THE JOUBNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY
AND
SCIENTIFIC METHODS
EDITED BY
FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGB
AND
WENDED T. BUSH
VOLUME XI
JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1914
NEW TOBK
THE SCIENCE PRESS
1914
PRESS OF
THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY
LANCASTER, PA.
VOL. XL No. 1. JANUARY 1, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
AN ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY OF PERCEPTION 1
IN reading the "Novum Organum" of Francis Bacon, one is im-
pressed with the author's feeling of discontent with the method
of intellectual inquiry employed by those who had preceded him, and
with his intense eagerness to inaugurate a new point of departure.
Bacon 's attitude toward the deductive method of the middle ages was
not so much one of fault-finding as one frankly recognizing that the
course of syllogistic reasoning had spent itself, that further progress
in that direction was impossible. The deductive method, in its ex-
haustive application to the subject-matter at hand, had extracted all
of the content which that subject-matter contained. Further advance
and progress was possible only by the discovery of a new subject-
matter, and for that discovery a new method and a new point of
departure were necessary. When a situation ceases any longer to
yield results, the practical thing to do is to quit the situation ; when
progress in a given direction is no longer possible, the obvious thing
to do is to change the direction.
The situation in contemporary philosophy presents an outlook in
many respects analogous to that represented by Bacon. A certain
method of approach has for a very long time been dominant in
philosophical analysis. This method has, with great rigor and con-
sistency, been applied to the subject-matter which has been of interest
to the reflective thinking of modern times. Certain very definite
suppositions have been made, and those suppositions have been worked
through in a most exhaustive manner. The controlling assumptions
of modern thinking have been applied with a thoroughness that is
commendable, but with a conclusion that is amazing. We find in the
end that a rigorous application of our premises has tended to multiply
rather than to solve problems. It has resulted in confusion rather
than clarity. The conclusion is even being driven home to us that
not only have many of our problems thus far defied solution, but that
they are in the very nature of the case insoluble. They are actually
iKead at the fortnightly conference of the officers and students of the de-
partment of philosophy of Columbia University, on November 17, 1913.
5
6 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
being set down as persistent. Philosophy concerns itself not merely
with existence and subsistence, but with persistence.
But if philosophy is to be productive and progressive, it must con-
cern itself with more than the hereditary transmission of acquired
problems. It is just the unsatisfactory character of the conclusions of
modern philosophy, just the nature of the problems with which it
deals, that suggests the requirement of a new point of departure.
Keid once intimated, touching the skepticism of Hume, that it is just
the absurdity of the conclusions which shows the falsity of the
premises. There are many indications at present that a new point
of departure is in a process of formation, a point of departure not
directed back on old assumptions with a view to a more thorough
application or further revision and refinement, but a point of depar-
ture freed from the old assumptions of the past and unencumbered
with the dead weight of tradition. It is being borne in upon us from
many sides that there is going on around us a philosophical renais-
sance. One who is at all sensitive to the trend of the times feels that a
transformation is being effected, a transformation issuing in an en-
tirely new method of approach. This current methodology is applied,
not to a refutation of old theses in their old context, but to the formu-
lation of new problems in a new context. It does not fight the past.
It is content to let it alone. Questions of a certain nature, it does not
strive to answer, it never asks them; problems of a definite kind, it
does not attempt to solve, it suppresses them.
But it is the topic of perception which is the subject of this paper.
In considering this topic I should like to indicate very clearly my
main interest and purpose. The treatment is to be largely historical
in character. An historical sketch is not undertaken, however, with
any belief that a knowledge of the various senses in which the term
perception has been employed will help us to tell what perception is.
My interest is neither in the rigor of psychological analysis nor in the
preciseness of logical definition. The main purpose of the paper is
not an attempt to state what perception is, but to use the topic of per-
ception to illustrate the necessity for a new point of departure in
philosophical analysis. An analysis of certain representative histor-
ical accounts of perception is undertaken with the following ques-
tions in mind : Just what, in specific instances, was the problem of
perception taken to be? Why was it a problem? What was the
situation in which the problem arose? What were the motives and
interests which forced the problem into prominence?
I shall cite only one example of the treatment of perception from
Greek philosophy, that of Democritus. From an investigation,
largely inductive, Democritus concludes that matter in motion is an
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 7
adequate conception for the explanation of the facts of the world and
of experience. On such an assumption, he explains the fact of per-
ception by the doctrine of effluences. I may not be able literally to
take over the cold which you are suffering from, but germs of that
cold may enter my body, and I may, as we say, catch it. And so
for perception, the object does not enter into my body, nor does my
body go out to the object, but the object may send off minute images
of itself, and those may impinge on my eye with the result that I
may say that I catch a perception in quite as literal a sense as I
say that I catch a cold.
There is something very genuine in this theory of Democritus.
The problem grows out of the subject-matter. It may be necessary
to explain the meaning of the statement that a problem is a problem
of the subject-matter. This I shall do by a rough characterization
rather than by precise definition. An empirical situation which for
the time is an object of investigation may present certain difficulties
in response to certain demands which are made of the situation. If
those demands grow out of the situation, they give rise to problems
of the subject-matter. So long as a problem is kept within the con-
text in which it occurs, and is expressive of a difficulty inherent in
the context, it is a problem of the context. When I abstract it from
the situation and consider it with respect to foreign subjects, or
when I import into the situation other demands which are expres-
sive of foreign interests, then the problem is no longer one of the
subject-matter.
But to return to Democritus, we have, to start with, matter in
motion and the void. The empirical situation is that I, a bit of
matter here, establish communication with the chair, a bit of matter
over there. Now, how, on his assumptions, is that possible? This
is a genuine problem of the subject-matter. And for the solution
of it, no hypothesis is invented, no deus ex machina is brought in. It
is solved in terms of the assumptions which give rise to it, and is at
all points kept within the context in which it arises.
When we turn to modern philosophy, the first thing that strikes
us is the revolution in its point of departure. The Greeks began
with the physical world and they discovered that perception is some-
thing which happens in that world. The moderns begin with the
world of the inner life, and from a theory of knowledge work out-
wards to a physical world. For Aristotle things primarily are, and
there is a science which is the science of being. Secondarily it is dis-
covered that things not only are, but that they are knowable. But
knowledge is something which arises in a world of fact. For the
moderns it is the other way around, a world of fact is something that
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is discovered, if discovered at all, through the medium of a theory of
knowledge.
This fact is of tremendous significance in its relation to a theory
of perception. It is one thing to begin with a world of fact and to
discover that within that world perception is an event. It is alto-
gether a different thing to begin with perceptual processes and to
conclude that those processes yield a world of fact. In the former
case perception takes its place as a natural happening; in the latter
case the world of fact is under the dictation and control of a theory
of knowledge. The outer world is there only by courtesy. It exists
under the shadow and protection of consciousnes. The modern ideal-
ist has often said, give me consciousness and I will explain the
world. But he begins by asking for consciousness. Might it not be
better to begin without asking for anything, but to start with what
we have, and attempt to give some sort of a consistent account of
our possession ?
In the forefront of modern philosophy, as one who more than any
other has entrenched certain conceptions into our modes of think-
ing, stands John Locke. He uses the word perception in two senses.
It stands for the act of perceiving, the operation involved; and
then it stands for the content perceived, for the product of the
operation. Perception considered as act is used by Locke in a very
broad sense to include all so-called cognitive acts. "Having ideas
and perception," 2 are for Locke the same thing. "The two great
and principal actions of the mind," he says, "are these two : percep-
tion, or thinking ; and volition, or willing. ' ' 3 He includes, as he him-
self says, even more than thinking. Thinking, as he defines it, is an
active process involving voluntary attention. Perception is this and
more. It spans the territory of mental process from the highest acts
of thinking involving voluntary attention down to "bare naked per-
ception" where "the mind is, for the most part, only passive."
Knowledge, in Locke's famous definition of it, is defined "as the
perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and
repugnancy of any of our ideas. ' ' 4
Such is Locke 's use of the word perception as the act of perceiv-
ing. It is used as synonymous with consciousness in general. To
perceive is the mental act of being-aware-of , quite irrespective of that
of which there is awareness. The act of perceiving seems to be the
same for all cognitive experience. It has no qualitative differences.
The differences are describable fully in terms of ideas perceived.
But Locke also uses the word perception in a second sense.
2 ' Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ' ' II., 1, 9.
s Ibid., II., 6, 2.
* Ibid., IV., 1, 2.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 9
"Whatever idea is in the mind," he says, "is either an actual per-
ception, or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind,
that by memory it can be made an actual perception again." 5 In
this second sense, perception stands for the content perceived. It is
synonymous with "idea." "It is plain," he says in another place,
"these perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting
our senses." 8 Or again, "Perception, as it is the first faculty of the
mind exercised about her ideas, so it is the first and simplest idea we
have from reflection. ' ' 7
Now let us take Locke 's account of perception in each of the two
senses pointed out, and see what is the problem with which it is
concerned. If we take perception as the act of perceiving, there is
for Locke no problem, or we might better say Locke makes no prob-
lem of it. It is not a question as to whether perception is cognitive.
Perception is cognition. It is just the act of being conscious, and
Locke makes no attempt to define it any further. ' ' What perception
is," he says, "every one will know better by reflecting on what he
does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, thinks, etc., than by any dis-
course of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind
can not miss it." 8
It is obvious that such an account of perception at once puts the
topic in such a context that any investigation of it is wholly impos-
sible. To know what perception is, Locke tells us to reflect on what
we do when we perceive. But that act of reflection is itself a second
act of perceiving, and the original act which we wish to investigate
has been precipitated into perception as content, and we are no
further than we were at first. Any attempt to give an account of
perception, therefore, involves us in an infinite regression.
The point to emphasize is that the account of perception which
Locke gives is set in such terms that just such a difficulty arises. It
is a genuine difficulty in the context in which it occurs. So long as
the problem is set in the above terms, you can never tell what per-
ception is. The only conclusion to draw is the one which Locke
draws, viz., that perception is ultimate and indefinable, that is to say,
we give up the problem.
If we turn to Locke 's use of perception jn the sense of content, we
find him interested in certain problems which are largely problems of
the subject-matter. Knowledge is conversant about ideas. On that
assumption certain questions naturally arise. One task is that of the
statistician. We must take an inventory of the stock of ideas, dis-
cover, enumerate, and compile them. We look into consciousness and
s Ibid., I., 4, 20.
e Hid., IV., 9, 4.
7 Hid., I., 9, 1.
s Ilid., II., 9, 2.
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set down what we see when we look. Locke also wishes to know
where the ideas come from, what relations obtain among them, and
what relations they sustain toward the outside world, the reality of
which he never denies. But these are all problems within the
larger setting of Locke's initial supposition that knowledge is con-
versant about ideas, and with the internal consistency of his solution
of these problems, we are not at all concerned. Our interest is with
the wider background on which the doctrine of knowledge is dis-
played.
The immediate objects of knowledge, Locke says, are ideas. Ideas
are psychical, intra-mental existences. That the immediate objects
of knowledge are ideas is a supposition which Locke, I suppose, took
over from Descartes. It has been pointed out, however, that Des-
cartes does not always use idea in the sense of a purely psychical
existence. However that may be, the meaning is very clear in
Locke, and after him this meaning is thoroughly entrenched in philo-
sophical literature. Hume's impressions, Kant's representations,
Mill's sensations, contemporary psychology's use of states of con-
sciousness, are all variations of Locke's terminology, and adhere to
the original supposition that knowledge is directly concerned with
psychical existences or mental states.
There is evidence to show that at the time of Locke his contem-
poraries hardly understood what he meant by calling the imme-
diate objects of knowledge ideas. For instance, the Bishop of Wor-
cester writes a long letter to Locke protesting against his "new way
of ideas. ' ' He writes : ' ' The world hath been strangely amused with
ideas of late; and we have been told that strange things might be
done by the help of ideas." After a long correspondence Locke con-
cluded, ' ' I pray you, let it be idea still. ' ' And idea it remained.
Now there is a genuine problem here, namely, whether or not
ideas, in the manner in which Locke conceives them, really exist.
This is simply a question of fact. What is the empirical evidence
for the existence or non-existence of sensations, or ideas, or mental
states ? And the problem becomes a scientific inquiry into the nature
of the evidence one presents in support of the view he takes. But
this problem is hardly considered by Locke. Its affirmative solution
is implied in the form of an assumption, the real problem being con-
cealed in the form of an initial hypothesis. And just that hypothesis
renders the entire subsequent development wholly artificial. The
problems that arise are problems in virtue of the assumption, and
possess meaning only in terms of that assumption.
Hume uses the word perception in the same broad sense as that
employed by Locke. 9 His skeptical conclusions represent the logical
' ' Treatise on Human Nature, " I., 1, 1 ; and I., 2, 6.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 11
deductions from Locke's assumptions. And these conclusions, as the
history of philosophy shows, were very disquieting and called forth
violent reactions from the Scotch school, on the one hand, and from
Kant, on the other.
It was Thomas Reid, the founder of the Scotch school, who gave
to the term perception its strict and precise psychological meaning,
a meaning which has been largely adopted in psychology ever since.
Prior to Reid, as we have seen, the word perception has had a long
history in the wide sense of cognition in general. Reid gives the
word a specific meaning. To quote: "The perception of external
objects by our senses is an operation of the mind of a peculiar
nature and ought to have a name appropriate to it. I know no
word more proper to express this act of the mind than perception. ' ' 10
Reid begins with a genuine interest in descriptive psychology.
He carefully distinguishes sensation from memory, imagination, and
reasoning. "The word sensation," according to Reid, "connotes
only subjective state produced by an external stimulus without im-
plying an awareness of an object." 11 Between sensation, on the one
hand, and memory and imagination, on the other, there is a qualita-
tive difference. While sensations themselves are subjective and imply
no awareness, they are accompanied by an intuitive belief in the
reality of an external object which is their cause. Now that act of
the mind by which it refers its sensations to an external object as its
cause is by Reid termed perception. The presence of sensations
arouses a belief in an external material world, and the act of the
mind involved in this belief is defined as perception. Perception is,
therefore, the immediate or intuitive awareness of an external
material object.
Now let us see what is implied in this doctrine and also attempt
to see why Reid formulates it. On Locke's assumption no direct
knowledge of the external world is possible. Berkeley destroys
Locke's theory of representative realism and his copy theory. The
conclusions of Hume constitute a logically implied solipsism. Reid,
however, believes in the existence of an outside world, but his psycho-
logical analysis of sensation does not yield a knowledge of that world ;
consequently, a definition of perception is framed which does yield
it, a definition, however, which smuggles in the very thing it is in-
tended to explain. The real problem is concealed in the definition.
Reid starts with a belief in an external world. He constructs a defi-
nition in response to that belief. Then he turns around and uses the
definition to prove the existence of the material world, when the defi-
nition itself is the outgrowth of an original assumption. Now that,
io"Intell. Powers," I., 1, 28.
11 ' ' Baldwin 's Dictionary, ' ' Article, ' ' Perception. ' '
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TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
I take it, is artificial. The definition begs the question. It assumes
what it should prove.
But why is he involved in the problem, and why does he abandon
his descriptive psychology and hurry on to a theory of knowledge?
He does it because he wishes to refute the skepticism of Hume. Just
as the Cambridge Platonists had, in opposition to a certain objec-
tionable theory of Hobbes, appealed to intuition as an infallible and
unerring guide to moral distinctions ; and just as Berkeley had con-
structed his idealistic philosophy in response to certain theological
interests ; so Reid, in the field of knowledge, appeals to intuition in
response to an interest centering in a refutation of Hume. In no one
of the cases is the problem a problem of the subject-matter. In each
case the problem is complicated by appealing to an interest in some-
thing entirely outside of the subject under consideration. Reid's
account of perception is not the result of a direct analysis of the
situation in which perception occurs, it is an account overawed by
an interest entirely foreign to the concrete situation. This fact was
recognized by Mill, who said that Reid's definition was so framed
that it might be used to refute his antagonists.
In Reid 's appeal to intuition we notice a characteristic peculiar to
modern philosophy. Difficulties are solved by an appeal to a defini-
tion of the mind or to the mechanism of consciousness, rather than by
an analysis of the given facts. Reid solves the problem of our knowl-
edge of an external world by appealing to the act of perception, an
act which carries with it its own guarantee of the existence of the
outside world. Belief in its existence comes not from an examination
of the world, but from an examination of the act of the mind by
which the world is known.
Not only do we note that difficulties are solved by an appeal to
the mind as a principle of explanation, but that appeal usually com-
plicates the original problem by importing into it certain demands
which arise solely out of the subjective appeal. And furthermore,
if you appeal to the mind to solve your problem, then the mind has
got to be just the sort of a thing that can do it. Such an appeal is
not in the interest of sound descriptive psychology, but is under the
constraint of the demand that it does what it is expected to do. And
history shows us that the mind has been most versatile and accommo-
dating in compliance with the demands which have been made of it.
This appeal to the mind as a source for the solution of difficulties
becomes more obvious when we turn to Kant. Using the word per-
ception, in the broad sense employed by both Locke and Hume, to
stand for cognition in general, Kant's problem is expressed in the
form of a question : c ' How is knowledge possible ? ' ' The problem is
not a problem of perception at all, but a problem of the presupposi-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 13
tions of perception. What sort of a thing must the mind be if it is to
give us valid knowledge ?
The perceptive process for Locke was an exceeding simple affair.
It was void of any qualitative differentiation, an ultimate process not
further definable. For Kant it is a highly complex process. If the
mind is to perceive, it must be an elaborate mechanism, an'd Kant
proceeds to rig it up. For Locke and Hume the emphasis was placed
on perception as content perceived. With Kant perception as the act
of perceiving is brought into prominence. The starting point for
Hume and Kant is the same. Both begin with Locke's assumptions.
From that assumption Hume concludes skepticism. From the same
assumption Kant draws a very different conclusion. Because satis-
factory relations are not found among impressions, Hume concludes
that they do not exist. Kant would reply that Hume did not find
them, because he was looking for them in the wrong place. That
relations are not given as items of sense experience is no evidence
that they do not exist. If they are not discovered on the content
side of perception, the only other place to look for them is on the
process side. Consequently the mind becomes endowed with relat-
ing activities. Hume sticks to his subject-matter, but does not find
relations. Kant abandons the subject-matter, but does find relations
as transcendental activities. How simply James handles the prob-
lem! A more exhaustive analysis of the subject-matter yields rela-
tions as felt relations within experience.
But the important point is that Kant's elaborate mechanism of
perception was necessitated by his initial assumption, the original
assumption of Locke, that all immediate objects of knowledge are
ideas. On that assumption the ' ' Critique of Pure Reason ' ' is worked
through with a thoroughness and consistency that is unexcelled.
An excellent example of the treatment of perception and of the
problems that have arisen in connection with it is afforded by James
Mill. The problem is clearly formulated by Mill in a. passage in
"The Analysis of the Human Mind." "When I lift my eyes from
the paper on which I am writing, I see the chairs and tables and
walls of my room, each of its proper shape and at its proper distance.
I see from my window trees and meadows, and horses and oxen, and
distant hills. I see each of its proper size, of its proper form, and
at its proper distance; and those particulars appear as immediate
informations of the eye, as the colors which I see by means of it."
There is the empirical situation. Now Mill continues : ' ' Yet philos-
ophy has ascertained that we derive nothing from the eye whatever
but sensations of color." There is your assumption. "How, then,"
asks Mill, "is it that we receive accurate information, by the eye,
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of size and shape and distance ? ' ' There is your problem. The reply
is made : ' ' By association merely. ' ' There is your solution.
Now why was this a problem for Mill? Simply because, as he
says, "philosophy has ascertained" that the immediate objects of
knowledge are sensations. This was no problem for Democritus,
because Greek philosophy had made no such ascertainment. It re-
mained for modern philosophy to ascertain that the immediate ob-
jects of knowledge are ideas or sensations. On this assumption Mill
has a genuine problem, but it is only a problem because of the con-
text in which it is set. The real problem, namely, that regarding the
evidence for the existence of sensations, Mill does not consider. '
Furthermore, Mill's proffered solution of the problem, the doc-
trine of the association of ideas, is but a further refinement growing
out of the same initial presupposition. If sensations are isolated, dis-
connected, detached, how do you explain the fact that perception is
of objects and not of fragments ? That is to say that the association
of ideas as a principle of explanation is necessitated by first conceiv-
ing of ideas as dissociated. The entire associative machinery of the
mind has been rendered necessary because we have first taken the
materials of knowledge to be fragmentary items. But, it seems
obvious, if you never take things apart, there will be no need of
putting them together. Professor Royce, in "The World and the
Individual," puts the following question to the realist whom he
represents as having pulverized a monolithic world : " In brief, ' ' he
says, l ( I want to see him mend the broken crystal of the world of the
many." Now we might agree, with Hume as an authority, that it
is impossible to mend a broken crystal, but we might reply that, if
we are careful, we need not break it. There is no need for beginning
with a broken crystal. To do that is to start with an assumption.
Might it not be well to go back to the days before Locke ever got
his hands on the crystal at all and thus to seek a point of departure
free from any prejudicial conception?
The account of perception given by Reid has, on its psychological
side, been generally adhered to by psychologists ever since. With
James, however, an important advance is made. Prior to James sen-
sation and perception have been clearly distinguished and kept apart.
Sensation is just so much helpless, inane content of a purely psychical
nature. Perception is the cognitive act initiated at the suggestion of
sensation by means of which I am immediately aware of an external
object. Now at the hands of James, this distinction is obliterated.
Sensations themselves become cognitive, and perception as a cogni-
tive act is distinguished from sensation only in the matter of degree
of complexity. You do not need the supervention of knowing acts
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 15
compresent with sensations. The sensations themselves do the know-
ing. The discussion of the problem is clarified to the extent that
sensation and perception are distinguished only in degree. But
even if we accept this account, namely, that "sensations are cogni-
tive, ' ' are we any nearer to knowing what perception is than we were
when Locke refused to discuss the question?
From this brief historical review, let us now stop to summarize
the main points which it illustrates. The first is the inevitable con-
nection between theories of perception and theories of knowledge. So
long as ideas, or sensations, or mental states are taken to be the imme-
diate objects of knowledge, then the relation between sensations and
an outside world becomes a problem. Beginning with the inner
world, it then becomes a very difficult matter to reach the world out-
side. In response to this difficulty we have eject theories, copy
theories, Eeid 's intuitional realism, and the more elaborate analogical
inferences of more recent times. Or if we begin naively with the
outer world, this curious situation arises. By a psychological analy-
sis we reduce that world to sensations, then by a subsequent epistemo-
logical transformation we re-objectify it. We end just where we
began, but with the suspicion, I should like to suggest, that the out-
side world, though masquerading under the guise of subjectivity,
has been the outside world all the time.
The second point to emphasize is that the discussion of perception
in terms of the doctrine that mental states are the immediate data of
perception has proceeded under the control of an initial assumption.
The real problem, namely, that touching the existence of psychical
data, and the evidence for or against them, has received but little
consideration.
In the third place, the accounts of perception which have been
given do not represent direct analyses of the situations in which
perception occurs, but they represent analyses of more complicated
situations, ones into which interests entirely foreign have been intro-
jected. Kant was not primarily interested in perception; he was
interested in -the validity of knowledge, and perception is so con-
ceived that it yields that kind of knowledge. Reid's account of
perception had as its motive the desire to refute Hume. Such foreign
interests and alien motives tend to exert a coercive influence and to
establish an unwarranted dictation over the description of the facts
which are given. In many cases, these foreign interests were of a
local nature, some of them expressive of peculiar social, religious, or
political conditions. The interests themselves may have entirely dis-
appeared with a change in the conditions which evoked them, yet
the theory of perception which was framed in response to temporary
demands has been perpetuated.
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Each of the three points which have been noted illustrates a
marked artificiality involved in the discussions of perception. A
problem arising within a given context may be a problem within that
context, but if abstracted from the background on which it is dis-
played it may be no problem at all. Or, again, a problem may be
a problem not only within a context, it may become so because of the
context. If the context is genuine, the problem is real, but if the con-
text itself is the result of false or inadequate analysis, the problem
becomes artificial.
The discussion of the topic of perception, as outlined in the his-
torical sketch which has been given, illustrates both types of artifi-
ciality. The artificiality, the attempt has been made to show, is un-
escapably bound up with the tradition. To avoid it, therefore,
necessitates a new point of departure and a new method of approach.
M. T. McCLURE.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
THE CASE METHOD IN ETHICS AND ITS CRITICS x
SURELY criticism of a new movement was never more kindly and
constructive than here. Professor Overstreet showed a generous
appreciation which makes me feel that it should be taken like Robert
Browning's praise of early Italian painters "for daring so much
before they well did it." Professor Powell has laid us all under
obligation in giving a more reasoned and detailed apologia of the case
system in law than I have seen elsewhere; and his recognition that
such a system may, with propriety and value, be applied to ethics is
reassuring and welcome. I have also received valuable comments
from many sources through personal letters whose authors I may not
quote, but whose criticisms I will endeavor to meet. If I fail to meet
the intent of the critics they will render me a service by pointing out
my failure, as I have no pride of opinion in the matter.
Let me then in brief space reply to one or two general criticisms.
First, I have never proposed the case method except as a propae-
deutic to ethics; 2 and I have acknowledged many of the difficulties
inherent in such a method of teaching. Yet I would reserve the right
to consider it the only method if, after due consideration, other meth-
ods should come to appear futile.
i These articles will be referred to by the numbers here attached, viz. : my
paper (1) "The Case Method in the Study and Teaching of Ethics," this JOUR-
NAL, Vol. X., page 337. (2) Professor H. A. Overstreet 's "Discussion"; "Pro-
fessor Cox's Case Method in Ethics," ibid., Vol. X., page 464. (3) Professor
Thomas Reed Powell's "The Study of Moral Judgments by the Case Method,"
ibid., Vol. X., page 484.
2C/. (1), page 343.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 17
Then, I have been criticized by many, including a distinguished
Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, for limiting my study
to actual decisions. I may confess that in the class-room I do not so
limit it. In my paper, necessarily brief (as this one must be), it was
difficult to explain how cases which did not involve actual decisions
were weighed ; and I was, as the issue proved, justly fearful of being
charged with the study of mere opinion. Inasmuch as judicial deci-
sions are social acts, a theory built upon them can not, with propriety,
be called subjective ; but when I speak of judicial decisions I would
not be understood to refer only to decisions of municipal, state, or
federal courts. I referred rather to decisions made "by the author-
ities of the group to which men belong" whatever that group may be.
For class-room purposes faculty judgments on student conduct, deci-
sions of inter-fraternity councils, athletic committees, etc., have
proved to be very valuable. Then, there are readily accessible deci-
sions (acts) of other social groups, such as labor unions, manufac-
turers' associations, social clubs, and the like. I know of no kind of
organization more capable of making judgments and carrying them
out than Society,, spelled with the capital letter, and sometimes those
decisions are articulated by a recognized leader.
With reference to cases which do not come to actual decision, I
would say this. Where there is general agreement respecting the
probable outcome, these cases weigh in one's judgment as to the
character of the law implied. Many newspaper cases from contem-
poraneous life are imperfectly stated and the conclusion is implied
only : yet there is no least doubt as to the issue. For example, many
cases of lynching are recorded by the newspapers. It is not difficult
to supply the details for the whole case. One knows that under cer-
tain conditions, in particular localities and times, homicide is not only
condoned, but applauded; nor does one have to go to records (which,
du reste, are easily obtainable) to know that homicide under duelling
conditions meets with the same judgment in some localities, and that
killing in war is equally honorable, though our squeamish modern age
professed to be shocked at the exploits of a recent redoubtable occu-
pant of the Presidential Chair.
When, however, we come to the analysis of the judgments (acts)
of individuals reacting to a situation, I confess myself unwilling to
base any theory upon them, since the interpretation of such acts is so
largely individual and so easily mistaken. The judge before men-
tioned warned me that not all legal decisions were law. I may be per-
mitted to return to this in connection with Professor Powell's criti-
cisms : but here let me say that every legal decision is law in a most
emphatic sense for either defendant or plaintiff in any actual case.
18
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PROFESSOR OVERSTREET 's CRITICISMS 3
"The facts with which ethics is concerned are decisions of a cer-
tain type. In the end, to be sure, the ethical question is, what ought
the decisions to be." 4 If I understand this, it is a begging of the
whole question in the interest of that view of ethics which empha-
sizes its normative character and thereby removes it altogether from
the realm of science. We may readily grant that there is an ought in
every moral situation. No man would ever do anything, deliberately,
unless for some reason he thought that he ought to do so. For this
reason such a study as Professor Sharp 's referred to by me before 5 is
a valuable study in psychology especially for those who wish to influ-
ence other men to pursue a particular line of conduct. It does not
seem to me to help us to determine what right conduct is or whether
there is any such thing. Inductive studies seem to show pretty
plainly that what a man owes to his group is determined by (1)
instinct, (2) custom, (3) habit, (4) approvals of the elders. 6 These
may be followed by some rational judgment concerning the value of
particular acts for the individual and his group. His sense of duty
can not develop except in connection with some particular society.
I have expressly repudiated 7 the study of cases of conscience. One
may study them as one studies any other subject psychologically.
The sophistic mob leader, whether in church or state, may study them
in order to handle men better, or the lawyer to win cases, etc., but
they are not the proper material for an objective study of ethics.
The objectivity which I have sought by means of an appeal to
historical cases alone "would seem" says Professor Overstreet "to be
purchased by the author at the altogether disastrous price of sur-
rendering ethics for history" ; and he does not think that I can really
mean "to sell out for so cheap a mess of pottage," but he thinks me
"seriously ambiguous upon the point."
In so far as I by no means confound such a study as mine with
history, I may reassure him; but only in so far as, for example,
economics is not history, yet derived immediately from history, which,
moreover, may easily be contemporaneous. The time element need
not enter in. It would be vain to seek for a definition of history
which would not be seriously challenged ; but there can be no manner
of doubt that history, far from being a mere record, is a series of
constructions, interpretations, whose subject-matter is the clashes of
various groups, social, political, economic, religious. As a unit, from
s Cf. (2), passim.
*Cf. (2), page 464.
5 ' ' The Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment, " F. C. Sharp.
C/. Dewey and Tufts "Ethics," Ch. IV.
iCf. (1), page 342.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 19
the standpoint of a particular historian, it is quite naturally not any
one of the disciplines implied above, but equally is it each one of these
disciplines when it treats of the conflicts incidental to them.
But, says Professor Overstreet, "history, for all its seeming secur-
ity, is not a consensus; ... all the while that the student has been
studying the historic judgments he has either been making upon them
his judgment of 'ought,' i. e., his judgment of moral value, or he has
been utterly unable either to discover the moral trend of the historic
succession or to pass judgment upon the contemporary situation."
I readily agree that history is not a consensus, but I by no means
agree with what seems to be the implication, viz., that there is no
objective law to be deduced from history. In situations, however
diverse and widely separated, and in the face of the possibility that
the ' ' latest ' ' development of the contemporaneous situation may seem
"lower" than much that has gone before, I maintain that there is a
principle discoverable, under rigid tests, which will have all the cer-
tainty that one could desire. If, now, we should find that, under
infinitely diverse conditions, men always do act according to a certain
principle (e. g., that of self-preservation), then it would be idle to tell
them that they ought to act differently. I am assuming, as is evident,
that no negative instances have been found. I have made no claim
that such will be the case. My tentative conclusions that ' ' The indi-
vidual may do as he will so long as he does not deny his own nature
and purpose in life," and "Individuality is the goal of social prog-
ress, ' ' have been supported by just such evidence, but in the absence
of published cases I must make them with apparent dogmatism. 8
PROFESSOR POWELL'S CRITICISMS
Professor Powell has so supplemented my imperfect paper from
many points of view, and I am so grateful to him for this, that my
response must be, in the main, merely to clear up obscure points.
Yet in some ways I must take issue with him.
"No satisfactory criterion can be discovered in the sources them-
selves, as those jurists know who have struggled vainly to distinguish
what is malum in se from what is merely malum prohibitum." *
s In reply to the statement [ (2), p. 466] ' ' The paper does not indicate clearly
the character of the cases studied (whether merely legal, or more broadly social,
or even individual), the sources from which they are drawn, the kind of examina-
tion to which they are subjected for ethical purposes, and the type of ethical con-
clusions drawn. ' ' This is true. I can not do so here in the brief space at my com-
mand, and my critic's indulgence, as well as that of other readers, must be asked
until a case book can be prepared and published. The aid of all well-disposed
persons is asked to this end.
*Cf. (3), page 484.
20
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
First note that malum is sufficient designation for anything which
is wrong ; but wrong is relative. What courts, acting as representa-
tives of civil bodies, call mala prohibita are merely those more tan-
gible (and usually grosser) undesirable things, to permit which
would endanger the very existence of the group in question. Social
inertia is such that no action is taken until life (of the group) is
threatened. "Rebaters" do indeed "go to dinner parties" (they
may be the life of the party!), but pickpockets are barred. They
would be fatal. It is not strange that jurists have failed to distin-
guish between these mala, for the difference is one of degree only.
Again " as it is not safe to infer moral condemnation from legal pro-
hibition or regulation, so it is equally dangerous to assume that the
group approves of what it does not punish." There seems to be a
failure here to change jurisdictions. Rebaters are not dangerous to
dinner parties; pickpockets are. Both come before civil courts; but
the latter come also before the court of dinner-givers. It seems to me
perfectly safe to infer moral condemnation from legal prohibition.
The infraction of any law, however trivial and silly, doomed to repeal
at the earliest date, is none the less an infraction, and immoral in so
far. We have a loose way of speaking of one frankly unlawful as
none the less "quite a moral man," because he does not get drunk,
pick pockets, or commit adultery, but there is high authority for the
belief that ' ' whosoever shall keep the whole law and yet offend in one
point, he is guilty of all."
"In some jurisdictions adultery is not a crime." True; but how
does Professor Powell know (as he assumes) that adultery is none
the less a crime? Is it not because he is familiar with civil groups
and courts which have declared it to be such? To insist (I fancy
that he would not do so) that in the sight of God or before an ideal
ethical law, it is always a crime, is to beg the whole question. The
comparison of judgments of different groups under different condi-
tions and at many periods of history is just that process which will
enable us to obtain the "legal mind" which has been instanced in his
article. Begin to study the history of adultery from the sources;
call the acts which are now conceived to make up that crime always
by the name adultery, and it is easy to see that one can readily find
groups where "it is not a crime."
My contention is that there are principles implied in the per-
sistent judgments of all groups at all times which patient research
will, probably, reveal. They are not yet found. If the case method
as applied to ethics shall obtain any following, then there are years
of arduous research ahead for many investigators. The kindly judg-
ment of the two critics cited encourages me to hope that there will
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 21
be others to use the method. From many unexpected sources has
come encouragement to persist, and the new year has brought a much
larger enrollment to my class, which will make the test of greater
value. A veteran English philosopher, otherwise approving, calls my
law ''that each organism or organization applauds its upholder and
condemns its threaten er " 10 ' * merely formal, " " a mere statement of
the tendency to social preservation which sanctions every institu-
tion." Agreed. The law was not announced as very important (al-
though it has importance), but because it was the only one thus far
discoverable. For practical guidance to right living it is as fruitless
as the Categorical Imperative itself! Professor Powell says 11 "that
the application of the case system to the teaching of ethics has possi-
bilities of incalculable service in training the capacity to form moral
judgments seems beyond dispute. This alone justifies extensive
experiment. Those who hope that it may result in giving us simpler
and more definite canons of conduct may be sadly disillusioned. In
the study of law it has not led students to believe that what is com-
monly termed 'the law' is a clear and simple objective entity or that
there are rules of law which may after wise selection be mechanically
applied 12 to the solution of concrete problems, etc." And again,
"suppose that some (such) 'universal law' is 'found' and many
others likewise. What profit have we ? Will this make men moral ? ' '
"No stress is laid upon the value of the case method for training in
. . . power of intelligent recognition and prudent adaptation."
These seem to me wise words which I shall take to heart. I find no
fault with them. Yet we may remember that even the Categorical
Imperative has been of some value as a measuring rod, and my barren
formulation may not be utterly useless. Conduct of an ideal sort
must somehow conform to general laws, however barren in them-
selves; but it should not be forgotten that I have said "men get their
moral impulsive power through loyalty to some group, however
small or large." This statement, as well as many others, needs the
support of collected cases. Its formulation was due to the study of
cases, for, previous to this study, my personal conviction had been
quite the contrary.
We do not, indeed, have courts of approval, as was expressly
pointed out; but we can judge by the tendency of progressive legis-
lative acts as to probable approvals. One does not need to know all
the points of a curve in order to plot it. There is a tendency in dis-
approvals which, reversed, tells us pretty plainly what approvals will
ioC/. (1), page 346.
11 Cf. (3), page 493.
12 Italics mine.
22
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
be. Consider a case from daily life not passed upon formally by any
court. A man has a " swollen fortune" gained by methods which
many people, influenced by intuitive morals, loudly condemn. Some
impassioned speaker denounces his ''tainted" money and declares
that society condemns such gains. Under the circumstances one is
justly suspicious of the speaker, for society invites the rich man in
question to dinners and house parties, gives large receptions in his
honor, sends him upon embassies, elects him to directorates, accepts
his money for colleges, churches, and hospitals, breaks its very neck
to see him when he appears in public, and so on. Any member of
the largest group to which he belongs would feel elated at the thought
of being allied to his family in marriage (I am drawing a composite
portrait). Is this condemnation? Then we must have passed with
Alice through the Looking Glass.
The case system seems to Professor Powell to be adapted to give
men the ' ' ethical mind ' ' and he thinks this valuable. This is its chief
function as a system of teaching the subject. Particular virtues can
not be taught in class except as the class is itself a particular group
and has its own loyalties, but discrimination can be taught there.
I am so far an Aristotelian that I consider no action virtuous which
is not conceived to be so. But, when I said that "every teaching of
ethics should be adapted to make men ethical, ' ' my thought was, not
so much to give them the "ethical mind" as to make them act in the
way which shall have been found, at the end of our study, to be
ethical. Naturally, at present, we are prejudiced against murder,
adultery, theft, lasciviousness, and the like. It is not probable that
we shall ever feel otherwise. Yet, as ethics has been taught in the
past it seems to me to have had very little influence upon its students
to prevent such misdemeanors and crimes. Can not we find a way
to make men practise what they profess to believe ? 13 The actual use
of cases inductively makes me skeptical about teaching them anything
but discrimination, i. e. f giving them the "ethical mind." The rest,
the greatest part must come from their recognized position as mem-
bers of some group to which they are loyal. Apparently the most
universal morality will come from consciousness of membership in
the human family. If so, this will be an interesting corroboration
from the scientific side of the ethics of the great religions. Ethics is
powerless to initiate, but all-powerful to guide.
Professor Powell asks: 14 "Are we forced to conclude that the
intellect, if it fail to discover an 'objective morality,' must retire
and leave to 'temperament' the task of making moral judgments?"
is Cf. "The Ignominy of Being Good," Max Eastman, Atlantic Monthly,
January, 1912.
i* Cf. (3), page 493.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 23
Perhaps my answer to this has already been sufficiently indicated.
The evidence so far at hand seems to show that a man's final ethics
will be largely a matter of his own formulation, the way in which he
wills to have his world. Trained in a certain fashion of living, loyal
to typical responses which he has come to love, a man finds, in the
conflict of interests, that he always chooses after his admirations.
How could he do otherwise? He comes to love for their own sake
virtues which, originally, were only means to the end of self-preserva-
tion. He has been trained to love truth-telling which now at times is
highly inconvenient, detrimental, even destructive; but he can not
give it up. Though all his prosperity in life were to depend upon it,
he can not lie. Truth-telling has acquired (whatever his ultimate
metaphysics may be) an absolute value for him.
Thus a man creates his own world of moral values. Original en-
dowment plays a large part (the largest, in my opinion) ; education
and environment contribute. The world of his satisfactions is his own
world, social, because no one can live without approvals, and he ap-
peals to a chosen, if countless, crowd of witnesses. This is what I
meant by temperament and tradition; this is implied in my phrase
"liberty of propaganda." Logically, there follows charity, tolera-
tion of the ethics of others, with, at the same time, a rigid adherence
to one's own. Those standards alone are truly absolute for a man
which are followed when no one observes, when all inhibitions and
restraints are removed those things which he wills to have realized.
This seems a far cry from the search for universal and objective
ethics, which may be interpreted as some remnant of a heart hunger
to know what religious people call the will of God. In the failure to
know this or to reach an objective ethics the resulting individualism
may be called a final appeal to the universe to realize, in part at
least, what one has conceived that will of God to be. The certain
outcome appears to be this: No man can act morally except upon
his own ethics. Since, however, men are more like than different, an
ultimate similarity of ethical judgments may confidently be ex-
pected, but there is no danger of an absolute uniformity. Perhaps, if
there were, all the sorrows and all the joys of this world would dis-
appear together ; and the need of ethics would vanish with the attain-
ment of an ideal.
GEORGE CLARKE Cox.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Pragmatism. D. L. MURRAY. New York: Dodge Publishing Company.
1912. Pp. x + 78.
This small volume is intended as an elementary introduction to prag-
matism. It may be said at once that Mr. Murray has done with unusual
success the thing that he set out to do, and that, too, with commendable
brevity. This does not mean, of course, that every pragmatist would ap-
prove of all that is here set down. But it should be borne in mind that the
author of this most excellent little volume is a disciple of Dr. Schiller.
A humanistic pragmatist would, I presume, be the last to deny that he
might for this very reason be led to select from Dewey and James what
best served his purposes.
A singular interest is brought to the volume by a rather unique intro-
duction by Dr. Schiller himself, who appears as sponsor for the author in
his maiden attempt. While pointing out the need of such a volume as
here appears and the peculiar fitness of Mr. Murray, by reason of his
youth, training at Oxford, etc., to write the same, he delivers himself
somewhat incidentally of the following characteristic paragraph, which, I
think, deserves as wide a circulation as it may find.
" Mr. Murray has (like myself) enjoyed the advantage of a severely
intellectualistic training in the classical philosophy of Oxford University,
and in its premier college, Balliol. The aim of this training is to instill
into the best minds the country produces the adamantine conviction that
philosophy has made no progress since Aristotle. It costs about 50,000
a year, but on the whole it is singularly successful. Its effect upon capable
minds possessed of common sense is to produce that contempt for the pure
intellect which distinguishes the British nation from all others, and en-
sures the practical success of administrators selected by an examination
so gloriously irrelevant to their duties that, since the lamentable demise
of the Chinese system, it may boast to be the most antiquated in the world."
It is a mistake, according to Mr. Murray, to look upon pragmatism " as
a parochial eccentricity, as a specific Americanism." On the contrary,
" it has come into being by a convergence of distinct lines of thought
pursued in different countries by different thinkers." He undertakes to
single out the sources of pragmatism. It owes its being to the changed
conceptions of scientific procedure consequent upon the increase in knowl-
edge; the advent of Darwinism, which made possible the logical theories
of Dewey; the internal evolution of philosophic reflection, set forth in the
writings of Schiller; the inadequacy of formal logic, pointed out by A.
Sidgwick, among others; the primacy of faith in the solution of religious
problems long practised by the religious, but first adequately treated by
James ; and finally, most fertile of all, the new psychology, i. e. f the intro-
duction of biological and voluntaristic principles into psychology.
Fundamentally pragmatism is a " collective name for the most modern
solution of puzzles which have impeded philosophical progress from time
immemorial, and it has arisen naturally in the course of philosophical
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 25
reflection." Not until William James substituted his " stream of experi-
ence " for the disjointed self of Hume was it possible for philosophy to
extricate herself from the difficulties consequent upon the acceptance of
atomistic psychology. Then all became clear; Kant's labors were super-
erogatory. The need of a transcendental factor of union, based upon the
psychology of Hume, fell away. But even Hume's stress upon the discrete
character of our experience was not without its advantages. Here was
abundant evidence of the selective character of thinking. Indeed, " the
volitional contribution is all-pervasive in our thinking " and may there-
fore be looked upon as legitimate. Thus arises the doctrine of voluntary
postulation which affords a new compromise between the old schools of
thought far superior to that offered by Kant, because based upon a truer
psychology. But it must not be overlooked, as is sometimes done, that this
doctrine involves verification, i. e., any postulate may become either prej-
udice or axiom. That depends upon future experience. It is mere chance
that James first presented this doctrine to a theological audience ;* it is as
applicable in science as in religion. The doctrine met a crying 1 need.
" For absolute truth has become a chimera, self -evidence an illusion, and
intuition untrustworthy." It was either scepticism or relativism; prag-
matism frankly takes the latter. For after all, " in real life thought starts
in perplexities," as Dewey points out, and all judgments are truth claims,
but subject to future validation. Mr. Murray then points out the failure
of old definitions of truth.
As to the arbitrary character of the pragmatic method of testing truths
which, it is claimed by some, would allow the pragmatist "to assert the
truth of every idea which seems to us pretty or pleasant," he says : " The
very term ' useful ' was chosen by pragmatists as a protest against the
common philosophic license of alleging ' truths ' which could never be
applied or tested, and were supposed to be none the worse for being 'use-
less.' It is clear both that such ' truths ' must be a monopoly of intel-
lectualism, and also that they do allow every man to believe whatever he
wishes provided only that he boldly claims ' self -evidence ' for his idio-
syncrasy." I presume such a statement is justified considering the success
with which pragmatists have met in getting their doctrine understood.
As the book purports to be an introduction to pragmatism, a doctrine
associated with the name of Dewey, it may not be amiss to call attention
to his own opinions in so far as they are opposed to humanism in at least
one respect, bearing upon the last chapter, Thought and Life. Fortunately
it can be done in his own words. 2 " According to the latter view (human-
ism) the personal appears to be ultimate and unanalyzable, the meta-
physically real. Associations with idealism, moreover, give it an idealistic
turn, a translation, in effect, of monistic intellectualistic idealism into a
pluralistic, voluntaristic idealism. But according to the former (his own
1 The essay ' ' The Will to Believe ' ' was read before the Philosophical Clubs
of Yale and Brown Universities. These clubs hardly constitute theological
audiences.
2 This JOURNAL, Vol. V., page 97.
26
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
views), the personal is not ultimate, but it is to be analyzed and defined
biologically on its genetic side, ethically on its prospective and functioning
side." This, I think, represents the views of the majority of pragmatists
in America, those under the influence of James as well as Dewey. There
is, of course, much ground for associating what seems to be a recrudescence
of an ancient Persian doctrine as to the importance of personal effort in
cosmic evolution with the name of James, but even he seems to have
stressed it less and less.
Humanistic pragmatism, if I may be allowed the general criticism,
seems to me to be under the sway of what may be called the genetic fallacy.
The place of selection in psychology is important. Recognition of this
fact helps us to understand what was once obscure, the true nature of
thinking. But it does not follow that it can hold the central place in a
metaphysics that Mr. Murray would give it.
JOHN PICKETT TURNER.
COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. July, 1913.
The Role of Kinwsthesis in the Perception of Rhythm (pp. 305-359) :
CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICH. - An experimental investigation into the prob-
lem of rhythm with a great deal of introspective analysis. It was con-
cluded that kinaesthesis is essential in the perception of rhythm, but when
perceived, rhythm can go on without kineBsthesis. Luther's Early Develop-
ment in the Light of Psychoanalysis (pp. 360-377) : PRESERVED SMITH. -
An analysis of the mental life of Luther, indicating terrific mental struggle
and anguish. An analysis of his temptations and suggested reasons for
his religious attitudes. The Fluctuation of Liminal Visual Stimuli of
Point Area (pp. 378-409) : C. E. FERREE. - A discussion of the fluctuation
phenomena, followed by experimental data, from which the conclusion is
drawn that fluctuations to minimal visual stimuli are due to the adapta-
tion and recovery of the sense organ. The Characteristic Form Assumed
T)y Dreams (pp. 410-413) : ELLIOT PARK FROST. - Dreams seem to be
rhythmic or spasmodic. Energy from one dream phase carries over to
another and breaks out rather suddenly with the corresponding physio-
logical accompaniments. Suppression and Substitution as a Factor in
Sex Differences (pp. 414-425) : M. E. HAGGERTY and E. J. KEMPF. - A
series of association tests were given to men and women. The women
showed a tendency to suppress associations that might be embarrassing.
Improvement in a Practise Experiment Under School Conditions (pp. 426-
428) : M. E. DONOVAN and EDWARD L. THORNDIKE. - Additional data that
support the point made in regard to practise in the American Journal of
Psychology, Vol. XIX,, page 383. Discussion: The Method of Examina-
tion (pp. 429-^40) : E. B. TITCHENER. Professor Yuzero Motora (pp. 440-
443). Fifth Report of the Polish Psychological Society (p. 444). Con-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 27
vention of Experimental Psychologists (p. 445) : S. W. FERNBERGER.
Book Reviews: Edwin B. Holt, The Place of Illusory Experience in a
Realistic World: H. P. WELD. G. P. Lipp, Das Problem der Willens-
freiheit: KADOSLAV A. TSANOFF. G. E. Moore, Ethics: RADOSLAV A.
TSANOFF. Wilhelm Wundt, Elemente der VolJcerpsychologie: SAMUEL W.
FERNBERGER. J. G. Frazer, The Belief in Immortality and the Worship
of the Dead: E. B. T. Edward Le Roy, The New Philosophy of Henri
Bergson: IVY G. CAMPBELL. Book Notes: Herbert Eugene Walter, Genet-
ics. A. Lasurski, Ueber das Studium der Individualitat. Edward Hitsh-
mann, Freud's Theories of the Neuroses. Maurice Parmelee, The Science
of Human Behavior. K. Orelli, Die Philosophischen auf Fassungen des
Mitleids. A Contribution to a Bibliography of Henri Bergson. Emil
Kraepelin, General Paresis. Giuseppe Fancuelli, L'Umorismo. Benj.
Moore, The Origin and Nature of Life. Aboys Miiller, Wahrheit und
WirMichJceit. De Witt H. Parker, The Metaphysics of Historical
Knowledge. Theodor Lipps, Psychologische Untersuchungen. Else
Wentscher, Grundzuge der EtTiiTc, mit Besonderer Berucksichtigung der
Padagogischen Probleme. David R. Major, The Elements of Psychology.
John E. Russell, A First Course in Philosophy. H. von Hug-Hellmuth,
Aus dem Seelenleben des Kindes; eine Psycholoanalytische Studie.
Johannes Maria Verweyen, Philosophie des Moglichen. Garry C. Myers,
A Study in Incidental Memory. Ludwig Edinger, Einfuhrung in die
Lehre vom Bau und Verrichtungen des Nervensy stems. Percy A. Camp-
bell, The Game of Mind; A Study in Psychological Disillusionment.
Max Frischeisen-Kohler, Jahrbuch der Philosophie. Dr. Eugene Ber-
nard Le Roy, Confession, d*un Incroyant. John G. Murdoch, Economics
As the Basis of Living Ethics.
Booth, Meyrick. Rudolf Eucken: His Philosophy and Influence. New
York : Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. vi -f 207.
Bucheneau, Artur. Kants Lehre vom Kategorischen Imperativ. Leipzig :
Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1913. Pp. ix -f 125. 2 M.
NOTES AND NEWS
PRIZE IN PSYCHOPHYSICS
A PRIZE of one hundred dollars ($100) is offered for the best paper on
the Availability of Pearson's Formulae for Psychophysics.
The rules for the solution of this problem have been formulated in gen-
eral terms by William Brown. It is now required (1) to make their form-
ulation specific, and (2) to show how they work out in actual practise.
This means that the writer must show the steps to be taken in the treat-
ment of a complete set of data (Vollreihe) for the attainment in every
case of a definite result. The calculations should be arranged with a view
to practical application, i. e., so that the amount of computation is reduced
to a minimum. If the labor of computation can be reduced by new tables,
this fact should be pointed out.
28
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The paper must contain samples of numerical calculation; but it is not
necessary that the writer have experimental data of his own. In default
of new data, those of P. M. Urban's experiments on lifted weights (all
seven observers) or those of H. Keller's acoumetrical experiments (all
results of one observer in both time-orders) are to be used.
Papers in competition for this prize will be received, not later than De-
cember 31, 1914, by Professor E. B. Titchener, Cornell Heights, Ithaca,
N. Y., U. S. A. Such papers are to be marked only with a motto, and are
to be accompanied by a sealed envelope, marked with the same motto, and
containing the name and address of the writer. The prize will be awarded
by a committee consisting of Professors William Brown, E. B. Titchener,
and F. M. Urban.
The committee will make known the name of the successful competitor
on July 1, 1915. The unsuccessful papers, with the corresponding en-
velopes, will be destroyed (unless called for by their authors) six months
after the publication of the award.
A MEETING of the Aristotelian Society was held on November 3. The
president delivered the inaugural address on " Appearance and Real Exist-
ence." Since the publication of Mr. Bradley's great work in 1893, no dis-
tinction has been more readily pressed into service as a means of making
headway in metaphysical construction than the distinction between appear-
ance and reality. Anything which comes short when compared with
reality is called by him " appearance," meaning thereby not that the
thing always is itself an appearance, but that its character becomes an
appearance in any judgment we make concerning it. Reality being con-
ceived as the single absolute experience, immanent in finite centers of
feeling, but never wholly included in any one finite center, it follows that
the contents of a finite subject's experience will point beyond themselves,
and will come to have for knowledge a meaning, this meaning being used
as an idea, as an adjective qualifying that which is other than its own
being. In later treatments of metaphysical problems we find the term
" appearance," or equivalent expressions, freely used, but without any
effort to make explicit and unmistakable the exact sense in which it is
to be understood. The way in which phenomena or appearances have
been treated in three great metaphysical systems the Platonic, the
Kantian, and the Hegelian was then considered at some length. In all
of them existence, in one form or another, is described to phenomena or
appearances. The important question is whether the concrete particular
things of the realm of existence are rightly described as phenomena or
appearances. The former are in no sense mental constructions. The
secondary qualities of things are not explicable as creations of the mind.
If we keep rigorously to the significance of phenomena in which the
subjective characteristic is the more prominent, they are not existing
entities. Their mode of being is similar in kind to that assigned to
universals. A then&um.
VOL. XL No. 2. JANUARY 15, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
VALUE AND POTENTIALITY
HENRI POINCARE 1 stood for the thesis that "scientific fact is
nothing but brute fact translated into a convenient language/'
and further that "all that the scientist creates in his fact is the
language in which he enunciates it"; and J. T. Merz 2 introduces us
to that part of his monumental work that deals with philosophy
by the statement that "more even than in science, we may say that in
philosophy progress consists in finding an appropriate verbal expres-
sion, or, having found it, in conveying to our readers the clear defi-
nition of the meaning we desire to attach to it. ' ' If there is any truth
in these opinions, then, it follows that the reconsideration of the
terms in which any concept is defined is important, and the enuncia-
tion of a more clear or more convenient definition, a real progress.
Within the whole realm of philosophy, it seems to the writer, few
concepts have suffered from inept formulation more than the concept
of value, and this not because of peculiar difficulty concerning fact, but
bcause of the interests of theologians and metaphysicians who have,
for the most part, either reduced it to an abstraction or deduced it as
corollary to an already accepted system. Metaphysical conceptions
of value, 3 such as those of Professor Miinsterberg and Mr. Russell,
only become intelligible, if at all, when one is ensconced in the system ;
and psychological conceptions, such as are found among the German
philosophers, and, in less objectionable form, among the realists and
some of the pragmatists, carry with them many obscure connotations
from psychology. Indeed, the psychologists, in this instance as in
many others, are in a more difficult position than the metaphysicians,
for in addition to the metaphysical assumption that the reality of
value has something to do with mind, they are beset with difficulties
due to the vacillation of their science between behaviorism, paral-
1 < ' The Value of Science, ' ' Pt. III., sec. 3.
2 l ' History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ' ' Vol. III.,
page 4.
sj. F. Dashiell, "The Philosophical Status of Values," New York, 1915
(thesis).
29
30 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
lelism, and spiritualism to such a degree that the "S S" call is
sent to-day rather from psychology to philosophy than in the counter
direction.
To examine the weaknesses of these contemporary theories system-
atically would be a task of such magnitude that to attempt it here
would be to remain walled up like the five kings in the cave of
Makkedah, while the victorious psychologists and metaphysicians
sweep the field. In consequence, this paper will merely attempt to
restate the facts of value with as much concreteness and independence
of the connotations of any system as the nature of the case permits.
The result, although aiming at neither agreements nor disagreements
with accepted positions, will doubtless attain both, but it desires
neither credit nor discredit therefor, but rather seeks criticism on the
ground that it successfully "walks around the idea and looks at it
from all sides ' ' to borrow Professor Dewey 's characterization of one
of his analyses.
That the concept of potentiality might be the key to a useful dis-
cussion of the facts under consideration is suggested by the root
meaning of the word value, for the value of an object, by derivation,
is that of which the object is capable, the development of its poten-
tialities. But first it is necessary to review the meaning of potentiality.
A potentiality of an actual thing is, I believe, generally accepted
to be nothing but the thing itself in relation to some transformation,
either of itself or of its environment, that might be brought about
under some conditions, at some time, through the actuality of the
thing. The group of conditions necessary for the realization of any
specific effect are, each of them, potential contributors to its realiza-
tion, but each demands the cooperation of the others before it can
become an actual cause, and some one of these factors is generally
seized upon as the effect "in potentiality. ' ' But which? They can
not all be so chosen, for with them all given the effect is at once
actual, although this fact is often obscured or denied when such
factors as space and time are overlooked. And such oversight is not
justifiable, for if cause is defined in the usual manner as the indis-
pensable condition of an event, space and time are certainly cooper-
ating causes. In such stock examples as "the egg is a potential
chicken," "a pile of bricks is potentially a wall," "steel is a poten-
tial knife, " it is the material cause to which the potentiality is accred-
ited. This is the result of picking out a striking factor in the situa-
tion which impresses us by some empirically intimate relation to the
effect and letting that factor stand as the condition par excellence of
the effect. But we are not always uniform in this usage, and, in-
deed, in many instances, its applicability is not obvious. Thus the
potentiality of old age may be said to lie in continued existence, and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 31
the potentiality of success in constant application, and here it is
hardly a question of material cause, in a modern nomenclature, but
of what is merely the ''warmest" causal factor. But even this re-
striction is somewhat arbitrary and, although it is, perhaps, contrary
to every-day usage, it is surely not meaningless to ascribe the poten-
tiality of an effect to any of its causal factors. Thus space and time,
as well as the egg, are potential chickens, for they are indispensable
conditions of the chicken-realization. It may be this is turning
them into material causes. Bergson does this in the case of time, and
there may be good ground, in the dynamic changes that result from
mere proportional increase in spatial magnitude, to believe something
analogous is true in the case of space. But at any rate, natural
choices in this matter are expressions of human interest rather than
of the ontological character of the thing chosen.
The potentialities of an object in some sense constitute its values,
but to identify the two terms would be to blur terms better kept
apart, provided a suitable differentia can be found. A frequent pro-
cedure is to assume that potentialities become values through the
selective activity of some human interest. Thus the egg is valuable
because of its chicken-potentiality, or the steel because of its knife-
potentiality, when somebody wants that chicken or that knife. This
is a view that makes the distinction between potentiality and value
depend neither on a difference in the objects nor on the processes of
transformation they are to initiate or undergo, nor on the end to be
realized, nor on any relation between these things, but only on the
attitude with which our thought approaches them, and while it is a
very excellent thing to have distinctions of this sort in language for
language has much more to do than to express the mere facts of an
objective world, and must often suggest our attitude toward them and
the angles at which we approach them it is unfortunate when the
philosopher confuses such distinctions with the ontological status
of facts, and, at best, it is a bad thing to accept a subjective differ-
entia of a concept when it is possible to find others less ephemeral and
more closely bound up with the nature of things. The human
organism is essentially egoistic and lives by making things realize its
ends through their potentialities. Consequently it is interested in
controllable potentialities and is quick to call them values, but it
does not follow that the true nature of value is brought out by such
preferences. On the contrary, in a concrete situation, it is not forced
or unnatural to say "sunshine has value for the growth of trees and
flowers," or "coral polyps for the production of islands," quite
regardless whether or no these things are desirable from any human
standpoint. And such instances should be adequate to show the un-
due narrowness of the subjective criterion.
32 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
If we examine certain related terms an interesting fact appears.
If a thing has value, it is valuable; but in the case of potentiality,
there is no correspondingly allied adjective, for " potential" is not
related to "potentiality" as "valuable" is to "value"; potential
relates to the effect to be realized through the potentiality possessed
by something else, but valuable means to possess the value. The
potentiality of the egg is in relation to the chicken that may come out
of it, but the potential egg is quite a different thing, yet the egg is at
once a value and valuable in relation to the chicken. Again, with the
assertion that a thing has value, there trembles on the lips the ques-
tion, how valuable is it? But it is only torturing the meaning of the
word to ask of a potentiality, how potential is it? In other words,
value relates to the adequacy of a thing to the realization of an effect,
whereas potentiality relates to the thing as contributing to the reali-
zation, without reference to its adequacy. Adequacy is an objective
attribute of the situation in question, and, if value is to be defined in
relation to potentiality, we might say that value is degree of adequacy
of a potentiality to the realization of the effect by virtue of which it
is a potentiality, or, put more concretely, the value of an object con-
sists in the adequacy of its qualities in reference to the realization of
a specific effect. Of course, the degree of such adequacy need not be
numerically estimated, and need not be specifically defined, but the
possibility of such estimates lies, nevertheless, behind all instances of
value. Values are not, then, a subclass of potentialities, for the two
concepts are mutually implicative in that the situations in which they
arise are identical. They differ in that they refer to different aspects
of the situations; potentiality, the factor through which the effect
may be realized and value to the readiness of the realization. Nor
does the definition mean that value is a relation, for I confess I can
find little instruction in such phrases. Value only arises in complex
situations where there are relations and is a name for a describable
aspect of such situations, but the value is no more the relation than it
is the thing, and to try to reduce it to one or the other is a highly
unwarranted over-simplification.
But an even more pernicious over-simplification appears when one
attempts to lump all values together as subjective or objective. The
subjective alternative is given peculiar plausibility because of a con-
fusion dnp to the differentia of values. Adequacy is easily confused
with the feeling of adequacy and interest in that adequacy and, in
consequence, value is taken to depend upon the behavior of a con-
scious subject or at least upon an "organism in the whole organism-
environment situation." The latter alternative, to be sure, avoids
much of the psychological difficulties in formulating a definition of
consciousness, but with the glamor of consciousness gone, the classifi-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 33
cation of all values as subjective is hard to understand unless it be
the result of exclusive attention to the normative sciences of tradition
which deal only with types of value already selected by human
interest. But there are values as truly objective as these are sub-
jective, although it should be noted that even this subjectivity is
nothing but a special case of objectivity, namely, that objectivity
in which a particular object, the organism, plays a leading role.
Let us examine a particular case of these subjective values. A
sunset charms me to-night, but if I had seen it last night when I had
the blues, it would have been repellent. Therefore I say the sunset 's
value is subjective with respect to its esthetic character. But what
does this mean? That the sunset in one environment-situation con-
tributes to the realization of one effect, and in another, to the realiza-
tion of quite a different effect. The sunset has remained, by hypothe-
sis, the same sunset, and its potentialities, as sunset, are unchanged,
but my organism in both cases the environment was first in one
state and then in another and its potentialities changed accordingly,
and to call the esthetic value subjective refers merely to this fact. In
other words, the difference between the values called subjective and
those called objective is that while the latter may reside in the poten-
tialities of one object or of a group of objects, of which the organism
is not one, the former demand at least a pair of objects of which the
organism must be one and the primary variable of the group.
Ontologically, subjective values are a sort of objective values differ-
entiated by the fact that an organism plays a leading part in their
variation.
It happens that organisms plus environments constitute the neces-
sary conditions for the realization of a large number of effects most
interesting to human beings, and as a change in either the organism
r the environment modifies the character of those effects, we seek to
discover whether it is the organism or the environment that is pri-
marily responsible in particular situations ; that is, to observe which
is, as a value, the greater. But we can not express this situation well
by attributing subjective value to an objective part of the complex,
by calling the esthetic value of the sunset subjective, without causing
confusion of thought. Indeed, it may well be that the peculiar lack of
interest in esthetics, and its peculiar unsuccess among philosophical
studies, is rooted in just this confusion. If the concrete expression
should be that an effect-value in a certain situation is determined by
an organism through its major contribution to the realization of that
effect, the fact that a certain object possesses esthetic value for me
is not so much a comment on the character of the object as on my
own condition and the possession of a certain sense of beauty becomes
an indication of the life status of the possessor.
34
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
If we grant that a certain situation requiring organic cooperation
for its attainment is desirable, and such an admission must always
be an hypothesis based upon anticipatory experiments in the thought
of an individual, the problem of the normative sciences becomes,
what sort of an environment and organism would be adequate to
attain it? And being practically interested, we limit ourselves
to an attainable environment and possible modifications of our or-
ganism in approximation to the desired result. And there is always
the corollary problem, how are these modifications of the organ-
ism and the environment to be brought about ? The scientific study
of such questions involves, of course, a selection from all values
of those subjectively interesting, but not necessarily of exclusively
subjective values, even in the sense in which the subjective is a species
of the objective. For even the assumption of the desired end, how-
ever socialized the selecting individual may become, is only an ex-
pression of organic fact.
We have yet to ask, does our definition imply that there are no
absolute values ? The problem of the absolute or relative character of
value is often confused with that of their subjectivity or objectivity.
If this identification be accepted, the above account is sufficient to
show that there are values wholly objective, or absolute, and values,
in a sense, subjective, or relative. But the point of the distinction of
the absolute and relative is not kept by this identification, for "abso-
lute" intends to mark out an abiding standard for reference. An
effect, through the potential realization of which a value exists, is the
standard, and such effects, as we have seen, may be independent of an
organism or dependent upon one, but it is at least dubious to assume
that the non-organic in relation to effects is eternal, while the organic
is transitory. The one may be relatively more abiding than the
other, but an eternal value could only appear in a world where
"Change may come not till all change end."
Such may be the world of a philosophic absolute being, but the
study of concrete values seems to give no evidence of such a world,
however glibly values may be deduced when such a world is once
assumed.
But absolute is also taken to mean (1) independent of any limita-
tion, (2) finished or perfect, and (3) capable of being conceived by
itself alone, and it is a propos to inquire whether in any of these
senses, also, there may be absolute values.
In the first instance, it is only value as an abstraction that may
be absolute, for any concrete instance of value is a value limited by
the potentialities of the thing possessing value. Thus the problem of
the reality of absolute value in this sense is the problem of the reality
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 35
of abstractions which introduces logical considerations beyond the
scope of this paper, but I suspect that if the abstractions are suffi-
ciently purified to be absolute, they may turn out to be like the coins
of M. Anatole France's needy knife-grinder from which have been
effaced all images, and which, because they contain nothing English,
French, or German about them any more, are no longer worth five
shillings, but are of "inestimable value and their circulation is ex-
tended infinitely." Such abstract values may be glorious, but they
are hardly interesting.
The first sense of absolute is near the third, the absolute as that
which can be conceived through itself alone, but now it is the con-
crete sense of value that may be absolute, and the abstract that is
relative, for abstractions are conceivable only through the concrete
from which they are abstracted, but a concrete value, the value of a
glass of water to statisfy my thirst at the present time, is surely con-
ceivable without the aid of extraneous fact and, therefore, conforms
to the condition laid down for absolute value. The plurality of the
facts is no slur upon the absoluteness of the value, for the conception
is really thirst-satisfying-glass-of-water-value, in which the facts are
all incorporated.
In the second sense, as perfect, values may also be absolute,
whether concrete or abstract, and, indeed, every object must be pos-
sessed of some absolute value in this sense, for in so far as it possessed
uniqueness it has some potentiality possessed by no other object, and
is the perfect possessor of the corresponding value, in the sense of
possessing it accurately and adequately. This perfection is, of course,
hardly spectacular. It means merely that the object-situation from
which the definition of the value is derived lives up to the definition
obtained from it. The distinction is only of importance when coupled
with some theory of uniqueness and individuality such as idealism
formulates regarding its Absolute Being.
The problem of absolute value is also sometimes confused with
that of intrinsic and extrinsic value, the former being classified as
absolute, the latter as relative. The distinction is based upon a
specific relation between the potentiality of the thing valued and the
effect with respect to which it has a value. If the effect appears as a
development of the thing itself, or as guaranteed by the thing itself
with the addition of such factors as space and time alone, the value is
called intrinsic or absolute. Thus the egg as a potential chicken, or
gold as a desirable medium of exchange, are intrinsic or absolute
values, but the egg, as a chicken dinner, or a banknote as a certificate
of deposited gold, are only extrinsically, or relatively valuable. The
dividing line is, however, not always easy to draw, and the intrinsic
is sometimes identified with the object's character as representative
36 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of a class in the sense that a parsnip may be intrinsically of great
value as a parsnip, but extrinsically of small value as an article of
food.
The concept of value has now been reviewed in its most significant
aspects, but before leaving the discussion there is still one form of
the definition of value that must be commented upon, the definition
of value in terms of purpose. If the present use of potentiality as a
starting-point is accepted, it must appear that such definitions involve
a hysteron proteron, or at least that they beg the question of the sub-
jectivity of values unless the concept of purpose be given some cosmic
significance that expresses a hope of the theologian rather than an
induction of science.
In the first place, if we turn to the question of logical priority,
we find that it is quite unintelligible to speak of purpose without the
presupposition of something purposed, but in order that there be
such a thing, there must be in our environment potentialities looking
toward the realization of the thing. Further, there must also be
potentialities of modifications in the organism which, taken in con-
junction with this environment, seem to guarantee its actuality. The
recognition of this environment-organism interaction is the recogni-
tion of a value of the type we have called subjective, and pleasurable
or unpleasurable reaction to such perceived values is that selection or
rejection of them that we call purpose. In other words, purpose does
not generate values, but purpose is itself a reaction of an organism
in a world of values whereby some of them are selected or rejected
because of our feelings toward the effects with respect to which they
are values. Take the purposive act of looking at a watch to learn the
time, as an example. The watch, the pocket, the hand, each has many
values; the watch, with respect to the pawnshop, as a missile; the
pocket as a storehouse for articles, as a place to put the hand when
embarrassed; the hand as a means of running a typewriter, etc.
Being in a state of unrest, it is perceived that certain of the watch-
hand-pocket values in conjunction with the present organic condi-
tion can lead to a state of peace devoutly to be wished, and the selec-
tion of these requisite values is the purposing of the action through
which the end is realized. Purposive action, then, presupposes values,
but doubly selected ones, for in the first place, the selected values
must be subjective, and in the second place, desirable ; and purpose is
only possible because we live in a world where there are objective as
well as organic potentialities generative of values amongst which we
can select for the sake of realizing effects which are somehow pre-
sented to us as desirable in anticipation.
There are also certain interesting interpretations of consciousness
resulting from this analysis of value in terms of potentiality, as well
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 37
as certain comments on the division and nature of the normative
sciences that should be developed, but to enter upon this here would
extend this paper unduly, and therefore they must be left until a
later date. Our problem was primarily one of the clarification and
precision of language, but it is hoped that it has not been wholly un-
illuminating as to the status of certain facts. Whatever facts may be,
this much is certain; it is only through words that they can enter
deeply into our thinking and, therefore, the reconsideration of the
meaning of words must be the necessary foundation of sound think-
ing both in philosophy and in science.
HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
PERCEPTION i
WHATEVER perception may be, it is obviously something
that has reference to living organisms. It is a term ap-
plied to a phase of organic or living behavior. If, then, we first set
out the various fundamental types of behavior characteristic of
living organisms, we shall be in a position to find a context for the
proper study of perception. Observation discovers three basic
types of organic action, viz, involuntary, reflex, and voluntary.
Involuntary and reflex action are different in that the latter occurs
only in connection with a disturbance in the organism's environ-
ment, whereas the former continues rhythmically (though with vari-
ations) under all conditions. They are .alike in that they are prac-
tically determinate forms of activity which can be almost as easily
foretold as sunrise and sunset.
Voluntary action occurs under conditions so variable that it is
impossible to foretell what the behavior of the organism will be.
It is evident that we are trying to describe voluntary action in terms
of observation from without. Is the description adequate? Is it
true that it is impossible to foretell the organism's conduct? It is
true, but not true enough. Though we can not say what will be the
particular act, we can foretell with fair certainty what the eventual
consequences of the act will be. It may seem absurd to say that we
do not know the act, but do know its consequences, yet this may
in a sense be true. We know the general direction, tendency, or
end of the organism's activity, but we do not know its means in
each instance. Now what is that direction or end? It seems to be
incapable of description in terms more explicit than the self-main-
i Eead at a fortnightly conference of the officers and students of the depart-
ment of philosophy of Columbia University, on December 1, 1913.
38 THE JOURNAL QF PHILOSOPHY
tenance of the organism and its continuous progress through, a proc-
ess of change. Thus we may speak of the cycle of life of a chicken
or a dog as Shakespeare speaks of the stages of man. While we
can not say what will be the particular events in the life history
of any of these organisms, we feel quite certain that whatever may
happen to it, and however much any event may divert its course,
the eventual consequence will be the return of the organism to its
vital path otherwise there is disaster and death. Here we come
upon the chief differentium of life expressed in terms of objectively
observed behavior, viz, purposive conduct, where by purpose we
mean the maintenance of an uniquely equilibrated activity in a
particular direction in time.
Now we are in a position to ask and perhaps answer some per-
tinent questions about perception. Had we begun with perception
at the outset of this paper, we might have been led, innocently
enough, to ask how perception is possible, how it can be valid, what
its content must be and whether that content is real or not. By our
method of approach we have avoided the pitfalls of artificial prob-
lems. We have come upon our difficulty naturally, for we are con-
fronted by a real situation which we are trying to understand and
describe. We see living organisms maintaining their characters
and pursuing their careers despite many distressing obstacles; we
see life existing and operating in the face of innumerable opposing
forces. How is this managed? is a problem generated naturally
by the situation before us. The answer is that the basic means is
the process of perception.
Perception is, then, a process of a living organism that enables
it to solve the problems set for it by its environment. It is a proc-
ess of adjustment to the advantages and disadvantages, values and
disvalues of the situation in which the organism fulfills its career.
We shall presently discuss the mechanism of perception, for we al-
ready understand its function. And the knowledge of its function
saves us from the discussion of unreal problems about it. We see
that it is a process, an act, and we do not ask questions that would
be relevant to knowledge or states of mind or consciousness, but
irrelevant to perception as action. Perception is an act of adjust-
ment, and in the sense in which we have defined purpose it is a pur-
posive act. The adjustment is not purely mechanical, for it has
reference to past and future time. If I stand erect, and you come
behind me and seize my arms and jerk me backward, I fall. Yet
this is not adjustment; a dummy used in football practise will
do the same. But if you come again when I am in the same posi-
tion, and hearing your footsteps I turn around to confront you, my
act is adjustment. My turning around is not the necessary mech-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 39
anical consequent of the noise made by your approach. That I do
turn around is explicable in terms of the present situation (stim-
ulus), the past (experience), and the future (purpose).
Let us imagine an experiment with two figures, alike in every
detail, one of which named M is a machine, while the other named
X is a human being. Suppose that the machine is so ingeniously
constructed of steel and wax as to be sensitive to light and sound,
while Mr. X is uncommonly dull and expressionless. Now let us
test them to see which is animate and which inanimate. We flash
a light and both close and re-open their eyes. We set off a giant
firecracker and both jump as the great noise is heard. We are
limiting ourselves, of course, to simple tests in order not to make
too great a demand on the mechanician's ingenuity. Must we
abandon the experiment and confess our inability to devise a simple
test to reveal life as distinguished from a machine? No, for we
have as yet failed to take account of the essential factor in living
nature, viz, time. Let us repeat the loud noise at short intervals.
We observe that figure M moves with perfect ease and precision,
whereas X is not so certain in movement. One of our observers re-
marks that figure M which works so smoothly must be alive, for it
functions so well, so much better than its neighbor. But we con-
tinue to repeat the sound until presently we note that M jumps as
unhesitatingly and easily as ever, while X does not move at all.
By this time the result of the experiment is obvious to all, even,
to him who mistook efficiency for life. We infer correctly that fig-
ure M is a machine responding regularly and inevitably in a defi-
nite way to a given stimulus, whereas X, who responded in various
ways and now does not react at all, is a living being. Now all that
we had to connect X with the noise was a process of sensitiveness to
sound. There is no knowledge on his part of anything that oc-
curred, for things were so arranged that we could observe him with-
out his observing us. He can not be said to have directed his con-
duct by any idea, for whatever may be the efficiency of an idea, the
conditions for its development were not present.
How then shall we explain his behavior? How does he come to
respond variously to the same stimulus? This trait of varied re-
sponse is the other side of what we noted as the mark of life, viz,
purpose. Purpose may stand for the end in any segment of the
current of living conduct, and variation of response may be re-
garded as the means. Let us now fit means to end; let us inquire
into the mechanism of perception as manifested in our experiment.
When the giant firecracker was exploded, air vibrations were set
up which pressed against X's body, especially against his ear-drum.
The pressure was then transmitted successively to the oval window,
40
lymph, cochlea, hairs, and the fibrils leading to the auditory nerve.
The nerves conducted the movement to some center in the spinal
cord or the brain, from which center the movement was in turn con-
ducted to certain motor areas such as the leg muscles. The leg
muscles contracted and X jumped. There was evidently an in-
herited structure which permitted an immediate and coordinated re-
sponse to the noise. But the process we have described is much
too simple to account for the act of jumping, for the body needs to
be held in a certain way ; arms, neck, abdomen, etc., have their part
to play in the act. The stimulus coming in by way of the ear
must have been discharged to many parts of the body. Nor was
the body at rest when the sound was made. Many processes were
going on, such as breathing, beating of the heart, gazing around the
room aimlessly, which were noticeably affected by the change in-
duced by the sound.
There is obviously no mechanical equivalence between the energy
of the sound and the energy expended in the jump. And some have
thought this fact of excess of energy in response over stimulus to be
the distinguishing trait of organic behavior. But observation of na-
ture reveals similar occurrences in the inorganic world, where by a
slight shock nitro-glycerine is decomposed into water, carbonic acid,
and nitrogen, the process being accompanied by a powerful evolution
of energy. It is true that a slight stimulus will often initiate a great
reaction, but there is no miracle in this. It is simply a way of say-
ing that the organism is a storehouse of a large amount of poten-
tial energy which will be released whenever necessary by any
proper stimulus, however slight. In the case of X we note that the
effect of the sound pressing against his ear-drum was to release
many tendencies in his body and to disarrange or rearrange its
processes.
Now is this perception? Have we explained the situation ade-
quately by describing the physiological structure that connects
sound with jumping. Obviously not, for to stop here would be
making a mystery of stimulus and response. What is this sound
that is said to have made X jump ? It did not make us jump even
at the beginning of the experiment, and at the end it did not visibly
affect him either. Is it not obvious that in perception, at least,
the sound made by the explosion of a firecracker is to be judged
according to its contextual relations? In a certain sense it was the
same sound that we all heard. In the light and fulness of present
knowledge (and this changes in the course of time) we can study
the sound retrospectively, and then we come to agree that in the
context of this knowledge, by means of which it is interpreted, the
sound is a definite fact, and the same for all of us. But was it the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 41
same for us all when it happened? Experience is insistent on this
point, in showing that sounds, smells, tastes, etc., are very different
for various persons at various times. Then if X and you and I did
not have precisely similar perceptions, what is the cause and mark
of difference? Or, to come to closer grip with the problem, what
was the difference between his relation to the sound heard first and
the sound (agreed by us to be exactly similar) he heard last? The
first made him jump, the last made him disgusted. It is clear that
we are dealing with relations, the relations of an organism to a se-
ries of vibrations. What is this relation? Eelations are manifold
and it would be useless to go through a list of them to show what
this relation is or is not. Let us say directly that this relation is one
of meaning, a relation peculiar to living organisms in their dealings
with their environment. What Mr. X perceived was not so many
vibrations of air per second, but the meaning to him of the envi-
ronmental situation. To him the event meant danger, and as it had
meant the same for a long line of ancestors, it had, by the reactions
repeatedly called forth, formed a structure or system in his body
that enabled him to respond immediately to the stimulus.
Had X's response, the jump, proved satisfactory, we would not
have noted in this particular case any change in behavior from
rapid movement to none at all. But the jump was not satisfactory,
. e., it was not itself a value, for it did not lead to further responses.
If the sound had fulfilled its meaning (say by the presence of a
lion), X's jump would have been followed by running or fighting,
all in a continuous succession wherein every element has its mean-
ing or value by what precedes and follows it, i. e., by its place in
the continuum. But the jump was a disvalue in that it cost valu-
able energy without becoming a means to further action. The con-
dition of the organism after the jump was one of dissatisfaction.
Not that X was not happy to find himself unharmed. But com-
pare his feeling to what it would have been (and was in the case of
his ancestors) had the jump led to flight and finally to escape and
victory. "Ah," he could say, "that was a fine jump, and didn't I
run fast ! ' ' How he would have exulted in every precious moment
of the hard-fought battle! But here the jump led nowhere. It
was like the golden apples that turn to brass in your hand. It
cost so much to attain and was worth so little. It was a means to
nothing and it meant nothing.
On its physiological side the situation is probably as follows:
The energy released to the motor areas, especially to the leg
muscles, is of a quantity large enough to start the full movement,
jump run, etc. But there is a break in the motor phase of the
activity. There is no running, or very little of it, and the result is
42
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
a back-up of energy in opposition to the direction initiated by the
sound stimulus. This back-up and the resultant conflict cause a
degradation of the system. The structure gets shaky, so to speak,
and the next time the sound is heard the paths of discharge that
were formerly so free are now somewhat clogged. The sensory sit-
uation when the last sound in our experiment is heard, is such that
discharge is no longer to the motor areas, but to other centers which
do lead somewhere, say to esthetic appreciation. We see thus that
the air vibrations which first meant danger now mean something to-
tally different. The perceiving process not only relates us to what
affects us at the moment, it is not an instantaneous carving up of
the environment, or arresting of a limited portion of the surround-
ing flux. Perception is a temporal process that opens up new
things to stimulate us. It is a progressive discovery of values or
revelation of reality.
We have been considering a situation which, however plausible,
is not characteristic of perception, and it may therefore be well to
study an example of perception in daily life. Suppose, then, we
ask what happens when one sees his friend enter the room. What
is the content of the perception, is it a man one sees or merely a
reflection of one's own consciousness? Suppose that as soon as one
sees him one goes over and shakes hands with him. Of course no
one would claim to be shaking hands with a meaning, and if it is a
man one shakes hands with, it must be a man that one saw. More-
over, one could not have gone to greet him without having seen him
first; ergo, one saw a man, a physical entity having no smack or
taint of meaning about him. Let us test this situation. When the
friend stepped in, light reflected from his body, dashed against the
eyeball of his host. Now it is imagined by some that at this point
in the process of perception an image of some sort is impressed on
the retina and is then conveyed somehow to consciousness. But
the facts are different, I believe. There is no image in the retina
until the light stimulus, having first reached an appropriate brain-
center, is discharged back to the eye. The eye must be accommo-
dated for the seeing of the object from which the light stimulus
comes, and this accommodation is directed by cortical control. But
even when the circuit has been established, there is no sight of a
man. At most there is movement of the eyeball. But the man
that one sees is tall and solid; he wears a rough cheviot suit and
smooth gloves, all of which one sees contemporaneously with the sight
of his blue tie and pale cheeks. The roughness and smoothness and
solidity are evidently tactual data in perception, and if redischarge
were only to the eye there would be no perception of a man at all.
However, the organism seems to be wiser than some of its philo-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 43
aophical critics. The incoming charge reaches centers of the spinal
cord and brain, and from these centers redischarges are made in
various directions, for example, to other centers and to a number of
peripheral sense-organs. The call that reaches the organism by
way of the eye is communicated to other agents in the communal
enterprise of perception. If there is to be any perception at all, it
must be accomplished by the cooperation of the various senses and
neural centers.
Successful cooperation is dependent upon a proper coordination
of the sensory reactions. What are the conditions of this coordina-
tion? Simple observations of infants show how coordination has
to be learned. They kick and fling about and roll their eyes and
turn head and body at every stimulation. The frequent presence
of the same stimulus results in coordination becoming more easily
and rapidly effected, till presently the child perceives immediately
he sees a person completely, at once. But this is at the cost of
many previous trials in the course of which the coordination grows
better and better. Yet is it proper to regard the coordination as
fitted to the act of seeing? Has the child learned laboriously to
coordinate merely to see or recognize or know his mother? This is
contrary to the facts of life where the organism finds the object of
perception a value or disvalue. There is no consummation in see-
ing. Seeing or perceiving generally is for further action and is
conditioned by the history and destiny of the percipient. The per-
ception is conditioned by the quality of the sensory situation before
and after the perception.
So, in the case of the friend whom one sees as he enters the
room. In a sense one sees the greeting as much as the friend. For
the light stimulation from his body sets up a sensory condition
which has its roots in one's previous experience with his friend.
There are movements of the eyes and legs; there are neural cur-
rents and cross-currents in various directions. What is the quality
of these movements and how are they correlated? Is the situation
one of conflict and interference or is it one of progressive coordina-
tion? Perhaps the conflict of the various elements in the sensory
situation is such as to inhibit any response this means that there is
as yet no perception. Perhaps partial responses are being effected,
tending to bring about the coordination requisite for a total or
complete response. When the coordination occurs, a deed has been
accomplished that may be termed variously as perception, or selec-
tion of stimulus, or choice of response. In other words, the organ-
ism, disturbed or threatened or aided by the environment, has re-
stored its equilibrium, has regained the track of its career.
Now we have been trying to show that the sensory situation
44
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of conflict or of harmony is not a chance affair. Its conditions may
be analyzed and enumerated as (1) organic equilibrium, (2) or-
ganic momentum, (3) organic reserve tendencies, (4) the organ-
ism's biography or past experience, (5) its purpose. The present
sensory situation is a forecast of my future movement, for that fu-
ture movement will be the outgrowth of factors operating in the
present situaion. But this situation derives its character from the
organism's experience of the consequences of its previous responses
to disturbances of this sort. Former consequences of organic ac-
tion have so affected the organism that its present activities have a
tendency to attain or avoid certain consequences of its own beha-
vior, or, in other words, to develop certain values by its own conduct.
"When, therefore, the coordination takes place, the perception
on its mental side is a feeling of my present organic attitude, which
is what it is because of my experience and my purpose. The per-
ception is thus an anticipation as well as a recognition. The friend
whom one sees is the friend who was a value or source of happiness
yesterday, and who will be the same presently. In seeing him one
has a feeling of the outcome of one's present organic attitude, an
anticipation of the consequences of his conduct his developing re-
sponse to his -developing stimulus. Stated differently, perception
is a cardinal point in a process of selecting a stimulus and response,
neither of which could be chosen separately, and both of which,
have their mental aspect in a feeling of anticipation.
The organism is constantly gambling with the odds as much in
its favor as it can manage. It does not respond without an inter-
est in the outcome of the response as a source of further stimuli to
further action. It is always in a situation of stimulus response
stimulus, a situation which though compelling the organism to re-
act somehow, yet permits it to react intelligently, by affording an
opportunity for choice. Perception is a process of choosing, for it
is the intermedium between the organism's present stage and the
stage which it desires to attain. The organism may experiment
with its environment in order to determine the various steps in^its
forward march. But experiment is too dangerous, if the whole or-
ganism is to be risked in testing every situation. Why not develop
a mediating process, a sort of buffer, whose function it shall be to
experiment with disturbing stimuli, and thus to presage in the
presently operating organic situation the quality of the possible
consequences of organic action, while these consequences themselves
are yet undetermined? Here is opportunity for choice. The organ-
ism, having felt the consequences of its conduct, in a part of itself, a
part that stands midway between it and its environment, is free to
determine what its behavior as a whole shall be.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 45
A perception is then definable as a choice of a stimulus and re-
sponse in view of selected consequences to which they may lead.
The friend one sees is the friend one expects to greet, who will greet
one warmly, and with whom one will spend a pleasant evening. None
of these expectations is necessarily known as such. Here it is im-
portant to recall that perception as we have been limiting the use of
the term is not a state of mind, or a fact of knowledge, but primarily
a fact of organic action. Suppose an indescribably strange creature
to enter the room of a person who is resting on a couch. Observe his
behavior as soon as his conduct appears to be a function of the
strange visitor's presence. Does he remain quite still, does he ap-
proach the intruder, or does he flee? We notice that his eyes shut
and reopen quickly, his fingers twitch and are clenched into a fist,
his limbs shake in short, he appears in a number of conflicting atti-
tudes of attack and defense. These attitudes have their counter-
parts in many partial responses that are taking place within his sen-
sory system. Of the many tendencies that are contending for overt
execution one becomes dominant and a coordination of the sensory
system is effected now perception takes place. The invader has
uttered a loud shrieking sound, and his frightened victim hides
under the couch.
"When asked later by a friend why he is so cold and pale, he says
that he ran away from a ghost or what-not. When his friend sug-
gests that it was a witch he assents; when told that it must have
been Mephisto, he says, " Certainly. " Then his friend discloses
that it was himself playing a trick on him, and when he has re-
gained his composure he says, " Why of course it was you !" and they
go over the details of the experience. It is clear that neither friend
nor devil entered into the experience when it happened, but it is
easily reconstructed retrospectively. What occurred was a feeling
of an organic tendency to flee from a presence that had a meaning of
dread, an anticipation of harm. Action and perception took place,
but there was hardly anything that could be called knowledge.
Now what is the relation of perception to knowledge, on one
hand, and to action, on the other? Perception is not a knowing,
not an idea; neither is it a complete overt act. Perception is a pe-
culiar kind of action, viz, the organism's incipient act, its internal
and partial activity leading to overt action and to knowledge. We
have, of course, been discussing the process of perceiving. If we
must employ the word "perception," let us limit its use to desig-
nate an organic situation, which on its motor side is a coordination
of tendencies into a definite incipient action that is the mean be-
tween chosen stimulus and response, and on its mental side a feel-
ing of anticipation of future consequences.
46
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
In assigning this definition to the word perception we are not
doing violence to language, though we are dealing pretty roughly
with "the genteel tradition in philosophy " that set up the elaborate
outfit of sensations, images, ideas, states of consciousness, etc., in
order to connect two parts of a complex, which are first artificially
separated and then miraculously rejoined. In the view that we
have been trying to explain the organism and its environment are
in continuous and dynamic relation. The attitude of the organism
to its surrounding material is fundamentally one of touching, grip-
ping, etc., and is manifested in many forms of various degrees of
refinement, such as taste, smell, hearing, and seeing. What better
word could be used to denote this attitude or activity than the word
"perceive" which originally meant, to seize or hold through some-
thing, or take possession of a thing thoroughly? The internal ac-
tivity through which the organism takes thorough possession of its
environment, by means of which it discovers the values needed for
the fulfilment of its career there you have perception.
ISAAC AARONSON.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
MISS CALKINS ON IDEALISM AND REALISM 1
THE controversy between realists and idealists promises to be un-
ending, partly because both parties are guilty of unconscious fallacies
in their arguments, which remain undetected by their opponents. I
think such a fallacy lies in Miss Calkins 's paper, a fallacy which
affects the root of the matter (the quotations are abbreviated for
convenience).
"The realist" says Miss Calkins "describes an object as yellow.
Some one may deny the yellowness. This throws the realist back on
what he directly observes, what he knows with certainty that he is
having a complex experience described by the term yellowness"
(p. 603).
There is a fallacy here in stating the true position of the realist,
and as it is a fallacy often acquiesced in by realists themselves, it may
again have escaped detection. The final sentence, so far from being
unchallengeable, verges on the absurd. If the original assertion
made by the realist be denied, he is undoubtedly thrown back, like
every one else, on what he directly observes ; that is his final court of
appeal. The questions, then, are, "What does he observe? Of what is
he certain ? and no realist can, or should, accept the answer to these
questions put into his mouth by Miss Calkins, who says the realist
1 ' is having a complex experience described by the term yellowness. ' J
i This JOURNAL, Vol. IX., page 603.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 47
Now to ' ' describe an entity by a term " is to assert that the entity
is of the character, or has the quality or attribute, denoted by that
term. If I describe this journal by the term valuable, I mean it has
the quality of value, I conjoin the entity with the character denoted
by the term; so that what Miss Calkins does is to make the realist
assert that his experience has the character of yellowness. But this
is not at all what the realist first asserted he described the object,
not his experience, as yellow, and Miss Calkins brings forward
nothing which can make him change his standpoint and modify his
assertion.
In making the realist say that he has an experience described by
the term yellowness, Miss Calkins does one of two things ; she either
(1) identifies the object of the realist with his experience regards
the statement "this object is described by the term yellowness" as
identical in meaning and final implication with "my experience is
described by the term yellowness." Or (2) if she does not so
identify object and experience, then she regards the realist's asser-
tion, "the object is described by the term yellow," as enabling and
justifying her to say that, therefore, his experience is described by
the term yellowness to argue from the one to the other.
The realist can, however, controvert both alternatives. Miss
Calkins herself seems to adopt the first, for we have (p. 605) "yellow
is a certain experience which a self has, just as any relation is a self-
in-its-relating a self as knowing"; this is a type of terminology
frequent among idealists. I can never succeed in understanding the
second form of it; "any relation is a self in relation" seems to
identify part with whole surely the self in relation is something
more than, and essentially different from, the relation merely.
Take an instance outside philosophy, and we quickly get a
reductio ad absurdam. ' ' Any relation is a self in relation. ' ' Marriage
is a relation. Therefore, marriage is a person married! and more
generally, a relation implies the terms it relates, and can in no sense
be identified with either of its terms.
In its first form (yellow is an experience) it can be accepted by
realists only with very careful and accurate definition and explana-
tion, if it is not denied altogether. The point lies in the exact sense
in which the term experience is used and understood.
I suppose realists and idealists will alike accept the assertion "I
am conscious"; and if I am conscious, I must be conscious of some-
thing; or since the word "thing" has already a definite usage and
implications, let us say "I am conscious of some entity," where
"entity" merely denotes what I am conscious of and carries here no
implications whatever as to its nature.
Now it is possible to use the word experience in one of two
48 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
mutually exclusive and incompatible senses, (a) I may choose to
say "I experience an entity" in the sense, and instead of, "I am
conscious of an entity;" we do this commonly, e. g., "I experience
an emotion, or a desire, or a determination." It is less usual and
more questionable to say "I experience an orange." But with this
construction of the word, in neither case can we say that the entity
is the experience, even if it be experienced; we can not identify or
confuse the entity which is experienced with the experiencing of the
entity; we can not say "yellow is an experience," even if we admit
the expression "yellow is experienced"; for that would be, on this
interpretation of experience, to identify what I am conscious of with
my being conscious of it. (&) On the other hand, we may use
experience to denote the entities of which I am conscious. Here
again we find a common usage, as when we say "my emotions, or
pains, constituted a terrible experience"; and here again it is less
usual and more questionable to say "the objects and qualities I per-
ceive are my experience," but in this case it is still less legitimate to
identify "experience" as denoting what I am conscious of, with my
being conscious itself.
Hence, if realists admit the expression "yellow is an experience"
it can only be in sense (&), meaning yellow is something which is
experienced, which I am conscious of. Nor can idealists derive any
controversial advantage from this admission, because to admit that
an entity is experienced in sense (&), implies in itself nothing further
about the nature of the entity; neither idealism or realism, unfor-
tunately, has any a priori foundations; the nature of the entities
still remains to be determined. We can not at once go on to say, as
Miss Calkins does (p. 604), "yellow is a way in which I am con-
scious." The utmost we can say is that "seeing yellow is a way in
which I am conscious"; but "seeing yellow" and "yellow seen" are
two entirely different things.
On the other hand, if Miss Calkins does not identify object and
experience, she can not ignore the realist's original assertion (which
was that he described the object as yellow), and substitute for that
that his experience is described as yellow. To transform the argu-
ment is not to rebut it. The realist will adhere to his original asser-
tion (provided he really is certain of what he is conscious). He will
say, if his assertion be denied, "the object is yellow, for I am certain
that I see, or perceive, or experience, if you like, it is yellow. But my
seeing, or perceiving, or even experiencing this, is certainly not to be
described by the term yellowness. I can not understand such an
assertion. I can not conceive seeing or perceiving, as a visual proc-
ess, or experiencing as a conscious process or relation, to be described
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 49
by the term yellowness that is an adjective applicable only to
material objects, not to the process of their cognition."
J. E. TURNEB.
LIVERPOOL, ENGLAND.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Enjoyment of Poetry. MAX EASTMAN. New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons. 1913. Pp. xi -f 224.
The excellence of Mr. Eastman's book is its unusual vitality. No
reader is likely to come from it with indifference. Whether it will " in-
crease enjoyment," as it is intended to do, remains to be seen. If the
reader is a scholar, or if he has thought much on the nature of poetry,
he will be puzzled and offended by the smartness, one is tempted to say
the boyish wilfulness, with which Mr. Eastman continually drops his sub-
ject and takes a shot at trained or organized investigation of truth. " A
misfortune incident to all education," he says, "is the fact that those
who elect to be teachers are scholars." Much in the book, unfortunately,
will increase the enjoyment of those who like to see scholarship chastised,
and who like to see that " art of life " exploited which consists of doing
and believing what one pleases. But Mr. Eastman might take his de-
fense from his own pages. In the chapter on " Realization of Things," he
quotes Edward Carpenter's " Little Brook Without a Name," which he
considers " one of the very precious poems of recent times " : " The little
mouse, the water-shrew, walks (even like Jesus Christ) upon the flood,
paddling quickly over the surface with its half -webbed feet." Comment-
ing on the art of shocking, here illustrated, he says : " Such extreme meas-
ures are at times indispensable to the sustainment of poetry. Something'
has to explode. Our souls must be invaded and ravaged, so ponderous is
their lethargy in which they apprehend only vague presences and general
bearings of things. Sing ' Lord ! Lord ! ' forever, and you rouse no hearts
to repentance ; but shout l Sky-Blasting Jehovah ! ' and some necks will
move." Mr. Eastman teaches us in the key of " Sky-Blasting Jehovah ! "
and his book, is vital our necks do move.
And he does teach us. I feel bound by my own devotion to poetry to
state at once the unfortunate twist in the book which will probably alien-
ate most scholars; to state simply my great admiration for the new and
sound things in the volume might imply some agreement (whereas I feel
none at all) with Mr. Eastman's judgments of scholarship and science.
But once this discrimination is made, his doctrine is immensely sugges-
tive. The heart of it is in the first chapter, where he defines the poetic
temperament as the disposition to realize the flavor of life, to taste the
quality of experience rather than to control it. This poetic tendency holds
in all kinds of living in the senses, in memory, in the intellect. Simple
as the definition is, and old as it is, it takes on extraordinary vigor in
Mr. Eastman's handling; this brief chapter may well provide a turning-
point in the mental life of many a reader.
50 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
This definition of what is poetic, it should be noticed, is from the
standpoint of one who experiences poetry, but does not create it. The book
would have been more effective if it had all been written from this point
of view; the title certainly leads us to expect as much. We should not
then have been puzzled by the chapter " To Compose Poetry." To be sure,
we should have missed its encouraging first sentence " The knowledge
needed to create an English rhythm, the only general knowledge there is
upon that subject, may be acquired while one converses about it " ; but we
would gladly exchange that encouragement for a chapter on how to read
English rhythm after it is created a far more difficult and necessary step
toward the enjoyment of poetry. It should also be noticed that this defini-
tion of what is poetic is as good for music or any other art as is is for
literature. Yet when Mr. Eastman begins to apply it more closely to
literature, the art he is for the moment concerned with, he limits the defi-
nition so that it can no longer apply to music, not even to verbal music,
but only to the arts which present or suggest pictures.
This narrowing of the definition appears in the second, third, and
fourth chapters, in which the distinction is made at some length between
the " language that chooses " and the " language that compares." Illus-
trations of the first kind are, winter squash, Canada fox, ball-and-socket,
office building, steamboat, railroad, money-saver, and motor-cyclist. Illus-
trations of the second kind the poetic kind are, blue-eyed grass, golden-
rod, fire-bird, dovetail, sky-scraper, ocean-greyhound, pinchpenny, rake-
hell, swashbuckler, spitfire, Mil-joy, and slipgibbet. The obvious differ-
ence between these lists is that the " poetic " words all are metaphorical,
and the others are not. We begin to see that to Mr. Eastman, as to Mr.
Hudson Maxim, poetry is simply metaphor. We notice that the verse
illustrations quoted in the book so far are from poems richer in images
than in music ; we are prepared for the statement (p. 36) that " poetic
creation begins in us when we marry . . . the images of memory to the
impressions of sense," and also for the statement (p. 95) that "poetry
... is a series of pictures accompanied by appropriate music." The
" appropriate music," the " vocal wonder " of poetry, is treated in the
chapter called " Poetry Itself " as something which is " built up " by such
constructors of verse as Tennyson, Lanier, Poe, Kipling, and Francis
Thompson.
But where are the images or pictures accompanied by appropriate
music in Tennyson's
Better to have loved and lost
Than never to have loved at all,
or in Burns's
Had we never lov 'd sae kindly,
Had we never lov'd sae blindly,
Never met or never parted
We had ne'er been broken-hearted,
or in Paolo's words to Dante,
quel giorno piu non vi leggemmo avante,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 51
or in Ophelia's answer to Hamlet, " I was the more deceived " ? The fact
is that Mr. Eastman has forgotten what to most of us is the very essence
of poetry he has forgotten the emotion. The poetic realization of life,
that which distinguishes it from the practical realization, is a storing-up
of passion which craves to be released. Mr. Eastman does not believe this,
I know; he says (p. 51): "Words make the world grow not, I think,
because they express a feeling, for that means that they relieve you of it,
but because they give to the feeling locality and distinct body." But
which of us who has written anything, has not felt that words do relieve
us of emotion? The mood is exhausted. A reader undergoes a similar
though more leisurely exhaustion; after repeated readings of any poem
he " becomes tired of it," and must lay it aside until he has stored up new
emotions for it to express. He can not understand a poem at all until he
has experienced the emotion it is calculated to relieve. In " Hamlet " we
live through the experience which Ophelia's words express; we experience
her devotion to the Prince, and when he says " I never loved you," we real-
ize our own heart-break in her quiet "I was the more deceived." Paolo's
narrative, similarly, has admitted us to a share in his tragic love of
Francesca, so that the simple statement " That day we read no more," does
justice to what is in our hearts. A dramatist or a story-teller prepares the
emotion which he later releases in poetry; a lyric poet must assume this
emotional preparation in the reader. But in all cases the poetic quality of
the language consists in the adequateness with which it provides an out-
let for the emotion. It may provide this outlet by an image, or by a
verbal cadence, or by mere felicity of diction.
If Mr. Eastman had remembered that emotion, and not image, is
cardinal in poetic expression, he would not have identified poetry with
slang. It is tiresome to be told so often, especially when we do not believe
it, that this or that vulgar expression is poetic. Slang is figurative, but
never poetic. It never gives any one the uplift expected of poetry; it can
not because it expresses no emotion. To lean against the leather, to rap
out a two-bagger, to zip it to the fence, are according to Mr. Eastman,
poetic expressions. Yet it is perhaps easier to believe that they were
manufactured in cold blood than that they sprang out of the realization of
life; for, like all slang, they save us the trouble, not only of feeling, but
of thinking. Mr. Eastman might answer that slang, though it immedi-
ately does become formula, is not so to the man who invented it; to him
it is poetry. That might be questioned; but Mr. Eastman would then be
talking of the creator, not of the reader, and we should notice that from
the standpoint of the reader slang, as soon as it is invented, becomes a
mere formula, whereas poetry does not.
Also if Mr. Eastman had remembered that emotion, and not image, is
cardinal in poetic expression, he probably would not have made those lists
of poetic and of practical words; for surely he would not be understood
to believe in an eighteenth-century poetic diction, a certain preserve of
language whence the authentic words of poetry may be drawn. That
critic would be bold indeed who would say that any word is unfit for
poetic use; the genius may arrive at any moment who will make that
52 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
word the vehicle of emotion. Conversely, I am surprised that Mr. East-
man should list any words as thougK he could guarantee them to be poetic;
it depends on how they are used. Is " sky-scraper," in the mouth of most
New Yorkers, an expression of the flavor of experience, a conscious satis-
faction in a Homeric image? or is it just a practical word, used for
control ?
Perhaps I have failed to indicate how highly I value this book. It has
stimulated me to much thinking, and it has helped me toward setting my
own house in order. If I object to his onslaughts upon the professional
scholars, Mr. Eastman will not be surprised, since I belong in that camp.
Like all else in his book, the onslaughts are interesting, and will, as I
admitted, provide enjoyment for many readers; but I leave the book con-
vinced that it is only the noblest kind of enjoyment that Mr. Eastman
really wishes to provide. JOHN ERSKINE .
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
The Philosophy of the Present in Germany. OSWALD KULPE. Translated
from the fifth German edition by MAUD LYALL PATRICK and G. T. W.
PATRICK. New York : The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. vii + 256.
This is certainly a better book than popular expositions of philosophy
usually are. It is small and readable. It is not, apparently, addressed to
students of philosophy, but to the German reading public, and it was worth
translating. That does not mean, however, that the philosophy it describes
is particularly modern. The breath of really modern thinking does not
seem to have fluttered these pleasant pages. Still, the title indicates the
subject sufficiently well.
It was rather a happy thought to sum up contemporary philosophy in
Germany under the headings of positivism, materialism, naturalism, and
idealism; under each of these topics there is a brief exposition of the phi-
losophy of its chief representatives, and a statement of their shortcomings.
The expositions are clear, but in the case of Mach a reader has the im-
pression that the author could not get the point of view he seeks to criti-
cize: in general, criticisms tend a little to the reproach that the writers
reviewed overlooked considerations that belonged to other systems than
their own; the trouble is not that they did not do well what they tried to
do, but that they did not do well what they had no intention to do.
Positivism is represented by Mach and Diihring, materialism by
Haeckel, naturalism by Nietzsche, and idealism by Eechner, Lotze,
von Hartmann, and Wundt. It is not surprising that materialism
fares rather badly, and it is certainly a pity to define naturalism as
something that can be illustrated by any writer who claims that his
doctrine is a return to nature. The chapter on Nietzsche is well
written in spite of the following quotation from it : " The sterner philo-
sophical disciplines, such as logic and the theory of knowledge, Nietzsche
touched upon only casually and never gave himself up to their prob-
lems with original interest; and in the other branches which he liked
to cultivate, such as metaphysics and ethics, he has no exact results to
offer. We can not call him, therefore, really a philosopher. Life was his
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 53
problem, and his heartfelt interest was the determination of life's value
and life's problems. This is the only theme which his thought mastered,
and this theme he was able with astonishing versatility of spirit to express
in every form of variation from the lowest to the most ideal" (p. 128).
Nevertheless, Nietzsche was not " really a philosopher." " But his own
time will come. . . . Then we shall welcome his criticisms just so far
as they point to actual evils. . . . Then we shall recognize in his judg-
ments and descriptions the direct expression of an original and signifi-
cant sensibility. . . ." One asks quite simply, " why not now ? "
No one of the four schools of thought selected for analysis will be the
philosophy of the future. That philosophy is most likely to result from
the cooperation of positivism and idealism. Scientific empiricism has de-
throned old-fashioned rationalism, but " neo-rationalism " will come to
our aid. How else will philosophers of the future be able to lecture about
the " world-riddle " ? Many things in the book are neatly put. " Leibniz
attributed to all thought, in so far as it takes place without contradiction,
a real significance and objective validity. According to this modern doc-
trine [Mach], on the contrary, all thought is merely formal. In both
cases the difference between mathematics and metaphysics ceases to exist,
but in the first case mathematics becomes metaphysics, while in the sec-
ond, vice versa, metaphysics becomes mathematics" (p. 242).
W. T. BUSH.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
ARCHIV FUR GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. July, 1913.
Friedrich Rosens' s Darstellung der persischen My stile: L. STEIN. -A note
calling attention to the reprint of Georg Rosens's translation of the
Mesnevi, the greatest work of the Persian mystics. Friedrich Rosens, son
of the translator, has contributed a noteworthy introduction to the new
edition. Platos Stellung zu Erziehungsfragen: DR. JEGEL. - A painstaking
and systematic presentation of Plato's teaching on education as found in
the Republic and the Laws. The aim of Plato in education was to train
the youth to be capable citizens serviceable to the state. BemerTcungen zur
Abfassungszeit und Methode der Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe:
EDGAR ZILSEL. -The first section of the "Amphiboly of Reflective Con-
cepts " in the " Critique of Pure Reason " comes from the year 1771 ; the
second and third divisions are supplementary presentations of later years.
The " Reflective Concepts " were uncritical forerunners of the " Cate-
gories." The first division accepts a knowable " Noumenon," the second
denies it, the third recognizes it as the limit of that which may be known.
Eleitophon wider Socrates: DR. H. BRUNNECKE. - " Cleitophon " is a
genuine Platonic dialogue in which Antisthenes is attacked under the
name of Socrates, and the bankruptcy of the Cynic teaching revealed as
preparation for the message of the Platonic Socrates in the dialectical com-
54
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
bat with Thrasymachus in the presence of Cleitophon in the beginning-
of the Republic. Philological studies corroborate this view, and show that
the dialogue was written in the later years of Plato's life. The Logic
of Antisthenes, Part I. : C. M. GILLESPIE. - An analysis of the passages
referring to Antisthenes, and a statement of his views on logic. Hobbes's
teachings are used as a basis of comparison. Rezensionen. Die neuesten
Erscheinungn auf der Gebiet der Geschichte der Philosophic. Beiheft:
Die Wissenschaft Demokrits und ihr Einfluss auf die moderne Natur-
wissenschaft : Louis LOWENHEIM. - This supplement contains the intro-
ductory sections of a work whose endeavor is to expound the teachings of
Democritus, and to show that he was the greatest figure in Greek thought,
and the real father of our modern scientific period. This latter title he
may claim since he was the teacher of Galileo who broke the homogeneous
Roman-Medieval tradition and returned to the Greek type of thought,
similarity to which characterizes the best work of our day. Lowenheim's
exposition is marked by freshness of approach, and by singular freedom
from tradition, but the evidence for his assertions frequently seems
rather slender.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. July, 1913. Philosophy in
France in 1912 (pp. 357-374) : A. LALANDE. - The topic of most frequent
current discussion is religion and philosophy. There is given an analysis
and criticism of Durkheim's Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse,
the leading philosophical work of the year. Contributions to the philos-
ophy of science are mentioned. French philosophy is poor in logical
theories. Identity as a Principle of Stable Values and as a Principle of
Predication (pp. 375-394) : L. E. HICKS. - " The postulate of a stability
sufficient to know things, to make assertions about them, to combine state-
ments in a chain of reasoning, is not out of harmony with actual condi-
ditions in a changing world. At the same time it is quite sufficient for
both epistemology and logic." Ethical Objectivity in the Light of Social
Psychology (pp. 395-409) : WILLIAM K. WRIGHT. - Current psychological
analysis has tended toward a subjectivistic account of moral standards.
The Social Psychology of McDougall, it is claimed, furnishes an adequate
basis for an objective ethics which will satisfy the demands of empirical
psychology. Discussion: Error and the New Realism (pp. 410-423) : A. O.
LOVEJOY. - A criticism of the three different solutions offered by Professors
Holt, Montague, and Pitkin, of the problem of error and illusion and their
reconcilement with the main thesis of neo-realism, with the conclusion
that the enterprise in which these neo-realistic writers is engaged is " one
in which success is impossible." Reviews of Books: James H. Leuba,
A Psychological Study of Religion: ERNEST L. TALBERT. Emile Durkheim,
Les formes elementaires de la vie religieuse : IRVING KING. Herbert Leslie
Stewart, Questions of the Day in Philosophy and Psychology: GEORGE H.
SABINE. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.
Castle, Cora Sutton. A Statistical Study of Eminent Women. Archives
of Psychology, No. 27. New York: The Science Press. 1913. Pp.
vii 90.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 65
Hollingworth, H. L. Advertising and Selling: Principles of Appeal and
Response. New York : D. Appleton Company. 1913. Pp. xiii -f- 314.
$2.00.
Hyslop, James H. Psychical Research and Survival. London: G. Bell
and Sons. New York : The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. x + 207.
$1.00.
Lasson, Georg. Hegels Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie.
Leipzig : Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1913. Pp. viii -+- 513. 7 M.
Ludowici, August. Das Genetische Prinzip: Versuch einer Lebenslehre.
Miinchen : F. Bruckmann. 1913. Pp. 299. 6 M.
Mamelet, A. Le Relativisme Philosophique chez Georg Simmel. Paris:
Librairie Felix Alcan. 1914. Pp. xi + 214. 3.75 F.
Maritain, J. La Philosophic Bergsonienne. Paris : Marcel Riviere et Cie.
1914. Pp. 477. 9 F.
Richter, Raoul. Essays. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1913. Pp.
xv + 416. 4M.
Schleiermacher Ausegewahlte Werke in vier Banden. Band II. Leipzig:
Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1913. Pp. xxx -f 703. 12.50 M.
NOTES AND NEWS
LETTER FROM PROFESSOR WILM
To THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIEN-
TIFIC METHODS:
I have to thank Professor Hocking for the interesting comments on a
recent book of mine called " The Problem of Religion," which he printed
in this JOURNAL. 1 I think, however, that those who have read Mr. Hock-
ing's review, but have not read my book (and the latter class must easily
include the majority of mankind) may have received a very partial view
of the sort of philosophy which my book really attempts to express. This
would, by itself, be a fact of very slight importance. Since, however, the
matter involves a principial question in philosophy, one which seems never
to remain long in abeyance, the question, namely, of philosophical method,
it may be worth while to exploit it somewhat further.
" The problem of religion," Mr. Hocking writes, apparently with crit-
ical intentions, " reduces, for the author, to a question of theory : ' the only
valid source of religious truth is philosophy.' The contributions of social
tradition and of intuition to religious knowledge receive scant recognition
in comparison, for example, with their place in Royce's ' The Sources of
Religious Insight.' Philosophy, as here understood, summarily excludes
revelation or authority in any historic sense."
Now, in so far as the positions here attributed to me serve to disparage
pseudo-scientific and occult methods of arriving at truth, and emphasize
methodically guarded reflection upon our experience as the sole organon
of the philosophy of religion, I most cordially subscribe to them. On the
i Vol. X., page 719.
56
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
other hand, I disclaim the suggestion, apparently also attributed to me r
that truth can be arrived at by the manipulation of empty concepts, or
that religion, even, comes into being as the result of formally logical proc-
esses. Philosophy does not create religion ex nihilo any more than it
creates art or the state. Our " social experience," including the social ex-
perience of the past as crystallized in tradition, does, of course, furnish the
indispensable materials for any religious interpretation of the world. We
do not pick our philosophies out of the air. On the other hand, social ex-
perience, whether original or traditional, can not be accepted unreflec-
tively. But the critical reflection upon experience is philosophy.
Furthermore, religion has uses, and it contains poetic and sentimental
values which are to many persons very precious, and which can be felt
without theorizing about them. But these values and graces can be ex-
hibited in their context and articulately justified only by philosophy. The
only alternative to this which I see is a mystic absorption which either chokes
utterance completely, or else limits the intellect to the stolid reiteration,
" God is great." It is a matter for congratulation that Professor Hocking
has himself not rested in so brief a creed, but has written a thick book to
show both that God is great and in what sense great.
E. C. WILM.
WELLS COLLEGE.
The American Psychological Association and the American Philosoph-
ical Association held a joint meeting at Yale University on December
29 to 31. This was the twenty-second annual meeting of the former
association and the thirteenth annual meeting of the latter association.
On the evening of December 29 the President of the Philosophical Asso-
ciation delivered his address. A joint dinner of the two associations was
followed by the address of the President of the Psychological Association
and an informal smoker on the evening of December 30. The joint meet-
ing of the two associations was held on December 31. The Psychological
Association elected the following officers: President, Professor R. M.
Ogden, of the University of Tennessee ; Secretary and Treasurer, Professor
W. H. Sheldon, of Dartmouth College; Members of Council, Professor S.
I. Franz, of the Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C.,
and Professor G. M. Whipple, of Cornell University. The following
officers were elected by the Philosophical Association : President, Professor
J. H. Tufts, of the University of Chicago; Vice-president, Professor W.
H. Sheldon, of Dartmouth College; Secretary and Treasurer, Professor
E. G. Spaulding, of Princeton University; Members of the Executive
Committee, Professor C. M. Bakewell, of Yale University; Professor
I. Woodbridge Riley, of Vassar College, and Professor Wendell T. Bush,
of Columbia University (to serve one year in place of Miss Calkins,,
resigned).
VOL. XI. No. 3. JANUARY 29, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
SOCIETIES
THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
rpHE thirteenth annual meeting of the American Philosophical
-L Association was held at Yale University, December 29, 30, and
31, in conjunction with the meeting of the affiliated Psychological
Association. Altogether the affair was highly successful not only
from the interest of the papers presented, but also, on the social side,
from the cordial hospitality of Yale and her graduate club, together
with the excellent facilities for commingling at the Hotel Taft, the
headquarters of both associations.
That the presence of the two associations together in New Haven
was appreciated by their members was attested by the frequent ex-
change of visits at their respective sessions and the awakening dis-
cussion of the joint meeting on Wednesday morning. Except for the
address of the President of the Philosophical Association, Professor
McGilvary, Monday evening was left open and gave grateful oppor-
tunity for private dinners and reunions of friends, while a joint
dinner and smoker, on Tuesday, served to bring the members of the
two associations together to listen to Professor Warren, the President
of the Psychological Association, and to exchange views informally.
As the addresses of both presidents will be published shortly
there is no need of summarizing them here. Professor McGilvary
spoke on "Time and the Experience of Time," distinguishing his
position from the positions of James, Bergson, and Royce ; and Pro-
fessor Warren, on ' ' The Mental and the Physical, ' ' setting forth the
advantages of a "double aspect" theory in the present state of psy-
chological investigation.
The general attendance at the meetings of the Philosophical
Association was large, although tardy arrivals somewhat weakened
the first session, and haste to leave town, or perhaps an unusually
interesting programme of the psychologists, reduced the attendance
at the last session to a pitiful handful. It was evident that few
papers and extended general discussion contribute most to the ends
57
58
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of the association, for in spite of the general excellence of Monday's
papers and their bearing on the next day's discussion, night came
without that clear demarcation of problems and issues which consti-
tutes the only end practicably attainable by such discussion. The
association would do well to consider the advantages of a more radical
adherence to the method of topical discussion introduced by a small
number of papers. Furthermore, the contrast between the outcome
of the longer discussion of Tuesday and the more limited one of the
joint session indicated that one day, at least, is necessary for the best
results.
If, however, it is necessary to retain a miscellaneous programme
for the benefit of those whose interests can not be met by the chosen
topics, certain modifications of this year's programme seem advis-
able. In the first place, the beginning is a more desirable locus for
such papers than the end, for the sake both of avoiding the discon-
certing anticlimax of a vanishing audience and of approaching fresh
minds and not those already jaded or turned to other lines of reflec-
tion by previous meetings. Secondly, the practise of circulating
abstracts should not be allowed to lapse so that, as at the present
meeting, most critics begin with the apology that they had had no
abstracts should not be allowed to lapse so that, as at the present
tion of a speaker's time is twenty minutes, he should write a twenty-
minute paper and not make extempore and not always intelligible
omissions, or read against time at a speed far greater than human
articulatory powers can master or human apprehension meet.
Monday morning's meeting was duly opened by Professor Mc-
Gilvary. Professor W. M. Urban spoke on "Existance, Value, and
Reality." His contentions were that value is indefinable; that it
belongs neither to existence nor to subsistence, but is a third type of
objective ; that value presupposes existence, but does not depend upon
it ; that all values are scaled ; and that a theory of existence is inde-
pendent of a theory of value. Professor Pitkin pointed out that what
we have here is really a relational theory of value, and he maintained
that the theory could be better stated in other terms. Professor Ur-
ban 's conception of a special value judgment seemed to him undesir-
able. Professor Sheldon objected to conceiving value as something that
lies behind qualities that are not values, or, in other words, to making
them a sort of Kantian thing-in-itself. He also expressed a wish for
a presentation of concrete instances. Professor Urban replied that he
was trying to eliminate the value judgment, but he could not accept
value as quality because of such ambiguities as that of the concept
of good, used in the ethical, and in the more general sense.
If the first discussion seemed based on the assumption that the
meaning of words can be determined apart from concrete situations,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 59
Professor Henderson's paper, on "The Scale of Values," proceeded
in the opposite fashion. A questionnaire was presented with a view to
scaling moral, intellectual, social, economic, taste, and health values
in the order of desirability. There was rather general dissent to the
questionnaire proposed by Professor Henderson both on the ground
of ambiguity as to the exact situations intended, and a tendency of
his cases, in some instances, to involve each other surreptitiously.
Professors Tufts, Sheldon, and Creighton introduced a discussion as
to the value of any hypothetical situations on the ground that choices
made in them differ fundamentally from those made under the pres-
sure of actual living. Attention then turned to the classes of people
from whom answers had been obtained, and many thought these
rather artificially selected. Professor Henderson's reply recognized
these objections, but he insisted that an approximation had been
obtained in the order moral, intellectual, social, property, and health
values, that had some predictive significance as to the choices of
most individuals.
The last paper of the morning, Professor Cohen's "History versus
Value," contested the value of history as peculiarly exhibiting the
nature of things, or their values. The special cases of economics,
jurisprudence, ethics, politics, religion, and philosophy were examined
for evidence. The opinion of the meeting seemed, however, to accord
with that expressed by Professor Woodbridge, that a false use of
history had been assumed in the argument, for while history does
not determine standards, it is an extension of experience, and often
enables us to understand valuations through the conditions that
gave rise to them. Professor Tufts also insisted upon the value of
the correct use of history, illustrating his point by a conception of
law as a growing essence.
In the afternoon Dr. Kallen was first on the programme with a
brilliantly written paper on "Value and Existence in Art and Re-
ligion." In a world not made for man, men must contradict their
own experience ; hence, value has its seat, not in nature, but in human
nature. Value appears as an ideal reconstruction of environment;
the unity of mind results from the interests of the body. Immor-
tality and freedom are also desiderates, but while art acknowledges
the reality of experience and changes existence into values by inject-
ing value into it, religion conserves values which it postulates outside
of existence, but does not create them. Professor Hocking anathe-
matized the paper as an epitome of what he most disbelieved. Re-
ligion and philosophy do not deal with the unreal and subjective.
Values are rooted in experience and in the permanent. Because of
the possibility of a vicarious satisfaction of instincts, the plurality
of values is not ultimate, but can be reduced to forms of the one value.
60 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Dr. Kallen replied that the empirical attitude is self-validating in
the struggle for existence and that the conditions of satisfaction are
not facts.
Professor Tufts presented the most empirical paper of the after-
noon, on "Social Factors in the Judgment of Value. " The situa-
tion in which predicates of valuation arise is dominated by a selec-
tive activity of the organism. This may change its character from
time to time as can be seen in the history of economic, social, ethical,
and esthetic values. The good, for example, is empirically only
good because good people approve it. Existence could only deter-
mine a standard of value if we could find in the universe something
sympathetic to ourselves, a larger self, as it were. Professor Over-
street voiced the importance of the analysis of actual situations where
the type of situation determines value, but he objected to distinc-
tions made in terms of objectivity, subjectivity, or mixed forms when
we don't really know what objectivity, etc., mean. It is better to
think of value merely in terms of real situation. Professor Tufts,
however, felt that this was merely a question of nomenclature.
Professor Montague's paper, "A Neo-realistic Conception of
Value," defined values as "all objects in so far as they satisfy human
interests," and developed this definition as implying two sorts of
value, primary and secondary, those satisfying interests of conscious
life, and those regulative of impersonal processes. All values have
extensity and intensity. He confined himself to developing the class
of primary values with respect to their relations to cognitive, affect-
ive, and conative faculties. Values are forms of adaptation to
environment. The truth-seeker bows to things as they are, the good-
seeker needs arrogance, but the beauty-seeker must trust to luck.
Professor Bakewell remarked that this discussion was peculiarly
foreign to the realistic position, and objectionable because, factually,
some values, such as the esthetic, are not measurable by extensity
and intensity. Also the distinction between the primary and sec-
ondary values is only one of degree, so the principle of division
leads to a cross classification. We can enjoy beliefs and appreciate
the beauty of truths. Moreover, the principle of conformity between
individual and environment is false, witness the case of the martyr
whose quivering flesh is not the conformity to environment that a
value should attain. Professor Sheldon also objected to the a priori
standpoint of the classification and to the artificial division of the
individual into three faculties. Professor French asked if there were
no wholly objective values. To this last Professor Montague answered
categorically, no. He then justified his method as the one best for
the association and his content as providing for an intersection of
values; truth can be pursued for logical, ethical, or esthetic ends.
The case of the martyr is no real exception.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 61
On account of the lateness of the hour, the paper of Dr. Dashiell,
who was introduced by Professor Woodbridge, was postponed until
Wednesday morning.
Dr. Dashiell emphasized the dynamic aspect of the universe and
defined value as that character of things which the conditions of
dynamic life throw into perspective. The distinction between value
and things is accordingly relative, and valuation may create new
values as well as modify old ones. The value experience is primary
and only afterwards analyzable into the organic and extra-organic;
hence it is incorrect to try to attribute a priori either an organic or
an extra-organic constitution to values. Dr. Drake's criticism was
primarily directed at Dr. Dashiell 's conception of the ultimateness of
value. Values result from the reaction of an organism on its per-
ceptions, but some values are irreducible, others not. Dr. Dashiell
had not distinguished intrinsic and extrinsic values. For all prac-
tical purposes consciousness is necessary for values and some, though
not all values, are modified by valuation. Dr. Dashiell replied that
he objected to making value a reaction to perception merely. The
relational theory is not to be reduced to a simple relation between
two things.
Professor Sheldon opened the general discussion and derived a
definition of value through a comparison of instances of values and
their common properties. The resulting conclusion, after examining
six classes of values, those satisfying instinct, the economic, the
esthetic, the moral, the intellectual, and the religious, was that value
is always the furthering of a tendency already present, but is not
dependent upon consciousness. Values are real and closely related
to potentiality. The scale of values is relative to the number of
tendencies furthered ; hence the high value of personality. If a tend-
ency to perfection were omnipresent in experience there would be
an all-inclusive value.
Professor Perry, the other leader of the debate, was rich in refer-
ences to published studies of value. He took his departure from
Professor Sheldon in asserting the need of discussing value in episte-
mological terms on the ground that values can not be collected like
butterflies. His first task was to present a classification of definitions
of value. From this classification it resulted that, although judg-
ments of value are often complex, there is no unique class of value
judgments. Value is a certain kind of fact and all values exist. But
wherever there is value, there is a certain kind of bias of interest;
hence effort and interest form the central point in discussing value.
A norm is merely an acknowledged standard.
In reply to Professor Overstreet's question as to the exact rela-
tion between the papers, it was gradually brought out that Professor
62
Perry's conception of interest, while relating in his opinion to the
structure and nature of things, is still a mental factor, and so
narrower than Professor Sheldon's tendency, and Professor Perry
seemed to imply that values give a fulfilment of interest, while they
only further Professor Sheldon's tendency.
Professor Urban introduced the distinction between the psycho-
logical and the ontological definitions. The latter he believed to be
impossible, but the former, as given by Professor Perry, was in
accordance with his own views. If Professor Sheldon uses the words
"better than," he must presuppose the fulfilment condition for
values.
For some moments the discussion drifted into a sceptical turn.
Professor Pitkin confessed an inability to understand what was meant
by "bias," "interest," and "appetite" as used to ground the defini-
tion of value, and he thought that Professor Urban was wrong in
inferring that value is absolute from the fact that values can be
ordered, since, as the mathematicians have taught us, entities that can
be ordered must be complexes. And Professor Creighton maintained
that the whole procedure was aimed at a type of scholastic defini-
tion of little value beside a discussion of the actual manifestations
of values. Professor Woodbridge suggested that Professor Sheldon
had really restated in modern philosophy certain classic questions
which should be discussed, such as, Is being good? and with such
questions goes the need of reanalyzing potentiality and actuality.
Professor Perry objected that this sort of question was unintelligible
as meaning different things to different people, and Professor Love-
joy pointed out that historically Professor Woodbridge 's problem
had led to an ' ' immoral optimism. ' ' He then recurred to the original
discussion by defending definitions against Professor Creighton on
the grounds of utility. Professor Perry should define his position
more closely with reference to hedonism, for hedonistic satisfaction
means gratification of interests, and if a plurality of interests is also
a good, the concept of the good has a double meaning transcending
pure hedonism.
Dr. Kallen maintained, as against Professor Pitkin, that the ques-
tion of discovering the element of value is independent of those ele-
ments, but he felt with Professor Creighton, that a knowledge of
acquaintance is worth more than too much knowledge about. Pro-
fessor Perry's definition, moreover, was circular without some ex-
ternal criterion of satisfaction.
The afternoon's discussion crystallized the differences between
Professor Perry and Professor Sheldon, as anticipated above. Its
new features were Miss Calkins 's extension of the olive branch to the
New Realists, and the introduction, somewhat late, of the problem
of the scaling of values.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 63
Miss Calkins, forgetting her last year's harmony with Professor
Perry, again entertainingly offered a first agreement, for his concept
of interest, as well as Professor Montague's satisfaction, coincides with
her idealistic liking and willing. She might be willing to differ from
Professor Montague as to classes of the valued, for his cognitive
values made no appeal, but in fundamental points, he was ripe to
enter a triumvirate with her and Professor Perry. Professor Urban
thought the agreement of slight significance because it was on grounds
general enough to be psychological commonplaces. Professor Over-
street insisted on trying to introduce discord into the triumvirate,
first by offering crucial examples and then by distinguishing an
organicity party (Professor Perry) from a psychological party (Miss
Calkins and Professor Montague). Professor Sheldon could not be
even an ally because his potentiality differed radically from the kind
of liking and seeking the others meant. Crucial instances introduced
by Professor Pitkin, Professor Tufts, and Professor Lord empha-
sized the fact that his tendency was something wider than the limita-
tions of conscious or organic processes, though inclusive of such
processes. Professor French found it hard to believe that value could
be so defined and have the same meaning in case of physical as in
case of conscious processes.
A certain confusion was introduced when certain members tried
to recur to the problem of the relation of value to existence and the
problem of mechanism and teleology. Professor McGilvary inquired
why we suppose that what aids tendency is good and what opposes
it evil. Is desire nothing but consciousness of movement toward, or
is something more added?
Professor Spaulding thought that Professor Sheldon's answer
shifted the ground and introduced the second dominant topic of the
afternoon by inquiring how we decided what tendencies give rise to
values that are better than others. The answer, that it was the
number of tendencies furthered, Professor Creighton characterized
as the reductio ad absurdum of the whole discussion, and it did not
seem, in general, to satisfy the members of the association. Professor
Pitkin suggested that instead of a number of individual tendencies,
the maximum action in the field might furnish a criterion ; Professor
Hocking, that it might be the kind of quantitative control ; and Pro-
fessor Overstreet, that it might be the inclusiveness of the tendency.
Professor Sheldon did not seem very certain of his attitude toward
these suggestions and, unfortunately, the lateness of the hour pre-
vented a sharpening of the issues on this point, as the meeting was
adjourned in favor of the business meeting.
On Wednesday morning a joint discussion with the Psychological
Association took place. The topic was "The Standpoint and Method
of Psychology." President Warren presided.
64
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Professor Creighton discussed two questions: Would results in
psychology analogous to those of the physical sciences satisfy us ? and
is the identity between the physical and the mental such that similar
methods can be applied in psychology and in the physical sciences?
To both questions his reply was a qualified negative. Psychology has
the same ideal of accuracy as other sciences, but its obligation to deal
with personality and with social problems alters its status. We are
under no logical necessity to divide mind into faculties and, factually,
we need not interpolate psychical states between things and experi-
ence. Psychology falls on the one hand into brain physiology, and,
on the other, into an interpretation of life in terms of the self.
Professor F. M. Urban maintained that philosophy develops its
methods and problems independently, and takes its material from the
entire field of experience. Psychology cultivates part of this field
and is related to philosophy exactly as the other sciences are. Certain
problems of introspection, probability, and the psychometric func-
tions lead directly to philosophic considerations, and in them the
philosopher can be of help to the psychologist. For example, in try-
ing to correlate mental states as revealed by introspection with defi-
nite groups of conditions, one is confronted with the difficulty that no
group of conditions, however carefully controlled, will always pro-
duce the same mental content. The judgments given on the com-
parison of two stimuli have all the features of chance events. Are
we to conclude that they are not causally necessitated? Or again,
with psychometrics comes the use of analytic functions and the as-
sumption that natural events may be represented by analytic func-
tions. Causal connection is represented by functional dependence,
and psychology uses a highly specialized form of this notion only.
What are the reasons for doing so? The answer must result from
analyzing the logical implications of the assumption, and from find-
ing the consequences of dropping it as a whole or in part. The
result is an analysis of the idea of causality.
Professor Dewey turned aside from the "dreary" methodological
problem and discussed the unwieldy ideas that students of psy-
chology bring to the philosophic class-room, ideas which it is the
chief labor of the teacher of philosophy to eradicate. Some examples
are the idea of a distinct world of the psychic, and of the privacy of
consciousness. Either philosophy must be wholly compromised by
such psychological conceptions or the philosopher must challenge the
ideas of the psychologist. Naturally he prefers the latter alternative.
Nor is he presumptuous in doing so, for not only have some among
the psychologists challenged them, but also history shows that many
of these notions are nothing but adaptations of notions forged by
philosophers which, having given, they can take away. Behaviorism
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 65
is promising, but must not be prejudiced by earlier psychological
conceptions. It can not mean mere mechanics of the nervous system,
a subcutaneous psychology, but must permit environment to be taken
into consideration as well. Perhaps the most important thing is to
get rid of the abstract term consciousness, although it is, of course,
justifiable to distinguish conscious acts from those that are not
conscious.
Professor Miinsterberg built up his discussion from the fight in
Germany over the proposed separation of philosophical and psycho-
logical professorships. He believes that psychology can never lead
us to real philosophical problems since psychological facts can be
interpreted by any one of several conflicting theories ; double aspect,
interactional, or parallelistic. Philosophy must determine general
conceptions, but it determines them a priori and without reference to
experience. Dualism is preferable, and there are two sorts of psy-
chology, usually unhappily mixed; the objective, or causal, and the
subjective, or purposive. The former is most studied, but it is no
more truly psychology than the -latter. Causal psychology is justi-
fied by the success of applied psychology, and it is in this field that
behaviorism may succeed. Both forms are transcended in the over-
individual will and absolute validity.
Professor Yerkes was unfortunately absent, so the meeting was
thrown open for general discussion. Miss Calkins found herself
close to Professor Creighton in distinguishing the two kinds of psy-
chology and introduced her nomenclature of the ideal (causal), and
the self (teleological), psychology. Professor Dearborn emphasized
the need for practical psychology, but objected to the introduction
of any artificial limitations. Professor Dunlap expressed sympathy
with Professor Dewey, although he recognized certain difficulties in
delimiting the behaviorist's field, manifest in such problems as
whether such processes as digestion should not also be ranked as
behavior. Professor Stanley Hall called attention to the contrast
between himself and Professor Miinsterberg, for he had gone from
philosophy to psychology, while Professor Miinsterberg was going
in the opposite direction, and inquired whether it was not artificial
to separate the problems. He concluded, however, that the impor-
tant thing was to keep at work, for the carrying through of any one
point of view would be an advantage.
The small afternoon session was opened by Professor Armstrong's
discussion of "Bergson, Berkeley, and Philosophical Intuition. "
Professor Armstrong contended that Bergson's attempt to reduce
philosophies to developments of a single intuition, however inspiring
and vital its results might appear to students, distorted the facts.
For example, although Berkeley's philosophy is a theistlc immaterial-
66
ism, it is equally true that Berkeley wished to reform science. The
immaterialism might have been related to several different concep-
tions of science. We can ask, then, whether his scientific conceptions,
and Bergson's own biology, are mere media of expression or integral
parts in their respective philosophies. Both Professor Love joy and
Miss Calkins welcomed this emphasis on Berkeley's philosophy as
being something more than a mere doctrine of esse est percipi and
Professor Lovejoy pointed out other evils that Bergson's conception
of intuition introduced into the study of the history of philosophy.
Professor Riley read some excerpts concerning ' ' Some Aspects of
the New Realism" from a book that he is about to bring out on the
history of American philosophy. The extracts exposited the origins
and development of the new realism and the doctrines set forth in the
realists' volume. Professor Lovejoy objected that the place indicated
for the account in the book distorted chronology for the sake of con-
necting the old with the new realism, and Professor Perry complained
of lack of reference to the influence of James. Professor Riley justi-
fied himself before Professor Lovejoy by explaining the popular char-
acter of the intended book, and before Professor Perry by referring
to unread chapters.
Mrs. Ladd-Franklin 's paper, which should have been entitled,
"The Non-Existence of Existence" instead of "Non-occurrence," as
on the official programme, was fundamentally an exposition of in-
definables in philosophy. The abstract term existence has no mean-
ing unless "precise." We need a conception of domain of which
may be asked whether a specified object occurs in this domain, in-
stead of a meaningless question concerning the existence of the
object. Domains are the indefinables, although they may be fixed by
the logical method of pointing. They have not yet been completely
classified, but the distinction of the domain of objects having a "past-
ness"-, and a "space-coefficient," and that of objects not having
these, is general. The terms real and reality are as obscure as the
term existence and need further demarcations. The doctrine that
results from these conceptions is a hypothetical realism and a real
solepsism. Professor Lovejoy gladly welcomed the expression "oc-
currence in a domain."
Professor Hyslop laid bare certain prejudices entering into our
thinking from an unjustifiable carrying over of distinctions from one
field to another. Thus the mechanical, the physical, and the teleo-
logical are grouped together as against the teleological, the spiritual,
the supernatural, etc., although the assimilation of the terms in the
two groups is logically unnecessary and historically sequential upon
the rise of Christian thought. Professor Montague offered several
valuable illustrations and, as Professor Britain, the last speaker on
the programme, was absent, the session was declared at an end.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 67
At the business meeting of the Philosophical Association the fol-
lowing officers were elected: President, Professor Tufts; Vice-presi-
dent, Professor Sheldon; Secretary and Treasurer, Professor Spaul-
ding; Members of the Executive Committee, Professor Bakewell, Pro-
fessor Riley, and Professor Bush (to serve one year in place of Miss
Calkins, resigned). Besides the usual business, Professor Creighton
introduced Professor Hoernle who laid before the Association the
attractions of the International Congress of Philosophy to meet in
London in 1915. The place of the Association's meeting next year
was left in the hands of the executive committee with power.
At a joint business meeting with the Psychological Association
the report of the special committee that has been studying the con-
ditions of the resignation of Professor Mecklin from Lafayette was
unanimously accepted, and instructions given concerning its publica-
tion and circulation.
HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
THE CASE OF PROFESSOR MECKLIN
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY OF THE AMERICAN PHILO-
SOPHICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION
BY the joint action of the presidents of the two associations, the
undersigned have been appointed a committee to inquire into
the circumstances connected with the resignation of Dr. John M.
Mecklin, in June last, from the professorship of philosophy and
psychology at Lafayette College. Reports of the incident published
in certain scientific journals and statements made by Professor Meck-
lin seemed to the presidents of the associations to give prima facie
grounds for the belief that Professor Mecklin 's resignation was given
under virtual compulsion ; that it was primarily due to the objections
of the president of the college to philosophical teachings contained,
or supposed to be contained, in certain text-books used by him ; that
the precise nature of the doctrines to which exception was taken had
not been made clear by the governing authorities of the college ; that
the whole affair was involved in a degree of indefiniteness and ob-
scurity which might, if not dissipated, operate unfairly to the injury
of the professional standing of Dr. Mecklin ; and that the procedure
used in bringing about his separation from the Lafayette College
faculty was of a somewhat summary and peculiar character. The
case, therefore, seemed to the presidents of both associations to be
one calling for investigation, in order that the facts might be fully
and accurately ascertained and made known to the members of these
68
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
associations and such other persons as might have an interest therein.
The personnel of the committee was not completely determined until
October; at the request of the chairman, the two presidents have
acted as members ex officio.
The committee's understanding of the purposes and scope of its
inquiry is sufficiently indicated by the first letter to President War-
field, sent November 12, which, with the omission of the prefatory
paragraph, is as follows:
' ' The function of the committee is primarily to secure an authori-
tative statement of the facts in the case which can be laid before the
members of the associations (of both of which Professor Mecklin is a
member) at their approaching annual meetings, for their informa-
tion. The concern of these bodies in the matter is twofold. They
consist for the most part of members of the university teaching
profession, and they are therefore anxious to ascertain the reason for
any action which may have the effect of injuring the professional
standing and opportunities of any of their own members. It would
seem, in the second place, desirable that the members of these asso-
ciations should know somewhat definitely what doctrinal restrictions
are imposed upon teachers and investigators in philosophy and psy-
chology in the principal American institutions of learning. Such
knowledge it is important to our members to have, both in order that
their action in making recommendations for positions and the like
may be guided thereby, and also that in their judgment of the depart-
ment of philosophy and psychology in any institution, they may bear
in mind the predetermined limits of liberty of opinion which affect
the tenure of professorships in that institution. It has been publicly
asserted that restrictions of this kind obtain at Lafayette College.
"In its attempt to secure the desired information the committee,
of course, turns first to yourself and to Professor Mecklin. "We shall
therefore be greatly obliged if you will let us know whether the
statements already published in Science and the JOURNAL. OF PHILOS-
OPHY regarding the circumstances of Professor Mecklin 's resignation
seem to you accurate, and what your understanding is as to the
doctrinal requirements imposed upon professors of philosophy and
psychology at Lafayette. The points about which we especially de-
sire to be informed are indicated by the accompanying questions ; we
shall be obliged if, as an aid to giving definiteness to any statement
which the committee may prepare on the subject, you will cover these
questions in the reply which we hope you will be good enough to let
us have."
The appended questions were as follows:
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 69
'*!. Was the resignation of Professor Mecklin called for by the
administrative authorities of Lafayette (a) because of certain doc-
trines held or taught by him; or (6) because of certain doctrines
contained in the text-books used by him?
'2. In either case, what, specifically, were the opinions or teach-
ings to which objection was made ?
1 ' 3. Are the statements made by Professor Mecklin in THE JOUR-
NAL OF PHILOSOPHY of September 25, 1913, regarded by the adminis-
trative authorities of Lafayette College as giving a substantially
accurate and sufficient account of the facts in the case ?
"4. Is subscription to any specified creed a requisite to appoint-
ment to a professorship in Lafayette College ?
"5. Are the professors of philosophy and psychology required,
so long as they hold their positions, to conform their teachings to any
specified creed or doctrine ?
' ' 6. If so, what is this creed ?
;< 7. Are similar requirements imposed upon professors of other
departments, such as biology and geology ?
''8. In case of alleged deviation by any professor from the doc-
trinal standards of the college, by whose interpretation of these
standards is such deviation determined?"
It should be said at once that the committee has failed to secure
from President Warfield any definite answer to its inquiries. One
month later, after a second copy of the above letter had been sent,
the following communication was received:
" Lafayette College has long been conducted under the general
direction of the Synod of Pennsylvania of the Presbyterian Church.
It has given very definite pledges to the public at large and par-
ticularly to those who have contributed to its endowment and who
have entrusted their sons to its instruction, that the teachings in
its class-rooms should be consistent in substance and in tendency
with the standards of the Church. The professorship of mental and
moral philosophy was endowed by an alumnus and member of the
board of trustees with clear and positive statement that it was his
purpose in endowing the professorship to continue the type of teach-
ing of philosophy which had long been characteristic of the college and
to provide thereby a foundation for conservative Christian thought
and character. The board of trustees of the college, acting under
the responsibility imposed by its charter and in the performance of
the trusts created by individuals is, of course, the judge of the fitness
of a professor and the satisfactory performance of the duties belong-
ing to his professorship.
"Acting through the proper officers with deliberation and with
70
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
full opportunity for all those interested to be heard, the resignation
of Professor John M. Mecklin, Ph.D., was asked and given. 1
(signed)
"J. W. HOLLENBACK,
President Board of Trustees,
E. D. WARFIELD,
President,
McCLUNEY RADCLIFFE,
Chairman Curriculum Committee."
The lateness of the date making it impossible for the chairman
to consult the entire committee, he, upon his own responsibility, on
December 19, addressed the following to President Warfield :
"I beg to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of the communi-
cation signed by yourself and Messrs. Hollenback and Kadcliffe, in
reply to the inquiries of the committee of the American Philosophical
and Psychological Associations of which I have the honor to be
chairman. I note that, by your letter, the board of trustees of the
college assumes the official responsibility for asking, as well as accept-
ing, the resignation of Professor Mecklin.
"May I express the hope that you will be good enough to let the
committee have, from yourself personally, some more specific state-
ment in regard to certain facts in the case concerning which we
greatly desire to be informed ?
"1. The committee will not, I think, be able to gather from the
reply thus far received, precisely what teachings of Professor Mecklin
were regarded by the trustees as the grounds upon which his resigna-
tion was asked for.
' ' 2. The committee will further be unable to gather what specific
doctrinal requirements are laid upon the professors of philosophy
and psychology at Lafayette College. I note the statement in your
letter to the effect that the college 'has given very definite pledges
i Since the presentation of this report, the chairman is in receipt of a com-
munication from a member of the board of trustees, who states that he feels it
his duty to place before the committee some actual facts which are not in
accordance with the above communication. He writes : ' ' It is possible that the
curriculum committee did ask for the resignation of Professor Mecklin, though
not to my knowledge. It is certain that the trustees before whom the matter
was brought by the committee did not ask for the resignation of Professor
Mecklin. The resignation of Professor Mecklin was given under pressure, it is
true, but was not distinctly asked for by the board of trustees. The last state-
ment, therefore, in the certificate sent to you [that cited above] is not in accord-
ance with the facts. I am not at present attempting to discuss the remainder of
this certificate as to whether it is in accordance with the facts or not, but because
I have not discussed it I do not wish it to be inferred that I believe it to be in
accordance with the facts." The chairman of the committee publishes this
statement as a part of the evidence in the case.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 71
that the teachings in its class-rooms should be consistent in substance
and in tendency with the standards of the Presbyterian Church/
It would appear, however, that Professor Mecklin declares that his
teachings in his class-room have never been inconsistent with the
standards of that Church, as they are interpreted by many ministers
and other members of the Church. It would seem from this that it
is not Presbyterian doctrine as such, but some particular interpreta-
tion of that doctrine, which is required at Lafayette. The committee
is anxious to be referred to some statement of that interpretation.
It seems not unfair to ask that when a college thus stands committed
to the teaching of a particular body of philosophical and religious
doctrine, it should make clear to all concerned what that body of
doctrine is, or indicate the creed or confession in which it may be
found formulated.
"3. The attention of the committee has been called by a number
of persons connected with the college, including members of the
board of trustees, to article VIII. of the charter of the college, with
which you are no doubt familiar. The committee is somewhat at
a loss to reconcile this article of the charter with the statement which
you have kindly made in regard to the doctrinal requirements im-
posed upon professors. Is this article held by the trustees to have
been abrogated by subsequent acts? And is it held by the trustees
that this clause is not a binding force in the execution of the trusts
created by the benefactors of the college ?
'The committee's desire is solely for an authoritative statement
of the facts in the matter, which is clearly of general interest and
concern to the entire body of teachers in philosophy and psychology.
We of course take it for granted that the authorities of Lafayette
College have no desire to prevent the facts from being fully known.
We are therefore encouraged to hope that we may once more be
favored with a reply to our request for information." To this
letter President Warfield replied on December 26 as follows :
'I beg to acknowledge your letter in which you ask from me
' personally' 'some more specific statement' in regard to certain
facts in connection with the resignation of Professor John M.
Mecklin, Ph.D.
'I trust you will pardon me if I say that your committee has
no relation to me personally which would justify my making a
personal statement to you with regard to these matters.
'You are quite correct in supposing that the 'authorities of
Lafayette College have no desire to prevent the facts from being
fully known. ' Those who were recognized as speaking for Dr. Meck-
lin formally requested of the board of trustees that no information
should be given to the public with regard to what took place before
72
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the board of trustees except that after the consideration of a report
from the curriculum committee Dr. Mecklin offered his resignation,
which was accepted, and that he was granted a year's salary. I feel
myself absolutely concluded [sic] by this action from any personal
statement in regard to several of the matters involved.
' 'The Synod of Pennsylvania is the duly constituted visitor of
the college. The chairman of the committee of visitation for 1913
is a member of the staff of instruction of Union Theological Seminary
of New York City.
"I hope you will, on reflection, perceive the impropriety of my
discussing with your committee questions affecting the college or its
members.
"Very truly yours,
(signed) E. D. WARFIELD."
This closes the correspondence between the committee and the presi-
dent of Lafayette College.
On the same date on which the first-mentioned letter was ad-
dressed to President Warfield a copy of it and the appended ques-
tions was sent to Professor Mecklin, together with the following :
'We shall be obliged if you will put before the committee a
statement of any facts which seem to you pertinent to our inquiry.
We should like in particular to know :
"1. Whether, on accepting your appointment at Lafayette, you
had either a tacit or definite understanding that your teaching was
subject to certain doctrinal restrictions.
"2. What specific objections either to your teaching or to the
text-books used were made by President Warfield in his letters to or
conversations with you.
"3. By whose judgment your alleged departure from Presby-
terian standards was determined.
"Any other documents bearing upon the case, in addition to
those you have already sent Professor Warren, the committee will
be glad to receive. Our purpose, as explained in the letter to Presi-
dent Warfield, is primarily to secure authoritative statements, not
only of the facts in the case in which you were personally concerned,
but also of the precise restrictions imposed upon freedom of inquiry
and teaching in philosophy and psychology at Lafayette College."
To this request Professor Mecklin responded with a full statement ;
he has subsequently answered directly and with detail further inter-
rogations of the committee, has had an interview with several of the
members, and has shown himself at all times ready to assist the
committee in its investigation. The committee has also received, in
reply to inquiries, letters from several members of the board of
trustees of the college, and from members of the faculty, and has
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 73
seen letters concerning the character and religious influence of Pro-
fessor Mecklin's teaching written by former students of his. In
this material, which is too voluminous to reproduce, the committee
believes it has sufficient evidence to justify it in presenting certain
conclusions. These conclusions bear upon three general questions.
I. What, before the present case arose, has been the accepted
understanding as to the limits of freedom in philosophical and psy-
chological teaching at Lafayette College?
American colleges and universities fall into two classes: those
in which freedom of inquiry, of belief, and of teaching is, if not
absolutely unrestricted, at least subject to limitations so few and so
remote as to give practically no occasion for differences of opinion;
and those which are frankly instruments of denominational or polit-
ical propaganda. The committee does not consider itself authorized
to discuss the question whether the existence of both sorts of insti-
tution is desirable. If, therefore, the present case were one in which
a teacher in a professedly denominational college had in his teaching
expressly repudiated some clearly denned and generally accepted
doctrine of that denomination, the committee would not feel justi-
fied in proceeding further with the matter. These associations
should, in the committee's opinion, intervene in questions of this
sort only for three ends: (1) To ascertain which institutions do, and
which do not, officially profess the principle of freedom of teaching ;
(2) to ascertain, with a fair degree of definiteness, in the case of
those institutions which do not, what the doctrinal limitations im-
posed upon their teachers of philosophy and psychology are; and
(3) to call attention publicly to all instances in which, in institu-
tions of the former sort, freedom of teaching appears to have been
interfered with, or in which, in institutions of the latter sort, restric-
tions other than those antecedently laid down appear to have been
imposed.
Upon the question whether Lafayette is to be classed with insti-
tutions of the first or second type, the committee finds a surprising
measure of disagreement among officers, teachers, and graduates of
the college. Article VIII. of the college charter provides :
'That persons of every religious denomination shall be capable
of being elected trustees, nor shall any person, either as principal,
professor, tutor or pupil, be refused admittance into said college, or
denied any of the privileges, immunities or advantages thereof for
or on account of his sentiments in matters of religion. ' '
In accordance with this clause of the charter, a trustee writes
the committee as follows:
"I need not remind you that Lafayette College is not a theo-
logical institution, nor does it profess to teach, or impose upon its
74
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
teachers or students, any creed or doctrinal religious standards
Whatever may be Dr. Mecklin's impression of the attitude of the
president, so far as the trustees and faculty of the institution are
concerned, I know of no policy or shaping thereof that in any way
involves the recognition or inculcation of any sectarian creed, Presby-
terian or otherwise, much less any particular type of Presbyterian-
ism." This interpretation of the charter which is obviously in
harmony with its text is evidently shared by other members of the
board of trustees.
On the other hand, the testimony of some members of the faculty,
and that of President Warfield and Messrs. Hollenback and Rad-
cliffe already cited, is that there is a general assumption that the
teaching of professors shall be in harmony with the doctrinal stand-
ards of the Presbyterian Church. The General Catalogue (1912-13)
contains the following statement (p. 146) :
"The aim of Lafayette College is distinctly religious. Under the
general direction of the Synod of Pennsylvania of the Presbyterian
Church, its instruction is in full sympathy with the doctrines of that
body. At the same time religious instruction is carried on with
a view to a broad and general development of Christian character,
within the lines of general acceptance among evangelical Christians,
the points of agreement, rather than those of disagreement, being
dwelt upon."
The last sentence would appear to indicate the understanding
upon which Professor Mecklin accepted the call to the professorship
of philosophy and psychology in 1904 ; he writes that he then and at
all times recognized that his teaching, ' l as well as that of every other
professor," was to be "in accord with Christianity in the broad
evangelical interpretation of that term. ' '
Here, then, would appear to be three distinct views of the posi-
tion and policy of the college : It is committed to no specific creed ;
it is committed only to the principles of * ' evangelical Christianity ' ' ;
and it is committed to the principles of the Presbyterian Church.
The committee, for the rest of this report, assumes that substantially
the last-mentioned view is to be taken as the answer to the first
question, that, in the words of a trustee, it has been "commonly
understood that the teachings in such departments [i. e., those of
philosophy and psychology] are in general to be in harmony with
the doctrines of philosophy usually taught and held in the Presby-
terian Church." But the committee can not but think it highly
undesirable that in any college a question of such importance should
be left open to such divergent official answers ; and it appears of
doubtful legality that the prevailing practise in the matter should
be in express contradiction with an unrepealed clause in the college
charter.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 75
II. The second question which the committee has endeavored to
answer is : What were the actual grounds upon which Professor Meck-
lin's resignation was asked for, and what do these indicate as to the
doctrinal limitations imposed upon professors in philosophy and psy-
chology under the present administration of the college? Upon this
the committee 's findings are as follows :
1. No connected and altogether definite statement seems ever to
have been formulated of the specific points in Professor Mecklin's
teaching to which objection was made, or of the manner in which
these were held to conflict with Presbyterian principles. A member
of the board of trustees of the college, who was present at the meet-
ing of the curriculum committee at which the matter was first brought
forward, states that he was unable from the discussion at that meet-
ing, or in any other way, to ascertain precisely on account of what
charges as to doctrines held or taught by him Professor Mecklin was
dismissed. This trustee writes that the accusations of erroneous
doctrines or opinions made against Professor Mecklin at this meeting
"were indefinite and as far as I am concerned remain so to this
present time." Another correspondent conversant with the facts
writes the committee that the president of the college simply asserted
that "the doctrines set forth in certain text-books adopted by Pro-
fessor Mecklin, viz., Angell on Psychology, Dewey and Tufts on
Ethics, McDougall on Social Psychology, and Ames on the Psychology
of Religious Experience, were a departure from the doctrines that
had been taught in the college in previous years. No definite state-
ment was ever made by the president to the board of trustees, so
far as I recollect, of the exact teachings to which he made objections,
other than the general objections to the text-books above mentioned,
and a general and indefinite statement that the teachings of Pro-
fessor Mecklin were not in harmony with the traditional teachings
of the college in the department of philosophy. Previously to Pro-
fessor Mecklin 's occupying the chair of philosophy, the teaching in
that department had for some years been by Presbyterian clergymen
who devoted a portion of their time thereto, but did not undertake
to present to the student any clearly defined system of philosophical
instruction. Professor Mecklin undertook to introduce such a system
of instruction, in line with other first-class educational institutions,
some of which were well-known Presbyterian colleges, and used in
connection therewith, among others, the text-books above mentioned.
Some of his teachings as inferred from the said text-books were
objected to by the president as contrary to the traditional teaching
of the college on these subjects. The board of trustees did not pass
upon the questions raised, although they discussed them, and there
was a difference of opinion among them on the subject. Some of
76
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the trustees, feeling it desirable that a controversy of a religious
or denominational aspect should be avoided, thought it wisest, in
view of all the circumstances, to advise Professor Mecklin to resign
rather than have the discussion proceed to a vote, which might or
might not have been in his favor." There seems, in short, to be no
general and clear understanding among the members of the board
of trustees and the faculty of the college as to the precise doctrinal
grounds upon which the president's insistence on Professor Mecklin 's
dismissal was based. It is the opinion of the committee that in no
institution, of whatever type, should a professor be compelled to re-
linquish his position for doctrinal reasons, except upon definite
charges, communicated to him in writing and laid, with the support-
ing evidence, before the entire board of trustees and the faculty ; and
that it is unfortunate in any case of this kind that, even by agree-
ment between the persons concerned, the matter should fail to be
brought to an explicit issue before the responsible governing body
of the institution.
2. It is not, however, impossible to gather from various evidence
examined by the committee, some indication of the feature of Pro-
fessor Mecklin 's teaching to which primarily President Warfield took
exception. His objections seem to have been originally directed
against the text-books already mentioned, and in these chiefly against
a certain doctrine. The first intimation to Professor Mecklin that his
resignation was likely to be demanded was in a letter from President
Warfield of March 28, 1913, excerpts from which follow :
'The papers [certain examination papers] which you sent me on
Monday are simply astonishing. They seem to confirm all that has
been rumored and to give body to those rumors. It would not be
just to you or to me if I failed to say so at once and frankly to
ask for a full statement of your position in regard to this matter
and to the chair which you hold. . . . My personal regard for you
is such that any criticism of or objection to your work gives me the
greatest pain. But obligations I can not escape make it necessary
for me to ask you to give a full and clear statement with regard
to your teaching and to say, in as kind a spirit as possible, that as
president of the college I insist that the instruction in the department
of philosophy shall be consistent with the professions made by its
authorities. I shall be glad to give you every opportunity to explain
your opinions and your teachings, but I ask that you do so explain
them or retire from the chair which you occupy." It appears that
the feature of the examination papers in Professor Mecklin 's course
on " Theism " which aroused these expressions was the application
of the conception of evolution, or what Professor Mecklin designates
as "the genetic and functional method, " to the history of religion,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 77
including the religion of Israel. And the statements of several mem-
bers of the faculty show it to be their understanding that, in the
words of one of them, ''the objection to Dr. Mecklin's teaching was
based upon his use of the doctrine or theory of evolution in his dis-
cussion of the growth of religion."
So far, then, as may be gathered in the absence of definite charges,
the doctrine mentioned would appear to have been the original and
decisive ground of the president's objection to Professor Mecklin's
teaching. Other objections to the contents of the text-books used
by him were subsequently introduced; and exception was taken also
to an article published by Dr. Mecklin in The International Journal
of Ethics in April, 1913. Your committee is not clearly informed
as to the passages in this article which President Warfield regarded
with disfavor. In a newspaper statement, given out after Professor
Mecklin's resignation, President Warfield declared that his objection
was to the " scope and method" of Dr. Mecklin's teaching, " especially
to his extending the instruction of his chair into departments which
never were intended to be embraced in it, particularly the psy-
chology of religious experience." It is abundantly evident, however,
that the question at issue was not the extent, but the actual or sup-
posed content of Professor Mecklin's teaching; and the committee
therefore supposes that the expressions in the president's published
statement refer in an obscure manner to his disapproval of the doc-
trine already indicated.
3. The committee as a body has, of course, no competency to
discuss whether the doctrines and the text-books in question are or
are not in harmony with Presbyterian standards. The committee
thinks it pertinent, however, to make the following observations :
(a) At the time of his resignation Professor Mecklin was an
ordained Presbyterian minister in good standing, and was frequently
called upon to preach in churches within the Synod of Pennsylvania.
(&) Certain of the text-books which appear to President War-
field to be of a dangerous tendency are in use in other colleges of
definitely Presbyterian affiliations.
(c) Professor Mecklin declares:
'I have respected the denominational (Presbyterian) connections
of the college in my teachings, in that I have not allowed moot
theological questions, such as the supernatural, to rise in the dis-
cussions of the class-room. I did not think, however, when I accepted
the chair, that these theological connections would be incompatible
with the use of the best text-books and the most approved scientific
methods in such subjects as psychology and ethics and the philosophy
of religion. The president and his supporters on the board of trus-
tees objected that the implications of functional psychology and the
78
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
genetic method are antagonistic to the ultra-conservative (Princeton)
type of theology which they identify with evangelical Christianity;
hence the issue resulting in my resignation. " It is also the testimony
of several members of the Lafayette faculty that it is generally
understood in the College community that Professor Mecklin ab-
stained from the direct discussion of questions of dogmatic theology.
(d) It appears to be the understanding of most of the members
of the Lafayette faculty who have answered our inquiries, that at
present adherence to a particular form of Presbyterian theology is
expected of the professor of philosophy and psychology. One writes :
"The teachings of the professor of philosophy are expected to con-
form to the standards of the most orthodox form of Presbyterianism,
viz., the Princeton type." (The references to "Princeton" here the
committee understands to be to the Princeton Theological Seminary,
of which institution Dr. Warfield is president of the board of direc-
tors. ) Another member of the Lafayette faculty writes : ' ' The creed
to which the professor of philosophy and psychology is required to
conform is, I should say, that of the most conservative branch in
the Presbyterian Church. ' ' A third, in reply to the question : " In
cases of alleged deviation by any professor from the doctrinal stand-
ards of the college, by whose interpretation of these standards is
such deviation determined ? ' ' answers : ' ' The president of the col-
lege. ' ' Finally Professor Mecklin states to the committee :
"Last spring, after receipt of the President's letter, I asked
what he meant by the 'standards of the Presbyterian Church/ He
said in reply that he meant by that term the type of Presbyterianism
found in the Southern Presbyterian Church and in Princeton
Seminary. ' '
In view of these facts, the committee is forced to conclude that
at Lafayette College at the present time tenure of the professorship
of philosophy and psychology is, in practise, subject, not only to
the requirement that the teachings of the incumbent shall be in
substantial harmony with the commonly accepted doctrines of the
Presbyterian Church, but also to the requirement that his teachings
shall be in substantial harmony with the theological opinions of the
administrative authorities of the college, and with their interpreta-
tion of the philosophical implications of those opinions. The com-
mittee also concludes that the statement of the Lafayette College
Catalogue, that the religious instruction there "is carried on within
the lines of general acceptance among evangelical Christians, the
points of agreement, rather than those of disagreement, being empha-
sized, " is not accurately descriptive of the present policy and prac-
tise of the college. The committee further gathers from various
evidence brought to its notice that the administration of the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 79
college disapproves of the mere presentation to the students, through
text-books or collateral reading, of any philosophical views which
it regards as seriously erroneous, and discourages instruction which
has the effect, as Professor Mecklin's evidently had, of provoking
thought and stimulating discussion and debate among the students
upon philosophical and religious issues.
4. It remains to inquire, in this connection, whether these special
restrictions were imposed, as President Warfield intimates, in part
because of the terms of the gift by which the chair of philosophy
in this college was endowed. Upon this point the committee finds
three considerations to be relevant :
(a) It does not seem that the incumbent of a particular endowed
chair in any college can rightfully or lawfully be subjected to re-
quirements to which the charter of that college declares that no
professor shall be subjected.
(&) The letter of President Warfield (December 6, 1904) by which
Dr. Mecklin was called to this professorship contained no intimation
that the position was regarded as subject to special or peculiar doc-
trinal restrictions. It declared only that the person to be appointed
"must approach the work from the point of view of the teacher
interested in grounding young men in a sound philosophical basis
for the experiences of life," and that he should be "an earnest
Christian man" having the ability "to anchor strong characters to
high truths."
(c) Professor Mecklin informs the committee that when he learned
that his teaching was being criticized, he sought out the founder of
the chair, explained his own attitude and his views about the work of
the department, and offered to resign his position if the donor felt
that the purposes of the foundation were being defeated. Dr. Meck-
lin assures the committee that the donor declared that he had no
such feeling and deprecated the step which Dr. Mecklin had offered
to take.
III. The third general question taken up by the committee con-
cerns the attitude of the administrative authorities of Lafayette
College towards the committee's inquiry. The letter already given,
signed by the president of the college, the president of the board
of trustees, and the chairman of the curriculum committee, can be
construed by your committee only as a courteous declination to give
these associations the definite information asked for. The subse-
quent letter of President Warfield accentuates this declination.
It is true that in this letter he gives as a reason for his refusal to
make "a statement with regard to these matters" a formal request
by "those who were recognized as speaking for Professor Mecklin"
that "no information should be given out with regard to what took
80
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
place before the board of trustees except that after the considera-
tion of a report from the curriculum committee Dr. Mecklin offered
his resignation which was accepted and that he was granted a year's
salary. " President Warfield thus represents his reticence as actu-
ated, at least in part, by a deference to Professor Mecklin 's wishes.
Upon this matter Professor Mecklin makes the following statement to
the committee : that no such request was made to the trustees by his
authority ; that, on the contrary, he regarded such a policy of secrecy
about the causes and circumstances of his resignation as unfair to
him and likely to be detrimental to his professional reputation ; that
he expressly informed a committee of the trustees which conferred
with him that he desired no concealment of the grounds for the action
taken ; that he has publicly given evidence that such was his .desire,
by his letter on the case, published in THE JOURNAL OP PHILOSOPHY ;
and that his wish that the facts should be fully made known has come
within the knowledge of President Warfield. Your committee notes,
also, that there was published in the Philadelphia Public Ledger of
June 20, 1913, a long and circumstantial, though incomplete, state-
ment (already referred to) by Dr. Warfield respecting Dr. Mecklin 's
resignation; it can not, therefore, be said that hitherto "no infor-
mation" has been "given to the public with regard to what took place
before the board of trustees," beyond that contained in the letter
above cited. In view of these circumstances the committee finds
itself unable to suppose that the decisive reason for President War-
field's reluctance to answer its inquiries is his consideration for the
interests and wishes of Professor Mecklin. The committee notes,
moreover, that two out of the three questions last laid before Presi-
dent Warfield asked for information, not about the resignation of
Professor Mecklin, but about the general policy of the college and the
specific credal requirements attaching to the professorship of phi-
losophy and psychology. These inquiries, also, President Warfield
has declined to answer. He intimates, indeed, that he regards it as
improper for persons not connected with the college to ask, or for
him to answer, c ' questions concerning the college or its members. ' '
The attitude thus assumed does not seem to this committee one
which can with propriety be maintained by the officers of any col-
lege or university towards the inquiries of a representative national
organization of college and university teachers and other scholars.
We believe it to be the right of the general body of professors of
philosophy and psychology to know definitely the conditions of the
tenure of any professorship in their subject; and also their right,
and that of the public to which colleges look for support, to under-
stand unequivocally what measure of freedom of teaching is guaran-
teed in any college, and to be informed as to the essential details of
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 81
any case in which credal restrictions, other than those to which the
college officially stands committed, are publicly declared by responsi-
ble persons to have been imposed. No college does well to live unto
itself to such a degree that it fails to recognize that in all such issues
the university teaching profession at large has a legitimate concern.
And any college hazards its claim upon the confidence of the public
and the friendly regard of the teaching profession by an appearance
of unwillingness to make a full and frank statement of the facts in all
matters of this sort.
(signed) A. 0. LOVE JOY, Chairman,
Johns Hopkins University.
J. E. CREIGHTON,
Cornell University.
W. E. HOCKING,
Yale University.
E. B. McGlLVARY,
University of Wisconsin.
W. T. MARVIN,
Rutgers College.
G. H. MEAD,
University of Chicago.
HOWARD C. WARREN,
Princeton University.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Influence of Monarchs. FREDERICK ADAMS WOODS. New York : 1913.
Pp. 13 + 422.
In "Heredity in Royalty," Dr. Woods measured the resemblance of
related individuals in intellect and morals, and presented evidence to show
that nearly all of this resemblance was referable to inborn nature. In the
present volume he measures the relation between a monarch's ability and
the progress during his reign of the people over whom he rules. The data
considered reach down to the end of the eighteenth century. The ability
of a monarch is denned as the general consensus of historians would define
it; the progress of the people in question is a mixture composed, appar-
ently, chiefly of material well-being, partly of safety and expansion as a
nation, and, to a less degree, of individual liberty and gains in science,
letters, and art. The comments of standard historians impartially col-
lected serve to grade the two facts, in each case, as superior, medium, or
inferior. A " raw " correlation of .6 is found between the ability of the
monarch and the progress of his people. Dr. Woods shows that most of
the factors producing unreliability in the original data act to make this
" raw " correlation less than it would be were the data unexceptionable.
82
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
He does not regard certain contrary tendencies to credit a monarch with
ability when his realm progressed for whatever cause, and rate him unduly
low when, by calamities, however caused, his rule suffered as of great
magnitude. In general, then, the rise and fall of national well-being on
the material and political sides is due in large measure to heredity and
variation acting on the gametes of royal families and the noble families
who have usurped or been granted monarchical position. England seems
to have emancipated herself from dependence on the quality of its kings
by about 1600.
As in the " Heredity in Royalty," Dr. Woods seems to assume that
intellect, ability, kindness, and chastity are unit characters, segregating
in the gametes. This is not necessary to his argument, and is in rather
direct opposition to the general findings of individual psychology, and
indeed, to some of Dr. Woods's own measurements. For example, if
intellect and morality were unit-characters due to the presence or absence
of a single determiner in the germs, a continuous gradation from very
high degrees that are rare through mediocre degrees that are common to
very low degrees that are rare, would not be the form of distribution for
them.
It should be noted further that Woods's measures of the condition of a
country's inhabitants, since they are based on the judgments of historians,
and since these in turn are probably often relative to a standard of what
in general might be expected in that land and era, are not, and do not
pretend to be, absolute measures of real advance from or retrogression
toward some defined zero-point of well-being.
Those students of history who are rebelling against being confined to
history as a record to be enlarged and corrected, and who envy the student
of the natural sciences, will find cause for hope in Dr. Woods's book and
suggestions in his methods that are applicable to the investigation of
many problems in the so-called " philosophy " of history. Woods is devoted
to the cause of replacing individual impressions concerning causes and
effects in human affairs by objective measurements of relations and more
unbiased massing of evidence. The criticism that is likely to be made of
such historiometric work is that it can not be done. The scientific retort
to this criticism is to go ahead and try to do it; Dr. Woods so retorts in
this volume, and, in my opinion, with success.
E. L. THORNDIKE.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE NEO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. August,
1913. Vers V unite (pp. 253-278) : D. MERCIER. - The moral, as well as
the speculative order, must be brought under the control of reason, so that
the contents of human consciousness may be united in an integral syn-
thesis. La demonstration metaphysique du libre arbitre (pp. 279-293) :
P. DE MUNNYNCK. -In order to prove the existence of free will, we must
not resort to the testimony of consciousness, as has been done too often
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
since Descartes, but to the metaphysical argument. L'esthetique de
Plotin (pp. 294-338) : Jos. COCHEZ. - In Plotinus's system, the first place
belongs to the beautiful and the good. Intelligence is subsistent beauty;
the soul is beautiful through intelligence; everything else is beautiful
through the soul. Le Pragmatisme en morale (pp. 339-365) : F. PAL-
HORIES. - In the system of the pragmatists, moral science has lost its
proper object and is bound to disappear. Godefroid de Fontaines (pp.
365-388) : A. PELZER. - A description of the extant manuscripts of Gode-
froid de Fontaines, a Belgian philosopher of the thirteenth century.
Le mouvement neo-scolastique (pp. 388-395) : M. DE WULF. Comptes
rendus: A. Mansion, Introduction a la physique d'Aristote: G. COLLE.
J. Lemaire, Cosmologia sive philosophia mineralium: D. NYS. J. Dedieu,
Montesquieu: G. LEGRAND. B. Petronievics, Principien der Metaphysik:
M. DEMUTH. A. Appelmans, La protection des animaux: J. LEMAIRE.
Dr. Hornich, Viertes Jahrbuch des Vereins fur christ. Erziehungswissen-
schaft: F. DE HOVRE. J. Ingenieros, Principios de Psicologia biologica:
J. VAN MOLLE. Chronique. Sommaire ideologique des ouvrages et revues
de philosophic.
Shaw, Charles Gray. The Ego and Its Place in the World. New York:
The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. xii + 523. $3.75.
Tagore, Kabindranath. Sadahana; The Kealization of Life. New York:
The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. xi -f 164. $1.25.
Wallin, J. E. Wallace. Psychological Aspects of the Problem of Atmos-
pheric Smoke Pollution. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
1913. Pp. 46.
Ward, James. Heredity and Memory. Cambridge: University Press.
1913. Pp. 56. Is. 6d.
NOTES AND NEWS
LETTER FROM PROFESSOR MAJOR
To THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIEN-
TIFIC METHODS:
Two points in the review of my " Elements of Psychology " x seem to
call for brief notice. (1) The reviewer is evidently unfamiliar with the
distinction between the broad generalization known as the law of psycho-
neural parallelism and the several doctrines described under the heading
psychophysical parallelism, and so finds what he thinks is an incurracy in
statement. In passing, I may say that in order to avoid all possible mis-
understanding the term " psychoneural correlation " will be substituted,
in the revised edition, for the term " psychoneural parallelism." (2) The
diagram on page 47 of the text has had a sorry time of it at the hands of
several critics, and no doubt it could be greatly improved. And yet I am
inclined to think that if it is examined in connection with the descriptive
matter of the text (p. 48), and if the reader remembers that the diagram
i This JOURNAL, Vol. X., page 669.
84 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
professes to be only a diagram (not a figure), his reaction will be a trifle
milder than that of the reviewer cited above.
Very truly yours,
DAVID K. MAJOR
UNIVERSITY OF OHIO.
A meeting of the Aristotelian Society was held on December 22, Pro-
fessor G. Dawes Hicks, President, in the chair. Mr. C. Delisle Burns read
a paper on " William of Ockham on Universals." The problem of the
reality of universals and particulars is not purely medieval, and not only
of historical interest. The difficulties which were once faced by William
of Ockham still need discussion. The problem arises in the perception
that we do not quite know what we mean when we say that two things are
similar. Various forms of modern idealism seem to imply that what is
real is ultimately and most truly one and indivisible. The particular and
the distinct should therefore have no reality except the conventional real-
ity given it by our need for action or the unfortunate limitations of
" finite " mind. But this is simply to adopt the solution offered by all
medieval realism in its modern form, as in Thomas Aquinas and Duns
Scotus. It must mean that particulars are to be explained finally [in terms
of universals ; or at least that the individual is regarded as a difficulty re-
maining over to be explained after we have grasped the real nature of the
whole. And it was to destroy precisely this form of philosophy that Ock-
ham labored. The interest of the position as Ockham found it is that it
was practically the same as that which we find to-day in surviving ideal-
ism. A thenaeum.
DR. FRANK P. GRAVES, of the Ohio State University, has been ap-
pointed professor of the history of education, and Dr. Harlan Updegraff,
of Northwestern University, professor of educational administration at
the University of Pennsylvania. Professor A. Duncan Yocum, who has
occupied the chair of pedagogy at that institution, will continue as pro-
fessor of educational research and practise.
PROFESSOR SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ, scientific director and psychologist
of the Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C., recently
addressed the Medical Society of St. Louis, on the subject of " Psycho-
logical Factors in Medical Practise."
A REGULAR meeting of the New York University Philosophical Society
was held on Tuesday evening, January 13. Professor John Dewey, of Co-
lumbia University, read a paper on " Some Conceptions of Pragmatism."
MR. H. G. CHILDS, professor of educational psychology in the Brooklyn
Training School for Teachers, has accepted an appointment to the chaii
of educational psychology in the University of Indiana.
MR. A. G. STEELE has been appointed head of the department of psy-
chology in Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.
MRS. CHRISTINE LADD-FRANKLIN recently held a conference on Color-
vision at the Brooklyn Academy of Music.
VOL. XI. No. 4. FEBRUARY 12, 1914
SOCIETIES
I
TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
THE twenty-second annual meeting of the American Psycho-
logical Association occurred at Yale University, December 29 to
31. From first to last the attendance was large and representative
of the northeastern part of the country. The chief social feature
was the joint banquet held at the Hotel Taft in connection with the
American Philosophical Association. Numerous smaller impromptu
luncheons, occurring at other times, contributed to the pleasure and
value of the meeting.
At the business meeting the several standing committees and
officers presented reports and appropriations were made to cover com-
mittee expenses. Professor Whipple resigned from the committee
on teaching experiments and Professor Kirkpatrick was elected to
the vacancy. The next annual meeting is to be held at Philadelphia
in affiliation with the American Association for the Advancement of
Science. For that meeting the following officers were elected : Presi-
dent, Mr. R. S. Woodworth ; New Members of the Council, Mr. G. N.
Whipple and Mr. S. I. Franz. Mr. R. M. Ogden was elected secre-
tary-treasurer for a period of three years, and a stipend of two hun-
dred and fifty dollars per annum was fixed for the position on
recommendation of the council. Mr. E. B. Twitmyer was elected
representative of the association on the council of the American
Association and the nominating committee for the coming year con-
sists of Messrs. H. W. Warren, E. L. Thorndike, and J. R. Angell.
On motion of Mr. Urban a committee of three is to be appointed
by the president to consider the advisability and means of offering
prizes for distinguished work in psychology.
There was considerable feeling manifested that the association
meetings can be made more helpful than they are. This feeling
found expression in a recommendation of the council that next year
the executive committee arrange for more informal dinners, smokers,
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luncheons, etc. Such meetings, it was thought, would favor informal
conferences among persons of kindred interests.
One round-table conference on mental tests of college students
found a place on this programme. Mr. Woodworth presided, and
there was discussion by Messrs. Whipple, Cornell, Bingham, Wells,
Major, Porter, Haggerty, and others. If arrangements for such
round-tables can be made so that persons interested in similar prob-
lems can be brought together for informal discussion, the value of
the annual meetings will be greatly enhanced. Our sessions are too
often made up of condensed lectures and too little discussion. This
result is almost unavoidable with our programmes arranged as they
now are. Where the materials for the programmes are offered by
individuals, there is sure to be a heterogeneous list of subjects. The
secretary must then do heroic work to arrange these into sessions
with some degree of unity. The interest of recent meetings is due
largely to the success of the retiring secretary in accomplishing this
feat. This method of securing a programme, valuable as it is from
certain points of view, has serious limitations and the newly elected
officers may well study methods for improving the general plan.
The apparatus exhibits begun at the Washington meeting con-
tinue to be a source of great interest. The Stoelting exhibit was again
on display and there were individual pieces shown by Messrs. Whip-
pie, Dunlap, Dearborn, McComas, Kirkpatrick, Bentley, Franz,
Porter, Hays, Warren, Bingham, and others.
The programme of forty-four papers had but three lacunae due
to absence. At one time double sessions were necessary. In spirit
the meeting had a decidedly behavioristic tendency. More than
half the papers either championed the behavioristic point of view
in one or another form or reported experiments pursued through
behavioristic. methods. A considerable part of the time the word
itself was in the air.
Mr. Warren, in the president's address on "The Mental and The
Physical," championed a monodualistic view of mind and matter.
He contended that science is not yet ready to adopt a metaphysics of
mind and matter. But some working hypothesis of the psychoneural
relation is needed in order to fix the scientific status of psychology.
The double-aspect view (monodualism) seems to fit the conditions
best. This conception of the relationship between mental and phys-
ical becomes clear when we examine the analogous relation between
surface and mass in our perception of material phenomena.
If mental and physical activity are two inseparable aspects of
one series of events, then the scientific assumption of uniformity or
"law" is extended from the physical into the mental sphere. The
old anthropomorphic conception of choice and reason must be radi-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 87
cally amended. In the light of modern science the presumption is
that mental phenomena, including choice and reason, are as uniform
as physical events. The burden of proof rests on those who deny the
regularity and determinacy of human volition and human reason-
ing. Even teleology may be brought into line with the mechanistic
processes of nature. Foresight is the conscious counterpart of pur-
posive activity, which is due to distant stimuli preparing the response
to contact stimuli by means of a complex nervous mechanism; the
beginnings of this purposive activity are manifest far down the
organic scale.
Psychology should embrace both the inner and outer aspects of
experience. It is the science of the relations between the individual
and his environment. These relations may be studied either objec-
tively as behavior, or introspectively as events of consciousness. Be-
havior study is essential to an understanding of genetic problems;
it serves also as a check on the data of introspection. Introspective
psychology has disclosed uniformities among mental events ; it claims
recognition by science on the ground that science should include
every branch which contributes to a unified view of the world. The
behaviorist himself admits that consciousness is a necessary instru-
ment of research. Without it there would be no scientific observa-
tion or generalization. Sense perception and the logical processes
require analysis quite as much as the facts and values which they
reveal. Science must study its instruments as well as its data.
In opening the joint session with the philosophers, Mr. Creighton
contended for a psychology which is not existential, but teleological.
The physical sciences, based on the mechanical theory, do not de-
scribe concrete individual things, but seek to determine the general
conditions and relations of material existence. Psychology has
attempted to obtain information of the same type as that expressed
in the laws of physical nature. Its laws, therefore, refer to the
conditions of mentality in general, in abstraction from the individual-
ized form of concrete minds. The question arises whether these
abstract conditions of mentality have not ultimately to be expressed
in physiological rather than in psychological terms. Is it possible
to maintain that there are existing processes or modes of conscious-
ness or even that there is any genuine scientific advantage in describ-
ing mental life from this point of view? Even if we grant, as it is
probably necessary to do, that a psychological physiology or a physio-
logical psychology is necessary, yet this type of science does not
satisfy all the legitimate demands that are made upon psychology.
There is also necessary a science of psychology, which shall deal with
the concrete individualized form of experience and which shall ex-
press its results in terms of a different mode of uniformity from
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that of the natural sciences. Its method is teleological rather than
Casual, and its standpoint is that of the concrete self in its relations
and functions. This type of psychology is no mere unrealized ideal,
but is found both in the historical systems and in contemporary
investigations. Its method of analysis is different from that of the
existential psychology, but not inferior in either definiteness or
certainty.
Mr. Urban contended that psychology has the same need as any
other science of the support of philosophy, because philosophy de-
velops its methods and problems independently and takes its material
from the whole field of experience. Certain problems lead more
directly to philosophic speculation, and it is in clearing up these
ideas that philosophy may be of assistance to psychology. The
notions of introspection, probability, and of the psychometric func-
tions are used as examples. In trying to correlate mental states,
as revealed by introspection, with definite groups of conditions one
encounters the difficulty that no group of conditions, no matter how
carefully controlled, will always produce the same mental content.
As a matter of fact, judgments given on the comparison of two
stimuli have all the features of chance events, and the question arises
whether we have to conclude from this that they are not causally
necessitated. The notion of the psychometric functions offers a
problem of similar great generality. In empirical determinations of
these functions one has to restrict oneself to certain simple expres-
sions called analytic functions. This restriction contains certain
implications which may be broadly stated in this way. Events char-
acterized by such functions may be fully determined on the basis of
a finite number of observations, and, once determined, the course of
these functions may be followed up indefinitely into the future or
back into the past. The assumption that the events of nature may
be represented by analytic functions must be made every time
mathematical reasoning is applied to the study of nature, because
the general type of function can not be used successfully. Can this
Restriction be justified? It seems that it is at the bottom of certain
peculiarities of our notions about causality. The way to advance this
problem consists in analyzing the logical implications of this assump-
tion and finding the consequences of dropping it as a whole or in
part.
The behaviorist note was present in Mr. Dewey's discussion of
the standpoint of psychology. The speaker dealt with the topic ' ' as it
presents itself in the actual teaching of philosophy. ' ' Whatever may
be the abstract theoretical aspects of the methodology of the two sub-
jects, from the standpoint of the present teaching of philosophy,
the subject of philosophy is intimately tied up with the conceptions
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 89
involved in the current teaching of psychology. It was pointed out
that almost all the epistemological problems that are in the fore-
front of discussion to-day are what they are because of the fact that
psychology is thought to afford scientific warrant for belief in a
separate psychic or mental realm of existence, having its own self-
contained entities, laws, and systemizations, and for the belief that
these psychic existences are either the primary immediate data of
knowledge or else the terms and units out of which knowledge is com-
posed. Hence such problems as whether we can know an external,
material world, and if so, how ; whether there is any reason for believ-
ing in such a world ; whether the psychic event or ' ' consciousness ' '
modifies the real object in the act of knowing it ; how mind and body
are connected in acts of knowing and willing; whether a psychic
existence can have physical efficiency; whether it falls under the
law of causality applicable to physical existence, etc. The genuine-
ness of such problems and the significance of the philosophy that
deals with them is absolutely dependent upon the standing of the
primary conception brought over from psychology. It was pointed
out that if the ''behavior" movement made much headway in psy-
chology, students (and future teachers) of philosophy would approach
philosophy with such different preconceptions as radically to alter
the subject-matter and method of philosophical discussion. In con-
clusion, the question was raised how far the fundamental assumption
of current introspective psychology had itself grown up within psy-
chology on the basis of its own scientific data and how far it was a
heritage from the philosophy of Locke and Descartes. If it should
turn out to be the latter, the circle of relationship between current
psychology and current philosophy would be complete ; so that how-
ever distant from the ideas of the seventeenth century philosophers
prided themselves upon being, they would still be inquiring into
their topics from the standpoint set by those ideas.
In animal psychology, which seems to be the field out of which
the term behaviorism takes its rise, there were four papers. Mr.
Craig reported on the attitudes of appetition and of aversion in
doves. He defined an attitude of appetition as a condition in the
bird which keeps the bird restlessly active, trying now this and now
that, until at last he gets from the environment that particular
stimulus which sets off a final reaction (end-reaction) after which
the bird appears satisfied and restful. In some cases the appetitive
attitude is an incipient end-reaction; in other cases it is different
from the end-reaction. The stimulus sought, which is needed to
activate the end-reaction, may be the stimulus of an entire situation,
involving even memory factors. Many instincts of birds are of an
opposite type, namely, attitudes of aversion, which keep the bird
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restlessly active so long as a certain stimulus is present, but give
him peace after he has succeeded in ridding himself of that stimulus.
It has been said erroneously that in animals there is no true dis-
tinction between work and play, that the animal's activities are all
play. A dove may be observed to make repeated trials to overcome
difficulties, enduring bodily injury, and continuing the struggle for
a long period, urged on all the while by an appetitive (or aversive)
attitude tending toward a certain end-situation. This is work.
Doves exhibit also conflict of attitudes, hesitation, and a final over-
coming of one attitude by the other. In certain cases the attitude
which stimulates the agent himself serves to stimulate also other doves
(patients) toward the same or correlative ends.
Regarded simply as observable motor phenomena (disregarding
questions of intelligence, and of conscious states) these activities of
birds seem to be the same, only more simple, as the behavior activated
by desire, purpose, volition, in men.
Mr. J. F. Shepard contrasted the labyrinth learning of ants,
rats, and cats with the learning of man. The former learn back-
wards while normal people learn more rapidly from the beginning
of the maze. There must, therefore, be "some difference in orga-
nization which gives the ant, the rat, the cat, and the person different
types of control of behavior. It is suggested that the theory which
gives association a character of inhibition as positive as excitation
may be a possible explanation of this organization."
Mr. Cole reported an investigation on color-blindness of cats.
Two cats confused a yellow with a white paper of the same flicker
equivalent. Two others confused Bradley standard blue with a dark
gray cambric and with a blue cambric, with which in turn they con-
fused the same gray. Two other cats confused red with black, and
two others confused Bradley green with Bradley "cool dark gray."
Thus a gray was found which was confused by two cats with each
of the colors yellow, blue, red, and green. All confusions persisted
for more than six hundred trials. Hering grays were found to be
useless for the experiments. The two cats which had learned to
select yellow as a food-color confused it with each of twelve colors
of nearly the same flicker equivalent. In the same way blue was
confused with three others colors, green with seven, and red with
nine other colors.
As we worked through the spectral colors in order an area of
"difficult discrimination" was found partially surrounding each
"confusion area." Two persons with dichromatic vision were asked
to sort these color-papers as Holmgren worsteds are sorted. Each
of the dichromates made five confusions which had been made by the
cats. Both of the dichromates and the cats agreed in the matches
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 91
(confusions) of two pairs of colors, and for each of these pairs the
flicker equivalents were identical. The colors confused with yellow
and green had almost the same flicker equivalents as yellow and
green, respectively, while those confused with red and blue varied
widely in flicker-value. This would suggest a shortened neutral
spectrum, yet while red was confused with black, blue was confused
with a very dark gray, but not with black. The work was done
under natural, daylight conditions, and the fact that so many con-
fusions were found suggests that, under the precautions taken, the
visual sense alone could be employed by the animals. In the light
of Ives's recent results, 1 which show that the flicker method is supe-
rior in both " sensibility and reproducibility " to the method of
equality of brightness, flicker values can hardly be ignored in experi-
ments on vision.
Mr. Cannon reported further on the physiological effects of fear
and rage. In addition to restoring a fatigued muscle wholly or
almost wholly to its original irritability, injected adrenalin markedly
increases the speed of coagulation of the blood. The adrenalin
liberated in pain and the major emotions hastens greatly the clotting
of blood. This reaction would be serviceable in case of injury to
blood-vessels in conditions which rage and pain might involve.
One session on experimental psychology was devoted chiefly to
papers on vision. Mrs. Ladd-Franklin proposed to reform color ter-
minology. It is wrong to permit the term color to be used with its
present ambiguity, as both including and excluding the series of
grays. The term is needed in the inclusive sense, and there is a simple
means at hand by which we may make it unambiguous, for color
proper, we should say chroma. We have already all its derivatives in
common use, dichromatic, achromatic, tetrachromatic (for normal
four-chroma vision). For the grays, including black and white, she
proposed to make use of the term achroma. With these two names for
the specific and the non-specific light-sensations, we have at once two
good words for the degree in which each sensation-constituent is pres-
ent in, say, a grayish blue : we can speak of its chromaticity and of its
achromaticity.
There are four unitary colors proper, or chromas, and four series
of color (chroma) blends. The words orange and purple should
never be admitted into scientific speech, non-unitary colors should
not be given unitary names. Just as there exist no unitary names
for the yellow-greens and the blue-greens, so we should, in the other
two series of color-blends, speak always of the red-blues and the red-
yellows.
The term brightness has been thoroughly vitiated for scientific
i Phil Mag., 1912.
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use by the absurd color theory of Hering his followers mean by it
three things at once: (1) brightness in the real sense; (2) an as-
sumed whiteness-constituent (though the color may be, for sensa-
tion, prefectly saturated) ; and (3) an imagined dissimilation-process
which is taken to be its physiological correlate. Since it is impos-
sible to rescue this word, at present, for its correct meaning, it is
indispensable to discard it entirely. Its place should be taken by
luminosity, or subjective intensity. Hering has said lately that
those who can accept neither the psychological nor the physiological
conceptions which lie at the base of his theory, may nevertheless
be grateful for his terminology. But in fact his terminology, as
regards "brightness" at least, is almost worse than his theory. His
theory is, moreover, so bound up with his baseless terminology that
the simple restitution of the term brightness, for instance, to its
natural and unambiguous significance (subjective intensity or lumi-
nosity) would suffice, I have no doubt, completely to upset his theory.
It is the surreptitious introduction of Hering 's hypothesis as to the
physiological substratum of brightness under this triply ambiguous
term that permits one to be oblivious of the untenableness of the
theory. A corrected color-terminology, therefore, far from being
immaterial, is bound to have important logical consequences.
Miss Cook reported an investigation of the relation between the
quality of colors which pair off as complementaries, and those which
mutually induce each other in simultaneous contrast. The method
was that of making color equations by means of rotating disks of
colored papers. Both complementary and contrast colors were formed
by the usual procedure. The results agree with those of Tschermak 2
in showing that the contrast color is both redder and bluer than
the complementary. The discrepancy is slight for red and for green,
large for yellow and for blue.
The anomaly is explained by Tschermak as being due to reddish-
blue adaptation of the eye in ordinary daylight. If this were the
case, the direction of the anomaly could be changed by artificial color-
adaptation to different colors. Experiments under conditions of
artificial color-adaptation, however, show no variation in the direc-
tion of the anomaly and only negligible variations in its amount,
whether the eye be adapted to red, blue, yellow, green, gray, or to
ordinary daylight. Evidently, therefore, Tschermak 's explanation
is inadequate, but the experimenters have no better one to offer.
Mr. Langfeld reported on a case of color hearing. The phe-
nomenon of color hearing of a talented musician was examined
twice, a period of seven years intervening between the two
investigations. It was found that the colors agreed even to the
2 P 'finger's Archiv, 1907.
\
93
subtler nuances. In the later investigation the colors accompanying
certain chords and the difference between consonance and dissonance
as regards the resulting colors were noted.
Mr. Ferree and Miss Rand have investigated the method of
Flicker for the photometry of lights of different colors and find it
deficient. The paper (1) briefly compared the relative advantages
and disadvantages of the method of flicker and the method of direct
comparison with regard, to sensitivity; (2) showed that the method
of flicker does not possess of itself the sureness of principle needed
to justify its use in accurate work; and (3) showed that as yet its
results have not been found to agree in the average with those of
any method which can be shown to have this sureness of principle.
It was pointed out that at the rate of speed at which the impressions
are given in the method of flicker, the eye is very much underex-
posed to its stimulus. This underexposure has the same effect on
sensation as a reduction in the intensity of the lights used, and the
amount of this reduction is so great that with the intensities used
in practical work the Purkinje phenomenon is involved in every
judgment or comparison that is made. The third point was covered
in the following way: (1) It was pointed out that the only method
that has thus far been used as a standard with which to compare
the method of flicker has been the equality of brightness method.
(2) It was shown that the extension of the equality of brightness
method to the photometry of colored light so far as that extension
has been made to the present time, has been based on a false assump-
tion with regard to the effect of colored and colorless light on sensa-
tion, and that the method, therefore, does not possess the sureness
of principle needed for a standard method. And (3) it was shown
both from experimental work and from a preponderance of the
work done by others who have made the comparison, that the results
by the method of flicker do not agree in the average with those ob-
tained by the equality of brightness method, and, therefore, that
justification for the adoption of the method of flicker can not be
found, even could that method be taken as standard.
The after-effect of visual motion was discussed by Mr. Hunter.
The visual motion was produced by black and white strips rotating
about a horizontal axis. The motion was viewed through a screen
with an aperture 4 X 7% inches. Six subjects were used. The
author obtained results which require an interpretation upon the
basis of eye-muscle strain due to inhibited tendency to follow moving
lines. The following facts may be given in support of the above:
(1) The after-movement is, in general, in the same direction as this
strain. (2) The appearance of the after-movement may be inhibited
by vigorous straining of the eye muscles in the fixation during the
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real movement. (3) Eye movements, confined to central area of
drum, plus winking and general muscle strain, will prevent the
appearance of the after-movement, though a negative after-image
of the aperture is obtained. (4) If a mirror be placed below the
rotating drum so that the motion is seen going in opposite directions,
eye-muscle strain may prevent the appearance of all after-move-
ment, or it may control the after-movement either on the drum or in
the mirror. Often the after-movement which opposes the direction
of strain is controlled, while that going in the same direction is
affected. (5) If one eye is stimulated by the movement, an after-
movement may be seen with the other eye either on the stationary
drum or upon a printed page. No negative after-image of the aper-
ture appears in the unstimulated eye. This after-movement is not
sharply localized and can be accounted for on the basis of the har-
monious action of the muscles of the two eyes. (6) The stationary
drum may be made to appear to rotate either up or down by strain-
ing any eye muscles in the corresponding directions. It is not con-
tended that the muscle strains alone are the effective conditions of
all after-movements. Both the fading of after-images and associa-
tion factors are influential as shown by data accumulated. Wohlge-
muth has opposed the after-image theory on the ground that constant
stimulation soon results in uniform fatigue. If this were true, no
movement could be seen, as is evident from rapid rates of rotation.
Miss Fernald presented a study of color preferences among thirty-
eight school children between the ages of six and eight. In a pre-
liminary series of comparisons of the four colors of the Milton
Bradley series (red, blue, green, and yellow) certain results appeared
which seemed to require further confirmation, with control of cer-
tain factors, before they could be accepted as generally valid. The
most striking of these results were a marked preponderance of
preference for blue when standard colors were compared and a shift
to red (pink) when tints were under consideration. It appeared from
this that hue was not the only factor to be considered, since in the
case of red and blue, at least, the preference changed from one to
the other with a shift in brightness of colors compared. An attempt
was made in this preliminary series to discover the effect of back-
ground by the use of white, gray, and black cards, but these did not
appreciably alter the situation.
In a more careful attempt these points have appeared. (1) Under
the conditions of the work the method of paired comparisons seemed
applicable in the tests of a majority of children, though there were
a few failures to make consistent selections. (2) The question of the
particular red or blue or other color used seems important when any
given series of colors, such as the Milton Bradley, is used. For
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 95
purposes of esthetic comparison with other colors, in the case of
young children, the standard orange red seems the better qualified
to represent the red group, and it is being so used in other tests at
present. (3) In the red and the blue series, each containing three
tints, three standards, and three shades, confirmation was obtained
of the common statement that children like the more saturated colors,
since the standards received the largest number of choices. Second-
arily there was a selection of tints in preference to shades.
Two papers on hearing were presented. One by Mr. Kogers
dealt with the binaural phase difference in sound localization. Pre-
vious investigators have argued that with sounds of low pitch com-
ing from considerable distances the difference in intensity at the two
ears would be too small to be used in localization of these sounds by
binaural intensity ratios. They have shown, furthermore, that under
certain experimental conditions the localization of low sounds is
clearly controlled by phase relations, each sound being localized on
the same side as the ear which receives its series of impacts ahead of
the other.
Recent critics have explained the phenomena as due to inter-
ference of sound waves meeting within the head, and have con-
cluded that the phase difference operated in these experiments only
through producing intensity difference. Other critics have ques-
tioned the experimental data.
Mr. Rogers reported that the experiments have been repeated in
modified form, largely through the work of Mr. Carl R. Brown,
with corroboration of the previous positive results. It has also been
shown that under the conditions of these experiments the proportion
of sound conduction through the head is so slight as to make it im-
probable that it could produce such results as appear, that a serious
error is present in the mathematics of the argument by which the
operation of the phase difference is explained in terms of intensity
differences, and that, rightly calculated, the sound interferences, if
they were effective, would produce just the opposite results from
those that actually occur.
He concluded that binaural phase differences do produce direct
and specific effects in the nervous system, and that these are a genuine
factor in the localization of sounds of low pitches, not only under
the artificial conditions of these experiments, but under natural con-
ditions as well.
In an investigation of pitch memory Mr. Baird found that abso-
lute pitch memory is subject to wide individual variation ; when the
eighty-eight tones of the piano were presented in irregular order,
nine observers made the following percentages of correct identifica-
tions (264 or more judgments by each observer) : 99, 97J, 89, 73, 62,
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51, 41, 32, and 26. Tones from the middle region, the once-accented
and the twice-accented octaves, are most accurately identified, and
tones from the subcontra octave were least accurately identified.
Relatively few errors were made with the piano tones; then follow,
in order of increasing difficulty, pipe organ (diapason, reed, string,
flute qualities) flute, clarinet, forks, voice (tenor, contralto, soprano,
bass). A determination of the limits of pitch within which each tone
of the octave (naturals only) is still identifiable shows an overlap-
ping in every instance, for instance, a tone of 545 vibrations is
sometimes identified as c, sometimes as d. (These determinations,
however, were made by means of the Tonvariator; and all of the
observers reported that tones of this clang-tint were exceedingly
difficult to identify). All observers agree in identifying the note
more accurately than the octave to which it belongs, a circumstance
which seems to support the view (Revesz, Kohler) that tones possess
an attribute of character in addition to their attributes of pitch and
clang-tint. The testimony of all nine observers agreed in asserting
that absolute pitch memory is not a product of deliberate training
and practise.
Two studies on human learning were reported, one by Mr.
Kirkpatrick on "Memorizing versus Incidental Learning." The
particular thing learned was a portion of an advanced multiplica-
tion table. Normal students and sixth-grade children were subjects.
The methods were (1) memorizing, then using; (2) using at once,
guided by a key sheet of products; (3) computing the products.
The memorizing or practise was continued eight and ten days. The
final test of efficiency was writing as many answers without a key
as possible in two minutes. The groups that practised computing
averaged the greatest number of answers. Those that spent all the
time in practise next, and those that spent part of the time in memo-
rizing wrote the fewest. Those that spent eight out of nine days
in memorizing were much behind those who spent only four or five
days out of ten in memorizing. The results in this preliminary ex-
periment suggest that the traditional practise of learning and drill-
ing on facts such as the multiplication table, then using them after-
wards is wasteful as well as wearisome.
In a contribution to the question of "quick learning," "quick
forgetting," Mr. "Woodworth stated that the contradictory results
obtained, according as retention is measured by the saving in re-
learning or by the amount recalled, make it desirable to introduce
further variations into the study of the above question. One varia-
tion consists in avoiding the matter of individual differences, and
examining the learning and retention of single associations by the
same individual. In one of the experiments reported, an Italian-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 97
English vocabulary of 20 pairs of words was to be learned from audi-
tory presentation. After one reading, the experimenter gave the
Italian words as stimuli, allowing 3-5 seconds for each response,
prompting and correcting, and so continuing till each correct re-
sponse had been given once. Over-learning was avoided by dropping
each pair from the list as soon as it was learned; but after all the
responses had been correctly given, the experimenter read the whole
list through once more. After an interval of 2-20 hours, the experi-
menter again used the Italian words as stimuli, and got the score of
correct responses, and also a report of associative aids employed in
remembering any of the pairs.
Under these conditions, the more quickly learned pairs were the
better retained. Thus :
Of the pairs learned in 1 reading, 73 per cent, were recalled after the interval.
Of the pairs learned in 2 readings, 72 per cent, were recalled after the interval.
Of the pairs learned in 3 readings, 63 per cent, were recalled after the interval.
Of the pairs learned in 4 readings, 58 per cent, were recalled after the interval.
Of the pairs learned in 5 readings, 38 per cent, were recalled after the interval.
Of the pairs learned in 611 readings, 27 per cent, were recalled after the interval.
Since the aided pairs (pairs in which the subject saw some rela-
tion between the terms or developed some mnemonic to hold them
together) were both more quickly learned and better retained than
the unaided pairs; the advantage of quick learning probably lies
partly in this association with aids. But this is not the whole story,
for when the unaided pairs are considered by themselves, the quickly
learned among them are better retained than the slowly learned ; and,
indeed, the quickness or slowness of learning makes more difference
to retention where no aids are present than where they are present.
We conclude that quick learning favors retention, and aided learn-
ing favors retention, each independently ; but that the two influences
work together, inasmuch as the best aids suggest themselves promptly
and promote quick learning.
The order of merit method appeared in an investigation of com-
posite group judgments by Mr. Scott. Students were told "to rank
in order of importance the motives which determine the election of
studies by your 1,000 fellow students (10 motives specified)."
: 'Rank in order of importance the qualities that give prestige to
the 1,000 college students (provided with a list of 8 such qualities)."
'Who is most respected in your home community the successful
business man, lawyer, minister, physician, or professor? Rank the
five in the order in which they are regarded in your community. ' '
'The attempt to answer these questions," said Mr. Scott, "is not
only a good exercise for the student in social psychology, but the
answers are illuminating to the professor in charge."
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In the use of the same method Mr. Hollingworth presented some
characteristics of judgments of evaluation. He pointed out that the
method has been used chiefly as an instrument in the investigation of
some specific problem, such as family resemblance, interests of chil-
dren, value of advertisements, measurements of school progress, dis-
tribution of eminence, etc. Little attention has been paid to the
characteristics and behavior of the judgments themselves. When the
various studies are considered together a number of interesting prob-
lems arise concerning the judgments themselves. He pointed out
some of these problems, and reviewed the available material, suggest-
ing tentative conclusions and further problems.
Mr. Rosanoff made a preliminary report of a higher scale of
mental measurements. The special problem is to develop a simple
method whereby a subject's mental capacity might be estimated from
what he has acquired in the course of his education in comparison
with the average acquisition of a large group of subjects of the same
degree of education.
The method proposed consists in the employment of a free asso-
ciation test applied by means of a list of one hundred stimulus words
gathered from the field of systematic education. The plan is to
collect a large number of test records from subjects of various
degrees of education and thus to develop a series of standards. The
special object is to employ the test, when normal standards are
available, in the study of native mental capacity in cases of insanity.
A small amount of material already collected seems to indicate
(1) that the number of " appropriate" reactions is in correlation
with degree of education, and (2) that, the factor of education being
constant, there is great range of variation which is tentatively as-
sumed to be in correlation with native mental capacity or at least
with educability.
Mr. Cornell reported data on the influence of race, color, nativity,
and truancy on the answers to the Binet tests. The evidence fur-
nished by the statistics quoted is mostly negative. The statistics
were taken from examination of delinquent boys at the Philadelphia
House of Detention, boys between nine and sixteen years of age and
mentally of inferior grade. Under these circumstances it is not pos-
sible to demonstrate the effect of home and neighborhood environ-
ment as it affects very young children in many cases. Nor was it
possible to show the effect of truancy in a group of boys whose total
mental equipment is usually the third or fourth grade at the age of
14 years. However, certain evidence in the case of younger children,
not so detailed as the evidence in the principal group studied, is here
presented.
The charts here displayed show the percentage of successful
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 99
answers to the questions designed by Binet for children of 9 years,
10 years, 11 years, and 15 years (Goddard's revision) . Altogether, 24
test questions were reviewed, 5 questions being contained in the group
for each year except year 15, in which there are only 4 questions.
Of the total of 24 questions the answers by the white native group
and the white foreign group were practically alike, and therefore
practically similar to the percentage for the total of all children of
that age. In only five cases was there any difference, and in these the
difference was not marked. These five were the reasoning out of
simple problems (IX., 4), answered slightly better by the white
native children; placing three given words in a sentence (IX., 5),
answered slightly better by the white native children; arranging
weights in proper sequence (X., 5), answered better by the white
native children; association test giving opposites, answered slightly
better by the white native children; repeating six numbers, done
better by colored children ; and making change, answered better after
ten years of age by the white native children, but at ten years of age
by the white foreign children.
A corresponding attempt to demonstrate differences in the
answers to the Binet tests in truant children compared with children
of known good or fair school attendance proved similarly barren of
startling results. In the 24 questions the answers of which were
studied, 19 were answered equally well by the truants and by the
boys who had been in fair or good school attendance. In three test
questions, namely, interpreting pictures, and ability to write a mes-
sage by the cipher code, and giving opposites in the association test,
the truants did slightly better on the average than the others. In
the problem stories requiring correct conclusions the truants did
slightly worse.
Turning from these negative results to a study of younger chil-
dren, the writer brought forward a study made on a number of small
children attending the school of observation and practise connected
with the Philadelphia Normal School. These children were all of a
very good social station. The answers to the Binet tests averaged
two years above the Binet standards for age.
The two studies bring out the general truth that differences in the
Binet answers due to environment will principally be found in
younger children.
Mr. Woods has undertaken a historiometric study of eminent
scientists designed primarily to furnish an objectively derived work-
ing list of the leading names in the history of the natural and exact
sciences. Three leading encyclopaedias have been utilized as a stand-
ard for inclusion the Encyclopaedia Britannica, La Grande Ency-
clopedic, and Meyer's Konversation Lexikon. Out of these the 1,300
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most prominent scientists have been selected from each encyclopaedia,
so that three lists contain the names of those to whom the greatest
amount of printed space is alloted. About 300 names appear in all
three lists, and are called class A. Class B consists of about 450
who appear in two of the three lists. Class C, those who appear in
but one of the three lists (about 2,100) . The rise and fall of scientific
activity can then be measured. The most significant changes are the
rise in Germany during the nineteenth century and the decline in
France. These changes are probably due to environment and not to
heredity, but the cause of the change is not quite evident. There is
apparently little bias of the editors of. the encyclopaedia towards their
own countrymen as regards scientists of the highest eminence or men
long dead. This bias is much stronger towards living men and less
eminent men. In historiometric work some triangulation or other
method of objective proof is necessary. Conformation from various
points of view and convergence of results will lead towards increas-
ing certainty and a progressive inductive science.
Mr. Fernberger presented a study intended to determine, experi-
mentally, the effect of the elimination of the two extreme intensities of
the comparison stimuli. Two series of lifted weights were employed ;
one, an extended series of seven pairs of stimuli ; the other, a reduced
series of five pairs. These were mingled in such a way that the results
from both were taken simultaneously. The space errors were elimi-
nated and the time errors were kept constant. Six thousand judg-
ments were taken from each of three subjects. The averages, for all
three subjects, of the values of the interval of uncertainty for the
extended and the reduced series, show a difference of only 0.07 gram.
The point of the subjective equality shifts somewhat, being 0.34
gram lighter for the reduced series than for the extended series.
Hence it would seem that the elimination of the two extreme values
of the comparison stimuli makes practically no variation in the deter-
mination of the sensitivity of the subject. Such an elimination,
obviously, reduces the time and labor necessary for the acquiring of
the data upon which the calculations are based by nearly one third.
A second psycho-physical paper by Mr. Mitchell dealt with the
influence of distractions on the formation of judgments in lifted
weight experiments. The investigation involves the problem of at-
tention and attempts to answer questions, similar to those raised by
Miinsterberg, Titchener, Wirth, and others, by the use of a technique
and methodology much more refined than these workers had at their
disposal. The judgments in experiments with lifted weights, ob-
tained and treated by the method of constant stimuli as developed by
Urban, are the basis of this discussion. Two kinds of distractions
were used: (1) While the subject gave all attention to the judgment
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 101
of the weight, a distracting sound stimulus was presented. (2) At
the same time that the subject lifted the weight he had to count dis-
crete sounds, that is, a second operation was carried on. During the
investigations approximately 75,000 judgments were made and on
the basis of these the following conclusions were given.
First, contrary to the traditional view, distractions (a) increase
the precision of judgment, that is, the subject's judgments are more
consistent, and (6) cause an overestimation of the weight, or in other
words, with a decrease of attention there is an increase in sensation
intensity.
Second, with distraction the sensitivity of the subjects is in-
creased, the upper and lower difference thresholds being nearer
together.
Third, the current division of attention into voluntary and in-
voluntary may not be valid, the method used here suggesting a more
satisfactory way of evaluating such psychical processes.
The vagaries of Freudianism were criticized in two papers. Mr.
Dunlap contended that under the caption of "The Pragmatic
Advantage of Freudo-analysis " successful psychoanalysis by
Freudian methods does not necessitate the discovery of the actual
association at the base of the patient's trouble, but merely the build-
ing up of a new association which supplants the old and the final
breaking up of the substituted association. The conventionalized
sexual symbolism is an admirable device for the formation of strong
associations, but a long period of time is necessary.
In a paper on "The Freudian Idea of Ambivalence," President
Hall said that neither paidologists nor pediatricians have ever
ascribed such importance to childhood as do the Freudians. Every
dream, neurosis, or psychosis, if only analyzed, reveals infantile de-
terminants. Every form of Janet's "flight from reality," autism,
normal day dreams, every lapse from apperceptive to associative
thought, from the abstract to anschaulich, is a retreat towards the
state of infancy. Art, poetry, myth, religion, are largely realizations
of childish wishes. Thus the first three or four years of life are
fateful for health, virtue, and success. The Freudians can not apply
psychoanalysis directly to infants. In fact, only two have been
studied with any detail. But they construct their child from the
lives of great men and from pathological cases. Ferenczi and some
others find in prenatal life the basis of a solipsistic " Allmacht der
Gedanken" seen all the way from magic to ultra idealism later. We
sympathize with Stern's protest, endorsed in the Breslau meeting of
physicians, against turning the analyst loose on children. Now,
Freud says, "Das Unbewusste ist das Infantile/' or that part of it
which is repressed. It is where complexes are performed, and these
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are mainly unconscious, and psychoanalysis is only a method of get-
ting at them. Yet we are now told that the future of psychoanalysis
rests more with psychologists of the normal than with psychiatrists.
The writer protested against Jung's large use of "libido" to include
even appetite for food, insisting that the autos preceded the eros,
pointed out that the Freudian child was only a fragment of a child,
that the traits studied were abnormal, and that the tendency to apply
them to normal children was the great error of the Freudians, that
a child in whom they were much developed was per se abnormal.
In a paper on "Intoxication and Ecstatic Trance in Religion"
Mr. Leuba attempted to establish three theses :
1. In all, or nearly all, non-civilized peoples states of intoxication
are looked upon as religious states par excellence; they are described
as God-possession.
2. In the religions of civilized nations, and in particular in Chris^
tianity, similar states, i. e., ecstatic trances, are likewise looked upon
as union with the divine.
3. The reason commonly offered for the identification of intoxica-
tion and trance states with divine possession, namely, the apparently
superhuman character of these states (vision, anesthesias, etc.), and
the alleged superhuman powers and knowledge which come to man
when in this condition, do not account adequately for the amazing
attractiveness of intoxication. This is apparent in the fact that in-
toxication retains its hold upon man when it ceases to be regarded as
divine.
In an analysis of intoxication consciousness, the author uncovers
the more fundamental reasons for the place secured by intoxication
in religion.
Three methods of producing religious intoxication are described,,
the chemical (various drugs: peyot, soma alcohol), the mechanical
(rhythmic dancing), and the psychical (as in the Yoga practise and
in Christian mysticism).
A supplementary report on the effect of a prolonged fast was
given by Mr. Langfeld.
At the time of making a series of psycho-physiological tests upon
a man fasting 31 days, a report of which was given at the last meet-
ing of the association, it was not possible to conduct experiments
after the subject had begun to take food. A year later, however, the
opportunity was given to make similar tests covering a period of six
days on the subject under normal conditions. The tests used were
the hand dynamometer test, the tapping test, the space threshold test,
the cancellation test, memory tests, and association and reproduction
tests. In all of these the records were as good if not better than at
the end of the fast, and it must be remembered that at that time
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 103
many of the tests showed improvement. As might be expected, the
strength tests showed the greatest improvement, being even better
than at the beginning of the fast. It seems, therefore, from these
results that the fast did not have any ill effects and certain facts may
indicate beneficial results.
A distinction between images and ideas was set forth by Mr.
Dunlap. Images are not contents modally resembling the special
sensation of vision, audition, etc., but are muscular sensations. They
may, therefore, be observed directly only by introspection, although
other means of observing the total complex (muscle contraction), of
which the image is a part, are important for the investigation of the
conditions of thought. "Introspection" as here used signifies noth-
ing more than the observation of images (muscle sensations') and
feelings. Perceptual consciousness is conditioned by the arc reflex
from non-muscular receptor to muscle ; consciousness of pure feeling
by the reflex from receptor to gland. The reflex from striped muscle
to striped muscle conditions directly the consciousness of muscular
action, and derivatively the thought of the object given originally
by the perceptual reflex whose terminus ad quern is the terminum a
quo of the thought-reflex. The idea is, therefore, the derivative con-
tent of the thought consciousness, and does not include the immedi-
ate content, or image. The image, as it is conventionally described,
masquerades in plumage stolen from the idea.
Mr. Jared S. Moore discussed the articulation of the concepts of
normal and abnormal psychology. He pointed out the striking dif-
ference in terminology and point of view between the literatures of
normal and abnormal psychology as we find them to-day. Especially,
the doctrine of the complex, which is so important for abnormal psy-
chology, is disregarded by writers on normal mental processes. This
is unfortunate and unreasonable, and detrimental to the student of
psychology. A complete understanding of mental disorders involves
an understanding of the complex as a normal factor in mental life.
The psychological problem is threefold structural, genetic, and
dynamic. Structurally, the complex is composed of cognitive and
affective elements the cognitive elements being grouped into ideas,
and these into systems of ideas. So, again structurally, personality
is an integration of systems of complexes the individual complexes
being grouped into systems, these into systems of a higher order, etc.
The genetic problem is itself twofold the problem of the develop-
ment of complexes out of their elements, and the problem of the
development of the personality by the accretion of new complexes.
The dynamic problem is concerned with the conative aspect and
motor tendencies of the complex, and leads to the distinction between
normal and abnormal psychology normal psychology treating of
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the harmonious activity of complexes, abnormal psychology treating
of conflict, repression, and dissociation.
Mr. Coe discussed the psychology of having friends. Friends r
mutual enjoyment of each other offers for analysis a social experi-
ence that is easily accessible to the psychologist, and that is rather
promoted than hindered by reflection upon it. The naive under-
standing of this experience asserts: (1) That which each friend en-
joys is the other friend, not merely goods to be mediated by him,
and (2) that the reason why a giver is valued above his gift is that
a giver has experience. Apparently, then, we value objects not only
as experience, but also as experiencing.
What has psychology done with data like these? In general, it
has investigated social intercourse from the standpoint of the mechan-
ism of the process, and from the standpoint of knowledge, but in
only a minor degree from the functional standpoint. Particularly,
the kind of value realized when a friend simply "has" his friend,
and the kind of adjustment therein achieved, have received scant
attention. (A) Something has been done with specific phases of
social intercourse, as suggestion and imitation. (B) Genetic study
has shown that the process of attaining self -consciousness is at the
same time the process of defining our social objects. (C) Eight kinds
of answers have been given to the question, "How do I know that
any other mind exists?" They range from "I see and hear my
friend ' ' ; through ' ' I infer by analogy, " " I postulate, " " I intuit, ' '
all the way to "There is continuity of substance between minds,"
and even "Individuals overlap." None of these theories gives a
sufficient account of the kind of value involved in "having" a friend,
or of the relation of this value to the "having." (D) Psychology
has determined that other-regard is not merely refined self-regard.
This is one step toward a psychology of social values. (E) Psy-
chology has raised the question, What is the "psychological" point
of view with respect to such multiple experiencing as friendship
asserts itself to be? No decisive answer has been given. If I as
psychologist consider myself and my friend merely as content of
experience-in-general, conversation being treated as internal dis-
course, and conversely as merely slower parts of the conversational
flow, I am unable to construe "having a friend" in any sense that I
can recognize as true description when I enjoy the experience itself.
It does not appear that psychology can either deny or translate into
anything else the naive assertion that I enjoy a second experiencing.
Mr. Faris, choosing the case of a Congo tribe which does not
punish certain of its members, attempted to show the relation between
punitive justice and the social consciousness.
There are three possible reactions of a group toward an offender
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 105
against social customs. There may be an immediate and instinctive
attack with no thought of limit or measure. There may be a social
reaction in which the culprit is considered a member of the group
with interests that are identical with the interests of the rest. Or,
thirdly, an intermediate attitude is possible where some consider
the culprit as a friend and others as an enemy, in which case the
friends will see that the enemy does not go too far. The first of
these attitudes is war, the second is a social attitude, and the third
alone can be properly designated as punishment.
It is owing to the absence of foreign members of the community
that some tribes do not punish. To the homogeneous tribe, there are
only two classes of people : kin who can not become enemies, and
enemies who can not become kin. If one of the enemy attack, there
is an immediate and instinctive retaliation with the destruction of
the foe for its object. The attack is made even when self-interest
dictates otherwise. But this can not be called punishment. Punish-
ment does arise among the slave-holding tribes where the group is
complex. It is possible to break some of the bonds of union, leaving
others intact.
An historical survey of psychological methods was given by Mr.
Ruckmich. Four different interpretations are found in the usage of
the word ' ' method " in a study of more than a score of systematic works
in psychology: (1) general mode of investigation of phenomena, e. g.,
"experimental method," "introspective method"; (2) a specific
type of procedure for purposes of control or treatment of data, e. g.,
"method of impression," "statistical method"; (3) point of view
taken or intention assumed in an investigation, e. g., "genetic
method," "descriptive method." These three are methodeutic, but
the last is logical in nature: (4) the type of reasoning involved in
the pursuit of any of these three or in the systematization of the
results obtained, e. g., "inductive method," "synthetic method."
The use of the first three classes of method is traced through the
history of psychology from Aristotle to the beginning of the nine-
teenth century by interpretation of the works of representative psy-
chologists, and from that time to the present by a classification of
the expositions of method as given in the systematic treatises of the
leading authorities. The most important feature of the development
of method is its derivation, on the one side, from casual observation
and occasional experiment, and, on the other, from the functions of
the "inner sense." A constant shift of emphasis on one or the
other of these factors is marked. The final movement toward experi-
mental procedure took place soon after Kant's refusal to admit psy-
chology to the rank of a science. From that time on, with the refine-
ment of experimentation, the use of "method" was broadened to
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include the second meaning in addition to the first and third. The
modes of investigation, however, also received critical treatment and
became more sharply defined. The establishment of psychology on
an empirical basis as a science took two directions: (1) the widening
of the scope of psychology to include comparative and physiological
aspects, and (2) the application of quantitative methods. At present,
the main differences between the various systems which grew out of
this development of the science lie in the several senses in which the
principal methods are used, and in the several evaluations of the
methods. Uncontrolled introspection, for example, is considered by
one group of authorities as a method which may contribute facts to
the science, by another, as wholly useless to the science. Again, some
authors maintain that experiment can control conditions affecting
both introspection and general observation of organic movements,
while others declare that its realm is psychophysics, physiology, or
the simpler mental processes and complexes. It is essential that sys-
tematic writers come to terms on the evaluation and interpretation
of the various methods, and also on the usage of the word " method. "
Miss Washburn, in discussing the Aufgdbe and intellectual in-
efficiency, pointed out the relation of the Aufgabe and bodily attitude
of activity. This activity attitude tends spontaneously to relax sooner
or later. Its duration is in part determined by physiological con-
ditions, but is influenced also by a psychological factor. The relax-
ation of the activity attitude is hastened by too much attention given
to the sensory accompaniment of the attitude to the attitude of work-
ing rather than to the work itself. Three types of intellectual in-
efficiency may be explained on this hypothesis as to the nature of an
Aufgabe: the lazy person, the spasmodic worker, and the fickle
worker. The lazy person seldom assumes the activity attitude. The
spasmodic worker quickly releases it, although he may recur to the
same task repeatedly after intervals of relaxation. His activity atti-
tude relaxes too soon, partly, at least, because he gives too much
attention to the attitude itself and thus lowers the threshold of
fatigue. The fickle worker is characterized by long-continued single
periods of activity, but when he has once dropped a task he tends not
to recur to it. His activity attitude has been so long continued that
the unpleasantness of extreme fatigue associates itself with the ideas
of the Aufgabe, so that subsequent recurrences of the activity atti-
tude fail to recall effectively this particular task.
It becomes more and more evident that to equate psychology with
the study of consciousness is unsatisfactory. Mr. Frost attempted
by definition to eliminate consciousness altogether. He attempted an
explanation of what is usually ascribed to consciousness, on a strictly
physiological basis. How can we explain the fact that things not
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 107
only are, but that they get reported? If we consider "awareness"
as a physiological and not a psychological term, a start will have
been made.
"Awareness" shall then characterize the response of neural
mechanism to stimulus. Iris reflex is a simple illustration. Such
a sensori-motor arc may be called an "alpha-arc." An alpha-arc
shall then characterize any simple, single, sensori-motor path initiated
by a peripheral stimulus, and resultant in some end-effect. When
alpha-arcs involve higher cortical centers, a further neural beta-arc
may be aroused in the association centers. Beta-arcs are then like
alpha-arcs, save that they take for their objects just prior alpha-
arcs, and the end-effect is modified by complication in terms of pre-
vious neural experience.
Such beta-arcs the writer terms " consciousizing processes."
Their biological significance is to allow of the modification of ordi-
nary reflex behavior in terms of the past experience of the organism.
No arcs, alpha or beta, are self -sensing, but any arcs (beta, gamma,
etc.) may become aware of any previous arc (alpha, beta, etc.). Such
awareness is what is commonly termed "consciousness."
Alpha-acres, not arousing beta-arcs, are called "pre-consciousizing
processes" (reflexes) ; while arcs that once aroused such beta-proc-
esses, but no longer do so, are called " consciousized processes"
(habits). Behavior would appear to be completely and most simply
explained by the mutual functioning of groups of alpha- and beta-
arcs, without the confusion of the hypothetical "consciousness."
"Sensations," then, are not "first things in the way of conscious-
ness, ' ' but the second. There must always be at least two physiologi-
cal processes, successive in time, for one to be a consciousizing proc-
ess, or "sensation." The iris can never get a sensation. An alpha-
arc might give ' ' red-awareness ' ' ; the subsequent beta-arc, if aroused,
would then give "sensation-of-red. " Can either introspection or
logic demand any further characterization of "sensation-red experi-
ence" than to say that a nervous impulse has passed through the
cortex, and there aroused a second impulse which takes it as
its object?
Physiological processes are not the vehicle of the psychic, but are
themselves just what and all we can mean by consciousness. Neither
introspection nor logic can demand any further "elementary psychic
process," or "knowing function."
Mr. Dearborn made suggestions as to the possible neurility of
euphoria and the sthenic index.
I. The basal feeling-tones (euphoria and dysphoria'), so far as
physiological, are more or less determined by the environment of the
receptors, euphoria representing relatively perfect adaptation.
108 TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
II. Three chief factors seem contributory to the euphoric cenes-
thesia: (A) nutritional and sympathetic influences from the intesti-
nal villi; (B) kinesthesia proper; and (0) the epicritic (dermal)
impulses.
III. The four million villi of the intestine, rich in muscle and
sympathetic nerves, probably adapt the blood's content of the nutri-
tive "lipoids" and protein to the immediate needs of the nerve-cells,
and besides may send inward sympathetic influences which in the
brain become euphoric.
IV. The tonus and the active contraction of the voluntary mus-
culature make variable, but essential contributions to the dynamic
reservoir of the central nervous system. Moreover (Bergson) kines-
thesia undoubtedly adds much of euphoric trend to the cenesthesia
by providing in part both intensity and extensity to the other senses.
V. The integrated epicritic impulses appear to predominate in
human physiologic euphoria, and there seem to be two chief modes
of stimulation, evaporation and oxidation.
VI. Air that is dead, i. e., not moving, humid and too warm,
humid and too cold, or lacking in oxygen, is a chief occasion of
physiologic dysphoria. Physiologically, these conditions probably are
lacks, lack of movement over the skin, lack of dryness (evaporation
so being lessened) , lack of the physiologic temperature, and lack of
dermal oxygen-reflex determinants of respiration.
VII. Adopting for the nervous system the all-or-none principle,
the actual neurology ("viatility," Morat) of the euphoric and sthenic
balance becomes an interpretation of the "synaptic" relations in the
action-system.
VIII. Physiologic euphoria is, then, more or less determined by
ample, unimpeded, and undeflected neurokinesis. This unimpeded
flood of ample neurokinesis is a condition of a high sthenic index
capable of factuating (or inhibiting) vigorously a rapid succession
of motor paths.
Under the title " Notes on The Mechanism of Continence," Mr.
G. V. N. Dearborn presented the following :
The problems most pressing for practical solution are psychologi-
cal. As analysis of contrectation (Moll) at once shows, the genesial
impulse involves potentially the entire epicritic receptive field, and
this cenesthesia provides the neurobinetic tonus of part of the volun-
tary behavior, involving the whole brain. By association among the
thousands of millions of neurones, this desire is normally in humans
sublimated into love. In the subconscious, as well as out of it, this
tonus of impulsive cenesthesia flooding the psychomotor cerebral
neurones with energy is often a powerful initiative force in the con-
structive behavior of young adults, its leading motor idea, involving
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 109
the whole organism more or less. Repression by way of secrecy and
false shame keeps active that which should usually be quiescent and
latent; and makes that which should be, by knowledge base habit,
subconsciously under control, often strongly aggressive, incontinent.
The neurology of voluntary movement involves factors more or
less like the following :
1. The Nervous Circuits; Kinesthesia. (A) Between muscles
and gray cord. (B) Between cord and brain.
2. The Cerebral Influences of Spatiality. (A) Ocular and other
visual muscles. (B) Retinae. ((7) Semicircular canals. (D) Active
muscles of limbs, etc. (E) Local signs.
3. The Gray Fabric of the Hemispheres. (A) Ideas of useful-
ness. (B) Memory-images of movements, etc. (C) Awareness of
ability. (D) Interests and emotional tones. (E) Inhibition.
Skill apparently may be considered a generalized or localized
voluntary control based on the current fusion (at first conscious) of
the two opposed, but complemental phases of kinesthesia, one actuat-
ing, vegetative, and generally unconscious, the other inhibitory, per-
sonal, and conscious, both subject to habituation, originating at
adolescence, by stimulating the development of the voluntary muscu-
lature, provide with the sexual impulse the means of its control.
Continence, then, appears as an inhibitory generalized skill, grace,
and cleverness based in adequate conscious correlation of the lower
centers with the higher, and in extensive and intensive voluntary and
habitual control not only of the skeletal muscle, but of the vegetative
effectors to some extent. Continuence is not wholly an ethical and an
esthetic matter, but one inherently and most intimately related to
(and even an index of) the most practical phases of life capability,
efficiency, competency, self-knowledge, initiative, personality, man-
hood, and womanhood. Scientifically, then, incontinence appears as
an index of a lack of personal culture, as clumsiness, inefficiency, stu-
pidity, and failure. The genesial impulse developing in the adoles-
cent is normally safeguarded by the simultaneous development of a
consciousness of general voluntary bodily control and of the surpass-
ing efficiency of his organism both actuative and inhibitory. This ex-
perience of "finding oneself" constitutes a criterion of physiologic
age which, partly because functional rather than structural, is more
significant than others so far suggested. Appropriate tests for its
determination would make it as definite a criterion, too, as any now
in use.
M. E. HAGGERTY.
UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA.
110
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Psychology of Insanity. BERNARD HART. New York: G. P. Put*
nam's Sons. 1913. Pp. vii + 176.
This small volume is devoted to the various mental mechanisms in in-
sanity. It presents in a remarkably clear manner that important recent
development in abnormal psychology, namely, the influence exerted by the
unconscious mental processes in the formation of the delusions, halluci-
nations, and conduct of the insane individual. It demonstrates in mental
diseases, as Freud has done for the symptomatic actions of every-day life,
that the various delusions and hallucinations are not due to chance, but
are caused by the rigorous deterministic action of the unconscious upon
the conscious. This deterministic mechanism shapes and directs the
various pathological ideas of the mentally diseased, so that if a mental
disorder is carefully analyzed, as, for instance, dementia prcecox has been
analyzed by Jung and Bleuler, or, in fact, if any case of insanity becomes
accessible for a psychoanalysis, it will be found that the delusions, halluci-
nations, depression, negativistic behavior, etc., are all. due to the action
of certain unconscious complexes.
Hart attempts to answer the question, what are the various uncon-
scious mechanisms at work in the formation and action of these com-
plexes, and as indicated in the preface, he follows the fundamental con-
ceptions of Freud, whom he characterizes as "probably the most original
and fertile thinker who has yet entered the field of abnormal psychology."
He gives, however, but little attention, or even credence to the sexual
conflicts and repressions in childhood upon which Freud and his school
have laid so much stress.
After a brief review of the history of insanity, in which he outlines
the conflict between neuropathology and psychopathology and the struggle
of each for supremacy in the field of modern psychiatry, he passes to the
fertile ground of the psychological conception of mental disease. The
various phenomena of insanity are treated as states of mind rather than
as manifestations of physical changes in the brain, although he very rea-
sonably admits that in modern psychopathology conceptions are employed
which have no actual phenomenal existence. For instance, such terms as
" complexes " and " repression " merely explain mental phenomena, just
as " force " and " energy " explain physical processes. Or, in addition,
these may be merely symbols of mental states, just as mathematical
signs may signify symbols of quantity.
The author then passes to a brief description of the various clinical
phenomena of insanity and of the mental mechanisms themselves, such
as dissociation, conscious and unconscious complexes, mental conflicts,
repression, projection, etc. These terms have now become the every-day
language of modern psychopathology. The data given in this little vol-
ume clearly demonstrate " that the thoughts and actions of the insane
are not a meaningless and inscrutable medley, but that cause and effect
play as considerable a part in the mind of the apparently incomprehen-
sible lunatic as in that of the normal man." The antecedent soil (or
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 111
process) for the insane delusions or hallucination lies in the unconscious,
in a group of ideas or beliefs known as a complex, perhaps partially or
completely stored up in childhood, and by means of the association tests
or through an analysis of the dreams, the delusions or hallucinations,
which are frequently merely a disguised or symbolized projection of the
complex, can be traced to their original sources. These unconscious com-
plexes may be repressed or an unconscious conflict may arise leading to
a mental dissociation, as shown in cases of hysteria, multiple personality,
or in extensive amnesias. If the complex is incompatible with reality, a
defense reaction takes place, and outbreaks of delirium or somnambulism
arise. It would lead us too far into detail to present further examples, as
the book furnishes so admirable a condensation of an important trend in
psychopathology. It is written in a pleasing style and is a distinct con-
tribution to the mental mechanisms of insanity.
I. H. CORIAT.
BOSTON, MASS.
The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson. E. LfiRoY. Translated by
VINCENT BENSON. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1913.
Pp. x-f 231.
An added evidence, if one were necessary, of the popularity of Henri
Bergson with the reading public could be cited from the prompt appear-
ance of Mr. Benson's translation of M. LeRoy's excellent popular exposi-
tion of this difficult, but fascinating philosophy. Mr. Benson's transla-
tion is in good literary taste, and if his version does not always carry over
the vivacity of the original, it has a certain life of its own, and that is
the most that can justly be expected under the exigencies of dealing with
the clarity of LeRoy and the opulence of Bergson. Quotations of the
latter are translated afresh, but references are made to the standard
English translations. 1
HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. September, 1913. Recherches sur le
mecanisme de I' imagination creatrice (fin) (pp. 225-251) : "N. KOSTYLEFF. -
In literary inspiration, conscious activity decidedly preponderates over the
unconscious. Chains of associations whose origins are (perhaps) for-
gotten, verbal reactions to suggestions, observation and study, and ability
to assume the character of the created personality, form the basis of
creative imagination in literature. Du metamorphisme d'une nationalite
par le langage (pp. 252-268) : RAOUL DE LA GRASSERIE, - Language is the
most powerful instrument making for the assimilation of a lesser by a
dominant race; in cases where such assimilation fails, the preservation of
its idiom by the lesser race is seen to be the most effective agency in pre-
1 The original was reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. X., page 192.
112
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
venting assimilation. Notes et documents. La timidite chez les aveugles:
M. DESAGHER. Une heredite psychologique par contraste: L. DUGAS.
Revue Generate. Les revues allemandes de psychologie en 1910 : FOUCAULT.
Analyses et comptes rendus. John Watson, The Interpretation of Reli-
gious Experience: J. BARUZI. Emile Brehier, Schelling: LIONEL DAURIAO.
Oscar Kraus, Platonis Hippias Minor: C. HUIT. Elisabeth Rotten, Goethes
Urphaenomen und die Platonische Idee: C. HUIT. Notices bibliographiques
(psychologie). Revue des periodiques Strangers.
Apelt, Otto. Platons Dialog Phaidon oder Tiber die Unsterblichkeit der
Seele. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1913. Pp. 155. 1.80 M.
Benett, W. Religion and Free Will: A Contribution to the Philosophy
of Values. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1913. Pp.345. 7s. 6d.
Burckhardt, George E. Was ist Individualismus ? Leipzig: Yerlag von
Felix Meiner. 1913. Pp. 88. 2 M.
Croce, Benedetto. The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico. Tr. by R. G.
Collingwood. New York : The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. xii -\-
317. $2.60.
NOTES AND NEWS
The current year marks the seven hundredth anniversary of the life
and activities of Roger Bacon. This most " disparate genius of the
Middle Ages," as Mr. Taylor calls him, was, none the less, one of the
most typical representatives of his time. For we have come to appreciate
that the Middle Ages were not years in which scholars blindly followed
tradition and authority, but were rather years in which they actively and
curiously tried to cope with the problems of a growing civilization.
There we find the modern spirit beginning its own education, the past its
teacher, the future its prospect. Roger Bacon may well be honored as
chief among its patron saints. It is proposed at Columbia University to
set aside a day in October to commemorate him, and a committee con-
sisting of President Butler and Professors Robinson, Montague, and
Woodbnidge have the arrangements in charge. There will be a number of
addresses which will be published in a volume illustrative of the scientific
attainments and outlook of the thirteenth century.
M. Emile Boutroux, president of the Fondation Thiers, was elected on
January 22 membre de 1' Academic franchise, the first philosopher since
the reception of Caro, more than twenty-five years ago, to receive this
honor. M. Boutroux, who was presented by M. Paul Bourget, fills the
chair left vacant by the death of General Langlois.
Ezra B. Crooks (Ph.D. Harvard, 1910) has been called from the
assistant professorship in philosophy at Northwestern University to the
professorship of philosophy and pedagogy in Randolph-Macon Woman's
College, Lynchburg, Virginia.
VOL. XI. No. 5. FEBRUARY 26, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
AN EMPIRICAL DEFINITION OF VALUE *
WHAT is the meaning of the term value and what part, if any,
does value play in the real world? This is the question
which philosophy seeks to answer under the heading, Theory of
Values, or Axiology. And the answers which have been given are as
diverse and conflicting as in most philosophical problems. The fac-
tions which have arisen in ontology are but transferred to the field of
axiology. We find that one view regards value as an objective inde-
finable property, having no necessary connection with the existing
world, 2 while another believes all values to depend upon being felt
by somebody; 3 whereas a second pair of views deny at least one of
these, as well as each other, yet agree that value is a more ultimate
category than fact, and define fact in terms of value: the Fichtean
and the instrumental theories. 4 Still another opposition holds be-
tween the position of Royce, that value is object of appreciation and
not of definition, 5 and that of Bosanquet, which refuses to separate,
hardly even to distinguish, value from rationality and reality. 6
These are simply the modern realistic, subjectivistic, voluntaristic,
pragmatic, idealistic standpoints, applied to this particular problem.
And if in the field of ontology there is no agreement of experts, it is
hardly likely that there will be here. Thus at the outset it seems im-
possible to give an account of value which has the slightest prospect
of general acceptance.
In such a situation it is our plain duty to seek the reasons for the
disagreement. If we examine the interpretations of value which
have been profered it appears that none of them contains, or is
based upon, an unambiguous, non-circular definition. For example :
suppose value is defined in subjective terms as, let us say, that which
1 Bead at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December,
1913.
2 B. A. Eussell, "Philosophical Essays," pages 4-15.
3W. M. Urban, "Valuation," Vol. III., page 9.
*H. Miinsterberg, ' ' Philosophic der Werte," ler Theil, 4ter Abschsittj J.
Dashiell, Philosophical Eeview, September, 1913.
5 ' ' Conception of God, ' ' pages 247-265.
e ' < The Principle of Individuality and Value, ' ' Chapter 8.
113
114
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
gives pleasure. This is no real definition, because it does not account
for the valuableness. "Why should pleasure confer value? It is
obvious enough that here is a vicious circle. Or suppose we say.
value is whatever increases life. The statement may be true, but it
assigns no ground for the ascription of the predicate "good"; for
why should increase of life be good f Similar criticism may be made
of views which make value primary and define being in terms of
value. They do not increase our knowledge of what value is : they
rather give up the real problem by pronouncing the category inde-
finable. Those who allege indefinability, however, do not, so far as I
know, make any thoroughgoing attempt to consider all possible defi-
nition. It is, in general, impossible to prove a given term indefinable :
such a universal negative can have only inductive warrant. The
most we can say is that no definition yet given is sufficient. And
where no sufficient definition is, there conflict will break out, because
liberty of interpretation is more or less unrestricted. The only way
to deal with this state of affairs is to search further, until we can
furnish a non-circular and positive definition. And for this no
method is satisfactory but to trace out the common structure of all
the valuable objects known to our experience, i. e., to treat value as
a "concrete universal" rather than an abstract one, and to obtain a
definition in terms of the specific situations in which values are
found. From such a definition alone may we learn something of the
status of values in reality.
It is, no doubt, to a certain extent absurd to attempt a problem of
this size and importance in a brief paper. Only the roughest kind
of a sketch can be given with many gaps in the evidence. A first
essay in this direction must be imperfect; but let us hope that its
errors will be corrected, and the way be pointed to further results.
The objects which are considered valuable, good or bad, worthy
of approval or disapproval, are generally acknowledged to belong to
at least one of the following six classes: (1) those which "satisfy
immediately any fundamental instinctive sense-tendency" of a living
organism, 7 (2) economic commodities, (3) esthetic or beautiful ob-
jects, (4) moral conduct, (5) religious objects, (6) intellectual
values. This classification differs from Urban 's, though not, I think,
disagreeing with it; his analysis being psychological and genetic
while ours is of objects rather than psychoses, following the scheme
of G. Fonsegrive. 8 Let us consider these classes in turn.
?W. M. Urban, "Valuation," page 192. Also, "there are certain funda-
mental connative tendencies, such as hunger, sex, expression of bodily energy, etc.,
the satisfaction of which gives immediate and unconditional . . . worth" (ibid.).
Professor Urban calls these "condition worths," since their value is dependent
upon the condition of the organism.
s Revue Philosophique, Vol. 69, page 553, and Vol. 70, page 43.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 115
1. The first class contains, in the main, objects of sensual pleas-
ure, and prima facie their value is dependent on some organism. We
may fairly say that pleasure connotes normal, unhindered function-
ing of a living organism. If the value of these objects lies in the
pleasure they afford, then their value lies in the fact that they con-
tribute to the normal, unhindered functioning of the organism. Now
such behavior of the organism is an essential part of its own con-
tinued life. The definition of life is not yet furnished by biology,
but some of its essential characteristics are agreed upon, and one of
them is that a living organism tends to perpetuate its own life, to
prolong it. That is, a living organism tends to perpetuate its own
normal, unhindered functioning. The objects of instinctive sensual
desire, when attained, help to fulfil that tendency. When the organ-
ism is conscious of them, it feels them to be good (or if painful and
thwarting the tendency, bad). But even if it were not conscious, as
perhaps some lower organisms are not, any object that called out a
reaction agreeing with this fundamental tendency of an organism
would be to that organism a good. What an amoaba ingests may be
to the amo3ba a good, though the amoeba takes no conscious delight
in it. The specific quale of this type of value lies in its helping to
fulfil a certain fundamental tendency resident in the organism.
2. Economic values. In the field of economics, "value [of an
article] is always and only the power to command other desirable
things in peaceful and voluntary exchange." 9 A value is distin-
guished from a utility. The latter has a certain kind of value in
that it is useful to the one who wants it ; but it is useful merely be-
cause wanted, and not as having any power of exchange for other
utilities. Hence a utility might come under the first class of values,
the ' ' condition worths, ' ' whereas value as used in economics forms a
distinct type, owing to its possessing exchangeability. Now there are
two laws that apply to value in this field the law of the threshold
and the law of diminishing values. Important though they seem,
however, they are for our purposes inessential. The law of the
threshold states that there is a certain least amount, and a certain
greatest amount, of a given article, beyond which value disappears.
As Urban has shown, this is a psychological law pure and simple,
analogous to Weber's and Fechner's laws; it applies to utility as
well as to value. 'This principle is an expression of the fact that
the power of an object to call out a feeling of worth . . . depends
not upon the object alone, but upon the feeling or connative disposi-
tion of the subject as well." 10 The familiar concepts of the "exist-
ence-minimum" and "marginal utility," and the whole field of this
T. N. Carver, ' ' The Distribution of Wealth, ' ' page 3.
10 ' ' Valuation, ' ' page 146.
116
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
law, do not then constitute part of the differentia of value. The
same may be said of the law of diminishing values. It, too, has a
psychological origin though not reducible to terms of stimulus and
sensitivity. "It is a phenomenon of limitation of judgment capacity,
rather than of capacity of stimulation. ' ni It is not because economic
values are values, rather than utilities, that these laws hold, but
because, like utilities, they are relative to human appreciation.
What, then, are the positive differentia of economic values?
One specific property of value is exchangeability ; another is that
value is a function of scarcity. 12 The less gold there is the greater is
the value of gold; if there were an infinite amount of it, it would
have no value. In other words, value exists only when the amount
of the valuable article is limited; and the more it is limited, the
greater the value (up to the psychological threshold). If we may
call up a simile to help us interpret this fact, it is like the pressure
of a gas, which exists only when the gas is confined, and increases as
the volume is diminished. Indeed, the analogy between value and
pressure is rather close. If a certain book has great value to me, I
am willing to pay high for it ; it dislodges from my purse an amount
of money proportional to its value. So the pressure of a gas is
measured by the amount of mass it dislodges. Again, as pressure of
a gas means tendency to expand and occupy the space filled by other
physical objects, so economic value of an article means a tendency
for it to take the place, by purchase or exchange, of other articles.
The fact that the valued article is desired by somebody makes this
tendency no mere figure of speech, but a psychological, or even a
physical, fact. Value here seems, then, to mean a real potentiality
or tendency of the economic object to come, by replacing another
object, into the possession of somebody who desires it. If every one
has it, if there is no scarcity, there can be no desire, and the tendency,
because already fulfilled, does not exist; hence scarcity is necessary
to value. Now it follows that economic values tend to do two things :
they tend to enhance the life of the prospective buyer by ministering
to his wants, "and they tend to enrich the economic life of the com-
munity by promoting trade. The former is not peculiar to value,
since utilities do the same thing; the latter is peculiar to value, and
must constitute the result we are seeking. A commodity has eco-
nomic value because it tends to be exchanged and thus to perpetuate
or increase the economic life of the community. From the point of
view of that economic life it thereby becomes a good, because it con-
tributes to that life. This result is similar to the one we obtained
from the study of the first class, the simple ' c condition worths. ' ' The
11 W. M. Urban, op. cit., page 173.
12 T. N. Carver, op. cit., page 12.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 117
value of the valuable object consists in contributing to an already
existing tendency, or group of tendencies.
3. Esthetic or beautiful objects. The problem of a definition of
beauty is extraordinarily difficult; there is no generally accepted
solution. There are, however, certain fairly well-established attrib-
utes of beauty, and we must simply do the best we can with these.
Beautiful objects seem to be of two kinds, roughly distinguished
as classic and romantic. The former have beauty of form and struc-
ture ; their elements display harmony, economy, or in a phrase whose
significance is even greater than its triteness, unity in variety. It
was the type most admired in classical antiquity. The second,
romantic beauty, may be defined as laying stress "on the idea of
significance, expressiveness, the utterance of all that life contains;
in general, that is to say, on the conception of the characteristic." 13
It is "accompanied by the craving for free and passionate expres-
sion." 14 This is preeminently modern, connected with the modern
interest in personality, man, and the subjective generally. The play-
impulse, "semblant modes," imagination, freedom, are expressions
of this type. The two classes are related somewhat as static an'd
dynamic. The distinction is not confined to works of art, but extends
to natural objects as well. Human beauty, for instance, as Plato
saw, divides approximately into these two kinds; feminine beauty
being in the main static, a beauty of repose, of symmetry and com-
position ; masculine being rather dynamic, active expression of inner
potency in deeds, virility. Let us now consider the nature of each
type.
Unity in variety appears superficially to be the most meaningless
of phrases. A heap of gravel has unity, being one heap, and variety,
having many pebbles of different sizes and shapes; but it has no
beauty. This, however, is not unity in variety, but unity and variety.
The preposition "in" signifies that each implies the other. A true
case would be one in which each particular element clearly contrib-
utes to the being and character of the rest, as in an arch or a living
organism. It is this quality of mutual support and contribution
that characterizes the classic type. Though the type is static, it is not
inert, for each element has a positive and discernible effect on the
others. Just as in the science of statics equilibrium is by no means
mere absence of motion, but rather a balance of pressures, attractions,
or repulsions, so here then is, if anything, more than if it were
dynamic. We may commend this fact to those philosophers who are
inclined to condemn the static as being lifeless and unproductive:
e. g. y using "static absolute" as a term of reproach, refusing to
is Bosanquet, ' ' History of -^Esthetics, ' ' pages 4-5.
i* Op. tit., page 5.
118
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
believe in substances, or anything but process. The ancient doctrine
of repose was, indeed, far from being a counsel to death. Now it is
in this mutual support that we find the clue to the ascription of
worth. Each part of the beautiful object is implied by the others;
each part is thus the fulfilment of the meaning which the others tend
to express, 15 but can not by themselves fully express. The whole
object is the fulfilment of the tendencies resident in each of its parts ;
from the point of view of those parts, then, it has worth or value.
This is analogous to the result obtained in economic values and
sensual values. But because the value here is wholly between the
object's own parts, it becomes intrinsic and the beautiful object's
beauty lies wholly within itself. Hence it is independent of the
particular observer of practical results, or of mere liking.
Romantic beauty seems to be quite different. The mutual deter-
mination of part by part, as in a statue or a painting, is subordinated
to ''free and passionate expression." The contrast is analogous to
that between determinism and freedom. Romantic beauty is meas-
ured by the depth, sincerity, intensity of emotional appeal; not
structure, but function, the dynamic side, is most in evidence. I do
not, of course, mean that structure and form are absent, but as seen
in the modern and mainly romantic art of music they are present
as a necessary background rather than as the immediate source of
the esthetic thrill. What is it, then, that moves us to say of romantic
beauty, "it is good"? Is it not that it reveals depths within the
personality which are throughout life struggling for expression? I
do not think we should consider music, the novel, the drama, more
than merely pleasant if they did not show us, however inarticulately,
the nature of our own personal life. 16 Personal life is always en-
deavoring to express itself : romantic beauty succors and fulfils that
endeavor. But such endeavor need not always be personal. The
wild beauty of a winter storm, of a volcanic eruption, or any dynam-
ically sublime event in nature, reveals hidden and restrained forces
of nature as free and unconstrained. We may then venture to define
romantic beauty to be the portrayal of an object as realizing, without
restraint, what its inner nature tends to accomplish. The realization
is good from the point of view of the object. And because the value
is Thus, it is said of Bach 's works in the polyphonic style that ' ' they have
that delicacy of inner adjustment more usually found in the works of nature than
in those of man; their melodies grow out of their motive germs as plants put
forth leaves and flowers ; their separate voices fit into one another like the crystals
in a bit of quartz ; and the whole fabric of the music stands on its elemental har-
monies as solidly as the mountains on their granite bases" (T. W. Surette and D.
G. Mason, "The Appreciation of Music," page 33).
i Cf. Surette and Mason, op. cit., page 203, remarks on the universality of
Beethoven's genius.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 119
lies in the relation of the object to its own inner tendencies, the
beauty is intrinsic and independent.
At this point it may be well to meet a certain natural criticism.
We shall probably be accused of speaking in mythological terms. Is
there any such "inner nature," "tendency to express itself," "en-
deavor," etc., as we have spoken of? Nominalists do not like these
words. But it is not necessary to prove that they are objectively
true. "In esthetic enjoyment, we do not distinguish reality from
semblance." 17 In romantic art, the object is portrayed as expressing
what we feel to be the inner nature of the object. The question of
illusion is irrelevant. In reality this objection is another form of the
vulgar objection to novel-reading on the ground that the novel is
only fiction.
On the psychological side of esthetics we find a parallelism which
confirms the above. "The diffusion of stimulation, the equilibrium
of impulses, life-enhancement through repose! this is the esthetic
experience. ' ' 18 Or as Fonsegrive says, " Toutes les valeurs esthetiques
correspondent a des accroissements. toutes les non-valeurs a des di-
minutions de vitalite interieure." 1Q Looking at the matter genetic-
ally, Urban finds that the well-ordered object of civilized art must,
indeed, minister to this equilibrium of impulses, this balance and
repose of connative tendencies ; as otherwise it could not have been
developed. In the absence of such repose, some one impulse would
prevail and there would follow a practical attitude, desire, or judg-
ment. 20 "... the formal element of order is significant only as a
means of securing repose in the object (or content) which, when
unesthetically experienced, is the object of explicit desire and judg-
ment" (p. 229). In fact, as Urban shows, this ordering and
balancing is a case of a general psychological law, that of comple-
mentary values. Now this simply means that the impulses combine
into a whole such that each member affects and influences the others.
It is quite analogous to the definition given of classic beauty, though
couched in terms of impulses and feelings.
4. Moral values. "Our moral judgments are ultimately judg-
ments of value," 21 and "by moral value we generally mean the par-
ticular kind of value which we assign to a good character" (p. 138).
Notwithstanding the vast amount of conflict and disagreement be-
tween ethical systems, we may deal with this province briefly. For
the disagreements do not so much concern the concrete description of
IT Baldwin 's Dictionary, Art. ' l Esthetic. ' '
is E. Puffer, ' ' The Psychology of Beauty, ' ' page 55.
i Revue Philosophique, Vol. 69, page 572.
20 " Valuation, " page 225.
21 Cf. Rashdall, ''Theory of Good and Evil," page 137.
120
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
a good character as the ultimate metaphysical formulation of it. In
practise there is a fair agreement that it is a character which tends
to preserve, so far as possible, the acknowledged values of life, for
society and for the individual. Its own value would then lie in its
contributing to personal life as a whole. It has been found impos-
sible to define a good character in abstraction from the concrete
values of personal life; even Kant's autonomous will must act so that
its maxim could, in actual life, become a universal law. And it
could become so only by ministering to the welfare of society and
the individual.
5. Eeligion and morality should hardly, I think, be identified,
even though they may in the long run be inseparable ; but the reli-
gious values seem to me to be of the same character as the moral
values. Perhaps the definition of religion which assumes the least
is that of Hoff ding : ' ' the fundamental axiom of religion, that which
expresses the innermost tendency of all religions, is the axiom of the
conservation of value." While one may personally believe that
religion is much more than this, it does not seem possible that it
could well be less if it is to be a worth-attitude rather than an onto-
logical one. But even from this minimum of character we may see
why religion has itself the highest of all values to the devotee. It is
because it appears to him as that which contributes to the mainte-
nance of all the values, whether in this life or another one. There
seems to be no difference between this type of value and the moral,
except one of degree : the religious being the greater and being guar-
anteed by a higher power than human will. And both the religious
and the moral values are those which assist in promoting those more
ultimate goods which persons inevitably endeavor to secure.
6. Intellectual values. To most human beings, the truth about
things is a value: the proof is that they try so hard to get it. As
we might expect, philosophers differ on the nature of this value.
One party holds that it is relative to other and practical values; a
second party, that it is instrinsic, good for its own sake. If the
former view is correct, the value of truth is analogous to that of
morality; it consists in ministering to increased life. If the latter
view is correct, truth is similar to an esthetic value. Here we are
met by another conflict of views. Non-pragmatists are generally
either idealists or realists; the idealists declare truth to be a coher-
ent system of propositions, the realists believe that its essence lies
in its correspondence with external reality. On the idealistic view
we have in the value of truth the same structure as in that of classic
beauty: a system of mutually determining parts, harmonious, eco-
nomic. On the realistic view truth consists in the expression of what
Philosophy of Eeligion," page 215.
22
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 121
is real in terms of human knowledge. The value of the truth lies
in its trueness, i. e., in the fact that it expresses to us the nature of
reality. This is comparable to romantic beauty, which we found to
consist in the expression of the inner nature of an object. The
search for truth by us human beings is the endeavor to get this reality
expressed in our experience. Truth is the fulfilment of that endeavor
after expression, and its value must then be said to be definable in
the same terms as romantic beauty. Oddly enough, the usual view is
that idealism is nearer to romanticism than is realism : but that is, I
think, not true of modern objective idealism. It is akin to classicism,
system, order; while realism seeks the expression of the tendency to
independence and freedom, and is thus essentially romantic.
The material for a definition of values is now at hand. We have
found in all cases that the value of an object consists in its helping
to complete or fulfil some tendency already present. In most of the
cases that men consider values, it is the fulfilment of tendencies in
the human organism, physical or conscious. Hence values are gen-
erally considered dependent on some personality. 23 But that would
seem a hasty generalization. The elegance of a mathematical proof
a form of classic beauty consists in the economy of its structure, the
mutual determination of its parts; and it continues just as elegant
when no one reads it, for it is constituted by objective logical impli-
cations. The beauty of the proof is universally valid and indepen-
dent of changes in the percipient; which is what objectivity means to
subjectivist and realist alike. And it is in unconscious accord with
our impersonal definition that we say sunlight is good for a plant, or
injurious to a photographic negative. If we do not speak thus of
inorganic nature, it is because persistent and dominant tendencies,
such as appear in living things, do not there obtrude themselves upon
our attention. We are so used to thinking of nature as a cut-and-
dried system, so intimidated (shall I say?) by the triumphs of the
exclusive scientific attitude, that we dare not find an analogy between
our own values and the processes studied in physics. But there is,
I believe, a close analogy. We saw it explicitly in the economic
values, and the other cases showed the same logical structure. Given
any tendency, in dead nature, in living organisms, in conscious minds,
which presses toward a certain end : any other tendency that furthers
this is for it a good, and any that resists it is for it bad.
May we here claim to have deduced the notion of value from
purely factual categories? The specific qualia of the good and bad
were empirically found to be furthering and hindering of some
tendency. Now this statement is couched wholly in terms other than
23 Hoff ding says : " It is personality which, in the world of our experience,
invests all other things with value, ' ' ' ' Philosophy of Religion, ' ' page 279.
122
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
those of value; yet we may be accused of a certain vicious circle.
For, to say that the furthering of a tendency is to that tendency a
good is to imply that the fulfilment is good ; and why, after all, should
it be so ? Have we really deduced the notion ' ' good" from the notion
''fulfilment"? The accusation certainly looks plausible, that we
have simply begged the concept "good," and left value, or at least
the core of value, undefined. 24 Now, even were this the case, our
definition should still have much utility, since it reveals certain
characters intrinsic to value ; and this knowledge is indispensable to
any metaphysics on the subject. That within these characters might
lie an indefinable, inaccessible core, could not deprive the definition
of truth or of usefulness so far as it goes. But to me, I admit, the
above formula seems to have laid bare the very innermost core of
value; and for the following two reasons. (1) There is, so far as I
can see, no further namable, identifiable quote; to allege it seems
to me an unwarrantable mystification, setting up an unknowable
from which nothing can be learned. "Good" is, no doubt, a different
notion from "fulfilment" and therefore appears to contain some-
thing not authorized in the content of the latter notion. But (2)
that is because "good" is the relation between the fulfilment (or
furthering) and the tendency; a relation uniquely determined, and
sufficiently determined, by the two. And because of this unique and
sufficient determination, we have, I think, a right to say that the no-
tion of "good" is not begged, but deduced. Accordingly, I venture
to offer the above definition as the only non-circular, positive one that
I have yet seen. The objections which common sense perhaps feels,
to any such claim of deduction of value from fact, would be per-
fectly sound, did fact not contain the category of tendency or poten-
tiality. Without that category, we may admit, there would be a
chasm between value and fact. A world whose only predicates were
those of actual existent terms and relations, whether permanent or
changing, would be a world in which no values could arise. We
could say that so and so is, was, or will be, but we could say no more.
But potentiality implies an end ; though not necessarily in the teleo-
logical sense. And potentiality is a category in good use in the field
of statics, theory of heat, and other branches of physics. Now it is
in this region of the factual, and in this alone, that the notion of
good or bad, of value, can arise.
There is, however, a further objection to our definition, drawn
from its consequences, to leave which unmentioned might seem the
concealment of a fatal weakness. Our formula appears (and I think
the appearance is truth) to commit us to a merely quantitative view.
If a value consists in contribution to the fulfilment of a given tend-
24 I owe this objection to Professor Urban.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 123
ency, then the only sense in which one value can be greater, better,
or higher than another, is in contributing more powerfully to a given
tendency, or in contributing to a greater number of tendencies. To
many this would appear a reductio ad absurdum; for it is widely
believed that Hedonism has fallen before an analogous objection, and
that values, like pleasures, are qualitatively higher and lower. But,
in the first place, appeal can hardly with justice be made in philos-
ophy to any doctrine, in order to confute another. The qualitative
view, like most philosophical views, can not be regarded as estab-
lished by consensus of experts; and if empirical evidence conflicts
with it, and shows value to be a quantitative affair, the pre-
sumption would seem to be against the qualitative view. But
further, the appeal to qualities is, in general, the appeal to the
indefinable. It is not a source of strength, but of weakness; a
giving up of problems, or a refusal to analyze. We wish to
know why a good moral character is better than a good dinner. Our
view indicates that it is because the good character contributes to a
vastly greater number of tendencies, in living organisms, than the
dinner per se can do. That which is the more inclusive or the more
intense is, other things being equal, the higher and better. This sort
of account explains the degree of a value while the qualitative ac-
count explains nothing. But a detailed working out of this state-
ment's consequences for the theory of the scale of values is here not
possible.
Do values then exist? Yes, if they are felt; just as much as gravi-
tation, pressure, collisions exist. They may be physical tendencies,
or any other kind ; so long as they are verifiable as aiding or hinder-
ing other tendencies of any kind whatsoever. There is no gulf be-
tween value and fact. Let it not be objected that we have made
value so ubiquitous as to lose all significance. One might as well say
that gravitation is meaningless because it applies to all bodies. Of
course, not all imagined values are real tendencies. A man's own
wealth may be to him an imaginary value, but without any concrete
evidence of its potency. But though this holds of particular and
lesser values, it is of diminishing force with the greater and more
universal values. Here we come in sight of a metaphysical conse-
quence of our definition which shows it to be, I think, a fertile and
suggestive one.
Some values are higher, more inclusive, than others. Thus. ,i
person has great value, because by foresight he is able to further so
many tendencies; those of the physical organism, of intellect, moral-
ity, art, etc. We may imagine a super-personal value which will in-
clude a much greater potentiality of this sort; even an all-inclusive
value which will tend to fulfil all the tendencies in the universe. The
124
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
more inclusive this value is, the fewer tendencies are left outside
which might oppose its complete realization of itself. If it were all-
inclusive, there would be nothing left to prevent its passing from
potentiality to actuality. A perfect value, or a perfect being, conse-
quently, must be actual as the ontological proof said. But the ques-
tion remains, is there any empirical evidence of such an all-inclusive
or perfect value, even as merely potential ? Does the ideal of perfec-
tion show itself as a real tendency, working in experience? Relig-
ious people claim that it does so, in their own personal experience.
It is outside our province to discuss this question. But it is, I think,
a wholly empirical one. The definition of value obtained above would
seem to show that if such an ideal is verifiable as a working tendency
in our lives, the ontological proof would hold. Kant's refutation of
that proof was based on the assumption, inherited from Descartes,
of a gulf fixed between subject and object, value and fact. But our
definition has crossed that gulf ; or rather has shown that there is no
gulf. Something of the fertility of the definition lies, I believe, in
that closure of a long-established breach.
One more application of the definition may be made. At bottom,
all reasoning, thinking, proving, knowing, is based upon certain
principles which carry with them their own evidence. Such are the
axioms of logic, the axiom that reality is accessible only in experience,
etc. These are accepted because they are ' ' deemed worthy. ' ' They
alone make knowledge possible, and thus contribute to our desire for
knowledge. They are to knowledge what God is to the religious
devotee: they are all-inclusive cognitive values, grounding all par-
ticular judgments and their connections. Because they ground all
knowledge, there is nothing to contradict them; their mere appear-
ance guarantees their truth; they are, to us, methods of immediate
insight. Their value is then more than potential, and they become
truths. This is not the case with any less fundamental propositions,
however useful they are ; for the latter do not ground all knowledge,
and some other propositions might contradict them. The funda-
mental axioms of all knowledge constitute a special case, like the
perfect being, where value implies objective realization.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE. W. H. SHELDON.
TWO FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE ECONOMICAL
LEARNING 1
fTlHE formation of a new habit which is the process of learning
-L offers many problems to the experimental psychologist. Re-
cently there has been considerable discussion as to the proper distri-
i Bead before the Atlanta meeting of the American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science, in Section H. (One correction due to information more
recently supplied me by letter has been made with reference to Pyle 's work. )
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 125
bution of working periods in such, formation. Such questions have
been asked as, ' ' How long should one work at any one period ? ' ' and,
1 'How long an interval of time should intervene between successive
periods?" That is, what is the relative value of short periods of
work as compared with longer periods? And again, what is the
value of short intervals between working periods as compared with
longer intervals?
These questions have not only been asked, but already answered,
at least in part. The experimental investigations of Ebbinghaus, 2
Yost, 3 Dearborn, 4 Starch, 5 and Pyle 6 all agree in the main that short
working periods are superior to longer periods, and that intervals of
a day are superior to longer or shorter intervals. But just how
much more efficient certain periods are than others has not been
worked out with anything like the accuracy that we need. And more
important still, we do not know, except in a very general way, what
the factors are which go to cause the results so far obtained.
I am interested in these same questions, but from an entirely dif-
ferent standpoint from that of the above-mentioned experimenters.
And though my work has been rather more concrete than theirs, I
have arrived at conclusions absolutely confirmatory of this previous
work. I have been endeavoring for some time to determine how dif-
ferent intervals of time between presentations of a firm's advertise-
ments affect the final permanent impression. My special problem
has been to determine the relative effects produced upon a reader,
(a) when four advertisements of one firm are seen within a few
minutes of each other, (6) when four advertisements are seen at in-
tervals of one week, and (c) when four advertisements are seen at
intervals of one month.
In systematizing my results I have used as a standard the average
strength of a reader's retention of an advertisement four months
after it was seen. This ability then is represented by 100. In Plate
I. all my other measurements are shown in terms of this 100, and by
it we can see how successive repetitions of advertisements affect
permanence of impression. When the four advertisements are seen
within a few minutes of each other the four create an impression
that is 82 per cent, superior to that created by but one advertisement.
2 H. Ebbinghaus, ' ' Griindzuge der Psychologic, ' ' Zweite Auflage, page 657.
s A. Yost, ' ' Die Assoziationsf estigheit in ihrer Abhangigheit von der Ver-
teilung der Wiederholungen. " Zeitsch. f. Psychol, 1897, 14, 436-472.
* W. F. Dearborn, "Experiments in Learning," J. of Educ. Psychol., 1910, 1,
page 373.
D. Starch, "Periods of Work in Learning," J. of Educ. Psychol., 1912, 3,
pages 209-213.
W. H. Pyle, "Economical Learning," J. of Educ. PsycJiol., 1912-13,
pages 148-158.
126
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
When the four advertisements are seen at intervals of a week the
four create an impression 90 per cent, greater than did one. But
when the interval is still further lengthened to one month the total
impression from the four advertisements drops to only 45 per cent,
more than from one advertisement.
Such a result is rather surprising when it is recalled that in the
first case all the advertisements of a firm are seen fully four months
before the test, in the second case the last advertisement of the firm
is seen three months before the test, and in the last case the last ad-
vertisement is seen but one month before the test.
These figures indicate, then, that a firm's advertisements repeated
at intervals of a few minutes or of a week create a very much greater
permanent impression than they would if they were repeated at
intervals of one month.
Thus far, I have secured no data concerning repetitions a day
apart. All the work done on the subject, however, has been so strong
in favor of the day interval, that I feel no hesitation in judging that
I shall probably find it superior in my case.
But now there is another factor which influences learning, which
enters into the general problem before us. How long should one
work at one time in order to secure the greatest returns per minute
spent? The workers on this question so far, with the exception of
Pyle, have complicated their results by asking, for example, which
is better: 2 repetitions a day for 12 days, or 4 repetitions a day for
6 days, or 8 repetitions a day for 3 days. Here two factors, " length
of working period" and "the number of presentations," are involved.
Pyle tells us that a 30- to 45-minute period is superior to a 15-minute
or a 60-minute period. That is, if four individuals of equal ability
work each day, respectively, 15, 30, 45, and 60 minutes, the second,
by one calculation, and the third, by another, do the greatest amount
of work. Pyle was presumably interested in the proper length of a
recitation period and so gave his results in this way. But his data,
as given, do not tell us how much work has been done by the four
individuals if we consider the amount of time spent by them, minute
per minute.
After simply reading his article I imagined that the 15-minute
worker had probably accomplished more per minute than the other
three workers. A recent letter has, however, made it clear that those
who worked 30 minutes a day accomplished more per minute than
those who worked 15 minutes a day, or those who worked longer
periods than 30 minutes.
Now let me report some recent work of my own which, though it
seems to have little in common with the just-mentioned investiga-
tions, touches intrinsically the same problem.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
127
f tfo
5
Ifo
% '
5 *
- io
fc-
to
B
A
of
PLATE I. Showing the Increase in Effect of Seeing Two Advertisements or
Four Advertisements over that of Seeing One Advertisement when (a) the Ad-
vertisements Follow One Another at Intervals of a Few Minutes, (6) the Ad-
vertisements Follow at Intervals of One Week, and (c) the Advertisements Fol-
low at Intervals of One Month.
30
'0
of ^<f^r//srtiiffs Showa af 0/<
PLATE II. Showing the Decrease in the Number of Advertisements that can
be Recognized Immediately Afterwards as the Total Number of Advertisements
Shown at One Time is Increased.
128
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
"
I
I
C
A
number of
PLATE III. Showing the Per cent, of Eeaders who Eemember a Firm Four
Months after the First Advertisement is Seen when, (a) the Advertisements Fol-
low One Another at Intervals of a Few Minutes and 168 Pages of Advertising
are Seen All at One Time, and (ft) the Advertisements Follow at Intervals of
One Month and but 42 Pages of Advertising are Seen at One Time.
I have already shown that as you increase the number of ad-
vertisements that are seen at any one time, you correspondingly de-
crease the total number that may be recognized immediately after-
wards. 7 In other words, this means that the larger the number of
objects attended to at one time the smaller can be the impression
from any one of them. The curve is shown in Plate II. Now this
law holds true in advertising, as I have sufficiently shown in some
experiments done for practical advertising men. For example, the
average full-page advertisement in Everybody's Magazine with its
144 pages of advertising is remembered by 6.8 per cent, of the read-
ers, whereas such an advertisement in the National Geographic Maga-
zine with but 24 pages of advertising is remembered by 12.4 per
cent, of its readers. In both these cases the persons tested read the
magazines at their leisure and were tested one week after none of
them ever dreaming that he would be tested. The advertisements in
the smaller advertising section, where but 24 pages of advertising
were to be seen, were remembered by 84 per cent, more individuals
7E. K. Strong, Jr., "The Effect of Length of Series upon Recognition
Memory," Psychol. Eev., 1912, 19, pages 447-462.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 129
than in the larger magazine with its 144 pages of advertising. From
our curve we find that one advertisement in 24 can be remembered
by 73.5 per cent, of the subjects immediately afterwards as com-
pared with but 38.0 per cent, when 144 advertisements are seen all
at once. In this case the superiority is 94 per cent. A difference of
but 10 per cent, between these two investigations, widely different in
character as they are, is of no great moment.
Let me give you another example. Kecently I tested two groups
of individuals one group looked through a magazine containing
42 advertising pages, the other looked through this same magazine
and 3 others with a total of 168 pages of advertising. One month
later they were tested as to the advertisements they noticed. The
second group remembered 7.8 per cent, of the advertisements in the
first magazine, whereas the first, who saw only one magazine, remem-
bered 14.9 per cent, of the advertisements in it. Increasing the num-
ber of advertising pages from 42 to 168 resulted in a decrease in the
per cent, remembered among the 42 pages from 14.9 per cent, to 7.8
per cent. That means that the situation in which but 42 pages are
read allows a 91 per cent, greater impression to be made than the one
in which 168 pages are read. Now what do we find from our curve
(Plate II.) ? The superiority of 42 pages is just 95 per cent, greater
than 168 pages. Here the difference between these two entirely
different experiments is but 4 per cent. Let me emphasize this. In
the experiment on which was based the curve in Plate II. the indi-
viduals were allowed but one second a page and were tested imme-
diately afterwards. In the just mentioned experiment the indi-
viduals were allowed to look at the magazines as they ordinarily do,
spending as much time as they wished to. And here they were tested
one month afterwards. Yet in both cases the relative superiority of
the impression made from each one of 42 pages of advertising over
that of each one of 168 pages was practically identical being, respec-
tively, 95 per cent, and 91 per cent.
I think there is no doubt I have proved my point that the
smaller the number of objects attended to at one time the greater the
impression each can and does make.
Here it seems to me my results parallel those of Pyle to a con-
siderable degree. After a certain length of time he finds that fur-
ther increases of time do not give corresponding increases in amount
learned. In his work other factors, such as " warming-up/' etc.,
may be present to prevent the shorter time intervals from being so
effective as intervals which are a little longer. My work certainly
shows that the fewer advertisements seen at once the better chance
each has to be remembered.
But why is this so ? I feel myself that an answer may be found
130
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
to this query by a scrutiny of some work along a rather different line.
Miiller and Pilzecker first emphasized the fact that, in memorizing,
the best results could be obtained by resting after learning instead
of going on to other work. When a second stanza was learned imme-
diately after the first, the retention of the first was injured to a con-
siderable degree as compared with the case where an interval of rest
was allowed before the study of a second stanza. For example, a
score of 56 was thus lowered to 26. This inhibitory effect has been
referred to by the term " retroactive inhibition." Book told me a
few days ago of some work he had just finished. He found that non-
sense syllables were best retained if a short period of rest followed
the memorizing. If a problem in arithmetic followed the memorizing,
the syllables could not be remembered so well as if the memorizer
had rested instead, but they could be remembered better than if a
second series of syllables were studied during that period.
It is apparent from these studies that strenuous mental work
following immediately a mental process of learning acts in an inhib-
itory manner upon the already formed associations. Possibly,
indeed, we should speak of such associations, not as formed, but
still forming. For apparently we must look upon the learning proc-
ess as a formation of new associations which require some time in
which to "set" or become "consolidated." Immediate subsequent
activity seems to inhibit such consolidation. Moreover, the more
similar the subsequent activity is to that which has gone before, the
more serious is the injury to the earlier work.
With this in mind it is very easy to see a good reason for the re-
sults I have been obtaining in my work in advertising. The impres-
sion from the first advertisement seen in a magazine requires some
time in which to set. But the impression made from the second
advertisement follows it immediately and inhibits the first. A third
impression follows and inhibits further the first two, and so on. And
so we find that the more advertisements seen at any one time the
slighter the permanent impression from any one of them.
Coming back now to the work of Starch and Pyle, we must see
in their work the same situation that has faced us in advertising. In
learning of any sort the more new impressions made one after the
other, the less can be the permanent retention from any one of them.
And this is the reason that Pyle can find the surprising fact that an
individual can actually learn more working 30 minutes a day than
when working 60 minutes a day.
To return to the results of my own investigations. I have one
more point to bring out. I have shown that intervals of different
lengths between repetitions are of different values, and that the
greater the number of impressions received at any one time the less
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 131
permanent any one of them can be. Now of these two factors in the
learning process the second is by far the more important.
. By combining the results of two experiments we have this situa-
tion. One group of individuals saw four magazines one right after
the other. The other group saw the same four magazines at intervals
of one month. Both groups were tested four months after the first
magazine was seen in each case. Plate III. shows the results. It is
very evident that the second arrangement is better than the first.
Now we have already seen that repetitions separated by a few
minutes are very much more effective than repetitions a month apart.
The trouble here is that the first group saw 168 pages of advertising
at one time, whereas the second group saw only 42 pages of adver-
tising at any one time. The slight impression possible from any one
advertisement among 168, as compared with the impression received
when among 42 advertisements, has far offset the advantage from
having the repetitions within a few minutes as compared with one
month.
Summarizing, I have hoped to make clear in this paper:
First. Of all intervals between successive repetitions that of a
day's length will give us our maximum results, and those of a few
minutes and of a week are much superior to that of a month.
Second. The more impressions made at one time, the less is the
permanent retention of any one of them. This is probably due to the
effect of retroactive inhibition.
Third. In any situation when both length of interval and the
number of impressions to be made at any one time are concerned, it
should be borne in mind that the second factor is far more important
than the first.
This means that further work should be directed more partic-
ularly to a better understanding of how many impressions can be
made to advantage at any one time, rather than to the proper interval
of time between their successive presentations.
EDWARD K. STRONG, JR.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
CONCEPTS AND EXISTENCE
"PROFESSOR BUSH'S discussion on ''Concepts and Existence" 1
provokes me to violent agreement with every point he there
makes, snve one. And that one is, I believe, not at all vital to Pro-
fessor Bush's central thesis. It is, however, important enough to be
cleared up. For upon it alone Professor Bush rests his argument
i This JOURNAL, Vol. X., page 686.
132
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
against one side of my attempt 2 to expose as erroneous the ancient
distinction between "noused" things and sensed things. The par-
ticular distinction I am interested in overthrowing is the Platonic
one which makes the senses the organs of experiencing particulars
and the intellect the organ of experiencing universals. To avoid
needless misunderstanding, I ought to reaffirm what I said in my
recent article on the subject : how and where and under what condi-
tions any given entity is experienced is a purely empirical question
which can not be answered by inference from any purely logical
propositions and distinctions (such as the distinction between "genus
homo" and John Smith of Smith ville). I do not believe that all
universals can be perceived, any more than I believe that all partic-
ulars can be. Furthermore, I am quite willing to agree with Pro-
fessor Bush when he says that "the ancient distinction between
noused things and sensed things can not be made quite to disappear, ' '
if by this statement he means that most universals are not given in
simple perception, and that especially most universals of the I v order
are never so given because they are not existential at all.
But Professor Bush adds to this meaning another one which he
establishes through an entirely different argument. Taking the
geometrical straight line as an illustration, he seeks to show that
"that which now appears in a definition reached after many years
of highly expert use is surely a different thing from the straight edge
of a particular object. Rules for construction need not be identical
with empirical descriptions of what is beheld after construction. ' '
Geometrical entities, says Professor Bush, are reached through- a
long process of trial and error by experts ; and the experts construct
their definitions with an eye to particular results and manipulations ;
so they finally construct concepts which are quite different from the
things we perceive. How great this difference is, Professor Bush
indicates in the following passage:
"In geometry, the line is the definition, although in architecture it is a
straight edge of structural matter. We speak of the plan of the roof, the lines
of the roof, the system of lines, etc., but what is a definition doing with a prepo-
sition of? The selected property of a thing becomes an instrument in geometri-
cal operations. . ."
What, now, is the nature of such a definition? It is as follows,
according to Professor Bush:
tl . . . Isolating this property (of straightness), . . . how shall we de-
scribe it? It will not help us to say that a straight line is a bee line. We must
describe it after the if-then fashion. In any case, we seek a formula, a con-
cept for bringing a straight line into existence. When we have done so, we have
another object which repeats the property. ... Is there, however, no difference
2 < ' The Empirical Status of Geometrical Entities, ' > this JOURNAL, Vol. X.,
page 393.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 133
between the formula of a railroad curve and the curve of the track when laid
down? It would be a little unusual to say that we perceive the curve of a track
that doesn't yet exist. The curve is, meanwhile, the plan of the engineer. ..."
Here I begin to grow troubled. It seems to me that this entire
line of reasoning proceeds from a wrong assumption about the
straight line (and all other geometrical entities). We are told that
"the line is the definition." But I certainly can not agree to this,
nor could a geometer, so long as he wasn't trying to be a metaphys-
ician. Indeed, the very wording of the definition is, as Professor
Bush says, a formula, one "for bringing a straight line into exist-
ence. ' ' Now, if this is true, how can the definition be identical with
that which it is to bring into existence ?
The definition, insofar as it is a pragmatic entity, is related to
the straight line precisely as the recipe of a cake is related to the
cake. I wish some of our champions of pragmatism would say this
quite boldly. It would help clear up an unnecessary confusion,
notably the one into which, as it appears to me, Professor Bush has
lapsed. The cake is not the recipe, and the recipe is not the cake.
Each has properties which the other lacks, consequences which the
other never can bring to pass. So, too, with the definition and the
straight line. The former is (or may be) a recipe which, if used
upon suitable material, will then produce a straight line which you
may see and feel and perhaps use in building a house.
Grant this, and does it not follow that the relation between form-
ula and thing to be made has nothing to do with the relation between
universal and particular? For the formula is not the universal and
never can be, any more than the recipe is the cake. One way of
proving this is as follows : We perceive genuine straight lines.
(Here, I take it, Professor Bush agrees with me.) But we do not
perceive them as definitions (there is no if-then relation in them, nor
are the implications of the preconditions of straightness visible).
Hence what we perceive is not a definition. Hence, if what we per-
ceive is identical with what the geometer's recipe produces, the
straight line is not a definition, nor is the definition the line. What,
then, is a formula? It is precisely what people have always sup-
posed it to be ; a statement of the materials and methods for bringing
about a certain state of affairs. The state of affairs may be any-
thing you please except the formula itself. There is a formula for
curing hams, a formula for paying your income tax, a formula for
making automobile tires, a formula for launching a stock company,
and so on, formulas without end. Now, I have not heard anybody
suggest that an automobile tire is identical with its definition. Cer-
tainly a man who found himself ten miles from the nearest garage,
and with the rear tires of his car punctured, would not feel that he
134 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
could slip a couple of definitions onto the wheels and spin merrily
onward.
I do not see in what respect straight lines differ from tires, in
their respective relations to their generating formulas.
WALTER B. PITKIN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
EEVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Questions of the Day in Philosophy and Psychology. HERBERT LESLIE
STEWART. New York : Longmans, Green, and Company. Pp. ix -f- 231.
In a foreword the author writes : " A considerable proportion of the
audience to which the lectures were addressed consisted of persons possess-
ing little previous knowledge of the subject, and the essays, as now pub-
lished, are intended to be intelligible to the general educated reader. To
those versed in the technicalities of philosophical discussion this must be
my apology for the popular style in which these papers were written."
There seems to be little occasion for this apology.
The following subjects are treated in the order given : " The Reform
in Psychology," " The Present Position of the Hypothesis of Sub-con-
sciousness," " The Interpretation of Genius," " The Growth of Public
Opinion Psychologically Considered," " Pragmatism," " Recidivism,"
" Pessimism," " The Value- Judgment and The Independence of Ethics "
and " The Cult of Nietzsche."
In the first essay, in which the author undertakes to appraise the " new
psychology," we find the following remarkable statement : " One of the
best fruits of this independent psychological movement has been the es-
tablishment of the Society for Psychical Research." Such a prop for
psychological science would not be highly regarded in America. And
again we read (p. 17) : " Already amid many protests whose echoes have
yet scarcely died away it has established telepathy as a principle of ex-
planation." When due allowance is made for philosophical hospitality
such a statement still appears sanguine. On the other hand, generous
welcome is accorded animal and comparative psychology. A clear state-
ment is given of the relation that that psychology should sustain to ethics,
jurisprudence, and politics. The fault with Mill and his school was not
that they used psychology in the manner that they did, but that they had
a bad psychology. It is the author's desire that the "new psychology"
may be " applied to these studies with Mill's logic and lucidity." After
reading the volume through one is disposed to doubt whether the writer
fully recognizes the implications of what he so generously accepts in his
initial address.
The essay on pragmatism is characteristic of the writer. The
leaders of the pragmatic movement are praised for the important service
that they have rendered to clear thinking, a service rendered in three
ways. First of all in their critique of concepts they " have helped us to
escape the difficulties in which an epistemology like Mr. Bradley's must
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 135
be entangled, by substituting the idea of a science that advances by pro-
visional hypotheses brought constantly to the touchstone of actual ' work-
ing ' for the idea of a mental process whose stages correspond bit by bit
to the processes of nature." Again in their attack upon the British phi-
losopher's " habit of recognizing difficulties ;" pragmatists have refused
to believe that any higher synthesis can justify "us in saying two con-
tradictory things at the same time, and every reader of the philosophical
literature of which I am speaking knows how sorely the admonition was
required." Furthermore, they have forced philosophers to reopen the much-
vexed question as to the relation between the psychology of cognition and
epistemology and metaphysics. While they have done no more than
merely force the reopening of this question, they have done this at a most
opportune moment. But while these things may be said in favor of prag-
matism, there is " no real justification in the evidence that has been ad-
duced " for the thesis that the movement exists to enforce, viz., " that
truth is not a purely intellectual ideal and that it is to be recognized by
other than intellectual tests." Laying verbal difficulties aside, we do not
have to believe certain things because we feel and will in certain ways.
As to the dictum of Schiller, " The foundation truths are at bottom pos-
tulates which we must accept if the universe is to be fit to live in" it may
be replied that genuine first truths, such as that the universe is rational
through and through, need no demonstration. The relational character of
experience is just as ultimate a datum as sense-impressions. Thinking is
relating, and relating is synonymous with the establishment of causal con-
nections. It is foolish to ask how thought can justify its causal law; this
would be to ask that thought justify itself. Furthermore, pragmatists are
not the first to do " justice to the significance of the feelings and the will
for the solution of the world problems." The " demands and cravings " of
human nature have long stood theology in good stead. By way of concilia-
tion Mr. Stewart urges that the universe might well be rational through
and through without reason's being the sole or even the most direct avenue
into the ultimate heart of things. " No doubt when viewed from the
standpoint of omniscience the whole scheme of things is so fitly joined
together that every part is seen to involve every other part after the
fashion on which the Hegelians love to dwell." But " mental operation
does not cease to be intellectual because it can not be embodied in a
syllogism." There may well be other ways to the center of things. And
to the author's mind " the non-rationative, but still intellectual, faculty
of intuition is ... one of the most fertile suggestions of the greatest of
living thinkers, M. Henri Bergson." The writer's position may be summed
up in his own words. " Its [pragmatism's] importance lies in the shock
it has given to so many slothful dogmatisms and in the determined effort
it has made to bring philosophy face to face with the concrete things of
life."
This is cold comfort from a conciliator. Add to this the marked dis-
position of Mr. Stewart to cling tenaciously to the Hegelian universe, and
one can well believe that the author will make little headway in his
conciliatory labors. Pragmatism presupposes an evolving universe and
136
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
evolving minds, an evolution that is a unique modern conception.
Between the evolving universe and the evolving minds there exists an
interaction involving a mutual plasticity between the knower and the
thing known, a doctrine that is likewise unique. In previous doctrines the
mind has been represented as plastic before nature's activity, or nature
has been thought to be the creation of an active mind. There have been
various efforts to establish an agreement between nature and mind, or to
explain a postulated resemblance between things as they exist and as they
are thought. At least, pragmatism introduces some novelty. But while
pragmatism presupposes a universe so constituted which of course is
quite enough to let out all Hegelians it does not stress the universe as an
object of knowledge and is perplexed when one speaks of the universe as
viewed from the standpoint of omniscience. It does regard the question
of human knowledge as germane. Truth is a quality of human, not divine,
ideas, judgments, etc. Knowing grows out of the very instability of
things. If there had been no instability, there would have been no doubt,
no uncertainty; and if there had been no doubt and uncertainty, there
would have been no thinking. There would have been only things acting
upon one another. But Mr. Stewart is still faced the other way.
The case made out for pessimism in the seventh essay takes on the
aspect of a forced march that is not satisfactorily explained until one
comes to read the following essay. The establishment of pessimism is one
way of urging the acceptance of theism. " If our argument so far has
been sound we have shown that, on purely naturalistic hypothesis, if a man
is temperamentally disposed to the condemnation of life there is no logic
that can refute him." Ah, but let us see what can be done on some other
assumption! The argument in one form or another is not new. St.
Thomas even found in evil a proof of God's existence. But it is not an
argument that has appealed to the human understanding, speaking
generally. One may not object to, one may accept, the tenets of theism,
but no one cares to be " backed into " the house of his father from the rear.
In the eighth essay Mr. Stewart argues against the independence of
ethics and maintains, after Kant, that theism and immortality are funda-
mental postulates regarding the cosmic order that are to be presupposed
in ethical theory. Recourse must be had to beliefs " which carry us beyond
the facts of the natural order of the world." Undoubtedly much can be
said in favor of immortality, theism granted; we should be allowed to
complete the task assigned. But the argument that ethics should be
based upon either theism or immortality does not seem to be so cogent.
In many places the author seems to overstep the bounds of good argument.
He writes : " Those, and they are not few, who find no point in such ques-
tions are, I believe, as a rule, persons whose career has not been of the
strenuous type, whose lot has been cast in conventional comfort and whose
imagination is not sufficiently active to bring before them any sort of
experience which is in sharp contrast with their own." And again : " When
Kant spoke of immortality he meant what he said, therein differing
notably from some writers who are confusing us by employing the same
word to-day." And here he introduces some unpleasant animadversions
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 137
upon other folks's conceptions of immortality that differ from the view that
he happens to entertain. It is, however, hard to see just why the use of
this term is to be prohibited. Much, at least, might be said for the
antiquity of some of these doctrines.
The essay upon the growth of public opinion is well worth reading,
showing a keen insight into social psychology. The author's conclusions,
however, do not seem to me justified. I am not sure that they do not
involve a very simple logical fallacy. It is true that men in the mass are
not moved by reason so much as by feeling, sympathy, suggestion, etc.
But do we have to appeal to the mass? A comprehensive educational pro-
gramme may reach far enough to render each member of a democracy
as an individual open to reason, while the proper social mechanisms, the
press, etc., may render the individual available. Indeed, some Americans
are hopeful that this transformation is now going on. If this be so, it does
not follow that there must be a leisure class whose duty it is to do the
thinking, while "the majority must always be led." One is prone to
wonder whether Mr. Stewart is entirely free from the bias of being a
contented Britisher.
Mr. Stewart makes a pitiful slaughter of poor Nietzsche. As he him-
self suggests, he probably takes him too seriously. From the standpoint
of philosophy, pity and sympathy seem to me to be more apt in his case
than the criticism here offered. In the field of literature, the case is
different; Nietzsche may be looked upon as the last word of romanticism.
For these reasons it seems that Mr. Stewart is guilty of carrying coals to
Newcastle.
JOHN PICKETT TURNER.
COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
Humanism: Philosophical Essays. F. C. S. SCHILLER. Second Edition
Enlarged. London : The Macmillan Company. 1912. Pp. xxxii + 382.
" Humanism ; Philosophical Essays," is enlarged in its second edition
by four essays, constituting about one fourth of the volume : " Humism
and Humanism,," " Solipsism," " Infallibility and Toleration," and
" Freedom and Responsibility." These comparatively recent deliver-
ances of the humanistic message attest its courage and catholicity,
not to say audacity. A neglected but bodeful aspect of Hume; a new
variety of solipsism, crypto-solipsism, whose fungoid growth may in-
fect alike the absolute idealist and the neo-realist, but finds the humanist
immune ; the infallibility of the Pope at Rome and the infallibility of the
"man in the street"; a call to surrender the idea of absolutextruth ; a
reconsideration of the free-will controversy: these are some of the topics
to which the humanistic criticism and interpretation are applied with
something of the fervor and conviction of a new gospel. It becomes evi-
dent that a relatively large amount of energy is still being consumed in
freeing humanistic modes of thought from the trammels of a highly insti-
tutionalized intellectualistic tradition; if more positive constructive re-
sults are demanded, the humanist can point apparently only to the fruitful
sciences whose working theories form " a policy and not a creed."
138
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The first of these essays is a protest against the attempt to relegate
humanism, to the category of humism. The resemblance is superficial.
Humanism is like humism in being an anti-apriorist, pragmatistic,
empiricism; but it differs in being neither scepticism nor intellectualism ;
nor does it surrender to Hume's criticism of causation and activity. More-
over, Hume's criticism of the conception of power, or activity, which has
been ignored or " silently and tamely acquiesced in " by the intellectualists,
is quite as paradoxical as his criticism of the conception of cause, and
is even more radically destructive in its philosophic effects. Humanism
by the simple expedient of starting with our immediate experience " as is,"
not with some sensationalistic or idealistic abstraction from experience,
" dissolves the whole mirage of Humanian magic."
A humanist could be a solipsist if he wanted to be one ; but he doesn't
logically have to be one. If his behavior indicates that he recognizes the
independent existence of others, with thoughts, wills, personalities, for
which he is not altogether responsible, the proof of his asolipsism is com-
plete. Other philosophies, realistic as well as idealistic,, are haunted by
the logical possibility of solipsism. This is more apparent in the case of
the monistic idealist. In the case of the neo-realist, his apsychologism
leaves the solipsistic door open. Failing to take into account the various
and sometimes conflicting reactions of different individuals to the world
of objects, the neo-realist may yield to the temptation to regard himself
as the sole knower of the world. Thus the humanist would be avenged
upon the realist, particularly, it would seem, upon the realist who has
held up to scorn subjectivism of the Berkeleyian type.
The doctrine of papal infallibility is reasonable and moderate, so
Schiller contends, compared with the crass infallibility claimed by the
" common-sense " individualist for each thought as it conies into his head,
and compared with the infallibility implicit in all rationalistic philosophy.
The remedy urged is to give up the idea of absolute truth. Let truth be
humanized. Let it be defined no longer as that which is " cogent and
compulsory and irresistible, but as what is attractive and valuable and
satisfying. Let truth mean whatever can satisfy our cognitive cravings,
whatever can answer a logical problem. And let it mean our best answer
for the time being. Let it be conceived,, that is, as essentially progressive
and improvable"
The essay on " Freedom and Responsibility " was published originally
one year prior to the essay on " Infallibility and Toleration," although it
follows the latter in the book. Possibly this accounts for the apparent lack
of a humanistic concept of freedom answering fully to the humanistic
concept of truth. The essay on " Freedom and Responsibility " is a many-
sided discussion of the old controversy, proceeding from a vigorous re-
ductio ad absurdum of the attempt of a socialistic writer to absolve crimi-
nals from responsibility for their crimes; going on to develop in one of
the most illuminating passages of the book the truth that resides in the
deterministic hypothesis when considered in its scientific bearings; and
concluding with a rehabilitation of the concept of freedom as a rational
concomitant of mental and moral growth, even determinism resting finally
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 139
on a free choice; but the emphasis, nevertheless, seems to be laid on the
freedom that is the freedom of choice choice, to be sure, that determines,
that is a genuine contribution to the course of events rather than on that
more concrete freedom of thought and action, that freedom to express and
to improve some concrete function or capacity, habit or method, which
humanized truth, truth that starts with and is realized in immediate
experience, truth that is " essentially progressive and improvable" would
seem bound to demand as its province and responsibility, and which is
perhaps all the freedom that the " plain man " at least really cares about.
WILLARD C. GORE.
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. September, 1913. Idealism as
Tautology or Paradox (pp. 467-483) : J. W. SCOTT. - The realistic criti-
cisms of idealism, in both England and America, are directed against
abandoned conceptions of idealism and mistake its central interest. They
attack Berkeley, not current idealism. German Philosophy in 1912 (pp.
484-501) : OSCAR EWALD. - Current German philosophy represents the
growing conflict between metaphysics and theories of knowledge, as in
open conflict. The chief representations of logism are Cohen, Natorp,
Kinkel, and Cassirer. Especially noteworthy is Natorp's " Kant und die
Marburger Schule " in the Kantstudien. The prominent metaphysicians
are Keyserling, Driesch, and Simmel. The Nature of Primary Qualities
(pp. 502-511): THEODORE DE LAGUNA. - The finding of a standard for
" real size " is a " case of incomplete induction ; yet all natural science is
based on it." The same is true for duration, mass, force, and work. Berg-
son's Intellect and Matter (pp. 512-519) : CHAS. E. CORY. - Bergson often
begins with certain contrasts and distinctions, submits them to analysis,
finally resolving them into a synthesis. But the arguments for the synthe-
sis have value only in terms of the original contrasts. This thesis is ap-
plied to the treatment of intellect and matter. '' Values " and the Nature
of Science (pp. 520-538) : JOHN FREDERICK DASHIELL. - The world we live
in is such that values form a fundamental category. " Scientific thinking
arises in the natural human enterprise of discovering, defining, and analy-
zing these dynamic values in the interest of living; the category of the
subjective finds its place here in the functional classification of worths."
Reviews of Books: John Watson, The Interpretation of Religious Experi-
ence : G. T. LADD. William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of God in Hu-
man Experience: JAY WILLIAM HUDSON. Oswald Kiilpe, Die Realisierung :
RALPH BARTON PERRY. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles.
Notes.
Gemelli, Agostino. II Metodo degli Equivalenti. Firenze: Libreria Edi-
trice Fiorentina. 1914. Pp. 344.
140
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
NOTES AND NEWS
PRESIDENT POULTON'S presidential address to the Linnean Society of
London deals with a work by G. W. Sleeper, of Boston, printed, apparently,
in 1849, and containing an anticipation of modern views on evolution and
the causes and transmission of disease. It goes far beyond most, if not all,
previous attempts at solving the problem of evolution. The clear grasp,
shown by the author, of the Darwinian principles of the struggle for life
and origin of fresh species by the preservation of those forms best adapted
for their environment, his advocacy of the persistence of germinal char-
acters, the terminology he uses, as well as his suggestion of the theories
afterward developed by Arrhenius, Galton, and Weismann, engender a
doubt as to whether his work is not a cleverly devised fabrication with a
falsified date. Not less surprising are his enunciation of the germ-theory
of disease, his experiments on the cultivation of streptococci from a sore
throat, with the use as a germ-filter of cotton wool sterilized by heat, his
suggestion of the action of phagocytes, and his recommendation of metal
gauze protective frames for doors and windows in order to ward off infec-
tion carried by insects. After weighing the interesting information
brought together by Professor Poulton respecting the book and its author,
few will doubt that Mr. Sleeper's work was really printed and published at
the time stated.
THE Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology has elected the
following officers for the year 1914 : President, Professor J. B. Watson, of
Johns Hopkins University; vice-president, Dr. Josiah Morse, of the Uni-
versity of South Carolina; secretary and treasurer, Professor W. C. Rue-
diger, of George Washington University.
DR. ROBERT H. GAULT, of Northwestern University, has been promoted
from assistant professor to associate professor of psychology. Dr. Gault
continues as editor in chief of the Journal of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nology.
AT the British Association a separate subsection of psychology was
formed this year for the first time. The contributions received were so
numerous that four meetings were held during afternoons.
ON January 16, Dr. C. E. Ferree read a paper before the Philadelphia
section of the Illuminating Engineering Society entitled " Deficiencies of
the Method of Flicker for the Photometry of Lights of Different Colors."
THE annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association was
held in the American Museum of Natural History, New York City, De-
cember 29-31, in affiliation with the American Folk-Lore Society.
DR. JOSEPH JASTROW, professor of psychology in the University of Wis-
consin, gave the opening convocation address at the University of Missouri
on February 4, on " Theory and Practise."
PROFESSOR EDWARD KASNER, of Columbia University, recently gave a
lecture at Princeton University on " Elements of Infinite O?^s and the
Geometry of Divergent Power Series."
VOL. XI. No. 6. MARCH 12, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE DEFINITION OF VALUE 1
I BELIEVE that I am in accord with the view of Professors Urban
and Sheldon 2 as to the general spirit in which the discussion of
this problem should be conducted. At any rate, I agree that we should
not ride hobbies or prolong factional differences that have arisen in the
past. We should treat our problem as a new problem, and approach it,
so far as possible, with innocent minds. We should not regard it merely
as a special case of an old problem ; and we should not feel obliged
to be consistent with our past selves, or loyal to our several parties.
Beyond this, I can not follow the Urban-Sheldon duumvirate, not
for lack of good will, but for lack of understanding. I can not
promise, with them both, to eschew epistemology and address myself
to "the structure of reality," because I find that when one examines
values one not only finds them in the context of subjectivity and
judgment, but is from the first puzzled to know how much of that
context belongs to their structure. I agree that we should be induc-
tive and seek to arrive at a definition of values by a study of instances,
but at the outset an instance can in this case be no more than an
approximation, a vaguely bounded region in or near which is that
entity which we may agree subsequently to call value. One can not
collect values as one can collect butterflies, and go off into one's
laboratory with the assurance that one holds in one's net the whole
and no more than the whole of that which one seeks. There is no
perfor 'tout the edges of values to mark the line at which they
may be detached. The great task is to trace the boundaries and de-
tach the entity by an act of discrimination. The Mona Lisa is good
and its theft was evil. But in order to add these to my collection of
values, what must I include? Is all that makes the Mona Lisa
good included within its frame? There is at least some ground for
asserting that, the Mona Lisa is a good only in so far as you include
its enjoyment, or its popularity, or its history. Similarly there are
those who say that its theft as evil must be taken to include the
i Read before the American Philosophical Association, December 29, 1914,
in opening the discussion of "Value."
. letters contributed to this JOURNAL, Vol. X., pages 587 and 643.
141
142
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
conscience of the thief, or the collective judgment of the times, or the
unhappiness of France. If, assuming that the Mona Lisa I had under
my arm was a good, I should forthwith compare it with the money in
my pocket with a view to discovering their common structure, I
should too hastily have committed myself to a limited set of struc-
tural possibilities. On the other hand, if I were to inquire more
carefully into the relation of the physical Mona Lisa with attitudes
and judgments of sentient beings, or with the demands and opinions
of communities, I should walk on the epistemological grass where
Messrs. Urban and Sheldon have enjoined us not to trespass. Of
these two evils, I shall choose the latter. I shall trespass because I
am curious to see what is there, and suspect that Messrs. Urban and
Sheldon will follow me if only to put me off. (I seem to see Pro-
fessor Urban 's footprints there already) !
In any case I am in agreement with Professor Sheldon as to the
manner in which he and I can best do our parts as leaders in this
discussion. We must seek to avoid a Babel of opinions by discover-
ing, if possible, a common language. There are classicists who speak
the purest Plato ; others who belong linguistically to the great family
of Kant and learned at their mother's knees to lisp the flowing
syllables of Windelband or Green ; and others who talk among them-
selves exclusively in the strange new dialects known as Deweyan and
Meinongese. There is as yet no cosmopolitan party that can speak all
these languages and think consecutively and commutably in terms of
TO ayaOov, cvSfUfjwvia, Beurtheilung, Normen, unmittelbare Gefuhl des
JSollens, valuation-process, recognition coefficient, redisposition, mar-
ginal utility, axiology, over-individual will for identities, Wert,
Werten, Bewerten, Wertung, Werthalten, Wertschatzen, Werturteil,
Wertgeben, Werterlebniss, Wertbegriff, Werthaltung, and NicJit-
gegebenkeitswerte. It is scarcely to be expected that we should all
engage profitably in a dispute between Rickert and Miinsterberg, or
Meinong and Ehrenfels, or Dewey and Stuart. But there is an
undertaking for which one of us is as well qualified as another, and
that is a review of the present state of the question a classification
of views from the standpoint of the outsider. A united attempt at
such an Auseinandersetzung would, at any rate, tend in the direction
of a universal language, or in the direction of an appeal from private
or party symbols to common objects. To promote this end, I shall
attempt a critical classification of definitions of value. 3 Of course I
shall betray myself in many a provincialism and prejudice, but yoi
will give me credit for my effort and I hope surpass me in attainment.
3 I recognize the existence of important problems that I do not here even
touch upon, such as the measurement of value, the distinguishing features of
species of value, such as moral value, beauty, truth, etc., the genesis, develop-
ment, and transposition of values, teleology, value and existence, etc.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 143
The fundamental problem in theory of value, in so far as this is
philosophical, is the problem of definition. If Socrates were here, he
might say : ' * Now I want you to tell me whether value is one whole,
of which virtue and beauty and wealth are parts ; or whether all these
are only the names of one and the same thing. Are they parts in the
same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes, and ears, are parts of a
face ; or are they like the parts of gold, which differ from the whole
and from one another only in being larger or smaller?" And we
should thus be drawn into a consideration not of the several features
of value, but of the physiognomy of value. What is it in principle
to be a value? What is value generically?
1. In undertaking to answer this question, we are challenged at
the outset by those who maintain the indefinability of value. This
view, advocated by Sidgwick a generation ago, and recently restated
and rearirued by Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, 4 Brentano, and
Santayana, would seem to rest upon two independent grounds.
(1) In the first place, value is adjectival rather than substantive.
It can not be identified with any of the things of which it is predi-
cated. There is no thing such as pleasure of which one can say that
it alone has value, for it is always possible that the addition of some-
thing else such as knowledge may result in more value or in less
value. We can define the valuable thing only as that which has value,
in other words, we can not define it at all. But this argument rests
upon a misconception. It is, of course, impossible to define a predi-
cate in terms of that of which it is predicated, otherwise there would
be no difference between subject and predicate. But it does not fol-
low that the predicate is indefinable. The beach is level, and I can
not define level in terms of beach. If I add more beach it may cease
to be level. But it does not follow that "level" is indefinable. It
would be indefinable were it unanalyzable, but that is evidently not
the case. There is certainly nothing in the nature of a predicate as
such that requires it to be simple. In the case of value, it becomes a
question of fact.
X-T is there any logical connection between the simplicity of a
quality and its restricted or unrestricted appearance in the role of
predicate. Were Moore able to prove universally, as he certainly has
not that any kind of thing whatsoever may be good, nothing
would follow as respects the simplicity or complexity of goodness.
Nor if it were proved that goodness was simple would anything fol-
low concerning the number of things that could be good. It is quite
possible to argue, as does Santayana in his criticism of Russell, 5 that
*C/. his "Principia Ethica," 5-14.
s "Winds of Doctrine," pages 138 ff.
144 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
goodness is simple, but that a thing's being good means that goodness
is emotionally attributed to it, so that a thing can not be good except
in relation to desire. It becomes a question, in short, as to the precise
nature and conditions of the copula in propositions concerning good-
ness. The question of the simplicity and indefinability of the predi-
cate value is an independent question.
(2) Not only Moore and Russell, but Santayana, Brentano, and
others as well, assert that the value character, whether it be termed
Tightness, goodness, or oughtness, is unanalyzable.
But in order to find that a character is indefinable one must at least
have found it. In other words, it will not do to pronounce value an
indefinable because one has not been able to define it. One must be
prepared to point to a distinct quote which appears in that region
which our value terms roughly indicate, and which is different from
the object's shape and size, from the interrelation of its parts, from
its relation to other objects, or to a subject, and from all the other
factors belonging to the same context, but designated by words other
than good, right, value, etc. I find no such residuum. Moore's com-
parison of good with the quality "yellow" 6 seems to me to be purely
hypothetical. Good would be like yellow if it were a simple quality.
But then the empirical fact that it is not like yellow argues that it
is not a simple quality. There is no difficulty over the meaning of terms
connoting simple qualities, nor is there serious difference of opinion
likely as to their distribution. Things wear them in public and any
passer by may note them. But no one who has read either Sidgwick's
or Moore's solemn observations concerning what things are or are
not good 7 can for an instant be deceived into supposing that their
moral perception has lit upon a quality whose presence they report
for our benefit. They impute goodness in a miscellaneous way to
things that are generally regarded as good, until in a fit of inspira-
tion they are moved to say that it is " Desirable Consciousness which
we must regard as ultimate Good," 8 or that "all great goods and
great evils involve both a cognition and an emotion directed towards
its object"; 9 which assertions are plausible because they sound so
much like the view that goodness itself consists in desirable conscious-
ness or in a cognitive-emotional attitude to an object. For our au-
thors these purport to be inductions reached after prolonged obser-
vation of the resting-place of the simple indefinable quality good.
That it should have settled permanently upon desirable consciousness
e"Principia Ethica," page 10.
iCf. Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics/' Bk. I., Ch. IX.; Bk. III., Ch. XIV.
Moore, "Principia Ethica," Ch. VI.; " Ethics, " Ch. VII.
s Sidgwick, op. cit., page 397.
With the possible exception of ' ' the consciousness of pain. ' ' Moore,
"Principia Ethica/' page 225.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 145
or the cognitive-emotional attitude as its habitat must possess for our
authors the novelty and wonder of sheer fact. For some of their
readers, like myself, those conclusions will appear to be a laborious
rediscovery of assumptions, or the splitting of an identity into a syn-
thetic judgment through the hypostasization of a word.
There are other sound reasons for rejecting this doctrine of inde-
finability, but I can here do no more than barely mention them. In
the first place, this doctrine is compelled to supplement an inde-
finable good with an indefinable evil ; and in that case I suspect that
the very peculiar and significant relation of polarity which exists be-
tween good and evil becomes not only indefinable, but unintelligible as
well. At the same time the matter of degrees or comparative magni-
tudes of value is left in even greater darkness than before. In the
second place, these indefinables give so little account of themselves
that the phenomenon of the appearance and disappearance, the wax-
ing and waning of values, is left totally unexplained. Finally, the
doctrine of iudefinability is objectionable on purely methodological
grounds. It is so easy and comfortable to mistake the simplicity of
our own knowledge for a simplicity in the object, that I believe the
hypothesis of simplicity should be a last resort with the presumption
against it until every alternative has been tried and found wanting.
II
The definability of value has usually been assumed. There has
doubtless been much confusion, as Moore has pointed out, between
the notion of the thing having value, or a good, and the value itself,
or gooi But most, if not all, of the classic views can neverthe-
less be stated as definitions of the value predicate. The views to
which I wish to call attention have rarely, if ever, been held in entire
purity. But theoretically, at any rate, they are independent, and
have fi prominently in both ancient and modern theories of
value.
Tin- first of these is the view that value consists in the relation of
harmony or fitness. 10 It finds its point of contact with common sense
in the popular expression "good for." To possess value means to be
com -i. But this relation is too universal to distinguish those
I>li' i with which the value sciences have to do. And it is
to be observed that the expression "good for" is almost invariably
applied to cases of fitness for good, the value of the consequence
Ix-ing- anticipated in the thought of the cause. That which is "good
for nothing" is fit for no good; it does not lack fitness, but is fit
only for the waste-basket or the rubbish heap. The same view in
I test exposition of this view of which I know is to be found in Pro-
r Palmer's " Nature of Goodness."
146 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
an amended and more defensible form asserts that the nature of
value lies in reciprocal fitness or in the ''organic" relation of inter-
dependence. But this view is usually supported by the aid of ex-
amples in which the interdependence is conducive to the existence
of a whole which is good in some other sense, as in the case of the
physical organism; or in which the interdependence is conducive to
the existence of members which are good in some other senses, as in
the case of the social community. The clearest instances of interde-
pendence pure and simple are to be found among mechanisms, such,
for example, as the gravitational system with its reciprocal masses,
velocities, and paths of motion. But such examples are not ordi-
narily cited, or if cited, are really used to illustrate not interdepend-
ence, but unity. As such, they satisfy esthetic and intellectual de-
mands and would not, I think, be regarded as examples of value were
they rigorously conceived as existing without relation to any con-
templating or aspiring mind.
Ill
There is a second view which, like the harmony or fitness view,
appeals to a familiar phrase and identifies goodness with a formal
relationship. The phrase in this case is ' ' good of its kind, ' ' and the
relationship is that of the particular to its universal. The ordinary
name for this view is the self-realization view. But this phrase is
clearly ambiguous. It may mean the realization of a self ; or it may
mean the auto-realization of anything, i. e., its representativeness,
or complete exemplification of those attributes or capacities that are
peculiar to the kind of which it is a case. Self-realization in the first
sense belongs to another type of theory, to be examined below, in
which goodness is defined as relative to interest. It is self-realization
in the second sense with which we have to do here. But when the dis-
tinction is made, doubt at once arises whether it would ever have
been held were it not for confusion with the first. The relation of a
case to its kind is too abstract and universal to serve the peculiar
purposes of the sciences of value. Goodness in this sense can not be
denied of anything. If A is a better m than B, it follows that B is a
better n than A. Everything is the most shining example of some-
thing. The worst specimen of a man may be the most perfect speci-
men of inebriety or simple-mindedness. This example is suggestive
of the confusions which give plausibility to the view. Whatever ade-
quately exemplifies a type already conceived as good reflects that
goodness. Man being good, the more manlike the better. Here the
goodness lies not in the bare relation of particular to universal, but
is borrowed from the nature of the universal itself. The typical
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 147
inebriate has no value in this sense. But whatever satisfies the cog-
nitive or esthetic interest is good, and the representation of a uni-
versal in a particular does provide such satisfaction in proportion to
the adequacy or lucidity of the representation. A good case of
inebriety facilitates the understanding or demonstration of the
generic defect. An adequate representation of man is interesting
and agreeable to contemplate. Thus the goodness does not lie in the
bare relation, but in the fact that the relation has a use or affords
enjoyment. In short, the typical is good when what is typified is
good in some other sense ; or when some demand exists for the typical
as such. Omit these qualifications, and typicality takes us too far
afield, is too pervasive a feature of our world, to be identified with
value.
But the above example contains another suggestion. It may be
asserted that value is in proportion to the degree of universality
realized; and that this accounts for the difference between the good
man and the good inebriate. As manhood takes precedence of ine-
briety so the absolute universal must take precedence of manhood;
and value would lie in the degree in which the particular reflected
the totality of being. But here again I feel sure that it can not be
the bare universality itself which constitutes the goodness. Were
this the case, it would be proper to regard the mechanical aspect of
human nature as better than its teleological aspect on the assump-
tion of a materialistic metaphysics; or crime and unmerited suffering
as better than justice and happiness on the assumption that they are
more characteristic of the waywardness and caprice of a world of
chance ; or the abstract factor of being as the best feature of life on
the pluralistic ground that there is no other universal feature. To
avoid such paradoxes one must introduce some material assumption.
One may assume that the universe is the fulfilment of a purpose in
which all particular interests come to fruition. Or one may assume
that the universe, as a whole, is good, so that in so far as the particu-
lar reflects the universal it reflects that goodness. Or one may as-
sume an interest in the universal, the philosophical interest, and judge
levels of intellectual attainment by that, adding perhaps the further
claim that only by identifying himself with this interest can a man
be i of happiness. But in all such cases the definition of value
is altered, and the bare relation of particular to universal becomes
<'ly accidental or instrumental.
IV
All of the views thus far discussed, value as indefinable, as fitness
or hannomj, and as the typical or universal, may be said to agree in
148
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characterizing value or goodness without reference to the fact of bias
or interest. The belief that this fact, or its characteristic relation, is
value has most commonly found expression in the pleasure theory or
hedonism. This doctrine is perhaps too ancient and too popular to be
exact. Broadly and historically it expresses a number of different,
more or less independent, and even conflicting motives, such, for ex-
ample, as scepticism, egoism, prudentialism, psychologism, material-
ism, humanism,' and humanitarianism. I shall interpret this doctrine
strictly as that which identifies good and evil with the states of pleas-
ure and pain respectively. A thing is good intrinsically in so far as
it is the. pleasure-state, or extrinsically in so far as it causes the
pleasure-state. And yet, curiously enough, it is doubtful if the view
has ever been held in this strict form. In disputes over hedonism it
has commonly been assumed that value consists ultimately in being
liked, hedonists asserting that only pleasure is liked for itself, and
their critics insisting that a man likes other things as well and can
not possibly be satisfied with mere pleasure. In this dispute the
hedonist has not only been worsted ; but as party to the dispute, he
has virtually abandoned his view. One may say that the controversy
over hedonism has had mainly to do not with the question "what is
goodness?' 7 but with the question "what is good?"; both parties
agreeing that goodness consists in being liked, and the hedonist as-
serting that the state of pleasure is the only case of a thing liked.
If it were not characteristic of the state of pleasure that the agent
tries to keep it when present or get it when absent, and of the state
of pain that the agent tends to get rid of it when present and avoid
it when absent, these states would probably never have recommended
themselves to any one's judgment as definitions of good and evil.
Now that it is clearly understood that one tries to keep and get other
things than pleasure, sometimes even pain itself, and that one tries
to stop and avoid other things than pain, even pleasure itself, the
hedonist accepts this later view rather as a clarification and correc-
tion of his former view than as a disproof of it. The crux of the
matter lies in the distinction between the motor-affective attitude or
impulse, and pleasure and pain as specific qualitative contents of
consciousness. The question lies in that portion of the field of psy-
chology that is, unfortunately for the theory of value and for all the
social sciences, least thoroughly explored. But it seems to be estab-
lished that it is possible to like pain, or to " dislike a foul smell more
strongly than a slight pain. ' ?11 Of course it is possible for hedonism
to gain a nominal victory by identifying liking with "taking pleas-
ure in," and disliking with "finding painful." But such terminol-
ogy seems only to blur an empirical and important distinction. Lik-
11 Miinsterberg, ' ' Eternal Values, ' ' page 66.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS U9
ing can certainly not be fully identified with a state or content of the
type illustrated by the scratching of itching skin, or the quenching of
thirst. It is characteristic of liking that it is directed towards an
object, and that it is motor or impulsive; and the pleasure quale,
even if it be invariably present, is certainly not proportional to what
may be called the degree of the liking. Hedonism, then, is too nar-
row an interpretation of a view that fundamentally is not hedonism
at all. To that view I shall now turn.
V
It is held at the present day with something approaching una-
nimity that value in the generic sense has to do with a certain con-
stant that we may call bias or interest. We have found that efforts
to define value in other terms, and even the argument for its inde-
finability. point unmistakably to this constant. The justification of
this view lies in the fact that bias or interest, with its manifold
varieties, conditions, and relations affords the best means of system-
atically describing that region of our world which the value sci-
ences and the value vocabulary roughly denote. In any case it will
doubtless appear that most of our differences of opinion will lie
within this view. It is broad and elastic enough to contain views so
different as the "self-realization" view of Green, Bradley, and their
followers, Windelband's "Beurtheilung," Rickert's " unmittelbare
GefiiJ/J firs Sollens," Westermark's "retributive emotions," San-
tayana's "objectified pleasure," Stuart's "valuation process,"
Meinong's " Urtheilsgefiihl," Royce's "loyalty" and countless other
conceptions which instruct, edify, and divide us.
It is one thing to assert that the fulfilment of interest is essen-
tial to value and another thing to say that it constitutes a sufficient
definition. In other words it is possible to maintain that satisfaction
of intt-tv^t as such is value, or to maintain that value is a qualified
satisfaction of interest. I shall state the former view first, then the
view which would deny it utterly, and finally the view or views
which would propose to qualify it.
1. Kir->t, then, the view that value consists in the fulfilment
of intrtvst as such. I have selected the phraseology that I have
thought to be least misleading; but it requires explanation. The
central fact for this view is the polarity of affective-motor atti-
tudes. Organisms and conscious beings behave towards certain objects
or "objectives" in the manner common to love, hope, aspiration, de-
sir yment, effort to keep or get; and towards other objects or
objectives in the manner common to hate, fear, repugnance, aversion,
effort to get rid of or avoid. I propose to generalize the terms liking
and disliking, and use them to stand for these two modes of mind.
150
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Liking and disliking are so related as to inhibit one another, and
can not both be directed to the same object at the same time and in
the same respect. They are often, but not always, directed to objects
having opposite or contradictory predicates (as when one likes
feminine women and dislikes masculine women). Furthermore,
whatever appears to promote the object of one of these modes be-
comes the object of the same mode ; but whatever appears to destroy
the object of one of these modes becomes the object of the opposite
mode. In other words a thing is liked for promoting an object of
liking or injuring an object of dislike, and a thing is disliked for
promoting an object of dislike or injuring an object of liking. It
is evident, furthermore, that either liking or disliking may be dis-
positional and yet be effective in inhibiting its opposite or in deter-
mining these derivitive modes. Since it is desirable to have terms
which signify this general type of reaction I shall use the term
interest to mean a subject's liking or disliking, including also their
derived or their dispositional forms. 12
According to our present view, then, value would consist in the
fulfilment of bias or interest. An object would be said to possess
value in so far as it fulfilled interest, or assumed the relation of
fulfilment to the term interest; where fulfilment is used in a gen-
eralized sense for the consummation of either liking or disliking. At
this point numerous questions press upon us. They are perhaps the
most significant and vexatious questions of the hour in this field of
inquiry, and I could not pretend to answer them in this paper even
if the answers were standing ready in my mind. But I must at least
state three of these questions, and I can perhaps best stimulate dis-
cussion of them by dogmatizing a little on my own account.
(1) First there is the question of the relative priority of feeling
and desire. In other words, does value consist at bottom 'in having
what you like or dislike, or in getting what you like or dislike ? It
does not seem reasonable to associate values exclusively either with
quiescent enjoyment or with progressive effort. On the other hand,
one can not but seek to unify them. This appears to be possible if we
recognize the motor factor in feeling, and the factor of prospective pos-
session in desire. 13 To like a present object is to seek to prolong it ;
and is thus not a merely static phenomenon after all. To consum-
mate desire is to achieve the object by the expenditure of effort, and
is thus not merely a matter of non-possession. Thus the difference
is softened, though it remains as one of the fundamental principles
12 Meinong uses the term in a similar sense. Cf ( . his ' ' Fur die Psychologie
und gegen den Psychologismus in der allgemeinen Werttheorie, " Logos, Vol.
III. (1912), page 7.
is This is perhaps the same as Dr. Anderson 's view that l ' the test of a
value is its influence upon activity." Cf. his " Social Value," page 104.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 1"*1
of classification. There are present values and prospective values,
according as action is directed to the prolongation or to the achieve-
ment of the object. What is enjoyed in the having may not be missed
and sought in its absence; and what is sought and achieved may have
no value after possession. It is even possible that what is dreaded
should bo clung to and enjoyed when possessed, and that what is
desired should be disrelished and rejected.
(2) A second question is already raised. Must a thing be in order
to possess value? One thing seems clear: there must be a term
towards which the interest or bias is directed. There can be no liking
or disliking unless there be something liked or disliked. But this
statement must be guarded and qualified. What is liked must be
able to serve as a motive; one likes to own or spend money, or one
likes one's friend to live or flourish, where the verbal form signifies
potential action or a state contingent upon will. And only when
this state is, can the value be said to be. But the state may be and
usually is presented or represented. And it is important to observe
that it may be sufficient that the presentation or representation
should exist. 14 I may like to see my friend looking well, or think
that my possessions are safe. Then my liking would not be affected
by the actual illness of my friend or the destruction of my property,
were my impressions and convictions to remain unaltered. Or the
state liked may be one of supposal or imagination merely. I may
like to suppose that God loves me or to imagine that I am rich. And
in those cases it is not necessary that things should be as I suppose
or imagine them. Desire furnishes an interesting example. If I seek
wealth, then in that relation, only my actual attainment of it is good.
But I may be actually poor and yet be satisfied in that I am con-
vinced that I am to become wealthy or in that I enjoy the imagined
pro So the course of achievement prior to its culmination is
attended with the compensating values of faith and fancy. 15
Since Meinong has contributed so largely to the exploitation of
this question and since what I have said is so largely in agreement
with wh.it I take to be his meaning, it may be well to point out that
he niphasized a specific role which the category of exist-
ence plays in value. That which is stipulated in desire, the contin-
gei expressed in the verbal form, is only sometimes existence.
It is not existence or non-existence only which I like or dislike, or
which is the object of the belief or the objective of the supposal or
imagination which I like or dislike. I may like two and two to equal
four, or to suppose that identity is a relation, or to know that my
' I'nlcss one abandons the present view and confines value to interest-ful-
filment founded on truth. Cf. below.
is There is also, of course, the value of partial achievement.
152 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
friend has married, where what I like must be consummated, but
where the consummation itself is not a mere possession of the char-
acter of existence.
(3) My third question runs as follows: Are liking and disliking
themselves cognitions of value, or are they the immediacies to which
judgments of value must ultimately be referred ? We seem already
to be committed to a certain answer. If value consists in an object's
consummating interest, then to know that an object has value is to
know that in it an interest is consummated. And it seems clear that
to take or have an interest in an object is not the same as to know
that one does. It does not follow that the two things are in the least
incompatible; and it may well be that in the last analysis interest
can be found or immediately observed only by the interested subject
himself. We seem to meet here with a special case of the general
question of introspection. But conceding everything to the advocates
of introspection there remains the difference between the attitude of
interest and the awareness of it. To say that "values are felt" 16
seems to be equivalent to saying that visual sensations are seen, or
auditory sensations heard, the fact being as Aristotle long ago
pointed out, that all sensations are objects of a common sense. Cer-
tainly it is not the liking itself which is liked ; or the dislike which,
is disliked ; nor can it be value which is liked or disliked since liking
and disliking are its essential components. In other words, that
value which a liking or disliking constitutes can not be the object of
that same liking or disliking.
Here is indeed a fundamental issue, and I hope that their aver-
sion to epistemology will not deter Professors Sheldon and Urban
from lending us their aid. It appears to me to be clear that interest
can not be at the same time constitutive and cognitive of value. And
;a failure to observe this fact is, I believe, the principal defect in
the existing literature on the subject. It even largely vitiates the
work of the Meinong school, which is otherwise sound and fruitful.
Such current conceptions as "appreciation," "valuation," "moral
sentiment," and "funded meaning" perpetuate and compound an
ambiguity. We face, I believe, a genuine dilemma. The attitude of
interest either constitutes values or it cognizes them. If it constitutes
them, then the cognition of value lies in the observation, compari-
son, recording, and systematic description of interests in their rela-
tions to their objects and to one another. The judgment of value is
the judgment about interests, and is otherwise like any other judg-
ment. If, on the other hand, the interest cognizes values, then values
themselves are not matters of interest at all, but qualities of objects
for which interest furnishes simply the requisite sensibility. If we
16 Cf. Urban, ' Valuation, ' ' page 22.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 153
accept this alternative we are thrown back upon Moore's contention
that value is indefinable.
The question is, as Dewey and others have suggested, 17 similar
to that concerning the status of the secondary qualities. But the
same method will, I believe, lead to opposite conclusions in the two
cases. We may attribute to objects qualities which upon reflection
we discover to be qualifications of ourselves. A "coveted book" is
evidently qualified by a relation to subjects. A "dull day," a
"boresome meeting," a "tiresome place," a "hopeful situation" are
less evidently so, but the clarification of the experience brings us in
each case to the identification of the quality with a specific relation
to the subject. When, on the other hand, we endeavor to localize
the blue of blue sky in the subject we fail. To call blue a mode of
the activity or process of seeing or of the sentient organism is mean-
ingless unless, as in the case of Professor Holt's theory, 18 blue is
reduced to quantitative modes that are localizable both in the object
and in the sentient. How is it with the alleged "tertiary qualities"
of value ? So far as I ascertain such qualities at all they appear to
me to be either modes of attitude or impulse, and thus motor, or
sensory qualia which are localizable in the body. In so far as I find
traces of what some regard as irreducible feeling-qualities, they
localize themselves either in my body or not at all ; in proportion as
I distinguish and examine them they lose all semblance of that pres-
ence to the object which becomes increasingly clear and unmistakable
in the case of color and sound. In short, the attentive effort at
localization, whereas it unites the secondary qualities with the object,
dissociates the alleged "tertiary qualities," and tends to unite them
with the sentient. It becomes less and less tolerable to speak of a
yellow or melodious organism, as it becomes more and more plausible
to speak of one that is covetous, bored, tired, or hopeful. Similarly I
conclude that interest is not an immediate cognition of value qualities
in its object, but is a mode of the organism, enacted, sensed, or pos-
sibly felt, and qualifying the object through being a response to it.
To like or dislike an object is to create that object's value. To be
aware that one likes or dislikes an object is to cognize that object's
value. Hut this awareness is no more (or no less) an interest than
any other awareness whatsoever; and even if it be an interest it is
not that interest which is its value-object. 19
nt rivsts be constitutive of values then the further analysis and
cla ion of values will be based upon a study of varieties of in-
interest. Interests may be dispositional or actual, momentary or
i? Cf. Dewey, "The Problem of Values," this JOURNAL, Vol. X., page 269;
Meinong, op. cit., page 12; Urban, op. tit., page 21.
is Cf. "The New Realism," pages 308-355.
iCy. also below, pages 161, 162.
154 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
permanent, personal, sub-personal, or super-personal, individual or
collective, mutually consistent or inconsistent, original or acquired.
The words good and evil now become blanket names for a thousand
different attitudes of liking and disliking. The importance of the
school of Meinong lies in exploitation of this rich empirical field, in
its substitution of this systematic, but elastic polytheism for the con-
ventional trinitarianism of the worshipers of the true, the beautiful,
and the good. Perhaps the most fruitful conception of the new school
is that of the presuppositional or "founded" interest, or what might
be called the ' ' constructive ' ' interest. By this is meant the liking or
dislike that rests upon an implied judgment, either concerning the
object or concerning the interest itself. Thus I may like a man on the
ground that he has assisted my friend, or is of my own party, or on the
ground that others like him; so that were the ground removed my
liking would cease. Whether in such a case the value itself may be
said to depend on the truth of the implied judgment is a question
for further consideration. It would evidently involve an abandon-
ment of the present view that any interest whatsoever in an object is
constitutive of value, and the acceptance of one of those limited or
qualified views that I propose to examine only after having met the
arguments that may be raised against this whole type of theory.
2. I have spoken of the very general agreement that value is a
function of interest. The notable exception is Mr. G. E. Moore, with
Mr. Eussell, whom in this particular he has, I suppose, inspired.
Indeed it is almost a case of Mr. Moore against the field. His argu-
ments therefore assume a special importance. 20
(1) He argues, and it seems to me quite soundly, that the term
"good" can not signify simply a judgment that something is good.
This is to the same effect as the argument which I have employed above
against the supposition that one and the same mode of mind can be
both cognitive of value and constitutive of the very value which it
cognizes. As Mr. Moore puts it, we should in that case have no
object for our cognition. The judgment can not be its own object.
If there is really to be a judgment that A is good, then ' ' good ' ' must
signify something other than the judgment itself.
(2) Second, he argues that the term "good" can not signify
merely the interest of the subject who uses the term. Here again his
argument seems unanswerable, unless we are prepared to abandon
discussion of the question altogether. For, as Moore points out, if
each party to the discussion is referring to his own interest, no two
can ever be referring to the same thing. This is the genuinely
vicious sort of relativism which puts an end to discourse, and is con-
tradicted in the very act of generalizing it. To the force of this
20 Cf. his " Ethics, Chs. III., IV.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 155
argument Santayana has not, I think, done justice. The objectivity
or commutability of judgments of value in some sense must be saved,
not for the benefit of those "debating societies'* for which he has so
poor an opinion, but in order that we may read and enjoy essays
like his own, and understand him even when he says "that good is
not an intrinsic or primary quality, but relative and adventitious"
There is an evident solution of the difficulty. Let good be defined as
relative to interest, where it is understood that interest signifies any
interest, and not exclusively that of the judge who defines. Interests
and their relations then become common objects. Against this modi-
fied and innocuous relativism Moore urges two objections.
(3) He appeals to the fact that we may use the word "good"
without consciously meaning object of interest. Judging by what
the speaker has in mind, to say that the object is good is not the same
as to say that some one is interested in it. 22 This type of argument
would prove altogether too much if it proved anything. No defini-
tion has ever been given of anything that is perfectly in keeping
either with verbal usage or conscious meanings. For words may
be mere echoes, and conscious meanings careless and obscure. The
absurdity of the argument is especially evident in the case of com-
plex entities, such as the exponents of the interest-view hold value to
be. A complex entity is only roughly or superficially denoted in
common discourse, and definitive analysis will invariably reveal a
structure which is not present to a mind which reflects the stereo-
typed familiarity.
(4) A much more interesting argument is based upon the notion
of intrinsic goodness. 23 If a thing derives value from its relation to
an interest taken in it, it would seem impossible that anything what-
soever should possess value within itself. It is natural to reply that
value is possessed intrinsically by the total complex object-in-relation-
to-interost. But the question has brought to light a fact that might
otherwise have escaped notice, the fact, namely, that value, like other
relational attributes, may be predicated in two ways. The subject of
the judgment may stand in the relation, or contain the relation.
Thus the predicate parallel may be predicated of one line in the sense
of being parallel to another, or of both lines in the sense of possessing
parallelism. When this peculiarity of relational predicates is ob-
served the difficulty concerning intrinsic values is, I think, removed.
Intrinsic value is possessed by the object-interest complex; extrinsic
value is possessed by the object itself or by any other factor or con-
Win'ds of Doctrine," page 147.
The argument is elaborated against a definition of ' 'right," but is ap-
plied also to "good." Cf. "Ethics," pages 111 ff., 164 ff.
23 Moore, ibid., pages 167 ff.
156 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
dition of the complex. Value may be predicated in either sense, as
possessed internally by the complex or relationship, and externally
by the object-term of the relationship.
Such are the arguments which Mr. Moore has urged against the
whole type of theory which I am now defending. A more numerous
army of critics would propose not to reject it, but to amend it. These
critics would propose in divers ways to define value as a limited class
of interest-fulfilments.
3. The type of theory to which we now turn asserts that what is
liked has value only in certain cases ; so that the bare psychological
fact of a particular liking is not in itself a guarantee of value. There
are several motives which lead to such a view. It is felt that the view
which I have been defending degrades value, or renders it too pro-
miscuous. Or the motive may be the demand for some standard by
which particular likings and dislikes may themselves be judged, by
which a good will may be distinguished from a bad, or a higher in-
terest from a lower. Or one may be moved by the fact that in cer-
tain notable cases, such as the moral consciousness, one's liking is
attended by a sense of some ulterior ground or sanction, by a recog-
nition that one's liking requires some support beyond itself in order
to give its object value. Or the view may result simply from a
transference to the realm of values of a general distinction between
appearance and reality. But there is perhaps one fundamental
motive after all : the desire, namely, to discover a criterion by which
superiority or inferiority shall be assigned to values themselves the
desire to justify a criticism of the natural or empirical values. It
seems to be necessary to provide for a scale or hierarchy in which
inclination shall be subordinated to duty, impulse to a "norm," or
enjoyment to an ideal. There is but one way in which this can be
accomplished without abandoning our present definition of value,
and that is by employing a quantitative scale. In such procedure no
new conception of value is introduced ; interest-fulfilments are merely
compounded and measured. If, on the other hand, interest-fulfil-
ments are judged higher or lower by some other standard, then that
ulterior standard is really definitive of value. Fulfilment of interest
becomes a general, but not sufficient characterization of interest.
Goodness will be that fulfilment of interest which conforms also to
the principle which defines the scale. In what follows I shall con-
tend that the superior interest fulfilments to which many writers
would confine value, are superior only in so far as greater, so that
there is in fact no resort to another principle.
We can not roll away this stone without uncovering a nest of
wriggling perplexities and ambiguities that may well terrify us. But
I shall hope to introduce a few clarifying distinctions. The most
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 157
fundamental distinction is between those views which would pro-
pose to define some specific complex type of interest as alone capable
of endowing its objects with value, and those views which would
look to the presupposition of interest and confine value to the cases
in which these presuppositions are true. The first class of views
might be termed ontological, the second epistemological or "axiolog-
ical ' ' in method.
(1) To the first class would belong, for example, the view that
value is confined to objects of self-conscious desire or will, in which
the agent desires the object as an extension or expression of himself.
Desire of this sort does exist. It is possible for me to try on the
various alternatives of choice before the mirror of my imagination,
and to select that in which I like myself best. But Green and others
have, I believe, attached too much importance to self-conscious
desire. 24 They seem to me to be seriously mistaken in thinking that
this is the distinguishing feature of volition. Choice is not, it is
true, a mere survival from a scramble of impulses; the dominant
factor in choice is undoubtedly something which may properly be
called the self. The system of the individual's interests comes for-
ward in the interval of deliberative suspense and assumes command.
But the extent to which the factor of self-objectification is present
is accidental and idiosyncratic. It may signify a habit of self-
examination, a peculiarly developed visual or social imagination, or
even a mere awkwardness and vanity.
It is certainly more plausible to argue that value is restricted to
the satisfaction of one's whole self, whether objectified or not, but
in any case distinguished from the momentary impulse. Good would
then be that which satisfies a person thoroughly or fundamentally or
permanently, after every interest has had an opportunity through
reflection of making its claims count. But if one asks why this sort
of interest-fulfilment deserves precedence of the fulfilment of iso-
lated or momentary impulses, for my part I can find only one
answer. It is because it is a more conserving and fruitful fulfil-
ment of an aggregate of interests than is possible when these interests
are unorganized. The organized fulfilment of a self is better than
the disorderly indulgence of its several impulses, on the ground that
the fulfilment of interest as such is good, and therefore the more the
better. In other words this view virtually assumes and applies the
view which we have been defending, and extends it quantitatively.
This assumption is even clearer when it is proposed to limit the
good to that which satisfies the peculiar human interest or preroga-
* C/. Green, "Prolegomena," pages 118, 154, 171; Mackenzie, "Notes on
the Theory of Value," Mind, N. S., Vol. IV., and "Introduction to Social Phi-
losophy, ' ' second edition, pages 266 ff .
158 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
live. This may mean that since good is interest-fulfilment it is pos-
sible to name kinds of good after the interest affected. There is the
animal good and the human good, the male and the female, the intel-
lectual and the esthetic, yours and mine, and as many others as there
are types or groups of interests that anyone has occasion to enu-
merate. Surely it would be arbitrary to select any one of these and
name it the good to the exclusion of the rest. But one may have in
mind as the peculiar interest of man the endeavor to systematize and
maximize all interests. Man's end is the good because man conceives
and aspires to the total or superlative good. In this case it is not
man 's interest as such that is the determinant of the good, but man 's
interest as the vehicle or representation of all interests. Here again,
however, the good is interest-fulfilment as such, and goods are ac-
credited or disparaged in respect of the degree or measure of such
fulfilment, rather than by appeal to an independent principle.
Similarly the good may be defined in terms of collective interest,
as the fulfilment of the demand of .a community rather than of an in-
dividual. Here again I see no ground on which such a "higher"
interest can be regarded as more legitimate, more properly significant
of value, save that it signifies a greater measure of fulfilment than
does a private interest. Similarly an interest may be cooperative
with collateral and ulterior interests, either within the personal life
or within society. On the assumption that interest- fulfilment as such
is good, the value of consistent or harmonious fulfilment is enhanced
by its indirect fruitfulness or innocence. Otherwise I see no reason
why it should be selected as peculiarly significant of value.
And finally a universal will or absolute will, or will of God, would
possess no peculiar claims were it not either a collective will or a co-
operative will. The universal will may be taken to mean the formal
identity of all wills the will-character as such. But one must be
careful not to speak of this as though it were itself a special case of
will. It can not itself define a type of will-fulfilment, for there is,
strictly speaking, no such will. There is a will for this and a will for
that, but no will in general save as the abstraction common to the two.
To define value in terms of the fulfilment of this would be equivalent
to attributing value to the fulfilment of any will. In other words, all
wills equally exemplify the general nature will, and all fulfilments
equally exemplify the generic fulfilment. On the other hand, if the
universal will were taken to mean a common will, then, even were
there such a thing, it could have no claim to precedence except on
quantitative grounds. Indeed it is quite conceivable that a common
will, such as the will for property, might prove inconsistent with the
most harmonious and beneficent system of life. There is certainly a
sense in which progress tends away from sameness of interests in
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 159
the direction of differentiation and adjustment. Nor again is there any
peculiar magic in the will that there shall be a universe. 25 It has
been thought that such a will must underlie every will, and its fulfil-
ment be the primitive value from which all others are derived. But
to any unsophisticated mind it must appear that such a will is pe-
culiarly rare and exotic. The will to know is a more important and
substantial interest. But neither of these interests, assuming both to
exist, is in any sense original or prior to all other interests. It is in-
correct to argue that he who wills that there be a universe, or who
wills to know, wills all that is implied in the concepts "universe" or
""knowledge." So that even if it were possible to deduce all values
from these concepts they would not have been deduced from the in-
terest itself. But so far as I know, no such deduction has been suc-
cessfully completed.
A universal will that would be entitled to preeminence in deter-
mining values would be a will that took up into itself or facilitated
all interests. But then its preeminence would be based on the as-
sumption of the value of all interest-fulfilment, and would signify
simply the comparative value of more and the superlative value of
most. In short, there is no specific kind of interest personal, social,
or metaphysical that can be said to determine value exclusively ; or
even preeminently, save in so far as it sums or enhances the fulfil-
ment of more limited interests.
I have reserved for the last a type of interest that will serve us as
a means of transition to our second class of views. It may be said
that only those interests determine values which contain expressly
or implicitly a reference to some ground beyond themselves. The
, real significance of interests of this class lies in the fact that they may
be in some sense tested by an appeal to their grounds, and I shall
therefore discuss them in that connection.
(2) To my mind the most important discoveries of such writers
as Meinoiii:, Ehrenfels, Urban, and others have to do with the so-
called "presuppositions" underlying interests of a certain type.
These presuppositions or constructions fall into two classes. First,
there are certain presuppositions concerning the state of the object
or its relation to other objects. Thus I may be happy in the thought
of my friend, on the presupposition that he exists. I may admire the
painting on the supposition that Titian painted it, the statue on the
ground that it is made of marble, or the lace on the ground that it
was made by hand. Or I may desire the medicine on the supposition
that it will cure my cold. In all of these cases I construe my object,
and my liking or dislike of it is contingent on this construction.
Second, there are certain presuppositions concerning the relation of
25 MUristerberg, "Philosophic der Werte, " page 74.
160
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the object, or the interest itself, to other interests. Thus I may desire
an education on the supposition that it is consistent with my general
purpose of efficiency, or condemn the act of theft on the assumption
that God condemns it, or admire the poem on the supposition that it
must rejoice all persons of taste, or approve my act with the convic-
tion that any judge must confirm my judgment. Assumption or
''postulates" of this second class afford the best definition of that
troublesome word "norm. " 26 My interest is normative in so far as
it is determined or controlled by the acknowledgment of a confirm-
ing interest in some sense superior to my own.
Now it is evident that a value may be tested by determining the truth
or falsity of the assumptions which mediate it. If I call a mediated or
constructive liking or disliking a valuation, I may validate or invali-
date a valuation according as I find it to be well-grounded or based
upon a misconception of the situation. If it turns out that the statue
was of plaster and the lace machine made, I shall cease to like them.
And, similarly, if I am convinced that God wills otherwise, I shall
cease to condemn the theft; or if I discover that education is incon-
sistent with efficiency I shall cease to value it. On the other hand,
when the grounds of any valuation are translated into conscious
judgments and proved true, the valuation is verified and confirmed.
A valuation that is undisturbed and fortified by increased light is in
a special sense >a true valuation or a genuine value. We must be on
our guard against a natural confusion. There are two entirely dis-
tinct senses in which a liking may be true, or a value genuine. On
the one hand, it may be true that I like the Mona Lisa; and in this
case, on the hypothesis that a thing liked has value, the Mona Lisa is
a genuine value. On the other hand, I may like it because it was
painted by Leonardo, and since it is true that it was painted by
Leonardo the value is founded on a correct belief. In other words,
a value may be the object of a true judgment or founded on a true
judgment.
I recognize the importance of distinguishing as a class of values
those which are well grounded. And it is even evident that they are
superior. But this superiority turns out to mean, I think, that they
are greater. For example, they are more durable. It is evident also
that in many cases they are multiple. If I desire the medicine on the
ground that it will cure my cold, in getting it I get two things that I
want, the medicine and the cure. A value founded on truth is both
hardier and more prolific. And there is the truth value itself to be
added besides. Or the presupposition may assert a fact or relation
that is itself constitutive of value, so that if the presupposition is
true, that value is added. But these merits can not be defined with-
26 Cf. Urban, "Valuation," page 18.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 161
out assuming that the value founded on ignorance or error possesses
the same in smaller measure. And the same holds of the so-called
normative attitudes. If I approve of honesty with a sense of the
backing of the community, or the confirming opinion of the disin-
terested spectator, I may be well- or ill-advised. If I be ill-advised,
then honesty has value in my eyes only ; if I be well-advised it has a
greater value for fulfiling more than my individual interest. But if
it be good that an act should be generally approved, it is only less
good that it should be privately approved. Furthermore, in so far
as my liking is conditioned by the coincidence of social opinion or a
Divine Will, then if these truly agree my liking is more durable, is
guaranteed against the menace of disillusionment. In either case the
superiority of a value founded on true presuppositions is quantita-
tive ; it signifies more of interest fulfilment and not value of a differ-
ent and more fundamental order.
Now that I have penetrated so far into this forbidden land of
epistemolo^ry, let me add one further point. I find this whole aspect
of values confused through a careless use of the term " judgment. "
An act of liking, especially when it is reflective and mediated, when,
in other words, it is conscious of itself and of its grounds, is often
spoken of as the " judgment of value." And it is commonly believed
that we have to do here with a unique sort of judgment. But this
belief is due to a lack of analysis. It is unique only in that it is com-
plex. If I consciously like the Mona Lisa on the conscious supposi-
tion that it is the work of Leonardo I may be said to judge twice.
First, I judge that I like the picture. There is nothing peculiar
about this judgment. It is like the judgment that I see stars. And it
differs from your judgment that I like the picture, only in that it may
be said to reflect a more immediate or certain experience of the
fact. I can see good reasons for regarding this as a judgment of
value, but none for regarding it as unique. Second, I judge that
Leonardo painted the picture. There is nothing peculiar about this
judgment. You might have made it ; and it is in all formal respects
like my judgment that heat causes water to boil. I see no reasons
for regarding this as in any sense a judgment of value. It simply
happens to condition the existence of a value. In addition to these
two judgment^ my complex state of mind contains my liking of the
picture. This is the central fact, but it is no more a judgment than
my entering the Louvre to see the picture. It constitutes the value,
but does not judge it, and determines the truth or falsity of a judg-
ment that I like it, but is not itself true or false.. Mix these three
things thoroughly and you have your normative or appreciative
consciousness, possessing at once the infallibility of fact, the truth-
162
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
claim of a judgment, and the virtuality and vague ulterior refer-
ence of a presupposition!
RALPH BARTON PERRY.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
RECENT STUDIES OF BODILY EFFECTS OF FEAR,
RAGE, AND PAIN 1
DURING the past three years a series of investigations has been
carried on in the Harvard Physiological Laboratory with the
object of securing further insight into bodily changes accompanying
pain and the major emotions. This work was the outgrowth of an
interest in the inhibitory effect of pain and emotional excitement on
digestive processes. The disturbances of digestion attending these
affective states may considerably outlast the period of obvious excite-
ment. 2 What might be the occasion for the continuance of emotional
disturbance in the body so long after the emotion-producing object
has disappeared?
A suggestion that seemed reasonable was that the state of excita-
tion was continued by secretion of the adrenal glands. These small
bodies pour into the blood-stream a substance (adrenin, adrenalin,
epinephrin) which exerts on structures innervated by the sympa-
thetic nerves the same effects as are produced by impulses passing
along those nerves. Thus the injection of adrenin will cause dilata-
tion of the pupil, erection of hairs, inhibition of the movements of
the alimentary canal, and other well-known consequences of sympa-
thetic stimulation. But these glands are themselves stimulated by
nerve impulses passing out by sympathetic pathways. It might be,
therefore, that the bodily changes accompanying emotional excite-
ment are produced initially by nerve impulses, that these impulses
also rouse secretion of the adrenal glands, and that this secretion
circulating in the blood continues by chemical influence changes
nervously initiated.
By using as an indicator a strip of intestinal muscle, sensitive to
adrenin in dilutions 1:20,000,000 parts, we were able to show that
when a dog barks at a cat, and the cat reacts by signs of terror or by
a raging counter attack, the cat's blood, taken near the opening of
the adrenal veins, contains an increased adrenal secretion. 3 Further-
1 A summary of remarks made at the meeting of the American Psycholog-
ical Association, New Haven, December 31, 1913.
2 See Cannon, ' ' The Mechanical Factors of Digestion, ' ' London and New
York, 1911, page 217; also American Journal of the Medical Sciences, 1909,
CXXXVIL, page 480.
3 See Cannon and de la Paz, American Journal of Physiology, 1911,
XXVIII., page 64.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 163
more, stimulation in an anesthetized animal of afferent nerves which,
if stimulated in the conscious animal would cause pain, likewise
evoked an increased secretion from the adrenal glands. 4 Pain, there-
fore, and such major emotions as fear and rage are accompanied by
the discharge of a substance which can cause further excitation of
organs innervated by the sympathetic system.
Certain remarkable effects of injecting adrenin have for many
years been known. For example, it will cause liberation of sugar
from the liver into the blood to such an extent that the sugar may
appear in the urine (glycosuria). It will drive the blood from the
abdominal viscera into the heart, lungs, central nervous system, and
the limbs. It seems to act as an antidote to muscular fatigue. And
it renders more rapid the coagulation of blood. The question at
once arose after our first observations, does the adrenal secretion
poured out in pain and emotional excitement likewise produce these
effects? Our later researches have been concerned with answers
to this question.
Emotional excitement and "painful" stimulation were proved to
be accompanied by glycosuria. If a caged cat is frightened or made
angry by a barking dog it is likely to be glycosuric. Students after
a hard examination, and football players after a thrilling contest,
also have, in many instances, glycosuria. 5 The mere handling of a
rabbit preparatory to an operation may nearly triple the sugar con-
tent of its blood.
If a muscle is fatigued, the threshold of irritability rises. It may
rise as much as 600 per cent., but the average increase is approxi-
mately 200 per cent. If the fatigued muscle is allowed to rest, the
former irritability is gradually regained, though two hours may
pass before the recovery is complete. If a small dose of adrenalin is
injected intravenously, or the adrenal glands are stimulated to
secrete, we have found that the former irritability of the fatigued
muscle may be recovered within three minutes. In this way adrenal
secretion may largely restore efficiency after fatigue. 6
Fear and anger as well as worry and distress are attended, as
already stated, by cessation of the contractions of the stomach and
int< These mental states also reduce or temporarily abolish
the sorrvtion of gastric juice. Adrenin injected into the body has
the same t-fTVct. Besides checking the functions of the alimentary
canal, adivnin drives out the blood which, during digestive activity,
e Cannon and Hoskins, American Journal of Physiology, 1911, XXIX,
page 274.
5 See Cannon, Shohl, and Wright, American Journal of Physiology, 1911,
, X., page 280; Cannon, ibid., 1914, XXXIIL, page 359.
See Cannon and Nice, American Journal of Physiology, 1913, XXXII., page
44; Gniber, ibid., 1914, XXXIIL, page 354.
164 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
floods the abdominal viscera. This blood flows all the more rapidly
and abundantly through the heart, the lungs, the central nervous
system, and the limbs. 7
If adrenin is injected in very minute amounts into the blood, the
time which intervenes between removal of blood from the vessels and
its clotting is greatly reduced. The same hastening of coagulation
is observed if splanchnic impulses are excited, or an afferent nerve
(e. g., the sciatic) is stimulated in a decerebrate animal, or if the
animal is roused to fear or anger. The clotting time which, by the
method used, was usually four or five minutes, was in some instances
reduced to half a minute. 8
These profound effects of pain and fear and rage are not in the
slightest degree directly subject to voluntary action. They are
rather of the nature of reflexes, for they appear promptly, and re-
sult from impulses which traverse pathways already prepared in
the nervous organization of the individual. Since the effects are
reflex in character, and since reflexes are responses commonly useful
to the body, it is pertinent to enquire regarding the utility of the
changes above described.
The clue which gives these responses significance is found in con-
sidering the conditions which would accompany fear or great anger
or pain. McDougall has pointed out the relation between these effect-
ive states and certain instincts. Thus fear is associated with the
instinct to run, anger with the instinct to fight. 9 The emotions in
wild life would be roused in the presence of prey or the enemy
a situation that would not unnaturally involve both the pursuer
and the pursued in a desperate run or a fight. In case of combat
pain would add to the stimulus of the emotion, and thus there might
ensue a supreme and prolonged struggle.
Under such circumstances the liberated sugar would be service-
able for the laboring muscles, for it is known to be the elective source
of muscular energy. The adrenal secretion, by abolishing the effects
of fatigue, would place the muscles unqualifiedly at the disposal of
the nervous system. The shifting of the blood from the less insistent
viscera of the abdomen to the organs of utmost value in critical
physical struggle the heart, lungs, limbs, and nervous system
would be of the greatest service in assuring efficient action of these
organs. And if in the combat the vessels are injured, prompt clot-
ting of the blood might help to prevent dangerous bleeding.
7 See Biedl, "Innere Sekretion, " Second edition, Leipzig, 1913. Pages
434, 435.
s See Cannon and Mendenhall, American Journal of Physiology, 1914,
XXXIII. Proceedings of the American Physiological Society, Dec. 29, 1913.
9 McDougall, (l Introduction to Social Psychology," London, 1908. Pages
49, 59.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 165
The emotional reactions above described may each be interpreted,
therefore, as making the organism more efficient in the struggle
which fear or rage or pain may involve. And that organism which,
with the aid of adrenal secretion, best mobilizes its sugar, lessens its
muscular fatigue, sends its blood to the vitally important organs,
and provides against serious hemorrhage will stand the best chance
of surviving in the struggle for existence. 10
W. B. CANNON.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
The Scope of Formal Logic. A. T. SHEARMAN. London: University of
London Press. 1911. Pp. xiv-f-162.
In a previous work, " The Development of Symbolic Logic," Mr.
Shearman gave an account of the " older " work of Boole, Venn, Schroder,
etc., i. e., of the " pre-Peanesque logicians," as he is pleased to call them.
The present volume is, in a way, a continuation of the earlier one. It
gives a brief exposition of the logical work of Frege, Peano, and Bertrand
Russell. For by " Formal Logic " Mr. Shearman means here what has
been variously designated by the names " symbolic logic," " mathematical
logic," " algebra of logic," " symbol logic " (Mrs. Ladd-Franklin),
"logistic" (Couturat). This kind of logic has not yet found its fitting
name ; but it is " making history." The purpose of " The Scope of Formal
Logic " is to convince the reader of the importance of the work in this
field, and, without presupposing any familiarity with the writings of
Frege, Peano, Russell, to lead the uninitiated to these fountain-heads of
modern logical thought. In the first chapter a number of important
terms, such as " prepositional function," " variable," etc., are elucidated.
In the second chapter Frege's, Peano's, and Russell's symbols, or at least
some of the more frequent among them, are explained by translating
several propositions, some simple, some more complex, from their symbolic
statements into English. This is continued in the third chapter which
exhibits the methods of proof in " Formal Logic." Chapter IV. is devoted
to a treatment, by means of these symbolic methods, of opposition, con-
version, syllogism, etc., i. e., the usual subject-matter of ordinary logic.
Chapter V. shows "(1) that arithmetical notions and processes may be
replaced by logical notions and processes, (2) that geometrical notions and
processes may be similarly replaced, and (3) that general logic ought, for
scientific purposes, or to enable us to reach conclusions that have always
been supported by common sense, to be regarded as lying at the basis of
pure mathematics" (p. 130). The remaining two chapters are given over
to a " philosophical treatment of number " and of " space." The author
has given here more of his own thoughts, though he makes acknowledg-
1 For a detailed discussion of the interpretation here outlined see Cannon,
American Journal of Physiology, 1914, XXXIII., page 356.
166 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ment to Frege in the discussion of number, to Russell in that of space;
he tries " to indicate in a concrete manner the fact that the treatment of
number in the preceding chapters implicitly rests upon that conception of
number which is here set forth " (p. 131) [and similarly in the next chapter
with reference to the nature of space]. But the account is vague, and,
as it stands, has little direct connection with " Formal Logic." It is a
presentation of " views concerning number that are unfolded ~by philos-
ophy "* (p. 143) rather than a development of the subject by the methods
expounded in the previous chapters. The " modern logician " will, no
doubt, be greatly relieved to learn that his procedure is " in accordance
with the dictates of philosophy," 2 that his propositions " imply nothing at
variance with the teaching that is unfolded by philosophy" (p. 150), that
" the modern treatment of spatial problems . . . proceeds along the lines-
which philosophy sets forth as those which should be followed." 3 But
one would like to know what this mysterious and imperious " philosophy "
is, and whence it gets an authority over the results of " logic." The re-
viewer misses in these chapters a clean separation of logical from psycho-
logical problems. Take, for example, such statements as the following:
" Number is conceptual " because, amongst other reasons, " we are able
to deal with numbers in propositions without being able either to perceive
or to have a mental picture of any corresponding entities" (p. 132).
"If a concept possesses these three attributes I shall, since no other
species of mental entities or act of attention possesses them, take the three
to constitute the definition of a concept. A concept, that is to say, is a
mental entity or act of attention which (1) is such that we can ask con-
cerning it if there exist corresponding objects, (2) is not necessarily
accompanied by corresponding perceptual objects, and (3) may exist
without the possibility of there being corresponding percepts or images "
(p. 133, note) . The writer is evidently a champion of " imageless
thought " ; psychologists will be eager to have him present his experi-
mental evidence ; but " logicians," I mean " modern logicians," have no
concern with it; having enough problems of their own, they are, or should
be, no longer willing to spoil a good psychological problem by hasty and
dogmatic solutions on so-called " logical " grounds. " Psychological "
solutions of logical problems are beginning to be recognized as misleading ;
" logical " solutions of psychological problems are, at the present stage of
experimental psychology, pathetic.
Regarding " definitions," the author has not " fallen into line with the
new exponents of logic" (p. xi). "Mr. Russell . . . does not explain
how it is that definitions are used in the same way as assertions" (p. 27).
This point is well taken. But I do not see that Mr. Shearman has re-
moved the difficulty. His distinction between definitions in symbolic logic
and in philosophy in that the latter are " naturally selected," the former
" artificially selected " (pp. 28, 29) does not go to the root of the matter.
The current theories regarding the nature and function of definitions in
1 Italics are mine.
2 Page 145 ; cf. page 158. Italics mine.
8 Page 159; cf. pages 161, 162. Italics mine.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 167
logic, or any other deductive system, are at fault, and need reexamina-
tion, if we are to get rid of troubles of which the one pointed out by Mr.
Shearman is an example, and only an example. 4
KARL SCHMIDT.
TUFTS COLLEGE, MASS.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
MIND. October, 1913. Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Berg-
son. The Conception of " Real Duration " (pp. 465 i83) : ARTHUR O.
LOVEJOY. - The account of the nature of time as developed by Bergson was
not an innovation, but it had been earlier developed, and developed as
deductions from Kant, by Ravaisson, Dauriac, and Pillon. Life and Logic
(pp. 484-492) : H. WILDON CARR. - Mr. Bosanquet, in his recent Gifford
lectures, misinterprets M. Bergson's theory of the indeterminism of life,
fails to see that there is no opposition between his and Bergson's account
of the logical process, and furthermore fails to prove that logic is creative.
Idealism and the Reality of Time (pp. 493-508) : HUGH A. REYBURN. -
Against the current criticisms of idealism and absolutism it is maintained
that "not less but more system is required." Absolutists must recognize
that time is real, external, and has a place in the absolute. Criticizes in
detail Bosanquet, who fails to give due recognition to the externality and
reality of time. Pragmatic Realism The Five Attributes (pp. 509-525) :
JOHN E. BOODIN. - There are five " ultimate types of differences which
reality makes to our reflective conduct." These " summa genera in the
reflective evaluation of the character of our world " are stuff, time, space,
consciousness, and form. They are irreducible to terms of each other, yet
they all make a difference to our creative purposes. Discussions: Analysis
of Categorical Propositions (pp. 526-531) : E. E. C. JONES. The " Work-
ing " of Truths and Their " Criterion" (pp. 532-538) : F. C. S. SCHILLER.
On Metageometry and the Sense of Direction (pp. 539-543) : H. S.
SHELTON. Realism and Pragmatism (pp. 544548) : RALPH BARTON PERRY.
The Meaning of Kant's Copernican Analogy (pp. 549-551) : NORMAN
KEMP SMITH. Critical Notes: G. E. Moore, Ethics: H. P. COOKE.
O. Kiilpe, Die Realisierung : Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissen-
schaften: A. WOLF. D. L. Murray, Pragmatism: H. V. KNOX. J. Royce,
William James and Other Essays: R. F. A. HOERNLE. E. Boutroux,
William James: R. F. A. HOERNLE. L. Brunschvicg, Les E tapes de la
Philosophic Mathematique: P. E. B. JOURDAIN. Baron F. von Hiigel,
Eternal Life: A Study of Its Implications and Applications: A. F. TAYLOR.
New Books. Philosophical Periodicals. Notes and Correspondence.
* I have briefly stated my views on this point in a series of propositions
which were read at the Cambridge meeting of the American Philosophical Asso-
ciation in 1911 and published in the proceedings of that meeting. Philosophical
Review, Vol. XXI., pages 210 ff. I hope to publish a more detailed statement in
this JOURNAL at an early date.
168
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Giese, Fritz. Das Freie Literarische Schaffen bei Kindern und Jugend-
lichen. Leipzig : Verlag von J. A. Earth. 1914. Pp. xiv + 242. 14 M.
Papini, Giovanni. Sul Pragmatismo. Milano: Libreria Editrice
Milanese. 1913. Pp. xii + 163. 2.50 L.
NOTES AND NEWS
DR. ARTHUR H. PIERCE, professor of psychology at Smith College, died
at Northampton on February 20, at the age of 46. He was born in West-
boro, Massachusetts, and was the son of Samuel and Caroline (Tufts)
Pierce. One year after his graduation from Amherst College, in the class
of 1888, he was appointed Walker Instructor of Mathematics at his Alma
Mater. Two years later he went to Harvard to pursue the study of psy-
chology, and received in 1892 the degree of M.A. In 1893 he was appointed
the first Rufus B. Kellogg fellow at Amherst College, and pursued his
studies abroad for several years, returning to Amherst to lecture in accord-
ance with the terms of the fellowship. The results of his studies have
been published in a volume entitled " Studies in Space Perception." In
1899 he received the degree of Ph.D. from Harvard University, and in
1900 was appointed associate professor of psychology at Smith College.
He was secretary of the American Psychological Association for several
years, and was, at the time of his death, chief editor of the Psychological
Bulletin. He was Fellow of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science.
THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association
met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psychology of
the New York Academy of Sciences on Monday, February 23, at Princeton
University. The following papers were read : " Some Tests of Efficiency
in Telephone Operators," Dr. H. C. McComas ; " Transfer and Interference
in the Substitution Test," Professor H. A. Ruger ; " A Comparison of the
Effects of Strychnine and Caffeine on Mental and Motor Efficiency," Dr.
A. T. Poffenberger; "A Comparison of Stylus and Key in the Tapping
Test," Dr. H. L. Hollingworth ; " An Experimental Critique of the Binet-
Simon Scale," Mr. Carl C. Brigham ; " The Work Curve for Short Periods
of Intense Application," Professor R. S. Woodworth ; " Recall in Relation
to Retention," Dr. Garry C. Meyers.
PROFESSOR HENRI BERGSON, of the University of Paris, was recently
elected a member of the Academic frangaise.
HI
VOL. XL No. 7. MAKCH 26, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
SOME CRITICAL REMARKS ON ANALYTICAL REALISM
IN 1903 appeared Mr. Bertrand Russell's "Principles of Mathe-
matics," a book which has attracted widespread interest. It
had the merit of discussing in a fairly accurate and sometimes witty
manner the fundamental mathematical disciplines, such as geometry,
mechanics, arithmetic, and transfinite assemblages, and of attempting
to relate these subjects to a system of philosophy, namely, the
"pluralism" of Mr. G. E. Moore, "which regards the world, both
that of existents and that of entities, as composed of an infinite
number of mutually independent entities, with relations which are
ultimate and not reducible to adjectives of their terms or of the
whole which these compose. ' ' 1 Russell 's treatment has been called
neo-realism. 2 The mathematical advantage of this philosophical
position, Russel maintains, is that, unlike most current philosophies,
it allows mathematics to be true 3 in a sense which he has frequently
sought to explain in various articles and which need not be dwelt
upon further here. 4
As to his method Russell says: "Our method will be one of
analysis, and our problem may be called philosophical in the sense
that we seek to pass from the complex to the simple, from the demon-
strable to its indemonstrable premisses. ' ' Also Russell does not dis-
tinguish 5 between inference and deduction ; induction appears 6 to him
as "either disguised deduction or a mere method of making plausible
guesses." It is natural enough that he should find the relation of
i ' ' Principles of Mathematics, ' ' page viii.
zH. Dufumier, Eevue de Metaphysique et de Morale, Vol. 17 (1909),
page 620.
3 Loc. cit., page viii.
* Cf., for instance, ' ' The Problems of Philosophy, ' ' London ; also Russell 's
" Philosophical Essays," New York, 1910.
""The Principles of Mathematics," 1.
C/. also Monist, Vol. 23 (1913), pages 489-490.
169
170 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
whole and part (which had been previously discussed by De Morgan)
fundamental for his position ; indeed, he says that for the comprehen-
sion of analysis it is necessary to investigate this notion. 7
As might be expected from Russell's realism, his relational posi-
tion is the so-called external one, which is opposed to the internal
theories favored by idealists. An external relation is described as
one implying no complexity in either of the related terms. 8 Ac-
cording to him 9 there exist external relations because asymmetrical
relations are involved in Number, Quantity, Order, Space, Time
and Motion, and it is impossible for him to explain asymmetrical
relations on either of the usual theories of relation, i. e., the mon-
istic and the monadistic. 10 Concerning the external treatment of
relations, it is important to recognize a contention made by Russell
which, I think, has been supported 11 by Couturat : Russell implies that
his discussion may serve as an engine of discovery in actual mathe-
matics. 12
Russell was able to carry out his discussion, as a whole, largely
because he could avail himself of Peano's symbolic formulary of
mathematics, whose principles he freely incorporated into his book
and from whose mathematical content he drew much of his in-
spiration. 13
II
In recent years, a group of young philosophers, "six realists" as
they called themselves, has been engaged in controversy, notably
with Dewey. 14 Presumably as an outcome of their activities they
published a book last year, "The New Realism," consisting of six
essays. One of these, "A Defense of Analysis," by Professor E. G.
Spaulding, of Princeton, deals to a considerable extent with mathe-
matics and will receive critical consideration in the present paper.
Spaulding 's purpose is to defend the general realistic interpreta-
tion of whole and part, to classify wholes into certain types, and
to show that the analysis of each kind of whole does not lead to
falsification. 15 The kinds of wholes Spaulding discusses are four :
I. Collections in numerical conjunction.
II. Classes formed or composed of parts which are not classes, but
7 LOG. cit., page 11, note; cf. A. T. Shearman, "The Development of Symbolic
Logic," pages 203-205.
s LOG. tit., chapter XVI.
LOG. tit., page 224, paragraph 1.
10 LOG. tit., 216.
11 Cf. Monist, Vol. 22 (1912), page 524.
12 LOG. cit., page 24, 27.
is See Russell 's own statements, loc. cit., page 26, 31, and elsewhere.
14 This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII. (1911).
is "The New Realism," pages 155, 157, 168.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 171
which may be either organic wholes or individuals or simples or
collections.
III. Classes formed or composed of subordinate classes.
IV. Unities or organic wholes.
Each of these "wholes" or rather specific instances of the latter,
Spauldinjjr examines in turn, in order to establish the thesis that
analysis is the discovery of the parts of a whole and the organizing
relations which these parts sustain to each other. 16
Ill
1. It is not my intention to consider Spaulding's essay point by
point in detail and in the order of his article. I shall relate myself
to crucial philosophic statements and then consider such mathe-
matical errors as are typical.
A comparison of Spaulding's article with Russell's "Principles
of Mathematics" shows at once that he has tried to carry out the
Russell programme. Indeed, he has almost literally followed Russell
in many instances, especially as to mathematics, and, when he devi-
ates from Russell, frequently falls into errors of a very obvious
nature.
One of the first points that Spaulding 17 makes is that "all the
attacks on analysis are made by methods which themselves involve
analysis or are analytical." In testing the effectiveness of any philo-
sophical system, we have the right to investigate its utility (1) with
reference to known contents, (2) with reference to unsolved prob-
lems. As to the second consideration, we are asked to take the word
of the realists that their analysis is a means of discovery, but for
tangible evidence they, in effect, refer us to analyses of known con-
tents. Not being creative mathematicians themselves, it would be
well for the realists to note what means of discovery eminent mathe-
maticians employ to solve problems in research ; but then they would
find that the logical position of these investigators is very different
from their analytical realism. 18 When in the presence of an un-
solved problem even Russell abandons his method of analysis and
becomes as an examination will show typically inductive; thus
illustrating Dewey's remark 19 that a universal seems necessarily as-
i Loo. cit., pages 158, 161, 168. It is hardly necessary to recall Aristotle's
well-known comparison of a "whole" with an "organism."
IT Loc. cit., page 160.
18 (/. II. Poincar6 L'Enseignement Mathematique, Vol. 10 (1908), pages
357-371. This position of Poincar6 has been criticized by E. Borel, Revue du
Mow, Vol. 7 (1909), page 98. Further, G. Cantor has stated his own general j
tion to be Aristotelian realism. S t r Z< itxchrift fiir Philosophic, Vol. 91 (1887),
page 86.
19 Decennial Pub. of V. of C., Ser. 1, Vol. 3, page 122.
172
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
sociated with the existence of a problem. But even in the analysis
of known contents the realists are unable to free themselves from
inductive methods. Peirce has said that the syllogism involves an
element of observation, 20 and a similar remark may be made of all
deduction and of all analysis. It is also easy to recognize observa-
tional elements of Spaulding's discussion. 21 Spaulding compares the
points on a line, the instants of time, and the series of real numbers
and finds common properties. Similarly, the so-called "platform"
which the six realists have printed as an appendix to their book aims
to be a doctrine underlying the six essays which, as they frankly
admit, are not in complete agreement. This must be the reply, then,
to Spaulding's general criticism of the attacks on analysis.
2. Spaulding's attempted general refutation of the attacks on
analysis is incidental to his consideration of specific arguments that
analysis is identical with falsification. The instances of attacks upon
analysis which Spaulding controverts, hardly do justice to the
possibilities. One of these so-called model attacks 22 on analysis runs
as follows: "The analysis of space leads to terms which are not
spatial ; it leads from the extended, the dimensional, to the un extended,
the undimensional. ' ' Another attack 23 is stated thus: "Space . . .
is given empirically by intuition (or some such mode of direct ap-
proach) as a unitary continuous whole. But analysis leads to terms
or to parts of space which are discrete from one another." Spaul-
ding does not seem to realize 24 that to regard mathematical space as
the result of an analysis of a " whole ' ' is itself a false attitude ; such
a position refers to a preliminary, perceptual space rather than a
complete space as a concept. My contention is that the analysis of a
"whole" could never induce the mathematical space Spaulding im-
plies in his essay, but only a limited portion of this space. The prob-
lem of the genesis of one of those mathematical contents to which
the generic name geometry is applied is, of course, classic. 25 In the
heuristic development of space, as I conceive it, we have first pre-
sented to us a perceptual spatial content; in this perceptual "whole,"
"points" are perhaps spatial magnitudes, "lines" or "rods" are of
limited length and have thickness, "planes" or "plates" are of lim-
ited area and have thickness, etc. 26 Comparison of such perceptual
20 American Journal of Mathematics, Vol. 7 (1884-1885), page 182; cf. G.
H. Mead, Phil Eev., Vol. 9, pages 5-9.
21 For instance, on page 184 of his essay.
22 Spaulding, loc. cit., page 186.
23 Spaulding, loc. cit., page 186.
24 Loc. cit., pages 169, 187.
25 Cf. Holder, ' ' Auschauung und Denken in der Geometric, ' ' page 2.
26 Cf. Veronese, ' ' Grundlagen der Geometrie, ' ' pages 52-56, 225, 226, etc.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 173
spaces leads to the organization of what may be called a fragmentary
conceptual space. By a generalizing, constructive process in which
the principle of complete induction plays an important part, this
fragmentary space is completed. The completion may be effected in
a variety of ways and, indeed, we have at least three geometries,
viz., the Euclidean, the Lobatcheffskian, and the Riemannian. Be-
tween such completed spaces and the nai've, perceptual contents which
approximate the former, Spaulding has not properly discriminated;
nor does he seem to understand that the term "space" in mathe-
matics is rather superficial. In fact, "space" is a name applied to
many collections of mathematical elements, but its use is a mere
matter of convenience, not essential to mathematics. 27 As in the case
of space, so in regard to continuity, time, and motion ; Spaulding has
not properly recognized the conceptual constructive systems as dis-
tinguished 28 from the crude percepts which led to them (in part),
and these misunderstandings are quite sufficient to throw out any
argument based on them. The thesis that Spaulding and the other
realists should refute to show that analysis does not lead to falsifica-
tion may briefly be stated thus :
Let it be granted that there exist infinite 29 wholes; then it is not
possible to analyze such wholes without leading to contradictions.
Here is an opportunity for the realists to display their analytical
skill. It seems that Russell's analysis resulted in an antinomy, 30
which is strangely at variance with his statement 31 that analysis
gives us the truth and nothing but the truth.
3. In a future article I hope to discuss the nature of the whole-
part relation, its hypothetical and intuitive significances, etc. I wish
here merely to refer to that intuitive aspect of a whole which refers
to the parts into which the whole has been analyzed. Granted that a
whole has been successfully analyzed into parts, these parts represent
a specific choice and this choice is intuitive. There must, then, have
been a guiding principle associated with the analysis. Let me give
an example. In the case of a descriptive three-space there are at
least three analyses possible, each leading to an asymmetrical rela-
tion, namely, one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and three-dimen-
sional. For each analysis there exists a specific definition of be-
27 Cf. E. J. Wilczynski, Bull Am. Math. Soc., Vol. 19 (1913), pages
333-334.
28 Cf. J. Royce, ' ' The World and the Individual, ' ' Vol. I., pages 526-588.
2 Cf. Spaulding, loc. cit., pages 157, 201 ; Russell, loc. cit., Chap. XVII.
soioc. cit., 70, 78, 100, 344. This antinomy, by the way, like many
others, seems to have as underlying problem the interdependence of object and
act, clearly recognized by Plato, ' ' Parmenides, " 135, etc.; "Phsedo, " 73.
si Loc. cit., page 141.
174
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tweenness. 32 Kussell and Spaulding have taken account of only one
analysis and only one definition of betweenness. Now what is to
guide us in adopting one analysis rather than another? Russell has
touched 33 upon this question:
"It is important to observe that the definition of a space, as of
most other entities of a certain complexity, is arbitrary within cer-
tain limits. . . . For example, in place of defining the line by a re-
lation between points, it is possible to define the line as a class hav-
ing a certain relation to a couple of points. In such cases we can
only be guided by motives of simplicity."
It would be interesting to know what Russell 34 means by ll mo-
tives of simplicity," and it is hard to see what test of simplicity of
parts there can be other than " satisfactory functioning." This
practical test, indeed, enables us to make a choice of the three analyses
mentioned above. A three-dimensional analysis of three-space finds
its justification in its relevance to the foundations of vector analysis
and the application of the latter to mechanics and physics. 35 The
geometric example just cited shows that analysis requires intuitive
control, and this control must prevent irrelevant analyses or con-
sideration of irrelevant contents. This deficiency suggests that
Russell tends towards scholasticism. What Green 36 says of the Aris-
totelian logic is not without application to Russell and Spaulding :
"Thus the Aristotelian or syllogistic logic earns the reproach of
consisting in a series of verbal propositions. It represents neither
a method of arriving at knowledge nor the system of ideas which
constitute the known world . . . but is merely of use in analyzing what
is involved in conceded general propositions. . . . Hence its use by
the Schoolmen. They did not want a method of arriving at truth nor
a theory of what knowledge consists in. ... As a rule for securing
consistency in the interpretation and application of general terms,
syllogistic logic has its value. ' '
While, of course, Russell's position, like that of Boole and De
Morgan, 37 occupies broader ground than the syllogistic logic, yet I
think that the criticism just quoted suggests a fundamental defect of
Russell and Spaulding. This view (as to Russell) finds' support in
S2 Amer. Jour, of Math., 1909, page 365.
33 Loc. tit., page 432.
34 C/. "Principles of Mathematics," page 251, last lines; page 379, para-
graph 4.
35 Cf. Amer. Jour. Math., 1913, pages 37-56.
36 ^ Philosophical Essays," Vol. II., page 160.
37 Both Boole and De Morgan recognized the inadequacy of the syllogistic
logic. Cf. "Laws of Thought," page 10, and Comb. Phil. Trans., 1864, page 335.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 175
an able survey 38 of Russell's " Principles of Mathematics" by Hauss-
dorff. The latter says:
''A scholastic acuteness which perceives imaginary problems and
neglects real difficulties, celebrates in Russell's book orgies of sub-
tlety. ' ' Again, he says :
"In Russell's book are two conflicting tendencies, viz., the for-
malistic, nominalistic, and one opposite to this for which it is diffi-
cult to find a name ; an a priori tendency, realistic in the medieval
sense, which would force us to discriminate, in a definite manner,
between what is fundamental and what is derived and leads us to
hair-splitting decisions in matters which are purely definitional."
To review briefly ; the realistic position of Spaulding and Russell
is insufficient to account for "wholes," in particular, those of a
mathematical nature; it is inadequate, too, in the control of content
if we admit that a whole has been successfully analyzed. The test of
ultimacy of an analysis into parts must be found in the satisfactory
functioning of these parts. For evidence of irrelevant analyses we
have only to turn to Russell 's book which seems to indicate ignorance
on the part of the author of the practical needs of mathematics
and logic.
4. The ultimacy of analysis which formed the subject of the pre-
ceding section suggests examination of the Russell-Spaulding treat-
ment of asymmetrical relations and their general theory of relation.
Spaulding, 39 citing Russell, 40 says that asymmetrical relations are
unintelligible on any other theory than that of external relations;
and to justify this statement Russell examines 41 the monistic and
monadistic theories of relation and concludes, at least to his own
satisfaction, that they are inadequate. Russell has given asymmet-
rical relations great prominence in his book. In every argument, if
he has an opportunity, he leads his readers to an asymmetrical rela-
tion. The theory of magnitude, when based on transitive, symmet-
rical relations seems to Russell paradoxical and complicated ; asym-
metrical relations provide a simple and consistent theory; geometric
order is generated by an asymmetrical relation and similarly in re-
gard to time and motion. 42 Now the question may fairly be asked:
Are asymmetrical relations indispensable from a practical stand-
point ? Of asymmetrical relations in general Royce 43 says :
'The contrast between symmetrical and unsymmetrical relations
38 Vierteljahrschrift fur wiss. Phil. u. Soz., Vol. 29 (1905), pages 119-124.
39 Cf. Spaulding, loc. tit., page 176, note.
40 Bussell, loc. cit., 216.
41 Kussell, loc. cit., 212-215.
42 Cf. Russell, loc. tit., 154-157; 206-207; 441, 446.
43 Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 6 (1905), pages
358-359.
176
THE JOVENAL OF PHILOSOPHY
seems, to the ordinary view, absolute. Mr. Eussell, in his late volume,
so treats it. ... In symbolic logic, however, a symmetrical copula,
namely, that of ' inconsistency' or of ' opposition' can be made to
accomplish all the work of the ordinary unsymmetrical copula <.
In other words, if I have otherwise defined the meaning of 'not,'
the statement 'x is inconsistent with not-?/' means the same as
( x implies 2/.' The copula in the former case is symmetrical, in the
latter unsymmetrical. ' '
But also mathematically there is no valid reason why we should
regard an asymmetrical relation more ultimate than a symmet-
rical one. A line may be generated by a transitive asymmet-
rical relation 44 between points, i. e., a relation of the type
aRb implies not bRa,
aRb and bRc imply aRc,
or a transitive symmetrical relation 45 between dyads, i. e., a relation of
the type
abKcd implies cdKab,
abKcd and cdKef imply abKef.
Eussell curiously infers from the definition of asymmetrical relations
on the basis of the symmetrical that the latter are not essential. 46
Why? By applying an analogous argument to asymmetrical rela-
tions we might easily prove that these are non-essential. For ex-
ample we can define 47
abKcd means (aRb and cRd) or (bRa and dRc).
In the second case we have transitiveness and symmetry on the basis
of asymmetrical relations. In geometry we should say that the two
methods of generating space are equivalent. If we consider w-dimen-
sional space generated linearly (n > 1) an infinite class of transitive
asymmetrical relations is required, 48 while a single transitive sym-
metrical relation suffices. Thus there exists in this case a practical
reason for preferring transitive symmetrical relations. Russell's re-
duction of the latter to asymmetrical relations, by the way, is ef-
fected through a ' ' principle of abstraction, ' ' closely allied to Peano 's
''definition by abstraction" which Yailati has characterized as prag-
matic. 49 From a practical mathematical standpoint I am unable,
44 Cf. American Journal of Mathematics, Vol. 31, page 378.
45 Cf. Amer. Jour, of Math., loc. tit., page 394.
46 Cf. Eussell, loc. tit., page 235.
47 Cf. Russell's view of "and" as a relation, loc. tit., page 71.
48 Cf. Eussell, loc. tit., page 395.
49 Cf. G. Vailati, " Pragmatism and Mathematical Logic," Monist, Vol. 16,
page 487. Eussell uses the principle of abstraction throughout his book; see espe-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 177
then, to verify that absolute position asymmetrical relations enjoy in
Russell's book.
5. Before considering the possibility of constructing an internal
theory of relations, including the asymmetrical, it will be useful to
exhibit some of the inconsistencies and vagaries in the Russell-
Spaulding external theory. We notice, for example, an arbitrariness
and uncertainty on the part of Russell and Spaulding concerning par-
ticular relations. Russell says : ' ' It seems best to regard and 50 as ex-
pressing a definite unique kind of combination, not a relation."
Spaulding, 51 on the other hand, assumes that and does express a rela-
tion. Again Russell explicitly assumes 52 that membership of a term in
a class is a relation, and this assumption leads 53 him to affirm that
some relations which hold between a term and itself are not necessar-
ily symmetrical, a statement which seems formally undesirable.
Concerning identity Russell 54 says frankly:
"The question whether identity is or is not a relation and even
whether there is such a concept at all 55 is not easy to answer. For
it may be said identity can not be a relation since where it is truly
asserted we have only one term, whereas two terms are required for
a relation. . . . Identity must be admitted and the difficulty as to
the two terms of a relation must be met by a sheer denial that two
different terms are necessary." The conclusion that must here be
drawn is that identity, as a relation, has a very dubious existence.
And if identity, as a relation, is in question, the same must be said of
difference, because the interdependence of identity and difference
is, I think, fairly well recognized. 56 Lastly, I observe that Russell
has arbitrarily assumed 57 that a sensed couple involves a relation :
: ' It may be doubted whether there is any such entity as the sensed
couple, and yet such phrases as ' R is a relation holding from a to & '
seem to show that its rejection would lead to paradoxes."
'It would seem, viewing the matter philosophically, that sense
cially loc. tit., page 519; compare also page 51. See also Gr. Vailati, Eevue du
Mois, Vol. 3, 1907, pages 162-185.
50 The term ' ' and ' ' has a far more pregnant meaning in symbolic logic than
Eussell recognizes (loc. cit., 71, 98). Consider, for instance, the definition,
given above, of the relation of abKcd in terms of the relation aElt.
51 Loc. cit., page 162.
52 Cf. Eussell, loc. cit., 21, 26, 30, 53, 68, 69, 76-78, 125, (cf. 491); see
also pages 25, 167.
53 Cf. Eussell, loc. cit., 30, 57, 76, 79, 94, 95.
54 Loc. cit., pages 63-64.
ss On page 96, loc. cit., Eussell says : ' ' Self -identity is plainly a relation, ' '
but on page 163 expresses doubt about identity being a relation.
5 Cf. for instance, Bradley, "Appearance and Eeality," 2d edition, pages
585, 617, etc.
57 Loc. cit., pages 87-88; 99 (cf. page 25); 512, note; 107, note.
178
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
can only be derived from some relational proposition. ' ' Russell thus
seems by no means certain that the sensed couple involves a relation.
If one assumes that identity and diversity are not relations, 68
that possession of a trait does not express relation, 59 that reference 60
to a term is non-relational, and that no relation is involved in a
sensed couple or rather functional ordered^ dyad (x y), then it
seems possible to explain asymmetrical relations on an internal basis.
I will mention briefly how this might be done. As a standard form
of a binary functional relation, I assume xRy, that is, "x possesses
R with reference to y" a relation between x and y arises, then, if
the term x possesses a mark or trait with reference to the term y.
Now I assume that xRy is always equivalent 62 to (xy)R l (xy) where
(xy) is a functional ordered dyad, and that R is symmetrical, i. e.,
(xy) and its repetition may be interchanged. Therefore the pre-
ceding interpretation suggests that a binary relation may be gene-
rated by comparing an ordered dyad (xy} with its repetition; one
has xRy if, and only if, (xy} possesses R with reference to itself, or
(xy) and its repetition possess a common mark or 63 the dyad (xy)
and its repetition are " relatively equal" with reference to a mark.
It should be observed that the equivalence of xRy and (xy)R^(xy)
involves subtle distinctions in Russell's external theory of relation;
it has as underlying problems the analysis of a reflexive relation 64
and the relation of the class of all propositions of the form xRy to the
associated pro positional function of two variables, <l>(x, y). G5 This
preceding internal theory seems consistent, but contradicts 66 several
ss Cf. Bradley, loc. cit., page 582.
59 Russell, loc. cit., 53, 79, also 425, 426.
eo Russell, loc. cit., 214. In the above I conceive of ''trait" not merely as
something that may be possessed by a term, but also as something that is
relevant to some term (cf. Russell, loc. cit., 81, 82). Reference, or rather
relevance, is a preliminary that may lead to relation. On "relevance" see
Schiller, Mind, 1912.
ei See Amer. Jour, of Math., Vol. 31, pages 370, 375.
62 As tending to illustrate this equivalence consider "x = y" and "x y
= x y, x y = Q.
63 Cf, Veronese, 1 1 Grundziige der Geometric, ' ' pages 2-5.
64 Cf. Russell, loc. cit., page 86, paragraph 2.
65 It seems possible to approach the above equivalence on the Russell basis
by saying (cf. Russell, loc. cit., page 85, paragraph 2 and 74) (xRy}e<t>(x, y),
or if one is thinking of a functional ordered dyad underlying xEy one
has (x, y)e<p(x, y}, as equivalent to the former symbolic statement. Now
(x, y)e(f>(x, y) expresses a relation of a class to a class of which it is the
only member, viz., a class of couples (x, y) to the associated propositional func-
tion 0(#, y}. One might, therefore, conveniently express (xy)c<f>(x, y) in terms
of a single (relational) symbol and get (xy)E 1 (xy). Compare also A. T. Shear-
man, Mind, 1907, page 260.
66 I assume that subject-predicate propositions are reducible to the standard,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 179
of Russell 's controversial assumptions concerning relation and class. 67
It seems plausible, therefore, to modify the monistic and monadis-
tic theories of relation so as to yield, formally at least, an unobjection-
able internal 08 theory. Against Russell 's external theory, it might be
urged that the external theory assumes 69 the definition of the general
effectiveness of a relation :
"The relation affirmed between A and B in the proposition { A
differs from B' is the general relation of difference and is precisely
and numerically the same as the relation affirmed between C and D
in ' C differs from D. ' And this doctrine must be held to be true of
all other relations; relations do not have instances, but are strictly
the same in all propositions in which they occur. ' '
In my opinion a more correct statement would be that general
concepts of relation are limit concepts to which classes of specific
instances of relation sometimes tend. Aside from this, however, it
may be questioned whether Russell has succeeded in entirely avoid-
ing relations as specific instances. What I suspect to be a disguised
internal relation is Russell's "measurable relation between two vec-
tors" which he describes 70 as follows: "To say that the relation is
measurable in terms of real numbers means . . . that all such relations
have a (1, 1) relation to some or all real numbers." From the stand-
point of the correspondence with real numbers it seems altogether
likely that we are concerned here with specific relational instances
in which the terms related are peculiarly involved. A precisely
analogous relational problem occurs elsewhere in the abstract mathe-
matical science of Grassmann, the Ausdeknungslehre which has
geometry and mechanics for particular applications. On the intro-
duction of the number system into his discipline Grassmann states 71
explicitly: "The numerical magnitude as developed in our science
does not appear as discrete number, i. e., not as a set of units,
but ... as a quotient of continuous magnitudes and therefore does
not at all presuppose the discrete conception." This conception of
number, regarded in a certain way as a foundation for a general
theory, may have its limitations; nevertheless, its use is, I think,
equivalent forms, "a possesses M," "a belongs to C," "0 affects a," where
M, C, may lead to a relation, class, operation, respectively. See Eussell, loc.
tit., 57, 79.
67 See, for instance, "Principles of Mathematics," page 167, paragraph 1.
08 I do not wish to imply here that I uphold a purely internal theory of re-
lation. On the contrary neither an internal theory nor an external theory, in
itself, appears to me adequate.
69 Russell, loc. cit., 55, page 51.
TO Lot. cit., page 433.
71 Cf. Gesammelte WerTce, Vol. I., page 138.
180
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
amply justified in Grassmann's Extensive Algebra and constitutes a
serious difficulty in the purely external theory of relation.
6. Reverting for a moment to the falsification of analysis, I may
be permitted to indicate how conflict, which is the source of embar-
rassment to analytical realists, is employed to advantage in the
pragmatic position. To have recognized the fundamental part of
conflict in the process of knowledge is, I believe, one of the great
merits of pragmatism. 72 This philosophy, at least in regard to con-
flict, seems more nearly in accord with the facts of mathematics as an
incomplete science than analytical realism. Let me review briefly a
few important instances of conflict in the history of mathematics and
the developments to which they have given rise. It is proper here to
quote Hilbert : 73
' ' In modern mathematics the question of the impossibility of solu-
tion of certain problems plays an important role and the attempts
made to answer such questions have often been the occasion of dis-
covering new and fruitful fields for research. We recall . . . the
demonstration by Abel of the impossibility of solving an equation of
the fifth degree by means of radicals, as also the discovery of the
impossibility of demonstrating the axiom of parallels, and finally the
theorems of Hermite and Lindemann concerning the impossibility of
constructing by algebraic means the numbers e and TT. ' '
Again, Hamilton endeavored to construct an algebra of three
units, a -f- '& + jc, which should obey the same laws of operations as
the ordinary complex number, a-\-ib; and out of the conflicts that
arose between these algebras, as he describes in detail in the preface
to his "Lectures on Quaternions," he was led to construct a new
complex number of four units, the quaternion. If I may give another
example, the problem of the continuity of the straight line is that
presented by the conflict of an intuitive straight line, say L, with the
class R of rational numbers ; namely, on the straight line L there is
an arbitrary number of points which corresponds to no rational num-
ber, while to every rational number there corresponds a point. Thus
as Dedekind says in his celebrated memoir, 74 a comparison of the
intuitive straight line L with the rational numbers R shows that the
72 Cf. Gr. H. Mead, Philosophical Review, Vol. 9 ; A. W. Moore, ' ' Pragma-
tism and its Critics," page 125. See also Stosch, Vierteljahrschrift fur wiss.
Phil, Vol. 29, page 97, note 3.
73 " Foundations of Geometry," page 131. Compare O. Perron, "Ueber
Wahrheit und Irrthum in der Mathematik, " Jahresber. d. Deutsch. Math. Ver.,
Vol. 20 (1911), page 196; H. Liebmann, ' ' Nothwendigkeit und Freiheit in der
Mathematik, " same journal, Vol. 14 (1905), page 230.
74 " Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen," pages 7-11.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 181
latter presents gaps, but the former does not. Dedekind's solution of
the conflict was his formulation 75 of the principle :
' * If all the points of a line are separated into two classes such that
every point of the first class lies to the left of every point of the
second class, then there exists one and only one point which produces
this separation. " More generally, I might refer to the conflict be-
tween analysis and geometry in the development of mathematics and
that great movement initiated by Lagrange known as the arithmeti-
zation 76 of mathematics in which rival theories due to Cauchy and
Weierstrass and Meray are prominent. But the examples given will,
I think, sufficiently indicate an important aspect of mathematics as
heuristic. 77
IV
I come now to criticisms of a more properly mathematical nature.
One of Professor Spaulding's colleagues, Professor W. B. Pitkin, in
the "New Realism" (p. 378), speaks of the objections which mathe-
matics has brought against realism in the past, and implies that these
have been cleared away in previous essays in the volume, presumably
Spaulding's essay. This statement, alas! can not be verified.
Spaulding has committed many mathematical errors and it is proper
to state that these seem due to an unfamiliarity with mathematical
conceptions, rather than to the peculiar philosophic position he up-
holds; his mathematical remarks obscure rather than elucidate his
fundamental theses. On this account I enter upon a mathematical
criticism of Spaulding's essay rather unwillingly, and a few indica-
tions of the most noticeable mistakes must suffice.
Readers of Spaulding's essay will quite agree with the author
when he says, 78 : ' It is important ... to present clearly and with pre-
cision that which analysis shows the continuum to be." But this is
what Spaulding does not do. (1) Consider his statement (p. 178),
' ' That there are irrationals is discovered in the realization that there
75 Obviously, Dedekind 's statement lacks rigor ; cf. Russell, loc. tit., 266.
76 Cf. G. Bohlmann, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker Vereinigung,
1901, page 95.
77 In the preceding section it might have been desirable to dwell on the
nature of conflict in general. Research mathematicians will probably have no
difficulty in recognizing in their own experiences what is meant by the conflict
of mathematical terms. The subtle character which such conflict often possesses
may be illustrated by an example. The statements, ' ' 1 + 2 = 3" and
"9 + 16 = 25" are not in conflict in reference to addition of integers, but they
are in conflict in that 9+16 = 25 may be expressed 3 3 + 4 3 = 5 2 , while
1 + 2 = 3 does not admit an analogous expression, in terms of squares. More
broadly, there is a conflict between "intuitive" and "formal" mathematics.
7 Loc. cit., page 78.
182
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
is some value for x whereby, for example x 2 = 2. The position 79
that underlies this statement is incorrect. What probably suggested
this remark to Spaulding is the possibility of making the (intuitive)
construction which he has described (p. 184, paragraph 3). 80 (2)
The definition of limit of a sequence Spaulding misquotes 81 from
Pierpont's book. 82 I remark that Pierpont's theory of real numbers
has been discussed in a review by G. A. Bliss. 83 (3) The error is
committed by Spaulding (p. 179) of juxtaposing the derivative of an
assemblage and the derivative of a function; further comment on this
seems unnecessary.
Spaulding 's analysis of space is not more satisfactory than his
arithmetical analysis. (1) Spaulding seems to have been misled
(p. 184, paragraph 1,) by Hilbert's use of the word ''continuity" in
connection with the Archimedean property of a line. 8 * (2) The
author's inability to comprehend mathematical continuity is clearly
shown, as is evident elsewhere, by his remark (p. 185) that a "series"
is continuous if it is perfect. The latter remark is contradicted by
nowhere dense perfect assemblages. 85 (3) Spaulding makes a very
feeble attempt (p. 188) to explain the relation of the extension of a
line to its continuity. What we are concerned with here is the de-
pendence of the Archimedean axiom on the axiom of Dedekind con-
tinuity in the foundations of geometry; this has been recently dis-
cussed by 0. Holder. 86 In view of such instances as the preceding,
Spaulding is not justified in saying 87 that his analysis of space
"states with clearness and precision what space is, what its continu-
ity is, what terms and relations are involved. ' '
I shall not consider further Spaulding 's errors. Enough has been
79 Russell has a remark quite as misleading as the one quoted above from
Spaulding; see Jourdain, Math. Gazette, Vol. IV. (1908), page 204, note,
so Compare also Dedekind, loc. cit.
si Loc. cit., page 178.
82 " The Theory of Functions of Real Variables," Vol. I., page 25, 42;
page 61, 97.
83 The Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 13 (1906-1907),
pages 121-122. See especially Bliss, loc. cit., page 121, note; compare H.
Weber, Jahresber. d. Deutsch. Math. Ver., Vol. 15 (1906), page 173. Instruc-
tive references to the theory of real numbers are, A. Pringsheim, preceding jour-
nal, Vol. 6, page 73; O. Perron, same journal, Vol. 16 (1907), page 142, and
Jourdain, Math. Gazette, Vol. IV. (1908), page 201.
84 < < Foundations of Geometry, ' ' page 24.
85 See Schoenflies, Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematilcer-Vereinigung,
Vol. 8 (1900), pages 101-102; cf. Russell, loc. cit., page 440, 417; page 288,
272.
seLeipziger Berichte, Vol. 63 (1911), pages 108-109. Cf. K. Th. Vahlen,
Jdhresber. d. Deutsch. Math. Ver., Vol. 16 (1907), page 409.
s? Lo6. cit., page 185.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 183
said to establish that he hot only is unable to analyze successfully
those mathematical contents with which he has dealt, but he does not
even possess familiarity with the mathematical conceptions he men-
tions. In this respect Spaulding differs from Russell, who, I think,
has been reasonably accurate in dealing with mathematical concep-
tions, and who has been aptly characterized by James 88 as an "ath-
letic ratiocinator. ' ' But so far as I have been able to ascertain, neither
Spaulding nor Russell has had experience in mathematical research,
and discovery, as Peirce 89 has pointed out, is a part of mathematics.
In conclusion, I should like to lay stress on the desirability of a
more intimate relation between philosophers and mathematicians.
"The mathematician's interests," says Royce, 90 "are not the philos-
opher's. But neither of the two has a monopoly of the abstractions
and in the end each of them and certainly the philosopher can
learn from the other. The metaphysic of the future will take fresh
account of mathematical research." The numerous misinterpreta-
tions of mathematics occurring constantly in philosophical literature,
probably not excepting the work of Bergson, 91 show that philosophers
can not pronounce judgment on mathematical contents without ac-
quainting themselves with mathematics in a way that probably re-
quires actual mathematical experience. Conversely, mathematicians
should endeavor to enter into the spirit of philosophical disciplines
and recognize that the study of philosophy can be made indirectly
the means of further mathematical development. 92 Mathematical
masters have sometimes acknowledged explicitly this advantage of
philosophic study. It is said of Kronecker, 93 for instance, that he
thought more philosophically than mathematically and considered it
profitable to go beyond his special mathematical field, to aim at
general ideas, and then to return to his more restricted activity.
ARTHUR R. SCHWEITZER.
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
ss "The Meaning of Truth," page 276.
8 Cf. J. B. Shaw, Bull. Am. Math. Soc., Vol. 18, page 381.
o "The World and the Individual," Vol. I., page 527; compare Vol. II.,
page x.
91 Cf. E. Borel, Eev. de Met. et de Morale, Vol. 16, 1908, pages 244-245.
92 Cf. M. Winter, Eev. de Met. et de Morale, Vol. 16, 1908, page 920.
3 Cf. Netto, Mathematical Congress Papers, Chicago, 1893, page 243; see
also page 246.
184 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
VALUE IN ITS RELATION TO MEANING AND PURPOSE
purpose, ana value oracKetea togetner, or usea intercnangeaoiy.
Thus, in introductory text-books of philosophy such statements may
be found as that science has for its problem the description and
explanation of facts, philosophy the interpretation of facts in terms
of meaning, of purpose, or of value ; or that the scientist is interested
in facts as such, whereas the philosopher inquires further into what
these facts mean, what they are for, and what function they fulfil
in the universe. But though considerable thought has been and is
being given to the definition of each of these concepts, the investiga-
tion of their mutual relations has been neglected, and it is to this
phase of the matter that I wish here to call attention.
In the first place, the three concepts have in common the factor
of external reference. However much independent reality we may
attribute to any object, to assert that such an object has a meaning,
purpose, or value is to acknowledge its lack of complete independ-
ence. All three concepts, then, are determined by some relation,
the subsistence of which is essential to the adequate definition of the
object concerned; and if this is so, we must look to the other term
of the relation for the principle of differentiation between them.
Now the meaning of an object is always determined by its rela-
tion to some other object. When any object A has a relation to an-
other object B, such that the subsistence of that relation is essential
to the adequate definition of A, B is determined as the meaning of A,
A as the "sign" of B. Thus, a frown is not merely a contortion of
the face, but a sign of anger, of deeply concentrated attention, of
anxiety or uncertainty, etc. : that is to say, the presence of the
frown is an indication of the existence of some definite state of mind
in the individual which "expresses itself" through the frown, and
without which the latter would be meaningless. So, the sound of the
dinner-bell ordinarily means that dinner is ready, and without a
dinner ready for consumption the ringing of the bell is meaningless.
So, again, the motif of Beethoven 's Fifth Symphony is said by some
to mean "Fate knocking at the door," by others to represent (i. e.,
to mean) the crying of a baby, and by others still is regarded as no
more than a theme to be developed, i. e., as having its meaning only
in relation to that which follows in the composition.
Meaning has reference to an accomplished fact, purpose to the
accomplishment of some fact: the meaning of an object is deter-
mined by its relation to some other object as existent, purpose by its
relation to some change in or modification of some object. Thus the
purpose of the nomination of a fusion ticket in New York City last
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 185
summer was to defeat Tammany, the meaning of the election of Mr.
Mitchel was the accomplished defeat of Tammany. Hence the defi-
nition : when any object A has a relation to a modification of some
object B (as B f ), such that the subsistence of that relation is essen-
tial to the adequate definition of A, then the change from B to B f is
determined as the purpose of A. If the meaning of a frown is anger,
its purpose is to convey the information that the frowner is angry,
and so far to produce a change in the mental state of the observer :
the angry man may suppress the frown, but if he frowns his facial
expression fails to fulfil its purpose if no modification results there-
from in the mind of the observer. So the purpose of the dinner-bell
is to produce, let us say, a movement of the guests from the con-
servatory to the dining-room; the purpose of the Fifth Symphony
motif to arouse the notion of Fate or the image of a crying baby in
the minds of the hearers, or at least to prepare them for the musical
mood of the composition.
Value, finally, is determined by the relation of the valuable object
to a subject, and is defined from the standpoint of the subject rather
than, as in the former cases, from that of the object said to "possess"
value. When any object A has a relation to a subject S such that
the subsistence of that relation is essential to the adequate definition
of S, A is said to be valuable, and the relation itself to constitute the
value of A. Thus the frown, the dinner-bell, the Beethoven motif,
the New York election, have value because they in one way or another
fulfil the interests, satisfy the needs, or complete the reality of some
subject. The frown is valuable because it enables the angry man to
express his anger, for without this or some other outward sign the
needs of the subject would fail to find satisfaction: the dinner-bell
is valuable because it enables the server to summon the diners with
less effort than any other method; the Beethoven motif is valuable
because it expresses the composer's and arouses the hearers' esthetic
sentiment; the New York election, finally, is valuable because it ex-
presses in the most practical and efficacious manner the dissatisfac-
tion of the people with political conditions.
These definitions, it is hoped, bring out clearly the close inter-
relations between our three concepts, and justify the use of them as
alternative predicates of objects whose reality extends beyond their
isolated existence. Purpose is hardly distinguishable from meaning
when predicated of an action, and value has been defined by Urban
as " affective- volitional meaning." Whether any fact that possesses
meaning must also possess purpose and value may be questioned, but
whatever has purpose or value has thereby meaning also. Meaning
is defined in terms of relation to some object but if we think of the
denotation of "object" as including also changes and conscious
186
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
selves, purpose and value become species of meaning. In other
words, if we conceive meaning as genus, and regard it as divisible
into the two species, logical (or cognitive) and affective-conative
meanings, purpose and value become subspecies under the second
head purpose essentially conative meaning, value, primarily, per-
haps (but not solely), affective.
JARED S. MOORE.
WESTERN EESERVE UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
La Synthese Mentale. GEORGES DWELSHAUVERS. Bibliotheque de Philos-
ophic Contemporaine. Paris : Librairies Felix Alcan et Guillaumin.
1908. Pp. 276.
The book, as its title indicates, is a study of the mental life. It is an
exposition of the nature of consciousness which Dwelshauvers character-
izes in terms of a synthetic activity. Its object is to explore the content
of this synthetic activity, to define that act which constitutes " the unity
of mentality." It is an attack on the materialistic and sensationalistic
theories that have reigned in psychology for so many years. Dwelshauvers
does not pretend to have originated the problem of the mental synthesis;
it is a continuation, but through a different method, of the line of work
which in France has preoccupied thinkers like Maine de Biran, Ravais-
son, Lachelier, Paulhan, Ribot, Pierre Janet, and many others. The
fundamental idea of Hoffding's " sketch of a psychology founded on ex-
perience " is, as Pierre Janet remarks in his preface to the French edi-
tion, that " consciousness is essentially an effort toward unity, a synthetic
force," and that even elementary sensations, and not only the higher
types of judgment and general ideas, are synthetic in their nature.
Dwelshauvers's work, though of a different scope, is based on those funda-
mental assumptions.
Dwelshauvers is brought to the notion of synthesis not by meta-
physical reasons, but, as he claims, through the simultaneous use of diverse
methods of psychology applied to the mental fact which he attempts to
define in its concrete reality, and not in abstraction. What Dwelshauvers
calls the unity of the life of the mind has nothing in common with the
Cartesian theory of a soul unable to have more than one idea at a time
on account of its simplicity, nor with the unity of the soul such as Her-
bart has admitted. The unity which is presented by the mental synthesis
is, according to Dwelshauvers, neither an abstract entity nor the property
of a substance, but the realization more or less perfect of a complex
equilibrium maintained among diverse tendencies which constitute the
conscious individuality. " The synthesis of the life of the mind," to
quote our author, " is neither a combination of elements nor simply an
expression of logical relations, but it is an act which explains the natural
way by which all of us, whether ignorants or subtle analysts, posit our ego
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 187
at the same time as we posit as equally real, i. e., as subjects, other egos,
or the non ego." " This act is intuitive, it is prelogic, it answers to an
interior vision, to a real affirmation of faith, or more simply, of sympathy."
The book is divided into four chapters which deal respectively with
(I.) the mental and cerebral activity, (II.) the unconscious, (III.) the
mental life and the laws which govern it, (IV.) personality and freedom.
In the first chapter the author examines the nervous system in its
relation to thought and shows that the physiology of the brain does not
explain the act of thought. The nervous cells do not produce representa-
tion; representation is the work of an act of the mind. It is an interior
act issued from this pure and non-spatial potentiality which mind is.
The act of the mind surpasses in its richness and variety the cerebral
activities which accompany it. The brain is to consciousness what the
piano is to the musical artist; the instrument has a restricted number of
keys, consequently the number of its movements is very limited. How-
ever, what the artist will play will vary infinitely. Viewed from its inner
side, the life of the mind appears as an elan, an interior movement;
studied in its relation with the organism which it animates, the life of the
mind manifests itself as anticipation. It anticipates the nervous system,
it establishes means of communication and does not make use of the
means already in existence. It is essentially effort, inextensivity , dyna-
mism. A mind which would be merely a synthetic consciousness of the
organism would not create anything new, would not adjust itself to un-
expected adaptations, in a word it would not live. Dwelshauvers, like
Bergson, rejects the psychophysical parallelism and, like him, criticizes
those psychological systems which speak of cerebral images, aggregates of
sensation in the brain and of psychophysiological localizations. He sums
up the first chapter by emphasizing the fact that we lose sight of the real
problem by attributing to the brain a function which it does not possess,
namely, " the formation of images, the activity of thought or ideation."
The second chapter deals with the unconscious in the mental life and
its relation to conscious thought " whose continuity is assured by the
movement and the depth of the unconscious life which never stops and
never tires" (p. 115). The author makes an interesting study of the
different forms of the unconscious, from the unconscious in the act of
thought to the unconscious in the affective life. He groups them into
two classes, the ultra-psychic unconsciousness and the psychic uncon-
sciousness. The first comprises the two limits of our mental life, the
rational unconsciousness which manifests itself in the act of the mind
and the irrational unconsciousness which connects itself to the organism.
The psychic unconsciousness manifests itself in memory and in autom-
atism. The conclusion of this study, which is carried over to the third
chapter, is that the mental life is not a series of states, " but is formed of
an indeterminable number of psychic currents of different force and
quality upon which there falls an ever changing illumination with an
infinitely varied play of light and shade. These currents sometimes
diverge, sometimes go parallel, and sometimes rejoin in order to divide
again."
188 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
So far the author has endeavored to give us a conception of the mental
life. He now tries, in the rest of the third chapter, to consider the laws
that govern the mental life. This brings him to a consideration of the
categories of quality, quantity,' duration, causality, and finality, those
objective categories which we are tempted to carry from the objective
world into the interpretation of the mental life. He shows what a pro-
found transformation the specificity of the spiritual life imposes on those
categories. The spatial categories as well as objective causality can not
apply to the mental life. Mental life differs from phenomena in this
essential point that all prevision with regard to it is impossible. Causality
for the psychologist does not connect phenomena and does not form an
indefinite series, but unites concrete facts, ideas, sentiments, volitions to
a personality. Nor is it legitimate to reduce the psychic finality to the
finality applicable to the external world. They have some common
characteristics, but consciousness and the will bestow upon psychic finality
an altogether different value. " The life of the mind," says Dwelshauvers,
" escapes the logical determination in which our reason groups phenomena.
It can not be understood without a theory of freedom." This theory of
freedom is the subject of the fourth chapter.
The psychological problem of liberty has no solution, according to our
author, as soon as we ask with regard to a given act whether that act is
free or not. Freedom has sense in psychology only for a series of acts,
for the ensemble of an activity, and not for such and such an act in
particular. The more a voluntary act is part of a more unified movement
the more free it is. It is the force of cohesion and resistance of the ego
which gives the measure of liberty. " One who prefers the unity of his
interior development to the solicitations of the environment tends to act
freely." Freedom is thus explained by personality and synthesis. It is
that unity which is the equilibrium, the harmony, of the different tend-
encies that make up the conscious individuality which explains freedom.
That unity, as we have already seen, is the mind, the spiritual principle
par excellence, which reveals itself in the pure act, in intuition, and in
reflection.
Here the author gives a historic sketch of the notion of mental synthesis
held by those philosophers whose writings help us to understand better
the meaning of the spiritual life. He takes up Leibniz, Kant, Wundt,
Hoffding, Pierre Janet, and Bergson. But it is rather surprising that
the author has omitted from this list Fichte, whose doctrines, if trans-
lated in contemporary terms, have, it seems to me, something in common
with those of Dwelshauvers.
The book contains, in addition to those four chapters, an appendix
which gives us a critical review of the various methods used in psychology.
The method with which Dwelshauvers identifies himself is the reflective
method, so named and defined by Jules Lagneau. This method, as we
can see from the plans followed in our present book and as Dwelshauvers
describes it himself, has for aim the explanation of the logical unity
which consciousness presents, the determination of its essential char-
acteristic and the search for the laws which would enable us to under-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 189
stand them. Dwelshauvers claims that this reflective method is superior
to the other ones because it has not the shortcomings of the introspective
and the psychophysical methods; that it is at the same time rational and
living, rational because it brings all psychological manifestations to a
unity, and living because it seeks the condition of the real, it makes no
abstraction. Dwelshauvers's method differs from the Bergsonian intui-
tion. For the Bergsonian intuition aims to reach the bottom of the
spiritual life under the stratified layers of the logic and the social, while
the reflective analysis^ applies itself more specially to thought as ideation
and reflection. It is by this method that, according to the author, we
arrive at a most correct notion of the mutual implications of ideas in the
concrete totality which constitutes all act of thought, of cognition, or of
reflected volition.
Such is but a brief outline of the fundamental ideas underlying the
book, the central thought of which is the revindication of the specific and
autonomous character of our mental life. The conclusions which Dwel-
shauvers reaches in his work do not differ much from those of Bergson.
But he comes to them through his own method, through his own original
and personal way of thinking, based on deep reflections, on scientific re-
searches, and on accumulation of facts which have been furnished to
him by the experimental investigations of leading scientists. Whether or
not we admit the author's theory of consciousness, we can not fail to find
his book most interesting and suggestive. It is at once a contribution to
and excellent representative of contemporary psychology.
NINA HIRSCHENSOHN.
The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Rendered into English by ELIZA-
BETH S. HALDANE and G. R. T. Ross. Two volumes. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 1911. Vol. I. Pp. vi-f 452; Vol. II. Pp. viii + 380.
This edition makes accessible to English readers much which has
been overlooked in other English renderings of Descartes. Thus far
English translations have been limited almost exclusively to the " Dis-
course," the " Meditations," and selections of the " Principles." These
works are, however, not enough to give us a comprehensible view of
Descartes. The way in which he expounded his theories makes a more
extensive acquaintance with his works necessary for a thorough under-
standing of his philosophy. Descartes never expressed freely and openly
what he believed to be the truth. He gave us his ideas only in
disguise; his progressive theories are veiled in conservative covers. The
" Discourse," the " Meditations," and the " Principles " only arouse our
suspicion of a double policy on the part of Descartes; a systematic study
of his scientific treatises and his other works confirms this suspicion, and,
what is more important, enables us to free the kernel of his philosophy
from the husk. The present translators, E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross,
have thus rendered an invaluable service to English readers by including
some of the scientific treatises and the polemics in this edition.
Of the scientific treatises, Volume I. contains the " Rules for the Direc-
190 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
tion of the Mind " and " The Passions of the Soul." The " Eules " give
us the original sketch of Descartes's method and its application to mathe-
matics. In this treatise the explanation of Descartes's view of extension
is worthy of notice. He refutes the independent existence of extension
and explicitly states that while " body possesses extension," " extension is
not body" (pp. 57 sq.)-
" The Passions of the Soul " is a mechanistic interpretation of all
vital phenomena. This was the first attempt to apply the mechanical
principle to both mental and physiological processes. Present-day psychol-
ogy and physiology testify to the significance of this attempt. English
readers have been thus far deprived of this very interesting treatise, as the
first translation of 1650 is practically out of print at present.
Of other works that have been given here their first English rendering,
Volume I. contains " The Search after Truth " and " Notes directed
against a Certain Programme."
" The Search after Truth " is an unfinished dialogue which exemplifies
the search for truth according to the Cartesian method by the " natural
light " alone.
The " Notes " is a refutation of ideas expressed in a pamphlet on the
nature of the mind, edited anonymously in the form of a manifesto or
poster by Eegius. These ideas conflicted with orthodoxy, and as Eegius
was generally known as an ardent follower of Descartes, the latter publishes
his opposition to a very much feared denunciation. In these " Notes,"
translated without the preface and the verses that accompanied the ori-
ginal, Descartes's incidental explanation of the innate ideas is very
elucidating, and makes all objections against them in the history of philos-
ophy appear to us vain (p. 442).
In addition to the above-mentioned works, Volume I. contains the
" Discourse," the " Meditations," and the " Principles."
The " Principles " are here more fully translated than in the previous
English editions. The headings of all passages not translated are given,
so that the contents can be inferred.
The second volume of this edition comprises the " Objections and
Replies," " Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God," a " Letter
from Descartes to Clerselier," and a " Letter to Dinet."
In the Introduction to this volume the translators explain the origin
of the " Objections and Replies." Before publishing the " Meditations,"
Descartes circulated it in manuscript among various theologians and
philosophers. Their criticisms and Descartes's replies were later pub-
lished, together with the " Meditations."
The " Objections and Replies " consists of seven sets of objections and
replies; objections by (I.) the theologian Caterus, (II.) a group of theo-
logians and philosophers, (III.) Hobbes, (IV.) Arnauld, (V.) Gassendi,
(VI.) another group of theologians and philosophers, and (VII.) Bourdin.
The " Objections " are criticisms, on one hand, from the theological,
and, on the other, from the empirical and scientific, points of view of
Descartes's following doctrines: The proofs of God's existence; efficient
causality and " causi sui " ; continual creation ; liberty of indifference in
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 191
man and God ; the method of doubt ; the principle of definition as criterion ;
the distinction between soul and body ; the nature of the " thinking thing,"
and the spirituality of the soul, and the identification of substance and
accident.
These criticisms contain things of considerable interest. In the
" Objection " by Caterus we find a striking parallel drawn between Des-
cartes's ontological argument and that of St. Tomas (pp. 3 sq.). In the
" Objection " by Arnauld, we have the identification of Descartes's " je
pense, done je suis" with St. Augustine's "si fallor sum" (p. 82), and
the discussion of Descartes's likeness to St. Augustine in the doctrine
that the soul is more clearly perceived than the body. In the objections of
Arnauld " as a theologian," perhaps the most interesting points are his
explanations of the danger of Descartes's rule of evidence for the teachings
of theology, and of the incompatibility of Descartes's conception of matter
with the theory of the Eucharist (pp. 93 sq.).
Gassendi's " Objections " gives us an insight into his materialism and
the reaction of an empiricist to Descartes's assertion that the mind is
more clearly perceived than the body, and that its essence is mind, and
to Descartes's similar speculative doctrines. Hobbes's " Objections " is
gratifying as an exposition of the relation of this materialistic thinker to
Descartes's spiritualistic philosophy. In these objections (pp. 61 sq.)
the interpretation of Descartes's conception of the " thinking thing "
as favorable to the soul's materiality attracts our attention as we meet
with the same objection in Gassendi's criticism.
In Descartes's " Replies " to the " Objections " we have elaborate dis-
cussions of his doctrines criticized by the opponents. In these " Replies "
comes up Descartes's attempt to reconcile his theory of matter with the
teaching of the Eucharist (pp. 116 sq.), which is later more elaborated
in a letter to Mesland. Descartes's distinction between real and formal
existence in the case of everything except God, is brought out here more
definitely than in the "Meditations" (especially p. 20).
The " Objections and Replies " are not important as an elucidation of
the difficulties with which we meet in Descartes's speculations; for in his
replies to the opponents he makes various concessions. This work is inter-
esting rather as an illustration of the attitude of Descartes's theological
and philosophical contemporaries towards his philosophy, and of his efforts
to justify the difficulties of his speculations leading to the accusation of
heterodoxy on one hand, and lack of empiricism on the other.
The " Arguments for God's existence " is an exposition in geometrical
form of the same proofs as occur in the " Discourse," the " Meditations."
and the " Principles."
In the " Letter to Father Dinet " Descartes complains of accusations
that his ideas are opposed to ancient philosophy and clash with theology,
and expresses his eagerness for the approval of his ideas by the Jesuit
society, of which approval he despairs on account of Bourdin's attack.
The " Letter to Clerselier " consists of Descartes's replies to objections
made by Gassendi to previous replies.
The rendering is done very carefully; expressions that can not be
192
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
translated precisely are quoted in the footnotes; literal exactness is, how-
ever, often sacrificed for the sake of English style. The variations in the
text of the different editions of the original works are indicated by means
of brackets.
The translators introduce each work by valuable notes as to place, date,
and circumstances of publication, character of the work and its history;
and indicate each time what edition of the original work they followed in
the translation.
In the preface to the first volume the translators promise an Eng-
lish rendering of Descartes's correspondence in the near future. I should
say his letters are quite indispensable for an unmistakable concep-
tion of Descartes. I should also add that a translation of the treatise
" Le Monde " would be very desirable in order to have Descartes in his
full greatness. LINA KAHN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
Immanuel Rants Werke. Gesamtausgabe in zehn Banden und zwei
Erlauterungs-banden. In Gemeinschaft mit HERMANN COHEN,
ARTHUR BUCHENAU, OTTO BUEK, ALBERT GORLAND, B. KELLERMANN,
herausgegeben von ERNST CASSIRER. Verlag von Bruno Cassirer,
Berlin. Bd. I. Vorkritische Schriften, herausgegeben von ARTHUR
BUCHENAU. Pp. 541.
It seems remarkable that an age which, according to his own avowal,
was entirely dominated by Kant, should not have given us a satisfactory
edition of Kant's works, one which every one could afford to buy. For the
editions of Rosenkranz and Hartenstein, apart from the fact that they
are inadequate, have long since been out of print ; the Kirchmann edition,
although recently improved, is very uneven; the new Akademie edition
is exorbitant in price, and Reclam offers only a few of Kant's writings.
Under these circumstances, we note with pleasure that a number of the
most prominent German Kant scholars of to-day have united to compile
a new edition of Kant, which has the advantage of being not only com-
plete and good, but also of being sufficiently cheap to be within the reach
of every one. The plan calls for ten volumes and two supplementary
volumes, of which the first will be a presentation of Kant's life and teach-
ings, by Ernst Cassirer; the second, by Hermann Cohen, will concern
itself with Kant's influence upon science and culture. Naturally, the
treatment of the text is based upon the original Kant edition, particularly
upon the last edition which Kant himself helped to compile. The manu-
scripts have been compared as far as they were accessible. Corrections
have been made only in those cases where the discrepancies and the mis-
prints were too evident a note always being made to the change, how-
ever. The new style of orthography, and alas!, also of punctuation, is
employed. The language, however, is altered only when rendered neces-
sary on account of a possible misunderstanding of the sense. The outer
equipment of this new edition is, in spite of its moderate cost, so rich
as to make it a pleasing piece of artistic workmanship in the library of
" booklovers." GUNTHER JACOBY.
UNIVERSITY OF KONIGSBERG.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 193
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. October, 1913.
The Measurement of Attention (pp. 465-507): KARL M. DALLENBACH. -
An experiment to measure the attention to auditory stimuli in terms of
clearness values. The introspective attention values were closely cor-
related with objective measurements. Two types of individuals in regard
to attention were found, " dual-division " and multi-level. A Bibliography
of Rhythm (pp. 508-519) : CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICH. Clinical Notes on
the Emotions and Their Relation to the Mind (pp. 520-524) : GEORGE
HENRY TAYLOR. - Emotions have their origin in sex, while opposed to
emotion is reason. A Rapid and Accurate Method of Scoring Nonsense
Syllables and Words (pp. 525-531) : DARWIN O. LYON. Characteristic
Differences between Recall and Recognition (pp. 532-544) : H. L. HOL-
LINGWORTH. - An experimental study bringing out the importance of
recognition as opposed to recall; data on the effect of the presentation,
primary, recency, etc., have been presented. A Note on the Relation and
Esthetic Value of the Perceptive Types in Color Appreciation (pp. 545-
554) : E. J. G. BRADFORD. - Four types of apperception were found ap-
proaching esthetic value in the following order, (1) sensational-associa-
tive, (2) physiological, (3) emotional-associative, (4) character. The
Comparative Value of Various Conceptions of Nervous Functions Based
on Mechanical Analogies (pp. 555-563) : MAX MEYER. - The writer pre-
sents several simple mechanical analogies that can easily be translated
into psycho-physiological terms. An Introspective Analysis of the Asso-
ciation-Reaction Consciousness (pp. 564-569) : EMILY T. BURR AND L. R.
GEISSLER. - There exists a close parallel between the consciousness of con-
cealing complex and association reactions under negative instruction.
" The Feeling of Being Stared At " Experimental (pp. 570-575) : J. E.
COOVER, PH.D. - The groundless " feeling of being stared at " is experi-
enced by one half of the student group of the university, due to a nervous-
ness and anxiety concerning one's looks and the attributing of objective
validity to subjective impressions. Projection of the Negative After
Image in the Field of the Closed Lids (pp. 576-578) : FRANK ANGELL. -
A discussion of the relation of the results published by the above author
to those of Mayerhausen (Graefe's Archiv, 1885). Prof. Martin on the
Perky Experiments (p. 579) : E. B. TITCHENER. Minor Studies from the
Psychological Laboratory of Vassar College. The Effect of the Interval
Between Repetitions on the Speed of Learning a Series of Movements
(pp. 580-583) : MILDRED BROWNING, DOROTHY E. BROWN, AND M. F. WASH-
BURN. - There are indications that the law of distributed repetitions holds
in habit formation especially for complex processes. A Suggested Coeffi-
cient of Affective Sensitiveness (pp. 583-585) : HELEN CLARK, NEIDA
QUACKENBUSH, AND M. F. WASHBURN. - There seems to be little correlation
between affective sensitiveness and the corresponding kinds of tests in
sense impressions. A Bibliography of the Scientific Writings of Wilhelm
Wundt (p. 586) : E. B. TITCHENER AND W. S. FOSTER. Book Reviews
(pp. 587-595) : Alexander Philip, The Dynamic Foundation of Knowl-
194
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
edge: B. H. BODE. S. S. Colvin, The Learning Process: W. S. FOSTER.
Eben Fiske, An Elementary Study of the Brain, Based on the Dissection
of the Brain of the Sheep: W. S. FOSTER. R. Munroe, Paleolithic Man
and Terramara Settlements in Europe. A. Wood, The Physical Basis of
Music. Eugenio Rignano, Qu'est-ce le raisonnement : THEODATE L. SMITH.
P. A. Talbot, In the Shadow of the Bush. Book Notes (pp. 596-599) :
C. S. Bluemel, Stammering and Cognate Defects of Speech. F. B. Jevons,
Personality. Edward L. Thorndike, Educational Psychology. Volume 1.
The Original Nature of Man. H. v. Buttel-Reepen, Man and His Fore-
runners. Leroy Walter Sackett, The Canada Porcupine: a Study of the
Learning Process. George Rouma, Le Langage Graphique de I'Enfant.
Hrs. v. Karl Marbe, Fortschritte der Psychologie und ihrer Anwendungen.
Miss Etta De Camp, Return of Frank R. Stockton. J. Dejerine and E.
Gauckler, The Psychoneuroses and Their Treatment ~by Psychotherapy.
Isabel Hornibrook, A Scout of To-day. Psychology and Philosophy
(p. 600). Index (pp. 601-605).
Grabmann, Martin. Der Gegenwartswert der Geschichtlichen Erforsch-
umg der Mittelalterlichen Philosophic. Wien: B. Herder. 1913.
Pp. vi + 94. $.45.
Jacoby, Giinther. Die " Neue Wirklichkeitslehre " in der Amerikanischen
Philosophie. Berlin. Pp. 22.
Walter, Johnston Estep. Nature and Cognition of Space and Time.
West Newton, Pa. Johnston and Penney. 1914. $1.35.
NOTES AND NEWS
LETTER FROM DR. SCHILLER
To THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND SCIEN-
TIFIC METHODS:
As Professor J. P. Turner has done me the honor to quote, in his
review of Mr. D. L. Murray's " Pragmatism," l from my preface to that
work a fragment which stops short of the point of my argument, viz.,
that given a certain sort and degree of intelligence there is nothing like
an intellectualistic education to develop " a perception of the intellectual
necessity of Pragmatism " and to opine that it deserves a wide circula-
tion, may I point out that his quotation is not quite accurate and may
possibly mislead? I did not ascribe to the British nation a contempt for
" the pure intellect ", but for " pure intellect ", and pointed to the prac-
tical success of administrators selected by an examination so gloriously
irrelevant to their " future duties " as that for the British, and, until
recently, that for the Chinese, Civil Service. But though I noted the
paradox, I did not dispute the success, and it should, in my opinion, be a
serious concern of political philosophers to account for the success of the
i This JOURNAL, Vol. XI., page 24.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 195
mandarinate in governing China for three thousand years and in attaining
a stability so much in excess of any that usually befalls the institutions
of man.
Very truly yours,
F. C. S. SCHILLER.
OXFORD UNIVERSITY,
February 3, 1914.
AT a meeting of the British Academy on January 28, Professor S.
Alexander read a paper on " The Basis of Realism." By insisting on the
equal claim of objects with the mind to be considered real, realism seems
at first sight to depress the mind, and make it less real. But this mis-
apprehension rests upon the mistake of confusing reality with perfection.
Mind is not more real than things, but more perfect, i. e., more developed.
In view of Mr. Bosanquet's recent criticism of realism (Adamson Lecture,
1913), and to show that by depriving mind of its pretensions realism actu-
ally establishes the perfection of mind, it seemed well to restate the posi-
tion. The starting-point is the analysis of an act of cognition into an act
of mind, its independent objects, and their compresence. This is not the
mere distinction of act from object, but is only understood as the distinc-
tion of an enjoying subject from a contemplated object, separate from it.
This latter distinction is thus the more important. This initial proposi-
tion of realism is " naive " and incomplete. When further examined, it
turns out to be a particular case of the compresence of interrelated reals
cohering within a universe. Two consequences of the analysis may be
stated. First, mind is a continuum of mental functions which are also
brain functions of a certain degree of development, with the mental
quality. Being mind or consciousness is a new empirical quality which
emerges at a particular stage. The mind is thus located in the brain.
Secondly, the alleged distinction of " contents " of sense from the
" objects " of thought disappears. The difference is one of part and whole.
In each case there is an object, and not a " content." Reasons were
assigned to account for the contrary view. But Mr. Bosanquet has urged
that the analysis fails, because a mind is a world, while its object is a
fragment. If this were so, the analysis from which realism starts would
be false from the beginning. But in fact the mind is as much a fragment
as the object, and the object is in the same sense a world as the mind (and
neither is). His further objection that the analysis fails to account for
the riches of mind, its wealth of being, or for tertiary qualities like beauty,
was examined, and it was shown (a) that the riches of mind are un-
affected ; they are but a complex of processes and tendencies, always corn-
present with their objects; and (&) that the reality, and the more perfect
reality, which is mind, enters as a constituent into beauty. It was then
shown that while objects are independent of the mind, the mind is in a
certain sense dependent on objects, or rather implies them. But again, to
suppose that this minimizes the self-existence of mind is to confuse inde-
pendence with isolation. The very lateness of mind in the order of
development is the condition of its perfection. But the most searching
L96
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
objection to realism is that its objects are mere abstractions and dead;
whereas it is urged they already imply mind, and things are thus continu-
ous in kind with mind. Now, according to realism, objects have all the
fundamental characters, of continuity, retention, and the like, which can
be seen more easily and flagrantly in minds. Thus the objection confuses
the specific characters of minds with the categorical, fundamental charac-
ters which are common to minds with things. It may indeed be said,
metaphorically, that all finites are minds; but this is inexact; and at any
rate it does not mean that things are " mind," but only that they are
different ranks of empirical existences, called minds, because in a certain
sense they " know," that is, are compresent with, one another. This led to
an attempt to define the larger issues between realism and (absolute)
idealism. For in the case of the latter, things are transformed in entering
into the one, individual whole. But for realism, things in certain
respects at least (intrinsic ones) remain in the whole what they are
already. The whole is not the only reality, but the most complete, or
perfect reality, in a second sense of perfection. Athenaeum.
THE Experimental Psychologists will meet this year at Columbia Uni-
versity on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, April 9 to 11. The scientific
sessions will be preceded by a dinner on Wednesday evening, April 8, in
honor of Professor James McKeen Cattell.
PROFESSOR THOMAS H. HAINES, of Ohio State University, who is on
leave of absence, is conducting the courses in psychology at Smith College
during the present semester.
DR. GEORGE R. M. WELLS, of Oberlin College, has been advanced to an
associate professorship of psychology.
THE Western Philosophical Association will hold its annual meeting
at the University of Chicago, Thursday and Friday, April 9 and 10, in
connection with the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy, wnich is
to occur at Chicago, April 10 and 11. It is proposed to devote the ses-
sion of Thursday afternoon to a discussion of the Neo-Realistic Doctrine
of Relations. The President's address will be given Thursday evening.
At the session Friday morning, Professor Fite will lead a discussion of
the subject of Natural Rights. On Friday afternoon the Association will
hold a joint session with the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy.
The special topic to be considered is Rule versus Discretion.
PROFESSOR GEORGE STUART FULLERTON closed his lectures as the first
Columbia exchange professor at the University of Vienna on February 21.
After the final lecture, the Dean of the Philosophical Faculty made an
address in which he announced that Professor Fullerton had been nomi-
nated honorary professor by the faculty, and closed with these words:
" I am glad to be able to inform you that yesterday the Emperor con-
firmed your nomination as honorary professor. You are hereby given the
continued right to lecture at our University, and I may express the wish
that you will frequently make use of it. In this spirit, let me say
auf Wiedersehen"
til
VOL. XI. No. 8. APRIL 9, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
A DEFINITION OF CAUSATION. I
THE category of causation was once regarded as rather funda-
mental in metaphysics; but in western civilization man's in-
terest in man has so taken possession of the field that philosophers
now study almost exclusively the problems of subjectivism, human
knowledge, or the nature of consciousness. Consequently it is diffi-
cult to find a modern discussion of causation which attempts anything
like an exhaustive investigation of its meaning. It is treated in
passing, with a remnant of respect for an old tradition, and generally
from the basis of an already finished system. Some have even gone
so far as to say there is no such thing as a cause. 1 This extreme
statement though made, at one time or another, of most of the im-
portant categories hardly merits much attention; for when the
scientist or the ordinary man uses the word cause, he is assuredly
thinking of something. The only question is what? Indeed the
question, whether this or any other concept has objectivity, is sub-
sidiary to the question, what does the concept mean? Only after
decision of the latter can the former be answered. Meanwhile, we
should not make too much of the fact that current interest is not cen-
tered upon defining objective categories. Fashions of thought
change ; the old discarded view is restored witness the present re-
vival of Platonic realism and sooner or later we may expect a
renewal of interest in things that are not man 's. And of these causa-
tion appears to be one of the principal ones. The plain fact that in
our transactions with reality so far as reality is vouchsafed to
mortals the category is inevitable and ubiquitous, at least suggests
this. We may reflect, too, that the great bulk of the increase of our
knowledge of reality in detail, i. e., the content of the sciences, has
come from looking for the causes of things. Prima facie it would
hardly seem possible to form a philosophical system, either closed or
open, without first according this category a serious treatment.
i So Mach : ' ' There is no cause and effect in nature ; nature has but an in-
dividual existence; nature simply is." Science of Mechanics (Eng. transl.),
page 483. Cf. also B. Eussell, Proc. Arist. Soc., 1912-13, page 1.
197
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The main reason of its importance lies in the fact that it deals
with the connection of events. Philosophers seek to know the uni-
verse as a whole be it of externally joined parts or an articulated
system. The thread which connects these parts in time is causation.
From one isolated event it leads to another. Can one understand the
constitution of the world unless he knows how this is done, of what
stuff this glue is made that attaches one event to another? Other
modes of connection there may be, too; but any mode that unites,
that gives a rational, systematic character to the world, is of funda-
mental significance for philosophy.
The problem of causation, being so central, is a very large one;
the bibliography alone is appalling. This same term has meant many
different things in the course of history ; it has been believed to rep-
resent a substance, a force, an event, a relation, a mere word. Pre-
sumably no broad treatment of it to-day could dispense with these
labors of the past. They are manifold and full of ingenious specu-
lation, and some of the best work, within the last century, is little
known. The standard histories (Konig's, Lang's, Goring 's, etc.)
give but small idea of this last. It is, however, manifestly undesirable
to bring much of this material into a discussion in a journal. What
we shall have to say will be along a line which has not been touched
as yet, except in a very fragmentary way. It is not regarded by the
writer as final, but simply as a piece of work that needs to be done,
and has not been done. It is also regarded by the writer as the nat-
ural way, and, philosophically, the indispensable way of attacking
this problem for reasons which shall soon be given. But it will re-
main subject to certain philosophical criticisms which can not be
-answered by any result obtained in this investigation, but must be
examined on their own account. For that part of the problem the
contributions of past thought form a necessary basis. We pass now
to the statement of our particular topic and method.
When physics tells us that heat causes a body to expand, that the
electric current causes a magnetic needle to be deflected, or that a
ray of light is due to the motion of electrons, what is the character of
the connection between the members in each pair? Suppose we take
the analysis science furnishes of each cause, and of each effect, and
of the process by which the one turns into the other; suppose this
accomplished for all kinds of cases which are treated in the various
sciences ; and suppose, finally, that we find, common to all the cases,
a certain logical structure. Then that structure will constitute an
empirically grounded definition of causation. A definition obtained
by this method will presumably be the only one which applies to real
events and is valid in the actual world ; for the causation men know
and profit by is one which reveals itself always in specific cases, and
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 199
it is not likely that its character can be understood quite apart from
its behavior in those cases. Nevertheless, this method has seldom
been pursued, and never, I think, with a sincere attempt at compre-
hensive treatment. The usual method is rather to treat the category
as a member of a hierarchy of concepts, as part of a rational ideal,
whose meaning can be deduced by analysis of that ideal and is quite
independent of empirical characters. Whether in the expansion of
a body by heat, or in the explosion of gunpowder by a spark, the
causal connection is assumed to be indifferent to the particular na-
ture of the event ; as indifferent as is number to the color of the ob-
jects numbered. Such a procedure is to the one first described as
abstract to concrete. It is not confined to either idealism or realism ;
it is used by Russell and G. E. Moore as well as Natorp and Royce.
The only difference is that the former pair would consider the con-
cept independent of the mind; the latter, due to the mind's activity.
And it may very well be true that there is a certain ideal concept,
fitly called causation, which is definable by abstract deductive meth-
ods. Yet it remains doubtful, until it is compared with an empirical
definition, whether this is the causation the scientist uses and the
philosopher evaluates in his criticism of science. And if it is not
that kind of causation, it is, though certainly of some value, yet of
much less value than the latter. Philosophy is interested primarily
in the real, and the world with which the sciences deal is at least
fairly high in the scale of realities. So the kind of causation, by
virtue of which one body hitting another moves it, is for philosophy
considerably more important than any abstractly perfect ideal which
does not hold of actual events. Naturally one can not deny before-
hand that the definitions given by the abstract method really do
apply to the existent world. The method itself, however, does not
seem likely to give the kind of result which philosophy desires to get ;
some "schematism" at least would be necessary, to show that such a
concept would be applicable to the concrete. In seeking a definition
of causation, accordingly, we must choose the empirical or concrete
method.
The position here taken is independent of the general issue about
the "externality" or " internality " of relations. Those who hold
the former view do indeed tend to believe that, in general, concepts
are independent of, and external to, their particular examples in the
actual world; while advocates of "internality" do not admit such
indrpondence. While we do here claim that the concept causation
can not be understood, in so far as philosophy desires to understand
it, when treated as thus independent, it is not because of a general
adoption of the doctrine of internality. It is because the causation
which alone is deserving of serious study seems to be the causation
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which is "internal" to the actual world, which forms the object-
matter of the sciences. Causation is, as Kant showed, a category
prima facie concerned with actuality; number and quantity are not
by definition so directly concerned with it. Its own special nature,
then, makes causation internal to the particulars of the actual world.
Our purpose is then to determine the meaning of causation as it
is found to hold in the actual course of events; that is, in the details
of the sciences. It is not, at present, to decide any question about
the metaphysical rank of the category. This inquiry is only a neces-
sary preliminary to such a decision ; it would get the concept fairly
before us, and ignore philosophical criticism until that is done. It is
necessary, however, to forestall one philosophical objection which, if
sound, would seem to invalidate beforehand the mode of investiga-
tion adopted.
There is a familiar view to the effect that science does not give
facts, but artifacts ("fictions" is too strong a word). The rigid
bodies, uniform atoms, symmetrical waves, of the text-books, are said
not to exist, and accelerations, as well as other functions, to be only
numbers. Accordingly, we can not study actual causation, for it is
not actual but ideal. And being ideal, its nature can be understood
only from the abstract, ideal side, as part of a great ideal of rational-
ity, or in Professor Royce's words, as theory of order. Now this ob-
jection is really irrelevant. Even if the concepts used by science are
not names of existing facts, they are nevertheless, as science studies
more deeply, ever closer approximations to existing facts, and their
detailed content depends more and more upon the nature of those
facts. Indeed, as Professor Royce shows, 2 the very result of the ab-
stractness of the scientific concepts is that many consequences can be
deduced from them, and experimental verification, therefore, may
become more manifold. As it were, they draw away from fact in
order to get closer and closer to it ; so that the full nature of the ab-
stract is realized only in its approximate verification in the concrete.
Oddly enough, he does not draw what seems the natural conclusion,
that the abstract concept has little meaning by itself, but says, rather,
: 'The order-systems . . . are therefore to be studied with a true under-
standing only when one considers them in abstraction from the
1 probable' and ' approximate ' exemplifications which they get in the
physical world" (pp. 94-95). Now the definition of causation ob-
tained from these approximately realized concepts is, in general,
different from that derived from a simple abstract treatment like that
of the theory of order, and is surely much nearer to the concrete.
We should gain the truest comprehension of causation by learning
its meaning in as close juxtaposition to facts as science can afford us.
2 Encyclopaedia of Philos., Vol. I., pages 94-95.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 201
This procedure, if still somewhat ideal, is not Timnixedly so, but
swayed to a large extent by the nature of facts. We shall in the
course of our analysis find some reason for suspecting this whole
philosophical objection of unsoundness, but it is not now necessary
to raise that question. It is not because the abstract views rest upon
a mistaken view of science, but because they are so poor and meager
of content, that they are considered unprofitable. They do not
study the concept of causation as it has been fully developed in its
employment with facts.
This same objection sometimes takes another form. Science has
obviously two ideals: that of pure rational system, and that of in-
formation about particular facts in time and space. One who values
the abstract higher than the concrete will probably tend to identify
science with the former ideal rather than with the latter or with
both. So, e. g., we find one who approaches philosophic questions
from the mathematical field, regarding the most perfect sciences as
the most mathematical, and the least concerned with events as causes.
[< In the motions of mutually gravitating bodies, there is nothing
that can be called a cause, and nothing that can be called an effect ;
there is merely a formula." 3 "This statement holds throughout
physics, and not only in the special case of gravitation. " 4 " . . . in
advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word 'cause*
never occurs" (p. 1). These statements seem very one-sided. They
altogether overlook the concreteness of science. If the word ' ' cause ' '
is seldom used in text-books of physics, it is that it is so obviously
taken for granted. But it is sometimes used. Watson says 5 "an
experiment is simply the artificial arrangement of certain causes, so
that . . ."; although, having stated this at the outset, he does not
find it necessary to repeat the word "cause" very often in describing
particular experiments. Nevertheless, more or less equivalent words,
such as "produce," "generate," "give rise to," are frequently used.
Science doubtless aims at mathematical system, but it never loses
touch with experiment, or with the verification of its deductions, ap-
proximately, in particular cases.
There is a more practical objection to this undertaking of ours,
which consists in the fact that science changes. Light was once de-
scribed in terms of the emission theory, then of the ether-undulation-
theory, now of the electromagnetic theory. Perhaps fifty years hence
the present views on the motion of electrons will be antiquated.
Better stick to the formal deductive side alone, and run no risk of
refutation by future science! That would be the safer course, no
sB. Russell, Proc. Arist. Soc., 1912-13, page 14.
* Ibid.
B "Text-book of Physics, " page 3.
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TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
doubt. But it would tell us very little about real causation. Mean-
while, the changes of science are not wholly destructive. Statics has
grown, practically by addition alone, and Newton's laws remain em-
pirically valid within the margin of error. But even if so extreme
a position as that of H. Poineare were correct, and causal explana-
tions were matters of choice, it would still be our duty to examine
the structure of all those which one might choose. At any rate, there
is no higher source of knowledge about the causation of the actual
world than the latest results of science. In the attempt to reach
results so certain that they can never be refuted, we are likely to
commit the fault of which the absolutists are accused I do not say
with justice of getting something which has no possible bearing
upon the particulars of experience. While this might be permitted
to an Absolute, it is clearly ruled out for a scientific category; for
science directs itself toward the existent.
It has been said above that the empirical method is the only one
fitted to define the causation philosophy is interested in. That does
not imply that it may not involve, in the working out of its analyses,
deductive methods. What is needed to-day is a protest against the
exclusive use of the latter; a use which by its abstract and exact
mathematical form has apparently attained certainty at the cost of
truth. We can not, of course, get universals from mere summation
of particulars, nor the universality inherent in a causal process
merely from a number, however large, of specific instances. But we
must know the nature of those instances before we can see how the
university of law is able to embody iteself. Our method then is
alleged to be the only one which makes it possible to understand
how the universal is adapted to the particulars.
Now what within the field of the sciences shall we select as cases
of cause and effect, and what reject ? For not all scientific reasoning
concerns these categories. The equations of dynamics are worked
out by means of mathematical properties; that part of dynamics is
clearly not pertinent. The test must be this : wherever a law is
spoken of, or a principle, in accordance with which one actual fact,
situation, or event uniquely determines another fact or its own
future state then we have what science treats as causation. The
two categories, causation and law, are one in denotation. We must
then without denying that some causes might act individually and
not by law govern our selection for the present investigation by the
criterion of law.
Perhaps some apology is needed from the present writer for
venturing into the field of science, inasmuch as it is only too obvious
that he is far from possessing competence therein. This, however, is
one of the risks that can not well be avoided. Philosophers who have
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 203
had the advantage of scientific training have not been disposed to
connect the categories with their empirical manifestations. The form
and the matter of knowledge have remained apart, sundered, neither
adapted to the other. Some one must attempt to overcome this
estrangement. It is very probable that first endeavors in this direc-
tion will at least partially fail, owing to misapprehension in regard
to the accepted truths of science. But it seems to the writer better
to make a move, however inadequate, in the right direction, than to
go on waiting in the vain hope that a well-qualified investigator will
do it. Mistakes may be corrected, and it is hoped will be. But until
some such inquiry into the structure of the concrete world of experi-
ence has been made, philosophers will have little to occupy themselves
with but an epistemology which is constituted by mutual refutations.
The sciences which aim to deal with facts comprise physics,
chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, history, linguistics, eco-
nomics, political and social sciences, and the psychological and an-
thropological sciences. There does not seem to be any systematic
body of knowledge which can not be brought under one or more of
these heads. Statistics is here excluded, for two reasons: (1) as set
forth in text-books like those of Bowley and Yule it is a method of
getting as exact knowledge as possible about facts rather than of
directly finding causal connections, (2) it is concerned, so far as it
gives laws, mainly with the important (and by philosophers hitherto
largely neglected) concept of probability rather than that of
causality.
How many, then, of these sciences offer distinct types of causa-
tion ? Some of them certainly do not. Thus, geology and astronomy
clearly explain their facts by appealing to the laws and causes set
forth in physics and chemistry. Biology, for many biologists, does
the same. Other biologists claim a special, unique kind of causation,
viz., that of an " entelechy. ' ' The point is not yet settled ; but until
all biologists are agreed that there is a kind of causal explanation not
reducible to terms of physics or chemistry, we can hardly take it as
a datum for our investigation. Though not denying its existence, we
may fairly say that until it is generally accepted in biology as a fact,
and shown analogous in structure to cases admittedly causal in other
sciences, it does not deserve the name causation. The psychological
sciences contain a similar uncertainty. Some psychologists e. g.,
Wundt believe in psychical causality sui generis; others do not.
Until the matter is decided we can not take the alleged cases of psy-
chical causation as data for analysis. In economics, history, political
and social sciences, no one, so far as I know, pretends that there is
any kind of process not explainable in psychological, biological,
physical, or chemical terms ; except in the case of history, where we
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have the familiar view of Rickert et al. This view is by no means
generally accepted by historians. Alleged cases of "individuelle
Kausalitat" or historical, personal causation can not then be taken as
data. Linguistics, finally, explains by appeal to biological and psy-
chological processes ; these we have already dealt with. The only sci-
ences, then, in which by the general agreement of those pursuing them
there seem to be independent types of causation, are physics and
chemistry. These sciences have analyzed particular causal processes
to an extent unparalleled by the others. By this work they have
established a claim to primacy ; what we shall find causation to mean
in their fields is what the term should be taken as meaning. Only if
Drieschian ' ' entelechies, " psychical causation, and other unknown
types, can be reduced to essentially the same logical structure as that
of physical or chemical causation, should they be called by the same
name. This is, in a sense, only a verbal issue, but it is one of some
importance in the interest of an exact philosophical vocabulary.
So far, we have physics and chemistry on our hands ; as wide a
field as one could wish. It can, however, be narrowed. The causal
processes studied in chemistry are, it appears, regarded by that
science as further reducible, and statable ultimately in the terms of
physics. Hence arose the science of Physical or Theoretical Chemis-
try. Professor Nernst, writing twenty years ago, when relatively
very little of this reduction had been done, said: "The question of
the nature of the forces which come into play in the chemical union
or decomposition of substances, was agitated long before a scientific
chemistry existed. As long ago as the time of the Grecian philoso-
phers, the ' ' love and hate ' ' of the atoms were spoken of as the causes
of the changes of matter ; and regarding our knowledge of the nature
of chemical forces, not much further advance has been made even at
the present time. " 6 "It can not be emphasized enough that we are
as yet very far from reaching the goal : viz., the explanation of chemi-
cal decompositions by the play of well-defined and well-investigated
physical forces" (p. 354). Since then, however, considerably more
has been done toward reaching this goal, by the electrical theory of
matter. 7 For the rest, we can hardly take it as containing definite
types of causal process, when it is believed to be further reducible.
The situation seems to be analogous to that of biology, where types
peculiar to that science are not generally agreed to exist. In the still
somewhat unsettled condition of chemistry on this point, we must
leave it and confine ourselves to physics.
In the field of physics there are apparently many kinds of causal
connection. Thus: an inelastic body strikes another inelastic body;
eW. Nernst, "Theoretical Chemistry, " Eng. tr., London, 1895, page 353.
7C/. J. J. Thomson, ''Electricity and Matter," London, 1904, Ch. 5.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 205
this cause is followed by the effect that both move on in contact.
Again, a ray of light enters a glass prism ; it is refracted. These
are, on the surface, quite different types of causation. An exhaustive
enumeration of all such types would carry us through a large text-
book of physics. Nevertheless, an account of the cause-effect relation
which omitted any of them would be lacking in generality and there-
fore inadequate. Fortunately, however, the number may be greatly
reduced. While the fields of dynamics, heat, light, etc., are at first
appearance so disparate, yet physics treats large portions of some
fields as cases of some other field. E.g., many types of causal relation
in the field of light are reduced to electrical types. In fact, glancing
over a standard text-book, we find that there are only a few types
that look really distinct. Our task is now to show these forth.
The total field of nature, so far as studied by physics, is comprised
under the following divisions : mechanics (including statics and
dynamics), "properties of matter" such as elasticity, capillarity,
density, etc., heat, sound, light and radiant energy, magnetism, elec-
tricity. To causal connections in each of these fields we must add
those embodied in transformations of energy from one field to
another; e. g., of electricity into light, of motion into heat or light,
etc. This classification is not quite a mutually exclusive one, nor has
it any obvious fundamentwn divisionis, but it contains all that is
known, with general agreement and certainty, of the actual causal
relations in the world. Let us take them in order, beginning with
mechanics.
The inclusion of statics, or the study of the causes of equilibrium,
encounters a certain objection. Some philosophers would say that
here are no events and therefore no causal connection. Several
answers to this are possible. (1) It rests on a preconceived definition
of cause, and can in this inquiry have no weight. Statics explains
why a body is in equilibrium : it regards the position of the weight-
arm as due to that of the power-arm of the lever. In other words, this
field is to be included because science treats it as if included. (2)
A condition of equilibrium may be regarded as an event, as much
as a motion. It occupies time and exists in the world of fact.
(3) There is no a priori reason why rest can not be a cause of, as
well as caused by, either rest or motion. Continuation of the same
condition in time is as real, and as dependent on preceding condi-
tions, as change. It may be that things as inert as circles do the
causing in some cases. It is a wholly empirical question.
What are the elementary causal situations in statics, out of which
all the situations studied in that science are composed? These will
be the types sought for. They are, I think, just three in number.
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They are the two laws which are respectively called (1) the principle
of the transmissibility of force, (2) the principle of composition and
resolution of forces, and (3) the definition of the moment of a force
about an axis, as producing a tendency to rotation. Every statical
situation seems to be a case of one or more of these. Thus, the
lever is a case of (3), the centre of gravity of a body is determined
by (2) and (1), the pulley is a case of (3), the inclined plane of (2).
The statics of fluids (liquids and gases) contain no principles beyond
those of the statics of solids. Even if it should be the case that these
three elementary cases are further reducible, it will do little harm;
the danger is that we examine too little rather than too much.
Dynamics is in general parallel to statics, their difference depend-
ing upon that between tendency to motion and actual motion. Indeed,
"every dynamical problem can, by the help of D'Alembert's prin-
ciple, be reduced to one in Statics." 8 We might, then, simply con-
sider the three laws of Newton as the elementary cases for both Dy-
namics and Statics, and let that suffice. "The principles of Newton
suffice by themselves, without the introduction of any new laws, to ex-
plore thoroughly every mechanical phenomenon practically occurring,
whether it belongs to Statics or to Dynamics. ' ' 9 Nevertheless, it is
sometimes more conducive to clear insight to show different instances
of the same type. We shall therefore consider the composition and
resolution of velocities and accelerations, the law of inertia and uni-
form motion, the case of a body's motion as changed by the external
force of gravitation (the second law), and of bodies undergoing
impact with other bodies (the third law 1 ). In regard to Newton's first
law, it is true that it does not hold for very high velocities, because
for such velocities the electrical state of the particle changes and
increases the mass. This, however, is no denial of the law. It also
happens that the bodies which act in accord with the causal laws of
dynamics, act at the same time under certain statical conditions;
so that the static and dynamic types are at once combined in single
events. This combination of many causes or effects into one must
also be dealt with.
Further cases under Mechanics are such as show transformation
from a static to a dynamic situation or the reverse. For example,
a pressure is the cause of a motion ; the attraction of the earth causes
a body to fall when the support is removed. In general, this type of
case may be called the passage from potential to kinetic energy, or
the reverse. It forms, I think, a distinct type of causal sequence and
as such deserves special examination.
s Bouth, ' ' Elementary Kigid Dynamics," page 316.
Mach, Science of Mechanics, Eng. tr., page 256.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 207
Properties of matter" include elasticity, f ration, resistance of a
medium to motion through it, the liquid, viscous, a^d gaseous states,
surface tension, capillarity, diffusion, osmosis, cohesion, density,
solution, gravitation, crystallization. The ways in whicV these prop-
erties behave, and determine events, are, of course, types of causal
connection. Some, however, have been reduced to mechanical cases :
e. g., the liquid and gaseous states are treated under the mechanical
sciences of hydrostatics, hydrodynamics, and kinetic theory of gases.
Surface tension, capillarity, diffusion, osmosis, and solution are also
conceived in mechanical terms, i. e., terms of molecular action. Vis-
cosity is a property of liquids which is due to internal friction.
There remain, then, elasticity, friction, resistance, density, cohesion,
gravitation, and crystallization. None of these has as yet been wholly
reduced to cases of mechanical action, static or dynamic. In this
division, also, it will be best to place that very general property of
matter which is defined under the law of indestructibility, or, as
sometimes named, the conservation of mass.
The field of events classified under Sound contains none but
mechanical types, combined with the above "properties." Under
Heat are two kinds: (1) those events, such as convection, conduction,
expansion, etc., which are either clearly mechanical or are explained
by the dynamical molecular theory of heat, and (2) radiant heat,
This last has been placed under the head of Eadiant Energy, which
in turn is reduced to terms of electrical disturbance. All the phe-
nomena of Light are accounted for in terms of electricity. Of the
other known kinds of radiant energy, such as X-rays, Becquerel rays,
etc., so far as they are explained the same is true. The field of
Magnetism contains only such events as are reduced to cases of elec-
trodynamics. Under Electricity the fundamental kind of event
seems to be the mutual attraction and repulsion of small charged
bodies. This may perhaps be couched in terms of ether-strain, but is
in any case at present conceived to be a non-mechanical type. The
development of this conception in the electron-theory has in fact
explained so many phenomena of chemistry that it is regarded by
many as indicating the ultimate constitution of matter. However
that may be, we do seem to find in the fields of Heat, Light, Eadiant
Energy, Magnetism, Electricity, and Chemical Transformation, a
great class of events of a unique type. Each such event constitutes
a cause-effect sequence as clearly as does mechanical impact or
gravitation ; but neither seems as yet reduced to the other. Accord-
ing to the present view of science, then, all cause-effect situations in
nature are in the last analysis, and so far as there is general agree-
ment, either mechanical cases, or cases determined by "properties
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THE JOU^ NAL op PHILOSOPHY
of matter," such as ^elasticity, friction, etc., or cases of electricity, or
combinations of ^ O me or all of these. And this can now be seen to
hold as well f # r transformations of energy from one kind to another,
viz., heat Vo motion, electricity to heat or motion, heat to light, etc.
For the; 'electric " current" is conceived, as we shall find, to be motion,
and ^lence may lead to motion in the shape of light, heat, or mechani-
cal energy; and conversely. In general, no new type of causation
appears in such processes ; so we may omit the study of transforma-
tions of energy. Our task is now to ascertain the logical structure
of the typical events in each of these three fields : that of Mechanics,
of "Properties of Matter," and of Electricity.
W. H. SHELDON.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.
RULE VERSUS DISCRETION
WHEN the conference on Legal and Social Philosophy decided to
place as the central problem for the next meeting the ques-
tion of the Province of Rule and Discretion in the Administration of
Justice, one of our honored colleagues, who had followed the first
meeting with generous sympathy, expressed grave doubt as to
whether the question was of sufficient general or philosophic impor-
tance. The prevailing absorption of philosophy in the problems of
epistemology makes it probable that this doubt is shared by a great
many, and makes it incumbent on us to show cause why philosophers
should busy themselves with this question. It will, however, be suffi-
cient for the present purpose if the following considerations succeed
in indicating genuine philosophic problems rather than any adequate
solution.
I
Amidst the diverse attitudes which people take to our courts of
law, nothing is more usual than the remark of educated people : ' ' If
: our judges would only occasionally forget their legal technicalities
and rely more often on common sense and justice, we would have less
reason to be dissatisfied with their work." This remark is based on
the belief that the end of courts of law is to render justice, and that
the technical rules are at best only means towards this end and ought
not, therefore, ever to stand in the way of the end itself. To which
the lawyer answers, that if the judge is to feel free to disregard a law
in the interest of what he thinks justice, then the law becomes a dead
letter and we are given over to the arbitrary sway of caprice, which
is equivalent to anarchy or tyranny. The classical expression of this
point of view occurs in Maine's Ancient Law. Commenting on the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 209
fact that the Greeks "disembarrassed themselves with astonishing
facility from cumbrous forms of procedure and needless terms of
art, and soon ceased to attach any superstitious value to rigid rules
and prescriptions," Maine says that it was not for the ultimate ad-
vantage of mankind that they did so, for "no durable system of juris-
prudence could be produced in this way. A community which never
hesitated to relax rules of written law whenever they stood in the
way of an ideally perfect decision on the facts of particular cases,
would only, if it bequeathed any body of judicial principles to pos-
terity, bequeath one consisting of the ideas of right and wrong which
happened to be prevalent at the time. Such a jurisprudence would
contain no framework to which the more advanced conceptions of
subsequent ages could be fitted. It would amount at best to a phi-
losophy, marked with the imperfections of the civilization under
which it grew up." 1
The attitude of the legalist to a system of law that merely achieves
justice is similar to the attitude of a properly trained physician to an
empiric medicine that merely cures people. To be worthy of respect,
both justice and medicine must work, not empirically from hand to
mouth, but according to a scientific system of rules. The predominant
reason for this rationalistic attitude in law is a practical one, the need
of certainty in human transactions and security against unforeseen
changes. Justice has been, and is still in several fields, administered
according to the sense of justice of the judge. But the judge decides
a controversy only after it has arisen. In entering, however, on any
transaction that involves reliance on future conditions, people must
in some measure know beforehand what they may and what they
may not do. Hence the need of definite rules to govern human trans-
actions and according to which controversies shall be decided. The
other advantages of justice administered according to rules or laws,
viz., that it provides a check against partiality, ignorance, etc., are
really subordinate to this great desideratum of certainty.
The non-legal philosopher may be inclined to question the as-
sumption at the basis of the above view, to wit, that the popular sense
of justice is more variable and less certain than the popular knowl-
edge and understanding of the law. But whatever may be said on the
two sides of this question, it is certain that wherever we meet a non-
homogeneous population such, e. g., as characterizes our urban life,
there we find actual differences of moral standard, and laws like
treaties of peace are necessary to establish uniform standards.
Legal philosophers, especially those of the English school, make a
great deal of the need of certainty in matters which are morally in-
i Maine, ' ' Ancient Law, ' ' Ch. 4.
210
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
different. The familiar illustration of this is the rule of the road. 2
It makes no difference whether the rule of the road is to turn to the
left or to turn to the right. The important thing is that there should
be a rule so that people may know how to avoid collision. The legal
or conventional part of justice, Aristotle tells us, "is what originally
was indifferent, but having been enacted, is no longer so. " 3 The as-
sertion is also frequently made that ' ' it is often more important that
a rule should be definite, certain, known, and permanent, than that it
should be ideally just." 4 Though this may be somewhat question-
able from a rigorous ethical point of view, there can be no doubt that
most people would rather stand a small loss than remain long in a
condition of doubt as to their rights.
For these reasons the legalist regards discretion on the part of the
magistrates as anarchy and the appeal from law to justice as shallow
and vicious. But now the plot thickens. Having banished the lay-
man or the empiric, the legalist meets his Nemesis in his own house-
hold. The requirement of certainty and the effort to eliminate all
discretion on the part of the magistrate make legal rules rigid, formal,
and inimical to progress. And when the law (in its effort to keep up
somewhat with the progress of life) develops, it becomes tremendously
complex, so that it becomes in practise unworkable and even uncer-
tain. Hence, legal history shows, if not alternating periods of justice
according to law and justice without law, at least periodic waves of
reform during which the sense of justice, natural law, or equity in-
troduces life and flexibility into the law and makes it adjustable to
its work. In course of time, however, under the social demand for
certainty, equity gets hardened and reduced to rigid rules, so that,
after a while, a new reform wave is necessary.
It would thus seem that life demands of law two seemingly con-
tradictory qualities, certainty or fixity and flexibility ; the former is
needed that human enterprise be not paralyzed by doubt and uncer-
tainty, and the latter that it be not strangled by the hand of the dead
past.
A detailed analysis of the factors which enter into this problem
and make it so significant to-day is not necessary for our present pur-
pose. The problem has been treated in a masterly way by Professor
Pound 5 in a series of articles which leave little to be desired by the
philosopher who wishes to orient himself in this matter. It may be
2 Pollock, * ' Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, ' ' page 24.
s "Ethics," V., 7.
4 Salmond, ' ' Jurisprudence " (3d. ed.), page 20.
s Columbia Law Eeview, December, 1913, and January and February, 1914,
and Harvard Law Eeview, January, 1914.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 211
useful, however, to consider here the purely logical aspect of the dia-
lectic immanent in this field of human endeavor.
II
That the dilemma between framing hard and fast rules or else al-
lowing room for discretion is a real one, can be seen in other fields of
human endeavor as well as in the law. It is felt by every one who has
to give orders to a human subordinate. You attempt to guard your-
self against his mistakes or departures from your settled policy by
laying down fixed rules. But when your subordinate rigorously fol-
lows these rules, you are vexed that he does so mechanically without
using common sense or "judgment." In the ancient and honorable
art of war the tendency has been to emphasize mechanical obedience.
Yet military history abundantly shows how initiative on the part of
subordinate officers or even privates carried the day. A distinguished
authority in our national game has said that the too-scientific players
"follow the rules even when the rules are bad which is worse than
no rules at all, ' ' and every one recalls the case of the British pickets
at Balaklava who were so highly trained that the camp was surprised
before they knew it, when common sense might have saved the day.
The most general form of this difficulty in the field of practise is
to be found in the political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. 6 Shall
the law or the just man rule ? Plato, as is well known, decides on the
latter alternative, using the analogy of the physician who, though he
writes out a prescription, ought to be free to change it when he finds
that conditions have changed. As a rule, however, he tells us, it is
better that the law should be obeyed. Aristotle, influenced, perhaps,
by the polemic motive, decides in favor of government by law rather
than by men ; but when we consider his admission that laws are fre-
quently the result of party bias, and his continued insistence that
equity exercised by magistrates is necessary as a corrective to the
abstract generality of laws which can not possibly take all circum-
stances into account, we see that our American publicists are not
really genuine disciples of the Stagyrite when they deify the one-
sided dogma about ' ' government by law ' ' as the final revelation of po-
litical truth for all times to come. In the intellectual realm this diffi-
culty shows itself in the form of the familiar dilemma between ra-
tionalism and empiricism. Should we put our faith in rules or in
concrete cases? In his address before the International Congress of
Physicists, the great Poincare began, ' ' Experience is the only source
of truth: it alone can teach us anything new; it alone can give us
certainty. These are two points which no one can contest. ' ' But on
6 Plato, "Statesman," pages 293-300; Aristotle, "Politics," II., 8; III.,
11, 15, 16; IV., 4.
212
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
the next page he tells us that " there are good experiments and poor
ones," and then, again, that "the physicist can not restrict himself
to generalizing his experiments, he must correct them." 7 Thus we
keep on appealing from principle to fact and then back again from
fact to principle. This is especially noticeable in ethics. How are we
to settle disagreements as to ethical matters ? By appeal to principle !
But if the principles are questioned, we appeal to particular in-
stances.
It is the essence of rationalism the naive faith in the adequacy
of all intellectual distinctions to declare that certain things can not
be or certain tasks can not be performed because they involve contra-
dictions. The history of human thought ought to warn us against
this easy assumption. All human difficulties are contradictions be-
fore they are solved. For a man to cross a river and not get wet was
a patent contradiction before the invention of boats. At any rate, a
distrust of the classical forms of rationalism leads to a wise scepti-
cism about sharp antithesis. Certainty and flexibility may be diffi-
cult qualities to bring together, but they are really not logical contra-
dictions. In the past we have tried to create certainty exclusively
through hard and fast rules, and this has admittedly broken down in
practise. The legalist's dilemma, either a rigid rule without dis-
cretion on the part of the judge, or else arbitrary caprice, does not,
however, exhaust all possibilities. If it were true, there would be no
middle course between absolutism and anarchy. (In the American
theory of government, "the Law" takes the place of the absolute mon-
arch or sovereign). As a matter of fact, discretion is not lawless.
When we praise any one for showing fine discretion on any occasion,
we certainly do not mean that he has acted in an anarchic manner.
Discretion, in general, represents more or less instinctive evaluation or
appreciation of the diverse elements that enter into a complex ; and
such instinctive evaluation must precede conscious rule-making. 8
Rule thus bears to discretion the relation of limit (in the mathematical
sense) . It is this which enables us to understand the present tendency
in American public life to take away administrative duties from courts
that exercise them according to fixed rules, and transfer them
to commissions clothed with large discretionary power. Doubtless
these commissions will, sooner or later, formulate their discretion into
rules (as did the courts of chancery), but observe that such commis-
sions have means of studying the effect of their decisions, and of
modifying their attitude in accordance with the results of enlarged
7 ' ' Rapports present au Congres International de Physique, ' ' I., pages
1, 2, 3 (italics mine).
s That judges must take part in the process of law-making, I have attempted
to show in my article in the American Law Review, March, 1914.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 213
experience, while our regular courts can only guess at the social ef-
fects of the rules which they work out, and have no guide except re-
liance on a priori maxims. That there is really nothing to prevent
our courts from likewise introducing statistical and scientific ma-
terial to guide them in their work is shown by the organization of
the municipal courts of Chicago.
In European countries the emancipation from legalistic rational-
ism has taken the form of a revolt from the ancient dogma that a
judge can decide controversies growing out of modern conditions by
finding the will of a legislator who could not possibly have foreseen
the complicated changes which time has brought about. This school
of Freie Rechtsfindung (litre recherche scientifique) insists, however,
that they are not contending for a lawless jurisprudence. On the
contrary, by judges availing themselves of the material offered by the
social sciences, the interests of social security will be all the better pro-
tected. 9
In the legalist's references to discretion we always find a sharp
antithesis between rules of reason and arbitrary will. It is easy to
dismiss all this as based on an antiquated faculty psychology, but such
verbal refutations, though popular, are not very illuminating.
What is reason?
When the defenders of the classical theory of law tell us that law
is reason, they mean that law is deduced from legal first principles
which are as eternal, self-evident, and binding as the axioms of
Euclid. 10 Hence the consistent adherents of this view, like Wolfe, do
not hesitate to deduce the most detailed regulations of life, table man-
ners, etc., from natural law.
Against this view we have, besides the refutation of the self-evi-
dent character of Euclid's axioms and consequent distrust of self-
evident propositions generally, a whole mass of evidence that the self-
evident principles to which legal philosophers have appealed are
vague, frequently in contradiction with other equally self-evident
principles, and always really dependent on a fundamental choice or
preference. Principles like "equality before the law" are clear only
so long as we do not apply them to actual problems where all sorts of
distinctions between people have to be made ; the ' ' right of each man
to what he produces" comes into flat contradiction, in the case of in-
valids, etc., with the equally self-evident "right to life." Even the
supposedly definite principle that "the whole is always greater than
the part" becomes somewhat vague when applied to moral issues by
See G6ny, "Methode d 'Interpretation " ; Ehrlich, " Freie Bechtsfindung
und f reie Eechtswissenschif t, ' ' and the various works of Stampe.
10 This is explicitly stated by the leading Catholic social philosopher of to-
day, Cathrein; see his "Socialism," page 126.
214
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
such a clear thinker as St. Thomas, when, e. g., he says, "as the part
and the whole are in a certain sense identical, the part may in a cer-
tain sense claim what belongs to the whole. ' ' X1
As a matter of fact, when people approve a proposal as reasonable
or condemn it as unreasonable, they mean in the first case either (1)
that the proposal agrees with their own usual assumptions, (2) that
the proposal forms an intellectually coherent or consistent body, and
(3) that ulterior as opposed to immediate interests are safeguarded
by it. A system of justice according to law (which involves trained
jurists) is eminently reasonable in all these three senses; i. e., it is
(1) conservative, (2) emphasizes coherency, system, or, if you please,
intellectual symmetry, and (3) safeguards fundamental interests.
Those, however, who insist that reason or logic does not determine
the ends of the law, that it is merely a tool to bring about ends which
we have on other grounds consciously or unconsciously adopted, are
misled, by a too simple analysis of the relation of means or instrument
to its end, to suppose that the end determines the means and never
vice versa. Reflection on actual situations shows that this is not true.
Give a boy a hatchet and he will want to do things for which he had
no desire before; or, if this illustration is not sufficiently dignified,
consider how the invention of rapid means of travel and communica-
tion has introduced Speed (alias Efficiency) as the supreme deity of
our civilization and final arbiter of our personal as well as social ends.
Philosophy has for some time been engaged in deciding the rela-
tive claims of rationalism and empiricism, and has tried to do so, in
the main, on the basis of an analysis of the procedure of the mathe-
matical or physical sciences. A thorough study of the see-saw be-
tween rule and discretion in law suggests the inadequacy of the cur-
rent antithesis between these two points of view. The rationalistic
and empirical motives can not be fully understood unless they are
seen in their application to the whole life which we call civilization.
Thus the fundamental motive of all radical empiricism comes out
most clearly, I venture to think, in James's essay on the "Moral
Equivalent of War, ' ' 12 with its expressed preference for all the hor-
rors of war rather than ' ' a world of clerks and teachers, of coeduca-
tion and zoophily, of consumers' leagues, and associated charities,"
etc. Empiricism is the motive which makes us all impatient of re-
straint and detest the world of rules and regulations with its cere-
monies and red tape. It makes us tired of routine and anxious for
the thrill of novelty. It glorifies immediacy, and is essentially an
11 Summa TheoL, ' ' 2a, 2ae QLXL, Art. 1 and 2. For a detailed expose" of
some juristic " first principles,' 7 see Demogue, "Les Notions Fondamentales du
Droit Priv6." Book I.
12 t ' Memories and Addresses. ' '
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 215
attitude of trusting ' ' nature. ' ' 13 On the other hand, rationalism, the
love of order and certainty, sets greatest value on what the tempera-
mentalist calls the artificialities of life; it makes us build houses to
protect us against winds, rain, and the variations of temperature, and
likewise set up theories to protect us against the flood of new and un-
expected experiences. Its essence is thus the setting up of arbitrary
bounds or limits to minimize the bewildering variations of nature
and to eliminate some of the shock of novelty. Just as it builds dams
and dikes to control the great rivers, so it sets up laws and ceremonies
to provide channels through which the fitful floods of human passion
and impulses may run more or less smoothly.
To the extent to which we recognize the inseparability of these
two motives in the life of civilization can we approach, it seems to me,
any adequate appreciation of the purely logical problem of rational-
ism versus empiricism.
MORRIS R. COHEN.
COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
THE MODERN SPIRIT AND DR. SPINGARN
IN a recent issue of this JOURNAL 1 Dr. Spingarn says that my
volume "The Masters of Modern French Criticism" lacks
"unified and consistent thought" and is indeed only an expression
of "personal bias." Perhaps if I state briefly the argument I have
aimed to put into this book it may have more meaning for some of
your readers than it seems to have had for Dr. Spingarn. I remark
in my preface that the literary critic is confronted to-day by the
same fundamental problem as the philosopher. "For, to inquire
whether the critic can judge, and if so by what standards, is only a
form of the more general inquiry whether the philosopher can dis-
cover any unifying principle to oppose to mere flux and relativity. ' '
French criticism has been marked during the past century by a
magnificient expansion of comprehension and sympathy, but this
expansion has been more or less at the expense of judgment because
the critics have lost traditional standards and have failed as yet to
find inner standards to take their place ; they have, in short, become
impressionists. These critical impressionists are, I point out, closely
related to philosophers like James and Bergson who revel in the
infinite otherwiseness of things, the warm immediacy of individual
impulse, and dismiss everything that makes for unity as cold, inert,
merely conceptual.
13 Hence the easy transition from radical empiricism to mysticism,
i Vol. X., page 693.
216
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
What are we to oppose to this purely unchecked and tempera-
mental view of life, this attempt, as the pragmatist has happily
phrased it, to live in a universe with the lid off? Some theory of
the absolute ? Nothing could be farther from my thought. Because
a man does not care to live in a universe with the lid off, it does not
follow that he must abide in some shadow world of Kantian con-
cepts. The intellectualist always writes with an eye on the anti-
intellectualist, and the anti-intellectualist counters upon the intel-
lectualist, but the true opponent of both intellectualist and anti-in-
tellectualist is the man of intuitive common sense. For common
sense may not only rest upon intuition, but on a form of intuition
that should be especially cultivated by those who wish to escape
from the present naturalistic imbroglio. What I have attempted
to do throughout my volume is to apply a sort of Socratic dialectic
to the word intuition and to the dangerous sophistries that are being
introduced under cover of this word into contemporary thought.
It has been assumed that the only type of intuitive person is the
person who has the intuition of change, of flux and relativity, and
who stands, therefore, for all that is expansive and expressive and
individual. In contrast to this type of intuition which makes itself
felt practically as vital impulse (elan vital) I have distinguished
another type of intuition the perception, namely, on the part of
the individual, of a something in himself that he possesses in- com-
mon with other men. In its higher forms (as possessed, for ex-
ample, by Joubert) this perception may be defined as inspired and
imaginative common sense. In opposition to elan vital, it makes
itself felt practically as an inner check or power of vital control
(frein vital). I have, therefore, defined two main directions of the
human spirit, corresponding to the two main types of intuition, and
have opposed a philosophy of the inner check to the various forms
of the philosophy of the flux that are now sweeping the occidental
world.
There is, then, something more vital than vital impulse, and
that is the power to control this impulse and direct it to some hu-
man end. The man of naturalistic temper is prone to look on im-
pulse alone as vital and dynamic, and to conceive of everything that
restrains as dead and mechanical. Those who stand for concentra-
tion and discipline he regards as reactionary or patronizes pityingly
as "academic."
I am flattered that Dr. Spingarn should think me an American
Brunetiere. I am less flattered by the way he dismisses as a vain
flourish of words all the passages in which I am at pains to dis-
tinguish between my point of view and that of Brunetiere. It is
true that, like Brunetiere, I would react against naturalism; but,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 217
unlike Brunetiere, I would react in the name of the modern spirit.
For the modern spirit does not necessarily coincide with the natu-
ralistic spirit; it is simply the positive and critical spirit, the spirit
that refuses to submit tamely to authority, but would try out and
test everything according to the facts. Now, however tradition may
confirm my dualistic conception, I do not rest it, as Brunetiere does
his conception, immediately on tradition, but on a fact on the pres-
ence, namely, in the breast of the individual man of a something
that is anterior to both intellect and emotion, that makes itself felt
experimentally as a power of control over intellect and emotion.
Kant tends to draw men away from a firm grasp on this primary
fact of human nature into mere intellectualism when he denies the
superrational intuitions. Bergson significantly takes this denial
as the point of departure for his own philosophy. 2 Benedetto Croce,
Dr. Spingarn's master, rests his system on a similar denial. 3
It is true, as Dr. Spingarn says, that I attack scientific positiv-
ism, but for a reason one would scarcely gather from his review
namely, because it is not sufficiently positive. The fault I have to
find with men like Taine is not that they are hard-headed, but that
they are not hard-headed enough. The scientist who tries to stretch
his observation of natural law to cover the whole of human nature
is really being drawn away from the positive and critical attitude
into some phantasmagoria of the intellect. In the name of this
phantasmagoria he tries to deny one of the two main directions of
the human spirit. What the present situation would seem to re-
quire is not the transcendentalist, but the spiritual positivist who
will plant himself on the facts of the human law at least as firmly
as the true scientist does on the facts of the natural law, and who
will look with equal disdain on the apriorist and the metaphysician.
One of the results of the naturalistic denial of dualism in the
field of literature and literary criticism has been to obliterate the
boundaries between creation and criticism, between genius and
taste. 'The identity of genius and taste," says Dr. Spingarn, in
his "New Criticism," is the final achievement of modern thought
on the subject of art, and it means that, fundamentally, the critical
and the creative instincts are one and the same. " This doctrine at all
events is not new. It is in germ in precursors of the naturalistic
movement like Eousseau and Diderot and, Croce would add, Vico ; it is
stated with perfect clearness by A. W. Schlegel 4 and passed on by him
to Madame de Stae'l. 5 Those who for a century or more have been
See his article on " L 'Intuition philosophique ' ' in Revue de Me"taphysique
et de Morale, Nov., 1911.
a ' ' Estetica, ' > page 68.
^"Vorlesungen tiber Schone Litteratur und Kunst" (1803) in Deutsche Lit-
teraturderikmale, 18, pages 82-83.
c Cf. "The Masters of Modern French Criticism, " pages 16-17.
218
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
putting forth these extreme views are playing into the hands of
the reactionaries, who assert that the modern spirit is in its essence
only anarchy, the readiness to sacrifice the true form and sym-
metry of life to mere expression. One should aim, on the contrary,
to be a modern of moderns, and at the same time practise the dis-
ciplinary virtues and so deprive the reactionaries of their only
serious argument.
I understand perfectly that the principles that seem to me to
make for this union of the disciplinary virtues with the modern
spirit do not seem to Dr. Spingarn principles at all, but merely
"personal bias"; they are too different from the point of view he
has borrowed from Croce. I do not, however, find it easy to under-
stand why so distinguished an investigator as the author of " Liter-
ary Criticism in the Renaissance" should fall into palpable mis-
statements of fact. For example, he says of my essay on Scherer:
' ' The reader will search in vain for a single allusion to literature or
art, to the life of the imagination in any of its forms." If the
reader turns to the essay on Scherer he will find detailed discussion
of Scherer 's attitude towards Moliere, Sainte-Beuve, Zola, Baude-
laire, and Goethe, along with less detailed treatment of his attitude
towards Arnold, Amiel, Hugo, Gautier, Lamartine, and others!
I admit, however, that my whole volume is meant as a protest against
the romantic tendency to withdraw into the tower of ivory in other
words, to treat art and literature as something apart from life.
IRVING BABBITT.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
French Prophets of Yesterday. ALBERT L. GUERARD. New York: D.
Appleton and Company. 1913. Pp. 288.
This is a book of a good kind, the subject is well chosen, and the work
is skilfully done. The writer traces the currents of religious thought
under the Second Empire as revealed, not merely by theologians and phi-
losophers, but by historians, critics, poets, novelists, and essayists, who
often express and develop the ideas of an age far more than the leaders of
the schools. In the period under review France had ceased to be the acknowl-
edged leader of the intellectual world; but she remained a great clearing-
house of thought. The contending influences which have gone to make up
modern life on its intellectual side were embodied there in such great
personalities as Scherer, Michelet, Hugo, Sainte-Beuve, Taine, and Renan,
whom one can not omit from one's acquaintanceship without serious loss.
Professor Guerard analyzes the contributions of all these, and of many
smaller men, to the thought of their time, not only with absolute fairness,
but with a breadth of sympathy and a fulness of knowledge no less praise-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 219
worthy than rare. The book deserves to be widely read by students of both
literature and philosophy ; any young man gifted with intellectual curiosity
should be grateful for the opportunity to find out what names like Veuil-
lot, Montalembert, Guizot, Quinet, Leconte de Lisle, and Alfred de Vigny
really stand for. And Professor Guerard has not achieved impartiality at
the price of a colorless moderation ; he has his own views, and is not afraid
to express them trenchantly enough. His judgment of Taine, for example,
will appear to some unduly severe :
" An appearance of unanswerable logic, a display of minute facts, an
imperious style, and above all the ardor of evident sincerity, gave out-
ward unity to a complex and contradictory system. His example strength-
ened that which is more dangerous than ignorance, and even than frivolity
pseudo-science. Clear, honest thinking in the good old French way,
modest, cautious, painstaking research of the modern kind, suffered equally
from the success of this pessimistic poet, earnestly masquerading as a
logician and a scientist. His intellect was a powerful and delicate instru-
ment which, through some original vice, was untrue: perhaps the harsh
word of a political opponent was none too harsh; ' Taine est un esprit
faux.' Always stimulating, always unreliable and dangerous, he has been
unduly praised as an intellectual and spiritual leader; whilst his fame as
an artist is firmly established, and will probably grow brighter when his
scientific claims are dismissed and forgotten."
It will be seen from the above that Professor Guerard writes English
uncommonly well ; indeed, a careful perusal reveals only one or two slips, 1
easily pardonable in a writer whose mother language is French. His elo-
quence carries one through occasional eddies and shallows of thought
which might perhaps have been better disregarded. Maret's attempt to
liberalize the Church, he says, is " deeply forgotten/' and it is a question
whether it was worth while to recall it, even in a survey so comprehensive
as this. Professor Guerard never ceases to be intellectually alert and
therefore stimulating, but he is naturally at his best in dealing with people
and movements that have really counted. By the side of his judgment of
Taine it is perhaps only fair to put his more favorable estimate of Renan :
" They call him frivolous : but for fifty years he devoted his strength to
minute and patient research, and died in harness, leaving forty scholarly
volumes behind him. They call him elusive and shifty : but he never varied
in his main course, and, when he presented alternative hypotheses, he did
so out of broad-mindedness and candor. They call him pliant, effeminate, a
moral weakling : but he went boldly through a spiritual ordeal from which
most men of the rugged and strenuous type would shrink and seek refuge
in dogmatism or compromise. They call him selfish and a Hedonist,
whilst he preached and practised absolute renunciation to whatever was not
the ideal. They rebuke him for his smiling benevolence, as if cheerfulness
was not the supreme grace of the strong, and indulgence the privilege of
the pure."
Professor Guerard makes a good point in support of this view in a f oot-
i ' ' Which ' ' for ' l who, ' ' for instance, in the middle of page 49.
220
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
note in which he draws attention to the fact that the two most famous
disciples of Renan, Jules Lemaitre and Anatole France, did not fail to act
with decision and energy in the Dreyfus crisis, although they took opposite
sides. His personal recollections of that mighty controversy are interest-
ing in themselves, and are used to bring home an important truth:
" Humanitarianism survives to the present day, as a faith, a hope, a
discipline. It was an essential part of the religion of the great Romanti-
cists, Hugo, Lamartine, George Sand; it remains the spiritual backbone
of France. A dozen years ago, when a great moral issue was placed before
the country, when the Catholics seemed to think only of material order,
conservation, and safety, it was in the name of Humanitarianism that
Zola led his great crusade for truth and justice. It was our privilege to
attend many tumultous meetings in those days; with quiet courage the
speakers scholars, scientists, ministers, anarchists, for all were welcome
to their share of honor and danger were facing obloquy, ostracism, and
even death; no elaborate High Mass in an ancient cathedral, no revivalist
meeting of the most successful evangelist, has ever given us a deeper feel-
ing of what religion should be."
Professor Guerard amply redeems the period he has chosen for study
from the reproach of spiritual indifference too lightly urged against it
and against nineteenth-century France in general by people who do not
know what they are talking about. His remark that " France in the six-
ties, materialistic as it seemed, discussed religion with an intensity, an
earnestness, which contrasts curiously with the good-humored indifference
of the British and American public at the present day might be extended
with perfect truth to France before and since. Professor Guerard has de-
served well of his country in this faithful and loving study ; and he would
add to the obligations under which he has laid American and English
readers if he were to add a companion volume on " French Prophets of
To-day," for which the material is no less rich, and for which he is abun-
dantly qualified.
J. W. CUNTJFFE.
: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
Heredity and Memory. JAMES WARD. Henry Sedgwick Memorial lecture
at Newnham College. Cambridge University Press. 1912. Pp. 56.
Professor Ward finds the starting-point of his discussion in the directed
activities of our conscious life. This affords an interpretative principle
which, on the ground of continuity, is extended to include all living proc-
esses. To the objection of the mechanist that continuity may be read in
either direction he replies that an explanatory concept must be derived
from cases where it is typically manifested.
The characteristic features which the problem presents are individuali-
zation and progress. The latter comprises both inheritance of the achieve-
ments of our predecessors and the attainment of expertness through ex-
perience. " Just as later generations inherit from earlier generations, so
later phases of the individual inherit, as it were, from earlier phases." In
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 221
the progressive modifications which thus arise in the plastic individual is
given " the possibility of an indefinite advance upwards in the scale of life
without the succession of individuals which heredity involves."
In the latter case the individual in a brief period repeats with certain
accelerations and foreshortenings the vast evolutionary history of which
he is the result. In an immortal and plastic individual all this might be
achieved, but every modification would be the result of function. A type
which actually connects these two series is presented by the unicellular
organisms where an endless series of individuals, each as old as the species,
arises through successive divisions by which, without death, the modifica-
tions of structure progressively acquired are continuously transmitted.
If now we suppose such an individual gifted with memory to be set
back from successively higher stages to the beginning of the whole process
again, the stages already traversed would be repeated each time with
accelerated rapidity, the latest acquisitions always involving the greatest
time and difficulty in their repetition. At any point in his history such an
individual would represent the sum of modifications acquired in the course
of experience.
This conception, which is fundamental to our notion of individual
existence, has met great opposition when applied to the derivation of
characteristics in the successive individuals of an hereditary series. " It is
unproved, impossible, and needless," say the critics. To this question the
writer then turns. In both cases alike a form of immortality is predicated,
but in that of the hypothetical individual modifications are due to the
teleological influences of experience, while in the case of the immortal
germ-plasm the factors, natural selection and amphimixis, are both non-
teleological. The attainment of the result is obviously possible under the
former conditions ; under the latter Ward thinks it to be inconceivable.
In the protozoa it is confessedly the former mode of transmission which
is present : if either term is to be denied it is the fact of inheritance, not of
acquisition. In the metazoa, according to Weissmannism, on the contrary,
there is absolute discontinuity between individual and individual, so far
as this system of acquired somatic modifications is concerned. One is thus
at a loss to find any resemblance between the processes of evolution in uni-
cellular and multicellular organisms, respectively.
The latest conception of intragerminal selection, formulated to meet the
problem of germ and soma, is a " surrender both of the ancestral continu-
ity and of the somatic discontinuity of the germ-plasm." But if the
principle breaks down even in the single matter of nutrition it needs
supplementation, and the whole question of possible modification must be
raised anew.
To this Ward now turns in the development of a psychological or
" mnemic " theory of heredity. In its modifiability and retentiveness
" every living cell, whether living in isolation or as a member of a complex
organism, must be credited with that organic memory which all life im-
plies. In the higher complex organisms the mechanism of this develop-
ment lies in the nervous system, but in the germ-plasm it is to be found in
the nucleus of the cell. The germ-cell thus becomes " a definite unity, the
222
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
counterpart of the structural alterations wrought by habit in the parental
organisms with which it has been in sympathetic rapport all along." We
can neither assume that experience has no place in the building up of an
organism nor that this process changes abruptly in passing from uni-
cellular to multicellular forms. Ontology and heredity thus become
aspects of a single process : what habit is for individual life heredity is for
social life. The writer closes with a protest against the physical interpre-
tation of this point of view. " The mnemic theory, then, if it is to be
worth anything, seems to me clearly to require not merely physical
records or ' engrams,' but living experience or tradition. The mnemic
theory will work for those who can accept a monadistic or panpsychistic
interpretation of the beings that make up the world, who believe with
Spinoza and Leibnitz that ' all individual things are animated albeit in
divers degrees.' But quite apart from difficulties of detail, I do not see
how in principle it will work otherwise."
EGBERT MACDOUGALL.
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.
An Introduction to Psychology. T. LOVEDAY and J. A. GREEN. Oxford:
The Clarendon Press. 1912. Pp. 272.
This volume is prepared especially for teachers, assumes little knowl-
edge on their part, and gives relatively little discussion of the technical
psychological problems. It is a chatty discussion in essay style of the
principal problems of psychology as they present themselves to the teacher
who has not thought too deeply before reading the book. Much attention
is given to the description of infancy and to the growth of the different
capacities during the period covered by school life. Purpose as the con-
trolling factor in attention, action, and thought is treated in two chapters ;
otherwise the book is for the most part devoted to a discussion of imagery,
association, thought, and imagination, treated as different processes.
Feeling, including emotion, is discussed in two chapters. On the whole,
the book bears about the same relation to psychology that nature study
does to the natural sciences. Within these limits it is well done.
W. B. PlLLSBURY.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. November, 1913. Degrees of
Reality (pp. 583-605) : BERNARD Muscio. - The notion of degrees of Real-
ity as employed in idealistic speculation is either based on an unwar-
ranted assumption, and supported by unsound arguments, or else it be-
comes psychology and ethics. Practical Success as the Criterion of
Truth (pp. 606-622) : HENRY W. WRIGHT. - " The purpose of this paper is
to investigate the meaning of practical success as a criterion of truth
when practical success is interpreted in terms of voluntary achievement."
The Problem of the Value-judgment (pp. 623-638) : DONALD W. FISHER. -
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 223
Develops the consequences of the view that every value is related to a sub-
ject in the sense of being emotionally valid for it. Analyzes the structure
of the value-judgment and maintains that there is no distinction between,
value- judgments and other types of subject-predicate judgments. The
Dualism of Bergson (pp. 639-652) : NANN CLARK BARR. - The method of
Bergson, that of making and subsequently resolving distinctions, shows a
progressive development. In " Time and Free Will," distinctions are ab-
solute. In " Matter and Memory," the distinctions earlier treated as ulti-
mate are largely transcended. In " Creative Evolution," the final inclusive
synthesis is reached. The result is " a genuine, though far from simple
or traditional, idealism." Reviews of Books: B. Bosanquet, The Value and
Destiny of the Individual: ERNEST ALBEE. F. Pillon, L'Annee Philo-
sophique: W. K. WRIGHT. John Theodore Merz, A History of European
Thought in the Nineteenth Century: J. E. CREIGHTON. Notices of New
Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. October, 1913. Sociologie et Psy-
chologie (pp. 337-357) : J. LEUBA. - A criticism of Durkheim's conception,
of religion, in which the following differentiation of magic and religion is
offered: the idea of an agent which can be acted upon by anthropopathic
means is the distinctive trait of religion, while that of magic is the em-
ployment of means of influence that act upon the agent mechanically and
automatically. The article advocates, against Durkheim, the importance
of the psychology of the individual in sociology. L'Inutilite du Vitalisme
(pp. 358-382) : F. Bosc. - Neo-vitalism is rendered useless, without im-
plying the triumph of materialistic monism, by a distinction between the
life that characterizes all reality (la vie cachee) and the life that appears
to the senses (la vie apparente}. "... the principle of life appears as a gen-
eral force which, by condensation, gives birth to matter, . . . matter pos-
sesses in decomposition the property of emitting imponderable forces that
approach more and more, in living complex bodies, the universal force."
L'Education et Bonheur (pp. 383-403) : J. FINOT. - A discussion of free-
will in connection with education and happiness. Notes et Documents.
Pensee, Image et Conscience chez V Animal et chez I'Homme: G. SAINT-
PAUL. Revue Critique. La Lutte Philosophique et la Division des
Croyances: F. PAULHAN. Analyses et Comptes Rendus. Buhler, Die
Gestaltwahrnehmungen: B. BOURDON. Luquet, Les Dessins d'un Enfant:
E. CRAMAUSSEL. Notices Bibliographiques. Revue des Periodiques
etr angers.
Torres, Alberto. Le Probleme Mondial. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa
Nacional. 1913. Pp. xviii -f 213.
Turro, R. Les Origines de la Connaissance. Paris: Librairie Felix
Alcan. 1914. Pp. 274. 5 fr.
Veblen, Thorstein. The Instinct of Workmanship. New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1914. Pp. x + 355. $1.50.
224
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
NOTES AND NEWS
THE following letter addressed to M. Fernand Vanderem is reprinted
from the Paris Figaro of February 28:
MONSIEUR :
Je tiens a vous remercier pour 1'article, fort joliment tourne, que vous
avez bien voulu me consacrer dans le Figaro. Je vous suis particuliere-
ment reconnaissant d'avoir retabli la verite sur un point essentiel. Quand
on compare mes cours a ceux de Caro, on oublie que je n'ai jamais fait
1'ombre d'une concession au "grand public", que mon enseignement
s'adresse aux specialistes, que je le rendais meme de plus en plus technique
a mesure que 1'affluence a mes cours augmentait. Cette annee, mon
cours du vendredi porte sur "la Methode en philosophic ", et celui du
samedi sur la deuxieme partie de I'Ethique de Spinoza, c'est-a-dire sur ce
qui a ete ecrit de plus difficile par le plus difficile des philosophes.
II y a deux points sur lesquels il me serait impossible de me mettre
d'accord avec vous; ces deux points n'en font d'ailleurs, probablement,
qu'un seul. D'une part, vous ne voyez dans la metaphysique qu'un tissu
d'hypotheses indemontrables, et d'autre part vous estimez que 1'accueil
fait a mes doctrines par le public en general est incomprehensible. Per-
mettez-moi de vous dire que la diffusion de ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler
le " bergsonisme " tient tout simplement a ce que les inities voient et a ce
que les non-inities entrevoient qu'ils ont affaire a une metaphysique
moulee sur V 'experience (soit exterieure, soit interieure), a une philosophic
modeste mais decidee a rester sur un terrain solide, a une doctrine qui
n'a rien de systematique, qui n'a pas reponse a tout, qui distingue des
problemes differents et les examine separement, enfin a une philosophic
capable de progresser et de se perfectionner indefiniment comme la science.
Chacun de mes livres m'a cout6 plusieurs annees de recherches scienti-
fiques; et chacun d'eux aboutit, non pas a de vagues generalites, mais a
des conclusions capables d'eclairer par quelque cote des questions tres
speciales. Encore une fois c'est la ce qu'on apergoit, distinctement OTI
confusement, quand on se rallie a cette philosophie.
Croyez, je vous prie, Monsieur, a mes sentiments distingues et devoues.
H. BERGSON.
AT the Conference on Legal and Social Philosophy, to be held in Chi-
cago on April 10 and 11, the sessions of the first day will be devoted to a
joint meeting with the Western Philosophical Association. On Friday
evening an informal dinner will be given by the local members from North-
western and Chicago Universities, which will be followed by a Round
Table Discussion on " The Advancement of Philosophic Jurisprudence."
The final meeting of the Conference will occur on Saturday morning,
April 11.
DR. OTTO KLEMM, decent at Leipzig, has been appointed professor of
psychology in Alberta University, Edmonton, Canada.
VOL. XI. No. 9. APRIL 23, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE WORK OF HENRI POINCARE
WHEN Henri Poincare, already a member of thirty-five learned
societies, was admitted in 1909 to the Academic Franchise,
to the place left vacant by the death of the poet, Sully Prudhomme,
M. Masson recounted in the words of a distinguished scientist the
career of this master ''whose reputation," he said, "is established
as an axiom."
"M. Poincare has a vast mind. He is remarkable both by the di-
versity and the depth of his knowledge. He is not only a geometer,
but also a physicist and an astronomer, not in the fashion of those
scientists who give themselves up to observations and experiments,
but by the applications he has made of analytic method to science;
in other words, he has advanced mathematical physics and celestial
mechanics.
"As a geometer, his writings on the theory of numbers, on inte-
gral calculus, and on the general theory of functions are spread
through more than one hundred and fifty Notes published in the
Comptes Rendus of the Academic des Sciences, and at least as
many articles and memoirs in French and foreign mathematical
journals.
"Professor of mathematics at the University of Paris, he has
published fourteen volumes of lessons on light, electricity, thermo-
dynamics, and the propagation of heat, making known in France
the theories of Maxwell as substantiated by Herz. He has not even
neglected wireless telegraphy an application of the Herzian waves.
"Also on the astronomical side he has shown much originality;
there, his studies on the form that a fluid mass takes in rotation and
submitted to universal gravitation have led to interesting theories
concerning the breaking apart of the earth and moon, and on the
formation of diverse variable stars; his work on the stability of the
solar system has led, by a revision of the calculus of Laplace and
by an approximation pushed still farther, to the proof that the theory
as formulated in 1784 is absolutely justified. The three volumes that
he has published on celestial mechanics are authoritative amongst
astronomers. ' '
225
226
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
In addition, there had also appeared three remarkable volumes 1
in which the philosophic significance of science is studied with rare
depth and from which emerges the most profound analysis of knowl-
edge, perhaps, that it may be the good fortune of our age to possess.
Yet, in 1913, when four distinguished French scholars unite 2 to re-
view the achievements of H. Poincare lamentably brought to a close
by death on July 17, 1912, much more is still to be told. Not only
have significant scientific publications followed those already enu-
merated, but also another volume of papers 3 of the highest interest
to philosophers is added to the list.
Langevin sets forth the dominant characteristics of Poincare 's
mind; 4 "His extraordinary power of abstract construction is equil-
ibrated by a constant care for reality ; he is a realist in mathematics
as in physics. The tree of his thought, branched to infinity, is solidly
attached to the soil by deep roots. . . . 5 Henri Poincare was never
troubled by the difficulties of analysis; he knew them scarcely more
than nature herself knows them, and he never lost contact with her. ' '
If his work lacked unity on the mathematical side it was because he
appreciated the adage of Hermite 6 " 'We are servants rather than
masters in mathematics. ' . . . The history of the work of Poincare is
nothing else than the history of mathematical science and the prob-
lems that it has placed in our epoch. ' ' For him science was so much
a living thing that growth of a part was not to be distinguished from
growth of the whole. No one understood better than he how the so-
lution of a single problem spreads its influence, like the splash of
a stone in a pool, until it permeates the whole. 7 "An experiment
of Kaufmann on radium revolutionized at the same time mechanics,
optics, and astronomy. ' ' A discovery by Poincare in geometry, that
( ( came ' ' while stepping into a ' bus, ' 8 has revolutionized our concep-
tion of the earth and of the generation of the heavens themselves.
To follow the technicalities that substantiate such work as Poin-
care 's is a task too difficult for those not deeply versed in the lore
of the mathematical and physical sciences. Indeed, even the able
expositors of the "Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale" frequently
i" Science et Hypothese," 1902; "La Valeur de la Science/' 1905; "Sci-
ence et M6thode," 1907.
*Rev. de M6t. et de Mor., September, 1913. L. Brunschvieg, "Le Philo-
sophe"; J. Hadamard, "Le Mathematician"; A. Lebeuf, " L ' Astronome " ; P.
Langevin, "Le Physicien."
s ' ' Dernieres Pensees, ' ' 1913.
* Rev. de Me"t. et de Mor., loc. cit., page 687.
s Loc. cit., page 696.
6 Hadamard, loc. cit., page 618.
7 Sci. et M6t., page 310.
s Sci. et M^t., page 51.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 227
impress upon our minds no more than a few baffling phrases
Fuchsian, meromorphic, and theta functions ; curves defined by dif-
ferential equations, equations with partial derivatives; molecular
tensions, capillary attractions, Herzian resonators, convection cur-
rents, etc., leaving us scarcely more informed than we were from M.
Masson's summary. Yet most of these things have their root in a
doctor's thesis of 1879, or the papers that appeared during the next
two or three years! And "the accumulation of these memorable
works is not their only characteristic. The god who inspired them
manifests his impatience in their very style. In a number of them
. . . two or three pages, luminous as concise, suffice for the 'veni,
vedi, vici' of a triumph of the human spirit." 9
Throughout we feel the scientist in love with truth and a man of
faith, for all scientists ' * are in a sense men of faith ; every passion
supposes a faith ; every motive of action is a faith ; it is faith alone
that gives perseverence, that gives courage. But, nevertheless, one
is not a scholar if one is not endowed with a critical spirit which
seems to exclude every sort of faith and often causes men of science
to be taken for skeptics." 10 His conclusions are models of caution.
Now he reviews Arrhenius 's hypothesis by which the universe might
escape that calorific death predicted by Claudius, and concludes that,
at most, we can infer a mere retardation of the process ; or again he
examines cosmological theories only to end in interrogation, since all,
including his own, fail to take account of some known fact. 11 Yet M.
Poincare does not lose faith in speculation. Had man been content
to await adequate data of knowledge, he would have lacked that im-
perious curiosity that raises him through science above the savage.
This curiosity is the incentive to work and ' ' however well endowed a
man may be, it amounts to nothing without work ; those who have re-
ceived the sacred spark from heaven are no more exempt than the
others ; their very genius only cuts out their work for them. ' ' 12
It is, however, M. Poincare 's reflections on the nature and sig-
nificance of science that especially concern the philosopher, for he
has rare acumen and an acquaintance with the subject-matter with
which he deals such as is almost unique in our literature. There have
been as keen philosophers and as learned scientists, but, with the
exceptions of Aristotle, and possibly Leibnitz, such intensity of phil-
osophic interest and scientific creativeness have never before been
united in one man. The unwary reader, however, should be warned
that from the appearance of "Science et 1'Hypothese" in 1902 to
ofiev. de M6t., pages 634-35.
10 ' ' Savants et Ecrivains, ' ' page v.
11 Leeons sur les Hypotheses Cosmogoniques, " 1911-13.
12 ' ' Savants et Ecrivains, ' ' page iv.
228
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
that of the "Dernieres Pensees" in 1913 there is manifest an unfold-
ing of the results of analysis that often betrays the unprepared, for
it is easy to pigeon-hole his earlier works as an expression of a phe-
nomenalistic relativism that is far from their real import.
' 'For the superficial observer," "Science and Hypothesis" be-
gins, "scientific truth is beyond the possibility of doubt; the logic of
science is infallible, and if the scientists are sometimes mistaken,
this is only from their mistaking its rules." When we look a little
more closely this confidence vanishes. We find the scientist every-
where depending upon assumptions and these assumptions are by no
means as stable as one might think. It is not a question of such
simple outlived ideas as defined for antiquity the shape of the earth
or the movement of the heavenly bodies, but of Carnot's principle,
of the principle of the relativity of space, or Newton's principle of
the equality of action and reaction, of Lavoisier's principle of the
conservation of mass, and even of Mayer's principle of the conserva-
tion of energy. We can not as yet predict the outcome in particular
instances, but such present doubts illustrate the instability of the
most fundamental certainties that science can contribute to our
knowledge.
What shall we do? Deny everything? "To be skeptical in this
fashion is still to be superficial. To doubt everything and to believe
everything are two equally convenient solutions; each saves us from
thinking. ' ' 13 But a superficial acquaintance with the results of sci-
ence convinces us that even our discarded hypotheses have been use-
ful. New science, then, if it is to transcend our present science, must
keep alive something of it or our old science will persist by the side
of it. Our formulae are like the victims of Kipling's vampire, for
some of them live, though most of them die, and it is experiment
alone through which these things are found out. But M. Poincare
is fond of pointing out that experiment is not everything unless it be
understood to be something more than a mere quest of observations.
The observations must be used, and to be used they must be gener-
alized. Carlyle's love of mere fact was unworthy of a countryman
of the man who invented the phrase experimentum crucis. No heap
of facts constitutes science, but rather an organization of facts. It is
science that enables us to predict, and a single observation by a wise
scientist like Pasteur can tumble into oblivion all the crowd of facts
a lesser mind might amass in a lifetime. Bacon would have under-
stood this, but not Carlyle. At best experiment gives us only a num-
ber of isolated points. To reduce these to law we must join them by
a continuous line, but "the curve we trace will pass between the ob-
served points and near these points; it will not pass through the
13 "Science et THypothese," page 2.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 229
points themselves. Thus we do not restrict ourselves to generalizing
the experiments, but we correct them ; and the physicist who* should
try to abstain from these corrections and really be content with the
bare experiments would be forced to enunciate some very strange
laws." 14
Even mathematics is not exempt from this dependence upon fact.
M. Poincare seems never to weary of returning to attack the logicians,
of whom B. Eussell and Hilbert are leading representatives, when
they would found mathematics on arbitrary definitions and postu-
lates. The first chapter of ''Science and Hypothesis" demonstrates
the factual foundation of arithmetic, the second of geometry; the
"Value of Science" begins with a discussion of the respective roles
of intuition and logic in mathematics; the second part of "Science
and Method" recurs to the same problem and ends with the words,
"the old logistic is dead, so much so that already the zigzag theory
and the no-classes theory (Eussell) are disputing over the succes-
sion"; and chapters three, four, and five of the "Dernieres
Pensees" are at the problem again, emphasizing especially the con-
clusion that "there is no logic or epistemology independent of
psychology. ' ' 15
Mathematical propositions are, then, transcriptions of experience.
It may be of psychological experience, such as our right to repeat a
certain process indefinitely the principle of complete induction
or of the conditions of movement which affect our geometrical inter-
pretations of space; or again, they may express complex relations
among physical objects, and often both psychological and physical
experiences are invoked. 16 Incidentally he has contributed to the
solution of the problem of the non-Euclidean geometries for the
philosopher by showing that every one of their theorems is useful to
solve problems of Euclidean geometry, thus extending the significance
of Eeimann's and Beltrami's proof that any fact expressed in
Euclidean terminology could be expressed by any non-Euclidean
system, and vice versa; and also the problem of hyperdimensional
geometries similarly by showing that any equations expressing facts
of space in terms of three dimensions can be translated into equa-
tions expressing those same facts in terms of ^-dimensions, although,
of course, the dimensions would not remain the same entities (lines) .
The consequence is that geometries are only languages and our choice
of geometries is based merely on convenience.
But this does not mean that the choice is arbitrary. "It is
true that it is convenient, it is true also that it is convenient
i* < l Science et 1 'Hypothese, > ' Ch. IX.
15 ' ' Dernieres Pens6es, ' ' page 139.
ie Cf. 1 1 Why Space has Three Dimensions, " l ' Dernieres Pense"es, ' ' Ch. III.
230
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
not only for me, but for all men; it is true that it will remain
convenient for our descendants; it is true finally that this can
not be by chance. ' ' The reason is that c ' all that the scientist creates
in a fact is the language in which he enunciates it" and " scientific
fact is only brute fact translated into a more convenient language. ' ' 17
Consider the four following statements of fact. They are M. Poin-
care's freely transcribed. It is getting dark, says the man on the
street ; an eclipse is taking place, says the astronomer ; the eclipse is
a phenomenon that could have been deduced from tables derived from
Newton's laws, says a mathematician; and the cause of it is that the
earth revolves around the sun, says Galileo. All of these statements
transcribe the same fact of experience. The first denotes a present
experience in relation to what has just been experienced ; the second
relates a present experience to the great mass of past and future ex-
periences; the third appeals to our powers of predicting and con-
catenating events ; and the last is so stated that one who is sufficiently
informed can see that Newton's tables are possible to construct and
of guaranteed applicability to this present experience.
The purpose of our theories, accordingly, is not to describe things
as they really are. They are not based on experience alone, but
spring from a collaboration of intellectual activity and facts whose
status is imposed by practical life. Their durability lies in their
power to simplify and unify the relations between things, and their
ephemeral aspect in their descriptive implications. When astrono-
mers said that the earth was the central body about which the sun
and stars revolved, they were saying nothing false except in so far
as they might be taken as speaking descriptively. That is, if we look
upon their theory merely as a formulation of certain relations that
express themselves among visible objects in the open heavens and the
visible earth, we find that it is a simple and unifying formula by
which to record them. To the casual observer, the sun, moon, and
stars do pass as they might if they revolved about the earth. The
motion is a fact. The trouble comes when we look more closely and
observe regressions and variations from the motion that is at first the
only one apparent to the eye. We must then reconstruct our theory,
and only then do we find that the helio-centric hypothesis has much
more power to unify and simplify than the other, and we say it is
true in a deeper sense. v Naively we chose the most conspicuous ob-
jects and scientifically those simplifying the most expressions. The
naive statement is not false, but an awkward conveyance of truth.
This is the essence of Poincare's identification of the truth with
the convenient. In his last volume 18 he explicitly identifies the con-
17 "La Valeur de la Science," Ch. X.
is ' ' Dernieres Pensees," pages 136 seq.-146 seq.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 231
ception with pragmatism and elaborates the conception as implying
that every statement that has a meaning must lead to some conse-
quences verifiable in fact, and that in this consists its truth. Ab-
stractions can be nothing but short cuts to getting into working re-
lations with the concrete. Unfortunately, the issue is confused for
the philosopher by an identification of pragmatism with idealism,
and the opposed school, characterized as Cantorians, with the realists.
These realists are more of the scholastic than of the modern type.
Their realism is based on essences and universals, and on things out-
side of relations to human beings, but of which the true and the
false may be uttered, although it is inconceivable that such utter-
ances meet with verification or rejection. They live by definition
through genus proximum et differientiam specificam and discover
the geometrical entities they define, instead of defining those that
they discover.
M. Poincare's idealism accords verbally with traditional state-
ments, "an object exists only when it is thought" and "an object
can not be conceived independently of a thinking subject," as op-
posed to the realistic, "the world existed before the creation of man,
even before living beings; it would exist even if there were no God
or thinking subject." But the general character of his epistemology
and ontology puts us in a curious dilemma in interpreting these
statements. Either this scientist, whose thinking is most exact in
the field of science, experiences an astounding lapse of logical in-
tuition when he enters the realm of philosophy, or else his idealism
must be read without those Berkeleian connotations the above quoted
idealistic phrases usually carry with them. In favor of the first con-
clusion is the curious Pythagoreanism by which he defines the objec-
tive as that which is common to many minds, and concludes that con-
sequently it can be nothing but mathematical relations, on the
ground that while the identity of sense qualities in two observers can
not be established, the scientific equivalents of them, the mathematical
relations involved in their experience, can be.
On the other hand, in an essay contributed to a volume entitled
"La Materialisme Actuelle" 19 and in the sixth chapter of the
"Dernieres Pensees" he favors an atomistic and discontinuous ac-
count of a deterministic universe that seems quite independent of
human consciousness. A definite solution of this problem of inter-
pretation can not be given without knowledge of the theory of con-
sciousness which must underlie these statements, and this M. Poin-
care has nowhere given us. If, for example, such a theory had been
developed along the lines of the new behaviorism, the statement that
the world can only exist in the mind of a thinking being would mean
10 Paris, 1913 ; contains also essays by Bergson and others.
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that the world, as man knows it, is merely an organization of objects
thrown into a practical perspective by their relations to the possible
modes of activity latent in the human or animal organism and, in
connection with epistemology, that objects are only aspects of an ulti-
mate, isolated (made objects) by these demands for action. On the
other hand, a representative theory of consciousness would lead to an
orthodox Berkeleianism difficult to harmonize with the ontology and
epistemology. The evidence left us is so slight that it would be il-
legitimate to conclude in favor of either interpretation.
When we examine the character of the formulae by which we ex-
press our knowledge, we find three distinct types. First, there is a
class of verifiable propositions of the sort that lead experimentally-
either to verification or to refutation. In either case they are useful,
for, if immediately rejected, the false ones at least narrow the field
of investigation and the very experiment which rejects them may
suggest a new hypothesis to replace the old, and thus be a great aid
to discovery, because when an hypothesis that pretends to take into
consideration all the factors in a given situation fails, it can only
mean that some unknown factor is present, something unexpected
and extraordinary which, without the false hypothesis, might have
been a long time overlooked.
The second class of hypotheses consists of general statements that
are useful to us in fixing our ideas, but which can not be submitted to
experimental tests and so can not be affirmed or denied. The prin-
ciple of the conservation of energy is such an hypothesis. The only
condition that makes it true is that we enunciate it for a strictly iso-
lated system, but this condition can never be realized in a system
upon which experimental observation is possible. Yet it is of the
highest value, for it expresses something that a large number of
scientific laws have in common. Its very generality guarantees its
unverifiability. But if the principle has a meaning, may it not be
false ? It may well be that we have not the right to apply it indefi-
nitely even though it is certain to be verified in the strict sense of
the term. We shall know when we have reached the limits of its
applicability by the fact that it ceases to be useful in the prediction
of new phenomena and it will stand condemned without being con-
tradicted.
The third class of hypotheses are such only in appearance. They
are really what M. Poincare calls disguised definitions or conven-
tions. ''These conventions are the work of the free activity of our
mind, which, in this domain, recognizes no obstacle. Here our mind
can affirm since it decrees, but let us understand that while these
decrees are imposed upon our science, which without them would be
impossible, they are not imposed upon nature. Are they arbitrary?
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 233
No, else they were sterile. Experiment leaves us our freedom of
choice, but it guides us by aiding us to discern the easiest way. Our
decrees are, therefore, like those of a prince, absolute but wise, who
consults his counsel of state."
The discovery of an hypothesis is an interesting case of creative
imagination and M. Poincare has contributed an important chapter
to the psychology of this problem. Certain of the dominant factors
of discovery are possessed by every one. In the first place the creator
must be able to reason ; in the second, he must be able to remember,
and in the third, he must possess a certain sensibility less easy to de-
fine. All men should be able to understand mathematics, for all men
go through the same thought processes as the mathematician, but
some men can not remember mathematical facts surely enough to re-
tain long series of mathematical reasonings, just as some men can not
retain the dominant facts in a game of chess well enough to be good
players. But the last factor of creation is by no means common to
all. In discovery, there is presented to thought countless combina-
tions from which those most likely to fit the situation in question are
selected, but the creative act is not merely one of selection, for to the
real creator many combinations are not even presented. Only the
useful ones present themselves, or at least those that have a frag-
mentary utility that may be rejected later as inadequate. A long
period of fruitless work often precedes, rejected combination after
rejected combination, then suddenly, at a quite irrelevant moment,
such as in the midst of a conversation, or a walk, the proper idea ap-
pears with a strong feeling of illumination and certainty that can
only be justified or refuted by later work. Unconscious work
has evidently been taking place. But M. Poincare is loath to accept
this as evidence of a subliminal self as a causal factor while any
other plausible hypothesis remains. What may happen is that an
automatic combining and recombining takes place until certain com-
binations having a peculiar affinity for our emotional consciousness
occur and bring themselves to our attention. The most original part
of his discussion is the interpretation of this feeling as esthetic, a
feeling of "the harmony of numbers and forms, of geometric ele-
gance," and there have never been finer pages written than those
following on the relation of the beautiful and the useful; for not
only is the sense of harmony the determining cause in the selection of
facts and scientific creation, but it is also the instigator of the en-
deavor from which results that flash of intellectual light which is the
essence of man's brief terrestrial career.
"The scientist does not study nature because it is useful; he
studies it because he delights in it, and he delights in it because it is
beautiful. ... Of course I do not here speak of that beauty which
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strikes the senses, the beauty of qualities and appearances; ... I
mean that profounder beauty which comes from the harmonious
order of the parts and which a pure intelligence can grasp. This it
is which gives a body, a structure, so to speak, to the iridescent ap-
pearances which flatter our senses, and without this support the
beauty of these fugitive dreams would be only imperfect, because it
would be vague and always fleeting. . . . And we need not fear that
this instinctive and unavowed prepossession will turn the scientist
aside from the search for the true. One may dream a harmonious
world, but how far the real world will leave it behind ! The greatest
artists that ever lived, the Greeks, made their heavens; how shabby
they were beside the true heavens, ours!
"And it is because simplicity, because grandeur, is beautiful, that
we preferably seek simple facts, sublime facts, that we delight now
in following the majestic course of the stars, now in examining with
the microscope that prodigious littleness which is also a grandeur,
now in seeking in geological time the traces of a past which attracts
because it is far away.
"We see, too, that the longing for the beautiful leads us to the
same choices as the longing for the useful. . . .
"Whence comes this concordance? Is it simply that the things
which seem to us beautiful are those which best adapt themselves to
our intelligence, and that consequently they are at the same time the
implement this intelligence knows best how to use ? Or is there here
a play of evolution and natural selection? Have the peoples whose
ideal most conformed to their highest interests exterminated the
others and taken their place ? All pursued their ideals without ref-
erence to consequences, but while this quest led some to destruction,
to others it gave empire. One is tempted to believe it. If the Greeks
have triumphed over the barbarian, and if Europe, heir of Greek
thought, dominates the world, it is because savages loved loud colors
and the clamorous tones of the drum which alone occupied their
senses, while the Greeks loved the intellectual beauty which hides be-
neath sensuous beauty, and it is this intellectual beauty that makes
intelligence sure and strong." 20
The "Dernieres Pensees" gives us our only glimpse of Poincare's
moral philosophy, 21 and much of the discussion here is limited to the
relations between science and morals. Morality for Poincare is ulti-
mately based on feelings, hence there can be neither a scientific moral-
ity nor an immoral science. Science can help us to foresee what con-
sequences follow if we act in a certain fashion. It can also cultivate
20 ' < Science et Methode, ' ' Ch. I.
21 LOG tit., Ch. VIII., "La Morale et la Science"; Ch. IX., "L 'Union
Morale. ' '
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 235
our sense of harmony and our love of truth. It can develop habits of
generalization so that we can see the furthering of our personal in-
terests as subordinate to wider interests, but it can not prove a moral
law and must contradict our idea of liberty, except in the sense in
which Fouillee construes this idea itself as a moving force. Half
science only is dangerous, for facts remain what they were before
they were articulated in scientific language. The power of morality
can not be weakened by an understanding of its secret force: "Is
gravitation less irresistible since Newton ? ' ' Life presents itself as a
strife in which now this and now that triumphs, and moral educa-
tion consists in organizing this strife to make as efficient as possible
our energies which are, in this relation, our feelings.
And the popular attitude toward science, as expressed by the ap-
propriations of governments, recognizes its ideal value. Astronomy
is one of the most expensive of the sciences, from the point of view
of research, yet governments never hesitate. And how is astronomy
useful ? 2: It raises us above ourselves and makes us conscious of
our power through its eternal presentation of harmony and law. It
is a prototype for our analysis of matter. "The stars send us not
only that visible and gross light which strikes our bodily eyes, but
from them also comes to us a light far more subtle, which illuminates
our minds. . . ." Astronomy taught man that there are laws from
which he can not escape, and with which there is no possible compro-
mise. It has taught him also the essential character of law, for from
Newton he first learns that law is a necessary relation between the
present state of the world and its immediately subsequent state. It
has also taught us to set aside appearance. "The day Copernicus
proved that what was thought the most stable was in motion, that
what was thought moving was fixed, he showed us how deceptive
could be the infantile reasonings which spring directly from the
immediate data of our senses." It has freed us from the illusion
that the world is made for man and it has taught us not to fear big
numbers. It may be that the stars will become a "majestic labora-
tory" and "gigantic crucibles" for the chemist; "perchance, even,
the stars will some day teach us something about life." Indeed,
Poincare is fond of repeating, it is astronomy that "has made us a
soul capable of comprehending nature. ' '
The value of science does not, then, rest in any material achieve-
ment in a utilitarian sense, and it is not a mere servant of man
through which he attains a dull mastery of an existence which he
can subject to his caprice, but science is rather the assertion of that
cosmic law through which man becomes more finely molded than
the beasts. And everywhere it is mankind, and not men, that truly
22 La Valeur de la Science, ' ' Ch. VI.
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succeeds, and truth, in the legitimate sense of the abstraction, rather
than loved truths. "Just as humanity is immortal, although men
suffer death, so truth is eternal, although ideas perish, because ideas
beget ideas as men beget men. ' ' 2S
HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
MUSIC AND EMOTION
THE esthetic emotions have long figured as one of the least under-
stood parts of the subject-matter of psychology. Psychologists
have called these emotions ' ' pseudo-emotions. ' ' And, after bestowing
upon them such an uncomplimentary title, they proceed to admit
that upon the whole ' ' they are something of a mystery. ' ' The name,
"pseudo-emotion," seems to imply a suspicion that the arousal of
emotion through the arts is in some sense not quite normal. Works
of art are contrasted with ordinary stimuli as "artificial" to
"natural" stimuli. However, when one recalls the age-long alliance
between music and the dance, between music and religion, and
between music and song, such a contrast seems to be inappropriate.
The universality with which music is utilized as a means of man's
self-expression would afford indication of the accommodation of
the organism to such stimuli. The writer is convinced that, at
bottom, music (and all the other arts, for that matter) rests upon the
exploitation of that sort of exciting agency which is the "natural,"
innately appropriate, and adequate stimulus for the calling forth of
an emotion through the excitation of the sense-organs. In this paper
I wish to undertake to throw some little light upon the connection of
music and emotion. The mechanics of the correlation admit of a
certain amount of explication. I must preface my remarks, however,
with the admission that I can offer little more than suggestions of the
direction in which research, I believe, might profitably proceed.
The point of difficulty in understanding the connection of music
and emotion is not the general fact that music arouses emotion, but
the necessity of finding specific differences in the music-stimuli to
account for the specific differences in the various emotions aroused.
Air-vibrations seem to be a most colorless medium. That mere air-
vibrations should form an exciting agency for the whole gamut of
human feelings, its martial ardors, its loves and hates, its joyances
and sadnesses, is truly an astounding fact ! Equally astonishing in
their own way, doubtless, are the effects of pigment and pencil,
marble and bronze, and the word- jewelry of the poet. But the
medium of music apparently is so diaphanous and intangible, and its
Savants et Ecrivains, " page 175.
23
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 237
appeal so intimate and organically profound, that the ostensible
inefficiency of air-vibrations to elicit such responses seems all the
more glaring.
It is to be noted, to begin with, that the feelings evoked by sound
are often regarded as less definite subjectively than feelings as
ordinarily occasioned. In every-day cases of the experience of emo-
tion we can generally specify the object which has called forth the
emotion. Or, more correctly stated, the tangibility of objects and
situations to which we react emotionally and the frequency with
which certain practically identical situations lead to emotional re-
sponse lend a definiteness to ordinary emotions that is obscured when
the stimulus has the intangibility of tonal air-vibrations. With cer-
tain exquisitely organized individuals, however, musically evoked
emotion appears to be as precise and meaningful as a beggar's re-
joicing over the gift of a needed coin. How to explain this definite-
ness for some individuals is a somewhat involved problem.
Music arouses various kinds of emotions, and there must be some
sort of differences between one bit of music and another to parallel
the differences in the emotional responses the several pieces of music
produce. Why one piece of music gladdens and the other saddens
must ultimately be explained by differences in the sound-complexes.
This is the crux of the problem. The question is : what differences in
the various complexes of air-vibration can be found to account for
the specific differences in the experiences of the listener?
On the one hand we have the emotion, on the other the stimuli,
that is, air- vibrations. The emotions are varied. They are not vague,
at least not to the musically enlightened. They possess a certain
exactness, a definitive outline. Often we recognize and name them.
Such and such music renders us gladsome; other tone-sequences
depress. Some we call funereal. Other musical phrases are indubi-
tably provocative of other frequently experienced emotional tones.
If then the emotions differ specifically we must seek specific differ-
ences in the stimuli to correlate therewith, just as we correlate one
vibration rate of the ether with a certain red, another with a cer-
tain green, and so on. Pieces of music resembling one another in
emotional value we should expect to find resembling one another in
structure. I hope to be able to show that such specific differences
exist and such a correlation can be found.
There are two factors to be laid bare. The first concerns our in-
nate organization. The second deals with the familiarization, through
the experience of the individual, with certain musical conventions
and the myriad associations that go to determine our reactions. It
is obvious that the second depends on the first; it arises as a result
of, and, as an inheritance, tends to develop further, the first factor.
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The first factor is biological : the second is a product of history. The
latter represents the elaboration and utilization of the material
afforded by the first factor.
To begin with the first factor. For the purposes of this paper we
need not consider in detail the various theories concerning emotion
and instinct. The interrelation of the two is pretty generally ad-
mitted. Now it seems clear that certain types of stimuli are what
may be called the organically appropriate and adequate stimuli for
evoking instinct and emotion. Furthermore, the bodily expression
of an emotion in one individual is often itself a sufficient stimulus to
elicit a similar reaction in other individuals. One animal in a herd
may be frightened by some unusual occurrence and this, as we say
quite properly, is contagious, so that it is communicated to the
others of the herd. Yet these others may not have been at all aware
of the unusual occurrence. Similarly, with regard to human beings,
we spea,k of the contagion of joy.
In the human being, too, an emotion may result from the occur-
rence of the appropriate stimuli. And certain broad differences in a
given type of stimulus, such as sound, will determine general diver-
gences in the responses. The manner in which the stimulation
occurs, and of course the condition of the organism, will also be
partial determinants. Thus a loud sound, unexpectedly sudden in
its appearance, is apt to cause almost any one to experience fear. In
the human herd, too, emotions will arise in one as an organic echo of
a disturbance in another person. The infant vibrates emotionally in
response to delicate shadings in the voice of the mother even before
it understands her words. With increasing experience we learn to
react to slighter and slighter differences in the intonation of voice
and to subtler and subtler distinctions and nuances in stimuli. The
effects secured by the art of acting depend largely on these facts.
These slight differences, acquiring different sets of widely ramifying
associations, become pulled further and further apart. As a con-
sequence the reverberations of our organisms become more and more
correlated with these nuances that may be undiscriminated by con-
sciousness.
It is in this fact of our innate organization that determines us to
respond to stimuli in certain more or less definite ways that I find
the primitive link between music and emotion. To the extent to
which a given piece of music considered as complex air-vibration
resembles the vibration-complex which is the stimulus that, with
reference to our innate organization, is the appropriate stimulus for
a certain emotional response, to that extent will the piece of music
evoke that same emotion. Neglecting minor elements in the process,
we can put it in this way : if a sound-complex, characterized by mov-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 239
ing in a certain range of pitch, with a general movement tendency
within the range, and also distinctive in coloring owing to its over-
tonic complex, larger and smaller periodicities of rhythm, and so
forth, produces a given type of emotional reverberation; then a
sound-complex represented by a piece of music that is known to
evoke that same type of emotional excitement will be found to have
a general resemblance to the first sound-complex. In the same
manner the sound-complex of a human voice expressing this sort of
emotion will resemble the two other sound-complexes. The vocal
expression, the "musical" sound, and the organically appropriate
stimulus will be found to resemble one another. They will not be
identical, of course, but taken in the large they are similar. The
music (which presumably is the resultant of an emotionalized condi-
tion of the composer) resembles the vocal expression of the emotion
simply because the art of composing depends ultimately on the ex-
ploitation of what I have called the primitive link between stimulus
and organic tendencies to respond.
We have a great deal of more or less direct evidence in support
of this contention. Since the correlation between bodily attitude
and expression on the one part, and the emotion, on the other, is
rather definite, we may consider the resemblances of bodily expres-
sion and music and in this wise find the correspondences between
the music and the emotion.
Consider martial music as an example. The readiness with which
one falls into step in obedience to its rhythm, the erectness of bear-
ing, the general tightening of the muscles, the flash of the eye, and
the heightening of bodily tone can be observed in almost every
listener. Of course, such attitudes are most apparent in the naive
unreflecting person, whose actions are not constrained by the petty
inhibitions of convention ; for some people seem to believe that they
are lapsing into barbarism whenever they permit free expression to
an emotion. Now consider the music itself. All martial music shows,
as a rule, certain general uniformities. Its characteristic range of
pitch which various examples approximate is indicated by the pre-
dominance of the brass in such music. The melody, the focal point
of attention, is most frequently given to the brass, especially to such
instruments as the cornet, trombone, and horns in general. Military
music has always been the music of the brass. The walls of Jericho fell
to the sound of trumpets ! A certain vigor and obviousness of accent
and forward propulsion characterize the rhythm, and the fitness
with which the martial step conforms thereto is evident. And brass
instruments, and, so far as I can discover, instruments like the fife
and bagpipes, tend to approximate a characteristic wave-form.
Such instruments are said to owe their timbre largely to the pre-
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dominance of the higher overtones coincident with the relative
feebleness of the lower overtones. These instruments form the center
of gravity of a military band. Now in the same connection, consider
the human voice. The martial thrill -is apt to voice itself in upward
tendencies of pitch within a range somewhat higher than in ordinary
moments; it also is apt to become more vibrant, sharper, brighter.
In this we see a general resemblance to the martial music. That is,
the vocal expression resembles the musical expression, and both fitly
parallel the bodily attitude.
I do not pretend, of course, to have exhausted all the factors in
this account. Suffice it to show that there is a resemblance, and that
various pieces of martial music resemble one another as much as
.various martial emotions resemble each other.
The dance affords further corroboration of my point. When
dancing is an art, we find that the music, the bodily movements, and
the emotional reactions show mutual congruity and compatibility.
A striking, if somewhat notorious, example of this is to be found in
the correlation of "rag-time" and what is called l ' rag-dancing. ' '
A musician once told me that the sorts of dancing, indiscriminately
called "rag," were the true movement corrolaries of "rag-time"
music. One has but to observe a negro ragamuffin dancing along the
street to appreciate the truth of the statement.
The opera affords a more complex and yet more exact confirma-
tion. Here the unity of effect is secured by the congruity and con-
cordance of several elements: the music of the orchestra, the voice
of the singer, the words sung, and the acting proper. We can some-
times discern that the music of the orchestra does precisely what the
human voice (not necessarily a singing voice) would do when freely
giving vent to the very same emotion that the music of the orchestra
is supposed to portray. Examine similar tragic moments in the
scores of various operas they will be found to have certain general
uniformities of structure. And the human voices in moments that
are tragic resemble one another in pitch, tone-quality, and the like.
Furthermore (and here is the essential point), the vocal expression
and the music also resemble each other. Why then the music evokes
that sort of an emotion is easy to see.
For illustration we can take Wagnerian motifs. The motif of
Isolde's exaltation in the love-death, the motifs of the Redemption
by Love, the Sword, the Siegfried, Guardian of the Sword, show
similarities amidst their differences. And they are similar in type,
although differing specifically, in their emotional value. The exalta-
tion of Isolde, the exaltation of the Redemption by Love, the heroism
of the Sword, and the Siegfried are all emotions that elevate and
uplift. Perhaps we may make a very general division of emotions
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 241
into two classes: those whose tendency is uplifting and those whose
tendency is depressing. The four motifs mentioned would then fall
into the first class.
Now as regards the sound-complexes, all four show an upward
tendency in pitch ; the first two rise rather high in the scale of pitch.
The latter two are enunciated principally by the brass, but move
through a lower range of pitch ; they lie well within the range that
is associated, as seen in many examples of music, with the heroic, the
valorous, and the martial. The interesting correlation is that all
four move upward in the scale of pitch, all four are of the class we
have dubbed uplifting, and this upward movement is generally char-
acteristic of the human voice when expressing freely such emotions.
An illuminating contrast is afforded by motifs like the oath-motif,
the dragon-motif, the fate and death motifs, and the music accom-
panying Hagen. They express the fearful, the awesome, the terrible,
the tragic. Their range of pitch is low, very low; the movement is
downward, and the sound-complex is properly rough and raucous.
Consider the human voice under the dominance of the terrible, the
awesome, the tragic does it not evince the same general character-
istics? It is certainly not smooth, mellow, or mellifluous; on the
contrary, it is apt to be hoarse, cacophonous, low-pitched, even
sepulchral.
Turn to songs. The analysis of a really successful one lays bare
important correlations. Suppose that the song is a poem of real
merit set to befitting music. It can be observed that the emotion-
verbally expressed is closely paralleled by the music : climaxes coin-
cide; transitions from major to minor and the reverse coincide
with similar transitions in the poem. And the singer's voice,
obedient to the music, works in a manner similar to its changes if the
poem were properly read instead of sung to music. Pushing the
point further back, we see that the music is emotionally adequate
because it has exploited the organically appropriate provocative of
the emotion, and so parallels the vocal expression of the emotion.
This should be sufficient to indicate that there is a general analogy
between the sounds in music which call up a certain type of emotion
and the tendencies in the vocal sounds that commonly occur in the
expression of that same emotion. So far, it is true, I have emphasized
only the sound-complex, and there are other factors of great, if not of
equal, importance. Tempo, for example, enters in decisively in some
cases. We can sometimes infer from the gait of a man something
concerning his mood. A brisk, tripping step is very different from a
slow, heavy, dragging pace. Two tempos in music, so contrasted,
differ as strikingly in emotional value. It is as difficult to conceive
of a funeral march in anything but a slow, solemn tempo as it is to
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imagine a mourner skipping along happily in the funeral procession.
Sadness of heart and a nonchalant demeanor are as incompatible as
a funeral march played in a gay swinging tempo is artistically im-
possible. And the artistic impossibility of the latter is directly
dependent upon the physiological incompatibility of the former.
Tempo, therefore, is also a determinant of the emotional value of
sound.
Khythms of a subordinate nature are also effective elements in
calling to life emotional attitudes. Subordinate rhythms within the
larger rhythm of the musical measure are often so prominent as
to indicate national types of musical composition. In that musical
glorification of the unexpected, ' ' rag-time, ' ' these minor rhythms are
the chief determinants of the effects of such music. It is worth
noting in this connection that "rag-time" requires a rather peculiar
sort of temperament and a rather definite sort of mood in the
performer in order that it can be played in such a manner as to
please even those to whom such productions are worthy of attention.
At the hands of certain rare individuals, "rag- time" playing is
almost an art. And the elements of the rendition that make it attrac-
tive to some persons are elements that are not indicated in the score.
The performer literally has to read them into the score. In the last
analysis it turns out to be mostly a matter of subordinate rhythm
and accent.
There are still other lines of evidence that might be appealed to
in corroboration of the general contention. Onomatopoetic words,
vowel sounds, and the like, throw light upon the point. Sufficient
has been given to show, however, that in music the primitive link
which relates music to the heart of our inner lives, and so to human
instinct and emotion, is the utilization of the innate correlations be-
tween sound-characteristics and emotion, and the additional fact that
the habitual expression of an emotion on the part of one person is
itself apt to evoke a similar emotion in others. Music has seized
upon this connection, and in all its development has never disavowed
it. In the history of the growth of musical theory and the means of
musical expression, this innate correlation of stimulus and response
is the starting-point, the propulsive force, and the raw material of
the movement.
A word of caution is appropriate in this place. One must not
over-rationalize the process of musical expression. One can not
assume that the composer is aware of the psychological and physio-
logical facts upon which his art depends. His choice of key, of
mode, of tempo, of orchestral emphasis, is regulated by their felt
appropriateness to his mood and emotion. Or if we say that such
choices are determined by the technique of his art, that technique is
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 243
continually being justified by his reactions to the effects of the laws
of his art. Musical theory did not create itself. Mathematical rela-
tionships may underlie all music, but mathematics did not give us
music. And just as we must not over-rationalize the composer, we
must not over-rationalize the auditor. The listener reacts imme-
diately to the music; or if his attitude has the aloofness of critical
judgment, the basis of the criticism is the felt appropriateness of the
music.
So much for the innate factor. The second factor, the influence
of experience, of associations and conventions, supervenes upon the
innate factor and develops it. We learn to associate types of music
with activities, events, sentiments, and moods. Think of the asso-
ciations that cluster about a funeral march ! Or a mass of Gounod !
One may say that it is now a musical convention that a certain sort
of music should have such and such a characteristic range of pitch,
such and such tendencies within the range, and such and such tempos.
But convention, however developed in the theory of the art, does not
explain its own origin. Funeral marches have certain recognizable
characteristices because at bottom such characteristics are an ade-
quate means of expression for a given emotion and the adequate
stimulus for the arousal of that emotion.
This does not diminish the significance of the role of history in
our experiences of music. Intervals that are regarded as harmonious
owe to history their acceptance as harmonious. Only a few decades
ago augmented chords were scandalous bits of futurism. The daring
of the whole tone scales of Debussy will probably have disappeared
for the composers of a few decades hence. We shall learn to react
to such things just as we have learned to react to the innovations of
Wagner. Conventions and associations that determine our responses
are as much a product of the development of music as they are a
cause ; and they are neither cause nor effect without the innate sus-
ceptibility of the organism of which so much has been said. Conven-
tions, associations, familiarizations in a word, the sum-total of our
musical experiences do not explain the intensity and imaginative
sweep of our reactions. It is necessary to realize that such influences
have their raison d'etre in our innate structure.
A final objection remains to be met. It may be said that there is
no such uniformity or constancy in our reactions as this contention
would lead us to expect. We do not always respond to a given piece
of music in the same way. Our responses vary from time to time
and from individual to individual. To this objection, however, one
might retort that there is as much constancy and uniformity in our
reactions to music as there is in our reactions to anything at all.
Besides, I believe it could be maintained that there is greater uni-
244
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
formity the higher the type of music considered. That uniformity
may be obscured by the fact of the extreme complexity of a symphony
as compared with a simple song, and the further fact that only a
small minority of people react to any extent emotionally to the
higher kinds of music. This may be due to lack of innate suscep-
tibility, or lack of experience, or what not. After all, many are
called to hear popular tunes, but few are chosen to hear symphonies.
However this may be, I think the objection may be disposed of if it is
remembered that a response is determined as much by the condition
of the individual at the moment as by the stimulus.
It is apparent that if our position be tenable, the modern orches-
tra is the most adequate means that we possess of expressing that
which can be expressed musically. This statement would doubtless
receive general assent. There are tone-complexes that can not be
produced save by the orchestra; there are literally some musical
thoughts that can not be expounded save by the orchestra. The solo
instrument, within the range of its possibilities, produces its effects
by approximating the sound-complexes to which we are organically
resonant. And the human voice is the most flexible of all instru-
ments, for the stimulus it affords is the direct expression of an
emotion.
When one considers the complexity of the phenomena which I
have been trying to analyze, a lack of definiteness and simplicity of
formulation in the results seems somewhat excusable. Many musical
experiences remind one of religious experiences. The difficulty of
analyzing the latter is well known. I have only striven to show that
the power of music over those ' ' whose heart-strings are a lute ' ' is not
wholly inexplicable. To such as these, the magic of tone and the
wings that music lends to imagination are phenomena so profound
that nothing less fundamental than inherited tendencies of our
organism would afford a satisfying basis of explanation. Our re-
sponses to such stimuli themselves unavoidably suggest that the
secret power of music arises from, and comes to rest in, certain intri-
cate tendencies of our innate structure.
ALBERT BALZ.
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA.
THE SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL VALUES
A FEW years ago 1 the present writer offered certain suggestions
on the problem of the classification of values. Three general
groups were distinguished factual, ideal, and transcendental values.
The first group was defined as involving adjustment of the organism
to its environment, and included the values of logical truth, utility,
i This JOURNAL, Vol. VII., pages 282-291.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 245
and agreeableness ; the second group was defined as involving a felt
harmony between the organism and some part of its environment,
and included the values of beauty, goodness, and religious truth ; the
third group was defined as involving a complete harmonization be-
tween the organism and its entire environment, but the task of
naming the values in this group was postponed to some future time.
I now seek the opportunity of completing this unfinished task.
In my former article, factual values were entitled "values of
adaptation," ideal values, "values of harmony," transcendental
values, "values of perfection." At this time it seems better to name
the last group "values of completeness." Notwithstanding the ill-
repute into which idealism, especially in its absolutist form, seems to
have fallen in recent years, I make no apology for taking my position
on this unpopular platform, nor for using the despised term "trans-
cendental" to name one of the classes of values. Absolute idealism
has its devoted defenders, who need no assistance from me, so I take
its standpoint for my own without feeling called upon to defend that
position.
By the transcendental, it was explained in the former article, ' ' is
meant the ultimate and complete as contrasted with the instrumental
and fragmentary." Logical truth, utility, and agreeableness bring
us into contact with our environment, but not into harmony with it :
beauty, goodness, and spiritual truth bring us into harmony with
parts of our environment, but not with the whole environment. Par-
tial comprehension without actual felt harmony is won through our
contact with facts, partial harmony without comprehension through
our absorption in the ideal ; but ' ' a completely rational and compre-
hensive attitude toward the world is won only by a thorough recog-
nition and realization of the harmony of all reality, ' ' and of our re-
lations therewith. Perhaps light will be thrown on the problem of
the transcendental values from our former consideration of the con-
cept of meaning. 2
A fact, we have seen, has meaning so far as it is related essentially
to some other fact, but the complete meaning of any fact involves all
its relations to every other fact in the universe. In the universe,
however, there are three distinct categories of facts facts of the
physical world, of the mental world of each individual self, and of
the social world of interacting selves facts of the outer world, of
the inner world, and of the fellow world, as Miinsterberg calls them 3
or, more briefly still, physical, mental, and social facts. Though
the meaning of any particular fact may be defined in part in terms
of some other particular fact, it is more fully defined in terms of the
2 This JOURNAL, Vol. XL, page 184.
s ' < The Eternal Values, ' ' page 80.
246
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
general category to which that fact belongs. Thus, the meaning of
any particular physical fact is with any degree of completeness de-
termined only by its relations to and in the entire cosmic system, the
meaning of any particular mental fact by its relations to and in the
entire stream of individual consciousness, and the meaning of any
particular social fact by its relations to and in the entire social
organism.
But are these larger wholes themselves meaningless? The scien-
tific concept of nature as a cosmic system may serve to give meaning
to physical facts which in their isolation would be meaningless, but
what is the meaning of the cosmic system as a whole ? The scientific
concept of evolution may be of value in explaining certain particular
facts, in that a given fact may be said to have a purpose so far as it
promotes the general evolutionary development of nature : but what
purpose does the evolutionary process, as a whole, fulfil ? These are
philosophical questions, and their persistence in men's minds bears
witness to an instinctive dissatisfaction with the merely scientific view
of nature. This dissatisfaction idealism overrules by its concept of a
spiritual world underlying nature, a world-purpose which transcends
the mere causal succession of phenomena, and gives them a deeper
meaning and an eternal value.
In the same way mental facts are meaningless apart from the
stream of personal consciousness of which they are passing phases,
and acquire meaning only in relation to that entire stream ; but is the
stream itself meaningless ? It may be true that mental facts have for
their purpose the furtherance of the life of the individual, but has
that life in its wholeness no purpose or value? Psychology the sci-
ence generalizes no further than the stream of consciousness, but the
idealist insists that personality, selfhood, lies deeper than the stream
of mental states, and that the assertion of a spiritual life transcend-
ing the natural is necessary to give meaning, purpose, and value to
the series of mental facts.
In the same way, again, the individual self may acknowledge his
insufficiency apart from the community, may find his complete mean-
ing and value only in his relations to humanity at large, and may
conceive his life-purpose to be to share in the life of his fellow-men
and advance the interests of civilization. But what is the meaning
of humanity ? what purpose does society, as a whole, fulfil ? is civili-
zation itself valuable, and if so why ? Again we find a host of ques-
tions pressing for solution, and in reply the assertion of a spiritual
life underlying and binding together, not only the separate mental
processes of the individual conscious stream, but also the separate
individual members of society.
But we must not postulate any dualism between the facts and the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 247
values thus distinguished. The spiritual world is no double of na-
ture, but nature itself spiritualized or evaluated, infused with mean-
ing and purpose. We may as scientists analyze the fact called nature,
or we may as philosophers interpret the meaning and value of na-
ture. So the spiritual life of the individual is not a separate life
parallel to the natural life, but the natural life spiritualized or in-
fused with meaning: the psychologist may analyze the fact called
mind, but the philosopher seeks to understand the personality re-
vealed through the separate mental processes. So, again, it is the
spiritual significance of social life, not the phenomena of that life,
in which the social philosopher is interested ; but the phenomena and
their significance are of course inseparable.
Eelatively complete meaning, then, is given to nature in the recog-
nition of nature as a partial expression of spirit, to our individual
mental life in the recognition of it as a partial expression of an
eternal spiritual life, to our social life in the recognition of it as a
partial expression of a universal spiritual life. These are our
" transcendental values" which complete all lesser values. But such
completeness is still only relative: the final step in the interpreta-
tion of the three " worlds" physical, mental, and social consists in
their correlation and unification as still partial expressions of an Ab-
solute Being. If the Absolute comprehends all reality, every fact
which means anything at all will find its complete meaning only in
that Absolute; if the Absolute is a living reality, every purposeful
fact must have for its highest purpose the sharing in the life of the
Absolute ; if the Absolute is personal, every finite self must find its
deepest and most lasting satisfaction in the Absolute Self.
In religious worship man feels himself to be living this higher
spiritual life in intimate relationship with the spiritual world. This
spiritual world the religious man calls Heaven, the spiritual com-
munity the Kingdom of Heaven or Kingdom of God; the Absolute
Self he denominates God, and his individual personality he calls his
soul. Philosophers shrink from the use of these terms because of their
varying and often extremely vague religious connotation, harboring
a special contempt for what religion calls "the immortal soul." The
latter antipathy is, I am convinced, due largely to the substantialist
doctrines usually connected by the "plain man" with his notion of
the soul : regard the soul as a substrate, and the objection fairly holds
think of it in terms of meaning, purpose, and value rather than of
substance, and the objection holds no longer. Considering that the
ordinary religious man talks of his "soul" with such freedom and
innocence of offense, and probably will continue to do so to the end
of the chapter, it would seem to at least one humble philosopher better
worth while to attempt to clarify this notion, than to expend vain
248
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
efforts in the futile endeavor to destroy it. The term "heaven" we
may think it best to surrender to religion for its exclusive use, but
"God" and "the soul" philosophy needs as well. Religion is a life
of communion with God and the spiritual world: Philosophy an at-
tempt, but only an attempt, to understand this life and its objects.
In these pages we have been making this attempt through the instru-
mentality of the concepts of meaning, purpose, and value.
JARED S. MOORE.
WESTERN EE SERVE UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Immanuel Kant's Leben. KARL VORLANDER. Philosophische Bibliothek.
Band 126. Leipzig : Verlag von Felix Meiner. 1911. Pp. 223.
It is rather astonishing that so little should have been written on the
life of Immanuel Kant when his doctrines are dealt with in thousands of
volumes. The biographies of Arnoldt, Rudolf and Johannes Reicke,
Warda, and others are incomplete accounts presenting to us only certain
parts of his life. Even in the works of Kuno Fischer, Paulsen, and
Kronenberg the biography constitutes merely an introduction to the study
of Kant's system of philosophy. Schubert's biography, published seventy
years ago, was the only complete account that we had of the life of Kant.
And yet, as Vorlander points out, Schubert's edition adds nothing new
to the former publications, 1 contains many inaccuracies, and valuable as
it was for its own time, has now become obsolete in the light of the new
facts revealed by the more complete publication of Kant's letters, and by
the last ten years of fruitful investigations.
Vorlander sets himself the task of presenting a complete account of
Kant's life chiefly from his own correspondence and from documents now
at our disposal. Although he endeavors to avoid controversial discussions,
he subjects former biographies to sharp criticism and many are the errors
which he points out in those works. 2 The book contains six chapters and
is supplemented by two pages on the sources, a chronological table, and an
index of proper names. Side by side with Kant's life we have a picture
of his time and a very interesting account of Kant's successive relations
with Knutzen, Green, Haman, Herder, Lambert, Moses Mendelsohn, and
others.
As an analysis and historical development of the philosopher's thought
has already been given in Vorlander's edition of Kant, 3 to which the
present volume is a supplement, he studiously avoids here the exposition
1 It does not seem to mark a great advance on the edition which appeared
immediately after Kant's death under the common title of "Immanuel Kant,"
the well-known joint publication of three different works written by Borowski,
Yachman, and Vasianski, and published by Frederick Nicolovius (Koenigsberg,
1804).
2 See pages 2, 5, 11, 16, 18, 19, 25, 35, 41, 63, 164.
sC/. the "Philosophische Bibliothek. "
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 249
and criticism of Kant's works. Only of a few of the least known writings
of 1750 and 1770 is an attempt made to give an analysis, as these were
not included in the Bibliothek edition. Moreover, he purposely omits the
treatment of Kant's attitude towards politics, religion, and art, reserving
this, as he tells us, for a future volume.
In thus systematically remaining within the biographical limits the
author succeeds in presenting us a simple and natural narration not only
of the outer events, but also of the inner life of Kant. He has shown us
that this very simple and quiet life, devoid of external commotions, and
with few great epochs, was not without its inner emotions and conflicts
which, when understood, throw light on Kant's moral doctrines. Vor-
lander's deep insight can be seen in his most interesting account of Kant's
inward struggles at the time when the reactionary government of Prussia
forbade him to teach his own philosophy. The philosopher of the cate-
gorical imperative who bids us not to lie even when the life of a human
being is at stake faces the necessity of being sincere with himself at such
a critical moment in his life. From some of his papers at that time we
find that he seals his struggles with the consoling compromise that " if
everything we say must be true, it is not our duty to divulge all truths."
We have in Vorlander's volume many other picturesque portraits of
Kant at the height of his powers and also some very touching ones as an
old man abandoned by all his friends and even by his own mind.
This volume leaves us with a somewhat different impression of Kant
than most of the biographers are wont to give us. Here we have not the
secluded and solitary Kant, " who was born, lived, and died in Koenigs-
berg." But it is the more human side of this stern philosopher that is
put before us. We see him not only in the class-room with his pupils, but
also in the kitchen with his servants, teaching his cook the transcendental
principles of cooking. It is a Kant of universal interests that could even
write a " Kritik der Kochkunst," as his friend Hippel said of him.
The style of the book is pleasant, clear, and almost picturesque. Those
acquainted with Vorlander's other works on Kant will find here the same
clearness and scientific scrupulousness that characterize them.
NlMA HlRSCHENSOHN.
Advertising and Selling: Principles of Appeal and Response. HARRY L.
HOLLINGWORTH. New York : D. Appleton and Company. 1913. Pp.
xiv.+ 314.
As stated in the preface, this book has resulted from the cooperative
attempt, on the part of a group of practical business men and one or two
individuals whose interests were chiefly scientific, (a.) to formulate and
systematize those facts and laws which relate to the processes of appeal
and response in the selling and advertising of goods, and (fr) to undertake
investigations which might result in the discovery of new facts and prin-
ciples of both practical and scientific interests.
Especially worthy of consideration is the theoretical discussion and the
report of experiments having to do with methods of attracting atten-
tion. The conclusion is reached that the greatest change in modern meth-
250
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
ods of advertising is to be brought about by a substitution of interest
incentives for mechanical devices as a means of attracting attention.
Under the discussion on association of ideas the observation is made
that the business men are violating some of these laws in a most un-
fortunate way. They are causing us to think watch when we think
of Ingersoll. They should cause us to think Ingersoll when we think
watch. They teach us to think of Christmas presents when we think of
Copley Prints. They should teach us to think of Copley Prints when we
think of Christmas presents.
Experiments are described in which the relative merits of typical types
of appeals were determined by laboratory methods. Actual advertisements
were also tested in the same way. Based upon these experiments, the
inference is drawn that the advertisers could avoid much needless expense
by thus testing types of appeals and concrete advertisements before run-
ning the advertisements in the magazines and newspapers with the
necessary enormous expense.
This contribution to applied psychology is a model in that it sacrifices
nothing to popularity and at the same time is interesting and practicable.
Each chapter is worthy of study by both the practical business man and
the professional psychologist. In this book we have another example of the
value of the behaviorist's point of view.
WALTER DILL SCOTT.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY.
JOUENALS AND NEW BOOKS
REVUE DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. November,
1913. Soren Kierkegaard (5th May, 1813 5th May, 1913 (pp. 719-732) :
H. HOFFDING. - A discourse delivered at the University of Copenhagen at
the centenary of the birth of Kierkegaard. The author treats of his double
character as a philosopher of personality and critic of philosophy. The
dominant feature of his work is his study of the ethico-religious problem.
La relation des jugements (pp. 733-751) : E. GOBLOT. - Believing that
verbalism has obscured all logic, the author seeks to get behind proposi-
tions and relate the judgments that are expressed by them. La conscience
transcendentale, critique de la philosopJiie Kantienne (pp. 752-786) :
C. RADULESCU-MOTRU. - Those who have continued the philosophy of Kant
were deceived by an error in his psychology or they would not have sought
the material origins of a priorism in genius, in society, in the will, in the
elan vitale, etc. Etudes critiques. La philosopJiie de I'histoire de Julius
Bahnsen d'apres des documents ine'dits: I. TALAYRACH. Questions pra-
tiques. La morale sexuelle: TH. RUYSSEN. L'individualisation de I'impot.
Table des matieres.
Blondel, Charles. La Conscience Morbide. Paris: Felix Alcan. 1914.
Pp. ii + 336. 6 F.
Bradley, F. H. Essays on Truth and Reality. Oxford: Clarendon
Press. 1914. Pp. xxvi + 480. 12s. 6d.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 251
Coffin, Joseph Herschel. The Socialized Conscience. Baltimore: War-
wick and York. 1913. Pp. viii -f- 247. $1.25.
Derworn, M. Die Mechanik des Geiteslebens. Leipzig : Verlag von B. G.
Teubner. 1914. Pp. 92. 1.25M.
Falkenfeld, Hellmuth. Wort und Seele. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix
Meiner. 1914. 2.50M.
Hasse, Heinrich. Schopenhauers Erkenntnislehre. Leipzig: Verlag von
Felix Meiner. 1913. Pp. ix + 217. 6M.
Von Ihering, Rudolf. Law as a Means to an End. Boston: Boston Book
Company. 1913. Pp. lix -f- 483.
Joel, Karl. Die Philosophische Kritis der Gegenwart. Leipzig: Verlag
von Felix Meiner. 1914. Pp. 56. 1.40M.
Medicus, Fritz. Fichtes Leben. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner.
1914. Pp. v -h 176. 3M.
De Poulpiquet, E. A. Le Miracle et ses Suppleances. Paris: Gabriel
Beauchesne. 1914. ii -|- 321.
Prince, Morton. The Unconscious. New York : The Macmillan Company.
1914. Pp. xiii -f 549. $2.00.
Richard, Gaston. La Question Sociale et le Mouvement Philosophique au
XIXe Siecle. Paris : Librairie Armand Colin. 1914. Pp. xii + 363.
3.50 F.
NOTES AND NEWS
AT a meeting of the Executive Committee of the American Philosoph-
ical Association in New York City, on March 8, it was voted that the next
meeting of the association be held in Chicago on December 28, 29, and 30,
in conjunction with the Political Science and American Historical As-
sociations. The three associations will participate in a joint discussion on
a topic to be announced later.
For discussion in the Philosophical Association, the following topic is
proposed :
1 The interpretation of justice, with special reference to problems forced
to the front by present economic, social, and political conditions."
A more definite formulation of this topic will be announced after
another meeting of the Executive Committee in June. In the meantime
members of the association are invited to offer, either by correspondence
with the Secretary or by publication, suggestions looking to further defi-
nition of the topic and possible restriction of the scope of the discussion.
(Signed) E. G. SPAULDING,
Secretary.
A CONFERENCE on Individual Psychology was held at Columbia Univer-
sity, April 6-8, by former pupils of the Department of Psychology. Among
the thirty-odd names appearing on the programme were those of Pro-
fessors Brown, of the University of California, Woodrow, of Minnesota,
Henmon, of Wisconsin, Jones, of Indiana, Breese, of Cincinnati, Ruediger,
of George Washington, Gordon, of Bryn Mawr, Dr. Wells, of McLean Hos-
252
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
pital, Dr. Bruner, of the Department of Child Study of the Chicago Pub-
lic Schools, and many from New York and vicinity. The topic of individ-
ual differences was considered on many sides, in regard to sense discrimi-
nation, reaction time, attention, intelligence, susceptibility to practise, as
well as with reference to education, vocational guidance, pathology, and
anthropology. At the close of the Conference, the members gave a com-
plimentary dinner to Professor James McKeen Cattell, in recognition of
the twenty-fifth anniversary of his first appointment as Professor of Psy-
chology. He was presented on this occasion with a volume entitled " The
Psychological Researches of James McKeen Cattell : A Review by Some of
His Pupils," the authors being Messrs. Henmon, Dearborn, Wells, Wood-
worth, Hollingworth, and Thorndike.
THE following note on " The Art of Refusing Manuscripts " is re-
printed from the Journal des Debats:
" Le redacteur en chef du Tsin Pao, journal chinois, regut un manuscrit
qui ne meritait pas d'etre insere. Get accident est commun a tous les di-
recteurs; diverses formules sont employees, qui adoucissent la blessure en
meme temps qu'on la fait. On dit le plus souvent : ' Votre manuscrit est
excellent, malheureusement il ne serait pas compris du public/ Ainsi,
1'auteur malheureux est exalte en meme temps qu'evince; le directeur se
tire d'affaire tout en agissant d'autorite, et le lecteur est a la fois calomnie
et epargne. On peut encore invoquer la ligne du journal, ligne magique,
mobile, et defensive, eternellement opposee au solliciteur. Si le sujet est
neuf , il est facile de decliner 1'honneur d'en parler ; et s'il ne 1'est point, il
est aise de refuser Particle. On peut encore invoquer 1'absence de place,
la susceptibilite des redacteurs attitres; on peut meme accepter le manu-
scrit : c'est un des plus surs moyens de ne jamais le publier.
" Ainsi font les grossiers Occidentaux. Mais la politesse des fils du Ciel
est exquise. Le redacteur du Tsin Pao ecrivit en retournant le manuscrit
refuse : ' Tres venerable f rere du soleil et de la lune ! Ton esclave se
courbe a tes pieds ! Je baise le sol devant toi, et j'implore de toi la permis-
sion de parler et de vivre. Ton manuscrit, tres venere, a passe entiere-
ment sous nos yeux, et nous 1'avons lu avec ravissement. C'est avec peur et
tremblement que je vous le renvoie. Si je me hasardais a le publier, le
president m'ordonnerait aussitot de prendre ce bijou pour modele, de ne
plus jamais m'en ecarter, et de n'avoir jamais la hardiesse de rien publier
qui lui fut inferieur. Or, ma longue experience des lettres m'a appris que
de telles perles ne peuvent etre produites qu'une fois, une fois tous les dix
mille ans. C'est pourquoi je dois vous la rendre. Je vous en conjure, par-
donnez-moi. Je suis a vos pieds, esclave de vos esclaves.' ?
The Editors trust that all friends of this JOURNAL appreciate that these
are their sentiments on any similar occasion.
VOL. XI. No. 10. MAT 7, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
A DEFINITION OF CAUSATION. II
PURSUANT to the empirical mode of investigating the causal
relation which was explained and defended in the previous
paper, we now take up the study of typical cases of causation. Fol-
lowing the outline already given, we consider first the types in the
field of Mechanics. This field was divided into three parts : statics,
dynamics, and transformation of kinetic into potential energy or
the reverse. Under statics were found three principal laws or causal
situations, first, that of the transmissibility of forces, second, that of
the composition and resolution of forces, and third that of the
moment of a force about a point as tending to produce rotation.
1. CASES OF MECHANICAL CAUSATION
Cases in Statics
"Principle of the Transmissibility of Force. "When a force acts
on a particle, the force will produce the same effect if it be supposed
applied at any point along a string connected with the particle, the
string lying in the line of action of the force." 1 This principle is
called an " axiom"; "it is one of the fundamental principles of
rational statics, and in most treatises on the subject, it constitutes
the basis of the investigation of the conditions of equilibrium" (p. 17).
It holds only if the particle acted on remains the same as regards the
relative positions of its parts, i. e., if it is a rigid body. Stated in
causal terms this means that a force acting at a certain point in a
certain direction implies or determines its own existence at all points
along that line. For if it were not conceived as already so existing,
it could not be assumed at pleasure to be there. This elementary
principle is by no means analytically self-evident; it is, in the
Kantian sense, a synthetic judgment. Hence it needs explanation.
In other words, it is desirable to see by virtue of what properties a
force gets this implication. What is the constitution of the whole
iG. M. Minchin, '/A Treatise on Statics," 5th ed., 1896, page 16.
253
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situation? Let the force act at A in the line AX and the direction
from A to X. Then the principle tells us that the force acts at an
adjacent point A'. It also tells us that it acts at a point A" adjacent
to A, and at another beyond and adjacent to A", say A!" and so on.
Only by such a series of points, taken near at will to one another,
can the generality of the position of the force along the line be
guaranteed. Notice that the series is started by two points : the origi-
nal point of application and the direction of the force for a direc-
tion needs two points to determine it. But the universality of the
positions of the force is due to the fact that all the positions are mem-
bers of the series which is thus started.
It is to be remembered that we are not here attempting to deduce
the principle of transmissibility, but only to determine the condi-
tions, observed and implied, under which it acts. As we shall meet
series analogous to the above in later cases, further examination of it
is at present deferred.
Composition of Forces
"If two forces be represented in magnitude, lines of action, and
senses by two right lines OA and OB, their resultant is represented
in magnitude, line of action, and sense by the diagonal, 0(7, of the
parallelogram OACB determined by these lines. ' ' 2
In order to understand the meaning of this principle, we must
ascertain what is meant by a force being "represented" by a right
line of finite length. "... the magnitude of any force is estimated
by the time-rate at which it generates momentum. Nevertheless in
statics it is only the tendency which forces have to produce motion
that is considered. . . . but the magnitude of each force is estimated
none the less with reference to the amount of momentum which it
would actually generate if it were completely unfettered by the action
of other forces" (p. 9). The forces, then, which as causes combine to
produce another force as effect must be understood as potential
rather than actual motions; but their potential character does not
prevent them from being actually present. They are in fact regarded
as so present, and have different names, such as pressure, tension,
attraction, repulsion. Thus, whatever philosophy may have to say of
mere potentiality, science at least uses the notion to describe reality.
Next comes the analysis of the cause-effect relation here contained.
The principle of composition is proved from the parallelogram of
velocities. The latter is a matter of inspection. If a particle move
in one second on a board from point A to point B, while the board is
being moved so that the line AB passes without change of direction
2 Minchin, op. cit., page 9.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 255
to the position CD, the body has possessed a velocity of AB per
second and at the same time a velocity of BD per second ; which is
the same as one of AD per second. These two velocities are actually
united in one body. Hence the forces, which are potential velocities,
are also actually united, and without loss of identity on the part of
either, into one new force. Superficially this appears to violate the
law of contradiction. But it would not do so, even were we dealing
with real motions; as shall be shown under dynamics. Were that
not the case, however, it might still hold in statics: for the forces
which combine are not actual motions, but potentialities. The law of
contradiction as exemplified in space tells us that one line can not be
another line, or one point another point ; but it does not in the least
imply that a tendency acting at one point can not be the same as two
other tendencies acting at that same point. The law of contradiction
tells us nothing at all about it ; the whole matter is a question of fact.
The concept of causation which is here employed by statics is, then,
that of two terms in a certain relation (combination 1 ) uniquely de-
termining a third, which is identical with the first two combined.
The identity is thoroughgoing in space and time ; yet in addition to
it there is a difference, viz., the left-hand member determines the
right-hand, but not conversely.
Two potentialities may and do combine and produce a third
potentiality identical with both yet with an added difference. It is
possible to go further : two potentialities which are entirely opposite
in character may combine to produce a resultant. That resultant is
called equilibrium. Even if a body could not move in two opposite
directions at once (though dynamics treats it as doing so) yet two
opposite tendencies can coexist, neither being realized. Equilibrium
is a real condition, and is identical with, uniquely determined by,
such a coexistence of opposites.
Of course, the concept of potentiality is out of fashion in philos-
ophy just now except with Thomists, who have always kept a
respect for common sense and must cope with many philosophical
objections. It is not our present occupation to deal with them. "We
wish to know whether and how science uses potentiality; and if it
finds itself compelled to use it in its causal determinations, that use
must be respected, and potential factors must be given as good a
title to objective validity as any other causal factors. Our general
maxim is, to take what science gives us, and understand it and all
that it implies, before we begin philosophical criticism.
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Resolution of Forces
"Having proved the principle of the composition of forces, the
principle of the resolution of force at once follows. ' ' 3 ' The force R
can be resolved in an infinite number of ways into two other forces ' '
(p. 14). The causation here, however, must be interpreted with care.
One force does not of itself give rise to sets of two forces : the pairs
are not called resultants, but components. Statistics does not treat
this aspect of the matter as a case of causation. Where the result
may vary throughout an infinite field, the Eindeutigkeit peculiar to
causation is lacking : it is rather chance than causation. If any de-
terminate force comes out of the original one, there must be an addi-
tional qualification; one of the components must be fixed. That
being done, the causal structure here is analogous to that of the prin-
ciple of composition. The cause is twofold, the effect one. There is
thoroughgoing identity between cause and effect. The force R being
treated from the point of view of its component A is the component
B. The subject of this sentence is the cause, the predicate the effect,
because the former uniquely determines the latter.
The only reason why we do not like to say that a body tending to
fall vertically toward the earth has also a real tendency to move
at an angle of 45 with the earth's surface is because usually there
is no obvious means of isolating that component. The scientific treat-
ment does not hesitate to say so, when it is desirable in a given prob-
lem. The caution perhaps needs to be repeated that we must at
present not criticize, but passively receive.
Force as Tending to Produce Rotation
"Let a force P ... act on a rigid body in the plane of the paper
and let an axis perpendicular to this plane pass through the body
at any point, 0. It is clear, then, that the effect of the force will be
to turn the body round this axis (the axis being supposed to be
fixed), and the rotatory effect will depend on two things firstly, the
magnitude of the force P, and, secondly, the perpendicular distance,
p, of P from The product P-p is called the moment of the force
about the axis through O." 4
This is a fundamental statical principle, which seems to be re-
s Op. cit., page 13.
* Op. cit., page 106.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 257
garded as almost, if not quite, self-evident. The self -evidence does
not concern us now ; but the way in which it acts does. To simplify
matters, let us consider a rigid horizontal bar capable of rotating
about a point where it rests on a fulcrum. Suppose a pressure P
exerted downward at the end of A. Its moment is AO-P. Now how
does it happen that this tends to make the bar rotate, i. e., that it
communicates an upward pressure to the other end, B ? This is an
elementary case of statical causation, and its constitution must be
analyzed.
A A A' o _B
r i i -
Let us designate the pressure exerted downward at A by x. The
bar is treated as continuous and fairly rigid. This means that x is
accompanied by a downward push at an adjacent point A'] if the
end of the bar tends to descend, the parts of the bar in its neighbor-
hood tend to go with it. Call the push at A', x'. It is also true that
there is a downward push at a point A" near A, such that it lies be-
tween A' and the fulcrum. Call this x". Proceeding along the bar
in this way until we reach the fulcrum, and taking the positions,
A, A', A" . . . near at pleasure to one another, we find an endless
series of pushes actuating the bar : x', x", x'", Abstracting for the
moment, after the customary procedure of science, from the fact of
the fulcrum and the magnitude of the pushes, we see that each member
of this series differs from the next before it only in spatial position.
We have, then, the series x, x', x", x'", . . . where each term after x is
similar to the preceding term in a very thoroughgoing fashion. That
is, it is similar to it not only in general character as downward push,
but in being followed by a term similar to itself. "We may for the
present purpose describe this series roughly thus : it seems to be de-
termined by a first term x which is followed by the term x' which is
in all save position exactly like x. For if this much is granted, x'
will have the property which x has, of being followed by another term
like itself, viz., x", which in turn, being like x', will be followed by
another x'", and so on. A natural name for this kind of series is
a self -repeater; it shall later be so designated.
This account neglects the fulcrum and its attendant circum-
stance, rotation of the bar. The rotation means that the downward
push x' is less than x, and x" is less than x, and so on. For the
magnitude of the push is defined by the velocity it gives the body
in unit time, and while the point A moves through a certain dis-
tance, the point A' moves through less than that distance. The mem-
bers of the above series have not, then, that all but perfect likeness
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above asserted. They differ in magnitude ; each being smaller than
its predecessor in the ratio of their distances from the fulcrum. This
does not effect their likeness in regard to that property of following
which holds throughout the series ; it simply adds to it by substitut-
ing "in all save position and magnitude" in the original descrip-
tion. "When the distance from the fulcrum is zero, the downward
push has zero magnitude. This does not mean that it is non-existent,
for the situation here is one of equilibrium, a resultant of two oppo-
site forces. The downward push is zero because it is really the re-
sultant of a downward push on the fulcrum and the upward push
of the fulcrum. When the distance from the fulcrum has a negative
value, the magnitude of the downward push also has a negative value
proportional to that distance. At B it has a negative value equal to
that of A if A0= BO equal to n/m that of A if A0= n/m-BO.
Lest it seem that we have no right to dub a fact negative, we have
to remember the meaning of negative in this connection. It is used
in this field to mean of an opposite direction to what is called posi-
tive. Of the unreality which is by common cause associated with
negation there is, of course, in this usage no trace. Accordingly
we can accept as well the statement that an upward push at B added
to an equal downward push at B when the arm OB is balanced with
OA, constitutes equilibrium at B. It might be considered that two
opposite motions of the same body at the same instant can not be:
but two opposite simultaneous tendencies are, as we have seen, a very
different matter, and there is nothing in the nature of space, time,
or observed events to forbid the notion. So, at least, the scientific
account of the matter thinks.
The whole situation has several distinguishable parts : the down-
ward push of A, the bar joining A and B, the fulcrum, the propor-
tion between push and distance, and the upward push of B. Now
is only one of these the cause and one other the effect, or what?
Philosophers have puzzled much over this problem of the difference
between cause and condition ; yet in this case the answer is, I think,
a simple one. Let us see what part each element plays in the con-
nection between A and B. The push at A is the starting-point.
The series of pushes along the bar forms the connecting link between
the starting-point and the end, the upward push of B. The fulcrum,
which means the rotation and proportion between push and distance,
simply modifies the character of each individual member of the
series, without affecting their property of linking A and B. The sit-
uation may then be written: push at A thread of linkage (modi-
fied by fulcrum) push at B. Now the leading-through is done by
the middle term, the thread of linkage. This leading is determined,
if our description of the series was correct, by two terms, viz., the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 259
push at A and the adjacent push at A' of such a character as to re-
semble A in all but place and amount. This description in fact really
includes the influence of the fulcrum, in the phrase "in all but . . .
amount." Accordingly, the last part, the push at B, is completely
and uniquely determined by the first two terms of the series (includ-
ing of course their relation). That alone suffices to guarantee the
existence and the character of the push at B.
Since, then, there are, from the point of view of unique determina-
tion or explanation, just two parts of this whole complex the de-
termining one being two related terms, the determined one being any
term later in the series there is nothing to do but to consider the for-
mer as the cause and the latter the effect. There is here no distinc-
tion between cause and condition, unless one of the two related terms
be arbitrarily designated cause and the other condition. But this
has no ground, since both appear necessary to start the series.
This analysis of statical situations might be considered itself
somewhat arbitrary. We have picked out certain elements mainly
spatial ones and neglected others such as color, kind of substance,
time of day, etc. Mach seems to regard this as prejudicial to the
objectivity of science. 5 It needs but to recall our present purpose.
If science has found its causal explanations by neglecting certain
points, we have to accept that fact. It has been able to succeed
in its quest by so doing ; hence we must conclude that the facts ne-
glected make no essential difference.
All other cases of statical causation, so far as I know, reduce to
the above cases and combinations of them. By the principle of com-
position, such combinations contain in the very fact of being combi-
nations, no new causal principle. They are themselves cases of
composition (or resolution) . Non-coplanar forces are treated by the
aid of the above principles alone. Hydrostatics and the statics of
gases, again, involve no new types; ready mobility being the main
differentia of these branches. Of course coefficients of friction, re-
sistance of media, density, elasticity, enter into the statical equations :
but this is once more a compounding of different causal types, and
these latter shall soon be examined on their own merits.
Types of Causation Found in Dynamics
The fundamental types here seem to be the composition and reso-
lution of velocities and accelerations, and the laws of motion. Under
the latter belong cases of a body at rest or in uniform motion, of a
body acted upon by external forces such as gravitation, and of bodies
under impact or collision with other bodies.
s f ( Mechanics, ' ' page 9.
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Composition and Resolution
The way in which the parallelogram of velocities is constituted
has been shown under statics. That of accelerations is completely
analogous. Now force in dynamics is represented by the acceler-
ation given to a certain mass. Therefore, forces are compounded and
resolved in dynamics just as in statics. In fact, the only reason
for discussing this type of case here is that it seemed, according to
the treatment above, that only potentialities or tendencies could
be compounded without loss or destruction. Thus, if a particle have
c
acceleration AB and also at the same time acceleration AD, then in
a unit of time it moves through a distance and in a direction which
gives it acceleration AC; but thereby it reaches point C, and not
B nor D. Hence the forces represented by accelerations AD and
AB seem not to have been actually realized.
It all depends upon what we mean by a force. Two ways of in-
terpreting it are possible; and on one of these ways the compo-
sition and resolution become fictions, on the other truth. A force
may be through and through particular, defined by a particular
point of application, a particular magnitude, a particular direction ;
or it may have something of the universal in its nature, which per-
mits it to be transferred or transmitted from one place to another
while remaining the same force. These two interpretations are
a priori possible ; but science in its empirical procedure has adopted
the second. It speaks of forces being transmitted, and treats them
as if they were transmitted ; just as it speaks of velocity being trans-
ferred, momentum imparted, etc. Indeed it is not science that is
nominalistic, but certain philosophic views about science. Suppose
now we take this universalist interpretation of a force : then a force
may itself be translated through space while remaining just itself.
The force which imparts acceleration AC is that force which gave
acceleration AD, its point of application being translated with accel-
eration AB. It has shifted its point of application, but has retained
the same direction and magnitude. It has moved the particle from A
in the direction AD by the amount AD; for the point D is actually
removed by that amount and in that direction from A. If it be ob-
jected that in dynamics a force is not an entity in itself, but simply
the acceleration of a mass, the same argument holds; for the basis
of it is that accelerations may be compounded. The only ground
for rejecting real composition seems to be that a line, considered by
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 261
itself, is not two other lines. But a line, considered in relation to
other lines or points, may have a property that it has not when con-
sidered alone, viz., the property of leading in different directions
according to the lines with reference to which it is considered.
Accordingly the law of composition implies a true identity be-
tween the forces (accelerations, velocities) which combine and the
resultant force. The structure of the causal relation is the same as
in the corresponding case of statics.
A special case is that of two equal and opposite forces. This
seems at first to be a reductio ad absurdum of the principle, inas-
much as the resultant is zero. How can zero be identical in dy-
namics with two real forces (accelerations, velocities) ? Now in statics
this was, as we have seen, perfectly possible ; for there we had only
potentialities, tendencies, not actual motion. But in dynamics, where
there is no motion there is force. Hence we either pass in this
case into statics kinetic energy becoming potential, as in a body
propelled upward against gravitation or into some other form of
energy than either, as when impact of inelastic bodies gives rise to
heat. These cases shall be later examined ; but even now it is evident
that the effect of two opposite forces never is merely zero ac-
celeration.
The resolution of forces is analogous to the same in statics.
It may here be asked, why do we not include a principle corre-
sponding to that of rotation in statics? For perfect symmetry it
ought to be done. But the structure of the causal situation is ob-
viously the same as that of the statical principle; so we pass it
entirely over.
Inertia and Rectilinear Motion
There has been a great deal of discussion as to the proper formu-
lation of Newton's laws; but it is our good fortune at present to
be able to avoid it. The nature of our problem enables us to take
the statement of any standard text-book, treating it as very nearly
what happens in the actual world. The first law says :
"A body continues in its state of rest, or of straight uniform
motion, except in so far as it is compelled to alter that state by im-
pressed force." 6
The direct implication is that a body, being at one moment in a
state of rest will, if the forces acting on it remain the same, be in
the same state at a later moment; and similarly if it be in straight
uniform motion for one period of time it will, if other conditions
acting on it remain, etc., have the same straight uniform motion at
Williamson and Tarleton, "Dynamics," London, 1889, page 25.
262
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a later period. Its earlier state determines its later state ; the later
state is accounted for by the law which connects it with that earlier
state. It might conceivably have been otherwise. Bodies might
begin to move of themselves, or to stop of themselves; this was in-
deed a primitive belief. But they do not. Why? It is not self-
evident, or an analytic judgment, though such a view has been
defended ; for time goes on and other things change while a certain
body remains (nearly) at rest in a given system. But even if it
were self-evident, it is a type of the behavior of bodies in which the
earlier state is by science believed to determine the later. That is, it
is a causal situation.
If a body is at rest in a given system (or in the universe, as
defenders of absolute motion would say) for a given period of short
duration, then at a slightly later period, with the same duration, it
is at rest, and also at another similar period, later by the same differ-
ence than the second. If difficulties are here raised by the terms
"same duration" and "same difference" the reply is that we mean
by them just what they are used in dynamics and physics to mean.
This series we have begun continues indefinitely in time. Denote
the body throughout the first period by x, throughout the second by
x', and so on. Then the series is defined by the following: a term x
is followed by another x' which resembles it in all save position, and
is therefore followed by a similar term x" . The series thus begun
will go on indefinitely, just as, to use Eoyce's illustration, a map of
England in England implies a map within itself, and so on. This
is moreover an adequate description of the series which defines this
case of inertia. For it holds, however small the successive 'periods
become, and however near together, and it holds through the whole
time. The causal structure here is analogous to that of transmission
of pressure along a rigid bar rotating about a fulcrum, in statics.
If a body is in uniform motion in a straight line, the terms of
the series become equal displacements in equal times; otherwise the
series is the same. However short the motion is, it has been repeating
itself indefinitely often.
The question of relativity of motion, time, space is indifferent to
this analysis. If a body's motion is uniform in a given system
then, other conditions being unaltered, it continues uniform in that
system. The fact that a line which is straight in one perspective is
sometimes not so in another is also irrelevant, provided the same
perspective is maintained. A uniform circular motion, or spiral
motion, continues uniform and of the same kind (circular, spiral)
so long as the conditions are unchanged ; being a compound motion,
the resultant of two or more which are uniform. A uniform accelera-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 263
tion, which is the combination of an original motion with a constant
force (as in gravitation) continues uniform while the conditions are
unchanged (i. e., distance from the center of mass of the earth).
We need not discuss the question, whether all forces must be defined
by straight lines. This is claimed by some, 7 but its necessity lies
beyond the scope of our problem. Dynamics and physics do so
define it and thereby succeed in explaining their phenomena; here
we only take passively what these sciences give us.
A certain reductio ad absurdum here appears. The endlessly re-
peating series must by its very definition go on forever ; but rest and
motion of the bodies we know, do not go on forever. But, as the
treatment of impact and of some later types will show, momentum is
always conserved; that is, the same amount of motion of the same
mass. When a resting body is moved, the rest becomes force of
inertia or tendency to resist motion ; a real and measurable condition,
though only a potentiality. When a moving body is stopped or
turned in another direction, the motion in the original direction con-
tinues, either as element of a composition of motions, or as trans-
ferred without loss to some other body, or as internal motion in the
shape of heat.
As to the concept of mass here used, it is not necessary to assume
that it represents quantity of matter. It may be defined, as Mach
and others claim, by means of acceleration produced in other bodies.
The conservation of mass is an empirical result, and is unaltered by
conceptual analysis. It is found that the total power of producing
accelerations in a given body remains unaltered by change of posi-
tion or spatial configuration. Perhaps, as Natorp, Wundt, Meyerson,
and others suggest, this is a priori necessary, because space by its
very definition would be incapable of affecting mass. But we have
here no concern with attempts to prove any causal process a priori
necessary. In the sequel the question of necessity must be discussed ;
at present our task is only to understand what causation is.
The Case of a Body Acted Upon by External Forces and Con-
sequently Changing Its Motion (or Rest).
If the force acting on the body is uniform (or nearly so) and
continues acting indefinitely, as is the case in gravitation, the velocity
given the body in a short period of time is simply added to that
rate of motion it had just before. The series of short successive
periods is then composed of members each of which has a constant
numerical ratio to the one before it ; x is followed by x' which is just
so much greater than x, and x' resembles x otherwise in all but its
7 E. Meyerson, ' ' Identite" et K4alit6, ' ' page 76.
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position in the series ; i. e., x' is followed by x" which again is greater
by the same ratio than x 1 and so on. The type of causation is
the same as before. Here the force of gravitation is spoken of as
the cause ; but little, if anything, is known of the way in which this
force arises and influences the motion of bodies. Hence we must
confine our attention to the way in which the motion of bodies goes
on under the influence of this force ; regarding the earlier displace-
ment, velocity, acceleration, as, under that influence, determining the
later displacement, etc.
With an impulsive force, whose action ceases almost instantane-
ously, the series of conditions after its action has ceased is one of
uniform motion. The communication of the impulse may occur in
any manner, and consequently will come under one of the types of
causation later discussed. One of these is taken up in the next
section.
W. H. SHELDON.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.
BETWEEN the profound and the commonplace the difference is
obscurity of statement : a profundity is a commonplace formu-
lated in strange or otherwise unintelligible terms. This must be my
excuse for beginning with the trite remark that the world we live in
is not one which was made for us, but one in which we happened.
I say this with all due deference to idealists and other pious persons
who believe that the trouble is only with us, and not at all with the
world, and I wish I could agree with them. I can't, because for one
reason, if the world were actually as they think it, they could not
think it as they do. Indeed, they could not think. For thinking
arises always as reaction to discomfort, to pain, to uncertainty, to
problems, and these could not exist in a world which was made for
us. It is notable that those who believe it to be such devote most of
their thinking to explaining the discrepancy between the world's
seeming and the world's being. Their chief business, after proving
that the world is all good, is solving "the problem of evil." Now if
really there were no evil, this evil consequence could not have
ensued : existence would have been a beatitude and not an adjustment,
and thinking would have been self-absorbed contemplation, blissful
intuition, not painful learning by the method of trial and error.
i Eead at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association,
1913.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 265
What "might have been" does not, however, become, by force of a
discursive demonstration that goodness alone exists and is real, and
that hence evil is non-existence, unreality, appearance. The appear-
ance of evil is in so far forth no less an evil and the best witnesses to
its reality are the historic attempts to explain it away. For this
appearance has a definite and inexpugnable character of its own,
even as appearance, which can not be destroyed by subsumption
under the "standpoint of the whole," "the absolute good," the
' ' over-individual values ' ' ; and it can not be abolished by the epithet
* ' appearance. ' ' To deny reality to evil only intensifies the evil, since
it makes two "problems" grow where only one grew before aad
serves no end as a solution of the real problem how evil can be
effectively abolished.
Because of these considerations I hold myself safe in assuming
that the world we live in was not made for us, and is, humanly
speaking, open to improvement in a great many directions. It will
be comparatively innocuous also to assume as a corollary that in so far
as the world was made for mind, it has been made so by man : civili-
zation is the adaptation of nature to human nature. And as a second
corollary it may be safely assumed that the world does not stay made :
civilization has brought its own problems and peculiar evils.
All this apparently irrelevant talk is intended to suggest that the
"problem of evil" can perhaps be best understood in the light of
another problem : the problem, namely, of why men have created the
problem of evil. For it is obvious that evil can be problematic only
in an absolutely good world, and the idea of an absolutely good
world is not a generalization upon experience, but a contradiction of
experience. If there is a metaphysical "problem of values," hence,
that problem may be restated as the ' ' problem of why men contradict
their own experience."
The problem so put suggests its own solution: first of all, that
nature and human nature are not compatible; that, consequently,
conclusions are being forced by nature on human nature which
human nature resents and rejects ; and that traits are being assigned
to nature by human nature which nature does not possess, but which,
if possessed, would make it congenial to human needs. All this is so
platitudinous that I feel ashamed to say it, but then, how can one
avoid platitudes without avoiding truth? And truth here is that
what is called value has its seat necessarily in human nature, and
that what is called existence has its seat necessarily in nature, of
which human nature is a part, and apart. Existence, hence, is by
no necessity a content of value. Non-human existence becomes valu-
able by its bearing on humanity, and value is relation to conscious-
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ness, is consciousness. 2 Existence is wider than consciousness and
independent of it : where consciousness exists value exists, but where
existence occurs value need not and in most cases does not occur.
Value is a specific kind of existence among other existences. When
it is said that value is non-existent nothing more is meant than that
the nature of value is not coincident and coexistent with the nature
of other existences, just as when it is said that a thing is not red,
the meaning is that red is not copresent with other qualities. Con-
versely, value may be said to be existent in nature when nature and
human nature, mind, are in any respect harmonious or identical.
What human nature tries to force upon nature must be, by implica-
tion, non-existent value, so that the nature of value must be held
inseparable from the nature of mind.
It follows that value is, in origin and character, completely irra-
tional. At the foundations of our existence it is the relation between
their objects and our major instincts, our appetites, our feelings, our
desires, our ambitions, most clearly, the self -regarding instinct and
the instincts of nutrition, reproduction, and gregariousness. Con-
cerning them, as William James writes, ' ' Science may come and con-
sider their ways and find that most of them are useful. But it is
not for the sake of their utility that they are followed, but because
at the moment of following them we feel that that is the only appro-
priate and natural thing to do. Not one man in a billion, when
taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility. He eats because the food
tastes good and makes him want more. If you ask him why he should
want to eat more of what tastes like that, instead of revering you as
a philosopher, he will probably laugh at you for a fool. The connec-
tion between the savory sensation and the act it awakens is for him
absolute and selbstverstandlich, an a priori synthesis of the most per-
fect sort, needing 'no proof but its own evidence. ... To the meta-
physician alone can such questions occur as 'Why do we smile when
pleased, and not scowl ? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd as we
talk to a single friend ? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits
upside down?' The common man can only say 'of course we smile,
of course our heart palpitates at the sight of a crowd, of course we
love the maiden, that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so
palpably and flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved. ' And so,
probably, does each animal feel about the particular things it tends
to do in the presence of particular objects. ... To the broody hen
the notion would probably seem monstrous that there should be a
creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the utterly
fascinating and precious and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object it
2 Cf. my paper ' ' Goodness, Cognition, and Beauty, ' ' this JOURNAL, Vol. IX.,
page 253.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 267
is to her. ' ' In sum, fundamental values are relations, responses, atti-
tudes, immediate, simple, subjectively obvious, and irrational. But
everything else becomes valuable or rational only by reference to
them.
Study them or the others empirically, 3 and they appear as types
of specific behavior, simple or complicated, involving a strong emo-
tional tone, and aggregates of connected ideas, more or less system-
atized. In the slang of the new medical psychology which has done
so much to uncover their method and mechanism, they are called
"complexes"; ethics has called them interests, and that designation
will do well enough. They are the primary and morally ultimate
efficacious units of which human nature is constituted, and it is in
terms of the world's bearing upon their destiny that we evaluate
nature and judge her significance in worth.
Now in interest, the important thing is emotional tone. What-
ever else is sharable, that is not. It is the very stuff of our attitudes,
our acceptances and rejections of the world and its contents, the very
essence of the relations we bear to these. That these relations shall
be identical for any two human beings requires that the two shall be
identical : two persons can not hold the same relation to the same or
different objects any more than two bodies can occupy the same
space at the same time. Hence, all our differences and disagree-
ments. Mere numerical density compels us to act as separate
centers, to value things with reference to separate interests, to orient
our worlds severally, and with ourselves as centers. This orienting
is the relating of the environment to our interests, the establishment
of our worlds of value. However much they may cross and inter-
penetrate, coincide they never can.
Our interests, furthermore, are possibly as numerous as our reflex
arcs. Each may, and most do, constitute distinct and independent
valuations of their objects, to which they respond, and each, with
these objects, remains an irreducible system. But reflex arcs and
interests do not act alone. They act like armies ; they are integrated,
and when so integrated their valuations fuse and constitute the more
complex and massive feelings, pleasures and pains, the emotions of
anger, of fear, of love; the sentiments of respect, of admiration, of
sympathy. They remain, through all degrees of complexity, appraise-
ments of the environment, as subject to empirical examination by
the psychologist as the environment itself by the physicist.
With a difference, however, a fundamental difference. When you
have an emotion you can not yourself examine it. Effectively as the
3C/. Thorndike, "The Original Nature of Man"; S. Freud, "Die Traiim-
deutung, Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben, ' ' "The Origin and Development of
Psycho-analysis," etc.; McDougall, "Social Psychology."
268
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
mind may work in sections, it can not with sanity be divided against
itself nor long remain so. A feeling can not be had and examined at
the same time. And though the investigator who studies the nature
of red does not become red, the investigator who studies the actual
emotion of anger does tend to become angry. Emotion is infectious ;
anger begets anger; fear, fear; love, love; Hate, hate; actions, rela-
tions, attitudes, when actual, integrate and fuse : to know them is to
have them, while to know things is simply to have a relation to them.
The same object may be both loved and hated, desired or spurned, by
different minds at the same time or by the same mind at different
times. One, for example, values whiskey positively, approaches, ab-
sorbs it, aims to increase its quantity and sale ; another apprehends it
negatively, turns from it, strives to oust it from his world. Then
according to these direct and immediate valuations of whiskey, its
place in the common world of the two minds will be determined. To
save or to destroy it, they may seek to destroy each other. Even
similar positive valuation of the object might imply this mutual
repugnance and destruction. Thus, rivals in love : they enhance and
glorify the same woman, but as she is not otherwise sharable,
they strive to eliminate each other. Throughout the world of values
the numerical difference of the seats or centers of value, whatever
their identity otherwise, keeps them ultimately inimical. They may
terminate in a common object, but they originate in different souls
and they are related to the object like two magnets to the same piece
of iron that lies between them. Most of what is orderly in society
and in science is the outcome of the adjustment of just such opposi-
tions: our civilization is an unstable equilibrium of objects, through
the cooperation, antipathy, and fusion of value-relations.
Individuals are no better off; personality is constructed in the
same way. If, indeed, the world had been made for us, we might
have been spared this warfare to man upon earth. Life might have
been the obvious irrational flow of bliss so vividly described by
William James, nature and human nature would have been one;
bridging the gulf between them would never have become a task for
the tender-minded among philosophers. Unfortunately our mere
numerical difference, the mere numerical difference of the interests
which compose our egos, makes the trouble, so that we are compelled
to devote most of our lives to converting the different into the same.
The major part of our instincts serve this function recognizably,
e. g., nutrition, and the "higher powers" do so no less, if not so
obviously. Generalization is nothing more, thinking nothing else.
It is the assimilation of many instances into one form, law, or pur-
pose ; the preservation of established contents of value, just as nutri-
tion is the preservation of life by means of the conversion of foreign
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 269
matter into the form and substance of the body. By bowels and by
brain, what is necessary, what will feed the irrationally given inter-
est, is preserved and consumed: the rest is cast off as waste, as
irrelevance, as contradiction.
And this is all that a mind is an affair of saving and rejecting,
of valuing with a system of objects of which a living body and its
desires and operations, its interests, are focal and the objects mar-
ginal, for its standard. Mind, thus, is neither simple, nor immutable,
nor stable; a thing to be ''changed," "confused," "cleared,"
"made-up," "trained." One body, I have written elsewhere, 4 "in
the course of its lifetime, has many minds, only partially united.
Men are all too often "of two minds." The unity of a mind de-
pends on its consistent pursuit of one interest, although we then call
it narrow ; or on the cooperation and harmony of its many interests.
Frequently two or more minds may struggle for the possession of the
same body, that is, the body may be divided between two elaborately
systematized tendencies to act. The beginning of such a division
occurs wherever there is difficulty in deciding between alternative
modes of behavior : the end is to be observed in those cases of dual or
multiple personality in which the body has ordered so great a collec-
tion of objects and systematized so large a collection of interests in
such typically distinct ways as to have set up for itself different and
opposed "minds." On the other hand, two or fifty or a million
bodies may be "of the same mind."
Unhappily, difference of mind, diversity and conflict of interests,
is quite as fundamental, if not more so, as sameness of mind, coopera-
tion and unity of interests. This the philosophic tradition sufficiently
attests. To Plato man is at once a protean beast, a lion, and an
intellect ; the last having for its proper task to rule the first and to
regulate the second. According to the Christian tradition man is
at once flesh and spirit, eternally in conflict with one another, and the
former is to be mortified that the latter may have eternal life.
Common sense divides us into head and heart, never quite at peace
with one another. There is no need of piling up citations. Add to
the inward disharmonies of mind its incompatibilities with the en-
vironment, and you perceive at once how completely it is, from
moment to moment, a theater and its life a drama of which the inter-
ests that compose it are at once protagonists and directors. The
catastrophe of this unceasing drama is always that one or more of
the players is driven from the stage of conscious existence. "It may
be that the environment social conditions, commercial necessity,
intellectual urgency, allies of other interests will drive it off; it
may be that its own intrinsic unpleasantness will banish it, will put
* This JOURNAL, Vol. IX., page 256.
270
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
it out of the mind ; whatever the cause, it is put out. Putting it out
does not, however, end the drama; putting it out serves to com-
plicate the drama. For the 'new psychology' shows that whenever
an interest or a desire or impulsion is put out of the mind, it is
really, if not extirpated, put into the mind; it is driven from the
conscious level of existence to the unconscious. It retains its force
and direction, only its work now lies underground. Its life hence-
forward consists partly in a direct oppugnance to the inhibitions that
keep it down, partly in burrowing beneath and around them and
seeking out unwonted channels of escape." Since life is long sup-
pressions accumulate, the mass of an existence of feeling and desire
tends to become composed entirely of these suppressions, layer upon
layer, and every interest in the aggregate striving to attain place in
the daylight of consciousness.
Now empirically and metaphysically, no one interest is more ex-
cellent than any other. Repressed or patent, each is either in a com-
pletely indifferent universe, or before the bar of an absolute justice
or under the domination of an absolute and universal good, entitled
to its free fulfilment and maintenance. Each is a form of the good ;
the essential content of each is good. That any are not fulfilled,
but repressed, is a fact to be recorded, not an appearance to be ex-
plained away. And it may turn out that the existence of the fact
may explain the effort to explain it away. For where interests are
in conflict with each other or with reality, and where the loser is not
extirpated, its revenge may be just this self-fulfilment in unreality,
in idea, which philosophies of absolute value offer it. Dreams, some
of the arts, religion, and philosophy may indeed be considered as
such fulfilments, worlds of luxuriant self-realization of all that part
of our nature which the harsh conjunctions with the environment
overthrow and suppress. They are ideal reconstructions of the sur-
rounding evil of the world into forms of the good. In them humanity
has its freest play and amplest expression.
This is most specifically true of philosophy. The environment
with which philosophy concerns itself is nothing less than the whole
universe ; its content is, within the history of its dominant tradition,
absolutely general and abstract ; it is, of all great human enterprises,
even religion, least constrained by the direction and march of events,
the mandate of circumstance. Like music, it expresses most truly
the immediate and intrinsic interests of the mind, its native bias and
its inward goal. It is constituted, for this reason, of the so-called
"normative" sciences, envisaging the non-existent as real, forcing
upon nature pure values, forms of the spirit incident to life in this
world, unmixed with baser matter. To formulate ultimate stand-
ards, to be completely and utterly lyrical is the prerogative of phil-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 271
osophy alone. As these standards reappear in all other reconstruc-
tions of the environment and most clearly in art and in religion,
it is pertinent to ennumerate them, and to indicate briefly their
bearing on existence.
It is obvious that to a mind constituted as is the human mind a
fundamental normation must be unity. The history of philosophy
from Thales to Bergson is significantly unanimous in its attempts to
prove that the world is, somehow, through and through one. That
the oneness requires proof is prima facie evidence that it is a value,
a desiderate, not an existence. And how valuable it is may be seen
merely in the fact that it derealized the inner conflict of interests,
the incompatibilities between nature and man, the uncertainties of
knowledge, and the certainties of evil, and substitutes therefor the
ultimate happy unison which the identity of the different compels.
Unity is the common desiderate of philosophic systems of all
types, neutral, materialistic, idealistic. But the dominant tradition
has tended to think this unity in terms of interest, of spirit, of
mentality. It has tended, in a word, to assimilate nature to human
nature, to identify things with the values of things, to envisage the
world in the image of man. To it, the world is all spirit, ego, or
idea ; and if not such through and through, then entirely subservient,
in its unhumanized parts, to the purposes and interests of ego, idea,
or spirit. Why, is obvious. A world of which the substance is such is
a totality of interest and purpose which faces no conflict and has
no enemy. It is fulfilment even before it is need, and need, indeed,
is only illusion. Again, mind is more at home with mind than with
things: the pathetic fallacy is the most inevitable and the most
general. Although the totality of spirit is conceived as good, that is,
as actualizing all our desiderates and ideals, it would still be felt,
that, even if the totality were evil, and not God, but the Devil ruled
the roost, the world so constituted is a better world than one utterly
non-spiritual. We can understand and be at home with malevolence :
it offers at least the benefits of similarity, of companionship, of inti-
mateness; but no horror can be greater than that of utter aliency.
How much of religion turns with a persistent tropism to the consid-
eration of the devil and his works, and how much it has fought his
elimination from the cosmic scheme ! And the philosophic tradition,
though it has cared less for the devil, has predominantly repudiated
aliency.
That eternity shall be used to complete unity and spirituality as
cosmic desiderates follows from its nature. In content either a
meaningless negation, not-time, of the same character as not-man or
not-donkey, or a designation of the persistence of quality, it is at
bottom the assurance that value-forms can not and will not be altered
272
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
in character and in relation to man. There is no recorded attempt
to prove that evil is eternal : eternity is eternity of the good alone.
Unity, spirituality, and eternity, then, are the value-forms which
the dominant philosophic tradition designates as the foundation and
metaphysical reality of universal nature. Of man, it posits immor-
tality and freedom, and even materialistic systems have in some
form tended to conserve these goods. For the desiderative character
of immortality, no argument is necessary. With freedom, however,
the case is different. The controversy over ' ' free-will, ' ' the casuistic
entanglement of this ideal with the notion of responsibility, and its
theological development in the problem of the relation of an omnip-
otent god to a recalcitrant creature, have so much obscured its pri-
mal significance that it is worth while pointing out how esentially
the ideal of freedom is compensatory. It is an ideal that could have
arisen only in the face of obstruction to action directed toward ful-
filling and satisfying interests. Even deterministic solutions of the
artificial "problem of freedom" are in fact nothing more than the
removal of obstructions. Spinoza's solution is typical, and its form
is that of all idealisms as well. It ensues by way of identification of
the obstruction's interests with those of the obstructee: the world
becomes the ego or the ego the world, with nothing outside to hinder
or to interfere. In the absolute existence is value de facto; in fact,
de jure.
Is any proof necessary that these value-forms are not the con-
tents of the daily life? If it is, why this unvarying succession of
attempts to prove that they are the contents of the daily life, that
goes by the name of history of philosophy? In fact, experience as
it conies from moment to moment is not one, harmonious and orderly,
but multifold, discordant, and chaotic. Its stuff is not spirit, but
stones and railway wrecks and volcanoes and Mexico and waters
and trees and stars and mud. It is not eternal, but changes from
instant to instant and from season to season. Actually, men do not
live forever; death is a fact, and immortality is literally as well as
in philosophic discourse not so much an aspiration for the continuity
of life as an aspiration for the elimination of death, purely immortal-
ity. Actually the will is not free, each interest encounters obstruc-
tion, no interest is completely satisfied, all are ultimately cut off by
death.
Such are the general features of all human experience, by age
unwithered, and with infinite variety forever unstaled. The tradi-
tional philosophic treatment of them is to deny their reality, to call
them appearance, and to satisfy the generic human interest which
they oppose and repress by means of the historic reconstruction in
imaginative dialectic of a world constituted by these most generalized
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 273
value-forms and to eulogize the reconstruction with the epithet
"reality." When, in the course of human events, such reconstruc-
tion becomes limited to the biography of particular individuals, is an
expression of their concrete and unique interests, is lived and acted
on, it is called paranoia. The difference is not one of kind, but of
concreteness, application, and individuality. Such a philosophy
applied in the daily life is a madness, like Christian science : kept in
its proper sphere, it is a fine art, the finest and most human of the
arts, a reconstruction in discourse of the whole universe, in the
image of the free human spirit. Philosophy is reasonable because it
is so unpersonal, abstract, and general, like music; because, in spite
of its labels, its reconstructions remain sure desiderates and value-
forms and are not confused with and substituted for existence. But
philosophers often have the delusion that the substitutions are
actually made.
It is the purity of the value-forms imagined in philosophy that
makes philosophy normative. The arts, which it judges, have an
identical origin and an indistinguishable intent, but they are prop-
erly its subordinates because they have not its purity. They, too,
aim at remodeling discordant nature into harmony with human
nature. They, too, are dominated by value-forms which shall satisfy
as nearly as possible all interests, shall liberate and fulfil all repres-
sions, and supply to our lives that unity, eternity, spirituality, and
freedom, of our central desire. But where philosophy merely negates
the concrete stuff of experience and defines its reality in terms of
desire alone, the arts acknowledge the reality of immediate experi-
ence, accept it as it comes, eliminating, adding, molding, until the
values desiderated become existent in the concrete immediacies of
experience as such. Art does not substitute values for existences by
changing their roles and calling one appearance and the other
reality: art converts values into existences, it realizes values, inject-
ing them into nature as far as may be. It does not claim for its re-
sults greater reality than nature's. It claims for its results greater
immediate harmony with human interests than nature. The propi-
tious reality of the philosopher is the unseen : the harmonious reality
of the artist must be sensible. Philosophy says that apparent actual
evil is merely apparent : art compels potential apparent good actually
to appear. Philosophy realizes fundamental values transcendentally,
beyond experience : art realizes them immediately within experience.
How completely it does so descriptions of the esthetic encounter
make clear. The artist's business is to create the other object in the
encounter, and this object, in Miss Puffer's words, is such that "the
organism is in a condition of repose of the highest possible tone,
functional efficiency, enhanced life. The personality is brought into
274
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
a state of unity and self -completeness. " The object, when appre-
hended, awakens the active functioning of the whole organism
directly and harmoniously with itself, cuts it off from the surround-
ing world, shuts that world out, and forms a complete, harmonious,
and self -sufficient system, peculiar and unique in the fact that there
is no passing from this deed into further adaptation with the object.
Struggle and change are at an end, and whatever activity now goes
on feels self-conserving, spontaneous, free. The need of readjust-
ment has disappeared, and with it the feeling of strain, obstruction,
and resistance which is its sign. There is nothing but the object, and
that is possessed, completely, satisf yingly, and as. if forever. Art, in
a word, supplies an environment from which strife, foreignness, ob-
struction, and death are eliminated. To this environment the mind
finds itself completely and harmoniously adapted by the initial act
of perception. In the world of art, value and existence are one.
If art may be said to create values, religion has been said to con-
serve them. But the values conserved are not those created: they
are the values postulated by philosophy as metaphysical reality.
Whereas, however philosophy substitutes these values for the world
of experience, religion makes them continuous with the world of
experience. For religion value and existence are on the same level,
but value is more potent and environs existence, directing it for its
own ends. The unique content of religion, hence, is a specific imagi-
native extension of the environment with value-forms: the visible
world is extended at either end by heaven and hell; the world of
minds, by God, satan, angels, demons, saints, and so on. But where
philosophy imaginatively abolishes existence in behalf of value, where
art realizes values in existence, religion tends to control and to
escape the environment which exists by means of the environment
which is postulated. The aim of religion is salvation from sin.
Salvation is escape from experience to heaven and the bosom of God :
while hell is the compensatory readjustment of inner quality to outer
condition for the alien and the enemy, without the knowledge of
whose existence life in heaven could not be complete.
In religion, hence, the conversion of the repressed array of inter-
ests into ideal value-forms is less radical and abstract than in philos-
ophy, and less checked by fusion with existence than in art. Hence
religion is at the same time more carnal and less reasonable than
philosophy and art. Its history and protagonists exhibit a closer
kinship to what is called insanity that being, in essence, the substi-
tution in actual life of the creatures of the imagination which satisfy
the repressed needs for those of reality which repress them. It is a
somnambulism which intensifies rather than abolishes the contrast
between what is desired and what must be accepted. It offers itself
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 275
rather as a refuge from reality than a control of it, and its develop-
ment as an institution has turned on the creation and use of devices
to make this escape feasible. For religion, therefore, the perception
that the actual world, whatever its history, is now not adapted to
human nature, is the true point of departure. Thus religion takes
more account of experience than compensatory philosophy; it does
not derealize existent evil. The outer conflict between human nature
and nature, the inner conflict between the interests that constitute
human nature, are expressed in the idea of sin. The desired abolition
of these conflicts, the salvation, are expressed in the ideas of heaven
and reunion with God. The machinery of this abolition, i. e., the re-
union of the divided, the conversion of the different into the same.
is the furniture of religious symbols and ceremonials myths, bap-
tisms, sacraments, prayers, and sacrifices: and all these are at the
same time instruments and expressions of desires. God is literally
"the conservation of values/' 5 "God's life in eternity," writes
Aristotle, who here dominates the earlier tradition, "is that which
we enjoy in our best moments, but are unable to possess permanently:
its very being is delight. And as actual being is delight, so the
various functions of waking, perceiving, thinking, are to us the
pleasantest parts of our life. Perfect and absolute thought is of per-
fect and absolute things. . . . And what God possesses is just this
absolute vision of perfection." 6 Even the most somnambulistic of
the transcendental philosophies has repeated, not improved upon
Aristotle. 'The highest conceptions that I get from experience of
what goodness and beauty are," writes Eoyce, "the noblest life that
I can imagine, the completest blessedness that I can think of, all
these are but faint suggestions of a truth that is infinitely realized in
the Divine, that knows all truth. Whatever perfection there is sug-
gested in these things, that he must fully know and experience." .
What religion demands of these ultimate value-forms is that they
shall work and its life as an institution depends upon making them
work. Christian science becomes a refuge from the failure of science,
magic from mechanism, and by means of them and their kind, blissful
immortality, complete self-fulfilment, is to be attained after death,
There is a happy life beyond, but it is beyond life. In fact, although
religion confuses value and existence, it localizes the great value-
forms outside of existence. Its history is on the one side a history of
the retreat and decimation of the gods from the world, a movement
from animism and pluralism to transcendentalism and monism; and
on the other, of an elaboration and extension of institutional devices
eC/. my paper, "Is Belief Essential in Keligion?" Int. Jour. Ethics, Oc-
tober, 1910.
' ' Metaphysics, ' ' Book Lambda.
276
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
by which the saving value-forms are to be made and kept operative
in the world. In so far forth, religion has been an art and its asso-
ciation with the arts has been notorious. But in so far as it has
tried to make values operative without making them existent, it has
been a magic. It has ignored the actual causes and nature and his-
tory of things, and has substituted for them non-existent desirable
causes, ultimately deducible to a single, eternal, beneficent spirit,
omnipotent and free. To convert these into existences, an operation
which is the obvious intent of much contemporary thinking in reli-
gion, 7 it must however give up the assumption that they already
exist qua spirit. But when religion gives up that assumption, relig-
ion gives up the ghost.
In religion, hence, value is non-existent and is said to exist. In
art existence is without value and is converted into value. Art makes
actual existences over into actual values ; religion makes actual values
over into hypothetical existences.
H. M. KALLEN.
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Probleme der 8ozialphilosophie. ROBERT MICHELS. Leipzig und Berlin:
B. G. Teubner. 1914. Pp. 208.
The author's purpose as announced in the foreword of this little
volume is twofold, namely, to emphasize that social problems still exist
in spite of the tomes written upon them, and incidentally to throw light
upon their solutions without attempting an exhaustive treatment. With
this end in view he has discussed the following topics: cooperation, eu-
genics, caste, progress, coquetry, the proletariat, the future of the nobility,
the international bourgeoisie and the relations of economics to politics.
On the whole the author has accomplished his purpose. He has given
us a series of interesting discussions in which, however, he has allowed
himself the greatest freedom of method, due to the fact, perhaps, that he
intends to stimulate and suggest rather than to offer final results. His
thought is needlessly obscured at times by long and involved sentences
where subject and predicate are separated by fifty and sixty words. Some
sentences, covering the better part of a page, give the impression that the
writer began and doggedly continued them until he had written himself
dry on that particular phase of his thought. Thought and style are good
illustrations of the proverbially German Mangel an Formsinn.
Undoubtedly the chief attraction of the book is its freshness and con-
creteness. SacTilichTceit is the dominant characteristic of the writer's
iCf. E. B. Perry, "The Moral Economy"; E. S. Ames, "The Psychology
of Religious Experience"; J. H. Leuba, "A Psychological Study of Religion."
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 277
thought. The work, therefore, is strikingly free from those theoretical
prepossessions which often give to books of this kind an atmosphere of
unreality. Loyalty to facts is perhaps responsible for what will appear
to many a weakness of the work, namely, the hesitating and tentative,
not to say negative, character of many of its conclusions. In the dis-
cussion of progress, for example, after marshaling the facts in two
chapters to show that progress is relative and that Fortschritt
scMechtlin (an indefinable term) does not exist, Michels concludes that
" progress " is a meaningless word which should be banished from " the
terminology of scholars " and that all investigation of the problem of
moral progress is a " useless waste of time." This is discouraging and, we
feel somehow, at variance with the gesunden Menschenverstand. We
remind ourselves, however, of Hume's whimsical confession of the funda-
mental inconsistency between his sceptical conclusions and human life,
and take courage. Two things, apparently, force the writer to these
negative conclusions, namely, the complex and contradictory nature of
the facts and his inability to apply to them a scientific (statistical)
method. " Morals hardly admit of numerical measurement." True, but
it does not follow from this that we must write ignoramus et ignorabimus
as the last word on the question of moral progress.
The writer's relative conclusions as to progress are made the basis for
a remarkable justification of war. He asserts "war is irrational, but not
immoral " a frank repudiation of the Socratic dictum that insight is of
the very essence of right action. War, furthermore, is absolutely indis-
pensable to the unfolding of national life. Situations arise when "the
necessities of national expansion shatter all bonds of reason and ethics.
Only weak and slavish peoples are just and dream of international
brotherly love " (p. 77). It would be hard to find a more brutal justifica-
tion of the mailed fist of militarism.
A most interesting chapter is devoted to the problem of cooperation.
After tracing the rise of the various forms of cooperation the writer
concludes that the age of individualism in business is definitely ended.
He is not persuaded, however, that cooperation will prove the solution
of all social problems. It carries within its own bosom the seeds of dis-
integration. For cooperation is an eternal Janus Bifrons. It aims
ostensibly at the solidarity of all mankind and yet it owes its origin and
growth to the negation of solidarity in that it lives only by virtue of the
conflicts and differences of interests between social groups. Only one
field of human endeavor admits of complete cooperation, namely, science.
Eugenics deals with the fundamental problem of the social sciences,
which Michels states as follows : " whether the undeniable inferiority of
the lower classes rests upon a firm anthropological basis of which class
distinctions are only the result, or whether the subordinated ' race ' is only
a phenomenon resulting from economic conditions, that is, whether the
inferiority of human material of the propertyless classes is to be derived
from wages and living conditions" (46). The problem of eugenics and
that of the proletariat are, according to Michels, closely related, but he
suggests no solution for either. He closes his discussion of the proletariat
278
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
with this question : " Is this mentally and physically defective proletariat,
as he appears to us in the study of politico-social anthropology, ripe for
his emancipation as a class, and, if we must answer this question in the
negative, what have we to do in order to make him ripe ? "
The nobility are in the judgment of the author a permanent element in
European society owing to the fact that they are constantly drawing new
blood from the bourgeoisie. The chapter on the international bourgeoisie,
containing an interesting comparison of this class in Germany, Italy, and
America, closes with the following statements which indicate the writer's
method and attitude throughout the book. " Our scientific task, the task
of social philosophy, or, if you will, of sociology, is not mainly to point out
ends, . . . but for the present solely to clarify. ... It does not consist in
determining what is good or what is bad in arrangement, but in establish-
ing what the actual relations are and whither the unfolding tendencies
lead" (p. 188). The writer has essayed, therefore, to discuss the problems
of social philosophy with no well-defined philosophy of his own. In this
fact is to be found the strength as well as the weakness of the book.
JOHN M. MECKLIN.
THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH.
Dante and Aquinas. PHILIP W. WICKSTEED. London and New York:
E. P. Button and Company. 1913. Pp. ix + 271.
There is much truth as well as aptness in the generalization which the
author of this volume advances in his preface : " Aquinas regards the
whole range of human experience and activities as the collecting ground
for illustrations of Christian truth, and Dante regards Christian truth as
the interpreting and inspiring force that makes all human life live." This
is a more penetrating view than the one commonly adopted, according to
which the " Commedia " is " Aquinas in verse." Moreover, the promise,
also contained in the preface, to give " a disinterested and popular treat-
ment of the subject, free from all propagandist and polemical intention "
is at once refreshing and inviting.
On the whole, the learned author has redeemed this promise with
praiseworthy thoroughness. It is safe to say that even the critic whose
propagandist and polemical intention is in evidence, will agree with the
following estimate : " My own impression is that we are on much safer
ground when we use the works of Aquinas as the best means of intro-
ducing us into the mental and theological atmosphere that Dante breathed,
than when we assume, without special evidence, that he had actually
steeped himself in the study of them and knew their exact teaching upon
every point" (p. 136). In this way it was possible for poetry "to glide
on the wings of theology " and not be compelled to " dance in the
shackles " of theological definitions and proofs. There are, undoubtedly,
points of divergency between the philosophy and theology of Aquinas and
the doctrine of the " Commedia," in spite of the universally accepted fact
that the groundwork of the poem is the Thomistic teaching. However,
one may hesitate in accepting as an instance of divergence the doctrine
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 279
of Parad. VII., 133-138, and Parad. XXIX., 34, in regard to the separate
creation and existence of formless matter, particularly as the author him-
self admits that this special feature of Dante's teaching stands apart from
the organic and constructive movements of the poet's mind (p. 150).
It is true, the doctrine of St. Thomas and of the scholastics generally
in regard to formless matter is so subtly technical that even a profound
student of the text of the " Summa " may be pardoned if he fails to dis-
tinguish, as the school did: (1) Pure Actuality, meaning absolute per-
fection, the infinite, and Pure Actuality, meaning relatively perfect im-
material beings, the angels, and (2) Formless Matter created so as to
coexist with the first created substantial forms, and Formless Matter
created to exist without any form and pre-existing (quoad tempus) before
the forms to which it was united. These, as has been said, are subtle
points of doctrine. The same excuse, however, can not be adduced in the
case of the account which the author gives (p. 73) of the Church's attitude
toward the introduction of Aristotelian philosophy in the first half of the
thirteenth century. It is now an oft-told tale. And yet, it seems, it must
be told again, with emphasis on the fact that there were two Aristotles
under consideration, the Arabian and the Greek. Again, the " relation of
reason to revelation " is admirably described (as taught by St. Thomas),
up to a certain point (pp. 96 ff.), the point, namely, at which the author
apparently confounds the task of the Christian philosopher with that of
the Christian theologian (p. 103). Finally, it is less than justice to that
much-misrepresented genius, John the Scot, to say that his assertion that
authority must rest on reason " amounts to a tacit exclusion of a really
authoritative revelation" (p. 43).
Notwithstanding the exception taken to these few points of detail, the
volume on " Dante and Aquinas " is heartily recommended to all students
of medieval philosophy as well as to those who are striving to get a clear
understanding of the " Divina Commedia." It was written with this
twofold purpose in view, and it will, unquestionably, accomplish both.
Especially successful is the attempt (p. 112 ff.) to describe " the character-
istic qualities of Thomas's mind."
WILLIAM TURNER.
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA.
JOUENALS AND NEW BOOKS
EEVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. November, 1913. Les Fondements
Oljectifs de la Notion d'Electron (pp. 449-478) : A. KEY. - A discussion
of the hypothesis of the invariability of the elementary electric charge,
with particular reference, in this first article of the series, to electrolysis,
cathode rays, etc. Le Monde comme Volonte de Representation (pp.
479-510) : JULES DE GAULTIER. - An account of a phenomenalistic (illu-
sionistic) metaphysics, which, " instead of a moral purpose that has shown
itself to be self-contradictory," attributes to existence, " according to a
280 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
new hypothesis, an esthetic and spectacular purpose, a will to representa-
tion." Remarques sur la Theorie Logique du Jugement (pp. 511-525) :
EDMOND GOBLOT. - With reference to quality, the admission of a third kind
of judgment, besides the affirmative and the negative judgments, would
involve the destruction of the principle of contradiction ; " the affirmative
judgment is always an affirmation, the negative judgment is the negation
of an attribute that is always positive." Analyses et Competes Rendus.
Leslie J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge, Absolutism, Pragmatism, Real-
ism: A. BEN JON. Montes, Precursores de la Ciencia Penal en Espana:
GASTON RICHARD. Garcia Lopez, Questions Penales: GASTON RICHARD.
Picece, Monismo e Scienza Giuridico-sociale : GASTON RICHARD. Alimena,
Note Filosofiche d'un Criminalista : GASTON RICHARD. Vincenzo Miceli,
Lezioni di Filosofia del Diritto: GASTON RICHARD. Del Vecchio, II Con-
cetto del Diritto: GASTON RICHARD. Pagano, L'individuo nell Etica e net
Diritto: GASTON RICHARD. G. A. Colozza, II Metodo Attivo nell
" Emilio": J. PERES. P. Hachet-Souplet, De V Animal a I'Enfant: J. M.
LAHY. Marius Latour, Premiers Principes d^une Theorie Generate des
Emotions: L. DUGAS. Dr. Georges Genil-Perrin, Histoire des Origines
et de I'Evolution de Vldee de DegSnerescence en Medecine Mentale: PH.
CHASLIN. Gudmundur Finnbogason, Den Sympatiske Forstacelse :
ALFRED BLANET. Notices Bibliographiques. Revue des Periodiques.
Lee, Vernon. The Beautiful. Cambridge : University Press. New York :
G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1913. Pp. viii+155.
Mayo, Marion J. The Mental Capacity of the American Negro. Archives
of Psychology, No. 28. New York: The Science Press. 1913. Pp. 70.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE Section of Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Acad-
emy of Sciences met in conjunction with the New York branch of the
American Psychological Association at Columbia University, on April 27.
The following papers were read: " A Study of Appetite," Garry C. Myers;
" Equivalence of Repetitions for Recall and Recognition," Edith F. Mul-
hall ; " Studies in Recognition," W. S. Monroe ; " A Study of Bagobo
Ceremonials, Magic, and Myth," Laura Watson Benedict ; " Is There Such
a Thing as General Judicial Capacity? ", Mary Ross; "Individual Differ-
ences in Judicial Capacity," Lillian Walton ; " Some Etiological Factors
of Mental Deficiency," Max G. Schlapp ; " Sex Differences in the Solution
of Mechanical Puzzles," H. A. Ruger.
THE First Congress of Mathematical Philosophy met in Paris at the
Sorbonne, April 6 to 8, inclusive. The conference was given under the
auspices of the editors of the Mathematical Encyclopedia and the French
Society of Philosophy. The opening address was delivered by Emile
Boutroux, President of the Congress.
PROFESSOR NORMAN WILDE, head of the department of philosophy and
psychology at the University of Minnesota, has been granted a year's leave
of absence. Professor David Swenson will act as chairman of the depart-
ment during Professor Wilde's absence.
J
VOL. XL No. 11. MAY 21, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
THE PERCEPTION OF MOTION
f I HE recent papers of Messrs. Hollingworth 1 and Pitkin 2 upon
what the former calls "The Law of the Resting Point" suggest
that some analogous observations of my own may be of general
interest. I will venture. to leave my statement in the form in which
it was written before Dr. Hollingworth 's article appeared.
I
The key to our conception not only of the continuity, but also of
the reality of nature is our perception of change. Hobbes's dictum,
"Always to perceive the same thing is equivalent to perceiving noth-
ing at all," is the assertion of what all experience seems to substan-
tiate, viz., that our perceptions gain their reality from their variety ;
and variety can be defined only in terms of change, or of passage
from one thing to another. On the other hand, if the change or
transition were absolute, if our perceptions were merely of isolated
and unrelated things, we should again have no variety and no
reality; Hobbes's dictum would apply to each thing in separation,
and instead of a sum we would have only a set of meaningless
ciphers : we might paraphrase Hobbes, * ' Never to perceive the same
thing is equivalent to perceiving nothing at all." Perception of
reality is contingent upon perception of sameness coupled with
difference, unity with variety; and neither of these can be clearly
conceived apart from the other.
The relation of sameness to difference, unity to variety, the one
to the many, we represent to ourselves by means of the notions of
change and motion. For example, we define any given line m n
as the path of a moving point, passing from m to n; m and n repre-
sent the elements of difference in the total conception, the path, p,
the uniting sameness; no element in the group is significant apart
from the others. All our notions of motion, and hence all our notions
i"A New Experiment in the Psychology of Perception," this JOURNAL,
Vol. X., page 505.
2 "The Law of the Resting Point," this JOURNAL, Vol. X., page 657.
281
282
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
of space (which is a construct of lines), are built upon this idea.
The case of non-spatial change is analogous. The succession of two
experiences in time we conceive as a kind of addition, a -f- /?? in
which the -f- is a sort of tie at once joining and holding apart the
qualities a, /?, distinguished as before and after. Indeed, time in
general is commonly symbolized by lines (time-curves, and the like)
showing the fundamental identity of spatial and temporal con-
tinuities. 3 Purely ideal changes follow the same plan, as may be
clearly seen in the syllogistic inference: A is B, B is C, therefore,
A is C; A and C represent the differences united by the middle term
B, which is the tie that justifies the passage from A to C, and which
must be felt, even if it be not expressed, in the conclusion. A begin-
ning, a middle, and an end, are alike present in our spatial, temporal,
and logical perceptions ; and in this general form of perception, the
middle is the fluid or moving connection which tells us that this
solid beginning has passed into just this solid end. "Everything
that changes," saith Philosophus, "is something and is changed by
something and into something"; and if we make that by which a
thing is changed an inherent force (as ultimately we do), this say-
ing will serve as a pattern for all our perception of reality.
The Greeks accepted as an axiom of physics that "some things
are in motion and some at rest. ' ' This but states formally what our
sense experiences continually assert. We see moving objects, but
we see them as moving only because they traverse a stationary back-
ground, or because we ourselves are in motion, in body, in head, or
in the eye muscles. From vision alone, unaccompanied by kinesthetie
sensations, it is frequently impossible to tell whether it is the per-
ceived objects or our own bodies which move. A familiar illustration
of this is the experience of uncertainty which comes when one is
seated in a railway car beside another train, as to whether it is one's
own or the parallel train that is starting ; the visual sensation of motion
so strongly suggests the accompanying kinesthesis that it is only by
comparing the observed train with some object known to be sta-
3 Kurt Bernhard, in an article on "Die Belativitat der Zeit" (Archiv. fur
Systematische Philosophic, XIII., 3), gives space a kind of conceptual priority to
time for the interesting reason that "time is a straight line," i. e., we fall back
upon spatial representations when we wish to express temporal relations, but
feel no corresponding necessity in regard to space, which (as geometry shows) is
describable in terms of its own characteristics. The "Zeitlinie" is not a circle
nor a closed curve, nor a type of curve leading into infinity; it has no single
points, and it is continuous; the straight line, one dimension, is its proper
image. This view is interesting in connection with Minkowski's suggestion
("Raum und Zeit, " Jahresbericht der Deutscher MathematiJcer Verelnigung,
Vol. XVIII.) that time may be treated, mathematically, as a fourth dimension.
. . . The problem involved seems to be one of the symbolization rather than of
the intuition of these "forms of experience."
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 283
tionary that we can assure ourselves that we are not in motion.
Similarly, if a train passes at express speed your own more slowly
moving car, it gives you not only the visible, but also the bodily
feeling of slowing down; you are able properly to judge your own
speed by observation of telegraph poles or other stationary objects
which themselves have the illusion of motion. Thus it is evident that
perception of motion is normally visual-kinesthetic ; and in ordinary
experience it is the kinesthetic element which tells us whether our
bodies or the perceived objects are in motion; in other words, kin-
esthesis gives us perception of bodies in motion, vision of bodies at
rest ; or, in any given motion m n, vision defines for us the limit-
ing stations, m, n, kinesthesis supplies the connective p.
This must not be taken to mean that the sense of sight can not by
itself give perception of motion. Most of our perceptions of motion
are purely of this sense. Particles too small for detection while at
rest become visible so soon as they are in motion; even so large an
insect as the house fly is often difficult to discern if it remain sta-
tionary. Perhaps the most astonishing illustration of this power is
the fact that the illuminated paths of ions the infinitesimal particles
of the infinitesimal atoms tltat compose the invisibly minute mole-
cules have been shown to be visible. And in the biological realm
the fact that the very young of many animals escape observation by
lying unmoving, while most animals may be startled into motion-
lessness, illustrates the relative imperceptibility of stationary objects.
Furthermore, there is an obvious difference between visual percep-
tions of motion dependent upon a general kinesthesis and purely
visual motion. In the former case, the movements observed are
indistinct and blurred as compared with the minute discriminations
of which pure vision is capable. Rapid motion of the body or the
head or the eyeballs results in an impression of confused rather than
of clear-cut change; it is only when the eyes are definitely focused
upon an object that minute changes can be observed, a glance at
a sunny meadow shows it all green, while to our steady gaze it re-
solves into a play of colors. Perhaps we can generalize with the
statement that bodily movement (kinesthesis) tends to resolve \j/,
motions into continuities, static vision into discrete elements.
For it is not at all certain that our perceptions of motion, even in
vision, are not ultimately kinesthetic. The structure of the eye is
such that delicate accommodations are constantly taking place, and
these are accentuated the moment the gaze is directed to follow a
moving object. Further, the more rapid motions are not seen as
motions, but as things. In the case of the ions, above mentioned,
what is actually seen is an illuminated path, a streak or line, not at
all a motion ; it is like the wake of a meteor or a flash of lightning
284
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
which visually assumes an extended form because the motion is too
swift for the eye to follow. This appears to be the case throughout
nature; we see things as stationary when their motion is too rapid
for the eye to follow ; all vision is mediated by radiant energy, which
represents the most rapid motion known to us, though it is never
seen as motion, but only as color or light; so that we might say in
general that a motion becomes visibly such in proportion to its slow-
\/ ness, or, at any rate, in proportion to its susceptibility to visual-kines-
thetic analysis. A common illustration of the tendency of rapid mo-
tion to lose its character as motion is the case of the spokes of a rapidly
revolving wheel, which with sufficient speed resolves into a disc of
color, or into bands varying in hue with the distance from the hub.
We might well liken the bands of the solar spectrum to a similar
modification of the etheric vibrations whose different rates corre-
spond to the several colors. Thus again we see actual movement
y perceived as visible magnitude as thing or element rather than as
transition.
It might be assumed that hearing and smell and the other senses
exemplify a similar condition, that what appear to them as qualities
are in fact but motions too rapid to be followed in their proper
character, and hence are converted into states viewed as if constant.
This would square admirably with the physical conception of the
objective world as composed entirely of forces, or active energies. It
is susceptible also of an obvious biological explanation. Motions
which we are to perceive as motions would naturally be such as our
bodies could accommodate themselves to; that is, our perception of
motion as such is directly proportional to our powers of physical re-
action. There is no biological reason why we should see as motion
the infinitely swift movement of the lightning, for the reason that
we could not dodge it could we see it coming ; on the other hand, there
is every reason why we should be able to follow the swiftest motions
of other animals, and in general it seems to be that our powers of
s analytic vision of motion are limited by the range of animal locomo-
tion, the whirring wings of the humming bird and dragon-fly just
passing our powers at one extreme, the vermicular slowness of the
snail at the other ; we can not quite see the mushroom grow, we can
not quite see the lightning speed, but we do not need to see either.
And in the case of sound, our analytic perception is again roughly
bounded by the range of notes open to animal production, the almost
inaudibly shrill pitch of some insects at one end of the gamut, the
bass growling of the huger mammals at the other; outside of these
there is mainly confusion and noise.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
II
285
The actual relation of vision to the perception of motion is
beautifully illustrated by certain artistic conventions. The swift
motion of a quadruped running has been represented from ancient to
FIG. 1. Running wild ass; low relief, Nineveh.
modern times by picturing the limbs as extended, parallel before and
behind, at their greatest reach (Figs. 1, 2). Instantaneous photog-
raphy shows that at no time are all the four limbs raised in this
manner; the position is a false one. As emphasizing the falsity and
conventionality of civilized art in contrast to the superb naturalism
of paleolithic European drawing, an interesting comparison has
been made between these representations of running horses and the
FIG. 2. Running bull; gold cup, Vaphio.
galloping or ambling deer drawn on an ancient bit of horn (Fig. 3) ;
the attitude caught by the primitive artist is just one assumed by
the galloping horse, as shown by instantaneous photographs (Fig. 4)
and never reproduced in civilized art until so shown. 4 This is no
doubt an interesting commentary upon the realistic truthfulness of
paleolithic perceptions; but a moment's regard of the pictures will
show that the artistic truthfulness of representation is all with the
* S. Reinach, ' ' Apollo, ' ' Paris, 1904, pages 6-7.
286
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
civilized picturing, the image of a horse running at top speed is
properly suggested by the false drawing.
What is the reason for this? Clearly it is an idiosyncrasy of
our vision of motion, and this may be stated: the movements of
FIG. 3. Galloping reindeer; incised bone, Caverne de Lorthet.
rapidly moving objects are visually indicated by their points of com-
parative rest, which are also their points of maximum acceleration.
This may be graphically indicated by the image of a pendulum
(Fig. 5) ; at the extremity of its swing (a) it is in momentary pause,
but just this position suggests rapid motion far more effectually than
any intermediate position (5), while at the point of swiftest motion
(c) it appears to be stationary. 5 The limbs of the running quad-
FIG. 4. Galloping horse, after an instantaneous photograph.
ruped are similarly seen at their highest swing, a point of momentary
slackening and pause preparatory to regression. Of course this is
actually the point of the greatest rate of change of motion, and it
may indicate the maximum strain upon visual accommodation.
s I borrow this illustration from the suggestion of H. G. Spearing, ' ' The
Childhood of Art," New York, 1913, page 103.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
287
Another illustration might be drawn from the revolving wheel;
motion is actually seen, or best seen, in the twinkling of the spokes
nearest the hub, where the movement is really slowest. Again, if
you will watch a rapidly receding train or car, instead of a uniform
shrinking of the image, it will be seen to diminish in a succession of
contractions, the eye interpreting the constant motion as a series of
positions or pictures, very similar in effect to the flicker of a cine-
matographic picture. Thus, again, we find the function of pure
vision to be the representation of rests rather than motions, the j/
continuities which it perceives being in space rather than in time, and
made up of stations or points rather than of transitions ; the transi-
tional element is mainly, if not exclusively, kinesthetic, so that we
may reasonably doubt whether the fixed eye of a person congenitally
anesthetic to muscle sensations would be able to perceive any motion
at all.
An artistic convention of a different type gives us light from a
different vantage. This is the tendency to elongate the bodies of yi
moving animals. Doubtless the actual extension of the running
horse or dog, head low and tail out, or of the flying duck, with
neck straight, is greater than that of the same animal in repose;
but there is no such elongation of the body itself as appears, for
example, in the running bull of the Vaphio cup (Fig. 2) or in the
ivory acrobats from Knossos. 6 The instinctive rationality of this
<?/. Spearing, "Childhood of Art," Fig. 336a.
288
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
convention we must realize when we reflect, for instance, upon the
relative ease with which we represent rapid motion in the case of
the trout as compared with the bass, or the minnow against the sun-
fish ; chubbiness is all at odds with speed, which pictorially tends to
assume the general form of a streak.
The instancy with which we transpose motion in time into exten-
sion in space visual movements into visual things was beautifully
, illustrated by Professor Cattell's experiments with his wheel chron-
oscope. 7 "In the ordinary vision of daily life," he writes, "the
eyes, the head and the whole body are in continual movement. There
are no distinct and lasting images on the retina; the physical condi-
tions are those of the photographic plate when the camera is con-
stantly moved hither and thither. But the world that we see appears
to each of us distinct and unshifting. When I glance across the
room along a row of books covering its side, for example images
follow one another in rapid succession, but I see this time continuum
as a space continuum with all the objects duly arranged side by side. ' '
Professor Cattell's experiment hinges upon a moving stimulus rather
than a moving eye (a distinction which is probably of moment,
although the results are analogous, as see p. 283 above) , but his records
very clearly demonstrate the inevitability with which we spatialize
our visual perceptions of change. I have observed the same fact in a
slightly more complicated form: the after-image of a wheel (in the
case noted, a brass electric fan) revolving so rapidly as to appear as
a disc, when the eyes were suddenly cast to one side, spread out into
an elongated band of color. Here, of course, we have both an obvious
retinal and an obvious kinesthetic element, the two uniting to form
an exaggerated spatial continuum. The elongation of the body of the
Vaphio bull would seem to have a sound psychological raison d'etre.
And here an adversion to Lessing seems in place especially since
the world of esthetics is just now torn between cubistical artists
bent on proving him wrong with the brush and shocked critics man-
fully maintaining with the pen his invulnerable righteousness. "Es
bleibt dabei: die Zeitfolge ist das Gebiet des Dichters, sowie der*
Raum das Gebiet des Malers," is Lessing 's famous dictum. 8 The
crust of his discussion is the unpicturableness of motion, the pre-
eminence of repose as the theme of plastic and graphic art. It is
first to be noted that Lessing (yielding to an esthetic instinct which
was surer than his critical theory) compromises his own generaliza-
tion. His doctrine of the "fruitful moment," when he comes to
apply it to the problem of motion (as distinguished from emotion),
7 "On Belations of Time and Space in Vision," Psych. Rev., VIL, 4,
page 325.
8"Laokoon," XVIII.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 289
induces an immediate modification. "All bodies exist not only in
space, but 'also in time. They endure, and can in each successive
moment of their duration appear otherwise and stand in other rela-
tions. Each of these momentary appearances and combinations is
the effect of a preceding and can be the cause of a following moment,
and so can be regarded as the center of an action. Consequently,
painting can imitate actions, though only indicatively through
bodies." 9 In acceding to Herr Mengs's comment on the treatment of
draperies by Raphael, Lessing is again concessive. He quotes Herr
Mengs 10 as follows: "Every fold has with him (Raphael) its reason,
be it on account of its own importance or from the movement of the
limb. Often one may observe from the arrangement of the folds,
how they have just been disposed ; and Raphael finds significance in
this. One sees, in the draperies, whether a leg or an arm, previous
to its motion, has been advanced or retracted, whether the limb pro-
ceeds from bending to extension, or whether, having been out-
stretched, it contracts. " It is undeniable that the artist, in this case,
represents two distinct moments in a single image, says Lessing,
just as the poet, by multiplying his epithets, may outstay his artistic
right in some unwontedly charming bit of space. The two arts
must be mutually hospitable of such encroachments, like friendly
neighbors; but "just as there, with the painter, the two distinguished
moments border upon one another so immediately that, without hesi-
tation, they may pass for a single one; so here, with the poet, the
several indications of different parts and qualities in space follow one
another with such compression and celerity that we believe ourselves
to hear them all at once. ' '
It is evident enough that Lessing was dealing with a bigger
problem than the limited psychology of his time could qualify him to
handle. In a certain broad way he is probably right as to the essen-
tial distinction between poetic and plastic "imitation." Never-
theless, when he comes to the minutiae of his distinction he fails
to give any satisfying account of the painter's significant moment,
in so far as it is concerned with the technical portrayal of motion.
May it not be that this moment is to be found just at that point in
the progress where, perceptually, the movement is crystallized into
the visual thing, the action converted into a visible embodiment?
The primitive conventions which we have noted seem to imply this.
Of course it would be begging a number of esthetic questions if we
were to permit such a satisfaction of Lessing 's problems to legalize the
"boundaries" which he sets for the arts. Modern painting makes
use of spaces undreamt of in his day, and there is no compelling
Jfc., XVI.
10 Ib., XVIII.
290
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
reason why the artist should not experiment with observational
moments as well as with angles of regard ; it is a mistake to suppose
that we are going to stay by the mask of La Mettrie after we have
discovered in it the gaping fool, and it may be that we will have
caught and passed it in just that instant in which it is triumphantly
the laughing philosopher; every one knows that pictures have their
moments of glamor, and that it is just for these moments that we
love them. Why may not the artist legitimately work for these rapt
eternities rather than for the tedious interregna which we fill with
conscious criticism? This need not be interpreted that I pretend to
understand the cubists !
Ill
It would offend my temperament to leave this subject without
suggesting some of its implications. I have touched upon these in
the field of esthetics. For psychology they are quite as interesting.
Instead of dealing with perception of time and perception of space
as if they were as independent as ever Kant thought them, while
perception of motion follows as a sort of evolution from their fusion,
ought we not to start with perception of motion (or back of that
with change) and proceed thence to the explanation of time and
space ? It is all very well, mechanically, to treat time and space as
constants of thought; but mechanics is artifice, and psychically
experience seems to follow an inverse mode. The geometers, who
develop the idea of space from the idea of motion, seem to have the
empirical right of way.
It would be a dereliction to fail to mention Bergson in this
context and supererogation to point the application. But may it
not be true that la duree reelle esthetizes itself in Lessingian
moments ? Or again may it indeed be that infinite space and all the
extended splendors of the universe are but the contemplated other
of the timelessly egoical absolute? For metaphysics, too, our obser-
vations seem pertinent. HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER.
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA.
SOCIETIES
NEW YOKK BRANCH OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION
THE New York Branch of the American Psychological Association
met in conjunction with the Section of Anthropology and Psy-
chology of the New York Academy of Sciences, on November 24 and
on February 23. The November meeting was held at the psycholog-
ical laboratories of Columbia University and the February meeting
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 291
at the psychological laboratory of Princeton University. The fol-
lowing papers were presented :
Professor Thorndike's Attack on the Ideo-motor Theory: PROFESSOR
MONTAGUE. (To appear in full in a forthcoming number of this
JOURNAL. )
The Color Vision of Animals: MRS. CHRISTINE LADD-FRANKLIN. (No
abstract offered.)
The Character of Ideas: JOHN PICKETT TURNER.
Recent psychological literature shows a wide divergence of opin-
ion as to what the proper task of psychology should be. On the one
hand psychology is defined as the science of behavior. It is claimed
that the student in his investigations can totally disregard what was
once thought to be the true field of psychology, states of consciousness,
ideas, etc. Such is the position of Watson. On the other hand, it is
said to be the task of psychology ' ' to study the structure of the mind
as if there were no such thing as body," working in the main "as
though there were nothing in the world except psychic facts. ' ' Both
of these positions show the unconscious influence of the Cartesian
tradition, a disposition to set ideas apart in a class by themselves.
There seems to be a general disposition among psychologists to take
ideas out of nature. This is unfortunate ; for ideas so regarded have
lost their true character. Ideas are in and of nature. They are
events in nature just as much as bodies, motions, and qualities are
events in nature. Events in nature come into various relations.
There are qualities known as color; so there are qualities known as
meaning. Certain events imply certain other events. The psycholo-
gist should study ideas as events in nature. To do this he must rid
himself of the unhappy habit of associating ideas exclusively with
men's bodies. The important thing is that certain events are effec-
tively related to certain other events, cortical or others. The one
thing to remember is that ideas can be successfully studied only in
the concrete. Such a position calls for the reinstatement of introspec-
tion in its former place of honor.
Measurements of Judgments of Certainty: RICHARD H. PAYNTER.
The purpose of this article is to state briefly the results of a series
of experiments in which measurements of judgments of certainty or
accuracy of recognitions were obtained. There have been many in-
vestigations concerning judgments of various psychological processes,
but judgments of certainty have received much less attention. In the
present paper different degrees of certainty are used, and the valid-
ity of judgments of certainty is measured in terms of the actual
facts. By this method it has been found possible to say just how
much value to assign to the judgment of one's own absolute certainty
292
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
or confidence. In order to compare the judgments of certainty of two
or more individuals they must all have an equal number of recog-
nitions. No attempt, however, is made to do this here. By asking
the subjects to sort their recognitions of quarter-page advertisements
just seen in piles of 100 per cent, certainty, 75 per cent, certainty,
and 25 per cent, certainty, it is possible to measure not only the accu-
racy of recognitions for each of the piles, but also the judgments of
the three degrees of certainty. This is done in the following man-
ner. It is first necessary to get the per cent, of accuracy of recogni-
tions of each pile. This is obtained by the use of Strong's formula
correct recognitions incorrect recognitions v -i
correct recognitions + incorrect recognitions
The judgments for each of the three degrees of certainty are then ob-
tained by calculating the per cent, the accuracy of recognitions of each
pile is of the certainty or accuracy required by the pile. It was
found that there are individual differences in judgments of certainty
and they are largest in the lower degrees of certainty ; that different
degrees of certainty under the same conditions are not judged equally
well; that the more valid judgments are found in the pile of abso-
lute certainty ; that the same degree of certainty is judged differently
under different conditions; that the judgments are less valid in the
more difficult situation; and that there is a general tendency to
underestimate the high degrees of certainty and the underestimation
increases with the difficulty of the task. Judgments of certainty in
experiments on perception or recall memory may be measured in the
same way as those in recognition memory. Finally it is of practical
importance that no two statements of absolute certainty or any other
degree of certainty be considered of equal value unless actually
found so on measurement.
Transfer and Interference in the Substitution Test: HENRY A. RUGER.
The purpose of the study was to determine whether a well-formed
rival habit or a poorly-formed one had the greater influence on the
formation of a given habit. The plan of the experiment included an
initial and final test series with a given key and a practise series with
keys formed by varying the arrangement of the test key. For the
practise series the group representing the well-formed habit practised
on a single rival key ; the group representing the poorly formed habit
either constantly changed to a new key or practised fewer times on
the same rival key. In addition to these two main groups there were
three control groups and one group which practised on the test key.
One of the control groups read newspapers during the practise
period; another did addition, and the third worked on a different
type of substitution. All the groups took the initial and final tests
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 293
with the test key. All the groups did better in the final than in the
initial test. However, the rival-habit groups showed much less im-
provement than the control groups. Consequently there was a domi-
nant interference effect. This interference effect was greater in the
group that formed the one strong rival habit than in the one that
formed one or many weak rival habits. The control groups were so
planned as to have different degrees of relatedness in their practise
series to the test keys. The newspaper group simply read what in-
terested them spontaneous attention ; the addition group worked
with voluntary attention and at top speed. The substitution-control
group worked on material similar to the test series, but not conflict-
ing with it. The three groups followed this, the above, order in the
extent of the improvement of the final over the initial test. Since the
difference, however, is less than the probable error, the control groups
may be considered as equivalent in this particular case. The group
which practised on the test keys showed two and a half times the im-
provement of the control groups, while the control groups showed
twice the improvement of the poorly formed rival habit group and
three times the improvement of the well-formed rival habit group.
Improvement was measured in terms of substitutions per second.
Three hundred and fifty subjects took part in the experiment.
Woodworth's and Well's color-naming and geometrical substitution
tests were employed. The symbols forming the keys were five
different letters or figures.
Some Tests for Efficiency in Telephone Operators: H. C. McCoMAS.
Two methods may be followed in testing telephone operators;
one, by analyzing the activities at the switchboard and examining
each, the other by testing these activities as a whole. The latter was
followed in the work at the Princeton Laboratory. The apparatus
duplicated an actual switchboard, on a small scale. The operator
made connections at the board and these were timed by a kymograph
in an adjoining room. The kymograph records showed the time
which elapsed between the appearance of a light over a call connec-
tion and the moment an operator "plugged in"; also, between the
moment a number was called and its appropriate connection made.
Fifty records in succession were taken for each subject. The oper-
ators were ranked according to the quickness of their reactions. This
ranking was compared with the composite ranking made by two
telephone supervisors independently. The test easily detected the
two best, and two out of three of the poorest, of the nine operators
supplied by the Princeton exchange.
This rather difficult test was supplemented by one which called
for very much simpler apparatus ; practically a test in motor coordi-
nation. The operator sat before a table supporting an upright board
294 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
upon which was fixed a sheet of paper containing ten crosses, ar-
ranged in three irregular rows. With a pencil she sought to touch
the intersections of the crossed lines in quick succession. After each
thrust at a cross the pencil point was brought down upon a blotter on
the table. This gave a movement similar to that of the switchboard.
Each subject was instructed to make the movements as quickly as
possible, but not to sacrifice accuracy for time. Tests were made for
each hand and with the sheets in various positions. The records in
time were taken with a stop-watch ; those for accuracy, by measuring
the distances of the pencil marks from the intersections of the lines.
The rankings thus obtained agreed remarkably well with the esti-
mates of the supervisors, showing a correlation of .6250, with a
probable error of .14 (by Spearman's Footrule). We have, then, in
this form of the motor-coordination test a valuable means of detect-
ing the quickness and accuracy of telephone operators, two of the
most important traits which make for success at the switchboard.
An Experimental Critique of the Binet-Simon Scale: CARL C.
BKIGHAM.
The Binet-Simon scale was applied to 294 children from 6 to 16
years of age, the majority of cases (226) being under 12 years. Ex-
perimental conditions were adhered to as strictly as possible. The
three investigators were always in ignorance of the physical age of
the child being examined.
A normal distribution of cases about the "at age" position was
found, 83 per cent, of the cases under 12 testing ' ' at age, ' ' 3 per cent,
"above age," and 14 per cent, "below age."
The scale was not uniform for all ages, as shown by the average
age difference of each physical age group, given in the following
arrays
Physical age 7 8 9 10 11 12
Average difference 0.5 0.7 1.4
The lack of tests above twelve years, and the difficulty of the "twelve
year" tests cause the deviations from the norm at 10, 11, and 12
years.
The teachers and the principal graded the children into five groups
according to mental capacity. The average age difference of the five
groups correlated with the teachers' judgments were as follows:
"Very bright" + 0.9, "Bright" 0, "Average" 0.5, "Dull" 0.9,
"Very dull" -1.8. In 4 per cent, of the cases there was a disagree-
ment between the judgments of the school authorities and the results
of the tests.
From the results of the investigation, it was found possible to con-
clude that the scale, as now standardized, measured the development
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 295
of intelligence of the children examined with at least 96 per cent,
efficiency, and served as an adequate measure of comparatively slight
individual differences in groups of the same physical age. The
''twelve year" tests were found to be unsatisfactory. Sex dif-
ferences were slight, girls possibly tending to vary more than boys.
The influence of the personal equation of the experimenters upon the
results of the tests was found to be negligible.
Recall in Relation to Retention: 1 GARRY C. MYERS.
Ten words were pronounced with regular tempo to 300 boys and
girls of normal school, academy, seventh, and eighth grades. The sub-
jects were made to believe it was a regular spelling test. At various
intervals the several groups of each grade were surprised by the re-
quest to recall as many of the words as they could remember. All
groups compared gave a final recall after the same interval (one hour,
one-half hour, or three weeks). One group had two intervening re-
calls, one had one, and one had no intervening recalls.
The results for final recall are best with two intervening recalls,
and for one intervening recall much better than for none. The gain
by the five minute over the immediate recall is noticeably greater in
its effect on the final recall, than the gain of immediate recall over no
intervening recalls. The total percentages for the respective groups
of girls are 89, 71, 58; for the boys, 73, 61, 52 (final recall after 30
minutes). The total percentages show a strong gain in efficiency in
the final recall after one hour, as a result of immediate recall girls,
76, 43 ; boys, 61, 40
On the whole the girls are noticeably superior to the boys and their
mode is one degree higher for each period of time. For immediate
recall and recall after one hour the mode for the boys is at 5, for the
girls, at 6. After three weeks it is at 4 and 6, respectively. The aver-
age deviation from the mode is consistently greater for the girls than
for the boys.
The pedagogical significance of these findings, especially in rela-
tion to drill and frequent reviews, is obvious.
A Comparison of Stylus and Key in the Tapping Test: H. L. HOL-
LINGWORTH.
During a prolonged series of tests both stylus and telegraph key
were used in the tapping test by the same persons. The paper pre-
sented some comparison of the results secured by the two methods.
Data secured by the two methods can not be treated as even qualita-
tively comparable, the two methods not only do not yield the same
results, but they do not seem even to test the same function. The key
is much slower than the stylus, the difference increasing with practise.
i This paper is published in full in the Journal of Educational Psychology,
March, 1914.
296
TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
The best individual by one method is not the best by the other. There
is 20 per cent, gain as the result of practise, when using the stylus, but
no gain at all in the use of the key. The variability of the records
is greater with the key than with the stylus. With respect to amount
of improvement through practise, individuals stand in the same rela-
tive order by the two methods, but the individual variabilities are
quite different in the two cases.
The Work Curve for Brief Period of Intense Application: R. S.
WOODWORTH.
Though the question of mental fatigue has been most examined
in prolonged work, it is possible that a characteristic work curve
should be obtained from short periods. In collaboration with Drs.
Wells and Pedrick, the author has studied periods of 5-40 seconds
in controlled association tests (logical relations, color naming, simple
directions) , series of 10 or 20 stimuli being visually presented all at
once, and the subject being required to react to the stimuli one after
another without intermission. The time of each single reaction was
recorded in order to see whether the speed of reaction changed in the
course of the series. The work curve so obtained varies from trial to
trial, but on the average, runs a definite course. The initial reaction
is the slowest, the next few the quickest of all, then comes a gradual
decline of speed till the last reaction, which is quicker than those just
before it. In the traditional language of the work curve, we find here
a rapid warmingnup, followed by progressive fatigue and an end-
spurt. These conceptions are, however, of questionable value when
applied to so brief a period of work, and a truer interpretation may
be had from the notions of overlap and interference. The ''fatigue
effect" is here, probably, an index of the steady accumulation of in-
terferences, while the warming-up and end-spurt effects can be con-
nected with the overlapping of the reactions to successive stimuli.
Overlap acts to the advantage of the performance as a whole, in spite
of the division of attention involved ; but in the case of the first reac-
tion, the division of attention is present without any chance of gain
from the overlap, while in the final reaction the division of attention
lapses and the advantage of overlap remains. When the same test
material is used with an interval of a few seconds between the pres-
entation of successive stimuli, both overlap and interference would
be expected to drop out; and, in fact, the work curve under these
conditions reduces practically to a dead level.
A Comparison of the Influence of Strychnine and Caffeine on Mental
and Motor Efficiency: DR. A. T. POFFENBERGER, JR.
The paper is based on a comparison of the results of two recent
studies, namely, ''The Influence of Caffeine on Mental and Motor Effi-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 297
ciency, " by H. L. Hollingworth, 2 and ' ' The Effects of Strychnine on
Mental and Motor Efficiency, " by A. T. Poffenberger, Jr. 3 Striking
differences appear in the action of the two drugs upon certain mental
and motor processes. The two tests were conducted on the same gen-
eral plan, and comparison of the two is both permissible and easy.
The tests were those well known in every psychological laboratory.
Motor ability was tested by the tapping test, coordination test, and
the steadiness test, while the mental ability was tested by the color
naming test, opposites test, cancellation test, and calculation tests.
Caffeine caused an increased efficiency in most of the tests, the
amount of increase varying with the size of the dose. Exceptions to
this statement were few, the principal one being the decrease in steadi-
ness with the increase in the size of the dose of caffeine. No after ef-
fects were noted during the course of the test which extended over a
period of about forty days.
The strychnine test, covering about the same period of time,
showed none of these effects, except in the case of the steadiness test
where there was a suggestion of decreased steadiness after a dose.
There was neither an increase in efficiency nor a retardation measur-
able during the period of the test.
The explanation of the difference is to be looked for in the seat of
the action of the two drugs in the nervous system, the latter acting
primarily on the cord and medulla and the former affecting the
higher centers of the cerebrum.
H. L. HOLLINGWORTH,
Secretary.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
IDEALIST TO EEALIST, ONCE MORE: A REPLY
~TN a recent number of this JOURNAL 1 Mr. J. E. Turner makes a
justifiable criticism not, I think, upon my argument against
"neo-realism," but upon a questionable expression in my statement
of the argument. He objects to my attributing to the realist the
"certainty that he is ... having a complex experience described
by the terms yellowness, coolness, etc. " 2 As Mr. Turner truly says
the realist would hold that he is describing "the object, not his
experience as yellow." Mr. Turner's criticism is simply met, and
2 "Archives of Psychology, No. 22, 1912.
3 Am. Jour. PsychoL, 25, 1914, 82 ff.
i"Miss Calkins on Idealism and Realism," this JOURNAL, Vol. XI., pages
46 ff.
2 This JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., page 453, quoted, Vol. IX., page 603. The
sentence is not quoted entire by Mr. Turner.
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
my meaning is correctly expressed, by replacing the word "de-
scribed ' ' by the word ' ' indicated. ' ' 3 For however firmly the realist
asseverates that he is describing an extra-mental entity he can not,
and does not, deny that by the term ' ' yellow ' ' he also indicates that
part of his experience (or consciousness) which he calls "seeing
yellow." 4
The idealist's argument may then be restated, omitting the term
which Mr. Turner criticizes. Such a restatement runs, briefly, as
follows: Both the idealist and the neo-realist admit (1) that they
have a consciousness indicated by the terms "yellow," "cold," and
the like. The neo-realist holds (2) that he also perceives directly an
extra-mental object, yellow and cold. But if this second statement
be challenged (as by one who says "the object is gray, not yellow")
the neo-realist must fall back upon the position which he occupies
with the idealist. No reiterated assertions, "the object is yellow,"
"yellow ... is an adjective applicable only to material objects " 5
will prevail against the stubborn counter-assertion, "No. The object
is gray." There is nothing left to the realist except the insistent
statement "I have the consciousness indicated by the term 'yellow/
not by the term 'gray.'
This proof, from the admitted occurrence of illusion, 6 that the
object of immediate certainty is experience (i. e., consciousness) is
merely the first step in an idealistic philosophy. But it is an
un demolished barrier to all forms of neo-realism.
MARY WHITON CALKINS.
WELLESLEY COLLEGE.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1912-1913. N. S., Vol. XIII.
London: Williams and Norgate. 1913.
It has been noted by several observers that the influence of Bergson in
England has been much stronger than in America. This opinion is con-
firmed by a comparison of the " Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society "
for last year with the topics discussed before the American Philosophical
3 I have used this expression in the paragraph next to that from which Mr.
Turner quotes. Cf. this JOURNAL, Vol. VIII., page 453, paragraph 3.
4 This JOURNAL, Vol. XL, page 48, paragraph 2. There is much to be said
for Mr. Turner's contention that the term "experience" can not be unambigu-
ously used. In the idealist 's mouth it means ' ' consciousness, ' ' whereas the real-
ist often interprets it to mean "object as experienced."
s Turner, op. tit., pages 48-49.
e Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, Philosophical Eeview, 1913, XXII., pages 410 ff., for
criticism of the various attempts of neo-realists, in "The New Realism," to ex-
plain illusion.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 299
Association during the same period. Of the thirteen papers in the
British volume, three deal directly with the French vitalist and three
more indirectly criticize some of his dominant hypotheses. Besides these
six there are two which reveal an interest in the problems of vitalism.
Interest in Bergson, however, is far from being identical with Bergsonism.
And after reading this volume, nobody will accuse the Aristotelian Society
of having degenerated into a revival meeting of neo-vitalists.
Mr. Bertrand Russell's leading article, " On the Notion of Cause," at
once disappoints and pleases the reviewer. Mr. Russell seeks to show
that the law of causality, as usually stated by philosophers, is false and is
not employed in science. What he actually succeeds in proving and most
clearly, too is that the definitions of causality (and necessity) given in
Baldwin's "Dictionary" are false and never used by scientists. The re-
viewer would gently protest that Mr. Russell unduly natters this literary
informe ingens cui lumen ademptum when he assumes that it represents
the opinions of philosophers on the nature of cause. Rather than attack
this blind Cyclops, Mr. Russell might better have selected the statements
of half a dozen contemporary thinkers. That would have been fairer to
philosophers, at any rate.
Mr. Russell next considers the nature of scientific laws; and he finds
that, far from stating that one event A is always followed by another
event B, they state "functional relations between certain events at cer-
tain times, which we call determinants and other events at earlier or
later times or at the same time." No a priori category is involved in this ;
scientific laws are purely empirical and not universal except in a trivial
and useless sense. The most interesting point in Mr. Russell's paper is
his argument (which unfortunately falls short of being a proof) that " a
system with one set of determinants may very likely have other sets of
quite a different kind; that, for example, a mechanically determined sys-
tem may also be teleologically or volitionally determined." This, of
course, has come to be pretty familiar among those who have worked in
the mathematical-logical problems of philosophy; and it is susceptible of
a variety of proofs, some of which have been set forth by various writers,
but without particular reference to the philosophy of causation. Would it
not have been useful, in Mr. Russell's essay, to have repeated the proof
with this reference?
To the reviewer, it appears that Mr. Russell ought to have expanded
considerably the most difficult and novel proposition in his analysis,
namely, that the scientific law of cause makes no difference between past
and future. ' The future determines the past in exactly the same sense in
which the past determines the future." The word " determine " here has
a purely logical significance ; a certain number of variables " determine "
another variable if that variable is a function of them. With this the
reviewer entirely agrees, as far as it goes; but it does not bring under
scrutiny those very peculiarities of the so-called " necessary connection "
which differentiate it from other instances of simple logical determination.
There is a specific difference between the relation of lightning to thunder
300
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
and the relation of the two sides and included angle of a triangle to the
third side. For instance, the thunder-lightning relation seems to be a
real irreversible in spite of the fact that, in its logical determination, the
later event determines the former and vice versa. Briefly, then, the causal
determination is a species of the genus function-variable. The scientist
deals with causes and effects generically, and finds this very useful; even
as the politician may deal with men generically as vertebrate bipeds with
appetites and reactions. But the metaphysician ought to study his objects,
be they causes or people or what not, in their full specificity. But the
mathematician who reconsiders thunder and lightning merely as instances
of function and variable is being pragmatic in the bad sense of this
foggy adjective.
The second essay of the volume, by Mr. G. Dawes Hicks, considers
" The Nature of Willing." In a most happy manner, the author shows
the all but incorrigible vagueness of philosophers in their use of the
term "will." He then restates Lotze's acute description of man's com-
plete ignorance of all that happens between an act of conscious volition
and the fulfilment of the resolve. Mr. Hicks, accepting this account,
concludes that " what specifically characterizes volition as a fact of mind
must be, to a large extent, independent of the execution which is its
normal consequent." Because of this, argues the writer, " it is exceed-
ingly improbable that in the primitive stages of conation there could
have been in any way prefigured or foreshadowed in a specific conative
act the results which would ensue from that act." " Anything, therefore,
of the nature of an idea of end or purpose must, in that case, be absent
from the early phases of the life of consciousness." Primitive life lacks
volition ; and even in mature life, the willing agent, " from being com-
parable to an operator, to whom the various details of his apparatus are
familiar . . . might more appropriately be likened to a subordinate
laborer who, to the working of the machine, the inner structure of which
lie has neither seen nor comprehends, contributes merely the external
appliances necessary to set it going." Mr. Hicks ends by casting doubts
upon the propriety of invoking " dispositions " to explain how the act
of will or the idea of the end desired passes over to fulfilment. " Disposi-
tion " merely blankets our ignorance of the process with an easy name.
The conclusion of the article is that mental activity can not be identified
with conation.
In "Purpose and Evolution," Mr. Arthur Lynch, a reformed Spen-
cerian, intones a pleasant song of revolt against Spencer and Darwin.
There is a purpose in the world; but the singer does not argue his case.
He asserts it fierily, with frequent choruses from eminent natural scien-
tists (in the footnotes). Mr. Lynch is profoundly impressed with the
fact that man is gaining a mastery over Nature and is working his way
toward " independence of authority " and free imagination.
" A New Logic " is presented by E. E. Constance Jones. It is a
criticism of Charles Mercier's recent book of the same title. Mr. Mercier
wishes to discard the traditional analysis of a proposition into subject
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 301
and predicate and to substitute therefor the relation of " Ratio " : thus,
" A is unequal to B " would be analyzed into the terms A., B, and the
specific relation of inequality. Miss Jones points out that, as the number
of distinct " ratios " (types of relation) is indefinitely great, no classifica-
tion of propositions would be possible. The critic heaps objection upon
objection, until Mr. Mercier is or ought to be confounded.
The fifth paper is by Mr. Frank Granger, on " Intuitional Thinking."
This is a peculiarly worded, but significant analysis of perception and
" higher " intuitions. Mr. Granger shows, among other things, that
normal perception is stereoscopic in time; that is, we do not perceive in-
stantaneous characters, but rather genuine duration characters in which
past, present, and future are " fused " or, to quote the author, " gathered
into one aspect." The reviewer must protest against the language here,
but not against the fact which Mr. Granger notes. The words suggest
that a " mind " somehow seizes things in different times and places and
condenses (interpenetrates) them into one time (and perhaps one place).
Now this is not what Mr. Granger means; he means, I take it, that the
act of intuition is itself extended in time and nevertheless truly single.
The stereoscope does condense; it brings two space fields into one field.
But apparently this is not strictly analogous to the intuiting of time
and things in time. The intuiting itself is approximately coterminous
temporally with the things intuited.
The most ingenious point in the essay is Mr. Granger's explanation of
the felt difference between an intuited object and a conceived one. The
real order is a time order, says he, and irreversible; but the conceptual
order is timeless and hence can be thought of, so to speak, forward or
backward or in any artificial arrangement we choose to cast its elements
into. The feeling of this plasticity is the mark of a concept. Formal logic
is a mechanicism for economizing the elements of the intuitional series,
and so rendering them more adequate to present reality in its narrative
form. Reality is irreversible; and real propositions are (consequently?)
inconvertible.
:< What Bergson Means by Interpenetration " is told by Miss Karin
Costelloe. Bergson's " duration " is a process of indivisible and spontane-
ous change; and it is in this process that interpenetration occurs. In
describing duration, Miss Costelloe makes one very obscure and startling
statement. ' The thing of really fundamental importance in duree is
interpenetration. Spontaneity really follows from this." This alleged
dependence is not made evident, and certainly it calls for more light. To
establish it would be a metaphysical triumph of no mean order. Inter-
penetration occurs when and where " the parts depend for their qualita-
tive character upon their connection with the whole of the rest of the
process." A discrete process, on the contrary, is one whose parts are
independent and externally related. Duration thus shows itself to be
very different from time, which is a dimension whose elements are
uniquely ordered and reciprocally external.
In " The Analysis of Volition," Mr. R. F. A. Hoernle concludes that
302
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volition is a word of as many meanings as there are psychologists; and
that " the disagreement between psychological theories is not, at bottom,
of the kind which can be settled by an appeal to i fact,' in the sense of
introspective evidence. On the contrary, it is due to differences of prin-
ciple." Psychologists differ as to the nature and aim of analysis, about
the methods, and about the concepts to be used. The issue is : what kind
and what degree of abstraction should psychology practise? This is met
indirectly by a discussion of the following questions: Is volition simple
or complex, derivative or unique? Does realization or action belong to
the essence of volition? What are the limits of a single volition within
the stream of consciousness? And what is the relation of volition to will?
The aim of the discussion being to bring out the conflicting presupposi-
tions behind them, Mr. Hoernle's remarks touch many problems in many
ways and so can not be adequately summarized here.
Next follows a brief abstract of L. P. Jacks's essay : " Does Conscious-
ness Evolve ? " It shows that the evolution " of consciousness " is quite
distinct from the " evolution " of consciousness. The former is the devel-
opment within the conscious series; the latter is the genesis of the series
itself out of something else. This distinction becomes important in all
discussions of purposive activity. Action prior to consciousness seems
purposive when considered by consciousness; how, the query then arises,
does the purpose operate? There is the temptation to say, as Caird does,
that the end is dimly present to the mind. Jacks goes on to show how
this view involves the psychologist's fallacy.
William W. Carlile, in his paper entitled " Kant's Transcendental
Esthetic with Some of Its Ulterior Bearings," extends the application of
the Kantian doctrine considerably beyond its original range. He shows
that many propositions not ordinarily considered analytic (in Kant's
sense) really are. The necessary analytic proposition rests on the law of
contradiction. Any proposition, then, the denial of which would contra-
dict, explicitly or implicitly, either the proposition itself or any other one
which is presupposed by it, must be analytic. Thus, " a man who is
stone-blind can not distinguish red from yellow " is analytic ; for the term,
stone-blind, means inability to see colors. The very process of naming,
therefore, fixes the character of the analytic proposition ; and " it conse-
quently affords no basis whatever for the view that the origin of truths
of this sort is, in any sense, independent of experience." Now, the strik-
ing thing about Mr. Carlile's essay is that it extends this view so as to
include Kant's synthetic truths. In working out this hypothesis, the
author undertakes to show that all metageometry is vitiated by its initial
assumptions, all of which involve contradictions. Incidentally, he sees
no difficulty in proving Euclid's postulates of parallelism, the indemon-
strability of which first suggested the logical independence of the
Euclidean postulates and led to the attempts to deduce systems from other
than the Euclidean set of propositions.
Miss L. S. Stebbing writes on " The Notion of Truth in Bergson's
Theory of Knowledge." Miss Stebbing renders a genuine service in re-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 303
porting Bergson's highly significant, but all too little known " Introduc-
tion a la Metaphysique " published in 1903 in the Revue de Metaphysique
et de Morale. More clearly than any other words from his pen, this sharp
essay reveals how completely the neo-vitalist is enmeshed in the ancient
substance-attribute notion of things. There are two ways of knowing a
thing, he there tells us: one by considering the thing from the outside,
and one by entering the inside of it. The former is relative and analytic ;
the latter gives us the real thing. The inside of a thing contains its real
nature. Intuition, in that essay, is not opposed to intellect as in Berg-
son's later writing ; it is rather a sort of " intellectual sympathy," to quote
Bergson.
But this is not the main consideration in Miss Stebbing's paper. She
is chiefly interested in showing that Mr. F. C. S. Schiller is entirely
wrong in claiming that Bergson and his two disciples, Le Roy and Wil-
bois, champion a pragmatic theory of truth. The reviewer agrees heartily
with Miss Stebbing's contention that both Bergson and Le Roy take a
view of truth which is entirely different from the James-Schiller theory.
But she will probably be assured by the Bergsonians that they are in
hearty agreement with both James and Schiller, not to mention every
other person who loves that blessed word Anti-intellectualism. This, too,
in spite of the palpable fact that Bergson and Le Roy assert that think-
ing serves only practical needs and, in so doing, deforms the truth to
suit those needs; whereas Schiller considers truth itself as a mere value.
For Le Roy there is a point of view beyond reason ; for Schiller, all mental
life is purposive and hence never can attain insight to a world " in itself."
For Le Roy, truth is not a value; it is movement, action, growth. In it
there is nothing permanent; it is progress and not certain results. Still
more clearly than Le Roy, Wilbois feels the need of going beyond the
limited pragmatic interpretation of conceptual knowledge and finding
truth elsewhere. Miss Stebbing goes on to draw a somewhat audacious
parallel between Aristotle's doctrine of nous poietikos and the Bergsonian
active intuition; and yet, audacious though it is, the comparison doubt-
less is profound, especially if one charitably minimizes the importance of
the rational in Aristotle's hypothesis. The significant thing about Berg-
son's " intuition " is its supposed power of leaping the barriers of normal
pragmatic thinking and coming to grasp the real world in an entirely
impractical fashion. For Bergson this, the highest achievement of con-
sciousness, is essentially useless; that is, it serves no particular purpose.
How different from Schiller and James!
Finally, Miss Stebbing exhibits the utter confusion of the Bergsonians
in failing to separate the problem of the nature of truth from the problem
about the criterion of truth'.
Next follows a lengthy symposium on the question : " Can there be
anything obscure or implicit in a mental state ? " This is discussed by
Messrs. Henry Barker, G. F. Stout, and R. F. A. Hoernle. Mr. Barker argues
that "the notion of implicit, like that of unconscious, mental elements
is ... at variance with the very nature of consciousness itself." Mr.
304
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Stout maintains the opposite. There are, he says, contents which are not
separately discerned. Mr. Hoernle agrees with neither, but with Mr.
Mitchell's view of the implicit.
As one might guess from its title, " Memory and Consciousness," Mr.
Arthur Robinson criticizes Bergson's " Matter and Memory." He con-
siders four points : the adequacy of Bergson's account of memory, the part
consciousness plays in his theory, the nature of the unconscious, and the
power of intuition to transcend intelligence. His answers to these four
problems run as follows: Bergson's treatment of memory neglects the
fact that memory is an assertion . . . and falls into serious difficulties
through an analysis which rests on the presupposition that everything
which can be called structure falls on the side of matter. Secondly, if
recollection is to aid choice, it must be possible for consciousness to
illumine the situation; but Bergson holds that freedom diminishes with
every increase of intelligence, and that intuition is unavailable because it
is divorced from action. Here the reviewer is constrained to say that Mr.
Robinson has seriously misconstrued Bergson; practical freedom does not
dimmish with increased intelligence, according to him. Only theoretical
truth in metaphysical matters dwindles. Thirdly, Bergson falls into a
contradiction when he makes the past completely present in every later
stage of reality and yet insists upon the reality of change. Finally,
psychology and philosophy can never " join hands," if Bergson is right
in making science use intelligence, and philosophy employ only intuition.
The volume closes with a study of " The Philosophy of Probability " by
A. Wolf. This is an endeavor to show that both complete determinism and
complete indeterminism must fail to afford logical justification for the
estimating of probabilities, and hence we must postulate partial deter-
minism. This, says Mr. Wolf, is the normal assumption of common
sense. There is real, " objective " chance, particularly in living creatures,
but not in physical stuffs.
WALTER B. PITKIN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
The Authorship of the Platonic Epistles. R. HACKFORTH. Manchester:
University Press. 1913. Pp. 203.
After a general introduction of thirty-five pages, which contains a re-
view of the history of the question as to the genuineness of the Platonic
Epistles, a summary of the supposed results of the stylometric investiga-
tion of the Platonic canon together with a revision of Raeder's list of rare
words found in the Epistles, there follows a separate discussion of the
claims of the thirteen letters in numerical order. As a useful summary
of the previous work of numerous scholars, so far as it was known to the
author, the discussion possesses a certain value; but too much of the best
work was quite unknown to him, and the author contributed too little
original matter or argument to affect the judgment of a scrupulous critic.
The conclusion to which the inquiry leads the author may be given in his
own words (p. 188) : " The result to which we have been led by the fore-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 305
going discussion is that we may hold five of the Platonic Epistles genuine,
viz., iii, iv, vii, viii, xiii, that we must reject five, viz., i, ii, v, vi, xii, and
that the remaining three, ix, x, and xi, must be left doubtful."
The very statement of this result ought, it would seem, to give the
critic pause; for it raises more questions than it purports to solve. Above
all, one is tempted to ask how so heterogeneous a collection for even a
superficial glance at the series of Epistles will show that it is a collection
deliberately made for a purpose could have come into existence if more
than half of its constituent members was spurious and the remainder
genuine. Our author's explanations fail to carry conviction; for they do
not touch upon the vital points. Unfortunately for the success of Mr.
Hackforth's study, but most fortunately for those who are seriously in-
terested in the question of which he treats, another scholar about the
same time opened up an entirely new vista by addressing himself to the
more fundamental problem of the existence and purpose of the collection
itself. I refer, of course, to the essay of Professor Otto Immisch, then of
Giessen, now of Konigsberg, " Der erste platonische Brief " (mit einer
Einleitung uber den ZwecJc und einer Vermutung uber die Entstehung
der platonischen Brief sammlung), in Philogus, LXXII. (N. F. XXVI.,
pp. 1-41). It is not too much to say that the whole question must be re-
opened and the results of renewed studies awaited before we can pro-
nounce upon the genuineness of the collection; although I am as
thoroughly convinced of its spuriousness now as I was eighteen years ago
when I published my " Pseudoplatonica."
W. A. HEIDEL.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.
J. 0. Fichtes WerJce in sechs Banden, mit drei Bildnissen Fichtes, heraus-
gegeben und eingeleitet Ton Professor DR. FRITZ MEDICUS. ca. 4500 pp.
in 4. Leipzig: Fritz Eckardt und Felix Meiner.
" Neoromanticism " is one of the most favored catchwords of modern
thought in Germany. Springing from the very midst of this new move-
ment a young German publisher, Fritz Eckardt, undertook some years ago
to prepare a new edition of the classics of German philosophy in the early
nineteenth century: Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel the ro-
manticists in philosophy. These new Eckardt-editions, combined with the
well-known editions of the " Philosophische Bibliothek " (formerly Diirr)
have been taken over by another publishing house, that of Dr. Felix Meiner.
The Fichte-edition has just been finished in memory of the appar-
ently little noticed one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Fichte's birth
(May 19, 1912). The only heretofore existing Fichte-edition, published
by J. H. Fichte, has become rare. Moreover, it was full of inaccuracies
and misprints, and the demand for a new edition became so great as al-
most to be an urgent necessity. The new edition, with its careful text,
tries to meet this demand. It is, however, not quite complete. A few of
the less important writings by Fichte, especially those of a biographical
nature, have been omitted. All his other writings appear unabridged and
306
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
in chronological order. The paging of the earlier Fichte-edition has been
followed in the new, so that references relating to the former may readily
be looked up in the latter; Finally, a very detailed index, which amounts
almost to a Fichte dictionary, and an instructive introduction, both by
Fritz Medicus, one of our best Fichte scholars, form an addition which
is not the least important feature of the work.
GUNTHER JACOBY.
GRIEFSWALD UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. January, 1914. The Problem
of Knowledge from the Standpoint of Validity (pp. 1-16) : ARCHIBALD A.
BOWMAN. - The fact of knowledge is the reality with which epistemology
starts. The standard of validity, thus becoming an internal one, takes the
form of the distinction between the scientific and the non-scientific.
Rationalism affirms the identification of the scientific with the valid;
pragmatism denies this. This antithesis, it is asserted, contains a com-
mon presupposition, and from this presupposition the validity of knowl-
edge is determined, with illustrations from the critical philosophy of Kant.
Truth, Reality, and Relation (pp. 17-26) : JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON. - Examines
in some detail the arguments of Professor Perry in support of the neo-
realistic theory of relations ; criticizes his ontological pluralism ; concludes
that " there can be no absolutely independent facts out of all relation to
other facts or themselves devoid of relational structure." HocJcing's
Philosophy of Religion: an Epirical Development of Absolutism (pp. 27-
47) : DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH. - The idealism of Professor Hocking is
a synthesis of the historical forms of mystical, logical, and psychological
idealism. Accepting (though this acceptance is criticized) the claims of
naturalism, realism, and subjective idealism, he proceeds by dialectic
to the position of absolute idealism, the dialectic supported at all points
by an appeal to intuition. A critical examination of this intuitional
appeal reveals, it is maintained, too exclusive emphasis upon mysticism,
an unwarranted use of the ontological argument, and too little regard for
the empirical and practical. Discussion: Unreal Subsistence and Con-
sciousness (pp. 48-64) : W. P. MONTAGUE. - A reply to Professor Lovejoy's
criticism of the New Realism. Defends the writer's own view of the
problem of error, agrees with his critic as to the " menace of relativism,"
and restates and defends his own theory of consciousness. Reviews of
Books: Heinrich Richert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Be-
griffsbildung : Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften:
GEORGE H. SABINE. Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity: A. C.
ARMSTRONG. Emile Myerson, Identite et Realite: JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON.
Philosophische Abhandlungen, Hermann Cohen zum IQsten Geburtstag
(4 Juli 1912) dargebracht: WALTER T. MARVIN. G. J. Blewett, The
Christian View of the World: HENRY W. WRIGHT. Notices of New Books.
Summaries of Articles. Notes.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 307
KEVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. December, 1913. Memoire Affective
et Cenesthesie (pp. 561-595) : P. SOLLIER. - The existence of such memory
is a fact, although the fact is generally obscured by the greater utility of
other types of memory; the former types are more difficult to evoke, but
are as persistent as sensorial memory ; kinesthetic memory is " only a
manifestation of ' cenesthesie,' " the latter being the basis of the linking
of our recollections to our personalities. La Logique du Reve et le Role de
I' Association et de la Vie Affective (pp. 596-613) : J. PERES. - " The
thought of dream puts itself directly in opposition to the world of waking
by the predominance, not alone of our internal sensations, but also of the
entire automatic material of representation. . . ." These conditions,
coupled with the play during sleep, of the laws and habits of normal
thought, lead to the characteristic incoherencies and contradictions of
dreams. Les Fondements Objectifs de la Notion d f Electron (pp. 613-642) :
A. HEY. - This second installment utilizes the phenomena of the ioniza-
tion of gases (Thomson and Rutherford) as further evidence for the
objective reality of the elementary quantity of electricity. Revue Critique.
L'Histoire des Theologies et des Philosophies Medievales: MAURICE MIL-
LIOUD. Analyses et Comptes Rendus. Augustin Guyau, La Philosophic
et la Sociologie d' Alfred Fouillee: E. BOIRAC. A. Cresson, UEspece et
son Serviteur: DR. JANKELEVITCH. Revue des Periodiques. Notices
Bib liographiques.
Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research. Vol. VII.,
No. 3. Pp. 391. $2.00.
Hartmann, Henry G. A New Conception of Relativity and Locke.
Cincinnati : University Press. 1914. Pp. 96. $1.00.
Keller, Ludwig. Die Freimaurerei. Leipzig: Verlag von B. G. Teubner.
1914. Pp. 147. 1.25 M.
Miiller-Freienfels, Richard. Poetik. Leipzig: Verlag von B. G. Teubner.
1914. Pp. vi-f 98. 1.25 M.
Miinsterberg, Hugo. Grundziige der Psychotechnik. Leipzig : Verlag von
J. A. Barth. 1914. Pp. ix -f 767. 16 M.
Rand, Benjamin. Shaftesbury's Second Characters or the Language of
Forms. Cambridge : University Press. 1914. Pp. xxix + 182. $2.50.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE meeting of the Kant-Oesellschaft held this year in Halle, April
18-20, was in the nature of a " Jubildumsveranstaltung " to celebrate the
tenth anniversary of its organization. In honor of the visitors a special
performance of Mozart's " Magic Flute " was given in the Opera House.
The founder of the society, Dr. Hans Vaihinger had written a " Prolog "
for this opera, in which he disclosed the intimate relation existing between
its theme and Kant's works. Dr. Bauch, of Jena, and Dr. Felix Krueger,
of Halle, gave the principal addresses of the meeting. The former in his
paper " Ueber den Begriff des Naturgesetzes," agreed with Helmholtz's
308
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
statement that a law of nature is a universal concept, and held that this
must be understood, not in a nominalistic or realistic sense, but in the
mathematical sense of a " function." Dr. Krueger, " Ueber den Begriff
des Wertes " emphasized the necessity of distinguishing sharply the ques-
tions of value, of being, and of knowing. Since Kant's time we hold in
mind that no " Ding, oder ZwecJc an sich " has value, but that every value
has to justify itself before the reason. Out of mere being it is impossible
to deduce an ought. Our judgments of value are, for the most part,
experienced as " Wertgefuhl " and it is not the content but the " Wert-
gefuhl" that gives value. That which gives value, viz., "the feeling of
value," must possess absolute value. Since the founding of the society on
April 22, 1904 (the hundredth anniversary of Kant's birthday), the mem-
bership has increased from 32 to 800 and the endowment from 15,000 M. to
42,000 M. The interest from the fund is used in giving prizes for the
most acceptable treatment of given subjects, in supporting scientific
journals, and in reprinting rare philosophical works of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Besides a large number of German philosophers,
several from Russia, Switzerland, and Austria were in attendance.
DR. JOSIAH ROYCE, since 1885 professor of the history of philosophy at
Harvard University, has been transferred to the Alford professorship of
natural religion, moral philosophy, and civil polity, left vacant by the
retirement of Professor Palmer.
MRS. CHRISTINE LADD-FRANKLIN has recently given lectures at Cornell
University on Color, and at Chicago on Color and Logic. She will also
lecture at the University of Illinois on these subjects.
DR. EDWARD K. STRONG, JR., of the department of psychology at
Columbia University, has been appointed professor of psychology and the
psychology of education at George Peabody College for Teachers.
PROFESSOR W. V. BINGHAM is on leave of absence from Dartmouth Col-
lege for travel and for study at Cambridge University. He will return in
time to continue his directorship of the Dartmouth summer session.
DR. MARY T. WHITLEY, instructor in educational psychology, Teachers
College, Columbia University, has been promoted to an assistant pro-
fessorship in that institution.
THE editors of the Psychological Review Publications have announced
the election of Dr. Shepherd I. Franz to the editorship of the Psycho-
logical Bulletin.
DR. DAVID CAMP ROGERS, associate professor of psychology at the Uni-
versity of Kansas, has been appointed professor of psychology at Smith
College.
PROFESSOR HENRI BERGSON gave the first of his Gifford Lectures in
Edinburgh, on Tuesday, April 21. The subject was " The Human Per-
sonality."
THERE will be a joint session of the Mind Society, the Aristotelian
Society, and the British Psychological Society at Durham, July 3 to 6.
VOL. XL No. 12. JUNE 4, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
A DEFINITION OF CAUSATON. Ill
IN the two preceding papers we have carried out the empirical
method of investigating the meaning of causation through the
field of statics, and through part of dynamics. In accordance with
the plan drawn up in the first paper, we shall now continue the
inquiry through the remainder of dynamics, the "properties of
matter," and the field of electricity. These, we decided, offer in the
present state of science the only types of causal connection which
are deserving of analysis, since all other types are reduced to some or
all of these three. The next case in order is that of
Impact
This may be viewed as a case under Newton's second law, if we
consider the acceleration given by one of the bodies to the other: if
we consider the motion of both bodies before and after the collision,
it falls under the third law. It seems to be a typical case, in
dynamics, of action and reaction between moving bodies. The inter-
est of it lies in its being treated as the type par excellence of all
causation, by those who defend a mechanical philosophy of nature.
Some, though not much, work has been done toward analysis of it in
monographs little known to English-speaking philosophers. 1 This
case also differs from anything previous in being more complex.
There appears to be a decided change of quality between cause and
effect, in contrast with the simple uniform series and the simple
combination of two forces into one, which were examined in the
last paper.
We shall begin with an artificially simple case. The bodies are
supposed smooth and non-rotating perfect spheres, perfectly elastic
or imperfectly elastic. The question, whether there is actual contact,
may be neglected.
Elastic smooth spheres in direct collision, where there is no rota-
tion, obey the following law. If the bodies have, respectively, masses
iR. Schellwien, "Das Gesetz der Kausalitat, > ' page 17; A. Kowalewski,
"Ueber das Kausal Problem/' pages 14-17; A. Farges, "Theorie Fondamentale
de 1'Acte et de la Puissance," pages 223-24; et al.
309
310
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
A and B, velocities u and v before collision, U and V after collision
u v VU.
Au -f- Bv is the total momentum of the two bodies before collision ;
when they are moving in the same direction Bv is positive, when in
opposite directions Bv is negative. In the same way, AU + BV is
the total momentum after collision. This means that whatever mo-
mentum A loses is taken up after collision by B, and conversely.
For Au AU = BV--Bv, where the left-hand member is the loss
in A'a momentum and the right hand member the gain in B's mo-
mentum. At contact with B, A 's momentum is simply split into two
parts and one of them transferred to B. It is analogous to a resolu-
tion and subsequent combination of forces, except that it here applies
to momenta and occurs in the same straight line. The two parts of
the whole process, before and after impact, thus reveal identity at
every stage, in spite of the apparent difference. But the identity is
yet more complete. The total momentum is not only the same
throughout, but it travels along in the same direction and at a uni-
form velocity. It is going just as fast before the impact as during
the impact and after the impact. That is, the center of mass of the
whole system (a property already accounted for by the principles of
statics) moves onward continuously at a steady rate. Its velocity is
easily found to be (Au -\- Bv) / (A -}- B) . The whole system, then, is
a case of the first law of motion : even the individual momenta con-
sidered by themselves are preserved, though the same velocity does
not continue with the same mass. The reason why the case of impact
seems irreducible to one of the first law is that velocities suffer change
after impact. It is a reason analogous to that which made composi-
tion of forces seem paradoxical. One line can not by itself be another
line, we admitted : but when it is considered from the point of view
of its relations to other lines, it can have several directions at once.
So here : the velocities before and after impact are different ; but
when we remember that velocity is not something by itself, but is
of a particular mass, the later velocity may be seen to admit a pos-
sible identity with the earlier velocity. The transfer of a velocity un-
changed from one mass to another greater or less mass is not the
transfer of something identical from one situation to another; for
the same velocity of a greater or less mass is a very different thing.
In the case of a uniform motion under the first law, the mass is con-
stant and hence the velocity persists unaltered : but it did so because
it was the velocity of a constant mass. Here, too, the velocity is pre-
served, but because it is the velocity of a different mass after impact,
it assumes a different value. The loss in velocity of A is u U; the
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 311
gain in velocity of B is V v- but V- -v= (u~-U)-A/B. The
velocity which B gains is just that which A lost, adapted to the mass
of B. The apparent differences are then due to the original elements
of the event persisting in new circumstances.
We can represent the whole process as a series whose elements x
are successive positions of the momentum of A; at the instant of im-
pact this is resolved, but the sum of the resolved momenta continues
this series uniformly onward. Thus :
/ X Al \ ( X Ai \
Xi, Xz, X Z ' X n \ = I , X n+ i I I .
\ X B J \ X B J
And we may do the same with the successive positions of the mo-
mentum of B; and with the motion of the center of mass of the whole
system. This reduces the case to one of the first law, with the prin-
ciple of resolution included. No new type of causation is found here.
Of wholly inelastic bodies in direct collision the same holds. The
differentia of this case is that, instead of u v=V U we have
U- =V. The bodies do not rebound, and consequently move on to-
gether after impact, in the direction in which the body with the
greater momentum was moving. Just as with elastic bodies, the loss
in momentum of A is gained by B, the center of mass moves onward
uniformly, the velocity is transferred, adapted to B, and a resolution
of momenta, occurs along the line of motion. The kinetic energy
after the collision is less than before, because some of it has gone into
heat in the bodies ; but the momenta are preserved just as with elastic
bodies. Consequently with the exception of this transfer to heat
this case is of the same type as above. Now the phenomena of heat
are explained by physics on the supposition that it is motion of the
molecules of a body. It presumes that the kinetic energy, i. e., half
the squares of the velocities times the masses, of all the particles of
the bodies, which is not continued in the form of molar motion after
the impact, could with sufficient knowledge of detail be equated to the
same function of the internal motions. Even here, then, there is
believed to be no exception: the motions of masses continue unde-
stroyed, though we can not trace the causal sequence in detail. Of
partially or imperfectly elastic bodies, which comprise all known
actual cases the equation u v=V U becomes e(u v)=V U,
where e is the " coefficient of restitution," representing the amount
of return to its original shape of a body after the deformation due to
impact. The introduction of e is indifferent to the conservation of
the momenta; it simply determines the amount of kinetic energy
transformed into heat. For the way in which elasticity acts we may
refer to the later discussion. Apart from that, no new principle is
involved.
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Oblique collision is treated by the same methods as direct colli-
sion, after the velocities have been resolved into suitable components. 2
It is, therefore, a combination of the above types with that of the
type of resolution of velocities, and offers nothing new for our
purposes.
Change from Potential to Actual Motion and the Converse
When a body is shot upward from the earth's surface with a cer-
tain initial velocity, that velocity decreases uniformly until the body
reaches the highest point of its journey, passes through zero velocity,
and returns with uniform acceleration. Let us suppose the rise and
fall of the body to be exactly vertical. Imagine also that at the turn-
ing-point of its flight a rigid support is suddenly thrust under it,
fixed there for a time, and then removed. This furnishes a clear
picture of the change from actual to potential motion and the con-
verse. The whole process is subject to law and is, therefore, causal
throughout. What is its make-up ?
As the body flies upward to its highest position, each stage through
which it passes is compounded of two causal processes the attrac-
tion of the earth and the continuation of initial velocity each of
which processes conforms to the type already described. We need
not concern ourselves further, then, with this portion of its flight.
The velocity which results, at every stage, decreases regularly until it
has the value zero. If no support were put in, it would pass through
the zero value and become negative, i. e., a velocity of contrary direc-
tion. The whole series would thus be quite analogous to the case of
pressure at one end of a bar balanced on a fulcrum, which is trans-
mitted to the other end of the bar; a case examined under the head
of statical causation. But when the support is thrust in, the motion
ceases for a finite period of time. The body is then said to have
potential energy due to its position, or the work already done in
raising it. The downward motion does not exist; no motion exists,
and there is said to be a tendency to move downward.
Observe first that this is a real condition, andi an identifiable one,
described by more than the word rest. The body exerts pressure
upon the support, and this pressure is its potentiality. When the
physicist speaks of this potential energy as something "metaphysi-
cal" -meaning, of course, inaccessible to observation he is, I ven-
ture to think, more modest than is necessary. Pressure might be
objectively as real as form and size. There is no reason a priori why
the content of touch-sensations should not be as objective as the
qualities given in visual sensation. The thing is a question of fact.
2 Cf. Williamson and Tarleton, op. cit., pages 70-72.
3 Thomson's and Poynting's "Heat," London, 1911, page 116, note.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 313
Is there evidence that pressures continue as colors, sounds, etc., do
no t when we do not perceive them ? There is such evidence. When-
ever the support is removed, the body falls. Therefore it was press-
ing downward, tending to fall, all the time. Its existence is as
objective as motion is, and as independent of our perception ; it is not
a ''secondary quality." In fact, the reason assigned for believing in
potential energy by the authors above referred to is that the energy
of motion which is lost appears again when the body falls ; 4 just the
reason why we believe in the existence of the bodies themselves when
we look away from them.
As soon as the support is placed under the body, a composition
of forces occurs, giving equilibrium. The downward pressure of the
body is exactly equal to the upward pressure of the support. The
series of velocities constituting the hitherto motion continues, but is
at this point compounded with another series ; the continuous upward
push of the support. It is the same sort of thing that we found in
the collision of bodies. There the uniform motion was not destroyed,
but compounded at the moment of impact with another uniform mo-
tion. So here, the series of velocities in the rising body continues,
but is compounded with the resistance of the support and, as it were,
turned in a different direction. The potentiality here is simply a
special case of composition, such that the forces compounded are
equal and opposite. In fact, we might define potentiality as equi-
librium. Nothing whatever is destroyed; rather something is added
to each of the factors, viz., the opposite factor. This explains the
familiar Thomistic-Aristotelian doctrine that a potentiality by itself
is never a cause of an event; for nothing happens unless the equi-
librium is destroyed. It agrees also with Ostwald's second law of
energetics, that no event occurs unless there is an uncompensated
difference of potential factors; since an uncompensated difference is
equivalent to the fact that there is no equilibrium. Or, again : "when
the parts of a body or of a system of bodies are in any degree free to
adjust themselves under forces that exist within the system, they will
always so arrange themselves as to make the potential energy of the
system as small as possible," 5 i. e., the differences compensate them-
selves as far as possible. So far, then, there is a continuation of the
original series plus a compounding of it with the pressure of the
support.
As soon as the support is removed, the composition is succeeded
by a resolution. The support no longer combines with gravitation to
produce equilibrium, and the latter force acts alone in the manner
stated under the topic of gravitation. In the whole process, from
* Op. cit., page 110.
D. W. Bering, ''Essentials of Physics," New York, 1912, page 45.
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beginning to end, there does not seem to be any new type of causa-
tion besides the serial type and the type of composition.
This completes the list of cases under mechanical causation. It
will be observed that the principle of composition plays a large part ;
so large, indeed, that all the complex cases are reduced to simpler
types by its aid (or that of its closely allied form, the principle of
resolution). A principle so ubiquitous and so useful would seem
likely to have some philosophical significance. In the writer's opin-
ion it has; and accordingly before passing to the topic of ''Proper-
ties of Matter" we had best pause to consider that significance.
A Generalization from the Principles of Composition and Resolution
We have seen that a combination of forces may really contain the
components intact. They may, in combining, pass from the actual
to the potential state, or the converse, or may be combined as already
potential and remain so, or as actual and remain so. This is philo-
sophically a significant result. One philosophical objection to the
objective reality of the scientific concepts is based on the assump-
tion that they are not, when combined as they are in reality, pre-
served in the same form as they have when treated alone. Now, as
a result of empirical investigation we have found that this is not
true. They are at least sometimes so preserved. As a general criti-
cism of science, then, this philosophical view should not stand.
When, however, the view is based, not on an assumption which can
not be verified, but on an ultimate doctrine of internal relations, it
is a different matter. Such a view declares that whether parts are
changed or not when combined into wholes, the ultimate metaphysi-
cal account of the parts must be formulated in terms of the whole.
That is not inconsistent with the empirical facts, and shall not here
be discussed. Our only present concern is to point out that if science
is not metaphysically ultimate, it is not because the parts with which
it deals fail to exist. The analytic treatment is true to existence.
A corollary of some importance to the philosophical estimation
of our present method is that it is right (barring dialectic, etc.)
in treating types of causation singly. In the manifold and
very complex combinations of them which constitute real indi-
vidual events, each kind of causation may well be preserved intact.
The artificially simplified laws of the text-books may never be re-
alized alone, but they are real tendencies and sometimes real proc-
esses, working uninjured by the environment with which they com-
bine. Had the deniers of the existence of abstractions considered the
detailed empirical evidence, they would, perhaps, have avoided such
a doctrine.
Are there, then, real rigid bodies, projectiles moving in straight
lines or perfect parabolas, totally inelastic bodies, etc.? There are
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 315
bodies whose tendency to behave as perfectly rigid*, etc., combines
with other tendencies to produce a resultant which is not as a whole
the behavior of a rigid body, etc. The abstract concepts of science
denote, in general, real tendencies in Nature, which are never de-
stroyed or lost, but combined with other and often opposing tenden-
cies. We may say, if dialectic, idealism, or other views command it,
that science does not deal with ultimate reality; but we should not,
it appears, say that science deals with the non-existent. Tendencies
exist as much as anything else.
This completes the list of cases under mechanical causation. We
pass next to the second of the three groups marked out above.
II. PROPERTIES OF MATTER
1. Elasticity
The elasticity of gases and liquids depends upon that of the solid
particles composing them; so we need examine only the properties
of elastic solids.
An elastic solid has the following property: "if the applied
forces and the consequent strain [of the body] be confined within
certain limits, the body offers continuous resistance to the strain, so
that it requires the continued exertion of external force to maintain
the body in a given state of strain ; and when this force is removed
the body tends to return to its natural state ..." other conditions
being equal. 6 Also "It always requires the same force (or system of
forces) to maintain the same strain at the same temperature ..." (p.
6). This, however, holds only of perfectly elastic solids; it is not a
universal law of matter. Even a very elastic body has its limits, such
that any strain greater than a certain amount renders it ductile.
'In this condition the resistance still increases with the strain, but
much less rapidly than before the limit was passed, and the tendency
to return towards the natural state is much diminished, so that,
when the external force is removed, the body is found to have ac-
quired a 'set' or permanent strain" (p. 4). Beyond this region of
greatly diminished elasticity lies breakage ; sometimes, as in the case
of brittle bodies, breakage supervenes almost directly upon the elas-
tic limit. Also, "by sudden and violent changes of temperature,
many substances, and notably metals and glass, may be entirely
altered in all their elastic properties" (p. 5), which property "is
obviously analogous to that [change] produced by straining it be-
yond its elastic limits" (ibid.). But even within the limit, resist-
ance to strain varies with the rate at which the strain is imposed, as
well as with frequency and recency of strain (fatigue).
6 W. J. Ibbetson, " Mathematical Theory of Elasticity," page 4.
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We may, then, classify the events that occur in this domain under
two heads : ( 1 ) cases of approximately perfect elasticity, such as the
behavior of metals, crystals, glass, jellies, etc., within their elastic
limits, not subject to viscosity or fatigue or " temper," and (2) all
other cases, including even approximately inelastic substances such
as tallow, putty, etc. Let us discuss these separately.
1. The elementary event is this : when a certain force has been
applied to a body, followed by a change of shape or volume, then
upon release the original volume or shape is restored. Scientists
believe that there are certain intramolecular stresses which bring
about this restoration. This is in itself no more mysterious than
gravitation, which pulls back to earth a raised body. But it is not
known how these forces move the particles of the elastic body ; with
what velocity and acceleration or with what relation to the mass or
displacement. The behavior of gravitating bodies has been accurately
described and measured, and found to conform to Newton's first law;
but of the molecular behavior of elastic bodies we know little or
nothing, and can not say whether it reduces to a mechanical or to
some other type. We must wait for further evidence.
2. The other cases confirm this statement. The intramolecular
forces do not always work. Sudden strain, too great strain, too pro-
longed or recent strain, etc., render them ineffective, or nearly so.
Why this is so, is not understood ; which is only another way of say-
ing that the nature of the molecular stresses is not known. If we
knew their behavior we should know how it is that these conditions
affect it. Here, then, the result is disappointing. We get no data
for causal analysis.
Nevertheless, so far as the behavior of these forces is known, we
may say that it is a case of potential energy leading to kinetic energy,
the latter being that of the motion undergone by the particles in
restoration to the original shape and volume. The potential energy
becoming kinetic is a case of the kind already considered under
dynamics. It appears to be an energy of position, giving rise to
motion of masses upon release of the detaining force.
2. Friction
This is of two kinds, sliding and rolling friction. Sliding friction
is explained thus : ' ' When one of the bodies tends to move over the
other, the projections interfere and tend to stop the motion." 7 Why
the coefficient of friction is different in different substances is known
only in a general way, viz., some substances are rougher, have more
projections, more rigidity, than others. No exact explanation of the
particular values of coefficients is at present available. That there
7 E. L. Hancock, ' ' Applied Mechanics for Engineers, ' ' page 261.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 317
should be such a thing as friction seems, from the above explanation,
to be due to the fact that bodies resist change of shape. The motion
is then transformed into heat, i. e., motion of the particles: this re-
duces to a case of impact, therefore, and is a dynamical type. When
a body resists change of shape or breakage, we have a case of cohe-
sion of which later. That sliding friction is nothing more than
these, is indicated by the laws of Morin: the friction between two
bodies is directly proportional to the pressure, and independent of
the area of contact. 8 For increase of pressure means increase in the
number of collisions between irregular projections in the surfaces.
And the fact that static friction is greater than kinetic is due to the
fact that in the state of rest there are more points of contact between
the two bodies owing to the sinking of the upper body on the lower
than in the state of motion. As far as sliding friction has been
analyzed, then, there are no types of causal connection found but
mechanical ones.
When the surfaces are lubricated, "the projections of one do not
fit into the other, but are kept apart by a film or layer of the lubri-
cant. " Here it is not a matter of collision between projections, but
of internal friction in the lubricant, of the attraction of its particles
for one another, of their adhesion to the surfaces of the bodies, and
of the substitution, in part, of rolling friction for sliding friction.
The events herein involved except for the rolling friction come
under the head of molecular attraction and cohesion : of which later.
Rolling friction depends upon deformation of one surface by the
pressure of the other: a wheel is flattened by the road and the road
depressed under the wheel. Instead of collisions we have pressure.
When the road-surface is very elastic, the depression is relatively
deep, and the road rises immediately behind the wheel almost as
steeply as in front. The depth of the depression here occasions slip-
ping, i. e., sliding friction; the case just considered. The unique
characteristic of rolling friction is, then, resistance offered by pres-
sure, and the causation is here statical and dynamical.
3. Resistance of a Medium
This situation is due partly to inertia of the particles of the
medium, and partly to another factor classed with friction under the
head of "passive resistances." 10 "If a mass m be supposed to move
in a straight line, without rotation, in a resisting medium, the resist-
ance is a function of the velocity of the body. ... If the resistance be
represented by <(i>), the equation of motion becomes
s Op. cit., above, page 263.
Op. cit., page 265.
loMinchin, "Statics," page 75.
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dv
where F is the external force acting along the right line. It is usual
to assume, with Newton, that <f>(v) =^v 2 , where ^ is a constant de-
pending on the density of the medium." 11 This law, however, is of
limited range ; in some cases the resistance increases with higher
powers of the velocity. The causes are, in fact, unknown; we can
not tell in detail how the resistance acts. The data give us no definite
type of causal connection.
4. Density
This property is not regarded as explained, except, in the case of
gases, by the number of molecules. Its causes are believed to lie in
the structures of the various substances, but just where or how is not
known. No material is here given us for analysis.
5. Cohesion
This is believed to be a general property of matter which prob-
ably reduces to molecular attraction of some sort, but whose detailed
behavior and laws are little known. If two smooth surfaces are
pressed together very hard they tend to adhere as if glued. Gluing
makes bodies adhere because, after drying, there is very little space
between the particles. "There is no real difference between ad-
hesion and cohesion." 12 Unfortunately, this amount of information
will not suffice for a causal analysis.
6. Gravitation
The source of this property is also unknown, though theories are
extant. 13 It is also unknown whether or not it acts instantaneously.
It is believed, however, to act uniformly in a straight line, for it obeys
the law of inverse squares, like light, radiant heat, and many other
phenomena which proceed in straight lines. The law of inverse
squares is a simple deduction from the property of action uniformly
in a straight line, as that action radiates in all directions from a
given body in space. The mode of action of gravitation, then, is
analogous to that property of uniform motion by which it continues
uniform in a straight line. Its type of behavior will, therefore, come
under the same serial description as uniform motion (discussed in
the preceding paper).
11 Williamson and Tarleton, "Dynamics," page 219.
i2Ganot's "Physics," Eng. tr., 18th ed., page 10.
is E. g., W. Sutherland, in Philos. Mag., December, 1904.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 319
7. Crystallization
u Definite chemical compounds almost always possess some power
to crystallize, though certain usually crystallized substances may be
made to assume an amorphous [non-crystallized] form by very much
accelerating their rate of solidification . . . ' ' " Substances which are
only known in the amorphous state are usually of indefinite chemical
composition, like coal, amber, or opal." 14 Crystallization thus ap-
pears to be a general property of matter, so far as it possesses defi-
nite chemical structure. As to its make-up : ' ' The physical behavior
of crystals . . . necessitates units of structure, or elementary particles
by whose regular arrangement the crystal is built up. As such units
we may assume the physical molecules . . ," 15 "If the crystal ele-
ments or physical molecules of a given substance possess the same
size and the same attractive forces, then, in case these molecules are
perfectly free to act and react upon each other, they must all assume
a similar position relative to one another, i. e., such a position that
equivalent directions of attraction and repulsion in all the molecules
shall be parallel" (p. 5). That is li the grouping about any molecule
must ~be the same as about every other" (p. 6). "Thus the study
of crystal structure becomes an investigation of the possible net-
works of points in space which satisfy these conditions" (p. 6). In
other words, this situation is one of statics and dynamics. The
causes of crystallization are "molecular forces which tend to produce
a regular internal structure in matter as it slowly solidifies," and
these forces are conceived to act under the laws of statics and
dynamics.
Further, "we may have crystals identical in composition and in
all their physical properties, but bounded by very different sets of
planes, all of which are equally possible with the same internal
structure. Such differences in form among crystals of the same sub-
stance condition what is known as crystal habit" (p. 12). "Exactly
what it is that determines the habit of a crystal is not known"
(p. 13). 'The growth of crystals, i. e., the relative development of
the different faces, is very variable, and often irregular. . . . The
conditions controlling these distortions are not well understood." 16
So far, then, there does not seem to be any definite type of causal
process in the formation or the growth of crystals, over and above
those already discussed. The nature or origin of the molecular
forces is not known ; their mode of action in determining structure is
mechanical; "habit" and growth are not understood.
i* Gr. H. Williams, "Elements of Crystallography," page 7.
is Op. tit., page 4.
16 W. Nernst, ' ' Theoretical Chemistry, ' ' page 79.
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8. The Principle of the "Indestructibility of Matter" (i. e. }
of Mass)
"Numerous investigations have shown that neither by physical
change of a substance, as, for example, by pressure, heating, magne-
tization, etc., nor by chemical decomposition, does there occur a
variation of its mass as measured by the attraction of the earth."
In fact, the whole atomic theory of chemistry is a reduction of ap-
parently diverse facts to terms of ultimate permanent units. This is
on a par with what we found in physics, as to conservation of mo-
mentum. From the point of view of a series of instants or short
periods in time, the unchangeable character of mass appears as a
process whose logical structure is the same as that of the series des-
cribing uniform motion, inertia, etc.
The principle of the conservation of energy seems obviously to
come under the same rule. It is, however, so broad and general and,
where formally stated, so lacking in concrete detail that by itself it
gives but a faint idea of the operation of causation; hence we con-
tent ourselves with this brief mention of it.
W. H. SHELDON.
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE?.
REGULATION IN BEHAVIOR
QJEVERAL years ago there appeared in Nature an account of a
kx statistical inquiry into sex determination. The results indicated
that children born to young mothers were predominantly girls and
that those born to old mothers were predominantly boys. Whether
this hypothesis has been borne out by further results I do not know,
but, assuming it to be a law, it is an example of what has been called
regulation in behavior. The purpose which such a process serves is
clear. When there is a shortage of women in a community girls are
likely to marry when very young, due to the increased opportunity
afforded them on account of the under-supply of more mature
women. If such marriages result in a number of female infants
greater than the normal expectation, the balance between supply and
demand is thereby reestablished. A similar compensation is had
when, in a society where females predominate, and hence are not
married so early in life, male offspring are in excess.
The world is full of instances of this sort. Organisms utilize the
very difficulties they encounter in order to bring about the removal
of these difficulties. Their make-up insures this regulation. They
do not depend on outside guidance to carry them through adverse
situations. The adverse situations in combination with an orsranism
C3
IT W. Nernst, ' ' Theoretical Chemistry, ' ' Eng. tr., page 4.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 321
are self-eliminating. Of course this is not always true for the indi-
vidual, but the social group, which is the larger organism, survives
because the procreation of its parts is as rapid as their destruction.
We often so construct a piece of machinery that this principle of
auto-adjustment holds in its behavior. This is done so that we may not
have to manipulate it and direct it to any great extent. The floating
ball disconnects the circuit and stops the pump when the tank is full.
The pendulum swings to one side and releases the air pressure which
tilts the wing tip of the aeroplane when a gust of wind causes it to
pitch or roll, and this restores equilibrium. The electric sterilizer is
supplied with a soft metal plug which melts off and releases a spring,
so breaking the circuit, when the water is exhausted. Otherwise the
rheostat would be burned out. But now the heat prevents itself from
being dangerous. A general statement of these and other forms of
regulation might be valuable. It might indeed serve as a rule of
thumb for inventors.
Bancroft 1 gives many excellent examples of regulatory behavior
as illustrating his * * universal law. ' ' This law is that * ' a system tends
to change so as to minimize an external disturbance." Some of the
cases he notes are :
The readjustment of prices through supply and demand.
Tears caused by and discharging an irritating substance from
the eye.
A splinter causing its own sloughing out.
In chemistry, the occasional prevention of further reaction by
some reaction products.
An insult causing a response which may prevent further insult.
The bending of trees to spill the wind.
It is certainly tautologous to say that organisms behave along
lines of least resistance, for our only definition of least resistance is
the resistance that a system is first to overcome. But any suspicion
that the statement of Bancroft's law falls short in a like way of
being a synthetic judgment, is removed after he has clarified it by il-
lustration and comment.
Adaptation of a group of animals or plants by selection is a case
of regulation if we regard the group as an organism. The capacity
for all the responses is not resident in all the individual animals or
plants, but is distributed among the parts (individuals) of the entire
organism (group). The existence of the organism is maintained
along with the life of those parts which respond adaptively to the
present condition, notwithstanding the death of those parts which
are not adjusted so to respond. This is shown in the adaptation of
i Bancroft, W. D., " A Universal Law," Jour. Am. Chem. Soc., XXXIII., No.
2, February, 1911.
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wheat to climate. A bushel of late ripening wheat will contain some
grains of early ripening wheat. Planted under certain conditions,
these latter alone will mature, but they will serve as seed for the next
crop, which will inherit their characteristics for the most part, and
which will be almost entirely early ripening wheat.
When an apparently new structural adaptation is developed in
an organism by a set of new conditions, the presumption is that the
organism's capacity for this change of structure was previously
resident in the organism, and not that the change was wholly caused
by the new condition. The condition was the necessary factor which
had to be added to the organism's potential capacity, in order that
the adaptation should result. An organism may in this way be so
adjusted as to respond adaptively to any one of a number of pos-
sible conditions which may be mutually exclusive. So when one re-
sponse is realized, the others may be latent. This is shown by the
substitution of hair for wool in the coat of a sheep that is taken to a
warmer climate. In the domain of behavior a similar rule is obvious.
Here a given stimulus calls forth a particular reaction which is espe-
cially fitted to the situation.
THE VITAL MANIFOLD
Organisms living in an environment of changing conditions are,
for the most part, constantly readjusting themselves to the change.
They avoid bad conditions and seek better. Or, when an unfavorable
condition can not be avoided, a change takes place in their structure
which makes it possible for them to live in that condition. If, when
in a certain medium some metabolic change takes place in them, which
to be set right demands some other medium, they seek out that
other medium either by trial and error reactions or, following cer-
tain clues present in their surroundings, by some specially appro-
priate instinctive or habitual reaction. If we admit that such proc-
esses are regulatory, we have made a beginning towards defining reg-
ulation. We may further say that it is characteristic of organisms
having a certain structure. It is the result of the interaction of such
organisms and their media. The organism and the media constitute
a manifold which, though constantly operating, so functions as to pre-
vent disintegration of the organism. The life-long stability of ar-
rangement possessed by the organism and its offspring further dif-
ferentiates it from the media and makes most significant the distinc-
tion between biology and the inorganic sciences. The field of the
science of animal behavior of which the processes in such a manifold
constitute the data, is in part hardly to be distinguished from some
of the subject-matter of dynamic biology. The former science, how-
ever, always classifies these processes on the basis of the regulation
which they display.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 323
NEGATIVE REGULATION
Regulation occurs when any process in the manifold which re-
duces the stability of the organism results in such a change, either
in the media (through the organism's migration or otherwise) or in
the organism itself, that the stability of the organism is regained, so
that the deviation toward instability has come to be the cause of its
own remedy. Such regulation is the avoidance of those states in the
organism or of those conditions in the media which are or have be-
come unfavorable to the stability of the organism, so let us call it
negative regulation.
Frequent examples of negative regulation are found in the be-
havior of inorganic manifolds, of plants, and of the lower animals.
When a boat in a heavy sea rolls to one side it rights itself into the
perpendicular again. It does this because of the fact that the further
it tilts from the perpendicular the greater is the leverage by which
the pull of gravity, which tends to bring it back, is applied. Its be-
havior conforms to our definition of negative regulation. The way
in which paramoecium retains favorable conditions must be described
by the same principle. 2 The valve action at the boundary of the
optimum will work for the animal 's good in either novel or familiar
conditions. A river (organism) shows regulation in migrating from
its original channel to one of greater stability, and in overcoming
obstacles, such as log jams or landslides, which serve as the cause of
their own remedy.
In the above examples correction is the result of the excess of proc-
ess, or deviation from stability. The correction and the condition
which needs correction may, however, both be the results of the same
cause, having no causal effect on each other. For instance, in cray-
fish oxygen starvation is corrected by the very activity which causes
it, namely, walking. The gills are placed so as to be moved by the
legs, for which reason walking causes both depletion and repair of the
oxygen content of the blood. Another example is found in the pro-
tective color changes in the coat of northern mammals. These changes
are possibly not the result of the color environment (the seasonal
variation of which is a deviation toward instability) , but rather the re-
sult of some accompanying condition such as food or temperature plus
certain internal factors. That is, the brown fur does not become
white because of the whiteness of the snow. The cause to which is
due in part the occurrence of the snow, namely, a decrease in tem-
perature, is largely responsible for the adaptive change in the color
of the fur. Again, for example, the sunshine which on a summer
day would otherwise overheat a man, is in part the cause of the
breezes which assist in keeping him cool. The cause, that is, which
2 Jennings, 1 1 Behavior of Lower Organisms. ' '
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
produces the deviation from the optimum brings about also a condi-
tion which helps to restore the optimum.
We may then occasionally find this relation between the deviation
from stability and its means of correction. The mutual cause of these
two processes may indeed be indefinitely remote. This phase of reg-
ulation is not recognized in the above definition, so we may add:
Negative regulation also occurs when a process in the manifold which
is the cause of a deviation from stability results independently in its
correction.
POSITIVE REGULATION
An organism may be so constituted that it reacts to some condi-
tion which is favorable, adapting itself so as to obtain benefit from
it, even when failure so to react to the condition would cause it no
more harm than the loss of an unusual benefit. This form of reac-
tion is sometimes given to a condition which the organism does not
reach by locomotion, such as a condition which is generally periodic
and has no fixed special position (e. g., a weather condition). But
if the organism has means of locomotion, the reaction more usually
involves a movement toward the favorable condition. This favorable
condition may be only occasionally present or it may be only oc-
casionally needed by the organism. The favorable condition to which
the organism reacts may be at a distance from, or may impinge upon,
the organism. If it is at a distance it must act mediately upon the
organism and the organism must have the power of locomotion in
order to take advantage of it. The favorable condition may be rela-
tively fixed in space, such as air at the top of the water, or it may be
relatively fixed in time, such as the regular recurrence of sunlight.
To distinguish this form of regulation let us call it positive.
Positive regulation occurs when some change in the environment
or in the physiological state of the organism causes such an adaptive
reaction of the organism or such an alteration in the media that the
interaction of the newly arranged organism and media which follows
brings about increased stability in the organism. In such a process
both organisms and media have a double function. The media act
first as the stimulus to the organism's adaptive reaction and second
as a contributing cause of the increased stability of the organism.
The organism likewise must be set or arranged to adjust or orient
itself to the changed conditions and also to interact with the novel
media so as to cause increased stability in the new relation. The
squirrel's storing its food, the butterfly's seeking its mate, and the
prospector's digging for gold are all examples of positive regulation.
In positive regulation the favorable condition and the adaptive
change do not always have the direct relation of cause and effect.
They may be as well results of a single cause. This is especially true
325
in the higher forms of behavior, such as the behavior of a group of
sympathetic organisms in a colony or society. For instance, Greek
philosophy was a cause which has ramified into many results.
Largely because of it, and of the development which it caused, the
present-day students write their books on science or philosophy, be-
cause of it there are laboratories, without which these books would
have lacked much material, and printing presses, without which the
volumes would never have reached their readers. That same early
philosophy is the inheritance of the people and without it the mod-
ern book would not be understood. As another example, when the
hot weather in spring impels birds to migrate northward it causes
also those changes in the country further north which produce food
and the proper conditions for raising the young. So we may add:
Positive regulation occurs when a process in the manifold which is
the cause of some potentially favorable condition results independ-
ently in an adaptive change by which the organism takes advantage
of it.
Both positive and negative regulation may take place as the re-
sult of a change merely in the physiological state of the organism
and not be due to any variation in the media. Negative regulation
is seen under such conditions in the reactions of the over-fed sea-
anemone away from food, or in the behavior of a dog that after a
time moves further away from a fire the heat of which had at first
attracted him. Positive regulation takes place under like conditions
when respiration is increased due to exercise, or when the hungry
animal goes out to search for food to which previously it had been
indifferent. Judgment and reason in the higher animals furnish the
best examples under these conditions for positive regulation. Posi-
tive regulation usually results in an increased margin of stability
which is insurance against future dangers and permits the organism
some rest from the activities of negative regulation. The two forms
of regulation are combined in the food reaction of most animals.
Hunger results in migratory search after food as well as in its cap-
ture. Many animals, however, capture food for future use when the
conditions of negative regulation are not present. The two forms of
regulation are, for instance, combined when a man rises in the morn-
ing partly because he is no longer comfortable in bed and partly be-
cause he hears the water running into his tub.
The direct interaction between the conditions existing at any
given time as well as the resulting adaptations in the manifold may
be described as follows:
In negative regulation unfavorable media (present or at a dis-
tance) may cause a change in the organism that makes it either resist
such media, or avoid or migrate from such media, or analyze or
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
synthesize such media into innocuous or favorable media. Or some
unfavorable part or process in the organism may cause its own elimi-
nation or discontinuance, either by interaction with the media, or by
action within the organism, or by both of these.
In positive regulation favorable media (present or at a distance)
may cause a change in the organism that makes it either interact with
such media or enter into or migrate to such media. Or innocuous
media (present or at a distance) may cause a change in the organ-
ism that makes it analyze or synthesize such media into favorable
media. Or some favorable part or process in the organism may cause
its own maintenance or continuance, either by interaction with the
media or by action within the organism or by both of these.
STEVENSON SMITH.
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON.
THE ANCIENT SPIRIT AND PEOFESSOR BABBITT
SOME time ago I had the pleasure of reviewing Professor Babbitt's
' ' Masters of Modern French Criticism ' ' in this JOURNAL ; x and
in a recent issue 2 he has published a courteous reply under the title of
"The Modern Spirit and Dr. Spingarn."
Professor Babbitt is much disturbed by my statement that his book
lacks ' ' unified and consistent thought ' ' and represents merely ' ' per-
sonal bias." I am not certain whether his reply is intended to con-
firm or refute this statement, since the ideas which he now expresses
are exactly those on which I based my original contention. He re-
states briefly what he had already said in the preface of his book, and
I must therefore assume that we are to accept all this as proof of
" consistent thought." But consistent thought about what? If he
will turn again to my review, he will find this assertion : ' ' The fact
is that Professor Babbitt has no esthetic theory. ... To the ques-
tions What is art? What is literature? What is criticism? he
offers no answers. ' ' In his recent reply he does not touch these ques-
tions at any point. He explains that literary criticism has much the
same problems to face as modern philosophy, that it, too, must deal
with the antitheses of intellectualism and intuitionalism, of discipline
and anarchy, and so on ; and he implies that ideas of this kind vindi-
cate the consistency of his thought in the field of criticism.
I confess, however, that if these utterances are intended as an-
swers to the questions What is Art ? What is criticism ? they are
not unlike the answer which my five-year-old son recently gave to
1 Vol. X., page 693.
2 Vol. XI., page 215.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 327
the question What is arithmetic ? * ' It is when you say one and one
make two, two and two make four, three and three make six." My
son has obviously identified arithmetic and stated some of its prob-
lems; he has explained it exactly as we explain anything which we
have to face and concerning which we have no "unified and con-
sistent thought." Professor Babbitt, however, has hardly gone so
far as to identify criticism in any way that indicates its essential pur-
poses or processes; he has simply stated some of the problems that
confront it at this period of time. He is under an illusion when he
thinks that his "principles" seem negligible to me merely because
they are "too different" from my own to make comprehension pos-
sible. I do not disagree with his principles, if by this is meant prin-
ciples of criticism; I merely find none with which to agree or dis-
agree. I agree with his statement of some of the problems of mod-
ern criticism, just as I disagree with his statement of others; but I
have looked in vain for any indication that he has ever asked him-
self what art really is, what literature really is, or what criticism
really is. It seems to me fair to say of such a book that it lacks uni-
fied and consistent thought in the field of literary criticism.
Professor Babbitt does, however, criticize the esthetic theory of
others; and I think that here, too, he has shown his confusion of
"personal bias" with "consistent thought." He assumes, for ex-
ample, that the theory of Benedetto Croce, that expression is art, im-
plies of necessity a lack of that intellectual discipline which he re-
gards as the chief need of the culture of our time. If we assume that
all expression is art, he argues, there is no place for training, for
discipline, for tradition, for ideals, for culture ; there is nothing left
but anarchy. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Disciplined
art and undisciplined art are both art ; or perhaps we should rather
say that disciplined minds as well as undisciplined ones may express
themselves in art. The mistake into which he has fallen is obvious ;
he is framing his definition, not from the thing itself, but from what
he believes to be the best form of it. But bad English is English as
much as good English ; the art of a child is art quite as much as that
of Michelangelo. It may be important to distinguish between the
two and to encourage the latter at the expense of the former ; but the
writer on esthetics should at least understand what they have in
common as well as what they differ in ; and what they have in com-
mon is that both are expression and therefore art. A disciplined
mind will express itself differently from an undisciplined one; but
until the artist expresses himself he can not create art, and when he
expresses himself he has created it. Professor Babbitt imagines that
this conception of art must necessarily indicate a preference for the
undisciplined form; but it is after all merely an attempt to under-
328
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
stand what art really is, and nothing else. It is not an attempt to
give practical advice to the men and women of our own time.
Professor Babbitt complains, with more apparent justification,
that I have done him an injustice in saying that in his essay on
Scherer there is not * ' a single allusion to literature or art, to the life
of the imagination in any of its forms. ' ' He insists that in this essay
he has discussed Scherer 's attitude toward Moliere, Sainte-Beuve,
Zola, Baudelaire, Goethe, and others. I turn to the passage on
Moliere, and I find that the author of Tartuffe is mentioned in order
to justify a quotation from Scherer in regard to the deficiencies of
the French language in the later nineteenth century. I turn to the
passage on Zola, and I find that an excerpt from Scherer 's essay on
Zola is quoted in regard to the vulgarizing influence of democracy
on culture. Is it unfair to say that these are not allusions to ' ' litera-
ture or art, to the life of the imagination in any of its forms"? Is it
unfair to say that Professor Babbitt is not concerned, in any of these
passages, with the way in which criticism interprets creation, but
that he is wholly obsessed with the problems of modern culture on
their practical side ?
This is what Professor Babbitt is interested in, and this alone.
He does not care what art or criticism is, but he does care that young
men and women should have discipline, training, tradition, ideals.
His mind is still in the period of Grasco-Roman culture, when litera-
ture was simply regarded as a preparation for the more important
activities of life ; and as Quintilian in writing a book on the Orator
really wrote a treatise on the education of Roman youth, so Professor
Babbitt in writing about modern French critics has really written a
treatise on our system of academic or literary education. His book
is a contribution to American culture; it is, as I have said, a digni-
fied and valuable work; but it adds little to our knowledge of the
history or theory of criticism. If Professor Babbitt is inclined to
take this statement too seriously, I can only remind him that Burton's
"Anatomy of Melancholy," while adding little to our knowledge of
neurology, and "Gulliver's Travels," while adding nothing to our
knowledge of geography, lose little if any of their interest on this
account. J. E. SPINGARN.
NEW YORK.
REPLY TO DR. SPINGARN
THE answer of my book to the question, What is criticism ? is that
criticism is primarily judgment and selection and only secon-
darily comprehension and sympathy. By discarding the traditional
basis of judgment and failing to put anything in its place criticism
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 329
has, I affirm, fallen into anarchy and impressionism. Does Dr. Spin-
garn hope to persuade any one that a discussion of this all-important
problem of standards and judgment and its relation to the work of
the chief French critics of the nineteenth century is without bearing
on either the theory or history of criticism? The basis on which I
rest my own critical standards is, as I tried to show in my reply to
his review, positive and immediate ; it involves no return to the past ;
Dr. Spingarn's treatment of me as a Graeco-Roman survival is there-
fore irrelevant; it strikes me, if I may be allowed the phrase, as an
attempt to draw a red herring across the trail.
In accusing Croce and his American disciple of readiness to sac-
rifice the true form and symmetry of life to mere expression, I did
not have in mind the assertion that art is only expression, but a far
more radical assertion namely, that beauty itself is only expres-
sion. 1 However, the statement that the art of a child is as much art
as that of Michelangelo is a sufficiently flagrant example of the
primitivism against which I protest; of the attempt to define art
solely in terms of the lower spontaneity in terms, that is, of the
instinctive, the unconscious, the irrational. A complete definition of
art would not eliminate the higher or human spontaneity, by which
I mean the power to curb or control the passion for expression and
impose upon it form and symmetry with reference to some adequate
end. For over a century naturalism in both its intellectual and emo-
tional forms has, instead of looking forward to ends, been groping
its way back to origins. A fruitful reaction against our present con-
fusions will surely put prime emphasis on the truth contained in the
Aristotelian dictum : * ' The end is the chief thing of all. ' '
Any one who wishes to form an opinion as to the justice of Dr.
Spingarn 's comment on the ' ' Scherer ' ' has only to compare this com-
ment with the essay itself. I have no fear as to the verdict.
IRVING BABBITT.
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
Social Environment and Moral Progress. ALFRED RUSSELL WALLACE.
London, New York, etc. : Cassell and Company. 1913. Pp. 158.
The purpose of this short, but most interesting and popularly written
volume, which may come to be considered the crowning point, if not the
magnum opus, of its author's long-continued work, is " to bring together
the evidence in support of this view [that actual morality is largely a
product of the social environment], to distinguish what is permanent and
inherited and what is superficial and not inherited, and to trace out some
of the consequences as regards what we term 'morality ' " (p. 3). The
i Croce, "Estetica, " page 81.
330
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
first part of the book, which is termed " historical," first, defining char-
acter as " the aggregate of mental faculties and emotions which consti-
tute personal or rational individuality" (p. 4), attempts to show by his-
torical and literary evidence that as a basis for morality it has shown no
essential advance during the historic period; and secondly, with some
statistical references, sketches with vigorous pen the injustice, the horrors,
the moral degradation of the nineteenth-century environment. In so far
as education and the superficial inducements of conventional morality
have no hereditary effects, while true moral character, though hereditary,
is not cumulative, " it follows that no definite advance in morals can occur
unless there is some selective or segregating agency at work" (p. 37).
The natural moral character of the race is good hospitality, for instance,
is a universal virtue (p. 101) ; it is the social environment which is evil
and which ruthlessly prevents the attainment of full moral stature corre-
sponding to the probable finality of the human form. Man, therefore, as
that animal which alone molds his environment, may proceed to better
his condition by its readjustment in a manner and for a purpose to be
suggested in Part II.
So far there is probably nothing new or disputable for readers who
assume the " dynamic " standpoint in sociology, though the view re-
sembles that which H. G. Wells, referring to Compte and Frederick Harri-
son, has recently described as the belief " that there was once a stable
condition of society with humanity, so to speak, sitting down in an
orderly and respectable manner; that humanity has been stirred up and is
on the move, and that finally it will sit down again on a higher plane, and
for good and all, cultured and happy, in the reorganized positivist state."
Again, it might be objected, perhaps, that the products of genius available
for educational purposes, while not hereditary when acquired nor cumu-
lative when innate, can yet be cumulatively transmitted by education.
There is a social as well as an individual heredity. Moral progress might,
therefore, be in a degree possible without positing any inheritance of the
qualities of genius or any artificially liberated (though intrinsically nat-
ural) selective potentiality. As, however, Wallace heartily favors equality
of educational opportunity as part of his remedial philosophy, this point
need not be pressed. The indictment of existing conditions reminds us
of the querulous tone of Mr. Spencer's " Facts and Comments," and is
drawn in striking contrast to the author's fundamental faith in the es-
sence of human nature. Here we may remember that the author of " The
Wonderful Century " found much therein to praise as well as to deplore.
Part II. is entitled " Theoretical." After a brief presentation of the
facts of natural selection, among animals (Ch. XIII.) , and as modified by
mind (Ch. XIV.), and of the laws of heredity and environment, the last
two chapters are concerned with the author's idea of initiating through
a new form of selection (Ch. XVI.) an era of moral progress (Ch. XVII.).
The non-heredity of acquired moral characteristics is here defended as
not merely true, but fortunate. How glad we may be that the dreary edu-
cation in brutality and superstition afforded by the Middle Ages could
have no hereditary influence. And yet here we may ask how Mr. Wai-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 331
lace was so confident that the many tokens of moral inferiority which
history furnishes were but superficial, in no way contaminating the
fundamental goodness of our nature. If we judge not mankind's nature
by its fruits how, then, shall we estimate its value? And if you answer
that those fruits were largely the product of a compromise with the hos-
tile environment, may we not ask again, if man is the modifier of his en-
vironment why do we credit him only with his will, not with his deeds?
Can social environment and that human nature which is in and of it be
considered separately? Not, I think, without some such speculative doc-
trine as that of the " Divine Influx," to which in the last resort Mr. Wal-
lace feels impelled.
The substance of this second part is that by the diminution of eco-
nomic pressure there will be a possibility of selection on the part of the
female who, under existing conditions, is for the most part driven to
marriage by economic stress rather than by choice. From the standpoint
of the female the argument is persuasive, but from the standpoint of the
male does not the opposite hold good? Under a system of economic pres-
sure, such as to-day obtains, it is the least able worker who is least able to
support a wife (omitting from consideration the injustices of transmitted
wealth) while, under the humanitarian conditions which Wallace would
fain have seen prevail, the feeblest male will have less difficulty in finding
himself a mate. That there will be no females so tasteless as to select the
less desirable males can hardly be maintained, even granting the belief
that they would prefer the more desirable, for that the preponderance of
males, brought about by shifting the incidence of accidental death, will
"give to women the power of rejecting all the lower types of character
among their suitors " (p. 148) is at least a speculative interpretation of
the slight excess of male births. This excess being usually traced to a
provision of nature accommodating the population to that greater inci-
dence, the two may be expected to disappear together. From the male's
point of view, therefore, the true selective agency, if also the cause of
widespread misery and social unrest, would appear to be the old malthu-
sian law with its implication of an inevitable struggle for existence within
the economic field. It is true Wallace has been at pains to discredit this
law because " when poverty is abolished and neither economic nor social
advantages will be gained by early marriage there can be no doubt it will
be generally deferred to a later date" (p. 143), and hence, on Galton's
showing, fertility will decrease. But supposing the government manage
" to organize the labor of the whole community for the equal good of all "
(p. 155) Wallace's final solution of the whole matter is the inference
to the postponement of marriage at all a reasonable one? Is it not pre-
cisely economic pressure which leads to its frequent postponement by
young men, and therefore perforce by women, to-day, and when there is
nothing to prevent marriage at an early date, why should we not suppose
it will occur earlier rather than be still further delayed? Apparently
Wallace relies on educational persuasion, which seems a none too reliable
motive. It is true that marriage to-day occurs later among the better
off, in a degree roughly proportional to their position in the social scale,
332
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
but as this is due to greater economic obligations at least as much as to
causes of culture or perhaps to a mixture of the two, it can not from this
be inferred that there would be a further postponement among all classes
either with the advent of better conditions in general, or with the attain-
ment of a higher average of general culture. On the contrary, an earlier
average of marriage has been taken as a reliable standard of realized or
immediately anticipated prosperity in a given territory. " Statistics of
marriage during and after so-called economic crises," says Parsons, " are
plain on this point." Thus the desirability of free selection on the fe-
male's part seems to be decidedly modified, if not rendered wholly doubt-
ful, by the necessarily concomitant elimination of existing selective
agencies operating in economic terms upon and through the male. The
social argument would thus point rather to an increasing inheritance tax
and greater equality of educational advantages than to conceding " full
political and social rights " (p. 148) to women.
Perhaps, however, there is something to be said on either side, and it is
at least cheering to have before us so clear an argument for the solution
of questions widely vexing us to-day, wherein the quasi-medical aspect is
specifically discounted (pp. 127 ff.), and the procedure is strictly prag-
matic, in place of insisting upon the indefinable " natural rights " of a
political philosophy now outgrown. Thus are eliminated two features of
the controversy of which many of us are becoming increasingly weary.
We are wisely reminded that social amelioration may more fitly become an
object of legislation than bungling attempts to tamper with the private
functions of the individual, and Wallace well asks how we can entrust
governments with the technical removal of minute effects, that have
shown themselves so largely incompetent to deal with the underlying
cause. " Let them devote all their energies to purifying this whitened
sepulcher of destitution and ignorance, and the beneficent laws of nature
will themselves bring about the physical, intellectual, and moral advance-
ment of our race."
REGINALD B. COOKE.
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
The Making of Character: Some Educational Aspects of Ethics. JOHN
MACCUNN. New York : The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. 226.
Perhaps the making of the English character is really so simple a proc-
ess as this little book would indicate. It may well be that the charges of
hypocrisy and pious smugness leveled by irritated geniuses against the
English people are quite unjust, and that the simple moral face and the
indomitable moral optimism which they present to the world really repre-
sent a perfect uncomplicatedness of spiritual process within. But as they
appear to a foreigner, the psychologico-ethical theories of the English wri-
ters from Bentham down to Arnold Bennett can only be described as ex-
ceedingly weird. This particular book, from the note of liberality which
runs through it, is evidently intended by the author to be rather advanced,
but his unanalytic treatment of heredity and the instincts, his complacent
review of the influence of bodily health, the influence of nature, family,
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 333
school friendship, livelihood, citizenship, church, moral ideals, etc., is all
quite uncomplicatedly English. He speaks always as if these concepts
represented so many parcels of spiritual food which the young, growing,
moral individual, purely qua individual, assimilates as he would bodily
food. The function of the ethical teacher than becomes simply to lay
before the individual youth the proper fare, and the healthy appetite can
be depended upon to do the rest.
All that sociological view of the moral process which sees the growth
of the individual soul as the gradual coming of the raw human animal
with its powerful instincts under a complex system of social constraints,
being gradually assimilated into a tenacious fabric of group-ideas and
folkways, is ignored in a book like this. There is constant confusion
made between the moral, as the individual taking of the social imprint,
and as the conscious critical selection and rejection of folkways and ideas
in accordance with some imagined ideal, or rather some imagined social
group with which one feels identified and sympathetic. The author speaks
one moment as if taking the faithful impress of existing institutions of
church, law, family, and state, constituted the making of moral character,
and, in the next discusses the forming of moral judgment which, if it
means anything, means the ruthless slaughtering of many of those same
faithful folkways of the orthodox codes. These conflicts, which would
seem to the sociologist the very heart of the ethical problem, are treated
with scant attention in this book. And the enormous role of the sexual
life, with its fantasies and appeals, as well as the role of the affective life
in general in the formation of " character " the very word is highly
ambiguous until we know whether it is to mean the smooth, unimpeachable,
uncriticized running of the individual cog in the social mechanism, or the
independent critical attitude which constructs its own " morality " out of
the various group-codes are ignored in the characteristic English way.
Of course one hardly likes to say that these things may not all be con-
genitally absent from the English consciousness and experience. But if
so, their thinking on ethical matters can scarcely be of universal applica-
tion and validity.
Originally written and published in 1900, this book could not be ex-
pected to quote the newer ethical and psychological schools such as those
of Dewey, Montessori, and Freud, for instance; our author's authorities
are rather Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Wordsworth, Burke. One might, how-
ever, have asked that these worthies be supplemented by a little personal
introspection, or sociological observation. The chief value of such a book
is, I suppose, to bring a warm glow or vague illumination to the pious
heart of some non-conformist parent. But it is a little difficult to see why
it should have demanded four reprintings in the United States of America.
EANDOLPH S. BOURNE.
BLOOMFIELD, N. J.
The Foundations of Science. H. POINCARE, tr. by G. B. Halsted. New
York: The Science Press. 1913. Pp. 553.
Under the above title are reprinted Professor Halsted's translations of
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TEE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
" Science et L'hypothese," 1 and " La Valeur de la Science," 2 together with
a translation of " Science et Methode," 3 which here appears in English
for the first time. Professor Royce's introduction to " Science and
Hypothesis " is retained, together with the translator's prefaces to the
first two volumes, but the author's prefatory essay to the English edition
of " The Value of Science," appears as the introductory chapter to
" Science and Method," as in the French editions. The whole is provided
with a suitable index, and a brief, somewhat ill-balanced, biographic
sketch by the translator prefaces the volume.
It is unfortunate that the three volumes are bound as one, for not
only is the result awkward by its bulk, but also the necessity of duplicating
their possessions is imposed upon owners of the first two works who are
desirous of possessing the third; and, moreover, there has recently ap-
peared a fourth volume, 4 quite coordinate with the other three, which,
if Poincare's philosophical writings are to be brought within one cover,
should certainly be incorporated with them.
The succession of Poincare's books indicates a constantly growing
grasp of the problems with which he deals. Beginning with a study of
the forms of scientific reasoning in " Science and Hypothesis," he passes,
in the " Value of Science," to the problem of their contact with fact, and
arrives at an interesting Pythagorean definition of the objective as noth-
ing but mathematical relations.. In " Science and Method " there is pre-
sented an admirable study of creative imagination showing its peculiarly
intimate connection with esthetic processes. This is followed by a review
of the methods of mathematics, mechanics, and astronomy which includes
a highly illuminating estimate of the significance of that disruption of
our most cherished physical concepts which has been instigated in con-
temporary science by such discoveries as that of radioactivity. 5
HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS
MIND. January, 1914. Aristotle s Refutation of " Aristotelian "
Logic (pp. 1-18) : F. C. S. SCHILLER. -It is misleading to confine (as is the
present custom at Oxford) the study of Aristotle's Logic to the Posterior
Analytics, the treatise displaying Aristotle's formal logic with its doctrine
of Contradictory Opposition. Illustrations are adduced to show that in
Aristotle's subsequent scientific discussions the law of contradiction plays
no part. Formal logic may be descriptive of the abstractly universal, but
not of the concrete and practical. The Meaning of Reality (pp. 19-40) :
J. S. MACKENZIE. - Briefly sketches the various senses in which the term
1 French, 1902; English, 1905.
2 French, 1905; English, 1907.
3 French, 1907.
^"Dernieres Pensees," 1913.
5 The ' ' Value of Science ' ' was reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. II., page 630,
and a general summary of Poincare's whole position appeared in Vol. XI., page
225.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 335
reality is used, concluding with the strictly metaphysical meaning " of
that which is substantial or independent." On the basis of this meaning
there follows an elaborate enumeration and classification of metaphysical
theories. Some Preliminary Considerations on Self-Identity (pp. 41-59) :
HAROLD H. JOACHIM. - Self -identity can not be construed as descriptive of
our bodies viewed either as atoms or as an aggregate of atoms or as
chemical or biological processes; neither is self-identity to be found in
the immediacy of self -feeling. We are to view " our spiritual selves as
the individuations of the universal spirit as that or nothing." A Criti-
cism of Dr. Mackenzie's Philosophy of Order (pp. 60-83) : L. P. SAUNDERS.
" I shall try to show that Dr. Mackenzie has really not contributed any-
thing in the paper under discussion to the solution of philosophic prob-
lems. He has mainly, I think, changed their names, and when he has not
done this he has, I believe, confused issues." Discussions: Aristotle's
Theory of Tragic Emotion (pp. 84-90) : A. W. BENN. Idealism and the
Reality of Time (pp. 91-95) : BERNARD BOSANQUET. Is Inversion a Valid
Inference? A Rejoinder (pp. 96-98) : L. E. HICKS. Truth and Working
(pp. 99-101) : ALFRED SIDGWICK. The Analysis of Categorical Propositions
(pp. 102-103) : BERNARD BOSANQUET. Critical Notes: B. Bosanquet, Logic,
or the Morphology of Knowledge: R. LATTA. F. Aveling, The Conscious-
ness of the Universal; a Contribution to the Phenomenology of the
Thought Processes: C. W. VALENTINE. C. A. Mercier, Conduct and Its
Disorders, Biologically Considered: W. L. MACKENZIE. A. Miiller, Wahr-
heit und WirTdichkeit: Untersuchungen zum realistischen Wahrheits-
problem: C. D. BROAD. New Books. Philosophical Periodicals. Note.
^ARCHIVES DE NEUROLOGIE. January, 1914. Contribution a
I'Etude de le Cecite Psychique des Mots et des Choses (pp. 1-10) : PRO-
FESSOR BERNHEIM. - In visual amnesia, or psychic blindness, the patient
sees, but can not recognize the object seen. He ignores its name and its
meaning. Sur les Alienations Mentales d'Origine Syphilitique (pp. 11-
32) : A. MARIE. - In the presence of a parasyphilide, one must proceed to
the examination of the blood and of the cerebrospinal fluid. If the blood
is positive, a general antisyphilitic treatment is indicated. If the cerebro-
spinal reaction alone is found, or is predominant, the central nervous sys-
tem must be treated directly. Le Traitement des Buveurs (pp. 33-42) :
DR. LEGRAIN. - There are two stages in the scientific treatment of alco-
holics: (1) disintoxication ; (2) reeducation, or psychotherapy. Revues
des Congres et des Societes. Analyses Bibliographiques.
Boutroux, Emile. Natural Law in Science and Philosophy. New York:
The Macmillan Company. 1914. Pp. 218. $1.75.
Branford, Victor. Interpretations and Forecasts : A Study of Survivals
and Tendencies in Contemporary Society. New York: Mitchell Ken-
nerly. 1914. Pp. 424. $2.50.
Day, Henry C. Catholic Democracy: Individualism and Socialism.
New York : Longmanns, Green, and Company. 1914. Pp. viii + 296.
$1.80.
336
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Dowd, Jerome. The Negro Eaces. Vol. II. New York : The Neale Pub-
lishing Company. 1914. Pp. 310. $2.50.
Haldane, J. S. Mechanism, Life and Personality. New York: E. P.
Button and Company. 1914. Pp. vii + 139. $1.00.
Holt, Edwin B. The Concept of Consciousness. New York: The Mac-
millan Company. 1914. Pp. xvi + 343. $3.25.
Juvalta, E. II Vecchio e il Nuovo Problema della Morale. Bologna:
Nichola Zanichelli. 1914. Pp. xii + 137.
NOTES AND NEWS
THE publishing house of Quelle and Meyer, of Leipzig, has launched a
weekly periodical, Die Geisteswissenschaften, whose scope is to be un-
usually broad, including philosophy, psychology, mathematics, science of
religion, science of history, philology, history of art, science of law, po-
litical science, economic and social sciences, and pedagogy. The editors,
Messrs. Otto Buek and Paul Herre, hope to make of it a clearing house
where scholars may exchange opinions and lose, in fruitful intercourse
with one another, the narrowness of their specialties. They hope also to
give an exact idea of the present state of the scientific disciplines and pro-
mote timely discussions of new problems and their proposed solutions.
The enterprise undoubtedly responds to a vital need of the present day
and ought to militate most beneficially against excessive scientific spe-
cialization.
On the occasion of the seventieth anniversary of the birth of Fried-
rich Nietzsche, on October 15, it is proposed to raise a monument to his
memory on the hill near Weimar, in the neighborhood of the Nietzsche
Archiv. A considerable fund has already been collected for the purpose,
and any surplus that may accrue will be used for the support of the Archiv,
which is under the guidance of Nietzsche's sister. Contributions should
be forwarded to Dr. Richard Oehler, the Librarian of Bonn University, 70
Konigstrasse, Bonn, or the Nietzsche Monument Fund, care of London
County and Westminster Bank, 109-111, New Oxford Street, London.
AT Columbia University the following changes are announced: Dr.
Harry L. Hollingworth has been promoted to an assistant professorship
of psychology at Barnard College; Henry Slonimsky (Ph.D., University
of Marburg), has been appointed to a lectureship in philosophy made va-
cant by the leave of absence of Dr. William F. Cooley, who goes to Vassar
College for a year; and Mr. Roberts B. Owen, assistant in philosophy at
Cornell University, has been appointed lecturer in philosophy.
DR. JAMES WARD, professor of mental philosophy and logic, at Cam-
bridge University, has been nominated to represent the University on the
occasion of the celebration at Oxford on June 10 of the seventh centenary
of the birth of Roger Bacon; and Dr. Sorley, Knightbridge professor of
moral philosophy, to represent the University at the fifth International
Congress of Philosophy to be held in London next year.
VOL. XI. No. 13. JUNE 18, 1914
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
SOCIETIES
THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE WEST-
ERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
THE fourteenth annual meeting of the Western Philosophical As-
sociation met, in conjunction with the Conference on Legal
and Social Philosophy, in Chicago, April 9 and 10. This well-at-
tended meeting probably marks the beginning of certain new things
in the philosophical work of the Middle West. The discussion cen-
tered chiefly around three topics, the realistic doctrine of relations,
the new conception of natural rights, and the relation of rule to dis-
cretion in the administration of law. Professor Cohen, the secretary
of the conference, contributed much to the discussion of relations,
while both he and Profesor Thilly, representing the eastern part of
the country, helped in the joint sessions, Many appreciations of the
meetings were to be heard, and especially of the part played in them
by the legal fraternity of the Middle West.
The meetings opened Thursday morning, in the law building of
the university, with Professor B. H. Bode presiding. The first paper,
"The Reality of Religion," by Professor G. J. Kirn, of Northwestern
College, maintained that the object of religious worship is deter-
mined by certain fundamental instincts. The cognitive instinct de-
mands that that object shall comprehend whatever is necessary to
render experience a consistent whole ; the affective instinct, that it
shall be worthy of love and loyalty ; and the volitional instinct, that
it shall contribute to greater efficiency in life. Religion thus grows
out of reality and effects adjustment to reality and hence is itself
real. God is a mental construct, an hypothesis if you will, the basis
of our experiment with reality. Professor G. D. Walcott, of Hamline
University, asked whether this conception of religion does not imply
that God is a creation of man. Are not the gods of savages as real
as ours? To which Professor Kirn replied that the latter are rela-
tively real, and so also is God as conceived by ourselves, real so far
337
338
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
as found real in experience. Only so can God appeal to man as a
constant object of aspiration and faith.
The second paper, ''The Pragmatism of Pascal," was by Pro-
fessor Norman Wilde, of Minnesota University. Pascal was not a
pragmatist, but neither was he technically anything else. Meanwhile,
such terms as nature, instinct, the heart, feeling, etc., occur with great
frequency in his philosophical writings. Cousin criticizes him as a
skeptic, but that is shallow. Pascal's thunderings against reason are
really directed against the demonstrability of all truth. One must
be a Pyrrhonist, a geometrician, and a Christian. As to the nature
of knowledge he is a Cartesian: its bases are indemonstrable. Na-
ture and instinct compel belief, and also doubt. The determining
factor in truth is not logical, but practical. He doubts facts as much
as theories, and never wearies of pointing out our ignorance as to
the causes and connections of things. He is a thorough empiricist
and, as to conception, a voluntarist. "The will is one of the chief
factors in belief," not because it creates belief, but because truth is
relative to our viewpoint. Custom furnishes the hardest proofs.
His famous wager is typical of his doctrine of belief. If we subdue
the passions and act as if we believed, the belief will come. To know
we must first love : the heart has reasons which the mind knows not
of. This is Augustinism and Paulinism, but not pragmatism. In
his anthropocentric tendencies, however, one feels the modernness of
Pascal.
Professor H. B. Alexander next read a paper, on "The Definition
of Number," which can be summarized as follows. "The logistic
conception of number, starting with the assumption of class as the
essential numerical idea, proceeds in two directions, (a) Outwardly,
it posits a limit within which must fall all the elements which make
the class a class, capable of structure. And that this outward limi-
tation is made in good faith, as essential to the idea, is sufficiently
evidenced by the recognized possibility of a class including classes,
of a class of classes, and finally of the class of all possible classes,
a veritable hierarchy of types of limitation. (&) Inwardly, there are
posited two types of structural relation, which may be described as
the principles of internal limitation. These are the relation of part-
to-part and part-to-whole. From the first is derived that freedom to
make comparisons which makes possible, or, is the possibility of,
the transcendental independence that distinguishes pure number.
From the second flows the whole concept of order, and especially the
notion of series or progression without which the idea of quantity
(i. e., greater-less) could not be. Three concepts seem to predomi-
nate in this construction, namely, class, element, relation. But the
two first, class and element, are surely no other than the two mean-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 339
ings which we commonly ascribe to unity, while relation is quite as
clearly the function (and therefore the meaning) of plurality." The
one and the many are thus the fundamentals of number, and we
seem to have returned to the Hellenic categories. Has the wheel of
time completed its circuit, or is logistic but an exercise of the lovers
of Uranian reason?
Professor M. C. Otto read a paper on "The Utility of the Syllo-
gism. ' ' The objections here urged against the syllogism are three : (1)
The syllogism is a useless device in the face of genuine difficulty.
The "fallacies" emphasized, illicit major, undistributed middle,
etc., are manufactured and spurious difficulties. (2) This inadequacy
of the syllogism is concealed by over-simplification of the field in
which tests are applied. That is, the face of the syllogism is saved
by treating as non-existent the only kind of arguments which per-
plex any one, namely, complex ones. It is an inherent defect of the
syllogism to be of use where there is no difficulty and to be mislead-
ing where there is. (3) The doctrine of the syllogism is based upon
an untenable conception of truth. The syllogism assumes the exist-
ence of a changeless, eternal truth, which we may approximate by re-
lating specific conclusions to universal propositions via the syllogism.
When these so-called universals are examined, they turn out to be
true only in a setting ; universal with a reservation. There is always
a question, therefore, whether the "universal" is true in the sense it
is taken to be true, and this can not be determined without reference
to the particular investigation in which the universal plays the title
role. But this is to admit the relativity of truth, with which the
syllogism can have no dealings. It is time to break completely with
a device which, interesting as it is historically, is as unreliable in
genuine perplexity as it is imperious in its claims and demands, and
which stands in the way of a logic in harmony with the needs of hu-
man experience.
Professor Boodin urged that the syllogism none the less deals
with a certain type of implication and has a genuine place in logic.
Professor Swenson pointed out that we are apt to misunderstand the
purpose and idea of the syllogism. It exposes the structure of rea-
soning, whatever the subject-matter may be. A general theory for
the avoidance of error does not exist, and hence the psychology of
actual thinking can not be formulated in syllogistic terms, and yet
the psychology of actual thinking will have implicit syllogisms in it.
President Bode was invited to defend his chapter on "The Value of
the Syllogism," and responded that the syllogism has nothing to do
with the structure of our actual thinking. Professor Tufts pointed
out that the paper does not say whether by syllogism is meant the
process of mediate judgment, as a whole, or merely one step in that
340
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
process. Dr. Kallen thought that formal logic has some educational
value as a discipline, but that it does not teach people how to think.
Material fallacies can not be determined by logical forms alone.
Professor Walcott felt that the syllogism with its rules has a value
similar to that of grammatical rules in locating errors, and Professor
Bode pointed out that in real thinking, which is usually a process of
reconstructing universals, the syllogism does not help us.
Professor J. E. Boodin, in his paper entitled, "Knowledge and
Social Interpretation," maintained that knowledge is nothing but
social interpretation. There are, however, several types of such in-
terpretation, and any independence of the cognitive, or other, type
must be due to some social pressure. The perceptual, affective, and
conceptual forms of knowledge all bear upon them the marks of so-
cial use and value. Affective knowledge or interpretation involves
the massing of vast fields of meaning that are essentially social in
origin. The unity of the cognitive process as pointed out by the
pragmatists is a truer account of knowledge than the triadic view of
Royce, Peirce, and others. Royce maintains that the interpreting
community makes nature, but we do not agree to this. The commun-
ity does no more than reconstruct nature. Professor Longwell asked
as to the unity of the cognitive process in view of the three types of
interpretation mentioned above. In answer Professor Boodin said
that the latter are determined by emphasis which in turn is due to
interest, temperament, and other factors. Dr. Schaub pointed out
that thinking does not absolutely require language as indispensable
and that Royce only means that the social renders knowledge objec-
tive.
In his ' ' The Philosophy of Roger Bacon, ' ' Professor A. H. Lloyd
mentioned the fact that this year is in a way the seven-hundredth
anniversary of the great scholastic's birth. He was a forerunner of
our era, but in many ways its master and teacher. Whether Lord
Bacon wrote Shakespeare or not, it would be easy for a person unin-
formed as to the times in which they lived to believe that he wrote
many passages in Roger Bacon's works. In his metaphysics he
taught that "substance" can no more be mere matter than mere
form. Substance can not be any one self-identical thing. Conse-
quently, Bacon subordinated the one to the many, the universal to
the particular, and so displayed a sense for method that was pro-
phetic of our own day. He was a Franciscan and an Englishman
and in both respects predisposed to anticipations of Protestantism.
His appreciation of induction and experiment were products of the
medieval system and organization of society. So also was his appreci-
ation of mathematics. In formulating the details of what he saw and
foresaw, he was less powerful than as a seer and prophet. The blind
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 341
and extravagant often mingle with the perspicuous and temperate in
his methods. His moral philosophy was a branch of theology based
on a synthesis of Mosaic law, Christian revelation, Pagan philosophy,
and natural science.
Professor Moore remarked that Bacon 's strength would have been
considered a weakness in his day. He would have been a mere meth-
odologist. There is no methodology at large, method is always rela-
tive to specific problems and materials. After some further comment
the association passed to the next paper.
In his paper on * ' Consciousness in Haeckel, ' ' Professor Ray Sigs-
bee, of Carleton College, pointed out that Haeckel recognizes three
fundamental elements or aspects of reality, (1) the physical, (2) the
chemical, (3) the consciously sensational (die Empfindung). These
are not three distinct things, but three ways of viewing one thing.
The quantity of matter, energy, and consciousness remains always
the same, the monal materialistic law. There is no energy without
matter, no matter without energy, and no consciousness without
energy and matter. Chemical reaction exhibits consciousness at its
lowest level, and consciousness evolves from motion through chemical
reaction to impulse and volition. Consciousness does not accompany
all sensations, and the fibers which connect and relate different sen-
sory centers in the cortex mark the point at which the purely physio-
logical becomes consciousness. Consciousness is a form of energy
which matter possesses. Aside from his dogmatism Haeckel 's system
is as dualistic as any other.
The papers read Thursday afternoon all had reference to the neo-
realistic doctrine of relations, the programme beginning with "Ex-
ternalism and Transcendentalism," by G. A. Tawney, of Cincinnati.
This paper compared the definition of externalism given by Mr. Ber-
trand Russell with this author's theory of knowledge as stated espe-
cially in his book "The Problems of Philosophy," and came to the
conclusion that the doctrine of externalism when interpreted in the
light of this theory of knowledge appears to be the principle of trans-
cendentalism reasserted. All the fundamentals of Mr. Russell's
theory of knowledge are characteristic of some one or another of the
transcendental philosophies. He denies that relations are the work of
the mind, and this may at first seem to be a point of essential differ-
ence; but many transcendentalists deny that relations (or univer-
sals) are the work of the mind. It seems questionable whether Mr.
Russell's externalism really advances the problem of relations beyond
the point at which Locke and Kant left it.
In a paper entitled ' ' Externalism as Arrested Development, ' ' by
W. G. Gore, of Chicago, it was pointed out that all knowing involves
inhibition, and the doctrine of externalism simply generalizes the
342
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
stage of inhibition and makes it the essence of all knowing. At this
stage of the knowledge process, the old has not been given up and the
new has not yet come into being, and at this stage the neo-realist finds
all that he regards as esential to knowledge. It is important to have
the fact of externality pointed out, both as a protection of hard-won
values and as a criticism of the individual who would take liberties
with these values. The increasing accessibility of the products of in-
dustry, art, and science and the increasing inaccessibility of produc-
tive participation in the corresponding processes in modern industry
amount to an artificial and largely unsuspected barrier between na-
tive capacities and their normal exercise. The most deadly sort of
externalism is unconscious, complacent, and idealistic. The realistic
doctrine may be said to be a reflection of this very real sort of exter-
nalism, and it is remedial in bringing externalism to consciousness
and correcting its illusions.
Dr. H. M. Kallen's paper, entitled "Bergson, Platonist," main-
tained that something more than mere movement is necessary to the
Platonic idea, namely, non-being, which degrades the idea to multi-
plicity, externalism, and geometry. In Plato's philosophy this
struggle with a foreign matter is characteristic of the knowing proc-
ess. The flute-player understands a flute best. The player's idea of
the flute is, consequently, not a concept or static form. It is what the
mind knows when particulars are arrested. Here is the elan vital.
The elan is dynamic and transcends individuals, but belongs to all.
The function of the eye is freest in the vertebrate eye rather than in
the pigment spot. The eye, which was originally a photograph, has
turned into a photographic apparatus. This functional conception of
the ' ' idea " as an operation involving arrest and inhibition is as char-
acteristic of Plato as it is of Bergson.
Professor E. H. Hollands read a paper on the "Externality of
Relations," taking Russell's definition of the doctrine as typical.
(1) Relatedness does not imply any corresponding complexity in the
relata; (2) any given entity is a constituent of many different com-
plexes. Three proofs are offered by the neo-realists (1) that from
asymmetrical relation, (2) that from the nature of analysis, (3) that
from the relations of simple terms.
As to the argument from asymmetrical relations the article by Mr.
Schweitzer in a recent number of this JOURNAL 1 was referred to in
which it is maintained, (1) that asymmetrical relations are no more
ultimate in mathematics than symmetrical, (2) that asymmetrical
mathematical relations are explicable on an internal basis. The sec-
ond argument, that from the nature of analysis, is based on the knowl-
edge relation. If knowledge modifies its object, the object can never
i Vol. XL., page 169.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 343
be known; or again, since all thinking implies the validity of the
analytic method, the validity of analysis can not be denied without
self-contradiction. The first statement is gravely ambiguous. The
one sense in which we can all accept the statement, ' ' knowledge modi-
fies its object," is that of the truism, "all known objects are know-
able, ' ' or that of the postulate, ' ' all reality is intelligible. ' ' Nothing
new in the postulate, certainly j. and how trivial the truism ! Neverthe-
less, if we accept either, this particular argument for the externality
of relations, in the sense in which Mr. Russell defines it, breaks down.
Either the truism or the postulate implies a complexity in the thing
known corresponding to the knowledge of it. In fact, if the realists
are to maintain the second of Mr. Russell's principles "any given
entity is a constituent of many different complexes" in regard to
the knowing complexes, then they must give up the first "related-
ness does not imply any corresponding complexity in the relata. ' ' In
reply to Spaulding's "Defense of Analysis," external relations are
not the only alternative to exhaustively constitutive relations. Rela-
tions sometimes constitute terms of discourse, or entities of definition ;
they never constitute existences. Mr. Spaulding says, "the adequacy,
the validity of analysis can be demonstrated if both the terms and
organizing relations, to whose discovery analysis always leads, are
considered. ' ' But the trouble is that on the theory of external rela-
tions, the relations must be, for analysis, terms of the complex. Mr.
Russell recognizes this. 2 Propositions bear to one another relations
of contradiction, implication, and so on ; they are in their turn terms
of a higher order. But it would be obviously absurd to say that these
relations imply no corresponding complexity in their relata, that they
are not grounded in their terms.
The third argument was quoted from Russell's paper in this JOUR-
NAL. 3 The first reply is, that there must be a constituent of A corre-
sponding to the relation (or of B, as the case may be) or else a rela-
tion of the relation to A will be necessary, and so on, ad infinitum.
This formal rebuttal makes us aware that we need to examine the pre-
suppositions of the argument. These underlie the theory of external
relations when it is strictly defined and kept clear of extraneous ques-
tions. They seem to be two; (1) there are absolutely simple terms,
and (2) the only alternative to ultimate simplicity is infinite com-
plexity. In the case of existent entities the first proposition must be
denied. As to subsistences, they are either defined or indefinable : if
defined, they are obviously not simple; if indefinable, then they are
constituted by their relations as stated in the fundamental axioms in
the sciences in which they appear. The other presupposition is an
2 Cf. (< Principles of Mathematics, ' ' page 140.
3 Vol. VIII., page 159.
344
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
instance of neglect of the systematic background of thought ; relations
do not require to be entirely grounded in the terms; sometimes the
complexity involved is almost wholly in the system in which the terms
occur. If this criticism of the three proofs is correct, the first prin-
ciple in Russell's statement of the doctrine of externality must be
denied, while the second one is valid, at least in many cases ; for none
of the objections to the proofs applies to it. While every related term
has a complexity in it corresponding to its relation, it is formally pos-
sible that the same term may be a member of an indefinite number of
complexes ; and this Professor Hollands proposed as the valid theory
of relations.
Professor Moore presented the old problem of " qualities and
relations" and asked, if qualities change, what changes them if not
their relations ? What is meant by terms when we assert the exter-
nality of relations? What is the meaning of "us" in Mr. Russell's
book, where the knowledge-relation is concerned? Professor Boodin
thought that the dynamic situation is more important than the ele-
ments of the problem, which are usually isolated and set at variance
with one another in such discussions as the present one. He spoke of
neo-realism as consciously dogmatic and of its postulates as being
consequently not very close to reality. Professor M. R. Cohen con-
tributed to the discussion by asking whether things are external to
one another. He thought that the realistic doctrine has been mis-
understood. Some things make no difference to one another, and what
the neo-realist means is just that. Certain qualities are internal and
certain others are relations and external. In some ways the whole
issue is the same as that between Plato and Aristotle, the issue be-
tween a functional and a static conception of substance. Dr. Kallen
pointed out that the usual presupposition of such discussions as the
present is either monadism or monism, it is that all relations are
either external or internal. He then pointed out that in causation the
external and internal are both present as if in a crucial case, and we
should avoid hypostatizing either. Professor H. B. Alexander spoke
of economies of thought represented in such realities of faith as con-
servation, the law of parsimony, the universality of relations, etc.
These constitute the systematic background of all thought, and may
be said to be valid in the sense of medieval realism. Professor Cohen
then remarked that the usual assumption is that when two things ap-
pear to be external to each other, we are simply ignorant of their con-
nection, but the neo-realist holds that externality and ignorance have
nothing in common. Professor Swenson remarked that the relation
of the mind to its object should be distinguished from the relation of
knowledge to its object. Dr. Schweitzer stated that in symbolic logic
it seems to make no difference whether we assert externalism or inter-
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 345
nalism. In ordinary logic internality of relations seems to be the
truth. The disparity between the two types of logic suggests that
there is need of definition and differentiation. Dr. Hartman raised
the question whether either externalism or internalism is equally true
of physical, chemical, biological, and psychological relations, making
the point that relations which might be said to be external to their re-
lata in a mechanical world become internal when transferred to the
biological and human spheres. Professor Tawney asked whether, if
the doctrine of the externality of relations means simply the external-
ity of things, it asserts anything more than James's radical em-
piricism.
The President's address on "The Psychological Doctrine of Focus
and Margin" will appear in the July number of the Philosophical
Review, and no attempt will be made to review it here. It was a
cogent appeal for a definition of the subject-matter and the aim of
psychology in terms of behavior. From this standpoint consciousness
means a specific type of control on the part of objects over bodily
adaptations. The focus is the stimulus considered in relation to
further stimuli ; the margin is the stimulus as concerned in the guid-
ance of bodily behavior.
On Friday morning, in the law building of the university, Pro-
fessor Warner Fite opened the day's proceedings with a paper, "In
Defense of Natural Rights." The older theory meant non-interfer-
ence, the appeal from external control to private judgment. At pres-
ent the tendency is to say that the individual is a product or function
of society, so that he has duties to it, while it has none to him. The
truth is we are products of our conditions only so far as we do not
know what is going on in us. All values are created by consciousness.
If a watch knew itself, it would have value for itself, and would have
claims against its owner. The obligation of others to respect my
rights is relative to my consciousness of my rights, this, because the
power to realize an end lies in the consciousness of it. What we are
internally is what we produce self-consciously; all our authority as
individuals is relative to this, and this is the new doctrine of natural
rights. It asserts the superior rights of the more intelligent, for might
does, in this sense, make right. The fundamental moral problem is
that of fair competition ; the moral struggle is a struggle of personal
rights against vested privilege.
Professor Tufts mentioned the presuppositions of the doctrine of
natural rights, as taught by Locke, namely, (1) that God commissions
the individual and so gives him his natural rights, and (2) that there
is always plenty of land and other values left for everybody else.
These have been stripped from the doctrine, and it is asserted in cib-
stracto. Are we under obligation to build a better house for a man
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who is not conscious of his need of it ? Ought we not build the better
house and, if necessary, force him to learn to appreciate it? Pro-
fessor Sharp pointed out that even such natural rights as Professor
Fite has in mind are relative to the social welfare. Thus one 's right
to the fruits of his toil are based on his right to his own person ; but a
court compelled a woman to pay her share of the cost of a ditch, al-
though she did not want the ditch dug and received no proportionate
benefit from it. Locke and John Adams would have denied her obli-
gation in this case. Professor Wright contrasted the self as particular
with the self as universal, and pointed out that the latter demands sac-
rifice of the former. Professor Fite's system has no place for sacri-
fice, and this must be regarded as a weakness. Professor Moore said
that Mr. Fite eliminates social meanings from the term ' ' nature ' ' and
then brings them in again under the head of intelligence or conscious-
ness. Surely we are about to do with the opposition of self and society
what we have already done with the opposition of mind and body.
The same self-consciousness that created institutions also creates
the opposition of the self-conscious individual to them. The oppo-
sition is therefore only a stage in a process. Professor Fite replied,
that the individual can be compelled to cooperate- has been settled
by the march of events. But upon what basis are we to cooperate ?
The answer of the natural rights theory is that this basis is the
distributive principle of individual good, each according to his in-
telligent share, and not each according to his ability to take and keep.
For example, in state universities we often hear that education should
be democratic, and this usually means that standards should be easy.
But the truth is that in a tax-supported institution more should be
done to keep standards up than in a privately-supported institution.
Finally, the theory of natural rights holds that, however far ahead
we may look, we should remember to conserve our own enjoyment as
individuals.
The second paper, "Jus Naturale Redivivum," by M. R. Cohen,
pointed out that the doctrine is now in process of revival among the
jurists of many European countries. It has been argued that human
beings never did exist in the assumed state of nature, and hence it is
meaningless to speak of natural law; but the fact is that Hobbes,
Rousseau, et al., refer to something in the present. Again, the old
argument assumed a self-sufficient individual who, with lordly
freedom, made what contracts he pleased, while modern psychologists
have shown that no such individual exists. However, contractualism
is not essential to the doctrine of natural law. Again, it is said that
since law is always the will of a sovereign, or an established rule,
questions of natural right do not concern the jurist; natural law
must be a matter of ethics, not a matter of law. However, judges are
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 347
compelled to rely upon a sense of justice, and the principles of jus-
tice are sought by systematic scientific investigation. In constitu-
tional law, bills of rights are made up of popular, vague, moral
maxims. Questions of right and wrong in external and enforceable
relations involve social ethics just as much as questions of personal
morality do. If it is possible to speak of a law that ought to be en-
forced and obeyed, this is certain. Professor Cohen opposed Fite's
doctrine of natural right, because it identifies right with might, it
eliminates the ought from the moral imperative. Once more, it is
said that all things are relative and nothing is eternal ; but the unity
of the race and its history is as fundamental in modern history and
social science as it ever was. Non-Euclidean geometries and other
modern mathematics lead us to distrust the self-evidence and cer-
tainty of first principles and axioms. Evidence, clearness, and
consistency are demanded. Just so, rights must be justified by
experience or evidence, and they must be clear and coherent. For
example, equality means indifference to differences, but modern law
tends toward the individualization of punishments and the recogni-
tion of actual classes. The right to life and the right to the products
of toil conflict in the case of an invalid who produces nothing. The
arts of civilization all involve the same difficulty, namely, the imposi-
tion by the intelligent upon the ignorant of that which is better than
the latter can know; and in this process neither the court, which
represents the established order, nor philosophy, which represents
the ideal good, can by itself alone mediate development. To that end
the two must cooperate, and hence this conference on legal and social
philosophy.
Dr. Kallen held that the rule of might comes in wherever the
will of the wise is imposed upon the unwise. Socially, all rights are
natural, but none are inalienable. The assumption that the will to
live is more natural than the will to die underlies punishment for
attempted suicide, and the doctrine of natural right recognizes this.
The seat of value is always the individual, the content of value is
always social, and society changes to meet the need of the individual.
Might always constitutes right, whether it be that of majorities or
individuals. The enforcement of law is always the expression of
something that arises and maintains itself naturally. Boodin re-
marked that each stands at a point of intersection in a network of
relations, while the unity and completeness of the whole demands
many abstractions such as philosophers, lawyers, shoe-makers, etc.
The underlying wisdom is the wisdom of the bee, the cosmic life that
makes us feel important as individuals. Kallen replied that all re-
form begins with the individual. Cohen said that might and right
can not be identified because might means success. We should either
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stop talking about might and right, or else keep the two distinct.
Eight is a matter of values to which might and success are only
incidentally relevant. Alexander spoke to similar effect. Kallen
asked whether individualism is the basis of harmony in the state,
while social control is a different non-individualistic basis. Alex-
ander replied that the individual is always a citizen, a social indi-
vidual. Kallen remarked that in Plato's Eepublic it is the social
implications of individuality, conceived as natural, that underlie the
state. Alexander rejoined that Dr. Kallen forgets that Plato banishes
the poets and artists from the state. Kallen replied that they are
outside the harmony of the state. Professor Cohen remarked that
what is is not absolutely distinct from what ought to be ; and Boodin,
that Dr. Kallen begs the question in ignoring the fact that the indi-
vidual is always the epitome of a vast system of social values. To
which Kallen replied that social relations are not as internal as
Dr. Boodin implies.
Dean John W. Wigmore next read a paper on ''Law as a Sci-
ence. ' ' He proposed the term Nomology for the science as a whole,
and suggested four main divisions of it, which the following terms
may perhaps sufficiently indicate. Nomology includes (1) Nomos-
copy, (a) Nomophysics, (b) Nomostatics, (c) Nomogenetics ; (2)
Nomosophy,= (a) Nomocritics, (&) Nomothetics, (c) Nomopolitics ;
(3) Nomodidactics ; (4) Nomopractics, = (a) Nomopoetics, (&)
Nomodicastics, (c) Nomodrastics. Nomoscopy is the description,
history, and explanation of law ; Nomosophy, the science of law as it
ought to be, the attempt to harmonize one legal notion with another
by subsuming both under a third. This is simply logical analysis,
but the application of ethical principles gives Nomothetics. Nomo-
critics and Nomothetics are not separated by any plain line, any
more than logic and ethics are. Nomopractics means the science of
law as enforced or enforceable and comprehends methods of making
law (nomopoetics), the methods by which judges apply law (nomo-
dicastics), and the methods of pushing the law home by its applica-
tion to the people (nomodrastics). Dean Wigmore spoke of the fact
that all principles of law, and of the science of law, now seem to be
undergoing criticism. Within the last five years, the fellow-servant
principle has come to be questioned. Everything is liable to be
questioned and required to give a reason for itself. Hence the real
help the philosophers may render the lawyers in the development of
a genuine science of law.
Professor Sharp remarked that branches 2 (a) and 2 (6) above
are really the same and deal with the end of law and its administra-
tion, while 2 (c) is concerned with the means of achieving that end.
At the opening of the Friday afternoon session, Professor Albert
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 349
Kocourek read on "The Formal Relation of Rule and Discretion"
and maintained that discretion is a permanent characteristic of the
law and a lever of legal evolution. It may be said to add to, modify,
and even substitute for the law. The courts are thought to apply
the law, but specific and direct applications are rare. Even where
they occur, controversy and difference of opinion are not eliminated.
In the legal syllogism, the law gives only the major premise, while
the minor has to be discovered in the great laboratory of litigation.
English and American law is inductive, while continental or Roman
law is deductive. The English judge has poorer tools to work with,
but greater skill, than the continental judge. Our system tends to
a great variety of rules. Sociological jurisprudence would override
all rules and abandon concepts. Relative, changing, and living
realities are the subject-matter of juristic science. Its method is
the method of purpose and teleology. It must consider, not only the
quantity and quality, but also the modality of juristic facts.
Professor Meacham spoke against the idea of government by dis-
cretion. "The rules we make in our sober hours to restrain our
passionate moments are absolutely necessary. ' ' Dean Wigmore spoke
of the need of a definition of discretion. It does not consist in the
fact that decisions are final. It must mean, in case there were but
one judge, that his decision is personal. It always means that the
precise case is subsequent to the making of the rule of law by the
legislature. The judge has power to introduce variations into the
law, so that two judges may decide differently on the same state of
facts. Any system based solely on rule will soon clog up : so will a
discretionary system: the pendulum of history swings from one to
the other, and the truth seems to lie in the transitions. Professor
Freund spoke of the so-called English Richterkoenigstum, maintain-
ing that there is greater freedom in German courts than either here
or in England. Professor Cohen added that this is a Continental
trait, and yet the English judge occupies the more regal position.
Our common law is made by the courts, while in Europe the
common law is the expression of legislative judgment. As a
matter of fact there is discretion : no formula can estop progress.
The sociological school simply insists on the wisdom of deciding cases
on the basis of social science rather than on the basis of a priori rules
or fictions. The reason for creating commissions to administer law
in place of the courts is simply the fact that a commission can check
up its results, whereas courts can not. Our constitutional law is a
system of discretions. Discretion is the growing point of rule. The
real question is whether we shall treat rules of law as fixed and
changeless or as hypotheses like those of science. Dean James P.
Hall pointed out that in some injunctions there is no question of
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discretion, the only questions relate to facts. In other cases rules
of law sometimes conflict. ' ' Discretipn is the growing point of rule, ' '
as Mr. Cohen said. Commissions exercise delegated legislative power
rather than discretion. They are supposed to use scientific methods
to a greater extent than courts do. Professor Freund added that
judicial discretion rests on hearing the law and reasoning, whereas
executive discretion does not.
David F. Swenson next read a paper on "The Epistemological
Basis of General Rules," pointing out that there must be an objec-
tive and self-identical body of juristic relations. Plato 's eternal and
unchanging ideas are here reasserted. Meanings remain even when
they change, and they admit of comparison. Logic discriminates
alternative meanings and banishes lack of clearness. Custom, asso-
ciation, and the natural history of meanings can not be substituted
for clearness and distinctness. Individual psychology alone does not
account for perfect meanings. When the contents of juristic knowl-
edge appear, they are objective and independent. But what are the
actual conditions under which rules are to be applied? Can their
application be said to describe a syllogism? Professor Swenson
answers, No. No fact of juristic significance comes so labeled as to
make its subsumption a mechanical process. That involves creative
imagination based on a knowledge of the code and an understanding
of the facts of the case. Only the trivial elements of the process are
controlled by the abstract laws of logic. The judge's social philos-
ophy, ethics, and knowledge of human nature enter into the process,
as also do his human sympathies. Two reasons are offered for the
statement that the application of law is an act of creative imagina-
tion. First, no completely elaborated code is possible. Any actual
system of rules is full of gaps and inadequate adjustments. Secondly,
it is never possible completely to express our intentions in rules of
law. Hence rules of interpretation are necessary, and just rules of
interpretation do not make the law, any more than gravitation makes
the stone break the window. The limitations of human reason make
these rules of interpretation necessary. Deciding cases on their
merits is a confession of difficulty in subsuming the case under the
proper rule.
F. C. Sharp then read on "The Moral Criterion in Some Eecent
Supreme Court Decisions," maintaining that a utilitarian theory of
imperatives underlies court decisions to-day, and also the decisions
of the plain man on moral and legal issues. Certain problems are
dealt with by both law and ethics. We prefer the nearer good, that
is to say, the good of those who are nearer to us in blood, race, occu-
pation, etc. Again we follow the maxim, So use your own as not to
injure others, but sacrifice for others is not obligatory. Again, we are
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 351
influenced by meritorious qualities in the persons concerned, very
much as the boy who thinks it mean to hit a dog, but hits a cat every
time. Again, we choose the greater good. This is not hedonism, but
utilitarianism, the pursuit of usefulness or the good. The police
power of the state includes all those unclassified residuary powers
reserved to the government by the constitution. It is the power of
the state to conserve the good of the state. In application this means
that you must actively cooperate with others for the good of all even
when you have no assurance of recompense. Underlying this is the
principle of the nearer good. The courts have nothing to do with the
principle of equality. Laws may operate differently on different
classes provided the classification rests on a reasonable basis. No
factitious equality wrought out by ignoring real differences is re-
spected. Progress consists in eliminating certain classes of errors.
What is right for one is right for others, but many judgments violate
this rule. Agan, the law aims at becoming a consistent system.
Inconsistencies are eliminated, and these are of all degrees of subtlety.
The final principle, the goal of both law and morality, is the good;
and the question, What are the moral rights of the case, is as funda-
mental for law as for ethics.
Professor Howard Smith, of the University of Wisconsin, main-
tained, on the contrary, that law has nothing to do with questions of
morality.
The last paper of the afternoon was on "The Nature of Social
Rules" by Professor Albion W. Small. Sociology holds that we
have passed the boundary between an earlier and a later period in
the evolution of rules, the periods of custom and reflection. The!
two great questions of sociology are, Of what sort have rules been,
and, Of what sort are they to be in the future? Customary rules
were the will of the stronger exercised over the weaker. But rules
were tempered by consideration of difficulty in enforcing them. The
balance of power between many conflicting interests determined the
rules of this era of evolution. To-day a new force is at work, a con-
ception of the human lot which is likely to work a Copernican revolu-
tion in social controls. The human lot is a concurrence of reciprocal
interests, recognized as a categorical imperative of objectivity. Rules
are formulations of the indicated function of each interest in the
economy of the whole or human lot. A social consciousness that
judges each interest in reference to the rest is in process of develop-
ment. An impartial spectator is an impossibility. The method is
to take the judgments of experts and test them by appeal to fact,
that is to say, by appeal to the part that the interest concerned plays
in promoting the whole social process, whatever the latter may turn
out to be. ' ' There are no rights except rights of way in performing
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social functions." The evolving ideal is that of a community of
reciprocating functions.
Thursday evening the association dined at the Quadrangle Club,
decided such matters of business as usually come up at business
meetings, attended upon the delivery of the presidential address by
Professor Bode, in the Harper Library Building, and enjoyed a
smoker at the Quadrangle Club. The officers elected for the coming
year are as follows: President, James H. Tufts; Vice-President, G.
T. W. Patrick ; Secretary-Treasurer, H. W. Wright ; Executive Com-
mittee, A. K. Rogers, G. A. Tawney, H. C. Longwell, E. S. Ames.
The following were elected to membership, Ray Sigsbee, E. Jordan,
H. G. Townsend, M. C. Otto, H. M. Sheffer, Queen Lois Shepherd,
C. H. Judd. It was decided to meet next December in conjunction
with the American Philosophical Association at the University of
Chicago. The treasurer reported a balance of $115.19.
G. A. TAWNEY.
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI.
MONTAGUE'S CLASSIFICATION OF VALUES
THE most recent classification of values is that which was pre-
sented by Professor Montague at the New Haven meeting of
the American Philosophical Association, in elaboration of an earlier
one. 1 The earlier treatment claimed to represent a pragmatic view
of values, the later one a neo-realistic view, but the ontological
implications are not very clear in either case. Fortunately, this does
not affect the worth of the result.
In my former article 2 1 reviewed Dr. Montague 's first classification
and with modifications adopted it in my own discussion of the factual
values. Dr. Montague asserts, in brief, that adjustment of the judg-
ments of the individual to the facts of his environment yields "the
cognitive value of truth" (a realistic, perhaps, but hardly a prag-
matic, view of truth) ; adjustment of the facts of the environment to
the desires of the individual, "the conative value of good;" and "the
spontaneous and unenforced adaptation of individual needs and en-
vironing facts to one another," "the affective value of beauty." So
far as goodness and beauty are concerned, at least, this classification
is open to serious objections. The goodness which merely fulfils the
desires of the individual is hardly more than economic, certainly not
moral, goodness; and the value yielded by spontaneous mutual ad-
justment between organism and environment is hardly more than the
1 See this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., page 233.
2 This JOURNAL, Vol. VII., pages 281-291.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 353
psychological feeling of agreeableness. Accordingly, in my own
treatment, though accepting Montague's principle of classification, I
have named the resultant values truth, utility, and agreeableness,
respectively.
In his recent return to the subject of value, Dr. Montague has
partially corrected these defects by cross-dividing the three groups of
cognitive, affective, and conative values into two sub-classes empir-
ical and rational types of value corresponding in many respects to
my own factual-ideal division. The true, the beautiful, and the good
are now termed rational values, and parallel to them we have as
empirical values the apparent or sensible, the pleasant or hedonic,
and the desirable or egoistic. To make clearer the comparison be-
tween Dr. Montague's classification and my own I have drawn up
the following table:
MONTAGUE. MOORE.
Empirical Values. Factual Values.
Cognitive Sensible Apparent. Logical True.
Affective Hedonic Pleasant. Affective Pleasant.
Conative Egoistic Desirable. Economic Useful.
Rational Values. Ideal Values.
Cognitive Logical True. Religious True.
Affective Esthetic Beautiful. Esthetic Beautiful.
Conative Ethical Good. Ethical Good.
The most conspicuous difference between the two lists, and the
only point for which I can claim originality, is that as I look at it
the "truth" which it is customary to group with beauty and good-
ness is religious rather than logical truth, the latter being a quite
different kind of value and better grouped with utility and agreeable-
ness. This point I have already brought out elsewhere 3 in an article
which insists on the alignment of ethics and esthetics with philosophy
of religion, rather than with logic, as is usually done. Logical or
scientific truth is that derived by reasoning, and involves a "dual-
istic" attitude of the mind toward its object, the latter being regarded
as possessing a reality more or less independent of the former, and
offering itself to scientific analysis and explanation : religious truth,
on the contrary, is that which the religious man claims to reach
immediately, by insight rather than inference, and involves a
"monistic" attitude of absorption of the mind in its object similar to
that characteristic of the esthetic experience, and of the most intimate
experiences of the social life. Logical truth, then, is a purely cogni-
tive value, as pleasure is purely affective and utility conative, and all
3 Western Reserve Bulletin, Vol. XII., No. 3, May, 1909.
354
alike have to do entirely with the facts of every-day life: religion,
art, and morality, on the other hand, whatever the special psycho-
logical emphasis of each may be, appeal to all sides of man 's nature,
and claim to bring man into relations with an ideal world which quite
transcends that of the merely actual.
I should prefer, therefore, not to use the traditional grouping of
mental processes as a basis for the classification of the ideal values.
The "sensible" or "apparent," furthermore, so far as it is distin-
guishable from the logically "true," would seem to me to be lacking
in value by virtue of this very fact.
In addition to this classification of the values themselves, both Dr.
Montague and I give some consideration to the psychological process
of evaluation. Dr. Montague defines value as that which satisfies an
interest, and attempts to determine the various forms of interest and
of satisfaction associated with the different types. Similarly, in my
former article, I made the statement that "evaluation of facts in-
volves interest as its general psychological condition, interest being
definable as a feeling of the importance of the object for the indi-
vidual; and the satisfaction of this interest yields pleasure as its
psychological result." But in the evaluation of ideals pleasure be-
comes transformed into happiness, and love takes the place of mere
interest. Pleasure I described as " an inner harmony . . . produced
by some adaptation between the individual and his environment":
happiness as " an inner harmony . . . produced by an outer one by
some harmony in the environment, and between the environment and
the individual. " So if interest is a feeling of adaptation between the
organism and some environing fact, love is "a feeling of harmony
between the contemplating subject and any ideal object." Whereas
Dr. Montague, then, adopts "interest" as the generic term for the
psychological condition of evaluation in every field, I prefer to
restrict it to evaluation in the factual realm, using the stronger term
"love" in connection with the evaluation of ideals. The reason for
this may be gathered from the definitions which I have formulated of
the two classes of values concerned, and of the terms "interest" and
"love."
I shall not here offer any lengthy criticism of Dr. Montague 's sub-
division of interest and satisfaction the former into curiosity as the
condition of cognitive evaluation, liking of affective, and desire of
conative evaluation; and the latter into belief, enjoyment, and ap-
proval, correspondingly. In my own paper I did not attempt any
subdivision : pleasure and happiness are not there defined as varieties
of satisfaction, but as the psychological results of satisfaction. In-
terest may be said quite properly, I think, to express itself in the
three ways Dr. Montague names, and with one exception the same
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 365
thing may be said of the satisfaction of interest. With regard to the
latter, however, the term "approval" seems to be out of place. We
" approve" that which is good in the moral sphere, but the satis-
faction of desire consists rather in the use of the desirable object,
just as the satisfaction of curiosity consists in belief in what is true,
and the satisfaction of liking in the enjoyment of what is pleasant.
No part of Dr. Montague's paper is concerned with evaluation in
the ideal realm, nor shall I attempt an analysis myself any further
than has already been done in my former article. I am here not so
much interested, indeed, either in the criticism of Dr. Montague's
presentation, or even in the presentation of a constructive scheme
myself, as in pointing out the specific agreements and differences
between us.
JARED S. MOORE.
WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.
CONCEPTS AND EXISTENCE
HHHE interesting discussion between Professor Bush and Professor
Pitkin that has been carried on in this JOURNAL 1 seems to suffer
from an overlooked ambiguity in the fundamental idea in question
that of the straight line. The term straight line is actually used in
three meanings which might be described as physical, mechanical,
and geometrical, and the problem of the relation of concept and ex-
istence might be stated with respect to any or all of these meanings.
There is also the further problem of the identity of the three things
conceived by virtue of which they are all straight lines. Professor
Pitkin is primarily interested in the physical line and its concept,
which he identifies with the geometrical line; Professor Bush (p. 690)
uses the mechanical conception, the railway curve as the plan of an
engineer, but has shifted from the geometrical conception by which
"the line is the definition" (p. 688). Undoubtedly these three con-
ceptions and the entities relative to them have been differentiated
"after many years of highly expert use" (p. 690) of concepts and
things and are really different, although they have a fundamental
identity. It is important, then, that they be kept apart.
Professor Hilbert begins his "Grundlagen der Geometric " with
an assumption of three different systems of things (Dinge) (p. 5).
It makes no difference what the things are provided they conform to
i(l) "The Empirical Status of Geometrical Entities," W. B. Pitkin, this
JOURNAL, Vol. X., pages 393-402; (2) "Concepts and Existence," W. T. Bush,
Vol. X., pages 686-690; (3) "Concepts and Existence," W. B. Pitkin, Vol. XL,
pages 131-133.
356
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS
certain postulated demands. The line is simply a particular class of
things in the first system. The postulates denning it do not even de-
mand concrete relations between them, but only types of relation,
asymmetrical and transitive, conforming to certain ordinal require-
ments. They could just as well be exemplified by a collection of
debtors and creditors properly restricted as to financial arrangements,
or by a collection of numbers, as by points. Their straightness, even,
is merely a requirement as to relations within the systems. The line
that is straight in an Euclidean system is a curve in such a system
as Riemann 's, and vice versa. The limitation to relational types, how-
ever, is important, for thereby the applicability of the system is ex-
tended to arithmetic and other branches of mathematics wherein the
types are exemplified and which consequently stand to it as objects
through which its results may be tested and their consistency estab-
lished. 2 Here is one instance of a line concept and an object con-
ceived.
The great peculiarity of mathematics, not of geometry alone, is
that it has no further use for entities of any sort than as terms to
connect by types of relations. Its objects are merely focal points in a
system of relational types and are irrelevant to mathematics in so far
as they are thought of as anything more than occupying a place in
such a system. In the physical universe things determine, if they do
not constitute, their relations; in pure mathematics, on the other
hand, entities are constituted by their relations, in so far as they
enter its domain. It is this fact that justifies Professor Bush in
asserting (p. 688) that "the line is the definition," and Professor
Pitkin's criticism (p. 133) "how can the definition be identical with
that which it is to bring into existence ? " is only justified by playing
back from the geometrical line to the mechanical or physical line.
The peculiar value of mathematics lies in the fact that the asym-
metrical and transitive relational types and ordinal properties studied
by it are so profusely illustrated in the physical universe, and on this
account it has been developed. The mechanical and the physical line
retain these geometrical characteristics and hence arises their dia-
grammatic and practical utility. They are the geometrical line, but
they are each also something more. It is not quite true that "the
definition, in so far as it is a pragmatic entity, is related to the straight
line precisely as the recipe of a cake is related to the cake" (p. 133)
if the definition is geometrical, and the line understood in the me-
chanical or physical sense, for the cake recipe prescribes not only the
proportions, but also the ingredients themselves, whereas the geom-
eter's definition only lays down the relations of the ingredients. The
engineer's plan, however, is a true recipe for the railway, for in it are
2 Cf. Hilbert, loc. cit., Kap. II.
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 357
specified both the ingredients and their relations, but the geometer's
definition is hardly a true recipe for a geometrically linear entity.
Why Professor Pitkin feels that from the fact that the cake is
not the recipe, it must follow "that the relation between formula and
thing to be made has nothing to do with the relation between uni-
versal and particular" (p. 133) I do not quite understand. The
universal, if it has any meaning at all, is surely primarily an instru-
ment for handling a situation. The most refined form of mathe*-
matics is nothing but the result of isolating significant aspects of
things because of the fruitfulness of those aspects in handling some
class of facts, and this selection is from what is given for the sake of
what can be done with it. Professor Pitkin 's realism should have
taught him that the recipe is the cake, only the cake is much more
than the recipe, just as the geometrical line is the experienced line,
only the experienced line is much more that the geometrical line. The
latter fact he fully recognizes in criticizing Pearson. Kecipe,
formula, and universal express limitations under which a thing exists
and the distinction, if it is to be made at all, must be based merely on
the degree of adequacy with which those limitations are formulated,
but not even the most careful recipe approaches the complexity of
concrete actuality, as every amateur cook can testify.
HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.
REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE
La Psychologic Objective. W. BECHTEREW. (Translated from the Russian
by N. KOSTYLEFF.) Paris: Alcan. 1913. Pp. 478.
The growing tendency to explain mental life in motor, rather than in
sensory, terms is fully embodied in the present work. The definition of
psychology as " a description and explanation of states of consciousness "
is rejected at the outset. Instead of studying sensations, images, or ideas
Professor Bechterew would have us study processes of stimulation and
response, neural traces and the association of these traces with new ex-
perience, and the determination of the nature of reactions in consequence
of the attendant circumstances. Instead of states of consciousness the
term " neuro-psychic process " is suggested in the hope of doing away
with the contrast between the physical and the psychical. Every neuro-
psychic act is reduced to the scheme of the reflex. Under the name " re-
flexology " objective psychology is said to be a branch of biology.
[Wherever a reaction is modified by individual experience, we have a
psycho-reflex or a neuro-psychic phenomenon in the proper sense of the
term. From the above it is clear that although Professor Bechterew re-
gards himself as a behaviorist, he would not limit himself to the study of
358
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
organic behavior. Moreover, " the schema of the neuro-psychic process
does not exclude a certain parallelism of objective study and introspec-
tion." He has already discovered an agreement between introspection
and external observation as to the threshold of certain reflexes and the
threshold of the corresponding perception. But this is a problem, he
adds, that belongs to the future.
The physiological explanation of reflexes and of cerebral traces is in
general accord with that set forth in McDougall's primer and similar
works. Professor Bechterew is evidently unfamiliar with the more de-
tailed study of reflex mechanisms by Professor Sherrington. That ab-
straction called the simple reflex is discussed as the fundamental reality,
and all the later chapters are built upon this concept. Automatisms are
classified as simple reflexes, instinct as an extension of simple reflexes,
and all the higher mental processes as combinations of simple reflexes
modified by cerebral traces. Attention is studied under the name of the
reflexes of nervous concentration; discrimination and volition, under the
name of the personal reflexes or the reflexes of the personality. Only in
the case of these last reflexes is the nervous system supposed to function
as a whole.
The explanation of the concept " personality " is limited in this book
to a few sentences. In an earlier monograph on the personality, to which
he refers us, Professor Bechterew attacks the view of the self as set forth
in James and suggests instead a description of the personality similar to
that given by Kraepelin. In that monograph Bechterew writes : " Accord-
ing to my view the personality embraces besides the principle of uniform-
ity a directing principle which guides a man's thinking, acting, or re-
fraining from action, and also determines the relation of the individual
to his fellow men." The importance of this concept both for psychology
and sociology is emphasized in this mono'graph. In the present work the
treatment of this concept is restricted to the following points. In infancy
organic impressions determine the child's relations with external impres-
sions. These organic impressions are the basis of individual differentia-
tion, a differentiation which reaches its culminating point in man under
the name of personality. Discrimination and volition are reflexes of the
personality. " The self of the individual has no anatomic substratum and
appears only as a totality of reflexes, the paths of which are traced in the
nervous system of the brain." According to this definition with which
the present work closes, the personality is not the social self of his earlier
monograph nor the psycho-physical organism as in current biological
usage, but seems to be identified with what Professor Loeb calls " the as-
sociative memory." In a chapter on symbolic reflexes Professor Bechterew
shows that he has clearly in mind a distinction, the absence of which-
sometimes befogs discussion namely, between the concepts personality
and the consciousness of personality. Consciousness of personality he
regards as identical with the general estimation of neuro-psychic phenom-
ena. This process of estimation he treats wholly subjectively (pp.
414-415).
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 359
From a survey of the book, as a whole, it would appear that Professor
Bechterew had set himself the task of writing a new system of psychology
in which the biogenetic development of the individual would be studied
by the expressive method. But in reality the work embodies under new
titles the systems of classification and modes of procedure which many
dynamic psychologists are finding inadequate. Psychiatrists, teachers,
and other students of the individual are calling for a system of psychol-
ogy that will throw new light on the underlying complexes in personal-
ity, of the normal as well as of the abnormal individual. The present
work reveals no acquaintance with the recent studies of individual types
and the studies of volitional attitudes, both of which are pointing in the
desired direction. The book, however, presents in an attractive style many
of the recent ideas that are worked out in greater detail in the writings
of Professors Baldwin, Woodworth, and others. Many of the fundamental
ideas of the book, such as the conception of an objective psychology, can
be traced back to Herbert Spencer, but in urging us to study the behavior
of personality as a whole, Professor Bechterew is encouraging a forward
movement in psychology. This movement is paralleling the evolution of
biological study which began with the study of isolated elements, but to-day
emphasizes the study of the whole personality that is, the psycho-physical
individual. The detailed accounts of experiments conducted in the St.
Petersburg laboratory under the author's supervision constitute an in-
teresting feature of the book.
NORBERT JOHN MELVILLE.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.
The Principle of Relativity in the Light of the Philosophy of Science.
PAUL CARUS. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co. 1913. Pp. 105.
This venture of a broad scholar into a field for the detail of which he
has only a general interest is perhaps no less pretentious than the aug-
mented title of his discourse. Certainly the light of the philosophy of
science is rather feeble if it can shed no better illumination on this
important problem of physical science, some phases of which must be still
obscured in Dr. Carus's mind, for we read : " We will here at once and
dogmatically state that the relativity physicists are perfectly right; what
they claim is really and truly a matter of course, and if they only would
present their proposition without dressing up their theory in paradoxical
statements, nobody would in the least hesitate to accept the new view"
(p. 3).
However, we also find : " The new conception, sailing under the flag
of the principle of relativity which has been so noisily advanced to replace
the old notions, does not prove quite satisfactory and presents too many
difficulties to be acceptable to the average mind. . . . The names of
Einstein, Lorentz, Minkowski, are the stars of first magnitude among the
founders of the new world-conception. Their arguments, mathematically
excogitated and worked out with subtle exactness, seem to carry every-
thing before them, and we are not prepared to say that their contentions
360 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
are wrong. Their propositions decidedly contain truths of great impor-
tance, referring mainly to calculations of minute precision in complicated
phenomena. Yet common sense rebels against them and would not be
convinced. Prima facie the new doctrine seems ingeniosius quam verius;
it is ingeniously contrived, but there is a hitch in it" (p. 77).
To the physicist there is a hitch in the author's a priori reasoning
which accepts the principle of relativity as offering nothing new in science
except paradoxes, and would solve those paradoxes by means of the " phi-
losophy of science " rather than by a clearer understanding of the subject.
The founders of relativity, the cogency of whose arguments Dr. Cams
admits, claim .nothing new for that part of the theory which is based on
the first postulate, the relativity of classical mechanics. A better under-
standing of the second postulate which Dr. Carus admits presents great
difficulties, yet which he is inclined to pass over lightly as belonging to
the field of physics and not philosophy would clear away the mystifying
shadows which give rise to as many paradoxical statements in Dr. Carus's
own article as he finds in the contentions of the relativists.
The second postulate, that the velocity of light is constant in a field
where the gravitational potential is constant, is the basis of Einstein's
definition of simultaneity; and it is upon the two postulates of the theory
that the so-called variations in time and space lengths, mass, etc., as
viewed by an observer from varying viewpoints, are based. These varia-
tions can be measured or at least illustrated by models in the laboratory,
and to the reviewer offer nothing for common sense to rebel against. 1
Dr. Carus's difficulties seem to be due to the fact that he does not appre-
ciate the difference between a Galilean and a Lorentz transformation,
much less realize the necessity that forces the latter upon us.
As "the details of the physical problems and their solution have only
a slight interest for philosophy " (p. 82) Dr. Carus willingly leaves them
to the physicist and formulates for himself a philosophy of science which
" is simpler than the world-conception of the relativity physicists,
rests on a more solid foundation and is absolutely free from paradoxes "
(p. 61), a philosophy which, if properly understood, would have enabled
leaders of thought not only in relatavism, but also in pragmatism, Berg-
sonianism, and other modern tendencies to avoid at least some of their
aberrations (p. 84).
This philosophy is not overaccurate in the use of scientific terms; for
instance, the terms activity (power), energy, and force seem synonymous
in the author's thinking. But the booklet is readable and will doubtless
be very useful in opening up the subject of relativity to a larger circle
of readers. Before considering it seriously one should master Einstein's
first paper 2 which, by the way, is too historic to have been omitted without
reference.
The reprinting of Bradley's original memoir as an appendix is as
appropriate as it is thoughtful, especially in view of the fact that a number
iR. A. Wetzel, Science, 38: 466 (1913).
2 Annalen der Physilc, 17: 905 (1905).
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 361
of text-book writers have followed the example of Schuster's " Optics "
and refrain from mentioning such a misfit as the aberration of light.
It is not surprising that a philosopher should experience difficulties in
grasping the ideas of thinkers in another field; the difficulties of the
theory of relativity are not insurmountable, however, as Dr. Carus and
his readers will find if they give the subject further attention.
REINHARD A. WETZEL.
COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
Outline of a Study of the Self. EGBERT M. YERKES and DANIEL W.
Harvard University Press : 1913.
The authors of this Outline Study have found that a study of ancestry,
development, and present constitution is an extremely profitable task for
most students, and they present this guide as an aid to systematic and
thorough study of this kind. The purpose of such study is threefold:
(1) To help the student understand himself or herself; (2) To help the
student understand and sympathize with others; (3) To arouse interest
in the study of heredity, environmental influence, eugenics, and euttienics.
Many of the questions propounded, it is stated, can not be answered fully,
but are given by way of suggestion.
The book is put together on the loose-leaf system, with blank pages for
records and replies. Under the heading " Ancestral History of the Self "
are given the " Record of Family Traits " of the Eugenics Record Office,
and many supplementary questions concerning physical, mental, moral,
and social traits of near relatives, with suggestions as to their classifica-
tion and evaluation. Under " Development or Growth of the Self " and
" The Self of To-day " the periods prenatal, infancy, childhood, adoles-
cence, and the present time are each provided with questions concerning
characteristics, influences, growth, temperament and inclination, habits,
capacities, and social relations. Under " The Significance of the Charac-
teristics of the Self " are given questions concerning vocational demands,
equipment, and ambitions; marital propensities and fitness; responsibil-
ities and preparation for parenthood ; and the " Index to the Germ Plasm "
of the Eugenics Record Office. A final section invites reflection on " The
Duties of the Self as a Member of Social Groups " in the light of physical
and mental constitution, moral and religious tendencies, vocational abil-
ities, and marital and parental relations and duties.
This attempt to present a suggestive outline for intensive study of the
individual should be recognized as both commendable and timely. That
it is but a step in the right direction its authors will no doubt cheerfully
agree. The Outline raises many questions which neither " the self " nor
anybody else can answer, as " Has heredity anything to do with your
vocational leaning ? " " Are you an improvement on the family type ? "
" What is your chief desire in life? " " Should you marry a ' similar ' or
a ' dissimilar ' individual? " " Do you inspire confidence? " " Make clear
your philosophy of life," etc. Observant students can hardly fail to note
the suggestive humor of such memoranda as " Habits of Father (alcohol,
tobacco, coffee, drugs). Habits of Mother (work, rest, recreation)." It
362 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
should be said, however, that these questions are not at all representative
of the Outline as a whole.
If the student takes the matter seriously he will probably conclude that
the answers to most of the questions are immaterial, since nobody can
show that one state of affairs is either more or less desirable than another.
As to the actual profit derived by the student from the very laborious task
of completing the Outline, the reviewer can not express himself until he
has had more experience with the Outline. He is temperamentally inclined
to believe that such a student will hardly be happier or more successful
than the one who forgets his grandparents and uncles and forges ahead as
opportunities present themselves. It would be indeed unfortunate if the
painstaking student should be led to believe that, having delivered opin-
ions on these various questions, he has really and thereby acquired any
new information about himself, or should be frightened by the formidable
aspects of the Family Tree, the Index to the Germ Plasm, or the para-
graphs on prenatal influences. Additional good might be achieved if the
student were requested to record his observations of others on the basis
of the Outline. Indeed it is quite probable that a careful study of some
other individual would be even more profitable than the analysis of the self.
It is to be hoped that the time will soon come when the student can be
provided with norms, correlations, and other facts and generalizations
which may enable him really to interpret his autobiographical details.
Meanwhile Yerkes and LaRue have done us genuine preliminary service
in formulating this Outline. It should result in giving greater definite-
ness and direction to the development of individual psychology and the
analysis of personality, the study of the activ 
