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Putts or 

TNI Nc E*A Pi>Ti8 C 


VOL. IX. No. 1. JANUARY 4, 1912. 



AT first sight nothing could seem more obvious than that things, 
individual blocks, exist. In fact that things exist as indi- 
vidual and distinct has seemed far clearer to common sense than that 
minds are individual. We only have to recollect that Aristotle found 
mind (active nous) impersonal and universal, while the body, with 
the functions depending upon it, seemed to furnish the individual 
substrate, and that Thomas Aquinas makes the body the principle of 
individuation, without which human souls, like the angels, would 
merge into the genus. It is unnecessary to say that philosophy has 
changed front in this respect, and finds it comparatively easy to 
recognize the individuality of minds, while the independence and 
individuality of things has well-nigh disappeared in the general 

There have been several motives for this attitude towards the 
reality of things. It is hardly necessary to mention that of tempera- 
mental mysticism, which will always seek reality in haziness and 
away from distinctions. Our going into a trance or going to sleep 
does obliterate plurality so far as we are concerned. But while it 
does away with the significance of distinctions for the dreamer, does 
it also do away with the existence of distinctions? I do not believe 
so. I can not help feeling that we are wiser when we are awake than 
when we are asleep, and that reality is such as we must take it 
in our systematic conduct. I would rather trust the tried-out dis- 
tinctions of common sense and science than the dreamy confluence 
of mysticism. 

Our antipathy to distinctions, however, may not be due merely 
to temperamental laziness. It may be due to conceptual difficulties. 
Thus the difficulties of conceiving plural things and their interactions 
in space lead Lotze to conceive the universe as a polyphonic unity 
an ' ' esthetic unity of purpose in the world which, as in some work of 
art, combines with convincing justice things which in their isolation 
would seem incoherent and scarcely to stand in any relation to one 



another at all." 1 Bradley, in a similar way, having found the prob- 
lem of relations and of motion insuperable on his abstract basis of 
procedure, has recourse to an esthetic absolute where the plurality 
of things and their ceaseless struggle is at rest. I can not see, how- 
ever, how we are justified in reading plurality out of the world 
because its existence interferes with our ready-made concepts. New 
concepts, perhaps the electrical definition of physical atoms, may 
make it easier to see how a world of relatively stable things may 
coexist and interact. In the meantime, if we must acknowledge 
diversity of things for purposes of conduct, we must hold that they 
have some distinct reality, even while we are perfecting our con- 
ceptual models. In any case, thought must wait upon facts. Where 
we find symphonic unity of system, there we must of course acknowl- 
edge it. But when the facts do not warrant such intimate unity, we 
have no right to read it into them on the basis of a priori conceptions. 
Even within our own individual history, we are far from finding 
a closely woven purposive unity. We are the creatures largely of 
habits and instincts. We must provisionally acknowledge different 
types of continuity of which unity of purpose is only one. 

The intellectualist's condemnation of things owes its convincing- 
ness to certain deep-rooted prejudices. One of these prejudices is 
that individuality means indivisibility, and conversely that what can 
be divided into parts can not be individual. The substance of 
Spinoza and the atoms of Democritus are alike indivisible. This 
difficulty of indecomposability would of course equally influence our 
view of psychic unities. We would have to deny the reality of the 
self, because it is complex and capable of analysis. The art-object 
would fall to pieces the moment we analyzed it. Hence you have 
either a heap of pieces on the one hand or a mystical, undifferentiated 
unity on the other. Now, what we must do here is to face the prob- 
lem honestly and cast out prejudice. We can as a matter of fact 
recognize a self or a work of art as a unity if the complexity con- 
verges in a direction or towards a purpose. If in the organic or 
inorganic thing we can recognize a common impulse or movement, 
we must recognize the thing as one, even though it is complex and 
physically divisible. 

This prejudice is closely connected with another the vice of 
abstraction, useful though abstraction is in its own place in the 
economy of thought. This prejudice consists in emphasizing the 
disjunctive function of the mind and in ignoring the conjunctive. 
Thus it is regarded as self-evident that the disparate qualities the 
creatures of linguistic substantiation exist; but their interpenetra- 
tion, their coexistence in the one thing, is regarded as the insuperable 

'"Metaphysics," English translation, Vol. II., p. 60. 


problem. And it is insuperable, if you take the disparate abstrac- 
tions for granted and try to compound a thing out of them. But this 
is starting at the wrong end of the process. We must go back to the 
concrete object. While our thought can abstract qualities, these 
qualities do not exist first as abstract entities and then compound 
themselves. They are ways of taking things in concrete contexts. 
If we can discriminate distinctions within this object, it is quite true 
that we must regard such distinctions as real. But if we must take 
the distinctions as coexisting, interpenetrating, flowing into each 
other, cohering in one pattern and movement, it is also true that 
they can so interpenetrate and coexist. Our conjunctive way of 
taking the object of experience needs no more justification than our 
disjunctive or analytic way. If the distinctions do coexist and inter- 
penetrate, they can do so. We do not make the transitions or unities, 
any more than the discreteness, in taking account of them. And 
Berkeley is quite right in maintaining that no additional entity, no 
substance or x, can simplify the fact, which is given with the quali- 
ties, viz., that they interpenetrate and persist. To trace these coex- 
istences and transitions of the facts of experience is the business of 
science, quite as much as that of the analysis of properties. 

It is strange that the unity of the thing should have caused so 
much trouble, while most philosophers have been willing to take the 
diversity within the thing for granted. I can not see why one is not 
as mysterious or as clear as the other. If you assume that a thing is 
mere abstract unity, it is true that no logic could get diversity out 
of it. If, again, you start with a collection of independent, disparate 
qualities, it will no doubt be impossible to get any unity into it. The 
simpler way is to proceed empirically and not to make absurd 
assumptions. If we can distinguish diversity of function, then, of 
course, there is diversity. If diversity of function, on the other 
hand, makes a thing go to pieces, if the only transitions possible are 
those of identity of property, then we should at least be as consistent 
as the father of intellectualism, Parmenides, and with him rule out 
all diversity as inconceivable, leaving the residuum of the homo- 
geneous block of being. 

Another intellectualist prejudice of which we must rid ourselves 
is the assumption that an individual, in order to be distinct, must dis- 
tinguish itself. On this basis, only self-conscious individuals could 
exist, and they only so long as they are self-conscious. We ourselves 
would vanish as individuals the moment we go to sleep or when our 
interest becomes absorbed in the objective situation. I do not believe 
this a valid assumption. Neither the existence nor the significance 
of an individual need depend upon self-discrimination. We have 
individual significance so long as any experience distinguishes us, 


whether awake or asleep. And the existence of an individual is in 
no wise dependent upon being distinguished. A thing may exist as 
individual a million years before it is distinguished. It is individual 
not because it distinguishes itself or we distinguish it, but because, 
when we do take account of it, we must treat it as distinct for the 
purpose in question. 

Nor is it necessary to regard self -subsistence or independence as 
the condition of reality. If only the self-subsistent were real, then 
only an indivisible whole, as Spinoza maintains, could be real. Now, 
it is quite true that the parts must, somehow, hang together. At least 
the physical world hangs together by its gravitational threads. But 
such hanging together need not prevent a certain individual play of 
the parts. The earth hangs together with the solar system, but that 
does not prevent the earth from having its own motion and history. 
For finite purposes at least, it is convenient to take reality piece- 
meal. And reality has parts and distinctions just in so far as it 
lends itself to such individual taking, however much the parts may 
cohere with a larger pattern. It is such pluralism which makes prac- 
tical adjustment and scientific sorting and identification relevant. 
The parts or aspects are real, if we must meet them as real. And 
the recognition of the character and reality of the part may, for the 
purpose in question, be more essential than the reality of the whole. 

It is not necessary, on the other hand, in order to recognize the 
plurality of the world, to fall into the opposite intellectualist abstrac- 
tion, that of absolutely independent plural entities such as the old- 
fashioned atoms or monads. Such an assumption is necessarily 
suicidal, for since such entities could not make any difference to each 
other or to any perceiving subject, it becomes impossible to speak of 
them as having properties or even to prove their existence. Even 
zero must be part of a thought context in order to be considered as 
existing. Things are as independent and impenetrable as we must 
take them. They may exist, as we have seen, independent of our 
cognitive context. They may come and go, so far as our awareness 
is concerned, without prejudice to their existence. But in some con- 
text they must hang. I can not conceive of individuals as outside 
of any context at all, as making no difference to other individuals, 
for it is through such difference to other individuals, and in the last 
analysis to human nature, that we conceive of an individual as 
existing at all. I can see only the possibility of a relative pluralism 
pluralism with its rough edges, its overlapping identities both 
from the existential and the cognitive side. No center liveth unto 
itself, in the isolated sense of Leibnitz's monad. But such relative 
pluralism prevents in any case the blank monotony of eleatic being. 
And while the parts hang with each other, they must be considered 


as real as the whole. The whole has no reality abstracted from just 
such parts. If the parts are relative to the whole, the whole is no 
less relative to the parts. If we emphasize that individuals exist and 
have significance only in contexts, it is well not to forget that they 
do exist within the contexts, social or physical, and can be identified 
in the variety of contexts into which they enter. 

Another and more serious kind of objection has been raised 
against the reality of things from the Heraclitean point of view, 
represented so brilliantly at the present time by Professor Bergson. 
If the universe is an absolute flux, making sections in the stream of 
change and calling them things must be a purely artificial attitude 
an illusion due to our gross sense perception at best and justified 
only by its convenience for practical purposes. To quote a recent 
statement of Bergson 's : "I regard the whole parceling out of things 
as relative to our faculty of perception. Our senses, adjusted to the 
material world, trace there lines of division which exist as directions, 
carved out for our future action. It is our contingent action which 
is reflected back in matter, as in a mirror, when our eyes perceive 
objects with well-marked contours, and distinguish them one from 
the other." 2 Things, therefore, have no real existence. They are 
due merely to our practical purposes. The real world is one of abso- 
lute fluency, where the past is drawn up into the moving flow. Not 
extension, but interpenetration; not repetition, but absolute novelty 
and growth; not qualities, but change, characterizes the real world, 
the key to which must be found in our own stream of consciousness. 
This real world can be grasped, not by the intellect, but by intuition, 
which gives us the real flow, as contrasted with the stereotyped copy 
of the intellect. And how do we come to speak of things at all, then ? 
By means of the intellect we form a space image of the real process. 
This image is like the cinematographic copy of moving figures. It is 
a static picture of spatially spread out and recorded changes which 
we substitute for the real duration. But while the latter is char- 
acterized by interpenetration and indivisibility, the former is char- 
acterized by extension and divisibility. Science decomposes the 
objects of sense still further into molecules and atoms and centers of 
force, but these pictures of science have no more reality than the 
perceptual things. They are merely contrivances to deal with the 
world of flux. 

Such, in brief, is the view of Bergson, and it certainly carries 
with it a great deal of truth. Our purposes are indispensable in the 
significant differentiation of our world ; and sometimes, no doubt, our 
marking the world off into parts is as artificial as the astronomer's 
longitudes and latitudes and his names for constellations. The world, 

1 This JOURNAL, Vol. VII., No. 14, pp. 386 and 287. 


too, from our finite point of view at any rate, is a world where novelty 
and growth play an important part. I can not admit, however, that 
the new Ileracliteanism gives ua the whole truth. 

In the first place, we must be suspicious of all absolutistic for- 
mulas. Absolute flux is as impossible of proof as absolute identity. 
Bergson and Parmenides alike must found their philosophy on intui- 
tion and conviction. I prefer the more modest pragmatic way of 
taking the world. 8 This means to take the facts at their face value. 
If there seems to be change and novelty, then, in so far, we must own 
it, whether our novelty is a retracing of an absolute experience or is 
objectively creative. Knowledge, whatever claims to absoluteness we 
may make, is after all our finite human version of reality; and we 
have access to no other. And for us change and novelty are real 
facts. But while we must recognize novelty and interpenetration as 
facts of our experience, it is also true that we must recognize a cer- 
tain amount of constancy. And this constancy can not be due 
merely to language and space objectification. There must, on the 
one hand, be constancy in our meanings, our inner purposes; and 
they are real processes. And there must, on the other, be constancy 
on the part of the processes referred to. Else constancy on the part 
of our symbols would not avail. Suppose we had a world where 
everything flowed but the symbols: in such a world we could not 
recognize or use the symbols as the same. There could be no such 
thing as intellect in such a world, because it too would have to change. 
And even if memories and concepts dipped into such a world from 
another universe, they would be utterly useless where nothing repeats 
itself. The intellect is an agency for prediction ; and what we must 
be able to predict is the real world of processes. Mind and things 
must conspire to have science. Even in the cinematograph, you have 
the constancy of the pictures and of the machinery which repeats 
them ; and they are part of the real world. 

Nor is it true of things, any more than of selves, that our marking 
them off from their context is purely arbitrary. It is difficult enough 
in either case ; and we can not pull them, root and all, without pull- 
ing a good deal of the context with them. When we come to define 
what we mean by Caesar, we find that he is very much entangled with 
the past out of which he grew, with the age in which he struggled, 
and with the results and opinions of his labors ever since. Yet for all 
that he is a well-marked character which we can understand and 
appreciate. So with the thing the organic individual, like the tree, 
or the inorganic individual, like the stone or the crystal. In any 
case, they are individual, when we must deal with them as such; 

My attitude to pragmatism I have explained in "Truth and Reality," 
Macmillan, 1911, especially in Chapters IX. and X. 


not when we mark them off arbitrarily, as in the case of the rainbow. 
And this is true though the individual is complex; though it may 
consist of many interpenetrating impulses, all traveling at diverse 

"When we come to define what we mean by the individuality of a 
thing, the problem waxes more difficult. Psychology gives us but 
scant help. As a matter of fact, it has tended to unfit us for the 
proper attitude to reality through its subjectivistic tendency. What 
we intend when we speak of a thing or act on a thing is not a fusion 
of sensations, together with the suggested sensory and ideational 
complex. This is merely an account of the process of becoming 
aware of things and not an account of the reality of things. Things 
can make sensible differences to our organism, but they are not con- 
stituted by our perception. They must be taken as preexisting in 
their own contexts, prior to such sensory discrimination on our part, 
else our instincts would not be adjusted to them ; they could fulfil no 
interest or need on the part of our will. The sensory differences, for 
practical purposes, exist primarily as signs or guides suggesting 
further control and use. The sight sensations, in the case of the 
infant, suggest the motor reaction of active touch, which in turn 
suggests the reflexes of eating. 

What, then, individuates things ? First of all, from the point of 
view of significance, they are individuated, as we have seen, by the 
purposes which select them and which they fulfil. They would have 
no individual significance except as thus differentiated in our cog- 
nitive experience. The thing must embody a will. Aristotle was 
quite right in saying that we can not treat the thing as a mere col- 
lection. We can not regard the word as a mere collection of letters, 
in so far as it is an individual word. "We must seek the cause by 
reason of which the matter is some definite thing." 4 For Aristotle 
this means finding the final cause of the thing. In artificial things 
like the word or the work of art, it is quite plain that we must find 
the idea which is expressed. Can we also find such an objective idea 
in natural things ? No, we can not find it there. We must be satis- 
fied if it has such distinctness of character and history as to fulfil a 
specific purpose of ours, whether it sustains the relation of a work of 
art to a more comprehensive experience or not. 

It does not follow, however, that things are created or "faked" 
by thus being taken over into our cognitive context. The selection 
and acknowledgment is forced, not arbitrary. The thing must sug- 
gest an own center of energy. It must roll out from the larger field 
of experience, forcing attention to its own movement and identity. 
Our cognitive meaning, so far from constituting things, must tally 

4 "Metaphysics," Bk. VII., Ch. XVII., 1. 


with the things terminate in our perceptions of them in order to 
be valid. If the thing is real, it can not be infinitely divisible, t. e., 
the form of the thing can not be merely of our own choosing. To be 
accorded objective existence, the thing must be acknowledged as 
having its own impulse, its own hi story, its own pattern of parts, 
which our ideas must copy sufficiently for idi'iitiiication and predic- 
tion. And the thing may have to be acknowledged as having such 
character and history, whether as old as the sun or as evanescent as 
the cloudlet. 

Can we identify such things in our experience f In the case of 
the organic thing, we seem to have a natural unity, comparable to 
that which we have in the case of the unity of the ego, even though 
the former is not a significant unity. There is a history which 
embodies a certain end or has a certain direction. To be sure, 
organisms may sometimes be divided without destroying their life; 
and the lower organisms do propagate their existence by spontaneous 
division. But the cell seems to be even here a fairly definite entity. 
The unicellular organisms have an individual immortality which is 
only limited by external accident. 

When we come to inorganic things, the problem is difficult. On 
the analogy of geometrical quantity it has sometimes been held that 
physical things are infinitely divisible. Interesting antinomies have 
been invented from Zeno down by playing between the mathematical 
and the physical conception of quantity. But we must not confuse 
mathematical divisibility with physical divisibility. Empirically, 
what we call things are, on the one hand, capable of being taken as 
individuals. On the other hand, it is possible to distinguish parts. 
Do we come to a limit in our division where we have to deal with a 
final natural unity? We do for practical purposes at least. The 
molecule seems like a distinct stopping-place, however hypothetical, 
if we would preserve the character of the compound. And in recent 
years interesting experiments have been made by Rutherford and 
others to prove the real existence of the atom. These experiments 
can not be ruled out by any a priori theory as regards infinite divisi- 
bility. The atom in turn seems to be a holding company for energies 
which under certain conditions can act individually. A smaller unit, 
the electron, it is maintained, must be assumed to account for such 
phenomena as radioactivity. The negative electric charge seems like 
a natural unit. Is it final T We can not say. All we can say is that 
we have had no need so far of assuming a smaller unit. There cer- 
tainly is no evidence for infinite divisibility. Furthermore, because 
units do not have absolute permanency and are themselves complex, 
that does not gainsay their individual reality, while we can take them 


as individual. The chair is an individual while we can use it as a 
chair, however complex and unstable its structure. 

It will be seen that we have adopted the instrumental method in 
dealing with the reality of the thing. Unlike the self, the thing has 
no meaning or value that we can share with it. We must judge it, 
therefore, by the ways in which we must take it in realizing our pur- 
poses; and we must hold that its reality is precisely what we must 
take it as in the service of our specific will. Let us now try to sum 
up the pragmatic significance of the thing. In the first place, we 
have seen that we can not speak of things unless we have persistent 
identity identity both in the purposes which take the things and in 
the objective processes which are taken. Unless we can take the same 
processes over again and thus predict their reoccurrence, we can not 
speak of things. In a world of absolute flux, not even the illusion of 
a thing could arise. This persistence or possibility of identification 
of certain processes is the pragmatic significance of substance, what- 
ever fleeting changes we may have to ignore in our conceptual taking 
of reality. As the thing is capable of existing in many contexts, and 
as it may have different reactions in different contexts, the idea of 
potential energy arises. The potential, or the core of the thing, is 
the more of what the thing can do. The air can produce sound. It 
can also furnish the Kansas dust storm, it can convey oxygen to the 
lungs, etc. As the contexts are not present, perhaps, for doing all 
these things at once, we speak of the others as possible reactions 
the (for the time being) hidden energy of the thing. 

In the second place, these expectancies or ways of taking the thing 
are social. Things do not merely figure in my individual experience, 
but they are capable of figuring in any number of experiences in the 
same immediate way. They fulfil not merely an individual, but a 
social, purpose. One reason for regarding social experience as more 
trustworthy is that social experience is less subject to illusions and 
hallucinations. While this is largely so and therefore furnishes an 
additional check, illusions and hallucinations may be social for the 
time being. The illusion of the moving railroad train is as social as 
any perception. A whole crowd has been known to see a ghost. So 
being social is not an infallible test of objectivity. As such percep- 
tions, however, do not tally with further experiences, they can not be 
taken as things. Whether we deal with things, therefore, from the 
point of view of individual or of social experience, our ideas of things 
can only be proven true as experience leans upon further experience 
in a consistent way. 

It has sometimes been stated that things are objective, because 
they are objects for several subjects. But this is inverting the true 
relation. Things are social experiences, because they hang in a con- 


text of their own and are not dependent upon individual experience 
for their existence. Things, moreover, are not the only objects of 
social experience. It is not true that our psychological objects are 
objects of one subject only as contrasted with things. If so, we could 
have no psychological sciences. We could never understand each 
other's meanings or their relations. The fact is that we can share 
each other's images, concepts, and even emotions and will atti- 
tudes, as truly as our sense facts. The oldest sciences man created 
were sciences of meaning, such as logic, geometry, and ethics. It is 
absurd, then, to say that mental facts exist for one subject only are 
private and unique. It is not their social character which distin- 
guishes things from meanings. 

Besides social agreement, we must add, therefore, sensible contin- 
uity as characteristic of our taking of things. Things are the sen- 
sible embodiments of purposes. They have a certain "liveliness" 
that our meanings as such, however social, do not ordinarily have. 
They are energies which we must recognize as belonging to a space 
context of their own, with their own steadiness and order, inde- 
pendent of our meanings. It is not that we, either in our individual 
or our social capacity, do acknowledge things, which makes things 
objective, but that we must acknowledge them, and that we must 
acknowledge them as having such a sensible character, such motion, 
such use in the realization of our specific purposes. Our ideas must 
terminate in the sensible things in order to be valid. We may select 
them in our service, we may spread them out into our classificatory 
schemes, we may symbolize their relations by our equations ; but we 
can do so successfully only by respecting their own character and 
relations as revealed in experience. We must believe, moreover, that 
the substance of things is precisely what we must take it as in 
experience. If radium breaks down and changes into helium, no 
assumption of inert matter, no postulate of substance, can guarantee 
its identity. The only key we have to reality is what reality must be 
taken as in the progressive realization of the purposes of human 





shall deliver the deliverer?" 

Professor Miller asks the question at the end of a "dis- 
cussion" of my paper on "Mind as an Observable Object." It is I 
who am the "deliverer," but of what a sorry sort will be gathered 
from the answer Mr. Miller finds to his own question. 

What shall deliver the deliverer? Nothing but a taste for real solutions 
which is the same as intellectual scruple. Nothing but common sense untired 
which is the same as pertinacity in logic. Nothing but looking about us before 
we advance sweeping the horizon of our subject circumspection; that last 
rule of Descartes 's method, followed as far as human vision can, ' ' to make 
enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I might be assured that 
nothing was omitted." 

One would like to have contributed something better than the 
inspiration of a bad example to sentiments so just. 

But Mr. Miller is no unkindly critic. He is good enough to say 
that some earlier work of mine promised better things that even 
now I may have better things in reserve. Perhaps, too, it occurred 
to Mr. Miller that a twenty-minute paper left me little room for 
enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I might be 
assured nothing was omitted. Something in the way of enumera- 
tion and review that I had tried before writing quite brought it home 
to me that sacrifices were demanded. I thought I might begin by 
passing over the ungereimte Frage. 

However happy this idea, I know it would have been happier if 
men stood in closer agreement as to what meaning meant. But then 
the history of philosophy would be the shortest of stories, the love of 
wisdom would not go long unrequited, thought would lie listless in 
the pervading calm and I should have missed a critic of flavor. It 
did seem to me, though, that some questions were beyond question 
as, for example, What should we call that which can have no name ? 

I know that many with a taste for real solutions have answered, 
An immediate fact of consciousness. Out of such facts taken 
together they make a "field," and out of such fields a world. 
But what in the world is consciousness? Across these fields, 
dust of their dust, passes the occasional figure of a fellow being. For 
his brother-likeness to the owner of the field, this passing figure is 
given a field of his own one from which the giver is forever 
excluded. Straightway the donor grows anxious for his gift. Does 
the one to whom it has been given really have the thing that has just 
been given to him ? Then where in the world is his consciousness ? 


No one can blame the dwellers in such a world if they cry aloud 
for deliverance, least of all one who remembers to have lived there 
and to have been unhappy there one who might still be unhappily 
living there had he waited with the others for a deliverer who could 
work miracles. 

Very pleasantly Mr. Miller quotes // mon intention the saying of 
a certain Old Lady: "We must all make a little effort every day to 
keep sane and to use words in the same senses." Which, being 
applied, I take to mean that the deliverer Mr. Miller awaits must 
begin by accepting "consciousness" in the sense those who would be 
delivered have given to the word. He must make a little effort every 
day to keep on using the term in this same sense. He must start at 
the same point and travel the same road, but he shall reach the goal 
of intelligibility at last without having been downed by any of those 
contradictions that have been the undoing of all who have so started 
and so traveled. Then, and only then, shall we know him for the 
true deliverer by the miracle he has wrought. 

Meanwhile, for one who is too impatient to await the impossible, 
there lies close to hand a suggestion so natural that it can not excite 
enthusiasm, so simple that it may inspire mockery, and so little in 
the "same sense" with what has gone before that the Old Lady of 
Good Counsel would not have it to be sane. It is this : Let us make 
our way out of a troubled world by the same door where in we went. 
Did we start with an immediate fact of consciousness and construct 
a world? Then let us now begin with the world and construct an 
immediate fact of consciousness. 

To be sure, the familiar scenes of the journey in will look altered 
on the way out, but isn't that rather what we had hoped for? At all 
events, it is vain to cry paradox at each new episode of the kind. 
For example, we came to grief by assuming that a man knew his own 
mind better than anything else and prior to anything else in the 
world. Somewhere along the way out we should expect to run across 
the reflection that his own mind is the last thing a man comes to 
know. "It is so far from self-evident," I had ventured to write, 
"that each man's mental state is his own indisputable possession, 
that no one hesitates to confess at times that his neighbor has read 
him better than he has read himself. . . . No one finds fault with 
Thackeray for intimating that the old Major is a better judge of 
Pendennis's feeling for the Fotheringay than is Pendennis himself." 

Mr. Miller selects the passage for an illustration of his difficulties. 

This is not a question of knowing our feelings, but of knowing how our 
feelings will develop or continue. To have a feeling and to be acquainted with 
it are the same thing. If a man does not know whether he is in love, it means 
that he does not know whether what he actually feels is or is not a sign of a 
continued disposition to feel and to act such as goes under that name. 


And again I had said, continuing the thought, "It is quite as 
likely that, under certain conditions, I do not know what red is, as 
that, under other conditions, I do not know \vhat love is." 

But "this," comments Mr. Miller, "is not a question whether I 
am acquainted with my own sensation, but whether I am acquainted 
with the social name for my sensation." 

These are only moments of our progress ; but Mr. Miller is right 
in choosing them to illustrate a difference of view that must go with 
every step we take together. I wish indeed he had put his first objec- 
tion a trifle differently. Unless love is of its essence enduring, there 
was no question of what Pendennis 's feeling would develop into, still 
less would I have chosen Pen as an example of one who did not know 
whether he was in love. I assumed that we were dealing with a man 
who was "sure" he was in love later with a man who was "sure" 
he saw the color red. Were they right or wrong in their surety ? Or 
rather, has the question, Were they right or wrong ? a meaning ? 

My own position : The question has so much meaning that it takes 
all the science of all the world to make out whether A is in love or 
whether B sees red. In that science A and B have their little part 
they are contributors of undetermined value but that they have the 
supreme, the ultimate part seems to me an assumption as little 
warranted as to suppose that I know better than all the world the 
nature of the pen I am holding because, forsooth, it is mine. Is it 
only a matter of the "social name" for the state of mind each surely 
has? Is it only that this one may err in calling his feeling "love," 
that one in calling his "red"? Then may they not err in calling 
their respective feelings by any other names, or by any names at all? 
And what should we, the philosophers, call that which maybe isn't 
this and maybe isn't that, but surely is the immediate and certain 
possession of the one who has it? "What shall we call that which 
can have no name ? ' ' Isn 't the shade of Protagoras whispering some- 
thing about ' ' the last seeming ' ' ? Isn 't Gorgias nudging my elbow ? 
Isn't Cratylus congratulating himself on having held his peace and 
but wagged his finger ? 

However, enough of episodes ! The general idea is that we start 
with a world and construct an immediate fact of consciousness. If 
this is the problem, we might be expected sooner or later to ask our- 
selves, What beings of this world do we call conscious, and why do 
we call them so ? Is not this a search for the meaning of conscious- 
ness ? It seemed to me that there must be something peculiar in the 
behavior of "conscious" beings, the which, if I could discover it, 
would give me the definition I sought. Their "consciousness" is that 
trait of the behavior of certain objects which makes me call them 
conscious; their "life," that trait which makes me call them alive; 


their "heat," that trait which makes me call them hot so I thought 
one might argue. 

Mr. Miller does not complain of me (I think T) for having 
attempted no more than this statement of an experimental problem. 
His objection is to the statement itself. 

Once more [he asks] the question what leads me to call a man conscious, and 
the question what consciousness means is Mr. Singer assuming that they are 
the same question f Are the nature of a thing and the tokens by which I infer 
its presence the samef . . . 

They are to me the same: I confuse, I identify, the question, 
What leads me to call a man conscious ? with the question, What does 
consciousness mean ? And I detect in myself the same lack of intel- 
lectual scruple in other situations. I am inclined to confuse the 
question, What leads me to call this thing a triangle ? with the ques- 
tion, What does triangle mean? Whether it is that I have wearied 
me of common sense, or that my logic has lost its pertinacity, I can 
not see why I should treat a conscious being more befoggedly than a 
triangle. Is making a mystery of them a way of paying tribute to 
the ' ' higher categories ' ' f 

In watching the behavior of beings I call by instinct conscious 
(the reason for which instinct constitutes my problem) I seem to 
find grounds for differentiating this part of their behavior into 
"faculties." Among other qualities, I attribute to them "sensi- 
bility. ' ' Part of their action I call reaction ; I call it their seeing of 
a color, their hearing of a sound. As my experience of other minds 
grows, my knowledge of my own is enriched : I class myself among 
those who see and hear. Further, I recognize certain behavior as 
descriptive, and notice the way in which descriptive behavior varies 
with the conditions governing seeing and hearing. All do not see the 
same thing or see the same thing in the same way. Mr. Miller makes 
much of this difference of content as a peculiarity yes, as the very 
essence of our notion of consciousness. 

The reasons why we say we find something in the world of facts which we 
call consciousness and which distinguishes itself from a behaving body [Mr. 
Singer] really does not consider. These reasons are after all simple. . . . Let 
us try to state the reasons without the terms of personality, self, etc. For 
example, at a single moment a certain number of objects . . . are in a peculiar 
sense together, while those objects and other objects are not in the same sense 
together. ... Of course the easiest way of putting this is to say 7 am seeing the 
first mentioned combination and 7 am not seeing [the second]. But it is quite 
easy to avoid making these references to self and its "seeing": it is quite easy 
to put it in terms of the "objective" facts themselves. These facts have a way 
of being together, some of them, while others are not in this sense together. . . . 
Groups there are, and breaches between tbem there are. Consciousness there is, 
and oblivion there is 


Ungefahr sagt das der Pfarrer auch but with a slightly different 
meaning ! For Mr. Miller concludes : 

"Consciousness" here is not behavior; it is, according to usage, either the 
"field" itself or the relation of conjunction between the components of the field. 

It can not be as a concession to my manner of speaking that Mr. 
Miller would avoid the easiest way of putting things. It is not I who 
object to such phrases as " / am seeing the rug" and "I am not see- 
ing the window," or again "I am seeing the rug and he is seeing the 
window. " As I arrive through observation at the notion of descrip- 
tive behavior, discover the way in which this varies with the point of 
view, I quite come to recognize that I see different things at different 
times, that I and another see different things at the same time. From 
this I gradually struggle toward an understanding of what is the 
same in the thing we so differently see, of the "objective" and the 
"subjective" factors in every description. I come to discover a sub- 
jective factor in my account of the very world with which I started. 
I come to see that the purely objective world and the purely sub- 
jective datum of consciousness are two ideals toward which we end- 
lessly strive, modifying our notions of each as we change our under- 
standing of the other. 

Are there not left vestiges of sanity, even of something like 
common sense, in my simple philosophy ? Who has ever been offered 
an immediate state of consciousness out of which to construct a 
world? Who has not been forced to start with a world, which it 
was his given task to re-construct? It is only in this process of 
reconstruction that the concepts of "consciousness" and "object of 
consciousness" fall out they fall out together, and together they 
grow apace. To follow the adventures of this pair is, I suspect, to 
be led deep into the heart of things. 




/CIRCUMSTANCES connected with the time of the appearance of 
^-^ Professor McGilvary's courteous questions to me (see this 
JOURNAL for August 17, 1911) prevented my attention to them in 
proper season. I hope the long lapse of time has not outlawed my 
reply such as it is. 

His questions were based primarily upon the following quotation 
from my article in the "James Memorial Volume": "The so-called 
action of 'consciousness' means simply the organic releases in the 
way of behavior which are the conditions of awareness and which 


also modify its content." If I am not able to answer Professor Me- 
Gilvary's questions directly, or with respect to the form in which he 
has put them, it is because these questions, as he formulates them, 
seem to me to depend upon ignoring the force of the so-called pre- 
fixed to action and the quotation-marks surrounding the word con- 
sciousness. I meant by these precautions to warn the reader that I 
was referring to a view for which I disowned responsibility, espe- 
cially as regards "consciousness." In fact I supposed it would be 
evident that the consciousness of the quotation marks designated pre- 
cisely a conception which I was engaged in criticizing, and for which 
I was proffering a substitute. But the form of the questions put to 
me seems to me (I may misapprehend their import) to depend upon 
supposing that I accept just what I meant to reject. Naturally, then, 
the questions imply that I have involved myself in serious incon- 

I quote two passages which afford some overt evidence that my 
impression is correct. "Although elsewhere in this paper Professor 
Dewey defined awareness as attention, I presume that in this sen- 
tence [the one quoted above] he would mean to include consciousness 
in its inattentive forms also." And in connection with his next 
question he says, "Knowledge is one kind of consciousness, pre- 
sumably." Both of these presumptions are natural on the basis of 
the notion of consciousness referred to in quotation marks, but I 
have difficulty in placing them in connection with my own view. 
Now if I am right in supposing that Professor McGilvary means one 
thing by consciousness and I mean another, I am somewhat embar- 
rassed in replying to his questions. If I reply in his sense, I shall 
misrepresent myself; if I reply in mine, I shall probably give addi- 
tional cause for misunderstanding, as the answers will be read in 
terms of his sense. Accordingly, I shall try to indicate what my view 
is, and then state the form his questions would take upon its basis. 

My contention was that "consciousness" is an adjective of be- 
havior, a quality attaching to it under certain conditions. When we 
make a noun of "conscious" and forget that we are dealing (as in 
the case of other nouns in -ness) with an abstract noun, we are guilty 
of the same fallacy as if we abstracted red from things and then 
discussed the relation of redness to things, instead of the relation of 
red things to other things. Hence (to come to question 1) there is 
certainly a question as to the relation of conscious behavior, atten- 
tive behavior, to other kinds of behavior. But this is not a question 
that can be discussed profitably after it has been misput. If the 
actual question is as to the role of the brain in certain kinds of 
behavior, the parallelist, automatist, etc., are making answer after 
they have translated the question into another and artificial form. 


So with the second question. My reply (after I have translated 
the question) is that the aim of knowledge (to which reference was 
made) is the enrichment and guidance of subsequent behaviors of 
all kinds. That conscious behavior grows out of instinctive and 
habitual (routine) behavior and is the prerequisite of moral, tech- 
nological, esthetic, etc., behaviors, and that looking at it in this way 
is the proper way of understanding thinking ("consciousness") and 
all that goes with it, may be false positions as matters of fact, but I 
do not see that such positions involve questions of internal con- 

The third question reads: "If it is the organic releases that 
change the environment in the act of knowing, does knowing as dis- 
tinct from these organic releases make any changes in the environ- 
ment on its own account?" The question involves the repudiated 
conception of consciousness, in the distinction it propounds between 
knowing and behavior. If consciousness be a characteristic quality 
of one kind of behavior, as distinct from other kinds, Professor Mc- 
Gilvary's question can not be asked. The only question is as to 
what changes conscious behavior makes as contrasting with other 
kinds. And my answer is that just given : the changes that conduce 
to direction of subsequent action and to enrichment of their mean- 

The fourth question reads in one of its forms : ' ' Once distinguish 
between consciousness and organic releases, what justification have 
we for asserting that knowledge can be only of the effects of the con- 
ditions of knowledge?" Here again, the distinguishing holds with 
the meaning that Professor McGilvary obviously attributes to "con- 
sciousness," but not upon my meaning. Translated into my own 
terms, the question would read: "What reasons have we for think- 
ing that knowing (attentive) behavior comes after certain other 
kinds?" And I quite agree with my questioner that this question is 
to be studied "just as we study anything else." And considering 
the number of times that an "instrumental" theory of knowing has 
been attacked on the ground that it narrows its consideration to the 
functions of knowledge, it is an interesting variation to find it 
intimated that it declines to extend its view to take them in. 1 To me 
though probably not to those who criticize it this suggests that 
the instrumental theory is trying to date knowing, to place it with 
respect both to its generating conditions and its consequences or 
functions. JOHN DEWEY. 


1 "If knowledge be distinct from its conditions, should we not study it as 
we study anything else, not confining ourselves entirely to the functions of its 
conditions, but extending our view to take in any possible functions it may 
itself have?" 



Some Problems of Philosophy. WILLIAM JAMES. New York: Longmans, 

Green, and Company. 1911. Pp. xii -f 231. 

This last book of Professor James has been prepared for the press by 
Dr. H. M. Kallen from two unfinished and unrevised manuscripts left by 
the author. The first chapter treats of the nature of philosophy, its value, 
and the objections urged against it. " Philosophy, beginning in wonder, 
... is able to fancy everything different from what it is. It sees the 
familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar. It 
rouses us from our native dogmatic slumber and breaks up our caked 
prejudices. Historically it has always been a sort of fecundation of four 
different human interests, science, poetry, religion, and logic, by one 
another" (p. 7). To the objections that philosophy has been dogmatic 
and unpractical Professor James replies that while this has, in a measure, 
been so in the past, there is no reason why it should continue so. " One 
can not see why, if such a policy should appear advisable, philosophy 
might not end by forswearing all dogmatism whatever, and become as 
hypothetical in her manners as the most empirical science of them all " 
(p. 26). As for the objection that philosophy has made no progress, we 
are reminded that " if every step forward which philosophy makes . . . 
gets accredited to science, the residuum of unanswered problems will alone 
remain to constitute the domain of philosophy, and will alone bear her 
name" (pp. 22-23). 

Chapter II. enumerates certain typical problems of metaphysics the 
discussion of which is to occupy the remainder of the book. Some of 
them are : " What are ' thoughts ' and what are ' things ' ? What do we 
mean when we say ' truth ' ? Is there a common stuff out of which all 
facts are made? How comes there to be a world at all? Is unity or di- 
versity more fundamental?" (pp. 29-30). Chapter III. deals with the 
problem of being. Has what exists come into being piecemeal, as the 
empiricist inclines to believe, or has it always been in its completeness a 
totality, as the rationalist holds? We can not say: "For all of us alike, 
fact forms a datum . . . which we can not explain or get behind. It 
makes itself somehow, and our business is far more with its What than 
with its Whence or Why " (p. 46). 

Chapters IV., V., and VI. discuss percept and concept. The author 
expounds with even more than his usual clearness and force the position 
adopted in " A Pluralistic Universe." " The great difference between 
percepts and concepts is that percepts are continuous and concepts are 
discrete" (p. 48). "For rationalistic writers conceptual knowledge was 
not only the more noble knowledge, but it originated independently of 
all perceptual particulars " (p. 55). " To this ultra-rationalistic opinion 
the empiricist contention that the significance of concepts consists always 
in their relation to perceptual particulars has been opposed " (p. 57). 
Needless to say, for the author it is the perceptual flux of particulars that 
has the primary reality. " The flux can never be superseded. We must 
carry it with us to the bitter end of our cognitive business, keeping it in 


the midst of the translation even when the latter proves illuminating, 
and falling back on it alone when the translation gives out. ' The in- 
superability of sensation ' would be a short expression of my thesis. To 
prove it I must show (1) that concepts are secondary formations, inade- 
quate, and only ministerial; and (2) that they falsify as well as omit, and 
make the flux impossible to understand" (p. 79). 

Chapter VII. deals with the One and the Many. " The alternative here 
is known as that between pluralism and monism. It is the most pregnant 
of all the dilemmas of philosophy. . . . Does reality exist distributively ? 
or collectively? in the shape of caches, everys, anys, eithers? or only in 
the shape of an all or whole? . . . Pluralism stands for the distributive, 
monism for the collective form of being" (p. 114). The author then 
proceeds to explain further the nature of pluralism and to defend it from 
the misrepresentations of its monistic critics. Various types of monism 
are noted and the attempt is made to show the natural affinity of monism 
for rationalism and of pluralism for empiricism. A rationalistic plural- 
ist of the type of Professor Howison would, of course, dissent from the 
view that pluralism is essentially empiristic. 

Chapter VIII. treats of the implications and consequences of monism 
and pluralism, and in Chapter IX. the most momentous of these implica- 
tions, the problem of novelty, is introduced and discussed in its several 
aspects through the remainder of the book. The perceptual life gives 
overwhelming testimony to the existence of novelty, and that testimony 
would be convincing were it not that novelty seems to conflict with the 
principle of continuity of which science is so fond. " With the notion 
that the constitution of things is continuous and not discrete, that of 
a divisibility ad infinitum is inseparably bound up. This infinite divisi- 
bility of some facts coupled with the infinite expansibility of others (space, 
time, and number) has given rise to one of the most obstinate of philos- 
ophy's dialectic problems. Let me take up, in as simple a way as I am 
able to, the problem of the infinite" (pp. 155-6). 

The paradoxes involved in the infinite as set forth by Zeno and by 
Kant are then presented, and to the Kantian antinomies (or rather to the 
first two of them) the author replies with what is virtually a defense of 
the " antithesis." A " standing infinite " (as distinguished from a 
" growing infinite," i. e., from the infinity of a series in process of comple- 
tion) can be thought of either distributively or collectively, and it is self- 
contradictory only when thought of collectively. " When we say that ' any,' 
' each,' or ' every ' one of Kant's conditions must be fulfilled, we are there- 
fore on impeccable ground, even though the conditions should form a 
series as endless as that of the whole numbers, to which we are forever 
able to add one. But if we say that ' all ' must be fulfilled and imagine 
' all ' to signify a sum harvested and gathered in, and represented by a 
number, we not only make a requirement utterly uncalled for . . . but 
we create puzzles . . . that may require, to get rid of them again, hypoth- 
eses as violent as Kant's idealism " (p. 163). " If now we turn from 
static to growing forms of being, we find ourselves confronted by much 
more serious difficulties. Zeno's and Kant's dialectic holds good wherever, 


before an end can be reached, a succession of terms, endless by definition, 
must needs have been successively counted out. . . . That Achilles should 
occupy in succession ' all ' the points in a single continuous inch of space 
is as inadmissible a conception as that he should count the series of whole 
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., to infinity and reach an end " (pp. 170-1). In 
the solution, based upon the " new infinite," offered by Mr. B. Russell, the 
author can find no satisfaction. He gives in this connection a critical 
analysis of the new infinite and its claim to override the whole-part 
axiom, which is to the reviewer one of the most interesting parts of the 
book. The essence of the criticism is perhaps best expressed in the fol- 
lowing: "Because any point whatever in an imaginary inch is now con- 
ceivable as being matched by some point in a quarter inch or half inch, 
this numerical ' similarity ' of the different quanta, taken pointwise, is 
treated as if it signified that half inches, quarter inches, and inches are 
mathematically identical things anyhow, and that their differences are 
things which we may scientifically neglect" (p. 179). And after carefully 
examining Mr. Russell's remedy for the Achilles puzzle, which " lies in 
noting that the sets of points in question [constituting the respective dis- 
tances traversed by Achilles and by the tortoise] are conceived as being 
infinitely numerous in both paths, and that where infinite multitudes are 
in question, to say that the whole is greater than the part is false " (p. 
180), the author concludes that "either we must stomach logical contra- 
diction ... or we must admit that the limit is reached in these suc- 
cessive cases by finite and perceptible units of approach drops, buds, 
steps, or whatever we please to term them, of change, coming wholly 
when they do come, or coming not at all" (p. 185). In short, Professor 
James divides the problems of the infinite into two classes: (1) those that 
pertain to the " standing infinite," (2) those that pertain to the " growing 
infinite." The first class of problems, exemplified in the first two antin- 
omies, he solves by accepting the position of Kant's " Antithesis." The 
second class of problems, illustrated in Zeno's " Achilles " and, perhaps, 
by the last two of the Kantian antinomies, he solves by accepting the 
finitist position of the " thesis." This dual division of the infinity prob- 
lems with the correspondingly diverse solutions offered for them, puts the 
whole matter in a new and interesting light. 

In the last chapter the problem of causation is taken up. We get our 
idea of cause from the perceptual experience of our own activity-situa- 
tions. Our desires seem to be genuinely creative of novelties in the 
world. And yet observation and reflection prevent our accepting the per- 
ceptual revelation at its face value. For between our conscious activities 
and the effects which they appear to produce, there intervenes a whole 
series of physiological and physical events which conceptual science must 
recognize as genuine links in the causal chain. This failure of the per- 
ceptual view " has led to the denial of efficient causation and to the sub- 
stitution for it of the bare descriptive notion of uniform sequence among 
events. Thus intellectualist philosophy once more has had to butcher our 
perceptual life in order to make it ' comprehensible ' " (p. 218). 

The book closes with the following passage : " If we took these [activ- 


ity] experiences as the type of what causation is, we should have to as- 
cribe to cases of causation outside of our own life, to physical cases also, 
an inwardly experiential nature. In other words, we should have to 
espouse a so-called ' pan-psychic ' philosophy. This complication, and the 
fact that hidden brain-events appear to be ' closer ' effects than those 
which consciousness directly aims at, lead us to interrupt the subject 
here provisionally. Our main result, up to this point, has been the con- 
trast between the perceptual and the intellectualist treatment of it " 
(p. 218). 

It can not but be keenly disappointing to the reader that this uncom- 
pleted book should stop just at the threshold of the treatment of the more 
specifically metaphysical and cosmological problems mentioned in the 
passage just quoted. It is to be hoped that it may be possible to publish, 
if only in the form of scattered notes and memoranda, some of Professor 
James's final conclusions on such subjects as the relation of mind and 

Considered as an introductory text in philosophy, this book has in a 
high degree that quality which I think, more than any other, explains the 
charm of James's work the quality of making the reader feel as he 
reads that he is himself participating in the creative thinking of the au- 
thor. James speaks here as he has always spoken, not as a master com- 
manding us to accept a completed system of knowledge, but rather as a 
lover of wisdom who invites us to join with him in the search for truth. 



An Introductory Psychology, MELBOURNE STUART READ. Boston: Ginn & 

Co. 1911. Pp. viii + 309. 

In this volume Professor Read presents the results of psychological in- 
vestigation as seen by the teacher. It is written obviously and admittedly 
for the most part at second hand, from text-books rather than from orig- 
inal investigations. It selects from the current literature the facts that 
bear upon the daily life of the student and applies them to an understand- 
ing of the ordinary mental operations. In the attainment of this end it 
may be said to be highly successful. 

The chapters cover the usual material in the introductory texts, in- 
cluding a chapter on the nervous system. In the arrangement there is 
some departure from the usual order which makes necessary anticipation 
in one chapter of material that is to be discussed in detail in another. 
Thus attention is treated after perception and the simple affective proc- 
esses and imagination, including ideational types, after memory. In each 
case many of the principles involved in the earlier treatment are discussed 
in full later. A change in arrangement would make the treatment more 
consistent and concise. 

On the whole the selection of material is very good. The statements 
are accurate and up-to-date. The aim of the book and the character of the 
reader for whom it was intended naturally make the style somewhat dif- 
fuse. There is also rather more about psychology relatively to actual state- 


merits of psychological fact than in the ordinary text-book, but that, too, 
is to be expected and will probably make the book more acceptable to the 
reader for whom it is intended. 




RTVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. April, 1911. Sul concetto di veritd 
(pp. 161-170) : B. VARISCO. - Rational truth varies according to a psycho- 
historical process; absolute truth, determined essentially as such, de- 
mands a theistic basis. Ordine giuridico ed ordine publico (pp. 170-196): 
ALESSANDRO LEVI. - The concept of public order functions as a political 
limit of subjective rights. // subcosciente (pp. 197-206) : ROBERTO As- 
FAGIOLI. - Proposes a stricter terminology to distinguish between the sub- 
conscious proper, co-conscious or dissociated psychic activity, and 
latent consciousness. La valutazione (pp. 207-216) : LUIGI VALLI. - Valua- 
tion is not a simple affective-volitional relation between subject and ob- 
ject, but a real or supposed constancy and uniformity of many such re- 
lations towards the same object. E il Buddhismo una religione o una 
filosofiaf (pp. 217-222): CARLO FORMICHI. - Northern Buddhism reduces 
itself to a system of ethics based on radical pessimism, and therefore 
should be considered a philosophy rather than a religion. II pluralismo 
moderno e il monismo (pp. 223-236) : ALESSANDRO CHIAPPELLI. - Modern 
pluralism, with its absolute heterogeneity, does not account for the mon- 
istic tendency found in recent science, nor the necessary integration de- 
manded by the spiritual principle of neo-Hegelianism. II contento morale 
della liber td nel nostro tempo (pp. 237-281) : GIUSEPPE TAROZZI. - The 
moral content of liberty is nowadays checked by unmoral economic free- 
dom and by excessive individualism ; it is increased by the growth of 
altruism and fraternity. I concetti di fine e di norma in etica (pp. 282 
292) : GIOVANNI VIDARI. - Ends and norms have not a constitutive but a 
heuristic function in ethics. L'errore (pp. 293-306) : F. C. S. SCHILLER. - 
Truth is a logical and error an illogical mode of evaluating a conscious 
situation. (The above papers were presented at the recent International 
Congress of Philosophy at Bologna.) Della filosofia del diritto in Italia 
dalla fine del secolo XVIII alia fine del secolo XIX (pp. 307-335) : F. F. 

RTVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. May-June, 1911. Estema idea logismo 
(pp. 337-360) : ROBERTO ARDIGO. - A positivistic discussion of the psychic 
as a possible world after the analogy of nervous activity. La filosofia 
italiana al Congresso di Bologna (pp. 361-366) : FREDERIOO ENRIQUES. - 
Argues that there is a veritable Italian philosophy and that it is not a 
mere adaptation of foreign thought. Dio e I'anima (pp. 367-386) : B. 
VARISCO. - God and the soul are not mere functions of thought, but real- 
ities. La rinascita dell'Hegel e la filosofia perenne (pp. 387-401) : PAOLA 


ROTTA. - The renewed interest in Hegel (through Croce, Hibben, Royce, 
Enriques) shows his system to be the single alternative to the traditional 
philosophy of transcendence between God and the world. La filosofia che 
non vissero (pp. 402-419) : LUIGI VALLI - Discusses three ways to recon- 
cile the ideal and the real practical, theoretical, mystical. Infinito e 
indefinite in Cartesio (pp. 420-427) : ROBERTO MENASCI. - Shows that Des- 
cartes considered the world infinite, not indefinite. Per I'io di Cartesio e 
di tutti (pp. 428-432) : L. MICHELANGELO BILLIA. -The ego of Descartes is 
not the grammatical subject, but the psychical self. Bibliografia filosofica 
italiana (1910). Recensioni e cenni. Notizie. Atti della Societd Filo- 
sifica Italiana (offers the programme of the fourth International Congress 
of Philosophy at Bologna, at which Professors Fullerton and Creighton 
were elected commissioners). 

Amendola, Giovanni. Maine de Biran : quattro lezione tenute alia bib- 
lioteca filosofica di Firenze nei giorni 14, 17, 21 e 24 Gennaio, 1911. 
Florence: Casa editrice italiana di A. Quattrini. 1911. Pp. 123. 

Blight, Stanley M. The Desire for Qualities. London: Henry Frowde. 
1911. Pp. xii + 322. 2s. 

Botti, Luigi. L'infinito. Genoa: A. F. Formiggini. 1932. Pp. 529. 

Lire 6. 
Herter, Christian A. Biological Aspects of Human Problems. New 

York : The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. xvi + 344. $1.50. 
Wheeler, Charles Kirkland. Critique of Pure Kant. Boston: The 

Arakelyan Press. 1911. Pp. 298. $1.50. 


THE New York Academy of Sciences and its affiliated societies held 
their annual dinner, Monday evening, December 18, at the Hotel Endicott. 
After the dinner, the annual meeting of the academy was held, at the con- 
clusion of which the address of the retiring president, Professor Franz 
Boas, entitled, " The History of the American Race," was read by the 
recording secretary, after which Mr. George Borup, a graduate student 
at Yale University, related a few of his most interesting experiences 
in connection with Admiral Peary's North Polar Expedition of 1908-09. 
According to the report of the recording secretary, the Academy held 
eight business meetings and twenty-seven sectional meetings during the 
year ending November 30, 1911, at which sixty-one stated papers were 
presented, classified under eight branches of science, and two public lec- 
tures were given at the American Museum of Natural History to the 
members of the Academy and its affiliated societies and their friends. 
The academy now has on its rolls 502 active members, including in this 
number 19 associate members; 120 fellows, 90 life members and 11 pa- 
trons, aside from the three members who were elected to fellowship at the 
meeting. The annual election resulted in the choice of the following 


officers for the year 1912: President, Emerson McMillin; vice-presidents, 
J. Edmund Woodman, Frederick A. Lucas, Charles Lane Poor, R. 8. 
Woodworth; corresponding secretary, Henry E. Crampton; recording sec- 
retary, Edmund Otis Hovey; treasurer, Charles F. Cox; librarian, Ralph 
W. Tower; editor, Edmund Otis Hovey; councillors (to serve three years), 
Charles P. Berkey and Clark Wissler ; members of the finance committee, 
Emerson McMillin, Frederic S. Lee, and George F. Kunz. 

IN accordance with announcements already published, the American 
Philosophical Association held its eleventh annual meeting at Harvard 
University, December 27 to 29. There were five sessions, all of which 
were marked by a full attendance and vigorous discussion. Wednesday 
evening the Association was entertained at a reception at the Harvard 
Union. The retiring president, Professor Woodbridge, read his address on 
" Evolution " on Thursday evening, after which occurred the annual 
smoker of the Association at the Colonial Club. At the business meeting 
on Thursday afternoon, it was voted to continue the Committee on Dis- 
cussion. Officers for the ensuing year were elected as follows: president, 
Professor Frank Thilly, of Cornell University; vice-president, Professor 
Norman Kemp Smith, of Princeton University; new members of the 
Executive Committee, Mr. W. B. Pitkin, of Columbia University, and 
Professor E. A. Singer, of the University of Pennsylvania. The place of 
the next meeting of the Association was left to the Executive Committee 
with power. 

THE twentieth annual meeting of the American Psychological Asso- 
ciation, held at Washington, December 27 to 29, was more than usually 
successful from the standpoints of both attendance and interest. The 
conference on psychology and medical education brought together a num- 
ber of eminent psychiatrists and psychologists; and while few if any 
problems were settled, many issues were raised and the pressing need of 
attention to them was made plainly apparent. The Association author- 
ized the organization of a committee on psychology in its relations with 
medical education, and President Seashore appointed to this committee 
Professor W. D. Scott, Professor E. E. Southard, and Professor J. B. 
Watson. Professor E. L. Thorndike was elected president for the ensuing 
year. The new members of the Council, to serve for three years, are 
Professor Margaret F. Washburn and Professor Max Meyer. 

DR. G. STANLEY HALL, president of Clark University, delivered the 
address at the inauguration of Dr. George E. Myers, principal of the 
State Manual Training Normal School at Pittsburg, Kansas. The sub- 
ject of the address was " Educational Efficiency." 

PROFESSOR JOSEPH JASTROW, of the University of Wisconsin, gave a 
public lecture, entitled " On the Trail of the Subconscious," at the Univer- 
sity on December 4, under the auspices of the University Association for 
Research and Phi Beta Kappa. 

DR. ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, hitherto assistant professor, has been 
promoted to a full professorship in anthropology at Clark University. 

VOL. IX. No. 2. JANUARY 18, 1912. 



IN this age, when nearly every discipline has achieved its own par- 
ticular pedagogy and has become self-conscious and, in a meas- 
ure, revised in terms of educational method, philosophy has almost 
escaped. Whether it is because philosophy is not among the high 
school disciplines, or because it is not popular enough, or because its 
canons are regarded as all its own and mysteriously apart, it is at 
any rate true that the pedagogical series yet lacks a ' ' How to Study 
and Teach Philosophy" to match the history and mathematics 

It may be that it will do philosophy no earthly good to come to 
pedagogical self -consciousness ; but there is only one way to find out 
unless one has a truly shameless aprioristic conscience. And it is 
with philosophy as it is with most other subjects : the more elemen- 
tary courses present the most harassing problems and are worthy 
of first attention. Of these elementary courses, the one that most 
obtrudes itself, because of its frankly experimental character, is the 
course whose purpose is avowedly and exclusively introductory. 
Whether a special course of this sort should be given at all is still 
a mooted question ; and that the aims and methods of such a course 
are still highly problematical is evidenced by the increasing number of 
text-books for such courses, each one written largely under the im- 
pression that the others are unsatisfactory. Here, at least, is a prob- 
lem upon which educational method must have its say : it is enlight- 
ened pedagogy alone that is to decide whether such a course should 
be given and what shall be the method of its presentation. Such 
philosophic pedagogy will be the product mainly of the reflective ex- 
perience of numbers of teachers. It is important that we know just 
what that experience is. 

Last year the Western Philosophical Association at its spring 
meeting devoted a special session to the consideration of the aims and 



methods of introduction courses in philosophy. 1 Unusual interest 
was aroused in the problems raised, and it was unanimously decided 
to pursue the subject further through an investigation which would 
aim to enlist the active cooperation of a considerable number of 
teachers of philosophy in representative colleges and universities of 
this country. For this investigation a committee was appointed. 2 
A questionnaire was prepared, through which it was hoped to ob- 
tain light with regard to the prevalence of courses specifically intro- 
ductory, their precise aims, and their methods, both formal and con- 
tentual ; besides which any other suggestions concerning the pedagogy 
of introduction courses were invited. 

The results of this investigation proved to be thoroughly worth 
while. Replies were received from most of the leading colleges and 
universities from thirty-five institutions in all, twelve of which 
were state universities. As a rule, the questions were answered in 
careful detail; and suggestions beyond the answers to specific ques- 
tions were often appended. The committee concluded its work with 
a brief report to the Association at its meeting last December. Since 
then, however, those who had been members of this committee agreed 
that it might be profitable for some one to go over the replies care- 
fully, with a view to a digest which might be of essential interest to 
teachers of philosophy in general. This task was handed over to the 
writer, who herewith presents the results of his review, together with 
such comments as have seemed to him worth while. 


More than two thirds of the departments represented in the re- 
plies offer a special course in the introduction to philosophy. The 
omission of the course is not restricted to the smaller colleges ; thus, 
one is led to conclude that its omission is not merely a matter of 
economy, but of principle. For instance, no course under this specific 
title is offered at Harvard, Yale, Minnesota, California, or Stanford. 
Five of the departments that omit the course express themselves as 
doubtful concerning the advisability of offering it. Two departments 
have discontinued the course, one because it seemed the least im- 
portant in a crowded curriculum, and one because it had not proved 
a successful method. A member of this latter department writes: 
"It is not and in my judgment never can be a satisfactory method 
of introducing a student to the subject." 

1 See ' ' The Tenth Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Associa- 
tion," reported by Bernard C. Ewer, in this JOURNAL, Vol. VII., pp. 426-428. 

'This committee consisted of Messrs. Bernard C. Ewer, Edgar L. Hinman, 
and the writer. 


Of course all the institutions represented have introductory 
courses of some kind. For instance, the chairman of the division of 
philosophy in one of our most important universities writes that the 
division offers no single course in the introduction to philosophy, and 
that it virtually accepts the principle that it is better to provide dif- 
ferent methods of approach that may suit men with different inter- 
ests and equipment. The usual elementary courses serve this pur- 

The important facts to note are that less than one third of the 
departments represented do not offer a special course in the intro- 
duction to philosophy ; that the majority of those that fail to offer it 
express no conviction against it ; that of the few that do, only one has 
tried it ; and that nearly all those that omit it make attempts to intro- 
duce the student in some other specific and systematic way, a sum- 
mary account of which will be given later under a discussion of 

The answers reveal three main aims : first, the introduction of the 
student to philosophic thinking of his own ; second, to the problems 
of philosophy; third, to the historic systems. A small number 
(eight) think the three aims equally fundamental. Two of these 
think that the order of the fulfilling of these aims should be three, 
two, one, in the above enumeration. Few are willing to omit any 
one of these aims, and these few omit the introduction to historic 
systems, save, in some cases, as a means. Only one makes this latter 
aim primary. Among the rest, opinion is about evenly divided be- 
tween the first and second aims as fundamental, with a slight tend- 
ency to emphasize philosophic thinking of the student's own. To 
quote a particularly thoughtful reply from a department in one of 
our best New England colleges: "I feel strongly that the courses 
should aim above all else to make thinkers out of the men, to make 
them men able and anxious to think their way through knotty prob- 
lems, and to give them a desire to get at the truth and an open- 
mindedness towards any evidence bearing on the problems, and if 
they get these things, it is a matter of secondary importance what 
they know of philosophy (i. e., how much) for time will remedy 
that lack of quantity and also what philosophy they believe; for 
success in attaining the results just mentioned as desirable will 
guarantee the quality of their product." 

Of those who emphasize the aim as the introducing of the stu- 
dent to the problems of philosophy, a number lay stress upon the 
problems "as they present themselves to thinkers to-day" or "in re- 
lation to present-day attitudes and tendencies." 


One reply adds an aim not named above : the preparation of the 
student to enter into the spirit of the great literatures. 



There are six chief methods suggested, which will be discussed 
in the order of their preference. 

1. Through the History of Philosophy. A majority (twenty- 
four) name the history of philosophy as an indispensable part of the 
means whereby the student shall be introduced to philosophy, and all 
but three of these emphasize it as of chief importance. Thirteen of 
the twenty-four consider the history of philosophy an all-sufficient 
method, the rest preferring to supplement it in various ways, the way 
most frequently mentioned being the discussion of the special philo- 
sophical problems for their own sakes especially the problems of 
the present day, which saves the student from a sense of remoteness 
and, in some degree, meets the objection of one who writes that he 
does not prefer the history of philosophy as a method because "it is 
too likely to detach the student from the problems of present-day 

Some of the departments that prefer the historical method are 
among those that were recorded above as having no special course 
in the introduction to philosophy. A member of a department of 
this sort, with definite objections to a special introduction course, 
strongly defends the historical method thus: "Assuming that the 
proper introductory course is the historical one, it should teach the 
student to do some philosophical thinking on his own account, and 
to get possession of himself through familiarizing himself with the 
fundamental categories of thought as these have emerged in the 
course of the development of philosophy. I am firmly convinced, as 
the result of my own experience, that no other way of approach can 
equal the historical in accomplishing these purposes. The aim is of 
course never simply to present views that others have held at a cer- 
tain time, but always to awaken and stimulate the student's own 
powers of reflection by helping him to live through the historical 
movement. Any independent introduction is sure to be partial and 
one-sided. It is not possible entirely to escape from this danger 
even by means of the historical course, but at least the student has a 
better opportunity to get a first-hand acquaintance with the different 
points of view which have together contributed to bring philosophy 
to its present stage." 

Some replies emphasize the fact that the vast majority of stu- 
dents come to the study of philosophy with no realization of its prob- 


lems. These problems have to be made real, and the history of their 
actual rise is indispensable for this purpose. That the history may 
genuinely accomplish this result, it is suggested that the main aim 
should be to present the more fundamental advances made toward 
a theory of the world and life in such a way that they seem progres- 
sive answers or approximations, rather than mere speculations. One, 
who has made a signal success of the historical mode of introduction, 
advises that it is an excellent principle to lay down at the beginning 
of such a course that the views represented by the historical philos- 
ophers were absolutely convincing to those who held them, and that 
until one is able to feel the plausibility of the doctrines presented, he 
is in no position to criticize them. ' ' All this means of course that the 
older philosophies live on in contemporaneous thinking, and that no 
view, however crude, fails to find its counterpart in the thinking of 
each one who is undertaking to get possession of himself. ' ' 

It is almost the unanimous opinion of those who favor the histor- 
ical method that generous use should be made of the sources : in this 
connection, the texts of Descartes, Locke, and Berkeley are most 
frequently mentioned as of special value to the beginner. 

The few who advance reasons against the historical method agree 
in insisting that the history of philosophy should follow and not pre- 
cede a somewhat systematic treatment of the problems of philosophy. 
It is objected that unless this is done the student is "too raw" to 
grasp the significance of the history, which, at any rate, is more val- 
uable to him after he has come face to face with some of the problems 
for himself. 

This leads us to a consideration of the method next in favor. 

2. Through the Problems of Philosophy Considered in Them- 
selves. While only six consider the discussion of the problems of 
philosophy an all-sufficient introduction, it is most frequently men- 
tioned as auxiliary to other methods, especially the historical. One, 
who favors the historical method for the less mature, is convinced that 
to those who are equal to it, it proves more stimulating than the his- 
torical courses. There is a general insistence that the problems shall 
be presented in connection with present-day issues and solutions, and 
that they should first emerge through a Socratie questioning of the 
student's own attitudes toward life. 8 As a typical reply puts it: 
"Introduce the student to philosophy through his stock on hand. 
Begin where the students are and grow into philosophy with them. 
Drag the problems out of them ; they are already infected. ' ' 

3. Through Science: Its Generalizations and Presuppositions. 
No one considers this, taken by itself, a good mode of approach for 

* See article on ' ' Hegel 'a Conception of an Introduction to Philosophy, ' ' by 
J. W. Hudson, in this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., pp. 345 ff. 


the average class, although some think it commendable for students 
with specifically scientific preparation. Nevertheless, as many as 
twelve deem it a valuable auxiliary method. The advantages most 
stressed include that of enabling the teacher to show the inevitable- 
ness of the philosophic task and at the same time to distinguish this 
task in aim and method from that of the sciences. Another merit of 
the approach through an examination of the presuppositions of sci- 
ence is felt to be the opening of an attractive and easy way to th<> 
problems of epistemology. 

The objections to this method are more outspoken and specinV 
than to any of the others discussed. They group themselves into 
four main criticisms. First, it is alleged that students are not at the 
outset interested in the presuppositions of science; second, their 
knowledge of the sciences is too limited, except in isolated cases : for 
the special student in the sciences, who would be qualified, rarely 
cares anything about philosophy; third, the problems aroused by 
science soon suffer from abstractness ; fourth, to quote the reply of a 
noted psychologist and authority on the mind of the youth, "This is 
the very worst method, for it brings precocity and conceit." 

4. Through Literature. While only one reply mentions as a 
purpose the introduction of the student to the great literatures, a 
little over a third lay some stress upon it as a valuable means among 
others, especially if used judiciously and discriminatingly. Its specific 
use, according to several, is to relate the history of philosophy to the 
total life of a people ; according to others, its value is in furnishing 
material and food for thought along the line of special problems 
under discussion. One reply mentions as being of worth for intro- 
ductory purposes a course on philosophical ideas in the English liter- 
ature of the nineteenth century, starting with Pope for a back- 
ground. This reply adds that the vast advantage is that the topics 
mean something to the student at once; moreover, they furnish ac- 
cess to any philosophical question one may care to raise, and the prob- 
lems need not be carried out any further than the class can stand. 
The writer of this reply, however, considers such a course as merely 

Several feel that the introduction through the great literatures 
can best be made in conjunction with the history of philosophy. One 
reply, representative of this conviction, is of such interest and worth 
that I quote from it at length : 

The best "find" in the history of philosophy for me is to begin with 
Oriental literatures, with enough copies of some of the best things in the depart- 
mental library, so that the students can browse and make selections of things they 
like in their notes. The order used is: Confucius, Mencius, Lao Tse, the Vedas, 
Brahmanas Upanishads (the six systems, cursorily, in outline), Buddhism, Persia, 


Egypt. Then, later, in its proper place, Hebrew literature and Jesus. Among 
the advantages are: a world-view; the possible historic setting of some of the 
Greek conceptions; a larger conception of the continuity of life and thought; 
and, most of all, an escape once for all from the false notion that ' ' philosophy ' ' 
consists in a lot of "systems" just. Philosophy has certainly drawn more 
historically, and does still, from ethics, poetry, religion, and the like than from 
science and logic. Philosophy is man 's attempt to formulate to himself his sense 
of worth (scientific, social, moral, esthetic), or his appreciation of meaning, or 
feeling of reality, and it is better and easier for students to catch first the verities 
in the great literatures of philosophy that are struggling to get themselves said, 
and then to formulate them into systematic statements so far as possible. It is 
a shame to have students break their heads over conceptions and systems and 
imagine that is philosophy the first thing. It is a piece of good luck if they get 
through it all with a taste left for philosophy. 

A representative of one of our larger philosophy departments, 
who thinks that most modern " introductions" are written primarily 
for future special students of philosophy, and that they are apt to 
be too technical for the average student, expresses the desire for a 
source-book of good literary material. With many others who have 
had practical experience with the problem, he feels that the diffi- 
culty is that most of our philosophy is not simple and interesting 
enough ("not literature enough") for the beginning student; while 
most literature is not philosophic enough or is so diffuse that a be- 
ginner loses sight of the philosophical problem. 

Apart from the objection on the part of some that literature is 
"too thin" to introduce to philosophy with much success, the diffi- 
culty is raised that most of those who affect literature seem to be 
usually devoid of philosophic interest. Another still more impor- 
tant objection is that while it is easy to get students to take literary 
courses in philosophy, they do not produce any adequate preparation 
for more advanced work. 

One's total impression after reading the replies under this head 
is that we have not paid enough attention to the use of the great 
literatures as an auxiliary mode of introduction to evaluate it ade- 
quately, and that here is a field in which some one might do some 
really needful intensive work with regard to both sources and 

5. Through Kulturgeschichte. Several, who prefer a historical 
approach, do not care to narrow the student to the history of tech- 
nical philosophy, but wish vitally to relate that history to Kultur- 
geschichte, i. e., the evolution of science, morality, art, religion, and 
political life, in short, the history of institutions. This is to pre- 
vent the student from getting the impression that, either historically 
or systematically, "philosophy is simply a clever and surprising 
species of intellectual gymnastics performed in vacuo," and also 


to lead him to philosophy through familiar highways. Some, who 
do not prefer the history of philosophy at all, or only secondarily, as 
a mode of introduction, nevertheless are convinced that philosophy 
can best be made to emerge from a consideration of the metaphysical 
implications of the history of institutions. Some very thoughtful 
replies were received on this somewhat untried method replies that 
lead one to feel that, in the right hands, it would be highly successful, 
at least in a supplementary way. In order to give a more detailed 
idea of this method, I quote from the reply of one who has tried it 
and made a success of it in connection with the history of philosophy 
proper : 

This introductory course should deal with the ' ' natural ' ' systems of peoples 
and ages rather than with the "artificial" systems developed by exceptional 
historic thinkers. A recent article in the JOURNAL* describes what I try to 
make my general history of philosophy a history of the ideals of peoples, their 
origin and significance (a) to the peoples themselves and (b) to succeeding agea 
and peoples, especially to us. I always encourage the point of view of people, 
and even take up their problems for systematic discussion so far as the class 
seem inclined to it and time permits. In general, the relation of philosophical 
movements to the life of the times which produced them needs emphasis in an 
introductory course more than the content (conceptual or doctrinal) of the move- 
ments themselves. I agree with you that the philosophy involved in history is 
the best subject-matter for this introductory course, and have pursued it to such 
an extent in the past that the historical department has sometimes asked what 
I'm teaching my students! I emphasize everything bearing on the history of 
institutions and social organization science in relation to industry, political 
organization, law, social customs and standards of moral judgment, the medieval 
church, educational devices and methods, historical events such as the wars with 
Philip, the conquests of Alexander, the fall of Borne with barbarian invasions, 
the rise and significance of the Holy Roman Empire, etc., using all the informa- 
tion students gather from other courses so far as possible.* 

6. Through the Religious Interest. The experience of several 
leads them to believe that the best way to a realization of the mean- 
ing of philosophy is through the religious interest. Through this, 
they find, is best reached the life and thinking of the majority. Of 
the six who mention this mode of approach, none rely upon it alone. 
Five combine it with the historic, scientific, and literary approaches. 
One finds that " comparing the religious with the scientific point of 
view creates thinking and forces the student to see the necessity for 
intelligent opinion." 

7. Other Methods. Two other modes of approach are named. 
Three mention logic without comment and one expresses a preference 

"An Introduction to Philosophy through the Philosophy in History," by 
J. W. Hudson, in this JOURNAL, Vol. VII., pp. 569 ff. 

'See also "The Aims of an Introductory Course in Philosophy," by Edgar 
L. Hinman, in this JOURNAL, Vol. VII., pp. 561 ff., an article in general sympathy 
with the above method. 


for the problems of sociology as revealing the necessity for a rational 
basis, and epistemology as showing the possibility and character of 
such a basis. Three mention psychology as a desirable prerequisite 
for the introductory course. Several feel that the mode of approach 
depends very largely upon the teacher, or upon the character of the 
students, or upon both. 

An attempt was made by the writer to discover whether those 
who agree concerning the true aim of an introduction course tend 
toward any agreement in method. No such tendency was discern- 
ible, except in the instance of those who find that all the aims 
named are to be reckoned with, in which case the question of ends 
and means was merely relative and a matter of emphasis solely. 


Only seven of the thirty-five who replied deem a text-book un- 
desirable, and only three of these would rely wholly upon lectures 
and discussions. The other four prefer assigned readings from 
carefully selected sources. One writer objects to the use of a single 
text on the ground that it supplies the student with answers, so that 
he does not do the thinking for himself that is essential to his phi- 
losophizing. One department of a well-known eastern university 
writes that it uses none of the elementary text-books written espe- 
cially for the classroom. 

Those who do rely wholly upon lectures and discussions feel that 
a book of any sort gets in the way of the student's own thinking, 
one suggestion being that the student's own experience is a sufficient 
text to yield him a modicum of first-hand philosophic thinking. 

But the conviction of the majority is unequivocally in favor of 
some kind of text, a conviction which, in general, is based upon 
the feeling that immature students in philosophy need a basis for 
discussion or ' ' center of operations ' ' ; that young students are used 
to quite definite tasks and require them; and that the text best 
directs the task and steadies the student's work. One reason given 
in defense of a text is that students are helped by models to imitate 
critically. A number insist that the text should be used only in con- 
nection with sources. Many suggest (what has fortunately become a 
truism) that the text-book be used as a basis not of mere recitation 
but of active discussion. 

It is interesting to note that while the majority are in favor of 
the use of a text-book, over one third of these complain that they 
have found none that is satisfactory, although they have tried a 
number of the more popular introductions. The criticisms are not 


explicit enough to be of any final value. Some think the current 
text-books too technical; others regard them as "not intelligible and 
concrete enough." One reply suggests what is probably very near 
the truth : that, on account of the nature of the course, each teacher 
would have to write his own text-book if he wishes one thoroughly 
satisfactory to himself. One teacher practically follows this sug- 
gestion by conducting the course through the aid of a syllabus in the 
form of questions, which aims to bring the student in contact with 
the sources, to guide his reading, and to prepare him to assist in 
class discussion by suggesting problems. 


First of all, the result of this questionnaire should not be taken 
for more than it purports to be the more or less off-hand contribu- 
tion of thirty-five teachers of philosophy to a problem so little dis- 
cussed as yet that few have attained to critical convictions on the 
subject. Yet, while the answers give results that obviously are not 
final, they are of immense suggestive value both for those to whom 
the introduction course is a real problem and for those who wish a 
basis for further investigation. We have not yet fully realized how 
much might be gained for philosophy by the active and intelligent 
cooperation of its teachers, although our journals and associations 
are gradually awakening us to the new demands and opportunities 
of conference. 

There are two points upon which most of the replies agree, no 
matter what the emphasis of aim or method : one point relates to a 
pedagogical principle and the other to what philosophy should be 
made to mean to the student. First, most emphasize the imperative 
need of getting at the student's point of view and of making phi- 
losophy emerge from that, instead of from any external ipsissima 
vcrba. To this end, much emphasis is laid upon generous and wisely 
directed discussion, the subjects of which shall be the problems of the 
class always these rather than those of the teacher. To this same 
end, we are warned against "talking over the heads of our hearers" 
and are told that the one thing needful pedagogically is close per- 
sonal intercourse between the student and the instructor, in order to 
get at each man's mind and to stimulate him to the formation of a 
critical opinion of his own. Second, the replies emphasize the fact 
that philosophy shall be so taught that we shall avoid the danger of 
making it seem what too often it does seem a thing of futility, an 
empty speculation. The problems of philosophy are to be made 
real, and for this purpose it is well constantly to refer to the vital 
issues of the present. Thus will philosophy be made a living thing 


and assume its rightful place as part of the inmost life of him who is 
so fortunate as to find it. 




problems of philosophy fall naturally into four groups: 
(1) Problems of knowing; (2) problems of being; (3) prob- 
lems of acting; (4) problems of feeling. The subjects with which 
these problems deal comprise, respectively, epistemology, metaphys- 
ics, ethics, and esthetics. Epistemology is itself concerned with two 
fairly distinct types of problems : ( 1 ) the functional problem of the 
criteria of truth and the way of attaining it; (2) the structural prob- 
lem of the nature of knowledge and the relation of the knower to the 
known. Discussion of the functional problem of epistemology has 
given us such doctrines and attitudes as mysticism, rationalism, em- 
piricism, and pragmatism, which are so many theories as to how we 
should get our knowledge and how we should test its truth. Discus- 
sion of the second or structural problem of epistemology has given 
us the doctrines of nai've realism, of dualistic realism, and of subjec- 
tivism, which are so many theories as to the nature of the relation of 
a knower to the objects known. These three epistemological theories, 
or rather types of theory (for there are, as we shall see, several 
variations of each), may be discussed pretty much on their own 
merits and in relative independence not only of metaphysical, 
ethical, and esthetical issues, but even of the epistemological prob- 
lems of the methodological or functional kind. In this paper I shall 
undertake to define the theories of nai've realism, dualism, and sub- 
jectivism, as they appear to me, and to show how the difficulties in- 
herent in the first theory have led to the adoption of the second, and 
how that has been given up for the third, the futility of which, in its 
turn, has led to a revival of the first. 

The theory of nai've realism is the most primitive of the theories 
under discussion. It conceives of objects as directly presented to 
consciousness and being precisely what they appear to be. Nothing 
intervenes between the knower and the world external to him. Ob- 
jects are not represented in consciousness by ideas; they are them- 
selves directly presented. This theory makes no distinction between 
seeming and being ; things are just what they seem. Consciousness is 
thought of as analogous to a light which shines out through the 

1 Bead at the tenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical Associa- 
tion, December, 1910. 


sense organs, illuminating the world outside the knower. There is in 
this naive view a complete disregard of the personal equation and of 
the elaborate mechanism underlying sense perception. In a world 
in which there was no such thing as error, this theory of the knowl- 
edge relation would remain unchallenged; but with the discovery of 
error and illusion comes perplexity. Dreams are probably the earliest 
phenomena of error to arouse the primitive mind from its dogmatic 
realism. How can a man lie asleep in his bed and at the same time 
travel to distant places and converse with those who are dead? How 
can the events of the dream be reconciled with the events of waking 
experience ? The first method of dealing with this type of error is to 
divide the real world into two realms, equally objective and equally 
external, but the one visible, tangible, and regular, the other more 
or less invisible, mysterious, and capricious. The soul after death, 
and sometimes during sleep, can enter the second of these realms. 
The objectified dreamland of the child and the ghostland of the sav- 
age are the outcome of the first effort of natural realism to cope with 
the problem of error. It is easy to see, however, that this doubling 
up of the world of existing objects will only explain a very limited 
number of dream experiences, while to the errors of waking experi- 
ence it is obviously inapplicable. Whenever, for example, the dream 
is concerned with the same events as those already experienced in 
waking life, there can be no question of appealing to a shadow world. 
Unreal events that are in conflict with the experience of one's fellows, 
and even with one's own more inclusive experience, must be banished 
completely from the external world. Where, then, shall they be lo- 
cated? What is more reasonable than to locate them inside the per- 
son who experiences them? for it is only upon him that the unreal 
object produces any effect. The objects of our dreams and our 
fancies, and of illusions generally, are held to exist only "in the 
mind." They are like feelings and desires in being directly experi- 
enced only by a single mind. Thus the soul, already held to be the 
mysterious principle of life, and endowed with peculiar properties, 
transcending ordinary physical things, is further enriched by being 
made the habitat of the multitudinous hosts of non-existent objects. 
Still further reflection on the phenomena of error leads to the dis- 
covery of the element of relativity in all knowledge, and finally to 
the realization that no external happening can be perceived until 
after it has ceased to exist. The events we perceive as present are 
always past, for in order that anything may be perceived it must send 
energy of some kind to our sense organs, and by the time the energy 
reaches us the phase of existence which gave rise to it has passed 
away. To this universal and necessary temporal aberration of per- 


ceived objects is added an almost equally universal spatial aberra- 
tion. For all objects that move relatively to the observer are per- 
ceived not where they are when perceived, but, at best, where they 
were when the stimulus issued from them- Not only may some of the 
stars which we see shining each night have ceased to shine years be- 
fore we were born, but even the sun which we see at a certain place 
in the sky is there no longer. The present sun, the only sun that now 
exists, we never see. It fills the space that to us appears empty. Its 
distance from what we see as the sun is measured by the distance 
through which the earth has turned on its axis in the eight minutes 
which it has taken the sun 's light to reach our eye. And in addition 
to these spatial and temporal aberrations of perception we know that 
what we perceive will depend not only upon the nature of the object 
but on the nature of the medium through which its energies have 
passed on their way to our organism ; and also upon the condition of 
our sense organs and brain. Finally, we have every reason to be- 
lieve that whenever the brain is stimulated in the same way in which 
it is normally stimulated by an object, we shall experience that ob- 
ject even though it is in no sense existentially present. These many 
undeniable facts prove that error is no trivial and exceptional phe- 
nomenon, but the normal, necessary, and universal taint from which 
every perceptual experience must suffer. 

It is such considerations as these that have led to the abandon- 
ment of naive realism in favor of the second theory of the nature of 
knowledge. According to this second theory, which is exemplified in 
the philosophies of Descartes and Locke, the mind never perceives 
anything external to itself. It can perceive only its own ideas or 
states. But as it seems impossible to account for the order in which 
these ideas occur by appealing to the mind in which they occur, it is 
held to be permissible and even necessary to infer a world of external 
objects resembling to a greater or less extent the effects, or ideas, 
which they produce in us. What we perceive is now held to be only 
a picture of what really exists. Consciousness is no longer thought 
of as analogous to a light which directly illumines the extra-organic 
world, but rather as a painter's canvas or a photographic plate 
on which objects in themselves imperceptible are represented. 
The great advantage of the second or picture theory is that it fully 
accounts for error and illusion ; the disadvantage of it is that it ap- 
pears to account for nothing else. The only external world is one 
that we can never experience, the only world that we can have any 
experience of is the internal world of ideas. When we attempt to 
justify the situation by appealing to inference as the guarantee of 
this unexperienceable externality, we are met by the difficulty that 
the world we infer can only be made of the matter of experience, i. e., 


can only be made up of mental pictures in new combinations. An 
inferred object is always a perceptible object, one that could be in 
some sense experienced, and, as we have seen, the only things that 
according to this view can be experienced are our mental states. 
Moreover, the world in which all our interests are centered is the 
world of experienced objects. Even if, per impossibile, we could 
justify the belief in a world beyond that which we could experience, 
it would be but a barren achievement, for such a world would con- 
tain none of the things that we see and feel. Such a so-called real 
world would be more alien to us and more thoroughly queer than 
were the ghostland or dreamland which, as we remember, the primi- 
tive realist sought to use as a home for certain of the unrealities of 

It seems very natural at such a juncture to try the experiment of 
leaving out this world of extra-mental objects, and contenting our- 
selves with a world in which there exist only minds and their states. 
This is the third theory, the theory of subjectivism. According to it, 
there can be no object without a subject, no existence without a con- 
sciousness of it. To be, is to be perceived. The world of objects 
capable of existing independently of a knower (the belief in which 
united the natural realist and the dualistic realist) is now rejected. 
This third theory agrees with the first theory in being epistemolog- 
ically monistic, t. e., in holding to the presentative rather than to the 
representative theory of perception, for, according to the first theory, 
whatever is perceived must exist, and according to the present theory 
whatever exists must be perceived. Nai've realism subsumed the per- 
ceived as a species under the genus existent. Subjectivism subsumes 
the existent as a species under the genus perceived. But while the 
third theory has these affiliations with the first theory, it agrees with 
the second theory in regarding all perceived objects as mental states 
ideas inhering in the mind that knows them and as inseparable 
from that mind as any accident is from the substance that owns it. 

Subjectivism has many forms, or rather, many degrees. It occurs 
in its first and most conservative form in the philosophy of Berkeley. 
Descartes and Locke, and other upholders of the dualistic epistemol- 
ogy, had already gone beyond the requirements of the picture theory 
in respect to the secondary qualities of objects. Not content with the 
doctrine that these qualities as they existed in objects could only be 
inferred, they had denied them even the inferential status which they 
accorded to primary qualities. The secondary qualities that we per- 
ceive are not even copies of what exists externally. They are the 
cloudy effects produced in the mind by combinations of primary 
qualities, and they resemble unreal objects in that they are merely 
subjective. The chief ground for this element of subjectivism in the 


systems of dualistic realism immediately preceding Berkeley, was the 
belief that relativity to the percipient implied subjectivity. As the 
secondary qualities showed this relativity, they were condemned as 
subjective. Now it was the easiest thing in the world for Berkeley 
to show that an equal or even greater relativity pertained to the 
primary qualities. The perceived form, size, and solidity of an ob- 
ject depend quite as much upon the relation of the percipient to the 
object as do its color and temperature. If it be axiomatic that what- 
ever is relative to the perceiver exists only as an idea, why, then, the 
primary qualities which were all that remained of the physical world 
could be reduced to mere ideas. But just here Berkeley brought his 
reasoning to an abrupt stop. He refused to recognize that (1) the 
relations between ideas or the order in which they are given to us, 
and (2) the other minds that are known, are quite as relative to the 
knower as are the primary and secondary qualities of the physical 
world. I can know other minds only in so far as I have experience 
of them, and to infer their independent existence involves just as 
much and just as little of the process of objectifying and hypostatiz- 
ing my own ideas as to infer the independent existence of physical 
objects. Berkeley avoided this obvious result of his own logic by 
using the word "notion" to describe the knowledge of those things 
that did not depend for their existence on the fact that they were 
known. If you had an idea of a thing say of your neighbor's body 
then that thing existed only as a mental state. But if you had a 
notion of a thing say of your neighbor's mind then that thing was 
quite capable of existing independently of your knowing it. Con- 
sidering the vigorous eloquence with which Berkeley inveighed 
against the tendency of philosophers to substitute words for thoughts, 
it is pathetic that he should himself have furnished such a striking 
example of that very fallacy. In later times Clifford and Pearson 
did not hesitate to avail themselves of a quite similar linguistic de- 
vice for escaping the solipsistic conclusion of a consistent subjectiv- 
ism. The distinction between the physical objects which as "con- 
structs" exist only in the consciousness of the knower and other 
minds which as "ejects" can be known without being in any way 
dependent on the knower, is essentially the same both in its meaning 
and in its futility as the Berkeleian distinction of idea and notion. 
For the issue between realism and subjectivism does not arise from a 
psycho-centric predicament a difficulty of conceiving of objects 
apart from any consciousness but rather from the much more rad- 
ical "ego-centric predicament" the difficulty of conceiving known 
things to exist independently of my knowing them. And the poig- 
nancy of the predicament is quite independent of the nature of the 


object itself, whether that be a physical thing like my neighbor's 
body, or a psychical thing like my neighbor's mind. 

Some part of this difficulty Hume saw and endeavored to meet in 
his proof that the spiritual substances of Berkeley were themselves 
mere ideas; but Hume's position is itself subject to two criticisms: 
First, it does not escape the ego-centric predicament for it is as diffi- 
cult to explain how one "bundle of perceptions" can have any 
knowledge of the other equally real "bundle of perceptions" as to 
explain how one "spirit" can have knowledge of other "spirits." 
Second, the Humean doctrine suffers from an additional difficulty 
peculiar to itself, in that by destroying the conception of the mind 
as a "substance," it made meaningless the quite correlative concep- 
tion of perceived objects as mental "states." If there is no sub- 
stance there can not be any states or accidents, and there ceases to 
be any sense in regarding the things that are known as dependent 
upon or inseparable from a knower. 2 

Passing on to that form of subjectivism developed by Kant, we 
may note three points: (1) A step back toward dualism, in that he 
dallies with, even if he does not actually embrace, the dualistic notion 
of a ding-an-sich, a reality outside and beyond the realm of experi- 
enced objects which serves as their cause or ground. (2) A step in 
advance of the subjectivism of Berkeley and Hume, in that Kant re- 
duces to the subjective status not merely the facts of nature but also 
her laws, so far, at least, as they are based upon the forms of space 
and time and upon the categories. (3) There appears in the Kant- 
ian system a wholly new feature which is destined to figure promi- 
nently in later systems. I mean the dualistic conception of the 
knower, as himself a twofold being, transcendental and empirical. 
It is the transcendental or noumenal self that gives laws to nature, 
and that owns the experienced objects as its states. The empirical or 
phenomenal self, on the other hand, is simply one object among 
others, and enjoys no special primacy in its relation to the world of 
which it is a part. 8 

The post-Kantian philosophies deal with the three points just 
mentioned in the following ways: (1) The retrograde feature of 
Kant's doctrine the belief in the ding-an-sich is abandoned. (2) 
The step in advance the legislative power conferred by Kant upon 
the self as knower is accepted and enlarged to the point of viewing 
consciousness as the source not only of the a priori forms of relation, 
but of all relations whatsoever. (3) The doctrine of the dual self is 

*For elaboration and proof of this, see the article by the author entitled 
"A Neglected Point in Hume's Philosophy," Philosophical Review, January, 

* Cf. what Kant called his refutation of (Berkeleian) idealism. 


extended to the point of identifying in one absolute self the plurality 
of transcendental selves held to by Kant, with the result that our 
various empirical selves and the objects of their experience are all 
regarded as the manifestations or fragments of a single perfect, all- 
inclusive, and eternal self. But it is not hard to see that this new 
dualism of the finite and the absolute self involves the same difficul- 
ties as those which we found in the Cartesian dualism of conscious 
state and physical object. For either the experience of the fragment 
embraces the experiences of the absolute or it does not. If the 
former, then the absolute becomes knowable, to be sure, but only at 
the cost of losing its absoluteness and being reduced to a mere 
"state" of the alleged fragment. The existence of the absolute will 
then depend upon the fact that it is known by its own fragments, 
and each fragmentary self will have to assume that its own experi- 
ence constitutes the entire universe which is solipsism. If the other 
horn of the dilemma be chosen and the independent reality of the 
absolute is insisted upon, then it is at the cost of making the absolute 
unknowable, of reducing it to the status of the unexperienceable 
external world of the dualistic realist. The dilemma itself is the 
inevitable consequence of making knowledge an internal relation 
and hence constitutive of its objects. Indeed a large part of the 
philosophical discussion of recent years has been concerned with the 
endeavor of the absolutists to defend their doctrine from the attacks 
of empiricists of the Berkeleian and Humean tradition in such a 
way as to avoid equally the Scylla of epistemological dualism and the 
Charybdis of solipsism. But, as we have seen, the more empirical 
subjectivists of the older and strictly British school are open to the 
same criticism as that which they urge upon the absolutists, for it is 
as difficult for the Berkeleian to justify his belief in the existence of 
other spirits, or the phenomenalistic follower of Hume his belief in 
bundles or streams of experience other than his own, as for the 
absolutist to justify those features of the absolute experience which 
lie beyond the experience of the finite fragments. 

And now enter upon this troubled scene the new realists, offering 
to absolutists and phenomenalists impartially their new theory of the 
relation of knower to known. On this point all subjectivists look 
alike to them, and they make no apology for lumping together for 
purposes of epistemological discussion such ontologically diverse 
theories as those of Fichte and Berkeley, of Mr. Bradley and Pro- 
fessor Karl Pearson. Indeed, it can not be too emphatically stated 
that the theory in question is concerned primarily with this single 
problem of the relation of knower to known. As such, it has no 
direct bearing on other philosophical issues, such as those of monism 
and pluralism, eternalism and temporalism, materialism and spiritu- 


alism, or even pragmatism and intellectualism. Of course this does 
not mean that those individuals who defend the new realism are 
without convictions on these matters, but only that as a basis for 
their clearer discussion it is first of all essential to get rid of sub- 

Like most new things this new theory is in essentials very old. 
To understand its meaning it is necessary to go back beyond Kant, 
beyond Berkeley, beyond even Locke and Descartes far back to that 
primordial common sense which believes in a world that exists inde- 
pendently of the knowing of it, but believes also that that same inde- 
pendent world can be directly presented in consciousness and not 
merely represented or copied by ' ' ideas. ' ' In short, the new realism 
is almost identical with that naive or natural realism which was the 
first of our three typic theories of the knowledge relation; and as 
such, it should be sharply distinguished from the dualistic or infer- 
ential realism of the Cartesians. 

Now the cause of the abandonment of nai've realism in favor of 
the dualistic or picture theory was the apparently hopeless disagree- 
ment of the world as presented in immediate experience with the 
true or corrected system of objects in whose reality we believe. It 
follows that the first and greatest problem for the new realists is to 
amend the realism of common sense in such wise as to make it 
compatible with the universal phenomenon of error and with the 
mechanism of perception upon which that phenomenon is based and 
in terms of which it must be interpreted. 




TN No. 16 of this volume Professor Walter B. Pitkin was kind 
enough to give a critical abstract of five essays published by 
me in the last years, all expounding one system of thought, based 
on the principle that opposition is the spring of consciousness. I 
feel very thankful to Professor Pitkin for the pains he took in draw- 
ing a very vivid and generally true picture of the line of thought I 
pursued, and I am glad that he finds me at least on the trail to truth, 
although my path diverges by a large angle from the psychological 

Indeed Professor Pitkin raises only one objection to the system 
contained in my writings, although, to be sure, that objection is 


directed against its very foundation. My critic says that either I 
mean by opposition that specific kind which exists between anti- 
thetical pairs, as for instance light and dark, or yellow and blue, as he 
generously puts it to make my situation easier, or that I understand 
opposition only in that broader sense of mutual exclusion which 
exists, for instance, between all colors. In the first case I must suc- 
cumb to the difficulty that to most objects an antithetical pair can not 
be designated; in the second, opposition could not carry the system 
built upon it, because "anything could be a sufficient precondition 
for the experiencing of anything else " ; "a sound, or a flavor, or a 
perfume, or any conceivable object with three sides, would all be 
equally efficient as 'contraries' with regard to a triangle." 

Professor Pitkin takes into consideration both branches of this 
alternative, but he decidedly represents me as having spoken in the 
former sense. Indeed, according to him, I assume "a polarizing 
tendency in the world-stuff itself, which gives rise to all intellectual 
distinctions," and he asks me to inform my readers (who would other- 
wise not be convinced) as to just what qualities (physical objects) 
do operate in antithetical pairs to effect consciousness. 

I think, however, and I am sorry that I must say so, that it is 
clearly the second sense of Professor Pitkin 's alternative in which 
the term "opposition" is used in my writings. In formulating 
against current psychology the charge mentioned by Professor Pitkin, 
that out of isolated perceptions (viz., such as have not a content of 
opposition against other perceptions) induction, experience of certain 
facts having certain consequences, and rational action can not arise, 
I manifestly take opposition in the sense of mutual exclusion only, 
since to establish such a charge no conception of polar antithesis is 
necessary. Indeed, in the very quotation which Professor Pitkin, in 
elucidating this charge, kindly takes from my writings, the terms 
Gegensatz and Ausschliessung are used together, separated only by 
a comma, with the precise intention of precluding the interpretation 
in the sense of polar antithesis the former term, however, being 
generally preferred in my writings in order to demonstrate that 
at the root of consciousness there is dynamic opposition (which, 
of course, is not identical with "polar antithesis"). If this inter- 
pretation is given to my principle, then it does follow that anything 
is a sufficient precondition for the experiencing of anything else. 
But this is just my opinion. Anything is, however, according to the 
theory I propose, the sufficient precondition for the experiencing of 
anything else with regard only to that element of the latter which is 
contained in it on that ground, that fundamentum divisionis, on 
which the two are opposed to, or exclude, each other. So a sound or 


a flavor or a perfume makes us experience a (seen) triangle only as 
light, a lighting, or visible object. 

Let us suppose a baby just born in a room free from sound and 
odor; let us exclude for simplicity's sake all tactual and gustatory, 
etc., impressions also, and let us suppose that a shining triangle is 
held before his eyes. The light of the triangle is not light to him in 
the same sense as it is to us, as, namely, one sort of thing; but 
it is to him the something, the stirring, the powerful, as opposed 
to the nothing, the quiet, the weak (namely, the dark), which 
environed him in his mother's womb, unperceived then because not 
yet opposed to the impression of light, but now, in consequence of the 
actual opposition, remembered. Such a baby would have no experi- 
ence of light as distinguished from something. Let us now suppose 
that later a noise arises in his neighborhood. He takes notice of 
"something again," which is "not the same," however, as that 
perceived until now, and he arrives at the notion of light or the 
visible as distinguished from another something. 1 % To experience the 
visible as a triangle, the opposition between planes having different 
outlines, or at least the opposition between numbers, must be brought 
to his perception; or, let us say, with regard to this example, more 
generally to his mind, as mathematical and geometrical conceptions 
can be formed a priori. But this again does not mean a polar anti- 
thesis, but only a mutual exclusion on another ground. Between 
specific opposition (polar antithesis) and chaotic exclusion, which 
Professor Pitkin opposes to each other, there is an intermediate sort 
of relation which is not restricted to pairs and might be called specific 

To sum up: Everybody is aware that rational action requires a 
systematical knowledge of things, their division into classes, the divi- 
sion of every such class into sub-classes, and so on. What I assert is 
that consciousness is from the very beginning consciousness of system, 

1 1 foresee that readers unfamiliar with the writings here spoken of will find 
great difficulty in understanding the asserted difference between perception of 
light as perception of the something and its perception as perception of light. 
To remove this difficulty, I am obliged to refer to my writings, where, especially 
in ' ' Das Beharren, etc., ' ' I try to show throughout the whole psychology how such 
differences work. Here I can only say that this difference is like that between 
perception of a tone simply as a tone and its perception as a high or a low tone. 
This difference, and the assertion that if only one tone (and silence) has 
impressed the subject so far in his lifetime, then only the former perception is 
possible to him, will perhaps more easily find acceptance than the corresponding 
assertion with regard to light. And I can further point to the fact that, whereas 
in the case when light would be the only (positive) sensation which has impressed 
a subject, it would give him, as was said, the perception of the powerful; in cases 
of other (positive) sensations also having already been experienced, this light 
would give, on the contrary, the perception of the tenderest, finest thing of all. 


which only develops in the course of life; consciousness not only of 
"this," but also of "therefore not being that." 

It is this idea which leads to that psychophysical theory (I can 
not allow that it is a "hypothesis" only) which Professor Pitkin 
somewhat approvingly reviews. 

The opposition, therefore, from which this theory derives con- 
sciousness, is nothing else but what other psychological theories call 
difference of stimuli. These theories, however, do not find the actions 
of different stimuli or their residua leading to dynamical conflicts in 
the subject, 2 and they do not see in such conflicts the very condition 
of consciousness, as I do. This is my answer to the request for in- 
formation with which Professor Pitkin closes his review. 

I may perhaps be allowed to mention that W. Polowzow, after 
having rather favorably reviewed my treatise "Das Beharren," 
etc., 3 later, in a criticism of "Die Stelle des Bewusstseins, " etc., 4 
finds the same difficulty with my theory as Professor Pitkin. 
Fraulein Polowzow mentions that I oppose to "seeing a dog" "see- 
ing no dog," and thinks that if this example is taken as typical of 
the sense of opposition in my works, my theory of the origin of 
consciousness is reduced ad absurdum. Now, I can not see why. 
' ' Seeing a dog ' ' means seeing a particular form. What I maintain is 
that consciousness of a form is impossible without more than one form 
being known to the subject, and that consequently the consciousness 
of the form called a dog can not arise in a subject without his know- 
ing at least one other form not called a dog. This may be false, but 
I can not see why it should be absurd. 

I can not see the absurdity, although this agreement between two 
(by no means all) of my critics induced me to think the matter over 
seriously once more. Their agreement seems to me to arise simply 
from the influence of current psychology, which prevents those 
used to it from seeing the dependence which I assert. Indeed I know 
of only one systematic treatise on psychology (the "Leitfaden" of 
Th. Lipps) which mentions negative perceptions, such as that of see- 
ing no dog, although such perceptions manifestly form the very 
starting-point of thought. But the psychology of to-day might justly 
be called the science of mind apart from its coherence. 

I close by expressing once more my best thanks to Professor 


* Th. Lipps ("Von Fiihlen, Wollen und Denken," second edition) does 
derive dynamical conflicts in the subject from this difference, but at the same 
time he calls this difference opposition, Gegensatg, Gegensatzlichkeit, just as I do. 

1 Zeitschrift fur Psychologic, Bd. 55, S. 154, 1910. 

4 Ibid., Bd. 58, S. 388, 1911. 



The Presentation of Reality. HELEN WODEHOUSE. Cambridge: Univer- 
sity Press. 1910. Pp. xii + 160. 

This essay is intended as a description of knowledge from the point 
of view of a philosophical psychology. Inspection of the experience 
called knowledge, or consciousness, finds it a real presentation of object 
to subject. Many objects are not spatial e. g., " objectives " (the con- 
tents of affirmative and negative judgments), connections of fact, other 
people's minds hence the object's presence to the subject, in knowledge, 
is not essentially a spatial relation. Neither is presence in general essen- 
tially spatial. " A real thing, whatever else it may be, is the method, or 
necessity, or law, in a group of events. The laws of its nature govern the 
behavior of other objects in relation to it, and our own experience in 
respect of it. ... Now ' presence ' . . . can only mean the actuality of 
government by the law-group in question. . . . ' I see Birmingham ' means 
that the nature of Birmingham is expressing itself in my perceptual ex- 
perience, governing the happenings there; and the contemplation of a 
thing in memory, in imagination, or in the most elaborate thought means 
exactly the same kind of fact" (pp. 70-72). 

The logical " difference " that makes presence knowledge is a striving 
to increase or diminish the extent of the presence. Consciousness is pres- 
ence with interest. 

To deny that knowledge is such real presentation is to deny that 
knowledge has content, unless " content " means something other than 
" datum," the " given," the " present," in knowledge, which no subjectivist 
says, or could think. And only by a meaningless distinction between 
content and what is contained can presentation in knowledge be thought 
to imply absence from knowledge, by a self-perpetuating recurrence of 
mediating relationships between content and container. 

It is impossible that content, an actualization of law, should be other 
than the very law, the very object; and again impossible that such object 
should be any content entirely. " No manifestation of the object exhausts 
the object; the latter can always expand its expression and tell us more 
and more" (p. 52). "In introspection ... we make the content of a 
given act of apprehension into the object of another act " (p. 20) ; but 
not even in introspection does content exhaust object. Any knowledge is 
a process, a gradual discovery. However we fix our limits, what is within 
them can develop internally. 

No one has yet offered a satisfactory account of the nature of an 
idea, and the author of this essay is convinced " that there are no such 
things as ideas. Contents and objects alike exist outside my body. . . . 
' Contents ' may be admirable tools if we can keep them free from the 
taint of the old ' ideas,' and can remember that the things which enter 
the mind, and which therefore are partly contained in our mind, are the 
same things that exist outside our body in the ordinary physical world " 
(p. 18). " It is literally true to say that the past or the future can be 


' present with me,' or that the friend I think of has ' entered into my 
thought ' or has been ' much in my mind.' ... I can no more think of a 
thing which is outside thought than I can see a thing which is out of 
sight" (pp. 71 and 72). ("Literally," if these terms, usually spatial, are 
given their deeper, extra-spatial meaning.) 

Knowledge is evidently not a static, but an active relation. The object 
operates on the subject. The subject strives to alter the extent of the 
operation ; the subject reacts receptively. The verb " know," whose gram- 
mar implies that the subject is initially or positively active, lends itself 
to the false subjectivistic conception that knowing is constructing reality. 
It is the object that is initially and positively active. " Even if the 
whole world grows by means of our interest; even if nothing can exist 
except on condition that it is known; . . . even in deliberate fiction or 
assumption, where we do wilfully create the objects that we apprehend, the 
creation is not the apprehension. . . . Whatever creates the reality that we 
find, it is not the finding, as such, that creates it, and it is this finding 
that constitutes knowledge" (pp. 7 and 8). 

If judgment is a kind of knowledge different from other apprehension, 
it is, like all apprehension, a case of " finding something there." It is 
more, no doubt; but, therefore, it is not pure knowledge. The modality 
of a judgment depends on the degree of limitation of content ; the strength 
of conviction is equally a quality of the object, not at all of the subject. 
It depends on the steadiness of the content. " We can not more or less 
receive except in the sense that we can receive more or less." 

In all levels or departments of knowledge the object may be the same. 
The content is different. The object, set in a clear field in contemplation, 
unfolds before us in the contents of consciousness. Where first we found 
only sense-contents, we presently find shape and position and likeness and 
distinction, and connections with all the world, and relations on which 
inferences rest. We "think the thing out." In a sense, the object of 
every knowledge is the universe entire; limitation of object depends on 
interest. In marginal sensations or images (where interest approaches 
the vanishing-point), and in exhaustive philosophical investigation, the 
object is the unlimited universe ; the content approaches " nothing " in 
the first case, " everything " in the second. In sensations that are ele- 
ments of a focalized percept the object is a section of the physical world 
that includes my body; in the peculiar case of introspection, a former 
content is the object. Here the content may be said to cover its object; 
even here the content does not exhaust the object, which is capable of 
indefinite development internally. 

There are an indefinite number of levels of knowledge in which we 
meet non-spatial objects that therefore can not enter into sense or imagery. 
All these are brought here under the name of " thought." Important 
examples of such non-spatial presentations were cited at the beginning. 
The yes-no determination in judgment is distinct from that of choice 
(B. Russell), and consists in the contrast between presence and absence of 
some feature in the object a matter of content purely, not of subjective 


act. In inference, association is undoubtedly operative constantly, but 
here also the matter of our belief is objective purely. " We find our way 
to a new conclusion in thinking as we find our way to a new district in 
exploring, not mainly by habit, but by observing the lie of the land and 
searching out the road" (p. 47). Inference is, in fact, only a special 
method for making the features of reality clear to ourselves and to others, 
and non-inferential knowledge is as common in thought as in sense. 

Among non-spatial presentations are included the minds of other 
people. When I contemplate material things, not only my object but the 
content of my mind is made of wood and stone. So when I contemplate 
my friend, the contents of my mind are " made " of his spirit and spiritual 
activity; for this enters my consciousness and is present to my thought. 

Two chapters are devoted to the defense of the presentation of reality 
in sense and in thought, respectively. Those who regard the contents of 
sense as too near to be objective (e. g., Stout) confuse sensation with 
feeling; for no other distinction between them ever has been or could be 
offered except the objectivity of sensation and the subjectivity of feeling. 
Those, on the other hand, who think the objects of thought are too remote 
to be presented at all are under the delusion of a spatial meaning in 
" presentation," and of another ambiguity, that of the phrase " immediate 
knowledge." Inferred knowledge is said to be non-immediate, but the 
meaning is historical rather than epistemological ; that is, inferred knowl- 
edge is reached by means of other knowledge; it is by no means therefore 
out of touch with its object. The recipient act, in inference, is continu- 
ally helped and guided by a creative act hypothesis, the making of sug- 
gestive pictures or guiding lines. Subjectivism confuses these elements 
of inference. 

Under the head of inference comes a criticism of James on conception, 
and it applies equally well to Bergson. These anti-conceptualists at- 
tribute too much to sense-experience, and miss the essential significance of 
thought. Pure sensation is the unreachable limiting case of experience 
accepted without inspection, with the given forbidden to expand. The 
immediate feeling of life does not solve, but sets, the problems of thought. 
Such feeling gives us the going thing; understanding gives us the "go" 
of it. Bradley is, on this point, in the strange company of these empiri- 
cists. They are right in counseling a modest attitude in intellect; wrong 
in their blindness to the objective realness of its content. They urge us 
to get full data, as if data were solution. They do not consider the 
involvedness of " immediacy." The true inwardness unfolds in relations, 
and it is just the distinction between thought and sense that the former 
is the apprehension of relations, the latter the apprehension of qualities. 
Our coming to see the relations may be (historically) non-immediate; 
our seeing them is of precisely the same immediacy as that of sense. The 
effort of coming to see them is that of focusing and guiding our sight. 
There is construction, creation, in coming to see; none in seeing. 

In short, if I " know about," I know. So, if we take the " con- 
tent of my sensation " as the object of thought, thought knows that 
content in knowing about it. The proposition that thought can not see 


what sense sees in an object, is a special case of the general truth that, so 
far as I am not repeating an apprehension, so far I am not apprehend- 
ing its own content that is, the aspect of the object which I appre- 
hended before. I can apprehend my own feeling, as I do in any 
judgment about it. But, as with sensation and belief, my apprehension 
of it is not repetition of it. Subjectivity is not descriptive of feeling. 
Mind is no more subjective than objective. I can contemplate my own 
mind, or anything else in the universe, as I prove by writing about it. 
But in the nature of things I can not have within the limits of my 
presented content the receiving of that content. I can not see my face. 
It is not invisible, but I can not look two ways at once. Living, for 
James and Bergson, is more than seeing life. But this is a mistake. 
Seeing life is more, not less, than living; for seeing implies living, and 
living does not imply seeing. 

In the problem of error, a second and brief division of the essay, the 
central doctrine is that knowledge is fallible in proportion to its signifi- 
cance. If sense can not lie, it is because of its inarticulateness, not 
because of its immediacy. " The only way of avoiding error is to stop 
short of the line round our content at which it unites with a special and 
determinate universe of reality" (p. 109). As a fact, no experience that 
has ever been proposed as the unshakable foundation of belief is roomy 
enough for any belief. But this is no great matter, for it is in the whole 
of experience that the reality of the world manifests itself. In any case 
of consciousness, whether knowledge or error, a real object is presented. 
The peculiarities of our nature conditioning error are elements in the 
given objective world. The objects of error are abnormal. Their reality 
contradicts itself, becomes transparent, and finally fades away. But no 
more than other objects is the false object created by our apprehension 
of it. 

The third part, too, can only be glanced at here. It is particularly 
interesting in its justification of the objective reality of the world of 
assumption, a mansion in the " many-mansioned universe." 

I can create the object of perceptual experience, as in building a house, 
or I can create it in the non-actual worlds by assuming. It is dependent 
in either case on the act of creation, not on that of apprehension. I do, 
in the latter case, just what I do in the former, " enlarge reality, create 
more objects for the apprehension of myself and others. These objects 
would be real if they were only presented once and then destroyed and 
forgotten ; but in most cases they have much more reality than this, since 
they are capable of being presented again and again, of being looked at in 
various aspects, of being explored and developed " (p. 133) . 

Assumption is thus creation in another universe than that of the act 
of creation. The latter universe is the ground of the former. As free 
creator, I can set the law of non-contradiction aside, in assumption. 
This circumstance, it will be remarked, does seem to constitute an impor- 
tant difference in the two kinds of creation. The building of a house has 
no such freedom as this. The author evidently regards the difference as 
irrelevant to the realness of the assumption world. That rests, no doubt, 


in the end, on the fact that it is contained in our knowledge. One can 
not treat the argument fairly in the space at present available. 

In assumption, I see the object as non-actual ; in judgment, as actual. 
Assumption and judgment differ thus in content. Both differ, also in 
content, from doubt. The content of belief has external articulation; 
the outline of the content of doubt is blurred. The outline of the content 
of assumption is distinct, but overlain upon, not articulated with, an 
external universe. 

This little book is much more suggestive than wordy, and criticism is 
largely disarmed by this feature of it. It keenly glances at many of the 
hardest problems of the theory of knowledge, with an able, charming, and 
persuasive air of solving some, and an equally gracious modesty with 
regard to others. 

It is an admirably useful book to work from in a study of epistemology. 


An Introduction to Experimental Psychology. CHARLES S. MYERS. Cam- 
bridge: University Press. 1911. Pp. vii + 156. 

This little book presents very clearly and interestingly some of the prob- 
lems and results of experimental psychology. The author has chosen 
those fields that are most interesting and to which he has himself made 
most contributions. There are seven chapters: one each on touch, tem- 
perature and pain, on color vision, the Miiller-Lyer and other illusions, on 
experimental esthetics, on memory, and two on mental tests. The first 
chapter for the most part gives a summary of the work of Head and Rivers 
on nerve division. The second chapter gives a brief summary of the facts 
of color vision, with some reference to theories, and then a relatively long 
summary of the work of Rivers in its bearing upon the color sense of 
savage tribes. The discussion of the Miiller-Lyer illusion makes much 
use of Rivers's work, with summary of the theories. Contrast and con- 
fluxion are preferred to eye movements as an explanation. 

Particularly good is the chapter on memory. It gives a very useful 
summary of the results of investigations of memory, with some practical 
suggestions. The first chapter on mental tests covers ten tests of sensory 
acuity, esthesiometer tests, and different tests of fatigue. It studies the 
results obtained from groups of different mental standings and of differ- 
ent ages, and considers the relative importance of mere sensory acuity 
and intelligence in the results. The second chapter on tests, the best in 
the volume, gives the Binet-Simon tests with modifications for British 

The work can be recommended to any interested layman, and should 
prove very useful on the topics treated as a work of reference for college 





REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. July, 1911. Le temps selon les phi- 
losophes Hellenes (pp. 5-24) : P. DUHEM. - According to Archytas time 
is a number determined by the general movement of the universe ; time in 
general is the duration of this movement, the time between two events is 
the number of revolutions which intervene between these events. Aris- 
totle, in the " Physics," defines time as that which indicates the number 
of successions in any movement. Plato denies that time is a number and 
asserts that it is a certain continuous quantity which is common to all 
actions. Le temperament nerveux, second article (pp. 25 47) : J. TOULE- 
MONDE. - Persons of the nervous temperament are characterized by sub- 
mission to all sorts of fanciful ideas obsessions with regard to their 
own health, judgments, intellectual problems. As a result they are filled 
at times with anxiety; at times are completely absorbed in thought, and 
at all times have an exaggerated idea of the value of time. The type is, 
moreover, characterized by extreme instability and by marked impression- 
ability. Les fails de Lourdes. A propos d'ouvrages recents (pp. 48-62) : 
R. VAN DER ELST. -To judge of the cures at Lourdes it is necessary to 
study the facts of the cases; defenders of the miraculous healings have 
not used adequately these facts, and adverse critics have almost ignored 
them. La loi naturelle, second article (pp. 63-85) : E. BRUNETEAU. - The 
doctrine of infallible moral intuition is utterly destroyed by the facts of 
history and anthropology, and yet these same facts point to the possession 
on the part of humanity everywhere and in all times of the same funda- 
mental principles of morality. Analyses et comptes rendus: J. Dewey, 
How we Think; G. Dumesnil, Le spiritualisme ; J, Segond, La priere: 
J. Louis. A Menard, Analyse et critique des principes de la psychologic de 
W. James: F. MEUTRE. S. Deploige, Le confiit de la morale et de la so- 
ciologie: R. FLORIAN. J. Lebreton, Les origines du dogme de la Trinite: J. 
GARDAIR. F. Picavet, Boscelin: R. SIMETERRE. Recension des revues. 

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. July, 1911. Le congres international 
de philosophic de 1911 (pp. 1-22) : A. REY. - The author's criticism of the 
organization of the congress and an account of the general ideas that 
seemed prevalent there. Pensee theoretique et pensee pratique (pp. 23- 
41) : F. RAUH. - The affirmation of the real always involves practical af- 
firmations, so the current separation of moral truths from cosmic truths 
is artificial and inexact. La sociologie de M. Durkheim (first article) 
(pp. 41-71): G. DAVY. -As M. Durkheim's works first made precise the 
idea, object, and method of sociology, so through this and the following 
study, M. Davy aims at a definition of this science. Essai d'une classi- 
fication des etats affectifs (end) (pp. 72-89) : E. TASSY. - A study of two 
of the three classes of affective states distinguished in the author's pre- 
vious article, organic affective states and psychic affective states, and a 
section on the function of intellectual activity. Analyses et comtes 
rendus. J. Rehmke, Das Bewusstsein: R. HUBERT. H. Joly, Problemes 


de science criminelle: G. RICHARD. 8. Deploige, Le conflit de la morale 
et de la sociologie: 3. SEGOND. N. Kostyleff, La crise de la psychologic 
experimental : J. DAGNAN-BOUVERET. Chabrier, Les emotion* et les etats 
organiques: J. DAGNAN-BOUVERET. J. Pickler, Ueber die biologische 
Funktionen des Bewusstseins: J. DAGNAN-BOUVERET. I. Babbit, The New 
Laocobn: C. LALO. 

McDougall, William. Body and Mind: A History and a Defense of 
Animism. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. xix + 
384. $2.76. 

Stratton, George Malcolm. Psychology of the Religious Life. London: 
George Allen & Company, Ltd. 1911. Pp. xii -f 376. $2.75. 


A NEW psychological review, Psiche, has been lauched in Italy with 
Professor Enrico Morselli of Genoa, Professor Sante de Sanctis of Rome, 
and Professor Guido Villa of Pavia as directors, and Dr. Roberto 
Assagioli of Florence as editor-in-chief. The directors aim to make the 
new review different from previous ' reviews in certain respects, one of 
which will be the devotion of each number to a particular topic. It is 
planned to publish six numbers of not less than sixty-four pages each in 
the course of the present year. The subscription price is L. 8 for Italian 
and L. 10 for foreign subscriptions. Single numbers will cost L. 2. 
Communications may be addressed to Via degli Alfani, 46, Florence. 

PRESIDENT G. STANLEY HALL, of Clark University, is giving a course 
of six lectures on " The Founders of Modern Psychology " at Columbia 
University. His program is as follows : January 16, " Edward D. Zeller, 
the Scholar in his Field " ; January 17, " Edward von Hartmann, the 
Philosopher of Temperament " ; January 23, " Hermann Lotze, the Har- 
monizer " ; January 24, " Theodor Fechner, the Animist " ; January 30, 
Hermann von Helmholtz, the Ideal Man of Science"; January 31, 
" Wilhelm Wundt, a Scientific Philosopher." 

THE Houghton Mifflin Company have in press "The Classical Psy- 
chologists," selections illustrating psychology from Anaxagoras to Wundt,. 
compiled by Dr. Benjamin Rand. This work of Dr. Rand is a companion 
volume to his " Modern Classical Philosophers " and " The Classical 

PROFESSOR HENRI BERGSON, professor of philosophy of the College de 
France, has accepted the invitation of the Senatus Academicus of the 
University of Edinburgh to be Gifford lecturer from October, 1913, to 
October, 1915. 

EDWARD O. SISSON, recently head of the department of education at 
the University of Washington, has been appointed professor of education 
in the newly established Reed College, at Portland, Oregon. 

VOL. IX. No. 3. FEBRUARY 1, 1912 


r I ^ HE doctrine of specific nerve energies was first definitely formu- 
lated by Johannes Miiller (1801-1858). Physiologists before 
his time had regarded the sense nerves as merely conductors, each of 
which, however, had a special sensibility to some peculiar impression, 
and hence was the mediator of some definite quality of external 
bodies. Miiller pointed out that the discovery of the possibility of 
arousing different sensations in different nerves by the same stimulus, 
e. g., electricity, and also of the fact that different stimuli, e. g., elec- 
trical and mechanical, can produce in the same sense organ similar 
sensations, had rendered the theory of the susceptibility of nerves to 
certain impressions inadequate and unsatisfactory. He therefore 
advanced the theory that "each peculiar nerve has a special power 
or quality, which the exciting cause merely renders manifest"; and 
that in sensations we do not experience the qualities or states of 
external bodies, but merely the conditions of the nerves themselves. 
Hence light, sound, and other apparently external qualities, as such, 
have no existence, but are states which certain unknown external 
influences excite in our nerves. 

It is clear that Muller considered the sensory nerves themselves 
as the seat of the "specific energy" ; and thought that the function of 
the central organ consisted in the connection of the nerves into a 
system, the reflection of the sensations upon the origin of the motor 
nerves, ideation, remembrance, and attention. His theory, also, 
seems to refer to modality only and not to quality; that is, a single 
specific nervous energy is provided for each sense organ ; and, there- 
fore, any sensory apparatus may respond to different forms of ade- 
quate stimuli in a variety of ways. 

Helmholtz first distinguished between modality and quality. 
Sensations differ in quality when it is possible to pass by a series of 
intervening sensations from one to the other. They differ in 
modality when this can not be done, e. g., visual and auditory sensa- 
tions. Helmholtz attempted to explain quality, also, by postulating; 



a specific energy for each nerve fiber, that is, he sought for specific 
energies within the individual sense organs; and his theories of visual 
and auditory processes depend upon this further application of the 
doctrine, e. g., each of the colors, red, green, and violet, depends upon 
a specific process. Ilelmholtz must have interpreted the law some- 
what differently from his predecessors, for he regarded these specific 
differences in quality as determined by the character of the external 
physical stimulus. In apparent contradiction to this he held that 
modality was exclusively subjective. But if quality depends upon 
external stimuli, the same must be said of modality, for the latter is 
a mere concept or general term. There is no such thing as tasting 
in general or seeing in general. What we taste or see is always a 
particular quality. 

Before proceeding we must refer to a certain ambiguity in the 
term "specific energy." It confuses function with property or 
quality. It makes, of course, a great deal of difference whether 
specific property or specific function is meant by the phrase. Most 
writers on the subject have used the term so loosely that it is difficult 
to know just what they mean when they speak of "specific energy." 
Wundt would scarcely deny the specific energy, in the sense of spe- 
cific function, of any given nervous unit; but he would deny it in the 
sense of a specific property, that is, specific chemical or physical 
process, in that unit as a correlate of a specific quality of sen- 
sation. Of course the latter meaning includes the former, but the 
opposite is not true at least not necessarily so. Miiller meant by 
the doctrine a specific nervous process, and so, we think, did 

McDougall leaves no doubt as to his position when he says : ' ' The 
nervous process which is the immediate exciting cause of each quality 
of sensation is different from that which excites any other quality 
of sensation"; and that "it is a difference which could, if we knew 
more about it, be expressed in physical or chemical terms." He 
advances the following proofs for his theory: (1) Whenever it has 
been found possible to stimulate a nerve or sense organ by inadequate 
stimuli, the resulting sensation is of a similar quality to that pro- 
duced by stimulation of the same nerve or sense organ by its ade- 
quate stimulus, that is, the one that normally excites it. (2) The 
Helmholtz theories of visual and auditory processes, which offer the 
most satisfactory explanation of the facts (?), depend upon this 
doctrine. (3) Unlike effects must have unlike causes, therefore 
unlike sensations must depend upon unlike nervous processes. 

McDougall differs from Miiller in placing the seat of the specific 
energy not in the nerves themselves, but in the cerebral cortex, and 
especially in the synaptic processes. His reasons for so doing are as 


follows: (1) If the specific quality were in the nerves or sense organs, 
we would have to consider these processes as directly affecting con- 
sciousness. This is improbable since loss of a sense organ or nerve 
does not prevent the recurrence of the same quality of sensation in 
imagination, while loss of the cortical structure does. (2) The con- 
duction processes of all sensory nerves appear similar in kind. 
(3) It is in harmony with the principle of strict localization of 
cerebral functions and the principle of association ; for if the cortex 
were of indifferent function, it would be difficult to Understand why 
the excitement of an associated group might not on one occasion be 
accompanied by one sensation, and on others by entirely different 
sensations or psychical states. (4) This specialized character belongs 
to the synapse, because the nerve cells are anatomically similar and 
have as their function to preside over nutrition; also the synaptic 
processes are highly fatiguable and transmit the nervous impulse 
discontinuously. These features seem likewise characteristic of psy- 
chical phenomena. 

It is noteworthy that as our knowledge of the processes concerned 
has advanced, the seat of the specific quality has receded from the 
nerves to the cell-bodies and thence to the synapse. That is, with 
the progress of physiology and anatomy, the advocates of the theory 
have been forced to withdraw this qualitas occulta from known to 
unknown regions. It seems likely, as Wundt remarks, that in the 
future the specific energy will be placed in the sense organs them- 
selves, where differences of structure and function warrant the 

Wundt holds that the different qualities of sensations depend not 
on the specific character of nervous elements, but solely upon the 
different modes of their connection. The principle of connection of 
elements asserts that the "simplest psychical content has a complex 
physiological substrate," e. g., the sensation of red has a complex 
connection of nervous elements as its physical correlate. It is not, 
however, so much the connection of nerve elements with one another, 
as their connection with organs and tissue elements and through 
these with external stimuli, that determines the specific quality of 
sensation. A specific physical or chemical process as the basis for 
each primary quality of sensation is an unnecessary hypothesis which 
involves many difficulties and is wholly unprovable. True, certain 
connections or systems of elements have specific functions, which, 
however, have been acquired under pressure of the external condi- 
tions of life. 

This leads to the hypothesis of the original indifference of func- 
tion, which is founded upon the following observations: (1) A fairly 
long continuance of any function is necessary before the correspond- 


ing sense qualities appear in imagination, c. g., if a person becomes 
blind in early life, he has no visual imagery. (2) Functional dis- 
turbances occasioned by lesions are sometimes removed by a vicarious 
functioning of other elements. Here the specific function arises dur- 
ing the lifetime of an individual. Of course we inherit dispositions, 
which consist in the connection of nervous and tissue elements, etc. ; 
but, even so, the development of their specific functions demands the 
actual discharge of these functions upon excitation of the end organs 
by external stimuli. 

The indifference of elementary function (and certainly property) 
is also proved anatomically by the essential identity of structure; 
physiologically, by the essential identity of nervous processes; and 
psychologically, by the fact that elementary qualities of sensation 
are referred to functions of peripheral elements. 

The doctrine of specific nerve energies is contrary to the physi- 
ological doctrine of the development of the senses and hence to the 
whole theory of evolution. According to the latter our various senses 
arose through differentiation from a common sensibility a differen- 
tiation due to the action of external stimuli upon the organism, and 
the adaptation of the latter to a complex environment. Hence each 
sense organ is excited only by those stimuli to which it has become 
specially adapted, and is unaffected by others. Even the sense 
organs, then, are only secondary in determining the qualities of sen- 
sations. These must ultimately be referred to external stimuli. The 
specific character of the sensation most probably consists in the 
attitude which we assume towards the external stimulus an attitude 
determined by the connection of nervous and other elements. 

We remarked above that each sense organ or nerve was excited 
only by its adequate stimuli, but it is just because there are excep- 
tions to this rule that the doctrine of specific energies was first for- 
mulated. Electrical stimulation will produce sensations of light, 
taste, or smell, etc. Mechanical stimuli will produce visual or 
auditory sensations; direct electrical stimulation or section of the 
nervus opticus will "cause flashes of light"; and it is said that 
mechanical, chemical, or thermal excitation of the chorda tympani 
will produce sensations of taste. These are the chief facts that can be 
brought to bear in favor of the theory, and which any other theory 
must endeavor to explain ; but even if otherwise inexplicable, they can 
not be regarded as proofs of the doctrine, but merely as illustrations. 

According to Wundt, all these cases of abnormal stimulation can 
be explained by the principle of "practise and adaptation." The 
impressions which the sense organs are adapted to receive, by virtue 
of inherited or developed connections of elements, arouse certain 
sensations; and when this mode of responding has become habitual, 


the accustomed excitation is set up by inadequate stimuli. Kiilpe 
says that sensory nerve fibers with centrifugal conduction have been 
demonstrated in the case of the nervus opticus, and that the visual 
sensations aroused by electrical stimulation of this nerve are due to 
the fact that the nervous excitation is first conveyed to the retina by 
these efferent sensory fibers, and thence pursues its normal or accus- 
tomed path of discharge. These centrifugal fibers may exist in all 
sensory nerves; but even if they do not, the alternative theory that 
stimulation arouses the accustomed excitation in the visual system of 
elements is not difficult ; and far simpler than the theory of a qualitas 
occulta different for every primary quality of sensation. 

If the doctrine of specific energies were true, we see no reason 
why there would not be a much more far-reaching indifference of the 
stimuli than is actually the case. The inadequate stimuli are limited 
in number, and there are many negative instances against the theory : 
e. g., mechanical stimuli will not produce sensations of taste or of 
smell; sound waves will not affect the nervus opticus, nor light 
waves the auditory nerve ; temperature stimuli will not arouse other 
sensations, etc. 

When electricity arouses the sensations of taste and smell, it may 
only prove that it is an adequate stimulus for these sensations, that is, 
that electricity can be tasted and smelt. There is at least nothing 
extraordinary in regarding electricity as an adequate stimulus for 
sight. Electrical and light waves are not essentially different ; and, 
especially if one adopts Meisling's vibratory theory of vision, this 
conclusion appears highly plausible. 

Then again an inadequate stimulus may contain within itself or 
give rise to the usual normal stimulus: e. g., when a sensation of 
sound is produced by mechanical pressure, this may be due to sound 
waves produced in the inner ear by external pressure upon the organ 
of hearing; and when electrical stimulation produces a taste sensa- 
tion, this may be due to a decomposition of the saliva, which frees the 
adequate stimulus. 

A final objection against the indifference of the stimuli or rather 
against the effects of inadequate stimuli as supposed by the doctrine 
of specific nerve energies is a psychological one which seems to us 
of considerable importance. It seems introspectively untrue that 
adequate and inadequate stimuli produce sensations that are at all 
or essentially the same in character. There is always a quality or 
feeling associated with sensations produced by the latter, by which 
they can clearly be distinguished from sensations produced by the 
former. We are never deceived in this respect ; and it certainly rests 
with the advocates of the doctrine to explain why this is so. If the 
theory were true, it would be difficult to understand why inade- 


quatc stimuli, e. </.. for sight, would not give us all the visual qualities 
of objects, even to externality and figure, which light waves are 
capable of giving us. 

We saw above that McDougall advances in favor of the doctrine 
of specific energies the Helmholtz theories of visual and auditory 
processes, which he says offer the best explanation of the facts. We 
do not intend to enter into a discussion of the relative merits of the 
various theories of color sensations. Space will not permit. But 
we consider the Hering theory, which allows at least two processes 
for each structural element, far superior to that of Helmholtz. It 
affords a better explanation for the phenomena of color blindness, 
peripheral and faint light vision, the psychical primariness of blue 
and yellow, etc. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the same 
cone can give rise to any or all of the sensations, red, green, and 
violet. This fact seems favorable to Meisling's vibratory theory, as 
well as incompatible with the doctrine of a specific process. 

As Wundt very well remarks, "Many senses have no distinct 
sensory elements corresponding to different sensational qualities" 
at least these have not been pointed out. This is especially true of 
smell, but holds to a lesser or greater extent of taste, vision, and even 
hearing, unless one adopts the Helmholtz theory of auditory proc- 
esses. This theory may be seriously questioned ; but even if true, it 
can scarcely afford an argument in favor of specific energies ; because 
it may be replied that "the different qualities of the sensations are 
due not to any original specific attribute of nerve fibers or other 
sensory elements, but to the way in which single nerve fibers are 
connected with end organs," etc. The processes in these fibers and 
their connections, which may, perhaps, be called specific functions, 
depend upon external impressions, and this dependence is localized 
at the periphery. 

When advocates of the doctrine of specific energies analyze sensa- 
tions to obtain elementary qualities and ascribe to each of these a 
specific quality of nerve process, they overlook the fact that we have 
no definite criterion of the primariness of a sensation. The gray 
obtained by mixing colors has psychically no similarity whatever to 
the colors, e. g., red and green, of which it is composed. How do we 
know that red may not itself consist of two or more equally dissimilar 
sensations? In fact Wundt 's principle of the connection of elements 
would lead us to believe this; and physiologically it appears true. 
Our criterion of the primariness of red must then be a physical one 
the simplicity of the etheric oscillations corresponding to this sen- 
sation. Here again we see external stimuli and not nerve process as 
the ultimate determining factor. This physical simplicity may 
cause (in fact does cause) excitation in a physiologically complex 


system. Hence it does not militate against the principle of connec- 
tion of elements. 

Myers points out that "our tonal sensations are the result of a 
fusion between various primordial elements of which we must always 
remain ignorant." This is true if we accept the Helmholtz theory; 
for according to it, pitch depends upon the position of the most 
intensely stimulated fiber, and we never experience the result of 
stimulating a single basilar fiber. This is another illustration of the 
principle of connection of elements, and the dependence of quality 
of sensation upon peripheral as well as other elements. 

Munsterberg's "action theory" can, we think, be used as an 
argument against specific nerve energies. At least it harmonizes 
very well with the view we have adopted and with Wundt's principle 
of connection of elements. According to this theory, sensory proc- 
esses are attended by consciousness only when they discharge into 
actions. In other words, sensation depends upon motor reactions to 
external stimuli or objects. This seems to be the logical conclusion 
of Wundt's principle; for this reaction or motor attitude is deter- 
mined by an inherited or developed connection of elements. The 
specific quality of sensations, then, is nothing more than the specific 
attitude we assume as determined by the motor discharge or rather 
by the whole sensory-motor arc. The chemical or physical process 
is, thus, the same in all nervous substance. There is no inexplicable 
difference here. This seems more intelligible, less fraught with diffi- 
culties, and more in accord with facts than the doctrine of specific 
energies in Miiller's and McDougall's sense. We say in McDougall's 
sense because this theory does not deny "specific energies," if by 
the term is meant the specific function of a given sensory motor arc 
or connection, which function may, however, be changed or modified 
by incorporation into a larger system or by vicarious functioning, 
as mentioned above. 

The action theory, it may be said, ascribes the quality of sensa- 
tions to the sensory path and its ending; but, we answer, vividness, 
intensity, facilitation, etc., depend on the motor discharge, and with- 
out these there would be no quality, for these are attributes of the 
quality, and in any case the action theory may not, of course, be 
infallible in all respects. 

A difficult question may be raised, viz. : Why is it that on loss of 
a sense organ, we still retain the corresponding imagery, while a cor- 
tical lesion in a specific area annihilates it? We sometimes forget 
that there is an important difference between a memory-image and a 
sensation. McDougall says, "An image resembles the sensation of 
which it is the representation or reproduction in every respect save 
that it lacks the vividness of the sensation." The image seems to 


lack the tangibleness or feeling of present existence that accom- 
panies the sensation. This, then, must be the quality contributed 
by the sense organ ; for every element in the sensory-motor connec- 
tion contributes its quota. Of course we must remember that without 
the sense organ there could be no sensations or images ; and without 
external stimuli there would have been no sense organs. After a cer- 
tain sensory-motor arc has been responding for a considerable time 
with a definite motor attitude to certain external stimuli, if the 
peripheral portion, the retina, e. g., be then removed, the remaining 
part of the arc will continue by virtue of adaptation to respond in 
the accustomed manner, when excited by overflows from other arcs 
or systems with which it has been previously connected. The sen- 
sory-motor connections are intact. There is nothing to prevent dis- 
charge into action. The result is imagery (in this case visual) 
which, as before said, lacks certain important qualities of sensations, 
either because it involves but part of the arc or because the impulse 
can never be so great as that initiated by external stimuli, without 
which the motor reaction and hence the imagery would have been 
impossible; for the reaction that underlies the imagery is due to 
adaptations arising from the habitual assumption of the attitude. 
The doctrine of specific nerve energies, as we mentioned above, ren- 
ders an explanation of imagery difficult if not impossible. McDou- 
gall's two theories seem to us inconsistent. He finds it difficult to 
explain how the seats of the physiological processes can be identical 
or partially identical and the resulting psychical phenomena dif- 
ferent ; and we find him hinting at the action theory, when he says, 
"Their motor tendencies are the same, the cortical excitement in 
both cases issues from the cortex by the same efferent paths. ' ' 

Now, if instead of a sensory organ being removed, there is a 
lesion in a definite cortical area, e. g., occipital lobe, how is it that 
imagery is lost? The answer to this follows from what we have 
said. In the former case the sensory-motor connections were intact ; 
now they are severed. The motor discharge is, therefore, impos- 
sible. Hence, there can be no reaction or motor attitude and no 
imagery or sensations. New connections are sometimes formed and 
the lost sense thus regained. This is called by Wundt "the prin- 
ciple of vicarious function," and is itself a strong argument against 
specific energy. 

In spite of McDougall's assertions to the contrary, we consider 
association inexplicable on the hypothesis of specific energy. The 
connection of absolutely unlike processes forever remain* an enigma, 
while association by similarity of motor attitude or reaction seems 
quite intelligible; and his principle of "strict localization of cerebral 
functions," which of course logically follows from the "doctrine of 


specific energies," is held by very few physiologists of the present 
day and still remains to be proved. 

In conclusion the results of an interesting experiment performed 
upon cats by Langley and Anderson may be cited against the doctrine 
of specific energies. The cervical sympathetic nerve contracts the 
blood vessels of the submaxillary gland ; the chorda tympani dilates 
these vessels. The cervical sympathetic was joined at its peripheral 
end to the chorda tympani. After union and regeneration, stimula- 
tion of the cervical sympathetic caused dilation of the vessels. This 
proves that a vaso-constrictor fiber can become a vaso-dilator fiber; 
and that whether contraction or dilation of the blood vessels occurs 
depends upon the mode of nerve ending. The experiment, of course, 
was performed upon efferent fibers, but it is not therefore without 
weight in a consideration of this problem ; and it is of especial value 
in refuting the theory that the seat of the specific energy is in the 
nerve fibers. 




TO the old immediate inferences recent writers add inversion. 
The inverse of_All S is P is Some S is not P. Of No S is P 
the inverse is Some S is P. I and have no inverse. 

Inversion violates the fundamental principle of logic and com- 
mon sense that we should not go beyond the evidence. Every con- 
clusion, in order to be valid, must be rigidly limited to the content 
of the premises. Its content must not be greater than that of the 
premises, and it must not be of a different kind. Now S, the contra- 
dictory of S, is an infinite term greater than S, for it includes all 
the universe 1 other than S. True, it is limited by the word Some in 
the conclusion, but that fails to make the reasoning good, because S 
is different in kind from S. An ordinary illicit process of the minor 
term is indeed cured by writing Some in the conclusion, as in the 
following example: No birds are viviparous; all birds are bipeds; 
therefore no bipeds are viviparous. The minor term is illicit, but 
the fault is easily cured by writing, Some bipeds are not viviparous. 
But the inverse also begins with Some. Why, then, is it still at 
fault? Simply because S is different in kind. Bipeds are the same 
two-legged creatures in the conclusion as in the minor premise; but 
every possible S differs from any possible S. Let S stand for rum- 
inants ; then S will represent non-ruminants. As lambs differ from 

1 Universe here means universe of discourse. 


hyenas and oxen from tigers, so every possible ruminant differs from 
any conceivable non-ruminant. Inverting, All ruminants are herbiv- 
orous, we have, Some non-ruminants are not herbivorous. In the 
premise we are talking about cows; in the conclusion about lions. 
Can we infer anything about the food of lions, or any other non- 
ruminant, from the fact that cows eat grass f 

Of the two fundamental requirements, (a) the content of the 
conclusion must not be greater than that of the premises, (&) it must 
not differ in kind, inversion clearly violates the second. Whether it 
does not also violate the first is a matter of doubt. The non-rum- 
inants are much the larger group, and whether those of them which 
are not herbivorous exceed the ruminants or not, is a question for 
the naturalist. No matter how it turns out, the doubt is damning. 
Valid reasoning is free from any shadow of doubt. 

Serious as this shadow of doubt may be, the other point, the dif- 
ference in kind between the subject-matter of the conclusion and the 
premise, is far more damaging to inversion. Shifting ground severs 
the bond of inference. To infer the food of non-ruminants from that 
of ruminants would be a famous short-cut in zoology. Such an easy 
royal road would be a boon to the plodding naturalist patiently 
studying each group for itself. 

Inversion makes no pretense of limiting its conclusion to the con- 
tent of its premises. It boldly introduces new matter and is reckless 
in regard to quantity. It clearly goes beyond the evidence. The 
most common violation of that limiting principle of reason and com- 
mon sense is illicit process the whole inferred when only a part is 
given, whole and part being alike in kind. Inversion goes one better 
(or worse). The new matter of its conclusion is not represented at 
all in its premises not even by so much as a beggarly "part." 
The only semblance of its presence in the premises arises from the 
common element "S" in both subjects. But one subject is the nega- 
tive, the contradictory, of the other, and negation is separation, 
opposition, not union or likeness. There is not a shred of matter in 
the premises common to the new matter of the conclusion, not the 
slenderest filament of an inferential bond. Inversion is a novel and 
gross form of illicit process which lugs in matter wholly new apd 
utterly alien to the initial matter of discourse. 

Bain calls immediate inferences "equivalent prepositional 
forms," and that phrase exactly describes the obverse or converse. 
But the inverse, with its injected alien matter of discourse, is very 
far from being equivalent to the invertend. The cogency of the 
reasoning accordingly differs notably in passing from the old imme- 
diate inferences to the new. The truth of the obverse or of the 
converse is obvious and indubitable. Given, No men are immortal, 


then the truth of its obverse, All men are mortal, admits no doubt. 
The two statements are strictly equivalent. Not so with inversion. 
The inverse of, All men are mortal, is, Some beings who are not men 
are immortal. That may be true, but its truth does not follow obvi- 
ously and indubitably from the invertend. Not so easy as that is the 
proof of immortality. My friends all die, therefore somebody will 
live forever, is a wide and wild leap in the way of inference. Inver- 
sion habitually proceeds per saltum. 

The absurdities of inversion are legion. No mathematician can 
square the circle ; therefore some one who is not a mathematician can 
square the circle. No athlete can jump thirty feet; therefore some 
one who is not an athlete can jump thirty feet. No man can prove 
that two and two are five ; therefore some one who is not a man can 
prove that two and two are five. No trouble to find absurdities. 
Just deny something of somebody and straightway it is true of some- 
body else ! The trouble comes when you seek concrete examples of 
inversion which are not silly. Inversionists for the most part pru- 
dently stick to symbols. I am not citing these absurdities just to 
be witty at the expense of inversion, but because they are the super- 
ficial symptoms of deep-seated unsoundness. 

Illicit process of the minor term is the salient point of my criti- 
cism. In the inverse of A there is also an apparent illicit process 
of the major term. Keynes and Read have attempted to explain 
away this weak point. I make no comment on their defense of 
inversion. One illicit process is quite enough, and that one to which 
I am now directing attention attaches not only to the inverse of A, 
but to every possible inverse, full or partial, derived from A, E, I, 
or O, for they all have S for the subject. 

The advocates of inversion have two lines of proof. First in 
order and first in importance is the eduction series leading to the 
inverse by alternate obversion and conversion thus: SaP .'. SeP .". 
PeS .'. PaS /. SiP .'. SoP. Of this series Keynes says: "If the 
universal validity of obversion and conversion is granted, it is impos- 
sible to detect any flaw in the argument by which the conclusion is 
reached" ("Formal Logic," p. 139). There is a flaw nevertheless. 
The series involves the assumption that the subject may be manipu- 
lated just as freely as the predicate, despite the radical difference 
between them. The one is subjectum, something placed beneath as 
the foundation, the essential matter of discourse; while the other is 
not the initial matter of discourse, but something said about it. 
Substituting S for S tears up the foundation and breaks the bond 
of inference. But substituting P for P is harmless, provided the 
balance is kept true by changing the quality of the proposition. For 
example, Some S is P .'. Some S is not not-P. The two negatives 


balance each other. But S, by injecting new matter of discourse, 
disturbs the equilibrium so profoundly that no change of quality can 
restore it. It is always an unbalanced negative. The deceptive 
semblance of balance in the double negative of the inverse (Some 
not-S is not P) is unreal. The two subjects, S and S, being wholly 
different, the quality of what is said about the latter cuts no figure 
in restoring equilibrium. If we say Smith is honest .*. not-Smith 
(Jones for instance) is not honest, do the negatives balance? Not 
at all. The shifting ground from one subject to another is a change 
so stupendous as to put out of court any question of balancing nega- 
tives. It is quite a matter of indifference whether we say Jones is 
honest or not honest so far as concerns any inferential relation to 
Smith is honest. The inferential tie, because of the change of sub- 
jects, is nil, and nonentity is indifferent to "is" and "is not." Just 
so with the change from ruminants to non-ruminants. It matters 
not one whit whether the latter are herbivorous or not. Changing 
subjects is so violent a jolt to the equilibrium that one little negative 
more or less in the predicate is of no consequence. Whatever con- 
crete values we assign to S and S the result is the same. They are 
so different that putting one for the other shatters the equilibrium so 
utterly that its restoration by a quality change is hopeless. The 
subject can not be manipulated with impunity. The basal assump- 
tion of the eduction series is fallacious. S always destroys the bal- 
ance, shifts the ground of discourse, brings in alien matter, breaks 
the bond of inference, and produces an illicit minor term. It boots 
not that in the eduction series S first appears in the predicate. It 
comes back as the subject with all its sins on its head. By severing 
the bond uniting the last term to the first, it leaves the inverse, SoP, 
dangling in empty space without any inferential support. The 
eduction series, the chief prop of inversion, is invalid. 

As regards the "universal validity" of conversion and obversion, 
both are sound inferences so long, and only so long, as the integrity 
of the subject is preserved. 

In the second place the inversionist appeals to Euler's circles. 
The inverse may be read off directly from them without any refer- 
ence to the long and intricate eduction series. From the diagram of 

All S is P, tf|)p) , it is obvious that Some S is not P, viz., the 

space outside of both circles. But unfortunately for inversion, the 
argument proves too much. The same inverse may be read off from 

/" x^^\ 

[S P ) , the diagram of I or 0. But I and O have no business to 

be sporting an inverse. By definition inversion depresses quantity, 
and the quantity of I, or of 0, is already a minimum. Yet Euler's 


method is just as liberal to them as it is to A and E. Even if we 
bring in the four possible diagrams of I, the inverse SoP is common 
to all of them. In fact every possible combination of two circles 
leaves outside space from which to read off SoP. 

It may be held that this objection is not fatal. The too prolific 
results of the Eulerian method may be checked by the eduction series, 
or by definition, thus ruling out the unwelcome results obtained from 
I and 0. But I have shown that the eduction series is itself invalid, 
hence unfit to serve as a standard for testing the results of another 
method; and the ruling out of certain results by definition is arbi- 
trary. Logical consistency demands either the acceptance of all 
inverses, those of particulars as well as of universals, or else the 
wholesale rejection of them all. 

The inversionist may claim that the facile and indiscriminate 
reading off of inverses from all sorts of propositions casts doubt upon 
the Eulerian method rather than upon inversion. In this I am very 
much inclined to agree with him, though meanwhile indulging the 
reflection that such doubt is bad for him in the end, since it under- 
mines his second line of defense. The legitimacy of Euler's diagrams 
rests upon the assumption that the relations of terms may be ade- 
quately represented by their extension alone as presented to the eye 
by lines and spaces on a flat field. In order to read off inverses we 
must further assume that outside space represents the contradictory 
of the term in the circle, and that this contradictory exists. Here 
begin modern refinements to which Euler himself was a stranger. 
He never dreamed of bothering the pretty head of his German 
princess with not-S's and not-P's. 

The basal assumption is sufficiently bold. Flat spaces constitute 
a very inadequate presentment of the intricate relations of terms 
each of which is rounded up into a subtile complex of qualities as 
well as quantity. However, so long as we limit ourselves to the 
inside of the simpler diagrams, as Euler did, the method has some 
merit. But its modern refinements are distinctly risky. Outside 
space is an untamed jungle full of logical pitfalls. There it lies plain 
and fair to the eye, therefore the contradictories of S and P exist, 
and their relations may be read off at a glance! Logical relations 
must conform to space relations! But the study of the existential 
import of propositions casts doubt upon the existence of S and P; 
and the facile reading off of inversion fallacies casts doubt upon the 
conformity of logical relations to space relations. Conclusions read 
off from the outside of Euler's circles should be held doubtful unless 
they have been independently confirmed. In the case of the flood of 
inverses (no less than six may be read off from the four diagrams 
of I), this independent verification is not in sight. On the contrary, 


illicit process taints them all. We must discard the whole lot, or else 
remand them to the chapter headed "Fallacies." 




THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Associa- 
tion met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and 
Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences on Monday, No- 
vember 27. An afternoon session was held at the Psychological Lab- 
oratory of Columbia University, and an evening session at the Amer- 
ican Museum of Natural History. Members dined at the Faculty 
Club, Columbia University. The following papers were read : 

Correlations of Association Tests: R. S. WOODWORTH. 

Preliminary results with the tests of controlled association pre- 
pared by Woodworth and Wells indicate rather high correlation 
between the tests of similar performances. 

Experiments in Progress at the University of Illinois: S. S. COLVIN. 

This paper reports some of the typical experiments now in prog- 
ress and partly completed, but not as yet published. One of the most 
extensive of these is the attempt to discover the effect of learning 
certain motor activities on the learning of other similar activities. It 
differs principally from other studies on the transfer of training in 
the large number of subjects who participated and in the attempt to 
isolate the factors of accuracy and rapidity. The experiment has 
been conducted in two sections, the first with about 300 children of 
the practise school of the Charleston (Illinois) Normal School, the 
second with about 1,800 children in the grade schools of Blooming- 
ton, Illinois. While the results have by no means been worked out, 
as far as they go they show that while there is a positive transfer 
effect from the practise series to the test series in accuracy, the op- 
posite is true in regard to rapidity. The test also clearly indicates 
the necessity of running a series of check experiments in interpret- 
ing the results. 

Another study attempts to test whether it is better to learn a 
given task at one sitting or at several. The material used in one test 
was nonsense syllables. These were learned in one, two, three, and 
four periods, respectively. The results showed that it made abso- 
lutely no difference as to which method was employed. The test is 


now being conducted with poetry as the memory material. A posi- 
tive result that lias so far been discovered is that there is a high posi- 
tive correlation between immediate recall and recall 24 hours later. 
The subjects used were about 600 children in the grammar grades of 
the Champaign public schools. 

A third test with school children, also conducted in the Cham- 
paign schools, has shown that while whispering is an aid to learning 
nonsense material, writing is a hindrance up to the sixth grade. 

An experiment to discover the extent of children's vocabularies 
indicates that they are more extensive than ordinarily exposed. 

Another experiment investigates the efficiency of spatial discrimi- 
nation under varying degrees of brightness intensities. Among the 
interesting results appears the fact that there are two maxima of 
discriminative efficiency, a relative maximum with an illumination 
of about two-candle-power illumination, and an absolute maximum 
when employing 32-candle-power illumination. Probably the factors 
of attention and habituation explain respectively the two maxima. 
The experiment is to be continued with chromatic lights and a simi- 
lar test is to be made in regard to sound. 

Eeaction Time to Different Retinal Areas: A. T. POFFENBERGER, JR. 
In the course of an experiment in which light stimuli falling 
upon different regions of the retina were reacted to by either the 
right or the left hand, certain differences appeared. This report in- 
cludes : (1) the differences in the time of reaction by the hand when 
the light stimulus strikes the center of vision, and points 10, 30, and 
45 degrees from the fovea in a horizontal plane; (2) a comparison 
of the reaction times resulting from a stimulation of one eye and of 
both eyes. All differences were based on averages of 400 reactions 
and have a very low probable error. In the two subjects tested, the 
times increased as the distance from the fovea increased, and in all 
cases the reaction of the nasal side of the retina was faster than 
of the temporal side. Comparison with other retinal peculiarities 
suggests that the differences found are due to conditions in the retina 
rather than to differences in the speed of the central process. The 
reaction time upon stimulation of both eyes was faster by about .015 
second than in the case of one eye, a difference due probably to the 
speed of transmission through the nerve centers. 

Some Experiments in Incidental Memory: G. C. MYERS. 

Subjects were asked to draw from memory a representation of 
the size of a dollar bill ; to choose from a series of circles those repre- 
senting the size of the respective common coins ; to represent a watch- 
dial with Roman notation. 

Of the 500 subjects (business men and students and pupils from 


the university to the third grade public school), 15 overestimated 
the length, 88 subjects overestimated the width. In both the cases 
the average underestimation was very much greater than the average 
overestimation. All of the 117 subjects who corrected for length in- 
creased it, and all but 2 of the 124 subjects who corrected for width 
increased it. As a result of this finding, tests are in progress on 
"image measuring." 

The males, as a rule, did better than the females. Of the 50 
country-school teachers and 30 high-school students, however, the 
females did noticeably better than the males. In the watch experi- 
ment, out of 198 cases, all but 19 wrote "IV" and all but 8 wrote 
"VI." In the coin test the general tendency is to overestimate the 
large ones and to underestimate the small ones. A number of other 
tests now in progress were mentioned. 

Visual Acuity with Lights of Different Colors and Intensities: D. E. 


The comparatively recent development of illuminants of high 
intrinsic brightness, with the attendant variations in hue, has given 
a new importance to the question of visual acuity. 

The proper conservation of the eyesight of those who must work 
almost constantly under artificial illumination makes it desirable to 
know what intensities and colors of illumination are best adapted 
to give the eye its highest efficiency. 

In the study of this question two points are obviously of vital 
importance namely, the exact determination of the intensities and 
the character of the test used to measure the acuity. 

Many complicating factors enter into the problem, among them 
being the following : the state of adaptation of the eye ; the varying 
sensitivity of different parts of the retina to lights of different 
colors in different states of adaptation; the influence of accom- 
modation, involving the chromatic aberration of the eye; size of 
pupil ; individual differences, including variation in sensitivity to 
different colors, and variations in the dioptric system of the eye. 

These factors, together with the failure to determine accurately 
the intensities of the lights used, and the employment of different 
types of tests, are responsible for the wide variations which are to 
be found in the conclusions of different observers. 

The present investigations indicate that red gives a considerably 
higher acuity than green, and that white may be either more or less 
efficient than red, depending largely upon individual differences, and 
upon the predominance of the long or short wave lengths. 

With all lights the acuity curve rises rapidly with increase in 
illumination until an intensity of from one to two meter candles is 


reached, after which large increases in intensity are accompanied 
with relatively slight increase in acuity. 

Unit acuity with white light is reached at an intensity of from 25 
to 35 meter candles. 

The following explanation is suggested to account for the higher 
acuity with red illumination. Various facts seem to indicate that 
the cones of the retina, which are concerned in the perception of 
form, are more sensitive to radiations of longer wave length, while 
the rods are relatively more sensitive to shorter wave lengths. It 
appears also that there is to some extent rivalry between the bright- 
ness sense and the form sense. With red illumination, therefore, 
cone vision has the advantage, resulting in enhanced perception or 

The Action of Pharmacological Agents as an Aid in the Classifica- 
tion of Mental Processes: H. L. HOLLINGWORTH. 
Many attempts have been made to make out correlations in effi- 
ciency in various mental and motor tests with a view to their classi- 
fication on the basis of function or process involved in their perform- 
ance. Low correlations have usually been found between tests that 
seem to have many elements in common. These low correlations per- 
haps result from specialized skill in certain analogous performances, 
or in individual differences in method of performing the task as- 
signed. The speaker presented results showing that tests can be 
usefully classified on the basis of the character of the influence of 
such a pharmacological agent as caffein. With respect to the char- 
acter of the drug effect, the action time and persistence of this effect, 
the tests employed at once fall into groups, the members of which 
resemble each other. It was suggested that this resemblance pointed 
to similarity of process, function, or nervous mechanism involved in 
performance of the tasks. Individual differences in the method of 
performance (revealed in the introspections) are also reflected in 
the character and time relations of the drug effect. 

Reactions to Simultaneous Stimuli: J. W. TODD. 

One hundred reactions were obtained from each subject to each 
of the following arrangements of stimuli of medium intensities: to 
single light, electric shock, and sound stimuli ; to the following sim- 
ultaneous stimuli with instructions to react to the first-named mem- 
ber of the pairs and groups : light and sound ; sound and light ; light 
and electric shock; shock and light; sound and shock; shock and 
sound; light, shock, sound; shock, sound, light; sound, shock, light. 
The following conclusions are based upon the data : 
1. The reaction-time to a pair of simultaneous stimuli is shorter 
than the reaction-time to either member of the pair presented alone. 


2. The reaction-time to three simultaneous stimuli is shorter than 
that to a pair of stimuli. 

3. The addition of another stimulus to one or to two stimuli re- 
duces the reaction-time, and reduces it in accordance with the reac- 
tion-time to the stimulus added, i. e., the addition of sound, which 
produces the shortest reaction-time, brings about the greatest reduc- 
tion ; the addition of the electric shock causes less reduction, while 
the addition of light, which produces the longest reaction-time, pro- 
duces the least reduction. 

On the Relation of Quickness of Learning to Retentiveness: DARWIN 


Close inspection shows the problem to be a very elaborate one. 
Not only must we settle it for various classes and ages, but we must 
use various methods of learning and, most important of all, various 
kinds and lengths of material. When it comes to the problem of as- 
certaining the subject's degree of retentiveness, various methods 
present themselves. Of these the two used chiefly in this work have 
been: (1) to have the subject write down, after a certain number of 
days, as much of the material as possible, and measure his retentive- 
ness by the work produced; (2) to supply the subject with the orig- 
inal material and take his time for the relearning of it. Each method 
has its advantages and disadvantages, a discussion of which can- not 
be undertaken in this summary. Suffice it to say that although the 
second method has the advantage of supplying us with an easy and 
accurate form of measurement, it is a question if it is a fair one to 
use in settling the question in hand, in that this method introduces 
the factor of "relearning." The method of correlation used with 
the second method is also open to criticism, for it may be said that it 
is incorrect to compare two men as having the same degree of re- 
tentiveness, one of whom takes 25 minutes to learn a passage and 
who one week later takes 5 minutes, and another who takes 10 minutes 
and three weeks later only 2 minutes, even though each may be said 
to have saved four-fifths of the time originally spent. A combina- 
tion of both methods was used in this work by having the second 
method follow immediately upon the first. 

The popular impression among the laity is that the slow but 
steady worker, even though dull, remembers his work better and 
longer than the more brilliant student a corollary of which is that 
those who learn the quickest forget the quickest. However, in so 
far as reliable statistics have been gathered, it has been found that 
in general the most rapid learner is also the best retainer. Exami- 
nation of the class records of the 132 students tested at the State 
Normal College at Albany also proved that the students who rank 
highest in their classes and who can be classed as "the most intelli- 


gent" have, as a rule, the best memories. A complete expression of 
the various results obtained with the various methods and materials 
used is obviously here impossible. Generally speaking, we may say 
that those who learn quickly remember longest if the material memo- 
rized is "meaningful" or "logical," but that they forget quickly if 
the material is such as involves the memorizing of motor associations, 
as is generally the case with digits, words, and nonsense syllables. 
This statement, however, needs many modifications. Thus, for ex- 
ample, with prose the ratio is not nearly so marked by the second 
method as it is with the first. With several sets of students it was 
even reversed. Words are certainly more "meaningful" than non- 
sense syllables; yet by the second method the ratio is found to be 
more pronounced for words than for nonsense syllables or digits, 
i. e., the percentage of time lost by the fast learners is greater than 
that lost by the slow learners ; and though this is true for digits also, 
it seems to be more true for words. For nonsense syllables (which 
one would think were material par excellence for the memorizing of 
motor associations) the ratio is not nearly as high as it is for digits 
and words. Although averaging the two methods gives a positive 
correlation for both prose and poetry, the second method taken alone 
does not always do so. This is especially so in the case of poetry, 
where the second method almost invariably gives the result that the 
fast learners have forgotten more than the slow ones. We are led to 
suspect that the explanation lies in the fact that in the memorizing 
of poetry rhythm is a most important factor. Taking all methods 
and materials into consideration, we can state quite positively that 
the amount of difference in retentiveness between the fast learner 
and the slow learner is much less than is generally supposd. 

The rather large mass of data obtained supply us with many 
rather interesting implications. (1) The retentiveness of men was 
found in general to be superior to that of women. (2) Individuals 
differ more in quickness of learning than in retentiveness. (3) The 
first method gives a truer index of retention than does the second, 
and would be more desirable were it capable of perfect measurement. 
(4) Memory in the main runs parallel with intelligence and there is 
a positive correlation between memory and scholarship. (5) This 
is more marked where the material is of a "logical" or "intelligible" 
nature, and a good memory for digits, words, nonsense syllables, 
sounds, colors, etc., does not necessarily go hand in hand with great 
intelligence. (6) With the same individual, slow learning gives 
greater retentiveness than does fast learning. (7) With the same 
individual, retentiveness is greater if the material is memorized as 
a whole than if memorized in parts. (8) Among the best learners 
those who learn the nonsense syllables rhythmically are not the best 


retainers. (9) The retention of ideas is increased by seeing that no 
mental work, especially work of a similar nature, is allowed to fol- 
low the memorizing. (10) Auditory and mechanical learning make 
recall prompt and rapid, but the amount recalled is generally less. 




The Mediceval Mind: A History of the Development of Thought and 

Emotion in the Middle Ages. HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR. Two volumes. 

London: Macmillan and Co. 1911. Pp. xv -f 613 ; 589. 

So far as the present reviewer is aware, Mr. Taylor's enterprise is in 
many important respects a novel one. His is not merely a new and 
improved version of standard presentations, but a fresh and highly in- 
genious attempt to supply the thoughtful reader with those various kinds 
of information in regard to the Middle Ages which he may be expected 
to crave and which he would look for in vain in the innumerable learned 
treatises on medieval history. The writer would make us feel "the 
reality of medieval argumentation, with the possible validity of medieval 
conclusions, and tread those channels of medieval passion which were 
cleared and deepened by the thought." To feel these is obviously " to 
reach human comradeship with medieval motives, no longer found too 
remote for our sympathy, or too fantastic or shallow for our understand- 
ing." That the accepted routine of medieval history does not accomplish 
this end is patent enough to any one who has sought to understand the 
Middle Ages. As Mr. Taylor says, "We must not drift too far with 
studies of daily life, habits and dress, wars and raiding, crimes and 
brutalities, or trade, and craft and agriculture. Nor will it be wise to 
keep too close to theology or within the lines of growth of secular and 
ecclesiastical institutions. Let the student be mindful of his purpose 
(which is my purpose in this book) to follow through the Middle Ages the 
development of intellectual energy and the growth of emotion. Holding 
this end in view, we shall not stray from our quest after those human 
qualities which impelled the strivings of medieval men and women, in- 
formed their imaginations, and moved them to love and tears and pity." 

It might seem at first sight that if once the historian deserts those 
seemingly staunch foundations of political, economic, and institutional 
history, he will be forced to choose between a history of medieval litera- 
ture or of philosophy, or run the grave danger of lapsing into scattered 
reflections and personal impressions detached from the solid earth of 
chronicled fact and event. Mr. Taylor has done none of these things. 
He has not written a history of literature or philosophy, nor has he at 
any point lost his moorings and drifted about the vague and eventless sea 
of haphazard generalization. Before proceeding to give a somewhat care- 
ful analysis of the volumes, which is the only way of forming a correct 


notion of their character and value, one more of Mr. Taylor's caveats 
may be mentioned. He is not occupied, he says, with " the brutalities of 
medieval life, nor with all the lower grades of ignorance and superstition 
which have attracted many previous writers. He has not had these things 
very actively in mind when using the expression medieval genius. That 
phrase, and the like, are to be understood as signifying ' the more in- 
formed and constructive spirit of the medieval time.' " 

Book I. is devoted to " The Groundwork." Here the author avails 
himself of the elaborate preparation for his work that he has made in 
writing his two admirable volumes on " Ancient Ideals " and his sug- 
gestive " Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages." As every one should 
know who has given any attention to the matter, the Middle Ages are far 
less original and peculiar in thought and institutions than was formerly 
supposed. The medieval culture is really the culture of the later Roman 
Empire at any rate, no real understanding of the Middle Ages is possible 
to one unfamiliar with that culture. One can not jump from the Golden 
Age of Augustus to the barbarian invasions without missing just what he 
most needs to know in order to estimate the intellectual and emotional 
life of the thousand years following the disruption of the Empire. 
Accordingly, Mr. Taylor properly assigns some two hundred pages to the 
following topics : " The Genesis of the Medieval Genius," " The Latinizing 
of the West," " Greek Philosophy as the Antecedent of the Patristic 
Apprehension of Fact," " Intellectual Interests of the Latin Fathers," 
" Latin Transmitters of Antique and Patristic Thought," " The Barbaric 
Disruption of the Empire," " The Celtic Strain in Gaul and Ireland," 
" Teuton Qualities : Anglo-Saxon, German, Norse," and, finally, " The 
Bringing of Christianity and Antique Knowledge to the Northern 
Peoples." This portion of his work would form an independent treatise 
of the greatest value to those laboring under a variety of vain delusions 
due to the habit of the older historians of attempting to begin their his- 
tories of the Middle Ages with the so-called fall of Rome. Fustel de 
Coulanges, Ebert, Dill, Glover, and others have all made their contribu- 
tions to the subject, but Mr. Taylor has done the work over from his own 
standpoint, basing his conclusions on his own independent research. He 
has by no means reproduced his " Classical Heritage," which supplements 
in certain respects the present work. In Book II. he bridges the gap 
between the waning culture of the sixth and seventh century and the 
clearly reviving culture of the twelfth and thirteenth. Toward one hun- 
dred and fifty pages fall to these early Middle Ages, to the Carolingian 
period and the mental aspects of the eleventh century in Italy, France, 
Germany, and England. 

The great bulk of the work is properly taken up with the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, which, with their immediate antecedents, appear to 
many writers to constitute a truly remarkable and instructive period, 
which can be deemed from the standpoint of its constructive achieve- 
ments, in art, law, education and thought, one of the chief sources of 
that culture which has prevailed down very nearly to the present, and 
which is responsible for many still current notions and social adjustments. 


Indeed the so-called Renaissance and the Protestant Revolt did far less to 
undermine the emotional and intellectual life inherited from the thir- 
teenth century than has commonly been assumed. 

Books III. and IV. deal with the ideals first of the saints and secondly 
of the knights. Peter Damiani whom Mr. Taylor has brought to life 
St. Bernard, Francis of Assisi, and holy women, like Hildegard of Bingen 
and Elizabeth of Schonau, illustrate the beauties of ascetic devotion, while 
the " spotted actuality," as the author happily terms it, may be judged 
from the devout obscenity of Caesar of Heisterbach, the prosaic chronique 
scandaleuse of Archbishop Rigaud's pastoral visits, and Salimbene's 
coarse fun. But Mr. Taylor betrays no Schadenfreude in the com- 
promising details of baseness, nor does he apologize for them. They do 
not prove to him that the ideals of the time were mere hypocrisy, but 
merely that ideals in the Middle Ages excelled conduct, as is their wont. 
In describing " society," knightly virtue is illustrated by Godfrey of 
Bouillon and St. Louis, reinforced by the belated Froissart. There is a 
chapter on Parzival, " the brave man slowly wise," and another beautiful 
one on " The Heart of Heloi'se," surely the loveliest woman in some cen- 
turies of whom we are fortunate enough to know anything. 

Book V. shows how symbolism lay back of the art, literature, and 
whole thought, emotion, and speculation of the time. This subject is one 
of the most important for the student of the Middle Ages, whatever his 
special interests. Mr. Taylor illustrates current scriptural allegorizing 
by extracts from the highly imaginative Honorius of Autun ; the " sym- 
bolic universe " finds its exponent in Hugo of St. Victor. 

In Book VI. Mr. Taylor proceeds to a consideration of two important 
elements in the medieval heritage from the Roman Empire, its Latinity 
and its law. Every one who busies himself with the Middle Ages soon 
comes to feel that medieval Latin often has great literary charm, if one 
does not insist on wondering what Cicero or Horace would have thought 
of Abelard, St. Thomas Aquinas, or Thomas of Celano. Mr. Taylor shows 
a lively appreciation of both the beauty and the defects of what used to 
be called " low " Latin. He has chapters on the medieval attitude toward 
the Latin classics for the Greek books had, with the exception of Aris- 
totle, pretty much all gone by the board together with many apt examples 
of medieval prose and verse. To any one with some knowledge of classical 
Latin and a fair degree of literary feeling, these chapters will prove among 
the most fascinating in the work. As for the chapter on the Roman and 
Canon laws, Mr. Taylor, who is an acknowledged authority on an impor- 
tant branch of contemporaneous law, is well qualified by his studies of 
earlier days to quench the easily satiated thirst of most of his readers for 
knowledge of these themes. 

The second half of Volume II. is devoted to " The Ultimate Intellec- 
tual Interests of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries " to what, in 
short, is commonly called scholasticism. To understand in some degree 
the spirit and scope of scholasticism, it may be remarked, is to understand 
a great many tendencies of the human mind which can be readily ob- 
served at the present day, without going back to Albert or his gifted 


disciple Thomas. After a consideration of the origin and general nature 
of scholastic speculation and its development in the twelfth century under 
the auspices of Abelard, Peter Lombard and others, Mr. Taylor gives an 
account of the rise of the Aristotle-ridden universities and the intellectual 
role of the Mendicant friars. Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus, and 
Thomas each has a chapter to himself, as well as the intempestive Roger 
Bacon and those daring spirits, Duns Scotus and Occam, who exercised 
so potent an influence upon later thinkers. The final chapter is admirably 
conceived " The Mediaeval Synthesis " which Dante offers in his " Divine 
Comedy." Every one likely to read Mr. Taylor's book is likely to have 
Dante on his shelves, and equally unlikely to possess the works of Albert 
or the " Opus Majus " of Bacon. If, as our author maintains, Dante's 
long poem is but a poetic summa of medieval thought and belief, the 
reader will find in " The Medieval Mind " the most elaborate and satis- 
factory prolegomenon ever prepared for the " Divina Commedia." 

Few readers who follow under Mr. Taylor's guidance the long way 
from Augustine to Dante will leave him without a somewhat bewildering 
sense of the extraordinary patience, sympathy, and intelligence which has 
produced the work in hand. There is ever so little that is merely formal 
or second-hand; the writer has read the works of others, but does not 
copy them out in his pages. He has doubtless been affected by their 
views here and there, but his own impressions and convictions are based 
on a first-hand acquaintance with the medieval writings themselves. He 
has found time and has had the industry and system necessary at once to 
collect his material and to assimilate it and " react " on it. To him 
belongs the highest tribute that the historian may win; he is at once the 
erudit and the savant and of few can this be said. 


A History of the Cavendish Laboratory, 1871-1910. London : Longmans, 

Green, & Co. 1910. Pp. xi + 342. 

Under this modest title we have a really important chapter in the 
history of scientific thought. On December 22, 1909, J. J. Thomson, on 
whom has fallen the mantle of Maxwell, completed the twenty-fifth year 
of his tenure of the Cavendish professorship of experimental physics at 
the University of Cambridge. In deciding to commemorate the event 
with a Festschrift his colleagues and pupils eschewed the usual form which 
such volumes now take, viz., that of a series of technical monographs on 
points of special interest to the writers. Instead they adopted the plan 
of writing a history of the Cavendish Laboratory, over which Clerk Max- 
well, Lord Rayleigh, and J. J. Thomson have in turn presided. The 
Cavendish Laboratory is easily the foremost British center of physical 
research, and of late years students from all parts of the world have come 
to work there. An account of the work done in this laboratory should, 
therefore, have a great interest for general students of science. Moreover, 
the plan of the volume, as shown in the letter addressed to the contribu- 
tors, states: 


" It is understood that the present volume should be the record not of 
what work was done, but of lion- that work came to be done. It is thought 
that the evolution of the ideas which have inspired physical teaching and 
research in Cambridge, and the part played in that evolution by the many 
eminent men who have worked in the laboratory, should be traced as far 
as possible; and it is hoped that the narration may be made in such a way 
as to be of interest even to those who are not professed students of our 

After an introductory chapter on how the laboratory came to be built, 
there follows a chapter on the Clerk Maxwell period by Professor Shuster, 
then one on the Rayleigh period by Professor Glazebrook, and a survey of 
the last twenty-five years by J. J. Thomson himself. These are followed 
by four detailed surveys, viz : the period of 1885-1894 by Professor Newall, 
the period of 1895-1898 by Professor Rutherford, the period of 1899-1902 
by C. T. R. Wilson, and the period of 1903-1909 by N. R. Campbell. The 
concluding chapter by Professor Wilberforce treats of the development of 
the teaching of physics. In the appendix we have some forty odd pages 
devoted to a list of the published memoirs based on the work done in the 
Cavendish Laboratory, and also a list of the workers who pursued their 
researches there, with their official positions, etc. The name index and 
the subject index which follow can not but enhance the value of the book. 

As was to be expected, the various contributors did not interpret their 
instructions in exactly the same way. Some emphasize the personal and 
the social side of the work, the inspiration of the great leaders, the genial 
spirit of cooperation prevailing among the workers, etc. Others describe 
the relation of the various researches " as they appear in a general and 
impersonal review" (p. 226). 

Professor Shuster's account of the Maxwell period is mainly personal. 
He describes his relations with Maxwell and the work done in the labora- 
tory which especially interested Professor Shuster. In this, as well as in 
the introductory chapter, however, we get occasional flashes which illumine 
for us not only the personality of Maxwell, but also the general ideas 
which animated his labors. In the seventies it was generally supposed 
that the only function of a physical laboratory was to measure physical 
constants. Maxwell, admitting that it is characteristic of modern experi- 
ments that they consist principally of measurement, went on in his intro- 
ductory lecture to add : " Our principal work, however, in the laboratory 
must be to acquaint ourselves with all kinds of scientific methods, to com- 
pare them, and to estimate their value. It will be a result worthy of our 
university ... if, by the free and full discussion of the relative values of 
different scientific procedures, we succeed in forming a school of scien- 
tific criticism, and in assisting in the development of the doctrine of 
method " (p. 17). 

It seems almost incredible that Maxwell, by many considered the suc- 
cessor of Newton, should have had only two or three students at his lec- 
tures, and that his laboratory equipment should have been so small that 
he should have found it necessary to report after a few years : " During 
the present term a skilled workman has been employed in the laboratory, 


and has already greatly improved the efficiency of several pieces of 
apparatus." Genius and enthusiasm, however, seem to have been more 
effective than numbers and means, so that the amount as well as the 
quality of the work turned out was truly wonderful. 

The period of Lord Rayleigh's professorship (1879-1884) was devoted 
especially to the determination of electrical units; and Professor Glaze- 
brook introduces his account with a remarkably clear exposition of the 
character of the fundamental units of physics, leading up to the explana- 
tion of how the ratio between the electrostatic and the electromagnetic 
units suggests the electromagnetic theory of -light. 

Professor Thomson's own account is a genial review of the social side 
of the work as well as its relation to the demands of Cambridge University. 
Incidentally and parenthetically we have in a few pages (pp. 92-96) a lucid 
account of the considerations which led him to formulate the corpuscular 
or electronic theory of matter. 

The detailed survey, by Professor Newall, of the work done in the 
laboratory between 1885 and 1894 contains a great deal of very valuable 
material under the subheadings : Experimental Optics, Electro-optics, 
Properties of Matter, Heat and Thermometry, Electricity and Magnetism, 
and the Passage of Electricity through Gases. The value of this and 
other chapters is, however, lessened for the general reader by the fact 
that the authors do not, or can not, owing to the limitations of space, 
indicate the importance or subsequent outcome of the experimental work 
which they describe. Thus on page 133 we are dryly told that a number 
of experiments by Roiti, Lecher, Wilberforce, and Rayleigh, to detect the 
influence of the motion of a medium on the velocity of light, failed. In 
view of the fact that this very question has since come to the forefront of 
physical discussion, and that the relativity theory is based entirely on these 
and similar "failures," some comment should have been vouchsafed to 
" those who are not professed students of our science." 

The period from 1895 to 1898 was a momentous one in the history of 
modern physics, and the part that the Cavendish Laboratory played is 
told by Professor Rutherford, who was a student of J. J. Thomson's 
during this period, and who subsequently won the Nobel Prize for his 
researches on radium emanations. Professor Rutherford indicates how 
" amongst other discoveries it [the Cavendish Laboratory] witnessed 
within its walls the final proof of the nature of the cathode rays, the 
advent of the negative corpuscle or electron, as a definite entity, the 
experimental proof of the character of the conduction of electricity 
through gases, and the initial analysis of the radiations from radioactive 
matter " (p. 159). 

The chapter by N. R. Campbell is perhaps more than any other in the 
book written with an eye for " the reader who is not a professed student 
of physics." It is full of suggestive ideas, and is from a philosophic 
point of view perhaps the most satisfactory. 

The book is handsomely printed and is in every way pleasant reading. 
Natives of Hoboken will be sorely disappointed to find Stevens Institute 
credited on p. 330 to Hobsten, N. J. (wherever that may be). Most 


American readers will likewise prefer class of men to class of man. A 
more serious misprint, liable to mislead the unwary reader, occurs in the 
last line on p. 93. The conductivity was due to something mixed with 
the gas, not with the glass. 

Professional philosophers who light-heartedly speak of atoms and 
molecules as mere " convenient symbols " will find the reading of this book, 
or of some of the memoirs mentioned in it, very troublesome. For not 
only are these " mere concepts " conceived as objective physical entities, 
but people in Cavendish Laboratory persist in counting them, weighing 
them, measuring their dimensions, and determining the electrical charges 
on the minute corpuscles which compose these bodies. No doubt the 
experimental work is largely interlarded with a great deal of conscious 
or unconscious assumption; and it can not be said that very clear lines 
are here always drawn between experimental results and the theories 
which are intended to explain them. Nevertheless, until some other 
explanation of this vast mass of experimental work is forthcoming, the 
theories of Joseph J. Thomson and his disciples will at least in the eyes 
of those familiar with the facts hold the field, 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. July, 1911. The Ontological 
Problem of Psychology (pp. 363-385) : GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. - Three 
topics are considered: first, the more or less scornful objections to the 
whole subject of ontology; second, the relation of ontology to real human 
interests; third, the progress attained toward answering the ontological 
problem of psychology. The greater part of the article is devoted to a 
discussion of the first topic. The present condition and future prospect 
of the ontological problem of psychology is considered and illustrated 
from the corresponding problem in the physical sciences. The concepts 
space, time, force, and substance are analyzed. Knowing Things (pp. 386- 
404) : JOHN E. BOODIN. - " In dealing with things as known, we place our- 
selves at once at the pragmatic point of view things as they must be 
taken in our systematic experience." " Qualities must be taken as ob- 
jective, if they enable us to identify and predict the things with which we 
must deal." Qualities are further distinguished from sensations, rela- 
tions, and values. Professor Pringle-Pattison's Epistemological Realism 
(pp. 405-421) : ALFRED H. JONES. - " The salient feature of this theory . . . 
consists in a substitution of what the author calls epistemological realism 
or dualism for the metaphysical dualism of English and continental 
philosophy. This new form of dualism differs from the traditional form 
of the theory in that it makes the independent or realistic existence of 
objects a fact of knowledge or conscious experience instead, as is usually 
done, of reality or existence." Reviews of Books (pp. 422-440). Ber- 
trand Russell, Philosophical Essays: EVANDER BRADLEY McGiLVARY. 


Pierre Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et I'Averro'isme latin au XIII me 
siecle: ISAAC HUSIK. Bruno Bauch, Das Substanzproblem in der griech- 
ischen Philosophic bis zur Blutezeit: W. A. HEIDEL. Dicran Aslanian, 
Les principes de devolution sociale: R. M. MAO!VER. Notices of New 
Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes. 

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. August, 1911. Les correlations psy- 
chophysiques (avec fig.) (pp. 115-135) : DR. SIKORSKI. - Experimental 
results correlating sphygmograms and pneumograms with different types 
of mentality, normal and abnormal. La definition du hasard de Cournot 
(pp. 136-159) : G. MILHAUD. - A defense of the coherency of Coumot's 
definitions of chance against current criticism. La sociologie de M. DurJc- 
heim (2e. et dernier article) (pp. 160-185) : G. DAVY. - The remainder of 
the exposition of M. Durkheim's sociology and a brief estimate of its sig- 
nificance, for it really leads to philosophy and needs completion from 
philosophy. Analyses et comptes rendus. C. Dunan, Les deux idealismes: 
A. PENJON. A. Binet, L'annee psychologique : H. PIERON. A. Michotte 
et Prum, Etude experimental sur le choix volontaire et ses antecedents 
immediates: G. L. DUPRAT. T. V. Moore, The Process of Abstraction: 
G. L. DUPRAT. Warner Brown, The Judgment of Difference with Special 
Reference to the Doctrine of the Threshold: B. BOURDON. Jacks, The 
Alchemy of Thought: G. L. DUPRAT. Martini, I fatti psichici riviviscenti : 
FR. PAULHAN. Chiappelli, Dalla critica al nuovo idealismo: L. DAURIAC. 
Revue des periodiques Strangers. 

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. September, 1911. Vie vegetative et 
vie intellectuelle (pp. 225-257): F. LE DANTEC. -A reply to M. Lalande's 
objections to the definition of life that the author has advocated for the 
last fifteen years. La categoric de relation (pp. 258-277) : A. CHIDE. - An 
attempt to trace the empirical genesis of this category in opposition to 
dialecticians from Heraclitus down. Le pragmatisme et I'esthetique (pp. 
278-284) : J. PERES. - Pragmatism contains certain esthetic principles and 
the author undertakes to exhibit them, together with certain verifications 
in fact. Observations et documents. Le reve et la pensee conceptuelle : 
DUPRAT. Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica: H. DUFUMIER. 
L. Couturat, O. Jespersen, R. Lorenz, W. Ostwald, L. Pfaundler, Welt- 
sprache und Wissenschaft : A. L. Dejerine et Gauckler, Les manifesta- 
tions fonctionelles des psychonevroses : DR. CH. BLONDEL. J. Dubois, Le 
probleme pedagogique: L. DUGAS. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant: F. 
PICAVET. Noel, (Euvres completes de J. Tauler: F. PICAVET. Baeumker, 
Witelo, philosophe et naturaliste du XHIe siecle: F. PICAVET. L. Adelphe, 
De la notion de souverainete dans la politique de Spinoza: G. RICHARD. 0. 
Richter, Nietzsche et les theories biologiques contemporaines : L. ARREAT. 
R. M. Wenley, Kant and his Philosophical Revolution: J. SECOND. Tari, 
Saggi di estetica: C. LALO. Revue des periodiques etrangers. 

Baldwin, James Mark. Thoughts and Things or Genetic Logic. Volume 
III. London : George Allen & Co., Ltd. ; New York : The Macmillan 
Co. 1911. Pp. xvi + 284. $2.75. 


Boutroux, Emile. Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy. 

Translated by Ilereward Nield. New York: The Macmillan Company. 

1011. Pp. ix -f 35.3. 
Claparede, Ed. Experimental Pedagogy and the Psychology of the Child. 

Translated by Mary Louch and Henry Holman. New York: Long- 

111:1113, Green and Co. 1011. Pp. viii + 322. 
De Coubertin, Pierre. L'analyse universelle. Paris: Felix Alcan. Pp. 



ONE of the great founders of the science of physical anthropology has 
passed away in the person of Dr. Paul Topinard. He was a pupil, col- 
league, and friend of the illustrious Broca, a " man who," Dr. Beddoe 
said, " positively radiated science and the love of science; no one could as- 
sociate with him without catching a portion of the sacred flame. Topinard 
has been the Elisha of this Elijah." Topinard made valuable investiga- 
tions on the living population of France, and many researches in various 
other branches of physical anthropology. In 1876 he published a relatively 
small book, " L'Anthropologie," for which he obtained a gold medal from 
the Faculty de Medecine de Paris, and a second prize from 1'Institut; it 
was translated into English, and published in the Library of Contemporary 
Science in 1878. This book is packed with information, as it contains 
numerous measurements and an exposition of methods of investigation ; 
it has long been a guide for students and a manual of reference for travel- 
ers and others. In 1885 he published his " Elements d'Anthropologie 
generate," a monumental work of 1157 pages, being the substance of his 
courses of lectures and laboratory instruction for eight years in the Ecole 
d'Anthropologie. It is not the compilation of a mere library student, but 
is permeated by the author's personality and contains the results of his 
very numerous and varied researches; in it he broke free from the tra- 
ditions of the monogenists and polygenists, and incorporated the new 
ideas spread by Darwin and Haeckel. This great work exhibits his vast 
erudition and untiring energy, and it is indispensable for all physical 
anthropologists. It is needless to add that Dr. Topinard has gained honors 
in his own country and the homage of his colleagues all over the world. 

MR. N. C. NELSON, instructor in anthropology in the University of 
California, has been appointed assistant curator in the department of 
anthropology in the American Museum of Natural History. He will 
assume his duties next June and give special attention to North Amer- 
ican archeology. 

DR. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, lecturer in philosophy at the University of 
Liverpool, has been appointed professor of mental and moral philosophy 
at the University of Melbourne. 

A GUIDE to " The Philosophy of Bergson," by A. D. Lindsay, a young 
Scotchman, will be brought out by Doran. 

VOL. IX. No. 4. FEBRUARY 15, 1912. 



THE American Philosophical Association has lately devoted much 
attention to an earnest and most important effort to render its 
general discussions more unified, more profitable, and more conducive 
to the furtherance of agreement among students of philosophy. 
There is no doubt that both the Executive Committee of the Asso- 
ciation and its "Committee on Definitions" have labored most self- 
sacrificingly to further this effort, so far as they could. Where the 
spirit shown has been so serious and so unselfish, criticism may appear 
ungracious. But the members of the committee have asked for criti- 
cisms. The issue involved is not as to their unquestionable sincerity 
and devotion, but as to the future policy of the Association, and as 
to the best way of securing, in the discussions at our meetings, the 
right sort of philosophical communion and community amongst the 
members. Our committees consist of valued and honored friends. 
But the Association itself is the "greater friend." We all wish it 
to find the best way of doing its work. We hope that it will long 
outlive our own generation. We want to initiate methods of coop- 
eration which, as they come to be improved by experience, will con- 
tinue to grow more and more effective as the years go on. To this 
end, we must be ready to criticize freely the first efforts to organize 
such methods of cooperation. I cheerfully submit to the severest 
scrutiny this my own effort at such criticism. 


In the report of the Executive Committee, printed before the last 
meeting of the Association and used during the meeting, a brief state- 
ment leads to the announcement of the subject selected for debate. 
Those who were appointed to lead the debate, as we are told in this 
report, "decided to limit themselves to the discussion of 'The Rela- 
tion of Consciousness and Object in Sense Perception.' ' Nobody 
ought to doubt, I think, that this selection was a good one. Acting 
under the power conferred upon the Executive Committee by the 



previous meeting of the Association, the Executive Committee here- 
upon voted "to have the selection of debaters carry with it the ap- 
pointment to the committee on definitions," the President of the 
Association acting as the fifth member of that committee. The com- 
mittee in question, with the assistance of the Secretary of the Asso- 
ciation, undertook, under the authority of the original vote of the 
Association, "the analysis and preparation of the problem for dis- 
cussion," and "definitions of terms pertaining to" the "subject, for 
the use of those participating in the debate." That the "analysis," 
"the preparation of the subject," and the "definitions of terms," 
were, in the main, satisfactory to the leading debaters who had been 
appointed by the Executive Committee of the Association, was thus 
secured by the fact that the subject was prepared for discussion by a 
committee consisting of these debaters themselves with the assistance 
of the President and the Secretary. In their report, the Executive 
Committee, still acting, of course, under the authority of the Asso- 
ciation, invited "members at large" to participate in the debate, by 
written papers, or otherwise, and, in doing so "to use, as far as 
possible, the definitions and divisions made by the committee. ' ' 

The report of the Committee on Definitions, printed along with 
the Executive Committee's report just cited, begins by emphasizing 
the importance of the enterprise which the Association had thus, 
through the Executive Committee, assigned to its care. "Such an 
extensive attempt," it said, "at an organization of cooperative 
philosophical inquiry, has not hitherto been made by this Asso- 
ciation." "The committee believes such organized and cooperative 
inquiry to have important possibilities for the future of philosophical 
study. It therefore ventures to express the hope that members will 
make a special effort to enter into the spirit of the undertaking, to 
review the recent literature of the subject, and, in their participation 
in the discussion, to conform, for the time being, to the general plan 
of procedure here suggested." 


It would have been indeed a very ungracious task for any member 
to take part in the general discussion to which all members of the 
Association were thus invited, unless he could feel cordially willing 
to accept all the essential features of the "preparation" and of the 
"definitions" which, in its report, the Committee on Definitions here- 
upon proceeded to set forth. Of the competency of the Committee 
to determine the rules of the proposed debate, so far as its own 
members were concerned, there could be of course no doubt. Of its 
authority, by virtue of the original vote of the Association, and under 
the conditions of its appointment, to ask members to follow its 
rulings with scrupulous care, in case they chose to participate in the 


general discussion at all, there could again be no doubt. The Execu- 
tive Committee added its express request, as we have seen, to that of 
the Committee on Definitions ; and hereby reasonably bound all who 
wanted to debate to do their best to confine their usage of terms and 
their definition of the issues to the forms prescribed by the Com- 
mittee on Definitions. The experiment in cooperative philosophical 
inquiry thus for the first time tried, could not fairly be interfered 
with by any voluntary participant through an expression of his 
unwillingness if he felt such unwillingness to accept the Com- 
mittee's analysis and .definitions of the problem as sufficient for the 
purposes of the debate. The Committee defined certain terms: 
a, b, c, etc. It proposed certain questions for debate relating to 
matters defined in these terms. Such a question might take the 
form: "Are all the members of the class ab members of the class cf" 
It asked the members who took part in the debate to accept these 
definitions and formulations of questions as the topics of inquiry. 
Nobody could meet the express wishes of the Committee, and discuss 
the topics which it wanted to have discussed, unless, accepting for 
the time the definitions proposed, he was ready to answer such ques- 
tions as "Is every ab a member of the class cf" in the spirit of one 
who considered the question at issue important, and the issue well 
taken. If he thought the issues to be ill defined by the Committee, 
and unworthy of the sort of attention that the Committee required, 
he had no proper place in this particular experiment in cooperation. 
It was in that case his duty to leave the general debate to other 
members. For nobody was asked to debate in the meeting the 
question whether the Committee had well formulated the issues. 
Members were asked to cooperate under the rules laid down by a 
body authorized to restrict the field of inquiry for the sake of 
ensuring cooperation. Nobody could attempt the cooperation, unless 
he was willing to abide by the restrictions. 

The responsibility of the Committee was of course as great as its 
authority. Its duty was and no doubt its intention was so to 
state the issues for debate that any or all of the philosophical opin- 
ions about those issues which are worth discussing, could be discussed. 
And of course a proper discussion of the issues could not include, at 
the meeting, such objections to the Committee 's report as I now offer. 
The debater was required to follow the assigned rules of the game. 
He was not to discuss their value. He was to play under these rules. 
Hence, if his views about the issues were worth discussing at all, the 
Committee's formulas ought to have left him unhampered. 

My present question is: How did the Committee accomplish this 
duty ? Whose cooperation did it make possible, in case the one who 
cooperated was understood to accept the plan of debate as printed? 


I am sorry that the somewhat elaborate "preparation" of the 
question set forth by the Committee will force me to make my answer 
to these questions tedious. But I can hardly be blamed for taking 
the Committee's formulas seriously, and, in consequence, analyzing 
them with care. 


After a study of the possible issues, the Committee presented, as 
the first of its questions for debate, the following: "In cases where a 
real (and non-hallucinatory) object is involved, what is the relation 
between the real and the perceived object with respect (a) to their 
numerical identity at the moment of perception, (b) with respect to 
the possibility of the existence of the real object at other moments 
apart from any perception?" This question was to be understood, 
by all who were to cooperate, as determined by the meanings assigned 
by the Committee to the terms "object," "perceived object," and 
"real object." 

The definitions of these terms, as printed in the Committee's 
report, are as follows: 

By object in this discussion shall be meant any complex of physical quali- 
ties, whether perceived or unperceived and whether real or unreal. _ 

By real objects is meant in this discussion such objects as are true parts 
of the material world. 

By perceived object is meant in this discussion an object given in some 
particular actual perception. 

It appears, from the context, and from the formulation of the 
question for debate quoted above, that the Committee very naturally 
laid some stress upon the fact that what it meant by "some par- 
ticular actual perception" involved an occurrence at some "moment 
of time," called also "the moment of perception" ; or, again, involved 
some determinate set or sequence of such momentary occurrences, 
"in some particular individuated stream of perceptions," that is, in 
the mind or in the experience of some person. 

The Committee did not define what it meant by the adjective 
"given," used in the above-cited definition of "perceived object." 
Of course the participants in the discussion would seem to be in so 
far left free to understand and to use that word in any reasonable 
and customary fashion that is consistent with the context of the re- 
port ; and it is plain that the members of the Committee were entirely 
unaware that by their use of this word they in the least restricted 
the reasonable liberty of anybody. As a fact, however, their defini- 
tion of the term "perceived object," taken together with their 
formulation of their question, and the context in which they used 
the word given, involved a very serious interference with the range 
of the cooperation which they invited. For what is "given" in a 


"moment of perception," and what is not "given," and the sense in 
which anything can be "given at a particular moment," and the 
sense in which what is "given" can also be an "object" all these 
are not topics of a merely pedantic curiosity about words. They are 
matters which have been lengthily, frequently, and momentously 
discussed, both in the controversies about perception and in other 
philosophical inquiries. Let us see how far and how profitably such 
questions could be discussed by any one who was ready to be guided, 
in the debate, by the rules laid down by the Committee. 


The word given has a wide range both of popular and of technical 
usage. Amongst its more technical meanings, three very readily 
occur to mind as possibly in question when the word is employed in 
a philosophical discussion. 

In a very wide sense, which is rendered in special cases more 
determinate by the context, given means: "Assumed, presupposed, 
agreed upon, accepted, taken as if it were known but always with 
reference to some specific purpose, inquiry, undertaking, discussion, 
or plan of action. ' ' This sense is of course a very elastic one, and is 
often convenient, just because the context which further defines the 
plan or inquiry in question so easily specifies the conditions subject 
to which something is declared or agreed to be given. But, for this 
very reason, given, if used in this first sense, means conditionally 
given, subject to the agreements or presuppositions in question, and, 
in this sense, does not mean: "present in some particular actual per- 
ception." In this wide sense of conditionally given, the Sherman 
Act is given, when legal controversies about certain combinations in 
restraint of trade are in question. And, for the purposes of the 
discussion, or of the present paper, the Committee's report, with its 
definitions, requests, statements of the issue, and so on, is itself given, 
to any one who wants to engage in the proposed discussion, or to 
read this paper. Any conceivable real or ideal object, principle, 
abstraction, fact, or fabulous invention, any portion of the universe, 
or the whole of it, could be given, in this sense, to somebody for some 
purpose. Yet the word given would not hereby be rendered hope- 
lessly vague, because, each time, the context or other connections of 
the plan or inquiry that was to be undertaken would enable one to 
specify the conditions which made the object or principle, in this 
sense, hypothetically or conventionally given. 

A second and also wide sense of the term given introduces the 
word into one's ontological vocabulary, and employs it as equivalent 
to existent, actual. God or an atom, Herbart's reals or Leibniz's 
monads, the events of history or the interior of the earth, anything 


believed by anybody to be a fact or a reality, may by that person be 
declared, in this sense, to be a given fact in the world, or simply to 
be given. This meaning is of course specified, on occasion, by 
naming the place, time, or other definable region of being, in which 
the fact in question is asserted to be a fact. This signification of the 
word given is frequent in usage, but is often inconvenient, because 
of the danger of confusion between this and the third meaning of 
given a danger which occasionally arises. 

In a third sense, given means present to or in the "experience" 
or "perception" or "feeling" or "state of mind" of somebody. 
I put in quotation marks the words and phrases that specify how or 
wherein the given is, in this sense, present, merely to indicate that, in 
any effort to specify this sense, one deals with matters which are 
amongst the most obvious and at the same time most problematic 
topics that philosophy has to consider. In order fully to explain 
what it is which in this sense is, for somebody, or at some time, given, 
that is, present or immediately known, or directly experienced, you 
need to face all the problems about "immediacy" and about "experi- 
ence" and about the "self" and about "time" and about the rela- 
tion of the relational aspect of the given to its non-relational aspect 
all the problems, I say, which have most divided the philosophers. 
These are also the problems that have disturbed the seekers after 
some sort of "intuition" or of religious "faith," ever since the 
Hindoo seers first retired to the forests (or in other words "took to 
the woods") in their own vain effort to solve that most recondite of 
human mysteries, the mystery regarding what it is that is given in 
this third sense. From Yajnavalkya to Bergson this problem of the 
given has troubled men. 

This sense of the word given is frequent in discussion. It is ex- 
tremely useful in attempts at defining the various problems whose 
nature and variety have just been indicated. But unless one bears 
in mind how difficult and recondite these problems are, he is likely 
to employ the term given, in this third sense, rather to escape from 
facing the greatest issues of philosophy than to prepare the way for 
further reflection upon them. Of course an important part of the 
task of anybody who calls anything given, in this third sense, is to 
specify what sort of presentation it is upon which he is insisting. 

Of these three senses of the word given, it seems plain, from the 
context, that the Committee intended some specification of the third 
sense to be in question. For their report uses the phrases: "at 
certain times present in a given individuated series of perceptions"; 
"given in some particular actual perception." Even if given were 
here supposed to be used in the second of the above-mentioned senses, 
this account of the "locus," . e., of the place and time wherein some- 


thing is for the purposes of the definition of a perceived object, 
given, would make the second sense (specified so as to apply to the 
case here in question) identical with some specification of the third 
sense. For even if the word given meant "is a fact," is "actual," 
the "perceived objects" of which the Committee speaks are here 
specified simply as "figuring" or as "present" "in some particular 
actual perception. ' ' That, then, is the way, or at least one way, in 
which those "perceived objects" are to be, just then, facts. And in 
this way the Committee means given to be understood. 

As to the first sense, the Committee is not defining its "perceived 
objects" as given to the percipient in the sense in which the Sherman 
Act is given as the agreed presupposition of a legal controversy. 
Of course, I repeat, all of the Committee 's definitions, topics, objects, 
and problems are to us members given, in our first sense of the word 
given, for the purpose of the proposed discussion, and as its agreed or 
at least supposed basis. But the "perceived objects" are said by 
the Committee to be given in "some particular actual perception," 
at one or at several moments of time, and in the individuated 
"stream" of some percipient's perceptions. The sense of given in 
the Committee's definition of perceived object is, therefore, some 
specification of the third of the senses above indicated. Hereby, then, 
the debater who can cooperate seems to be bound in advance by the 
Committee's report. In so far the wording and the context leave 
him not free to interpret the word given as he pleases. 

What is the result? The committee has certainly not left the 
cooperating debater free as to his definition of the word object. An 
object, in this discussion, is a "complex of physical qualities." It is 
of course left to the debater to hold whatever view he holds as to 
what a "complex of physical qualities" actually is and involves. 
But this latter view will no longer be a matter of merely verbal con- 
ventions. Of course such "complexes" as "yellow, hard, and ex- 
tended," or "brown, smooth, and solid," will be amongst the physical 
"objects" denoted by such phraseology. The debater will have his 
opinion as to what such ' ' physical " " complexes ' ' are, and as to what 
conditions they must meet in order to be "physical" at all. These 
views will no longer be reducible to definitions of terms. The de- 
bater's metaphysics or epistemology or perhaps just his opinions as a 
student of some physical science, will now come into play. If he is 
to cooperate, he must indeed accept the Committee's definition of 
object. But his doctrine about what makes a "complex" a "phys- 
ical" complex, will concern issues no longer verbal, but most de- 
cidedly "material." Let us still try to see what follows from this 
restriction of the meanings of object and of given, when taken 


Suppose that some philosopher should be asked to cooperate 
whose views about what a "complex of physical qualities" is, and 
especially about what such a complex is when it is a "true part of 
the material world," required him to say: "Such an object, such a 
complex, however real it is (and also in case, in the Committee's 
sense, it is unreal), never is, and by its very nature never can be, for 
any human being, 'present in some particular individuated stream 
of perceptions,' at any moment of time; and (at least for a human 
being) never can be given in some particular actual perception." 
Suppose the philosopher held this view, not because he was disposed 
to favor or to dwell upon verbal controversies, but because this was 
his opinion as to a material issue, namely, as to what a physical 
"complex" is, and as to what in this sense is given. Suppose, 
namely, that he had inquired into what is or can be given at any 
moment, in any human perception, or to any human being. Sup- 
pose that he had considered, with such care as he could use, why we 
believe in any physical facts whatever, and what is the essential 
truth about the very nature of such facts, as we believe in them. 
Then his views would be his own, and would not depend upon his 
terminology. Nevertheless, when asked to cooperate, he would be 
bound to accept the Committee's definitions. Accepting them, what 
would this philosopher be obliged to say about the class of perceived 
objects as defined by the Committee (not, of course, as he himself 
would have preferred to define what he calls perceived objects) T 

Such a philosopher could only say: "For a man of my opinions 
there exist no perceived objects (in the Committee's explicitly stated 
sense of that term), whether real or hallucinatory. For physical 
'complexes of qualities' are of such nature as forbids their being 
given, at any moment, in any human being's stream of perceptions. 
Therefore, for me, the Committee's class of 'perceived objects' is a 
'zero-class' (in the sense of modern symbolic logic). It is an 'empty' 
class. Herein it resembles the class of ' horses that are not horses. ' ' 

Since the problem of the present paper principally relates to the 
question : What part could a philosopher who held such views prop- 
erly take in the debate, under the Committee's rules and definitions? 
I shall very properly be met, in my turn, at this point, by the coun- 
ter-question : Are there any such philosophers ? If so, are their views 
worth discussing? 


In answer to this counter-question I may first cite the words of 
the Committee itself. On page 11 of its report, in enumerating the 
various current definitions of "consciousness," it refers to the fol- 
lowing view: "Consciousness is the instrumental activity of an or- 
ganism with respect to a problematic or potential object. Thus the 


nature of consciousness is such as to imply the artificiality of the 
first question, and accordingly of its several answers." Such an 
opinion, then, exists. We all think it worthy of careful discussion. 
I am far from defending this reported definition of conscious- 
ness; and I am very far from attempting to speak on behalf of the 
distinguished representative of this view to whom the Committee 
here refers. I can only say this: Were the reported view my own 
view of the nature of consciousness, I should be obliged to say that 
the "problematic or potential objects" to which my "instrumental 
activity" had "respect," were not the Committee's "perceived ob- 
jects" at all; and also that if my "problematic objects" were what 
I supposed to be identical with the "complexes of physical qualities" 
which the Committee asked me to call "objects," then whatever was 
given in my "individuated stream of perceptions" would not be 
such an object. So that, in this case, the first question would be for 
me not only ' ' artificial, ' ' but a question about a zero-class. And the 
Committee's second question, that about consciousness, would require 
me, if I also accepted the Committee's own definition of conscious- 
ness, to explain how this "instrumental activity" of my own organ- 
ism was "that by virtue of which" the members of this zero-class 
that is, the objects which for me would be no objects at all were 
"numerically" or otherwise distinguished from something else. 
Hereupon I should indeed be at a loss how to discuss the Committee 's 
second question any more usefully than the first question, unless, 
indeed, I in one way or another declined to accept the rulings of the 
Committee as to the conduct of the discussion, either by ignoring or 
by setting aside their definitions and requests. I should be sure 
that in any case the Committee had not succeeded in so stating the 
two questions as to make my opinions a natural part of the inquiry 
that they defined. I should feel myself excluded from profitable 
cooperation under the rules. 

But this is no place to expound in detail the views of any one 
thinker. Let me next simply point out theses which every one will 
find more or less familiar and which, in various contexts, enter into 
known doctrines about perception. Let me point out that whoever 
holds these theses ought to regard the Committee's definition of a 
"perceived object" as the definition of a zero-class. 

Suppose, for instance, that one holds, with J. S. Mill, that a 
physical object, such as any "complex of physical qualities," is es- 
sentially "a permanent possibility of sensation" in case it is "a 
true part of the material world" at all, while, in case of hallucina- 
tory or illusory physical objects, the object seems to be such a 
" permanent possibility ' ' when it is not so. One who takes this view 
seriously, holds a doctrine which concerns not verbal definitions, but 


assertions as to \\ the object (in the Committee's sense of the 
term) actually is. 

Hut a "permanent possibility of sensation," whatever else it ia, 
is never any one sensation or group of sensations ; nor yet is it any 
set of events in the individuated streams of perceptions of any hu- 
man percipients. These events, the given facts of sensation, come 
and go. The "permanent possibility" is no one of them. But it is 
what, for Mill, the "complex of physical qualities" essentially is, and 
for Mill, if his doctrine were taken quite seriously, there would be no 
other physical objects to consider, whether real or hallucinatory. 
But to speak of a perceived object, in the Committee's sense, would 
be to speak of a fleeting sensory event, in "some given actual per- 
ception." That is, the Committee's "perceived objects" would be 
"permanent possibilities" that are not permanent, or, once more, 
horses that are not horses. 

Mill's account of the object of perception has often been accuse-1 
of a false abstractness of formulation. Some have attempted to 
render his account more precise, or to deal with his arguments in 
another way, by asserting, with greater or less definiteness of 
phraseology, that the very being of a "complex of physical quali- 
ties" essentially consists in the truth of certain propositions. This 
doctrine, which, as it stands, is of course a metaphysical doctrine, 
has numerous representatives in modern discussion. Many, both 
before Mill's time and later, have been led to such an opinion, by 
considerations not wholly identical with those which Mill empha- 

It is notable, furthermore, that, whenever such thinkers attempt 
to define their objects (that is, their "complexes of physical quali- 
ties" in the Committee's sense of object), with precision, they in- 
clude amongst the propositions which define the being of the object 
certain universal propositions. Thus, for Mill, a bell to which a 
wire is duly attached is a "complex of physical qualities" whose 
being is partly defined by the truth of the proposition : "If I pull the 
wire I shall hear a ringing." Now any t'/-proposition is, in its log- 
ical sense, an universal proposition. And we are not here concerned 
with the material question whether this or that one amongst a set of 
such universal propositions is actually true, or again with the ques- 
tion: Subject to what conditions is it true? It is enough for our 
present purpose that, if a percipient is led to believe that the being 
of his object is in some respect defined by such a universal proposi- 
tion, and if this proposition is not true, then his object is in this re- 
spect illusory. The being of the object is defined by the truth of 
propositions, some of which are universal, whether it is a real ob- 
ject or an unreal one. 


In case, however, the truth of some universal proposition is essen- 
tial to the constitution, to the very being, of a "complex of physical 
qualities," it is, once more, a contradiction in terms to talk of the 
truth of such an universal proposition as ever, or at any time, or to 
anybody, "given in some particular actual perception," such as any 
mortal ever has. 

For any one who holds this view of what an object is, the Com- 
mittee's definition of perceived object is, therefore, equivalent to the 
definition of a. horse that is not a horse. 

Now some who hold such views about physical objects are meta- 
physical realists. Some are Kantians; and one very important as- 
pect of Kant's whole theory of the nature of the "phenomenal ob- 
jects" which he so sharply distinguished from the sensory data, con- 
sisted in his identification of the very being of a physical object with 
the truth of propositions, some of which are, in his opinion, a priori 
and universal, while all of them are true propositions in a way that 
only the "spontaneity of the understanding" and the relation of the 
object to the transcendental "unity of apperception" could warrant 
or determine. Whatever the variations of Kant's own phraseology 
variations easily explainable in the light of his own development 
there should be no question that what his fully developed doctrine 
defines as the true Gegenstand of perception, and as the phenomenal, 
yet still perfectly objective actual "complex of physical qualities," 
is nothing whose nature permits it to be given to any human per- 
cipient, in any particular actual perception. Many Kantians have 
come to emphasize these aspects of the Kantian theory of what a 
"complex of physical qualities" essentially is. For all such, the 
Committee's definition of a "complex of physical qualities given in 
some particular actual perception" is a definition of "perceived ob- 
jects" such that it requires some universal truth to be given as true 
in a particular actual moment of perception, and is also a definition 
which requires a permanent somewhat to be given as permanent in 
that which flits. The result is once more a zero-class. All such 
thinkers are, in my opinion, excluded from profitable participation 
in the Committee's discussion. 

Finally, amongst those to whom the very being of a "complex of 
physical qualities" consists in the truth of certain propositions, 
whereof some are universal propositions, there are students of phi- 
losophy who are metaphysical idealists. Of these students I am one. 
My views are not here in question. But perhaps I have a right to 
say that all such metaphysical idealists, whatever their other vari- 
eties of opinion, get to their results by interpreting the truth of these 
propositions in terms which they suppose to be concrete and reason- 
able enough, but which do not permit them to admit that such truths 


as constitute the being of such a "complex" could be, at any moment 
of time, given in the stream of anybody's particular actual per- 

I submit that, for all such thinkers, the Committee's formulations 
of the issue depend upon the definition of a zero-class. All such are, 
in my opinion, excluded from profitable cooperation in the discus- 
sion as defined by the Committee. 

In sum, whoever emphasizes the fact that what he means by a 
"complex of physical qualities" is something that perception brings 
to his notice, but that, once brought to his notice, is, in his opinion, 
essentially an object of interest, of belief, of intention, of faith, or of 
rational assurance, or of categorized conceptual structure, may well 
ask himself what place he has in the Committee's undertaking. For 
to him what is "given in a particular actual moment of perception" 
is simply not what he means by an object at all, whether he is a 
mystic or a pragmatist or a realist or an idealist. 


There are, then, such philosophers as I have defined, in general 
terms, by the assertion : For such philosophers the Committee's class 
of perceived objects is a zero-class. But just why, after all so one 
may reply to me why are such philosophers excluded from the in- 
quiry proposed by the Committee? Why may they not take part if 
they please? 

My answer has to be in terms familiar to every student of modern 
formal logic. 

If a "zero-class" is to be the subject of an assertion, what predi- 
cates may with truth be asserted of that zero-class? The answer of 
modern formal logic of the prevailing neo-Boolean type is well 
known, and, for logical purposes, is useful. A zero-class is not only 
subsumable, but is actually subsumed, under every class in the uni- 
verse of discourse. Hence of any zero-class all universal proposi- 
tions, whatever their predicates, are true. All particular proposi- 
tions, however, which have the zero-class as their subject, are false. 
Hence the fortunes of a zero-class are easily to be foreordained. 
Thus the class defined by the term, a horse that is not a horse, is, in- 
deed, by definition a zero-class. Hence it is formally correct to say : 
"All horses that are not horses can trot fast and play the violin at 
the same time." For the assertion is an universal. But this asser- 
tion, whose formal justification, and whose possible importance from 
certain points of view emphasized by modern logic, I need not here 
pause to explain, is no contribution to the arts or to the sciences that 
deal with the trotting-horse. It is an actually valuable formalism, 
which could indeed better be expressed in symbols. If I were asked 


to cooperate in a discussion amongst horse fanciers, and I had only 
such propositions as this to bring to their attention, it would be at 
once kinder and safer for me not to address the meeting. If they 
chose to discuss still other classes of horses that I considered to be 
zero-classes, I could at best only contribute the same logical truisms 
to their discussion, and so should be excluded from useful participa- 
tion in their deliberations unless indeed they asked me to say 
Whether and why I thought these classes to ~be zero-classes. That 
indeed might become more a valuable and material issue, in whose 
discussion I might gladly take part. But if they formulated ques- 
tions for debate that did not include this question, that in fact obvi- 
ously excluded it, how could I further contribute, unless I under- 
took something in the form of a criticism of the limitations which 
they had put upon the debate ? 

As a fact, the Committee did not ask anybody to discuss the 
question whether there are any "perceived objects" of the precise 
type that it defined. Its use of its definitions, its somewhat elaborate 
formulation of the ' ' logically possible views, ' ' its entire classification 
of the issues, excluded this inquiry from the recognized field for the 

No philosopher of the types illustrated in the foregoing discussion 
had any proper place in the cooperation which the Committee invited. 


Now, is all the foregoing mere ' ' logic-chopping, ' ' mere ' ' carping 
criticism, ' ' mere ' ' verbalism, ' ' or what James loved to call * ' barren 
intellectualism"? I hope not. I intend to insist upon what I sup- 
pose to be a practical issue. It was the Committee that offered defi- 
nitions supposed to be exact. My "carping" is intended only to be 
a taking of the Committee's requirements quite seriously. My 
*' verbalism" consists in using their own words as they required. 
And my practical purpose is constructive. I want to indicate some- 
thing, however little, about how our future discussions may best be 
organized if others at all agree with me. 

That the whole issue is not merely verbal, but is quite material 
and of practical importance for the discussion, will appear, I think, 
if we simply leave out the terms defined, and substitute the defini- 
tions. In order to do this, let us consider where we should stand if 
the Committee had said : ' ' Those who are to take part in this discus- 
sion are requested and supposed to assume : That ' complexes of phys- 
ical qualities' may be, and often are, given in 'some particular 
actual perception,' at some time, and in such wise as to be 'present 
in some individuated sequence' or 'stream of perceptions,' and for 
some human being." This would not be a verbal, but a very ma- 
terial assumption. 


Had the Committee said just this, we should have known that all 
whose metaphysical or epistemological opinions led them to hold, 
concerning physical objects, the views held by those whose otherwise 
very various doctrines I have just summarized, were expressly ex- 
cluded from participation. Such an exclusion would have been a 
perfectly proper plan for the debaters who belonged to the Com- 
mittee, if it was simply their intention to present their own views. 
But in that case the plan would not have included a call for the 
cooperation of members whose views were thus excluded. Now the 
Committee's definitions, and the preparation of the subject for de- 
bate, essentially involved, however unintentionally, just such an 
exclusion. This is the ground of my criticism. I conceive that 
hereby the Committee doomed the discussion in advance to be unable 
to find place in any just fashion for some of the most important views 
about perception. 

And now as to the practical result : The Committee inadvertently 
excluded people whom of course they never consciously intended to 
exclude. These people were no small party. Various mystics, 
scholastics, Kantians, idealists, modern realists, and pragmatists were 
among the people thus out of place in any inquiry that should be 
carried on under the restrictions carefully prepared by the Com- 
mittee. When any such people attempted to enter the actual debate, 
they could do so only either apologetically or rebelliously or unprofit- 
ably or through an ignoring of the restrictions. This was not what 
the Committee intended ; but it was what they brought to pass. This 
is not the best way to secure general cooperation. This, I think, is 
not what either the members of the Committee or any others of us 
desire to have done in our future general discussions, of which, as I 
hope, there will be many. The plan of having general discussions 
upon issues sharply defined and directly joined, is a plan that prom- 
ises great results for the future, if only we learn from our first 
attempts how to carry out that plan better than at first we did. 

What should the Committee have done ? In order to answer this 
question, I need not dwell upon any of my own whims, prejudices, or 
tastes. The correct mode of procedure was suggested, during the 
actual general discussion, by one of the members of the Committee, 
namely, our devoted and highly esteemed Secretary himself. I can 
not quote his words, although I heard them with approval. In sub- 
stance he said that one might well consider that table yonder (he 
did not define it in the abstract, but designated it by a perfectly 
acceptable gesture and wording), that "brown, smooth, solid some- 
what"; and that one might then try to tell how he himself considered 
what he found "present to his senses" (namely, the given) to be 


related to what he supposed the table (the object) really to be. I 
hope that I fairly represent the Secretary 's remark. 

Well, that is the question about perception, in a nutshell. Let 
anybody tell (if he can, and so far as he can) what it is that he sup- 
poses to be given in his "stream of perceptions," when he looks at 
the "table" or "orange" or "inkstand" or whatever else he sees or 
otherwise perceives. Let him then indicate what this which is given 
leads him personally, at that "moment of perception," to "believe to 
be there," or "to regard as real," or to view as a "true part of his 
material world," or, to consider as the object which, in his opinion, 
he just then knows or believes to be a "physical object." Let him 
hereupon compare the given as it is given with the object as he just 
then, in his momentary perception, takes it to be real. Let him still 
further explain, if he can and will, how this object which, at the 
"moment of perception," he takes to be real, is related to what he, as 
a philosopher, believes to be the really real, the genuine fact which 
lies at the basis both of his perception, and of the given, and of his 
momentary beliefs about "what is there." If the discussion is de- 
fined, upon the basis of such a beginning, in such wise as to call for 
still further comments upon known issues let the disputant coop- 
erate, if he will and can, by meeting these further issues. A discus- 
sion thus defined will indeed, as I firmly believe, actually illustrate 
the thesis that, for any percipient who wakes up to what he is be- 
lieving and is doing, the being of the object of perception will either 
consist in or essentially involve the truth of certain propositions 
(some of them universal), each of which defines this or that aspect of 
the object. Since such truths by their nature exclude the possibility 
of their ever being given at any moment in "the stream of percep- 
tions" of any human being, the object of perception will never be 
anything that is given in the personal experience of any one of us. 
Yet the correct result will not be (in my own opinion) what the Com- 
mittee defines as ' ' epistemological dualism and realism. ' ' It will be 
a result dependent upon one 's definition of the truth of propositions. 
Hence, for me, this result will be a form of idealism which here does 
not concern my reader. 

But the essential practical point is that, while a discussion thus 
initiated would need to be restricted by rules and definitions, so as 
to keep all concerned close to the issue and in constant cooperation, 
there would now be no need and little danger of defining the issue 
or the rules or the cooperation so as to exclude anybody whose 
views are seriously represented in classic or current philosophical 

Following the Secretary's admirable suggestion, I propose then, 
for the planning of our future discussions, a mode of procedure that 


in its origin goes back at least to Socrates or even to Zeno of Elea, 
and that, in its more exact and exacting restrictions, is well exem- 
plified in the procedure of some modern mathematical logicians. It 
is this : 

1. Define your problem as far as possible by designating typical 
examples. Socrates did this, and was a model for all of us. Even 
the Eleatic Zeno did it in his famous discussion of one of the most 
abstract of problems, and the issue as he defined it still interests us 
to-day. Our Secreatry proposes to do this sort of thing in preparing 
our future discussions. I second the suggestion. The Committee's 
report did not exhaust this device before proceeding to the more 
abstract definitions that it had to provide. Hence these definitions 
were not all well adapted to their own end. 

2. When designation by example has done its work, and when 
you come to the marshaling of the various possible varieties of 
opinion which you regard as worthy of discussion, it is of course 
natural to divide some universe of discourse into classes, and then 
to enumerate the possible views by pointing out the logically possible 
relations amongst these classes. But, when you do this, do not 
ignore those most momentous aspects of modern exact theories, 
namely, the "existence-theorems," or "existential postulates," and 
their contradictories (the assertions that declare or deny some of your 
defined classes to be "zero-classes"). Consider carefully, in the 
light both of formal logic and of the history of opinion, what alterna- 
tives regarding such assertions or denials what questions as to 
whether one or another of your defined classes has members are 
assertions or questions open to reasonable differences of opinion. 
This is a centrally important rule for every exact inquiry, and is 
greatly emphasized in the recent procedure of the logical theorists. 

These are not all the rules that ought to be followed by a com- 
mittee on definitions. But they are good rules, and practical rules. 
The Committee, on this occasion, did not follow them. 

May our future discussions be controlled by committees on defini- 
tions! That is a wise plan. May the discussions prosper! That is 
a good hope. May the committees be as successful in practise as the 
present Committee was earnest and faithful in its intentions and in 
its toils. My carping words are ended. 






fTlHE eleventh annual meeting of the American Philosophical As- 
-L sociation, held at Harvard University, December 27, 28, and 
29, was remarkable in two respects : First, for what it purposed but 
did not accomplish; second, for the unmistakable promise of a new 
type of accomplishment at future sessions. A committee of five had, 
with elaborate care, formulated and defined the main issue for dis- 
cussion, and this same committee, with the exception of the ex officio 
member, had undertaken to debate this issue. It was hoped that by 
this means the discussion would be so narrowed that it would result 
either in clearly defined agreement or in equally clearly defined dis- 
agreement. This hope was far from realized. The debate was not a 
sharp presentation of counter positions, but rather a presentation of 
the more or less complex and involved views of the individual de- 
baters upon the various issues in question. The discussion which fol- 
lowed was hardly less nebulous. In great part it was a discussion of 
what the discussion ought to have been but was not. But out of the 
confusion and relative failure of the debate the "riot of philo- 
sophic anarchy," as one of the members expressed it the opinion 
strongly emerged that the method of debating a clearly formulated 
issue should by all means be continued as by far the most profitable 
mode of philosophic discussion. To that end, the committee of five 
was continued in office with instructions to draw up a plan for the 
next meeting along lines similar to those laid down for this year's 
meeting. It is to be hoped that the lessons of this year will aid the 
committee in outlining a plan such as will make possible both a 
sharper joining of issue and a clearer effort of cooperation. 

The first paper of the session was read by Dr. Durant Drake on 
."What Kind of Realism?" Epistemological monism, he held, in- 
volves the giving up of the conception of a single temporal-spatial 
order into which all known facts fit; whereas the form of realism 
which accepts epistemological dualism can put all facts into one 
natural order, and is therefore in so far more plausible. 

Professor Montague presented three objections to the panpsy- 
chist view of Dr. Drake: (1) The view offers no explanation of the 
mind's consciousness of other minds as such; (2) it does not justify 
the differences found in the forms of the external world; (3) it is 
a self-refuting system in so far as, taking its stand upon the facts of 
physics and physiology, it then informs us that these facts do not 
exist. Dr. Drake in answer found no difficulty in the view that 


minds are known as true parts of the natural world, but under the 
form of brain processes. 

Professor Creighton followed with a paper on "The Determina- 
tion of the Real World." This process of determination, he held, 
consists in following and interpreting the findings of experience, 
which involves the relation of a mind or consciousness to a real 
world of persons and things. To be a mind is just to stand in this 
relation of active appreciation and interpretation of real objects. If 
knowledge is genuine, the categories are constituent principles of 
things, as well as forms of mind. This makes unnecessary all at- 
tempts to get rid of knowledge in order to have the object in its 
purity. To report the nature of reality as a whole, a synthesis of re- 
sults is needed, which can be achieved only by taking account of the 
processes of knowing through which the results of the special sci- 
ences are gained and reinterpreting these results and methods in the 
light of consciousness. 

Professor Perry, in opening the discussion of the paper, charged 
the reader with begging the question in his statement that philos- 
ophy is the adoption of the standpoint of experience, meaning by 
experience that which involves the duality of subject and object. 
For in saying this Professor Creighton answers at the outset the 
question that is really most interesting to us. Furthermore, the as- 
sumption of subject-object duality is a dangerous one, in so far as it 
tends to make the two correlated terms final. Most of the difficulty, 
he asserted, arises out of the occupation with abstract terms rather 
than with concrete situations. Miss Calkins thereupon rose and 
added humor to the situation by expressing her delight at being at 
last in agreement with Professor Perry and admonishing him to 
forego his own evil way of using such abstract terms as R and 8 
and 0. 

Professor Dewey seemed to find that Professor Creighton, after 
having declared mind to be a meaning and evaluation of existence, 
had substituted the declaration that it was a principle of meaning. 

Professor Creighton, in replying, admitted frankly that he saw 
no way out of begging the question as to the initial duality of sub- 
ject and real world. He failed indeed to see how the realists them- 
selves could escape making the assumption. 

Professor Lovejoy propounded two questions to Professor 
Creighton: (1) Whether he regarded the existence of the object in 
the experience relation as essential to the being of the object. To 
this Professor Creighton answered that he did so regard it in so far 
as the relation was internal. (2) If the object is, in this experience, 
truly revealed as it is, what does the object suffer if the conscious- 
ness is taken away! Professor Creighton answered: If one asks 


what would happen if my individual consciousness were withdrawn, 
the answer would be "nothing." But if one asks what would 
happen if all relation to any possible mind were withdrawn, the 
answer would be that no answer is possible. 

Professor Marvin followed with a paper on "Dogmatism vs. 
Criticism." The present-day issue usually called that between 
realism and idealism should rather be named that between dogma- 
tism and criticism. By criticism is meant the doctrine which asserts 
one or more of the following propositions: (a) The theory of knowl- 
edge is logically prior to all other sciences or to all other scientific 
procedure; (6) the theory of knowledge can ascertain the limits of 
the field of possible knowledge; (c) it can ascertain ultimately the 
validity of science and of the methods of science; (d) it can give us 
of itself certain fundamental existential truths usually called a 
theory of reality. In opposition, dogmatism asserts: (a) The theory 
of knowledge is not logically fundamental; it is simply one of the 
special sciences and logically presupposes the results of many other 
special sciences; (6) the theory of knowledge can not show except 
inductively and empirically either what knowledge is possible, or how 
it is possible, or again what are the limits of our knowledge; (c) it is 
not able to throw any light upon the nature of the existent world 
or upon the fundamental postulates and generalizations of science 
except in so far as the knowledge of one natural event or object 
enables us at times to make inferences regarding certain others. As 
a consequence of this difference in doctrine the realist has a very 
different interest in the theory of knowledge itself from that of the 
idealist. The conclusion to be drawn is that the name neo-dogma- 
tism would be a far more appropriate name for the movement in 
opposition to idealism than the name neo-realism. 

Miss Case, reverting to Professor Creighton's paper and refer- 
ring to the call to "dogmatism," expressed her belief that every 
philosophic position is an attitude, an assumption, and therefore es- 
sentially and necessarily a begging of the question. Professor 
Creighton felt that a return to dogmatism would eliminate the char- 
acteristic quality of modern philosophy. Philosophy must have a 
criterion for distinguishing between true and false ideas, hence must 
be criticism. Professor Marvin, answering Miss Case, agreed that 
we must start with premises, but only as postulates, not as final 
truths. He summed up his position by asking whether the problem 
of how we know is to be made the great crucial problem in the 
theory of reality, or whether the sciences are to be permitted to 
forge ahead in their own way. 

At the afternoon session, the debate proper on "The Relation of 
Consciousness and Object in Sense Perception" was begun. Pro- 


fessor Montague opened the debate with an impartial historical 
sketch of the development of the epistemological issue between real- 
ism and idealism in modern philosophy and then proceeded to de- 
velop his own argument in behalf of epistemological monism and 
realism. He held that the independent existence of perceived ob- 
jects was evidenced by their behavior as common sense and science 
regard it, and in so far as physiological theories of perception imply 
the prior existence of the objects perceived. The ordinary objec- 
tions to realism and the supposed axiomatic proof of idealism, he 
held, were based on a "verbal fallacy of psychophysical metonymy," 
t. e., equivocal use of such words as "idea," "perception," "experi- 
ence," to connote (1) the act or relation of thinking, perceiving, 
experiencing; (2) the thing or object thought of, perceived, experi- 
enced. While at the point of beginning the exposition of a new so- 
lution of the problem of error, Professor Montague was cut short by 
the time limit. 

Professor Dickinson S. Miller followed with the second paper of 
the debate. In the first part of his paper he outlined certain well- 
known positions of idealism which he held must be dismissed. Pro- 
ceeding to the consideration of neo-realism, he pointed out that the 
doctrine which neo-realism in the main defends is immediate or 
so-called naive realism. (It is not real naive realism, which is in 
fact a latent idealism.) But this species of presentative realism 
breaks down for three reasons amongst others: (a) the time taken in 
perception proves that the perceived object is not identical with the 
real object; (ft) the fact of illusion proves that the perceived object 
is not identical with the real object; (c) the theory would oblige us 
to hold that when two people side by side look at the same object 
much of the object is actually present in these two fields of con- 
sciousness at once. In conclusion, Professor Miller held that an 
object can not become a content of consciousness as an object. 
Objectivity is by its very nature a matter of properties in the object 
that can not be revealed in one instant nor even in a minute span of 
time. Objectivity means a potentiality of certain further manifesta- 
tions. A perception is an impression plus a readiness to behave in 
a certain fashion. Thus, an object can not, as such, be a given or 
"perceived" object. 

Professor Lovejoy followed with a paper which concerned itself 
solely with the question of the validity of the historic discovery of 
the subjectivity of hallucinations, illusions, and dreams. While all 
typical new realists agree in denying that the objects and qualities 
presented in hallucination or illusory perception are "subjective 
existences" merely, they differ as to whether those objects are 
"real" or "unreal" (in the sense suggested by the committee). 


Nunn, and apparently Alexander, and other English realists, de- 
clare that, e. g., the ' ' straight staff bent in a pool ' ' does not ' ' merely 
seem to be bent," but that it really "is bent." This view, which 
may be called absolute objectivism, appears to the writer the con- 
sistent one for this school to take. For the essence of the new real- 
ism is its conception of consciousness as an external and non-consti- 
tutive relation. But this conception implies that all objects and 
qualities actually presented in consciousness are, in a universal 
sense, real things in a real relation. But this consequence of the 
new realism requires us to assert contradictory predicates of the 
same object; to say that, e. g., the staff in the pool is at once both 
straight and not straight. Unless absolute objectivism can give us 
a new theory of the logical relation of sensible "attributes" to the 
objects possessing them, this seems a fatal objection to that doctrine, 
and therefore to the relational theory of consciousness, and therefore 
to the new realism (i. e., the combination of realism with epistemo- 
logical monism). 

Professor Thilly, in closing the debate, held that the answer to 
the question of consciousness as a factor in the perceptual situation 
which is given by radical realists follows necessarily from their 
naive dogmatism: if the object perceived is the object unperceived, 
numerically identical with it, then there is no difference between the 
status of an object in a stream of perceptions and its status out of it. 
But here the biological theories of these thinkers suggest conclusions 
inconsistent with their radical premises. Physically and physiolog- 
ically speaking, perception is the entire organism in interaction or 
relation with its environment; we can not single out any one partic- 
ular element in the situation and call that the physical or physiolog- 
ical counterpart of the process of perception. No more can we, in 
speaking of perception as a mental event, abstract the so-called per- 
ceived object from the functions involved, in the hope that we may 
in this way get at the case of being, or discover the object exactly as 
it would be apart from any perceiver. We may say that in the per- 
ceptual situation an object is revealed, made manifest, but we may 
also say that much that appears belongs to the mental realm, is read 
into the object, sometimes truly, sometimes not. This does not mean 
that the mind alters the real object or that it creates an object out of 
nothing or that the object creates a picture of itself in the mind or 
that the object lies imbedded in the mind. All that we can say is 
that a conscious organism perceives a real object in a certain way, 
according to the mental and physical factors involved. 

Professor McGilvary presented a close-packed ten-minute paper 
in which he argued, among other things, that the relational view of 
consciousness is compatible with the recognition that the same real 


object is in different consciousnesses; that an hallucinatory object 
occupies real space, but does not monopolize it ; in other words, that 
impenetrability is not a universal characteristic of space-occupying 
things; that color-blindness is explicable on the relational theory of 
consciousness as due to the fact that the real brightness of a real ob- 
ject is selected to be a term of a consciousness relation, while the 
color of the real object is left out of the consciousness complex. 

In the evening, the Harvard members of the Association enter- 
tained the visiting members at dinner at the Colonial Club. Pro- 
fessor Perry introduced President Lowell, who welcomed the Associa- 
tion with felicitous humor; to which President Woodbridge replied 
in happy vein. After the dinner a reception was tendered at the 
Harvard Union. 

The session Thursday morning was opened by Dr. H. R. Mar- 
shall's paper on the general topic. Dr. Marshall argued that in his 
appreciation of a natural order as distinguished from a mental 
order, the natural man accepts naively a radical dualism. But 
further consideration indicates some manner of correlation between 
the two orders. Objects in the outer world may become images of 
the mental order by the loss of some certain characteristic, viz., that 
of "out-thereness." This suggests that the natural order may be 
really part of and within the mental order, a part which has this 
"out-thereness" characteristic, which the rest of the mental world 
has not. This view he would call introspective monism. 

The meeting was then thrown open to general discussion. The 
prevailing note was one of criticism of the conduct of the debate. 
Mr. Pitkin expressed himself as grievously disappointed in so far 
as the specific empirical problems raised for debate had been passed 
over. No one had attempted to define accurately the term "numer- 
ical identity" contained in the first question propounded for debate. 
Numerical identity, he thought, might be defined in one of two ways, 
of which he felt that the latter would be the more profitable, viz., 
(1) identity with respect to quantity, or order, or place in a series; 
or (2) identity with respect to one value in a space, time, or other 
dimensional complex. With respect to the second question pro- 
pounded, he felt that the result had been even less happy, by reason 
of the absence of any clear definition of "object" and "perception." 

Dr. Cohen gave point to the discussion by disagreeing with 
Professor Miller that the neo-realist account of a stick appearing in 
water as bent was a self-contradiction. There was no reason, he 
held, why the same thing should not possess contradictory proper- 
ties; it was only necessary that these should not be contradictory 
from the same point of view. With respect to a straight line, for 
example, there are an infinite number of points of view length, 


angle, etc. from which the line may be viewed. It is fallacious to 
suppose that the only relevant point of view is that of the observer. 
So the same stick may appear in a number of different combinations 
according as we take our point of reference. In short, then, the 
existence of a thing is a general formula for all possible points 
of view. 

Dr. Spaulding followed Dr. Pitkin in the thought that the debate 
had failed to grapple with two essential issues : What is the differ- 
ence between a primary quality when it is perceived and when it is 
not perceived ; and what is the status of the entity which makes the 
difference? Professor Love joy, he felt, had attempted a reply by 
making consciousness the dumping-ground into which one put every- 
thing that one could not put into the real world. He urged that the 
Association proceed at once to the discussion of the two main issues. 
Whereupon Professor Warbeke, taking him at his word, with some 
humor, asked that Dr. Spaulding undertake what he had so wisely 
proposed. Dr. Spaulding, accepting the challenge, replied briefly 
that the brownness of the desk, for example, remains the same 
whether perceived or unperceived; that its perception, in short, 
consists simply in the desk's entering another relationship which 
does not alter or modify it. Professor Dewey felt that the main 
trouble with the discussion was due to the character of the com- 
mittee's report, with which Professor Lovejoy took issue, declaring 
that the purpose of the committee was to call forth a consideration 
of a certain doctrinal combination, viz., epistemological monism and 
realism. Was this combination an internally consistent and tenable 
view ? He had in his own paper, he said, proposed a test question : 
whether if you adhere to a relational theory of consciousness you 
can give any intelligible account of hallucinations and illusions. He 
felt that the neo-realist must, to be consistent, admit that hallucina- 
tions are real in the same sense as any other content. Professor 
Thilly expressed his disappointment with the discussion, asserting 
that the realist had no theory of perception, that he just took objects 
as they were. This he felt to be an utterly futile form of dogmatism. 

Professor Perry urged that the real point at issue in the discus- 
sion was between monism and dualism, between the view, namely, 
that the difference between perceived objects and real objects is an 
absolute difference, a difference of substance, and the view that the 
difference was not an absolute one. In view of their common 
monistic tendency he felt that realists and idealists might form one 
party. Professor Marvin found that the chief shortcoming of the 
discussion lay in the confusion of meaning of "real" and "error." 
Real objects had been defined as true parts of the material world. 
But the confusion lay in defining material on the one hand in terms 


of abstract dynamics, and on the other in terms of concrete experi- 
ence. With reference to "error," some of the speakers had seemed 
to look upon error as the act of assigning a particular content to the 
real material world or not so assigning it. On the contrary, he held, 
error lies rather in asserting a particular form of relation between 
one content and another which does not in fact obtain. Professor 
DeLaguna attempted by a concrete demonstration to indicate the 
difference which the scientist conceives between secondary and pri- 
mary qualities. The scientist, he held, never expressed what the 
qualities were, but described them simply in terms of the test of 
double contact. 

Professor Tufts felt that the test for a true object is a test by 
various sciences: what on the whole is the more permanent object, 
the one that we can do business with, etc. ? It is obvious that we can 
not assert numerical identity between perceived and real objects in 
all cases. He wondered whether Professor McGilvary's view would 
imply that the same desk might be all the various possible shades of 
brown. Professor McGilvary answered Yes and No. If we mean 
by the question whether in the space in which we see the colors all 
colors are, we must answer yes ; but in so far as they are in different 
relational contexts, we must answer no. It is by holding fast to 
distinctions of relational contexts that one avoids contradictions. 

Miss Calkins, referring to Professor Marvin's paper, hoped that 
the realists would follow its suggestion that the task of philosophy 
was the logical criticism of scientific conceptions. She felt that 
realism must make its position good not simply by appealing to the 
sciences, but by actively entering upon the task of logical criticism 
of scientific conceptions and results. Miss Calkins felt that the real 
source of confusion among philosophers was their constant use of 
abstract terms, that is, terms like "table," etc., in which the self was 
abstracted from. Professor Norman Smith rose to criticize what 
seemed to be the aim of the whole discussion. It seemed to be ar- 
ranged in such manner that agreement should be reached, as in the 
sciences. This, he felt, was seriously to confuse philosophic with 
scientific method. The question, What is the object when unper- 
ceived? Professor Smith thought to be a futile question. The real 
question that we should ask is, How do we conceive the object when 
un perceived T 

Professor Dewey, reverting to the question of the bent stick and 
the apparent contradiction between its bentness and straightness, 
approved of Dr. Cohen's position. The difficulty, he thought, lay 
in treating the perception as a real object rather than as various 
systems of relations. The visual bentness of the stick, a real fact of 
optics, in nowise contradicts its tactual straightness. Professor 


Perry, replying to Miss Calkins, saw no reason why "table" was an 
abstract term because the self was abstracted from. If this was so, 
the only way of being concrete was to talk about everything. Pro- 
fessor Creighton, in summing up the discussion, felt that there was 
need for some fundamentally new understanding of what body is. 
Professor Pitkin set the fundamental problem to be whether any 
function of a variable real should be regarded as a predicate of 
that real. 

The afternoon session was opened with a paper by Professor G. 
R. Montgomery on "The Meaning of Evolution." Professor Mont- 
gomery pointed out the two meanings of evolution, (1) that which 
asserts merely a continuity of material and living objects; (2) that 
which regards the present as the unfolding of the past. He sug- 
gested that the word evolution should be restricted to the second, 
while a new word should be found to express the first meaning. 

Professor Montgomery's paper was followed by a paper on "The 
Progress of Evolution ' ' by Professor A. C. Armstrong. Considering 
the progress of evolution from the point of view of noetics, Professor 
Armstrong laid special stress upon the fact that the relation of the 
concepts of genesis, nature, and worth had not yet been adequately 

The last paper of the afternoon was by Professor I. "Woodbridge 
Riley on "Early Evolution in America." 

The discussion of these papers was desultory. At the adjourn- 
ment of the session the business meeting convened. The following 
officers for the ensuing year were elected: president, Frank Thilly, 
vice-president, Norman Kemp Smith; secretary, Edward G. Spaul- 
ding; new members of the executive committee, W. B. Pitkin and 
E. A. Singer, Jr. 

Professor Dewey read resolutions in memory of Professor James, 
which were adopted in silence by a standing vote. The question 
of the place of meeting for 1912 was referred to the executive com- 
mittee with power, with the recommendation that the meeting be 
held at such a place as to make possible the attendance of Professor 

In the evening, Professor Woodbridge read his presidential 
address on "Evolution." As the address is to appear in full, it 
will be needless to summarize it in this place. 

The last morning of the meeting was occupied with four papers, 
which must be summarized very briefly. Mrs. Christine Ladd- 
Franklin opened the session with a paper on "Existence in Logic," 
in which she maintained that modern logic had introduced (in the 
hands of Bertrand Russell) many vagaries which the philosopher 
will do well not to take too seriously. Thus to set up "p implies q" 


as the type of the logic process and to regard it as capable of throw- 
ing light upon problems is an error. It would be far better to take 
as the type-relation one of those in which the existence-term which 
is always present is present explicitly. After some discussion, Dr. 
Morris R. Cohen followed with a paper on "Mechanism and Causal- 
ity in the Litfht of Recent Physics." The belief, he held, that all 
physical phenomena must be explicable in terms of mechanics rests 
as a matter of fact on the doctrine of the subjectivity of secondary 
qualities. Recent progress in physics seems to indicate that the 
laws of mechanics are not of universal application, t. e., do not hold 
of very large velocities nor of very small bodies, and it may be neces- 
sary to base mechanics on electricity rather than electricity on 
mechanics. Distinguishing between mechanism and determinism, 
the paper went on to show that the statistical view of physics enables 
us to dispense with the notion of causality and to replace it with the 
wider and more definite idea of functional relation, in the mathe- 
matical sense, between phenomena. In the subsequent discussion 
with Professor Royce, Dr. Cohen insisted that the mathematical 
treatment of physical phenomena does not necessarily make them a 
part of mechanics. Professor Sheldon followed with a paper on 
"Chance," which aimed to show that chance, as an empirical con- 
cept, is just as real as cause, space, quantity, or other accredited 
scientific categories. The final paper of the morning was by Dr. 
Karl Schmidt on "The Nature and Function of Definition in a 
Logical System," in which the writer maintained, as against the 
ordinary modern accounts of definition, that definition is of indis- 
pensable use in a deductive system because it introduces into that 
system the "new." Professor Royce spoke briefly in approval of 
Dr. Schmidt's view. After some brief discussion by Mrs. Franklin, 
Dr. Cohen, and Professor Royce, the meeting adjourned. 




Influencing Men in Business. WALTER DILL SCOTT. New York: The 

Ronald Press. 1911. Pp. 168. $1.00. 

This readable little book contains an analysis, in popular language, of 
typical processes of choice and action, and a comparison of argument and 
suggestion as means of influencing conduct. Simple business situations 
are cited in which each of the two methods of appeal is most likely to 
meet with success. The ideo-motor character of suggestion is empha- 
sized and illustrations of both argument and suggestion, drawn from 


advertising sources, are discussed in much the same vein that has popu- 
larized the author's earlier writings among the ambitious young business 
men to whom the book is dedicated. 

The chief difficulty with this type of "applied psychology" is that 
while classification and schematization of mental operations may facili- 
tate the recognition of one's own conscious states, it goes but a little 
way toward communicating the ability to set up these processes in others. 
The applied psychology which will really contribute toward industrial 
efficiency will grow out of the application of laboratory and statistical 
method. The methods of inquiry and research which psychology has de- 
veloped can be made to yield results of real value when applied to the 
complex process of every day life. The psychology evolved by the intro- 
spective method can never be in the true sense an applied science; it is 
at most an academic analysis illustrated by industrial instances. Aside 
from a heightened feeling of the dignity of his work, the real advance 
which the man of business can expect from psychology must come from 
his acquaintance with experimental technique. There are countless prob- 
lems in the efficient production and distribution of goods to the investi- 
gation of which such technique is well adapted. Such application has al- 
ready yielded material of interest, both to industry and to science. That 
the practical man is recognizing this fact is indicated by the recent es- 
tablishment, by the New York Advertising Men's League, of a research 
fellowship in the department of psychology at Columbia. 




1911. Husserl, sa critique du psyologisme ei sa conception d'une logique 
pure (pp. 685-698) : V. DELBOS. - In spite of certain defects in its develop- 
ment, Husserl's logic has the merit of rescuing logic from the corruptions 
of pragmatism and restoring it to its essentially theoretical and regulative 
function. La forme moderne du probleme des universaux (pp. 699-722) : 
CH. DUNAN. - The oppositions in the views of the realists, nominalists, and 
conceptualists can be overcome by placing the principle of intelligibility 
in the object, as Aristotle did, instead of leaving it a parte rei, as was 
done in the Middle Ages. La generalisation mathematique (pp. 723-758) : 
H. DUFUMIER. - The actual process of generalization is the process of 
subordinating objects to operations, and not mere omission of qualities 
of the object. Le caractere normatif et le caractere scientifique de la 
morale (pp. 759-779) : FR. D' HAUTEFEUILLE. - Ethics, to remain normative, 
must give up the pretense of being scientific, and will gain by so doing. 
Etudes critiques. La philosophic du langage de Julius Bahnsen d'apres 
des documents inedits: MME. I. TALAYRACH. Discussions. Sur un aperc.u 
d'Ostwald concernant les temps a plusieurs dimensions: G. LECHALAS. 
Questions pratiques. La famille et le contrat: E. LEVY. Supplement. 


Amendola, Giovanni. Maine De Biran. Firenze: A. Quattrini. 1911. 
Pp. 123. 

Angell, James Rowland. Chapters from Modern Psychology. New 
York : Longmans, Green, and Co. 1912. Pp. rii + 308. 

Leland, Abby Porter. The Educational Theory and Practise of T. H. 
Green. Columbia University Contributions to Education. No. 46. 
New York: Teachers College. 1911. Pp. 62. 


PROFESSOR J. McKEEN CATTELL, of Columbia University, gave the foun- 
dation address at the Indiana University on the morning of January 
nineteenth. In the afternoon he spoke before the faculties on " Grades 
and Credits," and in the evening addressed the Society of Sigma Xi. 
On January twenty-second he gave an address before the faculties of the 
University of Illinois on " The Administration of a University," and in 
the evening discussed the question with the committee charged with 
framing a constitution for the university. On January fifth, Professor 
Cattell gave an address at Lehigh University and at Lafayette College. 

ANNOUNCEMENT has been made that the formal inauguration of Dr. 
John Grier Hibben as president of Princeton University will take place 
early in May. Dr. Hibben will continue to give his special course of lec- 
tures on philosophy under the auspices of the Graduate School, and it is 
expected that he will continue to give at least one course to the under- 

THE minister of education has laid before the Hungarian parliament 
a bill which provides for the erection of two new universities in Hungary, 
in the cities of Pressburg and Debreczin. 

M. HENRI BERGSON, professor of philosophy at the College de France, 
has been appointed visiting French professor of Columbia University for 
the year 1913. 

PROFESSOR JOHN B. WATSON, of the Johns Hopkins University, has re- 
cently been granted a three years' appointment as a research associate of 
the Carnegie Institution of Washington. 

PROFESSOR W. P. MONTAGUE, of the department of philosophy of Co- 
lumbia University, has been appointed to deliver the Hewitt lectures at 
Cooper Union in the spring of 1913. 

PROFESSOR WARNER FITE, of the University of Indiana, is lecturing at 
Harvard this semester. During his absence his work at Indiana Univer- 
sity will be in charge of Dr. William K. Wright, of the University of 

VOL. IX. No. 5. FEBRUARY 29, 1912. 


rpHE realist platform promulgated in this JOURNAL, and the dis- 
J- cussions to which it has since given rise, have led me to try to 
formulate the views which I should incline to defend. I do not un- 
fortunately myself at present feel anything so solid as a platform 
beneath my feet. In this paper I propose to describe the kind of 
makeshift raft upon which, with my heart in my mouth, I venture 
out upon the stormy sea of speculation. My views are more negative 
than positive, but the negations involve assertions sufficiently defi- 
nite to carry me into waters dangerously deep, or else perhaps into 
befogged shallows where rocks abound. The reader may choose the 
one or the other metaphor according as what follows does or does not 
meet with his sympathetic approval. The views which I shall de- 
velop, in so far as they have historical affiliations, are chiefly inspired 
by two thinkers, one older and one contemporary, by Kant and by 

For me personally, the chief and most pressing problem in the 
theory of knowledge is to reconcile objectivism or realism with phe- 
nomenalism, and both with that individualistic standpoint which the 
nature of our self-consciousness seems to force upon each of us. A 
satisfactory theory of knowledge must, I should say, be at once real- 
istic, phenomenalistic, and individualistic. Realistic, because sub- 
jectivism has been demonstrated to be untenable. Phenomenal- 
istic, because it seems impossible to regard the world known in sense 
perception, or even in the natural sciences, as any thing but a quite 
partial and very imperfect representation of the real. Individual- 
istic, because, though our experience reveals a wider and common 
world to which we belong and out of which we have arisen, its com- 
plementary and equally striking aspect lies in the privacy of the 
inner life. 

The general problem of knowledge accordingly falls into two 
subordinate problems, each of which has its own peculiar diffi- 
culties. First, the reconciliation of the contention that we apprehend 



something that is non-mental with recognition of the fact that what 
we apprehend is in the form apprehended not genuinely real. Sec- 
ondly, the reconciliation of both objectivism and phenomenalism, but 
especially of phenomenalism, with tin- n -inurements of self-conscious- 
ness. I say, especially of phenomenalism, because if the phenome- 
nalism is thoroughgoing (and it must be if we are really to steer 
clear of subjectivism), it will apply to the self as truly as to the not- 
self. For that reason it seems easier to combine individualism with 
subjectivism than with phenomenalism. Kant and Bergson seem to 
me so especially helpful in this inquiry just because it is with these 
two problems that they are constantly wrestling. 

Let me, at starting, indicate in the briefest manner the criticisms 
which may be passed upon subjective and upon objective (or 
Hegelian) idealism. The fundamental objection to subjective ideal- 
ism, as found, for instance, in Locke's philosophy, is that it sets our 
representations in an impossible twofold relation to objects, first, as 
their mechanical effects, and secondly, as their apprehensions. There 
exists, on this view, an irresolvable conflict between the function of 
sensations and their origin. The function of sensations is cognitive ; 
their origin is mechanical. As cognitive they stand to objects in a re- 
lation of inclusion. They reveal the objects, reduplicating them in 
image within the mind. Yet in their origin they are effects, mechan- 
ically generated by the action of material bodies upon the sense organs 
and brain. As mechanical effects, there is no guarantee that they re- 
semble their causes; and if we may argue from other forms of me- 
chanical causation, there is little likelihood that they do. They 
stand to their first causes in a relation of exclusion, separated from 
them by a large number of varying intermediate processes. There is 
thus, to repeat, a conflict between their function and their origin. 
It is their origin in the external objects that guarantees their valid- 
ity; and yet the very nature of this relation invalidates their cog- 
nitive claims. It can also, I think, be shown that in the statement of 
its position, subjective idealism is guilty of arguing from a realistic 
starting-point to an idealistic concluson irreconcilable therewith. 
This is especially true of subjectivism in its extreme Berkeleian form. 
That argument has, however, been so often elaborated that its repe- 
tition is needless. 1 

The criticism to be passed upon objective idealism is of a different 
kind, namely, that it either ignores the problem of the relation of 
mind and body, or else gives a solution which is quite inadequate. 
It proceeds by emphasizing the logical relation of necessary implica- 
tion which holds between self-knowing and the objects known. It 

1 1 hare given a statement of it in an article in the Philosophical Review, 
Vol. XVII., p. 138 ff. 


argues that it is the very nature of a cognitive process to transcend 
itself, revealing to the mind real, independent, permanent objects. 
The distinction between subject and object implies, however, an 
underlying unity, an absolute self-consciousness, that conditions and 
unifies both. To this absolute self-consciousness sensations and all 
consciousnesses are due. 

Now, even supposing that these relations of mutual implication 
between subject and object, or between both and an absolute self -con- 
sciousness could be granted as conclusively proved, the problem of 
the relation of mind and body would still remain unconsidered. The 
only answer to this problem which, apparently, objective idealism is 
capable of giving, is the answer of Berkeley, more adequately stated, 
but still in essentials the same, namely, that the existence of the 
brain is necessary in order to complete our system of natural science, 
to develop its point of view universally, but is never in any sense the 
dynamical condition of our conscious life. The conscious can not 
originate in the unconscious. Our sensations are due, not to our 
brain states, but to an absolute reality that comes to consciousness of 
itself in the finite mind. 

Of course, stated in this bald fashion, no objective idealist will 
accept such an interpretation of his position. He is ready to admit 
that our having a sensation of red light is dependent upon a brain 
state caused by ether waves acting on the retina, but that, as I 
should contend, is a fact of which he can give no consistent account. 

That the body is the organ of our activities can not be doubted. 
The question which ought to be explicitly raised and definitely 
answered by objective idealism is as to whether or not the brain is 
likewise the organ of our consciousness. If it is also the organ of our 
consciousness, then in what terms is its cognitive function to be con- 
ceived? That is a question to which, as it seems to me, objective 
idealism has given no satisfactory answer. It is a question which it 
persistently ignores. 

The chief objection, therefore, to subjective idealism is that it re- 
gards the objects known as mechanically causing the apprehensions 
through which they are known. The chief objection to objective 
idealism is that it ignores the causal problem altogether. 

Each position has also, however, its own merits. The strength of 
subjectivism lies in its candid recognition of what appears to be 
beyond dispute, supported as it is by the whole strength of physical 
and physiological science, namely, that sensations are due to the 
action of material bodies upon the sense organs and brain. Philos- 
ophy is peculiarly skilled in explaining away inconvenient facts, by 
giving to them, in what it calls critical interpretation, a metaphysical 
twist. But the affection of the sense organs by material bodies is, it 


would seem, something that can not be thus conjured out of existence. 
The theory of knowledge must be prepared to interpret it in a man- 
ner that is not virtually in some concealed form its denial. 

Objective idealism is equally strong in its main contention, 
namely, that mind knowing and consciousness of objects known are 
inseparable. Mind has no meaning for us save as consciousness, and 
there is no consciousness that is not consciousness of objects. A mind 
that is unconscious, as, for instance, in sleep, is inconceivable by us. 
It is then merely a name for an unknown, equal to x. Sleep is, for this 
reason, something of which objective idealists have never been able to 
give any reputable account. But not only is mind that which is con- 
scious, it is also that which is not merely self-conscious. There is, as 
the objective idealists rightly maintain, no such thing as pure self- 
consciousness, a consciousness by a mind of itself and of nothing but 
itself. All consciousness, without exception, involves consciousness 
of objects. Consciousness of self and consciousness of the not-self 
are inseparable. This fact has important consequences, and is very 
rightly insisted upon by objective idealists. That, however, is a mat- 
ter to which I shall return. And now for the general problem. 

We may judge of man in two very different ways, from the point 
of view of his animal organism, and from the point of view of his 
inner life. Voltaire has remarked that "it would be very singular 
that all nature, all the planets, should obey eternal laws, and that 
there should be a little animal five feet high, who, in contempt of 
these laws, could act as he pleased, solely according to his caprice." 
Voltaire is here judging of man in terms of the conditions of his 
animal life. He is forgetting that this same animal of five feet can 
contain the stellar universe in thought within himself. Infinite 
space and infinite time can be ranged over by the human mind. 
Man's spiritual dignity dwarfs even the highest of his animal func- 
tions. Though finite in his mortal conditions, he is divinely infinite 
in his powers. 

Were we not so thoroughly familiar with the unlimited power of 
thought, could we (to form for the moment a self -contradictory 
hypothesis) without ourselves possessing this capacity, be informed 
that beings on other planets are thus endowed, we should certainly 
be incredulous. It would seem too absurdly impossible that a crea- 
ture five feet high and confined to one planet, should yet at the same 
time possess a something called mind or consciousness which can 
range over the whole of infinite space. That would surely be de- 
nounced as more unbelievable than any dogma ever propounded by 
the theologians, more impossible than the wildest and most super- 
stitious belief of primitive man. 

The power of thought is sufficiently wonderful in the animals, 


enabling them as it does to have some apprehension of their environ- 
ment, and so by variation of their reactions to attain satisfaction of 
their instinctive needs. But in man it no longer serves a merely 
practical purpose that is, if we adopt, as it seems to me we must, 
the idealist interpretation of the function of human thought. In 
man thought is essentially speculative in its character, connecting 
him with the universe as a whole, and driving him by the com- 
pulsion of an inner need to rationalize and render intelligible to 
himself the nature of things. 

It is this uniqueness of thought which seems to justify philosophy 
in laying so absolute a stress upon it, and in maintaining that it 
must largey contribute to the determining of our general philo- 
sophical attitude. By preoccupation with the question of knowledge, 
aided by the natural sciences, but not overweighted by them, we may 
hope to find some of the deeper clues that will lead to a more ade- 
quate solution of our philosophical problems. 

It is this twofold aspect of our existence, as at once animal in its 
conditions and potentially universal in its powers of apprehension, 
that forces upon Kant the problem of reconciling phenomenalism 
with individualism. The finite self exists in and through space and 
time, not space and time in and through the finite self. It is con- 
scious of a time that existed before its own existence and which will 
outlast it. It is conscious of itself as being limited down, as an ani- 
mal existence, to a particular position in space, and as subject to all 
the limitations which such position involves. Experience also teaches 
and this is likewise an essential element in Kant's doctrine that 
our various sensations are due to the action of material bodies upon 
our sense organs and brain. But, on the other hand, Kant is no less 
emphatic in maintaining that the whole world in space and time rests 
upon complex conditions that are inextricably bound up with the 
determining factors of our transitory existence. The material world 
in space is in its apprehended form phenomenal. It is an appearance 
which exists only in and through consciousness. And yet conscious- 
ness only appears in connection with individuals that are conditioned 
by the limitations which spatial and temporal existence impose. 

The usual interpretation of Kant is little better than a parody 
of his real teaching. It takes Kant's solution of the problem as con- 
sisting in the assumption of a self that by its creative agencies con- 
structs out of given sensations the mechanical world in space and 
time. The world exists separately in the mind of each individual 
observer; it has no independent existence apart from these its indi- 
vidual embodiments. If that were Kant's position, it would be of 
comparatively little value, and would merely be a form of Berkeleian- 
ism. The chief problems of philosophy center in the self, in the 


question as to the nature and possibility of spiritual existence. Cer- 
tainly, if we may assume the existence of the self as a spiritual being 
capable by its activities of generating the world in space and time, 
we may be able to explain tin- apprehended universe. The legiti- 
macy of such an assumption is. Imurvrr, itself the chief point at 
issue. And that it is an illegitimate assumption was one of Kant's 
main contentions. It is illegitimate for two reasons. First, because 
to explain by reference to the activities of such a self is to explain 
by faculties, by the unknown. It is a cause that will explain any- 
thing and everything equally well or badly. This is an argument 
which Kant nowhere himself employs, but it is implied in a second 
argument which finds expression both in the deduction of the cate- 
gories and in the paralogisms. The only self that we know is a con- 
scious self. And since as conscious it can only exist in and through 
consciousness of objects, it can not precede such consciousness as its 
generating cause. 

It is in another and very different manner that Kant maintains 
the dependence of phenomena upon consciousness. He makes a most 
valiant attempt to combine his phenomenalism with realism; and 
though most of the inconsistencies in his teaching are traceable to 
the almost insuperable difficulties to which any such attempt gives 
rise, it is also the source of much that is most suggestive in his 
thought. I shall try to indicate Kant's position on this point. 

As I have already said, it is much easier to combine realism with 
subjectivism than with phenomenalism. Realism appears in a sub- 
jectivist form in Descartes, Locke, and Leibnitz; also in Helmholtz, 
Huxley, and Spencer. In all of those thinkers, everything outside 
the individual mind is real: appearance is purely individual in 
origin. Their position, therefore, is not strictly phenomenalism, but 
only subjectivism. Kant, on the other hand, maintains that the indi- 
vidual is himself known only as appearance, and can not therefore 
be the medium in and through which appearance exists. Though 
appearance exists only in and through consciousness, it is not due to 
any causes that can legitimately be described as individual. 

But though Kant is insistent both upon his phenomenalism and 
upon his realism, he inclines, according to the exigencies of the 
argument and to the special difficulties which he happens in each 
context to have in view, now to the one and now to the other. 
"Inclines" is perhaps too mild a term. There may indeed be traced, 
running side by side through all his critical writings, two conflicting 
views as to the mode of existence possessed by the material world in 
space, as to the nature of mechanical causation, as to the constitution 
of inner sense, and as to the character of the transcendental unity of 
apperception. The usual and current interpretation of Kant, to 


which I have just referred, takes only the one set of views, and 
ignores the others. It is in the perpetual oscillation between the 
two, and in the perpetual striving to reconcile them, that much of 
the value, and most of the present-day interest, of the "Critique" 
lies. To this cause is largely due its permanent, though illusive, 
power of suggestion. 

Sensations, Kant holds, have a twofold origin, noumenal and 
mechanical. They are due in the first place to the action of things 
in themselves upon the noumenal conditions of the self, and also in 
the second place to the action of material bodies upon the sense- 
organs and brain. To take the latter first. Light reflected from 
objects, and acting on the retina, gives rise to sensations of color. 
For such causal interrelations there exists, Kant teaches, the same 
kind of empirical evidence as for the causal interacting of material 
bodies. Our sensational experiences are as truly events in time as 
are mechanical happenings in space. In this way, however, we can 
account only for the existence of our sensations and for the order in 
which they make their appearance in or to consciousness, not for 
pur awareness of them. To state the point by means of an illustra- 
tion. The impinging of one billiard ball upon another accounts 
causally for the motion which then appears in the second ball. But 
no one would dream of asserting that by itself it accounts for our 
consciousness of that second motion. We may contend that in an 
exactly similar manner, to the same extent, no more and no less, the 
action of an object upon the brain accounts only for the occurrence 
of a visual sensation as an event in the empirical time sequence. A 
sensation just as little as a motion can carry its own consciousness 
with it. To regard that as ever possible is ultimately to endow 
events in time with the capacity of apprehending objects in space. 
In dealing with causal connections in space and time we do not 
require to discuss the problem of knowledge proper, namely, how it 
is possible to have or acquire knowledge, whether of a motion in 
space or of a sensation in time. When we raise that further ques- 
tion we have to adopt a very different standpoint, and to take into 
account a much greater complexity of conditions. 

I may indicate two of the difficulties which such a view involves. 
It is fair sailing in regard to the organic sensations, and to the 
sensations of the lower senses, including temperature sensations. 
Difficulties present themselves in regard to sensations of touch and 
motor sense, and especially in regard to sensations of color. Color 
is not perceived as an event caused by the external object which acts 
on the retina, but as its inherent and permanent quality. The treat- 
ment of this point would require a paper all to itself. Another 
difficulty is in regard to feelings and desires. Kant cuts the gordian 


knot by viewing them as all mechanically conditioned. They fall 
within the empirical world, and are completely subject to its laws. 
But I proceed to my next main point. 

We have no direct acquaintance with consciousness. We are 
aware only of contents apprehended, never of the process to which 
their apprehension is due. We may, of course, be aware of the steps 
which we take in order to place ourselves in a proper position or 
mental attitude for experiencing a content, but of the actual con- 
sciousness of the content we have no awareness. We have experi- 
ence of pleasure, pain, desire, striving, and the like. These, how- 
ever, would seem to be in all cases experiences of which we are 
aware, but not to be themselves describable as awareness. We 
seem to postulate the existence of that which we name conscious- 
ness or awareness from reflection upon the order and mode of hap- 
pening of the various contents apprehended. It is inferred or 
postulated, not itself experienced. No analogy derivable from the 
known world is in the least degree adequate to express its mysterious 
character. The nearest analogy is space, and that is a comparison 
which does not help. Consciousness would seem to be an absolutely 
unique form of existence. Though we may determine certain of its 
conditions, and some of its chief effects, we can not specify its 
inherent nature. 

My third point is that the connection established by Kant between 
time and inner sense is illegitimate and misleading. Time appears 
to be just as objective as space. It is just as necessary a component 
of natural phenomena. Motion is the fundamental thing in nature; 
it is more important than the matter which serves as its vehicle, and 
by its very nature it demands both time and space; it occurs in 
both equally. One reason why time is, by Kant and others, taken as 
less objective than space, and as standing in a closer relation to 
mind, is, of course, that many so-called mental experiences have no 
position in space but occur in time. A pleasure or a pain, an odor, 
a sound, may as effects be traced to mechanical processes in space, 
but in themselves they are without form and shape, and can not 
strictly be regarded as possessing spatial position. For this reason 
feelings and the sensations of the secondary qualities have been 
regarded as mental in character and as wholly opposite in nature to 
the physical. But such argument might prove even physical energy 
to be a mental existence. 

To turn now to the other and more difficult aspect of the problem. 
What does the postulating of consciousness involve ? What are the 
conditions upon which consciousness would seem to rest? Kant's 
answer to this question is given in the subjective and objective 
deductions of the categories. For the purposes of this paper we 


need consider these deductions only in so far as they raise the ques- 
tion in regard to consciousness of time. Consciousness of time is 
involved in all our consciousness. Though highly complex, it is the 
minimum form in which our consciousness exists. It can not be 
explained as having developed from a more primitive and simpler 
form in which such temporal consciousness is not already contained. 
It is consciousness of a succession as a succession. Admittedly com- 
plex, it must have conditions equally complex. These Kant for- 
mulates as being synthetic processes whereby the past is held 
together with the present, being reproduced in image, and being 
recognized as representing experiences which have just elapsed. 
Ultimately this recognition involves some form of self-consciousness, 
implicit though not explicit. Kant therefore postulates as the indis- 
pensable conditions in and through which alone the minimum con- 
sciousness can be rendered possible, a large number of synthetic 
processes. These synthetic processes must take place and complete 
themselves before consciousness can exist at all. And as they thus 
precondition consciousness, they can not themselves be known to be 
conscious; and not being known to be conscious, they may not 
even be described as mental. We have, indeed, to conceive them on 
the analogy of our mental processes; but that may only be because 
of the limitation of our knowledge to the data of experience. 

Further, we have no right to conceive them as the activities of 
a noumenal self. "We know the self only as conscious, and the syn- 
thetic processes, being the generating conditions of consciousness, 
are also the generating conditions of the only self for which our 
experience can vouch. They are named "synthetic" because con- 
sciousness in its very nature would seem to involve the carrying 
over of content from one time to other times, and the construction 
of a more comprehensive total consciousness from the elements thus 
combined. Kant is here analyzing, in its simplest and most funda- 
mental form, what William James has described in his "Principles 
of Psychology," 2 as the telescoping of earlier mental states into the 

* Cf. Vol. I., p. 339. ' ' Each later thought, knowing and including thus 
the thoughts which went before, is the final receptacle and appropriating them 
is the final owner of all that they contain and own. Each thought is thus born 
an owner, and dies owned, transmitting whatever it realized as its self to its 
own later proprietor. As Kant says, it is as if elastic balls were to have not 
only motion, but knowledge of it, and a first ball were to transmit both its 
motion and its consciousness to a second, which took both up into its conscious- 
ness and passed them to a third, until the last ball held all that the other balls 
had held, and realized it as its own. It is this trick which the nascent thought 
has of immediately taking up the expiring thought and 'adopting' it, which is 
the foundation of the appropriation of most of the remoter constituents of the 
self. Who owns the last self owns the self before the last, for what possesses 
the possessor possesses the possessed. ' ' 


successive experiences that include them. They telescope in a man- 
ure which can never befall the successive events in a causal series, 
and which is not explicable by any scheme of relations derivable from 
the physical sphere. 

Tin- point may be made clearer by inquiring how Kant conceives 
the material upon which the synthetic processes act. They are, he 
says, due to the affection by thinirs in themselves of those factors in 
the noumenal conditions of the self which correspond to "sensi- 
bility." ("Outer sense" must not be identified with the bodily 
senses.) But just as he frequently speaks as if the synthetic proc- 
esses were mental activities exercised by the self, so also he fre- 
quently uses language which implies that the manifold upon which 
these processes act is identical with the sensations of the special 
senses. But the sensations of the bodily senses, even if reducible to 
it, can at most form only part of it. The synthetic processes, inter- 
preting the manifold in accordance with the fixed forms, space, time, 
and the categories, generate the spatial world within which objects 
are apprehended as acting upon one another, and also as causing 
through their action upon the sense-organs of the animal body sensa- 
tions as events in time. Sensations, as mechanically caused, are 
thus on the same plane as other appearances. They rest upon the 
same complex generating conditions as the motions which produce 
them. And the material for all of them, and not merely for our 
sensations, must be supplied in the primary manifold. 

Obviously, what Kant does is to apply to the interpretation of 
the noumenal conditions of our conscious experience a distinction 
derived by analogy from conscious experience itself the distinction, 
namely, between our mental processes and the sensuous material with 
which they deal. The application of such a distinction may be 
inevitable in any attempt to explain human experience; but, as 
Kant has himself pointed out, it can very easily, unless carefully 
interpreted, prove a source of serious misunderstanding. Just as 
the synthetic processes which generate consciousness are not known 
to be themselves conscious, so also the manifold can not be identified 
with the sensations of the bodily senses. These last are events in 
time, and are effects not of noumenal but of mechanical causes. 

Kant's conclusion is twofold: positive, to the effect that con- 
sciousness, for all that our analysis can prove to the contrary, may 
be merely a resultant, derivative from and dependent upon a com- 
plexity of conditions; and negative, to the effect that though these 
conditions may by analogy be described as consisting of synthetic 
processes acting upon a given material, they are in their real nature 
unknowable by us. Even their bare possibility we can not profess to 


comprehend. We postulate them only because they would seem to be 
demanded as indispensable conditions of our de facto experience. 
They can be defined only in terms of their effects, not in their own 
non-experienced nature. 

Kant obscures his position by the way in which he frequently 
speaks of the transcendental unity of apperception as the supreme 
condition of our experience. At times he even speaks as if it were 
the source of the synthetic processes. That can not, however, be 
regarded as his real teaching. Self-consciousness, and with it the 
unity of apperception, rests upon the same complexity of conditions 
as does outer experience, and may, therefore, be merely a product or 
resultant. It is, as he insists in the paralogisms, the emptiest of all 
our conceptions ; and can afford no sufficient ground for asserting 
the self to be a spiritual and abiding personality. We can not by 
theoretical analysis of the facts of experience or of the nature of self- 
consciousness prove anything whatsoever in regard to the ultimate 
nature of the self. 

Kant's phenomenalism thus involves an objectivist view of indi- 
vidual selves and of their interrelations. They fall within the single 
common world of space. Within this phenomenal world they stand 
in external mechanical relations to one another. They are appre- 
hended as embodied, with known contents, sensations, feelings, and 
desires, composing their inner experience. There is, from this point 
of view, no problem of knowledge. On this plane we have to deal 
only with events known, not with any process of apprehension. 
Even the inner components of the empirical self are not processes of 
apprehension, but apprehended existences. It is only when we 
make a regress beyond the phenomenal as such to the conditions 
which render it possible, that the problem of knowledge arises at all. 
And with that regress we are brought to the real crux of the whole 
question the reconciliation of such phenomenalism with the condi- 
tions of our self-consciousness. For we have then to take into 
account the fundamental fact that each self is not only a minute 
existence within the phenomenal world, but also in its powers of 
apprehension coequal with it. The self known is external to the 
objects known. The self that knows is conscious of itself as com- 
prehending within the field of its consciousness the wider universe 
in infinite space. 

Such considerations would, at first sight, seem to force us to 
modify our phenomenalist standpoint in the direction of subjectivism. 
For in what other manner can we hope to unite the two aspects of 
the self, the known conditions of its finite existence, and the con- 
sciousness through which it correlates with the universe as a whole? 


In the one aspect it is a part of appearance ; in the other it connects 
with that which makes appearance possible at all. 

Quite frequently it is the subjectivist solution which Kant seems 
to adopt, but he also suggests one that is more in harmony with his 
phenomenalist tendencies. He would then seem to distinguish be- 
tween the grounds and conditions of phenomenal existence and the 
special determining causes of individual consciousness. Transcen- 
dental conditions generate consciousness of the relatively permanent 
and objective world in space and time; empirical conditions within 
this space and time world determine the sensuous modes through 
which special portions of this infinite and uniform world appear 
diversely to different individuals. 

But such a solution is too crude to be acceptable. Consciousness 
of the objective world in space and time does not exist complete with 
one portion of it more specifically determined in terms of actual 
sense perceptions. Rather the consciousness of the single world in 
space and time is gradually developed through and out of sense- 
experience of limited portions of it. Kant leaves undiscussed all the 
obvious objections to which his phenomenalism lies open. He does 
not state in any adequate manner how from the phenomenalist 
standpoint he would regard the world described in mechanical terms 
by science as related to the world of ordinary sense experience, nor 
how different individual consciousnesses are related to one another. 
The very fact, however, that such problems are inevitably suggested 
by his critical inquiries is the best possible proof of their permanent 
value. They could never have occurred in any such form to his 

Bergson is one of the many who have attacked these problems in 
the light of distinctions first drawn by Kant. And in so doing he 
reformulates them in a manner which, though in many respects 
unsatisfactory, and which perhaps is not ultimately tenable, yet 
places the issues in a new and suggestive light. He sets aside the 
question of the genesis of consciousness. He assumes it as given. 
His starting-point is the world of material bodies in space. His 
problem is not to account for consciousness of it, but to explain 
why we know it in a form relative to our individual position and 
practical needs. It is the very nature of consciousness to correlate 
with reality as a whole, and to reveal it as it really exists. By right 
it is complete knowledge of true independent reality ; in actual fact 
it is limited in extent, permeated with illusion, and largely personal. 
The problem is not, therefore, one of genesis, but of the limitation of 
the already existent not how a self that is embodied and works 
under animal conditions is capable of attaining to a consciousness 


of the universe within which it falls, but how mind, which is inalien- 
ably universal, can be limited by animal conditions. The change is, 
indeed, one of orientation rather than of problem, for consciousness 
of time, and recognition, i. e., memory still remain central issues. 
Consciousness is "a force essentially free and essentially memory, a 
force whose very character is to pile up the past on the past, like a 
rolling snowball, and at every instant of duration to organize with 
this past something new which is a real creation." 3 

This position, when thus abstractly and baldly stated, may well 
seem to embody a most unlikely and even repellent thesis. Bergson 
renders it, however, both interesting and illuminating by the sug- 
gestiveness with which he works it out in honest detail. Common to 
him and to Kant remains the contention that an adequate theory of 
knowledge must reconcile realism and phenomenalism with one 
another, and both with the individualistic requirements of self-con- 
sciousness. And I should especially insist, considering the recent 
reemergence of realistic theories, upon phenomenalism as a funda- 
mental characteristic of our experience, calling for the most ample 
recognition. Only so can we formulate a position which is capable 
of allowing both for human knowledge and for human ignorance, 
both for known facts and for unknown possibilities. And only so, 
as it seems to me, can an idealist philosophy escape the suicidal 
admission of the unlimited validity of the naturalistic position. 

But Bergson modifies Kant's problems in still another direction; 
and by that restatement is enabled to carry their discussion several 
steps further. As above mentioned, Kant does not explain in what 
relation the mechanical world of natural science stands to the world 
of ordinary sense experience. The key to this question, or at least a 
point of view from which it can be profitably investigated, is sup- 
plied by biological science, 4 and though developed by many writers, 
has received its most convincing statement in Bergson 's "Matiere 
et Memoire." Our sense perceptions are permeated through and 
through, from end to end, with illusion. Objects are seen as dwin- 
dling in size, as changing in form and color, as they pass into the 
distance. The parallel sides of a street are seen to converge as they 
recede. These illusions justify themselves by their practical useful- 
ness, since they enable us to compress a wide extent of landscape 
into a single visual field, to determine distance, etc. But they like- 
wise establish the unreal fictitious nature, the mental subjective 

1 1 quote from the excellent resum6 of his views which Bergson has given in 
his recent article in the Hibbert Journal, October, 1911, Vol. X., p. 37. 

4 It was anticipated by Malebranche. It holds a central position in his 
delightful and most unfortunately neglected philosophy. Cf. British Journal of 
Psychology, Vol. I., part 3, p. 191 ff. 


character of the world perceived. The extent to which illusion thus 
permeates our sense experiences does not, however, become evident 
until we compare the knowledge which they yield with the conclu- 
sions of physical science. To define by an example: to sense per- 
ception a solid cannon ball appears to be a cold, black, continuous 
mass of quiescent matter. According to science it consists of mil- 
lions of discrete particles which are neither cold nor black, and which 
are in constant motion. These particles by their movements occupy 
the volume of the sphere, much as a small army may occupy a huge 
extent of country, not by bulk but by mobility. To sense perception 
the ball thus appears as being exactly what it is not, and not at all 
as what it is. Though we can take it in our hands and gaze upon 
it with our eyes, we can not thereby discover its real nature. When 
we look at the ball, we are unable to see what actually is there, and 
instead we see something that is not there at all. The same holds 
of every one of our sense perceptions. They do not represent, but 
misrepresent, the true nature of the real. Not through sense experi- 
ence, but only through scientific research, is genuine reality ever 
attained. The purpose of sense experience is not knowledge, but 
power. Its raison d'etre is to yield, in the most convenient form 
possible, such apprehension of the observer's environment as will 
render adaptation and practical control possible. And % this con- 
venient form in which external objects are apprehended may be, and 
generally is, entirely false, when tested by a theoretical standard. 
The deceptions (if we may so name them) of sense experience justify 
themselves by their practical usefulness, as well as by their esthetic 
value. And in spite of their illusoriness they yield data sufficient to 
render possible of achievement the adventurous task undertaken by 
the scientist, namely, that of discovering from them their actual 
generating conditions. 

The difference between the sensible and the mechanical is due in 
part, Bergson teaches, to a difference of tempo in the two series. 
"The essence of life seems to be to secure that matter, by a process 
necessarily very slow and difficult, should store up energy ready for 
life afterwards to expend this energy suddenly in free movements. ' ' 8 
Consciousness is similarly constituted. "In an interval which for 
it is infinitely short, and which constitutes one of our 'instants,' it 
seizes under an indivisible form millions and billions of events that 
succeed each other in inert matter. ... It is this immense history 
that I seize all at once under the pictorial form of a very brief sensa- 
tion of light. And we could say just the same of all our other sen- 
sations. Sensation, which is the point at which consciousness touches 

Loo. tit., p. 35. 


matter, is, then, the condensation, in the duration peculiar to this 
consciousness, of a history which in itself in the world of matter 
is something infinitely diluted, and which occupies enormous periods 
of what might be called the duration of things." 6 

So far Bergson is only reinforcing the general teaching of nat- 
ural science. But he likewise employs this pragmatic point of view 
in explanation of those categories of the understanding which Kant 
regarded as an ultimate and not further explicable endowment of 
the human mind. They too have their origin in our practical needs. 
Though the primary conscious purpose of the scientist is the gaining 
of knowledge, the modes in which he seeks to satisfy this endeavor 
are still influenced by non-theoretical conditions. The direct and 
immediate outcome of the sciences is, consequently, not knowledge, 
but power. Like sense experience, they deal only with appearances, 
though certainly with appearances that may legitimately be regarded 
as nearer to the independently real. For through knowledge of them 
man is enabled to transform what would otherwise be a fixed en- 
vironment, tyrannically dictating the general principles of his life, 
into one that is more in harmony with his human and spiritual needs. 

Problems, closed for Kant, thus open upon new perspectives ; and 
become possible of further development by novel methods on fresh 
lines. If the mechanical categories are the outcome of practical 
needs, and are therefore systematic illusions justified by their fruits ; 
and consequently, as we may further conclude, are only partial in 
their distortion of the real, it may be possible that scrutiny as careful 
and painstaking as that which has been expended upon the appear- 
ances of sense, may find in certain of the elements and contours of 
our scientific results data sufficient to enable the mind to penetrate 
even into the hidden mysteries of the absolutely real. For this, ulti- 
mately, is Bergson 's fundamental divergence from Kant. He is no 
less emphatic upon the merely phenomenal character of the mechan- 
ical world in space. But he cherishes hope, and supplies a wealth of 
detailed argument in support of the assertion, that by empirical cir- 
cumstantial reasoning, based upon the fundamental characteristics 
of natural existence and of human life, we may penetrate to the 
noumenal sphere. The limits of sense experience have been trans- 
cended in the construction of science. Thanks to these successes, and 
to the closer contact with reality which is thereby acquired, the 
achievements of the sciences may be accompanied by that less as- 
sured, but even more valuable insight which is only to be won by 
adventurous journeying upon the perilous paths of metaphysical 
speculation. Such insight, anticipatory and almost prophetic, ahead 

Loc. tit., pp. 36-37. 


of the sciences but still in touch with them, has been the very breath 
and spirit of human endeavor in the past. It may well continue to 
perform the same precarious but indispensable function in the fu- 
ture. In opposition to a purely naturalistic interpretation of the 
real, it can always draw afresh upon the comparatively untapped 
resources of our specifically human and essentially spiritual life. 

In conclusion, I may summarize and define the main points of 
this paper by stating them in their relation and opposition to the 
standpoint which Professor Dewey has so forcibly developed in his 
recent articles. 7 Firstly, the really critical issue in the present-day 
problem of knowledge would seem, as Professor Dewey has argued, 
to be the question whether awareness or consciousness may legiti- 
mately be regarded as an event, and therefore as having a place in 
the single continuous causal series that constitutes the objectively 
real. The thesis which I have tried to maintain is that this may be 
true of sensations, but not of the knowing process, of the awareness 
or consciousness as such. Consciousness can not be described as an 
event in any sense which would set it as an integral element into the 
single causal time and space series. 

Secondly, Professor Dewey denies that knowing is a "unique and 
non-natural type of relation." I have tried to argue for its unique- 
ness. "Non-natural" is a hard term; but taking it as meant, t. e., as 
signifying anything and everything that falls outside the single con- 
tinuous causal series investigated by the natural sciences, I have 
sought to defend the more traditional view, that the knowing process 
may be so described. 

Thirdly, it has been argued above, that we may judge of man 
either from the point of view of his animal organism or from that of 
his inner life. Professor Dewey would seem to maintain that so far 
as regards the problem of knowledge, or at least of sense per- 
ception, the former alone is required. 8 The thesis of this paper is the 
directly counter position. The problem of perception is for phi- 
losophy uniquely important, and can not be solved by any conceiv- 
able advance either of physiology or of biology upon their present 
lines. With a physiology or a biology fundamentally different from 
those actually existent we are not, of course, concerned ; in regard to 
such no prophecy, positive or negative, can be made. 



This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., pp. 393 and 496. 
Cf. Joe. cit., pp. 400 and 552. 



PEOFESSOR PERRY'S "Notes on the Philosophy of Henri 
Bergson" 1 is a trenchant criticism which undertakes to main- 
tain two propositions: (1) " Bergson 's indictment of the intellectual 
method rests on a misunderstanding of that method" (p. 674). 
(2) Bergson 's anti-intellectualism is "involved in a more serious 
error" in that it "puts forth a claim" to immediate knowledge which 
is "unfounded" (p. 678). 

I confess I am not able to make out the particular misunder- 
standing which Professor Perry means to attribute to Bergson under 
the first point of his criticism. From the statements (p. 675) it is 
not clear to me whether this misunderstanding relates to the nature 
and function of the concept, or whether it relates to the consistent 
procedure of the anti-intellectualist. 

I do not think that Professor Perry's statement (p. 675) that 
"Bergson is not clear as to whether a concept is to be distinguished 
by its function or its content" is quite to the point. It seems to me 
that Bergson is altogether clear in that matter. Bergson clearly 
teaches that, since the function of the intellect is to direct our action 
upon reality instead of revealing the nature of reality, concepts are 
the special instruments or tools by means of which our actions are 
made effective as they insert themselves into the real world. This 
essentially instrumental function of our concepts determines also 
their content or structure ; the two, function and content, correspond. 
Our concepts are plans of action, and not mediate ways of pene- 
trating or disclosing the nature of reality. Conceptual thinking 
is not ' ' a mode of access to immediacy. ' ' Hence, the ' ' strange pro- 
cedure" which Professor Perry points out (p. 675), namely, "to 
prove that intellect is essentially instrumental and then to attack it 
in behalf of that very end for which it is useful," can not rightly 
be imputed to Bergson 's pragmatism. 

I can not see that Professor Perry has brought forth anything 
under the second point of his criticism which tends to disprove 
Bergson 's anti-intellectualism. All that Professor Perry says (pp. 
676-7) about spacial continuity, etc., Bergson could accept. In the 
case of space, which is an intellectual construction, the formula and 
added statements which Professor Perry suggests, can mean, nay, 
they describe this kind of continuity ; for this continuity consists of 
just those elements and connections in which the intellect is at home ; 

ir This JOUBNAL, Vol. VIII., page 673. 


this quantitative multiplicity being made up of elements which are 
homogeneous, static, and which merely touch, but do not penetrate, 
each other. Siu-h a system or order can be conceived and described 
in the manner Professor IVrry suggests (p. 677). 

But how about the other continuities, those of time and motion? 
It is the essence of Bergson 's contention, that when the intellect 
deals with these continuities, it can do so only as it frames concepts 
which leave out of their content and their legitimate function just 
that which is distinctive of time and that which is the essence of 
motion. The intellect thinks time only as it spacializes it, and 
motion only as it reduces it to a succession of immobile states. Now, 
under this third point of his critique, I can not see that Professor 
Perry has broken the force of this contention. 

In the next criticism, the substance of Professor Perry's reason- 
ing against Bergson's position, "that to conceive time is to spacialize 
it," is as follows: "Bergson is misled by supposing that because 
time is conceived as orderly, it is therefore nothing but order. Bare 
logical order is static and can never express time. But it is an 
utterly different matter to regard time, like space and number, as a 
case of order, having the specific time quale over and above the prop- 
erties of order. Position, interval, before and after, are then to be 
taken in the temporal sense; and the terms of the series are not to be 
taken as bare logical terms, still less as spacial points, but as instants 
possessing a unique time-character of their own" (p. 678). 

Now, this reasoning, I think, begs the question. For, to regard 
time as a "case of order," and at the same time to give it the 
"specific quale" of the sort proposed, is as impossible a logical 
undertaking as would be the attempt to place something in a certain 
genus, and at the same time give it a mark or quale which takes it 
out of that genus altogether, and puts it within some other genus. 
The "time quale," the "unique time-character" which Professor 
Perry thinks constitutes only a specific differentia in the case he 
instances, really constitutes a generic difference. What we have in 
this instance is not a species within a genus, but two genera between 
which, Bergson contends, there is a radical difference. I do not 
think Professor Perry, in this part of his critique, has successfully 
met Bergson 's contention that the concepts of time and motion which 
our intellect forms do not give us knowledge of these realities; they 
do not give us "access to that immediacy" in which real duration 
and motion are given us. 

The second main criticism which Professor Perry makes upon 
Bergson's anti-intellectualism is that Bergson "puts forth a claim 
which is unfounded the claim, namely, to the immediate apprehen- 
sion of a fused and inarticulate unity" (p. 678). 


The substance of the critic's reply to Bergson is that what Berg- 
son puts forth as matter of immediate knowledge is not really knowl- 
edge at all. Thus, Bergson says: 2 "The more we succeed in making 
ourselves conscious of our progress in pure duration, the more we 
feel the different parts of our being enter into each other, and our 
whole personality concentrate itself in a point. ' ' To this Professor 
Perry replies (p. 679) : "What Bergson is here describing is, I am 
convinced, the disappearance of cognition into an experience which 
is not an experience of anything at all. . . . My experience of life has 
dissolved ; but nothing follows concerning the nature of life. I have 
simply closed my eyes to it. I have blurred and blotted out my 
knowledge of life. ' ' 

Now, after reading all the passages in Bergson 's writings which 
relate to intuitive knowledge, I can not convince mi/self that Bergson 
is not describing a truly cognitive experience, instead of giving us 
knowledge at the vanishing-point. My own introspection verifies 
Bergson 's statements. I am quite certain that I have an experience 
of something, namely, of real time in its flow and interpenetration of 
moments. I have, it seems to me, an immediate knowledge of just 
that qualitative multiplicity of psychical states which Bergson has 
clearly described and accurately distinguished from the other kind 
of multiplicity, of which we have knowledge only through the media- 
tion of conceptual thinking. 

I am unable to see on what grounds Professor Perry is "con- 
vinced" of the erroneousness of Bergson 's description, other than 
his own introspection, and possibly that of other individuals whose 
introspection yields the same results. It seems to me that the 
utmost Bergson 's critic makes out against Bergson 's position is that 
Bergson 's claim to an immediate apprehension of the sort described 
is not borne out by the introspective analysis of at least one person, 
and possibly not borne out by the introspection of other individuals. 
But that the claim to such non-conceptual knowledge is an unfounded 
one, the critic, in my opinion, has not shown. 




Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes. 

EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER. New York : The Macmillan Co. 1909. 

Pp. ix -f 318. 

This book consists of five lectures delivered at the University of Illi- 
nois ; the lectures proper fill about two thirds of the volume, the rest being 
'"Creative Evolution," page 201. 


given to notes. Together they form a needed analysis of the contribu- 
tions to the experimental investigation of thought by Marbe, Watt, Ach, 
Messer, Biihler, etc., besides giving the author's estimate of their value, 
his own present views concerning the problems raised, and his suggestions 
for fruitful directions of future research. It is doubly welcome because 
of the author's happy gifts for such a task. 

At the very outset it is shown that individual differences in mental 
make-up must play an important part in the psychology of thought, that, 
indeed, " a frank acceptance of the teachings of differential psychology 
will go far to allay some of the perennial controversies of the text-books " 
(p. 7). What part they may play Titchener indicates by laying bare the 
workings of his own mind. His mind is markedly of the imaginal the 
mixed imaginal sort. Sometimes one kind of imagery is uppermost, 
sometimes another. In reading, for instance, his ultimate standard of 
clarity and consistency in an author is schematically visual the visual 
pattern not merely an accompaniment of other processes, but one that " is 
or equals my gross understanding of the matter in hand" (p. 13). For 
him either visual or kinesthetic imagery, quite apart from verbal, may be 
the vehicles of logical meaning may mean of themselves and not act 
merely as guide-posts to something beyond. 

This discussion leads to one concerning the possibility of abstract or 
general ideas. It is pointed out that in the traditional English teaching 
there has been here a confusion between logic and psychology, for the 
abstract is not the conscious process, but the logical meaning. Titchener 
believes, indeed, that a particular definite image might carry abstract 
meaning and a vague image a particular meaning, since attenlional clear- 
ness is the essential element in the meaningfulness of an image, and not 
intrinsic definiteness. 

The argument thus far points to psychological sensationalism; the 
book is, indeed, a defense of sensationalism as an adequate instrument 
of interpretation in dealing with thought processes as well as with others. 
The author sharply separates modern sensationalism, however, from that 
of the associationists. They dealt with meanings, thought-tokens, bits 
of knowledge, with sensations of and not with sensations; the sensations 
and ideas of modern psychology are, on the contrary, Erlebnisse, data of 
immediate experience. Meanings, furthermore, are stable and may be 
ordered mosaic wise or chain-wise, but experience is continuously flowing; 
a psychology whose elements are sensations is, therefore, a process psy- 
chology, quite innocent of mosaic and concatenation. Whether referring 
to " substantive " or " transitive " meanings, the psychological process is 
always of itself transitory. Nor did the associationists help matters by 
invoking mental chemistry, for " we do not expect, if two sensations are 
put together, to obtain a simple concurrence of their two qualities " (p. 
32). Finally, modern sensationalism is merely an heuristic principle and 
not a preconceived theory; to us the sensation is an analytic element, 
says Titchener, abstracted from complex mental experiences, not a syn- 
thetic or generative element not a " first term " in the construction of 


The upshot of this first lecture is, then, that the image may adequately 
equal meaning and that, if the task of modern psychology is analysis of 
experience into its existential elements, sensation (with affection) is 
doubtless an adequate tool. 

The second lecture deals with " ' reference to object ' as the criterion 
of mind." In the various " reference to object " theories psychological 
fact has been cast into logical form; the separation of the conscious 
experience into act and content, or idea and object, leads to overarticula- 
tion and to neglect of analysis, because logical construction and not intro- 
spective analysis is here in control of classification and analysis. To 
extricate psychology from this Titchener invokes the process character 
of mind : the way a process runs its course (act) makes it sensing, feeling, 
or thinking, whereas the quality thus in passage (content) makes it tone 
or pleasure. Furthermore, the pointing relation of the "transitive ob- 
jectivity" theories (Stout, Witasek) does not obtain in feelings, organic 
sensations, etc., whereas we do find it in the physical world: the transitive 
reference is not, therefore, existentially speaking, a unique, characteristic 
criterion of mind. The concept of objective reference, in whatever form, 
is thus an irrelevant injection of logic into psychology, warping it away 
from the direct existential analysis of conscious phenomena where we 
do, in fact, find objectless mental processes. This exclusion of the " log- 
ical " objective-reference postulate from the existential science of psy- 
chology frees us from a frequently urged difficulty that two ideas or 
images under the form of existence can not make a meaning (because 
meaning is reference to object and this can be known but not imaged), 
since, in an existential psychology, the final appeal is to introspection; 
and introspection tells us, thinks Titchener, that under certain circum- 
stances two ideas do make a meaning. 

The third lecture takes up the actual work of the experimental investi- 
gators. Their attempt, the details of which can not here be considered, 
was, essentially, to isolate under experimental conditions some thought 
process and to require from the subjects careful introspection on its 
behavior. These introspective data Titchener thinks very valuable. As 
to the relative merits of the individual investigators, he believes that 
Marbe and Binet made a good beginning, that Ach and Watt followed 
logically with respective specializations of the problems involved, that 
Messer, disregarding the good example of Ach and Watt, tried too much, 
and that Biihler, in devoting himself to " a revolutionary attempt to 
rewrite the psychology of thought from the beginning" (p. 98), for- 
sakes rigid experiment and is methodologically retrogressive. 

Emerging from the work of these experimenters there appears, as 
perhaps most characteristic, the Bewusstseinslage " an almost untrans- 
latable term, meaning something like posture or attitude of conscious- 
ness " (p. 100), but identifiable, at least, with what Angell had previously 
phrased as " a tingling sense of irradiating meaning," and Stout as the 
experience of " imageless thought." Some such attitudes are doubt, diffi- 
culty, effort, hesitation, and the opposite experiences of certainty, assent, 


conviction, etc. Disregarding differences in usage, classification, and 
theory of the various investigators, we have here an exix-rii-m-i- that appar- 
ently defies analysis into sensations and images, into, in tine, any taraat 
of content whatever ; they are essentially obscure and intangible, " image- 
less presentations " with, however, perfectly " unequivocal reference," the 
niiml being thrown into a certain set or adjustment, the significance of 
which may be nttentionally clear but empty of imaginal furnishings 
There may, of course, be transitional forms (Titchener, indeed, regards 
the present pressing problem to be the tracing of the development of these 
attitudes, within the individual mind, from their original imaginal 
matrix), 1 but the full-blown attitude is apparently contentless. Does, 
then, consciousness really harbor such things? If so, are they mental 
elements? If they are not, what are they? The challenge to sensation- 
alism is unequivocal and unavoidable. 

It is but a short step to pass, in the fourth lecture, from the Beurusat- 
seinslage of meaning to thought itself. Do the experimental results bear 
out the theory of imageless thought! Marbe, unsuccessful in his search 
for psychological judgment processes, invokes, as the guide in judgment, 
an unconscious dispositional purpose. Watt proposes, as his psychological 
criterion of judgment, the Aufgdbe (problem or task) given, in his experi- 
ments, in the instructions of the experimenter and definable, more gen- 
erally, as the underlying intention in control of an activity. This it is 
that distinguishes a judgment from a mere sequence of experiences, and, 
although as explicit conscious experience it may be past and gone, it 
persists as an appreciable influence as an automatic set, attitude, or 
adjustment. This determining " problem " is also clear to Messer and 
Ach. As the reviewer understands it, we are here again in the presence 
of a Bewusstseinslage a Bewusstseinslage of cognition that may func- 
tion effectively, but exhibit no apparent imaginal content. Biihler finds, 
indeed, the most important factors in the thinking of his subjects to be 
something without sensible content, referred to as awareness, or knowl- 
edge, or " the consciousness that " or, most frequently, thoughts. These 
are Biihler's thought elements, the ultimate units of thought experience. 
Titchener, it may be remarked, objects to this last result on the specific 
ground that Biihler's introspective data show what in the sphere of sen- 
sation would be called the stimulus error the observer does not describe 
his thought, but, instead, what it is about, describes not the conscious 
process as such, but formulates " the reference of consciousness to things " 
(p. 147) a criticism applying also to Binet and Woodworth. 

But aside from this and aside from the unsatisfactory state of affairs 
that exists, as the author shows, as to a proper psychological criterion of 
judgment, the investigators agree that there is present in the thought 
process an effectively determining factor, yielding, however, no explicit 
conscious (sensory or imaginal) content. 

The challenge to sensationalism is wholesome and should be frankly 
and gladly met, thinks Titchener. In the last lecture he does what he 

'See, on this, Helen Maude Clarke, "Conscious Attitudes/' American 
Journal of Psychology, 1911, Vol. XXII., pp. 214-249. 


can, at the present stage of investigation, to meet it. The gain from 
previous work is clear: conscious states like doubt, hesitation, certainty, 
etc. attitudes have been isolated and the fact of determination, Auf- 
gabe, has been recognized as a principle of explanation in strict labora- 
tory procedure. The discovery of Aufgabe " has made it impossible for 
any future psychologist to write a psychology of thought in the language 
of content alone. I believe, indeed, that the principle of determination, 
taken together with what I may call a genetic sensationalism, furnishes 
a trustworthy guide for further experimental study of the thought- 
processes; and I think that the work immediately before us is, under this 
guidance, to bring the processes, little bit by bit, under rigorous experi- 
mental control" (pp. 163-164). The question is not wholly, therefore, 
Can the sensationalists find in the alleged imageless experiences always a 
sensory content? but rather, Isn't content more pervasively present than 
the imageless-thought disciples suppose, and may not such things as 
Watt's Aufgabe and Ach's determinierende Tendenzen be, genetically, 
developments from processes essentially imaginal? The further question, 
it is true, also awaits : If, originally full of content, these experiences are 
now empty of it, how should a sensationalistic psychology now classify 

Three regulative maxims are first proposed that, should direct inquiry 
into these matters. (1) Psychology must steer circumspectly between 
logic, on the one hand, and common sense, on the other. (2) Psychology, 
in such problems as thought, must supplement the analytic treatment 
with the genetic, racial as well as individual an analysis must be re- 
peated at the various formative levels of consciousness. Furthermore, we 
shall take as a mental element " any process that proves to be irreducible, 
unanalyzable, throughout the whole course of individual experience " (p. 
170). If an attitude can be traced back in the individual to an imaginal 
source, it is not a new kind of conscious element. (3) " Consciousness 
may be guided and controlled by extra-conscious, physiological factors 
by cortical sets and dispositions " (p. 173) a determination that may lead, 
too, to novel conscious connections. 

Titchener then attacks the problems directly. Is it nonsense to call a 
psychological fact or occurrence the meaning of another psychological 
fact or occurrence? Can two ideas be both idea and its meaning? Yes, 
under certain circumstances, as already stated in the second lecture. 
Psychologically, " meaning so far as it finds representation in conscious- 
ness at all is always context," and context is " simply the mental process 
or complex of mental processes which accrues to the original idea through 
the situation in which the organism finds itself" (p. 175). Originally 
meaning is kinesthesis the sensations involved in a characteristic bodily 
attitude " are psychologically the meaning of that process. . . . After- 
wards, when differentiation has taken place, context may be mainly a 
matter of sensations of the special senses, or of images, or of kinesthetic 
and other organic sensations, as the situation demands" (p. 176). Kin- 
esthesis and verbal imagery are especially important, since words them- 
selves were originally motor attitudes, kinesthetic contexts. 


But, further, meaning is probably carried in purely physiological 
terms; the Aufgdbe must be there, but that need not either come to con- 
sciousness. As for imageless thoughts, Titchener's own introspection 
does not show him, in his search for Bewusstseinslagen, forms of experi- 
ence different in kind from such kinesthetic backgrounds as his careful 
introspection often discovers in the respective attitudes involved in work- 
ing off, for instance, on a typewriter, a lecture or the daily batch of pro- 
fessional correspondence. But the contention is not at all that attitudes 
will always, in their developed state, exhibit content, but that, since 
genetically they probably spring from sensory experiences, they are not 
distinct conscious elements. While still recognizable as conscious atti- 
tudes, they either show some remnant of imagery or, since they may be, 
in their development towards physiological dispositions, on the brink of 
unconsciousness, exhibit none discoverable. In much of this Titchener 
is, of course, simply expressing tentative belief and not experiment-born 
conviction, but the main contention, that sensationalism has still a well- 
considered word or two to say, stands clear. In " feelings of relation," 
too, Titchener finds content ; but here, also, habit operates towards uncon- 
scious mechanization, towards physiological disposition. As to judgment, 
we do not yet know what it psychologically is; but the task of psychology 
is to work out the particular problems set by investigations already made 
and compare results with the teachings of logic, in order to find out what 
kinds of consciousness correspond with logical definitions of judgment. 

Finally, we are not yet driven to psychological revolution. " My task 
has been to persuade you that there is no need, as things are, to swell the 
number of mental elements; that the psychology of thought, so far as 
we have it, may be interpreted from the sensationalistic standpoint, and 
so far as we still await it, may be approached by sensationalistic methods " 
(p. 194). 

Titchener's personal answer to the challenge of the exponents of image- 
less thought is contained, in gist, in the following statement, referring, 
specifically, to " feelings of relation " : "I must declare . . . that I can 
bear witness both to kinesthesis and to cortical set, but that between these 
extremes I find nothing at all" (p. 188). That is, in such things as the 
Bewusstseinslage, as the Aufgabe, there is either discoverable content 
(sensational, imaginal) or there is unconsciousness, mechanization, physi- 
ological disposition, cortical set. It seems to the reviewer that the " cor- 
tical set" is an interpretation of the "nothing at all"; that is, intro- 
spection may discover content, but when it finds " nothing at all," it 
takes the matter to lie outside the conscious field and refers it then to 
cortical set. Others, however, prefer to keep these Bewusstseinslagen, 
etc., in consciousness and to call them " imageless." Introspection may, 
of course, give you " imagelessness " ; it can not give you cortical set. 
It might be a question, therefore, whether those who prefer to retain 
attitudes, no matter how contentless, within consciousness, are not ad- 
hering the more closely to the introspective ideal. The reply of sensa- 
tionalism to this is, of course, obvious: when any attitude reveals no sen- 


sational or imaginal content, one is not directly aware of it at all but 
infers its presence (as unconscious or physiological set) by its results in 
(introspective) consciousness; it can not, therefore, be a part of con- 
sciousness. But the rebuttal is equally obvious : first, some observers do 
confess to awareness for which subsequent reflection persistently fails to 
unmask imaginal content. Secondly, any one's introspection shows that 
one may be, at least momentarily, naively aware of some attitude, like 
doubt, with, at the time, no awareness whatever of sensations or images; 
it is only by the subsequent reflective analysis of introspection that the 
attitude, like a dissolving magic lantern view, may fade away and be 
replaced by an array of sensations. Now by what license can the first act 
of introspective awareness (that of doubt) be identified with the second 
(that of sensations) ? Surely, if introspection is the arbiter, as the sensa- 
tionalists would have it, to say that the first is the second is to forsake 
introspection and invoke logical construction. 

But, although even the introspective criterion does not appear to give 
the honors wholly to the sensationalists, the reviewer considers the diffi- 
culty between them and the exponents of imageless thought as one that 
neither experiment nor introspection can settle. It is a matter of just 
that naughty logical construction which those to whom it is axiomatic 
that introspection is the final arbiter intrench themselves against. Shall 
the term consciousness be limited to introspect able content, everything 
else being cortical set, or shall we leave physiology alone here and 
affirm that the contentless attitudes and Aufgaben are simply forms 
of consciousness on which the additional reflective process always 
involved in introspection is not possible? To this question the strictly 
introspective dispute as to whether one may or may not be directly 
aware of attitudes empty of discoverable content is, of course, not 
germane. The dilemma appears clear: either we must reserve the 
term " conscious " for the gifts of introspection, in which case we have a 
psychology limited to the field of attainable reflection, all else being 
extra-conscious physiological, if you will or we must maintain that 
the field of real conscious " stuff " lies underneath and around and about 
the field of introspection including, therefore, " mechanized " Bewusst- 
seinslagen and Aufgaben the data offered by introspection being simply 
the possible additional reflections that we may make on a part of it. The 
attitude in which no content is discoverable is merely conscious process 
successfully resisting reflection. This is, of course, quite aside from the 
question of whether it is a distinct kind of conscious element, for even 
if it be true that a process traceable back to a stage involving imaginal 
content can not be a distinct element, does the fact that in its develop- 
ment from this stage it gradually loses such content mean anything more 
than that it no longer presents introspectable attributes? Excluding it 
as a novel element, must we also throw it out of consciousness altogether? 
Is it logical to call it a conscious attitude so long as it is embedded in an 
imaginal matrix and then make it a physiological process when the 
imagery has forsaken it? Nor is all this a mere question of naming, of 


classification: it is a question of the definition of consciousness, one's 
answer to which sets the Aufgabe that controls even the details of labo- 
ratory procedure. ROSWELL P. ANOIKU. 

Phases of Evolution and Heredity. DAVTD Bi HHV II \RT. London: Reb- 

man Limited. 1910. Pp. xi + 259. 

The Darwin-Wallace theory falls short in two respects. (1) It does 
not show where the power of variation in the individual lies. (2) No 
adequate explanation of the inheritance of variation is offered. Circum- 
cision, practised generation after generation, plainly demonstrates that 
artificially produced variations in the " soma " of individuals are not 
transmitted to subsequent generations. Weismann made an advance on 
Darwinism when he asserted that the power of variation lies in the primi- 
tive germ-cells of the sexual glands, but he did not explain adequately the 
exact nature of the process of transmission. Mendel's experiments in 
artificial cross-fertilization between tall pea-plants and a dwarf variety 
showed that the first generation consisted uniformly of tall pea-plants. 
When these were allowed to self-fertilize, the result was tails and dwarfs 
in the ratio 3:1. The dwarfs thereafter bred true, but the " tails gave, on 
self-fertilization, one third which bred true to tallness and two thirds 
which, as impure tails, gave somatic tails, and also dwarfs breeding true 
again in the ratio 3:1." From this Mendelians infer that dominance and 
recessiveness of certain characteristics, called unit-characters, are ac- 
counted for by the theory of gametic segregation and combination ac- 
cording to the law of chance. Dr. Hart believes that the principal defect 
in the Mendelian theory is to be found in the fact that it states the ratio 
of transmission in relation to the " soma " of the plant only. An organism 
(plant or animal) consists of the adult individual part or " soma " and 
the propagative part. The latter is the determining factor in future 
reproduction. The author holds that the zygotes in each crossing consist 
of a propagative and a somatic part. The Mendelian ratio obtains in the 
propagative part only. 

In the fifth chapter, the author discusses what he terms an intrinsic 
theory of variation and transmission. lie sums it up 1 as follows: 

The primitive germ-cells which give rise to the gametes are derived from an 
early division of the zygote, and travel through the organism to the sexual gland 
without undergoing any mitosis, that is to say, without variation in their struc- 
ture. In the sexual gland they undergo mitosis, which means variation in the 
determinants of the unit-characters, according to the law of probability. . . . 
When the gametes unite, we get half of the varied chromosomes thrown off, and 
then when the zygote with its proper number of chromosomes is formed, we get 
the phenomenon of Mendelism, by which the unit-characters are distributed in 
the rygote, again according to the law of probability; so that by all this we 
get in subsequent generations organs following the curve of probability in their 
anatomical condition and function. 

Dr. Hart declares that this theory "puts variation by environment 
quite out of question." This conclusion, however, does not necessarily 
'P. 94 ff. 


stand. It remains to be shown that variations which environment not 
artificial mutilation produces on many succeeding generations do not 
affect the cells that are set apart for propagation as well as those that 
constitute the " soma," Tallness and shortness, which are continually 
transmitted, are themselves often the result of environment. The propa- 
gative cells do not exist independent of and apart from the " soma." In 
short, it seems best to wait until more evidence is in before accepting a 
theory which in part falls back on chance, and for the rest posits two 
independent causal series, the " soma " which is manifestly influenced by 
the environment, and the cells set apart for propagation, which act inde- 
pendent of environment. 

The book, as a whole, is not a unit, but discusses widely divergent phases 
of evolution and heredity. One chapter is devoted to the life of Mendel. 
Other subjects taken up are : " Heredity in Disease," " The Evolution of 
the Honey-Bee," "The Handicap of Sex," "Evolution and Keligion." 
The author has written a stimulating book. Most of the chapter captions 
might well serve as titles of books. FREDERICK GOODRICH HENKE. 



THE PHILOSOPHICAL EEVIEW. September, 1911. The Pla- 
tonic Distinction between " True " and " False " Pleasures and Pains 
(pp. 471^197) : HAROLD H. JOACHIM. - It is maintained that the question 
raised by Plato regarding the reality of pleasure and pain is of great 
importance. For common opinion the question of the truth or falsity of 
pleasure and pain does not arise, because for them there is no distinction 
of " the that " from " the what," thus marking them off from " knowing " 
and " willing." Regarding the distinction of the " that " and the " what " 
in " knowing " and " willing " as untenable, " feeling " is put in the same 
class, and the question of reality has equal validity with them. The Role of 
the Type in Mental Processes (pp. 498-514) : W. B. PiLLSBURY.-It is stated 
that consciousness has to do more with things than with sensations. The 
two current views that perception is a combination of sensations and that 
it is a group of movements are rejected. Things are " types " developed 
in experience out of a necessity of " harmonizing various experiences of 
the same object." The origin and nature of the " type " is explained as 
its meaning is illustrated in the processes of perception, memory, and 
action. Philosophy in France, 1910 (pp. 515-534) : ANDRE LALANDE. - A 
resume and brief criticism of various recent books on French philosophy. 
The emphasis is on religious philosophy. The chief works viewed are: 
J. J. Gourd: La philosophic de la religion; M. Charles Dunau: Les deux 
idealismes; M. Delvalue: Rationalisme et tradition; M. Parodi: Le prob- 
leme moral et la pensee contemporaine. Reviews of Books (pp. 535-558) : 
Theodore DeLaguna and Grace Andrus DeLaguna, Dogmatism and Evolu- 
tion: Studies in Modern Philosophy: ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY. Edward Brad- 
ford Titchener, A Text-book of Psychology: JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL. 
Emile Brehier, Chrysippe: G. S. BRETT. A. Meinong, Uber Annahmen: 


WILBUR M. URBAN. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. 

Kii lit 111:11 1 ii. Alfred. Zur Geschichte des Terminismus. Leipzig: Verlag 
von Quelle und Meyer. 1911. Pp. viii + 127. M. 4.20. 

Marck, Siegfried. Die Platoniscbe Ideen-Lehre in Ihren Motiven. 
Munich : C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1912. Pp. viii + 180. 

Taylor, A. E. Varia Socratica: First Series. (St. Andrew's University 
Publications, No. IX.) Oxford: James Parker & Co. 1911. Pp. 
xii + 269. 


FOR an anthropological research expedition to the islands of Normandy, 
Fergusson and Goodenough, in British New Guinea, as we learn from the 
London Times, funds are being provided out of the Oxford University 
common fund and by several of the colleges. The work has been under- 
taken by Mr. David Jenness, of Balliol College, who proposes, unaccom- 
panied, to spend a year amongst people who are admittedly cannibals. 
It is stipulated by the university, in contributing to the expedition, that 
the museum shall have the first offer of articles of interest which may be 
obtained. Assistance has been promised by the missionaries on Good- 
enough Island, including the use of a boat and native oarsmen. The first 
few weeks will be spent in cruising around the islands endeavoring to get 
on friendly terms with the people and in studying the trade relations. 
As the natives have sea-going canoes and trade with the neighboring 
coast and the island of Trobriand, 100 miles away, Mr. Jenness will 
endeavor to obtain the good will of one of the chiefs and settle down for 
about a year. Later he will proceed on a mission boat to Rossell Island, 
at the eastern end of the Louisiade Archipelago, to study some ethnolog- 
ical problems concerning the relationships of Oceanic peoples. Mr. Jen- 
ness has been provided with the latest scientific instruments, including a 
phonograph for recording native songs and speech. 

IT is stated in the Journal of the American Medical Association that 
Professor Theodor Ziehen, director of the psychiatric and neurologic 
clinic in Berlin, will resign his position at the end of the winter semester 
and discontinue all medical work, in order to devote himself exclusively 
to research in psychology. For this purpose, he will remove to Wiesbaden, 
where he will erect for himself a private psychological laboratory. 

DR. G. STANLEY HALL, president of Clark University, delivered the 
address at the inauguration of Dr. George E. Myers, principal of the 
State Manual Training School at Pittsburg, Kansas. The subject of 
the address was " Educational Efficiency." 

PROFESSOR R. S. WOODWORTH, of Columbia University, is planning to 
spend a semester's leave of absence in visiting the psychological institutes 
of England and Germany. 

VOL. IX. No. 6. MARCH 14, 1912. 



rpHE attempt to determine the character and import of immedi- 
-L acy, as a concept in present-day thought, finds its most promis- 
ing point of departure in the philosophy of Kant. While it is true 
that the "back to Kant" movement has been in abeyance of late, the 
present time is peculiarly in need of reflection upon its borrowings 
from the Kantian philosophy, in so far as these relate to the issues 
involved in current controversy. The fundamental issue, in fact, be- 
tween objective idealism and its opponents may be conveniently cen- 
tered about the treatment which Kant accords to the concept of im- 
mediacy. According to recent critics of objective idealism, this con- 
cept is made to cover two divergent and incompatible meanings, a 
confusion which has been perpetuated by his followers down to the 
present day. 

Stated somewhat generally, the problem which Kant set himself 
to solve was to ascertain how the concepts of the understanding 
justify their claim to validity within experience. This problem was 
particularly acute, owing to the sharp separation postulated by Kant 
between sense and understanding. The categories of the understand- 
ing, as he says, "are not conditions under which objects can be 
given in intuition, and it is quite possible therefore that objects 
should appear to us without any necessary reference to the functions 
of the understanding." 1 "It can not be denied that phenomena 
may be given in intuition without the functions of the understand- 
ing." 2 "We could quite well imagine that phenomena might pos- 
sibly be such that the understanding should not find them conform- 
ing to the conditions of its synthetical unity, and all might be in such 
confusion that nothing should appear in the succession of phenomena 
which could supply a rule of synthesis, and correspond, for in- 
stance, to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would 

1 ' ' Critique of Pure Eeason, ' ' p. 74. All the references are to the transla- 
tion by Max Miiller. 
'Ibid., p. 75. 



thus be quite empty, null, and meaningless. With all this phenomena 
would offer objects to our intuition, because intuition by itself does 
not require the functions of thought."* 

From this standpoint immediacy is necessarily identified with the 
material of sense, considered without reference to the concepts of the 
understanding. Concerning this material of sense, considered by 
itself, there can be no question of truth or falsehood, such as arises 
at once when the concepts of the understanding come into play. 
This separation, however, of sense and understanding disappears as 
Kant proceeds. "Every representation," as he explains, "contains 
something manifold, which could not be represented as such, unless 
the mind distinguished the time in the succession of one impression 
after another; for as contained in one moment, each representation 
can never be anything but absolute unity. In order to change this 
manifold into a unity of intuition (as, for instance, in the representa- 
tion of space), it is necessary first to run through the manifold and 
then to hold it together." 4 "Connection, however, does never lie in 
the objects, and can not be borrowed from them by perception, and 
thus be taken into the understanding, but is always an act of the 
understanding, which itself is nothing but a faculty of connecting 
a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under 
the unity of apperception, which is, in fact, the highest principle of 
all human knowledge. ' >B 

Considerations of this kind evidently require a profound modifi- 
cation of the standpoint maintained by Hume. In the first place, 
we are led to a radically different conception of immediacy. The 
sense impressions which at the outset represented the sum total of 
immediate experience, are now placed under the ban as empty ab- 
stractions. "Perception without conception is blind." And, sec- 
ondly, we are required to postulate a process of synthesis, not as an 
experienced fact, but as a precondition of all experience. That is, 
this reconstruction of immediacy is bound up with a non-spatial and 
non-temporal fact. ' ' The mind could never conceive the identity of 
itself in the manifoldness of its representations (and this a priori) 
if it did not clearly perceive the identity of its action, by which it 
subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a 
transcendental unity." 6 While Kant does not set forth clearly the 
precise character either of this new immediacy or of this numerical 
identity pervading experience, the implication of both in his stand- 
point seems to be reasonably plain. 

1 Ibid., p. 75. 
4 Ibid., p. 82. 
Ibid., p. 747. 
Ibid., p. 89. 


Viewed as an argument, Kant's disquisition possesses an inherent 
weakness to which his critics have given due attention. The fallacy 
of assuming in the premises what is denied in the conclusion is so 
painfully evident that extended exposition is superfluous. If we 
assume, to start with, that experience consists, in the first instance, 
of relationless sensations, we are indeed obliged to infer a transcen- 
dental unity of apperception; but when we look back from the end 
of the argument to the beginning, we find that these relationless sen- 
sations are altogether fictitious. The transcendentalist who reasons 
in this fashion is simply sawing off the bough by which he is sup- 
ported. The final result does not stand forth as a demonstrated con- 
clusion, but as an unsubstantiated assertion. This being the case, 
the vitality of transcendentalism during the nineteenth century seems 
a fit subject for wonder. As has been indicated previously, the ex- 
planation seems to be found in the fact that the two conceptions of 
immediacy which Kant failed to keep apart have been persistently 
confused since his day ; and it is to this confusion that transcenden- 
talism owes its influence and prestige. 

In order to make clear the nature of this confusion, it is necessary 
to determine more precisely than is done by Kant the character of 
the immediacy which is involved in the critical philosophy. The 
repudiation of sensationalism, if it is to mean anything at all, must 
mean that a different conception of immediacy has come into play. 
One of the chief merits, indeed, of the "Critique of Pure Reason" 
is that it is a reductio ad dbsurdum of its own premises. The ques- 
tion which forms its starting-point is how thought can assert its 
authority over that which is immediately and independently ' ' given. ' ' 
The conclusion at which Kant arrives is that thought can claim 
authority because there is no such immediate "given" as the argu- 
ment presupposed. Instead of such immediacy, we have an imme- 
diacy of a totally different kind. If we turn to the situations in 
which the distinction between datum and meaning is present as an 
experienced fact, we find that the distinction occurs whenever there 
is a question for which an answer is sought. The "immediate" or 
the "given" in such cases is that part of the situation which is 
subjected to scrutiny; the meaning is that which is tentative or 
hypothetical or " present-as-absent. " The distinction is transitory 
and exists for the sake of a purpose or end; it is indicative of the 
fact that the situation in which it occurs is in process of reconstruc- 
tion. Which element in the situation is to function as datum is 
determined by the end to be attained. The point is that datum and 
meaning determine each other ; they are derivatives which, when held 
in abstraction from each other, give us sense and thought in the sense 
of historical dualism. 


This interpretation of immediacy, moreover, necessarily prede- 
termines the conception of ' ' reality ' ' and ' ' truth. ' ' Having escaped 
the incubus of the transcendental, we are enabled to say that the facts 
\vith which we become acquainted, so far from being appearances of 
a more ultimate "reality," are just what they are found to be and 
nothing else. Any experience, such as the recollection of last week's 
events, the reflection upon the characteristics of a geological epoch, 
or the visual perception, clear or confused, of physical objects, is 
just so much fact, and is hence a datum in any philosophy which has 
a proper understanding of its own aims and limitations. The ques- 
tion what it "really" is can not properly be asked, save with refer- 
ence to its "truth" or serviceableness in the guidance of expectation 
or other behavior. The "real," in short, is whatever we find; it is a 
domain which tolerates no hierarchy or privileged class. The 
"true," on the other hand, is that which leads or guides in the way 
that it promises to do, and hence it is subject to a test or criterion 
which the true idea itself determines or points out. 

A consistent interpretation of immediacy, then, compels us to 
discard the conventional distinction between "appearance" and 
"reality." According to the present contention, the fallacy of 
transcendentalism lies in the fact that sense data are first detached 
from their context by abstraction, and then reunited with it through 
the agency of transcendental factors. When sense data are thus 
detached, the "being" or "reality" of the facts with which we deal 
becomes a legitimate problem, since we are compelled to regard them 
as a combination of the non-temporal or transcendental with the tem- 
poral or particular. This combination makes our starting-point 
hopelessly opaque, as Bradley has shown in pitiless detail. But if, 
on the other hand, we give to immediacy a purely functional inter- 
pretation, we escape the opposition between experience and a finished 
reality which inheres in the idealistic position, in spite of its role as 
the self-appointed nemesis of dualism. This functional interpreta- 
tion construes the distinction between datum and meaning in terms 
of a change taking place in things, a change which has as its goal the 
guidance or control of adjustment. This procedure furnishes us 
with an entirely different starting-point. It means that all experi- 
ences are equally real, though not all are equally true or serviceable. 
That is to say, the "real" is not a question if we regard knowing as 
a change which occurs in things for the furtherance of certain ends, 
but becomes a problem only in so far as we oppose experience and 
its object, the latter being considered as a finished real passively 
waiting to be "known." 

It was indicated previously that Kant is at no particular pains 
to develop the implications of this new immediacy to which his argu- 


ment leads. The very argument which logically compels the infer- 
ence to a new immediacy apparently shuts off the light. Between the 
premises and the conclusion lies the machinery of the Kantian trans- 
cendentalism ; and neither Kant nor his successors seems to have real- 
ized adequately that the rejection of abstract sense impressions car- 
ries with it the rejection of the transcendental elements with which 
they are correlated. This retention of the transcendental elements 
compels both sense and thought to lead a double life. In so far as 
the conclusion of the Kantian deduction is emphasized, they are 
simply derivatives, their status and nature being determined by the 
function which they fulfil. But in so far as the bias of transcenden- 
talism prevails, they are original constituents or ingredients of the 
situation from which functional sense and thought proceed by deriva- 
tion. In other words, objective idealism shelters two fundamental 
and correlative ambiguities. It treats immediacy both in the sense 
of historical empiricism and in the sense of present-day functional- 
ism ; and it confuses thought as a function in the reorganization of a 
situation with thought as a transcendental or ''constitutive" element. 
Hence it results that the duality of sense and meaning is often re- 
garded as a "discrepancy," for which there is no remedy within the 
bounds of human experience. The thought of an object, instead of 
being treated simply as the "presence-in-absence" which is the indis- 
pensable correlate of the "presence" of sense material, is "a 'what' 
which so far as it is a mere idea clearly is not, and if it also were, 
could not be called ideal. For ideality lies in the disjoining of 
quality from being." 7 Meaning is "a content which has been made 
loose from its own immediate existence and is used in divorce from 
that first unity. ' ' 8 Here we have once more the separation of ' ' imme- 
diacy" from thought, and so the relation of the two forthwith pre- 
sents a formidable problem. The two can not be wholly disjoined, 
as the Kantian conclusion attests; hence the puzzling fact that "the 
essential nature of the finite is that everywhere as it presents itself 
its character should slide beyond the limits of its existence. ' ' 9 

It seems clear that this ambiguity in "immediacy," with its cor- 
relate ambiguity in "thought," is essential to the standpoint of 
objective idealism. If immediacy were consistently treated as abso- 
lute, the outcome would not be transcendentalism but sensationalism. 
Or if immediacy were consistently treated as relative, then again the 
outcome would not be transcendentalism but some form of function- 
alism. But, directly or indirectly, the two meanings of immediacy 
are used in alternation. Bosanquet, for example, states that "it 

T Bradley, ' ' Appearance and Eeality, ' ' p. 163. 
8 Ibid., p. 164. 
Ibid., p. 166. 


makes no essential difference whether the ideas whose content is pro- 
nounced to be an attribute of reality appear to fall within what is 
given in perception or not. We shall find hereafter that it is vain to 
attempt to lay down boundaries between the given and its extension. 
The moment we try to do this we are on the wrong track." 10 In 
other words, the distinction between the given and its extension can 
at best be only a relative and fluctuating distinction, depending upon 
the character of the given situation. To all intents and purposes, 
however, a hard-and-fast boundary line is drawn on the second page 
preceding the passage just quoted; and as might be expected, the 
line is run in accordance with the landmarks set up by the Kantian 
transcendentalism. "The ideas used in judging are not particular 
existences but general significations or objective references. No mere 
mental occurrences as such, no series or combination of particular 
images, can by any possibility be a judgment." The given and its 
extension apparently tend to fall apart and hence to necessitate a 
resort to the transcendental in order to unite them again. Thus the 
following quotation excludes ideas or meanings from presentations, 
on the ground that the idea is simply a "habit or tendency": "If 
therefore we are asked to display it [the idea] as an image, as some- 
thing fixed in a permanent outline, however pale or meager, we can 
not do so. It is not an abstract image, but a concrete habit or tend- 
ency. It can only be displayed in the judgment, that is, in a con- 
crete case of reference to reality. Apart from this it is a mere ab- 
straction of analysis, a tendency to operate in a certain way upon 
certain psychical presentations. Psychically speaking, it is when 
realized in judgment a process more or less systematic, extending 
through time and dealing with momentary presentations as its ma- 
terial. In other words, we may describe it as a selective rule, shown 
by its workings, but not consciously before the mind. ' '" 

A similar confusion is present, as I venture to think, in an excep- 
tionally subtle and interesting form, in Royce's "World and the 
Individual." The world as fact, we are told, must be subordinated 
to the world as idea. When we study the idea, we find that it in- 
cludes an internal meaning and an external meaning, the latter being 
"that attempted correspondence with outer facts which many ac- 
counts of our ideas regard as their primary, inexplicable, and ulti- 
mate character." 12 There is, however, no purely external criterion 
of truth ; hence it is futile to ' ' stand apart from the internal meaning, 
from the conscious inner purpose embodied in a given idea, and still 
attempt to estimate whether or no that idea corresponds with its 

""Logic," Vol. I., p. 77. 
""Essentials of Logic," p. 78. 
M Vol. I., p. 26. 


object. ' ' 13 The experienced inner meaning determines its own task, 
its own special form of ' ' correspondence. ' ' Hence we can define the 
external meaning as that experience which fulfils the internal mean- 
ing. "The fulfilment of the internal meaning of the present idea 
would leave no other object defined by this idea as an object yet to 
besought" 14 

This subordination of the world as fact to the world as idea has 
the immense advantage that it eliminates the problem how we are to 
copy or "apprehend" an "external world." The world as fact, in 
Royce's treatment, corresponds to the position which holds sense and 
thought in separation from each other. Its criterion of truth is 
external, whereas from the standpoint of the world as idea, the cri- 
terion becomes internal. To say that the meaningful experience 
determines its own form of correspondence is to deny the separation 
of sense and thought, or of "experience" and "object." The dis- 
tinction between the two becomes functional and relative, in the sense 
previously indicated. It does not occur save where there is a prob- 
lem to be solved, a task to be performed, a purpose to be accom- 
plished. "A color, when merely seen, is in so far, for consciousness, 
no idea. A brute noise, merely heard, is no idea. But a melody, 
when sung, a picture, when in its wholeness actively appreciated, or 
the inner memory of your friend now in your mind, is an idea. For 
each of these latter states means something to you at the instant 
when you get it present to consciousness. ' ' 15 

Up to this point the position under consideration is to all appear- 
ances in entire agreement with that of functional ism. How mean- 
ings can determine their own reference ceases to be a problem when 
meanings are interpreted as the " presence-in-absence " of their ob- 
jects. This agreement ends, however, when our human experience, 
in the hands of its idealistic inquisitor, signifies its willingness to be 
damned for the glory of the absolute. The immediacy which pre- 
supposes the object gives place to the immediacy which is divorced 
from its object. Our attention is first of all called to the fact that 
"our direct experience gives us only the passing data and the frag- 
mentary ideas of the moment. ' ' This direct experience is compared 
with "the range of valid possible experience," which "is viewed by 
me as infinitely more extended than my actual human experience. ' ' 19 
A valid possible experience, when known as such, is the experience of 
a fact which is present as absent. But according to Royce this 
validity is ambiguous. It covers both the validity which is tested 

"Vol. I., p. 308. 
"Vol. I., p. 339. 
14 Vol. I., p. 24. 
M Vol. I., p. 259. 


and that which is not. That is, validity is a name both for the 
experience in which the valid idea finds fulfilment and for the experi- 
ence in which a fact is presented simply as absent. 17 Considered 
simply as a matter of terminology, this might be allowed to pass, but 
the context shows that something further is intended. Only the 
direct or fulfilling experience, we find, can give us the definiteness 
which characterizes true being. Until the fulfilling experience super- 
venes, we have, so far forth, bare validity, mere universality. Hence 
the question : "What is a valid or a determinately possible experience 
at the moment when it is supposed to be merely possible ? ' U8 

To this question the appropriate answer is that it makes an 
assumption which is both incompatible with Royce's starting-point 
and untrue to fact. The import of the functional interpretation of 
immediacy is precisely that datum and meaning can not be separated 
from each other. It is hardly good logic to begin by making the 
meaning or "possibility" organic to the given experience, and then 
to detach it in order to condemn it as "bare validity" or "mere 
universality." Such a procedure implies the very opposition between 
sense and thought which constitutes the point of departure for Kant. 
This separation serves only to justify the appeal to a transcendental, 
which thereupon becomes at once the sole abiding place for all indi- 
vidual fact, since the latter necessarily remains for us "the object of 
love and of hope, of desire and of will, of faith and of work, but 
never of present finding. " 19 

It appears, then, that despite the originality of Royce's treat- 
ment, his procedure, from the angle of the present criticism, is essen- 
tially the same as that of his predecessors, save that he both starts 
and finishes with the functional point of view. The immediate and 
the mediate are held apart just long enough to justify the introduc- 
tion of the transcendental, in order to heal the breach which has 
thus been created. We have the same alternation between types of 
immediacy, the same triumphant ushering-in of the transcendental, 
and, finally, the same bland denial that any separation between the 
immediate and the mediate was ever made or intended. 

A proper reconsideration, then, of the concept of immediacy will 
show that the "higher standpoint" which Kant enabled us to reach 
is not that of objective idealism but of functionalism. The former 
owes its being and peculiar character to the very presuppositions 
which Kant is supposed to have destroyed once for all. When these 
presuppositions are set aside in fact and not merely in appear- 
ance, we rid ourselves of a troublesome element of vacillation and 

17 C/., especially, Vol. I., pp. 259-261. 
" Vol. I., p. 260. 
Vol. I., p. 297. 


mystery; and the problems which the absolute is invoked to explain 
find a solvent in our human experience. 

B. H. BODE. 



IN a previous paper in this JOURNAL/ I attempted to summarize 
the arguments against "natural" realism that doctrine which 
purports to crystallize the view of the "natural" man, that the very 
data of his visual and tactile experience are identical with, i. e., go to 
make up, the "things" in the midst of which he lives and moves. 
According to that view, the "green" that my experience includes 
when I look at a tree exists at the tree-point in the world-order, and 
is not a copy or an effect of what there exists. That is to say, "nat- 
ural" realism ignores the representative nature of perception, ignores 
the distinction between the stimulus of perception, the source from 
which (in the case of sight) ether- waves radiate, and the datum 
existing in experience after those waves have hit the eye, ignores, to 
say no more, the time-difference between the stimulus-fact and the 

Obvious as this representative nature of perception is, the tempta- 
tion to " epistemological monism" is so great that it is a satisfaction 
to read, in one of Professor Dewey's recent papers, 2 that "it is easily 
demonstrable that there is a numerical duplicity between the astro- 
nomical star and the visible light," that "the astronomical star is a 
real object . . . the visible light is another real object." Generalized, 
this is to say that there is a numerical duplicity (but not necessarily 
a difference in substance, as, physical vs. mental) between stimulus- 
fact and sensation-fact. With these words, as with much in Pro- 
fessor Dewey's characteristically brilliant paper, I find myself in 
joyous sympathy. Surely we can all agree that the qualia which 
exist in a man's experience, and which are to him, as he looks, a 
given star or tree, are not the same existences as the "astronomical 
star" or the botanical tree. Without asserting what the star and 
tree of physical science are or are not, at least this "visible light," 
this visible greenness, are numerically different existences, existing 
later in time, and largely dependent for their nature upon the char- 
acteristics of the perceiver's sense-organs and brain. 

Our thanks then to Professor Dewey! But there are certain 
other statements of his that seem to me questionable and so may serve 

1 Vol. VIII., page 365. 

. This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., page 395. 


as texts for the inqury that I suggested at the close of my previous 
paper and propose here to outline. He tells us that "contemporary 
realists have frequently and clearly expounded the physical explana- 
tion of such cases as have been cited" the converging railway 
tracks, the star, pressing the eyeball, etc. and is frankly vexed with 
the idealists for not accepting this explanation. 8 Now, personally, 
I am not an idealist. But if, as one would judge from the columns 
of this JOURNAL, the idealist is the under dog nowadays, let us be 
sure to do him full justice! It seems to me, for one, that he has a 
simple and consistent account to give of these cases, and therefore, 
even when an adequate realistic account is offered him, need not neces- 
sarily bite at the bait; and, moreover, that the accounts which the 
neo-realists have been offering him of such cases are for the most part 
so far from adequate that he is thoroughly justified in considering 
them still as cases that make for his view. Surely, if he is careful 
in his phraseology (but the realist must remember that in this matter 
the idealist is at a disadvantage, the practical language of every day 
being hopelessly realistic, and the expression of the facts in consist- 
ently idealistic language a clumsy and confusing matter) he does not 
commit the fallacy which Professor Dewey ascribes to him. He does 
not begin, for instance, with a single realistic object, and then, on 
pushing the eyeball, decide that "there ain't no such animal." He 
simply finds that on a realistic basis such an experience is difficult 
to explain, whereas it is very simply statable on an idealistic basis, 
as: when a single-object experience is followed by a pushing-the- 
eyeball experience, there is thereupon a double-object experience. 
Of course some idealists, especially the earlier ones, have put their 
arguments in ways that justly provoke criticism. But the under- 
lying meaning of these arguments remains a sharp challenge to 

The point is, that all these cases can easily be described in terms 
of actual and potential sensations, while a description in terms of 
objects leads to grave difficulties. Suppose, for example, the realist 
is looking at a tree. The idealist would have said that he was having 
a tree-experience; but the realist says that this tree-that-he-sees is 
a physical tree, outside of him. He then shakes his eyeball. The 
tree-that-he-sees moves. But is it conceivable that a physical tree 
outside of him moves when he shakes his eyeball? So long as that 
green datum was still it was easy to think of it as a physical tree 
"out there." When it moves, it is no longer easy so to think of it. 
No wonder the idealist loves such cases ! Especially since early real- 
ism was of this ' ' natural ' ' type. But now, if the realist retracts his 
naive belief, and admits, with Professor Dewey and the present 

Ibid., page 395. 


writer and probably most contemporary realists, that the tree-datum- 
that-exists-within-his-experience (the moving-tree-datum let us call 
it existence B) is an effect of but not identical with the tree-from- 
which-ether-waves-radiate (existence A), this difficulty is solved, but 
another arises. The coast is by no means yet clear for the realist. 
"Frequent and clear" explanations of the situation may exist in 
contemporary realistic writing, but where, oh, where are they to be 
found ! The crux of the difficulty is this : where in the world of the 
realist does B exist? Must we not admit that unless the realist can 
give a thoroughgoing answer to this question, the idealist still has 
rather the better of the argument? 

That there is a satisfactory answer to this question, and that a 
complete realistic explanation of the situation in perception is pos- 
sible, I do not doubt. Several attempts at answering it have been 
made, but they are not free from objections and have generally been 
rejected by realists. It seems actually to be the case that the average 
realist refuses to recognize the need of explanation. When he has 
declared that perception is a "perfectly natural event," and has 
shown that a camera likewise produces an image which is an effect 
and representative of an outer object, he seems to think he has solved 
the problem. But the fact is, he has not touched it. There are more 
existences to account for in the perception case than in the camera 
case. The organism is indeed like a camera. There is produced in 
the brain through the eyes a physical perception-event (call it 
existence C} which varies concomitantly with the object looked at, 
and may therefore be called not only an effect, but in some sense a 
representative of that object the more legitimately, as it actually 
serves as a clue for the guiding of the organism in its dealings with 
it. But does the realist think that this brain-event, C, is the green- 
moving-datum, B? If not, where does this latter existence, the 
surest of all existences, have its habitation ? Where are we to put it 
in our physical scheme? If we have no place for it, how can we 
think we have given a clear explanation of the facts of perception? 

We are not allowed to say that it exists in the mind. The very 
idea that we have minds seems to be repugnant to the neo-realist. 
And indeed, if such a statement were made as an explanation of the 
difficulty, it would be but a verbal one. Calling the fact B mental, 
solves no problem. We have still to ask how it is related to the 
other existences, A and C. Here is a well-known physical chain of 
events, from A, through ether-waves, eyes, and nerve-waves, to C, 
and then out again into some muscular reaction. But nowhere in 
this chain cf events do we find B. The physical order seems com- 
plete and self-sufficing without it. There is no room for it. In- 
stinctively we identify B with A. It is the tree, what we see of the 


tree. But if my previous article holds, if Professor Dewey's state- 
ment holds, that "there is a numerical duplicity between the astro- 
nomical star and the visible light," between, in this case, the botan- 
ical tree and the visible green-moving fact (for the only difference 
between the two cases is that the time-difference between A and B is 
more striking in the former case), that refuge is definitely barred 
out. B exists at a later moment than A. A may have been annihi- 
lated in the meanwhile and may not be existing when B exists. 
B does exist simultaneously (or at least nearly simultaneously) with 
C; that is all that we seem to know about the relation of B to the 
A-C chain of events, except that B, like C, seems to be, in some sort, 
a representative of A, since it is the sign in our experience of our 
dealings with A. Are we to be left then with our J5's simply hang- 
ing on to our C"s, without any real footing in the world, with a time 
of existence but no place? If we call them mental, we have the 
well-known " psychophysical parallelism" between our #'s and C's. 
This is certainly a mysterious relation; mental B's clinging like 
barnacles at certain spots in the physical universe, but not really 
being there. If we call them physical, we have an equally mysterious 
physicophysical parallelism, a second set of physical realities exist- 
ing at the moment of our C's, but still with no place found for them. 
Truly, they are adrift in the deep ! 

One reason for not calling our B's mental lies perhaps in the 
dualistic implications of that word. The neo-realist is convinced 
(one wonders if it be not sometimes an a priori conviction rather 
than a humble generalization from experience!) that there are not 
two substances, mind and matter. Therefore we must call every- 
thing "physical"; or, at least, "natural" "mental" being thus 
made equivalent to "supernatural"! Professor Dewey likewise 
waxes satirical over the habit of calling such B's as the visible con- 
vergence of railway tracks, or the vsible light of a star, mental. 
"Is a photograph, then, to be conceived as a psychical somewhat?" 4 
But in the case of a camera (apart from perception by an observer) 
there is no B; there is only a chain of events loosely similar to the 
A-C chain of object-to-brain events. There is but one event at the 
moment when the photograph is taken, not two ; a certain molecular 
change in the plate, corresponding to C, the molecular change in the 
brain, or to an earlier event in the A-C chain, the molecular change 
in the eye. There is no datum-within-experience, no B, existing at 
that moment, as there is in the case of perception. There is no mys- 
terious parallelism, no problem, nothing that there is any temptation 
to call mental. 

Personally, I disbelieve in the dualistic theory, and should be 

Ibid., page 393. 


quite willing to give up the word "mental" altogether. But I can 
not see why it should be such a red rag to a realist. Let us agree 
that any dualistic implications are illegitimate in advance of the 
establishment of a dualistic theory, and let us use the word in a 
merely denotative sense, to include our .B's, and such other facts as 
dreams, wishes, pleasure, sorrow, and the like, for which there is 
likewise no known place available in the physical world. We shall 
still find the word a useful generic term for these numerous, impor- 
tant, and indisputably real facts. It is, at any rate, the commonly 
accepted name for these facts. No doubt, the natural man looks 
upon these same B 's as the actual things among which he moves, *. e., 
as if they were the A 's which cause them, and at such times he calls 
them not mental, but physical. But as soon as you show him the 
impossibility of that "natural" realism, he hastens to call his per- 
ception-datum mental, the green-moving-datum, e. g., a mental image 
of the really outer tree. It may still be that this fact, B, belongs to 
the same world as A and C, that it is as "natural" an event as the 
photographic image of a scene or the echo of a sound. Nevertheless, 
why disdain the common name for it? I hear a partial repetition 
of a sound. Why jump to the conclusion that it is an echo? The 
only answer is, that is what we call it. Why jump to the conclusion 
that these particular events we have specified are "mental"? The 
only answer is, again, that such is the common generic name for them. 

It is presumably true that "the seen light is an event" "stand- 
ing in a process continuous with the star. ' ' Though, as to that, if it 
can not be located anywhere in particular, and if it has no discover- 
able relations of energy with any part of the physical chain of events 
proceeding from the star, it is difficult to see how knowledge can 
have "supervened" that it does stand in such a continuous process. 
And, moreover, even granting that it is a link in the process some- 
where, is it safe to assert that ' ' since the seen light is an event within 
a continuous process, there is no point of view from which its 'reality' 
contrasts with that of the star"? 5 Certainly the reason why the 
writer has, at times, spoken of the "real" star, contrasting that 
existence with the "perception of the star," has had nothing to do 
with any denial of the place of the latter in a continuous process. 
The ' ' real ' ' star is the star that astronomy describes, the star that is 
moving at so many miles a second through space. The "real" tree 
is the tree the botanist describes, the tree that we point to and walk 
round. These existences, the A 's, have their definite and well-known 
place in the world order. The B 's, the data of our experience, are 
none the less real, but they are less really the star and the tree ; they 
are effects in our consciousness (or on our organisms, if you choose, 

'Ibid., page 395. 


and are prepared to show where in the organism), representative to 
us of star and tree, but distinct existences. The visible light, the B 
of which the "real" star is the A, figures to us as the star when our 
attention is upon that visual experience. But it is not flying through 
space at so many miles a second; it is not composed of billions of 
whirling atoms, etc., etc. So, not to speak of the ambiguous status 
of these 2?'s in the world, there is as much reason for speaking of 
the A's as the "real" things as there would be in discriminating 
between the "real" landscape and the picture of the landscape on 
a camera-plate. The latter is real enough, but it is not the real 

We have then our J.'s, the "real things," and we have our C's, 
the brain-perception-events which are effects and in some sense repre- 
sentatives of them, and our U's, the data of conscious perception, 
which exist synchronously (or at least nearly so) with our C's. 
According to what we proceed to do with our B 's will be our type of 
realism. The "natural" realist identifies them, per impossibile, with 
the .4's. The atomistic realist crams them all into one monad or 
arch-atom which is located somewhere, but no one can say where, in 
the brain. The dualistic realist asserts that they get into the causal 
chain in the midst of the C's, but gives them no place in the three- 
dimensioned world; they somehow get their fingers in the brain-pie 
without really being there. Another type of realist puts them 
frankly in the brain, in between or hanging on to the C's. One 
variety of this type of theory is that of Professor Montague, which 
puts the B's wherever we speak of "latent energy" in the brain. 
And finally, though not of course exhausting all contemporary the- 
ories, the panpsychic realist (who has a better name for him?) iden- 
tifies the B's with the C's, asserts that if we knew enough about what 
we call brain events we should discover that they really are con- 
scious events. 

This last theory is that of the present writer. Space forbids its 
defense at this time. But the object of this paper will have been 
attained if it sets any one thinking of the problem a little more 
sharply than before; if it helps any one to realize that there is a 
problem here. If we are to be realists, as we seem determined to be, 
let us think our realism through. Let us not think that by calling 
perception a "natural" or a "physical" process we have solved the 
very real and difficult problem of perception, or have won the right 
to jeer at idealists for clinging to their account of the matter. 





T WISH to offer a rather belated reply to Mrs. C. L. Franklin's 
J- article on "The Foundations of Philosophy: Explicit Primi- 
tives." 1 I am aware of the danger of crossing words with Mrs. 
Franklin in the supposedly special field of symbolic logic, but I am 
nevertheless moved to suggest, in response to her demand for explicit 
primitives, that a primitive is an illusion and an explicit primitive 
a contradiction in terms. 

Briefly, my position would be that when a term has been made 
explicit, it is then a party to a comparison and is thus involved in a 
relation to another term. Since each term now depends upon the 
other for its definition, neither can claim priority, much less primi- 
tiveness. The locomotive may precede the train and pull the train, 
but if there is no train to pull there is no locomotive. At least, in 
that case, the locomotive would call for a new definition in terms of 
its relation to some other things. But if there were no other things, 
the locomotive would have no character whatever. And therefore 
I say that the very notion of a primitive is an illusion. 

This is logical commonplace. So much so, however, that I am 
at a loss to account for the idea of a logical primitive, or even of a 
logical prior, except as a confusion between a logical relation and a 
certain familiar mechanical relation, which our logic has inherited 
from Aristotle and which owes its continued support to its plausi- 
bility for unthinking common sense. Mrs. Franklin suggests the 
point in the "Foundations of Philosophy." Now, as we all know, 
a house must rest upon a foundation, and when the foundation is 
removed the house falls ; that is to say, the foundation is a prior con- 
dition to the superstructure. But to assume that knowledge must 
be thus "founded" is to imitate those of the ancients who affirmed 
the impossibility of the antipodes. For our human structures, in- 
deed, the ultimately universal foundation is the earth. The earth is 
therefore a universal ultimate, or ' ' primitive. ' ' But a primitive in 
knowledge marks only the point where knowledge ends. To make 
it a "foundation" of knowledge is then to found knowledge upon 

Mrs. Franklin appeals for authority to the logic of mathematics. 
Now, according to tradition at least, mathematical method consists 
in laying down a primitive an axiom or postulate, or what not, 
which by definition is made an explicit primitive and then in de- 

1 This JOURNAL, Vol. VHI., page 708. 


riving its consequences; and when the primitive is laid down, the 
consequences are supposed to be not yet in sight. Otherwise there 
would be danger of a "circle." But we know that the manuscript 
of a mathematical work is usually completed before the first pages 
go to press; hence, the mathematician knows whither his primitives 
are to lead if the reader does not. The comparison will seem irrev- 
erent, but I can not avoid saying that the usual process of mathe- 
matical deduction reminds me of nothing so much as the magician 
who appears before his audience in a tightly fitting dress-suit and 
then from a roll of tape held between his thumb and forefinger 
extracts, among a number of other things, two jars of goldfish and 
a live goose. One may test the justice of the comparison by ob- 
serving the operation whereby even so critical a mind as Poincare 2 
derives a whole number-system from such ostensibly innocent primi- 
tives as x -\- a and x -f- 1 (the latter of which consists in adding a 
number 1 to a number x). To the uninitiated it would seem that, 
while the magician mystifies only his audience, the mathematician 
mystifies also himself. 

In the mechanical world, as conceived by common sense, the 
foundation supports the superstructure, but the superstructure adds 
no strength to the foundation. In the world of knowledge, I should 
say, the first principles are just as much supported by the deriva- 
tions as the latter by the former. Take a mathematical axiom and 
ask what it means ; it means just as much as may be derived from it, 
and no more. How far is it true ? It is true just as far as it yields 
a coherent system of consequences. That is to say, in a system of 
thought no feature is necessarily prior to any other. Priority is 
here a matter only of convenience of derivation, as determined by 
the point of view to which the argument appeals; or it may be a 
matter only of the paging of the book. Because, however, a book 
must have a page-order, and a discourse a beginning and end in time, 
it does not follow that there must be an order of precedence in the 
ideas. Again, take a witness supposed to be absolutely truthful, so 
that the truth of what he is to testify will only depend upon his 
veracity; make this supposition as absolute as you please, you can 
never make it so absolute that his veracity will be unaffected by the 
nature of the testimony which he is to give. It is just as absurd to 
speak of a science as being, in Mrs. Franklin's phrase, "at the begin- 
ning of things." Where is the beginning of things? If you locate 
it in the principles of physics, or of mechanics, or even of pure mathe- 
matics, I may reply that these "fundamental" principles depend for 
their final justification just as much upon their working out in 

"Science and Hypothesis," Chapter I. 


biology, or upon what we decide about the freedom of the will, as 

Mrs. Franklin points out that a failure to make your primitives 
explicit is apt to result in a ' ' circle in definition. ' ' But for my own 
part, although I stand for "straight thinking," and although I 
should be at a loss to invent a circular system of logic as a substitute 
for the rectilinear system of Aristotle, I find it difficult to see that 
the circle is not a better figure for thinking than the straight line. 
At least I should say that the test of a finally transparent idea is the 
ability to argue from & to a as readily as from a to &. To say that 
circular thinking leaves you just where you were seems to me not 
quite true this seems to refer to circular walking. In the first 
chapter of "Pendennis" I find the Major reading his mail. "But," 
you say, ' ' who is the Major ? Let us first define our ternm. " " Well, 
the Major is Arthur's uncle." "But who is Arthur?" "Why, he 
is the Major's nephew." This seems very inane, and yet I beg you 
to note that we are not as free to define the Major in any way we 
please as we were before, and the question remains whether the 
paucity of the result is not due solely to the smallness of the circle. 
Can we deny that the whole course of the novel, by virtue of which 
alone we are enabled to say quite definitely who, after all, the Major 
was, is anything more than an extension of just this circular process ? 
And can we then point to any absolute difference, especially to any 
"abstractly logical" difference, between the plot of a novel and a 
mathematical system, or a really organized natural science? Mrs. 
Franklin cites, as an illustration of the vice, Clerk-Maxwell's defini- 
tions of matter as ' ' that which may have energy communicated to it, ' ' 
and of energy as "that which passes from matter to matter." But 
it is hardly true that these definitions are altogether futile ; at least 
one learns that energy is communicable and, by implication, that 
matter is not. Mrs. Franklin seems to hold that a definition must 
settle the character of its object once for all, that is, must be finally 
explicit, if it is to do any defining whatever. Hence it is, no doubt, 
that in a "sound epistemology" consciousness must be "the first 
great indefinable. ' ' But in a world where everything is involved in 
everything else, nothing can be defined once for all ; and if conscious- 
ness is wholly indefinable, we shall be compelled, not to stop talking, 
perhaps, but at least to stop thinking about it. 

As a matter of fact, however, any actual process of thinking is 
far more circular than rectilinear, and I am unable to see how it 
could or ought to be otherwise. Suppose that one is writing a book. 
On the rectilinear theory, the first chapter should be written first 
and once for all, and in writing this chapter the author ought him- 
self to be as nai've with regard to the outcome in later chapters as he 


may, perhaps, suppose his reader to be. In other words, the later 
parts of the argument or the story should only depend upon the 
earlier. But of course this is never the case. Indeed, it is notorious 
that the first chapter is the hardest of all to write, and probably the 
chapter which is to undergo the greatest amount of revision; first, 
because the ideas can never be so clear as they will be after writing 
the whole, and secondly, because of the extreme difficulty of making 
any part of an argument clear to a reader who is not more or less 
familiar with the whole. Hence, though we begin with the first, after 
each new chapter we return and revise and we never cease revising, 
here, there, and everywhere, until, to our view, there is a mutual 
harmony of all. And upon this mutuality of dependence the argu- 
ment is finally "founded." 

Mrs. Franklin tells us that "Nothing must be admitted ... in 
the way of terms ... or propositions . . . except upon rigid inspection 
and fully aboveboard. ' ' I find it difficult to characterize this advice 
appropriately and yet with proper courtesy. For it reminds me 
both of my own first philosophical paper and of the attitude of many 
of my students, especially of those who are trained in mathematics, 
just when they begin to think about philosophy at all. The trouble 
with philosophy is, they tell me, that it fails to define its terms. The 
answer is obvious. Popular opinion to the contrary, students of 
philosophy are, at least, not less conscientious in their thinking and 
their expressions than other persons. Nor are they less disposed to 
recognize the practical wisdom of "Be sure you are right and then 
go ahead." But had this been their fixed rule, there would be no 
philosophy. For, in the end, the trouble is not with the definitions 
but with the ideas. If we could make the ideas clear, we could easily 
define them; or, rather, the clarification and the definition would be 
one and the same thing. But the clarification of the ideas is just the 
beginning and the end of what philosophy has to do. 

Having said something similar to this in a paper published sev- 
eral years ago, I was accused, rather, I was offered the right hand 
of fellowship and a certificate of good standing in the school of 
pragmatism. I have been unable to accept this generous, though 
embarrassing, invitation, but I will not say that the doctrine is not 
pragmatism, because I do not know what pragmatism would exclude. 
My belief is, however, that the foregoing criticism of the conception 
of primitives should belong in any view which makes coherence the 
test of truth. 





Charles Darwin and the Origin of Species: Addresses, etc., in America 

and England in the Year of the Two Anniversaries. EDWARD BAGNALL 

POULTON. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1909. 

The year 1909 was at once the centenary of the birth of Charles Dar- 
win and the fiftieth anniversary of the appearance of his greatest work. 
The occasion was fittingly commemorated by scientific meetings and ad- 
dresses in all parts of the world. Professor Poulton, as a leading ex- 
ponent of the Darwinism of twenty years ago, and an active investigator 
of certain diflicult evolutionary problems, was inevitably an important 
contributor to some of these programs, both in England and in America. 
Considering the circumstances of its preparation, it is no damaging 
criticism of the present volume to say that it contains little that is new, 
and little, indeed, that the author has not himself already told us. 1 

To the reviewer, the most interesting pages of the book relate to Dar- 
win's personality and to his frame of mind in dealing with various scien- 
tific problems. In this regard, he will ever remain as an ideal to succes- 
sive generations of younger investigators, whatever may become of his 
special hypotheses in the field of biology. A number of hitherto unpub- 
lished letters are introduced by Poulton, which serve to confirm the im- 
pressions which the world has already formed of the great naturalist's 
modesty and his boundless sympathy with the work of others. 

In recent years, along with the growing mass of legitimate criticism 
of certain of Darwin's theories, there has sometimes been displayed a 
tendency to belittle his scientific attainments, even to the point of charg- 
ing him with superficiality and a proneness to forming unwarranted con- 
clusions. Indeed, it does not appear diflicult to select passages from 
Darwin's writings in support of this view. Such charges reveal, how- 
ever, an unfortunate lack of historical perspective. To begin with, Dar- 
win was a naturalist a thing almost impossible at the present time and 
the data for his speculations were drawn from every branch of biology, 
as well as from geology, geography, and other sciences. This, indeed, was 
inevitable for the man who should establish the theory of organic evolu- 
tion. To the present-day specialist, who must concentrate his activities 
upon a very few organisms viewed in a very few relations, the work of 
all the great pioneers in his science must, in a sense, seem superficial. 
The latter were forced to admit much evidence provisionally, which the 
twentieth century experimentalist would very properly reject as inade- 
quate. Thus alone could the broad outlines of the science be sketched. It 
is in no way to the discredit of these great pioneers that some of their 
outlines were later erased in the light of more exact knowledge. 

Poulton is at considerable pains to refute that much hackneyed bit of 
moralizing over the blighting effect of a scientific career upon the esthetic 
faculties. As is well known, Darwin's own autobiography affords a much- 

*" Essays on Evolution, 1889-1907," reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., 
page 185. 


quoted text in support of this thesis. But Poulton dwells upon the 
wretched health endured by Darwin throughout nearly the whole of his 
active life, and points out that this concentration upon his scientific pur- 
suits was, in his case, a condition essential to the accomplishment of his 
work. Darwin's experience so often held up to us as a dreadful warning 
thus seems to afford no evidence for the mutual exclusiveness of scien- 
tific and esthetic development in the same mind. The author cites his 
own wide acquaintance with scientific men in support of the contrary view, 
and it is likely that most readers will draw similar evidence from their 
own experience. 

Much of the volume at hand is devoted to Poulton's own speculations 
in explanation of the colors of certain butterflies and an elaboration of 
the theories of " mimicry," originally framed by H. W. Bates and Fritz 
Miiller. From the standpoint of organic evolution, these cases undoubt- 
edly raise some very difficult problems, and Darwin himself thought them 
worthy of considerable attention. To Poulton they become the central 
theme in his view of nature, and the various hypothetical types of 
" mimicry " and protective coloration each designated with a rather un- 
wieldy name are discussed as fundamental realities, regardless of the 
very slender thread of experimental evidence on which they depend. It is 
true that he concedes the "paramount need for experimental research 
and field observations . . . [which] should be undertaken on the largest 
possible scale " (p. 191). But for him, the case seems to be pretty con- 
clusively settled without recourse to such experiments, and he later quali- 
fies his demand for investigations of this sort with the assurance that 
" while human performance is of the deepest interest for the solution of 
mysteries innumerable, of more profound significance still, for the com- 
prehension of the method of evolution, is the vast performance of nature 
herself " (p. 201). True, but it is that very performance itself the method 
of which is here in question. Nature is not yet such an open book that 
he who runs may read. 

Poulton believes that " the Mullerian hypothesis appears to explain a 
series of remarkable relationships which remain coincidences under any 
other hypothesis " (p. 191). On the other hand, Punnett 1 has pointed out 
the existence of some evidence that, in one alleged case of " mimicry " at 
least, the coloration of two " mimetic " forms, belonging to a single 
species (supposed to be modeled after two distinct species, belonging to a 
different family) behave to one another as Mendelian alternatives. " On 
this view," according to Punnett, " the genera Amauris and Euralia 
[the " mimicked " and the " mimicking," respectively] contain a similar 
set of pattern factors, and the conditions, whatever they may be, which 
bring about mutation in the former lead to the production of a similar 
mutation in the latter." The fact that among domesticated rodents (rats, 
mice, guinea-pigs and rabbits) not only the same colors, but some of the 
same general types of color pattern, have arisen independently argues for 
the possibility of such an origin of "mimetic" resemblances in insects. 
This view, like its alternative, is at present wholly unproven, and a final 

' " Mendelism, " pp. 144 et seq. 


decision of the question is probably still remote, but the Mendelian-Muta- 
tion explanation certainly relieves us of the truly terrible strain imposed 
upon our imagination by the classical " mimicry " hypotheses, as elabo- 
rated by such writers as Poulton. 

As regards Mendel's Law, our author has plainly shifted his point of 
view somewhat since the time when he could refer airily to " Mendel's 
interesting discovery." He now thinks that known facts " are enough to 
stamp Mendel's discovery as among the greatest in the history of the 
biological sciences" (p. 278). 

Poulton appears to feel keenly the contemptuous attitude of many of 
his younger colleagues toward the real founders of the theory of evolu- 
tion, and deprecates severely the gregarious tendency of the great body 
of minor workers, who rush to fall in line with every procession which 
seems to be marching behind a promising leader. I can not refrain from 
quoting some of the strong words with which our writer seeks to relieve 
his feelings : " In these later years the multitudes seem, for the moment 
at least, to recognize a prophet in every reed shaken with the wind. It 
would be interesting to know the number of forgotten works, of works 
soon to be forgotten, of works dead before they were born, which have 
been proclaimed as ' the most important contribution to biological 
thought since the appearance of the Origin of Species.' I would that the 
multitudes were not mere followers of the fleeting fashions of a day, but 
that they were right in their intuitions: I would that Newtons and Dar- 
wins might arise in every generation. I can not admit that the inability 
to see them on every side is merely the natural consequence of a cynical 
and pessimistic spirit" (p. ix). Which one of us has not been in just 
that mood? 


Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Experience. RADOSLAV A. 

TSANOFF. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co. Cornell Studies in 

Philosophy, No. 9. 1911. Pp. xiii -f- 77. 

The purpose of the author of this monograph was " to analyze closely " 
the three phases of Kant's philosophy which Schopenhauer regarded as 
most significant, viz., that philosophy must (1) "recognize the purely 
phenomenal character of knowledge," (2) " realize the primacy of will 
over reason," and (3) " be kept distinct from theology," and then " to 
inquire into their consistency and philosophical significance, as well as 
to determine as nearly as possible their historical value as interpretations 
of Kant's philosophy." The " inherent incompatibility of the two sys- 
tems " receives the emphasis rather than " the psychological aspects of 
the problem." A brief discussion of the literature in English, German, 
and French shows the need for such a work as this. 

The four chapters which constitute the body of the book have the 
following titles, indicating the nature and scope of the discussion: (1) 
" The Nature and Genesis of Experience : Perception and Conception" ; 
(2) " The Principles of Organization in Experience : The Deduction and 


the Real Significance of the Categories"; (3) "The Scope and Limits of 
Experience: Transcendental Dialectic"; (4) "Experience and Reality: 
The Will as the Thing-in-itself." The author's method in treating these 
topics is to present Schopenhauer's exposition and criticism of Kant with 
reference to each, and then by quotations from Kant and his own inter- 
pretation to show wherein Schopenhauer erred, or was correct. Not in- 
frequently, too, he introduces pertinent material from writers who were 
contemporary or nearly so, and also makes comparison with recent views 
which are the outgrowth of the Kantian movement or had a comparatively 
independent development. The author's own position seems to be " instru- 
mental " and " organic." 

Schopenhauer accepted the doctrine of Kant's " Esthetic " " unre- 
servedly," and then made a " clear-cut distinction between Verstand and 
Vernunft." His distinction, however, is not the same as that Kant 
himself made, and this initial error vitally affected Schopenhauer's further 
treatment of Kant. It is true that Kant was not always precise in the 
use of these terms, but his " confusion is the confusion of depths not yet 
clarified," while " Schopenhauer's lucidity manifests epistemological 

" The radical fault which Schopenhauer finds with Kant's deduction of 
the categories," Tsanoff maintains, " is its abstract character. . . . This 
protest against Kant's abstract formalism is most just; but his own 
theory of judgment incapacitates him at the very start from indicating 
the fundamental error." Tsanoff states Schopenhauer's " theory of judg- 
ment " briefly, compares it with Kant's, and then takes up the categories 
in their respective groups. In each case, Schopenhauer's interpretation 
and criticism are given, together with what seems to the author to be the 
proper evaluation. The "schematism" is treated briefly, since Schopen- 
hauer was inclined to dispense with it altogether, along with all the cate- 
gories save " causality," upon the basis of his own distinction between 
perception and conception. Tsanoff, too, thinks the " schematism " un- 
necessary, but for a different reason. " A correct diagnosis," he says, 
"would locate the trouble in Kant's departing from his own ideal of the 
organization of experience from within and attempting to explain that 
organization, as it were, ab extra. The deduction of the categories, there- 
fore, should be reinterpreted in the true Kantian spirit, its abstract 
formalism eliminated, and the immanent character of the organizing 
principles of experience clearly emphasized. This would obviate the 
difficulty by showing the irrelevancy and the needlessness of any schemata." 

In connection with the " Dialectic," Tsanoff admits that Schopenhauer 
was right in maintaining " that Kant's use of the term ' idea ' is essen- 
tially different from Plato's," but he also points out that Schopenhauer's 
use of the same term was not " true to the spirit of the original Platonic 
doctrine." The origin of these " ideas," as Kant used the term, is indi- 
cated, and each is discussed in turn, both from Schopenhauer's and from 
Kant's point of view. Incidentally, Schopenhauer's interpretation of 
matter is presented, and the propriety of identifying it with substance 
denied. Without dwelling upon the discussion of the mechanical and 


teleological categories involved in the antinomies, Tsanoff's conclusions 
may be stated. " In spite of essential differences in standpoint," he says, 
" which have been at least sufficiently accentuated in the above comparison 
of their treatment of the teleological principles, Kant and Schopenhauer 
make the same fundamental mistake. Neither fully realized the essen- 
tially instrumental character of all categories. Each and every category 
considers experience, all of it, from its own point of view. Experience is 
one, and the categories are its categories, the points of view from which 
it may profitably be regarded; no one of them can exhaust its meaning, 
nor can any truly significant category find its own meaning exhausted in 
any one part of experience, for the simple reason that experience is organic 
and is therefore not divisible into discrete parts." This, also, clearly 
indicates the author's point of view. 

In his interpretation of the " thing-in-itself " as will, Schopenhauer 
made what he regarded " as his own great contribution to philosophical 
thought." At this point, " Schopenhauer's philosophy joins on to the 
Kantian, or rather springs from it as from its parent stem." " By ' will ' 
Schopenhauer does not mean 'merely willing and purposing in the nar- 
rowest sense, but also all striving, wishing, shunning, hoping, fearing, 
loving, hating, in short, all that directly constitutes our weal and woe, 
desire and aversion.' " Now while this " will " may have qualities abso- 
lutely unknowable to us, " it is by no means an unknown quantity, . . . 
but is fully and immediately comprehended, and is so familiar to us that 
we know and understand what will is far better than anything else." 
Consequently, although " on Kant's basis " Schopenhauer thinks that 
" metaphysics is impossible," he feels that he himself has ground for 
" asserting the possibility of an immanent metaphysics, a metaphysics of 
experience." This view Tsanoff rejects, because Schopenhauer " seeks his 
ultimate reality ... in some one sort of experience. . . . The spirit of 
Schopenhauer's theory of reality " is that " to learn metaphysics, we must 
unlearn science." 

In conclusion, Tsanoff suggests " that Schopenhauer is not the true 
successor of Kant. Instead of being a neo-rationalist, as Kant, on the 
whole, remained, he is fundamentally an irrationalist, so far as his atti- 
tude towards ultimate reality is concerned. He also insists that the 
" world as idea and world as will are at least as incompatible philosophic- 
ally as Kant's two worlds of phenomena and noumena. Schopenhauer 
failed to profit by his own criticism of Kant. . . . Experience must be 
interpreted in terms of its own self -organizing totality. In the solution 
of its problems we can ignore no one of its elements or aspects. Cogni- 
tion is an essential aspect of experience, but cognition is not all; this is 
the lesson to be learned from the ' Critique of Pure Reason,' and espe- 
cially from the 'Dialectic.' The same is true of will. . . . Schopen- 
hauer's philosophy . . . represents an endless conflict. . . . His every 
problem is stated in the form of a dilemma. . . . He never fully com- 
prehended the immanent unity of experience. . . . This is the funda- 
mental defect of his philosophical system, which makes him incapable of 


grasping the real problems of Kant's philosophy, and of indicating a 
consistent method for their solution." 

The work, as a whole, is a thorough, scholarly treatment of a particular 
problem, and is based upon an independent handling of the sources. It 
should prove very serviceable for an enlarged knowledge of Kant and of 


La Nouvelle Psychologic Animale. GEORGES BOHN. Paris: Alcan. 1911. 

Pp. ii -f- 200. 

American students of animal behavior hare come to look upon the 
work of Dr. Bohn with a certain suspicion. Yerkes 1 thought his earlier 
papers " not thoroughly satisfactory scientifically, for they continually 
suggest questions, doubts, and new problems," and Jennings, reviewing 
" La Naissance de 1'Intelligence," * finds that Bohn does not stand " the 
test as to accuracy and trustworthiness of his scientific results in difficult 
fields . . . and that such confusion, inaccuracy, and misstatement of fact 
are almost or quite sufficient to remove the book from the field of science." 
An American reviewer is likely, therefore, to approach this new work of 
Dr. Bohn, which is " the continuation and complement of ' La Naissance 
de 1'Intelligence,' " with misgivings. The pudding is hardly better than 
the anticipation for " La Nouvelle Psychologic Animale," though a brief 
and clear statement of the author's views bears evidence of bias in favor 
of a theory of animal behavior which to say the least is but little more 
than a good working hypothesis. This presupposition in favor of a 
physicochemical explanation determines not only the author's criticism 
of other men's results, but it also seems to determine the presentation of 
the facts. 

Relying upon " the more recent studies which have been conceived in 
a really scientific spirit" (Preface), the author divides his treatise into 
three parts : " the activities of the inferior animals, the instincts of the 
arthropods, and the psychical activity of the vertebrates." 

The phenomena of behavior in lower animals may be grouped under 
three principal orders: "tropisms, sensibilite differ entielle, and memoire 
cellulaire." The first is the well-known local action theory of Loeb; the 
second is the tendency of the animal " to pause, to recoil, and to turn 
through one hundred and eighty degrees when the environment changes 
abruptly " ; the third group of phenomena are the evidences of associative 

In defense of his physicochemical theory, for which he does not cease 
to praise Loeb, the author attacks Jennings's theory of trial and error and 
insists that " the movements of infusoria are subject to very simple laws." 
But when did Jennings deny the explainability of infusorian behavior? 
If I have understood his work, Jennings's protest has not been against a 
physicochemical interpretation of animal behavior, but against the ten- 

1 Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, No. 66, p. 238, 1906. 
* American Naturalist, No. 43, p. 619, 1909. 


dency to find that explanation without considering all the facts. He has 
insisted on seeing the behavior in detail rather than in bulk and has re- 
fused to accept, as final, explanations which are based only on mass obser- 
vations. This, Bohn does not seem adequately to have realized. There 
seems a strange tendency on the part of certain writers, the moment you 
deny the sweeping character of their physical formula, to think that you 
have abdicated causal explanation altogether and are lost in the realms of 

In the second part, Dr. Bohn reviews the so-called instincts of arthro- 
pods, giving in turn the detailed studies on " feigning death," " return to 
the nest," " food-seeking," " mimicry," and " the social instincts." In- 
stinct he regards as a blanket term covering a " complex of activities, 
some simple and some complex, some inherited and some acquired in the 
course of individual life, all, it being understood, resulting from the di- 
verse qualities of living matter, inherited more or less independently, the 
one of the other" (p. 125). Most experimental students will agree with 
this tendency to replace the term instinct by more analytic concepts. 

" Among vertebrates psychical activity acquires, owing to the brain, a 
very great complexity" (p. 129). Hence, ten pages devoted to brain anat- 
omy, and then follow fifty-six pages treating in turn the method of Paw- 
low, the labyrinth method, the puzzle-box method, the method of imitation, 
and the method of training as these have been applied in the study 
of vertebrates. Thirty-one of the fifty-six pages are given to Paw- 
low, evidently because his method lends itself to the support of the author's 
theory. " The method of Pawlow is infinitely precious for psychology, be- 
cause, after a sure fashion, it leads to the discovery of the laws of associa- 
tive memory among superior animals" (p. 158, italics mine). Much less 
important is the labyrinth method because it gives " only synthetic re- 
sults . . . laws do not appear from the experiments which have been 
made" (p. 175). However, in the hands of Yerkes and Watson, the au- 
thor admits this method has given results of some importance. Of still 
less importance are the remaining methods, since the data that they give 
are "uncertain and contradictory" (p. 188), and the author contents him- 
self with giving the results with little comment. The method of discrimi- 
nation recently elaborated in such detail for the study of vision by Yerkes 
and Watson receives only passing notice. 

In the reviewer's opinion the order of merit for the several methods of 
animal investigation is hardly the one likely to be adopted in the further 
work of men who are really interested in getting all the facts. If we must 
have a physicochemical explanation of animal behavior to-morrow it will 
be well to let labyrinths, puzzle-boxes, imitation, and all go, and theorize 
ourselves into a state of complacent belief. If we would understand ani- 
mal behavior it were better to realize that in the case of the vertebrates 
we have hardly gotten as yet the first inklings of how to attack our prob- 
lems, that all the methods are yet on trial, and that what we need is re- 
finement of experimental procedure in connection with every method yet 
proposed. The methods which Bohn rejects have yielded results as im- 
portant as any which have come from the Pawlow Laboratory, and if it 


were not for preoccupation with certain theories he would probably have 
seen them in a truer light. M. E. HAGOERTY. 



MIND. October, 1911. Mr. Bradley's Doctrine of Knowledge (pp. 
457-488): E. H. STRANGE. -Mr. Bradley's thesis that it is in "feeling" 
that one directly encounters reality is called in question. The contention 
that feeling is the original mode of consciousness is challenged, and 
for the existence of Mr. Bradley's " whole of feeling " there is no evidence. 
The criticism contains a refutation of Mr. Bradley's doctrine of percep- 
tion as sentient experience, and judgment as divorce of content from 
existence. Mind and Body (pp. 489-506) : J. S. MACKENZIE. - The diffi- 
culties arising out of the relations obtaining between conscious states and 
body center around the doctrine of the conservation of energy, and it is 
suggested how these difficulties may be met without abandoning the 
doctrine. Mind is distinguished from conscious states and the problem 
of its persistence is considered. Aristophanes and Socrates (pp. 507-520) : 
R. PETRIE. -An examination of Professor Taylor's volume of essays, 
entitled " Varia Socratica," relating to Aristophanes's " Clouds " in its 
bearing upon the historic Socrates. Professor Taylor dismisses the evi- 
dence of Xenophon maintaining Socrates's interest in physics and mathe- 
matics. This view is opposed, and it is maintained that the caricature in 
the " Clouds " does not contradict the account given by Xenophon. Nega- 
tion Considered as a Statement of Difference in Identity (pp. 521-529) : 
AUGUSTA KLEIN. - The thesis is that " Negative predication should be in- 
terpreted as asserting neither a Difference in Difference (Miss Jones) nor 
an Identity in Difference (Hegel), but a Difference in Identity." Discus- 
sions: Self -consciousness and Consciousness of Self (pp. 530-537) : G. W. 
CUNNINGHAM. " Self -consciousness is completely realized only in the 
experience of the absolute." Truth as Value and the Value of Truth 
(pp. 538-539) : J. E. RUSSELL. A Point in Formal Logic (pp. 540-541) : 
T. B. MULLER. Critical Notes: E. G. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (trans- 
lated by), The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I.: A. E. TAYLOR, 
Natorp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften: P. E. B. 
JOURDAIN. A. D. Lindsay, The Philosophy of Bergson: H. W. CARR. 
A. W. Moore, Pragmatism and its Critics: D. L. MURRAY. William 
James, Some Problems of Philosophy: F. C. S. SCHILLER. New Books. 
Philosophical Periodicals. Notes. 

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. October, 1911. Le pragmatisme et le 
realisme du sens commun (pp. 337-367) : L. DAURIAC. - Pragmatism has 
its source in an attitude of mind, perhaps as old as mind itself, but it is 
the honor of William James to have detached it from rationalism, of 
which it now appears to be the absolute antithesis. Les tendances 
actuelles de la psychologic anglaise (pp. 368-399) : G. CANTECOR. - The 


progress and transformations of English psychology in the last thirty 
years as it appears in the work of Sully, Ward, and Stout. Methode de 
la science pedagogique (pp. 400-421) : L. CELLERIER. - The method includes 
a definition of education drawn from experience, the determination of 
pedagogical fact, observations of the facts of education, and the study and 
classification of elementary pedagogical facts. Analyses el comptes 
rendus: G. Dromard, Essai sur la sincerite: FR. PAULHAN. G. Simmel, 
Soziologie: DR. S. JANKELEVITCH. E. Durkheim et see collaborateurs, 
L'annee sociologique, t. XI: G. BELOT. A. Dupont, Gabriel Tarde et 
I'economie politique: G. JOUSSET. J. Delvaille, Essai sur I'histoire de 
I'idee de progres: L. ARREAT. Revue des periodiques etrangers. 
Adamson, Robert. A Short History of Logic. Edited by W. E. Sorley. 

Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1911. Pp. 

x + 266. 5s. 
Boden, Friedrich. Die Instinkbedingtheit der Wahrheit und Erfahrung. 

Berlin: Verlag von Leonhard Simion Nf. 1911. Pp. 80. M. 2.50. 
Buchenau, Artur. Rene Descartes Uber die Leidenschaften der Seele. 

Leipzig : Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1911. Pp. xxxi -f 150. 2 M. 20 Pf . 
Busse, Adolf. Aristotles Tiber die Seele. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix 

Meiner. 1911. Pp. xviii -f 120. 2 M. 20 Pf . 
Oehler, Richard. Nietzsche Als Bildner der Personlichkeit. Leipzig: 

Verlegt bei Felix Meiner. 1910. Pp. 31. 60 Pf . 

Vorlander, Karl. Immanuel Kants Leben. Leipzig : Felix Meiner. 1911. 
Pp. xi + 223. 3 M. 


THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association 
met, in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of 
the New York Academy of Sciences, at the American Museum of Natural 
History on Monday evening, February 26. The following papers were 
read: " The Heredity of Mental Traits," Dr. H. H. Goddard; " The Med- 
ical Course in Psychology," Dr. F. Lyman Wells ; " Rate Norms of 
Mental Development," Professor J. E. W. Wallin ; " Auditory and Visual 
Memory," Mr. A. E. Chrislip ; " The Influence of Narcotics on Physical 
and Mental Traits of Offspring," Mr. J. E. Hickman. 

Dr. J. E. Wallace Wallin, who has been engaged in the psychoclinical 
study of various types of mental defectives for over two years, and who 
has recently worked in the clinics at Johns Hopkins Hospital, has accepted 
a call from the University of Pittsburgh to organize a department of 
clinical psychology in the School of Education and also to lecture in the 
summer school on clinical psychology, the education of exceptional chil- 
dren, and experimental education. 

UNDER the auspices of the College of Sciences, a series of lectures has 
been recently given at the University of Illinois by Professor W. Johann- 


sen, of the University of Copenhagen. The subjects treated were " The 
Primitive Conception of Heredity," " The Principle of Pure Lines," 
" Mendelism," " Complications and Exceptions," " Mutations," " Con- 
tinuity or Discontinuity." 

DR. ELEANOB H. ROWLAND, professor of philosophy at Mt. Holyoke 
College, has resigned to become dean of women and professor of philos- 
ophy at Reed College, Portland, Oregon. Her place at Mt. Holyoke, for 
the current semester, will be taken by Dr. Kate Gordon. 

ON account of illness, Professor Josiah Royce, of Harvard University, 
has been compelled to give up the course of Bross lectures on " The Source 
of Religious Insight " and has been given leave of absence for the present 
academic year. 

THE Sarah Berliner research fellowship for women has been awarded 
to Miss Marie Gertrude Rand, of Brooklyn, a doctor of philosophy of 
Bryn Mawr College, for her work on the psychology of vision. 

DR. W. A. HEIDEL, professor of Greek at Wesleyan University, gave 
an address on " The Beginnings of Science " before the Middletown, 
Connecticut, Scientific Association on February 13. 

A NEW department in psychology and education is to be established at 
Swarthmore College next year, of which Dr. Bird T. Baldwin, now pro- 
fessor of education at the University of Texas, will be in charge. 

PROFESSOR CASPER RENE GREGORY, of the University of Leipzig, is 
giving a series of lectures at the University of Illinois on " The Develop- 
ment of Science in Germany." Dr. Gregory is the first American-born 
professor to receive appointment in a German university. He holds the 
chair of theology at Leipzig. 

ELIZABETH KEMPER ADAMS, of Smith College, has been promoted from 
associate professor of philosophy and education to professor of education. 

DR. B. W. VAN RIPER, of Nebraska Wesleyan University, has been 
elected assistant professor of philosophy in Boston University. 

DR. S. P. HAYES, professor of psychology in Mt. Holyoke College, has 
been granted a leave of absence for the second semester. He will spend 
the time abroad, chiefly at Cambridge University. 

THE Ichabod Spencer foundation lectures are being given at Union 
College by Professor Hugo Miinsterberg, of Harvard University. His 
subject is " Applied Psychology." 

THE death is announced, at seventy-one years of age, of Dr. Otto 
Liebmann, formerly professor of philosophy in the University of Jena. 

DR. JOHN J. TIGERT has been appointed professor of philosophy in the 
University of Kentucky. 

Dr. WENDELL T. BUSH, associate in philosophy in Columbia University ^ 
has been appointed associate professor of philosophy. 

PROFESSOR JOHN JOLY, F.R.S., has been appointed Huxley lecturer at 
Birmingham University for the current session. 

VOL. IX. No. 7. MARCH 28, 1912. 



PROFESSOR JUDD gives a brief statement 2 of the way in which 
the problem of modern experimental psychology arose. The 
account is interesting as showing how, as an integral part of the de- 
velopment of a certain form of control, a new "science" may be 
differentiated. From the standpoint of psychology the origin of the 
experimental method was wholly external and for a long time un- 
recognized. From the demands of another sort of experimentation, 
and in the service of another science, experimental psychology came 
into being. Some consideration of this fact may prove of general 

The specific problem to be solved in this case was that of deter- 
mining the amount of error that was involved in certain astronom- 
ical investigations, the inquiry arising from a suspicion that the 
hand was slow in recording what the eye perceived. Theoretical 
exactness required that the hand should record, without loss of time, 
what the eye noted through the telescope. For the purpose of cor- 
recting the error, the astronomers, as a mere matter of developing 
their own technique, and with no interest whatever in the problems 
of psychology as such, measured the eye-hand reaction-time of the 
one who made the record. In this process, as an interesting fact 
(of erudition), it was noted that the reaction times of different per- 
sons, the "personal equation," varied. 

Now, had these men been interested in this direction, this great 
discovery might have become immediately the basis of definite psy- 
chological method ; but for these astronomers it was only an incident, 
more or less regrettable, of the day 's work ; and the psychologists of 
the time seem not to have been able to make any constructive use of 
the facts or to fit them into their subject in any way. To the extent 

1 For standpoint and material suggestions I am indebted to Professor George 
H. Mead, of the University of Chicago. 
'"Psychology," p. 333. 



that it was noticed, or used, at all, it was taken over in a wholly ex- 
ternal sort of fashion, without analyzing the problem farther; it 
seems to have been a kind of scientific toy, making some curious, 
rather than useful, additions to knowledge. They used the method 
as if they, too, had turned astronomers, and as if the whole interest 
of science was in providing data for the correction of "personal 
equations." Little attention was paid, in these earlier days, to 
introspective reintegration of these facts: the results of their observa- 
tions and measurements were averaged in a purely external way, 
and consequently added little to the actual knowledge of psycholog- 
ical processes. 

But little by little the technique and method of experimental 
psychology have been developed ; and the field of operation has been 
changed from that of external observation and mechanical measure- 
ment to that of charting out the whole field of the psychical life. 
But it would seem that a certain exhilaration has carried the experi- 
mental psychologist too far, until we have to-day a very great over- 
working of the method, though it is likely that this misuse will have 
its value in helping to more completely determine the field and prob- 
lem of psychology. Let us carry the argument through to the end. 

Modern science, growing out of individual experience, found the 
forms of psychological measurement and analysis helpful in provid- 
ing a check upon its own developing technique. In its turn, psychol- 
ogy, as it became conscious of itself and began to call itself a 
"science," considered individual experience its proper field of in- 
vestigation, like the other and older sciences: it assumed that it could 
render very much needed service by investigating in accurate ways 
the whole round of mental phenomena; and its method was to be a 
generalization of the incidental work of the astronomers. It was 
thought that, since the method gave valuable results in the case of 
its use by these devotees of the oldest of the sciences, there could be 
no doubt of its legitimacy and adequacy as a method in the newest. 
But it is to be noted that the astronomers used this psychological 
method for the purpose of perfecting their own operations, not for 
the sake of the psychological information : that is to say, psychology 
was, for them, not a "science" in itself, but an important element 
in the technique of their science ; and it would seem that the generali- 
zation of their method would give us, not a new "science" of psy- 
chology, but a very important new sort of check upon the general 
technique of science. The mere generalization of the work of the 
astronomers does not give us a "psychology" with scientific stand- 
ing; what we get is an ancilla scientiarum, and of the physical sci- 
ences at that. 

For the method was, and is, essentially an abstraction. As used 


by the astronomers it was perfectly concrete : an effort to more ade- 
quately control a specific social experience. But when it was gener- 
alized into "experimental psychology," it became abstract, as any 
mere technique must inevitably become. To be sure, psychology has 
strenuously denied this, insisting upon its right to scientific stand- 
ing. But when closely pressed to define its actual field of knowledge, 
it has never been quite able to answer conclusively. For example, 
if we take such an avowedly functional treatment as that of Angell 
we find a rather questionable statement of the field of knowledge. 
He says 3 ''psychology is commonly defined as the science of con- 
sciousness. ' ' But when we turn to page 65 of the same book we find 
consciousness spoken of as the instrument of development "of those 
fixed and intelligent modes of reaction which we call habits. ' ' Now, 
any particular scientific fact, or law, or system, is, for the time, a 
"fixed and intelligent mode of reaction," that is, it is a social or 
individual habit. Accepted sciences are the intellectual and prac- 
tical habits, or fixed modes of controlling experience, in any period. 
Consciousness, from this point of view, becomes the tool of scientific 
development; and psychology as the "science of consciousness" be- 
comes the method of developing the technique of general science: 
and this brings us back to our astronomers. 

Most modern writers take the point of view of Angell. Some have 
tried to get an undisputed subject-matter for psychology by a proc- 
ess of eliminating all the physical and physiological materials of 
experience, hoping to have something left. But from the standpoint 
of the sciences which deal with the materials thus eliminated, there 
is to be nothing left : all is to be finally stated in terms of the iron law 
of cause and effect. And just as the astronomers had no interest 
in their results, save as a part of their own technique, so modern 
science seems to care little for any "science of consciousness" that 
offers itself as an abstract and independent field of knowledge. That 
which has been called prejudice on the part of the older sciences is 
probably just the healthy and justifiable feeling that psychology as 
it has been known in the past can have no other standing in any 
real organization of the sciences than it had with those first astron- 
omers : it is a part of the technique of science, not a science in itself. 

The experience of the individual has been the rich field of de- 
velopment of modern science ; and this has been but the more clearly 
seen as psychology has developed and the technique of control of ex- 
perience in the various sciences has been refined. But this develop- 
ment of physical science, with psychology as its general technique, 
has been accomplished at the sad cost of leaving psychology itself 
objectless, homeless, like the "man without a country." But, not 

"Psychology," p. 1. 


only has this development, as thus stated, left psychology as a tool, 
rather than a science ; it has also made it, practically, utterly useless 
in the field of the social sciences. It is not without reason that the 
sociologist has denied the right of the psychologist to any voice in 
the determination of the method of sociology. It is not to be won- 
dered at that the educationist has been skeptical of the value of 
psychology as an aid to the teacher. Psychology as it has been 
known, that is, experimental psychology developed on the basis of 
the work of the astronomers, has had very little to do with that 
stage of experience that precedes the differentiation of the physical 
object. It has been called into existence for the purpose of a clearer 
definition of the physical object (note the astronomers again), and 
it has had, in the past, no method of dealing with the social object 
save in terms of the abstractions which it employs in the case of 
physical objects: that is to say, it must reduce the social object to 
physical and abstract terms, just what the sociologist and educa- 
tor have not wanted. 

And here we come to the point made earlier in this discussion, 
that in the development of psychology there has been a miscarriage 
of method, or else that which appears so has been but a necessary 
stage in the development of the subject. Psychology itself has 
passed through several stages in the whole course of its development. 
Before the beginnings of the experimental point of view, the object 
of knowledge in such psychology as there was, was psyche, the 
soul, disconnected, or only temporarily connected, with the world 
of observable phenomena. Then there came, after the development 
of the experimental method, a very orgy of "scientific" progress, in 
which the ideal was that along with the world of physical objects the 
world of psychical existences was to be reduced to a statement in 
terms of motion; the soul was ruled out of existence. To this end 
was psychology, handmaid of the physical sciences but ambitious for 
a realm of her own, thus sadly reduced. 

But of course the whole range of the social sciences, the whole 
wide content of morality and religion, and the sober common sense 
of the physical sciences themselves, all rebel against the extreme im- 
plications of this doctrine, because it leaves out of account the whole 
world of the ends of life, the vitally human side of life : it loses sight 
of the ends of life, and focuses all its attentions upon the "means" 
of life; but without ends the very need of "means" passes, and the 
so-called "means" pass also. The effort to state the self, or to sum 
up psychology, in terms of molecular motion had, of course, to run 
its full length and determine its own impossibility. But if this at- 
tempt is impossible, it is so because there is something in the field 
attacked by psychology that can not be stated in terms of molecular 


motion ; that is to say, there is something which the physical sciences 
can not take care of. And, in recent years, in the general develop- 
ment of the theory of evolution and its wider generalization and 
application to more inclusive ranges of materials, the mind, or the 
self, has slowly become recognized as the center of organization of 
experience : this mind, or self, is now no longer a mere left-over, but 
a real and positive factor in the world, a fact in the full sense of the 
term, and as such as much an object of knowledge as the molecule 
or the atom. Psychology thus becomes the science of the self, the 
self as a reality for experience; it has accordingly a subject-matter 
of its own, and a right to be called a science in at least as real a sense 
as is physics the science of the molecule, or chemistry the science of 
the atom. 

But from this point of view psychology can no longer be defined 
as the science of consciousness ; it is now the science of the self, and 
the self is larger than consciousness; it is at least as large as the 
whole of experience. This means that psychology must give up its 
old position (a position that is still maintained in the laboratory atti- 
tude) as the handmaid of the physical sciences, and become the sci- 
ence of the self in all the relations of that self, its genesis, its develop- 
ment, and all its rich differentiations of activity, interest, and con- 
tent. But at this point we see that psychology has thus become 
social psychology. And there can be no escape from the fact that if 
psychology is to be a real science in its own right it must become 
social; for in no other way can it find a real object of knowledge 
that shall be its own. 

When, however, psychology has thus become social, it can absorb 
all the materials that the laboratories can bring it, and give to those 
materials a meaning they have never had before. These results, 
worked out in psychological laboratories, are just like the results of 
the work of the astronomers, materials that have, or may have, a so- 
cial value in perfecting the general technique by which science is 
ultimately to control all experience in the interest of a nobler human 
living. And from this point of view psychology becomes of use also 
in the social sciences ; becomes, indeed, as the science of the self, the 
basis of the technique of the social sciences ; and no follower of any 
of the special social sciences can ever again, save by confessing his 
ignorance, deny to the new psychology, as science of the self, the 
right to some voice in determining the materials, methods, and results 
of that special science. Social psychology will be heard from in 
every one of the special social sciences in the near future. 

Essentially, then, psychology has left the narrow field of service 
to the physical sciences (though its service is still at their disposal), 
and, finding a proper object for a special science in the "self," is 


about to find a scientific standing it has never had before. At the 
same time it is going to find a wider range of usefulness as the tech- 
nique of all the sciences: the social sciences, first of all, and the 
physical sciences, also, as these arise in the constant definition of the 
conditions of life. Psychology has become social psychology, the 
science of the whole concrete activity of the social self, or selves; 
social psychology is the science of the active self, the self at work, 
organizing and reorganizing its world of experience. The impulses 
to organization of experience are native, and, in man at least, they 
are social in their nature. The act needs no motive, and it presup- 
poses a social situation. In the carrying out of the act, in so far as 
there is a conflict or a hindrance to be overcome, there will appear a 
need of a definition of means to the end in view, a more complete 
determination and organization of the conditions under which the 
act may go on. This was the situation in which the astronomers had 
found themselves many times; they had made many corrections and 
readjustments, of which the one here described was for them only 
another. In many of their adjustments ordinary reflection upon the 
situation had been sufficient. But in this particular case mere re- 
flection was not sufficient; the telescope did not solve the problem: 
there was still a difficulty that had to be more adequately under- 
stood and controlled ; and a further refinement of method was neces- 
sary. Thus were undertaken the first experiments along psycholog- 
ical lines ; only, they were not experiments in psychology at all ; they 
were efforts to secure practical efficiency and a greater social utility 
in a science that cared nothing for psychology; and for the astron- 
omers they never became psychological materials. That is to say, the 
astronomers never saw the full implications of their incidental ex- 

Now, it is only a social psychology that can see the whole act in 
all its bearings. The social psychologist sees the astronomer himself 
engaged in the more comprehensive problem of a careful determina- 
tion of the character of the universal human environment: he is a 
social worker, in spite of his protests, and his need of a more com- 
plete determination of the "personal equation" is ultimately a social 
need. Social psychology can also see why this method was finally 
seized upon and hypothetically erected into a science in its own 
right. And it is possible to see how, and why, psychology had to 
come back from its intellectualistic, individualistic, and purely me- 
chanical vagaries to the more human conception of the whole man 
living his whole life in a complete social world. Social psychology is 
undertaking to deal with a concrete social situation, the wholeness of 
an act in all its immediate richness of emotional and conative ele- 
ments as well as its purely intellectual or "scientific" phases. 


Within this whole concrete act lies the specific problem of determin- 
ing the means to the end: this is true for the simplest act and for the 
most complex. So within the whole of social psychology lie the 
various problems of the experimental determination of the actual 
conditions of activity; but this experimental determination is but 
one phase of the whole act ; and if this determination is to have any 
other than a purely erudite interest, the demand for it must rise out 
of a concrete situation, and the determined result must be such as 
can get back into concrete activity and be tested by more organic 
conditions than those of the laboratory. 

The self develops through activity and emotional experiences 
which are organized into older experiences, as occasion demands, by 
the intellectual processes. Social psychology of the McDougall type 
is the science of the development of the self or selves; its unit of 
study is the concrete act, in all its organic richness. Within this 
concrete act lie the beginnings of all the sciences, social as well as 
physical, just as the beginnings of psychology lay within the con- 
crete act of the astronomer. These germs of rudimentary sciences 
come to consciousness at the call of some specific need. Experimental 
psychology arose to meet the need of more exact methods of determi- 
nation of an object in a particular physical science, but it might 
just as well have arisen in any other of the sciences: it came 
in to help physical science. It proved so helpful that some who 
became interested undertook to give it an independent scientific 
standing. But after thorough tests it has been found that that 
hypothesis is partially unfounded : psychology as a purely laboratory 
performance can have no real scientific standing, because it has no 
real object of knowledge. But the hypothesis was not utterly false ; 
and the feeling that there was room for a real science of psychology 
was well founded, though its foundation is not in the laboratory. 
After these fifty years and more of experimentation and discussion, 
psychology is coming into its own, the actual object of a real science 
is emerging into consciousness, and social psychology, having as its 
object of knowledge the development of the concrete social self, is 
here to stay. 

Under this larger conception, the work of the laboratory psychol- 
ogist comes to have a value it never had or could have before : it has 
a social meaning ; his work arises out of actual social situations, more 
or less immediate, and his results go back into social situations, more 
or less close by ; if they do not, then he is losing his way among bar- 
ren and profitless abstractions. 

And under this conception psychology comes to have meaning, 
essential meaning, for all the social sciences, but especially for edu- 
cation and the work of the teacher. In the midst of the growing 


modern world, with its demands for more democracy and at the same 
time more efficiency, the teacher is hard pressed. The whole modern 
world, but especially the school, needs a new insight into the con- 
crete processes of the developing self. The laboratory can offer de- 
tached fragments of isolated cases ; the older analytic psychology can 
offer some general suggestions on mental processes: these are good 
when they can be seen in their concrete setting in the actual course 
of the child's developing experience. But they are decidedly bad, as 
Miinsterberg has shown, when they are taken as final statements of 
processes and blindly followed without thought as to the organic re- 
lationships they sustain to the rest of the developing experience of 
the victim. Social psychology is the modern attempt to redinte- 
grate the experiences of the individual, to present that experience in 
concrete forms, with as much richness of detail as the analytical 
psychologist and the laboratory operator can furnish. For while 
the experimentalist is a good man to go to for data as to detailed 
operations, it is only as he leaves his laboratory to find his prob- 
lems, and takes his results back into the social world, there to rein- 
state them concretely in the flow of living human experience, that 
he can truly be said to be a real psychologist. 

The hope for the schools and for education generally, even the 
very hope for democracy itself, lies in making the teacher conscious 
of the processes of development as these are being restated in terms 
of social psychology. The teacher will have, must have, psychology 
of some kind ; the only relief from the intolerable psychology which 
Miinsterberg so rightly criticizes is found in the social psychology 
which can see the child as child, and also as mechanism; that is, 
as end of education and as means to education, at the same time. 
The educational psychology of the future must be a genuinely social 





THE twentieth annual meeting of the American Psychological 
Association, held in Washington, D. C., December 27, 28, 29, 
1911, in affiliation with the Southern Society for Philosophy and 
Psychology, was of rather unusual interest. The fact that it was 
the twentieth meeting brought up reminiscences regarding the found- 
ing of the association and rather gratifying reflections on the growth 


of psychological science in America. At the smoker given by Pro- 
fessors Franz and Reudiger at the New Fredonia Hotel on Thursday 
evening, following President Seashore's address, the company fell 
into a reminiscent mood and called on President Hall, Dr. Ladd, and 
Professors Cattell and Miinsterberg for speeches as to the early his- 
tory of psychology in America. This occasion and the luncheon 
given by Dr. Franz at the Government Hospital for the Insane on 
Thursday made up the social features of the meeting. The program 
contained several unusual features, including double sections, a large 
exhibit of apparatus, advanced abstracts of the papers read at the 
symposium on instinct and intelligence, and the conference on psy- 
chology and medical education. Special sessions were given over to 
mental tests, animal behavior, medical education, experimental psy- 
chology, general psychology, and educational psychology. Taking 
the program as a whole, it is fair to say that applied psychology 
bulked larger than any other topic, one third of the more than sixty 
papers being devoted to various subjects falling in this field, an evi- 
dence that the day of the consulting psychologist is about to come. 

The symposium on instinct and intelligence opened the meeting, 
Mr. Marshall being the first speaker. He considered the activities 
of animals from two view-points, the subjective and the objective. 
Speaking from the latter point of view he divided the activities of 
animals into two groups, one characterizing the simplest animals and 
the other the complex animals. The first group of activities display : 
(1) evident biologic value; (2) directness; (3) immediacy; (4) 
"perfect very first time"; (5) non-modifiability ; (6) innateness. 
The second group are not evidently of biologic value, are indirect, 
hesitant, highly modifiable, not evidently innate and not "perfect 
the very first time." But in complex animals there are certain 
activities of the first sort and these occurring in the midst of activi- 
ties of the other sort may be called ' ' instinct-actions. ' ' They may be 
regarded as due to the instinct actions of the cells and this cell 
instinct-action may be looked upon as the biologic unit. But these 
varied activities due to the compounding of instinct actions are what 
we call intelligent activities. Hence, we argue that intelligence is 
statable in terms of "instinct feelings," the psychic correspondents 
of instinct actions. If we could grasp the full psychic significance 
of an instinct-feeling, by slowing down the process, we should find 
in it all the essentials of intelligence; and if intelligent acts could 
be made immediate, they would appear objectively as "instinct- 
actions" and subjectively as "instinct-feelings." 

Mr. Herrick held that the term instinct as popularly used is 
incapable of scientific definition. He would replace the terms 
instinct and intelligence by the terms innate action and individually 


variable action, and maintained that these two types of action are 
separate biological functions, both of which are exhibited in some 
degree by all animals, and that they are individually variable. 
Under innate action, he would include the fundamental physiological 
properties, tropisms, taxes, reflexes, compound and chain reflexes, 
and the inherited elements of all higher behavior complexes. Under 
individually variable action he would include all non-heritable, 
acquired behavior from simple, physiological modifications resulting 
from practise at the lower extreme to learning by experience and the 
higher intelligent adaptations at the other extreme. A special mech- 
anism has been differentiated for the higher forms of variable action, 
namely, the association centers of the brain. 

Mr. Yerkes held that instinct and intelligence are two functional 
capacities or tendencies of the organism and that neither has devel- 
oped from the other. Now the one and now the other predominates 
in the life of the organism or the species. No organism lacks either 
the instinct capacity or the intelligence capacity. Instinctive activi- 
ties are practically serviceable on the occasion of their first appear- 
ance, strikingly perfect in important respects, predictable, heritable 
in definite form, and suggestive of experiences which the organism 
has not had. Intelligent activities, by contrast, are serviceable as 
the result of trial, practically unpredictable, not definitely heritable, 
and suggestive of experiences that the organism has had. 

Mr. Judd emphasized the importance of defining intelligence in 
positive rather than negative terms. It is by intelligence that an 
organism becomes superior to its environment and capable of modi- 
fying its environment. It is the power of initiating activities from 
inner motives; and the intelligent individual, instead of reacting 
upon objects in a manner determined by their sequence in nature, is 
able to bring objects distant in time or space into close relation with 
each other. This bringing together of remote objects is the result of 
inner processes of comparison or association, which group of proc- 
esses marks the highest stages of evolution. 

The conference on psychology and medical education was opened 
by Dr. Franz, who spoke on the present status of psychology in 
medical education and practise. The recent favorable growth of 
psychology in connection with medical affairs was held to be due to 
the realization of the importance of psychiatry and to the success 
of non-medical healers. In most schools, the speaker thought, psy- 
chological matters are discussed in the courses in physiology, psy- 
chiatry, neurology, and medicine. Psychology was held to be of 
value to research in psychiatry and neurology, and also in pharma- 
cological studies. To the physician psychology has its chief value 
in the consideration of mental diseases, in both diagnosis and treat- 


merit. It is also of value to all physicians because they must depend 
upon mental processes for diagnosis and for the estimation of the 
effects of remedial agents. This subject, which is so important for all 
physicians, can not be picked up incidentally, but there must be given 
some special attention to it in the medical course. 

Dr. Adolph Meyer spoke on the practical relation of psychology 
and psychiatry, holding that both fields are open to expansion. He 
spoke of a psychology that will cope with the problems of introspec- 
tion and also with the other problems dealing with the biological, 
physiological, and even anatomical conditions of mental life. It is 
the psychologist alone who can deal with the great borderland that 
lies between the physiology of special organs and the behavior of 
personalities. Psychiatry is forced to deal with psychological 
material. It determines mental facts partly as symptoms of diseases 
back of the conditions and partly as biological reactions of the type 
of mental integration, which, like suggestion, once induced, play a 
more or less well defined dynamic role. The first task is to describe 
critically the plain events of abnormal reactions and conduct as 
experiments of nature for the conditions under which they occur, the 
subjective and objective characteristics which allow us to differen- 
tiate the reactions from one another, the events and results in the 
conduct and life of the person, the dynamic factors and their modi- 
fiability, the time and influences needed for a readjustment of a 
state of balance. With this rule of formal technique and logical 
arrangement of the inquiry, we are bound to get sound common 
ground for a psychiatry which aims merely at the identification of 
given conditions with accepted disease-processes, and also for a 
dynamic pathology which gives psychobiological data a dynamic 

Dr. E. E. Southard contrasted the problems of teaching and 
research in the fields of psycho- and neuro-pathology. He insisted 
first on the unique value of the pathological method, not merely for 
the diagnostic and therapeutic purposes of medicine, but for biology 
as a whole and for the most vital of the biological sciences, psy- 
chology. He pointed out the perniciousness of psychophysical par- 
allelism in the discussion of matters psychological because it inhibits 
the free interchange of structural and functional concepts and the 
passage to and fro of workers in the several sciences. He pointed 
out that psychology and physiology have more in common than 
either has with such structural sciences as anatomy and histology 
and that the main common element of both mental and cerebral 
processes is the time element as against the space element of the 
structural sciences. He conceived that the mind twist and brain 
spot hypotheses for the explanation of certain forms of mental dis- 


ease are entirely consistent with each other, since from a different 
angle each is dealing with the same facts. 

Dr. Watson gave the outline of a proposed course in psychology 
for medical students. The course might be given as an elective in 
the second or third year of the medical school and should occupy two 
laboratory periods per week and one lecture. The course would pre- 
suppose a thorough course in elementary psychology as a part of 
the student's premedical training and would deal with the objective 
material of psychology. Such topics as the following should be 
considered: visual and auditory sensation, thorough tests and appli- 
cation of the Binet-Simon system, work in mental and muscular 
fatigue, acquistion of skillful acts, learning plateaus, conflicts, stamp- 
ing in and retention of wrong methods of response, association, mem- 
ory and retention, association method of Jung, reaction time. The 
aim would be not only to supply information regarding these sub- 
jects, but also to give training in the objective study of psychological 
processes and to prepare the student for the work of the clinic and 
the study of hypnotism, multiple personalities, aphasia, etc. 

Dr. Morton Prince doubted the value of the teaching of structural 
psychology to the medical student already almost submerged in the 
number of subjects he is called upon to master. He thought normal 
psychology should be to pathological psychology and psychothera- 
peutics what physiology is to pathological physiology and physiolog- 
ical therapeutics; but to attain this position, processes and mechan- 
isms should be elucidated rather than structure. He insisted that 
the professional psychologist has not occupied himself sufficiently 
with this sort of research and consequently the applications of psy- 
chology lagged far behind other applied sciences. He advocated 
what he chose to call "a new psychology" for the medical student, 
the chief features of which he outlined as follows : the subconscious, 
hypnosis and allied conditions ; suggestion and its phenomena ; mem- 
ory as a process ; amnesia and its mechanisms ; fixed ideas, conscious 
and subconscious; dissociation and synthesis of personality; emotions 
as dynamic forces; instincts as impulsive forces; sentiments as com- 
plexes of ideas and emotions; phenomena of conflicts, repression, 
resistance, inhibitions; mechanisms of thought; attitudes of mind; 
associative processes and reactions; habit processes; automatisms; 
mechanism of dreams ; influence of mind on the body ; fatigue. 

This course Dr. Prince insisted would supplement the course sug- 
gested by Dr. Watson and should be taught in the premedical course. 

In respect to this program Dr. Meyer thought that the college 
curriculum should not preempt the field of psychopathology, unless 
it has clinical material to work upon. 

The discussion which followed the reading of the papers was 


prompt and was engaged in by an equal number of physicians and 
psychologists. In general it centered about three topics: first, 
emphasis on the importance of psychology to the medical student; 
second, the kind of psychology that should be given ; third, the time 
and place to be given to psychology in the medical and premedical 
program. The following quotations were significant of the whole 

Dr. Jelliffe : ' ' Let us picture to ourselves the medical student of 
the remote future. Diseases of the body will be prevented and there 
will be three functions for the medical practitioner; to deal with the 
preservation of the species, with senility and with mental aberration. 
There will be the obstetrician and pediatrist, the specialist in old 
age, and the psychotherapist. If the problems of mental activities 
are to occupy such a large share in the future, the subject of psy- 
chology should bulk large in the medical curriculum. ' ' 

Professor Angier gave an outline of the course given to medical 
students at Yale and insisted that it would be ' ' unwise for a man to 
go into medicine or into psychotherapeutics particularly and not be 
acquainted to some extent with normal psychology." 

Dr. Hoch: "It is quite evident that the importance of mental 
factors, not only so far as psychiatry is concerned, but so far as all 
diseases are concerned, is being more and more appreciated. Physi- 
cians need much more training than at present, not only in psy- 
chiatry, but also in other branches, but the more marked need is along 
mental lines. We must not forget that common disorders that come 
to the physician and are looked upon as essentially physical would 
sometimes be much better treated from a mental point of view. ' ' 

The speaker commended the course outlined by Dr. Watson, but 
doubted whether there would be sufficient time for it. He rather 
favored the course suggested by Dr. Prince. 

Professor Haines emphasized the fact that "the psychology that 
the physician is coming to use is departing in no radical way from 
the psychology in which members of this association have been inter- 
ested. We must not forget that at bottom psychology grows by the 
method of introspection. What the young medical student needs is 
to get the attitude of the psychologist. He needs to know that there 
is such a thing as a mental phenomenon." 

Dr. Koder : " I believe that there should be greater attention paid 
to the subject of psychotherapy, and also to psychology of the normal 
mind ; the psychologist should be introduced into the medical facul- 
ties to teach his subject as a part of the curriculum of the medical 
school. It seems to me at least the equal in importance of anatomy 
and physiology and a part of the time that should be given to psy- 
chology may well be carved out from the hours now devoted to the 


subjects of anatomy, physiology, materia medica, and therapeutics. 
We devote forty hours to materia medica, and we all know that the 
practising physician uses only two or three dozen remedies and there 
is no need of overburdening the medical student with the almost 
useless knowledge of drugs which have little or no value." 

Dr. Starr outlined the work that is given in the medical and pre- 
medical course at Columbia University and said: "If the subject of 
psychological therapeutics is increasing in importance and we are 
appreciating it every day, and that students must be trained along 
that line they must obtain a knowledge of physiological psychology 
which must then be supplemented by some knowledge of pathological 
psychology." The speaker then spoke of the great value which 
pathology had been to psychology and suggested further cooperation 
from both psychologist and physician in research and teaching. 

Professor Angell: "I am very much more interested for the 
moment in the problem of psychology for the general practitioner 
than in that of the value of psychology for the medical specialist in 
psychiatry. . . . The rank and file of students are not becoming 
specialists in psychiatry. In the medical school in Chicago, as a 
result of my conferences with men of the medical faculty, I conclude 
that it is desirable that every medical student should have the equip- 
ment of an elementary and introductory course in general psy- 
chology. ... I have in mind the aspect of psychology as a science of 
mental behavior, one dealing with the common affairs of everyday 
life. ... A psychology of this functional and dynamic character 
can be taught without any elaborate terms and this kind of psy- 
chology certainly would give the student a point of view for the 
exploration of the human mind. I can not for a moment believe 
that the dissecting of the mind would make a physician a better gen- 
eral practitioner. What the physician needs is to consider the 
living dynamic individual, not the human being of the dissecting 
table, but the living being who has a developing mind." 

Dr. Williams objected to Dr. Prince's course, insisting that "it 
was putting the cart before the horse," and declared that "some 
such course as Dr. Watson suggested was absolutely essential. ' ' 

Professor Miinsterberg thought, after listening to the discussion, 
that the best thing we can do is to teach medical students "a little 
philosophical foundation for their psychological conceptions." 

The upshot of the conference was the appointment of a committee 
at the business meeting of the association, this committee to represent 
the association in conferences with similar committees, appointed by 
the American Medical Association or other medical associations, 
regarding further discussions of the relation of psychology to medical 
education. Professors W. D. Scott, E. E. Southard, and J. B. Wat- 
son were appointed to this committee. 


In his address as president of the Southern Society, Dr. Franz 
held that it can not be concluded at the present time that the psychic 
localization is more specific than that mentality is connected with 
brain activity. We are unable to say that the activity of the 
cerebrum alone is the concomitant of mental processes. He reviewed 
the work of Gall, Broca, Flechsig, and the more recent histological 
studies of localized function. He denied the proof of the relation of 
the so-called sensory and perceptive areas and showed that there has 
been no sufficient explanation for the histological differences between 
the various motor areas. The disorders of speech can not be consid- 
ered to be associated with definite parts of the brain and there are no 
facts which warrant a localization of definite mental states in the 
several layers of the cortex. 

At the session on animal behavior three papers were presented 
on sensory discrimination in mammals. Mr. Johnson reported tests 
on auditory discrimination in dogs which tended to show that after 
eliminating all secondary criteria and with the operator removed 
from the room, the dogs were unable to choose between middle C 
and the E above, the stimulus being given by the Helmholtz method 
of " tandem-driven" forks equipped with Koenig resonators, giving 
practically pure tones. On the basis of these results criticism was 
offered of the work done by Kalischer and Rothmann and it was held 
that there was no certain evidence that in any of their experiments 
were the dogs reacting to tone at all. 

Dr. Shepherd reported studies on the discrimination of articulate 
sounds by cats. The method was to speak a name to which the cat 
should make a positive response and get food. A cat seven months 
old learned the reaction in thirteen days and a three-year old cat 
learned the same reaction in twenty-five days. 

Professor Yerkes criticized the experiments on the ground that 
there had not been sufficient caution to prevent the animals choosing 
by secondary criteria, unconscious movements of the operator, etc. 

Professor Washburn, in reporting some experiments on color 
vision in the rabbit, gave as a criterion that an animal sees color 
rather than a gray, the animal's ability to discriminate between a 
color and any and all brightnesses whatsover. In the course of 
experiments in which colored papers were used the rabbit showed 
some ability to select a door on account of the relative brightness of 
the paper pinned on it, but the experimenter concluded that the rab- 
bit's hold on this principle, which involves a comparison of two 
papers, is very unstable. With red and a very dark gray (Hering 
number 46) four rabbits, which had learned to discriminate red 
from the lighter grays, failed to make any discrimination whatsoever 
and there was no evidence that rabbits see red as a color. 


The following results regarding the modifiability of behavior in 
the earthworm were presented by Professor Yerkes: (1) the worms 
have not acquired the habit of turning directly to the open arm of 
the T-shaped glass labyrinth and thus escaping to a moist dark tube ; 
(2) certain modifications have appeared during the daily series of 
trials; (3) there are indications of tracking; (4) the animals fatigue 
rapidly ; five trials per day prove more satisfactory than ten, fifteen 
or twenty; (5) in so far as the worms learn to follow a direct path 
through the T, they do so apparently by the use of certain cutaneous 
sense data rather than by inner kinesthetic data; (6) the first trial 
each day invariably presents numerous mistakes; (7) there is some 
indication that the sandpaper becomes a "warning" against the salt 
which lies beyond it in the arm of the T. 

Two experimental studies of the human learning process in the 
maze were reported. Mr. Boring used the Watson circular maze 
duplicated on a large scale and two observers who learned the maze 
made a numerical estimate of the processes involved in the learning, 
the two reports agreeing in 85 per cent, of the cases. Three phases 
were noted: the determination of direction after making the turns, 
guidance within the passage, and the location of the turns. Com- 
plete analysis of the first phase only was reported. This involved 
five factors: attitudinal, verbal, visual, kinesthetic, and automatic. 
Each of these followed a definite course throughout the learning 
process, varying somewhat with the ideational type of the learner. 
Attitudes were of importance in only the first two or three trials. 
The verbal factor reaches its height very early and the visual later. 
They both give place to kinesthesis, which, in turn, is resolved into 
a somatic automatism. The course of learning in this first phase 
falls into three periods. In the first, attitudes and verbal and visual 
imagery are advantageous, and the introduction of motor imagery 
is disadvantageous; in the second period, kinesthesis becomes favor- 
able, while attitudes and verbal and visual imagery become unfavor- 
able; in the third period, automatism predominates and learning is 
retarded by the introduction of any form of imagery. 

Mr. Perrin reported similar work in which he had used two types 
of maze, a pencil maze and another through which the subject walked. 
In both cases the subject was blindfolded. The time and error 
curves were quite comparable with those based on the records of 
white rats in the maze. The introspection showed, however, so it 
was claimed, that the learning was essentially that of the human in- 
stead of the animal mind, inasmuch as there was evidence of con- 
scious factors, attending, discriminating, judging, inferring, and 
reasoning. Ideational controls were built up through the play of 
the cognitive faculties. While the learning curves showed that 


learning was by the trial and error method and that the human did 
not improve upon the time and error records of the rats, they do seem 
to have the advantage when the conditions are altered as in chang- 
ing the maze. The human subjects make their adaptations more 

In his president's address Professor Seashore spoke on the meas- 
ure of a singer. He set forth the possible measurements of sensory, 
motor, associative, and affective powers and argued that technical 
psychology may be so employed as to furnish qualitative and quanti- 
tative classified knowledge about a singer, which knowledge may 
serve immediate and direct practical purposes. This sort of applied 
psychology, the speaker thought, will lead to a keener and more 
penetrating insight into the nature and the conditions of both the 
individual and his art, and this will result in helpful guidance and a 
more vital appreciation and respect for the possibilities of the singer 
and his song. Using the case of the singer as an example, President 
Seashore went on to emphasize the importance of applied psychol- 
ogy, and in particular, the need for training up experts who will be 
able to fill the places of consulting psychologists in the various fields 
that are asking help from psychology. 

Quite in the spirit of President Seashore 's address the vocational 
bureau at Cincinnati is trying to be of help in determining a scien- 
tific ground upon which to make recommendations for the employ- 
ment of children. The work of this bureau, which was reported by 
Dr. Wooley, is still in the research stage and has planned a five-years' 
investigation of the children who leave the public schools at the age 
of fourteen years and a comparative study of other children who 
remain in school. A thousand children are to be studied in each 
case. The series of tests include sensation, motor ability, perception, 
learning power, the use of language, ingenuity. The immediate 
problem is to determine the value of the tests in use, with the hope 
that later such tests may be used as criteria of the general or special 
ability of such persons as come under the bureau's jurisdiction. 

Five papers dealing with the learning process were presented. 
Dr. McGamble reported experiments which showed no correlation 
between the facility of learning and the tenacity of impression. 
When longer series of nonsense syllables are learned and relearned 
at the same rate of presentation, the fraction of the learning time 
saved in the relearning is greater if the presentation rate is neither 
very fast nor very slow. When the series are learned at different 
presentation rates, but relearned at the same rate, the fraction of the 
learning saved is greater for the series which were originally learned 
at the slow rate of presentation, unless the absolute learning time of 
the slow series is very small. 


Mr. Lyon in reporting on the same general problem thought that 
those who learn quickly remember longest where the material used 
is logical or meaningful in character, but forget quickest where the 
material is such as involves the memorizing of motor associations, 
which is generally the case with digits, words, and nonsense syllables. 
Mr. Lyon agreed with Dr. McGamble that the difference in retentive- 
ness between the fast learner and the slower learner is much less 
than is generally believed. 

Mr. Henmon took issue with the oft-quoted results of Ebbing- 
haus that the number of repetitions increases at first with great 
rapidity as the amount to be learned increases and that the increase 
in repetitions is relatively greater than the increase in the length of 
the series. Systematic investigation, he held, fails to confirm the 
law. On the contrary, there is a relative decrease in the number of 
repetitions as the length of series increases, and an increase in re- 
tention after an interval of time. This result holds not only for 
practised, but also for unpractised, subjects and is most marked with 
sense material. 

Professor Lough gave a partial report of extended studies in 
habit formation and called particular attention to the absence of 
plateaus, such as were found by Bryan and Harter some years ago. 
The complete report of these tests is soon to appear and will cover 
the study of such factors as practise, fatigue, distribution of repeti- 
tion, diurnal efficiency, changing keys, sex, age, ability, and indi- 
vidual variation. 

Dr. Rail presented some experimental evidence of the transfer of 
training in memory. As test material, lines from "Evangeline" and 
nonsense syllables were used. Training material included poetry 
and prose in English and foreign languages, irregular verbs, and 
vocabularies. Training period lasted four weeks and was for 
twenty minutes per day. Results showed wide variation, but in 
general there was gain in the test given at the end of the training 
period, amounting in all observers to 32.5 per cent. Control experi- 
ment on 28 untrained observers showed a gain of only 17.8 per 
cent. The results were held to show that there was a transfer of 21 
per cent, in learning "Evangeline" and 36 per cent, in the nonsense 

Why certain advertisements fail to force themselves upon our 
attention, and why certain others arouse our interest so that we read 
them clear through, is the problem that Mr. Strong has set himself 
to solve, and a preliminary statement of method was made under 
the title of the role of attention in advertising. The first problem 
of method indicates that the method of simultaneous presentation of 
many advertisements gives no valid results, while the successive pres- 


entation of the same material gives surprisingly constant results 
from different subjects. One of the by-products of the investiga- 
tion so far as completed was that there is no indication of the potency 
of either primacy or recency when more than ten advertisements are 
shown successively and then tested for attention-value and memora- 
bility by the recognition method; secondly, advertisements are as 
simple psychically as nonsense syllables, at least as far as attention 
and recognition enter. This latter fact, Mr. Strong held, was evi- 
dence that the simple physically was not the simple psychically, and 
that it is now time in experimental work to advance from the use of 
simple to the use of complex material, particularly in the study of 

Professor Warren challenged our entire system of elementary 
education in a review of Montessori's method of teaching reading 
and writing. The Casa dei Bambini, it was held, is an important 
modification of the kindergarten and is founded upon an accurate 
knowledge of the ability of children to do certain kinds of work at 
certain stages of development. In this system the training of touch 
and the kinesthetic senses are emphasized as important preludes to 
the teaching of writing, which in turn precedes the teaching of read- 
ing proper. 

For some years, papers dealing with mental tests and the treat- 
ment of defectives have found a place on the general program. At 
the twentieth meeting a special session was set apart for this aspect 
of psychology under the title of mental tests. Dr. Fernald discussed 
a kinetic will test, the device for which was on exhibition in the 
adjoining apparatus display. The apparatus measures fatigue in 
terms of units of time. The subject stands on his toes on an indi- 
cator which registers the amount of failure to keep the heels clear 
from the plates. The fluctuation of the heels is registered on a dial 
before the subject's face and this acts as a stimulus to keep the 
effort going. The test was applied to 116 reformatory prisoners and 
to 12 manual-training school students. The disparity of lowest 
and highest scores is remarkable, i. e., 2% and 52 minutes in 
the former group and 12 minutes and 2 hours in the latter group, 
and the difference in the average and median for these two groups is 
35 minutes, about twice the average of the reformatory group. No 
subject involuntarily rested his heels while still striving, but each 
decided to yield. 

Dr. H. H. Goddard described an adaptation board and its use 
and also discussed the present status of the Binet tests. He reported 
tests on 400 feeble-minded children, 2,000 normal children, 56 de- 
linquent girls, 100 juvenile court children, 100 children admitted to 
the Rahway reformatory, and on an entire private school in Penn- 


sylvania. Further tests were reported on the insane, and the speaker 
concluded that "the tests go a long way toward giving us what we 
want, are accurate far beyond belief. While it is true that they 
need supplementing and improving, yet it is quite possible that this 
supplementing will have to be in the nature of a consideration of 
individual cases and special tests for children. It is a problem that 
may well occupy the attention of psychologists, but no one should 
attempt to criticize the tests until he has used them on some hun- 
dreds of children." 

Dr. Wallin agreed that the Binet tests possess considerable value 
as an instrument for gauging mental station and classifying groups 
of mental defectives. He gave methods for testing the accuracy of 
the scale as follows: (a) Extensive surveys of normal children to as- 
certain if the age norms are correct; (6) annual tests of the same 
groups, to determine whether the amount of actual growth corre- 
sponds to the growth norms laid down in the scale; (c) the plotting 
of curves of efficiency or capacity for each age for the various traits 
tested in the scale. 

At this same session Dr. Hollingworth presented a brief ac- 
count of elaborate experiments on the influence of caffein on mental 
and motor efficiency. Extensive accounts of these tests have since 
appeared in the January numbers of The American Journal of 
Psychology, The Psychological Review, The Therapeutic Gazette, 
and in the Archives of Psychology, Columbia University Contribu- 
tions to Psychology. 

The Cornell experiments on the difference between memory and 
imagination images, reported by Mrs. Perky 1 and generalized in 
Titchener's recent text-book, received pointed criticism in a paper by 
Dr. Martin, who, on the ground of experimental evidence, refused 
to accept the results in question except as having an individual char- 
acter. The differences between the two kinds of images were not 
present in Dr. Martin 's results, her experiments being made on stu- 
dents and professors at Bonn and Stanford universities. 

Professor Washburn reported a new method of studying mediate 
association, which was defined in the following manner : a process A 
is followed in consciousness by an apparently unassociated process 
C; later it is found that the connection was made by the process B, 
formerly associated with both A and C, but not at this time appearing 
in consciousness. The method used was as follows: The observer 
was given a stimulus word and instructed to react with a wholly un- 
associated word. 662 experiments were performed and a number of 
typical mediate associations resulted. A full report of the experi- 
ments appears in the January number of the American Journal of 

1 American Journal of Psychology, No. 21, p. 422. 


Another paper from the Vassar Laboratory given by Miss Abbott 
dealt with the effect of adaptation on temperature discrimination. 
The method was to adapt the right and left hands to temperatures 
differing by five degrees, and then to test for slightly wanner tem- 
peratures. Such adaptation had more effect on the power of dis- 
crimination than adaptation to extreme temperatures. 

Mr. G. R. Wells reported the results of studies on the relation of 
reaction time to the duration of auditory stimulus. Five lengths of 
stimuli were used, viz., 76, 306, 516, 766, and 1066. No characteristic 
difference was found in the reactions to these different stimuli. 

Dr. Reudiger gave the results of a series of experiments made 
with the Bloch instrument to determine the ability of four subjects 
to localize 1 gram and 10 gram weights. The surfaces explored 
were on the forearm and the weights were applied to a vein and to 
surfaces where no vein was in evidence. Localization was just as ac- 
curate with one gram as with ten grams and it was even more ac- 
curate on a vein than on other parts of the skin. These facts, the 
speaker held, were contrary to the sensation-complex theory of 
space localization, and indicated that space perception on the skin 
was to be explained on the ground of the sensation-element theory. 

An experimental study of self -projection, meaning thereby any 
explicit form of self-reference, was reported by Professor Richard- 
son, the work being that of Professor Downey. Two chief forms 
were recognized, the visual and the kinesthetic. Different reagents 
saw themselves as actors in or spectators of a visualized scene. Kin- 
esthetic or organic self-reference was found to occur frequently and 
to assume the following forms: (1) objectified and fused with the 
visual self; (2) oscillating with the visualized self and localized in 
the body of the subject; (3) objectified and fused with a visualized 
object or a visualized person other than the self; (4) abstracted from 
all visual content and objectified or not. 

The role of the organic factor in the consciousness of meaning 
was emphasized in the report of experimental work by Professor 
Murray. The use of an extended imagery questionnaire in a group 
of elementary students brought out the fact that the organic imagery 
was accessible to introspection. Such stimulus words as expectancy, 
impatience, fright, surprise, relief, etc., were used, and definite or- 
ganic imagery was roughly demonstrated. Further tests with such 
words as mental, delicate, difficult, mistake, possible, etc., showed 
that organic and motor imagery claimed an equal share with visual 
and auditory imagery. 

Dr. Starch described a method for the objective measurement of 
handwriting by means of a celluloid graphometer, which measures 
the mean variation of the slant letters and their mean deviation from 


tin- base line. These two are reduced to the same units of linear dis- 
tance and averaged. In this manner all the samples in Thorndike's 
scale were measured, which showed that the uniformity of letters 
regularly decreases as the quality decreases. 

The relation between the retina and right-handedness was dis- 
cussed by Professor Stevens in reporting experimental results on the 
study of the space sense of the retina. His conclusions are as fol- 
lows: (1) in the horizontal meridian, the right half of an extent in 
the field of vision is overestimated; (2) this overestimation holds true 
for both right and left eyes; (3) the extent which is overestimated 
forms its image upon the left corresponding halves of the two retinas ; 
(4) the left corresponding halves of the retinas are connected exclu- 
sively with the left hemispheres of the cerebrum; (5) by reason of 
the fact of a marked difference in the space sense of the two halves 
of the retina, those objects in the right half of the field of vision, by 
appearing larger, attract the visual attention which in turn leads to 
grasping movements of the right hand. The hand thus favored by 
the earliest experiences acquires a special skill which causes it to be 
used in all manual acts requiring the greatest precision. 

Professor Magnusson reported experimental data on visual sensa- 
tions caused by changes in the strength of a magnetic field. The 
results verified the work of Dunlap and Thompson ; ascertained that 
the magnetic field induced by making and breaking a direct current 
gives a visual sensation ; gave threshold of the sensation in terms of 
ampere turns and the dependence of the sensation upon the fre- 
quency of the current. No sensation other than visual occurred and 
no after effects were experienced. 

Professor Cannon reported the work recently done at the Harvard 
Medical School on physiological changes attending fear and rage in 
cats. It was shown that the emotional excitements caused the 
adrenal glands to pour adrenalin into the blood, and it was thought 
that this might account for the continued excited state of the body. 
It was further shown that glycosuris occurred, following the pro- 
duction of adrenalin and the conclusion was that in the wild state 
the production of sugar furnished new energy and the adrenalin 
prevented fatigue. In this case these physiological changes would 
be distinctly useful functions. 

Introspection is not only an instrument of psychological investi- 
gation, it is also itself a psychological process or group of processes, 
and as such must be capable of psychological analysis. This was the 
point of view defended by Professor Dodge in a paper on the nature 
and limits of introspection. Such an analysis should furnish data 
for the evaluation of the products of introspection, for an estimate 
of its reliability as an instrument, and for an estimate of the factors 


of mental life that it is best calculated to disclose. The world of 
things is the result of the integration of sensory experience while 
introspection furnishes material for the integration of unitary ex- 
periences. The phenomena of introspection are not final facts of 
mental life, but like the phenomena of sound, are indicators for 
scientific construction. 

Professor Dodge also described two new sphygmographic instru- 
ments. The first which was demonstrated is a pneumatic photo- 
graphic recorder of extremely low latency and high sensitivity. 
Used in connection with any good microscope, it records vibrations of 
over 1,000 per second, shows overtones of vowels and heart tones, and 
gives pulse waves of any desired amplitude without changing its 
latency or other constants. Suitable for class lantern-demonstrations 
of pulse and plethysmographic changes, it is durable and practically 
fool-proof, at least for any one who can use a microscope. The second 
recorder was not demonstrated. It provides for recording the pulse 
of a distant and active subject by means of a string galvanometer. 

Mr. Munsell described his pigment color system and exhibited his 
books and models and apparatus, including a daylight photometer 
which attracted considerable attention. Lack of space forbids ade- 
quate description here, but extended explanation may be found in 
The Psychological Bulletin. 2 

Apropos of the doctrine of reserve energy, Dr. Williams pointed 
out that the inhibition of energy is not synonymous with storage and 
the energy which is not expended so as to be seen by the superficial 
observer is not merely held in reserve to be set free by therapeutic 
treatment. What does happen is that the energy is rechanneled, 
i. e., set going into new directions. 

Dr. Burrow objected to the present anatomical, static, bureauolog- 
ical ideas in connection with the definition of neurasthenia, and con- 
tended for a more restricted, individual, dynamic interpretation, 
such as may be yielded through a physiological analysis of a par- 
ticular case. The conception of functional changes having their basis 
in disintegrations occurring within the elements of the nervous sys- 
tem so minute as to escape ordinary objective tests he held to be a 
dodging of issues. He thought rather that important affective trends, 
obstructed in their natural course, bring about vicarious gratifica- 
tions in unconsciously motivated reactions, allied with the affective 
state through somatic associated connections. Such somatic connec- 
tions are the so-called symptoms of neurasthenia. This point of view, 
he thought, was supported by the evidence from dreams where there 
was a close parallel between the imagery of the patient as presented 
in his dreams and the organic imagery presented in his symptoms. 

2 Vol. 6, No. 7. 


Professor Jones, accepting Freud's definition of the term sublima- 
tion as ' ' the capacity to exchange an original sexual aim for another 
no longer sexual aim, though a psychically related one, ' ' argued that 
these discarded desires form the basis of many of our interests and 
activities in later life and insisted that a fuller knowledge of them 
would be of the greatest value to education by indicating the most 
fruitful paths along which sublimation could take place. 

That the real cause of emotion is a failure in the mechanics of 
brain integration, immediately occasioned by the occurrence of fac- 
tors, inner and outer, that are too difficult of synthesis under the 
given conditions and to whose action the organism may be abnormally 
sensitive, was the thesis advanced by Professor Huey in a discussion 
of emotivity and emotion in their relations to adaptation. The brain, 
the speaker thought, may be as basal an organ of emotion as the 
heart, and for many persons, disturbances of the pharynx, bladder, 
genitals, or skin ' ' mirror the soul ' ' more than do the heart and blood 
vessels. Emotional expression depends on (1) what functionings are 
called for by the situation; (2) what functionings happen to be in 
use at the time; (3) early acquired habits of reacting in a given 
manner to a given emotional situation ; (4) what organs or functions 
are most enfeebled, these being affected preferably; (5) occurrence 
of misfit, instinctive functionings of possible utility in race experi- 
ence; (6) functionings suggested to the individual in the fatigue of 
emotion, social custom, contagion, or auto-suggestion. 

At the business meeting, the committees on mental tests, on 
teaching experiments, and on periodicals, reported progress and were 
continued. The following recommendation of the council was 
adopted: "The council, believing that the members of the association 
should consider exercising a more direct control over the choice of its 
officers, recommends the appointment of a committee of three to 
consider this question, and, in the event of their approving a change 
in the present arrangements, to submit to the next annual meeting 
the necessary amendments to the constitution." Professors Aikins, 
Minor, and Pierce were appointed to this committee. 

On the recommendation of the council, Professor Thorndike was 
elected president for the ensuing year and Professors Margaret F. 
Washburn and Max Meyer were elected to membership in the council 
for three years to succeed President Sanford and Professor Thorn- 
dike. Professor Seashore, the retiring president, was elected to rep- 
resent the association on the council of the A. A. A. S. 

The next meeting will be held in Cleveland, in affiliation with the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, during the 
Christmas holidays, 1912. The International Congress for the spring 
of 1913 is abandoned. M. E. HAOOEBTY. 




Animal Intelligence: Experimental Studies. EDWARD L. THORNDIKE. The 
Animal Behavior Series. New York : Macmillan. 1911. Pp. viii -f- 297. 

All psychologists will be glad to have Thorndike's experimental work 
on the intelligence of animals brought together in this convenient form. 
The thesis on " Animal Intelligence," which was for many of us the first 
intimation that a real science of comparative psychology was possible, 
has been for some time out of print. It is here reprinted, together with 
the paper on " The Instinctive Reactions of Young Chicks," the " Note 
on the Psychology of Fishes," and the monograph on " The Mental Life 
of the Monkeys." To these papers there have been added an introductory 
chapter, an essay on " Laws and Hypotheses of Behavior," and one on 
" The Evolution of the Human Intellect." 

It is the new chapters, of course, that demand discussion in the present 
review. Thorndike's experimental researches have now undergone the test 
of time, and their influence has been valuable enough to satisfy any 
worker in a scientific field: few doctors' theses, indeed, have been so fruit- 
ful as " Animal Intelligence." The introductory chapter in the present 
book defends the study of behavior as opposed to that of " consciousness 
as such." The chapter on "Laws and Hypotheses for Behavior" pro- 
poses, as laws of behavior in general, that behavior is predictable, that 
" every response or change in response of an animal is the result of the 
interaction of its original knowable nature and the environment " ; and 
the law of instinct, that " to any situation an animal will, apart from 
learning, respond by virtue of the inherited nature of its reception-, con- 
nection-, and action-systems." All learning can be brought under the 
law of effect, that " of several responses made to the same situation, those 
which are accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the animal 
will, other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation, 
so that, when it recurs, they will be more likely to recur;" the reverse 
being true of responses accompanied by discomfort; and the law of exer- 
cise, that " any response to a situation will, other things being equal, be 
more strongly connected with the situation in proportion to the number of 
times it has been connected with that situation and to the average vigor 
and duration of the connections. The satisfaction and discomfort men- 
tioned in the law of effect are correlated with advantage and disadvantage, 
not necessarily to the organism as a whole, but to its neurones." Acces- 
sory conditions to the laws of effect and of exercise are the closeness with 
which the satisfaction is associated with the response, and " the readiness 
of the response to be connected with the situation." The chief point at 
which the reviewer would take issue with the author in this chapter con- 
cerns the relation between an act and the idea of an act. As is well 
known, Thorndike opposes the doctrine that an idea of a movement causes 
the movement. The reviewer, for whom this doctrine is one of the really 
valuable and fruitful discoveries of modern psychology, has long felt that 
its critics misunderstood the meaning of the term " movement idea," and 
the arguments put forward in the chapter under consideration confirm 
this opinion. Take for instance the following: "It is certain that in at 


least nine cases out of ten a response is produced, not by an image or 
other representation of it, but by a situation nowise like it or any of its 
accessories. Hunger and the perception of edible objects far outweigh 
ideas of grasping, biting, and swallowing as causes of the eating done in 
the world." It is surely sufficient to reply that the doctrine of the move- 
ment idea is applied to the perfecting of new responses, not to the per- 
formance of instinctive responses, and that of course even in new re- 
sponses the place of the movement idea is commonly later taken by an 
associated idea or perception. " It is also certain," the author continues, 
" that the idea of a response may be impotent to produce it. I can not 
produce a sneeze by thinking of sneezing. And, of course, one can have 
ideas of running a mile in two minutes, jumping a fence eight feet high, 
or drawing a line exactly equal to a hundred millimeter line, just as easily 
as of running the mile in ten minutes, or jumping four feet. It is further 
certain that the thought of doing one thing very often results in the man's 
doing something quite different. The thought of moving the eyes 
smoothly without stops along a line of print has occurred to many people, 
who nevertheless actually did as a result move the eyes in a series of 
jumps with long stops." The sneeze, of course, as a reflex, may be left 
out of consideration; nobody ever claimed that movement ideas produced 
reflexes. As for the other instances adduced, it is sufficient to say that no 
one has ever had an idea of running a mile in two minutes, or of any of 
the other impossible feats mentioned, or of moving the eyes smoothly 
along a line of print. The ideas which people may have thus labeled 
would be revealed by even a moderate degree of introspective analysis to 
be ideas of movements that had actually been performed by the persons 
entertaining the ideas. A movement idea is the revival, without periph- 
eral stimulation, of the sensations that resulted from the actual per- 
formance of the movement: if the movement has never been performed, 
its idea is impossible. 

Further, Professor Thorndike appears to think that the admission of 
the law that the idea of a movement can cause the performance of the 
movement would add a third principle of learning to the laws of effect 
and exercise. It would never have occurred to the reviewer not to see in 
the law of the movement idea a striking instance of the law of effect. It 
is of course always understood that a movement idea will not produce the 
corresponding movement if it or any of the associated processes that may be 
substituted for it has been connected with sufficiently strong unpleasantness. 
Just as an outside stimulus that by virtue of an inherited nervous con- 
nection naturally produces a movement may cease to do so if the move- 
ment has unpleasant consequences, so may a movement idea lose its move- 
ment-generating power. And the movement idea is itself based on the 
most immediate effect of the movement; the sensations, kinesthetic and 
otherwise, that are aroused by the motor process as it takes place. 

In the last chapter, on " The Evolution of Human Intellect " the writer 
points out that the superiority of the human mind consists in the power 
of analyzing situations, which, in turn, depends on " the increased delicacy 
and complexity of the cell structures in the human brain." 



A Text-book of Experimental Psychology. (With Laboratory Exercises.) 

CHARLES S. MEYERS. Second Edition. 2 volumes. New York: 

Longmanns, Green, and Co. 1911. 

The first glance at the second edition of this useful book reveals a 
striking improvement in general appearance, in binding, quality of paper, 
and in other details that go far toward making a book agreeably received. 
From the point of view of content, the references at the chapter ends have 
been brought up to date and the following changes have been made in the 

In chapter two (Cutaneous and Visceral Sensations) the recent work 
of Head and Kivers is amplified, and Head's assumption of the existence of 
two differently distributed systems of peripheral nerves underlying the 
two systems of cutaneous sensibility gives way to the suggestion of a 
single physiological system dissociated into separate psychological systems. 
The paragraph on " The Specific Nature of Pain Sensations " is omitted. 
To chapters three and four (Auditory Sensations) are added a paragraph 
on vowel quality of tones and two on consonant intervals and fusion. 
Erom chapter five is omitted the section on " Nervous Connections of the 
Motor and Labyrinthine Sensory Apparatus." Hering's colored diagrams, 
showing the relation between the pairs of antagonistic colors, are added 
to the chapters on " Visual Sensations." Chapters twelve and thirteen, 
on " Memory," remain unchanged except for the inclusion of the " method 
of reconstruction." Various parts of these chapters remain obscure to the 
average student, but this difficulty largely inheres in the nature of the 
material itself. Chapter sixteen, " On Weight," is recaptioned " On Mus- 
cular Effort," and supplemented by recent work on ocular movements. 
The chapter on "Local Signature" contains a new section dealing with 
" Autokinetic Sensations," and in the chapter on " Experiences of Iden- 
tity and Difference " appears a paragraph on " The Influence of the Sen- 
sory Cortex." The chapter on " Feeling " now precedes that on " Atten- 
tion " and is supplemented by a statement of the effects of thalamic lesion. 
A final new chapter on " Thought and Volition " gives a brief view of the 
recent experimental investigations of imageless thought, the conative ex- 
perience sui generis, determining tendencies and attitudes of conscious- 
ness, chiefly from the point of view of method. 

Volume two, of one hundred and seven pages, contains the laboratory 
exercises. The manual is inadequate as a guide in the hands of the be- 
ginning student, since it lacks sufficient prescription of method and de- 
tailed procedure. It will serve better as a manual of suggestions to the 
instructor, who, unless he can work personally and continuously with each 
pair of students or satisfactorily rehearse the experiment in a preliminary 
way before the class as a whole, must work out his own outline in detail. 
For suggestions toward the contents of such an outline the manual is very 
useful in the fields covered. The reviewer regrets that the publishers have 
announced that the two volumes will not be sold separately. 





REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. November, 1911. Le probleme soci- 
ologique et le probli-me philosophique (pp. 449-490) : E. DE ROBERTY. - 
The neo-positivistic position, that philosophy, like all branches of knowl- 
edge, has been in the past beset with illusions, " a real astrology and 
alchemy of general thought," is going to result in a new study, purely 
sociological, of the concepts of the mind and the laws of nature. Freud 
et le probleme des reves (pp. 491-522) : KOSTYLEFF. - Freud's principle, 
the progress of sensorial regression, finds in objective psychology a physio- 
logical basis that responds to all the varieties of dreams. Vie animale et 
vie morale (pp. 523-528) : A. LAI.A.M n.. - A response to an article of Le 
Dantec on " Vegetative and Intellectual Life." Revue Generate. Les 
periodiques allemands de psychologic: FOUCALT. Analyses et comptes 
rendus. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx: L. DAURIAC. Moore, Prag- 
matism and its Critics: L. DAURIAC. L. Daville, Leibnitz historien: A. 
PENJON. K. Vorlander, Oeschichte der Philosophic: M. SOLOVINE. Ber- 
nardino Telesio, De Rerum Natura: M. SOLOVINE. A. Wohlgemuth, On 
the After-effect of Seen Movements: B. BOURDON. Necrologie. 

Keyserling, Hermann Graf. Prolegomena zur Naturphilosophie. 

Munchen : J. F. Lehmann's Verlag. 1910. Pp. xii -f 159. 5 M. 
Ostwald, W. Natural Philosophy. Translated by T. Seltzer. New York : 

Henry Holt & Co. 1910. Pp. ix -f 193. $1.00. 


THERE has been established in Geneva an Institute for the Science of 
Education, which will be opened October 15, 1912. M. Pierre Bovet, pro- 
fessor of philosophy and pedagogy at the University of Neuchatel, has 
been chosen director, and Professor Ed. Claparede, director of the psycho- 
logical laboratory at the University of Geneva, will give instruction in 
psychology. The institute will be open to those who wish to follow the 
vocation of teaching. 

MAURICE DE WULF, professor at the University of Louvain, announces 
that the new edition of his work, " Histoire de la Philosophie Medievale," 
contains many expansions in the text and the addition to the bibliography 
of many titles of books produced within the past five years. 

THE Holiday Course organized by the University of Lille, with the co- 
operation of the Alliance Franchise, will enter upon its eighth year at 
Boulogne-sur-Mer in August, 1912. The course is planned to appeal to all 
students, whatever their knowledge of the French language may be. 

PROFESSOR CHARLES SEDOWICK MINOT has been selected by the German 
government as Harvard exchange professor at the University of Berlin for 
1912-13. Dr. Rudolf Eucken, professor of philosophy at Jena, has been 
appointed exchange professor at Harvard University. 

VOL. IX. No. 8. APRIL 11, 1912. 



~\ /TATHEMATICS, physics, astronomy were mere chapters in 
-i-V_L the philosophy of Greece. Gradually they became conscious 
of their own problems and matured into relative independence. 
This process of emancipation is typical: many classes of problems 
(an infinite number perhaps!) are contained in the realm of what is 
commonly called philosophy; more or less vague efforts at solving 
them are made, and these absorb the attention for a while until there 
comes a day when one class is recognized as distinct from the others, 
and a new science is born out of philosophy. Mathematics arrived at 
this condition early; physics only in the days of Galileo. It is true 
the experimental method which he used would alone assure him im- 
mortality. But it is not this new method which emancipated physics ; 
it is the particular type of problem which Galileo set. At first sight 
it might seem limited in application and insignificant in interest; 
but it proved fruitful in calling forth other problems of the same 
type, in whose solution the same or similar methods of procedure 
were effective. Singling out a new type of problem gave birth to 
a new science. 

This process of emancipation of philosophy's progeny is going on 
vigorously even to-day. It seems only yesterday that chemistry was 
born; and now psychology is asserting with gentle emphasis that it 
is weaned from the mother milk of philosophy ! 

In the realm of the old Aristotelian logic there are four distinct 
classes of problems that are still treated promiscuously and with- 
out regard for their inherent distinctions. Solutions of one are 
given out for solutions of another, though in reality they may be per- 
fectly irrelevant to it. To separate these disciplines by clearly dis- 
tinguishing the kinds of problems which they present will greatly 
help in their development; it is the first and indispensable step 
toward their proper solution. 



They all refer principally to what may be called "cognition," 
i. e., knowledge of a certain kind characterized by the property of 
being coherent, necessary, systematic, etc. Mathematics, physics, 
may stand as examples of what is here designated by cognition and 
may always be substituted for it in the present discussion. 

Suppose a system of cognition, such as plane geometry, to be 
given, 6. gr., in the form of Euclid's "Elements." Various questions 
may be asked regarding it, such as: Are the propositions clear and 
convincing? Do you grasp them readily, or only with difficulty? 
Are the "axioms" more "evident" to you than the propositions? 
How is your attitude toward the truth of a proposition affected by 
the "proof" which is given of it? Is your study aided or impeded 
by "logical rigor" in the formulation of the "axioms" and the ar- 
rangement of the propositions? How were these propositions dis- 
covered, and what natural conditions are most favorable for discov- 
ering new ones? These questions can easily be multiplied indefi- 
nitely. They are all of a certain type which may be characterized 
as follows: They imply that, besides the system of geometry, an "I" 
or "you," in general, a "consciousness," a "subject" is given, and 
the questions concern the relation of this "consciousness" to the 
system of propositions of geometry. Both are, in the meaning of 
the questions, separate, distinct, though in relation to each other. 
What this relation is in particular is not stated. The propositions of 
geometry may be conceived as "acts" of this "subject," as "con- 
tent" of this "consciousness," and thus as residing in this "ego"; 
but the words "acts," "content," "in" indicate again special rela- 
tions of these propositions to the "subject," just as did "evidence," 
"clearness," "difficulty of apprehension." Any question even 
whether a proposition may "exist" independently of a "human con- 
sciousness" or whether it is, first and last, nothing but a "content of 
some human consciousness" must be considered to be of the same 

In order to make this clearer let us call the propositions, con- 
cepts, etc., such as form plane geometry, "logical entities," and 
let us say that they have "existence" in a definite realm which 
we will call the "realm of logical entities." Distinct from this 
"realm of logical entities "is the " ego " which enters into (or is in) 
relation to them; and I shall call this relation the "subject-relation" 
of the logical entities. Some such distinction is indeed required by 
any of the above questions and it does not in any way prejudice the 
decision as to what the subject-relation will be: the whole realm of 
logical entities may be "immanent" in the "ego," or "transcendent" 
immanence and transcendence would merely express definite kinds 
of subject-relation. 


It is apparent that what ordinarily passes for "idealism" is 
concerned primarily with problems regarding the subject-relation. 
And it has often passed for "obvious" that a consideration of the 
subject-relation is primary, indispensable, unavoidable, decisive. 
Quite on the contrary it seems to me necessary to recognize that 
problems regarding the subject-relation are merely one type of prob- 
lems, that other, distinct types of problems are possible and impor- 
tant in the solution of which a decision regarding the subject-relation 
is irrelevant. This does not derogate in the least from the impor- 
tance of carefully studying the subject-relation. 

It seems to be recognized more and more that problems of this 
type belong to psychology; and I shall therefore speak of "Psychol- 
ogy of Cognition" to designate the discipline which studies the sub- 
ject-relations of logical entities. It may be that this type of prob- 
lems can fruitfully be subdivided; it may be that this whole type 
should be classified differently; it will have no bearing on the pres- 
ent study, so long as problems regarding the subject-relation of log- 
ical entities are recognized as distinct from others regarding the log- 
ical entities themselves. 

It is a platitude that nothing is true for me unless it is true for 
me though much discussion has hinged on this platitude. An ex- 
treme individualism has based on it the theory that no truth exists 
for me, unless it is recognized, seen, apprehended as such by me. 
All those who urge "evidence" as the test of logical truth, maintain 
in the last resort, or frankly even from the beginning, this theory. 
They base ' ' logic " on " psychology ' ' ; for ' ' evidence ' ' is one kind of 
"subject-relation." So long as this subject-relation remains the 
problem under investigation, their claim may be made with much 
force. We seem indeed to be constantly guided in our search for 
truth by the "clair et evident" of Descartes though it may well be 
suspected that the subject-relation corresponding to what we call 
"truth" is much more complicated, as the pragmatists are showing 
with convincing force. But when we set the problem of the truth of 
a proposition, apart from its power of convincing me or you, pro- 
vided such a problem is admitted as possible, we enter a completely 
different realm of investigation. Still clearer is this when we state 
such problems as: Does proposition p 1 "imply" p 2 , or not? What 
is the exact relation of p l to p 2 l Can p 2 be "proved" by assuming 
P! ? We then do not ask : Can "we" prove p 2 , but : Can it be proved? 
And these two do not by any means coincide. We must often admit 
the logical existence of relations, though "we" are unable to exhibit 
them. Every algebraical equation has a root, i. e., a root "exists," 
but given an algebraical equation "we" can but rarely find it. It is 
by no means necessary to go to special cases in mathematics to show 


the distinction between "logical" and "psychological" existence, 
though it is good to give a radical example where no "knower" ex- 
ists who psychologically "perceives" the existence of the logical 
entity. For whilst in the ordinary examples we readily admit that 
a certain relation may logically exist between p l and p 2 , though 
"you" or "I" do not "see" it, t. e., though it does not exist for 
"us," we are apt to overlook the radical nature of the distinction, 
because we may still, and often rightly, say: but it exists "psycho- 
logically" for "somebody." This blurs the distinction; for instead 
of entering into the purely logical question of the relation of p l to 
p,, we fall back into the psychological question of the subject-rela- 
tion of this logical relation, by reiterating: but the relation R must be 
in subject-relation to " somebody, " some " consciousness, " some " sub- 
ject," some "knower"! This is a mixing of problems, for the ques- 
tion was not : How do we, or how does anybody, perceive, or find, or in 
whichever manner establish a subject-relation to R', but: does it 
"exist"; does the proposition that "the sum of the angles in a plane 
triangle is equal to two right ones "presuppose the "parallel axiom"? 

To some it will, no doubt, be quite impossible to "ignore," for 
the time being, the psychological problem of the subject-relation, and 
to them the "realm of logical entities" will always flit around some 
"consciousness"; as the platonic ideas always had physical exist- 
ence somewhere, as Kant's "transcendental ego" was hidden in the 
innermost depths of the brain. And yet, it is just this "ignoring" 
of one problem when moving in the realm of another which is so 
characteristic of all fruitful work: in any "object" many kinds of 
problems intersect; properly and systematically to ignore the 
"others" is the first and necessary step toward the solution of the 

Whatever theory is accepted regarding the subject-relation of a 
logical entity does not in any way decide the question of its logical 
existence. If it is held that all logical entities without exception are 
in subject-relation to some "consciousness," it is still necessary to 
establish the distinction between "existing" and "non-existing" 
logical entities. This may be done by saying: a logical entity "ex- 
ists" if it is "necessary," "of general validity"; whether such an 
attempt would prove successful or not is not our concern here ; but 
it is our concern to insist that the mere relation of all logical entities 
to some consciousness is not capable of serving for a criterion to es- 
tablish this distinction. It is irrelevant to the problem of the exist- 
ence of logical entities. 

If this distinction of the problems regarding the subject-relation 
of logical entities from those regarding the logical entities them- 
selves is admitted, we may proceed to exemplify the latter types of 


problems. I shall call them "Logic of Cognition," "Critique of 
Cognition," and "Structure of Cognition." 

"Logic of cognition" treats of the relations of logical entities, 
not to a subject, but to each other. What are the propositions of 
plane geometry? Does a certain proposition p^ "imply" another 
p 2 ? What consequences follow from certain assumptions? What 
laws are valid in the drawing of inferences? Logic of cognition 
constructs, from the true beginning, systems of cognition. Attempts 
such as Whitehead and Russell's "Principia Mathematica" are es- 
sentially examples of what is meant here by "logic of cognition." 
It is dogmatic in form ; it does not justify or criticize ; it exhibits, it 
hypothesizes, it proves; in brief, it constructs. 

But with its special type of problems "logic of cognition," par- 
ticularly in its beginning, combines (and often confuses) problems 
of the third type: "critique of cognition." "Critique" determines 
the logical ' ' value ' ' of systems of cognition ; its main problem is the 
determination of the "truth" of a system, whilst "logic of cog- 
nition ' ' should be indifferent to the question whether the hypotheses, 
whose consequences it develops, are true or not. When mathema- 
ticians exhibit sets of postulates of algebra, of geometry, they move 
in the realm of "logic of cognition"; when they add proofs of the 
"independence" or "consistency" of these postulates, they enter 
into the realm of "critique of cognition." Critique elaborates and 
applies certain criteria (which may be called "criteria of truth") 
to systems of cognition. 

Construction and critical examination of systems of cognition, 
embracing as they are, leave still another type of problems dealing 
with the logical entities themselves. To state this new type of prob- 
lems, I find it convenient to take up the old distinction between 
"form" and "content" and apply it to systems of cognition. Sup- 
pose we are studying the properties of parallelograms. We could 
write down a system of propositions, such as : the opposite sides are 
parallel ; the opposite sides are equal ; the opposite angles are equal ; 
etc. But we might next ask: Are these propositions "independent" 
of each other? Or can we, in a plane geometry, by assuming some 
of them, deduce the others? We might then elaborate a different 
set of propositions, in which we proceed from some "defining" the 
parallelogram to others which we "prove." In both cases the same 
logical "content" is presented, namely, the properties of a parallelo- 
gram, but in different "form": a mere enumeration was "trans- 
formed" into a deductive system. And therewith a whole class of 
problems is presented all of which refer to the structure of these 
possible forms, in which the logical content of systems of cognition 
is or may be presented. What are the structural elements of a 


"deductive system"! How is it to be distinguished from "induc- 
tive systems"? What are the advantages of either form? What 
conditions must a certain logical content satisfy so that it can be put 
into the deductive system form? Are other, better forms existent or 
possible? What is the nature and function of "axioms," "defini- 
tions," "proofs"? The problem of the "new" in mathematics, the 
advantages and disadvantages of applying the deductive system 
form to "philosophy," all these are examples of the type of prob- 
lems which constitute "structure of cognition." 

These preliminary remarks may serve to direct attention away 
from some problems and toward the type to be examined in these 
studies, namely, the ones pertaining to "structure of cognition." 
Toward the necessity of keeping these problems distinct the follow- 
ing studies will add new evidence. Yet, the relation of these four 
disciplines to each other is so peculiarly close, that it is small wonder 
they have not been clearly distinguished before. No system can be 
presented without an appeal to the understanding of the reader, 
t. ., without some subject-relation; every system will use concepts 
and propositions of logic of cognition ; every system will have some 
structure, and endeavor to conform to the criteria of truth. This 
tends to confuse the issues; but if the emphasis is laid on the prob- 
lem which is presented for solution, the distinction becomes simple. 
Every system has a definite structure, but this structure need not 
be the problem of every investigation ; every system shall enter into 
a definite subject-relation, but this subject-relation need not be the 
problem of every investigation, etc. 

Since the days of Kant, and largely in consequence of his work, 
our thinking has been controlled by the idea of "presupposition." 
Categories and fundamental judgments were to him "conditions of 
the possibility of experience," t. e., that which is necessarily pre- 
supposed by experience itself. This idea has been extended to apply 
to sciences as a whole when we say : mathematics is presupposed by 
physics and attempts have been made to order the various disciplines 
in a series from this point of view of "presupposition." It is neces- 
sary to insist here, however, that this idea of ' ' presupposition ' ' leads 
readily to vagueness and confusion if applied promiscuously. It re- 
quires two restrictions. 

In the first place it is by no means "self evident" that the vari- 
ous disciplines can really be arranged in serial order by this prin- 
ciple of presupposition ; and this applies to the four disciplines which 
we have differentiated above. In a certain sense any one of them 
"presupposes" all the others. You can not study the subject-relation 
without using logical concepts and methods, without applying a 
definite ideal of truth, without putting the logical content of your 


study into a form of definite structure ; and the same applies around 
the circle. Not only is it vain thus to try to find the "more funda- 
mental" of the four, but it is positively misleading and injurious: 
we are apt to think that the questions of one can not be answered 
unless those of all the others are answered, somehow or other, first. 
We become so involved in "presuppositions" that we are unable to 
move a step forward or backward. The lesson of this predicament 
is instructive for all other cases. We must break through the idea 
of "presupposition" as applied to the various disciplines and recog- 
nize that each discipline makes its own presuppositions, its own 
hypotheses on which it builds; and in doing so may ignore the 
hypotheses of others. Mathematicians let "solids" interpenetrate 
each other, assume lines without breadth, weight, or color; to the 
physicist or psychologist such entities may be quite chimerical. 

In the second place the idea of "presupposition" is meaningless, 
unless the "point of view" is added from which the presupposition 
is considered, in other words unless we state in the realm of which 
problem the particular presupposition is studied. The discipline 
which is "presupposed" by another in the realm of one problem 
may in turn presuppose it in the realm of a different problem. And 
thus we are led back again to the first distinction between the various 
problems which control our procedure: not methods, not objects, 
not principles and presuppositions separate these disciplines "psy- 
chology of cognition," "logic of cognition," "critique of cogni- 
tion," "structure of cognition," but their problems! 

If this is kept in mind, a paradox which may otherwise be puz- 
zling will readily dissolve. In this study of the structure of systems 
we shall frequently "criticize" other accounts, and in this critique 
apply criteria which can be developed satisfactorily only in ' ' critique 
of cognition." Thus we shall frequently apply the criterion of 
"completeness": certain accounts will be found defective in com- 
pleteness in that they do not account for certain "facts." This 
would indeed be an infringement on the proper province of "critique 
of cognition," were it not for the circumstance that such critique 
is here merely incidental and for purposes of exposition. When 
some day the structure of systems will be studied more elaborately, 
we shall be able to dogmatically develop the various possible ac- 
counts, and then submit them to a systematic "critique." The 
growth of any science illustrates this, though what has been done 
more or less instinctively we can to-day see rationally. The change 
in procedure between Russell's "Principles of Mathematics" and 
Whitehead-Russell's "Principia Mathematica" is instructive in this 
respect, and illustrates the maxim that the reduction in polemic is 
proportional to the degree of logical perfection of a discipline; for 


the logical development of a system is one thing, its critical evalua- 
tion a second and distinct problem. 



THE introspective examination of the eye is interesting, both in 
experiments and in classroom work. The general name of 
entoptics for this subject was suggested by J. K. Listing. The 
method of studying the interior of one's own eyes, by letting light 
shine through a small pin-hole held close to the eye, has been care- 
fully developed. Barrett constructed an elaborate instrument on 
this plan and made some detailed experiments which are reported 
in the Proceedings of the Dublin Royal Society, 1906. That the in- 
side of the eye can be illuminated by the light reflected from a 
bright surface held close to the eyeball has been frequently men- 
tioned, but the possible improvements in method that this fact pro- 
vides have not been developed so far as I am aware, nor have their 
great advantages been appreciated. 

A very simple and very effective apparatus for becoming ac- 
quainted with some of the characteristics and phenomena of one's 
own eye is provided by small silver beads strung on a wire in a 
spectacle frame. From the standpoint of psychology, perhaps the 
most important use of such an instrument is in the study of the 
movements of the iris. 1 If, for instance, three beads are strung for 
each eye on a wire adjusted to the spectacle frame so that they are 
horizontal just below or perpendicular to one side of the pupil, they 
will throw three circles of light upon different parts of the retina of 
each eye. For some experiments it is well to cover the frame with 
black cloth, allowing the beads to show through a slit. The beads 
may be moved back and forth and the intensity of the light increased 
or diminished by approaching it or removing from it until the middle 
circle is exactly tangent to the two others. 

In the first place we have here a means of observing the reflex 
action of the pupils in both the eyes at the same time. Their co- 
ordination may be examined. 

In the second place we have a means of measuring quite exactly 

1 Badol reports an instrument to study dilations of the pupil in Transactions 
de la Societe de Biologic, 1876. He used a cylinder and two cards with pin-holes. 
For the study of iris movements from the medical standpoint, see Bumke, 
" Pupillenstorungen, " 1904, and Bache, " Pupillenlehre, " 1908. 


the enlargement and contraction of the pupil. The middle circle 
will go over into the field of the other circles or will draw away from 
them. A scale at a fixed distance from the eye may be used to inter- 
pret dimensions objectively. 

In the third place and this is an exceedingly important point 
the observer may take an easy position, settling back in his chair and 
permitting everything to fall into a normal condition. Such a con- 
dition is hardly possible where the eye is being looked at from the 

The reflex movements due to quantity of illumination, to con- 
verging movements of the eyeballs, to bodily irritations, and to 
mental states can be examined at one's leisure. A physician who 
undertakes to study iris movements in a patient would do well to be 
familiar with the reflex action in his own eye. Interesting are the 
changing jerkiness of the continual oscillations, the influence of 
fatigue, the reaction time, etc. It is noticeable, for instance, that the 
motion of the circles of light away from the center is greater than 
that about the macula. Again, the student will probably be surprised 
to find that, given a certain coordinated dilation with one eye closed, 
the opening of the closed eye brings about a quick contraction. He 
might have expected that, as the intensity of the sensation is not 
increased when objects are seen with two eyes, so the reflex motor 
effect would not be increased. 

The use of a single bead with two or three sources of light moved 
nearer and farther away enables one to light up surfaces of the 
retina with different intensities. This different lighting is an ad- 
vantage when one wishes to compare entoptic shadows falling on the 
outer portions of the retina with shadows at the center. If the light- 
ing be of the same degree, the central shadows are so much clearer 
that it is hard to pay attention to those away from the center. The 
difficulty may be partly overcome by strengthening the illumination 
which is thrown upon the outer parts of the retina. This advantage 
becomes quite important when one is trying to locate the position of 
the bodies which throw the shadows. Those near the center of the 
lens do not change their respective location on the different circles of 
light. Those in front move apart and those behind move together. 

In my own eye there is a fixed opaque body at about the center of 
the lens. A body like this enables one to confirm the blind spot. 
There is also a movable anchored body on the nasal side just back of 
the lens. I can throw this into the field of vision by a quick move- 
ment of the eyeball, and then it will slowly draw back out of sight. 
If the light be dimmed the iris curtains are drawn away and show it 

These circles of light give indirect information about the place 


of the veins and arteries that appear upon the retina when a light is 
moved about just below the pupil. The student will probably be 
surprised to learn first of all that none of the blood-vessels are made 
visible when the circles of light are thrown upon the retina from hi 
bead. Our method of studying entoptic phenomena allows a simul- 
taneous combination with Purkinje's experiment. The arbor-like 
branches will then be seen passing right across the circles of light. 

I will mention one more fact observed on using one bead with 
two lights, which seems to have a rather special psychological inter- 
est. If a light of a certain intensity is throwing a circle upon one 
portion of the retina and another stronger light is turned on to 
throw a circle upon another portion quite a distance away, there is 
an immediate dimming of the first circle. The dimming is of such a 
character as to appear to be entirely a peripheral matter and not 
due to mental interpretation from contrast. A possible analogy 
might be the disturbance of one current of electricity by the proxi- 
mat ion of a much stronger current. 

The same bead arrangement may be used to throw different colors 
from colored electric light globes upon different surfaces of the 
retina. These circles may be superposed, the different parts of the 
retina compared as to color sensation, the effects of contrasts brought 
out, etc. 




A PAPER of this same title which I offered a year ago met with 
a success beyond my expectation. It is something to have 
aimed at brevity and to be assured one has not missed completeness. 
Now there are a number of ways in which a theory of mind may be 
vitally amiss : in its epistemological background, in its psychological 
application, in its ethical consequences. Yet brief as was my exposi- 
tion, my critics gave me to understand that I had let none of these 
ways of going astray escape me. 

If then I return to my thesis, if I am led into an insistence 
neither justified by its merit nor excused by its interest, something 

1 This paper was prepared to be read before the Philosophical Association 
at Cambridge; but owing to a misunderstanding on the author's part was 
presented too late to be included in the program. With this explanation, the 
paper is offered without change of form. 


must be forgiven a scruple : I would make sure that my sinning was 
as round and perfect as my critics would have me think. 

As for background, it can not be painted in with a word or two. 
Professor Miller in the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY has called attention 
to the defects of an epistemology that would let one speak of mind 
as a trait of behavior, and I have met as best I could objections so 
well considered and so clearly put. 

This matter of background may then be allowed to rest for the 
moment, but it is with no little regret that I postpone the considera- 
tion of ethical consequences. For I was greatly interested in a de- 
duction of Professor Ormond 's making : One who regards mind as a 
trait of behavior, must he not hold that when the body is dissolved 
in death the soul that once inspired its outworn flesh is also dissi- 
pated and lost? 

I have spoken too hastily of criticism. Mr. Ormond would justly 
blame me for classing under this head remarks that were meant for 
no more than question. Mr. Ormond would be no more inclined 
than I to assume that a philosopher is bound to save his soul. On 
the other hand, I am at least as unwilling as Mr. Ormond could be 
to divest myself of any rag of immortality that may still cling to 
me in this cool age. But there are immortal souls and immortal 
souls. The learned in their high power of abstraction have pre- 
tended to find solace in the thought of a soul that, surviving the body, 
continues to enjoy all the individuality embodiment once conferred 
on it ; living on, I know not where ; experiencing, I know not what 
I can't think how. This very algebraic soul, this diagram of an 
ethical idea, my thought may inadvertently have rubbed out. If so, 
let that rest which never has rested. 

But simple folk too have their notion of immortality, and with the 
simple I would seem to have much in common. I should be sorry to 
feel that nowhere in my philosophy might I come across the like of 
that brave and kind soul which has gone marching on now these 
many years in the songs that men sing. Would you say that my 
thought had fallen into undignified ways if it sought this spirit in 
the very world that still sings its name, in the world which still 
holds a grave where its body lies a-mouldering ? 

Of all these delicate, difficult matters I would willingly speak 
another time. Just now there faces me an issue more vital than the 
destiny of souls after death it has to do with the nature of souls 
during life. 

To Miss Washburn, whose interest lies in comparing souls, I am 
indebted for a criticism that cared little enough what theory of 
knowledge may have gone before my thesis, what ethics might follow 
on it. Miss Washburn 's criticism aimed at things practical: What 


are you going to do with a being who thinks, but who exhibits no be- 
havior for the very reason that he thinks? What are you going to 
do with the passive, the utterly passive thinker? 

Before the Pantheon at Paris sits Rodin's image of the Thinker. 
I know that a statue doesn't really think, but I know too that those 
who think may sit as stonily statuesque as Rodin 's Thinker. Of one 
who has dared to suggest that mind is a trait of behavior it must 
inevitably be asked, What in the behavior of the thinker who doesn't 
behave is his thought? 

In the face of criticism so sympathetic and yet so thoroughgoing, 
it would be vain to point out the differences that make flesh not 
marble and marble not flesh. Of course the creature of blood and 
muscle is not wholly inert : his heart beats, he breathes, his eyes blink. 
More than that the dendronated termini of the axis cylinder proc- 
esses of his cortical nerve cells may now and then put forth a new 
shoot; at the very least, some molecules of him may effect an inter- 
change of atoms while he thinks. The trouble is that Miss Washburn 
refuses to identify any sort of a motion of atoms with a thought, and 
this makes the whole situation trying. If I say that the movement 
of certain atoms is what I mean by the behavior which is thought, 
the hands of Vogt and Biichner will reach out from Orcus and have 
me. If I refuse to say this, my own hands will seem to cast me off. 

One who has to surmount an obstacle of magnitude is entitled is 
he not to a running start, a start from old and settled things if any 
such can be found that hold an analogy? Now this image of the 
passive thinker does suggest to me something so old as to be almost 
forgotten it is the figure of dormant life. 

In the British Foreign Medical Review for January, 1839, ap- 
pears the review of a recent medical work. The author, Mr. Car- 
penter, had defined life as action and had shown so the sympathetic 
reviewer sums him up "that instead of looking for its cause in an 
imaginary vital principle . . . presumed to exist for the sake of ex- 
plaining the phenomena, we ought to study the properties which or- 
ganized structure enjoys and the agents which produce their mani- 
festation. ' ' 

Even to this reviewer of 1839 the idea that life is behavior has 
nothing new about it, for he continues, ' ' Some observations are made 
(by Mr. Carpenter) in refutation of the doctrine of a vital principle 
and we do not think them supererogatory ; for although the hypoth- 
esis would hardly have been expected to survive the fine scientific 
thrusts of Dr. Pritchard's classic weapon or the strokes of Dr. 
Fletcher's more truculent blade, it seems even yet not quite extinct."* 

M. Paine, Med. and Phyt. Com., I., 13. 


The theory that life was something other than behavior was not 
quite extinct in 1839! Will any theory that substitutes a Ding an 
sich for observable phenomena ever win to extinction? After dor- 
mant life comes passive thought. 

But to return to 1839 and the years that follow. Among our 
early American physiologists is to be numbered Martyn Paine, whose 
work is characterized by the late Dr. Gross as "of great scope and 
much erudition." Of much erudition, surely, and I beg to recom- 
mend Paine 's "Medical and Physiological Commentaries" to any 
in search of sources for a history of vitalism. Of what scope too 
I know to my sorrow. And yet of the pages and pages of erudition 
and scope would you know the one image that sticks firmly in my 
mind, Martyn Paine 's arm and shield against classic weapon and 
.truculent blade? It is just a seed, just an ordinary grain of corn, 
say. For one may defy the world to prove that this little dried-up 
thing is doing aught to support the hypothesis that it is alive. Yet 
one may take testimony of all the world that it is a living thing. 
Dormant life! What does it mean? It takes more than classic 
weapon and truculent blade to establish life as the thing Bichat de- 
fined it to be "the ensemble of functions that resist death." There is 
the seed corn that refuses to function, refuses to resist for what is 
there to resist and yet it lives ! But what in it is its life ? Ah, it is a 
certain principle called vital, dormant now, but only awaiting the 
right conditions to wake into the free gesture of life, into the blade, 
the ear, the full corn in the ear. 

So Martyn Paine. But is it hard for us, who are not of 1839 or 
1840, to see that the desiccated seed-corn is living not for what it 
does, if it does aught in a faint-hearted way to resist death, but just 
for what it might do? It is still on account of its doing that we 
call it alive ; but on account of its prospective, not of its actual doing. 
It is now alive, for we may now calculate from its condition what 
under other conditions it would do. 

If there is any analogy between dormant life and passive think- 
ing I take some comfort in the formula in which my thesis was pre- 
sented. Consciousness is behavior, if you will, but ' ' more accurately, 
our belief in consciousness is an expectation of probable behavior 
based on an observation of actual behavior, a belief to be confirmed 
or refuted by more observation as any other belief in a fact is to be 
tried out." 

If Martyn Paine had so viewed dormant life, he would not have 
felt the need of appealing to a vital principle. He would not have 
added this unobservable thing to facts observable in order to explain 
the meaning of the terms we use in describing these facts. If we 
can bring ourselves to view the passive thinker as we view passive 


life, we shall not have to add an "eject" or "thing-in-itself " to the 
behavior we see in him in order to explain what more than this 
meager behavior is the rich thought we attribute to him. We shall 
perhaps find that what we add to behavior actually observed is an 
actual calculus of probabilities; but the nature of this calculus de- 
mands the nicest analysis both as to the grounds on which it rests 
and as to the kind of test to which it can ultimately be put. 

To come at the matter from another angle : the analogy argument 
for other minds would not be so pernicious if it were not so true. 
It offers an accurate account of what I do when I furnish a passive 
thinker's mind for him, only it fails to suggest any grounds on which 
I may justify my doing; it avoids pointing out a way by which I 
may discover a mistake if I have made one or enjoy the sense of 
truth if I have hit on it. 

Yonder, say, is my thinker. It is of course the observation of 
past and present behavior that invites me to consider him as a thinker 
at all and may even suggest to me that his thought is dwelling on a 
mathematical problem. But sooner or later in defining his thought 
I venture a leap in the dark fill his mind with the kind of thing 
that goes on in mine. I am not justified by observation, but 
since I know that a mathematician can not think about mathematics 
in the abstract I give him a definite problem. He is trying to inte- 
grate a differential equation ; now he has seized upon a transforma- 
tion that looks promising; for a moment he hopes, in another moment 
he has cast the suggestion aside it has not worked. One may elab- 
orate to one's taste, one is still abstract while the fact before one 
must be concrete. Our mathematician is integrating? Very well, 
what is he integrating? Is it an equation of the third order and 
fourth degree, or of the fourth order and third degree, or of some 
other order and some other degree ? 

The obvious resource of one who wants to know is to ask the 
thinker what he is thinking about. Whereupon the obvious remark 
of one who regards consciousness as expected behavior is that one who 
so asks is appealing to behavior to confirm or refute his expectation. 
But such a triumph is brief. The man who replies is already other 
than the man who thought. He is in a more advantageous position 
than I to venture a guess in the same sense that he is better placed 
than I to see the wall behind my head ; but for him as for me it is 
only a guess. Memory is generally less fallible than divination, but 
it is fallible enough. Meanwhile if the question as to this thinker's 
past has a meaning it has also an answer and there is a definable 
method of arriving at this answer or at least of indefinitely approxi- 
mating it. An appeal to the thinker to tell us what was his thought 
can not give us the truth nor open a way by which we may approach 


the truth. The thought just past is lost in the infinite ocean of the 
past, the pebble just now dropped into this ocean is no easier of re- 
covery than is the treasure sunk there a thousand years ago. 

Let us then merge our present problem in a more general one; 
let us try to solve the difficult in terms of the more difficult; let us 
substitute for our passive thinker another hero. 

From certain letters of his, I judge that George Washington spent 
Christmas Day, 1790, at Mount Vernon. That there was a George 
Washington and that he was in a certain neighborhood at a certain 
past time an examination of now existing things will enable me to es- 
tablish. But what of his slave-boy Caesar? Was there such a slave- 
boy? At noon of this day was he in the kitchen of Mount Vernon 
helping the cook? And what was going through his mind at the 
moment? Was or wasn't it a thought of approaching dinner? 

These questions, humble in themselves, acquire an immense dig- 
nity when we realize that it tasks all our philosophy to answer them. 
Yet there must be a way of answering such questions, or else there 
is in the domain of reality such a thing as an unknowable fact. This 
is an equally portentous figure to introduce into one's philosophy, 
whether it stand for the being and thought of a slave, or whether it 
be taken for the hidden name of God. In either meaning, in all 
meanings, it is a term that I have long decided to leave out of my 
philosophy. The right to do so is one of those questions of back- 
ground with which I am not on this occasion dealing. 

For me, then, and for all who so far agree with me, there must 
be a way of reconstructing the past. Now the only way of recon- 
structing the past which science has so far developed is suggested by 
the classic saying of La Place: "Give me the mass, position, and 
velocity of every particle of matter in the universe, and I will pre- 
dict its future and recount its past." I say this utterance of La 
Place suggests a method of reconstruction : it does not define one ; 
he existed at a moment of the history of mechanics that took too 
seriously the conception of law at which it happened to have arrived. 
Of the refinements and generalizations that would have to be intro- 
duced in order to convert this suggestion into a definition, I have 
treated elsewhere, and as they do not affect the issue with which we 
are now dealing I shall pretend to take La Place quite seriously. 

If we do take such ideas seriously, we realize that the conditions 
on which the whole past may be reconstructed can never be realized. 
The data La Place asks for are infinite, the law by which he pretends 
to handle these data is a law that is known to hold only within limits 
of probable error which can never be reduced to zero. But what is 
interesting in the situation is that we can see no obstacle to the gath- 
ering of more and more of the data demanded, nor to the endless re- 


duction of the probable error which attaches to any law in which we 
propose to substitute the data gathered. 

We have here then a method of approximating indefinitely a cer- 
tain order of facts ; but alas ! it seems to be an order very different 
from that in which lay the facts about which we enquired. We 
asked, Did such a being live? Did he have such and such a thought? 
And we are answered, At least you may find out within any degree 
of accuracy required what atoms were in the neighborhood at the 
time you mention and how they were moving. 

I was asked at the outset, Is the movement of an atom a thought ? 
I was afraid to answer yes, and I was afraid to answer no. But 
such courage has come to me with study that I am now prepared to 
answer, yes and no. In order that this answer may not seem in any 
way ambiguous or evasive, I must explain that the movement of an 
atom is the movement of an atom and a thousand things beside. 

When my love swears that she is made of truth 
I do believe her though I know she lies. 

As these lines passed for the first time through the poet's mind, I am 
ready to believe any La Place who tells me that an atom of carbon 
in the poet's brain described such and such a path. But if the same 
reconstructor assured me that another atom of carbon, more like the 
first than one pea is like another, described just such another path as 
a certain lump of coal was being shot into my bin, I know not how I 
should disbelieve him. What then ? If moving atoms are thoughts, 
had not that lump of coal a bit of the poet in its make up ? 

Love, as our poet sings it, is not the only god that teaches the ear 
to be willing and the heart to accept truths it knows to be untrue. 
Mathematical science with its beautiful simplicity has a way of cast- 
ing spells as deep. The lust for mechanical images is as seductive to 
the intellect as are other desires to the flesh. One may laugh, but one 
may not by laughing cure. William James pointed out that the most 
ravishing music was after all but the rasping of hairs from a horse 's 
tail on the intestines of a cat. Plato, with gentler irony, had the 
Socrates of his Phiedo explain his situation in like terms. Why was 
he sitting there awaiting the cup, instead of flying to Megara or 
Bceotia? After all it was because his bones were at a certain angle 
with each other and his muscles drawn in such a way as to keep 
them so. 

Such sayings as these would be without humor if they were not 
true. There is nothing false in any of them or at least there is 
nothing more false than the recurrent "after all" which seems merely 
to introduce them. However, nothing can belie a truth as can the 
gesture with which it is presented. Granted that the poet, the 


musician, the moral being, is a congeries of moving atoms, is he after 
all nothing more? Gossmann in his Empirische Teleologie has a way 
of answering the question which has always seemed to me full of 
meaning. Because, he says, mechanism is allgultig it is not there- 
fore alleingiiltig. Mechanical insights give the truth, they only de- 
ceive us when we take this to be the whole truth. 

Now the vice of those who in the past have criticized the view that 
would treat mind as an aspect of mechanical behavior is that the 
critics themselves have been the slaves of mechanical and mathe- 
matical ideas. They have seen that there is a sense in which the 
movement of atoms taking place in a body can not be the thought of 
that body viewed as a thinker. They have proceeded with the in- 
stinct of a mathematician to add something, just as a cook whose dish 
is tasteless adds seasoning. But as they couldn't get the right flavor 
by adding more atomic movements, they added an "eject," a 
" parallel series," an " epiphenomenon. " 

My whole suggestion is that instead of helping out the shortcom- 
ings of a mechanical description of experience by the mechanical 
addition of something not falling within experience, we simply 
change our point of view toward the mechanism with which we are 
presented when that mechanism also behaves in a teleological way. 
Then we shall not be tempted, in trying to say what the movement 
of a certain atom of carbon has to do with Shakespeare's thought, to 
study its analogy with all similar movements of atoms of carbon in 
the wide world. If we insist on doing this we can not fail to arrive 
at the conclusion that such movements as a class have nothing to do 
with thoughts as a class. But then, if in order to learn what the 
turning of a certain wheel in my watch had to do with keeping time, 
I compared it with all the wheels in the world, those of locomotives, 
those of rapid-fire artillery, and the rest, I should have to conclude 
that wheels as a class have nothing to do with chronometry. 

I come back at last to my passive thinker. What I observe of his 
present behavior is not his thought ; what I expect in the way of fu- 
ture behavior is not the full meaning of his thought even though that 
behavior be a minute exposition on his part of what he believes to 
have been his thought; what I might observe of the minutest me- 
chanical changes in him is or is not his thought as I view it. Detail 
by detail these atomic movements may be classed with other atomic 
movements and the class has no common function. Putting all to- 
gether all that are contained within his skin I should think it un- 
likely that if they occurred within another skin placed in other sur- 
roundings they would work the same ends, be essential to the same 
activity of mind. But in so far as they are the mechanism by which 
the same peculiar aspect of teleological behavior may everywhere be 


worked out then I am willing to say, This is the behavior of the 
passive thinker that I mean by his thought. I should begin by look- 
ing for such movements of atoms as actually moved too slightly for 
us to notice it the organs of expression, the tongue, principally, and 
the eyes. Or perhaps I should find part of the movements to be of 
this nature, part of them such as strained the muscles that inhibited 
such expression. Either would be the first step toward a teleological 
interpretation of a mechanical event. But of these details I am not 
sure. To find just what that behavior is which others call the cri- 
terion of mind and which I call mind is a problem of long and care- 
ful analysis. For this analysis we must turn to the psychologist, and, 
above all, I have recently come to hope, to the comparative psychol- 
ogist. Yet even this hope must learn to be patient. When one passes 
beyond new observations to look for new interpretations one finds the 
shadow of the eject clouding fresh fields. 

"Bien entendu," writes Georges Bohn in a chapter discussing 
the "criteria of psychism" 8 "bien entendu, je ne parlerai pas ici 
de la conscience des animaux. Je ne la nie pas, mais je ne peux rien 
savoir a son egard. Je parlerai de psychisme, ce mot designant la 
complexity de phenomenes que je parviens a analyser plus ou moins." 

I can not think a metaphysics useless that might prevent a writer 
of the keen intelligence of M. Bohn from perverting his own sense of 
what words should mean to the use of those whom he occasionally 
refers to as "metaphysicians." In science as elsewhere it is not a 
bad thing to have one's courage with one, and a very little, I should 
think, would suffice to "deny" what one "will not speak of" what 
one can not speak of for the simple reason that one can know noth- 
ing about it. Isn't it saner to seek the meaning of consciousness 
itself among "the phenomena one can more or less analyze"? 




Elements of Physiological Psychology. GEORGE TRDMBULL LADD and 
ROBERT SESSIONS WOODWORTH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 
1911. Pp. xix + 704. 

The " Elements " has served a generation of psychological students as 
a storehouse of information, covering not only the phenomena of nervous 
structure and function in their relation to the processes of consciousness, 
but practically the whole domain upon which experimental psychology 
had entered at the time of its publication, embracing all the orders of 

"Naissance de I'lntelligence, " p. 111. 


sensation, perception of objects, the time-relations of mental phenomena, 
emotional states, the system of expressive reactions, and reproductive 
processes. If the great extension of research, not only into new fields, but 
also within each individual group of problems, be kept in mind, it is high 
praise to say that the new edition has fully maintained the standard of 
comprehensiveness and exactness by which the work was originally 

What this extension means in mere bulk and in the tax it imposes on 
the authors, in making the work representative of the status of research 
throughout the field discussed, may be inferred from a comparison of the 
number of sources cited in the two editions, respectively. In the old, 
there were some hundred and fifty, all told; in the new, considerably over 
five hundred, or well on for four times as many, appear. The increase in 
number of individual citations in the new edition is even greater than is 
indicated by a comparison of authors, for while in the original edition 
only one fourth of the names occurred more than once, repeated citations 
in the present mark nearly one half the names. 

Yet the bulk and weight of the volume have not been increased. The 
numbered pages of text in the new edition are less by one than in the old ; 
and while the total number in the revised edition is greater by some half 
dozen pages, the use of a thinner, but tougher and more flexible, paper has 
slightly decreased the thickness of the volume. At the same time, noth- 
ing has been sacrificed in the way of topographical excellence. The paper 
is solidly opaque and white, the type large and clear. The pages, also, 
are of the same size as in the original and the number of lines to a page 
remains unchanged. 

The subject-index of the new edition shows an enlargement even 
greater than that which marks the list of authors, increasing from about 
one hundred and forty titles to almost eight hundred, or nearly six times. 
When it is recalled that not only has the general product of experimental 
research during the last quarter of a century been added to the matter 
contained in the original edition, but that wholly new chapters have been 
introduced, such as the discussion of the process of learning and of the 
place of the nervous system in the animal kingdom, the successful 
confinement of bulk within the limits of an easily handled volume is 
the more remarkable. This has been accomplished in two ways. The 
more obvious of these is the omission of certain chapters of a more theo- 
retical or speculative character which leaves the empirical summation un- 
affected. The more important modification in this regard, however, is the 
painstaking economy of statement which is maintained throughout the 
work. How much has been done in this way, even in those parts which 
have undergone the least material changes or additions, can be appreci- 
ated only by a careful comparative reading of the two editions, chapter 
by chapter. The whole work is a close-packed compendium of research 
which represents nothing less than the history of physiological psychology 
during the past twenty-five years, the first generation of its continuous 
and general activity. 

What that period of time has meant in the history of experimental 


psychology in America, in its bearing both upon the general extension of 
interest in the study and in the development of the technical means of 
research, is indicated by a comparison of the place which American titles 
hold in the two editions. In the original work a half dozen such names 
occur, or one in twenty-five; in the present edition there are, roughly, six 
times that number, or nearly one fourth the total. Even allowing for 
greater completeness in the review of American literature, this change of 
relative position is impressive. Nor is the advance restricted to any indi- 
vidual province; it appears in the comparative study of organic types, in 
physiological research, and in the field of exceptional and pathological 
.phenomena as well as in the study of normal processes in the human 

The general arrangement of the original edition is retained without 
change. The summary of psychological data is supplemented by a de- 
scription of the physical basis of mental activities and by a discussion of 
the theoretical relations which exist between the two systems of phenom- 
ena. The work thus comprises three general divisions: first, a detailed 
account of the structure and functions of the nervous system; secondly, 
the presentation of the qualitative, quantitative, and temporal correla- 
tions of nervous and mental activities; and lastly, a consideration of the 
nature of mind in the light of the preceding discussion. 

The first part presents two departures from the first edition, apart 
from the many internal modifications and additions by which it is marked. 
The one departure consists in a transference of the two chapters on cere- 
bral functions from their original place in the second part to the close of 
part one. The change brings these chapters at last into a proper relation 
with the discussion of the mechanics and activities of the nervous system, 
to which the first part of the work is devoted. The second departure ap- 
pears in the introduction of a prefatory chapter on the significance of the 
nervous system in the animal kingdom, in which the different organic 
types are characterized as well as the general functions of nervous ele- 
ments, tissues, and systems pointed out. The chemistry of the nervous 
system is properly given a separate place (new ed., Chap. V.). It is not, 
however, the addition of a new discussion to the text, since the same prob- 
lem is treated in the first chapter of the old edition (" The Elements of 
the Nervous System "). The subdivision was desirable, not only in view 
of the more substantial knowledge now possessed, but also on the ground 
of improvement in the logical scheme of treatment. 

It seems to the reviewer scarcely correct to say in the preface to the 
new edition (p. vi) that " two entire chapters . . . have been added to part 
one," the second being chapter two (new ed.) on the " Development of the 
Nervous System in the Individual." The sixth chapter of the original 
edition entitled, " The Development of the Nervous Mechanism," is de- 
voted to this question, and its account runs parallel to that of the new. 
What does mark the revision is the greatly increased precision with 
which the intimate process of development is traced. The author of the 
original edition, limited by the results of investigation at the time, was 
able to follow, by contrast, only the gross features of the process. In con- 


eluding the chapter he adds the words: "All the coarser differentiations 
of structure to which reference has thus far been made are only the ex- 
pression so to speak of certain histogenetic changes which hare been 
secretly taking place." These changes are now largely an open secret, and 
it is in the detailed description of the histological development of the 
nervous system that the new edition differs from the old, rather than in 
the introduction of an organic part of the discussion previously omitted. 

The advance in histology is also reflected in the admirable and abun- 
dant illustration which accompanies this section of the new edition. It 
is shown, for example, in the description of the elements of the nervous 
system, 1 especially in the new series of cuts (Figs. 46-59). In the orig- 
inal edition there was not a single illustration of the minute geography 
of the nervous system and its elements which this series of figures repre- 
sents in such variety and detail. The evidence of progress in this direc- 
tion is not confined to a single chapter, but extends throughout the 
anatomical part of the work; compare, for example, as regards both text 
and illustration, the discussion of the microscopical structure of the cor- 
tical layers of the hemispheres. The full treatment of the nervous system 
from all standpoints structural, functional, chemical, developmental, etc. 
as an introduction to the psychological discussion of problems of psycho- 
physiological interrelation gives the work an independent value for the 
medical physiologist and alienist which no description of the purely mental 
phenomena could possess. At the same time the " Elements " provides 
only the general basis for the work of physician and psychiatrist since its 
scope is restricted to the phenomena of normal psychophysiology, a limita- 
tion which is strictly adhered to even when it involves the exclusion of 
data repeatedly dealt with in psychological laboratories, such as the influ- 
ence of drugs upon reaction times, expressive movement, and the percep- 
tion of objects and space relations. 

The second part of the work retains the arrangement of the original 
edition throughout. Its general subject is psychophysical correlation 
which is treated qualitatively in relation to three groups of mental phe- 
nomena sensations, perceptions, and representations; quantitatively, in 
the discussion of the psychophysic law, so-called; and temporally, in the 
review of reaction time and its complications. Apart from the revision 
and supplementation which mark practically every page, this section of 
the work is notable chiefly for the new matter added in the later chapters, 
in which are summarized the experimental investigations of association 
and memory; of the nature and forms of learning, both in man and 
simpler organic types; and of the mechanism of thought processes, atten- 
tion and its fluctuations, varied reactions, comparison, abstraction, and 
the forms of reasoning. 

In this central division of the work, as well as in the first part, certain 
general features of the revision may be noted. First, of course, is the 
great addition to the mass of individual observations recorded, but this 
is only the beginning of what the new edition represents. Equally strik- 

J Old Ed., Chap. L; New Ed., Chap. IV. 


ing is the reinspection within each individual field which, through its de- 
termination of the more intimate nature of the processes involved, has 
resulted in many important changes in our conception of the phenomena 
for instance, in the distribution of elements in the time-scheme of re- 
actions, in eye-movements and the visual perception of objects and space 
relations, in the orientation of the body and its sensational basis, etc. A 
thin! feature is the application of experimental methods to a larger range 
of psychological problems which is illustrated in the study of learning 
and the acquisition of skill and in the analysis of thought processes 
through controlled introspection. A fourth phase may be added, namely, 
the endeavor, in both sections of the work, to bring together the results of 
investigation upon human subjects and various types lower in the organic 
series, in order to achieve a more adequate view of the forms of behavior 
and their systematic modifications. This last point of view, however, is 
not maintained throughout the work, but rather appears as a conception 
applied in connection with specific problems, such as the development of 
a nervous system in the organic kingdom and the comparison of processes 
of learning in man and brute. 

In the third part, " The Nature of the Mind," the more theoretical or 
speculative problems concerning the relation of mind and body are dis- 
cussed in later and earlier editions alike. To this section in the original 
plan should properly be assigned the last chapter of part two on " Certain 
Static Relations of the Body and Mental Phenomena." The five chapters, 
which this rearrangement gives, are reduced to two in the present edition ; 
roughly, the discussion is cut down to one half its bulk. This modifica- 
tion is in service of the specific aim of the book, to confine attention as 
closely as possible to the summation of empirical investigations and the 
correlation of their results in descriptive and explanatory concepts. This 
reduction has made possible a very considerable addition to the facts dis- 
cussed, without increasing the bulk of the volume. 

Throughout the work the authors show an admirable common sense 
and succinctness of statement in their presentation of the multitude of 
facts with which, in its several parts, the work deals. In very many 
places a fine expository sense is necessary to set forth intelligibly the re- 
sults of complicated investigations without that elaborate description of 
methods and instruments which the scope of the " Elements " makes im- 
possible. In very many cases, also, a sustained critical judgment is es- 
sential to the appraisement of both methods of research and bearing of 
results upon debated theories. In all these ways the authors seem to have 
maintained an attitude for which they deserve the highest praise. 


Geschichte der Psychologie. OTTO KLEMM. (No. VI II. of the Series, 
" Wissenschaf t und Hypothese.") Leipzig and Berlin : B. G. Teubner. 
1911. Pp. 387. 
A general history of psychology, not limited to one period (like the 

work of Siebeck), nor to one nation (like that of Dessoir), certainly 


answers a felt need, and such a history is here attempted in commend- 
ably brief compass. No limitation of scope is stated by the author, but it 
is evident that he does not attempt to do justice to the most recent period; 
otherwise he would scarcely have sketched the development of experi- 
mental psychology with no mention of the work on memory; nor the de- 
velopment of individual psychology with no mention of Galton nor of any 
other author from 1782 down to Stern. Had he seriously meant to trace 
the recent course of psychological discussion, he would probably have 
deemed James worthy of more than seven lines and Ebbinghaus of more 
than five, and found occasion to mention such names as Ward, Stout, etc. 
The references to recent work lack balance and perspective, and the his- 
tory should properly be taken as ending at about 1870-1880. 

The older history is rather attractively told. There is, indeed, little of 
the personal note; biographical facts are usually limited to dates. A 
knowledge of the history of philosophy is presupposed in the reader, for 
the development is here traced topic by topic, a very serviceable mode of 
presentation, though it leads to some disjointedness in the treatment of 
related topics, and to the omission of any consecutive account of the 
psychology of such men as Aristotle or Locke. The main headings under 
which the subject is treated are: metaphysical psychology, empirical 
psychology (the faculty psychology, the inner sense, the association psy- 
chology, Herbart's psychical mechanics, comparative psychology, and mod- 
ern scientific psychology), fundamental concepts of psychology (defi- 
nition of psychology, consciousness, classification of the contents of con- 
sciousness, psychological methods, psychical measurements), the most im- 
portant theories (of sensation in general, of sight and hearing, of space 
perception, of feeling, and of will). 

The value of the different sections will, of course, differ with the 
reader; to the reviewer one of the most instructive chapters was that on 
the faculty psychology. Probably every reader will find many pages for 
which he will thank the author. 

Though the history of psychology, up to recent times, is closely bound 
up with the history of philosophy, the psychological importance of the sev- 
eral philosophers is by no means always proportional to their importance 
in metaphysics, and thus it happens that many an author who is passed 
over lightly in the histories of philosophy is worthy of considerable atten- 
tion from the psychologist. Such were, to judge from the present book, 
Alcahan, Buridan, Vives, Bonnet, names unfamiliar to the psychologist, 
but deserving to be brought to his attention. A defect of the book in this 
regard is assuredly the almost complete neglect of the Scottish school, 
with the exception of Hamilton. The eighteenth and first half of the nine- 
teenth centuries receive, on the whole, the most attention, and it is in 
regard to this period that the author's treatment is most valuable. Most 
of the psychological beginnings of the eighteenth century were, as the 
author says, submerged by the flood of critical and romantic philosophy; 
only the associationist psychology was saved by the continuity of British 

Objections might be raised at several points to the author's historical 


interpretations. His conception of the origin of empirical psychology is, 
for example (p. 45), that "inner perception first became aware of the 
greatest differences between complex experiences," and that the classes 
of experiences so separated were substantialized and made over into pow- 
ers or forces; and so arose the conception of faculties of the soul, a con- 
ception which, in spite of its scientific deficiencies, "was yet suited in a 
high degree to portray the course of experiences as they presented them- 
selves to primitive inner perception." It is improbable that the notion of 
faculties arose from inner observation, for when, in recent times, the at- 
tempt has been made to find the introspective differentia of judgment, 
will, memory, imagination, etc., no obtrusive and characteristic differences 
have appeared. It is much more likely that the faculties were from the 
beginning functions, performances, modes of behavior, and that they were 
distinguished not by introspection, but in terms of their end-results, even 
as the faculties of nutrition and reproduction were distinguished. The 
faculty psychology was based on a teleological classification, and this was 
its deficiency, since, being contented to define mental performances by 
their end-results, it felt no need either for introspective description or for 
a causal mechanics of mental processes. 

Again, it seems likely that in tracing the beginnings of modern scien- 
tific psychology back almost wholly to physiology and especially to Ger- 
man sense physiology, the author is guilty of a serious though common 
omission. Two other streams of influence have certainly been potent in 
producing the psychology of to-day. One is a biological influence, which, 
through Darwin and Galton, has given us our child and individual psy- 
chology, studies of mental heredity, of the correlation of abilities, etc. 
The other is a medical influence, very strong in French psychology, and 
probably traceable back to Charcot more than to any other one man. This 
influence, as every one knows, was potent in forming the psychology of 
James as well as of many living psychologists in all lands. Each of these 
two lines of study brought to psychology a wealth of empirical data as 
well as of problems and methods ; and though both of them have been and 
still more will be indebted to the experimental psychology of Helmholtz, 
Fechner, and Wundt, yet the historian must recognize their independence 
as sources of the fruitful empirical movement. 



Hegels Qrundlinien der Philosophic des Rechts: mit den von Oans redi- 
gierten Zusdtzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen. Edited by GEORG LASSON. 
Leipsic: Felix Meiner. 1911. Pp. xcv 4-380. 

The present edition of Hegel's " Rechtsphilosophie " is without doubt 
the most satisfactory that has as yet appeared: indeed, it will probably 
take its place as the standard text of that work. The faultiness of Hegel's 
original text (1821) has always been apparent enough: its defects are 
probably due to the fact that Hegel never read the proof-sheets a second 
time, although he had indicated many corrections and additions upon the 
first proof which made a second scrutiny necessary. At any rate, the text 


as it appeared was full of passages which have baffled the student and 
have been the vexation of translators. The only reconstruction of the 
text worth mentioning, during the ninety years since, is the well-known 
edition of Gans, appearing in 1833 and 1840, made familiar to English 
readers through the translation of Dyde. To be true, there is the edition 
of G. J. P. Bolland (1902), but this is based upon the Gans edition, and, 
while improving the text in a number of places, is hardly a critical at- 
tempt of a fundamental sort. 

The present edition takes its point of departure, not from the Gans 
edition, but from the original text of 1821. The editor has attempted to 
clear this text of its obvious inconsistencies and unintelligible passages 
and to make it the most readable text possible. This he has achieved, 
first, by adding words where they seemed necessary to the sense probably 
intended, and secondly, where this device failed, by downright alterations 
in the sentence construction. These changes, as well as the variations 
from Gans and Bolland, are carefully noted in a table at the close of the 
volume. Where words have been merely added by the editor, they have 
been bracketed. Thus, the Hegelian text is still kept apparent a care 
which Gans did not always observe, since he sometimes mingled added 
matter from the lecture-notes with the text itself, although he usually 
segregated them as addenda to the paragraphs they were meant to il- 

The present text, then, is essentially a critical restoration. However, 
the lecture-notes of the Gans edition are included; only they are here 
gathered together in a separate portion of the book. In the original text, 
Hegel had given a number of references to passages in his "Phanomen- 
ologie des Geistes " and to the " Encyclopadie." These references, which 
Gans for the most part omitted, are reinstated. 

The full and excellent introduction by the editor is especially com- 
mendable. Pastor Lasson is so well known as a sympathetic and patient 
student of Hegel, and has so clearly evinced his thorough scholarship in 
his editions of the " Encyclopadie " and of the " Phanomenologie " that 
one expects to find a luminous commentary in the first-hand analysis of 
the relation of Hegel's " Rechtsphilosophie " to his system as a whole. 
There is also a summary of Hegel's main positions in the book, as well as 
a section relating Hegel's views to the philosophic interpretation of his- 
tory, in terms of the characteristic Hegelian conceptions. 




1911. Psychopathology of Every-day Life (pp. 477-527) : ERNEST JONES, 
M.D. - According to the interpretations v:orked out by Freud many of the 
abnormalities of every-day life are determined rather than accidental. 
Examples of forgetting, lapsus linguae, lapsus calami, misprints, false 


visual recognition, mislaying of objects, and symptomatic acts, are cited 
with their Freudian explanations. Some general observations on the 
scope, possibilities, and influence of this kind of observations are made. 
Modifications of the normal routine of mental activity come as a result of 
a counter-impulse or as a restraint to some tendency associated with it. 
A Case of Colored Gustation (pp. 528-539) : JUNE F. DOWNEY. - A report of 
colored gustation like the more common instances of colored audition. 
The synesthetic factor is sensational in value. Often the color of the 
objects may enter into a fusion with their taste. A Note on the Con- 
sciousness of Self (pp. 540-552) : E. B. TITCUENER. - Several subjects who 
had been trained in experimental introspection report concerning the 
consciousness of self. It appears that self-consciousness appears inter- 
mittently in many cases. On Meaning and Understanding (pp. 553-577) : 
EDMUND JACOBSON. - The report of a study on the perception of letters, 
understanding of words and sentences by the report of what happens in 
a temporal order when certain stimuli are presented, also known as the 
Binet or Wurzburg method. Minor Studies from the Psychological Lab- 
oratory of Vassar College. The Effect of Area on the Pleasantness of 
Color (pp. 578-579) : DOROTHY CLARK, MARY S. GOODELL and M. F. 
WASHBURN. - Preferences are indicated as follows : saturated colors, small 
areas with the exception of red, a large area for tints and shades. Fluctu- 
ations in the Affective Value of Colors During Fixation for One Minute 
(pp. 579-582) : DOROTHY CRAWFORD and M. F. WASHBURN. - Associated 
ideas increase the pleasantness while adaptation seems to decrease it. 
Imitation in Raccoons (pp. 583-585) : W. T. SHEPHERD. - The raccoon 
does not show inferential or a high type of imitation. A Bibliography of 
the Scientific Writings of Wilhelm Wundt (pp. 586-587) : E. B. TITCH- 
ENER and L. R. GEISSLER. Book Reviews: W. Jerusalem, Introduction to 
Philosophy: W. H. SHELDON. Thomas Vernier Moore, The Process of 
Abstraction: W. F. BOOK. E. Toulouse et H. Pieron, Technique de Psy- 
chologie experimental de Toulouse, Vaschide et Pieron: E. B. T. Book 
Notes (pp. 600-604). Subject Index. Names of Authors. 

1911. L'intuition philosophique (pp. 809-827): H. BERGSON. -"To phi- 
losophize is a simple act " and the apparent complications of philosophies 
are superficial. While science seeks to obey nature in order to command, 
philosophy seeks to sympathize with nature. La logique deductive (pp. 
828-883) : A. PADUA. - An exposition of the latest thing in logical ideog- 
raphy. La mobilite chimique (pp. 884-903) : A. JOB. - In modern chem- 
istry the stable emerges from the unstable and the one is explained by the 
other. Etudes critiques. L'incoordonnable : A. LALANDE. Varietes. Ve. 
Congres' international de Progres religieux: I. BENRUBI. Tables des 
matieres. Supplement. 

Bosanquet, Bernard. The Principle of Individuality an'd Value. The 
Gifford Lectures for 1911. London: The Macmillan Co. 1912. 
Pp. xxxvii + 409. $3.25. 


Boutroux, Emile. William James. New York: Longmans, Green, & Co. 

1912. Pp. vii + 126. $1.00. 
Fouillee, Alfred. La Pensee et Les Nouvelles Ecoles Anti-Intellectual- 

istes. Paris: Librairie, Felix Alcan. 1911. Pp. xvi + 412. 7 Fr. 50. 

MacVannel, John Angus. Outline of a Course in the Philosophy of Edu- 
cation. New York : The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pp. ix + 207. $ .90. 

Ward, James. The Realm of Ends or Pluralism and Theism. The Gifford 
Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the years 
1907-10. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Cambridge: University 
Press. 1911. Pp. xvi + 490. $3.25. 


WE quote from an article in Science on "Pleistocene Man from Ips- 
wich " by Professor George Grant MacCurdy, curator of the anthropo- 
logical collection of the Peabody Museum of Natural History : " If the 
skeleton does not represent a burial and if the chalky sandy loam at this 
point is a part of the original mantel of boulder clay, then the man of 
Ipswich is the earliest yet found with the exception of Homo heidel- 
bergensis (Pithecanthropus not being considered as Homo). It would cor- 
respond to the latest eolithic horizon, the so-called Mesvinian, and would 
thus be somewhat older than the man of Galley Hill, provided the latter 
is properly dated. But as I pointed out in a recent article there is room 
for doubt as to the age of the Galley Hill skeleton. From the foregoing 
account it would seem that the age of the Ipswich skeleton is also still an 
open question. The importance of having expert witnesses present at the 
disinterment in discoveries of this class was perhaps never better exempli- 
fied than at Galley Hill and Ipswich. Their absence will, it is feared, 
always leave the shadow of a doubt as to the age of the skeletons in ques- 
tion; and doubt is a serious handicap in matters of such scientific import. 
If both these specimens are correctly dated, then there lived as contem- 
poraries in Europe for a long space of time two somatologically distinct 
races a primitive type represented by the Mauer mandible, Neandertal, 
Spy, Chapelle-aux-Saints, La Quina, etc.; and a modern type represented 
by Ipswich, Galley Hill, and possibly Bury St. Edmunds." 

THE Annual Meeting of the Western Philosophical Association was 
held at the University of Chicago on April 5 and 6. The following papers 
were read at the session on April 5 : " The Genesis and Functions of the 
Ethical Ideal," Professor George T. Kern ; " The Essentials of a First 
Course in Ethics," Professor G. D. Wolcott ; " The New Individualism," 
Professor J. H. Tufts ; " The Introductory Course in Ethics," Professor 
F.C. Sharp; " Some Points on Presentation," Professor J.H. Tufts; "The 
Content and Method of the First College Course in Ethics," Professor J. 
W. Hudson; "College Ethics for Freshmen," Professor B. C. Ewer; "Berg- 
son and Pragmatism," Professor A. W. Moore. On April 6, there was a 
joint session with the Western Psychological Association at which the 


following papers were read: " A Psychological Definition of Religion," 
Professor W. K. Wright; " Present Status of the Problem of the Relation 
between Mind and Matter," Professor Max Meyer; " The Two Theories of 
Consciousness in Bergson," Professor E. B. McGilvary; " The Mechanism 
of Social Consciousness," Professor G. H. Mead ; " The Paradoxes of 
Pragmatism," Professor B. H. Bode; "The Interpretation of Reality," 
Professor W. H. Wright ; " Cognition, Beauty, and Goodness," Professor 
H. M. Kallen ; " German Pragmatism," Professor G. Jacoby. 

IN a former issue of the JOURNAL it was stated that Professor Josiah 
Royce, of Harvard University, had been compelled to give up the course 
of Bross lectures on " The Source of Religious Insight." It should have 
been stated, however, that this course of lectures was given in full at Lake 
Forest College, Illinois, last November, and that the lectures are already in 
the press and are to be published shortly by Charles Scribner's Sons. They 
were to have been repeated by Professor Royce at Harvard, and it is only 
their repetition which has been abandoned for the present. 

DR. W. V. D. BINGHAM, director of the psychological laboratory, and 
professor of psychology and education at Dartmouth College, has been 
appointed director of the Dartmouth Summer School, which is to be 
reorganized and incorporated as an integral part of the institution's 
scheme of education. 

THE Rev. Casper Rene Gregory, professor of theology in the University 
of Leipzig, has concluded a special course of lectures at Western Reserve 
University. The lectures included a series of six on " Five Hundred 
Years of Science in Leipzig." 

THE Kaiser Wilhelm professor at Columbia University for the acade- 
mic year 1912-13, who is nominated by the Prussian Ministry of Public 
Instruction, will be Phelix Kriiger, professor of psychology at the Uni- 
versity of Halle. 

GILBERT MURRAY, Regius Professor of Greek, Oxford University, will 
give a series of lectures at Columbia University on April 15, 19, and 22. 
His general subject will be " Three Stages in Greek Religion." 

THE Section on Neurology and Psychiatry, of the New York Academy 
of Medicine, held a meeting on April 4. The subject under discussion 
was " Psychanalysis." 

DR. ARTHUR HOLMES, assistant professor of psychology at the Univer- 
sity of Pennsylvania, has accepted the post of dean of the faculties of 
Pennsylvania State College. 

PROFESSOR HERMAN HENDERSON, of the Wisconsin State Normal School 
at Milwaukee, will offer courses in the psychology of education at Oberlin 
College Summer School. 

A NEW scientific review, Bedrock, was launched in England this month. 
It is to appear quarterly, and is to be edited by a committee of five 

DR. WILLIAM WUNDT, professor of philosophy at Leipzig, has been made 
a knight of the Prussian order pour le m&rite. 

VOL. IX. No. 9. APRIL 25, 1912 



THE formal distinctions of epistemological theory are well worked 
out at the present time. All possible combinations of the 
terms of this discipline seem to have been discovered and cham- 
pioned. Each combination has points in its favor which awaken the 
sincere zeal of its champion. I wish to rise to a point of order. 
Have the postulates which lie back of these combinations been suffi- 
ciently examined? Is there, indeed, a cognitive relation either ex- 
ternal or internal? I am of the opinion that there is no such rela- 
tion. I shall now seek to justify and explain this opinion which 
seems, on the face of it, so revolutionary. 

Theories of knowledge are, first of all, divisible into two classes, 
those which hold cognition to be somehow immediate and those 
which regard it as mediate. Theories of immediate cognition may, 
again, be divided into two subclasses. One subclass is idealistic and 
asserts that an internal relation exists between the object and the 
knower or subject. There are many slightly divergent forms of 
this position, but, in essentials, the above statement is not mislead- 
ing. The second subclass is realistic and holds that an external 
relation exists between the object and the knower. By external is 
meant a relation which does not affect the object cognized. There 
are two current forms of this realistic subclass. The difference 
between them consists in their views of consciousness. The one 
considers it an actus purus externally related to the object; the 
other identifies it with the external relations supposed somehow to 
group objects selectively. Before we pass to a consideration of the 
mediate theories of cognition, let us ask ourselves what knowledge 
means for these realistic systems. Knowledge is the actual presence 
of reals. For the first view, consciousness in its relation to a thing 
accomplishes knowledge. The nature of the object is supposed to lie 
open to the mind and become subject to inspection. Things become 
transparent, as it were. Out of this peculiar relation, they are, for 
us, enveloped in darkness; in it, they stand in a glare of light. 



Knowledge is a presenting, an introducing, an intuition. The second 
position is even more skeptical of the traditional views of mind than 
the first. The emphasis shifts from mind as a knower to the objects 
known. Knowledge is a grouping of these objects. The theory may 
be designated selective objectivism and cognition is the selection. 

I wish now to call attention to a common characteristic of all 
these theories of immediate knowledge. They assert a real cognitive 
relation, external or internal, between the knower and the object. 
The only partial exception is the theory that tends to do away with 
the knower and to substitute a pan-objectivism. Even here, how- 
ever, a real relation determines a grouping although it does not 
affect the nature of the objects grouped. Such epistemological 
hypotheses are statements of our actual experience in terms of logic 
or, shall I say, in terms of mathematics ? They are professed trans- 
lations of natural realism. I suspect their correctness. What we 
actually have in cognition is an attitude towards objects considered 
real. Usually the attention is concentrated on the things and the 
attitude escapes notice. It lies in the background of consciousness. 
Even when it does attract attention, there is no experience of a 
cognitive relation between the individual and the thing. Awareness 
is simply an attitude towards things which is not supposed to affect 
them. Plans of action may come to mind and then the attitude 
becomes more complex; but always the objects retain their inde- 
pendence so far as awareness is concerned. It is, I believe, this 
character of cognition that makes realistic systems thinkable. The 
cognitive attitude involves a dualism and suggests no relation, ex- 
ternal or internal, to bridge it. This is a description of natural 
realism as I see it. Cognition does not imply a cognitive relation. 

Mediate theories of cognition are more complex than immediate 
theories. That fact is not necessarily in their favor. There are 
three important classes: the representative, the normative, and the 
pragmatic. Space forbids me to enter into the analysis which I have 
made of these. Suffice it to say that, in my opinion, they are all 
one-sided. But they emphasize some aspects of knowledge which 
must be borne in mind. 

Pragmatism stresses the mediate character of the objects 
known. It points out their history, the reconstructions they 
have undergone. Knowledge is an achievement and "ideas" are 
instruments for this end. This doctrine is rightly considered by 
Moore to be idealistic in the strictest sense of that much-abused 
term. The mistake made by the pragmatist is to confuse the re- 
flective attitude with the cognitive. He is so interested in the use 
of knowledge, its criteria, and the process of its achievement that 
he has overlooked the important stratifications and distinctions char- 


acteristic of the cognitive attitude. We must thank the realist for 
his counterbalancing emphasis on them. The reflective attitude is, 
strictly speaking, precognitive. 

The normative position brings us back from the process to the 
act. Its mistake is to misinterpret this act. It makes the object 
consciously depend on the "ought" of the subject. Here, again, 
there is a misreading of our actual experience. I repeat that the 
knower's attitude is one of acceptance of an object as being of such 
a character or as qualified in such a way. This attitude is modeled 
upon that of natural realism. It is dualistic and no cognitive rela- 
tion is to be found in the experience. 

The representative view is more complex. I shall not enter into 
the criticism which I must pass upon it. It is, however, the means of 
pointing out and stressing the peculiar phenomenon of doubling that 
seems to telescope itself into the apparently simple act of cognition. 
The distinction between thought, consciousness, idea, or concept and 
its object, which the human mind has been forced to postulate in 
order to account for error and for the mediate and personal char- 
acter of the content of knowledge, as against the supposedly com- 
mon and independent object known, is erected into a theory of 
knowledge. The real explanation of this distinction is entirely dif- 
ferent. It results from a duplication of the cognitive object. This 
duplication is due to the conflict between the cognitive attitude and 
the facts which emphasize the personal character of the objectivum. 
For instance, the objectivum can be considered mental and dependent 
and, at the same time, physical and independent of mind as the 
cognitive attitude requires. It is assigned to two spheres of exist- 
ence. The duplication of the cognitive object enables both motives 
to secure satisfaction. And they must both secure it. Hence even 
when we acknowledge the idealistic motives present in mediate 
theories of cognition, the structure of cognition remains dualistic. 

It is interesting to hunt for indications of the twofold use of 
the cognitive object, as idea and as object, in philosophic literature. 
Unfortunately idealistic motives and outlook so dominated the think- 
ers who came nearest to its discovery that its significance was not 
grasped. A critical study of Hume (Treatise, I., III., 7), Kant 
("Critique of Pure Reason," p. 483, Max Miiller's translation) and 
James ("Psychology," Vol. II., p. 290) is illuminating from the 
present point of view. None of them does justice to the structure of 
cognition. Professor James substitutes a psychological explanation 
of cognition for the cognitive experience. He comes much nearer to 
a realization of the duplication in the article, "Does Consciousness 
Exist?", but makes it an affair merely of context. The tendency 
to emphasize the influence of feeling and interest in determining the 


attitude and object of cognition is natural to a psychologist. The 
very terra, belief, selected as descriptive of the cognitive attitude 
inevitably leads to an analysis of these subjective factors. It is but 
a short step from this to the consideration of the object as merely 
an "idea" and the meaning of the existence of the object its relation 
to the individual's mind. We noted, in the discussion given to the 
mediate theories of knowledge, a similar mistake on the part of the 
pragmatist. The latter seeks to neutralize this result by a denial 
that there are individual minds. The mediation which leads to 
cognition overshadows the cognitive structure and meanings and 
causes their neglect or misinterpretation. In the very interesting 
and suggestive note in his "Psychology" 1 James discusses the 
existential judgment and decides that the distinction between it 
and the attributive judgment is superficial. We might suggest that 
the reason is not that existential judgments are attributive, but that 
attributive judgments are implicitly existential. Let us examine 
his argument: " 'The candle exists' is equivalent to, 'The candle is 
over there.' And this 'over there' means real space, space related 
to other reals. The proposition amounts to saying, 'The candle is in 
the same sphere with other reals.' It affirms of the candle a very 
concrete predicate, namely, this relation to other particular con- 
crete things." (So far we would agree with his analysis.) "Their 
real existence, as we shall later see, resolves itself into their peculiar 
relation to ourselves. Existence is thus no substantive quality when 
we predicate it of an object." This emphasis on the subjective is 
apparent in another place: "Reality means simply relation to our 
emotional and active life" (p. 295). He apparently agrees with 
Hume and Kant whom he quotes with approval. We must ask our- 
selves this question: "Is not James confusing two standpoints?" 
A thing is considered real when it does touch us vitally, but is the 
meaning of reality or existence that of a relation to ourselves! 
Existence is a meaning, unique in character, which does not affect 
the content of the object. It is not a determinant in the attributive 
sense. But it does qualify the whole object and give it a place with 
other objects of its own class. Things toward which we take this 
attitude are considered as real as ourselves. In this James is right 
when he says, "The pons et origo of all reality, whether from the 
absolute or the practical point of view is thus subjective, is our- 
selves" (p. 296). But the relations which we suppose ourselves to 
establish with such things are not cognitive. Cognition is a means 
towards the establishment of practical relations, but is not itself 
thought of as a real relation. We may suppose that cognition is 
impossible unless we are in causal relation with things by means of 

*Vol. II., page 290. 


our bodies, but cognition itself means a duality of equally real 
objects in which one takes a peculiar attitude towards the other. 
The cognitive relation, so-called, is either an intellectual, logical 
addition assumed because it is scandalous to think of two terms 
without a relation between them, or else the reading into the cog- 
nitive attitude of genetic relations in the precognitive stage, or else 
the shadow of the causal relation supposed to exist between us and 
the object. The first of these mistakes is made by the logician, the 
second by the psychologist, and the third by the scientist. All three 
are wrong. When we perceive an object or think of it, we do not 
have as an essential element a relation between the object and our- 
selves as knowers. 

If this interpretation of the structure of cognition is correct, im- 
portant consequences flow from it. In the first place idealism is 
robbed of the defense which has sheltered it for so long against the 
attacks of realism. Who has not felt the exasperating, baffling 
power of the dictum that we can not think an object except in rela- 
tion with a subject. This turns out to be merely a false rendition of 
the analytic proposition: We can not think of an object unless we 
think of it. Otherwise, the very nature of cognition is to recognize 
the independence and reality of the object. A peculiar, non-natural 
relation, such as the supposed cognitive relation, would be the very 
denial of such independence. It seems, then, that the subject-object 
relation is a dogma which has been an article of faith in the philo- 
sophic world. The nearest approach, hitherto, to heresy has been 
the doctrine of external relations. But such a doctrine is half- 
hearted. We need the complete and final heresy; there is no cog- 
nitive relation. 

Were we to accept the view that cognition is immediate and is the 
presence of an object to a knower, we would be forced to hold some 
form of naive realism. Once deny the existence of a cognitive rela- 
tion, if such is the view of knowledge, and no other course is open. 
The presence of objects to a knower would make no difference to 
them. He would be a spectator in whose field of vision they would 
come and go as people in a thronged street pass before the eyes of 
a stranger who looks out upon them from a hotel window. If cog- 
nition is the actual presence of reals to consciousness, idealism is 

But we have been led to acknowledge that cognition is mediate, 
not immediate. The idealistic motives, which the precognitive stage 
of reflective consciousness supports, are unaffected by the denial of 
the cognitive relation. The history of the material, the mediate or 
constructive character of the object, the fact of error, all induced us 
to refuse to acknowledge that the object present in cognition exists 


apart from the individual's mind. These facts, stressed so emphatic- 
ally by modern psychology and by pragmatism of the Dewey type, 
are the true defense of idealism. To what do they leadf We have 
claimed that they lead to a realism broadened by the inclusion of 
these idealistic motives and with a new conception of knowledge. 
Let us examine this more critical and indirect type of realism. 
There are many questions which it must answer satisfactorily if it 
is to justify itself. 

There is one problem which will occur to the mind of the reader 
almost immediately. In cognition does the mind transcend itself? 
Hitherto those who have denied the possibility of such a transcend- 
ence of experience have been idealists. How can the mind pass 
through the gulf of reality and touch things? To those who hold 
an organic view of mind, such a feat seems self-contradictory. Even 
revelation must be somehow immanent and adapted to the under- 
standing of the seer. The reply must be that such a transcendence 
is both thinkable and unthinkable. It is thinkable so long as we 
give attention to the cognitive attitude and its meanings. It is un- 
thinkable when mind is regarded as a realm of constructs and feel- 
ings, when it is regarded as consciousness in the non-cognitive, 
generic sense of that word. Real existents can not mix with mind, 
and knowledge is not a possession. Let us examine both aspects 
which have been so much confused. 

Transcendence is thinkable when we pay regard to the cognitive 
attitude and its meanings, for here the mind is a limited entity op- 
posed to that which is known as regards both content and existence. 
Of course the objects known could be called a part of experience, but 
the victory resulting would be merely verbal. It would consist in 
so stating the problem that it would be meaningless. We must 
admit, then, that the cognitive attitude makes the transcendence of 
mind thinkable. So long as the mind can be opposed to that which it 
knows in cognition the transcendence of mind is conceivable because 
it is seemingly a fact. We have, however, acknowledged that the 
cognitive object does not exist apart from mind even though it de- 
mands such an existence. This peculiar contradiction led, as we saw, 
to the phenomenon of the duplication of the cognitive object as idea 
and as object. As a result of this doubling, mind is enlarged to 
satisfy the idealistic motives and at the same time is opposed to the 
object as an independent existent. Cognition continues dualistic 
and, hence, realistic in its structure and meanings. The transcend- 
ence of mind is, however, unthinkable when mind is regarded as a 
personal system of ideas. 

The answer that critical realism must logically make to this first 
problem is evident. Knowledge does not involve an actual trans- 


cendence of the individual's mind, but it secures a reference beyond 
the individual's mind through the structure and meanings of the 
cognitive attitude. 

What, then, is knowledge and what is the relation of the cogni- 
tive object in the individual's mind to the real whose existence cog- 
nition demands? Knowledge is an achievement of the individual's 
mind working in collaboration with other minds in a more or less 
conscious fashion. The methods and tests used are immanent and 
arise in large measure from the material. When a conclusion is 
arrived at it is objectified, i. e., considered to exist as a quality, 
object, or relation in the sphere of existence presupposed by the 
nature of the domain investigated. When this domain is the physi- 
cal world, the construction is considered entirely independent of the 
mind which has elaborated it. There are types of knowledge of the 
physical world which are functions of our interest and our point of 
view. The usual type results from a collaboration between things 
and man. We do not attempt to separate out our contribution. A 
landscape is beautiful. The soft tones and harmonious outlines are 
assigned to nature. Esthetic knowledge welcomes this collabora- 
tion. The scientific type is dominated by another ideal, to separate 
out and remove from things evidently subjective elements. In 
neither type is knowledge the actual presence of the real in the mind. 
In both, however, the reference is realistic. 

We can turn now to the second part of the question under dis- 
cussion. What is the relation of the cognitive object in the indi- 
vidual's mind to the real whose existence cognition demands? The 
answer is simple and presents a negative reply to the question pro- 
pounded in the title of the article. In the case of physical reals 
there is no relation of a cognitive sort. The dualism of the cogni- 
tive attitude corresponds to an actual dualism. But a causal rela- 
tion of however indirect a sort between the real and a mind is a 
presupposition of the possibility of knowledge. This fact is ex- 
pressed by us in the causal relation assumed to connect percept and 
physical thing. This epistemological dualism is conceived by means 
of the duplication of the cognitive object into idea and thing between 
which no relation is supposed to exist. The preposition, "of," in 
the phrase "idea of" is not symbolic of any actual relation, but of 
a distinction between two spheres with different characteristics. 
These spheres are considered existentially distinct. 

The second comprehensive question which should be asked of 
critical realism is the following: In what sense does it differ from 
the idealism of the critical, phenomenalistic sort, from an up-to-date 
Kantianism, for instance ? The difference lies not in the content of 
knowledge, not necessarily even in the methods and criteria, which 


must be those of science, but in the reference of cognition and in the 
existential meanings connected with it. Idealism has entirely mis- 
interpreted the cognitive attitude. The Kantian phenomenon is the 
real as we are compelled to think it. Kant's interest in the process 
by which knowledge is secured, together with his leaning towards a 
Leibnitzian metaphysics, obscured for him the realistic import of 
cognition. The phenomenon is the thing-in-itself as we think it. 

The third question concerns the relation of individual minds to 
each other. Common sense and psychology hold that minds do not 
intersect. Critical realism agrees with this natural view and makes 
it comprehensible. Minds are microcosms whose boundaries are of 
their own making. Relatively to each other they live in a fourth 
dimension. But, since knowledge does not involve the actual pres- 
ence of the real, this pluralism is no barrier to mutual knowledge. 
What is required is actual causal influence and this is obtained 
through the body. Knowledge of other minds is, for critical realism, 
not a whit more mysterious than knowledge of physical reals. Were 
minds disembodied, there would, indeed, be trouble. As it is, our 
information is interpretative and comes through the channel of or- 
ganic activities and language. The cognitive reference and its 
mechanism is the same as for physical things. The knowledge of 
physical reals is, however, a means as well as an end in itself. This 
is seen in imitation and in the actual handling of things, or in 
pointing towards them to gain a common reference and under- 

There are many questions which could be raised and discussed 
in connection with this subject, besides those which I have attempted 
to answer here. But it is only the general epistemological scheme 
which I wish to present. I may state, however, that the import of 
this position for the categories is uppermost in my mind. 




/""CONSIDERING the contemptuous attitude of the average philos- 
^-^ opher toward algebra of logic, it is amusing to see "logicians" 
quarreling about so simple a matter as "inversion." Whilst some 
maintain, and "prove," that it is unconditionally possible, Professor 
Hicks 1 as stoutly maintains, and "proves," that it is unconditionally 
impossible. The whole matter seems really a mere trifle; but the 
clearing up of the issue may be undertaken as a very simple exercise 
in the "calculus of classes." 

1 This JOURNAL, Vol. IX., pages 65 ff. 


(a) The Universal Affirmative. Question: From "all A's are 
B" can we infer that "some not-A's are not-B's? Yes; provided 
"not-B" exists in the particular Universe of Discourse. 



and as 

AB' = (by hypothesis) ; 

:.A'B' = B' 

and if 

we obtain 

which is the required proposition. Note 1. If the "particular propo- 
sition" is taken to imply the existence of subject and predicate, we 
ought, of course, to add the second condition that not-A also exists. 
Note 2. Whilst not-B occurs in the first part of the proof, it is not 
necessary to assume its existence until we wish to make the final 
conclusion, which follows necessarily from the joint assertion : 

AB' = [all A's are B] 

B'4=0 [not-B exists], 

(&) The Universal Negative. Question: From "no A is B" can 
we infer that "some not- A is B"? Yes; provided "B" exists in the 
particular Universe of Discourse. 



and as 

AB = (by hypothesis); 

/.A'B = B 

and if 

we obtain 

which is the required proposition. Note 1. Same as above. Note 2. 


Whilst "B" occurs in the proposition itself, its existence is not 
thereby required, . e., if "B" does not exist, the proposition is 
"true" whatever A. But it is necessary to presuppose the existence 
of B in order to reach the particular proposition of the conclusion. 
Note 3. The "absurdities of inversion" mentioned by Professor 
Hicks (p. 67) all violate the condition: 5=f=0. 

Conclusion. "Inversion" is a valid process, provided the con- 
dition "not-5 exists" (for the universal affirmative), "B exists" 
(for the universal negative) is satisfied in the particular Universe 
of Discourse. " Inversionists " are wrong if they hold that this 
process is always valid; and Professor Hicks, who concludes that 
"we must discard the whole lot" (p. 70) is wrong also. 





THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Asso- 
ciation met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology 
and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences on Monday, 
February 26. The following papers were read at the meeting in the 
evening at the American Museum of Natural History. Afternoon 
and evening sessions are being planned for the next meeting on 
April 15. All those interested are invited to attend the meetings. 
The secretary will be glad to receive titles of papers which members 
or others may desire to present at the April meeting. 
The Influence of Narcotics on Physical and Mental Traits of Off- 
spring: J. E. HICKMAN. 

The purpose of the study was to learn if the use of narcostimu- 
lants (tea, coffee, tobacco, and alcohol) had any effect on the off- 
spring. The research extended over a period of four years. It 
included 306 families with 2,560 children ; 620 of this number were 
students of Murdoch Academy, Utah. These were carefully meas- 
ured by medical experts and teachers to get their physical and mental 
status. The measurements and examinations included height, 
weight, eyes, ears, nose, throat, teeth, heart, lungs, stomach, spleen, 
liver, kidneys, and nervous condition. A record of the death-rate 
in the families was obtained as well as a record of the student's 
intellectual standing. The students were divided into eight classes, 
according to the kinds and quality of stimulants used by the parents. 
The examination showed: first, that there was on an average a 


very decided difference between the offspring of abstainers and those 
of users, even where tea or coffee was used by only one parent, for 
the offspring of the abstainers were superior in size, intellect, and 
bodily condition to those of the caffein parents ; secondly, as the use 
of caffein was increased by the parents, from once to three and four 
times a day, a gradual decrease in height, weight, bodily condition, 
etc., of the offspring was manifest; thirdly, in families where not 
only tea and coffee were used, but also tobacco, the children were 
still more inferior mentally and physically, increasingly so with the 
increase of caffein drinks in connection with tobacco ; fourthly, where 
alcohol was used with the above narcostimulants the lowering of the 
physical and mental status was very marked. 

Comparing all the offspring of the narcostimulant pa'rents with 
those from abstaining parents, the latter were found to be better in 
all the 22 measurements than the former. Some of the differences 
were very great, especially in weight, height, eyes, ears, physical 
health, and rate of mortality. There are over 100 per cent, more eye, 
ear, and physical defects in the offspring of narco-parents. 72 per 
cent, more children died in this than in the abstaining class. 79 
per cent, of the narcostimulant families had lost one or more children, 
while only 49 per cent, of the abstaining class had lost any children. 
It was also shown that the death-rate of the parents in this latter 
class was 41 per cent, higher than in the former. The research also 
brought out the fact that it took the offspring of the narcostimulant 
parent eight tenths of a year longer to graduate from the grades. 
In the Academy they were on an average a year and seven months 
older than the students from the abstaining class. 

Visual and Auditory Memory: A. E. CHRISLIP. 

Experiments have been carried on in the psychological laboratory 
of Columbia University and elsewhere for the purpose of comparing* 
visual and auditory memory. The points investigated in the first 
experiment were to determine: the number of repetitions required 
by each sense to reproduce in a certain order certain total series of 
like construction; the average number of characters of a .series 
recalled in their proper order for each repetition of series of like 
construction for each sense; and to determine, if possible, the best 
material for testing the two senses. 

The material used consisted of numerals, nonsense syllables, and 
words. Series composed of 12 and 16 characters of each material 
were used in testing both senses. 

The result shows that when series of 12 numerals similarly con- 
structed were presented to the two senses, that out of 26 cases, 20 are 
visual, 8 auditory, and 8 show no difference. In the case of the series 


of 16 numerals, 19 visual, 4 auditory, and 13 show no difference. 
With 12 nonsense syllables there are 15 visual and 15 auditory, the 
rest showing no difference, but for 16 nonsense syllables, 25 visual, 
7 auditory, and 4 show no difference. With the 12 words there are 
14 visual, 10 auditory, and 12 no difference; with 16 numerals, 22 
visual, 9 auditory, and 5 show no difference. 

For each repetition of each series the result shows that in the 
memory tests for visual reproduction the greater average number is 
reproduced. The nonsense syllables were the best material, as they 
offered few combinations or devices for memorizing them. 

Experiments, in which stories of 100 words each have been used 
to test the two senses, have been carried on for some time. The 
two senses have been tested for both immediate and delayed recall. 
In both the immediate and the delayed reproductions the visual has 
been better than the auditory. There is an experiment now in opera- 
tion in which the method is somewhat different from that in the 
former experiments conducted with logical material. While the 
results are not all determined the indications are that the auditory 
may surpass the visual. 

The Hereditary Transmission of Mental Traits: HENBY H. GODDABD. 

It is not the purpose at the present time to present any results, 
but rather to make some suggestions and point out possible lines of 
research in the hereditary transmission of mental traits which may 
be of interest to psychologists. 

In connection with our studies of the cause of mental deficiency 
at the training school at Vineland, much material has been accumu- 
lated showing the hereditary transmission of deficiency. In connec- 
tion with these data many facts have come to hand which make it 
clear that not only deficiency, but many positive traits are directly 
transmitted. It is further suggested that psychology would gain val- 
uable data and contributions to many of its problems from a study of 
this question of heredity. Indeed, it seems quite possible that many 
problems which are now so complex as to elude our powers of anal- 
ogy would be easily analyzed if we were able to study the heredity 
problem and thus eliminate the hereditary factor. For example, if 
the goodness of memory depends, as Professor James said, upon the 
natural retentiveness of the brain tissue plus the logical association 
that the individual establishes, then we may reasonably expect that 
the condition of the brain tissue may be a quality that is transmitted 
and could be eliminated through the study of mode of transmission : 
or, in other words, we could determine to what extent the differences 
in memory are due to acquired factors. 

It would seem equally possible that sensory conditions may be 


traced through families just as peculiar eyes or eye sight, peculiar 
hearing, kinesthetic sensations, taste, or smell may be dependent 
upon organic conditions which may be found to be directly trans- 
mitted. The inborn habits or instincts are so bound up with 
acquired habits that it makes a very complex problem. It seems 
quite possible that a study of the instinctive activities of members 
of different generations might reveal to us a good deal about the 
nature of instinct and its transmission which would have very 
important bearings upon many of our problems of instinct and 
emotions. Even the study of such a complex problem as the inherit- 
ance of mental deficiency may possibly yield us some most important 

It seems hardly likely that mental deficiency is due to the absence 
of any one characteristic, but of several, and that it may be pictured 
more as though normal mentality is the result of a hundred factors 
of which a person must have, say, seventy-five in order to have what 
is called normal mentality. Now the twenty-five that are lacking 
may be any twenty-five, perhaps, in the whole list and a tracing of 
the hereditary traits might lead us eventually to determine some 
things about the resulting mentality when the missing factors belong 
to different groups. 

We shall work on these problems at Vineland as rapidly as pos- 
sible, but they should be studied in normal people as well. It is 
perhaps true that it would not be possible to go back farther than 
the living generations, but even so, if careful studies and tests were 
made of the mental traits in living persons, it would be possible to 
get the records of two and sometimes three generations, and these 
records could then be kept and supplemented as the years go by and 
the newer generations come on. There would thus be laid the basis 
for most valuable studies later on. 

The family histories, that we have secured in connection with our 
children at Vineland, suggest two or three interesting questions. 
For instance, there are several families in which alcoholism is strong 
in several generations. It is possible that we have in these families 
an unusual appetite for alcohol, which appetite has been transmitted. 
It looks as though it would not be impossible to eliminate to quite an 
extent the environmental factor, and so be able to determine whether 
this was hereditary or not. The same is true of the sexual life. 
A great many charts show very much sexual immorality: and pos- 
sibly here we may have, in some cases at least, an unusual develop- 
ment of the sex instinct which has broken over all bounds of con- 
ventionality and has shown in different generations. It appears that 
all of these problems are not only worthy of study, but might yield 


most important results. The speaker then showed graphic charts 
illustrating the family histories of a number of families. These 
charts showed the strong inheritance of feeble-mindedness and also 
illustrated the points made in regard to alcohol and sexuality. Con- 
siderable discussion followed. 




Einleitung in die Philosophic. HANS CORNELIUS. Zweite Auflage. 
Leipzig und Berlin: Druck und Verlag von B. G. Teubner. 1911. 
Pp. xv + 376. 

The philosophic individuality of Cornelius is the synthesis of two 
apparently antagonistic modes of thought: it has been molded by the 
same tendencies that shaped the anti-metaphysical methodology of Mach ; 
but as Cornelius rightly insists (pp. 211, 343) it bears not less clearly 
the stamp of Kant's transcendental logic. By regarding the Einleitung 
from this point of view as an independent philosophic complement of 
Mach's positivism we shall probably best succeed in fixing its place in 
contemporaneous literature. 

Perhaps no living thinker has proved so baffling to professional philos- 
ophers as Ernst Mach; perhaps no one has to such extent evoked what I 
should call " the metaphysician's fallacy." For Mach's method of pro- 
cedure is the method of the natural scientist: he investigates his prob- 
lems, one by one, according to the peculiar conditions of the case, without 
regard to whether his conclusions fit into a preconceived system. It is 
but necessary for the critic to assume that such a system exists and noth- 
ing is easier than to prove inconsistencies. What Mach attempts, how- 
ever, is not a system of philosophy, but a methodology. Those critics 
have never comprehended the trend of Mach's thinking who attach an 
exaggerated, quasi-metaphysical meaning to his " sensations " or " ele- 
ments." For Mach, his elements are not absolute, but provisional units. 
Nor does he suppose for a moment, as even so friendly a critic as Dr. 
Cams assumes, that the elements are immediate data of consciousness. 1 
The cardinal point lies in the definition of scientific endeavor as a pro- 
gressive determination of the functional relations of the elements. For 
this definition at once eliminates as utterly idle all such concepts of pop- 
ular philosophy as the ego, the Ding an sich, or the principle of causality, 
and thus constitutes the core of Mach's anti-metaphysical positivism. 

This methodological standpoint alone does not, of course, account for 
the origin of these popular concepts and Mach himself has indicated that 
it is obligatory to investigate what functional relations of the immediate 
data necessitated these methodologically no longer valuable concepts.* 

1 " Erkenntnis und Irrtum," 1906, pages 12, 16. 
*Loc. tit., page 13. 


This genetic inquiry, it must be admitted, Mach has rather suggested 
than undertaken in detail from a uniform psychological point of view. 
But in still another direction it was possible to supplement Mach's investi- 
gations. Mach rightly repels the criticism that his psychology ignores 
the spontaneous activity of the human mind; indeed, his emphasis of the 
principle of the economy of thought suffices to refute the accusation. 
Nevertheless, the formal peculiarities of Mach's presentation lend some 
color to the charge, and his definitions of consciousness might be misin- 
terpreted by prejudiced critics as a relapse into atomistic and passivistic 

No such misinterpretation would be possible in the case of Cornelius. 
In the center of his philosophy stands Mach's principle of the economy 
of thought, which is, however, at once recognized as but another expres- 
sion of the unity of consciousness. This principle explains at the same 
time the efforts of prescientific thought, the historical attempts at meta- 
physical unification, and the scientific striving for a view of the universe. 
The weakness of primitive and of metaphysical speculation lies in the 
fact that both make uncritical employment of traditional, popular (" nat- 
uralistic ") concepts. The investigation of the legitimacy of these con- 
cepts, that is, of their origin and empirical meaning such as the concepts 
of the persistent external world, of the reality of space and time, of 
causality, and of the ego coincides with the coming of age of philosophy, 
its transition from dogmatism into empiricism, from the metaphysical 
into the epistemological stage. The naturalistic concepts lead to prob- 
lems insoluble, not from any deficiency of the human intellect, but because 
of the erroneous assumptions involved in their formulation (Schein- 
probleme). These stumbling-blocks can be removed only by a general 
inquiry into the mechanism of thought, by a natural history of human 
thought. Such an investigation will not aim at a purely destructive 
annihilation of the popular view of the world, but at a genetic under- 
standing of that view and its clarification through the elimination of 
dogmatic elements. It must indeed be idealistic in the sense that it will 
proceed from the data of consciousness, which alone furnish the material 
for the structure and the totality of factors for the development of our 
world-view. Instead of denying, however, the existence of an objective 
world, it will merely attempt to show from what facts this concept is 
derived and thus determine its purely empirical significance. Cornelius's 
epistemology is thus emphatically psychologistic, not in the sense of rest- 
ing on special theories of psychic phenomena, but in the sense in which 
all epistemology, tacitly or explicitly, must be psychologistic in being 
based on an unprejudiced analysis and description of the immediate facts 
of consciousness (pp. 55 f.). And here what at once distinguishes Cor- 
nelius's psychology from an atomistic view is his emphatic and never- 
ceasing consideration of "die Factoren des Zusammenhangs der Erfahr- 
ung " those factors which Hoffding has conveniently included under the 
concept of the formal unity of consciousness.* 

Cornelius begins his inquiry with a consideration of the psychological 

1 " Psychologic in Umriasen," page 186. 


theories developed by the English thinkers of the seventeenth and eight- 
eenth centuries. This naturally leads to a critique which merely expresses 
the general consensus of modern psychologists as to the failure of the 
association theory to account for the distinctively synthetic peculiarity of 
consciousness (pp. 196 ff.). It is the faulty psychology of the associa- 
tionist school that resulted in the skeptical conclusions of their philos- 
ophy ; for a theory which from the start limits our knowledge to isolated, 
momentary perceptions, impressions, and ideas, can not arrive at a positive 
theory of generally valid knowledge (p. 208). 

The way to correct Hume's philosophy, therefore, is to correct the 
faults of his psychology. What we actually find in consciousness is not 
a mere sum of unrelated impressions and ideas out of which our experi- 
ence shapes itself by virtue of the laws of association, but a unified whole. 
The point is to ascertain those facts which may be noted in any period of 
consciousness over and above the isolated elements of experience. The 
first synthetic factor described by Cornelius produces the recognition of a 
definite part of the stream of consciousness as marked off from its sur- 
roundings. A second factor connecting the otherwise isolated elements of 
experience is the symbolic function of memory images. By means of this 
function we transcend the limitations of the present moment and form an 
idea of a past experience as a past experience. A third factor enables us 
to classify every new sensation and complex of sensations, to recognize it 
as similar to previous experiences or complexes of experiences. These 
synthetic factors correspond to Kant's synthesis of " intuitive apprehen- 
sion," " ideational reproduction," and " conceptual recognition," and in 
Kant's deduction of the categories of the understanding from the unity of 
consciousness Cornelius recognizes the historically first attempt in his 
own direction (p. 228). 

Without the facts conditioned by the synthetic factors, a unified 
experience would be impossible. They determine the most general laws of 
conscious phenomena among them the recollection and recognition of 
complexes. All our experiences are parts of complexes, and are remem- 
bered as parts of complexes. The law of association by contiguity is a 
special instance of the general law that every experience (Erlebnis) is 
merely part of a larger complex (p. 234). Similarly, the law of asso- 
ciation by similarity is merely an expression of the same principle : we do 
not merely recollect a past experience similar to a present one, but also 
distinguish it as past by recalling at the same time the associated elements 
of the past complex. Both laws axe not, as might be supposed on the 
basis of the old associationist school, alien forces regulating the course of 
conscious states, but laws immanent in all consciousness consequences of 
those factors without which even the simplest case of unified conscious- 
ness would be inconceivable (pp. 207, 236 f.). Cornelius's account of 
these laws thus recalls that of Huff ding, who similarly views association 
as but a special form of synthesis. 4 

Having enumerated the synthetic factors and their consequences, 

Loc. cit., page 219. 


Cornelius turns to the problem of the development of our concepts and 
judgments through these factors. In the assimilation of any new experi- 
ence, we proceed in one of two ways. We either confine ourselves to 
classifying it as similar with certain previous experiences; or, we step 
beyond the mere classification of our experience and infer that it forms 
part of a complex of other experiences. The concepts formed in these 
ways Cornelius describes as falling into two distinct categories : perceptual 
concepts (Wahrnehmungsbegriffe) and experiential concepts (Erfahr- 
ungsbegriffe). To subsume a given portion of my visual field under the 
perceptual concept " whiteness " is one thing ; to infer, beyond the imme- 
diate data, that whiteness represents " white chalk " constitutes the quite 
different step of subsuming under an experiential concept. The second 
process always takes place when we refer an impression to a persistent 

For the explanation of the development of our knowledge Cornelius 
introduces the concept of " configuration," Gestaltqualitdt. By this he 
understands those characteristics which define a complex as a complex, 
that is, as different from a mere summation of its elements. The signifi- 
cance of this concept results from the fact that all the contents of our con- 
sciousness are parts of complexes and as such possess relation fringes due 
to the configuration of their complexes. Among the concepts of complex- 
characteristics there are some relating to the modes of connection of our 
experiences in so far as these modes have their foundation in the unity of 
consciousness. As every one of our experiences must be connected with 
other experiences in these particular ways, these " relation-concepts " are 
applicable to all experience, and the judgments based on them are neces- 
sarily valid for all possible experience, regardless of the nature of the 
contents of the experiences. Borrowing Kant's term, Cornelius accord- 
ingly refers to these concepts as general modes of intuition. From these 
he eliminates Kant's spatial mode, first, because haptic and optic space 
are not immediately connected as parts of the same space and are not 
three-dimensional ; secondly, because even in the field of sensation, sounds 
are arranged without spatial order, while the same applies to the relations 
of sensations to memory images, or of sensations, judgments, and feelings 
(pp. 252 f.). On the other hand, Cornelius includes among his modes of 
intuition not only time, but also the concepts of totality and partiality, 
unity and plurality, similarity and equality, constancy and mutability, 
as well as the direction of the changes. 

This grouping suggests Ebbinghaus's treatment of the same intuitions 
as " the general attributes of sensations." Cornelius's discussion of this 
subject is probably the least satisfactory portion of his work. There is no 
serious attempt to justify the coordination of the other modes of intuition 
with that of time. It is perfectly true, for example, that the concept of 
similarity is applied to every possible experience in the sense that every 
experience is classified with reference to its resemblance to previous ex- 
periences that the apprehension of similarity may be described as merely 
an expression of the unity of consciousness. But this immediate classi- 


fication does not involve the construction of a continuum in which " alleg 
Afannigfaltige der Erscheinungen in gewixsen Verhaltnissen angeschauet 
wird." While time is, in Hoffding's phrase, a typical individual idea, all 
the several times experienced being but parts of the same time, this does 
not apply at all to similarity. In a previous section (p. 245) Cornelius 
himself very clearly distinguishes between similarity as an immediate 
datum of consciousness and the abstract concept of similarity. The 
abstract concept of similarity naturally comprises as a concept all possible 
special cases of similarity; but of course it is not present in all conscious 
phenomena. The apprehension of similarity, on the other hand, is indeed 
coextensive with consciousness, but each such apprehension is distinct from 
every other, and consequently it is not justifiable to speak of similarity 
as a general mode of intuition. So far as the exclusion of space from 
the universal modes of intuition is concerned, Cornelius's reasons quite 
irrespective of the justice of his conclusions can not be considered satis- 
factory. In limiting psychological space to two dimensions, the author 
certainly finds himself in excellent company, but an indication that other 
views are held would have been in place in a treatment which allegedly 
rests on the facts rather than the special theories of psychology. The 
same criticism applies to the denial of spatial quality to sensations of tone. 
If a psychologist like Wundt insists that we can not hear tones without 
localization,* such opinions can not be disregarded without some critical 
discussion. It would have been better and fairer to explain on what psy- 
chological assumptions space could not be regarded as a universal mode, 
and under what assumptions it must be regarded in this light. 

Having disposed of the purely classificatory perceptual concepts, Cor- 
nelius turns to the second category of experiential concepts. We con- 
tinually complement the given perceptions by referring them to constant 
objects, that is, by associating them with characteristics not immediately 
given to us, which is equivalent to associating them with possible future 
experiences. It is the synthetic character of consciousness that leads us 
to view every experience as a member of a complex. Our expectations 
as to the experiences linked with a given experience are defined in some 
measure by the knowledge that it has hitherto appeared only in a certain 
definite series. If an initial member common to several known series is 
linked with final members varying with intermediate members, the latter 
are recognized as conditions of the final links and determine the nature 
of our expectations. The complementary activity which forms experien- 
tial concepts and explains isolated phenomena by connecting them with 
others is nothing but a resume of our past experience and the expectation 
of future events in accordance with the past. The shorthand description 
of experience synonymous with the application of the principle of economy 
of thought is also identical with the formation of experiential concepts 
(p. 263). As the concept of a constant object implies nothing but the 
sum-total of its constant properties, what applies to the latter also applies 

' ' Ohne irgendeine Localisation Iconnen wir auch Tone nicht horen. ' ' In 
"Waa soil uns Kant nicht oeinf " Kleine Schriften, 1910, I., page 160. 


to the former: it expresses nothing but a series of definitely connected 
phenomena. To attribute reality to an object regardless of our perception 
of it simply means, as Hume failed to notice, that we connect our varying 
percepts with the same context of other percepts of the object. Kant cor- 
rectly explained the belief in the reality of objects, but failed to note that 
in so doing he had already explained that constant which an earlier philos- 
ophy postulated as an unknowable noumenon. By supposing that objects, 
as complexes of phenomena, must be phenomena of something else of an 
ever transcendent Ding an sich Kant relapsed into naturalistic philos- 
ophy (p. 277). The opposition thus engendered between noumena and 
phenomena is quite illusory. The foregoing considerations immediately 
eliminate two supposed problems which have disturbed the philosophers of 
many ages as to the connection between subject and object (" Ver- 
mittlungsprobleme"). As the concept of reality is constructed solely out 
of our subjective data, the problem how we can recognize the objective 
world despite the subjective conditions of our knowledge disappears, 
because it is seen to invert the actual conditions of the case. On the other 
hand, there also disappears the impassable barrier between the physical 
and the psychical world which is inevitably encountered on the dogmatic 
assumption of objective reality. As Cornelius puts it: " zu fragen, wie 
es Jcomme, doss das Ding durch die Sinnesorgane auf unser Bewusstsein 
wirTce, heisst also soviel als fragen, wie es Icomme, dass der gesetzmdssige 
Zusammenhang unserer Sinneswahrnehmungen, welchen wir erfarhrungs- 
massig erkannt und in bestimmter Weise bezeichnet hdben, wirklich eben 
dieser Zusammenhang unserer Wahrnehmungen ist" (p. 280). 

Cornelius fully recognizes that his investigation of the mechanism of 
concept-formation is purely psychological. Accordingly he now turns to 
the logical question of the validity of our concepts and judgments. After 
briefly sketching the psychology of the confirmation or repudiation of 
specific judgments, he arrives at the conclusion that judgments are of 
general validity only if the conditions defined in their formulation them- 
selves determine quite generally the nature of the experiences to be ob- 
served under those conditions. This is true of analytical judgments ; and 
also of the synthetic judgments resting on Cornelius's first category of 
concepts (Wahrnehmungsbegriffe), for the "knowledge of acquaintance" 
with any phenomenon that can be subsumed under a perceptual concept 
completely exhausts the possibilities of such a phenomenon. That spectral 
green resembles blue more closely than red is not an analytic judgment, 
because it does not follow from the definition of " green " ; nevertheless it 
is a statement of universal validity. This is not true of the experiential 
judgments, of our "laws of nature," for the observation of innumerable 
past experiences does not seem to establish the validity of a prophecy as to 
future experiences of a similar character. Observations contrary to past 
experience disturb our mental equilibrium, which can be readjusted only 
by bringing both the ordinary observation and the deviations from it 
under. a common law. This is done by correlating the usual experience 
with a formerly unnoticed condition, a change in which results in a dif- 


ferent experience; in such cases we speak of the cause of the changed re- 
sult. The principle of causality thus embodies merely the demand in- 
dispensable for the unity of our experience that all phenomena shall be 
arranged in constant empirical combinations. Accordingly, this prin- 
ciple has absolute validity and likewise defines the validity of our experi- 
ential laws: they are valid in so far as a hitherto unobserved cause does 
not produce an alteration. The category of causality is thus founded in 
the synthetic factors of consciousness (pp. 297-307). 

There remains to be explained the naturalistic concept of the ego. As 
we distinguish from the varying perceptions of an object the persistent 
object of the external world, so we develop the concept of a permanent ego 
as opposed to the flux of conscious phenomena. As in the former case, 
Cornelius identifies the concept of a persistent reality with the formation 
of concepts of his second category. Any single state of consciousness is 
found in a definite connection with past states of consciousness, not im- 
mediately experienced, but in some measure determining it. These defi- 
nite connections constitute the constant factors of our personality and 
may be described as " unconscious psychic facts," provided this phrase is 
taken merely as an abbreviated designation for definite, regular combina- 
tions of conscious phenomena, just as the concept of an objective thing is 
used merely to denote a definite connection of phenomena (pp. 314 f.). 

The subject of the ego naturally leads the author to consider two re- 
lated problems the relation of mind and body and the knowledge of alien 
consciousness. On both these questions Cornelius develops views of ex- 
traordinary sanity. The solipsistic view can not be refuted, because the 
direct experience of alien conscious states is forever precluded. On the 
other hand, the association of certain outward manifestations with con- 
sciousness is in consonance with the scientific, as well as prescientific, 
application of the principle of the economy of thought. Further, it is not 
a metaphysical association, because the concept of alien consciousness, 
being patterned on our own, does not transcend experience (pp. 329-332). 
With regard to the relation of mind and body, Cornelius admits psycho- 
physical parallelism for sensations; "well die physischen Vorgange ihrem 
Begrifie nach nichts Anderes sind, als die gesetzmdssigen Zusammen- 
hange, denen wir unsere Empfindungen einordnen" (p. 319). But it is 
not true that the parallelism of ideation and of physiological processes is 
an empirical fact. An analysis of the psychophysiology of the reflex arc 
leads to the result that while central nervous paths are intermediaries of 
sensation and movement, there is nothing to prove that they correspond 
to the psychological act of association following the sensation. Patholog- 
ical cases are likewise inadequate to prove the point. So far as brain dis- 
ease is not definitely observed, the assumption that a psychic derangement 
is necessarily due to a cerebral anomaly is a pure dogma. But, even when 
an affection of the brain is definitely ascertained, it might be supposed 
that the disease conditions an alteration of the sensation rather than of 
the relevant associations. Which of these views represents the facts can 
not be determined, and accordingly the general question whether psycho- 


physical parallelism holds for psychic facts beyond sensations and feelings 
remains unsolved. That the course of ideation depends on sensations and 
is thus indirectly conditioned by physiological processes, is readily ad- 
mitted (pp. 32&-32S). The constant factors of psychic life are by defi- 
nition independent of physiological alterations. This does not mean that 
the course of ideation is similarly independent, for those constant factors 
are precisely what the stream of ideas (Vorstellungsablauf) does not con- 
sist in. Accordingly, Cornelius infers from the independence of the con- 
stant factors that psychic life does not necessarily disappear with its 
physiological substratum. Inasmuch, on the other hand, as the constant 
factors are not themselves conscious experiences, but only conditions of 
such, it is equally inadmissible to infer the persistence of psychic life 
after death from the constancy of those factors. This argument is not 
particularly cogent. The constant factors are conditions, but they are not 
fully determining conditions, of consciousness. Psychic life involves a 
stream of ideas admittedly dependent though only indirectly on physio- 
logical conditions. The cessation of these conditions, it would seem, must 
necessarily result in a cessation of conscious phenomena. Indeed, if the 
constant " unconscious " factors are nothing but our experiences as to 
definite combinations of conscious phenomena, if consciousness is un- 
thinkable without feelings, and the latter are admittedly dependent on 
physical conditions (p. 319), it is not at all clear how consciousness could 
survive death. 

The " empiricist picture of the universe " sketched by Cornelius 
towards the close of his book (pp. 332348) has already been sufficiently 
indicated in the preceding pages. The recognition of all our laws as 
merely abbreviated expressions for our experiences eliminates all the il- 
lusory problems based on the uncritical assumption of the naturalistic 
concepts. Thus, Kant's first antinomy is now found to rest on the natural- 
istic concept of the universe as an immediate datum of knowledge. If we 
conceive the world merely as a resume of our experiences, its existence 
can not extend beyond the ordering of our experiences in accordance with 
the categories of our thinking, and instead of regarding it as infinite, we 
can state only that our increasing experience is nowhere hemmed in by 
any limits. This position eliminates the possibility of satisfying the 
metaphysical demand for a unification of the entire universe, for our in- 
tellectual machinery, the categories, are by virtue of their significance 
applicable only to the fractional components of our experience, not to a 
complete " unit " beyond experience. There is only one case in which we 
have scientific knowledge transcending a determination of parts the 
knowledge of the fundamental unity of our consciousness which differs 
from all our fractional experiences in appearing not as a manifold, but 
as an immediately unified reality. 

In the opening paragraphs of this article the philosophical position of 
Cornelius has already been indicated. The foregoing summary, it is to be 
hoped, has convinced the reader that we here have to deal with a solid at- 
tempt to grapple with philosophic concepts. Cornelius's attempt is not a 


final solution of the philosophical problem from a positivistic standpoint, 
because that very standpoint precludes a final solution. For positivism 
demands a philosophy that shall deal with particular philosophic concepts 
and problems, as every science deals with its problems. No sane scientist 
denies that each of his problems admits of indefinitely more profound in- 
vestigation, and in precisely the degree in which philosophers will attack 
their specific problems in the same spirit they will rehabilitate their 
scientific standing. With regard to Cornelius it has been indicated that 
several of his analyses do not seem to attain to the relative degree of 
profundity that might have been expected. But viewed as a whole, and 
more particularly as contrasted both with the reactionary sciolism now 
invading philosophical literature and with the crudities of much soi-disant 
positivism, his epistemology constitutes a landmark in the transition to a 
philosophy of the future that will be at once uncompromisingly radical 
and unassailably critical. 


Experiments in Educational Psychology. DANIEL STARCH. New York: 

The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. vii + 183. 

Two questions arise in the consideration of this work. First, what is 
its value in relation to other books in the same field? Second, what is the 
value of this method of approach to the problems of education : does it 
bring new insight or does it complicate the situation? 

Dr. Starch has brought together some valuable materials which must 
prove very stimulating to the teachers who are able to grasp them. He 
gives experimental methods for testing in concrete ways the facts of in- 
dividual differences, the obstacles to learning which result from defective 
sensation channels, the place of mental imagery in the processes of learn- 
ing and knowledge, the place of " trial and error " in experience, the 
progress of habit-building, the actualities in " formal discipline," the facts 
of " association," the nature of the apperceptive processes, the methods 
and laws of attention, the values of memory in learning, and the vital re- 
lationships of work and fatigue. All these things are real factors in the 
equipment of the teacher, and the teacher can not know too much about 
them. Any work which attempts to make clear these fundamental ele- 
ments in mental development must be welcomed, and it must be said that 
Dr. Starch has organized his materials in such a way as to make them 
very interesting to the teacher of educational psychology, and, rightly 
interpreted, to the average teacher. 

But there is another side to the matter, as indicated by the second 
question. Experimental education has been going its own way in the last 
few years, and a rather curious way it is, too. Education, as a whole 
process, is becoming more socially minded; we are being told that it is 
essentially a social movement, growing out of social pressures and lead- 
ing into social programs, both for the child and the race. From this point 
of view " only social psychology is of primary importance for education." 
On the other hand, experimental education seeks to isolate certain mental 


operations for special study. The very processes of isolation tend to ex- 
clude the social element; but this elimination of the social automatically 
eliminates the ideational, also, since the ideational element arose in ex- 
perience to mediate the social world and has no reason for existence when 
the social is gone. The net result of these exclusions in the experimental 
laboratory is the reduction of the learner to a piece of 'psychophysical 
machinery, and the interest of the experimenter centers in the reactions 
which the machine makes to a series of organized stimuli. The very 
make-up of Dr. Starch's book is determined by these demands. The " ob- 
server " must get no hints as to what is coming next : hence, many pages 
must be left blank, etc. Now, when the book is read in this light it is 
seen that provision is made, not for the study of those subjects noted 
above, but for the study of the following items : the individual differences 
of nervous systems, characteristic defects of sensation mechanisms, per- 
sistence of sense impressions, constructive processes on the higher and 
lower neural levels, the spread of constructive cerebral processes beyond 
their local field, the development of intracerebral relations, cerebral re- 
constructions, the persistence of neural energies and cerebral processes, 
and the rise, fall, and renewal of neural energies. That is to say, experi- 
mental education, as represented by this work, devotes itself to the study 
of a mechanism under conditions that exclude the presence of the most 
persistent stimuli, and therefore, the most characteristic reactions, of the 
actual school situations. A very serious problem is thus raised as to how 
the student can get these abstract results back into the social world where 
the actual processes of education go on. 

Yet there is no fundamental contradiction between this work of the 
educational experimentalist and that social psychology of the concrete 
educational processes demanded by the rising tide of educational inquiry. 
Social psychology seeks experimental determinations of processes of de- 
velopment and interaction that lie within the fields of social action. And 
the social psychology of education needs just such studies as this we are 
considering. But does this laboratory education feel the need of a social 
setting for its real experiments? And can this laboratory work find its 
way back into the concrete educational situation? This book deals with 
problems that have arisen in the life of the school ; the problems have been 
abstracted for special investigation : should not a chapter have been added 
to the book showing how these problems have arisen, and may arise, and 
how the results can be reinterpreted into the actual educational situa- 
tions, where they can be of real value to the teacher? If a laboratory 
manual is to have proper use, even by the average laboratory instructor, it 
must clearly relate itself to the concrete problems out of which it arose 
and into which its results must go. 

We need more work of this kind: but the experimentalist in the field 
of education must be ready to relate his problems and his results to the 
demands of the concrete educational processes as these are being inter- 
preted by social psychology if his work is to have fundamental value for 
education. JOSEPH K. HART. 



The American Philosophy Pragmatism. A. v. C. P. HUIZINGA. Boston: 

Sherman, French, & Co. Pp. v + 64. 

This is a curiously written and poorly arranged attack upon a current 
mode of thought. Disentangled, it consists of this fourfold root : a small 
amount of information upon pragmatism as an American philosophy; a 
large mass of 'quotations from the enemy; several popular diatribes from 
a conservative point of view ; and a few suggestive notes as to the relations 
of this latter-day movement to German idealism. 

The assumption that pragmatism is the American philosophy comes in 
the middle, not the beginning of this sketch. . " Professor " McCosh is 
said to have wished for a specific American, a national philosophy, but 
little anticipated the speedy realization of his desire in the specifically 
American Weltanschauung pragmatism. This is an error. What President 
McCosh wished, and the wish was father to the thought, was that his own 
natural realism, the Scotch common sense, might become the system of his 
adopted country. The rest of this sketch is filled with like misinforma- 
tion. Thus it is alleged that pragmatism neglects the theory of knowledge 
and of reality; that as the apotheosis of the evolutionary dogma it has 
irreverence for its mainspring; that as a doctrine of hustling activity it 
is opposed to " contemplating " wisdom, and so falls in with Kipling's de- 
scription of the predominant American trait of disregard for knowledge 
and law in the face of the supreme commands of " the instant need of 
things." These diatribes have their extreme form in a preface which 
claims that the point at issue is a denial of the supernatural, a discard- 
ing of the notion of being, a revolt against all tradition, authority, and 
unity, and all regulative norms and law. 

Such is poor pragmatism from the negative side. What it is posi- 
tively its opponent finds hard to say. In one place, he holds that it argues 
pluralism or polytheism " against our monotheistic belief." In another, 
that it is a scheme of pantheistic, evolutionary monism. This brings us 
to the fourth and only valuable point in the essay the attempt to con- 
nect pragmatism with German idealism of a previous generation. By his 
frequent use of good German and faulty French the author discloses a 
certain Teutonic facility in his exposition of " this pantheism of an all- 
pervading Zielstrebigkeit." Pragmatism, he suggests, in a blind sort of 
way, is akin to Fichte's teaching that things in themselves are as we have 
to make them, " that the ego limits itself in order to overcome the limi- 
tation, that the theoretical is only in behalf of the practical " ; in short, he 
teaches the duty of unremitting exertion, and this duty, it is easily seen, 
appeals to people who have work to do. In connecting the Vocation of 
Man with the demand for the strenuous life Huizinga has hit on a prob- 
able connecting link between primitive pragmatism and the St. Louis 
School. He does not say so definitely, but it may well be that the revo- 
lutionary refugees of '48 through their personal beliefs and through such 
a German- American organ as the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 
prepared the way for the rapid spread of pragmatism in the middle west. 
This is a suggestion as to what the writer might have done in tracing 


possible sources of the movement. However, he makes no such exact 
connection, but leaves us with only vague analogies between the Yankee 
" Let us still be up and doing " and the theme of Faust that " the ever- 
active, striving soul works out his own salvation." 

Although he is able to point out these German-American affinities, the 
author has no sympathy with them. His conclusion appears to be that 
pragmatism is a scheme of pantheistic, evolutionary monism, totally 
antipathetic to readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra for whom this essay was 
written. Indeed, pragmatism seems to fulfill the boast that the dangerous 
movement of Ritschlian valuation-theology would carry the Anglo- 
Saxon world in one generation. And yet in vindication of the old school, 
and against the charge that it is no longer adequate to the present needs, 
he contends that it is adequate, since it affirms that thought not only re- 
veals reality, but is a unique mode of reality itself. In this conclusion 
the anti-pragmatist has reached the third stage portrayed by James first 
scorn, then tolerance, lastly adjustment of the old to the new way of 

We might dismiss this sketch by saying that it is an essay with wide 
margins but a narrow outlook. It contains, however, several excellences. 
One is in pointing out the affinity between pragmatism and the Ritschlian 
motto " Religion without Metaphysics " ; another is in showing that prag- 
matism is an epistemological result of the doctrine of evolution; a third is 
in coining certain phrases which might be used as effective watchwords 
by radical pragmatists. Such phrases are "being is disclosed in the 
doing " ; and " We are no more searching for truth, we are engaged in 
making it." I. WOODBRIDGE RILEY. 



Lo studio sperimentale del pensiero e della volonta (pp. 494-504) : A. 
GEMELLI. - From a series of experiments performed by Biihler and other 
German psychologists, there can be demonstrated the autonomy of psy- 
chical activity and the essential distinction between thought and phantasm. 
Est-inza ed esistenza (pp. 505-525) : G. MATTIUSSI, S. J. - In the divine na- 
tuit, essence am! existence are identical; in finite beings, on the other 
hand, there is a real distinction between essence and existence. Sigieri 
di Brdbante nella Divina Commedia e le fonti della filosofia di Dante (pp. 
526-545) : BRUNO NARDI. - The Dantean cosmology appears as a fusion of 
Avicenna's peripateticism with the cosmological ideas of the Augustinian 
school. Note e Discussioni. Tribuna libera. Analisi d'opere. A. Pas- 
tore, Dell' essere e del conoscere: A. CUSCHIERI. Michotte-Priim, Etude 
experimental sur le choix volontaire et ses antecedents immediats: 
ARCAKGELO GALLI. G. Amendola, La volonta e il bene: G. TREDICI. G. 
Allievo, G. G. Rousseau filosofo e pedagogista: M. BRUSADELLI. De 
Dominicis, Scienza comparata dell' educazione: L. VENTURA. Note bib- 
liografiche. Sommario ideologico delle opere e delle riviste di filosofia. 


1911. Leg perplexites du Philebe (pp. 457-478) : ANDRE BREMOND. - Plato's 
dialogues, although great and inspiring, often lack in logical sequence and 
force of reasoning. Le libre arbitre et lea lots sociologiques d'apres 
Quetelet (pp. 479-515) : J. LOTTIN. - Quetelet never defended the thesis of 
the determinism of the individual will; he believed in social determinism, 
which he carefully distingushed from fatalism. Le traite " De esse et es- 
sentia" de Thierry de Fribourg (pp. 516-536): DR. KREBS. -Text of 
Thierry's " De Esse et Essentia," published for the first time from a 
manuscript of the Vatican library. Le neo-dogmatisme (pp. 537-563) : 
L. Du ROUSSAUX. - The type of neo-dogmatism born among certain 
Scholastics from the influence of Kantian criticism is decidedly inferior 
to the old, traditional dogmatism. A propos des conditions philosophiques 
de devolution (pp. 564-588) : A. BOUYSSONIE. - A criticism of Le Gui- 
chaoua's theory of causality in evolution. Le Guichaoua's answer. 
Comptes rendus. H. de Jongh, Uancienne faculte de theologie 
de Louvain au premier siecle de son existence: J. LOTTIX. A. Fouillee, 
La pensee et les nouvelles ecoles antiintellectualistes : J. HENRY. 
G. Surbled, La Volonte: F. PALHORIES. J. Mausbach, Grundlage und 
Ausbildung des Charakters nach dem hi. Thomas von Aquin: F. PAL- 
HORIES. Zaragiieta, El problema del alma ante la psicologia experimental: 
A. F. E. Boyd Barrett, S.J., Motive-force and Motivation-tracks, a Re- 
search in Will Psychology: A. F. O. Habert, La religion de la Grece 
antique: A. MANSION. L. Jeudon, La morale de I'honneur: A. MOUSTIERS. 
Sommaire ideologique des ouvrages et revues de philosophic. 

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. November, 1911. German 
Philosophy in 1910 (pp. 589-609): OSCAR EwALD.-The development of 
German philosophy in 1910 represents no divergence from the lines which 
it has followed during recent years. The era of critical idealism is still in 
the ascendent. The chief writers are mentioned, their principal works 
cited, with brief accounts of and comments on their contents. The Ex- 
ternality of Relations (pp. 610-621) : THEODORE DE LAGUNA. -The conflict 
as to whether relations are essential, as held by the neo-Hegelians, or ex- 
ternal, as held by the realists, is a conflict, it is asserted, calling for analy- 
sis rather than argument. Externality may mean that all relations are 
external to the nature of all relatives, a doctrine claimed to be false; or 
that relations are external to qualities, a doctrine dependent upon the dis- 
tinction between a quality and a relation ; or that relations are external to 
each other. The word " essential " is analyzed with reference to its vari- 
ous meanings. The Psychology of Punitive Justice (pp. 622-635) : WIL- 
LIAM K. WRIGHT. - " Of the three theories regarding punishment, the re- 
tributive theory, the deterrent theory, and the reformatory theory, public 
opinion at the present time is probably most correctly interpreted by the 
deterrent theory, which, as we have seen, is the resentment instinct inter- 
preted and rationalized." Reviews of Books (pp. 636-657). Konstantin 
Oesterreich, Die Phdnomenologie des Ich in ihren Grundproblemen: MARY 


WHITON CALKINS. Johannes Rehmke, Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft: 
W. H. SHELDON. Warner Fite, Individualism: ELLEN BLISS TALBOT. 
Leslie J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge: H. W. WRIGHT. Notices of 
New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes. 

Bosanquet, Bernard. Logic. Second Edition Eevised and Enlarged. 

2 Vols. Oxford : The Clarendon Press. 1912. Pp. xxiv + 711. 21s. 
Carver, Thomas Nixon. The Religion Worth Having. Boston and New 

York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1912. Pp. 140. $1.00. 
Colvin, Stephen S. The Learning Process. New York: The Macmillan 

Company. 1911. Pp. xxv + 336. $1.25. 
De Wulf, Maurice. Histoire de la Philosophie Medievale. Quatrieme 

Edition. Louvain: 1' Administration de la Revue Neo-Scolastique. 

1912. Pp. viii + 624. 10F. 
Engert, Horst. Teleologie und Kausalitat. Heidelberg: Carl Winters 

TJniversitatsbuchhandlung. 1911. Pp. 50. 
Flournoy, Thomas. La Philosophie de William James. Saint-Blaise : 

Foyer Solidariste. 1911. Pp. 219. 2.50F. 
Gilbert, Otto. Griechische Religionphilosophie. Leipzig: Verlag von 

Wilhelm Englemann. 1911. Pp. 554. 
Heimsoeth, Heinz. Die Methods der Erkenntnis bei Descartes und 

Leibniz. Erste Halite: Historische Einleitung. Descartes Methode 

der klaren und deutlichen Erkenntnis. Giessen: Verlag von Alfred 

Topelmann. 1912. Pp. 192. 5.50M. 
Home, Herman Harrell. Free Will and Human Responsibility. New 

York : The Macmillan Company. 1912. Pp. xvi + 197. $1.50. 
Jerusalem, Wilhelm. Die Aufgaben des Lehrers an Hoheren Schulen. 

Wien und Leipzig : Wilhelm Braumuller. 1912. Pp. xii + 392. 
Kessler, Dr. Kurt. Rudolf Euckens Bedeutung fur das moderne Chris- 

tentum. Bunzlau : Verlag von G. Kreuschmer. 1912. Pp. 68. 1.50M. 
Levinstein, Gustav. Philosophische Betrachtungen. Berlin: Leonard 

Simion. 1912. Pp. 99. 1.80M. 


THE following delegates have been appointed to represent the Ameri- 
can Philosophical Society on the following occasions: Vice-president 
William B. Scott, of Princeton, to represent the society at the two hun- 
dred and fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the Royal Society in 
July next; Professors Paul Haupt, of Baltimore, E. Washburn Hopkins, 
of New Haven, Morris Jastrow, Jr., of Philadelphia, and A. V. Williams 
Jackson, of New York, as delegates to the eleventh International Con- 
gress of Orientalists, to be held at Athens on April 7 to 14; Dr. Franz 
Boas, of New York, a delegate to the eighteenth International Congress 
of Americanists, to be held in London from May 27 to June 1. At the 
centenary of the Academy of Natural Sciences on March 19 to 21 the 


society was officially represented by Professor Henry F. Osborn, of New 
York, Dr. Charles D. Walcott, of Washington, Mr. Samuel Vauclain, of 
Philadelphia, Professor William B. Clark, of Baltimore, and Dr. II> nry 
H. Donaldson, of Philadelphia. 

THE Princeton University Press announces the publication of Presi- 
dent Witherspoon's Lectures on Moral Philosophy, edited by Mr. V. L. 
Collins, of Princeton University. This reprint is the first in the series 
of " Early American Philosophers," planned by the American Philosoph- 
ical Association, and to be published under its auspices by the universi- 
ties with which the respective authors, whose works are to be reprinted, 
were most intimately connected. The text is that of the first edition, that 
of 1800, which the editor has collated not only with the editions of 1810 
and 1822 but also with manuscript versions of the lectures written in 
1772, 1782 and 1795, and significant variants have been noted. The In- 
troduction is a study of Dr. Witherspoon's many-sided character; and a 
check-list of his published writings has been supplied. The frontispiece 
is a reproduction of the portrait of Dr. Witherspoon by Charles Wilson 
Peale. The edition is limited to 500 copies. 

THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association 
met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of 
the New York Academy of Sciences on Monday, April 22. At the after- 
noon session, which met at Columbia University, the following papers 
were read : " Sex Differences in Incidental Memory," Mr. G. C. Myers ; 
"Studies in Recognition Memory," Dr. E. K. Strong; "Individual Dif- 
ferences in the Interests of Children," Miss Gertrude M. Kuper ; " Ex- 
periments with the Hampton Court Maze," Professor H. A. Ruger. The 
papers read at the evening session at the American Museum of Natural 
History were as follows : " Relation of Interference to Adaptability," Mr. 
A. J. Culler; "The Optimal Distribution of Time and the Relation of 
Length of Material to Time Taken for Learning," Mr. D. O. Lyon ; " The 
Age of Walking and Talking in Relation to General Intelligence," Mr. 
C. D. Mead; "Practise in the Case of Children of School Age," Mr. T. 
H. Kirby. 

MRS. CHRISTINE LADD FRANKLIN has given three university lectures on 
color vision before the department of psychology of Columbia University, 
as follows : March 25, " The Theory of Color Theories The Color Tri- 
angle and the Color Square The Facts Inconsistent with the Hering 
Theory " ; March 27, " The Young-Helmholtz Theory in its Latest Form 
its Indispensableness and its Inadequacy"; March 29, "The Recent 
Views on Color Brunner, Pauli, Bernstein, Schenck The Development 
Theory of Color." 

THE Philosophical Institute of Canterbury, New Zealand, which came 
into existence on August 30, 1862, will celebrate its jubilee this year. It 
is proposed to mark the occasion by holding a gathering in Christchurch. 

DR. DURANT DRAKE, of the University of Illinois, has accepted the 
position of associate professor of ethics and the philosophy of religion at 
Wesleyan (Middletown, Conn.) University. 

VOL. IX. No. 10. MAY 9, 1912 



~T)HILOSOPHERS and artists have taken, throughout the history 
of thought, one of two attitudes toward beauty. They saw it 
either as a deep, metaphysical principle made magically manifest or 
as an ordinary psychologic or material datum, curious in its bearing 
on human interests. Beauty was, in these two views, assimilated, on 
the one hand, to the high, the noble, the divine, impersonal, and 
selfless; on the other, to the pleasures of the lower interests of life, 
to the satisfaction of appetites. To Plato, Plotinus, Kant, Schelling, 
Hegel, Schopenhauer, Euskin, Goethe, among many others, beauty 
was the supernal reality made manifest; escape from evil, the self- 
expression of the infinite, and what not that is transcendental and 
blissful. For Baumgarten, for the English empiricists from Hobbes 
to Burke, for psychologizing investigators like Lipps and Santayana, 
for biologizing ones like Darwin and Guyau or Spencer, beauty was 
identical with some state of mind or the function of some biological 
condition or trait. None allowed it any independent status or 
intrinsic, observable character. It was always taken metaphysically 
or positivistically ; attributed now to the object, now to the mind, 
and the diversity of opinion concerning its nature is so great as to 
render doubtful any definition of it, save in so far as that definition 
contains elements common to all the others. Such elements should, 
on the one hand, reveal either the constant conditions or occasions of 
beauty and perhaps its intrinsic character ; on the other, they should 
indicate its status with respect to man and nature. 

Where is beauty to be sought? In the definitions themselves? 
Hardly, since these look back to a specific situation having concrete 
and multifold characters from which the definitions as such abstract. 
Actual beauty is to be found empirically, like actual apples or chairs 
or tables. It can not be deduced; it must be sought in typical 
"beauty-situations." But since, according to the definitions, these 
are cases of either objective or psychological existence, we must 
examine both things of beauty and beauty-experiencing minds. 



Suppose, then, that we study any object to which the adjective 
"beautiful" is applied any statue, any picture, any poem', any 
melody. If it contains beauty as a quality or attribute not identical 
with any one of its other qualities, or so identical, or identical with 
the whole collection of them, this beauty must be capable of being 
analyzed out, like color, texture, shape, size, or expression. Now we 
can abstract from any object of beauty, one by one, its qualities 
its order, its structure, its tone or color, its contour or pitch, its 
imagery or expressiveness. We can exhibit these elements. We can 
say of the Lady in the Sistine Chapel : ' ' See, here is the rose of the 
Madonna's cheek, here the pink and white of her flesh, the blue of 
her eyes, the oval of her face, the round of her arm, the flowing line 
of her robe, the perfect curve of her aureole." But can we so 
abstract and exhibit her beauty ? Where in the picture shall we find 
it, whence take it, as we have found and taken these other qualities, 
from eyes and robe and aureole ? This quality we can not discover : 
like Berkeley's matter, it disappears with enumerations of qualities 
that, taken together, are supposed to possess it. Empirically, at least, 
beauty does not appear to be an additional quality, added to color 
and line and expression ; it is not an underlying quality where color 
and line and expression inhere. Shall we say then, as Berkeley said 
of matter, that beauty is the qualities that are supposed to possess it, 
that it consists of the union of these so various elements? Some 
philosophers do, in fact, hold some such proposition to be true. For 
them beauty consists in wholeness, and a beautiful thing, they call 
"an organic whole, self -completing and self -complete. " Others 
speak of the beautiful in an object as the harmonious union of its 
parts, identifying beauty with certain specific relations that such 
parts bear to one another. To all persons, who so think of beauty, 
it involves some kind of complexity: a simple thing can not be 
beautiful. Yet are there not many things we find beautiful that are 
genuinely simple a pure color, a graceful line, a single tone ? These 
are units of which complex esthetic objects are made, yet they are 
not unbeautiful in themselves. Reduce or increase their quantity 
or duration, they are still beautiful. We may not say, therefore, 
that beauty is identical with wholeness as such, nor yet that it is 
identical with a special kind of wholeness. Very often two objects 
made of esthetically the same material, in an identical fashion a 
picture and its copy, for example differ in no respect save in this 
unique matter of beauty; one of them possessing it supremely, the 
other not at all. Still more frequently an object which is found to 
be beautiful on one day is judged unbeautiful on the next ; while an 
object which has never been considered to possess beauty is sud- 
denly found to be endowed therewith in high degree. And this last 


event occurs to the most commonplace of objects a city street, a 
familiar voice, one's wife, one's pupils, even one's last year's con- 
tribution to the JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Yet when you analyze 
this transfigured thing, you find in it nothing new which is the cause 
of beauty, nor yet beauty itself. And not only is one and the same 
object inconstant with respect to beauty at different times ; if beauty 
is a quality of it, it both has it and does not have it at the same time. 
For every disagreement about the beauty of an object means that 
the beauty is there and not there at an identical instant. This could 
not be if beauty were a quality, whether a particular one, like red 
or shape, or the unity and wholeness, the combination of many such 
particular qualities. Experience, when taken thus radically, refutes 
both these conceptions. Neither beauty as a quality nor its identity 
with wholeness is revealed in it. Complexes or simples, they may be 
the occasion of beauty, or perhaps the result of beauty, but beauty's 
self they are not. But if beauty is not the wholeness of an object 
nor any special part or quality of an object, then it does not reside 
in the object. It is to be sought for elsewhere. 

That ' ' elsewhere, ' ' estheticians, following the normal bent of the 
philosophic mind, make the spirit. For a long time great schools of 
philosophy have persisted as the exponents of a fundamental propo- 
sition the proposition that the mind contributes a great deal to the 
nature of its object ; many, indeed, believing that knowing is creative. 
Psychology has given this belief a color of truth. It has been shown 
that what we see or hear or feel varies with our previous experience, 
the state of our bodies, our general mental tone. This fact, it is 
claimed, is most particularly evident in the region of our life known 
as values, and psychologists, accordingly, even those who do not be- 
lieve the general assumption that the mind alters or creates things by 
knowing them, have none the less found it convenient to identify 
beauty with certain psychological conditions. According to these 
scholars the mind endows an object with beauty when it assumes 
toward that object an "esthetic attitude." By "esthetic attitude" 
they mean certain changes in mind and body. These changes they 
study, analyze into components, define with respect to their bearing 
on each other, and then designate one or all of them with the word 
"beauty." So, beauty consists for some in the fusion into identity 
of certain mental states; for others it consists in the titillation of 
two feelings, one, that the object is real ; the second, that the object 
is unreal ; others, again, find beauty to be a balanced system of motor 
responses, or a fusion of mind and object, causing a "loss of person- 
ality"; while others still identify beauty with the emotional imita- 
tion of the object, by empathy or einfiihlung, or with the feeling of 
detachment from pain and the stress of the daily life the "libera 


tion" of the mind as in play, or with the attribution of pleasure to 
the object, rather than to the mind, and so on. Against such iden- 
tifications, and there are many more, the same difficulties may be 
urged as against the identification of beauty with wholeness or with 
any simple quality of an object. Are such psychological or physical 
states actually beauty? Do we discover them to be beauty as the 
chemist discovers oxygen and hydrogen to be water? I doubt 
whether even the most radical of the psychologizing estheticians 
would venture to assert that they can exhibit a psychophysical com- 
pound, beauty, just as they can exhibit any other psychophysical 
object the sensation red, an image, the process of attention, or of 
association. Here again, as with respect to the object, it is mere 
confusion to identify beauty with what precedes or succeeds it or is 
simultaneous with it. Empathy, "favorable stimulation and re- 
pose," "objectified pleasure," may be occasions or results of beauty, 
its concomitants, perhaps. They are not beauty itself, nor can they, 
empirically, be made into beauty. They often appear where it does 
not, and it, where they do not. If, therefore, beauty lies in the mind 
of him who sees, its manner of existence must be vastly different from 
ordinary "psychological existence." Nor can it have even trans- 
cendental existence like the Kantian categories, since, if Kant is 
right, time and space and the categories are always with us, while 
beauty is not so with us. Is, then, its existence a Berkeleyan thing, 
destroyed when we cease to think of it, appearing and disappearing 
as we choose ? Or is it something free and independent, working its 
will with us when it can even as we with it when we can ? What is 
its relation to the beautiful object and what to the mind ? 

The first thing that strikes the investigator who is trying to 
answer this question is the fact that the mind, in genuine esthetic 
experience, in which beauty appears, is not experiencing a thing 
called beauty; it is experiencing an object to which it afterwards 
attributes beauty. Nor yet is this object affecting a psychological 
quality or trait, designated as beauty; it is affecting an ordinary 
mind. Hence, the mind which seeks to experience beauty as such 
must take the esthetic experience as a whole ; must make its subject 
mind, beauty, and object together, and must analyze their mutual 
involutions. But to do this presupposes a conception of the nature 
of mind and its relation to its objects, and such a conception must 
needs be defined before the analysis can proceed. 


Common sense speaks of "reading the mind," "seeing what is 
in the mind," and so on. Empirically taken, mind, when spoken of 
in this manner, means a special way of behavior with respect to 


objects, a way of taking them together. It involves a body, objects, 
and this distinctive togetherness. When a man "knows his own 
mind" or "makes up his mind" or "changes" it, one object or one 
program of behavior is included, another rejected. One thing is clung 
to, asserted, another abandoned. To be able ' ' to read another like a 
book" is to distinguish the contents of the other's mind and his 
attitude toward them which alone makes them uniquely contents of 
his mind, their especial and concrete togetherness. It is, in a word, 
to perceive the direction and bearing of his interests. 

Now what is interest? Taken concretely it is an action of a 
complex called a body upon something not itself, in such wise that 
this action and its object continue to increase and to expand pros- 
perously. To say that John Jones is interested in music is to say 
that Jones so acts as to increase, use, and control those objects in his 
environment that are denoted by the word music the objects, their 
associations, and implications. He goes to concerts, to operas, he 
makes himself a member of musical clubs, he plays, he sings, he 
composes, or buys scores. We define all human characters by their 
dominating interests the miser, the boaster, the gambler, the philos- 
opher each of these words designates behavior tending to preserve 
or increase a certain type of existence. Now behavior of this kind 
is nothing more nor less than thinking. For thinking is only the 
prosecution of interests the preservation of what is propitious and 
the elimination of what is evil from the destruction of an enemy in 
the flesh, to a contradiction in logic. It requires a body, an object 
thought, and the way of thinking. And mind is what is left when 
the body is abstracted. In any concrete instance, hence, mind is a 
system of objects of which a living body, its operations, its desirings 
i. e., the motor and affectional life are central and the objects 

If this be the case, minds are neither simple nor stable. They 
may be and are "changed," "made up," "confused," "cleared," 
etc. One body, in the course of its lifetime, may have many minds, 
only partially united. The unity of a mind is coincident with its 
consistent pursuit of one interest (we then call it narrow) or with the 
cooperation and harmony of many (when we call it liberal). Fre- 
quently two or more minds struggle for the possession of one body ; 
that is, the body may be divided between two objects, each equally 
demanding response. The most typical instance of such a division 
is that in which you can not determine between two conflicting ways 
of behavior, where you are "of two minds" with respect to an object 
or an end. The most complex instances are those of dual or mul- 
tiple personality, in which" the body has ordered so great a collection 
of objects and systematized a sufficiently large number of interests 


in such typically distinct ways as to have set up for itself different 
and opposed "minds." On the other hand, two or fifty or a hun- 
dred bodies may be, so far as is compatible with their fundamental 
numerical diversity, "of the same mind." In fact, concerning the 
elementary things of life, the business of feeding and loving, the sun, 
the sky, the primordial conditions of labor, the majority of men are 
of one mind: it is this unity of mind that we call their "common 

Mind so taken, it is clear, does not create the objects it knows; 
it selects them. It does not "picture" or represent what it knows, 
it apprehends its objects directly. Not only is it, moreover, uncre- 
ative of things; it is uncreative of those things which are called 
purely mental memories, imaginations, ideas. Its world, instead of 
being dual, is single and continuous. Whatever it thinks has an 
independent status and definable character a centaur, the number 4, 
Caesar's death, to-morrow's dinner. Whatever the source of these 
objects, once they are cognitively found, they are found as real: 
they are capable of being subjects of conversation and of battle. 
They may be envisaged by many people without being thereby 
changed in the least, or they may be changed and their changes 
would be accountable in unambiguous terms of bodily or otherwise 
entitative action upon them. A world of such objects in which all 
things have each a genuine status has been called by William 
James a "world of pure experience," and this way of viewing it he 
has called ' ' radical empiricism ' ' and ' ' logical realism. ' ' Its content 
is an infinitude of entities, some "existent," some "non-existent," 
but really present in knowledge, partly or altogether, whenever 
thought or responded to. This infinitude must not, however, be 
taken as inert, nor as possessing in itself the orderly character of 
knowledge. It is a flux, a turmoil of confusion and disorder, con- 
taining pure chances, and with all its fulness, breeding infinitely 
more things. What order it contains is not necessary, but accidental 
an acquired habit of things : what things there are are not neces- 
sary but accidental spontaneous appearances that have succeeded 
in establishing their right to a place from among all the infinitude 
that have failed and been irredeemably lost. The cosmic order is a 
matter of cosmic adaptation: it is the salvage out of the universal 
chaos, neither good nor bad, but one out of an infinitude of possible 
orders, any of which might be much superior to this one, and any of 
which might in time or immediately displace it. 

I have just made use of the words "superior," "good," and 
"bad." That use was premature. Such terms, terms of valuation, 
introduce into the order of nature a new and extraneous order, itself 
as much an incident in the cosmos as is the cosmos in the universe. 


For us, however, it is a reordering of that universe, the establish- 
ment therein of a true center of reference, an unutterably different 
scale of being. This center, as we have seen, is that arrangement of 
entities we call the human organism. Like a magnet set within a 
heap of iron filings, it establishes within its environment a new and 
ulterior order; it endows the environmental contents with an addi- 
tional quality and another status, making them relevant chiefly to 
its specific capacity and arranging them along its line of force. It 
does not alter their constitution, but it violates their inertia and 
proper bias, refracting these with reference to the needs of its own 
nature. In the universal jumble simple things may lie side by side 
with complex things, one may spring from the other, the other from 
the one. For the mind, simple things are first; complexes are built 
out of them, the universe is reconstituted, willy-nilly, in an ascend- 
ing hierarchy of complexity, from logic, through mathematics, 
physics, chemistry, and biology, to ethics. Dominated by its inter- 
ests, regarding the residual world only with reference to its bear- 
ing on these, the organism manipulates and uses what it apprehends 
directly, until its complexity is utterly reduced or its force consumed. 
This activity is knowing response to objects as constituents or 
relevancies of interests. 

Now, actions, responses, uses are either relations or depend upon 
them, and relations may be not only efficacious and alterative, but 
also external and impotent, in no sense definitive. They need not 
constitute anything on which they operate. They appear and they 
disappear, but they always bind two or more things together in a 
specific identifiable way. Thus, I stand on the floor, and "onness" 
is a relation between me and the floor. But I should not be unmade 
by not being on the floor, nor the floor made by my being on it. 
Onness is an external relation and defines neither me nor the floor. 
On the other hand, certain relations, which bind complex things 
together, do define them, as a man's cognitive relation to things 
defines man, the knowing animal. By that act which constitutes him 
man, he is most adequately distinguished from other things. These, 
again, are identified as heavy, sweet, red, alive, big, small, but only 
under very special conditions are they identified as known, and only 
in abnormal cases defined as such. To them the immediacy of 
knowledge is an external relation which connects them with many 
knowers, and it is a relation which they lose and assume without 
suffering directly the least change in their constitution and character. 
Indeed, we do not claim to know things certainly or immediately 
until we are convinced that they have revealed to us every possible 
change they themselves independently undergo. Their self-revelation 
is classified sometimes according to the organs which respond to 


them, sometimes according to their complexity, sometimes according 
to both. 

So, when the body responds to an object by means of its sense- 
organs, the object is called a perception. It is generally a "thick" 
object, supposed to be made up of many simpler elements. It gets 
itself taken hold of by the appropriate reflex arc directly, much as a 
pair of tongs directly spans or grasps a piece of coal. Thus, the 
sounds you hear and the words you see are spanned immediately 
by your auditory and visual reflex arcs, indirectly, by your whole 
nervous system, and you are said to perceive what I say or what 
impresses the eyes. Now such perceptions are very complex: they 
are composed of a great variety of tones or shapes and colors and 
their relations, and they also carry meanings and stand for things 
not themselves. If "you span a single element of this complex, you 
are said to have a sensation or an idea or a conception. Psycholo- 
gists, to say nothing of philosophers like Kant, have made much of 
the difference between the two, but no genuine difference seems dis- 
coverable. The idea of red, e. g., whether it be "motor," or "kin- 
esthetic" or "sensory" or "verbal" or "imageless," is not distin- 
guishable as to qualitative content from the sensation of red; nor 
the idea of triangularity from the sensation of triangularity. In 
both cases you have before you less than is before you in perception, 
but what you have before you is none the less of the same kind as 
content of perception. 

Nor can the distinction between idea and sensation based on the 
mode of presentation hold. For even if sensations are presented by 
the senses and ideas by means of central processes, each is at the 
moment spanned by some reflex arc, and who shall say that the 
senses are not part of it ? If an entity is to be apprehended at all, 
it must be apprehended by one or more organs, and its nature is not 
different, whether the terminal act is arrived at in a roundabout 
way, through the intervention of various neural processes, or spon- 
taneously, by the response of the appropriate reflex arc to its stim- 
ulus. In either case the given character of this stimulus is directly 
grasped, and this is so in the apprehension of even such putatively 
psychical objects as memory and imagination. A remembered thing 
has to be sought and found like a thing perceived, and its difference 
from perception is rather in certain additive or subtractive qualities 
than intrinsic content. It is essentially no more a psychic or hidden 
thing than is a perception. If attainable at all, it is as open to-day, 
as shareable by many people, as potent in requiring our adjustment 
to it. 

This holds, I believe, also of imaginational beings. These are 
taken to be, like dreams, peculiarly private and hidden; their esse, 


more even than that of memory, is described as percipi. But if you 
study your imaginative activities, if you are lost in dream or revery, 
you observe that they do not come at your bidding, that they must, 
like ideas and memories and sensations and perceptions, be sought 
out; their character and integrity must be acknowledged as these 
impose themselves upon you. You observe that they require you to 
adapt yourself to them even as do the more permanent things, 
making you happy or afraid, angry or sorrowful, confiding or watch- 
ful, just like the residual, solid, daily life. The stuff of them is the 
stuff of that life, going a different way, appearing in new complexes, 
differing from it only in power to hold the places they preempt. 
Imaginations are not unreal ; those entities we so designate are only 
unfit. They belong, perhaps, to these other orders, to the infinite 
residuum which has not succeeded in making a place for itself in our 
cosmos, and breaks in, for the moment, perhaps, by way of the order 
of value, and is again cast out, banished, by the stronger, more 
"valid" order. Imaginations, too, may be common objects of 
knowledge; it is only their weakness which makes them sink out of 
our sight, like a tiny cloud to which you call the attention of your 
friend and which vanishes even as you cry, ' ' Look ! ' ' 

Such, then, are these so-called "mental," private entities quite 
real, quite recognizable, with varying facility open to the day and to 
the common view of all healthy eyes. But one group of realities does 
not seem sharable and common in the same sense. This group com- 
prises our preferences, our valuations. The others are objects, the 
goals of attention, the definitive contents of interest, the intelligible 
ideals of our lives. Attitudes and actions, however, are acceptances 
and rejections of these others, are the relations we bear to them, and 
just as two bodies can not occupy the same space at the same time, 
so two persons can not hold a numerically identical relation to the 
same object at the same time, unless these persons are identical. 
In this fact lies the source of all our differences and disagreements. 
Our mere numerical diversity compels us to value things with refer- 
ence to fundamentally separate interests, to orient, each of us a 
world, about a distinct center, the self. Such orienting is the re- 
lating of the environment to the vital purpose. It is valuation, the 
essence of knowing, and our primordial and ultimate relation to our 
world is a value-relation. As such it carries its own peculiar terms, 
and for us, at least, is constitutive of our nature as terms. It con- 
sists at its barest of the direct appreciation of the immediate bearing 
of an entity on our vital selfhood. It stands out most clearly in an 
elementary interest. Such an interest is constituted by three things 
an organism, an environment, the value-relation that binds them. 
This last is usually called cognition or awareness. It is different 


from all other possible relations of organism to environment in that 
it alone values the latter, connecting its terms more closely, as in 
attention, i. e., becoming the object's attribute, good; or divorcing 
them, becoming the attribute, 'bad. Good and bad, thus, are con- 
verse modes of designating immediate cognition, which is the value- 
relation and the essential constituent of interest, a relation that can 
be named, but not defined, utterly simple, primary, and ultimate. 

Now a mind involves countless reflex arcs, many objects, is com- 
posed of innumerable interests. Each of these, it is clear, may be 
separate and independent valuations of their content, positive or 
negative, good or bad. But reflex arcs do not act alone. They are 
"integrated" and act like mobs or armies, and when they so act their 
separate valuations also integrate, and though each preserves its 
identity of direction, it is penetrated through and through by all the 
others and constitutes with them a unity which is identical with a 
fresh and quite diverse valuation. Such would be the complex and 
more massive feelings, pleasures and pains, anger, fear, affection, 
respect, admiration, love, sympathy. These are valuating complexes 
composed of simpler valuations which fuse into one as the separate 
tones of a melody fuse into the melody. They are appraisements of 
the environment and as such can themselves be appraised though 
only with the greatest difficulty. For when you are possessed by any 
emotion you can not yourself examine it, and when your friend or 
your doctor studies such an actual attitude and its object or physi- 
ological condition or connected incident, he finds himself speedily 
assuming the attitude he is observing. Nothing is so fluent and 
infectious; anger begets anger; love, love; any relation tends to 
reproduce itself. It is because of this that a "social mind" is pos- 
sible or that a stable common sense can arise. 

How different when the object apprehended is a thing! Two 
persons may have opposed attitudes toward the same thing or a 
qualitatively identical attitude toward different things. For in- 
stance, you observe the red of the sunset ; your observing is identical 
with finding it pleasant ; you approach it, you open your senses wide 
to absorb it, you aim at more and more of it in a word, it becomes 
the content of your interest. Your neighbor, however, apprehends 
it negatively, turns from it, seeks to upset the cognitive equilibrium, 
to free himself of his relation to red, to oust red from his world. 
Then, according to these direct and immediate valuations of that 
color, its place in your common world will be determined, and in 
order to get rid of it or to save it, you may aim even to get rid of 
each other. So, while your object is identical, your attitudes toward 
it are different and opposed and are, mayhap, never to agree. For 
even if you should both apprehend red positively, even if it should 



become your common interest, it would be bound to you none the less 
by two numerically diverse relations; and while you might unite to 
defend it against a common foe, you might yet quarrel for its pos- 
session. Rivals in love do so frequently. They enhance and glorify 
the same woman, make common cause against her enemies, and are 
themselves bitter foes. So, even identical instances of the same 
relation, when directed, not upon their common terminal, but upon 
each other, are necessarily opposed in so far as they are numerically 
different; and the whole of our civilized world is definable by the 
cooperation, antipathy, and fusion of objects in the whirl of value- 


Mind, if the foregoing analysis is correct, is a system of objects 
related by a highly complex arrangement of value-relations to an- 
other complex, called the body. Anything outside this system, more 
or less durable, requiring a new adjustment, a reenvisagement or 
rearrangement of mind, would be an " object," whatever its char- 
acter, quality, or status. When, now, is such an object "beautiful," 
and what happens to mind when the object it encounters is called 
beautiful ? 

Let us consider first how this encounter ensues. That continu- 
ous stream of active feeling we call life is nothing so much as a 
stream. Its mass is flux ; in it moment passes into moment in terms 
of use. No point of it is sufficient for itself; it must borrow some 
of its reality from its predecessors and successors, it must surrender 
some of its proper integrity to the force of their withdrawing and 
of their coming on. Events affect us in their uses, not their natures, 
since they bear on interests, and should we pause for that nature, 
hence, the world becomes empty and we die. But now into the 
movement of multifold rates and infinite rhythms there bursts a 
thing with power to resist it. The attention, customarily shifting 
from this to that, pauses, the soul is turned from her headlong line 
of march to move upon this thing. The new value-relation brought 
to birth in that moment of pregnant attention feeds upon its occa- 
sion. From point to point it flows, holding each within the field of 
its unbroken act until it spans the utter fullness of the whole thing. 
One by one, the mind empties its storehouse of its appropriate treas- 
ures; these leap to the thing, making a constellation about it; the 
limbs of the body adjust themselves, so the rhythm of the breath, the 
pulse of the blood. A new onward movement of vitality has begun, 
enduring intensely, enduring profoundly, in felt-pulses of self- 
enhancing life. There is flux, but it is the flux of a growing fullness ; 
a flux of power, but the power of poise, self-sufficient, absolute. It 
does not, as the flux of routine or of individual adventure, flow 


unevenly, in eddies and whirls, from evil to good and back again ; it 
does not flow instrumentally, consuming one object in another, pass- 
ing from thing to thing, holding each for its use and abandoning each 
for its lost function. Rather do things grow more intensely them- 
selves, more distinct, and yet more at one. The flow here of 
instrument into end is the flow and enduring of an identical thing. 
The interest grows by what it feeds on, and it feeds upon itself. 

Such is the esthetic experience. Where, in it, does beauty ap- 
pear? In the mind, as we have learned to know mind? Certainly 
not. To that the very object is external, an occasion for reorganiza- 
tion and readjustment, set over against it, a new datum to be encoun- 
tered and controlled. In the object then ? We have seen that beauty 
can not be in the object. Rather is it what alone remains, an inde- 
pendent thing, a relation between this mind and this object, binding 
them together and holding them bound. As such, it is inevitably a 
variable. It will not always span the same terms, nor even one of 
a pair, more than once, nor need it bind two minds to the same object. 
Positive, since it links rather than separates, elusive, concretely per- 
ceptual, beauty's nature, like the nature of all values, is its particu- 
larity and its appearance as truly active only in concrete situations. 
The very life of interest, it can not be "disinterested"; the very 
occasion of concreteness, it can not be "universal." It may link the 
mind to any environmental content, from a mathematical abstrac- 
tion to a perceptual blotch. It is the only predicate in the judgment 
of beauty, whether the surgeon's of an operation, the carpenter's of 
his job, the sculptor's of his statue, the philosopher's of his system. 
But just because this is so it belongs to particular situations only, 
and the radical diversity of taste and judgment attests this concrete- 
ness. And it is only the failure to observe it where it occurs that 
makes people cling to its "disinterestedness." Such people miss 
the fact that the disinterestedness of the "esthetic" experience is like 
the disinterestedness of him who wants nothing because he already 
possesses everything. In morals, "disinterestedness" is instru- 
mental. It is not so much a loss of self far from it as a gain in 
the sense of the excellence of other selves. It consists in subjecting 
"self" to the service of alien ends; in becoming an instrument, a 
means, without finding in that state any too great private joy. In it, 
nothing is so keen as the sense of personality. In the "esthetic" 
experience the sense of personalty is also keen. But it is the keen- 
ness of completed selfhood, of utter private joy, not of public use. 
Far from being unselfish and disinterested, the esthetic experience is 
absolute absorption in interest, absolute selfishness. For of course 
what is already completely possessed is not desired ; and the mind in 
the grasp of beauty is in possession of its object so completely as to 


shut out, for the nonce, the righteous demand of other interests and 
the cry of other needs for satisfaction. Yet unselfishness is not the 
exclusion of other needs and interest, it is their prosecution and ful- 
filment. Unselfishness is not the repose of one's own perfect adapta- 
tion to the environment ; it is the unrest which compasses that adapta- 
tion for others. In the experience where beauty is the relation 
between you and your environment, it is, however, you yourself who 
are so adapted, and, being adapted, lifted up and out of the horde of 
conflicting interests. Your world is that object to which you are 
bound, and you are become isolated, alone, and supremely happy in 
that loneliness. Here is the only genuine solipsism, in which the 
stuff of reality assumes the status of mentality and things and 
thoughts are one. It is of the essential nature of beauty that your 
neighbor can have no part in your experience of its object, and that 
your experience of it can have no part as such in any other concern 
whatever in the enterprise of life. 

Private, concrete, elusive, in itself neither mental nor amental, 
beauty is the optimal mode of that positive, intrinsic value-relation 
which binds the mind to its object in such wise that the two are com- 
pletely and harmoniously adapted to each other in the very act of 




A DVANCE in the experimental analysis of behavior tends to 
-\. make psychological concepts inadequate. In the realm of 
human psychology one needs only to instance such a term as memory. 
Aristotle summed up his total discussion of this subject in sixty 
words. With modern psychology came experimental analysis and 
to-day it requires twice sixty words to name the separate subjects 
that we investigate in the general field of memory. It would be an 
easy matter to show the same analytic tendency in perception and 
thought and will and in many non-psychological fields as well. It 
would be no less easy to point out numerous fields where such 
analysis has not had its way, and comparative psychology is one of 
these. It does not require any great insight in the reader of com- 
parative psychology to see that many of the concepts used in the 
description of animal behavior are of the relatively unanalyzed sort. 
That we continue to talk in general about growth, development, intel- 

1 Bead at the twentieth meeting of the American Psychological Association, 
Washington, D. C., December, 1911. 


ligence, instinct, and imitation is evidence only of the fact that we 
have not yet pushed our experimental analysis to the end not far 
enough to see what in reality are the elemental processes out of which 
the complex behavior of animals is built up. I insist on the phrase 
"experimental analysis," for it is only by the most extensive and 
painstaking development of detailed methods and the application 
of these methods in quantitative studies that we shall ever be able 
to understand animal behavior and to see its intimate relation to 
human behavior. 

Take the case of imitation. There can be no doubt that the facts 
which this concept has been used to connote are more complex than 
any writer has yet set forth. It was no doubt a distinct advance in 
the discussion of the subject when scientists distinguished instinctive 
from voluntary imitation. This, however, is not a finally satisfac- 
tory analysis of the concept, and one reason why we have not made 
more progress in our study of the imitative behavior of animals is 
that the whole subject has been dominated by this crude differentia- 
tion. We have been looking for something that could be called 
instinctive imitation or voluntary imitation, and the facts have not 
fit this division. It would probably be more correct to say that 
psychologists have been looking for a sort of animal behavior that 
could be called voluntary imitation, and when they have found imita- 
tion that did not fulfill their idea of what constituted volition or 
inference they have gotten rid of such imitative behavior by calling 
it instinctive. The results of such study have not been encouraging, 
and experimentalists have tended to turn away from the study of 
imitation to fields that promised more definite results. 

Before this diversion from the study of imitative behavior is 
complete it may be worth while to examine the tools with which we 
have been working. After all what can one mean by instinctive 
imitation? Whatever he means by imitation, it must be qualified 
by what he means by instinct. And what does instinct mean in 
current psychological discussion? If one is content with verbiage, 
he may, after perusing a whole library on the subject, as Wheeler 
admits doing, and exercising the most arbitrary selection, satisfy 
himself with a form of words. If he is not a word-monger and insists 
on knowing concretely what instinct means in the analyzed behavior 
of any single mammal, there is scarcely a line in the experimental 
literature, except Yerkes's and Bloomfield's 2 work on the cat, to 
illuminate him. 

Let us try to be concrete. Speaking from the point of view of 
current thought, we would doubtless all agree that there is in the 
young of mammals an instinct to hunt out the breast and suck. 

"Do Kittens Instinctively Kill Mice," Psych. Bull, 7: 253. 


Now take the case of newly-born puppies and ask any single ques- 
tion about the makeup of the instinct ; ask what it is that sets this 
instinct going, and you will not find a satisfactory answer anywhere 
in the literature. That it can be neither sight nor sound seems 
evident, because the eyes and ears of new-born puppies are closed for 
practically a fortnight after birth. Yet it is an open question 
whether they can not distinguish shades of light through the closed 
lids. Suppose you eliminate light and sound. What do you know 
about the puppy's sense of smell, its power of discrimination, its 
range in quality, and its range in intensity; the exceptional power 
of certain odors to excite reaction, the distance over which the odor 
is perceptible, the power of localization? To every one of these 
questions you must answer, "Absolutely nothing specific." What 
about the new-born puppy's sense of temperature, its sense of touch, 
its power of orientation, its possible kinesthetic sensations, its oral 
sense, its ability to taste ? To every one of these interrogatories you 
must reply as before, "Nothing at all that fulfills the demands of 
experimental science. ' ' 

If you seek to know which of several stimuli is prepotent over the 
others and to determine some order of importance for the several 
possible senses, you complicate the situation still more, and your 
confusion increases if you raise the question of the relative accuracy, 
serviceableness, and modifiability of the supposedly connate neural 
connections. It is hardly necessary to do more than state the situa- 
tion to see that when we speak of the feeding instinct of young 
mammals we are merely cloaking our ignorance with a phrase. As 
an analytic concept it is valueless. Yet, if we have so little knowl- 
edge of the first experiences of the new-born animal, all its later 
history is clouded in even denser mists. There have been some 
studies on the sense of hearing and the sense of sight in dogs, but 
this work is not sufficiently accurate in its technique but that later 
experimentalists will insist on doing it all over again. There has 
been some work on dog intelligence, but not one of the reported 
investigations has even attempted to take the dog on his own ground, 
that of smell, and in no one of the investigations has the experimenter 
succeeded in eliminating himself from the experimental situation. 
These two shortcomings very decidedly limit the value of any investi- 
gation as yet made. When you couple with the evident fragmen- 
tariness of the experimental work and its certain lack of finality, the 
fact that the behavior of a dog at any level of development is a com- 
posite of inherited and learned reactions, you see how impossible it is 
in any given case of canine behavior to say what is instinct and what 
is intelligence. Gross facts are evident enough, but we ought at this 


time to be beyond the stage where we base theories of learning on 
the simple observations of common sense. 

Yet, in spite of our inability in concrete cases to separate instinct 
from intelligence, we are asked by current writers to regard a large 
proportion of dog behavior as due to instinctive imitation. I con- 
fess that I can not see how this sort of speculation is likely to illu- 
minate the subject of animal behavior. To use the phrase to point 
out a large body of unanalyzed behavior is of course allowable, on 
condition that we take the next imperative step in the process, 
namely, to analyze that behavior into its elemental terms. But to 
imagine that we have said something final about a certain bit of 
behavior when we call it instinctive imitation is to mislead ourselves 
and to confuse the rightful course of experimental investigation. 

With voluntary imitation the case is even worse. In human psy- 
chology we are at sea as to what constitute the elemental processes 
of inference and volition. In one place we read that the highest 
processes of mental life are nothing more than highly elaborated 
complexes of functioning images. In another place we are told that 
all this image-mongering is absurd, and that volition and inference 
can go on without any images whatever. On the one hand, we hear 
that we are nearing the end of sensationalism, and on the other, that 
the final triumph of sensationalistic psychology is even now in sight. 
Then we hear that there is no valid objective criterion of the presence 
of imagery that we must always depend upon the subject's intro- 
spective report. In the light of such confusion, such a term as 
voluntary or inferential imitation loses its significance. Until human 
psychology can give us something more settled regarding the proc- 
esses of volition we do well to use the term volition with parsimony 
in reference to the doings of animals. 

Here then is our situation. We have the concept of imitation, 
which is an essentially descriptive term, setting forth certain features 
in the objectively observable behavior of animals. This concept is 
then divided into two parts, not, mark you, on the basis of objectively 
observed features of behavior, but on the basis of the supposed psy- 
chical accompaniments of such behavior. The terms which are used 
to denote these two divisions then become, not descriptive terms any 
longer, but explanatory terms, i. e., they do not point out the beha- 
vior which actually takes place, but they attempt to indicate the non- 
observed processes antecedent to such behavior. These terms, how- 
ever, when submitted to critical examination, turn out to have the 
most uncertain significance, for, imitation entirely apart, it must be 
admitted that there is no understanding about the relation of instinct 
and volition. What is more is that we shall not have any under- 
standing of their relation so long as we confine our work to the logical 


differentiation of terms. It may not be a very encouraging situation, 
but there is little likelihood that anybody will say anything signifi- 
cant and concrete about instinct and volition in mammalian behavior 
until we have a far larger accumulation of experimentally deter- 
mined facts than we now have regarding any single mammal. 

This situation is an unfortunate one for the study of imitative 
behavior, which is no longer approached on its own merits, but which 
has to struggle for recognition under the burden of supposedly 
explanatory adjectives, which in fact explain nothing, being them- 
selves in need of description and explanation. We seem to face 
two alternatives : we may abandon the study of imitation and direct 
our studies to other fields. This we seem to be doing and to a degree 
the tendency is commendable. If the change is actuated by the feel- 
ing that imitative phenomena are so complex that we can not rightly 
interpret the results of experimental studies on imitation until we 
know more about the sensations and instincts, then, I agree. If, how- 
ever, the tendency to drop imitation out of our categories is due to 
the belief that when we are talking about imitation we are resorting 
to " magical agencies" and that we must abandon it in favor of 
something that is more truly scientific, then I dissent, and insist that 
whatever may finally be our decision regarding imitative phenomena, 
we are as yet without sufficient evidence for any such speedy termina- 
tion of this category. No person can face the whole group of experi- 
mentally determined facts of imitation in birds, 3 rats, 4 cats, 5 mon- 
keys, 6 and apes 7 and come to any such conclusion, except he do it 
in behalf of a theory which he regards as more important than the 

The second alternative is to suspend judgment as to the partic- 
ular level of psychical accomplishment denoted by the different kinds 
of imitative behavior, to free the concept of imitation from its unfor- 
tunate appendages and set ourselves to the task of accumulating the 
facts which we shall need before we can finally determine the impor- 
tance of any particular kind of imitative behavior. The social rela- 
tions of animals are of vast importance to their degree of mental 
attainment, and in these social relations there is a kind of behavior, 

* James P. Porter, ' ' Intelligence and Imitation in Birds, ' ' Amer. Jour. 
Psych., 21. 

4 Charles S. Berry, ' ' The Imitative Tendencies of White Rats, ' ' Jour. Comp. 
Neur. and Psych., 16 : 333. 

'Charles S. Berry, "An Experimental Study of Imitation in Cats," Jour. 
Comp. Neur. and Psych., 18: 1-25. 

M. E. Haggerty, "Imitation in Monkeys," Jour. Comp. Neur. and Psych., 
19: 337. 

7 M. E. Haggerty, ' ' Preliminary Studies on Anthropoid Apes, ' ' Psych. Bull., 
7: 49. 


which, to date, has not been better described than to call it imitation. 
At the present stage of our study of these relations, it is of secondary 
importance whether we are finally to explain them as "inherited 
reactions which are definitely serviceable on the occasion of their first 
appearance," or whether we must group them under entirely new 
rubrics. It is of first importance that we find out in terms of objec- 
tively describable behavior exactly what these relations are, and find 
it out in elemental terms. 

I said a moment ago that no one can face the whole group of experi- 
mentally determined facts of imitation in animals and treat them 
lightly. I wish now to call attention to a single case of imitation which 
I reported to this association three years ago. Two monkeys were put 
into a cage three by four feet at the bottom, and six feet high. Seven 
strings hung from the top of this cage to within eight inches of the 
floor. Near the floor was a circular opening in the back of the cage, 
and one of the strings was attached on the outside of the cage to a 
mechanism which would, when the string was pulled, drop food down 
through a chute on the outside of the cage to a floor level with the 
opening in question. One of the two monkeys had learned to pull 
the string and get food at the opening. The other monkey, although 
he had been allowed ample opportunity to learn the trick unaided, 
had failed to do so. After being allowed to be with the first monkey 
when she pulled the string and got food, the second animal when left 
alone directed his attention to the food opening in a way that he had 
never done and repeatedly handled the three strings nearest the 
opening in a far more interested manner than he had ever done. In 
explanation of this change in behavior I am perfectly willing to 
invoke Thorndike's first law of behavior 8 that "the same situation 
will, in the same animal, produce the same response and that if the 
same situation produces on two occasions two different responses, 
the animal must have changed." But then I would ask those who 
deny that this is imitative behavior to specify in what the change in 
the second monkey consists. To assume that there has been a change 
independent of the presence of the performing animal is mere gra- 
tuity. The evidence was too clear that the attention of the stupid 
monkey received a decided and sudden turn in the direction of the 
behavior of the other animal to doubt that that behavior was the 
determining factor. That the second monkey should go to the open- 
ing and look in may, of course, be explained by the fact that he had 
seen food there, but that he should suddenly become interested in 
the strings, the ends of which hung six inches above the opening and 
out of the animal's range of vision when he was looking into the 
opening, can receive no such explanation. There had been ample 

Edw. L. Thorndike, "Animal Intelligence," page 241. 


opportunity for the second monkey to learn the trick unaided, but 
he had failed to do so; the strings had never brought satisfaction 
to him through his own activity. Yet now, although he did not use 
the strings to get food, he continued to handle them, to pound them 
against the side of the cage and against each other, and several times 
after acting in this way he looked directly into the food opening. 
Such continued interest can not be explained by the ' ' law of effect. ' ' 
There is here a directing of attention that can not be due to the 
activities of the animal itself nor to any change in the mechanical 

This directing of attention which is so evident in this case was 
more marked in the next stage of the animal 's learning. The trained 
animal was put back into the cage and allowed to get food in the 
presence of the learning monkey. As a result of this experience the 
attention of the second animal was narrowed down to the correct 
string. He no longer played with all three strings but centered his 
attention on the correct one of the three, and that without ever 
having used it in getting food or finding satisfaction through it in 
any other way. That he did not at once do the necessary thing to 
get food shows that imitation was not perfect and had to be pieced 
out with accidental learning, but the very fact that, in spite of his 
inability to do the proper act, he kept working at the task shows 
that the law of effect is not sufficient to explain this kind of learning. 
I do not claim that this is voluntary or inferential imitation. I do 
not profess to have any very clear idea as to what voluntary and 
inferential imitation are. What I do claim is that you have here 
a progressive narrowing of one animal's attention (viewed objec- 
tively) in the direction of the behavior of another animal and that 
this change in the behavior of the second animal can not be accounted 
for by any supposed change in the animal itself, except such as is 
induced in it by its observation of the successful behavior of the 
trained monkey. 

If my contentions in this case are granted it may be urged that 
this is an exceptional case. I doubt that. My own investiga- 
tion showed other cases which can not be explained on the basis of 
the supposedly simpler laws. To be sure I do not claim any finality 
for my results. The investigation marks only one stage on the road 
of experimental analysis and only points the way for extended 
investigations in the same direction. The methods of procedure will 
bear favorable comparison with those of any published experiments 
in this field, and under these circumstances I shift the burden of 
proof to the objectors. They must take the experimental devices 
which produced these results and show that under the same condi- 
tions most monkeys will not do as the ones whose behavior is reported. 


In view of these contentions, to which I have tried to give some 
degree of reasonableness, I do not think that the time has come to 
discard our study of imitative behavior as Bohn 9 seems to think, nor 
to throw aside the category of imitation as Thorndike would have 
us do. That a final interpretation of the facts must wait upon the 
accumulation of a much larger body of material than we now have 
is certain. On the other hand, there is equal certainty that we must 
not telescope the facts so far ascertained with theories that do not 
give full justice to these facts. What our present situation indicates 
is a reworking of the concept of imitation by discarding the old 
classification and proceeding to a new classification based on objec- 
tively observed facts. That the experimentally determined data are 
as yet wholly inadequate for a final statement is admitted. Such 
a reorganization must take account of all the factors that determine 
attention and of the various levels of accuracy and complexity in 
the imitative behavior. The first step in the process of reorganiza- 
tion is to convince ourselves that the old classification has reached 
the limit of its usefulness ; the second step is to construct a new classi- 
fication for a single species of animal, and to follow this with a like 
service for other species, in every case basing the classification on the 
facts which have been brought to light by experimental investigation ; 
the third step will be to push the experimental analysis of imitative 
behavior much farther than we have yet done, and in the end we may 
be able to speak with positive understanding about the imitative 
behavior of animals. 




Motive Force and Motivation Tracks: A Research in Will Psychology. 
E. BOYD BARRETT, S. J. London : Longmans, Green, & Company. 1911. 
Pp. xiv + 225. 

Those who are watching the progress of psychology will easily be re- 
minded, through the present work, of Cardinal Mercier's efforts to interest 
catholic philosophers in experimental psychology. Broadly speaking, the 
Cardinal's propaganda in favor of the latest phases of psychological re- 
search can not be said to have been very fruitful among his correligionists. 
Where they have tackled psychological subjects experimentally, in follow- 
ing Cardinal Mercier's advice, they have done so with the intention of 
showing the exact manner in which the catholic philosopher must look 
upon experimental psychology rather than for the purpose of solving any 
particular problem. 

Georges Bohn, "La Nouvelle Psychologic Animate," page 185. 


It can not be said that Barrett's work is an exception to this rule ; this 
author, a member of the Society of Jesus, swears by the name of Cardinal 
Mercier. His work, however, gives us an excellent summary of the cur- 
rent theories of will. The subject is thus covered more satisfactorily than 
in any other recent publication, at least in so far as the literature per- 
taining to it is concerned, and for this service we may be thankful to the 
author. His familiarity with modern theories of the will no less than his 
easy flowing style renders the reading of his book a pleasure even to one 
untrained technically. Such fundamental problems as determinism, 
automatism, and the evolution of motivation are treated, on the whole, in 
a competent way, although the author's contention that the work shows, 
even indirectly, "the worthlessness of the psychological arguments for 
determinism " is unfounded. The strictly empirical experimental por- 
tion of the work shows nothing of this kind. His criticism of hedonism 
is particularly sound, provided we limit the use of the term, to a physical 
sense, in connection with activities of lower order, and, in man, to con- 
scious mental processes. 

We turn to the experimental matters reported upon in the book. Ex- 
periments were carried on with five subjects, including the author. Eight 
liquids, specially prepared, were used, to which nonsense names were 
given. Subjects were asked to taste the eight substances in rotation thrice 
every morning and thrice every evening, after calling out their respective 
names as given. The strength of these associations was tested by means 
of recognition tests, and then followed the choice experiments proper. 

These were as follows : The nonsense names, printed on cards, were 
revealed to the subject, as in the ordinary association tests, by means of 
Ach's changing machine. Subject was instructed : " React when you 
know what it is." By arranging the names of the substances in the order 
of hedonic feelings they evoked, a definite scale of values was obtained, 
differing, of course, for each subject according to his subjective likes and 

Next, cards were printed in various combinations, and two of different 
hedonic value were made to appear at the same time over glasses contain- 
ing the respective solutions. Subject was requested to choose a solution 
and drink it. A Hipp chronoscope measured the interval between the ap- 
pearance of the card and the time of reaction. By means of Ewald's key, 
a Vernier chronoscope was started by the reaction so that the time elap- 
sing between the reaction and the realization of the choice was also 

It will be noted that the processes of motivation and choice, which the 
author set out to investigate, took place in the interval between the per- 
ception of the excitant (in this case the card) and the active realiza- 
tion of the choice. This interval was subjected to close introspective 
scrutiny. The subjects made note of the motives which actuated them in 
the choice. The motivation factors, of course, were found to be mostly 
hedonic; they are divided by the author, arbitrarily, it would seem, into 
extrinsic and intrinsic. The author also speaks of "motivation tracks"; 
this adds to the plasticity and clearness of his thought, but when he per- 


sists in this direction to the extent of actually mapping out tracks or 
curves of motive force the reader can not escape the impression that this 
is one more instance in which a happy simile has been made to bear more 
than it will support. It would be difficult for the author to convince his 
readers of the actual occurrence of such tracks and curves as he draws out 
skilfully, even if he should take the trouble, which he evidently thought 
unnecessary in the present connection, of disclosing all the proofs he has 
for their support. 

In its final term, it was found that motivation becomes steadied and 
more and more automatic, that is, independent of conscious attention. 
This accords with our general empirical notions and is an illustration of 
the economizing tendency of volition. The opposite of this steadiness of 
purpose, hesitation, occurred frequently in the course of the author's ex- 
periments and is discussed by him in a special chapter, in which he treats 
of hesitation as a disease of the will and suggests ways of healing. 

Whatever might be said of the practicability or therapeutic value of 
the author's remedies for impairment of the will, it is difficult to see 
wherein the author's claim that " these suggestions are based on the con- 
sideration of the actual results of our experiments " is justified. Suppose 
we look up his universal remedy or grand arcanum, we find it stated as 
follows (p. 218) : " With regard to hesitation which is, par excellence, the 
malady of the will, inasmuch as it destroys serious motivation and leads 
to irregularities and inconsistencies, the great means of avoiding it is to 
acquire the habit of serious, decisive choosing and to avoid repining over 
past choices." Leaving aside, for the present, the manifestly unwise teach- 
ing about " not repining over past choices," it must be said that such ad- 
vice, far from being the product of experimental research, is the rawest 
kind of empiricism. Any country gossip is prepared to tell that what ails 
neighbor Jones, who is run down on account of gastric ulcer, is the ab- 
sence of good nourishing food and plenty of it. The need of nourishment 
may be very obvious in the case of neighbor Jones and where the will is 
not sufficient more will and plenty of it is logical enough, but such pre- 
scriptions are far from what is really needed. Other remedies suggested 
by the author are similarly superficial, even though they be ideally log- 
ical enough. 

The reader who will turn to this work expecting to find some new light 
on the subject of will and its motivation will probably be disappointed, but 
to one who wants the subject reviewed attractively and brought down to 
date this book will be highly welcome. 

Though not quite germane to the subject under consideration, the re- 
viewer thinks it his duty to express disapproval of a peculiar trick which 
may as well be branded here and now as unworthy of a scientist. The 
name of a liberal educator, who has recently suffered martyrdom in Spain, 
is dragged in by the author ostensibly to illustrate a point, but in reality 
to besmirch his memory. It is unfortunate that even the dead are not safe 
from such underhanded attacks. The peculiar villainy consists not merely 
in attaching an opprobrious epithet to an honored man, now dead, in a 
spirit of partizanship, but in doing so in connection with a work the read- 


ers of which are not expected perhaps to know the details of the situation 
to which reference is made. It is a sophisticated way of carrying preju- 
dice over into quarters where it may not otherwise have a chance to be 
heard, in the hope that through ignorance of the actual facts it may take 
root. Nothing is more clear to careful and impartial observers of contem- 
porary events than that Francesco Ferrer did not " hold sway for three 
days over half a million people, burning their churches, schools, museums, 
and all they held most precious." This allegation is false in every respect. 
While such falsehoods are not uncommon, especially in certain interested 
quarters, one would not expect them to be paraded in front of unsuspect- 
ing students of psychology who may be unfamiliar with the details of the 
situation, and least of all in a work like the present. 

The mention of Ferrer, the advocate of peace and apostle of secular 
education, in the same breadth with the sort of anarchists which the au- 
thor's fancy depicts, above all the bringing of this matter furtively into 
this book, is not without a purpose. One's adversary is shown in the 
wrong and placed hors de combat, as it were, at least in so far as pub- 
lic sympathy is concerned (especially if the adversary be dead and unable 
to defend himself against a false charge) if one succeeds to brand the 
adversary's memory with some title or epithet repulsive to public opin- 
ion. This E. Boyd Barrett, S.J., has endeavored to do parenthetically 
by throwing a sentence or two into the midst of matter with which the 
object of his bias has nothing in common. A remark thrown in sideways, 
where the hearer is not on guard and is unprepared, is more likely to take 
root than otherwise. It is this that invests the offense of E. Boyd Bar- 
rett, S.J., with particular gravity. 

Fortunately, no event of historic import in our generation has been 
the subject of such a thorough and impartial study as the Ferrer case. It 
is hoped that readers, upon seeing in print Barrett's assault upon the 
memory of Ferrer will be moved thereby to examine Wm. Archer's " Life, 
Trial, and Death of Francesco Ferrer " (London: Chapman & Hall, 1911), 
and thus acquaint themselves with the " Spanish Dreyfus " case, and with 
the true story of those troublous days in Spain. 


Essentials of Psychology. W. B. PILLSBURY. New York : The Macmillan 

Company. 1911. Pp. ix + 358. 

On reading this book one must conclude that Professor Pillsbury has 
written an excellent elementary text-book of psychology. The mode of 
presentation is such as to interest the student and the general reader, 
while the style is forceful and clear. Students and teachers will find the 
exercises connected with each main topic very usable and well devised for 
testing and applying the principles brought out in the discussion. The 
references given at the end of each chapter are, for the most part, to simi- 
lar treatments from other texts. The topics treated in the book are prac- 
tically the same as those in most introductory texts except chapters four- 
teen and fifteen, which deal, respectively, with " Work, Fatigue and Sleep," 


and " Interrelations of Mental Functions," and which, embodying the re- 
sults of recent experimentation, are a genuine addition to the value of the 
book. In general, the book profits decidedly by the incorporation of ex- 
perimental results, giving it a greater scientific value without detracting 
from its readableness. This is particularly true of the chapters on sensa- 
tion, perception, memory, and action, as well as those mentioned above. 

The book is written confessedly from the functional point of view. 
Psychology is defined in terms of behavior rather than in terms of con- 
sciousness. Consciousness as an object of study is subordinated to be- 
havior, its importance being borrowed from its relation to the latter. 
However, the results of structural psychology are made much use of and 
are made rather more important in the treatment than the author's state- 
ments in preface and introduction would lead one to expect. The result is 
largely a coordinating of the functional-behavior form of treatment with 
the structural-consciousness aspect. It would seem that at the beginning 
of the study of psychology there is no great gain in making one type sub- 
ordinate to the other, but that a coordination of treatment is more natural 
and useful for beginners. 

As the discussion is so largely functional, considerable space is given 
to the nervous system and habit. Two features here may be noticed: 
first, the explanation of the nervous current in terms of chemical action, 
and secondly, the use which is made of what we may call the Sherrington 
theory of the synapse. This latter fits in well with the discussion, but it 
seems somewhat doubtful if, after all, the use made of the theory is much 
more than a renaming of certain known features of nerve functioning 
while the theory itself lacks convincing proof. 

The general arrangement of the matter of the book is excellent. 
Habit, sensation, selection, and retention are first developed and are con- 
sidered fundamental. The more complex operations are then explained in 
terms of the simpler. The structural elements are sensations and memo- 
ries. Though all mental qualities come originally from sensation, the 
distinction is maintained between sensational and imaginal qualities. 
The author differs from some writers in being guided in classifying and 
enumerating sensation qualities by the doctrine of specific energies rather 
than by discrimination by introspection. In the treatment of feeling, we 
find affection as a mental element added to the sense and image qualities. 
The primary mental function is selection. This is fundamental in con- 
scious life and is called attention or will as applied to mental content or 
to action. Professor Pillsbury's contributions to the solution of the prob- 
lems of attention are well known, and this book is enriched by the results 
reached by his thorough investigations. The whole discussion of selec- 
tion, attention, action, and will, is decidedly good, perhaps forming the 
best part of the book. On the same high level, however, are the topics sen- 
sation, perception, association, and memory, the laws of learning and of 
retaining and forgetting being especially well worked out from experi- 
mental data. Probably the least satisfactory chapters are those dealing 
with feeling, emotion, and reasoning. The three theories of feeling ac- 
cording to the author ought to be combined if feelings are to be under- 


stood in their entirety. Perhaps an attempt to combine them in a single 
statement would be useful to the student. The chapter on the emotions 
is rather disappointing from both functional and structural points of 
view. The chapter on reasoning is rather more logical and rationalistic 
than one might expect from an experimental psychologist. These are' 
minor defects along with the general excellence of the work. It is a scien- 
tific text, pedagogically well arranged and presented. On the whole, as a 
first book in psychology, it is admirable both in design and in execution. 


The Moral Life. W. E. SORLEY. Cambridge: University Press. 1911. 

Pp. 147. 

Since this handbook on " The Moral Life and Moral Worth " is written 
for the general reader rather than the philosophical student, it is not un- 
fair to discuss the work from the standpoint of the amateur ethicist. 
And such a person will be apt to feel vaguely dissatisfied with the rigid 
distinction made between the historical treatment of the moral life and 
that from the view-point of validity, or judgment of worth. The author 
announces at the beginning his intention to treat the subject exclusively 
from the latter point of view. Then follow chapters devoted to an ortho- 
dox presentation of the five official Greek virtues, with a slight concession 
to modern ways in the shape of an inclusion of Industry, Thrift, and 
Prudence, and a short discussion of Freedom and Equality. But is this 
traditional outline, this static and coldly harmonious judgment of moral 
worth, the most profitable and fruitful way of viewing the subject? 
People are so incurably dynamic in their philosophy to-day that they can 
not find in this cross-section of the perfect character, this instantaneous 
photograph of the perfectly developed moral man, an adequate basis for 

The moral life is a process of the moralization of life and it can be 
judged only as a process. It can not be stated in terms of " qualities " 
that we " possess," but rather as a life that emerges and grows out of our 
reactions to successive crises, which we meet out of our store of instinctive 
tendencies and traditional ideas, and the peculiar individual trend of our 
reactions. Out of the jostlings and rubbings and settlings-down of these 
reactions and habits there slowly emerges the moral life. And in our 
judgment of this product lies the true moral worth. 

The study of a process of the forms of control and influence over hu- 
man behavior, and of the lines of reaction, is the only kind of "moral 
philosophy " that will prove very satisfactory to-day. Such a book is that 
of Professors Dewey and Tufts; in their work, the moral life smacks of 
reality; its nature is intelligible because its development is intelligible. 
By the side of it Professor Sorley seems to present a mass of cold abstrac- 
tions. Some general readers may feel the fine, healthy glow of the traveler 
in high and rarified altitudes of philosophic thought, but the radically 
minded will be apt to feel that they have asked for bread and have been 
given a stone. R. S. BOURNE. 




REVUE PITILOSOPHIQUE. December, 1911. La contagion des 
monies et des melancolies (pp. 561-683): O. DCMAS. -For manias and 
true melancholias the hypothesis of contagion is no more acceptable than 
for mental confusions. Positivisme, criticisme, et pragmatisme (pp. 584- 
605): I. I'i HAS. -A careful analysis of the pragmatic elements in these 
three points of view. L 'introspection (pp. 606-626) : L. DUGAS. - Vindica- 
tion of introspection as the fundamental, original, and peculiar method of 
psychology. Analyses et comples rendus. E. Tassy, Le travail d' ideation: 
FR. P\i IIIVN. Philosophic und Religion in Darstellungen (par divers 
auteure) : J. BEXRI'BI. L. Cuc'not, La genese des especes qnimales: F. LE 
I>\NTEC. H. M. Bernard, Some Neglected Factors in Evolution: G. E. Underbill, Mysticism: L. ARREAT. Bohn, La nouvelle psy- 
chologic animale: J.-M. LAHY. Dr. G. Stroehlin, Les syncinesies: G.-L. 
DTPRAT. S. Boirson, La coeducation: G.-L. DUPRAT. J. Rogues de Fur- 
sac, L'avarice: L. DUGAS. Revue des periodiques etrangers. 

II successo di Enrico Bergson (pp. 614-630). The success of Bergson's 
philosophy depends upon the abuse of intellectualism during the preceding 
generation, but sooner or later intellectualism will get the upper hand 
again and Bergson's reputation as a philosopher will be permanently 
eclipsed. Essema ed esistenza (pp. 631-657) : G. MATTIUSSI. In the 
divine nature, essence and existence are identical; in finite beings, on 
the other hand, there is a real distinction between the two concepts. Lo 
studio sperimentale del pensiero e della volonta (pp. 658-669) : A. 
GEMELLI. -An account of some recent experimental studies (Ach, 
Michotte-Priim) on the voluntary act, its antecedents and its motives. 
Note e discussioni. Cronaca scientifica. Analisi d'opere. A. Gemelli, 
8ui rapporti tra scienza e filosofia: D. D'ALBA. F. Paulsen, Introduzione 
alia filosofia: P. ROTTA. J. Geyser, Grundlagen der Logik und Erkennt- 
nislehre: E. CHIOCCHETTT. L. Profumo, S.J., Corso di filosofia ele- 
mentare, G. M. PETAZZI, S.J. A. Bonucci, Veritd e Realta: P. ROTTA. 
A. Tari, Saggi di estetica e metafisica: R. FUSARI. A. Cappellazzi, Le 
Categoric di Aristotele e la filosofia classica: P. G. P. E. Krebs, Meister 
Dietrich. Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft: B. NARDI. J. 
Zeitter, L'idee de I'etat dans Saint Thomas d'Aquin: A. MASNOVO. E. 
Caird, Hegel: E. CHIOCCHETTI. F. von Hiigel, Religione ed illusione: G. 
TREDICI. Note bibliografiche. Somnario ideologico. 
Frischeisen-Kohler, Max. Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit (Wissenschaft 

und Hypothese, Band XV.). Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1912. Pp. 

viii-f478. 3M. 
Johnston, Charles Hughes. High School Education. New York : Charles 

Scribner's Sons. 1912. Pp. xii -f 555. 
Lee, Vernon, and Anstruther-Thomson. C. Beauty and Ugliness and 

Other Studies in Psychological Esthetics. New York: John Lane 

Company. 1912. Pp. xviii -f- 376. $1.75. 


Mackenzie, W. Alle Fonti della Vita. Genoa: A. F. Formiggini. 
1912. Pp. 387. 10L. 

Mercier, Charles Arthur. Conduct and its Disorders. London: The 
Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. xii + 377. $3.25. 

Moore, Paul Elmer. Nietzsche. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1912. 
Pp. 87. $1.00. 

Miiller-Freienfels, Eichard. Psychologic der Kunst. Leipzig: Verlag 
von B. G. Teubner. 1912. 2 Vols. 4.40M. 

Perry, Ralph Barton. Present Philosophical Tendencies. New York: 
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1912. 

Petzoldt, J. Das Weltproblem. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1912. Pp. 
xii + 210. 3M. 

Reisner, George A. The Egyptian Conception of Immortality. Boston: 
The Houghton Mifflin Co. 1912. Pp. vii + 85. $0.85. 

Kichter, Raoul. Religionsphilosophie. Leipzig: Verlag von Ernst 
Wiegandt. 1912. Pp. viii -f 178. 3M. 

Rogers, Reginald A. P. A Short History of Ethics. London: The Mac- 
millan Company. 1911. Pp. xxii + 303. $1.10. 

Schiller, F. C. S. Formal Logic. New York: The Macmillan Company. 
1912. Pp. xviii + 423. $3.25. 

Shearman, A. T. The Scope of Formal Logic. The New Logical Doc- 
trines Expounded with some Criticisms. London : University of Lon- 
don Press ; Hodder & Stoughton. 1911. Pp. xiv + 165. 5s. 

Sheffield, Alfred Dwight. Grammar and Thinking. New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. vii + 193. $1.50. 

Tannery, Jules. Science et Philosophic. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1911. 
Pp. 284. 

Werner, Max. Das Christen turn und die monistische Religion. Berlin: 
Verlag von Karl Curtius. Pp. 202. 


THE fifth annual Congress of the Gesellschaft fiir experimentelle 
Psychologic was held in Berlin, April 16-20, under the presidency of Pro- 
fessor G. E. Miiller. There was a large and distinguished attendance of 
German psychologists, and papers were read by Professors Miiller, Kiilpe, 
Sommer, Goldscheider, Vogt, Lippmann and more than thirty others. 
Representatives from almost all of the countries of Europe were present, 
England's delegation including Professors McDougall, Myers, and Spear- 
man. From America, Professors W. F. Dearborn, L. J. Martin, A. Meyer, 
H. Miinsterberg, and R. S. Woodworth, were in attendance. Extensive 
exhibitions of psychological apparatus and of the methods and results 
of applied psychology were held in connection with the congress. The 
meeting in 1913 will be held in Gottingen. 

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES'S letters are being collected for biographical 
purposes, and any one who has any of his letters can render assistance that 


will be highly appreciated by addressing Henry James, Jr., 95 Irving St., 
Cambridge, Mass. Casual or brief letters may have an interest or im- 
portance not apparent to the person preserving them; and news of the 
whereabouts of any of the late William James's letters will be gratefully 

DR. EUOEN KUEHNEMANN, professor of philosophy at the University of 
Breslau, Germany, and recently German exchange professor at Harvard 
University, has been appointed as the first German university professor 
to occupy the Carl Schurz memorial professorship established last year in 
the University of Wisconsin by German-American citizens of Wisconsin 
and friends of the university. 

THE Annual General Meeting of the Mind Association will be held in 
Trinity College, Cambridge, on Saturday, June 1, 1912. On the after- 
noon of that day the London Aristotelian Society will hold a symposium, 
to which members of the Mind Association are invited, on " Purpose and 
Mechanism." Papers will be read by Professors W. R. Sorley, A. D. Lind- 
say, B. Bosanquet, and G. F. Stout. 

PROFESSOR FREDERICK E. BOLTON, professor of education and director 
of the school of education in the State University of Iowa, has accepted a 
call to become head of the department of education in the State Univer- 
sity of Washington at Seattle, and will begin his work at that place in 

M. HENRI POINCARE, professor of mathematical astronomy in the Uni- 
versity of Paris, lectured at the University of London during the early 
part of this month, upon "La Logique de I'Infini," " Le Temps et I'Es- 
pace," " Les Invariants arithmetiques," and "La Theorie du Rayonnement." 

PROFESSOR GEORGE GRANT McCuRDY will be the delegate from Yale 
University to the International Congress of Anthropology and Prehistoric 
Archeology to be held in Geneva, Switzerland, during the first week in 
September, 1912. 

AMONG the recent lectures at the University of Illinois were three upon 
" Heredity " by Professor W. E. Castle, of Harvard University, and one 
upon " Morals and Moral Ideals of the Japanese," by Professor Inaze 

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY has recently received a gift of $100,000 with 
which is to be founded a professorship for the study of the laws of descent, 
to be called the Balfour Professorship of Genetics. 

PROFESSOR HENRY B. FINE has resigned the deanship of the faculty of 
Princeton University, but continues as dean of the department of science 
and as Dod professor of mathematics. 

THE Philadelphia Branch of the American Philosophical Association 
held an unusually interesting meeting on April 18 to 20. President R. W. 
Keen gave the opening address. 

THE REV. GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX, professor of philosophy and the his- 
tory of religion in the Union Theological Seminary, died on April 25, 
at the age of fifty-nine years. 

VOL. IX. No. 11. MAY 23, 1912 



MY purpose is to show that chance is an objective category; 
objective, that is, in the same sense as causation, space, 
quantity, or other accepted scientific categories. By a chance-event, 
I mean an event which has no cause ; though a fuller definition will 
appear in the course of the argument. The question of the ultimate 
metaphysical status of the category will not be discussed. 

That there are aspects of the physical world which are, in a 
sense, outside the pale of law and causation, is widely admitted 
among philosophers to-day. Professor Royce has shown 1 that the 
element of significance or value which resides in individual things 
can not be scientifically accounted for ; Mr. C. S. Peirce has argued 2 
for an ultimate indeterminism out of which grows a certain amount 
of law; James 3 and Bergson* have defended an irreducible spon- 
taneity in all real events; Professor Palmer has lately advocated 
chance-combinations of causal series ; 5 Cournot 6 and others in France 
have stood for a similar view. Admitting in general the truth of 
these positions, I wish to carry the argument somewhat further, to 
give the concept a more positive interpretation, and to place it firmly 
within the field of scientific categories. Not only is chance, as I 
believe, more than a mere name for our ignorance ; not only is there 
a certain aspect of fact which is outside of causality; there is a per- 
fectly definable, intelligible tendency in physical events toward varia- 
tion from law, and this tendency is nearly, if not quite, as widely 
verified as laws themselves. I shall venture, then, to differ from 

^'Spirit of Modern Philosophy," Lecture XII. 

*Monist, January, 1891, April, 1892; also, incidentally, in October, 1892, 
January, 1893, and July, 1893. 

* ' ' Some Problems in Philosophy, ' ' Chapter IV. 

4 Principally in " L 'Evolution creatrice. ' ' As this is one of the main con- 
tentions of the whole book, specific reference is perhaps not needed. 

In "The Problem of Freedom," Chapter X. 

* ' ' Essai sur les f ondements de nos connaissances. ' ' Many articles on the 
subject by others have appeared in the Eevue PMlosopJiique. 



most of the previous views in regarding chance as a well-defined 
and, in one sense, a positive category within the scientific field or 
world of description. 

Before we go to the evidence for this view, a word must be said 
as regards the subject of this investigation. It is not the pure or 
mathematical concept of chance which is here studied, but the 
empirical; and a failure to distinguish these might lead to miscon- 
ception or misdirected refutation. The philosophy of scientific cate- 
gories, toward which this paper aims to contribute, may proceed in 
either of two ways. It may study such categories in abstracto, as 
pure concepts and members of an ideal system of concepts, without 
direct concern as to their mode of application to experience; or it 
may study them, not as members of an ideal system of knowledge, 
but as their nature is revealed in actual scientific treatment of the 
facts to which they apply. The former method treats categories as 
instruments of exact knowledge and perfect determination, a pur- 
posive rearrangement of data, due entirely to the activity of mind, 
and dominated by its ideal purposes ; the latter treats them as adapta- 
tions, rather, in which the ideals of the mind are less dominant and 
the intelligence of the knower is more subjected to the data. 
Examples of the former are the many recent works upon exact logic ; 
of the latter, Bergson's definition of consciousness in "Matiere et 
Memoire," Dewey's definition of truth in "Studies in Logical The- 
ory," Montague's definition of consciousness in the paper "Con- 
sciousness a Form of Energy." 7 In general the results of these 
methods will not agree, because they study different concepts. 
Causation as a factor in an ideal system of knowledge may be a very 
different thing from the causation that is used in the science of 
to-day. But to the philosopher both should be at least interesting. 
As to the question, which one is the ultimately correct category, that 
lies beyond the province of this paper. 8 I consciously choose the 
empirical concept of chance, seeking to know what, if anything, of 
the fortuitous is implied in the scientific methods and results of 
our time. 

If we consider the world in cross-section, at one moment we seem 
to find many causes acting, which themselves bear little if any causal 
relation to one another. That I am at this moment speaking can not 
be causally explained, so far as we know, by the fact that the tide is 
just now turning in the harbor. That the tile on the roof is loosened 
by the wind and falls just at the moment I pass beneath it (to use 
the familiar example) may very well be fully determined by ante- 

1 In " Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James. ' ' 
' The clearest statement I hare found, of the ideal or conceptual method, is 
in Professor Royce's "William James and Other Essays," pages 234 ff. 


cedent causes; that I pass at that moment may be equally deter- 
mined; but each of these series seems to be quite undetermined by 
the other. Here appears a loophole through which chance might 
enter the scientific realm; many thinkers have been so persuaded. 
And yet who knows that further scientific evidence might not show 
the two events related as the scales of a balance ? It might be a case 
of Kantian reciprocity. My passing beneath the house jars the 
earth, the house, and the tile, however slightly; and if the tide did 
not turn just now when I speak, something would be wrong with the 
moon or sun, and who knows what meteorological conditions might 
immediately transpire, even to the destruction of all of us ? It seems 
to me that we must await evidence on this point. Meanwhile I find 
nothing in the observed results to rule out a mutual determination of 
all these facts. 

But there is another way in which events might be uncaused. 
We might consider, not a cross-section of the world at one moment, 
but a sequence. It is conceivable, whether credible or not, that in a 
series like the successive positions of a falling body slight variations 
from the straight path might occur, which were not caused by any- 
thing in the past history of that body or any other fact, past or 
present. Is there any evidence, in present scientific methods or 
results, of such phenomena ? Is there any direct and positive impli- 
cation of uncaused variations from exact law in any of the sequences 
of this world? 

At the present date we have, thanks to the accurate measurements 
and tabulations of anthropologists, biologists, economists, meteorol- 
ogists, and others who employ statistical methods, an enormous body 
of facts of the sort we are seeking. It has been found, for example, 
that the height of men and women, the length of various organs, the 
fluctuations of the thermometer, of rainfall, of prices, and so on, 
show a variation about a more or less ideal type or average. And 
what is more, the manner of variation is much the same throughout. 
To quote Professor Pearson : ' ' From paupers to cricket scores, from 
school-board classes to ox-eye daisies, from Crustacea to birth-rates, 
we find almost universally the same laws of frequency." 9 Nor is 
such variation confined to phenomena of living organisms. Besides 
meteorological facts already mentioned, we find that the exactest 
measurements in our physical laboratories show similar variations 
in the facts there recorded. 10 But with the exact delimitation of the 
field wherein such variations occur we are not concerned; enough 
that they are widely prevalent. 

"Chances of Death and Other Essays," page 20. 

10 Any work on statistics will give an idea of the wide extent of this fact of 
variation. See, e. g., G. U. Yule, "Introduction to the Theory of Statistics." 


We may say summarily that there seems to be a tendency, when 
experiments are repeated again and again, for the results to vary 
more or less about an ideal standard, norm, or type. For we may 
regard each human individual, say, as a repetition of the experiment 
of producing a human being; each rainstorm as nature's repeated 
attempt to produce rain, etc. That many such experiments are 
being conducted simultaneously does not affect the logic of the situa- 
tion, just as the result is indifferent whether we toss one penny many 
times or many pennies at once. The examination of large collections, 
or repetitions of similar phenomena, thus suggests what we could not 
discover from the single case, namely, that besides the general law 
which says "be so and so" there is another which says "be not quite 
so and so. ' ' Such at least is the superficial impression we get from 
the facts. Indeed it seems likely that had the science of statistics 
been organized as long ago as the other natural sciences, philosophers 
would scarcely have defended universal causation as frequently as 
they have done. 

But superficial impression is far from demonstration. The mere 
fact of a wide-spread tendency to vary from a type is hardly the 
slightest evidence of real chance. Are not all the variations them- 
selves caused ? If you are taller than I am, surely there is a reason 
for it; if to-day's rain is heavier than last week's, atmospheric con- 
ditions will account for it. But let us look again at the variations. 
We said above that their manner was much the same everywhere. 
And, moreover, that manner is a rather remarkable one. When the 
numerical values are graphically plotted they reveal a fairly close 
approximation to the well-known curve of error, or probability- 
curve. Exact correspondence with that curve we do not get, of 
course; but perhaps no concept, curve, or standard ever fitted the 
facts exactly. Laws are certainly never exactly fulfilled, yet we 
accept them. Now this striking unanimity of the variations sug- 
gests that they are not completely accounted for, each by its par- 
ticular causal antecedents, but that a special tendency must be 
invoked to account for this common property; and that, too, a 
tendency to vary fortuitously, since the probability-curve is just 
what would result, in the long run, from fortuitous variation. If a 
series of murders are committed in a city, or in several cities, with a 
cross drawn in blood on the forehead of every victim, we should 
reasonably infer that one man, or band of men, was the author of the 
crimes. Such coincidence would be the strongest kind of circum- 
stantial evidence. Our case seems just like that. It is hard to 
resist the conclusion that there is a wide-spread tendency at work 
in nature, making each event a little different from what it would 
be if all were governed '.y absolute law. 


But the belief in universal causation, at least within the sphere 
of science, is so ingrained in us by our modern education that it is 
not easily dislodged. Must this resemblance to the probability-curve 
be explained by a fortuitous tendency to vary ? For, if there is any- 
thing less than a strong logical compulsion here, we can hardly 
abandon that widely attested concept of law. We must then ask 
whether the facts could not possibly be explained without the resort 
to chance. And in answer I shall try to show, first, that a special 
tendency to vary must be begged, and secondly, that this tendency 
must be such as to permit chance to the individual cases, though not 
to the group as a whole. No other explanation of the situation, I 
shall claim, will do justice to the facts. 

First, then, can not the resemblance to the probability-curve be 
explained on the hypothesis of universal causation ? Let us see how 
that hypothesis would work out. Consider the case of the heights of 
a large number of men in a given city. When their numerical values 
are plotted, we have an approximation to the said curve. The height 
of each man is undoubtedly dependent on many causes, such as 
inheritance, nourishment during years of growth, early health, open 
air, sunlight, amount of fatigue in early life, etc. Now if you take 
a great number of men, these causes are certain to vary greatly from 
man to man. They will combine very differently in the individual 
men, giving very different results. And if you take men enough, 
you will include all possible combinations of these many causes. 
And this is no affair of chance, but is certain to be the case. Every 
possible effect upon the height of a man will thus be realized, and 
this, as is well known, will give a result approximating the curve. 
No special tendency toward variation need be conjured up, therefore ; 
the large number of ways in which the causes affecting growth will 
combine, guaranteed by the large number of men measured, will suf- 
fice to account for the facts. So much for the hypothesis of causa- 
tion. As a matter of fact, it seems to be the view of many writers 
on the subject. 11 Yet I can not but regard it as unsatisfactory. 
That each variation is indeed due to many cooperating causes is 
indisputable. That it can be wholly explained by those causes is a 
very different matter. For it is a condition of the formation of the 
curve that all possible combinations be realized in equal numbers. 
And there is nothing in the causal explanation to ensure this. The 
mere fact that by taking cases over a wide enough area you get all 
possible combinations of causes will not determine that those dif- 
ferent combinations occur in anything like approximately equal 

U E. g., Venn, "Logic of Chance," page 475, footnote. Jevons, "Prin- 
ciples of Science," page 196. Laplace, "Philosophical Essay on Probabilities," 
page 4. 


numbers. But they do so occur. Accordingly, I think we are driven 
to say that over and above the known and unknown causal laws there 
is a special tendency, active in nature, to realize in the long run 
every possible combination of causes in equal numbers. And since 
the individuals that vary, whether they be human heights, or organs, 
or prices, or temperatures, or what not, are themselves the products 
of many causes, we may perfectly well say that individual phe- 
nomena themselves tend to vary equally in all possible directions 
about a type. I say "in all possible directions," for the variation is 
always, apparently, restricted to a rather narrow field. But within 
that field, at any rate, a clearly marked and positive tendency, in 
addition to the usual kinds of causation, seems a necessary hypothesis. 

Of course "tendency" is a vague word and renders one liable to 
the accusation of hypostasising an abstraction. But it is here used 
as no more than a concept or formula to summarize a large class of 
facts. Exactly the same is true of such concepts as causation and 
of the particular causal laws to which we accord our belief. In a 
sense they explain nothing and solve no mysteries. I do not here 
claim for the tendency in question any deeper validity than we 
ascribe to the usual causal laws; but if the argument so far is cor- 
rect, it should have at least as much validity as those concepts have. 
We should speak of a real tendency among events to vary about a 
type, even as we speak of a real tendency in bodies to fall, or a real 
tendency in heat to radiate. 

We come now to the second point mentioned above. May not this 
tendency to vary be itself a unique kind of a causal law, strictly 
determined in every detail? If it is so orderly and regular on the 
whole, must it not be equally so in every particular case? The 
probability-curve is a very regular affair, and the variations of phe- 
nomena are, on the whole, very regular too. We find approximately 
the same proportion of heights above the mode, the same below, again 
and again. How could the collection be so orderly if the individual 
members were lawless? In short, we must now examine the indi- 
vidual instances, to see how this collective tendency should be inter- 
preted in its application to them. 

If the tendency to vary is operative through the series as a whole, 
it can not well be nil in any one event. What form, then, must it 
assume in one such event? There must be a tendency for each event 
to vary somehow from the norm. And further, it must be either 
predominant in one direction, or equal in all directions. On the 
latter alternative, the various directions counterbalance one another, 
and nothing can decide which variation will occur except some cause 
external to the event itself, or just chance. But it will not suffice us 
to appeal to an external cause to decide the matter. For, as we have 


seen above, the appeal to such causes will not account for the col- 
lective character of the variations. It will not guarantee what must 
be guaranteed, that the variations will, in the long run, be fairly 
equal in all possible directions. If some particular, external cause 
decided, in each instance, which of the conflicting directions should 
prevail, we should not, in general, have in the series as a whole the 
all-inclusive manner of varying that we do find. The only alterna- 
tive is chance. This and this only would seem to allow to the series 
that elasticity which enables each instance so to combine with the 
others as to give the total result we observe. If then the tendency to 
vary is in each instance equal in all directions, the actual result in 
that instance must be ascribed to chance. 

But perhaps in each case the tendency to deviate is strongest in 
one direction, changing in accordance with some fixed and unknown 
law as the cases are repeated, and gradually covering all possible 
cases. This again would seem to reduce all to strict causation. To 
be sure the variations seem to be essentially irregular and disorderly, 
but that may perhaps be due to our ignorance. May not the tend- 
ency to vary be itself found an orderly and thoroughly determined 
affair if we could only study it carefully enough ? To this question 
I must answer, no. The collective tendency toward variation seems 
to me inconsistent with causal determination of the individual case. 
It is, I think, generally agreed within the scientific field that one and 
the same cause can not, under constant conditions, produce varying 
effects. The cause we are discussing is the tendency to vary, which 
is, perhaps, in some sense, one and the same throughout the series. 
In so far as it is the same it must be supposed to produce, under 
similar conditions, much the same results. Now the conditions in all 
the individual cases are, to all intents and purposes, the same 
throughout. For our tendency acts independently of these special 
circumstances of each case. We have already seen that those cir- 
cumstances could not guarantee the nearly equal distribution which 
occurs, and that consequently the tendency in question must be 
begged; and its action must be the predominant one if the result is 
to be secured. Each variation might then be treated as if it were 
due to that tendency alone. But that seems to me equivalent to 
having the conditions constant: the tendency to vary acts as if it 
were in isolation. It produces, however, as the experiment is re- 
peated, ever-differing results. As this would seem inconsistent with 
the causal action of the tendency, such action must be denied, and we 
must say that the individual variations could not possibly be caused 
by one tendency. Even if we discovered some time a hidden regu- 
larity about the variations, an order expressed by some function 
beyond our present knowledge, that order would have to be regarded 


as fortuitous. For the fact that there occurred different results from 
one and the same cause would be, for science, an inexplicable thing. 
Is it answered: "Perhaps your tendency to vary is not one tendency 
but a manifold complex of them"? The same inconsistency with 
causation would, I believe, hold even then. In so far as the com- 
plexity obtains, it means, after all, at bottom, many independent (i.e., 
fortuitous) tendencies. In short, no one tendency can explain an 
ever-varying manifold of effects, and many tendencies, in so far as 
they can not be reduced to one, themselves constitute chance. It is 
the spreading or multitude of the effects that, in my opinion, renders 
a causal explanation impossible. 

In cases of ordinary causation, the same cause does indeed pro- 
duce ever-varying effects. But that is because it acts in ever-differ- 
ing circumstances, and its action is influenced by those circumstances. 
Our tendency however can not, in the long run, be influenced by 
them. It acts with them and in them, but it must predominate over 
them if the equal distribution is to result. And it is this predom- 
inance, or causal isolation in a certain sense, which is the key of the 
situation. The manifoldness of the effects has nothing left to explain 
it but just its own manifoldness. From one isolated principle you 
can never get many results, and the many results can not combine 
into just one isolated principle. 

The conclusion thus seems to be forced upon us that our hypoth- 
esis of an all-inclusive collective variation implies complete am- 
biguity in the single case. We have then obtained, if the argument 
is correct, the following principle : there is a tendency, in many phe- 
nomena, to vary with equal frequency in all possible directions from 
obedience to law, the variation being such as to give regularity for 
the group as a whole, chance for the individual member. Of course 
this tendency is hardly ever, if ever, completely realized. It is a 
limiting concept, like that of law and causation. But it gives what 
is to my mind a more positive signification to chance than has usually 
been ascribed to that notion. Not mere irregularity, but a tendency 
to spread, to diverge, so as to treat all possibilities fairly and give 
them an equal showing that, somewhat metaphorically expressed, 
is what I think we should mean by chance. Of course these possi- 
bilities are not absolutely infinite in any one case; they are always 
restricted by the special circumstances of that case. Men probably 
can not vary much in height ; temperatures in a given region range 
hardly more than a few degrees out of the long scale known to 
science; and in general the field of chance is relatively small. On 
the other hand, we seem to find some amount of chance accompany- 
ing almost every case of law. How wide the field of variation is, in 
each class of phenomena, would seem to depend on the nature of the 


causes whose combination gives rise to the phenomena. But the 
whole matter is an empirical one. Our view gives no occasion for 
those caricatures, as Professor James called them, which would ac- 
cuse its advocates of believing that anything might happen in a 
given situation. Nor does it offer a contradiction to the principle of 
causality. Each variation is the resultant of many causes together 
with a chance-deviation. It would not be regarded as a denial of 
the law of gravitation if I held up a ball in my hand. No more 
does it deny the constant action of causes to assert that there is 
another principle cooperating with them. But the view I defend 
would imply partly uncaused beginnings, arising to some extent 
ex nihilo. Should a last stand be made on the ground that the 
principle of the conservation of energy would forbid any uncaused 
changes, we need only remember that the measurements which prove 
the conservation of energy are themselves subject to the same kind 
of variation as that we have been exhibiting. 

Finally let me indicate the relation of the above view to some 
previous arguments for and against indeterminism. It is well 
known that the more we learn about any given event, and the finer 
our measurements become, so much the closer is the approximation 
to exact law. The conclusion seems to many thinkers to follow 
inevitably, that a perfect knowledge, measurement, etc., would reveal 
perfectly exact law. It seems to be a case of a variable approaching 
a limit, as a hyperbola approaches its asymptote, or the series 
l + i-+i+> etc., approaches the number 2. But the mere fact 
that we get gradually nearer and nearer to exact law does not imply 
that the latter is the limit we are approaching. If a line be drawn 
parallel to the asymptote and beyond it, the curve gets nearer and 
nearer to that line, but does not approach it as a limit ; and the series 
1 + i + i +, etc., gets nearer and nearer to 3 without approaching 
it as a limit. Such reasoning is then quite inconclusive. Moreover, 
it overlooks the fact, which is the pivot of my argument, that the 
deviations from exact law themselves, when recorded and measured, 
show a positive manner of varying which can hardly be explained by 
causation. It is in this point that the present argument differs, so 
far as I know, from all previous arguments for indeterminism. Even 
those of Bergson and James, as I understand them, fail to point out 
this positive difference between law and variation. They find a 
fluent quality about facts which forever escapes the static and rigid 
concept. Yet one might reply to them that our concepts approach 
the fluent changing reality as a limit. Even though those concepts 
never reach that limit, they allow no irreducible remainder, which 
can be definitely named, to stay outside the conceptual series. The 
advocate of universal law may say: "You can point to no one fact 


which I can not come nearer and nearer to accounting for com- 
pletely. ' ' The series ir is never completed, yet any one term of it, 
which you can name, may be exactly computed. My own argument 
does, I think, escape this objection. It attempts to point out a well- 
verified character about facts which is not simply at present unex- 
plained in detail, but would seem to be inexplicable in terms of 
causation, even to a perfect knowledge. The tendency to deviate, to 
spread out, to produce ever new sports, is indeed in substantial agree- 
ment with the Jacobean doctrine of a growing universe. But I do 
not think the inadequacy of any given concepts, or group of concepts, 
to account for motion, change, or life, can be regarded as a proof 
of a real spontaneity in those facts. 

And the present argument goes even further. There seems to me 
no ground for saying that there is anything about spontaneity which 
is unintelligible, i. e., beyond clear conception. Chance as here de- 
fined appears to be clear enough. It is a dual affair, with a col- 
lective and an individual aspect, and in my view each of these 
aspects is meaningless without the other. The collection is law- 
abiding, the individual members, within limits, ambiguous. But I 
do not see why ambiguity is not a perfectly clear concept. There 
would seem to be, then, no real reason for excluding spontaneity 
from the kingdom of the intellect. It should be included as a gen- 
uine scientific category, no more wonderful than law itself. Not the 
limitation of the understanding by something indefinable, mysterious, 
unaccountable, but the inclusion of that something within the sphere 
of clear definition, is what every thinker naturally desires. 




T~ ITTLE if any attempt has hitherto been made to measure by 
-L-J scientific, objective means the mental improvement resulting 
from the correction or removal of the various physical defects which 
are now generally known to afflict the majority of school children. 
We are beginning to appreciate, from a number of recent studies, 
the extent of the retarding effect upon mental growth of such phys- 
ical anomalies as adenoids, hypertrophied tonsils, nasal obstructions, 
defective ears, eyes, and mouths ; but no one has attempted to deter- 

1 Read before Section L, Education, of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Washington, December 29, 1911. 


mine experimentally the precise orthogenic effects which are believed 
to ensue from a definite course of combined prophylactic and opera- 
tive treatment. And yet our whole system of medical school inspec- 
tion and treatment must ultimately justify itself by its demonstrated, 
verifiable results not by the opinions and assumptions, based on 
unaided observation, of schoolmasters, or medical inspectors, or 
school patrons, but by the comparable scores of a system of verifiable 
and demonstrable objective measures. 

In the present paper we shall give a very brief sketch of the 
results of an attempt to determine by scientific, mental measures the 
influence of hygienic and operative dental treatment upon the intel- 
lectual efficiency and working capacity of a squad of 27 public-school 
children in Cleveland, Ohio (10 boys and 17 girls), all of whom were 
handicapped, to a considerable degree, with diseased dentures or 
gums and an insanitary oral cavity. 2 These children were the recipi- 
ents of free dental treatment at the hands of the Cleveland Dental 
Society and the National Dental Association during the course of the 
experimental year, which began in May, 1910, and closed in May, 
1911. The treatment included not only the filling of dental cavities, 
the treatment of the gums, the brushing of the teeth and gums after 
each meal, and the sanitation of the oral cavity, but the thorough 
fletcherizing of the food. Oral euthenics contemplates not only 
mouth sanitation and the carpentry of the teeth, but the complete 
mastication of the food. Instruction relating to mouth hygiene and 
correct eating habits was given at the school (Marion) by the chair- 
man of the Oral Hygiene Committee of the National Dental Asso- 
ciation (Dr. W. G. Ebersole), together with two demonstration meals. 
Follow-up work was done by an employed nurse, for the purpose of 
giving individual advice and instruction to parents and pupils, and 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the pupils were faithfully 
following the instructions. 

This research, it may be added, was the outgrowth of the nation- 
wide school oral-hygiene campaign inaugurated in Cleveland in 
March, 1910, by the National Dental Association. My own connec- 
tion with the movement consisted in suggesting, contriving and giving 
(in person or by proxy) five series of psychological efficiency tests 
at stated intervals during the experimental year. These tests were 
designed to measure any improvement or increase, which might result 
from the practise of the oral hygiene regimen sketched above, in the 
power of immediate recall (immediate visual memory span), in the 
capacity to form spontaneous and controlled associations, in the 

* A more complete discussion of this research appears in ' ' Experimental 
Oral Euthenics," The Dental Cosmos, April and May, 1911, pages 404 ff. and 
pages 545 ff. 


ability to add, and in the ability to perceive, attend, and react to, 
certain visual impressions. 

In the memory test the pupils were required to memorize, during 
a period of 45 seconds, as many figures as possible. 10 figures, each 
containing 3 digits, in large print on a cardboard were displayed 
before the class. Exactly one minute was allowed for writing. This 
test is thus based on the use of non-sense materials and furnishes a 
measure of the immediate visual memory span. 

In the spontaneous association test the pupils were provided with 
a sheet of paper containing a column of 30 simple, every-day words. 
At a given signal they were told to turn the papers right side up and 
write opposite each word the first word suggested by it, irrespective 
of whether or not the suggested word was logically connected with 
the supplied antecedent or key-word. The time allowed was 85 sec- 
onds. The number of words written in a test like this furnishes an 
index of the speed of ideating or forming spontaneous associations 
or, in other words, of the speed of thinking. 

To measure the speed of forming controlled associations an 
antonym test was employed. In this the pupils were supplied with a 
sheet containing a column of 25 key-words, opposite each of which 
they were instructed to write (during 85 seconds) only that word 
which has the opposite meaning: e. g., better worse; sunrise sunset. 
This test requires intelligent discrimination and demands a higher 
degree of associational efficiency than that required in the pre- 
vious test. 

In the test on the speed and accuracy of adding the pupils were 
supplied with a sheet containing 32 columns of figures, each column 
consisting of 10 one-place digits. They were told to add as many 
columns as possible within the time limits (2 minutes) without stop- 
ping to re-add any of the columns. This test gives a measure of the 
ability to form controlled numerical associations. 

In the attention-perception test (A-test) a sheet was provided 
containing 26 lines of capital letters. The letters were printed 
entirely promiscuously instead of in proper alphabetical order. The 
pupils were told to start at the left end of the top line and proceed 
to draw a line through as many of the A's as possible within the 
time limits (100 seconds). They were specially cautioned not to 
skip any A's or to cross out any other letters. This test gives a 
measure of the speed and accuracy of perceptual discrimination, of 
the power of sustained attention, and, secondarily, of the speed and 
accuracy of manual reaction. 

These five tests thus explore some of the fundamental mental 
traits or capacities. In all tests, and in all sittings, the pupils were 
uniformly urged to do their very best. A system of quantitative, 


or combined quantitative and qualitative, scoring was worked out 
for each test. 

In order that tests of this character may be used as measuring- 
rods for gauging the increased functional efficiency resulting from 
the given euthenic or corrective factor or factors, a number of essen- 
tial conditions must be supplied. 

First, each of the tests must be constructed in sets or series, so 
that some of the tests may be given before the treatment begins, and 
some during the course of the treatment, or after its close. In this 
investigation each test was arranged in six sets, numbered from 1 to 
6. Tests 1 and 2 were given before treatment began. The average 
of these two pre-treatment tests, therefore, represents the pupils' 
initial efficiency. The last four tests were given during the course 
of the treatment, or after its close, so that the average of these repre- 
sents the pupils' terminal efficiency. The difference between the two 
averages accordingly represents the gain (index of improvement) 
made during the course of the treatment. Or, instead of taking the 
average of the last four tests for the final efficiency, we may substi- 
tute the average of the last two. This plan seems preferable, because 
the last two tests were given from three to five months after the 
dental treatment had been completed for all the pupils, while tests 3 
and 4 were given only one or two months after the beginning of the 
treatment for more than half of the pupils. Sufficient time had, 
therefore, not elapsed to allow the orthogenic effects to become opera- 
tive, at least not in maximal degree, at the time of the third and 
fourth tests. 

Secondly, the sets must be so constructed that all of the successive 
tests in the same set are uniformly difficult. That is, test number 2 
must be of the same difficulty as test number 1, test 3 the same as 
test 2, and so on. Manifestly, if each of the successive tests dimin- 
ishes in difficulty, the increased efficiency shown is spurious or largely 
exaggerated. Contrariwise, if each successive test increases in diffi- 
culty the actual improvement will be minimized or counteracted. 
Considerable pains were taken to make all the tests of a given set 
equi-difficult. Elsewhere evidence has been adduced to show that the 
tests were fairly uniform in difficulty. 

Thirdly, the conditions of giving the tests must be strictly uni- 
form in all the successive sittings. These conditions refer to the 
character of the explanations, the use of incentives or suggestions, 
the constant putting forth of maximal effort by the examinees, the 
withholding of assistance or fore-knowledge of the test materials, 
the seating of the pupils, the hour of the day used for testing, the 
time allowed for the tests, and the employment of uniform super- 


visory conditions. A scrupulous attempt was made in this research 
to realize these requirements. 

Fourthly, to place the results upon a strictly comparable basis, 
a second squad of imlnated children should be given exactly the 
same tests under precisely the same conditions. These children 
should come from the same social strata as the treated children, 
should approximately be of the same ages and suffer from the same 
degree of physical handicap. By means of the data obtained from 
such an untreated squad we should be able to determine the amount 
of improvement which is due to such contributing factors as famil- 
iarity, habituation, practise, and natural development (merely grow- 
ing older), and the share which is solely due to the application of the 
orthogenic factor under consideration. Unfortunately it was not 
possible for me to get such a squad as this organized during the 
experimental year. 

Fifthly, and finally, the factor or factors whose orthophrenic influ- 
ence is to be measured must be investigated under "controlled con- 
ditions." One must make certain that the factor is constantly opera- 
tive in the treated squad, and that it is inoperative in the untreated 
squad. In this investigation the oral hygienic measures were subject 
to a fair degree of control. It was the duty of the employed nurse 
to see that the pupils conformed strictly to the requirements. 

What, now, do the results show with respect to the influence of 
the dental treatment upon the working efficiency of the pupils? In 
attempting to answer this main question we shall also refer briefly to 
a number of accessory facts brought out in the investigation. One 
of these facts is the circumstance that while the boys manifested a 
higher degree of efficiency than the girls in all tests except the per- 
ception test, the indices of improvement were about the same for the 
two sexes, whence the boys' manifest superiority in the efficiency 
scores is not paralleled by a corresponding superiority in the im- 
provement indices. Similarly the amount of improvement was about 
the same for the older and younger pupils, a result not entirely in 
accordance with expectation, for it is currently believed that the 
benefits derived from the correction of physical defects are greater 
the earlier in the child's career the defect is corrected. This is 
believed to be true particularly as regards nasopharyngeal obstruc- 
tions. But so far as the mal-effects of dental defects are concerned 
there are no significant age differences. Pupils between the ages of 
11 and 15 appear to profit in equal degree, irrespective of sex, from 
the broad application of community mouth hygiene. 

On the other hand, the individual differences between the pupils 
in all tests are significant. The differences are quite as large as the 
differences frequently brought to light in other psychological and 


pedagogical experiments on pupils of the same age or school grade. 
Some pupils show a high degree, others a low degree, of proficiency ; 
and some pupils make marvellous gains while others gain very little, 
or not at all, or actually lose in efficiency. It is therefore apparent 
that experiments of this sort, which are based on only a few pupils, 
are at best only suggestive, and that valid inferences or conclusions 
must be based on the central tendencies or average results of a con- 
siderable number of pupils. 

Not only do we find these large individual differences in the 
efficiency scores and improvement indices, but the fact that a pupil 
gains much in one test does not warrant the belief that he will gain 
much in all the other tests. Quite the reverse may be the case. Thus 
a list of the 5 pupils, who made the smallest improvements in each 
of the 5 tests, was found to contain 19 of the 27 pupils, while the 
list of the 5 pupils, who made the greatest gain in each of the 5 tests, 
included 13 pupils. But not a single pupil was enumerated among 
the 5 poorest in all the tests, nor was a single pupil enumerated 
among the 5 best in all the tests. On the other hand, 8 of the pupils, 
ranking with the 5 poorest gainers in one test or another, also ranked 
with the 5 best gainers in one test or another. While 2 of these 
showed little improvement in 2 tests, they nevertheless made large 
gains in 2 tests. It is thus apparent that many pupils who gain 
little in some tests may improve remarkably in others. But it is 
worthy of remark that only 1 of the 3 pupils who were enumerated 
among the best gainers in 3 or more tests was included among the 
poorest gainers, while none of the 3 who were among the poorest in 
3 tests took rank with the 5 best in any of the 5 tests, so that there is 
a certain amount of correlation between the indices of improvement 
in the various tests, justifying the conclusion that pupils who improve 
very slowly in several tests will not take place with the best ground- 
gainers in any of the tests. Such pupils are probably suffering from 
general impairment or marked retardation. But teachers must 
recognize (that a child who gains little along one line of mental 
action may be developing normally, or even supernormally, along 
other lines. His capacity for development can not be determined 
from the improvement indices of one trait. Scientific pedagogy will 
make little progress until this fact is recognized, so that the educa- 
tional activities may be adjusted to meet individual developmental 

Although there are these individual differences the character of 
the central tendencies is unmistakable: there is a decided gain in 
every test, and not only are the gains decidedly more frequent than 
the losses, but the largest gains are invariably emphatically larger 
than the largest losses. This may be seen from the following data 


for each test, based on the average scores of tests 1 and 2, and the 
averages of tests 5 and 6 : 

Memory: 8 pupils lost in amounts varying from 5 to 15 per cent., 
while 19 gained in amounts varying from per cent, to 116 per cent. 
The average gain for all pupils amounted to 19 per cent. 

Spontaneous association: 2 pupils lost, the one 18 and the other 
43 per cent., while 25 gained from 2 to 162 per cent. The average 
improvement amounted to 42 per cent. 

Addition: 1 pupil suffered a loss of 13 per cent., 26 gained from 
6 to 125 per cent., while the average improvement was 35 per cent. 

Associating antonyms: all the pupils gained in amounts varying 
from 33 to 666 per cent., the average gain being 129 per cent. 

Perception-attention: all gained in amounts varying from 19 to 
101 per cent, the average improvement amounting to 60 per cent. 

It is thus evident that the gains varied considerably in the dif- 
ferent tests, and that the largest improvement occurred in the an- 
tonym, attention-perception, and spontaneous association tests. The 
average gain for all tests amounted to 57 per cent., truly a remark- 
ably large gain. 

How large a percentage of this significant gain is due solely to 
the improved physical condition of the pupils, which resulted from 
the treatment? This question does not admit of a categorical answer 
in the absence of parallel data from an untreated squad. But that 
a very large share is directly due to the dental treatment is indicated 
by the fact that most of these pupils were laggards or repeaters, 
pedagogically retarded from 1 to 4 years. During the experimental 
year, however, only 1 failed of promotion in the school work, while 
6 completed 38 weeks' work in 24 weeks, and 1 boy did 2 years' work 
in 1. This indicates that the pupils' physical condition had been 
so bettered that they were able to profit by the instruction, to form 
habits from practise, and to improve mentally as a result of in- 
creasing maturity. We may therefore conclude that if it be granted 
that a part of the gains manifested in the psychological tests resulted 
from practise and increasing maturity, the gains are still significant 
as showing that these pupils were making normal progress- during 
the experimental year, while many had failed to do so during the 
preceding year, as indicated by the records of pedagogical progress. 
It may be doubted, however, that the practise effects were very con- 
siderable, partly because of the brevity of the tests and the length 
of the intervals between some of them, and partly because of the 
counteracting effect of the growing monotony. 

It is also significant that the regularity of attendance improved 
considerably during the experimental year, owing to the improved 
physical and mental condition of the pupils. During the preceding 


year many were quite irregular, because of toothaches, bodily indis- 
positions, chronic weariness, or distaste for the school work; 5 were 
obliged to carry truancy cards, while during the experimental year 
it was not necessary to issue any of these cards; and several boys, 
previously regarded as " incorrigible, " became tractable and gentle- 
manly. The improved physical and mental health of many of the 
pupils, which was noticed by the teachers, commented on by the 
parents, and fully realized by the pupils, was also made manifest in a 
more buoyant spirit, a healthier complexion, and an improved disposi- 
tion and deportment. That a large share of the gains in the psycho- 
logical tests, say at least one half on a conservative estimate, can be 
directly ascribed to the oral hygienic regimen, is undoubted, I believe. 

This experiment, then, furnishes the first demonstration by means 
of controlled, serial, experimental tests, extending throughout a cal- 
endar year, of the psycho-orthogenic effects of the application of the 
broad principles of community mouth hygiene. The conclusions 
which follow from the results of the research are of far-reaching 
importance to the state and nation. 

There is probably no phase of the modern child-welfare movement 
which merits deeper scientific study by qualified experts than the 
relation of normative physical health and growth, and of normative 
pedagogical and psychical development, in school children, to a well- 
conceived plan of physical and mental orthogenesis. No phase of the 
problem of national conservation or racial euthenics more nearly 
affects the very fundamentals of human existence. Our greatest 
national asset is the normal, healthy child. It would seem that our 
child-welfare and social-betterment workers could more profitably 
apply themselves to the scientific determination of the physiological, 
psychological, and social causes of physical and mental inefficiency, 
and the discovery of scientific, corrective measures on a community 
basis, than to devote their resources to the mere gathering of statis- 
tical data. The largest contribution to the permanent betterment 
of the race will be made by those workers who will undertake, on an 
adequate scale, genuine, scientific investigations into the actual, dem- 
onstrated effects of the application of various orthogenic measures of 
a physical and mental character. No such investigations are any- 
where being prosecuted on an effective basis, notwithstanding that 
no one knows the actual, proven effects on the child of the application 
of various physical and psychological orthogenic measures or various 
pedagogical methods and devices. Our knowledge in this field is 
largely pretense and illusion. In no field of modern enterprise has 
there been such a lame attempt made to measure results scientifically, 
as in education. Indeed, we do not as yet so much as possess any 
scientific measures of educational results: the very conception of 


"measuring results in education" is a product of very recent indus- 
trial t hi nki ng. Is it not time that our large research foundations 
begin to treat more fairly the problems of human conservation and 
particularly those of child orthogenics? A million dollars spent in 
orthogenic investigations will accomplish immeasurably more for the 
welfare of the human race than tens of millions devoted to the cata- 
loguing of the stars of the heavens or exploring the trackless wastes 
of the polar regions. 

From the results of this investigation the conclusion is suggested 
that the desirability of establishing dental clinics in the public schools 
for free inspection and treatment should present itself to the tax- 
payer as a simple business, if not a humanitarian, proposition: the 
clinics are an economic means to an economic end, namely, the paying 
of proper dividends on the capital invested in the schools. Accord- 
ing to the best estimates there are 6,000,000 retardates in the public 
schools of the country, or about one third of the entire school popula- 
tion. One sixth of all the pupils are repeaters. It costs the country 
$27,000,000 to educate every sixth child once, twice, or three times in 
the same grade. That part of this enormous waste, which is as- 
cribable to the presence of those remediable physical defects in the 
children which exert a retarding influence upon the mental processes 
or which cause children to stay away from school, is entirely pre- 
ventable. Is it worth while to attempt to save this waste? Is it 
worth anything to the child to enable him to attend school more regu- 
larly and thereby increase his chances of promotion? Is it worth 
while to the repeater to shorten his stay in the schools? Is it worth 
while to enable him to attain a higher level of academic efficiency? 
Is it worth while to remove physical obstacles which may lessen his 
efficiency for life? Is it worth while to the taxpayer to eliminate, 
so far as possible, the necessity for the extra financial burden which 
he must assume for instruction that should have been done satisfac- 
torily the first time? There can be none but an affirmative answer. 
One of the means for accomplishing these desirable results appears 
to be the establishment of departments of orthogenics in the public 
schools. But these departments must be given a broader scope than 
are the present departments of medical inspection, and must be under 
the skilled direction of health officers who are experts in applied 
child or clinical psychology, corrective pedagogy, and preventive 
and corrective hygiene. 





nnHERE are many points which it would be interesting to discuss 
-L in Mr. Francis B. Summer's review of my book, "Charles 
Darwin and the Origin of Species." 1 I should, however, have ab- 
stained from troubling you were it not for Mr. Sumner's quotation 
of Professor Punnett's extraordinary misstatement of the modern 
Darwinian view. 2 For some time I had been intending to correct 
this curious blunder, and now that it has been quoted in your pages 
and even gives an ill-founded relief to Mr. Sumner, I feel that the 
time has come. 

Professor Punnett is speaking of two African species of the 
Danaine genus, Amauris, respectively mimicked by two Nymphaline 
butterflies found in the same localities. The two Danaines are 
Amauris niavius dominicanus and Amauris echeria; the two Nympha- 
lines, Euralia waklbergi and Euralia mima. All four are figured on 
Plate VI., facing page 134 of ' ' Mendelism. " Mr. G. A. K. Marshall, 
in 1902, 3 suggested that the two Euralias are probably forms of the 
same species, but the proof was not finally obtained until 1909 when 
the late Mr. A. D. Millar, of Durban, bred both forms from a single 
female. 4 There is good reason to believe, as Professor Punnett states, 5 
that the relationship between the two forms is Mendelian, and I can 
now further add that there is no doubt that mima is dominant and 
wahlbergi recessive. This conclusion is founded on the recent ex- 
periments of my friend, Mr. W. A. Lamborn, on the corresponding 
forms in the Lagos district, viz., dubia (=>mima) and anthedon 
(= walilbergi). Details of these experiments were communicated 
a few weeks ago to the Entomological Society of London, and will 
appear in the Proceedings for the present year. Now for Professor 
Punnett's statement: "On the modern Darwinian view certain indi- 
viduals of A. dominicanus gradually diverged from the dominicanus 
type and eventually reached the echeria type, though why this 
should have happened does not appear to be clear. At the same 
time those specimens [of Euralia'] which tended to vary in the direc- 
tion of A. echeria in places where this species was more abundant 

1 This JOURNAL, Vol. IX., pages 159-161. 

2 " Mendelism, " page 134. This, at least, is the reference in the third 
British edition, 1911, of Professor Punnett's work. The footnote on page 160 
of THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY gives page 144. 

8 Trans. Ent. Soc. London, pages 491-2. 

*Proc. Ent. Soc., London, 1910, pages xiv-xvi; Trans., page 498. 

8 ' ' Mendelism, ' ' page 135. 


than A. dominicanus, were encouraged by natural selection, and 
under its guiding hand the form mima eventually arose from wahl- 

"According to Mendelian views, on the other hand, A. echeria 
arose suddenly from A. dominicanus (or vice versa), and similarly 
wima arose suddenly from wahlbergi (p. 134). ... On this view 
the genera Amauris and Euralia contain a similar set of pattern fac- 
tors, and the conditions, whatever they may be, which bring about 
mutation in the former lead to the production of a similar mutation 
in the latter" (p. 135). 

Although Professor Punnett ought to be competent to express 
"Mendelian views," I am pretty confident that he will be unable to 
find a single Mendelian writer who would accept his assumption 
about the origin of the two species of Amauris. But, however this 
may be, it is quite certain that no Darwinian, modern or ancient, and 
certainly no student of insect systematics, has committed himself 
to the belief that one of these two Danaine models has directly 
arisen from the other. 

The late Dr. F. Moore, in his revision of the Danaince* placed 
echeria and dominicanus in separate genera. In this he was prob- 
ably wrong, but they are certainly widely separated. Amauris 
niavius niavius of the west, together with the eastern sub-species, 
niavius dominicanus, occupies an isolated position in the genus 
Amauris, and it is absurd I can use no milder word to suggest 
that echeria arose directly from either of them. Hence, the whole of 
Professor Punnett 's assumption of a parallelism in origin between 
model and mimic, which Mr. Sumner finds so comforting, falls to 
the ground. 

May I say in conclusion that, although the relationship between 
the two mimetic forms of Euralia is undoubtedly Mendelian, I can 
not believe that one of them arose suddenly from the other? I be- 
lieve that any one who looks at Professor Punnett 's Plate VI. will 
hesitate to accept the view that the details of either of the two 
mimetic patterns reproducing with great precision the pattern of 
a species belonging to a different sub-family arose all at once from 
the other by mutation. 

I have, furthermore, some evidence in support of the conclusion 
that the origin of the mimicry was gradual. Another closely related 
species, Euralia dinarcha, presents on the west coast of Africa two 
forms very roughly resembling the Danaine models which are so won- 

* Proc. Zool. Soc. London, 1883, page 201. Dr. Moore placed echeria and 
an allied species in Nebroda. Aurivillius in his great ' ' Bhopalocera ^Ethiopica" 
places niavius, including the eastern form dominicanus, second and echeria 
fifteenth in the genus Amauris. 


derfully mimicked by the forms anthedon and dubia of the allied 
species. I very much hope that Mr. Lamborn will be able to breed E. 
dinarcha, and ascertain whether the Mendelian relationship exists 
between its two forms. 7 But whether this is so or not, there can be 
little doubt that these forms exhibit to us an initial stage in an evo- 
lutionary journey which has been carried very much further by 
anthedon and dubia. 

There are other interesting facts which remain to be further in- 
vestigated in the Mendelian relationship of these mimics. Mr. Lam- 
born informs me that the recessive form anthedon shows a well- 
marked tendency to appear seasonally; so that, during part of the 
year, he finds only this form on the wing. Then, later on, dubia 
suddenly appears. Such a phenomenon is extremely difficult to ex- 
plain on ordinary Mendelian lines. Either we are faced by some 
undiscovered aspect of Mendel 's law or the dominant form must have 
the power of lying dormant in some one or more of its stages, and 
then suddenly appearing. Against this latter hypothesis is the fact 
that in the seven large families bred by Mr. Lamborn, and now in the 
Oxford University Museum, there was not the slightest evidence of 
any difference between the two forms in this respect. 




IT is a shame to be asking Professor Dewey to take up so much 
time in answering what are regarded as irrelevant questions. 
But he has been so good in the past that I am going to take the lib- 
erty of putting two more questions. I shall put them entirely in 
Mr. Dewey 's own words, so far as I can; and I shall request Mr. 
Dewey to forget, so far as this is possible, that in my former queries 
I seem to him to have confused his position with my own. The two 
questions I wish to lay before him concern the passage on the basis 
of which my previous unfortunate questions were raised. That 
passage I shall requote here so that all the data pertinent to my pres- 
ent inquiries may be seen at a glance : " Of course on the theory I am 

7 Keturning to Oxford at the end of the Easter vacation, I find a letter from 
Mr. Lamborn written March 29, 1912, from Oni Camp, near Lagos, telling me 
that he has now succeeded in obtaining eggs from both forms of E. dinarcha, and 
that the larvae are doing well. We may hope for evidence, which will decide 
whether these two forms are a Mendelian pair, in a few weeks. I am very 
fortunate in having friends in the tropics who are so often able to supply us 
with just the Very solutions for which we are looking with the utmost interest 
and eagerness. E. B. P. 


interested in expounding the so-called action of "consciousness" 
means simply the organic releases in the way of behavior which are 
the conditions of awareness, and which also modify its content." 1 In 
this sentence it seems to be asserted that organic releases in the way 
of behavior are the conditions of awareness. 

There are two other passages, in the essay from which the above 
quotation is made, which must be cited before I can put my ques- 
tions. "Awareness means attention, and attention means a crisis of 
some sort in an existent situation ; a forking of the roads of some ma- 
terial, a tendency to go this way and that" (p. 73). "A mistake is 
literally a mishandling; a doubt is a temporary suspense and vacilla- 
tion of reactions ; an ambiguity is the tension of alternative, but in- 
compatible mode of responsive treatment; an inquiry is a tentative 
and retrievable (because intra-organic) mode of activity entered 
upon prior to launching upon a knowledge which is public, ineluct- 
able without anchors to windward because it has taken physical 
effect through overt action" (pp. 69-70). A comparison of these 
two statements has led me, perhaps mistakenly, to think that for Mr. 
Dewey doubt, ambiguity, and inquiry are all cases of awareness. 
But these cases of awareness, if indeed they be such, are all said to 
be characterized by what seem to me to be not organic releases, but 
organic inhibitions. 

My two questions, now, are these: (1) Where in these cases of 
awareness, if they be such, are "the organic releases in the way of 
behavior which are the conditions of awareness"? (2) Even if it 
should prove to be the case that what I have called organic inhibi- 
tions are included by Mr. Dewey within the more generic term 
"organic releases," why are these "organic releases" called "the 
conditions of awareness" rather than the awareness itself? In other 
words, if awareness be literally these suspenses and tensions and 
intra-organic modes of activity, can these suspenses and tensions and 
intra-organic modes of activity be properly called also the conditions 
of awareness ? 

There are of course several other questions that I am keeping 
intra-organic and therefore retrievable two anchors weighed from 
the windward, I have found, are enough at a time. But if the above 
two questions are answered, I hope that I may get from these answers 
a clew to the answers of the others. 


'Jamee Memorial Volume," page 69. 



Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. HENRI BERGSON. Au- 
thorized translation by CLAUDESLEY BRERETON and FRED ROTHWELL. 
New York : The Macmillan Company. Pp. vi + 200. 
As usual, Professor Bergson is fortunate in his translators. There is 
a cockiness of expression in this version of " Le Rire " not altogether true 
to the suave dignity of the original, but the matter is such that the manner 
becomes it. Laughter, if Professor Bergson is right, is also cocky : an im- 
pertinence, he says somewhere, and it is with laughter that he here deals. 
His handling is in terms of the characteristic of Bergsonian philosophy. 
This is constituted by analytic dualisms of time and space, quality and 
quantity, life and matter. Time, quality, and life are real and potent, the 
rery stuff and texture of existence: space, quantity, and matter are but 
negations and inversions thereof, mere appearances of the living onrush. 
The routine of the daily life, our social relations, our amusements, are 
combinations of this process with its negations spatializations of time, 
intellectualizations of instinct, mechanizations of life. The exigencies of 
action make them so : they are the soul of use, and it is by its utilities that 
life maintains itself. There exists, however, a dimension in which utili- 
ties, with their concepts and generalizations, have no worth, where intellect 
is satanic rather than salvational, where only concrete and living individ- 
ualities count, where the elan vital is encountered with no veils between. 
In this dimension lies the field of art, which, " whether it be painting or 
sculpture, poetry or music, has no other object than to brush aside utili- 
tarian symbols, the conventional and socially accepted generalities, in 
short, everything that veils reality from us, in order to bring us face to 
face with reality itself." The older way of expressing this true and an- 
cient doctrine is to say that art is intrinsic and expressive, the residual 
life extrinsic and utilitarian sometimes. 

But the art of comedy is excommunicate from this election. It deals 
not with individuals, but with types; it is external and observational, not 
internal and imaginative. Only averages are its care, and the inductive 
sciences its kin, in that in method and object its " observation is always 
external and the result always general " (p. 169). And this must be, since 
the essence of the comic is to be a mechanization of life, a petrifaction of 
the labile, a mechanization and petrifaction not, however, through and 
through, but capable of correction, and therefore subject thereto at the 
hands of laughter. But that laughter's function may be universal, its ob- 
ject, the comic, must be general and not individual. Comedy, hence, can 
not reveal reality. 

Whether it is because of this metaphysical preconception that the 
analysis of objects of laughter is limited to French comedy from Moliere 
to Labiche, or because such an analysis has led to this generalization in 
terms of the Bergsonian metaphysic, can not be easily said. Certainly, to 
find in addition that laughter must concern itself with something human, 
in its social relations; that it must be divorced from emotion, requiring a 


" momentary anesthesia of the heart," points to the first alternative, for 
these are deducible from M. Bergson's interpretation of life and nature. 
And it is only such a deduction that would see the comic object everywhere 
as a " mechanization of life " caricature, because it involves rigidity and 
disproportion of feature; repeated or inverted movements, because they 
have, when alive, a continually changing aspect; character, because it is 
funny when automatism is opposed to freedom, the persistent and uncon- 
scious self-admiration of vanity to the labile and scientific cautiousness of 

Hence, it is not impossible that if M. Bergson had gone further afield 
for his cases of the comic, if, instead of confining himself to the comedy of 
literature and social life, he had sought out the occasions of laughter in 
nature and the other arts, he might have found it needful to modify his 
theory a little. Granted that it lightens the cases he cites, does it equally 
illuminate the laughter occasioned by tickling, by fear, by victory, by re- 
lease from any kind of suppression or tension? In cases of this sort is 
not the elan vital really liberated from, rather than a victim of, the contin- 
gencies of mechanization? How does the "mechanization of life" ex- 
plain the comic of music, of discords of pure colors that many artists find 
laughable? What human or social relation is actually to be seen in these 

Then laughter itself is it really "unemotional"? It is true that 
mirth is not anger nor pity nor horror nor joy, but need it be any the less 
an emotion on its own account? As well deny it of any other that has an 
identifiable individuality. That mirth is not a negative nor depressed 
emotion is obvious, that it is cruel and pitiless is often true, but then so 
are joy and anger among the exalted emotions, and fear, among the de- 
pressed ones. The " anesthesia " of the heart is common to all emotions, 
to say the least that is why they are emotions. They are selfish, central, 
exclude alternatives. They consume their object, each according to its 
fashion. If laughter hurts, so does anger; if mirth is blind, so is joy. And 
just as these are not intrinsically corrective, neither is mirth. Arising 
first as an intrinsic expression of certain values in existence, it acquires a 
secondary character which is in no way essential or definitive of it. Its 
utility is an artifact, not a natural growth, and the other emotions can 
participate in a similar utility, for if people dislike being laughed at, they 
also dislike being stormed at or pitied, and seek to change the conditions 
which evoke these emotions. 

Now are such conditions also mechanizations of life? And if they are 
not, may not some of those which evoke mirth also be innocent of that 
rigor? In nature there seem to be many such innocents. But even if 
there be one only, M. Bergson's subtle and fascinating book is rendered 
by it a "fallacy of composition" in which one object of mirth, viz., the 
petrifaction of the labile, is identified with all, and in which one incidental 
utility is converted into constitutive function. Yet not altogether, for at 
the end M. Bergson finds laughter also sympathetic, containing a " move- 
ment of relaxation," a relief from the strain of living, analogous to dream. 


And perhaps in its fundamental and deeper nature, laughter is that and 
only that. 


The Philosophy of Music: A Comparative Investigation into the Prin- 
ciples of Musical Esthetics. HALBERT HAINS BRITAN. New York: 
Longmans, Green, & Co. 1911. Pp. xiv + 252. 

After a somewhat laborious " Introduction," the treatise in hand com- 
prises a "Psychological Analysis of the Elements of Music," with chap- 
ters on rhythm, melody, harmony, and musical expression, and a discus- 
sion of " The Philosophy of Music," considered with reference to the ap- 
peal and the content of music to musical criticism and to education. 

The perspective of the " psychological analysis " may be indicated by 
a typical passage : " Ehythm ... is an attribute of neural activity in- 
bred in the nervous tissues through ages and cycles of development and 
growth before the mind was capable of true creative work such as both 
melody and harmony imply. Consequently the music of undeveloped 
tribes and of uncultivated taste is preponderatingly rhythmical. Instru- 
ments of percussion are the favorite musical instruments of men in the 
lowest stages of mental development" (p. 63). The combined authority 
of physiology and anthropology is characteristic of the day, but to the 
reviewer it seems too often to amount merely to the restatement of fa- 
miliar facts in grotesque or pedantic terms, less a profit to learning than 
a trial of temper. 

Professor Britan is better in his discussion of melody and harmony 
where neither protoplasm nor "primitive man" can be conveniently ad- 
jured. In melody he finds the gist of "musical thought," to which he 
proceeds to apply the rhetorical criteria of unity, strength, grace, original- 
ity, significance. While these terms serve no deeper purpose than to point 
to certain obvious features of musical composition sufficiently analogous 
to their literary counterparts to justify the terminology, yet in this there 
is a real service. For in the first place, it is worth while to suggest for 
musical description a set of analogies other than the overused (and often 
absurd) ones of painting and architecture; and in the second place, in a 
thoroughly profitable chapter on "Musical Criticism," Dr. Britan points 
the practical need and application of his terms. As to the quite different 
matter of penetrating the nature and analyzing the appeal of melody, it 
can hardly be maintained that we are much advanced. 

A suggestion that invites consideration is that the plaintive effect of 
the minor mode is due to the primacy of the major in the general ordina- 
tion of our musical conceptions : " So here in the minor scale, when we 
feel the unrest and yearning it produces, we are yearning in reality for 
the more natural order of the major mode" (p. 146). This, of course, is 
but another application of the " expectation " theory to musical inter- 
pretation like all the rest, still leaving with us, unsolved, the foundation 
of such expectancy. 

A general key to Professor Britan's position is his excellent saying, 


11 There are no patterns in art, though we are endeavoring to establish 
certain principles " (p. 217). And most of the principles laid down will 
be generally accepted. Yet his book as a whole would certainly be more 
effective without the odd assumption that it constitutes a " pioneer work " 
in a field represented by a literature of which his seventeen prefatory 
" references " give small measure. H. B. ALEXANDER. 



The Relative Legibility of Different Faces of Printing Types (pp. 1-34) : 
BARBARA ELIZABETH ROETHLEIN. - An experiment to determine the ease or 
difficulty that various printing types present in reading. The factors 
that produce legibility are given. The texture of the paper is not im- 
portant. The modification of certain letters is urged. The Psychology of 
the New Britannica (pp. 37-58): E. B. TITCHEXER. -The author has 
made a careful study of the articles that deal with psychology in the new 
Britannica. He finds little to commend and much to condemn. It seems 
that this new edition of the encyclopedia has not made an adequate re- 
vision of its psychological material. The Function of the Several Senses 
in Mental Life (pp. 59-74) : EDMUND C. SANFORD. - A brief survey of the 
development of the various senses is here given. Several mental experi- 
ences are taken up and discussed in relation to the various senses. The 
Relation of Practise to Individual Differences (pp. 75-88) : FREDERIC 
LYMAN WELLS. -The experiments indicate that a superior performance 
at the beginning is not attained with a sacrifice of the possibility of fu- 
ture improvements. The Influence of Caffein Alkaloid on the Quality 
and Amount of Sleep (pp. 89-100) : H. L. HOLLINOWORTH. - Small doses do 
not seem to disturb sleep. Doses larger than six grains impair sleep for 
most subjects. The effect is greatest when taken on an empty stomach. 
Minor Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Vassar College. 
Mediate Associations Studied by the Method of Inhibiting Associations: 
An Instance of the Effect of " Aufgabe " (pp. 101-109) : M. VALERIE 
ATHERTON and M. F. WASHBURN. A Study of the Images Representing 
the Concept Meaning (pp. 109-114) : MART W. CHAPIN and M. F. WASH- 
BURN. Recent Literature on Psychoanalysis (pp. 115-139) : DR. J. S. VAN 
TESLAAR.-A series of reviews of the following: (1) S. Freud, Psych o- 
analytische Bemerkungen uber einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall 
von Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides). Sonderabdruck aus dem Jahr- 
buch f. psycholanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, III., 
1911, 9-68. (2) Oskar Pfister, Hysterie und Mystik bei Margaretha 
Ebner (1291-1361). Zeitschr. f. Psychoanalyse, I., 1911, 468-485. (3) S. 
F. Ferenczi, Anatole France als Analytiker. Zentralblatt f. Psycho- 
analyse, I., 1911, 461-467. (4) Otto Rank, Das Verlieren als Symptom- 
handlung. Zentralblatt f. Psychoanalyse, I., 1911, 450-460. (5) Albert 
Mohl, Beruhmte Homosexuelle. Orenzfragen des Nerven und Seelen- 


lebens, LXXV., 1910, pp. 80. (6) H. Bertschlinger, Heiligungsvorgdnge 
~bei Schizophrenen. Allgem. Zeitschr. f. Psychiatric, LXVIIL, 1911, 
209-222. (7) S. Freud, Formulierung ueber die zwei Prinzipien des 
psychischen Geschehens. Sonderabdruck aus dem Jahrbuch fur psycho- 
analytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, III., 1911, 1-8. 
(8) Oskar Pfister, Die psychologische Entratselung der religiosen Glos- 
solalie und der automatischen Kryptographie. Sonderabdruck aus dem 
Jahrbuch f. psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen, HI., 
1911, 427-466. (9) M. Wulff, Beitrdge zur infantilen Sexualitdt. Zen- 
tralblatt f. Psychoanalyse, II., 1911, 6-7. (10) Jan Nelken, Ueber 
schyzophrene Wortzerlegungen, Zentralblatt f. Psychoanalyse, II., 1911, 
1-5. Alfred Binet (140-141). -A brief biographical sketch. Book Re- 
views. E. L. Thorndike, Animal Intelligence: L. W. SACKETT. C. S. 
Myers, A Text-book of Experimental Psychology with Laboratory Exer- 
cises: E. B. T. H. H. Britan, The Philosophy of Music: E. B. T. H. 
Bergson (translated by C. Brereton and F. Eothwell), Laughter; an 
Essay on the Meaning of the Comic: E. B. T. J. Welton, The Psychology 
of Education: W. S. FOSTER. William Brown, The Essentials of Mental 
Measurement: W. S. FOSTER. H. Addington Bruce, Scientific Mental 
Healing: W. S. FOSTER. Francisco Eedi (translated by M. Bigelow), 
Experiments in the Generation of Insects. H. de Vries (translated by C. 
S. Gager), Intracellular Pangenesis; Including a Paper on Fertilization 
and Hybridization. B. C. Punnett, Mendelism. F. L. Wells and A. 
Forbes, On Certain Electrical Processes in the Human Body and Their 
Relation to Emotional Reactions. M. T. Whitley, An Empirical Study 
of Certain Tests for Individual Differences. E. Abramowski, L' Analyse 
physiologique de la perception. F. Boas, Handbook of American Indian 
Languages. J. E. Swanton, Indian Tribes of the Lower Mississippi Val- 
ley and Adjacent Coast of the Gulf of Mexico. C. Thomas, Indian 
Languages of Mexico and Central America and their Geographical Dis- 
tribution. J. W. Fewkes, Preliminary Report on a Visit to the Navaho 
National Monument, Arizona. J. W. Fewkes, Antiquities of the Mesa 
Verde National Park: Cliff Palace. W. Goodsell, The Conflict of Natural- 
ism with Humanism. W. L. Eabenort, Spinoza as Educator. T. 
Schroeder, " Obscene " Literature and Constitutional Law : a Forensic 
Defense of Freedom of the Press. The Social Evil in Chicago: a Study 
of Existing Conditions by the Vice Commission of Chicago. Report of 
the Vice Commission of Minneapolis to His Honor J. C. Haynes, Mayor. 
W. J. Chidley, The Answer. G. E. Partridge, An Outline of Individual 
Study. W. Benett, Justice and Happiness. J. Eehmke, Zur Lehre vom 
Gemilt. J. W. H. Allen, The Universities of Ancient Greece. M. Offner, 
Die geistige Ermiidung. M. Offner (translated by G. M. Whipple), Men- 
tal Fatigue. M. Offner, Dass Geddchtniss. M. E. Thompson, Psychology 
and Pedagogy of Writing. W. H. Winch, When Should a Child Begin 
School? J. E. W. Wallin, Spelling Efficiency in Relation to Age, Grade and 
Sex. H. E. Cushman, A Beginner's History of Philosophy. L. J. Walker. 
Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism. C. J. Deter, 
Abriss der Geschichte der Philosophic. F. Cumont, The Oriental Relig- 


ions in Roman Paganism. L. Busse, Die Weltanschauung en der grossen 
Philosophen der Neuieit. P. Smith, The Life and Letters of Martin 
Luther. Book Notes. H. v. Buttel-Reepen, Aus dem Werdegang der 
Mensehheit. Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, Criminal Man According to the 
Classification of Cesare Lombroso. Otto Klemm, Oeschichte der Psychol- 
ogic. William E. Castle, Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal 
Breeding. M. Sopote, The Grades of Life. Arthur F. Hertz, The Ooul- 
stonian Lectures on the Sensibility of the Alimentary Canal. James 
Allen, Man, King of Mind, Body, and Circumstance. Richard Ilamann, 
Asthetik. George Trumbull Ladd and Robert Sessions Woodworth, Ele- 
ments of Physiological Psychology. William McDougall, Body and 
Mind. George Drayton Strayer, A Brief Course in the Teaching Process. 
Edward L. Thorndike, Animal Intelligence. George Trumbull Ladd, The 
Teacher's Practical Philosophy. H. H. Schroeder, The Psychology of 
Conduct. M. Mignard, La Joie Passive. H. Addington Bruce, Scientific 
Mental Healing. Gustave F. Mertins, A Watcher of the Skies. 
Biuso, C. Prolegomeni ad una Psicodinamica. Rome : Albrighi, Segati, 

& C. 1912. Pp. 176. 2.50 L. 
Bosanquet, B. The Principle of Individuality and Value. The Gifford 

Lectures for 1911. London : The Macmillan Company. Pp. xxxvii + 

409. 10s. 


M. HENRI POINCARE'S lecture at the Sorbonne on April 12 was as bril- 
liant as it was instructive. He dealt mainly with the constitution of 
matter, and drew the attention of his hearers, the French Physical Society, 
to the objective reality of the chemical atom, which he considers to be now 
beyond dispute. He made a bold comparison of the free electrons within 
the atom to comets, while considering the tied electrons as equivalent to 
the fixed stars, and accepted the magneton of M. Weiss as the third com- 
ponent of matter. Hence, he said, we must consider the atom, if we 
accept the most probable hypotheses current, not as a system whose move- 
ments are ordered and ruled by definite laws, but as a world where reigns 
a disordered agitation of elements delivered over to chance. Yet this 
world is rigorously closed to us at present, and every atom constitutes, 
according to him, an " individual." M. Poincar6's lecture will do much to 
clarify the views of inquirers into the subject, and it is to be hoped that 
during his forthcoming visit to this country he may repeat some of the 
conclusions announced in it. Athenceum, April 27. 

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES'S letters are being collected for biographical 
purposes, and any one who has any of his letters can render assistance that 
will be highly appreciated by addressing Henry James, Jr., 95 Irving St., 
Cambridge, Mass. Casual or brief letters may have an interest or im- 
portance not apparent to the person preserving them; and news of the 
whereabouts of any of the late William James's letters will be gratefully 

VOL. IX. No. 12. JUNE 6, 1912 



attention of the members of this association has been directed 
-- in their recent meetings to the issue between idealism and neo- 
realism and within this issue especially to the problem of perception 
and the relation between consciousness and the object of conscious- 
ness. Personally I rejoice that the main issue is the center of our 
attention ; but I regret exceedingly that we have turned to the prob- 
lem of perception as the point where the two philosophical parties 
really divide, for I do not believe that the study of this problem will 
lead quickly and directly to mutual understanding, let alone, to any 
agreement. As a realist I am firmly convinced that this is not the 
fundamental problem at issue; I deny that it is even in general a 
fundamental philosophical problem. I am aware that the very name 
"realist" as a party name is thereby declared to be inappropriate 
and that most realists will disagree with me in what I am saying; 
still I can urge that party names do get chosen in a more or less 
accidental way and do often describe the tension or division of 
opinion regarding matters of momentary interest rather than the 
great underlying causes for this difference of opinion. Indeed the 
partisans themselves are often blind to the real ground of difference ; 
and my point is, that in philosophy this is precisely the state of 
affairs which we should strive to avoid, because it is unphilosophical, 
and because it is bad methodologically. Moreover, our attention 
these days should be attracted not merely to a few men or to a local 
movement, but to a great international philosophical movement, a 
movement which, once it gets full headway, will mean a world-wide 
philosophical revolution. The realist should already know this; and 
the idealist, whatever his type of idealism, should awaken to the fact 
that the long and undisputed reign of idealism is about to enter upon 
troublous times. Such a movement as neo-realism has already shown 

*A paper read before the American Philosophical Association, Cambridge, 
December 27, 1911. This paper borrows a few paragraphs from an essay in a 
forthcoming volume entitled "The New Eealism." 



enough symptoms to make evident that it is opposed to idealism of 
every form and variety from that of John Locke to the present-day 
pragmatism. No minor problem, but a wholly different attitude 
toward all philosophical problems is the true force center from which 
it derives its impulse. 

What is this new attitude which forms the fundamental point at 
issue between the two philosophical parties? It is dogmatism vs. 
criticism. The neo-realistic movement is a return to dogmatism, 2 not 
to dogmatism in the specific sense of the seventeenth-century ration- 
alism, but in the generic sense of the contradictory of criticism. Let 
me make my meaning explicit by summing up the rival theories in 
two sets of propositions. The defendant, criticism, maintains one or 
more of the following propositions: first, that in general the theory 

It should be distinctly understood by the reader that the word "dog- 
matism" is used throughout this paper in the narrow and precise sense above 
defined. The name is taken from Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," where, 
whatever else it may mean, it denotes the contradictory of what Kant calls 
criticism. Unfortunately the word has other associations in Kant's mind and 
in the mind of the student of Kant, for it sometimes means specifically the 
ratwnali,itic ontology of the Cartesian and Leibnizian philosophers, whereas neo- 
realism differs radically from this philosophy. For example, many neo-realista 
have a strong tendency toward an extreme empiricism and toward an abandon- 
ment of the substance-attribute notion as a fundamental notion in metaphysics. 
Again, the older realism was a representative realism, an epistemological dualism; 
whereas neo-realism is an epistemological monism. Finally, a modern dogmatism 
must of necessity differ from that of the earlier centuries, just because it has 
behind it two centuries of experience with criticism. That is, it is consciously 
and deliberately dogmatic, whereas the earlier dogmatism was naive and was 
therefore easily misled into idealism and its so-called criticism. But in spite of 
these unfortunate associations, I believe the names, dogmatism and criticism, not 
only appropriate, but enlightening; for I think the neo-realistic movement to be 
a reaction against the whole enterprise of Locke, Kant, and their followers to 
get at a fundamental science, and not merely against their idealism. That is, 
neo-realism is not only a different theory of knowledge, but what is more impor- 
tant for metaphysics, a different doctrine as to the place of epistemology in the 
hierarchy of the sciences. As the names realism and idealism do not point out 
this difference clearly, I prefer the names dogmatism and criticism, which, if 
taken in their generic meanings as given by Kant, certainly indicate precisely 
this difference. Indeed I would go farther, for many contemporary realists are 
critic ists, and it is at least conceivable, no matter how remarkable, that some 
dogmatists may be idealists. My point may be summed up briefly in the follow- 
ing two sentences: Dogmatism is the contradictory of criticism and defines neo- 
realism negatively or by exclusion. Chiefly and perhaps only in this respect la 
neo-realism a return to seventeenth-century philosophy. 

Since reading this paper I find that most fellow realists, with whom I have 
had opportunity to speak regarding the name dogmatism, disapprove altogether 
of it, because it suggests that the neo-realist is not an empiricist. Personally, 
I do not fear this misunderstanding of the name, though of course any name, 
realism included, will be misinterpreted by the careless and thoughtless reader. 


of knowledge is logically fundamental or prior to all other sciences 
and to all other scientific procedure; secondly, that the theory of 
knowledge can ascertain the limits of the field of possible knowledge; 
thirdly, that it can determine ultimately the validity of science and 
of the methods of science and can correct the results of science with 
the authority of a court of final resort ; and, finally, that it can give 
us of itself certain fundamental, existential truths usually called a 
theory of reality. In opposition to these claims, the plaintiff, dog- 
matism, maintains : first, that the theory of knowledge is not logically 
fundamental, that it is simply one of the special sciences and logically 
presupposes the results of many of the other special sciences; sec- 
ondly, that the theory of knowledge is not able to show, except 
inductively and empirically, either what knowledge is possible or 
how it is possible or again what are the limits of our knowledge; 
and, finally, that it is not able to throw any light upon the nature 
of the existent world or upon the fundamental postulates and gen- 
eralizations of science, except in so far as the knowledge of one 
natural event or object enables us at times to make inferences 
regarding certain others ; in short, that the theory of knowledge does 
not give us a theory of reality, but, on the contrary, assumes a 
theory of reality of which it is not the author. Put in one proposi- 
tion, the charge which neo-realism makes against the older theory is, 
idealism is a vicious circle. 

All of this can be stated in a way that is less precise, but that is 
probably more suggestive. There are two prominent and radically 
different points of departure nowadays in our philosophical studies. 
One man, the idealist, is impressed with the facts and truths of psy- 
chology ; and though he may protest that psychology itself is but one 
of the special sciences, he still seeks a philosophical foundation by 
means of a study of these facts and truths. The other man, the 
realist, though not blind to these facts, can not regard them as the 
most significant ; rather he is impressed with the truth that the chief 
business of science is to demonstrate, and that logic is the funda- 
mental science. The one man is temperamentally a psychologist; 
the other a logician. 

What is the immediate result? Radical disagreement in two 
important places: for, in the first place, how can we get a common 
platform upon which we can discuss the problems of epistemology 
and come to an agreement as to what is their correct solution ; and, 
in the second place, how can we come to the same opinion regarding 
the authority and the place of the sciences in the field of philosoph- 
ical research ? Let us consider each of these questions more at length. 

In the field of epistemology, take the problem of perception and 
the relation of consciousness to its object. An entirely different 


point of departure tends to keep asunder the two lines of research. 
The idealist has on his hands a fundamental problem, and his whole 
theory of existence depends logically upon the solution at which he 
arrives. From the study of our conscious life and of the knowing 
process within it, he must learn all that he has a logical right to 
assume. He must keep his entire research, as it were, confined within 
the stream of consciousness. If he looks beyond consciousness he 
must do so from within outward. May I apply to his problem the 
adjective immanent f The realist on the other hand, as a dogmatist, 
approaches the problem from without. He assumes not only ex- 
tensive information regarding the knowing process, the function it 
fulfills in life, the relation between it and the bodily organism, but 
also extensive information regarding the physical and social environ- 
ment and regarding the nature of the objects of knowledge. Log- 
ically, the whole conception of existence as taught in physics, chem- 
istry, and biology is at his disposal to employ as a premise. For the 
one party, there is no non-mental world, or, if there is, it is unknow- 
able. For the other party, not only is there a non-mental world, but 
it is well-known, or at least far better known than is the mental 
world. Such a fundamental difference in the array of information 
upon which the solution of the problems is to be based can only lead 
to one of two things: to the illusion that we agree because we adopt 
the same words, though our meaning is utterly different, or to a 
debate on the logical position of epistemology in science. In the 
latter case the idealist will protest that no problem can be more 
nearly fundamental than the nature of the very process by which we 
solve problems; and the dogmatic realist will retort: Show me the 
critical theory of knowledge that lives up to your good intentions, 
that does not assume what you deny me the right to assume, that is 
not a vicious circle. 

A similar situation meets us when we turn our attention to the 
different attitudes taken toward the authority of science. Thus if we 
ask : "Who is the great metaphysical discoverer and explorer ? Is he 
the professional philosopher or is he mankind at large and above all 
others the investigator in the various fields of science ? Or expressed 
in other words, who has been giving us and who is giving us our 
modern theory of reality, the professional philosopher or the great 
mathematicians, astronomers, physicists, biologists, and psychologists ; 
such men as Galileo, Kepler, Harvey, Newton, La Place, Lavoisier, 
Priestley, Dalton, Mayer, Darwin, Helmholtz, Clerk Maxwell, and 
Hertz? The idealist seems to answer, "The professional philos- 
opher"; the neo-realist, "the scientific investigator and discoverer." 
The idealist appears to believe that the most certain information 
regarding reality, which we can possess, is that furnished by himself 


and other philosophers. At best the special sciences are only rela- 
tively true or need to be translated into the language and thought of 
idealism. Whereas the neo-realist regards the exact sciences to-day, 
to be sure, not as infallible, but as by far the most nearly certain 
body of information man possesses. Now do not misunderstand these 
statements. The realist is aware of many a crude piece of meta- 
physics in this and that scientific treatise, of many metaphysical 
inconsistencies in the doctrines of every generation of scientists, and 
in those of almost every individual scientist himself. Indeed this is 
precisely why professional metaphysicians are needed, for the special 
scientist is too busy to explore thoroughly the foundations upon 
which his theories rest, especially during periods when science is 
growing rapidly. But the metaphysician is not needed to revolu- 
tionize these theories. On the contrary, his business is to think 
through, to make explicit, to organize, and to make evident to 
the world the theory of reality that the scientists are implicitly 

"Ah," the idealist will say, "this is positivism." The realist 
replies : ' ' This is not positivism, for positivism is itself but a form of 
idealism and has in it precisely the error against which the realist 
protests. Its father was Hume, and, with him, it too would base 
science logically upon a theory of knowledge. True, there is this 
common feature that the realist is inclined to oppose absolutism or 
any other claim to an infallible theory of reality. He sees that 
science grows by trial and error, that science has found no other 
ultimate method of procedure. The realist is in this sense an empiri- 
cist; yet, mark well, not because he bases his metaphysics upon a 
theory of knowledge, but because our whole scientific procedure is a 
tentative one. Science does not assert its results as certainties, but 
as probabilities. It admits that it has not full proof of any of its 
existential hypotheses. Thus the empiricism of neo-realism is not a 
theory of knowledge, but a confession that our theories are not based 
upon full and sufficient proof. Moreover, he denies that our theories 
of knowledge are any better off in this respect, for he sees no way of 
digging deeper down for some ultimate support for these theories 
than does the physicist for physics. To change the figure, he sees no 
immovable standpoint that can serve him as a fulcrum with the help 
of which his logical lever will enable him to move the world. He 
wishes that he could ; but he is convinced that any attempt to do so, 
such as that of the Kantian or Hegelian transcendentalism, is an out 
and out vicious circle. In short his empiricism is dogmatism and 
differs radically from that of those idealists who are also empiricists. 

Let me illustrate my point that the realist believes that we owe 
our metaphysics to science and not to some ultimate type of philo- 


sophical research by giving two examples. Suppose a follower of 
Berkeley and a modern naive realist to be disputing regarding the 
nature of the content of which we are immediately aware in percep- 
tion. The Berkeleyan holding to an epistemological theory believes 
it all but self-evident that this content is mental or is made up of 
states of consciousness. In turn, of course, the realist maintains that 
this content is made up almost entirely of a non-mental world. Now 
my question is, why does the realist do so? Is it because he also 
draws this proposition as a conclusion from a theory of knowledge 
or perception? I reply, "No." It might even happen that he has 
no theory of knowledge or perception. Where does he get the propo- 
sition? My answer is, "Just where common sense and science get 
it"; and that means it is virtually an ultimate premise and not a 
conclusion at all. The realist can not come over to Berkeley's view 
because he can not see how to get there ; for he sees no way of log- 
ically undermining the position of common sense and of science and 
of thereby being able to build a deeper foundation or substructure 
beneath science and common sense. Here then is where the two men 
differ. The Berkeleyan finds such an ultimate problem whose solu- 
tion gives him a more nearly fundamental position than that of sci- 
ence. The realist beholds in this position a mere logical treadmill 
by which, no matter how long or how hard you labor onward, you 
end precisely where you started. To turn to a second illustration. 
Suppose a Kantian and a realistic empiricist to be discussing the 
nature of matter. The former would maintain that a study of the 
knowing process will throw light upon the question by showing what 
matter must be in order to be a possible experience. In short, there 
is a method by means of which we can in certain particulars antici- 
pate the physics of all time to come. The realist would reply, "No, 
it is impossible, or at least it has never been done." In all such 
reasoning you Kantians are surreptitiously borrowing the funda- 
mental postulates of the physics and of the psychology of the time ; 
and then after you have read them into your theory of knowledge 
you read them out again. Twenty years ago you would probably 
have tried to show that mass must be a fundamental constant in all 
nature because of the constitution of knowledge ; and your argument 
would no doubt have seemed plausible, because everybody then 
believed mass to be such a constant: but here to-day the ruthless 
facts are telling us that mass is a function of the velocity. In short, 
the realist will say, I fail utterly to see any method of research, other 
than that of the physical sciences, by which we can ascertain the 
fundamental postulates or principles of the true theory of nature. 
Hence I see no standpoint from which as a metaphysician I can 
judge regarding such matters more authoritatively than can the 


physicist in his laboratory. Rather what I see is that the growth of 
physics and astronomy in the days of Galileo revolutionized meta- 
physics then, and that the growth of physics to-day is probably going 
to revolutionize the metaphysics of our time, too. Indeed it has ever 
been thus, for all the major discoveries of science have led to changes 
within metaphysics; and some of them, such as evolution, have led 
to great changes within the theory of knowledge itself. 

To return to our main discussion : The dogmatist and the criticist 
will have a radically different methodology. If science is the source 
of my theory of reality my method of research must be a logical 
analysis of what science teaches ; and if science is as yet quite unable 
to answer the questions I put to it, I shall simply have to wait. If, 
however, the theory of knowledge is the fundamental and most trust- 
worthy source of my theory of reality, my method will be to pursue 
epistemological research and not to wait for the growth of any other 
science. Now this difference in method leads many critics to mis- 
understand neo-realism, charging neo-realism with an over-fondness 
for dialectic. But there is a radical difference between using logical 
analysis in order to ascertain, for example, what chemistry teaches 
or presupposes and using logical analysis to solve a chemical problem. 
No amount of mere logic could discover the weight of oxygen, but 
a man who never saw a chemical laboratory can learn from an 
encyclopedia what chemists assert to be the weight. In short, my 
point is that the employment of such logical analysis is a prominent 
trait of neo-realism and that it indicates not a return to that delight- 
ful occupation, spinning a web of truth out of one's internal organs 
spider fashion, but a return to dogmatism. 

May I call your attention also to what seems to me further evi- 
dence that the neo-realistic movement is essentially a return to 
dogmatism ? Why have neo-realists championed the following causes : 
first, the giving up of the substance-attribute notion as fundamental ; 
secondly, the holding to logical pluralism and its companion doctrine, 
the defense of analysis as an ultimate method of research; and, 
thirdly, the complete elimination of psychology or epistemology from 
formal logic? Which is true; are these principles inferred by the 
neo-realist from his theory of knowledge or has his theory of knowl- 
edge logically nothing to do with the matter? I am convinced that 
the latter is true, yes, even in the case of some neo-realists who may 
not be fully aware of it themselves. In the case of the substance- 
predicate notion, history shows that there has been gradually a 
wider and wider elimination of this notion from the mathematical 
and physical sciences from the days of Galileo to our own, whereas 
pre-Kantian rationalism, idealism of Kantian lineage, and roman- 
ticism have held more or less tenaciously to the older conception. 


In Lotze in Germany, in Bradley in England, and indeed in any 
upholder of the doctrine of the absolute we see a remarkable hostility 
to the proposition that relations are fundamental, whereas you see 
the opposite tendency among neo-realists. The only explanation I 
have of this division by parties is that psychology and sometimes 
romanticism dominate in the one, and logic dominates in the other. 
In the case of the remaining two principles, it is, however, more 
evident. Examine the treatises on logic of the objective idealists, 
the phenomenalists, and the pragmatists; and the influence of psy- 
chology, or, if you prefer so to call it, epistemology, is everywhere 
evident, whereas there is a remarkable tendency for neo-realism to 
side with formal logic against what has been dubbed Psychologismus. 
Consider finally how neo-realism champions analysis as an ultimate 
method of research and, in general, logical pluralism as fundamental 
to our modern theory of reality. Now if I mistake not it is evident 
to all philosophers that the exact sciences have been for centuries 
utterly dependent upon the method of analysis. Indeed without it 
we should not have any of our modern sciences. As a consequence 
both romanticists and monistic idealists have to find some other 
pigeonhole besides that of genuine truth in which to place science. 
In short, they have to claim that science can not be our direct and 
fundamental source for a theory of reality ; whereas the realist claims 
precisely the opposite. 

In conclusion, there is some evidence among realists themselves 
that they do not regard the name realism as the most appropriate. 
Mr. Bertrand Russell, who is certainly one of the foremost neo- 
realists in the English-speaking world, urges that the appropriate 
name is pluralism. I believe it would be more appropriate, for it 
would at least refer to a fundamental tenet of the new party; but 
against it I urge that the new movement is more a methodological 
rebellion against the older philosophy, and that in a recent reply to 
Mr. Bradley, Mr. Russell suggests this very thing. 3 Thus though I 
may be suggesting the impossible, I do nevertheless ask : Should not 
the new movement be called neo-dogmatism ? This name would at 
once make clear to the objective idealist the difference between the 
parties where now he feels that he, too, is in a sense a realist. Again 
it would do the same for those pragmatists who call themselves real- 
ists and yet feel rightly that there is some radical difference between 
their position and that of the neo-realists. It would make clear the 
relationship between the new movement and the seventeenth-century 
philosophy for which this movement has already expressed a fond- 
ness and with which neo-realism has been confused by some critics. 

"The Basis of Realism," this JOUBXAL, Vol. VIIL, page 158; and cf. 
Mind, 1910, N. S., Vol. XIX., pages 373-378. 


Finally, I believe it would indicate the chief bond between the indi- 
vidual realists themselves, a methodological bond rather than a theory 
of reality. 




OF all system forms, the so-called "deductive" has received the 
greatest attention. Its father is Aristotle. Following sugges- 
tions and using preliminary work by his master, Plato, he put the 
stamp of his own mind on his researches into the nature of the 
deductive system. Euclid gave the first great example of the form 
in his "Elements," and this example was interpreted and imitated 
in the light of the Aristotelian theory. Every school-boy who 
labored through Euclid's text was thus familiarized with the leading 
ideas of Aristotle's theory. And quite naturally it was believed 
that the deductive system form was something peculiarly mathe- 
matical, though the attempt was made, with indifferent success, to 
apply it to philosophy, with great success, to physics. 

The conception of a deductive system thus made current may be 
briefly stated as follows : Its dominating idea is that of ' ' proof, ' ' by 
which is meant "deductive" proof; no propositions are admitted as 
valid until they have been proved; and they are "true" just in so 
far as they have been proved. The "proof" shows that the proposi- 
tion "necessarily follows" from some other propositions; but this 
regress, so Aristotle taught, must come to an end; this is reached 
when we come to the "principles" (-n-p^tj ) which neither can nor 
need be proved, for they are ' ' self evident. ' ' By means of the proofs 
our propositions participate in this self -evidence which the "axioms" 
enjoy, and in this lucidity consists the great merit of the deductive 
system; error may indeed creep in through a faulty proof (nothing 
human is perfect, alas!) ; but it can be corrected, for the rules for 
making valid proofs were made the subject of explicit and detailed 
study. Propositions must be proved, that is, reduced to the axioms ; 
concepts must be "defined," that is, reduced to the fundamental 
concepts, in the last resort to the categories, which thus correspond 
to the axioms. Categories must be clear, intelligible, general; and 
the "derived" concepts, by means of the definitions, participate in 
the clearness of the categories, just as the propositions do in the self- 
evidence of the axioms. The light of day thus shines through the 
whole building, for its very structure assures clearness, validity, 


necessity, for which the philosophic mind had always been longing. 

As we look back over the centuries through which the history of 
the deductive system took its triumphant march, we are impressed 
with the feeling (which to the workers at the building seems to have 
been a conviction) that a system, such as plane geometry, could be 
developed in the deductive system form in but one way. Certain 
concepts are the fundamental concepts, certain propositions the 
axioms, radically distinct, by their nature of "clearness," "self- 
evidence," from all other concepts and propositions in the system. 
The search for "categories" and "principles" has always taken this 
direction and followed this procedure: by a direct inspection they 
are to be recognized as such, without further ado. Of course, indi- 
vidual writers did err (though it seems just a trifle hard to under- 
stand how they could have failed to recognize that which is "self 
evident") ; but the correction itself followed, with undaunted confi- 
dence, the same method of direct inspection ! 

This is the heritage of the Aristotelian theory; "categories," 
"axioms," the terms which most clearly express it. 

Had philosophers not been too much absorbed in different prob- 
lems and too ignorant of mathematics to be any longer interested in 
the work which was going on around them in the special sciences, 
this idea of a deductive system would have been rudely shaken by 
the work of intrepid mathematicians, who, without theoretical bias, 
proceeded to develop deductive systems of "geometry," of "algebra" 
by starting from various sets of "axioms." As it was, philosophers 
ignored, and mathematicians built according to Euclid's pattern, 
without much concern for the structural significance of their work. 
And so the opinion could prevail that the Aristotelian account still 
fitted the modern work. 

These various sets of "axioms" were at first offered in the spirit 
of the older conception of a deductive system, as improvements on 
Euclid's system which was found deficient in important points. But 
once the absolute perfection of Euclid's system was impugned and 
the possibility of starting from a different basis demonstrated, the 
work was carried on beyond the intentions of these first attempts. 
Mathematicians exhibited new, and new, sets of ' ' axioms, " " hypoth- 
eses," "postulates," "primitive propositions," or whatever name 
they chose for their starting-point of a deductive system, and proved 
that all of Euclid's propositions could be deduced from their sets 
also. But even more important than this multiplicity of "founda- 
tions" is the fact, that, if any one of these sets of "axioms" is 
chosen, the "axioms" of the other sets become theorems which must 
and can be proved. The new set of "axioms" may simply be a new 
selection from among the propositions of the old systems. What 


becomes of the radical distinction between "axioms" and "the- 
orems," if they may thus be interchanged! And what is true of 
the "axioms" applies to the categories. 

The consequences of this work have not yet been recognized, 
though its bearing on all our thinking seems great ; for the ' ' example 
of mathematics ' ' has been potent with those who imitated, as well as 
with those who opposed it. Spinoza, who put his philosophy into 
the deductive system form, as well as Kant, who denied the possi- 
bility of "definition" and "deductive proof" in philosophy, was 
guided by the Aristotelian idea of a deductive system. And Kant's 
own attempt at establishing a "table of categories" and of "funda- 
mental judgments" moves, at bottom, in the same direction: certain 
concepts are the categories; certain propositions the fundamental 
judgments. This is a remnant of the Aristotelian way of thinking 
in the great and complex German philosopher, who though a favor- 
ite subject of attack by the young scientists working in the realm of 
the "philosophy of mathematics" in other respects, and particu- 
larly in his "transcendental method," seems to have sounded the 
key-note of all this modern work. To have shown this convincingly 
is one of the great merits of Hermann Cohen. 

But are we not too rash in thus speaking rather disparagingly of 
the Aristotelian conception of a deductive system ? Has the modern 
work really made a different theory necessary? Above all, are the 
ideas controlling this work sound themselves? Wherein do they 
differ from the classical account, and do perhaps they themselves 
require modification? These questions should be put and answered 
systematically; for we are at present in a puzzling and somewhat 
irrational position. If "proofs" merely link propositions to "pos- 
tulates," lacking the distinguishing mark of "self-evidence," "cer- 
tainty," "undeniability," what is the advantage of all this laborious 
"proving"? We seem to "establish" nothing! And if all the 
propositions of a deductive system are "contained" in the "axioms," 
do we not merely keep reasserting these "axioms" when we state 
the "Pythagorean Proposition"? The problem of the "New" in 
mathematics arises! Ah, says Professor Poincare, who himself 
urged this problem, the "New" exists (and every unbiased mathe- 
matician will agree with him in this) ; but, though it is excluded 
indeed by the "deductive" procedure, it has its source in that impor- 
tant other method of mathematics, namely, "complete induction." 

Does not the great mathematician, in opposing this "mathe- 
matical induction" to the usual "deduction," misconceive the 
former? This question is of double importance. If Poincare 's 
solution is correct, mathematics is not purely a "deductive" system, 
as modern mathematical logicians hold. If it is incorrect, the prob- 


lem must either be solved differently or it is merely symptomatic of a 
general misunderstanding of the nature of a deductive system. 
I believe that the latter alternative is correct, and I shall indicate 
this by a brief analysis of PoincarS's theory. 

In the first place it must appear paradoxical, if "complete induc- 
tion" is really the source of the "New," that the application of the 
method should be so limited in "geometry" where the "New" is so 
very patent ! 

In the second place it must be borne in mind that the question 
how the "New" is found does not concern us here, but how we can 
account for its logical existence in a deductive system. 

Now let us briefly examine this method of "mathematical induc- 
tion. ' ' It may be well to attach our remarks to a particular example. 
I choose the "binomial theorem," because it is here that the beginner 
in mathematics usually makes his first acquaintance with this method ; 
and the simple form in which it appears here illustrates the point as 
well as the later refinements on it by Dedekind, Schroder, Hunting- 
ton, and others. 

Starting with the formulae 

(a + 6) = a 8 + 3a 2 6 + 3a6 2 -f 6, 

which are obtained by succesive multiplication with a-\-b = a-\-b, 
we make an "induction" to find the formula for the wth power, 

How this is done in detail, it is not essential for us to examine here. 
But, and this is essential, this formula is not yet warranted, it is a 
mere presumption, a methodical guess at a general law. To incor- 
porate this formula into the system, it requires to be "proved"; 
the "induction" is no warrant whatever. For in many cases we 
make a precisely similar induction, but find, on testing the "law" 
that it does not hold in general. This occurs with annoying fre- 
quency in the case of finding the "nth derivative of a function" (for 
the remainder in Taylor's theorem) ! The first part of the method, 
the "induction" consists, therefore, merely in making, by analogy, 
a guess at a general law (Bertrand Russell uses this rather dis- 
paraging, but very characteristic, expression). It is the second part 
which establishes the law as valid: by assuming the formula to be 
correct for n, we prove that it holds for n -f 1. This step from n to 
n-\-l is the really characteristic feature of the method (which is 
often called after it "conclusion from n to n-f-1") ; this step dis- 


tinguishes it radically from any ' ' induction. ' ' For it is a deduction 
pure and simple; here we "deduce"! From what? This I shall 
examine later. But we "deduce," no doubt about that! And 
nothing whatever distinguishes this ' ' conclusion from n to n -f- 1 " 
essentially from other deductive proofs. The "New" does enter here 
indeed ; but so it does in other ' ' deduction ' ' ; only how ? This is the 
question which the reference to "induction" leaves completely un- 
answered. And the problem of the "New" remains on our hands. 

Its solution, however, does not require the invention of new struc- 
tural elements or the recognition of hidden and unsuspected methods : 
the problem is merely symptomatic of the insufficiency of our preva- 
lent theory of a deductive system. A reexamination is needed which 
will draw the full theoretical consequences of the practical work of 
modern mathematics. 




MISS CALKINS is almost the only "idealist" who has ap- 
peared in arms against the advancing "realistic" movement. 
Partly because of this, partly because of the position Miss Calkins is 
rightly accorded among philosophic writers, and partly because her 
reply to the "realist" exhibits a type of fallacy entailing very im- 
portant consequences, it has seemed that her contention is particu- 
larly worthy of consideration. 

The reply in question 1 is divided into two parts. The first of 
these is concerned with the ' ' recent criticisms of idealism, ' ' which, it 
is said, can be grouped under three main heads : ' ' first, those which 
oppose idealism on the ground that it is subversive of some impor- 
tant system of beliefs; second, those which charge idealism with 
fundamental inconsistency ; and, third, those which claim that ideal- 
ism is based on unjustifiable assumptions. ' ' 

The first of these criticisms is disposed of briefly. The fact that 
certain beliefs are generally accepted does not render them true, and 
as long as one's contention is based upon this principle it is irre- 

The second criticism, that concerning the inconsistency of 
"idealism," is not treated at all fully. The "realistic" contention 
is said to be that the subject-object relation, which is essential to 

1 This JOUBNAL, Vol. VIII., pages 449 ff. 


knowledge, "is possible only on the supposition that non-mental 
reality exists." Miss Calkins admits that "idealism" makes the 
distinction between subject and object; but, apparently, not the 
supposition that non-mental reality exists. The "idealist," "like 
other men, recognizes a difference between present and external, and 
merely imagined, objects." But this distinction is said to refer not 
to two kinds of things, "extra-mental and mental," but to "objects 
respectively of ... shared and of .... unshared consciousness." 
The only point to be noted here is that the nature of an object can 
not be explained by the fact that it is an object for many subjects. 
That is a fact additional to the problem of the nature of the object, 
and irrelevant to its solution. 

The third of the "realistic" criticisms of "idealism" is treated 
at greater length and the chief point for consideration in Miss Cal- 
kins 's article is to be found in connection with it. The "realist" 
has said that "idealism" is based upon an unjustifiable assumption 
in holding that "an object, because known, is therefore mental in 
nature." Miss Calkins endeavors both to uphold the "idealistic" 
position and to refute the "realistic" criticism of it. The method 
employed for this purpose should be carefully observed. 

The "realistic" position is first stated in the words of Holt: 
"The entities (objects, facts, et cat.) under study in logic, mathe- 
matics, and the physical sciences are not mental in any usual or 
proper meaning of the word "mental." The being and nature of 
these entities are in no sense conditioned by their being known" 
(p. 452). This is said to be "an accurate and an uncompromising 
statement of the difference between the two parties. For the ideal- 
ist does hold as fundamental just this doctrine which the realist 
attributes to him, that is to say, he believes that objects, as known, 
are mental" (p. 452). Miss Calkins asserts (p. 454) that unknown 
objects (and hence unknown qualities of objects) while possible, are 
yet "utterly negligible," and, in addition, "inconceivable" and 
"indefinable." Throughout the article, statements recur which 
seem to be based upon the position that the unknown is non-existent ; 
but since Miss Calkins admits the possibility of the existence of an 
unknown, we must simply accept the statement that it is "incon- 
ceivable." Hence, the phrase "as known," at the end of the last 
quotation (p. 452) is unnecessary, and must not be taken to imply 
that Miss Calkins holds objects, as unknown, to be non-mental, nor, 
indeed, to be any thing at all. The contention between "idealist" 
and "realist" is then clear: the "idealist" holds that all objects of 
knowledge are mental, the "realist" that some objects of knowledge, 
at least, are non-mental. And the "realist" asserts that the "ideal- 
istic" contention is an unjustifiable assumption. 


Miss Calkins 's reply assumes the form of asserting that an ex- 
amination of the objects of logic, mathematics, and the physical sci- 
ences, shows that they are "ideal" (by which, apparently, is meant 
the same as "mental"). An empirical study of any known object 
reveals the fact that it is constituted of (1) sensible qualities and 
(2) relations. These are treated separately; but as the argument is 
the same in both cases, it will simplify matters if we limit our con- 
sideration of it to the treatment of sensible qualities. 

What is asserted, then, is that the ' ' idealist discovers by examina- 
tion of objects he does not (as the realist accuses) assume that 
both sense qualities and relations are mental" (p. 453). Hence, the 
question arises : what does Miss Calkins mean by the term "mental"? 
The answer to this question is best seen from the treatment of 
sensible qualities. Miss Calkins does not attempt to prove the men- 
tality of sensible qualities by the ordinary method, namely, by 
pointing out their "variability"; for this, she says, quite rightly, 
"does not prove, even though it suggests, the ideality of objects" 
(p. 453). "But the idealist," we are told, "rests his case, not on 
reasoning of this sort, but on the results of direct observation 
coupled with the inability of any observer to make an unchallenge- 
able assertion about sense qualities save in 'the terms of idealism. 
To be more explicit : the idealist demands that his opponent describe 
any immediately perceived sense object in such wise that his descrip- 
tion can not be disputed. The realist then describes an object as, 
let us say, yellow, rough, and cold. But somebody may deny the 
yellowness, the roughness, or the coldness ; and this throws the realist 
back on what he directly observes, what he knows with incontro- 
vertible and undeniable certainty, namely, that he is at this moment 
having a complex experience described by the terms yellowness, 
coldness, and the like (an experience which he does not give himself). 
This statement, and only this, nobody can challenge. And this state- 
ment embodies the result of immediate experience" (p. 453). This 
is the sole argument used to prove that sense qualities are mental. 
Now, what is meant by saying that no one can make "an un- 
challengeable assertion about sense qualities save in the terms of 
idealism"? We find that "terms of idealism" are terms which 
ascribe to sense qualities a mental nature. That this is so follows 
from the statement of what the "idealist" holds "as fundamental." 
So that the contention is that no one can make an unchallengeable 
assertion about sense qualities save by saying that they are mental. 
When it is asked how this conclusion is supported, the illustrations 
supplied are found to be of the following kind. If I say, e. g., that 
this orange is yellow, what is really implied is that I see that this 
orange is yellow ; or, if I say that snow is cold, what is really implied 


is that I am aware of it as cold ; when, in general, I make an assertion 
of the form "A' has the sense quality P," what is really implied is 
that I am aware of X as having the sense quality P. Hence, the 
argument runs, sense qualities are mental. 

There is a certain difficulty in perceiving the logic of this argu- 
ment. It must be particularly noted what Miss Calkins is demand- 
ing. She is insisting on an unchallengeable description of <f sense 
quality. It is therefore important to consider what is the nature 
of a description. 

The important point that comes to light when we begin to con- 
sider description is that it presupposes knowledge which is itself 
indescribable. Sense qualities are examples of such knowledge ; for 
sense qualities are not merely indescribable "save in the terms of 
idealism," but they are strictly not describable at all. It is, e. g., 
impossible to describe yellow to a man born blind. Each individual 
has a stock of indescribable knowledge, in which sense qualities have 
a large place, and it is quite incommunicable, because indescribable. 
Communication proceeds on the supposition that there is knowledge 
which, while incommunicable, is yet the property of all. Each indi- 
vidual is assumed to have a corresponding stock of such knowledge 
which he could have attained only by immediate acquaintance. 

Further, all description is in the terms of the elements of which 
the object is composed. (We do not describe yellow by saying that 
we are aware of it.) It follows that there can be no description of 
the elements themselves. Individuals are immediately aware of them. 

A description may be defined, therefore, as the characterization 
of a thing by the enumeration of the indescribable elements of which 
it is composed. The question then is : What is the nature of inde- 
scribable objects ? Among such are sense qualities, and it is asserted 
that they are mental. But why are they mental? Is it because 
they are indescribable? If so, it should be pointed out that the 
proposition ' ' Sense qualities are mental ' ' is different from the propo- 
sition "Sense qualities are indescribable" and needs for its proof 
the mediating proposition "Indescribable qualities are mental." 
But how is this proposition reached? 

Or is a quality mental because it is incommunicable ? This con- 
clusion does not seem to follow at once. To establish it one would 
have to prove independently that all incommunicable qualities are 
mental. And how is this to be done ? It might possibly be contended 
that if an object were purely individual it would be mental, though 
this seems questionable; but in any case it would have to be proved 
that incommunicable objects were purely individual. This seems 
palpably false: yellow is not purely individual, though it is quite 


What Miss Calkins has said may be summed up by saying that 
there are certain objects of knowledge which are incommunicable, 
because indescribable; though, what she actually says is that such 
objects can not be described "save in the terms of idealism." Hence, 
her contention that sense qualities are mental should mean simply 
that sense qualities are incommunicable. 

It may be doubted whether Miss Calkins means nothing more 
than this. There is some suggestion that when Miss Calkins says 
that sense qualities are mental she means ' ' mental ' ' to refer to their 
nature and not to their incommunicability. And this leads us to 
suppose that the term "mental" has been used in two senses by 
Miss Calkins, and that the proposition "sense qualities are mental," 
in consequence, means one thing at one time and another at another. 
This seems to be borne out from the following considerations. 

Miss Calkins outlines an argument (p. 452) by which a "monistic 
idealism" (it is apparently assumed) could be established, and also 
the conclusion which would be established by it. But the argument 
there outlined is merely mentioned ; much of the article is concerned 
with the other argument which we have quoted. Consequently, we 
must believe either that Miss Calkins did not think the outlined 
argument adequate for her purpose, or that she considered the one 
she uses a more effective instrument in attaining it. Now, the con- 
clusion which is said to follow from the "monistic idealist's" argu- 
ment (the one merely outlined) is that the objects which I "directly 
experience . . . must be like me, must in other words be other- 
self "*(p. 452). That is to say, in particular, that sense qualities 
must be "like me." It is true that this is said to be the conclusion 
of a monistic "idealist"; but since Miss Calkins would assume that 
title for herself, we must believe that it is that conclusion she is 
endeavoring to establish by the method which she actually employs 
throughout her article. // so, there is one important consideration. 

According to the argument actually adopted by Miss Calkins the 
conclusion was reached that sense qualities are mental, and it was 
seen what that proposition should mean. "Mental" in this conclu- 
sion should mean "indescribable." And as long as a term's mean- 
ing is made clear there can be little objection to any particular usage 
of it. But it must be noted that this meaning of "mental" has no 
reference to the nature of the sense qualities. An object could be 
mental in this sense if it were "gross matter." The one condition 
that it would have to fulfill would be ' ' indescribability. ' ' 

Not so, however, if mental is taken to mean "like me." The 
term then refers to the nature of an object and not at all to its rela- 
tions to a knower. A sense quality is "mental," is "like me," is 
* ' other-self, " if it thinks, feels, wills, acts, in this sense of ' ' mental ' ' ; 


and may, if it does these things, be said to be mental with as 
much, and as little, propriety as I may be said to be mental. And 
it is clear that this meaning of mental is very different from the 
former one. 

Now, if, in using the term "mental," we at one moment adopt 
one of these meanings and at another moment adopt the other, our 
conclusion will probably be unsound. Miss C.alkins seems uncon- 
sciously to have done this. She does not, indeed, explicitly use the 
term mental to mean "like me"; yet she says that is the "idealistic" 
conclusion, and the "idealistic" conclusion, she also tells us, is that 
objects of knowledge are mental. Hence, it seems that one sense of 
mental is synonymous with "like me." On the other hand, Miss 
Calkins does not explicitly use the term mental to mean inde- 
scribable ; but that is what her argument involves. Once sense quali- 
ties are said to be mental in this latter sense, it is natural to argue, 
fallaciously, that they are also mental in the sense that they are "like 
me." But this conclusion is clearly in no way whatever connected 
with the arguments by which Miss Calkins endeavors to prove that 
sense qualities are mental. 

There are two general meanings of the term mental which it is 
of the highest importance to keep distinct. The first of these makes 
the term applicable to qualities of minds as real existing entities. 
(In an analogous way it is said that speech is human.) In this sense 
of mental it is applied, e. g., to awareness, and also to any other 
quality which is peculiar to minds. 

The other general meaning of the term mental makes it applicable 
to any entity which is supposed to be dependent on minds for its 
existence, being, or reality. "Mental," in this sense, means simply 
' ' dependent for existence, being, or reality on mind or minds. " It is 
difficult to demonstrate that there are any such entities, though that 
there are is sometimes thought to be quite obvious. It has also been 
thought that an "idealism" could be established if it could be proved 
that all objects are dependent for their existence, being, or reality 
on minds. But this belief has been due to a fallacy. 

The fallacy consists in supposing that if objects are mental in the 
second sense, they are also mental in the former sense : if, that is, they 
are dependent for their existence, being, or reality on minds, they 
are also qualities of minds. It is hardly necessary to point out that 
the two meanings of mental have no logical connection whatsoever. 

This confusion has led to much superficial argument on behalf of 
"idealism." "Mental" has been used illegitimately very widely 
and much ignoratio elenchi argument has arisen due to the fallacy 
arising from this two-faced term. Miss Calkins 's article exhibits a 
similar inconsequence. 


It may be true that the objects of knowledge are "like me." 
It is possible also that Miss Calkins can demonstrate that they are 
"like me." I am not at present concerned to consider possible 
arguments in support of this conclusion. What I am concerned to 
do is to show that Miss Calkins either seeks to establish the conclu- 
sion that objects of knowledge are mental by an illegitimate use of 
the ambiguous term mental or does actually establish the proposition 
that the objects of knowledge are mental, but in a sense which is 
trivial and wholly irrelevant to the "realistic" contention. Miss 
Calkins has shown that objects of knowledge are mental neither in 
the sense that they are dependent for their existence, being, or reality 
on minds nor in the sense that they are similar to minds. Yet these 
seem to be by far the most important meanings of the term mental, 
and are the meanings most relevant to the particular "idealistic" 
theory which Miss Calkins outlines. And I wish to point out that 
this inconsequent type of argument is very prevalent in ' ' idealistic ' ' 

The second part of Miss Calkins 's article concerns itself (1) with 
the positive "realistic" doctrine and (2) with the "idealistic" con- 
ception of the universe. What is said with reference to (1), namely, 
that "realistic" writers have little positive doctrine is doubtless 
quite true. Still, is it not largely a polite fiction that a philosopher 
is great if he has constructed, at any cost, a pretentious theory of 
the universe? Has not the clearer-away of "much rubbish" a place 
in this world, as well as the builder of a crystal palace? In regard 
to (2) there is little to be said except that the treatment exhibits once 
more the difficulties arising from the word ' ' mental. ' ' 

The article is, on the whole, so admirably clear as to emphasize 
once and for all two distinct points: (1) when "idealists" say that 
the objects of knowledge are mental they must also say precisely 
what they mean by the term "mental"; (2) the hypothesis that the 
objects of knowledge are mental will have to find some definite, 
relevant, and logical support if it is to be more than a mere forgotten 
fantasy. BERNARD Muscio. 



Wandlungen in der Philosophic der Gegenwart. JULIUS GOLDSTEIN. 

Leipzig : Werner Klinkhardt. 1911. Pp. viii + 171. 

To readers outside of Germany Dr. Goldstein's book is likely to seem 
significant chiefly as an evidence of the awakening of the German mind to 
certain new philosophical tendencies that have long been conspicuous in 


Anglo-American and French thought, and as an effective instrument for 
the diffusion of those tendencies in the land of Kant and Hegel. The 
author plainly intimates to his fellow-countrymen that in philosophical 
matters they have for the most part ceased, at least until very recently, to 
be dans le mouvement. Elsewhere great changes have been taking place 
changes in the center of philosophic interest and in the fundamental 
presuppositions of philosophic procedure : " and these changes, in their 
reactions upon religion, ethics, and men's practical attitudes, have, for 
now nearly two decades, been bringing about a crisis in philosophy, have 
been giving a new direction to inquiry." But " in German philosophy 
few signs of all this are recognizable. It still, with some praiseworthy 
exceptions, walks with unsuspecting innocence in the old paths and busies 
itself with the traditional problems. In many cases it has not yet emerged 
from the Hume vs. Kant controversy." Possibly the old doctrines and the 
traditional methods of attack may in the end hold their own and success- 
fully dispose of the new though the author does not, in fact, anticipate 
that outcome. But in any case, the new ideas must be faced, must be 
more than superficially understood, must be open-mindedly examined, as 
they but rarely have been by German academic philosophers. Dr. Gold- 
stein has accordingly undertaken to naturalize the new tendencies in his 
own country and to arouse in the German philosophic public a fuller 
realization of the prevailing drift of contemporary reflection. 

Two means are employed to this end. The author, in the first place, 
endeavors to show the underlying unity of seemingly diverse innovating 
doctrines, to trace the convergence of a number of recent lines of thought 
in a general conclusion of great moment and of essential novelty. He 
offers, in the second place, brief, but by no means mechanical, expositions 
of the teaching of three philosophers whom he regards as the chief repre- 
sentatives of the new way of thinking : Bergson, James, and Eucken. The 
introduction of Eucken in this sort of company is somewhat surprising; 
and the author in the end is obliged to admit that that metaphysician 
returns to the " old paths " at what is, confessedly, the crucial point. The 
new movement may be described (among other ways of characterizing it) 
as a final Loslosung vom Platonismus; but Eucken's " affirmation that the 
Oeisiesleben is in itself timeless and immutable " can only be regarded as 
" a not yet eliminated survival of the Platonic mode of thought." One 
suspects that Dr. Goldstein felt obliged to have some German representa- 
tive of the new philosophy and consequently selected Eucken to figure 
rather incongruously in that role, faute de mieux. But in fact there are 
better German examples who might have been chosen, though perhaps no 
perfectly typical one. Some, at least, of Dr. Goldstein's "new paths" 
were trodden some time since by Avenarius, some by von Hartmann, and 
some by Dilthey; and the most important ones may be said to have been 
opened chiefly by Schelling and Schopenhauer. 

The author's enumeration of new tendencies and his attempt to inter- 
pret their collective import are interesting and often decidedly illumina- 
ting; no one can fail to derive from the book a better understanding of 
the intellectual movement of our time. Yet I do not think that the inter- 


pretation is at all complete or clear-cut. In general, what is now taking 
place, Dr. Goldstein finds, is a " smash-up of rationalism." nationalism 
he defines as " a conception of the nature of science formed under the 
influence of mathematics and an endeavor to bring the facts of life into 
accord with the mathematical physicist's picture of the universe." This 
definition, however, hardly corresponds to the author's own meaning or to 
the nature of the conceptions against which the most typical new philos- 
ophies are insurgent. It is quite as much against the rationalism of 
absolute idealism as against the rationalism of mechanistic naturalism, 
that James and Bergson and their followers, and Goldstein himself, have 
rebelled. The formula given neither indicates the common essence nor 
suggests the distinguishing differences of the various current forms of 
anti-rationalism. And in the absence of a more satisfactory definition of 
rationalism, the author fails to show convincingly that all the tendencies 
which he describes have a significant common essence or are anti-ration- 
alistic in the same sense. Under the one designation he includes such 
diverse attitudes as the simple, common-sense recognition of the limita- 
tions of our knowledge of nature and the probable necessity of future 
corrections in our scientific generalizations (p. 25) ; the admission that 
the subsumption of particular facts under general laws is merely descrip- 
tion and not explanation (p. 165) ; the denial of the apriority and logical 
necessity of the axioms of mathematics (p. 68) ; the recognition of the 
futility of all ready-made philosophies of history (p. 36) ; the discovery 
that technological progress often entails such an increasing complication 
of human life that it becomes a doubtful boon (p. 49) ; the abandonment of 
the belief that " an absolute, i. e., a final and definitive, religion " has 
been attained (p. 52) ; vitalism, which is fundamentally a special form of 
what may be called scientific pluralism, the denial of the possibility of 
regarding all natural laws " as special cases of a single, all-embracing 
world-law " (p. 58) ; instrumentalism, or the pragmatic conception of the 
nature and office of the intellect (p. 13) ; indeterminism (p. 30) ; temporal- 
ism, or the conception of reality as a process of becoming, in which there 
is no room for the timeless and eternal (p. 166) ; and radical evolutionism, 
or the conception of this becoming as a constant creation of new reality 
not given in nor wholly predictable from anything preexistent in which 
creative process the moral endeavor of man is a participation (pp. 166-170). 
All these positions, of course, represent one degree or another of diffi- 
dence with respect to the powers of the human reason; so much they have 
in common. But they represent very different degrees; and they have 
historically made their appearance, for the most part, under the influence 
of diverse logical motives, and as parts of quite dissimilar doctrines. The 
adoption of some of them by no means commits one to an acceptance of 
the others; and many of them are far from novel. But the adoption of 
the last two involves the acceptance of most to be precise, of all but three 
and naturally leads to the acceptance of all, of the others. And the fact 
is that Dr. Goldstein himself is a radical temporalist and a believer in 
Bergson's " creative evolutionism," and that to him, therefore, all these 
modes of anti-rationalism present themselves as phases of a single philos- 


ophy. In other words, while they have not historically sprung from a 
common root, and while the milder and older phases of the tendency do 
not logically imply the newer and more extreme phases, the former are 
more or less clearly implied by the latter. The book would have been 
clearer and more instructive if the author had from the first made it 
evident that the principal root of his own anti-rationalism was the com- 
bination of temporalism and radical evolutionism and had noted that it 
is only from the point of view of his own philosophy, and not in them- 
selves, that the numerous tendencies which he mentions constitute a doc- 
trinal unity. In the absence of an understanding of these points, the 
reader is likely to be left with a rather confused and congested sort of 
conception of both " rationalism " and its opposite, and with some errors 
of historical perspective not at all intended by the author. Dr. Gold- 
stein's Zusammenbruch des Rationalismus is a name for too many and too 
various doctrines or, at all events, for too many that are not themselves 
new, but merely capable of combination with certain significantly new 
doctrines. And since these last are scarcely set forth until the end of the 
book, the key to the inner logic of the author's exposition is concealed 
from the reader, and one can hardly help surmising to some extent 
from the author himself. 


Some Neglected Factors in Evolution: An Essay in Constructive Biology, 
Putnam's Sons. 1911. Pp. xvi -f 489. 

A book, rather interesting from the point of view of the speculative 
philosopher, but utterly fantastic in so far as it claims to be scientific, is 
Henry M. Bernard's " Some Neglected Factors in Evolution." 

Mr. Bernard starts with a hypothesis of the universal presence in liv- 
ing organisms of a protomitomic network consisting of so-called chroma- 
tin bodies from which radiate delicate linin filaments. The chromatin 
bodies function chemically, their influence being distributed along the linin 
threads. Growth and extension of this simple chromidial network is car- 
ried on by the dividing of the chromatin, together with the splitting of the 
growing threads. Waste matter, resulting from chemical reactions, is 
carried along the filaments to the surface of the organism. The tips of 
the filaments are sensitive, and impulses from outside may travel inward 
as a nerve current. 

Increase in size of an organism of this kind necessitates differentia- 
tions. Concentration of the powers of reaction and response gradually 
takes place. This means a closer clustering of chromidia where the 
stimuli are the strongest, with rearrangements of the filaments into 
strands for stronger and more coordinate contractions. Theoretically, 
such an organism should be spherical with all its chromatin collected in 
the center. The centers of energy would then be at the spot where all the 
paths of all the nerve stimuli from the surface cross each other. The 
primitive chromidial network thus becomes transformed into a new organ- 


ism, the cell. All this reasoning is purely hypothetical, and Mr. Ber- 
nard's " Studies on the Ketina," published in 1901-03, have, so far, con- 
vinced no one as to the reality of a protomitomic network. 

The metazoan body, according to Mr. Bernard, consists of a multitude 
of chromidial centers connected with each other by myriads of filaments. 
Gastraeal organisms arise from a rounded protomitomic individual which 
became impitted to form a digestive cavity. The cavity thus produced 
became lined with a compact layer of nuclear nodes, forming a digestive 

How tissues and organs may be formed out of the chromatin linin net- 
work is described in Chapters IX.-XII. The scheme described denotes 
peculiar imagination and considerable ingenuity. It is unfortunate, how- 
ever, that highly diagrammatic figures are shown purporting to be true to 
nature. The description of nuclear division according to the diagrams in 
Fig. 39 is grotesque. 

Part II. deals with the " Cosmic Ehythm " which Herbert Spencer had 
already recognized as traceable in the phenomena of life. During long 
epochs species have arisen, culminated, and dwindled away. Life on this 
earth has not progressed uniformly, but in immense undulations. In 
this, Mr. Bernard catches a glimpse of an evolutionary truth " wider than 
any as yet apprehended." Considered in the light of this law, the evolu- 
tion of organic life breaks up into a series of periods, each advancing ac- 
cording to a fixed formula. A great many forms are evolved on the plan 
of each unit of structure. Those which became modified for any special 
environment acquire stability at the cost of progress, but those which re- 
main free to react efficiently to any environment at any time may yield 
new organisms of a type higher than their own. The production of new 
types of organisms is due to that special method of colony formation in 
which the combining organisms or " units " fuse together in such a way 
as to give rise to a new and more complicated organism. 

Mr. Bernard traces five structural units in nature, the chromidial, the 
cell, the gastraeal, the annelidan, and, lastly, the unit culminating in 
man. In man, the nervous system is most highly specialized, the finer 
senses are so coordinated as to give a coherent report of the environment. 
A wealth of new forces appear comprised under the term psychic, e. g., 
the thirst for knowledge, the love of the beautiful, etc. " The human 
unit, therefore, has to attain a condition of stable equilibrium, not only 
with an external, material environment, but with a psychical environ- 

In the outburst of the " mind of man," in the fifth period, the psychic 
was " brought to the surface and externalized for the purpose of building 
up social aggregates." In modern society we find vast amalgamations 
gradually learning to live, side by side, without continual conflict. Old 
distinctions, necessary to the existence of the human organism only at the 
earlier stage of its integration, still persist. Like vestigial organs, how- 
ever, they must in time disappear. Any real advance to a condition of 
stable equilibrium seems impossible until harmony is established between 
the component units of the organism. The politics of the present and the 


history of the past give evidence of only blind and unsuccessful attempts 
to produce efficient and harmonious aggregates. Expressions of human 
sympathy and help have been considered graces, not duties. We are func- 
tional components of a new social organism. Only by the free develop- 
ment of all the units can a human society escape the fate which organ- 
isms of past periods brought upon themselves through the stiffness of 
their skeletons and the consequent withdrawal of large numbers of their 
units from sensitive contact with the environment. The organic rhythm 
is nearing the end of its fifth great period. Just as it appears to be re- 
peating the law of unit formation, it vanishes entirely. May we not be- 
lieve that it rises out of sight in order to start a new period on a higher 
level of life? 


Free Will and Human Responsibility. HERMAN HARRELL HORNE. New 

York: The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pp. xvi-f 197. 

If one is tempted to consider the freedom of the will an outgrown 
question left behind us with scholasticism and Jonathan Edwards, the 
publication of two books on the subject by American thinkers (Professor 
Palmer and Professor Home) within three months of each other should 
give one a greater respect for this time-honored problem. Nor will the 
perusal of Professor Home's presentation of the subject be likely to make 
one feel that the question is any nearer being settled than it was on that 
mournful day when BuridanoV ass starved quietly to death in the midst 
of assinine dainties. That one should feel thus on concluding the book 
is, perhaps, the more surprising inasmuch as the author does not pose as 
a dispassionate judge, but frankly holds a brief for the cause of freedom. 
To say this, however, does not mean that he treats determinism in an un- 
fair manner. He states the case without prejudice and puts the argu- 
ments on both sides as strongly as he can. 

The plan of the book is simple. After an introductory chapter, the 
history of the dispute is traced from the earliest times to the present. 
Then comes a presentation of the arguments of determinism, followed by 
the libertarian's rebuttal, and these are then reinforced by a chapter of 
positive arguments in favor of freedom. With this the discussion really 
ends, though further chapters are given us on "Pragmatism and Free- 
dom " and " The Difference it Makes." 

The historical sketch of so large an issue is naturally superficial. 
This of course was inevitable and is quite excusable. But the author 
might have given a clearer notion than he does of the relative importance 
of the question in pagan and in Christian philosophy. Moreover, the at- 
tempt is made to put the history of the conflict in such a light as to be 
itself an argument in favor of freedom, by showing that the general 
tendency has been toward it and away from determinism, a conclusion 
arrived at by omitting any mention of the great reinforcement which de- 
terminism has received from the modern views of nature since the time 
of Galileo. 


Professor Home claims no originality in his statement of the argu- 
ments on either side. He has simply collected all he could find, and the 
result is nine arguments for determinism (each separately rebutted), and 
twelve arguments for freedom. In reading these thirty arguments (count- 
ing the rebuttals) one can not help feeling that each side would have 
been more persuasive had it been furnished with fewer reasons. More 
striking is the author's apparent failure to grasp the real force of the 
ethical argument of determinism so well put by Hume, Greene, and many 
others, that if the act is not determined by the character, responsibility 
and, with it, morality go to pieces. This seeming failure of our author 
to evaluate fully the strongest argument of his opponents is perhaps re- 
lated to his frequent confusion of determinism with materialism, of the 
doctrine of freedom with idealism. That Professor Home is perfectly 
aware of the distinction here involved is clearly shown by the appendix; 
and yet many of his most elaborate and most trusted arguments and re- 
buttals aim simply at proving that mind may be a cause, that will acts are 
not determined by brain states, etc. as if Hegel, Greene, Paulsen, and a 
band of others had not amply demonstrated that determinism is as con- 
sistent with mental causation as is freedom. 

The value of the book lies in the sharpness with which the issue is 
stated, the clearness with which the whole great subject is presented in 
187 pages, and the excellence of the rebuttals of certain strong determi- 
nistic arguments. There is appended also a valuable bibliography which 
every one interested in the subject will be glad to have. On the whole, 
the book fulfills the purpose for which it was written as expressed in the 
author's preface : " In my own work I have felt the need of a clear brief 
treatise covering both sides of the issue in outline, to which students 
might be referred, and which might, perhaps, be used as a text for dis- 
cussion at a certain point in the course. These pages are designed to 
supply such a need." 




KEVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. January, 1912. Le " volontarisme 
intellectualiste " (pp. 1-21) : A. LALANDE. - Critical discussion of Fouille's 
" Thought and the New Anti-intellectualistic Schools." Les grands 
courants de I'esthetique allemande contemporaine (ler article) (pp. 22-43) : 
V. BASCH. - Shows the fundamentally psychological method of all Ger- 
man estheticians and discusses the Einfiihlung theory of Lipps and 
Volkelt. Les consequences et les applications de la psychologie (pp. 
44-67) : R. MEUNIER. - A sketch of the working value of psychological 
science in logic, ethics, sociology, metaphysics, pedagogy, psychothera- 
peutics, and " the difficult art of living." Notes de discussions. Y a-t-il 
dualisme radical de la vie et de la penseef: A. FouiLLfs. Analyses et 
comptes rendus. F. Le Dantec, Le chaos et Vharmonie universelle: CH. 


PPEDALLU. Laberthonni&re, Positivisme et Catholicisme: J. BARUZI. 
Alexandra David, Le modernisme bouddhiste et le bouddisme du Bouddha : 
J. BARUZI. J. Pacheu, Psychologic des mystiques Chretiens: J. BARUZI. 
A. Brofferio, La Filosofia delle Upanishadas: J. BARUZI. L. Jeudon, La 
morale de I'honneur: F. PAULHAN. J. Segond, Cournot et la psychologie 
vitaliste: DR. CH. BLOXDEL. L. Perego, L'idealismo etico di Fichte e il 
socialismo contemporeano : J. SECOND. B. Croce, La Filosofia di Oiambatt- 
isia Vico: DR. S. JANKKI.EVITCH. Kant, Oesammelte Schriften: J. 
SECOND. Revue des periodiques etrangers. 

Sur la structure logique du langage (pp. 1-24) : L. COUTURAT. -A sketch 
of an universal grammar that might realize Leibniz's idea of mirroring 
the human mind. Les formes de la vie psychologique (pp. 25-47) : C. 
D'ISTRIA. -A study, with reference to Cabanis, of the effects of age, sex, 
and temperament on psychic life. La logique deductive (pp. 48-67) : A. 
PADOA. - A continuation of his exposition of symbolic logic, including the 
syllogistic. Etudes critiques. La nature et I'homme dapres Sigurd Ibsen: 
P.-G. LA CHESNAIS. La Socio-psychologie de Wilhelm Wundt: H. NORERO. 
Discussions. La theorie elect romagnetique : M. DJUVARE. Questions 
pratiques. Les obligations des ouvriers syndiques: M. LEROT. Supple- 

Collins, Varnum Lansing. Lectures on Moral Philosophy by John 
Witherspoon. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1912. Pp. 
xxxi + 144. 

Downey, June E. The Imaginal Reaction to Poetry. Bulletin No. 2 
of the Department of Psychology of the University of Wyoming. 1912. 
Pp. 56. 

J. G. Fichtes Werke. Vol. VI. Mit Mehreren Bildnissen Fichtes Heraus- 
gegeben und Eingeleitet von Fritz Medicus. Leipzig: Verlag von 
Felix Meiner. 1912. Pp. 680. 7 M. 

Harrison, Jane Ellen. Themis : A Study of the Social Origins of Greek 
Religion. Cambridge: The University Press. 1912. Pp. xxxii + 
559. $5.00. 

Hollingworth, H. L. The Influence of Caffein on Mental and Motor 
Efficiency. Archives of Psychology, No. 22. Columbia Contribu- 
tions to Philosophy and Psychology, Vol. XX., No. 4. New York: 
The Science Press. Pp. iv -f 166. 

Husik, Isaac. Matter and Form in Aristotle. Berlin : Verlag von Leon- 
hard Simion. 1912. Pp. 93. 2.50 M. 

James, William. Essays in Radical Empiricism. Longmans, Green, and 
Company. 1912. Pp. xiii + 282. $1.25. 

Petronievics, Branislav. Principien Der Metaphysik. Heidelberg: Carl 
Winter's Universitatsbuchhandlung. 1912. Pp. xxxviii -f- 570. 

Stockl, Albert. Handbook of the History of Philosophy. Vol. I. Second 
edition. Translated by T. A. Finlay. New York : Longmans, Green, 
and Company. 1911. Pp. 446. $3.75. 


Wallin, J. E. Wallace. Experimental Oral Euthenics. Eeprinted from 
the Dental Cosmos. Pp. 32. 


SEVERAL professors and graduates of the new National University of 
Ireland, founded in 1909 (see Rev. Sc. Ph. Tin,., III., p. 390), published in 
March the first number of a review, entitled Studies, in which they intend 
to place before the reading public their researches in general literature, 
Celtic, classic, and oriental literature and history, philosophy, pedagogy, 
sociology, and the sciences. The magazine is to be directed by a com- 
mittee presided over by the Reverend T. A. Finlay, S.J., M.A., professor 
of political economy in the University College of Dublin. Each number 
will contain articles, reviews, and notes. 

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES'S letters are being collected for biographical 
purposes, and any one who has any of his letters can render assistance that 
will be highly appreciated by addressing Henry James, Jr., 95 Irving St., 
Cambridge, Mass. Casual or brief letters may have an interest or im- 
portance not apparent to the person preserving them; and news of the 
whereabouts of any of the late William James's letters will be gratefully 

A RECENT number of the Cambridge Review notes the lively interest of 
university scholars in the study of early Greek religion. Recently we had 
Miss Harrison's remarkable " Themis," and in the near future we may 
expect Mr. F. M. Cornford's " From Religion to Philosophy," as well as 
a book by Mr. A. B. Cook and further researches from the original and 
always stimulating pen of Professor Ridgeway. 

M. W. SPECHT, privat-docent of psychiatry in the University of 
Munich, recently launched a Zeitschrift fur Pathopsychologie (Leipzig, 
Englemann), the aim of which will be to strengthen the psychological 
foundations of mental pathology. Professors Ach, Bergson, Heymans, 
Janet, Kiilpe, Meumann, Miinsterberg, Dick, and Sommer will be con- 
tributing editors. 

A NEW periodical, Imago, is announced from Vienna, edited by Pro- 
fessor S. Freud and published under the direction of Otto Rank and 
Dr. Hanns Sachs. It is to be devoted to the application of psychoanalysis 
to the entire field of mental sciences. 

THE University of California has conferred the doctorate of laws upon 
Dr. Sidney E. Mezes, professor of philosophy and president of the Uni- 
versity of Texas, and upon Dr. E. C. Sanford, professor of psychology and 
president of Clark College. 

AT the National University of Mexico Professor J. M. Baldwin is 
delivering the second half of the two years' programme of lectures on 
psychosociology. In addition to these lectures a course in the history of 
psychology is also announced. 


MRS. JOHN STEWART KENNEDY has given to New York University a 
Hall of Philosophy. It is to be known as the Cornelius Baker Hall of 
Philosophy in memory of Mrs. Kennedy's father, who was one of the 
founders of the University. 

PROFESSOR LILLIEN J. MARTIN, of the department of psychology of Stan- 
ford University, gave an address on "Uber die Localisation optischer 
Vortellungsbilder " at the Fifth Congress for Experimental Psychology, 
held in Berlin. 

DR. F. W. MOTT will complete his series of lectures on " Heredity con- 
sidered from the Point of View of Physiology and Pathology " at Kings 
College, University of London, on June 10. 

IN a recent issue of the JOURNAL, the American Philosophical Society 
was incorrectly referred to as the Philadelphia Branch of the American 
Philosophical Association. 

MM. L. DUGAS and M. L. Cellerier, of Geneva, are about to launch 
a new educational annual entitled Annee Pedagogique, which is to be 
published by Alcan, Paris. 

THE installation of Dr. John Grier Hibben, hitherto Stuart professor 
of logic, as president of Princeton University occurred on Saturday, 
May 11. 

DR. IRA KEMSEN has resigned the presidency of Johns Hopkins Uni- 
versity. It is understood, however, that he will retain the chair of chem- 

MESSRS. E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY announce the publication of 
" English Philosophies and Schools of Philosophy " by Professor James 

DR. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, professor of philosophy and dean of the 
faculty of Brown University, has been elected president of Amherst 

MR. WALTER B. PITKIN, associate in philosophy in Columbia Univer- 
sity, has been appointed associate professor of philosophy. 

MR, C. M. GILLESPIE, of Yorkshire College, has been appointed to a 
newly established professorship of philosophy at Leads. 

MR. A. J. BALFOUR has been appointed as next Gifford lecturer for 
the session 1915-14. The appointment is for two years. 

ON May 14 Professor W. Bateson gave the first of two lectures on 
" The Study of Genetics," at the Eoyal Institution. 

PRIVAT DOCENT DR. F. A. SCHMID, of the University of Heidelberg, has 
been made professor extraordinarius. 

DR. GEORGE CLARKE Cox, of Dartmouth College, has been appointed 
assistant professor of philosophy. 

THE ninth annual meeting of the Experimental Psychologists was 
held at Worcester, Mass., April 15-17. 

VOL. IX. No. 13. . JUNE 20, 1912 



progress of evolution has various meanings. Hence it is 
necessary to define the subject proposed for consideration. 
Progress, first, may denote the spread of evolutionary doctrine. But 
this is patent, so that discussion is not required. Or it may mean 
the development of biological theory. In regard to this we need 
remember only that progress has of late been making, since progress 
here, contrary to the earlier belief, has proven indispensable. The 
fact of evolution is established. The form, the law, the process of 
evolution, and the forces at work therein, remain subjects of eager 
technical debate. Or, thirdly, progress might refer to the readjust- 
ment of principles occasioned by the acceptance of evolution. This 
phase of the matter lies more fully within the philosophical field; 
still it is not the one now suggested for discussion. Our subject 
proper may be termed the noetic of evolution, the discussion of the 
concepts and principles implied by evolution, and on which it is 
based. What progress has been made in respect of these? What 
was needed? How much has been gained? What remains to be 
accomplished ? Along with these questions, I shall also recall certain 
phases of the history of opinion. 

1. I begin with a negative statement of progress which may excite 
dissent: a just estimate has not yet been reached of the origin of 
evolutionary theory. It is common to date the beginning from Dar- 
win. But genetic views were fundamental in nineteenth-century 
thinking before Darwin announced, in part before he had conceived, 
"The Origin of Species." Among naturalists a notable minority 
had been groping their way toward a theory of descent. Spencer, 
at the mid-century, was advancing from sociology, biology, and 
psychology, to his cosmical doctrine. Prior to both Darwin and 
Spencer many of the Geisteswissenschaften had felt the influence of 
idealistic evolution, or had of themselves approached their problems 

1 Bead before the American Philosophical Association, Harvard University, 
December 28, 1911. 



by the genetic line of attack. Great as Darwinism was in itself 
and through its effects it may be questioned whether part of its 
success was not due to the preparation previously made for evolu- 
tionary conclusions. This question has special pertinence in regard 
to the influence of evolution beyond the limits of biology. Concern- 
ing this broader field there has been, and there persists, some con- 
fusion of opinion. Here, too, Darwin's work has been the greatest 
single force. But it has not been the only force, or the earliest, or 
the creative force in the temporal sense of the term. More often 
in the phrase of a recent writer 2 it has furnished "vast reinforce- 
ment" to tendencies already existing. 

2. Progress has been made in distinguishing phenomenal from 
transcendent evolution. Though Darwinism was not the sole cause 
of the intellectual revolution of the mid-century, it was the principal 
cause. The movement thus involved a scientific theory. And as we 
look back to the discussions of the sixties, how few there then were 
who distinguished between scientific results and transcendent impli- 
cations. Primarily the issue lay between rival theories of organic 
life: Are species fixed in nature, or are they mutable, produced by 
gradual process? But this issue was phrased in terms which com- 
bined science and theology: Have species been created once for all, 
or are they mutable and explicable by descent? The question of 
phenomenal fact and law was crossed with a transcendent problem. 

Related, of course, these questions are. And under the conditions 
of thought fifty years ago it was inevitable that they should be 
united. Nevertheless the consequences were disastrous. In regard 
to them, and concerning a number of kindred questions, the result 
was extreme confusion. The light engendered by the controversy 
was small, the heat in inverse ratio. Now, however, we marvel less 
at the clash of opposing doctrines and the emotional disturbance than 
at the tacit assumptions which were fundamental to the whole debate. 
Among these the fallacy under consideration took a prominent place. 
Neither orthodox nor revolutionary distinguished between phenom- 
enal truths and ultimate interpretations. 

From this fallacy later thought is happily delivered. At least, 
in this connection progress has been making in the sphere of ethics 
and theology. Whether the gain is equal in philosophy proper 
appears more doubtful. Fact and notion, law and ultimate prin- 
ciple, differ, whatever the instrument of transcendent thought may 
be whether faith or seasoned speculation. But concerning evolu- 
tion the distinction has been made more clear in the former than in 
the latter case. Our scientific brethren we can hardly hold re- 

1 Waggett, ' ' Darwin and Modern Science, ' ' page 480. 


sponsible for the confusion or popular reflection. Have philosoph- 
ical thinkers always been clear on the point themselves ? Have they 
contributed in due measure to the general enlightenment ? 

3. Evolution and the sciences. The problem just suggested has 
various ramifications. Scientific evolution and philosophical evolu- 
tion touch and differ. Hence arise questions in the logic of science 
on the other hand, also, questions of metaphysical conclusion. Our 
primary concern is with the problems of the former class, among 
which the subject of method is first and prominent. 

At the end of the "Origin of Species," Darwin predicted the 
application of evolution to psychology and anthropology. This 
prophecy, as all are aware, has been amply fulfilled. The mental 
sciences like the organic, sociology and ethics as well as psychology 
proper, have felt the stimulus of genetic ideas; not, however, with- 
out doubtful transfers of method and explanatory principle from 
one science to another, or from the sciences of one group to a group 
essentially diverse. Biological evolution has wrought out Darwin, 
cautious technician that he is, concludes "the necessary acquire- 
ment of each mental power and capacity by gradation." The 
struggle for existence determines organic evolution : mental evolution 
and its sub-varieties social, ethical, artistic, literary, religious 
the extremists urge, must follow the same law. 

Here progress has been forced by the continuing inquiry. The 
phenomena themselves have compelled revision of the categories 
chosen to explain them. Two examples may be cited in illustration. 
In moral evolution, as speedily appeared, the law of struggle in its 
primary form is a doubtful application. It would tend, for one 
thing, to eliminate rather than to conserve the superior individual. 
Therefore it was referred to the survival of the group, and competi- 
tion was interpreted as tribal instead of individual. Later the 
problem of heredity grew pressing, and in particular the problem of 
mental inheritance. Here the emphasis has recently been placed on 
the importance of the social environment, and a return has been 
made to the doctrine of social heredity a position, I venture to 
think, which we should never have abandoned. 

Progress then has been making at this point also. Is it, however, 
complete? Is it so great as is vitally needed for the independent 
prosperity of the sciences of the mental group? An affirmative 
answer would be of questionable validity. Undoubtedly the climax 
has been passed. No longer or, at least, more rarely do we 
explain all things, from theology to summer novels, by natural selec- 
tion. But biological psychology continues fairly prevalent. And 
one has even heard echoes of a similar spirit in recent developments 
of philosophy itself ! 


4. The presuppositions of evolution: that is, the presuppositions 
of a noetical kind, the concepts and principles assumed by evolution 
and on which it depends. Such are present, even in the scientific 
form of the doctrine, in evolution as a theory of descent. Still more 
are they present and determinant when the consequences of organic 
evolution are drawn, when its conclusions are brought to bear upon 
broader problems, when its methods are applied in other departments 
of thought. If the matter itself admitted of uncertainty, the doubt 
might be dispelled by a glance at recent history. Fifty years ago 
men confused scientific evolution and its transcendent implications. 
For the most part, also, they overlooked the bases on which their 
own arguments rested. Consider, e. g., the famous meeting of the 
British Association at Oxford in 1860. In the discussion between 
Wilberforce and Huxley the honors lay with the scientific thinker. 
In ethics, as in science, the biologist showed superior to the bishop. 
In epistemology, however, were not both at fault ? For them, as for 
most thinkers of the time, the debatable issue was the question of 
fact : Is man descended from some animal form ? The corollaries of 
the fact, they felt, needed no debate : If man is so descended, man is 
man no longer. For the underlying notions which condition this 
conclusion were left out of account; or they were deemed of little 
moment. Change and becoming, origin and nature, genesis and 
value how many thought of these ancient problems as fundamental 
to nineteenth-century reflection ? Yet nothing is clearer, if the mat- 
ter is thought through to the end, nothing more certain, than that 
such concepts underlie the whole body of genetic doctrine. 

If now we ask what progress has in this respect been made, the 
answer is complex. In certain ways the advance has been consid- 
erable. For the pressure of the questions forced by evolution on the 
world compelled attention also to their underlying bases. I do not 
mean to say that this attentive thought has always realized its own 
procedure. That is rarely true in the history of such movements. 
More often there is a mingling of methods reflective thinking, con- 
scious of its own nature and aims, goes hand in hand, or side by 
side, with processes which may best be described as processes of trial 
and error, practical attempts at partial readjustment adapted to the 
needs of given cases. Such processes have in special measure been 
characteristic of our time. We could not become philosophers at a 
bound. Or rather, we have philosophized in the happy belief that 
naught of metaphysics was mingled with our thinking. The origin 
of species, the descent of man, the genesis of conscience, political, 
social, religious development in measure we have thought through, 
or worked through, or "muddled through" our problems. And 
though we often knew it not, we have been busy the while with these 


other cruces origin, nature, worth, and their relations for they 
were inwrought in the tissue of our reflective task. 

Progress has been most pronounced in the field of the mental 
sciences. A letter of Henry Sedgwick, dated in the middle eighties, 
well expresses the change from the earlier point of view. Thinking 
of the non-moral and the moral stages of evolution, Sedgwick wrote : 
"I can not feel any doubt as to the historic fact of the time-relation 
of the two. . . . But I do not think that the determination of this 
historical question settles the relation between the two: the funda- 
mental question still remains open whether what is later in time is 
to be understood by contemplating what went before it, ... or 
whether the process of cosmical or of human development is not of 
such a kind that the significance of the earlier stages is only revealed 
when we look forward to their end. This, I think, is the deepest 
question of philosophy in the present stage of thought." The con- 
clusion suggested by the lamented Sidgwick was reached by many 
thinkers in the closing decades of the century gone, but not by all. 
On questions of such import scholars will differ, even when the issues 
have been made clear, and when, so far as may be, they have been 
thought through. Above all, these causes of divergence produce 
their maximum effect in ages which, like our own, have felt the spell 
of great discoveries. But if, in the nature of the case, progress 
could not be complete, has it been adequate? I fear the answer 
must be given in the negative. Indeed, if I mistake not, there has 
been of late considerable reaction toward the earlier and the cruder 
point of view. Current accounts of evolution and its influence not 
merely proclaim the universal potency of the genetic method, they 
appear to imply that no other estimate is possible. At times this 
conclusion is urged as the unassailable outcome of nineteenth-century 
reflection. It should rather be termed the position of the mid-cen- 
tury, or of the first decades after the mid-century was passed. For 
it ignores the progress which the later years have brought. 

It is necessary in conclusion to guard against a possible mis- 
understanding. The thesis that progress has been less than adequate 
does not imply agreement with venturesome essays of a contrary type. 
If certain forms of genetic theory ignore their own noetic problems, 
some philosophers of evolution attack these questions in a spirit of 
surprising confidence. The question may be raised whether Bergson 
himself should not be included in the latter class. Mind, Bergson 
defends in the evolutionary process, and other important interests. 
But what of the method of defense ? It is incisive, it is illuminating, 
the argument is phrased in a marvelous style, the doctrine is one of 
those works of genius which get us forward by its stimulating influ- 
ence, whether or not it can in the end be accepted as true. Is there, 


however, sufficient evidence for the conclusions reached? This at 
least is the doubt which recurs to some of us who welcome many of 
these conclusions. In the case of other systems the foundations are 
certainly too weak to support the constructions which are reared 
upon them. Therefore systems of this type also represent imperfect 
progress. For they are unstable, and, being unstable, they fail to 
realize their legitimate aims. In sum the noetic cruces suggested by 
evolution can not reasonably be ignored. Neither, on the other hand, 
are they solvable at a stroke. 



rriHIS JOURNAL having been kind enough to review 1 with some 
J- sympathy a paper of mine, which, as Professor Leuba phrased 
it, was intended to "clear much of the ground surrounding one of 
the fundamental problems of the psychology of ethics," I venture 
to submit to American men of science the conclusions of a larger 
inquiry which is to appear this year in Binet's Annee psychologique. 

The problem is that of the psychological conditions of this specific 
and well-known state of mind which a subject expresses when he 
says: "I am conscious that I ought." In a paper 2 of 1897, Pro- 
fessor Leuba has called it "the feeling of oughtness." I shall use 
the term, although it seems to me that the latest researches on the 
psychology of feelings tend to confine this word to affective states, 
where the consciousness is necessarily either agreeable or painful. 
Writing in French, I have used the expression la conscience de devoir 
or I'obligation de conscience. 

The feeling of oughtness is not always connected with the impres- 
sion of moral goodness. I have found it very often in introspections 
gathered during experiments on judgment and ideation, and was 
thus put on the way of an experimental study of this feeling such 
as, if I am not mistaken, has never been conducted before. 

The first results concerning this feeling of oughtness in the labo- 
ratory experiments are the following: 

1. It is the apperception of an internal conflict between two tend- 

'Vol. VIIL, page 361. 

'"The Psychophysiology of the Moral Imperative," Amer. Journal of 
Psychology, Vol. Vm., No. 4. 


encies, one of which has its origin in some definite orders (French 
consigne; German Aufgabe) given to the subject as to a sentry. 

2. These orders give birth only to a tendency if they be accepted 
by the subject. This acceptance implies, as its condition, a peculiar 
relation between the subject and the inquirer. From the standpoint 
of the subject this relation may be roughly described as an affective 
state a combination of love and fear and admiration which gives to 
the experimenter prestige and authority in the eyes of the subject. 

These being the results of a first investigation, the question arises : 
What are the tendencies of every-day life which can be assimilated 
to the tendency originating from orders? What are the tendencies 
which, if they meet with opposition, shall give rise to the feeling of 
oughtness? Habit, social custom and example, instinct have been 
asserted by several schools to be the fountain of moral obligation. 
I think it can be shown that none of them is, if considered alone, the 
source of any obligation whatever. Habit (of church going, e. g.) 
enforces the feeling of oughtness; it does not create it. Social cus- 
tom has certainly in every one of us a binding force ; but it does not 
act in this way through habits nor through the ideo-motor power of 
example. It is felt as an obligation, because there are, at its origin, 
positive orders given by respected authorities to affectively disposed 
subjects: in other terms, because the circumstances are exactly the 
same as in the laboratory experiments alluded to. 

If, in speaking of instincts, we first think of animal life, is it not 
curious that the symptoms, which might be interpreted as proving 
the presence of a feeling of oughtness in animals, are to be found in 
dogs to whom orders are given in general terms? Ought we per- 
haps to consider our domestic animals as Aristotle considered the 
slave : if they be not apt to form general judgments, they might be, 
nevertheless, capable of receiving them? 

The orders given in general terms to the psychological subject 
as to the soldier have not only the same characteristics as the ances- 
tral taboo to which the sociological school gives such a great place 
in the explanation of moral ideas; they also answer exactly to the 
description which Kant gives of the moral law : categorical, impera- 
tive, but requiring some experience, if one is to see where they have to 
be applied in practical life. This resemblance is easy to account for. 
The orders are indeed a product of reason, if we think that reason 
has a part in every universal proposition, be it indicative or impera- 
tive. But we have no ground for invoking here a pure reason 
dictating a law to all intelligent beings, whether human or not. 
Kant says himself that his theory does not in the least account for 


the practical effect of this purely rational law ; the fact of obligation 
remains to him entirely unintelligible. 8 

If we say that the origin of obligation is to be found in an uni- 
versal proposition formulated by a concrete person and accepted by 
another person, we shall understand the binding character of some 
orders, which to our intellectual judgment appear absurd. The 
obligatory character of the law of sacrifice, as it is felt by many 
Christians, is inconsistent with the rationalistic theory aa well as 
with the sociological one : this law, taken universally, is anti-rational 
as well as anti-social. With our theory, if we have received the law 
from somebody whom we love and admire, this is sufficient to explain 
the hold it has on us. 

Two questions are forced on our attention and require further 
examination: (1) How does the reason work in order to transform 
the "impression of good," given by a particular action, into a gen- 
eral judgment of value? (2) How is the affective relation, necessary 
to the acceptance of orders, originated? To this last problem so 
much may here be said: there is no ground to believe that prestige 
is always of social origin. Psycho-analysis shows a way in which 
biological and sociological values might be created apart from any 
social influence. 

These few propositions may perhaps be of some interest even 
without the body of facts which in a longer article could be called 
upon to back them up. They are, as can be seen, purely psycholog- 
ical. Their ethical, pedagogical, and philosophical corollaries do 
not concern us here. When the causal relations, which we have set 
forth, shall be generally recognized, the various philosophies will 
have to reckon with them, and they will do so without difficulty. 
Some will welcome the contingent character of our moral obligations ; 
others will be impressed with the great place our theory gives to the 
personality: to them the mystery of personality will soon seem as 
sacred and as adorable as did the mystery of the moral law. 




IN the interesting "Studies in Realism," which Mr. Dewey has 
recently published, 1 he has done two things. In addition to 
presenting more fully than he had done before his own view of the 
' ' Grundlegung, ' ' 3d section, sub fine. 
1 This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., pages 393 ff. and pages 546 ff. 


nature of perception, he has criticized the doctrine of perception 
held by ' ' epistemological " and ' ' presentative " realists. It is this 
criticism of realism that I wish to examine in this paper. 

The cardinal error Mr. Dewey finds in this realism is perhaps 
best summed up in these words: " Until the epistemological realists 
have seriously considered the main propositions of the pragmatic 
realists, viz., that knowing is something that happens to things in the 
natural course of their career, not the sudden introduction of a 
'unique' and non-natural type of relation that to a mind or 
consciousness they are hardly in a position to discuss the second 
and derived pragmatic proposition that, in this natural continuity, 
things in becoming known undergo a specific and detectable quali- 
tative change" (p. 554). The realists criticized are guilty, then, of 
believing that knowing is a sudden introduction of a "unique" and 
non-natural relation. 

There are three adjectives in this charge, but I presume that only 
one of them has any dyslogistic significance. The suddenness of the 
introduction of any relation can hardly be objected to by any em- 
piricist who sticks to his last. Nor can the recognition of the unique- 
ness of any relation be reasonably considered by Mr. Dewey as an 
anti-empirical procedure. He has himself recognized at least one 
unique relation and has given an excellent statement of what a 
unique relation is : " Here, if you please, is a unique relation of self 
and things, but it is unique, not in being wholly incomparable to all 
natural relations among events, but in the sense of being distinctive, 
or just the relation that it is" (p. 552). This sentence shows that 
the adjective that really is meant to count in Mr. Dewey 's indictment 
is the adjective "non-natural." 

Now why should the consciousness relation, which "epistemolog- 
ical" and "presentative" realists recognize, be considered non-nat- 
ural ? The answer seems to be that for them this relation is a rela- 
tion "to a mind." A very cursory glance over the pages of Mr. 
Dewey's articles will show that the realists he is criticizing, whether 
"presentative" or "epistemological," are constantly represented as 
holding that the thing known in perception is in relation "to a 
knower" or "to consciousness." Every criticism he passes against 
these realists presupposes for its validity that these realists are com- 
mitted to the doctrine that there is a non-natural "mind" or "con- 
sciousness" or "knower," and that anything in order to get known 
must get into a non-natural relation to this non-natural term. It is 
possible that these criticisms could be stated in other forms which 
should leave out of account this presupposition, so thorough-going in 
the form in which Mr. Dewey has stated them, but what the criticisms 
would then be would largely be a matter of conjecture. As the 


criticisms now stand they have direct pertinence only to some type 
of non-naturalistic realism which is based on the recognition of 
"mind" as an indispensable "knower" in every perception. 

Relation to a mind or consciousness or knower ! This is a thesis 
which some years ago was quite generally supported, and among 
realists even now Messrs. Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore still 
maintain this thesis. But most of the American thinkers, whom the