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THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

The

Kaiser's Memoirs

WILHELM II

Emperor of Germany 1888-1918

English Translation by
THOMAS R. YBARRA

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

NEW YORK AND LONDON

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Copyright, 1922
By McClure Newspaper Syndicate

Copyright, 1922
By Harper & Brothers
Printed in the U. S. A.

First Edition
K-W

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAQE

I. BISMARCK x

II. CAPRIVI 5I

III. HOHENLOHE 59

IV. BULOW 95

V. BETHMANN 124

VI. MY CO-WORKERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION 171

VII. SCIENCE AND ART 196

VIII. MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH 208

IX. ARMY AND NAVY , 223

X. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 346

i

XI. THE POPE AND PEACE -263

XII. END OF THE WAR AND MY ABDICATION 272

XIII. THE ENEMY TRIBUNAL AND THE NEUTRAL TRIBUNAL 292

XIV. THE QUESTION OF GUILT ,.303

XV. THE REVOLUTION AND GERMANY'S FUTURE 337

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

CHAPTER I
Bismarck

PRINCE BISMARCK'S greatness as a states
man and his imperishable services to Prussia
and Germany are historical facts of such tremen
dous significance that there is doubtless no man
in existence, whatever his party affiliations, who
would dare to place them in question. For this
very reason alone it is stupid to accuse me of not
having recognized the greatness of Prince Bis
marck. The opposite is the truth. I revered and
idolized him. Nor could it be otherwise. It
should be borne in mind with what generation I
grew up the generation of the devotees of Bis
marck. He was the creator of the German
Empire, the paladin of my grandfather, and all
of us considered him the greatest statesman of
his day and were proud that he was a German.
Bismarck was the idol in my temple, whom I
worshiped."

But monarchs also are human beings of flesh
and blood, Hence they, too, are exposed to the
influences emanating from the conduct of others;
therefore, looking at the matter from a human
point of view, one will understand how Prince

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Bismarck, by his fight against me, himself de
stroyed, with heavy blows, the idol of which I
have spoken. But my reverence for Bismarck, the
great statesman, remained unaltered.

While I was still Prince of Prussia I often
thought to myself: "I hope that the great Chan
cellor will live for many years yet, since I should
be safe if I could govern. with him." But my
reverence for the great statesman was not such as
to make me take upon my own shoulders, when
I became Emperor, political plans or actions of
the Prince which I considered mistakes. Even
the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was, to my way of
thinking, a mistake, likewise the "Kulturkampf."
Moreover, the constitution of the Empire was
drawn up so as to fit in with Bismarck's extraor
dinary preponderance as a statesman ; the big cui
rassier boots did not fit every man.

Then came the labor-protective legislation. I
most deeply deplored the dispute which grew out
of this, but, at that time, it was necessary for me
to take the road to compromise, which has gen~
erally been my road both on domestic and foreign
politics. For this reason I could not wage the open
warfare against the Social Democrats which the
Prince desired. Nevertheless, this quarrel about
political measures cannot lessen my admiration
for the greatness of Bismarck as a statesman; he
remains the creator of the German Empire, and
surely no one man need have done more for his
country than that

Owing to the fact that the great matter of uni-

2

BISMARCK

fying the Empire was always before my eyes, I
did not allow myself to be influenced by the agi
tations which were the commonplaces of those
days. In like manner, the fact that Bismarck was
called the majordomo of the Hohenzollerns could
not shake my trust in the Prince, although he, per
haps, had thoughts of a political tradition for his
family. As evidence of this, he felt unhappy, for
instance, that his son Bill felt no interest in politics
and wished to pass on his power to Herbert.

HIS GRANDFATHER'S SUCCESSOR

The tragic element for me, in the Bismarck
case, lay in the fact that I became the successor
of my grandfather in other words, that I skipped
one generation, to a certain extent. And that is
a serious thing. In such a case one is forced to
deal constantly with old deserving men, who live
more in the past than in the present, and cannot
grow into the future. When the grandson succeeds
his grandfather and finds a revered but old states
man of the stature of Bismarck, it is not a piece
of good luck for him, as one might suppose, and I,
in fact, supposed. Bismarck himself points that
out in the third volume of his memoirs (p. 40),
when he speaks, in the chapter about Botticher, of
the oldish caution of the Chancellor, and of Jlje
young Emperor.

And when Ballin had the Prince cast a glance
over the new harbor of Hamburg, Bismarck him
self felt that a new era had begun which he no
longer thoroughly understood. On that occasion
2 3

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

the Prince remarked, in astonishment, "Another
world, a new world 1"

This point of view also showed itself on the
occasion of the visit of Admiral von Tirpitz at
Friedrichsruh, at the time when he wished to win
the old Imperial Chancellor over to favoring the
first Navy bill.

As for me personally, I have the satisfaction of
recalling that Bismarck intrusted to me in 1886
the very delicate Brest mission, and said of me:
"Some day that man will be his own Chancellor/'
This shows that Bismarck must have had some
belief in me.

I feel no grudge against him for the third
volume of his reminiscences. I released this vol
ume after I had sought and obtained my rights.
To withhold the volume any longer would have
been pointless, since the main contents had become
known already through indiscretions; were this
not true, there might have been -varying opinions
as to the advisability in the choice of the time for
publication. Bismarck would turn over in his
grave if he could know at what time the third
volume appeared, and what consequences it had*
I should be honestly grieved if the third volume
had damaged the memory of the great Chancel
lor, because Bismarck is one of the heroic figures
whom the 'German people need for their regener
ation. My gratitude and reverence for the great
Chancellor cannot be impaired or extinguished
by the third volume nor by anything else
whatever.

BISMARCK

In the first half of the 'eighties I had been sum
moned to the Foreign Office at the behest of Prince
Bismarck; it was then presided over by Count
Herbert Bismarck, Upon reporting myself to the
Prince he gave me a short sketch of the personages
employed at the Foreign Office, and when he
named Herr von Holstein, who was then one of
the most prominent collaborators of the Prince,
it seemed to me that a slight warning against this
man ran through the Prince's words.

I got a room all to myself, and all the docu
ments concerning the preliminary history, origin,
and conclusion of the alliance with Austria (An-
drassy) were laid before me in order that I might
study them. I went often to the home of the
Prince and to that of Count Herbert

THE MAN WITH THE HYENA'S EYES

When I had thus become more intimate in
the Bismarck circle I heard more open talk about
Herr von Holstein. I heard that he was very
clever, a good worker, inordinately proud, an odd
sort of man, who never showed himself anywhere
and had no social relations, full of distrust, much
influenced by whims, and, besides all this, a good
hater, and, therefore, dangerous. Prince Bismarck
called him "The Man with the Hyena's Eyes,"
and told me that it would be well for me to keep
away from him. It was quite apparent that the
bitter attitude which the Prince showed later to
ward Holstein, his former collaborator, was form
ing even at that time.

5

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

The Foreign Office was conducted with the
strictest discipline by Count Herbert, whose rude
ness toward his employees particularly struck me.
The gentlemen there simply flew when they were
summoned or dismissed by the Count, so much so
that a joking saying arose at the time that "their
coat tails stood straight out behind them." The
foreign policy was conducted and dictated by
Prince Bismarck alone, after consultation with
Count Herbert, who passed on the commands of
the Chancellor and had them transformed into
instructions. Hence the Foreign Office was noth
ing but an office of the great Chancellor , where
work was done according to his directions. Able
men, with independent ideas, were not schooled
and trained there.

This was in contrast to the General Staff under
Moltke. There new officers were carefully de
veloped and trained to independent thinking and
action, in accordance with approved principles,
and by dint of preserving old traditions and taking
into account all that modern times had taught
At the Foreign Office there were only executive
instruments of a will, who were not informed as
to the important interrelationship of the questions
turned over to them for treatment, and could not,
therefore, collaborate independently. The Prince
loomed up like a huge block of granite in a
meadow ; were he to be dragged away, what would
be found beneath would be mostly worms and
dead roots.

I won the confidence of the Prince, who con-

6

BISMARCK

suited me about many things. For instance, when
the Prince brought about the first German colonial
acquisitions (Gross and Klein Popo, Togo, etc.),
I informed him, at his wish, concerning the state
of mind created in the public and the navy by this
move, and described to him the enthusiasm with
which the German people had hailed the new
road. The Prince remarked that the matter hardly
deserved this.

Later on I spoke often with the Prince about
the colonial question and always found in him the
intention to utilize the colonies as commercial ob
jects, or objects for swapping purposes, other than
to make them useful to the fatherland or utilize
them as sources of raw materials. As was my duty,
I called the Prince's attention to the fact that mer
chants and capitalists were beginning energet
ically to develop the colonies and that, therefore
as I had learned from Hanseatic circles they
counted upon protection from a navy. For this
reason, I pointed out that steps must be taken for
getting a fleet constructed in time, in order that
German assets in foreign lands should not be with
out protection; that, since the Prince had un
furled the German flag in foreign parts, and the
people stood behind it, there must also be a navy
behind it

BISMARCK'S CONTINENTAL PREPOSSESSIONS

But the Prince turned a deaf ear to my state
ments and made use of his pet motto : "If the Eng
lish should land on our soil I should have them

7

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

arrested." His idea was that the colonies would
be defended by us at home. The Prince attached
no importance to the fact that the very assump
tion that the English could land without opposition
in Germany since Heligoland was English was
unbearable for Germany, and that we, in order
to make a landing impossible from the start,
needed a sufficiently strong navy, and, likewise,
Heligoland.

The political interest of the Prince was, in fact,
concentrated essentially upon continental Europe;
England lay somewhat to one side among the
cares that burdened him daily, all the more so
since Salisbury stood well with him and had, in
the name of England, hailed with satisfaction the
Double (i. e.. Triple) Alliance, at the time of its
formation. The Prince worked primarily with
Russia, Austria, Italy, and Rumania, whose rela
tions toward Germany and one another he con
stantly watched over. As to the prudence and skill
with which he acted, Emperor William the Great
once made a pointed remark to von Albedyll, his
chief of Cabinet.

The General found His Majesty much excited
after a talk with Bismarck, to such an extent that
he feared for the health of the old Emperor, He
remarked, therefore, that His Majesty should
avoid similar worry in future; that, if Bismarck
was uhwilling to do as/His Majesty wished, His
8|Mjld' dismiss him. Whereupon the
replied that, despite hi? admiration and
toward the great Chancellor, he had
8

BISMARCK

already thought of dismissing him, since the self-
conscious attitude of the Prince became at times
too oppressive. But both he and the country
needed Bismarck too badly. Bismarck was the
one man who could juggle five balls of which at
least two were always in the air. That trick,
added the Emperor, was beyond his own powers.

Prince Bismarck did not realize that, through
the acquisition of colonies for Germany, he would
be obliged to look beyond Europe and be auto
matically forced to act, politically, on a large
scale with England especially. England, to be
sure, was one of the five balls in his diplomatic-
statesmanly game, but she was merely one of the
five, and he did not grant her the special impor
tance which was her due.

For this reason it was that the Foreign Office
likewise was involved entirely in the continental
interplay of politics, had not the requisite interest
in colonies, navy, or England, and possessed no
experience in world politics. The English
psychology and mentality, as shown in the
pursuit constant, though concealed by all sorts
of little cloaks of world hegemony, was to the
German Foreign Office a book sealed with seven
seals.

SOURCE OF RUSSIAN ENMITY

Once Prince Bismarck remarked to me that his
main object was to not let Russia and England
come to an understanding. I took the liberty of
observing that the opportunity to postpone such

9

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

an understanding for a long time lay ready to
hand in 1877-78, when the Russians might have
been allowed to occupy Constantinople had this
been done, the English fleet would have sailed in
without further ado to defend Constantinople and
the Russo-English conflict would have been on.
Instead, I continued, the Treaty of San Stefano
was forced upon the Russians and they were com
pelled to turn about at the very gates of the city
which they had reached and saw before them, after
frightful battles and hardships.

This, I went on, had created an inextinguish
able hatred in the Russian army against us (as had
been reported by Prussian officers who had accom
panied the Russian army on the Turkish cam
paign, especially Count Pfeil) ; moreover, the
above-mentioned treaty had been cast aside and
the Berlin Treaty substituted for it, which had
burdened us even more with the hostility of the
Russians, who looked upon us as the enemy of
their "just interests in the East" Thus the con
flict between Russia and England, which the
Prince desired, had been relegated far into the
future.

Prince Bismarck did not agree with this judg
ment of "his" Congress, concerning the results of
which he, as the "honest broker," was so proud ;
he remarked earnestly that he had wished to pre
vent a general conflagration and hacj been com
pelled to offer his services as a mediator. When
I, later on, told a gentleman at the Foreign Office
about this conversation, he replied that he had

10

BISMARCK

been present when the Prince, after signing the
Berlin Treaty, came into the Foreign Office and
received the congratulations of the officials assem
bled there. After he had listened to them the
Prince stood up and replied: "Now I am driving
Europe four-in-hand!" In the opinion of the said
gentleman the Prince was mistaken in this, since,
even at that time, there was the threat of a Russo-
French friendship in place of the Russo-Prussian
in other words, two horses were already to be
counted out of the four-in-hand. As Russia saw
it, Disraeli's statecraft had turned Bismarck's work
as "honest broker" into the negotiation of an
Anglo-Austrian victory over Russia.

Despite considerable differences in our opinions,
Prince Bismarck remained friendly and kindly
disposed to me, and, despite the great difference in
our ages, a pleasant relationship grew up between
us, since I, in common with all those of my gener
ation, was an ardent admirer of the Prince and
had won his trust by my zeal and frankness nor
have I ever betrayed that trust

During the time of my assignment at the Foreign
Office, Privy Councilor Raschdau, among others,
discoursed with me on commercial policy, colonies,
etc. In these matters, even at that early date, my
attention was called to our dependence upon Eng
land, due to the fact that we had no navy and that
Heligoland was in English hands. To be sure,
there was a project to extend our colonial posses
sions under the pressure of necessity, but all this
could happen only with England's permission.

ii

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

This was a serious matter, and certainly an un
worthy position for Germany.

INTERCOURT POLITICS

My assignment at the Foreign Office brought
a very unpleasant happening in its wake. My
parents were not very friendly toward Prince Bis
marck and looked with disfavor upon the fact that
their son had entered into the Prince's circle.
There was fear of my becoming influenced against
my parents, of superconservatism, of all sorts of
perils, which all sorts of tale bearers from Eng
land and "liberal circles," who rallied around my
father, imputed against me. I never bothered my
head with all this nonsense, but my position in the
house of my parents was rendered much more diffi
cult for me and, at times, painful. Through my
work under Prince Bismarck and the confidence
reposed in rne often subjected to the severest tests
I have had to suffer much in silence for the sake
of the Chancellor; he, however, apparently took
this quite as a matter of course.

I was on good terms with Count Herbert Bis
marck. He could be a very gay companion and
knew how to assemble interesting men around his
table, partly from the Foreign Office, partly from
other circles. However, true friendship never
ripened between us two. This was shown particu
larly whet* the Count asked to go at the same
time that his father retired. My request that he
stay by me and help me to maintain tradition in
our political policy elicited the sharp reply that

12

BISMARCK

he had beconje accustomed to report to his father
and serve him, wherefore it was out of the ques
tion to demand that he come, with his dispatch
case under his arm, to report to anybody else than
his father.

When Tsar Nicholas II, he who has been mur
dered, came of age, I was assigned at the instiga
tion of Prince Bismarck to confer upon the heir-
apparent at St Petersburg the Order of the Black
Eagle. Both the Emperor and Prince Bismarck
instructed me concerning the relationship of the
two countries and the two reigning dynasties with
each other, as well as concerning customs, person
ages, etc. The Emperor remarked in conclusion
that he would give his grandson the same piece of
advice that was given him, on the occasion of his
first visit as a young man to Russia, by Count
Adlerberg, viz., "In general, there as well as else
where, people prefer praise to criticism." Prince
Bismarck closed his remarks with these words:
"In the East, all those who wear their shirts outside
their trousers are decent people, but as soon as they
tuck their shirts inside their trousers and hang a
medal around their necks, they become pig-dogs."

From St Petersburg I repeatedly reported to
my grandfather and to Prince Bismarck. Natu
rally, I described, to the best of my knowledge, the
impressions which I got I noticed especially that
the old Russo-Prussian relations and sentiments
had cooled to a marked extent and were no longer
such as the Emperor and Prince Bismarck in their
talks with me had assumed. After my return, both

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

my grandfather and the Prince praised me for my
plain, clear report, which was all the pleasanter
for me since I was oppressed by the feeling that,
in a number of things, I had been forced to dis
illusion these high personages.

TO OFFER DARDANELLES TO RUSSIA

In 1886, at the end of August and beginning of
September, after the last meeting at Gastein of
Emperor William the Great and Prince Bismarck
with Emperor Franz Josef, where I also was pres
ent at the command of my grandfather, I was
commissioned to report personally to Tsar Alex
ander II concerning the decisions made there and
to take up with him the questions relating to the
Mediterranean and Turkey. Prince Bismarck
gave me his instructions, sanctioned by Emperor
William; they dealt most especially with Rus
sia's desire to reach Constantinople, to which the
Prince meant to raise no obstacles. On the con
trary, I received direct instructions to offer Russia
Constantinople and the Dardanelles (in other
words, San Stef ano and the Berlin Treaty had been
dropped!) . There was a plan to persuade Turkey
in a friendly way that an understanding with Rus
sia was desirable for her also.

The Tsar received me cordially at Brest-Litovsk
and I was present there at reviews of troops and
fortress and defensive maneuvers, which, even
then, unquestionably bore an anti-German look.

To sum up my conversations with the Tsar, the
following remark by him is of importance: "If

14

BISMARCK

I wish to have Constantinople, I shall take it when
ever I feel like it, without need of permission or
approval from Prince Bismarck." After this hide
refusal of the Bismarck offer of Constantinople,
I looked upon my mission as a failure and made
my report to the Prince accordingly.

When the Prince decided to make his offer to
the Tsar, he must have altered his political con
ceptions which had led to San Stefano and the
Congress of Berlin; or else, on account of the
development of the general political situation in
Europe, he considered that the moment had come
for shuffling the political cards in another way or,
as my grandfather had put it, to "juggle" differ
ently. Only a man of the world importance and
diplomatic ability of Prince Bismarck could em
bark on such a course. Whether the Prince had
planned his big political game with Russia in such
a way that he might, first, by means of the Con
gress of Berlin, prevent a general war and cajole
England, and then, after having thus hindered
Russia's Eastern aspirations, cater to these aspira
tions later, by a stroke of genius, in an even more
striking manner, it is impossible for me to say
Prince Bismarck never told anyone about his great
political projects.

If the above is true, Bismarck, trusting abso
lutely to his statesmanlike skill, must have reck
oned upon bringing Germany all the more into
Russian favor because Russian aspirations were
brcmght to fulfillment by Germany alone and
that at a moment when the general European polit-

u

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ical situation was less strained than in 1877-78.
In this case, nobody except Prince Bismarck could
have played the tremendous game to a successful
end. And therein lies the weakness in the superi
ority of great men. Had he also informed Eng
land of his offer to the Tsar? England must have
been opposed to it, as in 1878.

In any event, the Prince now adopted the policy
which I had already noted when I realized the dis
illusion of the Russians at having stood before the
gates of Constantinople without being allowed to
enter.

PROPHECY OP RUSSIAN DOWNFALL

At Brest-Litovsk, in the course of the constant
military preparations of all kinds, I could easily
see that the conduct of the Russian officers toward
me was essentially cooler and haughtier than on
the occasion of my first visit to St. Petersburg.
Only the small group of old generals, especially
those at the Russian court, who dated from the
days of Alexander II, and who knew and esteemed
Emperor William the Great, still showed their
reverence for him and their friendly feeling to
ward Germany. In the course of a talk with one
of them concerning the relations between the two
courts, armies, and countries, which I had found
undergoing a change in comparison with former
times, the old General said : "C'est ce vilain con-
gres de Berlin. Une grave f aute du Chancelier.
II a detniit Fancienne amitie entre nous, plante la
mefiance dans les cceurs de la Cour et du Gou-
vernement, et fourni le sentiment d'un grave tort

16

BISMARCK

fait a 1'armee russe apres sa campagne sanglante de
1877, pour lequel elle vout sa revanche. Et nous
voila ensemble avec cette maudite Republique
Frangaise, pleins de haine contre vous et rempli
1'idees subversives, qui en cas de guerre avec vous,
lous couteront notre dynastie." *

A prophetic foreshadowing of the downfall of
the reigning Russian dynasty I

From Brest I went to Strassburg, where my
grandfather was attending the Imperial maneu
vers. In spite of the failure of my mission I found
calm judgments of the political situation. My
grandfather was pleased at the cordial greetings
from the Tsar, which, in so far as the personal
relationship of the two rulers was concerned,
showed no change of heart Also, to my surprise,
I received a letter from Prince Bismarck wherein
he expressed gratitude and appreciation to me for
my actions and my report. This meant all the
more since my statements could not have been
agreeable to my grandfather and the Chancellor.
The Congress of Berlin had, especially in Russian
military circles, done away with the remnants of
the brotherhood in arms still fostered among us
and had engendered a hatred against everything
Prussian and German, stirred up by association

* *lt Is that confounded Congress of Berlin. A serious mistake on
the part of the Chancellor. He has destroyed the old friendship
between us, sown distrust in the hearts of the Court and the Govern
ment, and engendered the idea of a great injustice done the Russian
army after its Woody 1877 campaign, for which it wishes revenge.
And &ere we are by the side of that damned French Republic, full
of hate for you and of subversive ideas, which, in case of a war
against you, will coat us our dynasty,"

17

THE KAISER'S MEMU1K3

with French officers, which was increased by the
French until it developed into the desire of ven
geance by means of arms. That was the soil in
which, later, the World War ambitions of our
foes found nourishment "Revanche pour Sedan,"
combined with "Revanche pour San Stefano."
The words of the old General at Brest have re
mained unforgettably engraved upon my memory ;
they induced me to bring about my many meetings
with Alexander III and Nicholas II, at which my
grandfather's wish, impressed upon me on his
deathbed, that I watch over our relations with
Russia, has always been my guiding motive.

RELIEF AT CHANCELLOR'S DISMISSAL

In 1890, at the Narva maneuvers, I was obliged
to describe minutely to the Tsar the retirement of
Prince Bismarck. The Tsar listened very atten
tively. When I had finished, the usually very cool
and reserved sovereign, who seldom spoke about
politics, spontaneously seized my hand, thanked me
for this token of my confidence, regretted that I
had been brought into such a situation and added,
in exactly these words: "Je comprends parfaite-
ment ta ligne d'action; le Prince avec toute sa
grandeur n'etait apres tout rien d'autre que ton
employe ou fonctionnaire. Le moment ou il re-
fusait d'agir selon tes ordres, il f allait le renvoyer.
Moi pour ma part je me suis toujours mefie de lui,
at je ne lui ai jarnais cru un mot de ce qu'il f aisait
savoir ou me disait lui-meme, car j'etais sur et
savais qu'il me blaguait tout le temps. Pour les

18

BISMARCK

rapports entre nous deux, mon chcr Guillaume
[this was the first time that the Tsar so addressed
me], la chute du Prince aura les meilleures con
sequences, la mefiance disparaitra. J'ai confidance
en toi. Tu peux te fier a moi." *

I immediately wrote down this important talk
at the time it occurred. I am objective enough to
ask myself to what extent the courtesy of one ruler
to another and possibly, in addition, the satisfac
tion at the elimination of a statesman of Bismarck's
importance, can have influenced the Tsar, con
sciously or unconsciously, in making the above-
mentioned statement Prince Bismarck's belief in
the Tsar's trust in him was, subjectively, undoubt
edly genuine; and, moreover, there can be no
doubt as to the esteem in which Alexander III
held Bismarck's ability as a statesman.

In any even, the Tsar remained true to his word
up to the day of his death. This, to be sure, did
little to change Russia's general policy, but Ger
many, at least, was safe from an attack from that
quarter. The straightforward character of Alex
ander III guaranteed this it became otherwise
under his weak son.

Whatever one's attitude may be toward Bis-

1 "I understand perfectly your line of action ; the J*rince, with all
his greatness, was, after all, merely your employee or official. As
soon as he refused to follow your orders, it was necessary to dismiss
him. As for me, I always distrusted him, and I never believed a
word of what he had told me or said to me himself, for I was
sure and knew that he was hoaxing me all the time. As to the rela
tions between us two, my dear William, the downfall of the Prince
will have the best of results; distrust will disappear. I have con
fidence in you. You can trust me,"
3 19

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

marck's Russian policy, one thing must be ac
knowledged: the Prince, despite the Congress of
Berlin and the rapprochement of France to Rus
sia, was able to avoid serious friction. That is
equivalent to saying that, reckoning from the time
of the Berlin Congress, he played a superior diplo
matic and statesmanlike game for twelve years
(1878-90).

GERMANY AS PEACEMAKER

One must also lay stress upon the fact that it was
a German statesman who, in 1878, prevented a
general war, even at the cost of weakening the
relations of Germany to Russia, in the justified
belief that he would succeed, being a statesman
of genius who knew exactly what he was aiming
at, in strengthening these relations once more, or,
at least, in avoiding conflicts after he had over
come the crisis threatening all Europe.

He succeeded in doing that for twelve years
and his successors at the helm of the ship of state
succeeded in doing likewise for twenty-four more
years.

When I was a Prince I purposely held aloof
from party politics, concentrating my entire atten
tion upon my duties in the different army branches
to which I was assigned. This afforded me satis
faction and filled up my whole life. For this
reason I avoided, while I was Prince of Prussia,
all attempts to drag me into party activities. Of tea
enough endeavors were made, under the cloak of
harmless functions, teas and the like, to ensnare

20

BISMARCK

me into political circles or for electioneering pur
poses. But I always held aloof.

The outcome of the treacherous malady which
killed Emperor Frederick III was frankly told
me in advance by German physicians called into
consultation as experts by the English physician,
Sir Morell Mackenzie. My deep grief and sor
row were all the greater because it was almost
impossible for me to speak alone with my beloved
father. He was guarded like a prisoner by the
English physicians and, though reporters from all
countries could look upon the poor sick man from
the physicians' room, every kind of obstacle was
placed in my path to keep me from my father's side
and even to prevent me from keeping in constant
touch with him by writing; my letters were often
intercepted and not delivered. Moreover, from
among the group of watchers, an infamous, organ
ized compaign of slander was conducted in the
newspapers against me. Two journalists were
especially active in this: one Herr Schnidrowitz
and M. Jacques St. Cere, of the Figaro % Ger
man Jew who slandered him who was later
Emperor in the most poisonous way in France,
until the "Petit Sucrier" trial put an end to his
activities,

I gave the dying Emperor his last joy on earth
when I had the Second Infantry Brigade march
past him, led by me in person. These were the
first and last troops seen by Frederick III as Em
peror. He delighted his son by writing on this
occasion, on a little card, that he was grateful for

21

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

having had the pleasure of seeing these troops and
proud to call them his own. This event was a ray
of light during the gloomy ninety-nine days, which
brought upon me also, as Crown Prince, much
grief, humiliation, and suspicion. In fulfillment
of my duty during this crisis, I kept a watchful
eye upon all happenings in military, official, and
social circles, and was inwardly outraged at the
signs of slackness which I noted everywhere, most
especially at the hostility against my mother, which
was becoming more and more noticeable. More
over, I was naturally deeply hurt at the constant
campaign of slander directed against me which
depicted me as living in discord with my father,

HE BECOMES EMPEROR

After Emperor Frederick III had closed his
eyes forever, the heavy burden of governing the
Empire fell upon my youthful shoulders. First of
all I was confronted with the necessity of making
changes in the government personnel in various
quarters. The military entourage of the two em
perors, as well as the body of officialdom, had
grown too old. The so-called "maison militaire"
(military household of Emperor William the
Great) had been retained in its entirety by Em
peror Frederick III, without being required to
discharge military duties. In addition, there was
the entourage of Emperor Frederick IIL I pro
ceeded to dismiss, in the friendliest way, all those
gentlemen who wished to go into retirement ; some
of than received positions in the army, a few of

22

BISMARCK

the younger remained in my service for the tran
sition period.

During the ninety-nine days, while I was still
Crown Prince, I had silently concerned myself
with those personages to whom I proposed later
to give appointments, since the physicians had left
me no doubt that my father had only a short time
to live. I ignored court or external considera
tions; nothing but previous achievements and
character moved me to my choice. I did away with
the term "maison militaire" and transformed it
into "Main Headquarters of His Majesty." In
choosing my entourage I took the advice of only
one man in whom I reposed special confidence,
my former chief and brigade commander, Gen
eral afterward Adjutant General von Versen, a
man of straightforward, knightly, rather harsh
character, an officer of the old Prussian school, a
typical chip of the old block. During his military
service in line and guard regiments he had noted
with an observing eye the court influences and ten
dencies which had often worked to the disadvan
tage of the officer corps in the old "maison
militaire." In this direction the circle of ladies
of high position, jokingly known among the officers
as "trente et quarante" on account of their age,
also played a certain part. I wished to eliminate
such influences.

I appointed General von Wittich my First
Adjutant General and General von Hahnke, com
mander of the Second Infantry Guard Division,
chief of my Military Cabinet The latter was a

23

THE RAISER'S MEMOIRS

friend of Emperor Frederick III and, while I was
still serving with the First Infantry Guard Regi
ment, he was my brigade commander. These two
were men of military experience and iron prin<
ciples, who shared absolutely the sentiments of
their master, and remained bound to me to the end
of their lives by the most exemplary fidelity.

As the head of my court I appointed a man
known to me from his youth, the former Court
Marshal of my father, Count August Eulenburg,
who remained at the head of the Ministry of the
Royal House until his death in June, 1921, at the
age of eighty-two years. He was a man of fine
tact, uncommon ability, clear insight in court as
well as political matters, sincere character, and
golden fidelity to his King and his King's family.
His manifold abilities would have enabled him,
to the same degree that they had made him known
as Court Marshal throughout Europe, to act with
equal success as ambassador or as Imperial Chan*
cellor. Working with unswerving zeal, endowed
with winning politeness, he stood by me with help
ful counsel in many matters dynastic, family,
court, public life. He had to do with many
men, in all social strata and all walks of life,
by all of whom he was revered and esteemed,
and he was treated by me likewise with friend
ship and gratitude.

VICTORIA'S HAND IS FELT

After consultation with Priace Bismarck, Herr
von Lucanus from the Ministry of Public Worship

24

BISMARCK

and Instruction, was appointed chief of the Civil
Cabinet Prince Bismarck observed jokingly that
he was pleased with this choice, since Herr von
Lucanus was known to him as an able and enthusi
astic huntsman, which was always a good recom
mendation for a civilian official; he added that a
good huntsman was a regular good fellow. Herr
von Lucanus took over his post from His Excel
lency von Wilmowski. He discharged his duties
admirably and, being well endowed in all per
taining to art, technical matters, science, and pol
itics, he was to me a counselor, untiring collabo
rator, and friend. He combined with a healthy
knowledge of men a strong dash of refined humor,
which is so often lacking in men of the Germanic
race.

With Prince Bismarck I had stood on very good
and trustful terms ever since my assignment at
the Foreign Office. Then, as well as before, I
revered the powerful Chancellor with all the
ardor of my youth and was proud to have served
under him and to have the opportunity now to
work with him as my Chancellor.

The Prince, who was present during the last
hours of the old Emperor and had listened with
me to the latter's political testament to his grand
son L e., his wish as -to the special care to be
lavished upon relations with Russia brought
about my summer trip to St. Petersburg as my
first political act before the eyes of the world, in
order to emphasize our relationship to Russia in
accordance with the last wish of my dying grand-

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

father. He also had "travel arrangements" drawn
up for me.

An obstacle was placed in the way of carrying
out this plan by a letter from Queen Victoria of
England, who, upon hearing of the projected visit
to St. Petersburg, expressed to her eldest grand
son, in a good-humored but authoritative tone, her
disapproval of the contemplated journey. She
said that a year of mourning must first elapse, after
which my first visit was due to her, since she was
my grandmother, and to England, it being the
native country of my mother, before other lands
should be considered. When I placed this letter
before the Prince, he gave way to a violent fit of
anger. He spoke about "family dictation in Eng
land," of interference from that quarter which
must cease; the tone of the letter showed, he said,
how the Crown Prince and Emperor Frederick
had been ordered about and influenced by his
mother-in-law, wife, etc. Thereupon the Prince
wished to draw up the text of a reply to the Queen.
I remarked that I would prepare the appropriate
answer, steering the proper middle course between
the grandson and the Emperor, and that I would
show it to the Prince before dispatching it

The answer paid heed in its outward form to the
close relationship between a grandson and his
grandmother, who had carried him in her arms
when he was a baby and, in view of her age alone,
commanded great respect but, in its essentials,
it laid stress upon the position and duty of the
German Emperor, compelled to carry out uncon-

26

BISMARCK

ditionally a command of his dying father affecting
Germany's most vital interests. It stated that the
grandson was obliged to respect this command of
his grandfather in the interest of the country, the
representation of which interests had now devolved
upon him by the will of God, and that his royal
grandmother must leave to him the question of
deciding in what manner this was to be done. I
added that, otherwise, I was her loving grandson,
who would always be grateful for any advice from
his grandmother, who had derived so much ex
perience from her long reign; but that I was,
nevertheless, in matters affecting Germany, com
pelled to retain my freedom of action ; the visit to
St. Petersburg, I said, was politically necessary,
and the command of my Imperial grandfather was
consonant with the close family relations between
me and the Russian Imperial house ; therefore it
would be carrkd out

The Prince approved of the letter. The answer,
which arrived after a while, was surprising. The
Queen agreed that her grandson was in the right;
he must act in accordance with the interests of his
country; she would be glad to see him, even if it
were later on, at her own home. From that day
onward my relations with the Queen, who was
feared even by her own children, were of the best
imaginable; from that day onward she never
treated her grandson except as a sovereign of equal
rank with herself 1

On my first journeys I was accompanied by
Count Herbert, as the representative of the For
ay

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

eign Office. He drew up the speeches and con
ducted the political conferences, in so far as they
were of an official nature, in accordance with the
instructions of his father.

CONFLICT ON TURKISH POLICY

Upon my return from Constantinople in 1889
I described to the Prince at his request my impres
sions of Greece, where my sister Sophie was mar
ried to the heir-apparent. Crown Prince Constan-
tine, and also my Constantinople impressions. In
doing this, it struck me that Prince Bismarck spoke
quite disdainfully of Turkey, of the men in high
position there, and of conditions in that land. I
thought I might inspire him in part with essen
tially more favorable opinions, but my efforts
were of little avail. Upon asking the Prince the
reason why he held such an unfavorable opinion,
he answered that Count Herbert had reported very
disapprovingly on Turkey. Prince Bismarck and
Count Herbert were never favorably inclined to
ward Turkey and they never agreed with me in
my Turkish policy the old policy of Frederick
the Great

During the last period of his tenure of office as
Chancellor, Bismarck declared that the mainte
nance of friendly relations with Russia, whose Tsar
reposed special trust in him, was the most impor
tant reason for his remaining at his post. In this
connection it was that he gave me the first hints
coi*ceramg tfee secret reinsurance treaty with Rus
sia. Up to then I had heard nothing about it,

BISMARCK

cither from the Prince or the Foreign Office,
although it happened that I had concerned myself
especially with Russian matters.

When I assumed the reins of government owing
to the early death of my father, the generation of
the grandson, as I have already remarked, fol
lowed upon the generation of the grandfather,
which meant that the entire generation of Emperor
Frederick was overleaped. This generation,
through its dealings with Crown Prince Frederick
William, was imbued with many liberal ideas
and projects of reform which were to be carried
out under the direction of the Emperor Frederick.
Upon his death, this entire generation, especially
the politicians, found itself deceived in its hopes
of exerting influence, and felt itself, to a certain
extent, in the position of an orphan. Those be
longing to it, despite the fact that they did not
know my inner thoughts and aims, adopted a dis
trustful and reserved attitude toward me, instead
of transferring their interest from the father to the
son, for the purpose of furthering the welfare of
the fatherland.

There was one exception to this a representa
tive of the National Liberals, Herr von Benda
a man still in the full bloom of youth. While I
was still Prince I had made his acquaintance at the
great hare hunts got up by Councilor Dietze at
Barby. There Herr von Benda had won my affec
tion and confidence when I, surrounded by older
men, had listened to discussions on political, agri
cultural, and national-economic questions. In the

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

course of thetc, Herr von Benda held my attention
by means of his independent, interesting judgment
I accepted with pleasure an invitation to Benda's
country seat, Rudow, near Berlin, and from this
arose the custom of a regular yearly visit

The hours spent in the family circle at Rudow
stand out pleasantly in my memory. His talented
daughters used to regale us with music. The polit
ical conversations there proved Herr von Benda
to be a man of great foresight, which, free from
partisan considerations, gave him an open mind
as to the general needs of the state to an extent
seldom found among members of political parties.
He gave me many a helpful piece of advice for
the future, drawn from the depths of his faithful,
genuinely Prussian heart, by which he was attached
firmly to the family of his sovereign ; yet he was
able to feel broad tolerance for other parties.

HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD PARTIES

The later periods of my reign proved that I was
not hostile to any party, with the exception of the
Ultra-Socialists; also, that I was not anti-LiberaL
My most important Finance Minister was the
Liberal, Miquel; my Minister of Commerce was
the Liberal, Moeller; the leader of the Liberals,
Herr von Benaigsen, was Chief President of Han
over. I stood very close, especially in the second
half of my reign, to an elderly Liberal deputy,
whose acquaintance I made through Herr von
MiqueL This man was Herr Seydel (Celchen),
owner of an estate in eastern Germany a man

30

BISMARCK

with two clever eyes, which gazed forth from a
clean-shaven face. He worked with Miquel in
railway and canal questions, and was a thoroughly
able, simple, practical man a Liberal with a
streak of conservatism.

Naturally, I had numerous dealings and points
of contact with the Conservative party, since the
gentlemen of the country nobility often met me at
court hunts and other hunts, or else came to court
and served in court positions. Through them I
could become thoroughly informed on all agra
rian questions and learn where the fanner's shoe
pinched him.

The Free Thinkers, under the "unswerving"
leader, entered into no relations with me ; they lim
ited themselves to opposition.

In my conversations with Benda and Bennigsen
we of ten spoke of the future of Liberalism, and,
on one occasion, Benda made this interesting ob
servation : "It is not necessary and also not advis
able to have the Prussian heir-apparent dabble in
Liberalism we have no use for that sort of thing.
He must be essentially conservative, though he
must, at the same time, combine this with breadth,
and avoid narrowness and prejudice against other
parties."

Bennigsen agreed with me when I spoke to him
of the necessity of having the National Liberals
revise their program, which originally bearing
the motto: "Maintenance of the German Empire
and Freedom of the Press" had long since rallied
the members around the Liberal banner -in order

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

that, by such revision, the proselytizing power of
the old brand of Prussian Liberalism should not
be lost among the people. Both the Prussian
Liberals and the Conservatives, I continued, made
the mistake of remembering too well the old
period of conflict of 1 861-66; and, at elections
and other political fights, they were prone to fall
back into the habits of those days. That period,
I said, had already passed into history and come
to an end so far as our generation was concerned;
the present had begun for us with the year 1870
and the new Empire; our generation had drawn
a line under the year 1866; we must build anew
upon the foundations of the Empire; political
parties must shape their course also in this direc
tion and not take over from the past stuff that was
outworn and, moreover, calculated to create dis
cord. Unfortunately, all this has not come to
pass. Bennigsen made a very telling point when
he said : "Woe to the North German Liberals if
they come under the leadership of the South Ger
man Democrats, for that will mean the end of
real, genuine Liberalism! Then we shall get the
masked democracy arising from below, for which
we have no use hereabout 1 '

The Conservative party, honorable and faith
ful to its King, unfortunately has not always pro
duced leaders of superior endowments who were
at the same time skillful, tactically trained poli
ticians. The agrarian wing was at times too
strongly marked and was a burden to ,the party.
Moreover, memories of the period of conflict were

32

BISMARCK

still too lively. I counseled union with the Lib
erals, but found little support. I often pointed
out that the National Liberals in the Empire were
true to the Empire and to the Emperor, for which
reason they should be thoroughly welcome to the
Conservatives as allies; that I could not and did
not wish to govern without them in the Em
pire, and was absolutely unwilling to govern
against them; that North German conserva
tism was misunderstood in some parts of the
Empire because of differences in historical de
velopment; and that, therefore, the National
Liberals were the natural allies. It was owing to
these vitews of mine, for instance, that I removed
Court Preacher Stocker, a man of brilliant
achievement as a social missionary, from his post,
since he made a demagogical provocative speech
in South Germany, aimed against the Liberals
there.

The Center party was welded together by the
"Kulturkampf" and was strongly anti-Protestant
and hostile to the Empire. Notwithstanding this,
I had dealings with many important men of the
party and managed to interest them in practical
collaboration for the good of all. In this Schor-
lerner (the father) was especially helpful to me.
He never made a secret of his Prussian loyalty to
his King. His son, the well-known Minister of
Agriculture, even joined the Conservative party.
In many matters the Center co-operated; at one
period it possessed in its old leader, Wiadthorst,
the keenest politician in the legislature. Never-

33

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

thclcas, in spite of all this, one could not help
being aware of the underlying Centerist conviction
that the interests of the Roman Church must
always be maintained and never relegated to a
secondary place.

THE BREAK WITH BISMARCK

When I was Prince William I was placed for
a long time under the Chief President of the
Province of Brandenburg, von Achenbach, in
order that I might learn about home administra
tion, get experience in economic questions, and,
moreover, take an active part in the work.
Spurred on by the captivating discourses of Achen
bach, I derived from this period of my life a
special interest in the economic side of the inner
development of the country, whereas the purely
judicial side of the administration interested me
to a lesser degree. Improvements, canal construc
tion, highway building, forestry, improvement in
all kinds of transportation facilities, betterment
of dwellings, introduction of machines into agri
culture and their co-operative development all
of these were matters with which I busied myself
later on; this being especially true of hydraulic
work and the development of the network of rail
ways, particularly in the badly neglected territory
of Eastern Germany.

I discussed all these matters with the Ministers
of State after I had ascended the throne. In order
to spur them on, I allowed them free rein in their
various domains. But it turned out that this was

34

BISMARCK

hardly possible so long as Prince Bismarck re
mained in office, since he reserved for himself the
main deciding voice in everything, thereby im
pairing the independence of those working with
him. I soon saw that the Ministers, being entirely
under Bismarck's thumb, could not come out in
favor of "innovations" or ideas of the "young
master" of which Bismarck disapproved.

The Ministry, in short, was nothing but a tool
in the hands of Bismarck, acting solely in accord
ance with his wishes. This state of things was, in
itself, natural enough, since a Premier of such
overwhelming importance, who had won for Prus
sia and Germany such great political victories,
naturally dominated his Ministers completely and
led them despotically. Nevertheless, I found my
self in a difficult position; the typical answer with
which my suggestions were met was: "Prince
Bismarck does not want that done; we cannot get
him to consent to that; Emperor William I would
not have asked such a thing; that is not in accord
ance with tradition, etc." I understood more and
more that, in reality, I had no Ministry of State
at my disposal ; that the gentlemen composing it,
from long force of habit, considered themselves
officials of Prince Bismarck.

Here is an example to show the attitude of the
Cabinet toward me in those Bismarck days: The
question came up of renewing the Socialist law,
a political measure devised by Prince Bismarck
for fighting socialism. A certain paragraph therein
was to be toned down, in order to save the law,

* 35

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Bismarck opposed the change. There were sharp
differences of opinion. I summoned a Crown
Council. Bismarck spoke in the antechamber
with my adjutant; he declared that His Majesty
completely forgot that he was an officer and wore
a sword belt; that he must fall back upon the
army and lead it against the Socialists, in case the
Socialists should resort to revolutionary measures ;
that the Emperor should leave him a free hand,
which would restore quiet once for all. At the
Crown Council Bismarck stuck to his opinion.
The individual Ministers, when asked to express
their views, were lukewarm. A vote was taken
the entire Ministry voted against me.

This vote showed me once more the absolute
domination exerted by the Chancellor over his
Ministers. Deeply dissatisfied, I talked over the
matter with His Excellency Lucanus, who was as
much struck as I was by the situation. Lucanus
looked up some of the gentlemen and took them
to task for their attitude, whereupon they made it
clear that they were "not in a position" to oppose
the Prince and declared that it was quite impos
sible for anybody to expect them to vote against
the wishes of the Prince.

HANDLING A COAL STJUKE

The great Westphalian coal workers* strike in
the spring of 1889 took the civil administration
by surprise, causing great confusion and bewilder
ment, especially among members of the Westpha-
pfcrtrineial administration. From all sides
36

BISMARCK

came calls for troops ; every mine owner wanted,
if possible, to have sentries posted outside his room.
The commanders of the troops which were sum
moned immediately made reports on the situation
as they had found it

Among these was one of my former barrack
comrades, belonging to the Hussar Guard Regi
ment, ron Michaelis by name, who was famous as
a wit He rode, alone and unarmed, among the
striking crowds of workers, who the early spring
being remarkably warm were camped upon the
hillsides, and soon managed, by his confidence-
inspiring, jovial ways, to set up a harmless inter
course with the strikers. By questioning them he
obtained much valuable information about the
grievances real and imaginary of the workers,
as well as about their plans, hopes, and wishes for
the future. He soon won for himself general ap
preciation and affection among the workers and
handled them so well that complete quiet reigned
in his territory. When I, on account of nervous
and worried telegrams from the big industrial
leadefs and officials received at the office of the
Imperial Chancellor, inquired of Michaelis how
the situation stood, the following telegraphed an
swer came from him: "Everything quiet except
ing the Government officials."

A mass of material was collected, during the
spring and summer, from the announcements and
reports received which showed clearly that all was
not well in industrial- circled; that many a wish
of the workers was justified ajid, to say the least,

37

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

entitled to sympathetic investigation on the part
both of the employers and of the officials. The
realization of this, which was confirmed in me when
I questioned my former private teacher, Privy
Councilor Dr. Hinzpeter a man particularly
well informed on social phenomena, especially
those in his own province caused the resolve to
ripen in me to summon the State Council, include
employers and employees in its deliberations, and
bring about, under my personal direction, a thor
ough investigation of the labor question. I decided
that in so doing guiding principles and material
were to be acquired which would serve the Chan
cellor and the Prussian Government as a basis for
working out appropriate projects for new laws.

Inspired by such thought I went to His Excel
lency von Botticher, who at once prophesied op
position on the part of the Chancellor to such
action, and advised strongly against it I stuck
to my ideas, adducing in support of them the
maxim of Frederick the Great: "Je veux etre un
Roi des gueux" ("I wish to be King of the rab
ble"). I said that it was my duty to take care of
those Germans who were used up by industry, to
protect their strength and better their chances of
existence.

FURTHER CONFLICT WITH CHANCELLOR

The predicted opposition from Prince Bismarck
was not long in coming. There was much trouble
and fighting before I put through whaH wanted,
owing to the fact that some of the big industrial

3*

BISMARCK

interests ranged themselves on the side of the Chan
cellor. The State Council met, presided over by
me. At the opening session the Chancellor unex
pectedly appeared. He made a speech in which
he ironically criticized and disapproved the whole
undertaking set in motion by me, and refused his
co-operation. Thereupon he walked out of the
room.

After his departure the strange scene had its
effect on the assemblage. The fury and ruthless-
ness which the great Chancellor brought to the
support of his own policy and against mine, based
upon his absolute belief in the correctness of his
own judgment, made a tremendous impression
upon me and all those present. Neverthless, it
stood to reason that I was deeply hurt by what had
occurred. The assemblage proceeded to take up
its work again and turned out a wealth of material
for the extension of that social legislation called
into being by Emperor William the Great, which
is the pride of Germany, evincing, as it does, a
protective attitude toward the laboring classes such
as is not to be found in any other land on earth.

Thereupon I decided to summon a general social
congress. Prince Bismarck opposed this also.
Switzerland was contemplating something similar,
and had thought of convening a congress at Berne.
Roth, the Swiss ambassador, hearing of my scheme,
advised canceling the invitations to Berne and
accepting an invitation to Berlin. What he wished
occurred. Thanks to the generosity of Herr Roth,
it was possible to convene the congress at Berlin,

39

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

The material collected as a result of it was worked
out and applied in the form of laws only in
Germany, however.

Later on I talked with Bismarck concerning
his project of fighting the socialists, in case they
resorted to revolutionary acts, with cannon and
bayonets. I sought to convince him that it was out
of the question for me, almost immediately after
William the Great had closed his eyes after a
blessed reign, to stain the first years of my Govern
ment with the blood of my own people. Bismarck
was unmoved ; he declared that he would assume
responsibility for his actions; that all I need do
was to leave the thing to him. I answered that I
could not square such a course with my conscience
and my responsibility before God, particularly as
I knew perfectly well that conditions among the
laboring classes were bad and must be bettered at
all costs.

The conflict between the views of the Emperor
and the Chancellor relative to the social question
L e. 9 the furtherance of the welfare of the laboring
classes of the population, with participation therein
by the state was the real cause of the break be
tween us, and caused a hostility toward me, lasting
for years, on the part of Bismarck and a large
part of the German nation that was derotecj to
Mm, especially of the official class.

This conflict between the Chancellor and me
arose became of his belief that the social problem
could be solved by sfevere measures and, if the
worn cpaae to the worst, by means of soldiers ;

40

BISMARCK

not by following principles of general love for
mankind or humanitarian nonsense which, he be
lieved, he would have to adopt in conformity to
my views.

BISMARCK'S LABOR VIEWS

Bismarck was not a foe to the laboring classes
on that I wish to lay stress, in view of what I have
previously said. On the contrary! He was far too
great a statesman to mistake the importance of the
labor question to the state. But he considered the
whole matter from the standpoint of pure expedi
ency for the state. The state, he believed, should
care for the laborer, as much and in whatever
manner it deemed proper ; he would not admit of
any co-operation of the workers in this. Agitation
and rebellion, he believed, should be severely sup
pressed ; by force of arms, if necessary. Govern
ment protection on the one hand, the mailed fist
on the other that was Bismarck's social policy.

I, however, wished to win over the soul of the
German workingman, and I fought zealously to
attain this goal. I was filled with the consqious-
ness of a plain duty and responsibility toward my
entire people also, therefore, toward the labor
ing classes. What was theirs by right and justice
should become theirs, I thought; moreover, I
believed that this should be brought about, wher
ever the will or power of the employers ceased,
by the lord of the land and his Government, in so
far as justice or necessity demanded. As soon as
I had recognized the necessity for reforms, to

41

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

some of which the industrial elements would not
consent, I took up the cudgels for the laboring
classes, impelled by a sense of justice.

I had studied history sufficiently to guard my
self against the delusion of believing in the possi
bility of making an entire people happy. I real
ized clearly that it was impossible for one human
being to make a nation happy. The truth is that
the only nation which is happy is the one that is
contented, or at least is willing to be contented;
a willingness which implies a certain degree of
realization of what is possible a sense of the
practical, in short Unfortunately, there is often
a lack of this.

I was well aware that, in the unbounded de
mands of the Socialist leaders, unjustified greed
would be constantly developed anew. But, for the
very reason that I wished to be able to combat
unjustified aspirations with a clear conscience and
in a convincing way, it behooved me not to deny
recognition and aid to justified aspirations.

GERMAN SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The policy that kept in view the welfare of the
workers unquestionably imposed a heavy burden
upon all the industrial elements of Germany in
the matter of competition in the world market,
through the well-known laws for the protection of
workingmen. This was especially true in relation
to an industrial system lil^e the Belgian, which
could, without hindrance, squeeze the last drop
out of the human reserves of Belgium and pay

4*

BISMARCK

low wages, without feeling any pangs of con
science or compassion for the sinking morale of
the exhausted, unprotected people. By means of
my social legislation I made such conditions im
possible in Germany, and I caused it to be intro
duced also in Belgium, during the war, by General
von Bissing, in order to promote the welfare of the
Belgian workers. First of all, however, this legis
lation is to use a sporting term a handicap upon
German industry in the battle of world competi
tion: it alienated many big leaders of industry,
which, from their point of view, was quite natural.
But the lord of the land must always bear in mind
the welfare of the whole nation ; therefore, I went
my way unswervingly.

Those workers, on the other hand, who blindly
followed the Socialist leaders, gave me no word of
thanks for the protection created for them nor for
the work I had done. Between them and me lies
the motto of the Hohenzollerns, "Suum curque."
That means, "To each his own" not, as the Social
Democrats would have it, "To everyone the samel"

I also harbored the idea of preventing to some
extent competitive warfare, at least in the indus
trial world of the European continent, by bringing
about a sort of quota-fixing in foreign lands,
thereby facilitating production and making possi
ble a healthier mode of life among the working
classes.

There is great significance in the impression
which foreign workers get in studying Germany's
social legislation. A few years before the war peo-

43

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

pie in England, under the pressure of labor trou
bles, awoke to the conviction that better care must
be taken of the workers. As a result of this, com
missions visited Germany, some of them composed
of workingmen. Guided by representative Ger
mans, among them Socialists, they visited the in
dustrial regions, factories, benevolent institutions,
sanatoria of insurance companies, etc., and were
astonished at all the things they saw. At the fare
well dinner given them the English leader of the
workingmen's deputation turned to Bebel and
made this concluding remark:

"After all we have seen of what is done in Ger
many for the workers, I ask you : Are you people
still Socialists?" And the Englishmen remarked
to a German that they would be quite satisfied if
they could succeed, after long fights in Parliament,
in putting through one tenth of what had already
been accomplished years before in Germany to
ward bettering the condition of the laboring
classes.

I had observed with interest these visits of the
English deputations and marveled at their igno
rance of German conditions. But I marveled even
more at a question asked by the English Govern
ment, through the channel of the English Em-
bajssy, on the same subject, which betrayed an abso-
tytely amazing lack of knowledge of the progress
made in Germany in the province of social reform.
I questioned the English ambassador, remarking
tfo^t England, having been represented in 1890 at
the Berlin Social Congress, must certainly have

44

BISMARCK

been informed, at least through the Embassy, of
the Reichstag debates, which had dealt in a de
tailed way with the various social measures. The
ambassador replied that the same thing had also
occurred to him and caused him to have the earlier
records of the Embassy investigated, whereupon it
had transpired that the Embassy had sent the full
est reports on the subject to London and that thor
ough reports had been forwarded home concerning
every important stage in the progress of social re
form; but, "because they came from Germany,
nobody ever read them ; they were simply pigeon
holed and remained there ever since ; it is a down
right shame ; Germany does not interest people at
home/ 5

Thus the Briton, with a shrug of his shoulders.
Neither the British King nor Parliament had
enough conscience or time or desire to work for
the betterment of the working class. The "policy
of encirclement" for the annihilation of Germany,
especially of its industry, and, thereby, of its work
ing population, was, in their eyes, far more im
portant and rewarding. On the 9th of November
(1918) the German Radical Socialist leaders, with
their like-minded followers, joined forces with this
British policy of annihilation.

"WELFARE WORK" AT THE COURT

In a small way, in places where I had influence,
as, for instance, in the administration of my court
and in the Imperial Automobile Club, I laid stress
upon the social point of view. For instance, I

45

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

caused a fund to be established, out of the tips paid
for visiting palaces, which was destined solely to
the benefit of the domestic staff, and which, in the
course of time, reached a magnificent total. From
this fund the domestics and their families received
money for trips to bathing resorts, cost of taking
cures, burial expenses, dowries for their children,
confirmation expenses, and similar payments.

When I, at the request of the newly founded
Imperial Automobile Club, took it under my pro
tection, I accepted an invitation to a luncheon in
the beautiful rooms of the clubhouse, built by
Ihne. In addition to magnates like the Duke of
Ratibor, the Duke of Ujest, etc., I found there a
number of gentlemen from Berlin's high financial
circles, some of whom behaved rather wildly.
When the conversation turned to the subject of
drivers, I suggested establishing a fund which, in
case of accident, illness, or death befalling these
men, should provide means of livelihood for those
whom they left behind. The suggestion met with
unanimous approval, and the fund has had most
excellent results. Later on I brought about the
establishment of something similar for the skip
pers and pilots attached to the Imperial Yacht
Club at Kiel.

Special pleasure was afforded jne by the Kaiser
Wilhelm Children's Home, founded by me at Ahl-
beck, at which, in peace times, between May and
the end of September in each year, a large number
of children from the most poverty-stricken work
ing people's districts in Berlin were acconimo-

46

BISMARCK

dated in successive detachments, each lot staying
four weeks. This home is still under the tried
direction of the admirable superintendent, Miss
Kirschner, daughter of the former Chief Burgo
master of Berlin, and it has achieved most brilliant
results, both in the physical and the psychical
domain. Weakened, pale, needy children were
transformed there into fresh, blooming, happy lit
tle beings, concerning whose welfare I often joy
fully convinced myself by personal visits.

For the very reason that I have spoken of my
quarrel with Bismarck as a result of labor ques
tions, I wish to add to what I have already said
about his basic position in the matter an example
showing how brilliantly the Prince behaved in
something that concerned the workers. In this, to
be sure, he was impelled by nationalistic motives,
but he also realized at once that it was necessary to
protect a large element against unemployment,
which caused him to intervene with the full weight
of his authority.

Sometime around 1886, while I was still Prince
Wilhelm, I had learned that the great Vulcan ship
ping concern at Stettin was confronted, owing to
lack of orders, with bankruptcy, and its entire
force of workmen, numbering many thousands,
with starvation, which would mean a catastrophe
for the city of Stettin. Only by an order for the
building of a big ship could the Vulcan shipyards
be saved.

Spurred on some time before by Admiral von
Stosch, who wished to free us once and for all

47

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

from the English shipbuilders, the Vulcan people
had set to work courageously to build the first Ger
man armored ship, christened by my mother in
1874 on her birthday, on which occasion I was
present. Ever since that time the warships built
at the Vulcan yards had always satisfied naval
experts the concern, however, seldom built
warships.

THE CHANCELLOR IN ACTION

The German merchant marine, on the other
hand, had not dared to follow the path courage
ously blazed by Admiral von Stosch. And now the
brave German shipyard company was faced with
ruin, since the North German Lloyd had refused
its offer to build a passenger steamer, alleging that
the English, because of their years of shipbuilding
traditions, could build it better. It was a serious
emergency. I hastened to Prince Bismarck and
laid before him the matter as I have described it
above.

The Chancellor was furious; his eyes flashed,
his fist came crashing down on the table.

"Whatl Do you mean to say that these shop
keepers would rather have their boats built in Eng
land than in Germany? Why, that is unheard of!
And is a good German shipyard to fail for such a
reason? The devil take this gang of traders!"

He rang the bell and a servant entered.

"Have Privy Councilor X come here immedi
ately from the Foreign Office 1"

In a few minutes during which the Prince

48

BISMARCK

stamped up and down the room the man sum
moned appeared.

"Telegram to Hamburg, to our envoy the
Lloyd in Bremen is to have its new ship built by
the Vulcan Company in Stettin 1"

The Privy Councilor vanished in hot haste,
"with his coat tails sticking straight out behind
him." The Prince turned to me and said: "I am
greatly obliged to you. You have done the father
land, and also myself, an important service.
Henceforth ships will be built only in our yards
I'll take care to make this clear to the Hanseatic
crowd. You may telegraph to the Vulcan people
that the Chancellor will guarantee that the ship
will be built in the Vulcan yards. May this be the
first of a whole lot of such ships ! As for the work-*
ers whom you have thus saved from unemploy
ment, I hope that they will express their thanks to
youl"

I passed on the news to Privy Councilor Schlu-
tow at Stettin and great was the joy caused thereby.
This was the first step upon the road destined t6
lead to the construction of the magnificent Ger
man express steamers.

When I went, after I had ascended the throne
in 1888, to Stettin, in order to place honorary in
signia .on the flags of my Pomeranian Grenadiers,
I also visited the Vulcan shipyards, at the invita
tion of the directors. After my reception by the
directors outside the yards, the great doors were
flung open and I walked inside. But, instead of
work and pounding hammers, I found deep silence.

49

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

The entire body of workmen was standing in a
half circle, with bared heads ; in the middle stood
the oldest workman of all, a man with a snow-
white beard, bearing a laurel wreath in his hand.

I was deeply moved. Schlutow whispered to me :
"A little pleasure for you, which the workmen
themselves have thought up." The old workman
stepped forward and, in pithy, plain words, ex
pressed to me the gratitude of the workmen to me
for having saved them, and, above all, their wives
and children, from hardship and hunger, by my
appeal to Bismarck about the building of the ship.
As a token of their gratitude, he asked my permis
sion to hand over the laurel wreath. Most deeply
moved, I took the wreath and expressed my pleas
ure at receiving my first laurels, without the shed
ding of a drop of blood, from the hands of honest
German workmen.

That was in the year 1888! In those days, the
German laboring classes knew how to appreciate
the blessing of labor.

CHAPTER II

Caprivi

WHEN I began my reign, General von
Caprivi was Chief of the Admiralty. He
was the last general to hold this post I at once
took energetically in hand the development
and reform in fact, one may say the foundation
anew of the Imperial German Navy, based on
my preliminary studies in England and at home.
That was not to the liking of the General, who
was able, but rather self-willed, and not entirely
devoid of pride.

Unquestionably he had rendered valuable serv
ices in mobilization, improvement of the officer
corps, and the improvement and development of
the torpedo-boat organization, On the other hand,
the building of ships and the replacement of worn-
out material were in a deplorable state, to the detri
ment of the fleet and to the dissatisfaction of the
shipbuilding industry, which was growing and
looking about for employment.

Being an old Prussian general, Caprivi's way
of thinking was that of his day that of his com
rades of 1864, 1865, 1870, 1871 in his eyes, the
army had always done everything and would con-
5 51

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

tinue to do so in the future ; theref ore, no great de
mands for money to be devoted to the navy should
be imposed upon the country, since, should this be
done, there was danger that the sums destined to
the army might be decreased and its development
thereby hampered. This idea, from which he was
not to be dissuaded, is false. The amounts granted
did not flow into a reservoir from which they might
be directed, by the mere turning of a valve, now
into army, now into navy, channels. Whenever
Caprivi was unwilling to demand anything for
naval construction, in order, by so doing, to turn
more money toward the army, things did not hap
pen as he foresaw. By his action the army re
ceived not one penny more, but merely whatever
the Minister of War asked for and received in ac
cordance with his budget.

There was need of creating a Secretaryship of
State for the Navy which, entirely independent of
the Ministry of War, should have as its duty to de
mand and obtain for the navy as much as was
required for the protection of our commerce
and colonies. And that is what came to pass
later on.

Caprivi soon came to me with the request that
I relieve him from his post He stated that he was
not satisfied with it in itself ; that, moreover, I had
all sorts of plans for the future affecting the navy
which he considered impossible of realization, in
the first place, because there existed no means of
refjjacement for the officer corps at that time the
yearly influx of cadets was between sixty and

CAPRIVI

eighty and a large navy without a large officer
corps was unthinkable. In addition to this, he in
formed me, he had soon seen in the course of the
inspection tours of His Majesty that the Emperor
knew more about naval matters than he, the Gen
eral, which placed him in an impossible situation
in relation to his subordinates.

In view of these circumstances, I parted with
him, placing him in command of an army corps.
Following the motto, "The navy for the seamen!"
I chose, for the first time, an admiral as its chief,
a step which was received in maritime circles with
great joy. The man chosen was Admiral Count
Monts.

BISMARCK'S SUCCESSOR

When I was soon afterward confronted with the
rather unexpected retirement of Prince Bismarck,
I found the choice of his successor a difficult one.
Whoever it might be was sure to have a hard task,
without any prospect of appreciation for what he
might achieve; he would be looked upon as the
usurper of a post to which he was not entitled,
and which he was not qualified to fill. Crit
icism, criticism, nothing but criticism that was
sure to be the daily bread upon which the new
Chancellor must reckon; and he was also cer
tain of becoming the target for the hostility of all
those who favored Prince Bismarck as well as with
that of the many who previously could not do
enough In opposition to him. There was bound
to be a strong current of enmity toward the new

53

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Chancellor, in which the old Prince himself would
not be the least serious factor.

After taking all this into consideration, it was
decided to choose a man belonging to Prince Bis
marck's generation, who had held a leading posi
tion in the wars and had already filled a Govern
ment position under him. Hence Caprivi was
chosen. His age was a guarantee that he would be
a careful and calm adviser for the "orphaned"
young Emperor.

Very soon the question arose of the extension of
the reinsurance treaty with Russia. Caprivi de
clared that, out of consideration for Austria, he
was unable to renew it, since the threat against
Austria contained therein, when it became known
in Vienna as it almost unavoidably would was
such as to lead to very disagreeable consequences.
For this reason the treaty lapsed. To my way of
thinking, it had already lost its main value from
the fact that the Russians no longer stood whole
heartedly behind it. I was confirmed in this view
by a memorial written by Count Berchem, Under
Secretary of State, who had worked with Prince
Bismarck.

The Agrarian Conservatives opposed Caprivi
as a man without landed property and a violent
fight raged around the commercial treaties. These
difficulties were greatly enhanced because Prince
Bismarck, ignoring his former maxims, took part
in the fight against his successor with all his char
acteristic energy. Thus arose the opposition of
tBe Conservatives against the Government and the

54

CAPRIVI

Crown, and the Prince in person sowed the seed
from which later grew the "misunderstood Bis
marck" and that "Reichsverdrossenheit" (un
friendliness to the Empire) so often taken up in
the newspapers. The "misunderstood Bismarck"
created permanent opposition throughout my reign
against my suggestions and aims by means of quo
tations, speeches, and writings, as well as by pas
sive resistance and thoughtless criticism. Every
thing that was done was painted in black colors,
made ridiculous, and criticized from top to bottom,
by a press that placed itself quite willingly at the
disposal of the Prince and often out-Bismarcked
Bismarck in its behavior.

This phenomenon became most apparent at the
time of the acquisition of Heligoland. This
island, lying close in front of the great waterways
leading to the principal Hanseatic commercial
ports, was, in the hands of the British, a constant
menace to Hamburg and Bremen and rendered im
possible any project for building up a navy
Owing to this, I had firmly resolved to win back
this formerly German island to its fatherland.

THE DEAL FOR HELIGOLAND

The way to cause England to give up the red
rock of Heligoland was found in the colonial do
main. Lord Salisbury proved inclined to ex
change the "barren rock" for Zanzibar and Witu
in East Africa. From commercial sources and the
reports of the commanders of German cruisers
and gunboats which were stationed there and

55

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

cruised along the coast of the recently acquired
German East African colonies, I knew that, as soon
as Togo, Dar-es-Salaam, etc. } rose to prosperity,
the importance of Zanzibar on the coast of Africa
as the principal port of transshipment would be a
thing of the past, since, as soon as the above-men
tioned harbors were made deep enough and pro
vided with sufficient cargo-loading equipment for
trading steamers, there would no longer be any
need of ferrying goods coming from the interioi
in dhows to Zanzibar, in order to have them again
loaded on vessels there, since they could be loaded
direct at the new harbors along the coast.

Therefore, I was convinced that we had, first,
an acceptable asset for swapping purposes, and,
secondly, a good opportunity to avoid colonial fric
tion with England and come to a friendly under
standing with her. Caprivi agreed, the "negotia
tions were concluded, and one evening, shortly
before dinner, I was able to tell the Empress and
a few intimates the exceedingly joyful tidings that
Heligoland had become German.

A first and very important extension of the Em
pire had been achieved without bloodshed the
first condition for the upbuilding of the fleet was
fulfilled, something which the natives of the Han-
seatic towns and the rest of the North Germans had
wished for centuries had come to pass. In silence,
an important event had occurred.

Had Heligoland been acquired in the Chancel
lorship of Prince Bismarck, it would probably
have befcn valued very highly. Having happened

56

CAPRIVI

under Caprivi, it loosed a lot of criticism. It was
merely Caprivi, the usurper, who had had the
audacity to sit in the Prince's chair, and the "irre
sponsible," "ungrateful," "impulsive" young mas
ter who had done such a thing! Had Bismarck
only wished, he could have had the old rock any
day, but he never would have been so unskillful as
to give up to the English for it the very promising
African possessions, and he never would have
allowed himself to be thus worsted. That was the
sort of thing heard almost everywhere. The news
papers of the Prince joined loudly in this sort of
criticism^ to the great grief of the people of the
Hanseatic cities.

Curious indeed were the criticisms occasioned
by the swapping of Zanzibar and Witu, which ap
peared in the Bismarckian press, although previ
ously, when I worked under him, these newspapers
had always explained that he had not much belief
in the value of colonies in themselves and looked
upon them merely as objects to be exchanged, pos
sibly, for something else, in deals with the British.
His successor acted according to these ideas in the
Heligoland question, and was most violently criti
cized and attacked. Not until the World War
was on did I see articles in the German press which
unreservedly admitted the acquisition of Heligo
land to be an act of far-sighted politics and added
reflections as to what would doubtless have hap
pened if Heligoland had not become German.

The German nation has every reason to be
thankful to Count Caprivi for this achievement,

57

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

since thereby the building of its navy and its vic
tory at the Skagerrak were made possible. As for
the German navy, it long ago acknowledged this.

The school law of Count Zedlitz aroused violent
new conflicts. When they led to Zedlitz's retire
ment, the cry arose among his adherents : "If the
Count goes, so must the Chancellor."

Caprivi left his post, in a calm, dignified man
ner. He tried honestly, within the measure of his
powers and abilities, to continue the traditions of
Prince Bismarck. In this he found little support
among the political parties, and, for this reason, all
the more criticism and hostility in the public and
among those who, had they acted for the right and
the interests of the state, should have stood by him.
Without one word of apology, Caprivi, in noble
silence, lived all the rest of his life in almost soli
tary retirement

CHAPTER III

Hohenlohe

A JAIN I was confronted with the difficult
task of choosing a Chancellor. His posi
tion and activities were to be under somewhat
about the same auspices and subject to the same
conditions as in the case of his predecessor. But
now there was more of a desire that he should be a
statesman, an older man, of course, qualified to in
spire Prince Bismarck with more confidence than
a mere general could do.

It was assumed that a statesman would know bet
ter how to walk in the footsteps of the Prince,
politically speaking, and provide Bismarck with
less opportunity for criticism and attacks. These
latter had tended to create gradually among all
Government officials, who dated mostly from the
period of Bismarck, an unmistakable nervousness
and dissatisfaction, by which the work of the entire
governmental system was impaired to an extent by
no means inconsiderable. Moreover, it lent to the
opposition in the Reichstag a constantly renewed
strength drawn from elements previously faithful
to the Government, and made itself felt in a detri
mental manner. Especially in the Foreign Office,

59

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

the spirit of Holstein, the supposed representative
of the "old, tried Bismarckian traditions," began
to assert itself, so that the unwillingness to collabo
rate with the Emperor became particularly strong
and the belief grew up that it was necessary to
carry on, independently, the policy of Bismarck.

After mature deliberation, I decided to intrust
the post of Chancellor to Prince Hohenlohe, who
was then Governor of Alsace-Lorraine. At the
outbreak of the War of 1870 he had succeeded, as
Bavarian Minister, in getting Bavaria to enter the
war on the side of Prussia. Ever since he had been
highly esteemed by Prince Bismarck on account of
his fidelity to the Empire. It was natural to ex
pect that Bismarck's opposition would cool off
when confronted with such a successor. Thus, the
choice of Hohenlohe as Chancellor was strongly
influenced by consideration for Prince Bismarck
and for the public opinion inspired by him.

Prince Hohenlohe was the typical old-style
grand seigneur. He was thoroughly urbane by
nature and in his dealings with others : a man of re
fined mind, with a slight touch of playful irony
sometimes glinting through, keen on account of his
years, a level-headed observer and judge of men.
Despite the great difference in age between him
and me he got along very well with me, which was
shown on the surface by the fact that he was treated
both by the Empress and by myself as our uncle,
and addressed as such, which brought about a cer
tain atmosphere of intimate confidence in our in
tercourse, In his talks with me, especially in giv-

60

HOHENLOHE

ing his opinion as to appointments of officials, he
offered very characteristic descriptions of the gen
tlemen being discussed, often combined with phil
osophical observations which proved that he had
reflected deeply on life and humanity, and which
were evidence of a maturity and wisdom grounded
on experience.

Something happened during the first period of
Hohenlohe's regime as Chancellor which throws
an interesting light upon the relations between
France and Russia. Having, at the time of the
fraternization between Russia and France, re
ceived reliable information from the General
Staff as well as from our Embassy at Paris to the
effect that France contemplated withdrawing a
portion of her troops from Algeria, in order to
shift them to southern France either against Italy
or against Alsace, I apprised Tsar Nicholas II of
this news, adding the remark that I should be
obliged to adopt counter-measures unless the Tsar
could dissuade his ally from so provocative a step.

SOME DIPLOMATIC FENCING

At that time the Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs was Prince Lobanoff, formerly ambassador
at Vienna, well known for his pro-French pro
clivities. During the summer of 1895 ^ e ^ a ^ vis
ited France and been very cordially entertained.
During the autumn, just as I was staying for the
hunting at Hubertusstock on the Schorfheide near
Eberswalde, Prince Lobanoff, on his return jour
ney from Paris, requested to be received in audi-

61

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ence, at the behest of the Tsar. Upon being re
ceived by me he described the calm and sensible
frame of mind which he had found in Paris and
sought to quiet me, too, with regard to the above-
mentioned troop movements, which, according to
him, were mere empty rumor and chatter without
any real basis. He added that he was bringing to
me the most quieting assurances, that there was no
reason for my feeling the slightest alarm. I
thanked him heartily for his report, remarking
that the word "alarm" was not to be found in the
dictionary of a German officer; and I added that,
if France and Russia wished to make war, I could
not prevent it

Whereupon the Prince, piously casting up his
eyes toward heaven, made the sign of the cross and
said: "Oh, la guerre! quelle idee; qui y pense?
cela ne doit pas etre" ("Oh, war! what an idea;
who thinks of such a thing? it must not be"). To
that I replied that I, in any event, was not think
ing about it, but that an observer and he need
not be very keen eyed must assuredly consider
the constant celebrations and speeches, as well as
the official and unofficial visits exchanged between
Paris and St. Petersburg, as significant symptoms
which could not be ignored, and which were cal
culated to arouse great dissatisfaction in Ger
many; that, should it come to war, against my own
will and that of my people, I felt that, trusting in
God and in my army and people, it would be pos
sible for Germany to get the better of both
opponents.

6*

HOHENLOHE

To this I added still another statement, reported
to me from Paris, which had been made by a Rus
sian officer who was in France as a member of an
officers' deputation. Having been asked by a
French comrade whether the Russians believed
that they could beat the Germans, the gallant Slav
replied: "Non, mon ami, nous serons battus a
plate couture, mais qu'est-ce que ga fait? Nous
aurons la Republique" ("No, my friend, we shall
be thoroughly beaten, but what does that matter?
We shall get a republic").

At first the Prince eyed me, speechless, then,
shrugging his shoulders, he remarked: "Oh, la
guerre, il ne faut pas meme y penser" ( u Oh, war,
one must not even think about it"). The officer
had merely expressed the general opinion of the
Russian intelligentsia and social circles. As far
back as my first visit to St. Petersburg, in the early
'eighties, a grand duchess said to me at dinner,
quite calmly: "Here we sit all the time on a vol
cano. We expect the revolution any day I The
Slavs are not faithful, they are not at all monarchi
cal, all of them are republicans at heart; they dis
guise their sentiments, and they lie, every one of
them, all the time."

Three important events, related to foreign pol
itics, came within the period of Prince Hohen-
lohe's incumbency of the Chancellorship: the
opening, in 1895, of the Emperor William Canal
(North Sea-Baltic Canal), begun under Emperor
William the Great, to which squadrons or indi
vidual ships representing countries all over the

63

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

world were invited; the annexation, in 1897, of
Tsing-tao ; and, third, the much-discussed Kruger
dispatch.

THE SEIZURE OF TSING-TAO

Prince Hohenlohe played an especially impor
tant role in the annexation of Tsing-tao. He, too,
was of the opinion that Germany needed some
coaling stations for her ships, and that the demands
of commercial elements that the opportunity for
opening up China to international trade be not
allowed to pass were justified. It was resolved
that, under unimpaired Chinese sovereignty and
after payment of the likin (octroi, or internal rev
enue tax), a trading port, with a marine coaling
station as protection, was to be founded, wherein
it was contemplated to allow China to co-operate
to the utmost possible extent.

The station was to serve the ends of commerce,
before all else, the military measures being lim
ited solely to the protection of the trading center
as it developed; they did not constitute an end
in themselves or a basis for further military
enterprises.

Already several places had been considered, but
these had proved, upon more careful investigation,
to be unfitted, mostly because they had either bad
connections or none at all with the interior regions,
were not promising from a commercial-political
standpoint, or were encumbered by privileges
already granted to other foreign countries. Finally
|t was agreed because of the reports of Admiral

64

HOHENLOHE

Tirpitz, who was, at that time, chief of the East
Asiatic cruiser squadron, and because of the opin
ion of the geographical expert, Freiherr von
Richthofen, who, having been questioned on the
subject, had drawn a most promising picture of the
possibilities of development in Shantung to found
a settlement on the bay of Kiao-Chau.

The Chancellor proceeded to collect data on
the political questions which arose as a result of
this and which must be taken into consideration.
It was particularly necessary not to interfere with
Russia's designs, nor to disturb her. Further in
formation was obtained, some of it from our East
Asiatic division ; from this source favorable reports
came in as to anchorages and the ice-free nature of
the bay of Kiao-Chau, and as to the prospects, if
a port were to be founded them From conversa
tions among the officers of the Russian China divi
sion, which had come to our ears in our intercourse
with them, it was learned that the Russian Ad
miral, in accordance with orders from his Govern
ment, had anchored one winter in the bay, but
had found it so desolate and so atrociously lone
some there were no tea houses with Japanese
geisha girls, which the Russians deemed abso
lutely indispensable to winter quarters that the
Russian squadron would never go back there any
more.

It was also reported that the Russian Admiral
had advised his Government most earnestly
against prosecuting any further its intention of
founding a settlement on this bay, since there was

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

absolutely no advantage to be derived from it.
Hence, the Russians had no intention of gaining a
foothold there.

This last piece of news arrived at about the
same time as the answer from the Russian Foreign
Minister, Count Muravieff, sent through the Ger
man ambassador, relative to the sounding of Rus
sian opinion, which had been made pursuant to
instructions from the Chancellor. Muravieff set
forth that Russia, to be sure, had no direct claims,
based on treaty with China, to the bay, but that
she, nevertheless, laid claim to it on the basis of the
"droit du premier mouillage" ("right of first
anchorage"), since the Russian ships had anchored
there before those of any other fleet This answer,
it will be seen, ran counter to the report of our
East Asiatic division relative to the statements
made by the Russian Admiral.

When I, with Hollmann, met the Chancellor, in
order to discuss the Russian claim to Kiao-Chau,
the Prince listened to the reading of it with hi3
little ironical smile, and remarked that he had been
unable to find any jurist at the Foreign Office who
could tell him anything about this wonderful
claim. Was the navy in a position to do so? Ad
miral Hollmann declared that he, in all his experi
ence on foreign service, had never heard of it; that
it was nonsense and an invention of Muravieff,
whose only motive was unwillingness to have some
other nation settle on the shores of the bay. I ad
vised that Privy Councilor of the Admiralty
Perels, one of the most famous living experts on

66

HOHENLOHE

international maritime law and an acknowledged
authority in this domain, be asked to deliver an
opinion, in order to clarify the question. This was
done. The opinion tore Muravieff's contention to
pieces, corroborated that of Hollmann, and com
pletely did away with the legend about the "right
of first anchorage."

Months elapsed ; my August, 1897, visit to Peter-
hof was imminent. In agreement with the Prince,
my uncle, I decided to discuss the entire matter in
person and frankly with the Tsar, and, if possible,
put an end to Muravieff's notes and evasions. The
talk took place at Peterhof. The Tsar stated that
he had no interest in the territory south of the
Tientsin-Peking line, which meant that there was
no reason why he should place obstacles in our path
in Shantung: that his interest was concentrated
upon the territory on the Yalu, around Port Ar
thur, etc., now that the English had made difficul
ties for him at Mokpo; that he would, in fact, be
pleased if Germany should locate herself in future
on the other side of the Gulf of Chih-li as Russia's
welcome neighbor.

Afterward I had a talk with Muravieff. He
employed all his arts, wriggled back and forth in
his statements, and finally brought up his famous
"right of first anchorage." That was all I wanted.
I now passed to the offensive myself, striking out
at him squarely with the opinion delivered by
Perels. When I had told him, finally, as the
Tsar desired, the result of the conversations
between us two sovereigns, the diplomat Was even
e 67

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

more embarrassed, lost his assumed calm, and
capitulated.

Thus was the soil prepared, politically speak
ing. In the autumn came the news from Bishop
Anzer of the murder of the two German Catholic
missionaries in Shantung. The entire German
Catholic world, particularly the "colonials" in the
Centerist party, demanded energetic measures.
The Chancellor proposed to me immediate inter
vention. While I was engaged in the winter hunt
ing at Lotalingen, I consulted with him, in one of
the little towers of the castle there, as to what steps
were to be taken. The Prince proposed to intrust
Prince Henry of Prussia, who was present, with
the command of the squadron that was to be sent
out to reinforce the East Asiatic Division. I in
formed my brother of this in the presence of the
Chancellor, whereat the Prince and the other
gentlemen present were highly pleased. The
Chancellor sent the news to the Foreign Office
and to the new Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, Herr von Bfllow, who was away on a
journey.

Kiao-Chau was occupied in November, 1897.
In December of that year Prince Henry sailed, on
the Dtutschland, with his squadron to East-

,! \tfhere he later took over the command of
fepitit-e East Asiatic Dltisioiu Oa the 6th of

1898, the agreement with.China concern-
ii% Hao-Chau waasigtled. I At the same time, Mr,
3|^Ht^ ijip before the

Ae idea of the

68

HOHENLOHE

conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, in order
to bar Russia's advance in the East

QUEST FOR COALING STATIONS

One will naturally inquire why, in the discus
sion of our audacious move, there is no mention of
England, since she was certainly deeply interested
therein. Preliminaries, however, had already been
gone into with England. In order to meet the
necessity for German coaling stations, I had in
tended to found, lease, or buy some in agreement
with England, so far as might be possible. In view
of the fact that my uncle, the Chancellor, was, as
a member of the Hohenlohe family, related to
Queen Victoria, known to her personally for years
and highly esteemed by her, I hoped that this
might tend to facilitate the negotiations which
were entered into with the English Government
for the above-noted purpose My hope was dis
appointed. The negotiations dragged along with
out any prospect of successful termination.

I took occasion, therefore^ at the behest of the
Chancellor, to discuss the matter with the English
ambassador at Berlin. I complained of the treat
ment received from the English Government,
wMqh everywhere opposed German wishes, even
swfeh as were justified. The ambassador agreed
frankly with this, and expressed his astonishment
a$ England's failure to hieet Gerttoany halfway,
and at English shortsightedness, since, when a
! rMngtfiation like Genmany, whose deyelop-
f tetf tep ;% i was, ftot to: be prevented, ftirn4

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

directly to England in order to acquire territory
with her consent, instead of going straight ahead
or allying itself with other nations, it was certainly
more than England could reasonably ask.

Moreover, he added that, since England already
owned almost all the world, she could certainly
find a place where she might permit Germany to
establish a station; that he was unable to under
stand the gentlemen in Downing Street; that in
case Germany should not succeed in obtaining
England's approval, she would probably occupy,
on her own account, such places as were suited to
her ends, since, after all, there was no law against it.

I laid stress upon the fact that this agreed en
tirely with my own view and, in conclusion, I
summed up my standpoint once more for the am
bassador: I told him that Germany was the only
country in the world which, despite its colonial
possessions and its rapidly growing commerce,
possessed no coaling stations ; that we were quite
willing to acquire these with England's consent;
that, should she refuse to show a realization of our
situation and fail to meet us halfway, we should
be compelled to turn to some other great power, in
order, with its help, to found settlements.

This talk, likewise, was fruitless. Finally, the
negotiations with England were broken off, with
out result, in a rather impolite manner. There
upon the Chancellor and I decided to appeal to
Russia.

The occupation of Kaio-Chau aroused surprise
and anger in the English Government. Having

70

HOHENLOHE

refused us her support, England had definitely
reckoned on the belief that nobody would help
Germany in attaining her goal. Now things had
turned out differently, and there was no lack of
recriminations from London. When the English
ambassador took up this tone he was referred to
the conversation with me, and it was made clear
to him that it was solely the fault of his Govern
ment that it had come to no understanding with
Germany.

England's attitude of aloofness surprised us at
that time. An occurrence which, then, was un
known to me, may serve to throw light on the
matter.

FINDS SEED OF WORLD WAR*

In a book (The Problem of Japan) which ap
peared anonymously at The Hague in 1918 and
was said to have been written by an "Ex-Diplomat
from the Far East," an excerpt was published from
a work of the American, Professor Usher of Wash
ington University at St. Louis. Usher, like his
former colleague, Prof. John Bassett Moore of

1 "Once the magnitude of Pan-Germanism dawned on the English
ind French diplomats, once they became aware of the lengths to
which Germany was willing to go, they realized the necessity of
strengthening their position, and therefore made overtures to the
United States, which resulted, probably before the summer of the year
1897, in an understanding between the three countries. There seems
to be no doubt whatever that no papers of any sort were signed, that
no pledges were given which circumstances would not justify any one
of the contracting parties in denying or possibly repudiating. Never
theless, an understanding was reached that in case of a war begun
by Germany or Austria for tfce purpose of executing Pan- Germanism,
the United States would promptly declare in jfavor of England and
France and would do her utmost to assist them." ROLAND G. USHER,
Pan-Germanism, chap, x, p. 139.

71

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Columbia University, New York, has often been
called into consultation as an adviser on foreign
relations by the State Department at Washington,
since he had a knowledge possessed by few other
Americans on international questions affecting the
United States. Professor Usher, in his book pub
lished in 1913, made known, for the first time, the
existence and contents of an "agreement" or "secret
treaty" between England, America, and France,
dating from the spring of 1897. In this it was
agreed that, in case Germany or Austria, or both
of them, should begin a war for the sake of "Pan-
Germanism," the United States should at once
declare in favor of England and France and
go to the support of these powers with all its
resources. Professor Usher cites at length all the
reasons, including those of a colonial character,
which inevitably imposed upon the United States
the necessity of taking part, on the side of
England and France, in a war against Germany,
which Professor Usher, in 1913, prophesied as
imminent!!

The unknown author of The Problem of Japan
went to the trouble of publishing in tabulated
form the agreements between EngUn4 France,
arid America in 1897, in order thef eby to show, in
a way easily understood, the extent of tfoe recipro
cal gbHg&tions. This ch^pt^r is extraordinarily
reading; it gives a good glimpse into the
aty j history ijad fflepdftfion of the
wr oa the part of the Entente > which
2lt 'jihat tim was uniting against
72

HOHENLOHE

although not yet appearing under the name of
Entente Cordiale. The ex-diplomat remarks in
this connection:

Here is a treaty that Professor Usher alleges to
have been entered into as long ago as 1897, in which
every phase of activity and participation in future
events by England, France, and the United States is
provided for, including the conquest of the Spanish de
pendencies, control over Mexico and Central America,
the opening of China, and the annexation of coaling
stations. And all these measures Professor Usher
wishes us to believe were taken to defend the world
against Pan-Germanism.

It is unnecessary to remind Professor Usher* or
anybody else, for that matter, that Pan-Germanism, if
we go so far as to assume that such a thing actually
exists, had certainly never been heard of in 1897, at
which time Germany had not yet adopted her program
for naval construction on a large scale, the same hav
ing been bruited for the first time in 1898. If, there
fore, it is true that England, France, and the United
States harbored the mutual designs imputed to them
by Professor Usher, and entered into an alliance to
accomplish them, it will scarcely do to attribute the
conception of the idea and the stimulus to its con
summation to so feeble a pretext as the rise of a Pan-
Germanism. 1

Thus the ex-diplomat .

This is truly amaziag. A definite treaty of par
tition directed against Spain, Germany, etc., ar
ranged even to minute details, w$s planned be-
Qapls and Anglo-Saxons, in a time of the
t peace, and concluded without the

jPr0Jr|*t of Japan, by an B^rCpujciselof' of Legation in tEe
East, chap, viii, p. 136, note, Published by CX L. Langenhuyaen,
fott e*rd&m, ; i^iS.

J73

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

slightest twinge of conscience, in order to anni
hilate Germany and Austria and eliminate their
competition from the world market! Seventeen
years before the beginning of the World War this
treaty was made by the united Anglo-Saxons and
its goal was systematically envisaged throughout
this entire period! Now one can understand the
ease with which King Edward VII could pursue
his policy of encirclement; for years the principal
actors had been united and in readiness. When
he christened the compact "Entente Cordiale," its
appearance was for the world, especially for Ger
many, an unpleasant novelty, but in the countries
on the other side it was merely the official acknowl
edgment of facts long known there.

In view of this agreement, one can understand
also the opposition of England in 1897 to an agree
ment with Germany regarding coaling stations,
and the anger aroused because Germany managed,
in agreement with Russia, to gain a firm foothold
in China, concerning the exploitation of which
land without German participation a tripartite
treaty had already been made.

Usher talked out of school and conclusively
proved at whose door lies the guilt for the World
War. The treaty directed against Germany
sometimes called the "gentleman's agreement"
of the spring of 1897, is the basis, the point of de
parture, for this war, which was systematically de
veloped by the Entente countries for seventeen
years. When they had succeeded in winning over
Russia and Japan likewise for their purposes, they

74

HOHENLOHE

struck the blow, after Serbia had staged the Sara
jevo murder and had thus touched the match to
the carefully filled powder barrel.

Professor Usher's statements are likewise a com
plete refutation of all those who were impelled,
during the war, to find the reason for the entry
of the United States in certain military acts on the
part of Germany, as, for instance, the Lusitania
case, the expansion of U-boat warfare, etc. None
of that is right The recently published, excellent
book of John Kenneth Turner, Shall It Be Again?
points out, on the basis of convincing proofs, that
Wilson's alleged reasons for going to war and war
aims were not the real ones. America or rather
President Wilson was resolved probably from
the start, certainly from 1915, to range herself
against Germany and to fight She did the latter,
alleging the U-boat warfare as a pretext, in reality
under the influence of powerful financial groups,
and yielding to the pressure and prayers of her
partner, France, whose resources in man power
were becoming more and more exhausted* Amer
ica did not wish to leave a weakened France along
with England, whose annexation designs on Calais,
Dunkirk, etc., were well known to her.

It was a fateful thing for Germany let this be
stated here, in a general way that our Foreign
Office was unable to meet the broad policy of
encirclement of England and the cunning of Rus
sia and France with an equal degree of diplomatic
skill. This was partly because it had not really
been trained under Prince Bismarck; and there-

75

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

fore when, after the retirement of the Prince and
Count Herbert, the all-dominating will and spirit
were lacking, it was not up to the task of con
ducting foreign affairs on its own independent
initiative.

Moreover, it is difficult in Germany to train up
good diplomats, since our people lack the taste and
endowment for diplomacy which have shone forth
brilliantly only from a few German minds, like
Frederick the Great and Bismarck. Unfavorable
also t;o ^the Foreign Office were the very frequent
changes of Secretaries of State. Imperial Chan
cellors, following the example of Bismarck, main
tained their influence upon the Foreign Office and
suggested the Secretaries of State who should
direct its affairs. I acquiesced in the proposals of
the Imperial Chancellors as to these posts, since I
admitted their right to choose themselves their
leading collaborators in the domain of foreign
affairs. That these frequent changes were not cal
culated to work toward the continuity of political
policy was a disadvantage that had to be taken into
account

The Foreign Office was largely influenced by
the axiom: "No disagreeable quarrels with other
powers" "surtotit pas d'histoires" ("above all, no
yarns"), as the French general said to a company
of stoldiers which, he had beard, wished to mutiny.
One of the Secretaries of State told me once when,
in placing sotw matter; before me, I had called his
! to th& apparently ^eriqus situation in con-

^ tfcat tihis simply

HOHENLOHE

must be righted, that the Foreign Office based its acts
primarily upon the maxim : "Let us have quiet"

Given this attitude, one can also understand the
answer which the German representative gave to
a German merchant in a South American republic
who had asked him for help and intercession with
the authorities, since his shop had been plundered
and his property stolen: "Oh, don't bother me
with these things! We have established such
pleasant relations with this republic; any action
undertaken in your behalf would only serve to up
set them." I need scarcely add that whenever such
a conception of duty came to my attention I re
moved the official concerned from his post

The Foreign Office enjoyed general unpopularity
both among the people and in the army. I worked
continuously, during the tenure of office of various
Chancellors, for thorough reform, but in rain.
Every new Chancellor, especially if he himself did
not come from the ranks of the foreign service,
needed the Foreign Qffipe in order to work himself
into foreign affairs, and this took time. But once he
had worked himself in he was under obligation to
tfye officials, and was reluctant to make extensive
changes, burdened as he was by other matters and
lacking detailed knowledge regarding the Foreign
Qffice personnel, particularly as he still believed that
tie needed the advice of those who were"oj:intated."

DEVELOPMENT OF T$ING-TAQ

i i 1 '" * ' . *

But let us return td TPsing-tao. Here everything
Was ddae tb ? ^pQt&tii& etairfierce and industry, and

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

done jointly with the Chinese ; the flag of the Chi
nese Empire, moreover, was hoisted over the Cus
tom House at Tsing-tao. The development there
was such that the port, during the years immedi
ately preceding the war, ranked sixth among all
Chinese trading centers in the commercial register
of the great Chinese merchants and of the mer
chants' guild coming just after Tientsin. Tsing-tao
was a prospering German commercial colony,
where many Chinese worked side by side with Ger
mans; it was, so to speak, a great sample ware
house of German abilities and German achieve
ments, to which the Chinese, who formerly had
not known Germany, her capabilities of achieve
ment, or her products, could repair for selec
tion and emulation ; it was a contrast to the naval
stations of Russia and England, which were purely
military, directed solely toward domination and
conquest.

The rapid rise of Tsing-tao as a trading center
aroused the envy of the Japanese and English, but
this did not prevent swarms of the latter from
journeying, with their families, to the splendid
beach, enjoying its cool air and the beautiful
Strand Hotel, and devoting themselves to playing
polo and lawn tennis after they had escaped from
the heat of Hongkong, Canton, and Shanghai.
Envy prompted England in 1914 to demand that
Japan should take Tsing-tao, although it was de
facto Chinese. Japan did this joyfully, promis
ing to return it to China, but it was not returned
until the beginning of 1922, after much pressure,

78

HOHENLOHE

although Japan had agreed with America that she
was not to be allowed to make any territorial
changes in China without previous consultation
with Washington.

Thus a great German cultural work in foreign
lands, which stood as a model of the method and
manner which a cultured nation should employ in
extending the advantages of its culture to another
nation, was annihilated by Erlglish commercial
envy. Some day, when Hongkong has gone the
same way, England will repent of her act and bit
terly reproach herself for having abandoned her
old maxim, in accordance with which she has acted
for so many years : "White men together against
colored men." When once Japan has made a real
ity out of her watchword, "Asia for the Asiatics,"
and brought China and India under her sway,
England will cast her eyes about in search of Ger
many and the German fleet

As to the "yellow peril," I had the following
interview with the Tsar later, after the Russo-
Japanese War, at a meeting between us.

The Tsar was, at that time, visibly impressed by
the growing power of Japan and its constant
menace to ^Russia and Europe, and requested my
opinion concerning this. I answered that if the
Russians counted themselves among the cultured
nations of Europe they must be ready to rally to
the defense of these nations against the "yellow
peril" and to fight for and by the side of Europe
for their own and Europe's existence and culture ;
But that if the Russians, on the other hand, con-

79

THE KAISERS MEMOIRS

sidered themselves Asiatics they would unite with
the "yellow peril," and, joining forces with it,
would assail Europe. The Tsar, said I, must bear
this in mind in providing for the defense of his
land and organizing his army.

When the Tsar asked me what course I thought
the Russians would take, I replied : "The second."

The Tsar was outraged and wished to know at
once on what I based this opinion. I answered
that my opinion was based on Russia's construction
of railways and on the arraying of the Russian
army along the Prussian-Austrian frontier.
Thereupon the Tsar protested that he and his house
were Europeans, that his country and his Russians
would certainly cleave to Europe, that he would
look upon it as a matter of honor to protect Europe
from the "yellow men." To this I replied that if
this was the Tsar's attitude he must make his mili
tary preparations conform to it without delay.
The Tsar said nothing.

At all events, I sought to utilize Tsar Nicholas
IPs worry at the growing power of Japan to the
advantage of Germany and general European cul
ture. Russia, despite siding with Japan, was the
first nation to collapse among all those participat
ing in tjbe war.

REPROACHES FOR JAPAN

statesmen of Japan, of whom taei5e are
InuoitJer, *mu3t be in some doubt $$ to
whetter they ranged their country on the right *sid$
in the^waiiv ;1es, 'they will perhaps aslc .t

80

HOHENLOHE

selves whether it would not have been more advan
tageous for Japan to have prevented the World
War. This would have been within her powers,
had she ranged herself firmly and unequivocally
on the side of the Central Powers, from which
in former times she had learned so willingly and
so much.

Had Japan adopted soon enough such an orien
tation in her foreign policy, and, like Germany,
fought by peaceful means for her share in world
trade and activity, I should have put the "yellow
peril" away in a corner and joyfully welcomed into
the circle of peacefully inclined nations the pro
gressive Japanese nation, the "Prussians of the
East" Nobody regrets more than I that the
"yellow peril" had not already lost its meaning
when the crisis of 1914 arose. The experience
derived from the World War may yet bring this
about

Germany's joint action with France and Russia
at Shimonoseki was based upon Germany's situa
tion in Europe. Wedged in between on-marching
Russia, threatening Prussia's f rontier y and France,
fortifying her borders anew with forts and groups
of fortresses, confronted with a friendship between
these two nations resembling an alliance, Berlin
looked with anxiety into the future* The warlike
preparations of the two powers were far, ahead of
ours> their navies far more modern and powerful
than the German navy, which consisted of a few
old ships almost without fighting value. There-
forfe it seemed to us wise to acquiesce in the sugges-

81

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

tion of this strong group, in order that it might not
should we decline turn immediately to Eng
land and cause the entry of the latter into the com
bination. This would have meant the formation,
at that time, of the combination of 1914, which
would have been a serious matter for Germany.
Japan, on the other hand, was about to go over
anyhow to England, in her sympathies. More
over, Germany's making common cause with the
Franco-Russian group offered the possibility of
achieving gradually a more trusting and less
strained relationship in Europe and of living side
by side with our two neighbors there in more
friendliness, as a result of the common policy
adopted in the Far East. The policy adopted by
us at this juncture was also consistently based on
the maintenance of world peace.

In the entire Kiao-Chau question, Prince Ho-
henlohe, despite his age, evinced a capacity for
sticking steadily to his purpose and a degree of
resolution which must be reckoned as greatly to
his credit.

Unfortunately in the matter of the Kruger dis
patch his prudence and his vision, so clear on other
occasions, abandoned him : only by so assuming is
his obstinate insistence on the sending of this dis
patch to be understood. The influence of such an
energetic and eloquent personage as Herr von Mar-
schall, former State Attorney, may have been so
powerful, the siren song of Herr vonr Holstein so
convincing, that the Prince yielded to them. In
any event, he did his country an ill turn in this

82

HOHENLOHE

matter, and damaged me seriously both in Eng
land and at home.

THE KRUGER TELEGRAM *

Since the so-called Kruger dispatch made a big
stir and had serious political consequences, I shall
tell the story of it in detail.

The Jameson raid caused great and increasing
excitement in Germany. The German nation was
outraged at this attempt to overpower a little na
tion, which was Dutch and, hence, Lower Saxon-
German in origin and to which we were sym
pathetic because of racial relationship. I was
much worried at this violent excitement, which
also seized upon the higher classes of society, fore
seeing possible complications with England. I be
lieved that there was no way to prevent England
from conquering the Boer countries, should she so
desire, although I also was convinced that such a
conquest would be unjust. But I was unable to

i Tremendous excitement was caused in England when the in
cident of the Kruger message became known. On January 3, 1896,
the German Emperor telegraphed as follows to the President of the
South African Republic:

"I congratulate you most sincerely on having succeeded, with your
people, without calling on the help of foreign powers, by opposing
your own force to an armed band which broke into your country to
disturb the peace, in restoring quiet and in maintaining the inde
pendence of your country against external attack/'

On January 6th, in conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles, Baron
von Marschall protested against the view of the English press that
it was an act of hostility against England and an encroachment on
English rights for the German Emperor to congratulate the head of
a friendly state on his victory over an armed band that had invaded
his land in defiance of international law, and had been declared to
be outside the pale of the law by the English Government itself.
But it was not recorded that he disavowed the Kaiser's respon
sibility for it.

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

overcome the reigning excitement, and was even
harshly judged by my intimates on account of the
attitude I adopted.

One day when I had gone to my uncle, the Im
perial Chancellor, for a conference, at which the
Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral Holl-
mann, was present, Freiherr Marschall, one of the
Secretaries of State, suddenly appeared in high
excitement, with a sheet of paper in his hand. He
declared that the excitement among the people
in die Reichstag, even had grown to such propor
tions that it was absolutely necessary to give it out
ward expression, and that this could best be done
by a telegram to Kruger, a rough draft of which
he had in his hand.

I objected to this, being supported by Admiral
Hollmann. At first the Imperial Chancellor re
mained passive in the debate. In view of the fact
that I knew how ignorant Freiherr Marschall and
the Foreign Office were of English national psy
chology, I sought to make clear to Freiherr Mar
schall the consequences which such a step would
have among the English ; in this, likewise, Admiral
Hollmann seconded me. But Marschall was not
to be dissuaded.

Then, finally, the Imperial Chancellor took a
hand. He remarked that I, as a constitutional
ruler, must not stand out against the national con
sciousness and against my constitutional advisers;
otherwise, there was danger that the excited atti
tude of the German people, deeply outraged in its
sense of justice and also in its sympathy for the

84

HOHENLOHE

Dutch, might cause it to break down the barriers
and turn against me personally. Already, he said,
statements were flying about among the people ; it
was being said that the Emperor was, after all, half
an Englishman, with secret English sympathies;
that he was entirely under the influence of his
grandmother, Queen Victoria; that the dictation
emanating from England must cease once for all ;
that the Emperor must be freed from English
tutelage, etc.

SAYS HE SIGNED AGAINST HIS WILL

In view of all this, he continued, it was his duty
as Imperial Chancellor, notwithstanding he ad
mitted the justification of my objections, to insist
that I sign the telegram in the general political
interest, and, above all else, in the interest of my
relationship to my people. He and also Herr von
Marschall, he went on, in their capacity of my con
stitutional advisers, would assume full responsibil
ity for the telegram and its consequences.

Sir Valentine Chirol, at that time correspondent
of the Times, wrote, in the Times of September
iith, that Herr von Marschall, directly after the
sending of the dispatch, had stated to him that the
dispatch did not give the personal opinion of the
Emperor, but was a governmental act, for which
the Chancellor and he himself assumed full
responsibility.

Admiral Hollmann, when the Imperial Chancel
lor appealed to him for corroboration of this point
of view and was asked by him to uphold it to me,

85

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

declined to do so with the remark that the Anglo-
Saxon world would unquestionably attribute the.
telegram to the Kaiser, since nobody would believe
that such a provocative thing could come from His
Majesty's elderly advisers, and all would consider
it an "impulsive" act of the "youthful" Emperor.

Then I again tried to dissuade the gentlemen
from their project But the Imperial Chancellor
and Marschall insisted that I sign, reiterating that
they would be responsible for consequences. It
seemdd to me that I ought not to refuse after their
presentation of the case. I signed.

Not long before his death Admiral Hollmann
recalled the occurrence to me in full detail, as it
is described here.

After the Kruger dispatch was made public the
storm broke in England, as I had prophesied. I
received from all circles of English society, espe
cially from aristocratic ladies unknown to me, a
veritable flood of letters containing every possible
kind of reproach, some of the writers not hesitat
ing even at slandering me personally and insulting
me. Attacks and calumnies began to appear in the
press, so that soon the legend of the origin of the
dispatch was as firmly established as the amen at
church. If Marschall had also announced in the
Reichstag what he stated to Chirol, I personally
would not have been drawn into the matter to such
an extent.

In February, 1900, while the Boer War was in
progress and while I was with the fleet at Heligo
land attending the maneuvers of ships of the line,

86

HOHENLOHE

after having been present at the swearing in of re
cruits at Wilhelmshafen I received news by tele
graph from the Wilhelmstrasse, via Heligoland,
that Russia and France had proposed to Germany
to make a joint attack on England, now that she
was involved elsewhere, and cripple her sea traf
fic. I objected and ordered that the proposal be
declined.

Since I assumed that Paris and St. Petersburg
would present the matter at London in such a way
as to make it appear that Berlin had made the
above proposal to both of them, I immediately
telegraphed from Heligoland to Queen Victoria
and to the Prince of Wales (Edward) the fact of
the Russo-French proposal, and its refusal by
me. The Queen answered expressing her hearty
thanks, the Prince of Wales with an expression of
astonishment

Later, Her Majesty let me know secretly that,
shortly before the receipt of my telegram from
Heligoland concerning the proposal from Paris
and St. Petersburg, the false version of the matter
foreseen by me had indeed been told, and that she
was glad to have been able, thanks to my dispatch,
to expose the intrigue to her Government and quiet
it as to the loyal attitude of Germany; she added
that she would not forget the service I had done
England in troublous times.

DEAL WITH CECIL RHODES

When Cecil Rhodes came to me, in order to
bring about the construction of the Cape-to-Cairo

87

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Railway and Telegraph line through the interior
regions of German East Africa, his wishes were
approved by me, in agreement with the Foreign
Office and the Imperial Chancellor; with the pro
viso that a branch railway should be built via
Tabora, and that German material should be used
in the construction work on German territory.
Both conditions were acquiesced in by Rhodes
most willingly. He was grateful at the fulfillment
of his pet ambition by Germany, only a short time
after King Leopold of Belgium had refused his
request

Rhodes was full of admiration for Berlin and
the tremendous German industrial plants, which
he visited daily. He said that he regretted not
having been in Berlin before, in order to have
learned about the power and efficiency of Ger
many, and to have got into touch with the German
Government and prominent Germans in commer
cial circles. He said he had wished, even before
the Jameson raid, to visit Berlin, but had been pre
vented in London at that time from so doing; that,
had he been able to inform us before of his plan
to get permission to build the Cape-to-Cairo line
through the Boer countries, as well as through our
colonies, the German Government would probably
have been able to help him by bringing persuasion
to bear upon Kruger, who was unwilling to grant
this permission; that "the stupid Jameson Raid"
would never have been made, in that case, and the
Kruger dispatch never written as to that dispatch,
he ha$ never bprne me a grudge on account of it

88

HOHENLOHE

He added that as we, in Germany, could not be
correctly informed as to aim and actual purposes,
the said raid must have looked to us like "an act of
piracy," which naturally and quite rightly had
excited the Germans ; that all he had wanted was to
have such stretches of land as were needed for his
rail lines such, in fact, as Germany had just
granted to him in the interior of her colonies a
demand which was not unjust and would certainly
have met with German support. I was not to
worry, he added, about the dispatch and not bother
myself any more about the uproar in the English
press. Rhodes did not know about the origin of
the Kruger dispatch and wanted to console me,
imagining that I was its originator.

Rhodes went on to advise me to build the Bag
dad Railway and open up Mesopotamia, after
having had irrigation simultaneously introduced
there. He said that this was Germany's task, just
as his was the Cape-to-Cairo line. In view of the
fact that the building of this line through our terri
tory was also made dependent upon the cession to
us of the Samoan Islands, Rhodes worked actively
in London toward having them turned over to us.

In home politics, Prince Hohenlohe, as Chan
cellor, showed a mildness which was not generally
favorable. Owing to his long acquaintanceship
with Herr von Hertling, he was able to establish
friendly relations with the Vatican. His mildness
and indulgence were also exercised toward Alsace-
Lorraine, in which, as an expert of long standing,
he showed particular interest But he got little

89

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

thanks for this, since the French element, indirectly
benefited thereby, behaved with ever-increasing
arrogance.

PEN SKETCH OF HOHENLOHE

Prince Hohenlohe loved to employ mediation,
compromise, and conciliation toward the Social
ists likewise and he employed them on some occa
sions when energetic measures would have been
more fitting. He hailed with much joy my Far
East trip to Constantinople and Jerusalem. He
was pleased at the strengthening of our relations
with Turkey and considered the plan for the Bag
dad Railway arising from them as a great cultural
work worthy of Germany.

He also gave his most enthusiastic approval to
my visit to England in 1899, made by me with my
wife and two sons at the desire of my royal grand
mother, who, growing steadily weaker on account
of her years, wished to see her oldest grandson once
more. He hoped that this journey might serve to
efface somewhat the consequences of the Kruger
dispatch sent by him, and also to clarify some im
portant questions by means of conferences between
me and English statesmen.

In order to avoid any unpleasantness from the
English press, which, angered by the Boer War
and the partly unjustified attacks of certain Ger
man newspapers, had been answering in like tone,
the Queen had commissioned the author of The
Life of the Prince Consort, Sir Theodore Martin,
to inform the English press of Her Majesty's desire

90

HOHENLOHE

that a friendly reception be accorded to her Im
perial grandson. And that is what indeed came to
pass. The visit ran its course harmoniously and
caused satisfaction on all sides. I held important
conferences with various leading men.

Not once in the entire visit was the Kruger dis
patch mentioned. On the other hand, my royal
grandmother did not conceal from her grandson
how unwelcome the whole Boer War was to her;
she made no secret of her disapproval and aversion
for Mr. Chamberlain and all that he represented,
and thanked me again for my prompt and sharp
refusal of the Russo-French proposal to interfere
and for my immediate announcement of this pro
posal. One could easily see how much the Queen
loved her splendid army and how deeply she had
been grieved by the heavy reverses suffered by it
at the outset of the war, which had caused by no
means negligible losses.. Referring to these, the
aged Field Marshal Duke of Cambridge coined
the fine phrase : "The British nobleman and officer
have shown that they can die bravely as
gentlemen."

On my departure, the Queen bade me farewell
with cordial and grateful greetings to her "much-
cherished cousin," the Imperial Chancellor, whose
ability and experience, she hoped, would continue
to maintain good relations between our two
countries.

My -report entirely satisfied Prince Hohenlohe
as to the success of my journey; at the same time,
however, I was the object of the most violent

91

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

attacks from a certain section of the press and from
many excited "f riends of the Boers." The German
lacks the very thing with which the English peo
ple has been inoculated, and to which it has been
trained by long political self -discipline : when a
fight is on, even though it be merely upon the field
of diplomacy, the Englishman unquestioningly fol
lows the flag, in accordance with the proverb:
"You can't change the jockey while running."

In the autumn of 1900 Prince Hohenlohe re
tired from the Chancellorship, since the work had
become too arduous for a man of his advanced age.
Moreover, the constant quarrels and disputes of
the political parties with one another were dis
agreeable to him, and it went against the grain with
him to make speeches before them in the Reichstag.
Equally disagreeable to him was the press, part of
which had taken the bit between its teeth and
imagined that it could conserve the Bismarckian
tradition by quoting sayings by Bismarck, and had
greatly jeopardized relations with England, espe
cially during the Boer War.

CHANCELLOR'S RETIREMENT

The hope, aroused by the choice of Princte Ho
henlohe as Chancellor and his assumption of the
office, that Prince Bismarck would place less
obstacles in his path, had been only partly fulfilled.
The atmosphere had been much relieved and
Prince Bismarck brought to a much milder frame
of mind by my reconciliation with him, which had
6ceived outward expression in his solemn entry

92

HOHENLOHE

into Berlin and his staying at the old Hohenzollern
palace, but his adherents and those rallying around
him for the sake of opposition were not to be dis
suaded from their activities. Moreover, the politi
cal representatives of the people succeeded, while
I was on my way to Friedrichsruh to celebrate
Bismarck's eightieth birthday, in refusing to pay
homage to the old Imperial Chancellor, a thing
which naturally deeply hurt the sensitive Prince
Hohenlohe and filled him with indignation.

He, like myself, was deeply moved by the death
of his great predecessor, and we, together with the
German people, sincerely mourned Prince Bis
marck as one of the greatest of the sons of Prussia
and Germany, in spite of the fact that he had
not always made our task easy. I insisted upon
hurrying back from my trip to Norway in order
to pay honor to him who, as a faithful servant of
his old master, had helped the German nation to
unity, and under whom I, when I was Prince, had
had the proud privilege of working.

It is said that one of the reasons why Prince
Hohenlohe retired from his post was the advice
of his son Alexander, who was much at his father's
house; he was known in society as "the Crown
Prince," and was essentially different from his
lovable father.

Prince Hohenlohe could look back upon a series
of successes during his term as Chancellor: the
overcoming of the disputes concerning the "Citi
zens' Book of Laws," the reform of the military
punishment procedure, the Naval law, the appoint-

93

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ment of Waldersee to the command in China at
the time of the Boxer War, Tsing-tao, and the
Yangsfe Treaty.

He bade me farewell on the ith of October,
1900. Both of us were greatly moved, for not only
was the Chancellor and faithful co-worker parting
from his Emperor, but also the uncle from his
nephew, who looked up with grateful esteem to
the old man. At the age of seventy-five years an
age when others have long since retired to rest and
contemplation he had not hesitated to obey the
summons of the Emperor to subject himself to even
more exacting labors and devote his time and
strength to the German fatherland. When about
to leave my room, he grasped my hand once again
with the request that I might grant him, during
the years of life still remaining to him (which he
meant to spend in Berlin), the same plain, faithful
friendship which he had so long noted and admired
between me and Admiral von Hollmann. I shall
always preserve him faithfully in my memory.

94

CHAPTER IV
Biilow

ON the day after Prince Hohenlohe's farewell,
the man summoned by me as his successor-
Count Biilow, Secretary of State for Foreign Af
fairs, arrived. His choice for the post was emi
nently fitting, because he was thoroughly cognizant
of our foreign policy and, especially, of our rela
tions with England which policy was becoming
constantly livelier and more complicated and be
cause he had already proved himself a skillful
orator and ready debater in the Reichstag. The
fact that the second of these qualities was lacking
in his predecessor had often been painfully notice
able. When Prince Hohenlohe's intention to re
tire became known in the Imperial Council, the
Bavarian ambassador at Berlin, Count Lerchen-
feld, very pointedly remarked to me that for
Heaven's sake I was not to choose another South
German, since South Germans were not fitted for
the leading post at Berlin ; North Germans were
naturally better able to fill it and, therefore, it
would be better for the Empire to select a North
German,

I had been acquainted personally with Biilow

95

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

for a long time, ever since the period of his ambas
sadorship at Rome and his work as Secretary of
State. Then I had often visited him at his home
and had held many a conference with him in his
garden. He came into closer relationship with me
when he accompanied me on my journey to the
Far East, where, in co-operation with the ambas
sador, Freiherr Marschall, he assisted me in get
ting into personal touch with the leading men of
the Turkish Government Hence, the relations of
the new Chancellor with me were already begun
and, to a certain extent, established, since we had
for years discussed all political problems and
spheres. Moreover, he stood much nearer to me
in age than his predecessors, most of whom could
have been my grandfather. He was the first
"young Chancellor" of Germany. And this made
our common task easier for both of us.

When I was in Berlin, scarcely a day went by
without my taking a long morning walk with the
Chancellor in the garden of the Imperial Chan
cellor's palace,, during which outstanding business
was cleared up and problems of actuality discussed,
I often had a meal with him and always found
at his table, where I was most hospitably received
by the Count, his amiable wife and a group of the
most interesting men, in choosing whom the Couat
was a master. He was likewise unsurpassed in
skillfully conducting conversation and in the witty
handling of the various topics that arose. To me
it was always a pleasure to be in the company of
the Chancellor and enjoy his bubbling wit, to

96

BULOW

excliange views at his table with many professors,
savants, and artists, as well as Government officials
of all sorts, in informal, unofficial intercourse and
stimulating exchange of ideas.

The Count was an excellent narrator of anec
dotes, drawn both from books and his own personal
experience, which he told in several languages. He
liked to tell stories of the days when he was a diplo
mat, especially about his stay at St. Petersburg.

BULOW A DISCIPLE OF BISMARCK

The Count's father was an intimate friend of
Prince Bismarck and had been one of his closest
co-workers. Young Biilow also had begun his
career under the great Chancellor; he had been
brought up on Bismarckian ideas and traditions and
strongly influenced by them, but, nevertheless, had
not adhered to them to such an extent as to lose
his independence.

In the course of one of the first talks which I
had with Biilow as Imperial Chancellor he in
formed himself concerning my ideas of how best
to handle the English and have dealings with them.
I told him that I considered absolute frankness
the most important thing in dealing with England
and Englishmen; that the Englishman, in pre
senting his point of view and working for his in
terests, was inconsiderate to the point of brutality,
for which reason he thoroughly understood any
body who acted similarly toward him ; that there
must be no playing the diplomatic game, or "finess
ing," with an Englishman, because it made him

97

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

distrust those with whom he was dealing and sus
pect that they were not honest and wished secretly
to cheat him ; that such devious methods could be
successful only in dealing with Latin and Slavic
nations; that, once the Englishman had become
suspicious, there was nothing more to be done with
him, despite the most honeyed words and most
obliging concessions ; that the only advice, there
fore, which I could give the Chancellor was that
he confine himself entirely to straightforwardness
in his English policy. I said this with particular
emphasis, since "finessing" was especially dear to
the diplomatic character of Count Bulow and had
become second nature to him.

I also took occasion, during this talk, to warn
the Chancellor against Holstein. In spite of my
warning which was merely a repetition of that
given me before by Bismarck Bulow worked a
great deal, or was obliged to work, with Holstein.
This remarkable man had been able gradually,
especially since the time that the Foreign Office
had been, so to speak, orphaned by Bismarck's re
tirement, to create for himself a position that be
came steadily more influential and to maintain it
under three Chancellors with such skill that he was
considered indispensable.

Holstein was unquestionably possessed of great
shrewdness, seconded by a phenomenal memory
and a certain talent for political combinations,
which, to be sure, often became a hobby in his case.
His position was also based largely on the fact that
he was looked upon in many quarters, especially

98

BULOW

among the older officials, as the "bearer of the
Bismarckian traditions," the man who upheld these
in the teeth of "the young master." His importance
rested, above all, on his wide personal knowledge
in the entire domain of the foreign service. Since
he wielded, on account of this, an authoritative
influence on all proposals relative to the appoint
ment of officials and hence, also, on the careers
of the younger officials, it may be easily under
stood why he, little by little, had obtained for him
self a dominating position at the Foreign Office.
But he sought more and more to obtain, at the
same time, a decisive influence upon the conduct
of foreign policy; he had, in fact, become the guid
ing spirit both of the Foreign Office and of Ger
man foreign policy.

HOLSTEIN'S SECRET POWER

The serious thing about this was that he exerted
his far-reaching influence entirely from under
cover and avoided all official responsibility as an
adviser. He preferred to remain in the dark and
exert his influence from there. He refused every
responsible post many stood open to him every
honorary title, every promotion. He lived in com
plete seclusion. For a long time I tried in vain
to become personally acquainted with him, for
which purpose I used to invite him to meals, but
Holstein declined every time. Only once, in the
course of many years, did he consent to dine with
me at the Foreign Office, and it was characteristic
of him that, whereas on this occasion all the other
8 99

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

gentlemen present wore full evening dress, he ap
peared in a frock coat and excused himself on the
plea that he had no dress coat.

The secrecy with which he surrounded himself
in his work, so as not to be held responsible for it,
became apparent also at times in the character of
the memorials .drawn up by him; they were un
questionably ingenious and attractive, but often as
involved and ambiguous as the oracle of Delphi;
there were occasions when, after a decision had
been made based on the contents of one of these
documents, Herr von Holstein would prove to a
nicety that he meant exactly the opposite of what
had been thought.

I considered it a serious matter that an irre
sponsible counselor should bring to bear such
powerful influence, especially as he did So from
under cover and, hence, in doing it, eluded the offi
cials who were in duty bound to exert influence,
and who were the responsible parties. Often, es
pecially in the von Richthofen era, it happened
that I would advise a foreign ambassador to discuss
some political question, which he had taken up
with me, with the Secretary of State, and he would
reply: "J'en parlerai avec mon ami Holstein"
("I shall speak about it with my friend Holstein") .
The fact alone that an official of the Foreign Office
dealt with foreign ambassadors, going over the
head of his superior, did not seem right to me;
but that he should be dubbed by tjaese foreigners
"friend" seemed to me to go beyond what I deemed
advisable.

too

BULOW

Matters had, in fact, developed gradually to
such a stage that Holstein conducted a good part
of our foreign affairs. To be sure, he still listened
to the Chancellor in connection with them, but
what the Emperor thought or said about foreign
affairs was rather unimportant If things turned
out successfully, the Foreign Office reaped the
reward; if things went wrong, then it was the
fault of the "impulsive young master."

In spite of all this, Billow, too, apparently
thought Herr von Holstein indispensable at first;
he worked together with him for a long time, until
at last he, too, found unbearable the pressure which
this strange man exerted on everybody. To Herr
von Tschirschky, during his tenure of office as Sec
retary of State, belongs the merit of finally bring
ing the unendurable situation to a head. On being
questioned by me, he declared that he considered it
impossible that Herr von Holstein remain at his
post any longer, since he was embroiling the whole
Foreign Office, seeking to eliminate him, the Secre
tary of State, entirely, and creating all kinds of
obstacles, likewise, for the Chancellor.

DISMISSAL AND AN ENEMY

Thereupon I ordered Herr von Tschirschky to
prepare the way for the dismissal of Herr von
Holstein, which afterward took place, with the
approval of the Chancellor, after the latter had
recovered from the serious break-down in health
which he had suffered meanwhile. Herr von Hol
stein himself showed what manner of man he was

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

By going at once after his dismissal to Herr Harden
and placing himself at the latter's disposal for the
campaign against the Emperor,

The year 1901 gave Count Biilow plentiful op
portunities to show and assert himself in dealings
with England. Count Biilow still believed strongly
in the Bismarckian theory of having "two irons in
the fire" i. e., in making friendly agreements
with another country while always remaining on
good terms with Russia in which he received
support from the many pretended adherents of
Bismarck.

From the midst of the Jubilee celebration of the
two Hundredth coronation anniversary, I was called
to the deathbed of my grandmother, Queen Vic
toria, by a dispatch announcing to me the serious
condition of the Queen. I hurriedly made the
journey with my uncle, the Duke of Connaught,
who was at Berlin as the Queen's representative at
the festivities he was the favorite son of the Queen
and my particular friend, and a son-in-law of
Prince Frederick Charles and I was cordially
received in London by the then Prince of Wales
and the royal family. As my carriage drove out at
a trot from the railway station a plainly dressed man
stepped forward from the closely packed crowd
standing there in absolute silence, to the side of
the carriage, bared his head, and said: "Thank
you, Kaiser." The Prince of Wales, later Edward
VII, added : "That is what they all think, and they
will never forget this coming of yours."

Nevertheless, they did forget it, and quickly.

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BULOW

After the Queen had quietly breathed her last in
my arms, the curtain fell for me upon many memo
ries of childhood. Her death signified the close
of an epoch in English history and in Germany's re
lations with England. I now got into touch, as far
as possible, with prominent personages, and noted
everywhere a thoroughly sympathetic, friendly
spirit, which made no secret of the wish for good
relations with Germany.

At the farewell banquet impromptu speeches
were made by King Edward VII and myself,
which were cordial in tone and content, and did
not fail to make an impression on their hearers.
After the meal the English ambassador at Berlin
clasped my hand and said that my speech had
touched all his fellow countrymen's hearts, because
what I said was sincere and simple, as was fitting
for Englishmen ; that the speech must at once be
made public, since it would have an effect through
out the country, which was grateful for my com
ing; and that this would be useful to the relations
between the two countries. I answered that it was
a matter for the British Government and the King
to decide, that personally I had no objections to
having the speech made public.

Nevertheless, it was not made public, and the
British people never learned of my words, which
were the sincere expression of my sentiments and
thoughts. In another talk later on with me at
Berlin the same ambassador deeply regretted this,
but was unable to say what the reason was for this
omission.

103

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

In concluding my remarks on my stay in Eng
land I cannot pass over the fact that a portion of
the German press was unfortunately lacking both
in tactful appreciation of the grief of the English
royal family and people, as well as of the obliga
tions which my family relationship and political
considerations imposed upon me.

After my return home from England I was able
to report to the Chancellor on the good impres
sions I had received, and particularly that opinion
in England was apparently in f aror of an under
standing and of closer relations.

Billow expressed himself as satisfied with the
results of the journey, after we had talked at length
about it at Homburg, and consulted as to how the
situation created by the journey should be put to
use. I suggested that we should unquestionably
come to a good agreement, if an alliance which
I preferred could not be brought about. In any
svent, a firm agreement would suffice, I said, and
would suit the English ; in the long run an alliance
night always develop from it

The opportunity for such an alliance came with
unexpected promptness. While I was at Homburg
von der Hohe in the spring of 1901, Count Metter-
nich, who was with me as representative of the
Foreign Office, brought me a notification from
Berlin that Mr. Chamberlain had inquired there
as to whether Germany was ready for an alliance
with England. I immediately asked : " Against
whom?" since, if England so suddenly offered to
make an alliance in the midst of peace, it was plair

104

BULOW

that she needed the German army, which made
it worth while to find out against whom the
army was needed and for what reason German
troops were to fight, at England's behest, by
her side. Thereupon the answer came from
London that they were needed against Russia,
since Russia was a menace both to India and
to Constantinople.

The first thing I did was to call London's atten
tion to the old traditional brotherhood-in-arms be
tween the German and Russian armies, and the
close family ties between the reigning dynasties of
the two countries; in addition, I pointed out the
dangers of a war on two fronts, in case France
:ame in on the side of Russia, and also the fact that
we had acted jointly with France and Russia in
the Far East (Shimonoseki, 1895) an d that there
was no reason to unloose a conflict with Russia at
this time, when we were in the midst of peace;
that the superiority in number of the Russian army
on a peace footing was very great and the eastern
frontiers of Prussia seriously threatened by the
grouping of the Russian forces; that England
would not be in a position to protect our eastern
province from a Russian attack, since her fleet
could accomplish little in the Baltic and would
be unable to sail into the Black Sea ; that, in case
of our making common cause against Russia, Ger
many would be the only one who would be in great
danger, quite independently of the possibility of
the entry of France into the fight

Chamberlain then informed us that a firm alii-

105

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ance should be made, by which England would
naturally bind herself to come to our aid.

BRITISH ALLIANCE FAILS

I had also pointed out that the validity of an
alliance could only be assured when the English
Parliament had placed its approval upon it, since
the Ministry might be driven from office by the will
of the nation as expressed in Parliament, whereby
signature of the Ministry might be rendered null
and void and the alliance invalidated, and that we
could look upon the Chamberlain suggestion, for
the time being, merely as a purely personal project
of his own.

To this Chamberlain replied that he would get
backing from Parliament in due time and would
find the way of winning the Unionists over to his
idea; that all needed now was the signature of
Berlin. Matters did not progress as far as that,
because Parliamept was not to be won over to
Chamberlain's plan ; therefore the "plan" came to
nothing. Soon afterward England concluded her
alliance with Japan (Hayashi). The Russo-Jap
anese War broke out, in which Japan owing to
the fact that it fitted in with her schemes played
the role of pawn for England's interests, which
role had originally been reserved for Germany.
By this war Russia was thrown from the east back
to the west, where she might concern herself again
v^ith the Balkans, Constantinople, and India
which was to Japan's advantage leaving to Japan
a free hand in Korea and China.

106

BULOW

In 1905 came my journey to Tangier, under
taken much against my will. It came about as fol
lows : Toward the end of March I intended, as in
the previous year, to take a Mediterranean trip for
the sake of my health, for which I proposed to avail
myself of some ship running empty from Cuxhaven
to Naples. The Hamburg was destined by Ballin
for this purpose. At his request that I take along
some other guests, since the steamer was quite
empty, I invited a number of gentlemen, among
them Privy Councilor Althoc, Admiral Mensing,
Count Piickler, Ambassador von Varnbuhler, Pro
fessor Schiemann, Admiral Hollmann, etc.

Soon after the proposed trip became known
Biilow informed me that there was a strong desire
at Lisbon to have me stop there and pay the Por
tuguese court a visit To this I agreed. As the
date of departure approached, Biilow expressed
the additional wish that I also stop at Tangier and,
by visiting that Moroccan port, strengthen the
position of the Sultan of Morocco in relation to
the French.

This I declined, since it seemed to me that the
Morocco question was too full of explosive matter
and I feared that such a visit would work out dis-
advantageously rather than beneficially. Biilow
returned to the attack, without, however, persuad
ing me of the necessity or advisability of the visit

AGAIN KAISER "GIVES IN"

During the journey I had several talks with
Preiherr von Schoen, who accompanied me as rep-

107

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

resentative of the Foreign Office, as to the advis
ability of the visit We agreed that it would be
better to drop it I telegraphed this decision to
the Chancellor from Lisbon. Biilow replied em
phatically that I must take into consideration the
view of the German people and of the Reichstag,
which had become interested in the project, and
that it was necessary that I stop at Tangier.

I gave in, with a heavy heart, for I feared that
this visit, in view of the situation at Paris, might
be construed as a provocation and cause an inclina
tion in London to support France in case of war.
Since I suspected that Delcasse wished to make
Morocco a pretext for war, I feared that he might
make use of the Tangier visit for this purpose. ,

The visit took place, after much difficulty had
been experienced in the open roadstead of Tangier,
and it met with a certain amount of friendly par
ticipation by Italian and Southern French anarr
chists, rogues, and adventurers. A lot of Spaniards
stood upon a small square, amid waving banners
and loud cries ; these, according to a police official
who accompanied us, were an assembly of Spanish
anarchists.

The first I learned about the consequences of my
Tangier visit was when I got to Gibraltar and was
formally and frigidly received by the English, in
marked contrast to my cordial reception the year
before. What I had foreseen was justified by the
facts. Embitterment and anger reigned in Paris,
and Delcasse tried to rouse the nation to war j the
only reason tfrat he' did not succeed was that both

108

BULOW

the Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy
declared France not yet ready.

The fact that my fears were justified was also
corroborated later by the conversation between
Delcasse and the editor of Le Gaulois, in which
the Minister informed an astonished world that,
in case of war, England would have sided with
France. Thus, even as far back as that, I ran the
risk, through the Tangier visit forced upon me, of
getting blamed for the unchaining of a world war.
To think and act constitutionally is often a hard
task for a ruler upon whom in every case responsi
bility is finally saddled.

In October, 1905, the Paris Matin reported that
Delcasse had declared in the Council of Ministers
that England had offered, in case of war, to land
100,000 men in Holstein and seize the Kaiser Wil-
helm Canal. This English offer was repeated once
more later on, with the suggestion that it be af
firmed in writing. And the well-known Jaures,
who was murdered in accordance with the political
ideas of Isvolsky upon the outbreak of war in 1914,
knew beforehand about the statements by Delcasse
published in the Matin.

The downfall of Delcasse and the accession of
Rouvier to his post are to be ascribed partly to the
influence of the Prince of Monaco. During the
regatta week at Kiel the Prince had assured him
self, by talks with me, the Imperial (Chancellor, and
Government officials, of the sincerity of our desire
to compromise with France for the purpose of
enabling us to lire at peace with each other. He

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

stood well with the ambassador, Prince Radolin,
and worked actively toward a rapprochement be
tween the two countries.

The Prince of Monaco himself was of the opin
ion that Delcasse was a menace to the maintenance
of peace and hoped that he would soon fall and be
replaced by Rouvier, who was a prudent politician
thoroughly inclined to coming to an understanding
with Germany. The Prince said that he was on
good terms with Rouvier personally and would
willingly place himself at the disposal of the Ger
man ambassador as a go-between.

NEGOTIATIONS FRUITLESS

Then came Delcasse's fall, and Rouvier became
Minister. At once I caused the initiation of the
measures wherein I could count upon the support
of the Prince of Monaco. The Chancellor was
instructed to prepare a rapprochement with
France. And I particularly told Prince Radolin,
who personally received his instructions in Ber
lin, to make good use of the Rouvier regime for
the purpose of eliminating all possibilities of con
flict between the two countries. I added that the
reports of the Prince of Monaco, with whom he
was well acquainted, would be useful to him in
relations with Rouvier. Prince Radolin proceeded
with zeal and pleasure to the accomplishment of
this worth-while task.

At first the negotiations went well, so much so
that I began to hope that the important goal would
be attained and the evil impression caused by the

no

BULOW

Tangier visit effaced by an understanding. In the
meantime, the negotiations concerning Morocco
were continued ; they were concluded, after endless
trouble, by the summoning of the Algeciras Con
ference, based upon the circular note of Prince
Biilow, which pointed out that the Most-Favored-
Nation Clause No. 17 of the Madrid Convention
should remain in force and that the reforms in
Morocco, for which France alone was working,
should be carried out, in so far as necessary, only
in agreement with the signatory powers of the
Madrid Conference. These events, which riveted
general attention upon themselves, relegated the
special negotiations with Rouvier to the back
ground.

With regard to domestic policy, I had agreed
with the Chancellor that his main task was to be
the restoration of order in the relations between
the parties in the Reichstag, which had got into a
bad way under Hohenlohe, and, above all, to rally
the Conservatives, who had been won over to the
opposition by the Post-Bismarckians, orice more to
the support of the Government The Chancellor
accomplished this task with great patience and
tenacity. He finally formed the famous "bloc,"
which arose from the great electoral defeat of the
Socialists.

The Conservative party had many members who
had direct relations with the court, and also with
me personally, so that it was easier for this party
than for any other to become informed as to my
plans in political and other matters and to discuss

in

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

my ideas with me before they took shape in proj
ects for laws. I have not the impression that this
was done to the extent that was possible ; I might
perhaps have come into agreement with the gentle
men, through informal conversations, in the ques
tion of the building of the Central Canal op
posed, as is well known, by the Conservatives as
well as in the less important matters of the con
struction of the Cathedral and the Berlin Opera
House, in which I was deeply interested for the
sake of the Church and of art

I am saying nothing new if I remark that it was
by no means easy to deal with the gentlemen of the
Conservative party. Through their traditional serv
ices to the state they had acquired great experi
ence and independence of judgment, and had thus
formed firm political convictions, to which they
held faithfully and in a genuinely conservative
manner. From their ranks great statesmen, emi
nent Ministers, a brilliant officer corps, a model
body of, officials, had largely been produced.
Therefore, the consciousness of their own merit
was not without justification; in addition, their
loyalty to their King was unshakable. The King,
and the country both owed them gratitude.

FINDS FAULT WITH CONSERVATIVES

Their weakness lay in the fact that they were at
times too conservative that is, they recognized too
late the demands of the time and began by oppos
ing progress, although it might be progress advan
tageous to themselves. One may understand this in

112

BULOW

view of their past, but the fact remains that it
worked to the detriment of their relations with
me, especially during my reign, when the develop
ment of the Empire, particularly of industry and
commerce, pushed rapidly forward ; and I desired
and was obliged to place no obstacles in the
way of that development, but to promote it When
I said that it was not always easy, for the reasons
adduced, to deal with the Conservatives, I am well
aware that the same thing is maintained about me.
Perhaps this is because I stood close to the Con
servatives on account of my traditions, but was not
a Conservative for party reasons. I was and am,
indeed, in favor of progressive conservatism, which
preserves what is vital, rejects what is outworn, and
accepts that portion of the new which is useful.

Let me add that in discussions I was able to
endure the truth, even when it was uncomfortable
and bitter, better than people are aware, provided
it was told to me tactfully.

So that, when it is maintained that I and the
Conservatives did not get along in dealings with
each other, the same reason was at the root of the
difficulty on both sides. It would have been better
to arrive of tener at an understanding with me in
private conversations, for which I was always
ready. And in the canal question, on which we
could not agree, who was better qualified than the
Conservative to understand and appreciate the fact
that I have never subscribed to the pretty couplet,
u Unser Konig absolut, wenn er unseren Willen
tut" ("Absolute our King may be, if he does what

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

we decree") ? For, had I acted according to that
principle a very comfortable one for me the
Conservatives, in view of their belief in a strong
King who really governs, would logically have
been forced to oppose me. Surely the Conserva
tives must have respected me for having matched
their honorable axiom of manly pride before the
thrones of Kings with mine of kingly pride before
the Conservative party's throne, just as I did with
'regard to all other parties.

In any event, the occasional differences with the
Conservative party and with individual Conserv
atives cannot make me forget the services rendered
by men of this very party to the House of Hohen-
zollern, the Prussian -state, and the German
Empire,

Biilow finally did the great trick of bringing
Conservatives and Liberals together in Germany,
thus getting a big majority for the parties siding
with the Government. In doing so, the great abil
ities of the Chancellor, his skill, statecraft, and
shrewd knowledge of men, shone forth most
brilliantly. The great service rendered by him in
achieving this success won him thorough apprecia
tion and gratitude from his country and from my
self ; and, in addition, an increase of my trust in
him. The boundless delight of the people of
Berlin in the defeat of the Social Democrats at the
polls led to the nocturnal demonstration, which I
shall never forget, in front of my palace, in the
course of which my automobile had to force a, way
for itself, little by little, amid a cheering crowd of

114

BULOW

many thousands surrounding it The Lustgarten
was packed with great multitudes of people, at
whose tumultuous request the Empress and I had
to appear on the balcony in order to receive their
homage.

The Chancellor was present at the visit of King
Edward VII to Kiel. Among the many guests was
the former Chief Court Marshal of the Empress,
Frederick, Count Seckendorff, long acquainted
with Edward VII through his many visits to Eng
land, who reposed great trust in the Count. This
gentleman, at the behest of Bulow, with whom he
was friendly, arranged an interview between the
King and the Chancellor.

It took place on board the royal English yacht
after a breakfast to which I and the Chancellor
were invited. Both gentlemen sat for a long time
alone over their cigars. Afterward Billow reported
to me what had transpired at the interview. In
discussing the possible conclusion of an alliance
between Germany and England, the King, he told
me, had stated that such a thing was not at all
necessary in the case of our two countries, since
there was no real cause for enmity or strife between
them. This refusal to make an alliance was a plain
sign of the English "policy of encirclement/ 5 which
soon made itself felt clearly and disagreeably at
the Algeciras Conference. The pro-French and
anti-German attitude of England, which there
came out into the open, was due to special orders
from King Edward VII, who had sent Sir D.
Mackenzie Wallace to Algeciras as his "super-

9 115

THE KAISER'S MEMQIRS

vising representative," equipped with personal
instructions.

From hints given by the latter to his friends it
turned out that it was the King's wish to oppose
Germany strongly and support France at every
opportunity. When it was pointed out to him that
it might be possible, after all, to take up later with
Germany this or that question and perhaps come
to an understanding, he replied that, first of all
came the Anglo-Russian agreement; that, once that
was assured, an "arrangement" might be made with
Germany also. The English "arrangement" con
sisted in the encirclement of Germany,

HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH BULOW

The relations between me and the Chancellor
remained trustful and friendly throughout this
period. He was present repeatedly at the Kiel
regatta. Here, he found occasion, among other
matters, to confer with the Prince of Monaco and
a number of influential Frenchmen, who were
guests aboard the Prince's yacht, among whom
doubtless the most eminent was M. Jules Roche,
the leading expert on European budgets, and a
great admirer of Goethe. He always carried a
copy of Faust in his pocket

In April, 1906, came the unfortunate collapse in
the Reichstag of the overworked Chancellor. As
eoon as I received the news, I hurried there and
was glad that Privy Councilor Renvers could give
me encouraging news about Billow's condition.
While the Prince was recuperating during the

116

BULOW

summer at Norderney, I went from Heligoland,
which I had been inspecting, on a torpedo boat to
the island and surprised the Chancellor and his
wife at their villa. I spent the day in chatting with
the Chancellor, who had already recovered his
health to an encouraging degree and was browned
by the sea air and sunlight

In the late autumn of 1907 the Empress and I
paid a visit to Windsor, at the invitation of King
Edward VII. We were most cordially received
by the English royal family and the visit went off
harmoniously. After this visit I went for a rest to
the castle of Highcliffe, belonging to General
Stewart Worthley, situated on the south coast of
England, opposite The Needles.

Before my departure for England, the Chancel
lor, who was much pleased at the English invita
tion, had long talks with me as to the best way for
getting on a better footing with England, and had
suggested to me a number of his desires and proj
ects, to serve me as guides in my conversations
with Englishmen. During my visit I had frequent
occasion to discuss the subjects agreed upon and
conduct conversations as desired by the Chancellor.
Cipher telegrams containing my reports on these
conversations went regularly to Berlin and I re
peatedly received from the Chancellor approving
telegrams. I used to show these after the evening
meal to my intimates who accompanied me on my
visit; these men, among them the Chief Court
Marshal Count Eulenberg and Prince Max Egon
Furstenberg, read them and rejoiced with me at

117

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

the harmonious understanding between me and the
Chancellor.

After my return from England I made a general
report to the Chancellor, whereupon he expressed
to me his thanks for my having personally troubled
myself so much and worked so hard toward im
proving the relations between the two countries.

DEFENDS FAMOUS INTERVIEW 1

A year later came the incident about the so-
called "interview," published in the Daily Tele
graph. Its object was the improvement of Ger
man-English relations. I had sent the draft
submitted to me to the Chancellor for examina
tion through the representative of the Foreign
Office, Herr von Jenisch. I had called atten
tion, by means of notes, to certain portions which,
to my way of thinking, did not belong therein
and should be eliminated. Through a series of
mistakes on the part of the Foreign Office, when

1 One of the most startling incidents of the Kaiser's reign was
the interview with him printed in the London Daily Telegraph of
Oct. 28, 1908. In it he said that "Englishmen, in giving rein to
suspicions unworthy of a great nation," were "mad as March hares" ;
and that "the prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle
and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I
am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is
a minority of the best elements, just as it is in England with respect
to Germany." German opinion was, he admitted, "bitterly hostile"
to England during the Boer War, and, that the German people, if
he had permitted Boer delegates in Berlin, "would have crowned
them with flowers." He asserted that he had formulated a plan
of campaign in South Africa which Lord Roberts adopted in substance.

The Kaiser was quoted in this interview as declaring Germany
needed a large fleet chiefly on account of the Far Eastern situation.

The interview was republished in official German organs, and
caused as great a stir in Germany as in England. There were many
debates OB it in the Reichstag and one or two "investigations."

118

BULOW

the matter was taken up at my request, this was
not done.

A storm broke loose in the press. The Chancel
lor spoke in the Reichstag, but did not defend the
Kaiser, who was the object of attack, to the extent
that I expected, declaring, on the other hand, that
he wished to prevent in future the tendency toward
"personal politics" which had become apparent in
the last few years. The Conservative party took
upon itself to address an open letter to the King
through the newspapers, the contents of which
are known.

During these proceedings, I was staying first at
Eckartsau, with Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Aus
trian throne, and later with Kaiser Franz Joseph
at Vienna, both of whom disapproved of the Chan- 1
cellor's conduct. From Vienna I went to Donau-
eschingen to visit Prince Fiirstenberg, to whom the
press saw fit to address the demand that he should,
being an honest, upright man, tell the Emperor the
truth for once. When we talked over the whole
matter, the Prince advised me to get together, at
the Foreign Office, the dispatches from Highcliffe
in 1907, and the answers to them, and have these
laid before the Reichstag.

During this whole affair I underwent great
mental anguish, which was heightened by the sud
den death before my eyes of the intimate friend of
tny youth, Count Hiilsen-Haeseler, chief of the
Military Cabinet The faithful, self-sacrificing
friendship and care of the Prince and his family
were most welcome to me in these bitter days. And

119

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

letters and demonstrations from the Empire, part
of which sided with me and severely censured the
Chancellor, were a consolation to me during that
period.

After my return, the Chancellor appeared, lec
tured me on my political sins, and asked that I
sign the document that is already known, which
was afterward communicated to the press. I signed
it in silence and in silence I endured the attacks of
the press against myself and the Crown.

The Chancellor struck a serious blow, by his
conduct, at the firm confidence and sincere friend
ship which had bound me before to him. Un
doubtedly Prince Biilow thought that, handling
the matter as he did both in the Reichstag and with
me personally, he could best serve me and the
cause, especially as public excitement was running
very high at that time. In this I could not agree
with him, all the more so since his actions toward
me in the Daily Telegraph affair stood out in too
sharp contrast to the complaisance and recognition
which Biilow had previously manifested toward
me. I had become so accustomed to the amiability
of the Prince that I found the treatment now ac
corded me incomprehensible.

A BREAK WITH BULOW

The relationship between Emperor and Chan
cellor, excellent and amicable up to that time, was,
at all events, disturbed. I gave up personal rela
tions with the Chancellor and confined myself to
official dealings. After consultation with the Min-

120

BULOW

ister of the Royal Household and the chief of the
Cabinet, I resolved to follow Prince Furstenberg's
advice as to getting together the Highcliffe dis
patches, and charged the Foreign Office with this
task. It failed of accomplishment because the dis
patches in question were not to be found.

Toward the end of the winter the Chancellor
requested an audience with me. I walked up and
down with him in the picture gallery of the palace,
between the pictures of my ancestors, of the battles
of the Seven Years' War, of the proclamation of
the Empire at Versailles, and was amazed when
the Chancellor harked back to the events of the
autumn of 1908 and undertook to explain his atti
tude. Thereupon I took occasion to talk with him
about the entire past The frank talk and the ex
planations of the Prince satisfied me. The result
was that he remained in office.

The Chancellor requested that I dine with him
that evening, as I had so often done bef ore, in order
to show the outer world that all was again well.
I did so. A pleasant evening, enlivened by the
visibly delighted Princess with charming amiabil
ity, and by the Prince with his usual lively, witty
talk, closed that memorable day. Alluding to the
Prince's audience with me, a wag wrote later in a
newspaper, parodying a famous line: "The tear
flows, Germania has me again."

By this reconciliation I also wished to show that
I was in the habit of sacrificing my own sensitive
ness to the good of the cause. Despite Prince
Billow's attitude toward me in the Reichstag,

121

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

which was calculated to pain me, I naturally never
forgot his eminent gifts as a statesman and his
distinguished services to the fatherland. He
succeeded, by his skill, in avoiding a world
war at several moments of crisis, during the
period indeed, when I, together with Tirpitz,
was building our protecting fleet That was a
great achievement

A serious epilogue to the above-mentioned au
dience was provided by the Conservatives. The
Civil Cabinet informed the party leaders of the
Chancellor's audience and what happened there,
with the request that the party might now take
back its "Open Letter." This request which was
made solely in the interest of the Crown, not of
myself personally was declined by the party.
Not until 1916, when the war was under way, did
we get into touch again, through a delegate of the
party, at Great General Headquarters.

Just as the Conservatives did not do enough out
of respect for the Crown to satisfy me, so also the
Liberals of the Left, the Democrats and the So
cialists, distinguished themselves by an outburst qf
fury, which became, in their partisan press, a veri
table orgy, in which loud demands were made for
the limitation of autocratic, despotic inclinations,
etc. This agitation lasted the whole winter, with
out hindrance or objection from high Government
circles. Only after the Chancellor's audience did
it stop*

Later, a coolness gradually arose between the
Chancellor and the political parties. The Con-

122

BULOW

servatives drew away from the Liberals rifts ap
peared in the bloc. Centrists and Socialists but,
above all, the Chancellor himself brought about
its downfall, as Count Herding repeatedly ex
plained to me later for the last time at Spa. He
was proud to have worked energetically toward
causing Billow's downfall.

When matters had reached an impossible pass,
the Chancellor drew the proper conclusions and
recommended to me the choice of Herr von Beth-
mann as the fifth Chancellor of the Empire. After
careful consultations, I decided to acquiesce in the
wish of Prince Bizlow, to accept his request for
retirement, and to summon the man recommended
by him as his successor.

CHAPTER V

Bethmann

I HAD been well acquainted since my youth with
Herr yon Bethmann Hollweg. When I was in
active service for the first time in 1877, as Lieuten
ant in the Sixth Company of the First Infantry
Guard Regiment, it was quartered once at Hohen-
finow, the home of old Herr von Bethmann, father
of the Chancellor. I was attracted by the pleasant
family circle there, which was presided over by
Frau von Bethmann, a most worthy lady, born of
Swiss nationality, amiable and refined.

Often, as Prince and later as Emperor, I went
to Hohenfinow to visit the old gentleman, and I
was received on every occasion by the young head
of the rural district administration; at that time
neither of us imagined that he would become Im
perial Chancellor under me.

From these visits an intimate relationship sprang
up little by little, which served to increase steadily
my esteem for the diligence, ability, and noblp
character of Bethmann, which were much to my
liking. These qualities clung to him throughout
his career.

As Chief President and as Imperial Secretary of

124

BETHMANN

State for the Interior Bethmann gare a good ac
count of himself, and, while occupying the last-
named post, made his appearance successfully be
fore the Reichstag.

Co-operation with the Chancellor was easy for
me. With Bethmann I kept up my custom of daily
visits whenever possible, and of discussing fully
with him, while walking in the garden of the
Chancellor's palace, on politics, events of the day,
ispecial bills, and occurrences and of hearing re
ports from him. It was also a pleasure for me to
visit the Chancellor's home, since Bethmann's
spouse was the very model of a genuine German
wife, one whose simple distinction earned the
esteem of every visitor, while her winning kind
ness of heart spread around her an atmosphere of
cordiality. During the Bethmann regime the cus-
'tom of holding small evening receptions, instituted
by Prince Biilow and most enjoyable to me, was
continued, and this enabled me to keep on associat
ing informally with men of all circles and walks
of life.

In the journeys which the Chancellor had to
make in order to introduce himself, he won esteem
everywhere by his distinguished calm and sincere
methods of expression. Such foreign countries gs
were not hostile to us considered him a factor mak
ing for political stability and peace, to the main
tenance and strengthening of which he devoted his
most zealous efforts. This was entirely to my
liking.

Jn foreign politics he busied himself from the

125

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

start with the position of England in relation to
Germany and with the "policy of encirclement" of
King Edward VII, which had made itself felt
more and more since Reval, and was a source
of worry to Bethmann. This was likewise true of
the growing desire for revenge and enmity of
France, and the unreliability of Russia- During
his regime as Chancellor it became clear that Italy
was no longer to be reckoned with militarily; the
work of Barrere in that country made "extra tours"
chronic.

Upon assuming office, Herr von Bethmann found
the situation with regard to France cleared up to
such an extent that the German-French Morocco
Agreement had been signed on February 9, 1909.
By recognizing thereby the political predominance
of France in Morocco Prince Biilow had put the
finishing touch to the German political retreat
from Morocco. The standpoint which had deter
mined the trip to Tangier and, in addition, the Al-
geciras Conference, was thereby definitely aban
doned. The great satisfaction of the French Gov
ernment over this victory was expressed in a man
ner unwelcome to us by the conferring of the cross
of the Legion of Honor upon Prince Radolin and
Herr von Schoen.

RECEIVES BRITISH ROYALTY

On the same day King Edward VII, with Queen
Alexandra, made his first official visit to the Ger
man Emperor and his wife at their capital city of
Berlin eight years after his accession to the

126

BETHMANN

throne! Berlin received the eralted gentleman
with rejoicing ( !!) and showed no signs of dissatis
faction at his unfriendly policy.

The King did not look well ; he was tired and
aged, and suffered, moreover, from a severe attack
of cafarrh. Nevertheless, he accepted the invita
tion of the municipal authorities of Berlin to in
formal tea at the City Hall. From his description,
which was corroborated by Berlin gentlemen, the
function must have been satisfactory to both
parties.

I informed my uncle of the signing of the Ger
man-French Morocco Agreement and the news
seemed to please him. When I added, "I hope this
agreement will be a stepping stone to a better
understanding between the two countries," the
King nodded his head approvingly and said, "May
that be sol" If the King had co-operated toward
this, my project would probably not have failed.
Nevertheless, the visit of Their English Majesties
engendered a more friendly atmosphere for the
time being, which greeted Herr von Bethmann
upon his assuming office.

During his term of office Herr von Bethmann
had plenty of foreign matters to handle, connected
with the well-known events of 1909-14. Con
cerning this period a mass of material has been
published in different quarters, for instance, in the
book, Causes of the World War, by Secretary
of State von Jagow. In the Belgian Documents
the attitude of the German Government in the
various complications is described from a neutral

127

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

standpoint I had based this attitude on the
following:

Caution on the one hand, on the other, support of
our Austro-Hungarian allies whenever there is a plain
threat against their position as a world power, com
bined with counsels of moderation in action. Efforts in
the role of "honest broker" everywhere, activity as a
go-between wherever peace seems endangered. Firm
assertion of our own interests.

In view of the "encirclement" ambitions of our
opponents, we were in duty bound, for the sake
of self-preservation, to work steadily at the, same
time toward building up our army and navy for
purposes of defense, because of the central location
of Germany and her open, unprotected frontiers.
This period of history is also well described in
Stegemann's book, and Helfferich and Fried Jung
also depict the prewar days interestingly,

"EDWARD THE ENCIRCLER"

The death of the "encircler," Edward VII of
whom it was said pnce, in a report of the Belgian
Embassy at Berlin, that "the peace of Europe was
never in such danger as when the King of England
concerned himself with maintaining it" called
me to London, where I shared with my close rela
tions, the members of the English royal family, the
mourning into which the passing of the King had
thrown the dynasty and the nation. The entire
royal family received me at the railway station as
a token of their gratitude for the deference to fam
ily ties shown by my coming.

128

BETHMANN

King George drove with me to Westminster
Hall, where the gorgeously decorated coffin re
posed upon a towering catafalque, guarded by
household troops, troops of the line, and detach
ments from the Indian and Colonial contingents,
all in the traditional attitude of mourning heads
bowed, hands crossed over the butts and hilts of
their reversed arms. The old, gray hall, covered
by its great Gothic wooden ceiling, towered im
posingly over the catafalque, lighted merely by a
few rays of the sun filtering through narrow win
dows. One ray flooded the magnificent coffin of
the King, surmounted by the English crown, and
made marvelous play with the colors of the pre
cious stones adorning it.

Past the catafalque countless throngs of men,
women, and children of all classes and strata in the
nation passed in silence, many with hands folded
to bid a reverent farewell to him who had been so
popular as a ruler. A most impressive picture, in
its marvelous medieval setting.

I went up to the catafalque, with King George,
placed a cross upon it, and spoke a silent prayer,
after which my right hand and that of my royal
cousin found each other, quite unconsciously on our
part, and met in a firm clasp. This made a deep
impression on those who witnessed it, to such an
extent that, in the evening, one of my relations said
to me : "Your handshake with our King is all over
London: the people are deeply impressed by it, and
take it as a good omen for the future."

"That is the sincerest wish of my heart," I replied.

129

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

As I rode through London behind the coffin of
my uncle I was a witness of the tremendous and
impressive demonstration of grief on the part of
the vast multitude estimated at several millions
- on streets, balconies, and roofs, every one of
whom was clad in black, every man of whom stood
with bared head, among all of whom reigned per
fect order and absolute stillness. Upon this som
ber, solemn background the files of British soldiers
stood out all the more gorgeously. In splendid
array marched the battalions of the English
Guards: Grenadiers, Scots Guards, Coldstreams,
Irish Guards in their perfectly-fitting coats,
white leather facings, and heavy bearskin head
gear; all picked troops of superb appearance and
admirable martial bearing, a joy to any man with
the heart of a soldier. And all the troops lining
the path of the funeral cortege stood in the attitude
of mourning already described.

During my stay I resided, at the special desire
of King George, in Buckingham Palace. The
widow of tBe dead King, Queen Alexandra, re
ceived me with moving and charming kindness,
and talked much with me about bygone days ; my
recollections stretched back to my childhood, since
I, while still a little boy, had been present at the
wedding of my dead uncle.

THE PICHON CONVERSATION

The King gave a banquet to the many princely
guests and their suites, as well as for the representa
tives of foreign nations, at which M. Pichon was

130

BETHMANN

also present He was introduced to me and, in
conversation with him, I told him of the wishes
which the Imperial Chancellor had communicated
to me regarding our interests in Morocco and some
otfier political matters, which M. Pichon readily
agreed to carry out All other combinations con
nected in various quarters with this talk, belong in
the domain of fancy.

Although the period between 1909 and 1914 de
manded extraordinary attention to foreign events,
interior development was, nevertheless, promoted
zealously, and efforts made to meet the demands
of commerce, transportation, agriculture, and in
dustry, which were growing rapidly. Unfortu
nately endeavors in this direction were made much
more difficult by the discord among political parties.

The Chancellor wished to accomplish every
thing possible of accomplishment But his inclina
tion to get to the bottom of problems and his desire
to deal only with what was, from his meticulous
critical standpoint, thoroughly matured, tended,
in the course of time, to hamper progress. It was
difficult to bring him to make decisions before he
was thoroughly convinced of their being absolutely
free from objection. This made working with him
tiresome and aroused in those not close to him the
impression of vacillation, whereas, in reality, it
was merely overconscientiousness carried too far.

In addition, the Chancellor eventually devel
oped a strong and growing inclination toward
domination ; in discussions this tended to make him
obstinate and caused him to lay down the law to

10

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

those thinking otherwise as dogmatically as a
school teacher. This brought him many enemies
and often made things hard for me. A boyhood
friend of the Chancellor, to whom I spoke once
about this, replied, with a smile, that it had been so
with him even in school ; there Herr von Bethmann
lhad constantly taught and school-mastered his fel
low students, of whom my informant was one, so
that finally his classmates had nicknamed him u the
governess." He added that this trait was a mis
fortune for Bethmann, but that it had so grown
into his very being that he would never be able to
get rid of it.

An example of this is Bethmann's relationship
to Herr von Kiderlen, whom he desired to have as
Secretary of State, despite my emphatic objections.
Herr von Kiderlen was an able worker and a man
of strong character, who always sought to assert
his independence. He had been about one year in
office when Herr von Bethmann came to me one
day, complained of Kiderlen's obstinacy and in
subordination, and asked me to appeal to his con
science. I declined, with the observation that the
Chancellor had chosen Kiderlen against my wishes
and must now manage to get along with him ; that
the maintenance of discipline at the Foreign Office
was a duty devolving upon the Chancellor, in
which I had no desire to interfere.

FINDS FAULT WITH BETHMANN

Meanwhile, Bethmann's inadequacy to the post
of Chancellor became evident Deep down in his

BETHMANN

heart he was a pacifist and was obsessed with the
aberration of coming to an understanding with
England. I can perfectly well understand that a
man of pacifist inclinations should act thus in the
hope of avoiding a war thereby. His object was
entirely in accord with my policy. The ways and
means whereby Bethmann sought to achieve it
were, in my opinion, unsuitable. Nevertheless, I
backed his endeavors. But I certainly did not
believe that real success would result It became
ever more apparent, while he was Chancellor, that
he was remote from political realities. Yet he
always knew everything better than anybody else.
Owing to this overestimation of his own powers he
stuck unswervingly to his ideas, even when things
all turned out differently from what he had
expected.

His reports were always admirably prepared,
brilliant in form, and, hefcce, impressive and at
tractive. And in this there was an element of
danger. In his opinion there was always but one
solution, the one which he proposed! The ap
parent solidity and thoroughness of his reports and
suggestions, the illuminating treatment of the mat
ters reported upon from every angle, the references
to experts, to foreign and native statesmen and dip
lomats, etc., easily led to the impression that solely
the Bethmajin solution was worthy of considera
tion. In spite of these thorough preparations, he
made mistake after mistake.

Thus he had an actual share in our misfortune.
When I returned from my Norwegian trip in 1914

133

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

he did not place his resignation in my hands, to be
sure, but he admitted that his political calculations
had gone wrong. Nevertheless, I left him in office,
even after his Reichstag speech and the English
declaration of war of August 4, 1914, because I
considered it most serious to change the highest
official in the Empire at the most critical mo
ment in German history. The unanimous atti
tude of the nation in the face of the challenge
from the Entente might have been impaired by
such action.

Moreover, both the Chancellor and the chief
of the Civil Cabinet maintained that they had the
working classes behind them. I was loath to de
prive the working classes, which behaved in an
exemplary manner in 1914, of the statesman whom,
I had been told, they trusted.

The theory, constantly repeated to me in 1914
by the chief of the Civil Cabinet and the repre
sentative of the Foreign Office, that only Bethmann
had the support of the working classes, was finally
supplemented further by reports to me that the
Chancellor enjoyed the confidence in foreign
countries which was necessary to the conclusion of
peace. Thus it came about that Bethmann always
stayed iri office, until, finally, the Crown Prince
made the well-known investigation among the
party leaders which showed that the above-men
tioned theory was mistaken. This mistake was
made all the clearer to me when I read, at the
time of Bethmann's dismissal to which other fac
tors also contributed the most unfavorable opin-

134

BETHMANN

ions of him, especially in the Social Democratic
and Democratic press.

I do not wish to blame Bethmann with these
frank remarks, nor to exonerate others ; but, when
such important matters are discussed, personal
considerations must be ignored. I never doubted
the nobility of Bethmann's sentiments.

May I be allowed to say a few words here con
cerning the reform in the Prussian franchise, since
the handling of this by Herr von Bethmann is
characteristic of his policy of vacillation. During
the winter of 1914-15, when, following the bril
liant summer campaign, the hard, severe winter
trench-fighting had brought military movements
to a standstill, the extraordinary achievements of
all the troops and the spirit which I had found
among officers and men, both at the front and in
the hospitals, made such a profound impression on
me that I resolved to provide, for the tried, mag
nificent "Nation in Arms, n something in the politi
cal domain, when it returned home, which should
prove that I recognized what it had done and
wished to give the nation joy.

I often touched upon this theme in conversations
and suggested reforms in the Prussian franchise;
the man, said I, who returned home, after a strug
gle like this, with the Iron Cross perhaps of both
classes must no longer be "classified" at the polls.

At this juncture a memorial was submitted to me
by Herr von Loebell which proposed a reform in
the Prussian franchise on similar grounds. The
concise, clear, and convincing treatment of the sub-

135

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ject pleased me so much that I had a number of
gentlemen read the memorial, which took up, in
its original form, only general points of view,
without going into detail, and I was pleased to see
that it found approval with all whom I questioned
concerning it.

I had my thanks expressed to Herr von Loebell
through the chief of the Cabinet, von Valentini,
and caused Loebell to work out the matter in de
tail and make suggestions. This was done in the
spring of 1915. The memorial was very thorough
and dealt with a number of possibilities for the
franchise, without advising any one system. It
was approved by me, and sent by the chief of the
Cabinet to the Chancellor, with the command
that it be discussed, in the course of the year,
by the Ministers, and that their vote on it pos
sibly, also, some suggestions from them be laid
before me. The franchise law, of course, was
not to be proposed until after the conclusion
of peace.

EARLY GERMAN VICTORIES

Immediately/after that I went to Pless. The
battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, with its smashing vic
tory over the enemy, brought on the Galician-
Polish campaign, leading to the reconquest of
Lemberg, Przemysl and the capture of Warsaw,
Ivangorod, Modlin, Brest-Litovsk, etc., and com
pletely engaged my attention.

The Lusitania case, too, cast its shadow over
events, and Italy severed her alliance with us. So

136

BETHMANN

it is not to be wondered at if the franchise me
morial was pushed into the background.

The next winter, and the summer of 1916, like
wise, with their fighting on all fronts, the terrible
battle of the Somme, and the brilliant Rumanian
autumn and winter campaign, took me to all sorts
of places on the western and eastern fronts, even
as far as Nisch where the first memorable meet
ing with the Bulgarian Tsar took place and to
Orsova, so that I had no opportunity to take up
the matter of franchise reform with the care that
its importance demanded.

In the spring of 1917 I asked the Chancellor to
draw up an announcement of the reform, to be
made to the nation at Easter, since I assumed that
the Ministers had long since discussed it The
Chancellor drew up the text of the proclamation
at Hamburg, in agreement with the chief of the
Cabinet and myself ; he proposed that the method
of voting be left open for the time being, since he
was not yet quite sure about this. The Easter
proclamation appeared; it was based, like previous
treatments of the matter, on the idea that the re
form was not to be introduced until after the con
clusion of peace, because most of the voters were
away facing the enemy.

Party and press did what they could to postpone
the accomplishment of my purpose by recrimina
tions and strife, by bringing up the question of the
Prussian Reichstag franchise, and by the demand
for the introduction of the franchise bill while the
war was still in progress. Thus the question em-

137

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

barked upon its well-known and not very pleasant
course, which dragged itself out on account of the
interminable negotiations in the Landtag. It was
not until after the retirement of Herr von Beth-
mann that I learned through Loebell that the me
morial of 1915 had never been submitted to the
Ministers, but had lain untouched for a year and a
half in a desk drawer; that the Chancellor, influ
enced by the desires expressed in the country, had
dropped the various systems proposed and concen
trated upon the general (Reichstag) franchise, of
the eventual introduction of which he was, doubt
less, inwardly convinced.

In any event, the original basic idea was thor
oughly bungled by Bethmann's dilatoriness and
the strife among the parties. What I wanted was
to present a gift of honor, of my own free will, on
its triumphal return home, to my victorious army ?
to my "Nation in Arms," my brave Prussians, with
whom I had stood before the enemy.

CHANCELLOR'S DIPLOMATIC POWER

One of the results of Bethmann's marked in
clination toward control was that the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs was, under him, a mere
helper, so much so that the Foreign Office was
almost affiliated with the office of the Chancellor,
a state of affairs that made itself felt most especially
in the use made of the press department. Beth-
mann likewise asserted his independence decidedly
in his relations with me. Basing himself upon the
fact that, constitutionally, the Chancellor alone is

138

BETHMANN

responsible for foreign policy, he ruled as he
pleased. The Foreign Office was allowed to tell
me only what the Chancellor wished, so that it
happened sometimes that I was not informed con
cerning important occurrences.

The fact that this was possible is to be laid at
the door of the Constitution of the Empire. And
this is the right place for saying a word concern
ing the relations between the Emperor and the
Chancellor. In what follows I do not refer to my
relationship to Herr von Bethmann, but, quite
impersonally, to the difficulties in the relation
ship of the German Emperor to the Imperial
Chancellors, which are caused by the Imperial
Constitution.

I wish to call attention to the following points :

1. According to the Constitution of the Em
pire, the Chancellor is the director and representa
tive of the foreign policy of the Empire, for which
he assumes full responsibility; he has this policy
carried out by the Foreign Office, which is sub
ordinated to him, after he has reported on it to the
Emperor.

2. The Emperor has influence on foreign pol
icy only in so far as the Chancellor grants it to him.

3. The Emperor can bring his influence to
bear through discussions, information, suggestion,
proposals, reports, and impressions received by him
on his travels, which then take rank as a supple
ment to the political reports of the ambassadors or
ministers to the countries which he has personally
visited.

139

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

4. The Chancellor may act pursuant to such
action by the Emperor, and may make It the basis
of his decisions, whenever he is in agreement with
the Emperor's point of view. Otherwise he is sup
posed to maintain his own point of view and carry
it out (Kruger dispatch).

5. According to the Constitution, the Emperor
has no means of compelling the Chancellor or the
Foreign Office to accept his views. He cannot
cause the Chancellor to adopt a policy for which
the latter feels that he cannot assume responsibil
ity. Should the Emperor stick to his view, the
Chancellor can offer his resignation or demand that
he be relieved of his post.

6. On the other hand, the Emperor has no con
stitutional means of hindering the Chancellor or
the Foreign Office from carrying out a policy
which he thinks doubtful or mistaken. All he can
do, if the Chancellor insists, is to make a change in
the Chancellorship.

7. Every change of Chancellors, however, is
a serious matter, deeply affecting the life of the
nation, and hence, at a time of political compli
cations and high tension, an extremely serious
step, an ultima ratio (last resort) which is all the
more daring in that the number of men quali
fied to fill this abnormally difficult post is very
small.

The position of the Imperial Chancellor, which
was based on the towering personality of Prince
Bismarck, had assumed a serious preponderance
through the constantly growing number of posts

140

BETHMANN

under the Empire, over all of which the Chancel
lor was placed as chief and responsible head.

DISCLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY

If this is borne in mind, it is absolutely impossi
ble that anybody should still hold the Emperor
alone responsible for everything, as was done
formerly, especially toward the end of the war
and after the war, by critical know-it-alls and
carping revolutionists, both at home and in the
Entente countries. That, quite apart from every
thing personal, is a proof of complete igno
rance of the earlier Constitution of the German
Empire.

The visit of the Tsar to Potsdam in November,
1910, went off to the satisfaction of all concerned,
and was utilized by the Chancellor and Herr von
Kiderlen to get into touch with the newly ap
pointed Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, whom the
Tsar had brought with him. Apparently, the Rus
sian ruler enjoyed himself among us, and he took
an active part in the hunt arranged in his honor,
at which he proved himself an enthusiastic hunts
man. The result of the conferences between the
two statesmen seemed to promise well for the
future; both, after they had felt each other out,
harbored the hope of favorable relations between
the two countries.

During my spring visit to Corfu, the Melissori
troubles began, which riveted Greek attention
upon themselves. Corfu was well informed of the
constant smuggling of arms from Italy by way of

141

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Valeria into Albania, and there was a feeling in
Greek circles that machinations from across the
Adriatic, as well as from Montenegro, were not
without responsibility for what was happening.
It was also felt that the new Turkish Government
had not been wise in its handling of the Albanians,
who were very sensitive and suspicious; the former
Sultan Abdul-Hamid had realized this very well
and understood admirably how to get along with
the Albanians and to keep them quiet. Neverthe
less, there was no fear that more serious compli
cations would ensue.

At the beginning of 1911 I received a most cor
dial invitation from King George of England to
be present at the unveiling of the statue of Queen
Victoria, the grandmother of both of us. There
fore I went in the middle of May to London with
the Empress and our daughter. The reception on
the part of the English royal family and the people
of London was cordial.

The unveiling festivities were well arranged and
very magnificent. The big, round space in front
of Buckingham Palace was surrounded by grand
stands, which were filled to overflowing by invited
guests. In front of them were files of soldiers of
all arms and all regiments of the British army, in
full parade uniform, the cavalry and artillery be
ing on foot. All the banners of the troops were
arrayed at the foot of the statue.

The royal family, with their guests and their
suites, was grouped around the statue. King
George made a dedication speech which had a

142

BETHMANN

good effect, in which he made mention also of the
German Imperial couple.

Then, amid salutes and greetings, the statue was
unveiled; the Queen, in marble, seated upon a
throne, became visible, surmounted by a golden
figure of victory. It was an impressive moment.
Afterward the troops marched past, the Guards in
the van, then the Highlanders who, with their
gayly colored, becoming costume, gave an espe
cially picturesque touch to the military spectacle
then the rest of the soldiers. The march past
was carried out on the circular space, with all the
troops constantly wheeling: the outer wings had
to step out, the inner to hold back a most diffi
cult task for troops. The evolution was carried
out brilliantly; not one man made a mistake. The
Duke of Connaught, who had made all the mili
tary arrangements, deservedly won unanimous
applause.

FESTIVITIES IN ENGLAND

The remainder of our stay in England was de
voted to excursions ; we also enjoyed the hospital
ity of noble English families, at whose homes
there was an opportunity to hold intercourse with
many members of English nobility.

Special enjoyment in the domain of art was pro
vided by the King to his guests by a theatrical per
formance at Drury Lane Theater. A well-known
English play, "Money," was performed, by a com
pany especially assembled for the occasion, con
sisting of the leading actors and actresses of

143

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

London. As a surprise, a curtain fell between the
acts, painted especially for the occasion by a lady,
which depicted King George and me, life size, on
horseback, riding toward each other and saluting
militarily. The picture was executed with much
dash and was enthusiastically acclaimed by the
audience.

The performance of the actors and actresses in
"Money" was veritably masterly, since all con
cerned played their roles, even the smallest, to per
fection. In fact, it was a classic performance.

Another day I attended, at the Olympia track,
the sports of the British army and navy, which in
cluded admirable individual feats on foot and
horseback, as well as evolutions by bodies of troops
in close formation.

In describing the unveiling of the statue, as well
as the funeral of King Edward VII, I have con-*
cerned myself purposely with the externals and
pomp that are characteristic of such occasions in
England. They show that, in a land under par
liamentary rule, a so-called democratic land, more
importance is attached to well-nigh medieval
magnificence than in the young German Empire.

The French actions in Morocco, which were no
longer such as could be reconciled with the Al-
geciras Agreement, had once more engaged the
attention of the diplomats. For this reason the
Chancellor had requested me to find out, as soon
as opportunity should arise, what King George
thought about the situation.

I asked him if he thought that the French
144

BETHMANN

methods were still in accordance with the Alge-
ciras Agreement. The King remarked that the
agreement, to tell the truth, no longer was in force,
and that the best thing to do would be to forget it;
that the French, fundamentally, were doing noth
ing different in Morocco from what the English
had previously done in Egypt; that, therefore,
England would place no obstacles in the path of
the French, but would let them alone; that the
thing to do was to recognize the "fait accompli 7 ' of
the occupation of Morocco and make arrange
ments, for commercial protection, with France.

To the very end the visit went off well, and the
inhabitants of London, of all social strata, ex*
pressed their good will every time the guests of
their King showed themselves.

Thus the German Imperial couple was enabled
to return home with the best of impressions.
When I informed the Chancellor of these, he ex
pressed great satisfaction. From the remarks of
King George he drew the inference that England
considered the Algeciras Agreement no longer
valid and would not place any obstacles in the
way of the French occupation of Morocco.

From this the policy followed by him and the
Foreign Office arose which led to the Agadir case,
the last and equally unsuccessful attempt to main
tain our influence in Morocco. The situation be
came more serious during the Kiel regatta week.
The Foreign Office informed me of its intention to
send the Panther to Agadir. I gave expression to
strong misgivings as to this step, but had to drop

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

i

them in view of the urgent representations of the
Foreign Office.

In the first half of 1912 came the sending of Sir
Ernest Cassel with a verbal note in which Eng
land offered to remain neutral in case of an "un
provoked" attack upon Germany, provided Ger
many agreed to limit her naval construction pro
gram and to drop her new Naval bill, the latter
being darkly hinted at. Owing to our favorable
answer to this Lord Haldane was intrusted with
the negotiations and sent to Berlin. The negotia
tions finally fell through, owing to the constantly
more uncompromising attitude of England (Sir
E. Grey), who finally disavowed Lord Haldane
and withdrew his own verbal note, because Grey
was afraid to offend the French by a German-
English agreement and jeopardize the Anglo-
French-Russian understanding.

Here are the details of the case:

On the morning of January 29^ 1912, Herr Bal-
lin had himself announced to me at the palace in
Berlin and asked for an audience. I assumed that
it was a case of a belated birthday greeting, there
fore I was not a little astonished when Ballin, after
a short speech of congratulation, said that he had
come as an emissary of Sir Ernest Cassel, who had
just arrived in Berlin on a special mission and
wished to be received,

I asked whether it was a political matter, and
why, if so, the meeting had not been arranged
through the English ambassador. Ballin's answer
was to the effect that, from hints dropped by Cas-

146

BETHMANN

sel, he knew the matter to be of great importance,
and the explanation for Cassel's acting without the
intervention of the ambassador was because the
earnest desire had been expressed in London that
the official diplomatic representatives, both the
English and the German, should not be apprised
of the affair.

I declared that I was ready to receive Cassel
at once, but added that, should his mission have to
do with political questions, I should immediately
summon the Chancellor, since I was a constitu
tional monarch and not in a position to deal with
the representative of a foreign power alone with
out the Chancellor.

Ballin fetched Cassel, who handed me a docu
ment which, he stated, had been prepared with the
"approval and knowledge of the English Govern
ment." I read the short note through and was not
a little surprised to see that I was holding in my
hand a formal offer of neutrality in case Germany
became involved in future warlike complications,
conditioned upon certain limitations in the carry
ing out of our program of naval construction,
which were to be the subject of mutual confer
ences and agreements. Walking with Ballin into
the next room, I handed over the document for
him to read. After he had done so both of us ex
claimed in the same breath : "A verbal note 1"

It was plainly apparent that this "verbal note"

was aimed at the forthcoming addition to our

Naval law and designed in some way to delay or

frustrate it No matter how the matter was inter-

U 147

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

preted, I found myself confronted with a peculiar
situation, which also amazed Ballin. It reminded
me of the situation at Cronberg-Friedrichshof in
1905, when I was obliged to decline the demand,
made to me personally by the English Under Sec
retary, Hardinge, that we should forego our naval
construction.

SURPRISE AT BRITISH NOTE

Now, an intimate business friend of Edward
VII appears, without previous announcement
through official diplomatic channels, before the
German Emperor with a "verbal note" inspired
by the English Government, with explicit instruc
tions to evade all the diplomatic officials of both
countries. He hands over an offer from the Eng
lish Government to maintain neutrality in future
warlike complications provided certain agree
ments regarding limitation of naval construction
are made. And this is done by England, the
mother of "Constitutionalism"! When I pointed
this out to Ballin, he exclaimed: "Holy Constitu
tionalism! What has become of you? That is
'personal polities' with a vengeance!"

I agreed with Ballin to send at once for Herr
von Bethmann, in order that he might learn what
was transpiring and decide what to do in this
peculiar situation.

Bethmann was called up on the telephone and
soon appeared. At first the situation aroused in
him likewise a certain degree of astonishment; it
was interesting to watch the play of expression on

148

BETHMANN

his face as he was told about the matter. The
Chancellor suggested that Grand Admiral von
Tirpitz also be summoned, for the proper dis
patching of the business, and recommended that
an answer be drawn up in English, in the same
manner and form as the note delivered by Cassel,
and that it be handed to Sir Ernest, who wished to
return home that night. (English was chosen be
cause there was fear of obscurity and misunder
standing if the note were translated in London.)
The Chancellor asked me to draw up the note, since
I knew English best. After some objection I had
to make up my mind to be myself the writer of
the answer.

And now the following scene took place:
I sat at the writing table in the adjutant's room ;
the other gentlemen stood around me. I would
read a sentence from the note aloud and sketch out
an answer, which was, in turn, read aloud. Then
criticisms were made from right and left: one
thought the sentence too complaisant, another too
abrupt; it was thereupon remodeled, recast, im
proved, and polished. The Chancellor particularly
subjected my grammar and style to much torture,
owing to his habit of probing things philosophi
cally, to his methods of profound thoroughness,
which caused him to be most particular with every
word, in order that it, having been studied from
every angle, should later on afford nobody cause
for criticism.

After hours of work the note was finally finished
and, having been passed a couple of times from

149

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

hand to hand and then read aloud by me half a
dozen times more, it was signed.

When our group broke up, the Chancellor asked
Sir Ernest who was to be expected from England
to conduct the negotiations. Cassel replied that it
would certainly be a Minister, which one he did
not know perhaps Mr. Winston Churchill, Min
ister of the Navy, since the question was a naval
one. Then the Chancellor arranged further with
him that the unofficial method should be retained
and that Ballin should undertake to transmit all
the news regarding the matter which should ema
nate from England.

Sir Ernest expressed his lively gratitude for his
cordial reception and his satisfaction at the tenor
of our reply. Later Ballin informed me from his
hotel that Cassel had expressed himself as com
pletely satisfied over the successful outcome of his
mission, and that he would report to his Govern
ment the good impression made upon him.

When I thereupon conferred on the matter with
Admiral von Tirpitz we both agreed that the
Naval bill was in danger and, therefore, that we
must be very careful.

DIPLOMATIC PREPAREDNESS

In perfect secrecy the material was collected
which Admiral von Tirpitz was to present at the
negotiations; it consisted of a short historical
sketch of the development of the fleet and of the
increasingly difficult tasks devolving upon it; the
Naval law and its aims, nature, enactment, and ex-

150

BETHMANN

tension; finally, the contemplated Naval bill, its
meaning and the method of putting it through.

The Chancellor asked that the main negotiations
should be conducted at the palace in my presence.
In addition, I agreed with Admiral von Tirpitz
that he should speak English, as far as possible,
and that I, in case of difficult technical expres
sions, would interpret

Until England made known the name of the
negotiator, our time was spent in suppositions, and
Ballin informed us of combinations in connection
with which a number of names, even that of Grey,
came up.

At last the news arrived, through Ballin, that
Haldane the Minister of War, previously a law
yer had been intrusted with the conduct of the
negotiations and would soon arrive. General
amazement! Just imagine, "mutatis mutandis,"
that Germany had sent her Minister of War (at
that time von Heeringen) to London, instead of
Admiral von Tirpitz, for the discussion of a naval
matter !

When this point was discussed with Bethmann
and Tirpitz a number of suppositions were ad
vanced; the Chancellor said that Haldane was
known in England as a student of Goethe and as a
man versed in German philosophy and knowing
the German language, so that his choice was a
piece of politeness toward us. Tirpitz observed
that Haldane had formerly spent some time in
Berlin and worked with General von Einem at the
War Ministry, and hence knew the state of affairs

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

in Germany. I suggested that all that was very
well, but that the choice of Haldane showed that
England looked upon the question as purely politi
cal, since he knew only superficially about naval
affairs ; that the whole thing was probably directed
against Germany's naval policy in general and the
new Naval bill in particular; that it would be
well, therefore, not to forget this, in order that the
whole thing might not develop into a foreign
assault upon our right of self-determination as to
the strength of our defensive measures.

Haldane arrived and was received as an Im
perial guest. Ballin, who accompanied him,
solved the riddle of Haldane's choice on the basis
of information received by him from England.

He said that when Cassel had got back to Lon
don, reported on his reception, and handed over
the German reply, the impression made was so
favorable that no further doubt was entertained
there as to the satisfactory course of the negotia
tions and their conclusion in the form of an agree
ment; that, thereupon a keen dispute had arisen
among the Ministers, especially between Churchill
and Grey, as to who should go to Berlin and affix
his name to this great historical document, in case
the object should be achieved of making Germany
cbmpletely give up the further development of
her fleet; that Churchill thought himself the right
man for the job, since he was at the head of the
navy. But Grey and Asquith would not let their
colleague reap the glory, and, for this reason. Grey
stood for a while in the foreground another

152

BETHMANN

proof that it was politics rather than the number
of ships which was to play the leading role.

SELECTION OF CHURCHILL

After a while, however, it was decided that it
was more fitting to Grey's personal and official im
portance to appear only at the termination of the
negotiations, to affix his name to the agreement,
and as it was put in the information transmitted
from England to Ballin "to get his dinner from
the Emperor and to come in for his part of the
festivities and fireworks" which, in good Ger
man, means to enjoy the "Bengal light
illumination."

As it had been decided that Churchill was not to
get this in any event, it was necessary to choose
somebody for the negotiations who was close to
Asquith and Grey and who, possessing their com
plete confidence, was willing to conduct the nego
tiations as far as the beginning of the "fireworks" ;
one who, moreover, was already known at Berlin
and not a stranger in Germany. Churchill, to be
sure, qualified in this, for he had been present a
few times at the Imperial maneuvers in Silesia
and Wurttemberg as a guest of the Emperor. Bal
lin guaranteed the reliability of his London source
of information.

Before the negotiations began I once more
pointed out to Secretary of State von Tirpitz that
Haldane, in spite of being just then Minister of
War, probably had prepared himself for his task,
and had surely received careful instructions from

153

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

the English Admiralty, in which the spirit of
Fisher was paramount. In his Handbook for
English Naval Officers, Fisher had stated, among
other precepts well worthy of being remembered,
one which is characteristic of the Admiral, his de
partment and its spirit, which runs, word for word,
as follows: "If you tell a lie, stick to it"

Moreover, I said to Tirpitz, we must not forget
what an amazing adaptability the Anglo-Saxons
had, which fitted them for occupying positions
which had no relation to their previous life and
training. Furthermore, the interest in England in
the navy was generally so intense that almost every
educated man was an expert up to a certain point
on naval questions.

In the course of the negotiations Haldane proved
himself admirably well informed and a skillful,
tenacious debater, and his brilliant qualities as a
lawyer came to the fore. The conversation lasted
several hours, and brought about a general clarify
ing, as well as a preliminary agreement as to post
ponement of time limits of ship construction, etc.
The details concerning it are deposited in docu
ments at the Imperial Naval Office. Tirpitz was
splendid.

After some more conferences at which, like
wise, Ballin was present Haldane returned to
England. Ballin informed me that Haldane had
expressed himself to him as entirely satisfied with
the outcome of his mission, and had stated that in
about a week or two the first draft of the agree
ment could be sent to us.

*54

BETHMANN

Time passed the date set for the introduction
of the Naval bill approached. Tirpitz suggested,
in case the agreement were concluded previously,
that the Naval bill be altered accordingly; other
wise, that it be introduced without alteration.

SUSPECTS ENGLISH PURPOSES

At last we received, not the draft of the agree
ment, but a document asking all sorts of questions
and expressing a desire for all sorts of data, a
reply to which required many consultations and
much reflection. Little by little the suspicion
grew in me that the English were not in earnest
with regard to the agreement, since question fol
lowed question and details were sought which had
nothing directly to do with the agreement. Eng
land withdrew more and more from her promises,
and no draft of the agreement came to hand.

In Berlin a big agitation set in against the Naval
bill, Tirpitz and myself on the part of the Foreign
Office, and from other quarters, both qualified and
unqualified. The Chancellor also, who hoped to
achieve the agreement and affix his name to a docu
ment which would free Germany from "encircle
ment" and bring her into a regular and better re
lationship with England, carne out in favor of
dropping the Naval bill* But that would simply
have meant allowing a foreign power enormous
influence in matters of German national defense
and jeopardizing thereby the national right of self-
determination and our readiness for battle in case
of a war being forced upon us. Had we allowed

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

this it would have amounted to our consenting to
permit England, Germany's principal foe, to grant
us whatever she wished, after consulting her own
interests, without receiving ourselves the guar
anty of any equivalent concession.

In this confused state of affairs differences of
opinion and violent disputes arose, which, espe
cially in those circles which really knew little
about the navy, were conducted with much vio
lence and not always in a practical manner. Ad
miral von Tirpitz, all through that winter, which
was so hard a one for him and me, fought his fight
like a genuine, patriotic officer, realizing the situa
tion and seeing through his opponents with clear
vision and supporting me with complete convic
tion to the limit of his ability. All the Gov
ernment officials agreed that no foreign country
could be allowed any voice in helping decide what
we had or had not to do toward insuring our
protection.

The hope of bringing about the agreement grew
ever fainter; England continually showed lessen
ing interest and kept eliminating important parts
of her original verbal note. And so it came about
that Admiral von Tirpitz and I realized that the
whole proposal was merely a "maneuver."

The fight over the German Naval bill grew
steadily hotter. I happened at this time to meet
at Cuxhaven Doctor von Burchard, President of
the Hamburg Senate, whom I respected greatly,
as he was the very model of an aristocratic citizen
of a Hanseatic city, and who had often been con-

156

BETHMANN

suited by me in political matters. I described to
him the entire course of the affair and the disputes
in Berlin as to the introduction or nonintroduc-
tion of the bill, and asked him then to tell me, with
his usual complete frankness, what he thought the
right thing to do in the interest of the national
welfare, since I greatly desired to hear an objec
tive opinion, uninfluenced by the rival camps of
Berlin.

Doctor Burchard replied in his clear, keen,
pointed, convincing manner that it was my duty
toward the people and the fatherland to stick to
the bill ; that whosoever spoke against its introduc^
tion was committing a sin against them ; that what
ever we thought necessary to our defense must be
unconditionally brought into being; that, above
all else, we must never permit a foreign country
to have the presumption to interfere with us ; that
the English offer was a feint to make us drop the
Naval bill ; that this must, in no circumstances, be
allowed ; that the German nation would not under
stand why its right of self-determination had been
sacrificed ; that the bill must unquestionably be in
troduced ; that he would work in its favor in the
Federal Council (as indeed he did in a brilliant,
compelling speech) and also otherwise press its
acceptance in Berlin ; that the English would nat
urally resort to abuse, but that this made no differ
ence, since they had been doing so for a long time ;
that they certainly would not get into a war for
such a cause; that Admiral von Tirpitz was merely
doing his duty and fulfilling his obligations, and

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

that I should support him in every way; that the
Chancellor must give up opposing the measure,
otherwise he would run the risk of finally forfeit
ing public esteem on account of being "pro-
English."

Thus spoke the representative of the great com
mercial city, which was threatened before all
others in case of war with England. The genuine
Hanseatic spirit inspired his words.

Strangely enough, this opinion of Doctor
Burchard concerning the English offer has re
cently been corroborated to me in Holland by a
Dutchman who heard from Englishmen at that
time the English point of view. I and Tirpitz
guessed right the offer of neutrality, in case naval
expansion was curbed, was a political maneuver.

COUNTERCHARGES OF CHEATING

Soon news also came from Ballin that the mat
ter was not going well in England : that, according
to information received, a dispute had arisen- about
the agreement ; that there was dissatisfaction with
Haldane, who, it was said, had let himself be
cheated by Tirpitz 1 This was plain evidence of
the indignation felt because Tirpitz had not
walked into the trap and simply let the bill drop,
and that Haldane had been unable to serve up the
bill to the English Cabinet on a platter at tea time.
It is useless to say that there was any "cheating" on
Germany's part, but the reproach leveled at Hal
dane justifies the suspicion that his instructions
were that he should seek to "cheat" the Germans.

158

BETHMANN

Since his fellow countrymen thought that the re
verse was true, one can but thank Admiral von
Tirpitz most sincerely for having correctly
asserted the German standpoint to the benefit of
our fatherland.

Toward the end of March the fight about the
bill took on such violence that finally the Chan
cellor, on the 22d, asked me for his dismissal as I
stepped out of the vault in the Charlottenburg
Park. After long consultation and after I had
told him Doctor Burchard's view, the Chancellor
withdrew his request.

When, some time afterward, I paid a visit to
Herr von Bethmann in his garden, I found him
quite overcome and holding in his hand a message
from London. It contained the entire disavowal
of the verbal note delivered by Cassel, the with
drawal of the offer of neutrality, as well as of
every other offer, and at the end the advice that I
dismiss Herr von Bethmann from the Imperial
Chancellorship, since he enjoyed to a marked de
gree the confidence of the British Government!
Tears of anger shone in the eyes of the Chancellor,
thus badly deceived in his hopes; the praise ac
corded to him by a foreign government with which
Germany and he had just had such painful experi
ences hurt him deeply. For the second time he
offered me his resignation ; I did not accept it, but
sought to console him. I then ordered that the
ambassador in London be asked how he could have
accepted and forwarded such a message under any
conditions.

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Now the Chancellor was in favor of the bill, but
it was honorably proposed with the limitation
which it had been decided to impose upon it in
case of the conclusion of the agreement. In Eng
land, on the other hand, the full naval construction
program was carried out.

This "Haldane episode" is characteristic of
England's policy. This whole maneuver, con
ceived on a large scale, was engineered for the sole
purpose of hampering the development of the Ger
man fleet, while, simultaneously, in America,
which had an almost negligible merchant fleet; in
France, whose navy was superior in numbers to
the German; in Italy, in Russia, which also had
ships built abroad vast construction programs
were carried out without eliciting one word of pro
test from England. And Germany, wedged in be
tween France and Russia, certainly had to be at
least prepared to defend herself on the water
against those nations.

DEFENDS NAVAL PROGRAM

For this our naval construction program was ab
solutely necessary; it was never aimed against the
English fleet, four or five times as strong as ours,
and assuring England's superiority and security,
to equal the strength of which no sensible man in
Germany ever dreamed. We needed our fleet for
coast defense and the protection of our commerce;
for this purpose the lesser means of defense, like
U-boats, torpedo boats, and mines, were not suffi
cient In addition the coast batteries on the Baltic

1 60

BETHMANN

were so antiquated and miserably equipped that
they would have been razed within forty-eight
hours by the massed fire of the heavy guns of mod
ern battleships. Thus, our Baltic coast was prac
tically defenseless. To protect it the fleet was
necessary.

The Skagerrak (Jutland) battle has proved
what the fleet meant and what it was worth. That
battle would have meant annihilation for England
if the Reichstag had not refused up to 1900 all
proposals for strengthening the navy. Those
twelve lost years were destined never to be
retrieved.

Before we take our leave of Haldane I wish to
touch upon another episode in his activities. In
1906 he came, with the permission of the German
Government, to Berlin, to inform himself concern
ing the Prussian defense conditions, recruiting,
General Staff, etc. He busied himself at the Min
istry of War, where the Minister, General von
Einem, personally gave him information. After
about two or three weeks' work there he returned,
well satisfied, to England.

When, after the outbreak of the World War, the
"pro-German" Haldane, the friend of Goethe, was
boycotted and treated with such hostility that he
could no longer show himself in public, he had a
defense written of his term of office as Minister
of War by the well-known litterateur and journal
ist, Mr. Begbie, entitled Vindication of Great
Britain. Therein his services toward forming a
regular General Staff and preparing the British

1 6%

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

army for the World War are placed in a bright
light and emphasis is laid on the skill with which
he utilized the permission obtained from the
Prussian War Ministry in order to learn in
Germany about military matters and to reorgan
ize the British army and General Staff, to the
minutest detail and on the German model, for
the coming war against the erstwhile German
hosts.

Here we see the sly, adroit lawyer, who, shel
tered under the hospitality of a foreign country,
studies its military arrangements in order to forge
weapons against it out of the material and knowl
edge thus acquired. Quite characteristically the
book is dedicated to King Edward VII, whose
intimate, emissary, and tool Haldane was. In
those days Berlin saw in Haldane's mission a
"rapprochement" with England, toward which
Germans were always bending their efforts;
in reality, however, it was a "reconnoitering
expedition" under the very roof of the German
cousin. England showed her gratitude by
the World War, which Haldane helped to
prepare; in this case Haldane "cheated" the
Germans!

That is the history of the Haldane mission.
Later it was summarily maintained by all sorts of
ignorant dabblers in politics, belonging to the
press and the general public, that the promising
"rapprochement" with England through Haldane
had been wrecked by the obstinacy of the Emperor
and Admiral von Tirpitz and by theif clinging to

162

BETHMANN

the Naval bill against the wishes of all "sensible
counselors !"

KINGSHIP OF ALBANIA

At that time [in 1912] the question of the estab
lishment of an independent Albanian state and the
choice by the Powers of a head for it, was brought
to my attention also. A number of candidates
lusting for a crown had already presented them
selves before the tribunal of the Powers, without
getting themselves accepted; a number of candi
dates, considered by the Powers, were declined by
the Albanians. I looked upon the matter in itself
with indifference, and was of the opinion that as
in the case of every "creation of a nation" the
greatest possible attention should be paid to his
torical development, also to geographical peculiar
ities and the customs of the inhabitants.

In this peculiar land there has never been any
united nation under one ruler and one dynasty.
In valleys, encircled and cut off by high mountain
ranges, the Albanian tribes live separated to a con
siderable degree from onfc another. Their political
system is not unlike the clan system of the Scotch.
Christians and Mohammedans are represented in
equal numbers.

The custom of "vendetta" is an ancient one, sanc
tified by tradition, which is no less true of robbery
and cattle stealing. Agriculture is still in a back
ward stage of development, farming is in its in
fancy, the implements used therein date from
before the flood.

12 163

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

The head man of the clan dispenses justice in the
open, under the village tree, as it used to be done
once upon a time among the ancient Germans.
Every man is armed and most are excellent shots.
Whenever the head man of the clan turns up while
on a horseback tour through his territory in some
hamlet, the inhabitants expect a blessing from him
in the form of jingling coins, which sometimes are
scattered atibut by him from the saddle. This, of
course, is particularly customary at the outset of
a new Government's term, and great is the dis
satisfaction when it does not happen.

Up to the time of the Balkan War many Al
banians entered the Turkish service, where they
rose to high importance, being greatly prized on
account of their diligence and keen intelligence,
as well as their tenacious energy. They supplied
the Turkish administration with a large number of
officials, also with a certain percentage in the dip
lomatic corps and the army. The young Albanian
nobles were proud to serve in a splendid company
of palace guards of the Sultan, which scarcely had
an equal for size, martial appearance, and manly
beauty. These were partly relatives of the Sultan,
since the latter used to have noble Albanian women
of the principal clans in his harem in order that
he protected by blood brotherhood might be
safe from the "vendettas" of the clans, and, also,
that he might find out everything that might serve
to influence the feelings of the Albanian chieftains.
The desires of the Albanians which reached him
by this road for instance, as to supplies of arms

164

BETHMANN

and ammunition, school houses, building of high
ways, etc.---were thereupon granted in an incon
spicuous manner. Thus the Sultan was enabled
to keep the usually turbulent Albanians quiet and
loyal by means of "f amily ties."

With this knowledge of the state of affairs as
a foundation, I sought to bring my influence to
bear toward having a Mohammedan Prince
chosen, if possible perhaps an Egyptian Prince
not forgetting that he should have a well-lined
purse, which is an absolute necessity in Albania.
My advice was not heeded by the "Areopagus of
the Powers/' whose members were not bothering
themselves with the interests of the Albanians, but
seeking, first of all, for pretexts and opportunities
for fishing in the troubled Albanian waters in such
a way as to benefit their own countries.

OPPOSED CHOICE OF GERMAN

Therefore, I was not at all pleased when the
choice fell upon Prince William of Wied. I
esteemed him as a distinguished, knightly man of
lofty sentiments, but considered him unfitted for
the post. The Prince knew altogether too little
about Balkan affairs to be able to undertake this
thorny task with hope of success. It was particu
larly unpleasant to me that a German Prince
should make a fool of himself there, since it was
apparent from the start that the Entente would
place all sorts of obstacles in his path. Upon being
questioned by the Prince, I told my cousin all my
doubts, laying stress upon the difficulties awaiting

165

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

him, and advised him urgently to decline. I could
not command him, since the Prince of Wied, as
head of the family, had the final word in the
matter.

After the Prince's acceptance of the candidacy
offered him by the Powers, I received him in the
presence of the Chancellor. A certain irresolution
in the bearing of the Prince, who contemplated
his new task with anything but enthusiasm,
strengthened the resolve in me and the Chancellor
to try hard once more to dissuade the young candi
date from ascending the recently invented Al
banian "throne." But in vain. The ambitious,
mystically excited wife of the Prince saw in Al
bania the fulfillment of her wishes. And "ce que
femme veut, Dieu le veut" ("what woman wishes,
God wishes").

Carmen Sylva [the Queen of Rumania] also
worked toward having him accept; she went so far,
in fact, as to publish an article in the newspapers
beginning "Fairyland Wants Its Prince."

So even the best meant warnings were useless. I
had also strongly advised the Prince not to go to
Albania before the settlement of the financial
question, since the reasons which had led me to
suggest the selection of a rich ruler now came to
the fore. The Prince was not very wealthy and
the Powers had to supply him with a "donation,"
concerning the amount of which, and the method
of paying it by installments, an unpleasant quarrel
arose. At last a part payment was made.

Danger lurked for the Prince and his eventual

166

BETHMANN

Government in the person of Essad Pasha, an un
reliable, intriguing, greedy soldier of fortune, who
himself had designs on the Albanian throne and
held sway over a certain number of armed ad
herents. From the start he was an opponent of
the new Prince and he plotted secretly with Italy,
which was not favorably inclined toward the
Prince of Wied. Now, it would hare been quite
natural and a matter of course if the new ruler
had taken with him in his suite men from Ger
many whom he knew and who were faithful to
him. But he did not. An Englishman and an
Italian were attached to his person as "secretaries"
and they had nothing better to do than to work
against his interests, to give him bad advice and
to intrigue against him.

REQUIREMENTS OF A RULER

During the time that the Prince of Wied was
making his preparations the excellently written
pamphlet of an Austrian General Staff officer,
dealing with his travels in Albania, appeared.
The officer described, in a lively and clear style,
the geographical and climatic drawbacks, the
population and customs, the general poverty and
backwardness of the land.

He pointed out that a future ruler of the land
inust in no circumstances reside on the coast, but
must show himself to the inhabitants and travel
about in the country. Owing to the primitive
means of transportation, he went on, the lord of
the land must sit all day on horseback and ride

167

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

through his domain, having at his saddle bow the
famous "bag of sequins" mentioned in all Oriental
tales and legends, in order to sway public opinion
in his favor in the places visited by the expected
shower of gold. The ruler must be sure, the author
continued, to bind some of the clans of the region
closely to himself, so as to have at his beck and call
an armed force for asserting his will and overcom
ing any opponents wishing to rebel, since this was
the only way to maintain his power, in view of the
utter lack of "troops" or an "army" in the Euro
pean sense of the word.

This me^nt that the ruler of Albania must lead
at first a nomadic, horseback life, and, in addition,
provide himself with a wandering camp, with tents
and other accessories and the necessary horses.
Plenty of men adapted to this sort of life might
have been found in his squadron of the Third
Guard Uhlan Regiment, since many of his Uhlans,
who were very fond of the Prince, had declared
that they were ready to accompany him as volun
teers. Surely, they would have served him better
and been more useful to him than what he did in
preparing to take over the overlordship of Al
bania, without knowledge of the country.

I advised my cousin urgently to study this
pamphlet and to follow its recommendations, espe
cially with regard to his residence, which should
be fixed at some point as far as possible from the
warships of the Powers, in order that he might not
be forced to act under their pressure and arouse
suspicion among the Albanians that their ruler

168

BETHMANN

needed these ships for protection against his sub
jects. Did the Prince ever read the pamphlet?
In any event, the course adopted by him subse
quently was contrary to its advice and the advice
given him by me.

The Prince and his wife journeyed to Albania,
and things turned out as I had foreseen. Accord^
ing to reports describing the arrival of the sover
eign couple, the Princess, although she "was a
German, addressed the assembled Albanians from
her balcony in French, since they understood no
German ! The "court" remained at Durazzo under
the guns of the foreign ships. The Prince did not
travel on horseback through the land, nor did he
scatter gold sequins about not even from his bal
cony on the day of his arrival nor did he push
Essad out of the way. So the adventure ended as
one might imagine.

I have gone into some detail in describing my
opinion and attitude toward the question of the
choice of the ruler of Albania because, from every
possible quarter, false rumors have been circulated
for the purpose of imputing to me motives which
were utterly foreign to me. In this matter, also, I
gave honest advice when questioned, based on
sound knowledge of mankind.

The year 1912 also witnessed the meeting with
the Tsar at Baltisch-Port, whither I repaired on
board my yacht at the invitation of Nicholas II.
Our two yachts anchored side by side, so that visit
ing from ship to ship was easy. The Tsar, his
children, and his entire entourage vied with one

169

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

another in evidences of good will and hospitality.
The Russian and German escorting squadrons
were inspected, turn and turn about, by the Tsar
and myself together, and we took our meals either
at the Tsar's table or mine.

We spent one morning on land near Baltisch-
Port The Eighty-fifth "Viborg" Infantry Regi
ment, whose commander I was, had been drawn up
in a field and was inspected first in parade forma
tion, then in company and battalion exercises,
which were carried out in as satisfactory a manner
as was the parade with which the evolutions were
brought to a close.

The regiment, composed of four battalions,
made an excellent impression. It was in field
equipment brown-gray blouses and caps and
the latter, worn jauntily cocked over one ear by all,
gave to the sun-browned, martial faces of the
strong young soldiers a bold air which brought
joy to the heart of every soldier who gazed 'upon
them.

In the course of the brilliant and uncommonly
amiable reception which I met with on this occa
sion I received no hint of the Balkan alliance, con
cluded a short time before.

It was my last visit in Russia before the out
break of the war.

CHAPTER VI

My Co-workers in the Administration

IT behooves me to remark that I found particular
pleasure in working with His Excellency von
Stephan and in dealing with him. He was a
man of the old school, who fitted in so well with
me that he always grasped my ideas and sugges
tions and afterward carried them out with energy
and power, owing to his firm belief in them. A
man of iron energy and unflagging capacity for
work and joyousness ; endowed, moreover, with re
freshing humor, quick to perceive new possibil
ities, never at a loss for expedients, well versed in
political and technical matters, he seemed to have
been born especially for creative co-operation. I
trusted him implicitly, and my trust in him was
never betrayed. I learned much from my associa
tion with this stimulating, shrewd counselor.

The Post-Office Department reached an un-
imagined degree of excellence and aroused the ad
miration of the whole world. The great invention
of the telephone was utilized to the limit, was ap
plied extensively to the public service, and was
developed so as to facilitate it Likewise in the
domain of building Stephan brought about a de-

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

cided Improvement, which received my approval
and support

All great state building projects depended on
the vote of the investigating "Academy of Build-
ing," which, at that time, was a slow-moving, cum
brous, and backward body. I had already had ex
periences of my own with it The "White Draw
ing Room," originally merely provisional, had
been put up without much attention to style it
had been intended at first for an Indian mas
querade, a "Lalla Rookh n festival, in honor of
the Grand Duchess Charlotte, daughter of Fred
erick William III, and her husband, later Tsar
Nicholas I. An investigation instituted at my
order showed the material to be spurious and in
ferior; the structure was in the worst possible state
of decay and in danger of collapse ; a new one was
needed.

With the co-operation and collaboration of the
Empress Frederick, projects and plans were made,
and, finally, a big model was provided by Building
Councilor Inne the "modern Schlxitef," as the
Empress Frederick used to call him which won
unanimous approval. Only the Building Acad
emy opposed wearisome objections, stating that the
"White Drawing Room" ought to be preserved "in
its old historical beauty," and required no altera
tions. When the new structure was completed,
However, it also met with the approval of the gen
tlemen who had been formerly so critical.

Herr von Stephan also was at loggerheads with
the Academy of Building. He wanted to alter

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MY CO-WORKERS

many post offices, or build entirely new ones, espe
cially in the big cities, but, in view of the fearful
slowness and devotion to red tape of the aforesaid
official body, he used to receive no answers at all,
or else refusals, when he brought these matters to
its attention. The rule of thumb was supreme
there. Herr von Stephan was of the opinion that,
in its buildings as well as in other directions, the
youthful German Empire must give an impression
of power, and that the Imperial post offices must
be built accordingly; he believed that they should
harmonize with the general style of the towns
where they were located, or, at least, conform to
the style of the oldest and most important build
ings there. Nor could I do otherwise than agree
with such a view.

ACADEMY'S SHACKLES BROKEN

At last there Came a rupture with the aforemen
tioned Academy. His Excellency von Stephan
lost patience and informed me that he had freed
his office, and the buildings erected by it, from the
supervision of the Academy; that he had even
formed a committee from among his own archi
tects and officials for supervising purposes; and
that all he asked of me was to subject the more im
portant plans for buildings to a final inspection.
I did so willingly.

Stephan was an enthusiastic huntsman, so that I
had additional opportunities, while on the court
hunts, to enjoy association with this refreshing,
unchanging, faithful official and counselor.

173

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Among the Ministers whom I particularly
esteemed His Excellency Miquel took first place.
He it was who, as iny Finance Minister, put
through for Prussia the great reform which placed
the land on a sound basis and helped it toward
prosperity. Intercourse with this astute political
expert gave me great pleasure, and a wealth of
teaching and stimulus.

The degree to which Miquel wtas versed in all
possible matters was astounding. In conversation
he was brisk, humorous, and keen in elucidating
and arguing on a subject, in addition to which a
strong historical bent ran, like a red thread,
through his quotations. In history and ancient
languages he was marvelously well equipped, so
that, in his reports, he was able often to hark back
to the times of the Romans and quote from his store
of knowledge not out of Buchmann 1 pieces of
Latin in support of his arguments. Even when he
was instructing he was never tiresome on account
of his brilliant dialectics, but used to hold his
hearers spellbound to the very end.

It was His Excellency Miquel likewise who in
cited me to favor the great canal projects and sup
ported me when the Prussian Conservatives op
posed the Central [Rhine-Weser-Elbe] Canal,
and caused the failure of the plan to build it He
lent strength to the King and made the latter
depide not to let up in this fight until victory was
won. He knew, as I did, what blessings the canals

*A German philologist who compiled a well-known boot of
quotations.

174

MY CO-WORKERS

in Holland and the splendid canal network of
France had brought to those lands and what a re
lief they were to the ever more hard-pressed rail
ways. In the World War we might have had a
splendid east-to-west artery of transportation for
ammunition, wounded, siege material, supplies,
and the like, which would have made it possible, bj t
thus relieving the railways, for the latter to trans
port troops on an even greater scale moreover,
this would have lessened the shortage of coal. In
time of peace also, for which the canal was des
tined, it would have been most beneficial.

Minister von Miquel was a most ardent enthusi
ast for the Imperial German idea and the German
Empire of the Hohenzollerns : I lent an attentive
ear to his spirited handling of this theme. He was
a man who, clinging to the old tradition, thought
in a great German, Imperial way; he was fully
adequate to the requirements and demands of the
new era, rightly appreciating when these were of
value.

From the start I concerned myself with the
completion of the railway system. From the re
ports relating to national defense and the com
plaints of the General Staff, as well as from
personal observation, I knew of the absolutely
incredible neglect suffered by East Prussia in the
matter of railways. The state of affairs was abso
lutely dangerous, in view of the steady, though
gradual, reinforcing of the Russian troops facing
our frontier, and the development of the Russian
railway system.

175

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

During the last years of his reign Emperor
William the Great had commanded Field Mar
shal Moltke to report on the situation, since the
Russian armies, under the influence of France, were
being posted ever more conspicuously on the east
ern frontier of Prussia, arousing apprehension as
to the possibility of irruptions of great masses of
Russian cavalry into Prussia, Posen, and Silesia.
Quartermaster-General Count Waldersee and I
were present at the reading of this report From
it came the resolve to shift Prussian troops east
ward and to push toward completion the neglected
railway system.

The measures ordained by Emperor William I
and begun by him required time, particularly as
the new railway bridges over the Vistula and
Nogat had to be built by the military authorities
in the teeth of strong official opposition (May-
bach). Since the railways were considered a "na
tional pocketboofc," there was a desire to build
only "paying" lines, which caused prejudice
against outlays for military lines designed for
the defense of the fatherland, since it diminished
the fine surplus funds by which such great store
was laid.

Not until my reign were the plans of Emperor
William I brought to realization. Anyone tak
ing up a railway map of 1888 will be amazed at
the lack of railway connection in the east, particu
larly in East Prussia, especially if he compares it
with a 1914 map showing the development in the
intervening years. If we had had the old net-

176

MY CO-WORKERS

work, we should have lost our eastern territory
in 1914.

Unquestionably, Minister von Maybach ren
dered valuable services in the promotion and de
velopment of the railway system. He had to take
into account the wishes and demands of the rapidly
developing industrial sections of Western Ger
many, in doing which he naturally considered
military desires also, as far as he could. But dur
ing his regime Eastern Germany was very badly
treated with regard to railway lines, bridges, and
rolling stock. Had there been mobilization at
that time, it would have been necessary to transfer
hundreds of locomotives to the east in order to
maintain schedules capable of meeting even part
of the requirements of the General Staff. The
only means of communication with the east were
the two antiquated trestle bridges at Dirschau and
Marienburg. The General Staff became insistent,
which brought quarrels between it and Maybach.

Not until Minister Thielen came into office was
there a change, occasioned by his self-sacrificing
work, for which thanks are due him. Realizing
correctly what the military requirements were, he
pushed forward the completion of the eastern rail
ways. Thielen was an able, diligent, thoroughly
reliable official of the old Prussian type, faithful
to me and enjoying my high esteem. In common
with Miquel, he stood faithfully by the side of
his sovereign in the fight for the Central Canal.
Characteristic of him were the words which he
said in my presence, before a big assembly of

177

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

people, at the opening of the Elbe-Trave Canal :
"The Central Canal must and will be built" Re
lations between him and me remained harmonious
until his retirement

Despite the railway construction work in the
western part of Germany, there were in that region
likewise serious gaps in the network of railways,
from the point of view of mobilization and deploy
ment of troops, which had long since needed
remedying. The Rhine, as far up as Mainz, was
crossed by one railway bridge only; the Main
could be crossed only at Frankfort For a long
time the General Staff had been demanding the
remedying of these conditions. Fortunately, gen
eral traffic moved in the same direction for in
stance, if a traveler coming from the west wished
to reach one of the watering places in the Taunus
Mountains, or some place on the railway along
the right bank of the Rhine, he had to go as far
as Frankfort, and then return in the same direc
tion whence he had come, although at Mainz he
had almost b^en opposite Wiesbaden.

Minister Budde was the man chosen for the
accomplishment of this work As chief of the
railway department of the General Staff he had
IjOng since attracted my attention by his extraordi
nary capacity for work, his energy, and his prompt
ness in making decisions. He had often reported
to me on the gaps in our railway system, which
would hamper quick deployment of troops on
two fronts, and always pointed out the prepara
tions being made by Russia and France, which we

178

MY CO-WORKERS

were in duty bound to meet with preparations of
equal scope, in the interests of the national defense.

The first consideration, of course, in railway
construction had been the improvement and facili
tation of industry and commerce, but it had not
been able to meet the immeasurably increased
demands of these, since the great network of
canals, designed to relieve the railways, was not
in existence. The war on two fronts, which
threatened us more and more and for which our
railways were, technically speaking, not yet ready,
partly from financial-technical reasons made
necessary that more careful attention should be
paid to military requirements. Russia was build
ing, with French billions, an enormous network
of railways against us, while in France the rail
ways destined to facilitate the deployment of
forces against Germany were being indefatigably
extended by the completion of three-track lines
something as yet totally unknown in Germany.

Minister Budde set to work without delay. The
second great railway bridge over the Rhine at
Mainz was constructed, likewise the bridge over
the Main at Costheim, and the necessary switches
and loops for establishing communication with the
line along the right bank of the Rhine, and with
Wiesbaden; also the triangle at Biebrich-Mosbach
was completed. Budde's talents found brilliant
scope in the organization and training of the rail
way employees, whose numbers had grown until
they formed a large army, and in his far-sighted
care for his subordinates.

13 179

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

I respected this vigorous, active man with all
my heart, and deeply regretted that a treacherous
ailment put an end to his career in the very midst
of his work.

In His Excellency von Breitenbach I acquired
a new and valuable aid and co-worker ia my plans
regarding the railways. In the course of years he
developed into a personage of high eminence.
Distinguished and obliging, of comprehensive at
tainments, keen political insight, great capacity
for work and untiring industry, he stood in close
relationship to me.

His co-operation with the General Staff in mili
tary matters was due to his tl orough belief in the
necessity of strengthening our means of defense
against possible hostile attacks. Plans were made
for the construction of three new Rhine bridges,
at Riidesheim, Neuwied, and the Loreley, which
were not completed until during the war they
were named, respectively, after the Crown Prince,
Hindenburg, and Ludendorff. In the east, great
extensions of railway stations, bridges, and new
railway lines were built, some of them while the
war was in progress.

Other important works carried out by Breiten
bach in the west were the great railway bridge at
Cologne, to replace the old trestle bridge; a new
bridge, by the Beyen Tower, for freight traffic;
and new railways in the Eiffel Mountains. More
over, at my special suggestion, a through line was
built from Giessen to Wiesbaden, which included
reconstruction of the stations at Homburg and

1 80

MY CO-WORKERS

Wiesbaden and the building of a loop around
Frankfort and HSchst In addition, trains were
provided with through cars from Flushing to the
Taunus.

To show that it is impossible to please every
body, I wish to observe in passing that we were
violently attacked by the hotel proprietors of
Frankfort, who were naturally not at all pleased
at this elimination of Frankfort and of the neces
sity, existing previously, for passengers to change
trains there, since they lost thereby many custom
ers formerly obliged to spend a night in some
Frankfort hotel. This element brought particu
larly strong opposition to bear against the loop
line around Hochst

The battle concerning the Central Canal was
decided at last in favor of my plans. Under
Breitenbach, construction on it was pushed for
ward by sections with great energy. Those por
tions of this canal which it had been possible to
place in operation have fully met expectations.

During this period, also, the extraordinarily
difficult extension and deepening of the Kaiser
Wilhelm Canal, almost equivalent to building an
entirely new waterway, was brought to comple
tion, likewise the great Emden sea lock. These
were remarkable achievements in the domain of
bridge and lock construction, which aroused the
admiration of the world ; in the matter of locks,
for instance, those built at this time far surpassed
the locks of the Panama Canal in size. The diffi
cult tasks were brilliantly and thoroughly com-

181

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

pleted by the officials in charge; in so far as
the construction work was in the hands of the
Empire, it was carried out mostly with the super
vising co-operation of the Prussian Ministry of
Transportation.

I often went to Breitenbach's home, where I
had an opportunity, thanks to him, of having in
teresting talks on commercial-political and eco
nomic subjects with a highly intelligent circle, of
meeting a lot of eminent men and discussing
important questions. The plans and sketches of
all the larger railway stations, locks, and bridges
were submitted to me before the work of building
or rebuilding them was begun, and reports con
cerning them were made to me.

I have intentionally gone into detail in this mat
ter in order to show the following: First, how a
monarch can and must influence the development
of his realm by personal participation; second,
how, if he makes his selections quite indepen
dently of party reasons, he can place able men at
the head of the various departments; third, how,
by the honest co-operation of these men with the
sovereign, whose complete confidence they enjoy,
brilliant results can be achieved. Everything that
we did together was aboveboard and honest; noth
ing mattered but the welfare and development of
the fatherland, its strengthening and equipment
for competition in the world market.

As was natural, I had close and lasting relations
in the regular course of events with the Ministry
of Public .Worship and Instruction. Herr von

182

MY CO-WORKERS

Gossler and Herr von Trott may surely be con
sidered the most important and prominent occu
pants of this post In this Ministry a co-worker
almost without equal arose in the person of Min
istry Director Althoff, a man of genius.

I had been made acquainted with the dark side
of the high-school system of education by my own
school experiences. The predominantly philo
logical character of the training led, in the whole
educational system as well, to a certain one-
sidedness.

When I was at the Cassel High School in
1874-77 I had observed that, although there was
great enthusiasm for 1870-71 and the new Empire
among the boys, there was, nevertheless, a distinct
lack of the right conception of the German idea,
of the feeling "civis Germanus sum" ("I am a
German citizen") which I impressed later upon
my people at the laying of the foundation-stone of
the Saalburg. To create such sentiments and
awaken them in the rising generation and to lay
the foundations for them firmly in the young
hearts was a task somewhat beyond the powers of
the teaching staff, in view of the fossilized, anti
quated philological curriculum.

There was great neglect in the department of
German history, which is exactly the study through
which young hearts may be made to glow, through
which the love of one's native country, its future
and greatness, may be aroused. But little was
taught of more recent history, covering the years
since 1815. Young philologists were produced,

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

but no German citizens qualified for practical
co-operation toward building up the flourishing
young Empire.

In other words, no youths who were consciously
Germans were being turned out. In a small read
ing club composed of my classmates I often tried
to inculcate the idea of the Greater Germany, in
order to eliminate parochial and similar concep
tions which hampered the German idea. Admiral
Werner's Book of the German Fleet was one of
the few works by means of which the living feel
ing for the German Empire could be fanned into
flame.

Another thing that struck me, in addition to
the one-sidedness of the education in the schools,
was the tendency, among youths planning their
careers in those days, to turn their attention to
becoming Government officials, and always con
sider the profession of lawyer or judge the most
worthy goal.

This was doubtless due to the fact that the con
ditions obtaining in the Prussia of olden days
still had their effect in the youthful German Em
pire. As long as the state consisted, so to speak,
of government and administration, this tendency
among German youths in the shaping of their lives
was understandable and justified; since we were
living in a country of officials, the right road for
a youag man to select was the service of the state.
British youths of that time, self-reliant and made
robust by sports, were already talking, to be sure,
of eoloiiml conquests, of expeditions to explore

184

MY CO-WORKERS

new regions of the earth, of extending British
commerce; and they were trying, in the guise of
pioneers of their country, to make Great Britain
still stronger and greater, by practical, free action,
not as paid hirelings of the state. But England
had long been a world empire when we were still
a land of officials; therefore, the youth of Britain
could seek more remote and important goals than
the German.

Now that Germany had entered into world
economics and world politics, however, as a by no
means negligible factor, the- aspirations of German
youth should have undergone a more prompt
transformation. For this reason it was that I, dur
ing the later years of my reign, used to compare,
with a heavy heart, the proud young Britons, who
had learned much less Latin and Greek than was
required among us, with the children of Germany,
pale from overstudy. To be sure, there were even
then enterprising men in Germany brilliant
names can be cited among them but the concep
tion of serving the fatherland, not by traveling
along a definite, officially certified road, but by
independent competition, had not yet become suffi
ciently generalized. Therefore I held up the
English as an example, for it seems to me better
to take the good where one |inds it, without preju
dice, than to go through! the world wearing
blinkers.

With these considerations as a basis I won for
my German youths the School Reform against
desperate opposition from the philologists, inside

185

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

and outside the Ministry and school circles. Un
fortunately, the reform did not take the shape
which I hoped, and did not lead to the results
which I had expected.

The Germanic idea in all its splendor was first
revealed and preached to the astonished German
people by Chamberlain in his Foundations of the
Nineteenth Century. But, as is proved by the col
lapse of the German people, this was in vain.
To be sure, there was much singing of "Deutsch-
land iiber alles," but Germans, obeying the com
mands of their enemies, allowed the Emperor to
fall and the Empire to be broken to pieces ; and,
placing themselves under the orders of Russian
criminals vastly inferior to them in culture, they
stabbed their own army in the back while it was
still fighting valiantly.

Had Germans of all classes and conditions been
educated to feel joy and pride in their fatherland,
such a degradation of a great nation would have
been unimaginable.

This degradation which, it must be admitted,
occurred under remarkable, extremely difficult
circumstances is all the more difficult to under
stand i;m view of the fact that the youth of Ger
many, although it was impaired in health by
overstudy, and not so toughened by sports as the
English, achieved brilliant feats in the World
War, such as were nowhere equaled before.

The years 1914-18 showed what might have
been made out of the German people had it only
developed its admirable qualities in the right di-

186

MY CO-WORKERS

rection. The 4th of August, 1914, the heroes of
Langemark, countless splendid figures from all
classes, rise up from the chaos of the long war to
show what the German can do when he throws
away Philistinism and devotes himself, with the
enthusiasm which so seldom reveals itself com
pletely in him, to a great cause. May the German
people never forget these incarnations of its better
self; may it emulate them with its full strength
by inculcating in itself the true German spirit!

In the post of Minister of Justice I found His
Excellency Friedberg, the intimate, faithful friend
of my father, whom I had known ever since my
youth, when he was a welcome guest in the home
of my parents. This simple, affable man enjoyed
with me the same consideration which had been
shown him by my parents.

In later years I had frequent and welcome deal
ings with His Excellency Beseler, who also en
abled me to hear informal discussion at his house
of many an interesting legal problem by promi
nent lawyers, and to come into touch with legal
luminaries. I felt no particular inclination toward
the lawyers in themselves since pedantry, remote
ness from actualities and doctrinaire leanings
often assert themselves in the domain of the law
altogether too much for my taste but the com
pilation of the Citizens* Law Book interested me
greatly. I was present at sessions dealing with it,
and was proud that this fundamental German
work should have been brought to completion in
my reign.

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

When I met the Lord Chief Justice of Eng
land, while I was on a visit to that country, at the
home of Lord Haldane, I asked that great jurist
what he thought of the administration and inter
pretation of the law in Germany. His answer ran
thus: "You pronounce judgment too much ac
cording to the letter of the law ; we according to
the spirit and content of the law."

I have ofter pointed out how unfortunate it was
that we have not been able to introduce, in police
cases connected with traffic, streets, etc. the
prompt procedure of the English "police court."
For, in England, punishment in such cases is meted
out on the very next day, whereas in Germany
months often elapse, what with gathering of evi
dence and examination of witnesses, until, finally,
some insignificant sentence is pronounced long
after the case has been forgotten. I should also
have liked to introduce into Germany the heavy
penalties for libels published in the press which
are customary in England.

I have often pointed out how unfortunate it was
Prince, with Minister of Finance Scholz, and had
taken part in sessions wherein that famous man,
His Excellency Meinecke, figured. Meinecke was
Under Secretary of State in the Finance Ministry
and had, therefore, much to do with other Min
isters, since finances were an important thing
everywhere. He had achieved a certain degree of
fame because he as he thought was always able
smilingly to find the best way out of tight places.

Seholz was faithful to his duty and able, but he

1 88

MY CO-WORKERS

did not succeed in making the dry substance of
taxes and the like particularly interesting and
pleasant to me, nor was there any change in this
state of affairs until the versatile Miquel took
charge of the Finance Ministry- When Miquel
reported to me concerning the Prussian financial
reform, he suggested three plans : one modest, one
medium, one ambitious. To the delight of the
Minister I decided, without hesitation, for the
third. Both the monarch and the Minister were
filled with satisfaction when the reform was car
ried out

The Minister of the Interior, Herr von Putt-
kamer, had been forced to retire during the ninety-
nine days, to the great sorrow of him who was then
Crown Prince. He was an able, tried old Prus
sian official ; one of those Pomeranians of the old
school, filled with loyalty to the King a noble
man through and through. Rumor had it that
the Empress Frederick had driven him from office
by a plot, but this is not true. The Empress, with
her inclination to English Liberalism, doubtless
did not like the old-time Prussian Conservative,
yet she was not at all to blame for his going.
Prince Bismarck pushed him aside, perhaps out
of consideration for the Empress Frederick.

I was deeply interested in forestry and its im
provement along practical lines, especially as new
gold reserves could be created for the state by
reforestation,

Next to Herr von Podbielski, the ablest Min
ister df Agriculture and Forests was Freiherr von

189

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Schorlemer. Just as Herr von Podbielski bent
his efforts toward creating great stretches of for
ests In the east, in order to keep off the east wind
by a compact forest zone and thus improve our
climate, and, at the same time, provide a natural
protection against Russian attacks, so Herr von
Schorlemer opened up the eastern forest reserva
tions by extensive construction of roads, and by
thus facilitating the transportation of wood helped
Germany greatly in making headway in competi
tion against wood from Russia.

Both Ministers sought, in co-operation with me,
to improve our splendid Prussian forestry person
nel and better living conditions among them, and
to help toward promotions in their ranks all of
which these officials, zealous in their work and
faithful to their King, fully deserved.

The influx of large sums into the state's pocket-
book depended indeed on the honesty, industry,
and reliability of these men. I expected much
toward the restoration of the fatherland from the
statesmanlike shrewdness and ability of Herr von
Schorlemer, who was always quite conscious of
the goal at which he was aiming. 1

I learned much about forestry from Head For
esters Freiherr von Hovel ( Joachimsthal,. Schorf-
heide) and Freiherr Speck von Sternburg (Szitt-
kohnen, Rominten) on my many hunting expedi
tions with these excellent huntsmen and admin
istrators.

2 J* "en* death, which snatched him away m the midst of
labors^ is a serious Joss to the fatherland.
190

MY CO-WORKERS

Let me say a word here regarding a Russian
curiosity in the domain of preserving wild game.
The Tsar, who had heard a great deal about the
fine antlers of the stags at Rominten, wished to
have some of the same sort at Spala, in Poland.
Freiherr von Sternburg was sent to the Spala
hunting lodge one summer in order to give advice
regarding this project

He was received very cordially by a general,
who had charge of the hunting there and lived at
the lodge. Sternburg noticed that all the apart
ments, even those not inhabited, were always kept
heated. When he spoke of the enormous waste
of wood occasioned by this, the general shrugged
his shoulders and remarked that one never could
tell, the Tsar might put in an appearance some
day, after all. A gamekeeper, who was a German,
Was assigned to Sternburg, since the general did
not know his way about on the reservation and was
quite ignorant of game feeding.

In the course of his tours about the place Stern
burg observed a number of places where meadows
could be turned into pastures or good feeding
places could be installed. He drew attention to
the need of such arrangements, having noticed that
the deer had already begun to shed their horns to
a considerable extent, thereby causing much dam
age to the trees.

But the gamekeeper shook his head sadly and
remarked that he had already reported all that,
but in vain, since the hay for the deer had to be
brought by rail from the Black Sea and the ship-

191

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ments sometimes either did not arrive at all or
were greatly delayed and arrived spoiled. But
nothing would be done to alter this, continued the
gamekeeper, since too many people made a good
thing out of this transporting of the hay, which
was paid for at huge prices.

He also told how after he had called attention
to the many splinters of wood found in the intes
tines of the deer, in order to prove that they were
insufficiently fed and that feeding places must be
provided a committee of animal doctors had been
brought from St. Petersburg to investigate the
matter. The said committee lived and ate for
weeks in Spala at the Tsar's expense, shot many
deer, examined them, and held sessions; and the
upshot of all this was a report that the animals
had wood in their stomachs, which proved that
they could live on wood, for which reason feeding
places would be superfluous and the hay from the
Black Sea would suffice to supplement the wood.
And there the matter remained, in spite of Stern-
burg's visit!

When I heard this yarn, I involuntarily thought
of an anecdote which Prince Biilow especially de
lighted to tell in connection with his sojourn at St.
Petersburg. While there, he had attended the
salon of Madame Durnovo, where society used
often to gather. One day a prominent general
was complaining to the hostess that he had been
trapped in a money matter, which had brought
him much unpleasantness from "above." Appar
ently he wished, by his mournful description,

192

MY CO-WORKERS

to arouse sympathy for his bad luck, but Ma
dame Durnovo retorted, in her rough way:
"Mon cher General, quand on fait des saletes, il
faut qu'elles reussissent!" ("My dear General,
when you play dirty tricks it is necessary that they
be successful!")

.As Secretary of State in the Imperial Postal
Department likewise, Herr von Podbielski, after
I had chosen him and declined a number of other
candidates, did excellent work, treading worthily
in the footsteps of Stephan. Very practical; en
dowed with the business sense and a great knowl
edge of business ; well versed and clever in finan
cial matters ; of innate administrative talent, and,
at the same time, quick to fight; caustically witty;
a good speaker and debater he worked with zeal
and skill, often as a pioneer, particularly in matters
of world postal service, wireless telegraphy, etc.
This former colonel in the Ziethen Hussars made
a name for himself in the service of his fatherland
which will never be forgotten.

An amusing contrast to his career is that of a
Russian Hussar officer under Nicholas I. This
Tsar, being full of anger against the Holy Synod,
had driven away the man at the head of it. Shortly
afterward he inspected the Hussar Body Guard
Regiment, commanded by Colonel Count Protas-
soff. The immense satisfaction of the Tsar at the
splendid appearance and maneuvering of the fine
regiment found expression in the words, amazing
alike to the commander and his men : "Thou hast
maneuvered thy regiment magnificently, and, as

193

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

a token of my satisfaction, I name thee Procurator
of the Holy Synod, which thou must put into good
shape for me!"

Mention must be made here of another excellent
and worthy man, Minister Moller. He came from
Bielefeld, like Hinzpeter, and was bound to my
old teacher by lasting ties of friendship. In the
legislature he was one of the leaders of the Na
tional Liberals, by whom he was highly esteemed,
as he was in the Reichstag, on account of
his upright, distinguished Westphalian character
istics and his great experience in the commercial-
political domain.

When Imperial Chancellor Biilow suggested
Moller to me as Minister I remarked that he was
a party man and member of the Reichstag. The
Chancellor said that the National Liberals would
be pleased at Moller's appointment I observed
that the state Ministry of the Prussian King could
not and must not be a party Ministry, but must
stand above the parties in entire independence of
them; that I esteemed Moller personally very
much, but, should he become Minister, every
member of the legislature would have the am
bition to become one likewise; that, through
Moller's appointment, the ambitions of the other
parties to obtain ministerial chairs would also
be aroused and nobody could foresee the conse
quences ; that, moreover, Moller would be greatly
missed in the Reichstag, from which I did not
wish to take him on account of his influence with
all parties.

194

MY CO-WORKERS

Despite these objections and my advice against
it, Bulow stuck to his idea. Moller became Min
ister, and, as such, stood very well with me. But
what I had prophesied occurred comparatively
soon: Minister Moller was obliged to retire by
circumstances partially connected with the inner
workings of his party.

14

CHAPTER VII

Science and Art

THE broad and many-sided field whose care
devolved upon the Ministry of Public Wor
ship and Instruction embracing art, science, re
search, medical matters, etc. always aroused
my lively interest and enlisted my efforts in its
behalf.

Special pleasure was afforded me by the devel
opment of the Technical High School. The in
creasing importance of technical matters drew ever
larger numbers of the ablest youths to institu
tions of learning of this description, and the
achievements of the teachers there and of the
young engineers who were graduated constantly
Brought new laurels to the German name.

Among the teachers at Charlottenburg one of the
most prominent and best known all over the world
was Professor Doctor Slaby. Until his death he had
constant dealings with me and kept me informed
concerning the newest inventions by means of cap
tivating discourses. These were given not only in
his laboratory, but also in the quiet hunting lodge in
the forests of Brandenburg, where I, together with
the Empress, surrounded by a few intimates, used

196

SCIENCE AND ART

to listen eagerly to Slaby's words. Slaby was also
dear to me as an individual and caused me much
mental enjoyment by his simple, clear views on
every possible sort of thing in this world, which he
could always express in the most stimulating and
enthralling manner. Slaby meant much to me,
and I felt grateful affection for him up to the time
of his death.

Influenced by the achievements of the technical
high schools and of such men as Slaby, Intze, and
so on, I resolved to grant the high schools the same
privilege of representation in the Prussian upper
house as was enjoyed by the universities. But the
universities protested vehemently against this to
the Minister of Public Worship and Instruction,
and there ensued a violent fight against the clas
sical-scientific arrogance of the savants, until I
finally enforced my will by a decree. Slaby
received the news from me by telegraph in his
laboratory while he was delivering a lecture,
and gave it to the students, who burst into wild
cheers. The technical high schools have shown
themselves worthy of the honor conferred upon
them.

In view of the constantly more violent fight for
the markets of the world and its outlets, it became
necessary, in order to utilize the wisdom of the
leaders of German science in this direction, to pro
vide them with more freedom, quiet, possibility
for working, and materials. Many savants of
importance were hampered in research "work by
their activities as teachers, so that the only time

197

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

they had left over for research was their vacation.
This state of affairs resulted in overwork and over
burdening, which had to be stopped.

CHEMICAL RESEARCH

Attention was turned first to improvements in
the domain of chemistry. Minister von Trott and
Director of the Ministry Althoff, having grasped
the state of affairs with clear understanding, made
possible for me the establishment of the Kaiser
Wilhelm Society and drew up the statutes gov
erning it In the short time of its existence it has
achieved brilliant results and given me an oppor
tunity, at its general meetings, to become ac
quainted with eminent men in all branches of
knowledge with whom I thereafter entered into
regular intercourse. I also visited their labora
tories, where I could follow the progress of their
labors. New laboratories were founded, others
subsidized from the contributions of the senate
and members of the organization.

I was proud of this creation of mine, since it
proved a boon to the fatherland. The inventions
due to the research of its members benefited the
entire nation. It was a peace-time achievement
with a great and most promising future, which,
under the guidance of Herr von Trott, was in most
excellent hands; unfortunately, the war robbed
me of this joy, along with all others. Nowadays
I must do without the intercourse with my men
of learning of my association, and that is a cruel
blow to me. May it continue to live and labor

198

SCIENCE AND ART

for the benefit of research and the good of the
fatherland!

I had to face a severe fight in getting Professor
Harnack summoned to Berlin. The theologians
of the Right and the Orthodox element protested
vehemently. After I had again obtained full in
formation from Hinzpeter and he had closed his
opinion with the words that it would be most
regrettable for Berlin and Prussia if I backed
down, I insisted upon the summoning of Harnack,
and summoned he was.

Nowadays it is impossible to understand the
opposition to him. What a man Harnack is I
What an authoritative position he has won for
himself in the world of the mind J^ What benefit,
what knowledge, intercourse with this fiery in
tellect has brought to me ! What wonders he has
achieved, as head of the Royal Library and dean
of the senate of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, where
he, the theologian^ delivered the most learned
and most substantial talks on exact sciences, re
search, inventions, and chemistry. I shall always
look back with pleasure on the personality of
Harnack and on his labors.

Professor Erich Schmidt of the University of
Berlin was also a friend of mine and was often at
my home; I owe many an enjoyable evening to the
learned discourses of this savant

Professor Schiemann enjoyed my particular
confidence. An upright man, a native of the Baltic
Provinces, a champion of the Germanic idea
against Slavic arrogance, a clear-sighted politi-

199

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

cian and brilliant historian and writer, Schiemann
was constantly asked by me for advice on political
and historical questions. To him I owe much
good counsel, especially regarding the East He
was often at my home and often accompanied me
on journeys as, for instance, to Tangier and he
heard from me in our talks much important con
fidential matter not yet known to others on polit
ical questions. His unshakable capacity for keep
ing his mouth shut justified my trust in him. It
was a source of satisfaction to me to appoint this
tried man curator of the University of Dorpat,
after the liberation of the Baltic Provinces.

KAISER'S RUSSIAN FORESIGHT

How well he and I agreed in our political yiews
regarding Russia is illustrated by the following
incident: After the Peace of Portsmouth^ between
Russia and Japan, brought about by me in con
junction with President Roosevelt in 1905^ there
was much official (Foreign Office) and unofficial
puzzling of heads at Berlin as to what political
line Russia would take. In general it was thought
that Russia, angered at her defeat, would lean
toward the West and hence toward Germany
in order to find there new connections and strength
to help her in striking a blow for revenge against
Japan and reconquest of her lost territory and
prestige.

My opinion was quite different but I could not
make the official world share it I emphasized
the following points: That the Russians were

200

SCIENCE AND ART

Asiatics and Slavs; being the first, they would
be inclined to favor Japan, in spite of their defeat;
being the second, they would like to ally them
selves with those who had proved themselves
strong. Hence I thought that, after a while, Rus
sia, despite the Bjoko Agreement, would join
Japan, not Germany, and turn later against Ger
many. On account of these "fantastic" ideas, I
was actually ridiculed, officially and unofficially.

I summoned Schiemann and questioned him on
this subject, without revealing to him what I
thought about it I was much pleased when his
answer agreed absolutely with the views held by
me. For a long time Schiemann and I stood al
most alone when this weighty matter of foreign
politics came up in discussions.

The event justified us. The so-called "Russian
experts" of Berlin, as well as the official world,
were mistaken.

During the very first years of my reign there
was occasion for much important building work.

First, there was the question of erecting a worthy
monument over the tomb of my grandparents.
Since the old mausoleum at Charlottenburg was
inadequate, it was necessary to erect an addition.
Unfortunately, the funds left by Emperor William
the Great for such "extra construction" the so-
called Extra Construction Fund had been used
up during the ninety-nine days on something else.
Hence I was obliged to burden the Crown revenues
with unforeseen building expenses. The mauso
leum of my parents at Marly was erected by the

301

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Empress Frederick, according to her own sketches
and designs, and for this, too, I had to provide the
funds.

A thorough examination of the royal palaces
including those in the provinces had revealed,
particularly at the palace in Berlin, such deplor
able conditions in sanitation, comfort, and so on,
that there could be no more delay in remedying
them. In the course of my thirty years' reign I
restored these palaces to good condition work
ing in accordance with carefully prepared bud
gets, examined, corrected, and supervised by
myself with the help of architects (such as Ihne),
and of artists, with due regard for the traditions
of my ancestors all of which gave me much
trouble and tried my patience, but also provided
me with a great deal of enjoyment

ARCHITECTURAL INTERESTS

In restoring the Berlin palace, the Empress
Frederick, with her sure, keen eye for the proper
style and her sound judgment, helped materially
in offsetting the harm and neglect dating from
bygone days. My mother's expression of her view
ought surely to be of general interest: "Any style
is good so long as it is pure." Ihne used to call
the eclecticism of the 'nineties "a peu pres style"
(the "almost style"). The restoration of the Pic
ture Gallery, the last work of Herr Ihne who
died, unfortunately, all too soon was not com
pleted until during the first half of the war. The
palace of my forefathers, erected at much pains

SCIENCE AND ART

and a source of pride to me, was later bombarded,
stormed, sacked, and devastated by revolutionary
hordes.

These artistic building enterprises, as well as the
already-mentioned restoration of the White
Drawing Room, belong among the duties of repre
sentation devolving upon every Government, be
it absolute, constitutional, or democratic in form.
They afford a criterion of the national culture and
are a means of encouraging artists and, through
them, the development of art

During my vacations I busied myself with arch
aeology and was active in excavation work. Here
I kept in view one basic idea: to discover the roots
from which ancient Greek art developed and to
erect or find a bridge in the endeavor to establish
the cultural influence of the East on the West
It appeare^ to me that Assyriology was important,
since from it might be expected an elucidation and
vitalizing of the Old Testament, and, hence, of
the Holy Scriptures. Therefore, I accepted with
pleasure the offer of the presidency of the German
Orient Society and devoted myself to the study of
its work, which I promoted to the best of my
ability, never missing one of its public lectures on
the results of its explorations. I had much to do
with those at the head of it, and caused detailed
reports to be made to me of the excavations at
Nineveh, Assur, and Babylon, in Egypt and in
Syria, for the protection and facilitation of which
I often personally brought influence to bear on
the Turkish Government

203

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Professor Delitzsch, a member of the society
gave his well-known and much-attacked lecture
on "Babel and Bible," which, unfortunately, fell
upon the ears of a public as yet too ignorant and
unprepared, and led to all sorts of misinterpreta
tions, some of them in church circles.

I strove hard to clear up the matter. Since I
realized that the importance of Assyriology, then
enlisting the efforts of many prominent men, in
cluding clergymen of both religions, was not yet
understood and appreciated by the general public,
I had my trusted friend and brilliant theater di
rector, Count Hiilsen-Haesler, produce the play
"Assurbanipal," after long preparation, under the
auspices of the German Orient Society. Assyri-
ologists of all countries were invited to the dress
rehearsal; in the boxes, all mixed up together,
were professors, Protestant and Catholic clergy
men, Jews and Christians. Many expressed to me
their thanks for having shown, by this perform
ance, how far research work had already pro
gressed and for having, at the same time, revealed
more clearly to the general public the importance
of Assyriology.

My sojourn at Corfu likewise afforded me the
pleasure of serving archaeology and of busying
myself personally with excavation. The acci
dental discovery of a relief head of a Gorgon near
the town of Corfu led me to take charge of the
work myself. I called to my aid the experienced
excavator and expert in Greek antiques, Professor
Ddrpfeld, who took over the direction of the ex-

204

SCIENCE AND ART

cavation work. This savant, who was as enthu
siastic as I for the ancient Hellenic world, became
in the course of time a faithful friend of mine
and an invaluable source of instruction in ques
tions relating to architecture, styles, and so on
among the ancient Greeks and Achaeans.

"ILIAD" AS A GUIDE BOOK

It was a joy to hear Dorpfeld read and elucidate
the old Homeric poems, and establish, by means
of a map and following the hints and descriptions
of the poet, the location of the old Achaean settle
ments destroyed later by the Doric migration. It
appeared that the names of the old places had
often been transferred by the dispossessed inhab
itants to the new places. This made the identifi
cation of the location more difficult. Neverthe
less, Dorpfeld had rediscovered the location of a
whole series of them, with the help of his Homer,
which he carried in his hand like a Baedeker, hit
ting upon it by following the minute geographical
descriptions given by Homer.

This interested me so much that I took a trip
by water, with the Empress, in the company of
Dorpfeld, in order to put the matter to the test,
We went to Leukas (Ithaca) and visited, one after
another, the places made famous by the "Odys
sey," while Dorpfeld read from his Homer the
descriptive text referring to each. I was amazed
and had to admit that the region and the descrip
tion tallied exactly.

The excavations begun by me in Corfu under

2O|

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Dorpfeid's direction had valuable archaeological
results, since they produced evidence of an ex
tremely remote epoch of the earliest Doric art.
The relief of the Gorgon has given rise already
to tnany theories probable and improbable
combined, unfortunately, with a lot of superfluous
acrimonious discussion. From all this, it seems to
me, one of the piers for the bridge sought by me
between Asia and Europe is assuming shape.

I sent reports regularly to the Archaeological
Society, and I also brought the well-known Pro
fessor Caro from Athens to work with me. I was
busy with preparations for lectures to be deliv
ered before the society during the winter of
1914-15, and with searching discussions on many
disputed questions, which I hoped to bring toward
a solution "sine ira et studio." It was a pleasure
to me to be visited almost regularly, at Corfu, by
English and American archaeologists, former pu
pils of Dorpfeld, who helped zealously in throw
ing light on the difficult problems which often
came up. Since they were at work in Asia Minor,
I was deeply interested in hearing what impor
tance they attached to the Asiatic influence on early
Greek art as a result of their discoveries and
how readily they recognized a connection with the
East in the finds made at Corfu. In 1914, Pro
fessor Duhn of Heidelberg visited the excavations
at Corfu and, after thorough investigation, gave
his support to the riews held by Dorpfeld and me.
I shall tell in a separate piece of writing about the
result of my Corfu excavations.

206

SCIENCE AND ART

That was the sort of thing which, in the spring
of 1914, occupied the thoughts of the German
Emperor, who, lusting for robbery and conquest,
is accused of having bloodthirstily brought on the
World War. While I was exploring and discussing
Gorgons, Doric columns, and Homer, they were
already mobilizing against us in the Caucasus and
Russia. And the Tsar, at the beginning of the
year, when asked about his travel plans, had re
plied : " Je resterai chez moi cette annee, car nous
aurons la guerre!" ("I shall stay at home this year,
for we are going to have war I")

CHAPTER VIII

My Relations with the Church

MUCH has been written and said about my
relations with the Church. Even when I
was still a prince and a student at Bonn, I realized
the harmful influence of the "Kulturkampf " in its
last phase. The religigu? tiff, did so much toward
antagonism that once, for example, I was directly
boycotted, while on a hunting expedition, by mem
bers of leading noble Rhenish-Westphalian fam
ilies of the Rhineland belonging to the Ultra-
Montane party. Even as far back as that I re
solved, in the interests of the national welfare, to
work toward creating a modus vivendi such as
would make it possible for people professing the
two creeds jolBoe peacefully with each other. The
"Kulturkampf," as such, had come to an end be
fore the beginning of my reign.

I strove patiently and earnestly to be on good
terms with the Bishops, and I was on very friendly
terms with several, especially Cardinal Kopp,
Archbishop Simar, Doctor Schulte, Prince-Bishop
Bertram, Bishop Thiel, and, last but not least,
Archbishop Faulhaber and Cardinal von Hart-
mann. All of these were men far above the aver-

208

MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

age and an ornament to the episcopate, who gave
proof during the war of their patriotic devotion
to Emperor and Empire. This shows that I had
succeeded in clearing away the mists of the "Kul-
turkampf" and enabling my Catholic subjects,
like others, to rejoice in the Empire, in accordance
with the motto, "suum cuique" ("to each his own' 3 ) .
I was bound particularly closely all my life to
Cardinal Kopp, Prince-Bishop of Breslau. He
always served me loyally, so that my relationship
to him was most trusting. Of much value to me
was his mediation in dealings with the Vatican,
where he stood in high honor, although he cham
pioned absolutely the German point of view,

FRIENDSHIP FOR POPE LEO XIII

Probably little is known by the general public
of the friendly, trusting relationship that existed
between me and Pope Leo XIII. A prelate who
was close to him told me later that I had won the
confidence of the Pope on my first visit by the
absolute frankness which I showed toward him
and with which I told him things which others
intentionally kept from his ears.

Receptions by the Pope were conducted with
tremendous pomp. Swiss and Noble Guards, in
brilliant uniforms, servants, chamberlains, and
ecclesiastical dignitaries, were present in large
numbers a miniature representation of the might
of the Roman Catholic Church.

After I had traversed the courts, halls, and draw
ing-rooms, in which all these men had arrayed

209

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

themselves, I seated myself opposite the Pope
himself, in his little, one-windowed study. The
distinguished gentleman, with the fine, noble-
featured old face, whose eyes gazed piercingly at
his visitor, made a deep impression upon me. We
discussed many timely subjects. I was greatly
pleased that the Pope spoke appreciatively and
gratefully of the position occupied in Germany by
the Catholic religion and its adherents, adding the
assurance that he, for his part, would contribute
toward having the German Catholics yield to no
other Germans in love for their fatherland and in
loyalty.

Pope Leo XIII gave evidences of friendliness
toward me whenever he could. For instance, on
the occasion of one of my visits to Rome, he ac
corded my suite and servants the honor of a special
audience; he sent Prince-Bishop Kopp as Papal
Delegate on the occasion of the consecration by me
of the portal which I had had added to the ca
thedral at Metz, and was so kind as to inform me
of the naming of Archbishop Fischer of Cologne
as Cardinal, which was done to celebrate that day.

On the occasion of the

to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of his ac
cession to the Papacy, I sent a special mission to
convey my congratulations to the Pope y at the
head of which was Freiherr von Loe, for many
years intimately acquainted with him.

that and only a few months

before his death I paid my third and last visit

*A..^-r'*.r- . , %,, , ,,'*** K WOT., , ..-** ^, ,,,^ ,*

to the JPoge, Though he was very weak, this

210

MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

ninety-three-year-old man came up to me, hold
ing both his hands outstretched. Concerning this
visit, which was characterized by great cordiality on
both sides, I immediately jotted down some notes,
which recently came into my possession again.

The Pope said, among other things, that he could
not but give his full approval to the principles
according to which I governed ; that he had fol
lowed with interest my methods of governing and
recognized with pleasure that I had built up my
rule on a foundation of firm Christianity; that
such lofty religious principles underlay it that it
behooved him to ask the blessing of Heaven upon
myself, my dynasty, and the German Empire, and
to grant me his apostolic benediction.

"SWORD OF CATHOLIC CHURCH"

It was of interest to me that the Pope said to
me on this occasion that Germany must become
the sword of the Catholic Church. I remarked
tfiat the old Roman Empire of the German nation
no longer existed and that conditions had changed.
But he stuck to his words.

Then the Pope went on to say that he must
thank me once more for my unflagging attention
to the welfare of my Catholic subjects; that he
had heard about this from so many sources that he
was glad to tell me personally how grateful both
he and the German Catholics were for this atten
tion to their interests ; that he could assure me that
my Catholic subjects would stand by me, in good
and bad times, with absolute fidelity. "Us reste-

15 211

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ront absolument et infailliblement fideles" ("They
will remain absolutely and infallibly faithful").

I rejoiced greatly at these words of appreciation
from such an exalted source. I answered that I
considered it the duty of a Christian sovereign to
care for his subjects to the best of his ability, irre
spective of creed; that I could assure him that,
during my reign, everybody could profess his
religion without interferencFand fulfill InFcmties
fow^rSTnT&cd^^ic^i overlord; that this was
a fundamental principle of my life, from which I
could not be swerved,

Because I showed my CathoHj^
men from the very beginning that I wished to
allow them c^^kte^lr^^opi in the exercise of
their religion, a ^JJterspk in

the land and th^all^^ the "Kultariampf"

disappeared more and more. But I did not con
ceal from myself the fact that, despite all polite
ness and friendliness, the prelates, with the sole
exception of Cardinal Kopp, still continued to
look upon me as the Emperor, and I was com
pelled to take into account that, in the Catholic
south and west^ this idea would never quite vanish.
Grateful acknowledgment has repeatedly been
made to me of the fact that the Catholics were as
well off, during my reign, as they could possibly
desire ; but

on mixed marriages, and
party in politics, were cer
tainly a^gnjhat the antiheretical tendency still

212

MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

This made all the more intense my desire
the jSnnjznioa of the Pr^^tant Churches first,
in Prussi^men iiT^Germany, finally, in all
My endeavors, in conjunction with the

Chief Ecclesiastical Councilor, the General Su
perintendent, and so on, to find means of effecting
this union, were most earnest. I hailed the Eisen
ach Conference with joy and followed its pro
ceedings with interest. I assembled all the Gen
eral Superintendents for the consecration of the
Church at Jerusalem and also was able to greet in
vited deputations from Sweden, Norway, and so
forth; and I did likewise on the occasion of the
consecration of the Berlin cathedral, where,
among many other deputations, the Church of
England was represented by the Bishop of Ripon
(W. Boyd-Carpenter), the pastor of Queen Vic
toria of England, equally prominent as a writer
and preacher.
Whenever ossble 1 worked toward com-

promise^ closer relations and union, yet nothing
3efinite resulted. Though church union in Prus
sia has been a success, Lutherans and Reform
ists kept apart in other sections of the fatherland.
Many local rulers kept sharp watch over their
rights in relation to religions and, owing to this,
were hostile to a closer union of the different
creeds within their territory. Therefore, despite
my endeavors, the^Gg^rmaii. J^rotestant Church
was not able to unite and make common cause
againsM^ Only through

tEeemergency brought on by the revolution was

213

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

this made possible. On Ascension Day,
my great joy, the "German Evangelical Church
Union" was solemnly formed at the Schloss
Church at Wittenberg.

DOCTOR DRYANDER'S INFLUENCE

During the first years of my military service at
Potsdam I had felt deeply the inadequacy of the
sermons, which often dealt only with dry dog
matic matter and paid too little attention to the
person of Christ In Bonn I became acquainted
with Doctor Dryander, who made an impression
on me lasting throughout my life. His sermons
were free from dogma, the person of Christ was
their pivotal point, and "practical Christianity"
was brought into the foreground.

Later I brought him to Berlin and soon had
him appointed to a post at the Cathedral and in
my palace. Dryander was by my side for years,
until long after the 9th of November, standing
close to me spiritually, and bringing to me spir
itual consolation. We jjf ten talked on religious
matters and thrashed out thoroughly the tasks and
thefuture of the Protestant Church. The views

of Dryan3er m^IS^^t^powcfful^ clear, and of
truly evangelical strength made of him a pillar
and an ornament of his Church, and a faithful co-
worker with the Emperor, to whom he was closely
bound, in the interests of the Church and its
development

Since the gth of November, Doctor Dryander
also has been exposed to persecutions, but he has

214

MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

stood his ground courageously; the hopes, belief s,
and trust of his King are with him andjjhe Evan
gelical Chi^chT~~ The Church must again raise
up the broken nation inwardly according to the
gospel of "Ein'feste Burg ist unser Gott."

I cannot allow to pass without remark the in
fluence exerted by the work translated at my in
stigation of the English missionary Bernard
Lucas, entitled Conversations with Christ; as well
as the sermons on Jesus by Pastor Schneller
(Jerusalem), and the collections of sermons
called The Old God Still Lives and From Deep
Trouble, by Consistorial Councilor Conrad.
These brought us much inspiration and comfort
by their vital ability to absorb and hold readers
and hearers.

The fact that I could dealjwith religious and
church questions with complete objectivity "sine
ira et studio" isjluejto my excellentjeacher, Pro
fessor Doctor Hinzpeter, a WestphaljaiL Calyin-
ist He caused his pupil to grow up and live with
the Bible, eliminating, at the same time, all dog
matic and polemical questions; owing to this,
polemics in religion have remained alien to me,
and expressions like that autocratic one, "ortho
dox," are repulsive to me. As to my own religious
convictions, I set forth what they were years ago,
in a letter to my friend, Admiral Hollmann,
made public at the time, part of which is repro
duced at the end of this chapter.

I was enabled to bring joy to the hearts of my
Catholic subjects when I presented the plot of

215

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ground known as the "Dormition," acquired by me
from the Sultan in 1898 as a result of my sojourn
in Jerusalem, to the German Catholics there. The
worthy, faithful Father Peter Schmitz, representa
tive of the Catholic Society in Jerusalem, ex
pressed to me the heartfelt thanks of the German
Catholics on the spot in eloquent words at the
ceremony of taking possession.

THE CHURCH IN JERUSALEM

When I conferred with him as to future build
ing operations and as to the selection of persons
to occupy the place, the old expert on Jerusalem
advised me to select none of the order of monks
there, since all were more or less mixed up in the
intrigues and quarrels concerning the "loci
sacri" (sacred spots). After my return a delega
tion of the German Knights of Malta, under
Count Praschma, appeared before me to express
their gratitude. The design for the church, made
by a very talented Cologne architect and skill
fully adapted to the local style, was submitted to
me. After the completion of the church I de
cided that the Benedictine monks of Beuron
should take over the "Dormition"; they did so in
1906, also taking over the monastery built next
the new St Mary's Church.

I was on friendly terms for many years with
the Benedictine monks of the Beuron Congrega
tion, with whose Archabbot, Wolter, I had be
come acquainted at Sigmaringen. In mediaeval
times the order always stood well with the Ger-

216

MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

man Emperors, of whom scarcely one failed to
visit, in connection with his journeys to Rome,
the magnificently situated Monte Cassino. When
the Benedictine monks asked permission to estab
lish a settlement on the Rhine I had the splendid
Romanesque abbey of Maria Laach unused at
the time turned over to them. The order,
which counts among its members excellent artists,
including Father Desiderius, has brought new
glory to the abbey, which had fallen into neglect
and decay, by magnificent interior decorations.
Often have I visited Maria Laach and rejoiced in
the progress of its restoration, as well as in con
versations with the intelligent abbots and in the
hearty, simple reception on the part of the faith
ful brethren.

When I visited the monastery of Monte Cassino
I became acquainted, in the person of Archabbot
Monsignor Krug, with a man of extraordinary
mental gifts and comprehensive culture, who had
traveled a great deal about the world. He could
express himself with equal fluency in Italian, Eng
lish, and French, and his mother tongue, German.
In his address to King Victor Emmanuel of Italy
and me, he pointed out that nearly all the German
Emperors, as well as the Lombard Kings before
them, had paid visits to Monte Cassino. He pre
sented me with a magnificent collection of copies
of documents of the time of the Emperor Freder
ick II, taken from the library of the order, and I
reciprocated by presenting him with the works of
Frederick the Great

217

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Agriculture flourishes in the environs of the
monasteries maintained by the Benedictine Order,
being carried on by the lay brothers with all the
latest improvements, to the benefit of the back
ward peasantry of the region ; and in the country
and town communities of the order church singing
and organ playing are zealously cultivated by the
monks, who have attained a high degree of artistic
skill. The art of the goldsmith also flourishes
among the monks, likewise art embroidery among
the Benedictine nuns.

I caused to be reproduced in its full size the
Labarum (standard) of the Emperor Constantine
the Great, designed in accordance with the re
searches made by Monsignor Wilpert : one copy I
presented to the Pope, another to my Palace
Chapel at Berlin. The latter was stolen from the
chapel by the mob during the days of the revolu
tion. The metal work was done entirely by monks,
the embroidery by nuns of the order, both excel
lently. One of the places inhabited by nuns of this
order is the convent of Saint Hildegard, above
Rudesheim, which I visited in 1917.

My letter to Admiral Hollmann was due to the
excitement aroused by a lecture entitled "Babel
and Bible," delivered by Professor Delitzsch be
fore the German Orient Society, of which Admiral
Hollmann was one of the Board of Managers.

SCHOLARSHIP AND RELIGION

The first part of the letter, which deals primar
ily with Professor Delitzsch's statements, has been

218

MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

omitted from the reproduction of the letter printed
below:

Feb. 75, 1903.
MY DEAR HOLLMANN:

I should now like to return once again to my own
standpoint regarding the doctrine or view of revela
tion, as I have often set it forth to you, my dear Holl-
man, and other gentlemen. I distinguish between two
different kinds of revelation : a progressive, to a cer
tain extent historical revelation, and a purely religious
one, paving the way to the future coming of the
Messiah.

Of the first, this is to be said: There is not the small
est doubt in my mind that God constantly reveals Him
self through the human race created by Him. He has
"breathed His breath into mankind," or, in other
words, given it a piece of Himself, a soul. He follows
the development of the human race with a Father's
love and interest; for the purpose of leading it forward
and benefiting it, he "reveals" Himself in some great
savant or priest or king, whether among the heathens,
Jews, or Christians.

Hammurabi was one of these, likewise Moses,
Abraham, Homer, Charlemagne, Luther, Shakespeare,
Goethe, Kant, Emperor William the Great. These
men were selected by Him and made worthy of His
grace ; of achieving for their people, both in the spirit
ual and the physical domain, splendid and imperish
able things, in accordance with His will. How often
did my grandfather clearly emphasize that he was
but an instrument in the hand of the Lord.

The works of great minds are gifts of God to the
peoples of the earth, in order that they may improve
themselves on these models and grope forward, by
means of them, through the confusion of that which
is still unexplored here below. God has certainly re
vealed Himself in different ways to different peoples,

219

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

according to their standing and degree of culture, and
He is still doing it now. For, just as we are overcome
most by the greatness and majesty of the splendor of
Creation when we contemplate it, and are amazed at
the greatness of God as revealed therein, so also may
we, in contemplating whatever is great or splendid in
the works of a man or a people, recognize therein with
gratitude the splendor of the revelation of God. He
works directly upon us and among us! The second
kind of revelation, the more religious kind, is that
which leads to the coming of the Lord. It is intro
duced from Abraham onward, slowly but with fore
sight, all-wise and all-knowing; for without it mankind
would have been doomed.

And now begins the most astounding influence, the
revelation of God. The tribe of Abraham, and the
people descended from it, consider the holiest thing of
all t unescapable in its logical consequences, the belief
in one God. This belief they must have and cultivate.
Scattered by the captivity in Egypt, the separate parts
are welded together by Moses for the second time, and
still they try to maintain their "monotheism." The
direct intervention of God is what brings regeneration
to this people.

KAISER'S THEOLOGY

And thus it goes through the centuries, until the
Messiah announced and foreshadowed by the Prophets
and Psalmists shall at last appear. The greatest revela
tion of God in the world ! For He Himself appeared
in the body of His Son ; Christ is God, God in human
form. He saved us. He inspires us, we are led to
follow Him, we feel His fire burning within us, His
pity strengthening us, His dissatisfaction destroying
us, but also His intercession saving us. Sure of vic
tory, building solely upon His word, we go through
work, scorn, grief, misery, and death, for in Him we
the revealed word of God, and God never lies.
220

MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

That is my view of this question. The Word, espe
cially for us of the Evangelical faith, has become every
thing on account of Luther ; and Delitzsch, as a good
theologian, should not forget that our great Luther
taught us to sing and believe: "Das Wort sie sollen
Ia$sen stehn" ( "The Word they must allow to stand") .

It is self-evident that the Old Testament contains a
large number of parts which are of purely human-his
torical character and not "God's revealed Word."
These are purely historical descriptions of events of
all sorts, which occur in the life of the people of Israel
in the domain of politics, religion, morals, and spiritual
life.

For instance, the giving out of the Law on Mount
Sinai can be looked upon only symbolically as having
been inspired by God, since Moses had to turn to a
revival of laws perhaps known of old (possibly drawn
from the Code of Hammurabi), in order to bring
coherence and solidarity to the framework of his
people, which was loose and little capable of resistance.
Here the historian may perhaps find a connection,
either in sense or words, with the laws of Hammurabi,
the friend of Abraham, which may be logically right;
but this can never affect the fact that God had inspired
Moses to act thus, and, to that extent, had revealed
Himself to the people of Israel.

Therefore, my view is that our good professor
should rather avoid introducing and treating of re
ligion as such in his lectures before our association, but
that he may continue, unhindered, to describe what
ever brings the religion, customs, and so on of the
Babylonians, and so on, into relation with the Old
Testament.

As far as I am concerned, I am led by the above to
the f ollowing* conclusion :

(a) I believe in one only God.

(b) We men need, in order to teach Him, a Form,
especially for our children.

221

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

(c) This Form has been, up to now, the Old Testa
ment, as we now know It. This Form will be essentially
changed by research, inscriptions, and excavations ; but
that will cause no harm, nor will the fact that, thereby,
much of the halo of the Chosen People will disappear,
cause any harm. The kernel and content remain al
ways the same : God and His influence.

Religion was never a result of science, but something
flowing from the heart and being of man, through his
relations with God.

^ith heartiest thanks and many greetings, I remain
always

Your sincere friend,

(Signed) WILHELM I. R.

CHAPTER IX

Army and Navy

MY close relations with the army are a matter
of common knowledge. In this direc
tion I conformed to the tradition of my family.
Prussia's kings did not chase cosmopolitan mi
rages, but realized that the welfare of their land
could only be assured by means of a real power
protecting industry and commerce. If, in a num
ber of utterances, I admonished my people to
"keep their powder dry" and "their swords
sharp," the warning was addressed alike to foe and
friend. I wished our foes to pause and think a
long time before they dared to engage with us. I
wished to cultivate a manly spirit in the German
people; I wished to make sure that, when the hour
struck for us to defend the fruits of our industry
against an enemy's lust of conquest, it should find
a strong race.

In view of this I attached high value to the
educational duty of the army. General com
pulsory military service has a social influence upon
men in the mass equaled by nothing else. It
brings together rich and poor, sons of the soil
and of the city; it brings acquaintanceship and

223

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

mutual understanding among young people
whose roads, otherwise, would lead them far
apart; the feeling that they are serving one idea
unites them.

And think what we made out of our young men!
Pale town boys were transformed into erect,
healthy, sport-hardened men; limbs grown stiff
through labor were made adroit and pliable.

I stepped direct from brigade commander to
king to repeat the well-known words of King
Frederick William III. Up to then I had climbed
the steps of an officer's career. I still think with
pleasure of my pride when, on the 2d of May,
1869, during the spring parade, I first stood in the
ranks before my grandfather. Relations with the
individual man have always seemed valuable to
me, and, therefore, I particularly treasured the
assignments, during my military service, where I
could cultivate such relations. My activities as
commander of a company, a squadron, and a bat
tery, likewise as head of a regiment, are unforget-
able to me.

I felt at home among my soldiers. In them I
placed unlimited trust The painful experiences
of the autumn of 1918 have not diminished this
trust. I do not forget that a part of the German
people, after four years of unprecedented achieve
ments and privations, had become too ill to with
stand being corrupted by foes within and without.
Moreover, the best of the Germans lay under the
green sod; the others were thrown into such con
sternation by the events of the revolution which

224

ARMY AND NAVY

had been held to be impossible that they could not
spur themselves to act

Compulsory military service was the best school
for the physical and moral toughening of our peo
ple. It created for us free men who knew their
own value. From these an excellent corps of non
commissioned officers was formed ; from the latter,
in turn, we drew our Government officials, the like
of whom, in ability, incorruptibility and fidelity to
duty no other nation on earth can show.

BELIEVES OFFICERS STILL LOYAL

And it is from these very elements that I receive
nowadays signs of loyalty, every one of which does
me good. My old Second Company of the First
Infantry Guard Regiment has shared, through
good and evil days, the vicissitudes of its old cap
tain. I saw them for the last time in 1913, in close
formation still one hundred twenty-five strong
under that excellent sergeant, Hartmann, on the oc
casion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anni
versary of my accession to the throne.

In view of its proud duty as an educator and
leader of the nation in arms, the officer corps oc
cupied a particularly important position in the
German Empire. The method of replacement,
which, by adoption of the officers' vote, had been
lodged in the hands of the various bodies of offi
cers themselves, guaranteed the needed homo
geneity. Harmful outcroppings of the idea of
caste were merely sporadic ; wherever they made
themselves felt they were instantly rooted out.

225

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

I entered much and willingly into relations with
the various officer corps and felt like a comrade
among them. The materialistic spirit of our age,
to be sure, had not passed over the officer corps
without leaving traces ; but, on the whole, it must
be admitted that nowhere else were self-discipline,
fidelity to duty, and simplicity cultivated to such
an extent as among the officers.

A process of weeding out such as existed in no
other profession allowed only the ablest and best
to reach positions of influence. The commanding
generals were men of a high degree of attainment
and ability and what is even more important
men of character. It is a difficult matter to single
out individuals from among them.

fhough the man in the ranks at the front was
always particularly close to my heart, I must,
nevertheless, give special prominence to the Gen
eral Staff as a school for the officer corps. I have
already remarked that Field Marshal Count
Moltke had known how by careful training to
build up men who were not only up to require
ments, technically speaking, but also qualified for
action demanding willingness to assume responsi
bility, independence of judgment, and far-sighted
ness. "To be more than you seem" is written in
the preface to the Pocket Manual for the General
Staff Officer.

Field Marshal Count Moltke laid the founda
tions for this training; and his successors Count
Waldersee, that great genius, Count Schlieffen,
and General von Moltke built upon them. The

226

ARMY AND NAVY

result was the General Staff, which accomplished
unprecedented feats in the World War, and
aroused admiration throughout the world.

I soon realized that the greatest possible im
provement of our highly developed technical de
partment was absolutely necessary and would save
precious blood. Wherever possible, I worked to
ward the perfection of our armament and sought
to place machinery in the service of our army.

Among new creations, the very first place is
taken by the heavy artillery of the army in the field.
In bringing this into being I was obliged to over
come much opposition particularly, strange to
relate, in the ranks of the artillery itself. It is a
source of great satisfaction to me that I put this
matter through. It laid the foundation for the
carrying out of operations on a large scale, and it
was long before our foes could catch up with us in
this direction.

BETTER MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Mention must also be made of the machine
gun, which developed from modest beginnings to
being the backbone of the infantry's fighting
powers; the replacement of the rifle by the ma
chine gun multiplied the firing power of the in
fantry while, at the same time, diminishing its
losses.

Nor can I pass over without mention the intro
duction of the movable field kitchen, which I had
seen for the first time at some maneuvers of the
Russian army. It was of the greatest value in
16 227

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

maintaining the fighting efficiency of the army,
since the possibility of getting sufficient nourish
ment kept our troops fresh and healthy.

All human work remains unfinished. Never
theless, it may be said, without exaggeration, that
the German army which marched to battle in
1914 was an instrument of warfare without an
equal.

Whereas, at my accession to the throne, I had
found the army in a condition which merely re
quired development upon the foundations already
laid, the navy, on the other hand, was in the first
stage of development. After the failure of all the
attempts of Admiral Hollmann to move the recal
citrant Reichstag to adopt a slowly progressing,
systematic strengthening of German sea power
largely due to the cheap catchwords of Deputy
Richter and the lack of understanding of the Lib
erals of the Left, who were fooled by them the
Admiral requested me to retire him. Deeply
moved, I acceded to his request; this plain, loyal
man, the son of a genuine Berlin bourgeois family,
had become dear to me through his upright char
acter, his devotion to duty, and his attachment to
me. My friendship with him, based upon this
estimate, lasted for many years up to the moment
of the Admiral's sudden death ; it often caused me
to visit this faithful man, endowed with fine Ber
lin wit, at his home, and there to associate with
him as head of the German Orient Society, as
well as to see him, in a small circle of intimates,
at my own home, or to take him with me as a

228

ARMY AND NAVY

treasured traveling companion. He was one of
the most faithful of my faithful friends, always
remaining the same in his disinterestedness, never
asking anything for himself. Happy the city
which can produce such citizens! I preserve a
grateful memory of this tried and trusted friend.

Admiral Tirpitz succeeded Hollmann. In his
very first reports, which laid the foundation of the
first Naval law, he showed himself thoroughly in
accord with me in the belief that the sanction of the
Reichstag for the building of warships was not to
be gained by the old form of procedure. As I have
already pointed out, the opposition was not to be
convinced; the tone of the debates conducted by
Richter was unworthy of the importance of the
subject; for instance, the gunboat obtained in the
Reichstag by the Poles, under Herr von Kosciel-
sky, was jokingly dubbed Koscielska. Ridicule
was the weapon used, though the future of the
fatherland was in question.

It was necessary that the representative of the
navy should have a solid phalanx behind him, both
among the Ministers of State and in the Reichs
tag, and that it should, from absolute conviction,
energetically support him and the cause. There
fore, there was need of communicating to the
Reichstag members, still rather ignorant in naval
matters, the details of the great work; moreover, a
great movement must be engineered among the
people, among the "general public," indifferent as
yet, to arouse its interest and enthusiasm for the
navy, in order that pressure from the people itself

229

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

might be brought to bear upon the Reichstag mem
bers. To this end, an energetic propaganda was
needed, through a well-organized and well-di
rected press, as well as through eminent men of
science at the universities and technical high
schools.

FIGHT IN THE REICHSTAG

There was need of a complete change in the
whole method of handling the matter in the Reichs
tag. There must be no more bickerings about
individual ships and docks. In making up the
military budget, no arguments arose over the
strength of the army, unless it was a matter of new
formations. The makeup of the navy, like that of
the army, must be settled by law once for all, its
right of existence recognized and protected. The
units composing it must no longer be a matter for
debate. Moreover, not only the officer corps but
that of noncommissioned officers must be
strengthened and trained, in order to be ready for
service on the new ships. At the beginning of my
reign, sixty to eighty cadets, at the most, were en
rolled every year; in the last few years before the
war several hundred asked admission. Twelve
precious years, never to be retrieved, were lost by
the failure of the Reichstag; it is even harder to
create a navy overnight than an army.

The goal to be striven for was implied in the
law, which expressed the "idea of risk"; the aim
was to cause even the strongest hostile fleet to think
seriously before it came to blows with the German

230

ARMY AND NAVY

fleet, in view of the heavy losses that were to be
feared in a battle, which put the foe in danger of
becoming too weak for other tasks. The "idea of
risk" was brilliantly vindicated in the Skager-Rak
(Jutland) battle; the enemy, in spite of his im
mense superiority, dared not risk a second battle.
Trafalgar was already dim ; its laurels must not be
completely lost

The total number of units (ships) on hand it
was principally a matter of ships of the line was
taken as a basis for the Naval law, although these,
with the exception of the four ships of the Bran
denburg class, were little better than old iron.

The Naval law was looked upon by many lay
men, in view of the numbers involved, as a naval
increase. In reality, however, this was a false
view, since the so-called existing fleet was abso
lutely no longer a fleet It was slowly dying of old
age as Hollmann said when he retired ; included
in it were almost the oldest ships still in service in
all Europe.

Now that the Naval law was gradually coming
into force, lively building operations set in, launch-
ings were reported in the press, and there was joy
among those under the dominion of the "rage du
nombre" at the growing number of ships. But
when it was made clear to them that as soon as the
new ships were ready the old ones must be elim
inated, so that, as a matter of fact, the total number
of ships of fighting value would, at first, not be in
creased, they were greatly disillusioned. Had the
necessary ships been built in time during the wasted

231

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

twelve years the Naval law would have found a
quite different, usable basis already in existence.
But as matters now stood it was really a question
of the complete rebuilding of the entire German
fleet.

The large number of ships, to which those which
had to be eliminated were added, was a fallacy.
Therefore the English made a mistake when they
merely took account of the number of ships since
that fitted in well with the propaganda against
Germany but paid no attention to age or type,
arriving thus at a total that was far too high, and,
by such misleading methods, artificially nourish
ing the so-called apprehension at the growth of the
German navy.

Admiral Tirpitz now went ahead with the pro
gram approved by me. With iron energy and mer
ciless sacrifice of his health and strength he soon
was able to inject efficiency and power into the
handling of the naval question. At my command
he went, after the drafting of the Naval law, to
Friedrichsruh, the residence of Prince Bismarck,
in order to convince the latter of the necessity for
having a German navy.

The press worked zealously toward the intro
duction of the Naval law, and political economists,
experts on commerce and politics and so forth,
placed their pens at the service .of the great na
tional cause, the necessity for a navy having been
by now widely realized.

In the meantime the English, too, helped
though quite unconsciously toward bettering the

232

ARMY AND NAVY

Naval law's chance of being passed. The Boer
War had broken out, and had aroused among the
German people much sympathy for the little coun
try and much indignation on account of England's
violent assault upon it Thereupon the news came
of the utterly unjustified capture of two German
steamers on the East African coast by English war
ships. Indignation was general.

The news of the stopping of the second steamer
happened to be received by the Secretary of State,
von Biilow, at the very moment when Tirpitz and
I were with him. As soon as Biilow had read the
dispatch aloud, I quoted the old English proverb,
"It's an ill wind that blows nobody good," and
Tirpitz exclaimed, "Now we have the, wind we
need for bringing our ship into port. The Naval
law will go through. Your Majesty must present
a medal to the captain of the English ship in grati
tude for having put it through."

The Imperial Chancellor ordered up cham
pagne and the three of us drank joyously to the
new law, its acceptance, and the future German
fleet, not forgetting to express our thanks to the
English navy, which had proved so helpful to us.

Many years later, on my return from Lowther
Castle, where I had been hunting with Lord Lons-
dale, I was invited to dine with Lord Rosebery,
the great Liberal statesman and former Minister
of Foreign Affairs, also known through his re
searches in the history of Napoleon, at his beauti
ful country estate of Dalmeny Castle, situated close
to the sea, not far from the great Forth bridge.

233

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Among the guests was General Sir Ian Hamilton,
a Scotchman, well known on account of his part in
the Boer War, with whom I had become ac
quainted when he was a guest at the Imperial
German maneuvers, the Lord Provost of Edin
burgh, and a captain of the English navy, who was
commander of the naval station there.

The last sat next Admiral Freiherr von Sen-
den, directly across the table from me, and at
tracted my attention by the obvious embarrassment
which he manifested in his talk with the Admiral,
which he conducted in a low voice. After dinner
Admiral von Senden introduced the captain to me,
whereat the Englishman's embarrassment caused
him to behave even more awkwardly than before,
and aroused my attention because of the worried
look of his eyes and his pale face.

After the conversation, which turned on various
maritime topics, had come to an end, I asked Frei
herr von Senden what the matter was with the
man ; the Admiral laughed and replied that he had
elicited from his neighbor, during the meal, that
he had been the commander of the ship which had
captured the two German steamers in the Boer
War, and that he had been afraid that I might find
this out Senden had thereupon told him that he
was entirely mistaken about this; that had His
Majesty learned who he was he could rest assured
that he would have been very well treated and
thanked into the bargain.

"Thanked? What for?" queried the English
man.

234

ARMY AND NAVY

"For having made the passage of the Naval law
so much easier for the Emperor!' 3

One of the prime considerations in the passage
of the Naval law as also for all later additions,
and, in general, for the whole question of warship
construction was the question whether the Ger
man shipbuilding industry would be in a position
to keep pace with the naval program; whether, in
fact, it would be able to carry it out at all. Here,
too, Admiral von Tirpitz worked with tireless
energy. Encouraged and fired with enthusiasm
by him, the German shipbuilding yards went at
the great problem, filled with German audacity,
and solved it with positively brilliant results,
greatly distancing their foreign competitors. The
admirable technical endowment of the German en
gineers, as well as the better education of the Ger
man working classes, contributed in full measure
toward this achievement

FEVERISH HASTE FOR NAVY

Consultations, conferences, reports to me, service
trips to all shipbuilding yards, were the daily
bread of the indefatigable Tirpitz. But the
tremendous trouble and work were richly re
warded. The people woke up, began to have
a thought for the value of the colonies (raw
materials provided by ourselves without foreign
middlemen!) and for commercial relations,
and to feel interest in commerce, navigation,
shipping, etc.

And, at last, the derisive opposition stopped

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

cracking its jokes. Tirpitz, always ready for bat
tle, wielded a sharp blade in fighting, neyer joked
and allowed nobody to joke with him, so that his
opponents no longer felt like laughing. Things
went particularly badly with Deputy Richter
when Tirpitz brilliantly snubbed and silenced him
by quoting a patriotic saying, dating from the
'forties, of old Harkort whose district Richter
represented concerning the need for a German
fleet Now it was the turn of the other side of the
Reichstag to laugh.

And so the great day dawned. The law was
passed, after much fighting and talking, by a great
majority. The strength of the German navy
was assured; naval construction was to be
accomplished.

By means of construction and keeping an in
creased number of ships in service a fleet soon
sprang into being. In order to maneuver, lead, and
train its personnel a new book of regulations and
signal code were needed at the beginning of my
reign these had been worked out merely for one
division four ships since at that time a larger
number of units never navigated together in the
German navy /. e. f a larger number were not kept
in service. And even these were out of service in
the autumn, so that, in winter, there was (with the
exception of cruisers in foreign waters) absolutely
no German navy. All the care expended during
the summer season on training of crews, officers,
noncommissioned officers, engine-room crews, and
stokers, as well as on rigging and upkeep of ships,

236

ARMY AND NAVY

was as good as wasted when the ships were retired
from service in the autumn ; and when spring came
and they were put back into commission things
had to be started at the beginning again. The re
sult was that any degree of continuity in training
and of coherence among the crews with relation
to each other and their ships of "ship spirit," in
short could not be maintained. This was main
tained only on board the ships stationed in foreign
waters. Therefore, after the necessary heating
equipment, etc., had been put in, I ordered that
ships be kept in service also through the winter,
which was a veritable boon to the development of
the fleet

In order to obtain the necessary number of units
needed by the new regulations, Admiral von Tir-
pitz, in view of the shortage of ships of the line,
had already formed into divisions all the sorts of
vessels available, including gunboats and dispatch
boats, and carried out evolutions with them, so that
when the replacement of line ships began to take
place the foundations for the new regulations had
already been laid. The latter were then constantly
developed with the greatest energy by all the offi-
:ials concerned and kept pace with the growth of
the fleet

Hard work was done on the development of that
important weapon, the torpedo boat At that time
tve were filled with joyful pride that a German
:orpedo-boat division was the first united torpedo
squadron ever to cross the North Sea. It sailed,
mdef the command of my brother, Prince Henry,

237

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS
to take part in the celebration of Queen Victoria's
Golden Jubilee (1887).

COLONEL GOETHAL'S VISIT

The development of Heligoland and its fortifi
cations as a point of support for small cruisers and
torpedo boats also, later on, for U-boats was
also taken in hand, after the necessary protective
work for preserving the island had been con
structed by the state in connection with which
work the Empire and Prussia fought like cat and
dog.

On account of the growth of the fleet it became
necessary to widen the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.
After a hard struggle we caused the new locks to
be built of the largest possible size, capable of
meeting the development of dreadnaughts for a
long time to come. There the far-sighted policy of
the Admiral was brilliantly vindicated.

This found unexpected corroboration by a for
eigner. Colonel Goethals, the builder of the
Panama Canal, requested through the United
States Government permission to inspect the
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal and its new locks. Permis
sion was most willingly granted. After a meal
with me, at which Admiral von Tirpitz was pres
ent, the Admiral questioned the American engi
neer (who was enthusiastic over our construction
work) concerning the measurements of the Panama
locks, whereupon it transpired that the measure
ments of the locks of the Panama Canal were much
smaller than those of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.

238

ARMY AND NAVY

To my astonished question as to how that could be
possible, Goethals replied that the Navy Depart
ment, upon inquiry by him, had given those
measurements for ships of the line. Admiral von
Tirpitz then remarked that this size would be far
from adequate for the future, and that the newer
type of dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts
would not be able to go through the locks, conse
quently the canal would soon be useless for Ameri
can and other big battleships. The Colonel
agreed, and remarked that this was already true
of the newest ships under construction, and he con
gratulated His Excellency upon having had the
courage to demand and put through the big locks
of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which he had looked
upon with admiration and envy.

In like manner the very backward and anti
quated Imperial docks [the old tinker's shops, as
Tirpitz called them] were rebuilt and developed
into model modern plants and the arrangements
for the workers were developed so as to further the
welfare of the latter along the most approved lines.
Only those who, like myself, have followed and
seen with their own eyes from the very beginning
the origin and development of all these factors
necessary to the building up nay, the creation
anew of the fleet can form anything like a proper
idea of the enormous achievement of Admiral von
Tirpitz and his entire corps of assistants.

The office of the Imperial Naval Department
was also a new creation ; the old "Oberkommando"
was eliminated when it was divided into the two

239

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

main branches of Admiralty Staff and Imperial
Naval Department Both of these (as in the
army) were directly under the supreme war com
mander in chief this meant that there was no
longer any official between the Emperor and his
navy.

COMING OF THE DREADNAUGHT

When Admiral Fisher evolved an entirely new
type of ship for England in the shape of the
"dreadnaught" thereby surprising the world as if
he had launched a sudden assault upon it and
thought that he had thus given England, once for
all, an unapproachable naval superiority which
the rest of the powers could never meet, there was
naturally great excitement in all naval circles.
The idea, to be sure, did not originate with Fisher,
but came in the form of an appeal to ship
builders of the whole world from the famous
Italian engineer Cuniberti, who had made public
a sketch in Fred Jane's Illustrated Naval Atlas.

At the first conference regarding the introduc
tion of the "dreadnaught" type of big fighting
ship by England I at once agreed with Admiral
von Tirpitz that it had robbed all pre-dread-
naughts of their value and consigned them to the
scrap heap, especially the German ships, which it
had been necessary to keep considerably smaller,
on account of the measurements of our old locks,
than the ships of other navies, particularly the
English.

Thereupon Admiral von Tirpitz remarked that

240

ARMY AND NAVY

this would also apply to the English fleet itself as
soon as the other nations had followed Fisher's ex
ample; that England had robbed her enormous
pre-dreadnaught force, upon which her great su
periority lasted, of its fighting value, which would
necessitate her building an entirely new fleet of big
fighting ships, in competition with the entire
world, which would do likewise; that this would
be exceedingly costly; that England, in order to
maintain her notorious "two-Power standard,"
would have to exert herself to such an extent that
she would look with more disfavor than ever on
neyr warships built by other nations, toward whom
she was unfriendly, and begin to make objections ;
then this would be especially true if we started
building, but would be in vain, since, with the
existing types of ships in our fleet, we could not
expect to fight against big battleships, but were
forced, "nolens volens," to follow England along
this road.

The war fully confirmed Admiral Tirpitz's
opinion. Every one of our ships not in the big
fighting-ship class had to be retired from service.

When the first German big fighting ship was
placed in service there was a loud outcry in the
land of the British. The conviction gradually
dawned* that Fisher and his shipbuilders had
counted absolutely on the belief that Germany
would not be able to build any big fighting ships.
Therefore the disappointment was all the greater.
Why such an assumption was made is beyond com
prehension, since, even at that time, German ship-

241

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

builders had already built the great ocean grey
hounds, far surpassing our warships of the line in
tonnage, which had occasioned painfully notice
able competition to the English steamship lines.
Our big fighting ships, despite their small number,
showed themselves, at the Skager-Rak (Jutland)
battle, not only equal to their English opponents,
but superior to them both in seaworthiness and in
standing up under gunfire.

IMPATIENT FOR U-BOATS

The building of U-boats, unfortunately, could
not be pushed forward before the war to an extent
commensurate with my desires. On the one hand,
it was necessary not to overburden the naval budget
during the carrying out of the Naval law; more
over, most important of all, it was necessary to col
lect further data from experiments.

Tirpitz believed that the types with which other
nations were experimenting were too small and fit
only for coast defense; that Germany must build
"seagoing" submarines capable of navigating in
the open sea ; that this necessitated a larger type
which, however, must first be systematically de
veloped. This took a long time and required care
ful experiments with models.

The result was that, at first, in 1914, there were
only a small number of seaworthy submarines in
readiness. Even then more pressure might have
been brought to bear upon England with the avail
able submarines had not the Chancellor been so
concerned lest England be provoked thereby.

242

ARMY AND NAVY

The number and efficiency of the submarines
rose rapidly in the course of the war; in consider
ing numbers, however, one must always remember
that in wartime, U-boats are to be reckoned as
follows: One third of the total in active service,
one third on the outward or return journey, one
third undergoing repairs. The achievements of
t&e U-boats aroused the admiration of the entire
world and won the ardent gratitude of the
fatherland.

Admiral von Tirpitz's tremendous success in
creating the commercial colony of Tsing-tao must
never be forgotten. Here he gave proof once more
of his brilliant talent for administration and
organization in all directions. Those talents of
his created, out of a place that was previously
almost unknown and entirely without importance,
a commercial center which, within a few years,
showed a turnover of between fifty and sixty
millions.

The dealings with Reichstag members, the
press, and big industrial and world-commercial ele
ments gradually increased the Admiral's interest
in political matters, particularly in foreign affairs,
which were always bound up with the utilization
of ships. The clear world-vision acquired by him
as a traveled sailor, well acquainted with foreign
parts, qualified Tirpitz to make quick decisions,
which his fiery temperament wished to ,see trans
lated promptly into action.

The opposition and slowness of officialdom irri
tated him greatly. A certain tendency to distrust,

17 243

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

perhaps strengthened by many an experience, often
misled him to harbor suspicion sometimes jus
tified, sometimes not against individuals. This
caused a strong tinge of reserve in Tirpitz's char
acter and "hampered the joyful workings of the
heart" in others. He was also capable of bringing
to bear new views on a matter with great decision,
when, after renewed reflection or study of new
f acts, he had altered his previous view. This made
working with him not always exactly agreeable or
easy. The tremendous results of his achieve
ments, of which he was justly proud, gave him
a consciousness of the power of his personality,
which sometimes made itself apparent even to
his friends.

During the war Tirpitz's tendency to mix in
politics got the upper hand with him so much that
it eventually led to differences of opinion which
finally caused his retirement, since von Bethmann,
the Imperial Chancellor, demanded the dismissal
of the Admiral-in-chief with the observation that
the Imperial Secretaries of State were his subordi
nates and that the political policy must be con
ducted by himself alone.

It was with a heavy heart that I acquiesced in
the departure of this energetic, strong-willed man,
who had carried out my plans with genius and
who was indefatigable as a co-worker. Tirpitz
may always rest assured of my Imperial gratitude.
If only this source of strength might stand soon
again by the side of the unfortunate German
fatherland in its misery and distress ! Tirpitz can

244

ARMY AND NAVY

do and dares to do what many others do not dare.
The saying of the poet most certainly applies to
Admiral von Tirpitz: "The greatest blessing to
the children of earth is, after all, personality!' 5

The criticisms which the Admiral felt con
strained to make of me, in his book which is well
worth reading cannot change, in the slightest, my
opinion of him.

CHAPTER X
The Outbreak of War

ATER the arrival of the news of the assassina
tion of my friend, the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, I gave up going to Kiel for the re
gatta week and went back home, since I intended
to go to Vienna for his funeral. But I was asked
from there to give up this plan. Later I heard
that one of the reasons for this was consideration
for my personal safety; to this I naturally would
have paid no attention.

Greatly worried on account of the turn which
matters might now take, I decided to give up my
intended journey to Norway and remain at home.,
The Imperial Chancellor and the Foreign Office
held a view contrary to mine and wished me to
undertake the journey, as they considered that it
would have a quieting effect on all Europe. For
a long time I argued against going away from my
country at a time when the future was so unsettled,
but Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann told me,
in short and concise terms, that if I were now to
give up my travel plans, which were already
widely known, this would make the situation ap
pear more serious than it had been up to that

246

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

moment and possibly lead to the outbreak of war,
for which I might be held responsible; that the
whole world was merely waiting to be put out of
suspense by the news that I, in spite of the situa
tion, had quietly gone on my trip.

Thereupon I consulted the Chief of the Gen
eral Staff, and, when he also proved to be calm and
unworried regarding the state of affairs and him
self asked for a summer leave of absence to go to
Carlsbad, I decided, though with a heavy heart,
upon my departure.

The much-discussed so-called Potsdam Crown
Council of July 5th in reality never took place.
It. is an invention of malevolent persons. Natur
ally, before my departure, I received, as was my
custom, some of the Ministers individually, in
order to hear from them reports concerning their
departments. Neither was there any council of
Ministers and there was no talk about war prepara
tions at a single one of the conferences.

My fleet was cruising in the Norwegian fjords,
as usual, while I was on my summer vacation trip.
During my stay at Balholm I received only meager
news from the Foreign Office and was obliged to
rely principally on the Norwegian newspapers,
from which I got the impression that the situation
was growing worse. I telegraphed repeatedly to
the Chancellor and the Foreign Office that I con
sidered it advisable to return home, but was asked
each time not to interrupt my journey.

When I learned that the English fleet had not
dispersed after the review at Spithead, but had

247

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

remained conccrtfrated, I telegraphed again to Ber
lin that I considered my return necessary. My
opinion was not shared there.

But when, after that, I learned from the Nor
wegian newspapers not from Berlin about the
Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, and, immediately
thereafter, about the Serbian note to Austria, I
started without further ado upon my return jour
ney and commanded the fleet to repair to Wilhelms-
haven. Upon my departure I learned from a
Norwegian source that it was said that a part of
the English fleet had left secretly for Norway in
order to capture me (though peace still reigned!).
It is significant that Sir Edward Goschen, the Eng
lish ambassador, was informed on July 26th at the
Foreign OfHce that my return journey, undertaken
on my own initiative, was to be regretted, since
agitating rumors might be caused by it.

SAYS WAR WAS NOT FORESEEN

Upon my arrival at Potsdam I found the Chan
cellor and the Foreign Office in conflict with the
Chief of the General Staff, since General von
Moltke was of the opinion that war was sure to
break out, whereas the other two stuck firmly to
their view that things would not get to such a bad
pass, that there would be some way of avoiding
war, provided I did not order mobilization. This
dispute kept up steadily. Not until General von
Moltke announced that the Russians had set fire
to their frontier posts, torn up the frontier railway
tracks, and posted red mobilization liotices did a

248

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

light break upon the diplomats in the Wilhelm-
strasse and bring about both their own collapse and
that of their powers of resistance. They had not
wished to believe in the war.

This shows plainly how little we had expected
much less prepared for war in July, 1914. When,
in the spring of 1914, Tsar Nicholas II was ques
tioned by his Court Marshal as to his spring and
summer plans, he replied: "Je resterai chez moi
cette annee parceque nous aurons la guerre" ("I
shall stay at home this year because we shall have
war"). (This fact, it is said, was reported to Im
perial Chancellor von Bethmann; I heard noth
ing about it then and learned about it for the first
time in November, 1918.) This was the same
Tsar who gave me, on two separate occasions at
Bjorko and Baltisch-Port entirely without being
pressed by me and in a way that surprised me, his
word of honor as a sovereign, to which he added
weight by a clasp of the hand and an embrace, that
he would never draw his sword against the Ger
man Emperor least of all as an ally of England
in case a war should break out in Europe, owing
to his gratitude to the German Emperor for his
attitude in the Russo-Japanese War, in which
England alone had involved Russia, adding that
he hated England, since she had done him and
Russia a great wrong by inciting Japan against
them.

At the very time that the Tsar was announcing
his summer war program I was busy at Corfu ex
cavating antiquities; then I went to Wiesbaden,

249

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

and, finally, to Norway. A monarch who wishes
war and prepares it in such a way that he can sud
denly fall upon his neighbors a task requiring
long secret mobilization preparations and concen
tration of troops does not spend months outside
his own country and does not allow his Chief of
the General Staff to go to Carlsbad on leave of
absence. My enemies, in the meantime, planned
their preparations for an attack.

Our entire diplomatic machine failed. The
menace of war was not seen because the Foreign
Office was so hypnotized with its idea of "surtout
pas d'histoires" ("above all, no stories"), its belief
in peace at any cost, that it had completely elimi
nated war as a possible instrument of Entente
statesmanship from its calculations, and, therefore,
did not rightly estimate the importance of the signs
of war.

Herein also, is proof ,of Germany's peaceful in
clinations. The above-mentioned standpoint of
the Foreign Office brought it to a certain extent
into conflict with the General Staff and the Ad
miralty Staff, who uttered warnings, as was their
duty, and wished to make preparations for defense.
This conflict in views showed its effect for a long
time; the army could not forget that, by the fault
of the Foreign Office, it had been taken by sur
prise, and the diplomats were piqued because, in
spite of their stratagems, war had ensued, after all.

Innumerable are the pieces of evidence that as
early as the spring and summer of 1914, when
nobody in Germany believed as yet in the En-

250

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

tenters attack, war had been prepared for in Rus
sia, France, Belgium, and England.

I included the most important proofs of this, in
so far as they are known to me, in the Comparative
Historical Tables compiled by me. On account
of their great number, I shall cite only a few here.
If in so doing I do not mention all names, this is
done for reasons easily understood. Let me re
mark furthermore that this whole mass of material
became known to me only little by little, partly
during the war, mostly after the war.

1. As far back as April, 1914, the accumulation of
gold reserves in the English banks began. On the
other hand, Germany, as late as July, was still export
ing gold and grain; to the Entente countries, among
others.

2. In April, 1914, the German Naval Attache in
Tokyo, Captain von Knorr, reported that he was
greatly struck by the certainty with Which everyone
there foresaw a war of thfe Triple Alliance against
Germany in the near future . . . that there was a
something in the air as if, so to speak, people were ex
pressing their condolences over a death sentence not
yet pronounced.

3. At the end of March, 1914, General Sherbat-
sheff, director of the St. Petersburg War Academy,
made an address to his officers, wherein, among other
things, he said: That war with the powers forming the
Triple Alliance had become unavoidable on account
of Austria's anti-Russian Balkan policy; that there
existed the strongest sort of probability that it would
break out as early as that same summer ; that, for Rus
sia, it was a point of honor to assume the offensive
immediately.

4. In the report of the Belgian ambassador at

251

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Berlin regarding a Japanese military mission which had
arrived from St. Petersburg in April, 1914, it was
stated, among other things: At the regimental messes
the Japanese officers had heard quite open talk ot an
imminent war against Austria-Hungary and Germany;
it was stated, however, that the army was ready to take
the field, and that the moment was as auspicious for the
Russians as for their allies, the French.

c According to the memoirs of the then French
ambassador at St. Petersburg, M. Paleologue, pub
lished in 1921, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, the
Grand Duchesses Anastasia and Militza told him on
July 22, 1914, at Tsarskoe Selo, that their father,
the King of Montenegro, had informed them, m a
cipher telegram, that "we shall have war before the
end of the month [that is, before the 13* of August,
Russian style] ; . . . nothing will be left of Austria.

. . You will take back Alsace-Lorraine. . - .Our
armies will meet in Berlin. . . - Germany will be
annihilated." _

6. The former Serbian Charge d'Affaires at Ber
lin, Bogitshevich, tells in his book, Causes of the War,
published in 1919, of the following statement which
Cambon, the then French ambassador at Berlin, made
to him on the 26th or 2?th of July, 1914: J* Ger
many wishes matters to come to a war, she will have
England also against her. The English fleet will take
Hamburg. We shall thoroughly beat the Germans.'
Bogitshevich states that this talk made him sure that
the war had been decided upon at the time of the meet
ing of Poincare with the Russian Tsar at St. Peters
burg, if not sooner.

RUSSIAN CROWN COUNCIL

7. Another Russian of high rank, a member of the
Duma and a good friend of Sazonoff, told me later
about the secret Crown Council held, with the Tsar
presiding, in February, 1914; moreover, I obtained

252

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

corroboration, from other Russian sources mentioned
in my Historical Tables, of the following: At this
Crown Council Sazonoff made an address wherein he
suggested to the Tsar to seize Constantinople, which,
since the Triple Alliance would not acquiesce in it,
would cause a war against Germany and Austria. He
added that Italy would break away from these two,
in the natural course of events ; that France was to be
trusted absolutely and England probably.

The Tsar had agreed, it was said, and given orders
to take the necessary preliminary steps. The Russian
Finance Minister, Count Kokovzeff, wrote to the Tsar
advising against this course I was informed of this
by Count Mirbach after the peace of Brest-Litovsk
recommending a firm union with Germany and warn
ing against war, which, he said, would be unfavorable
to Russia and lead to revolution and the fall of the
dynasty. The Tsar did not follow this advice, but
pushed on toward war.

The same gentleman told me this : Two days after
the outbreak of war he had been invited by Sazonoff
to breakfast. The latter came up to him, beaming
with joy, and, rubbing his hands together, asked:
"Come now, my dear Baron, you must admit that I
have chosen the moment for war excellently, haven't
I ?" When the Baron, rather worried, asked him what
stand England would take, the Minister smote his
pocket, and, with a sly wink, whispered: "I have some
thing in my pocket which, within the next few weeks,
will bring joy to all Russia and astound the entire
world; I have received the English promise that Eng
land will go with Russia against Germany I"

9. Russian prisoners belonging to the Siberian
Corps, who were taken in East Prussia, said that they
had been transported by rail in the summer of 1913, to
the vicinity of Moscow, since maneuvers were to be
held there by the Tsar, The maneuvers did not take
place, but the troops were not taken back. They were

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

stationed for the winter in the vicinity of Moscow. In
the summer of 1914 they were brought forward to
the vicinity of Vilna, since big maneuvers were to be
held there by the Tsar; at and near Vilna they were
deployed and then, suddenly, the sharp cartridges (war
ammunition) were distributed and they were informed
that there was a war against Germany; they were un
able to say why and wherefore.

10* In a report, made public in the press, during
the winter of 1914-15; by an American, concerning
his trip through the Caucasus in the spring of 1914,
the following was stated: When he arrived in the
Caucasus, at the beginning of May, 1914* he met,
while on his way to Tiflis, long columns of troops of
all arms, in war equipment. He had feared that a
revolt had broken out in the Caucasus. When he
made inquiries of the authorities at Tiflis, while hav
ing his passport inspected, he received the quieting
news that the Caucasus was quite peaceful, that he
might travel wheresoever he wished, that what he had
seen had to do only with practice marching and
maneuvers.

At the close of his trip at the end of May, 1914,
he wished to embark at a Caucasian port, but all the
vessels there were so filled with troops that only after
much trouble could he manage to get a cabin for him
self and his wife. The Russian officers told him that
they were to land at Odessa and march from there to
take part in some great maneuvers.

THE COSSACK'S TESTIMONY

ii. Prince Tundutoff, Hetman of the Calmuck
Cossacks living between Tsaritsin and Astrakhan, who
was, before and during the war, personal aid of the
Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, came to General
Headquarters at Bosmont in 1918, seeking to establish
connection with Germany, since the Cossacks were not
Slavs at all and thoroughly hostile to the Bolsheviki.

254

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

He stated that he had been sent by Nicholas
Nicholaievitch, before the outbreak of war, to the
General Staff, in order to keep the Grand Duke posted
on happenings there and that he had been a wit
ness of the notorious telephone talks between the
Tsar and the Chief of the General Staff, General
Januskevitch ; that the Tsar, deeply impressed by the
earnest telegram of the German Emperor, had re
solved to folrbid mobilization and had ordered Janus
kevitch by telephone not to carry out mobilization,
i. e., to break it off; that the latter had not obeyed
the unmistakable order, but had inquired by telephone
of Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs with whom,
for weeks, he had kept in touch, intrigued and incited
to war what he was to do now; that Sazonoff had
answered that the Tsar's order was nonsense, that all
the General need do was to carry out mobilization,
that he [Sazonoff] would bring the Tsar around again
next day and talk him out of heeding the stupid tele
gram from the German Emperor; that, thereupon, Jan
uskevitch had informed the Tsar that mobilization was
already under way and could no longer be broken off.

Prince Tundutoff added: "This was a lie, for I
myself saw the mobilization order lying beside Janus
kevitch on his writing table, which shows that it had
not as yet been given out at all."

The psychologically interesting point about the
above is that Tsar Nicholas, who helped prepare the
World War and had already ordered mobilization,
wished to recede at the last moment. My earnest,
warning telegram, it seems, made him realize clearly
for the first time the colossal responsibility which he
was bringing upon himself by his warlike preparations.
Therefore, he wished to stop the war machine, the
murderer of entire peoples, which he had just set in
motion. This would have been possible and peace
might have been preserved if Sazonoff had not frus
trated his wish.

255

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

stationed for the winter in the vicinity of Moscow. In
the summer of 1914 they were brought forward to
the vicinity of Vilna, since big maneuvers were to be
held there by the Tsar; at and near Vilna they were
deployed and then, suddenly, the sharp cartridges (war
ammunition) were distributed and they were informed
that there was a war against Germany; they were un
able to say why and wherefore.

i<x In a report, made public in the press, during
the winter of 1914-15; by an American, concerning
his trip through the Caucasus in the spring 0^1914,
the following was stated: When he arrived in the
Caucasus, at the beginning of May, I9 I 4 he met,
while on his way to Tiflis, long columns of troops of
all arms, in war equipment. He had feared that a
revolt had broken out in the Caucasus. When he
made inquiries of the authorities at Tiflis, while hav
ing his passport inspected, he received the quieting
news that the Caucasus was quite peaceful, that he
might travel wheresoever he wished, that what he had
seen had to do only with practice marching and
maneuvers.

At the close of his trip at the end of May, 1914,
he wished to embark at a Caucasian port, but all the
vessels there were so filled with troops that only after
much trouble could he manage to get a cabin for him
self and his wife. The Russian officers told him that
they were to land at Odessa and march from there to
take part in some great maneuvers.

THE COSSACK'S TESTIMONY

ii. Prince Tundutoff, Hetman of the Calmuck
Cossacks living between Tsaritsin and Astrakhan, who
was, before and during the war, personal aid of the
Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, came to General
Headquarters at Bosmont in 1918, seeking to establish
connection with Germany, since the Cossacks were not
Slavs at all and thoroughly hostile to the Bolsheviki.

254

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

He stated that he had been sent by Nicholas
Nicholaievitch, before the outbreak of war, to the
General Staff, in order to keep the Grand Duke posted
on happenings there and that he had been a wit
ness of the notorious telephone talks between the
Tsar and the Chief of the General Staff, General
Januskevitch ; that the Tsar, deeply impressed by the
earnest telegram of the German Emperor, had re
solved to forbid mobilization and had ordered Janus
kevitch by telephone not to carry out mobilization,
i. e* t to break it off; that the latter had not obeyed
the unmistakable order, but had inquired by telephone
of Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs with whom,
for weeks, he had kept in touch, intrigued and incited
to war what he was to do now; that Sazonoff had
answered that the Tsar's order was nonsense, that all
the General need do was to carry out mobilization,
that he [Sazonoff] would bring the Tsar around again
next day and talk him out of heeding the stupid tele
gram from the German Emperor ; that, thereupon, Jan
uskevitch had informed the Tsar that mobilization was
already under way and could no longer be broken off.

Prince Tundutoff added: "This was a lie, for I
myself saw the mobilization order lying beside Janus
kevitch on his writing table, which shows that it had
not as yet been given out at all."

The psychologically interesting point about the
above is that Tsar Nicholas, who helped prepare the
World War and had already ordered mobilization,
wished to recede at the last moment. My earnest,
warning telegram, it seems, made him realize clearly
for the first time the colossal responsibility which he
was bringing upon himself by his warlike preparations.
Therefore, he wished to stop the war machine, the
murderer of entire peoples, which he had just set in
motion. This would have been possible and peace
might have been preserved if Sazonoff had not frus
trated his wish.

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

When I asked whether the Grand Duke, who was
known as a German-hater, had incited much to war,
the Cossack chief replied that the Grand Duke had
certainly worked zealously for war, but that incite
ment on his part would have been superfluous, since
there was already a strong sentiment against Germany
all through the Russian officer corps; that this spirit
was transmitted, principally, from the French army
to the Russian officers; that there had been a desire,
in fact, to go to war in 1908-09 (Bosnian Question),
but France was not then ready; that, in 19 Hi Russia,
likewise, was not quite ready; that Januskevitch and
Sukhomlinoff had really planned the war for 1917, but
Sazonoff and Isvolsky, as well as the French, could not
be restrained any longer; that the former two were
afraid of revolution in Russia and of the influence of
the German Emperor on the Tsar, which might dis
suade the Tsar from the idea of waging war; and
that the French, who were sure, for the time being,
of England's help, were afraid that England might
come to an understanding later on with Germany at
the expense of France.

When I asked whether the Tsar had been aware of
the warlike spirit in Russia and had tolerated it, the
Cossack Prince answered that it was worthy of note
that the Tsar had forbidden once for all, as a matter
of precaution, the inviting of German diplomats or
military attaches to luncheons or evening meals given
by Russian officers at which he himself was to be
present.

STORES OF ENGLISH COATS

(12) When our troops advanced in 1914 they
found, in northern France and along the Belgian
frontier, great stores of English soldiers' greatcoats.
According to statements by the inhabitants, these were
placed there during the last years of peace. Most of
the English infantrymen who were made prisoners by

256

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

us in the summer of 1914 had no greatcoats; when
asked why, they answered, quite naively: "We are to
find our greatcoats in the stores at Maubeuge, Le
Quesnoy, etc., in the north of France and in Belgium."

It was the same regarding maps. In Maubeuge
great quantities of English military maps of northern
France and Belgium were found by our men; copies of
these have been shown to me. The names of places
were printed in French and English, and all sorts of
words were translated in the margin for the conven
ience of soldiers; for instance: moulin=mill, pont=
bridge, maison=house, ville=town, bois=wood, etc.
These maps date from 1911 and were engraved at
Southampton.

The stores were established by England, with the
permission of the French and Belgian Governments,
before the war, in the midst of peace. What a tempest
of horror would have broken out in Belgium, the "neu
tral country," and what a rumpus England and France
would have kicked up, if we had wished to establish
stores of German soldiers 1 greatcoats and maps in
Spa, Liege, and Namur !

Among the statesmen who, besides Poincare, par
ticularly helped unleash the World War, the Sazonoff-
Isvolsky group probably should take first rank. Isvol-
sky, it is said, when at Paris, proudly placed his hand
upon his breast and declared : "I made the war. Je
suis le pere de cette guerre" ("I am the father of this
war").

Delcasse also has a large share in the guilt for
the World War, and Grey an even larger share, since
he was the spiritual leader of the "encirclement policy,"
which he faithfully pushed forward and brought to
completion, as the "legacy" of his dead sovereign.

I have been informed that an important role
was played in the preparation of the World War
directed against the monarchical Central Powers

257

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

by the policy of the international "Great Orient
Lodge" ; a policy extending over many years and
always envisaging the goal at which it aimed. But
the German Great Lodges, I was furthermore told
with two exceptions wherein non-German finan
cial interests are paramount and which maintain
secret connection with the "Great Orient" in Paris
had no relationship to the "Great Orient" They
were entirely loyal and faithful, according to th
assurance given me by the distinguished German
Freemason who explained to me this whole inter
relationship, which had, until then, been unknown
to me. He said that in 1917 an international meet
ing of the lodges of the "Great Orient" was held,
after which there was a subsequent conference in
Switzerland; at this the following program was
adopted: Dismemberment of Austria-Hungary,
democratization of Germany, elimination of the
House of Hapsburg, abdication of the German
Emperor, restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France,
union of Galicia with Poland, elimination of the
Pope and the Catholic Church, elimination of
every state Church in Europe.

I am not now in a position to investigate the very
damaging information which has been transmitted
to me, in the best of faith, concerning the organi
zation and activities of the Great Orient Lodges.
Secret and public political organizations have
played important parts in the life of peoples and
states, ever since history has existed. Some of them
have been beneficial : most of them have been de
structive, if they had to have secret password?

258

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

which shunned the light of day, The most dan
gerous of these organizations hide under the cloak
of some ideal object or other such as active love
of their neighbors, readiness to help the weak, and
poor, and so forth in order that, with such
pretexts as a blind, they may work for their real
secret ends. It is certainly advisable to study the
activities of the Great Orient Lodges, since one
ewnnot adopt a final attitude toward this world
wide organization until it has been thoroughly
investigated.

I shall not take up the war operations in this
work. I shall leave this task all the more read
ily "to my officers and to the historians, since I,
writing as I am without a single document, would
be able to describe events only in very broad
outline.

When I look back upon the four arduous war
years, with their hopes and fears, their brilliant
victories and losses in precious blood, what is up
permost in my mind is the feeling of ardent grati
tude and undying admiration for the unequaled
achievements of the German Nation in arms.

PROUD OF GERMAN ARMY

Just as no sacrifice in endurance and privation
was too great for those staying at home, so also the
army, in defending itself during the war criminally
forced upon us, did not merely overcome the
crushing superiority of twenty-eight hostile na
tions, but likewise, on land and water and in the
air, won victories whose glory may have paled a

18 259

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

bit in the mists of the present day } but, for that
very reason, will shine forth all the more brightly
in the light of history. Nor is that all. Wherever
there was distress among our allies, German inter
vention, often with weak forces, always restored
the situation and often won noteworthy successes.
Germans fought on all the battlefields of the far-
flung World War.

Surely the heroic bravery of the German nation
deserved a better fate than to fall a victim to the
dagger that treacherously stabbed it from behind ;
it seems to be the German destiny that Germans
shall always be defeated by Germans. Recently I
read the unfortunately not entirely unjustified
words: "In Germany every Siegfried has his
Hodur behind him."

Finally, let me say a word concerning the Ger
man "atrocities" and give two instances thereof!

After our advance into northern France I im
mediately ordered that art treasures be protected.
Art historians and professors were assigned to each
army, who traveled about inspecting, photograph
ing, and describing churches, chateaux, and castles.
Among them Professor Clemen, Curator of the
Rhine Province, especially distinguishel himself
and reported to me, when I was at the front, on the
protection of art treasures.

All the collections in towns, museums, and cas
tles were catalogued and numbered; whenever
they seemed to be imperiled by the fighting they
were taken away and assembled, at Valenciennes
and Maubeuge, in two splendid museums. There

260

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

they were carefully preserved and the name of the
owner marked on each article.

The old windows of the cathedral of St Quen-
tin were removed by German soldiers, at the risk
of their lives, under English shell-fire. The story
of the destruction of the church by the English
was told by a German Catholic priest, who pub
lished it with photographs, and it was sent, by my
orders, to the Pope.

At the chateau of Pinon, which belongs to the
Princess of Poix, who had been a guest of mine
and the Empress, the headquarters of the general
commanding the Third Army Corps was located.
I visited the chateau and lived there. Previously
the English had been quartered there and had rav
aged the place terribly. The commanding gen
eral,, von Lochow, and his staff had a great deal of
trouble getting it into some sort of shape again
after the devastation wrought by the English.

Accompanied by the general, I visited the pri
vate apartments of the Princess, which, up to then,
our soldiers had been forbidden to enter. I found
that her entire wardrobe had been thrown out of
the clothes presses by the English soldiers and, to
gether with her hats, was lying about on the floor.
I had every garment carefully cleaned, hung in
the presses, and locked up. The writing desk had
also been broken into and the Princess's corre
spondence was scattered about At my command,
all the letters were gathered together, sealed in a
package, placed in the writing desk, and locked up.

Afterward, al! the silverware was found buried

261

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

in the garden. According to the villagers this had
been ordered as early as the beginning of July, so
the Princess had known about the war long before
its outbreak! I at once ordered that the silver be
inventoried, deposited in the bank at Aix-la-Cha-
pelle, and returned to the Princess after the war.
Through neutral channels I caused news to be
transmitted to the Princess in Switzerland, by my
Court Marshal, Freiherr von Reischach, concern
ing Pinon, her silverware, and my care for her
property. No answer was received. Instead, the
Princess had published in the French press a letter
to the effect that General von Kluck had stolen all
her silver.

On account of my care and the self-sacrificing
work of German art experts and soldiers partly
at the risk of their lives art treasures worth bil
lions were preserved for their French owners and
for French towns. This was done by the Huns,
the boches!

CHAPTER XI
The Pope and Peace

IN the summer of 1917 I received at Krueznach
a visit from the Papal Nuncio, Pacelli, who was
accompanied by a chaplain. Pacelli is a distin
guished, likable man, of high intelligence and
excellent manners, the perfect pattern of an emi
nent prelate of the Catholic Church. He knows
German well enough to understand it easily when
he hears it, but not sufficiently to speak it with
fluency.

Our conversation was conducted in French, but
the Nuncio now and then employed German ex
pressions of speech. The chaplain spoke German
fluently and took part even when not asked in
the conversation, whenever he feared that the Nun
cio was becoming too much influenced by what I
said.

Very soon the conversation turned on the possi
bility of peace mediation and the bringing about
of peace, in which connection all sorts of projects
and possibilities were touched upon, discussed, and
dismissed.

Finally, I suggested that the Pope should make
an effort, seeing that my peace offer of December

263

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

12, 1916, had been rejected in such an unprece
dented manner. The Nuncio remarked that he
thought such a step would be attended with great
difficulties; that the Pope had already been re
buffed when he had made certain advances in this
direction; that, aside from this, the Pope was ab
solutely in despair on account of the slaughter and
wondered ceaselessly how he might help toward
freeing the world and European culture from the
scourge of war. Any suggestion as to this, he
added, would be rqost valuable to the Vatican.

I stated that the Pope, as the highest in rank
among all the priests of the Roman Catholic Chris
tians and Church, should, first of all, seek to issue
instructions to his priests in all countries to banish
hate, once for all, from their minds, since hate was
the greatest obstacle in the path of the peace idea ;
that it was, unfortunately, true that the clergy in
the Entente countries were, to a positively fright
ful extent, the standard-bearers and instigators of
hate and fighting.

I called attention to the numerous reports from
soldiers at the beginning of the war concerning
abbes and parish priests captured with arms in
their hands ; to the machinations of Cardinal Mer-
cier and the Belgian clergy, members of which
often worked as spies ; to the sermon of the Pro
testant Bishop of London, who, from the pulpit,
glorified the "Baralong" murderers; and to other
similar cases. I added that it would be, therefore,
a great achievement if the Pope should succeed in
having the Roman Catholic clergy in all the coun-

264

THE POPE AND PEACE

tries at war condemn hatred and recommend peace,
as was already being done by the German clergy,
be it from the pulpit or by means of pastoral
letters.

URGES PAPAL INTERCESSION

Pacelli found this idea excellent and worthy of
attention, but he remarked that it would be diffi
cult to enlist the efforts of the various prelates in
its support. I replied that, in view of the severe
discipline of the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic
Church, I could not imagine that, if the Pope
should solemnly call upon the prelates of the
Church to preach reconciliation and consideration
for the foe, those of any country whatsoever should
refuse obedience; that the prelates, on account of
their eminent rank, were above all parties, and,
since reconciliation and love of our neighbor were
fundamental principles of the Christian religion,
they were absolutely in duty bound to work toward
making people observe these principles.

Pacelli agreed to this and promised to give the
idea his earnest attention and report upon it to the
Vatican. In the further course of the conversation,
the Nuncio asked what form beyond the purely
ecclesiastical step suggested by me the bringing
about of peace possibilities through the interven
tion of the Pope might take. I pointed out that
Italy and Austria were two Roman Catholic states,
upon which the Pope could bring influence to bear
easily and effectively; that one of these lands was
his native country and place of residence, in which

265

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

he was greatly revered by the people and exerted
direct influence upon his fellow countrymen ; that
Austria was ruled by a sovereign who actually bore
the title "apostolic" ; who, with all his family, had
direct relations with the Vatican and was among
the most faithful adherents of the Catholic
Church ; that I was, therefore, of the opinion that
it would not be difficult for the Pope to try at least
to make a beginning with these two countries and
cause them to talk peace.

I added that the diplomatic skill and wide vision
of the Vatican were known the world over; that,
if once a beginning were made in this way and
it had a good chance of success the other Powers
could scarcely refuse an invitation from the Vati
can later on to an exchange of views, which should
be, at first, not binding upon them.

The Nuncio remarked that it would be difficult
for the Vatican to make the Italian Government
agree to such a thing, since it had no direct rela
tion with the said Government and no influence
upon its members; that the Italian Government
would never look with favor upon an invitation,
even to mere conferences.

Here the chaplain interposed that such a step
by the Pope was absolutely out of the question,
since it would entail consequences which might be
actually dangerous to the Vatican; the Govern
ment would at once mobilize the "piazza" ("man
in the street") against the Vatican, and the Vatican
certainly could not expose itself to that When I
refused to attach importance to this objection, the

266

THE POPE AND PEACE

chaplain grew more and more excited. He said
that I did not know the Romans ; that, when they
were incited they were simply terrible; that just
as soon as the "piazza" got into action things would
get disagreeable ; that, if it did, there was even a
possibility of an attack on the Vatican, which
might actually imperil the life of the Pope
himself.

SCOUTS DANGER FROM "PIAZZA"

I replied that I, too, was well acquainted with
the Vatican; that no rabble or "piazza" could
storm it; that, in addition, the Pope had a strong
party of adherents in society circles and among the
people, which would at once be ready to defend
him. The Nuncio agreed with me, but the chap
lain continued unabashed to expatiate upon the
terrors of the "piazza" and paint the risks run by
the Pope in the blackest of colors.

I then remarked that anyone wishing to capture
the Vatican must first get a battery of heavy mor
tars and howitzers, as well as pioneers and storm
troops, and institute a regular siege; that all this
was scarcely possible for the "piazza" ; that, there
fore, it was highly improbable that the latter would
undertake anything. Moreover, I mentioned hav
ing heard that measures had already been taken in
the Vatican to guard against such an emergency.
At this the priest was silent

The Nuncio then remarked that it was difficult
for the Pope to do anything really practical toward
peace without giving offense and arousing opposi-

2,67

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

tion in lay Italy, which would place him in danger ;
that it must be borne in mind that he was, unfor
tunately, not free; that had the Pope a country,
or at least a district of his own where he could
govern autonomously and do as he pleased, the
situation would be quite different; that, as mat
ters stood, he was too dependent upon lay Rome
and not able to act according to his own free will.

I remarked that the aim of bringing peace to
the world was so holy and great that it was impos
sible for the Pope to be frightened away, by purely
wordly considerations, from accomplishing such
a task, which seemed created especially for him;
that, should he succeed in it, the grateful world
would assuredly bring influence to bear upon the
Italian Government in support of his wishes and
of his independence.

This made an impression on the Nuncio; he
remarked that I was right, after all; that the
Pope must do something in the matter.

Then I called the attention of the Nuncio to the
following point: He must have noticed, I said,
how the Socialists of all countries were zealously
working in favor of peace efforts, I told him that
we had always allowed the German Socialists to
travel to foreign parts in order to discuss the ques
tion of making peace at conferences, because I
believed them to be acquainted with the desires
and views of the lower classes ; that we placed no
obstacles in the path of anybody desiring to work
honestly and without veiled purpose in the inter
ests of peace; that the same desires for peace also

268

THE POPE AND PEACE

existed among the Entente nations and among
their Socialists, but that the latter were prevented
by refusal of passports from attending congresses
in neutral lands; that the desire for peace was
gaining strength in the world, nations were ac
quiring it more and more, and if nobody in any
Government should be found willing to work
for peace I, unfortunately, had failed in my
attempt the peoples would finally take the
matter into their own hands. I added that this
would not occur without serious shocks and
revolutions, as history proved, through which the
Roman Church and the Pope would not come
unscathed.

WINS PROMISE OF ACTION

What must a Catholic soldier think, I asked,
when he reads always of efforts by Socialists only,
never of an effort by the Pope, to free him from
the horrors of war? If the Pope did nothing, I
continued, there was danger of peace being forced
upon the world by the Socialists, which would
mean the end of the power of the Pope and the
Roman Church, even among Catholics!

This argument struck home to the Nuncio. He
stated that he would at once report it to the Vatican
and give it his support; that the Pope would have
to act.

Greatly worried, the chaplain again interposed,
remarking that the Pope would endanger himself
by such a course ; that the "piazza" would attack
him.

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THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

To this I replied that I was a Protestant, and,
hence, a heretic in the chaplain's eyes, notwith
standing which I was obliged to point out that
the Pope was designated the "Viceroy of Christ
upon earth" by the Catholic Church and world;
that I had, in studying the Holy Scriptures, occu
pied myself earnestly and carefully with the per
son of the Saviour and sought to immerse myself
profoundly therein; that the Lord had never
feared the "piazza," although no fortresslike
building, with guards and weapons, was at His
disposal; that the Lord had always walked into
the midst of the "piazza," spoken to it, and finally
gone to His death on the Cross for the sake of this
hostile "piazza."

Was I now to believe, I asked, that His "Vice
roy upon earth" was afraid of the possibility of
becoming a martyr, like his Lord, in order to bring
peace to the bleeding world, all on account of
the ragged Roman "piazza"? I, the Protes
tant, thought far too highly of a Roman priest,
particularly of the Pope, to believe such a
thing. Nothing could be more glorious for him,
I went on, than to devote himself unreservedly,
body and soul, to the great cause of peace, even
despite the remote danger of thus becoming a
martyr!

With shining eyes, the Nuncio grasped my hand
and said, deeply moved : "Vous avez parf aitement
raison! C'est le devoir du Pape; il faut qu'il
agisse ; c'est par lui que le monde doit etre regagne
a la paix. Je transmettrai vos paroles a Sa Sain-

270

THE POPE AND PEACE

tete" ("You are absolutely right! It is the duty
of the Pope; he must act; it is through him that
the world must be won back to peace. I shall
transmit your words to His Holiness").

The chaplain turned away, shaking his head,
and murmured to himself: "Ah, la piazza, la
piazza 1"

CHAPTER XII

End of the War and My Abdication

A FEW days after August 8, 1918, I sum
moned a Crown Council, in order to get a
clear conception of the situation and to draw
therefrom the necessary conclusions upon which
to base the policy to be followed by Count Hert-
ling. The Chief Military Command approved
the idea that the Imperial Chancellor should keep
in sight the possibility of getting into closer touch
with the enemy, but laid stress on the necessity
of first occupying the Siegfried line and there
thoroughly beating off the foe, and on the fact
that negotiations must not begin before this oc
curred. Thereupon I directed that the Chancellor
get into communication with a neutral power the
Netherlands in order to ascertain whether it was
ready to undertake such a step toward mediation.
What rendered the contemplated action through
Dutch channels very difficult was that Austria
could not be brought to a definite agreement, but
continually postponed the declaration which had
been requested of her. Even a verbal agreement
given to me by the Emperor Charles was afterward
broken by him under Burian's influence,

272

END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

The Dutch government had already been in
formed by me and had signified its readiness to
act. Meanwhile, Austria, without notifying us,
made her first separate peace offer, which set the
ball rolling. The Emperor Charles had indeed
got into touch secretly with the Entente and had
long since resolved to abandon us. He acted ac
cording to the plan which he had explained thus
to his entourage : "When I go to the Germans, I
agree to everything they say, and when I return
home, I do whatever I please."

Thus it happened that my government and I
were constantly deceived by actions in Vienna,
without being able to do anything against it, since
from there we constantly received the hint: "If
you make things hard for us, we shall leave you
in the lurch; in other words, our army will no
longer fight by your side." In view of our situ
ation, such action on Austria's part had to be
avoided in any way possible, both on military and
political grounds.

The defection of Hungary and Austria brought
a crisis upon us. Had Emperor Charles kept con
trol of his nerves for three weeks longer, many
things would have turned out differently. But
Andrassy as he himself admitted had been ne
gotiating for a long time in Switzerland, behind
our backs, with the Entente. Thus Emperor
Charles believed that he would assure himself of
good treatment at the hands of the Entente.

After our failure of August 8th, General Luden-
dorff had declared that he could no longer guar-

273

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

antee a military victory. Therefore, the prepara
tion of peace negotiations was necessary. Since
diplomacy had not succeeded in initiating any
promising negotiations and the military situation
had become even worse in the meantime, on ac
count of revolutionary agitation, Ludendorff, on
the 29th of September, demanded that preparations
be made for an armistice instead of for peace
negotiations,

MOVEMENT FOR ABDICATION

At this critical time a strong movement began
at home in favor of setting up a new government
for the now necessary termination of the war, I
could not ignore this movement, since the old gov
ernment, during the seven weeks from August 8th
to the end of September, had not managed to
initiate peace negotiations offering any hope of
success.

Meanwhile, General von Gallwitz and General
von Mudra, summoned from the front, appeared
before me. They gave a picture of the inner situ
ation of the army, laying due emphasis upon the
great number of shirkers behind the front, the fre
quency of insubordination, the displaying of the
red flag upon trains filled with soldiers return
ing from furloughs at home and other similar
phenomena*

The two generals considered that the principal
cause of the bad conditions was to be sought in the
unfavorble influence exerted upon the soldiers by
the spirit predominating behind the front and in

274

END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

the general desire for ending the fighting and get
ting peace, which was spreading from the home
land along the lines of communication behind the
front and was already becoming noticeable even
among some of the troops at the front itself. The
generals advanced the opinion that, owing to these
reasons, the army must immediately be withdrawn
behind the Antwerp-Meuse line.

On that same day I commanded Field Marshal
von Hindenburg by telephone to effect as soon as
possible the retreat to the Antwerp-Meuse line.
The falling back of the tired, but nowhere deci
sively beaten, army to this position merely signi
fied occupying an essentially shorter line, possess
ing far greater natural advantages. It was not
yet completed, to be sure, but the fact was to be
borne in mind that we had engaged in battle on
the Somme while occupying positions composed
largely of shell craters. What we had to do was
to regain operative freedom, which, to my way of
thinking, was by no means impossible; in the
course of the war, had we not often retreated in
order to put ourselves in a situation that was more
advantageous from the military point of view?

The army, to be sure, was no longer the old
army. The new 1918 troops particularly were
badly tainted with revolutionary propaganda and
often took advantage of the darkness at night to
sneak away from the firing and vanish to the
rear.

But the majority of my divisions fought flaw
lessly to the very end and preserved their disci-
19 275

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

pline and military spirit To the very end they
were always a match for the foe in morale ; despite
superiority in numbers, cannon, munitions, tanks,
and airplanes, the foe invariably succumbed when
he ran up against serious resistance. Therefore,
the associations of our ex-fighters at the front are
right in bearing upon their banners the motto:
"Unbeaten on land and sea!"

SAYS ARMY WAS STILL STRONG

The achievements of the German fighters at the
front and of the German Nation in arms, during
four and a half years of war, are beyond all praise.
One does not know what to admire most : the en
thusiasm with which the magnificent youth of
1914, without waiting for our artillery fire to take
effect, joyfully charged on the enemy, or the self-
sacrificing fidelity to duty and tenacity with which
our men in field gray, sparingly fed and seldom
relieved, year in, year out, digging by night, liv
ing in dugouts and earthholes by day, or crouching
in shell holes, defied the hail of steel from the
enemy artillery, flyers, and tanks. And this army,
which one might have expected was to be rated as
utterly fought to a finish, was able, after nearly
four years of war, to carry out successful offensive
operations such as our foes could nowhere boast
of, despite their colossal superiority.

In spite of all this, it was not right to believe
the German army capable of accomplishing the
superhuman; it was necessary for us to fall back,
in order to get breath.

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END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

The Field Marshal balked at the order to re
treat; the army, he thought, should stay were It
was, for political reasons (peace negotiations and
so on) ; he also pointed out, among other things,
that it was necessary, first, to arrange for the with
drawal to the rear of war materials, etc.

I now resolved to go to the front, acquiescing
in the desire expressed to me by the army that
I might be with my hard-fighting troops and
convince myself personally of their spirit and
condition.

I could carry out this resolve all the sooner in
view of the fact that, ever since the new Govern
ment had been set up, no further claims were made
upon my time either by it or by the Imperial
Chancellor, which made my staying at home seem
useless.

The notes to Wilson were discussed and writ
ten by Solf, the War Cabinet, and the Reichstag,
after sessions lasting hours, without my being in
formed thereof; until, finally, on the occasion of
the last note to Wilson, I caused Solf to be given
to understand very plainly, through my chief of
Cabinet, that I demanded to know about the note
before it was sent.

Solf appeared and showed the note; he was
proud of his antithesis between laying down of
arms ("Waffenstreckung"), which was demanded
by Wilson, and armistice ("Waffenstillstand"),
which was proposed. When I spoke about the
rumors of abdication and demanded that the For
eign Office adopt an attitude, through the press,

277

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

against what was unworthy in the newspaper
polemics, Solf replied that already everybody on
every street corner was talking about abdication
and that, even in the best circles, people were dis
cussing it quite unreservedly.

When I expressed my indignation at this, Solf
sought to console me by observing that, should His
Majesty go, he also would, since he could serve no
longer under such conditions. I went, or to put
it much more correctly I was overthrown by my
own Government, and Herr Solf remained.

When the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max,
heard of my resolve to go to the front, he did all
he could to prevent it. He asked why I wished to
go and received the answer that I considered it my
duty, as Supreme Commander, to return to the
front, since I had been separated for almost a
month from the hard-fighting army. When the
Chancellor objected that I was indispensable at
home, I retorted that we were at war, that the
Emperor belonged to his soldiers. Finally, I de
clared, once for all, that I would go; that in case
Wilson's armistice note arrived, it would have to
be discussed, anyhow, a,t the General Headquar
ters of the army, for which purpose the Chancellor
and other members of the Government would be
obliged to go to Spa for the conferences.

"JOYFULLY RECEIVED" BY ARMY

I went to the army in Flanders, after having
once more given the General Staff at Spa definite
orders to fall back as quickly as possible to the

278

END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

Antwerp-Meuse line, in order that the troops
might finally be taken out of the fighting and
given a rest Despite objections that this would
demand time, that the position was not yet ready,
that the war material must first be taken back, and
so forth, I stood by the order. The retreat was
begun.

In Flanders I saw delegations from the different
divisions, spoke with the soldiers, distributed dec
orations, and was everywhere joyfully received by
officers and men. Particularly ardent enthusiasm
reigned among the soldiers of a royal Saxon recruit
depot, who greeted me with wild cheers at the
railway station when I was returning to my train.
While I was giving out decorations to members
of the Reserve Guard Division, an enemy bomb
ing squadron, followed by heavy fire from anti
aircraft guns and machine guns, flew directly over
us and dropped bombs near the special train.

The commanders of the army were unanimous
in declaring that the spirit of the troops at the
front was good and reliable; that, further to the
rear, among the supply columns, it was not so
good ; that the worst of all were the soldiers back
from leave, who, it was plain to be seen, had been
worked upon and infected at home, whence they
had brought back a poor spirit The young re
cruits at the depots, it was stated, furthermore, were
good.

At Spa, whither I now went, news came con
stantly from home about the ever more violent
agitation and hostile attitude against the Emperor

279

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

and the growing slackness and helplessness of the
Government, which, without initiative or strength,
was letting itself be pushed around at will It
was alluded to contemptuously in the newspapers
as the "debating society 15 and Prince Max was
called by leading newspapers the "Revolution
Chancellor." As I learned afterward, he lay in
bed for ten days, suffering from grippe and in
capable of really directing affairs. His Excel
lency von Payer and Solf , with the so-called War
Cabinet, which was in permanent session, governed
the German Empire,

At such a critical time, to my way of thinking,
the imperiled ship of state should not be steered
by representatives of the Imperial Chancellor,
since they certainly cannot have the authority
possessed by the responsible head of the Govern
ment What was particularly needed at this junc
ture was authority; yet, so far as I know, no wide
powers to act had been conferred upon the Vice
Chancellor,

The right solution L e>, the one that those con
cerned were in duty bound to adopt would have
been to remove Prince Max actually from the
post of Chancellor and summon in his place some
man of strong personality. Since we had the par
liamentary form of government it devolved upon
the political parties to bring about the change in
the Chancellorship and present me with a succes
sor to Prince Max. This did not take place.

Now the efforts of the Government and the
Imperial Chancellor to induce me to abdicate be-

280

END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

gan. Drews, the Minister of the Interior, came to
me at the behest of the Chancellor, in order to
supply me with information concerning the spirit
in the country. He described the well-known hap
penings in press, high finance, and public, and laid
emphasis on the fact that the Imperial Chancellor
himself adopted no attitude toward the question
of my abdication, but, nevertheless, had sent him
to me. Drews, in short, was to suggest to me that
I myself should decide to abdicate, in order that it
might not appear that the Government had exerted
pressure upon me.

I spoke to the Minister about the fateful con
sequences of my abdication and asked how he, as
a Prussian official, could reconcile such a supposi
tion with his oath as an official to his King. The
Minister grew embarrassed and excused himself
by reference to the command of the Imperial
Chancellor, who had been unable to find any other
man for the task. I was informed later that Drews
was one of the first officials who spoke of the abdi
cation of his master and King.

I refused to abdicate and declared that I would
gather troops together and return with them in
order to help the Government to maintain order
in the land.

After that, Drews was received, in my presence,
by Field Marshal von Hindenburg and General
Groner, whom he informed of the mission intrusted
to him by the Imperial Chancellor and by both
of whom he was very sharply rebuked in the name
of the army. Grpner's characterization of Prince

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THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Max, in particular, was expressed in such plain
terms that I had to appease and comfort the
Minister.

The Field Marshal also called Drews's attention
to the fact that, in the event of my abdication, the
army would not go on fighting, but would dis
perse, and that the majority of the officers, in par
ticular, would probably resign and thus leave the
army without leaders.

Soon after that I learned from one of my sons
that the Imperial Chancellor had tried to ascer-
":ain whether he was prepared to undertake the
mission which subsequently was undertaken by
Drews. My son indignantly declined to suggest
abdication to his father.

In the meantime I had sent the chief of Cabinet,
von Delbriick, to Berlin, in order to lay before
the Chancellor a general address, also intended
for publication, which should take the place of
my address to the Ministry (not published by the
Chancellor), deal more broadly with the matters
taken up therein, and make clear my attitude to
ward the Government and toward the new direc
tion taken by public opinion. At first the Chan
cellor failed to publish this. Not until several
days later did he find himself forced to permit
publication, owing to a letter written to him, as I
learned afterward, by the Empress.

Thereupon Herr von Delbriick informed me
that the address had made a good impression in
Berlin and in the press, relieved the situation, and
tended to quiet the people, so that .the idea of abdi-

282

END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

cation had begun to disappear and even the So
cialists of the Right had decided to postpone action
concerning it

SOCIALIST ACTIVITY

During the next few days there were constant
reports that the Socialists in Berlin were planning
trouble and that the Chancellor was growing
steadily more nervous. The report given by Drews
to the Government, after his return from Spa, had
not failed to cause an impression; the gentlemen
wished to get rid of me, to be sure, but for the time
being they were afraid of the consequences.

Their point of view was as obscure as their con
duct They acted as if they did not want a re
public, yet failed completely to realize that their
course was bound to lead straight to a republic.
Many, in fact, explained the actions of the Gov
ernment by maintaining that the creation of a re
public was the very end that its members had in
view ; plenty of people drew the conclusion, from
the puzzling conduct of the Chancellor toward
me, that he was working to eliminate me in order
to become himself President of the German Re
public, after being, in the interim, the adminis
trator of the Empire.

To believe this is undoubtedly to do the Prince
an injustice; such a train of thought is impos
sible in a man belonging to an old German princely
family.

General Groner, who had gone to Berlin to
study the situation, reported on his return that he

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THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

had received very bad impressions regarding the
Government and the sentiment prevailing in the
country; that things were approaching revolu
tion; that the Government was merely tearing
down without setting up anything positive; that
the people wanted peace at last, at any cost, no
matter what kind of peace ; that the authority of
the Government was equal to zero, the agitation
against the Emperor in full swing, my abdication
hardly to be avoided longer.

He added that the troops at home were unre
liable and disagreeable surprises might come in
case of a revolt; that the courier chests of the Rus
sian Bolshevist ambassador, seized by the criminal
police, had disclosed some very damaging evi
dence that the Russian Embassy, in conjunction
with the Spartacus group, had long since thor
oughly prepared, without being disturbed, a Bol
shevist revolution on the Russian model. (This
had gone on with the knowledge of the Foreign
Office which had received constant warning,
but had either laughed at them all or dismissed
them with the remark that the Bolsheviki must
not be angered likewise under the very eyes of
the police, which was continually at loggerheads
with the Foreign Office.) The men back from
leave, he went on, infected by propaganda, had
already carried the poison to the army, which was
already partly affected and would, as soon as it
had been made free by an armistice, refuse to fight
against the rebels upon its return home.

Therefore, he declared, it was necessary to ac-

284

END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

cept, immediately and unconditionally, any sort of
armistice, no matter how hard its conditions might
be; the army was no longer to be trusted and
revolution was imminent behind the front

PRINCE MAX INSISTENT

On the morning of the 9th of November, 1 the
Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden,
caused me to be informed again as he had already
done on the 7th that the Social Democrats, and
also the Social Democratic Secretaries of State,
demanded my abdication; that the rest of the
members of the Government, who had stood out so
far against it, were now in favor of it, and that
the same was true of the majority parties in the
Reichstag. For these reasons y he continued, he
requested me to abdicate immediately, since, other
wise, extensive street fighting attended by blood
shed would take place in Berlin; it had already
started on a small scale.

I immediately summoned Field Marshal von
Hindenburg and the Quartermaster General, Gen
eral Groner. General Groner again announced
that the army could fight no longer and wished
rest above all else, and that, therefore, any sort
of armistice must be unconditionally accepted;
that the armistice must be concluded as soon as
possible, since the army had supplies for only six

1 Concerning the course of events up to the fateful 9th of .November
and this day itself there are authentic statements by an eyewitness
in the book (well worth reading) of Major Niemann, who was sent
by the Chief Army Command to me, entitled War and Revolution
(Krieg und Revolution), Berlin, 1922.

285

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

to eight days more and was cut off from all further
supplies by the rebels, who had occupied all the
supply storehouses and Rhine bridges; that, for
some unexplained reason, the armistice commis
sion sent to France consisting of Erzberger, Am
bassador Count Oberndorff, and General von
Winterfeldt which had crossed the French lines
two evenings before, had sent no report as to the
nature of the conditions.

The Crown Prince also appeared, with his Chief
of Staff, Count Schulenburg, and took part in the
conference. During our conversation several tele
phone inquiries came from the Imperial Chan
cellor, which, pointing out that the Social Demo
crats had left the Government and that delay was
dangerous, became most insistent The Minister
of War reported uncertainty among part of the
troops in Berlin 4th Jagers, Second Company
of Alexander Regiment, Second Battery, Juterbog,
gone over to the rebels no street fighting.

I wished to spare my people civil war. If my
abdication was indeed the only way to prevent
bloodshed, I was willing to renounce the Imperial
throne, but not to abdicate as King of Prussia; I
would remain, as such, with my troops, since the
military leaders had declared that the officers
would leave in crowds if I abdicated entirely, and
the army would then pour back, without leaders,
into the fatherland, damage it, and place it in
peril.

A reply had been sent to the Imperial Chancel
lor to the effect that my decision must first be care-

286

END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

fully weighed and formulated, after which it
would be transmitted to the Chancellor. When,
a little later, this was done, there came the surpris
ing answer that my decision had arrived late!
The Imperial Chancellor, on his own initiative,
had summarily announced my abdication which
had not occurred yet at all! as well as renun
ciation of the throne by the Crown Prince, who
had not even been questioned. He had turned over
the Government to the Social Democrats and sum
moned Herr Ebert as Imperial Chancellor. All
this had been spread simultaneously by wireless,
so the entire army could read it.

DENIES HE FORSOOK FOLLOWERS

Thus the decision as to my going or staying, as
to my renunciation of the Imperial Crown and
retention of the Royal Crown of Prussia, was
summarily snatched from me. The army was
shaken to the core by the erroneous belief that its
King had abandoned it at the most critical moment
of all.

If the conduct of the Imperial Chancellor,
Priijce Max of Baden, is considered as a whole,
it appears as follows: first, solemn declaration
that he will place himself, together with the new
Government, before the Emperor's throne, to pro
tect it; then, suppression of the address, which
might have impressed public opinion favorably,
elimination of the Emperor from all co-operation
in the Government, sacrifice of the respect due the
Emperor by suppression of the censorship, failure

287

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

to come to the support of the monarchy in the mat
ter of abdication ; then, attempts to persuade the
Emperor to abdicate voluntarily; and, finally,
announcement of my abdication by wireless, in
which the Chancellor went over my head.

This sequence of events shows the course a
perilous one to the nation adopted by Scheide-
mann, who held the Chancellor in the hollow of
his hand. Scheidemann left the Ministers, his
colleagues, in the dark as to his real purposes,
drove the Prince from one step to another, and
finally summoned Ebert, declaring that the leaders
no longer had the masses under control. Thus he
caused the Prince to sacrifice the Emperor, the
princes, and the Empire, and made him the de
stroyer of the Empire. After that, Scheidemann
overthrew the weak princely "statesman."

Following the arrival of the wireless message,
the situation was difficult To be sure, troops were
being transported to Spa for the purpose of going
on undisturbed with the work at Great General
Headquarters, but the Field Marshal now thought
it no longer possible to reckon absolutely on their
reliability in case rebellious forces should advance
from Aix-le-Chapelle and Cologne and confront
our troops with the dilemma of whether or not
to fight against their own comrades. In view of
this, he advised me to leave the army and go to
some neutral country, for the purpose of avoiding
such a "civil war."

I went through a fearful internal struggle. On
the one hand, I, as a soldier, was outraged at the

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END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

idea of abandoning my still faithful, brave troops.
On the other hand, there was the declaration of
our foes that they were unwilling to conclude with
me any peace endurable to Germany, as well as
the statement of my own Government that only by
my departure for foreign parts was civil war to
be prevented.

In this struggle I set aside all that was personal,
I consciously sacrificed myself and my throne in
the belief that, by so doing, I was best serving the
interests of my beloved fatherland. The sacrifice
was in vain. My departure brought us neither
better armistice conditions nor better peace terms ;
nor did it prevent civil war on the contrary, it
hastened and intensified, in the most pernicious
manner, the disintegration in the army and the
nation.

PROUD OF THE ARMY

For thirty years the army was my pride. For
it I lived, upon it I labored. And now, after four
and a half brilliant years of war with unprece
dented victories, it was forced to collapse by the
stab in the back from the dagger of the revolu
tionists, at the very moment when peace was within
reach !

And the fact that it was in my proud navy, my
creation, that there was first open rebellion, cut
me most deeply to the heart.

There has been much talk about my having
abandoned the army and gone to neutral foreign
parts.

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THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Some say the Emperor should have gone to
some regiment at the front, hurled himself with it
upon the enemy, and sought death in one last at-
tacL That, however, would not only have ren
dered impossible the armistice, ardently desired
by the nation, concerning which the commission
sent from Berlin to General Foch was already
negotiating, but would also have meant the useless
sacrifice of the lives of many soldiers of some of
the very best and most faithful, in fact.

Others say the Emperor should have returned
home at the head of the army. But a peaceful re
turn was no longer possible; the rebels had already
seized the Rhine bridges and other important
points in the rear of the army. I could, to be
sure, have forced my way back at the head of
loyal troops taken from the fighting front; but,
by so doing, I should have put the finishing touch
to Germany's collapse, since, in addition to the
struggle with the enemy, who would certainly
have pressed forward in pursuit, civil war would
also have ensued.

Still others say the Emperor should have killed
himself. That was made impossible by my firm
Christian beliefs. And would not people have
exclaimed :

"How cowardly! Now he shirks all responsibil
ity by committing suicide!" This alternative was
also eliminated because I had to consider how to
be of help and use to my people and my country
in the evil time that was to be foreseen.

I knew also that I was particularly called upon
290

END OF WAR AND MY ABDICATION

to champion the cause of my people in the clearing
up of the question of war guilt which was dis-;
closing itself more and more as the pivotal point
in our future destiny since I better than anyone
else could bear witness to Germany's desire for
peace and to our clean conscience.

After unspeakably arduous soul struggles, and
following the most urgent advice of my counselors
of the highest rank who were present at the mo
ment, I decided to leave the country, since, in view
of the reports made to me, I must needs believe
that, by so doing, I should most faithfully serve
Germany, make possible better armistice and peace
terms for her, and spare her further loss of human
lives, distress, and misery.
20

CHAPTER XIII

The Enemy Tribunal and the Neutral Tribunal

WHEN the Entente's demand that I and the
German army leaders should be surren
dered for trial before Entente tribunals became
known, I immediately asked myself whether I
could be of use to my fatherland by giving myself
up before the German people and the German
Government had expressed themselves regarding
this demand. It was clear to me that, in the opin
ion of the Entente, such a surrender would so
seriously shake the prestige of Germany, as a state
and people, for all time, that we could never again
take our place, with equal rights, equal dignity,
and equal title to alliances, in the first rank of
nations, where we belonged.

I recognized it as my duty not to sacrifice the
honor and dignity of Germany. The question re
solved itself into deciding whether there was
any way to give myself up which might benefit
the German nation and not subject it to the
above-mentioned disadvantages. Were there
such a way I should have been ready without
hesitation to add another sacrifice to those already
made.

292

THE TRIBUNALS

The question of my giving myself up has also
been debated as I know in well-meaning and
earnest German circles. Wherever this was
due to psychological depression or failure to
realize the impression which self-chastisement,
self-debasement, and fruitless martyrdom in
the face of the Entente must arouse, all that
was needed was to recall the materially political
origin of the Entente's demand, cursorily
mentioned above, in order to arrive at a clean-
cut decision in other words, at an emphatic
refusal.

It was otherwise with the considerations based
upon the assumption that I might, by taking upon
myself, before the eyes of the whole world, the
responsibility for all important decisions and acts
of my Government connected with the war ? con
tribute toward making the fate of the German
nation easier. Here was not an act of unpolitical
sentimentality, but, on the contrary, a deed which,
in my eyes, had much to commend it The thought
that, according to the Constitution of the Empire
then in force, not I, ,but the Chancellor alone as
was well known bore the responsibility, would
naturally not have bothered me with regard to
this.

Had there been even the slightest prospect of
bettering Germany's situation by taking such a
step, there would have been no possible doubt for
me personally as to what I should do. Already I
had shown my personal willingness to sacrifice
myself when I left the country and gave up the

293

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

throne of my fathers, because I had been erroneously
and deceivingly assured that I could, by so doing,
make possible better peace terms for my people
and prevent civil war, I should likewise have
made this further attempt to help my people, de
spite the fact that, in the meantime, one of the
considerations in favor of it which have been urged
upon me viz., the prevention of civil war had
already turned out to be false,

RECALLS PLIGHT OF VERCINGETORIX

There was, however, no possibility of helping
the German people by such an act Surrender of
my person would have had no result beyond our
obedience to the demand from the Entente that I
be given up. For no tribunal in the world can
pronounce a just sentence before the state archives
of all the nations participating in the war are
thrown open, as has been done, and is still being
done, by Germany.

Who, after the unprecedented judgment of
Versailles, could still summon up optimism enough
to believe that the Entente nations would place
their secret documents at the disposal of such a
tribunal? Therefore, after careful reflection on
my part, I gave the decisive importance that was
their due to the above-mentioned weighty consid
erations of personal and national dignity and
honor, and rejected the idea of giving myself up.
It was not for me to play the role of Vercingetorix,
who, as is well known, relying upon the magna
nimity of his foes, surrendered himself to them in

294

THE TRIBUNALS

order to obtain a better fate for his people. In
view of the conduct of our enemies during the
war and in the peace negotiations, it was surely
not to be assumed that the Entente would
show any greater magnanimity than did Caesar
when he threw the noble Gaul into chains, sub
sequently had him executed, and, in spite of what
Vercingetorix had done, enslaved his people just
the same.

I wish to remark in a general way that it has
always proved wrong to follow the suggestions of
the enemy or to heed them to any extent. The
well-meant suggestions regarding m"y giving my
self up, emanating from Germans, also grew from
the soil of the enemy demands, though perhaps
partly unknown to those making them. For that
very reason it was necessary to refuse to heed them.

Thus the only solution remaining is an interna
tional, nonpartisan court, which, instead of trying
individuals, shall examine and pronounce judg
ment upon all the happenings leading to the World
War, in all the countries taking part therein, after
all the national archives, not merely those of
Germany, have been opened up. Germany
can well agree to this mode of procedure. Who
soever opposes it pronounces judgment upon
himself !

My standpoint on the subject here discussed is
expressed in the letter reproduced below, which I
addressed, under date of April 5, 1921, to Field
Marshal von Hindenburg, and which the latter
has made public in the meantime. To make mat-

295

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ters clearer, the letter which preceded it, from the
Marshal, is also given. 1

HINDENBURG'S LETTER

HANOVER, March 30,
YOUR IMPERIAL ANI> ROYAL MAJESTY :
I beg to thank Your Majesty most respectfully for
his gracious interest in the illness of my wife. She is
not yet out of danger.

I have little that is pleasant to report from our
country. The troubles in Central Germany are more
serious than they are represented to be by the Prussian
Government. I hope that they will soon be suppressed.
The effects of the Versailles peace decree lie ever
more crushingly upon the German people, and the ob
ject of this peace the policy of annihilation of our
enemies comes more plainly to the fore every day.
For the purpose of justifying this policy of force the
fairy tale of German war guilt must be adhered to.

The spokesman of the enemy alliance, Mr. Lloyd
George, is little disturbed by the fact that, on Decem
ber 20th of last year, he declared that no statesman
wished war in the summer of 1914, that all the nations
had slipped or stumbled into it. In his speech at the
London conference on March 3d he calmly remarked
that Germany's^responsibility for the war was funda
mental, that it was the basis on which the Peace of
Versailles was erected, and that, if the admission of
this guilt should be refused or given up, the treaty
would become untenable.

Now as before, the question of war guilt is the
cardinal point in the future of the German nation. The
admission of our alleged "guilt" regarding the war,
forced from the German representatives at Versailles

1 This letter and the letter from the Field Marshal which preceded
it are reprinted herewith. The parts which are most important in
relation to the matter in question are underscored in the text.

296

THE TRIBUNALS

against their judgment, is wreaking frightful venge
ance; equally so the untrue acknowledgment of Ger
many's "complicity" which Minister Simons gave at
the London conference.

I agree with Your Majesty to the uttermost depths
of my soul in my long term of military service I
have had the good fortune and honor to enter into
close personal relations with Your Majesty. I know
that all the efforts of Your Majesty throughout your
reign were bent toward maintaining peace. I can
realize how immeasurably hard it is for Your Majesty
to be eliminated from positive co-operation for the
fatherland.

The Comparative Historical Tables compiled by
Your Majesty, a printed copy of which Your Majesty
sent me recently, are a good contribution to the history
of the origin of the war and are calculated to remove
many an incorrect conception. I have regretted that
Your Majesty did not make the tables public, but
limited them instead to a small circle. Now that the
tables, owing to indiscretions, have been published in
the foreign press, partly in the form of incomplete ex
cerpts, it seems to me advisable to have them published
in full in the German press.

To r>iy great joy I have heard that there has been
an improvement recently in the health of Her Majesty.
May God help further!

With the deepest respect, unlimited fidelity and grati
tude, I am Your Imperial and Royal Majesty's most
humble servant,

(Signed) VON HINDENBURG,

Field Marshal

THE KAISER'S LETTER

HOUSE DOORN, April 5, ig2i.
MY DEAR FIELD MARSHAL :
Accept my warmest thanks for your letter of March
30th, ult. You are right. The hardest thing of all

297

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

for me is to be obliged to live in foreign parts, to fol
low, with burning anguish in my soul, the awful fate
of our dear fatherland, to which I have devoted the
labors of my entire life, and to be barred from co
operation.

You stood beside me during the dark, fatal days of
November, 1918. As you know, I forced myself to
the difficult, terrible decision to leave the country only
upon the urgent declaration of yourself and the rest
of my counselors who had been summoned that only
by my so doing would it be possible to obtain more
favorable armistice terms for our people and spare it a
bloody civil war.

The sacrifice was in vain. Now, as well as before,
the enemy wishes to make the German people expiate
the alleged guilt of "Imperial Germany."

SILENT UNDER ATTACKS

In my endeavor to subordinate all personal con
siderations to the welfare of Germany, I keep myself
completely in the background. I am silent in the face
of all the lies and slanders which are spread abroad
concerning me. I consider it beneath my dignity to
defend myself against attacks and abuse.

In accordance with this policy of restraint I have
also kept the Historical Tables mentioned by you
strictly objective and made them accessible only to a
narrow circle of acquaintances. I am utterly at a loss
to understand how they have now become public
through some sort of indiscretion or theft ( ?). The
purpose inspiring me when I prepared the Historical
tables^ was this : To bring together strictly historical
material by a systematic enumeration of sober facts,
such as might enable the reader to form his own judg
ment of the historical happenings preceding the war.
I found my most convincing sources, be it remarked,
in the literature which has sprung up after the war,
particularly in the works of natives of the enemy coun-

298

THE TRIBUNALS

tries.^ Therefore I am glad that you find my modest
contribution to history useful.

As to your suggestion to make the tables, which have
been completed in the meantime, accessible to the Ger
man press, I thank you, and will follow it. 1

Truth will hew a way for itself mightily, irresis
tibly, like an avalanche. Wii ever does not close his
ears to it against his better judgment must admit that,
during my twenty-six-year reign previous to the war,
German's foreign policy was directed solely to the
maintenance of peace. Its one and only aim was to
protect our sacred native soil, threatened from the
west and the east, and the peaceful development of
our commerce and political economy.

Had we ever had warlike intentions we should have
struck the blow in 1900, when England's hands were
tied by the Boer War, Russia's by the Japanese War,
at which time almost certain victory beckoned us. In
any event, we assuredly would not have singled out
the year 1914, when we were confronted by a com
pact, overwhelmingly superior foe. Also, every im
partial man must acknowledge to himself that Ger
many could expect nothing from the war, whereas our
enemies hoped to obtain from it the complete realiza
tion of the aims which they had based, long since, upon
our annihilation.

The fact that my zealous efforts and those of my
Government were concentrated, during the critical July
and August days of 1914, upon maintaining world peace
is being proved more and more conclusively by the
most recent literary and documentary publications in
Germany, and, most especially, in the enemy countries.
The most effective proof thereof is Sazonoff's state--
ment: "The German Emperor's love of peace is a
guarantee to us that we ourselves can decide upon the

has meanwhile been done. The Comparative Historical
Tables from iB?8 to the Outbreak of the Wo* In igij. were published
in December, 1921, by K. F. Koehler, Leipsic.

299

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

moment of war." What further proof of our inno
cence is needed? The above means that the intention
existed to make an attack upon one who was absolutely
unsuspecting.

CALLS ACCUSATION FUTILE

God is my witness that I, in order to avoid war, went
to the uttermost limit compatible with responsibility
for the security and inviolability of my dear fatherland.

It is futile to accuse Germany of war guilt. To-day
there is no longer any doubt that not Germany, but the
alliance of her foes, prepared the war according to a
definite plan, and intentionally caused it.

For the purpose of concealing this, the allied enemies
extorted the false "admission of guilt" from Germany
in the shameful Peace Treaty and demanded that I be
produced before a hostile tribunal. You, my dear Field
Marshal, know me too well not to be aware that no
sacrifice for my beloved fatherland is too great for
me. Nevertheless, a tribunal in which the enemy
alliance would be at once plaintiff and judge would be
not an organ of justice, but an instrument of political
arbitrariness j and would serve only, through the sen
tence which would inevitably be passed upon me, to jus
tify subsequently the unprecedented peace conditions
imposed upon us. Therefore, the enemy's demand
naturally had to be rejected by me.

But, in addition, the idea of my being produced
before a neutral tribunal, no matter how constituted,
cannot be entertained by me. / do not recognize the
validity of any sentence pronounced by any mortal judge
whatsoever, be he never so exalted in rank, upon the
measures taken by me most conscientiously as Emperor
and King in other words, as the constitutional, not
responsible, representative of the German nation
since, were I to do so, I should thereby be sacrificing
the honor and dignity of the German nation repre
sented by me.

300

THE TRIBUNALS

Legal proceedings having to do with guilt . and
punishment, instituted solely against the head of one of
the nations which took part in the war, deprive that
one nation of every vestige of equality of rights with
the other nations, and thereby of its prestige in the
community of nations. Moreover, this would cause,
as a consequence, the impression desired by the enemy
that the entire "question of guilt" concerns only this one
head of a nation and the one nation represented by
him. It must be taken into consideration, moreover,
that a nonpartisan judgment of the "question of guilt"
is impossible, if the legal proceedings are not made to
include the heads and leading statesmen of the enemy
powers, and if their conduct is not subjected to the same
investigation, since it goes without saying that the con
duct of the aforesaid one nation at the outbreak of
the war can be judged correctly only if there is simul
taneous consideration of the actions of its opponents.

A real clearing up of the "question of guilt," in
which surely Germany would have no less interest than
her foes, could be accomplished only if an international,
nonpartisan tribunal, instead of trying individuals as
criminals, should establish all the events which led to
the World War, as well as all other offenses against
international law, in order thereafter to measure cor
rectly the guilt of individuals implicated in every one
of the nations participating in the war.

Such an honest suggestion was officially made in Ger
many after the end of the war, but, so far as I know,
it was partly refused, partly found unworthy of any
answer at all. Furthermore, Germany, immediately
after the war, unreservedly threw open her archives,
whereas the enemy alliance has taken good care so far
not to follow such an example. The secret documents
from the Russian archives, now being made public in
America, are but the beginning.

This method of procedure on the part of the enemy
alliance in itself, combined with overwhelming damag-

301

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

ing evidence coming to hand, shows where the "war
guilt" is really to be sought I This makes it all the
more a soleihn duty for Germany to collect, sift, and
make public, by every possible means, every bit of ma
terial bearing on the "question of guilt," in order, by
so doing, to unmask the real originators of the war.

Unfortunately, the condition of Her Majesty has
become worse. My heart is filled with the most
grievous worry.

God with us I

Ycwr grateful

(Signed) WILHELM.

CHAPTER XIV

The Question of Guilt

HISTORY can show nothing to compare with
the World War of 1914-18. It also can
show nothing like the perplexity which has arisen
as to the causes leading up to the World War.

This is all the more astounding in that the Great
War befell a highly cultivated, enlightened, polit
ically trained race of men, and the causes leading
up to it were plainly to be seen*

The apparent complicity in the crisis of July,
1914, should deceive nobody. The telegrams ex
changed at that time between the Cabinets of the
great powers and their rulers, the activities of the
statesmen and leading private individuals in ver
bal negotiations with important personages of the
Entente, were certainly of the greatest importance
on account of the decisive significance assumed
by almost every word when it came from respon
sible lips, by every line that was written or tele
graphed. The essential basis of the causes of
the war, however, is not altered by such things;
it is firmly established, and people must never
hesitate from freeing it, calmly and with an eye
to realities, from the bewildering outcrop

303

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

pings from the events accompanying the outbreak
of war.

The general situation of the German Empire
in the period before the war had become continu
ally more brilliant, and for that very reason con
tinually more difficult from the point of view of
foreign politics. Unprecedented progress in in
dustry, commerce, and world traffic had made
Germany prosperous. The curve of our develop
ment tended steadily upward.

The concomitant of this peaceful penetration
of a considerable part of the world's markets, to
which German diligence and our achievements
justly entitled us, was bound to be disagreeable
to older nations of the world, particularly to
England. This is quite a natural phenomenon,
having nothing remarkable about it. Nobody
is pleased when a competitor suddenly appears
and obliges one to look on while the old cus
tomers desert to him. For this reason I cannot
reproach the British Empire because of English
ill humor at Germany's progress in the world's
markets.

Had England been able, by introducing better
commercial methods, to overcome or restrict Ger
man competition, she would have been quite within
her rights in doing so and no objections could have
been made. It simply would have been a case of
the better man winning. In the life of nations
nobody can find it objectionable if two nations
contend against each other peacefully by the same
methods/, e., peaceful methods yet with all

304

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

their energy, daring, and organizing ability, each
striving to benefit itself.

On the other hand, it is quite another matter if
one of these nations sees its assets on the world's
balance sheet threatened by the industry, achieve
ments, and super business methods of the other,
and hence, not being able to apply ability like that
of its young competitor, resorts to force i. e.> to
methods that are not those of peace, but of war
in order to call a halt upon the other nation in its
peaceful campaign of competition, or to anni
hilate it.

NAVY MERELY PROTECTIVE

Our situation became more serious since we were
obliged to build a navy for the protection of our
welfare, which, in the last analysis, was not based
on the nineteen billions yearly to which German
exports and imports amounted. The supposition
that we built this navy for the purpose of attack
ing and destroying the far stronger English fleet
is absurd, since it would have been impossible
for us to win a victory on the water, because of
the discrepancy between the two navies. More
over, we were striding forward in the world
market in accordance with our desires and had
no cause for complaint. Why, then, should we
wish to jeopardize the results of our peaceful
labors?

In France the idea of revenge had been sedu
lously cultivated ever since 1870-71; it was fos
tered, with every possible variation, in literary,

305

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

political, and military writings, in the officer corps,
in schools, associations, political circles.

I can well understand this spirit Looked at
from the healthy national standpoint, it is, after
all, more honorable for a nation to desire revenge
for a blow received than to endure it without
complaint

But Alsace-Lorraine had been German soil for
many centuries ; it was stolen by France and taken
back by us in 1871 as our property. Hence, a war
of revenge which had as its aim the conquest of
thoroughly German territory was unjust and itn-
moraL For us to have yielded on this point would
have been a slap in the face to our sentiments of
nationality and justice. Since Germany could
never voluntarily return Alsace-Lorraine to France,
the French dream could be realized only by means
of a victorious war which should push forward
the French boundary posts to the left bank of the
Rhine.

Germany, on the contrary, had no reason for
staking what she had won in 1870-71, so the course
for her to pursue was to maintain peace with
France, all the more so because of the fact that
tfie combination of the powers against the German-
Austrian Dual Alliance was continually becom
ing more apparent

As to Russia, the mighty empire of the Tsars
was clamoring for an outlet on the sea to the south
ward. This was a natural ambition and not to be
harshly judged. In addition, there was the Rus
sian-Austrian conflict of influence, especially in

306

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

Serbia, which also concerned Germany in so far
as Germany and Austria-Hungary were allies.

The Russia of the Tsars, moreover, was in a
state of continual internal ferment and every Tsar-
istic Government had to keep the possibility for
a foreign conflict ever in readiness, in order always
to be able to deflect attention from inner troubles
to foreign difficulties; to have a safety valve as an
outlet for the passions that might lead to trouble
at home.

Another point was that Russia's enormous de
mand for loans was met almost exclusively by
France ; more than twenty billions of French gold
francs found their way to Russia, and France had
a voice, to some extent, in determining how they
should be expended. As a result, it became en
tirely a matter of expenditure on strategic meas
ures and preparations for wan The golden chain
of the French billions not only bound Russia to
France financially, but made Russia serve the
French idea of revenge.

PURPOSE OF "ENCIRCLEMENT"

Thus England, France, and Russia had, though
for different reasons, an aim in common viz., to
overthrow Germany. England wished to do so
for commercial-political reasons, France on ac
count of her policy of revenge, Russia because she
was a satellite of France and also for reasons of
internal politics and because she wished to reach
the southern sea. These three great nations, there
fore, were bound to act together. The union of
21 307

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

these ambitions in a common course of action,
duly planned, is what we call the "policy of
encirclement"

Added to all this there was also the Gentlemen's
Agreement which has only recently come to light
and has already been thoroughly discussed in the
"Hohenlohe" chapter; concerning this agreement
I knew absolutely nothing during my reign, and
the German Foreign Office was only superficially
and unreliably informed.

When I learned of it, I immediately sought in
formation about it from Herr von Bethmann. He
wrote me a rather puzzling letter to the effect that
there was surely something about it among the
documents of the Foreign Office ; that the German
ambassador at that time in Washington, von Hoi-
leben, had made some confidential report on it, to
be sure, but had not given his source of informa
tion, wherefore the Foreign Office had not attached
any importance to the matter and had not reported
further on it to me. Hence the said agreement
had actually no influence upon Germany's policy,
but it constitutes supplementary proof that the
Anglo-Saxon world as far back as 1897 had com
bined against us, and thereby explains a number
of obstacles encountered by Germany in her for
eign policy. It also explains America's attitude
in the war.

We were quite well acquainted, on the other
hand, with the Entente Cordiale, its foundations
and purposes, and it decisively influenced the
course of our policy.

308

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

In view of the grouping of England, France,
and Russia three very strong powers only one
political course lay open to Germany, the threat
of deciding Germany's future by force of arms
must be avoided until we had secured for our
selves such an economic, military, naval, and na
tional-political position in the world as to make it
seem advisable to our opponents to refrain from
risking a decision by arms and to yield us the share
in the apportionment and management of the
world to which our ability entitled us. We neither
desired nor were we entitled to jeopardize our
hard-won welfare.

The aims of the Entente could be attained only
through a <war, those of Germany only without a
war. It is necessary to hold fast to this basic idea ;
it is of more decisive value than all accessory mat
ters. Hence I shall not go into detail here, nor
take up Belgian or other reports, nor the tele
grams sent just before the outbreak of war. The
thorough treatment of these details lies in the do
main of research.

In Gerriiany our situation was correctly under
stood, and we acted accordingly.

SOUGHT ENGLAND'S FRIENDSHIP

Taking up once more our relations with Eng
land, we did everything in our power to bring
about a rapprochement; we consented to the de
mand for limitation of naval construction, as I
have shown in my report of JtJaldane's visit to
Berlin. I went so far as to try to utilize my family

309

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

connections. But in vain. The actions of King
Edward VII are explained by the simple fact that
he was an Englishman and was trying to bring to
realization the plans of his Government Maybe
the political ambitions of the King, who did not
begin to reign until well along in years, contrib
uted to this.

We certainly did all that was possible to meet
England halfway, but it was useless, because the
German Export figures showed an increase; natur
ally we could not limit our world commerce in
order to satisfy England. That would have been
asking too much.

As regards our policy toward England, we have
been much blamed for having refused the offer of
an alliance made us by Chamberlain, the English
Colonial Minister, toward the close of the 'nine
ties. This matter, however, was far different in
character, on closer inspection, from what it was
represented as being.

First, Chamberlain brought a letter with him
from the English Premier, Salisbury, to Billow,
in which the English Prime Minister declared
that Chamberlain was dealing on his own account
only, that the English Cabinet was not behind him.
This, to be sure, might have meant the adoption
of a course that was diplomatically permissible,
giving the English Cabinet, which was respon
sible to Parliament, a free hand; but it turned
out later, be it remarked, that the Liberal group
in England was at that time hostile to a German-
English alliance.

r 3io

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

Nevertheless, in view of the fact that there was
a possibility that the course adopted was a mere
diplomatic formality that Chamberlain might
have been sent on ahead and complete freedom of
action retained for the English Cabinet, which is
a favorite method in London Prince Biilow, with
my consent, went thoroughly into the matter with
Chamberlain.

It transpired then that the English-German al
liance was aimed unquestionably against Russia.
Chamberlain spoke directly about a war to be
waged later by England and Germany against
Russia. Prince Biilow, in full agreement with me,
declined politely but emphatically thus to disturb
the peace of Europe. In so doing he was but fol
lowing the example of the great Chancellor, for
Prince Bismarck coined the phrase I myself
have heard it repeatedly in the Bismarck family
circle: "Germany must never become England's
dagger on the European continent."

So we did nothing further at that time than to
go straight ahead with our policy viz., we refused
all agreements which might lead to a war which
was not based directly on the defense of our native
soil. The refusal of the Chamberlain offer is a
proof of the German love of peace.

As to France, we sought to bring about an en
durable state of affairs. This was difficult, for, in
French eyes, we were the archenemy and it was
impossible for us to acquiesce in the demands in
spired by the policy of revenge. We settled the
Morocco quarrel peacefully; no man of standing

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

in Germany eatertained the idea of war on accoont
of Morocco, For the sake of peace we allowed
France at that time to encroach upon the essen
tially legitimate interests of Germany in Morocco,
strengthened as the French were by the agreement
concluded secretly with England as to mutual com
pensation in Egypt and Morocco.

In the Algeciras Conference the outline of the
Great War was already visible. It is assuredly not
pleasant to be forced to retreat politically, as we
did in the Morocco matter, but Germany's policy
subordinated everything to the great cause of pre
serving the peace of the world.

We tried to attain this end by courtesy, which
was partially resented. I recall the journey of
my mother, the Empress Frederick, to Paris. We
expected a tolerably good reception, since she was
an English Princess and went, as an artist, to be
the guest of French art Twice I visited the Em
press Eugenie once from Aldershot at her castle
of Fernboroiigh, the other time aboard her yacht,
in Norwegian waters, near Bergen. This was a
piece of politeness that seemed to me perfectly
natural, seeing that I happened to be very near
her. When the French General Bonnal was in
Berlin with several officers, these gentlemen dined
with the Second Infantry Regiment. , I was pres
ent and toasted the French army something that
was still out of the ordinary, but was done
with the best intentions. I brought French
female and male artists to Germany, All this
sort of thing, of course, was a trifle in the great

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THE QUESTION OF GUILT

game of politics, but it at least showed our
good will.

With regard to Russia, I went to the utmost
trouble. My letters, published in the meantime,
were naturally never sent without the knowledge
of the Imperial Chancellors, but always in agree
ment with them and largely at their desire. Russia
would doubtless never have got into a war with
Germany under Alexander III, for he was reli
able. Tsar Nicholas was weak and vacillating;
whoever had last been with him was right; and,
naturally, it was impossible for me always to be
that individual.

I made every effort with this Tsar, also, to
restore the traditional friendship between Ger
many and Russia. I was moved to do so not
only by political reasons, but by the promise
which I had made to my grandfather on his
deathbed.

I most urgently advised Tsar Nicholas, repeat
edly, to introduce liberal reforms within his coun
try, to summon the so-called Great Duma, which
existed and functioned even as far back as the reign
of Ivan the Terrible. In doing so it was not my
intention to interfere in Russian internal affairs;
what I wanted was to eliminate, in the interests of
Germany, the ferment going on in Russia, which
had often enough been deflected before to foreign
conflicts, as I have already described. I wished
to help toward eliminating at least this one phase
of the internal situation in Russia, which threat
ened to cause war, and I was all the more willing

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

to make the effort since I might thereby serve both
the Tsar and Russia.

The Tsar paid no heed to my advice, but created
a new Duma instead, which was quite inadequate
for coping with the situation. Had he summoned
the old Duma he might have dealt and talked per
sonally with all the representatives of his huge
realm and won their confidence.

When the Tsar resolved upon war against
Japan, I told him that I would assure him security
in the rear and cause him no annoyances. Ger
many kept this promise.

GRAND DUKE'S VISIT

When the course taken by the war did not fulfill
the Tsar's expectations, and the Russian and Jap
anese armies finally lay before each other for
weeks without serious fighting, the young brother
of the Tsar, Grand Duke Michael, arrived at
Berlin for a visit We could not quite make out
what he wanted. Prince Billow, who was then
Chancellor, requested me to ask the Grand Duke
sometime how matters really stood with Russia;
he said that he, the Prince, had received bad news
and thought it was high time for Russia to bring
the war to an end.

I undertook this mission. The Grand Duke
was visibly relieved when I spoke to him frankly;
he declared that things looked bad for Russia. I
tdld him that it seemed to me that the Tsar ought
to make peace soon, since what the Grand Duke
had told me about the unreliability of troops and

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

officers appeared to me quite as serious as the re
newed internal agitation.

Grand Duke Michael was grateful for my hay
ing given him an opportunity to talk. He said that
the Tsar was vascillating, as always, but he must
make peace and would make it if I advised him to
do so. He asked me to write a few lines to the Tsar
to that effect, for him to deliver.

I drafted a letter in English to Tsar Nicholas,
went to Biilow, told him what the Grand Duke
had told me, and showed him the draft of my let
ter. The Prince thanked me and found the letter
suitable. The Grand Duke informed the Russian
ambassador in Berlin, Count Osten-Sacken, and,
after he had repeatedly expressed his thanks, went
direct to the Tsar, who then had peace negotia
tions begun.

Count Osten-Sacken told me, when next we met,
that I had done Russia a great service. I was glad
this was recognized, and felt justified in hoping,
on account of this, that my conduct would con
tribute toward bringing about friendly relations
with Russia. In acting as I did I also worked
toward preventing the possible spread of a Rus
sian revolution, during the Russo-Japanese War,
across the frontiers of Germany. Germany earned
no thanks thereby; however, our conduct during
the Russo-Japanese War is another proof of our
love of peace.

The same purpose underlay my suggestion which
led to the Bjorko agreement (July, 1905). It
contemplated an alliance between Germany and

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Russia, which both the Allies as well as other
nations should be at liberty to join. Ratification
of this agreement failed through the opposition
of the Russian Government (Isvolsky).

It remains to say a few words about America.
Aside from the Gentlemen's Agreement already
mentioned, which assured America's standing be
side England and France in a World War, Amer
ica did not belong to the Entente Cordiale created
by King Edward VII at the behest of his Gov
ernment, and, most important of all, America, in
so far as it is possible at present to judge events,
did not contribute toward bringing on the World
War. Perhaps the unfriendly answer given by
President Wilson to the German Government at
the beginning of the war may have had some con
nection with the Gentlemen's Agreement.

AMERICAN FACTORS IN DEFEAT

But there can be no doubt that America's entry
into the war, and the enormous supplies of am
munition, and especially of war materials, which
preceded her entry, seriously hurt the chance of
the Central Powers to bring the war to a success
ful termination by force of arms.

It is necessary, however, to avoid all emotional
criticism of America also, since, in the great game
of politics, real factors only can be considered.
America was at liberty (despite the Gentlemen's
Agreement) to remain neutral or to enter the war
on tfye other side. One cannot reproach a nation
for a decision as to war or peace made in accord-

316

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

ance with its sovereign rights so long as the deci
sion is not in violation of definite agreements.
Such is not the case here.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that John Ken
neth Turner, in his already mentioned book. Shall
It Be Again? shows, on the basis of extensive
proofs, that all Wilson's reasons for America's
entry into the war were fictitious, that it was far
more a case of acting solely in the interest of Wall
Street high finance.

The great profit derived by America from the
World War consists in the fact that the United
States was able to attract to itself nearly fifty per
cent of all the gold in the world, so that now the
dollar, instead of the English pound, determines
the world's exchange rate. But here also no re
proach is at all justified, since any other nation
in a position to do so would have rejoiced in at
tracting to itself this increase of gold and of
prestige in the world's money market. It was
certainly regrettable for us that America did
not do this stroke of business on the side of the
Central Powers.

But just as Germany objects with perfect justi
fication to having had her peaceful labors com
bated by the Entente, not with peaceful, but with
warlike means, so also she can and must enter con
stant protest as she is already trying to do by
means of published material against America's
violation of the right at the close of the World War.

Personally I do not believe that the American
people would have consented to this; American

317

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

women particularly would not have participated
iiy tfie denial of President Wilson's Fourteen
Points, if they could have been enlightened at that
time as to the facts. America, more than other
countries, had been misled by English propa
ganda, and therefore allowed President Wilson,
who had been provided with unprecedented
powers, to act on his own initiative at Paris in
other words, to be beaten down on his Fourteen
Points. Just as Mr. Wilson omitted mention,
later on, of the English blockade, against which
he had protested previously, so also he acted with
regard to his Fourteen Points.

The German Government had accepted Wil
son's Fourteen Points, although they were severe
enough. The Allies likewise had accepted the
Fourteen Points, with the exception of those on
reparations and the freedom of the seas. Wilson
had guaranteed the Fourteen Points,

FOURTEEN POINTS ABANDONED

I fail to find the most important of them in the
Versailles instrument, but only those expressing
the Entente's policy of violence, and even part
of these in a greatly falsified form. Relying on
Wilson's guaranty, Germany evacuated the enemy
territory occupied by her and surrendered her
weapons in other words, made herself defense
less. In this blind confidence and the abandon
ment of the Fourteen Points on the one side, and
in the outbreak of the German revolution on the
other, lies the key to our present condition.

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

According to Turner, the Fourteen Points, as
far back as the drawing up of the armistice terms,
were, to Wilson, no more than a means of making
Germany lay down her arms ; as soon as this end
was achieved he dropped them.

Already a very large part of the American peo
ple has arrayed itself against Mr. Wilson and is
unwilling to be discredited along with him. I
am not dreaming of spontaneous American help
for Germany; all I count upon is the sober ac
knowledgment by the American people that it
has to make good the gigantic wrong done Ger
many by its former President. For the atmos
phere of a victory does not last forever, and later
on, not only in Germany, but elsewhere, people
will remember the unreliability of the American
President and look upon it as American
unreliability.

That is not a good thing, however, for the
American people. To have the policy of a na
tion branded with the stigma of unreliability is
not advantageous. When judgment is passed
hereafter on American policy, people will for
get that Mr. Wilson, unversed in the ways of
the world, was trapped by Lloyd George and
Clemenceau.

I have met particularly at the Kiel regattas
many American men and women whose political
judgment and caution would make it impossible
for them to approve such a flagrant breach of
faith as was committed by Mr. Wilson, because
of its effect on America's political prestige. It is

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

upon such considerations of national egotism, not
upon any sort of sentimental considerations, that
I base my hope that Germany's burden will be
lightened from across the ocean.

Besides the injustice in the abandonment of the
Fourteen Points, it must also be remembered that
Mr. Wilson was the first to demand of the Ger
man reigning dynasty that it withdraw, in doing
which he hinted that, were such action taken, the
German people would be granted a better peace.
Before the Government of Prince Max joined in
the demand for my abdication of the throne,
which it based on the same grounds as Mr. Wil
son that Germany would thereby get better
terms (prevention of civil war was used as a
second means of bringing pressure on me) it
was in duty bound to get some sort of a binding
guaranty from Mr. Wilson. In any event, the
statements made, which became continually more
urgent and pressing, contributed toward making
me resolve to quit the country, since I was con
strained to believe that I could render my country
a great service by so doing.

ACCEPTED "SIGHT UNSEEN"

I subordinated my own interests and those of
my dynasty, which certainly were not unimpor
tant, and forced myself, after the severest inward
struggles, to acquiesce in the wish of the German
authorities. Later it transpired that the German
Government had obtained no real guaranties.
But, in the tumultuous sequence of events during

320

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

those days, it was necessary for me to consider the
unequivocal and definite announcement of the
Imperial Chancellor as authoritative. For this
reason I did not investigate it

Why the Entente demanded, through Mr. Wil
son, that I should abdicate is now obvious. It
felt perfectly sure that, following my being dis
possessed of the throne, military and political in
stability would necessarily ensue in Germany and
enable it to force upon Germany not easier but
harder terms. At that time the revolution had
not yet appeared as an aid to the Entente.

For me to have remained on the throne would
have seemed to the Entente more advantageous
to Germany than my abdication. I myself agree
with this view of the Entente, now that it has
turned out that the Max of Baden Government
had no substantial foundation for its declaration
that my abdication would bring better terms to
my fatherland.

I go even further and declare that the Entente
would never have dared to offer such terms to an
intact German Empire. It would not have dared
to offer them to an imperial realm upon which the
parliamentary system had not yet been forced,
with the help of German Utopians, at the very
moment of its final fight for existence ; to a realm
whose monarchical Government had not been de
prived of the power to command its army and
navy.

In view of all this, heavy guilt also lies on the
shoulders of the American ex-President as a re-

321

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

suit of his having demanded my abdication under
the pretense that it would bring Germany better
terms. Here also we certainly have a point of
support for the powerful lever which is destined
to drag the Treaty of Versailles from where it lies
behind lock and key. In Germany, however, Mr.
Wilson should never be confused with the Ameri
can people.

In setting forth my political principles in what
follows I am actuated solely by a desire to con
tribute toward proving Germany's innocence of
having brought on the World War.

From the outset of my reign German policy
was based upon compromise of the differences
which it found existing between nations. In its
entirety, therefore, my policy was eminently
peaceful. This policy of peaceful compromise
became apparent in internal politics, at the very
beginning of my reign, in the legislation desired
by me for the protection of the workers. The de
velopment of social legislation, which placed
Germany at the head of civilized nations in the
domain of governmental protection, was based on
a like foundation.

The fundamental idea of a policy of compro
mise went so far within Germany that the strength
of the army would have remained far less than
universal compulsory military service and the size
of the population made possible. Here, as well as
in the matter of naval construction, the curtail
ments demanded by the Reichstag were put up
with by the Crown and the Government. Al-

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THE QUESTION OF GUILT

ready at that time the question of Germany's
capabilities of defense was left to the decision of
the people's representatives. A nation that
wished and prepared war would have adopted
quite different tactics.

INADEQUATE PREPAREDNESS

The more apparent the Entente's "policy of en
circlement" and attack became, the more the means
of protecting our welfare should have been
strengthened for defensive reasons. This idea of
natural and justified self-protection, by means of
defensive measures against a possible hostile at
tack was carried out in a wretchedly inadequate
manner.

Germany's desire for peace, in fact, was unable
to develop this protection by land and sea in a
manner compatible with her financial and na
tional strength and with the risk which our
welfare was bound to run in case of a war.
Therefore, we are now suffering not from the
consequences of the tendency toward aggression
falsely imputed to us, but actually from thfe conse
quences of a well-nigh incredible love of peace and
of blind confidence.

The entirely different political principles of
the Entente have already been described by me,
also our continuous efforts to get upon friendly
terms with the individual Entente nations.

I do not wish to ignore completely the less
important work done by Germany, also included
within the framework of politics on a large scale,
22 323

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

which was always inspired by the same purpose :
to effect compromise of existing points of con
flict The Kiel regatta brought us guests from
all the leading nations. We sought compromise
with the same zeal on the neutral territory of
sport as in the domain of science by means of ex
change professors, and foreign officers were most
willingly allowed to inspect our army system.
This latter might be adjudged a mistake, now that
we can look back, but, in any event, all these
points are certain proofs of our honest desire to
live at peace with all.

Moreover, Germany did not take advantage of
a single one of the opportunities that arose for
waging war with a sure prospect of success.

I have already pointed out the benevolent neu
trality of Germany toward Russia at the time of
the Russo-Japanese War.

At the time when England was deeply in
volved in the Boer War we might have fought
against England or against France, which, at that
time, would have been obliged to forego help
from England. But we did not do so. Also, while
the Russo-Japanese War was in progress, we
might have fought not only against Russia, but
also against France. But we did not do so.

In addition to the Morocco crisis already
touched upon, in connection with which we set
aside the idea of going to war, we also gave evi
dence of our desire for peace by overcoming the
Bosnian crisis by diplomatic means.
When one considers these plainly visible politi-

324

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

cal events as a whole and adduces the declarations
of Entente statesmen such as Poincare, Clemen-
ceau, Isvolsky, Tardieu, and others, one is bound
to ask one's self, in amazement, how a peace treaty,
founded upon Germany's guilt in having brought
on the World War, could have been drafted and
put through. This miscarriage of justice will not
stand before the bar of world history,

BLAMES FRANCE FOR 1870

A Frenchman, Louis Guetant, delegate from
Lyon to the Society for the Rights of Man, re
cently made this statement:

"If we once look upon events without preju
dice, with complete independence and frankness,
without bothering about which camp chance
placed us in at birth, the following is forced upon
our attention first of all: The War of 1914 is a
consequence of the War of 1870. For, ever since
that earlier date, the idea of revenge, more or less
veiled, has never left us.

"The War of 1870, however, was prepared and
declared by the French Government. The French
Empire, indeed, needed it very badly in order to
contend against interior troubles and its steadily
growing unpopularity with the public. Even
Gambetta, the wild tribune of the opposition,
exclaimed: 'If the Empire brings us the left
bank of the Rhine, I shall become reconciled
with it!' Thus, it was a war of conquest; nobody
bothered about what the conquered populations
might hare to say about it We shall bend their

325

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

will to oursP Thus it is written in the law of the
victor !

"And now, suddenly, the opportunity for doing
this was to escape France. In view of the political
difficulties and dangers of war caused by his can
didacy, Prince Leopold declared himself ready to
withdraw. That is bad! Without a pretext there
can be no war!

"It was the same with France as with the milk
maid and the broken pitcher in the fable, only in
stead of, 'Farewell, calf, cow, pig, hens/ it was^
'Farewell, bloody profits, glory, victory, left bank
of the Rhine, even Belgium 1' for the latter, too,
lay on that left bank of the Rhine which France
coveted. No, that would have been too hard, the
disillusionment would have been too great, the op
portunity must be created anew. The entire chau
vinistic press, the entire clan of boasters, set to work
and soon found a way. Gramont, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, sent Ambassador Benedetti to
visit Emperor William, who was taking the cure
at Ems, and demand from him a written promise
that, in case Prince Leopold should change his
mind about his withdrawal, he, William, as head
of the family, would take issue against this.

"The withdrawal of Prince Leopold was an
nounced to France in a valid manner and officially
accepted by the Spanish Government. There
could be no doubt as to its genuineness. Never
theless the Paris newspapers, almost without ex
ception, clamored for war. Whoever, like Robert
Michell in the Constitutionel, expressed his pleas-

326

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

ure at the prospects for peace and declared himself
satisfied, was insulted on the street Gambetta
shouted at him : 'You are satisfied ! What a base
expression!' Copies of his newspapers were stolen
from the news stands, thrown into the river, hurled
in his face! Emilie de Girandin wrote to him:
'The opportunity is unique, unhoped-for; if the
Empire misses it the Empire is lost!' Then it was
that preparation for the War of 1914 was begun."
Voices like this also, which are not unique either
in France or England, must always be adduced as
proof that the guilt is not ours,

"MISTAKEN, BUT NOT GUILTY"

Our political and diplomatic operations in the
course of decades were not, it must be admitted,
faultlessly conceived or executed. But where we
made mistakes they were caused invariably by the
too great desire to maintain world peace. Such
mistakes do not constitute guilt.

As I mentioned elsewhere, I even consider the
Congress of Berlin a mistake, for it made our rela
tions with Russia worse. The congress was a vic
tory for Disraeli, an Anglo-Austrian victory over
Russia, which turned Russian anger upon Ger
many. Yet think of all that has been done since
then to make up with Russia! I have partly enu
merated these acts. And Bismarck's sole intention
in bringing about the Congress of Berlin was, as I
have pointed out, the prevention of a great general
war.

Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg also, who

327

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

had strict orders from me to maintain peace if it
was at all possible, made mistakes in 1914; as a
statesman he was not at all adequate to the world
crisis. But the blame for the war cannot be put
upon us simply because our opponents profited by
our mistakes. Bethmann Hollweg wished to avoid
the war, like all of us sufficient proof of this is
to be found in the one fact alone that he persisted,
until the 4th of August, in his political inertia,
negotiating with England in the erroneous belief
that he could keep England out of the Entente.

While on this subject I wish also to call attention
to the delusion under which Prince Lichnowsky,
the German ambassador in London, was laboring.
Soon after he had become ambassador, King
George came to the Embassy to dinner. The
King's example was followed automatically by the
best society people in London.

The Prince and Princess were singled out for
marked attentions and exceedingly wejl treated
socially. From this the German ambassador drew
the conclusion that our relations with England had
improved, until, shortly before the war, Sir Ed
ward Grey coolly informed him that he must draw
no political conclusions from social favors and
good treatment accorded to him personally.

Nothing could give a better insight into the dif
ference between the English and German men
tality than this. The German assumed social
friendliness to be the expression of political
friendliness, since the German is accustomed to ex
press aversion and approval by means of social

328

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

forms as well as otherwise. He is very outspoken
about what he has on his mind.

CHARGES ENGLISH INSINCERITY

The Englishman, however, makes a distinction;
in fact, he is rather pleased if the man to whom he
is speaking confuses form with substance, or, in
other words, if he takes the form to be the expres
sion of actual sentiments and political views.
Judged from the English standpoint, the above-
mentioned words of Sir Edward Grey were a per
fectly frank statement.

The much-discussed nonrenewal of the reinsur
ance treaty with Russia, already touched upon by
me, is not to be considered so decisive as to have
influenced the question of whether there was to be
war or peace. The reinsurance treaty, in my opin
ion, would not have prevented the Russia of Nich
olas II from taking the road to the Entente; under
Alexander III it would have been superfluous.

Prince Bismarck's view that the Russian am
bassador, Prince Shuvaloff, would have renewed
the reinsurance treaty with him but not with his
successor, is naturally the honest, subjective way
of looking at the matter judged in the light of
fact, however, it does not hold water, in view of
what the two parties concerned had to consider at
that time. For instance, the Under Secretary of
State of the Prince, Count Berchem, stated offi
cially in a report to the Prince that the treaty could
not be renewed, which meant that it could not be
renewed through Shuvaloff, either.

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THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

I thought that not the old treaty, but only a new
and different kind of treaty, was possible, in the
drawing up of which Austria must participate, as
in the old Three-Emperor-Relationship.

But, as I said, treaties with Nicholas II would
not have seemed absolutely durable to me, par
ticularly after the sentiment of the very influential
Russian general public had also turned against
Germany.

Our acts were founded upon the clear percep
tion that Germany could reach the important posi
tion in the world and obtain the influence in world
affairs necessary to her solely by maintaining world
peace. This attitude was strengthened, moreover,
by personal considerations.

Never have I had warlike ambitions. In my
youth my father had given me terrible descriptions
of the battlefields of 1870 and 1871, and I felt no
inclination to bring such misery, on a colossally
larger scale, upon the German people and the
whole of civilized mankind. Old Field Marshal
Moltke, whom I respected greatly, had left behind
him the prophetic warning : Woe to him who hurls
the firebrand of war upon Europe! And I con
sidered as a political legacy from the great Chan
cellor the fact that Prince Bismarck had said that
Germany must never wage a preventive war; that
German resistance would be neutralized if she did.

Thus the trend of the German policy of main
taining the peace was determined by political in
sight, personal inclination, the legacies of two
great men, Bismarck and Moltke, and the desire of

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THE QUESTION OF GUILT

the German people to devote itself to peaceful
labors and not to plunge into adventures.

Whatever has been said in malevolent circles
about the existence of a German party favoring
war is a conscious or unconscious untruth. In
every land there are elements which, in serious
situations, either from honest conviction or less
lofty motives, favor the appeal to the sword, but
never have such elements influenced the course of
German policy.

The accusations, especially those which have
been made against the General Staff to the effect
that it worked for war, are pretty untenable. The
Prussian General Staff served its King and father
land by hard, faithful work, and maintained Ger
many's ability to defend herself by labors extend
ing over many years of peace, as was its duty, but
it exerted absolutely no political influence what
soever. Interest in politics, as is well known, was
never particularly strong in the Prussian-German
army. Looking backward, one might almost say,
in fact, that it would have been better for us if
those in leading military circles had concerned
themselves a bit more with foreign policy.

Therefore, how the Peace of Versailles, in view
of this perfectly clear state of affairs, could have
been founded upon Germany's guilt in haying
caused the World War, would seem an insoluble
riddle if it were not possible to trace the tremen
dous effect of a new war weapon viz., the politi
cal propaganda of England against Germany
planned on a large scale and applied with audacity

33 *

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

and unscrupulousness. I cannot bring myself to
dismiss this propaganda by branding it with catch
words such as "a piece of rascality," etc., since it
constitutes an achievement which, in spite of its
repugnant nature, cannot be ignored; it did us
more harm than the arms in the hands of our
opponents.

To us Germans, such an instrument of insincer
ity, distortion, and hypocrisy is not pleasing; it is
something that is incompatible with the German
character; we try to convince our opponents with
the weapon of truth as well as with other weapons.
But war is a cruel thing and what matters in it is
to win ; after all, to fire heavy guns at civilized be
ings is not a pleasant matter, nor to bombard beau
tiful old towns, yet this had to be done by both
sides in the war.

Moreover, we could not have developed a
propaganda on a large scale like that of our
enemies during the war for the very reason that
they had no foes in their rear, whereas we were
surrounded. In addition, most Germans have not
the gift to fit a scheme of propaganda to the dif
ferent nationalities of the nations upon which it is
supposed to work. But, just as the English were
more than our match with that terrible weapon
of theirs, the tank, against which we could bring
nothing of equal efficiency, so also were they su
perior to us with their very effective weapon of
propaganda.

And this weapon still continues its work and we
are compelled still to defend ourselves against it

332

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

over and over again. For there can be no doubt
that the unjust Peace of Versailles could not have
been founded upon Germany's war guilt unless
propaganda had previously accomplished its task
and, partly with the support of German pacifists,
instilled into the brains of 100,000,000 human
beings the belief in Germany's guilt, so that
the unjust Peace of Versailles seemed to many
justified.

HOPES FOR VERSAILLES REACTION

Meanwhile, things have changed, the barriers
between nations have fallen, and gradually they
are awakening to the realization of how their con
fidence was imposed upon. The reaction will be
crushing to the makers of the Versailles Peace, but
helpful to Germany. It goes without saying that,
among the statesmen, politicians, and publicists of
the Entente who really know, not a single one is
really convinced of Germany's guilt in having
caused the World War. Every one of them knows
the real interrelation of events, and assuredly
there never was a case where so many augurs smiled
at each other over a secret held in common as the
case of the responsibility for the World Wan In
fact, one may even speak of a chorus of such
individuals, since twenty-eight nations took part
in the war against Germany. But, in the long
run, not even the shrewdest augurs will suffice
to make world history. Truth will make its
way forward and thus Germany will come into
her rights.

333

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

The various stipulations of the Versailles
Treaty are in themselves null and void, since they
can be observed neither by the Entente nor by
Germany. It has been possible for months to note
what difficulties are arising in the path not only
of Germany, but of the victors, as a result of such
an extravagant instrument

In many ways the treaty has been punctured by
the Entente itself, and for this the reason is easily
found. In the present highly developed state of
the world, which rests upon free, systematic ex
change of material and intellectual property,
regulated solely by production itself, it is quite out
of the question for three men no matter how
eminent they may be to sit themselves down
anywhere and dictate paragraphed laws to the
world. Yet that is what the Versailles Treaty
does, not only for Germany, but also, indirectly,
for the Entente and America, since all economic
questions can be solved by mutual, not one-sided,
action.

The life of nations is regulated always and
most particularly in our day not by paragraphs,
but simply and solely by the needs of nations. It
is possible, to be sure, to do violence to those na
tional needs temporarily by the imposition of arbi
trary decisions, but, in such cases, both parties
concerned must suffer.

The world is in such a stage just now. Condi
tions like those at present cannot last; not guns, nor
tanks, nor squadrons of airplanes, can perpetuate
them. Therefore, their removal has already be-

334

THE QUESTION OF GUILT

gun ; for, if the peace of Versailles were really such
a judicious, unimpeachable instrument, bringing
blessings upon the world, there would not be con
stant need of new conferences, discussions, and
meetings having to do with this "marvelous" docu
ment The constant necessity for new interpreta
tions is due, indeed, to the fact that the needs of
highly cultivated and civilized nations were not
taken into account when the peace was concluded.

One must not be pharisaical, however; up to a
certain point the extravagance of the terms im
posed by the victor after a lif e-and-death struggle
is a natural consequence of the relief felt at having
escaped alive from deadly danger.

Nevertheless, I know that Germany, if we had
emerged victorious from the war, would have im
posed quite different terms i. e. y terms that would
have been just and endurable. The peace treaties
of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest which indeed are
not at all comparable with the Treaty of Versailles
cannot be adduced against us. They were con
cluded in the very midst of the war and had
to include conditions which would guarantee
our safety until the end of the war. Had it
come to a general peace, the treaty made by us
in the East would have had a far different aspect;
had we won the war, it would have been re
vised by ourselves. At the time it was made it
was necessary to give preference to military
requirements.

But enlightenment regarding the unjust Treaty
of Versailles is on the way and the necessities of

335

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

life among present-day nations will speak in im
perious tones to victors and vanquished.

After years of the heaviest trial will come the
liberation from a yoke imposed unjustly upon a
great, strong, honest nation. Then every one of us
will be glad and proud again that he is a German.

CHAPTER XV

The Revolution and Germany's , Future

1DO not care what my foes say about me. I do
not recognize them as my judges. When I see
how the same people who exaggeratedly spread
incense before me in other days are now vilifying
me, the most that I can feel is pity. The bitter
things that I hear about myself from home disap
point me. God is my witness that I have always
wished what was best for my country and my peo
ple, and I believed that every German had recog
nized and appreciated this. I have always tried
to keep my political acts, everything that I did as
a ruler and a man, in harmony with God's com
mandments. Much turned out differently from
what I desired, but my conscience is clean. The
welfare of my people and my Empire <was the goal
of my actions.

I bear my personal fate with resignation, for the
Lord knows what He does and what He wishes.
He knows why He subjects me to this test. I shall
bear everything with patience and await what
soever God still holds in store for me.

The only thing that grieves me is the fate of my
country and my people. I am pained at the hard

337

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

period of trial which my children of the German
land are undergoing, which I obliged to live in
foreign parts cannot suffer with them. That is
the sword thrust which pierces through my soul;
that is what is bitter to me. Here in solitude I still
feel and think solely for the German people, still
wonder how I can better matters and help with
enlightenment and counsel.

Nor can bitter criticism ever lessen my love for
my land and people. I remain faithful to the
Germans, no matter how each individual German
may now stand with regard to me. To those who
stand by me in misfortune as they stood in pros
perity, I am grateful they comfort me and relieve
my gnawing homesickness for my beloved Ger
man home. And I can respect those who, im
pelled by honest convictions, array themselves
against me ; as for the rest, let them look to justify
ing themselves to God, their consciences, and
history.

They will not succeed in separating me from
the Germans. Always I can look upon country
and people solely as one whole. They remain to
me what they were when I said on the occasion of
the opening of the Reichstag on the ist of August,
1914, in the Imperial Palace: "I know no more of
parties ; I know only Germans."

The revolution broke the Empress's heart She
aged visibly from November, 1918, onward, and
could not resist her bodily ills with the strength of
before. Thus her decline soon began. The hard
est of all for her to bear was her homesickness for

338

THE REVOLUTION

the soil of Germany, for the German people. Not
withstanding this, she still tried to bring me
consolation.

The revolution destroyed things of enormous
value. It was brought about at the very moment
when the German nation's fight for existence was
to have been ended, and every effort should have
been concentrated upon reconstruction. It was a
crime against the nation.

WIND AND WHIRLWIND

I am well aware that many who rally around
the Social Democratic banner did not wish revo
lution ; some of the individual Social Democratic
leaders likewise did not wish it at that time, and
more than one among them was ready to co-operate
with me. Yet these Social Democrats were in
capable of preventing the revolution, and therein
lies their share of guilt for what is now going on,
all the more so since the Socialist leaders stood
closer to the revolutionary masses than the repre
sentatives of the monarchical Government and,
therefore, could exert more influence upon them.

But the leaders, even in the days before the war,
had brought the idea of revolution to the masses
and fostered it, and the Social Democracy had
been, from time immemorial, openly hostile to the
earlier, monarchical form of government, and had
worked systematically toward eliminating it. It
sowed the wind and reaped the whirlwind.

The time and nature of the revolution were not
to the liking of a number of the leaders, but it was
23 339

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

exactly these men who, at the decisive moment,
abandoned leadership to the most unbridled ele
ments and failed to bring their influence to bear
toward maintaining the Government.

It was the duty of the Government of Prince
Max to protect the old form of government It
failed to fulfill its holy duty because it had become
dependent on the Socialist leaders, the very men
who had lost their influence on the masses to the
radical elements.

Therefore, the greatest share of the guilt falls
upon the leaders, and for that reason history will
not brand the German working classes, but their
leaders, with the curse of the revolution, in so far
as these leaders participated in making the revolu
tion or failed to prevent it and it will also brand
the Government of Prince Max of Baden with that
curse.

The German workers fought brilliantly in bat
tle under my leadership, and at home, as well,
labored ceaselessly to provide munitions and war
material. That is something which must not be
forgotten. It was only later that some of them
began to break away, but the responsibility for this
lies at the door of the agitators and revolutionists,
not at that of the decent, patriotic section of the
working classes.

The conscienceless agitators are the men really
responsible for Germany's total collapse. That
will be recognized some day by the working classes
themselves.

The present is a hard time for Germany. Of
340

THE REVOLUTION

the future of this healthy, strong nation I do not
despair. A nation which can achieve such an un
precedented rise as that of Germany between 1871
and 1914, a nation which can maintain itself suc
cessfully for over four years in a defensive war
against twenty-eight nations, cannot be driven
from the earth. Economically, the world cannot
do without us.

But in order that we may regain the position in
the world which is Germany's due, we must not
await or count upon help from outside. Such help
will not come, in any event; were it to come, it
would but mean at best our being mere Helots.
Also, the help which the German Social Demo
cratic party hoped for from abroad has not ma
terialized, after all. The international part of the
socialistic program has proved itself a frightful
mistake.

The workers of the Entente lands took the field
against the German people in order to destroy it;
nowhere was there a trace of international soli
darity among the masses.

ANOTHER GERMAN MISTAKE

This mistake, too, is one of the reasons why the
war turned out so badly for Germany. The Eng
lish and French working classes were rightly di
rected L e*, nationalistically by their leaders;
the German working classes were wrongly directed
L e., internationally.

The German people must rely upon no other
people, but solely upon themselves. When self -con-

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

scious, national sentiment returns to all the Strata
of our people our upward march will begin. All
classes of the population must be united in na
tional sentiment, no matter if their ways lie apart
in other departments of the nation's life. Therein
lies the strength of England, of France even of
the Poles.

If this comes to pass, the feeling of solidarity
with all fellow members of the nation, the con
sciousness of the dignity of our noble land, the
pride in being German, and the genuinely German
conception of ethics, which was one of the secret
sources of strength that have made Germany so
great, will come back to us.

In the community of cultured nations Germany
will again play, as she did before the war, the role
of the nation with the greatest capacity for labor,
and will once more march victoriously in the van
in peaceful competition, offering not only to her
self, but to all the nations of the earth, whatever
is best in the domain of technical achievement, of
science, of art

I believe in the revocation of the unjust Peace
of Versailles by the judgment of the sensible ele
ments of foreign lands and by Germany herself. I
believe in the German people and in the continua
tion of its peaceful mission in the world, which
has been interrupted by a terrible war, for which
Germany, since she did not will it, does 'not bear
the guilt

INDEX

Abdication of Kaiser and
Crown Prince, 280-288,
320, 321, 322.

Abdul-Hamid, Sultan, and
the Albanians, 142, 164,
165.

Achenbach, von, 34.

Adlerberg, Count, 13.

Admiralty, English, 154;
Staff, German, 240, 250.

Agadir affair, 145.

Agrarian Conservatives, 54.

Agreement, Anglo - Russian,
116; German-French, Mo
rocco, 126, 127.

Airplanes, 276, 334.

Aix-la-Chapelle, 262, 278.

Albania, 142, 163-169.

Albedyll, von, 8.

Aldershot, 312.

Alexander II, of Russia, 14,
16, 17, 18, 19, 28.

Alexander III, of Russia, 313,

329.

Alexandra, Queen, of Eng
land, 127, 130.

Algeciras Conference, 1 1 1 ,
115, 126, 144, 145, 312.

Alliance, Triple, 8, 251, 253;
Double, 8, 306; Anglo-
Japanese, 69; Balkan, 170;
German-English, 310, 311.

Alsace-Lorraine, 60, 61, 89,

252, 258, 306.

Althoc, Privy Councilor, 107.
Althoff, von, 183, 198.
America. See United States.
America, Central, 73.
Anastasia, Grand Duchess,

252.

Andrassy, 5, 273-
Annihilation, policy of, 296.
Antwerp-Meuse line, 275,

279.

Archives, 294, 295, 301.
"Areopagus of the Powers,"

165.
Armistice, 274, 278, 284, 285,

286, 289, 290, 298, 319-
Armored ship, first German,

48.
Army, German, 52, 62, 77,

105, 223-228, 259, 274,

275, 276, 277, 278, 281,

284, 285, 286, 287, 288,

289, 290, 320, 322, 331;

Russian, 10, 105, 227, 254 ;

British, 91, 142, 162.
"Asia for the Asiatics," 79.
Asquith, Herbert Henry, 152,

153-

"Assurbanipal," 204.
Assyriology, 203-207.
Astrakhan, 254.
Austria, alliance with, 5;

343

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

worked with, 8; threat
against, 54; war begun by
Germany on, 71 n.; if Ger
many or, should begin war,
72; ultimatum to Serbia,
248; Serbia's answer to,
248 ; anti-Russian Balkan
policy, 251; "nothing will
be left of Austria," 252 ; dis
memberment of Austria-
Hungary, 258; elimination
of the House of Hapsburg,
258; and the Pope, 265,
266 ; Emperor Charles's va
cillation, 272 ; peace offer of,
273 ; deceives Germany,
273 ; Russo-Austrian con
flict of influence in Serbia
307 ; Germany's ally, 307.
Automobile Club, Imperial
45, 46.

B

"Babel and the Bible," 204,

218.

Baden, 285, 287, 321, 34O.
Bagdad Railway, 89, 9.
Balholm, 247.

Balkans, 106, 165, I99> 200.
Ballin, Albert, 3, 107, 146,

147, 148, 150, 151, 152,

153, 154, 138.
Baltic, 105.

Baltisch-Port, 169-170, 249.
"Baralong" murderers, 264.
Barrere, Camille, 126. /
Battlefields of 1870-71, 330.
Bavaria, 60.

Belgian Documents, 127.
Belgium, 42, 43, 309, 326.

Bender, Herr von, 29-30, 31-
Benedetti, Ambassador, 326.
Benedictine monks, 216.
Bennigsen, Rudolf von, 30,

31, 32.

Berchem, Count, 54, 329-
Bergen, 312.

Berlin Treaty, 10, n, 14;

Congress, 2, 15, *7> 2O, 327*

Berlin, University of, 199;

Palace Chapel at, 218.
Bertram, Prince-Bishop, 208.
Beseler, Max, 187.
Bethmann Hqllweg, von,
Chancellor, 124-134; "the
governess," 132; enjoys con
fidence of foreign countries,
134; dismissed, 134; his
diplomatic power, 138, 246;
mistakes in 1914* 328;
wished to avoid war, 328;
tried to keep England out of
the Entente, 328.
Beuron Congregation, 216.
Biebrich-Mosbach, 179.
Bismarck, Bill, 3.
Bismarck, Count Herbert, 2,

5, 6, 12, 27, 28, 76-
Bismarck, Prince, Chancellor,
153 ; greatness as a states
man, i; services to Prussia
and Germany, i ; creator of
the German Empire, i ;
Memoirs, 3, 4; fight against
the Kaiser, 2; appreciation
by the Prince of Prussia
(later the Kaiser) , 2 ; major-
domo of the Hohenzol-
lerns, 3; and the harbor of
Hamburg, 4; the third vol
ume of his reminiscences, 4;

344

INDEX

continental preparations, 7;
his Congress, 10; "honest
broker," 10, n; "Now I
am driving Europe four-in-
hand, II ; retirement of, 18,
53; and the Socialists, 40;
his labor views, 41 ,* and the
Vulcan shipyards, 48; suc
ceeded by Caprivi, 54; fights
his successor, 55 ; "mis
understood Bismarck," 55,
76; reconciliation with Kai
ser, 92; eightieth birthday,
93; "Germany must never
become England's dagger on
the European continent,"
311; and the Congress of
Berlin, 327.

Bismarckian theory, 102.

Bjoko agreement, 201, 249,

315.

Bissing, General von, 43.
Black Sea, 105, 191, 192.
Blockade, English, 318.
Bodies, 262.

Bolsheviki, 181, 254, 284.
Bonn, 214.
Bonnal, General, 312.
Book of the German Fleet,

184.

Bosmont, 254.
Bosnia, 324, 326.
Botticher, His Excellency von,

3,38.

Brandenburg, 196.
Brandenburg, 231.
Breitenbach, Paul von, 180,

181, 182.
Brest-Litovsfc, 14, 16, 136,

253, 335J Treaty of, 335-
Brest mission, 4.

Bucharest, Treaty of, 335.
Buckingham Palace, 142.
Budde, Hermann, 178, 179.
Biilow, Prince von, 68 ; Chan
cellor, 95-123, 192, 194,

195,233,310,311,314)315-
Burchard, Doctor von, 156,

157-158, 159.
Burian, Stefan, 272.
Boyd-Carpenter, W., Bishop

of Ripon, 213.

Cabinet, German War, 23,

277, 280; Civil, 25, 35, 134,

136; English, 310, 311.
Caesar, 295.

Calmuck Cossacks, 254.
Cambon, Jules, 252.
Cambridge, Duke of, 91.
Canal, Central, 112, 174, 177,

178, 1 81; Elbe-Trave, 178;

Kaiser Wilhelm, 163, 181,

238-239; Panama, 181,

238.

Canton, 78.
Cape-to-Cairo Railway and

Telegraph line deal, 87-88,

89- ^

Caprivi, General Leo von, 51 ;
Chancellor, 54-58; opposi
tion of Bismarck, 57.

Carlsbad, 247, 250.

Caro, Professor, 206.

Cassel, Sir Ernest, 146, 147,
150, 152, 159-

Cassino, Monte, 217.

Caucasus, 207, 254.

Causes of the World War,
127, 252.

Centrists, 33, 68.

345

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Central Powers, 81, 257, 316,

317-

Chamberlain, Joseph, 68, 91,
104, 186, 310, 311.

Charles, Emperor, agreement
with Kaiser, 272; secret
dealings with the Entente,
273; "When I go to the
Germans, I agree to every
thing they say, and when I
return home, I do whatever
I please/' 273.

Charlotte, Grand Duchess,
172.

Charlottenburg, 196, 201.

Chih-li, Gulf of, 67.

China, 64, 106.

Chinese Empire, 78.

Chirol, Sir Valentine, 85, 86.

Church, of England, 213,*
St. Mary's (Jerusalem),
216.

Churchill, Winston, 150, 152,

153-
"Citizens' Book of Laws," 93,

187.

"Civis Germanus sum," 183.
Clemenceau, Georges, 3 1 9,

325.
Clemen, Professor Paul, 260.

Conference, London, 296, 297.

Conflict, Russo-English, 10.

Conflict of Influence, Russian-
Austrian, 306.

Congress of Berlin, 2, 327,

Connaught, Duke of, 102.

Conrad, Consistorial Coun
cilor, 215.

Conservatives, 31, 32, 33, 54,

III, 112, 114, 119, 122,

174.

Constantine, Crown Prince

(of Greece), 28.
Constantine the Great, 218.
Constantinople, 10, 14, 15,

16, 28, 90, 105, 106, 253.
Constitution, German, 2, 139-

141, 293-

Constitutionelj 326.
Conversations with Christ,

215.

Costheim, 179.
Court, international, 295.
Cronberg-Friedrichshof situa
tion, 148.
Crown Council, German, 247,

272; Russian, 252, 253.
Crown Prince, German, 286,

287.
Cuniberti, 240.

D

Coaling stations, 64, 69-70, Cuxhaven, 107, 156,

73, 74-

Cologne, 1 80, 288.
Colonial acquisitions, 7, 9.
Colonies, German, 7, 8, 9, II,

12, 55, 56, 57-
Commerce, world, 310.
Comparative Historical Tables

from 1878 to the Outbreak

of the War in 1914, 251,

253> 297, 298, 299 n.

Dahn, Professor, 306.
Daily Telegraph, London,
118, 120; "interview," 118.
Dardanelles, offer of, to Rus
sia, 14.

Dar-es-Salaam, 56.
"Debating society," 280.
_ Deldriick, Klemens von, 282.

346

INDEX

Delcasse, Theophile, 108, 257.

Dclitzsch, Professor Fried-
rich, 204, 218.

"Deutschland iiber alles," 186.

Dirschau, 177-

Disraeli, Benjamin, 11, 327.

Documents, secret, 294.

Dollar, American, 317.

Donaneschingen, 119.

"Dormition," 216.

Dorpat, University of, 2OO.

Dorpfeld, Professor Wilhelm
204, 205.

Downing Street, 70.

Dreadnaughts, 238, 239, 240,
241.

Drews, Bill, Minister of In
terior, 281.

Dryander, Doctor Ernest, 214.

Duma, Great, 313, 314; new

314-
Durnovo, Madame, 192, 193

Ebert, Imperial Chancellor,
287, 288.

Eckartsan, 119.

Edward VII, of England, 74,
103, 162; at Kiel, 115; in
vites Kaiser to Windsor,
117; "policy of encircle
ment," 45, ii5> 126, 128,
257," visits Berlin, 126;
death of and funeral, 128-
130, 144; actions of ex
plained, 310; political am
bitions of, 310; and the;
Entente Cordiale, 316.

Egypt, 3/2.

Eiffel Mountains, 180.

Einen, General von, 151, 161.

Eisenach Conference, 213.

Emden, 181.

Empire, French, 325, 327.

Empress, German, 61, 196,
297, 302, 338.

Ems, 326, 329-

England, 9, 10, 15, 16, 26,
44; conditions of English
workmen, 44-45; and Ger
many as to coaling stations,
69; anger at Germany's oc
cupation of Kiao-Chau, 70-
71; and France, 71 n., 72,
73, 75; and United States,
71 n., 72-74, 75; naval sta
tions, 78; and Japan, 78,
82; Kaiser foresees compli
cations with, 83; Kruger
telegram, 83-86; Russia
and France's proposal to
Germany to attack, 87, 91 ;
Kaiser loyal to, 87; the
Kaiser's opinion of English
men, 98; death of Queen
Victoria, 103; Kaiser's re
ception in England, 102-
104; Chamberlain suggests
alliance between Germany
and England against Rus
sia, 104-106; validity of
alliance, 106; plan fails,
106; alliance with Japan,
106; pro-French and anti-
German attitude of, at Al-
geciras Convention, 115-
116; Kaiser visits Windsor,
117; Edward VII visits
Berlin, 126; death of Ed
ward VII, 128-130; fu
neral, 129-130; unveiling

347

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

of statue to Queen Victoria, c - Enmity, source of Russian, 9.

142-143; Kaiser at, 142
1 43 ; festivities, 1 43-1 44 ;
comparison of pomp between
democratic England and
mediaeval Germany, 144;
in Egypt, 145; offer to re
main neutral in "unpro
voked" attack on Germany,
146; "verbal note" to the
Kaiser, 147; negotiations,
153-155; repudiation, 159;
Kaiser denounces Haldane,
162; evolution of the dread-
naught, 240; fleet, 241, 247,
252 ; "two-Power standard,"
241 ; Tsar's hatred for, 249 ;
promise of, to' side with Rus
sia against Germany, 253 ;
Germany's progress dis
agreeable to, 304; aim to
overthrow Germany, 307;
grouping of Russia, France,
and, 309 ; Germany tries to
bring about a rapproche
ment with, 309; Germany
consents to limitation of
naval construction, 309 ;
political ambitions of King
Edward, 310; Germany
could not satisfy, 310 ; secret
agreement with France as
to Morocco and Egypt,
312; propaganda in Amer
ica, 318; blockade, 318;
Bethmann tries to keep
England out of the Entente,
328 y political propaganda,
33i~333; working classes,
341; strength of England,
342-

348

Entente, 72, 73, 74, 134, 141*
165, 250, 251, 264, 269,
273, 292, 293, 294, 295,
303, 307, 309, 3i6, 317,
318, 321, 323, 325, 333,

334, 341-

Erzberger, Ambassador, 286.
Essad Pasha, 167, 169.
Eugenie, Empress, 312.
Eulenburg, Count Augustus,

24, 117.

"Fairyland Wants Its Prince/'
166.

Fatherland, 286, 289, 292,
297, 298, 300, 321, 33*.

Faulhaber, Archbishop, 208.

Federal Council, 157.

Fernborough, Castle of, 312.

Figaro^ 21.

Fischer, Cardinal, 210.

Fisher, Admiral, 154, 240.

Flanders, 278, 279.

Fleet, English, 10, 105, 241,
247, 248, 305-

Foch, General, 290.

Foreign Office, German, 5, 6,
9, 10, ii, 12, 25, 27, 29,
48, 59, 66, 68, 75, ?6, 77,
84,, 98, 99, ioo, 101, 104,
108, 118, 119, 121, 132,
134, 138, 139, 145, 146,
155, 246, 247, 248, 250,
277, 284, 308.

Foundations of the Nineteenth
Century, 1 86.

Fourteen Points, 318, 319,
320.

France, and Russia, 61 ; and

INDEX

Germany, Jin.; and United
States, 71 n., 72, 73, 75;
and England, 71 n., 72-74?
at Shimonoseki, 8 1 ; fortifi
cations, 81; Russo-French
proposal to Germany
against England, 87, 91;
anger at Kaiser's visit to
Tangier, 108; not yet ready
for war, 109; England's
offer of 100,000 men to
seize Kaiser Wilhelm
Canal, 109; downfall of
Delcasse, 109; accession of
Rouvier, 109; growing de
sire for revenge and enmity;
toward Germany, 126, 305;
German - French Morocco
agreement, 1 26 ; confers
cross of Legion of Honor
on Radolin and von Schoen,
126; railways, 179; armi
stice commission in, 286,
290 ; Kaiser understands
spirit, 306 ; Alsace-Lorraine,
306 ; enormous loans to Rus
sia, 307 ; aim to overthrow
Germany, 307 ; grouping of
England, Russia, and, 309;
Germany arch enemy of,
311; secret agreement with
England as to Morocco and
Egypt, 312; War of 1870
325; working classes, 341;
strength of France, 342.

Franchise, Prussian, 135-138.

Frankfort, 181.

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke
119, 246.

Franz Josef, Emperor, 14
119.

Frederick II, Emperor, 217.
Frederick Charles, Prince,

102.
Frederick, Crown Prince, 134,

1 80.
Frederick, Empress, 172, 189,

202, 312.
Frederick the Great, 28, 39,

76, 217.
Frederick, William III, 21

22, 24, 26, 29, 172, 224.
Free Thinkers, 31.
Friedberg, His Excellency

Heinrich, 187.
Fried jung, Heinrich, 128.
Friedrichsruh, Admiral von

Tirpitz at, 4 ; Kaiser at, 93.
Friendship, Russo-French to

replace Russo-Prussian, n.
Fiirstenberg, Prince Max

Egon, 117, 119.

Gambetta, Leon, 325, 327.

Galician-Polish campaign, 1*36.

Gallwitz, General von, 274.

General Headquarters, Ger
man, 122, 254, 278, 288.

General Staff; German, 6, 61,
161, 177, 178, 180, 226,
227, 247, 248, 250, 331;
English, 161, 162, 175;
Austrian, 167; Russian, 255.

"Gentlemen's agreement," 74,
308, 316.

George, David Lloyd, 296,
32O.

George V, of England, 130,
142, 143, 144, ^296, 328.

"German Evangelical Church
Union," 214.

349

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Germany, Bismarck creator of
German Empire, i; consti
tution of, 2, 139-141 ; alli
ance with Austria, 5; ani
mosity of Russian military
circles against, 17; as peace
maker, 20; maintenance of,
31; conditions of laboring
classes in, 36-50; first ar
mored ship, 48; merchant
marine, 48; shipbuilding in
dustry, 51, 235; corps, naval
officer, 51, 52,53, 112,230;
reinsurance treaty with
Russia, 54; and Kiao-Chau,
64-68, 74; coaling stations,
64, 69-70; and United
States, 71 n,, 72-74; diffi
culty of training up good
diplomats in, 76; English
commercial envy of, 79;
Russia and France's pro
posal to attack England, 87 ;
Cecil Rhodes's admiration
for Berlin and tremendous
German industrial plants,
88 ; difference between Ger
mans and English, 92; re
form of military punishment
procedure, 93; Naval law,
93, 146, 147; appointment
of Waldersee, 93; Boxer
war, 93; Tsing-tao, 94;
Yangtse Treaty, 94; rela
tions with England become
more complicated, 95 ;
France, Russia, and, in the
Far East, 105; validity of
an alliance, 106; failure of
plan, 106; disturbed rela
tions among the parties in

350

the Reichstag, 1 1 1 ; popular
demonstration at defeat of
Social Democrats, 114; Ed
ward VII at Kiel, 115; Kai
ser's Daily Telegraph inter
view, 1 18; press demands
Furstenberg to "tell the
Emperor the truth for
once," 119; Conservatives'
"Open Letter," 122; retire
ment of Biilow, 123; Beth-
mann Hollweg appointed
Chancellor, 124; growing
desire for revenge and en
mity of France, 126; Ger
man - French Morocco
Agreement, 126; Austro-
Hungarian allies, 128 ^'Na
tion in Arms," 135, 259;
Chancellor's powers, 139-
141 ; German French agree
ment, 146; "A verbal note 1 s *
147, 148; astonishment at,
149; discussion and reply,
1 49-1 50; negotiations, 153-
155; verbal note disavowed
by England, 159; Haldane
"cheated" the Germans,
162; blamed on Kaiser and
von Tirpitz, 162; the Cen
tral Canal, 174; railways,
1 75-1 82; schools, 183-185;
forests, 189; science and art,
196207; must become
sword of the Catholic
Church, 21 1 ; revolution,
213, 218, 224; Protestant
Union, 214-215; officer
corps, 225, 226; noncom
missioned officer corps, 225,
230; development of Heli-

INDEX

goland, 238 ; first big fight
ing ship, 241 ; U-boats, 242-
243 ; democratization of,
258 ; Germans on all battle
fields, 260; "Germans al
ways defeated by Germans,"
260; "In Germany every
Siegfried has his Hodur be
hind him," 260; atrocities,
260; protection of churches,
chateaux, castles, and art
treasures, 260; failure of
August 8, 1918, 272, 273;
movement for setting up of
new government, 274 ; inner
situation of army, 274, 279;
revolutionary agitation in,
274, 275; general desire
for ending fighting, 275;
achievements of fighters and
nation in arms, 276; army
of 1918 cannot compare with
army of 1914, 275, 276;
approaching revolution, 284;
people want peace at any
cost, 284; authority of Gov
ernment zero, 284 ; agitation
against Emperor in full
swing, 284; abdication of
Emperor \not to be avoided
any longer, 284; evidence of
Russian Bolshevist influence
in, 284; relations between
Foreign Office and police,
284; army no longer to bd
trusted, 285 ; revolution im
minent behind front, 285;
Kaiser's abdication de
manded, 285 J revolt among
troop begins, 286; Kaiser
willing to renounce Imperial

351

throne, but not to abdicate
as King of Prussia, 286; ab
dication of Kaiser and
Crown Prince summarily
announced, 287; conduct of
Prince Max, 287-288 ; sac
rifice of Emperor, princes,
and Empire, 288; Kaiser
advised to go to neutral
country, 288 ; foes unwilling
to conclude peace with Kai
ser, 289; the question of
war guilt, 291, 302; desire
for peace and clean con
science, 291 ; Kaiser decides
to leave country for coun
try's good, 291, 294; En
tente demands surrender of
Kaiser for trial, 292, 300;
state archives thrown open,
294; demands for Kaiser's
surrender rejected, 294;
policy of annihilation of
enemies, 296; general situa
tion before the war, 304;
unprecedented progress in in
dustry, commerce, and world
traffic, 304 ; navy merely pro
tective, 305 ; exports and im
ports, 305 ; Alsace-Lorraine,
German soil for centuries,
306 ; stolen by France, 306 ;
retaken in 1871, 306; and
Serbia, 307; aim of Eng
land, France, and Russia to
overthrow, 307 ; obstacles
encountered in foreign pol
icy, 308"; only one political
course, 309 ; seeks England's
friendship, 309; consents to
limitation of naval con-

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

struction, 309; blamed for
refusing alliance with Eng
land, 310; "Germany must
never become England's
dagger on the European con
tinent" (Bismarck), 311;
archenemy of France, 311 ;
traditional friendship be
tween Russia and, 313; pro
tests against America's vio
lation of right, 317; and
President Wilson's Four
teen Points, 318; evacuated
German territory and sur
rendered arms on Wilson's
guaranty, 318; revolution
as an aid to Entente, 321 ;
financial and national
strength, 323 ; War of 1 870,
325 ; political and diplomatic
operations, 325 ; English
propaganda against, 331-
333 ; wind and whirlwind,
339 > agitators responsible
for collapse, 340; English
and French working classes
versus German working
classes, 341 ; German people
must rely on themselves,
341 \ upward march will be
gin again, 342; will again
march in the van, 342.

"Germany will be annihi
lated/' 252.

Girandin, Emilie de, 327.

Goethals, Colonel, 238-239.

Gorlice-Tarnow, battle of,
136.

Goschen, Sir Edward, 248.

Gossler, Gustav von, 183.

Gramont, Herzog Agenor, 326.

Greatcoats, English soldiers',

256,

Greater Germany, 184.
"Great Orient Lodge," 258.
Greece, 28, 141, 142.
Grey, Sir Edward, 146, 151,

152, 153, 257, 328, 329-
Groner, General Wilhelm,

281, 283, 285.
Guetant, Louis, 325.

Hague, The, 71.

Hahnke, General Wilhelm

von, 23*

"Haldane Episode/ 1 160.
Haldane, Lord, 146, 151, 152,

153, 154, 158, 161, 162,

188.

Hamburg, 3, 49, 137, 252.
Hamilton, Sir Ian, 234.
Handbook for English Naval

Officers, 154.
Hanseatic ports, 55, 56, 57,

156.

Harden, Maximilian, 102.
Hardinge, Sir Charles, 149.
Harkort, Friedrich, 236.
Harnack, Professor Adolf von,

199.
Hartmann, Cardinal Felix

von, 208.

Hayashi, Tadasu, 106.
Headquarters, Great General,

122, 254, 278, 288.
Heavy artillery, 227.
Heeringen, Josias von, 151,
Helfferich, Karl, 128.
Heligoland, 8, n, 55; a

menace to Hamburg and

352

INDEX

Bremen, 55; deal for, 55;
acquired by Germany, 56;
Kaiser at, 86, 117; develop
ment of, 238; Colonel
Goethals enthusiastic over,
238.

Helots, 341.

Henry of Prussia, Prince, 68,

237-

Hertling, Count von, 89, 123,
272.

Highcliffe dispatches, 117,
119, 121.

Hildegard, Convent of Saint,
218.

Hindenburg, Field Marshal
Paul von, 181, 275, 277,
281, 282, 285, 288, 295-
302.

Hinzpeter, Professor George
Ernst, 38, 194, 199, 215,
228.

Hochst, 181.

Hohenfinow, 124.

Hohenlohe, Alexander ("the
Crown Prince"), 93.

Hohenlohe, Prince, Chancel
lor, 60-94; governor of Al
sace-Lorraine, 60 ; Bis
marck's opposition, 60, 82,
92; attitude toward Social
ists, 90, 91 ; retires, 92, in.

Hohenzollern, House of, 3,

43, H4, 175, 177-
Holland. See Netherlands.
Holleben, Ambassador von,

308.
Holstein, Fritz von, 5, 6, 60,

82, 98-102.
Hollmann, Admiral, 66, 67,

84, 94> 215, 218.

Hovel, Freiherr Baldwin von,

190.

Homburg, 104, 180,
Hongkong, 78, 79.
Hubertusstock, 61.
Hulsen - Haeseler, Count

George von, 119, 204.
Hungary, defection of, 273.
Huns, 262.

"Idea of risk," 230, 231.

Illustrated Naval Atlas > 240.

India, 105, 106.

Intze, 197.

Italy, 8, 61 ; severs alliance
with Germany, 136; smug-

' gling of arms from, to Al
bania, 141 ; plots against
William of Weid, 167;
would break away from
Germany and Austria, 253 ;
and the Pope, 265, 266-
268.

Isvolsky, 256, 257, 316, 325*

Ivan the Terrible, 313.

Ivangorod, 136.

Jagow, Gottlieb von, Secre
tary of State, 127.
Jameson raid, 83, 88.
Januskevitch, General Nikolai,

255-

Japan, 74; England and, 78;
watchwords, 79 ; growing
power of, 79; menace to
Russia and Europe, 79; re
preached by Kaiser, 81;

353

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

"Prussians of the East," 81 ;
sympathies with England,
82; alliance with England,
1 06; war with Russia, 106;
pawn of England, 106 ; free
hand in Korea and China,
1 06; Portsmouth Treaty,
200.

Jaures, Jean, 109.

Jenisch, Martin von, 118.

Jerusalem, 90 ; Church at, 213,
216.

Joachimsthal, 190.

Jubilee, papal, 210; Queen
Victoria's golden, 238.

Jutland, 58, 161, 231, 242.

Kaiser, Bismarck's fight
against, 2; his regard for
Bismarck while Prince of
Prussia, 2; his grandfather's
successor, 3 ; in the Foreign
Office, 5, 12; at St. Peters
burg, 13, 16, 25, 63; proph
ecy of Russian downfall,
16; conduct of Russian offi
cers toward, 16; relief at
Bismarck's dismissal, 18;
and his father, 21; he be
comes Emperor, 22; and
Queen Victoria, 26-27 ;
conflict with Bismarck on
Turkish policy, 28 ; impres
sions of Greece, 28; Con
stantinople impressions, 28;
Turkish policy, 28; attitude
of father's friends toward,
29 ; his attitude toward par
ties, 30-34; conflict with

354

Bismarck, 34; attitude of
Bismarck cabinet toward,
35; handles a coal strike,
36; and the laboring classes,
36, 322; his welfare fund,
45-46 ; and the Vulcan ship
yard, 47, 50; presented with
a laurel wreath by work-
ingrnen, 50 ; "orphaned"
young Emperor, 54; news
paper criticism of, 55, 57;
and Heligoland, 55-58 ; and
Prince Lobanoff, 61-63 ;
finds seed of World War,
71 ; Tsar asks opinion as to
growing power of Japan,
7980; reproaches for Ja
pan, 80; at Shimonoseki,
8 1 ; sees complications with
England, 83; Kruger tele
gram, 83-86; at Heligo
land, 86; loyalty to Eng
land, 87 ; Cecil Rhodes con
sults about Cape-to-Cairo
Railway and Telegraph
line, 88; visits England in
1899, 90; reconciliation
with Bismarck, 92; at
Friedrichsruh, 93 ; his opin
ion of Englishmen, 97-98;
warns Billow against Hoi-
stein, 98; his reception in
England at Queen Vic
toria's death, 102^104; at
Tangier, 107; at the Por
tuguese Court, 107 ; declines
to visit Morocco, 107; de
cides to do so, 1 08; recep
tion at Tangier, 108; at
Gibraltar, 108 ; visit to Tan
gier, 108; the construction

INDEX

of the cathedral and Berlin
Opera House, 112; disagree
ment with conservatives,
112-114; at Windsor, 117;
Highcliffe dispatches, 117,
119, 121 ; "Englishmen are
as mad as March hares,"
118 n.; Daily Telegraph
"interview/' 118-119; vis
its Eckartsan and Donaue-
schingen, 119; "tell the Em
peror the truth for once,"
119; his mental anguish,
119; lectured by Chancellor
Billow, 120; "The tear
flows, Germania has me
again," 121 ; his attitude,
128; fury of all parties
against, 122; appoints
Bethmann - Hollweg chan
cellor, 124; goes to Lon
don to funeral of Ed
ward VII, 128-130; his re
ception, 129; finds fault
with Bethmann, 132; at
Pless, 136; at Nisch, 137;
at Orsova, 137; meets Bul
garian Tsar, 137; his fran
chise plan, 135-138; at
Corfu, 141, 204; goes to
London at the unveiling of
statue of Queen Victoria,
142; surprise at "verbal
note" from England, 148;
writes the answer, 149; and
the naval bill, 156-159; de
fends naval program, 160;
and Albania, 163, 165-169;
meets Tsar at Baltisch-Port,
169-170, 249; and von
Stephan, 171; the "White

355

Drawing Room," 172; and
the Academy of Building,
172-173; and the Central
(Rhine-Weser-Elbe) Canal,
174; and the railways, 175-
182; and the schools, 183-
186; and forestry, 189; in
terest in science and art,
1 96 ; Russian foresight,
200^201 ; Assyriology and
the Acheans, 203-207 ;
at Corfu, 204, 205, 206,
249; relations with the
Catholic Church, 208-213;
boycotted by Rhenish-West-
phalian families, 208 ;
friendship for Pope Leo
XIII, 209; consecration of
portal of Cathedral at
Metz, 210; welfare of
Catholic subjects, 211-212;
Union of Protestant
churches, 213; Doctor Dry-
sander's influence over, 214;
presents "Dormition" to
German Catholics at Jeru
salem, 216; and the Bene
dictine monks, 216, 217,
21 8; letter to Hollmann,
219-222; his theology, 220;
relations with army and
navy, 223-245; at Vienna,
246; his journey to Norway,
247-248; Tsar's treachery
toward, 249; evidence war
had been prepared for in
France, England, and Rus
sia in spring of 1914, 251-
257; his Comparative His
torical Tables, 251, 253,
297, 298; abdication of, 258,

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

280-288; orders churches,
chateaux, castles, and art
treasures protected, 260 ; re
ceives papal nuncio, 263;
suggests Pope make peace
offer, 263; deceived by
Vienna, 272, 273; goes to
the front, 277; note to Wil
son, 277; rumors of abdica
tion, 277-278; Wilson's ar
mistice note, 278 ; orders re
treat to Antwerp-Meuse
line, 279; retreat begun,
279; joyfully received by
army, 279; in danger from
aircraft bombs, 279; hostile
attitude of people against,
280, 282; Minister of In
terior Drews suggests abdi
cation, 281; "fateful conse
quences of my abdication,"
281; refuses to abdicate,
281 ; sends Delbruck to Ber
lin, 282 ; son declines to sug
gest abdication, 282 ; address
to the Ministry, 282; ab
dication no longer to be
avoided, 285 ; abdication
demanded, 285; calls con
ference, 286; wishes to pre
vent bloodshed, 286; willing
to renounce Imperial throne,
but not to abdicate as King
of Prussia, 286 ; decision too
late, 287; abdication sum
marily announced, 287; as
to the abandonment of the
army by, 287 ; advised to go
to neutral country, 288 ; sac
rifice in vain, 289 ; sorrows
at disaffection in army and

356

navy, 289 ; opinions of Ger
man people as to what he
should have done, 290; de
cides to leave country for
country's good, 291, 294;
Entente demands his sur
render for trial, 292, 300;
undecided, 292 ; surrender
debated in German circles,
293 ; decides not to give him
self up, 294; letter from
Hindenburg, 296-297; the
Kaiser's answer, 297302;
silent in the face of lies and
slanders, 298 ; does not rec
ognize the validity of sen
tence pronounced by any
mortal judge, 300 ; toasts the
French army, 312; tries to
influence Nicholas II, 313;
Tsar's obstinacy, 314; re
ceives the Grand Duke
Michael, 314; suggests alli
ance between Russia and
Germany, 316; opinion of
American women, 318, 319;
accuses Wilson of wronging
Germany, 319; counts on
American people making
good wrong done by Wilson,
319; sees dark future for
America, 319; Wilson first
to demand abdication, 320;
political principles, 322;
policy eminently peaceful,
322; constant striving for
peace, 322-331; legacies of
Bismarck and Moltke, 330;
impervious to criticism, 337 ;
disappointed in German peo
ple, 337; conscience is clean,

INDEX

337; has confidence in the
Lord, 337; his sympathy
and love for German peo
ple, 338; is homesick, 338.

Kaiser Wilhelm Children's
Home, 46.

Kato, Baron Takaaki, 68.

Kiao-Chau, 64-84, 82.

Kiderlen, Alfred von, 132,
141.

Kiel, 109, 116, 145, 246, 319,

^324-

Kirschner, Miss, 46.
Kluck, General Alexander

von, 262.
Knights of Malta, German,

216.

Koehler, K. F,, 299.
Kokovzeff, Count Vladimir,

253.
Kopp, Cardinal George, 208,

210, 212.
Korea, 106.

Krleg und Revolution, 285 n.
Krueznach, 269.
Krug, Archabbot, 217.
Kruger dispatch, 64, 82-86,

88, 89, 90, 91, 140-
"Kulturkampf," 2, 33, 208,

2O9, 212.

Labor-protective legislation, 2.

La Gaulots, 109.

Landtag, 138.

Lascelles, Sir Frank, 83 n.

Law, international, 301.

Legislation, labor-protective, 2,

Lemberg, 136.

Lengemarfc, 187.

Leo XIII, Pope, 209; recep

tions of, 209; friendship be
tween Kaiser and, 209-210,
218; Kaiser asks to make
peace effort, 261-271.

Leopold, King of Belgium, 88.

Leopold, Prince, 326.

Le Quesnoy, 257.

Lerchenfeld, Count Hugo, 96.

Liberals, German, 29, 30, 31,
32, 33, 114, 122, 194, 228;
English, 310.

Lichnowsky, Prince Karl
Max, 328.

Liege, 257.

Life of the Prince Consort,
The, 90.

Lobanoff, Prince Alexei Boris-
sowitsch, 61.

Lochow, Ewald von, 261.

Loe, Freiherr Walter von,

2IO.

Loebell, Friedrich Wilhelm
von, 135, 136.

London, recriminations from,
71; Kaiser visits, 102, 117,
128, 142; message to Beth-
mann from, 159; Bishop of,
264; favorite method, 311.

Lonsdale, Earl Hugh Cecil
Lowther, 233.

Lotalingen, 68.

Lucanus, Herman von, 24-
25, 36.

Lucas, Bernard, 215.

LudendorfF, General Erich
von, bridge named after,
1 80; cannot guarantee mili
tary victory, 273; de
mands preparations for ar
mistice, 274.

Lusitania, 75, 136.

357

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

M

Machine gun, 227, 279.

Mackenzie, Sir Morell, 21.

Madrid Convention, in.

Mainz, 178, 179-

"Maison militaire," 22, 23.

Man with the Hyena's eyes,
The, 5.

Maria Laach, abbey of, 217.

Marienbad, 177.

Market, world, 304, 305;
money, 317'

Marschall, Adolf von, 82,
83 n., 84, 96.

Martin, Sir Theodore, 90.

Matin, Paris, 109.

Maubeuge, 257, 260.

Max, Prince, Imperial Chan
cellor, 277, 278, 280, 281,
282, 285, 286, 287, 288,
320, 321, 340-

Maybach, Albert von, 1765

177-
Meinecke, His Excellency,

188.

Melissori troubles, 141.

Memoirs, Bismarck's, 3, 4.

Mensing, Admiral, 107.

Mentality, English and Ger
man, 328-329.

Merchant Marine, German,
48.

Mercier, Cardinal, 264,

Mesopotamia, 89.

Metternich, Count Paul, 104.

Mexico, 73.

Michael, Grand Duke, 314.

Michaelis, von, 37*

Michell, Robert, 326.

Militza, Grand Duchess, 252.

Miquel, His Excellency Jo
hanna, 30, 174, 189.
Mirbach, Count William, 253.
"Misunderstood Bismarck,"

55.

Modlin, 136.
Mokpo, 67.
Moller, Theodore von, 30,

194.
Moltke, Count von, 6, 176,

226.
Moltke, General von, 226,

248, 330.

Monaco, Prince of, 109, 116.
Montenegro, 142; king of,

252.
Moore, John Bassett, Prof.,

Morocco, Sultan of, 107 ; ques
tion, 107 ; negotiations con
cerning concluded, 1 1 1 ;
Agreement, German-
French, 126, 127; French
actions in, 144-145? King
George's views on, 145.

Moscow, 253, 312, 313, 324.

Most-Favored-Nation Clause
No. 17, in.

Mountains, Taunus, 178, 181.

Mudra, General Bruno von,
274.

Muravieff, Count Michael,
66, 67.

N

Namur, 257.

Narva, 18.

National Liberals, 29, 31, 33,

194-

Naval bill, German, 146, 147,
150, 151, 152, 155, 156,

INDEX

157, 159, 160, 163, 229,
231, 232, 233, 235, 236,
242.

"Nation in Arms/* 135, 276.

Navy, Germany, 7, 8, 9, n,
51-53, 55,58,8i,i22, 156,
161, 224-245, 289, 305,
320; English, 10, 105, 241,
247, 248, 305.

Needles, The, 117.

Netherlands, The, and media
tion, 272-273.

Nicholaievitch, Grand Duke
Nicholas, 254, 255.

Nicholas I, of Russia, 172,

193-

Nicholas II, of Russia, 13, 19,
20, 61-62, 67, 79-80; visit
to Potsdam, 141 ; meets the
Kaiser at Baltisch-Port,
169-170, 191, 201, 249;"!
shall stay at home this year,
for we are going to have
war," 207, 249; summer
plans, 249 ; hatred for Eng
land, 249; his perfidy to
ward Kaiser, 249; meets
Poincare, 252 ; Sazonoff
suggests seizing Constan
tinople, 253 ; vacillation of,
312, 314, 315; Kaiser tries
to influence, 313; drafts a
letter to, 315; treaties with
not endurable, 330.

Niemann, Major, 285 n.

Nisch, 137.

O

"Oberkommando," 239.
Oberndorff, Count Alfred
von, 286.

Officer Corps, German, naval,
5i, 52, 53, H2, 230; non
commissioned, 225, 230;
army, 225, 226; French,
306; Russian, 206.

Order of the Black Eagle, 13.

Osten-Sacken, Count Nich-
olai, 315.

"Our armies will meet in Ber
lin," 252.

Pacelli, Eugenio, Papal Nun
cio, 263.

Palace, Imperial, 338.
Paleologue, M., 252.
Pan-Germanism, 71 n.
Pan-Germanism, 71 n., 72,

73.

Parliament, British, 45, 106,
310.

Payer, His Excellency Fried-
rich von, 280.

Peace, offers, by Germany,
274 ; by the Pope, 263 ; by
Austria, 273; negotiations,
295, 300.

Perels, Privy Councilor Ferdi
nand, 66, 67.

Peterhof, 67.

"Petit Sucrier" trial, 21.

Pfeil, Count Richard, 10.

Philistinism, 187.

"Piazza," 266, 267, 269, 270,

271-

Pichon, Stephane, 130.

Pinon, Chateau of, 261, 262.

Pocket Manual for the Gen
eral Staff, 226.

Podbielski, Victor von, 189,
190, 193*

359

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Poincare, President, 252, 257, Puttkamer, Robert Victor von,

325.

Poix, Princess of, 261, 262.
Poland, stags in, 191 ; union

of Galicia with, 258.
Poles, strength of, 342.

189.

R

Radolin, Prince Hugo, 109,

126.

"Policy of encirclement," 45, Raschdau, Privy Councilor,
115, 126, 128, 155, 257, ii.

3p7, 308, 323.
Politics, intercourt, 12.
Pomeranian Grenadiers, 49.
Pope. See Leo XIII.
Popo, Gross and Klein, 7.
Port Arthur, 67.
Portsmouth, Peace of, 200.
Posen, 176.

Post-Bismarckians, m.
Potsdam, 248.
Pound, English, 317.

Ratibor, Duke of, 46, 92.

Reichstag, 45, 59, 84, 86, 95,
1 08, in, 116, 118, 119,
120, 121, 125, 134* 137,
161, 194) 228, 229, 230,
236, 243, 277, 285, 322,
338.

"Reichsverdrossenheit," 55.

Reinsurance treaty, 54, 329.

Reichach, Hugo, E)reiherr,

von, 262.
Powers, great, 303, 306, Relations, Russo-Prussian, 14,

309-

26.

Praschma, Count Frederick, Renvers, Privy Councilor Ru-

216.

dolf, 116.

Problem of Japan, The, 71, Reparations, 318.

72, 73 n. Republic, French, 17 n., Ger-

Prussia, and Bavaria, 60; man, 283.

Prussian-Austrian frontier, Reval, 126.

80; eastern frontier threat- "Revolution Chancellor," 280.

ened by Russian forces, 105; Revolution, German, 213, 218,

conditions in olden days, 224, 280, 284, 285, 286,

184; financial reform, 189; 288, 289, 318, 321, 338,

forestry, 190; Ministry of 339; Russian, 253, 254,

Prussian king, 194; Upper 284, 315.

House, 197 ; Protestant Revue des Deux Mondes, 252.

churches, 213? kings, 223; Rhine, 178, 179, 217, 286,

East, 175, 176, 253. 290, 325, 326.

Przemysl, 136. Rhodes, Cecil, 87-89.

Psychology, English national, Richter, Deputy Eugen, 228,

84- 229, 236.

Piickler, Count Maximilian, Richthofen, Ferdinand, Frei-

IO 7- herr von, 65, 100.

360

INDEX

Ripon, Bishop (Boyd-Carpen-
ter, W.), 213.

Roche, M. Jules, 116.

Roman Catholic Church, in
terests, 34; Kaiser's rela
tions with, 208-212; might
of , 209 ; Germany must be
come sword of the, 211;
elimination of the Pope and,
258; Kaiser's views of the
power of, 263-270.

Rominten, 190, 191.

Roosevelt, President Theo
dore, 200.

Rosebery, Lord Archibald
Philip Primrose, 233.

Rotte, Arnold (Swiss ambas
sador), 39.

R o u v i e r , Maurice, 1 09,
in.

Rumania, Bismarck and, 8;
campaign, 137; Queen of,
indorses William of Weid
for Albanian throne, 166.

Russia, 8, 9, 10, n, 14, 15,
20, 25, 28; reinsurance
treaty with Germany, 54,
329; and France, 61 ; and
Kiao-Chau, 65, 74; naval
stations, 78; Tsar and Kai
ser, 80; at Shimonosefci,
81; Russo-French proposal
to Germany against Eng
land, 87, 91; Billow and,
102; Chamberlain suggests
alliance between England
and Germany against, 105,
310, 311; a menace to In
dia and Constantinople,
105 ; France, Germany, and,
in the Far East (Shimono-

361

seki, 1895), *05; army,
105; Russo-Japanese War,
106, 200; Tsar Nicholas
visits Potsdam, 141 ; rail
ways, 179; Holy Synod,
1 93 194- ; Portsmouth
Treaty, 200; Bjoko agree
ment, 20 1, 249; mobiliza
tion, 207, 247, 255; field
kitchen, 227 ; Tsar's treach
ery toward Germany, 249;
he meets Poincare, 252 ; Sa-
zonofiE suggests seizing Con
stantinople, 253 ; Italy
would break away from
Austria and Germany, 253 ;
France to be trusted abso
lutely, England probably,
253; evidence Russian Em
bassy prepared Bolshevist
revolution in Germany,
284; archives, 301; clamor
for an outlet on the sea to
southward, 306; in con
tinual internal ferment,
307; possibility of foreign
conflict, 307; enormous de
mand for loans, 307 ; French
gold in, 307; and the
French idea of revenge,
307 ; aim to overthrow Ger
many, 307; grouping of
England, France, and, 309;
traditional friendship be
tween Germany and, 313;
weakness of Nicholas II,
312; Grand Duke Michael
visits Berlin, 314; unreli
ability of troops in Russo-
Japanese War, 315; alli
ance between Germany and,

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

315; Anglo- Austrian vic
tory over, 327-
Russo-Prussian relations, 13.

Saalburg, 183.

St. Cere, Jacques, 21.

St. Petersburg, 13, 16, 25,
Billow at, 97, 192; Japa
nese military mission at,
252; Poincare meets Tsar
at, 252.

Saint-Quentin, Cathedral of,
261.

Samoan Islands, 89.

San Stefano, Treaty of, 10,
14, 15; revanche pour, 1 8.

Salisbury, Lord, 8, 55, 3*0-

Sarajevo murders, 75.

SazonofE, 141 > 252, 253, 255,

256, 257, 299-
Scheidemann, Philip, 288.
Schiemann, Professor Theo-

dor, 107, 199-200, 201.
Schlieffen, Count Alfred, 226.
Schlutow, Privy Councilor

Albert, 49, 50.
Schnidrowitz, Herr, 21.
Schmidt, Professor Erich, 199.
Schmitz, Father Peter, 216.
Schneller, Pastor Ludwig,

215.

Schoen, Wilhelm, Freiherr
von, 107, 126.

Scholz, Finance Minister
Adolf, 1 88.

School reform, 186.

Schorfheide, 190.

Schorlemer, Burghard, Frei
herr von, 33, 190.

362

Schulenburg, Count Freidrich
von, 286.

Schulte, Doctor Joseph, 208.

Science, German, 196-199.

Seas, freedom of, 318.

"Secret treaty" between Eng
land, America, and France,
72.

"Sedan, Revanche pour," 18.

Senden, Admiral Gustav von,

234-

Serbia, 75; Austrian ulti
matum to, 248; note to
Austria, 248; Russian-Aus
trian conflict of influence in,
306. ,

Seven Years' War, 121.

Seydel, Herr (Celchen), 30.

Shall It Be Again? 75, 317.

Shanghai, 78.

Shantung, 65, 67, 68.

Sherbatsheff, General, 251.

Shimonoseki, 81, 105.

Shuvaloff, Prince, 329.

Siegfried line, 272.

Sigmaringen, 216.

Silesia, 176.

Simar, Archbishop Hubert,
208.

Simons, Walter, 297.

Skagaraak (Jutland), 58, 161,
231, 242.

Slaby, Professor Adolf, 196-

197-
Social Congress, Berlin, 39,

44.
Social Democrats, 2, 21, 43,

122, 285, 286, 287, 339,

341-

Socialist law, 35.
Social problems, 40-50.

INDEX

Socialists, 35-36, 40-41, 42,
43, 44, 45, go, in, 114,
122, 268, 269, 283.

Society for the Rights of Man,
325-

Society, Kaiser Wilhelm, 198,
199; German Orient, 203,
204, 218, 228.

Solf, Wilhelm, 277, 278, 280.

Somme, battle of, 137, 276.

Source of Russian Enmity, 9.

South African Republic, 83 n.

Spa, 278, 279, 283, 288.

Spain, 73, 326.

Spala, 191, 192.

Spartacus group, 284.

Spithead, 248.

Stephan, His Excellency Hein-
rich von, 171, 172, 173,

193-

Sternburg, Speck von, Joseph,

190, 191.
Stettin, 47, 49.
Stocker, Adolf, Court

Preacher, 33.
Stosch, Admiral Albrecht von,

47, 48.

Strassburg, 17.

Sukhomlinoff, Vladimir, 256.
Surrender for trial, Kaiser's,

292-295.
"Suum cuique" (Hohenzol-

lern motto), 43.
Switzerland, 39, 258, 262,

273-

Sylva, Carmen, 166,
Szittkohnen, 190.

Tangier, Kaiser at, 107; re
sult of visit, 108-110, 200

363

Tanks, 276, 331, 334-

Tardieu, 325.

Theology, Kaiser's, 220,

Thiel, Bishop, 208.

Thielen, 177.

Three-Emperor - Relationship,
330.

Tientsin, 78.

Tientsin-Peking line, 67.

Times, London, 85.

Tirpitz, Admiral von, at
Friedrichsruh, 4, 65; and
fleet, 122; called into con
sultation, 149, 150, 151,
153; takes part in negotia
tions, 153-155; and the
naval bill, 156-159; suc
ceeds Hollmann, 229; and
naval program, 232, 233,
23 5> 236, 237; and the
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, 238,
239; and the dreadnaught,
240, 241; and the U-boat,
242; and Tsmg-tao, 243;
his temperament, 244; Beth-
mann demands his dismissal,
244.

Togo, 7, 56.

Torpedo boat, 237.

Trafalgar, 231.

Treaties, Berlin, 10, II, 14;
Yangtse, 94; Shimonoseki,
105 ; Portsmouth, 200 ; Ver
sailles, 294, 296, 318, 322,

331, 333, 334, 335, 342;

Bucharest, 335; Brest-JLit-

ovsk, 335.

"Trente et quarante," 23.
Tribunal, enemy, and the

neutral tribunal, 292.
Trott, von, 183, 198.

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Tsaritsin, 254.

Tsarskoe Selo, 252*

Tschirschky, Herr von, 103.

Tsing-tao, 64; development of,
77, 94, 243-

Tundutoff, Prince, 254.

Turkey, question^ relating to
the Mediterranean and, 14;
Bismarck and, 28; Kaiser's
policy, 28; German rela
tions with strengthened, 90 ;
his dealings with, 96; and
Albanians, 142, 164; Kai
ser's influence on, 203.

Turner, John Kenneth, 75,
317, 3i8.

U

U-boat warfare, 75.

Ujest, Duke of, 46.

Ultra-Montane party, 208.

Ultra-Socialists, 30, 45.

"Unbeaten on land and sea,"
276,

Understanding, Russian-Eng
lish, 9; Anglo-French, 146.

entering the war, 316;
her right to choose, 316;
President Wilson's reasons
fictitious, 317; Wall Street's
influence, 316; great finan
cial profit, 317; Germany
protests against America's
violation of the right, 317;
denial of Wilson's Four
teen Points, 318; misled by
English propaganda, 318;
Wilson's unprecedented
powers, 318; American
women, 318, 319; Germany
evacuated enemy territory
and surrendered her weap
ons on Wilson's guaranty,
318; Kaiser accuses Wilson
of wronging Germany, 319;
counts on American people
righting the wrong, 319;
unreliability of Americans,
320; national egotism, 320;
Wilson not the American
people, 322.

Unser Konig absolut, wenn
er unseren Willen tut," 113.

United States, and England Usher, Roland G., 71, 72.
and France, 71 n, 72-74,
75; Russian archives made *

public in, 301 ; attitude in Valenciennes, 260.

the war, 308; "gentlemen's Valentine, Rudolf von, 136.

agreement" assures standing Varnbuhler, Ambassador Axel
beside England and France von, 107.

in World War, 316; did Vatican, The, 89, 209, 264,
not belong to Entente Cor- 265, 266, 267, 269.

diale, 316; did not contribute Vendetta, 163, 164.

toward bringing on World "Verbal note," 147-156, 159.

War, 316; Germany's un- Vercingetorix, 294, 295.

friendly answer to President Versailles, 294, 296, 318, 322,
Wilson, 316; effect of 331, 333 , 334, 335, 342 .

364

INDEX

Versen, General Maximilian

von, 23.
"Viceroy of Christ upon

earth," 270.

Victor Emmanuel, King, 216.
Victoria, Queen, of England,

24, 26, 35, 69, 85, 87, 90,

91, 102, 213, 238.
Vienna, 273.
p' indication of Great Britain,

161.
Vulcan Shipyard, 47-50.

"Waffenstreckung," difference
between, and WafFenstill-
stand," 277.

Waldersee, Count von, 93,
226.

Wales, Prince of (Edward),
87, 102.

Wallace, Sir D. Mackenzie,
115.

Wall Street, 317.

War and Revolution, 285 n.

War Academy, St. Petersburg,
251.

War guilt, the question of,
291,296,298,299,300,301,
302, 322, 325,' 327, 33i
333, 342.

War, Russo-Turkish, 10;
World, 18, 57, 72, 74, 81,
161, 162, 186, 207, 227,
255, 257, 260, 295, 299,
301, 303, 312, 316, 317,
322, 325, 327, 33i, 333,*
of 1870, 60; Russo-Japa
nese, 79, 106, 200, 201, 249,
299; Boer, 83, 86, 90, 91,
92, 118 n., 223, 234, 299,

324; Boxer, 93; Seven
Years', rar; English decla
ration of, 134; Balkan, 164;
causes of the World, 304;
of 1914 a consequence of
the War of 1870, 325 ; civil,
in Germany, 286, 288-289,
294, 298, 320.

Warsaw, 136,

Weid, Prince William of, and
the Albanian throne, 165-
169; selects an English and
an Italian secretary, 167.

"Welfare work" at the Ger^
man Court, 45.

Werner, Admiral Reinhold,
184.

Westphalian coal strike, 36-

37-

"White Drawing Room," 172.

"White men together against
colored men," 79.

Wiesbaden, 178, 179, 180,
181.

Wilhelmshafen, 87, 248.

Wilhelmstrasse, 249.

William I, 176, 326.

William the Great, 8, 14, 16,
22, 25, 39, 40, 63, 176, 201.

Wilmonski, His Excellency
von, 25.

Wilpert, Monsignor, 218.

Wilson, President, against
Germany in 1915, 75 ; notes
to by Germany, 277; ar
mistice note of, 278; un
friendly answer of, 316; un
precedented powers, 318;
his Fourteen Points, 318;
and the English blockade,
318; double dealing, 319;

365

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

unreliability of, 319; gigan
tic wrong done Germany,
319; trapped by Lloyd
George and Clemenceau,
319; flagrant breach of faith,
320; rst to demand with
drawal of reigning dynasty,
320; Kaiser convinced rea
sons were good, 320; Presi
dent's heavy guilt, 321.

Windthorst, Ludwig, 33.

Winterfeldt, General Henry
von, 286.

Wittenberg, Schloss Church
at, 214.

Wittich, General Adolf von,
23-

Witu, 55.

Wolter, Archabbot, 216.
Women, American, 318, 319.
World, Anglo-Saxon, 308.
Worthley, General Stewart,

117.
Wiirttemberg, 153.

Yacht Club, Imperial, 46.
Yangtse Treaty, 94.
"Yellow peril," 79, 80, 81.
"You will take back Alsace-
Lorraine/' 252.

Zanzibar, 55, 56.
Zedlitz, Count, 58.

THE END