Kant's Prolegomena to any future metaphysics

'S PROLEGOMENA

PAUL CARUS

KANT'S PROLEGOMENA

TO ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS

EDITED IN ENGLISH

BY

DR. PAUL CARUS

REPRINT EDITION

WITH AN ESSAY ON KANT'S PHILOSOPHY, AND

OTHER SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

FOR THE STUDY OF KANT

CHICAGO ::: LONDON

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
1949

TRANSLATION COPYRIGHTED
BY

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING Co
1902.

Printed in the United States of America
By PAQUIN PRINTERS, Chicago

PUBLISHERS' PREFACE.

T7" ANT'S Prolegomena,^ although a small book, is indubitably
•^ the most important of his writings. It furnishes us with a
key to his main work, The Critique of Pure Reason ; in fact, it
is an extract containing all the salient ideas of Kant's system. It
approaches the subject in the simplest and most direct way, and
is therefore best adapted as an introduction into his philosophy.
For this reason, The Open Court Publishing Company has deemed
it advisable to bring out a new edition of the work, keeping in
view its broader use as a preliminary survey and explanation of
Kant's philosophy in general. In order to make the book useful
for this broader purpose, the editor has not only stated his own
views concerning the problem underlying the Prolegomena (see
page 167 et seq.), but has also collected the most important ma
terials which have reference to Kant's philosophy, or to the recep
tion which was accorded to it in various quarters (see page 241 et
seq.). The selections have not been made from a partisan stand
point, but have been chosen with a view to characterising the atti
tude of different minds, and to directing the student to the best
literature on the subject.

It is not without good reasons that the appearance of the
Critique of Ptire Reason is regarded as the beginning of a new
era in the history of philosophy ; and so it seems that a compre
hension of Kant's position, whether we accept or reject it, is indis
pensable to the student of philosophy. It is not his solution which

1 Prolegomena means literally prefatory or introductory remarks. It is
the neuter plural of the present passive participle of TrpoAe'-yeiy, to speak before^
i e., to make introductory remarks before beginning one's regular discourse.

IV PREFACE.

makes the sage of Konigsberg the initiator of modern thought, but
his formulation of the problem.

The present translation is practically new, but it goes without
saying that the editor utilised the labors of his predecessors, among
whom Prof. John P. Mahaffy and John H. Bernard deserve special
credit. Richardson's translation of 1818 may be regarded as super
seded and has not been consulted, but occasional reference has
been made to that of Prof. Ernest Belfort Bax. Considering the
difficulties under which even these translators labored we must
recognise the fact that they did their work well, with painstaking
diligence, great love of the subject, and good judgment. The editor
of the present translation has the advantage of being to the manor
born ; moreover, he is pretty well versed in Kant's style ; and
wherever he differs from his predecessors in the interpretation of
a construction, he has deviated from them not without good rea
sons. Nevertheless there are some passages which will still re
main doubtful, though happily they are of little consequence.

As a curiosum in Richardson's translation Professor Mahaffy
mentions that the words wider sinnig gewundene Schnecken,
which simply means "symmetric helices,"1 are rendered by
"snails rolled up contrary to all sense"— a wording that is itself
contrary to all sense and makes the whole paragraph unintelli
gible. We may add an instance of another mistake that misses
the mark. Kant employs in the Appendix a word that is no longer
used in German. He speaks of the Cento der Metaphystk as having
neue Lappen and einen verdnderten Zuschnitt. Mr. Bax trans
lates Cento by "body," Lappen by "outgrowths," and Zuschnitt
by "figure." His mistake is perhaps not less excusable than
Richardson's ; it is certainly not less comical, and it also destroys
the sense, which in the present case is a very striking simile.

1 Mahaffy not incorrectly translates "spirals winding opposite ways,"
and Mr. Bax follows him verbatim even to the repetition of the footnote.

PREFACE. V

Cento is a Latin word1 derived from the Greek aivrpuv* meaning
"a garment of many patches sewed together," or, as we might
now say, "a crazy quilt."

* * »

In the hope that this book will prove useful, The Open Court
Publishing Company offers it as a help to the student of philosophy.

p. c.

IThe French centon is still in use.

iffeVrpup, (l) one that bears the marks of the ntvrpov, goad; a rogue, (2) a
patched cloth ; (3) any kind of patchwork, especially verses made up of scraps
from other authors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

Kant's Prolegomena 1-163

Essay on Kant's Philosophy by, Dr. Paul Carus. (With Por
traits of Kant and Garve) 167-240

Supplementary Materials for the Study of Kant's Life and
Philosophy :

Introductory Note 243

Kant's Life and Writings. (After Windelband) 245

The Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of

Judgment. (After Weber) 250

Kant's Views on Religion. (After Schwegler) 258

Kant and Materialism. (After Lange) 261

Kant and Deism. (After Heinrich Heine.) With Fac
simile of the Title-page of the Critique of Pure

Reason 264

The Kantian Philosophy. (After Arthur Schopenhauer) 279
Hostile Estimate of Kant by a Swedenborgian. (After

Theodore F. Wright) 283

Facsimile and Translation of a Letter of Kant to His

Brother 285

Chronology of Kant's Life and Publications. (After

Paulsen) 287

Index to Kant's Prolegomena 293

Index to the Article on Kant's Philosophy 299

KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

INTRODUCTION.

'T^HESE Prolegomena are destined for the use, not
JL of pupils, but of future teachers, and even the
latter should not expect that they will be serviceable
for the systematic^exposition of a ready-made science,
but merely for the discovery of the science itself.

There are scholarly men, to whom the history of
philosophy (both ancient and modern) is philosophy
itself; for these the present Prolegomena are not
written. They must wait till those who endeavor to
draw from the fountain of reason itself have com
pleted their work ; it will then be the historian's turn
to inform the world of what has been done. Unfor
tunately, nothing can be said, which in their opinion
has not been said before, and truly the same proph
ecy applies to all future time; for since the human
reason has for many centuries speculated upon innu
merable objects in various ways, it is hardly to be ex
pected that we should not be able to discover anal
ogies for every new idea among the old sayings of
past ages.

My object is to persuade all those who think Meta
physics worth studying, that it is absolutely necessary
to pause a moment, and, neglecting all that has
been done, to propose first the preliminary question,
* Whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all pos
sible?'

2 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

If it be a science, how comes it that it cannot,
like other sciences, obtain universal and permanent
recognition ? If not, how can it maintain its preten
sions, and keep the human mind in suspense with
hopes, never ceasing, yet never fulfilled? Whether
then we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance
in this field, we must come once for all to a definite
conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called sci
ence, which cannot possibly remain on its present
footing. It seems almost ridiculous, while every other
science is continually advancing, that in this, which
pretends to be Wisdom incarnate, for whose oracle
every one inquires, we should constantly move round
the same spot, without gaining a single step. And
so its followers having melted away, we do not find
men confident of their ability to shine in other sciences
venturing their reputation here, where everybody, how
ever ignorant in other matters, may deliver a final
verdict, as in this domain there is as yet no standard
weight and measure to distinguish sound knowledge
from shallow talk.

After all it is nothing extraordinary in the elabora
tion of a science, when men begin to wonder how far
it has advanced, that the question should at last
occur, whether and how such a science is possible?
Human reason so delights in constructions, that it has
several times built up a tower, and then razed it to
examine the nature of the foundation. It is never too
late to become wise; but if the change comes late,
there is always more difficulty in starting a reform.

The question whether a science be possible, pre
supposes a doubt as to its actuality. But such a doubt
offends the men whose whole possessions consist of
**~'r si pposed jewel ; hence he who raises the doubt

INTRODUCTION. 3

must expect opposition from all sides. Some, in the
proud consciousness of their possessions, which are
ancient, and therefore considered legitimate, will take
their metaphysical compendia in their hands, and look
down on him with contempt ; others, who never see
anything except it be identical with what they have
seen before, will not understand him, and everything
will remain for a time, as if nothing had happened to
excite the concern, or the hope, for an impending
change.

Nevertheless, I venture to predict that the inde
pendent reader of these Prolegomena will not only
doubt his previous science, but ultimately be fully
persuaded, that it cannot exist unless the demands
here stated on which its possibility depends, be satis
fied ; and, as this has never been done, that there is,
as yet, no such thing as Metaphysics. But as it can
never cease to be in demand,1 — since the interests of
common sense are intimately interwoven with it, he
must confess that a radical reform, or rather a new
birth of the science after an original plan, are un
avoidable, however men may struggle against it for a
while.

Since the Essays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather
since the origin of metaphysics so far as we know its
history, nothing has ever happened which was more
decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by
David Hume. He threw no light on this species of
knowledge, but he certainly struck a spark from

1 Says Horace :

" Rusticus expectat, dum defluat amnis, at illc

Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum; "
14 A rustic fellow waiteth on the shore
For the river to flow away,
But the river flows, and flows on as before,
And it flows forever and aye."

4 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

which light might have been obtained, had it caught
some inflammable substance and had its smouldering
fire been carefully nursed and developed.

Hume started from a single but important concept
in Metaphysics, viz. , that of Cause and Effect (in
cluding its derivatives force and action, etc.). He
challenges reason, which pretends to have given birth
to this idea from herself, to answer him by what right
she thinks anything to be so constituted, that if that
thing be posited, something else also must necessarily
be posited ; for this is the meaning of the concept of
cause. He demonstrated irrefutably that it was per
fectly impossible for reason to think a priori and by
means of concepts a combination involving necessity..
We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the ex
istence of one thing, another must necessarily exist,
or how the concept of such a combination can arise
a priori. Hence he inferred, that reason was alto
gether deluded with reference to this concept, which
she erroneously considered as one of her children,
whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of im
agination, impregnated by experience, which sub
sumed certain representations under the Law of Asso
ciation, and mistook the subjective necessity of habit
for an objective necessity arising from insight. Hence
he inferred that reason had no power to think such
combinations, even generally, because her concepts
would then be purely fictitious, and all her pretended
a priori cognitions nothing but common experiences
marked with a false stamp. In plain language there
is not, and cannot be, any such thing as metaphysics
at all.1

1 Nevertheless Hume called this very destructive science metaphysics
and attached to it great value. Metaphysics and morals [he declares in the

INTRODUCTION. 5

However hasty and mistaken Hume's conclusion
may appear, it was at least founded upon investiga
tion, and this investigation deserved the concentrated
attention of the brighter spirits of his day as well as
determined efforts on their part to discover, if pos
sible, a happier solution of the problem in the sense
proposed by him, all of which would have speedily
resulted in a complete reform of the science.

But Hume suffered the usual misfortune of meta
physicians, of not being understood. It is positively
painful to see how utterly his opponents, Reid, Os
wald, Beattie, and lastly Priestley, missed the point
of the problem ; for while they were ever taking for
granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating
with zeal and often with impudence that which he
never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his
valuable suggestion that everything remained in its
old condition, as if nothing had happened.

The question was not whether the concept of
cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for
our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never
doubted ; but whether that concept could be thought
by reason a priori, and consequently whether it pos
sessed an inner truth, independent of all experience,
implying a wider application than merely to the ob
jects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It
was a question concerning the origin, not concerning
the indispensable need of the concept. Were the former

fourth part of his Essays] are the most important branches of science; math
ematics and physics are not nearly so important. But the acute man merely
regarded the negative use arising from the moderation of extravagant claims
of speculative reason, and the complete settlement of the many endless and
TMiblesome controversies that mislead mankind. He overlooked the posi
tive injury which results, if reason be deprived of its most important pro
spects, which can alone supply to the will the highest aim for all its en
deavor.

6 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

decided, the conditions of the use and the sphere of
its valid application would have been determined as
a matter of course.

But to satisfy the conditions of the problem, the
opponents of the great thinker should have penetrated
very deeply into the nature of reason, so far as it is
concerned with pure thinking, — a task which did not
suit them. They found a more convenient method of
!>eing defiant without any insight, viz., the appeal to
;ommon sense. It is indeed a great gift of God, to pos
sess right, or (as they now call it) plain common
sense. But this common sense must be shown prac
tically, by well-considered and reasonable thoughts
and words, not by appealing to it as an oracle, when
no rational justification can be advanced. To appeal
to common sense, when insight and science fail, and
no sooner — this is one of the subtile discoveries ot
modern times, by means of which the most superficial
ranter can safely enter the lists with the most thorough
thinker, and hold his own. But as long as a particle
of insight remains, no one would think of having re
course to this subterfuge. For what is it but an ap
peal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose ap
plause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular
charlatan glories and confides in it? I should think
that Hume might fairly have laid as much claim to
common sense as Beattie, and in addition to a critical
reason (such as the latter did not possess), which
keeps common sense in check and prevents it from
speculating, or, if speculations are under discussion,
restrains the desire to decide because it cannot satisfy
itself concerning its own arguments. By this means
alone can common sense remain sound. Chisels and
hammers may suffice to work a piece of wood, but for

INTRODUCTION. 7

steel-engraving we require an engraver's needle. Thus
common sense and speculative understanding are
each serviceable in their own way, the former in judg
ments which apply immediately to experience, the
latter when we judge universally from mere concepts,
as in metaphysics, where sound common sense, so
called in spite of the inapplicability of the word, has
no right to judge at all.

I openly confess, the suggestion of David Hume
was the very thing, which many years ago first inter
rupted my dogmatic slumber, and gave my investiga
tions in the field of speculative philosophy quite a
new direction. I was far from following him in the
conclusions at which he arrived by regarding, not the
whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can
give us no information. If we start from a well-
founded, but undeveloped, thought, which another
has bequeathed to us, we may well hope by continued
reflection to advance farther than the acute man, to
whom we owe the first spark of light.

1 therefore first tried whether Hume's objection
could not be put into a general form, and soon found
that the concept of the connexion of cause and effect
was by no means the only idea by which the under
standing thinks the connexion of things a priori, but
rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such
connexions. I sought to ascertain their number, and
when I had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting
from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction
of these concepts, which I was now certain were not
deduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended,
but sprang from the pure understanding. This de
duction (which seemed impossible to my acute prede
cessor, which had never even occurred to any one

8 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

else, though no one had hesitated to use the concepts
without investigating the basis of their objective val
idity) was the most difficult task ever undertaken in the
service of metaphysics ; and the worst was that meta
physics, such as it then existed, could not assist me
in the least, because this deduction alone can render
metaphysics possible. But as soon as I had succeeded
in solving Hume's problem not merely in a particular
case, but with respect to the whole faculty of pure rea
son, I could proceed safely, though slowly, to determine
the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from
general principles, in its circumference as well as in its
contents. This was required for metaphysics in order to
construct its system according to a reliable method.

But I fear that the execution of Hume's problem
in its widest extent (viz., my Critique of the Pure Rea
son) will fare as the problem itself fared, when first
proposed. It will be misjudged because it is mis
understood, and misunderstood because men choose
to skim through the book, and not to think through
it — a disagreeable task, because the work is dry, ob
scure, opposed to all ordinary notions, and moreover
long-winded. I confess, however, I did not expect to
hear from philosophers complaints of want of popu
larity, entertainment, and facility, when the existence
of a highly prized and indispensable cognition is at
stake, which cannot be established otherwise, than by
the strictest rules of methodic precision. Popularity
may follow, but is inadmissible at the beginning. Yet
as regards a certain obscurity, arising partly from the
diffuseness of the plan, owing to which the principal
points of the investigation are easily lost sight of, the

INTRODUCTION. 9

complaint is just, and I intend to remove it by the
present Prolegomena.

The first-mentioned work, which discusses the pure
faculty of reason in its whole compass and bounds,
will remain the foundation, to which the Prolegomena,
as a preliminary exercise, refer; for our critique must
first be established as a complete and perfected sci
ence, before we can think of letting Metaphysics ap
pear on the scene, or even have the most distant hope
of attaining it.

We have been long accustomed to seeing anti
quated knowledge produced as new by taking it out
of its former context, and reducing it to system in a
new suit of any fancy pattern under new titles. Most
readers will set out by expecting nothing else from
the Critique; but these Prolegomena may persuade
him that it is a perfectly new science, of which no
one has ever even thought, the very idea of which
was unknown, and for which nothing hitherto accom
plished can be of the smallest use, except it be the
suggestion of Hume's doubts. Yet even he did not
suspect such a formal science, but ran his ship ashore,
for safety's sake, landing on scepticism, there to let it
lie and rot ; whereas my object is rather to give it a
pilot, who, by means of safe astronomical principles
drawn from a knowledge of the globe, and provided
with a complete chart and compass, may steer the
ship safely, whither he listeth.

If in a new science, which is wholly isolated and
unique in its kind, we started with the prejudice that
we can judge of things by means of our previously
acquired knowledge, which is precisely what has first
to be called in question, we should only fancy we saw
everywhere what we had already known, the expres-

io KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

sions, having a similar sound, only that all would ap
pear utterly metamorphosed, senseless and unintelli
gible, because we should have as a foundation our
own notions, made by long habit a second nature, in
stead of the author's. But the longwindedness of the
work, so far as it depends on the subject, and not the
exposition, its consequent unavoidable dryness and
its scholastic precision are qualities which can only
benefit the science, though they may discredit the
book.

Few writers are gifted with the subtilty, and at the
same time with the grace, of David Hume, or with
the depth, as well as the elegance, of Moses Mendels
sohn. Yet I flatter myself I might have made my
own exposition popular, had my object been merely to
sketch out a plan and leave its completion to others,
instead of having my heart in the welfare of the sci
ence, to which I had devoted myself so long ; in truth,
it required no little constancy, and even self-denial,
to postpone the sweets of an immediate success to
the prospect of a slower, but more lasting, reputation.

Making plans is often the occupation of an opu
lent and boastful mind, which thus obtains the repu
tation of a creative genius, by demanding what it
cannot itself supply; by censuring, what it cannot
improve ; and by proposing, what it knows not where
to find. And yet something more should belong to a
sound plan of a general critique of pure reason than
mere conjectures, if this plan is to be other than the
usual declamations of pious aspirations. But pure
reason is a sphere so separate and self-contained, that
we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest.
We can therefore do nothing without first determin
ing the position of each part, and its relation to the

INTRODUCTION. X I

rest; for, as our judgment cannot be corrected by
anything without, the validity and use of every part
depends upon the relation in which it stands to all
the rest within the domain of reason.

So in the structure of an organized body, the end
of each member can only be deduced from the full
conception of the whole. It may, then, be said of
such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it
be perfectly complete, down to the smallest elements
of pure reason. In the sphere of this faculty you can
determine either everything or nothing.

But although a mere sketch, preceding the Critique
of Pure Reason, would be unintelligible, unreliable,
and useless, it is all the more useful as a sequel. For
so we are able to grasp the whole, to examine in de
tail the chief points of importance in the science, and
to improve in many respects our exposition, as com
pared with the first execution of the work.

After the completion of the work I offer here such
a plan which is sketched out after an analytical
method, while the work itself had to be executed in
the synthetical style, in order that the science may
present all its articulations, as the structure of a pe
culiar cognitive faculty, in their natural combination.
But should any reader find this plan, which I publish
as the Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics, still
obscure, let him consider that not every one is bound
to study Metaphysics, that many minds will succeed
very well, in the exact and even in deep sciences,
more closely allied to practical experience,1 while they

IThe term Anschauung here used means sense-perception. It is that
which is given to the senses and apprehended immediately, as an object is
seen by merely looking at it. The translation intuition, though etymolog-
ically correct, is misleading. In the present passage the term is not used in
its technical significance but means " practical experience." — Ed.

1 2 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

cannot succeed in investigations dealing exclusively
with abstract concepts. In such cases men should
apply their talents to other subjects. But he who
undertakes to judge, or still more, to construct, a sys
tem of Metaphysics, must satisfy the demands here
made, either by adopting my solution, or by thor
oughly refuting it, and substituting another. To
evade it is impossible.

In conclusion, let it be remembered that this
much-abused obscurity (frequently serving as a mere
pretext under which people hide their own indolence
or dullness) has its uses, since all who in other sci
ences observe a judicious silence, speak authorita
tively in metaphysics and make bold decisions, be
cause their ignorance is not here contrasted with the
knowledge of others. Yet it does contrast with sound
critical principles, which we may therefore commend
in the words of Virgil :

"Ignavum, fucos, pecus a prsesepibus arcent."
'Bees are defending their hives against drones, those indolent
creatures."

PROLEGOMENA.

PREAMBLE ON THE PECULIARITIES OF ALL META
PHYSICAL COGNITION.

§ i . Of the Sources of Metaphysics*

IF it becomes desirable to formulate any cognition
as science, it will be necessary first to determine
accurately those peculiar features which no other sci'
ence has in common with it, constituting its charac
teristics ; otherwise the boundaries of all sciences
become confused, and none of them can be treated
thoroughly according to its nature.

The characteristics of a science may consist of a
simple difference of object, or of the sources of cogni
tion, or of the kind of cognition, or perhaps of all
three conjointly. On this, therefore, depends the
idea of a possible science and its territory.

First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical
cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot
be empirical. Its principles (including not only its
maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived
from experience. It must not be physical but meta
physical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond
experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither
external experience, which is the source of physics
proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical

14 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, com
ing from pure Understanding and pure Reason.

But so far Metaphysics would not be distinguish
able from pure Mathematics; it must therefore be
called pure philosophical cognition ; and for the
meaning of this term I refer to the Critique of the
Pure Reason (II. "Method of Transcendentalism,"
Chap. I., Sec. i), where the distinction between these
two employments of the reason is sufficiently ex
plained. So far concerning the sources of metaphysi
cal cognition.

§ 2. Concerning the Kind of Cognition which can alone
be called Metaphysical.

a. Of the Distinction between Analytical and Syn
thetical Judgments in general. — The peculiarity of its
sources demands that metaphysical cognition must
consist of nothing but a priori judgments. But what
ever be their origin, or their logical form, there is a
distinction in judgments, as to their content, accord
ing to which they are either merely explicative, add
ing nothing to the content of the cognition, or expan
sive, increasing the given cognition : the former may
be called analytical, the latter synthetical, judgments.

Analytical judgments express nothing in the predi
cate but what has been already actually thought in
the concept of the subject, though not so distinctly or
vrith the same (full) consciousness. When I say: All
bodies are extended, I have not amplified in the least
my concept of body, but have only analysed it, as ex
tension was really thought to belong to that concept
before the judgment was made, though it was not ex
pressed ? this judgment is therefore analytical. On
the contrary, this judgment, All bodies have weight,

METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 15

contains in its predicate something not actually
thought in the general concept of the body; it ampli
fies my knowledge by adding something to my con
cept, and must therefore be called synthetical.

b. The Common Principle of all Analytical Judgments
is the Law of Contradiction. — All analytical judgments
depend wholly on the law of Contradiction, and are
in their nature a priori cognitions, whether the con
cepts that supply them with matter be empirical or
not. For the predicate of an affirmative analytical
judgment is already contained in the concept of the
subject, of which it cannot be denied without contra
diction. In the same way its opposite is necessarily
denied of the subject in an analytical, but negative,
judgment, by the same law of contradiction. Such is
the nature of the judgments : all bodies are extended,
and no bodies are unextended (i. e., simple).

For this very reason all analytical judgments are
a priori even when the concepts are empirical, as, for
example, Gold is a yellow metal ; for to know this I
require 110 experience beyond my concept of gold as
a yellow metal : it is, in fact, the very concept, and I
need only analyse it, without looking beyond it else
where.

c. Synthetical Judgments require a different Principle
from the Law of Contradiction. — There are synthetical
a posteriori judgments of empirical origin; but there
are also others which are proved to be certain a priori,
and which spring from pure Understanding and Rea
son. Yet they both agree in this, that they cannot
possibly spring from the principle of analysis, viz.,
the law of contradiction, alone ; they require a quite
different principle, though, from whatever they may
be deduced, they must be subject to the law of con-

i6 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

tradiction, which must never be violated, even though
everything cannot be deduced from it. I shall first
classify synthetical judgments.

1. Empirical Judgments are always synthetical. For
it would be absurd to base an analytical judgment on
experience, as our concept suffices tor the purpose
without requiring any testimony from experience.
That body is extended, is a judgment established a
priori, and not an empirical judgment. For before
appealing to experience, we already have all the con
ditions of the judgment in the concept, from which
we have but to elicit the predicate according to the
law of contradiction, and thereby to become conscious
of the necessity of the judgment, which experience
could not even teach us.

2. Mathematical Judgments are all synthetical. This
fact seems hitherto to have altogether escaped the
observation of those who have analysed human rea
son ; it even seems directly opposed to all their con
jectures, though incontestably certain, and most im
portant in its consequences. For as it was found that
the conclusions of mathematicians all proceed accord
ing to the law of contradiction (as is demanded by all
apodeictic certainty), men persuaded themselves that
the fundamental principles were known from the same
law. This was a great mistake, for a synthetical prop
osition can indeed be comprehended according to the
law of contradiction, but only by presupposing another
synthetical proposition from wnich it follows, but
never in itself.

First of all, we must observe that all proper math
ematical judgments are a priori, and not empirical,
because they carry with them necessity, which cannot
be obtained from experience. But if this be not con-

METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 17

ceded to me, very good ; I shall confine my assertion
to pure Mathematics, the very notion of which implies
that it contains pure a priori and not empirical cogni
tions.

It might at first be thought that the proposition
7-j-5 = i2 is a mere analytical judgment, following
from the concept of the sum of seven and five, accord
ing to the law of contradiction. But on closer exam
ination it appears that the concept of the sum of 7+5
contains merely their union in a single number, with
out its being at all thought what the particular num
ber is that unites them. The concept of twelve is by
no means thought by merely thinking of the combina
tion of seven and five ; and analyse this possible sum
as we may, we shall not discover twelve in the con
cept. We must go beyond these concepts, by calling to
our aid some concrete image (Anschauun^), i.e., either
our five fingers, or five points (as Segner has it in his
Arithmetic), and we must add successively the units
of the five, given in some concrete image {Anschau-
ung), to the concept of seven. Hence our concept
is really amplified by the proposition 7-^5 = 12, and
we add to the first a second, not thought in it. Arith
metical judgments are therefore synthetical, and the
more plainly according as we take larger numbers;
for in such cases it is clear that, however closely we
analyse our concepts without calling visual images
{Anschauung} to our aid, we can never find the sum by
such mere dissection.

All principles of geometry are no less analytical.
That a straight line is the shortest path between two
points, is a synthetical proposition. For my concept
of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only a
quality. The attribute of shortness is therefore alto-

18 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

gether additional, and cannot be obtained by any
analysis of the concept. Here, too, visualisation
(Anschauung} must come to aid us. It alone makes
the synthesis possible.

Some other principles, assumed by geometers, are
indeed actually analytical, and depend on the law of
contradiction ; but they only serve, as identical prop
ositions, as a method of concatenation, and not as
principles, e. g., a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or
a-\-b*>(ij the whole is greater than its part. And yet
even these, though they are recognised as valid from
mere concepts, are only admitted in mathematics, be
cause they can be represented in some visual form
{Anschauung}. What usually makes us believe that
the predicate of such apodeictic1 judgments is already
contained in our concept, and that the judgment is
therefore analytical, is the duplicity of the expression,
requesting us to think a certain predicate as of neces
sity implied in the thought of a given concept, which
necessity attaches to the concept. But the question
is not what we are requested to join in thought to the
given concept, but what we actually think together
with and in it, though obscurely ; and so it appears
that the predicate belongs to these concepts necessa
rily indeed, yet not directly but indirectly by an added
visualisation (Anschauung).

§ 3. A Remark on the General Division of Judgments

into Analytical and Synthetical.

This division is indispensable, as concerns the
Critique of human understanding, and therefore de-

IThe term apodeictic is borrowed by Kant from Aristotle who uses it in
the sense of "certain beyond dispute." The word is derived from airo&eCKWfju
(WjAow)and is contrasted to dialectic propositions, i. e., such statements
as admit of controversy.— Ed,

METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. IQ

serves to be called classical, though otherwise it is of
little use, but this is the reason why dogmatic philos
ophers, who always seek the sources of metaphysical
judgments in Metaphysics itself, and not apart from
it, in the pure laws of reason generally, altogether
neglected this apparently obvious distinction. Thus
the celebrated Wolf, and his acute follower Baum-
garten, came to seek the proof of the principle of
Sufficient Reason, which is clearly synthetical, in the
principle of Contradiction. In Locke's Essay, how
ever, I find an indication of my division. For in the
fourth book (chap. iii. § 9, seq.), having discussed
the various connexions of representations in judg
ments, and their sources, one of which he makes
" identity and contradiction" (analytical judgments),
and another the coexistence of representations in a
subject, he confesses (§ 10) that our a priori knowl
edge of the latter is very narrow, and almost nothing.
But in his remarks on this species of cognition, there
is so little of what is definite, and reduced to rules,
that we cannot wonder if no one, not even Hume, was
led to make investigations concerning this sort of
judgments. For such general and yet definite prin
ciples are not easily learned from other men, who
have had them obscurely in their minds. We must
hit on them first by our own reflexion, then we find
them elsewhere, where we could not possibly nave
found them at first, because the authors themselves
did not know that such an idea lay at the basis of
their observations. Men who never think indepen
dently have nevertheless the acuteness to discover
everything, after it has been once shown them, in
what was said long since, though no one ever saw it
there before.

KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

§ 4. The General Question of the Prolegomena. — 2s
Metaphysics at all Possible ? *

Were a metaphysics, which could maintain its
place as a science, really in existence ; could we say,
here is metaphysics, learn it, and it will convince you
irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth : this question
would be useless, and there would only remain that
other question (which would rather be a test of our
acuteness, than a proof of the existence of the thing
itself), "How is the science possible, and how does
reason come to attain it?" But human reason has
not been so fortunate in this case. There is no single
book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and
say: This is Metaphysics; here you may find the
noblest objects of this science, the knowledge of a
highest Being, and of a future existence, proved from
principles of pure reason. We can be shown indeed
many judgments, demonstrably certain, and never
questioned ; but these are all analytical, and rather
concern the materials and the scaffolding for Meta
physics, than the extension of knowledge, which i?
our proper object in studying it (§ 2). Even suppo
sing you produce synthetical judgments (such as the
law of Sufficient Reason, which you have never
proved, as you ought to, from pure reason a priori,
though we gladly concede its truth), you lapse when
they come to be employed for your principal object,
into such doubtful assertions, that in all ages one
Metaphysics has contradicted another, either in its
assertions, or their proofs, and thus has itself des
troyed its own claim to lasting assent. Nay, the very
attempts to set up such a science are the main cause

METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 22

of the early appearance of scepticism, a mental atti
tude in which reason treats itself with such violence
that it could never have arisen save from complete
despair of ever satisfying our most important aspira
tions. For long before men began to inquire into na
ture methodically, they consulted abstract reason,
which had to some extent been exercised by means of
ordinary experience; for reason is ever present, while
laws of nature must usually be discovered with labor.
So Metaphysics floated to the surface, like foam, which
dissolved the moment it was scooped off. But imme
diately there appeared a new supply on the surface,
to be ever eagerly gathered up by some, while others,
instead of seeking in the depths the cause of the phe
nomenon, thought they showed their wisdom by ridi
culing the idle labor of their neighbors.

The essential and distinguishing feature of pure
mathematical cognition among all other a priori cog
nitions is, that it cannot at all proceed from concepts,
but only by means of the construction of concepts
(see Critique II., Method of Transcendentalism,
chap. I., sect. i). As therefore in its judgments it
must proceed beyond the concept to that which its
corresponding visualisation (Anschauung} contains,
these judgments neither can, nor ought to, arise ana
lytically, by dissecting the concept, but are all syn
thetical.

I cannot refrain from pointing out the disadvan
tage resulting to philosophy from the neglect of this
easy and apparently insignificant observation. Hume
being prompted (a task worthy of a philosopher) to
cast his eye over the whole field of a priori cognitions
in which human understanding claims such mighty
possessions, heedlessly severed from it a whole, and

22 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

indeed its most valuable, province, viz., pure mathe
matics; for he thought its nature, or, so to speak,
the state-constitution of this empire, depended on
totally different principles, namely, on the law of
contradiction alone; and although he did not divide
judgments in this manner formally and universally as
I have done here, what he said was equivalent to this:
that mathematics contains only analytical, but meta
physics synthetical, a priori judgments. In this, how
ever, he was greatly mistaken, and the mistake had a
decidedly injurious effect upon his whole conception.
But for this, he would have extended his question
concerning the origin of our synthetical judgments
far beyond the metaphysical concept of Causality,
and included in it the possibility of mathematics a
priori also, for this latter he must have assumed to
be equally synthetical. And then he could not have
based his metaphysical judgments on mere experience
without subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally
to experience, a thing which he was far too acute to
do. The good company into which metaphysics would
thus have been brought, would have saved it from
the danger of a contemptuous ill-treatment, for the
thrust intended for it must have reached mathematics,
which was not and could not have been Hume's in
tention. Thus that acute man would have been led
into considerations which must needs be similar to
those that now occupy us, but which would have
gained inestimably > v his inimitably elegant style.

Metaphysical judgments, properly so called, are all
synthetical. We must distinguish judgments pertain
ing to metaphysics from metaphysical judgments
properly so called. Many of the former are analytical,
but they only afford the means for metaphysical judg-

METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 23

ments, which are the whole end of the science, and
which are always synthetical. For if there be con
cepts pertaining to metaphysics (as, for example, that
of substance), the judgments springing from simple
analysis of them also pertain to metaphysics, as, for
example, substance is that which only exists as sub
ject; and by means of several such analytical judg
ments, we seek to approach the definition of the con
cept. But as the analysis of a pure concept of the
understanding pertaining to metaphysics, does not
proceed in any different manner from the dissection
of any other, even empirical, concepts, not pertaining
to metaphysics (such as : air is an elastic fluid, the
elasticity of which is not destroyed by any known de
gree of cold), it follows that the concept indeed, but
not the analytical judgment, is properly metaphysical.
This science has something peculiar in the production
of its a priori cognitions, which must therefore be dis
tinguished from the features it has in common with
other rational knowledge. Thus the judgment, that
all the substance in things is permanent, is a synthet
ical and properly metaphysical judgment.

If the a priori principles, which constitute the ma
terials of metaphysics, have first been collected ac
cording to fixed principles, then their analysis will be
of great value ; it might be taught as a particular part
(as a philosophia definitive?), containing nothing but
analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics, and
could be treated separately from the synthetical which
constitute metaphysics proper. For indeed these
analyses are not elsewhere of much value, except in
metaphysics, i. e., as regards the synthetical judg
ments, which are to be generated by these previously
analysed concepts.

24 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

The conclusion drawn in this section then is, that
metaphysics is properly concerned with synthetical
propositions a priori, and these alone constitute its
end, for which it indeed requires various dissections
of its concepts, viz., of its analytical judgments, but
wherein the procedure is not different from that in
every other kind of knowledge, in wlpch we merely
seek to render our concepts distinct by analysis, But
the generation of a priori cognition by concrete im
ages as well as by concepts, in fine of synthetical
propositions a priori in philosophical cognition, con
stitutes the essential subject of Metaphysics.

Weary therefore as well of dogmatism, which
teaches us nothing, as of scepticism, which does not
even promise us anything, not even the quiet state of
a contented ignorance; disquieted by the importance
of knowledge so much needed; and lastly, rendered
suspicious by long experience of all knowledge which
we believe we possess, or which offers itself, under the
title of pure reason : there remains but one critical
question on the answer to which our future procedure
depends, viz., Is Metaphysics at all possible? But this
question must be answered not by sceptical objections
to the asseverations of some actual system of meta
physics (for we do not as yet admit such a thing to
exist), but from the conception, as yet only proble
matical, of a science of this sort.

In the Critique of Pure Reason I have treated this
question synthetically, by making inquiries into pure
reason itself, and endeavoring in this source to deter
mine the elements as well as the laws of its pure use
according to principles. The task is difficult, and
requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into
a system, based on no data except reason itself, and

METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 25

which therefore seeks, without resting upon any fact,
to unfold knowledge from its original germs. Prole
gomena, however, are designed for preparatory exer
cises; they are intended rather to point out what \ve
have to do in order if possible to actualise a science,
than to propound it. They must therefore rest upon
something already known as trustworthy, from which
we can set out with confidence, and ascend to sources
as yet unknown, the discovery of which will not only
explain to us what we knew, but exhibit a sphere of
many cognitions which all spring from the same
sources. The method of Prolegomena, especially of
those designed as a preparation for future metaphys
ics, is consequently analytical.

But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot
assume metaphysics to be an actual science, we can say
with confidence that certain pure a priori synthetical
cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are
actual and given ; for both contain propositions, which
are thoroughly recognised as apodeictically certain,
partly by mere reason, partly by general consent aris
ing from experience, and yet as independent of expe
rience. We have therefore some at least uncontested
synthetical knowledge a priori, and need not ask
whether it be possible, for it is actual, but how it is
possible, in order that we may deduce from the prin
ciple which makes the given cognitions possible the
possibility of all the rest.

The General Problem: How is Cognition from Pure

Reason Possible?

§ 5. We have above learned the significant dis
tinction between analytical and synthetical judgments.
The possibility of analytical propositions was easily

26 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

comprehended, being entirely founded on the law ot
Contradiction. The possibility of synthetical a pos
ter wri judgments, of those which are gathered horn
experience, also requires no particular explanation ;
for experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of
perceptions. There remain therefore only synthetical
propositions a priori, of which the possibility must
be sought or investigated, because they must depend
upon other principles than the law of contradiction.

But here we need not first establish the possibility
of such propositions so as to ask whether they are
possible. For there are enough of them which indeed
are of undoubted certainty, and as our present method
is analytical, we shall start from the fact, that such
synthetical but purely rational cognition actually ex
ists ; but we must now inquire into the reason of this
possibility, and ask, how such cognition is possible,
in order that we may from the principles of its possi
bility be enabled to determine the conditions of its
use, its sphere and its limits. The proper problem
upon which all depends, when expressed with scho
lastic precision, is therefore :

How are Synthetic Propositions a priori possible?

.b'or the sake of popularity^ have above expressed
this problem somewhat differently, as an inquiry into
purely rational cognition, which I could do for once
without detriment to the desired comprehension, be
cause, as we have only to do here with metaphysics
and its sources, the reader will, I hope, after the fore
going remarks, keep in mind that when we speak of
purely rational cognition, we do not mean analytical,
but synthetical cognition.1

1 It is unavoidable that as knowledge advances, certain expressions which
have become classical, after having been used since the infancy of science,

METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 27

Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of
this problem : its very existence depends upon it.
Let any one make metaphysical assertions with ever
so much plausibility, let him overwhelm us with con
clusions, if he has not previously proved able to an
swer this question satisfactorily, I have a right to say:
this is all vain baseless philosophy and false wisdom.
You speak through pure reason, and claim, as it were
to create cognitions a priori by not only dissecting
given concepts, but also by asserting connexions which
do not rest upon the law of contradiction, and which
you believe you conceive quite independently of all ex
perience ; how do you arrive at this, and how will
you justify your pretensions? An appeal to the con
sent of the Qojnmaa. sense of mankind cannot be
allowed; for that is a witness whose authority de
pends merely upon rumor. Says Horace:

" Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi."
" To all that which thou provest me thus, I refuse to give
credence."

The answer to this question, though indispensable,
is difficult; and though the principal reason that it
was not made long ago is, that the possibility of the
question never occurred to anybody, there is yet an
other reason, which is this that a satisfactory answer

will be found inadequate and unsuitable, and a newer an<i more appropriate
application of the terms will give rise to confusion. [This is the case with
the term '' analytical."] The analytical method, so far as it is opposed to the
synthetical, is very different from that which constitutes the essence of ana
lytical propositions : it signifies only that we start from what is sought, as if
it were given, and a?cend to the only conditions under which it is possible.
In this method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions, as in math
ematical analysis, and it were better to term it the regressive method, in
contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive. A principal part of Logic
too is distinguished by the name of Analytics, which here signifies the logic
of truth in contrast to Dialectics, without considering whether the cognitions
belonging to it are analytical or synthetical.

28 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

to this one question requires a much more persistent,
profound, and painstaking reflexion, than the most
diffuse work on Metaphysics, which on its first ap
pearance promised immortality to its author. And
every intelligent reader, when he carefully reflects
what this problem requires, must at first be struck
with its difficulty, and would regard it as insoluble and
even impossible, did there not actually exist pure syn
thetical cognitions a priori. This actually happened
to David Hume, though he did not conceive the ques
tion in its entire universality as is done here, and as
must be done, should the answer be decisive for all
Metaphysics. For how is it possible, says that acute
man, that when a concept is given me, I can go be
yond it and connect with it another, which is not con
tained in it, in such a manner as if the latter necessa
rily belonged to the former? Nothing but experience
can furnish us with such connexions (thus he con
cluded from the difficulty which he took to be an im
possibility), and all that vaunted necessity, or^ what
is the same thing, all cognition assumed to be a priori,
is nothing but a long habit of accepting something as
true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for
objective.

Should my reader complain of the difficulty and
the trouble which I occasion him in the solution of
this problem, he is at liberty to solve it himself in an
easier way. Perhaps he will then feel under obligation
to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so
profound research, and will rather be surprised at the
facility with which, considering the nature of the sub
ject, the solution has been attained. Yet it has cost
years of work to solve the problem in its whole uni
versality (using the term in the mathematical sense.

METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. 2Q

viz., for thai which is sufficient for all cases), and
finally to exhibit it in the analytical form, as the
reader finds it here.

All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and
legally suspended from their occupations till they
shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the
question, "How are synthetic cognitions a priori ^ pos
sible?" For the answer contains the only credentials
which they must show when they have anything to
offer in the name of pure reason. But if they do not
possess these credentials, they can expect nothing
else of reasonable people, who have been deceived so
often, than to be dismissed without further ado.

If they on the other hand desire to carry on their
business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome
oratory suited to the common sense of man, they can
not in justice be prevented. They will then speak the
modest language of a rational belief, they will grant
that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less
to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of
all possible experience, but only to assume (not for
speculative use, which they must abandon, but for
practical purposes only) the existence of something
that is possible and even indispensable for the guid
ance of the understanding and of the will in life. In
this manner alone can they be called useful and wise
men, and the more so as they renounce the title of
metaphysicians; for the latter profess to be specula
tive philosophers, and since, when judgments a priori
are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be ad
mitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is
thereby announced as necessary), such men cannot be
permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertions
rcust be either science, or are worth nothing at all.

30 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

It may be said, that the entire transcendental phi
losophy, which necessarily precedes all metaphysics,
is nothing but the complete solution of the problem
here propounded, in systematical order and complete
ness, and hitherto we have never had any transcen
dental philosophy; for what goes by its name is prop
erly a part of metaphysics, whereas the former science
is intended first to constitute the possibility of the
latter, and must therefore precede all metaphysics.
And it is not surprising that when a whole science,
deprived of all help from other sciences, and conse
quently in itself quite new, is required to answer a
single question satisfactorily, we should find the an
swer troublesome and difficult, nay even shrouded in
obscurity.

As we now proceed to this solution according to
the analytical method, in which we assume that such
cognitions from pure reasons actually exist, we can
only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition
(which alone is under consideration here), pure math
ematics and pure natural science (physics). For these
alone can exhibit to us objects in a definite and actual-
isable form (in der Anschauvtig), and consequently (if
there should occur in them a cognition 0/r/0r/)jcan
show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the
object in concrete, that is, its actuality, from which we
could proceed to the reason of its possibility by the
analytic method. This facilitates our work greatly
for here universal considerations are not only applied
to facts, but even start from them, while in a synthe
tic procedure they must strictly be derived in abstracto
from concepts.

But, in order to rise from these actual and at the
same time well-grounded pure cognitions a priori to

METAPHYSICAL COGNITION. $1

such a possible cognition of the same as we are seek
ing, viz., to metaphysics as a science, we must com
prehend that which occasions it, I mean the mere
natural, though in spite of its truth not unsuspected,
cognition a priori which lies at the bottom of that sci
ence, the elaboration of which without any critical in
vestigation of its possibility is commonly called meta
physics. In a word, we must comprehend the natural
conditions of such a science as a part of our inquiry,
and thus the transcendental problem will be gradually
answered by a division into four questions :

1 . How is pure mat he mat it s possible ?

2. How is pure natural science possible?

3. How is metaphysics in general possible?

4. How is metaphysics as a science possible?

It may be seen that the solution of these problems,
though chif fly designed to exhibit the essential matter
of the Critique, has yet something peculiar, which for
itself alone deserves attention. This is the search for
the sources of given sciences in reason itself, so that
its faculty of knowing something a priori may by its
own deeds be investigated and measured. By this
procedure these sciences gain, if not with regard to
their contents, yet as to their proper use, and while
they throw light on the higher question concerning
their common origin, they give, at the same time, an
occasion better to explain their own nature.

FIRST PART OF THE TRANSCEN
DENTAL PROBLEM.
\i

HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE?

§6.

HERE is a great and established branch of knowl
edge, encompassing even now a wonderfully
large domain and promising an unlimited extension in
the future. Yet it carries with it thoroughly apodeicti-
cal certainty, i. e., absolute necessity, which therefore
rests upon no empirical grounds. Consequently it is
a pure product of reason, and moreover is thoroughly
synthetical. [Here the question arises :]

" How then is it possible for human reason to pro
duce a cognition of this nature entirely a priori?"

Does not this faculty [which produces mathemat
ics], as it neither is nor can be baseu upon experi
ence, presuppose some ground of cognition a priori,
which lies deeply hidden, but which might reveal it
self by these its effects, if their first beginnings were
but diligently ferreted out?

§ 7. But we find that all mathematical cognition
has this peculiarity: it must first exhibit its concept
in a visual form {Anschauung} and indeed a priori,
therefore in a visual form which is not empirical, but
pure. Without this mathematics cannot take a single
step ; hence its judgments are always visual, viz.,

HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 33

"intuitive"; whereas philosophy must be satisfied
with discursive judgments from mere concepts, and
though it may illustrate its doctrines through a visual
figure, can never derive them from it. This obser
vation on the nature of mathematics gives us a clue
to the first and highest condition of its possibility,
which is, that some non-sensuous visualisation (called
pure intuition, or rcine Anschauung} must form its
basis, in which all its concepts can be exhibited or
consti ucted, in concrcto and yet a priori. If we can
find cut this pure intuition and its possibility, we may
thence easily explain how synthetical propositions
a priori are possible in pure mathematics, and conse
quently how this science itself is possible. Empirical
intuition [viz., sense-perception] enables us without
difficulty to enlarge the concept which we frame of an
object of intuition [or sense-perception], by new pred
icates, which intuition [i. e., sense perception] itself
presents synthetically in experience. Pure intuition
[viz., the visualisation of forms in our imagination,
from which every thing sensual, i. e., every thought
of material qualities, is excluded] does so likewise,
only with this difference, that in the latter case the
synthetical judgment is a priori certain and apodeic-
tical, in the former, only a posteriori and empirically
certain ; because this latter contains only that which
occurs in contingent empirical intuition, but the for
mer, that which must necessarily be discovered in
pure intuition. Here intuition, being an intuition a
priori, is before all experience, viz., before any percep
tion of particular objects, inseparably conjoined with
its concept.

§ 8. But with this step our perplexity seems rather
to increase than to lessen. For the question now

34 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

is, " How is it possible to intuite [in a visual form]
anything a priori?" An intuition [viz., a visual sense-
perception] is such a representation as immediately
depends upon the presence of the object. Hence it
seems impossible to intuite from the outset a priori, be
cause intuition would in that event take place without
either a former or a present object to refer to, and by
consequence could not be intuition. Concepts indeed
are such, that we can easily form some of them a
priori, viz., such as contain nothing but the thought
of an object in general ; and we need not find our
selves in an immediate relation to the object. Take,
for instance, the concepts of Quantity, of Cause, etc.
But even these require, in order to make them under
stood, a certain concrete use — that is, an application
to some sense-experience (Anschauung}, by which an
object of them is given us. But how can the intui
tion of the object [its visualisation] precede the ob
ject itself?

""§9. If our intuition [i. e., our sense-experience]
were perforce of such a nature as to represent things
as they are in themselves, there would not be any in
tuition a priori, but intuition would be always empir-
, ical. For I can only know what is contained in the ob
ject in itself when it is present and given to me. It is
indeed even then incomprehensible how the visualis
ing (Anschauung) of a present thing should make me
know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties can
not migrate into my faculty of representation. But
even granting this possibility, a visualising of that
sort would not take place a priori, that is, before the
object were presented to me ; for without this latter
fact no reason of a relation between my representa-

HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 35

tion and the object can be imagined, unless it depend
upon a direct inspiration.

Therefore in one way only can my intuition
{Anscliauung} anticipate the actuality of the ob
ject, and be a cognition a priori, viz. : Jf my intui
tion contains nothing but the form of sensibility,
antedating in my subjectivity all the actual im
pressions through which I am affected by objects.
For that objects of sense can only be intuited ac
cording to this form of sensibility I can know a priori.
Hence it follows : that propositions, which concern
this form of sensuous intuition only, are possible and
valid for objects of the senses ; as also, conversely,
that intuitions which are possible a priori can never
concern any other things than objects of our senses.1
§ 10. Accordingly, it is only the form of sensuous
intuition by which we can intuite things a priori, but
by which we can know objects only as they appear to
us (to our senses), not as they are in themselves ; and
this assumption is absolutely necessary if synthetical
propositions a priori be granted as possible, or if, in
case they actually occur, their possibility is to be
comprehended and determined beforehand.

Now, the intuitions which pure mathematics lays
at the foundation of all its cognitions and judgments
which appear at once apodeictic and necessary are
Space and Time. For mathematics must first have
all its concepts in intuition, and pure mathematics in
pure intuition, that is, jL.imi.st construct them. If it
proceeded in any other way, it would be impossible
to make any headway, for mathematics proceeds, not

1 This whole paragraph (§9) will be better understood when compared
with Remark I., following this section, appearing in the present edition on
page 40. —Ed.

36 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

analytically by dissection of concepts, but synthetic
ally, and if pure intuition be wanting, there is nothing
in which the matter for synthetical judgments a priori
can be given. Geometry is based upon the pure in
tuition of space. Arithmetic accomplishes its concept
of number by the successive addition of units in time;
and pure mechanics especially cannot attain its con
cepts of motion without employing the representation
of time. Both representations, however, are only in
tuitions ; for if we omit from the empirical intuitions
of bodies and their alterations (motion) everything
empirical, or belonging to sensation, space and time
still remain, which are therefore pure intuitions that
lie a priori at the basis of the empirical. Hence they
can never be omitted, but at the same time, by their
being pure intuitions a priori, they prove that they are
mere forms of our sensibility, which must precede all
empirical intuition, or perception of actual objects,
and conformably to which objects can be known a
priori, but only as they appear to us.

§ ii. The problem of the present section is there
fore solved. Pure mathematics, as synthetical cogni
tion a priori, is only possible by referring to no other
objects than those of the senses. At the basis of their
empirical intuition lies a pure intuition (of space and
of time) which is a priori. This is possible, because
the latter intuition is nothing but the mere form of
sensibility, which precedes the actual appearance of
the objects, in that it, in fact, makes them possible.
Yet this faculty of intuiting a priori affects not the
matter of the phenomenon (that is, the sense-element
in it, for this constitutes that which is empirical), but
its form, viz., space and time. Should any man ven
ture to doubt that these are determinations adhering

HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? $}

not to things in themselves, but to their relation to
our sensibility, I should be glad to know how it can
be possible to know the constitution of things a priori,
viz., before we have any acquaintance with them and
before they are presented to us. Such, however, is
the case with space and time. . But this is quite com
prehensible as soon as both count for nothing more
than _formal conditions of our sensibility, while the
ob]ecjts_CQunt merely as phenomena ; for then the form
of the phenomenon, i. e., pure intuition, can by all
means be represented as proceeding from ourselves,
that is, a priori.

§ 12. In order to add something by way of illus
tration and confirmation, we need only watch the
ordinary and necessary procedure of geometers. All
proofs of the complete congruence of two given fig
ures (where the one can in every respect be substi
tuted for the other) come ultimately to this that they
may be made to coincide; which is evidently noth
ing else than a synthetical proposition resting upon
immediate intuition, and this intuition must be pure,
^pr given a priori, otherwise the proposition could not
rank as apodeictically certain, but would have em
pirical certainty only. In that case, it could only be
said that it is always found to be so, and holds good
only as far as our perception reaches. That every
where space (which [in its entirety] is itself no longer
:he boundary of another space) has three dimensions,
and that space cannot in any way have more, is based
on the proposition that not more than three lines can
intersect at right angles in one point ; but this prop
osition cannot by any means be shown from concepts,
but rests immediately on intuition, and indeed on pure
and a priori intuition, because it is apodeictically cer-

38 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

tain. That we can require a line to be drawn to in
finity (in indefinitum), or that a series of changes (for
example, spaces traversed by motion) shall be infi
nitely continued, presupposes a representation of
^pace and time, which can only attach to intuition,
namely, so far as it in itself is bounded by nothing,
for from concepts it could never be inferred. Conse
quently, the basis of mathematics actually are pure
intuitions, which make its synthetical and apodeic-
tically valid propositions possible. Hence our tran
scendental deduction of the notions of space and of
time explains at the same time the possibility of pure
mathematics. Without some such deduction its truth
may be granted, but its existence could by no means
be understood, and we must assume "that everything
which can be given to our senses (to the external
senses in space, to the internal one in time) is intuited
by us as it appears to us, not as it is in itself."

§ 13. Those who cannot yet rid themselves of the
notion that space and time are actual qualities inher
ing in things in themselves, may exercise their acumen
on the following paradox. When they have in vain
attempted its solution, and are free from prejudices
at least for a few moments, they will suspect that the
degradation of space and of time to mere forms of
our sensuous intuition may perhaps be well founded.

If two things are quite equal in all respects as
much as can be ascertained by all means possible,
quantitatively and qualitatively, it must follow, that
the one can in all cases and under all circumstances
replace the other, and this substitution would not oc
casion the least perceptible difference. This in fact
is true of plane figures in geometry; but some spher
ical figures exhibit, notwithstanding a complete in-

HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? $Q

ternal agreement, such a contrast in their external
relation, that the one figure cannot possibly be put in
the place of the other. For instance, two spherical
triangles on opposite hemispheres, which have an arc
of the equator as their common base, may be quite
equal, both as regards sides and angles, so that noth
ing is to be found in either, if it be described for itself
alone and completed, that would not equally be ap
plicable to both ; and yet the one cannot be put in the
place of the other (being situated upon the opposite
hemisphere). Here then is an internal difference be
tween the two triangles, which difference our under
standing cannot describe as internal, and which only
manifests itself by external relations in space.

But I shall adduce examples, taken from common
life, that are more obvious still.

What can be more similar in every respect and in
every part more alike to my hand and to my ear, than
their images in a mirror? And yet I cannot put such
a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its arche
type ; for if this is a right hand, that in the glass is a
left one, and the image or reflexion of the right ear is
a left one which never can serve as a substitute for
the other. There are in this case no internal differ
ences which our understanding could determine by
thinking alone. Yet the differences are internal as
the senses teach, for, notwithstanding their complete
equality and similarity, the left hand cannot be en
closed in the same bounds as the right one (they are
not congruent); the glove of one hand cannot be used
for the other. What is the solution? These objects
are not representations of things as they are in them
selves, and as the pure understanding would cognise
them, but sensuous intuitions, that is, appearances,

40 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

the possibility of which rests upon the relation of cer
tain things unknown in themselves to something else,
viz., to our sensibility. Space is the form of the ex
ternal intuition of this sensibility, and the internal
determination of every space is only possible by the
determination of its external relation to the whole
space, of which it is a part (in other words, by its re
lation to the external sense). That is to say, the part
is only possible through the whole, which is never the
case with things in themselves, as objects of the mere
understanding, but with appearances only. Hence
the difference between similar and equal things, which
are yet not congruent (for instance, two symmetric
helices), cannot be made intelligible by any concept,
but only by the relation to the right and the left hands
which immediately refers to intuition.

REMARK I.

Pure Mathematics, and especially pure geometry,
can only have objective reality on condition that they
refer to objects of sense. But in regard to the latter
the principle holds good, that our sense representa
tion is not a representation of things in themselves,
but of the way in which they appear to us. Hence it
follows, that the propositions of geometry are not the
results of a mere creation of our poetic imagination,
and that therefore they cannot be referred with assu
rance to actual objects ; but rather that they are nec
essarily valid of space, and consequently of all that
may be found in space, because space is nothing else
than the form of all external appearances, and it is
this form alone in which objects of sense can be given.
Sensibility, the form of which is the basis of geom
etry, is that upon which the possibility of external

HOW 13 PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 4!

appearance depends. Therefore these appearances
can never contain anything but what geometry pre
scribes to them.

It would be quite otherwise if the senses were so
constituted as to represent objects as they are in
themselves. For then it would not by any means fol
low from the conception of space, which with all its
properties serves to the geometer as an a priori foun
dation, together with what is thence inferred, must
be so in nature. The space of the geometer would
be considered a mere fiction, and it would not be
credited with objective validity, because we cannot
see how things must of necessity agree with an image
of them, which we make spontaneously and previous
to our acquaintance with them. But if this image, or
rather this formal intuition, is the essential property of
our sensibility, by means of which alone objects are
given to us, and if this sensibility represents not
things in themselves, but their appearances: we shall
easily comprehend, and at the same time indisputably
prove, that all external objects of our world of sense
must necessarily coincide in the most rigorous way
with the propositions of geometry ; because sensibil
ity by means of its form of external intuition, viz., by
space, the same with which the geometer is occupied,
makes those objects at all possible as mere appear
ances.

It will always remain a remarkable phenomenon
in the history of philosophy, that there was a time,
when even mathematicians, who at the same time
were philosophers, began to doubt, not of the accuracy
of their geometrical propositions so far as they con
cerned space, but of their objective validity and the
applicability of this concept itself, and of all its corol

42 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

laries, to nature. They showed much concern whether
a line in nature might not consist of physical points,
and consequently that true space in the object might
consist of simple [discrete] parts, while the space
which the geometer has in his mind [being continu
ous] cannot be such. They did not recognise that
this mental space renders possible the physical space,
i. e., the extension of matter; that this pure space is
not at all a quality of things in themselves, but a form
of our sensuous faculty of representation ; and that
all objects in space are mere appearances, i. e., not
things in themselves but representations of our sensu
ous intuition. But such is the case, for the space of
the geometer is exactly the form of sensuous intuition
which we find a priori in us, and contains the ground
of the possibility of all external appearances (accord
ing to their form), and the latter must necessarily and
most rigidly agree with the propositions of the geom
eter, which he draws not from any fictitious concept,
but from the subjective basis of all external phenom
ena, which is sensibility itself. In this and no other
way can geometry be made secure as to the undoubted
objective reality of its propositions against all the in
trigues of a shallow Metaphysics, which is surprised
at them [the geometrical propositions], because it
has not traced them to the sources of their concepts.

REMARK II.

Whatever is given us as object, must be given us
in intuition. All our intuition however takes place by
means of the senses only; the understanding intuites
nothing, but only reflects. And as we have just shown
that the senses never and in no manner enable us to
know things in themselves, but only their appear-

HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 43

ances, which are mere representations of the sensi
bility, we conclude that 'all bodies, together with the
space in which they are, must be considered nothing
but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but
in our thoughts.' You will say : Is not this manifest
idealism ?

Idealism consists in the assertion, that there are
none but thinking beings, all other things, which we
think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but
representations in the thinking beings, to which no
object external to them corresponds in fact. Whereas
I say, that things as objects of our senses existing
outside us are given, but we know nothing of what
they may be in themselves, knowing only their ap
pearances, i. e. , the representations which they cause
in us by affecting our senses. Consequently I grant
by all means that there are bodies without us, that is,
things which, though quite unknown to us as to what
they are in themselves, we yet know by the represen
tations which their influence on our sensibility pro
cures us, and which we call bodies, a term signifying
merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown
to us, but not therefore less actual. Can this be
termed idealism? It is the very contrary.

Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since
him, it has been generally assumed and granted with
out detriment to the actual existence of external
things, that many of their predicates may be said to
belong not to the things in themselves, but to their
appearances, and to have no proper existence outside
o ir representation. Heat, color, and taste, for in
stance, are of this kind. Now, if I go farther, and for
weighty reasons rank as mere appearances the re
maining qualities of bodies also, which are called pri-

44 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

mary, such as extension, place, and in general space,
with all that which belongs to it (impenetrability or
materiality, space, etc.) — no one in the least can ad
duce the reason of its being inadmissible. As little
as the man who admits colors not to be properties of
the object in itself, but only as modifications of the
sense of sight, should on that account be called an
idealist, so little can my system be named idealistic,
merely because I find that more, nay,

All the properties which constitute the intuition of a
body belong merely to its appearance.

The existence of the thing that appears is thereby
not destroyed, as in genuine idealism, but it is only
shown, that we cannot possibly know it by the senses
as it is in itself.

I should be glad to know what my assertions must
be in order to avoid all idealism. Undoubtedly, I
should say, that the representation of space is not
only perfectly conformable to the relation which our
sensibility has to objects — that I have said — but that
it is quite similar to the object, — an assertion in which
I can find as little meaning as if I said that the sensa
tion of red has a similarity to the property of vermil
ion, which in me excites this sensation.

REMARK III.

Hence we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen
but futile objection, "that by admitting the ideality
of space and of time the whole sensible world would
be turned into mere sham." At first all philosophical
insight into the nature of sensuous cognition was
spoiled, by making the sensibility merely a confused
mode of representation, according to which we still
know things as they are, but without being able to re-

HOW 15 PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 45

duce everything in this our representation to a clear
consciousness ; whereas proof is offered by us that
sensibility consists, not in this logical distinction of
clearness and obscurity, but in the genetical one of
the origin of cognition itself. For sensuous percep
tion represents things not at all as they are, but only
the mode in which they affect our senses, and conse
quently by sensuous perception appearances only and
not things themselves are given to the understanding
for reflexion. After this necessary corrective, an ob
jection rises from an unpardonable and almost inten
tional misconception, as if my doctrine turned all the
things of the world of sense into mere illusion.

When an appearance is given us, we are still quite
free as to how we should judge the matter. The ap
pearance depends upon the senses, but the judgment
upon the understanding, and the only question is,
whether in the determination of the object there is
truth or not. But the difference between truth and
dreaming is not ascertained by the nature of the rep
resentations, which are referred to objects (for they
are the same in both cases), but by their connexion
according to those rules, which determine the coher
ence of the representations in the concept of an ob
ject, and by ascertaining whether they can subsist to
gether in experience or not. And it is not the fault
of the appearances if our cognition takes illusion for
truth, i. e., if the intuition, by which an object is given
us, is considered a concept of the thing or of its exist
ence also, which the understanding can only think.
The senses represent to us the paths of the planets as
now progressive, now retrogressive, and herein is
neither falsehood nor truth, because as long as we
hold this path to be nothing but appearance, we do

46 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

not judge of the objective nature of their motion. But
as a false judgment may easily arise when the under
standing is not on its guard against this subjective
mode of representation being considered objective,
we say they appear to move backward ; it is not the
senses however which must be charged with the illu
sion, but the understanding, whose province alone it
is to give an objective judgment on appearances.

Thus, even if we did not at all reflect on the origin
of our representations, whenever we connect our in
tuitions of sense (whatever they may contain), in
space and in time, according to the rules of the coher
ence of all cognition in experience, illusion or truth
will arise according as we are negligent or careful. It
is merely a question of the use of sensuous represen
tations in the understanding, and not of their origin.
In the same way, if I consider all the representations
of the senses, together with their form, space and
time, to be nothing but appearances, and space and
time to be a mere form of the sensibility, which is not
to be met with in objects out of it, and if I make use
of these representations in reference to possible ex
perience only, there is nothing in my regarding them
as appearances that can lead astray or cause illusion.
For all that they can correctly cohere according to
rules of truth in experience. Thus all the proposi
tions of geometry hold good of space as well as of all
the objects of the senses, consequently of all possible
experience, whether I consider space as a mere form
of the sensibility, or as something cleaving to the
things themselves. In the former case however I com
prehend how I can know a priori these propositions
concerning all the objects of external intuition. Other
wise, everything else as regards all possible experience

HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 47

remains just as if I had not departed from the vulgar
view.

But if I venture to go beyond all possible experi
ence with my notions of space and time, which I can
not refrain from doing if I proclaim them, qualities
inherent in things in themselves (for what should pre
vent me from letting them hold good of the same
things, even though my senses might be different, and
unsuited to them?), then a grave error may arise due
to illusion, for thus I would proclaim to be universally
valid what is merely a subjective condition of the in
tuition of things and sure only for all objects of sense,
viz., for all possible experience; I would refer this
condition to things in themselves, and do not limit it
to the conditions of experience.

My doctrine of the ideality of space and of time,
therefore, far from reducing the whole sensible world
to mere illusion, is the only means of securing the ap
plication of one of the most important cognitions (that
which mathematics propounds a priori} to actual ob
jects, and of preventing its being regarded as mere
illusion. For without this observation it would be
quite impossible to make out whether the intuitions
of space and time, which we borrow from no experi
ence, and which yet lie in our representation a priori,
are not mere phantasms of our brain, to which objects
do not correspond, at least not adequately, and con
sequently, whether we have been able to show its un
questionable validity with regard to all the objects of
the sensible world just because they are mere appear
ances.

Secondly, though these my principles make ap
pearances of the representations of the senses, they
are so far from turning the truth of experience into

48 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

mere illusion, that they are rather the only means of
preventing the transcendental illusion, by which meta
physics has hitherto been deceived, leading to the
childish endeavor of catching at bubbles, because ap
pearances, which are mere representations, were taken
for things in themselves. Here originated the remark
able event of the antimony of Reason which I shall
mention by and by, and which is destroyed by the
single observation, that appearance, as long as it is
employed in experience, produces truth, but the mo
ment it transgresses the bounds of experience, and
consequently becomes transcendent, produces nothing
but illusion.

Inasmuch, therefore, as I leave to things as we
obtain them by the senses their actuality, and only
limit our sensuous intuition of these things to this,
that they represent in no respect, not even in the
pure intuitions of space and of time, anything more
than mere appearance of those things, but never their
constitution in themselves, this is not a sweeping illu
sion invented for nature by me. My protestation too
against all charges of idealism is so valid and clear
as even to seem superfluous, were there not incompe
tent judges, who, while they would have an old name
for every deviation from their perverse though com
mon opinion, and never judge of the spirit of philo
sophic nomenclature, but cling to the letter only, are
ready to put their own conceits in the place of well-
defined notions, and thereby deform and distort them.
I have myself given this my theory the name of tran
scendental idealism, but that cannot authorise any
one to confound it either with the empirical idealism
of Descartes, (indeed, his was only an insoluble prob
lem, owing to which he thought every one at liberty

HOW IS PURE MATHEMATICS POSSIBLE? 49

to deny the existence of the corporeal world, because
it could never be proved satisfactorily), or with the
mystical and visionary idealism of Berkeley, against
which and other similar phantasms our Critique con
tains the proper antidote. My idealism concerns not
the existence of things (the doubting of which, how
ever, constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense), sine;;
it never came into my head to doubt it, but it con
cerns the sensuous representation of things, to which
space and time especially belong. Of these [viz.,
space and time], consequently of all appearances in
general, I have only shown, that they are neither
things (but mere modes of representation), nor deter
minations belonging to things in themselves. But
the word "transcendental,'* which with me means a
reference of our cognition, i. e., not to things, but
only to the cognitive faculty, was meant to obviate
this misconception. Yet rather than give further oc
casion to it by this word, I now retract it, and desire
this idealism of mine to be called critical. But if it
be really an objectionable idealism to convert actual
things (not appearances) into mere representations,
by what name shall we call him who conversely
changes mere representations to things? It may. 1
think, be called "dreaming idealism," in contradis
tinction to the former, which may be called "vision
ary," both of which are to be refuted by my transcen
dental, or, better, critical idealism.

SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCEN
DENTAL PROBLEM.

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE?

ATATURE is the existence of things, so far as it is.
li determined according to universal laws. Should
nature signify the existence of things .in themselves,
we could never cognise it either a priori or a posteriori.
Not a priori, for how can we know what belongs to
things in themselves, since this never can be done by
the dissection of our concepts (in analytical judg
ments)? We do not want to know what is. contained
in our concept of a thing (for the [concept describes
what] belongs to its logical being), but what is in the
actuality of the thing superadded to our concept, and
by what the thing itself is determined in its existence
outside the concept. Our understanding, and the con
ditions on which alone it can connect the determina
tions of things in their existence, do not prescribe
any rule to things themselves ; these do not conform
to our understanding, but it must conform itself to
them ; they must therefore be first given us in order
to gather these determinations from them, wherefore
they would not be cognised a priori.

A cognition of the nature of things in themselves
a posteriori would be equally impossible. For, if ex-

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 5!

perience is to teach us laws, to which the existence
of things is subject, these laws, if they regard things
in themselves, must belong to them of necessity even
outside our experience. But experience teaches us
what exists and how it exists, but never that it must
necessarily exist so and not otherwise. Experience
therefore can never teach us the nature of things in
themselves.

§ 15. We nevertheless actually possess a pure sci
ence of nature in which are propounded, a priori and
with all the necessity requisite to apodeictical propo
sitions, laws to which nature is subject. I need only
call to witness that propaedeutic of natural science
which, under the title of the universal Science of Na
ture, precedes all Physics (which is founded upon
empirical principles). In it we hive Mathematics ap
plied to appearance, and also merely discursive prin
ciples (or those derived from concepts), which con
stitute the philosophical part of the pure cognition of
nature. But there are several things in it, which are
not quite pure and independent of empirical sources:
such as the concept of motion, that of impenetrability
(upon which the empirical concept of matter rests),
that of inertia, and many others, which prevent its
being called a perfectly pure science of nature. Be
sides, it only refers to objects of the external sense,
and therefore does not give an example of a universal
science of nature, in the strict sense, for such a sci
ence must reduce nature in general, whether it regards
the object of the external or that of the internal sense
(the object of Physics as well as Psychology), to uni
versal laws. But among the principles of this uni
versal physics there are a few which actually have
the required universality^ for instance, the proposi-

52 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

tions that "substance is permanent/' and that " every
event is determined by a cause according to constant
laws," etc. These are actually universal laws of na
ture, which subsist completely a priori. There is then
in fact a pure science of nature, and the question
arises, How is it possible ?

§ 1 6. The word " nature" assumes yet another
meaning, which determines the object, whereas in the
former sense it only denotes the conformity to law
\Gtsctzmdssigkcit\ of the determinations of the exist
ence of things generally. If we consider it matcrialitcr
(i. e., in the matter that forms its objects) "nature is
the complex of all the objects of experience." And
with this only are we now concerned, for besides,
things which can never be objects of experience, if
they must be cognised as to their nature, would oblige
us to have recourse to concepts whose meaning could
never be given in concrcto (by any example of possible
experience). Consequently we must form for ourselves
a list of concepts of their nature, the reality whereof
(i. e., whether they actually refer to objects, or are
mere creations of thought) could never be determined.
The cognition of what cannot be an object of experi
ence would be hyperphysical, and with things hyper-
physical we are here not concerned, but only with
the cognition of nature, the actuality of which can be
confirmed by experience, though it [the cognition of
nature] is possible a priori and precedes all experi
ence.

§ 17. The formal [aspect] of nature in this nar
rower sense is therefore the conformity to law of all
the objects of experience, and so far as it is cognised
a priori, their necessary conformity. But it has just
been shown that the laws of nature can never be cog-

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 53

nised a priori in objects so far as they are considered
not in reference to possible experience, but as things
in themselves. And our inquiry here extends not to
things in themselves (the properties of which we pass
by), but to things as objects of possible experience,
and the complex of these is what we properly desig
nate as nature. And now I ask, when the possibility
of a cognition of nature a priori is in question, whether
it is better to arrange the problem thus : How can
we cognise a priori that things as objects of experi
ence necessarily conform to law? or thus : How is it
possible to cognise a priori the necessary conformity
to law of experience itself as regards all its objects
generally?

Closely considered, the solution of the problem,
represented in either way, amounts, with regard to the
pure cognition of nature (which is the point of the
question at issue), entirely to the same thing. For
the subjective laws, under which alone an empirical
cognition of things is possible, hold good of these
things, as objects of possible experience (not as things
in themselves, which are not considered here). Either
of the following statements means quite the same :

A judgment of observation can never rank as ex
perience, without the law, that " whenever an event
is observed, it is always referred to some antecedent,
which it follows according to a universal rule."

"Everything, of which experience teaches that it
happens, must have a cause."

It is, however, more commendable to choose the
first formula. For we can a priori and previous to all
given objects have a cognition of those conditions, on
which alone experience is possible, but never of the
laws to which things may in themselves be subject,

54 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

without reference to possible experience. We cannot
therefore study the nature of things a priori otherwise
than by investigating the conditions and the universal
(though subjective) laws, under which alone such a
cognition as experience (as to mere form) is possible,
and we determine accordingly the possibility of things,
as objects of experience. For if I should choose the
second formula, and seek the conditions a priori, on
which nature as an object of experience is possible, I
might easily fall into error, and fancy that I was speak
ing of nature as a thing in itself, and then move round
in endless circles, in a vain search for laws concern
ing things of which nothing is given me.

Accordingly we shall here be concerned with^ex-
perience only, and the universal conditions of its pos
sibility which are given a priori. Thence we shall
determine nature as the whole object of all possible
experience. I think it will be understood that I here
do not mean the rules of the observation of a nature
that is already given, for these already presuppose
experience. I do not mean how (through experience)
we can study the laws of nature ; for these would not
then be laws a priori, and would yield us no pure sci
ence of nature ; but [I mean to ask] how the condi
tions a priori of the possibility of experience are at
the same time the sources from which all the uni
versal laws of nature must be derived.

§ 1 8. In the first place we must state that, while
all judgments of experience {Erfahrungsurtheile} are
empirical (i. e., have their ground in immediate sense-
perception), vice versa, all empirical judgments (em-
pirischt Urtheile) are not judgments of experience,
but, besides the empirical, and in general besides
what is given to the sensuous intuition, particular

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 55

concepts must yet be superadded — concepts which
have their origin quite a priori in the pure under
standing, and under which every perception must be
first of all subsumed and then by their means changed
into experience.1

Empirical judgments, so far as they have objec
tive validity, are judgments of experience; but those
which are only subjectively valid, I name mere judg
ments of perception. The latter require no pure con
cept of the understanding, but only the logical con
nexion of perception in a thinking subject. But the
former always require, besides the representation of
the sensuous intuition, particular concepts originally
begotten in the understanding, which produce the objec
tive validity of the judgment of experience.

All our judgments are at first merely judgments of
perception; they hold good only for us (i. e., for our
subject), and we do not till afterwards give them a
new reference (to an object), and desire that they
shall always hold good for us and in the same way
for everybody else ; for when a judgment agrees with
an object, all judgments concerning the same object
must likewise agree among themselves, and thus the
^objective validity of the judgment of experience sig
nifies nothing else than its necessary universality of
application. And conversely when we have reason
to consider a judgment necessarily universal (which
never depends upon perception, but upon the pure
concept of the understanding, under which the per
ception is subsumed), we must consider it objective

s~— >\

1 Empirical judgments (empirische UrtheiU} are either mere statements
of fact, viz.. records of a perception, or statements of a natural law, implying
a causal connexion between two facts. The former Kant calls "judgments
of perception" (Wa.hr nehmungsurtheile], the latter "judgments of experi
ence ' ' [Rrfahrungsurtheile], — Ed,

56 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

also, that is, that it expresses not merely a reference
of our perception to a subject, but a quality of the
object. For there would be no reason for the judg
ments of other men necessarily agreeing with mine, if
it were not the unity of the object to which they all
refer, and with which they accord ; hence they must
all agree with one another.

§ 19. Therefore objective validity and necessary
^universality (for everybody) are equivalent terms, and
though we do not know the object in itself, yet when
we consider a judgment as universal, and also neces
sary, we understand it to have objective validity. By
this judgment we cognise the object (though it remains
unknown as it is in itself) by the universal and neces
sary connexion of the given perceptions. As this is
the case with all objects of senst^jiufo fronts of pyp^-
r i e n ce take their objective validity not from the im
mediate cognition of the object fwhich is impossible),
buTTrom the condition of universal validity in empiri
cal judgments, which, as already said, never rests
upon empirical, or, in short, sensuous conditions, but
upon a pure concept of_the_jjnderstanding. The ob
ject always remajiis_unj£n^wji_in_ jtself j but when hy_
the concept of the understanding the connexion_oi_the
representations of the object, which are given to our
sensibility, is determined as universally valid, the ob-
ject is determined by this relation, and it is the judg
ment that is objective.

To illustrate the matter : When we say, ''the room
is warm, sugar sweet, and wormwood bitter,"1 — we

1 1 freely grant that these examples do not represent such judgments of
perception as ever could become judgments of experience, even though a
concept of the understanding were superadded, because they refer merely
to feeling, which everybody knows to be merely subjective, and which of
course can never be attributed to the object, and consequently never become

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 57

have only subjectively valid judgments. I do not at
all expect that I or any other person shall always find
it as I now do; each of these sentences only expresses
a relation of two sensations to the same subject, to
myself, and that only in my present state of percep
tion ; consequently they are not valid of the object.
Such are judgments of perception. Judgments of ex
perience are of quite a different nature. What expe
rience teaches me under certain circumstances, it must
always teach me and everybody ; and its validity is
not limited to the subject nor to its state at a particu
lar time. Hence I pronounce all such judgments as
being objectively valid. For instance, when I say the
air is elastic, this judgment is as yet a judgment of
perception only — I do nothing but refer two of my
sensations to one another. But, if I would have it
called a judgment of experience, I require this con
nexion to stand under a condition, which makes it
universally valid. I desire therefore that I and every
body else should always connect necessarily the same
perceptions under the same circumstances.

§ 20. We must consequently analyse experience
in order to see what is contained in this product of
the senses and of the understanding, and how the
judgment of experience itself is possible. The foun
dation is the intuition of which I become conscious,
J. e., perception {perceptid)> which pertains merely to
the senses. But in the next place, there are acts of
judging (which belong only to the understanding).
But this judging may be twofold — first, I may merely

objective. I only wished to give here an example of a judgment that is
merely subjectively valid, containing no ground for universal validity, and
thereby for a relation to the object. An example of the judgments of per
ception, which become judgments of experience by superadded concepts of
the understanding, will be given in the next note.

58 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA

compare perceptions and connect them in a particular
state of my consciousness; or, secondly, I may con
nect them in consciousness generally. The former
judgment is merely a judgment of perception, and of
subjective validity only : it is merely a connexion of
perceptions in my mental state, without reference to
the object. Hence it is not, as is commonly imagined,
enough for experience to compare perceptions and to
connect them in consciousness through judgment;
there arises no universality and necessity, for which
alone judgments can become objectively valid and be
called experience.

Quite another judgment therefore is required be
fore perception can become experience. The given
intuition must be subsumed under a concept, which
determines the form of judging in general relatively
to the intuition, connects its empirical consciousness
in consciousness generally, and thereby procures uni
versal validity for empirical judgments. A concept of
this nature is a pure a priori concept of the Under
standing, which does nothing but determine for an
intuition the general way in which it can be used for
judgments. Let the concept be that of cause, then it
determines the intuition which is subsumed under it,
e. g., that of air, relative to judgments in general,
viz., the concept of air serves with regard to its ex
pansion in the relation of antecedent to consequent in
a hypothetical judgment. The concept of cause ac
cordingly is a p.ure concept of the understanding,
which is totally disparate from all possible perception,
and only serves to determine the representation sub
sumed under it, relatively to judgments in general,
and so to make a universally valid judgment possible.

Before, therefore, a judgment of perception can

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 59

become a judgment of experience, it is requisite that
the perception should be subsumed under some such
a concept of the understanding; for instance, air
ranks under the concept of causes, which determines
our judgment about it in regard to its expansion as
hypothetical.1 Thereby the expansion of the air is
represented not as merely belonging to the perception
of the air in my present state or in several states of
mine, or in the state of perception of others, but as
belonging to it necessarily. The judgment, "the air
is elastic," becomes universally valid, and a judgment
of experience, only by certain judgments preceding
it, which subsume the intuition of air under the con
cept of cause and effect: and they thereby determine
the perceptions not merely as regards one another in
me, but relatively to the form of judging in general,
which is here hypothetical, and in this way they ren
der the empirical judgment universally valid.

If all our synthetical judgments are analysed so
far as they are objectively valid, it will be found that
they never consist of mere intuitions connected only
(as is commonly believed) by comparison into a judg
ment ; but that they would be impossible were not a
pure concept of the understanding superadded to the
concepts abstracted from intuition, under which con
cept these latter are subsumed, and in this manner
only combined into an objectively valid judgment.

1 As an easier example, we may take the following : " When the sun shines
on the stone, it grows warm." This judgment, however often I and others
may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception, and contains no
necessity; perceptions are only usually conjoined in this manner. But if I
say, "The sun warms the stone," I add to the perception a concept of the
understanding, viz., that of cause, which connects with the concept of sun
shine that of heat as a necessary consequence, and the synthetical judgment
becomes of necessity universally valid, viz., objective, and is converted from
a perception into experience.

6o KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

Even the judgments of pure mathematics in their sim
plest axioms are not exempt from this condition. The
principle, "a straight line is the shortest between two
points," presupposes that the line is subsumed under
the concept of quantity, which certainly is no mere
intuition, but has its seat in the understanding alone,
and serves to determine the intuition (of the line)
with regard to the judgments which may be made
about it, relatively to their quantity, that is, to plu
rality (as judicia plurativd).1 For under them it is
understood that in a given intuition there is contained
a plurality of homogenous parts.

§ 21. To prove, then, the possibility of experience
so far as it rests upon pure concepts of the understand
ing a priori, we must first represent what belongs to
judgments in general and the various functions of the
understanding, in a complete table. For the pure con
cepts of the understanding must run parallel to these
functions, as such concepts are nothing more than con
cepts of intuitions in general, so far as these are deter
mined by one or other of these functions of judging,
in themselves, that is, necessarily and universally.
Hereby also the a priori principles of the possibility
of all experience, as of an objectively valid empirical
cognition, will be precisely determined. For they are
nothing but propositions by which all perception is
(under certain universal conditions of intuition) sub
sumed under those pure concepts of the understanding.

IThis name seems preferable to the term par 'ticularia, which is used for
these judgments in logic. For the latter implies the idea that they are not
universal. But when I start from unity (in single judgments) and so proceed
to universality, I must not [even indirectly and negatively] imply any refer
ence to universality. I think plurality merely without universality, and not
the exception from universality. This is necessary, if logical considerations
shall form the basis of the pure concepts of the understanding. However,
there is no need of making changes in logic.

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 6l

Logical Table of Judgments.

I. 2.

As to Quantity. As to Quality.
Universal. Affirmative.

Particular. Negative.

Singular. Infinite.

3- 4-

As to Relation. As to Modality.
Categorical. Problematical.

Hypothetical. Assertorical.

Disjunctive. Apodeictical.

Transcendental Table of the Pure Concepts of the
Understa nding.

I. 2.

As to Quantity. As to Quality.
Unity (the Measure). Reality.

Plurality (the Quantity). Negation.

Totality (the Whole). Limitation.

3- 4-

As to Relation. As to M'odalily.

Substance. Possibility.

Cause. Existence.

Community. Necessity.

Pure Physiological Table of the Universal Principles of
the Science of Nature.

I. 2.

Axioms of Intuition. Anticipations of Perception.

3- 4-

Analogies of Experience. Postulates of Empirical Thinking

generally.

62 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

§ 210. In order to comprise the whole matter in
one idea, it is first necessary to remind the reader
that we are discussing not the origin of experience,
but of that which lies in experience. The former per
tains to empirical psychology, and would even then
never be adequately explained without the latter,
which belongs to the Critique of cognition, and par
ticularly of the understanding.

Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to
the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely
a work of the understanding. But the judgments,
which the understanding forms alone from sensuous
intuitions, are far from being judgments of experience.
For in the one case the judgment connects only the
perceptions as they are given in the sensuous intui
tion, while in the other the judgments must express
what experience in general, and not what the mere
perception (which possesses only subjective validity)
contains. The judgment of experience must therefore
add to the sensuous intuition and its logical connex
ion in a judgment (after it has been rendered univer
sal by comparison) something that determines the
synthetical judgment as necessary and therefore as
universally valid. This can be nothing else than that
concept which represents the intuition as determined
in itself with regard to one form of judgment rather
than another, viz., a concept of that synthetical unity
of intuitions which can only be represented by a given
logical function of judgments.

§ 22. The sum of the matter is this: the business
of the senses is to intuite — that of the understanding
is to think. But thinking is uniting representations
in one consciousness. This union originates either
merely relative to the subject, and is accidental and

V* >)•
HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 63

^ ^*

subjective, or is absolute, and is necessary or objec
tive. Jhe__iinioii of representations in one conscious
ness is judgment. Thinking therefore isTrie same as
judging, or referring representations to judgments in
general. Hence judgments are either merely subjec
tive, when representations are referred to a conscious
ness in one subject only, and united in it, or objec
tive, when they are united in a consciousness gener
ally, that is, necessarily. The logical functions of all
judgments are but various modes of uniting represen
tations in consciousness. But if they serve for con
cepts, they are concepts of their necessary union in a
consciousness, and so principles of objectively valid
judgments. This union in a consciousness is either
analytical, by identity, or synthetical, by the combi
nation and addition of various representations one to
another. Experience consists in the synthetical con
nexion of phenomena (perceptions) in consciousness,
so far as this connexion is necessary. Hence the pure
concepts of the understanding are those under which
all perceptions must be subsumed ere they can serve
for judgments of experience, in which the synthetical
unity of the perceptions is represented as necessary
and universally valid.1

1 But how does this proposition, "that judgments of experience contain
necessity in the synthesis of perceptions," agree with my statement so often
before inculcated, that "experience as cognition a posteriori can afford con
tingent judgments only ?" When I say that experience teaches me some
thing, I mean only the perception that lies in experience, — for example, that
heat always follows the shining of the sun on a stone; consequently the
proposition of experience is always so far accidental. That this heat neces
sarily follows the shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of
experience ;by means of the concept of cause), yet is a fact not learned by
experience; for conversely, experience is first of all generated by this addi
tion of the concept of the understanding (of cause) to perception. How per
ception attains this addition may be seen by referring in the Critique itself
to the section on the Transcendental faculty of Judgment [viz., in the first
edition, Von dein Schematismus der reinen Vcrttandsbegriffe\,

64 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

§ 23. Judgments, when considered merely as the
condition of the union of given representations in a
consciousness, are rules. These rules, so far as they
represent the union as necessary, are rules a priori,
and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher
rules, are fundamental principles. But in regard to
the possibility of all experience, merely in relation to
the form of thinking in it, no conditions of judgments
of experience are higher than those which bring the
phenomena, according to the various form of their
intuition, under pure concepts of the understanding,
and render the empirical judgment objectively valid.
These concepts are therefore the a priori principles
of possible experience.

The principles of possible experience are then at
the same time universal laws of nature, which can be
cognised a priori. And thus the problem in our sec
ond question, "How is the pure Science of Nature
possible?" is solved. For the system which is re
quired for the form of a science is to be met with in
perfection here, because, beyond the above-mentioned
formal conditions of all judgments in general offered
in logic, no others are possible, and these constitute
a logical system. The concepts grounded thereupon,
which contain the a priori conditions of all synthetical
and necessary judgments, accordingly constitute a
transcendental system. Finally the principles, by
means of which all phenomena are subsumed under
these concepts, constitute a physical1 system, that is,
a system of nature, which precedes all empirical cog
nition of nature, makes it even possible, and hence

l[Kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as "per
taining to the science of physics," i. e., nature in general, not as we use the
term now as " pertaining to the functions of the living body." Accordingly
it has been translated " physical."— Ed.\

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 65

may in strictness be denominated the universal and
pure science of nature.

§ 24. The first one1 of the physiological principles
subsumes all phenomena, as intuitions in space and
time, under the concept of Quantity, and is so far a
principle of the application of Mathematics to experi
ence. The second one subsumes the empirical ele
ment, viz., sensation, which denotes the real in intui
tions, not indeed directly under the concept of quan
tity, because sensation is not an intuition that contains
either space or time, though it places the respective
object into both. But still there is between reality
(sense-representation) and the zero, or total void of
intuition in time, a difference which has a quantity.
For between every given degree of light and of dark
ness, between every degree of heat and of absolute
cold, between every degree of weight and of absolute
lightness, betw?een every degree of occupied space
and of totally void space, diminishing degrees can be
conceived, in the same manner as between conscious
ness and total unconsciousness (the darkness of a
psychological blank) ever diminishing degrees obtain.
Hence there is no perception that can prove an abso
lute absence of it ; for instance, no psychological
darkness that cannot be considered as a kind of con
sciousness, which is only outbalanced by a stronger
consciousness. This occurs in all cases of sensation,
and so the understanding can anticipate even sensa
tions, which constitute the peculiar quality of empiri
cal representations (appearances), by means of the
principle: "that they all have (consequently that

IThe three following paragraphs will hardly be understood unless refer
ence be made to what the Critique itself says on the subject of the Principles;
they will, however, be of service in giving a general view of the Principles,
arid in fixing the attention on the main points.

66 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

what is real in all phenomena has) a degree." Here
is the second application of mathematics (niathesis in-
tensorum} to the science of nature.

§ 25. Anent the relation of appearances merely
with a view to their existence, the determination is
not mathematical but dynamical, and can never be
objectively valid, consequently never fit for experi
ence, if it does not come under a priori principles by
which the cognition of experience relative to appear
ances becomes even possible. Hence appearances
must be subsumed under the concept of Substance,
which is the foundation of all determination of exist
ence, as a concept of the thing itself; or secondly—
so far as a succession is found among phenomena,
that is, an event — under the concept of an Effect
with reference to Cause ; or lastly — so far as coexist
ence is to be known objectively, that is, by a judg
ment of experience — under the concept of Commun
ity (action and reaction).1 Thus a priori principles
form the basis of objectively valid, though empirical
judgments, that is, of the possibility of experience so
far as it must connect objects as existing in nature.
These principles are the proper laws of nature, which
may be termed dynamical.

Finally the cognition of the agreement and con
nexion not only of appearances among themselves in
experience, but of their relation to experience in gen
eral, belongs to the judgments of experience. This
relation contains either their agreement with the for
mal conditions, which the understanding cognises, or
their coherence with the materials of the senses and
of perception, or combines both into one concept.
Consequently it contains Possibility, Actuality, and

1 [Kant uses here the equivocal term Wechseliuirkung.—Ed.}

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 67

Necessity according to universal laws of nature ; and
this constitutes the physical doctrine of method, or
the distinction of truth and of hypotheses, and the
bounds of the certainty of the latter.

§ 26. The third table of Principles drawn from the
nature of the understanding itself after the critical
method, shows an inherent perfection, which raises it
far above every other table which has hitherto though
in vain been tried or may yet be tried by analysing
the objects themselves dogmatically. It exhibits all
synthetical a priori principles completely and accord
ing to one principle, viz., the faculty of judging in
general, constituting the essence of experience as re
gards the understanding, so that we can be certain
that there are no more such principles, which affords
a satisfaction such as can never be attained by the
dogmatical method. Yet is this not all : there is a
still greater merit in it.

We must carefully bear in mind the proof which
shows the possibility of this cognition a priori, and at
the same time limits all such principles to a condition
which must never be lost sight of, if we desire it not
to be misunderstood, and extended in use beyond the
original sense which the understanding attaches to it.
This limit is that they contain nothing but the condi
tions of possible experience in general so far as it is
subjected to laws a priori. Consequently I do not
say, that things in themselves possess a quantity, that
their actuality possesses a degree, their existence a
connexion of accidents in a substance, etc. This no
body can prove, because such a synthetical connexion
from mere concepts, without any reference to sensu
ous intuition on the one side, or connexion of it in a
possible experience on the other, is absolutely impos-

68 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

sible. The essential limitation of the concepts in
these principles then is : That all things stand neces
sarily a priori under the afore-mentioned conditions,
c.s objects of experience only.

Hence there follows secondly a specifically pecu
liar mode of proof of these principles : they are not
directly referred to appearances and to their relations,
but to the possibility of experience, of which appear
ances constitute the matter only, not the form. Thus
they are referred to objectively and universally valid
synthetical propositions, in which we distinguish
judgments of experience from those of perception.
This takes place because appearances, as mere intui
tions, occupying a part of space and time, come un
der the concept of Quantity, which unites their multi
plicity a priori according to rules synthetically. Again,
so far as the perception contains, besides intuition,
sensibility, and between the latter and nothing (i. e.,
the total disappearance of sensibility), there is an
ever decreasing transition, it is apparent that that
which is in appearances must have a degree, so far
as it (viz., the perception) does not itself occupy
any part of space or of time.1 Still the transition to
actuality from empty time or empty space is only
possible in time; consequently though sensibility, as

IHeat and light are in a small space just as large as to degree as in a
large one ; in like manner the internal representations, pain, consciousness
in general, whether they last a short or a long time, need not vary as to the
degree. Hence the quantity is here in a point and in a moment just as great
as in any space or time however great. Degrees are therefore capable of in
crease, but not in intuition, rather in mere sensation (or the quantity of the
degree of an intuition). Hence they can only be estimated quantitatively by
the relation of i to o, viz., by their capability of decreasing by infinite inter
mediate degrees to disappearance, or of increasing from naught through in
finite gradations to a determinate sensation in a certain time. Quantitas
qualitatis est gradus [i. e., the degrees of quality must be measured Ly
equality].

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLL ? 69

the quality of empirical intuition, can never be cog
nised a priori, by its specific difference from other
sensibilities, yet it can, in a possible experience in
general, as a quantity of perception be intensely dis
tinguished from every other similar perception. Hence
the application of mathematics to nature, as regards
the sensuous intuition by which nature is given to us,
becomes possible and is thus determined.

Above all, the reader must pay attention to the
mode of proof of the principles which occur under
the title of Analogies of experience. For these do
not refer to the genesis of intuitions, as do the prin
ciples of applied mathematics, but to the connexion
of their existence in experience ; and this can be
nothing but the determination of their existence in
time according to necessary laws, under which alone
the connexion is objectively valid, and thus becomes
experience. The proof therefore does not turn on
the synthetical unity in the connexion of things in
themselves, but merely of perceptions, and of these
not in regard to their matter, but to the determination
of time and of the relation of their existence in it, ac
cording to universal laws. If the empirical determi
nation in relative time is indeed objectively valid (i. e.,
experience), these universal laws contain the neces
sary determination of existence in time generally (viz.,
according to a rule of the understanding a priori}.

In these Prolegomena I cannot further descant on
the subject, but my reader (who has probably been
long accustomed to consider experience a mere em
pirical synthesis of perceptions, and hence not con
sidered that it goes much beyond them, as it imparts
to empirical judgments universal validity, and for
that purpose requires a pure and a priori unity of the

7o KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

understanding) is recommended to pay special atten
tion to this distinction of experience from a mere ag
gregate of perceptions, and to judge the mode of proof
from this point of view.

§ 27. Now we are prepared to remove Hume's
doubt. He justly maintains, that we cannot compre
hend by reason the possibility of Causality, that is, of
the reference of the existence of one thing to the ex
istence of another, which is necessitated by the for
mer. I add, that we comprehend just as little the
concept of Subsistence, that is, the necessity that at
the foundation of the existence of things there lies a
subject which cannot itself be a predicate of any other
thing ; nay, we cannot even form a notion of the pos
sibility of such a thing (though we can point out ex
amples of its use in experience). The very same in
comprehensibility affects the Community of things, as
we cannot comprehend how from the state of one
thing an inference to the state of quite another thing
beyond it, and vice versa, can be drawn, and how sub
stances which have each their own separate existence
should depend upon one another necessarily. But I
am very far from holding these concepts to be derived
merely from experience, and the necessity represented
in them, to be imaginary and a mere illusion produced
in us by long habit. On the contrary, I have amply
shown, that they and the theorems derived from them
are firmly established a priori, or before all experience,
and have their undoubted objective value, though
only with regard to experience.

§ 28. Though I have no notion of such a connex
ion of things in themselves, that they can either exist
as substances, or act as causes, or stand in commun
ity with others (;ts parts of a real whole), and I can

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? Jl

just as little conceive such properties in appearances
as such (because those concepts contain nothing that
lies in the appearances, but only what the under
standing alone must think): we have yet a notion of
such a connexion of representations in our under
standing, and in judgments generally; consisting in
this that representations appear in one sort of judg
ments as subject in relation to predicates, in another
as reason in relation to consequences, and in a third £
as parts, which constitute together a total possible1'
cognition. Besides we cognise a priori that without
considering the representation of an object as deter
mined in some of these respects, we can have no valid
cognition of the object, and, if we should occupy our
selves about the object in itself, there is no possible
attribute, by which I could know that it is determined
under any of these aspects, that is, under the concept
either of substance, or of cause, or (in relation to
other substances) of community, for I have no notion
of the possibility of such a connexion of existence.
But the question is not how things in themselves, but
how the empirical cognition of things is determined,
as regards the above aspects of judgments in general,
that is, how things, as objects of experience, can and
shall be subsumed under these concepts of the under
standing. And then it is clear, that I completely com
prehend not only the possibility, but also the neces
sity of subsuming all phenomena under these concepts,
that is, of using them for principles of the possibility
of experience.

§ 29. When making an experiment with Hume's
problematical concept (his crux metaphysicoruni}, the
concept of cause, we have, in the first place, given
a priori, by means of logic, the form of a conditional

. i.
72 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

judgment in general, i. e., we have one given cogni
tion as antecedent and another as consequence. But
it is possible, that in perception we may meet with a
rule of relation, which runs thus : that a certain phe
nomenon is constantly followed by another (though
not conversely), and this is a case for me to use the
hypothetical judgment, and, for instance, to say, if
the sun shines long enough upon a body, it grows
warm. Here there is indeed as yet no necessity of
connexion, or concept of cause. But I proceed and
say, that if this proposition, which is merely a subjec
tive connexion of perceptions, is to be a judgment of
experience, it must be considered as necessary and
universally valid. Such a proposition would be, "the
sun is by its light the cause of heat." The empirical
rule is now considered as a law, and as valid not
merely of appearances but valid of them for the pur
poses of a possible experience which requires univer
sal and therefore necessarily valid rules. I therefore
easily comprehend the concept of cause, as a concept
necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience,
and its possibility as a synthetical union of percep
tions in consciousness generally; but I do not at all
comprehend the possibility of a thing generally as a
cause, because the concept of cause denotes a condi
tion not at all belonging to things, but to experience.
It is nothing in fact but an objectively valid cognition
of appearances and of their succession, so far as the
antecedent can be conjoined with the consequent ac
cording to the rule of hypothetical judgments.

§ 30. Hence if the pure concepts of the under
standing do not refer to objects of experience but to
things in themselves (noumena), they have no signifi
cation whatever. They serve, as it were, only to de-

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 73

cipher appearances, that we may be able to read them
as experience. The principles which arise from their
reference to the sensible \vorld, only serve our under
standing for empirical use. Beyond this they are
arbitrary combinations, without objective reality, and
we can neither cognise their possibility a priori, nor
verify their reference to objects, let alone make it in
telligible by any example ; because examples can only
be borrowed from some possible experience, conse
quently the objects of these concepts can be found
nowhere but in a possible experience.

This complete (though to its originator unex
pected) solution of Hume's problem rescues for the
pure concepts of the understanding their a priori ori
gin, and for the universal laws of nature their valid
ity, as laws of the understanding, yet in such a way as
to limit their use to experience, because their possi
bility depends solely on the reference of the under
standing to experience, but with a completely re
versed mode of connexion which never occurred to
Hume, not by deriving them from experience, but by
deriving experience from them.

This is therefore the result of all our foregoing in
quiries : " All synthetical principles a priori are noth
ing more than principles of possible experience, and
can never be referred to things in themselves, but to
appearances as objects of experience. And hence
pure mathematics as well as a pure science of nature
can never be referred to anything more than mere
appearances, and can only represent either that which
makes experience generally possible, or else that
which, as it is derived from these principles, must
always be capable of being represented in some pos
sible experience."

74 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

§ 31. And thus we have at last something definite,
upon which to depend in all metaphysical enterprises,
which have hitherto, boldly enough but always at
random, attempted everything without discrimination.
That the aim of their exertions should be so near,
struck neither the dogmatical thinkers nor those who,
confident in their supposed sound common sense,
started with concepts and principles of pure reason
(which were legitimate and natural, but destined for
mere empirical use) in quest of fields of knowledge,
to which they neither knew nor could know any de
terminate bounds, because they had never reflected
nor were able to reflect on the nature or even on the
possibility of such a pure understanding.

Many a naturalist of pure reason (by which I mean
the man who believes he can decide in matters of
metaphysics without any science) may pretend, that
he long ago by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense,
not only suspected, but knew and comprehended,
what is here propounded with so much ado, or, if he
likes, with prolix and pedantic pomp: "that with all
our reason we can never reach beyond the field of ex
perience." But when he is questioned about his ra
tional principles individually, he must grant, that
there are many of them which he has not taken from
experience, and which are therefore independent of it
and valid a priori. How then and on what grounds
will he restrain both himself and the dogmatist, who
makes use of these concepts and principles beyond
all possible experience, because they are recognised
to be independent of it? And even he, this adept in
sound sense, in spite of all his assumed and cheaply
acquired wisdom, is not exempt from wandering in
advertently beyond objects of experience into the field

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 75

of chimeras. He is often deeply enough involved in
them, though in announcing everything as mere prob
ability, rational conjecture, or analogy, he gives by
his popular language a color to his groundless pre
tensions.

§ 32. Since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers
into pure reason have conceived, besides the things
of sense, or appearances (phenomena), which make
up the sensible world, certain creations of the under
standing (Verstandeswescn)) called noumena, which
should constitute an intelligible world. And as ap
pearance and illusion were by those men identified (a
thing which we may well excuse in an undeveloped
epoch), actuality was only conceded to the creations
of thought.

And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense
as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are
based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this
thing in its internal constitution, but only know its
appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are
affected by this unknown something. The under
standing therefore, by assuming appearances, grants
the existence of things in themselves also, and so far
we may say, that the representation of such things as
form the basis of phenomena, consequently of mere
creations of the understanding, is not only admissible,
but unavoidable.

Our critical deduction by no means excludes things
of that sort (noumena), but rather limits the prin
ciples of the Aesthetic (the science of the sensibility)
to this, that they shall not extend to all things, as
everything would then be turned into mere appear
ance, but that they shall only hold good of objects of
possible experience. Hereby then objects of the un-

76 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

derstanding are granted, but with the inculcation of
this rule which admits of no exception: "that we
neither know nor can know anything at all definite of
these pure objects of the understanding, because our
pure concepts of the understanding as well as our
pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of pos
sible experience, consequently to mere things of sense,
and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts
retain no meaning whatever."

§ 33. There is indeed something seductive in our
pure concepts of the understanding, which tempts us
to a transcendent use, — a use which transcends all
possible experience. Not only are our concepts of
substance, of power, of action, of reality, and others,
quite independent of experience, containing nothing
of sense appearance, and so apparently applicable to
things in themselves (noumena), but, what strength
ens this conjecture, they contain a necessity of deter
mination in themselves, which experience never at
tains. The concept of cause implies a rule, according
to which one state follows another necessarily ; but
experience can only show us, that one state of things
often, or at most, commonly, follows another, and
therefore affords neither strict universality, nor neces
sity.

Hence the Categories seem to have a deeper
meaning and import than can be exhausted by their
empirical use, and so the understanding inadvertently
adds for itself to the house of experience a much
more extensive wing, which it fills with nothing but
creatures of thought, without ever observing that it
has transgressed with its otherwise lawful concepts
the bounds of their use.

§ 34. Two important, and even indispensable;

HOW 13 THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 77

though very dry, investigations had therefore become
indispensable in the Critique of Pure Reason, — viz.,
the two chapters "Vom Schematismus der reinen
Verstandsbegriffe," and "Vom Grunde der Unter-
scheidung aller Verstandesbegriffe iiberhaupt in Pha-
nomena und Noumena." In the former it is shown,
that the senses furnish not the pure concepts of the
understanding in concrete, but only the schedule for
their use, and that the object conformable to it occurs
only in experience (as the product of the understand
ing from materials of the sensibility). In the latter it
is shown, that, although our pure concepts of the
understanding and our principles are independent of
experience, and despite of the apparently greater
sphere of their use, still nothing whatever can be
thought by them beyond the field of experience, be
cause they can do nothing but merely determine the
logical form of the judgment relatively to given intui
tions. But as there is no intuition at all beyond the
field of the sensibility, these pure concepts, as they
cannot possibly be exhibited in eoncreto, are void of
all meaning; consequently all these noumena, to
gether with their complex, the intelligible world,1 are
nothing but representation of a problem, of which the
object in itself is possible, but the solution, from the
nature of our understanding, totally impossible. For
our understanding is not a faculty of intuition, but of

1 We speak of the " intelligible world," not (as the usual expression is)
"intellectual world." For cognitions are intellectual through the under
standing, and refer to our world of sense also; but objects, so far as they
can be represented merely by the understanding, and to which none of our
sensible intuitions can refer, are termed '• intelligible." But as some pos-
si'ole intuition must correspond to every object, we would have to assume an
understanding that intuites things immediately; but of such we have not the
least notion, nor have we of the things of the understanding [Verstandes-
v/eseiij, to which it should be applied.

78 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

the connexion of given intuitions in experience. Ex
perience must therefore contain all the objects for our
concepts ; but beyond it no concepts have any signifi
cance, as there is no intuition that might offer them a
foundation.

§ 35. The imagination may perhaps be forgiven
for occasional vagaries, and for not keeping carefully
within the limits of experience, since it gains life and
vigor by such flights, and since it is always easier to
moderate its boldness, than to stimulate its languor.
But the understanding which ought to think can never
be forgiven for indulging in vagaries; for we depend
upon it alone for assistance to set bounds, when nec
essary, to the vagaries of the imagination.

But the understanding begins its aberrations very
innocently and modestly. It first elucidates the ele
mentary cognitions, which inhere in it prior to all ex
perience, but yet must always have their application
in experience. It gradually drops these limits, and
what is there to prevent it, as it has quite freely de
rived its principles from itself? And then it proceeds
first to newly-imagined powers in nature, then to be
ings outside nature; in short to a world, for whose
construction the materials cannot be wanting, because
fertile fiction furnishes them abundantly, and though
not confirmed, is never refuted, by experience. This
is the reason that young thinkers are so partial to
metaphysics of the truly dogmatical kind, and often
sacrifice to it their time and their talents, which might
be otherwise better employed.

But there is no use in trying to moderate these
fruitless endeavors of pure reason by all manner of
cautions as to the difficulties of solving questions so
occult, by complaints of the limits of our reason, and

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 79

by degrading our assertions into mere conjectures.
For if their impossibility is not distinctly shown, and
reason's cognition of its own essence does not become
a true science, in which the field of its right use is
distinguished, so to say, with mathematical certainty
from that of its worthless and idle use, these fruitless
efforts will never be abandoned for good.

§ 36. How is Nature itself possible?

This question — the highest point that transcenden
tal philosophy can ever reach, and to which, as its
boundary and completion, it must proceed — properly
contains two questions.

FIRST: How is nature at all possible in the mate
rial sense, by intuition, considered as the totality of
appearances ; how are space, time, and that which
fills both — the object of sensation, in general possible?
The answer is : By means of the constitution of our
Sensibility, according to which it is specifically affected
by objects, which are in themselves unknown to it,
and totally distinct from those phenomena. This an
swer is given in the Critique itself in the transcenden
tal Aesthetic, and in these Prolegomena by the solution
of the first general problem.

SECONDLY : How is nature possible in the formal
sense, as the totality of the rules, under which all
phenomena must come, in order to be thought as
connected in experience? The answer must be this :
It is only possible by means of the constitution of our
Understanding, according to which all the above rep
resentations of the sensibility are necessarily referred
to a consciousness, and by which the peculiar way in
which we think (viz , by rules), and hence experience
also, are possible, but must be clearly distinguished

8o KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

from an insight into the objects in themselves. This
answer is given in the Critique itself in the transcen
dental Logic, and in these Prolegomena, in the course
of the solution of the second main problem.

But how this peculiar property of our sensibility
itself is possible, or that of our understanding and of
the apperception which is necessarily its basis and
that of all thinking, cannot be further analysed or an
swered, because it is of them that we are in need for
all our answers and for all our thinking about objects.

There are many laws of nature, which we can only
know by means of experience ; but conformity to law
in the connexion of appearances, i. e., in nature in
general, we cannot discover by any experience, be
cause experience itself requires laws which are a priori
at the basis of its possibility.

The possibility of experience in general is there
fore at the same time the universal law of nature, and
the principles of the experience are the very laws of
nature. For we do not know nature but as the total
ity of appearances, i. e., of representations in us, and
hence we can only derive the laws of its connexion
from the principles of their connexion in us, that is,
from the conditions of their necessary union in con
sciousness, which constitutes the possibility of expe
rience.

Even the main proposition expounded throughout
this section — that universal laws of nature can be dis
tinctly cognised a priori — leads naturally to the prop
osition : that the highest legislation of nature must
lie in ourselves, i. e., in our understanding, and that
we must not seek the universal laws of nature in na
ture by means of experience, but conversely must seek
nature, as to Its universal conformity to law, in the

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 8 1

conditions of the possibility of experience, which lie
in our sensibility and in onr understanding. For how
were it otherwise possible to know a priori these laws,
as they are not rules of analytical cognition, but truly
synthetical extensions of it?

Such a necessary agreement of the principles of
possible experience with the laws of the possibility of
nature, can only proceed from one of two reasons :
either these laws are drawn from nature by means of
experience, or conversely nature is derived from the
laws of the possibility of experience in general, and
is quite the same as the mere universal conformity
to law of the latter. The former is self-contradic
tory, for the universal laws of nature can and must be
cognised a priori (that is, independent of all experi
ence), and be the foundation of all empirical use of
the understanding; the latter alternative therefore
alone remains.1

But we must distinguish the empirical laws of na
ture, which always presuppose particular perceptions,
from the pure or universal laws of nature, which,
without being based on particular perceptions, con
tain merely the conditions of their necessary union
in experience. In relation to the latter, nature and
possible experience are quite the same, and as the
conformity to law here depends upon the necessary
connexion of appearances in experience (without
which we cannot cognise any object whatever in the
sensible world), consequently upon the original laws

1 Crusius alone thought of a compromise : that a Spirit, who can neither
err nor deceive, implanted these laws in us originally. But since false prin
ciples often intrude themselves, as indeed the very system of this man shows
in not a few examples, we are involved in difficulties as to the use of such a
principle in the absence of sure criteria to distinguish the genuine origin
from the spurious, as vye never can know certainly what the Spirit of truth
or the father of lies may have instilled into us.

82 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

of the understanding, it seems at first strange, but is
not the less certain, to say:

The understanding does not derive its laws (a priori}
from, but prescribes them to, nature.

§ 37- We shall illustrate this seemingly bold prop
osition by an example, which will show, that laws,
which we discover in objects of sensuous intuition
(especially when these laws are cognised as neces
sary), are commonly held by us to be such as have
been placed there by the understanding, in spite of
their being similar in all points to the laws of nature,
which we ascribe to experience.

§ 38. If we consider the properties of the circle,
by which this figure combines so many arbitrary de
terminations of space in itself, at once in a universal
rule, we cannot avoid attributing a constitution (eine
Natur} to this geometrical thing. Two right lines,
for example, which intersect one another and the
circle, howsoever they may be drawn, are always di
vided so that the rectangle constructed with the seg
ments of the one is equal to that constructed with the
segments of the other. The question now is : Does
this law lie in the circle or in the understanding, that
is, Does this figure, independently of the understand
ing, contain in itself the ground of the law, or does
the understanding, having constructed according to
its concepts (according to the quality of the radii) the
figure itself, introduce into it this law of the chords
cutting one another in geometrical proportion? When
we follow the proofs of this law, we soon perceive,
that it can only be derived from the condition on
which the understanding founds the construction of
this figure, and which is that of the equality of the
radii. But, if we enlarge this concept, to pursue fur-

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 83

ther the unity of various properties of geometrical
figures under common laws, and consider the circle
as a conic section, which of course is subject to the
same fundamental conditions of construction as other
conic sections, we shall find that all the chords which
intersect within the ellipse, parabola, and hyperbola,
always intersect so that the rectangles of their seg
ments are not indeed equal, but always bear a con
stant ratio to one another. If we proceed still farther,
to the fundamental laws of physical astronomy, we
find a physical law of reciprocal attraction diffused
over all material nature, the rule of which is: "that it
decreases inversely as the square of the distance from
each attracting point, i. e. , as the spherical surfaces
increase, over which this force spreads," which law
seems to be necessarily inherent in the very nature of
things, and hence is usually propounded as cognis
able a priori. Simple as the sources of this law are,
merely resting upon the relation of spherical surfaces
of different radii, its consequences are so valuable
with regard to the variety of their agreement and its
regularity, that not only are all possible orbits of the
celestial bodies conic sections, but such a relation of
these orbits to each other results, that no other law
of attraction, than that of the inverse square of the
distance, can be imagined as fit for a cosmical system.

Here accordingly is a nature that rests upon laws
which the understanding cognises a priori, and chiefly
from the universal principles of the determination of
space. Now I ask :

Do the laws of nature lie in space, and does the
understanding learn them by merely endeavoring to
find out the enormous wealth of meaning that lies in
space ; or do they inhere in the understanding and in

84 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

the way in which it determines space according to the
conditions of the synthetical unity in which its con
cepts are all centred?

Space is something so uniform and as to all par
ticular properties so indeterminate, that we should
certainly not seek a store of laws of nature in it.
Whereas that which determines space to assume the
form of a circle or the figures of a cone and a sphere,
is the understanding, so far as it contains the ground
of the unity of their constructions.

The mere universal form of intuition, called space,
must therefore be the substratum of all intuitions de-
terminable to particular objects, and in it of course
the condition of the possibility and of the variety of
these intuitions lies. But the unity of the objects is
entirely determined by the understanding, and on
conditions which lie in its own nature ; and thus the
understanding is the origin of the universal order of
nature, in that it comprehends all appearances under
its own laws, and thereby first constructs, a priori,
experience (as to its form), by means of which what
ever is to be cognised only by experience, is necessa
rily subjected to its laws. For we are not now con
cerned with the nature of things in themselves, which
is independent of the conditions both of our sensi
bility and our understanding, but with nature, as an
object of possible experience, and in this case the
understanding, whilst it makes experience possible,
thereby insists that the sensuous world is either not
an object of experience at all, or must be nature [viz.,
an existence of things, determined according to uni
versal laws1].

IThe definition of nature is given in the beginning of the Second Part of
the " Transcendental Pioblenj," in § 14.

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 85

APPENDIX TO THE PURE SCIENCE OF NATURE.

§ 39- Of the System of the Categories,

There can be nothing more desirable to a philos
opher, than to be able to derive the scattered multi
plicity of the concepts or the principles, which had
occurred to him in concrete use, from a principle
a priori, and to unite everything in this way in one
cognition. He formerly only believed that those
things, which remained after a certain abstraction,
and seemed by comparison among one another to
constitute a particular kind of cognitions, were com
pletely collected ; but this was only an Aggregate.
Now he knows, that just so many, neither more nor
less, can constitute the mode of cognition, and per
ceives the necessity of his division, which constitutes
comprehension; and now only he has attained a
System.

To search in our daily cognition for the concepts,
which do not rest upon particular experience, and yet
occur in all cognition of experience, where they as it
were constitute the mere form of connexion, presup
poses neither greater reflexion nor deeper insight,
than to detect in a language the rules of the actual
use of words generally, and thus to collect elements
for a grammar. In fact both researches are very
nearly related, even though we are not able to give a
reason why each language has just this and no other
formal constitution, and still less why an exact number
of such formal determinations in general are found
in it.

86 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

Aristotle collected ten pure elementary concepts
under the name of Categories.1 To these, which are
also called predicaments, he found himself obliged
afterwards to add five post-predicaments,2 some of
which however (prius, simul, and motus} are contained
in the former; but this random collection must be
considered (and commended) as a mere hint for future
inquirers, not as a regularly developed idea, and hence
it has, in the present more advanced state of philoso
phy, been rejected as quite useless.

After long reflexion on the pure elements of human
knowledge (those which contain nothing empirical), I
at last succeeded in distinguishing with certainty and
in separating the pure elementary notions of the Sen
sibility (space and time) from those of the Under
standing. Thus the yth, 8th, and Qth Categories had
to be excluded from the old list. And the others were
of no service to me ; because there was no principle
[in them], on which the understanding could be inves
tigated, measured in its completion, and all the func
tions, whence its pure concepts arise, determined ex
haustively and with precision.

But in order to discover such a principle, I looked
about for an act of the understanding which comprises
all the rest, and is distinguished only by various modi
fications or phases, in reducing the multiplicity of
representation to the unity of thinking in general : I
found this act of the understanding to consist in judg
ing. Here then the labors of the logicians were ready
at hand, though not yet quite free from defects, and
with this help I was enabled to exhibit a complete

1 t Substantia. i. Qualitas. 3. Quantitas. 4. Relatio. 5. Actio. 6. Pastio.
7. Quando. 8. Ubi. 9. Situs. 10. Habitus.

lOppositum. Prz'us. Szntul. Motus. Habere.

HOW IS THE SCIENCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE ? 87

table of the pure functions of the understanding,
which are however undetermined in regard to any ob
ject. I finally referred these functions of judging to
objects in general, or rather to the condition of deter
mining judgments as objectively valid, and so there
arose the pure concepts of the understanding, con
cerning which I could make certain, that these, and
this exact number only, constitute our whole cogni
tion of tilings from pure understanding. I was justi
fied in calling them by their old name, Categories,
while I reserved for myself the liberty of adding, un
der the title of "Predicables, " a complete list of all
the concepts deducible from them, by combinations
whether among themselves, or with the pure form of
the appearance, i. e., space or time, or with its mat
ter, so far as it is not yet empirically determined (viz.,
the object of sensation in general), as soon as a sys
tem of transcendental philosophy should be completed
with the construction of which I am engaged in the
Critique of Pure Reason itself.

Now the essential point in this system of Catego
ries, which distinguishes it from the old rhapsodical
collection without any principle, and for which alone
it deserves to be considered as philosophy, consists
in this: that by means of it the true significance of
the pure concepts of the understanding and the con
dition of their use could be precisely determined. For
here it became obvious that they are themselves noth
ing but logical functions, and as such do not produce
the least concept of an object, but require some sen
suous intuition as a basis. They therefore only serve
to determine empirical judgments, which are other
wise undetermined and indifferent as regards all func
tions of judging, relatively to these functions, thereby

KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

procuring them universal validity, and by means of
them making judgments of experience in general pos
sible.

Such an insight into the nature of the categories,
which limits them at the same time to the mere use of
experience, never occurred either to their first author,
or to any of his successors; but without this insight
(which immediately depends upon their derivation or
deduction), they are quite useless and only a miser
able list of names, without explanation or rule for
their u-se. Had the ancients ever conceived such a
notion, doubtless the whole study of the pure rational
knowledge, which under the name of metaphysics has
for centuries spoiled many a sound mind, would have
reached us in quite another shape, and would have
enlightened the human understanding, instead of
actually exhausting it in obscure and vain specula
tions, thereby rendering it unfit for true science.

This system of categories makes all treatment of
every object of pure reason itself systematic, and
affords a direction or clue how and through what
points of inquiry every metaphysical consideration
must proceed, in order to be complete ; for it exhausts
all the possible movements {momenta} of the under
standing, among which every concept must be classed.
In like manner the table of Principles has been formu
lated, the completeness of which we can only vouch
for by the system of the categories. Even in the divi
sion of the concepts,1 which must go beyond the phys
ical application of the understanding, it is always the
very same clue, which, as it must always be deter-

1 See the two tables in the chapters Von den Paralogisnten der rei'nen Ver-
nunft and the first division of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, System der kos-
mologischen Ideen.

HOW IS HIE SCIKNCE OF NATURE POSSIBLE? 89

mined a priority the same fixed points of the human
understanding, always forms a closed circle. There
is no doubt that the object of a pure conception either
of the understanding or of reason, so far as it is to be
estimated philosophically and on a priori principles,
can in this way be completely cognised. I could not
therefore omit to make use of this clue with regard to
one of the most abstract ontological divisions, viz.,
the various distinctions of "the notions of something
and of nothing," and to construct accordingly (Cri
tique t p. 207) a regular and necessary table of their
divisions.1

And this system, like every other true one founded
on a universal principle, shows its inestimable value
in this, that it excludes all foreign concepts, which
might otherwise intrude among the pure concepts of
the understanding, and determines the place of every
cognition. Those concepts, which under the name of
"concepts of reflexion" have been likewise arranged
in a table according to the clue of the categories, in
trude, without having any privilege or title to be

1 On the table of the categories many neat observations may be made, for
instance : (i) that the third arises from the first and the second joined in one
concept; (2) that in those of Quantity and of Quality there is merely a pro
gress from unity to totality or from something to nothing (for this purpose
the categories of Quality must stand thus : reality, limitation, total negation),
without correlita or opposita, whereas those of Relation and of Mcdality have
them ; (3) that, as in Logic categorical judgments are the basis of all others,
so the category of Substance is the basis of all concepts of artual things;
(4) that as Modality in the judgment is not a particular predicate, FO by the
modal concepts a determination is not superadded to things, etc., etc Such
observations are of great use. If we besides enumerate all the predicables,
which we can find pretty completely in any good ontology (for example,
Baumgarten's), and arrange them in classes under the categories, in which
operation we must not neglect to add as complete a dissection of all these
concepts as possible, there will then arise a merely analytical part of meta
physics, which does not contain a single synthetical proposition, which
might precede the second (the synthetical), and would by its precision and
completeness be not only useful, but, in virtue of its system, be even to some
extent elegant.

go KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

among the pure concepts of the understanding in On
tology. They are concepts of connexion, and thereby
ol the objects themselves, whereas the former are only
concepts of a mere comparison of concepts already
given, hence of quite another nature and use. By
my systematic division1 they are saved from this con
fusion. But the value of my special table of the cate
gories will be still more obvious, when we separate the
table of the transcendental concepts of Reason from
the concepts of the understanding. The latter being
of quite another nature and origin, they must have
quite another form than the former. This so neces
sary separation has never yet been made in any sys
tem of metaphysics for, as a rule, these rational con
cepts all mixed up with the categories, like children
of one family, which confusion was unavoidable in the
absence of a definite system of categories.

1 See Critique of Pure Reason, Von der Amphibolic der Reflexbegriffe.

THIRD PART OF THE MAIN TRAN
SCENDENTAL PROBLEM.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE?

§ 4°-

PURE mathematics and pure science of nature had
no occasion for such a deduction, as we have
made of both, for their own safety and certainty. For
the former rests upon its own evidence ; and the latter
(though sprung from pure sources of the understand
ing) upon experience and its thorough confirmation.
Physics cannot altogether refuse and dispense with
the testimony of the latter; because with all its cer
tainty, it can never, as philosophy, rival mathemat
ics. Both sciences therefore stood in need of this in
quiry, not for themselves, but for the sake of another
science, metaphysics.

Metaphysics has to do not only with concepts of
nature, which always find their application in experi
ence, but also with pure rational concepts, which
never can be given in any possible experience. Con
sequently the objective reality of these concepts (viz.,
that they are not mere chimeras), and the truth or
falsity of metaphysical assertions, cannot be discov
ered or confirmed by any experience. This part of
metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its
essential end, to which the rest is only a means, and

92 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

thus this science is in need of such a deduction for its
own sake. The third question now proposed relates
therefore as it were to the root and essential difference
of metaphysics, i. e., the occupation of Reason with
itself, and the supposed knowledge of objects arising
immediately from this incubation of its own concepts,
without requiring, or indeed being able to reach that
knowledge through, experience.1

Without solving this problem reason never is jus
tified. The empirical use to which reason limits the
pure understanding, does not fully satisfy the proper
destination of the latter. Every single experience is
only a part of the whole sphere of its domain, but the
absolute totality of all possible experience is itself not
experience. Yet it is a necessary [concrete] problem
for reason, the mere representation of which requires
concepts quite different from the categories, whose
use is only immanent, or refers to experience, so far
as it can be given. Whereas the concepts of reason
aim at the completeness, i. e., the collective unity of
all possible experience, and thereby transcend every
given experience. Thus they become transcendent.

As the understanding stands in need of categories
for experience, reason contains in itself the source
of ideas, by which I mean necessary concepts, whose
object cannot be given in any experience. The latter
are inherent in the nature of reason, as the former
are in that of the understanding. While the former
carry with them an illusion likely to mislead, the illu-

1 If we c.in say, that a science is actual at least in the idea of all men, as
soon as it appears that the problems which lead to it are proposed to every
body by the nature of human reason, and that therefore many (though faulty)
endravors are unavoidably made in its behalf, then we are bound to ?ay thnt
metaphysics is s-ihjeriively (a;:d indeed necessarily) actual, and therefore
we justly ask, h^w is ii .^objectively) possible.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 93

sion of the latter is inevitable, though it certainly can
be kept from misleading us.

Since all illusion consists in holding the subjective
ground of our judgments to be objective, a self-
knowledge of pure reason in its transcendent (ex
aggerated) use is the sole preservative from the aber
rations into which reason falls when it mistakes its
destination, and refers that to the object transcen-
dently, which only regards its own subject and its
guidance in all immanent use.

§ 41. The distinction of ideas, that is, of pure
concepts of reason, from categories, or pure concepts
of the understanding, as cognitions of a quite distinct
species, origin and use, is so important a point in
founding a science which is to contain the system of
all these a priori cognitions, that without this distinc
tion metaphysics is absolutely impossible, or is at
best a random, bungling attempt to build a castle in
the air without a knowledge of the materials or of
their fitness for any purpose. Had the Critique of
Pure Reason done nothing but first point out this dis
tinction, it had thereby contributed more to clear up
our conception of, and to guide our inquiry in, the
field of metaphysics, than all the vain efforts which
have hitherto been made to satisfy the transcendent
problems of pure reason, without ever surmising that
we were in quite another field than that of the under
standing, and hence classing concepts of the under
standing and those of reason together, as if they
were of the same kind.

§ 42. All pure cognitions of the understanding
have this feature, that their concepts present them
selves in experience, and their principles can be con
firmed by it ; whereas the transcendent cognitions of

94 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

reason cannot, either as ideas, appear in experience,
or as propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it.
Hence whatever errors may slip in unawares, can only
be discovered by pure reason itself — a discovery of
much difficulty, because this very reason naturally
becomes dialectical by means of its ideas, and this
unavoidable illusion cannot be limited by any objec
tive and dogmatical researches into things, but by a
subjective investigation of reason itself as a source of
ideas.

§ 43. In the Critique of Pure Reason it was always
my greatest care to endeavor not only carefully to dis
tinguish the several species of cognition, but to de
rive concepts belonging to each one of them from
their common source. I did this in order that by
knowing whence they originated, I might determine
their use with safety, and also have the unanticipated
but invaluable advantage of knowing the completeness
of my enumeration, classification and specification of
concepts a priori, and therefore according to prin
ciples. Without this, metaphysics is mere rhapsody,
in which no one knows whether he has enough, or
whether and where something is still wanting. We
can indeed have this advantage only in pure philos
ophy, but of this philosophy it constitutes the very
essence.

As I had found the origin of the categories in the
four logical functions of all the judgments of the un
derstanding, it was quite natural to seek the origin of
the ideas in the three functions of the syllogisms of
reason. For as soon as these pure concepts of rea
son (the transcendental ideas) are given, they could
hardly, except they be held innate, be found anywhere
else, than in the same activity of reason, which, so

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 95

far as it regards mere form, constitutes the logical
element cf the syllogisms of reason ; but, so far as it
represents judgments of the understanding with re
spect to the one or to the other form a priori, consti
tutes transcendental concepts of pure reason.

The formal distinction of syllogisms renders their
division into categorical, hypothetical, and disjunc
tive necessary. The' concepts of reason founded on
them contained therefore, rfirst, the idea of the com
plete subject (the substantial); secondly, the idea of
the complete series of conditions; thirdly, the deter
mination of all concepts in the idea of a complete
complex of that which is possible.1 The first idea is
psychological, the second cosmological, the third
theological, and, as all three give occasion to Dialec
tics, yet each in its own way, the division of the
whole Dialects of pure reason into its Paralogism, its
Antinomy, and its Ideal, was arranged accordingly.
Through this deduction we may feel assured that all
the claims of pure reason are completely represented,
and that none can be wanting ; because the faculty of
reason itself, whence they all take their origin, is
thereby completely surveyed.

§ 44. In these general considerations it is also re
markable that the ideas of reason are unlike the cate
gories, of no service to the use of our understanding

lln disjunctive judgments \ve consider all possibility as divided in re
spect to a particular concept. By the ontological principle of the universal
determination of a thing in general, I understand the principle that either
the one or the other of all possible contradictory predicates must be assigned
to any object. This is at the same time the principle of all disjunctive judg
ments, constituting the foundation of our conception of possibility, and in it
the possibility of every object in general is considered as determined. This
may serve as a slight explanation of the above proposition : that the activity
of reason in disjunctive syllogisms is formally the same as that by which it
fashions the idea of a universal conception of all reality, containing in itself
that which is positive in all contradictory predicates.

96 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

in experience, but quite dispensable, and become even
an impediment to the maxims of a rational cognition
of nature. Yet in another aspect still to be determined
they are necessary. Whether the soul is or is not a
simple substance, is of no consequence to us in the
explanation of its phenomena. For we cannot render
the notion of a simple being intelligible by any pos
sible experience that is sensuous or concrete. The
notion is therefore quite void as regards all hoped-for
insight into the cause of phenomena, and cannot at
all serve as a principle of the explanation of that
which internal or external experience supplies. So
the cosmological ideas of the beginning of the world
or of its eternity (a parte ante} cannot be of any greater
service to us for the explanation of any event in the
world itself. And finally we must, according to a
right maxim of the philosophy of nature, refrain from
all explanations of the design of nature, drawn from
the will of a Supreme Being ; because this would not
be natural philosophy, but an acknowledgment that
we have come to the end of it. The use of these
ideas, therefore, is quite different from that of those
categories by which (and by the principles built upon
which) experience itself first becomes possible. But
our laborious analytics of the understanding would be
superfluous if we had nothing else in view than the
mere cognition of nature as it can be given in experi
ence ; for reason does its work, both in mathematics
and in the science of nature, quite safely and well
without any of this subtle deduction. Therefore our
Critique of the Understanding combines with the ideas
of pure reason for a purpose which lies beyond the
empirical use of the understanding ; but this we have
above declared to be in this aspect totally inadmis-

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 97

sible, and without any object or meaning. Yet there
must be a harmony between that of the nature of rea
son and that of the understanding, and the former
must contribute to the perfection of the latter, and
cannot possibly upset it.

The solution of this question is as follows : Pure
reason does not in its ideas point to particular ob
jects, which lie beyond the field of experience, but
only requires completeness of the use of the under
standing in the system of experience. But this com
pleteness can be a completeness of principles only,
not of intuitions (i. e., concrete atsights or Anschau-
ungen) and of objects. In order however to represent
the ideas definitely, reason conceives them after the
fashion of the cognition of an object. The cognition
is as far as these rules are concerned completely de
termined, but the object is only an idea invented for
the purpose of bringing the cognition of the under
standing as near as possible to the completeness rep
resented by that idea.

Prefatory Remark to the Dialectics of Pure Reason.

§ 45. We have above shown in §§ 33 and 34 that
the purity of the categories from all admixture of sen
suous determinations may mislead reason into extend
ing their use, quite beyond all experience, to things
in themselves; though as these categories themselves
find no intuition which can give them meaning or
sense in concrete, they, as mere logical functions, can
represent a thing in general, but not give by them
selves alone a determinate concept of anything. Such
hyperbolical objects are distinguised by the appella
tion of Noumena, or pure beings of the understanding
(or better, beings of thought), such as, for example,

98 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

" substance, " but conceived without permanence in
tune, or "cause/1 but not acting in time, etc. Here
predicates, that only serve to make the conformity-to-
law of experience possible, are applied to these con
cepts, and yet they are deprived of all the conditions
of intuition, on which alone experience is possible,
and so these concepts lose all significance.

There is no danger, however, of the understanding
spontaneously making an excursion so very wantonly
beyond its own bounds into the field of the mere crea
tures of thought, without being impelled by foreign
laws. But when reason, which cannot be fully satis
fied with any empirical use of the rules of the under
standing, as being always conditioned, requires a com
pletion of this chain of conditions, then the under
standing is forced out of its sphere. And then it partly
represents objects of experience in a series so extended
that no experience can grasp, partly even (with a view
to complete the series) it seeks entirely beyond it
noumena, to which it can attach that chain, and so,
having at last escaped from the conditions of experi
ence, make its attitude as it were final. These are
then the transcendental ideas, which, though accord
ing to the true but hidden ends of the natural deter
mination of our reason, they may aim not at extrava
gant concepts, but at an unbounded extension of their
empirical use, yet seduce the understanding by an
unavoidable illusion to a transcendent use, which,
though deceitful, cannot be restrained within the
bounds of experience by any resolution, but only by
scientific instruction and with much difficulty.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 99

. I. The Psychological Idea. 1 ^f

§ 46. People have long since observed, that in all
substances the proper subject, that which remains
after all the accidents (as predicates) are abstracted,
consequently that which forms the substance of things
remains unknown, and various complaints have been
made concerning these limits to our knowledge. But
it will be well to consider that the human understand
ing is not to be blamed for its inability to know the
substance of things, that is, to determine it by itself,
but rather for requiring to cognise it which is a mere
idea definitely as though it were a given object. Pure
reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a
thing its proper subject, and for this subject, which
is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate, its sub
ject, and so on indefinitely (or as far as we can reach).
But hence it follows, that we must not hold anything,
at which we can arrive^ to .be an ultimate subject,
and that substance itself never cjm_b^J^qught_ by jour
understandinjk_however deep we may penetrate, even
if all nature were iin veiled tp_us. For the specific
nature of our umlerstaii'.lin;-;' consists in thinkiiii; every
thing discursively, that is, representing it by concepts,
and so by mere predicates, to which therefore the ab
solute subject must always be wanting. Hence all
the real properties, by which we cognise bodies, are
mere accidents, not excepting impenetrability, which
we can only represent to ourselves as the effect of a
power of which the subject is unknown to us.

Now we appear to have this substance in the con
sciousness of ourselves (in the thinking subject), and
indeed in an immediate intuition; for all the predi-

1 See Critique of Pure Reason, lron den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunfl.

100 KANT S PROLEGOMENA.

cates of an internal sense refer to the ego, as a sub
ject, and I cannot conceive myself as the predicate of
any other subject. Hence completeness in the refer
ence of the given concepts as predicates to a subject
— not merely an idea, but an object — that is, the ab
solute subject itself, seems to be given in experience.
But this expectation is disappointed. For the ego is
not a concept,1 but only the indication of the object
of the internal sense, so far as we cognise it by no
further predicate. Consequently it cannot be in itself
a predicate of any other thing; but just as little can
it be a determinate concept of an absolute subject,
but is, as in all other cases, only the reference of the
internal phenomena to their unknown subject. Yet
this idea (which serves very well, as a regulative prin
ciple, totally to destroy all materialistic explanations
of the internal phenomena of the soul) occasions by a
very natural misunderstanding a very specious argu
ment, which, from this supposed cognition of the
substance of our thinking being, infers its nature, so
far as the knowledge of it falls quite without the com
plex of experience.

§ 47. But though we may call this thinking self
(the soul) substance, as being the ultimate subject of
thinking which cannot be further represented as the
predicate of another thing; it remains quite empty
and without significance, if permanence — the quality
which renders the concept of substances in experience
fruitful — cannot be proved of it.

But permanence can never be proved of the con-

1 Were the representation of the apperception (the Ego) a concept, by
which anything could be thought, it could be used as a predicate of other
things or contain predicates in itself. But it is nothing more than the feeling
of an existence without tbf Inn^t definite conception and is only the repre
sentation of that to which ;-\\ think ing stands in relation (relatione accidttitis}.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? IOI

cept of a substance, as a thing in itself, but for the
purposes of experience only. This is sufficiently
shown by the first Analogy of Experience,1 and who
ever will not yield to this proof may try for himself
whether he can succeed in proving, from the concept
of a subject which does not exist itself as the predi
cate of another thing, that its existence is thoroughly
permanent, and that it cannot either in itself cr by
any natural cause originate or be annihilated. These
synthetical a priori propositions can never be proved
in themselves, but only in reference to things as ob
jects of possible experience.

§ 48. If therefore from the concept of the soul as
a substance, we would infer its permanence, this can
hold good as regards possible experience only, not
[of the soul] as a thing in itself and beyond all pos
sible experience. But life is the subjective condition
of all our possible experience, consequently we can
only infer the permanence of the soul in life ; for the
death of man is the end of all experience which con
cerns the soul as an object of experience, except the
contrary be proved, which is the very question in
hand. The permanence of the soul can therefore
only be proved (and no one cares for that) during the
life of man, but not, as we desire to do, after death ;
and for this general reason, that the concept of sub
stance, so far as it is to be considered necessarily
combined with the concept of permanence, can be so
combined only according to the principles of possible
experience, and therefore for the purposes of experi
ence only.2

1 Cf. Critique, Von den Analogien tier Erfahrung.

2 It is indeed very remarkable how carelessly metaphysicians have always
passed over the principle of the permanence of substances without ever

IO2 KAN1S PROLEGOMENA.

§'49. That there is something real without us
which not only corresponds, but must correspond, to
our external perceptions, can likewise be proved to
be not a connexion of things in themselves, but for
the sake of experience. This means that there is
something empirical, i. e. , some phenomenon in space
without us, that admits of a satisfactory proof, for we
have nothing to do with other objects than those
which belong to possible experience; because objects
which cannot be given us in any experience, do not
exist for us. Empirically without me is that which
appears in space, and space, together with all the
phenomena which it contains, belongs to the represen
tations, whose connexion according to laws of experi
ence proves their objective truth, just as the connexion
of the phenomena of the internal sense proves the ac
tuality of my soul (as an object of the internal sense).
By means of external experience I am conscious of
the actuality of bodies, as external phenomena in
space, in the same manner as by means of the inter
nal experience I am conscious of the existence of my

attempting a proof of it; doubtless because they found themselves aban
doned by all proofs as soon as they began to deal with the concept of sub
stance. Common sense, which felt distinctly that without this presupposition
no union of perceptions in experience is possible, supplied the want by a
postulate. From experience itself it never could derive such a principle,
parily because substances cannot be so traced in all their alterations and
dissolutions, that the matter can always be found undiminishod. partly be
cause the principle contains necessity, which is always the sign of an a priori
principle. People then boldly applied this postulate to the concept of soul
as a substance, and concluded a necessary continuance of the soul after the
death of man (especially as the simplicity of this substance, which is interred
from the indivisibility of consciousness, secured it from destruction by dis
solution). Had they found the genuine source of this principle — a discovery
which requires deeper researches than they were ever inclined to make —
they would have seen, that the law of the permanence of substances has
place for the purposes of experience only, and hence can hold good of things
so far as they are to be cognised and conjoined with others in experience,
but never independently of all possible experience, and consequently cannot
hold good of the soul after death.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 103

soul in time, but this soul is only cognised as an ob
ject of the internal sense by phenomena that consti-
tute an internal state, and of which the essence in it
self, which forms the basis of these phenomena, is
unknown. Cartesian idealism therefore does nothing
but distinguish external experience from dreaming;
and the conformity to law (as a criterion of its truth)
of the former, from the irregularity and the false illu
sion of the latter. In both it presupposes space and
time as conditions of the existence of objects, and it
only inquires whether the objects of the external
senses, which we when awake put in space, are as
actually to be found in it, as the object of the internal
sense, the soul, is in time ; that is, whether experience
carries with it sure criteria to distinguish it from im
agination. This doubt, however, may easily be dis
posed of, and we always do so in common life by in
vestigating the connexion of phenomena in both space
and time according to universal laws of experience,
and we cannot doubt, when the representation of ex
ternal things throughout agrees therewith, that they
constitute truthful experience. Material idealism, in
which phenomena are considered as such only accord
ing to their connexion in experience, may accordingly
be very easily refuted; and it is just as sure an expe
rience, that bodies exist without us (in space), as that
I myself exist according to the representation of the
internal sense (in time) : for the notion without us,
only signifies existence in space. However as the
Ego in the proposition, "I am," means not only the
object of internal intuition (in time), but the subject
of consciousness, just as body means not only external
intuition (in space), but the thing-in-itself, which is
the basis of this phenomenon ; [as this is the case]

104 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

the question, whether bodies (as phenomena of the
external sense) exist as bodies apart from my thoughts,
may without any hesitation be denied in nature. But
the question, whether I myself as a phenomenon of
the internal sense (the soul according to empirical
psychology) exist apart from my faculty of represen
tation in time, is an exactly similar inquiry, and must
likewise be answered in the negative. And in this
manner everything, when it is reduced to its true
meaning, is decided and certain. The formal (which
I have also called transcendental) actually abolishes
the material, or Cartesian, idealism. For if space be
nothing but a form of my sensibility, it is as a repre
sentation in me just as actual as I myself am, and
nothing but the empirical truth of the representations
in it remains for consideration. But, if this is not the
case, if space and the phenomena in it are something
existing without us, then all the criteria of experience
beyond our perception can never prove the actuality
of these objects without us.

II. The Cosmo logical Id fa.1

§ 50. This product of pure reason in its tran
scendent use is its most remarkable curiosity. It
serves as a very powerful agent to rouse philosophy
from its dogmatic slumber, and to stimulate it to the
arduous task of undertaking a Critique of Reason itself.

I term this idea cosmological, because it always
takes its object only from the sensible world, and does
not use any other than those whose object is given to
sense, consequently it remains in this respect in its
native home, it does not become transcendent, and is
therefore so far not mere idea ; whereas, to conceive

ICf. Critique, Die Antinomic der reinen Vernunft.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? IO5

the soul as a sirfiple substance, already means to con
ceive such an object (the simple) as cannot be pre
sented to the senses. Yet the cosmological idea
extends the connexion of the conditioned with its con
dition (whether the connexion is mathematical or dy
namical) so far, that experience never can keep up
with it. It is therefore with regard to this point always
an idea, whose object never can be adequately given
in any experience.

§ 51. In the first place, the use of a system of
categories becomes here so obvious and unmistakable,
that even if there were not several other proofs of it,
this alone would sufficiently prove it indispensable in
the system of pure reason. There are only four such
transcendent ideas, as there are so many classes of
categories ; in each of which, however, they refer only
to the absolute completeness of the series of the con
ditions for a given conditioned. In analogy to these
cosmological ideas there are only four kinds of dia
lectical assertions of pure reason, which, as they are
dialectical, thereby prove, that to each of them, oil
equally specious principles of pure reason, a contra
dictory assertion stands opposed. As all the meta
physical art of the most subtile distinction cannot
prevent this opposition, it compels the philosopher
to recur to the first sources of pure reason itself. This
Antinomy, not arbitrarily invented, but founded in
the nature of human reason, and hence unavoidable
and never ceasing, contains the following four theses
together with their antitheses:

i.

Thesis.
The World has, as to Time and Space, a Beginning (limit).

Io6 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

Antithesis.
The World is, as to Time and Space, infinite.

2.

Thesis.
Everything in the World consists of [elements that are] simple.

Antithesis.
There is nothing simple, but everything is composite.

3-

Thesis.
There are in the World Causes through Freedom.

Antithesis.
There is no Liberty, but all is Nature.

4-

Thesis.
In the Series of the World-Causes there is some necessary Being.

Antithesis.

There is Nothing necessary in the World, but in this Series All is
incidental.

§ 52. a. Here is the most singular phenomenon of
human reason, no other instance of which can be
shown in any other use. If we, as is commonly done,
represent to ourselves the appearances of the sensible
world as things in themselves, if we assume the prin
ciples of their combination as principles universally
valid of things in themselves and not merely of expe
rience, as is usually, nay without our Critique, un
avoidably done, there arises an unexpected conflict,
which never can be removed in the common dogmat
ical way ; because the thesis, as well as the antithesis,
can be shown by equally clear, evident, and irresist-

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? IC>7

ible proofs — for I pledge myself as to the correctness
of all these proofs — and reason therefore perceives
that it is divided with itself, a state at which the scep
tic rejoices, but which must make the critical philos
opher pause and feel ill at ease.

§ 52. b. We may blunder in various ways in meta
physics without any fear of being detected in false
hood. For we never can be refuted by experience if
we but avoid self-contradiction, which in synthetical,
though purely fictitious propositions, may be done
whenever the concepts, which we connect, are mere
ideas, that cannot be given (in their whole content)
in experience. For how can we make out by experi
ence, whether the world is from eternity or had a be
ginning, whether matter is infinitely divisible or con
sists of simple parts? Such concept cannot be given
in any experience, be it ever so extensive, and conse
quently the falsehood either of the positive or the
negative proposition cannot be discovered by this
touch-stone.

The only possible way in which reason could have
revealed unintentionally its secret Dialectics, falsely
announced as Dogmatics, would be when it were made
to ground an assertion upon a universally admitted
principle, and to deduce the exact contrary with the
greatest accuracy of inference from another which is
equally granted. This is actually here the case with
regard to four natural ide-as of reason, whence four
assertions on the one side, and as many counter-asser
tions on the other arise, each consistently following
from universally-acknowledged principles. Thus they
reveal by the use of these principles the dialectical
illusion of pure reason which would otherwise for
ever remain concealed.

io8 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA. .

This is therefore a decisive experiment, which
must necessarily expose any error lying hidden in the
assumptions of reason.1 Contradictory propositions
cannot both be false, except the concept, which is the
subject of both, is self-contradictory; for example,
the propositions, "a square circle is round, and a
square circle is not round," are both false. For, as
to the former it is false, that the circle is round, be
cause it is quadrangular; and it is likewise false, that
it is not round, that is, angular, because it is a circle.
For the logical criterion of the impossibility of a con
cept consists in this, that if we presuppose it, two
contradictory propositions both become false ; conse
quently, as no middle between them is conceivable,
nothing at all is thought by that concept.

§ 52. c. The first two antinomies, which I call
mathematical, because they are concerned with the
addition or division of the homogeneous, are founded
on such a self-contradictory concept ; and hence I ex
plain how it happens, that both the Thesis and Anti
thesis of the two are false.

When I speak of objects in time and in space, it is
not of things in themselves, of which I know nothing,
but of things in appearance, that is, of experience,
as the particular way of cognising objects which is
afforded to man. I must not say of what I think in
time or in space, that in itself, and independent of

1 I therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote to this
antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, because nature itself seems to
have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretentions,
and to force it to self-examination. For every proof, which I have given, as
well of the thesis as of the antithesis, I undertake to be responsible, and
thereby to show the certainty of the inevitable antinomy of reason. When
the reader is brought by this curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof
of the presumption upon which it rests, he will feel himself obliged to in
vestigate the ultimate foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me
more thoroughly.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? IOQ

these my thoughts, it exists in space and in time; for
in that case I should contradict myself; because space
and time, together with the appearances in them, are
nothing existing in themselves and outside of my rep
resentations, but are themselves only modes of repre
sentation, and it is palpably contradictory to say, that
a mere mode of representation exists without our rep
resentation. Objects of the senses therefore exist only
in experience; whereas to give them a self-subsisting
existence apart from experience or before it, is merely
to represent to ourselves that experience actually ex
ists apart from experience or before it.

Now if I inquire after the quantity of the world, as
to space and time, it is equally impossible, as regards
all my notions, to declare it infinite or to declare it
finite. For neither assertion can be contained in expe
rience, because experience either of an infinite space,
or of an infinite time elapsed, or again, of the bound
ary of the world by a void space, or by an antecedent
void time, is impossible; these are mere ideas. This
quantity of the world, which is determined in either
way, should therefore exist in the world itself apart
from all experience. This contradicts the notion of a
world of sense, which is merely a complex of the ap
pearances whose existence and connexion occur only
in our representations, that is, in experience, since this
latter is not an object in itself, but a mere mode of
representation. Hence it follows, that as the concept
of an absolutely existing world of sense is self-contra
dictory, the solution of the problem concerning its
quantity, whether attempted affirmatively or nega
tively, is always false.

The same holds good of the second antinomy,
which relates to the division of phenomena. For these

no KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

are mere representations, and the parts exist merely
in their representation, consequently in the division,
or in a possible experience where they are given, and
the division reaches only as far as this latter reaches.
To assume that an appearance, e. g., that of body,
contains in itself before all experience all the parts,
which any possible experience can ever reach, is to
impute to a mere appearance, which can exist only in
experience, an existence previous to experience. In
other words, it would mean that mere representations
exist before they can be found in our faculty of repre
sentation. Such an assertion is self-contradictory, as
also every solution of our misunderstood problem,
whether we maintain, that bodies in themselves con
sist of an infinite number of parts, or of a finite num
ber of simple parts.

§ 53. In the first (the mathematical) class of anti
nomies the falsehood of the assumption consists in
representing in one concept something self contra-
dictory as if it were compatible (i. e., an appearance
as an object in itself). But, as to the second (the dy
namical) class of antinomies, the falsehood of the rep
resentation consists in representing as contradictory
what is compatible ; so that, as in the former case,
the opposed assertions are both false, in this case, on
the other hand, where they are opposed to one an
other by mere misunderstanding, they may both be
true.

Any mathematical connexion necessarily presup
poses homogeneity of what is connected (in the con
cept of magnitude), while the dynamical one by nr»
means requires the same. When we have to deal with
extended magnitudes, all the parts must be homogene
ous with one another and with the whole ; whereas,

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? Ill

in the connexion of cause and effect, homogeneity
may indeed likewise be found, but is not necessary;
for the concept of causality (by means of which some-
tiling is posited through something else quite different
from it), at all events, does not require it.

If the objects of the world of sense are taken for
things in themselves, and the above laws of nature
for the laws of things in themselves, the contradiction
would be unavoidable. So also, if the subject of free
dom were, like other objects, represented as mere ap
pearance, the contradiction would be just as unavoid
able, for the same predicate would at once be affirmed
and denied of the same kind of object in the same
sense. But if natural necessity is referred merely to
appearances, and freedom merely to things in them
selves, no contradiction arises, if we at once assume,
or admit both kinds of causality, however difficult or
impossible it may be to make the latter kind conceiv
able.

As appearance every effect is an event, or some
thing that happens in time ; it must, according to the
universal law of nature, be preceded by a determina
tion of the causality of its cause (a state), which fol
lows according to a constant law. But this determi
nation of the cause as causality must likewise be
something that takes place or happens; the cause
must have begun to act, otherwise no succession be
tween it and the effect could be conceived. Other
wise the effect, as well as the causality of the cause,
would have always existed. Therefore the determi
nation of the cause to act must also have originated
among appearances, and must consequently, as well
as its effect, be an event, which must again have its
cause, and so on ; hence natural necessity must be

\

112 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

the condition, on which effective causes are deter
mined. Whereas if freedom is to be a property of
certain causes of appearances, it must, as regards
these, which are events, be a faculty of starting them
spontaneously, that is, without the causality of the
cause itself, and hence without requiring any other
ground to determine its start. But then the cause,
as to its causality, must not rank under time-determi
nations of its state, that is, it cannot be an appear
ance, and must be considered a thing in itself, while
its effects would be only appearances.1 If without
contradiction we can think of the beings of under
standing [Verstandesweseti} as exercising such an in
fluence on appearances, then natural necessity will
attach to all connexions of cause and effect in the
sensuous world, though on the other hand, freedom
can be granted to such cause, as is itself not an ap
pearance (but the foundation of appearance). Nature
therefore and freedom can without contradiction be
attributed to- the very same thing, but in different re
lations — on one side as a phenomenon, on the other
as a thing in itself.

We have in us a faculty, which not only stands in

IThe idea of freedom occurs only in the relation of the intellectual, as
cause, to the appearance, as effect. Hence we cannot attribute freedom to
matter in regard to the incessant action by which it fills its space, though
this action takes place from an internal principle. We can likewise find no
notion of freedom suitable to purely rational beings, for instance, to God, so
far as his action is immanent. For his action, though independent of ex
ternal determining causes, is determined in his eternal reason, that is, in the
divine nature. It is only, if something is to start by an action, and so the
effect occurs in the sequence of time, or in the world of sense (e. g., the be
ginning of the world), that we can put the question, whether the causality of
the cause must in its turn have been started, or whether the cause can origi
nate an effect without its causality itself beginning. In the former case the
concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity, in the latter, that
of freedom. From this the reader will see, that, as 1 explained freedom to
be the faculty of starting an event spontaneously, I have exactly hit the no
^•01 which is the prob;em of meta-physics.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 113

connexion with its subjective determining grounds
that are the natural causes of its actions, and is so far
the faculty of a being that itself belongs to appear
ances, but is also referred to objective grounds, that
are only ideas, so far as they can determine this fac
ulty, a connexion which is expressed by the word
ought. This faculty is called reason, and, so far as
we consider a being (man) entirely according to this
objectively determinable reason, he cannot be consid
ered as a being of sense, but this property is that of a
thing in itself, of which we cannot comprehend the
possibility — I mean how the ought (which however
has never yet taken place) should determine its activ
ity, and can become the cause of actions, whose effect
is an appearance in the sensible world. Yet the cau
sality of reason would be freedom with regard to the
effects in the sensuous world, so far as we can con
sider objective grounds, which are themselves ideas,
as their determinants. For its action in that case
would not depend upon subjective conditions, conse
quently not upon those of time, and of course not
upon the law of nature, which serves to determine
them, because grounds of reason give to actions the
rule universally, according to principles, without the
influence of the circumstances of either time or place.

What I adduce here is merely meant as an ex
ample to make the thing intelligible, and does not
necessarily belong to our problem, which must be de
cided from mere concepts, independently of the prop
erties which we meet in the actual world.

Now I may say without contradiction: that all the
actions of rational beings, so far as they are appear
ances (occurring in any experience), are subject to
the necessity of nature ; but the same actions, as re-

H4 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

gards merely the rational subject and its faculty of
acting according to mere reason, are free. For what
is required for the necessity of nature? Nothing more
than the determinability of every event in the world
of sense according to constant laws, that is, a refer
ence to cause in the appearance ; in this process the
thing in itself at its foundation and its causality re
main unknown. But I say, that the law of nature
remains, whether the rational being is the cause of
the effects in the sensuous world from reason, that is,
through freedom, or whether it does not determine
them on grounds of reason. For, if the former is the
case, the action is performed according to maxims,
the effect of which as appearance is always conform
able to constant laws ; if the latter is the case, and
the action not performed on principles of reason, it
is subjected to the empirical laws of the sensibility,
and in both cases the effects are connected according
to constant laws ; more than this we do not require
or know concerning natural necessity. But in the
former case reason is the cause of these laws of na
ture, and therefore free ; in the latter the effects fol
low according to mere natural laws of sensibility, be
cause reason does not influence it ; but reason itself
is not determined on that account by the sensibility,
arid is therefore free in this case too. Freedom is
therefore no hindrance to natural law in appearance,
neither does this law abrogate the freedom of the
practical use of reason, which is connected with
things in themselves, as determining grounds.

Thus practical freedom, viz., the freedom in which
reason possesses causality according to objectively
determining grounds, is rescued and yet natural ne
cessity is not in the least curtailed with regard to the

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 115

very same effects, as appearances. The same remarks
will serve to explain what we had to say concerning
transcendental freedom and its compatibility with
natural necessity (in the same subject, but not taken
in the same reference). For, as to this, every begin
ning of the action of a being from objective causes
regarded as determining grounds, is always a first
start, though the same action is in the series of ap
pearances only a subordinate start, which must be
preceded by a state of the cause, which determines it,
and is itself determined in the same manner by an
other immediately preceding. Thus we are able, in
rational beings, or in beings generally, so far as their
causality is determined in them as things in them
selves, to imagine a faculty of beginning from itself
a series of states, without falling into contradiction
with the laws of nature. For the relation of the ac
tion to objective grounds of reason is not a time-rela
tion ; in this case that which determines the causality
does not precede in time the action, because such de
termining grounds represent not a reference to objects
of sense, e. g., to causes in the appearances, but to
determining causes, as things in themselves, which do
not rank under conditions of time. And in this way
the action, with regard to the causality of reason, can
be considered as a first start in respect to the series of
appearances, and yet also as a merely subordinate be
ginning. We may therefore without contradiction
consider it in the former aspect as free, but in the
latter (in so far as it is merely appearance) as subject
to natural necessity.

As to the fourth Antinomy, it is solved in the same
way as the conflict of reason with itself in the third.
For, provided the cause in the appearance is distin-

u6 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

guished from the cause vfthe appearance (so far as it
can be thought as a thing in itself), both propositions
are perfectly reconcilable : the one, that there is no
where in the sensuous world a cause (according to
similar laws of causality), whose existence is abso
lutely necessary; the other, that this world is never
theless connected with a Necessary Being as its cause
(but of another kind and according to another law).
The incompatibility of these propositions entirely rests
upon the mistake of extending what is valid merely
of appearances to things in themselves, and in gen
eral confusing both in one concept.

§ 54. This then is the proposition and this the so
lution of the whole antinomy, in which reason finds
itself involved in the application of its principles to
the sensible world. The former alone (the mere prop
osition) would be a considerable service in the cause
of our knowledge of human reason, even though the
solution might fail to fully satisfy the reader, who has
here to combat a natural illusion, which has been but
recently exposed to him, and which he had hitherto
always regarded as genuine. For one result at least
is unavoidable. As it is quite impossible to prevent
this conflict of reason with itself — so long as the ob
jects of the sensible world are taken for things in
themselves, and not for mere appearances, which they
are in fact — the reader is thereby compelled to ex
amine over again the deduction of all our a priori cog
nition and the proof which I have given of my deduc
tion in order to come to a decision on the question.
This is all I require at present ; for when in this oc
cupation he shall have thought himself deep enough
into the nature of pure reason, those concepts by
which alone the solution of the conflict of reason is

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE?

possible, will become sufficiently familiar to him.
Without this preparation I cannot expect an unre
served assent even from the most attentive reader.

III. The Theological Idea . l

§ 55. The third transcendental Idea, which affords
matter for the most important, but, if pursued only
speculatively, transcendent and thereby dialectical
use of reason, is the ideal of pure reason. Reason in
this case does not, as with the psychological and the
cosmological Ideas, begin from experience, and err
by exaggerating its grounds, in striving to attain, if
possible, the absolute completeness of their series. It
rather totally breaks with experience, and from mere
concepts of what constitutes the absolute complete
ness of a thing in general, consequently by means of
the idea of a most perfect primal Being, it proceeds
to determine the possibility and therefore the actuality
of all other things. And so the mere presupposition
of a Being, who is conceived not in the series of expe
rience, yet for the purposes of experience — for the
sake of comprehending its connexion, order, and unity
— i. e., the idea [the notion of it], is more easily distin
guished from the concept of the understanding here,
than in the former cases. Hence we can easily expose
the dialectical illusion which arises from our making
the subjective conditions of our thinking objective
conditions of objects themselves, and an hypothesis
necessary for the satisfaction of our reason, a dogma.
As the observations of the Critiqtie on the preten
sions of transcendental theology are intelligible, clear,
and decisive, I have nothing more to add on the sub
ject.

ICf. Critique, the chapter on "Transcendental Ideals."

Ii8 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

General Remark on the Transcendental Ideas.

§ 56. The objects, which are given us by experi
ence, are in many respects incomprehensible, and
many questions, to which the law of nature leads us,
when carried beyond a certain point (though quite
conformably to the laws of nature), admit of no an
swer; as for example the question: why substances
attract one another? But if we entirely quit nature,
or in pursuing its combinations, exceed all possible
experience, and so enter the realm of mere ideas, we
cannot then say that the object is incomprehensible,
and that the nature of things proposes to us insoluble
problems. For we are not then concerned with na
ture or in general with given objects, but with con
cepts, which have their origin merely in our reason,
and with mere creations of thought; and all the prob
lems that arise from our notions of them must be
solved, because of course reason can and must give
a full account of its own procedure.1 As the psycho
logical, cosmological, and theological Ideas are noth
ing but pure concepts of reason, which cannot be
given in any experience, the questions which reason
asks us about them are put to us not by the objects,
but by mere maxims of our reason for the sake of its

1 Herr Platner in his Aphorisms acutely says (§§ 728, 729), " If reason be a
criterion, no concept, which is incomprehensible to human reason, can be
possible. Incomprehensibility has place in what is actual only. Here in
comprehensibility arises from the insufficiency of the acquired ideas." It
sounds paradoxical, but is otherwise not strange to say, that in nature there
is much incomprehensible (e. g., the faculty of generation) but if we mount
still higher, and even go beyond nature, everything again becomes compre
hensible; for we then quit entirely the objects, which can be given us, and
occupy ourselves merely about ideas, in which occupation we can easily
comprehend the law that reason prescribes by them to the understanding for
its use in experience, because the law is the reason's own production.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 113

own satisfaction. They must all be capable of satis
factory answers, which is done by showing that they
are principles which bring our use of the under
standing into thorough agreement, completeness, arid
synthetical unity, and that they so far hold good of
experience only, but of experience as a whole.

Although an absolute whole of experience is im
possible, the idea of a whole of cognition according
to principles must impart to our knowledge a peculiar
kind of unity, that of a system, without which it is
nothing but piecework, and cannot be used for prov
ing the existence of a highest purpose (which can
only be the general system of all purposes), I do not
here refer only to the practical, but also to the high
est purpose of the speculative use of reason.

The transcendental Ideas therefore express the
peculiar application of reason as a principle of syste
matic unity in the use of the understanding. Yet if
we assume this unity of the mode of cognition to be
attached to the object of cognition, if we regard that
which is merely regulative to be constitutive, and if
we persuade ourselves that we can by means of these
Ideas enlarge our cognition transcendently, or far be
yond all possible experience, while it only serves to
render experience within itself as nearly complete as
possible, i. e., to limit its progress by nothing that
cannot belong to experience : we suffer from a mere
misunderstanding in our estimate of the proper appli
cation of our reason and of its principles, and from a
Dialectic, which both confuses the empirical use of
reason, and also sets reason at variance with itself.

120 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

CONCLUSION.

On the Determination of the Bounds of Pure Reason.

§ 57. Having adduced the clearest arguments, it
would be absurd for us to hope that we can know
more of any object, than belongs to the possible ex
perience of it, or lay claim to the least atom of knowl
edge about anything not assumed to be an object of
possible experience, which would determine it accord
ing to the constitution it has in itself. For how could
we determine anything in this way, since time, space,
and the categories, and still more all the concepts
formed by empirical experience or perception in the
sensible world (Anschauung), have and can have no
other use, than to make experience possible. And if
this condition is omitted from the pure concepts of
the understanding, they do not determine any object,
and have no meaning whatever.

But it would be on the other hand a still greater
absurdity if we conceded no things in themselves, or
set up our experience for the only possible mode of
knowing things, our way of beholding (Anschauung)
them in space and in time for the only possible way,
and our discursive understanding for the archetype of
every possible understanding ; in fact if we wished to
have the principles of the possibility of experience
considered universal conditions of things in them
selves.

Our principles, which limit the use of reason to
possible experience, might in this way become tran
scendent, and the limits of our reason be set up as
limits of the possibility of things in themselves (as

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 151

Hume's dialogues mny illustrate), if a careful critique
did not guard the bounds of our reason with respect
to its empirical use, and set a limit to its pretensions.
Scepticism originally arose from metaphysics and its
licentious dialectics. At first it might, merely to favor
the empirical use of reason, announce everything that
transcends this use as worthless and deceitful ; but by
and by, when it was perceived that the very same
principles that are used in experience, insensibly, and
apparently with the same right, led still further than
experience extends, then men began to doubt even
the propositions of experience. But here there is no
danger; for common sense will doubtless always as
sert its rights. A certain confusion, however, arose
in science which cannot determine how far reason is
to be trusted, and why only so far and no further, and
this confusion can only be cleared up and all future
relapses obviated by a formal determination, on prin
ciple, of the boundary of the use of our reason.

We cannot indeed, beyond all possible experience,
form a definite notion of what things in themselves
may be. Yet we are not at liberty to abstain entirely
from inquiring into them ; for experience never satis
fies reason fully, but in answering questions, refers us
further and further back, and leaves us dissatisfied
with regard to their complete solution. This any one
may gather from the Dialectics of pure reason, which
therefore has its good subjective grounds. Having
acquired, as regards the nature of our soul, a clear
conception of the subject, and having come to the
conviction, that its manifestations cannot be explained
materialistically, who can refrain from asking what
the soul really is, and, if no concept of experience
suffices for the purpose, from accounting for it by a

122 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

concept of reason (that of a simple immaterial being),
though we cannot by any means prove its objective
reality? Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical
knowledge in all the cosmological questions of the
duration and of the quantity of the world, of freedom
or of natural necessity, since every answer given on
principles of experience begets a fresh question, which
likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows
the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation
to satisfy reason? Finally, who does not see in the
thorough-going contingency and dependence of all his
thoughts and assumptions on mere principles of ex
perience, the impossibility of stopping there? And
who does not feel himself compelled, notwithstanding
all interdictions against losing himself in transcendent
ideas, to seek rest and contentment beyond all the
concepts which he can vindicate by experience, in the
concept of a Being, the possibility of which we can
not conceive, but at the same time cannot be refuted,
because it relates to a mere being of the understand
ing, and without it reason must needs remain forever
dissatisfied?

Bounds (in extended beings) always presuppose a
space existing outside a certain definite place, and in
closing it ; limits do not require this, but are mere
negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is
not absolutely complete. But our reason, as it were,
sees in its surroundings a space for the cognition of
things in themselves, though we can never have defi
nite notions of them, and are limited to appearances
only.

As long as the cognition of reason is homogene
ous, definite bounds to it are inconceivable. In math
ematics and in natural phflosophy human reason ad-

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 123

mits of limits, but not of bounds, viz., that something
indeed lies without it, at which it can never arrive,
but not that it will at any point find completion in its
internal progress. The enlarging of our views in math
ematics, and the possibility of new discoveries, are
infinite ; and the same is the case with the discovery
of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws,
by continued experience and its rational combination.
But limits cannot be mistaken here, for mathematics
refers to appearances only, and what cannot be an ob
ject of sensuous contemplation, such as the concepts
of metaphysics and of morals, lies entirely without its
sphere, and it can never lead to them ; neither does
it require them. It is therefore not a continual pro
gress and an approximation towards these sciences,
and there is not, as it were, any point or line of con
tact. Natural science will never reveal to us the in
ternal constitution of things, which though not ap
pearance, yet can serve as the ultimate ground of
explaining appearance. Nor does that science require
this for its physical explanations. Nay even if such
grounds should be offered from other sources (for in
stance, the influence of immaterial beings), they must
be rejected and not used in the progress of its explana
tions. For these explanations must only be grounded
upon that which as an object of sense can belong to
experience, and be brought into connexion with our
actual perceptions and empirical laws.

But metaphysics leads us towards bounds in the
dialectical attempts of pure reason (not undertaken
arbitrarily or wantonly, but stimulated thereto by the
nature of reason itself). And the transcendental Ideas,
as they do not admit of evasion, and are never cap
able of realisation, serve to point out to us actually

124 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

not only the bounds of the pure use of reason, but also
the way to determine them. Such is the end and the
use of this natural predisposition of our reason, which
has brought forth metaphysics as its favorite child,
whose generation, like every other in the world, is not
to be ascribed to blind chance, but to an original
germ, wisely organised for great ends. For meta
physics, in its fundamental features, perhaps more
than any other science, is placed in us by nature it
self, and cannot be considered the production of an
arbitrary choice or ,a casual enlargement in the pro
gress of experience from which it is quite disparate.
Reason with all its concepts and laws of the un
derstanding, which suffice for empirical use, i. e.,
within the sensible world, finds in itself no satisfaction
because ever-recurring questions deprive us of all hope
of their complete solution. The transcendental ideas,
which have that completion in view, are such prob
lems of reason. But it sees clearly, that the sensuous
world cannot contain this completion, neither conse
quently can all the concepts, which serve merely for
understanding the world of sense, such as space and
time, and whatever we have adduced under the name
of pure concepts of the understanding. The sensuous
world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected
according to universal laws ; it has therefore no sub
sistence by itself; it is not the thing in itself, and
consequently must point to that which contains the
basis of this experience, to beings which cannot be
cognised merely as phenomena, but as things in them
selves. In the cognition of them alone reason can
hope to satisfy its desire of completeness in proceed
ing from the conditioned to its conditions.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 125

We have above (§§ 33, 34) indicated the limits of
reason with regard to all cognition of mere creations
of thought. Now, since the transcendental ideas have
urged us to approach them, and thus have led us, as
it were, to the spot where the occupied space (viz.,
experience) touches the void (that of which we can
know nothing, viz., noumena), we can determine the
bounds of pure reason. For in all bounds there is
something positive (e. g., a surface is the boundary
of corporeal space, and is therefore itself a space, a
line is a space, which is the boundary of the surface,
a point the boundary of the line, but yet always a
place in space), whereas limits contain mere nega
tions. The limits pointed out in those paragraphs are
not enough after we have discovered that beyond them
there still lies something (though we can never cog
nise what it is in itself). For the question now is,
What is the attitude of our reason in this connexion
of what we know with what we do not, and never shall,
know? This is an actual connexion of a known thing
with one quite unknown (and which will always re
main so), and though what is unknown should not
become the least more known — which we cannot even
hope — yet the notion of this connexion must be defi
nite, and capable of being rendered distinct.

We must therefore accept an immaterial being, a
world of understanding, and a Supreme Being (all
mere noumena), because in them only, as things in
themselves, reason finds that completion and satisfac
tion, which it can never hope for in the derivation of
appearances from their homogeneous grounds, and
because these actually have reference to something
distinct from them (and totally heterogeneous), as
appearances always presuppose an object in itself,

126 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

and therefore suggest its existence whether we can
know more of it or not.

But as we can never cognise these beings of un
derstanding as they are in themselves, that is, defi
nitely, yet must assume them as regards the sensible
world, and connect them with it by reason, we are at
least able to think this connexion by means of such
concepts as express their relation to the world of
sense. Yet if we represent to ourselves a being of the
understanding by nothing but pure concepts of the
understanding, we then indeed represent nothing def
inite to ourselves, consequently our concept has no
significance ; but if we think it by properties borrowed
from the sensuous world, it is no longer a being of un
derstanding, but is conceived as an appearance, and
belongs to the sensible world. Let us take an in
stance from the notion of the Supreme Being.

Our deistic conception is quite a pure concept of
reason, but represents only a thing containing all
realities, without being able to determine any one of
them; because for that purpose an example must be
taken from the world of sense, in which case we should
have an object of sense only, not something quite
heterogeneous, which can never be an object of sense.
Suppose I attribute to the Supreme Being understand
ing, for instance ; I have no concept of an understand
ing other than my own, one that must receive its per
ceptions {Anschauung) by the senses, and which is
occupied in bringing them under rules of the unity of
consciousness. Then the elements of my concept
would always lie in the appearance ; I should how
ever by the insufficiency of the appearance be neces
sitated to go beyond them to the concept of a being
which neither depends upon appearance, nor is bound

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 127

up with them as conditions of its determination. But
if I separate understanding from sensibility to obtain
a pure understanding, then nothing remains but the
mere form of thinking without perception (Anschau-
ung}, by which form alone I can cognise nothing def
inite, and consequently no object. For that purpose
I should conceive another understanding, such as
would directly perceive its objects,1 but of which I
have not the least notion ; because the human under
standing is discursive, and can [not directly perceive,
it can] only cognise by means of general concepts.
And the very same difficulties arise if we attribute a
will to the Supreme Being ; for we have this concept
only by drawing it from our internal experience, and
therefore from our dependence for satisfaction upon
objects whose existence we require ; and so the notion
rests upon sensibility, which is absolutely incompatible
with the pure concept of the Supreme Being.

Hume's objections to deism are weak, and affect
only the proofs, and not the deistic assertion itself.
But as regards theism, which depends on a stricter
determination of the concept of the Supreme Being
which in deism is merely transcendent, they are very
strong, and as this concept is formed, in certain (in
fact in all common) cases irrefutable. Hume always
insists, that by the mere concept of an original being,
to which we apply only ontological predicates (eter
nity, omnipresence, omnipotence), we think nothing
definite, and that properties which can yield a con
cept in concreto must be superadded ; that it is not
enough to say, it is Cause, but we must explain the
nature of its causality, for example, that of an under
standing and of a will. He then begins his attacks

IDer die Gegenstande anschaute.

128 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

on the essential point itself, i. e., theism, as he had
previously directed his battery only against the proofs
of deism, an attack which is not very dangerous to it
in its consequences. All his dangerous arguments
refer to anthropomorphism, which he holds to be in
separable from theism, and to make it absurd in it
self; but if the former be abandoned, the latter must
vanish with it, and nothing remain but deism, of which
nothing can come, which is of no value, and which
cannot serve as any foundation to religion or morals.
If this anthropomorphism were really unavoidable, no
proofs whatever of the existence of a Supreme Being,
even were they all granted, could determine for us the
concept of this Being without involving us in contra
dictions.

If we connect with the command to avoid all tran
scendent judgments of pure reason, the command
(which apparently conflicts with it) to proceed to con
cepts that lie beyond the field of its immanent (em
pirical) use, we discover that both can subsist to
gether, but only at the boundary of all lawful use of
reason. For this boundary belongs as well to the field
of experience, as to that of the creations of thought,
and we are thereby taught, as well, how these so re
markable ideas serve merely for marking the bounds
of human reason. On the one hand they give warning
not boundlessly to extend cognition of experience, as
if nothing but world1 remained for us to cognise, and
yet, on the other hand, not to transgress the bounds
of experience, and to think of judging about things
beyond them, as things in themselves.

But we stop at this boundary if we limit our judg-

IThe use of the word " world " without article, though odd, seems to be
the correct reading, but it may be a mere misprint. — Ed.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? I2Q

ment merely to the relation which the world may have
to a Being whose very concept lies beyond all the
knowledge which we can attain within the world. For
we then do not attribute to the Supreme Being any of
the properties in themselves, by which we represent
objects of experience, and thereby avoid dogmatic an
thropomorphism ; but we attribute them to his rela
tion to the world, and allow ourselves a symbolical
anthropomorphism, which in fact concerns language
only, and not the object itself.

If I say that we are compelled to consider the
world, as if it were the work of a Supreme Under
standing and Will, I really say nothing more, than
that a watch, a ship, a regiment, bears the same rela
tion to the watchmaker, the shipbuilder, the com
manding officer, as the world of sense (or whatever
constitutes the substratum of this complex of appear
ances) does to the Unknown, which I do not hereby
cognise as it is in itself, but as it is for me or in rela
tion to the world, of which I am a part.

§ 58. Such a cognition is one of analogy, and does
not signify (as is commonly understood) an imperfect
similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of rela
tions between two quite dissimilar things.1 By means

1 There is, e g., an analogy between the juridical relation of human actions
and the mechanical relation of motive powers. I never can do anything to an
other man without giving him a right to do the same to me on the same con
ditions ; just as no mass can act with its motive power on another mass with
out thereby occasioning the other to react equally against it. Here right and
motive power are quite dissimilar things, but in their relation there is com
plete similarity. By means of such an analogy I can obtain a notion of the
relation of things which absolutely are unknown to me. For instance, as the
promotion of the welfare of children (= a) is to the love of parents (= b), so
the welfare of the human species (= c) is to that unknown [quantity which is]
in God (=x), which we call love; not as if it had the least similarity to any
human inclination, but because we can suppose its relation to the world to
be similar to that which things of the world bear one another. But the con-

130 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

of this analogy, however, there remains a concept of
the Supreme Being sufficiently determined for us,
though we have left out everything that could deter
mine it absolutely or in itself; for we determine it as
regards the world and as regards ourselves, and more
do we not require. The attacks which Hume makes
upon those who would determine this concept abso
lutely, by taking the materials for so doing from
themselves and the world, do not affect us ; and he
cannot object to us, that we have nothing left if we
give up the objective anthropomorphism of the con
cept of the Supreme Being.

For let us assume at the outset (as Hume in his
dialogues makes Philo grant Cleanthes), as a neces
sary hypothesis, the deistical concept of the First Be
ing, in which this Being is thought by the mere onto-
logical predicates of substance, of cause, etc. This
must be done, because reason, actuated in the sen
sible world by mere conditions, which are themselves
always conditional, cannot otherwise have any satis
faction, and it therefore can be done without falling
into anthropomorphism (which transfers predicates
from the world of sense to a Being quite distinct from
the world), because those predicates are mere catego
ries, which, though they do not give a determinate
concept of God, yet give a concept not limited to any
conditions of sensibility. Thus nothing can prevent
our predicating of this Being a causality through rea
son with regard to the world, and thus passing to the
ism, without being obliged to attribute to God in
himself this kind of reason, as a property inhering in
him. For as to the former, the only possible way of

cept of relation in this case is a mere category, viz., the concept of cause,
which has nothing to do with sensibility.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 13!

prosecuting the use of reason (as regards all possible
experience, in complete harmouy with itself) in the
world of sense to the highest point, is to assume a
supreme reason r.s a cause of all the connexions in
the world. Such a principle must be quite advantage
ous to reason and can hurt it nowhere in its applica
tion to nature. As to the latter, reason is thereby
not transferred as a property to the First Being in
himself, but only to his relation to the world of sense,
and so anthropomorphism is entirely avoided. For
nothing is considered here but the cause of the form
of reason which is perceived everywhere in the world,
and reason is attributed to the Supreme Being, so far
as it contains the ground of this form of reason in the
world, but according to analogy only, that is, so far
as this expression shows merely the relation, which
the Supreme Cause unknown to us has to the world,
in order to determine everything in it conformably to
reason in the highest degree. We are thereby kept
from using reason as an attribute for the purpose of
conceiving God, but instead of conceiving the world
in such a manner as is necessary to have the greatest
possible use of reason according to principle. We
thereby acknowledge that the Supreme Being is quite
inscrutable and even unthinkable in any definite way
as to what he is in himself. We are thereby kept, on
the one hand, from making a transcendent use of the
concepts which we have of reason as an efficient cause
(by means of the will), in order to determine the Di
vine Nature by properties, which are only borrowed
from human nature, and from losing ourselves in
gross and extravagant notions, and on the other hand
from deluging the contemplation of the world with
hyperphysical modes of explanation according to our

132 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

notions of human reason, which we transfer to God,
and so losing for this contemplation its proper appli
cation, according to which it should be a rational
study of mere nature, and not a presumptuous deriva
tion of its appearances from a Supreme Reason. The
expression suited to our feeble notions is, that we con
ceive the world as if it came, as to its existence and
internal plan, from a Supreme Reason, by which no
tion we both cognise the constitution, which belongs
to the world itself, yet without pretending to deter
mine the nature of its cause in itself, and on the other
hand, \\e transfer the ground of this constitution (of
the form of reason in the world) upon the relation of
the Supreme Cause to the world, without finding the
world sufficient by itself for that purpose.1

Thus the difficulties which seem to oppose theism
disappear by combining with Hume's principle — "not
to carry the use of reason dogmatically beyond the
field of all possible experience" — this other principle,
which he quite overlooked : "not to consider the field
of experience as one which bounds itself in the eye of
our reason." The Critique of Pure Reason here points
out the true mean between dogmatism, which Hume
combats, and skepticism, which he would substitute
for it — a mean which is not like other means that we
find advisable to determine for ourselves as it were
mechanically (by adopting something from one side
and something from the other), and by which nobody

1 1 may say, that the causality of the Supreme Cause holds the same
place with regard to the world that human reason does with regard to its
works of art. Here the nature of the Supreme Cause itself remains unknown
to me : I only compare its effects (the order of the world) which I know, and
their conformity to reason, to the effects of human reason which I also know;
and hence I term the former reason, without attributing to it on that account
what I understand in man by this term, or attaching to it anything else
known to me, as its property.

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 133

is taught a better way, but such a one as can be ac
curately determined on principles.

§ 59. At the beginning of this annotation I made
use of the metaphor of a boundary, in order to estab- v
lish the limits of reason in regard to its suitable use.
The world of sense contains merely appearances,
which are not things in themselves, but the under
standing must assume these latter ones, viz., noumena.
In our reason both are comprised, and the question
is, How does reason proceed to set boundaries to the
understanding as regards both these fields? Experi
ence, which contains all that belongs to the sensuous
world, does not bound itself; it only proceeds in
every case from the conditioned to some other equally
conditioned object. Its boundary must lie quite with
out it, and this field is that of the pure beings of the
understanding. But this field, so far as the determi
nation of the nature of these beings is concerned, is
an empty space for us, and if dogmatically-determined
concepts alone are in question, we cannot pass out of
the field of possible experience. But as a boundary
itself is something positive, which belongs as well to
that which lies within, as to the space that lies with
out the given complex, it is still an actual positive
cognition, which reason only acquires by enlarging
itself to this boundary, yet without attempting to pass
it; because it there finds itself in the presence of an
empty space, in which it can conceive forms of things,
but not things themselves. But the setting of a bound
ary to the field of the understanding by something,
which is otherwise unknown to it, is still a cognition
which belongs to reason even at this standpoint, and
by which it is neither confined within the sensible,
nor straying without it, but only refers, as befits the

134 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

knowledge of a boundary, to the relation between that
which lies without it, and that which is contained
within it.

Natural theology is such a concept at the bound
ary of human reason, being constrained to look be
yond this boundary to the Idea of a Supreme Being
(and, for practical purposes to that of an intelligible
world also), not in order to determine anything rela
tively to this pure creation of the understanding, which
lies beyond the world of sense, but in order to guide
the use of reason within it according to principles of
the greatest possible (theoretical as well as practical)
unity. For this purpose we make use of the reference
of the world of sense to an independent reason, as the
cause of all its connexions. Thereby we do not purely
invent a being, but, as beyond the sensibl& world
there must be something that can only be thought by
the pure understanding, we determine that something
in this particular way, though only of course accord
ing to analogy.

And thus there remains our original proposition,
which is the rtsumt of the whole Critique: "that rea
son by all its a priori principles never teaches us any
thing more than objects of possible experience, and
even of these nothing more than can be cognised in
experience." But this limitation does not prevent
reason leading us to the objective boundary of experi
ence, viz., to the reference to something which is not
itself an object of experience, but is the ground of all
experience. Reason does not however teach us any
thing concerning the thing in itself: it only instructs
us as regards its own complete and highest use in the
field of possible experience. But this is all that can

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 135

be reasonably desired in the present case, and with
which we have cause to be satisfied.

§ 60. Thus we have fully exhibited metaphysics as
it is actually given in the natural predisposition of hu
man reason, and in that which constitutes the essen
tial end of its pursuit, according to its subjective pos
sibility. Though we have found, that this merely
natural use of such a predisposition of our reason, if
no discipline arising only from a scientific critique
bridles and sets limits to it, involves us in transcendent,
either apparently or really conflicting, dialectical syl
logisms ; and this fallacious metaphysics is not only
unnecessary as regards the promotion of our knowl
edge of nature, but even disadvantageous to it : there
yet remains a problem worthy of solution, which is to
find out the natural ends intended by this disposition
to transcendent concepts in our reason, because every
thing that lies in nature must be originally intended
for some useful purpose.

Such an inquiry is of a doubtful nature; and I
acknowledge, that what I can say about it is conjec
ture only, like every speculation about the first ends
of nature. The question does not concern the objec
tive validity of metaphysical judgments, but our nat
ural predisposition to them, and therefore does not
belong to the system of metaphysics but to anthro
pology.

When I compare all the transcendental Ideas, the
totality of which constitutes the particular problem of
natural pure reason, compelling it to quit the mere
contemplation of nature, to transcend all possible ex
perience, and in this endeavor to produce the thing
(be it knowledge or fiction) called metaphysics, I think
I perceive that the aim of this natural tendency is, to

136 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

free our notions from the fetters of experience and
from the limits of the mere contemplation of nature
so far as at least to open to us a field containing mere
objects for the pure understanding, which no sensi
bility can reach, not indeed for the purpose of specu-
latively occupying ourselves with them (for there we
can find no ground to stand on), but because practical
principles, which, without finding some such scope
for their necessary expectation and hope, could not
expand to the universality which reason unavoidably
requires from a moral point of view.

So I find that the Psychological Idea (however
little it may reveal to me the nature of the human
soul, which is higher than all concepts of experience),
shows the insufficiency of these concepts plainly
enough, and thereby deters me from materialism, the
psychological notion of which is unfit for any explana
tion of nature, and besides confines reason in prac
tical respects. The Cosmological Ideas, by the ob
vious insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature
to satisfy reason in its lawful inquiry, serve in the
same manner to keep us from naturalism, which as
serts nature to be sufficient for itself. Finally, all
natural necessity in the sensible world is conditional,
as it always presupposes the dependence of things
upon others, and unconditional necessity must be
sought only in the unity of a cause different from the
world of sense. But as the causality of this cause, in
its turn, were it merely nature, could never render
the existence of the contingent (as its consequent)
comprehensible, reason frees itself by means of the
Theological Idea from fatalism, (both as a blind nat
ural necessity in the coherence of nature itself, with
out a first principle, and as a blind causality of this

HOW IS METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL POSSIBLE? 137

principle itself), and leads to the concept of a cause
possessing freedom, or of a Supreme Intelligence.
Thus the transcendental Ideas serve, if not to instruct
us positively, at least to destroy the rash assertions of
Materialism, of Naturalism, and of Fatalism, and thus
to afford scope for the moral Ideas beyond the field of
speculation. These considerations, I should think,
explain in some measure the natural predisposition of
which I spoke.

The practical value, which a merely speculative
science may have, lies without the bounds of this sci
ence, and can therefore be considered as a scholion
merely, and like all scholia does not form part of the
science itself. This application however surely lies
within the bounds of philosophy, especially of philos
ophy drawn from the pure sources of reason, where
us speculative use in metaphysics must necessarily be
at unity with its practical use in morals. Hence the
unavoidable dialectics of pure reason, considered in
metaphysics, as a natural tendency, deserves to be
explained not as an illusion merely, which is to be re
moved, but also, if possible, as a natural provision as
regards its end, though this duty, a work of super
erogation, cannot justly be assigned to metaphysics
proper.

The solutions of these questions which are treated
in the chapter on the Regulative Use of the Ideas of
Pure Reason1 should be considered a second scholion
which however has a greater affinity with the subject
of metaphysics. For there certain rational principles
are expounded which determine a priori the order of
nature or rather of the understanding, which seeks
nature's laws through experience. They seem to be

1 Critique of Pure Reason, II., chap. III., section 7.

138 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

constitutive and legislative with regard to experience,
though they spring from pure reason, which cannot
be considered, like the understanding, as a principle
of possible experience. Now whether or not this har
mony rests upon the fact, that just as nature does not
inhere in appearances or in their source (the sensibil
ity) itself, but only in so far as the latter is in relation
to the understanding, as also a systematic unity in
applying the understanding to bring about an entirety
of all possible experience can only belong to the un
derstanding when in relation to reason ; and whether
or not experience is in this way mediately subordinate
to the legislation of reason : may be discussed by
those who desire to trace the nature of reason even
beyond its use in metaphysics, into the general prin
ciples of a history of nature ; I have represented this
task as important, but not attempted its solution, in
the book itself.1

And thus I conclude the analytical solution of the
main question which I had proposed : How is meta
physics in general possible? by ascending from the
data of its actual use in its consequences, to the
grounds of its possibility.

^Throughout in the Critique I never lost sight of the plan not to neglect
anything, were it ever so recondite, that could render the inquiry into the
nature of pure reason complete. Everybody may afterwards carry his re
searches as far as he pleases, when he has been merely shown what yet re
mains to be done. It is this a duty which must reasonably be expected of
him who has made it his business to survey the whole field, in order to con
sign it to others for future cultivation and allotment. And to this branch
both the scholia belong, which will hardly recommend themselves by their
dryness to amateurs, and hence are added here for connoisseurs only.

SCHOLIA.

SOLUTION OF THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THE

PROLEGOMENA, "HOW IS METAPHYSICS

POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE?"

METAPHYSICS, as a natural disposition of rea
son, is actual, but if considered by itself alone
(as the analytical solution of the third principal ques
tion showed), dialectical and illusory. If we think of
taking principles from it, and in using them follow
the natural, but on that account not less false, illu
sion, we can never produce science, but only a vain
dialectical art, in which one school may outdo an
other, but none can ever acquire a just and lasting
approbation.

In order that as a science metaphysics may be en
titled to claim not mere fallacious plausibility, but in
sight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must itself
exhibit the whole stock of a priori concepts, their di
vision according to their various sources (Sensibilit)',
Understanding, and Reason), together with a com
plete table of them, the analysis of all these concepts,
with all their consequences, especially by means of
the deduction of these concepts, the possibility of
synthetical cognition a priori, the principles of its ap
plication and finally its bounds, all in a complete sys
tem. Critique, therefore, and critique _ alone, contains
in itself the_ffihol& well- proved and well- tested plan,

140 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

and even all the means required to accomplish meta
physics, as a science; by other ways and means it is
impossible. The question here tlxTefore is not so
much how this performance is possible, as how to set
it going, and induce men of clear heads to quit their
hitherto perverted and fruitless cultivation for one
that will not deceive, and how such a union for the
common end may best be directed.

This much is certain, that whoever has once tasted
Critique will be ever after disgusted with all dogmati
cal twaddle which he formerly put up with, because
his reason must have something, and could find noth
ing better for its support.

Critique stands in the same relation to the com
mon metaphysics of the schools, as chemistry does to
alchemy, or as astronomy to the astrology of the for
tune-teller. I pledge myself that nobody who has
read through and through, and grasped the principles
of, the Critique even in these Prolegomena only, will
ever return to that old and sophistical pseudo-science;
but will rather with a certain delight look forward to
metaphysics which is now indeed in his power, re
quiring no more preparatory discoveries, and now at
last affording permanent satisfaction to reason. For
here is an advantage upon which, of all possible sci
ences, metaphysics alone can with certainty reckon :
that it can be brought to such completion and fixity
as to be incapable of further change, or of any aug
mentation by new discoveries; because here reason
has Jhe_sources of its knowledge in itself, not in pb-
jects^ and their observation (Anschauung), by which
latterjts stock of knowledge cannot be further in
creased. When then-fore it has exhibited the funda
mental laws of its faculty completely and so definitely

HOW IS METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE? 14!

as to avoid all misunderstanding, there remains noth
ing for pure reason to cognise a priori, nay, there is
even no ground to raise further questions. The sure
prospect of knowledge so definite and so compact has
a peculiar charm, even though we should set aside all
its advantages, of which I shall hereafter speak.

All false art, all vain wisdom, lasts its time, but
finally destroys itself, and its highest culture is also
the epoch of its decay. That this time is come for
metaphysics appears from the state into which it has
fallen among all learned nations, despite of all the
zeal with which other sciences of every kind are pros
ecuted. The old arrangement of our university studies
still preserves its shadow ; now and then an Academy
of Science tempts men by offering prizes to write
essays on it, but it is no longer numbered among
thorough sciences ; and let any one judge for himself
how a man of genius, if he were called a great meta
physician, would receive the compliment, which may
be well-meant, but is scarce envied by anybody.

Yet, though the period of the downfall of all dog
matical metaphysics has undoubtedly arrived, we are
yet far from being able to say that the period of its
regeneration is come by means of a thorough and
complete Critique of Reason. All transitions from a
tendency to its contrary pass through the stage of in
difference, and this moment is the most dangerous for
an author, but, in my opinion, the most favorable for
the science. For, when party spirit has died out by
a total dissolution of former connexions, minds are in
the best state to listen to several proposals for an or
ganisation according to a new plan.

When I say, that I hope these Prolegomena will
excite investigation in the field of critique and afford

a new and promising object to sustain the general
spirit of philosophy, which seems on its speculative
side to want sustenance, I can imagine beforehand,
that every one, whom the thorny paths of my Critique
have tired and put out of humor, will ask me, upon
what I found this hope. My answer is, upon the irre
sistible law of necessity.

That the human mind will ever give up metaphys
ical researches is as little to be expected as that we
should prefer to give up breathing altogether, to avoid
inhaling impure air. There will therefore always be
metaphysics in the world ; nay, every one, especially
every man of reflexion, will have it, and for want of a
recognised standard, will shape it for himself after his
own pattern. What has hitherto been called meta
physics, cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego
it entirely is impossible ; therefore a Critique of Pure
Reason itself must now be attempted or, if one exists,
investigated, and brought to the full test, because
there is no other means of supplying this pressing
want, which is something more than mere thirst for
knowledge.

Ever since I have come to know critique, when
ever I finish reading a book of metaphysical contents,
which, by the preciseness of its notions, by variety,
order, and an easy style, was not only entertaining
but also helpful, I cannot help asking, " Has this
author indeed advanced metaphysics a single step?"
The learned men, whose works have been useful to
me in other respects and always contributed to the
culture of my mental powers, will, I hope, forgive me
for saying, that I have never been able to find either
their essays or my own less important ones (though
self-love may recommend them to me) to have ad-

HOW IS METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE? 143

vanced the science of metaphysics in the least, and
why?

Here is the very obvious reason : metaphysics did
not then exist as a science, nor can it be gathered
piecemeal, but its germ must be fully preformed in
the Critique. But in order to prevent all misconcep
tion, we must remember what has been already said,
that by the analytical treatment of our concepts the
understanding gains indeed a great deal, but the
science (of metaphysics) is thereby not in the least
advanced, because these dissections of concepts are
nothing but the materials from which the intention is
to carpenter our science. Let the concepts of sub
stance and of accident be ever so well dissected and
determined, all this is very well as a preparation for
some future use. But if we cannot prove, that in all
which exists the substance endures, and only the ac
cidents vary, our science is not the least advanced
by all our analyses.

Metaphysics has hitherto never been able to prove
a priori either this proposition, or that of sufficient
reason, still less any more complex theorem, such as
belongs to psychology or cosmology, or indeed any
synthetical proposition. By all its analysing therefore
nothing is affected, nothing obtained or forwarded,
and the science, after all this bustle and noise, still
remains as it was in the days of Aristotle, though
far better preparations were made for it than of old,
if the clue to synthetical cognitions had only been
discovered.

If any one thinks himself offended, he is at liberty
to refute my charge by producing a single synthetical
proposition belonging to metaphysics, which he would
prove dogmatically a priori, for until he has actually

144 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

performed this feat, I shall not grant that he has truly
advanced the science ; even should this proposition be
sufficiently confirmed by common experience. No de
mand can be more moderate or more equitable, and
in the (inevitably certain) event of its non-perform
ance, no assertion more just, than that hitherto meta
physics has never existed as a science.

But there are two things which, in case the chal
lenge be accepted, I must deprecate: first, trifling
about probability and conjecture, which are suited as
little to metaphysics, as to geometry; and secondly,
a decision by means of the magic wand of common
sense, which does not convince every one, but which
accommodates itself to personal peculiarities.

For as to the former, nothing can be more absurd,
than in metaphysics, a philosophy from pure reason
to think of grounding our judgments upon probability
and conjecture. Everything that is to be cognised a
priori, is thereby announced as apodeictically certain,
and must therefore be proved in this way. We might
as well think of grounding geometry or arithmetic
upon conjectures. As to the .doctrine of chances in
the latter, it does not contain probable, but perfectly
certain, judgments concerning the degree of the prob
ability of certain cases, under given uniform condi
tions, which, in the sum of all possible cases, infallibly
happen according to the rule, though it is not suffi
ciently determined in respect to every single chance.
Conjectures (by means of induction and of analogy)
can be suffered in an empirical science of nature only,
yet even there the possibility at least of what we as
sume must be quite certain.

The appeal to common sense is even more absurd,
when concept and principles are announced as valid,

HOW IS METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE? 145

not in so far as they hold with regard to experience,
but even beyond the conditions of experience. For
what is common sense? It is normal good sense, so
far it judges right. But what is normal good sense?
It is the faculty of the knowledge and use of rules in
concrete, as distinguished from the speculative under
standing, which is a faculty of knowing rules in ub-
stracto. Common sense can hardly understand the
rule, " that every event is determined by means of its
cause," and can never comprehend it thus generally.
It therefore demands an example from experience,
and when it hears that this rule means nothing but
what it always thought when a pane was broken or a
kitchen-utensil missing, it then understands the prin
ciple and grants it. Common sense therefore is only
of use so far as it can see its rules (though they actu
ally are a priori^) confirmed by experience ; conse
quently to comprehend them a priori, or independently
of experience, belongs to the speculative understand
ing, and lies quite beyond the horizon of common
sense. But the province of metaphysics is entirely
confined to the latter kind of knowledge, and it is cer
tainly a bad index of common sense to appeal to it as
a witness, for it cannot here form any opinion what
ever, and men look down upon it with contempt until
they are in difficulties, and can find in their specula
tion neither in nor out.

It is a common subterfuge of those false friends of
common sense (who occasionally prize it highly, but
usually despise it) to say, that there must surely be
at all events some propositions which are immediately
certain, and of which there is no occasion to give any
proof, or even any account at all, because we other
wise could never stop inquiring into the grounds of

146 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

our judgments But if we except the principle of
contradiction, which is not sufficient to show the truth
of synthetical judgments, they can never adduce, in
proof of this privilege, anything else indubitable,
which they can immediately ascribe to common sense,
except mathematical propositions, such as twice two
make four, between two points there is but one
straight line, etc. But these judgments are radically
different from those of metaphysics. For in mathe
matics I myself can by thinking construct whatever I
represent to myself as possible by a concept : I add
to the first two the other two, one by one, and myself
make the number four, or I draw in thought from one
point to another all manner of lines, equal as well as
unequal ; yet I can draw one only, which is like itself
in ail its parts. But I cannot, by all my power of
thinking, extract from the concept of a thing the con
cept of something else, whose existence is necessarily
connected with the former, but I must call in experi
ence. And though my understanding furnishes me
a priori (yet only in reference to possible experience)
with the concept of such a connexion (i. e., causation),
I cannot exhibit it, like the concepts of mathematics,
by (Anschauung) visualising them, a priori, and so
show its possibility a priori. This concept, together
with the principles of its application, always requires,
if it shall hold a priori — as is requisite in metaphysics
— a justification and deduction of its possibility, be
cause we cannot otherwise know how far it holds
good, and whether it can be used in experience only
or beyond it also.

Therefore in metaphysics, as a speculative science
of pure reason, we can never appeal to common sense,
but may do so only v/hen we are forced to surrender

HOW IS METAPHYSICS POSSIBLE AS A SCIENCE? 147

it, and to renounce all purely speculative cognition,
which must always be knowledge, and consequently
when we forego metaphysics itself and its instruction,
for the sake of adopting a rational faith which alone
may be possible for us, and sufficient to our wants,
perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself.
For in this case the attitude of the question is quite
altered. Metaphysics must be science, not only as a
whole, but in all its parts, otherwise it is nothing;
because, as a speculation of pure reason, it finds a
hold only on general opinions. Beyond its field, how
ever, probability and common sense may be used with
advantage and justly, but on quite special principles,
of which the importance always depends on theTefer-
ence to practical life.

This is what I hold myself justified in requiring
for the possibility of metaphysics as a science.

APPENDIX.

ON WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MAKE METAPHYSICS
ACTUAL AS A SCIENCE.

SINCE all the ways heretofore taken have failed to
attain the goal, and since without a preceding
critique of pure reason it is not likely ever to be at
tained, the present essay now before the public has a
fair title to an accurate and careful investigation, ex
cept it be thought more advisable to give up all pre
tensions to metaphysics, to which, if men but would
consistently adhere to their purpose, no objection can
be made.

If we take the course of things as it is, not as it
ought to be, there are two sorts of judgments: (i) one
a judgment which precedes investigation (in our case
one in which the reader from his own metaphysics
pronounces judgment on the Critique of Pure Reason
which was intended to discuss the very possibility of
metaphysics); (2) the other a judgment subsequent to
investigation. In the latter the reader is enabled to
waive for awhile the consequences of the critical
researches that may be repugnant to his formerly
adopted metaphysics, and first examines the grounds
whence those consequences are derived. If what
common metaphysics propounds were demonstrably
certain, as for instance the theorems of geometry, the
former way of judging would hold good. For if the

APPENDIX. 149

consequences of certain principles are repugnant to
established truths, these principles are false and with
out further inquiry to be repudiated. But if meta
physics does not possess a stock of indisputably cer
tain (synthetical) propositions, and should it even be
the case that there are a number of them, which,
though among the most specious, are by their conse
quences in mutual collision, and if no sure criterion
of the truth of peculiarly metaphysical (synthetical)
propositions is to be met with in it, then the former
way of judging is not admissible, but the investigation
of the principles of the critique must precede all judg
ments as to its value.

ON A SPECIMEN OF A JUDGMENT OF THE CRITIQUE
PRIOR TO ITS EXAMINATION.

This judgment is to be found in the Gottingischen ge-
lehrten Anzeigen, in the supplement to the third divi
sion, of January 19, 1782, pages 40 et seq.

When an author who is familiar with the subject
of his work and endeavors to present his independent
reflexions in its elaboration, falls into the hands of a
reviewer who, in his turn, is keen enough to discern
the points on which the worth or worthlessness of the
book rests, who does not cling to words, but goes to
the heart of the subject, sifting and testing more than
the mere principles which the author takes as his
point of departure, the severity of the judgment may
indeed displease the latter, but the public does not
care, as it gains thereby; and the author himself may
be contented, as an opportunity of correcting or ex
plaining his positions is afforded to him at an early
date by the examination of a competent judge, in
such a manner, that if he believes himself fundamen-

150 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

tally right, he can remove in time any stone of offence
that might hurt the success of his work.

I find myself, with my reviewer, in quite another
position. He seems not to see at all the real matter
of the investigation with which (successfully or un
successfully) I have been occupied. It is either im
patience at thinking out a lengthy work, or vexation
at a threatened reform of a science in which he be
lieved he had brought everything to perfection long
ago, or, what I am unwilling to imagine, real narrow-
mindedness, that prevents him from ever carrying his
thoughts beyond his school-metaphysics. In short,
he passes impatiently in review a long series of prop
ositions, by which, without knowing their premises,
we can think nothing, intersperses here and there his
censure, the reason of which the reader understands
just as little as the propositions against which it is di
rected ; and hence [his report] can neither serve the
public nor damage me, in the judgment of experts. I
should, for these reasons, have passed over this judg
ment altogether, were it not that it may afford me oc
casion for some explanations which may in some cases
save the readers of these Prolegomena from a miscon
ception.

In order to take a position from which my reviewer
could most easily set the whole work in a most un
favorable light, without venturing to trouble himself
with any special investigation, he begins and ends by
saying :

"This work is a system of transcendent (or, as he
translates it, of higher) Idealism."1

IBy no means "higher." High towers, and metaphysically-great men
resembling them, round both of which there is commonly much wind, are not
for me. My place is the fruitful bathos, the bottom-land, of experience; and
the word transcendental, the meaning of which is so often explained by me,

APPENDIX. 151

A glance at this line soon showed me the sort of
criticism that I had to expect, much as though the re
viewer were one who had never seen or heard of geom
etry, having found a Euclid, and coming upon various
figures in turning over its leaves, were to say, on being
asked his opinion of it: "The work is a text-book of
drawing ; the author introduces a peculiar terminol
ogy, in order to give dark, incomprehensible direc
tions, which in the end teach nothing more than what
every one can effect by a fair natural accuracy of eye,
etc."

Let us see, in the meantime, what sort of an ideal
ism it is that goes through my whole work, although
it does not by a long way constitute the soul of the
system.

The dictum of all genuine idealists from the Eleatic
school to Bishop Berkeley, is contained in this for
mula: "All cognition through the senses and experi
ence is nothing but sheer illusion, and only, in the
ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is
truth."

The principle that throughout dominates and de
termines my Idealism, is on the contrary: "All cog
nition of things merely from pure understanding or
pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion, and only in
experience is there truth."

But this is directly contrary to idealism proper.

but not once grasped by my reviewer (so carelessly has he regarded every
thing), does not signify something passing beyond all experience, but some
thing that indeed precedes it a priori, but that is intended simply to make
cognition of experience possible. If these conceptions overstep experience,
their employment is termed transcendent, a word which must be distinguished
from transcendental, the latter being limited to the immanent use, that is,
to experience. All misunderstandings of this kind have been sufficiently
guarded against in the work itself, but my reviewer found his advantage in
misunderstanding me.

152 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

How came I then to use this expression for quite an
opposite purpose, and how came my reviewer to see
it everywhere?

The solution of this difficulty rests on something
that could have been very easily understood from the
general bearing of the work, if the reader had only
desired to do so. Space and time, together with all
that they contain, are not things nor qualities in them
selves, but belong merely to the appearances of the
latter: up to this point I am one in confession with
the above idealists. But these, and amongst them
more particularly Berkeley, regarded space as a mere
empirical presentation that, like the phenomenon it
contains, is only known to us by means of experience
or perception, together with its determinations. I,
on the contrary, prove in the first place, that space
(and also time, which Berkeley did not consider) and
all its determinations a priori, can be cognised by us,
because, no less than time, it inheres in our sensibility
as a pure form before all perception or experience and
makes all intuition of the same, and therefore all its
phenomena, possible. It follows from this, that as
truth rests on universal and necessary lawrs as its cri
teria, experience, according to Berkeley, can have no
criteria of truth, because its phenomena (according to
him) have nothing a priori at their foundation ; whence
it follows, that they are nothing but sheer illusion ;
whereas with us, space and time (in conjunction with
the pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe
their law to all possible experience a priori, and at
the same time afford the certain criterion for distin
guishing truth from illusion therein.1

1 Idealism proper always has a mystical tendency, and can have no other,
but mine is solely designed for the purpose of comprehending the possibility

APPENDIX. 153

My so-called (properly critical) Idealism is of quite
a special character, in that it subverts the ordinary
idealism, and that through it all cognition a priori,
even that of geometry, first receives objective reality,
which, without my demonstrated ideality of space and
time, could not be maintained by the most zealous
realists. This being the state of the case, I could
have wished, in order to avoid all misunderstanding,
to have named this conception of mine otherwise, but
to alter it altogether was impossible. It may be per
mitted me however, in future, as has been above inti
mated, to term it the formal, or better still, the crit
ical Idealism, to distinguish it from the dogmatic
Idealism of Berkeley, and from the sceptical Idealism
of Descartes.

Beyond this, I find nothing further remarkable in
the judgment of my book. The reviewer criticises
here and there, makes sweeping criticisms, a mode
prudently chosen, since it does not betray one's own
knowledge or ignorance ; a single thorough criticism
in detail, had it touched the main question, as is only
fair, would have exposed, it may be my error, or it
may be my reviewer's measure of insight into this spe
cies of research. It was, moreover, not a badly con
ceived plan, in order at once to take from readers
(who are accustomed to form their conceptions of
books from newspaper reports) the desire to read the
book itself, to pour out in one breath a number of pas
sages in succession, torn from their connexion, and

of our cognition a priori as to objects of experience, which is a problem
never hitherto solved or even suggested. In this way all mystical idealism
falls to the ground, for (as may be seen already in Plato) it inferred from our
cognitions a priori (even from those of geometry) another intuition different
from that of the senses (namely, an intellectual intuition), because it never
occurred to any one that the senses themselves might intuite a priori.

154 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

their grounds of proof and explanations, and which
must necessarily sound senseless, especially consider
ing how antipathetic they are to all school-metaphys
ics ; to exhaust the reader's patience ad nauseam, and
then, after having made me acquainted with the sen
sible proposition that persistent illusion is truth, to
conclude with the crude paternal moralisation : to
what end, then, the quarrel with accepted language,
to what end, and whence, the idealistic distinction?
A judgment which seeks all that is characteristic of
my book, first supposed to be metaphysically hetero
dox, in a mere innovation of the nomenclature, proves
clearly that my would-be judge has understood noth
ing of the subject, and in addition, has not under
stood himself.1

My reviewer speaks like a man who is conscious
of important and superior insight which he keeps hid
den ; for I am aware of nothing recent with respect to
metaphysics that could justify his tone. But he should
not withhold his discoveries from the world, for there
are doubtless many who, like myself, have not been
able to find in all the fine things that have for long
past been written in this department, anything that
has advanced the science by so much as a finger-
breadth ; we find indeed the giving a new point to
definitions, the supplying of lame proofs with new
crutches, the adding to the crazy-quilt of metaphysics

IThe reviewer often fights with his own shadow. When I oppose the
truth of experience to dream, he never thinks that I am here speaking simply
of the well-known somnio objective sumto of the Wolffian philosophy, which is
merely formal, and with which the distinction between sleeping and waking;
is in no way concerned, and in a transcendental philosophy indeed can have
no place. For the rest, he calls my deduction of the categories and table of
the principles of the understanding, " common well-known axioms of logic
and ontology, expressed in an idealistic manner." The reader need only
consult these Prolegomena, upon this point, to convince himself that a more
miserable and historically incoirtct, judgment, could hardly be made.

APPENDIX. 155

fresh patches or changing its pattern ; but all this is
not what the world requires. The world is tired of
metaphysical assertions ; it wants the possibility of
the science, the sources from which certainty therein
can be derived, and certain criteria by which it may
distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from
truth. To this the critic seems to possess a key, other
wise he would never have spoken out in such a high
tone.

But I am inclined to suspect that no such require
ment of the science has ever entered his thoughts, for
in that case he would have directed his judgment to
this point, and even a mistaken attempt in such an
important matter, would have won his respect. If
that be the case, we are once more good friends. He
may penetrate as deeply as he likes into metaphysics,
without any one hindering him ; only as concerns that
which lies outside metaphysics, its sources, which are
to be found in reason, he cannot form a judgment.
That my suspicion is not without foundation, is proved
by the fact that he does not mention a word about the
possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori, the special
problem upon the solution of which the fate of meta
physics wholly rests, and upon which my Critique (as
well as the present Prolegomena} entirely hinges. The
Idealism he encountered, and which he hung upon,
was only taken up in the doctrine as the sole means
of solving the above problem (although it received its
confirmation on other grounds), and hence he must
have shown either that the above problem does not
possess the importance I attribute to it (even in these
Prolegomena}, or that by my conception of appear
ances, it is either not solved at all, or can be better
solved in another way ; but I do not find a word of

156 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

this in the criticism. The reviewer, then, understands
nothing of my work, and possibly also nothing of the
spirit and essential nature of metaphysics itself; and
it is not, what I would rather assume, the hurry of a
man incensed at the labor of plodding through so
many obstacles, that threw an unfavorable shadow
over the work lying before him, and made its funda
mental features unrecognisable.

There is a good deal to be done before a learned
journal, it matters not with what care its writers may
be selected, can maintain its otherwise well-merited
reputation, in the field of metaphysics as elsewhere.
Other sciences and branches of knowledge have their
standard. Mathematics has it, in itself; history and
theology, in profane or sacred books ; natural science
and the art of medicine, in mathematics and experi
ence ; jurisprudence, in law books; and even matters
of taste in the examples of the ancients. But for the
judgment of the thing called metaphysics, the standard
has yet to be found. I have made an attempt to de
termine it, as well as its use. What is to be done,
then, until it be found; when works of this kind have
to be judged of? If they are of a dogmatic character,
one may do what one likes ; no one will play the mas
ter over others here for long, before some one else
appears to deal with him in the same manner. If,
however, they are critical in their character, not in
deed with reference to other works, but to reason it
self, so that the standard of judgment cannot be as
sumed but has first of all to be sought for, then, though
objection and blame may indeed be permitted, yet a
certain degree of leniency is indispensable, since the
need is common to us all, and the lack of the neces-

APPENDIX. 157

sary insight makes the high-handed attitude of judge
unwarranted.

In order, however, to connect my defence with the
interest of the philosophical commonwealth, I pro
pose a test, which must be decisive as to the mode,
whereby all metaphysical investigations may be di
rected to their common purpose. This is nothing
more than what formerly mathematicians have done,
in establishing the advantage of their methods by
competition. I challenge my critic to demonstrate,
as is only just, on a priori grounds, in his way, a
single really metaphysical principle asserted by him.
Being metaphysical it must be synthetic and cognised
a priori from conceptions, but it may also be any one
of the most indispensable principles, as for instance,
the principle of the persistence of substance, or of the
necessary determination of events in the world by
their causes. If he cannot do this (silence however is
confession), he must admit, that as metaphysics with
out apodeictic certainty of propositions of this kind
is nothing at all, its possibility or impossibility must
before all things be established in a critique of the
pure reason. Thus he is bound either to confess that
my principles in the Critique are correct, or he HI list
prove their invalidity. But as I can already foresee,
that, confidently as he has hitherto relied on the cer
tainty of his principles, when it comes to a strict test
he will not find a single one in the whole range of
metaphysics he can bring forward, I will concede to
him an advantageous condition, which can only be
expected in such a competition, and will relieve him
of the onus probandi by laying it on myself.

He finds in these Prolegomena and in my Critique
(chapter on the " Theses and Antitheses of the Four

158 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

Antinomies") eight propositions, of which two and two
contradict one another, but each of which necessarily
belongs to metaphysics, by which it must either be
accepted or rejected (although there is not one that
has not in this time been held by some philosopher).
Now he has the liberty of selecting any one cf these
eight propositions at his pleasure, and accepting it
without any proof, of which I shall make him a pres
ent, but only one (for waste of time will be just as
little serviceable to him as to me), and then of attack
ing my proof of the opposite proposition. If I can
save this one, and at the same time show, that ac
cording to principles which every dogmatic meta
physics must necessarily recognise, the opposite of
the proposition adopted by him can be just as clearly
proved, it is thereby established that metaphysics has
an hereditary failing, not to be explained, much less
set aside, until we ascend to its birth-place, pure rea
son itself, and thus my Critique must either be ac
cepted or a better one take its place; it must at least
be studied, which is the only thing I now require. If,
on the other hand, I cannot save my demonstration,
then a synthetic proposition a priori from dogmatic
principles is to be reckoned to the score of my oppo
nent, then also I will deem my impeachment of ordi
nary metaphysicsas unjust, and pledge myself to
recognise his stricture on my Critique as justified
(although this would not be the consequence by a
long way). To this end it would be necessary, it
seems to me, that he should step out of his incognito.
Otherwise I do not see how it could be avoided, that
instead of dealing with one, I should be honored by
several problems coming from anonymous and un
qualified opponents.

APPENDIX. 159

PROPOSALS AS TO AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CRI
TIQUE UPON WHICH A JUDGMENT MAY FOLLOW.

I feel obliged to the honored public even for the
silence with which it for a long time favored my Cri
tique, for this proves at least a postponement of judg
ment, and some supposition that in a work, leaving
all beaten tracks and striking out on a new path, in
which one cannot at once perhaps so easily find one's
way, something may perchance lie, from which an
important but at present dead branch of human
knowledge may derive new life and productiveness.
Hence may have originated a solicitude for the as yet
tender shoot, lest it be destroyed by a hasty judg
ment. A test of a judgment, delayed for the above
reasons, is now before my eye in the Gothaischcn gc-
Ithrtcn Zeitungi the thoroughness of which every
reader will himself perceive, from the clear and un-
perverted presentation of a fragment of one of the
first principles of my work, without taking into con
sideration my own suspicious praise.

And now I propose, since an extensive structure
cannot be judged of as a whole from a hurried glance,
to test it piece by piece from its foundations, so thereby
the present Prolegomena may fitly be used as a gene
ral outline with which the work itself may occasionally
be compared. This notion, if it were founded on
nothing more than my conceit of importance, such as
vanity commonly attributes to one's own productions,
would be immodest and would deserve to be repudi
ated with disgust. But now, the interests of specula
tive philosophy have arrived at the point of total ex
tinction, while human reason hangs upon them with

160 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

inextinguishable affection, and only after having been
ceaselessly deceived does it vainly attempt to change
this into indifference.

In our thinking age it is not to be supposed but
that many deserving men would use any good oppor
tunity of working for the common interest of the more
and more enlightened reason, if there were only some
hope of attaining the goal. Mathematics, natural
science, laws, arts, even morality, etc., do not com
pletely fill the soul ; there is always a space left over,
reserved for pure and speculative reason, the vacuity
of which prompts us to seek in vagaries, buffooneries,
and myticism for what seems to be employment and
entertainment, but what actually is mere pastime; in
order to deaden the troublesome voice of reason,
which in accordance with its nature requires some
thing that can satisfy it, and not merely subserve
other ends or the interests of our inclinations. A con
sideration, therefore, which is concerned only with
reason as it exists for it itself, has as I may reason
ably suppose a great fascination for every one who
has attempted thus to extend his conceptions, and I
may even say a greater than any other theoretical
branch of knowledge, for which he would not willingly
exchange it, because here all other cognitions, and
even purposes, must meet and unite themselves in a
whole.

I offer, therefore, these Prolegomena as a sketch
and text-book for this investigation, and not the work
itself. Although I am even now perfectly satisfied
with the latter as far as contents, order, and mode of
presentation, and the care that I have expended in
weighing and testing every sentence before writing it
down, are concerned (for it has taken me years to

APPENDIX. l6l

satisfy myself fully, not only as regards the whole,
but in some cases even as to the sources of one par
ticular proposition); yet I am not quite satisfied with
my exposition in some sections of the doctrine of ele
ments, as for instance in the deduction of the concep
tions of the Understanding, or in that on the paral
ogisms of pure reason, because a certain diffuseness
takes away from their clearness, and in place of them,
what is here said in the Prolegomena respecting these
sections, may be made the basis of the test.

It is the boast of the Germans that where steady
and continuous industry are requisite, they can carry
things farther than other nations. If this opinion be
well founded, an opportunity, a business, presents it
self, the successful issue of which we can scarcely
doubt, and in which all thinking men can equally
take part, though they have hitherto been unsuccess
ful in accomplishing it and in thus confirming the
above good opinion. But this is chiefly because the
science in question is of so peculiar a kind, that it
can be at once brought to completion and to that en
during state that it will never be able to be brought
in the least degree farther or increased by later dis
coveries, or even changed (leaving here out of account
adornment by greater clearness in some places, or
additional uses), and this is an advantage no other
science has or can have, because there is none so fully
isolated and independent of others, and which is con
cerned with the faculty of cognition pure and simple.
And the present moment seems, moreover, not to be
unfavorable to my expectation, for just now, in Ger
many, no one seems to know wherewith to occupy
himself, apart from the so-called useful sciences, so

162 KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

as to pursue not mere play, but a business possessing
an enduring purpose.

To discover the means how the endeavors of the
learned may be united in such a purpose, I must leave
to others. In the meantime, it is my intention to per
suade any one merely to follow my propositions, or
even to flatter me with the hope that he will do so ;
but attacks, repetitions, limitations, or confirmation,
completion, and extension, as the case may be, should
be appended. If the matter be but investigated from
its foundation, it cannot fail that a system, albeit not
my own, shall be erected, that shall be a possession
for future generations for which they may have reason
to be grateful.

It would lead us too far here to show what kind of
metaphysics may be expected, when only the princi
ples of criticism have been perfected, and how, be
cause the old false feathers have been pulled out, she
need by no means appear poor and reduced to an in
significant figure, but may be in other respects richly
and respectably adorned. But other and great uses
which would result from such a reform, strike one im
mediately. The ordinary metaphysics had its uses,
in tnat it sought out the elementary conceptions of
the pure understanding in order to make them clear
through analysis, and definite by explanation. In this
way it was a training for reason, in whatever direction
it might be turned; but this was all the good it did;
service was subsequently effaced when it favored con
ceit by venturesome assertions, sophistry by subtle
distinctions and adornment, and shallowness by the
ease with which it decided the most difficult problems
by means of a little school-wisdom, which is only the
more seductive the more it has the choice, on the one

APPENDIX. 163

hand, of taking something from the language of sci
ence, and on the other from that of popular discourse,
thus being everything to everybody, but in reality
nothing at all. By criticism, however, a standard is
given to our judgment, whereby knowledge may be
with certainty distinguished from pseudo-science, and
firmly founded, being brought into full operation in
metaphysics ; a mode of thought extending by degrees
its beneficial influence over every other use of reason,
at once infusing into it the true philosophical spirit.
But the service also that metaphysics performs for
theology, by making it independent of the judgment
of dogmatic speculation, thereby assuring it com
pletely against the attacks of all such opponents, is
certainly not to be valued lightly. For ordinary meta
physics, although it promised the latter much advan
tage, could not keep this promise, and moreover, by
summoning speculative dogmatics to its assistance,
did nothing but arm enemies against itself. Mysti
cism, which can prosper in a rationalistic age only
when it hides itself behind a system of school-meta
physics, under the protection of which it may venture
to rave with a semblance of rationality, is driven from
this, its last hiding-place, by critical philosophy. Last,
but not least, it cannot be otherwise than important
to a teacher of metaphysics, to be able to say with
universal assent, that what he expounds is Science,
and that thereby genuine services will be rendered to
the commonweal.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY,

BY DR. PAUL CARUS.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

T)HILOSOPHY is frequently regarded as idle ver-
L biage ; and the great mass of the average produc
tions of this branch of human endeavor would seem
to justify the statement. Nevertheless, philosophy
has exercised a paramount influence upon the history
of mankind, for philosophy is the quintessence of
man's conception of the world and the view he takes
of the significance of life. While philosophical books,
essays, lectures, and lessons may be intricate and long-
winded, there is at the core of all the questions under
discussion a public interest of a practical nature. The
problems that have reference to it are, as a rule, much
simpler and of more common application than is ap
parent to an outsider, and all of them closely consid
ered will be found to be of a religious nature.

KANT'S SIGNIFICANCE IN THE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY.

When we try to trace the erratic lines of the his
tory of philosophy, the advance seems slow, but the
results, meagre though they sometimes may be, can
be summarised in brief statements. Thus the sophistic
movement in Greece in contradistinction to the old
naive naturalists, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaxi-
menes, is characterised by the maxim : iraimoi/ fierpoi/
m>0pawros, [Man is the measure of all things], which is
the simple solution of a series of intricate problems.

168 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

In spite of its truth, it was misused by unscrupulous
rhetoricians, who disgraced the profession of sophists
and degraded the noble name of their science, called
Sophia, i. e., wisdom, to such an extent that the term
' < sophist " became an epithet of opprobrium. Socrates
Opposed the sophists, but in all theoretical points he
Vvas one ol them. There was only this difference,
that he insisted on the moral nature of man and thus
became the noblest exponent of the sophistic prin
ciple. It indicates a new departure that he changed
the name sophia to philosophia or philosophy, i. e., love
of wisdom, which was universally accepted as more
modest and better becoming to the teachers and spir
itual guides of mankind. While he granted that man
is the measure of all things, he pointed out the duty
of investigating the nature of man, and he selected
the Delphic maxim : yv&Qi o-tavrov, "know thyself," as
a motto for his life. It would lead us too far to show
how Plato worked out the Socratic problem of the hu
man soul, which led him to a recognition of the sig
nificance of forms, as expressed in his doctrine of
ideas, and how Aristotle applied it to natural science.
The Neo-Platonists developed Plato's mystical and
supernatural tendencies and prepared thereby for the
rise of a dualistic religion.

When Christianity became a dominating power in
the world, philosophy disappeared for a while, being
replaced by the belief in a divine revelation as the
sole source of all wisdom ; but in the Middle Ages
philosophy was revived as scholasticism, the impulse
to the movement being due to the revival of Aristote-
lianism, through an acquaintance with the writings of
cultured Arabian sages.

In the era of scholasticism we have two authori-

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 169

ties, Revelation and Science, the former conceived to
be identical with the verdicts of the Church, the latter
being a blind acceptance of a second-hand and much
distorted" knowledge of the philosopher's works. The
Platonic problem of the eternal types of things was
revived, and Nominalists and Realists contended with
one another on the question of the reality of ideas. In
their methods, however, these two conflicting schools
were on the same level, for both were in the habit of
appealing to certain authorities. With them proof
consisted in quotations either of church doctrines or
of passages from Aristotle. There was no genuine
science, no true philosophy, the efforts of the age
consisting in vain attempts at reconciling the two
conflicting sources of their opinions.

Modern philosophy is a product of the awakening
spirit of science, beginning with Descartes who pro
posed to introduce method into philosophy, as ex
pressed in his Discourse on Method. He abolished the
implicit belief in book authority. Falling back upon
the facts of life, he bethought himself of the signifi
cance of Man's thinking faculty, and so, starting again
from the subjective position of the sophists, he defined
his solution of the basic problem with great terseness
in the sentence : Cogito ergo sum, [I think, therefore
I am].

The latest phase in philosophy begins with Kant,
and it is his immortal merit to have gone to the bot
tom of the philosophical problem by reducing its diffi
culties to a system. In the Cartesian syllogism he
saw a fallacy if it was interpreted to mean "Cogito
ergo ego sum. "

The subject ego, implied in "sum" is implicitly
contained in " cogito," and thus if the sentence is

170 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

meant to prove the existence of a metaphysical ego,
the argument is a fallacy, being merely a deduction
derived from the assumption that the ego does the
thinking.

In spite of its syllogistic form the sentence was
not meant as a syllogism but as a statement of fact.
Kant's objection, however, holds good in either case,
for though the thinking be a fact, it is an assumption
to take for granted that the thinker is an ego, i. e., a
soul-entity that exists independently of its thinking.
Lichtenberg therefore said that we ought to replace
the sentence "/ think" by "it thinks." Yet even if
we allow the statement " I think" to pass, the ques
tion arises : What do we understand by "/"? Is it a
collective term for all the thought-processes that take
place in one and the same personality, or is there a
separate soul-being which does the thinking and con
stitutes the personality? In other words, the exist
ence of the thinking subject, called the /, does riot
imply that it is a spiritual thing in itself, nor even
that it constitutes a unity.

Mystic tendencies of a religious nature such as
found a classical exposition in Kant's contemporary
and namesake, Emanuel Swedenborg, rendered some
of the problems of philosophy more complicated by
laying special stress upon the difference between mat
ter and spirit, and discussing the possibility and prob
able nature of purely spiritual beings; but all philoso
phising on the subject consisted in declamations and
unproved propositions.

Wolf, a clear-headed thinker, though void of origi
nality, reduced the metaphysical notions from Aris
totle down to the eighteenth century into an elaborate

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 171

system, and thus became to Kant the typical exponent
of dogmatism.

In contrast to the metaphysical school, the sen
sualists had risen. They are best represented by
Locke who denied the existence of innate ideas (ex
cept the idea of causation) and tried to prove that all
abstract thought had its origin in sensation. Hume,
taking offence even at the claims of causation as a
necessary connexion, declared that, accustomed to
the invariable sequence of cause and effect, we mis
take our subjective necessity of thinking them to
gether for an objective necessity, which remains un
proved. Thus he turned skeptic and gave by his
doubts regarding the objective validity of causation
as a universal principle and a metaphysical truth the
suggestion to Kant to investigate the claims of all
metaphysics, of which the notion of causality is only
a part.

Here Kant's philosophical reform set in, which
consists in rejecting both the skepticism of Hume and
the dogmatism of Wolf and in offering a new solution
which he called criticism.

Kant took the next step in seeking for the prin
ciple that determined all thinking, and discovered it
in the purely formal laws of thought, which in their
complete unity constitute pure reason. The investi
gation of the conditions of thought, he called "criti
cism." He insisted that the dogmatical declamations
of all the various systems of metaphysics were idle
and useless talk. He said they were vain attempts at
building a mighty tower that would reach to Heaven.
But at the same time he claimed to prove that the
supply of building materials was after all sufficient for

172 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

a dwelling-house spacious enough for the needs of life
aud high enough to survey the field of experience.1

In place of the old metaphysics which used to de
rive from pure concepts a considerable amount of
pretended knowledge concerning God, the world, and
man, concerning substance, as the substratum of ex
istence, the soul, the future state of things, and im
mortality, Kant drew up an inventory of the posses
sions of Pure Reason and came to the conclusion that
all knowledge of purely formal thought is in itself
empty and that sense-experience in itself is blind ; the
two combined form the warp and woof of experience,
which alone can afford positive information concern
ing the nature of objects. Empirical knowledge of
the senses furnishes the material, while formal thought
supplies the method by which perceptions can be or
ganised and systematised into knowledge. Kant's aim
was not to produce glittering generalities, but to offer
critique, that is to say, a method of, and norm for,
scientific thought ; and he said, conscious of the sig
nificance of his philosophy:

"This much is certain, that whoever has once tasted critique
will be ever after disgusted with all dogmatical twaddle."

Dogmatism in metaphysics is the dragon which
Kant slew. But Kant's criticism was not purely nega
tive. He recognised in the world as an undeniable
fact the demand of the moral "ought" which he called
"the categorical imperative," and while he insisted
upon the determinism of natural law he would not
deny the freedom of the will establishing it upon

1 See Critique of Pure Reason in the chapter "Transcendental Doctrine ol
Method," Max Mullet's translation, p. 567, Meicklejohn's, p. 431, original
edition, p. 707.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 173

man's moral responsibility. He declared : "I shall,
therefore I can."

PERSONAL TRAITS.

Kant, the son of simple but rigorously pious parents
of Scotch extraction, lived at Konigsberg in Prus
sia under the rule of Frederick the Great.1 His moral
sense was stern and unalloyed with sentimentality.
He never married, and his relation to his relatives
was regulated strictly according to his views of duty.2
In his philosophy as well as in his private life he was
duty incarnate. While he had imbibed the sense of
duty that characterises the system of education in
Prussia, he was also swayed by the ideals of liberty
and fraternity so vigorously brought to the front by
the French revolution.8 His influence on the German
nation, on science, religion, and even politics cannot
be underrated, although his ideas did not reach the
people directly in the form he uttered them, but only
indirectly through his disciples, the preachers, teach
ers, and poets of the age. His main works which em
body the gist of his peculiar doctrines are the Critique
of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and
the Critique of Judgment. Among them the Critique

IFor a good condensed statement of Kant's life see page 245 of this vol
ume, where Professor Windelband's account is reproduced. For a convenient
chronological table of the data of Kant's life and publications see pages 287-
291 of the present volume.

have had reproduced at p. 285 of this volume a specimen of Kant's
handwriting, a letter of his to his brother, plainly characterising his business
like conception of duty which regulated his life with machine-like preci
sion.

SHeinrich Heine described Kant to the French most drastically in an
essay on German philosophy, of which an English translation has been re
printed in this volume at page 264.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 175

of Pure Reason is by far the most important one.1 It
is a pity that the Critique of Pure Reason, from the
appearance of which the historian dates the beginning
of the latest period in the evolution of philosophy, is
a ponderous and almost unintelligible work, — a book
with seven seals to the average reader; and it might
have remained ineffectual had not Kant been necessi
tated to rectify this defect by giving to the public a
popular explanation concerning his intentions.

The Critique of Pure Reason was published in 1781.
In the Gottingenschen Gelehrten Anzeigen of January
19, 1782, there appeared a review of the book, written
by Garve and modified by Feder, which irritated Kant
considerably, because the review treated his criticism
as a revival of Berkeley's idealism, which was com
monly regarded as pure subjectivism.2 There is no
need here of protesting in Berkeley's name against
this interpretation of his philosophy, for we are con
cerned here with Kant, not with Berkeley. But even
Kant misunderstood Berkeley,8 and for our present

1 A splendid analysis of the three Critiques is given by Prof. A. Weber in
his History of Philosophy, translated from the fifth French edition by Prof.
Frank Tilly, pp. 436-472. We have reprinted part of this analysis at p. 250.

The compilation of Kant's philosophy in a Kantlexikon by Gustav Wegner
(Berlin, 1893) is not very serviceable. The book is unhandy and lacks the
main requisite of a lexicon, a good index.

The exposition of Kant's philosophy by G. H. Lewes in his Biographical
History of Philosophy is an excellent sketch and worth a careful perusal. But
Lewes leaves the problem where Kant left it, saying : "There is, in truth, no
necessity in causation, except the necessity of our belief in it." But whence
does this necessity come, and what is its authority ?

5 Garve' s letter to Kant and Kant's answer contain the whole material of
the history of this garbled review. They are interesting reading but mainly
of a personal nature, consisting of explanations, excuses, and polite words.
For a reproduction of this correspondence see Reclaim's text edition of Kant's
Prolegomena, Appendix, pp. 214-230.

'For a condensed statement of Berkeley's idealism see Thomas J. Mc-
Cormack's preface to Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principle* ef Human
Knowledge, Chicago, The Open Court Pub. Co., 1901, especially pp. XU-KIT.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

purpose it is sufficient to say that Berkeley's idealism
meant to Kant and bis contemporaries pure subjec
tivism.

Kant was irritated because his philosophy was dis

posed of as an old error, a method which (as P^ulsen
says) has been developed into a regular system among
a certain class of Roman Catholic critics who regard
{lie possibilities of philosophising as. exhausted ir/ ihe

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 177

history of philosophy. Claiming to be in possession
of the whole truth, they are naturally disinclined to
believe that new truths can be brought to light. Thus
they have developed the habit of associating every
new idea with some one of the systems of the past
which to them are nothing but a catalogus errorum,
and serve them as so many coffins in which to bury
any doctrine that does not receive their approbation.

Kant's indignation was perhaps exaggerated, for
he ought to have considered the difficulty of under
standing a doctrine that was at the same time utterly
new and presented in a most unattractive, pedantical
form ; but the result was happy, for he felt urged to
write a popular explanation of his work, to offset
Garve's misconception, which would serve the reader
as Prolegomena, i. e , as prefatory remarks to the Cri
tique of Pure Reason.

These Prolegomena insist on the newness of Kant's
proposition and emphasise his adhesion to realism (or
the doctrine that the objective world is actual) in con
trast to the subjectivism of Berkeley, or what was sup
posed to be Berkeley. At the same time they possess
the charm of wonderful vigor and directness. Here
Kant does not write in the pedantic, dignified style
of a professor, but with the boldness of a resentful
author who, conscious of his title to careful considera
tion and believing himself to be wrongly criticised, is
anxious to be properly understood by the public.

While the Critique of Pure Reason is synthetic, the
Prolegomena are (as says Kant himself) analytic. In
the Critique of Pure Reason Kant discourses as one
who speaks ex cathedra, sitting in the professorial
chair; he propounds his doctrine deductively, and I

1 See Friedrich Paulsen's Kant, p. 229.

tjS KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

for one can very well understand that his expositions
appear to an uninitiated reader bewilderingly orac
ular. In the Prolegomena his style is not stilted but
rather careless and though his periods are long they
are fluent and easily understood.

KANT'S TERMS.

The main difficulty of understanding Kant, to later
generations, and also to foreigners not to the manner
born as regards the German vernacular, lies in his
terminology. Simple though his terms are when once
understood, they afford unsurmountable difficulties to
those who are not familiar with their significance.

Familiarity with the following terms is indispen
sable for a comprehension of Kant: " metaphysics ";
''understanding" and "reason"; "empirical" and
"experience"; "noumenon" and " phenomenon ";
a priori and a posteriori', "transcendental" and "tran
scendent" ; and "intuition" or Anschauung.

First, above all, there is the term "metaphysics,"
which is the science of first principles. Aristotle, who
discusses the subject of ap\ai, or first principles, in
books placed after the physical treatises (hence the
name ra /nera ra <£v<ri*a, sc. f!t/3\ia, corrupted into meta
physics), calls it First Philosophy, i. e., the Essence
or basis of Philosophy, and identifies it with Theol
ogy, because he finds in God the ultimate raison d'etre
of all metaphysical concepts such as being and be
coming, space and time, multiplicity and unity, things
and the world, cause and effect, substance and qual
ity, God and soul and immortality.

Kant defines metaphysics as :

"A system of all the principles of pure theo
retical reason-cognition ( Vernunfttrkenntniss) in

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 179

concepts, — briefly the system of pure theoretical
philosophy." l

In another place Kant (IV., p. 236) speaks of
metaphysics simply as "pure philosophy limited to
the objects of the understanding," a definition which
almost identifies it with Logic.2 He insists that meta
physics is based upon man's faculty of thinking and
not pure imagination. Being a priori, it deals witli^
the acts of pure thought, which reduce the manifold j
sense-impressions to unity bylaw. (Vol. IV., p. 362.)

The sources of metaphysics are limited by Kant
to the a priori (Vol. IV., p. 13); its possibility stands
and falls with the possibility of synthetical judgments
a priori (Vol. IV., p. 14); pre-Kantian metaphysics
is declared to be uncritical and unscientific (IV., p.
23); as a science metaphysics must be a systematic
presentation of all a priori concepts, including above
all the synthetical propositions of man's philosophical
cognition; and its final purpose (IV., p. 19) consists
in the cognition of the Supreme Being as well as of
the life to come (die zukiinftige Welt}. The latter
expression had perhaps better be replaced by the
broader idea of the mundus intelligibility the intelligible
world, constituting the purely formal in contrast to
the material, the Platonic ideas or types of things as
distinguished from their accidental relations in space
and time, exhibiting the abiding in the transcient and
thus making it possible to view the world (as Spinoza
has it) under the aspect of eternity, — sub specie ceterni.

Kant started a new line of investigation and kept
in view his main aim. So it was natural that he did

l£d. Hartenstein, Vol. VIII., p. 521.

2 Logic is defined by Kant (IV., p. 236) as " the pure philosophy which is
purely formal."

i8o KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

not feel the need of certain discriminations before his
work was pretty well advanced. This accounts for a
few inaccuracies in the use of his terminology, cover
ing the terms "understanding," "reason," and "ex
perience." He distinguishes in his Prolegomena be
tween reason and understanding, but the discrimination
is by no means thoroughly carried out. Theunder-
standing is defined as the use of the categories, and
reason tne taculty ot forming ideas^ The understand-
in g~liZc^r^in^TyTe^re^ntsthe logical functions, and
reason the domain of abstractions and generalisations.
The understanding draws conclusions and attends to
the machinery of thinking, reason seeks oneness in
plurality, aims at a systematical comprehension of
things apparently different and establishes laws to ex
plain the variety of phenomena by one common rule.

By "empirical" Kant understood all those judg
ments that contain sensory elements. They were either
mereTperceptions, i. e., a taking cognisance of sense-
impressions, or experience, i. e. , the product of
thought and perceptions, resulting in empirical state
ments that are universally valid.1

The contrast of perceptions, as the sense-woven
pictures of things, and ideas or the mind-begotten
concepts of them, is expressed in the two terms
"phenomenon" or appearance, and "noumenon" or
thought. Kant translates the former by the word Sin-
neswesen, i. e. , creature of the senses, and the latter
by the word Gedankcnwescn, i. e., creature of thought.2

1 That Kant' s use of the term " experience " was not always consistent I
have endeavored to explain elsewhere. See Printer of Philosophy, pp. 30 ft.

2 Pronounce no-comenon% not noomenon. The original Greek reads voov-
ficpov. The ou in the German transcription, "No-umetton " was misinterpreted
as a French ou; hence the erroneous pronunciation of some English lexicog
raphers as " noomenon."

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 181

Noumenon should not mean " thing in itself," as
which it is actually used by Kant contrary to his own
definition, but man's subjective conception of the
thing in itself. If the phenomenon is subjective ap
pearance, the noumenon, far from being objective,
is, according to Kant, still more subjective, being a
mere subjective digest of the materials furnished by
the subjective phenomenon. The term "noumenon,"
however, is not limited to its original meaning. Kant
understands by it, not only the subjective concept of
things, but also the objective ''thing in itself."

The terms a priori and a posteriori are of special
significance. They mean " before" and "afterwards,"
but we must bear in mind that they should be under
stood, not as a temporal succession, but in a logical
sense. A priori cognitions are the principles which
the naturalist uses in his investigations; but his in
vestigations themselves, consisting of sense-experi
ence, are a posteriori. Before he begins his investiga
tion, the naturalist must know that 2X2=4, that there
can be no effect without a cause, that he can rely on
the rule of three and on the syllogisms of logic. The
knowledge of these truths is the condition of science,
and all these truths are universal, i. e., they apply to
all possible cases. A priori knowledge has developed
through the practice of sense-experience. Indeed,
sense-experience came first in temporal order ; but
sense-impressions would forever remain a mass of iso
lated things were they not systematised with the as
sistance of a priori principles.

A priori does not mean innate, for neither mathe"^"|
matics, nor arithmetic, nor logic is innate; but the
theorems of these sciences can be deduced in our
thoughts without calling upon sense-experience to aid

1 82 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

us. Innate ideas would mean inherited notions, like
the instincts of animals. The characteristic feature
of a priori conceptions is not that we know them well
nor that we find them ready-made in our minds, but
that they have a universal application and are there
fore necessary truths.

The contrast between a priori and a posteriori
truths is easily explained when we consider that the
former are purely formal, the latter sensory. The for
mer therefore cannot give us any information concern
ing the substance, the matter, the thingish nature of
things (as Kant expresses it, "they are empty"), but
they can be used for determining the relations and
forms of things, and this renders them uniquely valu
able, for science is nothing but a tracing of the changes
of form, an application of the laws of form, a measur
ing, a weighing, a counting ; and their paramount im
portance appears in this that our knowledge of the
laws of form will in consideration of their universal
validity, result in the possibility of predetermining
future modifications under given conditions.

There are two synonyms of a priori, the word
"pure" and the term "transcendental."

Reason unalloyed with notions derived from sense-
experience, and therefore limited to conceptions a pri
ori, is called pure reason. "Transcendental" means
practically the same as pure and a priori. By tran
scendental discourses Kant understands those which
transcend experience and consider its a priori condi
tions. Thus, transcendental logic is pure logic in so
far as pure logic is the condition of applied logic.
Transcendental psychology is the doubtful domain of
abstract notions concerning the unity of the ego, its
substantiality and permanence, etc. Transcendental

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 183

cosmology consists of the ideas of existence in gene
ral and the universe in particular. Then the questions
arise as to the world's infinitude or limitedness, its
eternity or beginning and end. Further, whether or
not causality is absolute, viz., is there contingency
only, or is an uncaused will possible? Here the oracle
of pure reason fails and Kant formulates the result in
his strange doctrine of contradictions, or, as he calls
it, antinomies of pure reason.

Transcendental cosmology, transcendental psy
chology, transcendental theology, are not sciences,
but the dreams of metaphysics. As such they tran
scend experience to the extent of becoming hazy.
They cease to be accessible to comprehension and are
then in Kant's terminology called " transcendent. "

Mark the difference between the two terms : the
word "transcendental" denotes the subjective condi
tions of all experience, consisting in the recognition
of such truisms as logical, arithmetical, and geometri
cal theorems, which are the clearest, most indisput
able, and most unequivocal notions we have. Tran
scendent, however, means that which lies beyond the
ken of all possible knowledge within the nebulous do
main in which we can as well affirm as deny the pos
sibility of assumptions. Consider at the same time
that in the English language "transcendental" is a
synonym of "transcendent," and the difference made
by Kant has been slurred over by many of his exposi
tors. What a heap of confusion resulted from this
carelessness ! We need not wonder that his radical
system of transcendental criticism was transformed
into that uncritical metaphysicism, or dabbling in un
warranted transcendental notions which Kant so vig
orously and effectually combated.

184

The confusion which English interpreters produced
by their neglect of distinguishing between " transcen
dent" and " transcendental" was increased by their
misconception of the term Anschauung, which, being
properly but not adequately translated by its Latin
equivalent " intuition," became tinged with all the
mysticism and metaphysicism of intuitionalism. "In
tuition," according to the commonly accepted use of
the word, means in the English as well as in German
"the power of the mind by which it immediately per
ceives the truth of things without reasoning or analy
sis." As such intuitions signify not only the images
of sense-perception, but also, and indeed mainly, ec
static visions in which the soul is face to face with
presences spiritual, supernal, or divine ; and thus it
happened that under the guarantee of Kant's criticism
the most extravagant speculations could gain admis
sion to the philosophical world as genuine philosoph
ical ideas.

Anschauung, like the Latin intuitio, signifies the
act of looking at an object ; it denotes the sensation of
sight. However, its use is not restricted to sight, but
extends to all sense-perception. The peculiar feature
of sense-perception consists in its directness and im
mediate appearance in our organs of sense as sensa
tion. When we look at a tree we do not argue ; we
simply see the tree. We need not know anything
about the physical processes that take place both
outside in the domain of ether-waves which are re
flected on the sighted object, and within our eye
where the lens produces an image that is thrown upon
the surface of the retina, in the same way in which
the photographer's camera produces a picture on the
sensitive plate. The picture seen is the result of the

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 185

process, and all epistemological considerations are
after-thoughts. The same is true of all sensations.
Sensations, though the result of complicated pro
cesses, are given facts; they are the data of experi
ence and there is no argument in them, no reasoning,
no deliberation, no hesitation, as to their truth; they
are the realities of life, and from them we construct
our notions of the world in which we live.

It is a pity that we have not a Saxon equivalent
for the German Anschauung. We might coin the word
11 atsight," which (in contrast to insight) would de
note the act of perceiving a sighted object ; but the
word, in order to make the same impression, ought
to be current, which the term atsight is not. The
translation ''intuition" is admissible only on the con
dition that we exclude from it all mystical notions of
subjective visions and define it as visualised percep
tion. There are passages where Anschauung is an ex
act synonym for "sense-experience" or "perception,"
and we might translate it thus were it not for the ex
tended use Kant makes of the term by speaking of
reinc Anschauung, meaning thereby the pure forms of
sense-experience which are as much immediate data
of perception as are the sense-elements of sensation.

If we had to recast the exposition of Kant's phi
losophy we could avoid the term "pure intuition"
and replace it by the pure forms of sense-experience,
but if we would render Kant in his own words we can
not do so. The translator must reproduce Kant in
his own language, and thus must either invent a new
word such as atsight, or must cling to the traditional
term intuition.^

1 Mr. Kroeger'c proposition, made in tha Journal a/ Speculation Philo*-
epky, II., p. 191, to translate Anschauung by contemplation »eaoia inadmis-

186 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

KANT'S IDEALISM.

The contrasts in Kant's terminology, a priori and
a posteriori, formal and material, pure reason and ex
perience, etc., do not yet imply the conclusion at
which he arrives, the main result being the ideality of
space and time and of all pure forms of thought.
Kant was led to it by a strange fallacy, the error of
which we intend to trace in the subsequent pages.

First let us try to understand the point of view
which Kant took.

The pure form of our sense-perception is the rela
tional in the domain of sensory elements, viz., their
juxtaposition, or space, and their succession, or time,
their shape, their causal intercatenation, etc.

In his discourse on the pure forms of sense-per
ception (called "Transcendental ^Esthetics"), Kant
points out first of space, then of time, that they are
notions which are :

1. Insuppressible (viz., we can think or assume in
thought the non-existence of all objects, but not cf
space or time).

2. Necessary a priori (viz., they are of universal
application and transcendental, i. e., the condition of
all sense-perceptions.)

3. Unique (viz., there is but one space and one
time; all spaces, so called, are parts only of, or rooni
in, that one space; and different times are periods o
that one time).

4. Infinite (viz., all concrete objects are finite;

sible. Compare for further details of the use of the word the author's pam
phlet Kant and Spencer, pp. 76 ff. In the present translation of Kant's
Prolegomena we have rendered it a few times by sense-perception and -visuali
sation, but mostly by intuition, and have (wherever it is not translated by
"intuition") alway added ii; parenthesis the German original.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 187

but time and space, not being concrete entities, are
limitless).

He concludes that space and time are not proper
ties of objects as things-in-themselves, but the forms
of their phenomenal existence.

It is obviously a mistake to regard space and time
as concrete objects. Infinite objects would be mon
ster-existences the reality of which cannot but pass
our comprehension. They are the forms of thing?,
indispensable not only for their existence in general
but also for determining their several individual and
characteristic types ; for that which constitutes the
difference of things, so far as science has been able to
penetrate into the mysteries of being, is always due
to a difference of form. Kant guardedly grants em
pirical reality to space and time; he ascribes space
and time to things as phenomena, and denies only
their being properties of things as things-in-them
selves. But he adds the explicit statement that space
as well as time are. "the subjective conditions of the
sensibility under which alone external intuition (An-
schauung, \. e., sense-perception) becomes possible."
Thus, Kant concludes space and time are a priori in
tuitions; they do not belong to the external domain
of reality or objectivity, but to the sphere of subjec
tivity; and being forms of the sensibility of the in
tuitive mind they are (says Kant) ideal.

Kant does not deny the reality of things, but hav
ing established the ideality of space and time he be
lieves that,

"If we regarded space and time as properties which must le
found in objects as things-in-themselves, as sine quibus von c f
the possibility of their existence, and reflect on the absurdities in
which \ve then find our ^Ives involved, inasmuch as we are com-

1 88 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

pelled to admit the existence of two infinite things, which are
nevertheless not substances, nor anything really inhering in sub
stances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary conditions of the
existence of all things, and moreover, that they must continue to
exist, although all existing things were annihilated, — we cannot
blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusory ap
pearances. Nay, even or.r own existence which would in this case
depend upon the self-existent reality of such a mere nonentity as
time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance —
an absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of."1

Thus, Kant believes that if space and time were
objective they would impart their ideality to the ob
jective world and change it to mere appearance; by
conceiving space and time (and in addition to the
forms of our sensibility also the forms of our think
ing) as purely ideal, viz., as subjective properties of
the mind, he assures us that the world, our own ex
istence included, will be saved from the general col
lapse which it otherwise in his opinion must suffer.

KANT AND SWEDENBORG.

The development of Kant's theory of the ideality
of space and time coincides with his investigation of
Swedenborg's philosophy, if that word be applicable
to a world-conception which afterwards was denom
inated by Kant himself as "dreams of a visionary."
Swedenborgians claim that Kant was influenced by
Swedenborg in the formulation of his critical ideal
ism ; and Mr. Albert J. Edmunds discusses the sub
ject in an article which appeared in the New Church
Review, Vol. IV., No. 2, under the title: Time and
Space: Hints Given by Swedenborg to KanL While it
appears that there is less borrowing on the part of
Kant than can be made out by Swedenborg's adher-

1 Critique of Pure Reason, Supplement VI. of 2nd edition.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 189

ents, there is more justice in the claim of Sweden-
borg's influence over Kant than seems to be palatable
to such Kant scholars as is Professor Vaihinger.
Frank Sewall, the editor of the New Church Review,
goes over the field in an article entitled : Kant ana
Swedenborg on Cognition, in which he makes out a
good case scarcely less favorable for Swedenborg than
does Edmunds. The fact is that the mystical ideas
on space and time which permeate religious thought
had their effect on Swedenborg as much as on other
thinkers, mystics as well as philosophers, and among
the latter, on Kant ; and certain formulations of the
problem which can be found in Swedenborg, did not
strike Kant as much as may appear by a mere com
parison of the passages.

Mr. Edmunds quotes the following passages from
Leibnitz, on space and time :

"Since space in itself is an ideal thing like time, it must nec
essarily follow that space outside the world is imaginary, as even
the schoolmen have acknowledged it to be. The same is the case
with empty space in the world — which I still believe to be imagin
ary, for the reasons which I have set forth." (V. 33.)

" There is no space at all where there is no matter." (V. 62.)

"Space . . . is something ideal." (V. 104.)

" The immensity of God is independent of space, as the eter
nity of God is independent of time." (V. 106.)

"Had there been no creatures, space and time would only
have existed in the ideas of God." (Paper IV. 41.)

Here Leibnitz uses the very word "ideal," of both
space and time. Incidentally we must add that natu
ralists of to-day will no longer countenance Leibnitz's
view of the non-existence of empty space.

There is even the religious mysticism displayed by
Leibnitz which makes God independent of space and
time. Swedenborg says the same about the angels :

190 KAMI'S PHILOSOPHY.

"The angels have no idea of time. Such is the case in the
world of spirits and still more perfectly in heaven : how much
more before the Lord." (Arcana Ccelestia, 1274.)

It is a fact that Kant had read Swedenborg, but
the coincidences as to the ideality of space and time
and the theory of cognition are trivial as compared
with the coincidences with former philosophers, such
as Leibnitz. The truth is, we have in Swedenborg
the type of a religious thinker who formulates his
conception of space and time and other metaphysical
doctrines in the shape of mystical allegories, after the
fashion of Jacob Boehme and other religious vision
aries. It is wrong on the one side to overestimate his
mystical expressions, which are commonplace among
authors of his ilk, and, on the other hand, to ridicule
them as purely visionary, devoid of philosophical
value. It is characteristic of the human mind at a
certain stage of its development to formulate in mys
tical language philosophical conceptions which lie
beyond the grasp of the intellect of that peculiar stage
of growth. It is the religious attitude of approaching
philosophical problems in niyst:cal expressions. While
it is natural for a scientist to ridicule the mystic for
claiming to have solved the world-problem though
producing nothing but air-bubbles, it is at the same
time a one-sidedness to see in mysticism nothing but
wild and worthless hallucinations. Mysticism is a
solution of the world-problem by sentiment, and it
affords the great advantage of determining and estab
lishing the moral attitude of its devotees. Considered
as science it is absolutely worthless, considered as a
guide in life its worth is determined by the spirit of
which it is born. Where the religious sentiment i;
serious, deep, and noble, mysticism will find a poeti-

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 191

cal expression full of significance, depth, and aspira
tion. Kant as a religious man was attracted by Swe-
denborg, but when he weighed his revelations as phi
losophy he was so disappointed that he felt ashamed
of having been caught among the credulous investi
gators of occult phenomena.

Swedenborg is one of the most representative mys
tics, and while his books may be worthless as philo
sophical treatises, they are not only interesting to the
scientist because typical of a certain phase in the reli
gious development of human nature, but also classi
cal as mystical literature. The appreciation which he
has found among a number of adherents proves too
well how deeply his way of presenting metaphysical
problems in the shape of allegorical dreams is founded
in the peculiar constitution of man's spiritual system.
Those who took the trouble to investigate his miracles
and prophecies found that, however much might be
surmised, nothing could be definitely proved, except
the fact that there are people of fair and sometimes
even extraordinary intelligence who have a decided
inclination to believe in occult phenomena, that they,
though subjectively honest, can easily become con
vinced of things which they are anxious to believe,
and finally that in minds where a vivid imagination
checks the development of critical acumen, the poeti
cal conceptions of religious faith grow so definite and
concrete as to become indistinguishable from actual
life and reality.

Now, what are the lessons of the relation of mysti
cism to science?

We ought to consider that certain metaphysical
truths (as to the nature of space, time, our mode of
cognition, causation, infinity, eternity, etc.), when

192 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

stated in abstract formulas, seem dry and unmeaning
to unscientific minds, yet they possess a deep religious
significance which finds allegorical expression in the
various religious systems in myths, ceremonial insti
tutions, and dogmas. By sensual natures who cling
to the allegorical feature of the allegory, they can be
appreciated only if they are expressed in a sensual
way, if spiritual truths are told in parables of concrete
instances as if they were material facts of the material
world. It is characteristic of mystical minds to live
in an atmosphere of sensual symbolism in such a way
that they believe their own dreams, and their assur
ance makes their statement so convincing that they
easily find followers among those who are kin to them
in their mental constitution. As soon as a critical
reader tries to verify the statements of such men, he
finds himself irritated by a heap of worthless evidence,
and the result is an indignation such as Kant showed
after his perusal of Swedenborg's Arcana.

The following summarised statement of Sweden
borg's world-conception is given by Kant in his Essay
on Swcdenborg, which appeared in 1766 :l

" Each human soul has in this life its place in the spirit-world,
and belongs to a certain society, -which in every case is in harmony
with its internal condition of truth and good, that is, of under
standing and will. But the location of spirits among themselves
has nothing in common with space in the material world. The
soul of one man, therefore, in India can be next-door neighbor to
that of another in Europe, so far as spiritual position is con
cerned; while those who, as to the body, live in one house, may
I e quite far enough distant from one another as to those [that is,
spiritual] conditions. When man dies his soul does not change its
place, but only perceives itself in the same wherein, with regard
to other spirits, it already was in this life. Besides, although the

1 We quote from Mr. Albert J Edmunds's essay in the New Church Review,
Vol. IV., p. a6i.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 193

mutual relation of spirits is not in real space, yet it has to them the
appearance of space, and their relations are represented, with their
accompanying conditions, as nearnesses; their differences as dis
tances, even as the spirits themselves have not really extension,
yet present to one another the appearance of a human form. In
this imaginary space there is a plenary community of spiritual
natures. Swedenborg speaks with departed souls whenever he
pleases, etc."

Now, if we comprehend that besides the causal
connexion of things in space and time there is a logical
interrelation which appertains to pure reason, we shall
come to the conclusion that Swedenborg's ideas are
quite legitimate, if they are but understood to be poet
ical and if we are permitted to conceive them in a
strictly scientific sense. We read :

" The soul of one man in India can be next-door neighbor to
that of another in Europe so far as spiritual position is concerned;
while those who as to the body live in one house may be quite far
enough distant from one another as to those (that is, spiritual)
conditions."

Now, it is obvious that this sympathy of souls,
which is not according to space and time, but accord
ing to spiritual kinship, is quite legitimate and very
important to those who understand it. The sensual
man will find difficulty in grasping its significance, ex
cept that it be stated to him in a sensual way. Ob
viously, it is true that "spirits themselves have not
really extension." Their interrelation is of a different
kind. But if we imagine them, as Swedenborg does,
"to present to one another the appearance of a hu
man form," we conceive of their existence as though
it were in space, another kind of space than that filled
by matter, and "in this imaginary space there is a
plenary community of spiritual natures." Thus logi
cians represent the interrelation between genus and

194 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

species by geometrical figure, the one including the
oilier.

Swedenborg is simply a man whose imagination is
so vivid and whose scientific criticism is so little de
veloped that the imaginary space invented to repre
sent the interrelations of spiritual realities which are
in neither space nor time, becomes an actual space
to him ; his spirits become materialised shapes, and
thus it happens that he can speak "with departed
souls whenever he pleases." A scientist too, a his
torian or a naturalist, can consult the wisdom of the
departed spirits. He can make himself acquainted
with the views of Newton, of Goethe, of Kant; he
can incorporate their souls in his own being, but being
of a critical nature, he will not see them as bodily
shapes. It is characteristic of mystics that their im
agination outruns their sobriety, and thus the flights
of their fancy become real to them.

While it is not impossible that Swedenborg be
came the fulcrum on which Kant elaborated his meta
physics, we may at the same time justify the oppo
site statement that Kant's relation to Swedenborg is
purely incidental and without significance. The elab
oration of his theories as to space and time and cogni
tion, Kant made at the time when he read Sweden-
borg's works, but we must be aware of the fact that
Kant was familiar with mystic views in general, and
Swedenborg's expressions did not strike him as much
as it might appear to those who compare Swedenborg
and Kant only, but have no reference to Leibnitz and
other thinkers. Certainly, Kant would have come to
the same conclusion if he had dealt with any other
thinker of a similar type, Jacob Boehme, or even
spirits on a lower level in the line of mysticism.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 195

While Kant's statements show a certain resem
blance to those of S\vedenborg, we find that their
agreement with Leibnitz (a philosopher whom both
Immanuels, the great mystic as well as the great
critic, had studied carefully) is much closer. We shall
at the same time understand why Kant exhibited a de
cided contempt and scorn for the dreamy haziness of
these visionaries, which, when dealing with scientific
problems, is sterile and unprofitable. In contrasting
the philosophical study of metaphysics with those
vague fancies of religio-philosophical dreams, Kant
compared the latter to the intangible shade of a de
parted spirit, quoting Virgil's well-known verses where
Mneas in the under-world tries to embrace the soul of
his departed father, Anchises.1 Kant says:

" Metaphysics, with whom it is my destiny to be in love, offers
two advantages, although I have but seldom been favored by her:
the first is, to solve the problems which the investigating mind
raises when it is on the track of the more hidden properties of
things through reason. But here the result very frequently de
ceives hope, and has also in this case escaped our longing hands.
"Ter frustra comprensa manus effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno." — (VIRGIL.)
[Thrice I tried to embrace and thrice it escaped me, the image,
Airy and light as the wind, and to volatile dreams to be likened.]

KANT'S ANTINOMIES.

After this digression we revert to Kant's idealism
And will now point out the result to which it leads.

Kant, as we have seen, protests against being an
idealist in the sense that the reality of the external
world of objects or things be denied. His idealism
insists only on the ideality of space and time ; and by
ideality he understands subjectivity. But together

, Book VI., Verses 701-702.

196 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

with time and space all our forms of thought are as
sumed to be purely ideal. Hence there is a rift rend
ing asunder form and substance, thought and reality,
representative image or phenomenon and the repre
sented objects. We know phenomena, not noumena.
Things in themselves are unknowable, for the laws of
pure form have reference to appearances only.

If purely formal thought has no objective value, it
can be used merely to decide problems that lie within
the range of experience — the domain of appearance;
but things in themselves, the domain of transcendent
existence, lies without the pale of any possible knowl
edge.

Kant's method of dealing with these subjects is
peculiar. He neither leaves them alone nor solves
them, but formulates the affirmations as well as the
negations of a series of contradictory statements in
what he calls "the antinomies." Here the weakness
of Kant's philosophy comes out, indicating that there
must be a flaw in it somewhere.

It is interesting to notice that as to Kant's Antino
mies of Pure Reason the great Konigsberg philosopher
has been anticipated by Buddhism in which (accord
ing to Neumann's Reden Gautama's, Vol. II., Nos. 60
and 72) the antinomies are taught in a similar, partly
literally in the same, form. But there, too, the con
tradiction belongs to the formulation of the statement
of facts, not to the facts themselves.

In a certain sense we can say, the world must have
had a beginning, and must come to an end ; and the
world had no beginning and can have no end. If we
speak of this definite nebular system of stars compris
ing the entire milky way we are compelled to admit
that it began and will at some definite though distant

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 197

future be dissolved again ; but if we mean by world
the totality of existence in all its shapes, prior forms
and causes of origin, we must own that it has existed
and ever will exist. We could go back in thought to
the time before the present cosmos started, when
other worlds were evolving or dissolving and a differ
ent kind of universe or condition of things prevailed
and so on without coming to an end. But these con
ditions being the causes of the present world are in
cluded in our concept of the universe. The antino
mies are due to the equivocal significance of our
words, not to a fault of reason ; nor do they indicate
that existence itself is self-contradictory. The con
tradiction is not in the things but in our conception
of things.1

Schopenhauer has vigorously attacked Kant on
account of his antinomies, insinuating weakness and
hypocrisy. But it seems to us, while by no means
agreeing with Kant on this particular point, that
granting his premises his conclusion was justified.
The four points of the antinomies, viz., the eternity
and infinite divisibility of the world, the contrast of
freedom to causation and the existence of God, are
no longer of a purely formal nature; some notions of
experience are inevitably mixed up in them, and thus

iThat the antinomies cannot be regarded as true antinomies or contra
dictions of reason, but as the result of a misconception and lack of clearness
in our formulation of the several problems, becomes apparent in the antin
omy of freedom -versus necessity. Karl's definition of freedom (§ 53) as a fac
ulty of starting a chain of events spontaneously without antecedent causes
and his way of reconciling freedom and nature (or as we would say " deter
minism") is subject to serious criticism. Compare the author's solution of
the problem in Fundamental Problems, pp. 191-196; Ethical Problems, pp. 45-
50, 152-156; Primer of Philosophy, pp. 159-164; Soul of Man, pp. 389-397. See
also The Monist, Vol. III., pp. 611 ff., "The Future in Mental Causation."
Concerning the ought and its assumed mysterious nature compare the chap
ters "The Is and the Ought " and "An Analysis of the Moral Ought," in The
Ethical Problem, pp. 279-295.

igS

pure reason is unable to decide either way. We might
as well try to determine by a pru,ri considerations as
to whether or not electricity can be produced by fric
tion, or whether or not by rubbing an old metal lamp
the genii of the lamp will appear. Hence, before the
tribunal of pure reason either side, the affirmative as
well as the negative, is defensible, and thus we should
be obliged to settle the question with other methods ;
other methods, however, according to Kant's notions
concerning the nature of metaphysical questions,
would not be admissible, because he insists that all
metaphysical notions must be derived from pure con
cepts alone.

KANT'S PROBLEM.

Kant's philosophy has become the beginning of a
: *w epoch in the evolution of human thought through
a formulation of its basic problem and by starting out
in the right direction for its solution ; but Kant has
not spoken the final word.

Kant was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by
Hume's scepticism, and it was Hume's problem as to
the nature of causation which prompted him to strike
a new path in the conception of philosophical prob
lems.

Kant threw light on Hume's problem by general
ising it and recognising the kinship of the concep
tion of causation to mathematics and logic, all of them
beiiig purely formal knowledge. The significance of
forrm I thought and its power of affording a priori cog-
nitioi •, is Kant's peculiar problem.

It s generally conceded that Kant solved Hume's
probl n, but he failed to solve his own.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 199

By a strange misapprehension of the nature of form
and its non-objectivity, he has switched off into an
idealism (so called by himself) which it will be hard
to distinguish from that subjectivism which he as
sumed Berkeley's philosophy to be. The difference
between the two (in Kant's opinion) consists in this,
that according to Kant, the world itself is real but in
the form in which it represents itself in space and
time it is phenomenal, while he declares that accord
ing to Berkeley the world itself is "illusory appear
ance." Further Kant insists that the world as appear
ance, though purely phenomenal, is not an arbitrary
illusion, but governed by laws which render it neces
sary in all its details.

The great merit of Kant is his wonderfully keen
discrimination between the purely formal and the sen
sory, showing that the former is throughout universal
and necessary in its principles, while the latter is in
cidental and concrete or particular; but he fails to
apply the same discrimination to his conception of
experience and to the objects of experience, and thus
he limits the formal to the subject, while it is obvi
ously the universal feature of all existence, objective
as well as subjective, constituting between them the
connecting link that makes science, i. e., objective
cognition, possible.

Before we examine Kant's position, we must first
discuss, at least briefly, Hume's problem and offer the
solution in the form which Kant, in our opinion, ought
to have given it. It will then be easy to point out the
error that led him astray and prevented him from
offering a definite and final doctrine as to the nature
of form which should become the basis of all scientific
inquiry, and enable philosophy to become a science a?

200 KANT S PHILOSOPHY.

definite, or nearly so, as are mathematics and logic,
or even physics.

HUME'S PROBLEM.

Locke objected to the doctrine of innate ideas,
claiming that all ideas were the products of sense-
impressions, and he excepted only one idea, viz., the
principle of necessary connexion, i. e., causality.
Hume accepted Locke's sensualism, but, endeavoring
to be more consistent, drew its last consequence by
denying even the idea of cause and effect as a neces
sary connexion. He argued that we meet with con
stant conjunctions in experience, but not with neces
sity. By habit we are compelled to expect that upon
every cause its due effect will follow, but there is no
reason to assume that causation is due to a universal
and necessary law of objective validity. Hume saw
in the relation between cause and effect a synthesis,
calling it "the sequence of two objects"; and if it
were a synthesis, or a mere sequence, he would be
right that the connexion between cause and effect is
accidental and our belief in its necessity a mere habit.

The truth is that causation is not a sequence of
two objects following one another, but one process, a
motion, or a change of place ; and the simplest kind
of motion implies that there are at least three phases
or states of things in the system in which the motion
takes place : first the original condition (which for sim
plicity's sake we may assume to be in a relative equi
librium); secondly, the motion disturbing the equi
librium so as to make one or several elements in the
system seek new places; and thirdly, the new adjust
ment (which for simplicity's sake we will again regard
as being in equilibrium). The first phase is called

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY, 201

the conditions or circumstances, the second is the
cause, and the third the effect. Cause and effect are
not combined into a unity by the compulsion of a law
of necessary connexion ; they are two phases of one
and the same process. The duality is a product of
abstraction ; the unity of the two is the original fact,
and we know now that causality is but another ex
pression for the law of the conservation of matter and
energy. The naturalist assumes that matter and en
ergy are indestructible, and thus every process that
takes place in nature is only a transformation. Ac
cordingly, our belief in causation is after all, although
Hume denied it, finally based upon the logical prin
ciple of identity A=A. It is an extension of this prin
ciple to a state of motion.

, Cause, accordingly, is never an object, but always
an event, viz., a motion of some kind. We cannot
call the bullet the cause and death the effect ; or mer
cury the cause and paralysis the effect; or worse still
(as says George Lewes) that whiskey, water, sugar,
and lemon are the causes of punch.

We distinguish between cause and reason, reason
being the law under which a single event is subsumed
for the sake of explaining the effectiveness of the
cause.1

IThe instinct of language has here proved wiser than the scholarship of
philosophers. All European languages (the Greek, the Latin, together with
its derivatives the French, Italian, etc., the German, the English) distin
guish between " ain'a, causa, Ursache (from the same root as the English verb
'to seek') cause," and "apx*? (i. e., first principle) ratio, Grund, reason,"
the former being the particular incident that starts a process, the latter the
raison d'ftre, the principle, or general rule, the natural law that explains it.
When the two ideas are confounded as has been done frequently by philoso
phers, the greatest confusion results leading to such self-contradictory no
tions as " causa suz," "first cause," "ultimate cause," etc., which lead either
to agnosticism or to mysticism. For further details see the author's Primer
of Philosophy, the chapter on Causation, pp. 30-34, and Fundamental Prot-
Itms, pp. 29-30.

202 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

Kant, following the suggestion of Hurne, devoted
special attention to the problem of causality, but he
solved it by simply declaring that it wss a concept
a priori, and thus belonged to the same class of
truths as mathematical, arithmetical, and logical the
orems. He never attempted to explain its truth, let
alone to prove it, or to demonstrate its universality
and necessity. Mathematicians deem it necessary to
prove their theorems, but Kant, strange to say, neg
lected to deduce the law of causation from simpler
truths or analyse it into its elements. If Kant had
made attempts to analyse causation for the sake of
proving its validity after the fashion of logicians and
mathematicians, he might, with his keen insight into
the nature of physical laws and natural sciences, have
anticipated the discovery of the law of the conserva
tion of matter and energy, and might furthermore have
been preserved from the error of his subjectivism
which affected the whole system of his thought and
twisted his philosophy out of shape.

KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant's position re
mains unintelligible; we understand his arguments
and may even approve the several statements from
which they proceed, but we are astonished at the bold
ness of the conclusion, and fail to be convinced. His
objections to the belief in space and time as objective
things hold good only if space and time are assumed
to be things or objects; but not if they are thought to
be mere forms of objects. They are thinkable as forms
of thought not less than as forms of objects. When
assumed to be solely forms ot thought to the exclu
sion of the idea that there are any objective relations

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 203

corresponding to them, they become mysterious and
quite mystical, and here lies the reason why Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason is actually mystifying. He
bewilders the reader. We become acquainted with
his argument but do not feel sure that we have rightly
apprehended his meaning. In the Prolegomena Kant
is, at least, not unintelligible. The Prolegomena are
not deductive, but inductive. In them Kant leads us
the way he travelled himself, and this is the reason of
the importance of the Prolegomena. Kant embodied
their contents in various places into the second edi
tion of his Critique of Pure Reason. But the passages
are scattered and lose the plainness and power which
they possess in the context of the Prolegomena. Here
we are face to face with Kant as a man ; he gives us
a personal reply, as if he were interviewed ; and while
we grant the significance of transcendentalism and the
truth of many of his observations and deductions, we
can at the same time understand how he arrived at
errors. We can lay our finger on the very spot where
he went astray, and I cannot but wonder at the cour
age of this undaunted thinker who abided by the con
sequences of an apparently trivial fallacy, due to the
neglect to investigate one feature of the problem to
which he devoted many years of his life in profound
reflexion and close study.

Kant was puzzled that we could know anything a
priori concerning the formal constitution of things.
The celestial bodies obey laws which man develops
out of his mind. That the highest (i. e., the most
general or universal) laws of nature should happen to
be the same as the highest (i. e. , the formal) laws of
the thinking mind, and yet should be of an indepen
dent origin, seemed absurd to Kant. He saw only

204 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

two possibilities; either, he said, we have derived our
formal knowledge from the things by experience, or
we ourselves have put it into the things to which it
really does not belong. The former possibility is ex
cluded, because, says Kant (Prolegomena, § 9), "The
properties of a thing cannot migrate into my faculty
of representation," while on the other hand the purely
formal truths are not derived from experience, but
produced by the mind as cognitions a priori. Thus,
Kant accepts the other horn of the dilemma, declar
ing (Prolegomena, § 36) that our faculty of cognition
does not conform to the objects, but contrariwise, that
the objects conform to cognition. Objects, he claimed,
do not in themselves possess form, but our mind is so
constituted that it cannot help attributing form and
everything formal to the object of our experience.

IDEALITY NOT SUBJECTIVITY.

Now, it is true that our purely formal notions of
mathematical and logical truths are ideal (made of
the stuff that ideas consist of), but being purely formal
they are definitely determined, that is to say that,
wherever the same constructions are made, either by
the operations of other minds or of natural conditions
in the facts of objective reality, they will be found to
be the same. Thus, our mental constructions can re
construct the processes and formations of nature, and
we can learn to predetermine the course of natural
events.

Kant did not see that form might be a property of
all existence and that, in that case, the purely formal
in things would be of the same nature as the purely
formal in man's mind. It is true that the properties

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 205

of things do not migrate from the objects into the sub
ject, but they make impressions upon the senses and
these several impressions possess analogies to the
qualities by which they are caused. The analogies
between matter and sensation seem much more arbi
trary than those between the shapes of things and the
outlines of our sense-images. Nevertheless even here
we grant that the reduction of the latter to universal
laws is purely subjective, for there are no laws, qua
formulated laws, in the objective world, there are only
uniformities. But if we understand by the term law
a description of uniformities we must see at once that
there are objective realities (or rather features of real
ity) corresponding to our correct notions of the sev
eral formal laws.

If the uniformities of nature are not transferred
to the mind directly, but if the purely formal con
cepts nre developed independently of sense-experience
a priori, how is it possible that the two present the
wonderful agreement that puzzled Kant?

Nature is throughout activity, and so is our exist
ence. Nature is constantly combining and separating ;
we observe transformations; things move about; and
their constituent parts change places. Similar ope
rations are inalienable functions of the mind. The
subtlest analysis as well as the most complicated com
position and every investigation, be it ever so intri
cate, are mere combinations and separations, activi
ties given together with our existence.

The arguments of Kant by which he proves the
apriority of purely formal laws must be granted to be
true. The source of all purely formal thought is the
mind, and not sense-perceptions. They are ideal.
But the mind has been built up by experience, viz.,

206 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

by sense-impressions of different but definite forms,
and the formal order of objective nature is the mould
in which the mind has been formed. The brute can
not as yet analyse sensations into their forms and ma
terials, i. e., into the purely relational and the purely
sensory features ; but man can ; and when he has ac
quired the power of abstraction he can build models
of forms, exhausting the entire scope of all possible
cases, and these models serve him as examples of the
several analogous formations of nature. Accordingly,
our mental constitution, though a subjective construc
tion, is built up with materials quarried from the
formal uniformities of objective nature. Thus the
spider undoubtedly weaves his web from his own bod
ily self, but the materials have first been deposited
there by nature. Man's mind is not less than the spi
der's silken thread, produced by, and remaining a part
and an expression of, that great All-Being in which
all creatures live and move and have their being.

.There is this difference between the spider's web
and formal thought : the former consists of matter,
the pure forms of mathematical, logical, and other
ideas are immaterial ; they are abstracts made of the
purely relational features of sense-impressions. They
are ideal, viz., mental pictures, and as such they are
subjective. But they are not purely subjective. The
sensory part of a retinal image is purely subjective,
but the formal preserves in a reduced size the projec
tion of the shape of the object. Form belongs to the
object as well as to its subjective image, and thus the
subjective conception of form possesses an objective
value.

Everything ideal is subjective, but it need not be
purely subjective. Because the rational is ideal, it by

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 207

no means follows that it is not, and cannot be, objec
tive.

When \ve construct some purely formal configura-
t'on with our nature-given mental operations, it will
I>e the same as any other construction which has been
made in the same way, be it in the domain either of
things or of other minds. Nature performs the same
operations which appear in man's mental activity.
Man being a part of existence, what is more natural
than that his bodily and mental constitution partakes
of the same form as all the other parts of the world
that surrounds him?

A great and important part of our knowledge con
sists of purely formal theorems ; they are a priori. And
these purely formal theorems contain actual informa
tion concerning the formal aspect of the real world.
And why? Because they are systematic reconstruc
tions of the formal features of reality by imitating
operations of motion which take place throughout the
universe.

All formal theorems have a general application,
hence, whenever applicable, they afford a priori in
formation and can be employed as a key to unlock the
mysteries of the unknown.

By the rule of three we calculate the distance from
the earth to the sun, and map out the paths of the
several celestial bodies.

When Kant says: Our mind "dictates" certain
laws to the objects of experience, he uses a wrong ex
pression or takes a poetical license seriously. The
mind "dictates" nothing to reality. Reality includ
ing its form is such as it is independently of what we
think it to be. That which Kant calls dictating is a
mere determining, a description, implying at the same

208 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

time a foretelling or predicting of natural events which
(as we saw) is done by constructing in our mind anal
ogous models. The agreement between our model
and reality proves only that the scheme on which the
model has been constructed is correct ; it does not
prove that the model does any dictating. The model
dictates as little to reality as a barometer dictates what
air-pressure there is to be in the atmosphere.

THE FORMAL AND THE SENSORY.

While we must object to Kant's doctrine that
everything ideal is subjective and that what is directly
derived from the mind cannot be objective, we must
not (with the Sensualists) place the formal and the
sensual on tht same level. Kant is right that space
and time are not objects or things or entities ; they
are forms, and as forms they possess the quality of
being empty. There is no particularity about them
anywhere. Thus, space is space anywhere; it is not
like matter, denser here and looser there; nor like
energy, here intense, there weak. Considered in it
self, space is the mere potentiality of existence. It is
a description ol. the condition of granting motion to
move in all directions. Its very indifference and ab
sence of anything particular implies uniformity ; and
thus the laws of potentiality (i. e., the qualities of
possible forms) are mere schedules ; they are empty
in themselves, but possess universal application.1

The formal aspect of reality is its suchness; the
material elerrent is its thisness. All suchness can be

*ntbi have been felt by philosophers of all nations, and it is sur
prising to £TM? *.bem in the writings of Lao Tze and the Buddhist scriptures
in both of which the absence of materiality, the not-being, plays an impor
tant part aid *B endowed with religious sanctity.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 209

formulated in general, and even in universal, descrip
tions ; all thisness is individual and particular. State
ments of a general nature, such as are formulated by
employing the methods of formal thought, are not
single and concrete facts, but omnipresent and eter
nal laws ; they are true or untrue, correct or incor
rect. Facts of thisness are always in a special time
and in a special spot in space. They are definite nunc
and hie, not a semper and ubique. They are not true
or untrue, but real or unreal.

The essential feature of things is their form ; for
their form, which is their suchness, viz., their exter
nal shape as well as internal structure, constitutes
their character, their soul, their spiritual significance,
making them what they are. Their thisness is their
concrete presence which actualises the thing as a
stubborn fact of the material universe.

It is true that the sense-pictures in which the
world is represented to us are subjective; they are
appearances or phenomena; it is further true that
these pictures are radically different from the thirgs
which they represent. The color-sensation red has
no similarity (as Kant rightly observes) to the physi
cal qualities of vermillion ; and physicists have suffi
ciently penetrated into the constitution of matter of
any kind (though most of the problems remain still
unsolved) to convince us that matter as it is in itself
is radically different from the subjective picture as
which it presents itself to the senses. But the scien
tist assumes form to be objective, and all the theories
as to the constitution of matter, in chemistry as well
as in the several branches of physics, are based on
the principle of eliminating the subjective element,
that is to sa37. the properly sensory ingredients of our

2IO KANT S PHILOSOPHY.

experience, by reducing them to statements in purely
formal terms, which is done by measuring, by count
ing, by weighing, by defining their proportions, by
describing their shape and structure, by determining
their relations ; and if we have succeeded in doing so,
we claim to have understood the objective nature of
things. How can Kant's statement be upheld, that
the sensation red is not an objective quality of ver-
million ? Is it not because physics has taught us that
difference of color depends upon a difference of wave
length in ether vibration? Kant's argument is based
upon a tacit but indispensable recognition of the ob
jectivity of form and formal qualities.

Therefore, while granting that the sense-begotten
world-picture of our intuition is subjective appear
ance (cf. footnote on page 232), we claim in contrast
to Kant that its formal elements represent a feature
that inheres in existence as the form of existence.

In making form purely subjective, Kant changes
—notwithstanding his protestations — all ideas, all
thoughts, all science, into purely subjective conceits.
He is more of an idealist than Berkeley. Science can
be regarded as an objective method of cognition only
if the laws of form are objective features of reality

THE MORAL ASPECT.

An incidental remark on the moral aspect of the
contrast between the purely formal and the sensory
would not seem out of place here. Man has risen from
the sensual plane into the abstract realms of reason,
and morality becomes possible only by man's ability to
make general principles the basis of his actions. Thus
it happens that at a certain period of man's develop
ment the sensory is regarded as the lower, and gen-

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY, 211

eralisations with what they imply, ideals, maxims,
abstract thought, as the higher. The sensory is thus
discriminated against and even denounced as the en
emy of the spiritual. Hence the dualistic phase in
the religious and philosophical evolution of mankind
in which sensuality is branded as sin and salvation
sought in asceticism, i. e., the mortification of the
body.

We must consider, however, that the contrast be
tween form and matter, general law and particular
existence, the ideal and sensory, spirit and matter,
does not imply a contradictory antithesis, let alone
any hostility or exclusivity of the two. That the spir
itual, viz., the conception of the purely formal with
reason and its generalisations, develops only on a
higher plane, cannot be used to incriminate the sen
sory and the bodily. On the contrary, the spiritual
justifies the sensory and points out the higher aims
which it can attain.

And how indispensable is the sensory in religion!
Consider but love, so much insisted on by the preach
ers of almost all higher faiths. Is it not even in its
present form a sentiment, i. e., a sensory emotion?
The truth is that morality consists in the sanctifica-
tion of the sensory, not in its eradication ; and sancti-
fication means setting aside and devoting to a special
purpose, to the exclusion of a general use. Particu
larity is the nature of bodily existence and particu
larity demands exclusiveness. Any general use of
bodily functions will prostitute them. Reason, on the
contrary, is meant for general use and can never surfer
from a general application.

Kant's conception of morality is based upon rea
son, to the exclusion of sentiment. Reason makes

212 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

action according to principles or maxims possible,
and all those maxims are moral which can become
universally established. Thus the basis of ethics is
the golden rule, pronounced by Confucius, Christ, and
other religious leaders of mankind. Lao-Tze says of
the sage: "His methods invite requital."1

FORM BOTH SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE.

We believe we have satisfactorily explained the
problem of the a priori, of the purely formal, which
puzzled Kant; we have further shown how and why
the laws of purely formal thought agree with the
highest laws of nature ; why being devoid of particu
larity they are universal (implying necessity); and
there remains only to be pointed out that the validity
of science rests upon the assurance of the identity of
the subjective and the objective laws of form. Form,
being common to both domains, the objectivity cf
things and the subjectivity of the mind, serves as a
bridge on which cognition can advance into the un
known realms of objective existence, and thus the
formal sciences constitute our organ of cognition, the
objective reliability of which depends upon form be
ing an objective feature of things.

It goes without saying that all that Kant says
concerning their infinity, uniqueness, universality,
and necessity as being against the belief that space
and time are objects or things holds good; it proves
that they are forms. Yet though they must not be
regarded as objects, they are objective ; they are the
forms of intuition but also of the objects intuited.
Further, what Kant says (relying on symmetry as in

1 Tao-Teh-King, Chapter 30.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 213

tuitively perceived) to prove that they are forms of
intuitions and not concepts, holds as well to prove
that they are sighted forms of existence, not inter
nally hidden qualities of a stuffy, thingish nature to
be distilled from sense-perception in the alembic of
the observation before its existence can be known. It
is true that the world as it appears to us is a sense-
woven, subjective picture ; things as we perceive them
are phenomena. Further, our concepts, including the
world-conception of science, which is built up with
the help of the purely formal laws of thought, is a
mental construction ; they are noumena. Both worlds,
that of sense and that of thought, are subjective; but
they represent reality ; the senses picture the world in
the beauteous glow of sensations, and the mind de
scribes it in the exact measures of formal determina
tions ; but the latter, if true, offers an objectively valid
model of the constitution of things, explaining their
suchness without, however, giving any information as
to the nature of reality in itself, i. e., what matter is
in itself; whether it is eternal or not; why it exists;
and if it came into being, or how it happened to orig
inate. It is obvious that things are not matter, but
matter of a definite form ; the form is cognisable,
while matter is simply the indication of their concrete
reality as objects in the objective world.

SUBJECTIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF OBJECTIVE
VALIDITY.

Kant in discriminating between empirical percep
tion (viz., the sense impressions possessing only sub
jective validity) and experience (viz., the product of
sense-impressions worked out by the a priori methods
of pure reason imparting to our judgments universal-

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

ity and necessity)1 goes far in refuting himself and his
pet theory. He speaks of universality and necessity
as the only means by which the subjective elements
can become objectively valid. He claims, e. g., to
"have amply shown that they (the concepts of the
pure understanding, causality, including also mathe
matics, etc.) and the theorems derived from them are
firmly established a priori, or before all experience,
and have their undoubted objective value, though only
with regard to experience."

If the concepts of the pure understanding have
objective value, why are they not objective? Why
must they be regarded as purely subjective? We
grant the strength of Kant's argument that, being un
equivocally creations of the mind independent of
sense-experience, or, as Kant calls them, a priori.
they are subjective. But is not the question legiti
mate that they may be at once subjective and objec
tive? Kant disposes of this question too quickly, and
here lies his mistake: instead of investigating how
certain uniformities of law may be at once indigen
ously subjective, i. e., originated by purely mental
operations, and at the same time objective, i. e., ac-
tualised by the operations of material bodies in the
concrete world of real existence, he jumps at the con
clusion that all things ideal are necessarily purely
subjective. The ideal, viz., all that belongs to the
realm of ideas, is subjective, but it has objective va
lidity, and that which gives it objective validity is the
mind's power of forming universal and necessary
judgments. In fact, the terms universal and neces
sary would have no sense if they were limited to the
realm of subjectivity and if objective validity did not

1 Prolegomena, § 2 ff.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 215

imply true objectivity. Hence our aim is to explain
the correspondence between the subjective and the
objective, and we come to the conclusion that the
a priori judgments are based upon the conditions of
pure form, and form is a quality of the object as well
as of the subject.

Thus while Kant's doctrine implies that

the forms of intuition (space and time) and the
formal laws are a priori in the mind ; therefore
they are purely subjective and the intuiting and
thinking subject transfers them upon the objec
tive world ;
our position is the reverse.

What Kant calls a priori is purely formal; there
fore the mind can produce its laws and theorems by
purely mental operations, yet at the same time, being
purely formal, they apply to objective reality as the
formal conditions of all objects, and thus the opera
tions of objects, as far as their formal conditions are
concerned, bear a close analogy to the a priori theo
rems.

We construct the purely formal in our mind, but
we do not create it. Nor are the propositions of
mathematics a quality of space. We do not deduce
the Pythagorean theorem from space, but we con
struct a right-angled triangle and investigate the re
suits of our construction. Accordingly the theorems
thus evolved are products of our mental operations
executed on conditions given in our space conception.
There are no mathematical theorems in the stellar
universe, but there are conditions in the starry heav
ens which make it possible to calculate distances or
other relations with the help of arithmetical computa
tions and geometric constructions. And the condi-

216 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

tions which make this possible can only be the objec
tivity of form implying that the a priori laws of
subjective form as constructed in our mental models
possess an objective validity.

THE OBJECTIVE ANALOGUES OF MENTAL CON
STRUCTIONS.

Zeno's paradox and the difficulties which Clifford
found in the continuity conception of space, it seems
to me, arise from a direct identification of the mental
construction of space with the objective formal fea
tures of things that constitute what may be called ob
jective space. Objective space is an inherent quality
of things as the relational of their parts and is not, as
in subjective space, a construction. The path of a
body can be represented by a mathematical line, and
aline is infinitely divisible ; but for that reason it is
not composed of infinite parts. Nor has a moving
body to construct a line of an infinite number of in
finitely minute parts by adding them piecemeal. The
mental analysis and construction of a line is different
from traversing it. For moving over a definite stretch
of ground it is not necessary to go through the pro
cess of separately adding the imaginary infinitely
small parts of which it is supposed to consist and into
which it may be divided. It has not actually been
divided, it is only infinitely divisible.

It is true that time (as time) is purely subjective,
but there is a reality that corresponds to time. Time
is the measure of motion. We count the running sand
of the hour-glass, we divide the face of the sun-dial,
we build a clock to determine the lapse of time.
There is no time (as time) in the objective world,
but there are motions, such as the revolutions of the

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 217

earth round its axis, or round the sun, and these mo
tions possess succession with definite duration, ren
dering time, viz., their determination, possible. Dura
tion with succession of events in the world of things
is the objective equivalent of time. The measurement
of time is a subjective device.

The same is true of space as a conception of the
extended world of things. There is no space concep
tion in things, but bodies are extended ; and their re
lation among themselves is an arrangement of in
numerable juxtapositions. Extension, juxtaposition,
direction of motion, is the objective quality of things
that corresponds to the purely mental concept of
space.

The untrained and philosophically crude man
transfers subjective conceptions of things directly
upon the objective world. He speaks of light and
colors, of sounds, of time and numbers and things as
existing outside of his mind; but a close inspection of
the origin of mind will teach us to discriminate be
tween sound and air waves, between colors and the
cause of colors (produced by a commotion in the
ether, — a reality whose existence is directly imper
ceptible and can only be deduced indirectly by argu
ment). We shall learn by reflexion that geometrical
lines are purely mental constructions, but that the
paths of the stars possess qualities (viz., all those
which depend upon purely formal conditions) that
closely correspond to the conic sections of mathe
matics.

Further, it becomes obvious that our division of
the world into separate things is artificial, for things
are only clusters of predicates which impress us as
being units. The truth is that the world is so consti-

218 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

tuted as to render a perfect separation impossible.
Things are in a perpetual flux, and the limits between
them are arbitrary. As the whole atmosphere and its
pressure belong to our lungs, so the gravity of the sun
is an integral part of the weight of the earth. Thus
we can truly say that there are no separate things ex
cept in our minds where they are artificial divisions
invented for the practical purpose of describing the
world, of mapping out its parts, of comprehending
its actions and having a means of adjusting ourselves
to our surroundings.

Logic is purely mental, but there is something in
the objective world that tallies with logic ; we call it
natural law, but the term law is misleading. There
are no laws in nature, but only uniformities resulting
from the condition that the purely formal is the same
everywhere and that the same formal conditions will
produce the same formal effects.

Purely formal laws are universally valid only as
purely formal laws. Twice two will be four in all
arithmetical systems of any possible rational being,
and the statement is universally valid so far as pure
forms are concerned. If we deal with actualities pos
sessed of additional qualities where multiplication
ceases to have its strict mathematical sense, the state
ment will no longer be tenable. The accumulation of
power on a definite occasion may have results that
cannot be calculated by addition or multiplication.
The associated wealth of twice two millions may far
exceed four millions ; and twice one half will never be
one when we deal with living organisms. All this is
conceded. Ideal operations are purely mental and as
such subjective, but for all that they possess objec
tive validity which implies that there are objective

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 219

features exhibiting close analogies, by being products
of a fundamental sameness of conditions. This funda
mental sameness is the universality of form which is
common to both the domain of the objective world
and the ideal realm of the mind, the thinking subject
There are neither categories nor classes in the ob
jective world, but the different modes of existence are
classified by sentient beings and the scheme of the
classification is the result. A reflexion upon our modes
of thought objectifies them as modes of existence.
The Platonic ideas, i. e. , the eternal types of the vari
ous beings, do not possess a concrete existence as do,
e. g., the moulds of a potter, but there are uniformi
ties among the living forms which are obviously ap
parent. The doctrine of evolution proves that the
lines of division between the types of beings are not
so distinct in reality as they seem to be, and before a
strictly scientific inspection they fade away as imag
inary; yet they remain and are indispensable for our
method of classification ; and the unities which they
represent justify us in speaking of objective features
as corresponding to the mental conception of Platonic
ideas.

THE ORIGIN OF GENERALISATIONS.

The sense-impressions of things are registered ac
cording to their difference of form. Every sense-im
pression runs along in the groove prepared for it by a
former sense-impression. Thus the same is registered
with the same, and similar ones are correlated. The
result is a systematisation of sensory impressions, and
the relations that obtain in this system which is built
up in the natural course of growth, may appropriately
be compared to the pigeon-holes of a methodically

220 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

arranged cabinet. The difference between the cabinet
with pigeon-holes and the human mind is this, that
the former is artificial, the latter natural. The human
mind with its rationality has been developed accord
ing to mechanical law and the classification of sense-
impressions is done by it as automatically as the dis
tribution of the different letters in a type-distributing
machine.

Our ideas, our names of things, our system of
classification is purely subjective, but there is an ob
jective analogue of the eternal types, which consists
in the uniformities of all possible formations. This is
true of living creatures as well as of machines and
other concepts of human fancy. In the domain of
invention we know very well that the inventor some
times creates a combination of parts never actual-
ised before on earth ; but the inventor is a finder: he
is as much a discoverer as Columbus who found a
new continent, or the scientist who succeeds in formu
lating an unknown law. America existed before Co
lumbus, the law of gravitation held good before New
ton, and the idea of a steam engine was a realisable
combination before James Watts. It is a feature of
objective existence that certain functions can be per
formed in perfectly definite interrelations. Such con
ditions which are actualised by a certain combination
and disappear as soon as the combination is destroyed,
are the objective features in things which justify the
subjective idea of unities finding expression in con-
cepts of things and beings.

THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON.

Kant grants the objective applicability of the cate
gories but he denies the validity of the ideas of pure

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 221

reason, especially the cosmological, the psychological,
and the theojogical idea. We are unable to follow
Kant and are inclined to consider his three ideas of
Pure Reason in the same light as time and space and
the categories. The concept of unity is not a mere
assumption but it has its correspondent analogue in
reality1 and has its practical use; only we must be
ware of treating unities as concrete objectivities, as
separate and discrete entities, as things in themselves
which have an objective existence apart from and in
dependently of their constituent parts. Thus the soul
of man is as real on the assumption of an ego entity
as on the theory of its denial. Life is as true whether
or not vitalism can be established. The world is a
great interrelated system, whether or not the uniform
ities of nature are called laws. There is a creation
of the world, a formation of its life, a dispensation
of its destinies, taking place, whether or not this ulti
mate norm of being be called God; the facts of the
cosmic order remain the same on the assumptions of
both theism and atheism. But obviously, this deci
sion is not an endorsement of Kant's antinomies, but
an explanation of his reasons for formulating them.

While we grant that there is a reality correspond
ing to Kant's three ideas of pure reason, we do not
mean to say that there is a God such as the crude be
lief of an untrained mind represents him to be, nor
further that there is a soul such as it is assumed to
exist in the annals of superstition, nor finally that the
crude notions of a cosmos, the limits of the world or
its infinitude, its composition, its determinedness, and

IThus not only all organisms are unities, but also steam-engines, dy
namos, or any machinery that would not work unless it were constructed of
interacting parts in a definite way.

222 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

its absolute existence should be such as abstract rea
son might arbitrarily construct: we only mean to say
that there are factors in life which caused man to con
struct such mental images or ideas as are called God,
soul, and world. The ideas may be wrong, but the
factors which produced them are real, and the duty
devolves upon theology, psychology, and cosmology
to eliminate error and bring out the truth.

My objection to Kant's doctrine is not an objection
to his terminology nor to idealism in general. We
may form our world-view in an idealistic as well as a
realistic nomenclature. Object may mean either the
sense-woven picture or the outside thing which it sig
nifies. We may say that the objective world is ideal,
for such it is, meaning by objects the things as we see
them. We may say that the objective world is real,
meaning by objects the actual things represented in
our sense-images. The nomenclature of a philosoph
ical system is important but it is arbitrary. We may
criticise it as impractical, but we cannot on its account
reject a philosophy as untrue.

REALISM OR IDEALISM.

We object to Kant's doctrine of limiting form to
the subject and thus denying the objective value of
the ideal. W7e may define terms as we please-but we
must remain consistent. If the objects are ideal, I
gladly grant that the forms of the objects are ideal;
but for all that, being forms of the objects, they are
objective, as much as the objects themselves.

The sense-woven pictures of things, though sub
jective images, are the realities of life, and our con
cepts of things are symbols of them in terms of their
formal features expressed according to schedules

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 223

which we construct a priori. Time and space, the
forms of our sense- world (of our Ansekauung)9 accord
ingly are as real as these things, and I cannot say that
the things themselves are real while the forms of
things are purely ideal, i. e., not real.

Schopenhauer, a one-sided but nevertheless one of
the most prominent and faithful disciples of Kant, de
fends Kantian idealism against the misinterpretations
of the so-called realists in these sentences :

" In spite of all that one may say, nothing is so persistently
and ever anew misunderstood as Idealism, because it is interpreted
as meaning that one denies the empirical reality of the external
world. Upon this re?ts the perpetual return to the appeal to com
mon sense, which appears in many forms and guises ; for example,
as an ' irresistible conviction ' in the Scotch school, or as Jacobi's
faith in the reality of the external world. The external world by
no means presents itself, as Jac ;bi declares, upon credit, and is
accepted by us upon trust and faith. It presents itself as that
which it is, and performs directly what it promises."1

THE SUBJECT AS ITS OWN OBJECT.

The quarrel between the idealists so called and the
realists of Jacobi's stamp is purely a question of termi
nology. It is a vicious circle to ask whether the real
is real; the question is, "What do we understand by
real?" Now we agree with Kant in accepting An-
schauung as real. Our perceptions are the data of
experience, they are the facts of life about which there
is no quibbling and the question of unreality originates
only in the realm of abstract thought, viz., in the do
main of interpretation. Perceptions are classified ;
perceptions of the same kind are subsumed under the
general conception of their class and if a perception
is misinterpreted, our notion concerning it is errone-

1 From Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea.

224 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

ous. An after-image is as real as the original pei
ception, but it is called an illusion when it suggests
the presence of an object ; in other words when its
cause is misinterpreted.

Perceptions accordingly are what we define as
real, and space and time are, abstractly stated, the
forms of perception. Time and space, accordingly,
are as real as perceptions.

Now we may ask what are the objects of the per
ceptions, defining objects this time not as the sense-
woven images of our perception inside our senses,
but as the external presences which are supposed to
cause them. Since it is impossible here to enter into
a detailed epistemological discussion of the subject,
we state the answer for brevity's sake dogmatically as
follows: The objects (viz., the external presences
which are supposed to cause perceptions) are, ulti
mately, i. e., in their inmost constitution, of the same
nature as are the perceptions themselves. The per
ceptions in their totality are called the subject — which
is a sentient body, an intricate organism consisting
of different organs of sense and a superadded organ
of thought for preserving the sense-images, collating
them, classifying them, and interpreting them. We
are a system of perceptions and impulses, guided by
memories and thoughts, but we represent ourselves
in our own perception as a body in time and space.
Thus our representation of ourselves is our self-per
ception, i. e., a representation of the subject as its
own object, and our self-perception is as real as are
perceptions in general. Succession of sense-impres
sions and reactions thereupon, accordingly, form part
and parcel of our subject as its own object ; and in the
same way, juxtaposition of organs is an attribute of

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 225

our self, not as it is as a subject in itself, but of our
self as it represents itself as its own object. Other
objects are in the same predicament and partake of
the same nature. If time and space are the forms of
the objectified subject, viz., of our own bodily exist
ence we have good reasons to ascribe objectivity to
the facts from which the ideas of time and space are
derived, viz., to extension and succession.

THE OBJECTIVE ORIGIN OF SPACE AND TIME.

It is true that the factors which generate in the
mind our conceptions of time and space, together with
the entire formal aspect of being, lie in the subject, in
the sentient thinking being, but they lie not in the ab
stract subject in itself, not in the subjectivity of the
subject, not in the quality of the subject which re
mains when all other qualities, i. e., the objective
features of its own actualisation as a concrete being,
are omitted by the process of abstraction, i. e., when
they have been cancelled in thought. The subject in
itself will be found to be an empty generalisation
which contains nothing but a product of our analysis
of perception, the bare idea of the perceiving in con
trast to the perceived. It contains nothing either a
priori or a posteriori ; merely itself, the shadow of a
thing. But the actual subject, which is an object in
the objective world, exists somewhere in space and in
a given time. It moves, i. e., it changes its position.
It consists of juxtaposed organs and its experiences
exhibit a definite succession, each act having its own
definite duration. Therefore we do not hesitate, when
drawing a line of demarcation between the subjective
and the objective features of the thinking subject, to
include its form together with its bodily objectivation

226 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

in the realm of objectivity. In this way it happens
i hat time and space may be called subjective, because
the objectified subject finds them a priori in itself, but
their ultimate root lies in the domain of objectivity,
and we can therefore just as well call them objective,
because they are the forms of the objective world and
originate in the subject only because it is an object
belonging to the objective world.

UNIVERSALITY DUE TO SYSTEMATISATION.

Kant was puzzled mainly by the subjective aprio
rity of the laws of time and space and of all other for
mal relations, but this puzzling apriority is, closely
considered, nothing but their general applicability to
all possible experience, which is due to the fact that
all formal relations admit of systematisation. Formal
possibilities can be exhausted and purely formal state
ments apply to all pure forms. Hence they possess
universality, and universality admits of no exception,
hence it implies necessity, which involves a priori ap
plicability.

It is true (as Kant says) that purely formal knowl
edge is empty; but we know at the same time that
the purely formal knowledge gives system to the em
pirical, to the sense-given facts of our experience. If
we could not classify sense-impressions, they would
remain a useless chaos, and human reason would not
have developed. Kant expresses this truth by say
ing that the sensory impressions without the guidance
of the purely formal are blind.

But as the formative norms of the objective world
shape things and make them such as they are, our
formal cognition classifies sense-impression according
to their forms and thus makes a knowledge of objects

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 227

possible. Our formal cognition is not the cause of
the objective uniformities (as Kant suggests) but one
of their applications only, being, as it were, their own
reflexion in the consciousness of a sentient being. By
be,ng systematised in the shape of formulas, they ap
pi}1 a priori to experience and become in this way a
key, with the help of which we can unlock the closed
doors of the mysteries of nature and decipher the
riddles of the universe.

THE REAL AND THE SUPERREAL.

We may call the eternal norms of existence which
condition the formation of things "being" or "Sfin"
and the concrete actualisation of the types of being
their "becoming," Werdtn or Dasein. We become
acquainted with the norms of existence, part of which
are formulated as natural laws, by abstraction and
generalisation, but for that reason they are not mere
glittering generalities, abstract nonentities, or unreal
inventions, but significant features of objective exist
ence, depicting not accidental but necessary uniformi
ties. While we concede that the world of becoming
is real, we must grant that the realm of being is super-
real. Both Sfin and Wcrden, Being and Becoming,
are real ; but the reality of the two is different in kind.
The latter's reality is actualisation, the reality of the
former is eternality. Thus the former is immutable,
the latter a perpetual flux. The fleeting realities of
sense are definite objects in the objective world, but
the norms of eternal being are the formative factors
which shape them.

Obviously the eternal norms of existence, which
are identical with the purely formal laws constituting
the cosmic order, though not material facts, are the

228 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

most effective presences of the world. They are not
only real, they are superreal. They remain the same
whether realised or not in the actual world. They
produce the cosmic order, render the rise of rational
beings possible, they are the condition of the intelli
gibility of things, they are the prototype of mind and
spirituality, they are the corner-stone of both science
and ethics and constitute Kant's mundus intelligibilis —
the realm of spiritual being ; Swedenborg's sphere of
spirits, of angels, and archangels ; the kingdom of
God, to be realised on earth ; yea, God himself, for
God is all these norms in their totality and systematic
unity. In Lao-Tze's philosophy it is the eternal Tao,
the world-reason or primordial Logos. In Buddhist
metaphysics it corresponds to A9vaghosha's Tatha-
gatagarbha, i. e., the womb of Buddhahood and the
origin of all things ; to Amitabha, the source of all
light and wisdom, and also to the deathless, the un-
create, the non-corporeal existence (ardpcf), the Nir
vana of the older Buddhists.

NOUMENA.

The data of experience are sensations, or sense-
perceptions, which represent themselves as images of
things in time and space. The sensory element of
the images, which is conditioned by the material com
position of the sentient subject, is purely subjective
and need not be uniform. Thus we know that colors
are perceived differently by different eyes; the color
blind see the world like a steel engraving, or rather a
wash-picture, gray in gray. To the red-blind red ap
pears green, to the green-blind red appears dark yel
low and green pale yellow. If all men were color
blind, the gray ima^e would have to be regarded as

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 229

normal. The forms of things, too, are conditioned to
some extent by the material composition of our sense-
organs, as much so as the picture on the sensitive
plate of a photographer's camera depends upon the
lens. Further, \ve see not things as they are, but as
they are projected according to the laws of perspec
tive. But we can from the given data of the projected
images and additional considerations of other data of
experience reconstruct the form and structure of
tilings as they are in space and of the events as they
and their accelerations take place in time. This con
struction of things is called in Kant's terminology
things as creations of thought, or noumena, and the
noumena are intended as models of the objects them
selves, for they mean to depict things in their objec
tive nature, as they are after the elimination of all
subjective elements of cognition. Accordingly nou
mena (as noumena) are scientific notions, products
of reasoning, and subjective in a higher degree even
than sense-perceptions. They are the interpretations
of the sense-perceptions and are as such ideal, i. e.,
representations not things. But they represent things
as they are, independent of the senses of the sentient
subject. Noumena would be unmeaning, if they did
not represent objective realities, if they were purely
fictitious, if they did not portray the things as objects
in the objective world. We may fitly call the realities
for whose designation noumena (i. e., scientific con
cepts) have been invented objects, or more definitely,
objects in themselves.

They constitute the realm of experience, and time
and space are the generalised modes of their existence
by which we determine their formal qualities. Noth
ing is real in the sense of concrete existence, except

230 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

it be in time and space. Accordingly lime and space
(though not objects but mere forms) are objective
qualities of things, and without time and space con
crete things cease to be concretely real and become
either mere Ideas or nonentities.

We may with Kant distinguish between thing and
thing in itself and may understand by the latter the
eternal foundation of the thing, its metaphysical raison
d'etre, whatever that may mean (either its Platonic
idea, its eternal type, or the Schopenhauerian con
ception of its "will to be," or the general and abstract
idea of its existence), but under all conditions space
and time belong (as Kant says) to the things as ap
pearances, viz., the things as objects in the objective
world which implies (the contrary to that which Kant
says) that they are not purely subjective, but objec
tive.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF SPACE AND TIME.

Now we may call the perpetual flux of concrete
objects « ' appearance, "and the domain of eternal being
' ' the real things " : in that case the real things come to
appearance by becoming actual in time and space. In
this sense we agree with Kant, that time and space are
real for our experience, though not for our experience
alone, but for any experience. Every sentient sub
ject, in so far as it is sentient, every individual man,
is not a subject pure and simple, but an actualised
subject, an objectified thing, for all acts of cognition
are acts of an objective significance, taking place in
the domain of objective existence, as an interrelation
between two or several objects. One party to this
interrelation (viz., my bodily organisation) happens
to be the sentient and thinking subject, but that alters

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 231

nothing in the case, for all its actions take place in
time, and the concrete corporeality of its organs is
somewhere in space. Again therefore we come to the
conclusion that space and time appertain (as Kant
says) to the appearances of things. They appertain to
the subject, not in itself, but to the appearance of the
subject, viz., to its objectivation ; accordingly they are
(as opposed to what Kant says) objective, not purely
subjective, and may be called subjective only in a spe
cial sense, viz., in so far as they appertain to the objec
tified subject, which, however, is an object like any
other object in the objective world. The subject does
not transfer time and space into the objective world,
but anything that becomes actual thereby makes its
appearance in time and space. In other words, Time,
Space, and all the norms of purely formal relations,
are the forms of any possible concrete existence:
Whatever the metaphysical raison d'etre of things may
be, the "why there is anything," reality, when ac-
tualiscd, represents itself objectively as being in time
and space. The thinking subject does not represent
things in time and space, but in so far as it is an actual
object in the objective world, it represents itself (i. e.,
it appears) in time and space. So do all other things :
hence the concurrence of the formal notions of the
objectified subject with the formal conditions of the
objectified things of our surroundings. Kant says

(§520:

"Space and time together with the appear
ances in them are nothing existing in themselves
and outside of my representations but are them
selves only modes of representation."1

lit is very strange that the same Kant who says that space (viz., extf-rt
sion) is only a mode of representation dec rres (in § 2) that the sentence

232

He should have said (and here we use purposely
Kant's own term « ' appearance " *) :

Time and space are modes of appearance, viz.,
of self-representation.

Being modes of appearance they are inside every
subject in so far as it has made its appearance in the
objective world. They are in all objects as those re
lational features which determine the juxtaposition
of things. It is the actualised appearance that needs
extension (i. e., space) for the distribution of the sev
eral organs of the thinking subject. We feel our limbs
as being in different places, as moving about, as touch
ing, as separating, etc., and these feelings are parts
of our soul : they are the inside of the subject which
is objectified (or comes to appearance) in our bodily
existence. Our body (viz., our self as appearance) is
extended, and the space, needed for it, is limited by
the skin. The remainder of extension which accomo-
dates the other objects of the surrounding world is
designated as the outside ; and if the extension within
our skin is real, the outside must also be real. Both
together constitute space.

"bodies are extended "is analytical; accordingly he regards extension or
space as the essential feature of a thing, of an object. Why then does he not
recognise space as the mark of objectivism, which might have led him to
concede the objective nature of the operations of the thinking subject?

1 Appearance or phenomenon means originally the picture of objects as
it appears on the retina and generally all the data of sense-perception ; but
the word is used in contrast to noumenon, or abstract thought, denoting the
concrete object as it is given to the senses distinguished from its general and
abstract idea. Thus, the world of appearances means the concrete world of
objects that affect our senses, though the term might be interpreted to stand
for the retinal picture as a mere subjective image in contrast to the material
world of objective reality. Indeed, there are authors who do use the word in
the latter sense, while in the minds of most readers the two conceptions are
mixed and the former is imperceptibly affected by the latter. It would not be
difficult to point out what an interminable confusion the use of this word has
produced in philosophy.

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. . 233

When Kant denies that space and time are objec-
Jve, he becomes confused and self-contradictory. For
ne would either have to say that space and time are
limited within the boundary of the body of the think
ing subject, which is nonsense, or he must attribute
them to the subject as a thing in itself, which contra
dicts his own theory according to which time and
space do not refer to things in themselves, but to ap
pearances only. Thus even from Kant's own premises
and when employing his own terminology the theory
becomes untenable that space and time are purely
subjective attributes. Their very nature is objectivity,
and if objects are appearances, time and space as the
forms of all appearance must be regarded as features
of existence which in their very nature are objective.
It appears that Kant was not sufficiently careful to
distinguish between space-conception, which is sub
jective, and space itself, which, being the juxtaposi
tion of things and their parts, is objective. Space-
conception originates from within sentient organisms,
viz., in the mind, by its adjustment to the surround
ing world through the use of its organs. Its ultimate
sources are of a physiological nature consisting in the
motion of the limbs and especially the eyes. This is
what Ernst Mach calls physiological space.1 Mathe
matical space is a higher abstraction than physiolo
gical space. In mathematical space all incidental fea
tures, the differences of right and left, of high and low,
etc., are dropped, and space is regarded as homa-
loidal, viz., as constituted alike throughout. The
homaloidality of space is the simplest way of depriv
ing space of all positive attributes, of rendering it the

ISee Ernst Mach's article "On Physiological, as Distinguished from
Geometrical Space," in The Monixt, Vol. XL, No. 3., April, 1901.

234 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

"same" throughout. At any rate it is a mental con
struction as much as the idea of a straight line and all
geometrical figures. The construction has been made
without any concrete building material, with mere men
tal operations, simply by proceeding on the assump
tion of logical consistency, where the same procedure
yields the same result. That other space construc
tions are possible need not concern us here. At any
rate, our space-conception is built up in the thinking
subject by operations of which it is possessed in its
capacity as an object moving about in the objective
world. Our space-conception is a noumenon (a pro
duct of thought), and like all noumena, it is intended
to describe features of objective reality; and the?e
features of objective reality intended to be delineated
in our space-conception is objective space — viz., the
extension of the world and of its parts, the juxtaposi
tion of bodies, and the range of directions all around
every moving point.

Our space-conception is subjective, but for that
reason space itself remains as objective as any object
in space. Moreover, the data from which our space-
conception has been constructed are as objective as
are all the acts and facts of our bodily organism,

THINGS IN THEMSELVES.

Where, then, are the things in themselves, which,
according to Kant, remain unintelligible ?

There is a truth in the idea that our mind is so
constituted as to transfer to the phenomenal world
its a priori notions of time and space and its thought-
forms. The world of our senses which appears to us
as the objective world that surrounds us. is truly a
construction of our organs of sense ; the construction

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 235

is as necessary as is for example the reflexion of a pic
ture in a mirror ; things in themselves remain outside.
In this sense Kant's doctrine of idealism is undeniably
true.

But Kant goes further in saying that things in
themselves, meaning things viewed independently of
our sense-perception, do not partake of form and are
therefore unknowable. But what is knowledge if not
a correct description of things? Things are mirrored
in our eyes, and abstract notions are formed to rep
resent them in mental symbols. It would be absurd
to expect that things should bodily migrate into our
heads.

It is the ideal of science to eliminate the subjec
tivity of the thinking subject and construct a world-
picture in terms of formal laws, by the guidance of
the several sciences of formal thought; this is the
noumenal world, the world of thought ; but this nou-
menal world is nothing but a picture (more or less ac
curate) of the objective world as things are indepen
dently of sense-perception. Here everything changes
into motion of a definite form ; the rainbow with the
warm beauty of its colors becomes the reflexion of
?ther waves of a definite angle with definite wave
lengths. Though the noumenon is a subjective con
struction, it is an analogue of the objects as they are
in themselves, describing their suchness. Accord
ingly, this would be a cognition of things in them
selves, for Kant defines things in themselves as the
ground which determines our sensibility to have sense-
perceptions, or briefly the causes of phenomena.

Cognition is nothing more nor less than the con
struction of analogous symbols of things by which we
can know their nature for the sake of determining

236 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

their action, thus enabling us to direct the course of
events by adaptation partly of ourselves to conditions,
partly of our surroundings to our wants. Unless we
denounce science as a vagary of the human mind, we
must grant that in spite of the shortcomings of the
individual scientist, the ideal of science (which con
sists in describing things in their objective existence)
is justified, and can be more and more realised.

And what becomes of things in themselves?

If things in themselves cannot be described with
the assistance of formal thoughts, they degenerate
into dim chimerical and contradictory notions, such
as unextended bodies, or substances without quali
ties, or unmaterial entities, or causes which remain
outside the pale of causation.

The conception of things in themselves is a vagary
of pre-Kantian metaphysics, the empty shell of which,
as an irrational quantity, transcendent and unknow
able, was by some mishap suffered to remain in Kant's
philosophy.

If things in themselves mean objective things,
viz., things as they are, independently of our sensi
bility, we must deny that they are unknowable. If
they mean that which constitutes the essential char
acter of the things, making them what they are, they
will be seen to be determined by their suchness; they
are what Plato called the eternal types of being, or
ideas; and we ought to call them not "things in
themselves," but "forms in themselves."

Schopenhauer interprets the Kantian conception
of things in themselves as the metaphysical raison
d'etre of their existence, but he denies that its nature
cannot be known and discovers its manifestation in
"the Will." According to him it is the Will that

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 237

makes every one what he is, and Schopenhauer's Will
is not the physiological process of willing, the con
scious effort of causing an idea to pass into an act, but
the tendency to motion such as it inheres in all exist
ence, in the stone as gravity, in chemicals as affinity,
in sentient beings as desire. He expressly excludes
that feature which distinguishes will from unconscious
motions, viz., intelligence, and speaks of the blind
Will. The blind Will is practically deified by him,
for it is supposed to be above time and space and
credited with creative omnipotence. In reality it is
nothing but the widest generalisation of motion.

Clifford offers another interpretation of the term
'•thing in itself," viz., the sentiency of organised be
ings, constituting their subjectivity and corresponding
to what in man is called his "soul." But, again, this
subjectivity, the spiritual inside, is always the sentient
accompaniment of the organisation, the bodily out
side ; and its nature can be determined by studying
the visible exponents of its objective expression in
which it is realised. Thus Clifford's things in them
selves are as little unknowable as Schopenhauer's.

Agnosticism, the egg-shell of metaphysicism, pre
vented Kant from taking the last step suggested by
his doctrine of the necessity and universality of the
laws of pure form. He lost himself in contradictions
and became satisfied with his statement of the antino
mies of pure reason, according to which we may prove
with equal plausibility that God exists or that he does
not.

THE GOD PROBLEM.

If Kant had followed the course which we here,
under the guidance of the principles laid out by him,

238 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

have briefly sketched out, his philosophy not only
would have become less artificial and remained in
close touch with the natural sciences, but it would
a'SO have helped theology to develop* purer, truer,
and nobler religious ideals. With the egg-shell of
agnosticism on its back, Kantism was satisfied with
the existing state of beliefs and tilings ; nc t that Kant
endorsed the various irrationalities cf the Christianity
of his day, the literalism of dogma, the implicit belief
in the very text of the Bible, the Creation story, pa
ternalism of the Prussian State Church, etc.; he criti
cised them occasionally in mild terms ; but instead of
going to work to purify religion (not in the narrow
and prosaic spirit of his disciples, the Rationalists,
but with due reverence for the poetry of dogma and
legend, and at the same time with a consideration for
the practical needs of the heart): he simply justified
them in general terms on account of their moral use
fulness in his Critique of Practical Reason.

As an instance, let us point out his unsatisfactory
solution of the God problem.

Kant accepted in his conception of God the tradi
tional views of the Church, and discussed it as one of
the several metaphysical notions, the result being that
the idea is pronounced to be transcendent, and we
can with equally plausible reasons both affirm and
deny his existence. It is one of Kant's four antino
mies of Pure Reason. But God unknown to pure
reason and not discoverable in the domain of experi
ence and resuscitated only as a postulate of practical
reason is a poor substitute even for the mythological
conception of the god of the uneducated masses. An
hypothetical god cannot help; he is sicklied over
with the pale cast of thought ; he is not real ; he is

KANT'S PHILOSOPHY. 239

paralysed. I arn far from blaming Kant, who has
done so much for philosophy, for not having done
more and performed a reformer's work for religion ;
but I would suggest that he might as well from his
own principles have investigated the nature of formal
laws, which in the subjective sphere of reason appear
as transcendental ideas, and have come to the conclu
sion that a truer God-conception could be derived
therefrom, which then would commend itself as the
higher ideal. The popular notions of the several re
ligions and also of a primitive theology are dim fore-
shadovings of a scientific God-conception, the purity
of whivh is inci^afling with the progress of scientific
truth.

Thf* world •dtfder, that purely formal law in the
objective worM which forms and creates, shaping the
stellar universe (as Kant set forth so forcibly in his
General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens},
and rfYealing itself in the social development of man
as the power that makes for righteousness, must have
made its influence felt in the life of mankind at the
very beginning, and would naturally, according to the
practical needs of the intelligence of the successive
ages., assume the shape of a conception of God, more
or less crude in the beginning, and more or less phil
osophical in the mind of the wise. The world-order,
this superpersonal spirituality that acts as the divine
dispensation in the world, is hyperphysical (I pur
posely avoid the much-abused term "supernatural,"
but I might as well say supernatural). It is intrinsi
cally necessary, it is omnipresent, it is unerring in the
truth of its various applications which form as it were
a gr^nd system, comparable to the articulated differ-
et > ^rr, of a spiritual organism, — a personality ; it

240 KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

is as unfailingly just as the law of causation is rigid ;
and every God-conception is but an attempt at com
prehending its moral significance.

The fetishist's notion of a power to which he must
conform is not absolutely wrong. It contains a truth,
but is alloyed with superstitions. The idea of think
ing of God as a king of kings, as a supreme judge, is
more advanced, inasmuch as God henceforth repre
sents a moral maxim, the principle of justice in the
world. The God-father idea of Christianity surpasses
the theology of the prophets of the Old Testament,
but it, too, falls short of the truth in all its perfection.
All we have to do is to be serious in scientifically
thinking the divine attributes of omnipresence, of
eternality, of infinitude, of omniscience, of all-justice,
of the irrefragability of law in the physical, the psy
chical, and the social spheres of existence, which, re
flected in the instructive growth of his conscience,
become to man the moral norm of liie, and the ulti
mate authority of conduct.

Kant cited the religious notions of the theology of
his age before the tribunal of pure reason and dis
missed the suit as offering no issue, leaving the ques
tion in the state in which he had found it. He would
have served his age better had he worked out the
philosophical significance of the idea of God, on the
basis of the practical significance of his Transcenden
talism ; he would then, instead of leaving the problem
unsolved, have boldly propounded the gospel of the
superpersonal God as coming, not to destroy the old
theology, but to fulfil its yearnings and hopes, with
out in the least doing violence to the demands of crit
icism and scientific exactness.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR

THE STUDY OF KANT'S LIFE

AND PHILOSOPHY.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

materials, culled from Kantian literature, are intended
-L as specimens of the various opinions which prevail concern
ing Kant, and have been arranged and added to this book for the
purpose of enabling the student to study Kant in the impressions
which he made upon the philosophical public. The selection has
at the same time been offered with the intention of giving a
brief synopsis of Kant's work, at least so far as the systematic con
struction, or Ausbau, of his transcendental criticism is concerned.
It is understood that Kant's merits as a thinker and inquirer are not
limited to metaphysics, but it would have led us too far, and would
have swelled the book to too bulky a size, without doing justice to
the subject, if we had also attempted to consider here Kant's re
searches in physics, mechanics, astronomy, and the other natural
sciences. That Kant had a clear idea, not only of evolution and of
the descent of man from lower forms of life, but also of the dif
ficulties of the evolution theory, is well attested by many remark
able passages, collected by Fritz Schultze1.

We have only to add that we have selected Windelband as a
representative historian of philosophy, in preference, say, to Erd-
mann and Ueberweg, solely because of the terseness of his state
ments. Schwegler is a Hegelian, Weber an Alsatian under French
influence. Lange represents the large class of agnostics who grant
that materialism is untenable as a philosophy but deem it to be
the best working hypothesis in science. Schopenhauer is one of
the most original disciples of Kant, and set up a philosophy of his
own, conceiving the world under the double aspect of Will and
Idea. He hates Hegel and all " school-philosophy," saying that he
himself, the true philosopher, lives for philosophy, while the pro
fessors appointed to teach philosophy live on philosophy. Heine

\Kant und Darwin, ein Beitra^ zur Geschichte der Entwzckelungslekre
Jena, 1875.

244 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

is peculiarly interesting, being brilliant and cynical at the same
time. He speaks sometimes as if he were an atheist, and again
advocates a theism verging on pantheism. Theodore F. Wright's
digest of Stuckenberg is cavilling and spiteful. His is the most
unfavorable view of Kant, and we quote it on that account. Paul-
sen's chronological table will be welcome as a useful synopsis of
the data of Kant's life. p. c.

KANT'S LIFE AND WRITINGS.

(AFTER WINDEX-BAND.*)

TMMANUEL KANT was born April 22, 1724, at Konigsberg,
J. Prussia, the son of a saddler. He was educated at the Pietistic
Collegium Fridericianum, and attended in 1740 the University of
his native city to study theology ; but subjects of natural science
and philosophy gradually attracted him. After concluding his
studies, he became a private teacher in various families in the
vicinity of Konigsberg from 1746 to 1755 ; in the autumn of 1755 he
habilitated as Privatdocent in the philosophical faculty of Konigs
berg University, and was made full Professor there in 1770. The
cheerful, brilliant animation, and versatility of his middle years
gave place with time to an earnest, rigorous conception of life and
to the control of a strict consciousness of duty, which manifested
itself in his unremitting labour upon his great philosophical task,
in his masterful fulfilment of the duties of his academic profession,
and in the inflexible rectitude of his life, which was not without
a shade of the pedantic. The uniform course of his solitary and
modest scholar's life was not disturbed by the brilliancy of the
fame that fell upon his life's evening, and only transiently by the
dark shadow that the hatred of orthodoxy, which had obtained
control under Frederick William II., threatened to cast upon his
path by a prohibition of his philosophy. He died from the weak
ness of old age on the i2th of February, 1804.

Kant's middle and later life and personality has been drawn
most completely by Kuno Fischer (Geschtchte der neueren Philo
sophic, III. and IV., 3d ed., Munich, 1882); E. Arnoldt has treated
of his youth and the first part of his activity as a teacher (Konigs
berg, 1882). See also J H. W. Stuckenberg, Life of Kant (Lon
don, 1882).

\History of Philosophy. Translated from the German by James H. Tufts,
New York : Macmillan, 1893. Price $500. This work is especially valuable as
a comparative treatment of the history of thought

246 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

The change which was taking place in the philosopher toward
the end of the seventh decade of the eighteenth cemury appears
especially in his activity as a writer. His earlier "pre-critical"
works are distinguished by easy-flowing, graceful presentation,
and present themselves as admirable occasional writings of a man
of fine thought who is well versed in the world. His later works
show the laboriousness of his thought and the pressure of the con
tending motifs, both in the form of the investigation, with its cir
cumstantial heaviness and artificial architectonic structure, and in
the formation of his sentences, which are highly involved, and
frequently interrupted by restriction. Minerva frightened away
the graces ; but instead, the devout tone of deep thought and
earnest conviction, which here and there rises to powerful pathos
and weighty expression, hovers over his later writings.

For Kant's theoretical development, the antithesis between the
Leibnizo-Wolffian metaphysics and the Newtonian natural philos
ophy was at the beginning of decisive importance. The former
had been brought to his attention at the University by Knutzen,
the latter by Teske, and in his growing alienation from the philo
sophical school-system, his interest for natural science, to which
for the time he seemed to desire to devote himself entirely, co
operated strongly. His first treatise, 1747, was entitled Thoughts
upon the True Measure of Vis Viva, a controverted question be
tween Cartesian and Leibnizian physicists ; his great work upon
the General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens was a
natural science production of the first rank, and besides small
articles, his promotion-treatise, De Igne (1755), which propounded
a hypothesis as to imponderables, belongs here. His activity as a
teacher also showed, even on into his later period, a preference for
the subjects of natural sciences, especially for physical geography
and anthropology.

In theoretical philosophy Kant passed through many reversals
(mancherlei Umkippungcn} of his standpoint. At the beginning
(in the Physical Monadology} he had sought to adjust the opposi
tion between Leibniz and Newton, in their doctrine of space, by
the ordinary distinction of things-in-themselves (which are to be
known metaphysically), and phenomena, or things as they appear
(which are to be investigated physically) ; he then (in the writings
after 1760) attained to the insight that a metaphysics in the sense
of rationalism is impossible, that philosophy and mathematics must
have diametrically opposed methods, and that philosophy as the

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 247

empirical knowledge of the given cannot step beyond the circle of
experience. But while he allowed himself to be comforted by
Voltaire and Rousseau for this falling away of metaphysical in
sight, through the instrumentality of the "natural feeling" for the
right and holy, he was still working with Lambert at an improve
ment of the method of metaphysics, and when he found this, as he
hoped, by the aid of Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais, he constructed
in bold lines the mystico-dogmatic system of his Inaugural Dis
sertation.

The progress from this point to the System of Criticism is
obscure and controverted. For this development, and for the time
in which he was influenced by Hume, as well as for the direction
which that influence took, consult the following works : Fr. Michelis,
Kant vor und nach 1770 (Braunsberg, 1871) ; Fr. Paulsen, Ver-
such einer Entivicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkennt-
nisstheorie (Leipsic, 1875); A. Riehl, Geschichte und Methode dts
philosophischen Kriticismus (Leips. 1876) ; B. Erdmann, Kant's
Kriticismus (Leips. 1878) ; W. Windelband, Die verschiedenen
Phasen der Kantischen I^ehre ^'om Ding-an-sich {Vierteljahrs-
schrift filr zvissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1876). Cf. also the
writings by K. Dieterich on Kant's relation to Newton and Rous
seau under the title Die Kantische Philosophic in ihrer inneren
Entzuicklungsgeschichte, Freiburg i. B. 1885 ; also A. Wreschner,
Ernst Plainer und Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Leipsic,
1893); E. Adickes, Kant-Studien (Kiel and Leipsic, 1895); F.
Paulsen, Immanuel Kant (Stuttgart, 1898). For Kant on Evolu
tion, see P. Carus, Kant and Spencer (Chicago, 1900).

From the adjustment of the various tendencies of Kant's
thought proceeded the "Doomsday-book" of German philosophy,
the Critique of Pure Reason (Riga, 1781). It received a series of
changes in the second edition (1787), and these became the objec,
of very vigorous controversies after attention had been called to
them by Schelling (W., V. 196) and Jacobi (W., II. 291). Cf. con
cerning this, the writings cited above. H. Vaihinger, Commentar
zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Vol. I., Stuttgart, 1887,
Vol. II., 1892), has diligently collected the literature. Separate
editions of the Kritik, by K. Kehrbach, upon the basis of the first
edition, and by B. Erdmann and E. Adickes upon the basis of the
second edition, have been published.

There is an English translation of the Critique (2d ed.), by
in the Bohn Library, and also one by Max Miiller

248 KANT'S LIFE AXD PHILOSOPHY.

(text of ist ed. with supplements giving changes of 2d ed.), Lond.
1881. We have further a Paraphrase and Commentary by Mahaffy
and Bernard, 2d ed., Lond. and N. Y. 1889; and partial transla
tions in J. H. Stirling's Text-book to Kant, and in Watson's Selec
tions, Lond. and N. Y. 1888. This last contains also extracts from
the ethical writings and from the Critique of Judgment.

The additional main writings of Kant in his critical period are :
Prolegomena zu einerjeden kilnftigen Metaphysik, 1783 ; Grund-
legung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785 ; Metaphysische An-

fangsgrunde der Naturzvissenschaft, 1785 ; Kritik der prak-
ti&chen Vernunft, 1788; Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 1790; Die
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, 1793 ;
Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795 ; Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde
der Rechts- und Tugendlehre, 1797 ; Der Streit der Fakultdten,
1798. There is an English translation of the Prolegomena, by
Mahaffy and Bernard, Lond. and N. Y., 1889 ; of the Prolegomena
and Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science, by Bax, Bohn
Library ; of the ethical writings, including the first part of the
Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason, by T. K. Abbott,
4th ed., Lond. 1889; of the Critique of Judgment, by J. H.
Bernard, Lond. and N. Y. 1892 ; of the Philosophy of Law, by W.
Hastie, Edin. 1887 ; Principles of Politics, including the essay on
Perpetual Peace, by W. Hastie, Edin. 1891 ; of Kant's Inaugural
Dissertation, W. J. Eckoff, (New York, 1894). The contents of
Kant's Essays and Treatises, 2 vols. , Lond. 1798, is given in
Ueberiveg, II. 138 (Eng. tr.).

Complete editions of his works have been prepared by K.
Rosenkranz and F. W. Schubert (12 vols., Leips. 1833 ff.) ; by G.
Hartenstein (10 vols., Leips. 1838 f. ; more recently 8 vols., Leips.
1867 ff.); and by J. v. Kirchmann (in the Philos. Biblioth.}. They
contain, besides his smaller articles, etc., his lectures upon logic,
pedagogy, etc., and his letters. A survey of all that has been writ
ten by Kant (including also the manuscript of the Transition

from Metaphysics to Physics, which is without value for the inter
pretation of his critical system) is found in Ueberweg-Heinze, III,
§ 24 ; there, too, the voluminous literature is cited with great com
pleteness. Of this we can give here only a choice of the best and
most instructive ; a survey of the more valuable literature, ar
ranged according to its material, is offered by the article Kant, by
W. Windelband in Ersch und Gruber's Enc. The Journal of
Speculative Philosophy contains numerous articles upon Kant.

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 249

We may mention also Adamson, The Philosophy of Kant, Edin,
1879 ; art. Kant, in Enc. Brit. , by the same author ; arts, in Mind,
Vol. VI., by J. Watson, and in Philos. Review, 1893, by J. G.
Schurmann. — E. Adickes has published an exhaustive bibliography
of the German literature in the Philos. Review ; 1893 ff.

THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON.
AND THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT.

(AFTER WEBER. l)

I. THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON.2

A LTHOUGH the Critique of Pure Reason reduces us to a
XX. scepticism which is all the more absolute because it is rea
soned, proved, cientifically established, and legitimised, it would be
a grave mistake to consider the sage of Koenigsberg as a sceptic in
the traditional sense, and to impute to him a weakness for the mate
rialism of his age. Scepticism is the upshot of the Critique of Pure
Reason; it is not, however, the ultimatum of Kantianism. To assert
the contrary is completely to misunderstand the spirit of the
philosophy of Kant and the final purpose of his critique. This is
by no means hostile to the moral faith and its transcendent object,
but wholly in its favor. It is, undoubtedly, not Kant's intention to
"humiliate " reason, as Tertullian and Pascal had desired to do,
but to assign to it its proper place among all our faculties, its true
role in the complicated play of our spiritual life. Now, this place
is, according to Kant, a subordinate one ; this function is re
gulative and modifying, not constitutive and creative. The WILL,
and not reason, forms the basis of our faculties and of things.
that is the leading thought of Kantian philosophy. While reason
becomes entangled in inevitable antinomies and involves us in
doubts, the will is the ally of faith, the source, and therefore, the
natural guardian of our moral and religious beliefs. Observe that

1 From Weber's History of Philosophy. Translated by Frank Thilly. New
York: Scribner's. Price, $2.50. Weber's book is one of the clearest, con-
cisest, and most readable of the histories of philosophies.

2H. Cohen, Kant's Begrundung der Ethik, Berlin, 1877; E. Zeller, Ueber
das Kantische Moralprincip, Berlin, 1880; J. G. Schurman, Kantian Ethics
and the Ethics of Evolution, London, 1881; N. Porter, Kant's Ethics, Chicago,
1886 ; F. W. Forster, Der Entwickelungsgang der Kantischen Ethik, etc., Ber
lin, 1894 ; Piinjer, Die Religionslehre Kant's, Jena, 1874.

KANT'S LIFE AND paiLUbOPHY. 251

Kant in no wise denies the existence of the thing-in-itself, of the
soul, and of God, but only the possibility of proving the reality of
these Ideas, by means of reasoning. True, he combats spirit
ualistic dogmatism, but the same blow that brings it down over
throws materialism ; and though he attacks theism, he likewise de
molishes the dogmatic pretensions of the atheists. What he combats
to the utmost and pitilessly destroys is the dogmatism of theoretical
reason, under whatever form it may present itself, whether as
theism or atheism, spiritualism or materialism ; is its assumption
of authority in the system of our faculties ; is the prejudice which
attributes metaphysical capacity to the understanding, isolated
from the -will and depending on its ozvn resources. By way of
retaliation— and here he reveals the depth of his philosophic faith
— he concedes a certain metaphysical capacity to practical reason,
i. c., to ivill.

Like the understanding, the will has its own character, its
original forms, its particular legislation, a legislation which Kant
calls "practical reason." In this new domain, the problems raised
by the Critique of Pure Reason change in aspect ; doubts are dis
sipated, and uncertainties give way to practical certainty. The
moral law differs essentially from physical law, as conceived by
theoretical reason. Physical law is irresistible and inexorable ;
the moral law does not compel, but bind ; hence it implies free
dom. Though freedom cannot be proved theoretically, it is not in
the least doubtful to the will : it is a postulate of practical reason,
an immediate fact of the moral consciousness.1

Here arises one of the great difficulties with which philosophy
is confronted : How can we reconcile the postulate of practical rea
son with the axiom of pure reason that every occurrence in the
phenomenal order is a necessary effect, that the phenomenal world
is governed by an absolute determinism ? Kant, whose belief in
free-will is no less ardent than his love of truth, cannot admit an
absolute incompatibility between natural necessity and moral
liberty. The conflict of reason and conscience, regarding freedom,
can only be a seeming one ; it must be possible to resolve the an
tinomy without violating the rights of the intelligence or those of
the will.

The solution would, undoubtedly, be impossible, if the Cri
tique of Pure Reason absolutely denied liberty, but the fact is, it

zur Metaphysik der Sitten, p. 80 (Rosenkranz) ; Kritik der
praktischen I'ernunft, p. 274.

252 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

excludes freedom from the phenomenal sphere only, and not from
the intelligible and transcendent world, which exists behind the
phenomenon, though it is unknowable. Theoretical reason de
clares : Freedom, though impossible in the phenomenal world, is
possible in the absolute order ; it is conceived as a noumenon ; it
is intelligible ; and practical reason adds : it is certain. Hence,
there is no real contradiction between the faculty of knowledge
and of will. Our acts are determined, in so far as they occur in
time and in space, indetermined and free, in so far as the source
whence they spring, our intelligible character, is independent of
these two forms of sensibility.1

This would not be a solution if time and space were objective
realities, as dogmatic philosophy conceives them. From that
point of vieru, Spinoza is right in denying freedom. However, as
soon as we agree with criticism, that space and, above all, time are
modes of seeing things, and do not affect the things themselves,
determinism is reduced to a mere theory or general conception of
things, a theory or conception which reason cannot repudiate with
out abdicating, but which by no means expresses their real es
sence.

The Kantian solution of the problem of freedom at first sight
provokes a very serious objection. If the soul, as intelligible
character, does not exist in time, if it is not a phenomenon, we
can no longer subsume it under the category of causality, since the
categories apply only to phenomena and not to " noumena.'
Hence it ceases to be a cause and a free cause. Nor can we apply
to it the category of unity. Hence it ceases to be an individual
apart from other individuals : it is identified with the universal,
the eternal, and the infinite. Fichte, therefore, consistently de
duces his doctrine of the absolute ego from Kantian premises.
Our philosopher, however, does not seem to have the slightest
suspicion that this is the logical conclusion of this theory. Nay,
he postulates, always in the name of practical reason, individual
immortality2 as a necessary condition of the solution of the moral
problem, and the existence of a God3 apart from the intelligible
ego, as the highest guarantee of the moral order and the ultimate
triumph of the good. It is true, Kant's theology is merely an ap
pendix to his ethics, and is not to be taken very seriously. It is

\Kritik der praktischen 1'ernunft, pp. 225 ff.
J Kritik der praktischen Vcrnunft, p. 261.
3/</., p. 264.

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 253

no longer, as in the Middle Ages, the queen of the sciences, but
the humble servant of independent ethics. This personal God,
afterwards postulated by the Critique of Practical Reason, forcibly
reminds us of the celebrated epigram of a contemporary of our
philosopher: "If there were no God, we should have to invent
one."

The real God of Kant is Freedom in the service of the ideal,
or the good Will (der gute Witte) 1

His conviction in this matter is most clearly expressed by
the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason* i. e., of the
zvi'Il.3 Theoretical reason and practical reason, though not directly
contradicting each other, are slightly at variance as the most im
portant questions of ethics and religion, the former tending to con
ceive liberty, God, and the absolute as ideals having no demon
strable objective existence, the latter affirming the reality of the
autonomous soul, responsibility, immortality, and the Supreme
Being. The consequences of this dualism would be disastrous if
theoretical reason and practical reason were of equal rank ; and
they would be still more disastrous, were the latter subordinated
to the former. But the authority of practical reason is superior to
that of theoretical reason, and in real life the former predominates.
Hence we should, in any case, act as if it zvere proved that we
are free, that the soul is immortal, that there is a supreme judge
and rewarder.

In certain respects, the dualism of understanding and will is a
happy circumstance. If the realities of religion, God, freedom,
and the immortality of the soul, were self-evident truths, or
capable of theoretical proof, we should do the good for the sake of
future reward, our will would cease to be autonomous, our acts
would no longer be strictly moral ; for every other motive except
the categorical imperative of conscience and the respect which it
inspires, be it friendship or even the love of God, renders the will
heteronomous, and deprives its acts of their ethical character.
Moreover, religion is true only when completely identical with
morality. Religion within the bounds of reason consists in morality,
nothing more nor less. The essence of Christianity is eternal

\Grundlegung xur Mctaphytik der Sitten, p. n : Es ist uberall nichts in
der Welt J a uberhaupt auch ausser derselben zu denkcn moglich, -was ohne Ein-
ichrankung/ur gut konnte gehalten werden, als allein ein GUTER WiLLE.

IKritik der praktischen Vernunft,?. 258.

3 Id., pp. 105 ff.

254 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

morality ; the goal of the church is the triumph of right in human
ity. When the church aims at a different goal, it loses its raison
d'etre.1

II. CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT.2

While the Critique of Practical Reason, vrith its categorical
imperative, its primacy of the conscience, and its absolute inde
pendence of morality, satisfies Kant's moral feeling and his great
love of liberty, which had been shaken by the conclusions of the
Critique of Pure Reason , the philosophical instinct reasserts it
self in his aesthetics and teleology, which form the subject-matter
of his Critique of Judgment. We have seen how, in the Critique
of Pure Reason, he universally combines synthesis with analysis,
how he solders together the heterogeneous parts of the cognitive
apparatus : between the functions of sensibility and those of reason
he discovers the intermediate function of the idea of time, which
is half intuition, half category ; between a priori concepts which
are diametrically opposed, he inserts intermediary categories. The
same synthetic impulse leads him, in his Critique of Judgment,
to bridge over the chasm which separates theoretical reason and
the conscience.3

The aesthetical and teleological sense is an intermediate faculty,
a connecting link between the understanding and the will. Truth
is the object of the understanding, nature and natural necessity its
subject-matter. The will strives for the good ; it deals with free
dom. The aesthetical and teleological sense (or judgment in the
narrow sense of the term) is concerned with what lies between the
true and the good, between nature and liberty : we mean the

1 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, pp. 130 ff. ; 205
ff.— The independent morality of the socialist P. J. Proudhon (1809—1865) is
grounded on these principles. It is based on the following proposition:
" Morality must cease to lean on theology for support, it must free itself from
all so-called revealed dogmas, and base itself solely on conscience and the
innate principle of justice, without requiring the support of the belief in God
and the immortality of the soul." This doctrine of Proudhon has been re
produced and popularized by a weekly journal, the "Morale independante,'
edited by Massol, Morin and Coignet (1895 ff-)-

2[A. Stadler, Kant's Teleologie, etc., Berlin, 1874; H. Cohen, Kant's Be-
gr tin dung der Aesthetik, Berlin, 1889; J. Goldfriedrich, Kant's Aesthetik,
Leipsic, 1895; J. H. Tufts, The Sources and Development of Kant's Teleology ,
Chicago, 1892.]

ZXritik der Urtheilskraft , p. 14.

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 255

beautiful and the purposive. Kant calls it judgment because of
the analogy between its manifestations and what is called judg
ment in logic, like the judgment, the sense of the beautiful and the
teleological establishes a relation between two things which as
such have nothing in common : between what ought to be and what
is, between freedom and natural necessity.

i. ^Esthetics. — The sesthetical sense differs both from the
understanding and the will. It is neither theoretical nor practical
in character; it is a phenomenon sui generis. But it has this in
common with reason and will, that it rests on an essentially sub
jective basis. Just as reason constitutes the true, and will the
good, so the aesthetical sense makes the beautiful. Beauty does
not inhere in objects ; it does not exist apart from the assthetical
sense; it is the product of this sense, as time and space are the
products of the theoretical sense. That is beautiful which pleases
(quality), which pleases all (quantity), which pleases without in
terest and without a concept (relation), and pleases necessarily
(modality).1

What characterizes the beautiful and distinguishes it from the
sublime, is the feeling of peace, tranquillity, or harmony which it
arouses in us, in consequence of the perfect agreement between
the understanding and the imagination. The sublime, on the other
hand, disturbs us, agitates us, transports us. Beauty dwells in the
form ; the sublime, in the disproportion between the form and the
content. The beautiful calms and pacifies us ; the sublime brings
disorder into our faculties ; it produces discord between the rea
son, which conceives the infinite, and the imagination, which has
its fixed limits. The emotion caused in us by the starry heavens,
the storm, and the raging sea springs from the conflict aroused by
these different phenomena between our reason, which can measure
the forces of nature and the heavenly distances without being over
whelmed by the enormous figures, and our imagination, which
cannot follow reason into the depths of infinity. Man has a feel
ing of grandeur, because he himself is grand through reason. The
animal remains passive in the presence of the grand spectacles of
nature, because its intelligence does not rise beyond the level of its
imagination. Hence we aptly say, the sublime elevates the soul
(das Erhabene ist erhebend). In the feeling of the sublime, man
reveals himself as a being infinite in reason, finite in imagi-

1 Kritik der Urtheilskraft ', pp. 45 ff.

256 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

nation. Both infinite and finite : how is that possible ? Kant can
not fathom this mystery without surpassing the limits which he has
prescribed to knowledge.1

2. Teleology? — There are two kinds of purposiveness. The
one arouses in us, immediately and without the aid of any con
cept, a feeling of pleasure, satisfaction, and inner harmony : this is
subjective finality, which constitutes the beautiful. The other also
arouses pleasure, but mediately, in consequence of an experience
or an intermediate process of reasoning : this is objective finality,
which constitutes the suitable (das Zweckmcissige}. Thus, a
flower may be both the object of an aesthetical judgment in the
artist, and of a ideological judgment in the naturalist, who has
tested its value as a remedy. Only, the judgment which stamps it
as beautiful is immediate and spontaneous, while that of the
naturalist depends on previous experience.

The Critique of Pure Reason regards every phenomenon as a
necessary effect, and therefore excludes purposiveness from the
phenomenal world. Physics merely enumerates an infinite series
of causes and effects. Teleology introduces between the cause and
the effect, considered as the end or goal, the means, the in
strumental cause. Theoretically, teleology is valueless. However,
we cannot avoid it so long as we apply our teleological sense to
the study of nature. Unless we abandon one of our faculties,
which is as real and inevitable as reason and will, we cannot help
recognizing purposiveness in the structure of the eye, the ear, and
the organism in general. Though mechanism fully explains the
inorganic world, the teleological view forces itself upon us when
we come to consider anatomy, physiology, and biology.

The antinomy of mechanism, affirmed by the theoretical rea
son, and teleology, claimed by the teleological sense, is no more
insoluble than that of necessity and freedom.3 Teleology is noth
ing but a theory concerning phenomena. It no more expresses the
essence of things than mechanism. This essence is as unknowable
for the Critique of Judgment as for the Critique of Pure Reason.
Things-in-themselves are not in time ; they have no succession, no
duration. According to mechanism, the cause and its effect, ac
cording to teleology, the free cause, the means, and the goal at
which it aims, follow each other, i. e. , they are separated in time.

1 Kritik der Urthezlskraft, pp. 97 ff. ; 399 ft.
2/</ , pp. 239 ff. § Kritik der Vrtheilskraft, pp. 302 ff.

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 257

But time is merely an a priori form of intuition, a mode of con
ceiving things ; as such and apart from my thought or my theory,
the cause and the effect of the mechanist, the creative agent, the
means, and the goal of the teleologist, are in each other, insepar
able, simultaneous. Imagine an understanding which is not bound
to the a priori forms of space and time like ours, a free and ab
solute intellectual intuition : such an understanding would perceive
the cause, the means, and the end at one glance ; it would identify
the end and. the principle ; the end would not follow the efficient
cause, but would be immanent in it and identical with it. Im
manent teleology, which identifies the ends of nature with the act
ing causes, is the natural solution of the antinomy of mechanism
and purposiveness.

We see that the subjectivity of time and space is the most
original and, on the whole, the most fruitful of Kant's teachings.
There is no question so subtle, no problem so obscure, as not to
be illuminated by it. Space and time are the eyes of the mind,
the organs which reveal to it its inexhaustible content. These
organs are at the same time the boundaries of its knowledge. But
in spite of this insurmountable barrier, it feels free, immortal, and
divine ; and it declares its independence in the field of action. It
is the mind which prescribes its laws to the phenomenal world ; it
is the mind from which the moral law proceeds ; it is the mind and
its judgment which make the beautiful beautiful. In short, the
three Critiques culminate in absolute spiritualism. Kant compared
his work to that of Copernicus : just as the author of the Celestial
Revolutions puts the sun in the place of the earth in our planetary
system, so the author of the Critique places the mind in the centre
of the phenomenal world and makes the latter dependent upon it.
Kant's philosophy is, undoubtedly, the most remarkable and most
fruitful product of modern thought. With a single exception,
perhaps,1 the greatest systems which our century has produced are
continuations of Kantianism. Even those — and their number has
grown during the last thirty years — who have again taken up the
Anglo French philosophy of the eighteenth century, revere the
illustrious name of Immanuel Kant.

IWe mean the system of Comte, which is closely related to the French
philosophy of the eighteenth century. Comte himself says, in a letter to
Gustave d'Eichlhal, dated December loth, 1824 : " I have always considered
Kant not only as a very powerful thinker, but also as the metaphysician who
most closely approximates the positive philosophy."

KANT'S VIEWS ON RELIGION.

(AFTER scHWBGLBR.1)

RANT'S views of religion appear in his treatise on Religion
within the Bounds of Pure Reason. The fundamental idea
of this treatise is the reduction of religion to morality. Between
morality and religion there may be the twofold relation, that either
morality is founded upon religion, or else religion upon morality.
If the first relation were real, it would give us fear and hope as
principles of moral action ; but this cannot be ; there remains,
therefore, only the second. Morality leads necessarily to religion,
because the highest good is a necessary ideal of the reason, and
this can only be realized through a God ; but in no way may reli
gion first incite us to virtue, for the idea of God may never become
a moral motive. Religion, according to Kant, is the recognition
of all our duties as divine commands. It is revealed religion when
f must first know that something is a divine command, in order to
know that it is my duty : it is natural religion when I must first
know that something is my duty, in order to know that it is a di
vine command. The Church is an ethical community, which has
ior its end the fulfilment and the most perfect exhibition of moral
tommands, — a union of those who with united energies purpose to
resist evil and advance morality. The Church, in so far as it is no
Voject of a possible experience, is called the invisible Church,
which, as such, is merely the idea of the union of all the righteous
under the divine moral government of the world. The visible
Church, on the other hand, is that which represents the kingdom
of God upon earth, so far as this can be attained through men.
The requisites, and hence also the characteristics of the true visi
ble Church (which are divided according to the table of the cate
gories since this Church is given in experience) are the following:

ISchwegler's History of Philosophy. Translated by Seelye. New York
Appleton Schwegler's compendium has enjoyed the greatest popularity both
in Germany and abroad, for its accuracy and trustworthiness.

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 259

(a) In respect of quantity the Church must be total or universal;
and though it may be divided in accidental opinions, yet must it be
instituted upon such principles as will necessarily lead to a
universal union in one single church, (b) The quality of the true
visible Church is purity, as a union under no other than mor^l
motives, since it is at the same time purified from the stupidness
i;£ superstition and the madness of fanaticism, (c) The relation
of the members of the Church to each other rests upon the principle
of freedom. The Church is, therefore, zfree state, neither a hie
rarchy nor a democracy, but a voluntary, universal, and enduring
spiritual union, (d) In respect of modality the Church demands
that its constitution should be unchangeable. The laws them
selves may not change, though one may reserve to himself the
privilege of changing some accidental arrangements which relate
simply to the administration — That alone which can establish a
universal Church is the moral faith of the reason, for this alone can
be shared by the convictions of every man. But, because of the
peculiar weakness of human nature, we can never reckon enough
on this pure faith to build a Church on it alone, for men are not
easily convinced that the striving after virtue and an irreproach
able life is every thing which God demands : they always suppose
that they must oft^r to God a special service prescribed by tradi
tion, which only amounts to this — that he is served.

To establish a Charch, we must therefore have a statutory
faith historically grouuded npon facts. This is the so-called
faith of the Church. In every Church there are therefore two ele
ments — the purely moral, or the faith of reason, and the historico-
statutory, or the faith of the Church It depends now upon the re
lation of these two elements whether a Church shall have any
worth or not. The statutory element should ever be only the
vehicle of the moral element, Just so soon as this element becomes
in itself an independent end, claiming an independent validity, will
the Church become corrupt and irrational, and whenever the
Church passes over to the pure faith of reason, it approximates to
the kingdom of God. Upon this principle we may distinguish the
true from the spurious service of the kingdom of God, religion
from priestcraft. A dogma has worth alone in so far as it has a
moral content. The apostle Paul himself would scarcely have
given credit to the dicta- of the creed of the Church without this
moral faith. From the doctrine of Trinity, e. g.t taken literally,
nothing actually practical can be derived. Whether we have to

260 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

reverence in the Godhead three persons or ten makes no differ
ence, if in both cases we have the same rules for our conduct of
life. The Bible also, with its interpretation, must be considered
in a moral point of view. The records of revelation must be inter
preted in a sense which will harmonize with the universal rules of
the religion of reason. Reason is in religious things the highest
fnterpreter of the Bible. This interpretation in reference to some
texts may seem forced, yet it must be preferred to any such literal
interpretation as would contain nothing for morality, or perhaps
go against every moral feeling. That such a moral signification
may always be found without ever entirely repudiating the literal
sense, results from the fact that the foundation for an ethical reli
gion lay originally in the human reason. We need only to divest
the representations of the Bible of their mythical dress (an attempt
which Kant has himself made, by an ethical interpretation of some
of the weightiest doctrines), in order to attain for them a rational
meaning which shall be universally valid. The historical element
of the sacred books is in itself of no account. The maturer the
reason becomes, the more it can hold fast for itself the moral sense,
so much the more unnecessary will be the statutory institutions of
the faith of the Church. The transition from the creed of the
Church to the pure faith of reason is the approximation to the
kingdom of God, to which however, we can only approach nearer
and nearer in an infinite progress. The actual realization of the
kingdom of God is the end of the world, the termination of history

K/>NT AND MATERIALISM.
(AFTER LANGE.')

AS a routed army looks around it for a firm point where it may
hope to collect again into order, so recently there has been
heard everywhere in philosophic circles the cry, "Retreat tc
Kant ! " Only more recently, however, has this retreat to Kant
become a reality, and it is found that at bottom the standpoint of
the great Konigsberg philosopher could never have been properly
described as obsolete ; nay, that we have every reason to plunge
into the depths of the Kantian system with most serious efforts,
such as have hitherto been spent upon scarcely any other philoso
pher save Aristotle.

Misapprehension and impetuous productiveness have com
bined in an intellectually active age to break through the strict
barriers which Kant had imposed upon speculation. The reaction
which succeeded the metaphysical intoxication contributed the
more to the return to the prematurely abandoned position, as men
sound themselves again confronted by the Materialism which at
the appearance of Kant had disappeared and left scarcely a wrack
behind. At present we have not only a young school of Kantians
in the narrower and wider sense, but those also who wish to try
other paths see themselves compelled first to reckon with Kant,
and to offer a special justification for departing from his ways.
Even the factitious and exaggerated enthusiam for Schopenhauer's
philosophy partly owed its origin to a related tendency, whi,"e in
many cases it formed for more logical minds a transition to Kant.
But a special emphasis must here be laid on the friendly attitude
of men of science, who, so far as Materialism failed to satisfy
them, have inclined for ihe most part to a way of thinking which,
in very essential points, agrees with that of Kant.

\History of Materialism. Trans, by Thomas. 3 vols. London : Triibnp

~o. 1880.

262 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

And it is, in fact, by no means strictly orthodox Kantianism
upon which we must have laid distinctive stress; least of all that
dogmatic turn with which Schieiden thought he could crush Mate
rialism when he compared Kant, Fries, and Apelt with Keppler;
Newton, and Laplace, and maintained that by their labors the
ideas "Soul," "Freedom," "God," were as firmly established as
the laws of the stellar world. Such dogmatism is entirely foreign
to the spirit of the critique of reason, although Kant personally
attached great value to his having withdrawn these very ideas
from the controversy of the schools, by relegating them, as utterly
incapable as well of positive as negative proof, to the sphere of
practical philosophy. But the whole of the practical philosophy
is the variable and perishable part of Kant's philosophy, powerful
as were its effects upon his contemporaries. Only its site is im
perishable, not the edifice that the master has erected on this site.
Even the demonstration of this site, as of a free ground for the
building of ethical systems, can scarcely be numbered among the
permanent elements of the system, and therefore, if we are speak
ing of the salvation of moral ideas, nothing is more unsuitable
than to compare Kant with Keppler, to say nothing of Newton and
Laplace. Much rather must we seek for the whole importance of
the great reform which Kant inaugurated in his criticism of the
theoretical reason; here lies, in fact, even for ethics, the lasting
importance of the critical philosophy, which not only aided the
development of a particular system of ethical ideas, but, if prop
erly carried on, is capable of affording similar aid to the changing
requirements of various epochs of culture.

Kant himself was very far from comparing himself with Kep
pler; but he made another comparison, that is more significant
and appropriate. He compared his achievement to that of Coper
nicus. But this achievement consisted in this, that he reversed
the previous standpoint of metaphysics. Copernicus dared, "by
a paradoxical yet true method," to seek the observed motions, no,
in the heavenly bodies, but in their observers. Not less "para
doxical" must it appear to the sluggish mind of man when Kant
lightly and certainly overturns our collective experience, with all
the historical and exact sciences, by the simple assumption that
our notions do not regulate themselves according to things, but
things according to our notions.1 It follows immediately from

1 Compare the preface to the second edition of the Critique. Kant indeed
lets it here appear (note to p. xxii., Hartenst., iii. ao ff.) that in thoroughgoing

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 263

cnis that the objects of experience altogether are only our objects;
that the whole objective world is, in a word, not absolute objectiv
ity, but only objectivity for man and any similarly organised be
ings, while behind the phenomenal world, the absolute nature of
things, the " thing-in-itself " is veiled in impenetrable darkness.

criticism he claims the rOle of a Newton, by whose theory had been prtrvta
what Copernicus in his opinion (comp. as to this vol. I., p. 230) had only pro
posed as "hypothesis." But for the purpose of gaining a first view of the
nature of the Kantian reform, the comparison with Copernicus made in the
preface is more important

KANT AND DEISM.

(AFTER HEINRICH HEINE.1)

LESSING died at Brunswick in 1781, misunderstood, hated,
and decried. In the same year appeared at Konigsberg Im-
manuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. With this book
(which through a singular delay did not become generally known
till the close of the decade) there begins in Germany an intellectual
revolution which offers the most striking analogies to the material
revolution in France, and which must to the deeper thinkers ap
pear of at least as great importance as the latter. It developed it
self in the same phases, and between both revolutions there exists
the most remarkable parallelism. On each side of the Rhine we
see the same breach with the past ; all respect for tradition is with
drawn. As here, in France, every privilege, so there, in Germany,
every thought, must justify itself ; as here, the monarchy, the key
stone of the old social edifice, so there, deism, the keystone of the
old intellectual regime, falls from its place.

Of this catastrophe, the 2ist of January, for deism, we shall
speak in the concluding part of this volume. A peculiar awe, a
mysterious piety, overcomes us. Our heart is full of shuddering
compassion : it is the old Jehovah himself that is preparing for
death. We have known him so well from his cradle in Egypt,
where he was reared among the divine calves and crocodiles, the
sacred onions, ibises, and cats. We have seen him bid farewell to
these companions of his childhood and to the obelisks and sphinxes
of his native Nile, to become in Palestine a little god-king amidst
a poor shepherd people, and to inhabit a temple-palace of his own.
We have seen him later coming into contact with Assyrian-Baby
lonian civilisation, renouncing his all-too-human passions, no

From Religion and Philosophy in Germany. Translated by John Snod-
grass. Boston : Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1882. This work by Heine is cele
brated for its trenchant wit, and is the literary story of German philosophy
par excellence.

titt

bee

reitten

t> o n

Emmanuel $ a R t

i g o,

grtet>ricf)
1781.

266 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

longer giving vent to fierce wrath and vengeance, at least no
longer thundering at every trifle. We have seen him migrate to
Rome, the capital, where he abjures all national prejudices and
proclaims the celestial equality of all nations, and with such fine
phrases establishes an opposition to the old Jupiter, and intrigues
ceaselessly till he attains supreme authority, and from the Capitoi
rules the city and the world, urbem et orbem. We have seen how,
growing still more spiritualised, he becomes a loving father, a
universal friend of man, a benefactor of the world, a philanthro
pist ; but all this could avail him nothing !

Hear ye not the bells resounding? Kneel down. They are
bringing the sacraments to a dying god !

* * *

It is related that an English mechanician, who had already in
vented the most ingenious machines, at last took it into his head
to construct a man ; and that he succeeded. The work of his
hands deported itself and acted quite like a human being ; it even
contained within its leathern breast a sort of apparatus of human
sentiment, differing not greatly from the habitual sentiments of
Englishmen; it could communicate its emotions by articulate
sounds, and the noise of wheels in its interior, of springs and es
capements, which was distinctly audible, reproduced the genuine
English pronunciation. This automaton, in short, was an accom
plished gentleman, and nothing was wanting to render it com
pletely human except a soul. But the English mechanician had
not the power to bestow on hir work this soul, and the poor
creature, having become conscious of its imperfection, tormented
its creator day and night with supplication for a soul. This re
quest, daily repeated with growing urgency, became at last so in
supportable to the poor artist that he took to flight in order to es
cape from his own masterpiece. But the automaton also took the
mail coach, pursued him over the whole continent, travelled in
cessantly at his heels, frequently overtook him, and then gnashed
and growled in his ears, Give me a soul! These two figures may
now be met with in every country, and he only who knows their
peculiar relationship to each other can comprehend their unwonted
haste and their haggard anxiety. But as soon as we are made
aware of their strange relationship, we at once discover in them
something of a general character ; we see how one portion of the
English people is becoming weary of its mechanical existence, and
is demanding a soul, whilst the other portion, tormented by such i

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 267

request, is driven about in all directions, and that neither of them
can endure matters at home any longer.

The story is a terrible one. It is a fearful thing when the
bodies we have created demand of us a soul ; but it is a far more
dreadful, more terrible, more awful thing when we have created a
soul, to hear that soul demanding of us a body, and to behold it
pursuing us with this demand. The thought to which we have
given birth is such a soul, and it leaves us no rest until we have
endowed it with a body, until we have given it sensible reality.
Thought strives to become action, the word to become flesh, and,
marvellous to relate, man, like God in the Bible, needs only to ex
press his thought and the world takes form ; there is light or dark
ness ; the waters separate themselves from the dry land ; or it may
even be that wild beasts are brought forth. The world is the sign-
manual of the word.

Mark this, ye proud men of action ; ye are nothing but un
conscious hodmen of the men of thought who, often in humblest
stillness, have appointed you your inevitable task. Maximilian
Robespierre was merely the hand of Jean Jacques Rousseau, the
bloody hand that drew from the womb of time the body whose soul
Rousseau had created. May not the restless anxiety that troubled
the life of Jean Jacques have caused such stirrings within him
that he already foreboded the kind of accoucheur that was needed
to bring his thought living into the world ?

Old Fontenelle may have been right when he said : "If I held
all the truths of the universe in my hand, I would be very careful
not to open it." I, for my part, think otherwise. If I held all the
truths of the world in my hand, I might perhaps beseech you in
stantly to cut off that hand ; but, in any case, I should not long
hold it closed. I was not born to be a gaoler of thoughts ; by
Heaven ! I would set them free. What though they were to in
carnate themselves in the most hazardous realities, what though
they were to range through all lands like a mad bacchanalian pro
cession, what though they were to crush with their thyrsus our
most innocent flowers, what though they were to invade our hos
pitals and chase from his bed the old sick world — my heart would
bleed, no doubt, and I myself would suffer thereby ! For alas ! I
too am part of this old sick world, and the poet says truly, one may
mock at his crutches yet not be able to walk any better for that. I
am the most grievously sick of you all, and am the more to be
pitied since I know what health is ; but you do not know it, you

268 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

whom I envy ; you are capable of dying without perceiving your
dying condition. Yea, many of you are already long since dead,
though maintaining that your real life is just beginning. When I
try to dispel such a delusion, then you are angry with me and rail
at me, and, more horrible still, the dead rush upon and mock at
me, and more loathsome to me than their insults is the smell of
their putrefaction. Hence, ye spectres ! I am about to speak of a
man whose mere name has the might of an exorcism ; I speak of
Immanuel Kant.

It is said that night-wandering spirits are filled with terror at
sight of the headsman's axe. With what mighty fear, then, must
they be stricken when there is held up to them Kant's Critique
of Pure Reason \ This is the sword that slew deism in Ger
many.

To speak frankly, you French have been tame and moderate
compared with us Germans. At most, you could but kill a king,
and he had already lost his head before you guillotined him. For
accompaniment to such deed you must needs cause such a drum
ming and shrieking and stamping of feet that the whole universe
trembled. To compare Maximilian Robespierre with Immanuel
Kant is to confer too high an honour upon the former. Maximil-
lian Robespierre, the great citizen of the Rue Saint Honore", had,
it is true, his sudden attacks of destructiveness when it was a ques
tion of the monarchy, and his frame was violently convulsed when
the fit of regicidal epilepsy was on ; but as soon as it came to be a
question about the Supreme Being, he wiped the white froth from
his lips, washed the blood from his hands, donned his blue Sunday
coat with silver buttons, and stuck a nosegay in the bosom of his
broad vest.

The history of Immanuel Kant's life is difficult to portray, for
he had neither life nor history. He led a mechanical, regular
almost abstract bachelor existence in a little retired street of K6-
nigsberg, an old town on the north eastern frontier of Germany.
I do not believe that the great clock of the cathedral performed in
a more passionless and methodical manner its daily routine than
did its townsman, Immanuel Kant. Rising in the morning, coffee-
drinking, writing, reading lectures, dining, walking, everything had
its appointed time, and the neighbours knew that it was exactly
half-past three o'clock when Immanuel Kant stepped forth from
his house in his grey, tight-fitting coat, with his Spanish cane in
his hand, and betook himself to the little linden avenue called after

KAN I 'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 269

him to this day the "Philosopher's Walk." Summer and winter
he walked up and down it eight times, and when the weather was
dull or heavy clouds prognosticated rain, the townspeople beheld
his servant, the old Lampe, trudging anxiously behind him with a
big umbrella under his arm, like an image of Providence.

What a strange contrast did this man's outward life present to
his destructive, world annihilating thoughts! In sooth, had the
citizens of Konigsberg had the least presentiment of the full signifi
cance of his ideas, they would have felt a far more awful dread at
the presence of this man than at the sight of an executioner, who
can but kill the body. But the worthy folk saw in him nothing
more than a Professor of Philosophy, and as he passed at his
customary hour, they greeted him in a friendly manner and set
their watches by him.

But though Immanuel Kant, the arch-destroyer in the realm
of thought, far surpassed in terrorism Maximilian Robespierre, he
had many similarities with the latter, which induce a comparison
between the two men. In the first place, we find in both the same
inexorable, keen, poesyless, sober integrity. We likewise find in both
the same talent of suspicion, only that in the one it manifested
itself in the direction of thought and was called criticism, whilst in
the other it was directed against mankind and was styled re
publican virtue. But both presented in the highest degree the type
of the narrow-minded citizen. Nature had destined them for
weighing out coffee and sugar, but fate decided that they should
weigh out other things, and into the scales of the one it laid a king,

into the scales of the other a God And they both gave the

correct weight !

The Critique of Pure Reason is Kant's principal work;
and as none of his other writings is of equal importance, in speak
ing of it we must give it the right of preference. This book ap
peared in 1781, but, as already said, did not become generally
known till 1789. At the time of its publication it was quite over
looked, except for two insignificant notices, and it was not till a
later period that public attention was directed to this great book by
the articles of Schiitz, Schultz, and Reinhold. The cause of this
tardy recognition undoubtedly lay in the unusual form and bad
style in which the work is written. As regards his style, Kant
merits severer censure than any other philosopher, more especially
when we compare this with his former and better manner of writ
ing. The recently published collection of his minor works con-

270 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

tains his first attempts, and we are surprised to find in these an ex
cellent and often very witty style. These little treatises were trilled
forth while their author ruminated over his great work. There is
a gleefulness about them like that of a soldier tranquilly arming
for a combat in which he promises himself certain victory. Espe
cially remarkable amongst them are his Universal Natural His
tory and Theory of the Heavens, composed as early as 1755 ;
Observations on the Emotions of the Sublime and Beautiful
written ten years later ; and Dreams of a Glioststcr, full of
admirable humour after the manner of the French essay. Kant's
wit as displayed in these pamphlets is of quite a peculiar sort. The
wit clings to the thought, and in spite of its tenuity is thus enable;-
to reach a satisfactory height. Without such support wit, be it
ever so robust, cannot be successful ; like a vine-tendril wanting a
prop, it can only creep along the ground to rot there with all its
most precious fruits.

But why did Kant write his Critique of Pure Reason in
such a colourless, dry, packing-paper style ? I fancy that, having
rejected the mathematical form of the Cartesio-Leibnitzo-Wolfian
school, he feared that science might lose something of its dignity
by expressing itself in light, attractive, and agreeable tones. He
therefore gave it a stiff, abstract form, which coldly repelled all
familiarity on the part of intellects of the lower order. He wished
haughtily to separate himself from the popular philosophers of his
time, who aimed at the most citizen-like clearness, and so clothed
his thoughts in a courtly and frigid official dialect. Herein he
shows himself a true philistine. But it might also be that Kant
needed for the carefully measured march of his ideas a language
similarly precise, and that he was not in a position to create a
better. It is only genius that has a new word for a new thought.
Immanuel Kant, however, was no genius. Conscious of this de
fect, Kant, like the worthy Maximilian, showed himself all the
more mistrustful of genius, and went so far as to maintain, in his
Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, that genius has no busi
ness with scientific thought, and that its action ought to be rele
gated to the domain of art.

The heavy, buckram style of Kant's chief work has been the
source of much mischief ; for brainless imitators aped him in his
external form, and hence arose amongst us the superstition that no
one can be a philosopher who writes well. The mathematical
form, however, could not, after the days of Kant, reappear in

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 271

philosophy ; he has mercilessly passed sentence of death upon it in
his Critique of Pure Reason. The mathematical form in phi
losophy, he says, is good for nothing save the building of houses
of cards, in the same way that the philosophic form in mathe
matics produces nothing but twaddle, for in philosophy there can
be no definitions such as those in mathematics, where the defini
tions are not discursive but intuitive, that is to say, capable of be
ing demonstrated by inspection ; whilst what are called definitions
in philosophy are only tentatively, hypothetically put forth, the
real definition appearing only at the close, as the result.

How comes it that philosophers display so strong a predilec
tion for the mathematical form ? This predilection dates from the
time of Pythagoras, who designated the principles of things by
numbers. This was the idea of a genius : all that is sensible and
finite is stripped off in a number, and yet it denotes something
determined, and the relation of this thing to another determined
thing, which last, designated in turn by a number, receives the
same insensible and infinite character. In this respect numbers re
semble ideas that preserve the same character and relation to one
another. We can indicate by numbers in a very striking manner
ideas, as they are produced in our mind and in nature; but the
number still remains the sign of the idea, it is not th-.i idea itself.
The master is always conscious of this distinction, but the scholar
forgets it, and transmits to other scholars at second hand merely a
numerical hieroglyph, dead ciphers, which are repeated with par
rot-like scholastic pride, but of which the living significance is lost.
This applies likewise to the other methods of mathematical de
monstration. The intellect in its eternal mobility suffers no arrest;
and just as little can it be fixed down by lines, triangles, squares,
and circles, as by numbers. Thought can neither be calculated
nor measured.

As my chief duty is to facilitate in France the study of German
philosophy, I always dwell most strongly on the external difficulties
that are apt to dismay a stranger who has not already been made
aware of them. I would draw the special attention of those who
desire to make Frenchmen acquainted with Kant to the fact, that
it is possible to abstract from his philosophy that portion which
serves merely to refute the absurdities of the Wolfian philosophy.
This polemic, constantly reappearing, will only tend to produce
confusion in the minds of Frenchmen, and can be of no utility
to them.

272 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

The Critique of Pure Reason is, as I have said, Kant's
principal work, and his other writings are in a measure super
fluous, or may at least be considered as commentaries. The social
importance that attaches to his chief work will be apparent from
what follows.

The philosophers who preceded Kant reflected, doubtless, on
the origin of our cognitions, and followed, as we have seen, two
different routes, according to their view of ideas as a priori or as a
posteriori; but concerning the faculty of knowing, concerning the
extent and limits of this faculty, they occupied themselves less.
Now this was the task that Kant set before himself ; he submitted
the faculty of knowing to a merciless investigation, he sounded all
the depths of this faculty, he ascertained all its limits. In this in
vestigation he certainly discovered that about many things, where
with formerly we supposed ourselves to be most intimately ac
quainted, we can know nothing. This was very mortifying ; but it
has always been useful to know of what things we can know noth
ing. He who warns us against a useless journey performs as great
a service for us as he who points out to us the true path. Kant
proves to us that we know nothing about things as they are in and
by themselves, but that we have a knowledge of them only in so
far as they are reflected in our minds. We are therefore just like
the prisoners of whose condition Plato draws such an afflicting
picture in the seventh book of his Republic. These wretched be
ings, chained neck and thigh in such a manner that they cannot
turn their heads about, are seated within a roofless prison, into
which there comes from above a certain amount of light. This
light, however, is the light from a fire, the flame of which rises up
behind them, and indeed is separated from them only by a little
wall. Along the outer side of this wall are walking men bearing
all sorts of statues, images in wood and stone, and conversing with
one another. Now the poor prisoners can see nothing of these
men, who are not tall enough to overtop the wall ; and of the
statues, which rise above the wall, they see only the shadows flit
ting along the side of the wall opposite them. The shadows, how
ever, they take for real objects, and, deceived by the echo of their
prison, believe that it is the shadows that are conversing.

With the appearance of Kant former systems of philosophy,
which had merely sniffed about the external aspect of things, as
sembling and classifying their characteristics, ceased to exist. Kant
led investigation back to the human intellect, and inquired what

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 273

the latter had to reveal. Not without reason, therefore, did he
compare his philosophy to the method of Copernicus. Formerly
when men conceived the world as standing still, and the sun as
revolving round it, astronomical calculations failed to agree ac
curately. But wrhen Copernicus made the sun stand still and the
earth revolve round it, behold ! everything accorded admirably.
So formerly reason, like the sun, moved round the universe of
phenomena, and sought to throw light upon it. But Kant bade
reason, the sun, stand still, and the universe of phenomena now
turns round, and is illuminated the moment it comes within the
region of the intellectual orb.

These few words regarding the task that presented itself to
Kant will suffice to show that I consider that section of his book
where he treats of phenomena and noumena as the most impor
tant part, as the central point, of his philosophy. Kant, in effect,
distinguishes between the appearances of things and things them
selves. As we can know nothing of objects except in so far as
they manifest themselves to us through their appearance, and as
objects do not exhibit themselves to us as they are in and by
themselves, Kant gives the name phenomena to objects as they
appear to us, and noumena to objects as they are in themselves.
We know things, therefore, only as phenomena ; we cannot know
them as noumena. The latter are purely problematic; we can
neither say that they exist nor that they do not exist. The word
noumena has been correlated with the word phenomena merely
to enable us to speak of things in so far as they are cognisable
by us, without occupying our judgment about things that are not
cognisable by us. Kant did not therefore, as do many teachers
whom I will not name, make a distinction of objects into phe
nomena and noumena, into things that for us exist and into
things that for us do not exist. This would be an Irish bull in
philosophy. He wished merely to express a notion of limitation.

God, according to Kant, is a noumenon. As a result of his
argument, this ideal and transcendental being, hitherto called
God, is a mere fiction. It has arisen from a natural illusion. Kant
shows that we can know nothing regarding this noumenon, re
garding God, and that all reasonable proof of his existence is im
possible. The words of Dante, "Leave all hope behind !" may be
inscribed over this portion of the Critique of Pure Reason.

My readers will, I think, gladly exempt me from attempting a
popular elucidation of that portion of his work in which Kant

274 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

treats " of the arguments of speculative reason in favour of the ex
istence of a Supreme Being." Although the formal refutation of
these arguments occupies but a small space, and is not taken in
hand till the second part of the book is reached, there is already a
very evident intention of leading up to this refutation, which forms
one of the main points of the work. It connects itself with the
Critique of all Speculative Theology, wherein the last phan
toms of deism are put to flight. I cannot help remarking that
Kant, in attacking the three principal kinds of evidence in favour
of the existence of God, namely, the ontological, the cosmological,
and the physico-theological, whilst successful, according to my
opinion, in refuting the latter two, fails with regard to the first. I
am not aware whether the above terms are understood in this
country, and I therefore quote the passage from the Critique of
Pure Reason in which Kant formulates the distinction between
them.

" There are but three kinds of proof possible to speculative
reason of the existence of God. All the routes that may be selected
with this end in view start, either from definite experience and the
peculiar properties of the external world, as revealed by experi
ence, and ascend from it according to the laws of causality up to
the supreme cause above the world ; or, they rest merely on an
indefinite experience, as, for example, on an existence or being of
some kind or other ; or, lastly, they make an abstraction from all
experience, and arrive at a conclusion entirely a priori from pure
ideas of the existence of the supreme cause. The first of these is
the physico-theological proof, the second the cosmological, and the
third the ontological. Other proofs there are none, nor can other
proofs exist."

After repeated and careful study of Kant's chief work, I fan
cied myself able to recognise everywhere visible in it his polemic
? gainst these proofs of the existence of God ; and of this polemic I
might speak at greater length were I not restrained by a religious
sentiment. The mere discussion by any one of the existence of
God causes me to feel a strange disquietude, an uneasy dread such
as I once experienced in visiting New Bedlam in London, when,
for a moment losing sight of my guide, I was surrounded by mad
men. " God is all that is," and doubt of His existence is doubt of
life itself, it is death.

The more blameworthy any dispute regarding the existence ol
God may be, the more praiseworthy is meditation on the nature .of

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 275

God. Such meditation is a true, worship of God ; the soul is
thereby detached from the perishable and finite, and attains to
consciousness of innate love and of the harmony of the universe.
It is this consciousness that sends a thrill through the heart of the
emotional man in the act of prayer or in the contemplation of the
sacred symbols ; and the thinker realises this holy fervour in t*ie
exercise of that sublime faculty of the mind called reason, a facu'iy
whose highest function is to inquire into the nature of God. Mi;n
of specially religious temperament concern themselves with this
problem from childhood upwards ; they are mysteriously troubled
about it even at the first dawnings of reason. The author of these
pages is most joyfully conscious of having possessed this early
primitive religious feeling, and it has never forsaken him. God
was always the beginning and the end of all my thoughts. If I
now inquire : What is God ? what is his nature ? — as a little child
I had already inquired : How is God ? what is he like ? In that
childish time I could gaze upwards at the sky during whole days,
and was sadly vexed at evening because I never caught a glimpse
of God's most holy countenance, but saw only the grey silly gri
maces of the clouds. I was quite puzzled over the astronomical
lore with which in the "enlightenment period " even the youngest
children were tormented, and there was no end to my amazement
on learning that all those thousand millions of stars were spheres
as large and as beautiful as our own earth, and that over all this
glittering throng of worlds a single God ruled. I recollect once
seeing God in a dream far above in the most distant firmament.
He was looking contentedly out of a little window in the sky, a
devout hoary-headed being with a small Jewish beard, and he was
scattering forth myriads of seed-corns, which, as they fell from
heaven, burst open in the infinitude of space, and expanded to vast
dimensions till they became actual, radiant, blossoming, peopled
worlds, each one as large as our own globe. I could never forget
this countenance, and often in dreams I used to see the cheerful-
looking old man sprinkling forth the world-seeds from his little
window in the sky; once I even saw him clucking like our maid
when she threw down for the hens their barley. I could only see
how the falling seed-corns expanded into great shining orbs : but
the great hens that may by chance have been waiting about with
eager open bills to be fed with the falling orbs I could not see.

You smile, dear reader, at the notion of the big hens. Yet this
childish notion is not so very different from the view of the most

276 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

advanced deists. In the attempt to provide a conception of an ex
tra-mundane God, orient and Occident have exhausted themselves
in hyperbole. The imagination of deists has, however, vainly tor
mented itself with the infinitude of time and space. It is here that
their impotence, the inadequacy of their cosmology, and the unten-
ableness of their explanation of the nature of God becomes fully ap
parent. We are not greatly distressed, therefore, at beholding the
subversion of their explanation. Kant has actually wrought this
affliction upon them by refuting their demonstration of the exist
ence of God.

Nor would the vindication of the ontological proof specially
benefit deism, for this proof is equally available for pantheism.
To render my meaning more intelligible, I may remark that the
ontological proof is the one employed by Descartes, and that long
before his time, in the Middle Ages, Anselm of Canterbury had ex
pressed it in the form of an affecting prayer. Indeed, St. Augustine
may be said to have already made use of the ontological proof in
the second book of his work, De Libero Arbitrio.

I refrain, as I have said, from all popular discussion of Kant's
polemic against these proofs. Let it suffice to give an assurance
that since his time deism has vanished from the realm of specu
lative, reason. It may, perhaps, be several centuries yet before
this melancholy notice of decease gets universally bruited about;
we, however, have long since put on mourning. De Profundis!

You fancy, then, that we may now go home ! By my life, no!
there is yet a piece to be played ; after the tragedy comes the
farce. Up to this point Immanuel Kant has pursued the path of
inexorable philosophy ; he has stormed heaven and put the whole
garrison to the edge of the sword ; the ontological, cosmological,
and physico theological bodyguards lie there lifeless; Deity itself,
deprived of demonstration, has succumbed; there is now no All-
mercifulness, no fatherly kindness, no other-world reward for re
nunciation in this world, the immortality of the soul lies in its last
agony — you can hear its groans and death-rattle ; and old Lampe
is standing by with his umbrella under his arm, an afflicted spec
tator of the scene, tears and sweat-drops of terror dropping from
his countenance. Then Immanuel Kant relents and shows that he
is not merely a great philosopher but also a good man ; he reflects,
and half good-naturedly, half ironically, he says: "Old Lampe
must have a God, otherwise the poor fellow can never be happy.
Now, man ought to be happy in this world ; practical reason says

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 277

so ; — well, I am quite willing that practical reason should also
guarantee the existence of God." As the result of this argument
Kant distinguishes between the theoretical reason and the practi
cal reason, and by means of the latter, as with a magician's wand,
he revivifies deism, which theoretical reason had killed.

But is it not conceivable that Kant brought about this resur
rection, not merely for the sake of old Lampe, but through fear of
the police? Or did he act from sincere conviction? Was not his
object in destroying all evidence for the existence of God to show
us how embarrassing it might be to know nothing about God ? In
doing so, he acted almost as sagely as a Westphalian friend of
mine, who smashed all the lanterns in the Grohnder Street in Got-
tingen, and then proceeded to deliver to us in the dark a long
lecture on the practical necessity of lanterns, which he had the
oretically broken in order to show how, without them, we could
see nothing.

I have already said that on its appearance the Critique of
Pure Reason did not cause the slightest sensation, and it was not
till several years later, after certain clear-sighted philosophers had
written elucidations of it, that public attention was aroused regard
ing the book. In the year 1789, however, nothing else was talked
of in Germany but the philosophy of Kant, about which were
poured forth in abundance commentaries, chrestomathies, inter
pretations, estimates, apologies, and so forth. We need only glance
through the first philosophic catalogue at hand, and the innumer
able works having reference to Kant will amply testify to the in
tellectual movement that originated with this single man. In some
it exhibited itself as an ardent enthusiasm, in others as an acrid
loTthing, in many as a gaping curiosity regarding the result of this
intellectual revolution. We had popular riots in the world of
thought, just as you had in the material world, and over the dem
olition of ancient dogmatism we grew as excited as you did at the
Storming of the Bastille. There was also but a handful of old pen
sioners left for the defence of dogmatism, that is, the philosophy
of Wolf. It was a revolution, and one not wanting in horrors.
Amor.pst the party of the past, the really good Christians showed
least indignation at these horrors. Yea, they desired even greater,
in order that the measure of iniquity might be full, and the coun
ter-revolution be more speedily accomplished as a necessary re
action. We had pessimists in philosophy as you had in politics.
As in France there were people who maintained that Robespierre

278 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

was the agent of Pitt, with us there were many who went so far in
their wilful blindness as to persuade themselves that Kant was in
secret alliance with them, and that he had destroyed all philo
sophic proofs of the existence of God merely in order to convince
the world that man can never arrive at a knowledge of God by the
help of reason, and must therefore hold to revealed religion.

Kant brought about this great intellectual movement less by
the subject-matter of his writings than by the critical spirit that
pervaded them, a spirit that now began to force its way into all
sciences. It laid hold of all constituted authority. Even poetry
did not escape its influence. Schiller, for example, was a strong
Kantist, and his artistic views are impregnated with the spirit of
the philosophy of Kant. By reason of its dry, abstract character,
this philosophy was eminently hurtful to polite literature and the
fine arts Fortunately it did not interfere in the art of cookery.

The German people is not easily set in motion ; but let it be
once forced into any path and it will follow it to its termination
with the most dogged perseverance. Thus we exhibited our char-
icter in matters of religion, thus also we now acted in philosophy.
Shall we continue to advance as consistently in politics ?

Germany was drawn into the path of philosophy by Kant, and
philosophy became a national cause. A brilliant troop of great
thinkers suddenly sprang up on German soil, as if called into be
ing by magical art. If German philosophy should some day find,
as the French revolution has found, its Thiers and its Mignet, its
history will afford as remarkable reading as the works of these
authors. Germans will study it with pride, and Frenchmen with
admiration.

THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.
(AFTER ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.')

KANT'S greatest merit is the distinction of the phenomenon
from the thing in itself, based upon the proof that between
things and us there still always stands the intellect, so that they
cannot be known as they may be in themselves. He was led into
this path through Locke (see Prolegomena, § 13, Note 2). The
latter had shown that the secondary qualities of things, such as
sound, smell, color, hardness, softness, smoothness, and the like,
as founded on the affections of the senses, do not belong to the
objective body, to the thing in itself. To this he attributed only
the primary qualities, i. e., such as only presuppose space and im
penetrability ; thus extension, figure, solidity, number, mobility.
But this easily discovered Lockeian distinction was, as it were,
only a youthful introduction to the distinction of Kant. The lat
ter, starting from an incomparably higher standpoint, explains all
that Locke had accepted as primary qualities, i. e., qualities of
the thing in itself, as also belonging only to its phenomenal ap
pearance in our faculty of apprehension, and this just because the
conditions of this faculty, space, time and causality, are known by
us a priori. Thus Locke had abstracted from the thing in itself
the share which the organs of sense have in its phenomenal ap
pearance ; Kant, however, further abstracted the share of the
brain-functions (though not under that name). Thus the distinc
tion between the phenomenon and the thing in itself now received
an infinitely greater significance and a very much deeper meaning.
For this end he was obliged to take in hand the important separa
tion of our a priori from our a posteriori knowledge which be
fore him had never been carried out with adequate strictness and
completeness, nor with distinct consciousness. Accordingly this

IFrom the World as Will and Idea. Trans, by Haldane and Kemp.
3 vols. Third edition. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co. 1896.

280 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

- •»

f <

now became the principal subject of his profound investigations
Now here we would at once remark thit Kant's philosophy has a
threefold relation to that of his predecessors. First, as we have
just seen, to the philosophy of Locke, confirming and extending
it; secondly, to that of Hume, correcting and making use of it, a
relation which is most distinctly expressed in the Prolegomena
(that most beautiful and comprehensible of all Kant's important
writings, which is far too little read, for it facilitates immensely
the study of b;s philosophy), thirdly, a decidedly polemical and
destructive relation to the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy. All three
systems ought to be known before one proceeds to the study of the
Kantian philosophy. Now as Kant's separation of the phenome
non from the thing in itself, arrived at in the manner explained
above, far surpassed all that preceded it in the depth and thonght-
fulness of its conception, it was also exceedingly important in its
results. For in it he propounded, quite originally, in a perfectly
new way, found from a new side and on a new path, the same
truth which Plato never wearies of repeating, and in his language
generally expresses thus: This world which appears to the senses
has no true being, but only a ceaseless becoming; it is, and it is
not, and its comprehension is not so much knowledge as illusion.
This is also what he expresses mythically at the beginning of the
seventh book of the Republic, which is the most important passage
in all his writings. He says: "Men, firmly chained in a dark
cave, see neither the true original light nor real things, but only
the meagre light of the fire in the cave and the shadows of real
things which pass by the fire behind their backs; yet they think
the shadows are the reality, and the determining of the succession
of these shadows is true wisdom." The same truth, again quite
differently presented, is also a leading doctrine of the Vedas and
Puranas, the doctrine of Maya, by which really nothing else is
understood than what Kant calls the phenomenon in opposition to
the thing in itself; for the work of Miya is said to be just this
visible world in which we are, a summoned enchantment, an in
constant appearance without true being, like an optical illusion or
a dream, a veil which surrounds human consciousness, something
of which it is equally false and true to say that it is and that it is
not. But Kant not only expressed the same doctrine in a com
pletely new and original way, but raised it to the position of proved
and indisputable truth by means of the calmest and most tempe
rate exposition; while both Plato and the Indian philosophers had

KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. 281

founded their assertions merely upon a general perception of the
world, bad advanced them as the direct utterance of their con
sciousness, and presented them rather mythically and poetically
than philosophically and distinctly. In this respect they stand to
Kant in the same relation as the Pythagoreans Hicetas, Philolaus,
and Aristarchus, who already asserted the movement of the earth
round the fixed sun, stand to Copernicus. Such distinct knowl
edge and calm, thoughtful exposition of this dream-like nature of
the whole world is really the basis of the whole Kantian philoso
phy ; it is its soul and its greatest merit. He accomplished this
by taking to pieces the whole machinery of our intellect by means
of which the phantasmagoria of the objective world is brought
about, and presenting it in detail with marvellous insight and abil
ity. All earlier Western philosophy, appearing in comparison with
the Kantian unspeakably clumsy, had failed to recognise that
truth, and had therefore always spoken just as if in a dream.
Kant first awakened it suddenly out of this dream ; therefore the
last sleepers (Mendelssohn) called him the "all-destroyer." He
show, d that the laws which reign with inviolable necessity in ex
istence, i. e., in experience generally, are not to be applied to de
duce and explain existence itself; that thus the validity of these
laws is only relative, i. e., only arises after existence; the world
of experience in general is already established and present ; that
consequently these laws cannot be our guide when we come to the
explanation of the existence of the world and of ourselves. All
earlier Western philosophers had imagined that these laws, ac
cording to which the phenomena are combined, and all of which —
time and space, as well as causality and inference — I comprehend
under the expression "the principle of sufficient reason," — were
absolute laws conditioned by nothing, ccternce ventatcs \ that the
world itself existed only in consequence of and in conformity with
them ; and therefore that under their guidance the whole riddle of
the world must be capable of solution. The assumptions made
for this purpose, which Kant criticises under the name of the Idecs
of the reason, only served to raise the mere phenomenon, the work
of Maya, the shadow world of Plato, to the one highest reality, to
put it in the place of the inmost and true being of things, and
thereby to make the real knowledge of this impossible; that is, in
a word, to send the dreamers still more soundly to sleep. Kant
exhibited these laws, and therefore the whole world, as conditioned
by the form of knowledge belonging to the subject ; from which it

282 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

followed, that however far one carried investigation and reasoning
under the guidance of these laws, yet in the principal matter, i. e.,
in knowledge of the nature of the world in itself and outside the
idea, no step in advance was made, but one only moved like a
squirrel in its wheel. Thus, all the dogmatists may be compared
to persons who supposed that if they only went straight on long
enough they would come to the end of the world ; but Kant then
circumnavigated the world and showed that, because it is round,
one cannot get out of it by horizontal movement, but that yet by
perpendicular movement this is perhaps not impossible. We may
also say that Kant's doctrine affords the insight that we must seek
the end and beginning of the world, not without, but within us.

AN ESTIMATE OF KANT BY A SWEDEN-
BORGIAN.

(AFTER THEODORE F. WRIGHT.')

IN all his metaphysical work Kant was not pursuing a religious
course and was in fact becoming less and less of a Christian.
He was, however, no more contracted in his philosophical view of
the limits of reason than he was in all the ways of his life. " His
body was extremely emaciated, and at last it was dried like a pot
sherd," said one who knew him well. He was hollow-chested, and
one shoulder was too low. Not five feet high, his bones were
small and weak, and bis muscles still weaker (Stiickenburg, p. 93).
He had strong prejudice against the Jews (Jbid., p. 116). He took
no interest in other philosophers (Ibid., p. 124). Though be wrote
much in the field of theology, he knew almost nothing of theolo
gians (Ibid., p. 359). He did not answer letters (1 bid., p. 127).
He held to his views after rebutting facts were shown him, and
would contradict foreigners who spoke of their own countries in a
manner to interfere with his preconceived ideas (Ibid., p. 141).
He lived in the same small city with his two sisters, yet did not
speak to them for twenty-five years because of their inferior posi
tion (Ibid., p. 182). He spoke contemptuously of women and \vas
especially hostile to those of any mental power (Ibid , p 784). Ore
of his jokes was that there can be no women in heaven, for it is
written that there was silence there for the space of half an hour
(Ibid., p. 187), — and this from a man who always did the talking
wherever he was and who listened to another with marked impa
tience (Ibid., p. 141). He did not desire friendships, for " it is a
great burden to be tied to the fate of others and to be loaded with
their needs " (Ibid. , p. 193). He said that he did not know the
meaning of the word " spirit" (Ibid., p. 240). With Hume he held

IThis amusing compilation of data concerning Kant's life and personal
ity appeared in the New Church Review (Boston) of January, 1901.

284 KANT'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY.

that we have no knowledge of God (Ibid., p. 290). He saw no
use in revelation (Ibid., p. 335). H-3 identified religion with mere
morality (Ibid., p. 338). He never attended church and spoke of
prayer as ridiculous (Ibid , p. 354). His views against religion
led students to become mockers (Ibid., p. 358). His old age was
unhappy (Ibid., p. 425), and his rigidity of habits became repul
sive in the last degree (Ibid., p. 435). He died February 12, 1804,
after fifteen years of mental decline.

KANT'S LETTER TO HIS BROTHER.1

TRANSCRIPTION OF THE ORIGINAL.

Lieber Bruder !

Bei dem Besuche, den Ueberbringer dieses, Herr Reimer, ein
Verwandter von Deiner Frau, meiner werthen Schwagerin, bei
mir ab»elegt hat, ermangle ich nicht, was sich meiner iiberhauften
Beschaftigungen wegen nur in ausserordentlichen Fallen thun
lasst, mich bei Dir durch einen Brief in Erinnerung zu bringen.
Unerachtet dieser scheinbaren Gleichgtiltigkeit habe ich an Dich,
nicht allein so lange wir beiderseitig leben, oft genug, sondern
auch fur meinen Sterbefall, der in meinem Alter von 68 Jahren
doch nicht mehr sehr entfernt sein kann, briiderlich gedacht.
Unsere zwei iibrigen, beide verwittweten, Schwestern sind, die
alteste, welche fiinf erwachsene und zura Theil schon verhei-
rathete Kinder bat, ganzlich durch mich, die andere, welche im
St. Georgenhospital eingekauft ist, durch meinen Zuschuss ver-
sorgt. Den Kindern der ersteren habe ich, bei ihrer anfanglichen
hauslichen Einrichtung und auch nacbher, meinen Beistand nicht
versagt; so dass, was die Pflicht der Dankbarkeit, \vegen der uns
von unsern gemeinschaftlichen Eltern gewordenen Erziehnng for-
dert, nicht versSumt wird. Wenn Du mir einmal von dem Zu-
stande Deiner eigenen Familie Nachricht geben willst, so wird es
mir angenehm sein.

Uebrigens bin ich, in Begriissung meiner mir sehr wertben
Schwagerin, mit unveranderlicher Zuneigung

Dein treuer Bruder

KONIGSBERG, den 26. Januar 1792. I. KANT.

TRANSLATION.
DEAR BROTHER: —

Taking advantage of the visit which the bearer of this letter
Herr Reimer, a relative of your wife, my esteemed sister-in-law

iSee the facsimile of the German original on the opposite page.

286 KANT'S LETTER TO HIS BROTHER.

has paid me, I do not omit to recall myself to your memory,
although owing to my over-burdening labors this is something that
I allow myself only in extraordinary cases. Notwithstanding this
apparent indifference, I have, however, frequently thought of you
with brotherly regard, not only for this present life, but also in
case of my death, which at my age of 68 years cannot be far dis
tant. Of our two remaining widowed sisters, the eldest, who has
five adult children, some of whom are married, has been entirely
supported by me, and the younger, for whom admission to the St.
George's Hospital has been purchased, is also provided for. I
have also not refused assistance to the children of the former, on
their establishing their first homes, and even afterwards ; so that
there has been no neglect of the duty of gratitude that we owe to
our common parents for the education they gave us. If you will
inform me of the condition of your own family, I shall be gratified.

With regards to my much-esteemed sister-in-law, I remain,
with constant affection,

Your Faithful Brother,

I. KANT.

KONIGSBKRG, January 26, 1792.

CHRONOLOGY OF KANT'S LIFE AND PUB
LICATIONS.1

1724 Immanuel Kant born on
April 22.

1728 Lambert born.

1729 Lessing born.

1729 Mendelssohn born.

1730 Hamann born.

1732 Kant enters the Frideri-
ciannm, an academy in
KOnigsberg.

1735 Kant's brother Johann
Heinrich born.

1737 Kant's mother dies.
1740 Kant matriculates at the
University of Konigsberg

1740 Frederick II. ascends
the throne.

1740 Feder born.

1742 Garve born.

1744 Herder born.
1746 Kant's first publication :
Gtdanken von der vjah-
ren Schatzung der leben-
digen Krdfte (Thoughts
on the True Measure
ment of Living Forces).

1746 Kant's father dies.

1749 Goethe born.

1751 M. Knutzen dies.

1754 Christian Wolff dies.

1754 Investigation of the ques

tion, Whether the earth
in its rotation about its
axis has suffered any al
terations.

1754. Investigation of the ques
tion, Whether the earth
is growing old. (Both
questions treated in the
KSnigsberger Nachr.}.

1755 AUgcm. Naturgeschichte

und Theorie des Him-
mels (General Natural
History and Theory of
the Heavens).

1755 Kant takes his degree with

the treatise De Jgnc, and
qualifies as a university
lecturer with the treatise,
Princi-piorumprimorum
cognitionis mcta-physicce
nova dilucidatio.
1756-1763 Seven Years
War. The Russians in
KSnigsberg.

1756 Disputation on the treatise

Monadologia physica.
1756 Three small essays in the
Kdnigsberger Nachr.,

1 From Paulsen's Life of Kant, Fromann's Klassiker der Philasofhi€t Stutt
gart, 1898.

288

CHRONOLOGY.

on Earthquakes. (Evoked
by the Lisbon earthquake

0* I755-)

1756 New notes in elucidation

of the Theory of the
Winds.

1757 Outline and Announcement

of a course of Lectures
on Physical Geography,
with a brief supplemen
tary consideration of the
question whether the
west winds in our locality
are moist because of b.iv-
ing passed over a broad
stretch of sea

1758 New Scientific Conception

of Motion and Rest.

1759 Some Tentative Considera

tions of Optimism.
1759 Schiller born.
1762 Fichte born
1762 Publication of Rous
seau's Jzmile and Contrat
social.

1762 Die falsche Spitzfindig-
keit der vicr syllogisti-
schen /^iguren ertviescn
(The Erroneous Sophis
try of the Four Syllogistic
Figures Demonstrated).

1762 Der eir.zig mogliche Be-
weisgrund zu einer De
monstration vom Da-
sein Gottes (The Only
Possible Basis of a Dem
onstration of the Exist
ence of God).

1762 Untersuchung ilbcr die
Deutlichkcit der Grund-
sdtze der natiirluhen

Theologie und Moral
(Researches on the Dis
tinctness of the Princi
ples of Natural Theology
and Morals). (Prcis-
schnft der Berliner
Akademie, printed in
1764.)

1763 1'ersuch, den Be griff der

negativen Grosscn in
die II eltzveisheit einzu-
fiihren (Attempt to In
troduce the Notion of
Negative Quantities into
Philosophy).
1763 F. A. Schultz dies.

1764 1'ersuch iibcr die Krank-

hciten des Koffes (Essay
on the Diseases of the
Head ) {R'onigsb. Ztg.}.

1764 Beobachtungen tiber das

Gefiihl des Schonen und
F.rhabenen (Observa
tions on the Feeling of
the Beautiful and the
Sublime).

1765 Information on the Plan

of his Lectures.

1766 Trdume eines Geister-
sehers, erldutert durch
TrciurAe der Metaphysik
(Dreams of a Spirit-Seer,
etc.).

1766 Gottsched dies.
1768 Von dem erst en Grunde
des Unterschieds der
G eg end en im Ruum (On
the Fundamental Reason
for the Difference of Lo
calities in Space). (A'ffn.
Nachr. )

CHRONOLOGY.

289

1770 Kant obtains his full pro
fessorship in logic and
metaphysics.

1770 Disputatio de mundi sen-

sibilis atque inteliigi-

bilisforma et principiis.

1770 (Holbach) Systeme de

la nature.

1775 Von den verschiedenen
Racen des Menschen
(Ankiindigung der I'or-
lesungen iibcr physische
Geograph ie) . (On the
Different Races of Men.)

1776 Ufber das Dessauer Phi

lanthropic. (Kon. Ztg.)

1776 North American Dec
laration of Independence.

1776 Hume dies.

1778 Voltaire dies.

1778 Rousseau dies.

1780 Joseph II. ascends the
throne.

1781 Lessing dies.

1781 Kritik dcr reinen Ver-
nunft (Critique of Pure
Reason.

1783 Prolegomena zu einer
jedcn kiinftigen Afeta-
physik, die als IVj'ssen-
schaft zvird auflretcn
konnen (Prolegomena to
Every Future Metaphys
ics, etc.).

'784 Idee zu einer allgemeinen
Gesch. in iveltbiirger-
licher Absicht (Ideas for
a Universal History, etc.).

1784 Beantuuortung dcr Frage

Was ist Aufkldrung?
(Both the preceding ar

ticles in the Berliner
Monatsschrift.)

1785 Criticisms of Herder's
Ideen zur Fhilos. der
Geschichte. (Jenaische
Litter aturztg.)

1785 Ueber Vnlkane im Monde
(On Volcanoes in the
Moon).

1785 Von der Unrechtmassig-
keit dcs Bilchernath-
drucks (On the Illegality
of Literary Piracy).

1785 Bestimmung des Be griffs
einer AIenschenrace(D&-
termination of the Con
cept of a Race of Men).

1785 Grundlcgung zur AJcla-

physik der Sit ten (Foun
dation of the Metaphys
ics of Morals).

1786 Altitmasslictier Anfavg

der RIenschengcschichle
(Presumable Origin of
Human History). (Berl
Monatssckrift. )

1786 Was heisst sick im Pen-
ken orientieren ? (What
is the Meaning of Orien
tation inThinking?) (Ber
liner Afonatsschrift.)

1786 Aletap hys ische Anfangs-
grttnde der Naturu'is-
senschaften (Metaphys
ical Rudiments of the
Natural Sciences).
1786 Frederick the Great
dies, Frederick William
II. ascends the throne.
1788 Wollner's religious
edict.

290

CHRONOLOGY.

1788 Ueber den Gebrauch tcleo-
logischer Prinzipien in
der Philosophic (On the
Use of Teleological Prin
ciples in Philosophy).
(Deutsch. Aferk.).

1788 Kritik der praktischen
Vermmft (Critique of
Practical Reason).
1789 French Revolution.

1790 Kritih der Urteilskraft
(Critique of the Judg
ment).

1790 Ueber Philosophic iiber-
hat4.pt (erste Einl. zur
A'r. d. Urt.) (On Philos
ophy in General).

1790 Ueber tine Entdeckung,
nach der alle neue Kri
tik der reinen I7 er nun ft
durch cine dltere ent-
behrlich gemacht rver-
den soil (On a Discovery
by which, etc.). (Against
Eberhard).

1790 Ueber Schivarmerci und

die Mittcl dag eg en (On
Gushing and the Means
for its Prevention).

1791 Ueber das Afisslingen
aller philos. Versitchein
der Theodicee (On the
Failure of all Philosoph
ical Attempts in Theod
icy). (Berl. A/on.)

1792 Vom radikalen Bosen (On

the Radically Bad).
(Berl. Man )

1792 The continuation of
the foregoing articles is

prohibited by the Berlin
censorship.

1793 Religion innerhalb der
Crenzen der blossen Ver
nunft (Religion within
the Bounds of Mere Rea
son).

1793 Ueber den Gemcinspruch .

Das mag in der Theorie
nchtig sein, tangt aber
nichtfUr die Praxis (On
the Maxim : Good in
Theory, but Bad in Prac
tice). (Berl. Man.)

1794 Etivas tiber den Einfluss

des Monde s auf die
Witterung (On the In
fluence of the Moon on
the Weather). (Berliner
Mon.)

1794 Pas Endc aller Dinge
(The End of all Things).
(Berl. Afon.)

1794 Cabinet order of the King

and Kant's promise to
write nothing more on re
ligion.
1795 Peace of Basel.

1795 Zum eTjjigen Frieden (On

Universal Peace).

1796 Kant discontinues his lec

tures.

1796 Von einem neuer dings er-
hobenen, vornehmen Ton
in der Philosophic (On a
Recent Aristocratic Tone
in Philosophy). (Berl.
Afon.}

1796 Announcement of the ap
proaching completion of

CHRONOLOGY.

291

a tract on Universal
Peace in Philosophy.

1797 Metaphysische Anfangs-
grilnde der RechtsleJire
(Metaphysical Rudiments
of Jurisprudence).

1797 Metaphysische Anfangs-
grilnde der Tugendlehre
(Metaphysical Rudiments
of Morals).

1797 Ueber ein vcrmeintes
Recht aus Mcnschenliebe
zu liigen (On a Supposed
Right to Lie out of Love
for Man).

1797 Frederick William II.
dies and is succeeded by
Frederick William III.
WSllner dismissed.

1798 Ueber die Buchmacherei.

Briefe an Fr Ni-

colai (On Bookmaking
Two Letters to Fr. Nico-
lai).

1798 Der Streit der Fakultdten
(The Battle of the Facul
ties).

1798 Anthropologie in l>rag-
matischer llinsicht.

1800 Logic, edited by Jasche.

1802 Physical Geography, ed

ited by Rink.

1803 Pedagogy, edited by Rink.

1804 On the Prize Question of

the Berlin Academy :
What Real Progress has
Metaphysics made inGer-
many, since the Times
of Leibnitz and Wolff?
Edited by Rink.
1804 Kant dies on February 12.

INDEX TO KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

(Pages 1-163.)

Accidents, 99.

Actions as appearances subject to
necessity, 113.

Actuality, 66.

Addition and arithmetic, 36.

Air is elastic, 57-59-

Alchemy, 140.

Analogy, cognition by, 129.

Analytical and synthetical, 14-15, 17,
18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27.

Analytics and dialectics, 27.

Anschauung (visualisation), 17, 18, at,
30, 34, 120, 126, 140, 146 ; and mathe
matics, 32.

Antecedent, 53 ; and consequent, 72.

Anthropomorphism, 128, 130; avoided,
13'.

Antinomy, 105 et seq., 108.

Apodeictic, 18, 33; and necessary, 35;
and a priori, 144 ; certainty of meta
physics, 157.

Appearance, properties of a body be
long to, 44; and insufficiency, 126.

Appearances, space the form of, 40;
geometry prescribes to, 41 ; objects
are mere, 42; and sensuous per
ception, 45; and things in them,
selves, 75 ; actions as, subject to
necessity, 113.

Application o f a priori to experience,
34-

A priori, 70; knowledge and meta
physics, 14; and synthetical, 15,26,
29, 33 ; judgment (body is extended),
16; necessity, 16; and pure mathe
matics, 17, 32; the materials of
metaphysics, 23; and necessity, 28;
at the bottom of metaphysics, 31 ;
and its application to experience,

34; anticipating actuality, 35; at
the basis of the empirical, 36 ; apo-
deictically certain, 37; intuition
and three dimensions, 37; is it a
phantasm ? 47; things not cognised,
50; principles, 60; rules, 64 ; origin
of pure concepts, 73 ; basis of the
possibility of laws, 80; laws, basis
of the possibility of nature, 81;
geometrical laws, 83; and system;
85; understanding determined, 137;
concepts, sources of, 139; definite
and compact, 141 ; and apodeicti-
cal. 144; transcendent and tran
scendental, 150, 151; missing in
Berkeley, 153.

Aristotle, 86.

Arithmetic and addition, 36.

Association, law of, 4.

Astrology, 140.

Axioms, 60.

Baumgarten, 19.
Beattie, 5, 6.

Beginning, the world has a, 105.
Being, a, conceived for comprehend
ing the connexion, order, and unity

of the world, 117.
Beings of understanding, na.
Berkeley, 151, 152; his idealism, 49;

a priori missing in, 152; dogmatic

idealism of, 153.
Bodies, primary qualities of, 43~44;

mere representations, 43.
Body, thing in itself, as, 103.
Boundary, theology (natural) looks

beyond, 134 ; and limits, 133.
Bounds, not limits, 123; and limits

125; of pure reason, 120, 124.

294

INDEX TO KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

Categories, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 105 ; of
deeper meaning, 76; and under
standing, 92; and logical functions,
94-

Causality, 22; and succession, in.

Cause, 4, 53, 98 ; a pure concept of
the understanding, 58; is super-
added, 59;. and effect, 66; of con
nexions in the world, 131.

Challenge, 144.

Challenging the critic, 157.

Chimeras, 75.

Chisels and engraver's needle, 6-7.

Circle, law of the. 82.

Cognition, 45 ; of the understanding,
93; analogy, 129; insufficiency of
the, 136.

Common sense, 6, 27, 29, 145; no right
to judge in metaphysics, 7; appeal
to, 144; and metaphysics, 146.

Community, 66.

Composite; everything is, 106.

Concepts, of reason, 95 ; having their
origin in reason, 118.

Conflict of reason, 116.

Congruent, the two hands not, 39,

Connexions in the world, cause of,
131.

Consciousness, subject of, 103.

Consequent and antecedent, 72.

Construction and experience, 146.

Contradiction, law of, 16, 22, 27; and
synthetical judgments, 15.

Contrast of right and left, 39.

Cosmological idea. 104, 105.

Crazy-quilt of metaphysics, 154.

Criteria of truth, universal and nec
essary laws, 152.

Criterion of truth, 103.

Critical idealism, 49, 153.

Critical question, 24.

Criticism, standard given by, 163;
and metaphysics, 162.

Critique, contains plan of metaphys
ics, 139 ; justified, 158 ; whoever
has once tasted, etc.. 140.

Crusius's compromise, 81.

Degree, 66, 68.

Descartes, 48; his sceptical idealism.

Determinability and necessity, 1x4
Dialectics an-i analytics, 27.
Difieience of equal figures, 38-39.
Diffuseness of the plan, 8.
Dogmatics, downfall of, 141.
Dogmatic slumber, Kant's, 7.
Dogmatic twaddle, 140.
Dogmatism and scepticism, 24, 138.
Dreaming idealism, 49.

Effect and cause, 66.

Effect happens in time, in.

Ego, 100, 103.

Eleatic school, 151.

Empirical idealism, 48.

Empirical intuition, 33.

Empirical judgments, 16, 54, 55.

Engraver's needle, chisels and, 6-7.

Equal figures, difference of, 38-39.

Experience, 16, 57, 58, 63; geometry
holds all possible, 46; illusion in
transgressing. 48; and things in
themselves, 51; objects of pos
sible, 53 ; judgments of, 54, 55, 57.
62,63; possibility of, 60; intuitions
and judgments, 62; understanding
makes it possible, 84 ; analogy of,
101 ; and the real, 102; things in
themselves the basis of, 124, and
construction, 146; truth in, 151.

Facility of solution, 28.

Faculty of beginning from itself,
freedom a, 112-115.

Fiction, previous to our acquaint
ance, space would be mere, 41.

Foam, metaphysics like, 21.

Formal, 104.

Form, of intuition, a priori, 35 ; of
sensibility, pure intuition a, 36;
without perception remains, 127.

Four ideas of reason, 107.

Freedom, 114; and nature, 106. a
faculty of beginning from itself,
112-115; and reason, 113; rescued,
practical, 114; natural necessity
and, 115.

Functions of the understanding, 60.

Fundamental principles, 64.

Geometry, and space, 36; necessarily
valid of space, 40 : objects coincide

INDEX TO KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

295

with, 41 ; prescribes to appear
ances, 41 ; holds all possible expe
rience, 46.

Geometrical laws, 83.

Geometrical sources, 83.

Cetetzmussigkeit, 52.

God. (See Bf inf.)

Gothaische gelehrte Zritung, 156.

Gottingensche gelehrten Ameigen, 149.

Hand, right and left, 39,40.

Helices, symmetric, 40.

History of philosophy, i.

Horace, 3, 27.

Hume, David, 3, 4 6, 7, 10, 19, 21, 28,
71,121,127, 130, 132; his problem,
5, 8, 73; his spark of light, 7; his
doubts, 9, 70

Hyperphysical, 52.

Idealism, 44, 150, 151; Kant's, 43-44 ;
charges of, 48 ; empirical, 48 ; tran
scendental, 48, 49; critical, 49, 153 ;
dreaming, 49; of Berkeley, 49, 153 ;
visionary, 49; Cartesian or mate
rial, 103, 104; mystical, 152; of
Descartes, sceptical, 153.

Ideality of space and time, 47. -

Idea of unity system, 119.

Id» as, reason the source of, 92 ; theo
logical, 117; transcendental, their
origin In reason, 118, 137.

Illusion and truth, 152.

Illusion in transgressing experience,
48.

Illusory metaphysics, 139.

Imagination, 78.

Immaterial being, 125.

Ii cidental and necessary, 106.

Incomprehensibility, 118; of causal*
ity, 70.

Infinite, the world is, 106.

Infinite number of parts, no.

!muffic:ency and appearance, 126.

Intelligence, supreme, 137.

Intelligible world. 77.

Intern ,1 constitution of things never
revealed, 123.

Internal sense and soul, 104.

It tuit d, everything as it appears, 38.

lutuite, how to, a priori, 34.

Intuition, 33. 35, 37 ; at the founda
tion of mathematics, 35, 38; a pri
ori, and three dimensions, 37; space
the form of the external, 40; ob
jects given in, 42; of space and
time, appearance, 48 ; none beyond
sensibility, 77; universal form of,
84.

Intuitive, 33.

Judgment denned, 63 ; empirical, 54
55 ; of experience, 54. 55, 57, 62, 63;
of perception, 55, 57; synthetical
59 ; two sorts, 148.

Kant's dogmatic slumber, 7.

Labor of research, 28.

Law, conformity to, 52 et seq., 103;
of the circle, 82 ; reason prescribes
the, 118; reason's production, 118.

Laws, subjective, 53 ; of nature, their
sources, 54; universal, 54; of na
ture, particular and universal, 81;
of nature, not in space, 83 ; univer
sal and necessary, criteria of truth,
152-

Legislation of nature in ourselves,
80.

Legislative, the a. priori is,

Leibnitz, 3.

Limits, not bounds, 123; contain ne
gations, 125 ; and bounds, 125 ; and
boundary, 133.

Locke, 3, 19. 43.

Logical functions and categories, 94.

Logical table, 61.

Longwindedness of the work, 10.

Materialism, rash assertions destroy,

137-

Mathematical judgments, 16.

Mathematicians were philosophers,
41-

Mathematics, nature of 33; a priori,
32; and Anschauung, 32; and vis
ual form, 32; how possible, 32 et
seq.; intuitions at the foundation
°f 35. 38; applied to nature, 69;
must be referred to appearances,
73; and metai>h)sics, 91.

296

INDEX TO KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

Maxims, 114.

Mental space renders physical space
possible, 42.

Metaphysicians, oratory of, 29 ; sus
pended, 29.

Metaphysics, 135 ; whether possible,
1-3. 20, 24 ; impossible according to
Hume, 4; not every one is bound
to study, ii ; must satisfy the de
mands, 12; knowledge of, lying be
yond experience, 13 ; and a priori
knowledge, 14; sources of, 13 14;
like foam, 21 ; the materials of, a
priori, 23 ; and synthetical proposi
tions, 24 ; and synthetic a priori
propositions, 26-C7; difficulty of, 28;
and transcendental philosophy, 30;
a priori at the bottom of, 31 ; as a
science, 31, 147; young thinkers
partial to, 78; and mathematics, 91;
how possible? 91; grounds of, 138;
critique contains plan of, 139 ; illu
sory, 139; of decay, 141; will never
be given up, 142; and common
sense, 146; crazy-quilt of, 154; as
sertions of, world tired of, 155;
standard of, 156; apodeictic cer
tainty of, 157; and criticism, 162.

Nature, defined, 50, 52, 54; science of,
precedes physics, 51, 65; sources of
its laws, 54 ; system of, 64 ; its uni
versal laws cognised a priori, 64;
mathematics applied to, 69 ; how
possible, 79; the totality of rules,
79; legislation of, in ourselves, 80;
a priori laws basis of the possibil
ity of, 81; laws of, particular and
universal 81; its laws not in space,
83 ; and freedom, 106.

Necessary, 62; and apodeictic, 35;
universality and objective validity,
56; and incidental, 106,

Necessary Being, 116.

Necessity, 67 ; of habit, 4 ; (according
to Hume) a long habit, 28 ; and a
priori, 28 ; actions as appearances
subject to, 113; and determinabil-
ity, 114; natural, and freedom, 115;
unconditional, 136.

Noumena, (things in themselves). 72
76, 97; and creations of tlie under
standing, 75 ; as the void, 125.

Objective, 55 et seq.

Objective validity and necessary uni
versality, 56.

Objects, coincide with geometry, 41;
are mere appearances, 42; given in
intuition, 42; of possible experi
ence, 53; and things in themselves
in ; unknown, 56.

Obscurity, 12.

Ontology, 90.

Oratory of metaphysicians, 29.

Oswald, 5.

Ought and reason, 113.

Particularia, 60.

Perception, judgments of, 55, 57.

Permanence of substances, loi-ioa

Phantasm, is the a priori a? 47.

Phenomena, subjective basis of, 42;
in space, 102.

Philosophers, mathematicians were
41.

Philosophy, history of, i.

Physical space, mental space renders
it possible. 42.

Physics, preceded by Science of Na
ture, 51.

Physiological table, 61.

Plan of the work, analytical, u.

Platner, 118.

Plurativa judicia^ 60.

Popular, I might have made my ex
position, 10.

Popularity and Prolegomena, 8-9.

Possibility, 66.

Practical freedom rescued, 114.

Predicables, 87.

Predicates, 99; belonging to appear
ance, 43.

Priestley, 5.

Primary qualities of bodies, 43-44.

Prolegomena, for teachers, i ; and
popularity, 8-9; analytical, 25; prep
aratory, 25 ; as an outline, 159.

Properties of a body belong to ap
pearance, 44.

INDEX TO KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

297

Property, similarity of sensation to,
44.

Pseudo-science, 140.

Pure concepts, of the understanding,
60, 63, 64 ; table of the, 61 ; a priori
origin of, 73 ; of reason, 93.

Pure intuition, 33; a form of sensi
bility, 36.

Pure reason, 94, 97.

Quantity, 65, 68 ; and things in them
selves, 67 ; of the world, 109.
Questions, four, 31.

Real and experience, the, 102.

Reason, the source of ideas, 92 ; and
understanding, 92; pure concepts
of, 93, 94, 95. 97; divided with it
self, 107; four ideas of, 107; and
freedom, 113; and ought, 113; con
flict of, 116; concepts having their
origin in, 118; prescribes the law,
118; at variance with itself, 119;
bounds of pure, 120, 124, 128; finds
no satisfaction in itself, 124; teaches
nothing concerning the thing in it
self 134 ; freed by the theological
idea, 136.

Red and vermillion, 44.

Reid, 5.

Rules, 64 ; a priori, 64.

Scepticism, 21, 121; and dogmatism,
24.

Science of nature, 65.

Scholia, 138, 139 et seq.

Self, the thinking, ino.

Sensation, similarity of, to property,
44-

Senses, business of the, 62.

Sensibility, form of, and a priori, 35;
time and space conditions of our,
37; no intuition beyond, 77.

Sensible world no sham. 44.

Sensuous perception and appear
ances, 45.

Similarity of sensation to property,
44.

Simple and composite, 106.

Skepticism and dogmatism, 132.

Solution, facility of, 28.

Soul, 96, 100; as a substance, 101, 102
105 ; and internal sense. 104 ; the
nature of, 121, 136; vacuity in the,
160.

Sources of a priori concepts, 139.

Space, 122; and Time, 35; and geom
etry, 36 ; and time conditions of
our sensibility, 37; three dimen
sions, 37; and time, mere form>,
38; and time presupposed, 38 ; the
form of appearances, 40; thj form
of the external intuition, 40; would
be mere fiction previous to our ac
quaintance, 41 ; mental renders
physical possible, 42; aud time and
things in themselves, 47; and time,
ideality of, 47; aud time, intuitions
of, appearance, 48; not a store of
laws, 84 ; phenomena in, xoz ; and
time belong to appearances, 152.

Spark of light, Hume's 7.

Standard given by criticism, 163.

Subjective basis of phenomena, 42.

Subjective laws, 53.

Subsistence, 70.

Substance, 66, 98, TOO; of things, 99;
permanence of, 101-102; soul as a,
101, 102, 105.

Succession, 66, 72 ; and causality, in.

Sufficient reason, never been proved,
143-

Sun, shining on stone, 59, 63 ; the
cause of heat, 72.

Superadded, cause is, 59.

Supreme Being, 96, 125, 126, 127, 129,
130, 131.

Supreme Cause, 131, 132.

Supreme intelligence, 137.

Supreme Reason, 132.

Symmetric helices, 40.

Synthetical, and analytical, 14-15, 18,
22, 23, 25, 26, 27; t,nd a priori, 15
26, 29. 33; Judgments and the law
of Contradiction 15, 59; of 7 + 5
= 12, 17 ; propositions and meta
physics, 24.

System, of nature, 64; and a priori
85 ; idea of unity, 119.

Teachers, Prolegomena for, i.
Test, 157, 161.

298

INDEX TO KANT'S PROLEGOMENA.

Theological idea, 117; reason freed
by the, 136.

Theology (natural) looks beyond the
boundary, 134.

Thing in itself, as body, 103; reason
teaches nothing concerning, 134.

Things in themselves, 53, 70, 120, 121,
122; and space and time, 47; cog
nition of impossible, 50; under
standing must conform to, 50; and
experience, 51; and quantity, 67;
(noumena), 72, 76; serve to deci
pher appearances, 73 ; and appear
ances, 75; and objects, in; the
basis of experience, 124.

Things, unknown in themselves, 43;
substance of, 99 ; never revealed,
internal constitution of, 123.

Thinking de6ned, 62,

Thinking self, the, 100.

Time and Space, 35; conditions of
our sensibility, 37; mere forms, 38;
presupposed, 38 ; belong to appear
ances, 152.

Transcendent, 92, 104; transcenden
tal, a priori aud, 150, 151.

Transcendental, philosophy and met
aphysics, 30; problem, 32 et seq.;
idealism, 48, 49; philosophy, sys
tem of, 87; ideas, their origin in
reason, 118; a priori and tran
scendent, 150, 151.

Truth, and dreaming, 45 ; criterion
of, 103, 149 ; in experience, 151 ; and
illusion, 152.

Understanding, must conform to
things in themselves, 50; functions
of the, 60; pure concepts of the,
60. 63; table of the pure concepts
of the, 6r ; business of the, 62 ; crea
tions of. and noumena, 75; vaga
ries of the, 78 ; constitution of our
79; prescribes laws to nature, 82;
laws inhere in the, 83; makes ex
perience possible, 84; and cate
gories, 92; and reason, 92; cogni
tions of the, 93; beings of, 112;
world of, 125 ; systematic unity be
longs to, 138.

Unity a mode of cognition, 119.

Universality, necessary, 55.

Universal laws, 54 ; laws of nature,
cognised a priori, 64.

Universal validity, 69.

Universally valid, 62.

Vacuity in the soul, 160.
Vagaries of the understanding, 78.
Virgil, 12.

Visionary idealism, 49.
Visual form and mathematics, 32.
Visualisation (Ansrkauung) 18. 21.
Void, the, that of which we can know
nothing, 125.

'ung, 66.
Wisdom incarnate, 2.
Wolf, 19.

World, 128; questions of its duration
and quantity, 122.

INDEX TO THE ARTICLE ON KANT'S PHI-
LOSOPHY.

(Pages 167-240.)

Acvaghosha, 228.

After-imate, 224.

Agnosticism, 237.

Amitabha, 228.

Anschauung, 184, 187.

Antinomies, 221, 237; Kant's, 195 et

seq.; not true antinomies, 197.
A poster iori and a priori, 181, 182.
Appearance, two meanings of. 232;

time and space appertain to, 231,

232.
A priori, 198; not innate, 181; and a.

posteriori, 181, 182; purely formal,

207; has objective value, 214.
Apriority, general applicability, 226.
Aristotle, 169, 178.
Arfipa, 228.
Asceticism, 211.

Berkeley, 177; his idealism, 175; his
philosophy, 199; and Kant, 210.

Cartesian syllogism, the, 169.
Categories and modes of existence,

219.

Causation, 200 et spq.
Cat-se and reason, 201 et seq.
Christ 212.
Clifford, 216; on the thing in itself,

237-

Clusters, things are, 217.
Color-blind, 228.
Confucius, 212.
Constructions and mathematical

theorems. 215.
Construction, world of senses is a,

Cosmos, 221 et seq.
Critique of Pure Reason^ 175.

Datein and Sefn, 227.
Delphic maxim, 168.
Descartes, 169.
Dictates of our mind, 207.
Divisibility of line, infinite, 216,
Dogmatism, 172.

Edmunds, Albert J., 188, 189, iga.
Ego, metaphysical, 170.
Empirical, 180.
Extension, 225.

Feder, 175.

Flux of things. 218.

Formal, and the sensory, the, ao8
constructed, the purely, 215.

Formal cognition the key to mys
teries, 227.

Formal knowledge gives system,
purely, 226.

Formal sciences, the organ of cogni
tion, 212.

Formal theorems, general, 207.

Form both subjective and objective,
212 et seq.

Garve, 175.

Generalisations, origin of, 219.

God, 178, 221 et seq., 228; the world-
order, 239.

God problem, 237 et seq.

Golden Rule, 212.

GSttingtHtche GeUkrten Anztigen,
175-

3°o

INDEX TO "KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

Heine, Heinrich, 173.
Hom;iloidal, 233.

Hume, 171 ; his problem, 198, 199, 200
et seq.

Ideal and subjective, 206, 214.
Idealism and realism, 222-223.
Ideality, of space and time, 187; not

subjectivity, 204 et seq.
Image, 184 ; after-, 224.
Infinite divisibility of line, 216.
Innate ideas. 182, 200,
Innate not a priori, 181.
Intuition, 184.
Inventor a finder, the, 220.

Jacobi, 223.

Kant, his philosophical reform, 171;
his personal traits. 173 ; his indig
nation, 177 ; his terms, 178; on meta
physics, 178-179, 195; on reality, 187;
and Swedenborg, 188 et seq ; his
antinomies, 195 et seq.; his prob
lem, 198; puzzled by the a priori,
203 et seq.; and Berkeley, 210 ; his
conception of morality, 211 ; on
space and time, 231 ; his definition
of things in theinselves, 235.

Kantism, moral aspect of, 210 et seq.

Lao-Tze, 212, 228.
Laws, 218.

Leibnitz, 189, 190, 195.
Lichtenberg, 170.
Locke, 171, 200.
Logos, 228.

Mach. Ernst, 233.

Mathematical theorems and con
structions, 215.

Measure of motion (Time), 216.

Mental construction and straight
line, 234.

Metaphysics, 178; the old, 172; Kant
on 178-179, 195 ; sources of, 179.

Mind dictates, our, 207.

Mind, like the spider's thread. 206.

Modes of existence and categories,
219.

Morality, Kant's conception of, 211.
Mundus intelligibilis, 179, 228.

Naturalists of Greece, 167.

Nature, uniformities of, 205.

Neumann, 196.

Nirvana, 228.

Nomenclature is arbitrary, 222.

Norms of superreal, 227 et seq.

Noumena, 228 et seq.; represents

things, 229.
Noumenon, and phenomenon, 180-

181 ; space-conception a, 234.

Objectified, every sentient subject,
230; subject, the, 225, 226, 231.

Objective and subjective, 216, 217.

Objectivity of space and time, 230 et
seq.

Objects, what are they ? 224.

Organ of cognition, formal sciences
the, 212.

Paulsen, 173, 176, 177.

Phenomenon and noumenon, 180-181

Philosophy, Jove of wisdom, 168;

practical, 167.

Photographer's camera, 184.
Physiological space, 233.
Plato, 236.

Prolegomena, 177, 202 et seq.
Pure, 182.

Real, 224.

Realism and idealism, 222-223.

Real time and space, 229.

Reason, and cause, 201 et seq.; and

understanding, 180.
Red and vermillion, 209 et seq.
Religion, the sensory in, 211.

Scholasticism, 168-169.
Schopenhauer, 197, 223, 236 ; his Will,

237.

Sein and Daiein, 227.
Self-perception, 224.
Sensations, subjective, 228.
Senses, world of, a construction, 234.
Sensory, the formal and the, 208; in

religion, the, 211.
Sewall, Frank, 189.

INDEX TO "KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.

301

Socrates, 168.

Sophists, the, 168.

Soul, 221 et seq.; Swedenborg on the,
193-

Space and time, not objects, 187;
ideality of, 187; objectivity of, 225,
226, 230 et seq ; real, 229; forms of
any existence, 131; Kant on, 231;
appertain to appearances, 231, 232.

Space-conception, and space, 233; a
noumenon, 234.

Space, physiological, 233 ; and space-
conception, 233.

Spider's thread, mind like the, 206.

Spinoza, 179.

Straight line and mental construc
tion, 234.

Subject, 229; representation of the,
224; in itself empty, 225; the ob
jectified, 226; objectified, every
sentient, 230, 231.

Subjective, and ideal, 206,214; and
objective, 216, 217.

Subjectivity, not ideality, 204 et seq.;
science eliminates, 235.

Succession, 217, 225.

Suchness, 208 et seq.

Superreal. norms of, 227 et seq.

Swedenhorg, Emanuel, 170, 228; and
Kant, 188 et seq.; on the soul, 193.

Terms, Kant's, 178.

Theology, 178.

Thing in itself, Clifford on the, 237.

Things in themselves, 234 et seq.;

Kant's definition of, 235 ; a. vagary

236.
Things, represented by noumena

229 : are clusters, 217 ; flux of, 218;
and unities, 221.

Thisness, 208 et seq.
Tilly, Frank, 175.

Time and space, ideality of, 187; not
objects, 187; objectivity of 225,226,

230 et seq.; real, 229; appertain to
appearances, 231, 232; forms of any
existence, 231 ; Kant on, 231.

Time (measure of motion), 216.
Transcendental, 182; and transcend

ent, 183.
Transcendent and transcendental,

183.

Tufts, James H., 173.
Twaddle, dogmatical, 172.
Twice two, not one, 218.

Understanding and reason, 180.
Uniformities, 218; of nature, 205.
Unities and things, 221.

Vaihinger, i8g.

Vermillion and red, 209 et seq.

Watts, James, 220.
Weber, Prof. A., 175.
Windelband, 173.
Wolf, 170.

Zeno, 216.

KANT, I.

Prolegomena to any future 3
metajhysics.