformity of nature, for it would be observed that the
process of reducing chance to law is a process of discovering the two
sets of conditions, within and without the definite universe of dis-
course, upon which it depends. Let a represent the occurrence of a
chance event, such as the drawing of a black ball or the occurrence
of a mutant. Let a, b, c . . . represent the conditions within the
immediate universe of discourse of the problem. For example, in
the case of a mutant they are conditions inherent in the structure of
the germ cells and the like, which the biologist is bound to take into
consideration. And let m, n, o . . . be certain external conditions
without the universe of discourse; in the example in question they
are those conditions which the biologist has not deemed worthy of
considering, as for instance, the effect of atmosphere and chemicals
upon germ cells. Chance would be represented by the formula
a = f(a, b, c . . . m, n, o . . . ). Then according to this formula, the
chance event a becomes a function of these two separate sets of con-
ditions, the one confined entirely to the universe of discourse of the
problem, and the other set lying without it. The reduction of chance
to law consists in the determination of such values for a, &, c . . .
and m, n, o . . . as to bring regularity into such a new universe of
discourse as will include all these conditions.
ARTHUR DEWING.
HAEVARD UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Psychology and the Teacher. HUGO MUNSTERBERG. New York : D. Apple-
ton & Co. 1909. Pp. 325.
Part I. In this age of pedagogical unrest, Miinsterberg welcomes the
possibility of a more intimate connection of laboratory psychology with
schoolroom operations. The unpardonable sins of pedagogy have been
vagueness and failure to utilize the most vital psychological discoveries,
chiefly because of the lack of articulate ideals of the end in view. Laws
of attention, memory, or interest, though true, may not necessarily be
pertinent to educational situations. No facts per se yield educational
guidance. Practical pedagogics, for example, becomes vicious when a
wholesale carrying-over of laws of interest results. The foolish inference
in this classic example of pedagogical fallacy is that we must let the child
illustrate the psychological laws of interest, thereby bringing about chaos
of aims and subversion of sound development.
An ethical inquiry, then, must supplement a psychological one. From
the points of view of biology, psychology, and sociology we may analyze
the processes and discover suitable methods of procedure, but science as
74 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
science actually transforms, does not copy, reality. Ethics, portraying
human relationships and whole purposes in action, occupies the realm in
which vital pedagogy must move.
The author, now in the field of ethics, scores standards based on
hedonism, suggesting that our off-springing pedagogy of interest sets a
mean goal and offers a cheap and superficial task. We must find then in
a sort of dynamism true values beyond reference to a personal state, for
which, too, we can naturally strive. Here the author implies his whole
philosophy of eternal values, only the most literal drift of which the
average reader will take in. He does, however, exhort with the threat that
he who does otherwise than this in education " prostitutes his personality."
On this basis education is not an affair of mere morality any more than
one of mere art or religion or logic. And though the personal factor may
enter into one's categories of goals of worth, still " superpersonal absolute
values for all life " alone can make unity of purpose and integrity of
attitude for the teacher. Clearly ethics furnishes the aim.
Part II. As to the method educational psychology is in an apparent
dilemma. The humane emotional attitude of personal intercourse is
interpretive and appreciative, the impersonal attitude of science is liter-
ally descriptive and causally explanatory. Must the teacher shift his
point of view, or rather grow securely in the former? The author appar-
ently concludes that the teacher, in so far as he is to be a conscious psy-
chologist, is limited to the crude and clumsy use of facts brought bodily
and literally over from the " scientific " field to the field of " real life."
There is a suggestion here that clarity of science, even of psychological
science, stands opposed to the natural-life point of view, however signifi-
cant and rich this is. As to systematic psychology, Miinsterberg makes
slight use of, indeed scarcely fathers, his former sensationalistic or one-
element theory. Elementary psychology of some sort, however, must be
adopted to supplant faculty psychology and to reveal the " bewildering
manifoldness " of all mental processes. To offset this impending con-
fusion a biological view-point will restore the unity by conceiving the
nervous system as essentially a reacting not an absorbing, machinery.
Experiences, to be vivid, and hence efficacious, must fit in with action.
In this sense the student is a motor apparatus.
With this setting the author devotes eight chapters to a discussion of
specific mental operations or factors, apperception, memory, association,
attention, imitation and suggestion, will and habit, feeling, and indi-
vidual differences in general. His chapter scheme is to discuss the
notable genetic stages, the common individual differences including sex
differences, the typical pertinent experimental results, suggestions as to
how to investigate further, and the desirable and possible applications to
school work, such as adjusting teaching to the inevitable childhood
stages, etc. He is consistently and convincingly motor throughout, both
in his psychology and in his pedagogy. Aside from this general schematic
treatment in each chapter, a few points seem to be happily emphasized.
In training in memorizing, for example, we are apt to forget the neces-
sary " settling " or " absorption " period, as well as the different prin-
75
ciples governing " first learning " and " real keeping in mind " So the
teacher, after he has discovered the various types under his charge, and
incidentally noted his own peculiarities, should be wary of imposing
his own or any other one method upon all types. A knowledge of individ-
ual differences necessarily makes teaching more intelligible, though the
inevitableness of just such a situation in itself in no sense calls for a
segregation of types. And again, though one utilize involuntary atten-
tion, it should be with a view to the later persistent training in effortful
concentration. Formal training is a fact, training of the will being
formal even when the development in question may be specific. Feeling
being motor reaction, there is no emotion which can not be educated.
Induce the type-action, and you tend to engender the emotion. An ab-
normal emotional life is a life of obstructed activities.
Part III. The work of the school consists in instruction about things,
people, and self, and in inspiration in regard to our " emotional willing-
ness " in the activities which relate themselves to harmonies, perfection,
progress, idealism, human solidarity, reverence, and truth. The problem
of the curriculum is to effect these two purposes, paying due regard to
the student's limitations as to quantity and quality of matter, and to the
social democratic pressure, and to the " almost immoral lack of support
from the home." In the interests of "the unity of a national education " no
shallow concessions to the psychological doctrine of interest and the
philosophical doctrine of individualism such concessions as is the elect-
ive system should be allowed. It is impossible, with such a policy
dominating, to train voluntary attention.. The author next devotes a
chapter each to elementary and to higher studies, suggesting the distinct-
ive educational disciplines, and incidentally announcing a later treatise
on " psychological didactics." As regards high-school subjects he de-
precates the neglect of " conceptional " knowledge and training, the fact
of our " a?sthetic obtuseness," and the intrusion of industrial education
into the wrong place in our school programs, as well as the low estate of
the classics.
As to organization, we need condensation, sex adjustment, social ad-
justment, a reconsideration of coeducation and of the elective system,
some real discipline, more " psychological " recess periods, more imagina-
tive activity and general mentality in play and games, a principle for
directing home study, and home cooperation which is " more important
than taxes." The standard qualification for teachers should include the
possession of emotional temperaments of discernment, a mastery of sub-
ject-matter, and a professional preparation, which last, as at present
offered, generally needs to be supplemented by ethical training. Lastly,
the school should try to win back the male teacher.
The tone of the book is hortatory as well as analytic, combining pretty
well, or at times shifting skillfully and easily from one attitude to the
other of those the author has so vividly contrasted. The discussions of
elements and parallelism seem forcibly drawn into the treatment. There is
needless repetition too schematically presented. Many slaps at imaginary
absurd pedagogists lessen the force and detract from the tone of integrity
76 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of the presentation. The author has overworked the distinction, for
practical purposes, of facts and purposes, assuming and then too easily
settling an artificial epistemological question. There is an unfortunate
savor of the doctrinaire. The book seems academic. It arouses the sus-
picion of a lurking individual philosophical system which, as with
Spencer, must be, " illustrated " by the educative process. The other
sharp distinction between a thing eternally valuable in itself and
another that merely brings pleasure just as the above distinction of one
which possesses intellectual clarity and another that has merely emotional
richness still further accentuates the mechanical compartmental aspect
of the work as a whole.
On the other hand, the book is to be commended for its high educa-
tional aim clearly and boldly stated and consistently defended. The au-
thor's insistence that we supplement psychological inquiries with ethical
ones should set departments of education and teachers' colleges to work
upon the problem, already being definitely faced by France and Japan,
for example, of how to raise the present standard for certification of
teachers in this specific direction. The work is broken up into twenty-
nine short chapters which are rich in their suggestiveness. The author
has apparently settled so many, until quite recently at least, highly con-
troversial problems of formal discipline, of memory, of attention, of feel-
ing, etc., that the critical reader will scarcely be persuaded, particularly
when all the authoritative sources remain unmentioned. If, however, the
purpose of the book is rather the elementary and popular one of convey-
ing to the ordinary teacher the mere fact of the " bewildering manifold-
ness " of mental life, it succeeds consistently chapter by chapter. One of
the good features of this psychological part of the book is just this, that,
though each chapter-ending is tantalizingly inconclusive, still suggestions,
hinted at rather than clearly outlined, of pertinent lines of experimenta-
tion, abound. The average young teacher of educational psychology and
the better-than-average public-school teacher needs more. Again, as I
have already found with the book in a class of fifty-seven prospective
teachers unacquainted with Miinsterberg's philosophical characteristics,
the most literal and trite inferences from his ethical discussions and
implications are drawn. This suggests that writers of treatises for teach-
ers should possibly put only in the background, if anywhere, personal
predilections for a particular rigid philosophical system. Common words
used technically by this author, such as " causal relation," " description,"
" explanation," " appreciation," " will attitude," " values," etc., presup-
pose a good deal, and the average reader, student, or teacher is nonplussed
by them. Sentence structure of a sort of adapted German idiom with the
consequent grammatical irregularities increases the difficulties. The fol-
lowing are typical examples. " All which makes the child willing for the
work" (p. 243). "We may be short as we have approached this field
once . . ." (p. 244) . " Whether artistic drawing or singing are studied "
(p. 247), etc. To offset such obstacles of approach to his message Mtin-
sterberg has at command a style of exposition which is characterized by
penetration, incisiveness, wealth of illustration, vigor of purpose, en-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 77
thusiastic confidence in the doctrine unfolded, and directness of applica-
tion which is often startlingly convincing.
On the whole, this book from a distinguished psychologist should be
a welcome addition to one's pedagogical library, force many to resort to
experiment to verify or to refute the principles expounded, and, inci-
dentally, prepare the way for the author's more systematic promised
treatise on " psychological didactics."
CHAS. HUGHES JOHNSTON.
UNIVEBSITY OF MICHIGAN.
Clavis Universalis. ARTHUR COLLIER. Edited with Introduction and
Notes by ETHEL BOWMAN. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co.
1909. Pp. xxv + 140. $1.50.
All students of the history of philosophy have reason to be grateful to the
editor of this volume, to Professor Calkins, who appears to have inspired the
preparation of it, and to the publishing house which has brought it out in a
dignified but inexpensive form. The book seems to be an elaboration of a
Master's thesis submitted by Miss Bowman at Wellesley College; would
that, in the huge annual output of such lucubrations in our graduate
schools, one in a score yielded a result so serviceable to the rest of the
republic of letters ! For Collier's " Clavis," a document of all but the
highest interest and consequence in the history of English philosophy,
has hitherto been virtually unprocurable. The original edition was al-
ready a rarity before the end of the eighteenth century; and Dr. Parr's
" Collection of Metaphysical Tracts," 1837, which includes a reprint of
the book, is long since out of print, and is accessible, in America, in very
few libraries. The present volume gives the text complete, following the
edition of Parr, together with a short biographical and historical intro-
duction, and a few pages of notes. The editorial work, in general, has been
carefully and competently done ; use has been made of Benson's " Memoirs "
of Collier, and the clues relating to him, and to his historical influence, to be
found in Reid's and Hamilton's references to him, have been followed out, so
far as American libraries permit. There are occasional marks of a too me-
chanical transcription from sources and of carelessness in the matter of
proper names. Thus the same Scottish theologian figures as Robert Baron, in
the " Notes," and as Baronius, in the " Introduction." Latin names are
transferred to the English text in apparent ignorance of their meaning
or English equivalents. In a list of writers known to Collier appear
"Vincentius, Lirinensis, Suarez": the first two presumably disguise the
name of Vincent of Lerins. " Mogurtiae " and " Marpurgi " seem need-
lessly archaic ways of referring to Mayence and Marburg. Dugald
Stewart's name is regularly misspelled. On the other hand, the " Intro-
duction " probably gives correctly (following Hamilton) the name of the
" Professor Eschenbach of Rostock," translator of the " Clavis " into Ger-
man in 1756, about whom the present reviewer blundered in a paper in
" Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James "
(p. 289). The book is apparently not accessible on this side of the At-
lantic; I supposed the translator to be C. E. Eschenbach, professor of
78 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
mathematics and anatomy at Rostock, a person of some contemporary
celebrity. It appears that there was a more obscure Eschenbach, also of
Rostock, bearing the Christian name of Johann Christoph, who was a
theologian and metaphysician by trade; to him, seemingly, should be
given the credit for making Collier, and Berkeley's "Dialogues," avail-
able to German readers.
Miss Bowman seems to me needlessly non-committal on the question of
Collier's independence of Berkeley or even slightly to confuse the ques-
tion of independence with that of priority (pp. xxii-xxiv). Whether
Collier hit upon the idealistic doctrine before Berkeley, may, indeed, be
only " doubtful " ; the point is, in any case, of small historical significance.
But unless Collier's own statement be impeached, as well as several other
substantial pieces of evidence, there can be no doubt whatever that the
conclusions of the " Clavis " were arrived at long before they were pub-
lished, and before the author of them knew anything of the speculations
which a young Irishman in Dublin was then confiding to his Common-
place Book. And the fact that the two idealists arrived at their opinions
independently is of sufficient historical interest to deserve to be unequiv-
ocally stated. The " Notes " trace out a number of parallelisms between
Collier's and Berkeley's arguments; the value of the volume would have
been increased if this had been done in a more complete and systematic
manner, and some exact account given of the cases in which the proofs
offered logically coincide, those in which Collier supplements Berkeley,
and those in which Berkeley supplements Collier. The matters noted,
however, are minor imperfections in a useful and well-executed piece
of work.
Two results may conceivably follow from a more general acquaintance,
on the part of students of philosophy, with Collier's little treatise. One
is a certain modification of the usual account of the filiation of ideas in
the history of English thought. In Berkeley subjective idealism seemed
to emerge chiefly as a consequence of tendencies that owed their vogue
largely to the influence of Locke empiricism, nominalism, the demand for
simplification and intellectual parsimony, the desire to set definite bounds
to the scope of human knowledge. Berkeley's task is commonly, and not
erroneously, represented as consisting in carrying out Locke's task and
Locke's presuppositions with greater rigor and consistency; his "New
Question," says Eraser, was : " What in reason should we mean when with
Locke we assume the real existence of ' matter ' ; and to what sort of
power should we refer the phenomena that are present to our senses if,
in the spirit of Locke, we are to be faithful to the facts?" Now, Collier
can not be placed in any line of development that runs through Locke.
It is scarcely credible . that Collier was unacquainted with the " Essay
concerning Human Understanding," especially since his friend John
Norris wrote a reply to it, 1694; but at all events he was quite uninflu-
enced by it. Malebranche and Norris for him provided the sufficient basis
for idealism. He is, therefore, the chief (though not the only) witness to
the fact that Cartesianism of itself tended directly towards idealism; and
that this tendency was strengthened and accelerated when the Cartesian
79
problem of the psycho-physical relation was approached with the presup-
positions of a Platonistic epistemology and a Platonistic metaphysics of
the absolute. There is, thus, a double line of descent in English idealism ;
and Berkeley represents (in the main) the cadet branch of the family.
This historical fact is, perhaps, not so generally emphasized as it should
be. With a fuller recognition of it may come an appreciation of other
features of seventeenth-century English Platonism which are not less im-
portant in themselves, as types of philosophic doctrine, and are more im-
portant as historic influences.
It is not unlikely, also, that teachers of philosophy will make use of
parts of the " Clavis " as a means of first introducing undergraduates to
idealism in one of its typical historic forms. Collier's English has none
of the charm, the ease and urbanity, of Berkeley's style ; he is never likely
to take rank as an English classic. But if his book is inferior as litera-
ture, it is in some respects superior as argumentation, and especially as
pedagogy. Compared with the " Principles of Human Knowledge," the
" Clavis " has more of the virtues of a good text-book. It begins with
explicit definitions and explicit warnings against possible misunderstand-
ings ; its arguments are classified, catalogued, and correlated ; and it makes
less of the alleged sheer meaninglessness of the expression " existence with-
out the mind," and more of the really serious arguments from the antinomies
and from the relativity of all sensible properties. Berkeley's mode of
approach to his conclusion in the " Principles " usually, I find, produces
upon the mind of beginners the impression that he is begging the ques-
tion from the outset; such an impression is not likely to be produced by
the reading of Collier. Finally, Collier does not encumber the argument
with the essentially separable question concerning the existence of " ab-
stract ideas." For these reasons, the best historical introduction to ideal-
ism would seem to me to consist in selections from the " Clavis " followed
by parallel and supplementary passages from Berkeley's " Dialogues."
It is to be hoped that the present welcome volume is the harbinger of a
series of new editions of the more important writings of the English
Platonists. It is highly discreditable to English and American scholarship
that we possess neither modern and accessible editions of the texts of
most of these writings, nor any adequate historical study of the movement
of thought which they represent. The greatest desideratum here, per-
haps, is, first, a volume of judicious selections from the principal epistemo-
logical and metaphysical treatises of the Platonists which should include
something of Lord Brook, of More's " Enchiridion Metaphysicum " and
" Antidote against Atheism," of Norris's " Reflections " on Locke, his
" Theory of the Ideal World " and his " Metaphysical Essay towards the
Demonstration of a God," of Collier's " Specimen of True Philosophy,"
and of Burthogge's three principal writings ; and, second, a corresponding
volume of selections representing Platonistic ethics, which should include
a translation of More's " Enchiridion Ethicum." Until the literature is
thus made available, one of the most distinctive, most influential, and most
interesting movements in English reflection remains not only virtually
unstudied, but also scarcely accessible to study. A. O. LOVEJOY.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.
80 THE JOURXAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The Psychology of Skill with Special Reference to its Acquisition in
Typewriting. W. F. BOOK. University of Montana Publication
Bulletin No. 53, Psychological Series I. 1908. Pp. 188.
The aim of the author is to make a thorough analysis of the conscious
processes involved in the acquisition of expert skill in typewriting, and a
more complete study of the development and formation of habits than has
been offered hitherto. Four observers were trained in the use of an
Underwood typewriter; two by touch, with the key-board entirely con-
cealed; and two by the usual sight method. Records were taken on a
smoked drum of the number of strokes made on the machine, of the time
required for each, and of the observer's pulse variations (temporal artery
in front of each ear). A supplementing record of the introspections of
the learner and of the comments of the experimenter was also kept.
The following conclusions were reached:
1. Lower order habits develop into those of a higher order by a proc-
ess of short-circuiting. For example, the several processes antecedent to
the striking of a key fuse into a motor-tactual image of the letter which
serves to guide the movement. This letter-image in turn gives way to
word, and finally to sentence-images as the learner progresses.
2. New habits are always formed wholly unconsciously, and only under
great effort and other favorable conditions; but, once formed, they are
consciously employed when their advantage has been recognized. The
higher order habits develop simultaneously with the lower and depend
for their further development on the perfection of the lower. During the
perfecting of the groups of habits there occurred in some observers a
period of arrest lasting some thirty days. This critical stage appears to
mark the time required to overcome certain difficulties encountered in
the learning.
3. A close correlation is found to obtain between the pulse rate and
improvement, but only when effort is efficiently applied. A supra-normal
pulse rate characterizes periods of greatest improvement; a subnormal
rate, periods of arrest.
4. Regarding the retention of skill, two tests were made on one ob-
server, each covering a period of ten days; the one, six months, the other,
eighteen months, after the close of the regular practise. The first gave
a marked decrease in the average number of strokes a day when com-
pared with the average number of the last ten days of regular practise.
The second showed an appreciable increase. This result is thought to
be due to the disappearance, with the lapse of time, of certain psycho-
physical difficulties (interfering associations and bad habits of attention)
incidentally acquired in the practise. Their removal left the more firmly
established typewriting associations unimpeded. The author believes that
these interfering tendencies had not disappeared in the six months pre-
ceding the first memory test, and that the loss of efficiency was due to
the dulling of the typewriting associations.
The reviewer can not make the table on which these results are based
coincide with the curve of regular practise. As the curve stands, the
second memory test, instead of indicating an average increase of eighty-
81
five strokes a day as the author tells us, shows a decrease of some fifty
strokes from the average attained in the last regular practise, and an
increase in the percentage of errors. This result would seem more plaus-
ible after so long a lapse of time than an actual increase of skill.
M. GERTRUDE RAND.
BEYN MAWB COLLEGE.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE. November, 11, 1909. Die
Heterophorie und das Gesetz der Identischen Lehrichtungen (pp. 1-55) :
PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ HILLEBRAND. - Critical discussion (against Witasek)
of the above principles in visual space perception. Ein Beitrag uber die
sogenannten Vergleichungen iibermerklicher Empfindungsunterschiede
(pp. 56-71) : ROSA HEINE. - Confirmation, with daylight adaptation of
Frb'bes results in which the subjective mean between two brightnesses was
found to be higher than the arithmetical mean. When subjects are in-
structed to judge without the aid of cohesion, the reverse results are
obtained. Die assoziativen Faktoren ein dsthetischen Geniessen (pp. 71-
119) : RICHARD MULLER-FREINFELS. - For strong artistic reactions not the
unprejudiced indifferent consciousness is most favorable, but that in which
latent harmonious dispositions already exist. Inner imitation, though not
essential, is the best means of reenforcing the esthetic effect of an im-
pression. Animistic interpretations, based on feelings of organic adjust-
ments and innervations, deepen and enrich esthetic reactions to forms,
lines, melodies, etc. Artistic enjoyment is of two kinds, depending on
the role of the " idea of self," (1) as participant or (2) as spectator.
Uber die Verschmelzung von Schallreizen (pp. 119-143) : HEINRICH
SCHUSSLER. - The fusion of two or three successive noises (electric spark,
sound hammer strokes) is easiest when the strong stimulus is initial,
most difficult when faint noises follow each other. When the initial noise
is faint groups of three fuse more easily than pairs. Diffused attention
favors fusion. Reviews: Lipmann, Uber die Moglichkeit einer durch
psychische Krafte bewirkten Anderung der Energieverteilung in einem
geschlossenem System; A. Miiller, Die Psychologic des Unbewussten.
Das Unbewusste in der Modernen Psychologic: A. DREWS. Grunbaum,
Der Begriff des Ideals: ABRAHAM SCHLESINGER. Ariens-Kappers, Ein-
fuhrung in die Lehre vom Bau und den Verrichtungen des Nerven-
systems. L. Edinger, The Principles of the Minute Structure of the
Nervous System as Revealed by Recent Investigations: GUSTAV RETZIUS.
Koffka, The Psychophysics of Climate: E. B. TITCHENER. Kollner, On
the After Images of Subliminally Colored Stimuli: TITCHENER and PYLE.
Kieson, Uber die WirTcung des Stovains auf die Organe des GesclimacTcs,
der Hautempfindungen, des Geruchs und des Gehors nebst einigen weiter-
in Beobachtungen uber die Wirung des Kokains, des Alipins, und der
Karbolsdure ein Gebiete der Empfindungen: M. Poxzo. Muller-Freienfels,
The Psychology of Advertising: W. D. SCOTT. Lange, Un cas d'Associa-
82 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tion latente: E. GOBLOT. Baade, The Time of Perception as a Measure of
Differences in Sensations: TAIZO NAKASHIMA. Spielmeyer, Zur Theorie
der Halluzinationens; Kurt Goldstein, Bemerkungen uber das Real-
itdtsurteil von den Halluzinationen: A. PICK. M. Meyer, The Perimetry
of Sound: D. STARCH. Lipmann, Les Synesthesies : H. LOWRES. Spiel-
meyer, Une theorie nouvelle de I'Aphasie: L. DUGAS. Lange, La spatialite
des faits psychiques: L. DUPRAT. S. Meyer, Psychobiologische Grund-
begriffe. III. Gefiibl und Empfindung; O. Kohnstamm, Modification der
Gefiihle: EDUARD LUTZ. Miiller-Freienfels, Die gemeinsame Wurzel der
Kunst, Moral und Wissenschaft : HERMANN JAGER. Lange, Kant's
Analytik des Schonen: K. F. WIZE. Vorbrodt, Religionspsychologie, em-
pirische EntwicMung studie religiosen Bewusstseins: E. D. STARBUCK.
Lipmann, Uber Freiheit und Zurechnung : H. SIEBECK.
ANNALEN DEE NATUEPHILOSOPHIE. Band VIII., Heft 3.
August, 1909. Zur Lehre von der Rausalitdt (pp. 273-294) : W. H.
FRANKL. - The causal judgment justified as deduced from the primary
postulate, that the assumptions which lead to an increase of the sum of
human knowledge are to be preferred to the assumptions through which
that knowledge is decreased. Entwurf einer allgemeinen Wertlehre auf
biologischer Grundlage (pp. 295-320) : E. M. FREIENFELS. - Worth is de-
fined as anything which conduces to the enhancement and preservation of
life, whether of an individual or, in the case of conflicts between values
that transcend the individual, of as many individuals as possible. Das
Willkurliche in der Welt (pp. 321-328) : A. POCKELS. - In the hypothetical
world-formula of Laplace the constants represent the original fortuitous
element. In philosophy, the fortuitous is simply the independent. Uber
Beziehungen der Gele in der anorganischen Natur zu den Gelen der
lebendige Substanz (pp. 329-332) : F. CORNU. Das Biologische Geddchtnis
in der Energetik (pp. 333-361) : E. EIGNANO. - An argument in favor of
the central epigenetic theory in contrast to the pangenetic, leading to an
explanation of will in terms of energy. Die Hauptpunkte der Theorien
der aktiven Anpassung Schopenhauers und der Lamarckianer und Neu-
vitalisten (pp. 362-370) : O. PROCHNOW. - Eeinke's and Pauly's theories of
the influence of dominants are objective restatements of Schopenhauer's
theory of active adaptation. Die Prinzipien der Energetischen Psychol-
ogic (pp. 371-385) : N. KRAINSKY. - The energy of ideas is that of the
sensory impulse, solely; the greater energy of the muscular contraction is
due to stored potential energy. Neue Bucher (pp. 386-398) : W. O.
Heuer, Krausalitdt und Notwendigkeit. E. Petrucci, Essai sur une
Theorie de la vie. E. Stettheimer, The Will to Believe as a Basis of the
Defense of Religious Faith. E. Dennert, Naturwissenschaftlichen Zeit-
fragen. A. Eey, L'energetique et le mecanisme. A. Eey, Lemons
elementaires de psychologie et de philosophic.
Angel, James Eowland. The Ethics of Animal Experimentation. New
York: John Lane Co. 1909. Pp.147.
Baldwin, James Mark. Darwin and the Humanities. Baltimore: Eeview
Publishing Co. 1910. Pp. xii + 118.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 83
Durr, E. Grundziige der Ethik. Heidelberg: C. Winter. 1909. Pp.
vii + 383.
Headley, F. W. Darwinism and Modern Socialism. London: Methuen
& Co. 1909. Pp. xv + 342. 5s.
Houllevigne, S. The Evolution of the Sciences. Translated from the
French. London : T. Fisher Unwin. 1909. Pp. 318. 6s. 6d.
Heinze, Max. Ethische Werthe bei Aristotles. Leipzig : B. G. Teubner.
1909. Pp. 31.
Lugaro, E. Modern Problems in Psychiatry. Translated by Dr. David
Orr and Dr. E. G. Rows. Manchester : University Press. 1909. Pp.
vii + 305. 7s. 6d.
Ottolenghi, Raffaele. Un lontano precursore di Dante. Lugano, Casa
Editrice del " Coenobium." 1910. Pp. xvi + 119.
Walter, Eev. Johnston Estep. The Principles of Knowledge. 2 Vols.
West Newton, Pa. : Johnston & Puncey. 1901. Pp. 302, 331.
Wolf, A. Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being.
Translated and edited, with an introduction and commentary and a
Life of Spinoza. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1910. Pp.
cxxviii -f- 246.
NOTES AND NEWS
PROFESSOR GEORGE SANTAYANA, of Harvard University, will give six
lectures at Columbia University on " Three Philosophical Poets, Lucretius,
Dante, and Goethe." Professor Santayana's program is as follows:
Thursday, February 3 " Introduction, and Lucretius begun." Friday,
February 4 " Lucretius concluded." Monday, February 7 " The Herit-
age of Dante, his Life, and Minor Works." Tuesday, February 8 " The
Divine Comedy." Thursday, February 10 " Goethe's Faust ; its Ro-
mantic Elements." Friday, February 11 " Goethe's Faust ; the Moral
of it. General Review."
PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY, of Columbia University, will deliver six lec-
tures on " Aspects of the Pragmatic Movement of Modern Philosophy "
at John Hopkins University, January 31 to February 5. The topics of
the lectures are as follows : " Motives for Philosophic Revision, Nega-
tive and Positive," "Pragmatic Tendencies in Modern Philosophy,"
" Phases of Present Pragmatism," " The Biological Foundations,"
" Equivalents in Logical Theory," " The Problem of Truth."
THE fourth congress for experimental psychology will be held at Inns-
bruck April 19-22, 1910. The following contributions have been an-
nounced: M. Geiger, "Ueber das Wesen und die Bedeutung der Ein-
f iihlung " ; A. Kreidl, " Die Funktion des Vestibulappartes " ; C. von
Monakow, " Aufbau und Lokalisation der Bewegungen beim Menschen " ;
P. Ranschburg, "Ergebnisse der experimentellen Forschung auf dem
Gebiete der Pathologic des Gedachtnisses." Communications should be
addressed to Professor Dr. Fr. Hillebrand, Innsbruck.
84 TEE JOUENAL OF PHILOSOPHY
THE Societe Frangaise de Philosophic will undertake the publication
of a bibliography of French philosophy under the direction of M. V.
Delbos, which will comprise the titles of all works and articles published
during the year which deal with the subject matter of the bibliography.
It will appear once a year in one of the society's bulletins. The bibliog-
raphy will be partially included in the general international bibliography
undertaken at the last international congress of philosophy at Heidelberg.
THE death is announced of Professor K. Schaarschmidt, of the Uni-
versity of Bonn, author of works on Plato, Descartes, Spinoza and Leib-
niz ; of Professor Arleth, of the University of Innsbruck, who has written
on the philosophy of Aristotle; and of Salvatore Fragapone, professor of
the philosophy of right at the University of Bologna.
THE Rivista di psicologia applicata proposes the formation of an asso-
ciation of Italian psychologists with the object of coordinating psycholog-
ical study in Italy and of participating more effectively in the work of
scientific congresses. The organization of the society is entrusted for the
present to the Rivista di psicologia applicata.
AT the annual public meeting of the Paris Academy of Sciences, the
Binoux prizes were awarded to M. P. Duhem for all his works on the his-
tory of science, and to M. J. B. de Toni for his studies of the Italian
philosophers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
PRIVATDOZENT DR. BECKER, of Bonn, has been appointed professor of
philosophy at the University of Miinster. Professor Marbe, of the Frank-
furter Akademie fur Sozial und Handelswissenschaften, has been ap-
pointed at Wurzburg to succeed Professor Kiilpe, who goes to Bonn.
AT the meeting of the Academic des Sciences Morales et Politiques
on December 21 M. Emile Boutroux became president of the academy.
Professor Alois Riehl, of Berlin, was elected corresponding member of the
section of philosophy.
PROFESSOR J. W. BAIRD, of the University of Illinois, has been ap-
pointed professor of psychology at Clark University.
PROFESSOR E. B. TITCHENER, of Cornell University, has been made Sage
professor of psychology in the same university. The position is devoted
to research.
PROFESSOR ROLAND B. DIXON, of Harvard University, has been elected
vice-president of Section H anthropology and psychology of the Amer-
ican Association for the Advancement of Science.
VOL VII No 4. FEBRUARY 17. 1910
A SUGGESTION ABOUT MYSTICISM
MUCH interest in the subject of religious mysticism has been
shown in philosophic circles of late years. Most of the
writings I have seen have treated the subject from the outside, for I
know of no one who has spoken as having the direct authority of
experience in favor of his views. I also am an outsider, and very
likely what I say will prove the fact loudly enough to readers who
possibly may stand within the pale. Nevertheless, since between
outsiders one is as good as another, I will not leave my suggestion
unexpressed.
The suggestion, stated very briefly, is that states of mystical in-
tuition may be only very sudden and great extensions of the ordi-
nary "field of consciousness." Concerning the causes of such ex-
tensions I have no suggestion to make ; but the extension itself would,
if my view be correct, consist in an immense spreading of the
margin of the field, so that knowledge ordinarily transmarginal
would become included, and the ordinary margin would grow more
central. Fechner's "wave-scheme" will diagrammatize the altera-
tion, as I conceive it, if we suppose that the wave of present aware-
ness, steep above the horizontal line that represents the plane of the
usual "threshold," slopes away below it very gradually in all direc-
tions. A fall of the threshold, however caused, would, under these
circumstances, produce the state of things which we see on an un-
usually flat shore at the ebb of a spring-tide. Vast tracts usually
covered are then revealed to view, but nothing rises more than a few
inches above the water's bed, and great parts of the scene are sub-
merged again, whenever a wave washes over them.
Some persons have naturally a very wide, other a very narrow,
field of consciousness. The narrow field may be represented by an
unusually steep form of the wave. When by any accident the thresh-
old lowers, in persons of this type I speak here from direct per-
sonal experience so that the field widens and the relations of its
center to matters usually subliminal come into view, the larger pano-
85
86 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
rama perceived fills the mind with exhilaration and sense of mental
power. It is a refreshing experience; and such is now my hypoth-
esis we only have to suppose it to occur in an exceptionally exten-
sive form, to give us a mystical paroxysm, if such a term be allowed.
A few remarks about the field of consciousness may be needed
to give more definiteness to my hypothesis. The field is composed
at all times of a mass of present sensation, in a cloud of memories,
emotions, concepts, etc. Yet these ingredients which have to be
named separately, are not separate, as the conscious field contains
them. Its form is that of a much-at-once, in the unity of which the
sensations, memories, concepts, impulses, etc., coalesce and are dis-
solved. The present field as a whole came continuously out of its
predecessor and will melt into its successor as continuously again,
one sensation-mass passing into another sensation-mass and giving
the character of a gradually changing present to the experience,
while the memories and concepts carry time-coefficients which place
whatever is present in a temporal perspective more or less vast.
When, now, the threshold falls, what comes into view is not the
next mass of sensation; for sensation requires new physical stimu-
lations to produce it, and no alteration of a purely mental thresh-
old can create these. Only in case the physical stimuli were already
at work subliminally, preparing the next sensation, would whatever
sub-sensation was already prepared reveal itself when the thresh-
old fell. But with the memories, concepts, and conational states, the
case is different. Nobody knows exactly how far we are "margin-
ally'' conscious of these at ordinary times, or how far beyond the
"margin" of our present thought trans-marginal consciousness of
them may exist. 1 There is at any rate no definite bound set between
what is central and what is marginal in consciousness, and the mar-
gin itself has no definite bound a parte foris. It is like the field of
vision, which the slightest movement of the eye will extend, reveal-
ing objects that always stood there to be known. My hypothesis is
that a movement of the threshold downwards will similarly bring a
mass of subconscious memories, conceptions, emotional feelings, and
perceptions of relation, etc., into view all at once; and that if this
enlargement of the nimbus that surrounds the sensational present
1 Transmarginal or subliminal, the terms are synonymous. Some psycholo-
gists deny the existence of such consciousness altogether (A. H. Pierce, for
example, and Mtinsterberg apparently). Others, e. g., Bergson, make it exist
and carry the whole freight of our past. Others again (as Myers) would have
it extend (in the "telepathic" mode of communication) from one person's mind
into another's. For the purposes of my hypothesis I have to postulate its
existence; and once postulating it, I prefer not to set any definite bounds to its
extent.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 87
is vast enough, while no one of the items it contains attracts our
attention singly, we shall have the conditions fulfilled for a kind of
consciousness in all essential respects like that termed mystical. It
will be transient, if the change of threshold is transient. It will be
of reality, enlargement, and illumination, possibly rapturously so.
It will be of unification, for the present coalesces in it with ranges
of the remote quite out of its reach under ordinary circumstances;
and the sense of relation will be greatly enhanced. Its form will be
intuitive or perceptual, not conceptual, for the remembered or con-
ceived objects in the enlarged field are supposed not to attract the
attention singly, but only to give the sense of a tremendous much-
ness suddenly revealed. If they attracted attention separately, we
should have the ordinary steep-waved consciousness, and the mystical
character would depart.
Such is my suggestion. Persons who know something of mystical
experience will no doubt find in it much to criticize. If any such
shall do so with definiteness, it will have amply served its purpose of
helping our understanding of mystical states to become more precise.
The notion I have tried (at such expense of metaphor) to set
forth was originally suggested to me by certain experiences of my
own, which could only be described as very sudden and incompre-
hensible enlargements of the conscious field, bringing with them a
curious sense of cognition of real fact. All have occurred within
the past five years; three of them were similar in type; the fourth
was unique.
In each of the three like cases, the experience broke in abruptly
upon a perfectly commonplace situation and lasted perhaps less
than two minutes. In one instance I was engaged in conversation,
but I doubt whether the interlocutor noticed my abstraction. What
happened each time was that I seemed all at once to be reminded of
a past experience; and this reminiscence, ere I could conceive or
name it distinctly, developed into something further that belonged
with it, this in turn into something further still, and so on, until
the process faded out, leaving me amazed at the sudden vision of
increasing ranges of distant fact of which I could give no articu-
late account. The mode of consciousness was perceptual, not con-
ceptualthe field expanding so fast that there seemed no time for
conception or identification to get in its work. There was a strongly
exciting sense that my knowledge of past (or present?) reality was
enlarging pulse by pulse, but so rapidly that my intellectual proc-
esses could not keep up the pace. The content was thus entirely lost
to retrospection it sank into the limbo into which dreams vanish
as we gradually awake. The feeling I won't call it belief that I
88 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
had had a sudden opening, had seen through a window, as it were,
distant realities that incomprehensibly belonged with my own life,
was so acute that I can not shake it off to-day.
This conviction of fact-revealed, together with the perceptual
form of the experience and the inability to make articulate report,
are all characters of mystical states. The point of difference is that
in my case certain special directions only, in the field of reality,
seemed to get suddenly uncovered, whereas in classical mystical
experiences it appears rather as if the whole of reality were un-
covered at once. Uncovering of some sort is the essence of the
phenomenon, at any rate, and is what, in the language of the Fech-
nerian wave-metaphor, I have used the expression "fall of the
threshold" to denote.
My fourth experience of uncovering had to do with dreams. I
was suddenly intromitted into the cognizance of a pair of dreams
that I could not remember myself to have had, yet they seemed
somehow to connect with me. I despair of giving the reader any
just idea of the bewildering confusion of mind into which I was
thrown by this, the most intensely peculiar experience of my whole
life. I wrote a full memorandum of it a couple of days after it hap-
pened, and appended some reflections. Even though it should cast no
light on the conditions of mysticism, it seems as if this record
might be worthy of publication, simply as a contribution to the
descriptive literature of pathological mental states. I let it follow,
therefore, as originally written, with only a few words altered to
make the account more clear.
"San Francisco, Feb. 14th 1906. The night before last, in my
bed at Stanford University, I woke at about 7.30 A.M., from a quiet
dream of some sort, and whilst gathering my waking wits, seemed
suddenly to get mixed up with reminiscences of a dream of an en-
tirely different sort, which seemed to telescope, as it were, into the
first one, a dream very elaborate, of lions, and tragic. I concluded
this to have been a previous dream of the same sleep ; but the ap-
parent mingling of two dreams was something very queer, which I
had never before experienced.
"On the following night (Feb. 12-13) I awoke suddenly from
my first sleep, which appeared to have been very heavy, in the
middle of a dream, in thinking of which I became suddenly con-
fused by the contents of two other dreams that shuffled themselves
abruptly in between the parts of the first dream, and of which I
couldn't grasp the origin. Whence come these dreams? I asked.
They were close to me, and fresh, as if I had just dreamed them;
and yet they were far away from the first dream. The contents of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 89
the three had absolutely no connection. One had a cockney atmos-
phere, it had happened to some one in London. The other two were
American. One involved the trying on of a coat (was this the dream
I seemed to wake from?) the other was a sort of nightmare and had
to do with soldiers. Each had a wholly distinct emotional atmosphere
that made its individuality discontinuous with that of the others.
And yet, in a moment, as these three dreams alternately telescoped
into and out of each other, and I seemed to myself to have been their
common dreamer, they seemed quite as distinctly not to have been
dreamed in succession, in that one sleep. When, then? Not on a
previous night, either. When, then? and which was the one out of
which I had just awakened? I could no longer tell: one was as
close to me as the others, and yet they entirely repelled each other,
and I seemed thus to belong to three different dream-systems at once,
no one of which would connect itself either with the others or with
my waking life. I began to feel curiously confused and scared, and
tried to wake myself up wider, but I seemed already wide-awake.
Presently cold shivers of dread ran over me : am I getting into other
people's dreams? Is this a 'telepathic' experience? Or an invasion
of double (or treble) personality? Or is it a thrombus in a cortical
artery? and the beginning of a general mental 'confusion' and dis-
orientation which is going on to develop who knows how far?
"Decidedly I was losing hold of my 'self,' and making acquaint-
ance with a quality of mental distress that I had never known before,
its nearest analogue being the sinking, giddying anxiety that one
may have when, in the woods, one discovers that one is really 'lost.'
Most human troubles look towards a terminus. Most fears point in
a direction, and concentrate towards a climax. Most assaults of the
evil one may be met by bracing oneself against something, one's
principles, one's courage, one's will, one's pride. But in this experi-
ence all was diffusion from a centre, and foothold swept away, the
brace itself disintegrating all the faster as one needed its support
more direly. Meanwhile vivid perception (or remembrance) of the
various dreams kept coming over me in alternation. Whose ? whose f
WHOSE? Unless I can attach them, I am swept out to sea with no
horizon and no bond, getting lost. The idea aroused the 'creeps'
again, and with it the fear of again falling asleep and renewing the
process. It had begun the previous night, but then the confusion
had only gone one step, and had seemed simply curious. This was
the second step where might I be after a third step had been taken ?
My teeth chattered at the thought.
"At the same time I found myself filled with a new pity towards
persons passing into dementia with Verwirrtheit, or into invasions
of secondary personality. We regard them as simply curious; but
90 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
what they want in the awful drift of their being out of its customary
self, is any principle of steadiness to hold on to. We ought to assure
them and reassure them that we will stand by them, and recognize
the true self in them to the end. We ought to let them know that
we are with them and not (as too often we must seem to them) a part
of the world that but confirms and publishes their deliquescence.
"Evidently I was in full possession of my reflective wits; and
whenever I thus objectively thought of the situation in which I was,
my anxieties ceased. But there was a tendency to relapse into the
dreams and reminiscences, and to relapse vividly; and then the
confusion recommenced, along with the emotion of dread lest it
should develop farther.
"Then I looked at my watch. Half past twelve! Midnight,
therefore. And this gave me another reflective idea. Habitually,
on going to bed, I fall into a very deep slumber from which I never
naturally awaken until after two. I never awaken, therefore, from
a midnight dream, as I did to-night, so of midnight dreams my ordi-
nary consciousness retains no recollection. My sleep seemed terribly
heavy as I woke to-night. Dream states carry dream memories
why may not the two succedaneous dreams (whichever two of the
three were succedaneous) be memories of twelve o'clock dreams of
previous nights, swept in, along with the just-fading dream, into the
just-waking system of memory? Why, in short, may I not be tap-
ping, in a way precluded by my ordinary habit of life, the midnight
stratum of my past experiences?
"This idea gave great relief I felt now as if I were in full pos-
session of my anima rationalis. I turned on my light, resolving to
read myself to sleep. But I didn't read, I felt drowsy instead, and,
putting out the light, soon was in the arms of Morpheus.
' ' I woke again two or three times before daybreak with no dream-
experiences, and finally, with a curious, but not alarming, confusion
between two dreams, similar to that which I had had the previous
morning, I awoke to the new day at seven.
"Nothing peculiar happened the following night, so the thing
seems destined not to develop any further." 1
2 1 print the rest of my memorandum in the shape of a note:
" Several ideas suggest themselves that make the observation instructive.
" First, the general notion, now gaining ground in mental medicine, that
certain mental maladies may be foreshadowed in dream-life, and that therefore
the study of the latter may be profitable.
" Then the specific suggestion, that states of ' confusion,' loss of personality,
apraxia, etc., so often taken to indicate cortical lesion or degeneration of
dementic type, may be very superficial functional affections. In my own case
the confusion was foudroyante a state of consciousness unique and unpar-
alleled in my 64 years of the world's experience; yet it alternated quickly with
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 91
The distressing confusion of mind in this experience was the
exact opposite of mystical illumination, and equally unmystical was
the definiteness of what was perceived. But the exaltation of the
sense of relation was mystical (the perplexity all revolved about the
fact that the three dreams both did and did not belong in the most
intimate way together) ; and the sense that reality was being un-
covered was mystical in the highest degree. To this day I feel
that those extra dreams were dreamed in reality, but when, where,
and by whom, I can not guess.
In the Open Court for December, 1909, Mr. Frederick Hall nar-
rates a fit of ether-mysticism which agrees with my formula very
well. When one of his doctors made a remark to the other, he
chuckled, for he realized that these friends "believed they saw real
things and causes, but they didn't, and I did. ... I was where the
causes were and to see them required no more mental ability than
to recognize a color as blue. . . . The knowledge of how little [the
doctors] actually did see, coupled with their evident feeling that
they saw all there was, was funny to the last degree. . . . [They],
knew as little of the real causes as does the child who, viewing a
passing train and noting its revolving wheels, supposes that they,
turning of themselves, give to coaches and locomotive their momen-
tum. Or imagine a man seated in a boat, surrounded by dense fog,
and out of the fog seeing a flat stone leap from the crest of one wave
to another. If he had always sat thus, his explanations must be very
crude as compared with those of a man whose eyes could pierce fog,
and who saw upon the shore the boy skipping stones. In some such
way the remarks of the two physicians seemed to me like the last
two 'skips' of a stone thrown from my side. . . . All that was essen-
tial in the remark I knew before it was made. Thus to discover
convincingly and for myself, that the things which are unseen are
those of real importance, this was sufficiently stimulating."
It is evident that Mr. Hall's marginal field got enormously
enlarged by the ether, yet so little defined as to its particulars that
perfectly rational states, as this record shows. It seems, therefore, merely as
if the threshold between the rational and the morbid state had, in my case, been
temporarily lowered, and as if similar confusions might be very near the line
of possibility in all of us.
" There are also the suggestions of a telepathic entrance into some one else's
dreams, and of a doubling up of personality. In point of fact I don't know
now ' who ' had those three dreams, or which one ' I ' first woke up from, so
quickly did they substitute themselves back and forth for each other, discon-
tinuously. Their discontinuity was the pivot of the situation. My sense of it
was as ' vivid ' and ' original ' an experience as anything Hume could ask for.
And yet they kept telescoping!
" Then there is the notion that by waking at certain hours we may tap
distinct strata of ancient dream-memory."
92 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
what he perceived was mainly the thoroughgoing causal integration
of its whole content. That this perception brought with it a tre-
mendous feeling of importance and superiority is a matter of course.
I have treated the phenomenon under discussion as if it con-
sisted in the uncovering of tracts of consciousness. Is the conscious-
ness already there waiting to be uncovered? and is it a veridical
revelation of reality? These are questions on which I do not touch.
In the subjects of the experience the "emotion of conviction" is
always strong, and sometimes absolute. The ordinary psychologist
disposes of the phenomenon under the conveniently "scientific"
head of petit mal, if not of "bosh" or "rubbish." But we know
so little of the noetic value of abnormal mental states of any kind
that in my own opinion we had better keep an open mind and collect
facts sympathetically for a long time to come. We shall not under-
stand these alterations of consciousness either in this generation or
in the next.
WILLIAM JAMES.
HABVABD UNIVERSITY.
SOME NEGLECTED PARADOXES OF VISUAL SPACE. Ill
TDOWERFUL influences have been driving most philosophical
-*- discussions of space and time into the narrow and, in my
opinion, errant grooves of geometry and psychologistic biology.
Beginning with his space concepts, for instance, the geometer so
manipulates them, intentionally in a pure deduction, that their ulti-
mate meaning is paradox and paradox. Likewise the biologist: he
sets out with sensations and perceptions of space and, trying to find
them over again in the very same spatial universe where these ex-
periences have grown up, ends perforce in a muddle. That some-
thing may have been gained by both investigators, nobody need
doubt; but the meager and irregular returns of their investment
of strenuosity encourage the philosopher to strike from another
angle. The following remarks would do just this. They should be
looked upon as an experiment, to be judged entirely by its fruits.
I am again going to look at space, neither as a geometer nor as a
psychologist of the schools. I shall not deduce the implications of
certain Euclidean or non-Euclidean concepts of extension, direction,
position, magnitude, etc., nor shall I inquire into the upbuilding of
space qualia into space concepts. I shall only accept the natural
space-world the world that all ordinary persons somehow or other
have come to rely upon and, secondly, the adaptive, self-changing,
specializing nervous organism, as it is known in its broader outlines
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 93
and behavior to modern biology. And I shall then ask about two
striking peculiarities of this organism's adaptation to this extended
world in which it must find itself : first, about the correspondence of
spatial form between the retinal image of a perceived thing and the
thing perceived ; then about the vastly more important reflex imita-
tion. The constant purpose, in each case, will be to discover whether
an organism would be more likely to develop as our own actually
have in a world which stretches out essentially as we think our
world does or in a world whose spaces are all forms of consciousness
or, as I prefer to put the Kantian thought, hyperchemisms. How-
ever otiose this purpose may seem to professional epistemologists, it
can not but loom large to any biologist who, be it with Driesch and
Wolff or with Pauly and Francee, looks ahead to the horizon of his
science, where the philosopher 's sky comes down to meet it. For, if
organic differentiations, particularly those involved in the develop-
ment of perceptions of and reactions to visual space, can not be
explained on the Kantian hypothesis of hyperchemistry, then every
biologist faces a momentous dilemma. Either he must cling to the
idealistic hypothesis about space, following Driesch, and cast out,
root and branch, every principle of ontogenetic and phylogenetic
explanation which in any wise involves the notion of spatial adapta-
tion to a genuinely spatial environment ; or else, retaining this notion
and its derivative explanations, he must winnow from his faith and
his literature the reams of idealistic epistemology which, through
Mach, Pearson, and many other scientists, he has borrowed from a
century-old metaphysic. One need not be versed in any science in
order to sense the wide, long consequences of accepting squarely
either alternative. The better part of theoretical biology, and not a
little of similar flights in many other fields, would have to be done
over again, were the dilemma accepted.
I. Retinal Image and Perceived Form
One of the first tricks which poor little sophomores are taught,
after falling into the hands of the psychologist, is to regard as a
most unhappy accident the correspondence of form between the
(miscalled) retinal image and the thing seen as the result of that
image's presence. "What you see," says the teacher, "has no
such immediate connection with the ether vibrations which strike
the periphery of your optic tract. It is some kind of nerve current
which you really come to know when it gets to your cortex and does
something there." And then Thomas Brown is cited. "If," he
has written in his Lectures, "this (the shape of the nervous expanse
affected peripherally) alone were necessary, we should have square
inches and half-inches and various other forms, rectilinear and curvi-
94 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
linear, of fragrance and sound." And, to drive the point home,
Professor James's lucid foot-note ("Principles of Psychology," II.,
144) has the last say. It represents the almost unanimous convic-
tion of contemporary psychologists and philosophers so accurately
that it must be quoted.
" In the matter of spatial feeling, ... it looks at first sight as if the
sensation might be a direct cognition of its own neural condition. Were this
true, however, our sensation should be one of multitude rather than of con-
tinuous extent; for the condition is number of optical nerve-termini, and even
this is only a remote condition and not an immediate condition. The immediate
condition of the feeling is not the process in the retina, but the process in the
brain; and the process in the brain may, for aught we know, be as unlike a
triangle (the figure used in a previous illustration), nay, it probably is so,
as it is unlike redness or rage. It is simply a coincidence that in the case of
space one of the organic conditions . . . should lead to a representation in the
mind of the subject observed similar to that which it produces in the psycholog-
ical observer. In no other case is the coincidence found. Even should we admit
that we cognize triangles in space because of our immediate cognition of the
triangular shape of our excited group of nerve-tips, the matter would hardly
be more transparent, for the mystery would still remain, why are we so much
better cognizant of triangles on our finger-tips than on the nerve-tips of our
back, on our eye than on our ear, and on any of these parts than in our brain? "
Straining to its highest tension my frail will to believe, I have
been able to detect not the slightest plausibility in all this, probably
because I suffer from congenital realism. Laboring under the in-
firmities of this disease, though, I fancy I discern there three or four
contentions profoundly opposed, in spirit if not in word, to thorough-
going realism. And, as I am here trying out such a realism on the
stubborner facts of space, its objections to Professor James's note
must find voice.
1. It is not true that, if a percept were somehow a mental copy
of the pattern of ether waves at the retina, multitude should be the
thing or character perceived. For, if we follow the usual hypothesis
and say that each rod and cone yields a sensation of extension, clearly
we must admit (1) that the space between rods and cones is visually
non-existent and hence can not form a visible gap between the sensed
spaces; and (2) that no primordial extension quale, such as any
single rod or cone delivers, can possibly contain empirically an
awareness of its own spatial limits, but must be absolutely boundless,
when viewed from inside, as it were, or by itself. To do justice to
this objection to Professor James's point I must refer the reader to
two previous articles in this series (this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., Nos. 22
and 24). I would urge, as a result of these studies, that the con-
tinuous extent whose presence encourages Professor James and
almost everybody else to discredit the retinal image is absolutely
no evidence against the latter. For every totality of simul-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 95
taneously given extensions is, oqe might say, by definition a space
continuum just because it consists of all given spaces. To sup-
pose that all given spaces could be given as separate space-points is
not even a possible hypothesis, but a downright contradiction ; inas-
much as a given separateness is a given externality, in short a given
space intervening between given space-points. Though this may
sound in some ears like dialectic, I am confident that it is nothing
more harmful than accurate description and loyalty to definitions
where loyalty is needed for the description's sake.
2. The number of nerve-termini is not the essential condition
determining the form of the retinal image, though of course it is
influential in various ways. Relative position is what counts.
Indefinitely many different sets of nerve-termini can be the means
of yielding the same perceived form. What would be the smallest
group capable of producing, say, an empirical triangle, we do not
know; the behavior of minima visibilia in human perception makes
probable that fully a dozen termini must normally be involved, and
maybe twice as many. I can conceive, though, of a retina so per-
fectly organized that six or seven rods would do the business, and
without involving any structure or function radically different from
those of the human. But this is beside the point; the crux is in
distinguishing the retinal determinants of perceived form from those
of perceived size. The former owe their efficiency to some kind of
active cross-relation call it synthesis, if you will, provided you do
not invoke some spook, like the ego, to explain it. Though all direct
evidence is lacking, there is a reasonable probability that either the
horizontal cells or the immensely numerous lateral fibers in the
retina make known visual forms; at all events, their presence and
their position relative to the rods and cones suggest their connection
with no other peculiarity of visual space. To be sure, the number
of nerve-termini stimulated will generally influence the form per-
ceived and, on the other hand, the perception of size always involves
the formalizing or synthetic function. Indeed, on this second matter,
I incline to go the extent of saying that all perception of number and
size, excepting only the two limiting cases of a single minimum
visibile and the total field of vision, is formalizing; that is, discrete
points or masses can arise only as differentiations within a group.
Even random dots on a sheet of paper can be numbered only in so
far as the spaces between them are sensed as intervening, which is to
say, as extension groups. But there is in all this absolutely nothing
precluding or even resisting the notion that the number of nerve-
termini affected only secondarily determines visual forms. If these
very sketchy observations are enough to substantiate my point or even
to make it entertainable, a serious objection drawn from introspec-
96 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tion goes by the board. I refer to the fact that, in perception, forms
do not vary with their size ; thus, a triangle may double or quadruple
its area without the slightest change of contour or geometrical integ-
rity. Here the Kantian-Wundtian investigator sometimes thinks to
find a powerful argument for two indispensable theories of idealistic
psychology; (1) the "creative synthesis" and (2) the localization
of this high function in the brain (usually the cortex). As a matter
of fact, though, these questionable and ambiguous hypotheses can
derive not the least support from that source except by ignoring
histology and conceiving the retina, quite antiquely, as a sieve with
pores or as a mere bundle of telegraph wires spread out at their ends
and brought together as a cable in the optic nerve. But this brings
me to the third objection.
3. "The immediate condition of the feeling," says Professor
James, ' ' is not the process in the retina, but the process in the brain ' ' ;
and this, he adds, may no more resemble a triangle than redness
does. His first point may be granted, at least in so far as the present
topic is concerned ; but please note that it has relevance to Professor
James's argument only through the further assumption that the
immediate condition, the brain process, does not consist, at least in
part, of characters transmitted unchanged from the periphery. But
it is precisely this assumption that constitutes the issue raised about
the correspondence between retinal image and perceived form. To
appeal to it is obviously to beg the whole question. Why should
anybody suppose that the distribution and number of rods and cones
stimulated do not peculiarly qualify the neural current or what-
ever it is that gets to the brain and that this current is so utterly
different from the electric current that its features at the point of
inception go lost altogether a few inches further up the conducting
tract? The question has only two general answers. One is some
metaphysical theory which makes every change of relation at a given
center or node of relations modify all the characteristics of that
center or node. The other and the only one which any psycholo-
gist to-day will knowingly advance consists of empirical evidences.
So far as I have been able to understand these latter, however, they
all are grounded upon the crudest histology and inaccurate descrip-
tions of visual space.
To return to the independent variation of form-quality and size,
this is evidence of "creative synthesis," in Wundt's sense, and of the
central locus of this function only by the purest postulation ; which
is to say, only by assuming what you want to prove, namely, that
some stratum of retinal neurons does not sense geometrical patterns.
Maybe it does, and maybe again it doesn't; but you are not going to
decide the question, for the biologist at least, by a mere say-so in
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 97
favor of one opinion or the other. To say that you can not imagine
how the retina could accomplish the feat is to aid or injure neither
opinion ; for if you object to immediate retinal synthesis because you
can not think out its details, you must protest equally against
synthesis in the cortex or by an ego. But, in a general way, retinal
form-sensing appears to me a much less obscure process than that of
any other visual function. For instance, may it not be that the
horizontal cells sense the spatiality of the initial disturbances in rod
and cone cells in a manner essentially analogous to that in which a
magnetic field represents an electric field? The horizontal cell lies
at right angles to the rod-cone cell system, even as the lines of mag-
netic force lie with respect to the electric current and its field. If,
now, the ether vibrations are at bottom only a kind of electric dis-
turbance, as physicists almost unanimously hold to-day, then we
picture the retinal process quite comprehensively by supposing, in
accord with all psychologists, that the three accepted characteristics
of the forward drive determine the peculiarities of the light and
color, while the lateral drive gives the space quality. 1 Such a con-
ception, I am sure, would greatly simplify our stock puzzles of vis-
ual perception: to name only two, it would at least make compre-
hensible the odd fact that, though we never sense color without
extension, we do sense extension without color in extreme peripheral
vision ; and it would also be an adequate physical explanation of the
still more curious fact that a peripheral stimulus which yields only
a colorless extension when not moved across a retinal tract, develops
a color quale upon the slightest lateral displacement. 2 But, above
all else, it would serve our present desire by showing that visual
space-forms behave exactly as magnetic field-patterns do, in so far as
the latter do not necessarily vary with their size nor yet with the
number of electric currents cutting across and determining them.
Elementary experiments in the physical laboratory demonstrate this
1 My use of the word " drive " implies no hypothesis of ether displacement.
" Stress," " tension," or " potential energy " would do as well. Whether electro-
magnetic phenomena are genuine ether motions or something else is irrelevant
to the present hypothesis; the two essential and, I believe, undisputed points
are (1) the relative direction of electric and their accompanying magnetic
forces, and (2) the correlation of the two forces (every electric current sets
up a magnetic field, and every magnetic field, when moved, sets up an electric
current).
J To clarify these and all other interpretations springing from the hypoth-
esis is a hard undertaking which can not be entered upon here. All that I
would do here is to suggest enough about the bearings of the hypothesis so
that it will not seem a " long shot " or a momentary flash of scientific fancy.
I hope, in the near future, to read off in its terms a large number of established
and obscure psychological facts. Whether it will stand or not, it is the kind of
interpretation wanted.
98 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
last fact; hence I need not repeat here in detail how, for instance,
by adding new electric units in the proper manner to a given electro-
magnetic field (most easily, of course, to the exterior of the field
rather than by interpolation), the intensity of the central (original)
field grows, but its pattern of stress or tension lines remains substan-
tially what it was at first. If, now, the magnetic field is the stimulus
of the space-sensing neurons, its intensity determines the sensed mag-
nitude, while its pattern determines the sensed form. And as the
intensity may be increased either by increasing the number of elec-
tric units across the field or by increasing the electric force of the
units already in the field, so too the sensed magnitude may be in-
creased either by increasing the number of rods and cones stimu-
lated and communicating laterally with a given horizontal cell or
else by increasing the stimulus in the rods and cones already in-
volved. This second case, you will observe, roughly covers the phe-
nomena of irradiation and possibly many illusions of size, particu-
larly pathological macropsia and micropsia.
Though I believe the above hypothesis gives the clue to an expla-
nation of space vision, I do not argue it here. It may be quite wrong.
I cite it merely to show the easy conceivability of putting all funda-
mental qualities of seen space in the peripheral sense organs. And,
be it recalled, my motive in showing this much is to forestall an over-
hasty appeal to central synthesis or to a priori forms of experience.
To attribute to such transcendent functions or entities the moulding
of psychic complexes which indubitably seem to be given no less ob-
jectively than sunlight is to do this, I say, before having tried to
correlate those complexes with well-authenticated, observable differ-
ences in stimuli and in peripheral structure, may be pleasant meta-
physics, but it is assuredly bad scientific method. A grosser violation
of the law of parsimony there could scarcely be.
4. Genetic psychology has advanced so far, since Professor
James's classic "Principles" first appeared, that his last objection
to the correspondence between retinal image and perceived form
probably is less generally approved than it once was. Professor
James himself may, for aught I know, long since have stricken it
from his platform. I shall consider it here, though, because it intro-
duces us gradually to the supreme issue which the following study of
reflex-imitation grazes, namely, the controversy over the prior right
of psychology or of biology to found our theories of reality and con-
duct. "Grant," says the psychologist, "that the eye does cognize
retinal patterns. The mystery is as deep as ever. Why, as Professor
James puts it, are we so much better cognizant of triangles on our
finger-tips than on our back, on our eye than on our ear? And why,
as Thomas Brown puts it, do we not smell octagons and hear tetra-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 99
hedrons?" These are provincial queries, difficulties which arise only
if one refuses to look beyond the traditional confines of psychology
for answer to problems within them. One glance at biology and its con-
cepts of evolution makes nonsense of such doubts. No matter what or
why or how evolution is, in any case it can readily account for the ab-
sence of square odors and curving sounds from human experience. In-
deed, it makes them vastly more intelligible in their missing than in
their appearance. The sense of touch is, by pretty general acceptance,
the primordial one and, as will be pointed out more fully later, its
earliest development seems to have been toward a space sense. From
the naturalistic point of view, this was a first exigency, inasmuch as
the sensitive organism lived in a really extended world to whose
spatially marked differences it had to adjust itself. The organic
medium of sensitivity of space had to develop at the point of contact
with alien spaces, but nowhere else; hence the more or less distinct
feelings of extent and position from all stimuli of the body 's surface
(including the alimentary canal) and the pretty uniform absence
or exceeding vagueness of such feelings in connection with stimuli
beginning anywhere inside one 's skin. To the biologist, this cleavage
suggests the thoroughly objective nature of space, though not neces-
sarily a "copy theory" about our experiences of space. But what
concerns us much more deeply here the common spatiality of
peripheral sense-products, far from rendering more likely the same
development of space qualia in all specialized sense organs, makes
this outcome the least probable of all, under any evolutionary
hypothesis whatsoever. We should expect one or two organs to grow
toward the more complete knowing of space structures, while another
attunes itself to one peculiarity of matter, another to some other
cosmic character, and so on. Allow the right of such anticipation,
and the correspondence between retinal image and perceived form
shows up as no odd accident, but rather as a step toward more per-
fect representation of its environment by an organism; and the
absence of a correspondence between the geometrical pattern of
auditory nerve-termini and the harmonious sound they yield only
confirms superfluously what we all know, to wit, that the basilar
membrane, and its colleague neurons, are engaged in selecting and
reacting to some cosmic peculiarity other than extension.
I do not believe many persons, even among those who deny the
significance of the correspondence we have been considering, will
hold out with Thomas Brown or Professor James against the biolo-
gists. It will be generally conceded that there is no mystery in a
specialist knowing space as lay brethren know it not. But, unfor-
tunately, the biologists' contention, granted in such trifling matters,
is ignored in the greater issues. "Perhaps," says the psychologist,
100 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
"Darwin and his clan can force me with their principles to grant my
eyes unique space-sensing powers. But by that they have not wrung
from me a confession that the spaces I perceive exist apart from my
nerves. If my friend, Smith, can turn his ophthalmoscope into my
eye and detect there an image having a shape like the shape of the
object I am at the same instant perceiving, that indicates only that,
for the sake of the more accurate or the more useful a priori synthesis
or mental creation, the spaceless vital force which is my self has so
moulded itself spacelessly, of course, that one detail of its struc-
ture has one phenomenal quality somewhat like a quality concocted
by my self in noumenal conjunction with Ding an sich." Whether
in this Koenigsberg jargon or not, almost every psychologist, not ex-
cepting those who pursue the genetic method, is to-day championing
this intrinsically idealistic doctrine, while the more philosophical are
explicitly denying, with lengthy proofs, that perception is, in any
sense whatever, a copying function. So long as they stay at home
dissecting their own minds, these thinkers get along passably. But
when they crave, as all of them do, sooner or later, to know how
their minds came to be what they are, and in the remarkable bodies
they inhabit, they unhesitatingly fall back upon various principles
such as " adaptation," "socialization," "differentiation," "natural
selection," and the like. So be it. How can they do this, though,
yet clinging to a belief in an unextended ego living in an un-
extended world? If space is not real, substantially as the ordi-
nary man thinks it is, but a hyperchemical product of ego
and world; and if the latter "elements" no more resemble
space than oxygen and hydrogen do water, what and why is
' ' adaptation, ' ' what the utility of inventing space with all its weary-
ing distances, its inaccessible heights, perilous abysses and most
vexatious antinomies? Men like Driesch and Bergson, scenting this
danger from afar, have sought to meet it with a general metaphysical
biology, which, like most ventures metaphysical, exhibits astounding
skill in picking out facts that fit and overlooking most others. It is
the realist's privilege, w r hen, on metaphysical ground, to favor him-
self in the same liberal spirit. Out of scores of homely facts, there-
fore, I shall pick but two, the retinal image and reflex imitation, both
especially convenient: and I shall inquire, in the next paper, how a
psychologist can at the same time be an idealist in his theory of per-
ception and any kind of an evolutionist in his theory of the origin
and shaping of the organs of perception.
WALTER B. PITKIN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 101
THE TREATMENT OF "OPPOSITION" IN FORMAL LOGIC
i HOUGH a number of good text-books and elementary treatises
on formal logic have recently appeared, the subject of the
"opposition of propositions" is still usually put before students in
a form very similar to that in which Aristotle left it. But that form
is conspicuously deficient in clearness, precision, and systematic com-
pleteness. It is as if the syllogism were treated merely in a vague
and general way, with no rules more detailed than the dictum de
omni, no distinctions of mood and figure, no attempt at a complete
enumeration of valid moods. In other words, the logical prin-
ciples justifying the so-called "square of opposition" are, in no
text-book known to me, definitely and lucidly worked out. The
consequence is that college students commonly have difficulty in
seeing the why of the relations with respect to joint truth or joint
falsity that hold good between contraries, contradictories, and sub-
contraries; and many students, unable to reason through for them-
selves the logical necessities involved, merely stow away the "square"
in their memories, upon the authority of book or lecturer the one
thing absolutely inexcusable in the study of formal logic. There
is, however, a way (and, I think, only one way) of presenting the
subject with system, precision, and complete self-evidence; and the
logically adequate mode of presentation is also, experience leads me
to believe, the pedagogically effective way, even with quite immature
students. The matter is obvious enough, and the method in ques-
tion is, no doubt, used by many teachers of logic ; but it seems worth
while to call attention to it in print, in the hope that it may come to
be more generally used, both by teachers and by writers of text-
books.
A. The Number of Possible Relations between the Denotations of
Any Two Terms. It is well known, and it is easy to demonstrate
(though many text-books conceal the fact as if it were a dark secret),
that there are five, and only five, conceivable relations of mutual
inclusion or exclusion between two terms; and that any two terms
whatever must, with respect to their areas of denotation, stand to
each other in some one of these relations. In the concise phrasing
of Venn: "Given one class as known and determined in respect of
its extent, another class, also known and similarly determined, . . .
can coincide with the former, can include it, be included by it, par-
tially include and partially exclude it, or entirely exclude it. In
every recognized sense of the word, these are distinct relations, and
they seem to be the only such distinct relations which can possibly
102 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
exist." 1 To formulate this more fully: if 8 and P be two terms
whose denotation is not known, it is possible that they may hold to
one another any one of the following relations, but it is not possible
that they hold none of these relations :
1. All S may be all P; i. e., the two areas of denotation may be
coextensive.
2. All 8 may be merely some (and not all) P.
3. Some 8 may be all P.
4. Some 8 may be .merely some P, while some of it is not P.
5. No 8 may be any P.
These relations would be graphically exhibited, in the usual
manner, as follows : ( 1 ) By a diagram in which circle 8 and circle P
are coextensive; (2) by a diagram in which circle 8 is within P and
of less extension ; (3) by a diagram in which circle P is within circle
S and of less extension; (4) by overlapping circles, and (5) by
mutually exclusive circles. It is to be observed that these formulas
and diagrams express absolutely unequivocal situations so far, at
least, as is possible when the only quantitative distinction to be
taken into account is that between whole and part ; further, that with
respect to the real relations of any two terms, the situations given
are reciprocally exclusive as well as jointly exhaustive. In other
words, the actual denotations of any two terms not only must be
related in one of these ways, but also, they can not be, in fact, re-
lated in more than one.
B. The Import of the Four Types of Categorical Propositions
with Respect to the Denotative Relations of their Terms. The ordi-
nary categorical propositions are, with one exception, notoriously
incapable of expressing unequivocally the relations of their terms
with respect to mutual inclusion or exclusion. What this means is
that a given proposition known to be true does not enable us to
know which one of the possible relations of the subject and predicate
in one of which, and one only, those terms really stand is the
actual relation. One who affirms such an equivocal proposition
affirms merely that the two terms in question are related in one or
another of two or more enumerable ways, and that the terms are
not related in certain other ways (implicitly) excluded from that
enumeration. Consequently, to make explicit in a perfectly clear
1 Venn, "Symbolic Logic," 1894, pp. 5 ff . Venn cites several earlier writers
who have noted this fact and insisted upon its significance for the clear ex-
plication of the denotative import of ordinary propositions, and ascribes the
earliest statement of it to Gergonne. Says Schroder (" Vorlesungen iiber die
Algebra der Logik," 1891, Bd. II., 106): "These five relations were perceived
by no one, from Aristotle's time down to the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury (1816), when, so far as is known, they were first explicitly brought to
light by Gergonne."
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 103
and systematic manner the denotative import of each of the four
types of categorical proposition, it is necessary to enumerate, in the
case of each, all of the real situations compatible with the truth of
the proposition. In other words, to understand what, in extension,
the A proposition means, we must set down every relation between
and P which, if real, would justify the affirmation of A. Pro-
ceeding to this enumeration, we get the following result :
The A proposition is compatible with the reality of either rela-
tion (1) or (2) ; i. e., one who affirms A declares that either relation
(1) or else relation (2) is the actual fact; that, however, only one
of these is actual; and that no other relation (of the five) beyond
these two is actual. The / proposition is compatible with either (1)
or (2) or (3) or (4) ; i. e., whoever affirms it, declares that one or
another of these relations is actual ; that, however, only one of them
is actual; and that no other relation is actual. With E, only rela-
tion (5) is compatible. With 0, relations (3), (4) and (5) are com-
patible. In all the equivocal cases, it should be clearly understood,
the relations enumerated as compatible with the given proposition
are not jointly affirmed, nor is any one specifically affirmed. What
the proposition most definitely affirms is the unreality of all the re-
lations not enumerated under it; with respect to those enumerated,
it virtually bids us hold our judgment in suspense. If students are
to be taught to regard propositions as giving them any information
at all about the comparative denotations of subject and predicate,
they should be taught (as, in text-books, they usually are not) pre-
cisely and comprehensively what that information in each case is.
In short, the foregoing seems to me the only sound way of present-
ing the doctrine of the denotative import of propositions.
C. Application of the Foregoing Principles to the f< Opposition
of Propositions." In the light of the principles just set forth, it is
possible to formulate rules of self-evident necessity, covering the
possibility of joint truth or joint falsity of any two propositions
having the same matter but differing in form. To frame these rules,
it is needful only to glance at the lists of real relations compatible
with the truth of each type of proposition remembering that, so
far as the proposition shows, any one of the relations enumerated
under it is equally likely to be the one real relation ; that no relation
not enumerated under a given proposition admits of the truth of that
proposition ; and that, since any two terms must be related in one or
another of the five ways, no pair of propositions can be jointly af-
firmed (or denied) if that would imply, for any two terms, the
unreality, with respect to them, of all five denotative relations. The
rules, then, are obviously as follows (letting the term "case" stand
for "possible real relation of mutual inclusion or exclusion between
the given subject and predicate") :
104 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
I. Where all the cases compatible with a given proposition are
also compatible with another proposition (having the same matter),
the truth of the latter may be inferred from the truth of the former.
II. Where only some of the cases compatible with a given propo-
sition are also compatible with another proposition, from the truth
of the former we can not infer that the latter is true, but as little
can we infer that it is not true, i. e., it remains doubtful.
III. Where two propositions are compatible with no common
cases, from the truth of either the falsity of the other may be in-
ferred.
IV. Where two propositions are compatible with no common
cases, but between them exhaust all five possible cases, from the
falsity of either the truth of the other may be inferred.
Examining the several propositions with these rules in mind, we
see, for example, that Rule I. covers the relation of A to /, since
both cases enumerated under A (1 and 2) are also enumerated under
7. Hence, if A is true, / is true. Rule III. covers the relation of A 's
truth to both E and 0, since A has no cases in common with either
of them ; hence, if A is true, E and are false. Rule IV. covers the
relation of either A or 7 to 0, since, if the cases compatible with
either A or 7 be added to those compatible with 0, all five conceiv-
able cases will appear in the enumeration. Hence, neither A and 0,
nor I and 0, can both be false; if one of either pair is false, the
other must be true. In like manner, all the results set forth in the
books under the name of ' ' opposition ' ' can be worked out.
This may at first seem longer and more complicated than the
usual way of setting forth the subject. Even if it were so, it would
be a preferable way ; for it has, what the customary mode of exposi-
tion seems to me to lack, the merit of completeness of demonstration,
and that sort of clarity for the understanding which comes only
with the sense of having looked a problem through and through,
from foundation to top, and of having noted everything pertinent
that there was to note about it. And, in fact, the matter is, for
teaching purposes, extremely simple to present. It requires only the
drawing of five circle-diagrams; the assignment of a conventional
number to each diagram ; and then the setting down, opposite each
type of proposition A, I, E and O of the list of cases compatible
with it. The rest saute aux yeux of any fairly intelligent student.
Indeed, the three topics here dealt with under sections A, B and C
may best of all be given students in the form of problems to be
worked out by themselves. There are, after all, great compensations
in the fact that some important principles and interesting chapters
of formal logic are left out of most of the books in current use as
college texts. For the ideal teaching of logic would assuredly dis-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 105
pense with text-book expositions for all parts of the subject, and
would invite students to repeat, and improve upon, the adventure of
Aristotle with only the aid (but the enormous aid) of clearly for-
mulated statements of the next things to be looked for at each point
and, perhaps, for the duller wits, a little lifting over one or two
ponies asinorwrn. No other object of study lends itself so perfectly
to this pedagogical method.
Nothing that has been here said is meant to prejudice any of the
ulterior questions of logical theory. Though I do, in fact, think it
an error to maintain (as Mr. H. B. W. Joseph has most recently
done) that "the predicate of a proposition is not thought in exten-
sion," I do not suppose that those who hold that view would deny
that propositions may, for elementary pedagogical purposes, be
treated as having a denotative import with reference to both their
terms. At all events, in much current teaching, and in the most
widely used manuals, they are so treated. And so long as this is
done, it seems desirable that all the facts about their denotative im-
port, and the immediate inferences which are justified by those facts r
should be set forth in a logically cogent and a logically complete
manner. A. 0. LOVEJOY.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOUBI.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
La definition de I'etre et de la nature des idees dans le Sophiste de Platon*
AUGUSTE DIES. Paris : Felix Alcan. 1909. Pp. a-c -f- vii + 140.
The scope of this admirably conducted inquiry is sufficiently indicated
by the title. Like his countrymen, M. Piat and M. Brochard (L'Annee
Philosophique, 1907), M. Dies holds, as against the majority of German
scholars, that the Sophist does not present a new view of reality, which
sets it in opposition to the so-called " earlier " dialogues of Plato. He
is, however, fully aware of the difficulties raised by the discussions of the
Sophist and conscientiously sets them forth. It is clear that in this dia-
logue a certain shift is observable in the direction of Plato's interest, in
that concrete reality is accorded a higher value than in his earlier thought.
This observation led many scholars in former years and there still re-
main a few of that persuasion to regard the Sophist as an expression of
the thought of Aristotle, since he too tended to think of the concrete as
possessing the greater reality. But every student of Aristotle must soon
become aware that the Stagirite was hopelessly divided, attaching su-
preme value now to the concrete, now to the. abstract, and consequently
failing to harmonize his system of thought. The same implicit contra-
diction is apparent in all the maturer works of Plato, the Republic, Phile-
Zms, and Laws, no less than the Sophist. In all these dialogues Plato
106
sought ineffectually, to be sure, but none the less sincerely to mediate
the Ideas back to concrete reality; but the Ideas still remained for him,
in the Sophist as truly as in the Republic, as the expression of supreme
reality. Once this fact is noted and its significance apprehended, it is
clear that Aristotle could not have written the Sophist; for in his Logic,
which is his earliest systematic work, the dualism in Aristotle's thought
is fully, even painfully, apparent.
It is impossible here to discuss at length the argument of M. Dies.
He shows familiarity with the German literature of his subject, but sin-
gularly enough appears to have no knowledge of the strongest presentation
of the essential unity of Plato's thought, which is his main thesis. I
refer, of course, to Professor Shorey's " The Unity of Plato's Thought,"
Chicago, 1903. The proof-reading, especially of the Greek texts, as shown
by two pages of Errata appended and still incomplete, appears to have
been done after the book was printed. M. Dies would hare done better in
discussing Platonic terms to have inserted the Greek words consistently.
W. A. HEIDEL.
WESLEYAN UNIVEBSITY.
Text-Book of School and Class Management: Theory and Practise.
FELIX ARNOLD. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Pp.
xxii -+ 409.
Education, it is asserted in the preface to this volume, is still in the
age of lean kine, and management is one of the leanest. Recent books
which have appeared show the inadequacy of the older treatments, and
a complete text-book is still lacking. The present volume aims so far as
possible to meet this lack.
FT the practical aspects of the subject the author has depended upon
" his own tested experience " and " that of progressive teachers and prin-
cipals " whom he has had the good fortune to know. For the theoretical
aspects he has consulted the "best authorities" (a very remarkable list
a list indicative of a vast amount of reading!) and "has sought first-
hand information at every point." The chief obligation, it is stated, is to
the works on " Mental Development " by Professor Baldwin. Manage-
ment of a school refers " to its control by governing officials. It implies
direction and support by school boards. It presupposes cooperation be-
tween principal and teachers. It necessitates contact between teacher and
pupils, and pupils and principal." This forms the material of the discus-
sion. The present volume deals with the subject of " cooperation between
principal and teacher, and class management." Separate volumes will be
devoted to a discussion of (1) organization, classification, the health of
the child, school hygiene, and the school boards, (2) general method in
instruction. Each volume of the series will be complete in itself. This
first volume, " School and Class Management," treats the subject in re-
markable detail. There are the two parts (1) Principal and Teacher,
(2) Teacher and Child, developed through twelve chapters. After a dis-
cussion of the respective functions of the teacher and principal there is
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 107
considered the question of their cooperation in Instruction, Discipline,
Supervision, under the headings general means, special means, approved
and disapproved, individual versus uniform methods of instruction, mis-
conceptions of cooperation. The teacher and child are considered in part
two and again in very great detail. The concluding chapters are en-
titled, The Nature of Conduct, the Sanctions of Conduct, the Kinds of
Conduct, the General Development of Conduct, the Special Development
of Conduct.
JOHN ANGUS MACVANNEL.
TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
EEVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. November, 1909. Biologie scien-
tifique et trans formisme (pp. 481-500) : H. DRIESCH. - The principal prob-
lem of systematic biology (not biology of classification) is the scientific
explanation of individual differences, accidental variation. Neither the
Darwinian or Lamarckian theory, both of which attribute such variation
to chance, affords a solution of the problem. The principle may, how-
ever, be explained on the basis of entelechy. Le desir et la volonte selon
Saint Thomas d'Aquin (pp. 501-515) : A. D. SERTILLANGES. - The tendency
to become some person other than the self is desire or appetite. This fact
implies a power and a receptivity: desire is based upon actual lack and
potential abundance. Volition is an appetite, the object of which is
'bonum in universali. La pedagogie nouvelle (pp. 516-527) : G. JEANJEAN.
- The new pedagogy i. e., pedology is a complex of psychology and the
old-fashioned pedagogy. The development of the science in America,
England, and on the continent is noted. A quoi servent les laboratories de
psychologic? (pp. 528-539): L. M. BILLIA. -In spite of a certain value
the psychology laboratory exhibits certain fundamental defects: (1) the
study of consciousness as determined by physiological, physical, and chem-
ical conditions results in the destruction of psychology as such and the
apotheosis of the physical sciences; (2) the consideration of the limits of
our powers of feeling, intellect, and volition leads us to forget free-will
and the power of extending the possibilities of feeling, intellect, and
volition; (3) the worker in the laboratory tends to treat of psychology as
a curiosity, an object of pure experimental research rather than as a part
of life. L'objet de la metaphysique (pp. 540-546) : T. LAURET. - Meta-
physics is merely to be distinguished, not separated, from the sciences,
and it is to be viewed as the "first science." Science, in the ordinary
sense of the term, rests upon a metaphysical, extra-experimental basis;
metaphysics, on the other hand, must have a scientific, experimental basis.
L'habitude (pp. 547-554) : G. SEMBEL. - The Aristotelian and Cartesian
theories of habit are correct as far as they go, but the true nature
of habit is exhibited by a combination of the theories. Inertia, in-
activity, possibility, is an essential condition of habit, but in order
that this quality may be utilized and directed an active principle is requi-
108 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
site. Habit serves (1) to attenuate consciousness and (2) to diminish
effort. Analyses et comptes rendus: Hobbes, Leviathan: H. OLLION. G. E.
Lipps, Mythenbildung und ErTcenntniss. K. Joel, Der freie Wille. Eine
EntwicJcelung in Gesprdchen: E. GHERZI. G. Zuccante. Socrate: H.
TROUGHS. A. Meyer, Etude critique sur les relations d'Erasme et de
Luther. R. Bagardjon, Schopenhauer der Philosoph des Optimismus: H.
OLLION. H. Arnheim, Kant's Lehre vom " Bewusstsein uberhaupt " und
ihre Weiterbildung ~bis auf die Gegenwart: H. OLLION. Notes biblio-
graphiques. Recension des revues. Chronique. L'enseignement de la
philosophie dans les universites.
EEVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE. November, 1909. Pour lire en
psychologue la vie des saints (pp. 505-536) : C. ALIBERT. - Holiness con-
fers upon the saint a clearer and truer vision of the creatures and of
their relation to their Creator. La theorie des moyennes et son emploi
dans les sciences d" observation (pp. 537-569) : J. LOTTIN. - An examina-
tion of the different classes of averages and an inquiry into the sphere of
their application. Le sentiment de I'effort. L'effort volitionnel (pp. 570-
581) : L. VANHALST. - The object of volitional effort is to will a good and
to resist an evil. It resolves or tends to resolve a state of indecision. It
is always voluntary, but not always free. Melanges et documents: Les
" Sententice" de Gandulphe de Bologne ne sont-elles qu'un resume de
celles de Pierre Lombard? (pp. 582-599) : J. DE GHELLIXCK, S.J. - Gan-
dulph's work is in part independent of, and in part directly taken from,
Peter the Lombard's " Books of Sentences." Le testament philosophique
de M. Naville (pp. 600-607) : G. LEGRAND. - An analysis of Naville's last
work: "Les systemes de philosophique ou les philosophies affirmatives."
Le mouvement philosophique en Amerique (pp. 607-619) : J. B. CEULE-
MANS. - A historical sketch of the philosophical movement in this country,
chiefly taken from van Becelaere's " La philosophie en Amerique."
L'idee organique de I'Universite (pp. 619-624). -A fragment of a speech
delivered by Ladeuze in Louvain University on October 19th. Comptes-
rendus. H. Dehove, Essai critique sur le realisme thomiste, compare a
I'idealisme Icantien: P. SCHEUER, S.J. E. Klinke, S.J., Der Mensch.
Darstellung und Kritik des anthropologischen Problems in der Philos-
ophie Wilhelm Wundts: P. M. M. Fiihrich, S.J., Rechtssubjelct und
Kirchenrecht : P. HARMIGXIE. L. Davile, Leibniz historien: D. R. A,
Leon, Les Elements cartesiens de la doctrine spinoziste sur les rapports
de la pensee et de son objet: J. H. Morales et Religions: TH. VAN
TICHELIN. G. Vorbrodt, Beitrdge zur religiosen Psychologie: Psycho-
biologie und Gefiihl: J. EXGERT. J. T. Beysens, Algemeine Zielkunde:
P. M. Mgr. Baudrillart, Les Universites catholiques de France et de
I'etranger: L. NOEL. Chronique philosophique. Sommaire ideologique
des ouvrages et revues de Philosophie.
ANNALEN DER NATURPHILOSOPHIE, Band VIH., Heft 4.
November, 1909. Das Geschdft als Wissenschaft (pp. 399-412): O.
NAGEL. -In commerce and industry general principles are arrived at by
the same method as in experimental science. Die Prinzipien der ener-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 109
i
getischen Psycliologie (pp. 413-470) : N. KRAINSKY. - The term energy is
applied in characteristic ways to the " ego " and to the several phases of
consciousness, and equivalence is asserted between the stimulus and its
effects in sensation and imagination, without clarification of the problem
what common meaning may lie under these two applications of the term
energy, and how equivalence may be demonstrated. Grund und Ursache
(pp. 471-476) : W. H. FRANKL. - Two short notes. Uber Kometen als
kosmische Analytiker (pp. 477-482) : V. GOLDSCHMIDT. - Comets set glow-
ing the matter suspended in interplanetary space, revealing its varied
composition. Die Naturphilosophischen Anschauungen im altindischen
Denken (pp. 483-494) : R. STUBE. - The doctrines of Kapila, a realist
and dualist, and of Kanada, a materialist. Uber den analytischen Char-
acter des Existenz-theorems in der reinen Mathematik (pp. 495-502) : H.
BERGMANN. - For logistical mathematics existence means merely absence
of contradiction. Neue Bilcher (pp. 503-506) : W. O. Hans Driesch,
The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. Kurt Lasswitz, Seelen
und Ziele. Beitrdge zum Weltverstdndnis. M. Apel, Kommentar zu
Rants " Prolegomena" K. Braeunig, Mechanismus und vitalismus in
der Biologie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts.
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. November,
1909. Sociologie religieuse et theorie de la connaissance (pp. 733-758) :
E. DURKHEIM. - Our categories play a preponderant role in our thought,
and as all our civilization is condensed in them, no object is more appro-
priate for philosophic study. La philosophic de Jules Lagneau (pp. 759-
807) : G. DWELSHAUVERS. - A systematic, objective study and a brief ap-
preciation of Lagneau's philosophy. La nature de la pensee logique (pp.
808-823) : K. B.-R. AARS. - An attempt to establish for scientific thought
the distinction between cause and ground or reason. Four notions of
cause are distinguished. Correspondance inedite de Ch. Renouvier et de
Ch. Secretan (Suite) (pp. 824-835). -The continuation of a personal cor-
respondence interspersed with philosophic comments. Etudes critiques.
La Morale des Idees-Forces: L. WEBER. Le VI e Congres international de
Psychologic. Tables des matieres. Supplement.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. December, 1909. La preeminence de
la main droite : etude de polarite religieuse (pp. 553-580) : R. HERTZ.
- The differentiation of the sides of the body is a particular case and con-
sequence of the dualism inherent in primitive thought. Autour du prob-
lem de la connaissance (pp. 581-604) : A. CHIDE. - The author draws
pluralistic consequences from our failure to solve adequately the epis-
temological problem. Du charactere psychologique des idiotismes (pp.
605-625) : R. DE LA GRASSERIE. - English idioms are the result of material-
istic concepts and successfully avoid the animisms implied by those of
European languages. Revue generale. Sociologie criminelle: G. RICH-
ARD. Analyses et comptes rendus. Boex-Borel, Le pluralisme: A. REY.
Windeland, Die Philosophic im Deutschen Geistesleben des XIX. Jahr-
hunderts: J.-H. JUQUET. C. Henry, Psychobiologie et energetique: A.
110 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
KEY. Alber, De I'lllusion: TH. RIBOT. F. Tonnies, Die Sitte: G. L.
DUPRAT. E. Ettinger, Das Verbrecherproblem: G. L. DUPRAT. Radulescu-
Motru, Pulterea sufleteasca : G. ASLAN. Revue des periodiques strangers.
Carreno, Pedro Maria. Filosofia del Derecho. Tomo 1. Etica y Derecho
individual. Bogota: Imprenta de La Luz. 1909. Pp. 239.
Croce, Benedetto. Problemi di estetica e contribuiti alia storia dell'
estetica italiana. Bari : Guis. Laterza e Figli. 1910. Pp. viii + 513.
Haddon, A. C. The Races of Man and their Distribution. London:
Milner & Co. Pp. x + 126.
Hall, G. Stanley, and others. Proceedings of the Child Conference for
Research and Welfare, held at Clark University in connection with
the celebration of its twentieth anniversary, Worcester, Massachu-
setts, July 6-10, 1909. New York : G. E. Stechert & Co. Pp. xvi +
257. $1.50.
Lemaitre, Aug. La vie mentale de I'adolescent, et ses anomalies. Saint-
Blaise: Foyer Solidariste. 1910. Pp. 240.
Lorentz, H. A. The Theory of Electrons and its Applications to the
Phenomena of Light and Radiant Heat. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
London: David Nutt and Williams and Norgate. 1909. Pp. iv -J-
332.
Ottolenghi, Raffaele. Un Lontano Precursore di Dante. Lugano: Casa
editrice del Ccenobium. 1910. Pp. 135.
NOTES AND NEWS
following summary of papers read before the Anthropological
Society of Washington is from Science for January 28 :
"At the 439th meeting, January 4, 1910, Dr. Ales Hrdlicka, of the
National Museum, exhibited a cast of the lower jaw of Homo heidelber-
genesis donated recently to the National Museum by Professor Schoet-
tensack, of Heidelberg University. This jaw, which is preserved at the
university and has been described in detail by Professor Schoettensack,
was found less than two years ago near the village of Mauer, 10 kilo-
meters southeast of Heidelberg, under nearly 75 feet of loess and ancient
river sand. It dates from the Tipper Pliocene or the very beginning of
the Quaternary period and represents the most ancient being known that
can be regarded as man. To illustrate the remarkable characteristics of
this jaw Dr. Hrdlicka showed a number of mandibula of different anthro-
poid apes along with those of recent man. The paper was discussed by
Messrs. Theodore Gill, G. M. Kober, D. S. Lamb, Daniel Folkmar and
others.
The remainder of the evening was devoted to an address by Dr. W J
McGee, on " Conservation in the Human Realm." The speaker said that
the human realm may best be defined in terms of relation to the other
great realms in nature; and these are most conveniently stated in the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 111
order of increasing complexity, which may be considered also the order of
sequence in cosmic development.
The initial realm is that pertaining to cosmic bodies and their interre-
lations; the fundamental principle comprises the actions and reactions
of gravity, impact, etc., which together have been denoted molarity; the
field is largely covered by astronomy, with a part of physics. The second
realm pertains to atomic and certain molecular interrelations; its funda-
mental principle is affinity; and its field coincides fairly with chemistry.
The third realm is that of organic activity; its principle is vitality, which
directly and indirectly accelerated and multiplied the chemical differen-
tiation of the earth-crust; its field is covered by a large part of biology,
with cognate sciences. The fourth realm (which is closely allied to the
preceding) pertains to those organisms so complete in themselves as to be
self-active; its principle is motility; and its field is covered by zoology
and allied branches of knowledge. The final realm is that in which motile
organisms are so completely self-active as to react upon and dominate
lower nature; its principle is mentality; and its field is anthropology in
all of those aspects resting on a psychic basis. Now the entities proper
to the several realms coexist and interact; and in general the entities of
each higher realm dominate over all those of the lower realms. This is
especially true of mentality, which employs motility and directs vital-
ity to control affinity and morality, thereby making conquest over
lower nature for human welfare. In the power of mentality human
strength lies, while danger also lurks; for the power may be, and
in the absence of constraint often is, used for the destruction rather than
mere subjection of the materials and forces of nature. Viewed broadly,
the exercise of control over the realms of lower nature pertains to the
human realm no less than do the more passive attributes of mankind."
THE reviewer in The Nation (January 20) of " Transactions of the
Asiatic Society of Japan," Vol. XXXVI., Parts II. and III., writes as
follows :
" The gem in this collection of papers is Walter Dening's review of
three volumes on the Confucian philosophy in Japan by Professor Inouye
Tetsujiro, of the Imperial University. In these volumes, the result of
eight years of labor, we have an exhaustive and trustworthy history of
Japan's three great schools. No one can understand the Japan of to-day
without some knowledge of the philosophy, which for above twelve cen-
turies has moulded the mind of Japan, producing, besides other fruits,
that high moral standard of everyday life with which foreigners accus-
tomed to associate with Japanese gentlemen are so familiar. More im-
mediately potent in furnishing the finest specimens of Japanese humanity,
and particularly in equipping those minds which shaped the interior
potency of the empire before Commodore Perry and which since have
directed Japan's modern career, is the Oyomei philosophy. This was
founded by the last of the great Chinese philosophers (1472-1529), who
broke loose from the authority of the ancients and claimed the right to
interpret nature and its laws in his own fashion. By the Oyomei system,
the lack of idealism in the Japanese mind is corrected, as also its tendency
112 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
to a narrow practicality. No other such lucid exposition of Japanese
philosophic thought exists."
THE Western Philosophical Association and the North Central Section
of the American Psychological Association will hold meetings at the
University of Iowa, Iowa City, on Friday and Saturday, March 25 and
26, 1910. Separate sessions will be held Friday afternoon and Saturday
morning, and a joint session Saturday afternoon. Friday evening there
will be an address by the President of the Western Philosophical Asso-
ciation, Professor Carl E. Seashore. Titles of psychological papers
should be sent to W. D. Scott, 721 Coif ax St., Evanston, 111.; titles of
philosophical papers to B. C. Ewer, 614 Clark St., Evanston, 111. Papers
should not exceed twenty minutes in length. One session of the Western
Philosophical Association will be devoted, at least in part, to the ques-
tion of the proper contents and method of a course in Introduction to
Philosophy. It is expected that the general subject of the joint session
will be the Practical Applications of Psychology, Legal, Commercial and
Therapeutic.
THE firm of B. G. Teubner in Leipzig has undertaken the publication
of the complete works of the mathematician Leonard Euler, under the
editorial supervision of Professor Eudio, of Zurich, and Professors Krozer
and Stb'ckel, of Karlsruhe. The edition will fill forty three quarto vol-
umes; volume 1, algebra, edited by Professor Heinrich Weber is promised
for the current year.
PROFESSOR HUGO MUNSTERBERG, of Harvard University, delivered, on
January 21, 1910, the second of the series of lectures being given during
the college year by the Omega chapter of the Sigma Xi Society, at the
Ohia State University, Columbus, O. He spoke on " The Psychologist
in the Courtroom."
A DINNER was given on January 18 in honor of Professor William
James, on which occasion a portrait of Professor James was presented
to the University by members of the division by the visiting committee.
The painting, by Miss Ellen Emmet, is of three quarter length, and life
size. It will hang for the present in Emerson Hall but will be placed
eventually in the faculty room of University Hall.
PROFESSOR C. J. KEYSER, of Columbia University, delivered on Jan-
uary 14 at Princeton University a lecture on " Ways to Pass the Walls of
the World; or Scientific Speculations regarding the Figure and the
Dimensions of Space."
DR. A. L. SUTHERLAND, of the Government Hospital for the Insane at
Washington, has been appointed instructor in psychology in the Univer-
sity of Illinois.
MR. T. CASE, Waynflete professor of moral and metaphysical philos-
ophy, and president of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, has resigned his
professorship.
DR. KARL GROOS, professor of philosophy and pedagogy at Giessen,
has resigned his chair at the university.
VOL VII No 5. MARCH 3, 1910
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
PSYCHOLOGY IN ITS RELATIONS TO BIOLOGY
r INHERE was a time when I agreed heartily with those who say,
-L "What difference whether psychology be considered a part of
biology or an independent science, should we not in either case work
as we are working 1 ' ' But recently an examination of my experience
as teacher has convinced me of the incorrectness of this view. I note
that within the past ten years, as a direct result of a radical altera-
tion in my conception of the nature of psychology, I have almost
completely changed the materials of my courses in the subject. What
formerly I accepted as subject-matter of psychology and presented
as such to my students, I now consider matter of neurology and
general physiology; and, conversely, what I now deem the proper
and important materials of psychology, I then either relegated to
some branch of philosophy or ignored. This fact has sufficed to
convince me, as no amount of theoretical discussion would have done,
that one's conception of the materials, aims, and methods of his
science is of profound practical importance in connection with both
teaching and research. I wish, therefore, in the interests of what
I consider to be a profitable view of the relations of psychology to
biology, to report the results of a narrowly limited inquiry into the
conceptions of psychology held by American biologists, to make a
confession of faith, and to offer certain criticisms of psychology.
The aforesaid inquiry into the status of psychology in the minds
of biologists was conducted primarily that I might learn whether
the view which seems to me the best working conception is commonly
held. Had my investigation proved it to be the dominant concep-
tion, I should not be writing this article.
Inasmuch as in this inquiry I prized quality of judgment above
the number of opinions recorded, I sought the views of only a few
individuals. To each of twenty eminently able and successful
American biologists, of whom about one half are known to be pre-
dominantly morphological in their interests and the remainder physi-
ological, I addressed the following questions: (1) Do you consider
113
114 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
psychology a part of physiology? (2) If so, please define the term
psychology so that I shall clearly understand what it includes.
At the time of writing I have received the replies of nineteen
individuals. Of these replies four are non-committal, the writers
frankly admitting that they have no reasonably satisfactory basis for
an opinion; eight, with various qualifications, state that psychology
is merely a part of physiology ; and seven defend the view that it is
an independent science, differing essentially in materials or methods,
or both, from the biological sciences. Although it would add greatly
to the interest and value of this discussion to publish the replies in
full, I do not feel at liberty to do so, for the majority of my corre-
spondents, in attempting to satisfy my request, felt keenly the limita-
tions of their knowledge of psychology and expressed their views
partly as a personal favor. In quoting from the opinions, I shall
mention no names, but I wish to take this opportunity to express my
appreciation of the kindness of my correspondents. I shall preface
a general statement of the results of my inquiry with quotations
from the replies to my questions. These quotations present the
three types of conception of psychology which appear to be prevalent
among the biologists of this country.
First Type of Conception. "In my opinion," writes a biologist
whose interests are medical, "psychology is a part of physiology.
In reaching this conclusion, I assume that psychology is an expression
of the activity of the brain, modified, perhaps, in some instances, by
ductless glands. I take a purely material view and hold that, except
as a mere matter of convenience, the term 'psychology' will in time
disappear. As our knowledge of the functions of the central nervous
system increases, we shall probably recognize a thought, a sentiment,
a feeling, as being as much a matter of routine physiological action
of the corresponding cells of the brain as a muscular action is. ' '
This, I need not remind the reader, is a naked statement of
mechanical materialism in psychology. It assumes that consciousness
is a form of energy, and claims that it can be studied scientifically
only as energy. At this point we are not concerned with comments
or criticisms.
fiecond Type of Conception. A view widely removed from the
materialistic is clearly presented by two of my correspondents, the
one a morphologist, the other a physiologist. "I have always sup-
posed" thus the morphologist "that, when considered from the
standpoint of introspection, it (psychology) is a part of metaphysics,
but when treated experimentally it is a branch of physiology."
And the physiologist, after stating that "the application of scien-
tific method to consciousness can go only so far as to explain the
workings of the nervous mechanism," continues, "to my mind, there
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 115
is beyond this (the above) a true and wholly distinct psychology
a study of the nature and properties of consciousness independent
of the nervous mechanism. The methods of science are applicable
to matter and energy, but there is no warrant that they are applicable
also to the study of consciousness. Most of the older biologists felt
that they are not, and that consciousness must eventually be ap-
proached by methods that are extra-scientific, and that have not yet
been developed. Such a psychology as this is to be born. ' '
In each of these statements we have, it is to be noted, the recog-
nition of a special branch of inquiry whose proper materials are
psychological phenomena, and the denial of the possibility of apply-
ing the methods of natural science to these phenomena. Instead of
contending, as do the materialists, that physiology can deal ade-
quately with consciousnes by studying neural processes, the advo-
cates of this non-naturalistic psychology declare that, in spite of the
fact that no such thing as consciousness exists for the natural sci-
ences, we are compelled to admit the existence of psychical as con-
trasted with physical phenomena, and to grant that they may be
studied in some way or other. Most interesting, in this conception
of the nature and status of psychology, is the denial that a real sci-
ence of psychology exists side by side with the physical and the
biological sciences.
Third Type of Conception. In order to present the third and
last conception I have chosen, as in the previous instance, to quote
from two of my correspondents who hold essentially differing varie-
ties of the same conception. Both writers are physiologists. The
one writes, ' ' One has to recognize a fundamental distinction between
the subject-matters of psychology and physiology. This is briefly
that psychology deals with the subjective, physiology with the object-
ive manifestations of living organisms. If psychology fails to gain
insight into the nature of the phenomena of consciousness, qua con-
sciousness, then I conceive that it has failed in its object. Its central
object is the psychic, and it is interested in the correlated (objective)
organic processes only in so far as these throw light on the condi-
tions of psychical phenomena on their mode of action supposing
them to have any influence on physical processes or on the nature of
the organism, of which consciousness, apparently, is one character-
istic property or activity. ' ' And again, the other physiologist writes,
"I am inclined to divide the processes in living things into two
classes, and to distinguish two groups of sciences on that basis. Then
I should say that physiology is the science which deals with material
and energetic processes in living things, and psychology the science
which deals with processes which are not material or energetic, that
is, with the conscious processes."
116 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
This conception thus expressed evidently demands the develop-
ment of a science which differs from the biological sciences. But
before further considering the three types of conception, I shall offer
certain general conclusions to which I have been led by a study of
the replies to my questions and by reflection concerning the sub-
stance of discussions which I have had with many biologists.
The first of these conclusions is that the majority of American
biologists either consciously and avowedly, or without realization of
the fact, lack that definite knowledge of psychology which alone
could entitle them to an opinion concerning the nature of the subject
or its right to existence. This fact is not at all surprising in view
of the recency of the introduction of experimental method in the
study of consciousness, and the psychologist's regret over the state
of affairs well may change to satisfaction when he hears that almost
all of my correspondents disclaimed fitness properly to answer my
questions. To me, I must admit, this is the most encouraging result
of my inquiry.
Secondly, I am forced to conclude that approximately half of our
biologists, assuming that consciousness is a manifestation of energy,
contend that there can be no real science of psychology apart from
the physiology of the nervous system. The remainder hold that,
although much that is commonly called psychology properly belongs
to physiology, there is either an existent or a possible science of con-
sciousness wholly independent of physiology. Finally, among the
believers in an independent science of psychology there are those who
hold that its methods are not those of the natural sciences, and those
who believe that there now exists a flourishing science of conscious-
ness whose methods are essentially the same as those employed by
the physical and the biological sciences.
In the light of the above results of my investigation of opinion,
I conclude that the establishment and promotion of psychology as a
science among sciences places upon those who believe in its right to
an independent existence the burden of convincing biologists, and
natural scientists generally, of the logical and practical validity of
their claim. This, I believe, can be accomplished best by works.
It is my contention that the three views of psychology presented
in the quotations from my correspondents' replies not to mention
other views which do not happen to be popular with our biologists
are neither equally tenable from the logical standpoint nor equally
profitable as working bases for the investigation of psychological
phenomena, and I offer as my chief excuse for the publication of
this paper the fact that I believe the rapid development of a real
science of psychology depends largely upon the whole-hearted and
enthusiastic acceptance of some form of the third type of conception.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 117
I shall now present my chief reasons for this belief. There is noth-
ing original in what I am about to write ; I have accepted a certain
conception of psychology which is prevalent among psychologists,
and I take this opportunity to say so.
My notion of the relation of psychology to the biological sciences
will appear in the answers which I have to give to the questions:
(1) Is the material of psychology essentially different from that of
the physical and biological sciences? (2) Are the methods of nat-
ural science applicable in the study of consciousness? (3) Are the
aims or purposes of psychology the same as those of the physical
and biological sciences? and (4) Is the scientific investigation of
consciousness, as such, worth while ?
Natural science means, I take it, the systematic study of phe-
nomena for the purpose of describing them, correlating them with
other phenomena, discovering their laws, and explaining them caus-
ally. Each special science deals with a limited group of phenomena,
which may conveniently be studied as a group. The grouping, how-
ever, is entirely artificial, and we must suppose that with the progress
of investigation the special sciences will tend to coalesce, so that
finally we shall have a general world science which shall deal with all
phenomena of energy the organic as well as the inorganic. I should
like to be permitted throughout this discussion to refer to this com-
posite of the physical and the biological sciences as "physics" in
order to contrast it with what I wish to call ' ' psychics. ' ' The per-
tinent question for us with respect to the general science of physics
is, Would it include psychology? Many American scientists, per-
haps most of them, would answer in the affirmative, and for this very
reason it seems to me worth while to set forth my reasons for
believing that however far physics be developed, psychology will
ever remain logically independent of it.
Accepting the common-sense view of the world, science regards
objects now from the objective, now from the subjective point of
view. The objective point of regard or attitude toward things is
characteristic of physics; it deals with objects as existent " out
there " in space and time and as relatively independent of the
observer. The subjective attitude is characteristic of psychics; it
deals with objects as existent in the consciousness of the observer.
At the same moment an orange or the activity of a dog may be
material of physics and of psychics. The whole world is viewed by
the naive individual, as well as by the scientist, in these strikingly
different ways. We may, if we like, refuse to accept the assumption
of the physicist that his point of regard lends itself to scientific
inquiry; and we may similarly deny that the psychological attitude
toward objects furnishes a scientific approach to the world, but we
118 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
simply can not deny the existence of these two attitudes. Upon those
who urge that the one or the other attitude should be ignored by
scientists, or that the two should be fused and that things should be
studied neither as independent existences nor as consciousness, must
rest the duty of so directing the development of science as to provide
a knowledge of the world which shall be more valuable than that
provided by the physical and the psychical ways of viewing things.
Logically it would appear that objects of investigation are neither
wholly independent of nor wholly dependent upon the scientist, and
that it is therefore profitable to approach them by as many paths
the physical and the psychical are only two of many possibilities
as we can discover. Above all else I am interested in the increase
of our knowledge of phenomena their characteristics, relations, etc.
and I believe that we shall progress most satisfactorily for the
present by doing our best to apply the methods of exact science to
objects as physically and as psychically existent. If later we dis-
cover that either or both of these ways of viewing phenomena are
unprofitable we can then turn to other approaches to reality. His-
tory indicates that it is not well for the scientist to concentrate his
attention upon the task of discovering directly how things really
exist. Instead it pays him to be satisfied temporarily with partial
views of his objects.
I have answered the first question Is the material of psychology
essentially different from that of the physical and biological sci-
ences? by saying that it is not, and I have contended that physics
and psychics examine the same objects from different points of view
and with different attitudes toward their materials. This leads us
to inquire, Can objects considered as consciousness be studied by the
methods of the natural sciences?
Physics, by observation of its objects under natural and experi-
mentally controlled conditions, strives to gain a description of its
materials which is quantitatively accurate, which is verifiable, which
forms a basis for the prediction of events, and which explains phe-
nomena by revealing their causal relations. The recognition of these
several important points with respect to scientific method raises the
following questions concerning the methods of psychology.
Does psychology observe under natural and experimental con-
ditions? Certainly. For fifty years the application of experimen-
tation in the study of consciousness has progressed steadily, and
there is no proof that the limit of its usefulness has been reached.
Does it strive for quantitatively accurate descriptions of its
objects? "We must reply, that only such descriptions satisfy those
experimental psychologists who have made the greatest contribu-
tions of fact to their science. It has been said that the psychical
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 119
object can not be measured, that one of its prominent characteristics
is its restriction to qualitative, as contrasted with quantitative, in-
vestigation; but, inasmuch as we constantly refer to psychological
objects as greater or less, it seems that the rareness of accurate
measurements in psychology is due rather to the observer's lack of
skill than to the nature of his objects. At present it is customary to
characterize and stigmatize the data of the psychical sciences as
crudely inexact in comparison with those of the physical sciences.
Unquestionably this is the case, but I wish to insist that it need not
be true, and, further, that the responsibility for this condition of the
science rests upon psychologists. "We need ingenuity, insight, and
persistent effort in order to discover ways of describing our objects
with exactitude.
Does psychology present verifiable accounts of its objects? I
answer, in essentially the same way as do the natural sciences, but
less satisfactorily because of the inexactness of description; for
verifiability depends upon the degree of quantitative accuracy with
which an event has been studied as to its immediate characteristics
and its relations. In all those regions of psychology which have
been investigated with a reasonable degree of thoroughness and ac-
curacy we discover verifiability of observations. In this respect,
then, psychics differs from physics in its present status, not in its
possibilities.
But the most important question remains to be answered, Does
psychology explain phenomena causally ? Not a few students of the
psychical sciences seem to think that all causal explanations must
come from physics, and that psychology is necessarily teleological
instead of causal. With this view I must disagree, for an examina-
tion of the aims of both physics and psychics reveals the fact that
there are two mediate goals : the accurate description of phenomena,
and their explanation in causal terms. I contend that causation is
not limited to the physical sciences, but that from the psychological
point of view, as well as from the physical, we observe a series of
phenomena in which definite sequences are discoverable, and in
terms of this apparently necessary arrangement of our objects we
explain them. In physics this uniform relation of phenomena is
called physical causation ; in psychics it is called psychical causation.
It is just as important scientifically from the one point of view as
from the other. Comparative psychologists especially need to real-
ize that they are not compelled to turn to physiology W explana-
tions of their phenomena.
To sum up this rather dogmatic discussion of scientific method
in psychology, I may say that I can discover LIO essential difference
in the methods of the two groups of sciences which I have chosen
120
to designate as physics and psychics. Both are observational, ex-
perimental, quantitative, causal in their explanations; both are in
process of development, but in degree of development the psychical
sciences are inferior to the physical sciences. Certain of the reasons
for this state of affairs I shall attempt to indicate later in this paper.
The last two of the four questions concerning the relation of
psychology to the biological sciences must be answered summarily.
Above I have stated that the aim of natural science is to give
accurate descriptions of its objects, to correlate its phenomena, to
discover their laws, and to explain everything causally. This, it
seems to me, is the aim also of psychology. In fact this is the com-
mon aim of all the physical and psychical sciences.
Is the scientific investigation of consciousness, as such, worth
while? Can we justify our attempts to observe objects from the
psychological point of view? This is the kind of question no real
scientist stops to ask after he has once committed himself to the
search for truth in some division of science. For he knows full well
that our outlook is too limited to enable us to answer such queries
wisely. No one of us can justify his researches in the eyes of all
men, and fortunately none of us feels it necessary to do so. The
study of consciousness is worth while, if we can achieve the goal of
science.
The current American psychology of to-day is a dismal mixture
of physiology and psychology. No wonder biologists are confused
respecting the nature and status of the science; no wonder they
question its right to the name science. To me it now appears of first
importance that we should deal with psychological objects thor-
oughly and in a rigorously scientific manner instead of devoting
most of our time to premature attempts to correlate physiological
and psychological phenomena. Even more distasteful to the natural
scientist than the purest of speculative philosophy are these attempts
of psychologists to picture the neural processes which parallel, or
condition (according to the individual's conception of the relation
of body and mind), psychological phenomena. Vague imaginings,
mostly, are these "physiological explanations" of consciousness. I
could quote ad nauseam from standard text-books of psychology in
support of my contention that most of us know neither physiology
nor psychology well enough to correlate satisfactorily the results of
these sciences. I am deeply interested in physiological psychology,
as well as in physiology and psychology, but I maintain that at
present it is more important for science to advance our knowledge
of bodily and mental /processes than to speculate concerning their
relations or to try to explain one set of phenomena in terms of the
other.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 121
For psychology and psychologists there are certain urgently im-
portant and intensely practical, albeit unpleasant, facts which
should be mentioned in connection with this discussion. I refer to
the status of psychology in America, and to the reasons for the low
esteem in which it is held by our physical scientists. Most scientists,
whether they believe in a science of consciousness or not, admit that
the present status of the subject is extremely unsatisfactory. As
compared with even the newest of the physical sciences it appears
crude, vague, inexact, unscientific. It is reasonable, therefore, that
those of us who are professionally interested in the subject should
seek to discover the causes of this state of affairs.
My study of the situation has led me to the conclusion that there
are four preeminently important reasons for the sad plight of
psychology. 1 These are: (1) The lack of a generally and unquestion-
ingly accepted body of presuppositions or postulates to serve as a
working basis; (2) The lack of strong and research-impelling faith
in the value of the aims of psychology and in the possibility of at-
taining these ends by available scientific methods; (3) The too-
prevalent lack among empirical psychologists of thorough training
in scientific as contrasted with philosophical method, and (4) The
prevalence of poor teaching, and especially of the presentation of
psychology as a collection of bizarre phenomena or as a philosoph-
ical discipline instead of as a science similar to the physical sciences
in aims and methods. I shall briefly consider each of these four
facts for I am forced to admit that they are facts with the hope
that the frank recognition of undesirable conditions may be the first
step toward improvement.
As to presuppositions, it is safe to say that few, if any, sciences
are in worse plight than psychology. Progress in physics would
cease should the investigator question the independent existence of
his objects. Indeed, it takes but a superficial survey of the sciences
to convince one that no science can flourish until it has definitely
accepted a body of presuppositions, and until it has ceased to ques-
tion them so far as its practical problems are concerned. We recog-
nize that it is impossible to prove the truth of certain of the phys-
icist's most important assumptions, but we do not on that account
contend that his descriptions and explanations of the world of ob-
jects and events are valueless.
Psychology can not work without assumptions or presupposi-
tions, and it can not progress rapidly and steadily until a certain
group of presuppositions has been definitely and heartily accepted
1 It is noteworthy that psychology has a much better status in Europe than
in America.
122 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
by the great mass of its workers. It is not sufficient that an in-
vestigator here and there should adopt a working basis and then
turn all his attention to the problems of his science. There must be
union as a source of strength to the science. The study of the
animal mind at this time stands forth as an instructive example of
the effects of wrangling over assumptions instead of accepting the
best that can be found, and then straightway going to work. Espe-
cially pertinent at this point is a paragraph from a class report
which was submitted to me recently by a student in an introductory
course in comparative psychology. It reads, "A peculiarity of
'animal psychology' is that its expositors are still quarreling about
its presuppositions. In most sciences the speculative bases are so
widely accepted that workers in them, hearing no din of controversy,
suppose those bases to be not speculative at all. For that reason
expositors of other sciences may doubt the scientific status of
'animal psychology.' But it will be as scientific as any of the sci-
ences, if ever its workers unite upon a criterion of the presence of
consciousness. For the distinguishing mark of a science lies not in
the selection of first principles, but in the care, and caution, and
precision with which they are applied." I sincerely hope that my
teachings are at least partly responsible for this opinion, for I be-
lieve that it is the correct view, and I heartily wish that it were held
by all psychologists.
The sad truth is that to-day psychology means very different
things even to psychologists themselves. Already I have pointed out
the fact that our biologists look upon the subject as a part of physi-
ology, as a branch of metaphysics, as a possible science in which the
methods of natural science are not applicable, or, as a genuine
science of the subjective. Scarcely less divergent are the views of
those who are really working in psychology. What can be expected
of a subject thus hampered? Surely we may not hope for rapid and
consistent progress until we have united whole-heartedly upon a
working basis and a definition of the aims of our science.
Only less important than agreement as to presuppositions is the
attitude of the psychologist toward his work. As a group we lack
that strength of faith in our aims, methods, and ability which alone
makes for success in research. We lack enthusiasm ; we are divided ;
we waver in our aims; we mistrust our methods as well as our as-
sumptions ; we question the value of every step forward, and, as an
inevitable result, our subject lags at the very threshold to the king-
dom of the sciences. In a startling and illuminating way the biol-
ogists believe in their aims and methods. Those who fail because of
lack of faith and enthusiasm are the exceptions in this domain. Of
the physicists and the chemists the same is true. And of the value
123
of this attitude toward one's work what further evidence is needed
than the achievements of the physical and biological sciences.
To no small extent, in my opinion, our lack of faith and en-
thusiasm is due to the third of the conditions mentioned above,
namely, our inadequate training for the tasks which we set ourselves.
Psychologists generally have not been rigorously trained in the meth-
ods of the natural sciences ; yet, these methods definite, precise, ex-
acting are now recognized by the masters among psychologists as the
methods of psychology. Teachers and investigators, no less than
students of the subject, come to their tasks often to the research
laboratory of experimental psychology with keen interest in specu-
lative philosophy and not infrequently with theoretical knowledge
of scientific method, but of the practises of the exact sciences many
of them know nothing from experience. A host of those of us who
are known as psychologists simply do not know how to observe or to
experiment with objects either physically or psychologically. 2 I
hold that it is absurdly inconsistent for us to expect psychology to
develop scientifically so long as the majority of her workers are
trained in metaphysics instead of in physics or psychics. Doubtless
I should hasten to add that I respect both the methods and the re-
sults of speculative philosophy, and that I object merely to the use
of the subject as a substitute for science of the naturalistic sort.
I am convinced that philosophy does not give the training which the
experimental psychologist needs. Surely it is well worth while for
us to ponder the fact that every psychologist would give more for
a single research student well trained in the physical and biological
sciences than for a dozen skilled and able speculative philosophers.
Above I have insisted upon training in physics or biology as a
preparation for Avork in psychology, but I should with equal willing-
ness accept training in any science or sciences of the psychological
group were they as highly developed on the side of method as are
the physical sciences. The time may come when psychology itself
will furnish as satisfactory training in scientific method as can now
be gained in the physical sciences. But until that time has come,
we should avail ourselves freely of the advantages which the physi-
cists have won and generously place at our disposal.
Finally, I wish to call attention to the fact that the prevalent
teaching of psychology is not such as to build up a conception of the
3 Although the greater part of my own contributions to science have been
physiological, I feel that I am entitled by my experience in teaching psychology
to include myself among the students of consciousness. Were it not for the
fact that during the past nine years I have given one or more introductory
courses' in general psychology, as well as an elementary course in comparative
psychology each year, I should not offer any criticisms of the subject.
124 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
subject as a science or to develop a strictly scientific attitude toward
it. Because of diversity in point of view and vagueness and uncer-
tainty as to aims and methods in the minds of those of us who teach
it, psychology is, as a rule, presented to elementary students quite
unsystematically and unscientifically. Talk with almost any one
who has taken only an introductory course in psychology in a col-
lege or normal school and the fact will appear that the subject means
to the individual either a curious hodge-podge of more or less
bizarre and mysterious phenomena or a study of the brain and cer-
tain of its functions! Whether it is worse to consider the subject
as the study of hypnotism, thought transference, spiritualistic phe-
nomena, delusions, illusions, and dreams, or as the study of brain
processes, I leave it to any one who is interested to decide. For my
part, I am content to do everything in my power to replace both of
these conceptions of the subject by the one to the exposition of which
this paper is devoted. It is indeed a serious admission, that of
psychology as the systematic and persistent attempt to describe and
explain the facts of consciousness the average student has no notion.
There is something radically wrong, for even an elementary course
should give each student a definite idea of the chief characteristics
of the materials of psychology, of its aims, of its methods, and of its
principal achievements.
ROBERT M. YERKES.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
LITERATURE AND THE "NEW" PHILOSOPHY
I HAPPENED the other day. after reading Professor James's
admirable volume, ' ' A Pluralistic Universe, ' ' to pick up a copy
of "Hamlet." Now it is one of the miraculous properties of that
protean play, that, read it when you will, you instantly become con-
vinced that it was expressly written to shed light on whatever
problem has most recently chanced to occupy your mind. And so,
on this occasion, it was not strange that before I had finished the
first act, I was aware that the prophetic soul of Shakespeare, dream-
ing on things to come, had forecast in the opening scenes of the
drama, in vividly symbolic form, the situation in philosophy at the
close of the first decade of the twentieth century.
I shall not pause, in imparting my discovery, to prove that the
metaphysic taught at the University of Wittenberg was an effete
form of transcendental idealism, or to suggest that the gentle Horatio
was a rationalist of the "viciously intellectual" type. I institute
no analogies between this little group of Danish ghost-raisers and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 125
our modern societies of psychical research. I even refrain from
comparing the spirit of Hamlet's father to that of the late Frederic
Myers (though it would obviously be difficult to prove that Shake-
speare did not have any or all of these parallels in mind). I pass
over these perhaps doubtful points to come to one that, subversive
of all tradition though it be, nobody could possibly miss: to the
fact, namely, that Hamlet himself was a "radical empiricist." No
one, to be sure, calls him so in the course of the play. (I wish some
one had. His retort would have been distinctly worth recording.)
But Shakespeare places the fact itself beyond cavil, for when the
muffled accents of the ghost make themselves heard from beneath the
platform, Horatio, whose world affords no place for wonders such as
this, breaks forth :
day and night, but this is wondrous strange!
words to which Hamlet flashes back the instant answer:
And therefore as a stranger give it welcome!
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
This is, indeed, Elsinore, on a night in the dim past. It is the utter-
ance of Hamlet to Horatio. Yet, alter but a word, as it were, and
centuries have slipped noiselessly by. We are in Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts. It is the voice of the author of "A Pluralistic Universe"
chiding some "thin" and "tender-minded" monist:
There are more things in heaven and earth,
etc.
But the full force of this startling parallel can not strike us until
we notice (what the casual reader may be counted on to miss 1 ) that
Hamlet is censuring only very incidentally the personal metaphysical
conceptions of Horatio; he is arraigning, rather, philosophy itself.
This midnight visitation of his father's spirit is an experience which
his own previous theories of life will not assimilate. Under the
pressure of this sudden enlargement of vision, the poet in Hamlet
(for he is both poet and philosopher) rises superior to the thinker,
and as he turns on his trembling companion, every fiber in his being
seems to say: "0 Horatio, Horatio, life is not the paltry thing that
that thin-haired old recluse at Wittenberg, with his dusty tomes and
still dustier syllogisms, would have had us think! Ah no! it is
filled with things more terrible than ever entered his conception.
1 The pronoun " your " in the phrase, " Than are dreamt of in your philos-
ophy," causes the trouble, it being used, as so often in Elizabethan writings,
in much the way in which we might now say, " It takes your American to
squander money."
126
It is beset at every step with fresh perils. It is packed with infinite
variety, shattering to bits our puny human formula?, luring us on
with thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls." Some such utter-
ance as this we read on Hamlet's countenance as he turns upon
Horatio ; with some such utterance of silent protest, poetry has, from
the beginning, turned upon philosophy. AVhen, then, in the year
nineteen hundred and nine, I behold philosophy again before the
bar, and hear words of indictment which are the very echo of Ham-
let's to Horatio, I can not but wonder whether the spirit of poetry,
unseen perhaps and unsuspected, may not again be near; whether,
when the clouds that now obscure the sky have lifted, we may not
behold the stars of philosophy and poetry in unwonted but auspicious
conjunction.
Surely such a conjunction should be in the course of nature, for,
often as it is forgotten, the goal of poet and philosopher is the same.
Each, in his own way, seeks to unveil the secret of the world. "What
is the nature of reality?" asks the philosopher. "AYhat is this thing
called life," is the (often unconscious) question of the poet, "life,
to which man is bound by such strange chains of destiny?" And
the answers to each question have been many. Yet, as we gaze back
at the history of those answers, we note a difference so radical and
seemingly so final that he who seeks to dwell on it or lend it signifi-
cance may expect a request, polite or impatient, as the case may be,
to cease insisting on a point so obvious, with a further hint that the
distinction which he makes is merely the inherent difference in
method of two quite separate functions of the human spirit. This
is, to be sure, partly true. Yet certain signs in the philosophic
firmament bid us pause with the question, whether, after all, the
difference is as ultimate, or its significance as obvious, as has been
assumed. Meanwhile, it is time to mention what that difference is.
Philosophy, almost from the first (for perhaps some of those old
lonians were wiser than their sons), has sought a scheme or pattern
to which it can be shown that the universe conforms. The philos-
opher is like a mighty geometer endeavoring to construct a diagram
which, when superimposed on life, will fit it perfectly. Or, again,
he is like a map-maker. Soaring aloft, he seeks a bird's-eye view
of the country beloAv, that he may see things in their true relations,
and so construct, with the nicest accuracy, a chart of the region over
which he gazes. Not so the poet. He, too, may rise above the world
to expand his soul with a sight of life's remoter reaches, a glimpse
of its mighty outlines. But he rises only that he may again descend.
By an imperative demand of his nature he must know how the hearts
are beating in those cities, how the birds are singing in the woods,
how the storms are tossing the sailors on the sea,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 127
" The cattle rising from the grass
His thought must follow where they pass;
The penitent with anguish bow'd
His thought must follow through the crowd.
Yes! all this eddying, motley throng
That sparkles in the sun along,
Girl, statesman, merchant, soldier bold,
Master and servant, young and old,
Grave, gay, child, parent, husband, wife,
He follows home, and lives their life."
This necessity may drive the poet 2 so far even as to make him feel
(and this is what is called realism in literature) that if he can but
report truly, in all its manifold detail, the life about a single door-
yard in some secluded hilltown of New England, he may have done
as much toward attaining a comprehensive knowledge of the country
as he who, from a loftier vantage point, has beheld the whole land
in perspective, traced every curve and angle of the coast from Maine
to California. The poet, in other words, must know not merely the
form and configuration of reality; he must know, too, its fiber and
tissue. The stuff out of which the vast tapestry of life is woven,,
the color and quality of every thread these are not less to him than
the pattern after which it is fashioned or the design with which it is
adorned. The texture of every block of granite, the veining of
every marble shaft these, not less than the type of architecture,
classic or gothic, that governs their assembling. The flesh and blood
of life, not less than the skeleton. The fragrance and color of the
flower, not less than its delicate outline. The lights and shadows
on the mountains, not less than the contour they cut against the sky.
And is not the poet right, absolutely right, in insisting that these
things make up a part of reality? Assuredly, if the analogies of
ordinary experience count for anything, the "meaning" of life can
not be the whole of life.
A battle is fought. Does its whole reality lie in the "cause,"
reduced to abstract propositions, for which each of the opposing
forces is contending? Is the roll of the musketry nothing, the flash
of glittering blades, the spurting of bright blood, the flags wreathed
in smoke, the cursings of the captains, the prayers of the dying?"
A ship sets out from port. Does the reality of its voyage consist
solely in the will or purpose of its owners ? Is every incident of its
a I hope it is superfluous to note that I am using the word " poet," through-
out this paper, in its widest, which is also its derivative, sense with no special
reference to the artisan in verse. (The term is so much more pregnant and
suggestive than phrases like " literary man " or " man of letters " ! ) " Poetry,"
Matthew Arnold has well said, " is simply the most beautiful, impressive, and
Avidely effective mode of saying things."
128 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
passage to be explained in terms of the chart in its cabin or the
warehouse across the sea to which its cargo is consigned? How of
the white sails and the green waves, of the wreck descried far off at
sunset, or the icebergs drifting by by moonlight; of the storm, the
crowding of the sailors, the quick launching of boats, the beating
heart of the stowaway in the hold, the captain still on the rail when
the vessel sinks? Surely it can not be wholly otherwise with the
voyage of life.
But these are mere metaphors, it will be urged. Perhaps so.
Yet it is well to bear in mind that it is of such elements as these that
the literatures of every race and every age assure us life is made.
It can not behoove philosophy lightly to set such evidence aside.
The tragedy and comedy of existence, its irony and romance, its
pathos and humor these may not, they plainly do not, make up the
whole of life, but it is hard to escape the conviction that there is
about them something ultimate. "Why else should they lend them-
selves so readily to designs of beauty?
If any one fails to feel wherein there is something ultimate in
these things, appeal may be made to an experience, which, I believe,
is well-nigh universal. Who, in reading poetry, has not suddenly
come on one of those "inevitable" lines or passages that send the
blood tingling through the veins? You draw a deep breath and
exclaim: "This is life; this is reality!" "Yes," you feel, "however
high reality may reach above this, however deep it may pierce be-
neath, however distantly it may stretch to the right hand or to the
left, here, at least, it goes no farther in."
I might give examples. But in these things one man can not
choose for another, nor can one tell how far the effectiveness of a
passage depends on a context which one's own memory unconsciously
supplies. For my part I have always felt this quality and how
often one feels it in simple poetry where the mere thought is nothing !
in these two lines of Arnold's, verses whose music seems to have
caught the very shiver of the early morn:
And 't was when night was bordering hard on dawn,
When air is chilliest, and the stars sunk low,
or in that single haunting line :
And the night waxes, and the shadows fall.
I feel it in the cry of "Wordsworth's forsaken Margaret:
My apprehensions come in crowds;
I dread the rustling of the grass;
The very shadows of the clouds
Have power to shake me as they pass:
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 129
I question things and do not find
One that will answer to my mind;
And all the world appears unkind.
For him who remembers the tragic life and death of Swift, it is
present, with terrible intensity, in those four words, "Only a
woman's hair"; while no one, surely, can fail to feel it in superla-
tive degree commingled, here, however, with something widely
different in the Biblical phrase, "And God shall wipe away all
tears from their eyes," or in the last words of Hamlet: "The rest
is silence."
But life itself, it will be said, even more potently than poetry,
gives us these same emotions. If it does, so much the better. But
every one can not say so, and hence it is the function of the poet to
quicken the senses of those who, having eyes and ears, neither see
nor hear. When he succeeds, we feel that his words have imprisoned,
once for all, the very essence of the object he is depicting, of the
emotion he is presenting. And this is just what I meant by saying
that the poet puts us in possession of the tissue and fiber of reality.
Any one understands what is meant by calling Shakespeare's
"King Lear" philosophic, or Dante's "Divine Comedy," or the
"Prometheus Bound" of ^Eschylus. These productions, whatever
else they have, possess something of that range and scope, that all-
inclusiveness, which we associate naturally with the very word
philosophy. But call a song of Burns' philosophic and you excite
either perplexity or mere contempt. "How ignorant the fellow is,"
thinks the person you address, ' ' of the most elementary definitions ! ' '
Yet, if philosophy be, indeed, a quest after reality, nothing can be
more certain than that the songs of Burns are among the most philo-
sophic writings in any language. The difference lies in this: that
their power is intensity rather than range ; they do not give us the
whole, but at a single point they do pierce through and touch the
heart of life.
"But you are hopelessly beside the mark," it will be urged in
answer to all I have been saying, "if you imagine that philosophy,
too, is not interested in the warp and woof of life. Have philoso-
phers forgotten to talk of substance and essence ? Does not this one
tell you the world is made of mind ? Does not that one tell you it is
made of matter?" Precisely; and sometimes with such discrimina-
tion that the matter might be substituted for the mind, or the mind
for the matter, and none would be the wiser. It is a curious fact
that even the most antithetical varieties of philosophical substance
have a strange family resemblance (not unlike that which has been
noted among skeletons), so that one must take care to keep them
130 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
clearly labeled or they are liable to get confused. But in the ordi-
nary world of real substances, of stocks and stones and Cheshire
cats, could such a mere interchange of names ever deceive even the
most ignorant? No; there a rose by any other name would smell
as sweet, and Romeo, though no longer Romeo, would be as dear to
Juliet. It is not the poet, your true worshipper of words, who is
oftenest the dupe of words. For that man, rather, who, caring
little for things verbal, indulges in the easy excess of abstract and
technical language, is reserved the righteous nemesis of mistaking
names for things. To talk much of " substance" argues no neces-
sary intimacy with the reality itself. In illustration of which fact,
I have sometimes, in my more depraved moments, pictured the
philosopher to myself under the figure of a little tailor into whose
shop the universe has wandered in search of ready-made coat and
trousers. The little tailor, bent solely on providing a perfect "fit,"
leaves quite out of account the question of "the goods" themselves,
whether they be gray or scarlet, tweed or calico. The universe, per-
ceiving that the little tailor's mind has been affected, arises and de-
parts. But he, quite unconscious that his customer has gone, dees
not relax his search, and long afterward we catch glimpses of him,
through the window, still absorbed in the quest (and coming, per-
haps, all unawares, ever nearer and nearer the attainment) of that
highly ideal entity, the substance of a perfect fit.
But leaving these low and libelous comparisons, let us return to
what we were saying. It is a fact of no less philosophical than philo-
logical import that no human words (so far as I know) have ever
conveyed a sense of the fabric of which life is made save words
packed with the flavor and memories of the sensible world. Sensa-
tion, Professor James tells us, philosophers have shown a tendency
to despise. No poet ever despised sensation. A painter might as
well despise color, or a sculptor clay. It has been asserted, until the
phrase has become mere cant, that the poet is the idealist. In one
sense, this is, of course, forever true. But he is also, it is high time
to insist, an incorrigible realist, wedded in indissoluble union, to the
sounds and scents and colors of the outer world. Many a romantic
writer has tried to break those bonds. Behold Shelley, most ethereal
of poets, striving to leave the world of sense behind as he mounts
upward into the "intense inane," and see how, in spite of himself,
he carries that world with him :
The breath whose might I have invoked in song
Descends on me; my spirit's bark is driven
Far from the shore, far from the trembling throng
Whose sails were never to the tempest given;
The massy earth and sphered skies are riven!
131
I am borne darkly, fearfully, afar;
Whilst burning through the inmost veil of Heaven,
The soul of Adonais, like a star,
Beacons from the abode where the Eternal are.
"Well may the world of sense say of such poets, in Emerson's phrase:
They reckon ill who leave me out;
When me they fly, I am the wings.
But now, to come to the conclusion at which I have all along been
aiming, if I have read these recent books of Professor James's aright,
their very pith and upshot is a call to philosophy to open its eyes to
just this world of sense from which the poet has so long been gath-
ering such fruitful harvests ; a call to philosophy to come back from
these far excursions over the surface of life and to discover life's
third dimension ; to abandon these quests after the North Pole of the
universe, leading as they do over a w r hite monotony of snow and ice,
and to find the gold-mine in its own cellar, the sunshine in its own
attic, or, better yet, the human hearts between the two.
I account it, therefore, much more than a coincidence that the
two men Professor James has singled out for especial praise, Fechner
and Bergson, are men having a plainly poetic element in their na-
tures. I know little of the philosophy of either at first hand, but
what is said in "A Pluralistic Universe" is in itself sufficiently con-
clusive. The spirit and atmosphere of these men, quite as much as
their theories, appeal to Professor James. After quoting Fechner 's
description of a spring walk (a description parts of which Cardinal
Newman might have written), he remarks: "Where there is no
vision the people perish. . . . Fechner had vision, and that is why
one can read him over and over again, and each time bring away a
fresh sense of reality. ' ' 3 More than one critic would accept that last
phrase as an excellent criterion of literary quality. Much the same,
also, might be affirmed of this on Bergson : ' ' . . . open Bergson, and
new horizons loom on every page you read. It is like the breath of
the morning and the song of birds." 4
And if these things are said of Fechner and Bergson, what shall
be said of Professor James himself? Damning as the indictment
may sound to those whose most precious possession is an intellect
chaste and unspotted from contact with lower functions of the soul,
there is, for the truthful man, no escape from the conclusion that
Professor James, too, looks at the world in the poetic way. His
writings have, at their best, exactly that clarifying and energizing
power which is the sure mark of poetic, or, if you will, literary, en-
*"A Pluralistic Universe," p. 165.
4 Ibid., p. 265.
132 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
dowment. His philosophy is to Professor James a vision. But he
who has a vision, and has, too (it is important to add), power to im-
part that vision to the world, is, in so far, a poet. These books are
that rare and admirable thing among productions of their kind-
examples of their own doctrine. They have a third dimension, fiber,
tissue, concreteness, thickness (the last, fortunately, not in the sense
in which some other philosophic works possess it). They persuade
by something larger than their logic.
But I am making it more and more certain that I shall be mis-
understood. If any one imagines that I am pleading for an oblitera-
tion of the distinction between philosophy and poetry, he wildly mis-
interprets me, and I, in my endeavor to drive home my point, am
punished, with peculiar justice, for treating an intricate subject in
all too simple outline. No; the spheres of poetry and philosophy,
their methods and missions, are distinct. I recommend to no meta-
physician the composition of lullabies or epics. But this does not
mean that philosophy and literature may not form alliances, offen-
sive or defensive, or even mingle their forces in fighting the battles
of the spirit. Far otherwise. And far otherwise, especially, at the
present moment! For if this new "empiricism" is, indeed, to be
the philosophy of the immediate future, if logic is to be plucked
down from the metaphysical throne, and the concrete at last to be
proclaimed the real, then, in consistency, two paths and only two
lie open. (1) Philosophy may resign her ancient place as one of the
great voices of the world and descend into the arena of practical
activity. This would be heroic; but it would also be, would it not
(if so mild an expression may be pardoned), slightly suicidal? For
in that case, though she might be bestowing on the world something
better than philosophy, she could hardly be said, unless words have
lost their meaning, to be preserving her own identity. But (2) if
philosophy wishes still to speak, she must turn toward the one organ
which, as its history shows, has had some success in giving lasting
expression to the multifariousness of life. From science this new
philosophy has received her impetus, and from science she will con-
tinue to draw, in liberal measure, both facts and inspiration ; but in
seeking a voice for her discoveries, she must learn of literature, for
poetry, from the first, has been the voice of the infinite variety of
the world.
Unless she follows one of these two courses, the new philosophy
will be left, not merely in an impotent, but in a ridiculous, position.
For the man who, in solemn tones, utters the affecting creed, "I be-
lieve in the concrete, " is by no means, as he may suppose, extending
the conquests of metaphysics some leagues farther into the realm of
chaos and old night ; he is performing, on the other hand, the much
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 133
commoner and more benevolent act of adding to the gayety of na-
tions. The old irony of things has got him! He stands convicted
out of his own mouth! for of all the thin, pale ghosts of abstrac-
tion that ever paraded the philosophical platform, "the concrete"
is assuredly the thinnest and the palest. Let him, then, who has
placed his faith in any such bloodless hallucination of the mind,
fear lest, in an hour of disillusionment, he encounter, like Hamlet,
a more dreadful spectre, whose presence shall wrest from him, in
words not unlike Hamlet's own, the confession:
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in my philosophy.
HAROLD C. GODDARD.
SWABTHMORE COLLEGE.
A NOTE FROM PROFESSOR A. 0. LOVEJOY
COLUMBIA, MISSOURI, February 19, 1910.
To THE EDITOR OF THE JOURNAL OP PHILOSOPHY.
Sir: May I ask for a few lines of additional space to note an
erratum in a paper of mine in the issue of the JOURNAL for February
17 (Vol. VII., pp. 101-105) a slip in writing which escaped me in
too hasty proof-reading, and for which my own oversight is entirely
responsible? As all logicians who may have read the paper must
have noted, the phrase at the beginning of Rule IV., p. 104, should
be deleted, and the Rule should read as follows: "IV. When two
propositions between them exhaust all five possible cases, from the
falsity of either, the truth of the other may be inferred." This, of
course, is true whether or not the two propositions be compatible
with any common cases.
ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Religion and the Modern Mind and Other Essays in Modernism. FRANK
CARLTON DOAN. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1909. Pp.
ix + 201.
This volume is intended as a contribution to religion. Its interest to
the philosophical reader lies in its relation to pragmatism. Many have
asked of late, " What is the religious import of the new philosophy ? "
We have before us now a work which may be briefly characterized as the
gospel of humanism, on the basis of the pragmatic philosophy. It is not
to be supposed that this new gospel is expected to appeal to all men. It
is intended for what the author calls the " modern mind." The " modern
mind," says our author, " is by no means the average mind. . . . By
134 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
modern I mean the rare and sincerely open mind, the man conscious of
himself in relation to a full modern culture, unbounded by historic forms
and terms. . . . The man I call modern, whether for good or ill, is a man
without a conscious history ; he is without any religious traditions " (pp.
22-25). This new religion of humanity is a declaration of independence.
Independence not only of the rationalistic theology of the past, but also
of the religious history of the race. The method by which the new
religious attitude is to be acquired may be seen from a few quotations.
"Well, then, what does the modern mind want God to be? What are
man's lasting wants, his eternal needs? That's the question. Then,
dare to convert these eternal wants into resolute pulls upon being's
sources! Enter the free region of the Unknowable and stake out your
claims! Assert your right to find in God what your human life most
profoundly needs! Stake your life upon the trustworthiness of the
eternal! Hold fast to that! Demand what you need of that! Believe
in that! And, as God lives, that will come true in the end! This is the
method" (p. 34). We have heard before of the "will to believe." We
are called upon now to take the small step from this epistemological will
to the ontological will, the will to create. To be sure we are told that the
universe is not absolutely plastic to our desire, but " Doubt it not ! There
is a region of being what the philosophers call the Unknowable where
the facts are undetermined, where your poor human ' say so ' counts
tremendously ! It is the region of ' Man ' and ' God,' the habitation of
the ' God-Man ' of the modern mind."
" The modern man needs a new prophet who shall reveal the mystic
humanity of God; a prophet of the universal human life and righteous-
ness of God. He will bring close to man a God whose humane spirit has
lived and grown through practically infinite time and over practically
infinite space; a spirit which age after age in constant hopefulness and
patience has guided the very stars to serve the spirits of men; a God-Man
who through the ages has developed a hopefulness which can nevermore
give up its experiment of love among men, so long as one solitary soul
continues to live in right affectionate relation with this invisibly human
life; a great moral companion living and growing with and through the
human life; an infinitely human God with all of a man's mysterious
powers and sympathies. . . . This is the religion of the modern man,
conscious of his deepest needs and powers: a confident belief in the final
purity, dignity, and goodness, the actual presence of all his passions in a
living God. Man, an infinite god: God, an infinite man. This is the
religion, I tell you! How long, O Man-God, must men of the modern
mind await thy prophet?" (p. 51).
We are exhorted to acquire this new religion by trying what our
author calls, " an experiment in divinity." " The point is, to strip your
manhood most scrupulously, most painfully bare of all its filthy parts, to
lay aside your beastialities and liberate your manhoods, to expose the
naked, cold-as-steel soul of you to the eternal tempering energy of the
world's fire-dust; then by reacting to transpierce the universe's self with
this pure and strong manhood you bear, and call the resulting experience
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 135
God, God-Man, Man-God, or by what name soever God may will. That
experience is your religion's sole deep concern. That experience is you;
it is God. Perhaps this will appeal, I say, to men of iron constitution.
God grant this." In one place the author very happily denominates his
religion of humanity as a " mysticism of the will." In spite of the eman-
cipation from the religion of the past most of the ideas of the new religion
sound quite familiar, though often inverted. Traditional religion has
taught that in God we live and move and have our being ; the new religion
teaches that God lives and moves and has his being in us. The old said
God made us, the new exhorts us to make God. The old said God made
man in his own image, the new says let man make God in his own image.
The old regarded God as infinite and perfect, the new regards him as finite
and imperfect. Psychologists have noted that when one puts his head
between his feet and looks at the landscape inverted he sees the colors of
nature with a new and pristine vividness. No doubt there are tempera-
ments in which the religious consciousness is similarly vivified by inver-
sion. To certain temperaments no doubt this volume will present a
powerful and ennobling appeal. Most minds, however, seem to require at
least an illusion of objectivity in the object of their worship. The
religious nature of few men can be satisfied by a conscious product of
the " creative virtue of a religious enthusiasm." The author character-
ized the religions of the past as " vague " and " vacuous." To the present
writer it would seem that these adjectives might apply no less to the new.
In an appendix are republished the two articles, " An Outline of
Cosmic Humanism " and " The Cosmic Character," which appeared in
numbers 3 and 12, Vol. VI., of this JOURNAL.
E. C. FRENCH.
UNIVEBSITY OF NEBRASKA.
Wellesley College Studies in Psychology. No. 1. A Study in Memorizing
Various Materials by the Reconstruction Method. ELEANOR A. McC.
GAMBLE. Lancaster, Pa., and Baltimore, Md. : The Review Publishing
Co. Pp. v-f210.
The latest monograph supplement of the Psychological Review by
Professor Eleanor A. McC. Gamble is an account of a series of experiments
on herself and a number of other subjects in memorizing smells, colors, and
nonsense syllables. The experiments were conducted mainly at the psy-
chological laboratory of Wellesley College during a period of seven years
ending in December, 1908. The author of the monograph was the chief
subject as well as the chief experimenter.
The memory tests were made by the reconstruction method, which is as
follows: A number of objects are presented in succession; the subject is
then required to rearrange these objects in the same order in which they
were presented. The mode of procedure in the experiments with smells,
which formed the most novel part of the investigation, was to place the
scents in bottles of uniform size and shape which were handed to the
blindfolded subject, one at a time, at intervals of about five seconds; the
136 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
subject removed the stoppers and smelled the contents. After the pres-
entation of a series was completed, the subject was again handed the first
bottles as a starter, required to take up the others and, guided by smell
alone, to arrange them on the table in the same order in which they had
been first presented to her. If the subject failed to reproduce the series in
the right order, the bottles were again presented as at first and she tried
again. This was repeated until the series was correctly reproduced.
These experiments were of a rather rough nature, as the author takes
pains to assert. The experiments with smells were unavoidably so, and
those with colors and syllables were not made of a more rigorous char-
acter in order that the results derived from them might be comparable
with those from the smell experiments. No exact time was observed
between each presentation of a stimulus, and none between the com-
pletion of a presentation series and the beginning of reconstruction. The
experiments were conducted through a long period of time, under various
circumstances, with subjects of unequal training. The author believes,
and justly, that the great number of experiments and the uniformity
of the results lends significance to the work. Within the limits imposed
by the character of the investigation an immense amount of painstaking
was evidently expended. The monumental labor of the chief subject and
experimenter, the author of the monograph, deserves hearty commenda-
tion.
As many as 129 different scents were used at one stage of the investi-
gation, but these were reduced during the last two years to 83. One
hundred and thirty-six different colors were used, consisting of two-inch
squares cut from the Milton Bradley kindergarten papers. The nonsense
syllables were constructed in accordance with the precautions that have
been worked out by various investigators.
The most striking result obtained from these experiments was the
small number of repetitions necessary for a perfect reconstruction of a
series as compared with the number of repetitions necessary for the
perfect recitation of a series of nonsense syllables by the method of com-
plete memorizing. In these experiments, it should be remembered, the
subject was required to memorize the order in which the members of a
series were presented, but not the members themselves. The principal
subject was able to reconstruct series of 41 and 81 smells with an aver-
age repetition not exceeding 2.8. When the subject's practise was at its
maximum, series of 30 smells were perfectly reconstructed with an aver-
age of 2.2 repetitions. A less degree of perfection, called by the author
"correct reconstruction," meaning reconstruction after hesitation and
fumbling, was attained with 1.8 repetitions. With series of from 13 to 16
members at the outset of the color experiments, the average number of
repetitions for perfect reconstruction was 2.1. The serial order of non-
sense syllables slowly presented was just as easy to learn as the order of
smells and colors. The effect of practise was to reduce the number of
necessary repetitions to the same number for longer and longer series.
These results are in striking contrast to those obtained by Ebbing-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 137
haus by his method. He was able to recite series of 12 syllables (read
rapidly) only after from 14 to 16 repetitions, series of 16 only after 30
and series of 36 only after 55. The number of repetitions increased with
surprising rapidity as the length of the series increased. The limit of the
length of the series Ebbinghaus could memorize was sharply defined. He
found that when the number of series members exceeded even by a little
the maximal number which one could just master after a single presenta-
tion, the number of members retained was less than when the series was
shorter. Our author found, on the contrary, by her method of memoriz-
ing, that the number of repetitions necessary to memorize did not in-
crease with surprising rapidity as the series length increased, but increased
with surprising slowness. The subjects were generally able to remember
after one presentation of a long series rather more than after one pres-
entation of a shorter series. And, finally, there was no sharp limit to
the length of the series which a subject could reproduce after a single
presentation.
The fewer repetitions necessary by the reconstruction method than
by the methods of Ebbinghaus and of Miiller and Schumann are ascribed
by the author to the leisurely recall and the slow method of presentation
in the reconstruction method. As a consequence of this slowness, there is
a lessening of the conflict between incipient associations associations do
not cross and interfere with one another and there is a development of
a memorizing technique which can not be gained with rapid repetition.
Highly interesting introspective observations are given by the author of
her own technique, which does not consist of mnemonic devices but of
better apprehensions, grouping, and associating stereotyped imagery with
non-verbal material. With her acquired technique she was able to mem-
orize 81 nonsense syllables by the method of complete memorizing in less
time than she had done it by the reconstruction method in three quarters
of an hour, the syllables being presented and recited at approximately
one second intervals. It had taken about an hour and a quarter by the
reconstruction method.
The author offers some valuable suggestions on the conduct of the
memory and concludes with the observations that practise is probably
transferable only within very narrow limits, that one's brute retentiveness
can not be improved by training, but that a very great difference can
surely be made by training in what one can do with one's brute retentive-
ness along specific lines.
ABRAM LIPSKY.
NEW YORK.
138 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. January, 1910.
The Ethical Aspect of the New Theology (pp. 129-140) : J. H. MUIRHEAD.
- The New Theology rightly emphasizes the divine immanence but in the
interest of morality must also recognize the divine transcendence. This
suggests that the basis of theology must be in the thought of God as a
unity of ideals at once beyond and active in human life. The Present
Task of Ethical Theory (pp. 141-151) : JAMES H. TUFTS. - In view of the
present increasing development of scientific method and its successful
application to the problems of life and society and also of the increase in
social organization of all kinds, ethics should consider the reconstruction
of such concepts as those of reason, the self, freedom, happiness, the state,
our notions of which have been worked out under conditions quite dif-
ferent from those of to-day. The Philosophical Attitude (pp. 152-167) :
W. R. SORLEY. - The philosopher must consider both the nature of reality
and the meaning of value, hence he must attain a point of view from
which their relations are intelligible and this involves something more
than loyalty to facts: it needs equal loyalty to ideals of worth. Christian
Morals and the Competitive System (pp. 168-184) : THORSTEIX YEBLEN. -
The Christian principles of humility and mutual aid arose out of the
servile conditions of late Roman times, the latter a reversion to primitive
savage culture. The competitive principle is based on the economic con-
ditions of petty trade following the revival of industry. These latter
conditions being temporary, the ancient racial bias embodied in the
Christian principle of brotherhood should gain ground at the expense of
the pecuniary morals of the competitive system. Pauperism: Facts and
Theories (pp. 185-198): THOMAS JONES. -A discussion of the majority
and minority reports of the Poor Law Commission in Great Britain and
an approval of the preventive policy recommended in the latter. Ethics
and Language (pp. 199-216) : C. W. SUPER. - A study of certain ethical
concepts as embodied in language and illustrated in its history. Book
Reviews: W. H. Urban, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws: HELEN WODE-
HOUSE. J. MacCunn, Six Radical Thinkers: E. BARKER. W. Bennett,
The Ethical Aspects of Evolution: HENRY STURT. Paul Sourian, Les
Conditions du Bonheur: S. WATERLOW. Charles H. Cooley, Social
Crganization: C. A. ELLWOOD. Graham Wallas, Human Nature in
Politics: W. J. ROBERTS. Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism:
W. J. ROBERTS. A. C. Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry: F. M.
STAWELL. Georges Pellissier, Voltaire Philosophe: S. WATERLOW.
William James, The Meaning of Truth: E. B. McGiLVARY. G. S. Brett,
The Philosophy of Gassendi: HUGH A. REYBURN. Rudolph Otto, Life
and Ministry of Jesus: NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.
Arnold, Felix. Attention and Interest. New York: The Macmillan
Company. 1910. Pp. 272.
Bacon, Roger. Opera hactenus inedita. Fasc. I., De Viciis Contractis
in Studio Theologie, Fragmenta qua? supersunt nunc primum, edidit
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 139
Robert Steele, Oxford : Clarendon Press. Pp. viii, 56 ; Fasc. II.,
Liber Primus Communium Naturalium Fratris Rogeri, Partes
Prima et Secunda, edidit Robert Steele. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pp. iv, 137.
Baldwin, James Mark. Darwin and the Humanities. Baltimore: Re-
view Publishing Co. 1909. Pp. x + 118.
Bergman, Hugo. Das Philosophische Werk Bernard Bolzanos, nebst
einem Anhange : Bolzano's Beitrage zur philosophischen Grundlegung
der Mathematik. Halle : Niemeyer. 1909. Pp. xiv + 230.
Bury, R. G. The Symposium of Plato, with Introduction, Critical Notes
and Commentary. Cambridge : Heffer & Sons. London : Simp-
kin, Marshall. 1909. Pp. Ixxi + 179.
Cook, Helen Dodd. Die Taktile Schatzung von ausgefullten und leeren
Strecken. Leipzig: Wilhelm Englemann. 1910. Pp. 130.
King, Irving. The Development of Religion. New York: The Mac-
millan Company. 1910. Pp. xxiii -f 371. $1.75.
Loeb, Jacques. Die Bedeutung der Tropismen fiir die Psychologie.
Leipzig: Barth. 1909. Pp. 51.
Mendousse, P. L'ame de 1'adolescent. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1909. Pp.
v + 315.
Ribera, Julian. La supersticion pedagogica. 2 Vols. Madrid: Im-
prenta Iberica E. Maestre. 1910. Pp. 236, 262.
Ribot, Th. Problemes de Psychologie Affective. Paris: Alcan. 1910.
Pp. 172.
Savage, George H. The Harveian Oration on Experimental Psychology
and Hypnotism. London: Henry Frowde. Oxford University Press.
1909. Pp.44. Is.
Schinz, Albert. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a forerunner of Pragmatism.
Reprinted from the Monist, October, 1909. Chicago : The Open Court
Publishing Company. 1909. Pp. iii + 39.
Steenbergen, Albert. Henri Bergsons Intuitive Philosophie. Jena:
Engen Diederichs. 1909. Pp. 110.
NOTES AND NEWS
PROFESSOR MORRIS JASTROW, JR., professor of semetic languages in the
University of Pennsylvania, has begun a course of six lectures on " The
Religion of Babylonia and Assyria," to be delivered in the Adams Chapel
of the Union Theological Seminary, 700 Park Avenue, New York, under
the auspices of the American Committee for Lectures on the History of
Religion. Professor Jastrow's program is as follows : At 4:30, Friday,
February 25, "Culture and Religion"; Tuesday, March 1, "The Pan-
theon"; Friday, March 4, "Divination"; Tuesday, March 8, "Astrol-
ogy"; Friday, March 11, "Temples and Cults"; Tuesday, March 15,
"Life after Death"; Ethics.
140 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PROFESSOR JOSEPH JASTROW, of the department of psychology of the
University of Wisconsin, has accepted the general editorship of a new
series of psychological manuals for the general reader, to be known as the
" Conduct and Mind Series." His own contribution to the series will be
a work on " Character and Temperament." The introduction to an Eng-
lish edition of Professor Gross's " Criminal Psychology," about to be
issued as the first number of a series of translations of important foreign
works on the subject by the American Institute of Criminology, will be
written by Dr. Jastrow. He left the university the second week of Feb-
ruary to spend the second half year as lecturer at Columbia University.
SEVEN lectures on Contemporary Philosophic Thought, by members of
the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University, will be given in
Earl Hall at 4 :10 P.M. as follows : March 1, " Bergson," Dr. Pitkin ;
March 8, " Maeterlinck," Professor Dewey ; March 15, " Poincare," Dr.
Brown ; March 22, " William James," Professor Miller ; March 29,
"George Santayana," Dr. Bush; April 5, " Josiah Royce," Professor
Montague ; April 12, " Eucken," Professor Lord.
PROFESSOR J. MARK BALDWIN has withdrawn from his editorial con-
nection with the Psychological Review and affiliated publications. Pro-
fessor Baldwin's services in promoting the publication of psychological
studies in this country have been exceptionally great. His resignation is
learned with sincere regret.
THE French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences has elected
Professor William James, of Harvard University, a foreign member of
the society, in the room of the late M. de Martens, of St. Petersburg.
Professor James has been a corresponding member of the academy since
1898.
JAMES S. REID, professor of ancient history in the University of Cam-
bridge, England, will give two courses at Columbia University, one on
Roman Philosophy, with special reference to the De Finibus of Cicero,
Mondays and Thursdays at 3:10, beginning on March 3, and one, for a
limited number of students, on Greek Stoicism, Fridays, 3-5, beginning
March 4. Professor Reid will lecture under the auspices of the depart-
ment of classical philosophy.
PROFESSOR ETIENNE EMILE BOUTROUX, of Paris, will give a course of
lectures at Harvard, and will give also four public addresses at Cambridge
upon the " Essence of Religion " and the " Movement of Contemporane-
ous Philosophy."
DR. BERNARD BOSANQUET, formerly professor of moral philosophy in
St. Andrews University, has been asked by the Senatus of Edinburgh
University to become the Gifford lecturer for the usual period of three
years, from October, 1911.
VOL. VII No 6. MARCH 16, 1910
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
"A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE" AND THE LOGIC OF
IRRATIONALISM 1
THE eight lectures which comprise this book may be regarded -as
constituting something more than a prolegomenon to that sys-
tem of pluralistic metaphysics which the readers of Professor James
have so long been expecting. To the present writer the work appears
to fall into two distinct parts: the first consisting of a convincing
arraignment of the monistic conclusions and aprioristic methods of
Hegel and his modern followers together with an exposition and
defense of such pluralistic conclusions and empirical methods as
those of Fechner, while the second consists of a very unconvincing
exposition and defense of Bergson's critique of intellectualistic logic.
I shall in this review consider the two parts of the book separately,
attempting a sympathetic summary, largely in the author's own
words of the first part, and a general criticism of the second part.
The introductory lecture is itself an admirable example of that
free and unstilted method of philosophizing the propriety of which
its author is at pains to defend. It contains an unconventional sur-
vey of present-day tendencies in philosophy, together with careful
definitions of the various philosophical doctrines which the lectures
will discuss. Empiricism is defined as "the habit of explaining
wholes by parts," and rationalism as the opposite "habit of explain-
ing parts by wholes." Aside from this division of method philo-
sophical systems may be divided into the spiritualistic and the
materialistic. The materialistic standpoint is passed over as being
unlikely to interest the auditors of the lectures and the author pro-
ceeds to divide spiritualism into theism which "makes a duality of
man and God and leaves man an outsider" and pantheism which
expresses "the vision of God as the indwelling divine rather than the
external creator, and of human life as part and parcel of that deep
reality" (p. 30). Finally this pantheistic view is subdivided into a
*"A Pluralistic Universe," by William James. New York: Longmans.
Green and Co., 1909.
141
142 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
monistic or absolutistic and a pluralistic or empirical species.
According to absolutism the substance of things "becomes fully
divine only in the form of totality and is not its real self in any form
but the all-form, while the pluralistic view is willing to believe that
there may ultimately never be an aZZ-form at all, that the substance
of reality may never get totally collected, . . . and that a distributive
form of reality, the each-form, is logically as acceptable and em-
pirically as probable as the all-form commonly acquiesced in as so
obviously the self-evident thing. The contrast between these two
forms of a reality which we will agree to suppose substantially
spiritual is practically the topic of this course of lectures" (p. 34).
The second lecture is mainly a criticism of absolute idealism as
propounded by Bradley and Royce. The ' ' f oreignness ' ' of the abso-
lute is the first great objection which the author urges against it.
"Mr. Bradley 's absolute is neither intelligence nor will, neither a
self nor a collection of selves, neither truthful, good nor beautiful as
we understand these terms. It is in short a metaphysical monster.
... It is us, and all other appearances, but none of us a$ such, for
in it we are all 'transmuted' and its own as-suchness is of another
denomination altogether" (pp. 46-^7). In this and similar criti-
cisms, the author hardly takes sufficient account of Mr. Bradley 's
contention that while the absolute is not truthful, beautiful, etc., as
such, it does possess the positive and precious elements in each of
these forms of experience, and omits in its own synthesis of perfec-
tions only the negative and imperfect elements with which these
ideals are tainted in our finite experience. A peculiar aggravation
of the foreignness of the absolute lies for Professor James in its
timelessness. "It repels our sympathy because it has no history.
As such the absolute neither acts nor suffers, nor loves nor hates ; it
has no needs, desires, or aspirations, no failures or successes, friends
or enemies, victories or defeats" (pp. 47-48). Pluralism, in exor-
cising the absolute, exorcises the great de-realizer of the only life we
are at home in, and thus redeems the nature of reality from essential
foreignness" (pp. 49-50). The tendency of the absolutists to fly to
extremes and to propound false dilemmas to their adversaries is also
criticized in this chapter. The absolutists charge pluralists with
defending a world in which the facts exist independently of one
another, and then proceed to interpret the term independence in such
an extreme sense as to bar out all continuity and relation between the
several facts. Having shown up to their own satisfaction the ab-
surdity of such a conception, they draw the conclusion that the only
alternative is a world in which there is no independent existence at
all, each element being regarded a mere appearance or manifestation
of one fundamental and all-embracing unity. Lotze's criticism of
143
interaction is cited by the author as a sample of this type of fallacy.
To say that when two things appear to interact, they must be re-
garded as in reality two aspects of one thing, does not afford more
than a merely verbal solution of the difficulty. Royce's attack on
realism on the ground that if the object known could exist inde-
pendently of the knower it could never enter into relation with the
knower and could therefore never be an object of knowledge, is cited
as a second case of the tendency of the intellectualist to fly to ex-
tremes. "Professor Taylor is so naif in this habit of thinking only
in extremes that he charges the pluralists with cutting the ground
from under their own feet in not consistently following it themselves.
What pluralists say is that a universe really connected loosely, after
the pattern of our daily experience, is possible, and that for certain
reasons it is the hypothesis to be preferred. What Professor Taylor
thinks they naturally must or should say is that any other sort of
universe is logically impossible, and that a totality of things inter-
related like the world of the monists is not a hypothesis that can be
seriously thought out at all. Meanwhile no sensible pluralist either
flies or wants to fly to this dogmatic extreme" (p. 76). Professor
James uses the term "vicious intellectualism " to characterize this
general defect of absolutistic reasoning. "The treating of a name
as excluding from the fact named what the name's definition fails
positively to include is what I call 'vicious intellectualism' " (p. 60).
Lecture III. is a comprehensive and illuminating study of "that
strange and powerful genius Hegel who has done more to strengthen
idealistic pantheism in thoughtful circles than all other influences
put together. ... In no philosophy is the fact that a philosopher's
vision and the technique he uses in proof of it are two different
things more palpably evident than in Hegel" (p. 85). "Pluralistic
empiricism knows that everything is in an environment, a surround-
ing world of other things and that if you leave it to work there it
will inevitably meet with friction and opposition from its neighbors.
. . . But Hegel saw this undesirable characteristic of the world we
live in in a non-empirical light. Let the mental idea of the thing
work in your thought all alone, he fancied, and just the same conse-
quences will follow. It will be negated by the opposite ideas that
clog it, and can survive only by entering, along with them, into
some kind of treaty. This treaty will be an instance of the so-
called 'higher synthesis' of everything with its negative; and
Hegel's originality lay in transporting the process from the sphere
of percepts to that of concepts and treating it as the universal
method by which every kind of life, logical, physical or psycholog-
ical, is mediated. . . . Concepts were not in his eyes the static self-
contained things that previous logicians had supposed, but were
144 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
germinative and passed beyond themselves into each other by what
he called their immanent dialectic. . . . This view of concepts is
Hegel's revolutionary performance; . . . What he did with the
category of negation was his most original stroke" (pp. 90, 91, 92,
93). After thus stating his general interpretation of the Hegelian
philosophy, Professor James proceeds to illustrate it in detail, and to
show how the true and valuable parts of the system are due to
Hegel's vision of experience as a continuum in which the elements
are perpetually flowing into one another, while the false and barren
parts are due to his mistaken attempt to translate this perceptual
vision into an artificial dialectic of concepts.
At the end of this chapter the author returns to his attack upon
the monistic theory of the absolute, but from a somewhat different
point of view from that of his previous attacks. He now criticizes the
conception not so much on the basis of the false methods by which
it is inferred, but on the ground of its inadequacy to satisfy the very
demands of human experience from which it originated. Professor
James concedes to the absolutists that their theory satisfies the crav-
ing for mental peace. It allows us to believe that ultimately and
somehow all's right with the world. This belief is a source of com-
fort when we wish to take a moral holiday, to relax our own efforts
to better the scheme of things. If we are assured that our weak-
nesses of omission and even of commission are together with all other
forms of evil certain of being transmuted into good in that higher
synthesis which is more real than all else, why may we not rest from
our struggles confident that the world is guaranteed against any real
loss? Professor James might have added that even this point of
the doctrine is of questionable value in that it justifies not an oc-
casional but a perpetual moral holiday. For it is not only on Sun-
days in church, but also on week days in the stock market, that \vc
may salve our consciences with the comfortable conviction that the
absolute performs continuously his function of transmuting our
seeming evils into real good.
But passing from this point in favor of the absolute, Professor
James brings against it three specific objections. First there is the
familiar difficulty involved in the existence of evil. ' ' Grant that the
spectacle or world romance offered to itself by the absolute is in the
absolute's eyes perfect. Why would not the world be more perfect
by having the affair remain in just those terms, and by not having
any finite spectators to come in and add to what was perfect already
their innumerable imperfect manners of seing the same spectacle?
. . . Why, the absolute's total vision of things being so rational,
was it necessary to comminute it into all these coexisting inferior
fragmentary visions" (pp. 118-119). And again "The
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 145
perfect whole is certainly the whole of which the parts also are per-
fect. . . . The absolute is defined as the ideally perfect whole, yet
most of its parts, if not all, are admittedly imperfect. Evidently the
conception lacks internal consistency and yields us a problem rather
than a solution" (p. 124). The pluralist has no theoretical prob-
lem of evil. He accepts its existence as an ultimate datum and seeks
to change it. Believing in a finite God who is striving to remove the
evil that he did not make, he strives with him and can allow himself
no moral holidays because he knows that God needs his help and
needs it all the time.
A second objection that is here brought against the absolutists is
the sterility of their conception in helping us to interpret or under-
stand the world in which w r e live, "the absolute is useless for deduct-
ive purposes. . . . Whatever the details of experience may prove to
be, after the fact of them, the absolute will adopt them" (p. 126).
The third objection urged against the absolute is that in its capacity
of all-knower it must contemplate perpetually all that is trivial, all
that is silly, and all that is only negatively true. It must, for ex-
ample, know "that this table is not a chair, not a rhinoceros and not
a logarithm. . . . The rubbish in its mind would thus appear easily
to outweigh in amount the more desirable material. One would ex-
pect it fairly to burst with such an obesity, plethora, and superfaeta-
tion of useless information" (p. 128). To the reviewer this objec-
tion appears unfair, because it fails to credit the absolute with a
sense of proportion or perspective. The presence of unimportant
thoughts is only repugnant when they hold an important place in
the mind of the thinker, and distract the attention from what is
more important. With our limited scope of consciousness we can not
afford any time or energy when we are thinking of the positive char-
acters of a chair for the reflection that it is not a logarithm nor a
rhinoceros. Then again we should remember that the seeming bar-
renness of negative propositions is due to their being considered in
isolation from their positive correlates. The negative characters of
things exist only as consequences of their positive characters. It is
uninforming to know merely that the moon is not where the sun is,
but when we supplement this with a knowledge of the place where
the moon is the negative knowledge combines with the positive in a
perception of distance relation of sun and moon. The complete view
of the negative qualities of the things in the world would amount to
nothing more than the view of their positive relations to one another.
Put formally, we can say that the proposition A is not B is only a
back-handed and partial expression for the fuller truth that A is C.
But Professor James is content to claim for these various objec-
tions not that they refute completely the absolutistic theory, but that
146 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
they at least legitimize as a plausible hypothesis the rival pluralistic
belief in a " strung-along unfinished world in time ... a world in
which reality MAY exist in distributive form, in the shape not of an
all but of a set of eaches, . . . that are at any rate real enough to
have made themselves at least, appear to every one, whereas this
absolute has as yet appeared immediately to only a few mystics, and
indeed to them very ambiguously" (p. 129).
In the fourth lecture Professor James considers the philosophy
of Fechner as a system which resembles that of absolute idealism
on the single point of holding, that the many human conscious-
nesses are somehow combined in the unity of a superhuman con-
sciousness, but which differs from absolute idealism on all other
points. The most important of these differences are:
1. The cosmic mind of Fechner unifies and supplements its finite
elements without diminishing or transmuting their reality as indi-
vidual beings. We are constituent parts of the higher mind, but
are not in any sense its unreal appearances. The Fechnerian earth-
soul and the other still more inclusive souls are mightier than we.
but not more truly real.
2. For the meager abstract outline of a single absolute mind
which modern idealists present, Fechner substitutes the splendid
hierarchy of superhuman minds whose probable natures are con-
cretely portrayed in rich and plausible detail.
3. For the a priori intellectualistic dialectical methods by which
Hegel and his modern followers seek to prove their view, Fechner
substitutes the empirical methods of induction and analogy.
With sympathetic insight, Professor James gives to us a biograph-
ical sketch of Fechner, an account of his general standpoint and
many illustrations of his specific conclusions and the specific meth-
ods by which he attained them. One gains an impression of Fechner
as the ideal type of philosopher: one who combines the enthusiasm
and soaring imagination of a poet with the information and the in-
tellectual conscience of a man of science. To the followers of Hegel
the comparison of the two men should prove odiously effective. What
the author characterizes as the "thinness" of Hegel and more particu-
larly of his modern disciples, is set over against the "thickness" of
Fechner. By "thinness" the author means not only what he has
previously described as vicious intellectualism, but also the habit of
substituting the verbal refinements and subtleties of a dialectical
epistemology for the concrete and empirical problems which should
press on the philosopher for settlement. From thin methods result
thin conclusions conclusions that are meaner, abstract, and formal.
lacking in concreteness and detail. Fechner 's speculations are, on
the other hand, thick in method and in conclusion, which is to say
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 147
that they are conducted by empirical and inductive methods, and at-
tain to a corresponding concreteness of result. Of course what Pro-
fessor James praises in Fechner as "thickness" will be contemptu-
ously characterized by the Hegelians as "picture-thinking" and
"mythology"; while his attempt to enlist in the service of philos-
ophy the common or garden categories of mere physical science
will be regarded as an offense against the dignities of the profession.
But as if anticipating such objections Professor James reminds us
that the categories and the methods used by his hero are the only
ones that have proved adequate to produce universally accepted
bodies of doctrine. And it would be a pity if the dignity of phi-
losophy were incompatible with the employment of the only reliable
means of attaining truth.
At the beginning of this review I described Professor James's
book as an exposition and defense of two positions, the first com-
prising a refutation of the conclusions and methods of absolutism
together with a vindication of the conclusions and methods of
pluralism, the second comprising an examination and acceptance of
Bergson 's critique of the intellectualistic logic. With the chapter on
Fechner the evidence supporting the first of these two positions is
pretty much all in. It is true that here and there throughout the
remainder of the book, and more especially in the concluding
chapter, the author reiterates and supplements his earlier arguments.
But the principal theme of the last four chapters is the defense of
the new Bergsonian logic. To the reviewer the two parts of the
book seem to involve distinct issues. Certainly one might easily
agree with the author's conclusions as set forth in the first part and
radically disagree with those of the last part.
Lecture V., on the "Compounding of Consciousness," is a kind
of introduction to the new topic. Professor James begins by con-
fessing to a curious feeling of sympathy with certain phases of the
absolutist doctrine which as seen from the point of view of mere
logic can not be defended. The question which particularly troubles
our author and which has, as he tells us, troubled him for years, is
that of the identity or non-identity of a collective experience with the
sum of its seemingly constitutive distributive experiences. They can
not logically be identical, as the absolutist claims, because each
experience has its esse in its sentiri, and the experience of a whole is
not the sum of the experiences of its parts. But if, on the other
hand, we regard them as non-identical, as Professor James himself
had advocated in his ' ' Psychology, " " the whole philosophic position
thus produced is almost intolerable. Loyal to the logical kind of
rationalism, it is disloyal to every other kind. It makes the universe
discontinuous. These fields of experience that replace each other so
148 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
punctually, each knowing the same matter but in ever-widening con-
texts, from simplest feeling up to absolute knowledge, can they have
no being in common when their cognitive function is so manifestly
common ? If you reply that their common object is of itself enough
to make the many witnesses continuous, the same implacable logic
follows you how can one and the same object appear so variously.
Its diverse appearances break it into a plurality; and our world of
objects then falls into discontinuous pieces quite as much as did our
world of subjects. The resultant irrationality is quite intolerable"
(pp. 205-206). Here then is the dilemma which Professor Jamas
feels so poignantly that, after having, as he tells us, ' ' struggled with
the problem for years, covering hundreds of sheets of paper with
notes and memoranda" (p. 207), he is now willing to abandon the
old logic and adopt a Bergsonian irrationalism from the standpoint
of which any merely intellectualistic contradiction can be accepted
with the understanding that logical concepts and their relations are
but the imperfect means or instruments by which we try to control
the intrinsically illogical flux which constitutes the ultimate reality
of life. As the validity of this dilemma is crucial for most of the
conclusions that are stated in the latter half of the book, it behooves
us to examine it with some care. Professor James himself states
one possible way out, but only to reject it as useless. If the old
hypothesis of souls were revived it might, he tells us, be possible to
regard different souls as synthesizing differently the same mental
states. But, he adds, it would be vain to have recourse to this
hypothesis, for "You see no deeper into the fact that a hundred
sensations get compounded or known together by thinking that a
'soul' does the compounding than you see into a man's living eighty
years by thinking of him as an octogenarian. . . . Souls have worn
out both themselves and their welcome, that is the plain truth"
(pp. 209-210). And we may acquiesce in this verdict against the
soul at least so far as concerns its power to help us in this problem.
Let us then return to the author's main problem: How is it possible
to reconcile the conviction of common sense that the same things can
be at once both distributively and collectively known, ivith the log-
ical conviction that the experience of things as parts can not be iden-
tical with the experience of things as a whole? By way of criticism
I wish to demonstrate two theses (1) that there is a conception of ex-
perience that makes these supposedly incompatible demands per-
fectly compatible and logically compatible; (2) that even if this
were not so Professor James's condemnation of logic, as an imperfect
instrument for attaining truth, would not be justified. First with
regard to (1) : If the object experienced is not identical with the
act of experiencing it, i. e., if we conceive experience realistically as
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 149
a cognitive reference to an object other than the reference, there is
no more contradiction in thinking of many witnesses of the same
object than in thinking of many people pointing at the same object.
It is only the idealist who is compelled to admit that there are as
many objects as there are witnesses. For him the witnessing or act
of experience constitutes the object witnessed; its esse is percipi.
And if the world is objectively one system of facts then he is com-
pelled to hold that there is only one real self or witness the abso-
lute of whom we finite selves are the mere appearances. Now let
us extend this principle to the case in which the different witnesses
are supposed to witness the same object but in different aspects.
The child learning to read sees only the letters or perhaps the
words ; his teacher sees the letters and the words which the child sees,
but he sees also the sentence which the child does not see. The same
things are perceived by each witness, but one sees them in their col-
lective aspect or context while the other sees them only distributively.
From the realistic point of view there is no contradiction, no puzzle,
no mystery in this situation. To say that the same thing can have
many aspects and many relations means merely that many quali-
ties can be actualized or exemplified or coexistent in the same space
and time, and that relations that are different as respects one of
their terms are not different as respects the other. The same table
can be both wooden and round. The same number can be both half
of thirty and three times five. The same word can consist of the
letters d, o, g and also be the name for a familiar animal. And as a
thing is capable of having different qualities and relations without
prejudice to its numerical identity, so also it is capable of being
known to one witness in some of its aspects and to another witness
in other of its aspects. I perceive the table to be heavy and round,
you perceive it to be old and valuable. Do we therefore perceive
numerically different tables? Or, if human beings perceive only
fragments of the world and a superhuman being perceives not only
the fragments but the way they fit together, the collective aspect of
them, the meaning of the whole which they constitute would this
imply that we must either abandon logic or else abandon common-
sense and admit that there are two wholly separate worlds ? Surely
this proposed dilemna is absurd except on the single assumption
that the thing experienced is the experience of that thing. If this
assumption were true then it would indeed follow that things ex-
perienced collectively, as by an absolute, could have nothing in com-
mon with things experienced distributively, as by us. For the
experience of a whole is not numerically identical with the experi-
ence of its parts. The experience of a table as merely round and
hard is not identical with the experience of it as old and valuable.
150 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
And what except this idealistic assumption can Professor James
have in mind when he says "If you reply that their common object
is of itself enough to make the many witnesses continuous, the same
implacable logic follows you how can one and the same object ap-
pear so variously? Its diverse appearances break it into a plural-
ity; and our world of objects then falls into discontinuous pieces
quite as much as did our world of subjects. The resultant irration-
ality is really intolerable" (p. 206). One further point in this con-
nection: Not only is it possible from the realistic standpoint for
many witnesses to view the same objects in their different aspects,
but it is also possible for the point of view of one witness to be as
such an object of knowledge for another witness. When I see a play
or read a novel I not only view the same objects that are viewed by
the fictitious persons, but their several view-points are themselves
experienced by me as elements of the situation. Any conscious sub-
ject can be himself the object for any other conscious subject.
There is then nothing logically self-contradictory in the absolutistic
conception of a supreme witness for whom the whole world of ob-
jects together with the finite witnesses of those objects is viewed as a
single unified system of experience and facts. Of course such a situ-
ation would not necessarily imply the dependence cf these facts
upon the will of the all-seeing witness, nor would it imply that our
finite selves were in any sense unreal or our points of view in any
sense false. To put the whole matter briefly the dilemma involved
in the problem of 'how mental states can be compounded' is a mere
bogey of the subjectivistic imagination. From the realistic stand-
point it has no existence; and yet it is on the supposed validity of
this dilemma that Professor James bases his revolutionary pro-
posal to abandon logic and its principle of contradiction as inade-
quate to formulate the irrational flux of reality. The whole proced-
ure is the more surprising because, if I mistake not. Professor
James's recent articles on the nature of consciousness have been
definitely realistic in tone. In his article "Does Consciousness
Exist?" I understood Professor James to advocate that form of
realism which had elsewhere been termed the relational theory of
consciousness the theory that consciousness does not exist as a
substance or as a series of qualities but only as a special kind of
togetherness or external relation into which the independently ex-
isting facts are brought by means of their causal connection with
the nervous system. From such a point of view "being known" or
"being experienced" would only mean "being in a certain relation
to an organism" and it would seem as easy for the same facts to have
membership in different systems (to be, for example, respectively,
collectively, and distributive!;/ experienced) as for the same object
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 151
to be pushed from behind and pulled from in front. But in that
part of ' ' The Pluralistic Universe ' ' now under discussion I can find
no trace of its author's recently published realistic theory of con-
sciousness but only the old noxious assumption that a cognitive
experient is essentially incapable of experiencing anything beyond
his own states and processes.
And now a word as to the second of the two theses offered by the
reviewer in protest against the author's proposal to abandon the
intellectualistic logic. Suppose that all of the above criticism is
invalid. Suppose that Professor James is right in believing that the
puzzle of how to reconcile with logic the evident community of the
each-form and the all-form of the same subject-matter is insoluble.
Would he even on this assumption be justified in regarding reality
as irrational? Zeno, the Eleatic, was confronted by precisely the
same type of situation as that which confronts Professor James.
For Zeno too felt that he had discovered an antinomy between sense-
experience on the one side and the intellect with its demand for
non-contradiction on the other. Motion was self-contradictory, but
motion was the all-pervasive fact of the world of sense. Zeno chose
the intellectualistic horn of the supposed dilemma. Motion and
consequently the whole world of experience was pronounced an
unreality, a mere appearance, a product of Maya, a case of non-
being. Pure abstract being as the only thing not tainted with self-
contradiction was alone real. Zeno's answer to the problem is un-
satisfactory because facts, when viewed from the practical
standpoint, do not exhibit any appreciable discomfiture when some
philosopher classifies them as subjective, nor are their puzzling or
paradoxical characters in any way theoretically clarified or ex-
plained by degrading them to the status of mere appearance.
It is as difficult for the mystic to reconcile the existence of evil with
the existence of an omnipotent God when evil is called a tragic il-
lusion as when it is called a fact ; it is as difficult for Zeno to explain
how Achilles can catch a tortoise in a world of non-being as in a
world of being; it is as difficult for Kant to explain the puzzles in-
volved in the infinity of space and time when these are called sub-
jective as when they are called objective; it is as difficult for
Bradley to explain the presence of the relational paradoxes in a
world of appearance as in a world of reality. From Zeno to Brad-
ley the attempts to solve the world's puzzles by calling the world
names such as "non-being" or "appearance" is fatuous and
leads nowhere. When Zeno found what seemed to him to be a
hopeless conflict between logic and experience he felt that he was
confronted with the dilemma of condemning one or the other to the
realm of unreality, and he preferred to condemn experience. But
152 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
he overlooked the third possibility. He might have confessed that
his use of logic must have been wrong, that what appeared to be
the irrationality of motion might in reality be simply his failure to
discover its rationality. Professor James feels himself in the same
dilemma and, like Zeno, he impales himself on one of the horns
only it is the opposite horn to the one appropriated by the Eleatic.
He prefers irrationalism to acosmism; Zeno prefers acosmism to ir-
rationalism. James is as oblivious as Zeno to the third possibility
the possibility that what appears to him to be the irrationality of
the collective-distributive identity may in reality be simply his fail-
ure to discover its rationality. It is as arrogant for a Bergsonian
as for an Eleatic to insist that the world must be either unreal or
irrational, simply because of a failure to solve one of the world 's prob-
lems. And not only are the two answers equally arrogant, but they
are equally irrelevant. We have seen that it is in no sense a relevant
answer to the question How is it logically possible for Achilles to
catch the tortoise? to say He catches him in a realm of non-being.
Is it not equally irrelevant to answer the question, How is it logically
possible for the same thing to be viewed under different aspects by
saying? It is not logically possible, but only illogically so. Any
problem of this kind is a question of giving a consistent and intel-
ligible analysis of a situation it is a question of how we can fit
logic to fact. If we can't make the fit, so much the worse for us.
We can grin and bear it or we can try again, but we certainly
should not flatter ourselves that we have solved a problem by taking
the position that it has no solution even if we dignify that position
by calling it Bergsonianism or anti-intellectualism. But to deny the
adequacy of logic to cope with experience and to regard this denial
as itself clarifying the situation is just such an irrelevancy. To de-
fend irrationalism or anti-intellectualism as a solvent of intellectual
problems is simply to say "I won't play." Indeed, on coming to
this latter part of the book I felt as if I were observing a great chess-
player who, having met move after move of his opponent with unfail-
ing success, becomes suddenly and needlessly puzzled by some trivial
attack and in a pet of discouragement kicks over the table, spills the
pieces, and then declares that he has won the game. Professor
James has found the old logic quite good enough to formulate his
attack on absolutism and his vindication of pluralism and one won-
ders how he can feel that his action in throwing it over is necessary,
justifiable, relevant, or helpful.
After stating at such length the reasons against adopting ir-
rationalism, I have little space left to follow out in detail Professor
James's use of the new method. The general view presented in
lectures VI. and VII. seems to me to be somewhat as follows : Real-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 153
ity is essentially a flux of pure experience in which nothing is abso-
lute, determinate, or static. The elan vital or driving principle of
this flux evolves thought as a secondary or subsidiary activity, the
function of which is to depict the qualities of the flux in terms that
are suited to control it. The way in which thought performs its
seemingly difficult function is to extract from the flux the qualities
which modify it, and perpetuate them in static form as concepts.
By observing the relations which subsist between these concepts we
can anticipate and control the course of life. But these concepts,
useful as they are, will be essentially incapable of presenting the
dynamic aspect of the flux. You can photograph a moving body in
any or all of its successive positions, but you can never photograph
the movement itself. A system of concepts will fall short of ade-
quately representing the living flux of reality in the same way and
for the same reason that a series of photographs fall short of ade-
quately portraying a moving body, or a series of cross sections of
portraying a developing embryo. The only way to get an insight
into life is to live. Intuition, and immediate experience, are alone
able to provide the element of continuity which is so characteristic
of the real. From this point of view we should expect to find the
intellect baffled in the attempt to conceptualize such problems as
those of Zeno relating to space, time, and motion. And on the same
basis with the Zenonian problems is the especial bete noire of our
author the problem of how one and the same system can have the
each-form of distributive plurality and the all-form of collective
unity. What is logically self-contradictory is intuitively and ex-
perientially intelligible. And the interpenetration of each member
of a system with all the other members is repugnant to logic only
bcause logic is not adapted to express the synechistic essence of the
living real.
To this Bergsonian 2 view of the thought-function I will mention
but one objection. In ascribing to thought a power of extracting
from reality certain of its elements, it commits precisely the same
fault and falls into the same confusion that can be charged to the
vicious intellectualism of Bradley and Hegel. The confusion con-
sists in ascribing to objects of thought the properties of thought-
symbols. And the fault consists in regarding the activity of thought
as in some way constitutive or reconstitutive of its own objects.
When I make the judgment A is B, I do not tear out the attributes
A and B from the living unity of experienced reality and then try
to piece them together again by the use of the word is. I simply
a lt should be clearly understood that, both here and elsewhere, the position
which I am criticizing as Bergsonian is simply the position which, as I under-
stand it, Professor James ascribes to Bergson.
154 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
recognize that there are two qualities A and B and that these qual-
ities coexist in the same object or coinhere in the same substance.
Considered as written or oral symbols A and B are manipulated by
me. They are separated and then united. But the objective qualities
that they denote are in no sense changed or queered by the process.
They are simply apprehended as standing in a certain relation. As
Locke remarked, Man did not have to wait for Aristotle's definition
in order to become a rational animal. The attributes of rationality,
animality, and humanity coexisted in one object and to make the
judgment "Man is a rational animal" is simply to call attention in
terms of symbols understood by your neighbors to the fact that you
have apprehended or recognized that relation. A judgment about an
object is not an event in the life of that object, but only in the life of
the person making the judgment. And yet from Kant down there
has been current the perfectly imbecile doctrine that in conception
we tear the immediately experienced reality into separate pieces and
in judgment we put the pieces together. Bradley recognizes that
we can 't get the pieces together satisfactorily, and on the strength of
this inability of thought to repair by its judgments the disrupting
work of its concepts, postulates an absolute whose business it is to
restore in an inconceivable manner the unity that our conceptual
experience has shattered into fragments of appearance. Now
Bergson, as represented by James, ascribes to thought the same
preposterous activity of disrupting the continuity of the given,
but instead of declaring reality to be superrational and postulating
an absolute he declares reality to be subrational and postulates an
elan vital. It seems to me extraordinarily perverse to suppose that
a flux or a movement or anything else becomes especially static or
discrete or in any way different from what it is simply by being
made an object of thought and having judgments made about it.
And yet if we confuse the properties of the objects thought of with
the properties of the thought-symbols, it is easy to see how the step
could be taken. The conceptual symbol for motion is static, and if
in order to think of motion I must identify it with its symbol, why
then of course I have falsified it and may expect to find my logic
helpless to do justice to its character. But when I conceive of motion
it is motion that I conceive of, and not a misrepresentative and static
substitute for it. When I attend to some aspect or element of the ex-
perienced flux, I have a concept of it, and this does not imply that
I have torn it out of its context and swallowed it, but only that I
am pointing to it, just as it is, in its context. To "think" is only to
attend selectively to the various elements, aspects, and relations of
the given reality, and to record in symbols that which I have ob-
served. To say that the intellect falsifies a reality that is continuous
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 155
and mobile because it breaks it up into cross-sections that are dis-
crete and static, is as wrong as to say that the eye can only see space
as a system of colored points. The eye has no difficulty in seeing
space as continuous and the intellect has no difficulty in apprehend-
ing change. When we are confronted with a situation that appears
to involve a paradox or an antinomy, such for example as Achilles
catching a tortoise or, if Professor James prefers, the collective
unity of distributively distinct elements, we should recognize that
the trouble is due not to the situation being unreal (Zeno), nor to the
staticizing misrepresentation of the intellect (Bergson), but rather
to our own private inability to apprehend certain relational aspects
of the facts before us.
These then are the considerations which I would urge in criti-
cism of our author's attempt to ally his own new metaphysics of
pluralism with the new logic of Bergson. But whether the logic of
irrationalism be logically valid or not, it seems to me beyond dis-
pute that such a logic has no necessary identity with the metaphysics
of pluralism. Each doctrine can stand or fall independently of the
other. Indeed, as far as I can see, this whole business of anti-intel-
lectualism is no more incongruous with monism than with pluralism.
Aside from Schopenhauer there have been various mystics who have
not been averse to associating the most extravagant forms of monism
with a hearty contempt for the logic of self-consistency.
And as a last word to this much-belated review, I should like to
express very timidly the hope that when Professor James publishes
his final system of pluralistic metaphysics he will, purely out of
kindness to those of his admirers and disciples who still have the
intellectualistic taint, consent to segregate all new and fancy logics
made in France, in an appendix, where those who want them can
find them, but where they will not intrude to dampen the enthusiasm
of those who don't.
W. P. MONTAGUE.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
TO RECONSIDER THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS
I
A RISTOTLE described the association of ideas as by contiguity
-jk- and resemblance. He also stated that the law of the process
is the law of habit. "Mental movements," he says, "follow one
another, this one after that, by habituation."
Modern psychology, beginning with Hume, accepted his descrip-
tion of the process and rediscovered his explanation. And the
156 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
psychology of association is now of two kinds, that which occu-
pies itself with describing the process, and that which occupies
itself with expounding the law. Of the latter James's book is an
example. He shows clearly, as is well known, how association by
contiguity and by similarity are both examples of the redintegration
of an experience following the law of habit. Association by con-
tiguity is obviously so : if I think of a football I think also of a field
and thus complete an experience. Association by similarity, less
obviously: if I think of a football, and realize its rotundity, I am
thinking of rotundity, which calls up the contiguous features of a
former experience, and so I am thinking of the moon.
All this is what Aristotle pointed to in what he said about habit.
Thus the cycle of development has been to start from Aristotle's
description of the process, and to arrive at his explanation of it.
II
Aristotle and his followers explain why association proceeds as it-
does, but neither he nor they explain why it proceeds. Nor do they
describe the point at which the process begins. Whereupon does a
similar or contiguous experience begin to be recalled? And why
does habitude in the brain make its past performances conscious?
Is not the similarity of to-day's experience to yesterday's the very
basis upon which I remain unconscious of yesterday's? And is not
habit what allows brain processes to become unconscious? And if
these statements are true how can a point of similarity begin the
recall of a former experience, or habit explain its coming into the
mind ?
Ill
The truth is that while we have apprehended the nature of the
process, we have accepted from Aristotle exactly the wrong names.
It is at a point of contrast that association begins, and it is upon
the interruption of habit that a former experience revives in the
mind. Similarity of experiences is a condition of thought, but an
important difference is its cause.
Hence a revision of terms might be made in the psychology of
association. Where one says association by similarity he might say
dissociation through contrast. Where he says association by con-
tiguity, he might say dissociation because of discontinuity, or some
such words. And where another says partial redintegration because
of habit, he might say the separating out or the recall of a past
experience when habit is upset. Memory, he should say, is inter-
rupted assimilation. At least he should say these things if he means
to show and explain when and why association, or thought, occurs.
If he wishes simply to show that it occurs, and also that it occurs in
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 157
one way rather than another, Aristotle's terminology will do. He
said nothing false about association, but he did not explain its
occurrence.
Perhaps the reason for this was that Aristotle was a system-
maker, and if thought, or any other thing, happened to be predictable
from or assumed in his highest principles, it would not occur to him
to give it a natural explanation. Which is itself an example of the
failure to think, or to dissociate ideas, because of the perfect opera-
tion of habit.
IV
It is possible, therefore, that the cycle of development in theories
of association will not close with Aristotle's statement about habit,
but will extend as far back as Plato. For Plato was not habituated
to any system of philosophy, and it could occur to him that anything
needed explaining. He suggests a good explanation of the occur-
rence of thought in the seventh book of "The Republic."
"I mean to say," he says, "that objects of sense are of two kinds;
some of them do not excite thought because the sense is an adequate
judge of them ; while in the case of other objects there is a mistrust
of the senses which only stimulates inquiry. . . .
"Exciting objects are those which give opposite sensations; as
when the sense coming upon the object, and this not only at a dis-
tance, but near, gives no more vivid idea of any particular object
than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer ;
here are three fingers a little finger, a second finger, and a middle
finger. . . .
"Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the
middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin
that makes no difference ; a finger is a finger all the same. And
in all these cases the question, What is a finger? is not presented to
the ordinary mind; for the sight never intimates to the soul that a
finger is other than a finger. . . .
"And therefore, I said, there is nothing here which excites or
quickens intelligence. ' '
Plato is credited with interrupting the course of true science.
But his was the most scientific approach that the ancients made to
psychology. It failed to stimulate Aristotle, and was lost. But it
may well be remembered because it was an attempt at a causal
explanation of what lesser scientists have taken for granted.
If my finger to-day is similar enough to my finger yesterday, in
quality and function, no association or recall occurs albeit similarity
and contiguity, habit and redintegration, are present respectively in
the objects and the brain. But when a difference occurs, a discon-
tinuity, a failure of function, a break in the cerebral repetition, when,
158
for instance, an unexpected thumb appears then the finger yester-
day becomes an associated idea. As Plato observed, it is when we
are shocked that intelligence is quickened.
V
A return to Plato in this matter affects logic and philosophy.
Logic assumes that the w ? orld appears infinitely various until thought
discovers identities in it, reducing it to order, and finally (at least in
hope) to unity. But in evolution and life, on the contrary, the world
appears first a mere succession of identical experiences, a nearly
perfect order, and only with the development of the organism do
difference and disorder appear. And although it becomes the busi-
ness of the nervous system to find and coordinate working similarities
in this increasing chaos, the fact remains that the differences increase
so long as the organism develops. The aspiration of the intellect,
therefore, need not be to hoard up identities, and perfect a system
a program which is within the attainment of a mollusc, and of any
one who wishes to abstract sufficiently from his perceptions. A wiser
aspiration would be to awake clearly to the greatest multitude of
differences, know them as differences, and yet retain, through the
discernment of similarities important to life and pleasure, an equi-
librium of body and character. MAX EASTMAN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
EGOISM, ALTRUISM, CATHOLISM. A NOTE ON
ETHICAL TERMINOLOGY
THE careful reader of the "Data of Ethics" must be struck with
the fallacies involved in Spencer's use of the term altruism,
or as he puts it more emphatically, "pure altruism," under which
term he classes the Hebrew and Christian ideals embodied in such
naxims as "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The fallacy
is partly due no doubt to Spencer's somewhat biased attitude toward
the ethical doctrines in question, and partly to his too customary
superficial and mechanical thinking, but the error is made easy by
an evident gap in our ethical terminology, to which we desire to call
attention. We have the two traditional terms, egoism and al tritium.
which may be roughly but clearly defined as denoting the self-
regarding and the other-regarding impulses, respectively; but we
have no accepted term for the balance or adjustment between these
two sets of impulses which constitutes righteousness. For this con-
cept we propose the term catholism, and suggest briefly some reasons
for its adoption.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 159
The chief reason for the adoption of some fixed term for the
concept in question is the tendency to fallacy caused by the lack of
the term. Altruism is constantly used to denote not the group of
other-regarding impulses as distinct from the self-regarding and
opposed to them, but the ideal attitude, or righteousness. This is
plainly due to the fact that the egoistic impulses are racially com-
plete while the altruistic impulses are of later origin and less fully
developed, and that unrighteousness in general results from a defi-
ciency in the altruistic element; thus altruism has come to be iden-
tified with righteousness altruistic has come to mean good, and
egoistic, bad. The truth is of course that righteousness and good
are always, as Spencer indicates, the result of conciliation between
the two sets of impulses. In fact, if we could conceive of an organic
world in which the altruistic impulses had preceded the egoistic in
order of evolution, then in such a 'world altruistic would naturally
have become the synonym for bad and egoistic for good ! It is this
idea of conciliation which Spencer desires to make clear in his
chapters on egoism and altruism; unfortunately in his eagerness to
find the conciliation in question he runs blindly over it as it exists
in the maxims which he denominates "pure altruism."
Altruism is, in fact, of almost infinite variety; in itself it is
neither moral nor immoral, but merely a part of the material out of
which morality is built. It is a mere truism to say that altruistic
motives may sometimes lead to immoral conduct : thus, for the love a
man bears his wife he may rob his employer, or speculate with the
money of widows and orphans ; or he may even be tempted to actual
violence or murder. The fact is that the conflict and adjustment of
the interests of some others and other others, may at times be more
striking and difficult to me than the conflict between my interests
and those of others. The very weakness of altruism is that its
honors may be claimed on the ground of having served the interests
of any "others"; while the conduct involved may be hardly distin-
guishable from selfishness.
There are two conceivable types of immoral altruism: first the
type that disregards the interests of the actor himself ; doubtless such
altruism exists in certain rare cases, usually in connection with deep
religious feeling and conviction. It is conceivable, as Paulsen and
Spencer hint, that a time might come in the development of the race,
when this form of altruism would be a real peril. Even admitting
the theoretical possibility of this, it is probably far enough removed
from our day so that we need make no efforts to avert it. This type
for the present is harmful only as affording a straw figure for the
attacks of those who incline to look with disfavor on Christian ethics
and allied doctrines. The other type of immoral altruism has al-
160 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ready been indicated above, as the attitude in which the actor ignores
the interests of those remote from him and considers only his imme-
diate friends and kindred.
The ideal attitude of will is that which impartially considers all
claims; not all persons in the universe, be it noted, as Spencer so
often seems to assume, but all persons who are affected by the con-
duct in question. The fair calculus for estimating the balance of
interests is never a mere counting of individuals, or even of those
affected, but demands always a quantitative and qualitative esti-
mating of the interests of those who will be touched by the action
under consideration.
The two most essential points in avoiding the current fallacies
regarding the relation between egoism, altruism, and the right, are,
first, that the right always considers self as well as others; no rule
of conduct has ever been accepted by moral or religious leaders which
ignores this point, as is seen by careful consideration of such for-
mulas as the Golden Rule, the Hebrew commandment, ''Love thy
neighbor as thyself," and other traditional phrases. Second, all
interests must be considered in proportion to the degree to which
they are affected. This is the point that Spencer entirely ignores
in the Data, and for which he substitutes a mere numerical ratio;
somewhat thus: the Self (= 1) is to all, as 1 is to an infinite num-
ber; therefore the rule, loving one's neighbor as oneself is prac-
tically equivalent to loving the neighbor and not loving oneself at all.
The utter fallacy of this which any practical man feels by a sort
of intuition becomes apparent when we quantify the units in the
proportion; in many cases, probably in the majority of our minor
acts, the real interest of Self is greater than the total of all the
interests of others concerned.
Two words besides altruism should be considered as suitable terms
for the idea under discussion. The first is utilitarianism, which was
undoubtedly intended to cover this concept. Two serious objections
would forbid its adoption : its origin and history have bound it insep-
arably to the peculiar doctrines of Bentham and Mill; and the term
itself does not denote the essential element in the concept, which is
not happiness or utility or value, but the recognition and adjustment
of all interests concerned. The other term is the adjective universal-
istic; the first objection is the lack of a suitable noun without conflict
with the established use of the word universalism as denoting a
religious denomination. Besides, the term universalistic does not
imply any idea other than the mere inclusion of all, without ;my
regard to proportionate interests.
The term we would suggest is catholism, with the adjective
catholistic; these words avoid confusion with the religions lenns
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 161
catholic and Catholicism. The term catholism is a fitting third in
the series of which the first and second are egoism and altruism.
Etymologically it denotes the concept exactly: a consideration of
the claims of all concerned, and in due proportion. It has not been
appropriated for any other use which could conflict with the pro-
posed denotation ; indeed, so far as the writer knows, the word is not
found in the dictionaries. It is also reasonably short, and in accord
with the analogy of the language. EDWARD 0. SISSON.
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON,
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON.
ANALOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY
A NALOGY is important in philosophy: first as forerunning
-^- analysis (certainly not as substitute for analysis). Second, as
ballasting judgment, and lending proportion to an argument. Third,
as offering common ground of approach into regions where the attack
of "pure thought" is bound to vary with the thinker, both in point
of beginning and in method. If philosophy is to have the weight of
science in our present life, it is more necessary to gain a body of
agreement than to adopt the form and clothing of exactitude. And
if it be true, as I believe, that without the free use of analogy we
shall scarcely come to understand one another's meaning, much less
to reach agreement on any given problem, it may be that the first
step toward giving philosophy in fact the character of a science is to
forego the use of scientific forms as an exclusive or even primary
mode of presenting our thoughts to the world and to each other. We
may or may not abandon the scientific ideal ; but we must recognize
the peculiar and supreme difficulty of philosophy the absence of
that aid which physical nature gives all other sciences in the work
of outlining their concepts. Analogy, with all its obvious dangers,
less dangerous because obvious, is the only substitute for this inval-
uable fixative. WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING.
YALE UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Classical Moralists. BENJAMIN RAND. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin
Co. 1909. Pp. xix + 797. $3.
The nature and purpose of Dr. Rand's new compilation can best be
stated in the words of his preface. " The book is virtually a history of
ethics, based not upon the ordinary description of systems, but upon
selections from the original sources and upon translations of the authors
themselves. It is sought, so far as is practicable, to present by means of
162 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the case method the most distinctive and constructive features in the
ethical systems of the successive moralists. The evolution of ethical
thought is thereby revealed, stripped of its controversial material, from
Socrates to Martineau. Such a work, it is hoped, will prove indispensable
as a text-book of required reading, alike for the historical and for the
systematic study of ethics in the universities."
Any criticism of a work of this kind must concern itself either with
its general plan or with the details of its execution. As to the latter,
although there will always be differences of opinion over what to include
and exclude, Dr. Eand's judgment must commend itself in the main to
every one. Three quarters of the space are devoted to modern writers, but
this is just, in view of the accessibility of good classical translations and
of the variety of modern theories, though one may well blame the orig-
inals themselves for not imitating the brevity of the ancients. Perhaps
the greatest gap in the documents will be found in the interesting transi-
tion from medieval to modern ethics. Hobbes would not present such a
violent break with the past were he read in the light of the later scholas-
tics. Even Hooker, champion of the law that he is, paints a state of
nature in colors whose gloom rivals that of Hobbes himself, and in gen-
eral his influence upon the seventeenth-century thought was great enough
to deserve notice. Again, it might have been well to introduce such a
representation of the transition period as Charron with his practical and
independent " de la Sagesse," a book far worthier of study than Wollas-
ton's " Religion of Nature," part of which is included. So, too, a great
service would have been rendered by the inclusion of Gay's " Introduc-
tion " to Law's translation of Archbishop King's " Origin of Evil," a
work both scarce and valuable as the beginning of the associational
school of morals. But these are minor points in eight hundred pages of
excellently selected material.
As to the value of this kind of book opinions might differ more seri-
ously. That it has value is unquestionable, as the writing of this review
evidences, but whether it is the most valuable kind of book for class use
is a further question. To my mind, it is too meager for historical pur-
poses and too complete for systematic use. Courses in the history of
ethics are usually advanced courses in which the students need the com-
plete works of the men studied rather than samples, however good. On
the other hand, introductory courses in systematic ethics have no need
for the confusing variety given in this survey of the entire history of
ethics. If any historical material be given them, it should be in the
form of larger portions of the few fundamental types of ethical theory,
say Mill, Spencer, Kant, Plato, Aristotle. Any further reference to his-
tory distracts from the real subject-matter of the study. The source book
method has the defect of our recent free elective systems, too much of
everything and not enough of anything. The studying of forty-five au-
thors is not educative. That such a book is interesting and useful for
supplementary reference is doubtless true, but that it can form the basis
for study seems more than doubtful in spite of its unusual excellence of
execution. NORMAX WILDE.
THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 163
Habit-Formation and the Science of Teaching. STUART H. ROWE. New
York : Longmans, Green and Co. 1909. Pp. xvii + 308.
The author thinks that most educational psychologists make the intri-
cacies of educational processes glaringly apparent, but the applications
remote or trivial. He accordingly wishes to simplify the psychology of
habit and to point out definitely the applications to genuine school-life
problems. He indeed seeks chiefly to organize the usage of good teachers.
As yet, according to the author, no school habit of discipline or drill has
been investigated scientifically from the standpoint of its formation. This
book hence has the distinction of being the first to develop a methodology
of habit as a different task altogether from the traditional methodology of
imparting ideas. As there is in no field of educational effort a scientifi-
cally established method for securing the habits sought, even though one
may have defined with psychological insight those desired, one must
throughout show the relation of habit to education, and must render also
practical assistance to those whose business it is to inculcate or teach
habits as well as or even more than to impart ideas.
With this in mind the general plan is to elaborate the modes of select-
ing, making, and breaking habits, the vital phases of their formation or
obliteration as the case may be, and their relation to permanent incentives,
to subject-matter and to discipline.
Effective organization of experience is the function of the teacher.
Naturally the automatic ways of organizing experience depend upon one's
native equipment of a wide or narrow range of instinctive organizing im-
pulses, as well as upon those modified or combined or selected ways ac-
quired through more or less chance equipment. Teaching should change
such conditions by intelligently guiding the processes of acquiring each
specific habit with a definite aim. Concrete situations must be under con-
trol if we would effectively inculcate habits. Automatic learning should
also help purposive, if genuine habits are naturally developed rather than
grafted on artificially to the child's life. Having always first analyzed the
habit elements in a given subject-matter, the automatisms required should
be systematically worked for. The distinction should also be kept clearly
in mind that idea-learning per se and habit-gaining are accomplished by
distinctly different methods, multiplicity of association being the basis for
the one and invariability in repetition the basis for the other. Practically
courses of study should be so planned that ideas as ideas, idea-habits as
thought dispositions, and pure automatisms may be distinguished and
pointedly aimed for in the operations instituted. Often indeed compli-
cated habit-getting implies the automatic acquisition of the ideal part of
the situation, and should be more stressed than it has been, for this reason
also, in educational theory. Derivatives, as habits are, from instincts or
former habits, the author enumerates twenty-five instincts upon which
these habits should be formed by the teacher, and suggests an elaborate
(and somewhat over-schematized) classification of feelings which must
furnish the initiative or incentive for inaugurating the habit-forming
activity.
164 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The next division of the book represents an attempt to emphasize the
kind of practise and of repetition most effective in habit-getting, and also
in habit-breaking, the removal of certain habits being one of the most
important functions of the teacher. Next habits are shown to be in a unique
way disciplinary in function and to demand protracted treatment or
direction, no recitation period being sufficient to implant securely the
reaction desired.
The book as a whole lends itself to favorable and to adverse criticism,
and both features invite comment. Adversely, the treatment is admin-
istered in such broken doses, the pages are so chopped up into the regu-
lation-length paragraphs with black-line headings, some padded, coated,
spun out, sectioned, or outlined into itemized briefs that one, reading the
book at a sitting for some newly stated educational doctrine, has continu-
ally and persistently to fight off the deadening effect of these approved (?)
text-book methods of exposition. With this, or perhaps because of this
method, idea-getting seems to have been presented as an unwarrantably
isolated process, barren and mystical. The author apparently assumes
that the bare and barren idea-impartation is a sacred part of school ideals
and destined to go on forever, and that his own ideal of habit-acquisition
unrelated, indeed opposed, to the former process, will nicely supplement it ;
and further, that upon these two procedures we may scientifically rest our
methodology. This is surely not a criticism of the heart of Herbartian
intellectualistic pedagogics. Furthermore, the formal steps of habit-ma-
king, just as the five (or more or less) formal steps of the neo-Herbartians
for their intellectualizing operations would merely supplement these with
other no less formal steps.
Again, the author's suggestion that we divide the course of study into
habit-forming and idea-information subjects would defeat other ideals
now about to become influential in teaching. Still again, even with this
contribution to the methodology of habit, we have no experimental data
graphically given which would make concrete and irrefutable the school's
possible success, e. g., in cases of habit-breaking. Habit situations are
themselves so complex, that extended studies of habits vital or destructive
to educational development, which may serve as models and references,
are still needed. Otherwise the exhortation to follow certain rules and
maxims can not be obeyed intelligently and systematically.
On the other hand, in commendation of the book, we may certainly say
that it will fortunately stimulate all readers to a more definite reexami-
nation of the course of study. It creates the wholesome demand that we
for our own method at least be psychologically discriminating in the
examination of the educational possibilities of the subject-matter in hand.
It will also tend to offset the now undue emphasis put upon the bizarre
occurrences of the recitation period, and will emphasize forcibly the es-
sential carrying power of the habit elements in education, particularly as
they call for protracted, unswerving, and delicately skillful direction.
The treatise helps us to conceive teaching as an art based upon reliable
first principles. There are further about the book a tone of genuineness
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 165
and an apparent sense of sympathy and of familiarity with the actual
school situations and their limitations, not always in evidence in such
psychological studies. In short, the author has broadened and consider-
ably enriched the educational connotation of habit, and has incontestably
helped to make concrete some hitherto very vague and entirely inarticu-
late functions of teaching. He has furthermore opened up a suggestive
and unworked experimental field which should be inviting to many inves-
tigators who wish to make contributions where they will be effective prac-
tically. The book stands as another useful and needed topic reference
work for those who have before given less effectively than desired their
courses in the psychology of the typical educative processes.
The bibliography at the end is comprehensive and adds to the useful-
ness of the book.
CHAS. HUGHES JOHNSTON.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. XXL,
No. 1. January, 1910. Intelligence and Imitation in Birds; A Criterion
of Imitation (pp. 1-71) : JAMES P. PORTER. - An additional series of
experiments on the intelligence of the English sparrow and cowbird,
including experiments with the junco, white-throated sparrow, field spar-
row, bluebirds, white-crowned sparrows, tree, fox and song sparrows, blue
jays, orioles, and crows. Many of the birds showed signs of imitation.
The best fighters seemed to learn a given task earliest. The writer makes the
suggestion that intelligent imitation is in a new class and should be kept
apart from words which seem to imply reasoning on the part of the
animal mind. The (Edipus-Complex as an Explanation of Hamlet's
Mystery: A Study in Motive (pp. 72-113): ERNEST JONES. -A psycho-
analytic study of Hamlet. The repugnance of his task causing a peculiar
mental state, at the same time he being unconscious of this repugnance.
His actions are classified as specific aboulia and attempts to blind him-
self with self-deception. Certain psycho-neurotic symptoms are discussed
and applied to Hamlet. Spontaneous Constructions and Primitive
Activities of Children, Analogous to Those of Primitive Man (pp. 114-
150) : R. A. ACHER. - A questionnaire study. A collection of data on
children's activities and attitude toward blocks, sand, earth, stones, snow,
strings, bodily shape, clothing and striking, showing that a child may not
have the activities of primitive man yet he desires and needs them.
Bibliography. The Measurement of Attention by Professor Wirth's
Methods (pp. 151-156) : R. L. GEISSLER. - A reply to Professor Wirth's
criticism of the interpretation of the author previously made of his meth-
ods in measuring attention. Maintains that Wirth has failed to solve his
problem. His values invalidated by complicating factors. Impossible
for him to overcome certain difficulties because of his experimental
166 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
method. Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Vassar
College. The Sources of the Affective Reaction to Fallacies (pp. 157-161) :
ANNA H. TAYLOR and M. F. WASHBURN. - An introspective report of about
one hundred women students of the impression produced upon them by a
set of logical fallacies. Some Tests ~by the Association Method of Mental
Diagnoses (pp. 162-167) : HAZEL M. LEACH and M. F. WASHBURN. - A word
referring to an object not seen gives a long reaction. Psychological Lit-
erature. Reviews: Sigmund Freud, Brille's translation, Selected Papers
on Hysteria and Other Psychoneuroses. Paul Sollier, Le Doute. Otto
Lipman and William Stern, Zeitschrift fur angewante Psychologic und
psychologische Sammelsforshung. Ernesto Lugaro, translation, Modern
Problems in Psychiatry. Alfred Binet, L'Annee Psychologique. W. W.
Wundt, Alte und neue Gehirn-Probleme. N. Vaschide, Essai sur la Psy-
chologie de la Main. Anne Manning Robbins, Both Sides of the Veil.
William James, A Pluralistic Universe. William James, The Meaning
of Truth. Hugo Miinsterberg, Psychology and the Teacher. W. v.
Bechterew, Die FunTctionen der N erven-centra. Georges Rernacle, La
Philosophic de S. S. Laurie. Otto Lipmann, Grundriss der Psychologic
fur Juristen. Kate Gordon, Esthetics. C. E. Seashore, Elementary
Experiments in Psychology. D. P. Rhodes, The Philosophy of Change.
Eleanor A. Gamble, A Study in Memorizing. Dr. Pierre Kahn, La
Cyclothymie. Dr. Busse, Die Weltanschauung der grossen Philosophen
der Neuzeit. William A. White, Outline of Psychiatry. Henry Rutgers
Marshall, Consciousness. George Betts, The Distribution and Functions
of Mental Imagery. M. E. Haggerty, Imitation in MonJceys. Adam
Leroy Jones, Logic. Th. Ribot, Problemes de Psychologic affective:
FRANCIS JONES. E. A. Kirkpatrick, Genetic Psychology: OTTO PERLER.
S. Alrutz, Die Kitzel- und Juckempfindungen: P. E. WINTER. G. L.
Walton, Those Nerves. Index.
Ach, Narziss. Ueber den Willensakt und das Temperament. Eine ex-
perimentelle Untersuchung. Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer. 1910.
Pp. 324.
Bode, Boyd Henry. An Outline of Logic. New York : Henry Holt & Co.
1910. Pp. 324.
Clements, Joseph. The Metaphysics of the Nature and the Conception of
the Soul, its Habitat. Boston : The Roxburgh Publishing Co. Pp. 112.
De Cyon, Elie. Dieu et Science, Essais de Psychologic des Sciences.
Paris : Felix Alcan. 1910. Pp. xvi + 444.
D'Undine, Jean. L'art et le geste. Paris : Felix Alcan. 1910. Pp. xv +
284.
Hibben, John Grier. The Philosophy of Enlightenment. New York :
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1910. Pp. xii -f 311.
Hicks, R. D. Stoic and Epicurean. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons.
1910. xix + 412.
Naville, Ernest. Les Systemes de philosophic ou les philosophies affirma-
tives. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1909. Pp. 400.
167
Novocow, J. La Critique du Darwinisme Social. Paris: Felix Alcan.
1910. Pp. 407.
Piat, Clodius. La Morale du Bonheur. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1910. Pp.
vii + 263.
Sollier, Paul. Le Doute. Paris : Felix Alcan. 1910. Pp. viii -f 407.
Schinz, Albert. Anti-Pragmatism. Boston: Small, Maynard, & Co. Pp.
xx + 279.
Shargha, Ikbal Kishen. Examination of Professor William James' Psy-
chology. Allahabad : Earn Narain Lai. 1909. Pp. 118.
Von Aster, E. Immanuel Kant. Leipzig : Quelle und Meyer. 1909. Pp.
136.
Volkmann, Paul. Erkenntnistheoretische Grundziige der Naturwissen-
schaften, und ihre Beziehungen zum Giestesleben der Gegenwart.
Leipzig : B. G. Teubner. 1910. Pp. xxiii + 454.
Windelband, Wilhelm. Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic, fiinfte
durchgesehene Auflage. Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1910. Pp. viii
+589.
NOTES AND NEWS
" Ein philosophischer Begriff gebratner Gans entspricht :
Dass sie von selber Aepfel frass', gesehen hab' ich's nicht;
Doch jeder f reut des Inhalts sich, wenn man sie bringt zum Schmauss :
Das, was man hat hineingetan, nimmt wieder man heraus." Fechner.
Quoted in Indogermanische Forschungen. XXV., p. 392.
AT the meeting of the Aristotelian Society on February 7, Mr. A. D.
Lindsay read a paper on " Kant's Account of Causation." The abstract
is from the Athenaeum for February 26.
" Any discussion of the meaning and value of Kant's account of causa-
tion in ' The Critique of Pure Reason ' is profitably preceded by examining
first what Kant himself thought that he had proved. This can be dis-
covered in two important passages in ' The Critique of Judgment ' and in
Kant's discussion of the third antinomy of pure reason. The first passages
show that Kant distinguished clearly between the a priority of the general
law of causation and the empirical character of particular laws; the
second, that the distinction of phenomena and things-in-themselves implies
mainly a necessary reference of the understanding to perception. Apply-
ing these two principles to Kant's account of causation, we find that Kant,
beginning with the distinction between succession in apprehension and
apprehension of succession, shows that the fact of objective change in-
volves that change is determined by the character of what precedes it.
Thus we have a general rule that like causes produce like effects, which
applies to all that we perceive in so far as like elements can be discrim-
inated in it. Further, this principle does not explain change, but takes for
granted perceived continuous change. Any theory of causation which
168 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
implies that this reference to perception could be transcended is found to
be contradictory, but that reference involves that causation is correlate
to spontaneity. The application of the principle demands that the ele-
ments of experience are partly isolable and disparate, partly homogeneous
and continuous; but as this is implied in any perception of change, the
principle of causation is valid for all experience, without thereby enabling
us to anticipate any empirical causal laws, and without being incompatible
with spontaneity."
ARTHUR LIONEL SMITH, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, has
begun at Columbia University a series of twelve lecture conferences for
students of law and political science on English political writers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the development of " English
Political Theory from Hobbes to Burke." The titles of the lectures are as
follows : Hobbes and the Sovereignty, Hobbes and Church and State, Mil-
ton and the Eeligious Ideal, Harrington and the Division of the Powers,
Filmer and Divine Right and Passive Obedience, Sidney and the Social
Contact and Natural Rights, Locke and Individualism and the Right of
Revolution, Bolingbroke and the Use of History in Politics, Defoe and
Party Government Hume and the Science of Politics, Hamilton on
Federalism and on Democracy, Burke and the Body Politic.
PROFESSOR JAMES HAYDEN TUFTS, of the University of Chicago, began
on March 9 a series of ten lectures at Johns Hopkins University on
" Modern Problems of Metaphysics and the Theory of Knowledge." The
titles of the lectures are as follows: The Persistent Task of Philosophy
and the Present Situation, The Fundamental Ways of Viewing the World
and Life, The Meaning of Truth, The Dualism of Fact and Idea, The
Problem of Transcendence, Knowledge and Reality, Consciousness and
the Self, The Relation of Consciousness to Reality, The Eternal and the
Changing, Religious Illustrations of the Dualism of Fact.
VOLUME VI., of the Cambridge Modern History, which deals with the
eighteenth century, contains an admirable account of Hobbes and the
" English Political Philosophy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Cen-
turies/' by Mr. A. L. Smith.
DR. HUGO MUNSTERBERG, professor of psychology at Harvard University,
has been appointed exchange professor to lecture at Berlin in 1910-11.
VOL. VII. No. 7. MARCH 31, 1910
VALID KNOWLEDGE AND THE ''SUBJECTIVITY OF
EXPERIENCE"
XPERIENCE " seems to be in a perilous condition at present,
philosophically speaking. When it is an affair of opposing
apriorism or that phase of idealism which subsists by setting up
"pure thought" and endowing it with various synthetic functions,
many, if not most, contemporary writers profess an ardent attach-
ment to experience. When the problem of the relation of knowl-
edge and things is uppermost, many of the same writers express the
most profound distrust of experience. When the logical origin
of knowledge is under discussion, experience is a term broad enough
to cover whatever is perceived and is inferred from the per-
ceived, as well as all kinds of doing and suffering which affect what
we know and yet are not themselves "known," i. e., are not explicit
objects of awareness. When epistemology comes to the front,
experience dwindles down to the narrowest sensible content of pres-
entation. That the idealist should accept the latter or Humian no-
tion of experience is natural he needs it in his business. But, some-
what surprisingly, most realists carry the same brand of experience
in stock. The motive is not so clear as in the case of the idealist, but
one surmises that the reason is the same as that of the objective
idealist, only the other way around.
The objective idealist points to the contrast of the limitations of
experience and the ideal of knowledge implied in limited experi-
ence as proof of the necessity of absorption of our knowing in a
complete consciousness. The realist points to the contrast between
our meager flickering awareness of objects and the extensive and
enduring world of actually known objects as proof of the inde-
pendence of the object of knowledge from momentary awareness
with which he, a good intellectualist, has, like the idealist, identified
experience. And since the ideal of knowledge and the world of
actual knowledge are quite different and yet are correlated, idealist
169
170 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and realist, by standing upon the ground of the limited and sub-
jective character of experience, keep each other going.
This last paragraph is, however, a diversion from the point of my
paper which is to raise a doubt as to whether experience can have
the relation it is conceded to have to the production of valid knowl-
edge and yet be simply "subjective" in character. This doubt is
here raised for the especial benefit of the realist. Experience can
not, we are told, be an ultimate criterion, method or ''universe of
discourse" 1 in philosophy, without leading to a thoroughly sub-
jectivistic philosophy because experience is subjective. So be it.
Then upon what grounds does realism itself rest? Is it a purely
dialectical doctrine, one achieved through the elaboration I will not
say manipulation of the concept of knowledge and allied concepts ?
Or, since presumably it is not a supernatural revelation, is it a
"necessary truth," or an a priori intuition? Or does it rest upon
empirical grounds and hope for empirical verification ? And if so,
what is its relation as a valid theory of knowledge to the experiences
upon which it rests and to which it looks for confirmation ?
Since the realist will not claim that his knowledge of the rela-
tion of knowledge to its object exhausts the genus "valid knowl-
edge," the question may profitably be generalized: What is the
relation of any case of valid knowledge qua valid, to experience?
In considering this question, the reader may define "valid knowl-
edge" in general in any way he pleases, for my question is not
about the relation of the concept of valid knowledge to the concept
of experience: the realist has already told us that there is no rela-
tion save that of indifference. My question is not as to implication
or connotation, but is denotative in reference. What relation is
there between what exists as a valid knowledge and what exists as
empirical events? Even if it be admitted that the connotation of
the term "valid knowledge" is "object known as if there were no
knowing experience, no antecedents and (above all) no consequences
in experience"; there still remains the question denotatively or ex-
istentially all-important: What is the evidence that any given case
is an object so known ?
The peculiarity to which I invite the realist's attention is that
the method of guaranteeing a given object to be present as if there
were no experience is itself a method of experience a peculiar fact
in any case, but excessively peculiar when the experience taken to
warrant the belief that experience is ceasing from pernicious activity
is defined in advance as subjective. To be a realist and to be immune
from error in particular cases of knowing are not synonyms whith
1 This excellent way of characterizing experience is Bush's; see this JOURNAL,
Vol. VI., p. 175. The Existential Universe of Discourse.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 171
is to say that to know what valid knowledge is is not necessarily to
know what a valid knowledge is. Moreover, something is necessary
to determine a case of valid knowledge besides the bare presence of
the valid object. If this something else be not conditions and conse-
quences in experience, what is it? Since, as the realist tells us, the
object of knowledge is there anyway, what determines its presence
as an object of valid knowledge must be something besides itself, or
its fellow, or any collocation of its fellows, they being all in the same
predicament as itself. And, alack and alas, that this something else
required to secure and to guarantee the presence of an object as a
valid object should be experience which is subjective. If experi-
ence could be used only to account for error, what a convenience!
That, being subjective, it has nothing to do with the valid object and
yet is necessary to warrant it as valid, what an inconvenience !
For note what is required of this same subjective experience.
It must catapult upon the scene an object, while (by a sort of
rebound) it modestly withdraws far behind the scene. But this is
not enough : The fact that invalid objects are accepted as valid proves
that "experience" is frequently most perniciously active when it
seems to have withdrawn its influence. Hence, in cases of genuinely
scientific knowing, experience must affix to the object some special
sign witnessing that this object is free from its own influence. This
performance, on the assumption that experience is subjective, is
as if suspected beef-packers substituted for the government inspec-
tion label a certificate that the meat was sound because they had
done nothing to it except produce it. But this is not all. Only
certain modes of experience are efficacious in hitting upon the valid
object; and the possibility of science, that is, directed search for
(instead of their accidental finding) valid objects, depends upon
ability to discover and confirm those modes of experience that are
benign. Is it not extraordinary that experience if it be inherently
subjective should possess this Manichaean cleavage within itself?
The fact that scientific method consists of preference for certain
selected modes of experience as the likeliest way to secure valid
objects is worthy of special attention. During the seventeenth cen-
tury, the problem of the attainment of valid knowledge-objects
became acute. Intellectualistic philosophers, rationalists and sen-
sationalists alike, set to work to find some mark inhering in the valid
object which should guarantee its validity. Some sought it in the
sublimity or the clearness, or the universality of the content; others
sought it in the object's simplicity, or brute irreducibility, or sensu-
ousness. Experimental scientists said, in effect, that there was no
trait or quality of the knowledge-object per se which marked its
genuineness; that the status of genuineness is determined by the
172 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
way inquiry is conducted and by the way the thing looked upon as
valid behaves in the carrying forward of inquiry. This doctrine,
uniformly accepted, so far as I know, in the natural (if not the mathe-
matical) sciences was summed up in the doctrine that knowledge
depends upon experience and valid knowledge upon certain types
of experience. Now if to be a valid knowledge means (1) to be
got at through conditions and acts of doubt, suspense, observation,
suggestion, experimental manipulation, hypothesis-formation and
elaboration, application of mathematical calculations, and (2) to be
capable of fruitful use in suggesting and regulating further in-
quiries, then surely it is a moderate statement to say that some
experiences bear such an intimate relation to valid knowledge-objects
that it taxes credulity to regard experience as inherently subjective.
The realist may reply that it is not denied that empirical condi-
tions (or even consequences) are necessary to the appearance and
recognition of the valid object. What we object to, he will say, is
the implication that the conditions of the discovery of a valid ob-
ject are conditions of its validity; we object to confusing condi-
tions of genesis with conditions of validity. The reply is familiar,
but not relevant. The realist's attention is invited to the highly
intimate and pervasive connections that exist between empirical
conditions of genesis and consequence and the valid status of an
object; he is urged to tell what he means, in the light of this inti-
mate connection, by calling the conditions of genesis and bearing
"subjective," and how it is that the "subjective" can be respon-
sible not only for generating the manifestation of the valid object,
but also for stamping it as valid. The continuity of "experience"
and of "validity" is at once so unbroken and so important as to
render incredible the notion that genesis and consequence are in
one realm the subjective and validity in another, the objective.
In view of the facts of scientific procedure, it hardly seems exces-
sive to say that, in one regard, validity of status is a kind of experi-
ence. If it can be made out that experience is subjective, we should
not think we had achieved anything with a distinction of genesis
and validity; we should say that because the generator is only
subjective we can only laugh at the nai've audacity of its claim to
generate a valid object. To dispose of the difficulty by drawing a
hard and fast line between genesis and validity or between psycho-
logical and logical is to suppose that giving names to the terms of
a problem solves the problem of which they are the named terms.
Scientific method carries us a step further as to this point also.
In all the natural sciences, it has been found that the best way of
defining the nature of an object is by following its career, its be-
coming and its behavior. Strange indeed would be the logical situa-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 173
tion if in all specific cases of scientific conception we employed terms
of generation and efficiency in order to secure valuable conceptions,
but when we came to the conception of knowing itself found a
unique exception a complete irrelevance of genesis and content.
The realist professes to offer a valid conception of the nature of
valid knowledge. He either arrives at this conception by a dialectic
procedure or he follows the same methods that investigators employ
in other fields. If the latter, the definition of valid knowledge as
"knowledge as if experience were not there" is itself established by
certain experiences. Is he not then a little ungrateful in his treat-
ment of experience? Ungrateful or not, must he not admit that his
process is either dialectical, or analogous to the procedure of scien-
tific inquiries? If the latter, how can he frame his conception of
valid knowledge save by generalization of denotative or existential
eases of valid knowledge? If to be a valid knowledge means to
stand in a particular empirical context, can valid knowledge be con-
ceived except as an indicated type of empirical position and func-
tion?
To be more specific: Does a definition of valid knowledge have
any meaning to say nothing of validity save as based upon the
specific detectable traits of those instances of knowledge enterprises
that have turned out valid in contrast with those which have
turned out invalid? Does an epistemological definition of valid
knowledge, in distinction from a logical definition, have any meaning
at all? In short, is the realist a realist or is he merely an anti-
idealist ?
Without prejudice to the question of realism vs. idealism,
another question is of much more import for the future of philos-
ophy: Is the theory of knowledge to be epistemological or logical?
Is it to be concerned with the nature of knowledge and of truth in
general, that is, with conceptions which are totally irrelevant to the
methods and tests by which particular knowledges are effected and
particular truths tested? Or is the theory of knowledge to be a
generalized statement of particular instances of knowing, and the
theory of truth a generalized statement of particular instances of
''trues"?
Because the empiricist believes this question is immeasurably
more pregnant than the issue (within a pretended theory of knowl-
edge in general) of idealism versus realism, he catches it from both
sides. On account of the same belief, he takes his drubbings with
equanimity, for he is convinced that the presuppositions which
create the problem of knowledge in general are mere historic sur-
vivals, and that the future is with the question of the differences
174 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
between a good knowledge and a bad knowledge, not with the prob-
lem of knowledge ueberliaupt.
JOHN DEWEY.
COLUMBIA UNIVEBSITY.
WHAT SOCIAL OBJECTS MUST PSYCHOLOGY
PRESUPPOSE? 1
rpHERE is a persistent tendency among present-day psychologists
J- to use consciousness as the older rationalistic psychology used
the soul. It is spoken of as something that appears at a certain point,
it is a something into which the object of knowledge in some sense
enters from without. It is conceived to have certain functions
in the place of faculties. It is as completely separated from the
physical body by the doctrine of parallelism as the metaphysical body
was separated from the metaphysical soul by their opposite qualities.
Functional psychology has set itself the program of assimilating
the purposive character of conscious processes or of consciousness
as it is termed to the evolutionary conception of adaptation, but
instead of making consciousness in human individuals a particular
expression of a great process, as is demanded of a philosophy of
nature, it comes in generally as a new and peculiar factor which even
demands a new formula of evolution for its explanation ; it involves
a new evolution superinduced upon the old.
In spite of much philosophizing, consciousness is identified in cur-
rent psychological practise with the field which is open to introspec-
tion, and the object of knowledge is placed within this field, and
related to the physical world spoken of as an external field of reality
by a parallelistic series. This psychological practise tends to
accept the conceptual objects of science, the atoms, molecules, ether
vortex rings, ions, and electrons, as the substantial realities of the
physical world, and, by implication at least, to relegate the sensuous
content of objects of direct physical experience to this separate field
oi consciousness. The old-fashioned idealist has then only to point
out the thought structure of these hypothetical objects of science to
sweep triumphantly, with one stroke of his w r and, the w r hole world of
nature within this limited field of the consciousness open to intro-
spection. Whereupon the solipsistic spook arises again to reduce
one's world to a nutshell.
The way out of these crude psychological conceptions, in my
mind, lies in the recognition that psychical consciousness is a par-
ticular phase in development of reality, not an islanded phase of
1 Given at the meeting of the Psychological Association in Boston, December
31, 1909.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 175
reality connected with the rest of it by a one to one relationship of
parallel series. This point of view I have elsewhere developed some-
what obscurely and ineffectually, I am afraid. 2
What I wish to call to your attention in the few moments at my
disposal, is another phase of this situation which is itself psycholog-
ical in its character ; 3 the presupposition of selves as already in exist-
ence before the peculiar phase of consciousness can arise, which psy-
chology studies.
Most of us admit the reality of the objects of direct physical ex-
perience until we are too deeply entangled in our psychological
analyses of cognition. Unless we subject ourselves to the third degree
of criticism, the parallelism of which we speak lies between the proc-
esses of brain tissues which can be seen and smelt and handled and the
states of consciousness which are conditioned by them. While this
admission guarantees the physical bodies of our fellows as equally
real, the self is relegated to the restricted field of introspected con-
sciousness and enjoys not the reality of a so-called external object,
but only that of a combination of states of consciousness. Into the ex-
istence of those states of consciousness in another, we are solemnly
told we can only inferentially enter by a process of analogy from the
relations of our own introspected states and the movements of our
bodies to the movements of other bodies and the hypothetical con-
scious states that should accompany them. If we approach the self
from within, our analysis recognizes, to be sure, its close relationship
to, if not its identity with, the organization of consciousness, especially
as seen in conation, in apperception, in voluntary attention, in con-
duct, but what can be isolated as self-consciousness as such reduces
to a peculiar feeling of intimacy in certain conscious states, and the
self gathers, for some unexplained reason, about a core of certain
vague and seemingly unimportant organic sensations a feeling of
contraction in the brow, or in the throat, or goes out to the muscular
innervations all over the body which are not involved directly in
what we are doing or perceiving. And yet when we proceed intro-
spectively the whole field of consciousness is ascribed to this self, for
it is only in so far as we are self-conscious that we can introspect at all.
But what I wish to emphasize is that the other selves disappear
as given realities even when we are willing to admit the real objects
of physical experience. The self arises within the introspected field.
It has no existence outside that introspected field, and other selves
* " The Definition of the Psychical," University of Chicago Decennial
Volumes.
* I have discussed the implications of this position from a somewhat dif-
ferent point of view in the Psychological Bulletin, Vol. VI., No. 12, December
15, 1909.
176 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
are only projects and ejects of that field. Each self is an island,
and each self is sure only of its own island, for who knows what
mirages may arise above this analogical sea.
It is fair to assume that if we had exact social sciences which
could define persons precisely and determine the laws of social change
with mathematical exactness, we should accept selves, as there, in the
same sense in which we accept physical objects. They would be
guaranteed by their sciences. For in the practise of thought, we are
as convinced as the Greeks that exact knowledge assures the existence
of the object of knowledge.
It is evident that the assumption of the self as given by social
science in advance of introspection would materially and funda-
mentally affect our psychological practise. Consciousness as present
in selves would be given as there, outside the field of introspection.
Psychological science would have to presuppose selves as the precon-
dition of consciousness in individuals just as it presupposes nervous
systems and vascular changes. In actual psychological analysis we
should condition the existence and process of states and streams of
consciousness upon the normal presence and functioning of these
selves, as we condition the appearance and functioning of conscious-
ness upon the normal structure and operation of the physical mech-
anism, that our psychology presupposes.
In a manner we do this in treatises on mob-psychology, in such a
treatise on social psychology as that of Cooley's ''Human Nature and
the Social Order." McDougalPs "Social Psychology" prepares the
way for it in carrying back the processes of consciousness to social
impulses and instincts to those terms in which, somewhat vaguely,
selves are stated in an evolutionary theory of society.
The economic man of the dismal science was an attempt to state
the self in terms of an objective and exact social science. But for-
tunately the economic man has proved spurious. He does not exist.
The economic man is as little guaranteed by the orthodox political
economy, as realia were by the metaphysics of scholasticism.
Social science in anthropology, in sociology pure and impure,
dynamic and static, has not as yet found its scientific method. It is
not able to satisfactorily define its objects, nor to formulate their
laws of change and development. Until the social sciences are able
to state the social individual in terms of social processes, as the
physical sciences define their objects in terms of physical change,
they will not have risen to the point at which they can force their
object upon an introspective psychology. We can to-day foresee the
possibility of this. Eugenics, education, even political and economic
sciences, pass beyond the phase of description and look toward the
formation of the social object. "We recognize that we control the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 177
conditions which determine the individual. His errors and short-
comings can be conceivably corrected. His misery may be elim-
inated. His mental and moral defects corrected. His heredity,
social and physical, may be perfected. His very moral self-conscious-
ness through normal and healthful social conduct, through adequate
consciousness of his relations to others, may be constituted and estab-
lished. But without awaiting the development of the social sciences
it is possible to indicate in the nature of the consciousness which
psychology itself analyzes, the presupposition of social objects, whose
objective reality is a condition of the consciousness of self.
The contribution that I wish to suggest toward the recognition
of the given character of other selves is from psychology itself, and
arises out of the psychological theory of the origin of language and
its relation to meaning.
This theory, as you know, has been considerably advanced by
Wundt's formulation of the relation of language to gesture. From
this point of view language in its earliest form comes under that
group of movements which, since Darwin, have been called expres-
sions of the emotions. They fall into classes which have been regarded
as without essential connection. Either they are elements mainly
preparatory beginnings of actsi social acts, i. e., actions and reac-
tions Avhich arise under the stimulation of other individuals, such as
clenching the fists, grinding the teeth, assuming an attitude of defense
or else they are regarded as outflows of nervous energy which
sluice off the nervous excitement or reinforce and prepare in-
directly for action. Such gestures, if we may use the term in this
generalized sense, act as stimuli to other forms which are already
under social stimulation.
The phase of the subject which has not been sufficiently em-
phasized is the value which these truncated acts, these beginnings
of inhibited movements, these gestures, have as appropriate stim-
ulations for the conduct of other individuals. Inevitably, forms
that act and react to and upon each other come to prepare for
each other's reaction by the early movements in the act. The
preliminaries of a dog or cock fight amply illustrate the sensi-
tiveness of such individuals to the earliest perceptible indications
of coming acts. To a large degree forms, which live in groups or in
the relation of the animals of prey and those they prey upon, act
upon these first signs of oncoming acts. All gestures, to whatever
class they belong, whether they are the beginnings of the outgoing
act itself or are only indications of the attitude and nervous tension
which these acts involve, have this value of stimulating forms, socially
organized, to reactions appropriate to the attack, or flight, or wooing,
or suckling, of another form. Illustrations are to be found in hu-
178 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
man conduct, in such situations as fencing, where one combatant
without reflection makes his parry from the direction of the eye and
the infinitesimal change of attitude which are the prelude to the
thrust.
Gestures then are already significant in the sense that they are
stimuli to performed reactions, before they come to have significance
of conscious meaning. Allow me to emphasize further the value of
attitudes and the indications of organized preparation for conduct,
especially in the change of the muscles of the countenance, the altered
breathing, the quivering of tense muscles, the evidence of circulatory
changes, in such minutely adapted social groups, because among
these socially significant innervations will be found all these queer
organic sensations about which the consciousness of the self is sup-
posed to gather as a core.
Human conduct is distinguished primarily from animal conduct
by that increase in inhibition which is an essential phase of volun-
tary attention, and increased inhibition means an increase in gesture
in the signs of activities which are not carried out; in the assump-
tions of attitudes whose values in conduct fail to get complete expres-
sion. If we recognize language as a differentiation of gesture, the
conduct of no other form can compare with that of man in the abun-
dance of gesture.
The fundamental importance of gesture lies in the development
of the consciousness of meaning in reflective consciousness. As long
as one individual responds simply to the gesture of another by the
appropriate response, there is no necessary consciousness of meaning.
The situation is still on a level of that of two growling dogs walking
around each other, with tense limbs, bristly hair, and uncovered teeth.
It is not until an image arises of the response, which the gesture of
one form will bring out in another, that a consciousness of meaning
can attach to his own gesture. The meaning can appear only in
imaging the consequence of the gesture. To cry out in fear is an
immediate instinctive act, but to scream with an image of another
individual turning an attentive ear, taking on a sympathetic ex-
pression and an attitude of coming to help, is at least a favorable
condition for the development of a consciousness of meaning.
Of course the mere influence of the image, stimulating to reaction,
has no more meaning value than the effect of an external stimulus,
but in this converse of gestures there is also a consciousness of atti-
tude, of readiness to act in the manner which the gesture implies.
In the instance given the cry is part of the attitude of flight. The
cry calls out the image of a friendly individual. This image is not
merely a stimulus to run toward the friend, but is merged in the
consciousness of inhibited flight. If meaning is consciousness of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 179
attitude, as Dewey, Royce, and Angell among others maintain, then
consciousness of meaning arose only when some gesture that was
part of an inhibited act itself called up the image of the gesture of
another individual. Then the image of the gesture means the in-
hibited act to which the first gesture belonged. In a word, the
response to the cry has the meaning of inhibited flight.
One's own gestures could not take on meaning directly. The ges-
tures aroused by them in others would be that upon which attention
is centered. And these gestures become identified with the content
of one's own emotion and attitude. It is only through the response
that consciousness of meaning appears, a response which involves the
consciousness of another self as the presupposition of the meaning
in one 's own attitude. Other selves in a social environment logically
antedate the consciousness of self which introspection analyzes.
They must be admitted as there, as given, in the same sense in which
psychology accepts the given reality of physical organisms as a con-
dition of individual consciousness.
The importance for psychology of this recognition of others, if
thus bound up with the psychology of meaning, may need another
word of emphasis. Consciousness could no longer be regarded as an
island to be studied through parallel relations with neuroses. It
would be approached as experience which is socially as well as
physically determined. Introspective self-consciousness would be
recognized as a subjective phase, and this subjective phase could no
longer be regarded as the source out of which the experience arose.
Objective consciousness of selves must precede subjective conscious-
ness, and must continually condition it, if consciousness of meaning
itself presupposes the selves as there. Subjective self-consciousness
must appear within experience, must have a function in the develop-
ment of that experience, and must be studied from the point of view
of that function, not as that in which self-consciousness arises and
by which through analogical bridges and self-projections we slowly
construct a hypothetically objective social world in which to live.
Furthermore, meaning in the light of this recognition has its refer-
ence not to agglomerations of states of subjective consciousness, but
to objects in a socially conditioned experience. When in the process
revealed by introspection we reach the concept of self, we have at-
tained an attitude which we assume not toward our inner feelings,
but toward other individuals whose reality was implied even in the
inhibitions and reorganizations which characterize this inner con-
sciousness.
If we may assume, then, that meaning is consciousness of attitude,
I would challenge any one to show an adequate motive for directing
attention toward one's attitudes, in a consciousness of things that
180 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
were merely physical ; neither control over sense-perception nor over
response would be directly forwarded by attention directed toward
a consciousness of readiness to act in a given situation. It is only in
the social situation of converse that these gestures, and the attitudes
they express could become the object of attention and interest.
Whatever our theory may be as to the history of things, social con-
sciousness must antedate physical consciousness. A more correct
statement would be that experience in its original form became
reflective in the recognition of selves, and only gradually was there
differentiated a reflective experience of things which were purely
physical. * .^
GEORGE H. MEAD.
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
ATTENTION AS SENSORY CLEARNESS
I HAVE elsewhere maintained that the analytical study of atten-
tion must center about the sensory attribute of clearness or
vividness. This doctrine has, no doubt, to run the gauntlet of many
critical objections, and to submit to many and varied experimental
tests ; it is sharply at variance with the current trend of attentional
theory. Professor Woodworth, for instance, has recantly written
that " attention offers no genuine problem to the descriptive psy-
chologist; the questions which it raises are of a dynamic or of a
physiological nature." 1 He affirms also that the "attempt to de-
scribe the consciousness of a moment as made up of the clear and
the unclear leads to a curious paradox. ' '
I shall try, in the present note, to clear up this paradox ; I think
it can be shown that paradox arises only if the descriptive point of
view is forsaken for the dynamic, and that it is therefore of Mr.
Woodworth's own invention, and not intrinsic to my account of
attention. Parenthetically, I would remark that it is not correct,
from my standpoint, to describe any attentive consciousness as made
un of the clear and the unclear, unless these terms are understood
in a purely relative sense. I regard the attribute of clearness as an
intensive attribute, so that the focal processes in attention are
simply the more clear, and the marginal processes the less clear ; but
every sensation has some degree of clearness, just as every sensa-
tion has some degree of intensity. 2
Mr. "Woodworth's paradox, now, is expressed in the following
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. VI., p. 694.
"See my "Feeling and Attention," 1908, 10 f., 26, 183 f., etc.; "Text-book
of Psychology," I., 1909, pp. 53 f., 278 f. For simplicity's sake I speak here
only of sensation; clearness attaches also to the image ("Text-book," p. 198)
and to complex sensory and imaginal processes.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 181
sentence: "To reach a distinction between the clear and the un-
clear, each of them must receive some measure of attention ; but the
unclear is just that which is not attended to, and this precludes the
making of the distinction. ' ' It seems obvious that, in this sentence,
attention is taken dynamically, as something given to, bestowed
upon, directed towards the sensory contents of consciousness. But
suppose that for clearness I substitute a coordinate intensive attri-
bute of sensation, intensity itself, or duration, or extension. Then
the sentence might read : " To reach a distinction between the strong
and the weak, each of them must receive some measure of intensi-
fication ; but the weak is just that which is not intensified, and this
precludes the making of the distinction." Is any reader inclined
to take this argument seriously? Then neither should he take Mr.
Wood worth's paradox as a serious argument against my view of
clearness. For on that view clearness is attention; degree of clear-
ness is degree of attention; to separate attention from sensation is
on a par with separating intensity or duration or extension from
the sensations of which they are constitutive attributes. The para-
dox appears only if such a separation is made; it is the result of
reading a dynamic interpretation into a bit of descriptive psy-
chology.
There is, however, another form of the objection which it may be
worth while to meet. I have put clearness on the same level with
intensity, duration, and extension. But, it might be urged, we
judge and report upon these attributes in the state of attention;
experiments that deal with them presuppose a maximal attention, a
maximal degree of clearness in the sensations; in what state, then,
do we judge and report upon clearness itself? Must not any degree
of clearness, high or low, be made focal in consciousness if we are to
take introspective account of it? Must we not, in other words, at-
tend to attention, if we are to have a quantitative psychology of
clearness ?
The reply to this objection is, I think, twofold. First, if we ap-
proach it from the side of the intensive attributes other than clear-
ness, we must note that judgments of intensity, etc., are possible
under distraction, that is, in a state of submaximal attention; the
judgments are, of course, less accurate than those ordinarily passed
in experimental work, but psychologically they are true judgments.
It is not necessary, therefore, that intensity, duration, and exten-
sion be maximally clear in order to be judged, 3 though there is un-
* Indeed, the phrase " maximal attention " really begs the question. When
we demand maximal attention, we demand in reality the highest degree of
clearness attainable under the conditions of the experiment; and there is no
guarantee that this degree is strictly maximal. See " Text-book," p. 295.
182 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
doubtedly an optimal range of clearness within -which they prove,
when comparison is made with the relations obtaining among their
stimuli, to be judged most accurately. In any case, however, it is
the intensity, duration, or extension itself, and not the concomitant
degree of clearness, that touches off the intensive, temporal, or
spatial judgment; all that variation in attention can do is to
modify the judgment in a quantitative way. Secondly, and from
the side of clearness, the argument may be met by the reports of
observers who are called upon actually to estimate degrees of atten-
tion. There is no hint in these reports of any "attention" to
"clearness"; and subsequent questioning brings out explicitly the
identity of the mechanism of judgment in the various cases. Proc-
esses are given in consciousness as more or less clear, and the given
degree of clearness touches off the judgment directly; degree of at-
tention expresses itself in words, on the basis of clearness, without
intervention or intermediation; it is with clearness precisely as it is
with intensity and the rest. And, further, just as there is an
optimal range of clearness for judgments of intensity, etc., so also
is there an optimal range of intensity, duration, and extension for
judgments of clearness ; and just as the intensive judgment may be
modified quantitatively by an unfavorable degree of clearness, so
may judgments of clearness be modified quantitatively by unfavor-
able intensity, duration or extension. We have as yet very few ex-
periments that are definitely directed upon the clearness attribute;
but these statements follow of necessity from well-known experi-
mental studies of the attentive consciousness.
It seems, then, that the objection in this form may be satisfac-
torily met. There remains the very difficult and attractive prob-
lem of recollection, of the voluntary recall of degrees of clearness.
An obscure process, actually present, documents itself in judgment
as obscure; of this we have experimental evidence. But what if I
seek to recall the process at some later time? Then its obscurity
becomes focal and that statement looks like a contradiction in terms.
The fact is, however, that under these circumstances processes which
are now focal and therefore clear act as surrogates for the obscure
process of the past; certain present and clear processes mean or in-
tend a past process that, when present, was obscure. There is, I
believe, no doubt of the formal accuracy of this statement ; but I am
not yet able to go into details. "What the substitutive processes are,
whether there is any special group of such processes, and how in
conscious terms they mean the obscure event which they stand for,
these are questions for further experiment to answer.
E. B. TITCHENER.
COBNELL UNIVERSITY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 183
DISCUSSION
A DISCLAIMER
THE too flattering notice of myself by Professor James, in this
JOURNAL (January 20), contains a statement which I think
I should ask leave to correct. Professor James credits me with
"breaking loose from the Kantian tradition that immediate feeling
is all disconnectedness." But all that I have really done here is to
follow Hegel. In this and in some other points I saw long ago that
English psychology had a great deal to learn from Hegel's teaching.
To have seen this, and to some extent to have acted on it, is all that
common honesty allows me to claim. How far Hegel himself in this
point was original, and how again M. Bergson conceives his own
relation to post-Kantian philosophy, are matters that here do not
concern me. I write merely to disclaim for myself an originality
which is not mine. It belongs to me no more than does that heroical
perversity or perverse heroism with which also I find myself credited.
F. H. BRADLEY.
A CORRECTION
To THE EDITOR OP THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY,
DEAR SIR: The critical parts of Professor Montague's review of
my "Pluralistic Universe" in your number of March 17, have such
a crushing sound that, in order that careless readers may not sup-
pose me quite annihilated, I am tempted to make brief reply.
My lecture on the "compounding of consciousness" was an inci-
dent in my attempt to refute absolutism, and placed itself explicitly
on idealistic ground. In a world of mere "consciousness" (or of
purely "subjective states") I asked, "how can parts and whole be
numerically identical, when their 'content' is so different in form?"
Dr. Montague seems to forget this entirely, and when he brings in a
"realistic" world of independent objects and witnesses as the solu-
tion (pp. 148-9) he forgets with equal completeness that I (on pp.
200-3 of my book) indicate exactly that view as one possible solution.
My book doesn 't even enter into the general question of how sub-
jects know objects. I have treated of mediate knowledge in "Prag-
matism" and in the "Meaning of Truth," of immediate knowledge
(or direct perception) in the early article in this review ("Dees
Consciousness Exist?") to which Dr. Montague briefly refers. If
he wishes to demolish my epistemology I beg him to take those writ-
ings as his objects of attack.
I say nothing of my critic 's remarks on the logic of the Achilles,
184 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
etc. Perhaps if he were to spread them out more fully, I should find
them easier to apprehend.
Sincerely yours,
WM. JAMES.
CAMBBIDGE, MASS.
AN EXPLANATION
I AM extremely sorry if in my review of "A Pluralistic Universe"
I gave a false impression of its author's position with respect to
the points mentioned in his letter. Professor James charges me with
"forgetting completely" that on pages 200-8 of his book he has "ex-
plicitly" put forward the theory which I accept as a satisfactory
solution of the collective-distributive puzzle. Now after several re-
readings of these pages I am unable to find any statement of the
theory which I defended, that I should regard as adequate. I do
find at the bottom of page 200 a statement that many witnesses can
know the same object, which would seem to be explicitly identical
with my view ; but in the next paragraph at the top of page 201, I
find this view interpreted as implying that the fields of the several
consciousnesses are distinct entities and that the common object of
their knowledge lies beyond them, which is decidedly different from
the view that I maintained. Moreover on page 206 the author says
of this point of view "how can one and the same objects appear so
variously? Its diverse appearances break it into a plurality; and
our world of obejcts then falls into discontinuous pieces quite as
much as did our world of subjects." And again (page 207) "In my
heart of hearts, however, I knew that my situation was absurd and
could only be provisional." Inasmuch as I had contended in my
article that the absurdity which Professor James charges against
this view depended solely on his interpreting the many witnesses as
necessarily having distinct rather than overlapping fields of con-
sciousness, thus implying a dualism between the field of consciousness
and the object known, I can hardly feel that the passages to which
Professor James refers contain an "explicit statement" of my own
position, which it was incumbent upon me to recognize.
To Professor James's protest that I forgot that he was address-
ing himself to idealists and speaking from the idealistic standpoint,
in pressing home the difficulty of identifying a distributively known
and a collectively known object I can only reply that I got and still
get overwhelmingly the impression that he is speaking not as an ideal-
ist to idealists, but in his own person and voicing his own opinions
when he says "I must in short bring back distinct spiritual agents
... or else I must squarely confess the solution of the problem im-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 185
possible, and then either give up my intellectualistic logic ... or,
finally, face the fact that life is logically irrational. Sincerely, this
is the actual trilemma that confronts every one of us" (p. 208). Now
it is on the basis of this trilemma that the defense of Bergsonian irra-
tionism is based. If it is as Professor James's letter seems to me to
imply, a trilemma that applies merely to the idealist, why should he
feel concerned in his book to escape from it by accepting the new
logic? And why, too, if it applies merely to the idealist, should he
state that it is "the trilemma that confronts every one of us"?
It may be, however, that I have somehow misunderstood the pur-
port of his letter, and I offer the above not merely as a defense but
as an amende.
W. P. MONTAGUE.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
SOCIETIES
THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
rriHE American Psychological Association convened in Cambridge
J- the last three days of 1909. Many former Harvard men were
present and a good representation of the association membership was
evident at the opening meeting in Emerson Hall, where, at the
close of the morning session, Professor Miinsterberg, on behalf of
the Harvard department, extended an informal welcome. Unusual
facilities for the accommodation of the visiting psychologists had
been provided and the psychological laboratory was thrown open
for inspection during the entire time of the meetings. The annual
social event following the president's address was made more en-
joyable this year through the courtesy of Professor Miinsterberg,
who invited the association to his home for the occasion.
The program for the meeting was replete, containing forty-five
names of speakers. In addition to the usual number of papers in
the general field of psychology, special attention was given to ab-
normal psychology, animal psychology, and the methods of teaching
psychology, each of which topics occupied the whole or greater part
of an entire session.
Not only the largest attendance, but the most animated discus-
sion occurred on Wednesday afternoon, when psychoneurotic phe-
nomena were the subject for consideration. The animus for the
program was undoubtedly Freud's recent visit to this country, and
the discussion centered about his theories. The fray began with an
exposition of Freud's theory of the unconscious by Mr. Putnam.
186
According to Freud there is in many persons, in addition to the nor-
mal mental life developed on socially conventional lines, a secondary
stream of psychosis whose origin is primarily in the sex-instinct.
The social requirements of mental development suppress the normal
outlet of this secondary stream and the instinctive attempt
to find an outlet results in an ill-regulated education of this lower
mental level. The growth of this level goes on, however, without
conscious awareness, but with important consequences to mental life.
The lower stream does not always remain hidden, but thrusts itself
momentarily into the conscious field. The speaker insisted that this
secondary life is entitled to a name and contended that the terms
"unconscious," "subconscious," ' ' vorbewusst, " were appropriate.
The rationality of the Freudian view Mr. Putnam sought to show
by a comparison with Bergson's view of the relationship of bodily
and mental processes in normal life. Both Bergson and Freud indi-
cate that conscious awareness is not an essential feature of productive
mental life.
Freud's application of his theory to the case of dreams was set
forth by Mr. Jones. Dreams are directly continuous with the rest
of mental life and are explicable as the results of well-defined
causes. Dreams have a double content, one part "manifest" and the
other "latent." The latent content can be discovered only by psy-
cho-analysis. The application of this method always reveals the
dream as the imaginary fulfilment of a wish, Avhose nature has been
such that the subject has forcibly repressed it from the conscious
field. When the censor has been removed by sleep, the distorted wish
works itself out. On this theory, the study of dreams becomes the
most valuable means of access to the deeper phases of personality.
Mr. Boris Sidis in a paper on "The Fundamental States in Some
Forms of Psychoneurosis" opposed the Freudian view as to the sex-
ual character of these phenomena, the essential trait of which is the
systematic character of the manifestations. The system tends to
develop into a parasitic personality foreign to the patient and recurs
with such periodicity as to be described as recurrent mental states.
The fundamental causes of these states it was held are the experi-
ences of early childhood, such as mental trauma, emotional shocks,
etc. Psychoneurotic states of fear are due to the primitive fear of
the unfamiliar and an overdeveloped sense of the mysterious, culti-
vated in early life by social, moral, and religious training.
The discussion precipitated by these papers was vigorous and
prolonged. Hall, Prince, Putnam, and Jones, all of whom seemed to
accept the Freudian theories either as to result or method, argued
that we have here an avenue of psychological investigations that
promises much for the future study of the more complex mental
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 187
states. Scott, Sidis, and Whip pie were skeptical of the psycho-
analytic method for the study of dreams, pointing out the great
danger of the experimenter influencing by suggestion the "latent
mental content" to be revealed. At another time in the meeting
Mr. Scott reported a series of tests made by the standard methods of
studying suggestibility. The use of two "ideal" methods resulted
in a zero coefficient of correlation from which he concludes that there
must be made a new analysis of the factors involved. It was these
data which led him to enter his objection to Freud's method.
The growing importance of animal investigations appeared in
the Thursday morning program, which, with the exception of two
papers at the close, was devoted to the subject. Mr. Cole reported a
study of color vision in the raccoon by modification of the Kinnaman
method. The essential change in the apparatus was in clamping the
food glasses with their tops immediately beneath a horizontal board
so that the animals could not feel or see into the glasses before
choosing. A second improvement over the Kinnaman method was
the great number of check experiments used to insure that the
animals were really depending on the single visual factor of color.
The raccoons discriminated the food glass about ninety per cent, of
the time." Discussion of the paper conceded that this was one of the
most thorough studies of color vision yet made and seemed prac-
tically to exhaust the possibilities of the use of pigmented papers.
Those interested will be glad to learn that it is now proposed to test
the raccoon further by the Watson- Yerkes spectral light apparatus.
An investigation on the visual motor coordination of the rat was
reported by Miss Richardson. The device used was a jumping
apparatus adjustable to different heights and distances. The ani-
mals seemed able to land on the platform only when the conditions
were such that visual perception of the platform was not required.
Reliance was mainly upon the motor impulses. The work is an in-
teresting confirmation of Watson's work on kinesthetic sensations.
A third study of animal vision this time on the size discrimina-
tion of the dog was reported by Mr. Yerkes. The apparatus used
was an improved form of the brightness device previously used in
the Harvard laboratory. The work was done by Mr. Haggerty on a
Cocker spaniel. The report dealt chiefly with the development of
methods of handling the animal in the effort to force dependence on
size to the exclusion of other stimuli. The results so far obtained
point to the animal's ability to discriminate a circular area four
and a half centimeters in diameter from one six centimeters in
diameter.
Preliminary experiments on anthropoid apes were reported by
Mr. Haggerty. Two orangs and a chimpanzee were tested at the
188 THE JOUPNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
New York Zoological Park by the problem method. The devices
were adapted from Hobhouse and the results, while not extensive,
tend to show (a) a remarkably fertile field for the investigation of
animal intelligence ; (6) a definite and precise limitation of the sense-
impulse theory of animal learning; (c) a greater role for imitation
than among any of the lower species of primates.
In addition to the four investigations, place was found on the
program for one paper of a more general nature. Mr. Burnham
proposed a "Working Hypothesis for Animal Psychology." The
essential part of the hypothesis is that there has been not only an
evolution of total mental states, but that each sort of mental state
has had its own particular development. Thus there are not only
levels of intelligence, but rather levels of the evolution of percep-
tion, of memory, of judgment, etc. In the human mind we have
not a hierarchy of faculties, but a hierarchy of stages in the develop-
ment of each fundamental process.
On Thursday afternoon the Committee on Methods of Teaching
Psychology made its report. Abstracts of the work of the committee
had been distributed earlier and the time was occupied by comment
on specific phases of the report by the persons who had had the
report in charge. The fact that the discussion was participated in
by Seashore, Whipple, Calkins, Sanford, Pillsbury, Baird and
"Warren indicates the degree of interest the leaders of the field are
taking in the pedagogy of the subject. The discussion showed that
the most diverse aims and methods now prevail in different institu-
tions, that everything from physics to metaphysics is taught in the
name of psychology with the consequent misfortune that students
are confused and the subject too often discredited as a part of an
educational curriculum. The report is positive in character, replete
with practical suggestion for normal schools, colleges without lab-
oratories, and colleges and universities having laboratories. Printed
copies are to be distributed to all members of the ASSOCIATION and
the report will go far toward giving psychology its proper place and
dignity in the realm of educational disciplines. Two other papers
during the meeting dealt with methods of teaching, one by Mr.
Hylan on "An Instance in Intensive Teaching of Psychology" and
a second by Mr. Warren on "The Form of the Color Pyramid."
Educational psychology shared in the program with three papers.
Mr. W. F. Dearborn reported an investigation of the eye movements
in children's reading. Photographic records of these movements
were regarded as an index of the attention span and are thus su-
perior to tachistoscopic tests. They thus furnish an indication of
the pupil's progress in learning and the value of a pedagogical
method.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 189
Mr. Arnold had studied the mental retardation of children by
three methods. The child's breathing was obstructed by a plug in
the nostril and was then tested with simple mental tasks. Efficiency
decreased with the obstruction. Tests on children with defective
eyesight showed that while poor eyesight was physiologically harm-
ful it was not pedagogically so. Further tests showed that the ig-
noring of individual differences in school gradation was an auto-
matically working cause of retardation.
A paper by Miss Theodate Smith discussed a set of collected ob-
servations on the sense of shame in animals and children with the
conclusion that the development of shame in the phylogenetic and
ontogenetic scale coincides with the development of self-consciousness.
However, the special emphasis given to particular interests did
not eclipse the attention to normal human psychology. In this field
there were six papers, five of them reporting extended experimental
work, and one a bit of introspection on the type of ideation. The
latter was by Mr. Colvin and set forth his own ideational type as
being a marked case of the motor variety, a form which he called
mimetic, owing to the tendency to make actual movement when sen-
sation or image is present.
The tactual estimation of filled and unfilled spaces has been newly
attacked by Miss Cook, who has conducted a three-part investigation.
In the first part a filled and an unfilled space were placed succes-
sively on the same surface ; in the second part, the spaces were placed
simultaneously on adjacent parts of the forearm ; and in part three
the spaces were presented successively but in the same relative posi-
tion as in part two. All filled spaces were underestimated in the
first part and overestimated in the second, while the illusion prac-
tically disappeared in the third part. In the second sort of illusion
the subjects either judged the total impression of the filled space or
localized the end points, the illusion being the stronger in the first
case. The experimenter thinks the displacement a phenomenon of
attention. In experiments of the third type, the slight illusion that
appeared was an overestimation in the case of subjects who judged
by immediate impression and an underestimation by those who relied
upon localization. The same illusion appeared in the case of two
blind subjects and it is concluded that the illusion is truly tactual.
In discussion Mr. Miinsterberg pointed out that the results did
not contradict those of Rieber which showed that the tactual illusions
correspond to the visual.
Mr. Carr read a paper on "The Autokinetic Sensation," giving
the results of extended experimentation. Eye movements do not
occur when the fixation point remains with the light, but they do
occur when the fixation point remains apparently stationary and the
190 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
light moves away from the point. The velocity, extent, direction
and regularity of the illusion are dependent on the position of the
eyeball in the socket. Fatigue also is a factor and the illusion holds
for a foveal negative after-image, but no correlation was found be-
tween the aspects of the illusion and the bulbular twitchings. This
last result tends to disprove the integration theory of the illusions.
Mr. Pillsbury presented a new phase of the attention wave prob-
lem. The fluctuations of a minimal stimulus are not longer to be
regarded as true attention waves. The experiments were made by
Messrs. Work and Billings with a view to measure the period during
which one might attend to a supraliminal stimulus. The average
length of attention for fourteen subjects was from 1.2 (with m.v. of
4) to 4.2 (m.v. 1.2) seconds and for three other subjects .98 to 2.4
seconds based on a thousand results. The results seem to indicate
the time that any impression may be held before consciousness with-
out change.
Progress in determining the nature and cause of the galvanic
phenomena has been made by experiments reported by Mr. Boris
Sidis. As to its nature the results confirmed the author's previous
contention that the phenomenon is due to the generation of an
electromotive force under the influence of sensory stimulation and
affective states. In the experiments, the skin secretions, circulation,
and effects of the sympathetic and central nervous systems were
eliminated as possible causes, and the phenomenon seems to be of
muscular origin.
The popular belief that color-blindness is rarer among women
than among men is put seriously in question in a study by Mr.
Hayes on 457 college women. The results of tests with Nagel cards
show color deficiency in 104 of the number. Twenty-three of these
were further examined in the laboratory, with the result that two
were found to be color-blind, four others almost if not wholly so, and
the remaining 17 showed marked deficiency in ability to discriminate
colors. In many cases marked differences in the two eyes were dis-
covered.
Twice during the meeting questions of psychological theory came
to the fore, once during the president's address and again in a paper
by Mr. Mead on "What Social Object Does Psychology Presup-
pose?" Both speakers dissented from the generally accepted doc-
trine that introspection into a private consciousness is the only legiti-
mate procedure for psychology. The thesis defended by Mr. Judd
in his address on "Consciousness and Evolution" was that "the
concept of consciousness is most productively utilized in science
when it is treated as a cause. It determines by its present organi-
zation the mode of future action." This view accepted, "the study
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 191
of the relations of conscious processes to the environment and to the
other inner functions of the human individual becomes the legiti-
mate work of the science of psychology. Psychology thus becomes
the science of the function of consciousness in the world rather than
a mere introspective account of the various elements of conscious
states." On this view psychology acquires a field of objective study.
This thesis, which is not new in Mr. Judd's speculations, was
founded upon an historical statement of the evolutionary process
made to show that the course of evolution has not been free from
the determining influence of conscious processes, that language and
art are not to be understood as biological phenomena, and that not
biology, but psychology must be the basis of the social sciences.
Quite in the same spirit Mr. Mead held that the self of introspec-
tion was not the basis for the recognition of external selves, but that
these latter are logically preexistent to the former. Selves are social
objects which psychology must presuppose as definitely as it pre-
supposes the physical object the physical organism and its nervous
system. The social sciences must state the conditions under which
self-consciousness is possible rather than that self-consciousness
should create in a solipsistic way the selves it will recognize.
Other papers offered by title only were by Messrs. Dunlap,
Stratton, Wells, Porter, Franz, Ferree, Burnett, G. V. N. Dearborn
and Lough. Mr. Whipple demonstrated two instruments for bright-
ness discrimination, a pressure-pain balance and forks for pitch
discrimination. A new pendulum chronoscope was described by Mr.
Twitmyer.
Mr. Pillsbury was made the new president, and Messrs. Lindley
and Yerkes were elected to the council for a period of three years
each. The 1910 meeting will be at Minneapolis.
M. E. HAGGEBTT.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Esthetics. KATE GORDON. New York, Henry Holt & Co. 1909. Pp. 315.
In the field of esthetics only one thing is more conspicuous than the
lack of teachers of all-around competency, and that is the dearth of ele-
mentary text-books. Treatises, monographs, and essays abound, but the
beginner, seeking a broad, illuminating survey of the problems and an-
swers in the philosophy of art, must trust to lectures or else go beyond
the English language; and, if the latter, who will assure him success?
Neither of the two books which have aimed to supply his demand to wit,
Santayana's " Sense of Beauty " and Puffer's " The Psychology of Beauty "
has stood the test of class-rooms. They score on very different targets;
192 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
each handles some aspects of esthetics, but no more, and each frequently
becomes too special or too profound for the undergraduate who is taking
his first dip. All this makes Miss Gordon's volume a noteworthy con-
tribution, inasmuch as its harshest critic must confess that, first of Amer-
ican works, it possesses the fundamental virtues of an introduction. It
outlines the entire field of esthetics. Its style is simple and declarative.
Controversy is not heard in it. Obscure issues are not raised. There are
many clear examples and a number of figures. And each chapter closes
with a well-selected cluster of reading references. If there is any struc-
tural defect worth mention, it is probably the enumeration of special
forms : thus, Miss Gordon names and comments briefly upon each rhythm-
type, she gives a short history of the dance and follows it with a sketch
of the religious dances of the Middle Ages, the pavan, the gavotte, the
minuet, the pas de basque (to which she devotes a page), and finally three
pages on the principles of posture and movement, all of which principles
must be taught in dancing-school but have no place in a course on
esthetics, being nothing more than rules of poise and manipulation.
While there is the same tendency to descriptive detail in the chapter on
The Character of Simple Lines and Forms, it here enjoys a much sounder
excuse; the details are not rules for draughtsmen or a catalogue of
geometrical species, but rather a most useful account of the immediate
esthetic effect, the suggestiveness and the manner of employing artis-
tically lines, figures, and patterns.
A text-book should not be criticized for the theories on which it has
been built, except in so far as these mar the presentation of the subject
to the student's eyes. Miss Gordon advances many propositions about
which the fire of doubt burns fiercely; take, for instance, her assertion
that "the appreciation of nature is derived from the appreciation of
human art products," or that " criticism may be called the esthetics of
particular cases," or that emotion is representative, or that magic is an
incentive to the imitative impulse (instead of being a by-product of that
same impulse). Whether these opinions can win their fight or not need
not concern him who is looking for a good text-book; they are stated
frankly, simply, and undogmatically by Miss Gordon, and the worth of
the book does not hang in the slightest upon them. It is the mass of
admirably chosen facts and their clear ordering that count; and they
promise Miss Gordon's production a long and successful career.
WALTER B. PITKIN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
Augaben und Ziele des Menschenlebens. DR. J. UNOLD. Leipzig: B. G.
Teubner. 1908. Pp. vi + 142.
The book is a plea for supplanting religious instruction in the schools
(particularly those of Germany) by a course of training in scientific ethics.
Dr. Unold deplores the tendency of the German government to increase
the hours of religious instruction in the schools with the hope of counter-
acting the degeneration of morals which has followed the loss of religious
faith in the mass of the people. The emancipation from religious au-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 193
thority Dr. Unold regards as a step in advance in ethical progress. He
points out the fact that the ethics of religion depends upon external
authority, which the individual is constrained to obey by a system of
arbitrary rewards and punishments. Though he recognizes the usefulness
of such a stage of ethical development in establishing social habits, he
believes that it is already outgrown. The remedy for the degeneration
of morals (the reality of which he does not question) he finds not in
the attempt to force the people back into religious restraints, but in the
thorough ethical instruction of the young.
The course of ethical training which Dr. Unold outlines comprises
a theory of ethics which is to be classed as a type of perfectionism. Ethical
conduct consists in a conscious striving toward the purposes of life re-
vealed in organic evolution, in the development of social organization, and
finally in the history of human culture. From the first two sources he
derives two fundamental practical ends of existence: (1) the maintenance
of the race by means of the preservation, adaptation, and reproduction of
the individual, (2) the development of the greatest possible degree of
variety, and of efficiency in both the race and the individual. The attempt
to realize these ends constitutes the practical duties, such as the preserva-
tion of individual health, public hygiene, the production and care of chil-
dren, rational choice in marriage, obedience to the common laws of state
and society, and the education of the youth to social service. These laws of
the merely practical realm of conduct are safeguarded, and their fulfill-
ment in part insured, by the fundamental laws of the organic world, and
of human society. Their violation necessarily results in harm to the
individual, and to society. If the youth asks why he ought to strive to
conform to these rules of conduct, it is a sufficient answer to point out the
inexorable nature of the connection between the transgression and the
punishment when they are violated. A youth who fully understood this
connection would need no further restraint in the form of heaven and hell.
The third and highest end of conduct is revealed in the history of
human culture. It alone transcends the practical, and deserves to be
called ethical. This end Dr. Unold defines as the perfecting (Vervoll-
kommnung) of the various kinds of progress to be found in the history
of culture, namely, (1) intellectual-scientific, (2) artistic-literary, (3)
technical-commercial, (4) political-social, and (5) ethical-religious.
Progress in the ethical-religious field is given a special name the process
of ennobling (Veredlung) and is treated in detail. The ennobling of
the rac,e is a threefold process, consisting of (1) humanizing (development
of intellect, refining of feeling and discipline of the will), (2) individual-
izing (the production of exceptional personalities), and (3) socializing
(the development of a sense of national loyalty and social solidarity).
The highest end of conduct he accordingly states as follows : " The pro-
duction of an intelligent and noble personality, which shall devote itself
consciously and with enthusiasm to the cause of social-commercial,
national-political, and universal-human progress."
But the youth who asks why he ought to strive toward the realization
of the highest end of conduct is not so easily answered as in the case of
194 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the practical ends. The development of a noble personality is an end
which is set by the course of self-determined conscious activities, and
which lacks the binding force of natural law. Dr. Unold concludes that
the ethical ideal must depend for its motive power upon an act of faith
on the part of the individual faith not in a supernatural power, but in
the power of the individual intellect to understand, and of the individual
will to fulfill, the laws of life. It should be one of the first objects of early
education to instill such a faith in human might and in human destiny.
The book closes with a discussion of euda5monism, and utilitarianism.
The former doctrine is ranked lower in the ethical scale than the latter,
but both are regarded as confined to the limits of the merely practical.
The manner of presentation is clear, simple, and untechnical, and there
are numerous summaries which make the argument easy to follow. The
book contains a mass of suggestive detail to which no justice can be done
in a brief summary.
HELEN THOMPSON WOOLLEY.
CINCINNATI, OHIO.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. January, 1910. Perception
and Physical Reality (pp. 1-21) : J. A. LEIGHTON. - Physical reality in the
complex content of actual and possible perceptual experience. The reality of
perception logically involves the thoroughgoing interdependence and corre-
lation of perceptual object and percipient mind. The Self (pp. 22-33 : FRANK
THILLY. - The self exists. It is experienced. It is what is aware of states,
owns them, recognizes them, remembers them, connects them, assumes atti-
tudes toward them. No philosophy or psychology can afford to ignore
the self as a part of experience or dissolve it into a mere sum of states.
The Schematism in Baldwin's Logic (pp. 34-52): C. H. WILLIAMS. - Pro-
fessor Baldwin emphasizes the experimental character of thought, but
differs from pragmatism in maintaining that the true universal is some-
thing beyond the hypothetical general (or schema), and that it exhibits
fixed and determined knowledge. This position may be criticized as
creating a false dualism between the " as of general " and the true general,
or at bottom between percept and concept. Professor Baldwin's schematic
method is not new, but is a thorough working out of the old method of
hypothesis and proof. The Notion of the Implicit in Logic (pp. 53-62):
J. E. CREIGHTON. - The notion of the implicit is attacked as a fallacy in
Baldwin's Genetic Logic. Idealists have abused the notion, but its legiti-
mate use can not be dispensed with. Reviews of Books: William James,
The Meaning of Truth: GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. Ludwig Stein, Philo-
sophische Stromungen der Gegenwart: HENRY W. STUART. F. Pillon,
L'annee philosophique : E. L. HINMAN. James Bisset Pratt, What is
Pragmatism? GEORGE ROWLAND DODSON. Notices of Books. Summaries
of Articles. Notes.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 195
Bawden, Heath. The Principles of Pragmatism. New York and Boston :
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1910. Pp. viii -f 364.
Davenport, C. B. Eugenics: The Science of Human Improvement by
Better Heading. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1910. Pp. 35 + 7
pages of diagrams. $.50.
Davies, A. E. The Moral Life. A Study in Genetic Ethics. Baltimore :
Review Publishing Co. 1909. Pp. xii + 187.
La Monte, Robert Rives (Socialist) and Mencken, H. L. (Individualist).
Men vs. The Man. A Correspondence. New York : Henry Holt & Co.
1910. Pp. 252.
Leenhardt, F. L'E volution: Doctrine de Liberte. Saint-Blaise et Rou-
baix: Foyer Solidariste. 1910. Pp. 154.
Samuelson, James. The Human Race. London: Swan, Sonnenschein
& Co. 1910. Pp. xii -f 192.
Stumpf von, Carl. Philosophiche Reden und Vortrage. Leipzig: J. A.
Earth. 1910. Pp. 261. M. 5.
Volkert von, Johannes. System der Aesthetik. Band II. Munchen: C.
H. Beck'sche. 1910. Pp. xxii + 569. M. 10.50.
NOTES AND NEWS
ACCORDING to Science for March 11, " the naturalists of France and of
many other parts of the world are uniting in a jubilee celebration in
honor of J. H. Fabre, styled by Charles Darwin ' the immortal Fabre,' and
referred to by him also as ' that inimitable observer.' Fabre, after years
of labor and of patient observation and of most important work, is, in his
age, the most modest of men, leading a retired life, and his admirers
everywhere and in all walks are uniting in this celebration. Not only are
naturalists coming together for this jubilee, but prominent officials
throughout France and prominent men in literature as well, since Fabre's
published work possesses a high literary value. No one, says David Sharp,
has ever written on his subjects with equal brilliancy and vivacity. So
Mistral, the poet ; Edmund Rostrand, the poet and dramatist, and Maurice
Materlink, the naturalist, philosopher and novelist, among others, have
united in this jubilee. Members of the French Academy engaged in other
branches of science, such as Poincare, and men prominent in many walks
of life, not even excepting journalism, such as Hebrard, the director of the
Temps, have also associated themselves with Fabre's other admirers. The
jubilee will be held on the third of April, at the time of the inauguration
of the Institute of Oceanography by the Prince of Monaco. A medal will
be struck in honor of the occasion. Americans wishing to contribute may
send their subscriptions to Dr. L. O. Howard, permanent secretary of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, Smithsonian In-
stitution, Washington, D. C. These should be sent at once, since the
subscription closes the twenty-fifth of March."
THE paper, the abstract of which follows, was read by Miss M. E.
Durham before the Anthropological Institute at its meeting on February
196 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
22. " High Albania is the only spot in Europe in which the tribal system
exists intact. The tribes occupy the mountain land which forms the north-
west corner of Turkey in Europe. They are exogamous, but male blood
only counts. Each tribe is ruled by a council of elders, by ancient laws
handed down by oral tradition, which are strictly enforced. Roughly, the
tribes may be divided into three groups, one of which tells a tale of origin
from Bosnia; the second, of partial origin from Eashia; while the third
declares that it has " been there all the time." The tale of origin from
Bosnia is confirmed by the fact that the tatoo patterns used by these
tribes are used in certain districts of Bosnia. Among other very ancient
customs, the Levirate is still practised, even by many of the Roman Cath-
olic tribes. Blood vengeance is extremely prevalent throughout both
Christian and Moslem tribes. Its rules are complicated. Up country, the
houses are all stone Kulas (towers), built for defence, and having no
windows, but only loopholes for rifles. Communal families of as many as
forty members live together in one room, ruled by the house lord, who has
often power of life and death over his subjects. Marriage is always by
purchase, save for an occasional forcible capture. Children are betrothed
in infancy. Thirteeen to fifteen is a common age for a girl's marriage,
and fifteen to eighteen for a boy. Hospitality is the universal law of the
mountain. The tribesman, if he receives a traveller at all, gives him of
his best." The Ailienceum, March 5.
THE corporation and the board of overseers of Harvard University have
created the department of university extension, and appointed in it the
following officers Dean, Professor Ropes; members of the administrative
board for 1909-10, Professor Ropes, Professor Royce, Professor Hanus,
Professor Hart, Professor Moore, Professor Osterhout, Professor Hughes,
and Professor Munro.
D. APPLETON AND Co. announce for spring publication a new edition of
the works of Herbert Spencer in eighteen volumes, and " The Psychology
of Reasoning " by Professor W. B. Pillsbury, of the University of Michi-
gan. Macmillan and Co. announce " The Religion of the Chinese " by J.
J. M. De Groot.
DR. E. H. CAMERON, instructor in psychology in Yale University, has
been advanced to the grade of assistant professor.
DR. F. S. BREED, at present engaged in work in comparative psychology
at Harvard University, has been appointed instructor in psychology in
Yale University.
VOL. VII. No 8. APRIL H, 1910
THE PRAGMATISM OF KANT
VERY theologian who has felt the influence of Albrecht Ritschl
-I ^ has been accustomed to lay emphasis upon certain elements in
the teaching of Kant which are in harmony with the way of looking
at things now so commonly known as pragmatism. It therefore seems
to such theologians, or at any rate to one of them, strange that so
little account is taken of Kant and of his influence in discussions of
the pragmatic movement, whether by its friends or foes. In a famous
and often quoted passage in one of his addresses, Professor James
remarked : " I believe that Kant bequeathed to us not one single con-
ception which is both indispensable to philosophy and which philos-
ophy either did not possess before him or was not destined inevitably
to acquire after him through the growth of men's reflection upon the
hypotheses by which science interprets nature. The true line of
philosophic progress lies, in short, it seems to me, not so much through
Kant as round him to the point where now we stand. Philosophy
can perfectly well outflank him and build herself up into adequate
fullness by prolonging more directly the older English lines."
This judgment shows an amazing disregard of a side of Kant's
teaching with which one might expect Professor James to be in
heartiest sympathy and to emphasize accordingly. He is not sin-
gular in his attitude towards Kant. The impression given by many
modern writers on philosophy, English and American, is that Kant
is interpreted so exclusively in the light of post-Kantian, particularly
Hegelian and neo-Hegelian idealism, that a large and important part
of his thought has failed to receive the attention it deserves. It is
in this neglected side of his thought that I am myself particularly
interested, and no one surely can read Kant's posthumously published
essay "Uber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibnitz und
Wolff," the clearest and best summary of his philosophy with which
I am acquainted, without realizing that he too was particularly inter-
ested in it. It appears most fully worked out in his "Kritik der
praktischen Vernunft" and his "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
197
198
Sitten," but it comes to forcible expression also in nearly all his later
writings, notably in the posthumous essay just mentioned. I refer,
of course, to the doctrine of the postulates. We can not prove super-
sensible realities, they are inexperienceable by us. But in order to
the living of our moral life, the fulfilling of our moral purpose, we
postulate them and then live by them. We do not find them, we
create them. We make them true by postulating them. To quote
from Kant : ' ' Out of the moral law which our own reason prescribes
to us with authority, and not out of the theory of the nature of things
in themselves, arises the conception of God which the practical pure
reason compels us ourselves to make." 1
"Granted that the pure moral law absolutely binds every one, not
as a prudential rule but as a command, then the right-minded man
may well say : ' I will that there be a God, that my existence in this
world be also an existence outside the chain of nature, in a pure
world of the understanding, finally, that my existence be endless.
I insist on this and will not permit this belief to be taken from me. ' '
4 ' So far as the idea of purpose is concerned it is always made by
us, and the idea of the supreme purpose must be made a priori by the
reason. ' ' 3
' ' In this case we should not have to undertake investigations into
the nature of things which we make for ourselves and solely for
practical purposes, and which perhaps do not exist outside of our
idea, and perhaps could not even though no contradiction were in-
volved. For if we did we should only run into extravagance. ' '*
' ' Theoretically we come by the most strenuous exertion of reason
no whit nearer the conviction of the existence of God, the reality of
the highest good and a future life, for no insight into the nature of
supersensible reality is possible for us. Practically, however, we
make these objects for ourselves as we regard the idea of them help-
ful to the ultimate aim of our pure reason." 5
These (i. e., the postulates) "are ideas made by ourselves with a
practical purpose which must not be given theoretical value or they
will turn theology into theosophy, moral teleology into mysticism,
and psychology into pneumatology, and so put things a knowledge
of which we make use of in practical matters over into a transcendent
sphere where they are entirely inaccessible to our reason." 6
1 " Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophic,"
p. 17; Vorlander's edition; in the Philosophische Bibliothek, Vol. 46a.
"Practical Reason," ibid., Vol. 38, p. 182.
* " Fortschritte," ibid., Vol. 46 c, p. 125.
4 Hid., p. 127.
8 Ibid., p. 130 ff.
6 Ibid., p. 143.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 199
"Therefore belief has in itself a moral value, because it involves
a free assumption. 7 The credo in the three articles of the confession
of the pure practical reason ... is a free acceptance of them as true
without which it would have no moral value. It permits, therefore,
no imperative (no crede), and the argument upon which its correct-
ness is based is not that these propositions theoretically considered
are proved to be true, or that there is objective information touching
the actuality of the objects themselves, for this is impossible in con-
nection with the supersensible, but that there is subjective and from
the practical point of view valid ground to justify us in acting as if
we knew that these objects were real. ' ' 8
"That the world as a whole is always improving, this conviction
is justified by no theory, but by the pure practical reason which
commands us to act in accordance with such an hypothesis, and so
creates a theory agreeable to this principle." 9
We are evidently moving here in a realm of pragmatism. If one
says we have no evidence for the existence of God, no proof of divine
purpose in the world, we may say in the spirit of Kant : We will put
purpose there, we will give the world meaning which we can not
discover in it. This is to be religious in Kant 's sense. Faith in God
is an heroic deed, not a passive acquiescence. We make a moral
purpose supreme and we read it into the universe and thus we find
God for ourselves. The primacy of the will, the recognition of its
activity in forming truth, the insistence upon the practical nature
and practical test of the truth thus formed all this surely is gen-
uinely pragmatic.
It is true that there is an absoluteness about the belief in super-
sensible realities thus gained which contrasts sharply with the l^ose-
ness with which the modern pragmatist holds his postulates. And
it is true, too, that Kant will hear nothing of the verification of these
postulates by sense experience. But it is to be noticed that they are
verifiable in man's moral experience; in the realm of values. In
other words, they work in the moral life. If they do not, if by means
of them the moral life can not be lived and the moral purpose for-
warded, then they break down and must be repudiated. And so
there is a consistent pragmatism after all, even though it is obscured
by the use of the term experience in a narrow sense, and the conse-
1 It' is interesting to compare with Kant's notion of belief Hume's descrip-
tion of it as a " more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object,
than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain," and his denial that it
depends in any way upon the will. ( See the fifth section of his " Inquiry
Concerning the Human Understanding," entitled " Sceptical Solution of these
Doubts," part 2.)
8 Ibid., p. 129.
Ibid., p. 139.
200
quent assertion that the postulates are independent of all experience
and should look for no validation there. The truth is that the funda-
mental difference between Kant and the pragmatists, as appears
clearly enough in this connection, may be summed up in the state-
ment that the latter take the word experience in a broader sense
than he.
But in any case, even if there be an unpragmatic element here,
it should not blind us to the significance of Kant's main contention.
Man is a factor in the making of reality. The world is plastic, and
is in part, at least, and in its most important part, what man makes it,
for he gives it meaning and value. Keality is not simply what we
find it, it is also what we make it. 10 It is not merely the given things,
the brute facts, it is what we transform them into by interpreting
them in accordance with our ideals and bringing them into sub-
servience to our purposes. The practical reason according to Kant
is not something to be apologized for, a monstrosity in the philosoph-
ical world, as most of his followers thought. It is superior to the
theoretical reason because it carries us over into the higher realm of
values, the realm of ideals and purposes, the plastic realm in which
man is a dominant factor in the making of reality. It is significant
that in his ' ' Fortschritte " Kant defines metaphysics as the study of
the way in which the reason may pass from sensible to supersensible
realities, 11 and accordingly represents his Critique of the Practical
Reason as alone dealing with metaphysics in a positive sense, and
claims that his conclusions there mark the chief advance in meta-
physics since Leibnitz and Wolff. His interest in the realm of values
and the supreme significance which he attached to his epoch-making
labors in that realm are thus made abundantly evident. Attention
may be called in this connection to the fact that in his little essay
"Was ist Aufklarung?" published in 1784, he defined Aufklarung
not as the rationalist Mendelssohn had done, solely in intellectual
terms, but as independence and maturity of character, the courage
and the will to act as well as to think for one's self a practical, not
a mere theoretical, Aufklarung.
There are many other elements in this part of Kant's teaching
which have a decidedly pragmatic sound and remind us of positions
emphasized by one or another modern pragmatist. The contrast
which Kant's idealistic followers are fond of drawing between ap-
pearance and reality, as if there were no reality in phenomena, was
"The familiar fact should not be overlooked in this particular connection
that in opposition to Locke's view of knowledge as a purely receptive process
Kant made the creative activity of the knower a fundamental thesis of his
philosophy.
11 P. 84.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 201
denounced by him as unsound. Phenomena are real. Sense experi-
ence is a necessary element in reality and so reality is not fixed and
unalterable, but is constantly in the making. The absolutism in this
sphere against which the pragmatists are continually protesting is
not Kant's.
The monism of post-Kantian idealism which some pragmatists
are opposing so strenuously is equally foreign to him. The world
is given not as an all, but as an each. It comes to us in experience
as the many, not as the one. We may unify it conceptually by our
reason or practically by our will, but the unity is not primal unity
in which the many inhere and from which they flow. It is rather a
unity to be attained, a unity in the making. Moreover, it is not
absolute or all-inclusive; there are refractory elements which remain
outside not only of our own unification, but of every one's, God's
included. Kant was no easy-going optimist, treating evil as unreal.
He believed in the existence of the radically bad and in its progres-
sive overcoming not by its being taken up and transcended in the
consciousness of the absolute, but by the conflict of free human wills.
Man alone can overcome evil. It is his work, not God 's. And though
he live on everlastingly in an immortal life, the labor of overcoming
will never be finished.
Similarly the God whom Kant postulates upon the basis of man's
moral purpose is not an absolute being. He is not the one, or the
all. The reality and freedom of the individual are in no way limited
by Him. He is simply one of many free moral beings, working each
for his own end. He need not even be infinite. To postulate Him
is simply to postulate will and power for the accomplishment of a
certain definite purpose, beyond that and aside from that nothing.
Whether or not Professor James's pluralism be regarded as a neces-
sary consequence of his pragmatism, at any rate it is congenial to the
pragmatic spirit. The same is true of the pluralism of Kant.
That there are important pragmatic elements in Kant's teaching
no one certainly can deny in view of the considerations that have
been mentioned. But what of the "Critique of the Pure Reason,"
with its emphasis upon necessity, its insistence upon the a priori
character of the forms of knowledge, and its deduction of the trans-
cendental categories of thought? I do not desire to overlook or to
minimize the unpragmatic character of this side of Kant's thought.
I simply wish to remark that when the situation which he faced and
the dominant interest which controlled him are considered, the con-
trast between him and the pragmatists even here is seen to be less
complete than it seems. It is to be observed that Kant was awakened
by Hume from the rationalism of the Wolflfian school, which taught
that knowledge is possible apart from and independent of experience,
202 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
that it may be the fruit solely of "pure ideas of the understanding"
(to quote Kant himself), an assumption which led to intellectualism
and absolutism of the most extreme type. Against this Kant pro-
tested earnestly and insisted in opposition to it that no a priori
knowledge of any kind is possible, that knowledge can not exist apart
from experience and independent of it. What he did, as a matter
of fact, when Hume's challenge awakened him out of his dogmatic
slumber, was not to meet Hume's scepticism by the rationalistic
method of setting up a scheme of a priori and necessary truth inde-
pendent of all experience, but on the contrary to turn to experience
itself and analyze it. In so far he was as radical an empiricist as
Hume himself. The a priori forms and categories of thought are
given only in experience. To be sure, they are not the fruit of
experience, they are its pre-conditions. But apart from experience
they are wholly unknown and have neither significance nor reality.
They are, indeed, experiential forms, not in the sense that they are
a posteriori and derived from experience, but in the sense that they
have to do only with experience. Kant's analysis of the process of
knowing may be regarded as sound or unsound. In any case, it looks
unpragmatic in its outcome, for it finds elements which are not in any
sense either directly or indirectly the fruit of experience and which
can not be explained by it. But this should not blind us to the still
more significant fact that he discovers neither these nor anything else
anywhere but in experience. The limitation which he put upon the
pure reason, denying that it could transcend experience, is as essen-
tial a part of his "Critique of the Pure Reason" as the powers he
assigned to it, and when one takes it in connection with the "Critique
of the Practical Reason" which follows one must say an even more
important part.
It is to be noticed still further that the necessity which attached
to the a priori forms and categories, and upon the importance of
which Kant laid so great stress throughout his discussion, was not the
necessity of a transcendental object or system or scheme of truth.
It was simply a necessity found, so he thought, in experience (though
not deducible from it) and valueless beyond experience or independ-
ently of it. He admitted that other beings might have other laws of
thought and their knowledge exist under other conditions. That is,
the necessity which he ascribed to the forms and categories was a
necessity observed in the actual phenomena of human knowledge and
therefore properly assumed there, but only there (compare "Fort-
schritte," p. 92). It was not a necessity which could be used for the
construction of a world of objects or ideas transcending experience
and unrelated to it. Kant's categories of thought were purposive in
character, existing to meet the demand of the human mind for order-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 203
liness and sanity, and his failure to investigate their genesis and his
use of the unpragmatic term a priori in connection with them should
not mislead us as to the real significance of his position. His interest
was not that of the intellectualist, to reach absolute truth to set over
against the unreal world of shifting experience, but rather that of the
empiricist to account for and explain experience. How are synthetic
judgments a priori possible? This was the problem of his "Critique
of the Pure Reason." In other words how are certain given facts
in experience, for so he understood them to be, possible ? The differ-
ence between him and the pragmatists, after all, is at bottom a dif-
ference in their respective interpretations of experience. He interro-
gated it as eagerly as they and he refused as firmly as they to go
beyond it. As between the empiricism of Hume and the intellec-
tualism of the Wolflfian school he belonged with Hume. And still
more emphatically as between the pragmatists of to-day and the
intellectualists of either the Bradley or the Royce type, against whom
they chiefly fulminate, he belongs with the pragmatists. Kant was
an anti-sceptic but not an anti-empiricist. Certainty he did seek over
against the scepticism of Hume, but he sought it in and for experi-
ence, not apart from it and not for other and transcendental pur-
poses. His protests against the idealistic development that claimed
to be the legitimate fruit of his philosophy are familiar to everybody.
He had no sympathy with that development. On the contrary, his
interest w r as quite the reverse and his " Critique of the Pure
Reason ' ' should itself have made it clear even had not the ' ' Practical
Reason ' ' and other later works followed.
It would be too much to call Kant a pragmatist. There are too
many unpragmatic and anti-pragmatic elements in his system, and
not a few important features of modern pragmatism come from
influences that have arisen since his day. But the pragmatists are
his true successors and not the intellectualists or absolutists of one
and another type. It is he that has made pragmatism possible, it is
he, indeed, that has had, more than any one else, to do with making it 1
actual, and of all modern thinkers the pragmatist should be the last to
say that " the true line of philosophic progress lies not so much
through Kant as round him to the point where now we stand."
A. C. McGlFFERT.
UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINABY.
204
SOME NEGLECTED PARADOXES OF VISUAL SPACE. 1 IV
IN the matter of correspondence between the image on the retina
and the form or pattern perceived by the owner of the retina,
the biologist's dilemma shows up at only half-length, but already
awesomely enough. If, following a Kantian like Driesch, he regards
space as a hyperchemism, that is, as a product of two noumena
neither of which is spatial any more (and presumably even less
truly) than oxygen is water, then how does it happen that the very
sense organ which specializes in the manufacture of the raw noumenal
material out of which the Ego produces space chooses to take on
such a structure and materiality that, from the point of view of
another observer, it anticipates, at a given point in its mechanism,
the very space form which, at a later step in the a priori synthesis,
becomes an experience? The complete idealist can not say, with
Professor James, that we have to do here with a mere coincidence, a
misleading accident; for, note well, if the idealist agrees that the
eye is the mechanism of space-sensing, he really is condemning him-
self to say that in reality the eye is itself spaceless or, what amounts
to the same thing, that it is spatial only as a phenomenon, only in so
far as somebody is seeing it, and not in so far as it is an instrument
in producing vision. I fear this does not impress most idealistically
inclined biologists as an inevitable result of their position, nor yet as
a very serious one. But I think it is both.
To hold at one and the same time that there are organisms living
in some kind of an environment and that space is only phenomenal,
one must go the full length with Driesch and agree that the real ulti-
mate agents in such a world are themselves spaceless; and it is
greatly to Driesch 's credit as a consistent thinker that he has not
shirked this conclusion. It must be admitted, in all logic, that the
organic structures which we seem to perceive as extended and very
nicely differentiated with respect to position, size, form, etc., are not
actually extended, but simply have a nature that, when conjoining
noumenally with a noumenally distinct Ego, produces the appear-
ance of extension. The retina, therefore, possesses a most amazing
capacity, putting to shame all the creatures in Alice's Wonderland.
For, being spaceless, it not only manages to manufacture, or assist in
the manufacture, of space ; but, in so doing, it takes on the appear-
ance, not of manufacturing the space which its owner eventually
perceives, but of copying that space from some noumenon! Of
course, it can not be copying a phenomenon, inasmuch as a phenom-
enon exists, by definition, only inside of some Ego's consciousness
1 Read in part before the American Philosophical Association at New Haven,
December, 1909.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 205
system. So far as I can follow the idealist through this Cretan laby-
rinth, and see his way as I stumble along, he seems to be proving that
the retinal image is neither truly a phenomenon nor yet a noumenon.
For once admitting, as I suppose he does, that the retina and its
disposition at the moment has some reality above pure illusion, he
must say that the image, from its owner's point of view, is neither
the object seen (e. g., the phenomenal tree), nor the noumenal entity
(the tree in itself) nor yet the spaceless noumenal perceiving Ego.
And, from the point of view of an observer with an ophthalmoscope,
that same image is neither the phenomenal nor the noumenal tree
that appears to the owner of the retina.
I envy the thinker who can make sense of all this; and yet it
states the idealistic position quite fairly, I think. But the gravest
difficulty is not yet; it comes with my attempt to understand how a
Kantian biologist conceives the correlation and differentiation of
optic parts. If he considers the eye as really, and not only in a
phenomenal way, the medium of effecting the a priori synthesis re-
sulting in visual space, he must concede a most mysterious effort or
tendency in the vital force to mould, not only the retina, but the
whole optic apparatus, so as produce not only the feeling of space in
the individual, but also the mere appearance on the retina. In other
words, the crystalline lens, the cornea, and the aqueous humors all
cooperate, to all appearances, to produce, somewhere else in space,
namely, on the retina, a spatial pattern which should be the same
phenomenally as another thing somewhere else in space appears to
the owner of the retina. And all these organic parts do this as a
matter of metaphysical fact in a spaceless world ; as agents existing
somehow prior to the a priori synthesis, they are not spatial nor in a
space. They cooperate, they adjust themselves to each other and to
the external world, they yield to the supposed necessities of optics,
not because they are really outside of one another, not because the
organism as a whole needs to behave agreeably with its environment
and to control and modify spatial things ; but they cooperate either
for the purpose of producing their own mutual externality and the
external environment or else without this purpose but with the same
result.
There is, I feel, a certain unclarity in this statement, due to the
fact that we are dealing with one and the same sense-organ (and
that one the space specialist) ; one might say that just such odd
coincidences should be expected in a structure which, seeing all
things only under the guise of space, happens to have the knack of
looking back upon itself. There would be paradoxes, of course.
And a small concession in favor of dualistic representationism would
wipe them all out. For example, a defender of the "local sign"
206 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
theory might grant, as a biologist, that there is some cosmic peculiar-
ity to which the space we experience corresponds more or less asym-
metrically ; and yet, at the same time, he would deny both the mod-
erate and the radical beliefs of natural realism, viz., that the per-
ceived spaces somehow copy the objective or that they actually are
the objective in a peculiar setting. The absurd descriptions of the
retina just given must then be stricken out; the eye spreads out in
reality, only its outspreading is there not the kind of externality that
we sense with the eye itself. Vision is a translation of that objective
outspreading into a unique, incomparably different kind, the kind
we knew as psychic. And yet this mental projection can steer its
owner about in the world passably, if he but learns how to use it.
It is an admirable instrument for navigators, but is no more cosmic
space than a sextant is the pole star. This compromise is worthy of
a Talleyrand : it enables the Kantian to keep his a priori syntheses
and his Ego ; it leaves to the nai've man his real objective world and
his live, efficacious contact with it ; and it builds a wide platform for
several schools of humanism and pragmatism. It is more than a
master-stroke of diplomacy, too; many are the philosophical ques-
tions which it settles without a hitch. But there is at least one great
fact into whose face it can not look, and that is the imitative reflex,
which nothing short of radical natural realism of the nai've type can
make intelligible.
Smile at a young child, and the child smiles back. Frown, and
the child frowns. When the child is somewhat older, you may make
it respond with approximately the same tone or noise to the sound
you utter in its presence. In a normal child, the accuracy of this
response increases rapidly after the seventh or eighth month of life,
so that in the tenth month, according to Preyer and later investiga-
tors, all kinds of imitation are easily performed. I need not drag
you through the enormous latter-day literature on sociology, collect-
ive psychology, anthropology, and above all linguistics in order
to echo the now familiar proofs of the leading part such imitation
plays in the upbuilding of social institutions, types of belief, lan-
guage, art, and so on. The general facts, which tempt some think-
ers to view all mental life above the sense level as a mere blossoming
of that one same primitive imitative reflex, may here be accepted
as quite as clear and as certain as any empirical data can be. Most of
us can verify them directly in our own lives ad libitum. And many
of us, I fear, have often made the painful discovery that our most
brilliant and original ideas, punning or philosophizing, are but de-
ferred reflexes, giving back to a later hour other people's thoughts
which we have loved long since and lost awhile. Now, it is precisely
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 207
the biologist or his blood-brother, the genetic psychologist who
insists most earnestly that a theory of knowledge which is to be
worth the fashioning must, if it does not grow out of just such em-
pirical facts as this, at least reckon with all of them, giving each a
place in its resulting system. Let us first try to decide what is the
very least that must be done with the imitative reflex.
Accidental the correspondence between retinal image and per-
ceived form may be; but the very suggestion that mere chance has
brought about the correspondence between a perceived form, mo-
tion, or sound and the form, motion, or sound produced reflexly by
the percipient as a result of his perceiving the former that sug-
gestion, I say, simply proposes the total abolition of science and
scientists. For we have to do with a mechanism of the most astound-
ing complexity, which appears in multiple forms in a single organ-
ism, and which exhibits the correspondence, not inside the process
of producing a single sense quality (as in the case of the retinal
image), but between the end terms of a process involving several,
often many, different organs. I shall consider each of these as-
pects of the situation in a moment; just now let me emphasize the
three-fold improbability of mere chance. Chance would not be a
wild explanation, if we found only an occasional individual copying
a feature of his environment ; but millions of men and lower animals
do it regularly. Chance would not be absurd, again, if in all these
millions there were only a few occasional imitative reflexes recurring
with neither observable rhyme nor reason, now in one sort of situa-
tion and now again in another ; but such acts happen in almost every
hour of normal life among anthropoids and men, from the drum
concerts of the chimpanzees up to the sentimental young novel reader
who weeps with her heroines and gnashes her teeth in baffled rage
with the imagined villains of the printed page. And, finally, chance
would not outrage us as a hypothesis, if there were but one very
simple mechanism, operating with some very limited group of
peripheral stimuli, which produces the reflex in some one part of the
body; but the entire muscular system of every well-ordered human
being is subjugated to a mechanism that on the other side connects
with the retina in such a manner that some appropriate limb or set
of other muscles reproduces, after its own way, in postures or in
movements, the form or the path of seen things and acts. Less com-
prehensively but with equal or even rarer delicacy, the basilar mem-
brane and the laryngeal muscles are likewise joined up in a copying
machine which tends to give back to the outer world a faithful echo
of the sounds which that world has given it. At once general, con-
stant, manifold, and inconceivably intricate, can this function be
208 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
rationally set down as a mere chance producer of imitations of its
own stimuli ? Not unless its critic were to surrender every accepted
scientific method. That interpretation becomes still more hopeless
when we consider that reflex imitation, by and large, grows more
refined and more general as the organic type improves (i. e., be-
comes more sensitive and more adaptive ) . Any theory of knowledge,
then, which a biologist who does not desert his own science will ac-
cept must look upon the reflex as designed (not necessarily in any
finalistic manner, to be sure) to reproduce in organic matter certain
geometrical features of physical things which affect the organism
through certain media.
But before considering what such a theory of knowledge may be,
I find it unavoidable to describe what the reflex does; for, though
psychologists by the legion have analyzed, charted, genealogized, and
otherwise dissected it, none has, to my knowledge, pointed out just
those features and steps which are most relevant to our presnt
purpose. Professor Baldwin has dwelt at some length upon the
muscular reaction which either reproduces or retains its own stimu-
lating conditions ; but the details, no less than their meaning, he has
not elaborated at all so as to disentangle a theory of knowledge from
them. Lipps, I believe, is the only philosopher who has so much as
skirted this particular territory (if this is not true, I should greatly
appreciate correction) ; but his interest has been chiefly an esthet-
ician's, so that the peculiarities which he has briefly noted in his
various writings on Einfuhlung have never been brought to bear
upon his or anybody else's theory of knowledge. By all odds the
most significant peculiarity, however, has not been even mentioned
by him or anybody else; I refer to the fact that the imitative reflex
set up by perception of visual space forms and movements is an
imitation which the imitator himself either can not normally per-
ceive at all or which he perceives only indirectly. Recall our illus-
tration. If you smile at a child, the child smiles back. \Yhat has
happened? A certain arrangement of light waves, striking the re-
tira. sets up a neural current (or \vhatever you choose to call the
organic disturbance) which, after various wanderings and vicissi-
tudes, pulls the child's facial muscles in such a manner that, to an
observer, the arrangement of facial lines appears very much like
that of the lines in the object which the child is perceiving. But
the child himself does not see his own facial muscles. He does not
know that they take on this imitative pattern until he has patronized
the family mirrors and duly compared the architecture of his
grimaces with that of the things he reacts to. We may marvel, with
Lipps, at the inconceivable, baffling complexity of such a reflex ; but
such wonder is quite beside the point and a weak thing when we
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 209
weigh the epistemological implications of the happening. Put these
in the language of ordinary scientific realism, and they are, I think,
decidedly more startling than all the antinomies of Kant (which, it
may be well to remark in passing, are antinomies only if their
reader accepts in advance the very idealistic epistemology which
their existence is supposed to force upon him). What have we, if
not a physical complex reproducing itself in another physical com-
plex through the same medium and mechanism which somehow pro-
duce experiences of the first complex? What, again, if not that this
reproduction, or self-copying, is originally not given in direct em-
pirical form to the medium of reproduction, but can only be dis-
cerned by a second party? Consider what problems this situation
brings.
In terms of cause and effect if I may assume the propriety of
the category, as every natural realist must the process just de-
scribed is a genuine reflection, or perhaps more exactly a deflection,
of one material order into another through an intricate series of
causal steps in a nervous system; the character so deflected being
only the pure geometrical form of the peripheral cause. What, now,
are the causal steps to this consummation? A fair answer, it seems
to me, puts the whole psychophysical issue on a new level and in a
better light. Ignorant as we all are of the private adventures of a
nerve current on its course from retina through cortex down to
muscle, we must say that somewhere and somehow the geometrical
pattern of the retinal stimulus is thrown back and down a motor
tract in such a manner that certain muscle fibers stretch and relax so
as to group themselves in the pattern of the first stimulus, enor-
mously magnified and, of course, considerably blurred through the ap-
pallingly complex "refractive index" of the heterogeneous medium.
The biologist and everybody else who seeks to explain organic phe-
nomena first of all naturally, which is to say in terms of the cate-
gories under which they appear, ought long ago to have sensed the
irrelevance of the stock mind-body puzzle, when viewing the imita-
tive reflex. However pertinent to biology, psychology, or metaphys-
ics the question whether ether vibrations cause sensations or are
merely parallel to psychic epiphenomena, it is hardly worth discus-
sion until the facts of organic conduct have been broadly surveyed
and conscientiously interpreted in terms of the purposes that con-
duct serves, either actually or in aspiration. 2 And when, beginning
at the first basic type of behavior which most sharply distinguishes
the more perfectly from the less perfectly adapted and efficient or-
*The pragmatism which identifies itself with this scientific method and
with nothing save what that method implies must stand, it seems to me, forever
unassailable against all critics.
210 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ganism, namely, this same imitative reflex, the biologist turns psycho-
physicist, he ought easily see that the relation of physical stimulus
to "mental state" is, for all theory, secondary to the relation be-
tween the undeniably physical end-terms of the simple sensory-
motor imitation. For we can not, without fleeing the whole evo-
lutionary point of view, doubt (much less deny) that the motor
reaction here, as everywhere else, indicates or contains more fully
than does the sensation the purpose, suitability, or other significance
of the single process of which both are but phases. For it is the
final set of the body that constitutes its adjustment to the environ-
ment, whereas the sensation is either a mere intermediate step
toward that adjustment or else a device for retaining and recalling
one or both of the end terms of the process (i. e., for entering the
stimulus, so to speak, as a constant determinant or a suitably recur-
rent determinant of later reactions, and for releasing it in such).
Admit this, and at once the physical or unique nature of the sen-
sation becomes a matter of immediate indifference. For of one su-
preme fact the biologist is sure, to wit, that the result, the outcome
of the whole intricate process is a physical reproduction of a phys-
ical feature of a physical stimulus. Either alternative of the usual
psychophysical dilemma, then, is equally agreeable to a biologist
seeking a theory of knowledge : if, on the one hand, muscular imita-
tion is caused by the sensation complex, then the latter is precisely
what the naive man believes it to be, namely, a peculiar preservation
of a peripheral energy pattern; and if, on the other hand, the sen-
sation is epiphenomenon, the muscular imitation being caused
directly by the stimulus and without the contributory influence of
consciousness, then the sensation is still a copy of the stimulus, but
in a different order of existence ; for the percipient can make another
stimulus which "brings about the same sensation complex, under the
same conditions of observation, and he makes it "by the mere act of
thinking of the original sensation complex and letting his muscles
react imitatively. In other words, you or I can readily put on the
mien, air, or gait of somebody whom we saw last week ; that is, by the
sole aid of the experience, we can manufacture out of our own
bodies a physical form or movement which, affecting your or my
retina (say via a mirror), brings to pass an experience like the
original. I, for one, can not imagine how such an experience, be it
epiphenomenon or potential energy or what not, can turn its own
mysterious force, its moulding power, back into the world of nerve
and muscle fibers and in any manner arrange these spatially so
that, as a total retinal stimulus, they bring about a copy of the in-
stigating experience, unless this latter somehow matches its physical
peripheral determinants. This conclusion would not force itself
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 211
upon me so tyrannically if the stimulus were reproduced directly in
the retina itself ; for then it might well be that what seemed to be a
second stimulus was really but a revival of the first in the retina.
But the matter out of which the duplicating stimulus is actually
fashioned is not simple ether vibrations; what the memory directly
manufactures is a cause of such vibrations, a form which will reflect
light so arranged as to produce a geometrical pattern on the retina
like that which gave rise to the original instigating experience.
Here the imitator passes by a most circuitous route from an experi-
encecall it an idea, if you will heighten the difficulty for the
Kantians into the physical order which is moulded unconsciously.
And the resulting organic form is not a duplicate of the light waves ;
it is a physiological arrangement, a bundle of variously differen-
tiated bioplasms, which reflects light waves so that the latter, stimu-
lating the retina, duplicate the original percept. To repeat, then:
either the whole reflex is but a further developing and a specialized
reflecting of the physical stimulus, all done in physical terms, in
which case the perceived form is only a peculiar reproduction of the
stimulus ; or else the perceived form is epiphenomenal, but neverthe-
less is somehow so much like the physical occasion of its existence
that it can descend, like some Olympian god, to the crass world of
atoms and molecules to shape these, as the potter his clay, into an
image of its own material progenitor. The statue of Diana falls from
heaven; but no matter how long its descent nor how coarse the
marble, its form is the form of the huntress, though she is neither
stone nor an Ephesian. Choose betwixt these alternatives as one will,
I do not see any escape from what is virtually the ' ' copy theory ' ' of
knowledge entertained by the naive realist.
Before passing to the acute stage of the biologist's dilemma, let
me note that the latter is not relieved in the slightest degree by any
genetic or voluntaristic account of the origin of the imitative reflex.
And here the biologist himself should be the first to detect the futil-
ity of that pseudo-pragmatic method which would explain away all
difficulties simply by showing whence they come. For suppose he
try to interpret the reflex as a by-product, say, of the associative
process. He might then be able to show how, by natural selection,
or by specific resistances of nerve tracts, or by some other device, the
particular muscles come to respond imitatively to the correct visual
pattern. But what of it 1 At some moment, in some of the reacting-
muscles and nerves, the imitative reflex first develops; and there
you are! Be the conditions of its working what they may, the
crucial point is that it works! The stimulus is reflected. And the
same occurs, if the biologist talks of an elan vital, or an unconscious
will, or a psychoid, or any other primordial cosmic drive. What-
212 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ever the thing is which strives to copy, and whatever the implements
it forges to its end, when all is done, you have on your hands a
cosmic mirror. And it is just this mirror and it alone with which
any scientific theory of knowledge must be concerned. Theories of
being and of becoming may have their turn, but later and in their
proper place.
And now, let the biologist face his dilemma squarely. He, like
many eminent leaders of other natural sciences, has recently leaned
sharply toward Kantianism. The genetic psychologist has encour-
aged his inclination, and the majority of contemporary philosophers
welcomed him as one of the few elect who have stripped the scales of
common sense from their eyes. As a rule, he has taken up idealism,
if not half-headedly then surely with little zeal for reading its
tangible consequences to biological theory. For, had he even glanced
at the imitative reflex as a biological fact to be fitted into an ideal-
istically grounded hypothesis of evolution, he would have discov-
eredI should suppose at the very first that, having accepted
that reflex as a fact and not as an illusion, he must either cast
off idealism and hold to biology or else reject all biological ex-
planations now current and cling to Kant as the one and only god
of genuinely philosophical science. And the reason for this hard
choice is briefly this : all the problems of life which biology is trying
to solve either are or involve problems of getting along with space
and with time; idealism, denying the objective and independent
reality of space and time, though, can not consistently look upon
these problems as the incentives or causes of the evolution of mind
or generally of conscious organisms in which cellular structure
grows to suit the feelings of the creature, because the very situation
which makes the problems is itself a product of mind living in a
spaceless world. A word or two to make this clear.
If evolution is in some sense genuine, there are three possible
ways of regarding the problems of space and time which are some-
how apparently connected with the direction of organic adaptation :
(1) They are just what we take them to be; (2) they are curious
by-products of some noumenal situation, presumably a noumenal
conflict, but in no wise representing the nature of it; or (3) they
are a phenomenal projection, a representation, in a different order
of existence, of their inciting noumenal situation. The first view no
idealistic biologist can tolerate, of course; while the third, being
representative realism, is scarcely more endurable. The second alone
is hospitable; it is, I fancy, the opinion which Kant himself would
have accepted, not if the question had been put to him point-blank
in his scientific days, but probably if he could have returned to cos-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
mology after his Critiques. By it, we may conceive in the crude, mis-
representative imagery of phenomenal experience, that there is a
Bergsonian vital force trying to be happy in a stubborn environment
where there is neither up nor down, nor right nor left, nor north
nor south. It struggles, but does not move; it works out its own
salvation, but there is neither bird in the hand nor bird in the bush
for it, inasmuch as its ideal is neither here nor elsewhere. But,
struggling after its own transcendental fashion, it collides, not at all
geometrically of course, with its environment, which, one must
understand, is neither outside of its noumenal skin nor inside it;
and from the hard encounter flare up all the starry reaches, much
as bright sparks flash up when steel meets flint. How read the imi-
tative reflex, then? Remember, first of all, that appearances do not
produce appearances, but are all themselves outgrowths of a priori
syntheses. Causation is not given to us from without, so the Kantian
sometimes puts it; which is only a special phrasing of what we
have just said. Therefore, in none of the sensations of an imitative
reflex can anybody find even a trace of the cause of the procedure.
Consider, now, a small boy mocking the solemn countenance of his
grandfather. The spatial form the mocker perceives in no wise rep-
resents the peculiarities of the real cause of either the perception or
the motor discharge which copies that form. But this is not the
strangest phase of the puzzle. Most of all must we marvel at the
fact that the noumenal factors making the first appearance (i. e.,
the face the boy sees) work upon other noumena so as to force these
to produce another appearance (i. e., the boy's grimace), but all to
no purpose to the noumena themselves, inasmuch as these appear-
ances do not make the noumena 's environment more comfortable.
The biologist must look at the situation as analogous to one in which
a man, while trying to catch a street car, grows very red in the face.
The color is produced by his adaptation to a specific environment;
but he is not adapting to redness, he is trying to get himself into the
most useful space at the most useful time, and the flush in his cheeks
is only an unserviceable and not at all pictorial by-product of his
striving. Logically, then, though in no other sense, the noumenal
parallel in the case of the imitative reflex would be somewhat as fol-
lows: it would be as if a noumenal man, running for a noumenal
car, and growing noumenally red thereby, were to compel certain of
his fellow-citizens also to grow red in their respective faces, whether
they wanted to catch a car or not. And, yet, though the flush served
none of these parties but was a mere sign of the heat of somebody's
efforts reflected in the body politic, nevertheless the colors were
enabled to get along with one another and in the world of useless
214 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
noumenal by-products much more agreeably as a result. Was ever
such a preestablished harmony dreamed of by any Leibnitz ?
Need we be surprised that consistent idealistic biologists like
Driesch have, more by instinctive fore-fear than by reason, said
farewell to current biological methods and explanatory categories?
Adaptation, natural selection, and all the other concepts of Darwin-
ism and post-Darwinism lose meaning in the face of such a situation.
But now for the strange logic of your idealistic biologist. Com-
plain as Driesch will about the futility of every biological theory
which explains organic structures and organic behavior in terms of
space, he is still quite willing to accept the threading of chromatin
in the nucleus of a cell, its symmetrical division between the centro-
somes and the final complete cleavage of the whole structure as evi-
dence that an entelechy is busy, trying to "get somewhere"! And
every morsel of fact to which he appeals for proof of vitalism in his
study: "Die Lokalisation morphogenetischer Vorgange," and in his
two volumes on "The Science and Philosophy of the Organism" tells
us likewise about changes of form, changes of diet, changes of posi-
tion, changes of direction of motion in brief, about the moving of
extended things by a vital force which manifests itself and its plans
in these very displacements. Here, then, we are confronted with a
curious spectacle, that of a scientist rejecting the realist's view of
space out of respect for a hoary metaphysic, and in the next breath
accepting space as the scene in which the entelechy not only finds its
problems but works out its own salvation ! Far be it from any fair
critic to hold the Heidelberg biologist up to ridicule on this score ;
the only difference between him and all other scientists who turn
tender glances toward the "Critique of Pure Reason" is that he
has thought out his position to the bitter end and has not scrupled to
lay bare its final results in all their weakness. The dilemma of biol-
ogy is written clearly across Driesch 's pages, and no idealistic Bel-
shazzar need summon a Daniel to read its message. It comes to this,
and to nothing more: If you want an entelechy or an elan vital or
any law or force that explains the course of organic life, you must
accept the products of this life, its structures and its instruments, as
somehow expressing its problems, as well as their solutions. If they
do not exhibit the difficulties of existence and the goal sought, then
no human being has any right to suppose that there are any real
issues to be met by any body or any thing. A child's cry for milk
discloses not so much as a blind will, if the position of the milk with
relation to the child's stomach is not real and vitally important
quite apart from the child's space-experience. If space is only a syn-
thetic judgment a priori, if consciousness of space is only epiphe-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 215
nomenal, then whoever takes pains to feed the child or to feed
himself, for that matter is pottering at something a little less fruit-
ful and dignified than a jig-saw puzzle.
Grant, though, that any and every biologist must read off his
philosophy of the organism from the observed form and conduct of
the organism itself, and grant, secondly, that any interpretation of
life is at least a legitimate enterprise ; then, as a matter of scientific
method, you have dismissed forever all idealists from your councils.
For you have agreed with the philosopher's clown, the dull man of
common sense, that the vexations stirring all of us to action are the
vexations we sense, perceive, reflect over and plan about, namely,
situations in space and time ; and that the changes we effect in our
surroundings and in ourselves are really those which solve our prob-
lems. And, having gone this far, how in Heaven's name are you
going to hold aloof from some variation of that much despised ''copy
theory" of knowledge? Even concede to the idealists all the
noumena they yearn for, noumenal egos and things in them-
selves; grant them too their ideals of God, freedom and immortal-
ity: still we can discern or conjecture these forces and aspirations
only in so far as they are really at work in the world of space which
we perceive ; and, in this world, they have purport and are intellig-
ible only to the extent that they are there confronted with real diffi-
culties which are to be overcome only through real readjustments of
position, form and movement. In other words, the Christian Scien-
tist alone is entitled to say that the problems of the here and the
there, the now and the tomorrow, are not real for the vital force,
if such there be, which gives rise to consciousness. Everybody else,
even the absolute idealist, must recognize that one must choose be-
tween no evolution at all and epistemological realism, at least so
far as space is concerned.
WALTER B. PITKIN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
"PROFESSOR MONTAGUE, in his admirable criticism of Pro-
fessor James's ' ' irrationalism, " writes as if that criticism were
justifiable only from the point of view of the realist. A few verbal
alterations, however, to statements all of which appear on page 149
of the article in the JOURNAL, will render that criticism just as valid
for the absolute idealist. The objective idealist does not "admit
216 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
that there are as many objects as there are witnesses," and that
therefore ' ' if the world is objectively one system of facts ' ' there can
be "only one real self or witness the absolute of whom we finite
selves are the mere appearances": he does insist, however, that there
is only one perfectly complete and accurate ''witness the absolute,"
which as spiritual-world soul sums up and integrates the finite selves
after a metaphysical manner, just as the Fechnerian physical-world
soul is supposed to do after a psychological manner. The absolute,
like the reading teacher, "sees the letters and words which the child
[the finite self] sees, but he sees also the sentence which the child
does not see." His world is not a different world from that of the
finite self, but the same world seen both "collectively" and "dis-
tributively, ' ' and therefore completely instead of f ragmentarily :
for what is seen distributively only is thereby seen only fragmen-
tarily, and so far falsely just as every half-truth is so far error;
but what is seen distributively and collectively is thereby seen in its
wholeness. The distributive is not "mere appearance" and wholly
false, and the collective the only reality, but it is the vision of things
collectively that gives truth to what is lacking to the vision of them
merely distributively. True, "the experience of a whole is not
numerically identical with the experience of its parts," but it is
identical with the experience of the parts plus their wholeness. True
again, "the experience of a table as merely round and hard is not
identical with the experience of it as old and valuable"; but the
experience (as by the absolute, or any complete, all-round witness)
of a table qua table (. e., in its wholeness) is identical with the
experience of it as at once round, hard, old, valuable, and all the rest.
JARED S. MOORE.
WESTERN RESEBVE UNIVERSITY.
SOCIETIES
SECTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
THE Section met at the American Museum of Natural History
on November 22, 1909, at 8:15 P.M., in conjunction with the
New York Branch of the American Psychological Association. The
following papers were presented :
Some New Data on Fatigue: Professor EDWARD L. THORNDIKE.
Sixteen subjects worked from 300 to 700 minutes with no rest or
only a short rest for luncheon. The work was the mental multipli-
cation of three-place by three-place numbers. Each subject was
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 217
tested again after a rest of twelve hours or more. The loss in effi-
ciency was not great, being more than counterbalanced by the prac-
tise effect, and was not closely correlated with subjective estimates
of fatigue.
A Preliminary Report of a Statistical Study of Association: Dr. A.
J. ROSANOFF and Miss GRACE HELEN KENT.
With the object in view of deriving a normal standard of associa-
tion to be used in a study of disturbance of flow of thought in insan-
ity, the authors applied Sommer 's association test, in a form modified
by them, to one thousand normal persons. In their attempts to
analyze and classify the results, they found it necessary to depart
from the methods of grouping reactions which had been generally
in vogue, but found that for their purposes the most useful distinc-
tion was that between common and individual reactions. With but
few exceptions, records from normal persons contain not over ten
per cent, of individual reactions. In cases of insanity, over fifty per
cent, of individual reactions were frequently obtained. The distinc-
tion between a common and an individual reaction can be readily
made by reference to the tables compiled by the authors on the basis
of the thousand normal records already referred to. The authors
believe that the diagnosis of incipient insanity in backward school
pupils or in eccentric persons will be aided by the use of their tables,
and that possibly the study of normal mental development "may also
be aided. The results of the work on association in normal persons
are being prepared for publication.
An Attempt to Standardize Certain Tests of Controlled Association:
Professor R. S. WOODWORTH.
This work was undertaken with the cooperation of Dr. F. Lyman
Wells, under a committee of the American Psychological Association.
The object has been to make a careful selection of the material avail-
able for tests of controlled association, where the measurement is to
be in terms of time. Some of the tests selected, and others in process
of selection, were presented.
The Meaning of the Association Test: Dr. FREDERICK LYMAN WELLS.
A study of the time relations in the word list of Dr. Rosanoff and
Miss Kent. The reason why free association time is longer than
controlled association time is not an intellectual but a volitional one.
The task of deciding on a suitable response is much greater in free
than in controlled associations and to this the longer times of the
former are essentially due. This difficulty of decision may be de-
scribed as the product of striving for a response that will seem suffi-
ciently dignified, or for one that shall not betray something which it
is desired to hide, or as a product of distraction induced by special
218 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
interest possessed by the stimulus word. Those individuals who
decide on their responses promptly have short times and closely
packed distributions; long times and variable distributions are seen
in those who fumble with the experiment, and hesitate about which
is the best response to give. In respect to this variability the fifteen
women subjects fell into two species, eight being below and seven
above the central tendency of the ten men subjects. The median
times of- the individual words in the list range from seven to twenty
fifths of a second. Out of the 2,500 associations, 90 were ten seconds
and over in length, the women giving proportionately three times as
many of these as the men. The role of special ' ' complexes ' ' in these
reactions was probably a very subordinate one. What is measured
by the free association time in the conventional psychological test is,
in effect, the ability of the individual to make prompt choices and
decisions under the experimental conditions imposed. The sex dif-
ferences here observed are probably secondary to the special condi-
tions of the experiment.
E. S. WOODWORTH,
Secretary.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Knowledge, Life and Reality. GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York:
DoJd, Mead and Company. 1909. Pp. 549.
In this new volume, Professor Ladd has put " into semi-popular form
the system of reflective thinking which has been evolved and published
previously in separate volumes." The author refers the reader who desires
a more detailed exposition and defense of his philosophic system, to these
earlier monographs. In the present volume, however, frequent reference
is made to his other books, and long quotations are taken from them.
Professor Ladd says, in the early pages of this last book : " If there is
any kind of human undertaking for which one ought to prepare oneself
by thinking soberly, long, and hard, it is writing or speaking on philos-
ophy." Every one will admit that the author lias himself most thoroughly
complied with his own definition of the requirements of philosophic
apprenticeship. But there is great danger that one may think too long,
too hard, and too soberly and come to take himself and his profession so
seriously that he is unable to express himself with the brevity and sim-
plicity necessary to command the interest and attention of his readers in
these busy times. The essential doctrines of the author are submerged in
the stream of technical philosophic vocabulary, of which he is so eminent
a master. The style of the author's previous volumes lias invariably been
criticized as heavy and involved. This is also one of the principal objec-
tions to be brought against his last book. The general reader who is
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 219
looking for a " semi-popular " discussion of the problems of philosophy
may easily become discouraged before reaching the end of the first chapter.
The volume contains twenty-four chapters, as follows : Philosophy : Its
Conception and its Problems; Philosophy: Its Method and its Divisions;
Schools of Philosophy; Philosophy of Knowledge: The Psychological
View; Kinds, Degrees, and Limits of Knowledge; Principles and Presup-
positions of Knowledge; Scepticism, Agnosticism, and Criticism; Meta-
physics, as a Theory of Reality; Nature and Significance of the So-
called " Categories " ; Philosophy of Nature ; Philosophy of Mind ; Matter
and Mind: Nature and Spirit; Ethics, or Moral Philosophy: Its Sphere
and Problems; The Moral Self; The Morally Good: Its Kinds (The
Virtues) and its Unity; Schools of Ethics; ^Esthetical Consciousness;
The Arts: Their Classification and Nature; The Spirit of Beauty;
Philosophy of Eeligion: Its Origin in Experience; The World-Ground as
Absolute Person; God as Ethical Spirit; God and the World; Summary
and Conclusion.
These chapters, as one might infer from their titles, are not mutually
exclusive. There is much repetition, both of form and matter, in the
volume, and the general reader who is led by the title and preface to
expect a summary popular discussion of the fundamental problems of
philosophy will be disappointed. The author has not seriously changed
his view of life, knowledge, or reality, in the present volume. Pragmatism
has come into the philosophic arena, since Professor Ladd printed his last
volume, but he gives merely a passing notice to the new philosophy. He
says : " The very foundations of so-called pragmatism, with its foolish
fury toward the systems called by their older and more respectable names,
are themselves laid in rationalism and idealism. The truths have all of
them long ago been duly incorporated, as fragments, into both these so-
called schools" (p. 37). And again: "To men who do not care to think,
pragmatism may appear the least expensive, through-express route to the
terminal station, whose station-master is the realized hope of the ages "
(p. 55).
Although the author allies himself unequivocally with the anti-prag-
matists, yet many other passages might be cited in which he announces
doctrines that resemble very closely the more conspicuous teachings of
pragmatism. E. g., "Philosophy, like science, is an affair of develop-
ment, the conclusion of which can not be foreseen in time; and the final
form of which can not be predicted with precision. Hence the need which
modern philosophy has of the particular sciences in their modern form is
urgent and indispensable" (p. 12). "It would seem plain, then, that
modern science and modern philosophy are reciprocally dependent, and in
constant need, each of the other. Philosophy needs the spirit that applies
the scientific method to all the ascertained truths and veritable concep-
tions, which the particular sciences can impart" (p. 19).
C. H. RIEBER.
UNIVEBSITY OF CALIFOBNIA.
220 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Proclus's Metaphysical Elements. Translated from the Original Greek by
THOMAS M. JOHNSON. Published by the author: Osceola, Mo. 1910.
Pp. xvi + 201.
Under this title Mr. Johnson the Thomas Taylor of our time and
country has added to the useful " Bibliotheca Platonica " which he has
been publishing at intervals for a number of years, a translation of the
" Institutio Theologica " of Proclus. By reason of its combination of
completeness and systematic arrangement with comparative brevity, this
treatise was, perhaps, historically the most influential and important of
the expositions of the Neo-Platonic metaphysics, and especially of the
system of emanationism. It contains in compact form and in a tech-
nically careful formulation the more fundamental ideas underlying such
important medieval writings as Dionysius Areopagita, the " De divisione
natura? " of Erigena, and the "Liber de causis"; and it is no far cry
from the " Institutio Theologica " to Bruno's " Delia causa, principio ed
uno " and the first part of Spinoza's " Ethics." Indeed, in the work of
an eminent writer, which lies before me, bearing the date 1909, I find a
struggle with the same problem, and somewhat the same result a scheme
of ontology at once monistic and emanationistic. But one is not sure
that they did not do this sort of thing with the greater subtlety and in-
genuity in the fifth century.
The treatise was translated by Taylor in 1792, and Mr. Johnson's ver-
sion is based upon the earlier one, but somewhat modernized and corrected.
Many of Taylor's notes are reproduced; the biography of Proclus which is
prefixed is a paraphrase of the original " Life " by Marinus. Most con-
temporary scholars will be a little shocked by the complete absence of
breathings and accents from the Greek citations; and some of Mr. John-
son's critical and historical views about Greek philosophy will seem to
many to be of a somewhat too orthodox Neo-Platonic character. The stu-
dent of the history of philosophical ideas in America will be interested in
the fragment of autobiography in which Mr. Johnson tells of the sources
of his enthusiasm for the Platonistic philosophy (pp. xiii-xvi). All save
the comparatively recent manifestations of idealism in America and, in
particular, certain elements in what was called " Transcendentalism " and
in the St. Louis philosophical movement probably were due almost as
much to direct or indirect influences from Neo-Platonism and the English
Platonists as to Kant and his German successors. The extremely impor-
tant role of Alcott in relation to both movements is the best evidence of
this fact; and Mr. Johnson's account of his own intellectual history is a
case in point. He learned idealism and epistemological rationalism first
from purely Platonic sources ; though he afterwards found much the same
conceptions with various additions and rephrasings in the doctrines of
the St. Louis Hegelians. To the late William T. Harris the present vol-
ume is dedicated.
ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.
THE UNIVEBSITY OF MISSOURI.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 221
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE. December, 1909. Akus-
tische Untersuchungen (pp. 241-289) : WOLFGANG KOHLER. - Contraction
of the tensor tympani occurs reflexly as function of the total energy of
the impinging sound wave, and is independent of pitch differences.
Amplitude is thus diminished and intensity correspondingly magnified.
Helmholtz's theory of timber as dependent on intensity relation of partial
tones confirmed for trumpet, bugle and trombone. A psychological theory
of Klangfarbe and vocal character in terms of Intervalfarbe suggested,
Statistische Untersuchungen zur Sprachpsychologie (pp. 290-311) : PAUL
KULLMAN. - A study of prose rhythm in Goethe, Schiller and Heine. The
greater the average (m) number of syllables between accents (Z) the
smaller the number of monosyllables and the greater the average syllable
value of the vocabulary. The relation between m and Z follows mathe-
matical, not linguistic nor stylistic, laws. Vocabulary of emotional text
tends to be more monosyllabic than that of prose compositions neutrally
toned. Ueber die Bedeutung der Scheinbaren Grosse und Gestalt fur die
Gesichtsraumwahrnemung (pp. 311-361) : WALTHER POPPELREUTER. - Dis-
cussion of the various criteria of visual space perception, their relative
importance, and methods of investigation. Book Reviews: Simbriger, Zur
Regulierungsf unction im Zentralnervensystem: LAQUEUR. Spielmeyer,
Verdnderungen des Nervensy stems nach Stovainandsthesie : LAQUEUR.
Mingazzini, Uber Symptome infolge von Verletzungen des Okzipitallap-
pens durch Seschosse: LAQUEUR. V. Kries, Abhandlungen zur Physiol-
ogie der Gesichtsempfindungen aus dem physiologischen Insiitut zu
Freiburg i Br: NAGEL. Straub, Uber die Atiologie der Brechungsanoma-
lien des Auges und dem Ursprung der Emmetropie: KOLLNER. Bartels,
Ein einfaches Phorometer zur Messung latenter abweichungen beim
Nabesehen: FRANZ. Raehlmann, Der simultane Kontrast im Far-
bencchein: FRANZ. Rabinowitsch, Uber den gang der Schwellenempfind-
lichkeit bei DunJceladaptation und seine AbhdngigJceit von des Vorausge-
gangenen Belichtung: FRANZ. Zoth, Uber ein einfaches Fallphonometer
und die Bestimmung der Horscharfe mit demselben: LAQUEUR. Beyer,
Ubersicht uber die Fortschritte auf dem Gebiete der vergleichenden Anat-
omie des Mittelohrs: LAQUEUR. Bezold, Experimentelle Untersuchungen
uber den Schalkeitungsapparat des Menschlichen Ohres: BEYER. Macken-
zie, Klinische Studien uber die Functionspriifung des Labyrinthes mittels
des galvanischen Stromes: BEYER. Hensen, Die Empfindungsarten des
Schalles: KRUEGER. Yerkes and Berry, The Association Reaction Method
of Mental Diagnosis: KOFFKA. Lucka, Die Phantasie: LUIKE. Ziegler,
Das Gefiihl: GROETHUYSEN. Dugas, L'antipathie dans ses rapports avec
le caractere: GROETHUYSEN. Woetzoldt, Die Kunst des Portraits: COHN.
Siebeck, Grundfragen zur Psychologie und dsthetik der Tonkunst:
MULLER-FREIENFELS. Pikler, Uber Theodore Lipp's Versuch einer Theorie
des Willens: PRANDTL. Mauno, Zur Verteidigung der Moglichkeit des
Freien Willens: LIPMANN. Hart, A Philosophy of Psychiatry: KRAMER.
222 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Boschi u. Montemezyo, Su la ecoprassia: ALLERS. Jahrmarker, Krank-
hafte Rausch- und Affektzustande : SPIELMEYER. Meyer, The Relation of
the Auditory Center to Aphasia: GOLDSTEIN. Prinzig, Die Vererbung
pathologischer eigenschaften: SPIELMEYER. Heymans, Uber einige psy-
chischen Korrelationen: BAADE. Groos, Das Seelenleben des Kindes:
WRESCHNER. Sikorsky, Die Seelische EntwicTclung des Kindes nebst
Kurzer . Characteristic der Psychologie des reiferen alters: WRESCHEN.
Wimmer, Uber Associationsuntersuchungen besonders scliwaclisinniger
Kinder: ALLERS. Ferriani, Das Gefdngnisleben der jugendlichen Ver-
brecher: SPIELMEYER. Claparede, Les Tropismes devant la psychologie:
FRANZ.
Keyserling, Hermann. Schopenhauer als Verbilder. Leipzig: Fritz
Echardt Verlag. 1910. Pp. 127.
Lavrand, H. Reeducation physique et psychique. Paris: Bloud et Cie.
Pp. 121. 1 fr. 50 c.
Legrain. Les folies a eclipse. Paris: Bloud et Cie. 1909. Pp. 120.
1 f r. 75 c.
Marie, A. Les degenerescences auditives. Paris: Bloud et Cie. 1909.
Pp. 109. 1 fr. 50 c.
McConnell, Ray Madding. The Duty of Altruism. New York: The
Macmillan Co. 1910. Pp. 255. $1.50.
Mehlis, Georg. Die Geschichtsphilosophie Auguste Comtes kritisch dar-
gestellt. Leipzig: Fritz Echardt Verlag. 1910. Pp. 127.
Meunier, Paul, et Masselon, Rene. Les Reves et leur Interpretation.
Paris : Bloud et Cie. 1910. Pp. 2}1. 3 fr.
Pieron, Henri. L' evolution de la Memoire. Paris : Ernest Flammarion.
110. Pp. 360. 3fr. 50 c.
Thompson, Silvanus P. The Life of William Thomson, Baron Kelvin
of Largs. 2 vols. Vol. I., pp. xx + 584. Vol. II., pp. xi + 585
1297. London: Macmillan Co. 30s. net.
NOTES AND NEWS
A JOINT meeting of the Western Philosophical Association, the North
Central Section of the American Psychological Association, and the
Teachers of Psychology in Iowa, was held at the State University of
Iowa on March 25 and 26 with the following program : Friday, March 25,
meeting of the Teachers of Psychology in Iowa. Subject of discussion,
" The Psychology which is Required for the State Teachers' Certificate
upon Graduation for College in Iowa." North Central Section of the
American Psychological Association " Mental Association in Children
and Young Women," John A. Hancock, State Normal School, Mankota,
Minn. ; " The Problem and Content of a Psychology of Education,"
Irving King, University of Iowa; "The Thought Method of Learning,"
Joseph S. Gaylord, State Normal School, Winona, Minn. ; " The Psy-
chology Instructor's Problem in Iowa," Ed. Forest Blayney, Buena Vista
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 223
College ; " A Test on Attention Value of Magazine Pages," Daniel Starch,
University of Wisconsin. Western Philosophical Association " The
Goodness and Beauty of Truth," H. B. Alexander, University of Ne-
braska ; " The Nature of Truth," J. E. Boodin, University of Nebraska ;
" An Idealistic Philosophy as a Basis of Psychotherapy," Kowland
Haynes, University of Minnesota ; " Two Modern Social Philosophers,"
E. L. Talbert, State Normal School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Joint Ses-
sion Address of the President of the Western Philosophical Association,
Professor Carl E. Seashore : " The Role of Play in Religion." Saturday,
March 26, Joint Session " Huxley's Epiphenomenalism, A Criticism
and Appreciation," E. B. McGilvary, University of Wisconsin ; " The
Sense of Adjustment and Life of Appreciation," E. D. Starbuck, Univer-
sity of Iowa; "Virtues: Types and Sources," F. C. French, University
of Nebraska. North Central Section of the American Psychological
Association "A Study in the Acquisition of Skill in the Writing
Process," Linus W. Kline, State Normal School, Duluth, Minn. ; " Some
New Apparatus: (a) A New Memory Apparatus; (&) An Apparatus for
the Investigation of the Light and Color Sense in Animals," F. Kuhl-
mann, University of Illinois ; " The Correlation of Musical Education,
Pitch Discrimination, and Ability in Singing," George Haines Mount,
University of Iowa ; " Discrimination Sensibility for Pitch within the
Tonal Range," Henry G. Schaeffer, University of Iowa ; " The Role of
Pitch in Rhythm," Herbert Woodrow, University of Minnesota. Western
Philosophical Association " An Introduction to Philosophy through the
Philosophy of History," J. W. Hudson, University of Missouri ; " The
Aims of an Introductory Course in Philosophy," Edgar L. Hinman,
University of Nebraska ; " The Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy,"
Bernard C. Ewer, Northwestern University.
THE Minnesota Psychological Conference was held on April 1, at the
University of Minnesota, with the following program : Forenoon session
Symposium on Retardation : " Retarded Children in Minnesota Schools,"
Superintendent F. E. Lurton, Anoka ; " The Literature of Retardation,"
Dr. H. H. Woodrow, University of Minnesota ; " Retardation and Phys-
ical Defects," Dr. E. A. Meyerding, physical instructor, St. Paul Schools;
" Backward and Feeble-minded Children from the Institution Stand-
point," Dr. A. C. Rogers, superintendent Minnesota School for Feeble-
minded, Faribault; open discussion led by Judge John Day Smith,
Juvenile Court, Minneapolis, Superintendent J. L. Silvernail, Red Wing.
Afternoon session "Philosophical Implications in the Elementary
Course in Psychology," Professor Luther A. Weigle, Carlton College;
discussion led by Professor G. D. Walcott, Hamline University; "An
Inquiry into Children's Interests in Written Composition," Supervisor J.
H. Harris, Minneapolis; discussion led by Professor J. L. Stockton,
Winona Normal School; "Suggestibility in School Children," Mr. A. S.
Edwards, University of Minnesota ; " The Psychology of the Thought
Method," Miss Theda Gildermeister, Winona Normal School.
AT the University of Minnesota the department of psychology has
224 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
organized a free clinic for the study of mental development. It is the
aim of the department to apply psychological methods to the training of
backward children. Dr. H. H. Woodrow will have immediate charge of
the work. This semester he is conducting a special course in mental
retardation. Dr. J. P. Sedgwick, clinical instructor in diseases of chil-
dren in the college of medicine, will superintend the physical diagnosis
of all children studied. In order not to interfere with medical interests
and social organizations which are already in part serving similar pur-
poses, the department reserves the right to decide what children it will
work with. Mr. W. M. Duke, a specialist in the correction of stuttering
and stammering, has offered to assist in the training to correct speech
defects. It is the intention to make the correction of speech disturbances
a matter of special investigation as it is a field in which training is
recognized to be of prime importance.
DR. BORDEN PARKER BOWNE, professor of philosophy and dean of the
graduate school of arts and sciences of Boston University, died suddenly
at his home on April 1. Dr. Bowne has been a dean of Boston University
since 1876. He was born at Leonardville, N. J., on January 14, 1847.
He was graduated from the University of New York in 1871 and began
a special study in philosophy. His book, " The Philosophy of Herbert
Spencer," published in 1874, was such a success that Dr. Bowne decided
to make philosophy his life work and spent several years abroad studying
at the universities of Halle, Paris, and Gottingen. On his return he
served some time on the staff of the New York Independent and was then
appointed to the chair of philosophy at Boston University.
VIVIAN A. C. HENMON, A.B. (Bethany), Ph.D. (Columbia), now pro-
fessor in the University of Colorado and dean, has been elected associate
professor of educational psychology in the University of Wisconsin.
K. M. OGDEN, A.B. (Cornell), Ph.D. (Wiirzburg), has been promoted
to a professorship of philosophy and psychology in the University of
Tennessee.
CHARLES HUGHES JOHNSTON, junior professor of education at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, has been elected dean of the School of Education
at the University of Kansas. In addition to his duties as dean, Mr.
Johnston will continue his work and offer his courses in educational
psychology.
DR. J. A. BERGSTROM, professor of pedagogy at Stanford University,
previously professor of pedagogy and director of the psychological labora-
tory at the University of Indiana, died on February 28, at the age of
forty-two years.
THE honorary degree of Doctor of Letters was conferred upon Emile
Boutroux, professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne and director of the
Fondation Thiers, on April 4 by Columbia University.
VOL VII. No. 9. APRIL 28, 1910
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
JAMES AND BERGSON: OR, WHO IS AGAINST
INTELLECT?
IF there is one task more thankless and unprofitable than criti-
cizing critics, it is reporting reporters. Yet even this seems
warranted by its benefits in the case of Professor James and his
recent accounts of M. Bergson. Professor James is the unchallenged
veteran leader of American psychology and philosophy ; M. Bergson
the rising marshal of French thinkers. Each man's marching orders
are taken in deadly earnest at home and abroad. So, if both speak
as in agreement while differing profoundly, the unhappy rank and
file, which is trained to take words at their mouth value, will be
confused. That this danger is neither remote nor imaginary, can
scarcely be doubted by any one who takes pains to compare James's
anti-intellectualism with Bergson 's, and James's report of Bergson
with Bergson 's report on himself. Behind one or two important
common convictions, which are chiefly on questions of method, a
mass of far-reaching, irreconcilable doctrines lies half-concealed.
For the sake of clarity and with no approval or criticism of either
philosopher's opinions, I should like to point out a few divergent
tendencies and sharp oppositions which, I believe, must constitute a
perpetual injunction against every attempt to identify or even to
harness up the radical empiricism of Cambridge with Parisian
intuitionalism. "Abridgments like this of other men's opinions are
very unsatisfactory. They always work injustice," says Professor
James at the close of his sketch of Bergsonism in "A Pluralistic
Universe. ' n This is twice true of the following remarks, which are
largely an abridgment of an abridgment ; but their injustice weighs
lightly over against their fairness.
Professor James can find much in Bergson 's pages echoing his
own sentiments. Like him, Bergson opposes every static view of
reality, stands out for genuine freedom and continuous creation in
a flowing world. Both thinkers insist that man must look inward,
'Page 241.
225
226 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
dive into the stream of consciousness, for the richest truths. As de-
structive critics of static absolutism, both stand shoulder to shoulder.
But at these broader tendencies of speculation and of method agree-
ment stops. Bergson goes the way of the older cosmologists, James
stays with the subjectivistically inclined psychologists. Bergson re-
pudiates psychophysics and nearly all experiment and hypothesis
going with it, while James often unconsciously, as in his "Prin-
ciples of Psychology," embraces Fechner and all he stands for.
Bergson peers through his "mental stream" and spies something
underneath; but James forever lingers in the flood, saying: "though
one part of our experience may lean upon another part to make it
what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may he consid-
ered, experience as a whole is self-containing and leans on nothing." 2
Bergson declares that the elan vital and its antagonistic counter-
current are each in its pure form unknowable, inasmuch as all cogni-
tion is nothing but a kind of collision between these two streams and
a mixing of them : James long ago assured us that his radical empiri-
cism "must neither admit into its constructions any element that is
not directly experienced nor exclude from them any element that is
directly experienced." 3 Where Bergson thinks of life as transcend-
ing experience, James thinks only of experience as transcending con-
ceptual thinking. Were I to attempt an all-around account of their
systems, I should certainly turn everything in them about this fun-
damental difference in the point of view. Hence, for Bergson, the
last inwardness of every experience is quite beyond the most search-
ing intuition; it is, however, not in the least "absolutely dumb and
evanescent, the merely ideal limit of our minds," as that reality
"independent" of human thinking appears to James. 4 It is twofold,
a tremendous creative activity and an enormously stubborn, by no
means " evanescent, w matter. Such antitheses might be multiplied
almost indefinitely, but let them pass; it is more profitable to limit
ourselves to a contrast of our two philosophers' theories of the con-
cept. For it is Bergson 's critique of intellectualism, as founded on
1 is interpretation of conceptual experience, that wins the space of a
whole chapter for him in James's "A Pluralistic Universe." And
yet it is precisely on this topic that Professor James makes me sus-
pect that he has called upon an opponent to do a friend's service.
If I read both writers correctly, Professor James has sympathetic-
ally chalked up against Bergson many a costly item which the
Frenchman has never entered on his books and never will. Before
accepting this statement, you should peruse the citations in their
2 This JOURNAL, II., p. 114.
3 76., I., p. 534.
4 " Pragmatism," p. 248.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 227
original context I shall make; the obligation is peculiarly strong
because both men freely indulge in all the tropes known to the
literary artist, and still more because, in many points, their theories
differ no more than but just as much as an infinitesimal segment of
a curve does from an infinitesimal segment of a straight line.
James thinks to find in Bergson 's theory of concepts confirmation
of his own view that "the completer our definitions of ether- waves,
atoms, Gods, or souls become, the less instead of the more intelligible
do they appear to us. ... Ether and molecules may be like co-
ordinates and averages, only so many crutches by the help of which
we practically perform the operation of getting about among our
sensible experiences." 5 But this kind of pragmatic psychology
seems to me absolutely incompatible with everything Bergson is
driving at. Far from pronouncing "matter," "energy," and like
concepts mere "extraordinarily successful hypotheses" whose sole
claim to our preferences is their superior utility for human pur-
poses, the French intuitionalist firmly holds to the objective reality
of matter. On the very first page of his introduction to "L 'Evolu-
tion Creatrice ' ' I read : . . . notre intelligence, au sens etroit du mot,
est destinee a assurer 1'insertion parfaite de notre corps dans son
milieu, a se representer les rapports des choses exterieures entre
dies, enfin a penser la matiere.
To think matter ! Hardly a Cambridge performance, this ! The
external things are "out there," they are tough, thick, obstinate
quite loath to evanesce or to be the mere ideal limits of thought. And
in a later chapter, "De la Signification de la Vie," Bergson says
that science commits no sensible error in cutting up the universe
into relatively independent systems, for "la matiere s'etend dans
1'espace sans y etre absolument etendue." 6 What does this mean?
That the physicist's interpretation of nature carries us further
from the latter as he works out his concepts more fully ? Not at all.
Science is always approaching an adequate description of matter,
but such a description is unattainable only as 2 is the unattainable
sum of the series l + +
Ainsi, 1'espace de notre geometrie et la spatialite' des choses s'engendrent
mutuellement par 1'action et la reaction rciproques de deux termes qui sont
de mime essence, mais qui marchent en sens inverse 1'un de 1'autre. Ni 1'espace
n'est aussi Stranger a notre nature que nous nous le figurons, ni la matiere
n'est aussi completement etendue dans 1'espace que notre intelligence et nos
sens la reprgsentent. 1
In this difficult passage, which sorely needs its whole original set-
5 "A Pluralistic Universe," p. 342.
6 " L'Evolution Creatrice," p. 222.
f /6., p. 221.
228 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ting, one point stands out brilliantly : Bergson expressly repudiates
the very construction which Professor James places upon his theory.
Summarizing Bergson 's treatment of Zeno's paradoxes and mathe-
matical-geometrical concepts of time and space, Professor James
reports the intuitionalist as teaching that, "instead of being inter-
preters of reality, concepts negate the inwardness of reality alto-
gether." 8 Note, please, the two words I have italicized. Not Zeno's
concepts, not yours nor mine, but concepts as such are guilty. And
they are not simply defective or incomplete; they are altogether
mendacious in what concerns the interpenetrating densities of cosmic
action. I defy anybody to grub so much as a grain of this ore out
of Bergson 's mine! Here is another fragment even less amenable
to Professor James's reading:
L'entendement est chez lui dans le domaine de la mature inerte. Sur cette
matters s'excerce essentiellement 1'action huniaine, et 1'action, . . . ne saurait
se mouvoir dans 1'irreel. Ainsi, pourvu que Von ne considere de la physique
que sa forme generate, et non pas le detail de sa realisation, on peut dire qu'elle
touche I'absolu. 9
Lo J The horrid absolute rears its head even in Bergson ! And
it is the dead, chopped-out concept, the "form" of physical knowl-
edge, which actually fingers the monster. The concept is not invented
at each man 's own sweet will, by breaking up the flux with the same
freedom; we do not "create the subjects of our true as well as of
our false propositions," as James thinks. 10
Atoms and ether and potential energy and all the other things of
physical nature are all perfectly real objects or forces in a perfectly
real space. They are, indeed, so exceedingly real, so chock full of
existence, that, when we encounter them in the sudden shock that
constitutes intelligence, we simply can not take them all in; all we
gather about them in discrete thought is their surfaces at the points
of our collision with them and their standstill at the instant of that
collision. On this score Bergson speaks beyond all equivocation.
The escape from Democritus, Aristotle, Hume, and Kant, so far as
the question of spirit and matter is concerned, is found in the
hypothesis
". . . que ni la matiere ne determine la forme de Pintelligence, ni 1'intelli-
gence n'impose sa forme ft la matiere, ni la matiere et 1'intelligence n'ont
reglees 1'une sur 1'autre par je ne sais quelle harmonic preetablie mais que
progressivement 1'intelligence et la matiere se sont adoptees I'une d, 1'autre
pour s'arreter enfin A une forme commune. Cette adaptation se serait d'ailleurs
effectuee tout naturellement, parce que c'est la mCme inversion du mSme mouvc-
* " A Pluralistic Universe," p. 246.
"Evolution Cratrice," p. 216.
16 " Pragmatism," p. ~2~ii ><|.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 229
ment qui cr<e il la fois rintellectualite" de 1'esprit et la materiality des
choses." u
And, in the very next sentences, this profound thinker adds the
implications of this hypothesis. These, I think, no student can read
without perceiving instantly the world-wide difference between Berg-
son and James.
" De ce point de vue, la connaissance que nous donnent de la matiere notre
perception, d'un cote, et la science, de 1'autre, nous apparalt comme approxi-
mative, mais non pas comme relative. . . .11 faudrait, pour qu'une theorie
scientifique fut definitive, que 1'esprit put embrasser en bloc la totality des
choses et les situer exactement les unes par rapport aux autres; mais en reality
nous sommes obliged de poser les problgmes un a un, en termes qui sont par
la mme des termes provisoires, de sorte que la solution de chaque problfime
devra tre inde"finiment corrige" par la solution qu'on donnera des problSmes
suivants, et que la science, dans son ensemble, est relative a 1'ordre contingent
dans 1 lequel les problfimes ont e"te" pose's tour a tour. C*est en ce sens et dans
cette me"sure qu'il faut tenir la science pour conventionelle. Mais la conven-
tionalit6 est de fait pour ainsi dire, et non pas de droit. En principe, la science
positive porte sur la re'alite' mme, pourvu qu'elle ne sorte pas de son domaine
propre, qui est la matiere inerte."
Perception and scientific theorizing rated in the same class, and
that class a producer, not of relative but of approximate knowledge !
Surely James must cry halt at this, and still more sharply at Berg-
son's hypothesis that the limitations of conceptual thinking are im-
posed not by human desires as much as by the trick things have of
happening one after another and being likewise experienced.
How can Professor James report that Bergson says "concepts
make things less, not more intelligible, when we use them seriously
and radically?" How can he believe that Bergson thinks concepts
"serve us practically more than theoretically"? That the French-
man regards them as "throwing their map of abstract terms and
relations around our present experience"? And that the author of
"L 'Evolution Creatrice" thinks that "conception, developing its
subtler and more contradictory implications, comes to an end of its
usefulness, . . . and runs itself into 'the ground," whereupon Berg-
son "drops conception"? (Professor James himself italicizes this
last verb.)
The fact is, according to Bergson, that concepts alone make things
intelligible; that they serve us in theory better than in practise
("action," he says, "breaks the circle of logic"); and that, far
from being a map thrown about our present experience, they are
our present experience itself, halted in its flight, and by the shock of
stopping or "kicking back" condensing, as it were, into hard lumps
always into lumps of perfectly real, objective nature. These lumps
or precipitations are not "cut out" of reality, at all, as Professor
""Evolution Creatrice," p. 225.
230 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
James construes Bergson. 12 They are a phase of reality, they stay
in their stream. They are neither copies nor distortions of matter
in the picture-gallery of the vital force; they are intelligence itself
and matter itself, each in a special relation to the other. "What
Bergson sees and James apparently does not is that things are none
the less real when they are motionless and external to one another
than when they shoot through one another and interpenetrate and
move. James imagines that Bergson agrees with him in supposing
a concept to be a convenient misrepresentation made for exclusively
practical purposes. But, as I read Bergson, he clearly states that a
concept is reality (a part or phase of reality) retarded and solidified,
representing nothing whatever, distorting nothing whatever, but
simply being that which we live it as being, a cosmic character dis-
tinct from others. In its particular setting the characteristic is
distinct, but only there ; where there is no collision between the vital
energy and obstructing matter, where the former runs on smoothly
(and perhaps also where matter is serenely alone and uninvaded by
spirit?), there all other qualities of nature shoot through it and live
in it, so that it is external to them in neither space nor time. Were
more quoting called for, we might reprint pages iii and iv of
"L 'Evolution Creatrice, " where Bergson after describing all those
who, like James, deem the best product of intellectual effort a symbol
or pragmatic construct, as suffering from "un exces d'humilite"-
argues that the pragmatic nature of human activity makes it most
probable that conceptual thinking reaches the absolute or some
feature of it. "Une intelligence tendue vers 1 'action qui s'accom-
pliva et vers la reaction qui s'ensuivra, palpant son objet pour en
recevoir a chaque instant 1 'impression mobile, est une intelligence
qui touche quelque chose de 1'absolu. "
These random gleanings misrepresent each philosopher, of course,
for each writes a flux even as he preaches one. But I think that
whoever will work out in detail some of the contrasts indicated must
sooner or later come to wonder how such an acute, sympathetic, and
well-seasoned reader as Professor James ever fancied he saw an
exponent of his anti-intellectualism in Bergson. How could he
write that Bergson and Bradley together ''have broken my confi-
dence in concepts down"? 13 Surely, if ever a man taught that con-
cepts are to be trusted, in so far as we know what we are doing with
them, and in so far as we use them intelligently, that man is Bergson.
For James, the lead of intellect sends us over the divide between
rationalism and empiricism down into the intellectualistic valley of
dry bones and into the abyss of deception. For Bergson, the intel-
" " A Pluralistic Universe," p. 235.
18 This JOURNAL, VII., p. 33.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 231
lect heads always for the living reality of things, but, finding each
next advance more arduous than the last, stops always at an approxi-
mation of that last truth which one bold, keen intuition suggests but
can never quite lay bare. Could two theories of the concept differ
more in spirit ?
WALTER B. PITKIN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
ON CONTINUITY AND DISCRETENESS
IT would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the whole logical
crux of metaphysics centers in the problem of continuity and dis-
creteness. Whether one approach this problem with the emphasis
on the relation of the one and the many, or on the relation of perma-
nence and change, the same duality breaks out either in the static
antithesis of unity and manifoldness, or in the dynamic antithesis
of the continuity which is permanence and the discreteness which
is change.
Abstract monisms, from Parmenides to Spinoza, regard ultimate
reality as a homogeneous and unchanging continuum, in which the
whole is both logically and existentially prior to the parts. The most
obvious empirical source of this view is the apparent homogeneity,
unity, and permanence of pure space. Parmenides describes the
One in spatial terms. Spinoza conceives the one substance as an
infinite whole and it is no accident that he develops his system more
geometrico. I do not, of course, mean to imply that Spinoza's sub-
stance is simply space emptied of all content, but only that the geo-
metrical metaphor plays a large part in his conception thereof.
All forms of pluralism, on the other hand, have found a chief
determining motive in the analytical dissolution of the perceptual
continua of the space-time world, and, especially, of movement and
change, into discrete elements, or ''terms," and "relations." Con-
tinuity seems thereby to be reduced to a more and more relative and
transitive position. In Leibniz, who formulated the law of contin-
uity, there is the closest possible connection between his dynamic
pluralism and his mathematical analysis, devised to obtain formulas
for the calculation of continuous variables.
The progress of science seems to consist in the breaking up of
the perceptual continua of immediate experience into discrete ele-
ments and events. Physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology
pulverize the continua of space and motion, physical and vital proc-
esses, and consciousness, respectively. The analytic side of science
brings out discreteness in experience, and, by a one-sided emphasis
232 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
on this analytic function of thought, one gets the conclusion that the
result of the operations of intellect on experience is a world of pure
discreteness, of discontinuities and lack of connection everywhere.
If thought be powerless to grasp or find continuity, then the sole
function of the logical intellect is to rend the living unity of experi-
ence in pieces, and to transform its movement into an inert and
powerless set of terms and external relations. The world, as seen
by the intellect, becomes a lifeless and motionless wreck of the actual
living and evolving universe. We get, indeed, a "pluralistic uni-
verse," but a dead one. This procedure amounts to the assertion
that, for the intellect, there is no identity-in-difference, that differ-
ence is eternally difference and identity eternally identity, and that
in thought they never live and work together or durcheinander.
Would we restore the world that hangs together, that lives and
moves, would we restore the continuity which the intellect has ban-
ished from our actual world, then we must hark back to immediate
intuition, to sense and feeling, fling ourselves into the stream of
immediately experienced becoming and listen with ears attent to its
intellectually inarticulate murmuring. Here is the only anodyne
draught for the pains of a world torn asunder by the intellect.
Here the discontinuities cease from troubling and the antitheses are
at rest.
Such is the proposal of M. Henri Bergson, whose praises are sung
by Professor James in his ' ' Pluralistic Universe. ' ' Mr. James tells
us again, in this JOURNAL, that the two horns of the philosophical
dilemma are now Bradley or Bergson. 1 Both have shown in some-
what different ways the powerlessness of the intellect to apprehend
reality. Both have been in at the death of post-Kantian rationalism ;
but they differ as to the way of philosophical salvation.
I can not admit that philosophy is shut up with this dilemma.
It is not in the desperate impasse, where it must either divest itself
of all its intellectual habiliments and plunge naked into Bergson 's
current of immediate feeling, or by a process of "transmutation"
grow wings and soar into the mystical Absolute Experience of
Bradley.
Bergson 's conception of thought, which Mr. James seems to ac-
cept in toto, is that it is powerless to grasp the real flux and evolu-
tion of things, the real variety and novelty in change. Thought can
make only a series of static cuts through the real flow of becoming.
Its reflective renderings of the evolutionary process are like the geo-
metrical point and line of the traditional text-books. These cuts have
no breadth and no synthetic grasp of change. The illusion that sci-
ence grasps the real is due to its presentation of a rapid succession of
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. VII., pp. 29-33.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 233
static pictures in its concepts or symbolical formulas. These con-
cepts may seem to glide into one another like moving pictures, and
thus to give a semblance of life, but it is only a semblance. This
"cinematographic" character of thought renders it forever impotent
to seize the elusive and slippery reality of pure becoming.
The metaphor is frappant. All the world knows about moving
pictures, and Bergson's great literary genius beguiles the unwary
reader. Intellect, Bergson holds with the pragmatists, has the
purely practical function of helping us to act efficiently. And its
work is retrospective, whereas life and all reality are prospective.
Thought generalizes from the past. It conceptualizes the dead re-
mains of actions and enables man to adjust himself to the future,
because of a partial continuity of past and future. But thought
operates only on the by-products of the life-force's alchemy.
Thought assumes complete continuity between past and future, a
continuity that does not exist. The elan vital is ever bringing forth
the new.
There are, it seems to me, several fatal objections to the Berg-
sonian theory of the functions and limitations of intellect. If evo-
lution or pure becoming be real, it is certainly not discovered by
sense-feeling or intuition. Immediate experience does not, by itself,
yield the notion of cosmical evolution, nor, indeed, of any of the
forms of continuity which are true for science at least, whatever
may be their place in the Bergsonian metaphysics. There is no im-
mediately perceived continuity of the acorn with the oak, or of the
jelly-fish with the mammalia. Even the continuity of anthropoid
ape with man has never been very obvious to the casual observer
unequipped with the categories of biological analysis and synthesis.
Any theory of evolution, like any other great scientific generaliza-
tion, such as the law of gravitation or of the conservation of force,
is a principle of continuity operative within a certain field of experi-
ence, and fashioned by the activity of the intellect in its quest for
continuities and identities that are not patent to sense-perception
and immediate intuition. So far is it from being true that the out-
come of intellectual activity is solely the breaking up of the primitive
continuities of immediate experience into discrete elements, that in
fact the actual work of intellect is synthetic as well as analytic and
consists quite as much in linking the immediately discrete by threads
of continuity unearthed by a reflective quest.
In practical life, too, thought functions to. bridge over discon-
tinuities. The hungry man, the money-seeker, the lover, exercise
their intellects to devise means for overcoming the discontinuities be-
tween their desires and the situations which hinder the satisfaction
thereof.
234 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Bergson is captivated by his metaphors into a caricature of the
nature and function of the intellect. He really limits its activities
to the sort of work which consists in the analysis ad indefinitum of
a continuous line, a motion, or a change, into infinitesimal elements.
He envisages continuity as that of the spatial line or motion, and
discreteness as the analysis of the line into an indefinite series of
points, or of the motion into a series of static positions a la Zeno the
Eleatic. And Mr. James appears to follow him in this respect. Ac-
cordingly, the function of intellect being limited to the never-ending
chase for the infinitesimal, and the poor intellect being able, when
out of wind, to rest only on a static term, the only escape from the
Zenonian paradoxes seems to be to affirm that thought distorts real-
ity, to cry avaunt ! false intellect, and plunge in the stream of sensa-
tion and feeling. In spite of intellectual analysis, we see the con-
tinuous line and it is safe to bet that Achilles will overtake the
tortoise.
I will not take up space here to discuss the Zenonian paradoxes.
It is unnecessary to do so. The modern mathematical treatment of
the continuum as a type of serial order turns the flank of these
paradoxes. What Zeno's arguments really prove is that infinitesi-
mals are not actualities. The successive positions of Achilles and the
tortoise, or of the moving arrow, would be actual infinitesimals, if
a finite motion or distance were really made up of an infinitude of
static positions or of points without length. Any "here" and
"now" of motion or change is not absolute rest. It is a term in a
continuous series, defined by its relations to the terms before and
after it in the same series. The analysis may be stopped just where
it suits our purpose, but the serial continuity, the ordinal synthesis,
is always involved. 2
The position of Messrs. Bergson and James encounters a further
difficulty in their account of thought's practical function. Thought
breaks up the continuities of sense and feeling into discrete elements ;
but the function of thought is to enable one to adjust one's self to
new situations, by formulating, from the retrospective interpreta-
tion of past experiences, plans of action for the future. The possi-
bility of this successful prevision and adjustment implies a continu-
ity of past and future that thought is able to apprehend. . Further-
more, the actual process of evolution either has continuity of an
intelligible sort, or one is not entitled to speak of it as an evolution
or as one cosmical movement of pure becoming. One has no right,
in terms of discourse with one's fellows, to argue that the new is
-I may refer, for further discussion on this point, to P>. lviicll. "The
Principles of Mat hematics," especially Chapters XXI!.. XXXVI.. XLIT. and L.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 235
ever coming forth in this one process unless one is prepared to show
intelligible order and continuity between new and old. The hack-
neyed principle that the changing implies the permanent, is in place
here. In fact, Bergson does assume an ill-defined continuity or order
and elaborates it by the resources of intellect.
I think that Messrs. Bergson 's and James's caricatures of the
functions and operations of thought are due to a one-sided dwelling
upon the aforementioned puzzles of mathematical continuity and
discreteness, and that this has blinded them to the actual function of
thought in concrete experience and in the empirical sciences. Thus
they have been led to set up a false opposition between sense-experi-
ence and reflective thinking. I will repeat here what, it seems to me,
should now be taken as a truism, namely, that there is no bit of
significant experience of which we are reflectively aware that is not
shot through with thought. There is no such thing as an utterly
relationless experience. The intellectual element may not be promi-
nent, but it is always there. When reflective thinking begins to be
in evidence it neither descends from a rationalist heaven nor is
born by a miraculous parthenogenesis. At the other end of the scale,
I should suppose that, while we all stand in constant danger of
hypostatizing abstract concepts, we all recognize, in principle, that
"concepts without percepts are empty," and, further, that concepts
are nothing other than symbols of the actual continuities of ex-
perience.
I can not, then, admit the horn of Mr. James's dilemma which
would drive philosophy to save itself by swallowing Bergson 's pre-
scription and committing intellectual suicide.
Nor is philosophy compelled, if it revolt from Bergson 's proposal
for its euthanasia, to choose Mr. Bradley 's way. He has, indeed, per-
formed a brilliant tour-de-force by isolating, successively, the main
general features of experience, such as space, time, causality, the
self, and then showing that each of these features, when taken thus
by itself, fails to be self-sustaining and hopelessly falls apart into
the indefinite regress of terms and relations. One can, indeed, if
one will, take abstract space or time or causality, demand that it
shall stand by itself apart from the organic totality of experience,
and then with this abstraction go on thinking terms and relations
as long as one pleases to continue the game. The process has no
necessary end. One begins with the assumption that space, time,
causality, change, etc., pretend in naive thought and science to be
absolute and self-existent, and one easily shows that, on this assump-
tion, these aspects of experience fall into the indefinite regress of
terms and relations. And if qualities and relations are mutually im-
plicatory, of course neither can stand without the other. But, if
236 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
there are no intelligible qualities without relations, and vice versa,
why is not the real in experience simply the organic and functional
complex of qualities and relations? If there are no really external
terms subsisting without relations, and no relations that hang in the
empty void between, but not connecting, terms, then while thought
does not create experience ex nihilo, experience is intelligible. Mr.
Bradley 's conclusions that all the aspects of experience break up by
an endless process of fission, seem to me to be successfully deduced
because they were carefully put in with the initial assumption. Why
begin with this process of isolation of aspects of experience from
the concrete whole of experience? Why demand of thought the
impossible, and, to my mind, arbitrary, achievement of either being
the whole reality to which it refers or confessing itself powerless to
grasp the real? I may be simply confessing that I am a hopeless
Philistine in philosophy, when I say that I am unable to see either
that thought is ipso facto bankrupt if it is not immediately one with
everything that it knows, or that a world of elements in organic re-
lations is a contradictory and unintelligible conception.
To Mr. James's dilemma of Bradley or Bergson I reply, neither
Bradley nor Bergson! What then? I have space only to answer
very briefly. The best way for philosophy seems to me to be
an organic or functional and social conception of experience, and,
by consequence, of reality, since the latter can mean no more than
the ultimate unity and continuity of experience ; this organic whole
of experience thought grasps or significantly refers to reality, since
thought is an integral function of the system of experience, function-
ing in and through certain constituent dynamic elements of reality,
namely, selves. Thought is a function of the organic whole of real-
ity, a function which inheres in and operates through conscious in-
dividuals. I see no need or sufficient ground for sundering the
thinking self from its world; no ground for sundering immediate
experience from conceptual reflection; and, finally, no ground for
admitting that sense and feeling, when contrasted with systematic
thinking, yield the true and final continuities of experience, whereas
thought is tied up to discretions.
Perhaps, in conclusion, it may be well to summarize what appears
to me to be the logic of the situation. A theory of thought which
makes its function to consist in the separation of bare identity from
blank difference is a caricature of thought's work. To reason or
think is to connect things and to differentiate them in the same
breath. To relate implies that there are actual differences or terms
to be related. To really distinguish things is to find them together,
as members of a common field of experience. Even the proposition
"A is A" either means that the predicate is the subject with a dif-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 237
ference or it is solemn nonsense. Philosophy does not get out of the
supposed deadlock between the discrete and the continuous, the one
and the many, either by throwing away one term of the antithesis,
or by plunging headlong in the pre-reflective stream of crude sense-
experience. There is no need to resort to this heroic remedy. The
intellect is not tied up to that logical man of straw, either absolute
identity and continuity or absolute difference and discreteness. The
intellect itself demands both, and sensible experience already con-
tains them both, though in a less fully articulated form. Sensible
experience is never wholly innocent of thought. The logically for-
mulated relations of continuity in discreteness are simply the warp
and woof in the common texture of experience, when risen to reflect-
ive awareness of itself. In the sensibly continuous masses of primi-
tive experience, such as the continuum of perceptual space, or of
spatio-temporal movement, the continuity in question is only rela-
tively undifferentiated. Even in the perception of a simple move-
ment in space there is present the recognition of discreteness in
starting-point, direction, and goal. It is the work of reflective think-
ing to develop to fuller awareness the continuity in discreteness of
experience. As this work is done, the primitive continua are trans-
formed, not into pure discretions, but into other types of continuity,
such as the continuity of equivalent forces, of gravitational attrac-
tion, of natural selection, of purposive thinking, etc. The difference
between immediate sensible experience and the same experience when
worked over by thinking, is not that the continua of the former have
given place to the rags and tatters of thought 's analysis, but that the
broken and episodical continuities of sense have been supplanted by
more comprehensive and persisting principles of continuity. Think-
ing does show up in a brighter light the discreteness of individuality
in things and persons, but it likewise shows that the discrete indi-
vidualities, so defined, carry all the more intimately the continuities.
Contrast the continuity of the natural order for the modern student
of science with the chaotic world or the savage !
Thinking that is adequate to the actual content of experience is
always a movement which unites in differentiating, and differen-
tiates in uniting, things. It is a movement which develops to explicit
awareness the actual continuities or relationships of discrete moments
or terms. Reality is intelligible, for it is at once continuous and
discrete. And the continuity of the real can not be the mechanical
and external continuity of disjointed elements merely juxtaposed
in space. The continuity of the real is dynamic or living identity
unfolding itself in a system of differences, persistently differentiating
itself through change or qualitative development. It is true that the
qualitatively new is a feature of actual experience. On the other
238
hand, change or differentiation is unthinkable, even as sensational
experience, without continuity.
As we move on, in thinking, from blind and dumb sensation to
reflective experience, by a progressive differentiation, it becomes
clearer that the continuity which involves discreteness must always
be that of a unity of significant or teleological process. It is the
synthetic movement of living experience and purposiveness which
reveals the continuity that lives and works in and through discrete-
ness. So far Ave can go with M. Bergson ; but we do not admit that
his method is the one by which we can best understand the meaning
of the purposive process of reality.
Finally, there is no inscrutable mystery in the principle that ade-
quate thinking of the real requires continuity in discreteness, if the
developing world be a living and teleological system. For thinking
is just the increasing awareness that such a world gains of itself.
J. A. LEIGHTON.
HOBABT COLLEGE.
SOCIETIES
IN conjunction with the New York Branch of the American Psy-
chological Association, a meeting was held on February 28,
1910, at 8:15 P.M., at the American Museum of Natural History.
The following program was presented :
Psychological Measurements of the "Pulling Power" of an Adver-
tisement: Dr. H. L. HOLLINGWORTH.
The speaker discussed the defects of modern methods of "key-
ing" an advertisement, and advocated the substitution of psycholog-
ical tests. The results of an experiment with seventy-five subway
advertisements, by the order of merit method, were presented. In
cooperation with the New York Advertising Men's League, the keyed
results of various kinds of "copy" are being compared with psy-
chological measurements of the same advertisements. The work in
progress is directed toward four chief problems: (1) the validity of
individual judgments of persuasiveness; (2) the relative strength of
the various human instincts as the basis of appeal and conviction;
(3) the relative strength of various "effective conceptions"; (4) the
practical psychology of color in advertising.
Practise and Individual Differences: Dr. FREDERIC LYMAN" WELLS.
In thirty days ' practise with five subjects on the number checking
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 239
test (a form of the A test) and in the Kraepelinian addition test,
the general indication seemed to be that the subjects who did well
at the start had as much opportunity for further improvement as
those who did poorly. This would indicate that in the functions
tested the relative superiority of certain subjects was a manifesta-
tion, not of their being nearer the end of the practise curve, but of
an inherent ability to profit more by such practise as they had had.
The Physiological Support of the Perceptive Processes: Professor
JOSEPH JASTROW.
The purpose of this paper is to consider a more adequate formula-
tion of the relation between the physiological factor and a complex
sensory process in which it participates. A typical instance is found
in the visual perception of distance. The conventional statement
sets forth that in the presence of a situation requiring judgments of
distance, we bring into play the physiological mechanism, testing by
the clearness of the retinal image the necessary accommodation ; and
concomitantly throwing into gear the convergence apparatus, and
thus tentatively, though quickly, finding the proper adjustments;
and, lastly, that only when this process is accomplished is the product
handed over to the mental elaboration which, utilizing this basis,
makes of it a perception of such and such objects at such and such
distances. The point of view urged in opposition to this is that
while these factors are significant they are so in almost a reverse
order of values. Complex sensory perceptions are so much more
psychological that the habit of mind is to jump to an interpretation
on the very slightest data, and then use the physiological adjustments
merely to corroborate the psychological anticipation. The proof for
this view is found in the unwillingness of the eyes, and indeed their
inability, when deprived of a psychological clue and thrown wholly
upon physiological support, to obtain any satisfactory judgments at
all. In judging the distance of spots of light in a dark room, the
greatest diversity appears; and there appears also, just as soon as
the least glimmer of light gives any clue to the real situation, the
tendency to guess the result and then merely use the physiological
processes to check it. Two corollaries from this principle may be
said to support it. The one indicates the importance of extreme care
in avoiding suggestion; and the other explains why in complex
sensory judgments we are so prone to illusion. As a working
hypothesis for complex judgments this restatement of the physiolog-
ical support is not only in itself suggestive, but unites a variety of
experimental data in a consistent interpretation.
240 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The Emancipation of Intelligence in the Study of Philosophy: Dr.
W. T. BUSH.
The study of philosophy is still hampered by the claims of prob-
lems which are the products of presuppositions which no candid
observer is obliged to make, but which are remnants from a long
tradition. The tradition had its origin in natural conditions char-
acteristic of primitive culture. The resulting metaphysical concepts,
since they are not required in order to describe observable facts, but
since they do still play a great role in philosophy, particularly in
the philosophy of religion, are most readily explained as survivals
from prehistoric culture. The problems which depend upon taking
for granted the authority of these survival-concepts are, accord-
ingly, entirely artificial, and the philosophy whose stock in trade
is arguments about these problems is an artificial philosophy. The
philosophy which operates with these survival-concepts is monistic
idealism, and its two determining ideas are the absolute and con-
sciousness. But systems of philosophy that operate with unverifi-
able survivals are not the only artificial systems. Systems which
exist only to oppose the former derive all their vitality from the
existence of their artificial opponent. Accordingly, the various
realisms which get their problems from dialectical situations de-
veloped by idealism have a subject-matter that is equally unreal.
Now, mythology has been, in the past, an instrument for maintain-
ing very important social relations, but if social progress continues,
the time should come when misrepresentations of nature may be ap-
propriately replaced by the laws of facts, the only laws that any
ideal whatever can intelligently appeal to. Gifted men are, how-
ever, devoting their time and wits to debating questions which
would not exist save for the survival of three primitive ideas God,
the soul, the universe. The ideas of God and the universe were
united in pantheism to give the idea of the absolute, and from the
idea of the soul was derived the concept of mental states which
yielded the idealistic conception of consciousness.
Modern technical observation does not substantiate any claim to
existential validity for these ideas. Their persistence, therefore, in
disguised forms, as the presuppositions of problems which men feel
obliged to discuss, is a burden for intelligence in the study of phi-
losophy. That part of anthropology which is devoted to the study
of origins ought to be the means of liberating many from the per-
plexities of artificial problems. Disguised theological reminiscence
should not continue to be an obstacle to thoroughgoing empiricism.
R. S. WOOD WORTH,
Secretary
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 241
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Eternal Values. HUGO MUNSTERBERG. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co. 1909. Pp. 436.
This is Professor Miinsterberg's English version of his "Philosophic
der Werte." It is not a translation, for it contains a fuller criticism of
pragmatism than the German work and omits certain of the epistemolog-
ical discussions there found. For a clear understanding it should be
read in connection with his brief article " The Opponents of Eternal
Values " in the Psychological Bulletin for October 15, 1909, with Part I.
of his "Psychology and the Teacher," where he gives the same general
position in popular form, and with the first three chapters of his " Psy-
chotherapy," where he restates the relation of this idealistic philosophy to
current thought and the relation of psychological to epistemological
postulates.
First let us briefly summarize the argument as unfolded by the author.
In the sciences, psychology included, we find no values, for science pur-
posely abandons the valuing attitude. This purposeful abandonment of
valuation in science evidences a valuing of this abandonment. Nor do
we find in individual wishes any valid valuations, for these wishes are
conditioned by kinks of circumstance and individuality. But we do find
in immediate experience valuations assumed to be valid in an over-indi-
vidual sense. These are due to the satisfaction of will in its fundamental
demand for identity, the demand that our experience present a self-as-
serting world, not a chaos. This fundamental demand takes four forms
giving rise to logical, esthetic, ethical, and metaphysical values. Each of
these values the author studies in two aspects, first, as naively found, and
second, as purposely and consciously worked out. Each of these aspects
is studied for three different fields, the outer world, the fellow world, and
the inner world.
The naive logical values are called values of existence. In immediate
experience we find the self and the not-self. The self is distinguished by
having an inner contrast whereby one attitude excludes the opposite atti-
tude. The not-self consists of things in the outer world, persons in the
fellow world, valuations in the inner world. Things have the value of
existence when it is postulated that they are possible objects for every
subject. Persons exist when it is postulated that they take the relation of
subject to every possible object. Valuations exist when it is postulated
that our will recurs identical every time in given situations.
The purposive logical values are those of connection. Thus for the
outer world science, by means of concepts of cause, time, space, gives us
a nature thought of as identical in its substances and energies. In the
fellow world, history seeks the identities in the various will-relations of
different subjects. In the inner world reason gives us an identity in the
different valuations. The whole volume is a carrying out of this task of
reason.
242
In the esthetic valuations Professor Miinsterberg again takes the path,
not of psychology, but of immediate experience. Wherever through im-
mediate experience we find an agreement of manifold wills we have a
nai've esthetic value. These consist of an inner unity of aim in things,
which is called harmony, of an intended unity of striving in fellow beings,
which is called love, and of an inner unity of striving in ourselves, which
is called happiness.
Art gives us the purposive esthetic values, the values of beauty. Art
seeks to bring systematically to expression the self -agreement of the world
by making complete the mutual support of wills found in the nai've
esthetic values. The fine arts give us these values for the outer world by
making the form lights, lines, and the like agree within itself and with
the content. Literature performs a similar task for the fellow world by
giving a unity of content, holding together the manifoldness of wills ex-
pressed, a unity of style, and a consonance of style and content. Music
does the same for the inner world, realizing an inner harmony of content,
a harmony of form, and an agreement of form and content.
Distinct from scientific knowledge and from esthetic appreciation, but
coordinate with them, is ethical estimation, the value of the identity be-
tween the intention and fulfillment. These ethical values in their nai've
form are called values of development. Ethically estimated, the outer
world is looked upon as furnishing a setting for man, as having real
growth as well as change to greater complexity. Similarly in the fellow
world we have progress, that is, transition in the communal will toward
the over-personal standpoint belonging to every thinkable subject as such.
Finally, in the inner world we have self -development, when the inner life
follows not merely its individual will but the over-personal will which is
really its own.
The conscious ethical values are those of achievement. The achieve-
ment of industry has an absolute value by helping the outer world fulfill
its intention of helping mankind. Law has an absolute value in the
fellow world by forcing on the community those communal volitions which
constitute social life. Morality in the inner world is the living out in
action of the real will for the eternal values. It is secured, in the face
of the pull of our individual will, by thinking of our real selves as an
absolute value realizing itself in action.
The final group of values are the metaphysical values. The various
values so far outlined are independent, yet the conviction of immediate
experience is that there is an ultimate unity behind them. This convic-
tion furnishes the nai've metaphysical values, those of holiness. These
religious values take the form of three beliefs, one for each of the as-
pects of experience. Unity is secured for the outer world by a belief that
" through the agency of an over-experienceable power the opposition be-
tween natural order, happiness, and morality is removed from the world "
(p. 362). Unity in the diverging valuations in the fellow world is se-
cured by a belief in an over-historical starting-point for historical life.
Unity in the inner world is salvation. It is the arising in us of that
timeless " will-attitude by which every opposition of values is overcome
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 243
and the full unity of the true, the harmonious, and the good is reached
in our soul" (p. 383).
The conscious purposive working out of this na'ive conviction gives us
the values of absoluteness. In these we postulate an ultimate reality, an
over-self, which is a striving toward identity, a striving whose only con-
tent is itself. From this over-self the world is deduced as follows : this
over-self as striving splits up into starting-point (past) and goal (future),
and thus we have the time category; it splits up into striving (the here)
and content (the not -here), and thus we have the space category; the
content, the not-here, splits up, hence the striving correspondingly divides
and we have individual selves; through these individual selves the over-
self manifests itself in three directions and we have the three funda-
mental values already described. Through the space-time categories we
have the deduction of the outer world. Through the individual selves
we have the fellow world and the inner world.
After the first reading of this book a person whose habits of thought
incline him to consider what is so rather than what must be so is likely
to feel that there has been a distortion of facts in favor of an a priori
system. After a second reading he is likely to admit that there are fact
elements at the basis of the argument. After a third reading he will
probably wake up to the fact that here is a book which in its suggestive-
ness is a real contribution to the intellectual life of our time. The help-
fulness of the work is varied, but four elements are especially marked.
First, it arouses us to the fact that the scientific values are not the only
values in life. Like children with new toys, thinkers of to-day are likely
to believe that modern science and the habits of thought it fosters furnish
the most precious values of life. It is wholesome to be shown other
values of equal or greater preciousness. Similarly, in the second
place, the book sanctions our na'ive convictions of the utter valuable-
ness of our values. In the face of a youthfully disillusioned attitude
of skepticism toward such values this sanction is a tonic breeze. Third,
the volume is a careful working out of a philosophy in terms of value.
As we come to know more about this category of value, which has been
used so much of late, sometimes we wonder whether it contains so much
of real novel revelation as we once supposed. Nevertheless, the use of any
new term is helpful in breaking up the cake which covers conventional
concepts and the use of this category in a thoroughgoing fashion by Pro-
fessor Miinsterberg is a lasting contribution to the development of this
concept. Finally, the Rooseveltian vigor, not merely of the style, but of
the fundamental thought, is suggestive as an illustration of a philosoph-
ical system which is an expression of a racially and individually vigorous
life.
Certain questions, however, must arise to any reader even to one who
is more anxious to understand than to criticize. The first question is on
the nature of immediate experience. The keystone thought of the book is
that in immediate experience we know the self as a will for identity, as
demanding a world not a chaos. It is made clear that this will is not the
will which is analyzed by psychology. To use an old distinction, the will
244 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of psychology is that of the objective self, the " me," while this funda-
mental will known in immediate experience is the subjective self, the " I."
It is further made clear that to know in the sense of psychology is to ex-
press one value, the logical value, while to know in the sense of immediate
experience is to be immediately aware of without discriminating. But
can we be aware of the self immediately, or otherwise, as active or passive
without discriminating, without the I thus becoming the me? To put
the difficulty in argumentative form : The I can not be known in imme-
diate experience, for to know even in immediate experience implies to
objectify, and to objectify the I is for the I to deny itself; if the I can
not be known at all, it can not be known as will; if it can not be known
as will the valuations can not be deduced from it; if they can not be
deduced from the I, and if the valuations exist as we find that they do in
experience, they are activities of the objective self and are not absolute
but conditioned.
Furthermore, is not this belief in the unconditioned nature of values
an illusion similar in its psychological source to the " dialectical illusion
in all transcendental proofs of the existence of a necessary being " pointed
out by Kant? Professor Miinsterberg replies that this criticism is not
well founded, since Kant sought an absolute beyond experience while he
seeks eternal values in " experience which becomes a world through the
organizing activity of our will." 1 In other words, he believes that the
illusion which Kant recognized as inevitable in the search for uncondi-
tioned being beyond experience is not inevitable in the search in experi-
ence for the unconditioned form of the will which makes experience
possible. It seems that the author of the " Eternal Values " in catching
sight of one difference in these illusions, a difference in the realm where
this result is found, has failed to appreciate fully a similarity in the two
illusions, a similarity in their source and in the result found. The source
of the " dialectical illusion " is the use of a " heuristic " principle of our
natures by which we have to seek the unconditioned, to prove to us that
the unconditioned exists, that is, using it as pointing to the existence of
that which, by this principle, we are compelled to seek. Professor Miin-
sterberg argues that this very heuristic principle, this very striving, fur-
nishes in its form the very absoluteness which it seeks, that it points to
itself for the absoluteness for which it strives. The source of the illu-
sion is not altered because the principle has been turned upon itself
instead of toward a realm beyond experience. If we are looking through
a lens which inevitably modifies our vision we are not helped by turning
the lens upon a mirror which reflects the lens and thinking that our
image of the lens is not modified.
Subordinate to this are three minor difficulties. The first grows
directly from the main question. If we fail to find that the values are
absolute, do we need to deny that they are final for us? May we not
even deduce, if the facts warrant it, all the values from a fundamental
demand of our natures, a demand for identity, considering that the final
value. If we find others who think that identity is but a means to the
1 Psychological Bulletin, loc. cit., p. 334.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 245
satisfaction of a deeper value, we may recognize that they have a dif-
ferent final value, or may prove them mistaken, since unconsciously they,
too, are really seeking identity as final. We need not deny final values nor
affirm that these are absolute.
This brings us to the debate with pragmatism. Professor Miinster-
berg's chief criticism of pragmatism is that it is relativistic. Relativistic
is read to mean that truth for pragmatism is relative to individual de-
mands and the reply is made (p. 36) that the thesis of pragmatism in
claiming general validity presupposes a more than individual significance
and this denies itself. Is there not here a confusion between the use of
the term general and of the term absolute? May not truth have general
significance for the tribes of men, but not an absolute significance ? Pro-
fessor Miinsterberg replies 2 that truth binding in any such social sense
is not binding at all, is not really truth. In the " Eternal Values " he
gives us two definitions of real. In a narrower sense that is real which has
the value of existence (Chapter VII.). In a broader sense that is real
which is a realization, which satisfies the fundamental demand for the
realization of identity (p. 354). " Our own will and our own action must
decide whether the change in our life-experience is to be acknowledged as
a realization" (p. 355). Here he means our own will, not in the sense
of the individual will, but in the sense of an over-personal will which he
interprets as absolute. But since- truth involves, as Professor Miinster-
berg suggests, a relation to will, since this will can not be absolute inas-
much as it can not be traced to the subjective self, for that is unknowable
as will or anything else, and if traced to the objective self surely is not
unconditioned must not truth be conceived as relative to over-indi-
vidual demands, over-individual but not absolute? The discovery of the
origin of the binding character of truth should not alter that binding
character, whether that origin is found where Professor Miinsterberg
finds it or where the pragmatist finds it. One is tempted to quote to the
author one of his own sentences, " What we feel in our immediate ex-
perience (e. g., binding character of truth) is not changed in its meaning
and significance by such explanations" (p. 39). He is referring to the
biologist's explanations. The same is true of the pragmatist's or the
absolutist's explanations.
Finally a question comes in regard to the ingenious deduction of the
categories of space and time under the metaphysical values. For instance,
the category of time is achieved by the splitting up of striving into
starting-point or the past, and the goal or the future. Is this a real
deduction of the category of time or is it the application of a category
already possessed? Looking through this category at the striving process
it naturally splits up, but the splitting up is the evidence of the presence
of this category, not an explanation of its origin.
The " Eternal Values " contains a stimulating philosophy which many
would honestly like to adopt if they could avoid difficulties such as these.
ROWLAND HAYNES.
UNIVEBSITY OF MINNESOTA.
* Psychological Bulletin, loc. cit., pp. 336, 337.
246 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Psychotherapy. HUGO MUXSTERBERG. Xew York: Moffatt, Yard & Co.
1909.
This volume, the author states in his preface, belongs to a series of
books which are being written " to discuss for a wider public the practical
applications of modern psychology." The first book, called " On the
Witness Stand," studied the relations of scientific psychology to crime and
the law courts; this new book deals with the relations of psychology to
medicine.
The work is divided into three parts : Part I., dealing with the psycho-
logical basis of psychotherapy; Part II., with the practical work of psy-
chotherapy and Part III. with the place of psychotherapy.
In Part I. the author, in the chapter entitled The Aim of Psychology,
makes clear at once that man may be considered from two entirely differ-
ent points of view the purposive and the causal and that the indis-
criminate and haphazard confusion of these two points of view has led
to a great deal of misunderstanding and confusion. He seeks at once
then to carefully define these two standpoints and -shows that, regarded
from the determinative point of view, man is regarded subjectively in his
attitude to his environment as something with purposes, ideals, views,
and feelings, a concrete personality. This is regarded as being mental in
contradistinction to that which is objective or psychological, " not a self
which shows itself in its aims, purposes and attitudes, but a complex
content of consciousness, which is composed of numberless elements . , .
an object which I understand by describing its elements and their con-
nections."
This differentiation is not attempted with the view of indicating the
relative importance of either attitude, but only that a clear understand-
ing may be obtained of certain fundamentals of psychology, so that what
follows may be appreciated.
For the author, the theory of a psychophysical parallelism is neces-
sary in order that many things be made clear, and quoting from the
chapter Mind and Brain we read that " We can not have any explana-
tion of mental states as such at all, if we do not link them with physical
processes." Further, in order that the relationship between the causal
and purposive be clearly brought out, he continues : " Mental facts which
are conceived parallel to physiological brain processes do not represent
the immediate reality of our inner life our life reality is purposive and,
as such, outside of all causal explanation, and we have to take a special,
almost artificial, point of view to consider inner life as objects, as con-
tents of consciousness. Our inner life in its purposive reality has there-
fore nothing to do with brain processes, but if we are on the psychological
track and consider man as a system of psychological phenomena, then
to be sure we must see that our only possible interest lies in the finding
of necessary causal connections." While it is thus evident that the au-
thor is sufficiently plain in this for even the general reader, the question
of free-will and determinism is not so clearly defined, and though, from
the purposive standpoint man is free, from the causal he may be free or
unfree; however, his freedom can not mean exemption from causality,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 247
" but whenever the motor response results from the undisturbed coopera-
tion of the normal brain parts, then the inherited equipment and the
whole experience and the whole training, the acquired habits and the
acquired inhibitions, will count in bringing about the reaction. This is
the psychological freedom of man."
Doubtless many philosophers will take occasion to disagree with such
views, but the evident aim and intention of the author is not to evoke
philosophical discussion but merely to postulate certain psychological
doctrines to which he adheres, that he may have a definite groundwork for
what is to follow.
The succeeding chapter on Psychology and Medicine where the neces-
sity for clear-cut psycho-diagnosis as well as psychotherapy is pointed
out, is most lucid and should be perused by all those who would approach
the psychomedical field in the right spirit. The statement, " The mind
reflects only symptoms of the disease, the disease itself belongs always
to the organism. Psychotherapy has suffered too much from the belief
that the removal of mental symptoms is a cure of diseases," should be of
value in pointing out the necessity of biological and medical training for
those who undertake the treatment of patients by means of psychotherapy.
In the chapter on Suggestion and Hypnotism the author is concise and
easily understood. " To be suggestible means to be provided with a psy-
chophysical apparatus in which new propositions for actions close easily
the channels for antagonistic activity," and later " The hypnotic state
in its very nature is a state of reenforced suggestibility." The subcon-
scious story is told in three words " there is none." This chapter can
not be done justice to in a review; to be appreciated it must be read
and further, the reader is well repaid.
Part II. deals first with the field of psychotherapy, with general and
special methods where the methods of Freud and Jung and Breur are
discussed sanely and dispassionately, which in itself is something to be
thankful for, and finally, under the caption The Mental Symptoms, cases
are judiciously chosen that illustrate some of the symptoms for the re-
lief of which one may apply psychotherapy. Too much can not be said
in praise of Professor Munsterberg's discretion in this chapter; his sane
outlook is nowhere more in evidence. Bodily symptoms that may be
benefited by psychotherapy are considered in a separate chapter.
The book concludes with the three chapters of Part III., showing the
place of psychotherapy in the church in relation to the physician and to
the community. In this the author is at his best and the views expressed
are thoroughly safe and sane.
For the general reader the book can be heartily endorsed ; for the gen-
eral medical man the same applies. By students of psychology, psychiatry,
and neurology certain exceptions will undoubtedly be taken to certain
views expressed. Despite this fact, Professor Miinsterberg is to be heartily
congratulated on having given most ably and clearly an exposition of a
topic of great interest and importance to all.
J. G. FITZGERALD.
PATHOLOGICAL DEPARTMENT, UNIVEBSITY OF TORONTO.
248 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Modern Religious Problems. The Gospel of Jesus the Son of God.
GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX. Pp. 119. Sin and its Forgiveness. WILLIAM
DE WITT HYDE. Pp. 116. The Founding of the Church. BENJAMIN
WISNER BACON. Pp. 90. The Historical and Religious Value of the
Fourth Gospel. ERNEST F. SCOTT. Pp. 83. Boston and New York:
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1909.
Under the title of " Modern Eeligious Problems," a series of small
volumes on theology is promised us, four of which have already appeared.
The editor of the series, Dr. Ambrose White Vernon, is a graduate of
Princeton University and has been professor of practical theology in Yale
University for several years. The contributors are among our leading
Protestant theologians. The volumes of the series will be divided into
four categories, according as they relate to the Old or the New Testament,
the fundamental Christian conceptions or the practical church problems.
" The aim of this series of books," we read in an introductory notice, " is
to lay before the great body of intelligent people in the English-speaking
world the precise results of modern scholarship so that men both within
and without the churches may be able to understand the conception of
the Christian religion which obtains among its leading scholars to-day,
and that they may intelligently cooperate in the great practical problems
with which the churches are now confronted."
The first volume, " The Gospel of Jesus," by Dr. Knox, opens with an
introduction in which the aim of the contributors is exposed at greater
length. They are fully aware of the crisis through which the Christian
religion is actually passing, due to the lack of authority of the sacred
books nowadays and to the growing disregard for the world to come.
They hope, however, that the crisis will be passed through as safely and
as bravely as others have been. In order to contribute to this laudable
end, they propose to enter fully into the spirit of the day; to accept, nay
to welcome all the results of modern criticism.
There are, no doubt, a few points of doctrine which Dr. Knox seems to
regard as essential to a Christian, and hence as immutable. Such points
are the deity of Christ, the resurrection from the dead (p. 6), the belief
that the earthly life is worthless and that the citizenship of the Christian
is in heaven (pp. 35-6). He frankly admits, however, that the faith of
the present day must differ from the faith of previous ages. " It is not
precisely the same old story which is repeated generation after generation.
. . . Every age determines its gospel" (p. 1). A restudy and a restate-
ment of the fundamental Christian truths seem, therefore, necessary to
him. Religion, says he, can not pass away because it is of man's nature;
but for the same reason it can not remain unchanged (pp. 49-50).
Instead of laying emphasis on the metaphysics of the person of Christ,
or the nature of his birth and the mode of his resurrection, the church
must have in view the welfare of mankind (pp. 114-6). It must not even
insist too strongly upon the miracles of Christ. There were among the
Jews during his lifetime no miracles in the modern sense, for the simple
reason that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural was
not made (p. 59). Even when we speak of the resurrection of our Lord,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 249
we must be careful to understand one another. Are we bound to believe
in a resurrection in a literal sense? By no means. Paul identifies the
risen Christ with the spirit by which the disciples had felt themselves
seized. " This is at the furthest extreme from a rational conviction based
on historical evidence, that the tomb was empty, and that Jesus had risen "
(pp. 94-5).
The same progressive attitude is held by the other contributors. In
" Sin and its Forgiveness," Dr. Hyde goes so far as to maintain that " as
human experience develops, the divine attributes have to be retranslated
into terms of the deepening experience of the race " (p. 56). By forgive-
ness, Dr. Hyde does not mean any ecclesiastical forgiveness. He knows
too well that " the thoughtful modern man would not give the snap of his
fingers for the difference between ecclesiastical forgiveness and ecclesias-
tical condemnation" (p. 100). He regards forgiveness, therefore, as a
personal and social relation; as a deed whose real agents are laymen and
pastors doing laymen's personal work with individuals (p. 108). He gives
as a key to his doctrine the following principle, which may appear some-
what risky to the uninitiated : " Whoever forgives his fellow men their
trespasses can have for the asking the divine forgiveness for his own
shortcomings" (p. vi).
In " The Founding of the Church," Dr. Bacon retraces the birth of
the church, its faith in the risen Christ, its institutions. Jesus himself,
he asserts, had no idea of founding what we mean by church (p. 11).
He did not expect the little flock he had gathered to go out of Israel. The
church as we understand it to-day is an outgrowth of Jesus's rejection
and crucifixion. The critical moment in its existence was Jesus's appari-
tion to Peter. It matters little whether such an apparition was subjective
or objective. It made Peter the founder of the church just as Jesus was
the founder of the kingdom of God (p. 86). Only with the resurrection
did the Gospel begin.
Finally, in " The Historical and Religious Value of the Fourth
Gospel," Dr. Scott lays before us the conclusions reached by modern
scholarship with regard to the gospel of John. After showing that the
traditional theory which attributed it to the apostle John must be aban-
doned, he concludes that the unknown evangelist very likely belonged to
Asia Minor and lived within the first two decades of the second century.
He next studies the characteristics of the gospel and the aims of its
author. The task which the evangelist laid upon himself, says he, was
that of interpreting to a new time and translating into the terms of a
different culture the truth as it was in Christ (p. 30). Judaism and
Christianity had then come to open quarrel and the new-born religion
had to seek its future in the Gentile world. This is the reason why the
fourth evangelist presents the Christian theology under Greek forms of
thought. It is the reason why he assimilates the Alexandrian theory of
the Logos, which he identifies with Jesus, who thus becomes the Son
of God.
The author ends with a chapter on the permanent value of the gospel
and its influence on the subsequent history of Christianity, which one can
250 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
not over-estimate. It was chiefly due to this influence, says he, that
Christianity remained true to its original character amid the many dis-
turbing forces of the second and third centuries.
It is impossible in this brief notice to do justice to these four volumes.
They embody the very spirit of the best Protestant theology and will no
doubt dispel many a misunderstanding and engender a deep sympathy
for the church in many minds which are still repelled by the pretended
conflict between Christianity and science. And yet we can not but
express a feeling of apprehension which seizes us when we read these
beautiful pages.
Will not the successive modifications which Christianity shall be made
to undergo in the course of ages so alter its nature as to render it a mere
shadow of what it was in the past? And shall we be entitled to call it
Christianity then? It seems, indeed, that the doctrine contained in the
four volumes we consider may easily lead us to a profession of faith
which can hardly be called Christian. The authors of these books, as we
have seen, try to avoid the supernatural as much as possible. They do
not decide the question whether Jesus performed true miracles or not.
They would even be ready to explain his resurrection in a metaphorical
sense. It is true that they regard the divinity of Christ as the first article
of their creed, and heaven as the true abode of mankind. But what must
we think of similar assertions when we are told that " the hard and fast
distinctions between earth and heaven, natural and supernatural, God and
man, have completely broken down " (" Sin and its Forgiveness," p. 100) !
Does it not mean that if the Deity was embodied in Jesus Christ, it was
also embodied in Plato and Socrates? And if such be the case, why
should we call ourselves disciples of Christ rather than of Socrates or
Plat > ? The doctrine of Jesus has effected a revolution on the face of the
world, it will perhaps be replied. It is from Christ that our civilization,
our ideals, our very life, is derived. To this we will answer with Dr.
Knox that it is impossible to tell whether our Christian ideals are the
result of Greek philosophy colored by the Hebrew affluent or whether the
Bible contributes the main stream (p. 21). We will also remark with
Dr. Hyde that the Christian doctrine of forgiveness is latent in Plato's
dialogues (p. vii). And indeed why should we not prefer Socrates or
Plato to Jesus, who was a peasant (" Gospel of Jesus," p. 80), whose
knowledge of the larger world of men was as limited as his knowledge of
its learning (p. 56), who was regarded as insane by his own family (p.
93), whose life ended in failure (p. 88) ?
It is Guyau, I believe, who said that Protestantism logically leads to
atheism. Perhaps he was not entirely wrong.
JOSEPH Louis PERKIER.
NEW YORK CITY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 25
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. January, 1930.
La metaphysique de Hegel consideree d'un point de vue scientifique (pp.
1-24) : F. ENRIQUES. - Hegel's concrete logical embodiments reduce to
nonsense, but the poetic feeling of the system is an infinite inspiration.
Quelques remarques sur I'" Ethique a Nicomaque " (pp. 25-36) : A. LAS-
SON. - A study of the relations of the three great reports of Aristotle's
Ethics. La morale positive (pp. 37-78) : CH. DUNAN. - A reply to certain
criticisms of M. Belot, and a defense of the author's theory that meta-
physics should be the basis of ethics. Le Darwinisme en sociologie (pp.
79-92) : C. BOUGLE. - An attempt to define the sorts and limits of the
influence Darwin has had on sociology. Etudes critiques: Note sur la
querelle des deux gammes: G. LECHALES. Questions pratiques: Le
proces de la democratic: GUY-GRAND. Supplement.
Hart, Joseph Kinmont. A critical study of current theories of moral
education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1910. Pp. 48.
$0.53.
Johnson, Thomas M. Proclus' Metaphysical Elements. Osceola, Mo. :
Published by the author. Pp. xvi + 201.
Partridge, G. E. An Outline of Individual Study. New York: Sturgis
& Walton Company. 1910. Pp. v + 240. $1.25.
Peet, T. Eric. The Stone and Bronze Ages in Italy and Sicily. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. 1909. Pp. 528. 16s.
NOTES AND NEWS
AT the meeting on March 7 of the Aristotelian Society Mr. G. Dawes
Hicks read a paper on " Mr. G. E. Moore on the Subject Matter of Psy-
chology." " The problem presented by Mr. Moore is that of determining
which among the contents of the universe are mental, and how they are
distinguished from those which are non-mental. His conclusion is that
particular qualities of acts of consciousness, and any collection of such
acts which have some sort of unity, are undoubtedly mental entities;
whilst it is doubtful whether the entity (if there be such) which sees and
feels and thinks is mental, doubtful also whether sense-data are mental,
and doubtful whether there is any entity of the kind signified by the
phrase ' content of an act of consciousness,' although, if there be, it
would undoubtedly be a mental entity. Against this it was urged (1)
that an individual mind or subject, which is rather than has its states,
and is not a mere aggregate of them, is mental in a more primary sense
than the entities Mr. Moore finds to be undoubtedly mental ; (2) that the
threefold distinction between act, content, and object is justifiable, and
that the content is not rightly described as mental ; (3) that it is possible
to define more precisely what is meant by ' an act of consciousness ' ; and
(4) that psychology can not legitimately be restricted as regards its
subject-matter to what is mental or psychical." The Athenaeum, March 19.
252
THE first meeting of New York State teachers of educational psy-
chology was held at Ithaca, April 8 and 9, at the invitation of the Educa-
tional Department of Cornell University. Representatives of the colleges
and normal schools of the state discussed the extent and form of instruc-
tion in the nervous system, and the place of experimental work, in the
course in educational psychology. The latter discussion resulted in the
formulation of the chief purposes for which experimental work might be
introduced, and of the criteria for the selection of specific experiments.
The discussion of experimental work was supplemented by an exhibition
of the apparatus used for demonstration in the Cornell course in general
psychology, of the drill and research equipment of the psyychological
laboratory, and of apparatus in the educational laboratory for the conduct
of mental tests. By invitation, the evening meeting was held in the psy-
chological laboratory, where the formal program was followed by an
exposition by Professor Titchener of the contributions of the Cornell
laboratory to structural psychology, with special reference to the experi-
mental psychology of the thought -processes. A committee, consisting of
Professor G. M. Whipple, of Cornell (chairman), Professor George M.
Forbes, of Rochester, Dr. W. Van Dyke Bingham, of Columbia, and
Dr. Susan F. Chase, of the Buffalo Normal School, was appointed to
arrange for a meeting next year.
DR. E. H. CAMERON, instructor in psychology in Yale University, has
been advanced to the grade of assistant professor. In that institution
Dr. F. S. Breed, now engaged in graduate work in comparative psychology
at Harvard University, has been appointed instructor in psychology.
DR. C. LLOYD MORGAN, F.R.S., for upwards of twenty years principal
of University College, Bristol, first vice-chancellor of the university and
now professor of psychology and ethics, has received a presentation from
the staff and students of University College and friends. The gifts con-
sisted of several substantial pieces of plate and 200 worth of books.
DR. J. H. CREIGHTON, professor of philosophy at Cornell University,
will have leave of absence next year. His course will be taken by Dr. G.
H. Sabine, of Stanford University.
WALTER T. MARVIN, A.B. (Columbia), Ph.D. (Bonn), preceptor in
Princeton University since 1905, has been appointed professor of mental
philosophy and logic in Rutgers College.
PROFESSOR G. H. SABINE, of the department of philosophy at the Stan-
ford University of California, has been granted leave of absence for the
coming year to supply for Professor Creighton in the Sage School in
Cornell University. During the second semester of next year Professor
Addison W. Moore, of the University of Chicago, will conduct courses in
the department at Stanford.
VOL. VII. No. 10. MAY 12, 1910
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE RELATIONAL ACCOUNT OF TRUTH
THE problem of the definition of truth is much like that of
probability in that both belong to logic and can therefore be
settled with a minimum of reference to metaphysics. In obvious
recognition of this fact Professor James states that in so far as
pragmatism is a methodological theory of truth it is no metaphysic,
but, on the contrary, might be held by metaphysicians of whatever
stamp. 1 And yet his writings on pragmatism show the constant con-
cern to contrast "the belief that the world is still in the process of
making with the belief that there is an eternal edition of it ready-
made and complete." Doubtless the metaphysical aspects of truth
are worthy of weighty considerations, but since it is confessedly quite
unnecessary to thrash out questions of monism and pluralism, of
idealism and realism in order to arrive at a logical definition, it will
be the explicit aim of this paper to avoid such things wherever
possible.
Now if we turn our attention to the problems of truth that seem
to call for solution, we find that one difficulty is felt with especial
keenness. Truth has often been defined as agreement of an idea
with the object, but how this agreement is possible turns up as a
perennial epistemological puzzle. It has been explained by Pro-
fessor Royce as consisting of a form of "one-to-one correspondence"
which the idea itself chooses and intends. From a different point
of view Professor James regards an idea as agreeing with reality if
it "works," if it "helps us to get into satisfactory relations with the
rest of our experience." Both assertions are illuminating in their
place, and perhaps they are not utterly inconsistent with each other ;
but however this may be, they bring up questions which we do not
need to settle. For it is not solely ideas that can have the character
of truth attributed to them. Any kind of a representation at all
1 " Pragmatism," New York, 1907, p. 54. Compare also the statement,
" My account of truth is purely logical and relates to its definition only."
This JOUBNAL, Vol. V., p. 179.
253
254 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
may be called true ; but also many things can be true which are not
thought of as representations. The matter that a proposition asserts
is not ordinarily regarded as a representation or duplicate of some-
thing. Men of science and of practical affairs carry on investiga-
tions about the truth of particular matters without at all referring
to "ideas" and "objects" and "agreement." Thereby they avoid
many epistemological difficulties and differences, and this suggests
that we may very profitably do the same.
The way thus cleared we pass on to the further difficulties which
are described by Schiller as rendering impossible all definitions of
truth not couched in terms of value. 2 Besides the "agreement"
definition above discussed, he finds that non-pragmatic literature
furnishes only one respectable attempt at a definition. The true has
often been said to be that which fits into a system. Schiller 's strenu-
ous objections to this formulation seem to be quite sound, but he
fails to discern that it contains a certain theme which, we shall later
point out, really underlies all theories of truth. He argues with
justice that the above formulation is no criterion since falsehoods
can themselves form a system. Similarly he adds "It (the above
definition) would be adequate if we really had an indefeasible system
of absolute truth by whose aid we might detect the inconsistencies of
the pseudo-systems. But where shall we find such truth? The
bodies of 'truth' which de facto we acknowledge in our sciences are
all partial systems, incomplete in themselves and discrepant with
each other. If nothing short of absolute truth is perfectly sys-
tematic, and if all our systems are imperfect, is not all our 'truth'
tainted with falsehood, and must it not be admitted that no (actual)
systems are 'true'?" 3 Furthermore, in his well-known way, he in-
sists that it is not good philosophy to conceive individual systems as
in the end converging in one absolute and all-embracing system which
alone would be indubitably and strictly ' ' true. ' ' For this is to com-
mit the fallacy of arguing from the unity of a concept to a similar
unity of the concrete ways of exemplifying that concept and so to
assume that there is one system and no more into which all truth
must finally be fitted. Accordingly he concludes that only two ways
remain to fasten down truth : if an ens realissimum is not assumed,
then there remains nothing else but to tie truth to utility, to par-
ticular "fruits" and "consequences."
We desire to submit, on the contrary, that truth can be firmly
anchored regardless of metaphysical controversies about the exist-
ence of an all-embracing system of relations. This lesson can be
abstracted from the results of modern mathematical research. There
* " Humanism," London, 1903, Chap. III.
B Ibid., p. 48.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 255
is no " absolute" system of spatial relations, no absolute geometry,
but within each particular geometry, relations, and the truths that
affirm them, are as hard fixed as any ''absolute truth" could ever be.
We know that the proposition that a straight line is the shortest
distance between two points is by no means absolutely true in the
sense that Kant took it to be; but with respect to that particular
system of relations called the Euclidean geometry it still is consid-
ered as absolutely true. Certainly relative truth is not absolute truth
(truth without respect) ; but relative truth is absolutely relatively
true. Look at it from any point you please, and it always remains
true with reference to the standpoint to which it is relative. If a
sum total of particular geometrical systems or of particular scientific
systems should be shown to exist as a unitary whole in addition to
these particular systems themselves, well and good! We should
know something additional about being and about truth, but it is
emphatically to be maintained that in order to have truth it is not
necessary to chain it to the whole of being.
In order to develop this thesis a few words need to be said as to
what being logically is, as to what is meant by saying that a thing
exists. For as Taylor says, and as James agrees, " 'Reality' is, in
general, what truths have to take account of." 4 Or to express the
same thing in our own terminology, a truth is something that desig-
nates certain relations which have some attribute or other which
entitles them to be called existent. With this recognition of the
relation between truth and existence we inquire, What is logically
meant by saying that anything exists, say the traditional fairy, for
instance, or Achilles, or the number two, or this desk ? Obviously all
these things have existence in some sense, since we regard them as
legitimate objects for logical discourse. But it is immediately notice-
able that some distinction is drawn with reference to the existence
of the fairy as compared with that of the desk. It therefore suggests
itself first to inquire what is the property common to all things that
are said to exist ; and secondly, what are the additional properties that
belong to such things as this desk which so distinguish them from
such things as fairies that the latter come at times to be called unreal ?
To say that a fairy has existence is to connect it with that group
of facts known to childhood which consists of dragons and heroes and
demons and the rest of wonderland. To assert a fairy is to imply
these things. Similarly to assert that the number two exists is as
any exact definition of "two" will clearly bring out to imply the
system of whole numbers, or at least some essential part thereof.
And finally, when we say that this desk exists, we mean not with
reference to fairy-land nor with reference to the whole-number sys-
4 " Pragmatism," p. 244.
256
tern, but with reference to such objects as the other things in this
room, e. g., this chair, those walls, etc. In short, when one affirms
that something exists, one implicitly or explicitly indicates some
specific context and says that that thing implies that context. Not
to refer to some such context and yet to try to affirm some existence
would be to utter meaningless or self-contradictory words. To put
this view of existence in a formula we should say that to exist means,
with reference to some determinate system of relations, to imply
that system.
But since this definition applies to the objects of the reason, the
imagination, and the sensible world alike, there immediately arises
an objection which needs to be answered before we proceed. For
how comes it, then, that such things as fairies have come to be called
unreal in comparison with the objects of the physical world? It is
simply because we have selected that particular system called the
physical world as the one which is most important for our activity
and for our thought, and thus in a secondary sense have come to
call it the real world. But in the primary sense of the term fairies
exist no less than do the physical objects.
The first step toward a logical definition of truth consists in
making a logical definition of existence. This being done, if we here-
upon proceed to say a few words as to what constitutes a discovery
that some precise thing exists, we shall find that we have come upon
truth almost before we know it. To find out whether a thing exists
one of course tries where possible to come in perceptual contact with
it. One lets his sense organs play upon it, finds that his sensations
do or do not imply the thing, and passes his judgment accordingly.
But often it is inconvenient or impossible thus to get at the thing
itself, and then one must content himself with examining the thing's
environment or such parts of it as are accessible and then one searches
in the latter for indications of the presence of the thing. If, for
instance, I wish to learn whether "La Tosca" was played at the
opera last night, I can not now put myself in immediate perception
of the performance, but I can at any rate examine what one might
reasonably call the environment of the opera, viz., the play-bills, the
newspapers, the knowledge of my friends, etc. If "La Tosca"
existed last evening, it existed with reference to a very definite system
of relations, and I am now examining that system or such parts of
it as I can get at to see if it implies "La Tosca." I can be abso-
lutely certain that that system either does or does not imply "La
Tosca"; hence all that I should need in order to pass a certain judg-
ment that the performance, let us say, was given, would be to get at
and examine all the parts of that system essential for determining
the point at issue. But unfortunately I can not get at all those
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 257
parts, and precisely because that performance is now an event of the
past, and therefore, since I should look in vain for absolute certainty,
I have to content myself with reasonable indications that the system
implies that "La Tosca" was given last night. In so doing I form
the familiar probable judgment. If, on the other hand, not an
operatic performance but some abstract mathematical entity were in
question, and I needed to find out whether the latter existed with
reference to some specified system of mathematical relations, I could
(if I had the requisite mathematical ability) make a thorough exam-
ination of this mathematical system, and could accordingly pass an
absolutely certain judgment that the entity in question, let us say,
is implied. But whether one passes probable judgments or certain
judgments ; whether one is considering the existence of a physical or
an imaginary or an abstract logical object with reference to its speci-
fied system of relations; what one does is to search that system for
indications that that object is or is not implied. It is easy to put this
into a formula at once, and we can illustrate and make it clearer
later on. To be true is, with reference to some determinate system
of relations, to designate certain relations which are implied by that
system.
First we will illustrate this with concrete examples; next, show
how it meets the difficulties which Schiller and James draw attention
to; and this will lead us briefly to investigate in how far it agrees
with pragmatic standards, and finally, in how far it must be used
consciously or unconsciously in any self -consistent philosophy.
The simplest example of truth in the abstract is furnished by the
syllogism. The premises state that all A is B and that all B is C;
the conclusion, all A is C, is hereupon said to be true, and by this
nothing more is meant than that this conclusion designates a relation
which those premises imply. Again, the proposition that the sum of
the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles is frequently
called true. But of course it is true only with reference to the
Euclidean system and not with reference to the pseudo-spherical
geometry or certain other non-Euclidean space systems. Euclid's
system implies it, while these others do not. To take a physical
example, suppose that I affirm that this paper is white. I am justi-
fied in believing this statement to be absolutely true provided that
I give it any meaning at all. For I mean to indicate a certain com-
plex system of relations in which human beings with sense organs and
sensations like my own and also objects capable of affecting those
organs like this paper have their place. And with reference to the
system of relations that human experience of this sort constitutes, I
say that this paper is white, and I mean that this fact is implied by
that system of human experience. I do not say that this paper is
258 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
white and mean to refer to a system of experience possessed by beings
whose color-vision lacks the sensation, white. But I make the state-
ment with precise, though unexpressed, reference to our accepted
human experience, and as such the statement is absolutely true. In
this respect it does not differ one whit from any discovered mathe-
matical fact, and since even James admits that the latter have an
absolute and eternal character, the same thing must be admitted of
truths which have a more obvious human character.
But the relational definition is very sharply to be distinguished
from the description of truth as mere "systematic coherence" which
Schiller criticizes with much justice. The Ptolemaic theory, as he
would suggest, is quite systematic and yet is held to be false. The
real reason for this is that internal consistency does not make the
thing that has it true. It requires consistency with external things
for that, and then the thing is true only with reference to those
external things. But in so far as the "coherence" theory suspects
that truth is ultimately based on consistency of some form or other,
it pleads for what any consistent pragmatism must admit.
But, as I hope has been made clear, a theory of truth based on
the implication relation does not have to make reference to an "all-
embracing" system of relations. Indeed, even if such a thing as a
sum total of relations should be proved self-contradictory, the rela-
tional view of truth would be left essentially unaffected. For no one
doubts that we have particular systems of relations, and I hope that
it is clear that their implications are such as "no further experience
will ever alter." What is relationally true to-day can not be rela-
tionally false to-morrow if it is essentially the same "what." The
Ptolemaic astronomy was no truer a thousand years ago than it is
to-day. All will admit that it would be absurd to say that the solar
system changed when the heliocentric system came to be enunciated.
The latter theory designates certain relations which the solar system
implies. The Ptolemaic system does not do this and never did.
Hence we may be sure that it is relationally false regardless of
whether we shall ever be able to measure it up by an " all-embracing
system of reality. ' '
The above suggests the current controversy concerning the muta-
bility of truths, and with this question we will commence a brief
discussion of relationalism as compared with pragmatism. James's
statement that the true is "only the expedient in the way of our
thinking" is succeeded by the remark that the Ptolemaic system was
quite expedient before the heliocentric theory was recognized. It
would seem to follow that the Ptolemaic theory was once true else
what is the use of speaking about all this? But James frequently
draws our full attention by means of some startling paradox, and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 259
when we excitedly turn toward him he proceeds to define his epithets
until they come to lose much of the startling character that origi-
nally drew our attention. Hence, though he explicitly states that the
Ptolemaic theory was once expedient, he is quick to add an explana-
tion. "When new experiences lead to retrospective judgments,
using the past tense, what these judgments utter was true, even
though no past thinker had been there. We live forwards, a
Danish thinker has said, but we understand backwards." 6 Ergo,
the Ptolemaic theory was false, after all, and hence it was not made
false, and likewise the heliocentric theory was not made true. If this
be but granted, then it would seem possible to resolve some of the
entanglement by distinguishing between a truth and the realization
or consciousness of that truth. The former in itself would be a mere
thing in posse, to borrow James's expression for it, while the realiza-
tion would mark the truth in actual use. The passage from the
former to the latter would be the change or mutation. It would be a
passage from an abstract thing to a concrete thing which in many
respects, at least, should be considered the more important of the two.
But though change thus comes in as an important fact, it is confusing
to say that it is the truths themselves that change. Ideas change,
and thereby acquire new implications. But the implication relation
itself is not subject to change, and truth is only a certain aspect of
implication relation. Hence truth is like the number two, which it
would be useless to call either static or changing.
On one point relationalism and pragmatism seem to take sharp
issue. That point is with reference to the greater-less relation as
holding between truths. Given, let us say, a set of ten simple propo-
sitions and suppose that they were considered with reference to a
system of relations by which eight of them were implied while
two of them were contradicted. Then if this set were to be com-
pared with another set of ten simple propositions all of which
were implied by that system of relations, both relationalism and
pragmatism might agree that the latter propositions as a set were
more true than the former. But now suppose a different situation.
Suppose that we were considering two sets of propositions and
that in each case every one of them was in thorough logical con-
sistency with the system of relations by which we were measuring
them. Then relationalism would unhesitatingly pronounce them
both true and could not attribute any meaning to saying that one
is more true than the other. But pragmatism making truth directly
depend upon utility rather than on implication, it follows that
wherever one truth is more useful than another it must likewise be
more true than that other. And since any given proposition varies
/6td., p. 223.
260 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
in usefulness from day to day it is constantly sliding up and down
the scale of truth as well. Now this is untenable. Barring cases
such as we abstractly considered above, where they are partially
implied and partially not implied by the system that measures their
truth; barring these cases, a thing is either implied or it is not
implied, it is either true or it is not true, and there's an end of the
matter. The proposition, "This particular piece of paper is white,"
can not be described as less true than one that Taft is president or
that I must eat in order to sustain my life, even though these three
propositions have various degrees of usefulness.
It is not easy to dissuade oneself that most pragmatists, when
they say that the truth of a thing depends on its practical conse-
quences, mean just what is ordinarily meant by practical. "What a
business man would mean, for instance, if he employed the term.
But we have been given plainly to understand that it was never
meant to oppose it to the purely cognitive. 6 If we had known that
we should never have been so startled ! For it ought not to be hard
to convince any one that when we think of something as true we
have some purpose on hand for which that thing may have value;
and in estimating the truth of that thing it may be confessed that we
select the system of relations by which we measure it. But no
matter how subtly usefulness be defined or redefined, it will always
admit of degrees, provided the term be not subjected to our un-
recognizable distortion. And hence whatever meaning "usefulness"
may come to acquire, if truth be made a function of it, there will
always be some truths less true than other truths because the latter
happen to be more useful.
Pragmatists have so frequently challenged their opponents to
define their ow r n view of truth that the question came to the writer's
mind, "What is it which the non-pragmatists assert, w r hich the prag-
matists deny?" The present discussion, however crude its form,
serves to hint at the fundamental issue. And yet to what extent
the relational account is in utter disaccord with the central mean-
ing of the pragmatists, I should incline rather to ask than to state.
I do not see how the essential thesis of relationalism, with what-
ever particular errors I may have expounded it, can be successfully
contradicted by any doctrine. Phenomenalism, for instance, is
by no means inconsistent with relationalism. Indeed I hope that
it has been shown that distinctly human truths (statements of
color, etc.) are quite as absolute in character as are truths that are
less obviously human. Relationalism seems to be presupposed
even though unconsciously in every consistent philosophy. Cer-
9 Phil. Rev., January, 1908.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 261
tainly it is not so presupposed by a pragmatism that interprets the
term, "practical" "in the narrow sense." Mere utility will not
inevitably drag along the implication relation. But wherever
statements are made that ideas are true because they "work," be-
cause they successfully "lead" to other ideas and to other realities,
there we are simply listening to descriptions of the implication re-
lation in certain concrete manifestations. For that one thing can
imply another means nothing more than that things go together in our
experience; and hence that one thing may "lead" to the other.
And without this implication, this togetherness, all value would
fade into nothingness.
EDMUND JACOBSON.
CAMBBIDGE, MASS.
ON METHODS AND METHODOLOGY
ri^HE science of methodology has, for many years, been recognized
-* as a branch of logical theory, but, concerning its objects and
its methods there appears to be neither general agreement nor clear
discussion. It is universally asserted among philosophers that there
is a body of knowledge called science, that this has been obtained by
a certain vaguely defined scientific method, and that this method
should not be ignored in the elucidation of logical theory; but here
agreement seems to end. Since the period of Mill and Bain, the
results of the study have been meager. The study appears to have
become entangled with metaphysical subtleties and to have been bar-
ren of definite conclusions which have any recognizable bearing on
the sciences from which they have been abstracted. The errors of
the old empirical writers have been discovered and pointed out, but
no clear and useful conclusions appear to have taken the place of
those which have been criticized and abandoned.
This barrenness appears to me to be due to the fact that modern
logicians have been largely occupied with the metaphysical founda-
tions of their science, and so have lost touch with the scientific meth-
ods which form the rightful subject-matter of their study. The
present barrenness and indeterminateness points to the conclusion
that a valid and fertile methodology should proceed by the empirical
rather than by the metaphysical method.
It is instructive to note that a similar conclusion has been reached
by another course of reasoning. This line of thought is best illus-
trated by some of the views of Professor Dewey. In a criticism of
some contemporary logical theory he remarks that "Logical theory
will get along as well as reflective practise when it sticks close by
262 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and observes the directions and checks inherent in each successive
phase of the evolution of the cycle of experiencing. The problem in
general of the validity of the thinking process as distinct from the
validity of this or that process arises only when thinking is isolated
from its historical position and its material context." 1
The above striking quotation, which I have removed from its
context (and with the context of which I must not be understood to
express full agreement) well illustrates the standpoint of the present
essay. The value of philosophical controversies is often found in
the truths which emerge incidentally rather than in any considerable
addition to our knowledge of the topics nominally under discussion.
In the present instance, whatever opinions we may hold concerning
unsettled logical controversies, the view expressed above is one that
well deserves careful thought.
The discussion of the metaphysical nature of judgment and of its
relation to reality, which forms so large a part of some modern log-
ical theory, has no doubt considerable value from a certain point of
view. But, from the standpoint of the objective philosopher, it is
more important to distinguish clearly between good judgment and
bad judgment. The degree of abstraction in the more abstruse dis-
cussions is too great to be of practical use in assisting us to evaluate
the logical processes involved in the actual work of positive science.
Without insisting too dogmatically on this view so far as it relates
to pure logic, or attempting to limit the methods which may con-
cei T 'ably be used by theoretical logicians in such inquiries, it will be
sufficient for me to point out that whatever cogency such remarks
may possess in their relation to logic, is vastly increased when we
apply them to methodology.
The process of thought is as old as mankind, and, in its rudiments,
is probably a faculty inherited from our primeval ancestry in the
remote geologic past long before the species man could be said to
exist. Certainly more than traces of the thought process are to be
iound in the higher animals, and, consequently, a subjective analysis
of the thought process will have as its subject-matter a mass of
ingrained hereditary material. While reasoning that can truly be
called logical is not of such remote antiquity, yet it is universal
among mankind. Observers of the most backward savage races or
of the very youngest children who have acquired the power of speech
are often astonished at the penetration displayed in actual practical
1 " Studies in Logical Theory," p. 62. The present essay is in no way con-
cerned with the relation of metaphysics and logic or with the theories of Lotze
and others which Professor Dewey criticizes; but it strongly maintain? the
necessity of removing methodology from the metaphysical to the practical side
of logical theory.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 263
inferences when the subjects discussed are of such a nature as to
form a real part of the experience of the individuals concerned.
While children and savages would not express their ideas in syllo-
gistic form, it would be idle to deny the applicability of the term
logical to any process of thought by means of which it is possible
habitually to advance from valid premises to correct or even to
plausible conclusions. Indeed, it can surely be accepted as a fact of
history, independent of all theory, that a vast amount of logical
thinking in the concrete must precede the development of a science
of logic in the abstract worthy of the name.
The application of this conception to methodology is obvious.
While reason is universal among mankind and can, therefore, be
inferred to have descended from a remote antiquity, that develop-
ment of the process of human thought which can rightfully be de-
scribed as scientific investigation is of comparatively recent origin.
No doubt the first rough principles are implicit in all correct observa-
tion and logical thinking. Germs of the method and some of its
practical results can be traced to the dawn of history. The primi-
tive steam-engine of Hero of Alexandria, the universal fame of
Archimedes and the principles with which his name is associated
are two prominent examples. Yet, there is no evidence that any
such investigations had advanced beyond the earlier stages when
their development was not great enough to supply material for a
special branch of logical theory.
For all practical purposes, we can trace the rise of any consid-
erable body of scientific investigation to the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries. This development having existed during so brief a
period, it is evident that there is an enormous antecedent improba-
bility against the assumption that, by a metaphysical method, or by
an examination of the thought process as such, it is possible to deduce
valid principles of methodology. In this region of thought it is also
clear that there is a special danger in too great abstraction. When
the process is carried too far, the results are liable to lose any intel-
ligible connection with the particulars from which the abstractions
have been made.
Examples of this tendency can be seen when intellectualist logic
touches the borders of methodology. One striking instance is seen
in the modern treatment of cause and effect, concerning which the
conclusion of one school of theorists is concisely expressed by Pro-
fessor Bosanquet, who identifies this relation with "complete
ground. ' ' 2
1 See " Logic the Morphology of Knowledge," Vol. I., p. 276. " Now it is
plain from what has been said that the distinction of cause and effect is self-
destructive. It is utterly impossible to be successful in the investigation of a
264
It is outside the scope of this essay to enter into a full discussion
of the idea of cause or of the elimination from it of the time element ;
but, without entering into metaphysical reasoning, it will well illus-
trate the standpoint of this thesis to examine its meaning with regard
to science. If "complete ground" be regarded from one point of
view, it may be interpreted as a very indirect assertion of the ulti-
mate unity of nature and of the principle that no phenomenon or
section of phenomena is in reality isolated, but all take their place in
the greater cosmic unity. If it means this, it asserts a principle that
few, and certainly not I, are concerned to deny, and it is only open
to criticism in that the method of stating it is confusing and en-
tangled with much unnecessary controversy. If, on the other hand,
it is intended to be of any practical value in science or in method-
ology it can readily be seen that it fails to accomplish this object.
The scientist, for the purposes of his actual investigations, is by
no means concerned with the nature of cause as such (if indeed the
degree of abstraction in such a conception is not so great as to have
taken from the term all concrete meaning), but of the interrelation
of particular causes and particular effects.
It is the essence of the scientist's conception of cause that it is
not complete ground, that it is possible to repeat in time certain con-
ditions which we call causes and obtain thereby certain other condi-
tions which we call effects. A scientist finds by experiments that
one specimen of nitrogen which he obtains from the air is heavier
than another which he obtains from nitrites. The cause of this is not
"complete ground" (which is equivalent to saying that the experi-
ment can not be repeated), but the presence of argon in the air.
After a long period of careful research, this particular "cause" of
the observed effect is discovered. It is in the unraveling of partic-
ular conditions such as these that the phenomenal advance of science
has come about, and it is only in so far as methodology can throw
light on the character of such interrelations that its treatment of
cause or of any other scientific conception has any meaning or value
in connection with the sciences from which it has been abstracted.
causal relation without reducing it to the intelligible unity of a complete ground."
It is obvious in a case of this kind that immediately the relation becomes
reciprocal (complete ground) it becomes identical and we obtain the tautology
air = air or argon = argon. And so long as we retain the incomplete relation
heavy nitrogen we do not necessarily imply argon. Any event that can be
repeated in time is necessarily incomplete ground or " concrete events or groups
of incomplete relations" (ib., p. 268), and if we advance beyond this to Pro-
fessor Bosanquet's intelligible unity we reach a sphere where scientific investi-
gation has no meaning. The metaphysical unity we then obtain is an assump-
tion which antecedes the whole investigation. In short, such a treatment of
cause has no bearing on scientific work.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 265
The kind of methodology which we may call abstract maintains
its relation to the metaphysics from which it has been obtained, but
it has lost its connection with science. Such methods as these do not
assist scientific investigation, they only occasion confusion. To this
kind of investigation the scientist gives a very effective reply by
ignoring it altogether, and the quality of his work does not appear to
suffer in consequence. Whether or no the metaphysical treatment of
methodology be theoretically possible, it seems not unlikely that other
lines of treatment may give more practical results. Even if in a
remote future it be possible to carry the process of abstraction to a
higher degree, yet, for the present, we require a more careful and
detailed study of methods in particular and a wider area of data on
which to build our generalizations.
The conclusion of this line of argument obviously points to the
desirability of reverting to a more empirical treatment, and to the
methods of the great founders of inductive logic and scientific meth-
odology. While some of the special ideas of Mill and the other
empiricists are open to criticism in detail, there can be no doubt that
in their close adherence to actual instances of scientific investigation,
in their abstraction of methods from real researches in which they
had been used, they discovered an invaluable instrument of research.
In the use of this instrument, modern methodologists must not shirk
the task of criticizing, and where necessary criticizing adversely, the
methods used by the scientist and the manner in which he applies
them. Here is a difference between the standpoint of the early
methodologist and that which should be adopted by his successors.
In the early stages of the science it was necessary to find some
universal starting-point and this was obtaine'd by the analytical
examination of processes of investigation which were clear and
straightforward. But, after the first results have been gleaned in
this manner, there is a danger that further conclusions concerning
method, drawn from researches where there is no possibility of differ-
ence concerning methods or results, should be of the nature of tru-
isms. No doubt there are still interesting problems of methodology
implicit in the analysis of researches on the formation of dew or in
the theories of induced electricity, but such do not lie on the surface.
At any rate, there should be possible a new kind of methodological
investigation which maintains an even closer relation between theory
and practise. Such an investigation will endeavor to distinguish
between valid and invalid methods in their application to actual
problems, and, from instances of their use and misuse, to exhibit the
main principles which underlie them.
Some attempts have already been made by philosophers to accom-
266 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
plish these more practical aims. The recognized distinction between
the individual and the statistical methods is a case in point. Owing
to philosophic criticism, no one, outside the sphere of popular jour-
nalism, would maintain that so many people must commit suicide in
London or New York every year. Such a work as the second volume
of Sigwart's "Logik" contains many cogent criticisms of the valid
and the invalid application of scientific method. But, as a rule, such
investigations are somewhat remote from the actual theories of the
contemporary scientist. Standard works tend too much to assume
the form of a dictionary of theory. They are ignored by the sci-
entist, who most needs their help, and by the philosopher they are
studied without sufficient regard to concrete application.
An attempt to establish a closer relation between theory and
practise will be found in my own "Principles of Applied Mathe-
matics, ' ' an essay which originated entirely from a study of the prob-
lem of secular cooling. That any scientist of note, much less the
great Lord Kelvin, should have put forward as probable fact, a
theory of geologic time which contained so many patent fallacies,
appeared to me so strange that I endeavored to discover the reason.
It was soon apparent that the mathematical physicist was hypnotized
by the form of his mathematical instrument and that he failed to
inquire where it was and where it was not applicable. My own
article was an attempt to place this matter on a sound theoretical
footing.
This, I am sure, is not the only case where such investigations are
possible, and I sincerely hope that similar work will be undertaken
by other philosophic writers. The scientist will then find that he can
not ignore the philosopher, and the philosopher will discover that he
has a rightful sphere a little nearer earth than he has been accus-
tomed to look. Wherever methodology may end, it is here that it
should begin.
For such work as this, the rise of modern specialism offers many
opportunities. In recent scientific investigation, the range of the
individual worker has tended to become so narrow, and his outlook
over the main field of science so limited, that errors are continually
liable to occur in the application of the results of one branch of
knowledge to another. The mathematician dogmatizes over the whole
field of cosmological speculation. The biologist makes unproved and
far-reaching assertions concerning the methods of evolution which
affect our ideas on the nature of man and of society. In all branches
of science and in all fields of knowledge this is the age of the
specialist.
In the careful examination of the methods of the special sci-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 267
ences, in the determination of their nature and of their necessary
limits will be found a large and fertile field for the investigation of
the methodologist.
H. S. SHELTON.
ASHFOBD, MIDDLESEX, ENGLAND.
CONTINGENCY IN AN INFINITE WORLD
IN the number of this JOURNAL for February 3, 1910, Mr. W. H.
Kilpatrick champions the thesis that "if the actual universe be
conceived as quantitatively infinite," definite and final determina-
tion "antecedent to the act of eventuation" is excluded. The event
on arrival is, indeed, the inevitable outcome of the actual conditions,
but in an infinite universe it can never be inevitable that is, pre-
dictable by an adequate intelligence before it arrives. A priori it
is necessarily contingent, since the most perfect deduction is neces-
sarily made subject to the proviso that the conditions remain un-
changed. This is what can never be guaranteed in an infinite world,
a quantitative infinity offering endless possibilities of new factors
appearing in the field of even the most perfect calculation.
The question raised is evidently purely speculative. All actual
human prediction is, of course, contingent ; but Laplace and his fol-
lowers have been wont to maintain that for a conceivable super-
human intelligence the future, and indeed all time to its smallest
details, would be an open book; or, better, a mathematical formula
capable of making infallible disclosures without limit in the past
and the future. Mr. Kilpatrick denies this speculative possibility
on the ground that it requires the postulation of a closed and finite
universe, which is "substantially different from what science assumes
our actual universe to be."
But in what sense does science assume the universe to be infinite ?
Mr. Kilpatrick indicates the correct answer when he explains that
he uses "the word infinite ... in the mathematical sense, to indi-
cate, that is, such a variable number as may surpass any arbitrarily
assigned number, however great." At this point difficulty appears,
for such an infinite is essentially a positive and not a negative term ;
it is in itself a perfectly definite quantity. However much it may
transcend human grasp and be "infinite" relative to human ca-
pacity, it is for the superhuman calculator of Laplace a finite quan-
tity ; and it does not appear why such an intelligence should not deal
with it successfully, and, if not otherwise hindered, compute with
entire accuracy and in utmost detail the whole course of events.
Nor is any true infinite regress involved in the consideration of the
268 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
new factors furnishable from the stores of a universe infinite in the
mathematical sense. The regress would be limited to the extent
of the "infinite" in question, which the imaginary calculator would
doubtless find little difficulty in exhausting.
Even were Mr. Kilpatrick to cut loose from the support of physical
science, and postulate a universe truly infinite, in the metaphysical
sense, it does not seem evident that sure prediction by superhuman
intelligence would necessarily be excluded, for the organization of
the universe might be of a serial character, consisting of an endless
repetition of organized systems each of which had relations indeed
with its neighbors, but relations of a purely compensatory nature,
so that in the course of a given cycle each received from its environ-
ment impulses precisely equivalent to what it gave and no more. In
that case even in a universe metaphysically infinite, one fails to see
why the determination within each system might not be so complete
that perfect prediction on the part of an adequate intelligence should
be possible.
Suppose, however, we concede to our author the existence of a
truly infinite world with universal articulations, what is the practical
bearing of his conclusion? Is it more than the overthrow of an
incidental speculation? It does not seem to apply to the matters
usually at issue in the determinist controversy. For example, the
cosmic contingency for which he pleads offers no word of promise
to the principle of individuality as this faces the hostile forces of
wholesale mechanism. The human individual is immediately known
to us as a seat of efficiency, or immanent activity. Determinism,
however, goes behind the returns, and resolves this fundamental con-
tent of consciousness which to mature men is perhaps the thing of
supreme worth yielded by experience into illusion, substituting for
the perceptual datum the concept of a moving plexus of cosmic
agencies, with our consciousness of self as a mere epiphenomenon,
the phantasmally continuing rainbow over the stream of mechanical
process. 1 Now, just this and nothing more the human individual
seems to remain, so far as any bearing of our author's contingency
is concerned. If the outcome in a given life is never absolutely
predictable, it is none the less true that, whatever the outcome proves
to be, it has been determined completely by cosmic and not at all
by purely individual factors; and what does it matter to one that
his acts are not altogether predictable so long as they are not his,
or his only in an epiphenomenal, illusory sense; and so long as he
1 The only individual which is a reality for determinism ( as for Spinoza )
is the universe itself; and this, if the determinism is of the naturalistic order,
only in half-way fashion, since, while it credits the universe with immanent
activity, it finds in it no place at all for ultimate values.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 269
himself, so far as he exists at all, is really a spectator and not an
agent in the world, even as regards the activities he calls his own?
Then, the conscious individual normally regards himself and
other minds as centers of ultimate, and not merely instrumental,
values. To him values are their own raison d'etre. Nothing good
is called to account by normal consciousness unless it be in view of
some greater good. Again, however, determinism exposes the saw-
dust in the doll. Unless it be theological determinism in which
case its empirical grounds are far to seek values, too, are linked by
it into its endless causal chains, and made mere instruments of cosmic
selection, happy hits of nature for ulterior purposes, shrewd devices
by which she induces certain parts of herself to maintain useful
types of function. Now, from this situation also, one looks in vain
for relief to any contingency due merely to the infinitude of the
universe.
Indeed, it seems evident that out of absolutely determined ma-
terials none but a determinist structure is likely to be built. So long
as the mechanical philosopher is allowed to quarry the stone, that is,
permitted without protest to reify and virtually apotheosize abstrac-
tions from the field of perceptual physics, so long are blocks of
thought likely to fit into no edifice not inscribed with the name of
Destiny.
WM. FORBES COOLEY.
COLUMBIA UNIVEBSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Psychologic de I'Enfant et Pedagogie Experimentale. Second edition,
revised and enlarged. Dr. ED. CLAPAREDE. Geneve: Librarie Kiindig.
1909. Pp. viii + 283.
This neat little volume is an attempt to furnish practical teachers
with the elementary facts of mental growth together with some sugges-
tions and illustrations of how educational questions may be investigated
by the experimental method. The first 190 pages are devoted to an
informal discussion of various problems of child-psychology. The author
is firmly convinced that psychology, especially that of the child, is of the
utmost value for the teacher. An interesting and careful historical sur-
vey of the development of child-study in all civilized countries is presented.
Next follows a discussion of problems and methods. The problems of
an educational psychology are in brief : preservation of the child in health,
development of the mind and body through gymnastics, the equipment of
the memory and education as such; that is, the development of character.
The chapter on methods simply aims to state in a general way for the
teacher the different modes of approach to the subject, such as the method
of introspection, observation, experimentation, etc., without attempting
to go into technical details.
270 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Under " Mental Development " he states in a popular manner various
facts regarding physical growth, relation of this phase to mental growth,
the importance of play and imitation in the mental development, the
meaning and function of infancy, interest in education and the develop-
ment of interests. Throughout he shows much familiarity with various
American studies and refers to them repeatedly. The treatment is inter-
esting and up to date, but presents nothing new to the advanced student,
being, as we have said, written as an introduction for the rank and file
of the public-school teachers. All the chapters are accompanied with good
bibliographies from the German and English as well as from the French.
The last section of the book deals with the problem of intellectual
fatigue. Here the material is more valuable for the advanced student,
although the mode of presentation continues to be direct and non-tech-
nical. He offers a good resume of the complexities of the problem, the
factors entering into it, etc. The problem of the " fatigue coefficient "
of the different subjects of study, the influence of physical work on
mental fatigue, the hypothesis of a reservoir of energy, over-work, and
the rest are treated quite fully. The discussion contains much that is
suggestive, although the application of the doctrine of the reservoir is
sometimes rather fanciful. Brief resumes of the ordinary fatigue tests
and criticisms are included.
The main criticism to pass on the book is that it is scrappy and does
not attempt to present a systematic account of mental development such
as the teacher should have. Possibly, however, there is some justification
for a rather full discussion of certain pertinent topics instead of a
presentation of all phases in a more restricted form.
IRVIXG KING.
STATE UNIVEBSITY OF IOWA.
Contributions to the Study of the Affective Processes. TAIZO NAKASHIMA.
The American Journal of Psychology, April, 1909, Vol. XX., No. 2.
Pp. 157-193.
The author's chief purpose in this investigation is to study "the
mechanism of the affective judgment," and this phrase, particularly the
word " mechanism," furnishes the key to the general method and attitude
adopted in the getting and in the interpretation of the data. The sec-
ordary purposes were to test the usefulness of the Reizmethode to secure
pertinent results bearing on " current affective problems," and to study
affective processes by the discrimination reaction method.
In the first place the investigator appears to assume the existence of
affective elements, or to work from this hypothesis. By using the method
of paired comparisons and by repeating the harmonical experiments of
Titchener and of Hayes he wishes to confirm directly the results in regard
to affective judging incidentally got by these experimenters. Introspective
analysis is the primary object, introspective records being given very fully,
especially those of one subject. The data are interpreted to show that the
feeling judgment is not a mediated nor resultant experience, but is as
immediate as the sensory judgment; this too, contrary to the expectation
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 271
of two of his observers. Rarely is there any reason for these judgments.
Something of feeling quality is intrinsic in the stimuli, although organic
reactions are often mistaken for feeling itself. Tones, for example, are
as directly pleasant or unpleasant as they are loud or soft. For color the
same thing holds.
Using the Reizmethode to discover how feeling differs from sensation,
no specific results were obtained and the method, for this purpose, was
condemned. The author does ascribe invariable temporal precedence to
sensation, opposing Wundt's view that feelings may come beforehand pre-
saging the coming sensory experience. As incidental results the conclu-
sion is practically stated that the pleasant-unpleasant dimension is a
simple one qualitatively, the same in all sense departments, although one
observer thought he found differences within this dimension. The author
suggests that these differences may be sensational. Only one subject finds
" mixed feelings." The author questions their existence. Likewise for
the few reported cases of localization, it is suggested that on a certain
hypothesis they too can be explained away.
The discrimination reaction method determines the time relations to
be longer than sensible discriminations, yet that these affective processes
are amenable to tests by this method.
The study shows an industrious scrupulousness, numbering, counting,
calculating by highly approved methods, and quantificating even the most
obvious results. It strikes the reviewer that there is something lacking,
not wrong necessarily, in this method, if one judges entirely by the effect
on one of a study of the exposition itself. There appears to be something
mechanical and superficial about concluding for the element theory of
feeling from the fact simply of the quantitatively considered immediacy
of the affective judgment. In a sense the author, and Titchener also,
would seem to make the feeling judgment so direct, so purely acquisitive
functionally, so merely and separately a product of stimulation, as to
forget, overlook, or deny its reactive, essentially active, emotive, or evalu-
ating side altogether. Feeling, as we find by introspection when no par-
ticular theory is lurking near, genuine immediacy in the Bradleyan sense
when Bradley is psychologizing, 1 is something more and something deeper
than an extra item added to or in juxtaposition with the sense part of an
ordinary experienced situation. It is different in kind in a deeper psy-
chological sense than this analysis reveals. This quantitative sort of dis-
tinction above, this distinction of which time-relation tests are typical, is
a literal sort of demonstration which is well enough, but which for any
significance at all rests upon a profounder qualitative distinction. This
latter distinction is tantalizingly assumed throughout all investigations
of the type described above, which attempts laboriously to use in a new
field a method originally devised for sensational data conceived by pre-
supposition to be different.
Incidentally the reviewer is glad to note that the author (in a foot-
1 F. H. Bradley, " On our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," Mind, N. S.,
No. 69, pp. 40-64.
272 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
note), and Titchener also, admit the existence of feelings without the
pleasant-unpleasant dimension. It is interesting to speculate upon the
theoretical modifications likely to follow concessions of this kind, such
possibly, for example, as dimensionless feelings, since all of the other
Wundtian possibilities have already been rejected by this school.
CHAS. HUGHES JOHNSTON.
UNIVEBSITY OF MICHIGAN.
Time-Relations of the Affective Processes. TAIZO NAKASHIMA. Psycho-
logical Review, N. S., Vol. XVI., No. 5, September, 1909. Pp. 303-309.
The purpose is to test the time of affective arousal and the dependence
of affective intensity upon the duration of the stimulus.
For colors the shortest time ranged from .84 to .98 second, and for
geometrical figures, .72 to 1.08 second. The feeling arousal always fol-
lowed the sensory arousal. The time sense was very definite and there
were few cases of mixed feelings. The reaction time, for complex visual
impressions also, proved to be somewhat longer than the cognitive reaction
time, for simple colors it being considerably so. Practise shortened the
time a good deal, although only a slight effect was noticeable for tones.
The conclusions from this testing of the time relations in the different
sense departments, and their relations to the physiological expressions, are
as follows: These judgments are as immediate as sensory judgments of
psycho-physics; the time-relations, aside from being invariably longer,
show relatively the same variability as those of sensory; the method of
reaction is here similarly applicable; the time relations of affective to
sensory processes vary in the different sensory fields, being close in the
tactual and olfactory senses and remote in the color sense; and all vary
with the variation of the stimulus.
The two ways of accounting for the longer time necessary for the
affective arousal are sharply contrasted. One view is, that affection is a
definite resultant of a sensation, sensation-idea, or idea complex, and that
it is experienced after these complex processes have been consummated
(his own interpretation of Miinsterberg) . The other view (Titchener's)
is that the delayed appearance of feeling is due primarily to its lack of
distinctness, reinforced by the further fact that affective judgment in
complex sensory or apperceptive states is reached as quickly or more so
than in the purely sensory cases. The author prefers the latter, although
he does not deny affective clearness and affective attention.
The similarly possible directness of judgment in affective as well as
in sensory process is stressed as a point of kinship. One feels that the
author, maybe unconsciously, is nevertheless trying by some other than a
direct exhaustive introspective method, or at most by a sort of nose-count-
ing tabulation of answers, to establish qualitative likeness here. The way
they objectively seem to act after measuring their tardy time of entering
consciousness (as compared with sensory process), even if figures should
show such absolute similarity or identity in behavior, would in no sense
invalidate their absolute qualitative unlikeness.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 273
We have certainly an introspectively clear case of qualitatively dis-
parate and unlike mental elements or functions. It may be due to the
reviewer's incorrigibly prejudiced attitude, but he can not see how the
real feeling problem is illumined by these experiments, bolstered up as
they are with such respectable methods; nor can the reviewer altogether
agree with the interpretation of the data given, feeling, perhaps unwarrant-
ably, that the writer too easily relegates what some of his subjects call
" feelings " to his own category of " emotions " or organic or kinesthetic
sensations, or that he too easily and too surely speaks of his own subjects'
" alleged " qualitative differences in simple affections, or too lightly per-
haps of " mixed feelings," by each one of which rejections hangs a
controversy.
CHAS. HUGHES JOHNSTON.
UNIVEBSITY OF MICHIGAN.
La memoire affective et I 'experimentation. TH. RIBOT. Journal de Psy-
chologic normale et pathologique. Juillet-Aout, 1909, IV. Pp. 289-
292.
Kiilpe at the recent Philosophical Congress at Heidelberg reported
certain results of an experiment planned to verify Wundt's tridimensional
theory of feeling. These unpublished results constitute the topic for this
discussion by Ribot.
Kiilpe's experiment consisted in gathering under defined conditions
introspective data from seven subjects. The four series were as follows:
(1) The reproduction of certain sense feelings, (2) the reproduction of
certain more complex sensuous situations, (3) the reproduction of certain
types of complex emotions, and (4) the attempted placing in memory of
the emotional experience aroused by unknown but expressive portraits.
The results were that four subjects could reproduce excitement and
tension, but not pleasantness and unpleasantness. One thought that she
experienced a genuine feeling image of pain or pleasure, but tended to
confuse the reproduced excitement and tension with kinesthetic sensations.
The other two occasionally evoked affective images, although in one case
it was difficult to distinguish the feeling from its image. Both reproduced
excitement and tension. All seven could reproduce pain and distinguish
it from displeasure. Several thought that the affective image lost none
of its original intensity. Recalled pleasantness and unpleasantness seemed
to some very real, to others hallucinatory. In the fourth series the sub-
jects did not appear to be able to refer the revived feeling to any particular
former experience.
There is clearly nothing conclusive from these data. Ribot would
naturally expect a greater range of individual differences than one would
find in intellectual memory. Nevertheless he concludes that, very likely,
as artists and designers can throw most light on the visual type of imagery,
and musicians on the auditory, so we should possibly find distinguishable
affective types who could possibly best clarify for us the workings of the
affective recall. As is well known, Ribot believes both in the conservation
274 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and in the reproduction of affective states. These may reproduce them-
selves spontaneously or we may voluntarily call them up. The former
occurrence is the more common, the latter indeed being entirely unan-
alyzable by many persons.
The issue of the discussion, interesting as a Ribot theory, not as
Kiilpe's interpretation of his own data, is apparently that we probably
may add the affective as a memory type comparable in its specialized
appearance in certain individuals to that of the motor or the visual in
others. Whether we may speak in any intelligible sense of feeling im-
agery as we may of feeling recall the author does not discuss.
CHAS. HUGHES JOHNSTON.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Illinois.
Vol. L, No. 1. STEPHEN S. COLVIX. Baltimore, Md. : The Review
Publishing Co.
Two studies in animal psychology and three in the psychology of
learning from the University of Illinois constitute the psychological
monograph published by the Psychological Review in November, 1909.
The volume is edited by Stephen S. Colvin, who also shares in the author-
ship of two of the studies on the color perception of three dogs, a cat,
and a squirrel, with C. C. Burford, and on the development of imagina-
tion in school children and the relation between ideational types and
the retentivity of material appealing to various sense departments, with
E. J. Myers.
The work with the animals differed from the well-known experiments
of Professor Thorndike, in that the animals were kept as nearly normal
and allowed as much freedom as possible. Colored paper was pasted on
receptacles containing food that was accessible, paper of different colors
on other boxes and pans into which the animals could not enter; certain
colors were thus associated with satisfaction and other colors with fail-
ure. It was found that the animals could not only discriminate one color
from another, though with considerable individual differences, but were
able finally to " abstract " the colors, so that orange, for example, would
be picked out by a dog immediately in whatever location or circumstances
it might appear. Violet and green seemed to have less power, on the
w'lole, of impressing these animals' minds than orange and blue.
The other study by Professor Colvin, made in collaboration with E.
J. Myers, was an experiment on five hundred and twenty children in
public schools and two hundred and seventy-five students of elementary
psychology, with the aim of determining the predominant ideational
type at different ages. Cards on which were drawn geometrical figures,
nonsense characters and nonsense syllables were the material used. Later
a story was read to the subjects in which auditory, motor, and visual
ideas were artfully combined, in order to determine whether the visually
minded would or would not remember more of the visual ideas, the motor
minded of the motor ideas, and so on.
The children up to the age of ten were predominantly vizualizers.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 275
In later childhood, auditory imagery that is, verbal imagery appeared.
Motor imagery, it appears, plays less of a role than has generally been
supposed. A fairly definite correspondence was established between
ideational type and kind of material visual, auditory, motor, etc.
most readily remembered by each type. Incidentally it was found that
the rapid falling off of the memory curve, established by Ebbinghaus
and others, did not hold when the test of memory was the amount re-
tained instead of economy in relearning, and when sense instead of non-
sense material was used.
In an interesting study on " The Analysis of the Factor of Recall in
the Learning Process," Edwina E. Abbott shows that it is better in learn-
ing to pause at intervals and try to reproduce, rather than to go on un-
intermittently jamming the material in. The experiments were made
both with nonsense syllables and words, and the subjects were five stu-
dents from the psychological laboratory. The relative value of "jam-
ming in" and recalling differs with individuals, those having strong
" inner-speach " tendencies being more helped by recall than those who
depend on reimaging.
Another study by the same author, " On the Analysis of Memory
Consciousness in Orthography," establishes certain facts concerning the
mental processes of one who learns to spell words. The author found
that her four trained subjects invariably substituted visual imagery for
the heard letters when the words were spelled out to them, and that the
heard letters were never recalled in terms of auditory imagery. Vocali-
zation of the letters when words are presented visually is a hindrance;
vocalization of syllables, a help. In general, whatever aids visual pres-
entation, helps along the learning process.
A paper by F. Kuhlmann, on the " Development of Instincts and
Habits in Young Birds," gives the results of his observation of young
birds in their nests from the time of hatching until they flew away. He
recorded their rate of growth in weight, the time of appearance of vari-
ous motor coordinations and the stages of the appearance of fear. A
number of excellent photographs accompany the article.
ABRAM LIPSKY.
NEW YOBK.
tfber den Austieg der Druckempfindung. G. F. ARPS. Wundt's Psy-
chologische Studien, Bd. IV. (1908). Pp. 431-471.
The article reports a series of experiments carried on in the Leipzig
laboratory with the purpose of measuring the period of rise of a pressure
sensation, in other words, of determining the relation that exists between
the duration of a tactual stimulus and the intensity of the resulting pres-
sure sensation. To this end two stimuli were presented to the subject
successively, a normal stimulus of constant weight but variable duration,
and a comparison stimulus of constant duration but variable weight. The
rise of intensity of the sensation from the standard stimulus was measured
by determining for each duration of the standard the weight of the
276 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
variable stimulus (of constant duration), which gave a sensation of sub-
jectively equal intensity to that given by the standard.
The stimuli were two round pieces of ivory 0.5 cm. in diameter, which
were set down on the dorsal side of the first phalanx of the subject's first
and second fingers, respectively. The rather complicated apparatus used
was mainly electrical, though the comparison stimuli were given by
means of a pneumatic pressure-balance. Experiments were made both
by the method of limits and by the method of constant stimuli. There
was no essential difference in the results obtained by the two methods.
Two different standard stimuli were used, the first 134.2 gr., the second
58.5 gr., each with variable durations of from 13 a to 1385 a- There
were also two comparison stimuli used, of 1 sec. and 500 a duration,
respectively, each with varying weights. Four subjects were tested,
although the full series of experiments, using both standard stimuli, both
comparison stimuli, and all four combinations of the time-space order,
was carried through with only one subject. The steps between the various
comparison stimuli were sufficiently small to enable the author to plot
with relative accuracy the curve of the rise in intensity of the sensation
from the standard stimulus.
The most important result of the experiments was to show that the
rise of the sensation seems to be to a great degree independent of the
intensity of the standard stimulus at least for the stimuli here tested.
The curves for both standards (134.2 gr. and 58.5 gr.) reach their maxima
at about 980 a and sink again slightly beyond that point. For all curves
there is also a secondary maximum at 380 cr, followed by a drop at about
432 a and then a comparatively steady rise to 980 a, the absolute maxi-
mum. These results hold for all four subjects tested and for both com-
parison stimuli (1 sec. and 500 a), though the absolute values of the
results differ, of course, in the different cases.
The time-error and position-error are different for the several subjects.
All subjects show a tendency to overestimate the standard; for example,
a comparison pressure of 156.4 gr. and 1 sec. duration is judged equal to
a standard pressure of 134.2 gr. and 980 a duration. The author explains
this overestimation as due partly to the fact that the standard received
a " subjective emphasis " for the subject because of the sudden starting
up of the electro-magnetic apparatus. Besides this, the attention seemed
to the subjects to be directed especially to the standard pressure, and
this fact may have caused it to be overestimated. There are several
other points of interest, including fluctuations in the attention of the
subjects during stimulation, effects of contrast and assimilation both
between standard and comparison pressures and between succeeding com-
parison pressures, and the influence which the intensity of a pressure
sensation had on its apparent duration. The author does not attempt an
analysis of the different factors, physiological and psychical, which are
involved in the main result of these experiments, the long rise of the
pressure sensation and the apparently constant character of its curve,
regardless of the intensity of the sensation. HELEN D. COOK.
WELLESLEY COLLEGE.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 277
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
MIND. January, 1910. Observations on the Case of Sally Beau-
champ (pp. 1-29) : W. L. MACKENZIE. - " The most probable view is that
' Sally ' was either the main mental system of a profoundly hysterical
person ready to develop illusions, or delusions, out of everything, or a
* hypnotic state ' unawakened, and having all the same mental qualities.
When the ' real ' Miss Beauchamp was formed, Sally ' goes back to where
she came from ' a pathetic euphemism. Probably it is nearer the truth
to say that, in going away, she ' awoke ' from her ' deeper trance ' and
that she no longer wears into a state of super-suggestibility and delirium
the new, if not the real, Miss Beauchamp. That the new Miss Beau-
champ does not remember Sally's experiences as such is no proof that
Sally's experiences are not playing apart in some other form or lying
dormant as dispositions or traces that support the whole psycho-physical
life, and may yet emerge if occasion should require." The Present
Phase of " Idealist " Philosophy (pp. 30-45) : F. C. S. SCHILLER. - Ideal-
ism overlooks " the essential selectiveness of thought." The ideal of
knowledge as all-inclusive is false. Knowledge distinguishes and sepa-
rates what is given together. It does not put together what is given as
separate. Bradley illustrates the consequences of " verbalism " in logic,
and of abstracting thought from the personality of the thinker, so that
it ceases to be conceived as a human function. On Evolutionary Em-
piricism (pp. 46-62) : H. S. SHELTON. - With regard to " a priori " prin-
ciples, neither the apriorism of Kant, the empiricism of Mill, nor the
postulate theory of Schiller exhausts the possible alternatives. The
writer's theory admits " with the Kantians the apriority of certain ideas
to the experience of the individual. With the empiricists it ultimately
explains all knowledge in terms of experience. With the humanist it
admits the importance of postulation and the progressive character of
axioms and necessary truths. Association and ^Esthetic Perception (pp.
63-81): J. SHAWCROSS. - The writer assumes "the generally received
definition of beauty, considered as a quality of the object, namely, that it
is the sensuous or material expression of an immaterial content." " Con-
sidered as a normal activity of the mind, association is indispensable to
the appearance of any sensuous form as expressive; i. e,, unless certain
associations are aroused in the mind of the beholder, no object, however
beautiful in itself, can inspire in him a sentiment of beauty." Critical
Notices. J. A. Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas: A. E. TAYLOR. Will-
iam James (colleagues of), Essays in Honor of William James: HORACE
M. KALLEN. W. R. Boyce Gibson, The Problem of Logic: S. H. MEL-
LONE. C. and W. Stern, Die Kindersprache : W. H. WINCH. C. and W.
Stern, Erinnerung, Aussage und Luge in der ersten Kindheit: W. H.
WINCH. A. E. Taylor, Plato: J. A. STEWART. Henry Jones, Idealism as
a Practical Creed: J. H. MUIRHEAD. New Books. Philosophical Period-
icals. Notes.
278 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. February, 1910. La logique de la
contradiction (ler article) (pp. 144-172) : F. PAULHAN. - A study of the
principle of contradiction in relation to intellect, feeling, and action,
with special reference to its practical utility and value. L'automatisme
dans la criminalite (pp. 144-172) : MARRO. - All causes which put the
mental organism in a state of inferiority tend to further the translation
of motor images of criminal actions into relative movements. L'art de
I'education (pp. 173-198) : A. MARCERONA. - A study of the weaknesses
of education and educators, with the appropriate remedies. Analyses et
comptes rendus. Carveth Read, The Metaphysics of Nature: A. PENJON.
Albert Steenbergen, Henri Bergson's intuitive Philosophic: J. BENRUBI.
Notices bibliographiques. Anna Strong, The Psychology of Prayer: L.
ARREAT. Giovanni Gentile, II modernismo e i rapporti tra la religione e
filosofia: L. ARREAT. C. Myers, A Text-book of Experimental Psychology:
CH. LALO. H. Ebbinghaus, Precis de Psychologic : CH. LALO. W. James,
Precis de psychologic: CH. LALO. B. Christiansen, Philosophic der
Kunst: CH. LALO. H. Siebeck, Grundfragen zur Psychologic und
AesthetiJc der Tonkunst: CH. LALO. Revue des periodiques.
A Modernist. Letters to His Holiness Pope Pius X. Chicago: Open
Court Publishing Company; London: Kegan Paul, Teubner, Trench
& Co. 1909. Pp. xx + 280.
Boutroux, Emile. Wissenschaft und Religion in der philosophie unserer
zeit. Leipzig and Berlin : B. G. Teubner. 1910. Pp. vi -f 309. $1.40.
Dewey, John. The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and other essays
in contemporary thought. New York : Henry Holt & Co. 1910.
Pp. vi + 309. $1.40.
Finck, F. N. Die Haupttypen des Sprachbaus. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
1910. Pp. 114. M. 1.25.
Foucault, Marcel. L'illusion paradoxale et le seuil de Weber. Mont-
pellier: Coulet; Paris: Masson. 1910. Pp.213. Fr.4.
Gillette, John M. Vocational Education. New York: American Book
Co. 1910. Pp. viii -f 303.
Kisch, E. Heinrich. The Sexual Life of Woman in its Physiological,
Pathological and Hygienic Aspects. Translated by M. Eden Paul.
New York : Rebman Co. Pp. xii + 686. $5.
Lazzati, Luigi. Liberte de conscience et liberte de science. Translated
by J. Chamard. Paris : Giard and Briere. 1910. Pp. 453. Fr. 10.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thoughts out of Season. Parts I. and II. Part I.
translated by Anthony M. Ludovici, part II. by Edwin Collins. Edin-
burgh and London : T. N. Foulis ; New York : The Macmillan Company.
1910. Pp. xxxviii + 204, xix + 201. $1.25.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Vol. I. Translated by
Anthony M. Ludovici. Edinburgh and London: T. N. Foulis; New
York: The Macmillan Company. 1910. Pp. xiv + 384. $1.75.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 279
Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Future of our Educational Institutions,
Homer and Classical Philology. Translated, with introduction, by
J. M. Kennedy. Edinburgh and London: T. N. Foulis; New York:
The Macmillan Company. 1910. Pp. x+170. 2s. 6d. $1.25.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Human all-too-Human. Part I. Translated by
Helen Zimmern. Edinburgh and London: T. N. Foulis; New York:
The Macmillan Company. 1910. Pp. xiii + 407. $1.75.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Birth of Tragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism.
Translated by William A. Haussmann. Edinburgh and London : T. N.
Foulis; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1910. Pp. xxix + 194.
$1.25.
Talbert, Ernest Lynn. The Dualism of Fact and Idea in its Social
Implications. Chicago : University of Chicago Press. 1910. Pp. 52.
$0.53.
Varisco, Bernardo. I massimi problemi. Milano : Libreria Milanese.
1910. Pp. xi -f- 331.
Verworn, M. Die Mechanik des Geisteslebens. Leipzig : Teubner. 1910.
Pp. 114. M. 1.25.
Volkmann, Paul. Die Eigenart der Natur und der Eigensinn des Monis-
mus. Leipzig and Berlin : Teubner. 1910. Pp. 34. M. 1.
NOTES AND NEWS
AT the meeting of the English Folk-Lore Society on February 16, the
Rev. J. H. Weekes read a paper on " The Congo Medicine Man and his
Black and White Magic," of which the following account is from the
Athenaeum for February 26:
" Mr. Weekes said that there were some fifty different ngangas in the
Lower Congo, there being one for every known disease and every possible
emergency that could occur in native life, and that they appear to prac-
tise both black and white magic. Any person, rich or poor, man or woman,
who was sufficiently artful and energetic, could become a nganga. Mr.
Weekes went on to describe at length some of the more important of the
ngangas and their method of practising, including one who employed
thunder and lightning for inflicting injury on his client's enemy, one who
had control of the rain, and one who alone could perform the ceremonies
necessary to enable a man or woman to remarry. If a family suspects
that one of its members is under the ban of a nganga, the ceremony of
" marrying " the fetish into the family is gone through to restrain its
eagerness for harm. The power of the fetishes belonging to the ngangas
resided in small bundles comprising various articles, according to the
nature of the power to be exercised; small portions of these bundles were
placed in holes in the head or stomach of the fetish when his aid was to be
invoked. Mr. Weekes laid great stress on the fact that the fetishes were
not worshipped. Their powers were feared and implicitly believed in
280 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
even to the extent of leaving a man to die when once a nganga had de-
clared his approaching death but the fetishes were never bowed down to
or praised."
" LITTLE has hitherto been known of the language of the Yana tribe of
Indians, who occupy part of Shasta County, in the northern region of
California. This want has now been supplied by Messrs. E. Sapir and
R. B. Dixon, who have contributed to the ninth volume of the Publica-
tions of the University of California a series of legends recorded from the
lips of the two last survivors of those learned in the tribal traditions.
One of these tales is a remarkable variant of the Prometheus type of
legend, describing how Fox, Sandpiper, and Coyote stole the fire, how the
world was burned, and how the thieves escaped in a basket which Spider
hauled up to heaven by his thread. Another and less complete version
of the tale has been published by Mr. J. Curtin in his ( Creation Myths
of Primitive America.' The present collection of tales, recorded in two
dialects, will preserve for the use of philologists a language which is
fated before long to disappear." Nature, April 7.
AT the meeting on April 4 of the Aristotelian Society, Mr. H. W.
Carr read a paper on " Bergson's Theory of Instinct," of which the fol-
lowing abstract is from The Athenaeum for April 16: "The philosophical
aspect of the problem of instinct is concerned with the question whether
instinct, as we observe it in examples such as ants and bees, is a form of
knowledge, different from and comparable with intelligence, or whether
it is a form of reflex action that may develop into or result from intelli-
gence. M. Bergson holds that instinct and intelligence are two forms of
psychical activity which are completely different from one another in the
method of their action on inert matter; that they represent two powers
which must be supposed to have lain together in the original impetus of
life, and which appear to have been evolved at the expense of one another ;
and that they correspond to two forms of knowledge which we may dis-
tinguish in our own consciousness, viz., intelligence, which gives us our
knowledge of the external world of solid matter, the subject-matter of the
physical sciences, and intuition, which is a knowledge of life by life."
THE Society for Philosophical Inquiry held a memorial meeting in
honor of the late Dr. William T. Harris, formerly U. S. Commissioner of
Education, at the George Washington University, on Tuesday, May 3,
1910, at 4 :45 with the following program : " The Genesis of the Philos-
opher," by Rev. Dr. J. Macbride Sterrett ; " His Philosophy," Dr. Edward
E. Richardson; "Dr. Harris as U. S. Commissioner of Education,"
Dr. Elmer Ellsworth Brown, U. S. Commissioner of Education; "Dr.
Harris as Interpreter of Dante," Rev. Dr. Sewall ; " Impressions of
Dr. Harris as Teacher of Philosophy," Rev. Dr. U. G. Pierce.
MR. H. FOSTER ADAMS, fellow in the University of Chicago, has been
appointed instructor in psychology in the University of Kansas.
PROFESSOR ARTHUR H. PIERCE, of Smith College, will assume editorial
charge of the Psychological Bulletin in September.
MR. J. A. SMITH has just been elected Waynflete professor of Meta-
physics at Oxford University, in place of Professor Case.
VOL. VII. No. 11. MAY 26, 1910
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
BORDEN PARKER BOWNE
BORDEN PARKER BOWNE, LL.D., professor of philosophy and
dean of the Graduate School, Boston University, died suddenly on
the afternoon of April 1. His death was entirely unexpected, for
he was in active service, and he had even lectured as usual in the
forenoon. The loss to Boston University, to the great number of
men and women who had been his enthusiastic pupils, to the public
that reads philosophy, and to the ecclesiastical circles in which he
moved will be severely felt.
His Boston chair is the only academic position in philosophy that
he ever held. Born at Leonardsville, N. J., January 28, 1847 ; grad-
uated from New York University (then University of the City of
New York), in 1871; for two years a student at the universities of
Paris, Halle and Gottingen; then for a brief period assistant pro-
fessor of modern languages at his alma mater, and also for a time a
member of the editorial staff of The Independent, in 1876 he was
called to the office which, after nearly thirty-four years of distin-
guished service, he has now laid down. The inherent attractiveness
of his idealism, together with a brilliant style of exposition, which
never lacked the grace of wit, brought throngs of students to his
academic lectures. The same qualities have given his printed writ-
ings a wide circulation.
The keynote of his entire career as a philosopher was struck in
his first published work, "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer"
(New York, 1874). If the style of this production betrays the
exuberant audacity of youth, its argument, nevertheless, displays
surprising keenness. It came at a time when Spencer's deduction
of the definite from the indefinite, of consciousness from "nerve
shocks," and of morality from the laws of the redistribution of
matter, still seemed plausible. Bowne's interest in exposing the fal-
lacies of this whole method was largely religious. The ancient faith
that the world has meaning, and that this meaning can be known,
was to be defended. To maintain human freedom against the purely
281
282 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
deterministic interpretation of natural law ; to resist sensationalism,
associationalism, and whatever else analyzes away the real unity of
the mind ; to show that the higher categories are the fundamentally
real ones, and that the world can be articulately thought only in
terms of personality these were his central aims from first to last.
He was purposely and frankly an advocate, not a dispassionate on-
looker. He conceived philosophy, in the ancient and accredited way,
as existing for the purpose of furthering the interests of life. This
dominance of the practical explains in part his method, which was,
as he himself said, the reworking of categories somewhat after the
manner of Herbart. The result was not a system of speculative
idealism but rather an idealistic interpretation of life like that of
his revered teacher Lotze.
The same spirit and method went into his theological activities,
which were by no means unimportant. His effort was always to
think theological problems in terms of life, and as a consequence,
though he was by no means a radical, he was commonly regarded as
one. An unflinching defender of learning and liberty in the affair
of his colleague, Professor Mitchell, a wit who could discomfit a
theological adversary with a bon mot, a nature as religious as it was
courageous, he has left his mark upon the ecclesiastical life of his
time.
A list of his major philosophical publications is here appended.
"The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," 1874; "Studies in Theism,"
1879; "Metaphysics," 1882, revised 1898; "Introduction to Psycho-
logical Theory," 1887; "Philosophy of Theism," 1888, revised under
the title of "Theism," 1902; "The Principles of Ethics," 1892;
"Theory of Thought and Knowledge," 1897; "The Immanence of
God," 1905; "Personalism," 1907.
GEORGE A. COE.
UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.
THE SYSTEM OF VALUES
THE year 1909 was marked by the birth of a new philosophical
discipline the philosophy of values. In saying this, I do not,
of course, mean to imply that the problem of values is in any sense a
new one, but that during the past year for the first time the system-
atic description, classification, and explanation of values was en-
tered upon quite independently by several of our foremost thinkers.
Professor Montague 's brief discussion of ' ' The True, the Good, and
the Beautiful from a Pragmatic Standpoint" appeared in April, 1
following presentations of diverse aspects of the general problem by
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. VI., No. 9.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 283
Professors Coe, A. W. Moore, and Tufts during the preceding year ; 2
in May, two books of the first importance saw the light Professor
Urban 's psychological analysis of Valuation, and Professor Miinster-
berg's metaphysical system of The Eternal Values; and finally, as
the year drew to a close, and in recognition of this new interest, we
had the "Value Number" of The Psychological Bulletin, 3 containing
Professor Miinsterberg's apologia, and a further contribution and re-
view by Professor Tawney, and introducing us to certain foreign dis-
cussions of the same topic. Surely such a wide-spread movement is
significant, and the subject worthy of continued attention. In offer-
ing a further contribution to the discussion, it will be unnecessary,
in view of the fact that the material recently presented is of easy
access to all, to review it at any length in these pages, further than
to state briefly the definitions and classifications of each for the pur-
pose of comparison and criticism, and as a basis for further systema-
tization.
I. RECENT THEORIES OF VALUE
Dr. Montague offers no definition of value as such, but describes
his three types in terms of the adjustment of the organism to its
environment. These three types are: (1) "the cognitive value of
truth," yielded by the adjustment of "individual perceptions and
judgments to the facts of the environment" ; (2) "the conative value
of good," yielded by the adjustment of "the facts of the environment
to the desires of the individual"; and (3) "the affective value of
beauty," yielded by "the spontaneous and unenforced adaptation of
individual needs and environing facts to one another. ' '
Dr. Miinsterberg's treatment is epistemological. He defines value
in terms of identity of content between two moments of experience,
the second of which fulfills an overpersonal demand called for by the
"pure will" in the first. His classification is the most thorough and
systematic of all those which we have to consider. The four types of
identity, and the corresponding types of value are: (1) the identity
of every part with itself, yielding the logical values of conservation ;
(2) the identity in some sense of all the parts with one another, yield-
ing the esthetic values of agreement; (3) the identity of that which
changes throughout the process of change, yielding the ethical values
of realization; and (4) the ultimate identity of all these values with
one another, yielding the metaphysical values of completion. The
further details of the classification will appear in the appended table.
(Table I.)
Dr. Urban approaches his subject from the view-point of scientific
psychology. He defines value in terms of a felt harmony between
*This JOURNAL. Vol. V., pp. 253, 429, and 517.
"Vol. VI., No. 10.
284 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the object and my subjective dispositions, which is relatively inde-
pendent of my perceptions of existence and my judgments of truth.
His classification is genetic rather than logical: economic, esthetic,
and ethical values all make their first and embryonic appearance on
the lowest level of "simple appreciation," but each develops and ac-
quires new meaning during the progress of the "value movement."
The following scheme sums up his treatment:
I. Primary values: values that appertain to objects which serve
immediately to satisfy certain fundamental instinctive
tendencies.
1. Values of simple appreciation, or sub-personal condition
worths.
II. Secondary or derived values: values which develop from the
"pursuit, acquisition, and consumption of the primary
objects," which are first "imputed, as additional values,
to the primary objects," but later are abstracted from
them, and so become objects of higher value.
2. Values of characterization, or personal worths: those
which "presuppose explicit reference to the ideal or con-
cept of the person. ' '
3. Values of participation, or impersonal (rather, overper-
sonal) worths: those that are imputed to an act "be-
cause it is instrumental to certain social, over-individual
ends, and satisfies certain impersonal demands."
Dr. Tawney defines value in terms of consistency, or the tendency
of reflective experience to maintain itself throughout all its phases.
Values are classified into three groups (1) constitutive or presenta-
tive, including logical values; (2) imperative or motor, including
ethical values; and (3) purposive, including esthetic and economic
values each of w r hich may be viewed either as determined by habit
or as reconstructed in experience. This classification, like Urban 's,
is genetic, though reminding us also of Miinsterberg's distinction
between naive life values and developed culture values.
Finally, Dr. Orestano whose book, "I Valori Umani," is re-
viewed in the Psychological Bulletin ("Value Number," p. 360)
defines value in terms of interest regarded as belonging to the object
which produces it; and distinguishes five types economic, intellec-
tual, esthetic, religious, and moral.
II. CRITICISMS AND COMPARISONS
The fatal defect of all these classifications consists in a confusion
between factual, ideal, and transcendental values a confusion so
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 285
great as to involve in most cases the entire neglect of the last two
groups. Only these last two may be called eternal or absolute values ;
and relativists, like Urban, Tawney, and Orestano, have consequently
no room in their systems for them at all ; but in the case of such an
absolutist as Miinsterberg, the charge must be one of confusion rather
than of neglect. Thus, such values as those he calls "logical," and
all the "ethical" values except those of "morality" and perhaps of
"self-development," are phenomenal, and have to do with facts or
events in time, whereas only the others are pure and timeless ; on the
other hand pleasantness, to which he denies the name of value alto-
gether, has as much or as little right to that name as has the utility
("industry" value) or existence of any phenomenon in time.
The distinction between the actual and the ideal I have stated
elsewhere 4 in terms of attitude. Our attitude in the presence of facts
I there described as dualistic the "brute" facts of the actual world
stand over against me to be taken as they are, apart from the ques-
tion of their value for me at all ; our attitude in the presence of ideals,
on the other hand, is a monistic attitude an ideal is an object which
I regard as in harmony with my own nature, which manifests an
underlying unity with myself. So, whatever "value" may mean,
factual values values asserted of facts in time become ideal (and
so timeless) so soon as, and so far as, our attitude changes from a
dualistic to a monistic one so soon as, and so far as, the object of my
contemplation loses its aloofness and self-sufficiency, and becomes a
part of myself, and I "absorbed" in my object.
Perhaps the source of the confusion can be got at best by a con-
sideration of two quite distinct but often confused kinds of "truth"
value. I have pointed out (in the article referred to) the sharp dis-
tinction between logical (scientific and philosophical) truth, which
is derived mediately, through inference, and toward which our atti-
tude is dualistic ; and spiritual or religious truth, which is attained
immediately, by imagination, and toward which our attitude is mon-
istic. Each may be defined pragmatically, though in so far forth
vaguely, the former as that which is fulfilled in our ordinary ex-
perience, and the latter as that which harmonizes with the demands
of our spiritual nature. So far as we argue about truth, we are con-
cerned with the facts of science or the realities of metaphysics ; so far
as we claim (note the verb : time does not permit of its defense here)
immediate insight into truth we are concerned rather with the ideals
of the religious imagination. Miinsterberg 's "logical values" have
to do with truth in the lower sense of the term, and are factual
values the life-values are the truths of every-day experience, the
4 " Western Reserve University Bulletin," Vol. XII., No. 3.
286 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
culture-values are the truths of science. Truth in the higher
sense includes what he calls the metaphysical values of ''holiness";
and in the metaphysical values of "absoluteness" we have a return
to logical truth, but on a higher plane that of philosophy.
Urban 's and Tawney's theories, excellent as they may be for the
psychologist, yield confusion worse confounded to the metaphysician.
This confusion, however, is due to the point of view, and that not
being our own present point of view, we may pass on at once. Ore-
stano's classification, finally, again, brings out clearly the distinc-
tions between economic, logical, esthetic, ethical, and religious values,
and binds them together by his theory of interest ; but his list is an
enumeration rather than a classification, as the distinction between
the group of economic and logical values and that of esthetic, ethical,
and religious values is lost; and is furthermore defective in its
omission of what we shall refer to later as affective and transcen-
dental values.
An arrangement of the most pregnant terms in each of the defi-
nitions above quoted or paraphrased, in the order of increasing in-
tension, would give us interest, adjustment, consistency, harmony,
identity: the difference is one rather of terminology and degree of
force than of essential meaning. Of the terms used, interest is the
broadest and most colorless, but it is also vague, and weakens rather
than strengthens the intension of the word "value." "Adjust-
ment," the next in line of intension, however, is free from this ob-
jection, and may well serve as a nucleus of our definition and
analysis. In any case, value is some kind of a relation between the
object and a contemplating subject (Montague, Urban, Orestano),
or between different moments of the experience of such a subject
(Miinsterberg, Tawney).
III. A CONSTRUCTIVE SYSTEM OF VALUES
Let us make our approach to a definition of value by way of the
definition of life. Life is commonly defined as the mutual adjust-
ment of internal relations and external relations, or of the organism
as a whole to its environment as a whole ; and whatever advances any
of these adjustments, and so furthers the life-purposes of the organ-
ism, possesses value. Values in the broadest sense are of three general
types (I.) factual values, or values of adaptation, merely, which
advance the adjustment of the organism to its environment, with-
out producing an actual felt unity between them; (II.) ideal values,
or values of harmony, which do produce such a felt unity between
the organism and some part of its environment; and (III.) tran-
scendental values, or values of perfection, which arise from a com-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 287
plete harmonization between the organism and its entire environ-
ment. The facts of the phenomenal world yield values of adaptation,
which become values of harmony as soon as these facts become
transformed into ideals, and the attitude of the self to its object
becomes monistic.
The values of adaptation are threefold (cf. Montague) : (a)
whenever and so far as in the adjustment of our organism to its
environment our individual judgments are completely adapted to
the facts of our environment, we have the logical value of truth;
(6) whenever and so far as in this adjustment the facts of our
environment are adapted completely to the desires of the individual,
we have the economic value of utility; (c) whenever and so far as
there is such a spontaneous and unenforced adaptation of individ-
ual needs and environing facts to each other as to produce an inner
harmony in the mind, we have the affective value of agreeableness.
Judgments, desires, and feelings may be particular and transitory,
or universal and necessary hence the distinction between the log-
ically true, the useful, and the agreeable on the one hand, and the
ideally true, the good, and the beautiful on the other: in the first
case there is adjustment and adaptation merely, in the second case
there is complete harmony, unity, and absorption.
The values of adaptation were classified according to the kind
of adaptation which they arouse between the organism and the en-
vironment; the values of harmony are classified according to the
nature of the harmonious environment or object, (a) Harmony in
the physical environment the world of the senses favoring har-
mony within the organism, yields the esthetic value of beauty, which
corresponds to agreeableness among the factual values ; ( b ) harmony
in the social realm, which is sensuous in its manifestations but
transcends the senses in its inner reality, yields the ethical value of
goodness, corresponding to utility among the factual values; (c)
harmony in the spiritual or entirely supersensuous realm yields the
religious value of truth, corresponding to logical truth among the
factual values. To quote from the article above referred to, the
beautiful "is a revelation in the sensuous world of that common
nature which we find also in ourselves, and the same may be said
with regard to the good in the social and the true in the spiritual
environments. Whatever our senses acknowledge as in harmony
with itself and with our own inner nature, our esthetic conscious-
ness regards as beautiful; whatever deed of ourselves or of our
fellow men tends toward a closer binding together of man to man,
that our moral consciousness calls good; whatever in the supersen-
suous realm touches most deeply the essential needs of our spirits,
that our religious consciousness acknowledges as true."
288 THE JOVRXAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Finally, the complete harmonization of all the ideals to one
another produces the transcendental value of perfection. By the
transcendental as distinguished from the actual and the ideal is
meant the ultimate and complete as contrasted with the instrumental
and fragmentary. No facts are absolutely unideal, no ideals are
absolutely unreal : either the merely dualistic or the merely monistic
attitude by itself is partial, and a completely rational and compre-
hensive attitude toward the world is won only by a thorough recog-
nition and realization of the harmony of all reality, and of the
duality-in-unity of our relations with it. But for man as he is at
present constituted this attitude is not yet, and his nearest approach
to it he finds in the life of the ideal, which is not by any means the
completely rational life, but is a striving toward it in which is won
an occasional fragmentary glimpse of the ultimate harmony the
only complete and final "vital equilibrium" between self and en-
vironment toward the attainment of which all else is merely instru-
mental. Further description, classification, and analysis of the
values of perfection is a metaphysical task into which we can not at
present enter.
Any discussion of values must include not only a description
and classification of the object-values themselves a task which is
now completed so far as our present needs are concerned but also
an account of the relations between those values and the self (1)
of the process of determining those values (the process of evalua-
tion), and (2) of the conscious purposive reaction of the personality
to the values (the reaction-values) ; for each of these possesses the
characteristic of being valuable.
Furthermore, the process of evaluation must always be consid-
ered in connection with its conditions and its results. The psycho-
logical condition, stimulus, or incentive of the evaluation process
is in any case a feeling of adaptation, at least, between the individ-
ual and his environment; our attitude toward the evaluated object
is twofold (1) an intellectual attitude of recognition or acknowl-
edgment, and (2) an immediate emotional attitude of appreciation;
finally, the ultimate psychological result of the process is a general
feeling of satisfaction a sense of inner harmony produced by
the evaluation process. We shall consider these various factors
under each head in the following order: (1) the subjective psycho-
logical condition of the evaluation process, and the kind of satis-
faction produced thereby; (2) the process itself, in connection with
our attitude the evaluated object.
Evaluation of facts involves interest as its general psychological
condition, interest being definable as a feeling of the importance of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 289
the object for the individual; and the satisfaction of this interest
yields pleasure as its psychological result. Pleasure is itself an
inner harmony, but it is a harmony produced by some adaptation
between the individual and his environment; as soon as the inner
harmony comes to correspond to an outer one, pleasure becomes
transformed into happiness, which is also an inner harmony, but
produced by an outer one by some harmony in the environment,
and between the environment and the individual. Happiness, then,
is the general psychological result of the contemplation of the ideal,
whereas the general psychological condition of such contemplation
is love, which is definable as a feeling of harmony between the con-
templating subject and any ideal object.
The evaluation of logical truth is a testing of our judgments,
and is attained through a process of ratiocination ; the evaluation of
utilities we call utilization, which is a process concerned in the satis-
faction of desire; the evaluation of agreeableness consists in an
exercise of the feelings, resulting in the enjoyment of the agreeable
object. The evaluation of ideals always consists in an extended
"enjoyment" process called contemplation; and the organ of
esthetic evaluation we call taste, the organ of ethical evaluation
conscience, and the organ of religious evaluation faith. The ac-
knowledgment of factual volumes consists in a recognition of the
adaptability of the organism to its environment, or of the en-
vironment to the organism, or of their mutual adaptability
appreciation is the immediate emotional response of the individual
to the actual process of adaptation; the acknowledgment of ideal
values consists in the recognition of an objective harmony among
the various parts of the object appreciation is the immediate
emotional response of the individual to the actual process of har-
monization.
Finally, reaction to these various object-values and evaluations
yields a third set of values values of organization. There are six
varieties of these reaction-values in the factual realm three forms
of conscious reaction to the values in nature or the physical environ-
ment, and three forms of conscious reaction to the values in per-
sonality or the social environment. Conscious reaction to the
physical environment yields the logical reaction-value of science
(the organization of natural truths), the economic reaction-value of
industry (the organization of natural utilities), and the affective
reaction- value of play (in the sense, not merely of the spontaneous
overflow of surplus energy, but of organized sport) ; conscious re-
action to the social environment yields the logical reaction-value of
history (the organization of truths about personalities), the eco-
290
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
nomic reaction-value of law (the organization of active social rela-
tions), and the affective reaction- value of friendship (pleasurable
social intercourse). In the ideal realm, reaction takes the form
not only of organization, but of realization or creation: realization
in the esthetic field yields the reaction or organization value of art,
in the ethical sphere of morality, and in the spiritual realm of
religion.
Having constructed a skeleton system of values, we are now in a
better position to clear whatever confusion may subsist in Professor
Miinsterberg's system, and to orientate his various values in rela-
tion to our revised scheme. His "logical values" we saw have to do
with logical truth, and so are factual. His "values of unity" are
not so much esthetic as hedonic, or rather a mixture of hedonic
and ethical; except "harmony," which is purely esthetic, and be-
longs with the next group. "Love" is harmony in the social sphere,
"happiness" is harmony among the inner Volitions; love is in itself
ethical, but in its broadest sense it is the psychological condition, and
happiness the psychological result of every contemplative experi-
ence. Miinsterberg's "value of harmony" and "values of beauty"
are esthetic in the true sense. His "ethical values" are partly
ethical, but chiefly economic merely "growth," "progress," "in-
dustry," and "law" are purely economic, and so merely phenom-
enal and temporal; "self -development" as he restricts it is also
purely economic, and only "morality" is strictly ethical. His
"values of holiness" refer to the spiritual world, and so are re-
ligious; and, finally, his "values of absoluteness" are transcendental.
I append the second table for the purpose of placing before
us in orderly form the classification and correlation of the values.
TABLE I. PROFESSOR MUNSTERBERG'S SCHEME OF THE ETERNAL VALUES
Conservation.
Logical Values.
Agreement.
Esthetic Values.
Realization.
Ethical Values.
Completion.
Metaphysical Values.
Life.
Culture.
Life.
Culture.
Life.
Culture.
Life.
Culture.
Exist-
ence.
Connec-
tion.
Unity.
Beauty.
Develop-
ment.
Achieve-
ment
Holiness.
Absolute-
ness.
Outer physical
world. Na-
ture.
Things
Nature
Har-
mony
Fine
arts
Growth
Indus-
try
Creation
World
Social world.
Society.
Per-
sons
His-
tory
Love
Litera-
ture
Prog-
ress
Law
Revela-
tion
Man-
kind
Inner spiritual
world. Self-
hood.
Valu-
ations
Reason
Hap-
piness
Music
Self-
devel-
opment
Moral-
ity
Salva-
tion
Over-
self
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
TABLE II. PROPOSED SCHEME OF VALUES
291
Reaction-Values
Object-Values.
Condi-
tion.
Function.
Process.
Satia-
faction-
or
Values of Organization.
Factual values
Values of adaptation.
io
Natural
values
of orga
Personal
values
nization
Logical values
Truth.
I
2
|
Judgment
Ratiocination
a
Science
History
Economic values
Utility.
a
H- i
Desire
Utilization
S
Industry
Law
Affective values
Agreeableness.
Feeling
Enjoyment
Play
Friendship
Ideal values-
Values of harmony.
d
o
Values of realization
Esthetic values
Beauty.
>
Taste
ts
Ot
i
.
*PI
Art
Ethical values
Goodness.
^
Conscience
3
a
&
&
Morality
Eeligious values
Truth.
Faith
o
Religion
Transcendental values
Values of perfection.
J. S. MOORE.
WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.
THE PARADOX OF VOLUNTARY ATTENTION
r INHERE are two ways in which will is commonly supposed to be
**- related to attention: first, in the voluntary reproduction of
ideas; second, in fixing attention. Upon examination, it will be
observed that this division is exhaustive of the ways in which will
may be concerned with psychical processes. In so far as there are
voluntary processes of knowing, these owe their beginning and con-
tinuance to attention. If it should be admitted that there is direct
voluntary control of the feelings and emotions, such restraint would
be primarily due to attention. Consequently in determining the
relation of will to attention, we are really determining the relation
of will to every psychical process. 1
With respect to the first of the two divisions just noticed, it must
be said that there is no direct reproduction or recall of ideas. 2 In
order to attend to an idea, it must already be before consciousness :
1 See Stout, " Analytical Psychology," I., pp. 123, 124.
* V. Hartmann, " Phil. d. Unbewuset," I., p. 247. Fichte, " Werke," II., p.
567. Lipps, " Grundtatsachen," p. 49. H'offding, " Psych.," p. 23. Cf. Wundt,
" Grundriss der Psych.," p. 294. " Die Associationen sind demnach Erlebnisse,
die ihrerseits WillensvorgUnge erwecken konnen, selbst jedoch nicht unmittelbar
durch Willensvorgiinge beeinflusst werden."
292 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and in order voluntarily to reproduce it, it must be attended to.
That can not be voluntarily attended to or reproduced which is not
known, that is, which is not before consciousness. It is thus quite
evident that in order voluntarily to reproduce an idea we have to
know what it is which is voluntarily to be reproduced. But there
is also no indirect voluntary reproduction of ideas. Miinsterberg
has shown that if a certain idea a be associated with another idea 6,
so that when 6 is recalled the recalling of a follows, there is no will
involved in the process. But he continues: "If on the contrary I
can not think of a, search for it in my memory, recall the place at
which I saw it, remember the connection in which I heard it, and at
length a emerges in my consciousness, it was plainly will which
brought to light that which was sought." 3 But plainly the latter
process does not differ essentially from the supposed direct repro-
duction of the idea. The question is not why a emerges, but why I
search for a. I search for a not arbitrarily, but because an idea b
has suggested some idea or group of ideas associated with a, yet not
identical with it. According to Miinsterberg 's statement it would
follow that my will to recall a must be a will to recall something
indeterminate. To will to recall it, I must know what it is which is
to be recalled. It is the idea with which a is associated which causes
the emergence of a. For example, some one is asked to name the
seventeenth letter of the alphabet. Very few could answer the ques-
tion offhand. The letter desired is not discovered by summoning it
ex nihilo, from the ' ' storehouse of memory, ' ' but probably by count-
ing off the alphabet until Q, the seventeenth letter, is reached. Ex-
perience teaches that ideas thus successively associated tend to sug-
gest one another, and when the first of a known series has been repre-
sented, ideas associated in temporal contiguity may be represented.
There has been a will to recall the seventeenth letter, but not to recall
Q, otherwise Q would be present to consciousness. A given clue 4
has been used, but the last result is involuntary. If there were no
clue, the search would be vain : and the idea Q has emerged not be-
cause there was a will to have it emerge, but because an idea already
before consciousness was associated w r ith Q. If then one can not
voluntarily reproduce a single idea and so pay attention to it, so
neither can one voluntarily reproduce the ideas which are linked or
associated with the idea sought. The associated ideas must be al-
ready present before that with which they are associated has been
attained. When the latter are found it is not a result of volition, but
the effect of association. The associated ideas, as has been shown,
8 Mtinsterberg, " Die Willenshandlung," p. 64.
4 Cf. Stout, " Analyt. Psych.," I., p. 47. Bain, " The Senses and the Intel-
lect," p. 560. Jodl, " Lehrbuch der Psych.," p. 505.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 293
were not voluntarily reproduced, and so the missing idea has not
been voluntarily reproduced. 8
If inference and reasoning be generically distinguished from the
process of association and suggestion, then, as Miinsterberg says, the
reasoning by which a missing idea is reached, sometimes appears to
be more voluntary than mere reflection, that is, there is more effort
and "inner activity." But here evidently the question is not
whether an idea can be voluntarily reproduced, but whether the
process of reasoning can be voluntarily begun, that is, whether atten-
tion can be fixed upon it. From any point of view whatever, the
beginning of the reasoning process is conditioned by an act of atten-
tion, and unless it is continued automatically as is often the case,
it must be continued by renewed processes or acts of fixed attention.
Striimpell, who admits that an idea can not be directly recalled
by the will, says : ' ' On the contrary, will can indirectly determine the
beginning of the train of ideas, in that first of all a general idea
serves to give a direction to the involuntary reproduction, which
excludes every other." 8 As an example he gives the general idea
"Latin word" which reacts upon the unconscious psychical content,
and as a result, a particular Latin, not a German or a Greek word
rises into consciousness. Yet here it is difficult to perceive that the
will accomplished anything. The general idea is present, it is not
voluntarily recalled, and the particular word which it suggests is not
recalled ; otherwise it would be unnecessary to have the general idea
before consciousness to effect the suggestion. Striimpell holds also
that the stream of thought may be reversed voluntarily, may be
interrupted or brought to a conclusion. Strictly speaking, however,
the mere idea of changing or stopping the stream can not be volun-
tarily presented to consciousness, and its changes lie beyond the
control of the conscious subject.
The objection so often made to the introspective method in gen-
eral is particularly forcible with respect to the introspective observa-
tion of attention. It is objected that in introspection we necessarily
change the natural qualities of subjective processes. The attentive
process is altered and distorted by the very attempt to attend to it.
When any one is directed to fix his attention, what he generally does
is to try to apprehend and understand the object: but this is really
a rumination and wandering over the field presented to him. Or he
may fix his attention more narrowly, in which case a very artificial
and really inattentive state of mind ensues. In many cases, instead
5 See Uphues, " Psych, des Erkennens," pp. 141, 150, and Schwarz's incon-
clusive reply, Archiv fiir syst. Phil., N. F., III., 3. Lasson, Zeitschrift fur Phil.,
89, Beigabeheft. Lipps, " Tatsach.," p. 50. Striimpell, " Grundriss," p. 252.
Strumpell, "Grundriss," pp. 68 f.
294 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of attending to the given object, he attends or tries to attend to the
act of attention itself. Thus what he was to observe is likely to be
misapprehended, and the way in which he tries to observe it leads
him astray. Lalande reports the case of one who has the power of
reproducing auditive experiences with such intensity that they seem
objectively real: "but if at the moment of their greatest intensity
the observer wills to pay attention, the sound immediately becomes
confused and disappears." 7 It is possible that some observers are
able to conquer these difficulties: but unless I am much mistaken,
any one who says virtually: "I will try to discover what happens
when I fix my attention," fails to fix anything. His mind passes
from the object attended to, to his own feelings, and then back to the
object or to ideas associated with the object or with his own feelings.
Thus the natural characteristics of attention are distorted. Para-
doxical as it may seem, the more one is conscious of making an effort
to attend, the less attention there actually is : and the more absorbed
the attention, the less consciousness there is of the process and the
more consciousness there is of the object attended to. Most of the
qualities which psychologists describe as belonging to voluntary
attention can be observed only in these highly artificial experimental
cases. Normal attention has no defined subjective characteristics.
Having made this kind of preliminary caveat, I shall consider some-
what more specially this subject of voluntary fixed attention.
The term "stream of thought," "stream of consciousness"
[ Verlauf der Vorstellungen] 8 denotes at once the succession and the
continuity of phenomena. They correspond to what Kant called the
matter, the manifold of sensation. "Whatever opinion may be held
as to the more complex problems of conscious life, there can be no
dispute as to the existence of this flowing stream. It is not the pass-
ing of separate units like soldiers in procession. The progress of
the stream is continuous and the objects which make up the stream
are coterminous. They do not pass in single file, but rather are
crowded together in companies, sometimes in mobs, yet for the most
p; rt according to the general laws of association. 9 The term fixed
attention denotes an interruption of this stream. It implies that the
observer may intrude upon the passing throng of ideas and stop it
even if its direction can not be changed. In fixed attention, the
procession seems to halt in order that one of its detachments may be
inspected. In what does this supposed arrest of attention consist?
1 Lalande, " Sur un effet particulier cle Pattention." Reruc Phil., March,
1893, p. 284.
8 James, " Principles of Psychology," Vol. I., passim. Von Volkmann,
" Lehrbuch der Psych.," I., p. 64. Lotze, " Logik," pp. 3, 4.
"Cf. Jodl, "Lehrbuch der Psych.," p. 110.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 295
The diffusion of attention is regarded as the normal state: the
fixation of attention as the exceptional. And in the intelligent adult
this is the case. But in some cases the reverse is true. The physi-
ological or psychological principle underlying every act of attention
is of course inhibition in order to concentration the shutting out of
irrelevant matter in order to examine some central point. Such
inhibition would be superfluous were not consciousness made up of
reaction on a multitude of stimulations. That which distinguishes
the highly developed organism is the complexity of these reactions
and the necessity of inhibiting the irrelevant field of consciousness,
that the light may be thrown intensely on a certain limited area. If
the organism had to react only upon a single stimulus, attention
would be the rule, and inattention the exception. For example, per-
fect attention is presented in catalepsy where consciousness is shut
up to a single idea. Just before returning from a cataleptic to a
normal state, the mind seems exhausted and unable to fix in atten-
tion more than a single object. 10 But when we consider the variety
and complexity of stimulus and reaction in our own organism, it is
easy to see that a great part of the time our attention is unfixed.
At any rate, inattention and fixed attention are at opposite poles,
and either may be regarded as positive according to the individual
disposition. All that I would here affirm is that the stream of con-
sciousness can be neither voluntarily arrested nor changed. The
cause of fixed attention is not volition. The process is due wholly
to the nature of the object attended to and the sensations and feel-
ings associated with our consciousness of that object. These proposi-
tions are not easily accepted, but careful analysis gives assurance of
their validity. Such an analysis shows that attention has a peculiar
rhythmic character : and that what appears to be fixed is really inter-
mittent and discontinuous. The object of fixed attention is not held
stationary at the central point [Blickpunkt] of consciousness. As
Wundt says : ' ' to retain an idea with the attention is, moreover, as
experience shows, impossible: the fixing of attention is thus a
process, not a permanent state. A constant impression can be re-
tained only during the alternating moments of fixed and relaxed
attention." 11 The object appears to be fixed for a moment, but in
reality it is no more fixed than the rest of the flowing stream of
which it is a part. It may return again and again in alternation
with other objects. This alternation would probably be regular and
perfectly rhythmic, 12 were it not for the complexity of the influences
10 Janet, " L'Automatisme psych.," p. 192.
"Wundt, "Phys. Psych.," II., p. 284; " Grundriss," p. 252. Cf. Jodl,
"Lehrb. der Psych.," p. 112.
12 For general notice of the rhythmic organic processes, see Paulhan, " Les
loia de 1'activite" mentale," p. 381.
296 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
which are required to make attention effective. In attention, then,
the stream of consciousness is not arrested: and the object of "fixed"
attention comes and goes, differing only from objects unattended to
fixedly in that it reappears. There are physiological as well as psy-
chological reasons for this. Chief among the former is the influence
of respiration. 13 It is a matter of common observation that when we
pay attention to an object, we "hold our breath": and that usually
the recurrence of expiration and inspiration is an occasion for the
readjustment of attention. This is instinctive and unconscious, and
is common to many of the lower animals and to man. When the
attention is closely fixed, there is the breathlessness of suspense;
when it is relaxed there is the sigh of relief changes which of
course are associated with cardiac action. It need not be added that
fixed attention is impossible when the respiration is abnormally
rapid. Moreover, during the process of attention, there is an invol-
untary effort to hold the body motionless, which modifies the
breathing.
Attempts have been made to establish a law for these phenomena
of fluctuating attention. This is difficult to do, because the variety
of interruption is so great. Even when allowance has been made for
disturbing external causes, account must be taken of the subjective
feelings which modify the attentive process. 14
The physiological causes which condition and modify attention
are complicated with psychological causes. Attention oscillates be-
tween the point to which it is first directed and ideas associated with
the latter. These intrude and, as it were, "elbow" the attention
away from the original BUckpunkt. The case is like that of a man
who is trying to hold an upright position in a swaying crowd. The
greater his care to maintain himself on a certain spot, the greater
the probability that he will lose his equilibrium. It is only by par-
tially yielding to the movement of his neighbors, and by enlarging
slightly the extent of his station, that he can keep his footing. In
attending to very minute objects, this oscillation and alternation may
be observed more distinctly than when the area of attention is wider :
for the more extensive the field, the more room will there be for the
mind to wander. If I try to fix attention on the point of a pin, the
point of the pin will at once suggest ideas associated with it, and my
attention is diverted : but if the object of attention be a wide surface,
the tendency to inattention is less. If I try to fix attention on the
18 See Philippe, "La conscience dans 1'anesthe'sie chirurgicale," Revue Phil.,
May, 1899, p. 509.
14 Delabarre, Revue Phil, June, 1893, p. 639. J. E. Lough, " Proc. of the
Am. Psych. Soc.," December, 1898. Strieker, " Studien iiber die Bewegungs-
vorstellungen," p. 25. Giessler, " Die Atmung im Dienste der vorstellenden
Tiitigkeit."
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 297
multiplication table, there is a comparatively wide field over which
my mind can stray without getting away from the limits of the
object. But if I try to fix attention on a certain number, then the
longer the continuance of the process, the more considerable the
alternation and fluctuation. The material to which one attends is, as
it were, quickly exhausted. It is, however, the rapid dissipation of
attention from the original point to ideas associated with it which
seems to make the object more clear. When we attend to an un-
familiar object, it is difficult at first to determine its relation to other
objects, to affirm what it is even after we are aware that it is.
Whether this increasing clearness be attributed to apperception, to a
reflective judgment or to association, it is not the fixity of attention
which clarifies it, but rather the prolonged alternation between the
object and ideas associated with it. 15 It may be objected that the
constant return of attention to the original point is effected volun-
tarily: but if fixed attention were under voluntary control, then
whenever this return took place there would have to be a will to
attend to that upon which attention had ceased to be engaged, a will
to recall what was not present to consciousness. As has been proved
above, this is impossible. It can not even be maintained that at the
very beginning of the process there is a voluntary fixation of the
process: for that means simply that we will attend to that which is
already involuntarily an object of attention.
Kiilpe 16 defends the proposition that the will can modify the
course of ideas. His criticism is directed against the statements of
Lipps, 17 who holds that unconscious factors may determine the direc-
tion of our thinking. But the grounds of his criticism are unsatis-
factory. He asks what difference there would be between conscious
orderly thinking and the disorder of dreams, if the stream of thought
were not determined by the will; and what would distinguish action
with a purpose from the half deliberate, half automatic movement
of our limbs ? I confess that I can not see what the intrusion of the
will would have to do with the matter. The explanation of the dif-
ferences just referred to is quite independent of voluntary attention
and voluntary movement. If will be characterized as Kiilpe affirms,
chiefly by conation or effort [Streben], then the latter is quite as
prominent in dreams as in waking. Indeed, the most distinctive
symptom of nightmare is the fruitless effort of which the dreamer
is conscious. Dreaming is disordered and fantastic not because we
dream involuntarily: but, on the contrary, that which keeps our
15 On the origin of this oscillation, see Mtinsterberg, " BeitrSge," II. Pace,
Phil. Stud., VIII.
16 Kiilpe, " Die Lehre vom Willen in der neueren Psychologic," pp. 33 f .
11 Lipps, " Grundtatsachen," p. 49 f .
298 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
thoughts, in a waking state, from becoming dreams is the effect of
influences which we have no part in producing. As for the half
automatic, half deliberate acts, they are distinguished from conscious
deliberate acts by the presence of a purpose and the feelings which
accompany it. But Kiilpe insists further that the ''activity" of
psychical processes is not unconscious, but conscious, and must have
a consciousness as its vehicle [Trager], The latter he finds in will.
' ' What do I know of the unconscious ? " he asks. ' ' My consciousness
is my actuality, in my consciousness I experience activity, and this
inferred that the only interruption of the stream of consciousness
must be caused by conscious volitions : but how do the latter happen
to occur? Irrespective of any view which may be taken of the
unconscious, it is irreconcilable with our every-day experience to
suppose that each idea can be traced to its source that its cause
experience I call volition." 18 From such a statement, it might be
must have been an object of consciousness.
From the consideration of the general subject of voluntary atten-
tion, as given above, I conclude that neither in the recall of an idea
nor in fixing an idea which has been recalled, is it possible to prove
that will as a special psychical process has any part.
It may be objected that the conception of the will here adopted
is too narrow, and that psychical activity of every kind involves will
or is an expression of will. To reply at length to such an objection
would take me beyond the modest limits of this article. But to
predicate will of all psychical activity is to presuppose that will has
already been observed as a concrete datum of consciousness. Aside
from the fact that it is very doubtful whether there is such a datum
of consciousness, there seems to be no more reason to say that psy-
chical activity is will than to say that psychical activity is knowing
ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER.
GENEVA, SWITZEBLAND.
SOCIETIES
THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SOUTHERN
SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY
THE Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology held its
fifth annual meeting at Charlotte, North Carolina, on Tuesday,
December 28, 1909. It met in conjunction with the Southern Edu-
cational Association. The meeting comprised two sessions, forenoon
and afternoon. About one fourth of the members were in attend-
ance. The range of the topics presented by the papers and the
character of the discussions which followed marked this as one of
18 Kiilpe, ibid., p. 34.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 299
the most profitable meetings held by the society. The keen interest
maintained throughout the meeting showed the advantage that is
assured when the soliciting programs of other scientific bodies are
not present to attract the attention of those members who journey
to such meetings.
In discussing "The Functions of the Anterior and Posterior
Association Areas of the Cerebrum," Professor Franz presented the
status of our knowledge regarding cerebral localization, and reviewed
the results of recent experimental, clinical, and pathological studies.
On this basis he suggested an hypothesis as to the functions of these
areas, which, for the most part, specifies that the frontal lobes are
motor-associational, and the posterior sensory-associational.
The report of Professor Hill on "Tests made with a Modified
Binet-Buzenet Esthesiometer" included a description of some simple
devices convenient to carry on the work of ascertaining the general
effects of practise upon the median line of the forehead in the
discrimination of cutaneous stimuli. The new instruments were
designed to eliminate the errors attendant upon the use of the com-
pass-type of aBsthesiometer, such as the increase of arm-tremor of
the operator, the errors in readjustments, and the delays.
The communication of Professor Barnes on "Voluntary Isolation
of Control in a Group" reported the results of attempts to obtain
voluntary control of the movements of the ring finger without moving
the other fingers, and thereby secure further information as to the
conscious processes involved in the movements. The difficulties of
proper instrumentation have delayed a completion of the experi-
ments, but the results show that the voluntary isolation of control
of movement in a group is a problem of attention.
Further information concerning the four raccoons already re-
ported upon in Professor Cole's published paper "Concerning the
Intelligence of Racoons, ' ' was presented in the communication sent
by Dr. Shepherd on "The Discrimination of Articulate Sounds by
Raccoons." These six-months' old animals in the course of eighteen
days appeared to be able to discriminate articulate sounds perfectly
as involved in their names. The individual differences varied from
two hundred and seventy to five hundred trials. In view of these
differences, it was urged that experimenters use too few animals,
and so draw from their results too broad conclusions.
In his paper on "The Relative Value of the Affective and the
Intellectual Processes in the Genesis of the Psychosis called Trau-
matic Neurasthenia," Mr. Williams contended, after reviewing cur-
rent opinions and citing illustrative examples in his own practise,
that emotional shock has no power to perturb for long unless main-
tained ideationally.
300 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
In the preliminary report of his investigation of ' ' The Conscious-
ness of Meaning," Professor Ogden offered some results obtained
by employing the method used at Wiirzburg. Four series of experi-
ments, with four observers offer a variety of results. The reaction
times in part are regular, and in part irregular. In all observers,
imageless thoughts predominate over images, while the presence of
images tends to be relatively independent of the concrete or abstract
character of the stimulus word.
In his paper on ' ' The Psychology of Prejudice, ' ' Professor Morse
presented analyses which led to the rejection of the view that preju-
dice is the same as apperception. Prejudice is rather the refusal or
inability to apperceive, and arises from an undue prepossession for or
against an idea, an object, or an act.
In analyzing "The Concept of the Laws of Nature," Dr. Rich-
ardson's paper considered the special views of Pearson and Taylor
and endeavored to show "that purposiveness was not inconsistent
with mechanical or scientific calculation, and natural laws have an
ontological significance. ' '
In his presidential address, Professor Lefevre contributed to the
observance of the Darwinian semi-centenary by tracing in an ample
way "The Growth of the Concept of Evolution Among the Greeks."
The logical necessity of evolution was shown in the growth of view-
points from the early physiologers to Aristotle. The latter 's concept
of potentiality, development, and entelechy, or his teleological evolu-
tionary idealism, was regarded as the logical consummation of the
growth of the concept of evolution among the Greeks.
At the Wednesday forenoon session of the Southern Educational
Association, the secretary presented a detailed account of the history
and the work of the society.
EDWARD FRANKLIN BUCHNER.
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVEBSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Idealism as a Practical Creed: being the Lectures on Philosophy and
Modern Life delivered before the University of Sydney. HENRY JONES.
Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. 1909.
The title of this book is at once a paradox and a challenge. Idealism
and practicalness ! Can these be harmonized ? "I always thought," says
the ordinary man, " that if there was one thing more unpractical than
another it was an ideal, and that if a man would be real he must come
down from the hazy heights of dreamland and stand upon the solid earth
of actuality." Nay, says Professor Jones, it is the idealist who is in
touch with reality and the world of experience can only be rightly inter-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 301
preted by its ideals. We make our own world and it is thought which
legislates. And so idealism is a creed just because it is an interpretation
of life. It is the key to nature and experience. Other keys have been
tried, but they have proved inadequate. This is the only one which has
been found to fit the lock, and give man entrance not only to the kingdom
of heaven, but to the kingdoms of this earth as well.
Professor Jones is a Welshman and he has all the verve and intensity
of the Celt. He is a seer not less than a thinker and his pages glow with
color and his words strike fire as they come forth. The note of personal
conviction constantly recurs. He utters here his assured belief " the
hypothesis of my life " and he truly says that " no man has ever helped
the world with what is to himself a ' may be ' or ' perhaps.' "
The contents of the book were originally delivered as lectures before
the University of Sidney, and in addressing the youth of a young country
full of hope and enterprise his words not only take appropriately a prac-
tical shape, but aim at creating a spirit of patriotism and social responsi-
bility. He begins his lectures with a suggestive quotation from Hegel's
inaugural address at Heidelberg, to whose philosophy more than one
sympathetic reference is made; and in his general tone he reminds us of
Fichte's famous "Keden an die Deutsche Nation," which nearly a cen-
tury ago aroused the enthusiasm of his countrymen. Professor Jones
would remind this young Australian commonwealth that it is righteous-
ness alone that exalteth a nation. Not military glory, not material
prosperity, alone, valuable as these may be, but truth, spiritual ideals,
great thoughts concerning man and God are " greater far than all these
things." " I can form no higher wish for you than that it may be your
destiny to try by actual experiment how far this faith of the idealists
will stand the strain of a nation's practise."
The meaning which the author attaches to idealism is thus indicated.
" Philosophy," he says, " is an attitude of mind rather than a doctrine."
It is no finished, cut and dry formula. A final theory is not attainable
nor is a fixed system to be sought. Experience changes and grows, and
philosophy is experience becoming reflective, the mind or ego becoming
conscious of itself and the world. It was Hegel who first gave to philos-
ophy its modern form, its higher idealistic outlook. But this "way of
looking at life " is confined to no school, it is the possession of all our
noblest thought and greatest poetry.
If the author confines himself in these lectures to this particular form
of philosophy it is because, as he believes, it is that " which is most in
touch with our modern life and most akin to the poetry in which that
life has found its best expression," and " the principles of this philosophy
have entered deeply into the theoretic and practical life of our times."
For, after all, ideas are the only agents in man's life. " Man is always
pursuing ends great or small." " It is the idea of that which seems to
him desirable, not his mere muscles or nerves, or bare sense and impulse,
which carries him to his every act." But if idealism is the reflective or
purposive view of life as distinguished from the irreflective and instinctive,
it is no less the poetic or imaginative, as contrasted with the prosaic,
302 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
hence philosophy and poetry are really one in their aim. And indeed in
another aspect of it, it is the religious view as opposed to what Martineau
calls " the profane." In short, the conviction shared by all greatest minds
alike " seems to me that of the unity and the spiritual purpose of the
world why indeed may I not call it the hypothesis of the Nazarene
teacher as to the nature of God ? "
In lectures two, three, and four, under the headings " First the Blade,"
" Then the Ear," " After that the Full Corn," our author works out the
development of idealism in history. All history, he shows, is sacred, and
right and truth and freedom are gradually being evolved. The civiliza-
tion of mankind is the process of evolving the idea of freedom and he
seeks to show how the spirit of freedom " has been influenced by the
idealism which is itself the effluence and manifestation of that life." The
freedom of the individual and of society is at first a blind movement
towards an unknown good which gradually attains to consciousness and
self-knowledge. The eastern peoples had no genius for statecraft.
Among them, as Hegel says, only one, the monarch, was free. Freedom
first began to dawn on Greece, but it took at the outset the form of
imagination. With the rise of reflective thought among the sophists, and
especially in Socrates, the product of the imagination was destroyed. The
individual conscience claimed universal rights. Hence gradually the old
institutions perished and humanity was launched on a new enterprise.
But emancipation is only the " alphabet of true freedom " and this nega-
tive aspect reaches its full expression in the French Revolution.
A process of restoration must follow the epoch of criticism and disin-
tegration. Gradually must we learn to reconcile ourselves " to the condi-
tions under which we must necessarily live, without compromising either
their authority or our own freedom." The citizen must find himself in the
state and the state express itself through the citizen. Positive freedom is
arrived at when morality is socialized and society is moralized. If Pro-
fessor Jones speaks of restoration he is no champion of conservatism,
nor does he advocate any resuscitation of old forms and old traditions.
The new freedom restores the ancient world, but reinterprets it. The life
of humanity is for him a growth, a progress, an evolution . But it is no
blind or mechanical process. " The one-increasing purpose " in which
one good custom yields to a better is taking place through the free action
of the individual reason not less than the pressure of experience. Ideals
do not come to us ready-made from without. They are forged in the
laboratory of our own experience. They arise in the course of our traffic
with reality. While, in one sense, we make them, in another they make
us. They are therefore aspects of one continuous rational development
in which are revealed the true character and purpose of man.
In a fine chapter, which may be regarded by way of illustration of
this principle, he treats of the idealism of Wordsworth and Browning.
Both in their own way pled for the spiritual interpretation of the world
and of man. It is the unique quality of the great poet as of the great
philosopher that in all things they see the whole, viewing the world sub
specie ceternitatis. There is something inspiring in the view of life
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 303
inculcated by such choice spirits. They show us that there is one prin-
ciple in the universe and that principle is spiritual. It is a splendid and
heartening faith. But the question is, have they a right to it ? Is it true ?
This question naturally prepares the way for the two final chapters in
the book, entitled " The Call of the Age " and " The Answer of Idealism,"
in which objections are met, and, after some subtle criticism of alternative
solutions, the case for idealism is presented.
The last chapter is in one sense the most interesting, and for philos-
ophy the most important in the volume, for in it lies the crux of the
whole position. But to appreciate the cumulative force of this section
it must be read as a whole.
Professor Jones has no faith in " hybrid theories " which avoid ultimate
issues. Man is at his best only when he is in touch with ultimate issues.
A theory can not stop short of unity, or take refuge behind its own inco-
herence. A God who is not infinite but limited is a God who is neither
self-subsistent nor self-determined; a God above God, an absolute higher
than an absolute is an impossible conception.
The objection of course has often been brought against the absolute of
Hegel and all forms of the absolute idealism, that it stultifies human
effort. If all is already achieved and man is but "thinking God's
thoughts after him," is the world not an illusion ? Professor Jones admits
there can be no final reply of philosophy to this question. Philosophy has
but to interpret experience, not to say what it ought to be or how it might
be other than it is. It is not a finished world, if you like. God is work-
ing in us and through us. It is the part of knowledge to discover the order
already existent in the world; and of a moral agent to reveal the ideality
of the world, recognizing and obeying its laws and making himself their
willing instrument. " The moral agent who can raise himself and his
world to the condition in which they ' ought to be ' must contain the
possibilities of that change within himself and find them also in his
world." " Man reveals himself by means of it (the process) and it
reveals its nature by means of man." " Verily it is man who is in the
making, and not the great universe nor his God."
We are "thrown back upon absolute alternatives." Professor Jones
does not minimize the pathetic scene of human history, or attempt to
call evil good. If we learn through error and find through evil that good
is best, we must not overstep experience or flee to an imaginary realm
where knowledge and goodness have no possible opposites. We will not
take refuge in Mr. Bradley's absolute, in which all the differences of
finite experience are transcended because finite predicates have lost their
earthly significance. Good and evil are vitally connected and correlated.
But correlation does not mean that both terms of it are of equal worth.
The unity in which the opposites of experience meet is not a " tertium,"
separate and above them, but is one of those opposites themselves. " This
view, I believe, is true." " The process of morality is a process of inter-
pretation, of obedience, and of the appropriation of that which is, and
which is deemed right and good." The two sides of the correlation are
not merely abstract ideas. When a man speaks of " duty," " moral good,"
304 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
" right," he has already invested these conceptions with absolute author-
ity and he has, so to speak, thrown his own personality into the balance.
The " good " carries with it its own justification ; it exists in its own
right. And the recognition of it as good is the acknowledgment of its
complete autonomy and self-sufficiency. " In obeying its behests the
moral agent is aware that he is bowing to a necessity which is complete,
whose claim upon him is absolute, capable of no compromise." " Man's
conception of the good may be, and is, inadequate . . ., but at every
stage it stands before him as absolute in its worth and authority, a
necessity he dare not question and, in the degree to which he is moral-
ized, does not desire to question, but to obey."
Without following our author further, we may say a stronger or
more satisfactory plea for the idealistic interpretation of life has seldom
been made. It is the plea of a man who has thought in earnest. It is
no mere theory, it is, he believes, a working faith " the sanest hy-
pothesis that the mind of man has discovered as yet." Tried by all the
tests which reason knows, it will be found to stand. It does better justice
to the meaning of the world than materialism. The idea of order
" works better " than disorder. " It is a hypothesis which distorts reality
less; which finds reasonable room for more of its facts." If Professor
Jones seems in these sentences to acknowledge the test of pragmatism,
a perusal of his book will not fail to prove that he has no sympathy with
the view that a theory is true simply because " it works best." But tried
even by this test, these conceptions " will be admitted to be essentially
constitutive of the experiences of our day as expressed in its greatest
poetic, philosophic, and religious literature." This does not show
that the conceptions are true, nor even that they have practical import
and real value. In one sense the conception of the unity and spiritual
nature of reality has very great value, " even though it should prove as
Comte thought to be only the departing shadow of a religious super-
stition." " It has been an incomparable anodyne to a suffering world."
But we can not conclude from this fact alone that the conception is
true. It may be only the " noble lie " which leads to truth. " The argu-
ment from desire " that these ideas must be valid which meet man's
deepest wants is not convincing. " It rests upon optimistic presuppo-
sitions which have themselves to be verified." There is, in fact, no way
of testing any truth except by reason. This does not mean that only
the logical understanding can apprehend the truth. Poetry justifies
itself in other ways, and poetry may convince " all the more effectively
because it makes no logical pretensions." " For Reason is no abstract
faculty, but a name for the whole man, who is himself the living totality
of his own experience, when engaged upon discovering the true and the
false."
Man is discovering his own nature and where his true good lies,
through much failure and at a great cost. He is coming to himself
through his intercourse with his fellows and the world, and interpreting
them also in the process; and the one discovery which he is making, it
seems certain, is that he is spirit a mind set on knowing, and a will
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 305
fixed on good and finding it, seek it where he will, nowhere except in the
things of the spirit.
This hypothesis, Professor Jones says, is at least worthy of being
tried. For nations and for individuals it can only mean good. " I can
form no higher wish for you as a nation," he says to his hearers, " than
that it may be your destiny to try this faith by actual experience " ; and
for himself he concludes : " Nothing would I so willingly or gratefully
make my inheritance forever as the example of those who have made its
light the guide of their faltering footsteps."
ARCHIBALD B. D. ALEXANDER.
LANGBANK, SCOTLAND.
The Idea of the Soul. A. E. CRAWLEY. London : A. and C. Black. 1909.
Pp. viii -f 307.
Readers of Mr. Crawley's previous books, " The Mystic Rose " and
" The Tree of Life " the latter a somewhat amusing attempt to justify
(Anglican?) Christianity by an appeal to anthropology will know what
to expect in this present volume. They will find much new matter on a
deeply interesting theme, many fresh observations, and abundant material
for cogitation and discussion. But their gratitude for the author's inde-
pendence and originality will be tempered with regret at his constitutional
inability to set forth his ideas in simple and connected fashion. Mr.
Crawley's statements are dogmatic to an extreme; he appears to carry
always a scientific chip on his shoulder. He moves from one topic to
another with such rapidity that the reader grows breathless in pursuit of
the fleeting thought. The whole discussion has a vagueness and gener-
ality which, one fears, must have been borrowed from its subject-matter.
Mr. Crawley begins with Tylor's theory of animism as set forth in the
classical " Primitive Culture." He acknowledges the value of that work
as a starting-point for further inquiry, but thinks that Tylor was more
concerned with the place of animism in the evolution of culture than with
its origin as a philosophical conception. In Tylor's explanation " there
is no psychological precision the fact being that his explanation was
completed before the development of experimental psychology" (pp. 3-4).
As a general criticism, Mr. Crawley argues that Tylor, and one may
add Spencer and his followers, over-estimated the importance of certain
mental states as direct or indirect sources of animism. The " trance "
is pathological. " Visions," or hallucinations of sight, are pathological.
" It is illegitimate to base a universal phenomenon on abnormal facts "
(p. 13). Epilepsy, hysteria, delirium, and mania, if they might substan-
tiate notions already existing of the separable soul, have themselves noth-
ing to do with the origin of the soul-idea.
We come next to dreams. Mr. Crawley asks whether inferences from
and about dreams are really suflicient to originate the idea of the soul.
He considers the dream-theory "psychologically impossible" (p. 15).
Figures seen in dreams are not " phantoms " ; to the savage they are more
real, sometimes even larger, than what is seen when awake. Yet the idea
of the soul in all its stages is that of " an ethereal, rarefied, and often
306 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
miniature entity," inferior to the body in the qualities of solidity and
extension. Dreams might corroborate such a notion; they could not give
it birth.
Lastly we have the question, What causes sleep and death ? According
to Tylor, the savage answers, the " life " of the man, a thing separable
from the body, and able to go away and leave it insensible or dead.
According to Crawley the " life " notion is a late abstraction of primitive
thought. The contrast between waking and sleeping did not impress the
nai've mind of the savage. Primitive perception, again, noticed a differ-
ence between the sight of a living body and a dead, but did not proceed
to explain it by supposing that its " life " had now left it forever. Indeed,
the savage mourner treats his dead, for a time, as being still alive, just
as the civilized mourner will refuse to believe that the loved one has
really departed. And inference, when it does come, will not lead at once
to the idea of a vital principle, thus emphasized by contrast. Concepts
like " life," " force," " energy," are not abstracted by early thought from
the things in which they appear.
So much for Mr. Crawley's critique of the anthropological theory of
animism. That magnificent generalization is meeting some heavy
assaults these days : frontal attacks like Crawley's directed against its
psychological validity, side attacks like Lang's with his doctrine of " high
gods " who never were souls at all ; attacks in the rear like Marett's theory
of " pre-animistic religion." Meanwhile the animists stand by their
guns and await only the publication of Professor Tylor's Gifford lectures
to leave their intrenchments and rise and smite their foes.
Mr. Crawley by no means confines himself to negative criticism. He
has a very positive theory of his own. The idea of the soul is an " intel-
lectral product " (p. 23) to be studied in savage languages rather than in
primitive worship and ritual. It is the outcome of " elementary mental
processes " (p. 25) in the lowest stage of intellectual evolution we can
infer. Memory-images, chiefly visual in character, the stored results of
his acts of perception, are what first gave man his notion of the soul of a
thing. Thus the soul is neither a phantom nor a double; nor an illusion,
since it is not mistaken for the reality; nor a shadow, since it has three-
dimensional volume, form, feature, and color ; it is not a ghost. " Spiritual
existence is mental existence; the world of spirits is the mental world.
Everything that can through perception lay the foundation of a memory-
image can claim the possession of a soul, an existence in the spiritual
world here and hereafter" (p. 78).
Having advanced this explanation of the origin of the soul, Mr.
Crawley devotes a lengthy and valuable chapter to Pre-scientific Psychol-
ogies. In this he sets forth with some approach to completeness the doc-
trine of the soul in certain great ethnological areas such as Australia,
Polynesia and Melanesia, Africa and America. Whatever be the value of
the author's psychological disquisitions, this collection of evidence based
on the latest and best authorities in English, German, and Dutch, is a
distinct addition to the scanty literature of the subject.
The remainder of the book deals with such attributes of the soul as its
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 307
size, substance, and separability, its power of embodiment and transmigra-
tion, the notion of plurality of souls, the soul as a guardian-spirit, and so
on. The author explains these and allied features on the basis of his
theory that the soul-idea is the mental duplicate of reality. This sup-
plies him with a broad generalization which he does not hesitate to apply
to all spiritual philosophies from the rude imaginings of the savage to the
latest and most advanced speculations on the absolute. At this point we
may leave him to the consideration of the metaphysicians.
HUTTON WEBSTER.
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
KEVUE PHILOSOPHIQTJE. March, 1910. Les tendances vives
de la philosophic contemporaine (pp. 217-248) : A. CHIAPPELLI. - The
tendencies of our day are unsystematic and express themselves in a
radical empiricism or in objective idealism. Les phenomenes qui com-
mencent (pp. 249-274) : F. LE DANTEC. - An analysis of such phenomena
as the realization of a new species, the beginning of a cancer, or a chem-
ical process, with a view to establishing the meaning of stability in such
cases. La logique de la contradiction (2e et dernier article) (pp. 275303) :
F. PAULHAN. - No absolute contradictions exist, and it is the task of logic
to develop relative contradictions and partial identities into fruitful
harmonies. Revue critique. La theorie des valeurs: A. LALANDE. An-
alyses et comptes rendus. M. Landrieu, Lamarck, le fondateur du trans-
formisme: H. DAUDIN. A. Wagner, Les fondements de I'economie
politique: A. LANDRY. Headley, Darwinism and Modern Socialism: S.
JANKELEVITCH. Croce, Filosofia della practica: S. JANKELEVITCH. Prat,
Conies pour les metaphysiciens : L. DUGAS.
Goebel, Karl. Die Vorsokratische Philosophie. Bonn: Karl Georgi.
1910. Pp. 400. M. 7.50.
Renda, A. L'Oblio, saggio sull' attivita selettiva della coscienza. Turin :
Fratelli Bocca. 1910. Pp. viii + 229. L. 3.
Stumpf, C., und Menzer, P. Tafeln zur Geschichte der Philosophie.
Dritte verbesserte und vermehrte auflage. Berlin : Verlag von Speyer
und Peters. 1910. M. 1.50.
Volkelt, Johannes. System der Aesthetik. Bd. II. Miinchen: C. H.
Becksche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1910. Pp. xxii + 569. M. 10.50.
Vortrage; Naturgesetzlichkeit und Vitalismus, K. Siegel; Erkenntnis-
kritik und Erkenntnistheorie, O. Ewald; Das Zeitproblem, A. Stohr;
Lebenskraf t oder Lebensstoff e ? H. Prizbram ; Darwins 100 Geburtstag,
B. Hatschek; Der Zweckbegriff im psychologischen und erkenntnis-
theoretischen Denken, K. v. Roretz. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius
Barth. 1910. Pp. 98. M. 3.
308 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
NOTES AND NEWS
Science for May 6 contains the paper on " The Psychology of Social
Consciousness implied in Instruction " read by Professor George H. Mead
before the section for education of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, at Boston, in December, 1909. The following
passage is taken from it : " The child in entering into his heritage of
ideas and methods should have the emotional response which the boy has
in a primitive community when he has been initiated into the mysteries
and the social code of the group of which he has become a citizen. We
have a few remainders of this emotional response, in the confirmation or
conversion and entrance into the church, in the initiation into the frater-
nity, and in the passage from apprenticeship into the union. But the
complexities of our social life, and the abstract intellectual character of
the ideas which society uses have made it increasingly difficult to identify
the attainment of the equipment of a man with the meaning of manhood
and citizenship."
THE first volume to be published of the " Harvard Studies in Com-
parative Literature " will be " Three Philosophical Poets Lucretius,
Dante, and Goethe " by Professor George Santayana, of Harvard Uni-
versity.
PROFESSOR E. B. McGiLVARY, of the department of philosophy of the
University of Wisconsin, was elected president of the Western Philosoph-
ical Association at the recent meeting at the University of Iowa.
MR. A. G. BALFOUR has revised his Romanes lectures on " The Criti-
cism of Beauty " published from a shorthand report last November. The
new edition is to be published immediately by the Oxford University Press.
PROFESSOR ERNST MEUMANN, of the University of Halle, has been called
to the University of Leipzig to replace Professor Max Heinze.
DR. ARTHUR 0. LOVEJOY, of the University of Missouri, has been ap-
pointed professor of philosophy at the Johns Hopkins University.
VOL. VII. No. 12. JUNE 9, 1910
THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM 1
ri THOSE who wish to gain some insight into the biological phi-
* losophy known as ' ' vitalism, " or at least to become acquainted
with the maturer views of one of its leading exponents, will find the
present volumes of the greatest service. To English and American
students, in particular, it will be a boon to have at last a presenta-
tion of Driesch's views in the English language. Most readers will
probably find it sufficiently difficult to follow this writer's rather
devious trains of thought, even without the added obstacle imposed
by a foreign idiom. And we may regard it as a hopeful sign of the
times that the number of these readers appears to be considerable. 2
It is surely a subject for congratulation when our working biologists
are willing to pause in their labors long enough to make such a wide
excursion into philosophy, especially when this particular brand of
philosophy stands in flat contradiction to some of their most cher-
ished dogmas. It is not uncommon to hear any effort of the scientific
imagination dismissed with the contemptuous epithet of "metaphys-
ics." But problems there are which force themselves upon our at-
tention even though they baffle us, and any sincere attempt to face
such problems certainly deserves praise. All this we may say without
agreeing with any particular solution which may be offered us.
One of these volumes of Driesch's, comprising the first half of
his Gifford lecture course, has already been reviewed in this JOURNAL
by Professor T. H. Morgan. 3 I have not found it possible, how-
ever, to deal with the second volume independently of the first, and
accordingly I shall here consider the work as a whole. This proced-
ure seems all the more allowable since the point of view of the two
1 The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the
years 1907 and 1908. By Hans Driesch. London: Adam and Charles Black,
1908. Vol. I., pp. xiii + 329; Vol. II., pp. xvi + 381.
*To the knowledge of the reviewer this work has already been used as the
basis of " seminar " courses in the zoological departments of two of our leading
universities.
8 This JOUBNAL, Vol. VI., No. 4.
309
310 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
reviewers differs sufficiently to render unlikely any considerable
duplication of thought.
The work as a whole is divided into two sections, which do not,
however, correspond with the division into volumes. Section A pre-
sents The Chief Eesults of Analytical Biology, while Section B dis-
cusses The Philosophy of the Organism. The first section comprises
Part I., The Individual Organism with Regard to Form and Metab-
olism; Part II., Systematics and History, and Part III., Organic
Movements. The second section comprises I., The Indirect Justifi-
cation of Entelechy ; II., The Direct Justification of Entelechy ; III.,
The Problem of Universal Teleology, and IV., Metaphysical Conclu-
sions. The further division of the work into subsections of various
grades is altogether too intricate to be kept in mind by the reader,
and we can not see that it serves any useful purpose whatever.
In Section A we meet with such biological data as the author
offers in support of his thesis, and here it is, also, that we find his
three "proofs" of vitalism. In commencing Section B, however,
we part company with concrete reality, and wander through a
rather bewildering maze, first of theoretical mechanics, and later of
Kantian metaphysics, with incidental excursions into psychology and
ethics.
Taking up, in the order of presentation, the three "proofs" of
vitalism, we find as the first of these the existence of what the
author calls " harmonious-equipotential systems." His argument is
based chiefly upon some of the well-known phenomena of "restitu-
tion" well known, it may be added, as a result of researches in
which Driesch himself has played a leading part. During the cleav-
age stages of certain eggs, we may remove a part indeed any part,
within rather wide limits without interfering with the production
of a normal organism. Or we may readjust and misplace the cells at
will, without preventing these from becoming organized in a normal
fashion. Similarly, in the case of certain adult organisms, rather
low in the scale of life, a new whole will be produced from a frag-
ment of sufficient size cut out in any plane or from any part of the
body. From experiments such as these, Driesch was years ago led
to his now rather celebrated declaration that the ' ' prospective value ' '
of a cell in a developing embryo was a "function of its position."
Such a complex, in which each portion may, in emergency, be forced
to play any role in the future development of the animal, the au-
thor terms a "harmonious-equipotential system."
After defining a "machine" as "a typical configuration of phys-
ical and of chemical constituents, by the acting of which a typical
effect is attained" (Vol. I., pp. 138, 139), Driesch grants that such
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 311
a machine "might very well be the motive force of organogenesis in
general, if only normal, that is to say, if only undisturbed develop-
ment existed, and if a taking away of parts of our systems led to frag-
mental development" (p. 139). But and here comes the proof of
vitalism "there may be a whole development out of each portion of
the system above certain limits which is, say, of the Volume V.
Good! Then there ought to exist a machine, like that which exists
in the whole undisturbed system, in this portion V also, only of
smaller dimensions; but it also ought to exist in the portion V^
which is equal to V in amount, and also in F 2 , in V 3 , F 4 and so on.*
Indeed, there do exist almost indefinitely many V n , all of which can
perform the whole morphogenesis, and all of which therefore ought
to possess the machine. But these different portions V n are only
partially different from each other in spatial relation. Many parts
of V 2 are also parts of V : and of V 3 and of F 4 and so on ; that is to
say, the different volumes V n - overlap each other successively and in
such a manner that each following one exceeds the preceding one in
the line by a very small amount only. But what then about our
machines? Every volume which may perform morphogenesis com-
pletely must possess the machine in its totality. And now every
element of one volume may play any possible elemental role in every
other, it follows that each part of the whole harmonious system
possesses any possible elemental part of the machine equally well,
all parts of the system at the same time being constituents of dif-
ferent machines. A very strange sort of machine indeed which is
the same in all its parts!" (pp. 139, 140).
"Therefore," our author concludes, "there can be neither any
sort of a machine nor any sort of causality based upon constellation
underlying the differentiation of harmonious-equipotential systems"
(P- 141).
No attempt will be made to meet this or the next following
"proof" of vitalism until the close of this review.
The second proof of vitalism is found by Driesch in the phenom-
ena of heredity. The aggregation of reproductive cells, in this
author's terminology, constitutes a " complex-equipotential system."
This type of system differs from that just considered in that, while
in the "harmonious" system each part plays but a single role (the
latter depending upon circumstances), in the second type complex
acts are performed by each single element. Since the germ-cells
constituting the gonad are the most complex of all in the outcome of
4 This argument is illustrated by a diagram showing how an indefinite
number of portions, of equal or of different sizes, and overlapping one another
in various degrees, might be chosen from the organism.
312 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
their growth activities, the latter represents "the clearest type of a
complex-equipotential system which exists. ' '
"Could such a theory," Driesch asks us, reverting to the "ma-
chine" theory, "irrespective of all the experimental facts which
contradict it could such a theory stand before the one fact, that
there occurs a genesis of that complex-equipotential system of which
our one single egg forms a part ? Can you imagine a very complicated
machine, differing in the three dimensions of space, to be divided
hundreds of times and in spite of that to remain always the same
whole?" (I., p. 225).
Passing mention is made of the phenomena of hybridization,
particularly to those which we know as "Mendelian." The concept
of "unit characters," which has been formulated by various biol-
ogists in explanation of the Mendelian phenomena, certainly has an
atomistic (i. e. } a mechanical) flavor. But Driesch reasons quite
otherwise: "What is shown, in the first place, by these discoveries
is the importance of an arranging and ruling factor in spite of all
units. The organism is always one whole, whether the paternal
properties prevail or the more complicated maternal ones; in other
words, all so-called properties that consist in the spatial relations of
parts have nothing to do with 'units' or 'allelomorphs,' which in-
deed can not be more than necessary means or materials, requiring
to be ordered" (pp. 232, 233).
Driesch 's third proof of vitalism he finds in the field of organic
movement, particularly in that of intelligent action. It rests upon
what he terms the principle of "individuality of correspondence"
between stimulus and response.
After discussing the role played by human speech, in the course
of which some slight difference in the sound of a single word (i. e.,
in the auditory stimulus) may result in a totally different course of
action on the part of the person addressed, while two totally differ-
ent sentences, perhaps in different languages (i. e., widely different
stimuli), may have the same effect, he says: "There can be hardly a
clearer expression of the fact that it is the totality in its specificity,
both of the stimulus and of the effect, that comes into account in
acting, and nothing else. . . . The totalities of stimulus and effect
have a 'meaning,' and their meanings do not at all depend on one
another piece by piece" (Vol. II., p. 71).
To this argument an air of mathematical precision is given by a
schematic presentation (pp. 70, 71) which seems worth reproducing
here : ' ' Firstly, change the stimulus from a, &, c, d, e, f, g, h, i into
a, 6, y, d, e, f, g, h, i, and the effect may be transformed from a lf b lt
Ci, d 1} e 1} / lf g 1} h 1} ij_ into m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 313
And secondly, change the stimulus from a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i
into a, /?, y, 8, e, , 17, 0, i, K, and the effect may remain a l} b v c ly d lt
e i> A> 9i> ^i> *i> i n spite of that change.
Once more: "The dog, 'this dog,' 'my dog' is 'the same' stim-
ulus, seen from any side or at any angle whatever: it always is
recognized as 'the same,' though the actual retina image differs in
every case. It is absolutely impossible to understand this fact on
the assumption of any kind of preformed material recipient in the
brain, corresponding to the stimulus in question, even if we inten-
tionally neglect the fact that the material recipient would have been
created by the stimulus in the individual 's life : a recipient for the
dog seen from the side would not suffice for identifying the dog from
behind!" (p. 73).
An identical argument was offered tentatively (pp. 41-45) for
some phenomena of instinct, although the author did not believe the
case to have been wholly proved for these.
Another aspect of the same difficulty is stated somewhat later:
"But it (the brain) only can store engrammata in the sense of given
combinations of given elements, and therefore nothing but the
psychical phenomena of simple recognition and of association by
contiguity is immediately related to cerebral processes: it is abso-
lutely inconceivable how the brain qua bodily brain could accomplish
the new and free and 'logical' rearrangement of the elements of the
engrammata, following the lines of individuality" (p. 98).
While any satisfactory attempt to answer this argument would
lead us far into the field of psychology or of brain physiology, we
may ask in passing how Driesch would account for the almost in-
finite complication of association paths in the human brain. Is it
not here that we find the mechanism by which any element of our
experience may be brought into association directly or indirectly
with any other element? And how, indeed, is "meaning" to be
explained except in terms of association? That several widely
different stimuli, having the same meaning (i. e., having certain
associations in common), can bring about an identical response
would seem, on the face of it, no more difficult to understand than
that several very differently shaped keys can open the same lock.
And conversely, that a slight difference in the stimulus (involving
a change of "meaning") can bring about a complete change in the
character of the response would have its parallel in the fact that
a very slight modification of a key may destroy its adaptedness
to one lock and render it suited to an entirely different one. These
are confessedly very crude parallels, and leave out of account
the almost infinite complexity of the mechanism which we are
considering. But it is this complexity, we believe, and not any in-
314
herent impossibility, that makes a satisfactory formulation of the
brain 's action ' ' absolutely inconceivable ' ' at present.
Certain other lines of evidence are discussed by Driesch, though
he makes no claim that these constitute independent proofs of vital-
ism. Such are the ' ' equifinality of restitutions" and various phe-
nomena of "adaptation," morphological and physiological. Under
the first head he includes cases in which several different methods
are at the disposal of the organism in its endeavor to repair itself
after a given injury, the outcome, however, being the same in all
cases. To the word "adaptation" he gives a much more restricted
meaning than that adopted by many evolutionary writers, for he
distinguishes between mere "specific adaptedness" and "adapta-
tion." The latter term is reserved for useful responses, either
structural or functional, to some external condition which is new to
the organism in question.
Regarding the phenomena of selective permeability, which have
frequently been urged as proofs of vitalism, since they seem to con-
tradict the ordinary laws of osmosis and diffusion, Driesch takes a
conservative position: "Nothing, indeed, is against the assumption
that this organization may include factors which actually drive ions
or compounds to the side of higher concentration, which indeed
drive them by ' doing work, ' if we like to speak in terms of energy ;
and these factors included in organization may very well be of a
true physical or chemical nature." And here he adds an avowal of
his mental attitude in approaching these questions: ""We must hold
to the so-called 'machine theory' of life as long as possible, we must
hold it until we are really forced to give it up" (I., p. 187).
The phenomena of "immunity," however, he regards as offering
far greater difficulties to the mechanistic point of view. Concern-
ing one phase of the subject he says : ' ' This phenomenon in particu-
larthe production of more of the antitoxin or the 'precipitin' than
is actually necessary seems to render almost impossible any merely
chemical theory of the facts" (I., pp. 207, 208). We may well
query, however, whether such an over-production harmonizes any
better with a teleological explanation.
If all these various facts are not to be explained by reference to
the laws of physics and chemistry, how are we to interpret them?
Driesch 's answer constitutes the positive side of his teaching. His
special solution is introduced tentatively, early in the course of his
lectures. Its "justification" he leaves to a later stage. "Let us
then borrow our terminology from Aristotle, and let that factor in
life phenomena which we have shown to be a factor of true autonomy
be called entelechy, though without identifying our doctrine with
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 315
what Aristotle meant ..." (I., p. 144). A considerable part of
the second volume is devoted to an endeavor to give this word a
positive meaning.
"We are told that entelechy is an "intensive manif oldness, ' ' i. e.,
that its diversities are not temporal or spatial. Again, it "uses the
conductive and specific faculties of the brain as a piano-player uses
the piano" (II., p. 97). But entelechy, even of the sort which is
responsible for intelligent actions, "has nothing of a psychical na-
ture" (p. 138). The words "soul," "mind," and "psyche" are
carefully avoided, since they would lead us into "pseudo-psychol-
ogy." For Driesch, "the terms 'conscious' and 'consciousness' do
not belong to that part of the Given which we call Nature ; they be-
long to the Ego, to 'my' Ego, and to my Ego exclusively. It is not
even possible to express with clearness what is meant by saying that
there 'is' consciousness in any being in Nature" (II., p. 37). For
" 'being' relates to bodily movements and changes, in that sense of
'being' which is the only starting-point of all science, the sense of
'being given to my Ego' " (p. 38). Accordingly, he proposes the
"very neutral name of 'Psychoid' for the elemental agent discov-
ered in action. 'Psychoid' 5 that is, a something which, though not
a 'psyche,' can only be described in terms analogous to those of
psychology" 6 (p. 82).
Now, "it is by no means difficult to get a good idea of part of
the manif oldness concerned in 'psychoids' by a psychological analy-
sis. In fact, we have merely to apply such concepts as perceiving,
liking, judging, willing to a psychoid in a metaphorical manner in
order to have a good picture of what is happening in every natural
event where psychoids come into play" (II., pp. 139, 140).
But "the problem becomes very complicated as soon as we turn
from the facts to the 'how,' as soon as we inquire the meaning of the
primary faculties of those entelechies in which an historical basis
does not play any part at all. We indeed are in a rather desperate
condition with regard to the real analysis of the fundamental prop-
erties of morphogenetic, adaptive, and instinctive entelechies: for
there must be a something in them that has an analogy not to know-
ing and willing in general as it may be supposed to exist in the
primary faculties of psychoids but to the milling of specific unex-
perienced realities, and to knowing the specific means of attaining
them. And we are by no means able to understand such a specified
primary knowing and willing in even the slightest degree" (p. 142).
8 It is clearly implied, though I believe nowhere explicitly stated, that the
" psychoid " is to be regarded merely as a species under the genus " entelechy."
In general, quotation-marks and italics are fearfully overworked by
Driesch.
316 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
It is likely that the greater number both of biologists and of psy-
chologists will agree in regarding the position of such a hypothesis
as "desperate" in the extreme. In fact, it seems to represent more
than anything else the weakness of the whole vitalistic position.
As has already been pointed out, "psychoids" appear to be con-
ceived by Driesch merely as entelechies of a higher order. We are
plainly told (II., p. 150) that "we may speak of an order concern-
ing the rank of dignity of entelechies, comparable with the order of
ranks or dignities in an army or administration. But all entelechies
[in a given organism] have originated from the primordial one, and
in this respect may be said to be one altogether" (p. 150). Again,
after referring to "psychoids," in particular: "one might say that
a higher sort of psychoid governs the main brain, a lower one the
thalamus opticus, the cerebellum, the medulla, and so on, ' ' although,
"it may well be true . . . that all motor entelechy is one and the
same in one individual" (II., p. 105). In another place, on the
contrary, he states that it is false to assume "that there are in space
as many entelechies as there are individuals" (II., p. 317). Such
passages suggest that even in the mind of Driesch himself the con-
cept of entelechy is not without its contradictions.
Driesch is insistent in his claim that "in dealing with entelechy
we are not dealing with anything psychical, or absolute or meta-
physical: we are analyzing an agent at work in nature" (II., p. 259).
Yet his method of characterizing this "natural" agent has at times
a strong flavor of medieval scholasticism: "entelechy means the
faculty of achieving a 'forma essentialis ' ; being and becoming are
united here in a most remarkable manner : time enters into the time-
less, i. e., into the 'idea' in the sense of Plato" (II., p. 149).
Modern science is above all pervaded by the spirit to which, of
late, the name "pragmatism" has been given. Is not this in its
essence a mere insistence that when we speak we shall actually mean
something? But what, in the presence of this touchstone, becomes
of such a deliverance as that last quoted ? Whether or not the whole
conception of "entelechy" would not likewise dissolve into nothing-
ness each reader must decide for himself.
Of great importance for an appreciation of Driesch 's specula-
tions are the author's attempts to define the relations of entelechy to
matter and energy, on the one hand, and to mind on the other.
To begin with, he regards entelechy as in no way conflicting with
the "concept of univocal determination" or with the principle "no
effect without a cause." "The facts in the universe that originate
in entelechy will be univocally determined as such whenever entel-
echy is such as it is, and entelechy is either of this or that determined
kind" (II., p. 154).
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 317
"Entelechy may be aroused to manifestation by a change in
bodily nature, such as is effected by fertilization or by some opera-
tion, or by some motor stimulus; and, on the other hand, entelechy
may on its own part lead to changes in bodily nature" (p. 156).
But entelechy is not energy: it "lacks all the characteristics of
quantity: entelechy is order of relation and absolutely nothing else"
(p. 169). It is thus not even allowable to speak of "a vital kind of
energy." Such an energy "would be an energy with differences in
itself, which is contradictory to the concept of energy" (p. 178).
We may readily agree that the concept of "vital energy" has been
the product of a good deal of loose thinking. Driesch has pointed
out very clearly some of its weaknesses.
Much ingenuity is displayed by our author in his endeavor to
avoid a conflict with the so-called laws of energetics. Entelechy, he
tells us, is "unable to cause reactions between chemical compounds
which never are known to react in the inorganic world. In short,
entelechy is altogether unable to create differences of intensity of
any kind. 7 But entelechy is able, so far as we know from the facts
concerned in restitution and adaptation, to suspend for as long a
period as it wants any one of all the reactions which are possible
with such compounds as are present, and which would happen with-
out entelechy. And entelechy may regulate this suspending of reac-
tions now in one direction and now in the other, suspending and
permitting possible becoming whenever required for its purposes"
(p. 180). _
' ' Let it be well understood : we do not admit that entelechy may
transform potentials into actual happening by means of a so-called
' Auslosung' in any sense. Entelechy, according to our view, is quite
unable to remove any kind of an 'obstacle' to happening, such as is
removed in catalysis ; 8 for such a removal would require energy, and
entelechy is non-energetical. We only admit that entelechy may set
free into actuality what it has itself prevented from actuality, and
what it has suspended hitherto" (p. 180). And again: "Suspend-
ing the compensation of uncompensated differences of intensities
among coupled kinds of energies and relaxing that suspension are in
fact not acts that would require any amount of energy" 9 (p. 185).
1 It is true that he later attributes this admission to " cautiousness " and
tells us that " perhaps it will really become necessary some day to admit that
entelechy not only suspends potentials, but that it creates potentials . . . and
thereby creates energy" (II., p. 236).
8 He tells us, to be sure (II., p. 187) : "In the formation or activation of
ferments we hypothetically see the fundamental r61e played by entelechy."
These ferments are not, however, " created " by entelechy.
* This conception suggests, of course, the celebrated " demon " of Clerk
Maxwell, and Driesch himself points out the analogy.
318 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Whether or not such a process (if it occurred] would require
energy, we must leave for decision to the special student of ener-
getics. We may, however, call upon Driesch to tell us (1) whether
nature offers any parallel to such a process as he has assumed ; and
(2) whether such a hypothesis is capable of being translated into
terms of experience at all.
So far as we have been able to discover, no answer whatever is
given to the first of these questions. Several attempts have, how-
ever, been made to answer the second, i. e., to give us a "snap-shot"
of entelechy at work. One "concrete" illustration is offered us on
page 193 (Vol. II.) : "A harmonious-equipotential system may con-
sist of n cells, each of them composed of m different (chemical) con-
stituents. In each cell every constitutent is able to react with every
other; in other words, there exist chemical potentials or affinities
between each possible pair of constituents in each cell. So far the
given 'diversity of elemental composition,' kept in mere potentiality
by the suspending action of entelechy. But now entelechy proceeds
to actuality, and it does so by enlarging the amount of 'diversity of
distribution ' in the system in question : actually out of all the possible
reactions in each cell, only one is allowed to happen and this actual
reaction which determines the 'prospective value' of th cell, is dif-
ferent in each" (p. 193).
Again, after endeavoring to explain how entelechy may affect
the movement of a body (though itself unable to "create" motion),
he further illustrates his position as follows: "The mechanical
process we have imagined is represented very clearly by an inelastic
body moving with a velocity V and entering during its motion into
an elastic ball. It will move into this ball for a certain time with
decreasing velocity, come to rest for a moment, and then move in the
opposite direction with increasing velocity again: let this process be
stopped at the moment when the inelastic body has traversed say one
third of the path into the elastic mass. There is no contradiction to
energetics in such an event, provided, of course, that after the sus-
pension has ceased the mechanical and energetic events continue
their course from the point where it was broken" (pp. 220, 221).
Here, as in H. G. Wells 's story of "The Man who Could Work
Miracles," all the effects of one miracle are abolished by another
miracle, and nature resumes her old course, leaving nobody the wiser
for her temporary aberration! In the field of philosophy, "com-
mon sense" is notoriously a sort of poor relation, whose opinions no
one would offer by way of serious argument. Yet it will probably
be conceded that any hypothesis must at least be viewed with sus-
picion which offers such an affront to our habitual modes of thought.
To the reviewer there would seem to be no essential difference
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 319
between this view of Driesch's and that by which Descartes endeav-
ored to make plausible the interaction between mind and body
t. e., that mind (we may substitute entelechy) might affect the direc-
tion of the motion, though not its amount. But to this last view
Driesch recognizes the force of the objection that ' ' a certain amount
of energy would be necessary for any 'turning' of a mass element"
(II, p. 222).
Entelechy, we are told, "is affected by and acts upon spatial
causality as if it came out of an ultra-spatial dimension ; it does not
act in space, it acts into space; it is not in space, it only has points
of manifestation in space" (p. 235). And with commendable
frankness, the author points out the analogy of this view "with
some theoretical views that are advocated by so-called spiritualists."
From his proposition that ' ' entelechy may set free into actuality
what it has itself prevented from actuality," and nothing else,
Driesch draws one curious corollary: "If entelechy always must
have done something in order that it may do anything in the present
and future, there can, of course, never be any real beginning of its
acting, but this acting must be continuous. And this is what the
fact of inheritance teaches us ... a certain portion of matter that
stands under the control of entelechy is handed down from genera-
tion to generation. And thus entelechy always has already acted!"
(II., p. 181). The problem of the primary origin of life is regarded
as an insoluble one (p. 262).
Driesch's conception of the relation of entelechy to mind has
already been indicated in part: entelechy is totally different from
mind, and yet can be understood only by the aid of an analogy with
mind. His attempt to define the relation between the "psychoid"
and the individual consciousness (which last was banished at an
earlier stage of the discussion) carries us into an attenuated atmos-
phere which surely has little in common with that of the biological
laboratory. After a subjective and objective analysis of the train
of events which take place between an act of perception and the
appropriate motor response, he is led to recognize "the most remark-
able fact that certain processes which we are forced to regard as
going on in my body may show a gap in the midst of them. . . .
There is 'reality' between the two halves as far as states presented
to consciousness are reality, but there is no reality between them as
regards 'my body.' . . . But now there must be created some sort
of scientifically [ !] legitimate correlate to the intra-psychical series
of the subjective point of view as advocated before. Here then we
meet our old friend the 'psychoid' again, a sort of entelechy as a
natural factor" (II., p. 282).
320 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Ordinary psycho-physical parallelism Driesch will have none of;
and indeed his reasons for rejecting this doctrine are stated with
clearness and force. But, "now apparently our discussion ends in
a sort of parallelism again! For there can be no doubt that the
immediate conscious experience of the intra-psychical series is 'par-
allel' to the part played by the 'psychoid' " (pp. 293, 294).
And once more (this from Driesch the metaphysician, not from
Driesch the biologist) : "we may say that the intra-psychical series,
or briefly ' the psychical, ' ' the conscious, ' is parallel to, or rather an
epiphenomenon of a certain metaphysical happening (unexplainable
in detail, but most certainly not resembling anything mechanical,
not even by analogy) which interferes with the metaphysical cor-
relate of so-called mechanical reality" (p. 294).
Psycho-physical parallelism may or may not be an accurate
description of reality. But the invariable correlation of certain
states of consciousness with certain physical changes if, at least,
this correlation is regarded in a purely temporal sense is in any
case conceivable. The hypothesis is capable of translation into the
commonest facts of experience. Can as much be said for this new
parallelism of ' ' psyche ' ' and ' ' psychoid ' ' ?
Let us now consider Driesch 's attitude toward certain other of
the leading problems of biology and philosophy. Early in the lec-
ture course, after a discussion of some of the phenomena presented
by a developing egg, our author concludes: "Morphogenesis, we
have learned, is 'epigenesis' not only in the descriptive, but also in
the theoretical sense: manifoldness in space is produced where no
manifoldness was; real 'evolutio' is limited to rather insignificant
topics. But was there nothing 'manifold' previous to morpho-
genesis? Nothing certainly of an extensive character, but there was
something else : there was an entelechy, and thus we may provision-
ally call entelechy an 'intensive manifoldness.' That then is our
result: not evolutio, but epigenesis 'epigenesis vitalistica' " (I.,
p. 144).
At a deeper level of the analysis he is led, however, to an exact
reversal of the foregoing conclusion: "moreover, any single spatial
occurrence induced or modified by entelechy has its previous single
correlate in a certain single feature of entelechy, as far as it is an
intensive manifoldness . . . our assumption leads to the consequence
strange as it is that nothing really new can happen anywhere
in the universe. All happening is 'evolutio' in the deepest meaning
of the word" 10 (II., p. 154). And the same point of view is restated
10 This phase of Driesch's doctrine has been ably criticized by Spaulding
(Philosophical Review, July, 1909).
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 321
with equal emphasis on page 198: "Also in organic systems diversi-
ties are only created on the basis of preexisting diversities, even if
external agents are excluded, ... in short, differentiation is 'evolutio'
in the ontological sense of the word. ' '
It may not be fair, perhaps, to charge Driesch with any such
inconsistency of thought as might be inferred from the passages
quoted. That there are, however, glaring inconsistencies in his
various statements regarding "evolutio" and "epigenesis" is self-
evident. And this is but a single instance of a looseness of con-
struction which pervades the whole work.
As regards the theory of "evolution" in the more modern sense
of the word (not to be confused with the "evolutio" of the fore-
going discussion), Driesch displays very little appreciation of the
tremendous conquests which have so greatly enlarged the boundaries
of our knowledge during the past fifty years. Whatever may be our
estimate of "Darwinism" in the narrower and more technical sense
of the word, we seldom hear a dissenting opinion as to the importance
of the scientific awakening for which Darwin was in a large measure
responsible.
Driesch prefers the term "theory of descent" to "evolution,"
since "there must be a real 'evolving' of something, in order that
the word evolution may be justified verbally: and that is not the
case in so-called phylogeny" (I., p. 250). The theory of descent
explains the similarities among organisms/ not the diversities (pp.
254, 255), hence it "leaves the problem of systematics practically
where it was, and adds really nothing to its solution" (p. 256).
If "so-called phylogeny ... is based only on the pure theory of
transformism, there is nothing explained at all. It was for this
reason that the philosopher Liebmann complained of phylogeny that
it furnishes nothing but a 'gallery of ancestors' " (p. 256). And
even this "gallery," he tells us (not without justice) is largely
mythical.
Passing from the theory of descent itself to the chief explanatory
hypothesis, Driesch finds that natural selection is "to some degree
self-evident"; but to regard it "as a positive factor in descent would
be to confound the sufficient reason for the non-existence of what is
not, with the sufficient reason of what is" (pp. 263, 264).
To Lamarckism Driesch grants more than do many recent evolu-
tionary philosophers, even those of a less skeptical frame of mind.
"Congenital histological adaptedness, " he thinks, "may be regarded
hypothetically as due to an inheritance of adaptive characters which
had been acquired by the organism's activity, exerted during a great
number of generations" (p. 290).
Both theories, however, are, in the opinion of our author, open
322 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
to the same fundamental objection: "the contingency of the typical
organic form" is maintained alike by Darwinism and Lamarckism
(p. 284). Thus, "Lamarckism of the dogmatic kind, as will easily
be seen, only differs from Darwinism in this respect, that what
according to the latter happens to the organism passively by means
of selection, is according to the former performed actively by the
organism by means of a 'judgment' by the retention and handing
down of chance variations" (p. 285). Thus one element "of dog-
matic Lamarckism, invented with the express purpose of defeating
Darwinism and taking the place of its fluctuating variability . . .
is liable to just the same objections as dogmatic Darwinism itself" 11
(p. 282). For Driesch denies most strenuously "that specific organ-
ization proper is due to contingent variations, which accidentally
have been found to satisfy some needs of the individual and there-
fore have been maintained and handed down. . . . The process of
restitution, perfect the very first time it occurs, if it occurs at all,
is again the classical instance against this new sort of contingency,
which is assumed to be the basis of transformism. Here we see with
our eyes that the organism can do more than simply perpetuate
variations that have occurred at random and bear in themselves no
relation whatever to any sort of unit or totality" (I., p. 286). The
same opinion was offered earlier (p. 218), in especial application to
the views of Jennings regarding the possible role of the "trial and
error" principle in morphogenesis. "We shall refer to this point
again.
In any defense of vitalism, we naturally expect to hear much
regarding "teleology." Driesch, indeed, devotes considerable space
to an analysis of what is meant by organic teleology. The acts of
other persons we regard as purposeful by analogy with our own
acts. As regards the lower organisms, however, and of morpho-
genetic processes everywhere, "mere analogy would fail here to
justify the application of the term, for, in fact, we can not imagine
ourselves in the position of a newt repairing its foot: we are cer-
tainly unable to regenerate our own foot if it is lost in an accident,
and even if our body could repair it, the process would probably go
on in a so-called unconscious manner. "We must then seek for a some-
what different criterion of teleology without leaving the analogy with
our own acting quite out of sight" (II., pp. 131, 132).
Nor would it meet the point, he thinks, "to say that physiological
u This agreement of the two theories in respect to contingency was pointed
out by the present reviewer in a critique of Pauly's " Darwinismus and
Lamarckismus " (this JOUBNAL, August 27, 1908, p. 487). It was there shown
that the much-anathematized principle of selection had unconsciously been
made one of the foundation stones of the Lamarckian theory, or at least of
Pauly's version of that theory.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 323
and morphogenetic processes are teleological simply because they
serve to form and to preserve the organism ; for this argument, taken
by itself, would not imply that there is something which ought to
be formed and preserved" (p. 132).
Driesch 's own idea of what is signified by organic purposef ulness
is herewith presented in his own words. The reviewer regrets his
inability to abstract or to simplify this statement. He regrets his
inability even to understand it in any real sense. He therefore cites
the original text in the hope that other readers may fare better:
"Every organic process indeed, morphogenetic or physiological, is
'purposeful' for the reason that it serves to form and to preserve a
specific constellation which occurs in indefinite exemplars, and
whose specificity has no other reason than the existence of a pre-
vious specificity of the same type; for this reason and no other is
an organic process 'teleological.' For only on this basis is there an
analogy with phenomena to which the predicate teleological has
already been given by our previous analysis, viz., the phenomena
leading to indefinite exemplars of specific constellations called
machines, or objects of art and industry in general, that is, the phe-
nomena of human acting" (p. 132).
At a later point in the work, teleology and contingency are con-
trasted. The latter, it is said, only acquires a clear meaning when
opposed to the former. In reality, of course, nothing is contingent
in the sense of being undetermined; "but as to events at this very
point of space and at this very moment of time, philosophy may
speak of the contingency of their happening here and now, whenever
it is not possible to discover anything like a wholeness or a plan to
which their local and temporal appearance is due. Contingency in
this sense is the same as non-teleology" (II., p. 352). "Teleology
is by no means ' causality seen from behind ' as many of our dogmatic
philosophers maintain" (II., p. 335).
After a discussion of "harmony in nature," he tells us (II., p.
353) that the common objection to a teleological explanation "is
generally a sort of enlarged Darwinism." But, "we again object
on our part that this presentment of the facts is powerless to do
away with the simple truth that, Givenness being what it is, one
thing does occur in favor of the other" (p. 354). If by this our
author simply means that, however produced, harmonies do exist in
nature, and that they may therefore be regarded as part of a uni-
versal plan, we must grant him his right to this opinion ; but such a
statement is in no way incompatible with a full acceptance of Dar-
winism. It is but a repetition of the time-honored declaration of
the up-to-date theologian that natural selection is merely the way in
which the Creator creates.
324 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Taken as a whole these lectures of Driesch's are in some measure
calculated to reassure those who have feared that modern biology
has shaken the foundations of faith. In fact his general attitude
toward the larger theological problems, though not dogmatic, appears
to be rather surprisingly conventional and orthodox.
Although his "natural science" point of view forces him to be
deterministic, an analysis of freedom leads to the usual ' ' antinomy, ' '
and he concludes with the declaration that "freedom thus escapes
analysis altogether, for analysis would mean subjection to necessity"
(II., p. 305). Earlier he had told us that "the common opinion
about life phenomena, which of course is neither analytical nor theo-
retical in any sense, claims that 'I' can move my body by my 'will,'
and that every living being has a so-called 'soul' by which it can do
the same. This view, suggested by ordinary unscientific experience,
can now be said to have been transferred from a non-analytical and
non-theoretical to an analytical and theoretical sphere, and to have
been proved and psychologically justified in this sphere. In fact
'I' am a link in the univocally determined series of phenomena, so
far as I 'will'; my volition is both influenced and influencing"
(II, p. 285).
Thus, ' ' vitalism is the highroad to morality : morality would be
an absurdity without it. ... To a convinced theoretical materialist,
to whom his neighbor is a real mechanical system, morality is an
absurdity" (p. 358). The reviewer finds the marginal comment
"nonsense!" opposite the foregoing passage. This was not cour-
teous, of course, but I can not refrain from citing that first
impression.
As regards a future existence, the doctrine of entelechy has
nothing to say. "What science knows about death is simply this:
a certain amount of matter that was formerly controlled by entelechy
becomes freed from this control, and then obeys the laws of physico-
chemical causality exclusively" (II., p. 262). Science ought, we are
told, to deal with the so-called phenomena of spiritualism "even at
the risk of finding a mere chaos of defective criticism and actual
fraud; but one single fact, positively established, would well repay
the hard work of generations" 12 (p. 261). In the present temper of
the scientific world, even such a conservative utterance as this
requires courage. We can only express our assent in principle,
though willing for the present to confine our own attention to more
promising fields of exploration.
The "primary entelechy in the universe" lies at the apex of
Driesch's edifice. "This primary entelechy would not have created
absolute reality, but would have ordered certain parts of it, and
13 Driesch regards telepathy as " established beyond all doubt."
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 325
these parts, therefore, would show a sort of non-contingent constella-
tion whilst all other constellations of the elementalities of the uni-
verse would be contingent." This, he grants, "is downright
dualism." 13
Now "in this sense of a primary entelechy of order of constella-
tion in the world . . . the concept of God therefore appears as an
eternal task of science ; unintelligible in the last resort, as all religions
maintain, and only approachable by analogies, like all absoluteness"
(pp. 370, 371). Such a view "does not contradict the concept of
God as formed by the reasoning imagination. . . . But science, and
the doctrine of entelechy in particular, most strongly contradicts any
form of so-called 'pantheism.' Entelechy and matter are different
and external to one another throughout" (p. 372).
Whatever else may be said of Driesch's speculative writings, we
can not but grant that he has rendered us a service of a high order in
compelling our attention to certain very real problems in the field
of biological philosophy. He has also done us an important service
in forcing us to realize how very hazy and unformed are many of
our ideas concerning those very mechanical principles which we so
stoutly affirm to lie at the foundation of all the phenomena of life.
That Driesch himself has been able to offer as an alternative any-
thing more than a pseudo-solution of these difficulties we do not
believe. His "entelechy," even though he justifies it by the crea-
tion of a new "ontological category," remains an empty name.
Based upon mind as a prototype, and only intelligible by analogy
with mind, it still is something utterly different from mind. It
merely does the same sort of things which mind does or rather,
which it would do if it could, for in reality, we are told, mind can
do nothing at all. Only the "psychoid," the "natural" even
though utterly inconceivable factor, can really act. How much
simpler the panpsychic type of vitalism represented by Pauly!
For him no necessity for a third unimaginable mode of existence:
nothing but concrete acts of perception, judgment and will. 1 *
Driesch's oft-reiterated assertion that entelechy is a "natural"
factor does not help his case in the least. From the major premise
18 The same dualism is thus expressed with relation to the organic sphere:
" even in the only field where dynamically effective individuality is known to
us in the biological individual this individuality seems not to be concerned
in the minutest details : the single cells of a tissue are not as such a really essen-
tial constituent of organization " (p. 367). Again: individuality (= entelechy)
" interferes or has interfered with causality here and there, but not every-
where" (p. 368).
"It is true that Pauly does not consistently live up to this standard, but
lapses at times into the purest mysticism.
326 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
"everything that is is natural" may be deduced the "naturalness"
of any figment of the imagination whatever. Have we not all
listened to a similar justification of belief in miracles, not to speak of
that latter-day witchcraft which, under various names, still flourishes
in our midst 1
Driesch expresses his "firm conviction that we can not avoid the
admission of vitalistic autonomic agents possessing no experience . . .
and yet endowed with specific knowing and willing." There must
be something, in other words, which foresees (if, indeed, uncon-
sciously) the end to be attained, and directs the organism toward
its attainment. No piece of mechanism imaginable, he believes,
could explain the phenomena in question.
The issue here involved is certainly a fundamental one. It is
another phase of the same problem which confronted Darwin: how
are "teleological" results to be explained without the need of
invoking final causes? For, whether we consider the life of a race
or of an individual organism, phenomena constantly come to view
which seem like the manifestations of conscious purpose directed
toward a definite goal. As is familiar to all, Darwin's special con-
tribution to the subject lay in his formulation of the principle of
natural selection, i. e., the perpetuation of favorable variations, which
were conceived of as "accidental" in the sense of being unrelated
to the end to be attained.
Darwin 's hypothesis has been subjected to a most searching criti-
cism, and the general verdict seems to be that it is not in itself a
sufficient account of the motive principle underlying organic evolu-
tion. But it is significant that every real causal explanation of
evolution which has compelled serious attention has embodied, at
least implicitly, the selective principle. "Mutation" needs selection
in order to explain advance. Without it, we should have to fall
back upon some postulate of "orthogenesis," which, of course, has
no explanatory value at all, but is merely the restatement of our
problem. The same may be said of the various attempts to account
for evolution by "isolation." Even Lamarckism, which has figured
historically chiefly as a rival theory, and an alternative to natural
selection, is, in last analysis, based upon the selective principle. 15
For unless we assume some inscrutable foreknowledge on the part
of the organism (or its entelechy), as does Driesch, we must suppose
that the responses of the latter are in the first instance random and
non-adaptive. There is a survival (i. e., retention by the organism)
of these responses which satisfy a given need, and these are fixed in
the race through heredity.
In fact, it would seem impossible to frame any purely mechanical
"As has already been pointed out above (p. 322).
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 327
(i. e., non-teleological) explanation of those structures and functions
which we call ' ' purposeful ' ' without postulating a selection of some
sort. And the materials for this selection must, in the first instance,
have been "contingent" in the sense of not having been determined
in their nature by the need to be satisfied. The only alternative
would seem to be a revival of the "special creation" hypothesis under
a new name and a mysticism fatal to any further advance along
these lines.
Jennings has recently extended his "trial and error" hypothesis
(i. e., selection in its purest form) to the problems of organic regu-
lation. According to this view, based originally upon the reactions
of infusoria to stimuli, any interference or disturbance in the physi-
ological processes of the organism ' ' causes a change of behavior and
varied movements, subjecting the organism to many different con-
ditions. One of these conditions relieves the interference with the
internal processes, so that the changes in behavior cease." 16 Thus,
if we behold merely the end results of this process, we may readily
be led to believe that the organism actually seeks favorable condi-
tions and avoids unfavorable ones. Now, if we substitute "metab-
olism" or "processes of growth" for the word "behavior" in the
foregoing formula, we arrive at a conception which may be applicable
to various processes of restitution and form-regulation. This appli-
cation of his principle Jennings himself has not hesitated to make,
though in a tentative way.
Mention must here be made of another hypothesis, in no sense
contradictory to the foregoing, although emphasizing a different
aspect of the problem. It is of interest as an attempt to formulate
in some detail the mechanical working out of certain processes which
have furnished some of the chief arguments for vitalism. In an
extremely suggestive and ingenious paper, 17 S. J. Holmes has called
to his aid the analogy of symbiosis, in an attempt to explain the
close interrelation and interdependence of the various parts of the
body. "The harmonious functioning of an organism," he believes,
' ' is mainly secured by a system of automatically acting checks which
we may conceive to act in a manner more or less remotely analogous
to the governor of a steam-engine or the forces which regulate the
motions of the planets. ... In these cases deviation from the normal
is the cause which automatically sets up activities by which the
normal is regained." So too, "the self -regulation of organisms may
... be in a measure understood if we assume that their parts stand
in a relation of mutual dependence such that the undue growth or
functioning of any part is held in check by the reactions thus
19 " Behavior of the Lower Organisms," p. 343.
17 " Archiv filr Entwickelungsmechanik der Organismen," 1904, Bd. XVII.
328 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
brought about by other, and especially the contiguous structures.
If we suppose that the various cells constituting the body have each
a different kind of metabolism, and that the products of each cell are
in some way utilized by the neighboring cells, so that each derives
an advantage from the particular association in which it occurs, we
may understand, in a measure, how this checking may be brought
about." And here an analogy is pointed out with the relations
which obtain in "symbiotic" communities, such as those composed
of animal cells and certain unicellular algae.
The cases of functional hypertrophy among higher animals are
completely in harmony with such a conception. "Removal of one
kidney causes an increased growth in the other kidney in response
to the greater demand upon its activity. . . . The connection of these
cases of functional hypertrophy with regeneration is intimate. Re-
move one of a pair of organs and its fellow increases in size. Remove
a part of one of these organs and the remaining portion grows, forms
new tissue, and regenerates the missing part." That such a process
may be conceived of in chemical terms is suggested by some of the
phenomena of "chemical equilibration." "The decomposition of
compounds in solution proceeds until there is a definite relation
established between the amounts of the old compounds and the new.
If the chemical equilibration thus established is disturbed by the
removal of one of these compounds more of that compound will be
produced ; and the more rapidly the compound is removed the more
rapidly it is formed."
This hypothesis of Holmes 's is closely related to that of Jennings
(as Jennings himself has been quick to point out), though no ex-
plicit reference is made by the former to ' ' trial and error. ' ' At one
point, however, we are told that "cells which develop in the direc-
tion of the missing part receive those advantages which the sym-
biotic relation afforded the cells whose place they take. Differen-
tiation in any other direction deprives them of these advantages and
subjects them to other unfavorable conditions." The author avows
his adoption of Roux's principle of the "struggle of the parts,"
though in a modified form. "We have conceived the parts of an
organism to be engaged in a struggle for existence, but, as the parts
are mutually dependent, the struggle leads to an adjustment to a
norm instead of the elimination of some parts and the survival of
others." Thus, although there is no selection of elementary parts
for survival, there is assumed a furtherance of those activities of
each which conform to the needs of the whole and a checking of
those activities which do not conform to these needs. 18
" It is true that something more is assumed than the selection of contingent
variations in the activities of the parts; but the conception is none the less
mechanical throughout.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 329
Holmes has obviously given us a mere sketch of a theory of form-
regulation, as was indeed inevitable in the present state of our
knowledge. I have dwelt upon it here at such length, inasmuch as
it undoubtedly helps us to conceive in physicochemical terms certain
phenomena which have long been the mainstay of vitalism. We
can not say as much of the various references to crystal formation
and other analogies with inorganic nature which have so frequently
been offered in rebuttal.
Now it must be remembered that Driesch himself, in a passage
already cited, has recognized and endeavored to meet the class of
explanations which we have just discussed. "The process of resti-
tution, perfect the very first time it occurs, ... is the classical
instance against this new sort of contingency. . . . Here we see
with our own eyes that the organism can do more than simply per-
petuate variations which have occurred at random." What we see
with our own eyes, it may be replied, is only a series of visible stages
in the process of restitution. We do not see the inmost morpho-
genetic processes, physical and chemical, by which this end is at-
tained. How do we know that each step has not been, as Jennings
suggests, the outcome of much blind groping on the part of the
living units concerned? In the case of certain physiological "reg-
ulations" Jennings has pointed out that there is some evidence for
such a process of gradual adaptation. It is quite possible, there-
fore, that in this particular instance, Driesch has raised an issue
which we may put to experimental test. For any indication of a
profiting by "experience," i. e., of a shortening of the time required
to effect a given regulative response, would harmonize well with
the hypothesis that the response was at first effected through tenta-
tive steps.
As regards the phenomena of "intelligent" action, it is quite
certain that the principle of selection (trial and error) may be
applied with illuminating results. This has been pointed out by
Biitschli, 19 in his well-known critique of vitalism, and indeed the idea
is rather a fundamental one in psychology. We must remember
that the vitalist projects his own conception of "purposeful" human
conduct backward throughout the whole realm of organic activity.
Is it not possible that a more accurate analysis of the actual devel-
opment of rational behavior in the human individual would have led
to a very different conception of organic purposef ulness 1
In conclusion, it may be well to add that I do not regard the
mechanical views here advocated as being in any sense more "ma-
terialistic" than those of Driesch. While the dualistic interpolation
of non-physical causes in the physical chain of events has been de-
18 " Mechanismus und Vitalismus," Leipzig, 1901.
330 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
nied, nothing has been said in any way inconsistent either with a
thoroughgoing idealism of this, that, or the other variety, or with the
doctrine of psychophysical parallelism. These concepts, however,
belong to metaphysics rather than to biology, and I believe that the
issues raised by the vitalists may be met without having recourse
to them. FRANCIS B. SUMNEB.
NAPLES ZOOLOGICAL STATION.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Right to Believe. ELEANOR HARRIS ROWLAND. Boston and New
York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1909.
Miss Rowland's book is an examination into the claims of religious
belief to acceptance on the part of those who wish to believe all that is
intellectually permissible, but nothing more. The book consists of six
chapters and a short introduction. The introduction defines the object
of the book; the first chapter defends the rationality of adopting religion
as a working hypothesis while its truth is under discussion, and defines
religion in a general way; the remaining chapters are devoted to a
detailed account of the author's religious beliefs and to an attempt to
establish their claims not only to be used as experimental working
hypotheses, but to be accepted as truths: their right to belief.
What the book really contains is a religious creed for unimaginative
persons desirous of being supplied with one, together with an argument
for bringing their conflicting reason and desire into harmony.
As the title suggests, William James's religious philosophy forms the
theoretical basis, and apparently also the practical inspiration of this
little book, which seems indeed to have caught a breath of his spirit. In
style it is direct, concise, and colloquial, and therefore eminently readable
for the layman, for whom, among others, it is meant. It contains many
keen and well-put observations on life and living, and is interesting in
the sense in which all books presenting the personal experience of a lively
mind are interesting. Its value as a contribution to religious philosophy,
or, if it disclaim such a classification, to thought about religion, appears to
me to be slight, and for the following reasons.
The argument, we are told, is addressed, not to the emotional believer
or unbeliever, but to the mind which demands reasons for its affirmations
and negations, and has in this case found none. It is to this doubter
that tbe religious hypothesis is recommended as a working hypothesis,
until grounds for its rational acceptance shall have been found; the prac-
tical grounds for its adoption in the interim lying solely in the greater
satisfaction afforded from the ethical point of view, and evidenced by
"general assent" (page 11). The doubting reader is inclined to let this
argument pass unchallenged, first because to him, who by definition is
asking for proofs, the practical attitude is uninteresting, and second,
because religion, not having been defined, is still sufficiently vague to
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 331
lack even the amount of materiality necessary to permit it to conflict
with anything else, or to produce any concrete results, satisfactory or
otherwise. No sooner, however, has the reader, for the sake of continuing
the argument, agreed to give the religious hypothesis the chance of
proving the best working hypothesis, than religion is defined as "essen-
tially " comprising five affirmations : the existence of God, the divinity
of Christ, the freedom of man, the efficacy of prayer, and the immortality
of the soul. The doubter, who has more or less reluctantly accepted his
own religious ideal as a temporary guest, now finds himself embarrassed
by a form of Christianity which, in the name of the author, refuses to
be dislodged until its host shall have " disproved " the five affirmations in
which it consists.
Here is truly an extraordinary situation. A perfectly arbitrary
definition of religion has been made, this religion has been asserted on
the authority of a few persons to be a " satisfactory " view of the world ;
this burden, and in addition to it the burden of proof, has been shifted
to the shoulders of the poor reader, if he wishes to " disbelieve." As he
is still " doubting," however, he turns hopefully to the next chapter, in
which the author has promised to establish not only his opportunities, but
also his right to believe.
Here he is confronted with the first religious affirmation, the existence
of God (who is conceived as a disembodied personality, whose motive in
creation was the desire for ultimate companionship), and is again chal-
lenged to " disprove " it. The author, undertaking to do so for the reader,
shows that there is no evidence of either a sensational or a deductive
character, that is, no proof in support of God's existence. She concludes,
however, that as absence of proof is not disproof, and as, unless you dis-
prove a statement you have no logical right to disbelieve it, you must
now admit that God's existence has at least half a chance of being true.
But, continues the author, if you have failed to find proof or disproof for
religion, you have done something decisive in its favor, nevertheless; you
have placed it outside the sphere of scientific treatment altogether; you
have protected it once for all from the chance of being affected by scien-
tific results; religion and science are now seen to be running on separate
tracks. In this position outside the influence of science, the author finds
much company for religion; laws of nature, ultimate concepts, and even
such fundamental facts as other minds, the self, and the connection
between mind and body, are cited as analogies, as mysteries without
sense-evidence or logical necessity. " Our acceptance of God's existence
depends, as does our belief in the real personalities of others and of our-
self, on our desire to so believe where proof is impossible " (p. 41).
It would seem unnecessary to do more than present such statements
in order to exhibit their falsity, but for the sake of clearness let it be
said that the laws of nature are affected by scientific results, are tested
and verified by sense experience, and are not only within the pale of
science, but constitute the instruments with which science operates; that
ultimate concepts are, even when not definable in other terms, arrived at
by logical processes from the fountain head of perceptual experience ; that
332 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
personality in self and others is a fact of experience or derived from such
fact, as is also the connection of mind and body, and that it is in the
interpretation of such experiences only that theories differ; and lastly,
that even if the foregoing were not the case and there were no sense-
evidence in favor of any of these beliefs, they would, nevertheless, form
no analogies to religious belief inasmuch as they are held as matters of
knowledge, and are dealt with by methodological and philosophical theory
as matters of real or potential knowledge, to be clarified, interpreted, and
tested by their relations of other facts and their scientific systematization.
It remains the unique achievement of the author's religious " thinker "
to have removed all knowledge not sensational in character from the
sphere and influence of scientific method, to call it " faith " and run it
along parallel tracks; in short, to split the world in twain and feel com-
fortable in it. " Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the
evidence of things not seen," says the book, " and the crux of the whole
situation is, what do we hope for?" (p. 42). And yet it appears that
after all it is not sufficient to hope for a thing in order to assert its reality,
for when about to embark on a voyage of discovery of the nature of our
hopes, the author once more undertakes to determine what kind of
evidence would weigh the balances in favor of the existence of religious
facts, and whether such evidence obtains. Finally, after following through
many intricacies, the goal of this whole inquiry, the right to believe,
is reached, and the evidence for the validity of religious affirmations is
located. It is termed "qualitative" evidence, and consists in the God-
experience of the " high " and " valuable " witness in his most " signifi-
cant " and " best " moments. If such a man, provided he be otherwise
normal, testifies to holding communion with a disembodied but real per-
sonality (God) and getting responses from him, who can contradict him,
says our author (p. 52).
Thus it is the religious experience (feeling and its interpretation) on
the part of the highest type of normal men of " all " generations that
vouches for the existence of God, and for the other religious facts. As,
however, no standards of evaluation are given by the author there obtains
no necessary connection between highness or goodness and the form of
religion here held; the connection remains accidental and permits us to
give the same credence to the experiences of a good Buddhist, a good
Atheist or a good Mystic as to those of a good Christian. Rare references
are indeed made to what " the world as a whole " or " all religions " have
" apparently " wanted, but they are based on no historical considerations
whatever, and in the remaining chapters the point of view taken is
explicitly that of the " average person's " and implicitly that of the Chris-
tian's religious demands. That " evidence " such as this establishes
neither the actual universality nor the ideal validity of the author's
religious beliefs must be obvious. One needs but to reflect that from the
quantitative point of view the evidence to-day would be against and not
for any form of Christianity; and that from a qualitative point of view,
unless we make the test of a man's " value " consist in his faith in these
particular tenets which would beg the question there have been and are
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 333
to-day innumerable good, great, and significant men, poets, artists, philos-
ophers, founders of religion, heroes of one sort or another, who have
believed otherwise, or not at all. The stream of time has flowed past the
Christian era, past Spinoza and his age, Voltaire and his, to our own day
encouraged and inspirited by such thinkers as Nietzsche, Ibsen, Maeter-
linck, and Key.
The right bestowed by this book on the doubter searching for light,
is his right not only to his individual religious sentiment, but to an
individual interpretation of this sentiment in conformity with his indi-
vidual hopes, and independent of scientific methods or results.
E. STETTHEIMER.
NEW YOBK.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
EEVUE PHILOSOPHIQTIE. April, 1910. Une felida artificielle
(l er article) (pp. 329-357) : P. JANET. - An interesting account of a case
of hysterical anorexia lasting seventeen years and involving modifications
of the personality. La mort et I'immortalite d'apres les donnees de la
biologie (pp. 358-380) : DR. JANKELEVITCH. - Biological considerations
serve to show us, not the utility of death, but the uselessness of immor-
tality. L'existence et le fondement des lois du hasard (pp. 381-401) :
RiCHARD-EoY. - The terms " probable," " improbable," " almost certain "
correspond to essentially metaphysical notions that spring from some
mysterious instinct in man. Influence de I'habitude sur les sentiments
(pp. 402-412) : E. MARTIN. - A study of the relation of the two principles,
(1) that feelings are weakened through exercise and (2) that feelings tend
to create an increased sensibility to feeling by repetition. Analyses et
comptes rendus. N. Lossky, Die Grundlegung des Intuitiv ismus : M.
SOLOVINE. Garfein-Garski, Ein neuer Versuch uber das Wesen der
Philosophic: G.-H. LUQUET. Dr. J. Petersen, Kausalitat, Determinismus
und Fatalismus: DR. S. JANKELEVITCH. Dr. Ludwig Stein, Dualismus
oder monismusf: G.-H. LUQUET. Dr. A. Eausch, Elemente der Philos-
ophic: G.-H. LUQUET. J. J. von Biervliet, La Psychologic quantitative:
DR. J. PHILIPPE. M. Oeffner, Das Geddchtniss: L. POINTEVIN. Pierre
Duhem, Etude sur Leonard de Vinci: L. ARREAT. Arthur Collier, Clavis
Universalis: M. SOLOVINE. B. Spaventa, La Filosofia Italiana nelle sue
relazioni con la Filosofia Europea: J. PERES. E. Bodrero, Eraclito: C.
HUIT. N. Hartmann, Platos Logik des Seins: C. HUIT. Albert Gb'rland,
Aristoteles und Kant beziiglich der Idee der theoretischen ErJcenntnis:
C. HUIT. J. M. Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities: G.-L. DUPRAT.
Revue des periodiques etrangers.
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. March, 1910.
Hasard ou Lilerte? (pp. 137-146) : E. BOUTROUX. - A defense of contin-
gency and freedom. The fourth lecture of the series recently delivered
at Harvard University. L'objectivite du principe de Carnot (pp. 147-
179) : B. BRUNHES. - A careful statement of the meaning of the principle
334 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of degradation of energy and the antinomy apparently existing between
it and the mechanical theory of heat. A reply is included to certain criti-
cisms of Le Dantec. II y a fayots et fagots (pp. 180-184) : F. LE DANTEC.
-A frank acceptance of Brunhes's corrections that distinguishes two
meanings of the principle of the degradation of energy : (1) the principle
of the fall of temperature, (2) the principle of the diffusion of diffusible
energy. F. Ranch: sa psychologic de la Connaissance et de I' Action
(pp. 185-218) : H. DAUDIN. - An appreciative study of this writer's work.
Etudes critiques. "Devoir," par B. Jacob: L. WEBER. Varietes. Pour
la Bibliographic philosophique : TH. RUYSSEN. Questions practiques.
Le proces de la Democratic: GUY-GRAND. Supplement.
Berkeley, Hastings. Mysticism in Modern Mathematics. New York,
London, Edinburgh, Toronto, Melbourne: Henry Frowde, Oxford
University Press. 1910. Pp. xii + 264. 8 s.
Bosanquet, Bernard. The Philosophical Theory of the State (Second
Edition). London: Macmillan and Co. 1910. Pp. xl + 342.
Charmont, J. La Renaissance du Droit Naturel. Montpelier: Coulet
et Fils ; Paris : Masson et Cie. 1910. Pp.218.
Dewing, Arthur Stone. Life as Reality. A Philosophical Essay. New
York, London, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1910.
Pp. x + 214. $1.25.
Jones, Henry. The Working Faith of the Social Reformer, and other
Essays. London : Macmillan & Co. 1910. Pp. xii + 305.
Levy-Bruhl, L. Les fonctions mentales dans les societes inferieures.
Paris: F. Alcan. 1910. Pp.461.
Pichler, Hans. Ueber Christian Wolffs Ontologie. Leipzig: Durr'sche
Buchhandlung. 1910. Pp. 91.
Sorley, W. R. The Interpretation of Evolution (British Academy Pro-
ceedings). London: Henry Frowde. 1910. Pp. 32.
The Works of Aristotle, translated into English, J. A. Smith and W. D.
Ross, Editors. "De Mirabilibus Auscultationibus," Lawrence D.
Dowdall. Oxford : The Clarendon Press. 1909.
Von Uexkiill, J. Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere. Berlin : J. Springer.
1909. Pp. 259. M. 7.
Walker, Leslie J. Theories of Knowledge. Absolutism, Pragmatism,
Realism. New York, London, Bombay, and Calcutta: Longmans,
Greene, & Co. 1910. Pp. xxxix + 696. $2.75.
NOTES AND NEWS
BELOW are the names of the members of the Southern Society for
Philosophy and Psychology, for 1910. The names of members of the
Council are marked by an asterisk. The year in which the term expires
is given in parenthesis.
Bailey, Superintendent T. P., Memphis City Schools, Memphis, Tenn.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 335
Baird, Professor J. W., Clark University, Worcester, Mass.
*('10) Baldwin, Dr. J. M., 116, avenue Matignon, Paris, France.
Barnes, Professor J. C., Maryville College, Maryville, Tenn.
Benedict, President Mark K., Institute for Women, Sweet Briar, Va.
Bierly, Professor H. E., University of Chattanooga, Chattanooga, Tenn.
Brooks, Professor E. C., Trinity College, Durham, N. C.
*Buchner, Professor E. F., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
(President).
Burrow, Dr. N. T., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Carre, Professor H. B., Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn.
Coffey, Professor A. B., University of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, La.
Day, Professor F. L., Randolph-Macon College, Ashland, Va.
Dresslar, Professor F. B., University of Alabama, University, Ala.
Dubray, Professor C. A., Marist College, Washington, D. C.
Dunlap, Dr. K., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Eby, Professor F., Baylor University, Waco, Texas.
*('!!) Ellis, Professor A. C., University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
Fant, Professor Anne, Mississippi State Industrial Institute, Columbus,
Miss.
Farrar, Dr. C. B., Sheppard-Pratt Hospital, Towson, Md.
*Franz, Dr. S. I., Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C
(Vice-President) .
Furry, Dr. W. D., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Gault, Mr. R. H., Northwestern University, Evanston, 111.
Griffin, Professor E. H., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Gwinn, Professor J. M., Tulane University, New Orleans, La.
*('10) Halleck, Mr. R. P., Boys' High School, Louisville, Ky.
Hornstein, Mr. F., 1008 Fourth Street, Boone, Iowa.
Harrison, Professor J. G., Mercer University, Macon, Ga.
*('!!) Hill, Professor D. S., Peabody Normal College, Nashville, Tenn.
Hodge, Professor F. A., State Female Normal School, Farmville, Va.
Johnson, Professor P., Bethany College, Bethany, W. Va.
Jones, Professor E. E., University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind.
Keen, Mr. J. H., University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
King, President C. B., Elizabeth College, Charlotte, N. C.
Ladd-Franklin, Mrs. Christine, 527 Cathedral Parkway, New York.
Lane, Professor W. B., Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Lynchburg, Va.
Lefevre, Professor Albert, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.
McAllister, Professor C. N., State Normal School, Warrensburg, Mo.
Martin, Mr. M. A., Richmond, Va.
Messenger, Professor J. F., University of Vermont, Burlington, Vt.
Meyer, Professor Max, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.
Mezes, President S. E., University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
Monroe, President , North Carolina Medical College, Charlotte, N. C.
Moore, Professor G. B., University of South Carolina, Columbia, S. C.
Morse, Professor Josiah, Peabody Normal College, Nashville, Tenn.
Ogden, Professor R. M., University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn. (Sec-
retary and Treasurer).
336 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Pace, Professor E. A., Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.
Parrish, Professor Celestia S., State Normal School, Athens, Ga.
*('12) Payne, Professor Bruce R., University of Virginia, Charlottes-
ville, Va.
*('12) Pearce, President H. J., Brenau College, Gainesville, Ga.
Purinton, President D. B., University of West Virginia, Morgantown,
W. Va.
Rail, Dr. E. E., University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
Raymond, Professor G. L., George Washington University, Washington,
D. C.
Richardson, Dr. E. E., 406 Seventh Street, S. W., Washington, D. C.
Ruediger, Professor W. C., George Washington University, Washington,
D. C.
Sauvage, Professor G. M., Holy Cross Colleges, Washington, D. C.
Schmidt, Dr. Karl, Pequaket, N. H.
Shanahan, Professor E. T., Catholic University of America, Washington,
D. C.
Sheppard, Dr. W. T., 511 G Street, Washington, D. C.
Smith, Professor S., Hampden-Sidney College, Virginia.
Smith, Professor W. B., Tulane University, New Orleans, La.
Steele, Professor N. M., Furman University, Greeneville, S. C.
Sterritt, Professor J. MacB., George Washington University, Washington,
D. C.
Sutherland, Dr. A. H., University of Illinois, Urbana, HI.
Wardlaw, Professor Patterson, University of South Carolina, Columbia,
S. C.
Watson, Professor J. B., Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.
Williams, Mr. T. A., 1758 K Street, Washington, D. C.
Woofter, Professor T. J., University of Georgia, Athens, Ga.
Yoakum, Dr. C. S., University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
MR. B. R. SIMPSON, of the department of psychology and education,
Brooklyn Training School for Teachers, will engage in summer school
work in the University of Georgia this summer. Mr. Simpson will offer
two courses, one in " Educational Psychology " and one in " Principles
of Education."
PROFESSOR LLOYD MORGAN, for twenty -two years Principal of University
College, Bristol, Eng., and now Professor of Psychology and Ethics in the
University of Bristol, has been presented with a quantity of plate and
books in recognition of his services to higher education.
MR. L. W. COLE, formerly professor of psychology in the University of
Oklahoma, more recently instructor in psychology in Wellesley College, has
been appointed professor of psychology in the University of Colorado.
MACMILLAN AND COMPANY announce Professor J. G. Frazer's " Totem-
ism and Exogamy " in four volumes.
DR. NOAH KNOWLES DAVIS, professor emeritus of philosophy in the
University of Virginia, has diei at the age of eighty years.
VOL. VII. No 13. JUNE 23, 1910
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
REALISM AS A POLEMIC AND PROGRAM OF REFORM. I
TT) EALISM may be said to be at the present moment something
J-lJ between a tendency and a school. So long as it was recog-
nized only by its enemies it was no more than a tendency. But war
has developed a class-consciousness, and the time is near at hand, if
indeed it is not already here, when one realist may recognize
another. This dawning spirit of fellowship, accompanied as it is
with a desire for a better understanding and a more effective co-
operation, justifies an attempt to summarize the articles of a real-
istic creed. In the two papers of which this is the first, I shall con-
fine myself to the realistic critique. There is a certain propriety in
this because a new movement invariably arises as a protest against
tradition, and bases its hope of constructive achievement on the
correction of certain established habits of thought. Realism is as
yet in a phase in which this critical motive dominates, and affords
the best promise of initial agreement.
I propose to discuss three topics: I., General Philosophical
Errors Defined on Realistic Grounds; II., the Realistic Critique of
Contemporary Philosophy; III., The Realistic Program of Reform.
The present paper will be devoted to the first of these topics.
I. GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL ERRORS DEFINED ON REALISTIC GROUNDS
Methodological laxity has been the rule rather than the excep-
tion in philosophical procedure. At the opening of modern phi-
losophy a definite attempt was made to reduce philosophical dis-
course to logical form. The attempt was abandoned after the time
of Leibniz, but not until it had demonstrated the impossibility of
expressing the traditional philosophy of the time in precise defini-
tions and cogent deductions. The difference between analytical
geometry and Descartes 's "Meditations," between Euclid and
Spinoza's "Ethics," and between the calculus and Leibniz's "Mon-
adology," is unmistakable and most impressive. It is not a differ-
ence of degree of excellence, but a difference between success and
337
338 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
failure, between logical order and logical chaos. And since the time
of Leibniz the gap between philosophy and exact science has
widened. Philosophers have ordinarily been less skilled than Des-
cartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, in physics and mathematics, and in
the forms of reasoning which they require. They have also been less
devoted than were these early reformers to ideals of clarity and
cogency, less scrupulous and fastidious in both argument and as-
sertion. Meanwhile exact science has made great strides, not only
in extension, but also, and this is more to the point, in exactness.
Physics, mathematics, and logic have so been renewed in their
foundations, and refined in their superstructure, as to mark a new
epoch in the history of method. It is small wonder, then, that
philosophy falls far below the present high standards of correct
thinking. It is more surprising that philosophers show so great
an indifference to these standards even when, as is often the case,
they are themselves expert students of logic. While one can fre-
quently detect the effect of their philosophy on their logic, there is
rarely evidence that their logic has strengthened and clarified their
philosophy.
The general lack of logical form and rigor appears in both ma-
terials and structure that is, in a lack of clearness and definiteness
in fundamental concepts, and in a lack of consecutiveness in reason-
ing. These are the charges which Descartes brought against the phil-
osophical tradition of his time, and they are scarcely less pertinent
now. With these fundamental defects I do not propose to deal.
Perhaps the most striking evidence of their presence is the impossi-
bility of obtaining agreement among close students of the sources as
to what an author means by his basal concepts, such as ' ' substance, ' '
"spirit," ''will," "experience," "matter"; or what he regards as
the proof of his primary contention, such as, "the universe is ulti-
mately consciousness." 1 Philosophical systems can not be sub-
mitted to the sort of critical revision that is possible in the case of
Euclidean geometry or Newtonian mechanics, because they do not
even approximate systematic form. The terms lack definition, and
the reasoning lacks order. Thus there are no present philosophical
systems, so far as I know, that are not to some extent palpably
guilty of the basal fallacies of equivocation and petitio principii.
But it will prove more instructive in this present brief summary to
deal with certain complex fallacies, or general errors, which are
doubtless reducible to these and other elementary fallacies, but
which have assumed a more or less stereotyped form in present
philosophical literature.
'Rashdall, in "Personal Idealism," p. 339.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 339
1. The Fallacy of Argument from the Ego-centric Predicament. 2
The "ego-centric predicament" consists in the impossibility of
finding anything that is not known. This is a predicament rather
than a discovery, because it refers to a difficulty of procedure,
rather than to a character of things. It is impossible to eliminate
the knower without interrupting observation; hence the peculiar
difficulty of discovering what characters, if any, things possess when
not known. When this situation is formulated as a proposition
concerning things, the result is either the redundant inference that
all known things are known, or the false inference that all things
are known. The former is, on account of its redundancy, not a
proposition at all; and its use results only in confusing it with the
second proposition, which involves a petitio principii. The falsity
of the inference, in the case of the latter proposition, lies in its
being a use of the method of agreement unsupported by the method
of difference. It is impossible to argue from the fact that every-
thing one finds is known, to the conclusion that knowing is a uni-
versal condition of being, because it is impossible to find non-things
which are not known. The use of the method of agreement without
negative cases is a fallacy. It should be added that at best the
method of agreement is a preliminary aid to exact thought, and can
throw no light whatsoever on what can be meant by saying that
knowing is a condition of being. And yet this method, misapplied,
is the main proof, perhaps the only proof, that has been offered of
the cardinal principle of idealistic philosophies the definition of
being in terms of consciousness. It is difficult, on account of the
very lack of logical form which I have noted to obtain pure cases of
philosophical fallacies. And this particular fallacy has so far be-
come a commonplace as to be regarded as a self-evident truth. 3
The step in which it is employed is omitted or obscured in many
idealistic treatises. In others it is spread so thin, is so pervasive
and insidious, that while it lends whatever support is offered for
"I have discussed this error more fully in this JOURNAL, Vol. VII., No. 1.
' There is doubtless a dim recognition of the invalidity of the argument in
the plea which many idealistic writers make for its acceptance as self-evident.
" ' The world is my idea,' " says Schopenhauer, " is a proposition which every
one must recognize as true as soon as he understands it." ("World as Will
and Idea," Haldane and Kemp's translation, Vol. II., p. 164.) "To what
purpose," says Berkeley, " is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated
with the utmost evidence in a line or two?" ("Principles of Human Knowl-
edge," Fraser's edition, p. 269). Cf. also Bradley, "Appearance and Reality,"
p. 144. This self-evident or easily demonstrated principle never receives, how-
ever, at the hands either of these writers or of any other, an axiomatic formu-
lation or a rigid demonstration. There is an implied hope that the reader will
accept it without further ado, and allow the idealist to proceed with his
idealism.
340 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the cardinal idealistic principle, it is nowhere explicitly formulated.
But the following scattering instances will suffice to illustrate its
meaning. The first illustrates the error of redundancy, the others
the error of inference from agreement. 4
(a-) " Presence in immediate experience is a universal character
of all that is real, because it is only in so far as anything is thus pre-
sented in immediate unity with the concrete life of feeling that it
can be given as a condition or fact of which an individual interest
must be taken into account, on pain of not reaching accomplish-
ment." 3
(b) "Thus true philosophy must always be idealistic; indeed, it
must be so in order to be merely honest. For nothing is more certain
than that no man ever came out of himself in order to identify him-
self directly with things which are different from him; but every-
thing of which he has certain, and therefore immediate, knowledge
lies within his own consciousness." 6
(c) "We perceive, on reflection, that to be real, or even barely to
exist, must be to fall within sentience. ..." "-Find any piece of
existence, take up anything that any one could possibly call a fact,
and then judge if it does not consist in sentient experience.
. . . When the experiment is made strictly, I can myself conceive of
nothing else than the experienced. Anything in no sense felt or
perceived becomes to me quite unmeaning. . . . You can not find
fact unless in unity with sentience." 7
(d) "Idealism, whether of a Hegel or a Berkeley, seeks to inter-
pret the universe after the analogy of conscious life, and regards
conscious experience as for us the great reality. Wisely enough, for
in no other way can we know or find ultimate reality. ' ' 8
(e) "Wir wissen nichts von einem Sein, das ist, ohne dass es als
seiend beurteilt wird, und niemand weiss davon etwas, wenn er sich
ernstlich fragt, denn wie sollte er wissen, ohne geurteilt zu haben,
und wie sollte er urteilen, ohne dabei ein Sollen anzuerkennen 1 Wir
konnen daher nicht sagen, dass so geurteilt werden soil, wie es wirk-
* For further examples, cf. Berkeley, " Works," Fraser's edition, I., pp. 259,
406; Calkins, "The Persistent Problems of Philosophy," p. 123; Bax, "The
Roots of Reality," pp. 35, 39 ; Fichte, " Vocation of Man " ; Ferrier, " Institutes
of Metaphysics," and the author's " Egocentric Predicament," in this JOUBNAL,
Vol. VII., No. 1.
'A. E. Taylor: "Elements of Metaphysics," pp. 54-55. If the reader is
curious to verify the general charge of logical laxity made above, he is advised
to consult pp. 23-24 of this work, where he will find an " A " proposition simply
converted, and an argument for idealism based on the assertion that a real
object differs from an imaginary one through being a " psychical matter of fact."
* Schopenhauer, op. cit., p. 165.
* Bradley, " Appearance and Reality," pp. 144-146.
' Lindsay, " Studies in European Philosophy," p. 207.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 341
lich ist, sondern wir miissen diesen Satz umkehren und behaupten,
dass nur das wirklich ist, was als seiend beurteilt warden soil, dass
also das Sollen und nicht das Sein das logisch Urspriingliche ist." 9
2. The Fallacy of Pseudo-Simplicity. There is a disposition in
philosophy as well as in common sense to assume the simplicity of that
which is only familiar or stereotyped. This error has conspired with
the error just examined to lend a certain plausibility to subjectivism.
For one would scarcely assert with so much gravity that the world
was his idea, or that the "I think" must accompany every judgment,
unless he supposed that the first personal pronoun referred to some-
thing that did not require further elucidation. 10 Self-consciousness
could never have figured in idealistic philosophies as the immediate
and primary certainty if it were understood to be a complex and
problematic conception. And yet such it must be admitted to be,
once its practical simplicity, based on habits of thought and speech,
is discounted. Similarly the common dogma, to the effect that con-
sciousness can be known only introspectively, is based on the as-
sumption that it is known introspectively, and that thus approached
it is a simple datum. Traditional spiritistic conceptions of will,
activity, immediacy, and life, rest on the same fundamental misap-
prehension, as does the materialistic acceptance of body as an irre-
ducible entity. That which is really at stake here is nothing less
than the method of analysis itself. In exact procedure it is not
permitted to assert the simplicity of any concept until after analy-
sis. That the concepts enumerated above are not analytically simple,
is proved by the fact that when they are treated as simple, it is
necessary to give them a complex existence also in order to account
for what is known about them. It is customary to say that this is
a "manifestation" or "transformation" of the simple and more
fundamental reality. But this is to reverse the order which is
proper to thought as the deliberate and systematic attempt to
know. It is equivalent to asserting that the more pains we take to
know, the less real is the object of our knowledge; a proposition
which is never asserted without being contradicted, since it ex-
presses the final critical analysis of the thinker who asserts it. I
append several scattering examples. 11
(a) "A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active being as it per-
ceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces or
otherwise operates about them it is called the will. . . . Such is the
* Rickert, " Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis," pp. 156-157.
10 1 have discussed this application of the error in an article entitled " The
Mind's Familiarity with Itself," in this JOUBNAL, Vol. VI., No. 5.
11 For other examples compare Bergson, " L'Evolution Creatrice," chap. I.,
and James, " A Pluralistic Universe," pp. 260, 261, 264.
342 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
nature of Spirit, or that which acts, that it can not be of itself per-
ceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. . . . Though it
must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul,
spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving,
hating inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these
words." 12
(&) "Every man knows the difference between feeling and doing,
between idle reverie and intense thought, between impotent and
aimless drifting and unswerving tenacity of purpose, being the slave
of every passion or the master of himself. ... It must surely ever re-
main futile, nay, even foolish, to attempt to explain either receptivity
or activity ; for what is there in experience more fundamental ? And
being thus fundamental, the prime staple of all experience, it is
absurd to seek to prove them real, since in the first and foremost
sense of reality the real and they are one." 13
(c) "Do not permit thyself to be perplexed by sophists and half-
philosophers; things do not appear to thee through any representa-
tion; of the thing that exists, and that can exist, thou art imme-
diately conscious; and there is no other thing than a that of which
thou art conscious. Thou thyself art the thing; thou thyself, by
virtue of thy finitude the innermost law of thy being art thus
presented before thyself, and projected out of thyself; and all that
thou perceivest out of thyself is still thyself only. This conscious-
ness has been well named intuition. In all consciousness I contem-
plate myself, for I am myself : to the subjective, conscious being, con-
sciousness is self-contemplation." 14
(d) " Ainsi se verifie, ainsi s'eclaircira par une etude plus appro-
fondie des faits internes, le principe que nous enoncions d'abord:
la vie consciente se presente sous un double aspect, selon qu'on
1'apercoit directement ou par refraction a travers 1'espace Con-
sidere en eux-memes, les etats de conscience profonds n'ont aucun
rapport avec la quantite ; ils sont qualite pure ; ils se melent de telle
raaniere qu'on ne saurait dire s'ils sont un ou plusieurs, ni meme
les examiner a ce point de vue sans les denaturer aussitot. La duree
qu'ils creent ainsi est une duree dont les moments ne constituent pas
une multiplicite numerique. " 15
3. The Fallacy of Transcendent Implication. I use the term
"transcendent" to mean that which can not be identical with the
content of a particular cognitive state ; that which is super-cognitive,
sub-cognitive, or ultra-cognitive. The fallacy lies in the supposition
12 Berkeley, " Principles of Human Knowledge," Eraser's edition, p. 272.
M Ward, " Naturalism and Agnosticism," Vol. II., pp. 52, 53.
" Fichte, " The Vocation of Man," Smith's translation, p. 70.
" Bergson, " Essai sur les donnees imme'diates de la conscience," p. 103.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 343
that one can by means of inference or implication somehow get a
footing outside content; it being self-evident, on the contrary, that
if the inference or implication is followed through it can not but
terminate in an object, which, like the initial object, is exhibited to
the mind.
In its earlier, and now obsolescent form, this fallacy is used to
prove a material or problematic reality that causes ideas, and is in
some sense represented by them. Berkeley having shown that noth-
ing can be inferred from ideas except further ideas, this variety of
dualism very properly lost its standing in philosophical tradition.
But it was almost immediately replaced by a second variety which
still survives with undiminished prestige. According to this second
view, it is possible to infer from the content of knowledge certain
necessary "presuppositions." These do not belong to the body of
knowledge because they create or support it. Object presupposes
subject which can never be object; passivity presupposes activity
which can never be passivity; variety presupposes unity which can
never be an element of the manifold. These words and phrases are
intended to refer to that which as the universal condition of all
knowledge, can never itself be known. Now just why that which
functions in one way can not also function in another way is not
clear. There is certainly no material or practical difficulty in pho-
tographing a camera, provided one has another camera; and I sus-
pect that there is no greater difficulty in making an object of a sub-
ject, provided one can supply another subject. Nor is there any
apparent reason why a subject, while functioning as subject, i. e.,
while knowing, should not also be the object of another subject
and without any transformation or duplication whatsoever. In any
case, in spite of all professions to the contrary, it is exactly this
which takes place, when any report is made of the transcendental
presupposition. The dilemma with which Berkeley refuted the dual-
ism of Locke applies with equal force to the dualism of Kant. The
transcendental is no better than the transcendent. Either the a
priori forms of subjectivity and the transcendental ego of appercep-
tion are known or they are not. In the latter case, they may be
simply neglected as verbal fictions ; in the former case they must be
ideas, or content of mind, and take their place with the rest. In the
examples which follow, the first two illustrate the earlier dualism,
and the rest the later or transcendental dualism.
(a) "It is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without
that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us
know that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes
that idea in us, though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it
does it ; ... v. g., whilst I write this, I have, by the paper affecting
344 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
my eyes, tha.t idea produced in my mind, which, whatever object
causes, I call white; by which I know that that quality or accident
(i. e., whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea)
doth really exist, and hath a being without me." 16
(&) "Turn the problem round and ponder over it as we may,
beyond the sense-impression, beyond the brain terminals of the sen-
sory nerves we can not get. Of what is beyond them, of 'things-in-
themselves,' as the metaphysicians term them, we can know but one
characteristic, and this we can only describe as a capacity for pro-
ducing sense-impressions, for sending messages along the sensory
nerves to the brain." 17
(c) "Thus we see that the famous psychological argument (for
the simplicity of the thinking I ) is founded merely on the indivisible
unity of a representation, which only determines the verb with refer-
ence to a person; and it is clear that the subject of inherence is
designated transcendentally only by the I, which accompanies the
thought, without our perceiving the smallest quality of it, in fact,
without our knowing anything about it. It signifies a something in
general (a transcendental subject) the representation of which must
no doubt be simple, because nothing is determined in it, and nothing
can be represented more simple than by the concept of a mere some-
thing. The simplicity, however, of the representation of a subject is
not, therefore, a knowledge of the simplicity of the subject, because
no account whatever is taken of its qualities when it is designated
by the entirely empty expression I, an expression that can be applied
to every thinking subject." 18
(d) "The notion of a relation between consciousness and some-
thing beyond is necessarily an imperfect one; for there can be no
second term for the relation to take hold of: the category of Tran-
scendence, like its correlative, Manifestation, is one-sided, or merely
indicative or oretic. Nevertheless, since all metaphysical speculation
points to transcendent Being, I submit, fourthly, that we may give
this vacuum some body, or at least a skeleton, by transferring thither
something from its correlative consciousness. . . . That which is thus
defined can not be called Subject, for that term is applicable only
to its conscious activity. Nor is 'Substance' a satisfactory name;
for it suggests that consciousness is an attribute and therefore a
degree less real. 'Soul' has the merit of meaning a conscious thing
having also other characters. . . . Perhaps the most colorless name
for it is the Transcendent, or merely Being. ' ' 19
18 Locke, " Essay Concerning the Human Understanding," Bohn Lib., Vol.
II., p. 244.
a Pearson, " Grammar of Science," p. 67.
18 Kant, " Critique of Pure Reason," Max Mtiller's translation, pp. 289-290.
"Read, "Metaphysics of Nature," pp. 171-172.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 345
(e) "Dass das erkenntnistheoretische Subjekt niemals Objekt
werden kann, well es, als Objekt gedacht, sich selbst als Subjekt stete
voraussetzt, heisst nur, dass es nicht als ein urirkliches Objekt zu
denken ist, das immanent oder transzendent existiert. Diese
Behauptung aber schliesst nicht aus, das wir den Begriff eines
solchen Subjekts zum Objekt einer erkenntnistheoretischen Eror-
terung machen, denn dadurch wird nicht das erkenntnistheoretische
Subjekt selbst, sodern eben nur sein Begriff zum Objekt, und man
wird doch nicht behaupten wollen, dass, wenn wir ein Objekt unter-
suchen, das ein Begriff ist, dieser Begriff notwendig der Begriff eines
Objekts sei. Wir brauchen also nur daran festzuhalten, dass unsere
erkenntnistheoretischen Begriffe keinen Inhalt haben, der sich auf
Wirklichkeiten bezieht, und es mussen dann alle scheinbaren Para-
doxien verschwinden. ' ' to
4. The Error of Exclusive Particularity. It is ordinarily as-
sumed that a particular term of any system belongs to such system
exclusively. That this is a false assumption is proved empirically.
The point b of the class of points that constitutes the straight line
abc, may belong also to the class of points that constitute the inter-
secting straight line xby. The man John Doe who belongs to the
class Republican Party, may belong also to the intersecting class
captains of industry. Unless this multiple classification of terms
were possible, discourse would break down utterly. All the terms of
discourse are general in the sense that they belong to several contexts.
It is this fact that accounts for the origin and the usefulness of lan-
guage. And without this generality of terms the world would pos-
sess no structure, not even motion or similarity. For there could be
no motion if the same could not be in different places at different
times, and there could be no similarity if the same could not appear
in different qualitative groupings. It is little wonder, then, that
the virtual rejection of this principle by philosophy has led to a
fundamental and perpetual difficulty. To this error may be traced,
I think, the untenability of Platonic universalism, recognized appar-
ently by Plato himself; and the untenability of modern particular-
ism, attested by the desperate efforts which almost every modern
philosopher has made to save himself from it.
The most familiar variety of particularism is found in naturalism.
This may be traced to the naive bias for the space-time order, or that
historical series of bodily changes which constitutes the course of
nature. Naturalism asserts that this is the only system, and that its
terms, the several bodily events, belong to it exclusively. That this
theory is untenable is evident at once, since in order that bodily
events shall possess the structure and connections necessary to them,
* Rickert, " Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis," p. 154.
346 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
being must contain other terms, such as places, times, numbers, etc.,
that are not bodily events. But historically, naturalism has been
discredited mainly by its failure to provide for the system of ideas,
a system without which the bodily system itself could not be known.
And it is the exclusive particularity of the terms of this latter that
has figured most prominently in philosophical discussions.
In dualism of the Cartesian type the terms of nature and the
terms of knowledge are regarded as exclusive, but in order that
knowledge shall mean anything at all, it is assumed that there is
some sort of representative relation between them. Spinoza and
Leibniz endeavored to bring them together through a third and
neutral term. Among the English philosophers the impossibility of
showing how the mind can know nature if each is a closed circle,
possessing its content wholly within itself, leads finally to the aboli-
tion of nature as an independent system. Thus the pendulum swings
from naturalism to subjectivism. And in the whole course of this
dialectic the mistaken principle of exclusive particularity is as-
sumed.
In the position of Hume the error assumes the form in w y hich it
still persists. Speaking generally, philosophy since Hume has been
engaged in the same task that occupies Hume in the closing sections
of his "Treatise," the task of compensating for a radical particular-
ism assumed at the outset. For Hume the world dissolves into the
temporal flow of states each of which is unique and irrecoverable.
But it is clear that were the world such as that, there could be no
knowledge. For in order that there shall be knowledge it is neces-
sary that different knowing states shall return to the same object.
There must be persistent topics, and identical assertions amidst the
diversity of knowing states. Thus it would be impossible for Hume
to know that the world is a flux, unless this general flux character
could somehow be repeatedly and consistently asserted at different
moments of the flux. And if this is possible, the assertion can not be
wholly identified with any particular moment.
Nominalism is a way of nursing this difficulty without curing it.
There is no curing it without removing its cause, the error of exclu-
sive particularity. Assume that a term may belong to a class with-
out belonging to it wholly or exclusively, and there is no difficulty
in supposing that a proposition such as consciousness is a flux may
belong to the flux of consciousness, and also to other systems which
are more permanent or even out of time altogether. That this in-
volves no contradiction is proved, as consistency in the last analysis
always is, by the cases that can be found. Nominalism does not
remove the source of the difficulty, but attempts to dispense alto-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 347
gether with the generality of terms by introducing a higher order of
particularity.
Humanistic nominalism, inaugurated by Hume himself, attributes
to names, concepts, constructs, etc., a scope or range that is not pos-
sessed by the particulars of sense. They are the instruments or
meanings of society at large, and hence pass more slowly into the
limbo of the past. But they do pass nevertheless, and Hume's
original difficulty is only changed in scale. If one thinks in terms
of epochs rather than in terms of moments, it is still evident that
knowledge is impossible. Since every judgment is limited to its
own epoch, it is not permitted to judge of the order of epochs.
After a sufficient lapse of time every assertion is contradicted.
Absolute nominalism asserts that there is only one knower, who
comprehends the whole of history, and whose cognitive states pos-
sess a final or standard particularity. The process of consciousness
is still the single system to which every term belongs, and which
possesses its terms exclusively. Everything is held to be that par-
ticular mode or act in which the absolute knows it. There is an
obvious presumption against such a theory on account of its arti-
ficiality, and the extremely questionable character of its central
conception. Hence its utter futility is apparent when it is seen that
it does not render that special service for which it was invoked.
For it is as impossible as ever to retain the principle of exclusive
particularity. It is still necessary to explain within the absolute's
knowledge how there may be motion and similarity. It is no easier
to understand how the absolute may will, intend, or mean the same
in different contexts, than it is to understand how the same terms
may belong to different contexts. Furthermore, it is necessary to
explain how what the absolute knows eternally may also be known
by the finite knower temporally, and this is no easier than to ex-
plain how what man knows may belong also to the more stable order
of nature. In either case, it is necessary to recognize the multiple
particularity of terms, and had this principle been accepted at the
outset, the whole nominalistic construction, with its attendant con-
fusion of mind, would have been unnecessary. 21
(a) "My sensations are in myself, not in the object, for I am
myself and not the object ; I am conscious only of myself and of my
state, not of the state of the object." 22
21 In addition to the examples given in the text, cf. also Hume, " Treatise
of Human Nature/' Green and Grose edition, introduction, pp. 267, 299, and
passim; Schiller, From Plato to Protagoras, in his "Studies in Humanism";
Bergson, " L'Evolution Cr&itrice," pp. 164 sq.; James, "A Pluralistic Universe,"
p. 280; Royce, "Conception of God," pp. 289-9; Taylor, "Elements of Meta-
physics," pp. 57, 58, 60.
* Fichte, " The Vocation of Man," Smith's translation, p. 42.
348 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
(&) "That if we were merely phenomena among phenomena
we could not have knowledge of a world of phenomena, appears
from analysis of the conditions of an intelligent experience. . . .
The modifications of our sensibility can not, as successive events,
make up our consciousness of them. Within the consciousness that
they are related in the way of before and after there is no before
and after. There is no such relation between components of the
consciousness as there is between the events of which it is the con-
sciousness. They form a process in time. If it were a process in
time, it would not be a consciousness of them as forming such a
process. ' ' 23
(c) "The external world and my fellow creatures therein are
real 'independently' of me, because this assumption is essential to
my action, and therefore as real as the experience I am thereby try-
ing to control, provided always that the situation which evoked the
postulate continues. Thus the 'independence' of the real world is
limited by the very postulate which constructed it; it is an inde-
pendence subject to the one condition that its postulation skould not
cease. If, therefore, anything should happen in my experience lead-
ing me to doubt its ultimateness, the reality of the 'independent'
external world would be at once affected." 24
(d} "The nature of objectivity depends entirely on how experi-
ence as a whole is conceived. But objectivity, as the control exerted
by the unity, does imply that, as such, it can not fall simply and
solely within the life history of the mere individual. In some way it
must lie beyond its processes, no matter what their span, or how long
they continue. ... It is, therefore, impossible to limit it to a 'social
unity' inside which the individual life history is spent. . . . We seem
bound, therefore, to admit that, in the long run, the only objectivity
which is final is that in which the unity determining finite processes
within experience is simply the unity of all experience as such. . . .
Being experience it must be the experience of a conscious life, and
being a unity, consciously referred to as such, it must be the ex-
perience of a single subject, an Absolute Individuality." 25
5. The Speculative Dogma. By the "speculative dogma" I mean
the assumption for philosophical purposes that there is an all-suffi-
cient, all-general principle, a single fundamental proposition that
adequately determines or explains everything. This assumption has
commonly taken one or the other of two forms. By many it has been
assumed that such a principle constitutes the proper content or sub-
ject-matter of philosophy. But such an assumption is dogmatic
28 Green, " Prolegomena to Ethics," pp. 69-60.
34 Schiller, " Studies in Humanism," p. 474.
* Baillie, " Idealistic Construction of Experience," pp. 23-25.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 349
because it ignores the prior question as to whether there is such
a principle or not. So far as the general task of philosophy is
concerned this must be treated as an open question. Philosophy
does aim, it is true, to generalize as widely and comprehend as ade-
quately as possible; but a loosely aggregated world abounding in
unmitigated variety, is a valid philosophical hypothesis. The dis-
covery of a highly coherent system under which all the wealth of
experience could be subsumed, would be the most magnificent of
philosophical achievements; but if there is no such system philos-
ophy must be satisfied with something less with whatever, in
fact, there happens to be. By others, in the second place, it has
been assumed that the idea of such a principle or system is the
property of every thoughtful person, the existence of an object
corresponding to it being alone doubtful. This assumption gave
rise to the ontological proof of God, which carried conviction only
so long as men did not question the definiteness and meaning of
the idea. For the assumption obscured a problem, the problem,
namely, as to whether there is any idea corresponding to the words
ens realissimum. The possibility of defining, on general logical
grounds, a maximum of being or truth, is to say the least highly
questionable. And it is certain that this problem must properly
precede any inferences from such a maximal idea.
The speculative dogma has been the most prolific cause of the
verbal abuses which abound in philosophy, and which I propose to
consider separately. It is through this dogma that various words
have been invested with a certain hyperbole and equivocation, in
consequence of the attempt to stretch their meaning to fit the specu-
lative demand. A further evil arising from the speculative dogma
is the unjust and confusing disparagement of positive knowledge,
through invidious comparison with this Unknown God to which the
philosopher has erected his altar.
(a) "Water is the material cause of all things." 26
(6) "And when I speak of the other division of the intellectual,
you will also understand me to speak of that knowledge which
reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypoth-
eses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses that is to say,
as steps and points of departure into a region which is above hy-
potheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first prin-
ciple of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which de-
pends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the
aid of any sensible object, beginning and ending in ideas. ' ' 27
(c) "When the mind afterwards reviews the different ideas
* Thales, in Burnet's " Early Greek Philosophy," p. 42.
21 Descartes, " Principles of Philosophy," Veitch's edition, p. 199.
350 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
that are in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them
that of a Being omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect;
and it observes that in this idea there is contained not only possible
and contingent existence, as in the ideas of all other things which it
clearly perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and eternal." 28
(d) "We can not play the game of thought, if one might use
such an expression, without taking our stand upon the idea that the
world is a self -consistent and intelligible whole: though, of course,
this does not mean that any actual attempt to systematize our
knowledge can be more than a step towards the attainment of the
ideal of a perfect analysis and resynthesis of the manifold con-
tent of experience. The problem of knowledge is to find out how
the real unity of the world manifests itself through all its equally
real differences. ... It is involved in the very idea of a developing
consciousness such as ours, that while as an intelligence, it pre-
supposes the idea of the whole, and, both in thought and action,
must continually strive to realize that idea, yet what it deals with is
necessarily a partial and limited experience, and its actual attain-
ments can never, either in theory or practise, be more than pro-
visional. ' ' 29
6. The Error of Verbal Suggestion. Words which do not possess
a clear and unambiguous meaning, but which nevertheless have a
rhetorical effect owing to their associations, lend themselves to a
specious discourse, having no cognitive value in itself, and standing
in the way of the attainment of genuine knowledge. This is Bacon's
famous idol of the forum. In philosophy this reliance on the sug-
gestive, rather than the proper denotative or connotative function
of words, is due not only to man 's general and ineradicable tendency
to verbalism, but also to the wide vogue of doctrines that are funda-
mentally inarticulate. We have already examined two errors which
lead philosophers to accept such doctrines. The error of transcend-
ent implication involves a reference to topics that can not be ex-
hibited between mind and mind; they can not be identified and as-
signed a single and unequivocal name. The speculative dogma has,
as we have seen, led to the use of words which shall somehow convey
a sense of finality, or of limitless and exhaustive application, where
no specific object or exact concept possessing such characters is
offered for inspection. This is what Berkeley calls the "method of
growing in expression, and dwindling in notion." Ordinarily the
words so used have a precise meaning also, and there results a double
evil. On the one hand, the exact meaning of such terms as "force,"
* Plato's "Republic," 511 B, Jowett's translation.
29 Edward Caird, " Idealism and the Theory of Knowledge," reprinted from
the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. I., pp. 8-9.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 351
"matter," ''consciousness," "will," etc., is blurred and vitiated;
and on the other hand, their speculative meaning borrows a content
to which it is not entitled. The desire of philosophers to satisfy the
religious demand for an object of worship or faith, doubtless one of
the fundamental motives of the speculative dogma, leads to yet
another variety of verbal suggestion, in which a technical philo-
sophical conception is given a name that possesses eloquence and
power of edification. Thus philosophers commonly prefer the term
"eternal" to the term "non-temporal," and "infinite" to "series
with no last term," or "class, a part of which can be put in one-to-
one correspondence with the whole. ' ' Such terms as ' ' significance, ' '
"supreme," "highest," "unity," have a similar value. Or the
same end may be achieved by decorating almost any word with a
capital letter; as is exemplified by the emotional difference between
truth and Truth, or absolute and Absolute.
But, finally, there is a verbal abuse which is wors. even, than
equivocation. For it is possible to invent utterly fictitious concepts
simply by combining words. In such cases, the constituent con-
cepts, if the words happen to signify any, are not united. They may
be positively repugnant, or simply irrelevant. At any rate, they
have not been tested for consistency, and whether they do or do not
constitute a true system or complex concept remains wholly prob-
lematic. This is the principal source of the fallacy of obscurum per
obscurius and affords an almost limitless opportunity for error.
Examples of this error will be found also under several of the errors
examined above, more especially those of transcendent implication
and the speculative dogma. 30
(a) "As before shown, we can not go on merging derivative
truths in those wider truths from which they are derived, without
reaching at least a widest truth which can be merged in no other,
or derived from no other. And the relation in which it stands to
the truths of science in general, shows that this truth transcending
demonstration is the Persistence of Force. To this an ultimate analy-
sis brings us down, and on this a rational synthesis must be built
up. ... But when we ask what this energy is, there is no answer
save that it is the noumenal cause implied by the phenomenal effect.
Hence the force of which we assert persistence is that Absolute
Force we are obliged to postulate as the necessary correlate of the
force we are conscious of. By the Persistence of Force, we really
mean the persistence of some Cause which transcends our knowledge
and conception. In asserting it we assert an Unconditioned Reality,
without beginning or end." 81
80 See also Munsterberg's " Eternal Values," pp. 403-404.
n Spencer, " First Principles," sixth edition, pp. 175-176.
352 THE JOVRXAL OF PHILOSOPHY
(&) "In his treatise of the Celestial Hierarchy, he (Dionysius
the Areopagite) saith that God is something above all essence and
life, irrrep Tracrav ovcriav Kal farjv ; and again, in his treatise of the
Divine Names, that He is above all wisdom and understanding, inrep
Tracrav crofyiav Kal crvvecriv, ineffable and innominable, app^os Kal
avaiwfjios ; the wisdom of God he terms an unreasonable, unintelli-
gent, and foolish wisdom ; rrjv akoyov, Kal avow, Kal /Acopav ao<piav.
But then the reason he gives for expressing himself in this strange
manner is, that the Divine wisdom is the cause of all reason, wis-
dom, and understanding, and therein are contained the treasures of
all wisdom and knowledge. He calls God inrepcrofyos and vTrep^ay; ; as
if wisdom and life were words not worthy to express the divine
perfections: and he adds that the attributes unintelligent and un-
perceiving must be ascribed to the divinity, not /car'e\\en/rtz;, by way
of defect, but K.a& v7Tpo%r)v, by way of eminency; which he ex-
plains by our giving the name of darkness to light inaccessible." 32
(c) "It is not that a primary thought or even a creative moral
activity operates in us, but that a new totality of life, a self-existent
and self-sufficing being, a primary creative power which fashions
the world and expresses itself in complete acts, makes its presence
felt in us this is the cardinal principle on the attainment and
vivid realization of which all truth of thought and life depends
for us." 83
(d) "This brings us to the Absolute Idea. . . . Reality is a
differentiated unity, in which the unity has no meaning but the
differentiations, and the differentiations have no meaning but the
unity. The differentiations are individuals for each of whom the
unity exists, and whose whole nature consists in the fact that the
unity is for them, as the whole nature of the unity consists in the
fact that it is for the individuals." 34
The indictment which realism finds against traditional and con-
temporary philosophy is based, I believe, on these six charges. As
I have thus far expounded them they doubtless appear to be quite
miscellaneous, and to afford no ground for systematic construction.
But in a second paper, which will deal with rival doctrines and
M Berkeley, " Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher," Fraser's edition, Vol.
II., pp. 182-183. Berkeley's comment is as follows: "Upon the whole, although
this method of growing in expression and dwindling in notion, of clearing up
doubts by nonsense, and avoiding difficulties by running into affected contradic-
tions, may perhaps proceed from a well-meant zeal, yet it appears not to be
according to knowledge."
w Eucken, " Life of the Spirit," Pogson's translation, p. 329.
** McTaggart, " Studies in Hegelian Cosmology," p. 19.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 353
formulate a program of reform, I shall hope to prove that these
criticisms have some underlying connection and positive import.
RALPH BARTON PERRY.
HABVABD UNIVERSITY.
DISCUSSION
JAMES, BERGSON AND MR. PITKIN
MR. PITKIN 'S article in Vol. VII., No. 9, of this JOURNAL seems
to exhibit Professor James in another of his imputed protean
roles. This time he appears, if Mr. Pitkin is right, as an untrust-
worthy reporter, a perverter of truth, who by his report has done
Bergson a grave injustice, and himself perhaps a graver one. That
there are differences between James and Bergson may be true, but it
is hard to believe that James in his account of Bergson in " A Plural-
istic Universe," blindly or willfully overlooked them, or that they
were a matter of issue in that book. The question under discussion
was not metaphysical, but epistemological, and Professor James's
confidence in concepts was broken, not in so far as they were used as
controllers, but as revealers. Their status in the flux was not in
issue; their function as revealing it, was. And I submit, that if
Bergson teaches anything, he teaches that concepts do not reveal
reality, and can not.
Moreover, I doubt whether even metaphysically, there is the dif-
ference between James's and Bergson 's view of the concept that Mr.
Pitkin thinks there is. For both, essentially, the concept is less than
the real, a secondary and derivative function of it, and not the
real itself, taken in its integrity. Differences in the mode of formu-
lating this vision of the concept's nature there no doubt are, but
the vision is, to me at any rate, essentially the same. Therefore,
until Mr. Pitkin announced it, I had no idea that Professor James
was ' ' against intellect. ' ' I was pleasantly certain that he was against
intellectualism, but not against intellect on the contrary, I had al-
ways supposed that Professor James had consistently done what
Mr. Pitkin finds so excellent in Bergson had "taught that concepts
were to be trusted in so far as we know what we are doing ivith
them and in so far as we use them intelligently. ' n In fact, I had
thought that pragmatism involved some such doctrine of the con-
cept, and in another paper 2 I had suggested, with Professor James's
approval, that it does so. My conviction in this regard is so obsti-
nate that I can not help doubting, in spite of Mr. Pitkin 's very clear
1 This JOUBNAL, VII., 9, p. 230.
'This JOUBNAL, VI., 24.
354 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and very damning quotations from both James and Bergson,
whether he is really correct in his account. This doubt is further
intensified by the fact that there has been ample time for Bergson
to protest if he had believed himself misrepresented by James, yet
no such protest, either public or private, has been forthcoming.
Finally, Mr. Pitkin has brought me to consider that if "such an
acute, sympathetic and well-seasoned reader as Professor James
ever fancied he saw an exponent of his anti-intellectualism in Berg-
son," he is more likely to be right than Mr. Pitkin. But that is
another matter. I am merely concerned here to show that whatever
the differences or agreements between James and Bergson, James's
report of Bergson is Mr. Pitkin to the contrary notwithstanding
essentially correct. I can not help thinking, in a word, that Mr. Pit-
kin's reading of Bergson has caught at the inessential rather than
the essential a cinematographic instant, not the cumulative move-
ment of Bergson 's thought.
Mr. Pitkin 's quotations come from the introduction to "L 'Evolu-
tion Creatrice" and from the chapter De la Signification de la Vie,
pp. 216, 221, 225 from those sections which discuss the natural
function of intellect and indicate the utilitarian nature of knowing.
The whole of this discussion and most of the chapter to which it
belongs is still antecedent to that critique of intellect ualism with
which Professor James is concerned in his report, and Mr. Pitkin 's
quotations, and his use of them, made me feel that he had missed
both the intent and the method of Bergson. The Bergsonian method
is dramatic and cumulative ; his intent is to demonstrate the external-
ity of thought, its inadequacy for getting at the heart of reality.
Beginning with an analysis of the evolution of life, he proceeds by
showing that each of its mutations is purely utilitarian, and that
each account of it misses its inner nature. Intellect, in the natural,
still uncriticized, history of man, is such a utilitarian miracle of
mutation, operating for the sake of keeping man going, but not for
the sake of seeing reality as it is. Instrumental, unspeculative, it
touches, when generalized, upon the absolute, matter which it has
operated upon, which it has adapted to itself, until it has reached
the limit of its proper capacity. Intrinsically, matter is pure, un-
divided "ecoulement" continuous flux, in reality identical with the
other and polarized movement called life. But extrinsically, "le
sectionnement de la matiere en corps inorganises est relatif a nos
sens et a notre intelligence ... la matiere, envisagee comme un
tout indivisee doit etre un flux plutot qu'une chose" (p. 203).
Again, " intellectualite et materialite se seraient constitutes
dan le detail par adaptation reciproque. L'une et 1'autre
355
deriveraient d'une forme d 'existence plus vaste et plus haute"
(p. 204). The effective determinant of material form is, more-
over, as for Dr. Schiller, more human than material. "Nos per-
ceptions nous donnent le dessin de notre action possible sur les
choses bien plus que celui des choses memes" (p. 206).
These passages are all from the beginning of the chapter from
which Mr. Pitkin has quoted so signally. They belong to an intro-
ductory sketch of the chapter's aim, which is finally defined, on
pages 211-212, as the demonstration that "la philosophic ne peut
pas, ne doit pas accepter la relation etablie par le pur intellectual-
isme entre la theorie de la connaissance et la theorie de connu, entre
la metaphysique et la science." This once agreed, it will be found
that "1 'effort que nous donnons pour depasser le pur entendement
nous introduit dans quelque chose de plus vaste, ou notre entende-
ment se decoupe et dont il a du se detacher" (p. 217). Please note
the phrase I have italicized.
These few citations from the outline of the Bergsonian critical
program indicate with sufficient clearness, I should think, how Pro-
fessor James "can believe that Bergson thinks that concepts serve
us practically more than theoretically," that "conception develop-
ing its subtle and more contradictory implications comes to an end
of its usefulness" and that Bergson "drops conception." But in the
interest of fairness let us take a full measure of quotation. Turn to
the final portions of this chapter favored by Mr. Pitkin De la sig-
nification de la vie. You find that the whole preceding analysis of
knowing and intellect aims exactly at driving home the doctrine that
utilities are not revelations, that conception must be dropped. Things
do not exist, you are repeatedly told, only actions. ' ' La chose resulte
d'une solidification operee par notre entendement il n'y a jamais
d'autre choses que celles que 1 'entendement a constitutes. . . . Les
choses se constituent par la coupe instantanee que 1 'entendement
pratique, a un moment donnee ..." (pp. 270, 271).
These hints become still more articulate and explicit when we
pass from the description of the natural function of intellect to the
critique of that substitution of the fixations of intellect for the
character of reality which is called intellectualism. Then we find
that in judgment concepts are things "plus ou moins artificiellement
crees par 1 'esprit de 1'homme, je veux dire extraits par sa libre initia-
tive de la continuity de 1'experience" (p. 315). Forms and con-
cepts are invariably abstractions that miss the heart of reality. Even
the concept of change itself is an inadequate substitute for "la
specificite du changement." What is here discussed, please note, is
not concepts in operation, instruments helping us to get about in the
356 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
world, concepts "used intelligently and in so far as we know what
we are doing with them," but concepts as mere, practical cinemato-
graphic views of reality envisaged as its: metaphysical essence, by
Plato, by Aristotle, by science, etc. The outcome of the discussion
is that Bergson "drops conception" just as Professor James says.
The reality is a thick, enduring, creative flux. Thought is a cine-
matographic mechanism and involves in its very essence two funda-
mental illusions. One consists in believing "qu'on pourra penser
1'instable par 1 'intermediaire du stable, le mouvant par l'immobile."
The other consists in the practical habit that thought has developed
of making use of the pseudo-idea of a void in trying to think the
fullness of reality as such. 3 The concept, whatever its status in real-
ity, is a "fundamental illusion" as a revealer, as a signification or
representative of reality. Its sole business is to control. Immobile,
it does, just as Professor James says, altogether negate the inwardness
of the moving reality. It must be dropped, if that reality is to be
apprehended. "Sur le flux meme de la duree la science ne voulait
ni ne pouvait avoir prise, attachee qu'elle etait a la methode cine-
matographique. On se serait degage de cette methode. 4 Ou eut
exige de 1 'esprit qu'il renoncat a ses habitudes les plus cheres.
C'est a 1'interieur du devenir qu'on se serait transports par un
effort de sympathie. Ou ne se fut plus demande ou un mobile sera,
quelle configuration un systeme prendra, par quel etat un change-
ment passera a n'importe quel moment: les moments du temps qui
ne sont que des arrets de notre attention, eussent ete abolis: c'est
1 'eeoulement du temps, c'est le flux meme du reel qu'on eut essaye
de suivre. Le premier genre de connaissance a 1'avantage de nous
faire prevoir 1'avenir et de nous rendre, dans une certaine mesure,
maitres des evenements; en revanche il ne retient de la realite
mouvante que des immobilites eventuelles, c'est a dire des vues prises
sur elle par notre esprit: il symbolise le reel et le transpose en h um a in
plutot qu'il ne I'exprime. 5 L'autre connaissance, si elle est possible,
sera pratiquement inutile, elle n'etendra pas notre empire sur la
nature, elle contrariera meme certaines aspirations naturelles de
1'intelligence ; mais, si elle reussissait, c'est la realite meme qu'elle
embrasserait dans une definitive etreinte " (pp. 370-371).
I have quoted at length. I could not do otherwise in fairness to
Professor James. And anybody who reads this book of Bergson 's
through, or who is at all acquainted with his two earlier ones, 6 must
8 To get M. Bergson's full intention the whole passage, pp. 295 to the
middle of 297, should be read.
4 The italics are mine.
* The italics are mine.
* " Les donnees immediates de la conscience" and " Matiere et me'moire."
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 357
realize that, if there are differences between Bergson and James,
they are not missed by the latter. His primary concern in "A
Pluralistic Universe" is not with them, but with Bergson 's critique
of intellectualism. Mr. Pitkin has not shown, and I feel sure, can
not show that James anywhere claims an unjustified unanimity with
Bergson. Mr. Pitkin simply misses the point of James's discussion
and Bergson 's intent. So far as reporting on Bergson goes, what
has here been cited must indicate clearly that if anybody has failed
to understand Bergson, it is not William James.
H. M. KALLEN.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Imitation in Monkeys. M. E. HAGGERTY. Journal of Comparative
Neurology and Psychology, Vol. XIX. (1909). Pp. 337-455.
Dr. Haggerty's problem was " to discover in what ways certain species
of monkeys are influenced by one another's acts." As a matter of fact,
his paper is mainly devoted to proving that the behavior of one animal
does influence the behavior of another (observing) animal. The work is
not carried far enough to allow us to make any analysis of the ways in
which this influence is exerted.
The investigation was carried on in the Harvard Psychological Labo-
ratory from October, 1907, to June, 1908, and in the New York Zoological
Park from the latter date to September, 1908. The subjects used in the
tests were eight cebus monkeys and three macacus monkeys.
The problem set the animal consisted in the manipulation of simple
but well-chosen types of mechanisms. A large roomy experimental cage
was built which permitted the easy installation of any desired mechanical
device. In all seven types of mechanism were presented to the animals.
Their type is sufficiently indicated by calling them, respectively, the chute,
rope, paper, screen, plug, button, and spring mechanism. The successful
manipulation of these devices always furnished the animal with food.
Each of the eleven animals was given five opportunities to learn to
manipulate the mechanisms unaided. At the conclusion of these prelim-
inary trials, it was found that each animal had either solved the problem
unaided by the usual trial method or else had lost all interest in solving it.
In every problem, then, the experimenter had at his disposal certain
trained animals (called imitatees) and certain untrained animals called
imitators. It remained then to test the effect upon the imitator of allow-
ing tbe imitatee to solve the problem in the presence of the former. In
some cases the imitator was allowed to enter the experimental cage with
the imitatee; in others, the imitator was confined in an observation box
which afforded a clear view of the acts of the imitatee. The imitator, after
watching the acts of the imitatee, was immediately afterwards allowed
to try the problem. He was permitted to work ten minutes (or longer if
he seemed on the point of solving it). If at tbe expiration of this time
358 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
he had not solved it, he was again put back in the observation box and
allowed to watch the trained animal again go through with the task.
" An animal was not counted to have failed until he had seen the per-
formance a hundred times and yet was not able to repeat it." By this
procedure, Dr. Haggerty hoped to be able to get some indication or
measure of the influence which the irnitatee's act has upon the imitator's.
The author finds abundant evidence of the presence of imitation in all
seven of his experiments.
By the word "imitation" the author means to imply the following
behavior: (a) the animal which imitates observes an act of another
animal; (&) more or less directly thereafter its behavior is modified in
the direction of the act observed; (c) this modification is usually sudden;
(c?) the behavior is changed to a considerable degree, and, when wholly
successful, is an exact copy of the act observed. Defined in this way, the
author reports that the seven experiments yielded a total of sixteen suc-
cessful cases of imitation, three of which were immediate; and five cases
of partially successful imitation. Of the eleven animals used, only two
failed to exhibit imitative behavior.
It is of interest to note that imitation did not always occur between
animals thoroughly accustomed to each other. Familiarity tended to
lessen attention. Strangeness and a certain amount of pugnacity seemed
effective in arousing attention.
The paper furnishes us with a mass of very valuable detail, but the
author does not attempt to analyze just what the effective factors are
which bring about the change in behavior on the part of the imitator.
For example, so simple a control test as touching or otherwise indicating
the part which the animal ought to attack was apparently not carried out.
Nor did the experimenter try the effect of manipulating the devices him-
self. It will be remembered that the author states his problem as being
" to discover in what ways certain species of monkeys are influenced by
one another's acts," and while this limitation of the problem excuses him
to a certain extent from carrying out the control tests just suggested, yet,
at the same time, the fundamental question to be settled is, was the
imitator's behavior changed because of or through the acts of the imitatee,
or merely by reason of the fact that his attention was attracted to the
proper locality? If the latter is the case, it is obvious that it is not the
act of the imitatee per se which brings about the change in behavior on
the part of the imitator. While there is no evidence for it, still the fact
remains that the mechanical manipulation of the devices (e. g., if the
string, button, etc., had been manipulated or even pointed out with a
stick) might have produced the same result. These statements are
offered as a criticism of the author's too narrow method rather than of his
experimental work. So far as the reviewer can see, the latter is extremely
well done. Further analysis, however, is well worth while.
The paper really attempts too much. The author would have given
us a clearer insight into this vexed and controversial subject if, in place
of amassing so much material from so many different types of experi-
ments, he had worked more intensively upon a single well-chosen experi-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 359
ment. However, even admitting the all-too-common fault of incomplete
ness, it is evident that Haggerty's work is a solid achievement. The
amount of work involved in carrying through such a series of experiments
is enormous no matter what animal is used as a subject. It is more than
doubled when the monkey is used, by reason of his restlessness, agility,
and generally uncleanly habits.
JOHN B. WATSON.
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVEBSITY.
Kant's Theory of Knowledge. H. A. PRICHARD. Oxford : The Clarendon
Press. 1909. Pp. vi + 324.
This book appears to be a critical first-hand study of the " Critique of
the Pure Keason." The other critiques and their bearing upon the first
" Critique " do not receive attention. More particularly this work is a
critical exposition of the " Transcendental ^Esthetic and Analytic " ; the
" Dialectic " not being considered to any extent.
Mr. Prichard has made an earnest attempt to understand and elucidate
the difficulties that unfortunately are found all too frequently in Kant.
It would appear as if the author of the book in question had availed him-
self comparatively little of the largely developed Kantian literature, if
the references can be taken as an inference. If this be so, the question is
pertinent as to whether this is not an advantage, at least in some respects.
A study of the original with a limited number of helps sometimes gives
better results than making use of a larger number with the danger of
obscuration and misleading views from the multiplicity of interpretations.
Granting then the correctness of Mr. Prichard's apparent motive and
method, the question is in regard to the amount or value of his elucida-
tion and appreciation of the Kantian epistemology.
The thirteen chapters of this book deal with the sensibility and under-
standing, space and time, phenomena and noumena, knowledge and reality,
the categories, the analogies of experience, and the postulates of empirical
thought, as well as some general considerations as the " problem of the
' C 
