THE JOTJBNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
J
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY
AND
SCIENTIFIC METHODS
EDITED BY
FREDEBICK J. E. WOODBBIDGE
AND
T. BUSH
VOLUME IX
JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1912
THE SCIENCE PRESS
1912
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VOL. IX. No. 1. JANUARY 4, 1912.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
DO THINGS EXIST?
AT first sight nothing could seem more obvious than that things,
individual blocks, exist. In fact that things exist as indi-
vidual and distinct has seemed far clearer to common sense than that
minds are individual. We only have to recollect that Aristotle found
mind (active nous) impersonal and universal, while the body, with
the functions depending upon it, seemed to furnish the individual
substrate, and that Thomas Aquinas makes the body the principle of
individuation, without which human souls, like the angels, would
merge into the genus. It is unnecessary to say that philosophy has
changed front in this respect, and finds it comparatively easy to
recognize the individuality of minds, while the independence and
individuality of things has well-nigh disappeared in the general
continuum.
There have been several motives for this attitude towards the
reality of things. It is hardly necessary to mention that of tempera-
mental mysticism, which will always seek reality in haziness and
away from distinctions. Our going into a trance or going to sleep
does obliterate plurality so far as we are concerned. But while it
does away with the significance of distinctions for the dreamer, does
it also do away with the existence of distinctions? I do not believe
so. I can not help feeling that we are wiser when we are awake than
when we are asleep, and that reality is such as we must take it
in our systematic conduct. I would rather trust the tried-out dis-
tinctions of common sense and science than the dreamy confluence
of mysticism.
Our antipathy to distinctions, however, may not be due merely
to temperamental laziness. It may be due to conceptual difficulties.
Thus the difficulties of conceiving plural things and their interactions
in space lead Lotze to conceive the universe as a polyphonic unity
an ' ' esthetic unity of purpose in the world which, as in some work of
art, combines with convincing justice things which in their isolation
would seem incoherent and scarcely to stand in any relation to one
5
6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
another at all." 1 Bradley, in a similar way, having found the prob-
lem of relations and of motion insuperable on his abstract basis of
procedure, has recourse to an esthetic absolute where the plurality
of things and their ceaseless struggle is at rest. I can not see, how-
ever, how we are justified in reading plurality out of the world
because its existence interferes with our ready-made concepts. New
concepts, perhaps the electrical definition of physical atoms, may
make it easier to see how a world of relatively stable things may
coexist and interact. In the meantime, if we must acknowledge
diversity of things for purposes of conduct, we must hold that they
have some distinct reality, even while we are perfecting our con-
ceptual models. In any case, thought must wait upon facts. Where
we find symphonic unity of system, there we must of course acknowl-
edge it. But when the facts do not warrant such intimate unity, we
have no right to read it into them on the basis of a priori conceptions.
Even within our own individual history, we are far from finding
a closely woven purposive unity. We are the creatures largely of
habits and instincts. We must provisionally acknowledge different
types of continuity of which unity of purpose is only one.
The intellectualist's condemnation of things owes its convincing-
ness to certain deep-rooted prejudices. One of these prejudices is
that individuality means indivisibility, and conversely that what can
be divided into parts can not be individual. The substance of
Spinoza and the atoms of Democritus are alike indivisible. This
difficulty of indecomposability would of course equally influence our
view of psychic unities. We would have to deny the reality of the
self, because it is complex and capable of analysis. The art-object
would fall to pieces the moment we analyzed it. Hence you have
either a heap of pieces on the one hand or a mystical, undifferentiated
unity on the other. Now, what we must do here is to face the prob-
lem honestly and cast out prejudice. We can as a matter of fact
recognize a self or a work of art as a unity if the complexity con-
verges in a direction or towards a purpose. If in the organic or
inorganic thing we can recognize a common impulse or movement,
we must recognize the thing as one, even though it is complex and
physically divisible.
This prejudice is closely connected with another the vice of
abstraction, useful though abstraction is in its own place in the
economy of thought. This prejudice consists in emphasizing the
disjunctive function of the mind and in ignoring the conjunctive.
Thus it is regarded as self-evident that the disparate qualities the
creatures of linguistic substantiation exist; but their interpenetra-
tion, their coexistence in the one thing, is regarded as the insuperable
'"Metaphysics," English translation, Vol. II., p. 60.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 7
problem. And it is insuperable, if you take the disparate abstrac-
tions for granted and try to compound a thing out of them. But this
is starting at the wrong end of the process. We must go back to the
concrete object. While our thought can abstract qualities, these
qualities do not exist first as abstract entities and then compound
themselves. They are ways of taking things in concrete contexts.
If we can discriminate distinctions within this object, it is quite true
that we must regard such distinctions as real. But if we must take
the distinctions as coexisting, interpenetrating, flowing into each
other, cohering in one pattern and movement, it is also true that
they can so interpenetrate and coexist. Our conjunctive way of
taking the object of experience needs no more justification than our
disjunctive or analytic way. If the distinctions do coexist and inter-
penetrate, they can do so. We do not make the transitions or unities,
any more than the discreteness, in taking account of them. And
Berkeley is quite right in maintaining that no additional entity, no
substance or x, can simplify the fact, which is given with the quali-
ties, viz., that they interpenetrate and persist. To trace these coex-
istences and transitions of the facts of experience is the business of
science, quite as much as that of the analysis of properties.
It is strange that the unity of the thing should have caused so
much trouble, while most philosophers have been willing to take the
diversity within the thing for granted. I can not see why one is not
as mysterious or as clear as the other. If you assume that a thing is
mere abstract unity, it is true that no logic could get diversity out
of it. If, again, you start with a collection of independent, disparate
qualities, it will no doubt be impossible to get any unity into it. The
simpler way is to proceed empirically and not to make absurd
assumptions. If we can distinguish diversity of function, then, of
course, there is diversity. If diversity of function, on the other
hand, makes a thing go to pieces, if the only transitions possible are
those of identity of property, then we should at least be as consistent
as the father of intellectualism, Parmenides, and with him rule out
all diversity as inconceivable, leaving the residuum of the homo-
geneous block of being.
Another intellectualist prejudice of which we must rid ourselves
is the assumption that an individual, in order to be distinct, must dis-
tinguish itself. On this basis, only self-conscious individuals could
exist, and they only so long as they are self-conscious. We ourselves
would vanish as individuals the moment we go to sleep or when our
interest becomes absorbed in the objective situation. I do not believe
this a valid assumption. Neither the existence nor the significance
of an individual need depend upon self-discrimination. We have
individual significance so long as any experience distinguishes us,
8 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
whether awake or asleep. And the existence of an individual is in
no wise dependent upon being distinguished. A thing may exist as
individual a million years before it is distinguished. It is individual
not because it distinguishes itself or we distinguish it, but because,
when we do take account of it, we must treat it as distinct for the
purpose in question.
Nor is it necessary to regard self -subsistence or independence as
the condition of reality. If only the self-subsistent were real, then
only an indivisible whole, as Spinoza maintains, could be real. Now,
it is quite true that the parts must, somehow, hang together. At least
the physical world hangs together by its gravitational threads. But
such hanging together need not prevent a certain individual play of
the parts. The earth hangs together with the solar system, but that
does not prevent the earth from having its own motion and history.
For finite purposes at least, it is convenient to take reality piece-
meal. And reality has parts and distinctions just in so far as it
lends itself to such individual taking, however much the parts may
cohere with a larger pattern. It is such pluralism which makes prac-
tical adjustment and scientific sorting and identification relevant.
The parts or aspects are real, if we must meet them as real. And
the recognition of the character and reality of the part may, for the
purpose in question, be more essential than the reality of the whole.
It is not necessary, on the other hand, in order to recognize the
plurality of the world, to fall into the opposite intellectualist abstrac-
tion, that of absolutely independent plural entities such as the old-
fashioned atoms or monads. Such an assumption is necessarily
suicidal, for since such entities could not make any difference to each
other or to any perceiving subject, it becomes impossible to speak of
them as having properties or even to prove their existence. Even
zero must be part of a thought context in order to be considered as
existing. Things are as independent and impenetrable as we must
take them. They may exist, as we have seen, independent of our
cognitive context. They may come and go, so far as our awareness
is concerned, without prejudice to their existence. But in some con-
text they must hang. I can not conceive of individuals as outside
of any context at all, as making no difference to other individuals,
for it is through such difference to other individuals, and in the last
analysis to human nature, that we conceive of an individual as
existing at all. I can see only the possibility of a relative pluralism
pluralism with its rough edges, its overlapping identities both
from the existential and the cognitive side. No center liveth unto
itself, in the isolated sense of Leibnitz's monad. But such relative
pluralism prevents in any case the blank monotony of eleatic being.
And while the parts hang with each other, they must be considered
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 9
as real as the whole. The whole has no reality abstracted from just
such parts. If the parts are relative to the whole, the whole is no
less relative to the parts. If we emphasize that individuals exist and
have significance only in contexts, it is well not to forget that they
do exist within the contexts, social or physical, and can be identified
in the variety of contexts into which they enter.
Another and more serious kind of objection has been raised
against the reality of things from the Heraclitean point of view,
represented so brilliantly at the present time by Professor Bergson.
If the universe is an absolute flux, making sections in the stream of
change and calling them things must be a purely artificial attitude
an illusion due to our gross sense perception at best and justified
only by its convenience for practical purposes. To quote a recent
statement of Bergson 's : "I regard the whole parceling out of things
as relative to our faculty of perception. Our senses, adjusted to the
material world, trace there lines of division which exist as directions,
carved out for our future action. It is our contingent action which
is reflected back in matter, as in a mirror, when our eyes perceive
objects with well-marked contours, and distinguish them one from
the other." 2 Things, therefore, have no real existence. They are
due merely to our practical purposes. The real world is one of abso-
lute fluency, where the past is drawn up into the moving flow. Not
extension, but interpenetration; not repetition, but absolute novelty
and growth; not qualities, but change, characterizes the real world,
the key to which must be found in our own stream of consciousness.
This real world can be grasped, not by the intellect, but by intuition,
which gives us the real flow, as contrasted with the stereotyped copy
of the intellect. And how do we come to speak of things at all, then ?
By means of the intellect we form a space image of the real process.
This image is like the cinematographic copy of moving figures. It is
a static picture of spatially spread out and recorded changes which
we substitute for the real duration. But while the latter is char-
acterized by interpenetration and indivisibility, the former is char-
acterized by extension and divisibility. Science decomposes the
objects of sense still further into molecules and atoms and centers of
force, but these pictures of science have no more reality than the
perceptual things. They are merely contrivances to deal with the
world of flux.
Such, in brief, is the view of Bergson, and it certainly carries
with it a great deal of truth. Our purposes are indispensable in the
significant differentiation of our world ; and sometimes, no doubt, our
marking the world off into parts is as artificial as the astronomer's
longitudes and latitudes and his names for constellations. The world,
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. VII., No. 14, pp. 386 and 287.
10 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
too, from our finite point of view at any rate, is a world where novelty
and growth play an important part. I can not admit, however, that
the new Ileracliteanism gives ua the whole truth.
In the first place, we must be suspicious of all absolutistic for-
mulas. Absolute flux is as impossible of proof as absolute identity.
Bergson and Parmenides alike must found their philosophy on intui-
tion and conviction. I prefer the more modest pragmatic way of
taking the world. 8 This means to take the facts at their face value.
If there seems to be change and novelty, then, in so far, we must own
it, whether our novelty is a retracing of an absolute experience or is
objectively creative. Knowledge, whatever claims to absoluteness we
may make, is after all our finite human version of reality; and we
have access to no other. And for us change and novelty are real
facts. But while we must recognize novelty and interpenetration as
facts of our experience, it is also true that we must recognize a cer-
tain amount of constancy. And this constancy can not be due
merely to language and space objectification. There must, on the
one hand, be constancy in our meanings, our inner purposes; and
they are real processes. And there must, on the other, be constancy
on the part of the processes referred to. Else constancy on the part
of our symbols would not avail. Suppose we had a world where
everything flowed but the symbols: in such a world we could not
recognize or use the symbols as the same. There could be no such
thing as intellect in such a world, because it too would have to change.
And even if memories and concepts dipped into such a world from
another universe, they would be utterly useless where nothing repeats
itself. The intellect is an agency for prediction ; and what we must
be able to predict is the real world of processes. Mind and things
must conspire to have science. Even in the cinematograph, you have
the constancy of the pictures and of the machinery which repeats
them ; and they are part of the real world.
Nor is it true of things, any more than of selves, that our marking
them off from their context is purely arbitrary. It is difficult enough
in either case ; and we can not pull them, root and all, without pull-
ing a good deal of the context with them. When we come to define
what we mean by Caesar, we find that he is very much entangled with
the past out of which he grew, with the age in which he struggled,
and with the results and opinions of his labors ever since. Yet for all
that he is a well-marked character which we can understand and
appreciate. So with the thing the organic individual, like the tree,
or the inorganic individual, like the stone or the crystal. In any
case, they are individual, when we must deal with them as such;
My attitude to pragmatism I have explained in "Truth and Reality,"
Macmillan, 1911, especially in Chapters IX. and X.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 11
not when we mark them off arbitrarily, as in the case of the rainbow.
And this is true though the individual is complex; though it may
consist of many interpenetrating impulses, all traveling at diverse
paces.
"When we come to define what we mean by the individuality of a
thing, the problem waxes more difficult. Psychology gives us but
scant help. As a matter of fact, it has tended to unfit us for the
proper attitude to reality through its subjectivistic tendency. What
we intend when we speak of a thing or act on a thing is not a fusion
of sensations, together with the suggested sensory and ideational
complex. This is merely an account of the process of becoming
aware of things and not an account of the reality of things. Things
can make sensible differences to our organism, but they are not con-
stituted by our perception. They must be taken as preexisting in
their own contexts, prior to such sensory discrimination on our part,
else our instincts would not be adjusted to them ; they could fulfil no
interest or need on the part of our will. The sensory differences, for
practical purposes, exist primarily as signs or guides suggesting
further control and use. The sight sensations, in the case of the
infant, suggest the motor reaction of active touch, which in turn
suggests the reflexes of eating.
What, then, individuates things ? First of all, from the point of
view of significance, they are individuated, as we have seen, by the
purposes which select them and which they fulfil. They would have
no individual significance except as thus differentiated in our cog-
nitive experience. The thing must embody a will. Aristotle was
quite right in saying that we can not treat the thing as a mere col-
lection. We can not regard the word as a mere collection of letters,
in so far as it is an individual word. "We must seek the cause by
reason of which the matter is some definite thing." 4 For Aristotle
this means finding the final cause of the thing. In artificial things
like the word or the work of art, it is quite plain that we must find
the idea which is expressed. Can we also find such an objective idea
in natural things ? No, we can not find it there. We must be satis-
fied if it has such distinctness of character and history as to fulfil a
specific purpose of ours, whether it sustains the relation of a work of
art to a more comprehensive experience or not.
It does not follow, however, that things are created or "faked"
by thus being taken over into our cognitive context. The selection
and acknowledgment is forced, not arbitrary. The thing must sug-
gest an own center of energy. It must roll out from the larger field
of experience, forcing attention to its own movement and identity.
Our cognitive meaning, so far from constituting things, must tally
4 "Metaphysics," Bk. VII., Ch. XVII., 1.
12 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
with the things terminate in our perceptions of them in order to
be valid. If the thing is real, it can not be infinitely divisible, t. e.,
the form of the thing can not be merely of our own choosing. To be
accorded objective existence, the thing must be acknowledged as
having its own impulse, its own hi story, its own pattern of parts,
which our ideas must copy sufficiently for idi'iitiiication and predic-
tion. And the thing may have to be acknowledged as having such
character and history, whether as old as the sun or as evanescent as
the cloudlet.
Can we identify such things in our experience f In the case of
the organic thing, we seem to have a natural unity, comparable to
that which we have in the case of the unity of the ego, even though
the former is not a significant unity. There is a history which
embodies a certain end or has a certain direction. To be sure,
organisms may sometimes be divided without destroying their life;
and the lower organisms do propagate their existence by spontaneous
division. But the cell seems to be even here a fairly definite entity.
The unicellular organisms have an individual immortality which is
only limited by external accident.
When we come to inorganic things, the problem is difficult. On
the analogy of geometrical quantity it has sometimes been held that
physical things are infinitely divisible. Interesting antinomies have
been invented from Zeno down by playing between the mathematical
and the physical conception of quantity. But we must not confuse
mathematical divisibility with physical divisibility. Empirically,
what we call things are, on the one hand, capable of being taken as
individuals. On the other hand, it is possible to distinguish parts.
Do we come to a limit in our division where we have to deal with a
final natural unity? We do for practical purposes at least. The
molecule seems like a distinct stopping-place, however hypothetical,
if we would preserve the character of the compound. And in recent
years interesting experiments have been made by Rutherford and
others to prove the real existence of the atom. These experiments
can not be ruled out by any a priori theory as regards infinite divisi-
bility. The atom in turn seems to be a holding company for energies
which under certain conditions can act individually. A smaller unit,
the electron, it is maintained, must be assumed to account for such
phenomena as radioactivity. The negative electric charge seems like
a natural unit. Is it final T We can not say. All we can say is that
we have had no need so far of assuming a smaller unit. There cer-
tainly is no evidence for infinite divisibility. Furthermore, because
units do not have absolute permanency and are themselves complex,
that does not gainsay their individual reality, while we can take them
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 13
as individual. The chair is an individual while we can use it as a
chair, however complex and unstable its structure.
It will be seen that we have adopted the instrumental method in
dealing with the reality of the thing. Unlike the self, the thing has
no meaning or value that we can share with it. We must judge it,
therefore, by the ways in which we must take it in realizing our pur-
poses; and we must hold that its reality is precisely what we must
take it as in the service of our specific will. Let us now try to sum
up the pragmatic significance of the thing. In the first place, we
have seen that we can not speak of things unless we have persistent
identity identity both in the purposes which take the things and in
the objective processes which are taken. Unless we can take the same
processes over again and thus predict their reoccurrence, we can not
speak of things. In a world of absolute flux, not even the illusion of
a thing could arise. This persistence or possibility of identification
of certain processes is the pragmatic significance of substance, what-
ever fleeting changes we may have to ignore in our conceptual taking
of reality. As the thing is capable of existing in many contexts, and
as it may have different reactions in different contexts, the idea of
potential energy arises. The potential, or the core of the thing, is
the more of what the thing can do. The air can produce sound. It
can also furnish the Kansas dust storm, it can convey oxygen to the
lungs, etc. As the contexts are not present, perhaps, for doing all
these things at once, we speak of the others as possible reactions
the (for the time being) hidden energy of the thing.
In the second place, these expectancies or ways of taking the thing
are social. Things do not merely figure in my individual experience,
but they are capable of figuring in any number of experiences in the
same immediate way. They fulfil not merely an individual, but a
social, purpose. One reason for regarding social experience as more
trustworthy is that social experience is less subject to illusions and
hallucinations. While this is largely so and therefore furnishes an
additional check, illusions and hallucinations may be social for the
time being. The illusion of the moving railroad train is as social as
any perception. A whole crowd has been known to see a ghost. So
being social is not an infallible test of objectivity. As such percep-
tions, however, do not tally with further experiences, they can not be
taken as things. Whether we deal with things, therefore, from the
point of view of individual or of social experience, our ideas of things
can only be proven true as experience leans upon further experience
in a consistent way.
It has sometimes been stated that things are objective, because
they are objects for several subjects. But this is inverting the true
relation. Things are social experiences, because they hang in a con-
14 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
text of their own and are not dependent upon individual experience
for their existence. Things, moreover, are not the only objects of
social experience. It is not true that our psychological objects are
objects of one subject only as contrasted with things. If so, we could
have no psychological sciences. We could never understand each
other's meanings or their relations. The fact is that we can share
each other's images, concepts, and even emotions and will atti-
tudes, as truly as our sense facts. The oldest sciences man created
were sciences of meaning, such as logic, geometry, and ethics. It is
absurd, then, to say that mental facts exist for one subject only are
private and unique. It is not their social character which distin-
guishes things from meanings.
Besides social agreement, we must add, therefore, sensible contin-
uity as characteristic of our taking of things. Things are the sen-
sible embodiments of purposes. They have a certain "liveliness"
that our meanings as such, however social, do not ordinarily have.
They are energies which we must recognize as belonging to a space
context of their own, with their own steadiness and order, inde-
pendent of our meanings. It is not that we, either in our individual
or our social capacity, do acknowledge things, which makes things
objective, but that we must acknowledge them, and that we must
acknowledge them as having such a sensible character, such motion,
such use in the realization of our specific purposes. Our ideas must
terminate in the sensible things in order to be valid. We may select
them in our service, we may spread them out into our classificatory
schemes, we may symbolize their relations by our equations ; but we
can do so successfully only by respecting their own character and
relations as revealed in experience. We must believe, moreover, that
the substance of things is precisely what we must take it as in
experience. If radium breaks down and changes into helium, no
assumption of inert matter, no postulate of substance, can guarantee
its identity. The only key we have to reality is what reality must be
taken as in the progressive realization of the purposes of human
nature.
JOHN E. BOODIN.
UNIVERSITY or KANSAS.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 15
DISCUSSION
CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEHAVIOR. A REPLY
shall deliver the deliverer?"
Professor Miller asks the question at the end of a "dis-
cussion" of my paper on "Mind as an Observable Object." It is I
who am the "deliverer," but of what a sorry sort will be gathered
from the answer Mr. Miller finds to his own question.
What shall deliver the deliverer? Nothing but a taste for real solutions
which is the same as intellectual scruple. Nothing but common sense untired
which is the same as pertinacity in logic. Nothing but looking about us before
we advance sweeping the horizon of our subject circumspection; that last
rule of Descartes 's method, followed as far as human vision can, ' ' to make
enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I might be assured that
nothing was omitted."
One would like to have contributed something better than the
inspiration of a bad example to sentiments so just.
But Mr. Miller is no unkindly critic. He is good enough to say
that some earlier work of mine promised better things that even
now I may have better things in reserve. Perhaps, too, it occurred
to Mr. Miller that a twenty-minute paper left me little room for
enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I might be
assured nothing was omitted. Something in the way of enumera-
tion and review that I had tried before writing quite brought it home
to me that sacrifices were demanded. I thought I might begin by
passing over the ungereimte Frage.
However happy this idea, I know it would have been happier if
men stood in closer agreement as to what meaning meant. But then
the history of philosophy would be the shortest of stories, the love of
wisdom would not go long unrequited, thought would lie listless in
the pervading calm and I should have missed a critic of flavor. It
did seem to me, though, that some questions were beyond question
as, for example, What should we call that which can have no name ?
I know that many with a taste for real solutions have answered,
An immediate fact of consciousness. Out of such facts taken
together they make a "field," and out of such fields a world.
But what in the world is consciousness? Across these fields,
dust of their dust, passes the occasional figure of a fellow being. For
his brother-likeness to the owner of the field, this passing figure is
given a field of his own one from which the giver is forever
excluded. Straightway the donor grows anxious for his gift. Does
the one to whom it has been given really have the thing that has just
been given to him ? Then where in the world is his consciousness ?
16 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
No one can blame the dwellers in such a world if they cry aloud
for deliverance, least of all one who remembers to have lived there
and to have been unhappy there one who might still be unhappily
living there had he waited with the others for a deliverer who could
work miracles.
Very pleasantly Mr. Miller quotes // mon intention the saying of
a certain Old Lady: "We must all make a little effort every day to
keep sane and to use words in the same senses." Which, being
applied, I take to mean that the deliverer Mr. Miller awaits must
begin by accepting "consciousness" in the sense those who would be
delivered have given to the word. He must make a little effort every
day to keep on using the term in this same sense. He must start at
the same point and travel the same road, but he shall reach the goal
of intelligibility at last without having been downed by any of those
contradictions that have been the undoing of all who have so started
and so traveled. Then, and only then, shall we know him for the
true deliverer by the miracle he has wrought.
Meanwhile, for one who is too impatient to await the impossible,
there lies close to hand a suggestion so natural that it can not excite
enthusiasm, so simple that it may inspire mockery, and so little in
the "same sense" with what has gone before that the Old Lady of
Good Counsel would not have it to be sane. It is this : Let us make
our way out of a troubled world by the same door where in we went.
Did we start with an immediate fact of consciousness and construct
a world? Then let us now begin with the world and construct an
immediate fact of consciousness.
To be sure, the familiar scenes of the journey in will look altered
on the way out, but isn't that rather what we had hoped for? At all
events, it is vain to cry paradox at each new episode of the kind.
For example, we came to grief by assuming that a man knew his own
mind better than anything else and prior to anything else in the
world. Somewhere along the way out we should expect to run across
the reflection that his own mind is the last thing a man comes to
know. "It is so far from self-evident," I had ventured to write,
"that each man's mental state is his own indisputable possession,
that no one hesitates to confess at times that his neighbor has read
him better than he has read himself. . . . No one finds fault with
Thackeray for intimating that the old Major is a better judge of
Pendennis's feeling for the Fotheringay than is Pendennis himself."
Mr. Miller selects the passage for an illustration of his difficulties.
This is not a question of knowing our feelings, but of knowing how our
feelings will develop or continue. To have a feeling and to be acquainted with
it are the same thing. If a man does not know whether he is in love, it means
that he does not know whether what he actually feels is or is not a sign of a
continued disposition to feel and to act such as goes under that name.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 17
And again I had said, continuing the thought, "It is quite as
likely that, under certain conditions, I do not know what red is, as
that, under other conditions, I do not know \vhat love is."
But "this," comments Mr. Miller, "is not a question whether I
am acquainted with my own sensation, but whether I am acquainted
with the social name for my sensation."
These are only moments of our progress ; but Mr. Miller is right
in choosing them to illustrate a difference of view that must go with
every step we take together. I wish indeed he had put his first objec-
tion a trifle differently. Unless love is of its essence enduring, there
was no question of what Pendennis 's feeling would develop into, still
less would I have chosen Pen as an example of one who did not know
whether he was in love. I assumed that we were dealing with a man
who was "sure" he was in love later with a man who was "sure"
he saw the color red. Were they right or wrong in their surety ? Or
rather, has the question, Were they right or wrong ? a meaning ?
My own position : The question has so much meaning that it takes
all the science of all the world to make out whether A is in love or
whether B sees red. In that science A and B have their little part
they are contributors of undetermined value but that they have the
supreme, the ultimate part seems to me an assumption as little
warranted as to suppose that I know better than all the world the
nature of the pen I am holding because, forsooth, it is mine. Is it
only a matter of the "social name" for the state of mind each surely
has? Is it only that this one may err in calling his feeling "love,"
that one in calling his "red"? Then may they not err in calling
their respective feelings by any other names, or by any names at all?
And what should we, the philosophers, call that which maybe isn't
this and maybe isn't that, but surely is the immediate and certain
possession of the one who has it? "What shall we call that which
can have no name ? ' ' Isn 't the shade of Protagoras whispering some-
thing about ' ' the last seeming ' ' ? Isn 't Gorgias nudging my elbow ?
Isn't Cratylus congratulating himself on having held his peace and
but wagged his finger ?
However, enough of episodes ! The general idea is that we start
with a world and construct an immediate fact of consciousness. If
this is the problem, we might be expected sooner or later to ask our-
selves, What beings of this world do we call conscious, and why do
we call them so ? Is not this a search for the meaning of conscious-
ness ? It seemed to me that there must be something peculiar in the
behavior of "conscious" beings, the which, if I could discover it,
would give me the definition I sought. Their "consciousness" is that
trait of the behavior of certain objects which makes me call them
conscious; their "life," that trait which makes me call them alive;
18 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
their "heat," that trait which makes me call them hot so I thought
one might argue.
Mr. Miller does not complain of me (I think T) for having
attempted no more than this statement of an experimental problem.
His objection is to the statement itself.
Once more [he asks] the question what leads me to call a man conscious, and
the question what consciousness means is Mr. Singer assuming that they are
the same question f Are the nature of a thing and the tokens by which I infer
its presence the samef . . .
They are to me the same: I confuse, I identify, the question,
What leads me to call a man conscious ? with the question, What does
consciousness mean ? And I detect in myself the same lack of intel-
lectual scruple in other situations. I am inclined to confuse the
question, What leads me to call this thing a triangle ? with the ques-
tion, What does triangle mean? Whether it is that I have wearied
me of common sense, or that my logic has lost its pertinacity, I can
not see why I should treat a conscious being more befoggedly than a
triangle. Is making a mystery of them a way of paying tribute to
the ' ' higher categories ' ' f
In watching the behavior of beings I call by instinct conscious
(the reason for which instinct constitutes my problem) I seem to
find grounds for differentiating this part of their behavior into
"faculties." Among other qualities, I attribute to them "sensi-
bility. ' ' Part of their action I call reaction ; I call it their seeing of
a color, their hearing of a sound. As my experience of other minds
grows, my knowledge of my own is enriched : I class myself among
those who see and hear. Further, I recognize certain behavior as
descriptive, and notice the way in which descriptive behavior varies
with the conditions governing seeing and hearing. All do not see the
same thing or see the same thing in the same way. Mr. Miller makes
much of this difference of content as a peculiarity yes, as the very
essence of our notion of consciousness.
The reasons why we say we find something in the world of facts which we
call consciousness and which distinguishes itself from a behaving body [Mr.
Singer] really does not consider. These reasons are after all simple. . . . Let
us try to state the reasons without the terms of personality, self, etc. For
example, at a single moment a certain number of objects . . . are in a peculiar
sense together, while those objects and other objects are not in the same sense
together. ... Of course the easiest way of putting this is to say 7 am seeing the
first mentioned combination and 7 am not seeing [the second]. But it is quite
easy to avoid making these references to self and its "seeing": it is quite easy
to put it in terms of the "objective" facts themselves. These facts have a way
of being together, some of them, while others are not in this sense together. . . .
Groups there are, and breaches between tbem there are. Consciousness there is,
and oblivion there is
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 19
Ungefahr sagt das der Pfarrer auch but with a slightly different
meaning ! For Mr. Miller concludes :
"Consciousness" here is not behavior; it is, according to usage, either the
"field" itself or the relation of conjunction between the components of the field.
It can not be as a concession to my manner of speaking that Mr.
Miller would avoid the easiest way of putting things. It is not I who
object to such phrases as " / am seeing the rug" and "I am not see-
ing the window," or again "I am seeing the rug and he is seeing the
window. " As I arrive through observation at the notion of descrip-
tive behavior, discover the way in which this varies with the point of
view, I quite come to recognize that I see different things at different
times, that I and another see different things at the same time. From
this I gradually struggle toward an understanding of what is the
same in the thing we so differently see, of the "objective" and the
"subjective" factors in every description. I come to discover a sub-
jective factor in my account of the very world with which I started.
I come to see that the purely objective world and the purely sub-
jective datum of consciousness are two ideals toward which we end-
lessly strive, modifying our notions of each as we change our under-
standing of the other.
Are there not left vestiges of sanity, even of something like
common sense, in my simple philosophy ? Who has ever been offered
an immediate state of consciousness out of which to construct a
world? Who has not been forced to start with a world, which it
was his given task to re-construct? It is only in this process of
reconstruction that the concepts of "consciousness" and "object of
consciousness" fall out they fall out together, and together they
grow apace. To follow the adventures of this pair is, I suspect, to
be led deep into the heart of things.
EDGAR A. SINGER, JR.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR McGILVARY'S QUESTIONS
/CIRCUMSTANCES connected with the time of the appearance of
^-^ Professor McGilvary's courteous questions to me (see this
JOURNAL for August 17, 1911) prevented my attention to them in
proper season. I hope the long lapse of time has not outlawed my
reply such as it is.
His questions were based primarily upon the following quotation
from my article in the "James Memorial Volume": "The so-called
action of 'consciousness' means simply the organic releases in the
way of behavior which are the conditions of awareness and which
20 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
also modify its content." If I am not able to answer Professor Me-
Gilvary's questions directly, or with respect to the form in which he
has put them, it is because these questions, as he formulates them,
seem to me to depend upon ignoring the force of the so-called pre-
fixed to action and the quotation-marks surrounding the word con-
sciousness. I meant by these precautions to warn the reader that I
was referring to a view for which I disowned responsibility, espe-
cially as regards "consciousness." In fact I supposed it would be
evident that the consciousness of the quotation marks designated pre-
cisely a conception which I was engaged in criticizing, and for which
I was proffering a substitute. But the form of the questions put to
me seems to me (I may misapprehend their import) to depend upon
supposing that I accept just what I meant to reject. Naturally, then,
the questions imply that I have involved myself in serious incon-
sistencies.
I quote two passages which afford some overt evidence that my
impression is correct. "Although elsewhere in this paper Professor
Dewey defined awareness as attention, I presume that in this sen-
tence [the one quoted above] he would mean to include consciousness
in its inattentive forms also." And in connection with his next
question he says, "Knowledge is one kind of consciousness, pre-
sumably." Both of these presumptions are natural on the basis of
the notion of consciousness referred to in quotation marks, but I
have difficulty in placing them in connection with my own view.
Now if I am right in supposing that Professor McGilvary means one
thing by consciousness and I mean another, I am somewhat embar-
rassed in replying to his questions. If I reply in his sense, I shall
misrepresent myself; if I reply in mine, I shall probably give addi-
tional cause for misunderstanding, as the answers will be read in
terms of his sense. Accordingly, I shall try to indicate what my view
is, and then state the form his questions would take upon its basis.
My contention was that "consciousness" is an adjective of be-
havior, a quality attaching to it under certain conditions. When we
make a noun of "conscious" and forget that we are dealing (as in
the case of other nouns in -ness) with an abstract noun, we are guilty
of the same fallacy as if we abstracted red from things and then
discussed the relation of redness to things, instead of the relation of
red things to other things. Hence (to come to question 1) there is
certainly a question as to the relation of conscious behavior, atten-
tive behavior, to other kinds of behavior. But this is not a question
that can be discussed profitably after it has been misput. If the
actual question is as to the role of the brain in certain kinds of
behavior, the parallelist, automatist, etc., are making answer after
they have translated the question into another and artificial form.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 21
So with the second question. My reply (after I have translated
the question) is that the aim of knowledge (to which reference was
made) is the enrichment and guidance of subsequent behaviors of
all kinds. That conscious behavior grows out of instinctive and
habitual (routine) behavior and is the prerequisite of moral, tech-
nological, esthetic, etc., behaviors, and that looking at it in this way
is the proper way of understanding thinking ("consciousness") and
all that goes with it, may be false positions as matters of fact, but I
do not see that such positions involve questions of internal con-
sistency.
The third question reads: "If it is the organic releases that
change the environment in the act of knowing, does knowing as dis-
tinct from these organic releases make any changes in the environ-
ment on its own account?" The question involves the repudiated
conception of consciousness, in the distinction it propounds between
knowing and behavior. If consciousness be a characteristic quality
of one kind of behavior, as distinct from other kinds, Professor Mc-
Gilvary's question can not be asked. The only question is as to
what changes conscious behavior makes as contrasting with other
kinds. And my answer is that just given : the changes that conduce
to direction of subsequent action and to enrichment of their mean-
ings.
The fourth question reads in one of its forms : ' ' Once distinguish
between consciousness and organic releases, what justification have
we for asserting that knowledge can be only of the effects of the con-
ditions of knowledge?" Here again, the distinguishing holds with
the meaning that Professor McGilvary obviously attributes to "con-
sciousness," but not upon my meaning. Translated into my own
terms, the question would read: "What reasons have we for think-
ing that knowing (attentive) behavior comes after certain other
kinds?" And I quite agree with my questioner that this question is
to be studied "just as we study anything else." And considering
the number of times that an "instrumental" theory of knowing has
been attacked on the ground that it narrows its consideration to the
functions of knowledge, it is an interesting variation to find it
intimated that it declines to extend its view to take them in. 1 To me
though probably not to those who criticize it this suggests that
the instrumental theory is trying to date knowing, to place it with
respect both to its generating conditions and its consequences or
functions. JOHN DEWEY.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
1 "If knowledge be distinct from its conditions, should we not study it as
we study anything else, not confining ourselves entirely to the functions of its
conditions, but extending our view to take in any possible functions it may
itself have?"
22 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Some Problems of Philosophy. WILLIAM JAMES. New York: Longmans,
Green, and Company. 1911. Pp. xii -f 231.
This last book of Professor James has been prepared for the press by
Dr. H. M. Kallen from two unfinished and unrevised manuscripts left by
the author. The first chapter treats of the nature of philosophy, its value,
and the objections urged against it. " Philosophy, beginning in wonder,
... is able to fancy everything different from what it is. It sees the
familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar. It
rouses us from our native dogmatic slumber and breaks up our caked
prejudices. Historically it has always been a sort of fecundation of four
different human interests, science, poetry, religion, and logic, by one
another" (p. 7). To the objections that philosophy has been dogmatic
and unpractical Professor James replies that while this has, in a measure,
been so in the past, there is no reason why it should continue so. " One
can not see why, if such a policy should appear advisable, philosophy
might not end by forswearing all dogmatism whatever, and become as
hypothetical in her manners as the most empirical science of them all "
(p. 26). As for the objection that philosophy has made no progress, we
are reminded that " if every step forward which philosophy makes . . .
gets accredited to science, the residuum of unanswered problems will alone
remain to constitute the domain of philosophy, and will alone bear her
name" (pp. 22-23).
Chapter II. enumerates certain typical problems of metaphysics the
discussion of which is to occupy the remainder of the book. Some of
them are : " What are ' thoughts ' and what are ' things ' ? What do we
mean when we say ' truth ' ? Is there a common stuff out of which all
facts are made? How comes there to be a world at all? Is unity or di-
versity more fundamental?" (pp. 29-30). Chapter III. deals with the
problem of being. Has what exists come into being piecemeal, as the
empiricist inclines to believe, or has it always been in its completeness a
totality, as the rationalist holds? We can not say: "For all of us alike,
fact forms a datum . . . which we can not explain or get behind. It
makes itself somehow, and our business is far more with its What than
with its Whence or Why " (p. 46).
Chapters IV., V., and VI. discuss percept and concept. The author
expounds with even more than his usual clearness and force the position
adopted in " A Pluralistic Universe." " The great difference between
percepts and concepts is that percepts are continuous and concepts are
discrete" (p. 48). "For rationalistic writers conceptual knowledge was
not only the more noble knowledge, but it originated independently of
all perceptual particulars " (p. 55). " To this ultra-rationalistic opinion
the empiricist contention that the significance of concepts consists always
in their relation to perceptual particulars has been opposed " (p. 57).
Needless to say, for the author it is the perceptual flux of particulars that
has the primary reality. " The flux can never be superseded. We must
carry it with us to the bitter end of our cognitive business, keeping it in
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 23
the midst of the translation even when the latter proves illuminating,
and falling back on it alone when the translation gives out. ' The in-
superability of sensation ' would be a short expression of my thesis. To
prove it I must show (1) that concepts are secondary formations, inade-
quate, and only ministerial; and (2) that they falsify as well as omit, and
make the flux impossible to understand" (p. 79).
Chapter VII. deals with the One and the Many. " The alternative here
is known as that between pluralism and monism. It is the most pregnant
of all the dilemmas of philosophy. . . . Does reality exist distributively ?
or collectively? in the shape of caches, everys, anys, eithers? or only in
the shape of an all or whole? . . . Pluralism stands for the distributive,
monism for the collective form of being" (p. 114). The author then
proceeds to explain further the nature of pluralism and to defend it from
the misrepresentations of its monistic critics. Various types of monism
are noted and the attempt is made to show the natural affinity of monism
for rationalism and of pluralism for empiricism. A rationalistic plural-
ist of the type of Professor Howison would, of course, dissent from the
view that pluralism is essentially empiristic.
Chapter VIII. treats of the implications and consequences of monism
and pluralism, and in Chapter IX. the most momentous of these implica-
tions, the problem of novelty, is introduced and discussed in its several
aspects through the remainder of the book. The perceptual life gives
overwhelming testimony to the existence of novelty, and that testimony
would be convincing were it not that novelty seems to conflict with the
principle of continuity of which science is so fond. " With the notion
that the constitution of things is continuous and not discrete, that of
a divisibility ad infinitum is inseparably bound up. This infinite divisi-
bility of some facts coupled with the infinite expansibility of others (space,
time, and number) has given rise to one of the most obstinate of philos-
ophy's dialectic problems. Let me take up, in as simple a way as I am
able to, the problem of the infinite" (pp. 155-6).
The paradoxes involved in the infinite as set forth by Zeno and by
Kant are then presented, and to the Kantian antinomies (or rather to the
first two of them) the author replies with what is virtually a defense of
the " antithesis." A " standing infinite " (as distinguished from a
" growing infinite," i. e., from the infinity of a series in process of comple-
tion) can be thought of either distributively or collectively, and it is self-
contradictory only when thought of collectively. " When we say that ' any,'
' each,' or ' every ' one of Kant's conditions must be fulfilled, we are there-
fore on impeccable ground, even though the conditions should form a
series as endless as that of the whole numbers, to which we are forever
able to add one. But if we say that ' all ' must be fulfilled and imagine
' all ' to signify a sum harvested and gathered in, and represented by a
number, we not only make a requirement utterly uncalled for . . . but
we create puzzles . . . that may require, to get rid of them again, hypoth-
eses as violent as Kant's idealism " (p. 163). " If now we turn from
static to growing forms of being, we find ourselves confronted by much
more serious difficulties. Zeno's and Kant's dialectic holds good wherever,
24 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
before an end can be reached, a succession of terms, endless by definition,
must needs have been successively counted out. . . . That Achilles should
occupy in succession ' all ' the points in a single continuous inch of space
is as inadmissible a conception as that he should count the series of whole
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., to infinity and reach an end " (pp. 170-1). In
the solution, based upon the " new infinite," offered by Mr. B. Russell, the
author can find no satisfaction. He gives in this connection a critical
analysis of the new infinite and its claim to override the whole-part
axiom, which is to the reviewer one of the most interesting parts of the
book. The essence of the criticism is perhaps best expressed in the fol-
lowing: "Because any point whatever in an imaginary inch is now con-
ceivable as being matched by some point in a quarter inch or half inch,
this numerical ' similarity ' of the different quanta, taken pointwise, is
treated as if it signified that half inches, quarter inches, and inches are
mathematically identical things anyhow, and that their differences are
things which we may scientifically neglect" (p. 179). And after carefully
examining Mr. Russell's remedy for the Achilles puzzle, which " lies in
noting that the sets of points in question [constituting the respective dis-
tances traversed by Achilles and by the tortoise] are conceived as being
infinitely numerous in both paths, and that where infinite multitudes are
in question, to say that the whole is greater than the part is false " (p.
180), the author concludes that "either we must stomach logical contra-
diction ... or we must admit that the limit is reached in these suc-
cessive cases by finite and perceptible units of approach drops, buds,
steps, or whatever we please to term them, of change, coming wholly
when they do come, or coming not at all" (p. 185). In short, Professor
James divides the problems of the infinite into two classes: (1) those that
pertain to the " standing infinite," (2) those that pertain to the " growing
infinite." The first class of problems, exemplified in the first two antin-
omies, he solves by accepting the position of Kant's " Antithesis." The
second class of problems, illustrated in Zeno's " Achilles " and, perhaps,
by the last two of the Kantian antinomies, he solves by accepting the
finitist position of the " thesis." This dual division of the infinity prob-
lems with the correspondingly diverse solutions offered for them, puts the
whole matter in a new and interesting light.
In the last chapter the problem of causation is taken up. We get our
idea of cause from the perceptual experience of our own activity-situa-
tions. Our desires seem to be genuinely creative of novelties in the
world. And yet observation and reflection prevent our accepting the per-
ceptual revelation at its face value. For between our conscious activities
and the effects which they appear to produce, there intervenes a whole
series of physiological and physical events which conceptual science must
recognize as genuine links in the causal chain. This failure of the per-
ceptual view " has led to the denial of efficient causation and to the sub-
stitution for it of the bare descriptive notion of uniform sequence among
events. Thus intellectualist philosophy once more has had to butcher our
perceptual life in order to make it ' comprehensible ' " (p. 218).
The book closes with the following passage : " If we took these [activ-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 25
ity] experiences as the type of what causation is, we should have to as-
cribe to cases of causation outside of our own life, to physical cases also,
an inwardly experiential nature. In other words, we should have to
espouse a so-called ' pan-psychic ' philosophy. This complication, and the
fact that hidden brain-events appear to be ' closer ' effects than those
which consciousness directly aims at, lead us to interrupt the subject
here provisionally. Our main result, up to this point, has been the con-
trast between the perceptual and the intellectualist treatment of it "
(p. 218).
It can not but be keenly disappointing to the reader that this uncom-
pleted book should stop just at the threshold of the treatment of the more
specifically metaphysical and cosmological problems mentioned in the
passage just quoted. It is to be hoped that it may be possible to publish,
if only in the form of scattered notes and memoranda, some of Professor
James's final conclusions on such subjects as the relation of mind and
brain.
Considered as an introductory text in philosophy, this book has in a
high degree that quality which I think, more than any other, explains the
charm of James's work the quality of making the reader feel as he
reads that he is himself participating in the creative thinking of the au-
thor. James speaks here as he has always spoken, not as a master com-
manding us to accept a completed system of knowledge, but rather as a
lover of wisdom who invites us to join with him in the search for truth.
W. P. MONTAGUE.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
An Introductory Psychology, MELBOURNE STUART READ. Boston: Ginn &
Co. 1911. Pp. viii + 309.
In this volume Professor Read presents the results of psychological in-
vestigation as seen by the teacher. It is written obviously and admittedly
for the most part at second hand, from text-books rather than from orig-
inal investigations. It selects from the current literature the facts that
bear upon the daily life of the student and applies them to an understand-
ing of the ordinary mental operations. In the attainment of this end it
may be said to be highly successful.
The chapters cover the usual material in the introductory texts, in-
cluding a chapter on the nervous system. In the arrangement there is
some departure from the usual order which makes necessary anticipation
in one chapter of material that is to be discussed in detail in another.
Thus attention is treated after perception and the simple affective proc-
esses and imagination, including ideational types, after memory. In each
case many of the principles involved in the earlier treatment are discussed
in full later. A change in arrangement would make the treatment more
consistent and concise.
On the whole the selection of material is very good. The statements
are accurate and up-to-date. The aim of the book and the character of the
reader for whom it was intended naturally make the style somewhat dif-
fuse. There is also rather more about psychology relatively to actual state-
26 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
merits of psychological fact than in the ordinary text-book, but that, too,
is to be expected and will probably make the book more acceptable to the
reader for whom it is intended.
W. B. PlLLSBURY.
UNIVERSITY or MICHIGAN.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
RTVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. April, 1911. Sul concetto di veritd
(pp. 161-170) : B. VARISCO. - Rational truth varies according to a psycho-
historical process; absolute truth, determined essentially as such, de-
mands a theistic basis. Ordine giuridico ed ordine publico (pp. 170-196):
ALESSANDRO LEVI. - The concept of public order functions as a political
limit of subjective rights. // subcosciente (pp. 197-206) : ROBERTO As-
FAGIOLI. - Proposes a stricter terminology to distinguish between the sub-
conscious proper, co-conscious or dissociated psychic activity, and
latent consciousness. La valutazione (pp. 207-216) : LUIGI VALLI. - Valua-
tion is not a simple affective-volitional relation between subject and ob-
ject, but a real or supposed constancy and uniformity of many such re-
lations towards the same object. E il Buddhismo una religione o una
filosofiaf (pp. 217-222): CARLO FORMICHI. - Northern Buddhism reduces
itself to a system of ethics based on radical pessimism, and therefore
should be considered a philosophy rather than a religion. II pluralismo
moderno e il monismo (pp. 223-236) : ALESSANDRO CHIAPPELLI. - Modern
pluralism, with its absolute heterogeneity, does not account for the mon-
istic tendency found in recent science, nor the necessary integration de-
manded by the spiritual principle of neo-Hegelianism. II contento morale
della liber td nel nostro tempo (pp. 237-281) : GIUSEPPE TAROZZI. - The
moral content of liberty is nowadays checked by unmoral economic free-
dom and by excessive individualism ; it is increased by the growth of
altruism and fraternity. I concetti di fine e di norma in etica (pp. 282
292) : GIOVANNI VIDARI. - Ends and norms have not a constitutive but a
heuristic function in ethics. L'errore (pp. 293-306) : F. C. S. SCHILLER. -
Truth is a logical and error an illogical mode of evaluating a conscious
situation. (The above papers were presented at the recent International
Congress of Philosophy at Bologna.) Della filosofia del diritto in Italia
dalla fine del secolo XVIII alia fine del secolo XIX (pp. 307-335) : F. F.
GUELFI.
RTVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. May-June, 1911. Estema idea logismo
(pp. 337-360) : ROBERTO ARDIGO. - A positivistic discussion of the psychic
as a possible world after the analogy of nervous activity. La filosofia
italiana al Congresso di Bologna (pp. 361-366) : FREDERIOO ENRIQUES. -
Argues that there is a veritable Italian philosophy and that it is not a
mere adaptation of foreign thought. Dio e I'anima (pp. 367-386) : B.
VARISCO. - God and the soul are not mere functions of thought, but real-
ities. La rinascita dell'Hegel e la filosofia perenne (pp. 387-401) : PAOLA
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 27
ROTTA. - The renewed interest in Hegel (through Croce, Hibben, Royce,
Enriques) shows his system to be the single alternative to the traditional
philosophy of transcendence between God and the world. La filosofia che
non vissero (pp. 402-419) : LUIGI VALLI - Discusses three ways to recon-
cile the ideal and the real practical, theoretical, mystical. Infinito e
indefinite in Cartesio (pp. 420-427) : ROBERTO MENASCI. - Shows that Des-
cartes considered the world infinite, not indefinite. Per I'io di Cartesio e
di tutti (pp. 428-432) : L. MICHELANGELO BILLIA. -The ego of Descartes is
not the grammatical subject, but the psychical self. Bibliografia filosofica
italiana (1910). Recensioni e cenni. Notizie. Atti della Societd Filo-
sifica Italiana (offers the programme of the fourth International Congress
of Philosophy at Bologna, at which Professors Fullerton and Creighton
were elected commissioners).
Amendola, Giovanni. Maine de Biran : quattro lezione tenute alia bib-
lioteca filosofica di Firenze nei giorni 14, 17, 21 e 24 Gennaio, 1911.
Florence: Casa editrice italiana di A. Quattrini. 1911. Pp. 123.
Blight, Stanley M. The Desire for Qualities. London: Henry Frowde.
1911. Pp. xii + 322. 2s.
Botti, Luigi. L'infinito. Genoa: A. F. Formiggini. 1932. Pp. 529.
Lire 6.
Herter, Christian A. Biological Aspects of Human Problems. New
York : The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. xvi + 344. $1.50.
Wheeler, Charles Kirkland. Critique of Pure Kant. Boston: The
Arakelyan Press. 1911. Pp. 298. $1.50.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE New York Academy of Sciences and its affiliated societies held
their annual dinner, Monday evening, December 18, at the Hotel Endicott.
After the dinner, the annual meeting of the academy was held, at the con-
clusion of which the address of the retiring president, Professor Franz
Boas, entitled, " The History of the American Race," was read by the
recording secretary, after which Mr. George Borup, a graduate student
at Yale University, related a few of his most interesting experiences
in connection with Admiral Peary's North Polar Expedition of 1908-09.
According to the report of the recording secretary, the Academy held
eight business meetings and twenty-seven sectional meetings during the
year ending November 30, 1911, at which sixty-one stated papers were
presented, classified under eight branches of science, and two public lec-
tures were given at the American Museum of Natural History to the
members of the Academy and its affiliated societies and their friends.
The academy now has on its rolls 502 active members, including in this
number 19 associate members; 120 fellows, 90 life members and 11 pa-
trons, aside from the three members who were elected to fellowship at the
meeting. The annual election resulted in the choice of the following
28 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
officers for the year 1912: President, Emerson McMillin; vice-presidents,
J. Edmund Woodman, Frederick A. Lucas, Charles Lane Poor, R. 8.
Woodworth; corresponding secretary, Henry E. Crampton; recording sec-
retary, Edmund Otis Hovey; treasurer, Charles F. Cox; librarian, Ralph
W. Tower; editor, Edmund Otis Hovey; councillors (to serve three years),
Charles P. Berkey and Clark Wissler ; members of the finance committee,
Emerson McMillin, Frederic S. Lee, and George F. Kunz.
IN accordance with announcements already published, the American
Philosophical Association held its eleventh annual meeting at Harvard
University, December 27 to 29. There were five sessions, all of which
were marked by a full attendance and vigorous discussion. Wednesday
evening the Association was entertained at a reception at the Harvard
Union. The retiring president, Professor Woodbridge, read his address on
" Evolution " on Thursday evening, after which occurred the annual
smoker of the Association at the Colonial Club. At the business meeting
on Thursday afternoon, it was voted to continue the Committee on Dis-
cussion. Officers for the ensuing year were elected as follows: president,
Professor Frank Thilly, of Cornell University; vice-president, Professor
Norman Kemp Smith, of Princeton University; new members of the
Executive Committee, Mr. W. B. Pitkin, of Columbia University, and
Professor E. A. Singer, of the University of Pennsylvania. The place of
the next meeting of the Association was left to the Executive Committee
with power.
THE twentieth annual meeting of the American Psychological Asso-
ciation, held at Washington, December 27 to 29, was more than usually
successful from the standpoints of both attendance and interest. The
conference on psychology and medical education brought together a num-
ber of eminent psychiatrists and psychologists; and while few if any
problems were settled, many issues were raised and the pressing need of
attention to them was made plainly apparent. The Association author-
ized the organization of a committee on psychology in its relations with
medical education, and President Seashore appointed to this committee
Professor W. D. Scott, Professor E. E. Southard, and Professor J. B.
Watson. Professor E. L. Thorndike was elected president for the ensuing
year. The new members of the Council, to serve for three years, are
Professor Margaret F. Washburn and Professor Max Meyer.
DR. G. STANLEY HALL, president of Clark University, delivered the
address at the inauguration of Dr. George E. Myers, principal of the
State Manual Training Normal School at Pittsburg, Kansas. The sub-
ject of the address was " Educational Efficiency."
PROFESSOR JOSEPH JASTROW, of the University of Wisconsin, gave a
public lecture, entitled " On the Trail of the Subconscious," at the Univer-
sity on December 4, under the auspices of the University Association for
Research and Phi Beta Kappa.
DR. ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, hitherto assistant professor, has been
promoted to a full professorship in anthropology at Clark University.
VOL. IX. No. 2. JANUARY 18, 1912.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE AIMS AND METHODS OF INTRODUCTION COURSES
A QUESTIONNAIRE
IN this age, when nearly every discipline has achieved its own par-
ticular pedagogy and has become self-conscious and, in a meas-
ure, revised in terms of educational method, philosophy has almost
escaped. Whether it is because philosophy is not among the high
school disciplines, or because it is not popular enough, or because its
canons are regarded as all its own and mysteriously apart, it is at
any rate true that the pedagogical series yet lacks a ' ' How to Study
and Teach Philosophy" to match the history and mathematics
methodologies.
It may be that it will do philosophy no earthly good to come to
pedagogical self -consciousness ; but there is only one way to find out
unless one has a truly shameless aprioristic conscience. And it is
with philosophy as it is with most other subjects : the more elemen-
tary courses present the most harassing problems and are worthy
of first attention. Of these elementary courses, the one that most
obtrudes itself, because of its frankly experimental character, is the
course whose purpose is avowedly and exclusively introductory.
Whether a special course of this sort should be given at all is still
a mooted question ; and that the aims and methods of such a course
are still highly problematical is evidenced by the increasing number of
text-books for such courses, each one written largely under the im-
pression that the others are unsatisfactory. Here, at least, is a prob-
lem upon which educational method must have its say : it is enlight-
ened pedagogy alone that is to decide whether such a course should
be given and what shall be the method of its presentation. Such
philosophic pedagogy will be the product mainly of the reflective ex-
perience of numbers of teachers. It is important that we know just
what that experience is.
Last year the Western Philosophical Association at its spring
meeting devoted a special session to the consideration of the aims and
29
30 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
methods of introduction courses in philosophy. 1 Unusual interest
was aroused in the problems raised, and it was unanimously decided
to pursue the subject further through an investigation which would
aim to enlist the active cooperation of a considerable number of
teachers of philosophy in representative colleges and universities of
this country. For this investigation a committee was appointed. 2
A questionnaire was prepared, through which it was hoped to ob-
tain light with regard to the prevalence of courses specifically intro-
ductory, their precise aims, and their methods, both formal and con-
tentual ; besides which any other suggestions concerning the pedagogy
of introduction courses were invited.
The results of this investigation proved to be thoroughly worth
while. Replies were received from most of the leading colleges and
universities from thirty-five institutions in all, twelve of which
were state universities. As a rule, the questions were answered in
careful detail; and suggestions beyond the answers to specific ques-
tions were often appended. The committee concluded its work with
a brief report to the Association at its meeting last December. Since
then, however, those who had been members of this committee agreed
that it might be profitable for some one to go over the replies care-
fully, with a view to a digest which might be of essential interest to
teachers of philosophy in general. This task was handed over to the
writer, who herewith presents the results of his review, together with
such comments as have seemed to him worth while.
I. PREVALENCE OF COURSES IN THE INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY
More than two thirds of the departments represented in the re-
plies offer a special course in the introduction to philosophy. The
omission of the course is not restricted to the smaller colleges ; thus,
one is led to conclude that its omission is not merely a matter of
economy, but of principle. For instance, no course under this specific
title is offered at Harvard, Yale, Minnesota, California, or Stanford.
Five of the departments that omit the course express themselves as
doubtful concerning the advisability of offering it. Two departments
have discontinued the course, one because it seemed the least im-
portant in a crowded curriculum, and one because it had not proved
a successful method. A member of this latter department writes:
"It is not and in my judgment never can be a satisfactory method
of introducing a student to the subject."
1 See ' ' The Tenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Associa-
tion," reported by Bernard C. Ewer, in this JOURNAL, Vol. VII., pp. 426-428.
'This committee consisted of Messrs. Bernard C. Ewer, Edgar L. Hinman,
and the writer.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 31
Of course all the institutions represented have introductory
courses of some kind. For instance, the chairman of the division of
philosophy in one of our most important universities writes that the
division offers no single course in the introduction to philosophy, and
that it virtually accepts the principle that it is better to provide dif-
ferent methods of approach that may suit men with different inter-
ests and equipment. The usual elementary courses serve this pur-
pose.
The important facts to note are that less than one third of the
departments represented do not offer a special course in the intro-
duction to philosophy ; that the majority of those that fail to offer it
express no conviction against it ; that of the few that do, only one has
tried it ; and that nearly all those that omit it make attempts to intro-
duce the student in some other specific and systematic way, a sum-
mary account of which will be given later under a discussion of
methods.
II. THE AIM OF A COURSE IN THE INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY
The answers reveal three main aims : first, the introduction of the
student to philosophic thinking of his own ; second, to the problems
of philosophy; third, to the historic systems. A small number
(eight) think the three aims equally fundamental. Two of these
think that the order of the fulfilling of these aims should be three,
two, one, in the above enumeration. Few are willing to omit any
one of these aims, and these few omit the introduction to historic
systems, save, in some cases, as a means. Only one makes this latter
aim primary. Among the rest, opinion is about evenly divided be-
tween the first and second aims as fundamental, with a slight tend-
ency to emphasize philosophic thinking of the student's own. To
quote a particularly thoughtful reply from a department in one of
our best New England colleges: "I feel strongly that the courses
should aim above all else to make thinkers out of the men, to make
them men able and anxious to think their way through knotty prob-
lems, and to give them a desire to get at the truth and an open-
mindedness towards any evidence bearing on the problems, and if
they get these things, it is a matter of secondary importance what
they know of philosophy (i. e., how much) for time will remedy
that lack of quantity and also what philosophy they believe; for
success in attaining the results just mentioned as desirable will
guarantee the quality of their product."
Of those who emphasize the aim as the introducing of the stu-
dent to the problems of philosophy, a number lay stress upon the
problems "as they present themselves to thinkers to-day" or "in re-
lation to present-day attitudes and tendencies."
32 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
One reply adds an aim not named above : the preparation of the
student to enter into the spirit of the great literatures.
III. THE PREFERABLE METHOD FOR INTRODUCING STUDENTS TO
PHILOSOPHY
There are six chief methods suggested, which will be discussed
in the order of their preference.
1. Through the History of Philosophy. A majority (twenty-
four) name the history of philosophy as an indispensable part of the
means whereby the student shall be introduced to philosophy, and all
but three of these emphasize it as of chief importance. Thirteen of
the twenty-four consider the history of philosophy an all-sufficient
method, the rest preferring to supplement it in various ways, the way
most frequently mentioned being the discussion of the special philo-
sophical problems for their own sakes especially the problems of
the present day, which saves the student from a sense of remoteness
and, in some degree, meets the objection of one who writes that he
does not prefer the history of philosophy as a method because "it is
too likely to detach the student from the problems of present-day
civilization."
Some of the departments that prefer the historical method are
among those that were recorded above as having no special course
in the introduction to philosophy. A member of a department of
this sort, with definite objections to a special introduction course,
strongly defends the historical method thus: "Assuming that the
proper introductory course is the historical one, it should teach the
student to do some philosophical thinking on his own account, and
to get possession of himself through familiarizing himself with the
fundamental categories of thought as these have emerged in the
course of the development of philosophy. I am firmly convinced, as
the result of my own experience, that no other way of approach can
equal the historical in accomplishing these purposes. The aim is of
course never simply to present views that others have held at a cer-
tain time, but always to awaken and stimulate the student's own
powers of reflection by helping him to live through the historical
movement. Any independent introduction is sure to be partial and
one-sided. It is not possible entirely to escape from this danger
even by means of the historical course, but at least the student has a
better opportunity to get a first-hand acquaintance with the different
points of view which have together contributed to bring philosophy
to its present stage."
Some replies emphasize the fact that the vast majority of stu-
dents come to the study of philosophy with no realization of its prob-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 33
lems. These problems have to be made real, and the history of their
actual rise is indispensable for this purpose. That the history may
genuinely accomplish this result, it is suggested that the main aim
should be to present the more fundamental advances made toward
a theory of the world and life in such a way that they seem progres-
sive answers or approximations, rather than mere speculations. One,
who has made a signal success of the historical mode of introduction,
advises that it is an excellent principle to lay down at the beginning
of such a course that the views represented by the historical philos-
ophers were absolutely convincing to those who held them, and that
until one is able to feel the plausibility of the doctrines presented, he
is in no position to criticize them. ' ' All this means of course that the
older philosophies live on in contemporaneous thinking, and that no
view, however crude, fails to find its counterpart in the thinking of
each one who is undertaking to get possession of himself. ' '
It is almost the unanimous opinion of those who favor the histor-
ical method that generous use should be made of the sources : in this
connection, the texts of Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley are most
frequently mentioned as of special value to the beginner.
The few who advance reasons against the historical method agree
in insisting that the history of philosophy should follow and not pre-
cede a somewhat systematic treatment of the problems of philosophy.
It is objected that unless this is done the student is "too raw" to
grasp the significance of the history, which, at any rate, is more val-
uable to him after he has come face to face with some of the problems
for himself.
This leads us to a consideration of the method next in favor.
2. Through the Problems of Philosophy Considered in Them-
selves. While only six consider the discussion of the problems of
philosophy an all-sufficient introduction, it is most frequently men-
tioned as auxiliary to other methods, especially the historical. One,
who favors the historical method for the less mature, is convinced that
to those who are equal to it, it proves more stimulating than the his-
torical courses. There is a general insistence that the problems shall
be presented in connection with present-day issues and solutions, and
that they should first emerge through a Socratie questioning of the
student's own attitudes toward life. 8 As a typical reply puts it:
"Introduce the student to philosophy through his stock on hand.
Begin where the students are and grow into philosophy with them.
Drag the problems out of them ; they are already infected. ' '
3. Through Science: Its Generalizations and Presuppositions.
No one considers this, taken by itself, a good mode of approach for
* See article on ' ' Hegel 'a Conception of an Introduction to Philosophy, ' ' by
J. W. Hudson, in this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., pp. 345 ff.
84 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the average class, although some think it commendable for students
with specifically scientific preparation. Nevertheless, as many as
twelve deem it a valuable auxiliary method. The advantages most
stressed include that of enabling the teacher to show the inevitable-
ness of the philosophic task and at the same time to distinguish this
task in aim and method from that of the sciences. Another merit of
the approach through an examination of the presuppositions of sci-
ence is felt to be the opening of an attractive and easy way to th<>
problems of epistemology.
The objections to this method are more outspoken and specinV
than to any of the others discussed. They group themselves into
four main criticisms. First, it is alleged that students are not at the
outset interested in the presuppositions of science; second, their
knowledge of the sciences is too limited, except in isolated cases : for
the special student in the sciences, who would be qualified, rarely
cares anything about philosophy; third, the problems aroused by
science soon suffer from abstractness ; fourth, to quote the reply of a
noted psychologist and authority on the mind of the youth, "This is
the very worst method, for it brings precocity and conceit."
4. Through Literature. While only one reply mentions as a
purpose the introduction of the student to the great literatures, a
little over a third lay some stress upon it as a valuable means among
others, especially if used judiciously and discriminatingly. Its specific
use, according to several, is to relate the history of philosophy to the
total life of a people ; according to others, its value is in furnishing
material and food for thought along the line of special problems
under discussion. One reply mentions as being of worth for intro-
ductory purposes a course on philosophical ideas in the English liter-
ature of the nineteenth century, starting with Pope for a back-
ground. This reply adds that the vast advantage is that the topics
mean something to the student at once; moreover, they furnish ac-
cess to any philosophical question one may care to raise, and the prob-
lems need not be carried out any further than the class can stand.
The writer of this reply, however, considers such a course as merely
auxiliary.
Several feel that the introduction through the great literatures
can best be made in conjunction with the history of philosophy. One
reply, representative of this conviction, is of such interest and worth
that I quote from it at length :
The best "find" in the history of philosophy for me is to begin with
Oriental literatures, with enough copies of some of the best things in the depart-
mental library, so that the students can browse and make selections of things they
like in their notes. The order used is: Confucius, Mencius, Lao Tse, the Vedas,
Brahmanas Upanishads (the six systems, cursorily, in outline), Buddhism, Persia,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 35
Egypt. Then, later, in its proper place, Hebrew literature and Jesus. Among
the advantages are: a world-view; the possible historic setting of some of the
Greek conceptions; a larger conception of the continuity of life and thought;
and, most of all, an escape once for all from the false notion that ' ' philosophy ' '
consists in a lot of "systems" just. Philosophy has certainly drawn more
historically, and does still, from ethics, poetry, religion, and the like than from
science and logic. Philosophy is man 's attempt to formulate to himself his sense
of worth (scientific, social, moral, esthetic), or his appreciation of meaning, or
feeling of reality, and it is better and easier for students to catch first the verities
in the great literatures of philosophy that are struggling to get themselves said,
and then to formulate them into systematic statements so far as possible. It is
a shame to have students break their heads over conceptions and systems and
imagine that is philosophy the first thing. It is a piece of good luck if they get
through it all with a taste left for philosophy.
A representative of one of our larger philosophy departments,
who thinks that most modern " introductions" are written primarily
for future special students of philosophy, and that they are apt to
be too technical for the average student, expresses the desire for a
source-book of good literary material. With many others who have
had practical experience with the problem, he feels that the diffi-
culty is that most of our philosophy is not simple and interesting
enough ("not literature enough") for the beginning student; while
most literature is not philosophic enough or is so diffuse that a be-
ginner loses sight of the philosophical problem.
Apart from the objection on the part of some that literature is
"too thin" to introduce to philosophy with much success, the diffi-
culty is raised that most of those who affect literature seem to be
usually devoid of philosophic interest. Another still more impor-
tant objection is that while it is easy to get students to take literary
courses in philosophy, they do not produce any adequate preparation
for more advanced work.
One's total impression after reading the replies under this head
is that we have not paid enough attention to the use of the great
literatures as an auxiliary mode of introduction to evaluate it ade-
quately, and that here is a field in which some one might do some
really needful intensive work with regard to both sources and
methods.
5. Through Kulturgeschichte. Several, who prefer a historical
approach, do not care to narrow the student to the history of tech-
nical philosophy, but wish vitally to relate that history to Kultur-
geschichte, i. e., the evolution of science, morality, art, religion, and
political life, in short, the history of institutions. This is to pre-
vent the student from getting the impression that, either historically
or systematically, "philosophy is simply a clever and surprising
species of intellectual gymnastics performed in vacuo," and also
36 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
to lead him to philosophy through familiar highways. Some, who
do not prefer the history of philosophy at all, or only secondarily, as
a mode of introduction, nevertheless are convinced that philosophy
can best be made to emerge from a consideration of the metaphysical
implications of the history of institutions. Some very thoughtful
replies were received on this somewhat untried method replies that
lead one to feel that, in the right hands, it would be highly successful,
at least in a supplementary way. In order to give a more detailed
idea of this method, I quote from the reply of one who has tried it
and made a success of it in connection with the history of philosophy
proper :
This introductory course should deal with the ' ' natural ' ' systems of peoples
and ages rather than with the "artificial" systems developed by exceptional
historic thinkers. A recent article in the JOURNAL* describes what I try to
make my general history of philosophy a history of the ideals of peoples, their
origin and significance (a) to the peoples themselves and (b) to succeeding agea
and peoples, especially to us. I always encourage the point of view of people,
and even take up their problems for systematic discussion so far as the class
seem inclined to it and time permits. In general, the relation of philosophical
movements to the life of the times which produced them needs emphasis in an
introductory course more than the content (conceptual or doctrinal) of the move-
ments themselves. I agree with you that the philosophy involved in history is
the best subject-matter for this introductory course, and have pursued it to such
an extent in the past that the historical department has sometimes asked what
I'm teaching my students! I emphasize everything bearing on the history of
institutions and social organization science in relation to industry, political
organization, law, social customs and standards of moral judgment, the medieval
church, educational devices and methods, historical events such as the wars with
Philip, the conquests of Alexander, the fall of Borne with barbarian invasions,
the rise and significance of the Holy Roman Empire, etc., using all the informa-
tion students gather from other courses so far as possible.*
6. Through the Religious Interest. The experience of several
leads them to believe that the best way to a realization of the mean-
ing of philosophy is through the religious interest. Through this,
they find, is best reached the life and thinking of the majority. Of
the six who mention this mode of approach, none rely upon it alone.
Five combine it with the historic, scientific, and literary approaches.
One finds that " comparing the religious with the scientific point of
view creates thinking and forces the student to see the necessity for
intelligent opinion."
7. Other Methods. Two other modes of approach are named.
Three mention logic without comment and one expresses a preference
"An Introduction to Philosophy through the Philosophy in History," by
J. W. Hudson, in this JOURNAL, Vol. VII., pp. 569 ff.
'See also "The Aims of an Introductory Course in Philosophy," by Edgar
L. Hinman, in this JOURNAL, Vol. VII., pp. 561 ff., an article in general sympathy
with the above method.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 37
for the problems of sociology as revealing the necessity for a rational
basis, and epistemology as showing the possibility and character of
such a basis. Three mention psychology as a desirable prerequisite
for the introductory course. Several feel that the mode of approach
depends very largely upon the teacher, or upon the character of the
students, or upon both.
An attempt was made by the writer to discover whether those
who agree concerning the true aim of an introduction course tend
toward any agreement in method. No such tendency was discern-
ible, except in the instance of those who find that all the aims
named are to be reckoned with, in which case the question of ends
and means was merely relative and a matter of emphasis solely.
IV. THE USE OF A TEXT-BOOK IN INTRODUCTION COURSES
Only seven of the thirty-five who replied deem a text-book un-
desirable, and only three of these would rely wholly upon lectures
and discussions. The other four prefer assigned readings from
carefully selected sources. One writer objects to the use of a single
text on the ground that it supplies the student with answers, so that
he does not do the thinking for himself that is essential to his phi-
losophizing. One department of a well-known eastern university
writes that it uses none of the elementary text-books written espe-
cially for the classroom.
Those who do rely wholly upon lectures and discussions feel that
a book of any sort gets in the way of the student's own thinking,
one suggestion being that the student's own experience is a sufficient
text to yield him a modicum of first-hand philosophic thinking.
But the conviction of the majority is unequivocally in favor of
some kind of text, a conviction which, in general, is based upon
the feeling that immature students in philosophy need a basis for
discussion or ' ' center of operations ' ' ; that young students are used
to quite definite tasks and require them; and that the text best
directs the task and steadies the student's work. One reason given
in defense of a text is that students are helped by models to imitate
critically. A number insist that the text should be used only in con-
nection with sources. Many suggest (what has fortunately become a
truism) that the text-book be used as a basis not of mere recitation
but of active discussion.
It is interesting to note that while the majority are in favor of
the use of a text-book, over one third of these complain that they
have found none that is satisfactory, although they have tried a
number of the more popular introductions. The criticisms are not
38 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
explicit enough to be of any final value. Some think the current
text-books too technical; others regard them as "not intelligible and
concrete enough." One reply suggests what is probably very near
the truth : that, on account of the nature of the course, each teacher
would have to write his own text-book if he wishes one thoroughly
satisfactory to himself. One teacher practically follows this sug-
gestion by conducting the course through the aid of a syllabus in the
form of questions, which aims to bring the student in contact with
the sources, to guide his reading, and to prepare him to assist in
class discussion by suggesting problems.
V. CONCLUSION
First of all, the result of this questionnaire should not be taken
for more than it purports to be the more or less off-hand contribu-
tion of thirty-five teachers of philosophy to a problem so little dis-
cussed as yet that few have attained to critical convictions on the
subject. Yet, while the answers give results that obviously are not
final, they are of immense suggestive value both for those to whom
the introduction course is a real problem and for those who wish a
basis for further investigation. We have not yet fully realized how
much might be gained for philosophy by the active and intelligent
cooperation of its teachers, although our journals and associations
are gradually awakening us to the new demands and opportunities
of conference.
There are two points upon which most of the replies agree, no
matter what the emphasis of aim or method : one point relates to a
pedagogical principle and the other to what philosophy should be
made to mean to the student. First, most emphasize the imperative
need of getting at the student's point of view and of making phi-
losophy emerge from that, instead of from any external ipsissima
vcrba. To this end, much emphasis is laid upon generous and wisely
directed discussion, the subjects of which shall be the problems of the
class always these rather than those of the teacher. To this same
end, we are warned against "talking over the heads of our hearers"
and are told that the one thing needful pedagogically is close per-
sonal intercourse between the student and the instructor, in order to
get at each man's mind and to stimulate him to the formation of a
critical opinion of his own. Second, the replies emphasize the fact
that philosophy shall be so taught that we shall avoid the danger of
making it seem what too often it does seem a thing of futility, an
empty speculation. The problems of philosophy are to be made
real, and for this purpose it is well constantly to refer to the vital
issues of the present. Thus will philosophy be made a living thing
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 39
and assume its rightful place as part of the inmost life of him who is
so fortunate as to find it.
JAY WILLIAM HUDSON.
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.
THE NEW REALISM AND THE OLD 1
problems of philosophy fall naturally into four groups:
(1) Problems of knowing; (2) problems of being; (3) prob-
lems of acting; (4) problems of feeling. The subjects with which
these problems deal comprise, respectively, epistemology, metaphys-
ics, ethics, and esthetics. Epistemology is itself concerned with two
fairly distinct types of problems : ( 1 ) the functional problem of the
criteria of truth and the way of attaining it; (2) the structural prob-
lem of the nature of knowledge and the relation of the knower to the
known. Discussion of the functional problem of epistemology has
given us such doctrines and attitudes as mysticism, rationalism, em-
piricism, and pragmatism, which are so many theories as to how we
should get our knowledge and how we should test its truth. Discus-
sion of the second or structural problem of epistemology has given
us the doctrines of nai've realism, of dualistic realism, and of subjec-
tivism, which are so many theories as to the nature of the relation of
a knower to the objects known. These three epistemological theories,
or rather types of theory (for there are, as we shall see, several
variations of each), may be discussed pretty much on their own
merits and in relative independence not only of metaphysical,
ethical, and esthetical issues, but even of the epistemological prob-
lems of the methodological or functional kind. In this paper I shall
undertake to define the theories of nai've realism, dualism, and sub-
jectivism, as they appear to me, and to show how the difficulties in-
herent in the first theory have led to the adoption of the second, and
how that has been given up for the third, the futility of which, in its
turn, has led to a revival of the first.
The theory of nai've realism is the most primitive of the theories
under discussion. It conceives of objects as directly presented to
consciousness and being precisely what they appear to be. Nothing
intervenes between the knower and the world external to him. Ob-
jects are not represented in consciousness by ideas; they are them-
selves directly presented. This theory makes no distinction between
seeming and being ; things are just what they seem. Consciousness is
thought of as analogous to a light which shines out through the
1 Bead at the tenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Associa-
tion, December, 1910.
40 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
sense organs, illuminating the world outside the knower. There is in
this naive view a complete disregard of the personal equation and of
the elaborate mechanism underlying sense perception. In a world
in which there was no such thing as error, this theory of the knowl-
edge relation would remain unchallenged; but with the discovery of
error and illusion comes perplexity. Dreams are probably the earliest
phenomena of error to arouse the primitive mind from its dogmatic
realism. How can a man lie asleep in his bed and at the same time
travel to distant places and converse with those who are dead? How
can the events of the dream be reconciled with the events of waking
experience ? The first method of dealing with this type of error is to
divide the real world into two realms, equally objective and equally
external, but the one visible, tangible, and regular, the other more
or less invisible, mysterious, and capricious. The soul after death,
and sometimes during sleep, can enter the second of these realms.
The objectified dreamland of the child and the ghostland of the sav-
age are the outcome of the first effort of natural realism to cope with
the problem of error. It is easy to see, however, that this doubling
up of the world of existing objects will only explain a very limited
number of dream experiences, while to the errors of waking experi-
ence it is obviously inapplicable. Whenever, for example, the dream
is concerned with the same events as those already experienced in
waking life, there can be no question of appealing to a shadow world.
Unreal events that are in conflict with the experience of one's fellows,
and even with one's own more inclusive experience, must be banished
completely from the external world. Where, then, shall they be lo-
cated? What is more reasonable than to locate them inside the per-
son who experiences them? for it is only upon him that the unreal
object produces any effect. The objects of our dreams and our
fancies, and of illusions generally, are held to exist only "in the
mind." They are like feelings and desires in being directly experi-
enced only by a single mind. Thus the soul, already held to be the
mysterious principle of life, and endowed with peculiar properties,
transcending ordinary physical things, is further enriched by being
made the habitat of the multitudinous hosts of non-existent objects.
Still further reflection on the phenomena of error leads to the dis-
covery of the element of relativity in all knowledge, and finally to
the realization that no external happening can be perceived until
after it has ceased to exist. The events we perceive as present are
always past, for in order that anything may be perceived it must send
energy of some kind to our sense organs, and by the time the energy
reaches us the phase of existence which gave rise to it has passed
away. To this universal and necessary temporal aberration of per-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 41
ceived objects is added an almost equally universal spatial aberra-
tion. For all objects that move relatively to the observer are per-
ceived not where they are when perceived, but, at best, where they
were when the stimulus issued from them- Not only may some of the
stars which we see shining each night have ceased to shine years be-
fore we were born, but even the sun which we see at a certain place
in the sky is there no longer. The present sun, the only sun that now
exists, we never see. It fills the space that to us appears empty. Its
distance from what we see as the sun is measured by the distance
through which the earth has turned on its axis in the eight minutes
which it has taken the sun 's light to reach our eye. And in addition
to these spatial and temporal aberrations of perception we know that
what we perceive will depend not only upon the nature of the object
but on the nature of the medium through which its energies have
passed on their way to our organism ; and also upon the condition of
our sense organs and brain. Finally, we have every reason to be-
lieve that whenever the brain is stimulated in the same way in which
it is normally stimulated by an object, we shall experience that ob-
ject even though it is in no sense existentially present. These many
undeniable facts prove that error is no trivial and exceptional phe-
nomenon, but the normal, necessary, and universal taint from which
every perceptual experience must suffer.
It is such considerations as these that have led to the abandon-
ment of naive realism in favor of the second theory of the nature of
knowledge. According to this second theory, which is exemplified in
the philosophies of Descartes and Locke, the mind never perceives
anything external to itself. It can perceive only its own ideas or
states. But as it seems impossible to account for the order in which
these ideas occur by appealing to the mind in which they occur, it is
held to be permissible and even necessary to infer a world of external
objects resembling to a greater or less extent the effects, or ideas,
which they produce in us. What we perceive is now held to be only
a picture of what really exists. Consciousness is no longer thought
of as analogous to a light which directly illumines the extra-organic
world, but rather as a painter's canvas or a photographic plate
on which objects in themselves imperceptible are represented.
The great advantage of the second or picture theory is that it fully
accounts for error and illusion ; the disadvantage of it is that it ap-
pears to account for nothing else. The only external world is one
that we can never experience, the only world that we can have any
experience of is the internal world of ideas. When we attempt to
justify the situation by appealing to inference as the guarantee of
this unexperienceable externality, we are met by the difficulty that
the world we infer can only be made of the matter of experience, i. e.,
42 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
can only be made up of mental pictures in new combinations. An
inferred object is always a perceptible object, one that could be in
some sense experienced, and, as we have seen, the only things that
according to this view can be experienced are our mental states.
Moreover, the world in which all our interests are centered is the
world of experienced objects. Even if, per impossibile, we could
justify the belief in a world beyond that which we could experience,
it would be but a barren achievement, for such a world would con-
tain none of the things that we see and feel. Such a so-called real
world would be more alien to us and more thoroughly queer than
were the ghostland or dreamland which, as we remember, the primi-
tive realist sought to use as a home for certain of the unrealities of
life.
It seems very natural at such a juncture to try the experiment of
leaving out this world of extra-mental objects, and contenting our-
selves with a world in which there exist only minds and their states.
This is the third theory, the theory of subjectivism. According to it,
there can be no object without a subject, no existence without a con-
sciousness of it. To be, is to be perceived. The world of objects
capable of existing independently of a knower (the belief in which
united the natural realist and the dualistic realist) is now rejected.
This third theory agrees with the first theory in being epistemolog-
ically monistic, t. e., in holding to the presentative rather than to the
representative theory of perception, for, according to the first theory,
whatever is perceived must exist, and according to the present theory
whatever exists must be perceived. Nai've realism subsumed the per-
ceived as a species under the genus existent. Subjectivism subsumes
the existent as a species under the genus perceived. But while the
third theory has these affiliations with the first theory, it agrees with
the second theory in regarding all perceived objects as mental states
ideas inhering in the mind that knows them and as inseparable
from that mind as any accident is from the substance that owns it.
Subjectivism has many forms, or rather, many degrees. It occurs
in its first and most conservative form in the philosophy of Berkeley.
Descartes and Locke, and other upholders of the dualistic epistemol-
ogy, had already gone beyond the requirements of the picture theory
in respect to the secondary qualities of objects. Not content with the
doctrine that these qualities as they existed in objects could only be
inferred, they had denied them even the inferential status which they
accorded to primary qualities. The secondary qualities that we per-
ceive are not even copies of what exists externally. They are the
cloudy effects produced in the mind by combinations of primary
qualities, and they resemble unreal objects in that they are merely
subjective. The chief ground for this element of subjectivism in the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 43
systems of dualistic realism immediately preceding Berkeley, was the
belief that relativity to the percipient implied subjectivity. As the
secondary qualities showed this relativity, they were condemned as
subjective. Now it was the easiest thing in the world for Berkeley
to show that an equal or even greater relativity pertained to the
primary qualities. The perceived form, size, and solidity of an ob-
ject depend quite as much upon the relation of the percipient to the
object as do its color and temperature. If it be axiomatic that what-
ever is relative to the perceiver exists only as an idea, why, then, the
primary qualities which were all that remained of the physical world
could be reduced to mere ideas. But just here Berkeley brought his
reasoning to an abrupt stop. He refused to recognize that (1) the
relations between ideas or the order in which they are given to us,
and (2) the other minds that are known, are quite as relative to the
knower as are the primary and secondary qualities of the physical
world. I can know other minds only in so far as I have experience
of them, and to infer their independent existence involves just as
much and just as little of the process of objectifying and hypostatiz-
ing my own ideas as to infer the independent existence of physical
objects. Berkeley avoided this obvious result of his own logic by
using the word "notion" to describe the knowledge of those things
that did not depend for their existence on the fact that they were
known. If you had an idea of a thing say of your neighbor's body
then that thing existed only as a mental state. But if you had a
notion of a thing say of your neighbor's mind then that thing was
quite capable of existing independently of your knowing it. Con-
sidering the vigorous eloquence with which Berkeley inveighed
against the tendency of philosophers to substitute words for thoughts,
it is pathetic that he should himself have furnished such a striking
example of that very fallacy. In later times Clifford and Pearson
did not hesitate to avail themselves of a quite similar linguistic de-
vice for escaping the solipsistic conclusion of a consistent subjectiv-
ism. The distinction between the physical objects which as "con-
structs" exist only in the consciousness of the knower and other
minds which as "ejects" can be known without being in any way
dependent on the knower, is essentially the same both in its meaning
and in its futility as the Berkeleian distinction of idea and notion.
For the issue between realism and subjectivism does not arise from a
psycho-centric predicament a difficulty of conceiving of objects
apart from any consciousness but rather from the much more rad-
ical "ego-centric predicament" the difficulty of conceiving known
things to exist independently of my knowing them. And the poig-
nancy of the predicament is quite independent of the nature of the
44 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
object itself, whether that be a physical thing like my neighbor's
body, or a psychical thing like my neighbor's mind.
Some part of this difficulty Hume saw and endeavored to meet in
his proof that the spiritual substances of Berkeley were themselves
mere ideas; but Hume's position is itself subject to two criticisms:
First, it does not escape the ego-centric predicament for it is as diffi-
cult to explain how one "bundle of perceptions" can have any
knowledge of the other equally real "bundle of perceptions" as to
explain how one "spirit" can have knowledge of other "spirits."
Second, the Humean doctrine suffers from an additional difficulty
peculiar to itself, in that by destroying the conception of the mind
as a "substance," it made meaningless the quite correlative concep-
tion of perceived objects as mental "states." If there is no sub-
stance there can not be any states or accidents, and there ceases to
be any sense in regarding the things that are known as dependent
upon or inseparable from a knower. 2
Passing on to that form of subjectivism developed by Kant, we
may note three points: (1) A step back toward dualism, in that he
dallies with, even if he does not actually embrace, the dualistic notion
of a ding-an-sich, a reality outside and beyond the realm of experi-
enced objects which serves as their cause or ground. (2) A step in
advance of the subjectivism of Berkeley and Hume, in that Kant re-
duces to the subjective status not merely the facts of nature but also
her laws, so far, at least, as they are based upon the forms of space
and time and upon the categories. (3) There appears in the Kant-
ian system a wholly new feature which is destined to figure promi-
nently in later systems. I mean the dualistic conception of the
knower, as himself a twofold being, transcendental and empirical.
It is the transcendental or noumenal self that gives laws to nature,
and that owns the experienced objects as its states. The empirical or
phenomenal self, on the other hand, is simply one object among
others, and enjoys no special primacy in its relation to the world of
which it is a part. 8
The post-Kantian philosophies deal with the three points just
mentioned in the following ways: (1) The retrograde feature of
Kant's doctrine the belief in the ding-an-sich is abandoned. (2)
The step in advance the legislative power conferred by Kant upon
the self as knower is accepted and enlarged to the point of viewing
consciousness as the source not only of the a priori forms of relation,
but of all relations whatsoever. (3) The doctrine of the dual self is
*For elaboration and proof of this, see the article by the author entitled
"A Neglected Point in Hume's Philosophy," Philosophical Review, January,
1905.
* Cf. what Kant called his refutation of (Berkeleian) idealism.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 45
extended to the point of identifying in one absolute self the plurality
of transcendental selves held to by Kant, with the result that our
various empirical selves and the objects of their experience are all
regarded as the manifestations or fragments of a single perfect, all-
inclusive, and eternal self. But it is not hard to see that this new
dualism of the finite and the absolute self involves the same difficul-
ties as those which we found in the Cartesian dualism of conscious
state and physical object. For either the experience of the fragment
embraces the experiences of the absolute or it does not. If the
former, then the absolute becomes knowable, to be sure, but only at
the cost of losing its absoluteness and being reduced to a mere
"state" of the alleged fragment. The existence of the absolute will
then depend upon the fact that it is known by its own fragments,
and each fragmentary self will have to assume that its own experi-
ence constitutes the entire universe which is solipsism. If the other
horn of the dilemma be chosen and the independent reality of the
absolute is insisted upon, then it is at the cost of making the absolute
unknowable, of reducing it to the status of the unexperienceable
external world of the dualistic realist. The dilemma itself is the
inevitable consequence of making knowledge an internal relation
and hence constitutive of its objects. Indeed a large part of the
philosophical discussion of recent years has been concerned with the
endeavor of the absolutists to defend their doctrine from the attacks
of empiricists of the Berkeleian and Humean tradition in such a
way as to avoid equally the Scylla of epistemological dualism and the
Charybdis of solipsism. But, as we have seen, the more empirical
subjectivists of the older and strictly British school are open to the
same criticism as that which they urge upon the absolutists, for it is
as difficult for the Berkeleian to justify his belief in the existence of
other spirits, or the phenomenalistic follower of Hume his belief in
bundles or streams of experience other than his own, as for the
absolutist to justify those features of the absolute experience which
lie beyond the experience of the finite fragments.
And now enter upon this troubled scene the new realists, offering
to absolutists and phenomenalists impartially their new theory of the
relation of knower to known. On this point all subjectivists look
alike to them, and they make no apology for lumping together for
purposes of epistemological discussion such ontologically diverse
theories as those of Fichte and Berkeley, of Mr. Bradley and Pro-
fessor Karl Pearson. Indeed, it can not be too emphatically stated
that the theory in question is concerned primarily with this single
problem of the relation of knower to known. As such, it has no
direct bearing on other philosophical issues, such as those of monism
and pluralism, eternalism and temporalism, materialism and spiritu-
46 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
alism, or even pragmatism and intellectualism. Of course this does
not mean that those individuals who defend the new realism are
without convictions on these matters, but only that as a basis for
their clearer discussion it is first of all essential to get rid of sub-
jectivism.
Like most new things this new theory is in essentials very old.
To understand its meaning it is necessary to go back beyond Kant,
beyond Berkeley, beyond even Locke and Descartes far back to that
primordial common sense which believes in a world that exists inde-
pendently of the knowing of it, but believes also that that same inde-
pendent world can be directly presented in consciousness and not
merely represented or copied by ' ' ideas. ' ' In short, the new realism
is almost identical with that naive or natural realism which was the
first of our three typic theories of the knowledge relation; and as
such, it should be sharply distinguished from the dualistic or infer-
ential realism of the Cartesians.
Now the cause of the abandonment of nai've realism in favor of
the dualistic or picture theory was the apparently hopeless disagree-
ment of the world as presented in immediate experience with the
true or corrected system of objects in whose reality we believe. It
follows that the first and greatest problem for the new realists is to
amend the realism of common sense in such wise as to make it
compatible with the universal phenomenon of error and with the
mechanism of perception upon which that phenomenon is based and
in terms of which it must be interpreted.
W. P. MONTAGUE.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
DISCUSSION
OPPOSITION AS CONDITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
TN No. 16 of this volume Professor Walter B. Pitkin was kind
enough to give a critical abstract of five essays published by
me in the last years, all expounding one system of thought, based
on the principle that opposition is the spring of consciousness. I
feel very thankful to Professor Pitkin for the pains he took in draw-
ing a very vivid and generally true picture of the line of thought I
pursued, and I am glad that he finds me at least on the trail to truth,
although my path diverges by a large angle from the psychological
highroad.
Indeed Professor Pitkin raises only one objection to the system
contained in my writings, although, to be sure, that objection is
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 47
directed against its very foundation. My critic says that either I
mean by opposition that specific kind which exists between anti-
thetical pairs, as for instance light and dark, or yellow and blue, as he
generously puts it to make my situation easier, or that I understand
opposition only in that broader sense of mutual exclusion which
exists, for instance, between all colors. In the first case I must suc-
cumb to the difficulty that to most objects an antithetical pair can not
be designated; in the second, opposition could not carry the system
built upon it, because "anything could be a sufficient precondition
for the experiencing of anything else " ; "a sound, or a flavor, or a
perfume, or any conceivable object with three sides, would all be
equally efficient as 'contraries' with regard to a triangle."
Professor Pitkin takes into consideration both branches of this
alternative, but he decidedly represents me as having spoken in the
former sense. Indeed, according to him, I assume "a polarizing
tendency in the world-stuff itself, which gives rise to all intellectual
distinctions," and he asks me to inform my readers (who would other-
wise not be convinced) as to just what qualities (physical objects)
do operate in antithetical pairs to effect consciousness.
I think, however, and I am sorry that I must say so, that it is
clearly the second sense of Professor Pitkin 's alternative in which
the term "opposition" is used in my writings. In formulating
against current psychology the charge mentioned by Professor Pitkin,
that out of isolated perceptions (viz., such as have not a content of
opposition against other perceptions) induction, experience of certain
facts having certain consequences, and rational action can not arise,
I manifestly take opposition in the sense of mutual exclusion only,
since to establish such a charge no conception of polar antithesis is
necessary. Indeed, in the very quotation which Professor Pitkin, in
elucidating this charge, kindly takes from my writings, the terms
Gegensatz and Ausschliessung are used together, separated only by
a comma, with the precise intention of precluding the interpretation
in the sense of polar antithesis the former term, however, being
generally preferred in my writings in order to demonstrate that
at the root of consciousness there is dynamic opposition (which,
of course, is not identical with "polar antithesis"). If this inter-
pretation is given to my principle, then it does follow that anything
is a sufficient precondition for the experiencing of anything else.
But this is just my opinion. Anything is, however, according to the
theory I propose, the sufficient precondition for the experiencing of
anything else with regard only to that element of the latter which is
contained in it on that ground, that fundamentum divisionis, on
which the two are opposed to, or exclude, each other. So a sound or
48 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
a flavor or a perfume makes us experience a (seen) triangle only as
light, a lighting, or visible object.
Let us suppose a baby just born in a room free from sound and
odor; let us exclude for simplicity's sake all tactual and gustatory,
etc., impressions also, and let us suppose that a shining triangle is
held before his eyes. The light of the triangle is not light to him in
the same sense as it is to us, as, namely, one sort of thing; but
it is to him the something, the stirring, the powerful, as opposed
to the nothing, the quiet, the weak (namely, the dark), which
environed him in his mother's womb, unperceived then because not
yet opposed to the impression of light, but now, in consequence of the
actual opposition, remembered. Such a baby would have no experi-
ence of light as distinguished from something. Let us now suppose
that later a noise arises in his neighborhood. He takes notice of
"something again," which is "not the same," however, as that
perceived until now, and he arrives at the notion of light or the
visible as distinguished from another something. 1 % To experience the
visible as a triangle, the opposition between planes having different
outlines, or at least the opposition between numbers, must be brought
to his perception; or, let us say, with regard to this example, more
generally to his mind, as mathematical and geometrical conceptions
can be formed a priori. But this again does not mean a polar anti-
thesis, but only a mutual exclusion on another ground. Between
specific opposition (polar antithesis) and chaotic exclusion, which
Professor Pitkin opposes to each other, there is an intermediate sort
of relation which is not restricted to pairs and might be called specific
exclusion.
To sum up: Everybody is aware that rational action requires a
systematical knowledge of things, their division into classes, the divi-
sion of every such class into sub-classes, and so on. What I assert is
that consciousness is from the very beginning consciousness of system,
1 1 foresee that readers unfamiliar with the writings here spoken of will find
great difficulty in understanding the asserted difference between perception of
light as perception of the something and its perception as perception of light.
To remove this difficulty, I am obliged to refer to my writings, where, especially
in ' ' Das Beharren, etc., ' ' I try to show throughout the whole psychology how such
differences work. Here I can only say that this difference is like that between
perception of a tone simply as a tone and its perception as a high or a low tone.
This difference, and the assertion that if only one tone (and silence) has
impressed the subject so far in his lifetime, then only the former perception is
possible to him, will perhaps more easily find acceptance than the corresponding
assertion with regard to light. And I can further point to the fact that, whereas
in the case when light would be the only (positive) sensation which has impressed
a subject, it would give him, as was said, the perception of the powerful; in cases
of other (positive) sensations also having already been experienced, this light
would give, on the contrary, the perception of the tenderest, finest thing of all.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 49
which only develops in the course of life; consciousness not only of
"this," but also of "therefore not being that."
It is this idea which leads to that psychophysical theory (I can
not allow that it is a "hypothesis" only) which Professor Pitkin
somewhat approvingly reviews.
The opposition, therefore, from which this theory derives con-
sciousness, is nothing else but what other psychological theories call
difference of stimuli. These theories, however, do not find the actions
of different stimuli or their residua leading to dynamical conflicts in
the subject, 2 and they do not see in such conflicts the very condition
of consciousness, as I do. This is my answer to the request for in-
formation with which Professor Pitkin closes his review.
I may perhaps be allowed to mention that W. Polowzow, after
having rather favorably reviewed my treatise "Das Beharren,"
etc., 3 later, in a criticism of "Die Stelle des Bewusstseins, " etc., 4
finds the same difficulty with my theory as Professor Pitkin.
Fraulein Polowzow mentions that I oppose to "seeing a dog" "see-
ing no dog," and thinks that if this example is taken as typical of
the sense of opposition in my works, my theory of the origin of
consciousness is reduced ad absurdum. Now, I can not see why.
' ' Seeing a dog ' ' means seeing a particular form. What I maintain is
that consciousness of a form is impossible without more than one form
being known to the subject, and that consequently the consciousness
of the form called a dog can not arise in a subject without his know-
ing at least one other form not called a dog. This may be false, but
I can not see why it should be absurd.
I can not see the absurdity, although this agreement between two
(by no means all) of my critics induced me to think the matter over
seriously once more. Their agreement seems to me to arise simply
from the influence of current psychology, which prevents those
used to it from seeing the dependence which I assert. Indeed I know
of only one systematic treatise on psychology (the "Leitfaden" of
Th. Lipps) which mentions negative perceptions, such as that of see-
ing no dog, although such perceptions manifestly form the very
starting-point of thought. But the psychology of to-day might justly
be called the science of mind apart from its coherence.
I close by expressing once more my best thanks to Professor
Pitkin. JULIUS PIKLEB.
UNIVERSITY OP BUDAPEST.
* Th. Lipps ("Von Fiihlen, Wollen und Denken," second edition) does
derive dynamical conflicts in the subject from this difference, but at the same
time he calls this difference opposition, Gegensatg, Gegensatzlichkeit, just as I do.
1 Zeitschrift fur Psychologic, Bd. 55, S. 154, 1910.
4 Ibid., Bd. 58, S. 388, 1911.
60 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Presentation of Reality. HELEN WODEHOUSE. Cambridge: Univer-
sity Press. 1910. Pp. xii + 160.
This essay is intended as a description of knowledge from the point
of view of a philosophical psychology. Inspection of the experience
called knowledge, or consciousness, finds it a real presentation of object
to subject. Many objects are not spatial e. g., " objectives " (the con-
tents of affirmative and negative judgments), connections of fact, other
people's minds hence the object's presence to the subject, in knowledge,
is not essentially a spatial relation. Neither is presence in general essen-
tially spatial. " A real thing, whatever else it may be, is the method, or
necessity, or law, in a group of events. The laws of its nature govern the
behavior of other objects in relation to it, and our own experience in
respect of it. ... Now ' presence ' . . . can only mean the actuality of
government by the law-group in question. . . . ' I see Birmingham ' means
that the nature of Birmingham is expressing itself in my perceptual ex-
perience, governing the happenings there; and the contemplation of a
thing in memory, in imagination, or in the most elaborate thought means
exactly the same kind of fact" (pp. 70-72).
The logical " difference " that makes presence knowledge is a striving
to increase or diminish the extent of the presence. Consciousness is pres-
ence with interest.
To deny that knowledge is such real presentation is to deny that
knowledge has content, unless " content " means something other than
" datum," the " given," the " present," in knowledge, which no subjectivist
says, or could think. And only by a meaningless distinction between
content and what is contained can presentation in knowledge be thought
to imply absence from knowledge, by a self-perpetuating recurrence of
mediating relationships between content and container.
It is impossible that content, an actualization of law, should be other
than the very law, the very object; and again impossible that such object
should be any content entirely. " No manifestation of the object exhausts
the object; the latter can always expand its expression and tell us more
and more" (p. 52). "In introspection ... we make the content of a
given act of apprehension into the object of another act " (p. 20) ; but
not even in introspection does content exhaust object. Any knowledge is
a process, a gradual discovery. However we fix our limits, what is within
them can develop internally.
No one has yet offered a satisfactory account of the nature of an
idea, and the author of this essay is convinced " that there are no such
things as ideas. Contents and objects alike exist outside my body. . . .
' Contents ' may be admirable tools if we can keep them free from the
taint of the old ' ideas,' and can remember that the things which enter
the mind, and which therefore are partly contained in our mind, are the
same things that exist outside our body in the ordinary physical world "
(p. 18). " It is literally true to say that the past or the future can be
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 51
' present with me,' or that the friend I think of has ' entered into my
thought ' or has been ' much in my mind.' ... I can no more think of a
thing which is outside thought than I can see a thing which is out of
sight" (pp. 71 and 72). ("Literally," if these terms, usually spatial, are
given their deeper, extra-spatial meaning.)
Knowledge is evidently not a static, but an active relation. The object
operates on the subject. The subject strives to alter the extent of the
operation ; the subject reacts receptively. The verb " know," whose gram-
mar implies that the subject is initially or positively active, lends itself
to the false subjectivistic conception that knowing is constructing reality.
It is the object that is initially and positively active. " Even if the
whole world grows by means of our interest; even if nothing can exist
except on condition that it is known; . . . even in deliberate fiction or
assumption, where we do wilfully create the objects that we apprehend, the
creation is not the apprehension. . . . Whatever creates the reality that we
find, it is not the finding, as such, that creates it, and it is this finding
that constitutes knowledge" (pp. 7 and 8).
If judgment is a kind of knowledge different from other apprehension,
it is, like all apprehension, a case of " finding something there." It is
more, no doubt; but, therefore, it is not pure knowledge. The modality
of a judgment depends on the degree of limitation of content ; the strength
of conviction is equally a quality of the object, not at all of the subject.
It depends on the steadiness of the content. " We can not more or less
receive except in the sense that we can receive more or less."
In all levels or departments of knowledge the object may be the same.
The content is different. The object, set in a clear field in contemplation,
unfolds before us in the contents of consciousness. Where first we found
only sense-contents, we presently find shape and position and likeness and
distinction, and connections with all the world, and relations on which
inferences rest. We "think the thing out." In a sense, the object of
every knowledge is the universe entire; limitation of object depends on
interest. In marginal sensations or images (where interest approaches
the vanishing-point), and in exhaustive philosophical investigation, the
object is the unlimited universe ; the content approaches " nothing " in
the first case, " everything " in the second. In sensations that are ele-
ments of a focalized percept the object is a section of the physical world
that includes my body; in the peculiar case of introspection, a former
content is the object. Here the content may be said to cover its object;
even here the content does not exhaust the object, which is capable of
indefinite development internally.
There are an indefinite number of levels of knowledge in which we
meet non-spatial objects that therefore can not enter into sense or imagery.
All these are brought here under the name of " thought." Important
examples of such non-spatial presentations were cited at the beginning.
The yes-no determination in judgment is distinct from that of choice
(B. Russell), and consists in the contrast between presence and absence of
some feature in the object a matter of content purely, not of subjective
52 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
act. In inference, association is undoubtedly operative constantly, but
here also the matter of our belief is objective purely. " We find our way
to a new conclusion in thinking as we find our way to a new district in
exploring, not mainly by habit, but by observing the lie of the land and
searching out the road" (p. 47). Inference is, in fact, only a special
method for making the features of reality clear to ourselves and to others,
and non-inferential knowledge is as common in thought as in sense.
Among non-spatial presentations are included the minds of other
people. When I contemplate material things, not only my object but the
content of my mind is made of wood and stone. So when I contemplate
my friend, the contents of my mind are " made " of his spirit and spiritual
activity; for this enters my consciousness and is present to my thought.
Two chapters are devoted to the defense of the presentation of reality
in sense and in thought, respectively. Those who regard the contents of
sense as too near to be objective (e. g., Stout) confuse sensation with
feeling; for no other distinction between them ever has been or could be
offered except the objectivity of sensation and the subjectivity of feeling.
Those, on the other hand, who think the objects of thought are too remote
to be presented at all are under the delusion of a spatial meaning in
" presentation," and of another ambiguity, that of the phrase " immediate
knowledge." Inferred knowledge is said to be non-immediate, but the
meaning is historical rather than epistemological ; that is, inferred knowl-
edge is reached by means of other knowledge; it is by no means therefore
out of touch with its object. The recipient act, in inference, is continu-
ally helped and guided by a creative act hypothesis, the making of sug-
gestive pictures or guiding lines. Subjectivism confuses these elements
of inference.
Under the head of inference comes a criticism of James on conception,
and it applies equally well to Bergson. These anti-conceptualists at-
tribute too much to sense-experience, and miss the essential significance of
thought. Pure sensation is the unreachable limiting case of experience
accepted without inspection, with the given forbidden to expand. The
immediate feeling of life does not solve, but sets, the problems of thought.
Such feeling gives us the going thing; understanding gives us the "go"
of it. Bradley is, on this point, in the strange company of these empiri-
cists. They are right in counseling a modest attitude in intellect; wrong
in their blindness to the objective realness of its content. They urge us
to get full data, as if data were solution. They do not consider the
involvedness of " immediacy." The true inwardness unfolds in relations,
and it is just the distinction between thought and sense that the former
is the apprehension of relations, the latter the apprehension of qualities.
Our coming to see the relations may be (historically) non-immediate;
our seeing them is of precisely the same immediacy as that of sense. The
effort of coming to see them is that of focusing and guiding our sight.
There is construction, creation, in coming to see; none in seeing.
In short, if I " know about," I know. So, if we take the " con-
tent of my sensation " as the object of thought, thought knows that
content in knowing about it. The proposition that thought can not see
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 53
what sense sees in an object, is a special case of the general truth that, so
far as I am not repeating an apprehension, so far I am not apprehend-
ing its own content that is, the aspect of the object which I appre-
hended before. I can apprehend my own feeling, as I do in any
judgment about it. But, as with sensation and belief, my apprehension
of it is not repetition of it. Subjectivity is not descriptive of feeling.
Mind is no more subjective than objective. I can contemplate my own
mind, or anything else in the universe, as I prove by writing about it.
But in the nature of things I can not have within the limits of my
presented content the receiving of that content. I can not see my face.
It is not invisible, but I can not look two ways at once. Living, for
James and Bergson, is more than seeing life. But this is a mistake.
Seeing life is more, not less, than living; for seeing implies living, and
living does not imply seeing.
In the problem of error, a second and brief division of the essay, the
central doctrine is that knowledge is fallible in proportion to its signifi-
cance. If sense can not lie, it is because of its inarticulateness, not
because of its immediacy. " The only way of avoiding error is to stop
short of the line round our content at which it unites with a special and
determinate universe of reality" (p. 109). As a fact, no experience that
has ever been proposed as the unshakable foundation of belief is roomy
enough for any belief. But this is no great matter, for it is in the whole
of experience that the reality of the world manifests itself. In any case
of consciousness, whether knowledge or error, a real object is presented.
The peculiarities of our nature conditioning error are elements in the
given objective world. The objects of error are abnormal. Their reality
contradicts itself, becomes transparent, and finally fades away. But no
more than other objects is the false object created by our apprehension
of it.
The third part, too, can only be glanced at here. It is particularly
interesting in its justification of the objective reality of the world of
assumption, a mansion in the " many-mansioned universe."
I can create the object of perceptual experience, as in building a house,
or I can create it in the non-actual worlds by assuming. It is dependent
in either case on the act of creation, not on that of apprehension. I do,
in the latter case, just what I do in the former, " enlarge reality, create
more objects for the apprehension of myself and others. These objects
would be real if they were only presented once and then destroyed and
forgotten ; but in most cases they have much more reality than this, since
they are capable of being presented again and again, of being looked at in
various aspects, of being explored and developed " (p. 133) .
Assumption is thus creation in another universe than that of the act
of creation. The latter universe is the ground of the former. As free
creator, I can set the law of non-contradiction aside, in assumption.
This circumstance, it will be remarked, does seem to constitute an impor-
tant difference in the two kinds of creation. The building of a house has
no such freedom as this. The author evidently regards the difference as
irrelevant to the realness of the assumption world. That rests, no doubt,
64 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
in the end, on the fact that it is contained in our knowledge. One can
not treat the argument fairly in the space at present available.
In assumption, I see the object as non-actual ; in judgment, as actual.
Assumption and judgment differ thus in content. Both differ, also in
content, from doubt. The content of belief has external articulation;
the outline of the content of doubt is blurred. The outline of the content
of assumption is distinct, but overlain upon, not articulated with, an
external universe.
This little book is much more suggestive than wordy, and criticism is
largely disarmed by this feature of it. It keenly glances at many of the
hardest problems of the theory of knowledge, with an able, charming, and
persuasive air of solving some, and an equally gracious modesty with
regard to others.
It is an admirably useful book to work from in a study of epistemology.
ARTHUR MITCHELL.
UNIVERSITY or KANSAS.
An Introduction to Experimental Psychology. CHARLES S. MYERS. Cam-
bridge: University Press. 1911. Pp. vii + 156.
This little book presents very clearly and interestingly some of the prob-
lems and results of experimental psychology. The author has chosen
those fields that are most interesting and to which he has himself made
most contributions. There are seven chapters: one each on touch, tem-
perature and pain, on color vision, the Miiller-Lyer and other illusions, on
experimental esthetics, on memory, and two on mental tests. The first
chapter for the most part gives a summary of the work of Head and Rivers
on nerve division. The second chapter gives a brief summary of the facts
of color vision, with some reference to theories, and then a relatively long
summary of the work of Rivers in its bearing upon the color sense of
savage tribes. The discussion of the Miiller-Lyer illusion makes much
use of Rivers's work, with summary of the theories. Contrast and con-
fluxion are preferred to eye movements as an explanation.
Particularly good is the chapter on memory. It gives a very useful
summary of the results of investigations of memory, with some practical
suggestions. The first chapter on mental tests covers ten tests of sensory
acuity, esthesiometer tests, and different tests of fatigue. It studies the
results obtained from groups of different mental standings and of differ-
ent ages, and considers the relative importance of mere sensory acuity
and intelligence in the results. The second chapter on tests, the best in
the volume, gives the Binet-Simon tests with modifications for British
usage.
The work can be recommended to any interested layman, and should
prove very useful on the topics treated as a work of reference for college
students.
W. B. PlLLSBURY.
UNIVERSITY or MICHIGAN.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 55
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. July, 1911. Le temps selon les phi-
losophes Hellenes (pp. 5-24) : P. DUHEM. - According to Archytas time
is a number determined by the general movement of the universe ; time in
general is the duration of this movement, the time between two events is
the number of revolutions which intervene between these events. Aris-
totle, in the " Physics," defines time as that which indicates the number
of successions in any movement. Plato denies that time is a number and
asserts that it is a certain continuous quantity which is common to all
actions. Le temperament nerveux, second article (pp. 25 47) : J. TOULE-
MONDE. - Persons of the nervous temperament are characterized by sub-
mission to all sorts of fanciful ideas obsessions with regard to their
own health, judgments, intellectual problems. As a result they are filled
at times with anxiety; at times are completely absorbed in thought, and
at all times have an exaggerated idea of the value of time. The type is,
moreover, characterized by extreme instability and by marked impression-
ability. Les fails de Lourdes. A propos d'ouvrages recents (pp. 48-62) :
R. VAN DER ELST. -To judge of the cures at Lourdes it is necessary to
study the facts of the cases; defenders of the miraculous healings have
not used adequately these facts, and adverse critics have almost ignored
them. La loi naturelle, second article (pp. 63-85) : E. BRUNETEAU. - The
doctrine of infallible moral intuition is utterly destroyed by the facts of
history and anthropology, and yet these same facts point to the possession
on the part of humanity everywhere and in all times of the same funda-
mental principles of morality. Analyses et comptes rendus: J. Dewey,
How we Think; G. Dumesnil, Le spiritualisme ; J, Segond, La priere:
J. Louis. A Menard, Analyse et critique des principes de la psychologic de
W. James: F. MEUTRE. S. Deploige, Le confiit de la morale et de la so-
ciologie: R. FLORIAN. J. Lebreton, Les origines du dogme de la Trinite: J.
GARDAIR. F. Picavet, Boscelin: R. SIMETERRE. Recension des revues.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. July, 1911. Le congres international
de philosophic de 1911 (pp. 1-22) : A. REY. - The author's criticism of the
organization of the congress and an account of the general ideas that
seemed prevalent there. Pensee theoretique et pensee pratique (pp. 23-
41) : F. RAUH. - The affirmation of the real always involves practical af-
firmations, so the current separation of moral truths from cosmic truths
is artificial and inexact. La sociologie de M. Durkheim (first article)
(pp. 41-71): G. DAVY. -As M. Durkheim's works first made precise the
idea, object, and method of sociology, so through this and the following
study, M. Davy aims at a definition of this science. Essai d'une classi-
fication des etats affectifs (end) (pp. 72-89) : E. TASSY. - A study of two
of the three classes of affective states distinguished in the author's pre-
vious article, organic affective states and psychic affective states, and a
section on the function of intellectual activity. Analyses et comtes
rendus. J. Rehmke, Das Bewusstsein: R. HUBERT. H. Joly, Problemes
56 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
de science criminelle: G. RICHARD. 8. Deploige, Le conflit de la morale
et de la sociologie: 3. SEGOND. N. Kostyleff, La crise de la psychologic
experimental : J. DAGNAN-BOUVERET. Chabrier, Les emotion* et les etats
organiques: J. DAGNAN-BOUVERET. J. Pickler, Ueber die biologische
Funktionen des Bewusstseins: J. DAGNAN-BOUVERET. I. Babbit, The New
Laocobn: C. LALO.
McDougall, William. Body and Mind: A History and a Defense of
Animism. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. xix +
384. $2.76.
Stratton, George Malcolm. Psychology of the Religious Life. London:
George Allen & Company, Ltd. 1911. Pp. xii -f 376. $2.75.
NOTES AND NEWS
A NEW psychological review, Psiche, has been lauched in Italy with
Professor Enrico Morselli of Genoa, Professor Sante de Sanctis of Rome,
and Professor Guido Villa of Pavia as directors, and Dr. Roberto
Assagioli of Florence as editor-in-chief. The directors aim to make the
new review different from previous ' reviews in certain respects, one of
which will be the devotion of each number to a particular topic. It is
planned to publish six numbers of not less than sixty-four pages each in
the course of the present year. The subscription price is L. 8 for Italian
and L. 10 for foreign subscriptions. Single numbers will cost L. 2.
Communications may be addressed to Via degli Alfani, 46, Florence.
PRESIDENT G. STANLEY HALL, of Clark University, is giving a course
of six lectures on " The Founders of Modern Psychology " at Columbia
University. His program is as follows : January 16, " Edward D. Zeller,
the Scholar in his Field " ; January 17, " Edward von Hartmann, the
Philosopher of Temperament " ; January 23, " Hermann Lotze, the Har-
monizer " ; January 24, " Theodor Fechner, the Animist " ; January 30,
Hermann von Helmholtz, the Ideal Man of Science"; January 31,
" Wilhelm Wundt, a Scientific Philosopher."
THE Houghton Mifflin Company have in press "The Classical Psy-
chologists," selections illustrating psychology from Anaxagoras to Wundt,.
compiled by Dr. Benjamin Rand. This work of Dr. Rand is a companion
volume to his " Modern Classical Philosophers " and " The Classical
Moralists."
PROFESSOR HENRI BERGSON, professor of philosophy of the College de
France, has accepted the invitation of the Senatus Academicus of the
University of Edinburgh to be Gifford lecturer from October, 1913, to
October, 1915.
EDWARD O. SISSON, recently head of the department of education at
the University of Washington, has been appointed professor of education
in the newly established Reed College, at Portland, Oregon.
VOL. IX. No. 3. FEBRUARY 1, 1912
DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC NERVE ENERGIES
r I ^ HE doctrine of specific nerve energies was first definitely formu-
lated by Johannes Miiller (1801-1858). Physiologists before
his time had regarded the sense nerves as merely conductors, each of
which, however, had a special sensibility to some peculiar impression,
and hence was the mediator of some definite quality of external
bodies. Miiller pointed out that the discovery of the possibility of
arousing different sensations in different nerves by the same stimulus,
e. g., electricity, and also of the fact that different stimuli, e. g., elec-
trical and mechanical, can produce in the same sense organ similar
sensations, had rendered the theory of the susceptibility of nerves to
certain impressions inadequate and unsatisfactory. He therefore
advanced the theory that "each peculiar nerve has a special power
or quality, which the exciting cause merely renders manifest"; and
that in sensations we do not experience the qualities or states of
external bodies, but merely the conditions of the nerves themselves.
Hence light, sound, and other apparently external qualities, as such,
have no existence, but are states which certain unknown external
influences excite in our nerves.
It is clear that Muller considered the sensory nerves themselves
as the seat of the "specific energy" ; and thought that the function of
the central organ consisted in the connection of the nerves into a
system, the reflection of the sensations upon the origin of the motor
nerves, ideation, remembrance, and attention. His theory, also,
seems to refer to modality only and not to quality; that is, a single
specific nervous energy is provided for each sense organ ; and, there-
fore, any sensory apparatus may respond to different forms of ade-
quate stimuli in a variety of ways.
Helmholtz first distinguished between modality and quality.
Sensations differ in quality when it is possible to pass by a series of
intervening sensations from one to the other. They differ in
modality when this can not be done, e. g., visual and auditory sensa-
tions. Helmholtz attempted to explain quality, also, by postulating;
57
58 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
a specific energy for each nerve fiber, that is, he sought for specific
energies within the individual sense organs; and his theories of visual
and auditory processes depend upon this further application of the
doctrine, e. g., each of the colors, red, green, and violet, depends upon
a specific process. Ilelmholtz must have interpreted the law some-
what differently from his predecessors, for he regarded these specific
differences in quality as determined by the character of the external
physical stimulus. In apparent contradiction to this he held that
modality was exclusively subjective. But if quality depends upon
external stimuli, the same must be said of modality, for the latter is
a mere concept or general term. There is no such thing as tasting
in general or seeing in general. What we taste or see is always a
particular quality.
Before proceeding we must refer to a certain ambiguity in the
term "specific energy." It confuses function with property or
quality. It makes, of course, a great deal of difference whether
specific property or specific function is meant by the phrase. Most
writers on the subject have used the term so loosely that it is difficult
to know just what they mean when they speak of "specific energy."
Wundt would scarcely deny the specific energy, in the sense of spe-
cific function, of any given nervous unit; but he would deny it in the
sense of a specific property, that is, specific chemical or physical
process, in that unit as a correlate of a specific quality of sen-
sation. Of course the latter meaning includes the former, but the
opposite is not true at least not necessarily so. Miiller meant by
the doctrine a specific nervous process, and so, we think, did
Helmholtz.
McDougall leaves no doubt as to his position when he says : ' ' The
nervous process which is the immediate exciting cause of each quality
of sensation is different from that which excites any other quality
of sensation"; and that "it is a difference which could, if we knew
more about it, be expressed in physical or chemical terms." He
advances the following proofs for his theory: (1) Whenever it has
been found possible to stimulate a nerve or sense organ by inadequate
stimuli, the resulting sensation is of a similar quality to that pro-
duced by stimulation of the same nerve or sense organ by its ade-
quate stimulus, that is, the one that normally excites it. (2) The
Helmholtz theories of visual and auditory processes, which offer the
most satisfactory explanation of the facts (?), depend upon this
doctrine. (3) Unlike effects must have unlike causes, therefore
unlike sensations must depend upon unlike nervous processes.
McDougall differs from Miiller in placing the seat of the specific
energy not in the nerves themselves, but in the cerebral cortex, and
especially in the synaptic processes. His reasons for so doing are as
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 59
follows: (1) If the specific quality were in the nerves or sense organs,
we would have to consider these processes as directly affecting con-
sciousness. This is improbable since loss of a sense organ or nerve
does not prevent the recurrence of the same quality of sensation in
imagination, while loss of the cortical structure does. (2) The con-
duction processes of all sensory nerves appear similar in kind.
(3) It is in harmony with the principle of strict localization of
cerebral functions and the principle of association ; for if the cortex
were of indifferent function, it would be difficult to Understand why
the excitement of an associated group might not on one occasion be
accompanied by one sensation, and on others by entirely different
sensations or psychical states. (4) This specialized character belongs
to the synapse, because the nerve cells are anatomically similar and
have as their function to preside over nutrition; also the synaptic
processes are highly fatiguable and transmit the nervous impulse
discontinuously. These features seem likewise characteristic of psy-
chical phenomena.
It is noteworthy that as our knowledge of the processes concerned
has advanced, the seat of the specific quality has receded from the
nerves to the cell-bodies and thence to the synapse. That is, with
the progress of physiology and anatomy, the advocates of the theory
have been forced to withdraw this qualitas occulta from known to
unknown regions. It seems likely, as Wundt remarks, that in the
future the specific energy will be placed in the sense organs them-
selves, where differences of structure and function warrant the
assumption.
Wundt holds that the different qualities of sensations depend not
on the specific character of nervous elements, but solely upon the
different modes of their connection. The principle of connection of
elements asserts that the "simplest psychical content has a complex
physiological substrate," e. g., the sensation of red has a complex
connection of nervous elements as its physical correlate. It is not,
however, so much the connection of nerve elements with one another,
as their connection with organs and tissue elements and through
these with external stimuli, that determines the specific quality of
sensation. A specific physical or chemical process as the basis for
each primary quality of sensation is an unnecessary hypothesis which
involves many difficulties and is wholly unprovable. True, certain
connections or systems of elements have specific functions, which,
however, have been acquired under pressure of the external condi-
tions of life.
This leads to the hypothesis of the original indifference of func-
tion, which is founded upon the following observations: (1) A fairly
long continuance of any function is necessary before the correspond-
60 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ing sense qualities appear in imagination, c. g., if a person becomes
blind in early life, he has no visual imagery. (2) Functional dis-
turbances occasioned by lesions are sometimes removed by a vicarious
functioning of other elements. Here the specific function arises dur-
ing the lifetime of an individual. Of course we inherit dispositions,
which consist in the connection of nervous and tissue elements, etc. ;
but, even so, the development of their specific functions demands the
actual discharge of these functions upon excitation of the end organs
by external stimuli.
The indifference of elementary function (and certainly property)
is also proved anatomically by the essential identity of structure;
physiologically, by the essential identity of nervous processes; and
psychologically, by the fact that elementary qualities of sensation
are referred to functions of peripheral elements.
The doctrine of specific nerve energies is contrary to the physi-
ological doctrine of the development of the senses and hence to the
whole theory of evolution. According to the latter our various senses
arose through differentiation from a common sensibility a differen-
tiation due to the action of external stimuli upon the organism, and
the adaptation of the latter to a complex environment. Hence each
sense organ is excited only by those stimuli to which it has become
specially adapted, and is unaffected by others. Even the sense
organs, then, are only secondary in determining the qualities of sen-
sations. These must ultimately be referred to external stimuli. The
specific character of the sensation most probably consists in the
attitude which we assume towards the external stimulus an attitude
determined by the connection of nervous and other elements.
We remarked above that each sense organ or nerve was excited
only by its adequate stimuli, but it is just because there are excep-
tions to this rule that the doctrine of specific energies was first for-
mulated. Electrical stimulation will produce sensations of light,
taste, or smell, etc. Mechanical stimuli will produce visual or
auditory sensations; direct electrical stimulation or section of the
nervus opticus will "cause flashes of light"; and it is said that
mechanical, chemical, or thermal excitation of the chorda tympani
will produce sensations of taste. These are the chief facts that can be
brought to bear in favor of the theory, and which any other theory
must endeavor to explain ; but even if otherwise inexplicable, they can
not be regarded as proofs of the doctrine, but merely as illustrations.
According to Wundt, all these cases of abnormal stimulation can
be explained by the principle of "practise and adaptation." The
impressions which the sense organs are adapted to receive, by virtue
of inherited or developed connections of elements, arouse certain
sensations; and when this mode of responding has become habitual,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 61
the accustomed excitation is set up by inadequate stimuli. Kiilpe
says that sensory nerve fibers with centrifugal conduction have been
demonstrated in the case of the nervus opticus, and that the visual
sensations aroused by electrical stimulation of this nerve are due to
the fact that the nervous excitation is first conveyed to the retina by
these efferent sensory fibers, and thence pursues its normal or accus-
tomed path of discharge. These centrifugal fibers may exist in all
sensory nerves; but even if they do not, the alternative theory that
stimulation arouses the accustomed excitation in the visual system of
elements is not difficult ; and far simpler than the theory of a qualitas
occulta different for every primary quality of sensation.
If the doctrine of specific energies were true, we see no reason
why there would not be a much more far-reaching indifference of the
stimuli than is actually the case. The inadequate stimuli are limited
in number, and there are many negative instances against the theory :
e. g., mechanical stimuli will not produce sensations of taste or of
smell; sound waves will not affect the nervus opticus, nor light
waves the auditory nerve ; temperature stimuli will not arouse other
sensations, etc.
When electricity arouses the sensations of taste and smell, it may
only prove that it is an adequate stimulus for these sensations, that is,
that electricity can be tasted and smelt. There is at least nothing
extraordinary in regarding electricity as an adequate stimulus for
sight. Electrical and light waves are not essentially different ; and,
especially if one adopts Meisling's vibratory theory of vision, this
conclusion appears highly plausible.
Then again an inadequate stimulus may contain within itself or
give rise to the usual normal stimulus: e. g., when a sensation of
sound is produced by mechanical pressure, this may be due to sound
waves produced in the inner ear by external pressure upon the organ
of hearing; and when electrical stimulation produces a taste sensa-
tion, this may be due to a decomposition of the saliva, which frees the
adequate stimulus.
A final objection against the indifference of the stimuli or rather
against the effects of inadequate stimuli as supposed by the doctrine
of specific nerve energies is a psychological one which seems to us
of considerable importance. It seems introspectively untrue that
adequate and inadequate stimuli produce sensations that are at all
or essentially the same in character. There is always a quality or
feeling associated with sensations produced by the latter, by which
they can clearly be distinguished from sensations produced by the
former. We are never deceived in this respect ; and it certainly rests
with the advocates of the doctrine to explain why this is so. If the
theory were true, it would be difficult to understand why inade-
62 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
quatc stimuli, e. </.. for sight, would not give us all the visual qualities
of objects, even to externality and figure, which light waves are
capable of giving us.
We saw above that McDougall advances in favor of the doctrine
of specific energies the Helmholtz theories of visual and auditory
processes, which he says offer the best explanation of the facts. We
do not intend to enter into a discussion of the relative merits of the
various theories of color sensations. Space will not permit. But
we consider the Hering theory, which allows at least two processes
for each structural element, far superior to that of Helmholtz. It
affords a better explanation for the phenomena of color blindness,
peripheral and faint light vision, the psychical primariness of blue
and yellow, etc. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the same
cone can give rise to any or all of the sensations, red, green, and
violet. This fact seems favorable to Meisling's vibratory theory, as
well as incompatible with the doctrine of a specific process.
As Wundt very well remarks, "Many senses have no distinct
sensory elements corresponding to different sensational qualities"
at least these have not been pointed out. This is especially true of
smell, but holds to a lesser or greater extent of taste, vision, and even
hearing, unless one adopts the Helmholtz theory of auditory proc-
esses. This theory may be seriously questioned ; but even if true, it
can scarcely afford an argument in favor of specific energies ; because
it may be replied that "the different qualities of the sensations are
due not to any original specific attribute of nerve fibers or other
sensory elements, but to the way in which single nerve fibers are
connected with end organs," etc. The processes in these fibers and
their connections, which may, perhaps, be called specific functions,
depend upon external impressions, and this dependence is localized
at the periphery.
When advocates of the doctrine of specific energies analyze sensa-
tions to obtain elementary qualities and ascribe to each of these a
specific quality of nerve process, they overlook the fact that we have
no definite criterion of the primariness of a sensation. The gray
obtained by mixing colors has psychically no similarity whatever to
the colors, e. g., red and green, of which it is composed. How do we
know that red may not itself consist of two or more equally dissimilar
sensations? In fact Wundt 's principle of the connection of elements
would lead us to believe this; and physiologically it appears true.
Our criterion of the primariness of red must then be a physical one
the simplicity of the etheric oscillations corresponding to this sen-
sation. Here again we see external stimuli and not nerve process as
the ultimate determining factor. This physical simplicity may
cause (in fact does cause) excitation in a physiologically complex
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 63
system. Hence it does not militate against the principle of connec-
tion of elements.
Myers points out that "our tonal sensations are the result of a
fusion between various primordial elements of which we must always
remain ignorant." This is true if we accept the Helmholtz theory;
for according to it, pitch depends upon the position of the most
intensely stimulated fiber, and we never experience the result of
stimulating a single basilar fiber. This is another illustration of the
principle of connection of elements, and the dependence of quality
of sensation upon peripheral as well as other elements.
Munsterberg's "action theory" can, we think, be used as an
argument against specific nerve energies. At least it harmonizes
very well with the view we have adopted and with Wundt's principle
of connection of elements. According to this theory, sensory proc-
esses are attended by consciousness only when they discharge into
actions. In other words, sensation depends upon motor reactions to
external stimuli or objects. This seems to be the logical conclusion
of Wundt's principle; for this reaction or motor attitude is deter-
mined by an inherited or developed connection of elements. The
specific quality of sensations, then, is nothing more than the specific
attitude we assume as determined by the motor discharge or rather
by the whole sensory-motor arc. The chemical or physical process
is, thus, the same in all nervous substance. There is no inexplicable
difference here. This seems more intelligible, less fraught with diffi-
culties, and more in accord with facts than the doctrine of specific
energies in Miiller's and McDougall's sense. We say in McDougall's
sense because this theory does not deny "specific energies," if by
the term is meant the specific function of a given sensory motor arc
or connection, which function may, however, be changed or modified
by incorporation into a larger system or by vicarious functioning,
as mentioned above.
The action theory, it may be said, ascribes the quality of sensa-
tions to the sensory path and its ending; but, we answer, vividness,
intensity, facilitation, etc., depend on the motor discharge, and with-
out these there would be no quality, for these are attributes of the
quality, and in any case the action theory may not, of course, be
infallible in all respects.
A difficult question may be raised, viz. : Why is it that on loss of
a sense organ, we still retain the corresponding imagery, while a cor-
tical lesion in a specific area annihilates it? We sometimes forget
that there is an important difference between a memory-image and a
sensation. McDougall says, "An image resembles the sensation of
which it is the representation or reproduction in every respect save
that it lacks the vividness of the sensation." The image seems to
64 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
lack the tangibleness or feeling of present existence that accom-
panies the sensation. This, then, must be the quality contributed
by the sense organ ; for every element in the sensory-motor connec-
tion contributes its quota. Of course we must remember that without
the sense organ there could be no sensations or images ; and without
external stimuli there would have been no sense organs. After a cer-
tain sensory-motor arc has been responding for a considerable time
with a definite motor attitude to certain external stimuli, if the
peripheral portion, the retina, e. g., be then removed, the remaining
part of the arc will continue by virtue of adaptation to respond in
the accustomed manner, when excited by overflows from other arcs
or systems with which it has been previously connected. The sen-
sory-motor connections are intact. There is nothing to prevent dis-
charge into action. The result is imagery (in this case visual)
which, as before said, lacks certain important qualities of sensations,
either because it involves but part of the arc or because the impulse
can never be so great as that initiated by external stimuli, without
which the motor reaction and hence the imagery would have been
impossible; for the reaction that underlies the imagery is due to
adaptations arising from the habitual assumption of the attitude.
The doctrine of specific nerve energies, as we mentioned above, ren-
ders an explanation of imagery difficult if not impossible. McDou-
gall's two theories seem to us inconsistent. He finds it difficult to
explain how the seats of the physiological processes can be identical
or partially identical and the resulting psychical phenomena dif-
ferent ; and we find him hinting at the action theory, when he says,
"Their motor tendencies are the same, the cortical excitement in
both cases issues from the cortex by the same efferent paths. ' '
Now, if instead of a sensory organ being removed, there is a
lesion in a definite cortical area, e. g., occipital lobe, how is it that
imagery is lost? The answer to this follows from what we have
said. In the former case the sensory-motor connections were intact ;
now they are severed. The motor discharge is, therefore, impos-
sible. Hence, there can be no reaction or motor attitude and no
imagery or sensations. New connections are sometimes formed and
the lost sense thus regained. This is called by Wundt "the prin-
ciple of vicarious function," and is itself a strong argument against
specific energy.
In spite of McDougall's assertions to the contrary, we consider
association inexplicable on the hypothesis of specific energy. The
connection of absolutely unlike processes forever remain* an enigma,
while association by similarity of motor attitude or reaction seems
quite intelligible; and his principle of "strict localization of cerebral
functions," which of course logically follows from the "doctrine of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 65
specific energies," is held by very few physiologists of the present
day and still remains to be proved.
In conclusion the results of an interesting experiment performed
upon cats by Langley and Anderson may be cited against the doctrine
of specific energies. The cervical sympathetic nerve contracts the
blood vessels of the submaxillary gland ; the chorda tympani dilates
these vessels. The cervical sympathetic was joined at its peripheral
end to the chorda tympani. After union and regeneration, stimula-
tion of the cervical sympathetic caused dilation of the vessels. This
proves that a vaso-constrictor fiber can become a vaso-dilator fiber;
and that whether contraction or dilation of the blood vessels occurs
depends upon the mode of nerve ending. The experiment, of course,
was performed upon efferent fibers, but it is not therefore without
weight in a consideration of this problem ; and it is of especial value
in refuting the theory that the seat of the specific energy is in the
nerve fibers.
J. W. BRIDGES.
McGiLL UNIVERSITY.
IS INVERSION A VALID INFERENCE?
TO the old immediate inferences recent writers add inversion.
The inverse of_All S is P is Some S is not P. Of No S is P
the inverse is Some S is P. I and have no inverse.
Inversion violates the fundamental principle of logic and com-
mon sense that we should not go beyond the evidence. Every con-
clusion, in order to be valid, must be rigidly limited to the content
of the premises. Its content must not be greater than that of the
premises, and it must not be of a different kind. Now S, the contra-
dictory of S, is an infinite term greater than S, for it includes all
the universe 1 other than S. True, it is limited by the word Some in
the conclusion, but that fails to make the reasoning good, because S
is different in kind from S. An ordinary illicit process of the minor
term is indeed cured by writing Some in the conclusion, as in the
following example: No birds are viviparous; all birds are bipeds;
therefore no bipeds are viviparous. The minor term is illicit, but
the fault is easily cured by writing, Some bipeds are not viviparous.
But the inverse also begins with Some. Why, then, is it still at
fault? Simply because S is different in kind. Bipeds are the same
two-legged creatures in the conclusion as in the minor premise; but
every possible S differs from any possible S. Let S stand for rum-
inants ; then S will represent non-ruminants. As lambs differ from
1 Universe here means universe of discourse.
66 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
hyenas and oxen from tigers, so every possible ruminant differs from
any conceivable non-ruminant. Inverting, All ruminants are herbiv-
orous, we have, Some non-ruminants are not herbivorous. In the
premise we are talking about cows; in the conclusion about lions.
Can we infer anything about the food of lions, or any other non-
ruminant, from the fact that cows eat grass f
Of the two fundamental requirements, (a) the content of the
conclusion must not be greater than that of the premises, (&) it must
not differ in kind, inversion clearly violates the second. Whether it
does not also violate the first is a matter of doubt. The non-rum-
inants are much the larger group, and whether those of them which
are not herbivorous exceed the ruminants or not, is a question for
the naturalist. No matter how it turns out, the doubt is damning.
Valid reasoning is free from any shadow of doubt.
Serious as this shadow of doubt may be, the other point, the dif-
ference in kind between the subject-matter of the conclusion and the
premise, is far more damaging to inversion. Shifting ground severs
the bond of inference. To infer the food of non-ruminants from that
of ruminants would be a famous short-cut in zoology. Such an easy
royal road would be a boon to the plodding naturalist patiently
studying each group for itself.
Inversion makes no pretense of limiting its conclusion to the con-
tent of its premises. It boldly introduces new matter and is reckless
in regard to quantity. It clearly goes beyond the evidence. The
most common violation of that limiting principle of reason and com-
mon sense is illicit process the whole inferred when only a part is
given, whole and part being alike in kind. Inversion goes one better
(or worse). The new matter of its conclusion is not represented at
all in its premises not even by so much as a beggarly "part."
The only semblance of its presence in the premises arises from the
common element "S" in both subjects. But one subject is the nega-
tive, the contradictory, of the other, and negation is separation,
opposition, not union or likeness. There is not a shred of matter in
the premises common to the new matter of the conclusion, not the
slenderest filament of an inferential bond. Inversion is a novel and
gross form of illicit process which lugs in matter wholly new apd
utterly alien to the initial matter of discourse.
Bain calls immediate inferences "equivalent prepositional
forms," and that phrase exactly describes the obverse or converse.
But the inverse, with its injected alien matter of discourse, is very
far from being equivalent to the invertend. The cogency of the
reasoning accordingly differs notably in passing from the old imme-
diate inferences to the new. The truth of the obverse or of the
converse is obvious and indubitable. Given, No men are immortal,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 67
then the truth of its obverse, All men are mortal, admits no doubt.
The two statements are strictly equivalent. Not so with inversion.
The inverse of, All men are mortal, is, Some beings who are not men
are immortal. That may be true, but its truth does not follow obvi-
ously and indubitably from the invertend. Not so easy as that is the
proof of immortality. My friends all die, therefore somebody will
live forever, is a wide and wild leap in the way of inference. Inver-
sion habitually proceeds per saltum.
The absurdities of inversion are legion. No mathematician can
square the circle ; therefore some one who is not a mathematician can
square the circle. No athlete can jump thirty feet; therefore some
one who is not an athlete can jump thirty feet. No man can prove
that two and two are five ; therefore some one who is not a man can
prove that two and two are five. No trouble to find absurdities.
Just deny something of somebody and straightway it is true of some-
body else ! The trouble comes when you seek concrete examples of
inversion which are not silly. Inversionists for the most part pru-
dently stick to symbols. I am not citing these absurdities just to
be witty at the expense of inversion, but because they are the super-
ficial symptoms of deep-seated unsoundness.
Illicit process of the minor term is the salient point of my criti-
cism. In the inverse of A there is also an apparent illicit process
of the major term. Keynes and Read have attempted to explain
away this weak point. I make no comment on their defense of
inversion. One illicit process is quite enough, and that one to which
I am now directing attention attaches not only to the inverse of A,
but to every possible inverse, full or partial, derived from A, E, I,
or O, for they all have S for the subject.
The advocates of inversion have two lines of proof. First in
order and first in importance is the eduction series leading to the
inverse by alternate obversion and conversion thus: SaP .'. SeP .".
PeS .'. PaS /. SiP .'. SoP. Of this series Keynes says: "If the
universal validity of obversion and conversion is granted, it is impos-
sible to detect any flaw in the argument by which the conclusion is
reached" ("Formal Logic," p. 139). There is a flaw nevertheless.
The series involves the assumption that the subject may be manipu-
lated just as freely as the predicate, despite the radical difference
between them. The one is subjectum, something placed beneath as
the foundation, the essential matter of discourse; while the other is
not the initial matter of discourse, but something said about it.
Substituting S for S tears up the foundation and breaks the bond
of inference. But substituting P for P is harmless, provided the
balance is kept true by changing the quality of the proposition. For
example, Some S is P .'. Some S is not not-P. The two negatives
08 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
balance each other. But S, by injecting new matter of discourse,
disturbs the equilibrium so profoundly that no change of quality can
restore it. It is always an unbalanced negative. The deceptive
semblance of balance in the double negative of the inverse (Some
not-S is not P) is unreal. The two subjects, S and S, being wholly
different, the quality of what is said about the latter cuts no figure
in restoring equilibrium. If we say Smith is honest .*. not-Smith
(Jones for instance) is not honest, do the negatives balance? Not
at all. The shifting ground from one subject to another is a change
so stupendous as to put out of court any question of balancing nega-
tives. It is quite a matter of indifference whether we say Jones is
honest or not honest so far as concerns any inferential relation to
Smith is honest. The inferential tie, because of the change of sub-
jects, is nil, and nonentity is indifferent to "is" and "is not." Just
so with the change from ruminants to non-ruminants. It matters
not one whit whether the latter are herbivorous or not. Changing
subjects is so violent a jolt to the equilibrium that one little negative
more or less in the predicate is of no consequence. Whatever con-
crete values we assign to S and S the result is the same. They are
so different that putting one for the other shatters the equilibrium so
utterly that its restoration by a quality change is hopeless. The
subject can not be manipulated with impunity. The basal assump-
tion of the eduction series is fallacious. S always destroys the bal-
ance, shifts the ground of discourse, brings in alien matter, breaks
the bond of inference, and produces an illicit minor term. It boots
not that in the eduction series S first appears in the predicate. It
comes back as the subject with all its sins on its head. By severing
the bond uniting the last term to the first, it leaves the inverse, SoP,
dangling in empty space without any inferential support. The
eduction series, the chief prop of inversion, is invalid.
As regards the "universal validity" of conversion and obversion,
both are sound inferences so long, and only so long, as the integrity
of the subject is preserved.
In the second place the inversionist appeals to Euler's circles.
The inverse may be read off directly from them without any refer-
ence to the long and intricate eduction series. From the diagram of
All S is P, tf|)p) , it is obvious that Some S is not P, viz., the
space outside of both circles. But unfortunately for inversion, the
argument proves too much. The same inverse may be read off from
/" x^^\
[S P ) , the diagram of I or 0. But I and O have no business to
be sporting an inverse. By definition inversion depresses quantity,
and the quantity of I, or of 0, is already a minimum. Yet Euler's
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 69
method is just as liberal to them as it is to A and E. Even if we
bring in the four possible diagrams of I, the inverse SoP is common
to all of them. In fact every possible combination of two circles
leaves outside space from which to read off SoP.
It may be held that this objection is not fatal. The too prolific
results of the Eulerian method may be checked by the eduction series,
or by definition, thus ruling out the unwelcome results obtained from
I and 0. But I have shown that the eduction series is itself invalid,
hence unfit to serve as a standard for testing the results of another
method; and the ruling out of certain results by definition is arbi-
trary. Logical consistency demands either the acceptance of all
inverses, those of particulars as well as of universals, or else the
wholesale rejection of them all.
The inversionist may claim that the facile and indiscriminate
reading off of inverses from all sorts of propositions casts doubt upon
the Eulerian method rather than upon inversion. In this I am very
much inclined to agree with him, though meanwhile indulging the
reflection that such doubt is bad for him in the end, since it under-
mines his second line of defense. The legitimacy of Euler's diagrams
rests upon the assumption that the relations of terms may be ade-
quately represented by their extension alone as presented to the eye
by lines and spaces on a flat field. In order to read off inverses we
must further assume that outside space represents the contradictory
of the term in the circle, and that this contradictory exists. Here
begin modern refinements to which Euler himself was a stranger.
He never dreamed of bothering the pretty head of his German
princess with not-S's and not-P's.
The basal assumption is sufficiently bold. Flat spaces constitute
a very inadequate presentment of the intricate relations of terms
each of which is rounded up into a subtile complex of qualities as
well as quantity. However, so long as we limit ourselves to the
inside of the simpler diagrams, as Euler did, the method has some
merit. But its modern refinements are distinctly risky. Outside
space is an untamed jungle full of logical pitfalls. There it lies plain
and fair to the eye, therefore the contradictories of S and P exist,
and their relations may be read off at a glance! Logical relations
must conform to space relations! But the study of the existential
import of propositions casts doubt upon the existence of S and P;
and the facile reading off of inversion fallacies casts doubt upon the
conformity of logical relations to space relations. Conclusions read
off from the outside of Euler's circles should be held doubtful unless
they have been independently confirmed. In the case of the flood of
inverses (no less than six may be read off from the four diagrams
of I), this independent verification is not in sight. On the contrary,
70 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
illicit process taints them all. We must discard the whole lot, or else
remand them to the chapter headed "Fallacies."
L. E. HICKS.
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA.
SOCIETIES
NEW YORK BRANCH OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL ASSOCIATION
THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Associa-
tion met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and
Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences on Monday, No-
vember 27. An afternoon session was held at the Psychological Lab-
oratory of Columbia University, and an evening session at the Amer-
ican Museum of Natural History. Members dined at the Faculty
Club, Columbia University. The following papers were read :
Correlations of Association Tests: R. S. WOODWORTH.
Preliminary results with the tests of controlled association pre-
pared by Woodworth and Wells indicate rather high correlation
between the tests of similar performances.
Experiments in Progress at the University of Illinois: S. S. COLVIN.
This paper reports some of the typical experiments now in prog-
ress and partly completed, but not as yet published. One of the most
extensive of these is the attempt to discover the effect of learning
certain motor activities on the learning of other similar activities. It
differs principally from other studies on the transfer of training in
the large number of subjects who participated and in the attempt to
isolate the factors of accuracy and rapidity. The experiment has
been conducted in two sections, the first with about 300 children of
the practise school of the Charleston (Illinois) Normal School, the
second with about 1,800 children in the grade schools of Blooming-
ton, Illinois. While the results have by no means been worked out,
as far as they go they show that while there is a positive transfer
effect from the practise series to the test series in accuracy, the op-
posite is true in regard to rapidity. The test also clearly indicates
the necessity of running a series of check experiments in interpret-
ing the results.
Another study attempts to test whether it is better to learn a
given task at one sitting or at several. The material used in one test
was nonsense syllables. These were learned in one, two, three, and
four periods, respectively. The results showed that it made abso-
lutely no difference as to which method was employed. The test is
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 71
now being conducted with poetry as the memory material. A posi-
tive result that lias so far been discovered is that there is a high posi-
tive correlation between immediate recall and recall 24 hours later.
The subjects used were about 600 children in the grammar grades of
the Champaign public schools.
A third test with school children, also conducted in the Cham-
paign schools, has shown that while whispering is an aid to learning
nonsense material, writing is a hindrance up to the sixth grade.
An experiment to discover the extent of children's vocabularies
indicates that they are more extensive than ordinarily exposed.
Another experiment investigates the efficiency of spatial discrimi-
nation under varying degrees of brightness intensities. Among the
interesting results appears the fact that there are two maxima of
discriminative efficiency, a relative maximum with an illumination
of about two-candle-power illumination, and an absolute maximum
when employing 32-candle-power illumination. Probably the factors
of attention and habituation explain respectively the two maxima.
The experiment is to be continued with chromatic lights and a simi-
lar test is to be made in regard to sound.
Eeaction Time to Different Retinal Areas: A. T. POFFENBERGER, JR.
In the course of an experiment in which light stimuli falling
upon different regions of the retina were reacted to by either the
right or the left hand, certain differences appeared. This report in-
cludes : (1) the differences in the time of reaction by the hand when
the light stimulus strikes the center of vision, and points 10, 30, and
45 degrees from the fovea in a horizontal plane; (2) a comparison
of the reaction times resulting from a stimulation of one eye and of
both eyes. All differences were based on averages of 400 reactions
and have a very low probable error. In the two subjects tested, the
times increased as the distance from the fovea increased, and in all
cases the reaction of the nasal side of the retina was faster than
of the temporal side. Comparison with other retinal peculiarities
suggests that the differences found are due to conditions in the retina
rather than to differences in the speed of the central process. The
reaction time upon stimulation of both eyes was faster by about .015
second than in the case of one eye, a difference due probably to the
speed of transmission through the nerve centers.
Some Experiments in Incidental Memory: G. C. MYERS.
Subjects were asked to draw from memory a representation of
the size of a dollar bill ; to choose from a series of circles those repre-
senting the size of the respective common coins ; to represent a watch-
dial with Roman notation.
Of the 500 subjects (business men and students and pupils from
72 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the university to the third grade public school), 15 overestimated
the length, 88 subjects overestimated the width. In both the cases
the average underestimation was very much greater than the average
overestimation. All of the 117 subjects who corrected for length in-
creased it, and all but 2 of the 124 subjects who corrected for width
increased it. As a result of this finding, tests are in progress on
"image measuring."
The males, as a rule, did better than the females. Of the 50
country-school teachers and 30 high-school students, however, the
females did noticeably better than the males. In the watch experi-
ment, out of 198 cases, all but 19 wrote "IV" and all but 8 wrote
"VI." In the coin test the general tendency is to overestimate the
large ones and to underestimate the small ones. A number of other
tests now in progress were mentioned.
Visual Acuity with Lights of Different Colors and Intensities: D. E.
RICE.
The comparatively recent development of illuminants of high
intrinsic brightness, with the attendant variations in hue, has given
a new importance to the question of visual acuity.
The proper conservation of the eyesight of those who must work
almost constantly under artificial illumination makes it desirable to
know what intensities and colors of illumination are best adapted
to give the eye its highest efficiency.
In the study of this question two points are obviously of vital
importance namely, the exact determination of the intensities and
the character of the test used to measure the acuity.
Many complicating factors enter into the problem, among them
being the following : the state of adaptation of the eye ; the varying
sensitivity of different parts of the retina to lights of different
colors in different states of adaptation; the influence of accom-
modation, involving the chromatic aberration of the eye; size of
pupil ; individual differences, including variation in sensitivity to
different colors, and variations in the dioptric system of the eye.
These factors, together with the failure to determine accurately
the intensities of the lights used, and the employment of different
types of tests, are responsible for the wide variations which are to
be found in the conclusions of different observers.
The present investigations indicate that red gives a considerably
higher acuity than green, and that white may be either more or less
efficient than red, depending largely upon individual differences, and
upon the predominance of the long or short wave lengths.
With all lights the acuity curve rises rapidly with increase in
illumination until an intensity of from one to two meter candles is
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 73
reached, after which large increases in intensity are accompanied
with relatively slight increase in acuity.
Unit acuity with white light is reached at an intensity of from 25
to 35 meter candles.
The following explanation is suggested to account for the higher
acuity with red illumination. Various facts seem to indicate that
the cones of the retina, which are concerned in the perception of
form, are more sensitive to radiations of longer wave length, while
the rods are relatively more sensitive to shorter wave lengths. It
appears also that there is to some extent rivalry between the bright-
ness sense and the form sense. With red illumination, therefore,
cone vision has the advantage, resulting in enhanced perception or
form.
The Action of Pharmacological Agents as an Aid in the Classifica-
tion of Mental Processes: H. L. HOLLINGWORTH.
Many attempts have been made to make out correlations in effi-
ciency in various mental and motor tests with a view to their classi-
fication on the basis of function or process involved in their perform-
ance. Low correlations have usually been found between tests that
seem to have many elements in common. These low correlations per-
haps result from specialized skill in certain analogous performances,
or in individual differences in method of performing the task as-
signed. The speaker presented results showing that tests can be
usefully classified on the basis of the character of the influence of
such a pharmacological agent as caffein. With respect to the char-
acter of the drug effect, the action time and persistence of this effect,
the tests employed at once fall into groups, the members of which
resemble each other. It was suggested that this resemblance pointed
to similarity of process, function, or nervous mechanism involved in
performance of the tasks. Individual differences in the method of
performance (revealed in the introspections) are also reflected in
the character and time relations of the drug effect.
Reactions to Simultaneous Stimuli: J. W. TODD.
One hundred reactions were obtained from each subject to each
of the following arrangements of stimuli of medium intensities: to
single light, electric shock, and sound stimuli ; to the following sim-
ultaneous stimuli with instructions to react to the first-named mem-
ber of the pairs and groups : light and sound ; sound and light ; light
and electric shock; shock and light; sound and shock; shock and
sound; light, shock, sound; shock, sound, light; sound, shock, light.
The following conclusions are based upon the data :
1. The reaction-time to a pair of simultaneous stimuli is shorter
than the reaction-time to either member of the pair presented alone.
74 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
2. The reaction-time to three simultaneous stimuli is shorter than
that to a pair of stimuli.
3. The addition of another stimulus to one or to two stimuli re-
duces the reaction-time, and reduces it in accordance with the reac-
tion-time to the stimulus added, i. e., the addition of sound, which
produces the shortest reaction-time, brings about the greatest reduc-
tion ; the addition of the electric shock causes less reduction, while
the addition of light, which produces the longest reaction-time, pro-
duces the least reduction.
On the Relation of Quickness of Learning to Retentiveness: DARWIN
OLIVER LYON.
Close inspection shows the problem to be a very elaborate one.
Not only must we settle it for various classes and ages, but we must
use various methods of learning and, most important of all, various
kinds and lengths of material. When it comes to the problem of as-
certaining the subject's degree of retentiveness, various methods
present themselves. Of these the two used chiefly in this work have
been: (1) to have the subject write down, after a certain number of
days, as much of the material as possible, and measure his retentive-
ness by the work produced; (2) to supply the subject with the orig-
inal material and take his time for the relearning of it. Each method
has its advantages and disadvantages, a discussion of which can- not
be undertaken in this summary. Suffice it to say that although the
second method has the advantage of supplying us with an easy and
accurate form of measurement, it is a question if it is a fair one to
use in settling the question in hand, in that this method introduces
the factor of "relearning." The method of correlation used with
the second method is also open to criticism, for it may be said that it
is incorrect to compare two men as having the same degree of re-
tentiveness, one of whom takes 25 minutes to learn a passage and
who one week later takes 5 minutes, and another who takes 10 minutes
and three weeks later only 2 minutes, even though each may be said
to have saved four-fifths of the time originally spent. A combina-
tion of both methods was used in this work by having the second
method follow immediately upon the first.
The popular impression among the laity is that the slow but
steady worker, even though dull, remembers his work better and
longer than the more brilliant student a corollary of which is that
those who learn the quickest forget the quickest. However, in so
far as reliable statistics have been gathered, it has been found that
in general the most rapid learner is also the best retainer. Exami-
nation of the class records of the 132 students tested at the State
Normal College at Albany also proved that the students who rank
highest in their classes and who can be classed as "the most intelli-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 75
gent" have, as a rule, the best memories. A complete expression of
the various results obtained with the various methods and materials
used is obviously here impossible. Generally speaking, we may say
that those who learn quickly remember longest if the material memo-
rized is "meaningful" or "logical," but that they forget quickly if
the material is such as involves the memorizing of motor associations,
as is generally the case with digits, words, and nonsense syllables.
This statement, however, needs many modifications. Thus, for ex-
ample, with prose the ratio is not nearly so marked by the second
method as it is with the first. With several sets of students it was
even reversed. Words are certainly more "meaningful" than non-
sense syllables; yet by the second method the ratio is found to be
more pronounced for words than for nonsense syllables or digits,
i. e., the percentage of time lost by the fast learners is greater than
that lost by the slow learners ; and though this is true for digits also,
it seems to be more true for words. For nonsense syllables (which
one would think were material par excellence for the memorizing of
motor associations) the ratio is not nearly as high as it is for digits
and words. Although averaging the two methods gives a positive
correlation for both prose and poetry, the second method taken alone
does not always do so. This is especially so in the case of poetry,
where the second method almost invariably gives the result that the
fast learners have forgotten more than the slow ones. We are led to
suspect that the explanation lies in the fact that in the memorizing
of poetry rhythm is a most important factor. Taking all methods
and materials into consideration, we can state quite positively that
the amount of difference in retentiveness between the fast learner
and the slow learner is much less than is generally supposd.
The rather large mass of data obtained supply us with many
rather interesting implications. (1) The retentiveness of men was
found in general to be superior to that of women. (2) Individuals
differ more in quickness of learning than in retentiveness. (3) The
first method gives a truer index of retention than does the second,
and would be more desirable were it capable of perfect measurement.
(4) Memory in the main runs parallel with intelligence and there is
a positive correlation between memory and scholarship. (5) This
is more marked where the material is of a "logical" or "intelligible"
nature, and a good memory for digits, words, nonsense syllables,
sounds, colors, etc., does not necessarily go hand in hand with great
intelligence. (6) With the same individual, slow learning gives
greater retentiveness than does fast learning. (7) With the same
individual, retentiveness is greater if the material is memorized as
a whole than if memorized in parts. (8) Among the best learners
those who learn the nonsense syllables rhythmically are not the best
76 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
retainers. (9) The retention of ideas is increased by seeing that no
mental work, especially work of a similar nature, is allowed to fol-
low the memorizing. (10) Auditory and mechanical learning make
recall prompt and rapid, but the amount recalled is generally less.
H. L. HOLLINOWORTH,
Secretary
BARNARD COLLEGE.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Mediceval Mind: A History of the Development of Thought and
Emotion in the Middle Ages. HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR. Two volumes.
London: Macmillan and Co. 1911. Pp. xv -f 613 ; 589.
So far as the present reviewer is aware, Mr. Taylor's enterprise is in
many important respects a novel one. His is not merely a new and
improved version of standard presentations, but a fresh and highly in-
genious attempt to supply the thoughtful reader with those various kinds
of information in regard to the Middle Ages which he may be expected
to crave and which he would look for in vain in the innumerable learned
treatises on medieval history. The writer would make us feel "the
reality of medieval argumentation, with the possible validity of medieval
conclusions, and tread those channels of medieval passion which were
cleared and deepened by the thought." To feel these is obviously " to
reach human comradeship with medieval motives, no longer found too
remote for our sympathy, or too fantastic or shallow for our understand-
ing." That the accepted routine of medieval history does not accomplish
this end is patent enough to any one who has sought to understand the
Middle Ages. As Mr. Taylor says, "We must not drift too far with
studies of daily life, habits and dress, wars and raiding, crimes and
brutalities, or trade, and craft and agriculture. Nor will it be wise to
keep too close to theology or within the lines of growth of secular and
ecclesiastical institutions. Let the student be mindful of his purpose
(which is my purpose in this book) to follow through the Middle Ages the
development of intellectual energy and the growth of emotion. Holding
this end in view, we shall not stray from our quest after those human
qualities which impelled the strivings of medieval men and women, in-
formed their imaginations, and moved them to love and tears and pity."
It might seem at first sight that if once the historian deserts those
seemingly staunch foundations of political, economic, and institutional
history, he will be forced to choose between a history of medieval litera-
ture or of philosophy, or run the grave danger of lapsing into scattered
reflections and personal impressions detached from the solid earth of
chronicled fact and event. Mr. Taylor has done none of these things.
He has not written a history of literature or philosophy, nor has he at
any point lost his moorings and drifted about the vague and eventless sea
of haphazard generalization. Before proceeding to give a somewhat care-
ful analysis of the volumes, which is the only way of forming a correct
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 77
notion of their character and value, one more of Mr. Taylor's caveats
may be mentioned. He is not occupied, he says, with " the brutalities of
medieval life, nor with all the lower grades of ignorance and superstition
which have attracted many previous writers. He has not had these things
very actively in mind when using the expression medieval genius. That
phrase, and the like, are to be understood as signifying ' the more in-
formed and constructive spirit of the medieval time.' "
Book I. is devoted to " The Groundwork." Here the author avails
himself of the elaborate preparation for his work that he has made in
writing his two admirable volumes on " Ancient Ideals " and his sug-
gestive " Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages." As every one should
know who has given any attention to the matter, the Middle Ages are far
less original and peculiar in thought and institutions than was formerly
supposed. The medieval culture is really the culture of the later Roman
Empire at any rate, no real understanding of the Middle Ages is possible
to one unfamiliar with that culture. One can not jump from the Golden
Age of Augustus to the barbarian invasions without missing just what he
most needs to know in order to estimate the intellectual and emotional
life of the thousand years following the disruption of the Empire.
Accordingly, Mr. Taylor properly assigns some two hundred pages to the
following topics : " The Genesis of the Medieval Genius," " The Latinizing
of the West," " Greek Philosophy as the Antecedent of the Patristic
Apprehension of Fact," " Intellectual Interests of the Latin Fathers,"
" Latin Transmitters of Antique and Patristic Thought," " The Barbaric
Disruption of the Empire," " The Celtic Strain in Gaul and Ireland,"
" Teuton Qualities : Anglo-Saxon, German, Norse," and, finally, " The
Bringing of Christianity and Antique Knowledge to the Northern
Peoples." This portion of his work would form an independent treatise
of the greatest value to those laboring under a variety of vain delusions
due to the habit of the older historians of attempting to begin their his-
tories of the Middle Ages with the so-called fall of Rome. Fustel de
Coulanges, Ebert, Dill, Glover, and others have all made their contribu-
tions to the subject, but Mr. Taylor has done the work over from his own
standpoint, basing his conclusions on his own independent research. He
has by no means reproduced his " Classical Heritage," which supplements
in certain respects the present work. In Book II. he bridges the gap
between the waning culture of the sixth and seventh century and the
clearly reviving culture of the twelfth and thirteenth. Toward one hun-
dred and fifty pages fall to these early Middle Ages, to the Carolingian
period and the mental aspects of the eleventh century in Italy, France,
Germany, and England.
The great bulk of the work is properly taken up with the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, which, with their immediate antecedents, appear to
many writers to constitute a truly remarkable and instructive period,
which can be deemed from the standpoint of its constructive achieve-
ments, in art, law, education and thought, one of the chief sources of
that culture which has prevailed down very nearly to the present, and
which is responsible for many still current notions and social adjustments.
78 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Indeed the so-called Renaissance and the Protestant Revolt did far less to
undermine the emotional and intellectual life inherited from the thir-
teenth century than has commonly been assumed.
Books III. and IV. deal with the ideals first of the saints and secondly
of the knights. Peter Damiani whom Mr. Taylor has brought to life
St. Bernard, Francis of Assisi, and holy women, like Hildegard of Bingen
and Elizabeth of Schonau, illustrate the beauties of ascetic devotion, while
the " spotted actuality," as the author happily terms it, may be judged
from the devout obscenity of Caesar of Heisterbach, the prosaic chronique
scandaleuse of Archbishop Rigaud's pastoral visits, and Salimbene's
coarse fun. But Mr. Taylor betrays no Schadenfreude in the com-
promising details of baseness, nor does he apologize for them. They do
not prove to him that the ideals of the time were mere hypocrisy, but
merely that ideals in the Middle Ages excelled conduct, as is their wont.
In describing " society," knightly virtue is illustrated by Godfrey of
Bouillon and St. Louis, reinforced by the belated Froissart. There is a
chapter on Parzival, " the brave man slowly wise," and another beautiful
one on " The Heart of Heloi'se," surely the loveliest woman in some cen-
turies of whom we are fortunate enough to know anything.
Book V. shows how symbolism lay back of the art, literature, and
whole thought, emotion, and speculation of the time. This subject is one
of the most important for the student of the Middle Ages, whatever his
special interests. Mr. Taylor illustrates current scriptural allegorizing
by extracts from the highly imaginative Honorius of Autun ; the " sym-
bolic universe " finds its exponent in Hugo of St. Victor.
In Book VI. Mr. Taylor proceeds to a consideration of two important
elements in the medieval heritage from the Roman Empire, its Latinity
and its law. Every one who busies himself with the Middle Ages soon
comes to feel that medieval Latin often has great literary charm, if one
does not insist on wondering what Cicero or Horace would have thought
of Abelard, St. Thomas Aquinas, or Thomas of Celano. Mr. Taylor shows
a lively appreciation of both the beauty and the defects of what used to
be called " low " Latin. He has chapters on the medieval attitude toward
the Latin classics for the Greek books had, with the exception of Aris-
totle, pretty much all gone by the board together with many apt examples
of medieval prose and verse. To any one with some knowledge of classical
Latin and a fair degree of literary feeling, these chapters will prove among
the most fascinating in the work. As for the chapter on the Roman and
Canon laws, Mr. Taylor, who is an acknowledged authority on an impor-
tant branch of contemporaneous law, is well qualified by his studies of
earlier days to quench the easily satiated thirst of most of his readers for
knowledge of these themes.
The second half of Volume II. is devoted to " The Ultimate Intellec-
tual Interests of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries " to what, in
short, is commonly called scholasticism. To understand in some degree
the spirit and scope of scholasticism, it may be remarked, is to understand
a great many tendencies of the human mind which can be readily ob-
served at the present day, without going back to Albert or his gifted
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 79
disciple Thomas. After a consideration of the origin and general nature
of scholastic speculation and its development in the twelfth century under
the auspices of Abelard, Peter Lombard and others, Mr. Taylor gives an
account of the rise of the Aristotle-ridden universities and the intellectual
role of the Mendicant friars. Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus, and
Thomas each has a chapter to himself, as well as the intempestive Roger
Bacon and those daring spirits, Duns Scotus and Occam, who exercised
so potent an influence upon later thinkers. The final chapter is admirably
conceived " The Mediaeval Synthesis " which Dante offers in his " Divine
Comedy." Every one likely to read Mr. Taylor's book is likely to have
Dante on his shelves, and equally unlikely to possess the works of Albert
or the " Opus Majus " of Bacon. If, as our author maintains, Dante's
long poem is but a poetic summa of medieval thought and belief, the
reader will find in " The Medieval Mind " the most elaborate and satis-
factory prolegomenon ever prepared for the " Divina Commedia."
Few readers who follow under Mr. Taylor's guidance the long way
from Augustine to Dante will leave him without a somewhat bewildering
sense of the extraordinary patience, sympathy, and intelligence which has
produced the work in hand. There is ever so little that is merely formal
or second-hand; the writer has read the works of others, but does not
copy them out in his pages. He has doubtless been affected by their
views here and there, but his own impressions and convictions are based
on a first-hand acquaintance with the medieval writings themselves. He
has found time and has had the industry and system necessary at once to
collect his material and to assimilate it and " react " on it. To him
belongs the highest tribute that the historian may win; he is at once the
erudit and the savant and of few can this be said.
JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
A History of the Cavendish Laboratory, 1871-1910. London : Longmans,
Green, & Co. 1910. Pp. xi + 342.
Under this modest title we have a really important chapter in the
history of scientific thought. On December 22, 1909, J. J. Thomson, on
whom has fallen the mantle of Maxwell, completed the twenty-fifth year
of his tenure of the Cavendish professorship of experimental physics at
the University of Cambridge. In deciding to commemorate the event
with a Festschrift his colleagues and pupils eschewed the usual form which
such volumes now take, viz., that of a series of technical monographs on
points of special interest to the writers. Instead they adopted the plan
of writing a history of the Cavendish Laboratory, over which Clerk Max-
well, Lord Rayleigh, and J. J. Thomson have in turn presided. The
Cavendish Laboratory is easily the foremost British center of physical
research, and of late years students from all parts of the world have come
to work there. An account of the work done in this laboratory should,
therefore, have a great interest for general students of science. Moreover,
the plan of the volume, as shown in the letter addressed to the contribu-
tors, states:
80 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
" It is understood that the present volume should be the record not of
what work was done, but of lion- that work came to be done. It is thought
that the evolution of the ideas which have inspired physical teaching and
research in Cambridge, and the part played in that evolution by the many
eminent men who have worked in the laboratory, should be traced as far
as possible; and it is hoped that the narration may be made in such a way
as to be of interest even to those who are not professed students of our
science."
After an introductory chapter on how the laboratory came to be built,
there follows a chapter on the Clerk Maxwell period by Professor Shuster,
then one on the Rayleigh period by Professor Glazebrook, and a survey of
the last twenty-five years by J. J. Thomson himself. These are followed
by four detailed surveys, viz : the period of 1885-1894 by Professor Newall,
the period of 1895-1898 by Professor Rutherford, the period of 1899-1902
by C. T. R. Wilson, and the period of 1903-1909 by N. R. Campbell. The
concluding chapter by Professor Wilberforce treats of the development of
the teaching of physics. In the appendix we have some forty odd pages
devoted to a list of the published memoirs based on the work done in the
Cavendish Laboratory, and also a list of the workers who pursued their
researches there, with their official positions, etc. The name index and
the subject index which follow can not but enhance the value of the book.
As was to be expected, the various contributors did not interpret their
instructions in exactly the same way. Some emphasize the personal and
the social side of the work, the inspiration of the great leaders, the genial
spirit of cooperation prevailing among the workers, etc. Others describe
the relation of the various researches " as they appear in a general and
impersonal review" (p. 226).
Professor Shuster's account of the Maxwell period is mainly personal.
He describes his relations with Maxwell and the work done in the labora-
tory which especially interested Professor Shuster. In this, as well as in
the introductory chapter, however, we get occasional flashes which illumine
for us not only the personality of Maxwell, but also the general ideas
which animated his labors. In the seventies it was generally supposed
that the only function of a physical laboratory was to measure physical
constants. Maxwell, admitting that it is characteristic of modern experi-
ments that they consist principally of measurement, went on in his intro-
ductory lecture to add : " Our principal work, however, in the laboratory
must be to acquaint ourselves with all kinds of scientific methods, to com-
pare them, and to estimate their value. It will be a result worthy of our
university ... if, by the free and full discussion of the relative values of
different scientific procedures, we succeed in forming a school of scien-
tific criticism, and in assisting in the development of the doctrine of
method " (p. 17).
It seems almost incredible that Maxwell, by many considered the suc-
cessor of Newton, should have had only two or three students at his lec-
tures, and that his laboratory equipment should have been so small that
he should have found it necessary to report after a few years : " During
the present term a skilled workman has been employed in the laboratory,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 81
and has already greatly improved the efficiency of several pieces of
apparatus." Genius and enthusiasm, however, seem to have been more
effective than numbers and means, so that the amount as well as the
quality of the work turned out was truly wonderful.
The period of Lord Rayleigh's professorship (1879-1884) was devoted
especially to the determination of electrical units; and Professor Glaze-
brook introduces his account with a remarkably clear exposition of the
character of the fundamental units of physics, leading up to the explana-
tion of how the ratio between the electrostatic and the electromagnetic
units suggests the electromagnetic theory of -light.
Professor Thomson's own account is a genial review of the social side
of the work as well as its relation to the demands of Cambridge University.
Incidentally and parenthetically we have in a few pages (pp. 92-96) a lucid
account of the considerations which led him to formulate the corpuscular
or electronic theory of matter.
The detailed survey, by Professor Newall, of the work done in the
laboratory between 1885 and 1894 contains a great deal of very valuable
material under the subheadings : Experimental Optics, Electro-optics,
Properties of Matter, Heat and Thermometry, Electricity and Magnetism,
and the Passage of Electricity through Gases. The value of this and
other chapters is, however, lessened for the general reader by the fact
that the authors do not, or can not, owing to the limitations of space,
indicate the importance or subsequent outcome of the experimental work
which they describe. Thus on page 133 we are dryly told that a number
of experiments by Roiti, Lecher, Wilberforce, and Rayleigh, to detect the
influence of the motion of a medium on the velocity of light, failed. In
view of the fact that this very question has since come to the forefront of
physical discussion, and that the relativity theory is based entirely on these
and similar "failures," some comment should have been vouchsafed to
" those who are not professed students of our science."
The period from 1895 to 1898 was a momentous one in the history of
modern physics, and the part that the Cavendish Laboratory played is
told by Professor Rutherford, who was a student of J. J. Thomson's
during this period, and who subsequently won the Nobel Prize for his
researches on radium emanations. Professor Rutherford indicates how
" amongst other discoveries it [the Cavendish Laboratory] witnessed
within its walls the final proof of the nature of the cathode rays, the
advent of the negative corpuscle or electron, as a definite entity, the
experimental proof of the character of the conduction of electricity
through gases, and the initial analysis of the radiations from radioactive
matter " (p. 159).
The chapter by N. R. Campbell is perhaps more than any other in the
book written with an eye for " the reader who is not a professed student
of physics." It is full of suggestive ideas, and is from a philosophic
point of view perhaps the most satisfactory.
The book is handsomely printed and is in every way pleasant reading.
Natives of Hoboken will be sorely disappointed to find Stevens Institute
credited on p. 330 to Hobsten, N. J. (wherever that may be). Most
82 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
American readers will likewise prefer class of men to class of man. A
more serious misprint, liable to mislead the unwary reader, occurs in the
last line on p. 93. The conductivity was due to something mixed with
the gas, not with the glass.
Professional philosophers who light-heartedly speak of atoms and
molecules as mere " convenient symbols " will find the reading of this book,
or of some of the memoirs mentioned in it, very troublesome. For not
only are these " mere concepts " conceived as objective physical entities,
but people in Cavendish Laboratory persist in counting them, weighing
them, measuring their dimensions, and determining the electrical charges
on the minute corpuscles which compose these bodies. No doubt the
experimental work is largely interlarded with a great deal of conscious
or unconscious assumption; and it can not be said that very clear lines
are here always drawn between experimental results and the theories
which are intended to explain them. Nevertheless, until some other
explanation of this vast mass of experimental work is forthcoming, the
theories of Joseph J. Thomson and his disciples will at least in the eyes
of those familiar with the facts hold the field,
MORHIS K. COHEN.
COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. July, 1911. The Ontological
Problem of Psychology (pp. 363-385) : GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. - Three
topics are considered: first, the more or less scornful objections to the
whole subject of ontology; second, the relation of ontology to real human
interests; third, the progress attained toward answering the ontological
problem of psychology. The greater part of the article is devoted to a
discussion of the first topic. The present condition and future prospect
of the ontological problem of psychology is considered and illustrated
from the corresponding problem in the physical sciences. The concepts
space, time, force, and substance are analyzed. Knowing Things (pp. 386-
404) : JOHN E. BOODIN. - " In dealing with things as known, we place our-
selves at once at the pragmatic point of view things as they must be
taken in our systematic experience." " Qualities must be taken as ob-
jective, if they enable us to identify and predict the things with which we
must deal." Qualities are further distinguished from sensations, rela-
tions, and values. Professor Pringle-Pattison's Epistemological Realism
(pp. 405-421) : ALFRED H. JONES. - " The salient feature of this theory . . .
consists in a substitution of what the author calls epistemological realism
or dualism for the metaphysical dualism of English and continental
philosophy. This new form of dualism differs from the traditional form
of the theory in that it makes the independent or realistic existence of
objects a fact of knowledge or conscious experience instead, as is usually
done, of reality or existence." Reviews of Books (pp. 422-440). Ber-
trand Russell, Philosophical Essays: EVANDER BRADLEY McGiLVARY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 83
Pierre Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et I'Averro'isme latin au XIII me
siecle: ISAAC HUSIK. Bruno Bauch, Das Substanzproblem in der griech-
ischen Philosophic bis zur Blutezeit: W. A. HEIDEL. Dicran Aslanian,
Les principes de devolution sociale: R. M. MAO!VER. Notices of New
Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. August, 1911. Les correlations psy-
chophysiques (avec fig.) (pp. 115-135) : DR. SIKORSKI. - Experimental
results correlating sphygmograms and pneumograms with different types
of mentality, normal and abnormal. La definition du hasard de Cournot
(pp. 136-159) : G. MILHAUD. - A defense of the coherency of Coumot's
definitions of chance against current criticism. La sociologie de M. DurJc-
heim (2e. et dernier article) (pp. 160-185) : G. DAVY. - The remainder of
the exposition of M. Durkheim's sociology and a brief estimate of its sig-
nificance, for it really leads to philosophy and needs completion from
philosophy. Analyses et comptes rendus. C. Dunan, Les deux idealismes:
A. PENJON. A. Binet, L'annee psychologique : H. PIERON. A. Michotte
et Prum, Etude experimental sur le choix volontaire et ses antecedents
immediates: G. L. DUPRAT. T. V. Moore, The Process of Abstraction:
G. L. DUPRAT. Warner Brown, The Judgment of Difference with Special
Reference to the Doctrine of the Threshold: B. BOURDON. Jacks, The
Alchemy of Thought: G. L. DUPRAT. Martini, I fatti psichici riviviscenti :
FR. PAULHAN. Chiappelli, Dalla critica al nuovo idealismo: L. DAURIAC.
Revue des periodiques Strangers.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. September, 1911. Vie vegetative et
vie intellectuelle (pp. 225-257): F. LE DANTEC. -A reply to M. Lalande's
objections to the definition of life that the author has advocated for the
last fifteen years. La categoric de relation (pp. 258-277) : A. CHIDE. - An
attempt to trace the empirical genesis of this category in opposition to
dialecticians from Heraclitus down. Le pragmatisme et I'esthetique (pp.
278-284) : J. PERES. - Pragmatism contains certain esthetic principles and
the author undertakes to exhibit them, together with certain verifications
in fact. Observations et documents. Le reve et la pensee conceptuelle :
DUPRAT. Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica: H. DUFUMIER.
L. Couturat, O. Jespersen, R. Lorenz, W. Ostwald, L. Pfaundler, Welt-
sprache und Wissenschaft : A. L. Dejerine et Gauckler, Les manifesta-
tions fonctionelles des psychonevroses : DR. CH. BLONDEL. J. Dubois, Le
probleme pedagogique: L. DUGAS. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant: F.
PICAVET. Noel, (Euvres completes de J. Tauler: F. PICAVET. Baeumker,
Witelo, philosophe et naturaliste du XHIe siecle: F. PICAVET. L. Adelphe,
De la notion de souverainete dans la politique de Spinoza: G. RICHARD. 0.
Richter, Nietzsche et les theories biologiques contemporaines : L. ARREAT.
R. M. Wenley, Kant and his Philosophical Revolution: J. SECOND. Tari,
Saggi di estetica: C. LALO. Revue des periodiques etrangers.
Baldwin, James Mark. Thoughts and Things or Genetic Logic. Volume
III. London : George Allen & Co., Ltd. ; New York : The Macmillan
Co. 1911. Pp. xvi + 284. $2.75.
84 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Boutroux, Emile. Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy.
Translated by Ilereward Nield. New York: The Macmillan Company.
1011. Pp. ix -f 35.3.
Claparede, Ed. Experimental Pedagogy and the Psychology of the Child.
Translated by Mary Louch and Henry Holman. New York: Long-
111:1113, Green and Co. 1011. Pp. viii + 322.
De Coubertin, Pierre. L'analyse universelle. Paris: Felix Alcan. Pp.
155.
NOTES AND NEWS
ONE of the great founders of the science of physical anthropology has
passed away in the person of Dr. Paul Topinard. He was a pupil, col-
league, and friend of the illustrious Broca, a " man who," Dr. Beddoe
said, " positively radiated science and the love of science; no one could as-
sociate with him without catching a portion of the sacred flame. Topinard
has been the Elisha of this Elijah." Topinard made valuable investiga-
tions on the living population of France, and many researches in various
other branches of physical anthropology. In 1876 he published a relatively
small book, " L'Anthropologie," for which he obtained a gold medal from
the Faculty de Medecine de Paris, and a second prize from 1'Institut; it
was translated into English, and published in the Library of Contemporary
Science in 1878. This book is packed with information, as it contains
numerous measurements and an exposition of methods of investigation ;
it has long been a guide for students and a manual of reference for travel-
ers and others. In 1885 he published his " Elements d'Anthropologie
generate," a monumental work of 1157 pages, being the substance of his
courses of lectures and laboratory instruction for eight years in the Ecole
d'Anthropologie. It is not the compilation of a mere library student, but
is permeated by the author's personality and contains the results of his
very numerous and varied researches; in it he broke free from the tra-
ditions of the monogenists and polygenists, and incorporated the new
ideas spread by Darwin and Haeckel. This great work exhibits his vast
erudition and untiring energy, and it is indispensable for all physical
anthropologists. It is needless to add that Dr. Topinard has gained honors
in his own country and the homage of his colleagues all over the world.
Nature.
MR. N. C. NELSON, instructor in anthropology in the University of
California, has been appointed assistant curator in the department of
anthropology in the American Museum of Natural History. He will
assume his duties next June and give special attention to North Amer-
ican archeology.
DR. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, lecturer in philosophy at the University of
Liverpool, has been appointed professor of mental and moral philosophy
at the University of Melbourne.
A GUIDE to " The Philosophy of Bergson," by A. D. Lindsay, a young
Scotchman, will be brought out by Doran.
VOL. IX. No. 4. FEBRUARY 15, 1912.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
ON DEFINITIONS AND DEBATES
THE American Philosophical Association has lately devoted much
attention to an earnest and most important effort to render its
general discussions more unified, more profitable, and more conducive
to the furtherance of agreement among students of philosophy.
There is no doubt that both the Executive Committee of the Asso-
ciation and its "Committee on Definitions" have labored most self-
sacrificingly to further this effort, so far as they could. Where the
spirit shown has been so serious and so unselfish, criticism may appear
ungracious. But the members of the committee have asked for criti-
cisms. The issue involved is not as to their unquestionable sincerity
and devotion, but as to the future policy of the Association, and as
to the best way of securing, in the discussions at our meetings, the
right sort of philosophical communion and community amongst the
members. Our committees consist of valued and honored friends.
But the Association itself is the "greater friend." We all wish it
to find the best way of doing its work. We hope that it will long
outlive our own generation. We want to initiate methods of coop-
eration which, as they come to be improved by experience, will con-
tinue to grow more and more effective as the years go on. To this
end, we must be ready to criticize freely the first efforts to organize
such methods of cooperation. I cheerfully submit to the severest
scrutiny this my own effort at such criticism.
I
In the report of the Executive Committee, printed before the last
meeting of the Association and used during the meeting, a brief state-
ment leads to the announcement of the subject selected for debate.
Those who were appointed to lead the debate, as we are told in this
report, "decided to limit themselves to the discussion of 'The Rela-
tion of Consciousness and Object in Sense Perception.' ' Nobody
ought to doubt, I think, that this selection was a good one. Acting
under the power conferred upon the Executive Committee by the
85
86 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
previous meeting of the Association, the Executive Committee here-
upon voted "to have the selection of debaters carry with it the ap-
pointment to the committee on definitions," the President of the
Association acting as the fifth member of that committee. The com-
mittee in question, with the assistance of the Secretary of the Asso-
ciation, undertook, under the authority of the original vote of the
Association, "the analysis and preparation of the problem for dis-
cussion," and "definitions of terms pertaining to" the "subject, for
the use of those participating in the debate." That the "analysis,"
"the preparation of the subject," and the "definitions of terms,"
were, in the main, satisfactory to the leading debaters who had been
appointed by the Executive Committee of the Association, was thus
secured by the fact that the subject was prepared for discussion by a
committee consisting of these debaters themselves with the assistance
of the President and the Secretary. In their report, the Executive
Committee, still acting, of course, under the authority of the Asso-
ciation, invited "members at large" to participate in the debate, by
written papers, or otherwise, and, in doing so "to use, as far as
possible, the definitions and divisions made by the committee. ' '
The report of the Committee on Definitions, printed along with
the Executive Committee's report just cited, begins by emphasizing
the importance of the enterprise which the Association had thus,
through the Executive Committee, assigned to its care. "Such an
extensive attempt," it said, "at an organization of cooperative
philosophical inquiry, has not hitherto been made by this Asso-
ciation." "The committee believes such organized and cooperative
inquiry to have important possibilities for the future of philosophical
study. It therefore ventures to express the hope that members will
make a special effort to enter into the spirit of the undertaking, to
review the recent literature of the subject, and, in their participation
in the discussion, to conform, for the time being, to the general plan
of procedure here suggested."
II
It would have been indeed a very ungracious task for any member
to take part in the general discussion to which all members of the
Association were thus invited, unless he could feel cordially willing
to accept all the essential features of the "preparation" and of the
"definitions" which, in its report, the Committee on Definitions here-
upon proceeded to set forth. Of the competency of the Committee
to determine the rules of the proposed debate, so far as its own
members were concerned, there could be of course no doubt. Of its
authority, by virtue of the original vote of the Association, and under
the conditions of its appointment, to ask members to follow its
rulings with scrupulous care, in case they chose to participate in the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 87
general discussion at all, there could again be no doubt. The Execu-
tive Committee added its express request, as we have seen, to that of
the Committee on Definitions ; and hereby reasonably bound all who
wanted to debate to do their best to confine their usage of terms and
their definition of the issues to the forms prescribed by the Com-
mittee on Definitions. The experiment in cooperative philosophical
inquiry thus for the first time tried, could not fairly be interfered
with by any voluntary participant through an expression of his
unwillingness if he felt such unwillingness to accept the Com-
mittee's analysis and .definitions of the problem as sufficient for the
purposes of the debate. The Committee defined certain terms:
a, b, c, etc. It proposed certain questions for debate relating to
matters defined in these terms. Such a question might take the
form: "Are all the members of the class ab members of the class cf"
It asked the members who took part in the debate to accept these
definitions and formulations of questions as the topics of inquiry.
Nobody could meet the express wishes of the Committee, and discuss
the topics which it wanted to have discussed, unless, accepting for
the time the definitions proposed, he was ready to answer such ques-
tions as "Is every ab a member of the class cf" in the spirit of one
who considered the question at issue important, and the issue well
taken. If he thought the issues to be ill defined by the Committee,
and unworthy of the sort of attention that the Committee required,
he had no proper place in this particular experiment in cooperation.
It was in that case his duty to leave the general debate to other
members. For nobody was asked to debate in the meeting the
question whether the Committee had well formulated the issues.
Members were asked to cooperate under the rules laid down by a
body authorized to restrict the field of inquiry for the sake of
ensuring cooperation. Nobody could attempt the cooperation, unless
he was willing to abide by the restrictions.
The responsibility of the Committee was of course as great as its
authority. Its duty was and no doubt its intention was so to
state the issues for debate that any or all of the philosophical opin-
ions about those issues which are worth discussing, could be discussed.
And of course a proper discussion of the issues could not include, at
the meeting, such objections to the Committee 's report as I now offer.
The debater was required to follow the assigned rules of the game.
He was not to discuss their value. He was to play under these rules.
Hence, if his views about the issues were worth discussing at all, the
Committee's formulas ought to have left him unhampered.
My present question is: How did the Committee accomplish this
duty ? Whose cooperation did it make possible, in case the one who
cooperated was understood to accept the plan of debate as printed?
88 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
I am sorry that the somewhat elaborate "preparation" of the
question set forth by the Committee will force me to make my answer
to these questions tedious. But I can hardly be blamed for taking
the Committee's formulas seriously, and, in consequence, analyzing
them with care.
Ill
After a study of the possible issues, the Committee presented, as
the first of its questions for debate, the following: "In cases where a
real (and non-hallucinatory) object is involved, what is the relation
between the real and the perceived object with respect (a) to their
numerical identity at the moment of perception, (b) with respect to
the possibility of the existence of the real object at other moments
apart from any perception?" This question was to be understood,
by all who were to cooperate, as determined by the meanings assigned
by the Committee to the terms "object," "perceived object," and
"real object."
The definitions of these terms, as printed in the Committee's
report, are as follows:
By object in this discussion shall be meant any complex of physical quali-
ties, whether perceived or unperceived and whether real or unreal. _
By real objects is meant in this discussion such objects as are true parts
of the material world.
By perceived object is meant in this discussion an object given in some
particular actual perception.
It appears, from the context, and from the formulation of the
question for debate quoted above, that the Committee very naturally
laid some stress upon the fact that what it meant by "some par-
ticular actual perception" involved an occurrence at some "moment
of time," called also "the moment of perception" ; or, again, involved
some determinate set or sequence of such momentary occurrences,
"in some particular individuated stream of perceptions," that is, in
the mind or in the experience of some person.
The Committee did not define what it meant by the adjective
"given," used in the above-cited definition of "perceived object."
Of course the participants in the discussion would seem to be in so
far left free to understand and to use that word in any reasonable
and customary fashion that is consistent with the context of the re-
port ; and it is plain that the members of the Committee were entirely
unaware that by their use of this word they in the least restricted
the reasonable liberty of anybody. As a fact, however, their defini-
tion of the term "perceived object," taken together with their
formulation of their question, and the context in which they used
the word given, involved a very serious interference with the range
of the cooperation which they invited. For what is "given" in a
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 89
"moment of perception," and what is not "given," and the sense in
which anything can be "given at a particular moment," and the
sense in which what is "given" can also be an "object" all these
are not topics of a merely pedantic curiosity about words. They are
matters which have been lengthily, frequently, and momentously
discussed, both in the controversies about perception and in other
philosophical inquiries. Let us see how far and how profitably such
questions could be discussed by any one who was ready to be guided,
in the debate, by the rules laid down by the Committee.
IV
The word given has a wide range both of popular and of technical
usage. Amongst its more technical meanings, three very readily
occur to mind as possibly in question when the word is employed in
a philosophical discussion.
In a very wide sense, which is rendered in special cases more
determinate by the context, given means: "Assumed, presupposed,
agreed upon, accepted, taken as if it were known but always with
reference to some specific purpose, inquiry, undertaking, discussion,
or plan of action. ' ' This sense is of course a very elastic one, and is
often convenient, just because the context which further defines the
plan or inquiry in question so easily specifies the conditions subject
to which something is declared or agreed to be given. But, for this
very reason, given, if used in this first sense, means conditionally
given, subject to the agreements or presuppositions in question, and,
in this sense, does not mean: "present in some particular actual per-
ception." In this wide sense of conditionally given, the Sherman
Act is given, when legal controversies about certain combinations in
restraint of trade are in question. And, for the purposes of the
discussion, or of the present paper, the Committee's report, with its
definitions, requests, statements of the issue, and so on, is itself given,
to any one who wants to engage in the proposed discussion, or to
read this paper. Any conceivable real or ideal object, principle,
abstraction, fact, or fabulous invention, any portion of the universe,
or the whole of it, could be given, in this sense, to somebody for some
purpose. Yet the word given would not hereby be rendered hope-
lessly vague, because, each time, the context or other connections of
the plan or inquiry that was to be undertaken would enable one to
specify the conditions which made the object or principle, in this
sense, hypothetically or conventionally given.
A second and also wide sense of the term given introduces the
word into one's ontological vocabulary, and employs it as equivalent
to existent, actual. God or an atom, Herbart's reals or Leibniz's
monads, the events of history or the interior of the earth, anything
90 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
believed by anybody to be a fact or a reality, may by that person be
declared, in this sense, to be a given fact in the world, or simply to
be given. This meaning is of course specified, on occasion, by
naming the place, time, or other definable region of being, in which
the fact in question is asserted to be a fact. This signification of the
word given is frequent in usage, but is often inconvenient, because
of the danger of confusion between this and the third meaning of
given a danger which occasionally arises.
In a third sense, given means present to or in the "experience"
or "perception" or "feeling" or "state of mind" of somebody.
I put in quotation marks the words and phrases that specify how or
wherein the given is, in this sense, present, merely to indicate that, in
any effort to specify this sense, one deals with matters which are
amongst the most obvious and at the same time most problematic
topics that philosophy has to consider. In order fully to explain
what it is which in this sense is, for somebody, or at some time, given,
that is, present or immediately known, or directly experienced, you
need to face all the problems about "immediacy" and about "experi-
ence" and about the "self" and about "time" and about the rela-
tion of the relational aspect of the given to its non-relational aspect
all the problems, I say, which have most divided the philosophers.
These are also the problems that have disturbed the seekers after
some sort of "intuition" or of religious "faith," ever since the
Hindoo seers first retired to the forests (or in other words "took to
the woods") in their own vain effort to solve that most recondite of
human mysteries, the mystery regarding what it is that is given in
this third sense. From Yajnavalkya to Bergson this problem of the
given has troubled men.
This sense of the word given is frequent in discussion. It is ex-
tremely useful in attempts at defining the various problems whose
nature and variety have just been indicated. But unless one bears
in mind how difficult and recondite these problems are, he is likely
to employ the term given, in this third sense, rather to escape from
facing the greatest issues of philosophy than to prepare the way for
further reflection upon them. Of course an important part of the
task of anybody who calls anything given, in this third sense, is to
specify what sort of presentation it is upon which he is insisting.
Of these three senses of the word given, it seems plain, from the
context, that the Committee intended some specification of the third
sense to be in question. For their report uses the phrases: "at
certain times present in a given individuated series of perceptions";
"given in some particular actual perception." Even if given were
here supposed to be used in the second of the above-mentioned senses,
this account of the "locus," . e., of the place and time wherein some-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 91
thing is for the purposes of the definition of a perceived object,
given, would make the second sense (specified so as to apply to the
case here in question) identical with some specification of the third
sense. For even if the word given meant "is a fact," is "actual,"
the "perceived objects" of which the Committee speaks are here
specified simply as "figuring" or as "present" "in some particular
actual perception. ' ' That, then, is the way, or at least one way, in
which those "perceived objects" are to be, just then, facts. And in
this way the Committee means given to be understood.
As to the first sense, the Committee is not defining its "perceived
objects" as given to the percipient in the sense in which the Sherman
Act is given as the agreed presupposition of a legal controversy.
Of course, I repeat, all of the Committee 's definitions, topics, objects,
and problems are to us members given, in our first sense of the word
given, for the purpose of the proposed discussion, and as its agreed or
at least supposed basis. But the "perceived objects" are said by
the Committee to be given in "some particular actual perception,"
at one or at several moments of time, and in the individuated
"stream" of some percipient's perceptions. The sense of given in
the Committee's definition of perceived object is, therefore, some
specification of the third of the senses above indicated. Hereby, then,
the debater who can cooperate seems to be bound in advance by the
Committee's report. In so far the wording and the context leave
him not free to interpret the word given as he pleases.
What is the result? The committee has certainly not left the
cooperating debater free as to his definition of the word object. An
object, in this discussion, is a "complex of physical qualities." It is
of course left to the debater to hold whatever view he holds as to
what a "complex of physical qualities" actually is and involves.
But this latter view will no longer be a matter of merely verbal con-
ventions. Of course such "complexes" as "yellow, hard, and ex-
tended," or "brown, smooth, and solid," will be amongst the physical
"objects" denoted by such phraseology. The debater will have his
opinion as to what such ' ' physical " " complexes ' ' are, and as to what
conditions they must meet in order to be "physical" at all. These
views will no longer be reducible to definitions of terms. The de-
bater's metaphysics or epistemology or perhaps just his opinions as a
student of some physical science, will now come into play. If he is
to cooperate, he must indeed accept the Committee's definition of
object. But his doctrine about what makes a "complex" a "phys-
ical" complex, will concern issues no longer verbal, but most de-
cidedly "material." Let us still try to see what follows from this
restriction of the meanings of object and of given, when taken
together.
92 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Suppose that some philosopher should be asked to cooperate
whose views about what a "complex of physical qualities" is, and
especially about what such a complex is when it is a "true part of
the material world," required him to say: "Such an object, such a
complex, however real it is (and also in case, in the Committee's
sense, it is unreal), never is, and by its very nature never can be, for
any human being, 'present in some particular individuated stream
of perceptions,' at any moment of time; and (at least for a human
being) never can be given in some particular actual perception."
Suppose the philosopher held this view, not because he was disposed
to favor or to dwell upon verbal controversies, but because this was
his opinion as to a material issue, namely, as to what a physical
"complex" is, and as to what in this sense is given. Suppose,
namely, that he had inquired into what is or can be given at any
moment, in any human perception, or to any human being. Sup-
pose that he had considered, with such care as he could use, why we
believe in any physical facts whatever, and what is the essential
truth about the very nature of such facts, as we believe in them.
Then his views would be his own, and would not depend upon his
terminology. Nevertheless, when asked to cooperate, he would be
bound to accept the Committee's definitions. Accepting them, what
would this philosopher be obliged to say about the class of perceived
objects as defined by the Committee (not, of course, as he himself
would have preferred to define what he calls perceived objects) T
Such a philosopher could only say: "For a man of my opinions
there exist no perceived objects (in the Committee's explicitly stated
sense of that term), whether real or hallucinatory. For physical
'complexes of qualities' are of such nature as forbids their being
given, at any moment, in any human being's stream of perceptions.
Therefore, for me, the Committee's class of 'perceived objects' is a
'zero-class' (in the sense of modern symbolic logic). It is an 'empty'
class. Herein it resembles the class of ' horses that are not horses. ' '
Since the problem of the present paper principally relates to the
question : What part could a philosopher who held such views prop-
erly take in the debate, under the Committee's rules and definitions?
I shall very properly be met, in my turn, at this point, by the coun-
ter-question : Are there any such philosophers ? If so, are their views
worth discussing?
V
In answer to this counter-question I may first cite the words of
the Committee itself. On page 11 of its report, in enumerating the
various current definitions of "consciousness," it refers to the fol-
lowing view: "Consciousness is the instrumental activity of an or-
ganism with respect to a problematic or potential object. Thus the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 93
nature of consciousness is such as to imply the artificiality of the
first question, and accordingly of its several answers." Such an
opinion, then, exists. We all think it worthy of careful discussion.
I am far from defending this reported definition of conscious-
ness; and I am very far from attempting to speak on behalf of the
distinguished representative of this view to whom the Committee
here refers. I can only say this: Were the reported view my own
view of the nature of consciousness, I should be obliged to say that
the "problematic or potential objects" to which my "instrumental
activity" had "respect," were not the Committee's "perceived ob-
jects" at all; and also that if my "problematic objects" were what
I supposed to be identical with the "complexes of physical qualities"
which the Committee asked me to call "objects," then whatever was
given in my "individuated stream of perceptions" would not be
such an object. So that, in this case, the first question would be for
me not only ' ' artificial, ' ' but a question about a zero-class. And the
Committee's second question, that about consciousness, would require
me, if I also accepted the Committee's own definition of conscious-
ness, to explain how this "instrumental activity" of my own organ-
ism was "that by virtue of which" the members of this zero-class
that is, the objects which for me would be no objects at all were
"numerically" or otherwise distinguished from something else.
Hereupon I should indeed be at a loss how to discuss the Committee 's
second question any more usefully than the first question, unless,
indeed, I in one way or another declined to accept the rulings of the
Committee as to the conduct of the discussion, either by ignoring or
by setting aside their definitions and requests. I should be sure
that in any case the Committee had not succeeded in so stating the
two questions as to make my opinions a natural part of the inquiry
that they defined. I should feel myself excluded from profitable
cooperation under the rules.
But this is no place to expound in detail the views of any one
thinker. Let me next simply point out theses which every one will
find more or less familiar and which, in various contexts, enter into
known doctrines about perception. Let me point out that whoever
holds these theses ought to regard the Committee's definition of a
"perceived object" as the definition of a zero-class.
Suppose, for instance, that one holds, with J. S. Mill, that a
physical object, such as any "complex of physical qualities," is es-
sentially "a permanent possibility of sensation" in case it is "a
true part of the material world" at all, while, in case of hallucina-
tory or illusory physical objects, the object seems to be such a
" permanent possibility ' ' when it is not so. One who takes this view
seriously, holds a doctrine which concerns not verbal definitions, but
94 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
assertions as to \\li.it the object (in the Committee's sense of the
term) actually is.
Hut a "permanent possibility of sensation," whatever else it ia,
is never any one sensation or group of sensations ; nor yet is it any
set of events in the individuated streams of perceptions of any hu-
man percipients. These events, the given facts of sensation, come
and go. The "permanent possibility" is no one of them. But it is
what, for Mill, the "complex of physical qualities" essentially is, and
for Mill, if his doctrine were taken quite seriously, there would be no
other physical objects to consider, whether real or hallucinatory.
But to speak of a perceived object, in the Committee's sense, would
be to speak of a fleeting sensory event, in "some given actual per-
ception." That is, the Committee's "perceived objects" would be
"permanent possibilities" that are not permanent, or, once more,
horses that are not horses.
Mill's account of the object of perception has often been accuse-1
of a false abstractness of formulation. Some have attempted to
render his account more precise, or to deal with his arguments in
another way, by asserting, with greater or less definiteness of
phraseology, that the very being of a "complex of physical quali-
ties" essentially consists in the truth of certain propositions. This
doctrine, which, as it stands, is of course a metaphysical doctrine,
has numerous representatives in modern discussion. Many, both
before Mill's time and later, have been led to such an opinion, by
considerations not wholly identical with those which Mill empha-
sized.
It is notable, furthermore, that, whenever such thinkers attempt
to define their objects (that is, their "complexes of physical quali-
ties" in the Committee's sense of object), with precision, they in-
clude amongst the propositions which define the being of the object
certain universal propositions. Thus, for Mill, a bell to which a
wire is duly attached is a "complex of physical qualities" whose
being is partly defined by the truth of the proposition : "If I pull the
wire I shall hear a ringing." Now any t'/-proposition is, in its log-
ical sense, an universal proposition. And we are not here concerned
with the material question whether this or that one amongst a set of
such universal propositions is actually true, or again with the ques-
tion: Subject to what conditions is it true? It is enough for our
present purpose that, if a percipient is led to believe that the being
of his object is in some respect defined by such a universal proposi-
tion, and if this proposition is not true, then his object is in this re-
spect illusory. The being of the object is defined by the truth of
propositions, some of which are universal, whether it is a real ob-
ject or an unreal one.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 95
In case, however, the truth of some universal proposition is essen-
tial to the constitution, to the very being, of a "complex of physical
qualities," it is, once more, a contradiction in terms to talk of the
truth of such an universal proposition as ever, or at any time, or to
anybody, "given in some particular actual perception," such as any
mortal ever has.
For any one who holds this view of what an object is, the Com-
mittee's definition of perceived object is, therefore, equivalent to the
definition of a. horse that is not a horse.
Now some who hold such views about physical objects are meta-
physical realists. Some are Kantians; and one very important as-
pect of Kant's whole theory of the nature of the "phenomenal ob-
jects" which he so sharply distinguished from the sensory data, con-
sisted in his identification of the very being of a physical object with
the truth of propositions, some of which are, in his opinion, a priori
and universal, while all of them are true propositions in a way that
only the "spontaneity of the understanding" and the relation of the
object to the transcendental "unity of apperception" could warrant
or determine. Whatever the variations of Kant's own phraseology
variations easily explainable in the light of his own development
there should be no question that what his fully developed doctrine
defines as the true Gegenstand of perception, and as the phenomenal,
yet still perfectly objective actual "complex of physical qualities,"
is nothing whose nature permits it to be given to any human per-
cipient, in any particular actual perception. Many Kantians have
come to emphasize these aspects of the Kantian theory of what a
"complex of physical qualities" essentially is. For all such, the
Committee's definition of a "complex of physical qualities given in
some particular actual perception" is a definition of "perceived ob-
jects" such that it requires some universal truth to be given as true
in a particular actual moment of perception, and is also a definition
which requires a permanent somewhat to be given as permanent in
that which flits. The result is once more a zero-class. All such
thinkers are, in my opinion, excluded from profitable participation
in the Committee's discussion.
Finally, amongst those to whom the very being of a "complex of
physical qualities" consists in the truth of certain propositions,
whereof some are universal propositions, there are students of phi-
losophy who are metaphysical idealists. Of these students I am one.
My views are not here in question. But perhaps I have a right to
say that all such metaphysical idealists, whatever their other vari-
eties of opinion, get to their results by interpreting the truth of these
propositions in terms which they suppose to be concrete and reason-
able enough, but which do not permit them to admit that such truths
96 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
as constitute the being of such a "complex" could be, at any moment
of time, given in the stream of anybody's particular actual per-
ceptions.
I submit that, for all such thinkers, the Committee's formulations
of the issue depend upon the definition of a zero-class. All such are,
in my opinion, excluded from profitable cooperation in the discus-
sion as defined by the Committee.
In sum, whoever emphasizes the fact that what he means by a
"complex of physical qualities" is something that perception brings
to his notice, but that, once brought to his notice, is, in his opinion,
essentially an object of interest, of belief, of intention, of faith, or of
rational assurance, or of categorized conceptual structure, may well
ask himself what place he has in the Committee's undertaking. For
to him what is "given in a particular actual moment of perception"
is simply not what he means by an object at all, whether he is a
mystic or a pragmatist or a realist or an idealist.
VI
There are, then, such philosophers as I have defined, in general
terms, by the assertion : For such philosophers the Committee's class
of perceived objects is a zero-class. But just why, after all so one
may reply to me why are such philosophers excluded from the in-
quiry proposed by the Committee? Why may they not take part if
they please?
My answer has to be in terms familiar to every student of modern
formal logic.
If a "zero-class" is to be the subject of an assertion, what predi-
cates may with truth be asserted of that zero-class? The answer of
modern formal logic of the prevailing neo-Boolean type is well
known, and, for logical purposes, is useful. A zero-class is not only
subsumable, but is actually subsumed, under every class in the uni-
verse of discourse. Hence of any zero-class all universal proposi-
tions, whatever their predicates, are true. All particular proposi-
tions, however, which have the zero-class as their subject, are false.
Hence the fortunes of a zero-class are easily to be foreordained.
Thus the class defined by the term, a horse that is not a horse, is, in-
deed, by definition a zero-class. Hence it is formally correct to say :
"All horses that are not horses can trot fast and play the violin at
the same time." For the assertion is an universal. But this asser-
tion, whose formal justification, and whose possible importance from
certain points of view emphasized by modern logic, I need not here
pause to explain, is no contribution to the arts or to the sciences that
deal with the trotting-horse. It is an actually valuable formalism,
which could indeed better be expressed in symbols. If I were asked
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 97
to cooperate in a discussion amongst horse fanciers, and I had only
such propositions as this to bring to their attention, it would be at
once kinder and safer for me not to address the meeting. If they
chose to discuss still other classes of horses that I considered to be
zero-classes, I could at best only contribute the same logical truisms
to their discussion, and so should be excluded from useful participa-
tion in their deliberations unless indeed they asked me to say
Whether and why I thought these classes to ~be zero-classes. That
indeed might become more a valuable and material issue, in whose
discussion I might gladly take part. But if they formulated ques-
tions for debate that did not include this question, that in fact obvi-
ously excluded it, how could I further contribute, unless I under-
took something in the form of a criticism of the limitations which
they had put upon the debate ?
As a fact, the Committee did not ask anybody to discuss the
question whether there are any "perceived objects" of the precise
type that it defined. Its use of its definitions, its somewhat elaborate
formulation of the ' ' logically possible views, ' ' its entire classification
of the issues, excluded this inquiry from the recognized field for the
debate.
No philosopher of the types illustrated in the foregoing discussion
had any proper place in the cooperation which the Committee invited.
VII
Now, is all the foregoing mere ' ' logic-chopping, ' ' mere ' ' carping
criticism, ' ' mere ' ' verbalism, ' ' or what James loved to call * ' barren
intellectualism"? I hope not. I intend to insist upon what I sup-
pose to be a practical issue. It was the Committee that offered defi-
nitions supposed to be exact. My "carping" is intended only to be
a taking of the Committee's requirements quite seriously. My
*' verbalism" consists in using their own words as they required.
And my practical purpose is constructive. I want to indicate some-
thing, however little, about how our future discussions may best be
organized if others at all agree with me.
That the whole issue is not merely verbal, but is quite material
and of practical importance for the discussion, will appear, I think,
if we simply leave out the terms defined, and substitute the defini-
tions. In order to do this, let us consider where we should stand if
the Committee had said : ' ' Those who are to take part in this discus-
sion are requested and supposed to assume : That ' complexes of phys-
ical qualities' may be, and often are, given in 'some particular
actual perception,' at some time, and in such wise as to be 'present
in some individuated sequence' or 'stream of perceptions,' and for
some human being." This would not be a verbal, but a very ma-
terial assumption.
98 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Had the Committee said just this, we should have known that all
whose metaphysical or epistemological opinions led them to hold,
concerning physical objects, the views held by those whose otherwise
very various doctrines I have just summarized, were expressly ex-
cluded from participation. Such an exclusion would have been a
perfectly proper plan for the debaters who belonged to the Com-
mittee, if it was simply their intention to present their own views.
But in that case the plan would not have included a call for the
cooperation of members whose views were thus excluded. Now the
Committee's definitions, and the preparation of the subject for de-
bate, essentially involved, however unintentionally, just such an
exclusion. This is the ground of my criticism. I conceive that
hereby the Committee doomed the discussion in advance to be unable
to find place in any just fashion for some of the most important views
about perception.
And now as to the practical result : The Committee inadvertently
excluded people whom of course they never consciously intended to
exclude. These people were no small party. Various mystics,
scholastics, Kantians, idealists, modern realists, and pragmatists were
among the people thus out of place in any inquiry that should be
carried on under the restrictions carefully prepared by the Com-
mittee. When any such people attempted to enter the actual debate,
they could do so only either apologetically or rebelliously or unprofit-
ably or through an ignoring of the restrictions. This was not what
the Committee intended ; but it was what they brought to pass. This
is not the best way to secure general cooperation. This, I think, is
not what either the members of the Committee or any others of us
desire to have done in our future general discussions, of which, as I
hope, there will be many. The plan of having general discussions
upon issues sharply defined and directly joined, is a plan that prom-
ises great results for the future, if only we learn from our first
attempts how to carry out that plan better than at first we did.
What should the Committee have done ? In order to answer this
question, I need not dwell upon any of my own whims, prejudices, or
tastes. The correct mode of procedure was suggested, during the
actual general discussion, by one of the members of the Committee,
namely, our devoted and highly esteemed Secretary himself. I can
not quote his words, although I heard them with approval. In sub-
stance he said that one might well consider that table yonder (he
did not define it in the abstract, but designated it by a perfectly
acceptable gesture and wording), that "brown, smooth, solid some-
what"; and that one might then try to tell how he himself considered
what he found "present to his senses" (namely, the given) to be
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 99
related to what he supposed the table (the object) really to be. I
hope that I fairly represent the Secretary 's remark.
Well, that is the question about perception, in a nutshell. Let
anybody tell (if he can, and so far as he can) what it is that he sup-
poses to be given in his "stream of perceptions," when he looks at
the "table" or "orange" or "inkstand" or whatever else he sees or
otherwise perceives. Let him then indicate what this which is given
leads him personally, at that "moment of perception," to "believe to
be there," or "to regard as real," or to view as a "true part of his
material world," or, to consider as the object which, in his opinion,
he just then knows or believes to be a "physical object." Let him
hereupon compare the given as it is given with the object as he just
then, in his momentary perception, takes it to be real. Let him still
further explain, if he can and will, how this object which, at the
"moment of perception," he takes to be real, is related to what he, as
a philosopher, believes to be the really real, the genuine fact which
lies at the basis both of his perception, and of the given, and of his
momentary beliefs about "what is there." If the discussion is de-
fined, upon the basis of such a beginning, in such wise as to call for
still further comments upon known issues let the disputant coop-
erate, if he will and can, by meeting these further issues. A discus-
sion thus defined will indeed, as I firmly believe, actually illustrate
the thesis that, for any percipient who wakes up to what he is be-
lieving and is doing, the being of the object of perception will either
consist in or essentially involve the truth of certain propositions
(some of them universal), each of which defines this or that aspect of
the object. Since such truths by their nature exclude the possibility
of their ever being given at any moment in "the stream of percep-
tions" of any human being, the object of perception will never be
anything that is given in the personal experience of any one of us.
Yet the correct result will not be (in my own opinion) what the Com-
mittee defines as ' ' epistemological dualism and realism. ' ' It will be
a result dependent upon one 's definition of the truth of propositions.
Hence, for me, this result will be a form of idealism which here does
not concern my reader.
But the essential practical point is that, while a discussion thus
initiated would need to be restricted by rules and definitions, so as
to keep all concerned close to the issue and in constant cooperation,
there would now be no need and little danger of defining the issue
or the rules or the cooperation so as to exclude anybody whose
views are seriously represented in classic or current philosophical
discussion.
Following the Secretary's admirable suggestion, I propose then,
for the planning of our future discussions, a mode of procedure that
100 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
in its origin goes back at least to Socrates or even to Zeno of Elea,
and that, in its more exact and exacting restrictions, is well exem-
plified in the procedure of some modern mathematical logicians. It
is this :
1. Define your problem as far as possible by designating typical
examples. Socrates did this, and was a model for all of us. Even
the Eleatic Zeno did it in his famous discussion of one of the most
abstract of problems, and the issue as he defined it still interests us
to-day. Our Secreatry proposes to do this sort of thing in preparing
our future discussions. I second the suggestion. The Committee's
report did not exhaust this device before proceeding to the more
abstract definitions that it had to provide. Hence these definitions
were not all well adapted to their own end.
2. When designation by example has done its work, and when
you come to the marshaling of the various possible varieties of
opinion which you regard as worthy of discussion, it is of course
natural to divide some universe of discourse into classes, and then
to enumerate the possible views by pointing out the logically possible
relations amongst these classes. But, when you do this, do not
ignore those most momentous aspects of modern exact theories,
namely, the "existence-theorems," or "existential postulates," and
their contradictories (the assertions that declare or deny some of your
defined classes to be "zero-classes"). Consider carefully, in the
light both of formal logic and of the history of opinion, what alterna-
tives regarding such assertions or denials what questions as to
whether one or another of your defined classes has members are
assertions or questions open to reasonable differences of opinion.
This is a centrally important rule for every exact inquiry, and is
greatly emphasized in the recent procedure of the logical theorists.
These are not all the rules that ought to be followed by a com-
mittee on definitions. But they are good rules, and practical rules.
The Committee, on this occasion, did not follow them.
May our future discussions be controlled by committees on defini-
tions! That is a wise plan. May the discussions prosper! That is
a good hope. May the committees be as successful in practise as the
present Committee was earnest and faithful in its intentions and in
its toils. My carping words are ended.
JOSIAH ROYCB.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 101
SOCIETIES
ELEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
fTlHE eleventh annual meeting of the American Philosophical As-
-L sociation, held at Harvard University, December 27, 28, and
29, was remarkable in two respects : First, for what it purposed but
did not accomplish; second, for the unmistakable promise of a new
type of accomplishment at future sessions. A committee of five had,
with elaborate care, formulated and defined the main issue for dis-
cussion, and this same committee, with the exception of the ex officio
member, had undertaken to debate this issue. It was hoped that by
this means the discussion would be so narrowed that it would result
either in clearly defined agreement or in equally clearly defined dis-
agreement. This hope was far from realized. The debate was not a
sharp presentation of counter positions, but rather a presentation of
the more or less complex and involved views of the individual de-
baters upon the various issues in question. The discussion which fol-
lowed was hardly less nebulous. In great part it was a discussion of
what the discussion ought to have been but was not. But out of the
confusion and relative failure of the debate the "riot of philo-
sophic anarchy," as one of the members expressed it the opinion
strongly emerged that the method of debating a clearly formulated
issue should by all means be continued as by far the most profitable
mode of philosophic discussion. To that end, the committee of five
was continued in office with instructions to draw up a plan for the
next meeting along lines similar to those laid down for this year's
meeting. It is to be hoped that the lessons of this year will aid the
committee in outlining a plan such as will make possible both a
sharper joining of issue and a clearer effort of cooperation.
The first paper of the session was read by Dr. Durant Drake on
."What Kind of Realism?" Epistemological monism, he held, in-
volves the giving up of the conception of a single temporal-spatial
order into which all known facts fit; whereas the form of realism
which accepts epistemological dualism can put all facts into one
natural order, and is therefore in so far more plausible.
Professor Montague presented three objections to the panpsy-
chist view of Dr. Drake: (1) The view offers no explanation of the
mind's consciousness of other minds as such; (2) it does not justify
the differences found in the forms of the external world; (3) it is
a self-refuting system in so far as, taking its stand upon the facts of
physics and physiology, it then informs us that these facts do not
exist. Dr. Drake in answer found no difficulty in the view that
102 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
minds are known as true parts of the natural world, but under the
form of brain processes.
Professor Creighton followed with a paper on "The Determina-
tion of the Real World." This process of determination, he held,
consists in following and interpreting the findings of experience,
which involves the relation of a mind or consciousness to a real
world of persons and things. To be a mind is just to stand in this
relation of active appreciation and interpretation of real objects. If
knowledge is genuine, the categories are constituent principles of
things, as well as forms of mind. This makes unnecessary all at-
tempts to get rid of knowledge in order to have the object in its
purity. To report the nature of reality as a whole, a synthesis of re-
sults is needed, which can be achieved only by taking account of the
processes of knowing through which the results of the special sci-
ences are gained and reinterpreting these results and methods in the
light of consciousness.
Professor Perry, in opening the discussion of the paper, charged
the reader with begging the question in his statement that philos-
ophy is the adoption of the standpoint of experience, meaning by
experience that which involves the duality of subject and object.
For in saying this Professor Creighton answers at the outset the
question that is really most interesting to us. Furthermore, the as-
sumption of subject-object duality is a dangerous one, in so far as it
tends to make the two correlated terms final. Most of the difficulty,
he asserted, arises out of the occupation with abstract terms rather
than with concrete situations. Miss Calkins thereupon rose and
added humor to the situation by expressing her delight at being at
last in agreement with Professor Perry and admonishing him to
forego his own evil way of using such abstract terms as R and 8
and 0.
Professor Dewey seemed to find that Professor Creighton, after
having declared mind to be a meaning and evaluation of existence,
had substituted the declaration that it was a principle of meaning.
Professor Creighton, in replying, admitted frankly that he saw
no way out of begging the question as to the initial duality of sub-
ject and real world. He failed indeed to see how the realists them-
selves could escape making the assumption.
Professor Lovejoy propounded two questions to Professor
Creighton: (1) Whether he regarded the existence of the object in
the experience relation as essential to the being of the object. To
this Professor Creighton answered that he did so regard it in so far
as the relation was internal. (2) If the object is, in this experience,
truly revealed as it is, what does the object suffer if the conscious-
ness is taken away! Professor Creighton answered: If one asks
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 103
what would happen if my individual consciousness were withdrawn,
the answer would be "nothing." But if one asks what would
happen if all relation to any possible mind were withdrawn, the
answer would be that no answer is possible.
Professor Marvin followed with a paper on "Dogmatism vs.
Criticism." The present-day issue usually called that between
realism and idealism should rather be named that between dogma-
tism and criticism. By criticism is meant the doctrine which asserts
one or more of the following propositions: (a) The theory of knowl-
edge is logically prior to all other sciences or to all other scientific
procedure; (6) the theory of knowledge can ascertain the limits of
the field of possible knowledge; (c) it can ascertain ultimately the
validity of science and of the methods of science; (d) it can give us
of itself certain fundamental existential truths usually called a
theory of reality. In opposition, dogmatism asserts: (a) The theory
of knowledge is not logically fundamental; it is simply one of the
special sciences and logically presupposes the results of many other
special sciences; (6) the theory of knowledge can not show except
inductively and empirically either what knowledge is possible, or how
it is possible, or again what are the limits of our knowledge; (c) it is
not able to throw any light upon the nature of the existent world
or upon the fundamental postulates and generalizations of science
except in so far as the knowledge of one natural event or object
enables us at times to make inferences regarding certain others. As
a consequence of this difference in doctrine the realist has a very
different interest in the theory of knowledge itself from that of the
idealist. The conclusion to be drawn is that the name neo-dogma-
tism would be a far more appropriate name for the movement in
opposition to idealism than the name neo-realism.
Miss Case, reverting to Professor Creighton's paper and refer-
ring to the call to "dogmatism," expressed her belief that every
philosophic position is an attitude, an assumption, and therefore es-
sentially and necessarily a begging of the question. Professor
Creighton felt that a return to dogmatism would eliminate the char-
acteristic quality of modern philosophy. Philosophy must have a
criterion for distinguishing between true and false ideas, hence must
be criticism. Professor Marvin, answering Miss Case, agreed that
we must start with premises, but only as postulates, not as final
truths. He summed up his position by asking whether the problem
of how we know is to be made the great crucial problem in the
theory of reality, or whether the sciences are to be permitted to
forge ahead in their own way.
At the afternoon session, the debate proper on "The Relation of
Consciousness and Object in Sense Perception" was begun. Pro-
104 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
fessor Montague opened the debate with an impartial historical
sketch of the development of the epistemological issue between real-
ism and idealism in modern philosophy and then proceeded to de-
velop his own argument in behalf of epistemological monism and
realism. He held that the independent existence of perceived ob-
jects was evidenced by their behavior as common sense and science
regard it, and in so far as physiological theories of perception imply
the prior existence of the objects perceived. The ordinary objec-
tions to realism and the supposed axiomatic proof of idealism, he
held, were based on a "verbal fallacy of psychophysical metonymy,"
t. e., equivocal use of such words as "idea," "perception," "experi-
ence," to connote (1) the act or relation of thinking, perceiving,
experiencing; (2) the thing or object thought of, perceived, experi-
enced. While at the point of beginning the exposition of a new so-
lution of the problem of error, Professor Montague was cut short by
the time limit.
Professor Dickinson S. Miller followed with the second paper of
the debate. In the first part of his paper he outlined certain well-
known positions of idealism which he held must be dismissed. Pro-
ceeding to the consideration of neo-realism, he pointed out that the
doctrine which neo-realism in the main defends is immediate or
so-called naive realism. (It is not real naive realism, which is in
fact a latent idealism.) But this species of presentative realism
breaks down for three reasons amongst others: (a) the time taken in
perception proves that the perceived object is not identical with the
real object; (ft) the fact of illusion proves that the perceived object
is not identical with the real object; (c) the theory would oblige us
to hold that when two people side by side look at the same object
much of the object is actually present in these two fields of con-
sciousness at once. In conclusion, Professor Miller held that an
object can not become a content of consciousness as an object.
Objectivity is by its very nature a matter of properties in the object
that can not be revealed in one instant nor even in a minute span of
time. Objectivity means a potentiality of certain further manifesta-
tions. A perception is an impression plus a readiness to behave in
a certain fashion. Thus, an object can not, as such, be a given or
"perceived" object.
Professor Lovejoy followed with a paper which concerned itself
solely with the question of the validity of the historic discovery of
the subjectivity of hallucinations, illusions, and dreams. While all
typical new realists agree in denying that the objects and qualities
presented in hallucination or illusory perception are "subjective
existences" merely, they differ as to whether those objects are
"real" or "unreal" (in the sense suggested by the committee).
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 105
Nunn, and apparently Alexander, and other English realists, de-
clare that, e. g., the ' ' straight staff bent in a pool ' ' does not ' ' merely
seem to be bent," but that it really "is bent." This view, which
may be called absolute objectivism, appears to the writer the con-
sistent one for this school to take. For the essence of the new real-
ism is its conception of consciousness as an external and non-consti-
tutive relation. But this conception implies that all objects and
qualities actually presented in consciousness are, in a universal
sense, real things in a real relation. But this consequence of the
new realism requires us to assert contradictory predicates of the
same object; to say that, e. g., the staff in the pool is at once both
straight and not straight. Unless absolute objectivism can give us
a new theory of the logical relation of sensible "attributes" to the
objects possessing them, this seems a fatal objection to that doctrine,
and therefore to the relational theory of consciousness, and therefore
to the new realism (i. e., the combination of realism with epistemo-
logical monism).
Professor Thilly, in closing the debate, held that the answer to
the question of consciousness as a factor in the perceptual situation
which is given by radical realists follows necessarily from their
naive dogmatism: if the object perceived is the object unperceived,
numerically identical with it, then there is no difference between the
status of an object in a stream of perceptions and its status out of it.
But here the biological theories of these thinkers suggest conclusions
inconsistent with their radical premises. Physically and physiolog-
ically speaking, perception is the entire organism in interaction or
relation with its environment; we can not single out any one partic-
ular element in the situation and call that the physical or physiolog-
ical counterpart of the process of perception. No more can we, in
speaking of perception as a mental event, abstract the so-called per-
ceived object from the functions involved, in the hope that we may
in this way get at the case of being, or discover the object exactly as
it would be apart from any perceiver. We may say that in the per-
ceptual situation an object is revealed, made manifest, but we may
also say that much that appears belongs to the mental realm, is read
into the object, sometimes truly, sometimes not. This does not mean
that the mind alters the real object or that it creates an object out of
nothing or that the object creates a picture of itself in the mind or
that the object lies imbedded in the mind. All that we can say is
that a conscious organism perceives a real object in a certain way,
according to the mental and physical factors involved.
Professor McGilvary presented a close-packed ten-minute paper
in which he argued, among other things, that the relational view of
consciousness is compatible with the recognition that the same real
106 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
object is in different consciousnesses; that an hallucinatory object
occupies real space, but does not monopolize it ; in other words, that
impenetrability is not a universal characteristic of space-occupying
things; that color-blindness is explicable on the relational theory of
consciousness as due to the fact that the real brightness of a real ob-
ject is selected to be a term of a consciousness relation, while the
color of the real object is left out of the consciousness complex.
In the evening, the Harvard members of the Association enter-
tained the visiting members at dinner at the Colonial Club. Pro-
fessor Perry introduced President Lowell, who welcomed the Associa-
tion with felicitous humor; to which President Woodbridge replied
in happy vein. After the dinner a reception was tendered at the
Harvard Union.
The session Thursday morning was opened by Dr. H. R. Mar-
shall's paper on the general topic. Dr. Marshall argued that in his
appreciation of a natural order as distinguished from a mental
order, the natural man accepts naively a radical dualism. But
further consideration indicates some manner of correlation between
the two orders. Objects in the outer world may become images of
the mental order by the loss of some certain characteristic, viz., that
of "out-thereness." This suggests that the natural order may be
really part of and within the mental order, a part which has this
"out-thereness" characteristic, which the rest of the mental world
has not. This view he would call introspective monism.
The meeting was then thrown open to general discussion. The
prevailing note was one of criticism of the conduct of the debate.
Mr. Pitkin expressed himself as grievously disappointed in so far
as the specific empirical problems raised for debate had been passed
over. No one had attempted to define accurately the term "numer-
ical identity" contained in the first question propounded for debate.
Numerical identity, he thought, might be defined in one of two ways,
of which he felt that the latter would be the more profitable, viz.,
(1) identity with respect to quantity, or order, or place in a series;
or (2) identity with respect to one value in a space, time, or other
dimensional complex. With respect to the second question pro-
pounded, he felt that the result had been even less happy, by reason
of the absence of any clear definition of "object" and "perception."
Dr. Cohen gave point to the discussion by disagreeing with
Professor Miller that the neo-realist account of a stick appearing in
water as bent was a self-contradiction. There was no reason, he
held, why the same thing should not possess contradictory proper-
ties; it was only necessary that these should not be contradictory
from the same point of view. With respect to a straight line, for
example, there are an infinite number of points of view length,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 107
angle, etc. from which the line may be viewed. It is fallacious to
suppose that the only relevant point of view is that of the observer.
So the same stick may appear in a number of different combinations
according as we take our point of reference. In short, then, the
existence of a thing is a general formula for all possible points
of view.
Dr. Spaulding followed Dr. Pitkin in the thought that the debate
had failed to grapple with two essential issues : What is the differ-
ence between a primary quality when it is perceived and when it is
not perceived ; and what is the status of the entity which makes the
difference? Professor Love joy, he felt, had attempted a reply by
making consciousness the dumping-ground into which one put every-
thing that one could not put into the real world. He urged that the
Association proceed at once to the discussion of the two main issues.
Whereupon Professor Warbeke, taking him at his word, with some
humor, asked that Dr. Spaulding undertake what he had so wisely
proposed. Dr. Spaulding, accepting the challenge, replied briefly
that the brownness of the desk, for example, remains the same
whether perceived or unperceived; that its perception, in short,
consists simply in the desk's entering another relationship which
does not alter or modify it. Professor Dewey felt that the main
trouble with the discussion was due to the character of the com-
mittee's report, with which Professor Lovejoy took issue, declaring
that the purpose of the committee was to call forth a consideration
of a certain doctrinal combination, viz., epistemological monism and
realism. Was this combination an internally consistent and tenable
view ? He had in his own paper, he said, proposed a test question :
whether if you adhere to a relational theory of consciousness you
can give any intelligible account of hallucinations and illusions. He
felt that the neo-realist must, to be consistent, admit that hallucina-
tions are real in the same sense as any other content. Professor
Thilly expressed his disappointment with the discussion, asserting
that the realist had no theory of perception, that he just took objects
as they were. This he felt to be an utterly futile form of dogmatism.
Professor Perry urged that the real point at issue in the discus-
sion was between monism and dualism, between the view, namely,
that the difference between perceived objects and real objects is an
absolute difference, a difference of substance, and the view that the
difference was not an absolute one. In view of their common
monistic tendency he felt that realists and idealists might form one
party. Professor Marvin found that the chief shortcoming of the
discussion lay in the confusion of meaning of "real" and "error."
Real objects had been defined as true parts of the material world.
But the confusion lay in defining material on the one hand in terms
108 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of abstract dynamics, and on the other in terms of concrete experi-
ence. With reference to "error," some of the speakers had seemed
to look upon error as the act of assigning a particular content to the
real material world or not so assigning it. On the contrary, he held,
error lies rather in asserting a particular form of relation between
one content and another which does not in fact obtain. Professor
DeLaguna attempted by a concrete demonstration to indicate the
difference which the scientist conceives between secondary and pri-
mary qualities. The scientist, he held, never expressed what the
qualities were, but described them simply in terms of the test of
double contact.
Professor Tufts felt that the test for a true object is a test by
various sciences: what on the whole is the more permanent object,
the one that we can do business with, etc. ? It is obvious that we can
not assert numerical identity between perceived and real objects in
all cases. He wondered whether Professor McGilvary's view would
imply that the same desk might be all the various possible shades of
brown. Professor McGilvary answered Yes and No. If we mean
by the question whether in the space in which we see the colors all
colors are, we must answer yes ; but in so far as they are in different
relational contexts, we must answer no. It is by holding fast to
distinctions of relational contexts that one avoids contradictions.
Miss Calkins, referring to Professor Marvin's paper, hoped that
the realists would follow its suggestion that the task of philosophy
was the logical criticism of scientific conceptions. She felt that
realism must make its position good not simply by appealing to the
sciences, but by actively entering upon the task of logical criticism
of scientific conceptions and results. Miss Calkins felt that the real
source of confusion among philosophers was their constant use of
abstract terms, that is, terms like "table," etc., in which the self was
abstracted from. Professor Norman Smith rose to criticize what
seemed to be the aim of the whole discussion. It seemed to be ar-
ranged in such manner that agreement should be reached, as in the
sciences. This, he felt, was seriously to confuse philosophic with
scientific method. The question, What is the object when unper-
ceived? Professor Smith thought to be a futile question. The real
question that we should ask is, How do we conceive the object when
un perceived T
Professor Dewey, reverting to the question of the bent stick and
the apparent contradiction between its bentness and straightness,
approved of Dr. Cohen's position. The difficulty, he thought, lay
in treating the perception as a real object rather than as various
systems of relations. The visual bentness of the stick, a real fact of
optics, in nowise contradicts its tactual straightness. Professor
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 109
Perry, replying to Miss Calkins, saw no reason why "table" was an
abstract term because the self was abstracted from. If this was so,
the only way of being concrete was to talk about everything. Pro-
fessor Creighton, in summing up the discussion, felt that there was
need for some fundamentally new understanding of what body is.
Professor Pitkin set the fundamental problem to be whether any
function of a variable real should be regarded as a predicate of
that real.
The afternoon session was opened with a paper by Professor G.
R. Montgomery on "The Meaning of Evolution." Professor Mont-
gomery pointed out the two meanings of evolution, (1) that which
asserts merely a continuity of material and living objects; (2) that
which regards the present as the unfolding of the past. He sug-
gested that the word evolution should be restricted to the second,
while a new word should be found to express the first meaning.
Professor Montgomery's paper was followed by a paper on "The
Progress of Evolution ' ' by Professor A. C. Armstrong. Considering
the progress of evolution from the point of view of noetics, Professor
Armstrong laid special stress upon the fact that the relation of the
concepts of genesis, nature, and worth had not yet been adequately
considered.
The last paper of the afternoon was by Professor I. "Woodbridge
Riley on "Early Evolution in America."
The discussion of these papers was desultory. At the adjourn-
ment of the session the business meeting convened. The following
officers for the ensuing year were elected: president, Frank Thilly,
vice-president, Norman Kemp Smith; secretary, Edward G. Spaul-
ding; new members of the executive committee, W. B. Pitkin and
E. A. Singer, Jr.
Professor Dewey read resolutions in memory of Professor James,
which were adopted in silence by a standing vote. The question
of the place of meeting for 1912 was referred to the executive com-
mittee with power, with the recommendation that the meeting be
held at such a place as to make possible the attendance of Professor
Bergson.
In the evening, Professor Woodbridge read his presidential
address on "Evolution." As the address is to appear in full, it
will be needless to summarize it in this place.
The last morning of the meeting was occupied with four papers,
which must be summarized very briefly. Mrs. Christine Ladd-
Franklin opened the session with a paper on "Existence in Logic,"
in which she maintained that modern logic had introduced (in the
hands of Bertrand Russell) many vagaries which the philosopher
will do well not to take too seriously. Thus to set up "p implies q"
110 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
as the type of the logic process and to regard it as capable of throw-
ing light upon problems is an error. It would be far better to take
as the type-relation one of those in which the existence-term which
is always present is present explicitly. After some discussion, Dr.
Morris R. Cohen followed with a paper on "Mechanism and Causal-
ity in the Litfht of Recent Physics." The belief, he held, that all
physical phenomena must be explicable in terms of mechanics rests
as a matter of fact on the doctrine of the subjectivity of secondary
qualities. Recent progress in physics seems to indicate that the
laws of mechanics are not of universal application, t. e., do not hold
of very large velocities nor of very small bodies, and it may be neces-
sary to base mechanics on electricity rather than electricity on
mechanics. Distinguishing between mechanism and determinism,
the paper went on to show that the statistical view of physics enables
us to dispense with the notion of causality and to replace it with the
wider and more definite idea of functional relation, in the mathe-
matical sense, between phenomena. In the subsequent discussion
with Professor Royce, Dr. Cohen insisted that the mathematical
treatment of physical phenomena does not necessarily make them a
part of mechanics. Professor Sheldon followed with a paper on
"Chance," which aimed to show that chance, as an empirical con-
cept, is just as real as cause, space, quantity, or other accredited
scientific categories. The final paper of the morning was by Dr.
Karl Schmidt on "The Nature and Function of Definition in a
Logical System," in which the writer maintained, as against the
ordinary modern accounts of definition, that definition is of indis-
pensable use in a deductive system because it introduces into that
system the "new." Professor Royce spoke briefly in approval of
Dr. Schmidt's view. After some brief discussion by Mrs. Franklin,
Dr. Cohen, and Professor Royce, the meeting adjourned.
H. A. OVERSTREET.
COLLEGE or THE CITY or NEW YORK.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Influencing Men in Business. WALTER DILL SCOTT. New York: The
Ronald Press. 1911. Pp. 168. $1.00.
This readable little book contains an analysis, in popular language, of
typical processes of choice and action, and a comparison of argument and
suggestion as means of influencing conduct. Simple business situations
are cited in which each of the two methods of appeal is most likely to
meet with success. The ideo-motor character of suggestion is empha-
sized and illustrations of both argument and suggestion, drawn from
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 111
advertising sources, are discussed in much the same vein that has popu-
larized the author's earlier writings among the ambitious young business
men to whom the book is dedicated.
The chief difficulty with this type of "applied psychology" is that
while classification and schematization of mental operations may facili-
tate the recognition of one's own conscious states, it goes but a little
way toward communicating the ability to set up these processes in others.
The applied psychology which will really contribute toward industrial
efficiency will grow out of the application of laboratory and statistical
method. The methods of inquiry and research which psychology has de-
veloped can be made to yield results of real value when applied to the
complex process of every day life. The psychology evolved by the intro-
spective method can never be in the true sense an applied science; it is
at most an academic analysis illustrated by industrial instances. Aside
from a heightened feeling of the dignity of his work, the real advance
which the man of business can expect from psychology must come from
his acquaintance with experimental technique. There are countless prob-
lems in the efficient production and distribution of goods to the investi-
gation of which such technique is well adapted. Such application has al-
ready yielded material of interest, both to industry and to science. That
the practical man is recognizing this fact is indicated by the recent es-
tablishment, by the New York Advertising Men's League, of a research
fellowship in the department of psychology at Columbia.
H. L. HOLLINGWORTH.
BARNARD COLLEGE.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. September,
1911. Husserl, sa critique du psyologisme ei sa conception d'une logique
pure (pp. 685-698) : V. DELBOS. - In spite of certain defects in its develop-
ment, Husserl's logic has the merit of rescuing logic from the corruptions
of pragmatism and restoring it to its essentially theoretical and regulative
function. La forme moderne du probleme des universaux (pp. 699-722) :
CH. DUNAN. - The oppositions in the views of the realists, nominalists, and
conceptualists can be overcome by placing the principle of intelligibility
in the object, as Aristotle did, instead of leaving it a parte rei, as was
done in the Middle Ages. La generalisation mathematique (pp. 723-758) :
H. DUFUMIER. - The actual process of generalization is the process of
subordinating objects to operations, and not mere omission of qualities
of the object. Le caractere normatif et le caractere scientifique de la
morale (pp. 759-779) : FR. D' HAUTEFEUILLE. - Ethics, to remain normative,
must give up the pretense of being scientific, and will gain by so doing.
Etudes critiques. La philosophic du langage de Julius Bahnsen d'apres
des documents inedits: MME. I. TALAYRACH. Discussions. Sur un aperc.u
d'Ostwald concernant les temps a plusieurs dimensions: G. LECHALAS.
Questions pratiques. La famille et le contrat: E. LEVY. Supplement.
112 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Amendola, Giovanni. Maine De Biran. Firenze: A. Quattrini. 1911.
Pp. 123.
Angell, James Rowland. Chapters from Modern Psychology. New
York : Longmans, Green, and Co. 1912. Pp. rii + 308.
Leland, Abby Porter. The Educational Theory and Practise of T. H.
Green. Columbia University Contributions to Education. No. 46.
New York: Teachers College. 1911. Pp. 62.
NOTES AND NEWS
PROFESSOR J. McKEEN CATTELL, of Columbia University, gave the foun-
dation address at the Indiana University on the morning of January
nineteenth. In the afternoon he spoke before the faculties on " Grades
and Credits," and in the evening addressed the Society of Sigma Xi.
On January twenty-second he gave an address before the faculties of the
University of Illinois on " The Administration of a University," and in
the evening discussed the question with the committee charged with
framing a constitution for the university. On January fifth, Professor
Cattell gave an address at Lehigh University and at Lafayette College.
ANNOUNCEMENT has been made that the formal inauguration of Dr.
John Grier Hibben as president of Princeton University will take place
early in May. Dr. Hibben will continue to give his special course of lec-
tures on philosophy under the auspices of the Graduate School, and it is
expected that he will continue to give at least one course to the under-
graduates.
THE minister of education has laid before the Hungarian parliament
a bill which provides for the erection of two new universities in Hungary,
in the cities of Pressburg and Debreczin.
M. HENRI BERGSON, professor of philosophy at the College de France,
has been appointed visiting French professor of Columbia University for
the year 1913.
PROFESSOR JOHN B. WATSON, of the Johns Hopkins University, has re-
cently been granted a three years' appointment as a research associate of
the Carnegie Institution of Washington.
PROFESSOR W. P. MONTAGUE, of the department of philosophy of Co-
lumbia University, has been appointed to deliver the Hewitt lectures at
Cooper Union in the spring of 1913.
PROFESSOR WARNER FITE, of the University of Indiana, is lecturing at
Harvard this semester. During his absence his work at Indiana Univer-
sity will be in charge of Dr. William K. Wright, of the University of
Wisconsin.
VOL. IX. No. 5. FEBRUARY 29, 1912.
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
rpHE realist platform promulgated in this JOURNAL, and the dis-
J- cussions to which it has since given rise, have led me to try to
formulate the views which I should incline to defend. I do not un-
fortunately myself at present feel anything so solid as a platform
beneath my feet. In this paper I propose to describe the kind of
makeshift raft upon which, with my heart in my mouth, I venture
out upon the stormy sea of speculation. My views are more negative
than positive, but the negations involve assertions sufficiently defi-
nite to carry me into waters dangerously deep, or else perhaps into
befogged shallows where rocks abound. The reader may choose the
one or the other metaphor according as what follows does or does not
meet with his sympathetic approval. The views which I shall de-
velop, in so far as they have historical affiliations, are chiefly inspired
by two thinkers, one older and one contemporary, by Kant and by
Bergson.
For me personally, the chief and most pressing problem in the
theory of knowledge is to reconcile objectivism or realism with phe-
nomenalism, and both with that individualistic standpoint which the
nature of our self-consciousness seems to force upon each of us. A
satisfactory theory of knowledge must, I should say, be at once real-
istic, phenomenalistic, and individualistic. Realistic, because sub-
jectivism has been demonstrated to be untenable. Phenomenal-
istic, because it seems impossible to regard the world known in sense
perception, or even in the natural sciences, as any thing but a quite
partial and very imperfect representation of the real. Individual-
istic, because, though our experience reveals a wider and common
world to which we belong and out of which we have arisen, its com-
plementary and equally striking aspect lies in the privacy of the
inner life.
The general problem of knowledge accordingly falls into two
subordinate problems, each of which has its own peculiar diffi-
culties. First, the reconciliation of the contention that we apprehend
113
114 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
something that is non-mental with recognition of the fact that what
we apprehend is in the form apprehended not genuinely real. Sec-
ondly, the reconciliation of both objectivism and phenomenalism, but
especially of phenomenalism, with tin- n -inurements of self-conscious-
ness. I say, especially of phenomenalism, because if the phenome-
nalism is thoroughgoing (and it must be if we are really to steer
clear of subjectivism), it will apply to the self as truly as to the not-
self. For that reason it seems easier to combine individualism with
subjectivism than with phenomenalism. Kant and Bergson seem to
me so especially helpful in this inquiry just because it is with these
two problems that they are constantly wrestling.
Let me, at starting, indicate in the briefest manner the criticisms
which may be passed upon subjective and upon objective (or
Hegelian) idealism. The fundamental objection to subjective ideal-
ism, as found, for instance, in Locke's philosophy, is that it sets our
representations in an impossible twofold relation to objects, first, as
their mechanical effects, and secondly, as their apprehensions. There
exists, on this view, an irresolvable conflict between the function of
sensations and their origin. The function of sensations is cognitive ;
their origin is mechanical. As cognitive they stand to objects in a re-
lation of inclusion. They reveal the objects, reduplicating them in
image within the mind. Yet in their origin they are effects, mechan-
ically generated by the action of material bodies upon the sense organs
and brain. As mechanical effects, there is no guarantee that they re-
semble their causes; and if we may argue from other forms of me-
chanical causation, there is little likelihood that they do. They
stand to their first causes in a relation of exclusion, separated from
them by a large number of varying intermediate processes. There is
thus, to repeat, a conflict between their function and their origin.
It is their origin in the external objects that guarantees their valid-
ity; and yet the very nature of this relation invalidates their cog-
nitive claims. It can also, I think, be shown that in the statement of
its position, subjective idealism is guilty of arguing from a realistic
starting-point to an idealistic concluson irreconcilable therewith.
This is especially true of subjectivism in its extreme Berkeleian form.
That argument has, however, been so often elaborated that its repe-
tition is needless. 1
The criticism to be passed upon objective idealism is of a different
kind, namely, that it either ignores the problem of the relation of
mind and body, or else gives a solution which is quite inadequate.
It proceeds by emphasizing the logical relation of necessary implica-
tion which holds between self-knowing and the objects known. It
1 1 hare given a statement of it in an article in the Philosophical Review,
Vol. XVII., p. 138 ff.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 115
argues that it is the very nature of a cognitive process to transcend
itself, revealing to the mind real, independent, permanent objects.
The distinction between subject and object implies, however, an
underlying unity, an absolute self-consciousness, that conditions and
unifies both. To this absolute self-consciousness sensations and all
consciousnesses are due.
Now, even supposing that these relations of mutual implication
between subject and object, or between both and an absolute self -con-
sciousness could be granted as conclusively proved, the problem of
the relation of mind and body would still remain unconsidered. The
only answer to this problem which, apparently, objective idealism is
capable of giving, is the answer of Berkeley, more adequately stated,
but still in essentials the same, namely, that the existence of the
brain is necessary in order to complete our system of natural science,
to develop its point of view universally, but is never in any sense the
dynamical condition of our conscious life. The conscious can not
originate in the unconscious. Our sensations are due, not to our
brain states, but to an absolute reality that comes to consciousness of
itself in the finite mind.
Of course, stated in this bald fashion, no objective idealist will
accept such an interpretation of his position. He is ready to admit
that our having a sensation of red light is dependent upon a brain
state caused by ether waves acting on the retina, but that, as I
should contend, is a fact of which he can give no consistent account.
That the body is the organ of our activities can not be doubted.
The question which ought to be explicitly raised and definitely
answered by objective idealism is as to whether or not the brain is
likewise the organ of our consciousness. If it is also the organ of our
consciousness, then in what terms is its cognitive function to be con-
ceived? That is a question to which, as it seems to me, objective
idealism has given no satisfactory answer. It is a question which it
persistently ignores.
The chief objection, therefore, to subjective idealism is that it re-
gards the objects known as mechanically causing the apprehensions
through which they are known. The chief objection to objective
idealism is that it ignores the causal problem altogether.
Each position has also, however, its own merits. The strength of
subjectivism lies in its candid recognition of what appears to be
beyond dispute, supported as it is by the whole strength of physical
and physiological science, namely, that sensations are due to the
action of material bodies upon the sense organs and brain. Philos-
ophy is peculiarly skilled in explaining away inconvenient facts, by
giving to them, in what it calls critical interpretation, a metaphysical
twist. But the affection of the sense organs by material bodies is, it
116
would seem, something that can not be thus conjured out of existence.
The theory of knowledge must be prepared to interpret it in a man-
ner that is not virtually in some concealed form its denial.
Objective idealism is equally strong in its main contention,
namely, that mind knowing and consciousness of objects known are
inseparable. Mind has no meaning for us save as consciousness, and
there is no consciousness that is not consciousness of objects. A mind
that is unconscious, as, for instance, in sleep, is inconceivable by us.
It is then merely a name for an unknown, equal to x. Sleep is, for this
reason, something of which objective idealists have never been able to
give any reputable account. But not only is mind that which is con-
scious, it is also that which is not merely self-conscious. There is, as
the objective idealists rightly maintain, no such thing as pure self-
consciousness, a consciousness by a mind of itself and of nothing but
itself. All consciousness, without exception, involves consciousness
of objects. Consciousness of self and consciousness of the not-self
are inseparable. This fact has important consequences, and is very
rightly insisted upon by objective idealists. That, however, is a mat-
ter to which I shall return. And now for the general problem.
We may judge of man in two very different ways, from the point
of view of his animal organism, and from the point of view of his
inner life. Voltaire has remarked that "it would be very singular
that all nature, all the planets, should obey eternal laws, and that
there should be a little animal five feet high, who, in contempt of
these laws, could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice."
Voltaire is here judging of man in terms of the conditions of his
animal life. He is forgetting that this same animal of five feet can
contain the stellar universe in thought within himself. Infinite
space and infinite time can be ranged over by the human mind.
Man's spiritual dignity dwarfs even the highest of his animal func-
tions. Though finite in his mortal conditions, he is divinely infinite
in his powers.
Were we not so thoroughly familiar with the unlimited power of
thought, could we (to form for the moment a self -contradictory
hypothesis) without ourselves possessing this capacity, be informed
that beings on other planets are thus endowed, we should certainly
be incredulous. It would seem too absurdly impossible that a crea-
ture five feet high and confined to one planet, should yet at the same
time possess a something called mind or consciousness which can
range over the whole of infinite space. That would surely be de-
nounced as more unbelievable than any dogma ever propounded by
the theologians, more impossible than the wildest and most super-
stitious belief of primitive man.
The power of thought is sufficiently wonderful in the animals,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 117
enabling them as it does to have some apprehension of their environ-
ment, and so by variation of their reactions to attain satisfaction of
their instinctive needs. But in man it no longer serves a merely
practical purpose that is, if we adopt, as it seems to me we must,
the idealist interpretation of the function of human thought. In
man thought is essentially speculative in its character, connecting
him with the universe as a whole, and driving him by the com-
pulsion of an inner need to rationalize and render intelligible to
himself the nature of things.
It is this uniqueness of thought which seems to justify philosophy
in laying so absolute a stress upon it, and in maintaining that it
must largey contribute to the determining of our general philo-
sophical attitude. By preoccupation with the question of knowledge,
aided by the natural sciences, but not overweighted by them, we may
hope to find some of the deeper clues that will lead to a more ade-
quate solution of our philosophical problems.
It is this twofold aspect of our existence, as at once animal in its
conditions and potentially universal in its powers of apprehension,
that forces upon Kant the problem of reconciling phenomenalism
with individualism. The finite self exists in and through space and
time, not space and time in and through the finite self. It is con-
scious of a time that existed before its own existence and which will
outlast it. It is conscious of itself as being limited down, as an ani-
mal existence, to a particular position in space, and as subject to all
the limitations which such position involves. Experience also teaches
and this is likewise an essential element in Kant's doctrine that
our various sensations are due to the action of material bodies upon
our sense organs and brain. But, on the other hand, Kant is no less
emphatic in maintaining that the whole world in space and time rests
upon complex conditions that are inextricably bound up with the
determining factors of our transitory existence. The material world
in space is in its apprehended form phenomenal. It is an appearance
which exists only in and through consciousness. And yet conscious-
ness only appears in connection with individuals that are conditioned
by the limitations which spatial and temporal existence impose.
The usual interpretation of Kant is little better than a parody
of his real teaching. It takes Kant's solution of the problem as con-
sisting in the assumption of a self that by its creative agencies con-
structs out of given sensations the mechanical world in space and
time. The world exists separately in the mind of each individual
observer; it has no independent existence apart from these its indi-
vidual embodiments. If that were Kant's position, it would be of
comparatively little value, and would merely be a form of Berkeleian-
ism. The chief problems of philosophy center in the self, in the
118 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
question as to the nature and possibility of spiritual existence. Cer-
tainly, if we may assume the existence of the self as a spiritual being
capable by its activities of generating the world in space and time,
we may be able to explain tin- apprehended universe. The legiti-
macy of such an assumption is. Imurvrr, itself the chief point at
issue. And that it is an illegitimate assumption was one of Kant's
main contentions. It is illegitimate for two reasons. First, because
to explain by reference to the activities of such a self is to explain
by faculties, by the unknown. It is a cause that will explain any-
thing and everything equally well or badly. This is an argument
which Kant nowhere himself employs, but it is implied in a second
argument which finds expression both in the deduction of the cate-
gories and in the paralogisms. The only self that we know is a con-
scious self. And since as conscious it can only exist in and through
consciousness of objects, it can not precede such consciousness as its
generating cause.
It is in another and very different manner that Kant maintains
the dependence of phenomena upon consciousness. He makes a most
valiant attempt to combine his phenomenalism with realism; and
though most of the inconsistencies in his teaching are traceable to
the almost insuperable difficulties to which any such attempt gives
rise, it is also the source of much that is most suggestive in his
thought. I shall try to indicate Kant's position on this point.
As I have already said, it is much easier to combine realism with
subjectivism than with phenomenalism. Realism appears in a sub-
jectivist form in Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz; also in Helmholtz,
Huxley, and Spencer. In all of those thinkers, everything outside
the individual mind is real: appearance is purely individual in
origin. Their position, therefore, is not strictly phenomenalism, but
only subjectivism. Kant, on the other hand, maintains that the indi-
vidual is himself known only as appearance, and can not therefore
be the medium in and through which appearance exists. Though
appearance exists only in and through consciousness, it is not due to
any causes that can legitimately be described as individual.
But though Kant is insistent both upon his phenomenalism and
upon his realism, he inclines, according to the exigencies of the
argument and to the special difficulties which he happens in each
context to have in view, now to the one and now to the other.
"Inclines" is perhaps too mild a term. There may indeed be traced,
running side by side through all his critical writings, two conflicting
views as to the mode of existence possessed by the material world in
space, as to the nature of mechanical causation, as to the constitution
of inner sense, and as to the character of the transcendental unity of
apperception. The usual and current interpretation of Kant, to
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 119
which I have just referred, takes only the one set of views, and
ignores the others. It is in the perpetual oscillation between the
two, and in the perpetual striving to reconcile them, that much of
the value, and most of the present-day interest, of the "Critique"
lies. To this cause is largely due its permanent, though illusive,
power of suggestion.
Sensations, Kant holds, have a twofold origin, noumenal and
mechanical. They are due in the first place to the action of things
in themselves upon the noumenal conditions of the self, and also in
the second place to the action of material bodies upon the sense-
organs and brain. To take the latter first. Light reflected from
objects, and acting on the retina, gives rise to sensations of color.
For such causal interrelations there exists, Kant teaches, the same
kind of empirical evidence as for the causal interacting of material
bodies. Our sensational experiences are as truly events in time as
are mechanical happenings in space. In this way, however, we can
account only for the existence of our sensations and for the order in
which they make their appearance in or to consciousness, not for
pur awareness of them. To state the point by means of an illustra-
tion. The impinging of one billiard ball upon another accounts
causally for the motion which then appears in the second ball. But
no one would dream of asserting that by itself it accounts for our
consciousness of that second motion. We may contend that in an
exactly similar manner, to the same extent, no more and no less, the
action of an object upon the brain accounts only for the occurrence
of a visual sensation as an event in the empirical time sequence. A
sensation just as little as a motion can carry its own consciousness
with it. To regard that as ever possible is ultimately to endow
events in time with the capacity of apprehending objects in space.
In dealing with causal connections in space and time we do not
require to discuss the problem of knowledge proper, namely, how it
is possible to have or acquire knowledge, whether of a motion in
space or of a sensation in time. When we raise that further ques-
tion we have to adopt a very different standpoint, and to take into
account a much greater complexity of conditions.
I may indicate two of the difficulties which such a view involves.
It is fair sailing in regard to the organic sensations, and to the
sensations of the lower senses, including temperature sensations.
Difficulties present themselves in regard to sensations of touch and
motor sense, and especially in regard to sensations of color. Color
is not perceived as an event caused by the external object which acts
on the retina, but as its inherent and permanent quality. The treat-
ment of this point would require a paper all to itself. Another
difficulty is in regard to feelings and desires. Kant cuts the gordian
120 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
knot by viewing them as all mechanically conditioned. They fall
within the empirical world, and are completely subject to its laws.
But I proceed to my next main point.
We have no direct acquaintance with consciousness. We are
aware only of contents apprehended, never of the process to which
their apprehension is due. We may, of course, be aware of the steps
which we take in order to place ourselves in a proper position or
mental attitude for experiencing a content, but of the actual con-
sciousness of the content we have no awareness. We have experi-
ence of pleasure, pain, desire, striving, and the like. These, how-
ever, would seem to be in all cases experiences of which we are
aware, but not to be themselves describable as awareness. We
seem to postulate the existence of that which we name conscious-
ness or awareness from reflection upon the order and mode of hap-
pening of the various contents apprehended. It is inferred or
postulated, not itself experienced. No analogy derivable from the
known world is in the least degree adequate to express its mysterious
character. The nearest analogy is space, and that is a comparison
which does not help. Consciousness would seem to be an absolutely
unique form of existence. Though we may determine certain of its
conditions, and some of its chief effects, we can not specify its
inherent nature.
My third point is that the connection established by Kant between
time and inner sense is illegitimate and misleading. Time appears
to be just as objective as space. It is just as necessary a component
of natural phenomena. Motion is the fundamental thing in nature;
it is more important than the matter which serves as its vehicle, and
by its very nature it demands both time and space; it occurs in
both equally. One reason why time is, by Kant and others, taken as
less objective than space, and as standing in a closer relation to
mind, is, of course, that many so-called mental experiences have no
position in space but occur in time. A pleasure or a pain, an odor,
a sound, may as effects be traced to mechanical processes in space,
but in themselves they are without form and shape, and can not
strictly be regarded as possessing spatial position. For this reason
feelings and the sensations of the secondary qualities have been
regarded as mental in character and as wholly opposite in nature to
the physical. But such argument might prove even physical energy
to be a mental existence.
To turn now to the other and more difficult aspect of the problem.
What does the postulating of consciousness involve ? What are the
conditions upon which consciousness would seem to rest? Kant's
answer to this question is given in the subjective and objective
deductions of the categories. For the purposes of this paper we
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 121
need consider these deductions only in so far as they raise the ques-
tion in regard to consciousness of time. Consciousness of time is
involved in all our consciousness. Though highly complex, it is the
minimum form in which our consciousness exists. It can not be
explained as having developed from a more primitive and simpler
form in which such temporal consciousness is not already contained.
It is consciousness of a succession as a succession. Admittedly com-
plex, it must have conditions equally complex. These Kant for-
mulates as being synthetic processes whereby the past is held
together with the present, being reproduced in image, and being
recognized as representing experiences which have just elapsed.
Ultimately this recognition involves some form of self-consciousness,
implicit though not explicit. Kant therefore postulates as the indis-
pensable conditions in and through which alone the minimum con-
sciousness can be rendered possible, a large number of synthetic
processes. These synthetic processes must take place and complete
themselves before consciousness can exist at all. And as they thus
precondition consciousness, they can not themselves be known to be
conscious; and not being known to be conscious, they may not
even be described as mental. We have, indeed, to conceive them on
the analogy of our mental processes; but that may only be because
of the limitation of our knowledge to the data of experience.
Further, we have no right to conceive them as the activities of
a noumenal self. "We know the self only as conscious, and the syn-
thetic processes, being the generating conditions of consciousness,
are also the generating conditions of the only self for which our
experience can vouch. They are named "synthetic" because con-
sciousness in its very nature would seem to involve the carrying
over of content from one time to other times, and the construction
of a more comprehensive total consciousness from the elements thus
combined. Kant is here analyzing, in its simplest and most funda-
mental form, what William James has described in his "Principles
of Psychology," 2 as the telescoping of earlier mental states into the
* Cf. Vol. I., p. 339. ' ' Each later thought, knowing and including thus
the thoughts which went before, is the final receptacle and appropriating them
is the final owner of all that they contain and own. Each thought is thus born
an owner, and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realized as its self to its
own later proprietor. As Kant says, it is as if elastic balls were to have not
only motion, but knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit both its
motion and its consciousness to a second, which took both up into its conscious-
ness and passed them to a third, until the last ball held all that the other balls
had held, and realized it as its own. It is this trick which the nascent thought
has of immediately taking up the expiring thought and 'adopting' it, which is
the foundation of the appropriation of most of the remoter constituents of the
self. Who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possesses
the possessor possesses the possessed. ' '
122 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
successive experiences that include them. They telescope in a man-
ure which can never befall the successive events in a causal series,
and which is not explicable by any scheme of relations derivable from
the physical sphere.
Tin- point may be made clearer by inquiring how Kant conceives
the material upon which the synthetic processes act. They are, he
says, due to the affection by thinirs in themselves of those factors in
the noumenal conditions of the self which correspond to "sensi-
bility." ("Outer sense" must not be identified with the bodily
senses.) But just as he frequently speaks as if the synthetic proc-
esses were mental activities exercised by the self, so also he fre-
quently uses language which implies that the manifold upon which
these processes act is identical with the sensations of the special
senses. But the sensations of the bodily senses, even if reducible to
it, can at most form only part of it. The synthetic processes, inter-
preting the manifold in accordance with the fixed forms, space, time,
and the categories, generate the spatial world within which objects
are apprehended as acting upon one another, and also as causing
through their action upon the sense-organs of the animal body sensa-
tions as events in time. Sensations, as mechanically caused, are
thus on the same plane as other appearances. They rest upon the
same complex generating conditions as the motions which produce
them. And the material for all of them, and not merely for our
sensations, must be supplied in the primary manifold.
Obviously, what Kant does is to apply to the interpretation of
the noumenal conditions of our conscious experience a distinction
derived by analogy from conscious experience itself the distinction,
namely, between our mental processes and the sensuous material with
which they deal. The application of such a distinction may be
inevitable in any attempt to explain human experience; but, as
Kant has himself pointed out, it can very easily, unless carefully
interpreted, prove a source of serious misunderstanding. Just as
the synthetic processes which generate consciousness are not known
to be themselves conscious, so also the manifold can not be identified
with the sensations of the bodily senses. These last are events in
time, and are effects not of noumenal but of mechanical causes.
Kant's conclusion is twofold: positive, to the effect that con-
sciousness, for all that our analysis can prove to the contrary, may
be merely a resultant, derivative from and dependent upon a com-
plexity of conditions; and negative, to the effect that though these
conditions may by analogy be described as consisting of synthetic
processes acting upon a given material, they are in their real nature
unknowable by us. Even their bare possibility we can not profess to
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 123
comprehend. We postulate them only because they would seem to be
demanded as indispensable conditions of our de facto experience.
They can be defined only in terms of their effects, not in their own
non-experienced nature.
Kant obscures his position by the way in which he frequently
speaks of the transcendental unity of apperception as the supreme
condition of our experience. At times he even speaks as if it were
the source of the synthetic processes. That can not, however, be
regarded as his real teaching. Self-consciousness, and with it the
unity of apperception, rests upon the same complexity of conditions
as does outer experience, and may, therefore, be merely a product or
resultant. It is, as he insists in the paralogisms, the emptiest of all
our conceptions ; and can afford no sufficient ground for asserting
the self to be a spiritual and abiding personality. We can not by
theoretical analysis of the facts of experience or of the nature of self-
consciousness prove anything whatsoever in regard to the ultimate
nature of the self.
Kant's phenomenalism thus involves an objectivist view of indi-
vidual selves and of their interrelations. They fall within the single
common world of space. Within this phenomenal world they stand
in external mechanical relations to one another. They are appre-
hended as embodied, with known contents, sensations, feelings, and
desires, composing their inner experience. There is, from this point
of view, no problem of knowledge. On this plane we have to deal
only with events known, not with any process of apprehension.
Even the inner components of the empirical self are not processes of
apprehension, but apprehended existences. It is only when we
make a regress beyond the phenomenal as such to the conditions
which render it possible, that the problem of knowledge arises at all.
And with that regress we are brought to the real crux of the whole
question the reconciliation of such phenomenalism with the condi-
tions of our self-consciousness. For we have then to take into
account the fundamental fact that each self is not only a minute
existence within the phenomenal world, but also in its powers of
apprehension coequal with it. The self known is external to the
objects known. The self that knows is conscious of itself as com-
prehending within the field of its consciousness the wider universe
in infinite space.
Such considerations would, at first sight, seem to force us to
modify our phenomenalist standpoint in the direction of subjectivism.
For in what other manner can we hope to unite the two aspects of
the self, the known conditions of its finite existence, and the con-
sciousness through which it correlates with the universe as a whole?
124 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
In the one aspect it is a part of appearance ; in the other it connects
with that which makes appearance possible at all.
Quite frequently it is the subjectivist solution which Kant seems
to adopt, but he also suggests one that is more in harmony with his
phenomenalist tendencies. He would then seem to distinguish be-
tween the grounds and conditions of phenomenal existence and the
special determining causes of individual consciousness. Transcen-
dental conditions generate consciousness of the relatively permanent
and objective world in space and time; empirical conditions within
this space and time world determine the sensuous modes through
which special portions of this infinite and uniform world appear
diversely to different individuals.
But such a solution is too crude to be acceptable. Consciousness
of the objective world in space and time does not exist complete with
one portion of it more specifically determined in terms of actual
sense perceptions. Rather the consciousness of the single world in
space and time is gradually developed through and out of sense-
experience of limited portions of it. Kant leaves undiscussed all the
obvious objections to which his phenomenalism lies open. He does
not state in any adequate manner how from the phenomenalist
standpoint he would regard the world described in mechanical terms
by science as related to the world of ordinary sense experience, nor
how different individual consciousnesses are related to one another.
The very fact, however, that such problems are inevitably suggested
by his critical inquiries is the best possible proof of their permanent
value. They could never have occurred in any such form to his
predecessors.
Bergson is one of the many who have attacked these problems in
the light of distinctions first drawn by Kant. And in so doing he
reformulates them in a manner which, though in many respects
unsatisfactory, and which perhaps is not ultimately tenable, yet
places the issues in a new and suggestive light. He sets aside the
question of the genesis of consciousness. He assumes it as given.
His starting-point is the world of material bodies in space. His
problem is not to account for consciousness of it, but to explain
why we know it in a form relative to our individual position and
practical needs. It is the very nature of consciousness to correlate
with reality as a whole, and to reveal it as it really exists. By right
it is complete knowledge of true independent reality ; in actual fact
it is limited in extent, permeated with illusion, and largely personal.
The problem is not, therefore, one of genesis, but of the limitation of
the already existent not how a self that is embodied and works
under animal conditions is capable of attaining to a consciousness
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 125
of the universe within which it falls, but how mind, which is inalien-
ably universal, can be limited by animal conditions. The change is,
indeed, one of orientation rather than of problem, for consciousness
of time, and recognition, i. e., memory still remain central issues.
Consciousness is "a force essentially free and essentially memory, a
force whose very character is to pile up the past on the past, like a
rolling snowball, and at every instant of duration to organize with
this past something new which is a real creation." 3
This position, when thus abstractly and baldly stated, may well
seem to embody a most unlikely and even repellent thesis. Bergson
renders it, however, both interesting and illuminating by the sug-
gestiveness with which he works it out in honest detail. Common to
him and to Kant remains the contention that an adequate theory of
knowledge must reconcile realism and phenomenalism with one
another, and both with the individualistic requirements of self-con-
sciousness. And I should especially insist, considering the recent
reemergence of realistic theories, upon phenomenalism as a funda-
mental characteristic of our experience, calling for the most ample
recognition. Only so can we formulate a position which is capable
of allowing both for human knowledge and for human ignorance,
both for known facts and for unknown possibilities. And only so,
as it seems to me, can an idealist philosophy escape the suicidal
admission of the unlimited validity of the naturalistic position.
But Bergson modifies Kant's problems in still another direction;
and by that restatement is enabled to carry their discussion several
steps further. As above mentioned, Kant does not explain in what
relation the mechanical world of natural science stands to the world
of ordinary sense experience. The key to this question, or at least a
point of view from which it can be profitably investigated, is sup-
plied by biological science, 4 and though developed by many writers,
has received its most convincing statement in Bergson 's "Matiere
et Memoire." Our sense perceptions are permeated through and
through, from end to end, with illusion. Objects are seen as dwin-
dling in size, as changing in form and color, as they pass into the
distance. The parallel sides of a street are seen to converge as they
recede. These illusions justify themselves by their practical useful-
ness, since they enable us to compress a wide extent of landscape
into a single visual field, to determine distance, etc. But they like-
wise establish the unreal fictitious nature, the mental subjective
1 1 quote from the excellent resum6 of his views which Bergson has given in
his recent article in the Hibbert Journal, October, 1911, Vol. X., p. 37.
4 It was anticipated by Malebranche. It holds a central position in his
delightful and most unfortunately neglected philosophy. Cf. British Journal of
Psychology, Vol. I., part 3, p. 191 ff.
126 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
character of the world perceived. The extent to which illusion thus
permeates our sense experiences does not, however, become evident
until we compare the knowledge which they yield with the conclu-
sions of physical science. To define by an example: to sense per-
ception a solid cannon ball appears to be a cold, black, continuous
mass of quiescent matter. According to science it consists of mil-
lions of discrete particles which are neither cold nor black, and which
are in constant motion. These particles by their movements occupy
the volume of the sphere, much as a small army may occupy a huge
extent of country, not by bulk but by mobility. To sense perception
the ball thus appears as being exactly what it is not, and not at all
as what it is. Though we can take it in our hands and gaze upon
it with our eyes, we can not thereby discover its real nature. When
we look at the ball, we are unable to see what actually is there, and
instead we see something that is not there at all. The same holds
of every one of our sense perceptions. They do not represent, but
misrepresent, the true nature of the real. Not through sense experi-
ence, but only through scientific research, is genuine reality ever
attained. The purpose of sense experience is not knowledge, but
power. Its raison d'etre is to yield, in the most convenient form
possible, such apprehension of the observer's environment as will
render adaptation and practical control possible. And % this con-
venient form in which external objects are apprehended may be, and
generally is, entirely false, when tested by a theoretical standard.
The deceptions (if we may so name them) of sense experience justify
themselves by their practical usefulness, as well as by their esthetic
value. And in spite of their illusoriness they yield data sufficient to
render possible of achievement the adventurous task undertaken by
the scientist, namely, that of discovering from them their actual
generating conditions.
The difference between the sensible and the mechanical is due in
part, Bergson teaches, to a difference of tempo in the two series.
"The essence of life seems to be to secure that matter, by a process
necessarily very slow and difficult, should store up energy ready for
life afterwards to expend this energy suddenly in free movements. ' ' 8
Consciousness is similarly constituted. "In an interval which for
it is infinitely short, and which constitutes one of our 'instants,' it
seizes under an indivisible form millions and billions of events that
succeed each other in inert matter. ... It is this immense history
that I seize all at once under the pictorial form of a very brief sensa-
tion of light. And we could say just the same of all our other sen-
sations. Sensation, which is the point at which consciousness touches
Loo. tit., p. 35.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 127
matter, is, then, the condensation, in the duration peculiar to this
consciousness, of a history which in itself in the world of matter
is something infinitely diluted, and which occupies enormous periods
of what might be called the duration of things." 6
So far Bergson is only reinforcing the general teaching of nat-
ural science. But he likewise employs this pragmatic point of view
in explanation of those categories of the understanding which Kant
regarded as an ultimate and not further explicable endowment of
the human mind. They too have their origin in our practical needs.
Though the primary conscious purpose of the scientist is the gaining
of knowledge, the modes in which he seeks to satisfy this endeavor
are still influenced by non-theoretical conditions. The direct and
immediate outcome of the sciences is, consequently, not knowledge,
but power. Like sense experience, they deal only with appearances,
though certainly with appearances that may legitimately be regarded
as nearer to the independently real. For through knowledge of them
man is enabled to transform what would otherwise be a fixed en-
vironment, tyrannically dictating the general principles of his life,
into one that is more in harmony with his human and spiritual needs.
Problems, closed for Kant, thus open upon new perspectives ; and
become possible of further development by novel methods on fresh
lines. If the mechanical categories are the outcome of practical
needs, and are therefore systematic illusions justified by their fruits ;
and consequently, as we may further conclude, are only partial in
their distortion of the real, it may be possible that scrutiny as careful
and painstaking as that which has been expended upon the appear-
ances of sense, may find in certain of the elements and contours of
our scientific results data sufficient to enable the mind to penetrate
even into the hidden mysteries of the absolutely real. For this, ulti-
mately, is Bergson 's fundamental divergence from Kant. He is no
less emphatic upon the merely phenomenal character of the mechan-
ical world in space. But he cherishes hope, and supplies a wealth of
detailed argument in support of the assertion, that by empirical cir-
cumstantial reasoning, based upon the fundamental characteristics
of natural existence and of human life, we may penetrate to the
noumenal sphere. The limits of sense experience have been trans-
cended in the construction of science. Thanks to these successes, and
to the closer contact with reality which is thereby acquired, the
achievements of the sciences may be accompanied by that less as-
sured, but even more valuable insight which is only to be won by
adventurous journeying upon the perilous paths of metaphysical
speculation. Such insight, anticipatory and almost prophetic, ahead
Loc. tit., pp. 36-37.
128 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of the sciences but still in touch with them, has been the very breath
and spirit of human endeavor in the past. It may well continue to
perform the same precarious but indispensable function in the fu-
ture. In opposition to a purely naturalistic interpretation of the
real, it can always draw afresh upon the comparatively untapped
resources of our specifically human and essentially spiritual life.
In conclusion, I may summarize and define the main points of
this paper by stating them in their relation and opposition to the
standpoint which Professor Dewey has so forcibly developed in his
recent articles. 7 Firstly, the really critical issue in the present-day
problem of knowledge would seem, as Professor Dewey has argued,
to be the question whether awareness or consciousness may legiti-
mately be regarded as an event, and therefore as having a place in
the single continuous causal series that constitutes the objectively
real. The thesis which I have tried to maintain is that this may be
true of sensations, but not of the knowing process, of the awareness
or consciousness as such. Consciousness can not be described as an
event in any sense which would set it as an integral element into the
single causal time and space series.
Secondly, Professor Dewey denies that knowing is a "unique and
non-natural type of relation." I have tried to argue for its unique-
ness. "Non-natural" is a hard term; but taking it as meant, t. e., as
signifying anything and everything that falls outside the single con-
tinuous causal series investigated by the natural sciences, I have
sought to defend the more traditional view, that the knowing process
may be so described.
Thirdly, it has been argued above, that we may judge of man
either from the point of view of his animal organism or from that of
his inner life. Professor Dewey would seem to maintain that so far
as regards the problem of knowledge, or at least of sense per-
ception, the former alone is required. 8 The thesis of this paper is the
directly counter position. The problem of perception is for phi-
losophy uniquely important, and can not be solved by any conceiv-
able advance either of physiology or of biology upon their present
lines. With a physiology or a biology fundamentally different from
those actually existent we are not, of course, concerned ; in regard to
such no prophecy, positive or negative, can be made.
NOBMAN KEMP SMITH.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.
This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., pp. 393 and 496.
Cf. Joe. cit., pp. 400 and 552.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 129
DISCUSSION
BERGSON'S ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM
PEOFESSOR PERRY'S "Notes on the Philosophy of Henri
Bergson" 1 is a trenchant criticism which undertakes to main-
tain two propositions: (1) " Bergson 's indictment of the intellectual
method rests on a misunderstanding of that method" (p. 674).
(2) Bergson 's anti-intellectualism is "involved in a more serious
error" in that it "puts forth a claim" to immediate knowledge which
is "unfounded" (p. 678).
I confess I am not able to make out the particular misunder-
standing which Professor Perry means to attribute to Bergson under
the first point of his criticism. From the statements (p. 675) it is
not clear to me whether this misunderstanding relates to the nature
and function of the concept, or whether it relates to the consistent
procedure of the anti-intellectualist.
I do not think that Professor Perry's statement (p. 675) that
"Bergson is not clear as to whether a concept is to be distinguished
by its function or its content" is quite to the point. It seems to me
that Bergson is altogether clear in that matter. Bergson clearly
teaches that, since the function of the intellect is to direct our action
upon reality instead of revealing the nature of reality, concepts are
the special instruments or tools by means of which our actions are
made effective as they insert themselves into the real world. This
essentially instrumental function of our concepts determines also
their content or structure ; the two, function and content, correspond.
Our concepts are plans of action, and not mediate ways of pene-
trating or disclosing the nature of reality. Conceptual thinking
is not ' ' a mode of access to immediacy. ' ' Hence, the ' ' strange pro-
cedure" which Professor Perry points out (p. 675), namely, "to
prove that intellect is essentially instrumental and then to attack it
in behalf of that very end for which it is useful," can not rightly
be imputed to Bergson 's pragmatism.
I can not see that Professor Perry has brought forth anything
under the second point of his criticism which tends to disprove
Bergson 's anti-intellectualism. All that Professor Perry says (pp.
676-7) about spacial continuity, etc., Bergson could accept. In the
case of space, which is an intellectual construction, the formula and
added statements which Professor Perry suggests, can mean, nay,
they describe this kind of continuity ; for this continuity consists of
just those elements and connections in which the intellect is at home ;
ir This JOUBNAL, Vol. VIII., page 673.
130 7 ///; JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
this quantitative multiplicity being made up of elements which are
homogeneous, static, and which merely touch, but do not penetrate,
each other. Siu-h a system or order can be conceived and described
in the manner Professor IVrry suggests (p. 677).
But how about the other continuities, those of time and motion?
It is the essence of Bergson 's contention, that when the intellect
deals with these continuities, it can do so only as it frames concepts
which leave out of their content and their legitimate function just
that which is distinctive of time and that which is the essence of
motion. The intellect thinks time only as it spacializes it, and
motion only as it reduces it to a succession of immobile states. Now,
under this third point of his critique, I can not see that Professor
Perry has broken the force of this contention.
In the next criticism, the substance of Professor Perry's reason-
ing against Bergson's position, "that to conceive time is to spacialize
it," is as follows: "Bergson is misled by supposing that because
time is conceived as orderly, it is therefore nothing but order. Bare
logical order is static and can never express time. But it is an
utterly different matter to regard time, like space and number, as a
case of order, having the specific time quale over and above the prop-
erties of order. Position, interval, before and after, are then to be
taken in the temporal sense; and the terms of the series are not to be
taken as bare logical terms, still less as spacial points, but as instants
possessing a unique time-character of their own" (p. 678).
Now, this reasoning, I think, begs the question. For, to regard
time as a "case of order," and at the same time to give it the
"specific quale" of the sort proposed, is as impossible a logical
undertaking as would be the attempt to place something in a certain
genus, and at the same time give it a mark or quale which takes it
out of that genus altogether, and puts it within some other genus.
The "time quale," the "unique time-character" which Professor
Perry thinks constitutes only a specific differentia in the case he
instances, really constitutes a generic difference. What we have in
this instance is not a species within a genus, but two genera between
which, Bergson contends, there is a radical difference. I do not
think Professor Perry, in this part of his critique, has successfully
met Bergson 's contention that the concepts of time and motion which
our intellect forms do not give us knowledge of these realities; they
do not give us "access to that immediacy" in which real duration
and motion are given us.
The second main criticism which Professor Perry makes upon
Bergson's anti-intellectualism is that Bergson "puts forth a claim
which is unfounded the claim, namely, to the immediate apprehen-
sion of a fused and inarticulate unity" (p. 678).
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 131
The substance of the critic's reply to Bergson is that what Berg-
son puts forth as matter of immediate knowledge is not really knowl-
edge at all. Thus, Bergson says: 2 "The more we succeed in making
ourselves conscious of our progress in pure duration, the more we
feel the different parts of our being enter into each other, and our
whole personality concentrate itself in a point. ' ' To this Professor
Perry replies (p. 679) : "What Bergson is here describing is, I am
convinced, the disappearance of cognition into an experience which
is not an experience of anything at all. . . . My experience of life has
dissolved ; but nothing follows concerning the nature of life. I have
simply closed my eyes to it. I have blurred and blotted out my
knowledge of life. ' '
Now, after reading all the passages in Bergson 's writings which
relate to intuitive knowledge, I can not convince mi/self that Bergson
is not describing a truly cognitive experience, instead of giving us
knowledge at the vanishing-point. My own introspection verifies
Bergson 's statements. I am quite certain that I have an experience
of something, namely, of real time in its flow and interpenetration of
moments. I have, it seems to me, an immediate knowledge of just
that qualitative multiplicity of psychical states which Bergson has
clearly described and accurately distinguished from the other kind
of multiplicity, of which we have knowledge only through the media-
tion of conceptual thinking.
I am unable to see on what grounds Professor Perry is "con-
vinced" of the erroneousness of Bergson 's description, other than
his own introspection, and possibly that of other individuals whose
introspection yields the same results. It seems to me that the
utmost Bergson 's critic makes out against Bergson 's position is that
Bergson 's claim to an immediate apprehension of the sort described
is not borne out by the introspective analysis of at least one person,
and possibly not borne out by the introspection of other individuals.
But that the claim to such non-conceptual knowledge is an unfounded
one, the critic, in my opinion, has not shown.
JOHN E. RUSSELL.
WILLIAMS COLLEGE.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes.
EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. New York : The Macmillan Co. 1909.
Pp. ix -f 318.
This book consists of five lectures delivered at the University of Illi-
nois ; the lectures proper fill about two thirds of the volume, the rest being
'"Creative Evolution," page 201.
132 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
given to notes. Together they form a needed analysis of the contribu-
tions to the experimental investigation of thought by Marbe, Watt, Ach,
Messer, Biihler, etc., besides giving the author's estimate of their value,
his own present views concerning the problems raised, and his suggestions
for fruitful directions of future research. It is doubly welcome because
of the author's happy gifts for such a task.
At the very outset it is shown that individual differences in mental
make-up must play an important part in the psychology of thought, that,
indeed, " a frank acceptance of the teachings of differential psychology
will go far to allay some of the perennial controversies of the text-books "
(p. 7). What part they may play Titchener indicates by laying bare the
workings of his own mind. His mind is markedly of the imaginal the
mixed imaginal sort. Sometimes one kind of imagery is uppermost,
sometimes another. In reading, for instance, his ultimate standard of
clarity and consistency in an author is schematically visual the visual
pattern not merely an accompaniment of other processes, but one that " is
or equals my gross understanding of the matter in hand" (p. 13). For
him either visual or kinesthetic imagery, quite apart from verbal, may be
the vehicles of logical meaning may mean of themselves and not act
merely as guide-posts to something beyond.
This discussion leads to one concerning the possibility of abstract or
general ideas. It is pointed out that in the traditional English teaching
there has been here a confusion between logic and psychology, for the
abstract is not the conscious process, but the logical meaning. Titchener
believes, indeed, that a particular definite image might carry abstract
meaning and a vague image a particular meaning, since attenlional clear-
ness is the essential element in the meaningfulness of an image, and not
intrinsic definiteness.
The argument thus far points to psychological sensationalism; the
book is, indeed, a defense of sensationalism as an adequate instrument
of interpretation in dealing with thought processes as well as with others.
The author sharply separates modern sensationalism, however, from that
of the associationists. They dealt with meanings, thought-tokens, bits
of knowledge, with sensations of and not with sensations; the sensations
and ideas of modern psychology are, on the contrary, Erlebnisse, data of
immediate experience. Meanings, furthermore, are stable and may be
ordered mosaic wise or chain-wise, but experience is continuously flowing;
a psychology whose elements are sensations is, therefore, a process psy-
chology, quite innocent of mosaic and concatenation. Whether referring
to " substantive " or " transitive " meanings, the psychological process is
always of itself transitory. Nor did the associationists help matters by
invoking mental chemistry, for " we do not expect, if two sensations are
put together, to obtain a simple concurrence of their two qualities " (p.
32). Finally, modern sensationalism is merely an heuristic principle and
not a preconceived theory; to us the sensation is an analytic element,
says Titchener, abstracted from complex mental experiences, not a syn-
thetic or generative element not a " first term " in the construction of
mind.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 133
The upshot of this first lecture is, then, that the image may adequately
equal meaning and that, if the task of modern psychology is analysis of
experience into its existential elements, sensation (with affection) is
doubtless an adequate tool.
The second lecture deals with " ' reference to object ' as the criterion
of mind." In the various " reference to object " theories psychological
fact has been cast into logical form; the separation of the conscious
experience into act and content, or idea and object, leads to overarticula-
tion and to neglect of analysis, because logical construction and not intro-
spective analysis is here in control of classification and analysis. To
extricate psychology from this Titchener invokes the process character
of mind : the way a process runs its course (act) makes it sensing, feeling,
or thinking, whereas the quality thus in passage (content) makes it tone
or pleasure. Furthermore, the pointing relation of the "transitive ob-
jectivity" theories (Stout, Witasek) does not obtain in feelings, organic
sensations, etc., whereas we do find it in the physical world: the transitive
reference is not, therefore, existentially speaking, a unique, characteristic
criterion of mind. The concept of objective reference, in whatever form,
is thus an irrelevant injection of logic into psychology, warping it away
from the direct existential analysis of conscious phenomena where we
do, in fact, find objectless mental processes. This exclusion of the " log-
ical " objective-reference postulate from the existential science of psy-
chology frees us from a frequently urged difficulty that two ideas or
images under the form of existence can not make a meaning (because
meaning is reference to object and this can be known but not imaged),
since, in an existential psychology, the final appeal is to introspection;
and introspection tells us, thinks Titchener, that under certain circum-
stances two ideas do make a meaning.
The third lecture takes up the actual work of the experimental investi-
gators. Their attempt, the details of which can not here be considered,
was, essentially, to isolate under experimental conditions some thought
process and to require from the subjects careful introspection on its
behavior. These introspective data Titchener thinks very valuable. As
to the relative merits of the individual investigators, he believes that
Marbe and Binet made a good beginning, that Ach and Watt followed
logically with respective specializations of the problems involved, that
Messer, disregarding the good example of Ach and Watt, tried too much,
and that Biihler, in devoting himself to " a revolutionary attempt to
rewrite the psychology of thought from the beginning" (p. 98), for-
sakes rigid experiment and is methodologically retrogressive.
Emerging from the work of these experimenters there appears, as
perhaps most characteristic, the Bewusstseinslage " an almost untrans-
latable term, meaning something like posture or attitude of conscious-
ness " (p. 100), but identifiable, at least, with what Angell had previously
phrased as " a tingling sense of irradiating meaning," and Stout as the
experience of " imageless thought." Some such attitudes are doubt, diffi-
culty, effort, hesitation, and the opposite experiences of certainty, assent,
134 THE JOURNAL OF
conviction, etc. Disregarding differences in usage, classification, and
theory of the various investigators, we have here an exix-rii-m-i- that appar-
ently defies analysis into sensations and images, into, in tine, any taraat
of content whatever ; they are essentially obscure and intangible, " image-
less presentations " with, however, perfectly " unequivocal reference," the
niiml being thrown into a certain set or adjustment, the significance of
which may be nttentionally clear but empty of imaginal furnishings
There may, of course, be transitional forms (Titchener, indeed, regards
the present pressing problem to be the tracing of the development of these
attitudes, within the individual mind, from their original imaginal
matrix), 1 but the full-blown attitude is apparently contentless. Does,
then, consciousness really harbor such things? If so, are they mental
elements? If they are not, what are they? The challenge to sensation-
alism is unequivocal and unavoidable.
It is but a short step to pass, in the fourth lecture, from the Beurusat-
seinslage of meaning to thought itself. Do the experimental results bear
out the theory of imageless thought! Marbe, unsuccessful in his search
for psychological judgment processes, invokes, as the guide in judgment,
an unconscious dispositional purpose. Watt proposes, as his psychological
criterion of judgment, the Aufgdbe (problem or task) given, in his experi-
ments, in the instructions of the experimenter and definable, more gen-
erally, as the underlying intention in control of an activity. This it is
that distinguishes a judgment from a mere sequence of experiences, and,
although as explicit conscious experience it may be past and gone, it
persists as an appreciable influence as an automatic set, attitude, or
adjustment. This determining " problem " is also clear to Messer and
Ach. As the reviewer understands it, we are here again in the presence
of a Bewusstseinslage a Bewusstseinslage of cognition that may func-
tion effectively, but exhibit no apparent imaginal content. Biihler finds,
indeed, the most important factors in the thinking of his subjects to be
something without sensible content, referred to as awareness, or knowl-
edge, or " the consciousness that " or, most frequently, thoughts. These
are Biihler's thought elements, the ultimate units of thought experience.
Titchener, it may be remarked, objects to this last result on the specific
ground that Biihler's introspective data show what in the sphere of sen-
sation would be called the stimulus error the observer does not describe
his thought, but, instead, what it is about, describes not the conscious
process as such, but formulates " the reference of consciousness to things "
(p. 147) a criticism applying also to Binet and Woodworth.
But aside from this and aside from the unsatisfactory state of affairs
that exists, as the author shows, as to a proper psychological criterion of
judgment, the investigators agree that there is present in the thought
process an effectively determining factor, yielding, however, no explicit
conscious (sensory or imaginal) content.
The challenge to sensationalism is wholesome and should be frankly
and gladly met, thinks Titchener. In the last lecture he does what he
'See, on this, Helen Maude Clarke, "Conscious Attitudes/' American
Journal of Psychology, 1911, Vol. XXII., pp. 214-249.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 135
can, at the present stage of investigation, to meet it. The gain from
previous work is clear: conscious states like doubt, hesitation, certainty,
etc. attitudes have been isolated and the fact of determination, Auf-
gabe, has been recognized as a principle of explanation in strict labora-
tory procedure. The discovery of Aufgabe " has made it impossible for
any future psychologist to write a psychology of thought in the language
of content alone. I believe, indeed, that the principle of determination,
taken together with what I may call a genetic sensationalism, furnishes
a trustworthy guide for further experimental study of the thought-
processes; and I think that the work immediately before us is, under this
guidance, to bring the processes, little bit by bit, under rigorous experi-
mental control" (pp. 163-164). The question is not wholly, therefore,
Can the sensationalists find in the alleged imageless experiences always a
sensory content? but rather, Isn't content more pervasively present than
the imageless-thought disciples suppose, and may not such things as
Watt's Aufgabe and Ach's determinierende Tendenzen be, genetically,
developments from processes essentially imaginal? The further question,
it is true, also awaits : If, originally full of content, these experiences are
now empty of it, how should a sensationalistic psychology now classify
them?
Three regulative maxims are first proposed that, should direct inquiry
into these matters. (1) Psychology must steer circumspectly between
logic, on the one hand, and common sense, on the other. (2) Psychology,
in such problems as thought, must supplement the analytic treatment
with the genetic, racial as well as individual an analysis must be re-
peated at the various formative levels of consciousness. Furthermore, we
shall take as a mental element " any process that proves to be irreducible,
unanalyzable, throughout the whole course of individual experience " (p.
170). If an attitude can be traced back in the individual to an imaginal
source, it is not a new kind of conscious element. (3) " Consciousness
may be guided and controlled by extra-conscious, physiological factors
by cortical sets and dispositions " (p. 173) a determination that may lead,
too, to novel conscious connections.
Titchener then attacks the problems directly. Is it nonsense to call a
psychological fact or occurrence the meaning of another psychological
fact or occurrence? Can two ideas be both idea and its meaning? Yes,
under certain circumstances, as already stated in the second lecture.
Psychologically, " meaning so far as it finds representation in conscious-
ness at all is always context," and context is " simply the mental process
or complex of mental processes which accrues to the original idea through
the situation in which the organism finds itself" (p. 175). Originally
meaning is kinesthesis the sensations involved in a characteristic bodily
attitude " are psychologically the meaning of that process. . . . After-
wards, when differentiation has taken place, context may be mainly a
matter of sensations of the special senses, or of images, or of kinesthetic
and other organic sensations, as the situation demands" (p. 176). Kin-
esthesis and verbal imagery are especially important, since words them-
selves were originally motor attitudes, kinesthetic contexts.
136 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOI'U V
But, further, meaning is probably carried in purely physiological
terms; the Aufgdbe must be there, but that need not either come to con-
sciousness. As for imageless thoughts, Titchener's own introspection
does not show him, in his search for Bewusstseinslagen, forms of experi-
ence different in kind from such kinesthetic backgrounds as his careful
introspection often discovers in the respective attitudes involved in work-
ing off, for instance, on a typewriter, a lecture or the daily batch of pro-
fessional correspondence. But the contention is not at all that attitudes
will always, in their developed state, exhibit content, but that, since
genetically they probably spring from sensory experiences, they are not
distinct conscious elements. While still recognizable as conscious atti-
tudes, they either show some remnant of imagery or, since they may be,
in their development towards physiological dispositions, on the brink of
unconsciousness, exhibit none discoverable. In much of this Titchener
is, of course, simply expressing tentative belief and not experiment-born
conviction, but the main contention, that sensationalism has still a well-
considered word or two to say, stands clear. In " feelings of relation,"
too, Titchener finds content ; but here, also, habit operates towards uncon-
scious mechanization, towards physiological disposition. As to judgment,
we do not yet know what it psychologically is; but the task of psychology
is to work out the particular problems set by investigations already made
and compare results with the teachings of logic, in order to find out what
kinds of consciousness correspond with logical definitions of judgment.
Finally, we are not yet driven to psychological revolution. " My task
has been to persuade you that there is no need, as things are, to swell the
number of mental elements; that the psychology of thought, so far as
we have it, may be interpreted from the sensationalistic standpoint, and
so far as we still await it, may be approached by sensationalistic methods "
(p. 194).
Titchener's personal answer to the challenge of the exponents of image-
less thought is contained, in gist, in the following statement, referring,
specifically, to " feelings of relation " : "I must declare . . . that I can
bear witness both to kinesthesis and to cortical set, but that between these
extremes I find nothing at all" (p. 188). That is, in such things as the
Bewusstseinslage, as the Aufgabe, there is either discoverable content
(sensational, imaginal) or there is unconsciousness, mechanization, physi-
ological disposition, cortical set. It seems to the reviewer that the " cor-
tical set" is an interpretation of the "nothing at all"; that is, intro-
spection may discover content, but when it finds " nothing at all," it
takes the matter to lie outside the conscious field and refers it then to
cortical set. Others, however, prefer to keep these Bewusstseinslagen,
etc., in consciousness and to call them " imageless." Introspection may,
of course, give you " imagelessness " ; it can not give you cortical set.
It might be a question, therefore, whether those who prefer to retain
attitudes, no matter how contentless, within consciousness, are not ad-
hering the more closely to the introspective ideal. The reply of sensa-
tionalism to this is, of course, obvious: when any attitude reveals no sen-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 137
sational or imaginal content, one is not directly aware of it at all but
infers its presence (as unconscious or physiological set) by its results in
(introspective) consciousness; it can not, therefore, be a part of con-
sciousness. But the rebuttal is equally obvious : first, some observers do
confess to awareness for which subsequent reflection persistently fails to
unmask imaginal content. Secondly, any one's introspection shows that
one may be, at least momentarily, naively aware of some attitude, like
doubt, with, at the time, no awareness whatever of sensations or images;
it is only by the subsequent reflective analysis of introspection that the
attitude, like a dissolving magic lantern view, may fade away and be
replaced by an array of sensations. Now by what license can the first act
of introspective awareness (that of doubt) be identified with the second
(that of sensations) ? Surely, if introspection is the arbiter, as the sensa-
tionalists would have it, to say that the first is the second is to forsake
introspection and invoke logical construction.
But, although even the introspective criterion does not appear to give
the honors wholly to the sensationalists, the reviewer considers the diffi-
culty between them and the exponents of imageless thought as one that
neither experiment nor introspection can settle. It is a matter of just
that naughty logical construction which those to whom it is axiomatic
that introspection is the final arbiter intrench themselves against. Shall
the term consciousness be limited to introspect able content, everything
else being cortical set, or shall we leave physiology alone here and
affirm that the contentless attitudes and Aufgaben are simply forms
of consciousness on which the additional reflective process always
involved in introspection is not possible? To this question the strictly
introspective dispute as to whether one may or may not be directly
aware of attitudes empty of discoverable content is, of course, not
germane. The dilemma appears clear: either we must reserve the
term " conscious " for the gifts of introspection, in which case we have a
psychology limited to the field of attainable reflection, all else being
extra-conscious physiological, if you will or we must maintain that
the field of real conscious " stuff " lies underneath and around and about
the field of introspection including, therefore, " mechanized " Bewusst-
seinslagen and Aufgaben the data offered by introspection being simply
the possible additional reflections that we may make on a part of it. The
attitude in which no content is discoverable is merely conscious process
successfully resisting reflection. This is, of course, quite aside from the
question of whether it is a distinct kind of conscious element, for even
if it be true that a process traceable back to a stage involving imaginal
content can not be a distinct element, does the fact that in its develop-
ment from this stage it gradually loses such content mean anything more
than that it no longer presents introspectable attributes? Excluding it
as a novel element, must we also throw it out of consciousness altogether?
Is it logical to call it a conscious attitude so long as it is embedded in an
imaginal matrix and then make it a physiological process when the
imagery has forsaken it? Nor is all this a mere question of naming, of
138 THE JOURNAL OF FTIIWSOPHY
classification: it is a question of the definition of consciousness, one's
answer to which sets the Aufgabe that controls even the details of labo-
ratory procedure. ROSWELL P. ANOIKU.
YALI UNIVERSITY.
Phases of Evolution and Heredity. DAVTD Bi HHV II \RT. London: Reb-
man Limited. 1910. Pp. xi + 259.
The Darwin-Wallace theory falls short in two respects. (1) It does
not show where the power of variation in the individual lies. (2) No
adequate explanation of the inheritance of variation is offered. Circum-
cision, practised generation after generation, plainly demonstrates that
artificially produced variations in the " soma " of individuals are not
transmitted to subsequent generations. Weismann made an advance on
Darwinism when he asserted that the power of variation lies in the primi-
tive germ-cells of the sexual glands, but he did not explain adequately the
exact nature of the process of transmission. Mendel's experiments in
artificial cross-fertilization between tall pea-plants and a dwarf variety
showed that the first generation consisted uniformly of tall pea-plants.
When these were allowed to self-fertilize, the result was tails and dwarfs
in the ratio 3:1. The dwarfs thereafter bred true, but the " tails gave, on
self-fertilization, one third which bred true to tallness and two thirds
which, as impure tails, gave somatic tails, and also dwarfs breeding true
again in the ratio 3:1." From this Mendelians infer that dominance and
recessiveness of certain characteristics, called unit-characters, are ac-
counted for by the theory of gametic segregation and combination ac-
cording to the law of chance. Dr. Hart believes that the principal defect
in the Mendelian theory is to be found in the fact that it states the ratio
of transmission in relation to the " soma " of the plant only. An organism
(plant or animal) consists of the adult individual part or " soma " and
the propagative part. The latter is the determining factor in future
reproduction. The author holds that the zygotes in each crossing consist
of a propagative and a somatic part. The Mendelian ratio obtains in the
propagative part only.
In the fifth chapter, the author discusses what he terms an intrinsic
theory of variation and transmission. lie sums it up 1 as follows:
The primitive germ-cells which give rise to the gametes are derived from an
early division of the zygote, and travel through the organism to the sexual gland
without undergoing any mitosis, that is to say, without variation in their struc-
ture. In the sexual gland they undergo mitosis, which means variation in the
determinants of the unit-characters, according to the law of probability. . . .
When the gametes unite, we get half of the varied chromosomes thrown off, and
then when the zygote with its proper number of chromosomes is formed, we get
the phenomenon of Mendelism, by which the unit-characters are distributed in
the rygote, again according to the law of probability; so that by all this we
get in subsequent generations organs following the curve of probability in their
anatomical condition and function.
Dr. Hart declares that this theory "puts variation by environment
quite out of question." This conclusion, however, does not necessarily
'P. 94 ff.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 139
stand. It remains to be shown that variations which environment not
artificial mutilation produces on many succeeding generations do not
affect the cells that are set apart for propagation as well as those that
constitute the " soma," Tallness and shortness, which are continually
transmitted, are themselves often the result of environment. The propa-
gative cells do not exist independent of and apart from the " soma." In
short, it seems best to wait until more evidence is in before accepting a
theory which in part falls back on chance, and for the rest posits two
independent causal series, the " soma " which is manifestly influenced by
the environment, and the cells set apart for propagation, which act inde-
pendent of environment.
The book, as a whole, is not a unit, but discusses widely divergent phases
of evolution and heredity. One chapter is devoted to the life of Mendel.
Other subjects taken up are : " Heredity in Disease," " The Evolution of
the Honey-Bee," "The Handicap of Sex," "Evolution and Keligion."
The author has written a stimulating book. Most of the chapter captions
might well serve as titles of books. FREDERICK GOODRICH HENKE.
THE UNIVERSITY OF NANKING.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE PHILOSOPHICAL EEVIEW. September, 1911. The Pla-
tonic Distinction between " True " and " False " Pleasures and Pains
(pp. 471^197) : HAROLD H. JOACHIM. - It is maintained that the question
raised by Plato regarding the reality of pleasure and pain is of great
importance. For common opinion the question of the truth or falsity of
pleasure and pain does not arise, because for them there is no distinction
of " the that " from " the what," thus marking them off from " knowing "
and " willing." Regarding the distinction of the " that " and the " what "
in " knowing " and " willing " as untenable, " feeling " is put in the same
class, and the question of reality has equal validity with them. The Role of
the Type in Mental Processes (pp. 498-514) : W. B. PiLLSBURY.-It is stated
that consciousness has to do more with things than with sensations. The
two current views that perception is a combination of sensations and that
it is a group of movements are rejected. Things are " types " developed
in experience out of a necessity of " harmonizing various experiences of
the same object." The origin and nature of the " type " is explained as
its meaning is illustrated in the processes of perception, memory, and
action. Philosophy in France, 1910 (pp. 515-534) : ANDRE LALANDE. - A
resume and brief criticism of various recent books on French philosophy.
The emphasis is on religious philosophy. The chief works viewed are:
J. J. Gourd: La philosophic de la religion; M. Charles Dunau: Les deux
idealismes; M. Delvalue: Rationalisme et tradition; M. Parodi: Le prob-
leme moral et la pensee contemporaine. Reviews of Books (pp. 535-558) :
Theodore DeLaguna and Grace Andrus DeLaguna, Dogmatism and Evolu-
tion: Studies in Modern Philosophy: ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. Edward Brad-
ford Titchener, A Text-book of Psychology: JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL.
Emile Brehier, Chrysippe: G. S. BRETT. A. Meinong, Uber Annahmen:
140 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
WILBUR M. URBAN. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles.
Notes.
Kii lit 111:11 1 ii. Alfred. Zur Geschichte des Terminismus. Leipzig: Verlag
von Quelle und Meyer. 1911. Pp. viii + 127. M. 4.20.
Marck, Siegfried. Die Platoniscbe Ideen-Lehre in Ihren Motiven.
Munich : C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1912. Pp. viii + 180.
Taylor, A. E. Varia Socratica: First Series. (St. Andrew's University
Publications, No. IX.) Oxford: James Parker & Co. 1911. Pp.
xii + 269.
NOTES AND NEWS
FOR an anthropological research expedition to the islands of Normandy,
Fergusson and Goodenough, in British New Guinea, as we learn from the
London Times, funds are being provided out of the Oxford University
common fund and by several of the colleges. The work has been under-
taken by Mr. David Jenness, of Balliol College, who proposes, unaccom-
panied, to spend a year amongst people who are admittedly cannibals.
It is stipulated by the university, in contributing to the expedition, that
the museum shall have the first offer of articles of interest which may be
obtained. Assistance has been promised by the missionaries on Good-
enough Island, including the use of a boat and native oarsmen. The first
few weeks will be spent in cruising around the islands endeavoring to get
on friendly terms with the people and in studying the trade relations.
As the natives have sea-going canoes and trade with the neighboring
coast and the island of Trobriand, 100 miles away, Mr. Jenness will
endeavor to obtain the good will of one of the chiefs and settle down for
about a year. Later he will proceed on a mission boat to Rossell Island,
at the eastern end of the Louisiade Archipelago, to study some ethnolog-
ical problems concerning the relationships of Oceanic peoples. Mr. Jen-
ness has been provided with the latest scientific instruments, including a
phonograph for recording native songs and speech.
IT is stated in the Journal of the American Medical Association that
Professor Theodor Ziehen, director of the psychiatric and neurologic
clinic in Berlin, will resign his position at the end of the winter semester
and discontinue all medical work, in order to devote himself exclusively
to research in psychology. For this purpose, he will remove to Wiesbaden,
where he will erect for himself a private psychological laboratory.
DR. G. STANLEY HALL, president of Clark University, delivered the
address at the inauguration of Dr. George E. Myers, principal of the
State Manual Training School at Pittsburg, Kansas. The subject of
the address was " Educational Efficiency."
PROFESSOR R. S. WOODWORTH, of Columbia University, is planning to
spend a semester's leave of absence in visiting the psychological institutes
of England and Germany.
VOL. IX. No. 6. MARCH 14, 1912.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE CONCEPT OF IMMEDIACY
rpHE attempt to determine the character and import of immedi-
-L acy, as a concept in present-day thought, finds its most promis-
ing point of departure in the philosophy of Kant. While it is true
that the "back to Kant" movement has been in abeyance of late, the
present time is peculiarly in need of reflection upon its borrowings
from the Kantian philosophy, in so far as these relate to the issues
involved in current controversy. The fundamental issue, in fact, be-
tween objective idealism and its opponents may be conveniently cen-
tered about the treatment which Kant accords to the concept of im-
mediacy. According to recent critics of objective idealism, this con-
cept is made to cover two divergent and incompatible meanings, a
confusion which has been perpetuated by his followers down to the
present day.
Stated somewhat generally, the problem which Kant set himself
to solve was to ascertain how the concepts of the understanding
justify their claim to validity within experience. This problem was
particularly acute, owing to the sharp separation postulated by Kant
between sense and understanding. The categories of the understand-
ing, as he says, "are not conditions under which objects can be
given in intuition, and it is quite possible therefore that objects
should appear to us without any necessary reference to the functions
of the understanding." 1 "It can not be denied that phenomena
may be given in intuition without the functions of the understand-
ing." 2 "We could quite well imagine that phenomena might pos-
sibly be such that the understanding should not find them conform-
ing to the conditions of its synthetical unity, and all might be in such
confusion that nothing should appear in the succession of phenomena
which could supply a rule of synthesis, and correspond, for in-
stance, to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would
1 ' ' Critique of Pure Eeason, ' ' p. 74. All the references are to the transla-
tion by Max Miiller.
'Ibid., p. 75.
141
142 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
thus be quite empty, null, and meaningless. With all this phenomena
would offer objects to our intuition, because intuition by itself does
not require the functions of thought."*
From this standpoint immediacy is necessarily identified with the
material of sense, considered without reference to the concepts of the
understanding. Concerning this material of sense, considered by
itself, there can be no question of truth or falsehood, such as arises
at once when the concepts of the understanding come into play.
This separation, however, of sense and understanding disappears as
Kant proceeds. "Every representation," as he explains, "contains
something manifold, which could not be represented as such, unless
the mind distinguished the time in the succession of one impression
after another; for as contained in one moment, each representation
can never be anything but absolute unity. In order to change this
manifold into a unity of intuition (as, for instance, in the representa-
tion of space), it is necessary first to run through the manifold and
then to hold it together." 4 "Connection, however, does never lie in
the objects, and can not be borrowed from them by perception, and
thus be taken into the understanding, but is always an act of the
understanding, which itself is nothing but a faculty of connecting
a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under
the unity of apperception, which is, in fact, the highest principle of
all human knowledge. ' >B
Considerations of this kind evidently require a profound modifi-
cation of the standpoint maintained by Hume. In the first place,
we are led to a radically different conception of immediacy. The
sense impressions which at the outset represented the sum total of
immediate experience, are now placed under the ban as empty ab-
stractions. "Perception without conception is blind." And, sec-
ondly, we are required to postulate a process of synthesis, not as an
experienced fact, but as a precondition of all experience. That is,
this reconstruction of immediacy is bound up with a non-spatial and
non-temporal fact. ' ' The mind could never conceive the identity of
itself in the manifoldness of its representations (and this a priori)
if it did not clearly perceive the identity of its action, by which it
subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a
transcendental unity." 6 While Kant does not set forth clearly the
precise character either of this new immediacy or of this numerical
identity pervading experience, the implication of both in his stand-
point seems to be reasonably plain.
1 Ibid., p. 75.
4 Ibid., p. 82.
Ibid., p. 747.
Ibid., p. 89.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 143
Viewed as an argument, Kant's disquisition possesses an inherent
weakness to which his critics have given due attention. The fallacy
of assuming in the premises what is denied in the conclusion is so
painfully evident that extended exposition is superfluous. If we
assume, to start with, that experience consists, in the first instance,
of relationless sensations, we are indeed obliged to infer a transcen-
dental unity of apperception; but when we look back from the end
of the argument to the beginning, we find that these relationless sen-
sations are altogether fictitious. The transcendentalist who reasons
in this fashion is simply sawing off the bough by which he is sup-
ported. The final result does not stand forth as a demonstrated con-
clusion, but as an unsubstantiated assertion. This being the case,
the vitality of transcendentalism during the nineteenth century seems
a fit subject for wonder. As has been indicated previously, the ex-
planation seems to be found in the fact that the two conceptions of
immediacy which Kant failed to keep apart have been persistently
confused since his day ; and it is to this confusion that transcenden-
talism owes its influence and prestige.
In order to make clear the nature of this confusion, it is necessary
to determine more precisely than is done by Kant the character of
the immediacy which is involved in the critical philosophy. The
repudiation of sensationalism, if it is to mean anything at all, must
mean that a different conception of immediacy has come into play.
One of the chief merits, indeed, of the "Critique of Pure Reason"
is that it is a reductio ad dbsurdum of its own premises. The ques-
tion which forms its starting-point is how thought can assert its
authority over that which is immediately and independently ' ' given. ' '
The conclusion at which Kant arrives is that thought can claim
authority because there is no such immediate "given" as the argu-
ment presupposed. Instead of such immediacy, we have an imme-
diacy of a totally different kind. If we turn to the situations in
which the distinction between datum and meaning is present as an
experienced fact, we find that the distinction occurs whenever there
is a question for which an answer is sought. The "immediate" or
the "given" in such cases is that part of the situation which is
subjected to scrutiny; the meaning is that which is tentative or
hypothetical or " present-as-absent. " The distinction is transitory
and exists for the sake of a purpose or end; it is indicative of the
fact that the situation in which it occurs is in process of reconstruc-
tion. Which element in the situation is to function as datum is
determined by the end to be attained. The point is that datum and
meaning determine each other ; they are derivatives which, when held
in abstraction from each other, give us sense and thought in the sense
of historical dualism.
144 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
This interpretation of immediacy, moreover, necessarily prede-
termines the conception of ' ' reality ' ' and ' ' truth. ' ' Having escaped
the incubus of the transcendental, we are enabled to say that the facts
\vith which we become acquainted, so far from being appearances of
a more ultimate "reality," are just what they are found to be and
nothing else. Any experience, such as the recollection of last week's
events, the reflection upon the characteristics of a geological epoch,
or the visual perception, clear or confused, of physical objects, is
just so much fact, and is hence a datum in any philosophy which has
a proper understanding of its own aims and limitations. The ques-
tion what it "really" is can not properly be asked, save with refer-
ence to its "truth" or serviceableness in the guidance of expectation
or other behavior. The "real," in short, is whatever we find; it is a
domain which tolerates no hierarchy or privileged class. The
"true," on the other hand, is that which leads or guides in the way
that it promises to do, and hence it is subject to a test or criterion
which the true idea itself determines or points out.
A consistent interpretation of immediacy, then, compels us to
discard the conventional distinction between "appearance" and
"reality." According to the present contention, the fallacy of
transcendentalism lies in the fact that sense data are first detached
from their context by abstraction, and then reunited with it through
the agency of transcendental factors. When sense data are thus
detached, the "being" or "reality" of the facts with which we deal
becomes a legitimate problem, since we are compelled to regard them
as a combination of the non-temporal or transcendental with the tem-
poral or particular. This combination makes our starting-point
hopelessly opaque, as Bradley has shown in pitiless detail. But if,
on the other hand, we give to immediacy a purely functional inter-
pretation, we escape the opposition between experience and a finished
reality which inheres in the idealistic position, in spite of its role as
the self-appointed nemesis of dualism. This functional interpreta-
tion construes the distinction between datum and meaning in terms
of a change taking place in things, a change which has as its goal the
guidance or control of adjustment. This procedure furnishes us
with an entirely different starting-point. It means that all experi-
ences are equally real, though not all are equally true or serviceable.
That is to say, the "real" is not a question if we regard knowing as
a change which occurs in things for the furtherance of certain ends,
but becomes a problem only in so far as we oppose experience and
its object, the latter being considered as a finished real passively
waiting to be "known."
It was indicated previously that Kant is at no particular pains
to develop the implications of this new immediacy to which his argu-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 145
ment leads. The very argument which logically compels the infer-
ence to a new immediacy apparently shuts off the light. Between the
premises and the conclusion lies the machinery of the Kantian trans-
cendentalism ; and neither Kant nor his successors seems to have real-
ized adequately that the rejection of abstract sense impressions car-
ries with it the rejection of the transcendental elements with which
they are correlated. This retention of the transcendental elements
compels both sense and thought to lead a double life. In so far as
the conclusion of the Kantian deduction is emphasized, they are
simply derivatives, their status and nature being determined by the
function which they fulfil. But in so far as the bias of transcenden-
talism prevails, they are original constituents or ingredients of the
situation from which functional sense and thought proceed by deriva-
tion. In other words, objective idealism shelters two fundamental
and correlative ambiguities. It treats immediacy both in the sense
of historical empiricism and in the sense of present-day functional-
ism ; and it confuses thought as a function in the reorganization of a
situation with thought as a transcendental or ''constitutive" element.
Hence it results that the duality of sense and meaning is often re-
garded as a "discrepancy," for which there is no remedy within the
bounds of human experience. The thought of an object, instead of
being treated simply as the "presence-in-absence" which is the indis-
pensable correlate of the "presence" of sense material, is "a 'what'
which so far as it is a mere idea clearly is not, and if it also were,
could not be called ideal. For ideality lies in the disjoining of
quality from being." 7 Meaning is "a content which has been made
loose from its own immediate existence and is used in divorce from
that first unity. ' ' 8 Here we have once more the separation of ' ' imme-
diacy" from thought, and so the relation of the two forthwith pre-
sents a formidable problem. The two can not be wholly disjoined,
as the Kantian conclusion attests; hence the puzzling fact that "the
essential nature of the finite is that everywhere as it presents itself
its character should slide beyond the limits of its existence. ' ' 9
It seems clear that this ambiguity in "immediacy," with its cor-
relate ambiguity in "thought," is essential to the standpoint of
objective idealism. If immediacy were consistently treated as abso-
lute, the outcome would not be transcendentalism but sensationalism.
Or if immediacy were consistently treated as relative, then again the
outcome would not be transcendentalism but some form of function-
alism. But, directly or indirectly, the two meanings of immediacy
are used in alternation. Bosanquet, for example, states that "it
T Bradley, ' ' Appearance and Eeality, ' ' p. 163.
8 Ibid., p. 164.
Ibid., p. 166.
146 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
makes no essential difference whether the ideas whose content is pro-
nounced to be an attribute of reality appear to fall within what is
given in perception or not. We shall find hereafter that it is vain to
attempt to lay down boundaries between the given and its extension.
The moment we try to do this we are on the wrong track." 10 In
other words, the distinction between the given and its extension can
at best be only a relative and fluctuating distinction, depending upon
the character of the given situation. To all intents and purposes,
however, a hard-and-fast boundary line is drawn on the second page
preceding the passage just quoted; and as might be expected, the
line is run in accordance with the landmarks set up by the Kantian
transcendentalism. "The ideas used in judging are not particular
existences but general significations or objective references. No mere
mental occurrences as such, no series or combination of particular
images, can by any possibility be a judgment." The given and its
extension apparently tend to fall apart and hence to necessitate a
resort to the transcendental in order to unite them again. Thus the
following quotation excludes ideas or meanings from presentations,
on the ground that the idea is simply a "habit or tendency": "If
therefore we are asked to display it [the idea] as an image, as some-
thing fixed in a permanent outline, however pale or meager, we can
not do so. It is not an abstract image, but a concrete habit or tend-
ency. It can only be displayed in the judgment, that is, in a con-
crete case of reference to reality. Apart from this it is a mere ab-
straction of analysis, a tendency to operate in a certain way upon
certain psychical presentations. Psychically speaking, it is when
realized in judgment a process more or less systematic, extending
through time and dealing with momentary presentations as its ma-
terial. In other words, we may describe it as a selective rule, shown
by its workings, but not consciously before the mind. ' '"
A similar confusion is present, as I venture to think, in an excep-
tionally subtle and interesting form, in Royce's "World and the
Individual." The world as fact, we are told, must be subordinated
to the world as idea. When we study the idea, we find that it in-
cludes an internal meaning and an external meaning, the latter being
"that attempted correspondence with outer facts which many ac-
counts of our ideas regard as their primary, inexplicable, and ulti-
mate character." 12 There is, however, no purely external criterion
of truth ; hence it is futile to ' ' stand apart from the internal meaning,
from the conscious inner purpose embodied in a given idea, and still
attempt to estimate whether or no that idea corresponds with its
""Logic," Vol. I., p. 77.
""Essentials of Logic," p. 78.
M Vol. I., p. 26.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 147
object. ' ' 13 The experienced inner meaning determines its own task,
its own special form of ' ' correspondence. ' ' Hence we can define the
external meaning as that experience which fulfils the internal mean-
ing. "The fulfilment of the internal meaning of the present idea
would leave no other object defined by this idea as an object yet to
besought" 14
This subordination of the world as fact to the world as idea has
the immense advantage that it eliminates the problem how we are to
copy or "apprehend" an "external world." The world as fact, in
Royce's treatment, corresponds to the position which holds sense and
thought in separation from each other. Its criterion of truth is
external, whereas from the standpoint of the world as idea, the cri-
terion becomes internal. To say that the meaningful experience
determines its own form of correspondence is to deny the separation
of sense and thought, or of "experience" and "object." The dis-
tinction between the two becomes functional and relative, in the sense
previously indicated. It does not occur save where there is a prob-
lem to be solved, a task to be performed, a purpose to be accom-
plished. "A color, when merely seen, is in so far, for consciousness,
no idea. A brute noise, merely heard, is no idea. But a melody,
when sung, a picture, when in its wholeness actively appreciated, or
the inner memory of your friend now in your mind, is an idea. For
each of these latter states means something to you at the instant
when you get it present to consciousness. ' ' 15
Up to this point the position under consideration is to all appear-
ances in entire agreement with that of functional ism. How mean-
ings can determine their own reference ceases to be a problem when
meanings are interpreted as the " presence-in-absence " of their ob-
jects. This agreement ends, however, when our human experience,
in the hands of its idealistic inquisitor, signifies its willingness to be
damned for the glory of the absolute. The immediacy which pre-
supposes the object gives place to the immediacy which is divorced
from its object. Our attention is first of all called to the fact that
"our direct experience gives us only the passing data and the frag-
mentary ideas of the moment. ' ' This direct experience is compared
with "the range of valid possible experience," which "is viewed by
me as infinitely more extended than my actual human experience. ' ' 19
A valid possible experience, when known as such, is the experience of
a fact which is present as absent. But according to Royce this
validity is ambiguous. It covers both the validity which is tested
"Vol. I., p. 308.
"Vol. I., p. 339.
14 Vol. I., p. 24.
M Vol. I., p. 259.
148 TUB JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and that which is not. That is, validity is a name both for the
experience in which the valid idea finds fulfilment and for the experi-
ence in which a fact is presented simply as absent. 17 Considered
simply as a matter of terminology, this might be allowed to pass, but
the context shows that something further is intended. Only the
direct or fulfilling experience, we find, can give us the definiteness
which characterizes true being. Until the fulfilling experience super-
venes, we have, so far forth, bare validity, mere universality. Hence
the question : "What is a valid or a determinately possible experience
at the moment when it is supposed to be merely possible ? ' U8
To this question the appropriate answer is that it makes an
assumption which is both incompatible with Royce's starting-point
and untrue to fact. The import of the functional interpretation of
immediacy is precisely that datum and meaning can not be separated
from each other. It is hardly good logic to begin by making the
meaning or "possibility" organic to the given experience, and then
to detach it in order to condemn it as "bare validity" or "mere
universality." Such a procedure implies the very opposition between
sense and thought which constitutes the point of departure for Kant.
This separation serves only to justify the appeal to a transcendental,
which thereupon becomes at once the sole abiding place for all indi-
vidual fact, since the latter necessarily remains for us "the object of
love and of hope, of desire and of will, of faith and of work, but
never of present finding. " 19
It appears, then, that despite the originality of Royce's treat-
ment, his procedure, from the angle of the present criticism, is essen-
tially the same as that of his predecessors, save that he both starts
and finishes with the functional point of view. The immediate and
the mediate are held apart just long enough to justify the introduc-
tion of the transcendental, in order to heal the breach which has
thus been created. We have the same alternation between types of
immediacy, the same triumphant ushering-in of the transcendental,
and, finally, the same bland denial that any separation between the
immediate and the mediate was ever made or intended.
A proper reconsideration, then, of the concept of immediacy will
show that the "higher standpoint" which Kant enabled us to reach
is not that of objective idealism but of functionalism. The former
owes its being and peculiar character to the very presuppositions
which Kant is supposed to have destroyed once for all. When these
presuppositions are set aside in fact and not merely in appear-
ance, we rid ourselves of a troublesome element of vacillation and
17 C/., especially, Vol. I., pp. 259-261.
" Vol. I., p. 260.
Vol. I., p. 297.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 149
mystery; and the problems which the absolute is invoked to explain
find a solvent in our human experience.
B. H. BODE.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.
WHAT KIND OF REALISM?
IN a previous paper in this JOURNAL/ I attempted to summarize
the arguments against "natural" realism that doctrine which
purports to crystallize the view of the "natural" man, that the very
data of his visual and tactile experience are identical with, i. e., go to
make up, the "things" in the midst of which he lives and moves.
According to that view, the "green" that my experience includes
when I look at a tree exists at the tree-point in the world-order, and
is not a copy or an effect of what there exists. That is to say, "nat-
ural" realism ignores the representative nature of perception, ignores
the distinction between the stimulus of perception, the source from
which (in the case of sight) ether- waves radiate, and the datum
existing in experience after those waves have hit the eye, ignores, to
say no more, the time-difference between the stimulus-fact and the
experienced-fact.
Obvious as this representative nature of perception is, the tempta-
tion to " epistemological monism" is so great that it is a satisfaction
to read, in one of Professor Dewey's recent papers, 2 that "it is easily
demonstrable that there is a numerical duplicity between the astro-
nomical star and the visible light," that "the astronomical star is a
real object . . . the visible light is another real object." Generalized,
this is to say that there is a numerical duplicity (but not necessarily
a difference in substance, as, physical vs. mental) between stimulus-
fact and sensation-fact. With these words, as with much in Pro-
fessor Dewey's characteristically brilliant paper, I find myself in
joyous sympathy. Surely we can all agree that the qualia which
exist in a man's experience, and which are to him, as he looks, a
given star or tree, are not the same existences as the "astronomical
star" or the botanical tree. Without asserting what the star and
tree of physical science are or are not, at least this "visible light,"
this visible greenness, are numerically different existences, existing
later in time, and largely dependent for their nature upon the char-
acteristics of the perceiver's sense-organs and brain.
Our thanks then to Professor Dewey! But there are certain
other statements of his that seem to me questionable and so may serve
1 Vol. VIII., page 365.
. This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., page 395.
150 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
as texts for the inqury that I suggested at the close of my previous
paper and propose here to outline. He tells us that "contemporary
realists have frequently and clearly expounded the physical explana-
tion of such cases as have been cited" the converging railway
tracks, the star, pressing the eyeball, etc. and is frankly vexed with
the idealists for not accepting this explanation. 8 Now, personally,
I am not an idealist. But if, as one would judge from the columns
of this JOURNAL, the idealist is the under dog nowadays, let us be
sure to do him full justice! It seems to me, for one, that he has a
simple and consistent account to give of these cases, and therefore,
even when an adequate realistic account is offered him, need not neces-
sarily bite at the bait; and, moreover, that the accounts which the
neo-realists have been offering him of such cases are for the most part
so far from adequate that he is thoroughly justified in considering
them still as cases that make for his view. Surely, if he is careful
in his phraseology (but the realist must remember that in this matter
the idealist is at a disadvantage, the practical language of every day
being hopelessly realistic, and the expression of the facts in consist-
ently idealistic language a clumsy and confusing matter) he does not
commit the fallacy which Professor Dewey ascribes to him. He does
not begin, for instance, with a single realistic object, and then, on
pushing the eyeball, decide that "there ain't no such animal." He
simply finds that on a realistic basis such an experience is difficult
to explain, whereas it is very simply statable on an idealistic basis,
as: when a single-object experience is followed by a pushing-the-
eyeball experience, there is thereupon a double-object experience.
Of course some idealists, especially the earlier ones, have put their
arguments in ways that justly provoke criticism. But the under-
lying meaning of these arguments remains a sharp challenge to
realism.
The point is, that all these cases can easily be described in terms
of actual and potential sensations, while a description in terms of
objects leads to grave difficulties. Suppose, for example, the realist
is looking at a tree. The idealist would have said that he was having
a tree-experience; but the realist says that this tree-that-he-sees is
a physical tree, outside of him. He then shakes his eyeball. The
tree-that-he-sees moves. But is it conceivable that a physical tree
outside of him moves when he shakes his eyeball? So long as that
green datum was still it was easy to think of it as a physical tree
"out there." When it moves, it is no longer easy so to think of it.
No wonder the idealist loves such cases ! Especially since early real-
ism was of this ' ' natural ' ' type. But now, if the realist retracts his
naive belief, and admits, with Professor Dewey and the present
Ibid., page 395.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 151
writer and probably most contemporary realists, that the tree-datum-
that-exists-within-his-experience (the moving-tree-datum let us call
it existence B) is an effect of but not identical with the tree-from-
which-ether-waves-radiate (existence A), this difficulty is solved, but
another arises. The coast is by no means yet clear for the realist.
"Frequent and clear" explanations of the situation may exist in
contemporary realistic writing, but where, oh, where are they to be
found ! The crux of the difficulty is this : where in the world of the
realist does B exist? Must we not admit that unless the realist can
give a thoroughgoing answer to this question, the idealist still has
rather the better of the argument?
That there is a satisfactory answer to this question, and that a
complete realistic explanation of the situation in perception is pos-
sible, I do not doubt. Several attempts at answering it have been
made, but they are not free from objections and have generally been
rejected by realists. It seems actually to be the case that the average
realist refuses to recognize the need of explanation. When he has
declared that perception is a "perfectly natural event," and has
shown that a camera likewise produces an image which is an effect
and representative of an outer object, he seems to think he has solved
the problem. But the fact is, he has not touched it. There are more
existences to account for in the perception case than in the camera
case. The organism is indeed like a camera. There is produced in
the brain through the eyes a physical perception-event (call it
existence C} which varies concomitantly with the object looked at,
and may therefore be called not only an effect, but in some sense a
representative of that object the more legitimately, as it actually
serves as a clue for the guiding of the organism in its dealings with
it. But does the realist think that this brain-event, C, is the green-
moving-datum, B? If not, where does this latter existence, the
surest of all existences, have its habitation ? Where are we to put it
in our physical scheme? If we have no place for it, how can we
think we have given a clear explanation of the facts of perception?
We are not allowed to say that it exists in the mind. The very
idea that we have minds seems to be repugnant to the neo-realist.
And indeed, if such a statement were made as an explanation of the
difficulty, it would be but a verbal one. Calling the fact B mental,
solves no problem. We have still to ask how it is related to the
other existences, A and C. Here is a well-known physical chain of
events, from A, through ether-waves, eyes, and nerve-waves, to C,
and then out again into some muscular reaction. But nowhere in
this chain cf events do we find B. The physical order seems com-
plete and self-sufficing without it. There is no room for it. In-
stinctively we identify B with A. It is the tree, what we see of the
152 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tree. But if my previous article holds, if Professor Dewey's state-
ment holds, that "there is a numerical duplicity between the astro-
nomical star and the visible light," between, in this case, the botan-
ical tree and the visible green-moving fact (for the only difference
between the two cases is that the time-difference between A and B is
more striking in the former case), that refuge is definitely barred
out. B exists at a later moment than A. A may have been annihi-
lated in the meanwhile and may not be existing when B exists.
B does exist simultaneously (or at least nearly simultaneously) with
C; that is all that we seem to know about the relation of B to the
A-C chain of events, except that B, like C, seems to be, in some sort,
a representative of A, since it is the sign in our experience of our
dealings with A. Are we to be left then with our J5's simply hang-
ing on to our C"s, without any real footing in the world, with a time
of existence but no place? If we call them mental, we have the
well-known " psychophysical parallelism" between our #'s and C's.
This is certainly a mysterious relation; mental B's clinging like
barnacles at certain spots in the physical universe, but not really
being there. If we call them physical, we have an equally mysterious
physicophysical parallelism, a second set of physical realities exist-
ing at the moment of our C's, but still with no place found for them.
Truly, they are adrift in the deep !
One reason for not calling our B's mental lies perhaps in the
dualistic implications of that word. The neo-realist is convinced
(one wonders if it be not sometimes an a priori conviction rather
than a humble generalization from experience!) that there are not
two substances, mind and matter. Therefore we must call every-
thing "physical"; or, at least, "natural" "mental" being thus
made equivalent to "supernatural"! Professor Dewey likewise
waxes satirical over the habit of calling such B's as the visible con-
vergence of railway tracks, or the vsible light of a star, mental.
"Is a photograph, then, to be conceived as a psychical somewhat?" 4
But in the case of a camera (apart from perception by an observer)
there is no B; there is only a chain of events loosely similar to the
A-C chain of object-to-brain events. There is but one event at the
moment when the photograph is taken, not two ; a certain molecular
change in the plate, corresponding to C, the molecular change in the
brain, or to an earlier event in the A-C chain, the molecular change
in the eye. There is no datum-within-experience, no B, existing at
that moment, as there is in the case of perception. There is no mys-
terious parallelism, no problem, nothing that there is any temptation
to call mental.
Personally, I disbelieve in the dualistic theory, and should be
Ibid., page 393.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 153
quite willing to give up the word "mental" altogether. But I can
not see why it should be such a red rag to a realist. Let us agree
that any dualistic implications are illegitimate in advance of the
establishment of a dualistic theory, and let us use the word in a
merely denotative sense, to include our .B's, and such other facts as
dreams, wishes, pleasure, sorrow, and the like, for which there is
likewise no known place available in the physical world. We shall
still find the word a useful generic term for these numerous, impor-
tant, and indisputably real facts. It is, at any rate, the commonly
accepted name for these facts. No doubt, the natural man looks
upon these same B 's as the actual things among which he moves, *. e.,
as if they were the A 's which cause them, and at such times he calls
them not mental, but physical. But as soon as you show him the
impossibility of that "natural" realism, he hastens to call his per-
ception-datum mental, the green-moving-datum, e. g., a mental image
of the really outer tree. It may still be that this fact, B, belongs to
the same world as A and C, that it is as "natural" an event as the
photographic image of a scene or the echo of a sound. Nevertheless,
why disdain the common name for it? I hear a partial repetition
of a sound. Why jump to the conclusion that it is an echo? The
only answer is, that is what we call it. Why jump to the conclusion
that these particular events we have specified are "mental"? The
only answer is, again, that such is the common generic name for them.
It is presumably true that "the seen light is an event" "stand-
ing in a process continuous with the star. ' ' Though, as to that, if it
can not be located anywhere in particular, and if it has no discover-
able relations of energy with any part of the physical chain of events
proceeding from the star, it is difficult to see how knowledge can
have "supervened" that it does stand in such a continuous process.
And, moreover, even granting that it is a link in the process some-
where, is it safe to assert that ' ' since the seen light is an event within
a continuous process, there is no point of view from which its 'reality'
contrasts with that of the star"? 5 Certainly the reason why the
writer has, at times, spoken of the "real" star, contrasting that
existence with the "perception of the star," has had nothing to do
with any denial of the place of the latter in a continuous process.
The ' ' real ' ' star is the star that astronomy describes, the star that is
moving at so many miles a second through space. The "real" tree
is the tree the botanist describes, the tree that we point to and walk
round. These existences, the A 's, have their definite and well-known
place in the world order. The B 's, the data of our experience, are
none the less real, but they are less really the star and the tree ; they
are effects in our consciousness (or on our organisms, if you choose,
'Ibid., page 395.
164 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and are prepared to show where in the organism), representative to
us of star and tree, but distinct existences. The visible light, the B
of which the "real" star is the A, figures to us as the star when our
attention is upon that visual experience. But it is not flying through
space at so many miles a second; it is not composed of billions of
whirling atoms, etc., etc. So, not to speak of the ambiguous status
of these 2?'s in the world, there is as much reason for speaking of
the A's as the "real" things as there would be in discriminating
between the "real" landscape and the picture of the landscape on
a camera-plate. The latter is real enough, but it is not the real
landscape.
We have then our J.'s, the "real things," and we have our C's,
the brain-perception-events which are effects and in some sense repre-
sentatives of them, and our U's, the data of conscious perception,
which exist synchronously (or at least nearly so) with our C's.
According to what we proceed to do with our B 's will be our type of
realism. The "natural" realist identifies them, per impossibile, with
the .4's. The atomistic realist crams them all into one monad or
arch-atom which is located somewhere, but no one can say where, in
the brain. The dualistic realist asserts that they get into the causal
chain in the midst of the C's, but gives them no place in the three-
dimensioned world; they somehow get their fingers in the brain-pie
without really being there. Another type of realist puts them
frankly in the brain, in between or hanging on to the C's. One
variety of this type of theory is that of Professor Montague, which
puts the B's wherever we speak of "latent energy" in the brain.
And finally, though not of course exhausting all contemporary the-
ories, the panpsychic realist (who has a better name for him?) iden-
tifies the B's with the C's, asserts that if we knew enough about what
we call brain events we should discover that they really are con-
scious events.
This last theory is that of the present writer. Space forbids its
defense at this time. But the object of this paper will have been
attained if it sets any one thinking of the problem a little more
sharply than before; if it helps any one to realize that there is a
problem here. If we are to be realists, as we seem determined to be,
let us think our realism through. Let us not think that by calling
perception a "natural" or a "physical" process we have solved the
very real and difficult problem of perception, or have won the right
to jeer at idealists for clinging to their account of the matter.
DUBANT DRAKE.
THK UNIVERSITY or ILLINOIS.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 155
DISCUSSION
EXPLICIT PRIMITIVES: A REPLY TO MRS. FRANKLIN
T WISH to offer a rather belated reply to Mrs. C. L. Franklin's
J- article on "The Foundations of Philosophy: Explicit Primi-
tives." 1 I am aware of the danger of crossing words with Mrs.
Franklin in the supposedly special field of symbolic logic, but I am
nevertheless moved to suggest, in response to her demand for explicit
primitives, that a primitive is an illusion and an explicit primitive
a contradiction in terms.
Briefly, my position would be that when a term has been made
explicit, it is then a party to a comparison and is thus involved in a
relation to another term. Since each term now depends upon the
other for its definition, neither can claim priority, much less primi-
tiveness. The locomotive may precede the train and pull the train,
but if there is no train to pull there is no locomotive. At least, in
that case, the locomotive would call for a new definition in terms of
its relation to some other things. But if there were no other things,
the locomotive would have no character whatever. And therefore
I say that the very notion of a primitive is an illusion.
This is logical commonplace. So much so, however, that I am
at a loss to account for the idea of a logical primitive, or even of a
logical prior, except as a confusion between a logical relation and a
certain familiar mechanical relation, which our logic has inherited
from Aristotle and which owes its continued support to its plausi-
bility for unthinking common sense. Mrs. Franklin suggests the
point in the "Foundations of Philosophy." Now, as we all know,
a house must rest upon a foundation, and when the foundation is
removed the house falls ; that is to say, the foundation is a prior con-
dition to the superstructure. But to assume that knowledge must
be thus "founded" is to imitate those of the ancients who affirmed
the impossibility of the antipodes. For our human structures, in-
deed, the ultimately universal foundation is the earth. The earth is
therefore a universal ultimate, or ' ' primitive. ' ' But a primitive in
knowledge marks only the point where knowledge ends. To make
it a "foundation" of knowledge is then to found knowledge upon
ignorance.
Mrs. Franklin appeals for authority to the logic of mathematics.
Now, according to tradition at least, mathematical method consists
in laying down a primitive an axiom or postulate, or what not,
which by definition is made an explicit primitive and then in de-
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. VHI., page 708.
15t; THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
riving its consequences; and when the primitive is laid down, the
consequences are supposed to be not yet in sight. Otherwise there
would be danger of a "circle." But we know that the manuscript
of a mathematical work is usually completed before the first pages
go to press; hence, the mathematician knows whither his primitives
are to lead if the reader does not. The comparison will seem irrev-
erent, but I can not avoid saying that the usual process of mathe-
matical deduction reminds me of nothing so much as the magician
who appears before his audience in a tightly fitting dress-suit and
then from a roll of tape held between his thumb and forefinger
extracts, among a number of other things, two jars of goldfish and
a live goose. One may test the justice of the comparison by ob-
serving the operation whereby even so critical a mind as Poincare 2
derives a whole number-system from such ostensibly innocent primi-
tives as x -\- a and x -f- 1 (the latter of which consists in adding a
number 1 to a number x). To the uninitiated it would seem that,
while the magician mystifies only his audience, the mathematician
mystifies also himself.
In the mechanical world, as conceived by common sense, the
foundation supports the superstructure, but the superstructure adds
no strength to the foundation. In the world of knowledge, I should
say, the first principles are just as much supported by the deriva-
tions as the latter by the former. Take a mathematical axiom and
ask what it means ; it means just as much as may be derived from it,
and no more. How far is it true ? It is true just as far as it yields
a coherent system of consequences. That is to say, in a system of
thought no feature is necessarily prior to any other. Priority is
here a matter only of convenience of derivation, as determined by
the point of view to which the argument appeals; or it may be a
matter only of the paging of the book. Because, however, a book
must have a page-order, and a discourse a beginning and end in time,
it does not follow that there must be an order of precedence in the
ideas. Again, take a witness supposed to be absolutely truthful, so
that the truth of what he is to testify will only depend upon his
veracity; make this supposition as absolute as you please, you can
never make it so absolute that his veracity will be unaffected by the
nature of the testimony which he is to give. It is just as absurd to
speak of a science as being, in Mrs. Franklin's phrase, "at the begin-
ning of things." Where is the beginning of things? If you locate
it in the principles of physics, or of mechanics, or even of pure mathe-
matics, I may reply that these "fundamental" principles depend for
their final justification just as much upon their working out in
"Science and Hypothesis," Chapter I.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 157
biology, or upon what we decide about the freedom of the will, as
conversely.
Mrs. Franklin points out that a failure to make your primitives
explicit is apt to result in a ' ' circle in definition. ' ' But for my own
part, although I stand for "straight thinking," and although I
should be at a loss to invent a circular system of logic as a substitute
for the rectilinear system of Aristotle, I find it difficult to see that
the circle is not a better figure for thinking than the straight line.
At least I should say that the test of a finally transparent idea is the
ability to argue from & to a as readily as from a to &. To say that
circular thinking leaves you just where you were seems to me not
quite true this seems to refer to circular walking. In the first
chapter of "Pendennis" I find the Major reading his mail. "But,"
you say, ' ' who is the Major ? Let us first define our ternm. " " Well,
the Major is Arthur's uncle." "But who is Arthur?" "Why, he
is the Major's nephew." This seems very inane, and yet I beg you
to note that we are not as free to define the Major in any way we
please as we were before, and the question remains whether the
paucity of the result is not due solely to the smallness of the circle.
Can we deny that the whole course of the novel, by virtue of which
alone we are enabled to say quite definitely who, after all, the Major
was, is anything more than an extension of just this circular process ?
And can we then point to any absolute difference, especially to any
"abstractly logical" difference, between the plot of a novel and a
mathematical system, or a really organized natural science? Mrs.
Franklin cites, as an illustration of the vice, Clerk-Maxwell's defini-
tions of matter as ' ' that which may have energy communicated to it, ' '
and of energy as "that which passes from matter to matter." But
it is hardly true that these definitions are altogether futile ; at least
one learns that energy is communicable and, by implication, that
matter is not. Mrs. Franklin seems to hold that a definition must
settle the character of its object once for all, that is, must be finally
explicit, if it is to do any defining whatever. Hence it is, no doubt,
that in a "sound epistemology" consciousness must be "the first
great indefinable. ' ' But in a world where everything is involved in
everything else, nothing can be defined once for all ; and if conscious-
ness is wholly indefinable, we shall be compelled, not to stop talking,
perhaps, but at least to stop thinking about it.
As a matter of fact, however, any actual process of thinking is
far more circular than rectilinear, and I am unable to see how it
could or ought to be otherwise. Suppose that one is writing a book.
On the rectilinear theory, the first chapter should be written first
and once for all, and in writing this chapter the author ought him-
self to be as nai've with regard to the outcome in later chapters as he
158 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
may, perhaps, suppose his reader to be. In other words, the later
parts of the argument or the story should only depend upon the
earlier. But of course this is never the case. Indeed, it is notorious
that the first chapter is the hardest of all to write, and probably the
chapter which is to undergo the greatest amount of revision; first,
because the ideas can never be so clear as they will be after writing
the whole, and secondly, because of the extreme difficulty of making
any part of an argument clear to a reader who is not more or less
familiar with the whole. Hence, though we begin with the first, after
each new chapter we return and revise and we never cease revising,
here, there, and everywhere, until, to our view, there is a mutual
harmony of all. And upon this mutuality of dependence the argu-
ment is finally "founded."
Mrs. Franklin tells us that "Nothing must be admitted ... in
the way of terms ... or propositions . . . except upon rigid inspection
and fully aboveboard. ' ' I find it difficult to characterize this advice
appropriately and yet with proper courtesy. For it reminds me
both of my own first philosophical paper and of the attitude of many
of my students, especially of those who are trained in mathematics,
just when they begin to think about philosophy at all. The trouble
with philosophy is, they tell me, that it fails to define its terms. The
answer is obvious. Popular opinion to the contrary, students of
philosophy are, at least, not less conscientious in their thinking and
their expressions than other persons. Nor are they less disposed to
recognize the practical wisdom of "Be sure you are right and then
go ahead." But had this been their fixed rule, there would be no
philosophy. For, in the end, the trouble is not with the definitions
but with the ideas. If we could make the ideas clear, we could easily
define them; or, rather, the clarification and the definition would be
one and the same thing. But the clarification of the ideas is just the
beginning and the end of what philosophy has to do.
Having said something similar to this in a paper published sev-
eral years ago, I was accused, rather, I was offered the right hand
of fellowship and a certificate of good standing in the school of
pragmatism. I have been unable to accept this generous, though
embarrassing, invitation, but I will not say that the doctrine is not
pragmatism, because I do not know what pragmatism would exclude.
My belief is, however, that the foregoing criticism of the conception
of primitives should belong in any view which makes coherence the
test of truth.
WARNER Fira
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 159
EE VIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Charles Darwin and the Origin of Species: Addresses, etc., in America
and England in the Year of the Two Anniversaries. EDWARD BAGNALL
POULTON. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1909.
The year 1909 was at once the centenary of the birth of Charles Dar-
win and the fiftieth anniversary of the appearance of his greatest work.
The occasion was fittingly commemorated by scientific meetings and ad-
dresses in all parts of the world. Professor Poulton, as a leading ex-
ponent of the Darwinism of twenty years ago, and an active investigator
of certain diflicult evolutionary problems, was inevitably an important
contributor to some of these programs, both in England and in America.
Considering the circumstances of its preparation, it is no damaging
criticism of the present volume to say that it contains little that is new,
and little, indeed, that the author has not himself already told us. 1
To the reviewer, the most interesting pages of the book relate to Dar-
win's personality and to his frame of mind in dealing with various scien-
tific problems. In this regard, he will ever remain as an ideal to succes-
sive generations of younger investigators, whatever may become of his
special hypotheses in the field of biology. A number of hitherto unpub-
lished letters are introduced by Poulton, which serve to confirm the im-
pressions which the world has already formed of the great naturalist's
modesty and his boundless sympathy with the work of others.
In recent years, along with the growing mass of legitimate criticism
of certain of Darwin's theories, there has sometimes been displayed a
tendency to belittle his scientific attainments, even to the point of charg-
ing him with superficiality and a proneness to forming unwarranted con-
clusions. Indeed, it does not appear diflicult to select passages from
Darwin's writings in support of this view. Such charges reveal, how-
ever, an unfortunate lack of historical perspective. To begin with, Dar-
win was a naturalist a thing almost impossible at the present time and
the data for his speculations were drawn from every branch of biology,
as well as from geology, geography, and other sciences. This, indeed, was
inevitable for the man who should establish the theory of organic evolu-
tion. To the present-day specialist, who must concentrate his activities
upon a very few organisms viewed in a very few relations, the work of
all the great pioneers in his science must, in a sense, seem superficial.
The latter were forced to admit much evidence provisionally, which the
twentieth century experimentalist would very properly reject as inade-
quate. Thus alone could the broad outlines of the science be sketched. It
is in no way to the discredit of these great pioneers that some of their
outlines were later erased in the light of more exact knowledge.
Poulton is at considerable pains to refute that much hackneyed bit of
moralizing over the blighting effect of a scientific career upon the esthetic
faculties. As is well known, Darwin's own autobiography affords a much-
*" Essays on Evolution, 1889-1907," reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. VI.,
page 185.
160 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
quoted text in support of this thesis. But Poulton dwells upon the
wretched health endured by Darwin throughout nearly the whole of his
active life, and points out that this concentration upon his scientific pur-
suits was, in his case, a condition essential to the accomplishment of his
work. Darwin's experience so often held up to us as a dreadful warning
thus seems to afford no evidence for the mutual exclusiveness of scien-
tific and esthetic development in the same mind. The author cites his
own wide acquaintance with scientific men in support of the contrary view,
and it is likely that most readers will draw similar evidence from their
own experience.
Much of the volume at hand is devoted to Poulton's own speculations
in explanation of the colors of certain butterflies and an elaboration of
the theories of " mimicry," originally framed by H. W. Bates and Fritz
Miiller. From the standpoint of organic evolution, these cases undoubt-
edly raise some very difficult problems, and Darwin himself thought them
worthy of considerable attention. To Poulton they become the central
theme in his view of nature, and the various hypothetical types of
" mimicry " and protective coloration each designated with a rather un-
wieldy name are discussed as fundamental realities, regardless of the
very slender thread of experimental evidence on which they depend. It is
true that he concedes the "paramount need for experimental research
and field observations . . . [which] should be undertaken on the largest
possible scale " (p. 191). But for him, the case seems to be pretty con-
clusively settled without recourse to such experiments, and he later quali-
fies his demand for investigations of this sort with the assurance that
" while human performance is of the deepest interest for the solution of
mysteries innumerable, of more profound significance still, for the com-
prehension of the method of evolution, is the vast performance of nature
herself " (p. 201). True, but it is that very performance itself the method
of which is here in question. Nature is not yet such an open book that
he who runs may read.
Poulton believes that " the Mullerian hypothesis appears to explain a
series of remarkable relationships which remain coincidences under any
other hypothesis " (p. 191). On the other hand, Punnett 1 has pointed out
the existence of some evidence that, in one alleged case of " mimicry " at
least, the coloration of two " mimetic " forms, belonging to a single
species (supposed to be modeled after two distinct species, belonging to a
different family) behave to one another as Mendelian alternatives. " On
this view," according to Punnett, " the genera Amauris and Euralia
[the " mimicked " and the " mimicking," respectively] contain a similar
set of pattern factors, and the conditions, whatever they may be, which
bring about mutation in the former lead to the production of a similar
mutation in the latter." The fact that among domesticated rodents (rats,
mice, guinea-pigs and rabbits) not only the same colors, but some of the
same general types of color pattern, have arisen independently argues for
the possibility of such an origin of "mimetic" resemblances in insects.
This view, like its alternative, is at present wholly unproven, and a final
' " Mendelism, " pp. 144 et seq.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 161
decision of the question is probably still remote, but the Mendelian-Muta-
tion explanation certainly relieves us of the truly terrible strain imposed
upon our imagination by the classical " mimicry " hypotheses, as elabo-
rated by such writers as Poulton.
As regards Mendel's Law, our author has plainly shifted his point of
view somewhat since the time when he could refer airily to " Mendel's
interesting discovery." He now thinks that known facts " are enough to
stamp Mendel's discovery as among the greatest in the history of the
biological sciences" (p. 278).
Poulton appears to feel keenly the contemptuous attitude of many of
his younger colleagues toward the real founders of the theory of evolu-
tion, and deprecates severely the gregarious tendency of the great body
of minor workers, who rush to fall in line with every procession which
seems to be marching behind a promising leader. I can not refrain from
quoting some of the strong words with which our writer seeks to relieve
his feelings : " In these later years the multitudes seem, for the moment
at least, to recognize a prophet in every reed shaken with the wind. It
would be interesting to know the number of forgotten works, of works
soon to be forgotten, of works dead before they were born, which have
been proclaimed as ' the most important contribution to biological
thought since the appearance of the Origin of Species.' I would that the
multitudes were not mere followers of the fleeting fashions of a day, but
that they were right in their intuitions: I would that Newtons and Dar-
wins might arise in every generation. I can not admit that the inability
to see them on every side is merely the natural consequence of a cynical
and pessimistic spirit" (p. ix). Which one of us has not been in just
that mood?
FRANCIS B. SUMNER.
WOODS HOLE, MASS.
Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Experience. RADOSLAV A.
TSANOFF. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co. Cornell Studies in
Philosophy, No. 9. 1911. Pp. xiii -f- 77.
The purpose of the author of this monograph was " to analyze closely "
the three phases of Kant's philosophy which Schopenhauer regarded as
most significant, viz., that philosophy must (1) "recognize the purely
phenomenal character of knowledge," (2) " realize the primacy of will
over reason," and (3) " be kept distinct from theology," and then " to
inquire into their consistency and philosophical significance, as well as
to determine as nearly as possible their historical value as interpretations
of Kant's philosophy." The " inherent incompatibility of the two sys-
tems " receives the emphasis rather than " the psychological aspects of
the problem." A brief discussion of the literature in English, German,
and French shows the need for such a work as this.
The four chapters which constitute the body of the book have the
following titles, indicating the nature and scope of the discussion: (1)
" The Nature and Genesis of Experience : Perception and Conception" ;
(2) " The Principles of Organization in Experience : The Deduction and
162 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the Real Significance of the Categories"; (3) "The Scope and Limits of
Experience: Transcendental Dialectic"; (4) "Experience and Reality:
The Will as the Thing-in-itself." The author's method in treating these
topics is to present Schopenhauer's exposition and criticism of Kant with
reference to each, and then by quotations from Kant and his own inter-
pretation to show wherein Schopenhauer erred, or was correct. Not in-
frequently, too, he introduces pertinent material from writers who were
contemporary or nearly so, and also makes comparison with recent views
which are the outgrowth of the Kantian movement or had a comparatively
independent development. The author's own position seems to be " instru-
mental " and " organic."
Schopenhauer accepted the doctrine of Kant's " Esthetic " " unre-
servedly," and then made a " clear-cut distinction between Verstand and
Vernunft." His distinction, however, is not the same as that Kant
himself made, and this initial error vitally affected Schopenhauer's further
treatment of Kant. It is true that Kant was not always precise in the
use of these terms, but his " confusion is the confusion of depths not yet
clarified," while " Schopenhauer's lucidity manifests epistemological
shallowness."
" The radical fault which Schopenhauer finds with Kant's deduction of
the categories," Tsanoff maintains, " is its abstract character. . . . This
protest against Kant's abstract formalism is most just; but his own
theory of judgment incapacitates him at the very start from indicating
the fundamental error." Tsanoff states Schopenhauer's " theory of judg-
ment " briefly, compares it with Kant's, and then takes up the categories
in their respective groups. In each case, Schopenhauer's interpretation
and criticism are given, together with what seems to the author to be the
proper evaluation. The "schematism" is treated briefly, since Schopen-
hauer was inclined to dispense with it altogether, along with all the cate-
gories save " causality," upon the basis of his own distinction between
perception and conception. Tsanoff, too, thinks the " schematism " un-
necessary, but for a different reason. " A correct diagnosis," he says,
"would locate the trouble in Kant's departing from his own ideal of the
organization of experience from within and attempting to explain that
organization, as it were, ab extra. The deduction of the categories, there-
fore, should be reinterpreted in the true Kantian spirit, its abstract
formalism eliminated, and the immanent character of the organizing
principles of experience clearly emphasized. This would obviate the
difficulty by showing the irrelevancy and the needlessness of any schemata."
In connection with the " Dialectic," Tsanoff admits that Schopenhauer
was right in maintaining " that Kant's use of the term ' idea ' is essen-
tially different from Plato's," but he also points out that Schopenhauer's
use of the same term was not " true to the spirit of the original Platonic
doctrine." The origin of these " ideas," as Kant used the term, is indi-
cated, and each is discussed in turn, both from Schopenhauer's and from
Kant's point of view. Incidentally, Schopenhauer's interpretation of
matter is presented, and the propriety of identifying it with substance
denied. Without dwelling upon the discussion of the mechanical and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 163
teleological categories involved in the antinomies, Tsanoff's conclusions
may be stated. " In spite of essential differences in standpoint," he says,
" which have been at least sufficiently accentuated in the above comparison
of their treatment of the teleological principles, Kant and Schopenhauer
make the same fundamental mistake. Neither fully realized the essen-
tially instrumental character of all categories. Each and every category
considers experience, all of it, from its own point of view. Experience is
one, and the categories are its categories, the points of view from which
it may profitably be regarded; no one of them can exhaust its meaning,
nor can any truly significant category find its own meaning exhausted in
any one part of experience, for the simple reason that experience is organic
and is therefore not divisible into discrete parts." This, also, clearly
indicates the author's point of view.
In his interpretation of the " thing-in-itself " as will, Schopenhauer
made what he regarded " as his own great contribution to philosophical
thought." At this point, " Schopenhauer's philosophy joins on to the
Kantian, or rather springs from it as from its parent stem." " By ' will '
Schopenhauer does not mean 'merely willing and purposing in the nar-
rowest sense, but also all striving, wishing, shunning, hoping, fearing,
loving, hating, in short, all that directly constitutes our weal and woe,
desire and aversion.' " Now while this " will " may have qualities abso-
lutely unknowable to us, " it is by no means an unknown quantity, . . .
but is fully and immediately comprehended, and is so familiar to us that
we know and understand what will is far better than anything else."
Consequently, although " on Kant's basis " Schopenhauer thinks that
" metaphysics is impossible," he feels that he himself has ground for
" asserting the possibility of an immanent metaphysics, a metaphysics of
experience." This view Tsanoff rejects, because Schopenhauer " seeks his
ultimate reality ... in some one sort of experience. . . . The spirit of
Schopenhauer's theory of reality " is that " to learn metaphysics, we must
unlearn science."
In conclusion, Tsanoff suggests " that Schopenhauer is not the true
successor of Kant. Instead of being a neo-rationalist, as Kant, on the
whole, remained, he is fundamentally an irrationalist, so far as his atti-
tude towards ultimate reality is concerned. He also insists that the
" world as idea and world as will are at least as incompatible philosophic-
ally as Kant's two worlds of phenomena and noumena. Schopenhauer
failed to profit by his own criticism of Kant. . . . Experience must be
interpreted in terms of its own self -organizing totality. In the solution
of its problems we can ignore no one of its elements or aspects. Cogni-
tion is an essential aspect of experience, but cognition is not all; this is
the lesson to be learned from the ' Critique of Pure Reason,' and espe-
cially from the 'Dialectic.' The same is true of will. . . . Schopen-
hauer's philosophy . . . represents an endless conflict. . . . His every
problem is stated in the form of a dilemma. . . . He never fully com-
prehended the immanent unity of experience. . . . This is the funda-
mental defect of his philosophical system, which makes him incapable of
164 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
grasping the real problems of Kant's philosophy, and of indicating a
consistent method for their solution."
The work, as a whole, is a thorough, scholarly treatment of a particular
problem, and is based upon an independent handling of the sources. It
should prove very serviceable for an enlarged knowledge of Kant and of
Schopenhauer.
GREGORY D. WALCOTT.
HAMLINK UNIVKBSITT.
La Nouvelle Psychologic Animale. GEORGES BOHN. Paris: Alcan. 1911.
Pp. ii -f- 200.
American students of animal behavior hare come to look upon the
work of Dr. Bohn with a certain suspicion. Yerkes 1 thought his earlier
papers " not thoroughly satisfactory scientifically, for they continually
suggest questions, doubts, and new problems," and Jennings, reviewing
" La Naissance de 1'Intelligence," * finds that Bohn does not stand " the
test as to accuracy and trustworthiness of his scientific results in difficult
fields . . . and that such confusion, inaccuracy, and misstatement of fact
are almost or quite sufficient to remove the book from the field of science."
An American reviewer is likely, therefore, to approach this new work of
Dr. Bohn, which is " the continuation and complement of ' La Naissance
de 1'Intelligence,' " with misgivings. The pudding is hardly better than
the anticipation for " La Nouvelle Psychologic Animale," though a brief
and clear statement of the author's views bears evidence of bias in favor
of a theory of animal behavior which to say the least is but little more
than a good working hypothesis. This presupposition in favor of a
physicochemical explanation determines not only the author's criticism
of other men's results, but it also seems to determine the presentation of
the facts.
Relying upon " the more recent studies which have been conceived in
a really scientific spirit" (Preface), the author divides his treatise into
three parts : " the activities of the inferior animals, the instincts of the
arthropods, and the psychical activity of the vertebrates."
The phenomena of behavior in lower animals may be grouped under
three principal orders: "tropisms, sensibilite differ entielle, and memoire
cellulaire." The first is the well-known local action theory of Loeb; the
second is the tendency of the animal " to pause, to recoil, and to turn
through one hundred and eighty degrees when the environment changes
abruptly " ; the third group of phenomena are the evidences of associative
memory.
In defense of his physicochemical theory, for which he does not cease
to praise Loeb, the author attacks Jennings's theory of trial and error and
insists that " the movements of infusoria are subject to very simple laws."
But when did Jennings deny the explainability of infusorian behavior?
If I have understood his work, Jennings's protest has not been against a
physicochemical interpretation of animal behavior, but against the ten-
1 Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, No. 66, p. 238, 1906.
* American Naturalist, No. 43, p. 619, 1909.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 165
dency to find that explanation without considering all the facts. He has
insisted on seeing the behavior in detail rather than in bulk and has re-
fused to accept, as final, explanations which are based only on mass obser-
vations. This, Bohn does not seem adequately to have realized. There
seems a strange tendency on the part of certain writers, the moment you
deny the sweeping character of their physical formula, to think that you
have abdicated causal explanation altogether and are lost in the realms of
mystery.
In the second part, Dr. Bohn reviews the so-called instincts of arthro-
pods, giving in turn the detailed studies on " feigning death," " return to
the nest," " food-seeking," " mimicry," and " the social instincts." In-
stinct he regards as a blanket term covering a " complex of activities,
some simple and some complex, some inherited and some acquired in the
course of individual life, all, it being understood, resulting from the di-
verse qualities of living matter, inherited more or less independently, the
one of the other" (p. 125). Most experimental students will agree with
this tendency to replace the term instinct by more analytic concepts.
" Among vertebrates psychical activity acquires, owing to the brain, a
very great complexity" (p. 129). Hence, ten pages devoted to brain anat-
omy, and then follow fifty-six pages treating in turn the method of Paw-
low, the labyrinth method, the puzzle-box method, the method of imitation,
and the method of training as these have been applied in the study
of vertebrates. Thirty-one of the fifty-six pages are given to Paw-
low, evidently because his method lends itself to the support of the author's
theory. " The method of Pawlow is infinitely precious for psychology, be-
cause, after a sure fashion, it leads to the discovery of the laws of associa-
tive memory among superior animals" (p. 158, italics mine). Much less
important is the labyrinth method because it gives " only synthetic re-
sults . . . laws do not appear from the experiments which have been
made" (p. 175). However, in the hands of Yerkes and Watson, the au-
thor admits this method has given results of some importance. Of still
less importance are the remaining methods, since the data that they give
are "uncertain and contradictory" (p. 188), and the author contents him-
self with giving the results with little comment. The method of discrimi-
nation recently elaborated in such detail for the study of vision by Yerkes
and Watson receives only passing notice.
In the reviewer's opinion the order of merit for the several methods of
animal investigation is hardly the one likely to be adopted in the further
work of men who are really interested in getting all the facts. If we must
have a physicochemical explanation of animal behavior to-morrow it will
be well to let labyrinths, puzzle-boxes, imitation, and all go, and theorize
ourselves into a state of complacent belief. If we would understand ani-
mal behavior it were better to realize that in the case of the vertebrates
we have hardly gotten as yet the first inklings of how to attack our prob-
lems, that all the methods are yet on trial, and that what we need is re-
finement of experimental procedure in connection with every method yet
proposed. The methods which Bohn rejects have yielded results as im-
portant as any which have come from the Pawlow Laboratory, and if it
166 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
were not for preoccupation with certain theories he would probably have
seen them in a truer light. M. E. HAGOERTY.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
MIND. October, 1911. Mr. Bradley's Doctrine of Knowledge (pp.
457-488): E. H. STRANGE. -Mr. Bradley's thesis that it is in "feeling"
that one directly encounters reality is called in question. The contention
that feeling is the original mode of consciousness is challenged, and
for the existence of Mr. Bradley's " whole of feeling " there is no evidence.
The criticism contains a refutation of Mr. Bradley's doctrine of percep-
tion as sentient experience, and judgment as divorce of content from
existence. Mind and Body (pp. 489-506) : J. S. MACKENZIE. - The diffi-
culties arising out of the relations obtaining between conscious states and
body center around the doctrine of the conservation of energy, and it is
suggested how these difficulties may be met without abandoning the
doctrine. Mind is distinguished from conscious states and the problem
of its persistence is considered. Aristophanes and Socrates (pp. 507-520) :
R. PETRIE. -An examination of Professor Taylor's volume of essays,
entitled " Varia Socratica," relating to Aristophanes's " Clouds " in its
bearing upon the historic Socrates. Professor Taylor dismisses the evi-
dence of Xenophon maintaining Socrates's interest in physics and mathe-
matics. This view is opposed, and it is maintained that the caricature in
the " Clouds " does not contradict the account given by Xenophon. Nega-
tion Considered as a Statement of Difference in Identity (pp. 521-529) :
AUGUSTA KLEIN. - The thesis is that " Negative predication should be in-
terpreted as asserting neither a Difference in Difference (Miss Jones) nor
an Identity in Difference (Hegel), but a Difference in Identity." Discus-
sions: Self -consciousness and Consciousness of Self (pp. 530-537) : G. W.
CUNNINGHAM. " Self -consciousness is completely realized only in the
experience of the absolute." Truth as Value and the Value of Truth
(pp. 538-539) : J. E. RUSSELL. A Point in Formal Logic (pp. 540-541) :
T. B. MULLER. Critical Notes: E. G. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (trans-
lated by), The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I.: A. E. TAYLOR,
Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften: P. E. B.
JOURDAIN. A. D. Lindsay, The Philosophy of Bergson: H. W. CARR.
A. W. Moore, Pragmatism and its Critics: D. L. MURRAY. William
James, Some Problems of Philosophy: F. C. S. SCHILLER. New Books.
Philosophical Periodicals. Notes.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. October, 1911. Le pragmatisme et le
realisme du sens commun (pp. 337-367) : L. DAURIAC. - Pragmatism has
its source in an attitude of mind, perhaps as old as mind itself, but it is
the honor of William James to have detached it from rationalism, of
which it now appears to be the absolute antithesis. Les tendances
actuelles de la psychologic anglaise (pp. 368-399) : G. CANTECOR. - The
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 167
progress and transformations of English psychology in the last thirty
years as it appears in the work of Sully, Ward, and Stout. Methode de
la science pedagogique (pp. 400-421) : L. CELLERIER. - The method includes
a definition of education drawn from experience, the determination of
pedagogical fact, observations of the facts of education, and the study and
classification of elementary pedagogical facts. Analyses el comptes
rendus: G. Dromard, Essai sur la sincerite: FR. PAULHAN. G. Simmel,
Soziologie: DR. S. JANKELEVITCH. E. Durkheim et see collaborateurs,
L'annee sociologique, t. XI: G. BELOT. A. Dupont, Gabriel Tarde et
I'economie politique: G. JOUSSET. J. Delvaille, Essai sur I'histoire de
I'idee de progres: L. ARREAT. Revue des periodiques etrangers.
Adamson, Robert. A Short History of Logic. Edited by W. E. Sorley.
Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1911. Pp.
x + 266. 5s.
Boden, Friedrich. Die Instinkbedingtheit der Wahrheit und Erfahrung.
Berlin: Verlag von Leonhard Simion Nf. 1911. Pp. 80. M. 2.50.
Buchenau, Artur. Rene Descartes Uber die Leidenschaften der Seele.
Leipzig : Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1911. Pp. xxxi -f 150. 2 M. 20 Pf .
Busse, Adolf. Aristotles Tiber die Seele. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix
Meiner. 1911. Pp. xviii -f 120. 2 M. 20 Pf .
Oehler, Richard. Nietzsche Als Bildner der Personlichkeit. Leipzig:
Verlegt bei Felix Meiner. 1910. Pp. 31. 60 Pf .
Vorlander, Karl. Immanuel Kants Leben. Leipzig : Felix Meiner. 1911.
Pp. xi + 223. 3 M.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association
met, in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of
the New York Academy of Sciences, at the American Museum of Natural
History on Monday evening, February 26. The following papers were
read: " The Heredity of Mental Traits," Dr. H. H. Goddard; " The Med-
ical Course in Psychology," Dr. F. Lyman Wells ; " Rate Norms of
Mental Development," Professor J. E. W. Wallin ; " Auditory and Visual
Memory," Mr. A. E. Chrislip ; " The Influence of Narcotics on Physical
and Mental Traits of Offspring," Mr. J. E. Hickman.
Dr. J. E. Wallace Wallin, who has been engaged in the psychoclinical
study of various types of mental defectives for over two years, and who
has recently worked in the clinics at Johns Hopkins Hospital, has accepted
a call from the University of Pittsburgh to organize a department of
clinical psychology in the School of Education and also to lecture in the
summer school on clinical psychology, the education of exceptional chil-
dren, and experimental education.
UNDER the auspices of the College of Sciences, a series of lectures has
been recently given at the University of Illinois by Professor W. Johann-
168 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
sen, of the University of Copenhagen. The subjects treated were " The
Primitive Conception of Heredity," " The Principle of Pure Lines,"
" Mendelism," " Complications and Exceptions," " Mutations," " Con-
tinuity or Discontinuity."
DR. ELEANOB H. ROWLAND, professor of philosophy at Mt. Holyoke
College, has resigned to become dean of women and professor of philos-
ophy at Reed College, Portland, Oregon. Her place at Mt. Holyoke, for
the current semester, will be taken by Dr. Kate Gordon.
ON account of illness, Professor Josiah Royce, of Harvard University,
has been compelled to give up the course of Bross lectures on " The Source
of Religious Insight " and has been given leave of absence for the present
academic year.
THE Sarah Berliner research fellowship for women has been awarded
to Miss Marie Gertrude Rand, of Brooklyn, a doctor of philosophy of
Bryn Mawr College, for her work on the psychology of vision.
DR. W. A. HEIDEL, professor of Greek at Wesleyan University, gave
an address on " The Beginnings of Science " before the Middletown,
Connecticut, Scientific Association on February 13.
A NEW department in psychology and education is to be established at
Swarthmore College next year, of which Dr. Bird T. Baldwin, now pro-
fessor of education at the University of Texas, will be in charge.
PROFESSOR CASPER RENE GREGORY, of the University of Leipzig, is
giving a series of lectures at the University of Illinois on " The Develop-
ment of Science in Germany." Dr. Gregory is the first American-born
professor to receive appointment in a German university. He holds the
chair of theology at Leipzig.
ELIZABETH KEMPER ADAMS, of Smith College, has been promoted from
associate professor of philosophy and education to professor of education.
DR. B. W. VAN RIPER, of Nebraska Wesleyan University, has been
elected assistant professor of philosophy in Boston University.
DR. S. P. HAYES, professor of psychology in Mt. Holyoke College, has
been granted a leave of absence for the second semester. He will spend
the time abroad, chiefly at Cambridge University.
THE Ichabod Spencer foundation lectures are being given at Union
College by Professor Hugo Miinsterberg, of Harvard University. His
subject is " Applied Psychology."
THE death is announced, at seventy-one years of age, of Dr. Otto
Liebmann, formerly professor of philosophy in the University of Jena.
DR. JOHN J. TIGERT has been appointed professor of philosophy in the
University of Kentucky.
Dr. WENDELL T. BUSH, associate in philosophy in Columbia University ^
has been appointed associate professor of philosophy.
PROFESSOR JOHN JOLY, F.R.S., has been appointed Huxley lecturer at
Birmingham University for the current session.
VOL. IX. No. 7. MARCH 28, 1912.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE RELATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL AND EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 1
PROFESSOR JUDD gives a brief statement 2 of the way in which
the problem of modern experimental psychology arose. The
account is interesting as showing how, as an integral part of the de-
velopment of a certain form of control, a new "science" may be
differentiated. From the standpoint of psychology the origin of the
experimental method was wholly external and for a long time un-
recognized. From the demands of another sort of experimentation,
and in the service of another science, experimental psychology came
into being. Some consideration of this fact may prove of general
interest.
The specific problem to be solved in this case was that of deter-
mining the amount of error that was involved in certain astronom-
ical investigations, the inquiry arising from a suspicion that the
hand was slow in recording what the eye perceived. Theoretical
exactness required that the hand should record, without loss of time,
what the eye noted through the telescope. For the purpose of cor-
recting the error, the astronomers, as a mere matter of developing
their own technique, and with no interest whatever in the problems
of psychology as such, measured the eye-hand reaction-time of the
one who made the record. In this process, as an interesting fact
(of erudition), it was noted that the reaction times of different per-
sons, the "personal equation," varied.
Now, had these men been interested in this direction, this great
discovery might have become immediately the basis of definite psy-
chological method ; but for these astronomers it was only an incident,
more or less regrettable, of the day 's work ; and the psychologists of
the time seem not to have been able to make any constructive use of
the facts or to fit them into their subject in any way. To the extent
1 For standpoint and material suggestions I am indebted to Professor George
H. Mead, of the University of Chicago.
'"Psychology," p. 333.
169
170 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
that it was noticed, or used, at all, it was taken over in a wholly ex-
ternal sort of fashion, without analyzing the problem farther; it
seems to have been a kind of scientific toy, making some curious,
rather than useful, additions to knowledge. They used the method
as if they, too, had turned astronomers, and as if the whole interest
of science was in providing data for the correction of "personal
equations." Little attention was paid, in these earlier days, to
introspective reintegration of these facts: the results of their observa-
tions and measurements were averaged in a purely external way,
and consequently added little to the actual knowledge of psycholog-
ical processes.
But little by little the technique and method of experimental
psychology have been developed ; and the field of operation has been
changed from that of external observation and mechanical measure-
ment to that of charting out the whole field of the psychical life.
But it would seem that a certain exhilaration has carried the experi-
mental psychologist too far, until we have to-day a very great over-
working of the method, though it is likely that this misuse will have
its value in helping to more completely determine the field and prob-
lem of psychology. Let us carry the argument through to the end.
Modern science, growing out of individual experience, found the
forms of psychological measurement and analysis helpful in provid-
ing a check upon its own developing technique. In its turn, psychol-
ogy, as it became conscious of itself and began to call itself a
"science," considered individual experience its proper field of in-
vestigation, like the other and older sciences: it assumed that it could
render very much needed service by investigating in accurate ways
the whole round of mental phenomena; and its method was to be a
generalization of the incidental work of the astronomers. It was
thought that, since the method gave valuable results in the case of
its use by these devotees of the oldest of the sciences, there could be
no doubt of its legitimacy and adequacy as a method in the newest.
But it is to be noted that the astronomers used this psychological
method for the purpose of perfecting their own operations, not for
the sake of the psychological information : that is to say, psychology
was, for them, not a "science" in itself, but an important element
in the technique of their science ; and it would seem that the generali-
zation of their method would give us, not a new "science" of psy-
chology, but a very important new sort of check upon the general
technique of science. The mere generalization of the work of the
astronomers does not give us a "psychology" with scientific stand-
ing; what we get is an ancilla scientiarum, and of the physical sci-
ences at that.
For the method was, and is, essentially an abstraction. As used
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 171
by the astronomers it was perfectly concrete : an effort to more ade-
quately control a specific social experience. But when it was gener-
alized into "experimental psychology," it became abstract, as any
mere technique must inevitably become. To be sure, psychology has
strenuously denied this, insisting upon its right to scientific stand-
ing. But when closely pressed to define its actual field of knowledge,
it has never been quite able to answer conclusively. For example,
if we take such an avowedly functional treatment as that of Angell
we find a rather questionable statement of the field of knowledge.
He says 3 ''psychology is commonly defined as the science of con-
sciousness. ' ' But when we turn to page 65 of the same book we find
consciousness spoken of as the instrument of development "of those
fixed and intelligent modes of reaction which we call habits. ' ' Now,
any particular scientific fact, or law, or system, is, for the time, a
"fixed and intelligent mode of reaction," that is, it is a social or
individual habit. Accepted sciences are the intellectual and prac-
tical habits, or fixed modes of controlling experience, in any period.
Consciousness, from this point of view, becomes the tool of scientific
development; and psychology as the "science of consciousness" be-
comes the method of developing the technique of general science:
and this brings us back to our astronomers.
Most modern writers take the point of view of Angell. Some have
tried to get an undisputed subject-matter for psychology by a proc-
ess of eliminating all the physical and physiological materials of
experience, hoping to have something left. But from the standpoint
of the sciences which deal with the materials thus eliminated, there
is to be nothing left : all is to be finally stated in terms of the iron law
of cause and effect. And just as the astronomers had no interest
in their results, save as a part of their own technique, so modern
science seems to care little for any "science of consciousness" that
offers itself as an abstract and independent field of knowledge. That
which has been called prejudice on the part of the older sciences is
probably just the healthy and justifiable feeling that psychology as
it has been known in the past can have no other standing in any
real organization of the sciences than it had with those first astron-
omers : it is a part of the technique of science, not a science in itself.
The experience of the individual has been the rich field of de-
velopment of modern science ; and this has been but the more clearly
seen as psychology has developed and the technique of control of ex-
perience in the various sciences has been refined. But this develop-
ment of physical science, with psychology as its general technique,
has been accomplished at the sad cost of leaving psychology itself
objectless, homeless, like the "man without a country." But, not
"Psychology," p. 1.
172 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
only has this development, as thus stated, left psychology as a tool,
rather than a science ; it has also made it, practically, utterly useless
in the field of the social sciences. It is not without reason that the
sociologist has denied the right of the psychologist to any voice in
the determination of the method of sociology. It is not to be won-
dered at that the educationist has been skeptical of the value of
psychology as an aid to the teacher. Psychology as it has been
known, that is, experimental psychology developed on the basis of
the work of the astronomers, has had very little to do with that
stage of experience that precedes the differentiation of the physical
object. It has been called into existence for the purpose of a clearer
definition of the physical object (note the astronomers again), and
it has had, in the past, no method of dealing with the social object
save in terms of the abstractions which it employs in the case of
physical objects: that is to say, it must reduce the social object to
physical and abstract terms, just what the sociologist and educa-
tor have not wanted.
And here we come to the point made earlier in this discussion,
that in the development of psychology there has been a miscarriage
of method, or else that which appears so has been but a necessary
stage in the development of the subject. Psychology itself has
passed through several stages in the whole course of its development.
Before the beginnings of the experimental point of view, the object
of knowledge in such psychology as there was, was psyche, the
soul, disconnected, or only temporarily connected, with the world
of observable phenomena. Then there came, after the development
of the experimental method, a very orgy of "scientific" progress, in
which the ideal was that along with the world of physical objects the
world of psychical existences was to be reduced to a statement in
terms of motion; the soul was ruled out of existence. To this end
was psychology, handmaid of the physical sciences but ambitious for
a realm of her own, thus sadly reduced.
But of course the whole range of the social sciences, the whole
wide content of morality and religion, and the sober common sense
of the physical sciences themselves, all rebel against the extreme im-
plications of this doctrine, because it leaves out of account the whole
world of the ends of life, the vitally human side of life : it loses sight
of the ends of life, and focuses all its attentions upon the "means"
of life; but without ends the very need of "means" passes, and the
so-called "means" pass also. The effort to state the self, or to sum
up psychology, in terms of molecular motion had, of course, to run
its full length and determine its own impossibility. But if this at-
tempt is impossible, it is so because there is something in the field
attacked by psychology that can not be stated in terms of molecular
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 173
motion ; that is to say, there is something which the physical sciences
can not take care of. And, in recent years, in the general develop-
ment of the theory of evolution and its wider generalization and
application to more inclusive ranges of materials, the mind, or the
self, has slowly become recognized as the center of organization of
experience : this mind, or self, is now no longer a mere left-over, but
a real and positive factor in the world, a fact in the full sense of the
term, and as such as much an object of knowledge as the molecule
or the atom. Psychology thus becomes the science of the self, the
self as a reality for experience; it has accordingly a subject-matter
of its own, and a right to be called a science in at least as real a sense
as is physics the science of the molecule, or chemistry the science of
the atom.
But from this point of view psychology can no longer be defined
as the science of consciousness ; it is now the science of the self, and
the self is larger than consciousness; it is at least as large as the
whole of experience. This means that psychology must give up its
old position (a position that is still maintained in the laboratory atti-
tude) as the handmaid of the physical sciences, and become the sci-
ence of the self in all the relations of that self, its genesis, its develop-
ment, and all its rich differentiations of activity, interest, and con-
tent. But at this point we see that psychology has thus become
social psychology. And there can be no escape from the fact that if
psychology is to be a real science in its own right it must become
social; for in no other way can it find a real object of knowledge
that shall be its own.
When, however, psychology has thus become social, it can absorb
all the materials that the laboratories can bring it, and give to those
materials a meaning they have never had before. These results,
worked out in psychological laboratories, are just like the results of
the work of the astronomers, materials that have, or may have, a so-
cial value in perfecting the general technique by which science is
ultimately to control all experience in the interest of a nobler human
living. And from this point of view psychology becomes of use also
in the social sciences ; becomes, indeed, as the science of the self, the
basis of the technique of the social sciences ; and no follower of any
of the special social sciences can ever again, save by confessing his
ignorance, deny to the new psychology, as science of the self, the
right to some voice in determining the materials, methods, and results
of that special science. Social psychology will be heard from in
every one of the special social sciences in the near future.
Essentially, then, psychology has left the narrow field of service
to the physical sciences (though its service is still at their disposal),
and, finding a proper object for a special science in the "self," is
174 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
about to find a scientific standing it has never had before. At the
same time it is going to find a wider range of usefulness as the tech-
nique of all the sciences: the social sciences, first of all, and the
physical sciences, also, as these arise in the constant definition of the
conditions of life. Psychology has become social psychology, the
science of the whole concrete activity of the social self, or selves;
social psychology is the science of the active self, the self at work,
organizing and reorganizing its world of experience. The impulses
to organization of experience are native, and, in man at least, they
are social in their nature. The act needs no motive, and it presup-
poses a social situation. In the carrying out of the act, in so far as
there is a conflict or a hindrance to be overcome, there will appear a
need of a definition of means to the end in view, a more complete
determination and organization of the conditions under which the
act may go on. This was the situation in which the astronomers had
found themselves many times; they had made many corrections and
readjustments, of which the one here described was for them only
another. In many of their adjustments ordinary reflection upon the
situation had been sufficient. But in this particular case mere re-
flection was not sufficient; the telescope did not solve the problem:
there was still a difficulty that had to be more adequately under-
stood and controlled ; and a further refinement of method was neces-
sary. Thus were undertaken the first experiments along psycholog-
ical lines ; only, they were not experiments in psychology at all ; they
were efforts to secure practical efficiency and a greater social utility
in a science that cared nothing for psychology; and for the astron-
omers they never became psychological materials. That is to say, the
astronomers never saw the full implications of their incidental ex-
periments.
Now, it is only a social psychology that can see the whole act in
all its bearings. The social psychologist sees the astronomer himself
engaged in the more comprehensive problem of a careful determina-
tion of the character of the universal human environment: he is a
social worker, in spite of his protests, and his need of a more com-
plete determination of the "personal equation" is ultimately a social
need. Social psychology can also see why this method was finally
seized upon and hypothetically erected into a science in its own
right. And it is possible to see how, and why, psychology had to
come back from its intellectualistic, individualistic, and purely me-
chanical vagaries to the more human conception of the whole man
living his whole life in a complete social world. Social psychology is
undertaking to deal with a concrete social situation, the wholeness of
an act in all its immediate richness of emotional and conative ele-
ments as well as its purely intellectual or "scientific" phases.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 175
Within this whole concrete act lies the specific problem of determin-
ing the means to the end: this is true for the simplest act and for the
most complex. So within the whole of social psychology lie the
various problems of the experimental determination of the actual
conditions of activity; but this experimental determination is but
one phase of the whole act ; and if this determination is to have any
other than a purely erudite interest, the demand for it must rise out
of a concrete situation, and the determined result must be such as
can get back into concrete activity and be tested by more organic
conditions than those of the laboratory.
The self develops through activity and emotional experiences
which are organized into older experiences, as occasion demands, by
the intellectual processes. Social psychology of the McDougall type
is the science of the development of the self or selves; its unit of
study is the concrete act, in all its organic richness. Within this
concrete act lie the beginnings of all the sciences, social as well as
physical, just as the beginnings of psychology lay within the con-
crete act of the astronomer. These germs of rudimentary sciences
come to consciousness at the call of some specific need. Experimental
psychology arose to meet the need of more exact methods of determi-
nation of an object in a particular physical science, but it might
just as well have arisen in any other of the sciences: it came
in to help physical science. It proved so helpful that some who
became interested undertook to give it an independent scientific
standing. But after thorough tests it has been found that that
hypothesis is partially unfounded : psychology as a purely laboratory
performance can have no real scientific standing, because it has no
real object of knowledge. But the hypothesis was not utterly false ;
and the feeling that there was room for a real science of psychology
was well founded, though its foundation is not in the laboratory.
After these fifty years and more of experimentation and discussion,
psychology is coming into its own, the actual object of a real science
is emerging into consciousness, and social psychology, having as its
object of knowledge the development of the concrete social self, is
here to stay.
Under this larger conception, the work of the laboratory psychol-
ogist comes to have a value it never had or could have before : it has
a social meaning ; his work arises out of actual social situations, more
or less immediate, and his results go back into social situations, more
or less close by ; if they do not, then he is losing his way among bar-
ren and profitless abstractions.
And under this conception psychology comes to have meaning,
essential meaning, for all the social sciences, but especially for edu-
cation and the work of the teacher. In the midst of the growing
176 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
modern world, with its demands for more democracy and at the same
time more efficiency, the teacher is hard pressed. The whole modern
world, but especially the school, needs a new insight into the con-
crete processes of the developing self. The laboratory can offer de-
tached fragments of isolated cases ; the older analytic psychology can
offer some general suggestions on mental processes: these are good
when they can be seen in their concrete setting in the actual course
of the child's developing experience. But they are decidedly bad, as
Miinsterberg has shown, when they are taken as final statements of
processes and blindly followed without thought as to the organic re-
lationships they sustain to the rest of the developing experience of
the victim. Social psychology is the modern attempt to redinte-
grate the experiences of the individual, to present that experience in
concrete forms, with as much richness of detail as the analytical
psychologist and the laboratory operator can furnish. For while
the experimentalist is a good man to go to for data as to detailed
operations, it is only as he leaves his laboratory to find his prob-
lems, and takes his results back into the social world, there to rein-
state them concretely in the flow of living human experience, that
he can truly be said to be a real psychologist.
The hope for the schools and for education generally, even the
very hope for democracy itself, lies in making the teacher conscious
of the processes of development as these are being restated in terms
of social psychology. The teacher will have, must have, psychology
of some kind ; the only relief from the intolerable psychology which
Miinsterberg so rightly criticizes is found in the social psychology
which can see the child as child, and also as mechanism; that is,
as end of education and as means to education, at the same time.
The educational psychology of the future must be a genuinely social
psychology.
JOSEPH KINMONT HART.
THE UNIVERSITY or WASHINGTON.
SOCIETIES
TWENTIETH MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
THE twentieth annual meeting of the American Psychological
Association, held in Washington, D. C., December 27, 28, 29,
1911, in affiliation with the Southern Society for Philosophy and
Psychology, was of rather unusual interest. The fact that it was
the twentieth meeting brought up reminiscences regarding the found-
ing of the association and rather gratifying reflections on the growth
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 177
of psychological science in America. At the smoker given by Pro-
fessors Franz and Reudiger at the New Fredonia Hotel on Thursday
evening, following President Seashore's address, the company fell
into a reminiscent mood and called on President Hall, Dr. Ladd, and
Professors Cattell and Miinsterberg for speeches as to the early his-
tory of psychology in America. This occasion and the luncheon
given by Dr. Franz at the Government Hospital for the Insane on
Thursday made up the social features of the meeting. The program
contained several unusual features, including double sections, a large
exhibit of apparatus, advanced abstracts of the papers read at the
symposium on instinct and intelligence, and the conference on psy-
chology and medical education. Special sessions were given over to
mental tests, animal behavior, medical education, experimental psy-
chology, general psychology, and educational psychology. Taking
the program as a whole, it is fair to say that applied psychology
bulked larger than any other topic, one third of the more than sixty
papers being devoted to various subjects falling in this field, an evi-
dence that the day of the consulting psychologist is about to come.
The symposium on instinct and intelligence opened the meeting,
Mr. Marshall being the first speaker. He considered the activities
of animals from two view-points, the subjective and the objective.
Speaking from the latter point of view he divided the activities of
animals into two groups, one characterizing the simplest animals and
the other the complex animals. The first group of activities display :
(1) evident biologic value; (2) directness; (3) immediacy; (4)
"perfect very first time"; (5) non-modifiability ; (6) innateness.
The second group are not evidently of biologic value, are indirect,
hesitant, highly modifiable, not evidently innate and not "perfect
the very first time." But in complex animals there are certain
activities of the first sort and these occurring in the midst of activi-
ties of the other sort may be called ' ' instinct-actions. ' ' They may be
regarded as due to the instinct actions of the cells and this cell
instinct-action may be looked upon as the biologic unit. But these
varied activities due to the compounding of instinct actions are what
we call intelligent activities. Hence, we argue that intelligence is
statable in terms of "instinct feelings," the psychic correspondents
of instinct actions. If we could grasp the full psychic significance
of an instinct-feeling, by slowing down the process, we should find
in it all the essentials of intelligence; and if intelligent acts could
be made immediate, they would appear objectively as "instinct-
actions" and subjectively as "instinct-feelings."
Mr. Herrick held that the term instinct as popularly used is
incapable of scientific definition. He would replace the terms
instinct and intelligence by the terms innate action and individually
178 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
variable action, and maintained that these two types of action are
separate biological functions, both of which are exhibited in some
degree by all animals, and that they are individually variable.
Under innate action, he would include the fundamental physiological
properties, tropisms, taxes, reflexes, compound and chain reflexes,
and the inherited elements of all higher behavior complexes. Under
individually variable action he would include all non-heritable,
acquired behavior from simple, physiological modifications resulting
from practise at the lower extreme to learning by experience and the
higher intelligent adaptations at the other extreme. A special mech-
anism has been differentiated for the higher forms of variable action,
namely, the association centers of the brain.
Mr. Yerkes held that instinct and intelligence are two functional
capacities or tendencies of the organism and that neither has devel-
oped from the other. Now the one and now the other predominates
in the life of the organism or the species. No organism lacks either
the instinct capacity or the intelligence capacity. Instinctive activi-
ties are practically serviceable on the occasion of their first appear-
ance, strikingly perfect in important respects, predictable, heritable
in definite form, and suggestive of experiences which the organism
has not had. Intelligent activities, by contrast, are serviceable as
the result of trial, practically unpredictable, not definitely heritable,
and suggestive of experiences that the organism has had.
Mr. Judd emphasized the importance of defining intelligence in
positive rather than negative terms. It is by intelligence that an
organism becomes superior to its environment and capable of modi-
fying its environment. It is the power of initiating activities from
inner motives; and the intelligent individual, instead of reacting
upon objects in a manner determined by their sequence in nature, is
able to bring objects distant in time or space into close relation with
each other. This bringing together of remote objects is the result of
inner processes of comparison or association, which group of proc-
esses marks the highest stages of evolution.
The conference on psychology and medical education was opened
by Dr. Franz, who spoke on the present status of psychology in
medical education and practise. The recent favorable growth of
psychology in connection with medical affairs was held to be due to
the realization of the importance of psychiatry and to the success
of non-medical healers. In most schools, the speaker thought, psy-
chological matters are discussed in the courses in physiology, psy-
chiatry, neurology, and medicine. Psychology was held to be of
value to research in psychiatry and neurology, and also in pharma-
cological studies. To the physician psychology has its chief value
in the consideration of mental diseases, in both diagnosis and treat-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 179
merit. It is also of value to all physicians because they must depend
upon mental processes for diagnosis and for the estimation of the
effects of remedial agents. This subject, which is so important for all
physicians, can not be picked up incidentally, but there must be given
some special attention to it in the medical course.
Dr. Adolph Meyer spoke on the practical relation of psychology
and psychiatry, holding that both fields are open to expansion. He
spoke of a psychology that will cope with the problems of introspec-
tion and also with the other problems dealing with the biological,
physiological, and even anatomical conditions of mental life. It is
the psychologist alone who can deal with the great borderland that
lies between the physiology of special organs and the behavior of
personalities. Psychiatry is forced to deal with psychological
material. It determines mental facts partly as symptoms of diseases
back of the conditions and partly as biological reactions of the type
of mental integration, which, like suggestion, once induced, play a
more or less well defined dynamic role. The first task is to describe
critically the plain events of abnormal reactions and conduct as
experiments of nature for the conditions under which they occur, the
subjective and objective characteristics which allow us to differen-
tiate the reactions from one another, the events and results in the
conduct and life of the person, the dynamic factors and their modi-
fiability, the time and influences needed for a readjustment of a
state of balance. With this rule of formal technique and logical
arrangement of the inquiry, we are bound to get sound common
ground for a psychiatry which aims merely at the identification of
given conditions with accepted disease-processes, and also for a
dynamic pathology which gives psychobiological data a dynamic
position.
Dr. E. E. Southard contrasted the problems of teaching and
research in the fields of psycho- and neuro-pathology. He insisted
first on the unique value of the pathological method, not merely for
the diagnostic and therapeutic purposes of medicine, but for biology
as a whole and for the most vital of the biological sciences, psy-
chology. He pointed out the perniciousness of psychophysical par-
allelism in the discussion of matters psychological because it inhibits
the free interchange of structural and functional concepts and the
passage to and fro of workers in the several sciences. He pointed
out that psychology and physiology have more in common than
either has with such structural sciences as anatomy and histology
and that the main common element of both mental and cerebral
processes is the time element as against the space element of the
structural sciences. He conceived that the mind twist and brain
spot hypotheses for the explanation of certain forms of mental dis-
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ease are entirely consistent with each other, since from a different
angle each is dealing with the same facts.
Dr. Watson gave the outline of a proposed course in psychology
for medical students. The course might be given as an elective in
the second or third year of the medical school and should occupy two
laboratory periods per week and one lecture. The course would pre-
suppose a thorough course in elementary psychology as a part of
the student's premedical training and would deal with the objective
material of psychology. Such topics as the following should be
considered: visual and auditory sensation, thorough tests and appli-
cation of the Binet-Simon system, work in mental and muscular
fatigue, acquistion of skillful acts, learning plateaus, conflicts, stamp-
ing in and retention of wrong methods of response, association, mem-
ory and retention, association method of Jung, reaction time. The
aim would be not only to supply information regarding these sub-
jects, but also to give training in the objective study of psychological
processes and to prepare the student for the work of the clinic and
the study of hypnotism, multiple personalities, aphasia, etc.
Dr. Morton Prince doubted the value of the teaching of structural
psychology to the medical student already almost submerged in the
number of subjects he is called upon to master. He thought normal
psychology should be to pathological psychology and psychothera-
peutics what physiology is to pathological physiology and physiolog-
ical therapeutics; but to attain this position, processes and mechan-
isms should be elucidated rather than structure. He insisted that
the professional psychologist has not occupied himself sufficiently
with this sort of research and consequently the applications of psy-
chology lagged far behind other applied sciences. He advocated
what he chose to call "a new psychology" for the medical student,
the chief features of which he outlined as follows : the subconscious,
hypnosis and allied conditions ; suggestion and its phenomena ; mem-
ory as a process ; amnesia and its mechanisms ; fixed ideas, conscious
and subconscious; dissociation and synthesis of personality; emotions
as dynamic forces; instincts as impulsive forces; sentiments as com-
plexes of ideas and emotions; phenomena of conflicts, repression,
resistance, inhibitions; mechanisms of thought; attitudes of mind;
associative processes and reactions; habit processes; automatisms;
mechanism of dreams ; influence of mind on the body ; fatigue.
This course Dr. Prince insisted would supplement the course sug-
gested by Dr. Watson and should be taught in the premedical course.
In respect to this program Dr. Meyer thought that the college
curriculum should not preempt the field of psychopathology, unless
it has clinical material to work upon.
The discussion which followed the reading of the papers was
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 181
prompt and was engaged in by an equal number of physicians and
psychologists. In general it centered about three topics: first,
emphasis on the importance of psychology to the medical student;
second, the kind of psychology that should be given ; third, the time
and place to be given to psychology in the medical and premedical
program. The following quotations were significant of the whole
discussion.
Dr. Jelliffe : ' ' Let us picture to ourselves the medical student of
the remote future. Diseases of the body will be prevented and there
will be three functions for the medical practitioner; to deal with the
preservation of the species, with senility and with mental aberration.
There will be the obstetrician and pediatrist, the specialist in old
age, and the psychotherapist. If the problems of mental activities
are to occupy such a large share in the future, the subject of psy-
chology should bulk large in the medical curriculum. ' '
Professor Angier gave an outline of the course given to medical
students at Yale and insisted that it would be ' ' unwise for a man to
go into medicine or into psychotherapeutics particularly and not be
acquainted to some extent with normal psychology."
Dr. Hoch: "It is quite evident that the importance of mental
factors, not only so far as psychiatry is concerned, but so far as all
diseases are concerned, is being more and more appreciated. Physi-
cians need much more training than at present, not only in psy-
chiatry, but also in other branches, but the more marked need is along
mental lines. We must not forget that common disorders that come
to the physician and are looked upon as essentially physical would
sometimes be much better treated from a mental point of view. ' '
The speaker commended the course outlined by Dr. Watson, but
doubted whether there would be sufficient time for it. He rather
favored the course suggested by Dr. Prince.
Professor Haines emphasized the fact that "the psychology that
the physician is coming to use is departing in no radical way from
the psychology in which members of this association have been inter-
ested. We must not forget that at bottom psychology grows by the
method of introspection. What the young medical student needs is
to get the attitude of the psychologist. He needs to know that there
is such a thing as a mental phenomenon."
Dr. Koder : " I believe that there should be greater attention paid
to the subject of psychotherapy, and also to psychology of the normal
mind ; the psychologist should be introduced into the medical facul-
ties to teach his subject as a part of the curriculum of the medical
school. It seems to me at least the equal in importance of anatomy
and physiology and a part of the time that should be given to psy-
chology may well be carved out from the hours now devoted to the
182 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
subjects of anatomy, physiology, materia medica, and therapeutics.
We devote forty hours to materia medica, and we all know that the
practising physician uses only two or three dozen remedies and there
is no need of overburdening the medical student with the almost
useless knowledge of drugs which have little or no value."
Dr. Starr outlined the work that is given in the medical and pre-
medical course at Columbia University and said: "If the subject of
psychological therapeutics is increasing in importance and we are
appreciating it every day, and that students must be trained along
that line they must obtain a knowledge of physiological psychology
which must then be supplemented by some knowledge of pathological
psychology." The speaker then spoke of the great value which
pathology had been to psychology and suggested further cooperation
from both psychologist and physician in research and teaching.
Professor Angell: "I am very much more interested for the
moment in the problem of psychology for the general practitioner
than in that of the value of psychology for the medical specialist in
psychiatry. . . . The rank and file of students are not becoming
specialists in psychiatry. In the medical school in Chicago, as a
result of my conferences with men of the medical faculty, I conclude
that it is desirable that every medical student should have the equip-
ment of an elementary and introductory course in general psy-
chology. ... I have in mind the aspect of psychology as a science of
mental behavior, one dealing with the common affairs of everyday
life. ... A psychology of this functional and dynamic character
can be taught without any elaborate terms and this kind of psy-
chology certainly would give the student a point of view for the
exploration of the human mind. I can not for a moment believe
that the dissecting of the mind would make a physician a better gen-
eral practitioner. What the physician needs is to consider the
living dynamic individual, not the human being of the dissecting
table, but the living being who has a developing mind."
Dr. Williams objected to Dr. Prince's course, insisting that "it
was putting the cart before the horse," and declared that "some
such course as Dr. Watson suggested was absolutely essential. ' '
Professor Miinsterberg thought, after listening to the discussion,
that the best thing we can do is to teach medical students "a little
philosophical foundation for their psychological conceptions."
The upshot of the conference was the appointment of a committee
at the business meeting of the association, this committee to represent
the association in conferences with similar committees, appointed by
the American Medical Association or other medical associations,
regarding further discussions of the relation of psychology to medical
education. Professors W. D. Scott, E. E. Southard, and J. B. Wat-
son were appointed to this committee.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 183
In his address as president of the Southern Society, Dr. Franz
held that it can not be concluded at the present time that the psychic
localization is more specific than that mentality is connected with
brain activity. We are unable to say that the activity of the
cerebrum alone is the concomitant of mental processes. He reviewed
the work of Gall, Broca, Flechsig, and the more recent histological
studies of localized function. He denied the proof of the relation of
the so-called sensory and perceptive areas and showed that there has
been no sufficient explanation for the histological differences between
the various motor areas. The disorders of speech can not be consid-
ered to be associated with definite parts of the brain and there are no
facts which warrant a localization of definite mental states in the
several layers of the cortex.
At the session on animal behavior three papers were presented
on sensory discrimination in mammals. Mr. Johnson reported tests
on auditory discrimination in dogs which tended to show that after
eliminating all secondary criteria and with the operator removed
from the room, the dogs were unable to choose between middle C
and the E above, the stimulus being given by the Helmholtz method
of " tandem-driven" forks equipped with Koenig resonators, giving
practically pure tones. On the basis of these results criticism was
offered of the work done by Kalischer and Rothmann and it was held
that there was no certain evidence that in any of their experiments
were the dogs reacting to tone at all.
Dr. Shepherd reported studies on the discrimination of articulate
sounds by cats. The method was to speak a name to which the cat
should make a positive response and get food. A cat seven months
old learned the reaction in thirteen days and a three-year old cat
learned the same reaction in twenty-five days.
Professor Yerkes criticized the experiments on the ground that
there had not been sufficient caution to prevent the animals choosing
by secondary criteria, unconscious movements of the operator, etc.
Professor Washburn, in reporting some experiments on color
vision in the rabbit, gave as a criterion that an animal sees color
rather than a gray, the animal's ability to discriminate between a
color and any and all brightnesses whatsover. In the course of
experiments in which colored papers were used the rabbit showed
some ability to select a door on account of the relative brightness of
the paper pinned on it, but the experimenter concluded that the rab-
bit's hold on this principle, which involves a comparison of two
papers, is very unstable. With red and a very dark gray (Hering
number 46) four rabbits, which had learned to discriminate red
from the lighter grays, failed to make any discrimination whatsoever
and there was no evidence that rabbits see red as a color.
184 TIIK JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The following results regarding the modifiability of behavior in
the earthworm were presented by Professor Yerkes: (1) the worms
have not acquired the habit of turning directly to the open arm of
the T-shaped glass labyrinth and thus escaping to a moist dark tube ;
(2) certain modifications have appeared during the daily series of
trials; (3) there are indications of tracking; (4) the animals fatigue
rapidly ; five trials per day prove more satisfactory than ten, fifteen
or twenty; (5) in so far as the worms learn to follow a direct path
through the T, they do so apparently by the use of certain cutaneous
sense data rather than by inner kinesthetic data; (6) the first trial
each day invariably presents numerous mistakes; (7) there is some
indication that the sandpaper becomes a "warning" against the salt
which lies beyond it in the arm of the T.
Two experimental studies of the human learning process in the
maze were reported. Mr. Boring used the Watson circular maze
duplicated on a large scale and two observers who learned the maze
made a numerical estimate of the processes involved in the learning,
the two reports agreeing in 85 per cent, of the cases. Three phases
were noted: the determination of direction after making the turns,
guidance within the passage, and the location of the turns. Com-
plete analysis of the first phase only was reported. This involved
five factors: attitudinal, verbal, visual, kinesthetic, and automatic.
Each of these followed a definite course throughout the learning
process, varying somewhat with the ideational type of the learner.
Attitudes were of importance in only the first two or three trials.
The verbal factor reaches its height very early and the visual later.
They both give place to kinesthesis, which, in turn, is resolved into
a somatic automatism. The course of learning in this first phase
falls into three periods. In the first, attitudes and verbal and visual
imagery are advantageous, and the introduction of motor imagery
is disadvantageous; in the second period, kinesthesis becomes favor-
able, while attitudes and verbal and visual imagery become unfavor-
able; in the third period, automatism predominates and learning is
retarded by the introduction of any form of imagery.
Mr. Perrin reported similar work in which he had used two types
of maze, a pencil maze and another through which the subject walked.
In both cases the subject was blindfolded. The time and error
curves were quite comparable with those based on the records of
white rats in the maze. The introspection showed, however, so it
was claimed, that the learning was essentially that of the human in-
stead of the animal mind, inasmuch as there was evidence of con-
scious factors, attending, discriminating, judging, inferring, and
reasoning. Ideational controls were built up through the play of
the cognitive faculties. While the learning curves showed that
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 185
learning was by the trial and error method and that the human did
not improve upon the time and error records of the rats, they do seem
to have the advantage when the conditions are altered as in chang-
ing the maze. The human subjects make their adaptations more
easily.
In his president's address Professor Seashore spoke on the meas-
ure of a singer. He set forth the possible measurements of sensory,
motor, associative, and affective powers and argued that technical
psychology may be so employed as to furnish qualitative and quanti-
tative classified knowledge about a singer, which knowledge may
serve immediate and direct practical purposes. This sort of applied
psychology, the speaker thought, will lead to a keener and more
penetrating insight into the nature and the conditions of both the
individual and his art, and this will result in helpful guidance and a
more vital appreciation and respect for the possibilities of the singer
and his song. Using the case of the singer as an example, President
Seashore went on to emphasize the importance of applied psychol-
ogy, and in particular, the need for training up experts who will be
able to fill the places of consulting psychologists in the various fields
that are asking help from psychology.
Quite in the spirit of President Seashore 's address the vocational
bureau at Cincinnati is trying to be of help in determining a scien-
tific ground upon which to make recommendations for the employ-
ment of children. The work of this bureau, which was reported by
Dr. Wooley, is still in the research stage and has planned a five-years'
investigation of the children who leave the public schools at the age
of fourteen years and a comparative study of other children who
remain in school. A thousand children are to be studied in each
case. The series of tests include sensation, motor ability, perception,
learning power, the use of language, ingenuity. The immediate
problem is to determine the value of the tests in use, with the hope
that later such tests may be used as criteria of the general or special
ability of such persons as come under the bureau's jurisdiction.
Five papers dealing with the learning process were presented.
Dr. McGamble reported experiments which showed no correlation
between the facility of learning and the tenacity of impression.
When longer series of nonsense syllables are learned and relearned
at the same rate of presentation, the fraction of the learning time
saved in the relearning is greater if the presentation rate is neither
very fast nor very slow. When the series are learned at different
presentation rates, but relearned at the same rate, the fraction of the
learning saved is greater for the series which were originally learned
at the slow rate of presentation, unless the absolute learning time of
the slow series is very small.
186 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Mr. Lyon in reporting on the same general problem thought that
those who learn quickly remember longest where the material used
is logical or meaningful in character, but forget quickest where the
material is such as involves the memorizing of motor associations,
which is generally the case with digits, words, and nonsense syllables.
Mr. Lyon agreed with Dr. McGamble that the difference in retentive-
ness between the fast learner and the slower learner is much less
than is generally believed.
Mr. Henmon took issue with the oft-quoted results of Ebbing-
haus that the number of repetitions increases at first with great
rapidity as the amount to be learned increases and that the increase
in repetitions is relatively greater than the increase in the length of
the series. Systematic investigation, he held, fails to confirm the
law. On the contrary, there is a relative decrease in the number of
repetitions as the length of series increases, and an increase in re-
tention after an interval of time. This result holds not only for
practised, but also for unpractised, subjects and is most marked with
sense material.
Professor Lough gave a partial report of extended studies in
habit formation and called particular attention to the absence of
plateaus, such as were found by Bryan and Harter some years ago.
The complete report of these tests is soon to appear and will cover
the study of such factors as practise, fatigue, distribution of repeti-
tion, diurnal efficiency, changing keys, sex, age, ability, and indi-
vidual variation.
Dr. Rail presented some experimental evidence of the transfer of
training in memory. As test material, lines from "Evangeline" and
nonsense syllables were used. Training material included poetry
and prose in English and foreign languages, irregular verbs, and
vocabularies. Training period lasted four weeks and was for
twenty minutes per day. Results showed wide variation, but in
general there was gain in the test given at the end of the training
period, amounting in all observers to 32.5 per cent. Control experi-
ment on 28 untrained observers showed a gain of only 17.8 per
cent. The results were held to show that there was a transfer of 21
per cent, in learning "Evangeline" and 36 per cent, in the nonsense
syllables.
Why certain advertisements fail to force themselves upon our
attention, and why certain others arouse our interest so that we read
them clear through, is the problem that Mr. Strong has set himself
to solve, and a preliminary statement of method was made under
the title of the role of attention in advertising. The first problem
of method indicates that the method of simultaneous presentation of
many advertisements gives no valid results, while the successive pres-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 187
entation of the same material gives surprisingly constant results
from different subjects. One of the by-products of the investiga-
tion so far as completed was that there is no indication of the potency
of either primacy or recency when more than ten advertisements are
shown successively and then tested for attention-value and memora-
bility by the recognition method; secondly, advertisements are as
simple psychically as nonsense syllables, at least as far as attention
and recognition enter. This latter fact, Mr. Strong held, was evi-
dence that the simple physically was not the simple psychically, and
that it is now time in experimental work to advance from the use of
simple to the use of complex material, particularly in the study of
esthetics.
Professor Warren challenged our entire system of elementary
education in a review of Montessori's method of teaching reading
and writing. The Casa dei Bambini, it was held, is an important
modification of the kindergarten and is founded upon an accurate
knowledge of the ability of children to do certain kinds of work at
certain stages of development. In this system the training of touch
and the kinesthetic senses are emphasized as important preludes to
the teaching of writing, which in turn precedes the teaching of read-
ing proper.
For some years, papers dealing with mental tests and the treat-
ment of defectives have found a place on the general program. At
the twentieth meeting a special session was set apart for this aspect
of psychology under the title of mental tests. Dr. Fernald discussed
a kinetic will test, the device for which was on exhibition in the
adjoining apparatus display. The apparatus measures fatigue in
terms of units of time. The subject stands on his toes on an indi-
cator which registers the amount of failure to keep the heels clear
from the plates. The fluctuation of the heels is registered on a dial
before the subject's face and this acts as a stimulus to keep the
effort going. The test was applied to 116 reformatory prisoners and
to 12 manual-training school students. The disparity of lowest
and highest scores is remarkable, i. e., 2% and 52 minutes in
the former group and 12 minutes and 2 hours in the latter group,
and the difference in the average and median for these two groups is
35 minutes, about twice the average of the reformatory group. No
subject involuntarily rested his heels while still striving, but each
decided to yield.
Dr. H. H. Goddard described an adaptation board and its use
and also discussed the present status of the Binet tests. He reported
tests on 400 feeble-minded children, 2,000 normal children, 56 de-
linquent girls, 100 juvenile court children, 100 children admitted to
the Rahway reformatory, and on an entire private school in Penn-
is* THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
sylvania. Further tests were reported on the insane, and the speaker
concluded that "the tests go a long way toward giving us what we
want, are accurate far beyond belief. While it is true that they
need supplementing and improving, yet it is quite possible that this
supplementing will have to be in the nature of a consideration of
individual cases and special tests for children. It is a problem that
may well occupy the attention of psychologists, but no one should
attempt to criticize the tests until he has used them on some hun-
dreds of children."
Dr. Wallin agreed that the Binet tests possess considerable value
as an instrument for gauging mental station and classifying groups
of mental defectives. He gave methods for testing the accuracy of
the scale as follows: (a) Extensive surveys of normal children to as-
certain if the age norms are correct; (6) annual tests of the same
groups, to determine whether the amount of actual growth corre-
sponds to the growth norms laid down in the scale; (c) the plotting
of curves of efficiency or capacity for each age for the various traits
tested in the scale.
At this same session Dr. Hollingworth presented a brief ac-
count of elaborate experiments on the influence of caffein on mental
and motor efficiency. Extensive accounts of these tests have since
appeared in the January numbers of The American Journal of
Psychology, The Psychological Review, The Therapeutic Gazette,
and in the Archives of Psychology, Columbia University Contribu-
tions to Psychology.
The Cornell experiments on the difference between memory and
imagination images, reported by Mrs. Perky 1 and generalized in
Titchener's recent text-book, received pointed criticism in a paper by
Dr. Martin, who, on the ground of experimental evidence, refused
to accept the results in question except as having an individual char-
acter. The differences between the two kinds of images were not
present in Dr. Martin 's results, her experiments being made on stu-
dents and professors at Bonn and Stanford universities.
Professor Washburn reported a new method of studying mediate
association, which was defined in the following manner : a process A
is followed in consciousness by an apparently unassociated process
C; later it is found that the connection was made by the process B,
formerly associated with both A and C, but not at this time appearing
in consciousness. The method used was as follows: The observer
was given a stimulus word and instructed to react with a wholly un-
associated word. 662 experiments were performed and a number of
typical mediate associations resulted. A full report of the experi-
ments appears in the January number of the American Journal of
Psychology.
1 American Journal of Psychology, No. 21, p. 422.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 189
Another paper from the Vassar Laboratory given by Miss Abbott
dealt with the effect of adaptation on temperature discrimination.
The method was to adapt the right and left hands to temperatures
differing by five degrees, and then to test for slightly wanner tem-
peratures. Such adaptation had more effect on the power of dis-
crimination than adaptation to extreme temperatures.
Mr. G. R. Wells reported the results of studies on the relation of
reaction time to the duration of auditory stimulus. Five lengths of
stimuli were used, viz., 76, 306, 516, 766, and 1066. No characteristic
difference was found in the reactions to these different stimuli.
Dr. Reudiger gave the results of a series of experiments made
with the Bloch instrument to determine the ability of four subjects
to localize 1 gram and 10 gram weights. The surfaces explored
were on the forearm and the weights were applied to a vein and to
surfaces where no vein was in evidence. Localization was just as ac-
curate with one gram as with ten grams and it was even more ac-
curate on a vein than on other parts of the skin. These facts, the
speaker held, were contrary to the sensation-complex theory of
space localization, and indicated that space perception on the skin
was to be explained on the ground of the sensation-element theory.
An experimental study of self -projection, meaning thereby any
explicit form of self-reference, was reported by Professor Richard-
son, the work being that of Professor Downey. Two chief forms
were recognized, the visual and the kinesthetic. Different reagents
saw themselves as actors in or spectators of a visualized scene. Kin-
esthetic or organic self-reference was found to occur frequently and
to assume the following forms: (1) objectified and fused with the
visual self; (2) oscillating with the visualized self and localized in
the body of the subject; (3) objectified and fused with a visualized
object or a visualized person other than the self; (4) abstracted from
all visual content and objectified or not.
The role of the organic factor in the consciousness of meaning
was emphasized in the report of experimental work by Professor
Murray. The use of an extended imagery questionnaire in a group
of elementary students brought out the fact that the organic imagery
was accessible to introspection. Such stimulus words as expectancy,
impatience, fright, surprise, relief, etc., were used, and definite or-
ganic imagery was roughly demonstrated. Further tests with such
words as mental, delicate, difficult, mistake, possible, etc., showed
that organic and motor imagery claimed an equal share with visual
and auditory imagery.
Dr. Starch described a method for the objective measurement of
handwriting by means of a celluloid graphometer, which measures
the mean variation of the slant letters and their mean deviation from
190 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tin- base line. These two are reduced to the same units of linear dis-
tance and averaged. In this manner all the samples in Thorndike's
scale were measured, which showed that the uniformity of letters
regularly decreases as the quality decreases.
The relation between the retina and right-handedness was dis-
cussed by Professor Stevens in reporting experimental results on the
study of the space sense of the retina. His conclusions are as fol-
lows: (1) in the horizontal meridian, the right half of an extent in
the field of vision is overestimated; (2) this overestimation holds true
for both right and left eyes; (3) the extent which is overestimated
forms its image upon the left corresponding halves of the two retinas ;
(4) the left corresponding halves of the retinas are connected exclu-
sively with the left hemispheres of the cerebrum; (5) by reason of
the fact of a marked difference in the space sense of the two halves
of the retina, those objects in the right half of the field of vision, by
appearing larger, attract the visual attention which in turn leads to
grasping movements of the right hand. The hand thus favored by
the earliest experiences acquires a special skill which causes it to be
used in all manual acts requiring the greatest precision.
Professor Magnusson reported experimental data on visual sensa-
tions caused by changes in the strength of a magnetic field. The
results verified the work of Dunlap and Thompson ; ascertained that
the magnetic field induced by making and breaking a direct current
gives a visual sensation ; gave threshold of the sensation in terms of
ampere turns and the dependence of the sensation upon the fre-
quency of the current. No sensation other than visual occurred and
no after effects were experienced.
Professor Cannon reported the work recently done at the Harvard
Medical School on physiological changes attending fear and rage in
cats. It was shown that the emotional excitements caused the
adrenal glands to pour adrenalin into the blood, and it was thought
that this might account for the continued excited state of the body.
It was further shown that glycosuris occurred, following the pro-
duction of adrenalin and the conclusion was that in the wild state
the production of sugar furnished new energy and the adrenalin
prevented fatigue. In this case these physiological changes would
be distinctly useful functions.
Introspection is not only an instrument of psychological investi-
gation, it is also itself a psychological process or group of processes,
and as such must be capable of psychological analysis. This was the
point of view defended by Professor Dodge in a paper on the nature
and limits of introspection. Such an analysis should furnish data
for the evaluation of the products of introspection, for an estimate
of its reliability as an instrument, and for an estimate of the factors
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 191
of mental life that it is best calculated to disclose. The world of
things is the result of the integration of sensory experience while
introspection furnishes material for the integration of unitary ex-
periences. The phenomena of introspection are not final facts of
mental life, but like the phenomena of sound, are indicators for
scientific construction.
Professor Dodge also described two new sphygmographic instru-
ments. The first which was demonstrated is a pneumatic photo-
graphic recorder of extremely low latency and high sensitivity.
Used in connection with any good microscope, it records vibrations of
over 1,000 per second, shows overtones of vowels and heart tones, and
gives pulse waves of any desired amplitude without changing its
latency or other constants. Suitable for class lantern-demonstrations
of pulse and plethysmographic changes, it is durable and practically
fool-proof, at least for any one who can use a microscope. The second
recorder was not demonstrated. It provides for recording the pulse
of a distant and active subject by means of a string galvanometer.
Mr. Munsell described his pigment color system and exhibited his
books and models and apparatus, including a daylight photometer
which attracted considerable attention. Lack of space forbids ade-
quate description here, but extended explanation may be found in
The Psychological Bulletin. 2
Apropos of the doctrine of reserve energy, Dr. Williams pointed
out that the inhibition of energy is not synonymous with storage and
the energy which is not expended so as to be seen by the superficial
observer is not merely held in reserve to be set free by therapeutic
treatment. What does happen is that the energy is rechanneled,
i. e., set going into new directions.
Dr. Burrow objected to the present anatomical, static, bureauolog-
ical ideas in connection with the definition of neurasthenia, and con-
tended for a more restricted, individual, dynamic interpretation,
such as may be yielded through a physiological analysis of a par-
ticular case. The conception of functional changes having their basis
in disintegrations occurring within the elements of the nervous sys-
tem so minute as to escape ordinary objective tests he held to be a
dodging of issues. He thought rather that important affective trends,
obstructed in their natural course, bring about vicarious gratifica-
tions in unconsciously motivated reactions, allied with the affective
state through somatic associated connections. Such somatic connec-
tions are the so-called symptoms of neurasthenia. This point of view,
he thought, was supported by the evidence from dreams where there
was a close parallel between the imagery of the patient as presented
in his dreams and the organic imagery presented in his symptoms.
2 Vol. 6, No. 7.
192 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Professor Jones, accepting Freud's definition of the term sublima-
tion as ' ' the capacity to exchange an original sexual aim for another
no longer sexual aim, though a psychically related one, ' ' argued that
these discarded desires form the basis of many of our interests and
activities in later life and insisted that a fuller knowledge of them
would be of the greatest value to education by indicating the most
fruitful paths along which sublimation could take place.
That the real cause of emotion is a failure in the mechanics of
brain integration, immediately occasioned by the occurrence of fac-
tors, inner and outer, that are too difficult of synthesis under the
given conditions and to whose action the organism may be abnormally
sensitive, was the thesis advanced by Professor Huey in a discussion
of emotivity and emotion in their relations to adaptation. The brain,
the speaker thought, may be as basal an organ of emotion as the
heart, and for many persons, disturbances of the pharynx, bladder,
genitals, or skin ' ' mirror the soul ' ' more than do the heart and blood
vessels. Emotional expression depends on (1) what functionings are
called for by the situation; (2) what functionings happen to be in
use at the time; (3) early acquired habits of reacting in a given
manner to a given emotional situation ; (4) what organs or functions
are most enfeebled, these being affected preferably; (5) occurrence
of misfit, instinctive functionings of possible utility in race experi-
ence; (6) functionings suggested to the individual in the fatigue of
emotion, social custom, contagion, or auto-suggestion.
At the business meeting, the committees on mental tests, on
teaching experiments, and on periodicals, reported progress and were
continued. The following recommendation of the council was
adopted: "The council, believing that the members of the association
should consider exercising a more direct control over the choice of its
officers, recommends the appointment of a committee of three to
consider this question, and, in the event of their approving a change
in the present arrangements, to submit to the next annual meeting
the necessary amendments to the constitution." Professors Aikins,
Minor, and Pierce were appointed to this committee.
On the recommendation of the council, Professor Thorndike was
elected president for the ensuing year and Professors Margaret F.
Washburn and Max Meyer were elected to membership in the council
for three years to succeed President Sanford and Professor Thorn-
dike. Professor Seashore, the retiring president, was elected to rep-
resent the association on the council of the A. A. A. S.
The next meeting will be held in Cleveland, in affiliation with the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, during the
Christmas holidays, 1912. The International Congress for the spring
of 1913 is abandoned. M. E. HAOOEBTY.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 193
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Animal Intelligence: Experimental Studies. EDWARD L. THORNDIKE. The
Animal Behavior Series. New York : Macmillan. 1911. Pp. viii -f- 297.
All psychologists will be glad to have Thorndike's experimental work
on the intelligence of animals brought together in this convenient form.
The thesis on " Animal Intelligence," which was for many of us the first
intimation that a real science of comparative psychology was possible,
has been for some time out of print. It is here reprinted, together with
the paper on " The Instinctive Reactions of Young Chicks," the " Note
on the Psychology of Fishes," and the monograph on " The Mental Life
of the Monkeys." To these papers there have been added an introductory
chapter, an essay on " Laws and Hypotheses of Behavior," and one on
" The Evolution of the Human Intellect."
It is the new chapters, of course, that demand discussion in the present
review. Thorndike's experimental researches have now undergone the test
of time, and their influence has been valuable enough to satisfy any
worker in a scientific field: few doctors' theses, indeed, have been so fruit-
ful as " Animal Intelligence." The introductory chapter in the present
book defends the study of behavior as opposed to that of " consciousness
as such." The chapter on "Laws and Hypotheses for Behavior" pro-
poses, as laws of behavior in general, that behavior is predictable, that
" every response or change in response of an animal is the result of the
interaction of its original knowable nature and the environment " ; and
the law of instinct, that " to any situation an animal will, apart from
learning, respond by virtue of the inherited nature of its reception-, con-
nection-, and action-systems." All learning can be brought under the
law of effect, that " of several responses made to the same situation, those
which are accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the animal
will, other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation,
so that, when it recurs, they will be more likely to recur;" the reverse
being true of responses accompanied by discomfort; and the law of exer-
cise, that " any response to a situation will, other things being equal, be
more strongly connected with the situation in proportion to the number of
times it has been connected with that situation and to the average vigor
and duration of the connections. The satisfaction and discomfort men-
tioned in the law of effect are correlated with advantage and disadvantage,
not necessarily to the organism as a whole, but to its neurones." Acces-
sory conditions to the laws of effect and of exercise are the closeness with
which the satisfaction is associated with the response, and " the readiness
of the response to be connected with the situation." The chief point at
which the reviewer would take issue with the author in this chapter con-
cerns the relation between an act and the idea of an act. As is well
known, Thorndike opposes the doctrine that an idea of a movement causes
the movement. The reviewer, for whom this doctrine is one of the really
valuable and fruitful discoveries of modern psychology, has long felt that
its critics misunderstood the meaning of the term " movement idea," and
the arguments put forward in the chapter under consideration confirm
this opinion. Take for instance the following: "It is certain that in at
194 I HE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
least nine cases out of ten a response is produced, not by an image or
other representation of it, but by a situation nowise like it or any of its
accessories. Hunger and the perception of edible objects far outweigh
ideas of grasping, biting, and swallowing as causes of the eating done in
the world." It is surely sufficient to reply that the doctrine of the move-
ment idea is applied to the perfecting of new responses, not to the per-
formance of instinctive responses, and that of course even in new re-
sponses the place of the movement idea is commonly later taken by an
associated idea or perception. " It is also certain," the author continues,
" that the idea of a response may be impotent to produce it. I can not
produce a sneeze by thinking of sneezing. And, of course, one can have
ideas of running a mile in two minutes, jumping a fence eight feet high,
or drawing a line exactly equal to a hundred millimeter line, just as easily
as of running the mile in ten minutes, or jumping four feet. It is further
certain that the thought of doing one thing very often results in the man's
doing something quite different. The thought of moving the eyes
smoothly without stops along a line of print has occurred to many people,
who nevertheless actually did as a result move the eyes in a series of
jumps with long stops." The sneeze, of course, as a reflex, may be left
out of consideration; nobody ever claimed that movement ideas produced
reflexes. As for the other instances adduced, it is sufficient to say that no
one has ever had an idea of running a mile in two minutes, or of any of
the other impossible feats mentioned, or of moving the eyes smoothly
along a line of print. The ideas which people may have thus labeled
would be revealed by even a moderate degree of introspective analysis to
be ideas of movements that had actually been performed by the persons
entertaining the ideas. A movement idea is the revival, without periph-
eral stimulation, of the sensations that resulted from the actual per-
formance of the movement: if the movement has never been performed,
its idea is impossible.
Further, Professor Thorndike appears to think that the admission of
the law that the idea of a movement can cause the performance of the
movement would add a third principle of learning to the laws of effect
and exercise. It would never have occurred to the reviewer not to see in
the law of the movement idea a striking instance of the law of effect. It
is of course always understood that a movement idea will not produce the
corresponding movement if it or any of the associated processes that may be
substituted for it has been connected with sufficiently strong unpleasantness.
Just as an outside stimulus that by virtue of an inherited nervous con-
nection naturally produces a movement may cease to do so if the move-
ment has unpleasant consequences, so may a movement idea lose its move-
ment-generating power. And the movement idea is itself based on the
most immediate effect of the movement; the sensations, kinesthetic and
otherwise, that are aroused by the motor process as it takes place.
In the last chapter, on " The Evolution of Human Intellect " the writer
points out that the superiority of the human mind consists in the power
of analyzing situations, which, in turn, depends on " the increased delicacy
and complexity of the cell structures in the human brain."
VASSAK COLLEGE. MARGARET FLOY WASHBURN.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 195
A Text-book of Experimental Psychology. (With Laboratory Exercises.)
CHARLES S. MEYERS. Second Edition. 2 volumes. New York:
Longmanns, Green, and Co. 1911.
The first glance at the second edition of this useful book reveals a
striking improvement in general appearance, in binding, quality of paper,
and in other details that go far toward making a book agreeably received.
From the point of view of content, the references at the chapter ends have
been brought up to date and the following changes have been made in the
text.
In chapter two (Cutaneous and Visceral Sensations) the recent work
of Head and Kivers is amplified, and Head's assumption of the existence of
two differently distributed systems of peripheral nerves underlying the
two systems of cutaneous sensibility gives way to the suggestion of a
single physiological system dissociated into separate psychological systems.
The paragraph on " The Specific Nature of Pain Sensations " is omitted.
To chapters three and four (Auditory Sensations) are added a paragraph
on vowel quality of tones and two on consonant intervals and fusion.
Erom chapter five is omitted the section on " Nervous Connections of the
Motor and Labyrinthine Sensory Apparatus." Hering's colored diagrams,
showing the relation between the pairs of antagonistic colors, are added
to the chapters on " Visual Sensations." Chapters twelve and thirteen,
on " Memory," remain unchanged except for the inclusion of the " method
of reconstruction." Various parts of these chapters remain obscure to the
average student, but this difficulty largely inheres in the nature of the
material itself. Chapter sixteen, " On Weight," is recaptioned " On Mus-
cular Effort," and supplemented by recent work on ocular movements.
The chapter on "Local Signature" contains a new section dealing with
" Autokinetic Sensations," and in the chapter on " Experiences of Iden-
tity and Difference " appears a paragraph on " The Influence of the Sen-
sory Cortex." The chapter on " Feeling " now precedes that on " Atten-
tion " and is supplemented by a statement of the effects of thalamic lesion.
A final new chapter on " Thought and Volition " gives a brief view of the
recent experimental investigations of imageless thought, the conative ex-
perience sui generis, determining tendencies and attitudes of conscious-
ness, chiefly from the point of view of method.
Volume two, of one hundred and seven pages, contains the laboratory
exercises. The manual is inadequate as a guide in the hands of the be-
ginning student, since it lacks sufficient prescription of method and de-
tailed procedure. It will serve better as a manual of suggestions to the
instructor, who, unless he can work personally and continuously with each
pair of students or satisfactorily rehearse the experiment in a preliminary
way before the class as a whole, must work out his own outline in detail.
For suggestions toward the contents of such an outline the manual is very
useful in the fields covered. The reviewer regrets that the publishers have
announced that the two volumes will not be sold separately.
H. L. HOLLINGWORTH.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
196 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. November, 1911. Le probleme soci-
ologique et le probli-me philosophique (pp. 449-490) : E. DE ROBERTY. -
The neo-positivistic position, that philosophy, like all branches of knowl-
edge, has been in the past beset with illusions, " a real astrology and
alchemy of general thought," is going to result in a new study, purely
sociological, of the concepts of the mind and the laws of nature. Freud
et le probleme des reves (pp. 491-522) : KOSTYLEFF. - Freud's principle,
the progress of sensorial regression, finds in objective psychology a physio-
logical basis that responds to all the varieties of dreams. Vie animale et
vie morale (pp. 523-528) : A. LAI.A.M n.. - A response to an article of Le
Dantec on " Vegetative and Intellectual Life." Revue Generate. Les
periodiques allemands de psychologic: FOUCALT. Analyses et comptes
rendus. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx: L. DAURIAC. Moore, Prag-
matism and its Critics: L. DAURIAC. L. Daville, Leibnitz historien: A.
PENJON. K. Vorlander, Oeschichte der Philosophic: M. SOLOVINE. Ber-
nardino Telesio, De Rerum Natura: M. SOLOVINE. A. Wohlgemuth, On
the After-effect of Seen Movements: B. BOURDON. Necrologie.
Keyserling, Hermann Graf. Prolegomena zur Naturphilosophie.
Munchen : J. F. Lehmann's Verlag. 1910. Pp. xii -f 159. 5 M.
Ostwald, W. Natural Philosophy. Translated by T. Seltzer. New York :
Henry Holt & Co. 1910. Pp. ix -f 193. $1.00.
NOTES AND NEWS
THERE has been established in Geneva an Institute for the Science of
Education, which will be opened October 15, 1912. M. Pierre Bovet, pro-
fessor of philosophy and pedagogy at the University of Neuchatel, has
been chosen director, and Professor Ed. Claparede, director of the psycho-
logical laboratory at the University of Geneva, will give instruction in
psychology. The institute will be open to those who wish to follow the
vocation of teaching.
MAURICE DE WULF, professor at the University of Louvain, announces
that the new edition of his work, " Histoire de la Philosophie Medievale,"
contains many expansions in the text and the addition to the bibliography
of many titles of books produced within the past five years.
THE Holiday Course organized by the University of Lille, with the co-
operation of the Alliance Franchise, will enter upon its eighth year at
Boulogne-sur-Mer in August, 1912. The course is planned to appeal to all
students, whatever their knowledge of the French language may be.
PROFESSOR CHARLES SEDOWICK MINOT has been selected by the German
government as Harvard exchange professor at the University of Berlin for
1912-13. Dr. Rudolf Eucken, professor of philosophy at Jena, has been
appointed exchange professor at Harvard University.
VOL. IX. No. 8. APRIL 11, 1912.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF SYSTEMS
1. THE SEPARATION OF PROBLEMS
~\ /TATHEMATICS, physics, astronomy were mere chapters in
-i-V_L the philosophy of Greece. Gradually they became conscious
of their own problems and matured into relative independence.
This process of emancipation is typical: many classes of problems
(an infinite number perhaps!) are contained in the realm of what is
commonly called philosophy; more or less vague efforts at solving
them are made, and these absorb the attention for a while until there
comes a day when one class is recognized as distinct from the others,
and a new science is born out of philosophy. Mathematics arrived at
this condition early; physics only in the days of Galileo. It is true
the experimental method which he used would alone assure him im-
mortality. But it is not this new method which emancipated physics ;
it is the particular type of problem which Galileo set. At first sight
it might seem limited in application and insignificant in interest;
but it proved fruitful in calling forth other problems of the same
type, in whose solution the same or similar methods of procedure
were effective. Singling out a new type of problem gave birth to
a new science.
This process of emancipation of philosophy's progeny is going on
vigorously even to-day. It seems only yesterday that chemistry was
born; and now psychology is asserting with gentle emphasis that it
is weaned from the mother milk of philosophy !
In the realm of the old Aristotelian logic there are four distinct
classes of problems that are still treated promiscuously and with-
out regard for their inherent distinctions. Solutions of one are
given out for solutions of another, though in reality they may be per-
fectly irrelevant to it. To separate these disciplines by clearly dis-
tinguishing the kinds of problems which they present will greatly
help in their development; it is the first and indispensable step
toward their proper solution.
197
198 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
They all refer principally to what may be called "cognition,"
i. e., knowledge of a certain kind characterized by the property of
being coherent, necessary, systematic, etc. Mathematics, physics,
may stand as examples of what is here designated by cognition and
may always be substituted for it in the present discussion.
Suppose a system of cognition, such as plane geometry, to be
given, 6. gr., in the form of Euclid's "Elements." Various questions
may be asked regarding it, such as: Are the propositions clear and
convincing? Do you grasp them readily, or only with difficulty?
Are the "axioms" more "evident" to you than the propositions?
How is your attitude toward the truth of a proposition affected by
the "proof" which is given of it? Is your study aided or impeded
by "logical rigor" in the formulation of the "axioms" and the ar-
rangement of the propositions? How were these propositions dis-
covered, and what natural conditions are most favorable for discov-
ering new ones? These questions can easily be multiplied indefi-
nitely. They are all of a certain type which may be characterized
as follows: They imply that, besides the system of geometry, an "I"
or "you," in general, a "consciousness," a "subject" is given, and
the questions concern the relation of this "consciousness" to the
system of propositions of geometry. Both are, in the meaning of
the questions, separate, distinct, though in relation to each other.
What this relation is in particular is not stated. The propositions of
geometry may be conceived as "acts" of this "subject," as "con-
tent" of this "consciousness," and thus as residing in this "ego";
but the words "acts," "content," "in" indicate again special rela-
tions of these propositions to the "subject," just as did "evidence,"
"clearness," "difficulty of apprehension." Any question even
whether a proposition may "exist" independently of a "human con-
sciousness" or whether it is, first and last, nothing but a "content of
some human consciousness" must be considered to be of the same
type.
In order to make this clearer let us call the propositions, con-
cepts, etc., such as form plane geometry, "logical entities," and
let us say that they have "existence" in a definite realm which
we will call the "realm of logical entities." Distinct from this
"realm of logical entities "is the " ego " which enters into (or is in)
relation to them; and I shall call this relation the "subject-relation"
of the logical entities. Some such distinction is indeed required by
any of the above questions and it does not in any way prejudice the
decision as to what the subject-relation will be: the whole realm of
logical entities may be "immanent" in the "ego," or "transcendent"
immanence and transcendence would merely express definite kinds
of subject-relation.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 199
It is apparent that what ordinarily passes for "idealism" is
concerned primarily with problems regarding the subject-relation.
And it has often passed for "obvious" that a consideration of the
subject-relation is primary, indispensable, unavoidable, decisive.
Quite on the contrary it seems to me necessary to recognize that
problems regarding the subject-relation are merely one type of prob-
lems, that other, distinct types of problems are possible and impor-
tant in the solution of which a decision regarding the subject-relation
is irrelevant. This does not derogate in the least from the impor-
tance of carefully studying the subject-relation.
It seems to be recognized more and more that problems of this
type belong to psychology; and I shall therefore speak of "Psychol-
ogy of Cognition" to designate the discipline which studies the sub-
ject-relations of logical entities. It may be that this type of prob-
lems can fruitfully be subdivided; it may be that this whole type
should be classified differently; it will have no bearing on the pres-
ent study, so long as problems regarding the subject-relation of log-
ical entities are recognized as distinct from others regarding the log-
ical entities themselves.
It is a platitude that nothing is true for me unless it is true for
me though much discussion has hinged on this platitude. An ex-
treme individualism has based on it the theory that no truth exists
for me, unless it is recognized, seen, apprehended as such by me.
All those who urge "evidence" as the test of logical truth, maintain
in the last resort, or frankly even from the beginning, this theory.
They base ' ' logic " on " psychology ' ' ; for ' ' evidence ' ' is one kind of
"subject-relation." So long as this subject-relation remains the
problem under investigation, their claim may be made with much
force. We seem indeed to be constantly guided in our search for
truth by the "clair et evident" of Descartes though it may well be
suspected that the subject-relation corresponding to what we call
"truth" is much more complicated, as the pragmatists are showing
with convincing force. But when we set the problem of the truth of
a proposition, apart from its power of convincing me or you, pro-
vided such a problem is admitted as possible, we enter a completely
different realm of investigation. Still clearer is this when we state
such problems as: Does proposition p 1 "imply" p 2 , or not? What
is the exact relation of p l to p 2 l Can p 2 be "proved" by assuming
P! ? We then do not ask : Can "we" prove p 2 , but : Can it be proved?
And these two do not by any means coincide. We must often admit
the logical existence of relations, though "we" are unable to exhibit
them. Every algebraical equation has a root, i. e., a root "exists,"
but given an algebraical equation "we" can but rarely find it. It is
by no means necessary to go to special cases in mathematics to show
200 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the distinction between "logical" and "psychological" existence,
though it is good to give a radical example where no "knower" ex-
ists who psychologically "perceives" the existence of the logical
entity. For whilst in the ordinary examples we readily admit that
a certain relation may logically exist between p l and p 2 , though
"you" or "I" do not "see" it, t. e., though it does not exist for
"us," we are apt to overlook the radical nature of the distinction,
because we may still, and often rightly, say: but it exists "psycho-
logically" for "somebody." This blurs the distinction; for instead
of entering into the purely logical question of the relation of p l to
p,, we fall back into the psychological question of the subject-rela-
tion of this logical relation, by reiterating: but the relation R must be
in subject-relation to " somebody, " some " consciousness, " some " sub-
ject," some "knower"! This is a mixing of problems, for the ques-
tion was not : How do we, or how does anybody, perceive, or find, or in
whichever manner establish a subject-relation to R', but: does it
"exist"; does the proposition that "the sum of the angles in a plane
triangle is equal to two right ones "presuppose the "parallel axiom"?
To some it will, no doubt, be quite impossible to "ignore," for
the time being, the psychological problem of the subject-relation, and
to them the "realm of logical entities" will always flit around some
"consciousness"; as the platonic ideas always had physical exist-
ence somewhere, as Kant's "transcendental ego" was hidden in the
innermost depths of the brain. And yet, it is just this "ignoring"
of one problem when moving in the realm of another which is so
characteristic of all fruitful work: in any "object" many kinds of
problems intersect; properly and systematically to ignore the
"others" is the first and necessary step toward the solution of the
"one."
Whatever theory is accepted regarding the subject-relation of a
logical entity does not in any way decide the question of its logical
existence. If it is held that all logical entities without exception are
in subject-relation to some "consciousness," it is still necessary to
establish the distinction between "existing" and "non-existing"
logical entities. This may be done by saying: a logical entity "ex-
ists" if it is "necessary," "of general validity"; whether such an
attempt would prove successful or not is not our concern here ; but
it is our concern to insist that the mere relation of all logical entities
to some consciousness is not capable of serving for a criterion to es-
tablish this distinction. It is irrelevant to the problem of the exist-
ence of logical entities.
If this distinction of the problems regarding the subject-relation
of logical entities from those regarding the logical entities them-
selves is admitted, we may proceed to exemplify the latter types of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 201
problems. I shall call them "Logic of Cognition," "Critique of
Cognition," and "Structure of Cognition."
"Logic of cognition" treats of the relations of logical entities,
not to a subject, but to each other. What are the propositions of
plane geometry? Does a certain proposition p^ "imply" another
p 2 ? What consequences follow from certain assumptions? What
laws are valid in the drawing of inferences? Logic of cognition
constructs, from the true beginning, systems of cognition. Attempts
such as Whitehead and Russell's "Principia Mathematica" are es-
sentially examples of what is meant here by "logic of cognition."
It is dogmatic in form ; it does not justify or criticize ; it exhibits, it
hypothesizes, it proves; in brief, it constructs.
But with its special type of problems "logic of cognition," par-
ticularly in its beginning, combines (and often confuses) problems
of the third type: "critique of cognition." "Critique" determines
the logical ' ' value ' ' of systems of cognition ; its main problem is the
determination of the "truth" of a system, whilst "logic of cog-
nition ' ' should be indifferent to the question whether the hypotheses,
whose consequences it develops, are true or not. When mathema-
ticians exhibit sets of postulates of algebra, of geometry, they move
in the realm of "logic of cognition"; when they add proofs of the
"independence" or "consistency" of these postulates, they enter
into the realm of "critique of cognition." Critique elaborates and
applies certain criteria (which may be called "criteria of truth")
to systems of cognition.
Construction and critical examination of systems of cognition,
embracing as they are, leave still another type of problems dealing
with the logical entities themselves. To state this new type of prob-
lems, I find it convenient to take up the old distinction between
"form" and "content" and apply it to systems of cognition. Sup-
pose we are studying the properties of parallelograms. We could
write down a system of propositions, such as : the opposite sides are
parallel ; the opposite sides are equal ; the opposite angles are equal ;
etc. But we might next ask: Are these propositions "independent"
of each other? Or can we, in a plane geometry, by assuming some
of them, deduce the others? We might then elaborate a different
set of propositions, in which we proceed from some "defining" the
parallelogram to others which we "prove." In both cases the same
logical "content" is presented, namely, the properties of a parallelo-
gram, but in different "form": a mere enumeration was "trans-
formed" into a deductive system. And therewith a whole class of
problems is presented all of which refer to the structure of these
possible forms, in which the logical content of systems of cognition
is or may be presented. What are the structural elements of a
202 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
"deductive system"! How is it to be distinguished from "induc-
tive systems"? What are the advantages of either form? What
conditions must a certain logical content satisfy so that it can be put
into the deductive system form? Are other, better forms existent or
possible? What is the nature and function of "axioms," "defini-
tions," "proofs"? The problem of the "new" in mathematics, the
advantages and disadvantages of applying the deductive system
form to "philosophy," all these are examples of the type of prob-
lems which constitute "structure of cognition."
These preliminary remarks may serve to direct attention away
from some problems and toward the type to be examined in these
studies, namely, the ones pertaining to "structure of cognition."
Toward the necessity of keeping these problems distinct the follow-
ing studies will add new evidence. Yet, the relation of these four
disciplines to each other is so peculiarly close, that it is small wonder
they have not been clearly distinguished before. No system can be
presented without an appeal to the understanding of the reader,
t. ., without some subject-relation; every system will use concepts
and propositions of logic of cognition ; every system will have some
structure, and endeavor to conform to the criteria of truth. This
tends to confuse the issues; but if the emphasis is laid on the prob-
lem which is presented for solution, the distinction becomes simple.
Every system has a definite structure, but this structure need not
be the problem of every investigation ; every system shall enter into
a definite subject-relation, but this subject-relation need not be the
problem of every investigation, etc.
Since the days of Kant, and largely in consequence of his work,
our thinking has been controlled by the idea of "presupposition."
Categories and fundamental judgments were to him "conditions of
the possibility of experience," t. e., that which is necessarily pre-
supposed by experience itself. This idea has been extended to apply
to sciences as a whole when we say : mathematics is presupposed by
physics and attempts have been made to order the various disciplines
in a series from this point of view of "presupposition." It is neces-
sary to insist here, however, that this idea of ' ' presupposition ' ' leads
readily to vagueness and confusion if applied promiscuously. It re-
quires two restrictions.
In the first place it is by no means "self evident" that the vari-
ous disciplines can really be arranged in serial order by this prin-
ciple of presupposition ; and this applies to the four disciplines which
we have differentiated above. In a certain sense any one of them
"presupposes" all the others. You can not study the subject-relation
without using logical concepts and methods, without applying a
definite ideal of truth, without putting the logical content of your
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 203
study into a form of definite structure ; and the same applies around
the circle. Not only is it vain thus to try to find the "more funda-
mental" of the four, but it is positively misleading and injurious:
we are apt to think that the questions of one can not be answered
unless those of all the others are answered, somehow or other, first.
We become so involved in "presuppositions" that we are unable to
move a step forward or backward. The lesson of this predicament
is instructive for all other cases. We must break through the idea
of "presupposition" as applied to the various disciplines and recog-
nize that each discipline makes its own presuppositions, its own
hypotheses on which it builds; and in doing so may ignore the
hypotheses of others. Mathematicians let "solids" interpenetrate
each other, assume lines without breadth, weight, or color; to the
physicist or psychologist such entities may be quite chimerical.
In the second place the idea of "presupposition" is meaningless,
unless the "point of view" is added from which the presupposition
is considered, in other words unless we state in the realm of which
problem the particular presupposition is studied. The discipline
which is "presupposed" by another in the realm of one problem
may in turn presuppose it in the realm of a different problem. And
thus we are led back again to the first distinction between the various
problems which control our procedure: not methods, not objects,
not principles and presuppositions separate these disciplines "psy-
chology of cognition," "logic of cognition," "critique of cogni-
tion," "structure of cognition," but their problems!
If this is kept in mind, a paradox which may otherwise be puz-
zling will readily dissolve. In this study of the structure of systems
we shall frequently "criticize" other accounts, and in this critique
apply criteria which can be developed satisfactorily only in ' ' critique
of cognition." Thus we shall frequently apply the criterion of
"completeness": certain accounts will be found defective in com-
pleteness in that they do not account for certain "facts." This
would indeed be an infringement on the proper province of "critique
of cognition," were it not for the circumstance that such critique
is here merely incidental and for purposes of exposition. When
some day the structure of systems will be studied more elaborately,
we shall be able to dogmatically develop the various possible ac-
counts, and then submit them to a systematic "critique." The
growth of any science illustrates this, though what has been done
more or less instinctively we can to-day see rationally. The change
in procedure between Russell's "Principles of Mathematics" and
Whitehead-Russell's "Principia Mathematica" is instructive in this
respect, and illustrates the maxim that the reduction in polemic is
proportional to the degree of logical perfection of a discipline; for
i?04 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the logical development of a system is one thing, its critical evalua-
tion a second and distinct problem.
KARL SCHMIDT.
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
A SIMPLE METHOD FOR THE STUDY OF ENTOPTIC
PHENOMENA
THE introspective examination of the eye is interesting, both in
experiments and in classroom work. The general name of
entoptics for this subject was suggested by J. K. Listing. The
method of studying the interior of one's own eyes, by letting light
shine through a small pin-hole held close to the eye, has been care-
fully developed. Barrett constructed an elaborate instrument on
this plan and made some detailed experiments which are reported
in the Proceedings of the Dublin Royal Society, 1906. That the in-
side of the eye can be illuminated by the light reflected from a
bright surface held close to the eyeball has been frequently men-
tioned, but the possible improvements in method that this fact pro-
vides have not been developed so far as I am aware, nor have their
great advantages been appreciated.
A very simple and very effective apparatus for becoming ac-
quainted with some of the characteristics and phenomena of one's
own eye is provided by small silver beads strung on a wire in a
spectacle frame. From the standpoint of psychology, perhaps the
most important use of such an instrument is in the study of the
movements of the iris. 1 If, for instance, three beads are strung for
each eye on a wire adjusted to the spectacle frame so that they are
horizontal just below or perpendicular to one side of the pupil, they
will throw three circles of light upon different parts of the retina of
each eye. For some experiments it is well to cover the frame with
black cloth, allowing the beads to show through a slit. The beads
may be moved back and forth and the intensity of the light increased
or diminished by approaching it or removing from it until the middle
circle is exactly tangent to the two others.
In the first place we have here a means of observing the reflex
action of the pupils in both the eyes at the same time. Their co-
ordination may be examined.
In the second place we have a means of measuring quite exactly
1 Badol reports an instrument to study dilations of the pupil in Transactions
de la Societe de Biologic, 1876. He used a cylinder and two cards with pin-holes.
For the study of iris movements from the medical standpoint, see Bumke,
" Pupillenstorungen, " 1904, and Bache, " Pupillenlehre, " 1908.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 205
the enlargement and contraction of the pupil. The middle circle
will go over into the field of the other circles or will draw away from
them. A scale at a fixed distance from the eye may be used to inter-
pret dimensions objectively.
In the third place and this is an exceedingly important point
the observer may take an easy position, settling back in his chair and
permitting everything to fall into a normal condition. Such a con-
dition is hardly possible where the eye is being looked at from the
outside.
The reflex movements due to quantity of illumination, to con-
verging movements of the eyeballs, to bodily irritations, and to
mental states can be examined at one's leisure. A physician who
undertakes to study iris movements in a patient would do well to be
familiar with the reflex action in his own eye. Interesting are the
changing jerkiness of the continual oscillations, the influence of
fatigue, the reaction time, etc. It is noticeable, for instance, that the
motion of the circles of light away from the center is greater than
that about the macula. Again, the student will probably be surprised
to find that, given a certain coordinated dilation with one eye closed,
the opening of the closed eye brings about a quick contraction. He
might have expected that, as the intensity of the sensation is not
increased when objects are seen with two eyes, so the reflex motor
effect would not be increased.
The use of a single bead with two or three sources of light moved
nearer and farther away enables one to light up surfaces of the
retina with different intensities. This different lighting is an ad-
vantage when one wishes to compare entoptic shadows falling on the
outer portions of the retina with shadows at the center. If the light-
ing be of the same degree, the central shadows are so much clearer
that it is hard to pay attention to those away from the center. The
difficulty may be partly overcome by strengthening the illumination
which is thrown upon the outer parts of the retina. This advantage
becomes quite important when one is trying to locate the position of
the bodies which throw the shadows. Those near the center of the
lens do not change their respective location on the different circles of
light. Those in front move apart and those behind move together.
In my own eye there is a fixed opaque body at about the center of
the lens. A body like this enables one to confirm the blind spot.
There is also a movable anchored body on the nasal side just back of
the lens. I can throw this into the field of vision by a quick move-
ment of the eyeball, and then it will slowly draw back out of sight.
If the light be dimmed the iris curtains are drawn away and show it
stationary.
These circles of light give indirect information about the place
206 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of the veins and arteries that appear upon the retina when a light is
moved about just below the pupil. The student will probably be
surprised to learn first of all that none of the blood-vessels are made
visible when the circles of light are thrown upon the retina from hi
bead. Our method of studying entoptic phenomena allows a simul-
taneous combination with Purkinje's experiment. The arbor-like
branches will then be seen passing right across the circles of light.
I will mention one more fact observed on using one bead with
two lights, which seems to have a rather special psychological inter-
est. If a light of a certain intensity is throwing a circle upon one
portion of the retina and another stronger light is turned on to
throw a circle upon another portion quite a distance away, there is
an immediate dimming of the first circle. The dimming is of such a
character as to appear to be entirely a peripheral matter and not
due to mental interpretation from contrast. A possible analogy
might be the disturbance of one current of electricity by the proxi-
mat ion of a much stronger current.
The same bead arrangement may be used to throw different colors
from colored electric light globes upon different surfaces of the
retina. These circles may be superposed, the different parts of the
retina compared as to color sensation, the effects of contrasts brought
out, etc.
GEORGE R. MONTGOMERY.
Niw YORK UNIVERSITY.
DISCUSSION
ON MIND AS AN OBSERVABLE OBJECT 1
A PAPER of this same title which I offered a year ago met with
a success beyond my expectation. It is something to have
aimed at brevity and to be assured one has not missed completeness.
Now there are a number of ways in which a theory of mind may be
vitally amiss : in its epistemological background, in its psychological
application, in its ethical consequences. Yet brief as was my exposi-
tion, my critics gave me to understand that I had let none of these
ways of going astray escape me.
If then I return to my thesis, if I am led into an insistence
neither justified by its merit nor excused by its interest, something
1 This paper was prepared to be read before the Philosophical Association
at Cambridge; but owing to a misunderstanding on the author's part was
presented too late to be included in the program. With this explanation, the
paper is offered without change of form.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 207
must be forgiven a scruple : I would make sure that my sinning was
as round and perfect as my critics would have me think.
As for background, it can not be painted in with a word or two.
Professor Miller in the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY has called attention
to the defects of an epistemology that would let one speak of mind
as a trait of behavior, and I have met as best I could objections so
well considered and so clearly put.
This matter of background may then be allowed to rest for the
moment, but it is with no little regret that I postpone the considera-
tion of ethical consequences. For I was greatly interested in a de-
duction of Professor Ormond 's making : One who regards mind as a
trait of behavior, must he not hold that when the body is dissolved
in death the soul that once inspired its outworn flesh is also dissi-
pated and lost?
I have spoken too hastily of criticism. Mr. Ormond would justly
blame me for classing under this head remarks that were meant for
no more than question. Mr. Ormond would be no more inclined
than I to assume that a philosopher is bound to save his soul. On
the other hand, I am at least as unwilling as Mr. Ormond could be
to divest myself of any rag of immortality that may still cling to
me in this cool age. But there are immortal souls and immortal
souls. The learned in their high power of abstraction have pre-
tended to find solace in the thought of a soul that, surviving the body,
continues to enjoy all the individuality embodiment once conferred
on it ; living on, I know not where ; experiencing, I know not what
I can't think how. This very algebraic soul, this diagram of an
ethical idea, my thought may inadvertently have rubbed out. If so,
let that rest which never has rested.
But simple folk too have their notion of immortality, and with the
simple I would seem to have much in common. I should be sorry to
feel that nowhere in my philosophy might I come across the like of
that brave and kind soul which has gone marching on now these
many years in the songs that men sing. Would you say that my
thought had fallen into undignified ways if it sought this spirit in
the very world that still sings its name, in the world which still
holds a grave where its body lies a-mouldering ?
Of all these delicate, difficult matters I would willingly speak
another time. Just now there faces me an issue more vital than the
destiny of souls after death it has to do with the nature of souls
during life.
To Miss Washburn, whose interest lies in comparing souls, I am
indebted for a criticism that cared little enough what theory of
knowledge may have gone before my thesis, what ethics might follow
on it. Miss Washburn 's criticism aimed at things practical: What
208 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
are you going to do with a being who thinks, but who exhibits no be-
havior for the very reason that he thinks? What are you going to
do with the passive, the utterly passive thinker?
Before the Pantheon at Paris sits Rodin's image of the Thinker.
I know that a statue doesn't really think, but I know too that those
who think may sit as stonily statuesque as Rodin 's Thinker. Of one
who has dared to suggest that mind is a trait of behavior it must
inevitably be asked, What in the behavior of the thinker who doesn't
behave is his thought?
In the face of criticism so sympathetic and yet so thoroughgoing,
it would be vain to point out the differences that make flesh not
marble and marble not flesh. Of course the creature of blood and
muscle is not wholly inert : his heart beats, he breathes, his eyes blink.
More than that the dendronated termini of the axis cylinder proc-
esses of his cortical nerve cells may now and then put forth a new
shoot; at the very least, some molecules of him may effect an inter-
change of atoms while he thinks. The trouble is that Miss Washburn
refuses to identify any sort of a motion of atoms with a thought, and
this makes the whole situation trying. If I say that the movement
of certain atoms is what I mean by the behavior which is thought,
the hands of Vogt and Biichner will reach out from Orcus and have
me. If I refuse to say this, my own hands will seem to cast me off.
One who has to surmount an obstacle of magnitude is entitled is
he not to a running start, a start from old and settled things if any
such can be found that hold an analogy? Now this image of the
passive thinker does suggest to me something so old as to be almost
forgotten it is the figure of dormant life.
In the British Foreign Medical Review for January, 1839, ap-
pears the review of a recent medical work. The author, Mr. Car-
penter, had defined life as action and had shown so the sympathetic
reviewer sums him up "that instead of looking for its cause in an
imaginary vital principle . . . presumed to exist for the sake of ex-
plaining the phenomena, we ought to study the properties which or-
ganized structure enjoys and the agents which produce their mani-
festation. ' '
Even to this reviewer of 1839 the idea that life is behavior has
nothing new about it, for he continues, ' ' Some observations are made
(by Mr. Carpenter) in refutation of the doctrine of a vital principle
and we do not think them supererogatory ; for although the hypoth-
esis would hardly have been expected to survive the fine scientific
thrusts of Dr. Pritchard's classic weapon or the strokes of Dr.
Fletcher's more truculent blade, it seems even yet not quite extinct."*
M. Paine, Med. and Phyt. Com., I., 13.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 209
The theory that life was something other than behavior was not
quite extinct in 1839! Will any theory that substitutes a Ding an
sich for observable phenomena ever win to extinction? After dor-
mant life comes passive thought.
But to return to 1839 and the years that follow. Among our
early American physiologists is to be numbered Martyn Paine, whose
work is characterized by the late Dr. Gross as "of great scope and
much erudition." Of much erudition, surely, and I beg to recom-
mend Paine 's "Medical and Physiological Commentaries" to any
in search of sources for a history of vitalism. Of what scope too
I know to my sorrow. And yet of the pages and pages of erudition
and scope would you know the one image that sticks firmly in my
mind, Martyn Paine 's arm and shield against classic weapon and
.truculent blade? It is just a seed, just an ordinary grain of corn,
say. For one may defy the world to prove that this little dried-up
thing is doing aught to support the hypothesis that it is alive. Yet
one may take testimony of all the world that it is a living thing.
Dormant life! What does it mean? It takes more than classic
weapon and truculent blade to establish life as the thing Bichat de-
fined it to be "the ensemble of functions that resist death." There is
the seed corn that refuses to function, refuses to resist for what is
there to resist and yet it lives ! But what in it is its life ? Ah, it is a
certain principle called vital, dormant now, but only awaiting the
right conditions to wake into the free gesture of life, into the blade,
the ear, the full corn in the ear.
So Martyn Paine. But is it hard for us, who are not of 1839 or
1840, to see that the desiccated seed-corn is living not for what it
does, if it does aught in a faint-hearted way to resist death, but just
for what it might do? It is still on account of its doing that we
call it alive ; but on account of its prospective, not of its actual doing.
It is now alive, for we may now calculate from its condition what
under other conditions it would do.
If there is any analogy between dormant life and passive think-
ing I take some comfort in the formula in which my thesis was pre-
sented. Consciousness is behavior, if you will, but ' ' more accurately,
our belief in consciousness is an expectation of probable behavior
based on an observation of actual behavior, a belief to be confirmed
or refuted by more observation as any other belief in a fact is to be
tried out."
If Martyn Paine had so viewed dormant life, he would not have
felt the need of appealing to a vital principle. He would not have
added this unobservable thing to facts observable in order to explain
the meaning of the terms we use in describing these facts. If we
can bring ourselves to view the passive thinker as we view passive
210 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
life, we shall not have to add an "eject" or "thing-in-itself " to the
behavior we see in him in order to explain what more than this
meager behavior is the rich thought we attribute to him. We shall
perhaps find that what we add to behavior actually observed is an
actual calculus of probabilities; but the nature of this calculus de-
mands the nicest analysis both as to the grounds on which it rests
and as to the kind of test to which it can ultimately be put.
To come at the matter from another angle : the analogy argument
for other minds would not be so pernicious if it were not so true.
It offers an accurate account of what I do when I furnish a passive
thinker's mind for him, only it fails to suggest any grounds on which
I may justify my doing; it avoids pointing out a way by which I
may discover a mistake if I have made one or enjoy the sense of
truth if I have hit on it.
Yonder, say, is my thinker. It is of course the observation of
past and present behavior that invites me to consider him as a thinker
at all and may even suggest to me that his thought is dwelling on a
mathematical problem. But sooner or later in defining his thought
I venture a leap in the dark fill his mind with the kind of thing
that goes on in mine. I am not justified by observation, but
since I know that a mathematician can not think about mathematics
in the abstract I give him a definite problem. He is trying to inte-
grate a differential equation ; now he has seized upon a transforma-
tion that looks promising; for a moment he hopes, in another moment
he has cast the suggestion aside it has not worked. One may elab-
orate to one's taste, one is still abstract while the fact before one
must be concrete. Our mathematician is integrating? Very well,
what is he integrating? Is it an equation of the third order and
fourth degree, or of the fourth order and third degree, or of some
other order and some other degree ?
The obvious resource of one who wants to know is to ask the
thinker what he is thinking about. Whereupon the obvious remark
of one who regards consciousness as expected behavior is that one who
so asks is appealing to behavior to confirm or refute his expectation.
But such a triumph is brief. The man who replies is already other
than the man who thought. He is in a more advantageous position
than I to venture a guess in the same sense that he is better placed
than I to see the wall behind my head ; but for him as for me it is
only a guess. Memory is generally less fallible than divination, but
it is fallible enough. Meanwhile if the question as to this thinker's
past has a meaning it has also an answer and there is a definable
method of arriving at this answer or at least of indefinitely approxi-
mating it. An appeal to the thinker to tell us what was his thought
can not give us the truth nor open a way by which we may approach
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 211
the truth. The thought just past is lost in the infinite ocean of the
past, the pebble just now dropped into this ocean is no easier of re-
covery than is the treasure sunk there a thousand years ago.
Let us then merge our present problem in a more general one;
let us try to solve the difficult in terms of the more difficult; let us
substitute for our passive thinker another hero.
From certain letters of his, I judge that George Washington spent
Christmas Day, 1790, at Mount Vernon. That there was a George
Washington and that he was in a certain neighborhood at a certain
past time an examination of now existing things will enable me to es-
tablish. But what of his slave-boy Caesar? Was there such a slave-
boy? At noon of this day was he in the kitchen of Mount Vernon
helping the cook? And what was going through his mind at the
moment? Was or wasn't it a thought of approaching dinner?
These questions, humble in themselves, acquire an immense dig-
nity when we realize that it tasks all our philosophy to answer them.
Yet there must be a way of answering such questions, or else there
is in the domain of reality such a thing as an unknowable fact. This
is an equally portentous figure to introduce into one's philosophy,
whether it stand for the being and thought of a slave, or whether it
be taken for the hidden name of God. In either meaning, in all
meanings, it is a term that I have long decided to leave out of my
philosophy. The right to do so is one of those questions of back-
ground with which I am not on this occasion dealing.
For me, then, and for all who so far agree with me, there must
be a way of reconstructing the past. Now the only way of recon-
structing the past which science has so far developed is suggested by
the classic saying of La Place: "Give me the mass, position, and
velocity of every particle of matter in the universe, and I will pre-
dict its future and recount its past." I say this utterance of La
Place suggests a method of reconstruction : it does not define one ;
he existed at a moment of the history of mechanics that took too
seriously the conception of law at which it happened to have arrived.
Of the refinements and generalizations that would have to be intro-
duced in order to convert this suggestion into a definition, I have
treated elsewhere, and as they do not affect the issue with which we
are now dealing I shall pretend to take La Place quite seriously.
If we do take such ideas seriously, we realize that the conditions
on which the whole past may be reconstructed can never be realized.
The data La Place asks for are infinite, the law by which he pretends
to handle these data is a law that is known to hold only within limits
of probable error which can never be reduced to zero. But what is
interesting in the situation is that we can see no obstacle to the gath-
ering of more and more of the data demanded, nor to the endless re-
212 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
duction of the probable error which attaches to any law in which we
propose to substitute the data gathered.
We have here then a method of approximating indefinitely a cer-
tain order of facts ; but alas ! it seems to be an order very different
from that in which lay the facts about which we enquired. We
asked, Did such a being live? Did he have such and such a thought?
And we are answered, At least you may find out within any degree
of accuracy required what atoms were in the neighborhood at the
time you mention and how they were moving.
I was asked at the outset, Is the movement of an atom a thought ?
I was afraid to answer yes, and I was afraid to answer no. But
such courage has come to me with study that I am now prepared to
answer, yes and no. In order that this answer may not seem in any
way ambiguous or evasive, I must explain that the movement of an
atom is the movement of an atom and a thousand things beside.
When my love swears that she is made of truth
I do believe her though I know she lies.
As these lines passed for the first time through the poet's mind, I am
ready to believe any La Place who tells me that an atom of carbon
in the poet's brain described such and such a path. But if the same
reconstructor assured me that another atom of carbon, more like the
first than one pea is like another, described just such another path as
a certain lump of coal was being shot into my bin, I know not how I
should disbelieve him. What then ? If moving atoms are thoughts,
had not that lump of coal a bit of the poet in its make up ?
Love, as our poet sings it, is not the only god that teaches the ear
to be willing and the heart to accept truths it knows to be untrue.
Mathematical science with its beautiful simplicity has a way of cast-
ing spells as deep. The lust for mechanical images is as seductive to
the intellect as are other desires to the flesh. One may laugh, but one
may not by laughing cure. William James pointed out that the most
ravishing music was after all but the rasping of hairs from a horse 's
tail on the intestines of a cat. Plato, with gentler irony, had the
Socrates of his Phiedo explain his situation in like terms. Why was
he sitting there awaiting the cup, instead of flying to Megara or
Bceotia? After all it was because his bones were at a certain angle
with each other and his muscles drawn in such a way as to keep
them so.
Such sayings as these would be without humor if they were not
true. There is nothing false in any of them or at least there is
nothing more false than the recurrent "after all" which seems merely
to introduce them. However, nothing can belie a truth as can the
gesture with which it is presented. Granted that the poet, the
213
musician, the moral being, is a congeries of moving atoms, is he after
all nothing more? Gossmann in his Empirische Teleologie has a way
of answering the question which has always seemed to me full of
meaning. Because, he says, mechanism is allgultig it is not there-
fore alleingiiltig. Mechanical insights give the truth, they only de-
ceive us when we take this to be the whole truth.
Now the vice of those who in the past have criticized the view that
would treat mind as an aspect of mechanical behavior is that the
critics themselves have been the slaves of mechanical and mathe-
matical ideas. They have seen that there is a sense in which the
movement of atoms taking place in a body can not be the thought of
that body viewed as a thinker. They have proceeded with the in-
stinct of a mathematician to add something, just as a cook whose dish
is tasteless adds seasoning. But as they couldn't get the right flavor
by adding more atomic movements, they added an "eject," a
" parallel series," an " epiphenomenon. "
My whole suggestion is that instead of helping out the shortcom-
ings of a mechanical description of experience by the mechanical
addition of something not falling within experience, we simply
change our point of view toward the mechanism with which we are
presented when that mechanism also behaves in a teleological way.
Then we shall not be tempted, in trying to say what the movement
of a certain atom of carbon has to do with Shakespeare's thought, to
study its analogy with all similar movements of atoms of carbon in
the wide world. If we insist on doing this we can not fail to arrive
at the conclusion that such movements as a class have nothing to do
with thoughts as a class. But then, if in order to learn what the
turning of a certain wheel in my watch had to do with keeping time,
I compared it with all the wheels in the world, those of locomotives,
those of rapid-fire artillery, and the rest, I should have to conclude
that wheels as a class have nothing to do with chronometry.
I come back at last to my passive thinker. What I observe of his
present behavior is not his thought ; what I expect in the way of fu-
ture behavior is not the full meaning of his thought even though that
behavior be a minute exposition on his part of what he believes to
have been his thought; what I might observe of the minutest me-
chanical changes in him is or is not his thought as I view it. Detail
by detail these atomic movements may be classed with other atomic
movements and the class has no common function. Putting all to-
gether all that are contained within his skin I should think it un-
likely that if they occurred within another skin placed in other sur-
roundings they would work the same ends, be essential to the same
activity of mind. But in so far as they are the mechanism by which
the same peculiar aspect of teleological behavior may everywhere be
214 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
worked out then I am willing to say, This is the behavior of the
passive thinker that I mean by his thought. I should begin by look-
ing for such movements of atoms as actually moved too slightly for
us to notice it the organs of expression, the tongue, principally, and
the eyes. Or perhaps I should find part of the movements to be of
this nature, part of them such as strained the muscles that inhibited
such expression. Either would be the first step toward a teleological
interpretation of a mechanical event. But of these details I am not
sure. To find just what that behavior is which others call the cri-
terion of mind and which I call mind is a problem of long and care-
ful analysis. For this analysis we must turn to the psychologist, and,
above all, I have recently come to hope, to the comparative psychol-
ogist. Yet even this hope must learn to be patient. When one passes
beyond new observations to look for new interpretations one finds the
shadow of the eject clouding fresh fields.
"Bien entendu," writes Georges Bohn in a chapter discussing
the "criteria of psychism" 8 "bien entendu, je ne parlerai pas ici
de la conscience des animaux. Je ne la nie pas, mais je ne peux rien
savoir a son egard. Je parlerai de psychisme, ce mot designant la
complexity de phenomenes que je parviens a analyser plus ou moins."
I can not think a metaphysics useless that might prevent a writer
of the keen intelligence of M. Bohn from perverting his own sense of
what words should mean to the use of those whom he occasionally
refers to as "metaphysicians." In science as elsewhere it is not a
bad thing to have one's courage with one, and a very little, I should
think, would suffice to "deny" what one "will not speak of" what
one can not speak of for the simple reason that one can know noth-
ing about it. Isn't it saner to seek the meaning of consciousness
itself among "the phenomena one can more or less analyze"?
EDGAR A. SINGER, JR.
UNIVEESITT or PENNSYLVANIA.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Elements of Physiological Psychology. GEORGE TRDMBULL LADD and
ROBERT SESSIONS WOODWORTH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
1911. Pp. xix + 704.
The " Elements " has served a generation of psychological students as
a storehouse of information, covering not only the phenomena of nervous
structure and function in their relation to the processes of consciousness,
but practically the whole domain upon which experimental psychology
had entered at the time of its publication, embracing all the orders of
"Naissance de I'lntelligence, " p. 111.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 215
sensation, perception of objects, the time-relations of mental phenomena,
emotional states, the system of expressive reactions, and reproductive
processes. If the great extension of research, not only into new fields, but
also within each individual group of problems, be kept in mind, it is high
praise to say that the new edition has fully maintained the standard of
comprehensiveness and exactness by which the work was originally
marked.
What this extension means in mere bulk and in the tax it imposes on
the authors, in making the work representative of the status of research
throughout the field discussed, may be inferred from a comparison of the
number of sources cited in the two editions, respectively. In the old,
there were some hundred and fifty, all told; in the new, considerably over
five hundred, or well on for four times as many, appear. The increase in
number of individual citations in the new edition is even greater than is
indicated by a comparison of authors, for while in the original edition
only one fourth of the names occurred more than once, repeated citations
in the present mark nearly one half the names.
Yet the bulk and weight of the volume have not been increased. The
numbered pages of text in the new edition are less by one than in the old ;
and while the total number in the revised edition is greater by some half
dozen pages, the use of a thinner, but tougher and more flexible, paper has
slightly decreased the thickness of the volume. At the same time, noth-
ing has been sacrificed in the way of topographical excellence. The paper
is solidly opaque and white, the type large and clear. The pages, also,
are of the same size as in the original and the number of lines to a page
remains unchanged.
The subject-index of the new edition shows an enlargement even
greater than that which marks the list of authors, increasing from about
one hundred and forty titles to almost eight hundred, or nearly six times.
When it is recalled that not only has the general product of experimental
research during the last quarter of a century been added to the matter
contained in the original edition, but that wholly new chapters have been
introduced, such as the discussion of the process of learning and of the
place of the nervous system in the animal kingdom, the successful
confinement of bulk within the limits of an easily handled volume is
the more remarkable. This has been accomplished in two ways. The
more obvious of these is the omission of certain chapters of a more theo-
retical or speculative character which leaves the empirical summation un-
affected. The more important modification in this regard, however, is the
painstaking economy of statement which is maintained throughout the
work. How much has been done in this way, even in those parts which
have undergone the least material changes or additions, can be appreci-
ated only by a careful comparative reading of the two editions, chapter
by chapter. The whole work is a close-packed compendium of research
which represents nothing less than the history of physiological psychology
during the past twenty-five years, the first generation of its continuous
and general activity.
What that period of time has meant in the history of experimental
216 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
psychology in America, in its bearing both upon the general extension of
interest in the study and in the development of the technical means of
research, is indicated by a comparison of the place which American titles
hold in the two editions. In the original work a half dozen such names
occur, or one in twenty-five; in the present edition there are, roughly, six
times that number, or nearly one fourth the total. Even allowing for
greater completeness in the review of American literature, this change of
relative position is impressive. Nor is the advance restricted to any indi-
vidual province; it appears in the comparative study of organic types, in
physiological research, and in the field of exceptional and pathological
.phenomena as well as in the study of normal processes in the human
subject.
The general arrangement of the original edition is retained without
change. The summary of psychological data is supplemented by a de-
scription of the physical basis of mental activities and by a discussion of
the theoretical relations which exist between the two systems of phenom-
ena. The work thus comprises three general divisions: first, a detailed
account of the structure and functions of the nervous system; secondly,
the presentation of the qualitative, quantitative, and temporal correla-
tions of nervous and mental activities; and lastly, a consideration of the
nature of mind in the light of the preceding discussion.
The first part presents two departures from the first edition, apart
from the many internal modifications and additions by which it is marked.
The one departure consists in a transference of the two chapters on cere-
bral functions from their original place in the second part to the close of
part one. The change brings these chapters at last into a proper relation
with the discussion of the mechanics and activities of the nervous system,
to which the first part of the work is devoted. The second departure ap-
pears in the introduction of a prefatory chapter on the significance of the
nervous system in the animal kingdom, in which the different organic
types are characterized as well as the general functions of nervous ele-
ments, tissues, and systems pointed out. The chemistry of the nervous
system is properly given a separate place (new ed., Chap. V.). It is not,
however, the addition of a new discussion to the text, since the same prob-
lem is treated in the first chapter of the old edition (" The Elements of
the Nervous System "). The subdivision was desirable, not only in view
of the more substantial knowledge now possessed, but also on the ground
of improvement in the logical scheme of treatment.
It seems to the reviewer scarcely correct to say in the preface to the
new edition (p. vi) that " two entire chapters . . . have been added to part
one," the second being chapter two (new ed.) on the " Development of the
Nervous System in the Individual." The sixth chapter of the original
edition entitled, " The Development of the Nervous Mechanism," is de-
voted to this question, and its account runs parallel to that of the new.
What does mark the revision is the greatly increased precision with
which the intimate process of development is traced. The author of the
original edition, limited by the results of investigation at the time, was
able to follow, by contrast, only the gross features of the process. In con-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 217
eluding the chapter he adds the words: "All the coarser differentiations
of structure to which reference has thus far been made are only the ex-
pression so to speak of certain histogenetic changes which hare been
secretly taking place." These changes are now largely an open secret, and
it is in the detailed description of the histological development of the
nervous system that the new edition differs from the old, rather than in
the introduction of an organic part of the discussion previously omitted.
The advance in histology is also reflected in the admirable and abun-
dant illustration which accompanies this section of the new edition. It
is shown, for example, in the description of the elements of the nervous
system, 1 especially in the new series of cuts (Figs. 46-59). In the orig-
inal edition there was not a single illustration of the minute geography
of the nervous system and its elements which this series of figures repre-
sents in such variety and detail. The evidence of progress in this direc-
tion is not confined to a single chapter, but extends throughout the
anatomical part of the work; compare, for example, as regards both text
and illustration, the discussion of the microscopical structure of the cor-
tical layers of the hemispheres. The full treatment of the nervous system
from all standpoints structural, functional, chemical, developmental, etc.
as an introduction to the psychological discussion of problems of psycho-
physiological interrelation gives the work an independent value for the
medical physiologist and alienist which no description of the purely mental
phenomena could possess. At the same time the " Elements " provides
only the general basis for the work of physician and psychiatrist since its
scope is restricted to the phenomena of normal psychophysiology, a limita-
tion which is strictly adhered to even when it involves the exclusion of
data repeatedly dealt with in psychological laboratories, such as the influ-
ence of drugs upon reaction times, expressive movement, and the percep-
tion of objects and space relations.
The second part of the work retains the arrangement of the original
edition throughout. Its general subject is psychophysical correlation
which is treated qualitatively in relation to three groups of mental phe-
nomena sensations, perceptions, and representations; quantitatively, in
the discussion of the psychophysic law, so-called; and temporally, in the
review of reaction time and its complications. Apart from the revision
and supplementation which mark practically every page, this section of
the work is notable chiefly for the new matter added in the later chapters,
in which are summarized the experimental investigations of association
and memory; of the nature and forms of learning, both in man and
simpler organic types; and of the mechanism of thought processes, atten-
tion and its fluctuations, varied reactions, comparison, abstraction, and
the forms of reasoning.
In this central division of the work, as well as in the first part, certain
general features of the revision may be noted. First, of course, is the
great addition to the mass of individual observations recorded, but this
is only the beginning of what the new edition represents. Equally strik-
J Old Ed., Chap. L; New Ed., Chap. IV.
218 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ing is the reinspection within each individual field which, through its de-
termination of the more intimate nature of the processes involved, has
resulted in many important changes in our conception of the phenomena
for instance, in the distribution of elements in the time-scheme of re-
actions, in eye-movements and the visual perception of objects and space
relations, in the orientation of the body and its sensational basis, etc. A
thin! feature is the application of experimental methods to a larger range
of psychological problems which is illustrated in the study of learning
and the acquisition of skill and in the analysis of thought processes
through controlled introspection. A fourth phase may be added, namely,
the endeavor, in both sections of the work, to bring together the results of
investigation upon human subjects and various types lower in the organic
series, in order to achieve a more adequate view of the forms of behavior
and their systematic modifications. This last point of view, however, is
not maintained throughout the work, but rather appears as a conception
applied in connection with specific problems, such as the development of
a nervous system in the organic kingdom and the comparison of processes
of learning in man and brute.
In the third part, " The Nature of the Mind," the more theoretical or
speculative problems concerning the relation of mind and body are dis-
cussed in later and earlier editions alike. To this section in the original
plan should properly be assigned the last chapter of part two on " Certain
Static Relations of the Body and Mental Phenomena." The five chapters,
which this rearrangement gives, are reduced to two in the present edition ;
roughly, the discussion is cut down to one half its bulk. This modifica-
tion is in service of the specific aim of the book, to confine attention as
closely as possible to the summation of empirical investigations and the
correlation of their results in descriptive and explanatory concepts. This
reduction has made possible a very considerable addition to the facts dis-
cussed, without increasing the bulk of the volume.
Throughout the work the authors show an admirable common sense
and succinctness of statement in their presentation of the multitude of
facts with which, in its several parts, the work deals. In very many
places a fine expository sense is necessary to set forth intelligibly the re-
sults of complicated investigations without that elaborate description of
methods and instruments which the scope of the " Elements " makes im-
possible. In very many cases, also, a sustained critical judgment is es-
sential to the appraisement of both methods of research and bearing of
results upon debated theories. In all these ways the authors seem to have
maintained an attitude for which they deserve the highest praise.
ROBERT MACDOUOALL.
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.
Geschichte der Psychologie. OTTO KLEMM. (No. VI II. of the Series,
" Wissenschaf t und Hypothese.") Leipzig and Berlin : B. G. Teubner.
1911. Pp. 387.
A general history of psychology, not limited to one period (like the
work of Siebeck), nor to one nation (like that of Dessoir), certainly
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 219
answers a felt need, and such a history is here attempted in commend-
ably brief compass. No limitation of scope is stated by the author, but it
is evident that he does not attempt to do justice to the most recent period;
otherwise he would scarcely have sketched the development of experi-
mental psychology with no mention of the work on memory; nor the de-
velopment of individual psychology with no mention of Galton nor of any
other author from 1782 down to Stern. Had he seriously meant to trace
the recent course of psychological discussion, he would probably have
deemed James worthy of more than seven lines and Ebbinghaus of more
than five, and found occasion to mention such names as Ward, Stout, etc.
The references to recent work lack balance and perspective, and the his-
tory should properly be taken as ending at about 1870-1880.
The older history is rather attractively told. There is, indeed, little of
the personal note; biographical facts are usually limited to dates. A
knowledge of the history of philosophy is presupposed in the reader, for
the development is here traced topic by topic, a very serviceable mode of
presentation, though it leads to some disjointedness in the treatment of
related topics, and to the omission of any consecutive account of the
psychology of such men as Aristotle or Locke. The main headings under
which the subject is treated are: metaphysical psychology, empirical
psychology (the faculty psychology, the inner sense, the association psy-
chology, Herbart's psychical mechanics, comparative psychology, and mod-
ern scientific psychology), fundamental concepts of psychology (defi-
nition of psychology, consciousness, classification of the contents of con-
sciousness, psychological methods, psychical measurements), the most im-
portant theories (of sensation in general, of sight and hearing, of space
perception, of feeling, and of will).
The value of the different sections will, of course, differ with the
reader; to the reviewer one of the most instructive chapters was that on
the faculty psychology. Probably every reader will find many pages for
which he will thank the author.
Though the history of psychology, up to recent times, is closely bound
up with the history of philosophy, the psychological importance of the sev-
eral philosophers is by no means always proportional to their importance
in metaphysics, and thus it happens that many an author who is passed
over lightly in the histories of philosophy is worthy of considerable atten-
tion from the psychologist. Such were, to judge from the present book,
Alcahan, Buridan, Vives, Bonnet, names unfamiliar to the psychologist,
but deserving to be brought to his attention. A defect of the book in this
regard is assuredly the almost complete neglect of the Scottish school,
with the exception of Hamilton. The eighteenth and first half of the nine-
teenth centuries receive, on the whole, the most attention, and it is in
regard to this period that the author's treatment is most valuable. Most
of the psychological beginnings of the eighteenth century were, as the
author says, submerged by the flood of critical and romantic philosophy;
only the associationist psychology was saved by the continuity of British
tradition.
Objections might be raised at several points to the author's historical
220 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
interpretations. His conception of the origin of empirical psychology is,
for example (p. 45), that "inner perception first became aware of the
greatest differences between complex experiences," and that the classes
of experiences so separated were substantialized and made over into pow-
ers or forces; and so arose the conception of faculties of the soul, a con-
ception which, in spite of its scientific deficiencies, "was yet suited in a
high degree to portray the course of experiences as they presented them-
selves to primitive inner perception." It is improbable that the notion of
faculties arose from inner observation, for when, in recent times, the at-
tempt has been made to find the introspective differentia of judgment,
will, memory, imagination, etc., no obtrusive and characteristic differences
have appeared. It is much more likely that the faculties were from the
beginning functions, performances, modes of behavior, and that they were
distinguished not by introspection, but in terms of their end-results, even
as the faculties of nutrition and reproduction were distinguished. The
faculty psychology was based on a teleological classification, and this was
its deficiency, since, being contented to define mental performances by
their end-results, it felt no need either for introspective description or for
a causal mechanics of mental processes.
Again, it seems likely that in tracing the beginnings of modern scien-
tific psychology back almost wholly to physiology and especially to Ger-
man sense physiology, the author is guilty of a serious though common
omission. Two other streams of influence have certainly been potent in
producing the psychology of to-day. One is a biological influence, which,
through Darwin and Galton, has given us our child and individual psy-
chology, studies of mental heredity, of the correlation of abilities, etc.
The other is a medical influence, very strong in French psychology, and
probably traceable back to Charcot more than to any other one man. This
influence, as every one knows, was potent in forming the psychology of
James as well as of many living psychologists in all lands. Each of these
two lines of study brought to psychology a wealth of empirical data as
well as of problems and methods ; and though both of them have been and
still more will be indebted to the experimental psychology of Helmholtz,
Fechner, and Wundt, yet the historian must recognize their independence
as sources of the fruitful empirical movement.
K. S. WOODWORTH.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
Hegels Qrundlinien der Philosophic des Rechts: mit den von Oans redi-
gierten Zusdtzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen. Edited by GEORG LASSON.
Leipsic: Felix Meiner. 1911. Pp. xcv 4-380.
The present edition of Hegel's " Rechtsphilosophie " is without doubt
the most satisfactory that has as yet appeared: indeed, it will probably
take its place as the standard text of that work. The faultiness of Hegel's
original text (1821) has always been apparent enough: its defects are
probably due to the fact that Hegel never read the proof-sheets a second
time, although he had indicated many corrections and additions upon the
first proof which made a second scrutiny necessary. At any rate, the text
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 221
as it appeared was full of passages which have baffled the student and
have been the vexation of translators. The only reconstruction of the
text worth mentioning, during the ninety years since, is the well-known
edition of Gans, appearing in 1833 and 1840, made familiar to English
readers through the translation of Dyde. To be true, there is the edition
of G. J. P. Bolland (1902), but this is based upon the Gans edition, and,
while improving the text in a number of places, is hardly a critical at-
tempt of a fundamental sort.
The present edition takes its point of departure, not from the Gans
edition, but from the original text of 1821. The editor has attempted to
clear this text of its obvious inconsistencies and unintelligible passages
and to make it the most readable text possible. This he has achieved,
first, by adding words where they seemed necessary to the sense probably
intended, and secondly, where this device failed, by downright alterations
in the sentence construction. These changes, as well as the variations
from Gans and Bolland, are carefully noted in a table at the close of the
volume. Where words have been merely added by the editor, they have
been bracketed. Thus, the Hegelian text is still kept apparent a care
which Gans did not always observe, since he sometimes mingled added
matter from the lecture-notes with the text itself, although he usually
segregated them as addenda to the paragraphs they were meant to il-
lumine.
The present text, then, is essentially a critical restoration. However,
the lecture-notes of the Gans edition are included; only they are here
gathered together in a separate portion of the book. In the original text,
Hegel had given a number of references to passages in his "Phanomen-
ologie des Geistes " and to the " Encyclopadie." These references, which
Gans for the most part omitted, are reinstated.
The full and excellent introduction by the editor is especially com-
mendable. Pastor Lasson is so well known as a sympathetic and patient
student of Hegel, and has so clearly evinced his thorough scholarship in
his editions of the " Encyclopadie " and of the " Phanomenologie " that
one expects to find a luminous commentary in the first-hand analysis of
the relation of Hegel's " Rechtsphilosophie " to his system as a whole.
There is also a summary of Hegel's main positions in the book, as well as
a section relating Hegel's views to the philosophic interpretation of his-
tory, in terms of the characteristic Hegelian conceptions.
JAY WILLIAM HUDSON.
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. October,
1911. Psychopathology of Every-day Life (pp. 477-527) : ERNEST JONES,
M.D. - According to the interpretations v:orked out by Freud many of the
abnormalities of every-day life are determined rather than accidental.
Examples of forgetting, lapsus linguae, lapsus calami, misprints, false
222 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
visual recognition, mislaying of objects, and symptomatic acts, are cited
with their Freudian explanations. Some general observations on the
scope, possibilities, and influence of this kind of observations are made.
Modifications of the normal routine of mental activity come as a result of
a counter-impulse or as a restraint to some tendency associated with it.
A Case of Colored Gustation (pp. 528-539) : JUNE F. DOWNEY. - A report of
colored gustation like the more common instances of colored audition.
The synesthetic factor is sensational in value. Often the color of the
objects may enter into a fusion with their taste. A Note on the Con-
sciousness of Self (pp. 540-552) : E. B. TITCUENER. - Several subjects who
had been trained in experimental introspection report concerning the
consciousness of self. It appears that self-consciousness appears inter-
mittently in many cases. On Meaning and Understanding (pp. 553-577) :
EDMUND JACOBSON. - The report of a study on the perception of letters,
understanding of words and sentences by the report of what happens in
a temporal order when certain stimuli are presented, also known as the
Binet or Wurzburg method. Minor Studies from the Psychological Lab-
oratory of Vassar College. The Effect of Area on the Pleasantness of
Color (pp. 578-579) : DOROTHY CLARK, MARY S. GOODELL and M. F.
WASHBURN. - Preferences are indicated as follows : saturated colors, small
areas with the exception of red, a large area for tints and shades. Fluctu-
ations in the Affective Value of Colors During Fixation for One Minute
(pp. 579-582) : DOROTHY CRAWFORD and M. F. WASHBURN. - Associated
ideas increase the pleasantness while adaptation seems to decrease it.
Imitation in Raccoons (pp. 583-585) : W. T. SHEPHERD. - The raccoon
does not show inferential or a high type of imitation. A Bibliography of
the Scientific Writings of Wilhelm Wundt (pp. 586-587) : E. B. TITCH-
ENER and L. R. GEISSLER. Book Reviews: W. Jerusalem, Introduction to
Philosophy: W. H. SHELDON. Thomas Vernier Moore, The Process of
Abstraction: W. F. BOOK. E. Toulouse et H. Pieron, Technique de Psy-
chologie experimental de Toulouse, Vaschide et Pieron: E. B. T. Book
Notes (pp. 600-604). Subject Index. Names of Authors.
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. November,
1911. L'intuition philosophique (pp. 809-827): H. BERGSON. -"To phi-
losophize is a simple act " and the apparent complications of philosophies
are superficial. While science seeks to obey nature in order to command,
philosophy seeks to sympathize with nature. La logique deductive (pp.
828-883) : A. PADUA. - An exposition of the latest thing in logical ideog-
raphy. La mobilite chimique (pp. 884-903) : A. JOB. - In modern chem-
istry the stable emerges from the unstable and the one is explained by the
other. Etudes critiques. L'incoordonnable : A. LALANDE. Varietes. Ve.
Congres' international de Progres religieux: I. BENRUBI. Tables des
matieres. Supplement.
Bosanquet, Bernard. The Principle of Individuality an'd Value. The
Gifford Lectures for 1911. London: The Macmillan Co. 1912.
Pp. xxxvii + 409. $3.25.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 223
Boutroux, Emile. William James. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co.
1912. Pp. vii + 126. $1.00.
Fouillee, Alfred. La Pensee et Les Nouvelles Ecoles Anti-Intellectual-
istes. Paris: Librairie, Felix Alcan. 1911. Pp. xvi + 412. 7 Fr. 50.
MacVannel, John Angus. Outline of a Course in the Philosophy of Edu-
cation. New York : The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pp. ix + 207. $ .90.
Ward, James. The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism. The Gifford
Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the years
1907-10. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Cambridge: University
Press. 1911. Pp. xvi + 490. $3.25.
NOTES AND NEWS
WE quote from an article in Science on "Pleistocene Man from Ips-
wich " by Professor George Grant MacCurdy, curator of the anthropo-
logical collection of the Peabody Museum of Natural History : " If the
skeleton does not represent a burial and if the chalky sandy loam at this
point is a part of the original mantel of boulder clay, then the man of
Ipswich is the earliest yet found with the exception of Homo heidel-
bergensis (Pithecanthropus not being considered as Homo). It would cor-
respond to the latest eolithic horizon, the so-called Mesvinian, and would
thus be somewhat older than the man of Galley Hill, provided the latter
is properly dated. But as I pointed out in a recent article there is room
for doubt as to the age of the Galley Hill skeleton. From the foregoing
account it would seem that the age of the Ipswich skeleton is also still an
open question. The importance of having expert witnesses present at the
disinterment in discoveries of this class was perhaps never better exempli-
fied than at Galley Hill and Ipswich. Their absence will, it is feared,
always leave the shadow of a doubt as to the age of the skeletons in ques-
tion; and doubt is a serious handicap in matters of such scientific import.
If both these specimens are correctly dated, then there lived as contem-
poraries in Europe for a long space of time two somatologically distinct
races a primitive type represented by the Mauer mandible, Neandertal,
Spy, Chapelle-aux-Saints, La Quina, etc.; and a modern type represented
by Ipswich, Galley Hill, and possibly Bury St. Edmunds."
THE Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association was
held at the University of Chicago on April 5 and 6. The following papers
were read at the session on April 5 : " The Genesis and Functions of the
Ethical Ideal," Professor George T. Kern ; " The Essentials of a First
Course in Ethics," Professor G. D. Wolcott ; " The New Individualism,"
Professor J. H. Tufts ; " The Introductory Course in Ethics," Professor
F.C. Sharp; " Some Points on Presentation," Professor J.H. Tufts; "The
Content and Method of the First College Course in Ethics," Professor J.
W. Hudson; "College Ethics for Freshmen," Professor B. C. Ewer; "Berg-
son and Pragmatism," Professor A. W. Moore. On April 6, there was a
joint session with the Western Psychological Association at which the
224 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
following papers were read: " A Psychological Definition of Religion,"
Professor W. K. Wright; " Present Status of the Problem of the Relation
between Mind and Matter," Professor Max Meyer; " The Two Theories of
Consciousness in Bergson," Professor E. B. McGilvary; " The Mechanism
of Social Consciousness," Professor G. H. Mead ; " The Paradoxes of
Pragmatism," Professor B. H. Bode; "The Interpretation of Reality,"
Professor W. H. Wright ; " Cognition, Beauty, and Goodness," Professor
H. M. Kallen ; " German Pragmatism," Professor G. Jacoby.
IN a former issue of the JOURNAL it was stated that Professor Josiah
Royce, of Harvard University, had been compelled to give up the course
of Bross lectures on " The Source of Religious Insight." It should have
been stated, however, that this course of lectures was given in full at Lake
Forest College, Illinois, last November, and that the lectures are already in
the press and are to be published shortly by Charles Scribner's Sons. They
were to have been repeated by Professor Royce at Harvard, and it is only
their repetition which has been abandoned for the present.
DR. W. V. D. BINGHAM, director of the psychological laboratory, and
professor of psychology and education at Dartmouth College, has been
appointed director of the Dartmouth Summer School, which is to be
reorganized and incorporated as an integral part of the institution's
scheme of education.
THE Rev. Casper Rene Gregory, professor of theology in the University
of Leipzig, has concluded a special course of lectures at Western Reserve
University. The lectures included a series of six on " Five Hundred
Years of Science in Leipzig."
THE Kaiser Wilhelm professor at Columbia University for the acade-
mic year 1912-13, who is nominated by the Prussian Ministry of Public
Instruction, will be Phelix Kriiger, professor of psychology at the Uni-
versity of Halle.
GILBERT MURRAY, Regius Professor of Greek, Oxford University, will
give a series of lectures at Columbia University on April 15, 19, and 22.
His general subject will be " Three Stages in Greek Religion."
THE Section on Neurology and Psychiatry, of the New York Academy
of Medicine, held a meeting on April 4. The subject under discussion
was " Psychanalysis."
DR. ARTHUR HOLMES, assistant professor of psychology at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, has accepted the post of dean of the faculties of
Pennsylvania State College.
PROFESSOR HERMAN HENDERSON, of the Wisconsin State Normal School
at Milwaukee, will offer courses in the psychology of education at Oberlin
College Summer School.
A NEW scientific review, Bedrock, was launched in England this month.
It is to appear quarterly, and is to be edited by a committee of five
members.
DR. WILLIAM WUNDT, professor of philosophy at Leipzig, has been made
a knight of the Prussian order pour le m&rite.
VOL. IX. No. 9. APRIL 25, 1912
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
IS THERE A COGNITIVE RELATION?
THE formal distinctions of epistemological theory are well worked
out at the present time. All possible combinations of the
terms of this discipline seem to have been discovered and cham-
pioned. Each combination has points in its favor which awaken the
sincere zeal of its champion. I wish to rise to a point of order.
Have the postulates which lie back of these combinations been suffi-
ciently examined? Is there, indeed, a cognitive relation either ex-
ternal or internal? I am of the opinion that there is no such rela-
tion. I shall now seek to justify and explain this opinion which
seems, on the face of it, so revolutionary.
Theories of knowledge are, first of all, divisible into two classes,
those which hold cognition to be somehow immediate and those
which regard it as mediate. Theories of immediate cognition may,
again, be divided into two subclasses. One subclass is idealistic and
asserts that an internal relation exists between the object and the
knower or subject. There are many slightly divergent forms of
this position, but, in essentials, the above statement is not mislead-
ing. The second subclass is realistic and holds that an external
relation exists between the object and the knower. By external is
meant a relation which does not affect the object cognized. There
are two current forms of this realistic subclass. The difference
between them consists in their views of consciousness. The one
considers it an actus purus externally related to the object; the
other identifies it with the external relations supposed somehow to
group objects selectively. Before we pass to a consideration of the
mediate theories of cognition, let us ask ourselves what knowledge
means for these realistic systems. Knowledge is the actual presence
of reals. For the first view, consciousness in its relation to a thing
accomplishes knowledge. The nature of the object is supposed to lie
open to the mind and become subject to inspection. Things become
transparent, as it were. Out of this peculiar relation, they are, for
us, enveloped in darkness; in it, they stand in a glare of light.
225
226 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Knowledge is a presenting, an introducing, an intuition. The second
position is even more skeptical of the traditional views of mind than
the first. The emphasis shifts from mind as a knower to the objects
known. Knowledge is a grouping of these objects. The theory may
be designated selective objectivism and cognition is the selection.
I wish now to call attention to a common characteristic of all
these theories of immediate knowledge. They assert a real cognitive
relation, external or internal, between the knower and the object.
The only partial exception is the theory that tends to do away with
the knower and to substitute a pan-objectivism. Even here, how-
ever, a real relation determines a grouping although it does not
affect the nature of the objects grouped. Such epistemological
hypotheses are statements of our actual experience in terms of logic
or, shall I say, in terms of mathematics ? They are professed trans-
lations of natural realism. I suspect their correctness. What we
actually have in cognition is an attitude towards objects considered
real. Usually the attention is concentrated on the things and the
attitude escapes notice. It lies in the background of consciousness.
Even when it does attract attention, there is no experience of a
cognitive relation between the individual and the thing. Awareness
is simply an attitude towards things which is not supposed to affect
them. Plans of action may come to mind and then the attitude
becomes more complex; but always the objects retain their inde-
pendence so far as awareness is concerned. It is, I believe, this
character of cognition that makes realistic systems thinkable. The
cognitive attitude involves a dualism and suggests no relation, ex-
ternal or internal, to bridge it. This is a description of natural
realism as I see it. Cognition does not imply a cognitive relation.
Mediate theories of cognition are more complex than immediate
theories. That fact is not necessarily in their favor. There are
three important classes: the representative, the normative, and the
pragmatic. Space forbids me to enter into the analysis which I have
made of these. Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, they are all
one-sided. But they emphasize some aspects of knowledge which
must be borne in mind.
Pragmatism stresses the mediate character of the objects
known. It points out their history, the reconstructions they
have undergone. Knowledge is an achievement and "ideas" are
instruments for this end. This doctrine is rightly considered by
Moore to be idealistic in the strictest sense of that much-abused
term. The mistake made by the pragmatist is to confuse the re-
flective attitude with the cognitive. He is so interested in the use
of knowledge, its criteria, and the process of its achievement that
he has overlooked the important stratifications and distinctions char-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 227
acteristic of the cognitive attitude. We must thank the realist for
his counterbalancing emphasis on them. The reflective attitude is,
strictly speaking, precognitive.
The normative position brings us back from the process to the
act. Its mistake is to misinterpret this act. It makes the object
consciously depend on the "ought" of the subject. Here, again,
there is a misreading of our actual experience. I repeat that the
knower's attitude is one of acceptance of an object as being of such
a character or as qualified in such a way. This attitude is modeled
upon that of natural realism. It is dualistic and no cognitive rela-
tion is to be found in the experience.
The representative view is more complex. I shall not enter into
the criticism which I must pass upon it. It is, however, the means of
pointing out and stressing the peculiar phenomenon of doubling that
seems to telescope itself into the apparently simple act of cognition.
The distinction between thought, consciousness, idea, or concept and
its object, which the human mind has been forced to postulate in
order to account for error and for the mediate and personal char-
acter of the content of knowledge, as against the supposedly com-
mon and independent object known, is erected into a theory of
knowledge. The real explanation of this distinction is entirely dif-
ferent. It results from a duplication of the cognitive object. This
duplication is due to the conflict between the cognitive attitude and
the facts which emphasize the personal character of the objectivum.
For instance, the objectivum can be considered mental and dependent
and, at the same time, physical and independent of mind as the
cognitive attitude requires. It is assigned to two spheres of exist-
ence. The duplication of the cognitive object enables both motives
to secure satisfaction. And they must both secure it. Hence even
when we acknowledge the idealistic motives present in mediate
theories of cognition, the structure of cognition remains dualistic.
It is interesting to hunt for indications of the twofold use of
the cognitive object, as idea and as object, in philosophic literature.
Unfortunately idealistic motives and outlook so dominated the think-
ers who came nearest to its discovery that its significance was not
grasped. A critical study of Hume (Treatise, I., III., 7), Kant
("Critique of Pure Reason," p. 483, Max Miiller's translation) and
James ("Psychology," Vol. II., p. 290) is illuminating from the
present point of view. None of them does justice to the structure of
cognition. Professor James substitutes a psychological explanation
of cognition for the cognitive experience. He comes much nearer to
a realization of the duplication in the article, "Does Consciousness
Exist?", but makes it an affair merely of context. The tendency
to emphasize the influence of feeling and interest in determining the
228 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
attitude and object of cognition is natural to a psychologist. The
very terra, belief, selected as descriptive of the cognitive attitude
inevitably leads to an analysis of these subjective factors. It is but
a short step from this to the consideration of the object as merely
an "idea" and the meaning of the existence of the object its relation
to the individual's mind. We noted, in the discussion given to the
mediate theories of knowledge, a similar mistake on the part of the
pragmatist. The latter seeks to neutralize this result by a denial
that there are individual minds. The mediation which leads to
cognition overshadows the cognitive structure and meanings and
causes their neglect or misinterpretation. In the very interesting
and suggestive note in his "Psychology" 1 James discusses the
existential judgment and decides that the distinction between it
and the attributive judgment is superficial. We might suggest that
the reason is not that existential judgments are attributive, but that
attributive judgments are implicitly existential. Let us examine
his argument: " 'The candle exists' is equivalent to, 'The candle is
over there.' And this 'over there' means real space, space related
to other reals. The proposition amounts to saying, 'The candle is in
the same sphere with other reals.' It affirms of the candle a very
concrete predicate, namely, this relation to other particular con-
crete things." (So far we would agree with his analysis.) "Their
real existence, as we shall later see, resolves itself into their peculiar
relation to ourselves. Existence is thus no substantive quality when
we predicate it of an object." This emphasis on the subjective is
apparent in another place: "Reality means simply relation to our
emotional and active life" (p. 295). He apparently agrees with
Hume and Kant whom he quotes with approval. We must ask our-
selves this question: "Is not James confusing two standpoints?"
A thing is considered real when it does touch us vitally, but is the
meaning of reality or existence that of a relation to ourselves!
Existence is a meaning, unique in character, which does not affect
the content of the object. It is not a determinant in the attributive
sense. But it does qualify the whole object and give it a place with
other objects of its own class. Things toward which we take this
attitude are considered as real as ourselves. In this James is right
when he says, "The pons et origo of all reality, whether from the
absolute or the practical point of view is thus subjective, is our-
selves" (p. 296). But the relations which we suppose ourselves to
establish with such things are not cognitive. Cognition is a means
towards the establishment of practical relations, but is not itself
thought of as a real relation. We may suppose that cognition is
impossible unless we are in causal relation with things by means of
*Vol. II., page 290.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 229
our bodies, but cognition itself means a duality of equally real
objects in which one takes a peculiar attitude towards the other.
The cognitive relation, so-called, is either an intellectual, logical
addition assumed because it is scandalous to think of two terms
without a relation between them, or else the reading into the cog-
nitive attitude of genetic relations in the precognitive stage, or else
the shadow of the causal relation supposed to exist between us and
the object. The first of these mistakes is made by the logician, the
second by the psychologist, and the third by the scientist. All three
are wrong. When we perceive an object or think of it, we do not
have as an essential element a relation between the object and our-
selves as knowers.
If this interpretation of the structure of cognition is correct, im-
portant consequences flow from it. In the first place idealism is
robbed of the defense which has sheltered it for so long against the
attacks of realism. Who has not felt the exasperating, baffling
power of the dictum that we can not think an object except in rela-
tion with a subject. This turns out to be merely a false rendition of
the analytic proposition: We can not think of an object unless we
think of it. Otherwise, the very nature of cognition is to recognize
the independence and reality of the object. A peculiar, non-natural
relation, such as the supposed cognitive relation, would be the very
denial of such independence. It seems, then, that the subject-object
relation is a dogma which has been an article of faith in the philo-
sophic world. The nearest approach, hitherto, to heresy has been
the doctrine of external relations. But such a doctrine is half-
hearted. We need the complete and final heresy; there is no cog-
nitive relation.
Were we to accept the view that cognition is immediate and is the
presence of an object to a knower, we would be forced to hold some
form of naive realism. Once deny the existence of a cognitive rela-
tion, if such is the view of knowledge, and no other course is open.
The presence of objects to a knower would make no difference to
them. He would be a spectator in whose field of vision they would
come and go as people in a thronged street pass before the eyes of
a stranger who looks out upon them from a hotel window. If cog-
nition is the actual presence of reals to consciousness, idealism is
doomed.
But we have been led to acknowledge that cognition is mediate,
not immediate. The idealistic motives, which the precognitive stage
of reflective consciousness supports, are unaffected by the denial of
the cognitive relation. The history of the material, the mediate or
constructive character of the object, the fact of error, all induced us
to refuse to acknowledge that the object present in cognition exists
230 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
apart from the individual's mind. These facts, stressed so emphatic-
ally by modern psychology and by pragmatism of the Dewey type,
are the true defense of idealism. To what do they leadf We have
claimed that they lead to a realism broadened by the inclusion of
these idealistic motives and with a new conception of knowledge.
Let us examine this more critical and indirect type of realism.
There are many questions which it must answer satisfactorily if it
is to justify itself.
There is one problem which will occur to the mind of the reader
almost immediately. In cognition does the mind transcend itself?
Hitherto those who have denied the possibility of such a transcend-
ence of experience have been idealists. How can the mind pass
through the gulf of reality and touch things? To those who hold
an organic view of mind, such a feat seems self-contradictory. Even
revelation must be somehow immanent and adapted to the under-
standing of the seer. The reply must be that such a transcendence
is both thinkable and unthinkable. It is thinkable so long as we
give attention to the cognitive attitude and its meanings. It is un-
thinkable when mind is regarded as a realm of constructs and feel-
ings, when it is regarded as consciousness in the non-cognitive,
generic sense of that word. Real existents can not mix with mind,
and knowledge is not a possession. Let us examine both aspects
which have been so much confused.
Transcendence is thinkable when we pay regard to the cognitive
attitude and its meanings, for here the mind is a limited entity op-
posed to that which is known as regards both content and existence.
Of course the objects known could be called a part of experience, but
the victory resulting would be merely verbal. It would consist in
so stating the problem that it would be meaningless. We must
admit, then, that the cognitive attitude makes the transcendence of
mind thinkable. So long as the mind can be opposed to that which it
knows in cognition the transcendence of mind is conceivable because
it is seemingly a fact. We have, however, acknowledged that the
cognitive object does not exist apart from mind even though it de-
mands such an existence. This peculiar contradiction led, as we saw,
to the phenomenon of the duplication of the cognitive object as idea
and as object. As a result of this doubling, mind is enlarged to
satisfy the idealistic motives and at the same time is opposed to the
object as an independent existent. Cognition continues dualistic
and, hence, realistic in its structure and meanings. The transcend-
ence of mind is, however, unthinkable when mind is regarded as a
personal system of ideas.
The answer that critical realism must logically make to this first
problem is evident. Knowledge does not involve an actual trans-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 231
cendence of the individual's mind, but it secures a reference beyond
the individual's mind through the structure and meanings of the
cognitive attitude.
What, then, is knowledge and what is the relation of the cogni-
tive object in the individual's mind to the real whose existence cog-
nition demands? Knowledge is an achievement of the individual's
mind working in collaboration with other minds in a more or less
conscious fashion. The methods and tests used are immanent and
arise in large measure from the material. When a conclusion is
arrived at it is objectified, i. e., considered to exist as a quality,
object, or relation in the sphere of existence presupposed by the
nature of the domain investigated. When this domain is the physi-
cal world, the construction is considered entirely independent of the
mind which has elaborated it. There are types of knowledge of the
physical world which are functions of our interest and our point of
view. The usual type results from a collaboration between things
and man. We do not attempt to separate out our contribution. A
landscape is beautiful. The soft tones and harmonious outlines are
assigned to nature. Esthetic knowledge welcomes this collabora-
tion. The scientific type is dominated by another ideal, to separate
out and remove from things evidently subjective elements. In
neither type is knowledge the actual presence of the real in the mind.
In both, however, the reference is realistic.
We can turn now to the second part of the question under dis-
cussion. What is the relation of the cognitive object in the indi-
vidual's mind to the real whose existence cognition demands? The
answer is simple and presents a negative reply to the question pro-
pounded in the title of the article. In the case of physical reals
there is no relation of a cognitive sort. The dualism of the cogni-
tive attitude corresponds to an actual dualism. But a causal rela-
tion of however indirect a sort between the real and a mind is a
presupposition of the possibility of knowledge. This fact is ex-
pressed by us in the causal relation assumed to connect percept and
physical thing. This epistemological dualism is conceived by means
of the duplication of the cognitive object into idea and thing between
which no relation is supposed to exist. The preposition, "of," in
the phrase "idea of" is not symbolic of any actual relation, but of
a distinction between two spheres with different characteristics.
These spheres are considered existentially distinct.
The second comprehensive question which should be asked of
critical realism is the following: In what sense does it differ from
the idealism of the critical, phenomenalistic sort, from an up-to-date
Kantianism, for instance ? The difference lies not in the content of
knowledge, not necessarily even in the methods and criteria, which
232 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
must be those of science, but in the reference of cognition and in the
existential meanings connected with it. Idealism has entirely mis-
interpreted the cognitive attitude. The Kantian phenomenon is the
real as we are compelled to think it. Kant's interest in the process
by which knowledge is secured, together with his leaning towards a
Leibnitzian metaphysics, obscured for him the realistic import of
cognition. The phenomenon is the thing-in-itself as we think it.
The third question concerns the relation of individual minds to
each other. Common sense and psychology hold that minds do not
intersect. Critical realism agrees with this natural view and makes
it comprehensible. Minds are microcosms whose boundaries are of
their own making. Relatively to each other they live in a fourth
dimension. But, since knowledge does not involve the actual pres-
ence of the real, this pluralism is no barrier to mutual knowledge.
What is required is actual causal influence and this is obtained
through the body. Knowledge of other minds is, for critical realism,
not a whit more mysterious than knowledge of physical reals. Were
minds disembodied, there would, indeed, be trouble. As it is, our
information is interpretative and comes through the channel of or-
ganic activities and language. The cognitive reference and its
mechanism is the same as for physical things. The knowledge of
physical reals is, however, a means as well as an end in itself. This
is seen in imitation and in the actual handling of things, or in
pointing towards them to gain a common reference and under-
standing.
There are many questions which could be raised and discussed
in connection with this subject, besides those which I have attempted
to answer here. But it is only the general epistemological scheme
which I wish to present. I may state, however, that the import of
this position for the categories is uppermost in my mind.
ROY WOOD SELLARS.
UNIVERSITY or MICHIGAN.
"INVERSION"
/""CONSIDERING the contemptuous attitude of the average philos-
^-^ opher toward algebra of logic, it is amusing to see "logicians"
quarreling about so simple a matter as "inversion." Whilst some
maintain, and "prove," that it is unconditionally possible, Professor
Hicks 1 as stoutly maintains, and "proves," that it is unconditionally
impossible. The whole matter seems really a mere trifle; but the
clearing up of the issue may be undertaken as a very simple exercise
in the "calculus of classes."
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. IX., pages 65 ff.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 233
(a) The Universal Affirmative. Question: From "all A's are
B" can we infer that "some not-A's are not-B's? Yes; provided
"not-B" exists in the particular Universe of Discourse.
For
or
and as
AB' = (by hypothesis) ;
:.A'B' = B'
and if
B'=f=0
we obtain
which is the required proposition. Note 1. If the "particular propo-
sition" is taken to imply the existence of subject and predicate, we
ought, of course, to add the second condition that not-A also exists.
Note 2. Whilst not-B occurs in the first part of the proof, it is not
necessary to assume its existence until we wish to make the final
conclusion, which follows necessarily from the joint assertion :
AB' = [all A's are B]
and
B'4=0 [not-B exists],
(&) The Universal Negative. Question: From "no A is B" can
we infer that "some not- A is B"? Yes; provided "B" exists in the
particular Universe of Discourse.
For
or
and as
AB = (by hypothesis);
/.A'B = B
and if
BH=0
we obtain
which is the required proposition. Note 1. Same as above. Note 2.
234 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Whilst "B" occurs in the proposition itself, its existence is not
thereby required, . e., if "B" does not exist, the proposition is
"true" whatever A. But it is necessary to presuppose the existence
of B in order to reach the particular proposition of the conclusion.
Note 3. The "absurdities of inversion" mentioned by Professor
Hicks (p. 67) all violate the condition: 5=f=0.
Conclusion. "Inversion" is a valid process, provided the con-
dition "not-5 exists" (for the universal affirmative), "B exists"
(for the universal negative) is satisfied in the particular Universe
of Discourse. " Inversionists " are wrong if they hold that this
process is always valid; and Professor Hicks, who concludes that
"we must discard the whole lot" (p. 70) is wrong also.
KARL SCHMIDT.
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
SOCIETIES
THE NEW YORK BRANCH OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Asso-
ciation met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology
and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences on Monday,
February 26. The following papers were read at the meeting in the
evening at the American Museum of Natural History. Afternoon
and evening sessions are being planned for the next meeting on
April 15. All those interested are invited to attend the meetings.
The secretary will be glad to receive titles of papers which members
or others may desire to present at the April meeting.
The Influence of Narcotics on Physical and Mental Traits of Off-
spring: J. E. HICKMAN.
The purpose of the study was to learn if the use of narcostimu-
lants (tea, coffee, tobacco, and alcohol) had any effect on the off-
spring. The research extended over a period of four years. It
included 306 families with 2,560 children ; 620 of this number were
students of Murdoch Academy, Utah. These were carefully meas-
ured by medical experts and teachers to get their physical and mental
status. The measurements and examinations included height,
weight, eyes, ears, nose, throat, teeth, heart, lungs, stomach, spleen,
liver, kidneys, and nervous condition. A record of the death-rate
in the families was obtained as well as a record of the student's
intellectual standing. The students were divided into eight classes,
according to the kinds and quality of stimulants used by the parents.
The examination showed: first, that there was on an average a
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 235
very decided difference between the offspring of abstainers and those
of users, even where tea or coffee was used by only one parent, for
the offspring of the abstainers were superior in size, intellect, and
bodily condition to those of the caffein parents ; secondly, as the use
of caffein was increased by the parents, from once to three and four
times a day, a gradual decrease in height, weight, bodily condition,
etc., of the offspring was manifest; thirdly, in families where not
only tea and coffee were used, but also tobacco, the children were
still more inferior mentally and physically, increasingly so with the
increase of caffein drinks in connection with tobacco ; fourthly, where
alcohol was used with the above narcostimulants the lowering of the
physical and mental status was very marked.
Comparing all the offspring of the narcostimulant pa'rents with
those from abstaining parents, the latter were found to be better in
all the 22 measurements than the former. Some of the differences
were very great, especially in weight, height, eyes, ears, physical
health, and rate of mortality. There are over 100 per cent, more eye,
ear, and physical defects in the offspring of narco-parents. 72 per
cent, more children died in this than in the abstaining class. 79
per cent, of the narcostimulant families had lost one or more children,
while only 49 per cent, of the abstaining class had lost any children.
It was also shown that the death-rate of the parents in this latter
class was 41 per cent, higher than in the former. The research also
brought out the fact that it took the offspring of the narcostimulant
parent eight tenths of a year longer to graduate from the grades.
In the Academy they were on an average a year and seven months
older than the students from the abstaining class.
Visual and Auditory Memory: A. E. CHRISLIP.
Experiments have been carried on in the psychological laboratory
of Columbia University and elsewhere for the purpose of comparing*
visual and auditory memory. The points investigated in the first
experiment were to determine: the number of repetitions required
by each sense to reproduce in a certain order certain total series of
like construction; the average number of characters of a .series
recalled in their proper order for each repetition of series of like
construction for each sense; and to determine, if possible, the best
material for testing the two senses.
The material used consisted of numerals, nonsense syllables, and
words. Series composed of 12 and 16 characters of each material
were used in testing both senses.
The result shows that when series of 12 numerals similarly con-
structed were presented to the two senses, that out of 26 cases, 20 are
visual, 8 auditory, and 8 show no difference. In the case of the series
236 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of 16 numerals, 19 visual, 4 auditory, and 13 show no difference.
With 12 nonsense syllables there are 15 visual and 15 auditory, the
rest showing no difference, but for 16 nonsense syllables, 25 visual,
7 auditory, and 4 show no difference. With the 12 words there are
14 visual, 10 auditory, and 12 no difference; with 16 numerals, 22
visual, 9 auditory, and 5 show no difference.
For each repetition of each series the result shows that in the
memory tests for visual reproduction the greater average number is
reproduced. The nonsense syllables were the best material, as they
offered few combinations or devices for memorizing them.
Experiments, in which stories of 100 words each have been used
to test the two senses, have been carried on for some time. The
two senses have been tested for both immediate and delayed recall.
In both the immediate and the delayed reproductions the visual has
been better than the auditory. There is an experiment now in opera-
tion in which the method is somewhat different from that in the
former experiments conducted with logical material. While the
results are not all determined the indications are that the auditory
may surpass the visual.
The Hereditary Transmission of Mental Traits: HENBY H. GODDABD.
It is not the purpose at the present time to present any results,
but rather to make some suggestions and point out possible lines of
research in the hereditary transmission of mental traits which may
be of interest to psychologists.
In connection with our studies of the cause of mental deficiency
at the training school at Vineland, much material has been accumu-
lated showing the hereditary transmission of deficiency. In connec-
tion with these data many facts have come to hand which make it
clear that not only deficiency, but many positive traits are directly
transmitted. It is further suggested that psychology would gain val-
uable data and contributions to many of its problems from a study of
this question of heredity. Indeed, it seems quite possible that many
problems which are now so complex as to elude our powers of anal-
ogy would be easily analyzed if we were able to study the heredity
problem and thus eliminate the hereditary factor. For example, if
the goodness of memory depends, as Professor James said, upon the
natural retentiveness of the brain tissue plus the logical association
that the individual establishes, then we may reasonably expect that
the condition of the brain tissue may be a quality that is transmitted
and could be eliminated through the study of mode of transmission :
or, in other words, we could determine to what extent the differences
in memory are due to acquired factors.
It would seem equally possible that sensory conditions may be
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 237
traced through families just as peculiar eyes or eye sight, peculiar
hearing, kinesthetic sensations, taste, or smell may be dependent
upon organic conditions which may be found to be directly trans-
mitted. The inborn habits or instincts are so bound up with
acquired habits that it makes a very complex problem. It seems
quite possible that a study of the instinctive activities of members
of different generations might reveal to us a good deal about the
nature of instinct and its transmission which would have very
important bearings upon many of our problems of instinct and
emotions. Even the study of such a complex problem as the inherit-
ance of mental deficiency may possibly yield us some most important
results.
It seems hardly likely that mental deficiency is due to the absence
of any one characteristic, but of several, and that it may be pictured
more as though normal mentality is the result of a hundred factors
of which a person must have, say, seventy-five in order to have what
is called normal mentality. Now the twenty-five that are lacking
may be any twenty-five, perhaps, in the whole list and a tracing of
the hereditary traits might lead us eventually to determine some
things about the resulting mentality when the missing factors belong
to different groups.
We shall work on these problems at Vineland as rapidly as pos-
sible, but they should be studied in normal people as well. It is
perhaps true that it would not be possible to go back farther than
the living generations, but even so, if careful studies and tests were
made of the mental traits in living persons, it would be possible to
get the records of two and sometimes three generations, and these
records could then be kept and supplemented as the years go by and
the newer generations come on. There would thus be laid the basis
for most valuable studies later on.
The family histories, that we have secured in connection with our
children at Vineland, suggest two or three interesting questions.
For instance, there are several families in which alcoholism is strong
in several generations. It is possible that we have in these families
an unusual appetite for alcohol, which appetite has been transmitted.
It looks as though it would not be impossible to eliminate to quite an
extent the environmental factor, and so be able to determine whether
this was hereditary or not. The same is true of the sexual life.
A great many charts show very much sexual immorality: and pos-
sibly here we may have, in some cases at least, an unusual develop-
ment of the sex instinct which has broken over all bounds of con-
ventionality and has shown in different generations. It appears that
all of these problems are not only worthy of study, but might yield
238 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
most important results. The speaker then showed graphic charts
illustrating the family histories of a number of families. These
charts showed the strong inheritance of feeble-mindedness and also
illustrated the points made in regard to alcohol and sexuality. Con-
siderable discussion followed.
H. L. HOLLINGWORTH,
Secretary.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Einleitung in die Philosophic. HANS CORNELIUS. Zweite Auflage.
Leipzig und Berlin: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner. 1911.
Pp. xv + 376.
The philosophic individuality of Cornelius is the synthesis of two
apparently antagonistic modes of thought: it has been molded by the
same tendencies that shaped the anti-metaphysical methodology of Mach ;
but as Cornelius rightly insists (pp. 211, 343) it bears not less clearly
the stamp of Kant's transcendental logic. By regarding the Einleitung
from this point of view as an independent philosophic complement of
Mach's positivism we shall probably best succeed in fixing its place in
contemporaneous literature.
Perhaps no living thinker has proved so baffling to professional philos-
ophers as Ernst Mach; perhaps no one has to such extent evoked what I
should call " the metaphysician's fallacy." For Mach's method of pro-
cedure is the method of the natural scientist: he investigates his prob-
lems, one by one, according to the peculiar conditions of the case, without
regard to whether his conclusions fit into a preconceived system. It is
but necessary for the critic to assume that such a system exists and noth-
ing is easier than to prove inconsistencies. What Mach attempts, how-
ever, is not a system of philosophy, but a methodology. Those critics
have never comprehended the trend of Mach's thinking who attach an
exaggerated, quasi-metaphysical meaning to his " sensations " or " ele-
ments." For Mach, his elements are not absolute, but provisional units.
Nor does he suppose for a moment, as even so friendly a critic as Dr.
Cams assumes, that the elements are immediate data of consciousness. 1
The cardinal point lies in the definition of scientific endeavor as a pro-
gressive determination of the functional relations of the elements. For
this definition at once eliminates as utterly idle all such concepts of pop-
ular philosophy as the ego, the Ding an sich, or the principle of causality,
and thus constitutes the core of Mach's anti-metaphysical positivism.
This methodological standpoint alone does not, of course, account for
the origin of these popular concepts and Mach himself has indicated that
it is obligatory to investigate what functional relations of the immediate
data necessitated these methodologically no longer valuable concepts.*
1 " Erkenntnis und Irrtum," 1906, pages 12, 16.
*Loc. tit., page 13.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 239
This genetic inquiry, it must be admitted, Mach has rather suggested
than undertaken in detail from a uniform psychological point of view.
But in still another direction it was possible to supplement Mach's investi-
gations. Mach rightly repels the criticism that his psychology ignores
the spontaneous activity of the human mind; indeed, his emphasis of the
principle of the economy of thought suffices to refute the accusation.
Nevertheless, the formal peculiarities of Mach's presentation lend some
color to the charge, and his definitions of consciousness might be misin-
terpreted by prejudiced critics as a relapse into atomistic and passivistic
psychologizing.
No such misinterpretation would be possible in the case of Cornelius.
In the center of his philosophy stands Mach's principle of the economy
of thought, which is, however, at once recognized as but another expres-
sion of the unity of consciousness. This principle explains at the same
time the efforts of prescientific thought, the historical attempts at meta-
physical unification, and the scientific striving for a view of the universe.
The weakness of primitive and of metaphysical speculation lies in the
fact that both make uncritical employment of traditional, popular (" nat-
uralistic ") concepts. The investigation of the legitimacy of these con-
cepts, that is, of their origin and empirical meaning such as the concepts
of the persistent external world, of the reality of space and time, of
causality, and of the ego coincides with the coming of age of philosophy,
its transition from dogmatism into empiricism, from the metaphysical
into the epistemological stage. The naturalistic concepts lead to prob-
lems insoluble, not from any deficiency of the human intellect, but because
of the erroneous assumptions involved in their formulation (Schein-
probleme). These stumbling-blocks can be removed only by a general
inquiry into the mechanism of thought, by a natural history of human
thought. Such an investigation will not aim at a purely destructive
annihilation of the popular view of the world, but at a genetic under-
standing of that view and its clarification through the elimination of
dogmatic elements. It must indeed be idealistic in the sense that it will
proceed from the data of consciousness, which alone furnish the material
for the structure and the totality of factors for the development of our
world-view. Instead of denying, however, the existence of an objective
world, it will merely attempt to show from what facts this concept is
derived and thus determine its purely empirical significance. Cornelius's
epistemology is thus emphatically psychologistic, not in the sense of rest-
ing on special theories of psychic phenomena, but in the sense in which
all epistemology, tacitly or explicitly, must be psychologistic in being
based on an unprejudiced analysis and description of the immediate facts
of consciousness (pp. 55 f.). And here what at once distinguishes Cor-
nelius's psychology from an atomistic view is his emphatic and never-
ceasing consideration of "die Factoren des Zusammenhangs der Erfahr-
ung " those factors which Hoffding has conveniently included under the
concept of the formal unity of consciousness.*
Cornelius begins his inquiry with a consideration of the psychological
1 " Psychologic in Umriasen," page 186.
240 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
theories developed by the English thinkers of the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries. This naturally leads to a critique which merely expresses
the general consensus of modern psychologists as to the failure of the
association theory to account for the distinctively synthetic peculiarity of
consciousness (pp. 196 ff.). It is the faulty psychology of the associa-
tionist school that resulted in the skeptical conclusions of their philos-
ophy ; for a theory which from the start limits our knowledge to isolated,
momentary perceptions, impressions, and ideas, can not arrive at a positive
theory of generally valid knowledge (p. 208).
The way to correct Hume's philosophy, therefore, is to correct the
faults of his psychology. What we actually find in consciousness is not
a mere sum of unrelated impressions and ideas out of which our experi-
ence shapes itself by virtue of the laws of association, but a unified whole.
The point is to ascertain those facts which may be noted in any period of
consciousness over and above the isolated elements of experience. The
first synthetic factor described by Cornelius produces the recognition of a
definite part of the stream of consciousness as marked off from its sur-
roundings. A second factor connecting the otherwise isolated elements of
experience is the symbolic function of memory images. By means of this
function we transcend the limitations of the present moment and form an
idea of a past experience as a past experience. A third factor enables us
to classify every new sensation and complex of sensations, to recognize it
as similar to previous experiences or complexes of experiences. These
synthetic factors correspond to Kant's synthesis of " intuitive apprehen-
sion," " ideational reproduction," and " conceptual recognition," and in
Kant's deduction of the categories of the understanding from the unity of
consciousness Cornelius recognizes the historically first attempt in his
own direction (p. 228).
Without the facts conditioned by the synthetic factors, a unified
experience would be impossible. They determine the most general laws of
conscious phenomena among them the recollection and recognition of
complexes. All our experiences are parts of complexes, and are remem-
bered as parts of complexes. The law of association by contiguity is a
special instance of the general law that every experience (Erlebnis) is
merely part of a larger complex (p. 234). Similarly, the law of asso-
ciation by similarity is merely an expression of the same principle : we do
not merely recollect a past experience similar to a present one, but also
distinguish it as past by recalling at the same time the associated elements
of the past complex. Both laws axe not, as might be supposed on the
basis of the old associationist school, alien forces regulating the course of
conscious states, but laws immanent in all consciousness consequences of
those factors without which even the simplest case of unified conscious-
ness would be inconceivable (pp. 207, 236 f.). Cornelius's account of
these laws thus recalls that of Huff ding, who similarly views association
as but a special form of synthesis. 4
Having enumerated the synthetic factors and their consequences,
Loc. cit., page 219.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 241
Cornelius turns to the problem of the development of our concepts and
judgments through these factors. In the assimilation of any new experi-
ence, we proceed in one of two ways. We either confine ourselves to
classifying it as similar with certain previous experiences; or, we step
beyond the mere classification of our experience and infer that it forms
part of a complex of other experiences. The concepts formed in these
ways Cornelius describes as falling into two distinct categories : perceptual
concepts (Wahrnehmungsbegriffe) and experiential concepts (Erfahr-
ungsbegriffe). To subsume a given portion of my visual field under the
perceptual concept " whiteness " is one thing ; to infer, beyond the imme-
diate data, that whiteness represents " white chalk " constitutes the quite
different step of subsuming under an experiential concept. The second
process always takes place when we refer an impression to a persistent
object.
For the explanation of the development of our knowledge Cornelius
introduces the concept of " configuration," Gestaltqualitdt. By this he
understands those characteristics which define a complex as a complex,
that is, as different from a mere summation of its elements. The signifi-
cance of this concept results from the fact that all the contents of our con-
sciousness are parts of complexes and as such possess relation fringes due
to the configuration of their complexes. Among the concepts of complex-
characteristics there are some relating to the modes of connection of our
experiences in so far as these modes have their foundation in the unity of
consciousness. As every one of our experiences must be connected with
other experiences in these particular ways, these " relation-concepts " are
applicable to all experience, and the judgments based on them are neces-
sarily valid for all possible experience, regardless of the nature of the
contents of the experiences. Borrowing Kant's term, Cornelius accord-
ingly refers to these concepts as general modes of intuition. From these
he eliminates Kant's spatial mode, first, because haptic and optic space
are not immediately connected as parts of the same space and are not
three-dimensional ; secondly, because even in the field of sensation, sounds
are arranged without spatial order, while the same applies to the relations
of sensations to memory images, or of sensations, judgments, and feelings
(pp. 252 f.). On the other hand, Cornelius includes among his modes of
intuition not only time, but also the concepts of totality and partiality,
unity and plurality, similarity and equality, constancy and mutability,
as well as the direction of the changes.
This grouping suggests Ebbinghaus's treatment of the same intuitions
as " the general attributes of sensations." Cornelius's discussion of this
subject is probably the least satisfactory portion of his work. There is no
serious attempt to justify the coordination of the other modes of intuition
with that of time. It is perfectly true, for example, that the concept of
similarity is applied to every possible experience in the sense that every
experience is classified with reference to its resemblance to previous ex-
periences that the apprehension of similarity may be described as merely
an expression of the unity of consciousness. But this immediate classi-
242 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
fication does not involve the construction of a continuum in which " alleg
Afannigfaltige der Erscheinungen in gewixsen Verhaltnissen angeschauet
wird." While time is, in Hoffding's phrase, a typical individual idea, all
the several times experienced being but parts of the same time, this does
not apply at all to similarity. In a previous section (p. 245) Cornelius
himself very clearly distinguishes between similarity as an immediate
datum of consciousness and the abstract concept of similarity. The
abstract concept of similarity naturally comprises as a concept all possible
special cases of similarity; but of course it is not present in all conscious
phenomena. The apprehension of similarity, on the other hand, is indeed
coextensive with consciousness, but each such apprehension is distinct from
every other, and consequently it is not justifiable to speak of similarity
as a general mode of intuition. So far as the exclusion of space from
the universal modes of intuition is concerned, Cornelius's reasons quite
irrespective of the justice of his conclusions can not be considered satis-
factory. In limiting psychological space to two dimensions, the author
certainly finds himself in excellent company, but an indication that other
views are held would have been in place in a treatment which allegedly
rests on the facts rather than the special theories of psychology. The
same criticism applies to the denial of spatial quality to sensations of tone.
If a psychologist like Wundt insists that we can not hear tones without
localization,* such opinions can not be disregarded without some critical
discussion. It would have been better and fairer to explain on what psy-
chological assumptions space could not be regarded as a universal mode,
and under what assumptions it must be regarded in this light.
Having disposed of the purely classificatory perceptual concepts, Cor-
nelius turns to the second category of experiential concepts. We con-
tinually complement the given perceptions by referring them to constant
objects, that is, by associating them with characteristics not immediately
given to us, which is equivalent to associating them with possible future
experiences. It is the synthetic character of consciousness that leads us
to view every experience as a member of a complex. Our expectations
as to the experiences linked with a given experience are defined in some
measure by the knowledge that it has hitherto appeared only in a certain
definite series. If an initial member common to several known series is
linked with final members varying with intermediate members, the latter
are recognized as conditions of the final links and determine the nature
of our expectations. The complementary activity which forms experien-
tial concepts and explains isolated phenomena by connecting them with
others is nothing but a resume of our past experience and the expectation
of future events in accordance with the past. The shorthand description
of experience synonymous with the application of the principle of economy
of thought is also identical with the formation of experiential concepts
(p. 263). As the concept of a constant object implies nothing but the
sum-total of its constant properties, what applies to the latter also applies
' ' Ohne irgendeine Localisation Iconnen wir auch Tone nicht horen. ' ' In
"Waa soil uns Kant nicht oeinf " Kleine Schriften, 1910, I., page 160.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 243
to the former: it expresses nothing but a series of definitely connected
phenomena. To attribute reality to an object regardless of our perception
of it simply means, as Hume failed to notice, that we connect our varying
percepts with the same context of other percepts of the object. Kant cor-
rectly explained the belief in the reality of objects, but failed to note that
in so doing he had already explained that constant which an earlier philos-
ophy postulated as an unknowable noumenon. By supposing that objects,
as complexes of phenomena, must be phenomena of something else of an
ever transcendent Ding an sich Kant relapsed into naturalistic philos-
ophy (p. 277). The opposition thus engendered between noumena and
phenomena is quite illusory. The foregoing considerations immediately
eliminate two supposed problems which have disturbed the philosophers of
many ages as to the connection between subject and object (" Ver-
mittlungsprobleme"). As the concept of reality is constructed solely out
of our subjective data, the problem how we can recognize the objective
world despite the subjective conditions of our knowledge disappears,
because it is seen to invert the actual conditions of the case. On the other
hand, there also disappears the impassable barrier between the physical
and the psychical world which is inevitably encountered on the dogmatic
assumption of objective reality. As Cornelius puts it: " zu fragen, wie
es Jcomme, doss das Ding durch die Sinnesorgane auf unser Bewusstsein
wirTce, heisst also soviel als fragen, wie es Icomme, dass der gesetzmdssige
Zusammenhang unserer Sinneswahrnehmungen, welchen wir erfarhrungs-
massig erkannt und in bestimmter Weise bezeichnet hdben, wirklich eben
dieser Zusammenhang unserer Wahrnehmungen ist" (p. 280).
Cornelius fully recognizes that his investigation of the mechanism of
concept-formation is purely psychological. Accordingly he now turns to
the logical question of the validity of our concepts and judgments. After
briefly sketching the psychology of the confirmation or repudiation of
specific judgments, he arrives at the conclusion that judgments are of
general validity only if the conditions defined in their formulation them-
selves determine quite generally the nature of the experiences to be ob-
served under those conditions. This is true of analytical judgments ; and
also of the synthetic judgments resting on Cornelius's first category of
concepts (Wahrnehmungsbegriffe), for the "knowledge of acquaintance"
with any phenomenon that can be subsumed under a perceptual concept
completely exhausts the possibilities of such a phenomenon. That spectral
green resembles blue more closely than red is not an analytic judgment,
because it does not follow from the definition of " green " ; nevertheless it
is a statement of universal validity. This is not true of the experiential
judgments, of our "laws of nature," for the observation of innumerable
past experiences does not seem to establish the validity of a prophecy as to
future experiences of a similar character. Observations contrary to past
experience disturb our mental equilibrium, which can be readjusted only
by bringing both the ordinary observation and the deviations from it
under. a common law. This is done by correlating the usual experience
with a formerly unnoticed condition, a change in which results in a dif-
244 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ferent experience; in such cases we speak of the cause of the changed re-
sult. The principle of causality thus embodies merely the demand in-
dispensable for the unity of our experience that all phenomena shall be
arranged in constant empirical combinations. Accordingly, this prin-
ciple has absolute validity and likewise defines the validity of our experi-
ential laws: they are valid in so far as a hitherto unobserved cause does
not produce an alteration. The category of causality is thus founded in
the synthetic factors of consciousness (pp. 297-307).
There remains to be explained the naturalistic concept of the ego. As
we distinguish from the varying perceptions of an object the persistent
object of the external world, so we develop the concept of a permanent ego
as opposed to the flux of conscious phenomena. As in the former case,
Cornelius identifies the concept of a persistent reality with the formation
of concepts of his second category. Any single state of consciousness is
found in a definite connection with past states of consciousness, not im-
mediately experienced, but in some measure determining it. These defi-
nite connections constitute the constant factors of our personality and
may be described as " unconscious psychic facts," provided this phrase is
taken merely as an abbreviated designation for definite, regular combina-
tions of conscious phenomena, just as the concept of an objective thing is
used merely to denote a definite connection of phenomena (pp. 314 f.).
The subject of the ego naturally leads the author to consider two re-
lated problems the relation of mind and body and the knowledge of alien
consciousness. On both these questions Cornelius develops views of ex-
traordinary sanity. The solipsistic view can not be refuted, because the
direct experience of alien conscious states is forever precluded. On the
other hand, the association of certain outward manifestations with con-
sciousness is in consonance with the scientific, as well as prescientific,
application of the principle of the economy of thought. Further, it is not
a metaphysical association, because the concept of alien consciousness,
being patterned on our own, does not transcend experience (pp. 329-332).
With regard to the relation of mind and body, Cornelius admits psycho-
physical parallelism for sensations; "well die physischen Vorgange ihrem
Begrifie nach nichts Anderes sind, als die gesetzmdssigen Zusammen-
hange, denen wir unsere Empfindungen einordnen" (p. 319). But it is
not true that the parallelism of ideation and of physiological processes is
an empirical fact. An analysis of the psychophysiology of the reflex arc
leads to the result that while central nervous paths are intermediaries of
sensation and movement, there is nothing to prove that they correspond
to the psychological act of association following the sensation. Patholog-
ical cases are likewise inadequate to prove the point. So far as brain dis-
ease is not definitely observed, the assumption that a psychic derangement
is necessarily due to a cerebral anomaly is a pure dogma. But, even when
an affection of the brain is definitely ascertained, it might be supposed
that the disease conditions an alteration of the sensation rather than of
the relevant associations. Which of these views represents the facts can
not be determined, and accordingly the general question whether psycho-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 245
physical parallelism holds for psychic facts beyond sensations and feelings
remains unsolved. That the course of ideation depends on sensations and
is thus indirectly conditioned by physiological processes, is readily ad-
mitted (pp. 32&-32S). The constant factors of psychic life are by defi-
nition independent of physiological alterations. This does not mean that
the course of ideation is similarly independent, for those constant factors
are precisely what the stream of ideas (Vorstellungsablauf) does not con-
sist in. Accordingly, Cornelius infers from the independence of the con-
stant factors that psychic life does not necessarily disappear with its
physiological substratum. Inasmuch, on the other hand, as the constant
factors are not themselves conscious experiences, but only conditions of
such, it is equally inadmissible to infer the persistence of psychic life
after death from the constancy of those factors. This argument is not
particularly cogent. The constant factors are conditions, but they are not
fully determining conditions, of consciousness. Psychic life involves a
stream of ideas admittedly dependent though only indirectly on physio-
logical conditions. The cessation of these conditions, it would seem, must
necessarily result in a cessation of conscious phenomena. Indeed, if the
constant " unconscious " factors are nothing but our experiences as to
definite combinations of conscious phenomena, if consciousness is un-
thinkable without feelings, and the latter are admittedly dependent on
physical conditions (p. 319), it is not at all clear how consciousness could
survive death.
The " empiricist picture of the universe " sketched by Cornelius
towards the close of his book (pp. 332348) has already been sufficiently
indicated in the preceding pages. The recognition of all our laws as
merely abbreviated expressions for our experiences eliminates all the il-
lusory problems based on the uncritical assumption of the naturalistic
concepts. Thus, Kant's first antinomy is now found to rest on the natural-
istic concept of the universe as an immediate datum of knowledge. If we
conceive the world merely as a resume of our experiences, its existence
can not extend beyond the ordering of our experiences in accordance with
the categories of our thinking, and instead of regarding it as infinite, we
can state only that our increasing experience is nowhere hemmed in by
any limits. This position eliminates the possibility of satisfying the
metaphysical demand for a unification of the entire universe, for our in-
tellectual machinery, the categories, are by virtue of their significance
applicable only to the fractional components of our experience, not to a
complete " unit " beyond experience. There is only one case in which we
have scientific knowledge transcending a determination of parts the
knowledge of the fundamental unity of our consciousness which differs
from all our fractional experiences in appearing not as a manifold, but
as an immediately unified reality.
In the opening paragraphs of this article the philosophical position of
Cornelius has already been indicated. The foregoing summary, it is to be
hoped, has convinced the reader that we here have to deal with a solid at-
tempt to grapple with philosophic concepts. Cornelius's attempt is not a
246 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
final solution of the philosophical problem from a positivistic standpoint,
because that very standpoint precludes a final solution. For positivism
demands a philosophy that shall deal with particular philosophic concepts
and problems, as every science deals with its problems. No sane scientist
denies that each of his problems admits of indefinitely more profound in-
vestigation, and in precisely the degree in which philosophers will attack
their specific problems in the same spirit they will rehabilitate their
scientific standing. With regard to Cornelius it has been indicated that
several of his analyses do not seem to attain to the relative degree of
profundity that might have been expected. But viewed as a whole, and
more particularly as contrasted both with the reactionary sciolism now
invading philosophical literature and with the crudities of much soi-disant
positivism, his epistemology constitutes a landmark in the transition to a
philosophy of the future that will be at once uncompromisingly radical
and unassailably critical.
ROBERT H. LOWIE.
AMEEICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY.
Experiments in Educational Psychology. DANIEL STARCH. New York:
The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. vii + 183.
Two questions arise in the consideration of this work. First, what is
its value in relation to other books in the same field? Second, what is the
value of this method of approach to the problems of education : does it
bring new insight or does it complicate the situation?
Dr. Starch has brought together some valuable materials which must
prove very stimulating to the teachers who are able to grasp them. He
gives experimental methods for testing in concrete ways the facts of in-
dividual differences, the obstacles to learning which result from defective
sensation channels, the place of mental imagery in the processes of learn-
ing and knowledge, the place of " trial and error " in experience, the
progress of habit-building, the actualities in " formal discipline," the facts
of " association," the nature of the apperceptive processes, the methods
and laws of attention, the values of memory in learning, and the vital re-
lationships of work and fatigue. All these things are real factors in the
equipment of the teacher, and the teacher can not know too much about
them. Any work which attempts to make clear these fundamental ele-
ments in mental development must be welcomed, and it must be said that
Dr. Starch has organized his materials in such a way as to make them
very interesting to the teacher of educational psychology, and, rightly
interpreted, to the average teacher.
But there is another side to the matter, as indicated by the second
question. Experimental education has been going its own way in the last
few years, and a rather curious way it is, too. Education, as a whole
process, is becoming more socially minded; we are being told that it is
essentially a social movement, growing out of social pressures and lead-
ing into social programs, both for the child and the race. From this point
of view " only social psychology is of primary importance for education."
On the other hand, experimental education seeks to isolate certain mental
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 247
operations for special study. The very processes of isolation tend to ex-
clude the social element; but this elimination of the social automatically
eliminates the ideational, also, since the ideational element arose in ex-
perience to mediate the social world and has no reason for existence when
the social is gone. The net result of these exclusions in the experimental
laboratory is the reduction of the learner to a piece of 'psychophysical
machinery, and the interest of the experimenter centers in the reactions
which the machine makes to a series of organized stimuli. The very
make-up of Dr. Starch's book is determined by these demands. The " ob-
server " must get no hints as to what is coming next : hence, many pages
must be left blank, etc. Now, when the book is read in this light it is
seen that provision is made, not for the study of those subjects noted
above, but for the study of the following items : the individual differences
of nervous systems, characteristic defects of sensation mechanisms, per-
sistence of sense impressions, constructive processes on the higher and
lower neural levels, the spread of constructive cerebral processes beyond
their local field, the development of intracerebral relations, cerebral re-
constructions, the persistence of neural energies and cerebral processes,
and the rise, fall, and renewal of neural energies. That is to say, experi-
mental education, as represented by this work, devotes itself to the study
of a mechanism under conditions that exclude the presence of the most
persistent stimuli, and therefore, the most characteristic reactions, of the
actual school situations. A very serious problem is thus raised as to how
the student can get these abstract results back into the social world where
the actual processes of education go on.
Yet there is no fundamental contradiction between this work of the
educational experimentalist and that social psychology of the concrete
educational processes demanded by the rising tide of educational inquiry.
Social psychology seeks experimental determinations of processes of de-
velopment and interaction that lie within the fields of social action. And
the social psychology of education needs just such studies as this we are
considering. But does this laboratory education feel the need of a social
setting for its real experiments? And can this laboratory work find its
way back into the concrete educational situation? This book deals with
problems that have arisen in the life of the school ; the problems have been
abstracted for special investigation : should not a chapter have been added
to the book showing how these problems have arisen, and may arise, and
how the results can be reinterpreted into the actual educational situa-
tions, where they can be of real value to the teacher? If a laboratory
manual is to have proper use, even by the average laboratory instructor, it
must clearly relate itself to the concrete problems out of which it arose
and into which its results must go.
We need more work of this kind: but the experimentalist in the field
of education must be ready to relate his problems and his results to the
demands of the concrete educational processes as these are being inter-
preted by social psychology if his work is to have fundamental value for
education. JOSEPH K. HART.
THE UNIVEESITT OF WASHINGTON.
24 s THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The American Philosophy Pragmatism. A. v. C. P. HUIZINGA. Boston:
Sherman, French, & Co. Pp. v + 64.
This is a curiously written and poorly arranged attack upon a current
mode of thought. Disentangled, it consists of this fourfold root : a small
amount of information upon pragmatism as an American philosophy; a
large mass of 'quotations from the enemy; several popular diatribes from
a conservative point of view ; and a few suggestive notes as to the relations
of this latter-day movement to German idealism.
The assumption that pragmatism is the American philosophy comes in
the middle, not the beginning of this sketch. . " Professor " McCosh is
said to have wished for a specific American, a national philosophy, but
little anticipated the speedy realization of his desire in the specifically
American Weltanschauung pragmatism. This is an error. What President
McCosh wished, and the wish was father to the thought, was that his own
natural realism, the Scotch common sense, might become the system of his
adopted country. The rest of this sketch is filled with like misinforma-
tion. Thus it is alleged that pragmatism neglects the theory of knowledge
and of reality; that as the apotheosis of the evolutionary dogma it has
irreverence for its mainspring; that as a doctrine of hustling activity it
is opposed to " contemplating " wisdom, and so falls in with Kipling's de-
scription of the predominant American trait of disregard for knowledge
and law in the face of the supreme commands of " the instant need of
things." These diatribes have their extreme form in a preface which
claims that the point at issue is a denial of the supernatural, a discard-
ing of the notion of being, a revolt against all tradition, authority, and
unity, and all regulative norms and law.
Such is poor pragmatism from the negative side. What it is posi-
tively its opponent finds hard to say. In one place, he holds that it argues
pluralism or polytheism " against our monotheistic belief." In another,
that it is a scheme of pantheistic, evolutionary monism. This brings us
to the fourth and only valuable point in the essay the attempt to con-
nect pragmatism with German idealism of a previous generation. By his
frequent use of good German and faulty French the author discloses a
certain Teutonic facility in his exposition of " this pantheism of an all-
pervading Zielstrebigkeit." Pragmatism, he suggests, in a blind sort of
way, is akin to Fichte's teaching that things in themselves are as we have
to make them, " that the ego limits itself in order to overcome the limi-
tation, that the theoretical is only in behalf of the practical " ; in short, he
teaches the duty of unremitting exertion, and this duty, it is easily seen,
appeals to people who have work to do. In connecting the Vocation of
Man with the demand for the strenuous life Huizinga has hit on a prob-
able connecting link between primitive pragmatism and the St. Louis
School. He does not say so definitely, but it may well be that the revo-
lutionary refugees of '48 through their personal beliefs and through such
a German- American organ as the Journal of Speculative Philosophy,
prepared the way for the rapid spread of pragmatism in the middle west.
This is a suggestion as to what the writer might have done in tracing
249
possible sources of the movement. However, he makes no such exact
connection, but leaves us with only vague analogies between the Yankee
" Let us still be up and doing " and the theme of Faust that " the ever-
active, striving soul works out his own salvation."
Although he is able to point out these German-American affinities, the
author has no sympathy with them. His conclusion appears to be that
pragmatism is a scheme of pantheistic, evolutionary monism, totally
antipathetic to readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra for whom this essay was
written. Indeed, pragmatism seems to fulfill the boast that the dangerous
movement of Ritschlian valuation-theology would carry the Anglo-
Saxon world in one generation. And yet in vindication of the old school,
and against the charge that it is no longer adequate to the present needs,
he contends that it is adequate, since it affirms that thought not only re-
veals reality, but is a unique mode of reality itself. In this conclusion
the anti-pragmatist has reached the third stage portrayed by James first
scorn, then tolerance, lastly adjustment of the old to the new way of
thinking.
We might dismiss this sketch by saying that it is an essay with wide
margins but a narrow outlook. It contains, however, several excellences.
One is in pointing out the affinity between pragmatism and the Ritschlian
motto " Religion without Metaphysics " ; another is in showing that prag-
matism is an epistemological result of the doctrine of evolution; a third is
in coining certain phrases which might be used as effective watchwords
by radical pragmatists. Such phrases are "being is disclosed in the
doing " ; and " We are no more searching for truth, we are engaged in
making it." I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY.
VASSAE COLLEGE.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. October, 1911.
Lo studio sperimentale del pensiero e della volonta (pp. 494-504) : A.
GEMELLI. - From a series of experiments performed by Biihler and other
German psychologists, there can be demonstrated the autonomy of psy-
chical activity and the essential distinction between thought and phantasm.
Est-inza ed esistenza (pp. 505-525) : G. MATTIUSSI, S. J. - In the divine na-
tuit, essence am! existence are identical; in finite beings, on the other
hand, there is a real distinction between essence and existence. Sigieri
di Brdbante nella Divina Commedia e le fonti della filosofia di Dante (pp.
526-545) : BRUNO NARDI. - The Dantean cosmology appears as a fusion of
Avicenna's peripateticism with the cosmological ideas of the Augustinian
school. Note e Discussioni. Tribuna libera. Analisi d'opere. A. Pas-
tore, Dell' essere e del conoscere: A. CUSCHIERI. Michotte-Priim, Etude
experimental sur le choix volontaire et ses antecedents immediats:
ARCAKGELO GALLI. G. Amendola, La volonta e il bene: G. TREDICI. G.
Allievo, G. G. Rousseau filosofo e pedagogista: M. BRUSADELLI. De
Dominicis, Scienza comparata dell' educazione: L. VENTURA. Note bib-
liografiche. Sommario ideologico delle opere e delle riviste di filosofia.
250 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. November,
1911. Leg perplexites du Philebe (pp. 457-478) : ANDRE BREMOND. - Plato's
dialogues, although great and inspiring, often lack in logical sequence and
force of reasoning. Le libre arbitre et lea lots sociologiques d'apres
Quetelet (pp. 479-515) : J. LOTTIN. - Quetelet never defended the thesis of
the determinism of the individual will; he believed in social determinism,
which he carefully distingushed from fatalism. Le traite " De esse et es-
sentia" de Thierry de Fribourg (pp. 516-536): DR. KREBS. -Text of
Thierry's " De Esse et Essentia," published for the first time from a
manuscript of the Vatican library. Le neo-dogmatisme (pp. 537-563) :
L. Du ROUSSAUX. - The type of neo-dogmatism born among certain
Scholastics from the influence of Kantian criticism is decidedly inferior
to the old, traditional dogmatism. A propos des conditions philosophiques
de devolution (pp. 564-588) : A. BOUYSSONIE. - A criticism of Le Gui-
chaoua's theory of causality in evolution. Le Guichaoua's answer.
Comptes rendus. H. de Jongh, Uancienne faculte de theologie
de Louvain au premier siecle de son existence: J. LOTTIX. A. Fouillee,
La pensee et les nouvelles ecoles antiintellectualistes : J. HENRY.
G. Surbled, La Volonte: F. PALHORIES. J. Mausbach, Grundlage und
Ausbildung des Charakters nach dem hi. Thomas von Aquin: F. PAL-
HORIES. Zaragiieta, El problema del alma ante la psicologia experimental:
A. F. E. Boyd Barrett, S.J., Motive-force and Motivation-tracks, a Re-
search in Will Psychology: A. F. O. Habert, La religion de la Grece
antique: A. MANSION. L. Jeudon, La morale de I'honneur: A. MOUSTIERS.
Sommaire ideologique des ouvrages et revues de philosophic.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. November, 1911. German
Philosophy in 1910 (pp. 589-609): OSCAR EwALD.-The development of
German philosophy in 1910 represents no divergence from the lines which
it has followed during recent years. The era of critical idealism is still in
the ascendent. The chief writers are mentioned, their principal works
cited, with brief accounts of and comments on their contents. The Ex-
ternality of Relations (pp. 610-621) : THEODORE DE LAGUNA. -The conflict
as to whether relations are essential, as held by the neo-Hegelians, or ex-
ternal, as held by the realists, is a conflict, it is asserted, calling for analy-
sis rather than argument. Externality may mean that all relations are
external to the nature of all relatives, a doctrine claimed to be false; or
that relations are external to qualities, a doctrine dependent upon the dis-
tinction between a quality and a relation ; or that relations are external to
each other. The word " essential " is analyzed with reference to its vari-
ous meanings. The Psychology of Punitive Justice (pp. 622-635) : WIL-
LIAM K. WRIGHT. - " Of the three theories regarding punishment, the re-
tributive theory, the deterrent theory, and the reformatory theory, public
opinion at the present time is probably most correctly interpreted by the
deterrent theory, which, as we have seen, is the resentment instinct inter-
preted and rationalized." Reviews of Books (pp. 636-657). Konstantin
Oesterreich, Die Phdnomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen: MARY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 251
WHITON CALKINS. Johannes Rehmke, Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft:
W. H. SHELDON. Warner Fite, Individualism: ELLEN BLISS TALBOT.
Leslie J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge: H. W. WRIGHT. Notices of
New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.
Bosanquet, Bernard. Logic. Second Edition Eevised and Enlarged.
2 Vols. Oxford : The Clarendon Press. 1912. Pp. xxiv + 711. 21s.
Carver, Thomas Nixon. The Religion Worth Having. Boston and New
York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1912. Pp. 140. $1.00.
Colvin, Stephen S. The Learning Process. New York: The Macmillan
Company. 1911. Pp. xxv + 336. $1.25.
De Wulf, Maurice. Histoire de la Philosophie Medievale. Quatrieme
Edition. Louvain: 1' Administration de la Revue Neo-Scolastique.
1912. Pp. viii + 624. 10F.
Engert, Horst. Teleologie und Kausalitat. Heidelberg: Carl Winters
TJniversitatsbuchhandlung. 1911. Pp. 50.
Flournoy, Thomas. La Philosophie de William James. Saint-Blaise :
Foyer Solidariste. 1911. Pp. 219. 2.50F.
Gilbert, Otto. Griechische Religionphilosophie. Leipzig: Verlag von
Wilhelm Englemann. 1911. Pp. 554.
Heimsoeth, Heinz. Die Methods der Erkenntnis bei Descartes und
Leibniz. Erste Halite: Historische Einleitung. Descartes Methode
der klaren und deutlichen Erkenntnis. Giessen: Verlag von Alfred
Topelmann. 1912. Pp. 192. 5.50M.
Home, Herman Harrell. Free Will and Human Responsibility. New
York : The Macmillan Company. 1912. Pp. xvi + 197. $1.50.
Jerusalem, Wilhelm. Die Aufgaben des Lehrers an Hoheren Schulen.
Wien und Leipzig : Wilhelm Braumuller. 1912. Pp. xii + 392.
Kessler, Dr. Kurt. Rudolf Euckens Bedeutung fur das moderne Chris-
tentum. Bunzlau : Verlag von G. Kreuschmer. 1912. Pp. 68. 1.50M.
Levinstein, Gustav. Philosophische Betrachtungen. Berlin: Leonard
Simion. 1912. Pp. 99. 1.80M.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE following delegates have been appointed to represent the Ameri-
can Philosophical Society on the following occasions: Vice-president
William B. Scott, of Princeton, to represent the society at the two hun-
dred and fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the Royal Society in
July next; Professors Paul Haupt, of Baltimore, E. Washburn Hopkins,
of New Haven, Morris Jastrow, Jr., of Philadelphia, and A. V. Williams
Jackson, of New York, as delegates to the eleventh International Con-
gress of Orientalists, to be held at Athens on April 7 to 14; Dr. Franz
Boas, of New York, a delegate to the eighteenth International Congress
of Americanists, to be held in London from May 27 to June 1. At the
centenary of the Academy of Natural Sciences on March 19 to 21 the
252 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
society was officially represented by Professor Henry F. Osborn, of New
York, Dr. Charles D. Walcott, of Washington, Mr. Samuel Vauclain, of
Philadelphia, Professor William B. Clark, of Baltimore, and Dr. II> nry
H. Donaldson, of Philadelphia.
THE Princeton University Press announces the publication of Presi-
dent Witherspoon's Lectures on Moral Philosophy, edited by Mr. V. L.
Collins, of Princeton University. This reprint is the first in the series
of " Early American Philosophers," planned by the American Philosoph-
ical Association, and to be published under its auspices by the universi-
ties with which the respective authors, whose works are to be reprinted,
were most intimately connected. The text is that of the first edition, that
of 1800, which the editor has collated not only with the editions of 1810
and 1822 but also with manuscript versions of the lectures written in
1772, 1782 and 1795, and significant variants have been noted. The In-
troduction is a study of Dr. Witherspoon's many-sided character; and a
check-list of his published writings has been supplied. The frontispiece
is a reproduction of the portrait of Dr. Witherspoon by Charles Wilson
Peale. The edition is limited to 500 copies.
THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association
met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of
the New York Academy of Sciences on Monday, April 22. At the after-
noon session, which met at Columbia University, the following papers
were read : " Sex Differences in Incidental Memory," Mr. G. C. Myers ;
"Studies in Recognition Memory," Dr. E. K. Strong; "Individual Dif-
ferences in the Interests of Children," Miss Gertrude M. Kuper ; " Ex-
periments with the Hampton Court Maze," Professor H. A. Ruger. The
papers read at the evening session at the American Museum of Natural
History were as follows : " Relation of Interference to Adaptability," Mr.
A. J. Culler; "The Optimal Distribution of Time and the Relation of
Length of Material to Time Taken for Learning," Mr. D. O. Lyon ; " The
Age of Walking and Talking in Relation to General Intelligence," Mr.
C. D. Mead; "Practise in the Case of Children of School Age," Mr. T.
H. Kirby.
MRS. CHRISTINE LADD FRANKLIN has given three university lectures on
color vision before the department of psychology of Columbia University,
as follows : March 25, " The Theory of Color Theories The Color Tri-
angle and the Color Square The Facts Inconsistent with the Hering
Theory " ; March 27, " The Young-Helmholtz Theory in its Latest Form
its Indispensableness and its Inadequacy"; March 29, "The Recent
Views on Color Brunner, Pauli, Bernstein, Schenck The Development
Theory of Color."
THE Philosophical Institute of Canterbury, New Zealand, which came
into existence on August 30, 1862, will celebrate its jubilee this year. It
is proposed to mark the occasion by holding a gathering in Christchurch.
DR. DURANT DRAKE, of the University of Illinois, has accepted the
position of associate professor of ethics and the philosophy of religion at
Wesleyan (Middletown, Conn.) University.
VOL. IX. No. 10. MAY 9, 1912
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
BEAUTY, COGNITION, AND GOODNESS
~T)HILOSOPHERS and artists have taken, throughout the history
of thought, one of two attitudes toward beauty. They saw it
either as a deep, metaphysical principle made magically manifest or
as an ordinary psychologic or material datum, curious in its bearing
on human interests. Beauty was, in these two views, assimilated, on
the one hand, to the high, the noble, the divine, impersonal, and
selfless; on the other, to the pleasures of the lower interests of life,
to the satisfaction of appetites. To Plato, Plotinus, Kant, Schelling,
Hegel, Schopenhauer, Euskin, Goethe, among many others, beauty
was the supernal reality made manifest; escape from evil, the self-
expression of the infinite, and what not that is transcendental and
blissful. For Baumgarten, for the English empiricists from Hobbes
to Burke, for psychologizing investigators like Lipps and Santayana,
for biologizing ones like Darwin and Guyau or Spencer, beauty was
identical with some state of mind or the function of some biological
condition or trait. None allowed it any independent status or
intrinsic, observable character. It was always taken metaphysically
or positivistically ; attributed now to the object, now to the mind,
and the diversity of opinion concerning its nature is so great as to
render doubtful any definition of it, save in so far as that definition
contains elements common to all the others. Such elements should,
on the one hand, reveal either the constant conditions or occasions of
beauty and perhaps its intrinsic character ; on the other, they should
indicate its status with respect to man and nature.
Where is beauty to be sought? In the definitions themselves?
Hardly, since these look back to a specific situation having concrete
and multifold characters from which the definitions as such abstract.
Actual beauty is to be found empirically, like actual apples or chairs
or tables. It can not be deduced; it must be sought in typical
"beauty-situations." But since, according to the definitions, these
are cases of either objective or psychological existence, we must
examine both things of beauty and beauty-experiencing minds.
253
254 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Suppose, then, that we study any object to which the adjective
"beautiful" is applied any statue, any picture, any poem', any
melody. If it contains beauty as a quality or attribute not identical
with any one of its other qualities, or so identical, or identical with
the whole collection of them, this beauty must be capable of being
analyzed out, like color, texture, shape, size, or expression. Now we
can abstract from any object of beauty, one by one, its qualities
its order, its structure, its tone or color, its contour or pitch, its
imagery or expressiveness. We can exhibit these elements. We can
say of the Lady in the Sistine Chapel : ' ' See, here is the rose of the
Madonna's cheek, here the pink and white of her flesh, the blue of
her eyes, the oval of her face, the round of her arm, the flowing line
of her robe, the perfect curve of her aureole." But can we so
abstract and exhibit her beauty ? Where in the picture shall we find
it, whence take it, as we have found and taken these other qualities,
from eyes and robe and aureole ? This quality we can not discover :
like Berkeley's matter, it disappears with enumerations of qualities
that, taken together, are supposed to possess it. Empirically, at least,
beauty does not appear to be an additional quality, added to color
and line and expression ; it is not an underlying quality where color
and line and expression inhere. Shall we say then, as Berkeley said
of matter, that beauty is the qualities that are supposed to possess it,
that it consists of the union of these so various elements? Some
philosophers do, in fact, hold some such proposition to be true. For
them beauty consists in wholeness, and a beautiful thing, they call
"an organic whole, self -completing and self -complete. " Others
speak of the beautiful in an object as the harmonious union of its
parts, identifying beauty with certain specific relations that such
parts bear to one another. To all persons, who so think of beauty,
it involves some kind of complexity: a simple thing can not be
beautiful. Yet are there not many things we find beautiful that are
genuinely simple a pure color, a graceful line, a single tone ? These
are units of which complex esthetic objects are made, yet they are
not unbeautiful in themselves. Reduce or increase their quantity
or duration, they are still beautiful. We may not say, therefore,
that beauty is identical with wholeness as such, nor yet that it is
identical with a special kind of wholeness. Very often two objects
made of esthetically the same material, in an identical fashion a
picture and its copy, for example differ in no respect save in this
unique matter of beauty; one of them possessing it supremely, the
other not at all. Still more frequently an object which is found to
be beautiful on one day is judged unbeautiful on the next ; while an
object which has never been considered to possess beauty is sud-
denly found to be endowed therewith in high degree. And this last
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 255
event occurs to the most commonplace of objects a city street, a
familiar voice, one's wife, one's pupils, even one's last year's con-
tribution to the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Yet when you analyze
this transfigured thing, you find in it nothing new which is the cause
of beauty, nor yet beauty itself. And not only is one and the same
object inconstant with respect to beauty at different times ; if beauty
is a quality of it, it both has it and does not have it at the same time.
For every disagreement about the beauty of an object means that
the beauty is there and not there at an identical instant. This could
not be if beauty were a quality, whether a particular one, like red
or shape, or the unity and wholeness, the combination of many such
particular qualities. Experience, when taken thus radically, refutes
both these conceptions. Neither beauty as a quality nor its identity
with wholeness is revealed in it. Complexes or simples, they may be
the occasion of beauty, or perhaps the result of beauty, but beauty's
self they are not. But if beauty is not the wholeness of an object
nor any special part or quality of an object, then it does not reside
in the object. It is to be sought for elsewhere.
That ' ' elsewhere, ' ' estheticians, following the normal bent of the
philosophic mind, make the spirit. For a long time great schools of
philosophy have persisted as the exponents of a fundamental propo-
sition the proposition that the mind contributes a great deal to the
nature of its object ; many, indeed, believing that knowing is creative.
Psychology has given this belief a color of truth. It has been shown
that what we see or hear or feel varies with our previous experience,
the state of our bodies, our general mental tone. This fact, it is
claimed, is most particularly evident in the region of our life known
as values, and psychologists, accordingly, even those who do not be-
lieve the general assumption that the mind alters or creates things by
knowing them, have none the less found it convenient to identify
beauty with certain psychological conditions. According to these
scholars the mind endows an object with beauty when it assumes
toward that object an "esthetic attitude." By "esthetic attitude"
they mean certain changes in mind and body. These changes they
study, analyze into components, define with respect to their bearing
on each other, and then designate one or all of them with the word
"beauty." So, beauty consists for some in the fusion into identity
of certain mental states; for others it consists in the titillation of
two feelings, one, that the object is real ; the second, that the object
is unreal ; others, again, find beauty to be a balanced system of motor
responses, or a fusion of mind and object, causing a "loss of person-
ality"; while others still identify beauty with the emotional imita-
tion of the object, by empathy or einfiihlung, or with the feeling of
detachment from pain and the stress of the daily life the "libera
256 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tion" of the mind as in play, or with the attribution of pleasure to
the object, rather than to the mind, and so on. Against such iden-
tifications, and there are many more, the same difficulties may be
urged as against the identification of beauty with wholeness or with
any simple quality of an object. Are such psychological or physical
states actually beauty? Do we discover them to be beauty as the
chemist discovers oxygen and hydrogen to be water? I doubt
whether even the most radical of the psychologizing estheticians
would venture to assert that they can exhibit a psychophysical com-
pound, beauty, just as they can exhibit any other psychophysical
object the sensation red, an image, the process of attention, or of
association. Here again, as with respect to the object, it is mere
confusion to identify beauty with what precedes or succeeds it or is
simultaneous with it. Empathy, "favorable stimulation and re-
pose," "objectified pleasure," may be occasions or results of beauty,
its concomitants, perhaps. They are not beauty itself, nor can they,
empirically, be made into beauty. They often appear where it does
not, and it, where they do not. If, therefore, beauty lies in the mind
of him who sees, its manner of existence must be vastly different from
ordinary "psychological existence." Nor can it have even trans-
cendental existence like the Kantian categories, since, if Kant is
right, time and space and the categories are always with us, while
beauty is not so with us. Is, then, its existence a Berkeleyan thing,
destroyed when we cease to think of it, appearing and disappearing
as we choose ? Or is it something free and independent, working its
will with us when it can even as we with it when we can ? What is
its relation to the beautiful object and what to the mind ?
The first thing that strikes the investigator who is trying to
answer this question is the fact that the mind, in genuine esthetic
experience, in which beauty appears, is not experiencing a thing
called beauty; it is experiencing an object to which it afterwards
attributes beauty. Nor yet is this object affecting a psychological
quality or trait, designated as beauty; it is affecting an ordinary
mind. Hence, the mind which seeks to experience beauty as such
must take the esthetic experience as a whole ; must make its subject
mind, beauty, and object together, and must analyze their mutual
involutions. But to do this presupposes a conception of the nature
of mind and its relation to its objects, and such a conception must
needs be defined before the analysis can proceed.
II
Common sense speaks of "reading the mind," "seeing what is
in the mind," and so on. Empirically taken, mind, when spoken of
in this manner, means a special way of behavior with respect to
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 257
objects, a way of taking them together. It involves a body, objects,
and this distinctive togetherness. When a man "knows his own
mind" or "makes up his mind" or "changes" it, one object or one
program of behavior is included, another rejected. One thing is clung
to, asserted, another abandoned. To be able ' ' to read another like a
book" is to distinguish the contents of the other's mind and his
attitude toward them which alone makes them uniquely contents of
his mind, their especial and concrete togetherness. It is, in a word,
to perceive the direction and bearing of his interests.
Now what is interest? Taken concretely it is an action of a
complex called a body upon something not itself, in such wise that
this action and its object continue to increase and to expand pros-
perously. To say that John Jones is interested in music is to say
that Jones so acts as to increase, use, and control those objects in his
environment that are denoted by the word music the objects, their
associations, and implications. He goes to concerts, to operas, he
makes himself a member of musical clubs, he plays, he sings, he
composes, or buys scores. We define all human characters by their
dominating interests the miser, the boaster, the gambler, the philos-
opher each of these words designates behavior tending to preserve
or increase a certain type of existence. Now behavior of this kind
is nothing more nor less than thinking. For thinking is only the
prosecution of interests the preservation of what is propitious and
the elimination of what is evil from the destruction of an enemy in
the flesh, to a contradiction in logic. It requires a body, an object
thought, and the way of thinking. And mind is what is left when
the body is abstracted. In any concrete instance, hence, mind is a
system of objects of which a living body, its operations, its desirings
i. e., the motor and affectional life are central and the objects
marginal.
If this be the case, minds are neither simple nor stable. They
may be and are "changed," "made up," "confused," "cleared,"
etc. One body, in the course of its lifetime, may have many minds,
only partially united. The unity of a mind is coincident with its
consistent pursuit of one interest (we then call it narrow) or with the
cooperation and harmony of many (when we call it liberal). Fre-
quently two or more minds struggle for the possession of one body ;
that is, the body may be divided between two objects, each equally
demanding response. The most typical instance of such a division
is that in which you can not determine between two conflicting ways
of behavior, where you are "of two minds" with respect to an object
or an end. The most complex instances are those of dual or mul-
tiple personality, in which" the body has ordered so great a collection
of objects and systematized a sufficiently large number of interests
258 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
in such typically distinct ways as to have set up for itself different
and opposed "minds." On the other hand, two or fifty or a hun-
dred bodies may be, so far as is compatible with their fundamental
numerical diversity, "of the same mind." In fact, concerning the
elementary things of life, the business of feeding and loving, the sun,
the sky, the primordial conditions of labor, the majority of men are
of one mind: it is this unity of mind that we call their "common
sense."
Mind so taken, it is clear, does not create the objects it knows;
it selects them. It does not "picture" or represent what it knows,
it apprehends its objects directly. Not only is it, moreover, uncre-
ative of things; it is uncreative of those things which are called
purely mental memories, imaginations, ideas. Its world, instead of
being dual, is single and continuous. Whatever it thinks has an
independent status and definable character a centaur, the number 4,
Caesar's death, to-morrow's dinner. Whatever the source of these
objects, once they are cognitively found, they are found as real:
they are capable of being subjects of conversation and of battle.
They may be envisaged by many people without being thereby
changed in the least, or they may be changed and their changes
would be accountable in unambiguous terms of bodily or otherwise
entitative action upon them. A world of such objects in which all
things have each a genuine status has been called by William
James a "world of pure experience," and this way of viewing it he
has called ' ' radical empiricism ' ' and ' ' logical realism. ' ' Its content
is an infinitude of entities, some "existent," some "non-existent,"
but really present in knowledge, partly or altogether, whenever
thought or responded to. This infinitude must not, however, be
taken as inert, nor as possessing in itself the orderly character of
knowledge. It is a flux, a turmoil of confusion and disorder, con-
taining pure chances, and with all its fulness, breeding infinitely
more things. What order it contains is not necessary, but accidental
an acquired habit of things : what things there are are not neces-
sary but accidental spontaneous appearances that have succeeded
in establishing their right to a place from among all the infinitude
that have failed and been irredeemably lost. The cosmic order is a
matter of cosmic adaptation: it is the salvage out of the universal
chaos, neither good nor bad, but one out of an infinitude of possible
orders, any of which might be much superior to this one, and any of
which might in time or immediately displace it.
I have just made use of the words "superior," "good," and
"bad." That use was premature. Such terms, terms of valuation,
introduce into the order of nature a new and extraneous order, itself
as much an incident in the cosmos as is the cosmos in the universe.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 259
For us, however, it is a reordering of that universe, the establish-
ment therein of a true center of reference, an unutterably different
scale of being. This center, as we have seen, is that arrangement of
entities we call the human organism. Like a magnet set within a
heap of iron filings, it establishes within its environment a new and
ulterior order; it endows the environmental contents with an addi-
tional quality and another status, making them relevant chiefly to
its specific capacity and arranging them along its line of force. It
does not alter their constitution, but it violates their inertia and
proper bias, refracting these with reference to the needs of its own
nature. In the universal jumble simple things may lie side by side
with complex things, one may spring from the other, the other from
the one. For the mind, simple things are first; complexes are built
out of them, the universe is reconstituted, willy-nilly, in an ascend-
ing hierarchy of complexity, from logic, through mathematics,
physics, chemistry, and biology, to ethics. Dominated by its inter-
ests, regarding the residual world only with reference to its bear-
ing on these, the organism manipulates and uses what it apprehends
directly, until its complexity is utterly reduced or its force consumed.
This activity is knowing response to objects as constituents or
relevancies of interests.
Now, actions, responses, uses are either relations or depend upon
them, and relations may be not only efficacious and alterative, but
also external and impotent, in no sense definitive. They need not
constitute anything on which they operate. They appear and they
disappear, but they always bind two or more things together in a
specific identifiable way. Thus, I stand on the floor, and "onness"
is a relation between me and the floor. But I should not be unmade
by not being on the floor, nor the floor made by my being on it.
Onness is an external relation and defines neither me nor the floor.
On the other hand, certain relations, which bind complex things
together, do define them, as a man's cognitive relation to things
defines man, the knowing animal. By that act which constitutes him
man, he is most adequately distinguished from other things. These,
again, are identified as heavy, sweet, red, alive, big, small, but only
under very special conditions are they identified as known, and only
in abnormal cases defined as such. To them the immediacy of
knowledge is an external relation which connects them with many
knowers, and it is a relation which they lose and assume without
suffering directly the least change in their constitution and character.
Indeed, we do not claim to know things certainly or immediately
until we are convinced that they have revealed to us every possible
change they themselves independently undergo. Their self-revelation
is classified sometimes according to the organs which respond to
260 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
them, sometimes according to their complexity, sometimes according
to both.
So, when the body responds to an object by means of its sense-
organs, the object is called a perception. It is generally a "thick"
object, supposed to be made up of many simpler elements. It gets
itself taken hold of by the appropriate reflex arc directly, much as a
pair of tongs directly spans or grasps a piece of coal. Thus, the
sounds you hear and the words you see are spanned immediately
by your auditory and visual reflex arcs, indirectly, by your whole
nervous system, and you are said to perceive what I say or what
impresses the eyes. Now such perceptions are very complex: they
are composed of a great variety of tones or shapes and colors and
their relations, and they also carry meanings and stand for things
not themselves. If "you span a single element of this complex, you
are said to have a sensation or an idea or a conception. Psycholo-
gists, to say nothing of philosophers like Kant, have made much of
the difference between the two, but no genuine difference seems dis-
coverable. The idea of red, e. g., whether it be "motor," or "kin-
esthetic" or "sensory" or "verbal" or "imageless," is not distin-
guishable as to qualitative content from the sensation of red; nor
the idea of triangularity from the sensation of triangularity. In
both cases you have before you less than is before you in perception,
but what you have before you is none the less of the same kind as
content of perception.
Nor can the distinction between idea and sensation based on the
mode of presentation hold. For even if sensations are presented by
the senses and ideas by means of central processes, each is at the
moment spanned by some reflex arc, and who shall say that the
senses are not part of it ? If an entity is to be apprehended at all,
it must be apprehended by one or more organs, and its nature is not
different, whether the terminal act is arrived at in a roundabout
way, through the intervention of various neural processes, or spon-
taneously, by the response of the appropriate reflex arc to its stim-
ulus. In either case the given character of this stimulus is directly
grasped, and this is so in the apprehension of even such putatively
psychical objects as memory and imagination. A remembered thing
has to be sought and found like a thing perceived, and its difference
from perception is rather in certain additive or subtractive qualities
than intrinsic content. It is essentially no more a psychic or hidden
thing than is a perception. If attainable at all, it is as open to-day,
as shareable by many people, as potent in requiring our adjustment
to it.
This holds, I believe, also of imaginational beings. These are
taken to be, like dreams, peculiarly private and hidden; their esse,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 261
more even than that of memory, is described as percipi. But if you
study your imaginative activities, if you are lost in dream or revery,
you observe that they do not come at your bidding, that they must,
like ideas and memories and sensations and perceptions, be sought
out; their character and integrity must be acknowledged as these
impose themselves upon you. You observe that they require you to
adapt yourself to them even as do the more permanent things,
making you happy or afraid, angry or sorrowful, confiding or watch-
ful, just like the residual, solid, daily life. The stuff of them is the
stuff of that life, going a different way, appearing in new complexes,
differing from it only in power to hold the places they preempt.
Imaginations are not unreal ; those entities we so designate are only
unfit. They belong, perhaps, to these other orders, to the infinite
residuum which has not succeeded in making a place for itself in our
cosmos, and breaks in, for the moment, perhaps, by way of the order
of value, and is again cast out, banished, by the stronger, more
"valid" order. Imaginations, too, may be common objects of
knowledge; it is only their weakness which makes them sink out of
our sight, like a tiny cloud to which you call the attention of your
friend and which vanishes even as you cry, ' ' Look ! ' '
Such, then, are these so-called "mental," private entities quite
real, quite recognizable, with varying facility open to the day and to
the common view of all healthy eyes. But one group of realities does
not seem sharable and common in the same sense. This group com-
prises our preferences, our valuations. The others are objects, the
goals of attention, the definitive contents of interest, the intelligible
ideals of our lives. Attitudes and actions, however, are acceptances
and rejections of these others, are the relations we bear to them, and
just as two bodies can not occupy the same space at the same time,
so two persons can not hold a numerically identical relation to the
same object at the same time, unless these persons are identical.
In this fact lies the source of all our differences and disagreements.
Our mere numerical diversity compels us to value things with refer-
ence to fundamentally separate interests, to orient, each of us a
world, about a distinct center, the self. Such orienting is the re-
lating of the environment to the vital purpose. It is valuation, the
essence of knowing, and our primordial and ultimate relation to our
world is a value-relation. As such it carries its own peculiar terms,
and for us, at least, is constitutive of our nature as terms. It con-
sists at its barest of the direct appreciation of the immediate bearing
of an entity on our vital selfhood. It stands out most clearly in an
elementary interest. Such an interest is constituted by three things
an organism, an environment, the value-relation that binds them.
This last is usually called cognition or awareness. It is different
262 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
from all other possible relations of organism to environment in that
it alone values the latter, connecting its terms more closely, as in
attention, i. e., becoming the object's attribute, good; or divorcing
them, becoming the attribute, 'bad. Good and bad, thus, are con-
verse modes of designating immediate cognition, which is the value-
relation and the essential constituent of interest, a relation that can
be named, but not defined, utterly simple, primary, and ultimate.
Now a mind involves countless reflex arcs, many objects, is com-
posed of innumerable interests. Each of these, it is clear, may be
separate and independent valuations of their content, positive or
negative, good or bad. But reflex arcs do not act alone. They are
"integrated" and act like mobs or armies, and when they so act their
separate valuations also integrate, and though each preserves its
identity of direction, it is penetrated through and through by all the
others and constitutes with them a unity which is identical with a
fresh and quite diverse valuation. Such would be the complex and
more massive feelings, pleasures and pains, anger, fear, affection,
respect, admiration, love, sympathy. These are valuating complexes
composed of simpler valuations which fuse into one as the separate
tones of a melody fuse into the melody. They are appraisements of
the environment and as such can themselves be appraised though
only with the greatest difficulty. For when you are possessed by any
emotion you can not yourself examine it, and when your friend or
your doctor studies such an actual attitude and its object or physi-
ological condition or connected incident, he finds himself speedily
assuming the attitude he is observing. Nothing is so fluent and
infectious; anger begets anger; love, love; any relation tends to
reproduce itself. It is because of this that a "social mind" is pos-
sible or that a stable common sense can arise.
How different when the object apprehended is a thing! Two
persons may have opposed attitudes toward the same thing or a
qualitatively identical attitude toward different things. For in-
stance, you observe the red of the sunset ; your observing is identical
with finding it pleasant ; you approach it, you open your senses wide
to absorb it, you aim at more and more of it in a word, it becomes
the content of your interest. Your neighbor, however, apprehends
it negatively, turns from it, seeks to upset the cognitive equilibrium,
to free himself of his relation to red, to oust red from his world.
Then, according to these direct and immediate valuations of that
color, its place in your common world will be determined, and in
order to get rid of it or to save it, you may aim even to get rid of
each other. So, while your object is identical, your attitudes toward
it are different and opposed and are, mayhap, never to agree. For
even if you should both apprehend red positively, even if it should
V
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 263
become your common interest, it would be bound to you none the less
by two numerically diverse relations; and while you might unite to
defend it against a common foe, you might yet quarrel for its pos-
session. Rivals in love do so frequently. They enhance and glorify
the same woman, make common cause against her enemies, and are
themselves bitter foes. So, even identical instances of the same
relation, when directed, not upon their common terminal, but upon
each other, are necessarily opposed in so far as they are numerically
different; and the whole of our civilized world is definable by the
cooperation, antipathy, and fusion of objects in the whirl of value-
relations.
Ill
Mind, if the foregoing analysis is correct, is a system of objects
related by a highly complex arrangement of value-relations to an-
other complex, called the body. Anything outside this system, more
or less durable, requiring a new adjustment, a reenvisagement or
rearrangement of mind, would be an " object," whatever its char-
acter, quality, or status. When, now, is such an object "beautiful,"
and what happens to mind when the object it encounters is called
beautiful ?
Let us consider first how this encounter ensues. That continu-
ous stream of active feeling we call life is nothing so much as a
stream. Its mass is flux ; in it moment passes into moment in terms
of use. No point of it is sufficient for itself; it must borrow some
of its reality from its predecessors and successors, it must surrender
some of its proper integrity to the force of their withdrawing and
of their coming on. Events affect us in their uses, not their natures,
since they bear on interests, and should we pause for that nature,
hence, the world becomes empty and we die. But now into the
movement of multifold rates and infinite rhythms there bursts a
thing with power to resist it. The attention, customarily shifting
from this to that, pauses, the soul is turned from her headlong line
of march to move upon this thing. The new value-relation brought
to birth in that moment of pregnant attention feeds upon its occa-
sion. From point to point it flows, holding each within the field of
its unbroken act until it spans the utter fullness of the whole thing.
One by one, the mind empties its storehouse of its appropriate treas-
ures; these leap to the thing, making a constellation about it; the
limbs of the body adjust themselves, so the rhythm of the breath, the
pulse of the blood. A new onward movement of vitality has begun,
enduring intensely, enduring profoundly, in felt-pulses of self-
enhancing life. There is flux, but it is the flux of a growing fullness ;
a flux of power, but the power of poise, self-sufficient, absolute. It
does not, as the flux of routine or of individual adventure, flow
264 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
unevenly, in eddies and whirls, from evil to good and back again ; it
does not flow instrumentally, consuming one object in another, pass-
ing from thing to thing, holding each for its use and abandoning each
for its lost function. Rather do things grow more intensely them-
selves, more distinct, and yet more at one. The flow here of
instrument into end is the flow and enduring of an identical thing.
The interest grows by what it feeds on, and it feeds upon itself.
Such is the esthetic experience. Where, in it, does beauty ap-
pear? In the mind, as we have learned to know mind? Certainly
not. To that the very object is external, an occasion for reorganiza-
tion and readjustment, set over against it, a new datum to be encoun-
tered and controlled. In the object then ? We have seen that beauty
can not be in the object. Rather is it what alone remains, an inde-
pendent thing, a relation between this mind and this object, binding
them together and holding them bound. As such, it is inevitably a
variable. It will not always span the same terms, nor even one of
a pair, more than once, nor need it bind two minds to the same object.
Positive, since it links rather than separates, elusive, concretely per-
ceptual, beauty's nature, like the nature of all values, is its particu-
larity and its appearance as truly active only in concrete situations.
The very life of interest, it can not be "disinterested"; the very
occasion of concreteness, it can not be "universal." It may link the
mind to any environmental content, from a mathematical abstrac-
tion to a perceptual blotch. It is the only predicate in the judgment
of beauty, whether the surgeon's of an operation, the carpenter's of
his job, the sculptor's of his statue, the philosopher's of his system.
But just because this is so it belongs to particular situations only,
and the radical diversity of taste and judgment attests this concrete-
ness. And it is only the failure to observe it where it occurs that
makes people cling to its "disinterestedness." Such people miss
the fact that the disinterestedness of the "esthetic" experience is like
the disinterestedness of him who wants nothing because he already
possesses everything. In morals, "disinterestedness" is instru-
mental. It is not so much a loss of self far from it as a gain in
the sense of the excellence of other selves. It consists in subjecting
"self" to the service of alien ends; in becoming an instrument, a
means, without finding in that state any too great private joy. In it,
nothing is so keen as the sense of personality. In the "esthetic"
experience the sense of personalty is also keen. But it is the keen-
ness of completed selfhood, of utter private joy, not of public use.
Far from being unselfish and disinterested, the esthetic experience is
absolute absorption in interest, absolute selfishness. For of course
what is already completely possessed is not desired ; and the mind in
the grasp of beauty is in possession of its object so completely as to
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 265
shut out, for the nonce, the righteous demand of other interests and
the cry of other needs for satisfaction. Yet unselfishness is not the
exclusion of other needs and interest, it is their prosecution and ful-
filment. Unselfishness is not the repose of one's own perfect adapta-
tion to the environment ; it is the unrest which compasses that adapta-
tion for others. In the experience where beauty is the relation
between you and your environment, it is, however, you yourself who
are so adapted, and, being adapted, lifted up and out of the horde of
conflicting interests. Your world is that object to which you are
bound, and you are become isolated, alone, and supremely happy in
that loneliness. Here is the only genuine solipsism, in which the
stuff of reality assumes the status of mentality and things and
thoughts are one. It is of the essential nature of beauty that your
neighbor can have no part in your experience of its object, and that
your experience of it can have no part as such in any other concern
whatever in the enterprise of life.
Private, concrete, elusive, in itself neither mental nor amental,
beauty is the optimal mode of that positive, intrinsic value-relation
which binds the mind to its object in such wise that the two are com-
pletely and harmoniously adapted to each other in the very act of
apprehension.
H. M. KALLEN.
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
IMITATION AND ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 1
A DVANCE in the experimental analysis of behavior tends to
-\. make psychological concepts inadequate. In the realm of
human psychology one needs only to instance such a term as memory.
Aristotle summed up his total discussion of this subject in sixty
words. With modern psychology came experimental analysis and
to-day it requires twice sixty words to name the separate subjects
that we investigate in the general field of memory. It would be an
easy matter to show the same analytic tendency in perception and
thought and will and in many non-psychological fields as well. It
would be no less easy to point out numerous fields where such
analysis has not had its way, and comparative psychology is one of
these. It does not require any great insight in the reader of com-
parative psychology to see that many of the concepts used in the
description of animal behavior are of the relatively unanalyzed sort.
That we continue to talk in general about growth, development, intel-
1 Bead at the twentieth meeting of the American Psychological Association,
Washington, D. C., December, 1911.
2;u THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ligence, instinct, and imitation is evidence only of the fact that we
have not yet pushed our experimental analysis to the end not far
enough to see what in reality are the elemental processes out of which
the complex behavior of animals is built up. I insist on the phrase
"experimental analysis," for it is only by the most extensive and
painstaking development of detailed methods and the application
of these methods in quantitative studies that we shall ever be able
to understand animal behavior and to see its intimate relation to
human behavior.
Take the case of imitation. There can be no doubt that the facts
which this concept has been used to connote are more complex than
any writer has yet set forth. It was no doubt a distinct advance in
the discussion of the subject when scientists distinguished instinctive
from voluntary imitation. This, however, is not a finally satisfac-
tory analysis of the concept, and one reason why we have not made
more progress in our study of the imitative behavior of animals is
that the whole subject has been dominated by this crude differentia-
tion. We have been looking for something that could be called
instinctive imitation or voluntary imitation, and the facts have not
fit this division. It would probably be more correct to say that
psychologists have been looking for a sort of animal behavior that
could be called voluntary imitation, and when they have found imita-
tion that did not fulfill their idea of what constituted volition or
inference they have gotten rid of such imitative behavior by calling
it instinctive. The results of such study have not been encouraging,
and experimentalists have tended to turn away from the study of
imitation to fields that promised more definite results.
Before this diversion from the study of imitative behavior is
complete it may be worth while to examine the tools with which we
have been working. After all what can one mean by instinctive
imitation? Whatever he means by imitation, it must be qualified
by what he means by instinct. And what does instinct mean in
current psychological discussion? If one is content with verbiage,
he may, after perusing a whole library on the subject, as Wheeler
admits doing, and exercising the most arbitrary selection, satisfy
himself with a form of words. If he is not a word-monger and insists
on knowing concretely what instinct means in the analyzed behavior
of any single mammal, there is scarcely a line in the experimental
literature, except Yerkes's and Bloomfield's 2 work on the cat, to
illuminate him.
Let us try to be concrete. Speaking from the point of view of
current thought, we would doubtless all agree that there is in the
young of mammals an instinct to hunt out the breast and suck.
"Do Kittens Instinctively Kill Mice," Psych. Bull, 7: 253.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 267
Now take the case of newly-born puppies and ask any single ques-
tion about the makeup of the instinct ; ask what it is that sets this
instinct going, and you will not find a satisfactory answer anywhere
in the literature. That it can be neither sight nor sound seems
evident, because the eyes and ears of new-born puppies are closed for
practically a fortnight after birth. Yet it is an open question
whether they can not distinguish shades of light through the closed
lids. Suppose you eliminate light and sound. What do you know
about the puppy's sense of smell, its power of discrimination, its
range in quality, and its range in intensity; the exceptional power
of certain odors to excite reaction, the distance over which the odor
is perceptible, the power of localization? To every one of these
questions you must answer, "Absolutely nothing specific." What
about the new-born puppy's sense of temperature, its sense of touch,
its power of orientation, its possible kinesthetic sensations, its oral
sense, its ability to taste ? To every one of these interrogatories you
must reply as before, "Nothing at all that fulfills the demands of
experimental science. ' '
If you seek to know which of several stimuli is prepotent over the
others and to determine some order of importance for the several
possible senses, you complicate the situation still more, and your
confusion increases if you raise the question of the relative accuracy,
serviceableness, and modifiability of the supposedly connate neural
connections. It is hardly necessary to do more than state the situa-
tion to see that when we speak of the feeding instinct of young
mammals we are merely cloaking our ignorance with a phrase. As
an analytic concept it is valueless. Yet, if we have so little knowl-
edge of the first experiences of the new-born animal, all its later
history is clouded in even denser mists. There have been some
studies on the sense of hearing and the sense of sight in dogs, but
this work is not sufficiently accurate in its technique but that later
experimentalists will insist on doing it all over again. There has
been some work on dog intelligence, but not one of the reported
investigations has even attempted to take the dog on his own ground,
that of smell, and in no one of the investigations has the experimenter
succeeded in eliminating himself from the experimental situation.
These two shortcomings very decidedly limit the value of any investi-
gation as yet made. When you couple with the evident fragmen-
tariness of the experimental work and its certain lack of finality, the
fact that the behavior of a dog at any level of development is a com-
posite of inherited and learned reactions, you see how impossible it is
in any given case of canine behavior to say what is instinct and what
is intelligence. Gross facts are evident enough, but we ought at this
268 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
time to be beyond the stage where we base theories of learning on
the simple observations of common sense.
Yet, in spite of our inability in concrete cases to separate instinct
from intelligence, we are asked by current writers to regard a large
proportion of dog behavior as due to instinctive imitation. I con-
fess that I can not see how this sort of speculation is likely to illu-
minate the subject of animal behavior. To use the phrase to point
out a large body of unanalyzed behavior is of course allowable, on
condition that we take the next imperative step in the process,
namely, to analyze that behavior into its elemental terms. But to
imagine that we have said something final about a certain bit of
behavior when we call it instinctive imitation is to mislead ourselves
and to confuse the rightful course of experimental investigation.
With voluntary imitation the case is even worse. In human psy-
chology we are at sea as to what constitute the elemental processes
of inference and volition. In one place we read that the highest
processes of mental life are nothing more than highly elaborated
complexes of functioning images. In another place we are told that
all this image-mongering is absurd, and that volition and inference
can go on without any images whatever. On the one hand, we hear
that we are nearing the end of sensationalism, and on the other, that
the final triumph of sensationalistic psychology is even now in sight.
Then we hear that there is no valid objective criterion of the presence
of imagery that we must always depend upon the subject's intro-
spective report. In the light of such confusion, such a term as
voluntary or inferential imitation loses its significance. Until human
psychology can give us something more settled regarding the proc-
esses of volition we do well to use the term volition with parsimony
in reference to the doings of animals.
Here then is our situation. We have the concept of imitation,
which is an essentially descriptive term, setting forth certain features
in the objectively observable behavior of animals. This concept is
then divided into two parts, not, mark you, on the basis of objectively
observed features of behavior, but on the basis of the supposed psy-
chical accompaniments of such behavior. The terms which are used
to denote these two divisions then become, not descriptive terms any
longer, but explanatory terms, i. e., they do not point out the beha-
vior which actually takes place, but they attempt to indicate the non-
observed processes antecedent to such behavior. These terms, how-
ever, when submitted to critical examination, turn out to have the
most uncertain significance, for, imitation entirely apart, it must be
admitted that there is no understanding about the relation of instinct
and volition. What is more is that we shall not have any under-
standing of their relation so long as we confine our work to the logical
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 269
differentiation of terms. It may not be a very encouraging situation,
but there is little likelihood that anybody will say anything signifi-
cant and concrete about instinct and volition in mammalian behavior
until we have a far larger accumulation of experimentally deter-
mined facts than we now have regarding any single mammal.
This situation is an unfortunate one for the study of imitative
behavior, which is no longer approached on its own merits, but which
has to struggle for recognition under the burden of supposedly
explanatory adjectives, which in fact explain nothing, being them-
selves in need of description and explanation. We seem to face
two alternatives : we may abandon the study of imitation and direct
our studies to other fields. This we seem to be doing and to a degree
the tendency is commendable. If the change is actuated by the feel-
ing that imitative phenomena are so complex that we can not rightly
interpret the results of experimental studies on imitation until we
know more about the sensations and instincts, then, I agree. If, how-
ever, the tendency to drop imitation out of our categories is due to
the belief that when we are talking about imitation we are resorting
to " magical agencies" and that we must abandon it in favor of
something that is more truly scientific, then I dissent, and insist that
whatever may finally be our decision regarding imitative phenomena,
we are as yet without sufficient evidence for any such speedy termina-
tion of this category. No person can face the whole group of experi-
mentally determined facts of imitation in birds, 3 rats, 4 cats, 5 mon-
keys, 6 and apes 7 and come to any such conclusion, except he do it
in behalf of a theory which he regards as more important than the
facts.
The second alternative is to suspend judgment as to the partic-
ular level of psychical accomplishment denoted by the different kinds
of imitative behavior, to free the concept of imitation from its unfor-
tunate appendages and set ourselves to the task of accumulating the
facts which we shall need before we can finally determine the impor-
tance of any particular kind of imitative behavior. The social rela-
tions of animals are of vast importance to their degree of mental
attainment, and in these social relations there is a kind of behavior,
* James P. Porter, ' ' Intelligence and Imitation in Birds, ' ' Amer. Jour.
Psych., 21.
4 Charles S. Berry, ' ' The Imitative Tendencies of White Rats, ' ' Jour. Comp.
Neur. and Psych., 16 : 333.
'Charles S. Berry, "An Experimental Study of Imitation in Cats," Jour.
Comp. Neur. and Psych., 18: 1-25.
M. E. Haggerty, "Imitation in Monkeys," Jour. Comp. Neur. and Psych.,
19: 337.
7 M. E. Haggerty, ' ' Preliminary Studies on Anthropoid Apes, ' ' Psych. Bull.,
7: 49.
270 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
which, to date, has not been better described than to call it imitation.
At the present stage of our study of these relations, it is of secondary
importance whether we are finally to explain them as "inherited
reactions which are definitely serviceable on the occasion of their first
appearance," or whether we must group them under entirely new
rubrics. It is of first importance that we find out in terms of objec-
tively describable behavior exactly what these relations are, and find
it out in elemental terms.
I said a moment ago that no one can face the whole group of experi-
mentally determined facts of imitation in animals and treat them
lightly. I wish now to call attention to a single case of imitation which
I reported to this association three years ago. Two monkeys were put
into a cage three by four feet at the bottom, and six feet high. Seven
strings hung from the top of this cage to within eight inches of the
floor. Near the floor was a circular opening in the back of the cage,
and one of the strings was attached on the outside of the cage to a
mechanism which would, when the string was pulled, drop food down
through a chute on the outside of the cage to a floor level with the
opening in question. One of the two monkeys had learned to pull
the string and get food at the opening. The other monkey, although
he had been allowed ample opportunity to learn the trick unaided,
had failed to do so. After being allowed to be with the first monkey
when she pulled the string and got food, the second animal when left
alone directed his attention to the food opening in a way that he had
never done and repeatedly handled the three strings nearest the
opening in a far more interested manner than he had ever done. In
explanation of this change in behavior I am perfectly willing to
invoke Thorndike's first law of behavior 8 that "the same situation
will, in the same animal, produce the same response and that if the
same situation produces on two occasions two different responses,
the animal must have changed." But then I would ask those who
deny that this is imitative behavior to specify in what the change in
the second monkey consists. To assume that there has been a change
independent of the presence of the performing animal is mere gra-
tuity. The evidence was too clear that the attention of the stupid
monkey received a decided and sudden turn in the direction of the
behavior of the other animal to doubt that that behavior was the
determining factor. That the second monkey should go to the open-
ing and look in may, of course, be explained by the fact that he had
seen food there, but that he should suddenly become interested in
the strings, the ends of which hung six inches above the opening and
out of the animal's range of vision when he was looking into the
opening, can receive no such explanation. There had been ample
Edw. L. Thorndike, "Animal Intelligence," page 241.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 271
opportunity for the second monkey to learn the trick unaided, but
he had failed to do so; the strings had never brought satisfaction
to him through his own activity. Yet now, although he did not use
the strings to get food, he continued to handle them, to pound them
against the side of the cage and against each other, and several times
after acting in this way he looked directly into the food opening.
Such continued interest can not be explained by the ' ' law of effect. ' '
There is here a directing of attention that can not be due to the
activities of the animal itself nor to any change in the mechanical
situation.
This directing of attention which is so evident in this case was
more marked in the next stage of the animal 's learning. The trained
animal was put back into the cage and allowed to get food in the
presence of the learning monkey. As a result of this experience the
attention of the second animal was narrowed down to the correct
string. He no longer played with all three strings but centered his
attention on the correct one of the three, and that without ever
having used it in getting food or finding satisfaction through it in
any other way. That he did not at once do the necessary thing to
get food shows that imitation was not perfect and had to be pieced
out with accidental learning, but the very fact that, in spite of his
inability to do the proper act, he kept working at the task shows
that the law of effect is not sufficient to explain this kind of learning.
I do not claim that this is voluntary or inferential imitation. I do
not profess to have any very clear idea as to what voluntary and
inferential imitation are. What I do claim is that you have here
a progressive narrowing of one animal's attention (viewed objec-
tively) in the direction of the behavior of another animal and that
this change in the behavior of the second animal can not be accounted
for by any supposed change in the animal itself, except such as is
induced in it by its observation of the successful behavior of the
trained monkey.
If my contentions in this case are granted it may be urged that
this is an exceptional case. I doubt that. My own investiga-
tion showed other cases which can not be explained on the basis of
the supposedly simpler laws. To be sure I do not claim any finality
for my results. The investigation marks only one stage on the road
of experimental analysis and only points the way for extended
investigations in the same direction. The methods of procedure will
bear favorable comparison with those of any published experiments
in this field, and under these circumstances I shift the burden of
proof to the objectors. They must take the experimental devices
which produced these results and show that under the same condi-
tions most monkeys will not do as the ones whose behavior is reported.
272 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
In view of these contentions, to which I have tried to give some
degree of reasonableness, I do not think that the time has come to
discard our study of imitative behavior as Bohn 9 seems to think, nor
to throw aside the category of imitation as Thorndike would have
us do. That a final interpretation of the facts must wait upon the
accumulation of a much larger body of material than we now have
is certain. On the other hand, there is equal certainty that we must
not telescope the facts so far ascertained with theories that do not
give full justice to these facts. What our present situation indicates
is a reworking of the concept of imitation by discarding the old
classification and proceeding to a new classification based on objec-
tively observed facts. That the experimentally determined data are
as yet wholly inadequate for a final statement is admitted. Such
a reorganization must take account of all the factors that determine
attention and of the various levels of accuracy and complexity in
the imitative behavior. The first step in the process of reorganiza-
tion is to convince ourselves that the old classification has reached
the limit of its usefulness ; the second step is to construct a new classi-
fication for a single species of animal, and to follow this with a like
service for other species, in every case basing the classification on the
facts which have been brought to light by experimental investigation ;
the third step will be to push the experimental analysis of imitative
behavior much farther than we have yet done, and in the end we may
be able to speak with positive understanding about the imitative
behavior of animals.
M. E. HAGGERTY.
INDIANA UNIVEBSITT.
EEVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Motive Force and Motivation Tracks: A Research in Will Psychology.
E. BOYD BARRETT, S. J. London : Longmans, Green, & Company. 1911.
Pp. xiv + 225.
Those who are watching the progress of psychology will easily be re-
minded, through the present work, of Cardinal Mercier's efforts to interest
catholic philosophers in experimental psychology. Broadly speaking, the
Cardinal's propaganda in favor of the latest phases of psychological re-
search can not be said to have been very fruitful among his correligionists.
Where they have tackled psychological subjects experimentally, in follow-
ing Cardinal Mercier's advice, they have done so with the intention of
showing the exact manner in which the catholic philosopher must look
upon experimental psychology rather than for the purpose of solving any
particular problem.
Georges Bohn, "La Nouvelle Psychologic Animate," page 185.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 273
It can not be said that Barrett's work is an exception to this rule ; this
author, a member of the Society of Jesus, swears by the name of Cardinal
Mercier. His work, however, gives us an excellent summary of the cur-
rent theories of will. The subject is thus covered more satisfactorily than
in any other recent publication, at least in so far as the literature per-
taining to it is concerned, and for this service we may be thankful to the
author. His familiarity with modern theories of the will no less than his
easy flowing style renders the reading of his book a pleasure even to one
untrained technically. Such fundamental problems as determinism,
automatism, and the evolution of motivation are treated, on the whole, in
a competent way, although the author's contention that the work shows,
even indirectly, "the worthlessness of the psychological arguments for
determinism " is unfounded. The strictly empirical experimental por-
tion of the work shows nothing of this kind. His criticism of hedonism
is particularly sound, provided we limit the use of the term, to a physical
sense, in connection with activities of lower order, and, in man, to con-
scious mental processes.
We turn to the experimental matters reported upon in the book. Ex-
periments were carried on with five subjects, including the author. Eight
liquids, specially prepared, were used, to which nonsense names were
given. Subjects were asked to taste the eight substances in rotation thrice
every morning and thrice every evening, after calling out their respective
names as given. The strength of these associations was tested by means
of recognition tests, and then followed the choice experiments proper.
These were as follows : The nonsense names, printed on cards, were
revealed to the subject, as in the ordinary association tests, by means of
Ach's changing machine. Subject was instructed : " React when you
know what it is." By arranging the names of the substances in the order
of hedonic feelings they evoked, a definite scale of values was obtained,
differing, of course, for each subject according to his subjective likes and
dislikes.
Next, cards were printed in various combinations, and two of different
hedonic value were made to appear at the same time over glasses contain-
ing the respective solutions. Subject was requested to choose a solution
and drink it. A Hipp chronoscope measured the interval between the ap-
pearance of the card and the time of reaction. By means of Ewald's key,
a Vernier chronoscope was started by the reaction so that the time elap-
sing between the reaction and the realization of the choice was also
measured.
It will be noted that the processes of motivation and choice, which the
author set out to investigate, took place in the interval between the per-
ception of the excitant (in this case the card) and the active realiza-
tion of the choice. This interval was subjected to close introspective
scrutiny. The subjects made note of the motives which actuated them in
the choice. The motivation factors, of course, were found to be mostly
hedonic; they are divided by the author, arbitrarily, it would seem, into
extrinsic and intrinsic. The author also speaks of "motivation tracks";
this adds to the plasticity and clearness of his thought, but when he per-
274 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
sists in this direction to the extent of actually mapping out tracks or
curves of motive force the reader can not escape the impression that this
is one more instance in which a happy simile has been made to bear more
than it will support. It would be difficult for the author to convince his
readers of the actual occurrence of such tracks and curves as he draws out
skilfully, even if he should take the trouble, which he evidently thought
unnecessary in the present connection, of disclosing all the proofs he has
for their support.
In its final term, it was found that motivation becomes steadied and
more and more automatic, that is, independent of conscious attention.
This accords with our general empirical notions and is an illustration of
the economizing tendency of volition. The opposite of this steadiness of
purpose, hesitation, occurred frequently in the course of the author's ex-
periments and is discussed by him in a special chapter, in which he treats
of hesitation as a disease of the will and suggests ways of healing.
Whatever might be said of the practicability or therapeutic value of
the author's remedies for impairment of the will, it is difficult to see
wherein the author's claim that " these suggestions are based on the con-
sideration of the actual results of our experiments " is justified. Suppose
we look up his universal remedy or grand arcanum, we find it stated as
follows (p. 218) : " With regard to hesitation which is, par excellence, the
malady of the will, inasmuch as it destroys serious motivation and leads
to irregularities and inconsistencies, the great means of avoiding it is to
acquire the habit of serious, decisive choosing and to avoid repining over
past choices." Leaving aside, for the present, the manifestly unwise teach-
ing about " not repining over past choices," it must be said that such ad-
vice, far from being the product of experimental research, is the rawest
kind of empiricism. Any country gossip is prepared to tell that what ails
neighbor Jones, who is run down on account of gastric ulcer, is the ab-
sence of good nourishing food and plenty of it. The need of nourishment
may be very obvious in the case of neighbor Jones and where the will is
not sufficient more will and plenty of it is logical enough, but such pre-
scriptions are far from what is really needed. Other remedies suggested
by the author are similarly superficial, even though they be ideally log-
ical enough.
The reader who will turn to this work expecting to find some new light
on the subject of will and its motivation will probably be disappointed, but
to one who wants the subject reviewed attractively and brought down to
date this book will be highly welcome.
Though not quite germane to the subject under consideration, the re-
viewer thinks it his duty to express disapproval of a peculiar trick which
may as well be branded here and now as unworthy of a scientist. The
name of a liberal educator, who has recently suffered martyrdom in Spain,
is dragged in by the author ostensibly to illustrate a point, but in reality
to besmirch his memory. It is unfortunate that even the dead are not safe
from such underhanded attacks. The peculiar villainy consists not merely
in attaching an opprobrious epithet to an honored man, now dead, in a
spirit of partizanship, but in doing so in connection with a work the read-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 275
ers of which are not expected perhaps to know the details of the situation
to which reference is made. It is a sophisticated way of carrying preju-
dice over into quarters where it may not otherwise have a chance to be
heard, in the hope that through ignorance of the actual facts it may take
root. Nothing is more clear to careful and impartial observers of contem-
porary events than that Francesco Ferrer did not " hold sway for three
days over half a million people, burning their churches, schools, museums,
and all they held most precious." This allegation is false in every respect.
While such falsehoods are not uncommon, especially in certain interested
quarters, one would not expect them to be paraded in front of unsuspect-
ing students of psychology who may be unfamiliar with the details of the
situation, and least of all in a work like the present.
The mention of Ferrer, the advocate of peace and apostle of secular
education, in the same breadth with the sort of anarchists which the au-
thor's fancy depicts, above all the bringing of this matter furtively into
this book, is not without a purpose. One's adversary is shown in the
wrong and placed hors de combat, as it were, at least in so far as pub-
lic sympathy is concerned (especially if the adversary be dead and unable
to defend himself against a false charge) if one succeeds to brand the
adversary's memory with some title or epithet repulsive to public opin-
ion. This E. Boyd Barrett, S.J., has endeavored to do parenthetically
by throwing a sentence or two into the midst of matter with which the
object of his bias has nothing in common. A remark thrown in sideways,
where the hearer is not on guard and is unprepared, is more likely to take
root than otherwise. It is this that invests the offense of E. Boyd Bar-
rett, S.J., with particular gravity.
Fortunately, no event of historic import in our generation has been
the subject of such a thorough and impartial study as the Ferrer case. It
is hoped that readers, upon seeing in print Barrett's assault upon the
memory of Ferrer will be moved thereby to examine Wm. Archer's " Life,
Trial, and Death of Francesco Ferrer " (London: Chapman & Hall, 1911),
and thus acquaint themselves with the " Spanish Dreyfus " case, and with
the true story of those troublous days in Spain.
J. S. VAN TESLAAR.
CLABK UNIVEBSITY.
Essentials of Psychology. W. B. PILLSBURY. New York : The Macmillan
Company. 1911. Pp. ix + 358.
On reading this book one must conclude that Professor Pillsbury has
written an excellent elementary text-book of psychology. The mode of
presentation is such as to interest the student and the general reader,
while the style is forceful and clear. Students and teachers will find the
exercises connected with each main topic very usable and well devised for
testing and applying the principles brought out in the discussion. The
references given at the end of each chapter are, for the most part, to simi-
lar treatments from other texts. The topics treated in the book are prac-
tically the same as those in most introductory texts except chapters four-
teen and fifteen, which deal, respectively, with " Work, Fatigue and Sleep,"
276 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and " Interrelations of Mental Functions," and which, embodying the re-
sults of recent experimentation, are a genuine addition to the value of the
book. In general, the book profits decidedly by the incorporation of ex-
perimental results, giving it a greater scientific value without detracting
from its readableness. This is particularly true of the chapters on sensa-
tion, perception, memory, and action, as well as those mentioned above.
The book is written confessedly from the functional point of view.
Psychology is defined in terms of behavior rather than in terms of con-
sciousness. Consciousness as an object of study is subordinated to be-
havior, its importance being borrowed from its relation to the latter.
However, the results of structural psychology are made much use of and
are made rather more important in the treatment than the author's state-
ments in preface and introduction would lead one to expect. The result is
largely a coordinating of the functional-behavior form of treatment with
the structural-consciousness aspect. It would seem that at the beginning
of the study of psychology there is no great gain in making one type sub-
ordinate to the other, but that a coordination of treatment is more natural
and useful for beginners.
As the discussion is so largely functional, considerable space is given
to the nervous system and habit. Two features here may be noticed:
first, the explanation of the nervous current in terms of chemical action,
and secondly, the use which is made of what we may call the Sherrington
theory of the synapse. This latter fits in well with the discussion, but it
seems somewhat doubtful if, after all, the use made of the theory is much
more than a renaming of certain known features of nerve functioning
while the theory itself lacks convincing proof.
The general arrangement of the matter of the book is excellent.
Habit, sensation, selection, and retention are first developed and are con-
sidered fundamental. The more complex operations are then explained in
terms of the simpler. The structural elements are sensations and memo-
ries. Though all mental qualities come originally from sensation, the
distinction is maintained between sensational and imaginal qualities.
The author differs from some writers in being guided in classifying and
enumerating sensation qualities by the doctrine of specific energies rather
than by discrimination by introspection. In the treatment of feeling, we
find affection as a mental element added to the sense and image qualities.
The primary mental function is selection. This is fundamental in con-
scious life and is called attention or will as applied to mental content or
to action. Professor Pillsbury's contributions to the solution of the prob-
lems of attention are well known, and this book is enriched by the results
reached by his thorough investigations. The whole discussion of selec-
tion, attention, action, and will, is decidedly good, perhaps forming the
best part of the book. On the same high level, however, are the topics sen-
sation, perception, association, and memory, the laws of learning and of
retaining and forgetting being especially well worked out from experi-
mental data. Probably the least satisfactory chapters are those dealing
with feeling, emotion, and reasoning. The three theories of feeling ac-
cording to the author ought to be combined if feelings are to be under-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 277
stood in their entirety. Perhaps an attempt to combine them in a single
statement would be useful to the student. The chapter on the emotions
is rather disappointing from both functional and structural points of
view. The chapter on reasoning is rather more logical and rationalistic
than one might expect from an experimental psychologist. These are'
minor defects along with the general excellence of the work. It is a scien-
tific text, pedagogically well arranged and presented. On the whole, as a
first book in psychology, it is admirable both in design and in execution.
MELBOURNE S. HEAD.
COLGATE UNIVERSITY.
The Moral Life. W. E. SORLEY. Cambridge: University Press. 1911.
Pp. 147.
Since this handbook on " The Moral Life and Moral Worth " is written
for the general reader rather than the philosophical student, it is not un-
fair to discuss the work from the standpoint of the amateur ethicist.
And such a person will be apt to feel vaguely dissatisfied with the rigid
distinction made between the historical treatment of the moral life and
that from the view-point of validity, or judgment of worth. The author
announces at the beginning his intention to treat the subject exclusively
from the latter point of view. Then follow chapters devoted to an ortho-
dox presentation of the five official Greek virtues, with a slight concession
to modern ways in the shape of an inclusion of Industry, Thrift, and
Prudence, and a short discussion of Freedom and Equality. But is this
traditional outline, this static and coldly harmonious judgment of moral
worth, the most profitable and fruitful way of viewing the subject?
People are so incurably dynamic in their philosophy to-day that they can
not find in this cross-section of the perfect character, this instantaneous
photograph of the perfectly developed moral man, an adequate basis for
judgment.
The moral life is a process of the moralization of life and it can be
judged only as a process. It can not be stated in terms of " qualities "
that we " possess," but rather as a life that emerges and grows out of our
reactions to successive crises, which we meet out of our store of instinctive
tendencies and traditional ideas, and the peculiar individual trend of our
reactions. Out of the jostlings and rubbings and settlings-down of these
reactions and habits there slowly emerges the moral life. And in our
judgment of this product lies the true moral worth.
The study of a process of the forms of control and influence over hu-
man behavior, and of the lines of reaction, is the only kind of "moral
philosophy " that will prove very satisfactory to-day. Such a book is that
of Professors Dewey and Tufts; in their work, the moral life smacks of
reality; its nature is intelligible because its development is intelligible.
By the side of it Professor Sorley seems to present a mass of cold abstrac-
tions. Some general readers may feel the fine, healthy glow of the traveler
in high and rarified altitudes of philosophic thought, but the radically
minded will be apt to feel that they have asked for bread and have been
given a stone. R. S. BOURNE.
COLUMBIA COLLEGE.
278 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
JOURNALS AND NKW HnnKS
REVUE PITILOSOPHIQUE. December, 1911. La contagion des
monies et des melancolies (pp. 561-683): O. DCMAS. -For manias and
true melancholias the hypothesis of contagion is no more acceptable than
for mental confusions. Positivisme, criticisme, et pragmatisme (pp. 584-
605): I. I'i HAS. -A careful analysis of the pragmatic elements in these
three points of view. L 'introspection (pp. 606-626) : L. DUGAS. - Vindica-
tion of introspection as the fundamental, original, and peculiar method of
psychology. Analyses et comples rendus. E. Tassy, Le travail d' ideation:
FR. P\i IIIVN. Philosophic und Religion in Darstellungen (par divers
auteure) : J. BEXRI'BI. L. Cuc'not, La genese des especes qnimales: F. LE
I>\NTEC. H. M. Bernard, Some Neglected Factors in Evolution: G.
Sn.im.i:. E. Underbill, Mysticism: L. ARREAT. Bohn, La nouvelle psy-
chologic animale: J.-M. LAHY. Dr. G. Stroehlin, Les syncinesies: G.-L.
DTPRAT. S. Boirson, La coeducation: G.-L. DUPRAT. J. Rogues de Fur-
sac, L'avarice: L. DUGAS. Revue des periodiques etrangers.
REVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. December, 1911.
II successo di Enrico Bergson (pp. 614-630). The success of Bergson's
philosophy depends upon the abuse of intellectualism during the preceding
generation, but sooner or later intellectualism will get the upper hand
again and Bergson's reputation as a philosopher will be permanently
eclipsed. Essema ed esistenza (pp. 631-657) : G. MATTIUSSI. In the
divine nature, essence and existence are identical; in finite beings, on
the other hand, there is a real distinction between the two concepts. Lo
studio sperimentale del pensiero e della volonta (pp. 658-669) : A.
GEMELLI. -An account of some recent experimental studies (Ach,
Michotte-Priim) on the voluntary act, its antecedents and its motives.
Note e discussioni. Cronaca scientifica. Analisi d'opere. A. Gemelli,
8ui rapporti tra scienza e filosofia: D. D'ALBA. F. Paulsen, Introduzione
alia filosofia: P. ROTTA. J. Geyser, Grundlagen der Logik und Erkennt-
nislehre: E. CHIOCCHETTT. L. Profumo, S.J., Corso di filosofia ele-
mentare, G. M. PETAZZI, S.J. A. Bonucci, Veritd e Realta: P. ROTTA.
A. Tari, Saggi di estetica e metafisica: R. FUSARI. A. Cappellazzi, Le
Categoric di Aristotele e la filosofia classica: P. G. P. E. Krebs, Meister
Dietrich. Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft: B. NARDI. J.
Zeitter, L'idee de I'etat dans Saint Thomas d'Aquin: A. MASNOVO. E.
Caird, Hegel: E. CHIOCCHETTI. F. von Hiigel, Religione ed illusione: G.
TREDICI. Note bibliografiche. Somnario ideologico.
Frischeisen-Kohler, Max. Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit (Wissenschaft
und Hypothese, Band XV.). Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1912. Pp.
viii-f478. 3M.
Johnston, Charles Hughes. High School Education. New York : Charles
Scribner's Sons. 1912. Pp. xii -f 555.
Lee, Vernon, and Anstruther-Thomson. C. Beauty and Ugliness and
Other Studies in Psychological Esthetics. New York: John Lane
Company. 1912. Pp. xviii -f- 376. $1.75.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 279
Mackenzie, W. Alle Fonti della Vita. Genoa: A. F. Formiggini.
1912. Pp. 387. 10L.
Mercier, Charles Arthur. Conduct and its Disorders. London: The
Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. xii + 377. $3.25.
Moore, Paul Elmer. Nietzsche. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1912.
Pp. 87. $1.00.
Miiller-Freienfels, Eichard. Psychologic der Kunst. Leipzig: Verlag
von B. G. Teubner. 1912. 2 Vols. 4.40M.
Perry, Ralph Barton. Present Philosophical Tendencies. New York:
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1912.
Petzoldt, J. Das Weltproblem. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1912. Pp.
xii + 210. 3M.
Reisner, George A. The Egyptian Conception of Immortality. Boston:
The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1912. Pp. vii + 85. $0.85.
Kichter, Raoul. Religionsphilosophie. Leipzig: Verlag von Ernst
Wiegandt. 1912. Pp. viii -f 178. 3M.
Rogers, Reginald A. P. A Short History of Ethics. London: The Mac-
millan Company. 1911. Pp. xxii + 303. $1.10.
Schiller, F. C. S. Formal Logic. New York: The Macmillan Company.
1912. Pp. xviii + 423. $3.25.
Shearman, A. T. The Scope of Formal Logic. The New Logical Doc-
trines Expounded with some Criticisms. London : University of Lon-
don Press ; Hodder & Stoughton. 1911. Pp. xiv + 165. 5s.
Sheffield, Alfred Dwight. Grammar and Thinking. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. vii + 193. $1.50.
Tannery, Jules. Science et Philosophic. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1911.
Pp. 284.
Werner, Max. Das Christen turn und die monistische Religion. Berlin:
Verlag von Karl Curtius. Pp. 202.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE fifth annual Congress of the Gesellschaft fiir experimentelle
Psychologic was held in Berlin, April 16-20, under the presidency of Pro-
fessor G. E. Miiller. There was a large and distinguished attendance of
German psychologists, and papers were read by Professors Miiller, Kiilpe,
Sommer, Goldscheider, Vogt, Lippmann and more than thirty others.
Representatives from almost all of the countries of Europe were present,
England's delegation including Professors McDougall, Myers, and Spear-
man. From America, Professors W. F. Dearborn, L. J. Martin, A. Meyer,
H. Miinsterberg, and R. S. Woodworth, were in attendance. Extensive
exhibitions of psychological apparatus and of the methods and results
of applied psychology were held in connection with the congress. The
meeting in 1913 will be held in Gottingen.
PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES'S letters are being collected for biographical
purposes, and any one who has any of his letters can render assistance that
280 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
will be highly appreciated by addressing Henry James, Jr., 95 Irving St.,
Cambridge, Mass. Casual or brief letters may have an interest or im-
portance not apparent to the person preserving them; and news of the
whereabouts of any of the late William James's letters will be gratefully
received.
DR. EUOEN KUEHNEMANN, professor of philosophy at the University of
Breslau, Germany, and recently German exchange professor at Harvard
University, has been appointed as the first German university professor
to occupy the Carl Schurz memorial professorship established last year in
the University of Wisconsin by German-American citizens of Wisconsin
and friends of the university.
THE Annual General Meeting of the Mind Association will be held in
Trinity College, Cambridge, on Saturday, June 1, 1912. On the after-
noon of that day the London Aristotelian Society will hold a symposium,
to which members of the Mind Association are invited, on " Purpose and
Mechanism." Papers will be read by Professors W. R. Sorley, A. D. Lind-
say, B. Bosanquet, and G. F. Stout.
PROFESSOR FREDERICK E. BOLTON, professor of education and director
of the school of education in the State University of Iowa, has accepted a
call to become head of the department of education in the State Univer-
sity of Washington at Seattle, and will begin his work at that place in
September.
M. HENRI POINCARE, professor of mathematical astronomy in the Uni-
versity of Paris, lectured at the University of London during the early
part of this month, upon "La Logique de I'Infini," " Le Temps et I'Es-
pace," " Les Invariants arithmetiques," and "La Theorie du Rayonnement."
PROFESSOR GEORGE GRANT McCuRDY will be the delegate from Yale
University to the International Congress of Anthropology and Prehistoric
Archeology to be held in Geneva, Switzerland, during the first week in
September, 1912.
AMONG the recent lectures at the University of Illinois were three upon
" Heredity " by Professor W. E. Castle, of Harvard University, and one
upon " Morals and Moral Ideals of the Japanese," by Professor Inaze
Nitobe.
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY has recently received a gift of $100,000 with
which is to be founded a professorship for the study of the laws of descent,
to be called the Balfour Professorship of Genetics.
PROFESSOR HENRY B. FINE has resigned the deanship of the faculty of
Princeton University, but continues as dean of the department of science
and as Dod professor of mathematics.
THE Philadelphia Branch of the American Philosophical Association
held an unusually interesting meeting on April 18 to 20. President R. W.
Keen gave the opening address.
THE REV. GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX, professor of philosophy and the his-
tory of religion in the Union Theological Seminary, died on April 25,
at the age of fifty-nine years.
VOL. IX. No. 11. MAY 23, 1912
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
CHANCE
MY purpose is to show that chance is an objective category;
objective, that is, in the same sense as causation, space,
quantity, or other accepted scientific categories. By a chance-event,
I mean an event which has no cause ; though a fuller definition will
appear in the course of the argument. The question of the ultimate
metaphysical status of the category will not be discussed.
That there are aspects of the physical world which are, in a
sense, outside the pale of law and causation, is widely admitted
among philosophers to-day. Professor Royce has shown 1 that the
element of significance or value which resides in individual things
can not be scientifically accounted for ; Mr. C. S. Peirce has argued 2
for an ultimate indeterminism out of which grows a certain amount
of law; James 3 and Bergson* have defended an irreducible spon-
taneity in all real events; Professor Palmer has lately advocated
chance-combinations of causal series ; 5 Cournot 6 and others in France
have stood for a similar view. Admitting in general the truth of
these positions, I wish to carry the argument somewhat further, to
give the concept a more positive interpretation, and to place it firmly
within the field of scientific categories. Not only is chance, as I
believe, more than a mere name for our ignorance ; not only is there
a certain aspect of fact which is outside of causality; there is a per-
fectly definable, intelligible tendency in physical events toward varia-
tion from law, and this tendency is nearly, if not quite, as widely
verified as laws themselves. I shall venture, then, to differ from
^'Spirit of Modern Philosophy," Lecture XII.
*Monist, January, 1891, April, 1892; also, incidentally, in October, 1892,
January, 1893, and July, 1893.
* ' ' Some Problems in Philosophy, ' ' Chapter IV.
4 Principally in " L 'Evolution creatrice. ' ' As this is one of the main con-
tentions of the whole book, specific reference is perhaps not needed.
In "The Problem of Freedom," Chapter X.
* ' ' Essai sur les f ondements de nos connaissances. ' ' Many articles on the
subject by others have appeared in the Eevue PMlosopJiique.
281
282 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
most of the previous views in regarding chance as a well-defined
and, in one sense, a positive category within the scientific field or
world of description.
Before we go to the evidence for this view, a word must be said
as regards the subject of this investigation. It is not the pure or
mathematical concept of chance which is here studied, but the
empirical; and a failure to distinguish these might lead to miscon-
ception or misdirected refutation. The philosophy of scientific cate-
gories, toward which this paper aims to contribute, may proceed in
either of two ways. It may study such categories in abstracto, as
pure concepts and members of an ideal system of concepts, without
direct concern as to their mode of application to experience; or it
may study them, not as members of an ideal system of knowledge,
but as their nature is revealed in actual scientific treatment of the
facts to which they apply. The former method treats categories as
instruments of exact knowledge and perfect determination, a pur-
posive rearrangement of data, due entirely to the activity of mind,
and dominated by its ideal purposes ; the latter treats them as adapta-
tions, rather, in which the ideals of the mind are less dominant and
the intelligence of the knower is more subjected to the data.
Examples of the former are the many recent works upon exact logic ;
of the latter, Bergson's definition of consciousness in "Matiere et
Memoire," Dewey's definition of truth in "Studies in Logical The-
ory," Montague's definition of consciousness in the paper "Con-
sciousness a Form of Energy." 7 In general the results of these
methods will not agree, because they study different concepts.
Causation as a factor in an ideal system of knowledge may be a very
different thing from the causation that is used in the science of
to-day. But to the philosopher both should be at least interesting.
As to the question, which one is the ultimately correct category, that
lies beyond the province of this paper. 8 I consciously choose the
empirical concept of chance, seeking to know what, if anything, of
the fortuitous is implied in the scientific methods and results of
our time.
If we consider the world in cross-section, at one moment we seem
to find many causes acting, which themselves bear little if any causal
relation to one another. That I am at this moment speaking can not
be causally explained, so far as we know, by the fact that the tide is
just now turning in the harbor. That the tile on the roof is loosened
by the wind and falls just at the moment I pass beneath it (to use
the familiar example) may very well be fully determined by ante-
1 In " Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James. ' '
' The clearest statement I hare found, of the ideal or conceptual method, is
in Professor Royce's "William James and Other Essays," pages 234 ff.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 283
cedent causes; that I pass at that moment may be equally deter-
mined; but each of these series seems to be quite undetermined by
the other. Here appears a loophole through which chance might
enter the scientific realm; many thinkers have been so persuaded.
And yet who knows that further scientific evidence might not show
the two events related as the scales of a balance ? It might be a case
of Kantian reciprocity. My passing beneath the house jars the
earth, the house, and the tile, however slightly; and if the tide did
not turn just now when I speak, something would be wrong with the
moon or sun, and who knows what meteorological conditions might
immediately transpire, even to the destruction of all of us ? It seems
to me that we must await evidence on this point. Meanwhile I find
nothing in the observed results to rule out a mutual determination of
all these facts.
But there is another way in which events might be uncaused.
We might consider, not a cross-section of the world at one moment,
but a sequence. It is conceivable, whether credible or not, that in a
series like the successive positions of a falling body slight variations
from the straight path might occur, which were not caused by any-
thing in the past history of that body or any other fact, past or
present. Is there any evidence, in present scientific methods or
results, of such phenomena ? Is there any direct and positive impli-
cation of uncaused variations from exact law in any of the sequences
of this world?
At the present date we have, thanks to the accurate measurements
and tabulations of anthropologists, biologists, economists, meteorol-
ogists, and others who employ statistical methods, an enormous body
of facts of the sort we are seeking. It has been found, for example,
that the height of men and women, the length of various organs, the
fluctuations of the thermometer, of rainfall, of prices, and so on,
show a variation about a more or less ideal type or average. And
what is more, the manner of variation is much the same throughout.
To quote Professor Pearson : ' ' From paupers to cricket scores, from
school-board classes to ox-eye daisies, from Crustacea to birth-rates,
we find almost universally the same laws of frequency." 9 Nor is
such variation confined to phenomena of living organisms. Besides
meteorological facts already mentioned, we find that the exactest
measurements in our physical laboratories show similar variations
in the facts there recorded. 10 But with the exact delimitation of the
field wherein such variations occur we are not concerned; enough
that they are widely prevalent.
"Chances of Death and Other Essays," page 20.
10 Any work on statistics will give an idea of the wide extent of this fact of
variation. See, e. g., G. U. Yule, "Introduction to the Theory of Statistics."
L's4 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
We may say summarily that there seems to be a tendency, when
experiments are repeated again and again, for the results to vary
more or less about an ideal standard, norm, or type. For we may
regard each human individual, say, as a repetition of the experiment
of producing a human being; each rainstorm as nature's repeated
attempt to produce rain, etc. That many such experiments are
being conducted simultaneously does not affect the logic of the situa-
tion, just as the result is indifferent whether we toss one penny many
times or many pennies at once. The examination of large collections,
or repetitions of similar phenomena, thus suggests what we could not
discover from the single case, namely, that besides the general law
which says "be so and so" there is another which says "be not quite
so and so. ' ' Such at least is the superficial impression we get from
the facts. Indeed it seems likely that had the science of statistics
been organized as long ago as the other natural sciences, philosophers
would scarcely have defended universal causation as frequently as
they have done.
But superficial impression is far from demonstration. The mere
fact of a wide-spread tendency to vary from a type is hardly the
slightest evidence of real chance. Are not all the variations them-
selves caused ? If you are taller than I am, surely there is a reason
for it; if to-day's rain is heavier than last week's, atmospheric con-
ditions will account for it. But let us look again at the variations.
We said above that their manner was much the same everywhere.
And, moreover, that manner is a rather remarkable one. When the
numerical values are graphically plotted they reveal a fairly close
approximation to the well-known curve of error, or probability-
curve. Exact correspondence with that curve we do not get, of
course; but perhaps no concept, curve, or standard ever fitted the
facts exactly. Laws are certainly never exactly fulfilled, yet we
accept them. Now this striking unanimity of the variations sug-
gests that they are not completely accounted for, each by its par-
ticular causal antecedents, but that a special tendency must be
invoked to account for this common property; and that, too, a
tendency to vary fortuitously, since the probability-curve is just
what would result, in the long run, from fortuitous variation. If a
series of murders are committed in a city, or in several cities, with a
cross drawn in blood on the forehead of every victim, we should
reasonably infer that one man, or band of men, was the author of the
crimes. Such coincidence would be the strongest kind of circum-
stantial evidence. Our case seems just like that. It is hard to
resist the conclusion that there is a wide-spread tendency at work
in nature, making each event a little different from what it would
be if all were governed '.y absolute law.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 285
But the belief in universal causation, at least within the sphere
of science, is so ingrained in us by our modern education that it is
not easily dislodged. Must this resemblance to the probability-curve
be explained by a fortuitous tendency to vary ? For, if there is any-
thing less than a strong logical compulsion here, we can hardly
abandon that widely attested concept of law. We must then ask
whether the facts could not possibly be explained without the resort
to chance. And in answer I shall try to show, first, that a special
tendency to vary must be begged, and secondly, that this tendency
must be such as to permit chance to the individual cases, though not
to the group as a whole. No other explanation of the situation, I
shall claim, will do justice to the facts.
First, then, can not the resemblance to the probability-curve be
explained on the hypothesis of universal causation ? Let us see how
that hypothesis would work out. Consider the case of the heights of
a large number of men in a given city. When their numerical values
are plotted, we have an approximation to the said curve. The height
of each man is undoubtedly dependent on many causes, such as
inheritance, nourishment during years of growth, early health, open
air, sunlight, amount of fatigue in early life, etc. Now if you take
a great number of men, these causes are certain to vary greatly from
man to man. They will combine very differently in the individual
men, giving very different results. And if you take men enough,
you will include all possible combinations of these many causes.
And this is no affair of chance, but is certain to be the case. Every
possible effect upon the height of a man will thus be realized, and
this, as is well known, will give a result approximating the curve.
No special tendency toward variation need be conjured up, therefore ;
the large number of ways in which the causes affecting growth will
combine, guaranteed by the large number of men measured, will suf-
fice to account for the facts. So much for the hypothesis of causa-
tion. As a matter of fact, it seems to be the view of many writers
on the subject. 11 Yet I can not but regard it as unsatisfactory.
That each variation is indeed due to many cooperating causes is
indisputable. That it can be wholly explained by those causes is a
very different matter. For it is a condition of the formation of the
curve that all possible combinations be realized in equal numbers.
And there is nothing in the causal explanation to ensure this. The
mere fact that by taking cases over a wide enough area you get all
possible combinations of causes will not determine that those dif-
ferent combinations occur in anything like approximately equal
U E. g., Venn, "Logic of Chance," page 475, footnote. Jevons, "Prin-
ciples of Science," page 196. Laplace, "Philosophical Essay on Probabilities,"
page 4.
286 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
numbers. But they do so occur. Accordingly, I think we are driven
to say that over and above the known and unknown causal laws there
is a special tendency, active in nature, to realize in the long run
every possible combination of causes in equal numbers. And since
the individuals that vary, whether they be human heights, or organs,
or prices, or temperatures, or what not, are themselves the products
of many causes, we may perfectly well say that individual phe-
nomena themselves tend to vary equally in all possible directions
about a type. I say "in all possible directions," for the variation is
always, apparently, restricted to a rather narrow field. But within
that field, at any rate, a clearly marked and positive tendency, in
addition to the usual kinds of causation, seems a necessary hypothesis.
Of course "tendency" is a vague word and renders one liable to
the accusation of hypostasising an abstraction. But it is here used
as no more than a concept or formula to summarize a large class of
facts. Exactly the same is true of such concepts as causation and
of the particular causal laws to which we accord our belief. In a
sense they explain nothing and solve no mysteries. I do not here
claim for the tendency in question any deeper validity than we
ascribe to the usual causal laws; but if the argument so far is cor-
rect, it should have at least as much validity as those concepts have.
We should speak of a real tendency among events to vary about a
type, even as we speak of a real tendency in bodies to fall, or a real
tendency in heat to radiate.
We come now to the second point mentioned above. May not this
tendency to vary be itself a unique kind of a causal law, strictly
determined in every detail? If it is so orderly and regular on the
whole, must it not be equally so in every particular case? The
probability-curve is a very regular affair, and the variations of phe-
nomena are, on the whole, very regular too. We find approximately
the same proportion of heights above the mode, the same below, again
and again. How could the collection be so orderly if the individual
members were lawless? In short, we must now examine the indi-
vidual instances, to see how this collective tendency should be inter-
preted in its application to them.
If the tendency to vary is operative through the series as a whole,
it can not well be nil in any one event. What form, then, must it
assume in one such event? There must be a tendency for each event
to vary somehow from the norm. And further, it must be either
predominant in one direction, or equal in all directions. On the
latter alternative, the various directions counterbalance one another,
and nothing can decide which variation will occur except some cause
external to the event itself, or just chance. But it will not suffice us
to appeal to an external cause to decide the matter. For, as we have
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 287
seen above, the appeal to such causes will not account for the col-
lective character of the variations. It will not guarantee what must
be guaranteed, that the variations will, in the long run, be fairly
equal in all possible directions. If some particular, external cause
decided, in each instance, which of the conflicting directions should
prevail, we should not, in general, have in the series as a whole the
all-inclusive manner of varying that we do find. The only alterna-
tive is chance. This and this only would seem to allow to the series
that elasticity which enables each instance so to combine with the
others as to give the total result we observe. If then the tendency to
vary is in each instance equal in all directions, the actual result in
that instance must be ascribed to chance.
But perhaps in each case the tendency to deviate is strongest in
one direction, changing in accordance with some fixed and unknown
law as the cases are repeated, and gradually covering all possible
cases. This again would seem to reduce all to strict causation. To
be sure the variations seem to be essentially irregular and disorderly,
but that may perhaps be due to our ignorance. May not the tend-
ency to vary be itself found an orderly and thoroughly determined
affair if we could only study it carefully enough ? To this question
I must answer, no. The collective tendency toward variation seems
to me inconsistent with causal determination of the individual case.
It is, I think, generally agreed within the scientific field that one and
the same cause can not, under constant conditions, produce varying
effects. The cause we are discussing is the tendency to vary, which
is, perhaps, in some sense, one and the same throughout the series.
In so far as it is the same it must be supposed to produce, under
similar conditions, much the same results. Now the conditions in all
the individual cases are, to all intents and purposes, the same
throughout. For our tendency acts independently of these special
circumstances of each case. We have already seen that those cir-
cumstances could not guarantee the nearly equal distribution which
occurs, and that consequently the tendency in question must be
begged; and its action must be the predominant one if the result is
to be secured. Each variation might then be treated as if it were
due to that tendency alone. But that seems to me equivalent to
having the conditions constant: the tendency to vary acts as if it
were in isolation. It produces, however, as the experiment is re-
peated, ever-differing results. As this would seem inconsistent with
the causal action of the tendency, such action must be denied, and we
must say that the individual variations could not possibly be caused
by one tendency. Even if we discovered some time a hidden regu-
larity about the variations, an order expressed by some function
beyond our present knowledge, that order would have to be regarded
288 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
as fortuitous. For the fact that there occurred different results from
one and the same cause would be, for science, an inexplicable thing.
Is it answered: "Perhaps your tendency to vary is not one tendency
but a manifold complex of them"? The same inconsistency with
causation would, I believe, hold even then. In so far as the com-
plexity obtains, it means, after all, at bottom, many independent (i.e.,
fortuitous) tendencies. In short, no one tendency can explain an
ever-varying manifold of effects, and many tendencies, in so far as
they can not be reduced to one, themselves constitute chance. It is
the spreading or multitude of the effects that, in my opinion, renders
a causal explanation impossible.
In cases of ordinary causation, the same cause does indeed pro-
duce ever-varying effects. But that is because it acts in ever-differ-
ing circumstances, and its action is influenced by those circumstances.
Our tendency however can not, in the long run, be influenced by
them. It acts with them and in them, but it must predominate over
them if the equal distribution is to result. And it is this predom-
inance, or causal isolation in a certain sense, which is the key of the
situation. The manifoldness of the effects has nothing left to explain
it but just its own manifoldness. From one isolated principle you
can never get many results, and the many results can not combine
into just one isolated principle.
The conclusion thus seems to be forced upon us that our hypoth-
esis of an all-inclusive collective variation implies complete am-
biguity in the single case. We have then obtained, if the argument
is correct, the following principle : there is a tendency, in many phe-
nomena, to vary with equal frequency in all possible directions from
obedience to law, the variation being such as to give regularity for
the group as a whole, chance for the individual member. Of course
this tendency is hardly ever, if ever, completely realized. It is a
limiting concept, like that of law and causation. But it gives what
is to my mind a more positive signification to chance than has usually
been ascribed to that notion. Not mere irregularity, but a tendency
to spread, to diverge, so as to treat all possibilities fairly and give
them an equal showing that, somewhat metaphorically expressed,
is what I think we should mean by chance. Of course these possi-
bilities are not absolutely infinite in any one case; they are always
restricted by the special circumstances of that case. Men probably
can not vary much in height ; temperatures in a given region range
hardly more than a few degrees out of the long scale known to
science; and in general the field of chance is relatively small. On
the other hand, we seem to find some amount of chance accompany-
ing almost every case of law. How wide the field of variation is, in
each class of phenomena, would seem to depend on the nature of the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 289
causes whose combination gives rise to the phenomena. But the
whole matter is an empirical one. Our view gives no occasion for
those caricatures, as Professor James called them, which would ac-
cuse its advocates of believing that anything might happen in a
given situation. Nor does it offer a contradiction to the principle of
causality. Each variation is the resultant of many causes together
with a chance-deviation. It would not be regarded as a denial of
the law of gravitation if I held up a ball in my hand. No more
does it deny the constant action of causes to assert that there is
another principle cooperating with them. But the view I defend
would imply partly uncaused beginnings, arising to some extent
ex nihilo. Should a last stand be made on the ground that the
principle of the conservation of energy would forbid any uncaused
changes, we need only remember that the measurements which prove
the conservation of energy are themselves subject to the same kind
of variation as that we have been exhibiting.
Finally let me indicate the relation of the above view to some
previous arguments for and against indeterminism. It is well
known that the more we learn about any given event, and the finer
our measurements become, so much the closer is the approximation
to exact law. The conclusion seems to many thinkers to follow
inevitably, that a perfect knowledge, measurement, etc., would reveal
perfectly exact law. It seems to be a case of a variable approaching
a limit, as a hyperbola approaches its asymptote, or the series
l + i-+i+> etc., approaches the number 2. But the mere fact
that we get gradually nearer and nearer to exact law does not imply
that the latter is the limit we are approaching. If a line be drawn
parallel to the asymptote and beyond it, the curve gets nearer and
nearer to that line, but does not approach it as a limit ; and the series
1 + i + i +, etc., gets nearer and nearer to 3 without approaching
it as a limit. Such reasoning is then quite inconclusive. Moreover,
it overlooks the fact, which is the pivot of my argument, that the
deviations from exact law themselves, when recorded and measured,
show a positive manner of varying which can hardly be explained by
causation. It is in this point that the present argument differs, so
far as I know, from all previous arguments for indeterminism. Even
those of Bergson and James, as I understand them, fail to point out
this positive difference between law and variation. They find a
fluent quality about facts which forever escapes the static and rigid
concept. Yet one might reply to them that our concepts approach
the fluent changing reality as a limit. Even though those concepts
never reach that limit, they allow no irreducible remainder, which
can be definitely named, to stay outside the conceptual series. The
advocate of universal law may say: "You can point to no one fact
200 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
which I can not come nearer and nearer to accounting for com-
pletely. ' ' The series ir is never completed, yet any one term of it,
which you can name, may be exactly computed. My own argument
does, I think, escape this objection. It attempts to point out a well-
verified character about facts which is not simply at present unex-
plained in detail, but would seem to be inexplicable in terms of
causation, even to a perfect knowledge. The tendency to deviate, to
spread out, to produce ever new sports, is indeed in substantial agree-
ment with the Jacobean doctrine of a growing universe. But I do
not think the inadequacy of any given concepts, or group of concepts,
to account for motion, change, or life, can be regarded as a proof
of a real spontaneity in those facts.
And the present argument goes even further. There seems to me
no ground for saying that there is anything about spontaneity which
is unintelligible, i. e., beyond clear conception. Chance as here de-
fined appears to be clear enough. It is a dual affair, with a col-
lective and an individual aspect, and in my view each of these
aspects is meaningless without the other. The collection is law-
abiding, the individual members, within limits, ambiguous. But I
do not see why ambiguity is not a perfectly clear concept. There
would seem to be, then, no real reason for excluding spontaneity
from the kingdom of the intellect. It should be included as a gen-
uine scientific category, no more wonderful than law itself. Not the
limitation of the understanding by something indefinable, mysterious,
unaccountable, but the inclusion of that something within the sphere
of clear definition, is what every thinker naturally desires.
W. H. SHELDON.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.
EXPERIMENTAL ORAL ORTHOGENICS: AN EXPERI-
MENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF
DENTAL TREATMENT ON MENTAL EFFICIENCY 1
T~ ITTLE if any attempt has hitherto been made to measure by
-L-J scientific, objective means the mental improvement resulting
from the correction or removal of the various physical defects which
are now generally known to afflict the majority of school children.
We are beginning to appreciate, from a number of recent studies,
the extent of the retarding effect upon mental growth of such phys-
ical anomalies as adenoids, hypertrophied tonsils, nasal obstructions,
defective ears, eyes, and mouths ; but no one has attempted to deter-
1 Read before Section L, Education, of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, Washington, December 29, 1911.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 291
mine experimentally the precise orthogenic effects which are believed
to ensue from a definite course of combined prophylactic and opera-
tive treatment. And yet our whole system of medical school inspec-
tion and treatment must ultimately justify itself by its demonstrated,
verifiable results not by the opinions and assumptions, based on
unaided observation, of schoolmasters, or medical inspectors, or
school patrons, but by the comparable scores of a system of verifiable
and demonstrable objective measures.
In the present paper we shall give a very brief sketch of the
results of an attempt to determine by scientific, mental measures the
influence of hygienic and operative dental treatment upon the intel-
lectual efficiency and working capacity of a squad of 27 public-school
children in Cleveland, Ohio (10 boys and 17 girls), all of whom were
handicapped, to a considerable degree, with diseased dentures or
gums and an insanitary oral cavity. 2 These children were the recipi-
ents of free dental treatment at the hands of the Cleveland Dental
Society and the National Dental Association during the course of the
experimental year, which began in May, 1910, and closed in May,
1911. The treatment included not only the filling of dental cavities,
the treatment of the gums, the brushing of the teeth and gums after
each meal, and the sanitation of the oral cavity, but the thorough
fletcherizing of the food. Oral euthenics contemplates not only
mouth sanitation and the carpentry of the teeth, but the complete
mastication of the food. Instruction relating to mouth hygiene and
correct eating habits was given at the school (Marion) by the chair-
man of the Oral Hygiene Committee of the National Dental Asso-
ciation (Dr. W. G. Ebersole), together with two demonstration meals.
Follow-up work was done by an employed nurse, for the purpose of
giving individual advice and instruction to parents and pupils, and
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the pupils were faithfully
following the instructions.
This research, it may be added, was the outgrowth of the nation-
wide school oral-hygiene campaign inaugurated in Cleveland in
March, 1910, by the National Dental Association. My own connec-
tion with the movement consisted in suggesting, contriving and giving
(in person or by proxy) five series of psychological efficiency tests
at stated intervals during the experimental year. These tests were
designed to measure any improvement or increase, which might result
from the practise of the oral hygiene regimen sketched above, in the
power of immediate recall (immediate visual memory span), in the
capacity to form spontaneous and controlled associations, in the
* A more complete discussion of this research appears in ' ' Experimental
Oral Euthenics," The Dental Cosmos, April and May, 1911, pages 404 ff. and
pages 545 ff.
292 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ability to add, and in the ability to perceive, attend, and react to,
certain visual impressions.
In the memory test the pupils were required to memorize, during
a period of 45 seconds, as many figures as possible. 10 figures, each
containing 3 digits, in large print on a cardboard were displayed
before the class. Exactly one minute was allowed for writing. This
test is thus based on the use of non-sense materials and furnishes a
measure of the immediate visual memory span.
In the spontaneous association test the pupils were provided with
a sheet of paper containing a column of 30 simple, every-day words.
At a given signal they were told to turn the papers right side up and
write opposite each word the first word suggested by it, irrespective
of whether or not the suggested word was logically connected with
the supplied antecedent or key-word. The time allowed was 85 sec-
onds. The number of words written in a test like this furnishes an
index of the speed of ideating or forming spontaneous associations
or, in other words, of the speed of thinking.
To measure the speed of forming controlled associations an
antonym test was employed. In this the pupils were supplied with a
sheet containing a column of 25 key-words, opposite each of which
they were instructed to write (during 85 seconds) only that word
which has the opposite meaning: e. g., better worse; sunrise sunset.
This test requires intelligent discrimination and demands a higher
degree of associational efficiency than that required in the pre-
vious test.
In the test on the speed and accuracy of adding the pupils were
supplied with a sheet containing 32 columns of figures, each column
consisting of 10 one-place digits. They were told to add as many
columns as possible within the time limits (2 minutes) without stop-
ping to re-add any of the columns. This test gives a measure of the
ability to form controlled numerical associations.
In the attention-perception test (A-test) a sheet was provided
containing 26 lines of capital letters. The letters were printed
entirely promiscuously instead of in proper alphabetical order. The
pupils were told to start at the left end of the top line and proceed
to draw a line through as many of the A's as possible within the
time limits (100 seconds). They were specially cautioned not to
skip any A's or to cross out any other letters. This test gives a
measure of the speed and accuracy of perceptual discrimination, of
the power of sustained attention, and, secondarily, of the speed and
accuracy of manual reaction.
These five tests thus explore some of the fundamental mental
traits or capacities. In all tests, and in all sittings, the pupils were
uniformly urged to do their very best. A system of quantitative,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 293
or combined quantitative and qualitative, scoring was worked out
for each test.
In order that tests of this character may be used as measuring-
rods for gauging the increased functional efficiency resulting from
the given euthenic or corrective factor or factors, a number of essen-
tial conditions must be supplied.
First, each of the tests must be constructed in sets or series, so
that some of the tests may be given before the treatment begins, and
some during the course of the treatment, or after its close. In this
investigation each test was arranged in six sets, numbered from 1 to
6. Tests 1 and 2 were given before treatment began. The average
of these two pre-treatment tests, therefore, represents the pupils'
initial efficiency. The last four tests were given during the course
of the treatment, or after its close, so that the average of these repre-
sents the pupils' terminal efficiency. The difference between the two
averages accordingly represents the gain (index of improvement)
made during the course of the treatment. Or, instead of taking the
average of the last four tests for the final efficiency, we may substi-
tute the average of the last two. This plan seems preferable, because
the last two tests were given from three to five months after the
dental treatment had been completed for all the pupils, while tests 3
and 4 were given only one or two months after the beginning of the
treatment for more than half of the pupils. Sufficient time had,
therefore, not elapsed to allow the orthogenic effects to become opera-
tive, at least not in maximal degree, at the time of the third and
fourth tests.
Secondly, the sets must be so constructed that all of the successive
tests in the same set are uniformly difficult. That is, test number 2
must be of the same difficulty as test number 1, test 3 the same as
test 2, and so on. Manifestly, if each of the successive tests dimin-
ishes in difficulty, the increased efficiency shown is spurious or largely
exaggerated. Contrariwise, if each successive test increases in diffi-
culty the actual improvement will be minimized or counteracted.
Considerable pains were taken to make all the tests of a given set
equi-difficult. Elsewhere evidence has been adduced to show that the
tests were fairly uniform in difficulty.
Thirdly, the conditions of giving the tests must be strictly uni-
form in all the successive sittings. These conditions refer to the
character of the explanations, the use of incentives or suggestions,
the constant putting forth of maximal effort by the examinees, the
withholding of assistance or fore-knowledge of the test materials,
the seating of the pupils, the hour of the day used for testing, the
time allowed for the tests, and the employment of uniform super-
294 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
visory conditions. A scrupulous attempt was made in this research
to realize these requirements.
Fourthly, to place the results upon a strictly comparable basis,
a second squad of imlnated children should be given exactly the
same tests under precisely the same conditions. These children
should come from the same social strata as the treated children,
should approximately be of the same ages and suffer from the same
degree of physical handicap. By means of the data obtained from
such an untreated squad we should be able to determine the amount
of improvement which is due to such contributing factors as famil-
iarity, habituation, practise, and natural development (merely grow-
ing older), and the share which is solely due to the application of the
orthogenic factor under consideration. Unfortunately it was not
possible for me to get such a squad as this organized during the
experimental year.
Fifthly, and finally, the factor or factors whose orthophrenic influ-
ence is to be measured must be investigated under "controlled con-
ditions." One must make certain that the factor is constantly opera-
tive in the treated squad, and that it is inoperative in the untreated
squad. In this investigation the oral hygienic measures were subject
to a fair degree of control. It was the duty of the employed nurse
to see that the pupils conformed strictly to the requirements.
What, now, do the results show with respect to the influence of
the dental treatment upon the working efficiency of the pupils? In
attempting to answer this main question we shall also refer briefly to
a number of accessory facts brought out in the investigation. One
of these facts is the circumstance that while the boys manifested a
higher degree of efficiency than the girls in all tests except the per-
ception test, the indices of improvement were about the same for the
two sexes, whence the boys' manifest superiority in the efficiency
scores is not paralleled by a corresponding superiority in the im-
provement indices. Similarly the amount of improvement was about
the same for the older and younger pupils, a result not entirely in
accordance with expectation, for it is currently believed that the
benefits derived from the correction of physical defects are greater
the earlier in the child's career the defect is corrected. This is
believed to be true particularly as regards nasopharyngeal obstruc-
tions. But so far as the mal-effects of dental defects are concerned
there are no significant age differences. Pupils between the ages of
11 and 15 appear to profit in equal degree, irrespective of sex, from
the broad application of community mouth hygiene.
On the other hand, the individual differences between the pupils
in all tests are significant. The differences are quite as large as the
differences frequently brought to light in other psychological and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 295
pedagogical experiments on pupils of the same age or school grade.
Some pupils show a high degree, others a low degree, of proficiency ;
and some pupils make marvellous gains while others gain very little,
or not at all, or actually lose in efficiency. It is therefore apparent
that experiments of this sort, which are based on only a few pupils,
are at best only suggestive, and that valid inferences or conclusions
must be based on the central tendencies or average results of a con-
siderable number of pupils.
Not only do we find these large individual differences in the
efficiency scores and improvement indices, but the fact that a pupil
gains much in one test does not warrant the belief that he will gain
much in all the other tests. Quite the reverse may be the case. Thus
a list of the 5 pupils, who made the smallest improvements in each
of the 5 tests, was found to contain 19 of the 27 pupils, while the
list of the 5 pupils, who made the greatest gain in each of the 5 tests,
included 13 pupils. But not a single pupil was enumerated among
the 5 poorest in all the tests, nor was a single pupil enumerated
among the 5 best in all the tests. On the other hand, 8 of the pupils,
ranking with the 5 poorest gainers in one test or another, also ranked
with the 5 best gainers in one test or another. While 2 of these
showed little improvement in 2 tests, they nevertheless made large
gains in 2 tests. It is thus apparent that many pupils who gain
little in some tests may improve remarkably in others. But it is
worthy of remark that only 1 of the 3 pupils who were enumerated
among the best gainers in 3 or more tests was included among the
poorest gainers, while none of the 3 who were among the poorest in
3 tests took rank with the 5 best in any of the 5 tests, so that there is
a certain amount of correlation between the indices of improvement
in the various tests, justifying the conclusion that pupils who improve
very slowly in several tests will not take place with the best ground-
gainers in any of the tests. Such pupils are probably suffering from
general impairment or marked retardation. But teachers must
recognize (that a child who gains little along one line of mental
action may be developing normally, or even supernormally, along
other lines. His capacity for development can not be determined
from the improvement indices of one trait. Scientific pedagogy will
make little progress until this fact is recognized, so that the educa-
tional activities may be adjusted to meet individual developmental
idiosyncrasies.
Although there are these individual differences the character of
the central tendencies is unmistakable: there is a decided gain in
every test, and not only are the gains decidedly more frequent than
the losses, but the largest gains are invariably emphatically larger
than the largest losses. This may be seen from the following data
2IM5 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
for each test, based on the average scores of tests 1 and 2, and the
averages of tests 5 and 6 :
Memory: 8 pupils lost in amounts varying from 5 to 15 per cent.,
while 19 gained in amounts varying from per cent, to 116 per cent.
The average gain for all pupils amounted to 19 per cent.
Spontaneous association: 2 pupils lost, the one 18 and the other
43 per cent., while 25 gained from 2 to 162 per cent. The average
improvement amounted to 42 per cent.
Addition: 1 pupil suffered a loss of 13 per cent., 26 gained from
6 to 125 per cent., while the average improvement was 35 per cent.
Associating antonyms: all the pupils gained in amounts varying
from 33 to 666 per cent., the average gain being 129 per cent.
Perception-attention: all gained in amounts varying from 19 to
101 per cent, the average improvement amounting to 60 per cent.
It is thus evident that the gains varied considerably in the dif-
ferent tests, and that the largest improvement occurred in the an-
tonym, attention-perception, and spontaneous association tests. The
average gain for all tests amounted to 57 per cent., truly a remark-
ably large gain.
How large a percentage of this significant gain is due solely to
the improved physical condition of the pupils, which resulted from
the treatment? This question does not admit of a categorical answer
in the absence of parallel data from an untreated squad. But that
a very large share is directly due to the dental treatment is indicated
by the fact that most of these pupils were laggards or repeaters,
pedagogically retarded from 1 to 4 years. During the experimental
year, however, only 1 failed of promotion in the school work, while
6 completed 38 weeks' work in 24 weeks, and 1 boy did 2 years' work
in 1. This indicates that the pupils' physical condition had been
so bettered that they were able to profit by the instruction, to form
habits from practise, and to improve mentally as a result of in-
creasing maturity. We may therefore conclude that if it be granted
that a part of the gains manifested in the psychological tests resulted
from practise and increasing maturity, the gains are still significant
as showing that these pupils were making normal progress- during
the experimental year, while many had failed to do so during the
preceding year, as indicated by the records of pedagogical progress.
It may be doubted, however, that the practise effects were very con-
siderable, partly because of the brevity of the tests and the length
of the intervals between some of them, and partly because of the
counteracting effect of the growing monotony.
It is also significant that the regularity of attendance improved
considerably during the experimental year, owing to the improved
physical and mental condition of the pupils. During the preceding
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 297
year many were quite irregular, because of toothaches, bodily indis-
positions, chronic weariness, or distaste for the school work; 5 were
obliged to carry truancy cards, while during the experimental year
it was not necessary to issue any of these cards; and several boys,
previously regarded as " incorrigible, " became tractable and gentle-
manly. The improved physical and mental health of many of the
pupils, which was noticed by the teachers, commented on by the
parents, and fully realized by the pupils, was also made manifest in a
more buoyant spirit, a healthier complexion, and an improved disposi-
tion and deportment. That a large share of the gains in the psycho-
logical tests, say at least one half on a conservative estimate, can be
directly ascribed to the oral hygienic regimen, is undoubted, I believe.
This experiment, then, furnishes the first demonstration by means
of controlled, serial, experimental tests, extending throughout a cal-
endar year, of the psycho-orthogenic effects of the application of the
broad principles of community mouth hygiene. The conclusions
which follow from the results of the research are of far-reaching
importance to the state and nation.
There is probably no phase of the modern child-welfare movement
which merits deeper scientific study by qualified experts than the
relation of normative physical health and growth, and of normative
pedagogical and psychical development, in school children, to a well-
conceived plan of physical and mental orthogenesis. No phase of the
problem of national conservation or racial euthenics more nearly
affects the very fundamentals of human existence. Our greatest
national asset is the normal, healthy child. It would seem that our
child-welfare and social-betterment workers could more profitably
apply themselves to the scientific determination of the physiological,
psychological, and social causes of physical and mental inefficiency,
and the discovery of scientific, corrective measures on a community
basis, than to devote their resources to the mere gathering of statis-
tical data. The largest contribution to the permanent betterment
of the race will be made by those workers who will undertake, on an
adequate scale, genuine, scientific investigations into the actual, dem-
onstrated effects of the application of various orthogenic measures of
a physical and mental character. No such investigations are any-
where being prosecuted on an effective basis, notwithstanding that
no one knows the actual, proven effects on the child of the application
of various physical and psychological orthogenic measures or various
pedagogical methods and devices. Our knowledge in this field is
largely pretense and illusion. In no field of modern enterprise has
there been such a lame attempt made to measure results scientifically,
as in education. Indeed, we do not as yet so much as possess any
scientific measures of educational results: the very conception of
29s THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
"measuring results in education" is a product of very recent indus-
trial t hi nki ng. Is it not time that our large research foundations
begin to treat more fairly the problems of human conservation and
particularly those of child orthogenics? A million dollars spent in
orthogenic investigations will accomplish immeasurably more for the
welfare of the human race than tens of millions devoted to the cata-
loguing of the stars of the heavens or exploring the trackless wastes
of the polar regions.
From the results of this investigation the conclusion is suggested
that the desirability of establishing dental clinics in the public schools
for free inspection and treatment should present itself to the tax-
payer as a simple business, if not a humanitarian, proposition: the
clinics are an economic means to an economic end, namely, the paying
of proper dividends on the capital invested in the schools. Accord-
ing to the best estimates there are 6,000,000 retardates in the public
schools of the country, or about one third of the entire school popula-
tion. One sixth of all the pupils are repeaters. It costs the country
$27,000,000 to educate every sixth child once, twice, or three times in
the same grade. That part of this enormous waste, which is as-
cribable to the presence of those remediable physical defects in the
children which exert a retarding influence upon the mental processes
or which cause children to stay away from school, is entirely pre-
ventable. Is it worth while to attempt to save this waste? Is it
worth anything to the child to enable him to attend school more regu-
larly and thereby increase his chances of promotion? Is it worth
while to the repeater to shorten his stay in the schools? Is it worth
while to enable him to attain a higher level of academic efficiency?
Is it worth while to remove physical obstacles which may lessen his
efficiency for life? Is it worth while to the taxpayer to eliminate,
so far as possible, the necessity for the extra financial burden which
he must assume for instruction that should have been done satisfac-
torily the first time? There can be none but an affirmative answer.
One of the means for accomplishing these desirable results appears
to be the establishment of departments of orthogenics in the public
schools. But these departments must be given a broader scope than
are the present departments of medical inspection, and must be under
the skilled direction of health officers who are experts in applied
child or clinical psychology, corrective pedagogy, and preventive
and corrective hygiene.
J. E. WALLACE WALLJN.
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 299
DISCUSSION
LETTER FROM PROFESSOR POULTON
nnHERE are many points which it would be interesting to discuss
-L in Mr. Francis B. Summer's review of my book, "Charles
Darwin and the Origin of Species." 1 I should, however, have ab-
stained from troubling you were it not for Mr. Sumner's quotation
of Professor Punnett's extraordinary misstatement of the modern
Darwinian view. 2 For some time I had been intending to correct
this curious blunder, and now that it has been quoted in your pages
and even gives an ill-founded relief to Mr. Sumner, I feel that the
time has come.
Professor Punnett is speaking of two African species of the
Danaine genus, Amauris, respectively mimicked by two Nymphaline
butterflies found in the same localities. The two Danaines are
Amauris niavius dominicanus and Amauris echeria; the two Nympha-
lines, Euralia waklbergi and Euralia mima. All four are figured on
Plate VI., facing page 134 of ' ' Mendelism. " Mr. G. A. K. Marshall,
in 1902, 3 suggested that the two Euralias are probably forms of the
same species, but the proof was not finally obtained until 1909 when
the late Mr. A. D. Millar, of Durban, bred both forms from a single
female. 4 There is good reason to believe, as Professor Punnett states, 5
that the relationship between the two forms is Mendelian, and I can
now further add that there is no doubt that mima is dominant and
wahlbergi recessive. This conclusion is founded on the recent ex-
periments of my friend, Mr. W. A. Lamborn, on the corresponding
forms in the Lagos district, viz., dubia (=>mima) and anthedon
(= walilbergi). Details of these experiments were communicated
a few weeks ago to the Entomological Society of London, and will
appear in the Proceedings for the present year. Now for Professor
Punnett's statement: "On the modern Darwinian view certain indi-
viduals of A. dominicanus gradually diverged from the dominicanus
type and eventually reached the echeria type, though why this
should have happened does not appear to be clear. At the same
time those specimens [of Euralia'] which tended to vary in the direc-
tion of A. echeria in places where this species was more abundant
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. IX., pages 159-161.
2 " Mendelism, " page 134. This, at least, is the reference in the third
British edition, 1911, of Professor Punnett's work. The footnote on page 160
of THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY gives page 144.
8 Trans. Ent. Soc. London, pages 491-2.
*Proc. Ent. Soc., London, 1910, pages xiv-xvi; Trans., page 498.
8 ' ' Mendelism, ' ' page 135.
300 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
than A. dominicanus, were encouraged by natural selection, and
under its guiding hand the form mima eventually arose from wahl-
bergi.
"According to Mendelian views, on the other hand, A. echeria
arose suddenly from A. dominicanus (or vice versa), and similarly
wima arose suddenly from wahlbergi (p. 134). ... On this view
the genera Amauris and Euralia contain a similar set of pattern fac-
tors, and the conditions, whatever they may be, which bring about
mutation in the former lead to the production of a similar mutation
in the latter" (p. 135).
Although Professor Punnett ought to be competent to express
"Mendelian views," I am pretty confident that he will be unable to
find a single Mendelian writer who would accept his assumption
about the origin of the two species of Amauris. But, however this
may be, it is quite certain that no Darwinian, modern or ancient, and
certainly no student of insect systematics, has committed himself
to the belief that one of these two Danaine models has directly
arisen from the other.
The late Dr. F. Moore, in his revision of the Danaince* placed
echeria and dominicanus in separate genera. In this he was prob-
ably wrong, but they are certainly widely separated. Amauris
niavius niavius of the west, together with the eastern sub-species,
niavius dominicanus, occupies an isolated position in the genus
Amauris, and it is absurd I can use no milder word to suggest
that echeria arose directly from either of them. Hence, the whole of
Professor Punnett 's assumption of a parallelism in origin between
model and mimic, which Mr. Sumner finds so comforting, falls to
the ground.
May I say in conclusion that, although the relationship between
the two mimetic forms of Euralia is undoubtedly Mendelian, I can
not believe that one of them arose suddenly from the other? I be-
lieve that any one who looks at Professor Punnett 's Plate VI. will
hesitate to accept the view that the details of either of the two
mimetic patterns reproducing with great precision the pattern of
a species belonging to a different sub-family arose all at once from
the other by mutation.
I have, furthermore, some evidence in support of the conclusion
that the origin of the mimicry was gradual. Another closely related
species, Euralia dinarcha, presents on the west coast of Africa two
forms very roughly resembling the Danaine models which are so won-
* Proc. Zool. Soc. London, 1883, page 201. Dr. Moore placed echeria and
an allied species in Nebroda. Aurivillius in his great ' ' Bhopalocera ^Ethiopica"
places niavius, including the eastern form dominicanus, second and echeria
fifteenth in the genus Amauris.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 301
derfully mimicked by the forms anthedon and dubia of the allied
species. I very much hope that Mr. Lamborn will be able to breed E.
dinarcha, and ascertain whether the Mendelian relationship exists
between its two forms. 7 But whether this is so or not, there can be
little doubt that these forms exhibit to us an initial stage in an evo-
lutionary journey which has been carried very much further by
anthedon and dubia.
There are other interesting facts which remain to be further in-
vestigated in the Mendelian relationship of these mimics. Mr. Lam-
born informs me that the recessive form anthedon shows a well-
marked tendency to appear seasonally; so that, during part of the
year, he finds only this form on the wing. Then, later on, dubia
suddenly appears. Such a phenomenon is extremely difficult to ex-
plain on ordinary Mendelian lines. Either we are faced by some
undiscovered aspect of Mendel 's law or the dominant form must have
the power of lying dormant in some one or more of its stages, and
then suddenly appearing. Against this latter hypothesis is the fact
that in the seven large families bred by Mr. Lamborn, and now in the
Oxford University Museum, there was not the slightest evidence of
any difference between the two forms in this respect.
EDWARD B. POULTON.
OXFORD UNIVERSITY MUSEUM.
PROFESSOR DEWEY'S " AWARENESS"
IT is a shame to be asking Professor Dewey to take up so much
time in answering what are regarded as irrelevant questions.
But he has been so good in the past that I am going to take the lib-
erty of putting two more questions. I shall put them entirely in
Mr. Dewey 's own words, so far as I can; and I shall request Mr.
Dewey to forget, so far as this is possible, that in my former queries
I seem to him to have confused his position with my own. The two
questions I wish to lay before him concern the passage on the basis
of which my previous unfortunate questions were raised. That
passage I shall requote here so that all the data pertinent to my pres-
ent inquiries may be seen at a glance : " Of course on the theory I am
7 Keturning to Oxford at the end of the Easter vacation, I find a letter from
Mr. Lamborn written March 29, 1912, from Oni Camp, near Lagos, telling me
that he has now succeeded in obtaining eggs from both forms of E. dinarcha, and
that the larvae are doing well. We may hope for evidence, which will decide
whether these two forms are a Mendelian pair, in a few weeks. I am very
fortunate in having friends in the tropics who are so often able to supply us
with just the Very solutions for which we are looking with the utmost interest
and eagerness. E. B. P.
302 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
interested in expounding the so-called action of "consciousness"
means simply the organic releases in the way of behavior which are
the conditions of awareness, and which also modify its content." 1 In
this sentence it seems to be asserted that organic releases in the way
of behavior are the conditions of awareness.
There are two other passages, in the essay from which the above
quotation is made, which must be cited before I can put my ques-
tions. "Awareness means attention, and attention means a crisis of
some sort in an existent situation ; a forking of the roads of some ma-
terial, a tendency to go this way and that" (p. 73). "A mistake is
literally a mishandling; a doubt is a temporary suspense and vacilla-
tion of reactions ; an ambiguity is the tension of alternative, but in-
compatible mode of responsive treatment; an inquiry is a tentative
and retrievable (because intra-organic) mode of activity entered
upon prior to launching upon a knowledge which is public, ineluct-
able without anchors to windward because it has taken physical
effect through overt action" (pp. 69-70). A comparison of these
two statements has led me, perhaps mistakenly, to think that for Mr.
Dewey doubt, ambiguity, and inquiry are all cases of awareness.
But these cases of awareness, if indeed they be such, are all said to
be characterized by what seem to me to be not organic releases, but
organic inhibitions.
My two questions, now, are these: (1) Where in these cases of
awareness, if they be such, are "the organic releases in the way of
behavior which are the conditions of awareness"? (2) Even if it
should prove to be the case that what I have called organic inhibi-
tions are included by Mr. Dewey within the more generic term
"organic releases," why are these "organic releases" called "the
conditions of awareness" rather than the awareness itself? In other
words, if awareness be literally these suspenses and tensions and
intra-organic modes of activity, can these suspenses and tensions and
intra-organic modes of activity be properly called also the conditions
of awareness ?
There are of course several other questions that I am keeping
intra-organic and therefore retrievable two anchors weighed from
the windward, I have found, are enough at a time. But if the above
two questions are answered, I hope that I may get from these answers
a clew to the answers of the others.
EVANDEE BRADLEY McGiLVABY.
UNIVKESITT OP WISCONSIN.
'Jamee Memorial Volume," page 69.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 303
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. HENRI BERGSON. Au-
thorized translation by CLAUDESLEY BRERETON and FRED ROTHWELL.
New York : The Macmillan Company. Pp. vi + 200.
As usual, Professor Bergson is fortunate in his translators. There is
a cockiness of expression in this version of " Le Rire " not altogether true
to the suave dignity of the original, but the matter is such that the manner
becomes it. Laughter, if Professor Bergson is right, is also cocky : an im-
pertinence, he says somewhere, and it is with laughter that he here deals.
His handling is in terms of the characteristic of Bergsonian philosophy.
This is constituted by analytic dualisms of time and space, quality and
quantity, life and matter. Time, quality, and life are real and potent, the
rery stuff and texture of existence: space, quantity, and matter are but
negations and inversions thereof, mere appearances of the living onrush.
The routine of the daily life, our social relations, our amusements, are
combinations of this process with its negations spatializations of time,
intellectualizations of instinct, mechanizations of life. The exigencies of
action make them so : they are the soul of use, and it is by its utilities that
life maintains itself. There exists, however, a dimension in which utili-
ties, with their concepts and generalizations, have no worth, where intellect
is satanic rather than salvational, where only concrete and living individ-
ualities count, where the elan vital is encountered with no veils between.
In this dimension lies the field of art, which, " whether it be painting or
sculpture, poetry or music, has no other object than to brush aside utili-
tarian symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in
short, everything that veils reality from us, in order to bring us face to
face with reality itself." The older way of expressing this true and an-
cient doctrine is to say that art is intrinsic and expressive, the residual
life extrinsic and utilitarian sometimes.
But the art of comedy is excommunicate from this election. It deals
not with individuals, but with types; it is external and observational, not
internal and imaginative. Only averages are its care, and the inductive
sciences its kin, in that in method and object its " observation is always
external and the result always general " (p. 169). And this must be, since
the essence of the comic is to be a mechanization of life, a petrifaction of
the labile, a mechanization and petrifaction not, however, through and
through, but capable of correction, and therefore subject thereto at the
hands of laughter. But that laughter's function may be universal, its ob-
ject, the comic, must be general and not individual. Comedy, hence, can
not reveal reality.
Whether it is because of this metaphysical preconception that the
analysis of objects of laughter is limited to French comedy from Moliere
to Labiche, or because such an analysis has led to this generalization in
terms of the Bergsonian metaphysic, can not be easily said. Certainly, to
find in addition that laughter must concern itself with something human,
in its social relations; that it must be divorced from emotion, requiring a
304 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
" momentary anesthesia of the heart," points to the first alternative, for
these are deducible from M. Bergson's interpretation of life and nature.
And it is only such a deduction that would see the comic object everywhere
as a " mechanization of life " caricature, because it involves rigidity and
disproportion of feature; repeated or inverted movements, because they
have, when alive, a continually changing aspect; character, because it is
funny when automatism is opposed to freedom, the persistent and uncon-
scious self-admiration of vanity to the labile and scientific cautiousness of
modesty.
Hence, it is not impossible that if M. Bergson had gone further afield
for his cases of the comic, if, instead of confining himself to the comedy of
literature and social life, he had sought out the occasions of laughter in
nature and the other arts, he might have found it needful to modify his
theory a little. Granted that it lightens the cases he cites, does it equally
illuminate the laughter occasioned by tickling, by fear, by victory, by re-
lease from any kind of suppression or tension? In cases of this sort is
not the elan vital really liberated from, rather than a victim of, the contin-
gencies of mechanization? How does the "mechanization of life" ex-
plain the comic of music, of discords of pure colors that many artists find
laughable? What human or social relation is actually to be seen in these
things?
Then laughter itself is it really "unemotional"? It is true that
mirth is not anger nor pity nor horror nor joy, but need it be any the less
an emotion on its own account? As well deny it of any other that has an
identifiable individuality. That mirth is not a negative nor depressed
emotion is obvious, that it is cruel and pitiless is often true, but then so
are joy and anger among the exalted emotions, and fear, among the de-
pressed ones. The " anesthesia " of the heart is common to all emotions,
to say the least that is why they are emotions. They are selfish, central,
exclude alternatives. They consume their object, each according to its
fashion. If laughter hurts, so does anger; if mirth is blind, so is joy. And
just as these are not intrinsically corrective, neither is mirth. Arising
first as an intrinsic expression of certain values in existence, it acquires a
secondary character which is in no way essential or definitive of it. Its
utility is an artifact, not a natural growth, and the other emotions can
participate in a similar utility, for if people dislike being laughed at, they
also dislike being stormed at or pitied, and seek to change the conditions
which evoke these emotions.
Now are such conditions also mechanizations of life? And if they are
not, may not some of those which evoke mirth also be innocent of that
rigor? In nature there seem to be many such innocents. But even if
there be one only, M. Bergson's subtle and fascinating book is rendered
by it a "fallacy of composition" in which one object of mirth, viz., the
petrifaction of the labile, is identified with all, and in which one incidental
utility is converted into constitutive function. Yet not altogether, for at
the end M. Bergson finds laughter also sympathetic, containing a " move-
ment of relaxation," a relief from the strain of living, analogous to dream.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 305
And perhaps in its fundamental and deeper nature, laughter is that and
only that.
H. M. KALLEN.
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
The Philosophy of Music: A Comparative Investigation into the Prin-
ciples of Musical Esthetics. HALBERT HAINS BRITAN. New York:
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1911. Pp. xiv + 252.
After a somewhat laborious " Introduction," the treatise in hand com-
prises a "Psychological Analysis of the Elements of Music," with chap-
ters on rhythm, melody, harmony, and musical expression, and a discus-
sion of " The Philosophy of Music," considered with reference to the ap-
peal and the content of music to musical criticism and to education.
The perspective of the " psychological analysis " may be indicated by
a typical passage : " Ehythm ... is an attribute of neural activity in-
bred in the nervous tissues through ages and cycles of development and
growth before the mind was capable of true creative work such as both
melody and harmony imply. Consequently the music of undeveloped
tribes and of uncultivated taste is preponderatingly rhythmical. Instru-
ments of percussion are the favorite musical instruments of men in the
lowest stages of mental development" (p. 63). The combined authority
of physiology and anthropology is characteristic of the day, but to the
reviewer it seems too often to amount merely to the restatement of fa-
miliar facts in grotesque or pedantic terms, less a profit to learning than
a trial of temper.
Professor Britan is better in his discussion of melody and harmony
where neither protoplasm nor "primitive man" can be conveniently ad-
jured. In melody he finds the gist of "musical thought," to which he
proceeds to apply the rhetorical criteria of unity, strength, grace, original-
ity, significance. While these terms serve no deeper purpose than to point
to certain obvious features of musical composition sufficiently analogous
to their literary counterparts to justify the terminology, yet in this there
is a real service. For in the first place, it is worth while to suggest for
musical description a set of analogies other than the overused (and often
absurd) ones of painting and architecture; and in the second place, in a
thoroughly profitable chapter on "Musical Criticism," Dr. Britan points
the practical need and application of his terms. As to the quite different
matter of penetrating the nature and analyzing the appeal of melody, it
can hardly be maintained that we are much advanced.
A suggestion that invites consideration is that the plaintive effect of
the minor mode is due to the primacy of the major in the general ordina-
tion of our musical conceptions : " So here in the minor scale, when we
feel the unrest and yearning it produces, we are yearning in reality for
the more natural order of the major mode" (p. 146). This, of course, is
but another application of the " expectation " theory to musical inter-
pretation like all the rest, still leaving with us, unsolved, the foundation
of such expectancy.
A general key to Professor Britan's position is his excellent saying,
300 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
11 There are no patterns in art, though we are endeavoring to establish
certain principles " (p. 217). And most of the principles laid down will
be generally accepted. Yet his book as a whole would certainly be more
effective without the odd assumption that it constitutes a " pioneer work "
in a field represented by a literature of which his seventeen prefatory
" references " give small measure. H. B. ALEXANDER.
UNIVERSITY or NEBRASKA.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. January, 1912.
The Relative Legibility of Different Faces of Printing Types (pp. 1-34) :
BARBARA ELIZABETH ROETHLEIN. - An experiment to determine the ease or
difficulty that various printing types present in reading. The factors
that produce legibility are given. The texture of the paper is not im-
portant. The modification of certain letters is urged. The Psychology of
the New Britannica (pp. 37-58): E. B. TITCHEXER. -The author has
made a careful study of the articles that deal with psychology in the new
Britannica. He finds little to commend and much to condemn. It seems
that this new edition of the encyclopedia has not made an adequate re-
vision of its psychological material. The Function of the Several Senses
in Mental Life (pp. 59-74) : EDMUND C. SANFORD. - A brief survey of the
development of the various senses is here given. Several mental experi-
ences are taken up and discussed in relation to the various senses. The
Relation of Practise to Individual Differences (pp. 75-88) : FREDERIC
LYMAN WELLS. -The experiments indicate that a superior performance
at the beginning is not attained with a sacrifice of the possibility of fu-
ture improvements. The Influence of Caffein Alkaloid on the Quality
and Amount of Sleep (pp. 89-100) : H. L. HOLLINOWORTH. - Small doses do
not seem to disturb sleep. Doses larger than six grains impair sleep for
most subjects. The effect is greatest when taken on an empty stomach.
Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Vassar College.
Mediate Associations Studied by the Method of Inhibiting Associations:
An Instance of the Effect of " Aufgabe " (pp. 101-109) : M. VALERIE
ATHERTON and M. F. WASHBURN. A Study of the Images Representing
the Concept Meaning (pp. 109-114) : MART W. CHAPIN and M. F. WASH-
BURN. Recent Literature on Psychoanalysis (pp. 115-139) : DR. J. S. VAN
TESLAAR.-A series of reviews of the following: (1) S. Freud, Psych o-
analytische Bemerkungen uber einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall
von Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides). Sonderabdruck aus dem Jahr-
buch f. psycholanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, III.,
1911, 9-68. (2) Oskar Pfister, Hysterie und Mystik bei Margaretha
Ebner (1291-1361). Zeitschr. f. Psychoanalyse, I., 1911, 468-485. (3) S.
F. Ferenczi, Anatole France als Analytiker. Zentralblatt f. Psycho-
analyse, I., 1911, 461-467. (4) Otto Rank, Das Verlieren als Symptom-
handlung. Zentralblatt f. Psychoanalyse, I., 1911, 450-460. (5) Albert
Mohl, Beruhmte Homosexuelle. Orenzfragen des Nerven und Seelen-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 307
lebens, LXXV., 1910, pp. 80. (6) H. Bertschlinger, Heiligungsvorgdnge
~bei Schizophrenen. Allgem. Zeitschr. f. Psychiatric, LXVIIL, 1911,
209-222. (7) S. Freud, Formulierung ueber die zwei Prinzipien des
psychischen Geschehens. Sonderabdruck aus dem Jahrbuch fur psycho-
analytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, III., 1911, 1-8.
(8) Oskar Pfister, Die psychologische Entratselung der religiosen Glos-
solalie und der automatischen Kryptographie. Sonderabdruck aus dem
Jahrbuch f. psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, HI.,
1911, 427-466. (9) M. Wulff, Beitrdge zur infantilen Sexualitdt. Zen-
tralblatt f. Psychoanalyse, II., 1911, 6-7. (10) Jan Nelken, Ueber
schyzophrene Wortzerlegungen, Zentralblatt f. Psychoanalyse, II., 1911,
1-5. Alfred Binet (140-141). -A brief biographical sketch. Book Re-
views. E. L. Thorndike, Animal Intelligence: L. W. SACKETT. C. S.
Myers, A Text-book of Experimental Psychology with Laboratory Exer-
cises: E. B. T. H. H. Britan, The Philosophy of Music: E. B. T. H.
Bergson (translated by C. Brereton and F. Eothwell), Laughter; an
Essay on the Meaning of the Comic: E. B. T. J. Welton, The Psychology
of Education: W. S. FOSTER. William Brown, The Essentials of Mental
Measurement: W. S. FOSTER. H. Addington Bruce, Scientific Mental
Healing: W. S. FOSTER. Francisco Eedi (translated by M. Bigelow),
Experiments in the Generation of Insects. H. de Vries (translated by C.
S. Gager), Intracellular Pangenesis; Including a Paper on Fertilization
and Hybridization. B. C. Punnett, Mendelism. F. L. Wells and A.
Forbes, On Certain Electrical Processes in the Human Body and Their
Relation to Emotional Reactions. M. T. Whitley, An Empirical Study
of Certain Tests for Individual Differences. E. Abramowski, L' Analyse
physiologique de la perception. F. Boas, Handbook of American Indian
Languages. J. E. Swanton, Indian Tribes of the Lower Mississippi Val-
ley and Adjacent Coast of the Gulf of Mexico. C. Thomas, Indian
Languages of Mexico and Central America and their Geographical Dis-
tribution. J. W. Fewkes, Preliminary Report on a Visit to the Navaho
National Monument, Arizona. J. W. Fewkes, Antiquities of the Mesa
Verde National Park: Cliff Palace. W. Goodsell, The Conflict of Natural-
ism with Humanism. W. L. Eabenort, Spinoza as Educator. T.
Schroeder, " Obscene " Literature and Constitutional Law : a Forensic
Defense of Freedom of the Press. The Social Evil in Chicago: a Study
of Existing Conditions by the Vice Commission of Chicago. Report of
the Vice Commission of Minneapolis to His Honor J. C. Haynes, Mayor.
W. J. Chidley, The Answer. G. E. Partridge, An Outline of Individual
Study. W. Benett, Justice and Happiness. J. Eehmke, Zur Lehre vom
Gemilt. J. W. H. Allen, The Universities of Ancient Greece. M. Offner,
Die geistige Ermiidung. M. Offner (translated by G. M. Whipple), Men-
tal Fatigue. M. Offner, Dass Geddchtniss. M. E. Thompson, Psychology
and Pedagogy of Writing. W. H. Winch, When Should a Child Begin
School? J. E. W. Wallin, Spelling Efficiency in Relation to Age, Grade and
Sex. H. E. Cushman, A Beginner's History of Philosophy. L. J. Walker.
Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism. C. J. Deter,
Abriss der Geschichte der Philosophic. F. Cumont, The Oriental Relig-
308 Tilt: JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ions in Roman Paganism. L. Busse, Die Weltanschauung en der grossen
Philosophen der Neuieit. P. Smith, The Life and Letters of Martin
Luther. Book Notes. H. v. Buttel-Reepen, Aus dem Werdegang der
Mensehheit. Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, Criminal Man According to the
Classification of Cesare Lombroso. Otto Klemm, Oeschichte der Psychol-
ogic. William E. Castle, Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal
Breeding. M. Sopote, The Grades of Life. Arthur F. Hertz, The Ooul-
stonian Lectures on the Sensibility of the Alimentary Canal. James
Allen, Man, King of Mind, Body, and Circumstance. Richard Ilamann,
Asthetik. George Trumbull Ladd and Robert Sessions Woodworth, Ele-
ments of Physiological Psychology. William McDougall, Body and
Mind. George Drayton Strayer, A Brief Course in the Teaching Process.
Edward L. Thorndike, Animal Intelligence. George Trumbull Ladd, The
Teacher's Practical Philosophy. H. H. Schroeder, The Psychology of
Conduct. M. Mignard, La Joie Passive. H. Addington Bruce, Scientific
Mental Healing. Gustave F. Mertins, A Watcher of the Skies.
Biuso, C. Prolegomeni ad una Psicodinamica. Rome : Albrighi, Segati,
& C. 1912. Pp. 176. 2.50 L.
Bosanquet, B. The Principle of Individuality and Value. The Gifford
Lectures for 1911. London : The Macmillan Company. Pp. xxxvii +
409. 10s.
NOTES AND NEWS
M. HENRI POINCARE'S lecture at the Sorbonne on April 12 was as bril-
liant as it was instructive. He dealt mainly with the constitution of
matter, and drew the attention of his hearers, the French Physical Society,
to the objective reality of the chemical atom, which he considers to be now
beyond dispute. He made a bold comparison of the free electrons within
the atom to comets, while considering the tied electrons as equivalent to
the fixed stars, and accepted the magneton of M. Weiss as the third com-
ponent of matter. Hence, he said, we must consider the atom, if we
accept the most probable hypotheses current, not as a system whose move-
ments are ordered and ruled by definite laws, but as a world where reigns
a disordered agitation of elements delivered over to chance. Yet this
world is rigorously closed to us at present, and every atom constitutes,
according to him, an " individual." M. Poincar6's lecture will do much to
clarify the views of inquirers into the subject, and it is to be hoped that
during his forthcoming visit to this country he may repeat some of the
conclusions announced in it. Athenceum, April 27.
PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES'S letters are being collected for biographical
purposes, and any one who has any of his letters can render assistance that
will be highly appreciated by addressing Henry James, Jr., 95 Irving St.,
Cambridge, Mass. Casual or brief letters may have an interest or im-
portance not apparent to the person preserving them; and news of the
whereabouts of any of the late William James's letters will be gratefully
received.
VOL. IX. No. 12. JUNE 6, 1912
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
DOGMATISM YEESUS CRITICISM 1
attention of the members of this association has been directed
-- in their recent meetings to the issue between idealism and neo-
realism and within this issue especially to the problem of perception
and the relation between consciousness and the object of conscious-
ness. Personally I rejoice that the main issue is the center of our
attention ; but I regret exceedingly that we have turned to the prob-
lem of perception as the point where the two philosophical parties
really divide, for I do not believe that the study of this problem will
lead quickly and directly to mutual understanding, let alone, to any
agreement. As a realist I am firmly convinced that this is not the
fundamental problem at issue; I deny that it is even in general a
fundamental philosophical problem. I am aware that the very name
"realist" as a party name is thereby declared to be inappropriate
and that most realists will disagree with me in what I am saying;
still I can urge that party names do get chosen in a more or less
accidental way and do often describe the tension or division of
opinion regarding matters of momentary interest rather than the
great underlying causes for this difference of opinion. Indeed the
partisans themselves are often blind to the real ground of difference ;
and my point is, that in philosophy this is precisely the state of
affairs which we should strive to avoid, because it is unphilosophical,
and because it is bad methodologically. Moreover, our attention
these days should be attracted not merely to a few men or to a local
movement, but to a great international philosophical movement, a
movement which, once it gets full headway, will mean a world-wide
philosophical revolution. The realist should already know this; and
the idealist, whatever his type of idealism, should awaken to the fact
that the long and undisputed reign of idealism is about to enter upon
troublous times. Such a movement as neo-realism has already shown
*A paper read before the American Philosophical Association, Cambridge,
December 27, 1911. This paper borrows a few paragraphs from an essay in a
forthcoming volume entitled "The New Eealism."
309
310 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
enough symptoms to make evident that it is opposed to idealism of
every form and variety from that of John Locke to the present-day
pragmatism. No minor problem, but a wholly different attitude
toward all philosophical problems is the true force center from which
it derives its impulse.
What is this new attitude which forms the fundamental point at
issue between the two philosophical parties? It is dogmatism vs.
criticism. The neo-realistic movement is a return to dogmatism, 2 not
to dogmatism in the specific sense of the seventeenth-century ration-
alism, but in the generic sense of the contradictory of criticism. Let
me make my meaning explicit by summing up the rival theories in
two sets of propositions. The defendant, criticism, maintains one or
more of the following propositions: first, that in general the theory
It should be distinctly understood by the reader that the word "dog-
matism" is used throughout this paper in the narrow and precise sense above
defined. The name is taken from Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," where,
whatever else it may mean, it denotes the contradictory of what Kant calls
criticism. Unfortunately the word has other associations in Kant's mind and
in the mind of the student of Kant, for it sometimes means specifically the
ratwnali,itic ontology of the Cartesian and Leibnizian philosophers, whereas neo-
realism differs radically from this philosophy. For example, many neo-realista
have a strong tendency toward an extreme empiricism and toward an abandon-
ment of the substance-attribute notion as a fundamental notion in metaphysics.
Again, the older realism was a representative realism, an epistemological dualism;
whereas neo-realism is an epistemological monism. Finally, a modern dogmatism
must of necessity differ from that of the earlier centuries, just because it has
behind it two centuries of experience with criticism. That is, it is consciously
and deliberately dogmatic, whereas the earlier dogmatism was naive and was
therefore easily misled into idealism and its so-called criticism. But in spite of
these unfortunate associations, I believe the names, dogmatism and criticism, not
only appropriate, but enlightening; for I think the neo-realistic movement to be
a reaction against the whole enterprise of Locke, Kant, and their followers to
get at a fundamental science, and not merely against their idealism. That is,
neo-realism is not only a different theory of knowledge, but what is more impor-
tant for metaphysics, a different doctrine as to the place of epistemology in the
hierarchy of the sciences. As the names realism and idealism do not point out
this difference clearly, I prefer the names dogmatism and criticism, which, if
taken in their generic meanings as given by Kant, certainly indicate precisely
this difference. Indeed I would go farther, for many contemporary realists are
critic ists, and it is at least conceivable, no matter how remarkable, that some
dogmatists may be idealists. My point may be summed up briefly in the follow-
ing two sentences: Dogmatism is the contradictory of criticism and defines neo-
realism negatively or by exclusion. Chiefly and perhaps only in this respect la
neo-realism a return to seventeenth-century philosophy.
Since reading this paper I find that most fellow realists, with whom I have
had opportunity to speak regarding the name dogmatism, disapprove altogether
of it, because it suggests that the neo-realist is not an empiricist. Personally,
I do not fear this misunderstanding of the name, though of course any name,
realism included, will be misinterpreted by the careless and thoughtless reader.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 311
of knowledge is logically fundamental or prior to all other sciences
and to all other scientific procedure; secondly, that the theory of
knowledge can ascertain the limits of the field of possible knowledge;
thirdly, that it can determine ultimately the validity of science and
of the methods of science and can correct the results of science with
the authority of a court of final resort ; and, finally, that it can give
us of itself certain fundamental, existential truths usually called a
theory of reality. In opposition to these claims, the plaintiff, dog-
matism, maintains : first, that the theory of knowledge is not logically
fundamental, that it is simply one of the special sciences and logically
presupposes the results of many of the other special sciences; sec-
ondly, that the theory of knowledge is not able to show, except
inductively and empirically, either what knowledge is possible or
how it is possible or again what are the limits of our knowledge;
and, finally, that it is not able to throw any light upon the nature
of the existent world or upon the fundamental postulates and gen-
eralizations of science, except in so far as the knowledge of one
natural event or object enables us at times to make inferences
regarding certain others ; in short, that the theory of knowledge does
not give us a theory of reality, but, on the contrary, assumes a
theory of reality of which it is not the author. Put in one proposi-
tion, the charge which neo-realism makes against the older theory is,
idealism is a vicious circle.
All of this can be stated in a way that is less precise, but that is
probably more suggestive. There are two prominent and radically
different points of departure nowadays in our philosophical studies.
One man, the idealist, is impressed with the facts and truths of psy-
chology ; and though he may protest that psychology itself is but one
of the special sciences, he still seeks a philosophical foundation by
means of a study of these facts and truths. The other man, the
realist, though not blind to these facts, can not regard them as the
most significant ; rather he is impressed with the truth that the chief
business of science is to demonstrate, and that logic is the funda-
mental science. The one man is temperamentally a psychologist;
the other a logician.
What is the immediate result? Radical disagreement in two
important places: for, in the first place, how can we get a common
platform upon which we can discuss the problems of epistemology
and come to an agreement as to what is their correct solution ; and,
in the second place, how can we come to the same opinion regarding
the authority and the place of the sciences in the field of philosoph-
ical research ? Let us consider each of these questions more at length.
In the field of epistemology, take the problem of perception and
the relation of consciousness to its object. An entirely different
312 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
point of departure tends to keep asunder the two lines of research.
The idealist has on his hands a fundamental problem, and his whole
theory of existence depends logically upon the solution at which he
arrives. From the study of our conscious life and of the knowing
process within it, he must learn all that he has a logical right to
assume. He must keep his entire research, as it were, confined within
the stream of consciousness. If he looks beyond consciousness he
must do so from within outward. May I apply to his problem the
adjective immanent f The realist on the other hand, as a dogmatist,
approaches the problem from without. He assumes not only ex-
tensive information regarding the knowing process, the function it
fulfills in life, the relation between it and the bodily organism, but
also extensive information regarding the physical and social environ-
ment and regarding the nature of the objects of knowledge. Log-
ically, the whole conception of existence as taught in physics, chem-
istry, and biology is at his disposal to employ as a premise. For the
one party, there is no non-mental world, or, if there is, it is unknow-
able. For the other party, not only is there a non-mental world, but
it is well-known, or at least far better known than is the mental
world. Such a fundamental difference in the array of information
upon which the solution of the problems is to be based can only lead
to one of two things: to the illusion that we agree because we adopt
the same words, though our meaning is utterly different, or to a
debate on the logical position of epistemology in science. In the
latter case the idealist will protest that no problem can be more
nearly fundamental than the nature of the very process by which we
solve problems; and the dogmatic realist will retort: Show me the
critical theory of knowledge that lives up to your good intentions,
that does not assume what you deny me the right to assume, that is
not a vicious circle.
A similar situation meets us when we turn our attention to the
different attitudes taken toward the authority of science. Thus if we
ask : "Who is the great metaphysical discoverer and explorer ? Is he
the professional philosopher or is he mankind at large and above all
others the investigator in the various fields of science ? Or expressed
in other words, who has been giving us and who is giving us our
modern theory of reality, the professional philosopher or the great
mathematicians, astronomers, physicists, biologists, and psychologists ;
such men as Galileo, Kepler, Harvey, Newton, La Place, Lavoisier,
Priestley, Dalton, Mayer, Darwin, Helmholtz, Clerk Maxwell, and
Hertz? The idealist seems to answer, "The professional philos-
opher"; the neo-realist, "the scientific investigator and discoverer."
The idealist appears to believe that the most certain information
regarding reality, which we can possess, is that furnished by himself
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 313
and other philosophers. At best the special sciences are only rela-
tively true or need to be translated into the language and thought of
idealism. Whereas the neo-realist regards the exact sciences to-day,
to be sure, not as infallible, but as by far the most nearly certain
body of information man possesses. Now do not misunderstand these
statements. The realist is aware of many a crude piece of meta-
physics in this and that scientific treatise, of many metaphysical
inconsistencies in the doctrines of every generation of scientists, and
in those of almost every individual scientist himself. Indeed this is
precisely why professional metaphysicians are needed, for the special
scientist is too busy to explore thoroughly the foundations upon
which his theories rest, especially during periods when science is
growing rapidly. But the metaphysician is not needed to revolu-
tionize these theories. On the contrary, his business is to think
through, to make explicit, to organize, and to make evident to
the world the theory of reality that the scientists are implicitly
entertaining.
"Ah," the idealist will say, "this is positivism." The realist
replies : ' ' This is not positivism, for positivism is itself but a form of
idealism and has in it precisely the error against which the realist
protests. Its father was Hume, and, with him, it too would base
science logically upon a theory of knowledge. True, there is this
common feature that the realist is inclined to oppose absolutism or
any other claim to an infallible theory of reality. He sees that
science grows by trial and error, that science has found no other
ultimate method of procedure. The realist is in this sense an empiri-
cist; yet, mark well, not because he bases his metaphysics upon a
theory of knowledge, but because our whole scientific procedure is a
tentative one. Science does not assert its results as certainties, but
as probabilities. It admits that it has not full proof of any of its
existential hypotheses. Thus the empiricism of neo-realism is not a
theory of knowledge, but a confession that our theories are not based
upon full and sufficient proof. Moreover, he denies that our theories
of knowledge are any better off in this respect, for he sees no way of
digging deeper down for some ultimate support for these theories
than does the physicist for physics. To change the figure, he sees no
immovable standpoint that can serve him as a fulcrum with the help
of which his logical lever will enable him to move the world. He
wishes that he could ; but he is convinced that any attempt to do so,
such as that of the Kantian or Hegelian transcendentalism, is an out
and out vicious circle. In short his empiricism is dogmatism and
differs radically from that of those idealists who are also empiricists.
Let me illustrate my point that the realist believes that we owe
our metaphysics to science and not to some ultimate type of philo-
314 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
sophical research by giving two examples. Suppose a follower of
Berkeley and a modern naive realist to be disputing regarding the
nature of the content of which we are immediately aware in percep-
tion. The Berkeleyan holding to an epistemological theory believes
it all but self-evident that this content is mental or is made up of
states of consciousness. In turn, of course, the realist maintains that
this content is made up almost entirely of a non-mental world. Now
my question is, why does the realist do so? Is it because he also
draws this proposition as a conclusion from a theory of knowledge
or perception? I reply, "No." It might even happen that he has
no theory of knowledge or perception. Where does he get the propo-
sition? My answer is, "Just where common sense and science get
it"; and that means it is virtually an ultimate premise and not a
conclusion at all. The realist can not come over to Berkeley's view
because he can not see how to get there ; for he sees no way of log-
ically undermining the position of common sense and of science and
of thereby being able to build a deeper foundation or substructure
beneath science and common sense. Here then is where the two men
differ. The Berkeleyan finds such an ultimate problem whose solu-
tion gives him a more nearly fundamental position than that of sci-
ence. The realist beholds in this position a mere logical treadmill
by which, no matter how long or how hard you labor onward, you
end precisely where you started. To turn to a second illustration.
Suppose a Kantian and a realistic empiricist to be discussing the
nature of matter. The former would maintain that a study of the
knowing process will throw light upon the question by showing what
matter must be in order to be a possible experience. In short, there
is a method by means of which we can in certain particulars antici-
pate the physics of all time to come. The realist would reply, "No,
it is impossible, or at least it has never been done." In all such
reasoning you Kantians are surreptitiously borrowing the funda-
mental postulates of the physics and of the psychology of the time ;
and then after you have read them into your theory of knowledge
you read them out again. Twenty years ago you would probably
have tried to show that mass must be a fundamental constant in all
nature because of the constitution of knowledge ; and your argument
would no doubt have seemed plausible, because everybody then
believed mass to be such a constant: but here to-day the ruthless
facts are telling us that mass is a function of the velocity. In short,
the realist will say, I fail utterly to see any method of research, other
than that of the physical sciences, by which we can ascertain the
fundamental postulates or principles of the true theory of nature.
Hence I see no standpoint from which as a metaphysician I can
judge regarding such matters more authoritatively than can the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 315
physicist in his laboratory. Rather what I see is that the growth of
physics and astronomy in the days of Galileo revolutionized meta-
physics then, and that the growth of physics to-day is probably going
to revolutionize the metaphysics of our time, too. Indeed it has ever
been thus, for all the major discoveries of science have led to changes
within metaphysics; and some of them, such as evolution, have led
to great changes within the theory of knowledge itself.
To return to our main discussion : The dogmatist and the criticist
will have a radically different methodology. If science is the source
of my theory of reality my method of research must be a logical
analysis of what science teaches ; and if science is as yet quite unable
to answer the questions I put to it, I shall simply have to wait. If,
however, the theory of knowledge is the fundamental and most trust-
worthy source of my theory of reality, my method will be to pursue
epistemological research and not to wait for the growth of any other
science. Now this difference in method leads many critics to mis-
understand neo-realism, charging neo-realism with an over-fondness
for dialectic. But there is a radical difference between using logical
analysis in order to ascertain, for example, what chemistry teaches
or presupposes and using logical analysis to solve a chemical problem.
No amount of mere logic could discover the weight of oxygen, but
a man who never saw a chemical laboratory can learn from an
encyclopedia what chemists assert to be the weight. In short, my
point is that the employment of such logical analysis is a prominent
trait of neo-realism and that it indicates not a return to that delight-
ful occupation, spinning a web of truth out of one's internal organs
spider fashion, but a return to dogmatism.
May I call your attention also to what seems to me further evi-
dence that the neo-realistic movement is essentially a return to
dogmatism ? Why have neo-realists championed the following causes :
first, the giving up of the substance-attribute notion as fundamental ;
secondly, the holding to logical pluralism and its companion doctrine,
the defense of analysis as an ultimate method of research; and,
thirdly, the complete elimination of psychology or epistemology from
formal logic? Which is true; are these principles inferred by the
neo-realist from his theory of knowledge or has his theory of knowl-
edge logically nothing to do with the matter? I am convinced that
the latter is true, yes, even in the case of some neo-realists who may
not be fully aware of it themselves. In the case of the substance-
predicate notion, history shows that there has been gradually a
wider and wider elimination of this notion from the mathematical
and physical sciences from the days of Galileo to our own, whereas
pre-Kantian rationalism, idealism of Kantian lineage, and roman-
ticism have held more or less tenaciously to the older conception.
316 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
In Lotze in Germany, in Bradley in England, and indeed in any
upholder of the doctrine of the absolute we see a remarkable hostility
to the proposition that relations are fundamental, whereas you see
the opposite tendency among neo-realists. The only explanation I
have of this division by parties is that psychology and sometimes
romanticism dominate in the one, and logic dominates in the other.
In the case of the remaining two principles, it is, however, more
evident. Examine the treatises on logic of the objective idealists,
the phenomenalists, and the pragmatists; and the influence of psy-
chology, or, if you prefer so to call it, epistemology, is everywhere
evident, whereas there is a remarkable tendency for neo-realism to
side with formal logic against what has been dubbed Psychologismus.
Consider finally how neo-realism champions analysis as an ultimate
method of research and, in general, logical pluralism as fundamental
to our modern theory of reality. Now if I mistake not it is evident
to all philosophers that the exact sciences have been for centuries
utterly dependent upon the method of analysis. Indeed without it
we should not have any of our modern sciences. As a consequence
both romanticists and monistic idealists have to find some other
pigeonhole besides that of genuine truth in which to place science.
In short, they have to claim that science can not be our direct and
fundamental source for a theory of reality ; whereas the realist claims
precisely the opposite.
In conclusion, there is some evidence among realists themselves
that they do not regard the name realism as the most appropriate.
Mr. Bertrand Russell, who is certainly one of the foremost neo-
realists in the English-speaking world, urges that the appropriate
name is pluralism. I believe it would be more appropriate, for it
would at least refer to a fundamental tenet of the new party; but
against it I urge that the new movement is more a methodological
rebellion against the older philosophy, and that in a recent reply to
Mr. Bradley, Mr. Russell suggests this very thing. 3 Thus though I
may be suggesting the impossible, I do nevertheless ask : Should not
the new movement be called neo-dogmatism ? This name would at
once make clear to the objective idealist the difference between the
parties where now he feels that he, too, is in a sense a realist. Again
it would do the same for those pragmatists who call themselves real-
ists and yet feel rightly that there is some radical difference between
their position and that of the neo-realists. It would make clear the
relationship between the new movement and the seventeenth-century
philosophy for which this movement has already expressed a fond-
ness and with which neo-realism has been confused by some critics.
"The Basis of Realism," this JOUBXAL, Vol. VIIL, page 158; and cf.
Mind, 1910, N. S., Vol. XIX., pages 373-378.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 317
Finally, I believe it would indicate the chief bond between the indi-
vidual realists themselves, a methodological bond rather than a theory
of reality.
WALTER T. MARVIN.
EUTQEBS COLLEGE.
STUDIES IN THE STRUCTURE OF SYSTEMS
2. THE DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM FORM
OF all system forms, the so-called "deductive" has received the
greatest attention. Its father is Aristotle. Following sugges-
tions and using preliminary work by his master, Plato, he put the
stamp of his own mind on his researches into the nature of the
deductive system. Euclid gave the first great example of the form
in his "Elements," and this example was interpreted and imitated
in the light of the Aristotelian theory. Every school-boy who
labored through Euclid's text was thus familiarized with the leading
ideas of Aristotle's theory. And quite naturally it was believed
that the deductive system form was something peculiarly mathe-
matical, though the attempt was made, with indifferent success, to
apply it to philosophy, with great success, to physics.
The conception of a deductive system thus made current may be
briefly stated as follows : Its dominating idea is that of ' ' proof, ' ' by
which is meant "deductive" proof; no propositions are admitted as
valid until they have been proved; and they are "true" just in so
far as they have been proved. The "proof" shows that the proposi-
tion "necessarily follows" from some other propositions; but this
regress, so Aristotle taught, must come to an end; this is reached
when we come to the "principles" (-n-p^tj ) which neither can nor
need be proved, for they are ' ' self evident. ' ' By means of the proofs
our propositions participate in this self -evidence which the "axioms"
enjoy, and in this lucidity consists the great merit of the deductive
system; error may indeed creep in through a faulty proof (nothing
human is perfect, alas!) ; but it can be corrected, for the rules for
making valid proofs were made the subject of explicit and detailed
study. Propositions must be proved, that is, reduced to the axioms ;
concepts must be "defined," that is, reduced to the fundamental
concepts, in the last resort to the categories, which thus correspond
to the axioms. Categories must be clear, intelligible, general; and
the "derived" concepts, by means of the definitions, participate in
the clearness of the categories, just as the propositions do in the self-
evidence of the axioms. The light of day thus shines through the
whole building, for its very structure assures clearness, validity,
318 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
necessity, for which the philosophic mind had always been longing.
As we look back over the centuries through which the history of
the deductive system took its triumphant march, we are impressed
with the feeling (which to the workers at the building seems to have
been a conviction) that a system, such as plane geometry, could be
developed in the deductive system form in but one way. Certain
concepts are the fundamental concepts, certain propositions the
axioms, radically distinct, by their nature of "clearness," "self-
evidence," from all other concepts and propositions in the system.
The search for "categories" and "principles" has always taken this
direction and followed this procedure: by a direct inspection they
are to be recognized as such, without further ado. Of course, indi-
vidual writers did err (though it seems just a trifle hard to under-
stand how they could have failed to recognize that which is "self
evident") ; but the correction itself followed, with undaunted confi-
dence, the same method of direct inspection !
This is the heritage of the Aristotelian theory; "categories,"
"axioms," the terms which most clearly express it.
Had philosophers not been too much absorbed in different prob-
lems and too ignorant of mathematics to be any longer interested in
the work which was going on around them in the special sciences,
this idea of a deductive system would have been rudely shaken by
the work of intrepid mathematicians, who, without theoretical bias,
proceeded to develop deductive systems of "geometry," of "algebra"
by starting from various sets of "axioms." As it was, philosophers
ignored, and mathematicians built according to Euclid's pattern,
without much concern for the structural significance of their work.
And so the opinion could prevail that the Aristotelian account still
fitted the modern work.
These various sets of "axioms" were at first offered in the spirit
of the older conception of a deductive system, as improvements on
Euclid's system which was found deficient in important points. But
once the absolute perfection of Euclid's system was impugned and
the possibility of starting from a different basis demonstrated, the
work was carried on beyond the intentions of these first attempts.
Mathematicians exhibited new, and new, sets of ' ' axioms, " " hypoth-
eses," "postulates," "primitive propositions," or whatever name
they chose for their starting-point of a deductive system, and proved
that all of Euclid's propositions could be deduced from their sets
also. But even more important than this multiplicity of "founda-
tions" is the fact, that, if any one of these sets of "axioms" is
chosen, the "axioms" of the other sets become theorems which must
and can be proved. The new set of "axioms" may simply be a new
selection from among the propositions of the old systems. What
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 319
becomes of the radical distinction between "axioms" and "the-
orems," if they may thus be interchanged! And what is true of
the "axioms" applies to the categories.
The consequences of this work have not yet been recognized,
though its bearing on all our thinking seems great ; for the ' ' example
of mathematics ' ' has been potent with those who imitated, as well as
with those who opposed it. Spinoza, who put his philosophy into
the deductive system form, as well as Kant, who denied the possi-
bility of "definition" and "deductive proof" in philosophy, was
guided by the Aristotelian idea of a deductive system. And Kant's
own attempt at establishing a "table of categories" and of "funda-
mental judgments" moves, at bottom, in the same direction: certain
concepts are the categories; certain propositions the fundamental
judgments. This is a remnant of the Aristotelian way of thinking
in the great and complex German philosopher, who though a favor-
ite subject of attack by the young scientists working in the realm of
the "philosophy of mathematics" in other respects, and particu-
larly in his "transcendental method," seems to have sounded the
key-note of all this modern work. To have shown this convincingly
is one of the great merits of Hermann Cohen.
But are we not too rash in thus speaking rather disparagingly of
the Aristotelian conception of a deductive system ? Has the modern
work really made a different theory necessary? Above all, are the
ideas controlling this work sound themselves? Wherein do they
differ from the classical account, and do perhaps they themselves
require modification? These questions should be put and answered
systematically; for we are at present in a puzzling and somewhat
irrational position. If "proofs" merely link propositions to "pos-
tulates," lacking the distinguishing mark of "self-evidence," "cer-
tainty," "undeniability," what is the advantage of all this laborious
"proving"? We seem to "establish" nothing! And if all the
propositions of a deductive system are "contained" in the "axioms,"
do we not merely keep reasserting these "axioms" when we state
the "Pythagorean Proposition"? The problem of the "New" in
mathematics arises! Ah, says Professor Poincare, who himself
urged this problem, the "New" exists (and every unbiased mathe-
matician will agree with him in this) ; but, though it is excluded
indeed by the "deductive" procedure, it has its source in that impor-
tant other method of mathematics, namely, "complete induction."
Does not the great mathematician, in opposing this "mathe-
matical induction" to the usual "deduction," misconceive the
former? This question is of double importance. If Poincare 's
solution is correct, mathematics is not purely a "deductive" system,
as modern mathematical logicians hold. If it is incorrect, the prob-
320 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
lem must either be solved differently or it is merely symptomatic of a
general misunderstanding of the nature of a deductive system.
I believe that the latter alternative is correct, and I shall indicate
this by a brief analysis of PoincarS's theory.
In the first place it must appear paradoxical, if "complete induc-
tion" is really the source of the "New," that the application of the
method should be so limited in "geometry" where the "New" is so
very patent !
In the second place it must be borne in mind that the question
how the "New" is found does not concern us here, but how we can
account for its logical existence in a deductive system.
Now let us briefly examine this method of "mathematical induc-
tion. ' ' It may be well to attach our remarks to a particular example.
I choose the "binomial theorem," because it is here that the beginner
in mathematics usually makes his first acquaintance with this method ;
and the simple form in which it appears here illustrates the point as
well as the later refinements on it by Dedekind, Schroder, Hunting-
ton, and others.
Starting with the formulae
(a + 6) = a 8 + 3a 2 6 + 3a6 2 -f 6,
etc.,
which are obtained by succesive multiplication with a-\-b = a-\-b,
we make an "induction" to find the formula for the wth power,
How this is done in detail, it is not essential for us to examine here.
But, and this is essential, this formula is not yet warranted, it is a
mere presumption, a methodical guess at a general law. To incor-
porate this formula into the system, it requires to be "proved";
the "induction" is no warrant whatever. For in many cases we
make a precisely similar induction, but find, on testing the "law"
that it does not hold in general. This occurs with annoying fre-
quency in the case of finding the "nth derivative of a function" (for
the remainder in Taylor's theorem) ! The first part of the method,
the "induction" consists, therefore, merely in making, by analogy,
a guess at a general law (Bertrand Russell uses this rather dis-
paraging, but very characteristic, expression). It is the second part
which establishes the law as valid: by assuming the formula to be
correct for n, we prove that it holds for n -f 1. This step from n to
n-\-l is the really characteristic feature of the method (which is
often called after it "conclusion from n to n-f-1") ; this step dis-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 321
tinguishes it radically from any ' ' induction. ' ' For it is a deduction
pure and simple; here we "deduce"! From what? This I shall
examine later. But we "deduce," no doubt about that! And
nothing whatever distinguishes this ' ' conclusion from n to n -f- 1 "
essentially from other deductive proofs. The "New" does enter here
indeed ; but so it does in other ' ' deduction ' ' ; only how ? This is the
question which the reference to "induction" leaves completely un-
answered. And the problem of the "New" remains on our hands.
Its solution, however, does not require the invention of new struc-
tural elements or the recognition of hidden and unsuspected methods :
the problem is merely symptomatic of the insufficiency of our preva-
lent theory of a deductive system. A reexamination is needed which
will draw the full theoretical consequences of the practical work of
modern mathematics.
KARL SCHMIDT.
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
DISCUSSION
MISS CALKINS 'S REPLY TO THE REALIST
MISS CALKINS is almost the only "idealist" who has ap-
peared in arms against the advancing "realistic" movement.
Partly because of this, partly because of the position Miss Calkins is
rightly accorded among philosophic writers, and partly because her
reply to the "realist" exhibits a type of fallacy entailing very im-
portant consequences, it has seemed that her contention is particu-
larly worthy of consideration.
The reply in question 1 is divided into two parts. The first of
these is concerned with the ' ' recent criticisms of idealism, ' ' which, it
is said, can be grouped under three main heads : ' ' first, those which
oppose idealism on the ground that it is subversive of some impor-
tant system of beliefs; second, those which charge idealism with
fundamental inconsistency ; and, third, those which claim that ideal-
ism is based on unjustifiable assumptions. ' '
The first of these criticisms is disposed of briefly. The fact that
certain beliefs are generally accepted does not render them true, and
as long as one's contention is based upon this principle it is irre-
futable.
The second criticism, that concerning the inconsistency of
"idealism," is not treated at all fully. The "realistic" contention
is said to be that the subject-object relation, which is essential to
1 This JOUBNAL, Vol. VIII., pages 449 ff.
322 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
knowledge, "is possible only on the supposition that non-mental
reality exists." Miss Calkins admits that "idealism" makes the
distinction between subject and object; but, apparently, not the
supposition that non-mental reality exists. The "idealist," "like
other men, recognizes a difference between present and external, and
merely imagined, objects." But this distinction is said to refer not
to two kinds of things, "extra-mental and mental," but to "objects
respectively of ... shared and of .... unshared consciousness."
The only point to be noted here is that the nature of an object can
not be explained by the fact that it is an object for many subjects.
That is a fact additional to the problem of the nature of the object,
and irrelevant to its solution.
The third of the "realistic" criticisms of "idealism" is treated
at greater length and the chief point for consideration in Miss Cal-
kins 's article is to be found in connection with it. The "realist"
has said that "idealism" is based upon an unjustifiable assumption
in holding that "an object, because known, is therefore mental in
nature." Miss Calkins endeavors both to uphold the "idealistic"
position and to refute the "realistic" criticism of it. The method
employed for this purpose should be carefully observed.
The "realistic" position is first stated in the words of Holt:
"The entities (objects, facts, et cat.) under study in logic, mathe-
matics, and the physical sciences are not mental in any usual or
proper meaning of the word "mental." The being and nature of
these entities are in no sense conditioned by their being known"
(p. 452). This is said to be "an accurate and an uncompromising
statement of the difference between the two parties. For the ideal-
ist does hold as fundamental just this doctrine which the realist
attributes to him, that is to say, he believes that objects, as known,
are mental" (p. 452). Miss Calkins asserts (p. 454) that unknown
objects (and hence unknown qualities of objects) while possible, are
yet "utterly negligible," and, in addition, "inconceivable" and
"indefinable." Throughout the article, statements recur which
seem to be based upon the position that the unknown is non-existent ;
but since Miss Calkins admits the possibility of the existence of an
unknown, we must simply accept the statement that it is "incon-
ceivable." Hence, the phrase "as known," at the end of the last
quotation (p. 452) is unnecessary, and must not be taken to imply
that Miss Calkins holds objects, as unknown, to be non-mental, nor,
indeed, to be any thing at all. The contention between "idealist"
and "realist" is then clear: the "idealist" holds that all objects of
knowledge are mental, the "realist" that some objects of knowledge,
at least, are non-mental. And the "realist" asserts that the "ideal-
istic" contention is an unjustifiable assumption.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 323
Miss Calkins 's reply assumes the form of asserting that an ex-
amination of the objects of logic, mathematics, and the physical sci-
ences, shows that they are "ideal" (by which, apparently, is meant
the same as "mental"). An empirical study of any known object
reveals the fact that it is constituted of (1) sensible qualities and
(2) relations. These are treated separately; but as the argument is
the same in both cases, it will simplify matters if we limit our con-
sideration of it to the treatment of sensible qualities.
What is asserted, then, is that the ' ' idealist discovers by examina-
tion of objects he does not (as the realist accuses) assume that
both sense qualities and relations are mental" (p. 453). Hence, the
question arises : what does Miss Calkins mean by the term "mental"?
The answer to this question is best seen from the treatment of
sensible qualities. Miss Calkins does not attempt to prove the men-
tality of sensible qualities by the ordinary method, namely, by
pointing out their "variability"; for this, she says, quite rightly,
"does not prove, even though it suggests, the ideality of objects"
(p. 453). "But the idealist," we are told, "rests his case, not on
reasoning of this sort, but on the results of direct observation
coupled with the inability of any observer to make an unchallenge-
able assertion about sense qualities save in 'the terms of idealism.
To be more explicit : the idealist demands that his opponent describe
any immediately perceived sense object in such wise that his descrip-
tion can not be disputed. The realist then describes an object as,
let us say, yellow, rough, and cold. But somebody may deny the
yellowness, the roughness, or the coldness ; and this throws the realist
back on what he directly observes, what he knows with incontro-
vertible and undeniable certainty, namely, that he is at this moment
having a complex experience described by the terms yellowness,
coldness, and the like (an experience which he does not give himself).
This statement, and only this, nobody can challenge. And this state-
ment embodies the result of immediate experience" (p. 453). This
is the sole argument used to prove that sense qualities are mental.
Now, what is meant by saying that no one can make "an un-
challengeable assertion about sense qualities save in the terms of
idealism"? We find that "terms of idealism" are terms which
ascribe to sense qualities a mental nature. That this is so follows
from the statement of what the "idealist" holds "as fundamental."
So that the contention is that no one can make an unchallengeable
assertion about sense qualities save by saying that they are mental.
When it is asked how this conclusion is supported, the illustrations
supplied are found to be of the following kind. If I say, e. g., that
this orange is yellow, what is really implied is that I see that this
orange is yellow ; or, if I say that snow is cold, what is really implied
324 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
is that I am aware of it as cold ; when, in general, I make an assertion
of the form "A' has the sense quality P," what is really implied is
that I am aware of X as having the sense quality P. Hence, the
argument runs, sense qualities are mental.
There is a certain difficulty in perceiving the logic of this argu-
ment. It must be particularly noted what Miss Calkins is demand-
ing. She is insisting on an unchallengeable description of <f sense
quality. It is therefore important to consider what is the nature
of a description.
The important point that comes to light when we begin to con-
sider description is that it presupposes knowledge which is itself
indescribable. Sense qualities are examples of such knowledge ; for
sense qualities are not merely indescribable "save in the terms of
idealism," but they are strictly not describable at all. It is, e. g.,
impossible to describe yellow to a man born blind. Each individual
has a stock of indescribable knowledge, in which sense qualities have
a large place, and it is quite incommunicable, because indescribable.
Communication proceeds on the supposition that there is knowledge
which, while incommunicable, is yet the property of all. Each indi-
vidual is assumed to have a corresponding stock of such knowledge
which he could have attained only by immediate acquaintance.
Further, all description is in the terms of the elements of which
the object is composed. (We do not describe yellow by saying that
we are aware of it.) It follows that there can be no description of
the elements themselves. Individuals are immediately aware of them.
A description may be defined, therefore, as the characterization
of a thing by the enumeration of the indescribable elements of which
it is composed. The question then is : What is the nature of inde-
scribable objects ? Among such are sense qualities, and it is asserted
that they are mental. But why are they mental? Is it because
they are indescribable? If so, it should be pointed out that the
proposition ' ' Sense qualities are mental ' ' is different from the propo-
sition "Sense qualities are indescribable" and needs for its proof
the mediating proposition "Indescribable qualities are mental."
But how is this proposition reached?
Or is a quality mental because it is incommunicable ? This con-
clusion does not seem to follow at once. To establish it one would
have to prove independently that all incommunicable qualities are
mental. And how is this to be done ? It might possibly be contended
that if an object were purely individual it would be mental, though
this seems questionable; but in any case it would have to be proved
that incommunicable objects were purely individual. This seems
palpably false: yellow is not purely individual, though it is quite
incommunicable.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 325
What Miss Calkins has said may be summed up by saying that
there are certain objects of knowledge which are incommunicable,
because indescribable; though, what she actually says is that such
objects can not be described "save in the terms of idealism." Hence,
her contention that sense qualities are mental should mean simply
that sense qualities are incommunicable.
It may be doubted whether Miss Calkins means nothing more
than this. There is some suggestion that when Miss Calkins says
that sense qualities are mental she means ' ' mental ' ' to refer to their
nature and not to their incommunicability. And this leads us to
suppose that the term "mental" has been used in two senses by
Miss Calkins, and that the proposition "sense qualities are mental,"
in consequence, means one thing at one time and another at another.
This seems to be borne out from the following considerations.
Miss Calkins outlines an argument (p. 452) by which a "monistic
idealism" (it is apparently assumed) could be established, and also
the conclusion which would be established by it. But the argument
there outlined is merely mentioned ; much of the article is concerned
with the other argument which we have quoted. Consequently, we
must believe either that Miss Calkins did not think the outlined
argument adequate for her purpose, or that she considered the one
she uses a more effective instrument in attaining it. Now, the con-
clusion which is said to follow from the "monistic idealist's" argu-
ment (the one merely outlined) is that the objects which I "directly
experience . . . must be like me, must in other words be other-
self "*(p. 452). That is to say, in particular, that sense qualities
must be "like me." It is true that this is said to be the conclusion
of a monistic "idealist"; but since Miss Calkins would assume that
title for herself, we must believe that it is that conclusion she is
endeavoring to establish by the method which she actually employs
throughout her article. // so, there is one important consideration.
According to the argument actually adopted by Miss Calkins the
conclusion was reached that sense qualities are mental, and it was
seen what that proposition should mean. "Mental" in this conclu-
sion should mean "indescribable." And as long as a term's mean-
ing is made clear there can be little objection to any particular usage
of it. But it must be noted that this meaning of "mental" has no
reference to the nature of the sense qualities. An object could be
mental in this sense if it were "gross matter." The one condition
that it would have to fulfill would be ' ' indescribability. ' '
Not so, however, if mental is taken to mean "like me." The
term then refers to the nature of an object and not at all to its rela-
tions to a knower. A sense quality is "mental," is "like me," is
* ' other-self, " if it thinks, feels, wills, acts, in this sense of ' ' mental ' ' ;
326 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and may, if it does these things, be said to be mental with as
much, and as little, propriety as I may be said to be mental. And
it is clear that this meaning of mental is very different from the
former one.
Now, if, in using the term "mental," we at one moment adopt
one of these meanings and at another moment adopt the other, our
conclusion will probably be unsound. Miss C.alkins seems uncon-
sciously to have done this. She does not, indeed, explicitly use the
term mental to mean "like me"; yet she says that is the "idealistic"
conclusion, and the "idealistic" conclusion, she also tells us, is that
objects of knowledge are mental. Hence, it seems that one sense of
mental is synonymous with "like me." On the other hand, Miss
Calkins does not explicitly use the term mental to mean inde-
scribable ; but that is what her argument involves. Once sense quali-
ties are said to be mental in this latter sense, it is natural to argue,
fallaciously, that they are also mental in the sense that they are "like
me." But this conclusion is clearly in no way whatever connected
with the arguments by which Miss Calkins endeavors to prove that
sense qualities are mental.
There are two general meanings of the term mental which it is
of the highest importance to keep distinct. The first of these makes
the term applicable to qualities of minds as real existing entities.
(In an analogous way it is said that speech is human.) In this sense
of mental it is applied, e. g., to awareness, and also to any other
quality which is peculiar to minds.
The other general meaning of the term mental makes it applicable
to any entity which is supposed to be dependent on minds for its
existence, being, or reality. "Mental," in this sense, means simply
' ' dependent for existence, being, or reality on mind or minds. " It is
difficult to demonstrate that there are any such entities, though that
there are is sometimes thought to be quite obvious. It has also been
thought that an "idealism" could be established if it could be proved
that all objects are dependent for their existence, being, or reality
on minds. But this belief has been due to a fallacy.
The fallacy consists in supposing that if objects are mental in the
second sense, they are also mental in the former sense : if, that is, they
are dependent for their existence, being, or reality on minds, they
are also qualities of minds. It is hardly necessary to point out that
the two meanings of mental have no logical connection whatsoever.
This confusion has led to much superficial argument on behalf of
"idealism." "Mental" has been used illegitimately very widely
and much ignoratio elenchi argument has arisen due to the fallacy
arising from this two-faced term. Miss Calkins 's article exhibits a
similar inconsequence.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 327
It may be true that the objects of knowledge are "like me."
It is possible also that Miss Calkins can demonstrate that they are
"like me." I am not at present concerned to consider possible
arguments in support of this conclusion. What I am concerned to
do is to show that Miss Calkins either seeks to establish the conclu-
sion that objects of knowledge are mental by an illegitimate use of
the ambiguous term mental or does actually establish the proposition
that the objects of knowledge are mental, but in a sense which is
trivial and wholly irrelevant to the "realistic" contention. Miss
Calkins has shown that objects of knowledge are mental neither in
the sense that they are dependent for their existence, being, or reality
on minds nor in the sense that they are similar to minds. Yet these
seem to be by far the most important meanings of the term mental,
and are the meanings most relevant to the particular "idealistic"
theory which Miss Calkins outlines. And I wish to point out that
this inconsequent type of argument is very prevalent in ' ' idealistic ' '
writings.
The second part of Miss Calkins 's article concerns itself (1) with
the positive "realistic" doctrine and (2) with the "idealistic" con-
ception of the universe. What is said with reference to (1), namely,
that "realistic" writers have little positive doctrine is doubtless
quite true. Still, is it not largely a polite fiction that a philosopher
is great if he has constructed, at any cost, a pretentious theory of
the universe? Has not the clearer-away of "much rubbish" a place
in this world, as well as the builder of a crystal palace? In regard
to (2) there is little to be said except that the treatment exhibits once
more the difficulties arising from the word ' ' mental. ' '
The article is, on the whole, so admirably clear as to emphasize
once and for all two distinct points: (1) when "idealists" say that
the objects of knowledge are mental they must also say precisely
what they mean by the term "mental"; (2) the hypothesis that the
objects of knowledge are mental will have to find some definite,
relevant, and logical support if it is to be more than a mere forgotten
fantasy. BERNARD Muscio.
CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Wandlungen in der Philosophic der Gegenwart. JULIUS GOLDSTEIN.
Leipzig : Werner Klinkhardt. 1911. Pp. viii + 171.
To readers outside of Germany Dr. Goldstein's book is likely to seem
significant chiefly as an evidence of the awakening of the German mind to
certain new philosophical tendencies that have long been conspicuous in
328 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Anglo-American and French thought, and as an effective instrument for
the diffusion of those tendencies in the land of Kant and Hegel. The
author plainly intimates to his fellow-countrymen that in philosophical
matters they have for the most part ceased, at least until very recently, to
be dans le mouvement. Elsewhere great changes have been taking place
changes in the center of philosophic interest and in the fundamental
presuppositions of philosophic procedure : " and these changes, in their
reactions upon religion, ethics, and men's practical attitudes, have, for
now nearly two decades, been bringing about a crisis in philosophy, have
been giving a new direction to inquiry." But " in German philosophy
few signs of all this are recognizable. It still, with some praiseworthy
exceptions, walks with unsuspecting innocence in the old paths and busies
itself with the traditional problems. In many cases it has not yet emerged
from the Hume vs. Kant controversy." Possibly the old doctrines and the
traditional methods of attack may in the end hold their own and success-
fully dispose of the new though the author does not, in fact, anticipate
that outcome. But in any case, the new ideas must be faced, must be
more than superficially understood, must be open-mindedly examined, as
they but rarely have been by German academic philosophers. Dr. Gold-
stein has accordingly undertaken to naturalize the new tendencies in his
own country and to arouse in the German philosophic public a fuller
realization of the prevailing drift of contemporary reflection.
Two means are employed to this end. The author, in the first place,
endeavors to show the underlying unity of seemingly diverse innovating
doctrines, to trace the convergence of a number of recent lines of thought
in a general conclusion of great moment and of essential novelty. He
offers, in the second place, brief, but by no means mechanical, expositions
of the teaching of three philosophers whom he regards as the chief repre-
sentatives of the new way of thinking : Bergson, James, and Eucken. The
introduction of Eucken in this sort of company is somewhat surprising;
and the author in the end is obliged to admit that that metaphysician
returns to the " old paths " at what is, confessedly, the crucial point. The
new movement may be described (among other ways of characterizing it)
as a final Loslosung vom Platonismus; but Eucken's " affirmation that the
Oeisiesleben is in itself timeless and immutable " can only be regarded as
" a not yet eliminated survival of the Platonic mode of thought." One
suspects that Dr. Goldstein felt obliged to have some German representa-
tive of the new philosophy and consequently selected Eucken to figure
rather incongruously in that role, faute de mieux. But in fact there are
better German examples who might have been chosen, though perhaps no
perfectly typical one. Some, at least, of Dr. Goldstein's "new paths"
were trodden some time since by Avenarius, some by von Hartmann, and
some by Dilthey; and the most important ones may be said to have been
opened chiefly by Schelling and Schopenhauer.
The author's enumeration of new tendencies and his attempt to inter-
pret their collective import are interesting and often decidedly illumina-
ting; no one can fail to derive from the book a better understanding of
the intellectual movement of our time. Yet I do not think that the inter-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 329
pretation is at all complete or clear-cut. In general, what is now taking
place, Dr. Goldstein finds, is a " smash-up of rationalism." nationalism
he defines as " a conception of the nature of science formed under the
influence of mathematics and an endeavor to bring the facts of life into
accord with the mathematical physicist's picture of the universe." This
definition, however, hardly corresponds to the author's own meaning or to
the nature of the conceptions against which the most typical new philos-
ophies are insurgent. It is quite as much against the rationalism of
absolute idealism as against the rationalism of mechanistic naturalism,
that James and Bergson and their followers, and Goldstein himself, have
rebelled. The formula given neither indicates the common essence nor
suggests the distinguishing differences of the various current forms of
anti-rationalism. And in the absence of a more satisfactory definition of
rationalism, the author fails to show convincingly that all the tendencies
which he describes have a significant common essence or are anti-ration-
alistic in the same sense. Under the one designation he includes such
diverse attitudes as the simple, common-sense recognition of the limita-
tions of our knowledge of nature and the probable necessity of future
corrections in our scientific generalizations (p. 25) ; the admission that
the subsumption of particular facts under general laws is merely descrip-
tion and not explanation (p. 165) ; the denial of the apriority and logical
necessity of the axioms of mathematics (p. 68) ; the recognition of the
futility of all ready-made philosophies of history (p. 36) ; the discovery
that technological progress often entails such an increasing complication
of human life that it becomes a doubtful boon (p. 49) ; the abandonment of
the belief that " an absolute, i. e., a final and definitive, religion " has
been attained (p. 52) ; vitalism, which is fundamentally a special form of
what may be called scientific pluralism, the denial of the possibility of
regarding all natural laws " as special cases of a single, all-embracing
world-law " (p. 58) ; instrumentalism, or the pragmatic conception of the
nature and office of the intellect (p. 13) ; indeterminism (p. 30) ; temporal-
ism, or the conception of reality as a process of becoming, in which there
is no room for the timeless and eternal (p. 166) ; and radical evolutionism,
or the conception of this becoming as a constant creation of new reality
not given in nor wholly predictable from anything preexistent in which
creative process the moral endeavor of man is a participation (pp. 166-170).
All these positions, of course, represent one degree or another of diffi-
dence with respect to the powers of the human reason; so much they have
in common. But they represent very different degrees; and they have
historically made their appearance, for the most part, under the influence
of diverse logical motives, and as parts of quite dissimilar doctrines. The
adoption of some of them by no means commits one to an acceptance of
the others; and many of them are far from novel. But the adoption of
the last two involves the acceptance of most to be precise, of all but three
and naturally leads to the acceptance of all, of the others. And the fact
is that Dr. Goldstein himself is a radical temporalist and a believer in
Bergson's " creative evolutionism," and that to him, therefore, all these
modes of anti-rationalism present themselves as phases of a single philos-
330 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ophy. In other words, while they have not historically sprung from a
common root, and while the milder and older phases of the tendency do
not logically imply the newer and more extreme phases, the former are
more or less clearly implied by the latter. The book would have been
clearer and more instructive if the author had from the first made it
evident that the principal root of his own anti-rationalism was the com-
bination of temporalism and radical evolutionism and had noted that it
is only from the point of view of his own philosophy, and not in them-
selves, that the numerous tendencies which he mentions constitute a doc-
trinal unity. In the absence of an understanding of these points, the
reader is likely to be left with a rather confused and congested sort of
conception of both " rationalism " and its opposite, and with some errors
of historical perspective not at all intended by the author. Dr. Gold-
stein's Zusammenbruch des Rationalismus is a name for too many and too
various doctrines or, at all events, for too many that are not themselves
new, but merely capable of combination with certain significantly new
doctrines. And since these last are scarcely set forth until the end of the
book, the key to the inner logic of the author's exposition is concealed
from the reader, and one can hardly help surmising to some extent
from the author himself.
ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.
Some Neglected Factors in Evolution: An Essay in Constructive Biology,
HENRY M. BERNARD. Edited by MATILDA BERNARD. New York : G. P.
Putnam's Sons. 1911. Pp. xvi -f 489.
A book, rather interesting from the point of view of the speculative
philosopher, but utterly fantastic in so far as it claims to be scientific, is
Henry M. Bernard's " Some Neglected Factors in Evolution."
Mr. Bernard starts with a hypothesis of the universal presence in liv-
ing organisms of a protomitomic network consisting of so-called chroma-
tin bodies from which radiate delicate linin filaments. The chromatin
bodies function chemically, their influence being distributed along the linin
threads. Growth and extension of this simple chromidial network is car-
ried on by the dividing of the chromatin, together with the splitting of the
growing threads. Waste matter, resulting from chemical reactions, is
carried along the filaments to the surface of the organism. The tips of
the filaments are sensitive, and impulses from outside may travel inward
as a nerve current.
Increase in size of an organism of this kind necessitates differentia-
tions. Concentration of the powers of reaction and response gradually
takes place. This means a closer clustering of chromidia where the
stimuli are the strongest, with rearrangements of the filaments into
strands for stronger and more coordinate contractions. Theoretically,
such an organism should be spherical with all its chromatin collected in
the center. The centers of energy would then be at the spot where all the
paths of all the nerve stimuli from the surface cross each other. The
primitive chromidial network thus becomes transformed into a new organ-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 331
ism, the cell. All this reasoning is purely hypothetical, and Mr. Ber-
nard's " Studies on the Ketina," published in 1901-03, have, so far, con-
vinced no one as to the reality of a protomitomic network.
The metazoan body, according to Mr. Bernard, consists of a multitude
of chromidial centers connected with each other by myriads of filaments.
Gastraeal organisms arise from a rounded protomitomic individual which
became impitted to form a digestive cavity. The cavity thus produced
became lined with a compact layer of nuclear nodes, forming a digestive
epithelium.
How tissues and organs may be formed out of the chromatin linin net-
work is described in Chapters IX.-XII. The scheme described denotes
peculiar imagination and considerable ingenuity. It is unfortunate, how-
ever, that highly diagrammatic figures are shown purporting to be true to
nature. The description of nuclear division according to the diagrams in
Fig. 39 is grotesque.
Part II. deals with the " Cosmic Ehythm " which Herbert Spencer had
already recognized as traceable in the phenomena of life. During long
epochs species have arisen, culminated, and dwindled away. Life on this
earth has not progressed uniformly, but in immense undulations. In
this, Mr. Bernard catches a glimpse of an evolutionary truth " wider than
any as yet apprehended." Considered in the light of this law, the evolu-
tion of organic life breaks up into a series of periods, each advancing ac-
cording to a fixed formula. A great many forms are evolved on the plan
of each unit of structure. Those which became modified for any special
environment acquire stability at the cost of progress, but those which re-
main free to react efficiently to any environment at any time may yield
new organisms of a type higher than their own. The production of new
types of organisms is due to that special method of colony formation in
which the combining organisms or " units " fuse together in such a way
as to give rise to a new and more complicated organism.
Mr. Bernard traces five structural units in nature, the chromidial, the
cell, the gastraeal, the annelidan, and, lastly, the unit culminating in
man. In man, the nervous system is most highly specialized, the finer
senses are so coordinated as to give a coherent report of the environment.
A wealth of new forces appear comprised under the term psychic, e. g.,
the thirst for knowledge, the love of the beautiful, etc. " The human
unit, therefore, has to attain a condition of stable equilibrium, not only
with an external, material environment, but with a psychical environ-
ment."
In the outburst of the " mind of man," in the fifth period, the psychic
was " brought to the surface and externalized for the purpose of building
up social aggregates." In modern society we find vast amalgamations
gradually learning to live, side by side, without continual conflict. Old
distinctions, necessary to the existence of the human organism only at the
earlier stage of its integration, still persist. Like vestigial organs, how-
ever, they must in time disappear. Any real advance to a condition of
stable equilibrium seems impossible until harmony is established between
the component units of the organism. The politics of the present and the
332 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
history of the past give evidence of only blind and unsuccessful attempts
to produce efficient and harmonious aggregates. Expressions of human
sympathy and help have been considered graces, not duties. We are func-
tional components of a new social organism. Only by the free develop-
ment of all the units can a human society escape the fate which organ-
isms of past periods brought upon themselves through the stiffness of
their skeletons and the consequent withdrawal of large numbers of their
units from sensitive contact with the environment. The organic rhythm
is nearing the end of its fifth great period. Just as it appears to be re-
peating the law of unit formation, it vanishes entirely. May we not be-
lieve that it rises out of sight in order to start a new period on a higher
level of life?
ROBERT CHAMBERS, JR.
NEW YORK CITY.
Free Will and Human Responsibility. HERMAN HARRELL HORNE. New
York: The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pp. xvi-f 197.
If one is tempted to consider the freedom of the will an outgrown
question left behind us with scholasticism and Jonathan Edwards, the
publication of two books on the subject by American thinkers (Professor
Palmer and Professor Home) within three months of each other should
give one a greater respect for this time-honored problem. Nor will the
perusal of Professor Home's presentation of the subject be likely to make
one feel that the question is any nearer being settled than it was on that
mournful day when BuridanoV ass starved quietly to death in the midst
of assinine dainties. That one should feel thus on concluding the book
is, perhaps, the more surprising inasmuch as the author does not pose as
a dispassionate judge, but frankly holds a brief for the cause of freedom.
To say this, however, does not mean that he treats determinism in an un-
fair manner. He states the case without prejudice and puts the argu-
ments on both sides as strongly as he can.
The plan of the book is simple. After an introductory chapter, the
history of the dispute is traced from the earliest times to the present.
Then comes a presentation of the arguments of determinism, followed by
the libertarian's rebuttal, and these are then reinforced by a chapter of
positive arguments in favor of freedom. With this the discussion really
ends, though further chapters are given us on "Pragmatism and Free-
dom " and " The Difference it Makes."
The historical sketch of so large an issue is naturally superficial.
This of course was inevitable and is quite excusable. But the author
might have given a clearer notion than he does of the relative importance
of the question in pagan and in Christian philosophy. Moreover, the at-
tempt is made to put the history of the conflict in such a light as to be
itself an argument in favor of freedom, by showing that the general
tendency has been toward it and away from determinism, a conclusion
arrived at by omitting any mention of the great reinforcement which de-
terminism has received from the modern views of nature since the time
of Galileo.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 333
Professor Home claims no originality in his statement of the argu-
ments on either side. He has simply collected all he could find, and the
result is nine arguments for determinism (each separately rebutted), and
twelve arguments for freedom. In reading these thirty arguments (count-
ing the rebuttals) one can not help feeling that each side would have
been more persuasive had it been furnished with fewer reasons. More
striking is the author's apparent failure to grasp the real force of the
ethical argument of determinism so well put by Hume, Greene, and many
others, that if the act is not determined by the character, responsibility
and, with it, morality go to pieces. This seeming failure of our author
to evaluate fully the strongest argument of his opponents is perhaps re-
lated to his frequent confusion of determinism with materialism, of the
doctrine of freedom with idealism. That Professor Home is perfectly
aware of the distinction here involved is clearly shown by the appendix;
and yet many of his most elaborate and most trusted arguments and re-
buttals aim simply at proving that mind may be a cause, that will acts are
not determined by brain states, etc. as if Hegel, Greene, Paulsen, and a
band of others had not amply demonstrated that determinism is as con-
sistent with mental causation as is freedom.
The value of the book lies in the sharpness with which the issue is
stated, the clearness with which the whole great subject is presented in
187 pages, and the excellence of the rebuttals of certain strong determi-
nistic arguments. There is appended also a valuable bibliography which
every one interested in the subject will be glad to have. On the whole,
the book fulfills the purpose for which it was written as expressed in the
author's preface : " In my own work I have felt the need of a clear brief
treatise covering both sides of the issue in outline, to which students
might be referred, and which might, perhaps, be used as a text for dis-
cussion at a certain point in the course. These pages are designed to
supply such a need."
JAMES B. PRATT.
WILLIAMS COLLEGE.
JOTJKNALS AND NEW BOOKS
KEVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. January, 1912. Le " volontarisme
intellectualiste " (pp. 1-21) : A. LALANDE. - Critical discussion of Fouille's
" Thought and the New Anti-intellectualistic Schools." Les grands
courants de I'esthetique allemande contemporaine (ler article) (pp. 22-43) :
V. BASCH. - Shows the fundamentally psychological method of all Ger-
man estheticians and discusses the Einfiihlung theory of Lipps and
Volkelt. Les consequences et les applications de la psychologie (pp.
44-67) : R. MEUNIER. - A sketch of the working value of psychological
science in logic, ethics, sociology, metaphysics, pedagogy, psychothera-
peutics, and " the difficult art of living." Notes de discussions. Y a-t-il
dualisme radical de la vie et de la penseef: A. FouiLLfs. Analyses et
comptes rendus. F. Le Dantec, Le chaos et Vharmonie universelle: CH.
334 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PPEDALLU. Laberthonni&re, Positivisme et Catholicisme: J. BARUZI.
Alexandra David, Le modernisme bouddhiste et le bouddisme du Bouddha :
J. BARUZI. J. Pacheu, Psychologic des mystiques Chretiens: J. BARUZI.
A. Brofferio, La Filosofia delle Upanishadas: J. BARUZI. L. Jeudon, La
morale de I'honneur: F. PAULHAN. J. Segond, Cournot et la psychologie
vitaliste: DR. CH. BLOXDEL. L. Perego, L'idealismo etico di Fichte e il
socialismo contemporeano : J. SECOND. B. Croce, La Filosofia di Oiambatt-
isia Vico: DR. S. JANKKI.EVITCH. Kant, Oesammelte Schriften: J.
SECOND. Revue des periodiques etrangers.
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. January, 1912.
Sur la structure logique du langage (pp. 1-24) : L. COUTURAT. -A sketch
of an universal grammar that might realize Leibniz's idea of mirroring
the human mind. Les formes de la vie psychologique (pp. 25-47) : C.
D'ISTRIA. -A study, with reference to Cabanis, of the effects of age, sex,
and temperament on psychic life. La logique deductive (pp. 48-67) : A.
PADOA. - A continuation of his exposition of symbolic logic, including the
syllogistic. Etudes critiques. La nature et I'homme dapres Sigurd Ibsen:
P.-G. LA CHESNAIS. La Socio-psychologie de Wilhelm Wundt: H. NORERO.
Discussions. La theorie elect romagnetique : M. DJUVARE. Questions
pratiques. Les obligations des ouvriers syndiques: M. LEROT. Supple-
ment.
Collins, Varnum Lansing. Lectures on Moral Philosophy by John
Witherspoon. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1912. Pp.
xxxi + 144.
Downey, June E. The Imaginal Reaction to Poetry. Bulletin No. 2
of the Department of Psychology of the University of Wyoming. 1912.
Pp. 56.
J. G. Fichtes Werke. Vol. VI. Mit Mehreren Bildnissen Fichtes Heraus-
gegeben und Eingeleitet von Fritz Medicus. Leipzig: Verlag von
Felix Meiner. 1912. Pp. 680. 7 M.
Harrison, Jane Ellen. Themis : A Study of the Social Origins of Greek
Religion. Cambridge: The University Press. 1912. Pp. xxxii +
559. $5.00.
Hollingworth, H. L. The Influence of Caffein on Mental and Motor
Efficiency. Archives of Psychology, No. 22. Columbia Contribu-
tions to Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. XX., No. 4. New York:
The Science Press. Pp. iv -f 166.
Husik, Isaac. Matter and Form in Aristotle. Berlin : Verlag von Leon-
hard Simion. 1912. Pp. 93. 2.50 M.
James, William. Essays in Radical Empiricism. Longmans, Green, and
Company. 1912. Pp. xiii + 282. $1.25.
Petronievics, Branislav. Principien Der Metaphysik. Heidelberg: Carl
Winter's Universitatsbuchhandlung. 1912. Pp. xxxviii -f- 570.
Stockl, Albert. Handbook of the History of Philosophy. Vol. I. Second
edition. Translated by T. A. Finlay. New York : Longmans, Green,
and Company. 1911. Pp. 446. $3.75.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 335
Wallin, J. E. Wallace. Experimental Oral Euthenics. Eeprinted from
the Dental Cosmos. Pp. 32.
NOTES AND NEWS
SEVERAL professors and graduates of the new National University of
Ireland, founded in 1909 (see Rev. Sc. Ph. Tin,., III., p. 390), published in
March the first number of a review, entitled Studies, in which they intend
to place before the reading public their researches in general literature,
Celtic, classic, and oriental literature and history, philosophy, pedagogy,
sociology, and the sciences. The magazine is to be directed by a com-
mittee presided over by the Reverend T. A. Finlay, S.J., M.A., professor
of political economy in the University College of Dublin. Each number
will contain articles, reviews, and notes.
PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES'S letters are being collected for biographical
purposes, and any one who has any of his letters can render assistance that
will be highly appreciated by addressing Henry James, Jr., 95 Irving St.,
Cambridge, Mass. Casual or brief letters may have an interest or im-
portance not apparent to the person preserving them; and news of the
whereabouts of any of the late William James's letters will be gratefully
received.
A RECENT number of the Cambridge Review notes the lively interest of
university scholars in the study of early Greek religion. Recently we had
Miss Harrison's remarkable " Themis," and in the near future we may
expect Mr. F. M. Cornford's " From Religion to Philosophy," as well as
a book by Mr. A. B. Cook and further researches from the original and
always stimulating pen of Professor Ridgeway.
M. W. SPECHT, privat-docent of psychiatry in the University of
Munich, recently launched a Zeitschrift fur Pathopsychologie (Leipzig,
Englemann), the aim of which will be to strengthen the psychological
foundations of mental pathology. Professors Ach, Bergson, Heymans,
Janet, Kiilpe, Meumann, Miinsterberg, Dick, and Sommer will be con-
tributing editors.
A NEW periodical, Imago, is announced from Vienna, edited by Pro-
fessor S. Freud and published under the direction of Otto Rank and
Dr. Hanns Sachs. It is to be devoted to the application of psychoanalysis
to the entire field of mental sciences.
THE University of California has conferred the doctorate of laws upon
Dr. Sidney E. Mezes, professor of philosophy and president of the Uni-
versity of Texas, and upon Dr. E. C. Sanford, professor of psychology and
president of Clark College.
AT the National University of Mexico Professor J. M. Baldwin is
delivering the second half of the two years' programme of lectures on
psychosociology. In addition to these lectures a course in the history of
psychology is also announced.
336 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
MRS. JOHN STEWART KENNEDY has given to New York University a
Hall of Philosophy. It is to be known as the Cornelius Baker Hall of
Philosophy in memory of Mrs. Kennedy's father, who was one of the
founders of the University.
PROFESSOR LILLIEN J. MARTIN, of the department of psychology of Stan-
ford University, gave an address on "Uber die Localisation optischer
Vortellungsbilder " at the Fifth Congress for Experimental Psychology,
held in Berlin.
DR. F. W. MOTT will complete his series of lectures on " Heredity con-
sidered from the Point of View of Physiology and Pathology " at Kings
College, University of London, on June 10.
IN a recent issue of the JOURNAL, the American Philosophical Society
was incorrectly referred to as the Philadelphia Branch of the American
Philosophical Association.
MM. L. DUGAS and M. L. Cellerier, of Geneva, are about to launch
a new educational annual entitled Annee Pedagogique, which is to be
published by Alcan, Paris.
THE installation of Dr. John Grier Hibben, hitherto Stuart professor
of logic, as president of Princeton University occurred on Saturday,
May 11.
DR. IRA KEMSEN has resigned the presidency of Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. It is understood, however, that he will retain the chair of chem-
istry.
MESSRS. E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY announce the publication of
" English Philosophies and Schools of Philosophy " by Professor James
Seth.
DR. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, professor of philosophy and dean of the
faculty of Brown University, has been elected president of Amherst
College.
MR. WALTER B. PITKIN, associate in philosophy in Columbia Univer-
sity, has been appointed associate professor of philosophy.
MR, C. M. GILLESPIE, of Yorkshire College, has been appointed to a
newly established professorship of philosophy at Leads.
MR. A. J. BALFOUR has been appointed as next Gifford lecturer for
the session 1915-14. The appointment is for two years.
ON May 14 Professor W. Bateson gave the first of two lectures on
" The Study of Genetics," at the Eoyal Institution.
PRIVAT DOCENT DR. F. A. SCHMID, of the University of Heidelberg, has
been made professor extraordinarius.
DR. GEORGE CLARKE Cox, of Dartmouth College, has been appointed
assistant professor of philosophy.
THE ninth annual meeting of the Experimental Psychologists was
held at Worcester, Mass., April 15-17.
VOL. IX. No. 13. . JUNE 20, 1912
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE PROGRESS OF EVOLUTION 1
progress of evolution has various meanings. Hence it is
necessary to define the subject proposed for consideration.
Progress, first, may denote the spread of evolutionary doctrine. But
this is patent, so that discussion is not required. Or it may mean
the development of biological theory. In regard to this we need
remember only that progress has of late been making, since progress
here, contrary to the earlier belief, has proven indispensable. The
fact of evolution is established. The form, the law, the process of
evolution, and the forces at work therein, remain subjects of eager
technical debate. Or, thirdly, progress might refer to the readjust-
ment of principles occasioned by the acceptance of evolution. This
phase of the matter lies more fully within the philosophical field;
still it is not the one now suggested for discussion. Our subject
proper may be termed the noetic of evolution, the discussion of the
concepts and principles implied by evolution, and on which it is
based. What progress has been made in respect of these? What
was needed? How much has been gained? What remains to be
accomplished ? Along with these questions, I shall also recall certain
phases of the history of opinion.
1. I begin with a negative statement of progress which may excite
dissent: a just estimate has not yet been reached of the origin of
evolutionary theory. It is common to date the beginning from Dar-
win. But genetic views were fundamental in nineteenth-century
thinking before Darwin announced, in part before he had conceived,
"The Origin of Species." Among naturalists a notable minority
had been groping their way toward a theory of descent. Spencer,
at the mid-century, was advancing from sociology, biology, and
psychology, to his cosmical doctrine. Prior to both Darwin and
Spencer many of the Geisteswissenschaften had felt the influence of
idealistic evolution, or had of themselves approached their problems
1 Bead before the American Philosophical Association, Harvard University,
December 28, 1911.
337
338 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
by the genetic line of attack. Great as Darwinism was in itself
and through its effects it may be questioned whether part of its
success was not due to the preparation previously made for evolu-
tionary conclusions. This question has special pertinence in regard
to the influence of evolution beyond the limits of biology. Concern-
ing this broader field there has been, and there persists, some con-
fusion of opinion. Here, too, Darwin's work has been the greatest
single force. But it has not been the only force, or the earliest, or
the creative force in the temporal sense of the term. More often
in the phrase of a recent writer 2 it has furnished "vast reinforce-
ment" to tendencies already existing.
2. Progress has been made in distinguishing phenomenal from
transcendent evolution. Though Darwinism was not the sole cause
of the intellectual revolution of the mid-century, it was the principal
cause. The movement thus involved a scientific theory. And as we
look back to the discussions of the sixties, how few there then were
who distinguished between scientific results and transcendent impli-
cations. Primarily the issue lay between rival theories of organic
life: Are species fixed in nature, or are they mutable, produced by
gradual process? But this issue was phrased in terms which com-
bined science and theology: Have species been created once for all,
or are they mutable and explicable by descent? The question of
phenomenal fact and law was crossed with a transcendent problem.
Related, of course, these questions are. And under the conditions
of thought fifty years ago it was inevitable that they should be
united. Nevertheless the consequences were disastrous. In regard
to them, and concerning a number of kindred questions, the result
was extreme confusion. The light engendered by the controversy
was small, the heat in inverse ratio. Now, however, we marvel less
at the clash of opposing doctrines and the emotional disturbance than
at the tacit assumptions which were fundamental to the whole debate.
Among these the fallacy under consideration took a prominent place.
Neither orthodox nor revolutionary distinguished between phenom-
enal truths and ultimate interpretations.
From this fallacy later thought is happily delivered. At least,
in this connection progress has been making in the sphere of ethics
and theology. Whether the gain is equal in philosophy proper
appears more doubtful. Fact and notion, law and ultimate prin-
ciple, differ, whatever the instrument of transcendent thought may
be whether faith or seasoned speculation. But concerning evolu-
tion the distinction has been made more clear in the former than in
the latter case. Our scientific brethren we can hardly hold re-
1 Waggett, ' ' Darwin and Modern Science, ' ' page 480.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 339
sponsible for the confusion or popular reflection. Have philosoph-
ical thinkers always been clear on the point themselves ? Have they
contributed in due measure to the general enlightenment ?
3. Evolution and the sciences. The problem just suggested has
various ramifications. Scientific evolution and philosophical evolu-
tion touch and differ. Hence arise questions in the logic of science
on the other hand, also, questions of metaphysical conclusion. Our
primary concern is with the problems of the former class, among
which the subject of method is first and prominent.
At the end of the "Origin of Species," Darwin predicted the
application of evolution to psychology and anthropology. This
prophecy, as all are aware, has been amply fulfilled. The mental
sciences like the organic, sociology and ethics as well as psychology
proper, have felt the stimulus of genetic ideas; not, however, with-
out doubtful transfers of method and explanatory principle from
one science to another, or from the sciences of one group to a group
essentially diverse. Biological evolution has wrought out Darwin,
cautious technician that he is, concludes "the necessary acquire-
ment of each mental power and capacity by gradation." The
struggle for existence determines organic evolution : mental evolution
and its sub-varieties social, ethical, artistic, literary, religious
the extremists urge, must follow the same law.
Here progress has been forced by the continuing inquiry. The
phenomena themselves have compelled revision of the categories
chosen to explain them. Two examples may be cited in illustration.
In moral evolution, as speedily appeared, the law of struggle in its
primary form is a doubtful application. It would tend, for one
thing, to eliminate rather than to conserve the superior individual.
Therefore it was referred to the survival of the group, and competi-
tion was interpreted as tribal instead of individual. Later the
problem of heredity grew pressing, and in particular the problem of
mental inheritance. Here the emphasis has recently been placed on
the importance of the social environment, and a return has been
made to the doctrine of social heredity a position, I venture to
think, which we should never have abandoned.
Progress then has been making at this point also. Is it, however,
complete? Is it so great as is vitally needed for the independent
prosperity of the sciences of the mental group? An affirmative
answer would be of questionable validity. Undoubtedly the climax
has been passed. No longer or, at least, more rarely do we
explain all things, from theology to summer novels, by natural selec-
tion. But biological psychology continues fairly prevalent. And
one has even heard echoes of a similar spirit in recent developments
of philosophy itself !
340 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
4. The presuppositions of evolution: that is, the presuppositions
of a noetical kind, the concepts and principles assumed by evolution
and on which it depends. Such are present, even in the scientific
form of the doctrine, in evolution as a theory of descent. Still more
are they present and determinant when the consequences of organic
evolution are drawn, when its conclusions are brought to bear upon
broader problems, when its methods are applied in other departments
of thought. If the matter itself admitted of uncertainty, the doubt
might be dispelled by a glance at recent history. Fifty years ago
men confused scientific evolution and its transcendent implications.
For the most part, also, they overlooked the bases on which their
own arguments rested. Consider, e. g., the famous meeting of the
British Association at Oxford in 1860. In the discussion between
Wilberforce and Huxley the honors lay with the scientific thinker.
In ethics, as in science, the biologist showed superior to the bishop.
In epistemology, however, were not both at fault ? For them, as for
most thinkers of the time, the debatable issue was the question of
fact : Is man descended from some animal form ? The corollaries of
the fact, they felt, needed no debate : If man is so descended, man is
man no longer. For the underlying notions which condition this
conclusion were left out of account; or they were deemed of little
moment. Change and becoming, origin and nature, genesis and
value how many thought of these ancient problems as fundamental
to nineteenth-century reflection ? Yet nothing is clearer, if the mat-
ter is thought through to the end, nothing more certain, than that
such concepts underlie the whole body of genetic doctrine.
If now we ask what progress has in this respect been made, the
answer is complex. In certain ways the advance has been consid-
erable. For the pressure of the questions forced by evolution on the
world compelled attention also to their underlying bases. I do not
mean to say that this attentive thought has always realized its own
procedure. That is rarely true in the history of such movements.
More often there is a mingling of methods reflective thinking, con-
scious of its own nature and aims, goes hand in hand, or side by
side, with processes which may best be described as processes of trial
and error, practical attempts at partial readjustment adapted to the
needs of given cases. Such processes have in special measure been
characteristic of our time. We could not become philosophers at a
bound. Or rather, we have philosophized in the happy belief that
naught of metaphysics was mingled with our thinking. The origin
of species, the descent of man, the genesis of conscience, political,
social, religious development in measure we have thought through,
or worked through, or "muddled through" our problems. And
though we often knew it not, we have been busy the while with these
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 341
other cruces origin, nature, worth, and their relations for they
were inwrought in the tissue of our reflective task.
Progress has been most pronounced in the field of the mental
sciences. A letter of Henry Sedgwick, dated in the middle eighties,
well expresses the change from the earlier point of view. Thinking
of the non-moral and the moral stages of evolution, Sedgwick wrote :
"I can not feel any doubt as to the historic fact of the time-relation
of the two. . . . But I do not think that the determination of this
historical question settles the relation between the two: the funda-
mental question still remains open whether what is later in time is
to be understood by contemplating what went before it, ... or
whether the process of cosmical or of human development is not of
such a kind that the significance of the earlier stages is only revealed
when we look forward to their end. This, I think, is the deepest
question of philosophy in the present stage of thought." The con-
clusion suggested by the lamented Sidgwick was reached by many
thinkers in the closing decades of the century gone, but not by all.
On questions of such import scholars will differ, even when the issues
have been made clear, and when, so far as may be, they have been
thought through. Above all, these causes of divergence produce
their maximum effect in ages which, like our own, have felt the spell
of great discoveries. But if, in the nature of the case, progress
could not be complete, has it been adequate? I fear the answer
must be given in the negative. Indeed, if I mistake not, there has
been of late considerable reaction toward the earlier and the cruder
point of view. Current accounts of evolution and its influence not
merely proclaim the universal potency of the genetic method, they
appear to imply that no other estimate is possible. At times this
conclusion is urged as the unassailable outcome of nineteenth-century
reflection. It should rather be termed the position of the mid-cen-
tury, or of the first decades after the mid-century was passed. For
it ignores the progress which the later years have brought.
It is necessary in conclusion to guard against a possible mis-
understanding. The thesis that progress has been less than adequate
does not imply agreement with venturesome essays of a contrary type.
If certain forms of genetic theory ignore their own noetic problems,
some philosophers of evolution attack these questions in a spirit of
surprising confidence. The question may be raised whether Bergson
himself should not be included in the latter class. Mind, Bergson
defends in the evolutionary process, and other important interests.
But what of the method of defense ? It is incisive, it is illuminating,
the argument is phrased in a marvelous style, the doctrine is one of
those works of genius which get us forward by its stimulating influ-
ence, whether or not it can in the end be accepted as true. Is there,
342 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
however, sufficient evidence for the conclusions reached? This at
least is the doubt which recurs to some of us who welcome many of
these conclusions. In the case of other systems the foundations are
certainly too weak to support the constructions which are reared
upon them. Therefore systems of this type also represent imperfect
progress. For they are unstable, and, being unstable, they fail to
realize their legitimate aims. In sum the noetic cruces suggested by
evolution can not reasonably be ignored. Neither, on the other hand,
are they solvable at a stroke.
A. C. ARMSTRONG.
WCSLKYAN UNIVERSITY.
THE FEELING OF OUGHTNESS:
ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS
rriHIS JOURNAL having been kind enough to review 1 with some
J- sympathy a paper of mine, which, as Professor Leuba phrased
it, was intended to "clear much of the ground surrounding one of
the fundamental problems of the psychology of ethics," I venture
to submit to American men of science the conclusions of a larger
inquiry which is to appear this year in Binet's Annee psychologique.
The problem is that of the psychological conditions of this specific
and well-known state of mind which a subject expresses when he
says: "I am conscious that I ought." In a paper 2 of 1897, Pro-
fessor Leuba has called it "the feeling of oughtness." I shall use
the term, although it seems to me that the latest researches on the
psychology of feelings tend to confine this word to affective states,
where the consciousness is necessarily either agreeable or painful.
Writing in French, I have used the expression la conscience de devoir
or I'obligation de conscience.
The feeling of oughtness is not always connected with the impres-
sion of moral goodness. I have found it very often in introspections
gathered during experiments on judgment and ideation, and was
thus put on the way of an experimental study of this feeling such
as, if I am not mistaken, has never been conducted before.
The first results concerning this feeling of oughtness in the labo-
ratory experiments are the following:
1. It is the apperception of an internal conflict between two tend-
'Vol. VIIL, page 361.
'"The Psychophysiology of the Moral Imperative," Amer. Journal of
Psychology, Vol. Vm., No. 4.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 343
encies, one of which has its origin in some definite orders (French
consigne; German Aufgabe) given to the subject as to a sentry.
2. These orders give birth only to a tendency if they be accepted
by the subject. This acceptance implies, as its condition, a peculiar
relation between the subject and the inquirer. From the standpoint
of the subject this relation may be roughly described as an affective
state a combination of love and fear and admiration which gives to
the experimenter prestige and authority in the eyes of the subject.
These being the results of a first investigation, the question arises :
What are the tendencies of every-day life which can be assimilated
to the tendency originating from orders? What are the tendencies
which, if they meet with opposition, shall give rise to the feeling of
oughtness? Habit, social custom and example, instinct have been
asserted by several schools to be the fountain of moral obligation.
I think it can be shown that none of them is, if considered alone, the
source of any obligation whatever. Habit (of church going, e. g.)
enforces the feeling of oughtness; it does not create it. Social cus-
tom has certainly in every one of us a binding force ; but it does not
act in this way through habits nor through the ideo-motor power of
example. It is felt as an obligation, because there are, at its origin,
positive orders given by respected authorities to affectively disposed
subjects: in other terms, because the circumstances are exactly the
same as in the laboratory experiments alluded to.
If, in speaking of instincts, we first think of animal life, is it not
curious that the symptoms, which might be interpreted as proving
the presence of a feeling of oughtness in animals, are to be found in
dogs to whom orders are given in general terms? Ought we per-
haps to consider our domestic animals as Aristotle considered the
slave : if they be not apt to form general judgments, they might be,
nevertheless, capable of receiving them?
The orders given in general terms to the psychological subject
as to the soldier have not only the same characteristics as the ances-
tral taboo to which the sociological school gives such a great place
in the explanation of moral ideas; they also answer exactly to the
description which Kant gives of the moral law : categorical, impera-
tive, but requiring some experience, if one is to see where they have to
be applied in practical life. This resemblance is easy to account for.
The orders are indeed a product of reason, if we think that reason
has a part in every universal proposition, be it indicative or impera-
tive. But we have no ground for invoking here a pure reason
dictating a law to all intelligent beings, whether human or not.
Kant says himself that his theory does not in the least account for
344 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the practical effect of this purely rational law ; the fact of obligation
remains to him entirely unintelligible. 8
If we say that the origin of obligation is to be found in an uni-
versal proposition formulated by a concrete person and accepted by
another person, we shall understand the binding character of some
orders, which to our intellectual judgment appear absurd. The
obligatory character of the law of sacrifice, as it is felt by many
Christians, is inconsistent with the rationalistic theory aa well as
with the sociological one : this law, taken universally, is anti-rational
as well as anti-social. With our theory, if we have received the law
from somebody whom we love and admire, this is sufficient to explain
the hold it has on us.
Two questions are forced on our attention and require further
examination: (1) How does the reason work in order to transform
the "impression of good," given by a particular action, into a gen-
eral judgment of value? (2) How is the affective relation, necessary
to the acceptance of orders, originated? To this last problem so
much may here be said: there is no ground to believe that prestige
is always of social origin. Psycho-analysis shows a way in which
biological and sociological values might be created apart from any
social influence.
These few propositions may perhaps be of some interest even
without the body of facts which in a longer article could be called
upon to back them up. They are, as can be seen, purely psycholog-
ical. Their ethical, pedagogical, and philosophical corollaries do
not concern us here. When the causal relations, which we have set
forth, shall be generally recognized, the various philosophies will
have to reckon with them, and they will do so without difficulty.
Some will welcome the contingent character of our moral obligations ;
others will be impressed with the great place our theory gives to the
personality: to them the mystery of personality will soon seem as
sacred and as adorable as did the mystery of the moral law.
PIERRE BOVET.
UNIVERSITY o NEUCHATEL.
DISCUSSION
PROFESSOR DE WET'S "BRIEF STUDIES IN REALISM"
IN the interesting "Studies in Realism," which Mr. Dewey has
recently published, 1 he has done two things. In addition to
presenting more fully than he had done before his own view of the
' ' Grundlegung, ' ' 3d section, sub fine.
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., pages 393 ff. and pages 546 ff.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 345
nature of perception, he has criticized the doctrine of perception
held by ' ' epistemological " and ' ' presentative " realists. It is this
criticism of realism that I wish to examine in this paper.
The cardinal error Mr. Dewey finds in this realism is perhaps
best summed up in these words: " Until the epistemological realists
have seriously considered the main propositions of the pragmatic
realists, viz., that knowing is something that happens to things in the
natural course of their career, not the sudden introduction of a
'unique' and non-natural type of relation that to a mind or
consciousness they are hardly in a position to discuss the second
and derived pragmatic proposition that, in this natural continuity,
things in becoming known undergo a specific and detectable quali-
tative change" (p. 554). The realists criticized are guilty, then, of
believing that knowing is a sudden introduction of a "unique" and
non-natural relation.
There are three adjectives in this charge, but I presume that only
one of them has any dyslogistic significance. The suddenness of the
introduction of any relation can hardly be objected to by any em-
piricist who sticks to his last. Nor can the recognition of the unique-
ness of any relation be reasonably considered by Mr. Dewey as an
anti-empirical procedure. He has himself recognized at least one
unique relation and has given an excellent statement of what a
unique relation is : " Here, if you please, is a unique relation of self
and things, but it is unique, not in being wholly incomparable to all
natural relations among events, but in the sense of being distinctive,
or just the relation that it is" (p. 552). This sentence shows that
the adjective that really is meant to count in Mr. Dewey 's indictment
is the adjective "non-natural."
Now why should the consciousness relation, which "epistemolog-
ical" and "presentative" realists recognize, be considered non-nat-
ural ? The answer seems to be that for them this relation is a rela-
tion "to a mind." A very cursory glance over the pages of Mr.
Dewey's articles will show that the realists he is criticizing, whether
"presentative" or "epistemological," are constantly represented as
holding that the thing known in perception is in relation "to a
knower" or "to consciousness." Every criticism he passes against
these realists presupposes for its validity that these realists are com-
mitted to the doctrine that there is a non-natural "mind" or "con-
sciousness" or "knower," and that anything in order to get known
must get into a non-natural relation to this non-natural term. It is
possible that these criticisms could be stated in other forms which
should leave out of account this presupposition, so thorough-going in
the form in which Mr. Dewey has stated them, but what the criticisms
would then be would largely be a matter of conjecture. As the
346 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
criticisms now stand they have direct pertinence only to some type
of non-naturalistic realism which is based on the recognition of
"mind" as an indispensable "knower" in every perception.
Relation to a mind or consciousness or knower ! This is a thesis
which some years ago was quite generally supported, and among
realists even now Messrs. Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore still
maintain this thesis. But most of the American thinkers, whom the
American Philosophical Association's "Committee on Definitions"
would class as "epistemologically monistic realists," have been as
outspoken against this thesis as Mr. Dewey himself. For instance,
Mr. Woodbridge and the contributors to the "First Program and
Platform of Six Realists" have made it fundamental to their re-
spective realisms that consciousness is a relation between things and
not a term of a relation or a relation of things to mind.
Now Mr. Dewey has, in the commendable way so characteristic of
him, made his criticisms as impersonal as possible. With two or three
exceptions he has named no names ; but he has made it, nevertheless,
quite obvious that the "epistemological" and " presentative " realists
he has in mind are those whose views are similar to Mr. Perry's.
His reference to Mr. Perry's phrase, "ego-centric predicament," 2
near the beginning of his second paper, seems to be a clear indication
of his meaning, so far as "epistemological" realism is concerned.
As regards "presentative" realism his position is made unmis-
takable. "Many realists . . . have treated the cases of seen light,
doubled imagery, as perception in a way that ascribes to perception
an inherent cognitive status. They have treated the perceptions as
cases of knowledge, instead of as simply natural events having, in
themselves (apart from a use that may be made of them), no more
knowledge status or worth than, say, a shower or a fever. What I
intend to show is that if 'perceptions' are regarded as cases of
knowledge, the gate is opened to the idealistic interpretation. The
physical explanation holds of them as long as they are regarded
simply as natural events a doctrine I shall call nai've realism; it
does not hold of them considered as cases of knowledge the view I
call presentative realism" (p. 395). All epistemologically monistic
realism, thus, is explicitly brought within the scope of his criticism.
Now how does Mr. Dewey show that when perceptions are re-
garded as cases of knowledge the gate is opened to the idealistic
interpretation? After stating his own "nai've" realistic position he
says: "But suppose that the realist accepts the traditionary psy-
chology according to which every event in the way of a perception is
also a case of knowing something. Is the way out now so simple?
* Of the bearing of which on the realistic position I have written elsewhere,
Philosophical Eevicw, Vol. XXI., pages 351 ff.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 347
In the case of the doubled fingers or the seen light, the thing known
in perception contrasts with the physical source and cause of the
knowledge. There is a numerical duplicity. Moreover, the thing
known in perception is in relation to a knower, while the physical
cause is not as such in relation to a knower. Is not the most plaus-
ible account of the difference between the physical cause of the per-
ceptive knowledge and what the latter presents precisely this latter
difference namely, presentation to a knower f If perception is a case
of knowing, it must be a case of knowing the star; but since the
'real' star is not known in the perception, the knowledge relation
must somehow have changed the 'object' into a 'content.' Thus
when the realist conceives the perceptual occurrence as a case of
knowledge or of presentation to a mind or knower, he lets the nose
of the idealist camel into the tent. He has not great cause for sur-
prise when the camel comes in and devours the tent" (pp. 395-6;
most of the italics mine).
It is as clear as anything can be that here the gate is opened to
the idealistic interpretation by the introduction of the phrases and
clauses I have italicized. Once deny that a case of knowledge is a
presentation of the thing known to a "mind" or "knower," and the
proof that an idealistic interpretation is involved in the treatment
of perceptions as cases of knowledge loses all cogency. But this is
just the denial that is made by many realists who still regard percep-
tions as cases of knowledge. These realists, however, in so regarding
perceptions are " presentative " realists according to Mr. Dewey's
definition. In other words, Mr. Dewey's proof of the essentially
idealistic character of "presentative" realism requires two premises.
One is that perceptions are cases of knowlege, and the other is that
perceptive knowledge is presentation to a "knower." Without the
latter premise the proof halts, and Mr. Dewey must do without this
premise if he is to represent the position of these realists correctly.
Mr. Dewey's proof then leaves untouched the question whether these
realists have given ground for the idealists' neglect of the physical
explanation given by realists of such cases as doubled imagery
(p. 395).
Now everything that is further urged in these two articles against
"presentative" and " epistemological' ' realism assumes that all the
advocates of this realism believe perception to be a presentation of
objects "to a mind." Hence the whole argument is void as against
these realists who, while being "presentative" and "epistemolog-
ical," deny the existence of a "mind" to which objects are presented.
It is quite possible, as I have already suggested, that some of the
reasons urged against this type of realism can be restated so as to
bear against it, but it is evident that in the form in which they have
348 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
been stated by Mr. Dewey they are beside the mark, if the mark is
this type of realism. 8
But there is one specification of the charge against "presentative"
realism which it is possible here to examine without regard to the
fact that it is implicated in the general misunderstanding already
alluded to. Mr. Dewey says that if ' ' presentative " realism be true
the physical conditions which cause perception ought to be perceived
along with other objects. "In the case of the seen light, reference to
the velocity of light is quite adequate to account for its occurrence
in its time and space difference from the star. But viewed as a case
of what is known (on the supposition that perception is a case of
knowledge), reference to it only increases the contrast between the
real object and the object known in perception. For, being just as
much a part of the object that causes the perception as is the star
itself, it (the velocity of light) ought to be part of what is known in
the perception, while it is not. Since the velocity of light is a constit-
uent element in the star, it should be known in the perception ; since
it is not so known, reference to it only increases the discrepancy be-
tween the object of the perception the seen light and the real, as-
tronomical star. The same is true of any physical conditions that
might be referred to: The very things that, from the standpoint of
perception as a natural event, are conditions that account for its
happening are, from the standpoint of perception as a case of knowl-
edge, part of the dbject that ought to be known but is not" (pp.
396-7).
The simplest way to answer this criticism is to challenge the
statement. Why might anything to be perceived that is not per-
ceived? Either we have an empiricist theory of perception or we
have an apriorist theory. Apriorism can, from its own presupposi-
tions, lay down the law as to what ought to be. The genuine em-
piricist may also be concerned with what ought to be, but, in matters
theoretical, what ought to be is for him only what he is led by ex-
perience to expect. If these expectations are not realized, he does
not decline to accept what comes instead; he merely tries next time
not to cherish such vain expectations. Now our past experience does
The fact that such an acute thinker as Mr. Dewey can criticize an adverse
view without realizing that he is thoroughly misapprehending it should make him
more sympathetic with the failure of the critics of instrumentalism in under-
standing its presuppositions. It may also be suggested that perhaps one reason
for Mr. Dewey 's misunderstanding questions asked of him by a realist, questions
that concern his view of consciousness, is that Mr. Dewey misunderstands the
questioner's view of consciousness and is thus led to impute to the questioner an
imputation to Mr. Dewey of a view which the latter has first erroneously
imputed to the questioner. (See Mr. Dewey 's "Reply," this JOUBNAL, Vol. IX.,
pages 19 ff.)
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 349
not justify us in saying that whenever anything is perceived the
physical conditions which give rise to our perception of it are all
perceived. If then we persist in saying that nevertheless they ought
to be perceived, this "ought" is evidently not an "ought" of empir-
ically warranted expectation, but an ' ' ought " of a priori legislation.
It is a bit of sheer dogmatism, of licentious intellectualism ; and the
i^se of such an "ought" by an avowed opponent of dogmatism and
intellectualism for the purpose of demolishing an empirical realism
comes as a startling surprise, not unrelieved by a touch of humor.
" Presentative " realists who regard consciousness as a selective
relation among things, a relation unique in the sense of being the
distinctive relation it is and comparable to other natural relations, 4
have in this conception of consciousness a means of explaining why
the physical conditions of perception as a case of knowledge are not
themselves perceived. This explanation consists in showing that
what has to be explained is an instance of a general characteristic of
selective relations. This characteristic is exemplified when the chisel
of the sculptor, though it is the physical condition of the marble's
assuming a similitude to the model, does not itself enter into the re-
lation of similarity with statue and model. Suppose, for another
instance, that my room-mate at college invites me to spend the holi-
days at his home and that there I meet his sister whom I subse-
quently marry. When I thus enter into the matrimonial relation
with the girl of my choice, must she and I include her brother in the
family constituted by our marriage, because forsooth he was the con-
dition of our coming to know and love and wed each other ? Must we
likewise marry the clergyman who officiated at the ceremony, and also
marry the marriage-license which authorized it, because they too
are the conditions of the marriage ? What a monstrously redundant
polygamy such an "oi^ght" requires every bride and groom to com-
mit! It seems the most "natural" thing in the world that new re-
lations should arise and sometimes arise suddenly, and yet that the
conditions, physical and otherwise, which brought about these rela-
tionships should not be included in the specific relational complexes
produced by them. Why should we deny to the consciousness rela-
tion a similar privilege of obtaining among just the terms its condi-
tions see fit to assign to it, without intruding ourselves upon it with
the arbitrary demand that it should be more catholic in its terms
than it naturally is ? EVANDER BRADLEY McGiLVARY.
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
4 ' ' Experience and its Inner Duplicity, ' ' this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., page 232 :
"In answering this question I beg the reader not to allow the term 'together-
ness' as I have employed it to prejudice him. Like every general term, it
emphasizes common features and slurs over peculiar features."
350 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
SOCIETIES
THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING OP THE WESTERN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
THE Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical As-
sociation was held at the University of Chicago, April 5 and 6,
1912. In pursuance of the plan adopted by the executive committee,
the morning and afternoon sessions of the first day were devoted
to papers on ethics and the discussion of ethical problems. The
special topic of the afternoon was "The Teaching of Ethics." The
discussion of this topic, led by F. C. Sharp, J. H. Tufts, and J. W.
Hudson, was lively and profitable. In the evening the visiting mem-
bers were guests of the local members at a delightful dinner given
at the Quadrangle Club. At the session immediately following, the
President's address was given by A. W. Moore upon "Bergson and
Pragmatism." The day was closed by a smoker where the usual
good-fellowship prevailed.
The morning of the second day was given to a joint session with
the Western Psychological Association, at which five papers were
read and discussed. At the business meeting, which was held at the
close of the afternoon session, reports were received from the Secre-
tary and Treasurer, B. C. Ewer, showing a balance on hand of $82.85,
and from the Acting Secretary, H. W. Wright, showing an expendi-
ture of $9.58 for printing, postage, etc. E. B. Crooks, V. A. C. Hen-
mon, H. M. Kallen, and G. T. Kirn were elected to membership in the
Association. Officers for the coming year were elected as follows:
President, J. E. Boodin; Vice-president, B. H. Bode; Secretary and
Treasurer, H. W. Wright; Executive Committee, A. W. Moore, A. K.
Rogers, G. A. Tawney, W. K. Wright. The place and time of the
next meeting were left to the decision of the Executive Committee.
The following are abstracts of papers read at this meeting:
The Genesis and Function of the Ethical Ideal: G. T. KIRN.
The ethical ideals are the product of the natural life which pro-
ceeds to organize experience.
Human life begins with instincts, and if ever more than an in-
stinctive life is to appear the instincts must be redirected by the ra-
tional life.
In the growth of the ethical ideal there is a prelogical stage, for
ethical ideals as well as concepts are formed before we become con-
scious of the process. They are largely the bequest of social heredity,
and are enforced by social authority. But what at first is done un-
consciously will in time be done under the direction of consciousness.
An instinctive act has consequences which are unsatisfactory and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 351
the unsatisfactory results tend to inhibit the instinct. After a num-
ber of repetitions the "idea" of unpleasant future consequences will
inhibit present impulses to action. The action of the moment is now
organized with reference to life as a whole.
Society also makes the contribution, for the actions of one per-
son have consequences for another. The painful response of the other
has an inhibitive effect upon the agent; and the impulse of the mo-
ment is organized in a larger whole, which is society. In all cases the
ideals crystallize out of experience and determine the direction a per-
sonality takes in the realization of itself.
Even the earlier prophets of Israel wrote history in order to trace
the relation between conduct and consequences. Thus they ascer-
tained the will of their God. The authority which at first is found
in society is afterwards turned over to reason which instinctively
urges that every intention, or volition, be consistent and in harmony
with the experience already organized.
The Essentials of a First Course in Ethics: GREGORY D. WALCOTT.
A first course in ethics should give college students a fairly ade-
quate survey of the field of ethical discussion and present a fairly
consistent programme of procedure when face to face with actual
ethical problems. The former result is gained by an epitomized his-
tory of philosophy, with emphasis upon the ethical contributions of
the more important thinkers as presented in their own works; the
latter, by a constructive discussion of a half dozen main topics, viz.,
"The Method of Ethics," which should be scientific against a gen-
eral evolutionary background; "The Field of Ethics," where ethics
is considered in relation to other subjects, especially sociology, from
which it is practically differentiated by the altruistic motive; "The
Different Planes of Ethical Living," which result, in part, in con-
sequence of the opposition between the individual consciousness and
the social consciousness ; ' ' The Criteria of Moral Progress, ' ' in con-
nection with social progress evidenced by increasing social complex-
ity and social control; "The Moral Ideal," which has both physical
and psychical elements; and "The Realization of the Ideal," con-
sidered with reference to both an ideal and the actual environment.
College students are a variable factor in the community and form a
distinct class. They need to realize that their contribution to the
social welfare will be in proportion to their affiliation with the larger
group, but not complete submergence in it.
The New Individualism : JAMES H. TUFTS.
The new individualism defended by Professor Fite in his recent
volume, ' ' Individualism, ' ' takes as its point of departure the distinc-
tion between a mechanical and a conscious process, and proposes as
352 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ethical standard, "To each according to his intelligence." The paper
aims to examine how far the distinction referred to is consistently
carried through, and whether the author's conceptions of the individ-
ual and society involve survivals of the mechanical point of view.
As regards the criterion proposed, the question is discussed whether
duty to another is adequately met by treating him according to his
actual intelligence, or whether there is a duty to raise his intelligence.
The Introductory Course in Ethics: F. C. SHARP.
On account of its importance for the guidance of life, the course
in elementary ethics should be accessible to the largest possible num-
ber of students. For this reason it should be free from prerequisites
and should not ordinarily extend beyond the limits of a single semes-
ter. For the same reason, if a semester in theory and a semester in
applied ethics are offered, each course should be so planned that it
can be taken independently of the other.
The method generally employed in the class room in this country
seems to be the "pouring-in method," in one of its several forms.
This does not even accomplish satisfactorily the narrow ends which
it sets before itself, that of the apprehension and retention of the re-
sults of the observation and thought of others. What is far more
important, it does little or nothing to develop either the power to
observe and think or the habit of observing and thinking. The
method now in vogue should therefore be replaced by the method
of discovery, in which the members of the class are given problems to
work out and the teacher supplies only so much of the necessary in-
formation as the students are unable to obtain by their own efforts.
Since we all live in an ethical laboratory the introduction of this
method into ethics is a comparatively simple matter. The teaching
of introductory ethics through the study of the history of ethics will
by no means accomplish the results obtainable by the method here
recommended.
The Content and Method of the First College Course in Ethics: JAY
WILLIAM HUDSON.
The founding and maintaining of a concrete, democratic society
is not merely a political project ; it is primarily an ethical undertak-
ing for the sake of a very definite ethical ideal of human welfare. It
is an undertaking which implies rational, self-conscious responsibility
on the part of every real member of it. This, in turn, implies the
self-conscious examination and evaluation of moral standards by
every man and woman who have achieved democracy's rights and
duties. Education for democracy, in contrast with education for less
autonomous forms of society, means a new and cardinal emphasis
upon a thorough education in all the technique of efficient moral re-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 353
flection. There is only one course in which the future citizen can
receive a direct and intensive training of this sort the course in eth-
ics. The content and method of the course must be modified in terms
of this neglected fact.
College Ethics for Freshmen: BERNARD C. EWER.
Many college troubles are due in part to undergraduate ignorance
of college ideals. There is need of a systematic course of study, in
the curriculum of the freshman year, dealing with the various educa-
tional and social aspects of college life. Such a course would include
consideration of the history of the American college, its purpose, the
individual programme of study, departments and methods of study,
grades and honors, honesty, educational interests outside the cur-
riculum, health, athletics, fraternities, co-education, student govern-
ment, college spirit and college honor, religious institutions, the rela-
tion of the college to the home and to the surrounding community,
the choice of a vocation. It should afford training in study methods,
and could be combined with work in various departments. The
literature used should include books and magazine articles on the
college, and also the best popular books on education, health, Amer-
ican social and political life, and biography. Such a course would
impart seriousness to undergraduate purposes, and would help to
establish a cordial understanding between students and faculty.
Berg son and Pragmatism .- 1 A. W. MOORE.
A Psychological Definition of Religion: WILLIAM K. WRIGHT.
The definition defended was: "Religion is the endeavor to secure
the conservatism of socially recognized values through specific actions
that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary
ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that
imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency. ' ' The definition is
subjective and empirical and covers all cases of what any individual
of any religion would himself regard as a religious act, and differ-
entiates religion from animism, magic, morals, ethics, esthetics, and
science. It is practically useful as a preliminary step toward deter-
mining the objective function of religion in human society, which is
found to be conservative and socializing. This function is so sig-
nificant as to furnish a strong defense for the ontological validity
of religion in the field of contemporary metaphysics.
Present Status of the Problem of the Relation between Mind and
Matter: MAX MEYER.
Modern scientific progress is largely due to the fact that scientists
have ceased to introduce ghosts as causes into the explanation of
objective facts. Accordingly, we ought not to introduce ghosts, sub-
1 To be published in full elsewhere.
364 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
jective states, into our explanations of animal behavior, as is quite
commonly done by comparative psychologists who speak of satisfac-
tion as stamping in paths of low resistance in the nervous system,
unless a scientific advantage is to be gained by thus deviating from
the approved method of science. No one, however, has ever shown
any advantage to be thus gained. If by interaction this ghost theory
of animal and human behavior is meant, then we certainly ought to
prefer parallelism, that is, purely objective science. If, on the other
hand, by parallelism is meant that corresponding subjective states
and nervous processes are strictly simultaneous, then we ought simply
to wait till the answer is given by proper observation, which may
become possible in the future. The most urgent need of the present
time is the establishment of definite correlates of specific mental
functions and of specific nervous functions so that we may translate
subjective descriptions of human life into objective terms for the
benefit of a purely objective theory of human behavior.
The Two Theories of Consciousness in Bergson: E. B. McGiLVABY.
In "Time and Free Will," duration and motion are mechanical
syntheses; t. e., there is neither duration nor motion, except for a
conscious spectator and except in consciousness. "If consciousness
is aware of anything more than positions, the reason is that it keeps
the successive positions in mind and synthesizes them" (p. 111).
In the first chapter of "Matter and Memory," not only do
objects exist independently of the consciousness which perceives
them, but these objects have motion and activity of their own; "the
truth is that movements of matter are very clear, regarded as images,
and that there is no need to look in motion for anything more than
we see in it" (pp. 9-10). So far is consciousness from being the
agent whose synthetic activity gives motion to inert spatial things,
that on the contrary, consciousness arises only when the independent
motion of matter is partly suppressed in order to make way for the
indeterminate action of our bodies.
According to the former view there is more in consciousness
than in matter; there is motion in consciousness, which matter by
itself does not have. According to the latter view there is less in
consciousness than in matter; the motion that matter has in its own
right is reduced to give play to freedom. Bergson oscillates in the
latter part of "Matter and Memory" and in "Creative Evolution"
between these two views. His behavior exemplifies in a beautiful
manner his theory that every one carries all his past with him and
that just so much of this past as is suited to the exigencies of the
present moment becomes effective. When it is suitable to the exi-
gencies of his philosophy to remember that matter has been proved
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 355
to be inert, he remembers that this proof has been given. When it is
suitable that matter should be active, he remembers that matter has
been proved to be active. The difficulty which the reader finds in
his later view of matter is thus due to the fact that Bergson com-
bines two radically inconsistent views.
The Mechanism of Social Conduct: G. H. MEAD.
The mechanism of social conduct is to be regarded from the
standpoint of social behavior. The peculiar character of social
behavior is found in the gesture which influences other forms in
acts involving members of a group. These gestures are the first
overt indications of the response of another individual who forms
the answering gesture. Within this field of the conversation of
gestures lies social behavior. The social object or percept may be
defined as the gestures which lead to a social act when it is sensed
by another form, and arouses in that form the imagery of its answer-
ing gesture and the consequences of this response. This involves as
yet only responses to social objects in the experience of an animal,
but no consciousness of a self. This is presumably not present in
the consciousness of animals lower than man nor in that of very
young children. It is a growth in consciousness. The phase of
social behavior which seems to give the mechanism for the formation
of a self, is found in the human animal's ability to stimulate himself
socially, largely through vocal gesture, as he stimulates others, and
to respond to this gesture as he would to the vocal gesture of another.
A self is in these terms one 's own response to one 's own social stim-
ulation. One is able to carry on a conversation with one's self and
one carries it on with others. This "me" the empirical ego of
psychology arises only over against the consciousness of other selves
and gains its importance through its function of rehearsing inhibited
social actions in their relation to each other, in the reflective prepara-
tion for conduct involving interaction with other individuals of a
group.
The Paradoxes of Pragmatism: B. H. BODE.
The paradoxes of pragmatism have their origin in the fact that
certain of its doctrines are interpreted from different and incom-
patible standpoints. Such difficulties as arise from the appeal to
immediate experience, from the changes that objects undergo in
becoming known, and from the influence of the organism upon the
character of our experiences, may be removed if we avoid the con-
fusion of standpoints. The appeal to immediate experience is at the
bottom a repudiation of the unknowable, to which other philosophies
are bound to have recourse in order to give a consistent account of
the nature of the truth-relation. The pragmatic account avoids this
356 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
result, and it is able to establish an intimate connection between the
origin of hypothesis and the process by which it is verified. The
apparent impossibility of attaining true knowledge of the past, if
knowledge involves a change in things, ceases to be formidable if we
do not construe the relation of organism and environment, and of
past and present, in a mechanical fashion. Once we give up the
attempt to cut off the past from the present and to make of know-
ing a process in which things are passively registered, the pragmatic
explanation becomes straightforward and natural.
The Interpretation of Reality: H. W. WRIGHT.
Rationalism, whether it takes the form of naturalism or of intel-
lectualism, is unable to interpret a reality which is undergoing gen-
uine evolution. Naturalism attempts to interpret the real universe
in terms of facts and forces whose modes of action are already fixed
and predetermined, and hence leaves no opportunity for the occur-
rence of the really new, in fact, no possibility of evolution itself.
Intellectualism, on the other hand, converts the legitimate demands
of human thought for consistency and coherence of ideas into a test
of reality, and, finding the actual world neither unified nor self-
consistent, rejects it as illusory and regards the temporal process of
change which we directly experience as mere appearance, and evolu-
tion itself as unreal. Neither is feeling nor any form of sensuous
intuition adequate to the interpretation of real evolution. To which
of our capacities shall we look then? Assuredly, to that activity
which produces our own personal development, i. e., will. For it is
volition which maintains the unity of our experience while at the
same time continually introducing new objects into it. The activity
of will is therefore the very principle of genesis itself, the essence of
real development, showing us the ideal possibilities of the future,
thus converting the ideal into actuality. It is consequently able as
no other form of human experience to interpret the nature of reality,
not as being, but as becoming, as that which is achieving organization,
is winning unity.
Cognition, Beauty, and Goodness: H. M. KALLEN.
Private, concrete, elusive, in itself neither mental nor amental,
beauty is the optional mode of that positive, intrinsic, value-relation
which binds the mind to its object in such wise that the two are com-
pletely and harmoniously adapted to each other in the very act of
apprehension.
German Pragmatism : G. JACOBY.
In opposition to Professor James's formula: "Germany lags
behind in pragmatism," we propose that "America lags behind Ger-
many." American pragmatism is the reaction of a biological type
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 357
of philosophy against the rationalistic idealism of the so-called
"Hegelian" school of this country. Forty years ago a similar
biological philosophy in Germany reacted against the true Hegelian
school of Hegel himself. From this anti-Hegelian movement derives
the well-known German pragmatism of Ernest Mach, Wilhelm
Jerusalem, George Simmel, Richard Avenarius, Wilhelm Ostwald,
and Hans Vaihinger, whose recently published standard work on
"Die Philosophic des Als Ob" was written in 1816-1818. If Amer-
ican pragmatism meets at present with disapproval in Germany this
is due to the fact, that just at the time when anti-Hegelian prag-
matism became popular in this country, Germany had become tired
of it and had just entered a new counter-reaction, the so-called
"revival of philosophy." The German revivalists reject pragmatism
as a kind of utilitarianism. But this is a misunderstanding. It
appears that pragmatism is the best, if not the only method, by which
the tendencies of the new German movement can be worked out
satisfactorily.
H. W. WRIGHT.
LAKE FOREST COLLEGE.
Analyse et Critique des Principes de la Psychologic de W. James. A.
MENARD. Paris : Felix Alcan. 1911. Pp. 466.
" Une etude de ce genre," M. Menard writes in his preface, " destinee
tout particulierement a exposer I'essentiel d'un ouvrage important pen ou
mal connu comportait des citations ou le lecteur put retrouver I'auteur,
malgre le commentateur. On excusera, pour cela meme, noire loyalisme
d'en avoir abuse." This sentiment is the key to the book. But M. Menard
is too modest. His analysis is desirable not only for the French public;
it performs a needful and a high service also for all readers to whom the
psychological work of William James is of interest readers American or
English or continental. Nor is there need to deprecate the " loyalty " of
quotation, or to excuse such divergences between author and commenta-
tor as arise in the book. M. Menard's criticisms are those of a reflective
interpreter, not of a hostile judge. What he says comes rather by way of
supplementation and complement, than by way of contradiction or dis-
putatious abstraction.
Of the many excellences of this summary, not the least seems to me
to be the effectiveness with which it exhibits the inward consistency and
articulation of James's psychological method. To the incidental reader
and even to the student who approaches the " Principles " with the bias
and preconceptions of the barren psychology of the laboratory, a psychol-
ogy dominated largely by the Wundtian influence, much in the master's
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
great book seems discontinuous, unreflectively empirical, contradictory.
M. M<'nard shows how superficial such an impression is. The eight chap-
ters, in which James's principles of psychology are expounded reveal an
architectonic that is not merely the expres 
